No. I.

IT is a truth my fellow citizens, not so obvious as important, that a government may some­times possess the form of freedom, without the substance. The people often suppose themselves free, because they have aimed at the establishment of liberty. They forget, that its principles, unless skilfully applied, can never produce their proper effect.

Examples of these truths most frequently occur in representative governments, which being of a ve­ry complicated structure, require the most exact pro­portion of parts, and are thrown into disorder by the smallest derangement. We are struck by the beauty of the machine; we admire the variety and apparent aptness of its parts; but we overlook, or disregard some seemingly minute defects, which frequently, but sometimes too late, command our attention, by their destructive consequences.

Representation is a substitute for popular go­vernment. [Page 4] It is now universally admitted, that the supreme power resides in the whole people. In the exercise of this power, all are equal. For when men enter into society, they enter with equal rights; and the portion of independence which each gives up, is relinquished to the whole community, not to any of its seperate members. No indivi­dual can be bound, except by the will of all. This will must be declared by a majority; in form­ing which; every individual has a right to give his vote; otherwise he would be a subject of the go­vernment, not one of its members. When his vote is given, it has as much weight as that of any other member of the society. Hence, in the ancient republics, when the spirit of liberty was strong, but the science of government not far advanced be­yond its first principles, all the citizens had a right to assemble, and deliberate in common, on public measures. This was called popular government.

But in large societies, it is impossible to convene all the members: even in small ones, it cannot be done without great inconvenience: and such as­semblies have ever been found an unfailing source of public calamities. A method was therefore contrived, of assembling the people by representa­tion. The territory which belong to a state, was divided into districts, or the inhabitants into classes; and a number of representatives were chosen, pro­portionate to one or the other, and sometimes, to both of these divisions. The supreme power, or certain portions of it, was delegated to those representatives, who, in the name of their con­stituents, carried on the government. Thus re­presentative governments were founded.

Hence it is evident that a representative govern­ment cannot be free, unless it be so constituted, [Page 5] that each member of the community may possess, by his representative, the same portion of power, in public affairs, that he would have been entitled to himself, had the government been administered by all the people in person. In the latter case, all would be equal; because each member would have a right to vote; and one man's vote would count as much as another's. All, therefore, should be equal by representation. Liberty is destroyed, if each individual has not as much power, by the laws, over any other, as that other has over him. If the state be divided into districts, equal in po­pulation, and some send more representatives than others, the government is not free; for the indi­viduals of those districts, which send the fewest representatives, have less power than their fellow citizens, and are in a greater or less degree govern­ed by them. Still farther will liberty be banished, if some districts have fewer inhabitants than others, and yet choose a greater number of representatives. But if a case should occur, in which a few small districts, thinly populated, send more representa­tives than all the others of which the state is com­posed, though much more extensive, and fuller of inhabitants, then the government, whatever may be its appearance and external form, is a perfect aristocracy. The very definition of aristocracy, is a community, where a small part of the people have the power of making laws to bind the rest. This small part may exercise its power in person or by representatives; but the government is still the same. A state in which one fifth of the peo­ple can make laws to bind the other four fifths, cannot be free. It may be a mild aristocracy; from particular circumstances it may long conti­nue so: but it is an aristocracy still; and sooner or [Page 6] later, will produce all the bitter fruits of that hateful and pernicious weed.

Since then my fellow citizens, a representative government requires such nicety in its constructi­on, and may be so easily perverted; since liberty may be destroyed by such small deviations from principle; surely it is an object deserving the at­tention of enlightened patriotism, to enquire, whether some abuse has not crept into our sys­tem.—Such an enquiry I propose to undertake; it will be carried on through a series of letters, in which the following points will be discussed: 1. Whether on the principle of numbers, the citi­zens of South-Carolina are equally represented in the state government? 2. Whether property ought to influence representation? 3. Whether our representation is equal on the principle of pro­perty rightly understood? 4. If an inequality should be found to exist, how it was introduced? 5. What is the peculiar nature of this inequality? And lastly, what are its effects on liberty?

Let not this enquiry be considered as useless. I know, that under our present form of govern­ment whatever may be its effects, we enjoy a great portion of liberty and equality. But present health is perfectly consistent with the seeds of dis­ease. Preventive medicines are best. And the surest method of perpetuating the blessings of a system, is to find out and remove its imperfecti­on.

No. II.

THE first object proposed for enquiry, is, whether the citizens of this state enjoy, in [Page 7] the state government, an equal representation, on the principle of numbers? Here our surest guide will be the census, and the list of representatives, as settled by the constitution. By comparing them, the question may be decided with ease and cer­tainty.

The state may be considered under a threefold division: first, into upper and lower country; secondly into districts; and thirdly into counties and parishes. The lower country extends along the coast, from Georgia to North-Carolina, and about fifty or sixty miles back from the sea. It includes the districts of Georgetown, Beaufort and Charleston, and is divided into parishes. The upper country takes in the rest of the state, to the borders of North-Carolina, and the Indian boun­dary. It contains the districts of Orangeburgh, Camden, Cheraw, Ninety-six, Pinckney, and Washington, which are subdivided into counties.

Charleston district consists of the following pa­rishes: Saint Michael's and Saint Phillip's, inclu­ding Charleston, and containing 8,089 white inha­bitants; Saint Bartholomew 2,133; Saint John's, Berkley 692; Saint George's, Dorchester 1,252; Saint Stephen's 226, Saint James' Santee 437; Saint Thomas' 397; Christ Church 566; Saint James's, Goose creek 439; Saint John's, Colle­ton 585; Saint Andrew's 370; and Saint Paul's 276. This gives Charleston district 15,452 white inhabitants. That district sends 48 representatives, 15 from Saint Michael's and Saint Phillip's, and three from each of its other parishes: it has also 13 senators.

Beaufort district includes 4 parishes; Saint Hele­na, Saint Lukes, Prince William, and Saint Peter's. Its number of white inhabitants is 4,364; and it [Page 8] sends 12 representatives; 3 from each parish: it has four senators.

Georgetown district consists of 3 parishes; Prince Georges, All-Saints, and Prince Frederics; containing together, 8,878 white inhabitants; It sends ten representatives and three senators.

The white inhabitants of the lower country, therefore, amount to 28,694; its number of re­presentatives is seventy; and it has twenty sena­tors.

The district of Ninety-six has four counties; Edgefield, containing 9,785 white inhabitants, Abbeville 7,495, Laurens 8,210, and Newberry 8,186; Ninety-six district then has 33,674 white inhabitants; and its number of representatives is twelve, three for each county; it has four sena­tors. The same number of both, with Beaufort district, which contains only 4,364 white inhabit­ants; less than one seventh of the number in Ninety-six. Hence it is plain that one free man in Beaufort district, has as much power in our go­vernment, as seven free men in Ninety-six.

Charleston district contains 15,452 white inha­bitants; Ninety-six, 33,674; more than double; yet Ninety-six district sends twelve members to the house of representatives, and Charleston forty-eight, exactly four times as many. A free man, in Charleston district, therefore, has eight times as much influence in the house of representatives, as a free man in Ninety-six. In the senate, the dis­proportion is not quite so great. Ninety-six has four members, and Charleston district thirteen; something more than three times the number; so that, in the senate, a free man of Charleston has only six times as much power as one of Ninety-six.

Washington district is composed of two counties, [Page 9] Pendleton and Greenville; the former con­tains 8,731 white inhabitants; the latter 5,888; in all 14 619; within less than a thousand of the numbers in Charleston district, which are 15,452; yet Washington sends five members to the house of representatives, and two senators. Charleston sends forty eight to the former, and thirteen to the latter; more than eight times the number sent by Washington.

Pinckney district contains four counties: Union, which has 6,430 white inhabitants; Spartanburgh 7,907; York 5,652; and Chester 5881; amount­ing, in the whole, to 25,870. Each of those counties sends two members to the house of repre­sentatives, except York, which has three; this makes 9 in all. 25,870 inhabitants in Pinckney, send 9 members to the house of representatives. Four thousand three hundred and sixty four in Beaufort, send twelve; and in Charleston fifteen thousand four hundred and fifty-two, send forty-eight; so that a free man in Charleston or Beaufort districts, has at the least seven times as much pow­er in the government, as a free man in Pinckney. This district sends three senators, Charleston thir­teen, and Beaufort four.

In Camden district there were five counties, at the time of the census: Fairfield, Richland, Cla­rendon, Claremont, and Lancaster. A new one, Kershaw, has lately been erected. Fairfield has five thousand one hundred and thirty-eight white inhabitants; Richland two thousand four hundred and seventy-nine; Clarendon one thousand seven hundred and ninety; Claremont two thousand four hundred and thirty-eight; and Lancaster four thousand eight hundred and sixty-four. This is the enumeration by the census; but it is thought to [Page 10] be much too low. It gives Camden, however, six­teen thousand seven hundred and nine white inha­bitants; above one thousand more than Charleston district contains; yet Camden district sends but twelve members to the house of representatives; two for each of the above-mentioned five counties, and two for Kershaw; whereas, Charleston sends forty-eight; just four times the number. The dis­proportion in senators is still greater; Camden sends but three, and Charleston thirteen.

Orangeburgh district, contains 12,412 white in­habitants; and it sends ten members to the house of representatives, and three senators. Beaufort has 4,364 inhabitants, something more than one third of the numbers of Orangeburgh, and it elects twelve representatives and four senators. Charles­ton has 15,452 white inhabitants; about 3000 more than Orangeburgh, and yet it elects very near­ly five times as many representatives, and more than four times the number of senators.

In the district of Cheraw there are 7,618 white inhabitants; it sends six members to the house of representatives, and two senators.

Throwing the districts of Ninety-six, Wash­ington, Pinckney, Camden, Orangeburgh, and Cheraw, into the upper country division, it is found to contain 120,902 white inhabitants; it sends 54 members to the house of representatives, and 17 senators. The lower country, including the three districts of Charleston, Beaufort and Georgetown, contains 28,694 white inhabitants, and it elects 70 representatives and twenty sena­tors. Divide 149,596, the whole number in the state by 28,694, those of the lower country, and the result will be more that five, from whence it appears, that a large majority of both branches of [Page 11] the legislature, is elected by less than one fifth of the people. This one fifth therefore governs the other four fifths, and the state is an aristocracy. 28,000 citizens by their representatives, can make laws to bind 120,000, without their consent.

If you take away Georgetown district from the lower country, still the two remaining ones, Charleston and Beaufort will have sixty representa­tives and 17 senators, a greater number of repre­sentatives and as many senators as the whole upper country together, which has only fifty-four of the first and seventeen of the latter: and if you add Georgetown district to the upper country division, the latter will even then have but a very small ma­jority; sixty-four representatives to sixty, and twenty senators to seventeen.

Thus the two districts of Charleston and Beau­fort, which contain but 19,866 white inhabitants, not more than one sixth of our whole numbers, can nevertheless, with the addition of three repre­sentatives and two senators from the other districts, govern the whole state—can make laws, raise tax­es, appoint officers of government, and exercise all other functions of supreme power over the other five sixths, how much soever they may be oppress­ed by the measures adopted, or how firmly soever opposed to them. Such a government may be a­mused with the form of freedom, but it would be difficult to prove that it possesses the substance.

The whole state contains 149,596 white inha­bitants. Of this number 15,452 not quite one ninth, reside in Charleston district, the house of representatives consists of 124 members, and the se­nate of thirty-seven; of these Charleston district elects forty-eight representatives and thirteen se­nators. Consequently Charleston district, with [Page 12] less than one ninth of the inhabitants in the state, elects more than a third of the legislature. It sends very nearly as many members to both houses, as all the upper country together, though it has not one sixth of the numbers. Charleston district has 15,452 white inhabitants, forty-eight representa­tives, and thirteen senators. The six upper coun­try districts have 120,902 white inhabitants, fifty-four representatives, and seventeen senators. So that in all legislative questions 15,452 citizens, who happen to reside in Charleston district, have, with­in a very little, as much power in the government as 120,902 who inhabit other parts of the state.

Here the greater number is evidently subjected to the power of the smaller, and a much smaller too; which is the most exact definition that can be given of an aristocracy.

If we compare particular parishes in the lower with particular counties in the upper country, the inequality of representation will strike us still more forcibly. Thus, for instance, Saint Paul's parish, in Charleston district, contains two hundred and seventy-six white inhabitants, and this parish sends three representatives and one senator. Edgefield county, in Ninety-six district, has 9,785 white in­habitants. It also sends three representatives and one senator. The county has above thirty-nine times as many white inhabitants as the parish. Yet they send an equal number of members to the le­gislature. Consequently, one freeman in Saint Paul's parish, has more influence in the government than thirty-nine freemen in Edgefield county.

Pendleton county, in Washington district, con­tains 8,731 white inhabitants. The parish of St. Stephen's, in Charleston district, 226; Saint Ste­phen's parish sends three representatives and one [Page 13] senator. Pendleton county the same number of each. It follows that one freeman in this parish, has as much power in the goverment, as thirty-eight freemen in Pendleton county.

These are the most populous counties in the up­per country. And Saint Stephen's and Saint Paul's are the least populous parishes below; they were chosen to make the contrast more striking. But in many other instances, the disproportion be­tween numbers and representation, is nearly as great; in all it is very considerable.

From all this, it appears, that the citizens of South-Carolina, are very far from being equally represented in the state government on the princi­ple of numbers. On the contrary, it is evident, that a considerable majority of the legislature is elected by less than one fifth of the people; which one fifth consequently governs the other four fifths. In the next number I shall proceed to enquire, whether any other principle, than that of num­bers, ought to be admitted in the apportionment of representation.

No. III.

THE order of my subject leads me next to enquire, whether representation ought to be affected by wealth?

It is admitted by all, that the lower country contains far more wealth, in proportion to the number of its inhabitants, than the upper coun­try. Should it appear that property ought to be regarded in apportioning the representation, a great part of the inequality, which exists in our government, might be justified on that principle. [Page 14] But I apprehend that a very little consideration of the subject will be sufficient to convince us, that no principle can be more void of foundation, or lead to more destructive consequences.

Society is prior to property. In a state of na­ture each individual possesses what he can enjoy at the time, and no more. When he goes out of his cave another comes into it with as good a right as his predecessor, and in his turn is succeeded by a third occupant, who holds by the same title as the former. If he should find a fruit tree, he claims a right to as much fruit as he can pluck and carry away. The rest remains so the next comer. In a state like this no property can be accumulated. The single efforts of one individual can do nothing more than supply his own immediate wants: and when a number of such individuals assemble for mutual defence, or from any other motives, no one brings into the community more than his per­sonal strength and labour. All are equal in pos­sessions and rights; and for a considerable time whatever they acquire continues to be in com­mon. At length, however, as society advances, and the understandings of men are improved by longer experience, it is discovered, that in order to encourage industry and enterprize, each indivi­dual must be secured, in the separate enjoyment of what he can procure, by his labour or inge­nuity. Hence rules are made for the security of property. Wealth encreases by the united efforts of a society, whose members mutually aid each other, while each is pursuing his own advantage; and some being more industrious, more skilful, or more fortunate than others, accumulate to themselves a greater portion, of what the labour of all is employed in producing.

[Page 15]Property then being a more creature of govern­ment and laws, can have no influence in their original formation. To deny this would be to contend that an effect might be instrumental in producing its cause, or that a plant had produced the very seed from which it sprung.

Accordingly, we find, that in all these early go­vernments, which were formed on the principles of freedom, all the members, however different in property, talents or influence, were equal in political rights. In an assembly of the people at Athens, the lowest mechanic, or labourer, had a vote. Themistocles, Cimon, or Pericles, had no more. And in the democratic assemblies at Rome, the poorest citizen was equal to Scipio, or Julius Caesar in the right of suffrage.

But representative governments are substitutes for these popular assemblies, where all the citizens are convened, and each has a right to vote. As wealth gives no preference in one, it ought not to give it in the other.

It is a never failing property of wealth to accu­mulate in particular hands. In all well regulated societies, some few will be very rich, a consider­able number in moderate circumstances, and far the greater part comparatively poor. Suppose that the government remains in the hands of all the people, who assemble, in person, to delibe­rate and decide upon public measures. If you say that a citizen, who possesses twice as much as ano­ther, shall have twice as many votes, the govern­ment cannot be free, because a much smaller number, possessing two votes each, can govern a much greater, each of whom has but one. If you pursue the principle, a citizen who possesses ten times as much as another, must have ten times [Page 16] as many votes. Suppose the community to con­sist of 10,000 members; it may well happen that 1,000 of these will collectively possess as much wealth as the other 9,000, perhaps more. In that case this 1,000 will govern the community; and the state will be an aristocracy.

If the government be representative, this prin­ciple will still produce the same effect. In the in­stance mentioned above, suppose that the people, instead of assembling to vote in person, should choose representatives. If the 1,000 rich citizens choose ten times as many representatives, in pro­portion to their numbers, as the 9000 poor ones, the former will have the greatest number of repre­sentatives, and will continue to govern the whole state. The only difference is, that instead of ru­ling in person, they do it by their representatives. Consequently, if wealth has any influence on re­presentation, the government cannot be free. It is further removed from liberty, in proportion as this influence becomes greater. Whenever it be­comes so great, that a small number of citizens, on account of their wealth, have more votes, ei­ther in person or by representatives, than all the others, the government is an aristocracy.

But it is sometimes said, that property ought to have the power of protecting itself—That the poor being the most numerous in all societies, would, if they had equal power in the govern­ment with the rich, sacrifice these latter to their envy or their avarice.—And that to guard against this evil, property ought to be represented.

This amounts to saying, in the first place, that every government ought to be aristocratic; for no community can be free, when a small number of its members possesses, no matter for what rea­son, [Page 17] more power in the government than all the rest together. This is evident from the principles already established. If wealth must be represent­ed, a free government cannot exist.

Secondly, wealth will always acquire influence enough in every government to protect itself. The possessors of it commonly have a better education, more extensive means of acquiring knowledge, and improving their talents, more leisure for attending to public affairs, better opportunities of making friends, establishing connections and forming parties. A rich citizen, without having more votes, or choosing more representatives than his poor neighbours, will very speedily obtain ten times as much influence in the government. In­stead of giving him more votes, you should give him fewer, in order to ballance and check that ten­dency to inequality, which exists in every society, and is its most dangerous ingredient. You can­not prevent one man from acquiring more wealth than others. You cannot prevent this wealth from uniting itself with talents, and obtaining influ­ence. But you ought to counteract this disposition as much as possible. Strip wealth of as many ad­vantages as you can, still it will have enough, and more than enough. But if in addition to its natural and inevitable influence, you give it con­stitutional power in the government; then instead of checking, you favor and promote the tendency of society to its most dangerous disease.

Thirdly, no society is, or can be divided into very rich and very poor members. There will be a great variety of intermediate classes, rising in regular gradation, from the lowest to the most opulent. These middle classes indeed form the bulk of every community. As they are all pos­sessed [Page 18] of more or less property, they are all inter­ested in its preservation; and while they enact just laws, for the security of their own possessions, they equally protect those of the richest members.

In the fourth place, the representatives, what­ever may be the situation of their constituents, will always be men of more or less property: on such the people naturally fix their choice; they will carry with them into the government, not only the feelings and views of their constituents, but their own also—this will ensure a sufficient re­gard to the rights of property. Representatives who possess wealth themselves, whatever their constituents might do were they assembled in per­son, will never make laws for subjecting property to unjust burdens. There is more danger of their consulting their own interests at the expence of their constituents. Thus it appears, that represen­tation, however equal on the principle of numbers, is, in its very nature, necessarily conducive to the preservation of property.

Lastly, if the rights of property could not be protected, without giving it a share in representa­tion, there could be no occasion for its having that share in more than one branch of the legislature. The use of two houses, or seperate branches, is that one may operate as a check upon the other; so as to prevent improper measures from being adop­ted through haste or rashness. If property be re­presented in the senate, it will be secure: for no legislative act can be done without the senates con­currence. Besides, if property be represented in one branch, the personal rights of the people should be represented in the other. Of conse­quence, one man's personal rights being as great as another's, the representation, in one branch at [Page 19] least, ought to be equal on the principle of num­bers. The truth is, that it ought to be so in both branches; for property will always be secure and formidable, though you give it no constitutional advantages; and to allow it any is contrary to eve­ry just principle of free government.

It is further alledged, that as wealthy men con­tribute most to the support of government, they ought to possess the greatest number of its ad­vantages.

And they do possess the greatest number. Why does a rich man pay more to government than a poor one? Because he has more to pay with. Is it not from government and laws that he derives his wealth? Do they not protect him in the exclu­sive possession of it? What but their influence and authority prevents his riches from being seized by men stronger than he is, and who want perhaps for the supply of their necessities, what he dissi­pates in gratifying the most idle, perhaps the most vicious appetites? Will any one affirm, that a wealthy man enjoys no greater portion of the ad­vantages of society than a poor one? What is the respect and influence which riches bestow? What are the pleasures of affluence and ease? What is the power of conferring obligations, rendering services, and relieving distress? Are not these advantages? Do not rich men enjoy them in a much higher degree than those in more narrow circumstances? and is it not perfectly reasonable, that as they have more to pay with, and more to be protected, they should pay a greater portion of the price of protection?

Besides it is not true, that the rich contribute more than the poor. All contribute equally, be­cause all pay in proportion to their possessions, that [Page 20] is to their means of payment. If I possess 1000 l. and another person ten thousand, he pays 100 l. and I pay ten. The sum which he pays is the largest, but my ten pounds is as much for me, and as difficult for me to pay as his hundred, and as I pay less, so I have fewer advantages, and less property to be protected than he has.

To say, that because one citizen is richer than another, and in a general and equal assessment of property, pays a larger sum towards the expence of government, he ought to possess greater po­litical privileges, and more power in the enacting of laws, which are to bind both equally; amounts to saying, that because a man is poor he ought to be a slave; that there ought to be no such thing as a free constitution; in fine, that every govern­ment ought to be an aristocracy, in which the rich might domineer at pleasure over their fellow citi­zens. Present the idea in this form, which is its true one, and it becomes too horrid to be dwelt upon; yet when disguised by a little sophistry, it is made one of the chief arguments to support an unequal representation. From all this it is evident, that property ought to have no influence on the number of representatives.

We are next to enquire, whether, even on the scale of property, the citizens of this state are equally represented.—This will be the subject of the following number.

No. IV.

IN the last number, my fellow citizens, we con­tended, that property ought to have no influ­ence on representation. We will now admit, for a moment, the contrary position, and enquire whe­ther on the principle of property, rightly under­stood, [Page 21] the citizens of this state are equally repre­sented.

Here, instead of the census, we will take the tax returns. By comparing them with the list of representatives and senators, we may quickly solve the question.

It is to be lamented, that from various causes, these returns are very inaccurate. It frequently happens, that people residing in one county or parish, possess property in others; and yet make all their returns where they live. Hence one pa­rish or county often appears to be much more rich, and another much poorer, than it is in reali­ty. Property in the upper country, to a large a­mount, is held by people in Charleston, and re­turned there; so that the advantage of the lower country, in point of wealth, is less in truth than in appearance. The tax collectors who receive the returns, are sometimes negligent; the people who make them are often inaccurate. But we have no better guides, and must follow these with all their imperfections.

The parishes of St. Phillip's and St. Michael's, which include Charleston, pay taxes to the amount of 10,671 l. 13 s 4 d. It is however to be remem­bered, that many wealthy planters, whose pos­sessions are in the other parishes, make their re­turns in Charleston. These two parishes send 15 representatives and two senators. Saint Bartholo­mew's pays 1,566 l 10 s 1 d. Saint Andrew's 1,020 l 0 s 6 d. Saint Paul's, to include its two di­visions and Edisto island, 2,220 l 2 s 3 d. Christ church, 631 l 16 s 8 d. Saint Stephens, 958 l 6 s 9 d Saint James's, Santee, 886 l 3 s 11 d. Saint James's, Goose creek, 295 l 8 s 10 d. Saint John's, Berkley, 1,115 l 11 s 6 d. Saint Thomas, 895 l 19 s 5 d. Saint [Page 22] John's, Wadmalaw, 732 l 8 s 6 d. and St. George's, Dorchester, 504 l 13 s 4 d. These are the parishes which compose Charleston district. The whole a­mount of their taxes is 21,473 l 14 s 6 d. They send to the legislature forty-eight representatives and thirteen senators.

In Beaufort district there are four parishes— Saint Helena, which pays 1,114 l 13 s 2 d in taxes. Prince William's, 468 l 7 s 5 d. Saint Peter's, 642 l, and Saint Luke's 767 l 2 s 4 d; in all 3,022 l 2 s 11 d. This district elects twelve representatives and four senators.

Georgetown district contains three parishes— Prince George, All Saints, and Prince Frederick. The first pays 1,765 l 13 s 4 d. The second 525 l 9 s 9 d. and the last 1,294 l 9 s 5 d. This district therefore pays taxes to the amount of 3,585 l. 12 s 6 d and it sends ten representatives and three senators. The whole lower country, including Beaufort, Charleston, and Georgetown districts, pays 28,081 l 5 s 11 d. and chooses seventy representatives and twenty senators.

Ninety-six district pays 1,898 l 17 s 6 d. Wash­ington, 428 l 5 s 8 d. Pinckney, 1,360 l 3 s 1 d. Camden, 2,079 l 3 s 10 d. Orangeburgh, 1,677 l. and Cheraw, 966 l 12 s 1 d. The taxes paid by the upper country, which consists of these dis­tricts, amounts to 8,390 l. 2 s 3 d; it elects fifty-four representatives and seventeen senators.

No body contends, that wealth alone ought to be considered in apportioning the representation. Such a principle is too monstrous to be endured for a moment. The most violent stickler for aris­tocracy and the present system, have never ven­tured upon that ground. To contend for it would be to attempt the establishment of a pure aristocra­cy [Page 23] of the rich; a desire of which, nobody has hi­therto been found so shameless as to avow. The sup­porters of our present system, contend, that repre­sentation ought to be in a joint ratio of wealth and numbers—each district, say they, should have a number of representatives, in proportion, not to numbers alone, or to wealth alone, but to a joint proportion of wealth and numbers. That is, if one district or county has three times as many in­habitants as the other, and that other is three times the richest, they ought to have an equal number of representatives; because, the advantage of su­perior numbers on one side, is counter-ballanced by the advantages of superior wealth on the other. Let us for a moment admit, though the contrary has been clearly proved, that this is a just principle. Let us apply it to our present situation, and see what will be the result.

The lower country, as we have already seen, contains 28,694 white inhabitants, and pays £. 28,081 5 s. 10 d. tax. The upper country con­tains 120,902 white inhabitants, and pays £.8,390 13 s. 3 d. tax. The former pays three times as much tax; the latter has five times as many free­men. If the lower country exceeded the upper as much in amount of taxes, as the upper country ex­ceeds it in number of inhabitants, the proportion would be equal, and they should have an equal num­ber of representatives. The superiority of numbers on one side, being compensated, in that case, by the advantage of wealth on the other. But the supe­riority of numbers in the upper country, five to one, greatly out-weighs the superiority of tax below; which is only three to one. Consequently, on the principle contended for, a joint proportion of wealth and numbers, the upper country ought to [Page 24] exceed the lower in number of representatives, in the proportion of five to three; and should have at least one fourth the most members in both hou­ses: Instead of which it has nearly one third the fewest.

On the principle of property therefore, in the only sense in which it is or can be contended for, as well as on that of numbers, the only true one, our representation, is exceedingly unequal. We are next to enquire into the origin of this inequality.

No. V.

IN the preceeding numbers, my fellow citizens, it has been proved, that you are not equally represented in the state government. The six up­per districts are entitled, by their superior populati­on, to four fifths of the whole representation, in­stead of which they have less than one half. Even the principle of property, combined with numbers, gives them a right to one third more representa­tives than they now elect. We are next to con­sider the origin of this inequality.

The sea coast of South-Carolina was settled many years before the interior country had been explored. The first settlers were Europeans, who would naturally form their establishments near the sea. The tide flows but a very short distance up the rivers. There are few, if any, instances in which it exceeds 30 miles. Consequently naviga­on and commerce would at first be confined entirely to the sea coast. The country, for a considerable distance above the tides-way, is low, wet, and barren; affording no inducements to early settlers, and even now very thinly inhabited. For many [Page 25] years after the first establishments were formed, some hostile tribes of Indians maintained their ground in the neighbuorhood of the coast, and prevented the new settlements from extending far into the interior country. All that is now called the back country, and even the middle districts, were for a long time held by the savages; early in the settlements, the culture of rice was introduced, and soon became the great object of enterprise and industry. The only lands proper for the production of this grain, are situated near the sea—wealth and population rapidly encreased; and all these circumstances united to confine them to a few leagues along the coast.

It was in this state of the colony that its first government was formed. The lower country flourishing and wealthy; the middle either wholly unsettled, or containing a few indigent and scat­tered inhabitants; and the more remote interior parts, now called the back country, entirely un­known, or occupied by savages. This government consisted, in part, of an assembly elected by the people. The elections was made by parishes, into a number of which the colony was divided. In this division the middle country was little regard­ed; the back country being almost or quite un­known, was wholly over looked: insomuch that some of the parishes extended from the sea to the mountains, while the place of election was at the parish church, within a few miles from the coast.

The few scattered back settlers, as the inhabi­tants at a distance from the sea were then called might come down and vote if they thought pro­per: but it never was expected, and seldom done.

[Page 26]In process of time, the back country began to be peopled by emigrations from the interior parts of North-Carolina, Virginia, and Pensylvania. Some numerous settlements were gradually form­ed; but the rich and refined inhabitants below, either knew nothing of them, or considered them as hordes of rude hunters, little superior to savages. They were of no importance in the goverment; no change was on their account made in the represen­tation. The members of the legislature were elected by the parishes, and assembled in Charles­ton. At the same place the courts of justice were held; and if a man of Long Canes, or Paco­let, was sued, brought an action, or was indicted for an offence, he and his witnesses were forced to attend in Charleston.

The people of the back country becoming daily more and more numerous, began to be sensible of their strength, and loudly complained of this une­qual distribution of the advantages of government. At length in the year 1769, more than 100 years after the colony was planted, they, with much diffi­culty, obtained an act for establishing courts in vari­ous parts of the country. Still they were little re­garded in elections. A few of the most popular men among them sometimes obtained seats, but the number was small and precarious. Almost the whole house of representatives was chosen by the people below. The elections were still made by parishes; and a leading man from the back coun­try, had no method of getting himself elected, but to bring down a sufficient number of his neighbours, to give him a majority of votes. The first instance of this happened about 30 years ago. The peo­ple of Long Canes, who were included in the pa­rish of Saint Bartholomews, came down in a body [Page 27] to an election, and put in one of their neighbours. This gentleman, the first inhabitant of the upper country, that ever obtained a seat in the legislature of this state, is still alive. So long was it before the rights of the upper country began to be re­garded.

This inequality of representation continued to exist at the revolution. The popular assemblies, which made the first regular opposition to the Bri­tish government, were elected by the parishes in the usual manner. A few of the principal men in the upper country obtained seats; but their number was small, and their influence inconsiderable. When the province at length completely threw off its dependence, and began to form a government of its own, no convention of the people was called for that purpose; but the assembly, which, till then had exercised the legisla­tive powers, passed an act containing a form of government. This instrument apportioned the number of representatives in such a manner, as to give the back country a share greater than it had before; but still very inadequate to its population. As it had however but a very small number of re­presentatives, and of course, very little power in the assembly which formed the system. It was forced to submit to the conditions imposed on it, and glad to accept such advantages, however small, as it could obtain. Besides it was, probably un­acquainted with its own strength; nor was the in­equality of numbers as great then as it has since become. Thus was a system formed and acqui­esced in, which gave the three districts of Charles­ton, Beaufort and Georgetown, more representa­tives than were allotted to all the rest of the state. In the year 1789, the legislature resolved to call a [Page 28] convention of the people. To revise and amend the constitution was the object of this assembly. When the motion for calling it was discussed in the legislature, some contended, that a conven­tion brings back the people to the first principles of society; according to which all are equal. That consequently all ought to be equally repre­sented in this convention, for which purpose eve­ry parish and county should be invited to choose a number of delegates, in exact proportion to its number of free inhabitants. These principles are undeniable; but the lower country members per­ceived that should they be adopted, the upper country, by its superior population, would rule the convention. They, therefore, opposed this system with all their might, and their superiority of numbers in the legislature, ensured their suc­cess. It was resolved, that each parish and coun­ty should send the same number of delegates to the convention, that it sent of members to the le­gislature: and thus the lower country preserved the same superiority of numbers, the same power over the votes, in one assembly, which it possessed in the other.

The effects of this plan became visible as soon as the convention commenced its deliberations. In every vote the lower country was found to pos­sess a decisive majority. Consequently no reform, however desirable to four fifths of the people, could be made without the lower country's consent. Some of its members joined the upper country in its attempt to remove the seat of government; which was effected by their assistance. But on the subject of representation they were inflexible. An attempt was made to apportion it according to numbers, or to a joint ratio of numbers and [Page 29] wealth. The lower country firmly opposed both propositions. A violent contest ensued, in which, as usual, the upper country was defeated. The will of four-fifths of the people, expressed by their representatives, was prevented from taking effect, by the opposition of one fifth. The num­ber of representatives was reduced by one-half, but the proportion remained the same. To a county, or parish, which before elected six repre­sentatives, three were allowed. The lower coun­try maintained its former superiority, and one-fifth of the citizens imposed a government on the other four-fifths.

This view of the origin of our inequality in re­presentation, leads us to consider, next, its pecu­liar nature. This enquiry will make the subject of the following number.

No. VI.

HAVING in the preceeding number, explain­ed the origin of our inequality in represen­tation, we come now, my fellow-citizens, to con­sider its nature and properties. I fear we shall find them of a very alarming kind.

In North-Carolina and Virginia, some counties are much larger than others, and yet all choose an equal number of representatives; but there, large and small counties are equally distributed through every part of the state: and if you throw it into two grand divisions, you cannot say that one has a greater portion of representatives than the other, Thus the representation is equal with respect to the whole state; though unequal if estimated by single counties or districts. The same observa­tions will apply to England, where about one twen­tieth [Page 30] of the people elects the house of commons. But that twentieth is equally distributed through every part of the kingdom. The mischief there, is, not that some parts of the country are une­qually represented; but that all are insufficiently and improperly represented.

But in this state the inequality is confined to particular parts of the country, lying contiguous to each other. Not only a parish containing 300 inhabitants, elects as many representatives as a country with 8,000, but a district consisting of such parishes, and whose aggregate numbers a­mount to only 15,452, elects four times as many representatives, as another district, whose num­bers are 33,674; and three districts on the sea coast, containing 28,694 white inhabitants, send more representatives, than six other districts in the interior country, whose numbers amount to 120,902. Hence it is evident, that one part of the state, much inferior in extent, and far more so in population, can govern all the other districts; which consequently, instead of being parts of a free government, are reduced to the condition of provinces, subject to a foreign power.

In the next place, these different parts of the country differ widely from each other, in situation and character. In the upper country a great equa­lity of property prevails. Below, some are very rich, others extremely poor; and from the situa­tion of the country, and mode of cultivation, carried on by slaves, and confined, as it is, to some small spots of land, this inequality is likely to encrease with the encrease of wealth. Inequa­lity of fortune leads to inequality of condition; and inequality of condition is the parent and nurse of aristocracy. Superior wealth, not only, [Page 31] is apt to beget and cherish a love of power and privileges, but has a strong tendency to bestow them Hence there is danger that an aristocrati­cal spirit may arise in the low country, if it do not already exist there: and this is a powerful reason against suffering that part of the state to possess an undue influence in the government. For where aristocracy once gains admittance, it never ceases to make new encroachments, 'till it has to­tally rooted out the principles of liberty, of which it is the natural and implacable enemy.

Thirdly, the upper and lower counties have opposite habits and views in almost every parti­cular. One is accustomed to expence, the other to frugality. One will be inclined to numerous offices, large salaries, and an expensive govern­ment. The other, from the moderate fortunes of the inhabitants, and their simple way of life, will prefer low taxes, small salaries, and a very fru­gal, civil establishment. One imports almost every article of consumption, and pays for it in produce: The other is far removed from naviga­tion, has very little to export, and must there­fore supply its own wants. Consequently one will favor commerce; the other manufactures. One wishes for slaves; the other will be better without them. Where two classes of people, in the same community, have such opposite inclina­tions and customs, it is fit that the most nume­rous should govern. For the interests and feel­ings of the greatest number ought to be consulted.

Fourthly, this inequality is much greater in re­ality than appearance From the census it ap­pears that 28,000 citizens out of 149,000, govern the whole state. But we must recollect, that in the lower country, where these 28,000 reside, the [Page 32] greatest inequality of property prevails—This has a tendency to throw all political power and privileges into the hands of the rich; whose num­bers are comparatively small. The power there­fore which the lower country possesses by its supe­riority in representation, is not possessed by all the people of the lower country, but by a small part of them. A certain great man in Athens, used to assert that his little son governed all Greece: for, said he, Athens governs Greece, I govern Athens, my wife governs me, and my young son governs my wife. In like manner, a few hun­dred persons below, govern South Carolina; for they govern the lower country, and the lower country governs the rest of the state. Of all the properties of our inequality in representation, this is the most alarming.

In the last place, this inequality, already so enormous, is every moment becoming greater. The state is now governed, we will say, by one-fifth of its inhabitants, residing in a particular part of the country. In twenty years, should the present system remain, it will be governed by one-tenth; in forty years by one-twentieth; and so on as the excess of numbers becomes greater and greater. The encrease of population below is very slow and inconsiderable. The swamps are engrossed by a few families. Besides, they require immense labour, and perhaps the labour of Africans to reduce them to cultivation. The high lands are exceedingly barren. These cir­cumstances will continually drive labouring people, of a disposition, in any degree enterprizing, into the upper country. They will never stay and exhaust their strength in a barren soil, and sickly climate, when they know that lands can easily be [Page 33] procured in a fertile and healthy country. From the expensive manner of living below, a family might be independent, and even opulent in the upper country, with what would hardly enable them to subsist decently near Charleston. This, with the changes of property, which must fre­quently take place, will probably occasion many families to retire from the lower country with the remains of their fortune, and settle above. The sickliness of the climate below, which destroys life, perhaps faster than it is produced, will pre­vent those from multiplying who do not emigrate. It is questionable, whether Charleston district con­tains, out of Charleston, more inhabitants now, than it did fifty years ago. The encrease, if any, has certainly been very inconsiderable. A great number of families which were among the first settlers, have become wholly extinct; and many, formerly numerous, are now reduced to one or two individuals in each. In the upper country, on the contrary, population advances with an as­tonishing rapidity. A mild and healthy climate, a fertile soil, almost every where capable of ad­vantageous cultivation—the simple and active life of the inhabitants, the abundant means of sub­sistance which moderate labour procures—the ex­tent of the country, which give the species full room to expand itself; all contribute to multiply it in a manner almost incredible, and this natural encrease is aided by constant migrations, from less fortunate climes. Thirty years ago, Abbeville and Edgefield counties were so inconsiderable as to remain a part of Saint Bartholemews parish. They now contain 17,280 white inhabitants. The numbers of Pendleton county, which about eight years ago was entirely a desert, now amount to [Page 34] 8731, with this rapid progress in population, wealth must greatly encrease. A fertile country encreasing in number of inhabitants, and im­proving in agriculture and arts; where the fruits of his industry are secured to every individual, must soon become rich. There is no doubt that wealth encreases much faster in the upper country than below. Exports by no means afford a cer­tain criterion of riches. The most wealthy coun­tries often export the least, because the people have enough within themselves, without purcha­sing from abroad, and consume their own pro­ductions, instead of exchanging them for those of their neighbours. This is very much the case with the upper country. On the contrary, al­most the whole labour of the lower country, is employed in cultivating staples for exportation. The people import a great part even of their pro­visions: and almost the whole product of their labour is exported. Yet the exports of the upper country have doubled within the last seven or eight years; while those from below have encrea­sed very little during that period. Hence it is plain, that the superiority which the lower coun­try country enjoys in point of wealth, will per­petually diminish; while its inferiority in num­bers, must every day become more consider­able. Should the present apportionment of repre­sentation continue, the time must soon arrive, when the upper country, equal to the lower in wealth, and containing ten times as many free inhabitants, will have one third less power in the government. The least opulent, the smallest, and the worst peopled part of the state, will rule all the rest.

Thus it appears that the inequality of our re­presentation, [Page 35] is of the most dangerous kind, al­ready enormous, constantly encreasing, and throwing the whole power of government into the hands of a small part of the citizens, whose habits of life, situation, and political sentiments, must be for ever different from those of the great body of the community. We must next consi­der the effects of this inequality.

No. VII.

IT now remains for us my fellow citizens, in this seventh and last number, to consider what ef­fects the inequality of which we have been speak­ing, may now, or hereafter, produce on our liber­ties

It is extremely evident, that the six upper dis­tricts are absolutely under the dominion of the three lower ones, which possess a decisive majority in both branches of the legislature. If any one should be disposed to deny this, let us ask him, whether the whole upper country, should it unite to a man, can carry any measure in the legislature, however important to its interests, without the as­sistance of the lower members? Surely it cannot. There hardly can be a question which will more deeply interest the upper country, than the remo­val of the seat of government. But how was it carried; by their own strength? No, all their struggles for that purpose were ineffectual till they were joined by some members from below. Though the upper country, to a man, was desi­rous of county courts, though four fifths of the people considered that establishment as of the ut­most importance to their welfare, it was not ob­tained without the greatest difficulty; and never could have taken place, had not some lower mem­bers [Page 36] lent their assistance. Yet this was a measure which the lower country had no interest to pre­vent. They, therefore, after a long struggle, granted it as a matter of favour. But is it consis­tant with the character of freemen to hold their rights by courtesy, at the will of an handful of their fellow citizens? No, this is the condition of servants, whose masters may sometimes be mild, just, and even generous; but are masters still.

Provinces will be well governed, whenever their interests happen to coincide with the views and interests of the power to which they are subject. This power may sometimes even make a small sacrifice of its own interests to their wishes. But will it always be in that disposition? Let our own history witness. In some points where the lower country was not very materially interested, it has yielded to the wishes and interests of its subjects in the upper country. This was the case with the county court act. Even the removal of the seat of government, though highly interesting to those lower members, who reside in Charleston, and therefore opposed by them with all their might, was a matter of indifference to the lower country gentlemen in general, who, when they were for­ced to leave home, cared very little, whether they went to Columbia or Charleston. Some of them, therefore, gratified the upper country by voting for the removal, and some, no doubt, voted for it be­cause they thought it right and conducive to the ge­neral good of the state. After all, this removal was more properly a division of the government, for all the principal officers continue to reside in Charleston. The governor is never obliged to be at Columbia, but while the legislature is sitting. The supreme courts are held there but a few days in the year; the secretary's, treasurer's, and sur­veyor [Page 37] general's offices, at a great expence, and with much inconvenience to the state, are divided between Charleston and Columbia. The lower country was by no means generally interested, to prevent this partial removal; and yet through the opposition of a few powerful individuals, it did not take place without considerable difficulty. A complete removal, though much desired by the whole upper country, by four-fifths of the peo­ple, could not possibly be obtained. And when a question arose, in which the lower country was universally opposed in interest to the upper, the question of representation, we all know the event. The upper country, with four fifths of the people, and every principle of justice and good govern­ment clearly on its side, was out voted and over ruled. It was not then the interest of the ruling power to gratify the wishes, or consult the inter­ests of its provinces; and accordingly they were treated with the utmost neglect, and a system of government imposed upon them, replete with inequality, injustice and servitude.

This is sufficient to shew, that the lower coun­try, which is the governing power, will seldom be disposed to favor its dependant provinces, the other districts, where its own interests or conve­nience, or those of some powerful individuals in it, can be in any considerable degree affected. On how many, and what important points, these interests may differ, will soon appear.

In the election of officers they must frequently differ. The lower country will wish to have go­vernors, senators for congress, and electors of the president, chosen from among men of their own party and way of thinking. The upper country, on the contrary, will be desirous to fill those high and important stations with men whom they know, [Page 38] and on whose love of true republicanism they can rely. But have they the power of doing it? No. Should the lower country combine in support of a candidate, the most odious to the six upper dis­tricts, that is to four fifths of the citizens, it can give him 90 votes. The upper country has only 73 to oppose him with. Consequently every pub­lic office of this state, from the governor and sena­tors of the United States, down to the sheriffs of the various districts, may be filled, by the lower country in [...] with characters the most obnoxi­ous to four-fifths of the people.

Suppose the upper country should fix its choice on a candidate universally beloved by them, for the office of governor, for instance, or senator; can they elect him? Not if the lower country thinks proper to support another. They can give him 73 votes These 73 votes will represent the will of four-fifths of the people. Consequently this candidate will be the choice of four out of five of his fellow citizens. But if the other one-fifth think proper to oppose him, they can give his antagonist 90 votes, and prevent his election.

It is not only in elections, but in passing laws, laying taxes, and indeed in every legislative act, that this tyranny may be exercised. The cultiva­ted lands in the lower country are of ten or twen­ty times the productive value of those above. At present they are taxed according to their respective value, which is just: but suppose the lower coun­try should think fit to alter the mode, and to tax all lands equally: could the upper country pre­vent it? No. Suppose the people below should choose to take off the tax on negroes, and lay it upon cattle, tobacco, hemp, and wheat; so as to remove the whole burden of public contribution from their own shoulders, and lay it on those of [Page 39] the upper country: could the latter prevent this unjust imposition? No. The lower country has a decided majority in the legislature, and can make what laws, and lay what taxes, it may think pro­per. Suppose it should think proper to lay a poll tax; by which a man in the lower country posses­sed of 10,000 pounds would pay no more for the support of government, than one in Ninety-six or Pinckney, who has only ten pounds: it has the power of doing it. It may also take off the tax on coaches and lay it on waggons: if it should be disposed to do so, the upper country has no power to hinder it.

It would be endless to enumerate all the instan­ces, in which the lower country, by its superiority in representation, may sacrifice the interests of four-fifths of the people who are governed, to the interests or convenience of one-fifth which governs.

But it may be said, will all these oppressions be exercised? I do not say that all of them will; per­haps it may be a considerable time before we shall feel any of them. I contend that they may be exercised, that the lower country has the power of exercising them: a power which it has in ma­ny instances exerted: and I say that it is inconsist­ant with every just idea of freedom for the great body of the people to be in the power of a small part, and to hold its rights dependant on their jus­tice or favor. Why did we quarrel with Great Britain? Not for the evils which she inflicted up­on us, but to guard against those which she might inflict. Not because she taxed us in all cases what­soever, without our consent; but because she claimed a right of doing so. This right the lower country possesses over the upper, and may exercise whenever prompted to do so by its interests or inclination.

And now my fellow citizens, I conclude with a [Page 40] warning which requires your most serious atten­tion. Beware of supposing, that because the evil which I have pointed out, does not at present press with its whole weight upon you, it is therefore unworthy of immediate attention. Great abuses in government, like great rivers, arise from small beginings. They are easily checked at first, but encreasing imperceptibly in their progress, they at length become too powerful for opposition. Thus corruption crept into the British government; and thus your liberties will be gradually undermi­ned, unless you speedily apply a remedy to the dangerous malady under which our constitution labours.