WHEN we examine the principles of our Con­stitution, we have reason to admire it, as an excel­lent form of a free government: And when we consider its binding force and acknowledged autho­rity over all the branches of the administration, we have reason to confide in it, as a security of liberty. That either the constitution or its administration should be perfect, it is inconsistent with the nature of man, its agent and object, to expect. Can the work of man resemble that of angels, or would the laws of angels control the vice and folly of man? We are yet on earth, and not in heaven; the im­perfection of our nature must show itself in all our works, and in all our conduct; and to the imperfec­tion and perverseness of our nature must our laws be adapted. The variety of the human mind ren­ders impossible an uniformity of opinion: as well may we expect uniform serenity of sky, or con­stancy [Page 4]of health. The genius of our government, dictating a just regard to the sentiments of every individual, contributes, with the variety of our na­ture, to render vain the hope of general approba­tion. Where the iron yoke of despotism weighs down every neck to an equality of submission, opi­nion is useless, and complaint dangerous; and there is the acquiescence of constraint, and the silence of fear. But in a democratic government, where each man, while he feels his consequence, must feel his disappointment; you may as well bid the water cease to ruffle, when the wind blows, as think to prevent dissatisfaction, suppress murmurs, or still clamour. These arise out of our nature, and our government; and, like other evils, may be lessened by prudence and skill, but cannot be removed.

To have been in a situation of difficulty and dan­ger, and to be extricated without injury, loss, or cause of regret, is more than human nature, or hu­man fortune will permit us to hope. To have ad­justed the sufferings, services, and d [...]s of a revo­lution, and an eight years' war; to have prepared, on a new and untried plan, and to have created in­terests to support, a frame of government for thir­teen extended and independent states, of various prejudices and views; to have administered the go­vernment of those states, under all the errors of its structure, and the perils of their condition; to have reformed this government, and adapted it to their [Page 5]varying circumstances; and, hitherto, disappointing the malicious hopes of our enemies, and the affec­tionate fears of our friends, to have conducted it prosperously amidst the conflict of a world in arms; is a task, which only the ignorant and thoughtless will deem light. And to have executed this task, without many errors, and many complaints, would have required a wisdom, a virtue, and a fortune, far above the lot of man. When we view our past steps, our present state, and our future fair and reasonable prospects, every candid and intelligent man, who justly estimates the difficulty of our affairs, and the frailty of our nature, will see abun­dant reason to respect the wisdom and virtue of those, by whom our government has been admini­stered, and to admire the felicity of our fortune.

As we ought not to hope in man, for the virtue of angels, neither ought we to fear, in him, the ma­lice of devils. A weak and erring creature, he is sometimes misled by ignorance, and seduced by temptation; but when he wilfully does wrong, it is for some cause, other than the pleasure of doing it. The way to keep man right, therefore, is to point out clearly his duty, and remove from him all inducement to depart from it. The man who, in this situation, does wrong, must have a degree of malignity not common in human nature; and the man who can easily suppose it in another, must find something in himself inclining him to do it. In this [Page 6]situation our constitution, as nearly as practical skill and prudence can direct, has placed all those who are entrusted with its administration. The limits of authority are prescribed, and temptations to abuse of authority are, as much as possible, remo­ved. No man can make laws to bind others, and not himself. No man can judge in his own cause. The authority of every man may be examined, and every man's abuse of it punished. All duty is de­fined; all power is limited; all interests are the same. There is no power but, in some way, is derived from the whole community, and, in due progress, returns to it. There is no power, which abuse of it does not determine. There is no privi­lege, office, or trust, which is not accessible to the merit of any citizen; none, which his merit can transmit to his posterity. There are no offices, trusts, or pensions, but for the public benefit; none, which the public will cannot abolish. What more effectual guards, than our constitution has established against temptation to human frailty, could human prudence invent? That those who have administered the government have erred, may be true; and that they may err, is true; for they are men. But, as the constitution has, as much as possible, removed temptation, we cannot, without proof, or without admitting our own corruption, suffer ourselves to believe, that they have erred wilfully.

[Page 7] Besides that security of liberty, and a faithful administration, which the principles of our constitu­tion, and the nature of man afford us, we have an additional security, in the station of those who are intrusted with the administration of our government. If the elective branch exercise its powers with judgment and fidelity, it is hardly possible that the administration should be wrong; for it will fill all offices with men of understanding, integrity, and knowledge: and such appointments must produce a good administration. Considering therefore (as, where the elective branch acts properly, we ought to consider) that appointment to office is an evi­dence of understanding and knowledge, we have, in station a security for a faithful administration. There is in understanding and knowledge a power, which those who possess them not, cannot feel, al­most irresistibly impelling to acquire reputation, by a faithful discharge of duty. Understanding and knowledge furnish a just estimate of the importance of virtue, and inspire the mind with a desire of it: and however they may sometimes yield to strong temptation, it requires far stronger temptations to baffle the judgment, where they exist, than where they exist not. Let, therefore, the elective branch always fill offices with understanding and know­ledge, as most justly and readily valuing and em­bracing duty.

Together with the constitution, nature, and sta­tion, we have in that character, which station en­ables [Page 8]public officers to form, a further security of a good administration. Is it to be supposed, that understanding and knowledge, which so strongly impel to pursue virtue and duty, will not as strongly impel to retain them? Character, reputation, or a good name, is not easily acquired, and will not less reluctantly be abandoned. It is not in the nature of man readily to give up that which we have hardly acquired and highly value. Is it easy to conceive, that a Washington or an Adams, who have derived all their fame from their exertions in the cause of liberty, would abandon the source of their glory and their pride?

We find, therefore, in the nature of man, in our political constitution, and in the station and cha­racter of those who administer it, a competent secu­rity of our liberty, and a faithful administration. And I am persuaded, that an accurate review of all the past transactions of our government will sa­tisfy every intelligent and candid mind, that they are all consistent with a sincere desire for the pub­lic good, and generally well calculated to promote it; that the errors in it have been fewer than in other governments in similar circumstances, and that, to account for those errors, it is not necessary to suspect corruption or any design against liberty; for they may all be accounted for, by the fallibi­lity of human judgment, and the variety of human opinion.

[Page 9] But why then, if our government has been so administered, and we cannot hope for perfection, do we hear complaints? Complaint is as natural to man, as error. False judgment is one of the natu­ral errors of man. And we are not less disposed to censure others, than to approve ourselves. Let any man look back upon his past life, and, with his own, compare the opinion of others, on his con­duct; and then say, whether others form a right judgment of his motives and actions. If others be mistaken with respect to us, may not we be mista­ken with respect to others? And may we not all be mistaken, in the judgment we form of the admini­stration of the government?

The administration indeed may have been erro­neous; but, without supposing error in the admini­stration, we may account for complaint, from the nature of man, and of our government. Where the powers of government are limited to a few, they are supposed to qualify themselves for the ad­ministration of them; and others, who have no au­thority, may take no pains to examine or to judge, but submit in silence. But, in our government, every citizen has a share in the administration, and a right to examine its conduct. We are too apt to confound right with capacity, and power with skill; to think ourselves qualified to do, what we are per­mitted to do; and, because we may judge, to suppose that we can judge. Politics, legislation, or [Page 10]the art of government, is a science, and like other sciences, to understand it, requires knowledge, study, and reflection. Respectable as this country is, we can hardly suppose, that the state of educa­tion and knowledge in it is yet such, as to enable all who may judge to judge rightly, of the conduct of administration. And this difficulty is increased by the readiness, with which our interest directs us to admit strangers to a participation of our privi­leges. We sometimes see those, who but a few months from Europe, and but ill qualified by pre­vious knowledge or experience, have had little op­portunity of understanding our interests, suddenly, and perhaps before they have acquired the charac­ter of citizens, become the most forward to exa­mine, and the most severe to censure, the measures of our administration. The difficulty, therefore, of general knowledge, will induce a prudent man, when he hears complaints of administration, to he­sitate in deciding, whether the error be in the ad­ministration, or in the complaint; and to consider on which side there is the best chance for a right understanding of the subject.

In the mechanic arts, a stranger will frequently be at a loss to explain the use, and frequently be disposed to censure the folly, of the different opera­tions of the artisan. But this happens more rarely in the common arts, because the effect is so imme­diately connected with the operation, that we can [Page 11]more readily discern its use, and form a right judgment. In the sciences, physic, law, &c. where our ignorance is greater, and can be less easily cor­rected, our mistakes are more frequent and more gross. Under no government, perhaps, has justice been more purely and skilfully administered, than in courts of law, in our government. Yet do we not sometimes hear their decisions arraigned by the ignorant, as erroneous, and by the malevolent, as corrupt and prejudiced?

We all admit, that all nature is under the go­vernment of Almighty wisdom: but is there any government, against which there are so many com­plaints? Where is the man that could not prescribe better seasons, better health, and better fortune, than we now receive from the Great Governor of the universe. If we are not pleased with the go­vernment of God, can we wonder, if the govern­ment of man displease us? And in whom, shall we say, is the error?

Since we complain most, where we least under­stand, we have reason to lay it down as a rule, that, where, as in our government, there is little temp­tation to error, complaints are in proportion to ig­norance, and arise from it.

As our ignorance occasions complaints, our in­formation is often ill qualified either to justify or [Page 12]remove them. Our most distinguished clamourers frequently derive their information only from news­papers. I would not be understood to throw out indiscriminate censure; but newspapers are some­times published, not that they may be useful to the readers, but to the printers; not that they may in­struct, but that they may be bought; and the ob­ject of the publishers is not so much to inform the judgment by just knowledge, as to excite passion and curiosity, and support the party that will best support their custom.

Sometimes also we see men, who, disappointed by accident, or destitute of useful talents to lead them to that rank or character, which their vanity or ambition suggests, seek popularity by censure and complaint against all measures. Unable to comprehend, they seem to dread, every proposition which comes not from themselves, and fill the coun­try with their false clamours and foolish fears.

When we combine all those causes, we may, without admitting that the administration of our government has been erroneous, perhaps justly, wonder, not that the complaints have been so many, but that they have been so few.

Besides these internal grounds of dissatisfaction, there is another, from which some nations have suf­fered much; but from which, I hope, we have [Page 13]little to fear. The author of A History of the late Revolution in Sweden, says, "The framers of the Swedish constitution, by placing their liberties be­yond the reach of any attacks of their sovereigns, imagined they had effectually secured them; and forgot they had left a door open for another species of corruption, equally fatal to liberty, and, in its consequences, infinitely more ruinous to the coun­try, foreign corruption. ^*" To this cause tampering with the interests and feelings of the people; em­barrassing the counsels, and checking the energy of the government; and thus throwing the nation into confusion and distress, he attributes that revo­lution, which restored the king to despotism, and overthrew all those barriers of liberty, which the framers of the constitution had established as effec­tual.

We, distant from the courts of Europe, and in­experienced in their intrigues, can have but little knowledge or suspicion of the artifices, by which the greater play off the smaller states against each other. Under pretence of maintaining the peace of Europe, they are in a constant state of concealed hostility; and, to preserve the balance of power, each kingdom is perpetually on the watch for an opportunity of aggrandizing itself. Of those Euro­pean [Page 14]powers, France and Britain have long taken the lead; and with all the influence, which money and art can give, have mutually striven to make every smaller state a thorn in the side of each other, and light up the flame of war, whenever their seve­ral interests might suggest. For this purpose, they have maintained ministers at every court in Europe, to watch the conduct of that court, and the mini­sters of other nations there. But as those public agents must be known and suspected, and so less competent for the necessary corruption and artifice; they have often been but shadows, without real confidence or power, and have been directed to re­ceive instructions from others, who had no public authority. Or if they acted uncontrolled, together with them, there were often sent others, who, pos­sessing talents without a name, and exciting no sus­picion, could intrigue more successfully. To those public ministers and concealed agents of the courts of France and Britain, was intrusted a competent management of powers and money. They inter­fered in all the internal measures of the state in which they resided. They excited parties where they found none, and where they found parties they supported them. In these intrigues, principle was altogether disregarded; except the principle of embroiling the government on which they acted, and accomplishing the purpose they meant to effect. While, at one time, in Holland, the agents of France supported democratic or aristocratic fac­tions, [Page 15]because the agents of Britain supported des­potic; in Sweden, they changed sides; and each supported that in one country, which it opposed in another. And in the same country, at different times, they adopted a contrary conduct, as their interest or views suggested. In Holland, or in Swe­den, the minister of France was, at one time, on the side of democracy, and another time on the side of monarchy, as he could best wield the foreign state to the purposes of his court. And the mini­ster of Britain as certainly took the side opposite to that which the French minister headed. To secure his success, each minister distributed money, foment­ed prejudice, and stirred passion, through the whole state: and the parties of the distracted nation, de­luded by their arts, or seduced by their wealth, be­lieved, or pretended, that they were struggling for the interests of their country, when they were con­tributing to its ruin. By spies and bribes, those foreign ministers pried into all the counsels of the state which they were sent to watch or corrupt. They endeavoured to influence all its conduct. If a treaty were ever so necessary and inoffensive, they affected dissatisfaction, feigned injury, embarrassed its progress and execution, and excited clamour against it. If an election approached, they spread abroad reports, and exerted influence, bribes, and corruption, to secure the appointment that most fa­voured their views. The author whom I quoted, informs us, that when the states of Sweden assem­bled [Page 16]in 1765, the French ambassador was supposed to have laid out no less than 400,000 livres in the election of the marshal of the diet. But the En­glish and Russian ministers had taken their mea­sures so well, that the marshal was of their side. What then must they have laid out!

He also informs us, that in 1766, Sweden con­cluded a treaty of Friendship with England; the chief article of which was, that the subjects of each nation were to enjoy reciprocally, in their respective kingdoms, ports, and harbours, all advantages and immunities which the most favoured nation did then, or might afterwards enjoy. "Inoffensive," says he, "as this treaty was, France affected to be exceed­ingly dissatisfied with it, as well as surprised at its being concluded without having been previously communicated to her. She accordingly made use of it as a pretext for putting off the payment of a part of the subsidies which had been then some time due. She further threatened, that, in case Sweden entered into a defensive alliance with Eng­land, she would deprive the Swedish ships of all the advantages they possessed in the ports of France. There is something in the French ambassador's de­claration to the Swedish ministry on this occasion, which gives so true an idea of the dependence in which Sweden was held by France, that it deserves a place here. The true reason of the delay of the payment of the subsidies is, that his Most Christian [Page 17]Majesty, had made in consequence of treaties, which he religiously observed, certain political arrangements relative to his interior affairs: That one of these ar­rangements of his Majesty, with regard to the North was that Sweden should conclude no treaty, without his Majesty's consent. That, in contempt of this en­gagement, the motive of the subsidies of France to the Swedish court, Sweden had made a treaty with a fo­reign power, without waiting for the consent of his Most Christian Majesty. That Sweden not attending to this engagement had deranged the political views of his Majesty, as his non-payment of the subsidies would derange the economical views of Sweden."

Poland has long exhibited a melancholy example of the fatal effects of foreign influence on a divided people, and the deplorable spectacle of a nation bro­ken to pieces by its own passions, and the violence of other powers. The king of Prussia, in his me­moirs from 1763 to 1775, has detailed (and he knew them well) some of the intrigues of foreign states, and the miserable pretexts under which they cover their ambition, rapacity, and hatred towards the unhappy nations whom they embrace in their cruel and insidious policy.

Mirabean, the distinguished defender of French liberty, resided, sometime before the revolution, as secret agent of France in Prussia. Of the means, which such persons use, we may form some idea [Page 18]from his expressions. "I do not scruple," says he, "to affirm, that by the aid of 1000 guineas, the whole secrets of Berlin might be perfectly known— It is impossible, that any thing should escape the ambassador of France, if he be adroit, active, li­beral, and has the art to invite proper guests to his daily dinners and suppers: for these are the efficaci­ous means, and not public dinners. He is a kind of register office, to which all the discontented, the babblers, and the covetous resort ^*."

Though, as they always opposed each other, one of them might sometimes do good, yet it is not to be supposed, that the arts and money of those fo­reign ministers, to learn and influence the coun­sels of the nation in which they resided, even when they promoted the good of that nation, were ex­erted for that purpose, or for any other purpose, than to promote the views of their own courts. Mirabeau, while at Berlin, seems to have been the agent of Mr. Calonne, then in the French mini­stry; and is said to have written his letters to Talyrand Perigord, late bishop of Autun. Speak­ing of the disturbances in Holland, he says, "The undoubted politics of our cabinet, are to render the Stadtholder subservient to the public good, and the independence of the United Provinces; not to pro­cure his expulsion. A successful pacification of the [Page 19]troubles of Holland would render Mr. Calonne more service, than their continuation. Should it be proved to Mr. Calonne, that the Stadtholder is come over to the side of France, wherefore will he spoil his own game ^*."

If we examine the history of the minor states of Europe, we shall find, that the agents of those two nations, Britain and France, in opposition to each other have been constantly engaged, in endea­vours to turn the counsels and exertions of every other state, at whatever expense to itself, against the rival nation. Though war of the sword may have ceased, war of arts and intrigue never ceased between them. And though, to succeed, they might cover their intrigues under the specious pre­tence of the interest of the state which they strove to influence or aid, their real design was always the aggrandizement of their own, and the humbling of its rival nation.

With this disposition, it was not to be supposed, that, when the American revolution commenced, France would be indifferent to so fair an opportu­nity of humbling the pride and power of Britain. Accordingly, as soon as it was seen to be no hasty riot or transient insurrection, that would sink under the force of the British government; but was likely [Page 20]to issue in the complete independence of the United States, the French court took a decided, open, ac­tive, and useful, part in our favour. The resent­ment arising from the war, and the disputes arising out of the treaty of peace, left no inducement for France to increase our animosity against Britain. But no sooner did we endeavour to compose those disputes, by a treaty, both necessary for us, and harmless to France, than here, as in other coun­tries, France clamoured against that treaty; be­cause it restored us to a state of amity with Britain.

I have no desire to lessen that just resentment against the actual and intended injuries of Britain, or that just gratitude for the services of France, which every American has felt. Nor am I satisfied, that the opinion is altogether correct, that a nation ought to have no passions. Resentment and gra­titude are useful passions, planted in man for good purposes. Resentment of injury ought not to cease, while redress is attainable, and not obtained. Nor ought gratitude for benefits to cease, while retri­bution is practicable, useful, and not bestowed. If Britain be no longer, our enemy, but now disposed to do us justice, ought not our resentment to cease? If our services would be useless to France; if fight­ing no longer for her safety, but for her pride, she ought not to claim them; and if, while they could only feed her pride, they would hazard our safety; ought gratitude to be exerted? It is no longer a [Page 21]question, whether the nations of Europe will ac­knowledge France as a republic. The combined armies no longer take her towns, or occupy her ter­ritory. Instead of defending her own, she now overruns other countries; and continues the war to enlarge her boundaries. Britain her most danger­ous enemy has already sent to her capital, to sue for peace. And France may, whenever she pleases have the consent of all her enemies, to sheathe her sword, disband her armies, and, under her repub­lican constitution, retain all that vast empire, which her king governed. In this situation of France, and when we have omitted no service, which with­out injustice or ruin to ourselves, we could bestow; shall our gratitude be summoned to services useless to her, and dangerous to us? And shall it be called ingratitude, without war, to have composed our disputes with Britain, by a treaty, which has se­cured to us points essential to our safety, and con­tains no stipulation injurious to France? Though gratitude be a duty, both of states and individuals; the first duty, both of states and individuals, is self preservation. States, like individuals, may often cover their conduct with pretences of generosity and disinterestedness; but it will be found generally, that self is at the bottom. Nor do we but in romance, see Don Quixotes, who gratuitously labour through the world, to redress grievances. Among nations as among individuals, where there is no common in­terest, there will be but little common service. And, [Page 22]in both, a prudent man will always suspect strained professions of generosity, for symptoms of deceit.

To a prudent jealousy of other governments we ought to unite a prudent confidence in our own. Here the tie of common interest subsists. With a constitution restraining all the branches of the admi­nistration, and with frequent elections, what have we to fear from our government? Where there is no room for fear, there is no cause for jealousy; and confidence becomes a duty, which we owe to our own happiness and interest. A decisive, firm, and energetic execution of the laws, is the health of a free government; and, to secure that, the hands of government must be strengthened, by a just con­fidence. Where there is an influential representation of the people, violations of the constitution are, at least, not less to be feared from the legislature, than from the executive. The most popular branch is always the greatest favourite; and favourites are always the most apt to abuse power. The senate of Sweden determined, that they might supply the want of the king's signature by affixing a stamp of his name; in other words, that though he governed in form, they should govern in reality. The house of Commons in England raised troops, in the king's name, to sight against him; and, as soon as they found that they could govern without him, they laid him aside, and, after him, dismissed also the house of Lords, and took all government into their own hands.

[Page 23] But have not other nations lost their freedom, by usurpation of the executive?

Precedent or example becomes argument, only when cases are similar: and a variety of circum­stances contributed to despotism in Europe, which do not exist here. There, the king was considered as owner of the whole territory; and all estates were derived from him. He had a separate estate annexed to his person, extensive domains, and large revenue. All estates, that had no heirs, escheated to him. All, that were forfeited for crimes, vested in him. All penalties and forfeitures for offences were his. For the use of all these, he was not ac­countable. He commanded the whole force of the kingdom. He could raise and maintain armies of his own will, and direct them at his pleasure. The administration of this revenue, and command of this force, combined with the turbulence and rivalship of feudal aristocracy, enabled the king to increase his authority at his discretion. This accumulation of estate, treasure, force, and authority enabled the father to transmit his possessions and authorities to his son, and made the crown hereditary; and this both tempted and enabled to render it despotic. While all were accountable to the king; his mini­sters only were responsible, and he was subject to no jurisdiction. The situation of our executive is so entire­ly different from all this; that the jealousy necessary in other government, is not necessary in ours; nor does it seem to me proper to believe, that party [Page 24]spirit contributes to the preservation of our li­berties.

Let each of us look into his own heart, and cha­ritably believe, that the virtues which he sees in himself exist also in others. Let us not suppose, that patriotism is confined to ourselves, to our friends, or to our party; or that other opinions and measures than ours, may not also be intended and adapted for the public good. Let us judge of men in public stations, as men; with the errors in­deed, but also with virtues of men, and examine their conduct with that indulgence to their weakness, and that respect for their integrity, which we owe to men, and as men expect to receive. Let us instruct, and, if possible, reform, but not hate each other. Having all a common interest in the prosperity of the state, let us, as members of one family, work to­gether, in unity and affection, for the public good, and discharge our political duties, with fidelity and judgment. In electing to office, let us be careful to choose men of knowledge, understanding, and inte­grity; and then reposing, with confidence, in the ex­cellence of our constitution, and the skill and honesty of the administration; let us not disturb our peace, with groundless jealousy, or weaken the energy of the laws, by rash censures, and erring complaints. And, with this spirit of faithfulness and reciprocal confidence, let us proceed to the peculiar duties of our several stations, at this time.