UNBIASSED reason clearly dictates, that God has an original inalienable right and propriety in all things; and particularly in mankind—a right to make what use of them he pleases. And that he is not obliged to render an account, why he deals with one in this, and another in that manner. Because, as creatures, they are his absolute property, and, as sinners, are obnoxious to his wrath.

BUT it is evident that the divine disposal, relatively to mankind, has met with great opposition and com­plaint—Is a doctrine very disagreeable to human pride—And is what the Apostle labored to establish, in the text and context, against the carnal reasonings, and self-conceited pretensions of the Jews, and all others who have the audacity to deny, or question God's absolute right, and uncontrolable authority to dispose of men and things according to his sovereign pleasure.

THE subject of discourse in this chapter is the re­jection of the Jews, and the extension of saving mercy to the Gentiles. The former prided themselves in their descent, their privileges, and their legal righte­ousness. On these grounds they [...] expectations of life and salvation. And claiming the peculiar favour and protection of the Almighty, they despised the Gentile world; as out [...]s from God, and not deserving their regard. Therefore, when it [Page 6] was [...] that the Gentiles were fellow [...]irs and p [...]rtakers of the blessings of the Messiah through [...], equally with the believing Jews, by far the greater part of that people rejected the counsel of God against themselves, and were left to their own stub [...]orn [...], to bring ruin and destruction upon themselves [...] the Gentiles, by the power of the Holy Ghost, were brought to believe in Christ and obtain salvation.

To set aside their vain pretensions; and vindicate God's right and authority to dispense the [...] of his goodness according to his own will, the [...] observed v. 6 and 7. "They are not all Israel which are of Israel: Neither, because they are the [...] of Abraham are they all children." The [...] ac­cording to his sovereign pleasure, made a difference between Is [...]e [...], and Isaac, in favour of the la [...]r, And should it be urged "there was an obvious [...] for this discrimination: because Is [...]el was the son of the bond, but Isaac: of the free woman." The next instance cannot be liable to such an [...] — the difference made by God between [...], and [...], twin children of Isaac by Rebecca. For the younger was preferred to the elder: not because it was fore­seen that the temper and behaviour of the younger, would exceed the elder in goodness: For this [...] ­ence was given "before the children were born, and had done any good or evil" v. II. Which [...] op­posite discrimination was designed to illustrate this great doctrine. "That the purpose of [...] accord­ing to election might stand, not of wor [...]. [...] that calleth." The Jews, who professed [...] regard for the writings of Moses, could have [...] son to object to this as arguing unrighte [...] [...] God because He saith to Moses, v. 19. "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion." In which words JEHOVAH claims a sovereign right to dis­pense his mercy and compassionate regards, where, [Page 7] when, to whom, and in what measure he pleases. "So then, v. 16. it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy" For, although Isaac willed the blessing to ESAU, and [...] ran to get the venison; yet, by the divine ordi­nation and disposal, it was conferred upon Jacob. And further, concerning Pharaoh the Scripture saith, E [...]. IX. 16. "And in very deed for this cause have I raised thee up for to shew in thee my power, and that my name may be declared throughout all the earth." His being raised up may intend his advancement to the throne of Egypt: or his being made to stand up when the hail, pestilence, and other judgments carried off so many Egyptians. Pharaoh was not immediately destroyed for his contempt of God; as he justly might have been. God spared him when so many fell a­round him, that he might make his power and ven­geance appear more conspicuous and triumphant, by overthrowing him and his hosts in the red sea.

FROM these well chosen and weighty particulars, and the reasons combined with the adduced instances, the consequence is drawn in the words read. "There­fore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth."

THAT we may derive proper instruction, and con­viction from this important passage of sacred Writ; we are naturally led,

• I. To investigate the meaning of God's having mercy on whom he will have mercy. Also,
• II. THE meaning of the counter-part to this, And whom he will he hardeneth.
• III. EVINCE, and illustrate this great truth, That it belongs to God—is his essential prerogative, to have mercy on whom he will have mercy, and to harden whom he will harden. Then,
• IV. ANSWER objections. And,
• V. IMPROVE the subject, by deduction, and Appli­cation.

[Page 8]As it may tend to relieve the minds of some read­ers, I shall divide the discourse, it being lengthy, in­to three parts.

THE FIRST PART, Containing an attempt to explain the text.

To do this orderly and clearly it is necessary to investigate the meaning of God's having mercy on whom he will have mercy.

MERCY, when applied to God in the Bible, is some­times used with greater latitude, than at others. The divine character, generally summed up in holi­ness, is sometimes expressed by mercy. But mercy, more strictly considered, is a branch of holiness—is of the nature of benevolence; yet doth imply some­thing in the object towards which it is exercised, whereby it is differenced from benevolence in a gen­eral view. Benevolence respects being—intelligent existence. Mercy respects the ill-deserving. Great favor may be shown, much good, may be conferred upon the innocent: but favor shown to the innocent is not of the nature of mercy, strictly considered: because mercy is contrary to desert; or the good, which is the effect of mercy, is so far from being merited by those who are the recipients, that they deserve only evil.

WE may, therefore, define mercy applied to God by saying, It is the divine inclination to do good to the ill deserving.

ACCORDING to this definition, mercy may be dis­tinguished from compassion, as well as from bene­volence. It is true, that mercy and compassion are oftentimes used synonimously; yet strictly speaking, misery is the object of compassion, without joining to it either innocence, or ill desert: whereas mercy has respect to misery well deserved.

Now, as all mankind are sinners, "for there is none righteo [...]s, no, not one," and consequently, odi­ous to divine purity, and obnoxious to divine wrath: so all the good things men enjoy ought to be con­sidered, [Page 9] as flowing to them from mercy. The in­numerable blessings conserred upon them in the pre­sent state, are mercies equally numberless. Where­by it appears, that in different ways and degrees, all have experience of mercy from God. It is evident, however, that, in the text, mercy is not to be un­derstood in this general sense. Here respect is had, not only to discriminating, but also to saving mercy. That which, in a lower sense, may be called discri­minating mercy, is exercised towards many who are not the subjects of saving mercy. Discriminating mercy is exercised in temporal blessings and spiritual privi­leges. Some abound in riches; and enjoy better health of body than others do. Some are under bet­ter advantages in respect to society: and better ad­vantages for mental and moral improvement, than o­thers are. And there are more powerful operations of the Holy Spirit on the minds and consciences [...] some, than of others, who yet may be left to stifle their convictions, and never experience the change of regeneration and a saving conversion to God. And in such respects it may be truly said, He hath mercy on whom he will have mercy.

THAT, in the text, particular reference is had to saving mercy, is evident from the tenor of the dis­course in this chapter. For it was obviously Paul's design to vindicate the divine conduct, in rejecting the body of the Jewish nation, and extending sav­ing mercy to the Gentiles. Moreover, it is suffici­ently evident from the latter part of the verse. Whom he will he hardeneth. For they who are not hardened, are softened, i.e. renewed and sanctified: because there is no medium between these. There­fore saving mercy is here intended.

As there is a difference in the exercise of divine mercy, in other respects; so there is a most wide and important difference in the exercise of saving mercy. It is not bestowed upon all mankind; but upon some [Page 10] only—even those upon whom God is pleased to be­stow it. In the text, and many other places, the exer­cise of mercy is resolved into the will or sovereign pleasure of the Deity. No reason is he [...] assigned only his will. He hath mercy on whom he will have mercy. What then, are we to understand by this mode of speaking?

1. WE are not to conceive that God acts from mere will, as this is generally understood, when applied to men. The potentates of the earth are frequently re­presented as acting from mere will, to signify that they act tyrannically, contrary to all reason and equity; by displaying their power, in numberless ways of vio­lence and oppression, to gratify their ambition and a­varice. The will of God, in the exercise of his sa­ving mercy, is not arbitrary in any such sense. For no wrong is done to those upon whom he doth not be­stow his mercy: neither is partiality exercised, in the sense that being partial or a respecter of persons, im­plies any thing mean and unworthy.

2. WE are not to conceive that God acts without wisdom—without a regard to that which upon the whole is best, in the choice he makes of these, upon whom he is determined to bestow his saving mercy. The divine will is not blind, nor capricious. Altho' we are not able to investigate them, no doubt there are good and sufficient reasons, why God bestows his saving mercy upon some, and not upon others. And why those very persons upon whom he doth be­stow it, rather than others. But, in respect to this mat­ter, his tho'ts are not our tho'ts—are high above them, as the heavens are high above the earth. It is not, because some are more noble, wise, and mighty than o­thers; or have done more to recommend themselves, than others have done. It is those, upon whom, in his infinite wisdom, God sees best to bestow it: Whose salvation will most effectually conduce to his own glory, and the illustrious display of his grace.

[Page 11]3. "HE hath mercy on whom he will have mercy" signifies to us; That God hath and exerciseth a right to do what he will with his own.

ALL men being sinners, he is not obliged to exercise his saving mercy towards any. And it lies in his own breast to determine on whom he will confer it; and on whom he will not. By this, we see, the exercise is ar­bitrary, in respect to subjects. Neither they upon whom such mercy is bestowed, nor they upon whom it is not bestowed, have any claims to advance. There­fore, if any are saved; their salvation must be the ef­fect of mere mercy, sovereign grace.

4. WE may farther observe, That this mode of speaking doth naturally lead us to conceive; that as mercy is the only spring of salvation: So in the exer­cise of it, God is self moved, and perfectly free. No­thing out of himself, strictly speaking, doth induce God to shew mercy. The exercise of saving mercy, in its whole extent, flows from his infinitely free self-mo­ved propensity. It is true, God exercises mercy in a view of the guilt, and ruin of sinners: For if sin had not taken place, there would have been no room for the exercise of it. Therefore we may humbly con­ceive, Sin was permitted to take place, to prepare the way for the manifestation of divine justice, in the pu­nishment of some; and that the infinitely merciful heart of the Deity might work forth, in the pardon & salvation of others: And that the most important ends, respect­ing the Deity himself, and the created intelligent sys­tem, might be accomplished in the final result. But the whole scene is laid, and the exercise conducted in such a manner, as to make it manifest; that when God bestows his saving mercy upon any, he acts of, from, and for himself. And the regard shown to those upon whom he confers his saving mercy is rather subordi­nate, than original and ultimate: or if ultimate, yet certainly, not supreme.

ON the whole, God hath determined the objects of [Page 12] saving mercy according to the counsel of his own will, and so as to answer his own most important ends. Not needing, nor asking any assistance; not looking upon himself amenable to any creature. And without pay­ing the least attention & regard to those circumstances and distinctions, men are apt to think, ought to influ­ence in such a determination, and consequent proce­dure. For, "Who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counsellor?" instructing and aid­ing him in what he ought to resolve and do. "Or who hath first given to him?" Certainly none.

MANY are ready to think it is proper they should be the objects of divine favor, on account of their.de­scent; or because they have superior abilities and ad­vantages; or because they have made a profession of religion, are civil and moral in their behaviour, and if not sinless, are less criminal & unworthy than many oth­ers they could easily name. Or because they have taken abundant pains to recommend themselves to divine fa­vor. Indeed there is a great variety of particulars, implying different circumstances and distinctions which take place among mankind, on account whereof they are apt to imagine, God will shew them his salvation. But the Almighty doth not regard those distinctions, in which weak mortals are so apt to pride themselves. He doth not make less comparative guile and unwor­thiness the ground of his choice; For upon some he bestows salvation whose guilt is very great—even up­on the chief of sinners. Some of one; and some of a­nother nation are saved. Some descended from wor­thy progenitors; others not so descended. Some of such a station and employment are chosen; others of the like station are rejected. And where there is a si­milarity of circumstances, it is probable, some are sa­ved; others not.

We cannot determine beforehand who will be sa­ved, From the situation [...]en are in, the way they [Page 13] pursue, the exertions they make, we cannot know that God hath saving mercy in design for them. It is not possible to know that God will bestow mercy upon one, or another before he doth bestow it; unless he should be pleased to reveal his purpose, in respect to certain persons, to some of his servants. But he is not wont often, if ever to do this. And although the situation some persons are in, who have not as yet obtained re­generating grace, may render it more probable they will obtain mercy, than that others in general will, and more probable in the given situation, that they in par­ticular shall obtain, than it would be, were they not in such a situation: Yet no situation—no external circum­stances, or even state of mind persons may be in antece­dently to regeneration, ought to be considered, as ha­ving the least influence in the divine determination, respecting the bestowment of his saving mercy.

ON the other hand; when we find saving mercy, in event is conferred upon persons, who were in such a particular situation, external and internal, we are to conceive they were brought thereunto, because God purposed to save them.

HAVING thus stated what we are to understand by God's having mercy on whom he will have mercy. The way is prepared.

II. To investigate the meaning of the counterpart to this, And whom he will he hardeneth.

IT is true that he hardeneth whom he will, as it is that he hath mercy on whom he will; because the same pen of inspiration asserts both. They on whom he hath mer­cy are regenerated, are united to Christ, are justified, and shall be saved: seeing, as hath been observed, there is a particular reference, not to common and pro­miscuous; but to special saving mercy. Consequently, by the hardened we are to understend those who are, or shall be lest in an imp [...]t unbelieving state to the last—to their eternal ruin and des [...]n. For the e­vent of remaining impenitent and unbelieving to the [Page 14] end of this probationary state will be endless ruin & mi­sery. Of the truth of this doctrine the Scriptures afford abundant proof. At present, I shall only refer to the 22d. verse, which is not only in point, but decisive. For here we are taught, that God will shew his wrath, and make his power known on the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction, and endured with much long suffering. Now should these vessels be eternally happy after ha­ving been ever so many millions of ages in torment; they would be vessels of mercy, and not vessels of wrath. And salvation, rather than destruction would be their end—that to which they are fitted.

WE are compelled to understand the text to mean being hardened in this awful sense. The scope of the Apostle evinces it: which was the rejection of the Jews through unbelief to their destruction, and the exten­sion of saving mercy to the Gentiles. The adduced instance of Pharaoh whose heart was hardened to his destruction, proves it. For this instance is brought [...] to support the declaration stated in the text. As he hardened Pharaoh to his destruction: so whom he will he hardeneth to their destruction. And more than all this, the antithesis used in the text doth necessarily require such a construction. Because, although there are various respects and degrees, according to which, several persons may be said to be hardened, and even the same person at different times. Yet if any should be hardened in impenitence ten, twenty, forty years or more: but should be renewed by divine grace, and saved at last; upon such God would have mercy in the sense of the text. Therefore it is evident, this would destroy the contrast—would leave no opposition be­tween those upon whom he hath mercy, and those whom he hardeneth.

THE expression, he hardeneth, is used in a metapho­rical sense. It is borrowed from particular [...] that are called hard; such as a stone, piece of [...] or dried clay, which are not easily penetrated, broken [Page 15] and changed. They will resist a considerable power applied to alter them. And some bodies naturally hard, being worked upon, will grow harder still. Whereas substances that are soft will readily yield, giv­ing way to impressions made upon them. Hardness, when applied to the mind, doth import an unaptness to be rightly moved and affected; a bent to resist the truth, and oppose the authority and commands of God. Leaving the metaphor—a hard is the same with a self­ish, proud, unholy heart. And according to the degree of selfishness, and opposition to truth and holiness is the degree of hardness. And lastly, whatsoever serves to render men's minds stupid, averse to good, proud and stubborn, may be said to harden them.

WHAT being hardened doth intend may now be seen. But the great question is, what we are to understand by, whom HE will HE hardeneth? Or in what sense may it be truly said God hardeneth any man? For it needeth not to be a laboring point in our minds, that he should harden whom he will, if we can find a consistent sense, in which he may be said to harden any one. Be­cause that which will serve to vindicate his character in hardening any one, may serve as well to vindicate it in hardening another, and as many as he shall see fit to har­den. For, if doing it in one instance implies no deni­al of his holiness; doing it in ten, or ten thousand in­stances will imply no denial thereof—It being easy [...] to see, that where there is no denial or opposition in a single instance; there will be none in ever so many in­stances of the same nature. The question returns, what are we to understand by whom HE will HE hard­eneth?

THIS indeed is a tremendously delicate subject; and by using great freedom and boldness of enquiry there may be danger of our conceiving, and uttering what shall be exceedingly reproachful to the Deity. And there seemeth to be danger on both hands; So that by steering beyond the proper point to avoid Scylla; we [Page 16] fall into Charybdis. And this I apprehend we shall do. If on one hand, we wholly deny any interposition [...] and divine disposal in respect to the taking place of sin, and a continued series—a confirmed state in wicked­ness, ending in eternal ruin and destruction. Or by a­scribing more, in any essential respect, to a divine inter­position and disposal than ought to be ascribed, on the other. And it may not be easy to determine which would be most injurious and reproachful. Yet, per­haps, it is not possible for us to fix the point precisely, by ascertaining with exactness, how far the will, and disposal of the Deity are concerned in this delicate af­fair.

To proceed with humility and due caution in the en­quiry, it may be observed, that since God hardeneth whom he will, it is certain his will, in some sense, must be concerned in hardening men; and the active verb hardeneth doth import some divine agency and dispo­sal. So that, without flat contradiction to the plainest assertion of the pen of inspiration, we cannot wholly ex­clude the will and agency of God. From this however, it doth not follow, that there is the same agency or exertion of divine power in producing the event called sin, and hardness of heart, as there is in producing the ef­fect called holiness. And notwithstanding the divine will & disposal are concerned in the former; they may be, & we may have reason to apprehend they are concerned in a very different sense and manner, in the latter, i. e. in the communication of holiness, and conservation of saints in a holy state. Indeed this mode of speaking doth not necessarily imply, that God exerts any imme­diate influence at all in hardening men. For, should we suppose sin—hardness of heart to take place in con­sequence of the suspension of a particular kind of influ­ence, which by many hath been called supernatural in­fluence, producing, & continuing holiness in creatures: Even as the absence of light is darkness; as night fol­lows the going down of the sun, without any positive [Page 17] immediate exertion to produce night or darkness—I say, on such a supposition, the manner of speaking in the text, would not be improper. For the night—dark­ness is sometimes represented as being made, yea crea­ted. And, we ordinarily say the absence of light cau­seth darkness.

IT is true, that sin is in opposition to holiness; self­ishness to benevolence; so that we may invariably say selfish and benevolent exercises are contrary to each o­ther. And it is certain, that holy benevolent exercises in creatures are the effect of divine exertion; do take place in consequence of the influence of the Holy Ghost upon the heart. For God worketh in the saints, "both to will and to do of his good pleasure." It is also evi­dent, that men do not act independently of God, when they act sinfully. God doth not withhold every kind of influence and support. If he should they would cease to be. There would be no ability, no sufficiency for any kind of perception, and exercise. "In him we live, move, and have our being." This is true in respect to the wicked, as it is in regard to others. But it doth not follow, because holy, and sinful exercises are opposite to each other, and holy exercises are the effect of a divine supernatural operation; that sinful ex­ercises must be the fruit of any similar exertion of di­vine power. For the same efficiency that produces an effect of one kind may not be necessary to produce an effect of another, and an opposite kind. Allowing the same cause may produce different, and even opposite effects; as the same fire that melts wax, and fuses me­tals will dry, and harden humid soft clay: Yet, per­haps, in nature's ample field we shall not find an in­stance, affording a decisive proof, that the same cause doth produce opposite effects in the same subject; un­less there is a materil variation in some circumstance, or circumstances attending the subject, and then indeed as to the case in hand, the subject is not the same. And many considerable effects seem to be produced, or oc­casioned [Page 18] by privation of influence, rather than by posi­tive exertion. A river congealed so as to form a bridge sufficiently strong for an army, with ammunition and baggage to pass safely over, is a great, real, sensible ef­fect. How is it produced! Not by the presence and powerful influence of the sun; but by his absence, or the faint influence of his beams. It is true, there can be no ice without water; and there can be no water without an omnipotent hand to create it: also, the presence and power of God in the beams of the sum is necessary to keep the water in a warm flowing state. But that, the beams of the sun being withdrawn, there is need of a superadded influence to turn the flowing water into a congealed state may not easily, if at all, be made to appear. And who would choose to affirm? There may not be something as great, and even more considerable in respect to moral voluntary effects, than in regard to those which are natural and mechani­cal: where there is no pretence of any proper agency in the subjects of the effects, or their mediate causes.

LET it be farther observed, That, in regeneration and sanctification, the Scriptures ascribe a peculiar in­terposition and influence to God, This argues that sinful exercises are not the effect of divine influences in the sense holy excrcises are. Should it be urged, "that although the extrinsic influence which produces holi­ness in creatures is not the same with that which produ­ces sin: Yet as creatures have no independent sufficien­cy for any kind of perception and volition, there neces­sarily must be an extrinsic divine influence, and as im­mediately exerted, to the production of sinful, as of ho­ly volitions." Answer. This will not follow. Be­cause the sinfulness of volitions may proceed from a privative, rather than a positive cause. In other words. According to Scriptural representation there seemeth to be a peculiar, and what hath been called su­pernatural influence, in producing holy perceptions and volitions, which influence is over and above that [Page 19] general influence—extrinsic exertion, necessary to pre­pare the way for perceptions and volitions, to take place in creatures. i. e. to enable them to understand and choose. If so; then there is not a necessity of influence tantamount to this, to prepare the way for sinful exercises to take place. Because the suspension of the kind of influence, which hath been mentioned, may be attended with this consequence. Sinful exercises may be conceived of as taking place, without any other kind of influence—extrinsic exertion, than what is necessary, to enable man to understand, choose and act.

To sum up the whole, I think it is more safe, and doth better accord with the Scriptures to say, That God orders the occasion; and for wise, and important ends, doth not interpose that influence, which in the given circumstances, would be necessary to prevent sin and impenitence; than that he causes sin and impeni­tence by his own positive and immediate energy. And that he permits, which is to say doth not effectually prevent, than that he produces, or infuses such hard­ness.

SOME very bold inquirers, and reasoners, may cen­sure this permitting; ordering the occasion; not pre­venting; as making use of expressions, too lenient and timid. And may urge, that such a stating of the case is only an expedient to relieve the imagination; but doth afford no relief to any real difficulty. In regard to such persons I would farther observe. Although I do not assert, that the supposition of such a direct, posi­tive agency in the taking place, the continu nce, and prevalence of wickedness in the system, as they may in­sist upon; would necessarily involve the idea, or conse­quence that God is the author of sin, in such a sense, as to render the sinner less criminal, and sin less odious to the divine being, than it would appear to be on any other supposition, and the Scriptural representatious make it to be. And although the abettors of the di­rect, positive agency of the Deity in the production of [Page 20] all moral evil, for ought I choose to say to the contra­ry, may have clear conceptions of the evil of sin, just desert of the sinner, and God's infinite hatred and aver­sion to sin: Yet there seems to be something in it which doth naturally, if not necessarily shock the mind. And, as I apprehend, hath a powerful tendency to pre­judice the minds of people in general, and of many pi­ous well-meaning persons (who [...] able to pursue references metaphysically refined) against the system of truth revealed in the Bible, and lead them to entertain very unworthy thoughts of the blessed God, the glori­ous fountain of being and good. And after all, it seems to be a philosophical point, respecting the manner of accomplishing the divine purposes, about which it is not necessary the world should be exercised.

As Paul drew the consequence, whom he will he hardeneth, from what is said concerning Pharaoh—our conceptions may possibly be assisted, by bringing into view what is narrated of him in the history given by Moses.

GOD sent Moses to demand of Pharaoh permission for the children of Israel to go, and offer sacrifice in the wilderness; but told him, that he would harden Pharaoh's heart so that he should not let the people go. When Moses delivered the message to Pharaoh; he answered, "who is the LORD that I should obey his voice to let Israel go? I know not the LORD, nei­ther will I let Israel go." Pharaoh made the Israelites serve with hard bondage in brick, and mortar. His pride and covetousness could not consent, to loose the service of so many men. Therefore, instead of com­plying with the demand God made by Moses he or­dered a heavier task to be imposed upon them. By the divine command, Moses began to work signs and wonders to convince the king of Egypt, that he was really sent by God, and influence him to comply with his demand. Pharaoh called for his magicians; Jan­nes and Jambres withstood Moses. And so long as [Page 21] they did something in imitation of the miracles wrought by Moses and Aaron, this served to fix him in his resolution, not to let the people go. When the magicians could not produce lice; but owned themselves defeated, and that what Moses did was the finger of God; it is not improbable Pharaoh thought Moses did this; because he had greater skill in magic, than Jannes and Jambres, and thereby his heart was hardened. When the magicians were farther contoun­ded: so that they could not stand before Moses, be­cause of the blains that broke forth upon them; as they did upon man and beast throughout all the land of Egypt. It is said,."the LORD hardened the heart of Pharaoh." Yet, after this it is said, " Pharaoh sinned yet more, and hardened his heart he and his servants." And when the judgments succeeding the hail were in­flicted it is repeatedly said, "the LORD hardened the heart of Pharaoh". And although at last, by the de­struction of all the first born in Egypt, Pharaoh was constrained to let the people depart; they had not gone far before he recanted, and pursued them with his chariots and horsemen, the LORD hardening the heart of the king of Egypt to do this, and the hearts of the Egyptians. Which is thus expressed: "the en­emy said I will pursue, I will overtake, I will divide the spoil: my lust shall be satisfied upon them; I will draw my sword, my hand shall destroy them."

HERE a most wonderful scene was laid open: re­markable in respect to manifesting the extreme wick­edness, and hard-hear edness of Pharaoh, and his ser­vants; and displaying the power and glory of JEHO­VAH in the deliverance of his people, and the punish­ment and overthrow of Pharaoh and the Egyptians." "For the LORD triumphed gloriously by throwing the horse and his rider into the sea." Upon this occa­sion it was proper to ask in a strain of devout admir­ation, as Moses did, "who is like unto thee O Lord among the gods! who is like thee, glorious in holi­ness, [Page 22] fearful in praises, doing wonders?"

No one who reads and attends to the whole narra­tion ought to entertain the least doubt, whether this scene, antecedently to its being opened, was compre­hended in the divine plan. And it is evident, there was a previous certainty that Pharaoh's heart would be har­dened. And that God raised him up for this very pur­pose, that he might shew his power in him, and that his own glorious name might be declared throughout all the earth.

BUT how are we to understand this? Shall we say, "that God intended to make his power known by har­dening Pharaoh's heart, in virtue of his own positive immediate energy, working such hardness in his heart?" Answer. This doth not appear from the his­tory: but rather this. God intended to make his pow­er known in many stupendous miracles wrought to convince, and persuade Pharaoh; whose heart he did not see fit, by any positive efficiency, to prevent grow­ing hard, and increase in obduracy, notwithstanding all that was said and done calculated to reduce him to a willing subjection and compliance. And to make his power and name glorious by triumphing over him, as he did at last, in his deserved destruction.

IT may be observed, that three modes of expression are used in setting forth the hardness of Pharaoh's heart. The LORD hardened his heart; his heart was hardened: and he i. e. Pharaoh himself hardened his heart. According to this account, his hardness is sometimes ascribed, neither to God, nor to Pharaoh directly, leaving room to say it was occasioned, in part, by certain circumstances. And although these circumstances were ordered by the wise holy provi­dence of God: yet this may be far from amounting to a direct positive divine efficiency in producing such hardness. And it is evident, there was no such agency of the Deity in the affair as to prevent his hardness of heart being with propriety ascribed to Pharaoh him­self. [Page 23] And as it is sometimes ascribed to himself it is apparent, there was no compulsion—there was no o­ther, than a moral necessity, of his remaining in a har­dened state. Or what consisted in his own inclination and choice. He acted spontaneously; he chose to gra­tify his avarice by detaining the Israelites in his ser­vice; notwithstanding all that was said and done, to gain a compliance with what was demanded of him by Moses, in the name of JEHOVAH.

THEREFORE, the narration given by Moses only ren­ders it necessary we should maintain, that hardening the heart of Pharaoh was comprehended in the divine plan—That it was previously certain he would conti­nue in a hardened state, God not being obliged thereto, and not seeing fit to prevent it, by the efficacious influ­ences of his spirit and grace. And in this, or some sense like this, it may be said God hardeneth whom he will. He hath determined whom he will harden, and upon whom he will have mercy. There is a previous certainty in respect to a certain number unknown to us, but perfectly well known to God, who will be harden­ed to their eternal ruin: notwithstanding all that hath been, is, or shall be done, to prevent it. That is to say, who after their hardness and impenitent heart, will treasure up to themselves wrath and damnation, by de­spising the riches of his goodness, long-suffering and forbearance. Whom the goodness of God (however well adapted in itself to that purpose) will not lead to repentance; nor the divine severity drive from the love, and pursuit of their evil ways. In all of whom God will make his power known; and at last, not only declare his name throughout all the earth; but render it divinely glorious to the utmost extent of creation, and to the endless ages of eternity; as he will also, the exceeding riches of his grace in their salvation, upon whom it shall please him to have mercy.

[Page 24]THE SECOND PART. Containing some proof and illustration of the doctrine.

WE may now proceed,

III. To evince and illustrate this great truth, that it belongs to God—is one of his essential prerogatives to have mercy on whom he will have mercy, and to harden whom he will harden.

THE following arguments may sufficiently evince & illustrate this important doctrine.

ARG: I. GOD hath an original inalienable right and propriety in all things. Therefore it belongs to him —is his essential prerogative to have mercy on whom he will, and to harden whom [...] will.

I. WHEN we say this belongs to God, is a divine prerogative, we do or ought to mean, that it is essen­tial to Deity, an original inalienable prerogative. That it belongs to him in an absolute independent man­ner; so as to render it absurd to say, or suppose it doth not belong to him: so absurd, as that the denial thereof doth imply a denial of the supremacy, perfec­tion and glory of Jehovah; and is tantamount to the denial of the existence of a Deity, the first cause, and last end of all things.

WHEN the Psalmist saith, "power belongeth unto God," he no doubt means, that original absolute pow­er belongs to him, inherently, and essentially. That he doth not in the least degree derive his power from any other, and is not at all dependent on any other for the exercise of it. And strictly speaking, that he doth not derive it from himself; any more than he derives his existence from himself: But this power is in him ne­cessarily, with a necessity absolute, like that of his being.

2. IT may easily be seen, that the denial of absolute perfection, perfection original and every way exempt from derivation, implies a denial of divine existence, although, in our conception, and the order of stating things, we place existence first. For divine existence is the existence of a being absolutely perfect. There­fore, [Page 25] since in the idea of Deity absolute perfection is included, we cannot admit the idea of such existence, without being compelled to admit the idea of absolute perfection, as necessarily pertaining thereunto: And to deny such perfection is impliedly, to deny the exist­ence to which the perfection doth necessarily belong.

WE may indeed Without this conceive of existence, and call it Deity: however it is not Deity, strictly speaking, but our own false conception, and vain ima­gination. It may be proper also to observe here, That the will of God ever is, and necessarily must be wise and good in the highest sense: because it is repugnant to the idea of absolute perfection to admit the possibili­ty of the contrary. For, if his will, in any instance and respect, should be unwise, not good this would be a proof of the want of absolute perfection.

3. WHEN we consider God as possessing absolute per­fection, originally and independently. And also consi­der him as the creator of all things. Of whom, through whom, and to whom are all things!" That he hath an original inalienable right and propriety in all things, to order and dispose of them according to his wisdom and good pleasure, is implied therein, or doth flow therefrom by infallible consequence. In so­much, that it will amount to a denial of his absolute per­fection, and his divine existence, by necessary implicati­on, to deny he hath such an inherent inalienable right.

4. As it thus appears, That it belongs to God to dispose of all creatures and things, according to the counsel of his own will: Therefore it belongs to God —is his essential prerogative to have mercy on whom he will, and to harden whom he will; as the matter hath been explained. For a denial of this, is, in ef­fect, a denial of his right to dispose of all creatures and things as he pleaseth; because this is comprehen­ded in his having such an original inalienable right. Consequently, by what hath been said, a denial of this will involve a denial of his absolute perfection—his di­vine [Page 26] existence.

IN all the divine arrangements, perhaps, there is no higher, brighter display of prerogative; than what is exercised in the Salvation and Damnation of sinners. And we may not limit the divine prerogative, by ad­mitting the exercise of it in other matters; but deny­ing that it doth extend to this. However contrary to the pride, the overweening conceits men have of themselves; and however they may be disposed to set up, and maintain their notions of independent power and liberty to choose for themselves, and fix even their eternal state: Yet God asserts it to be his prerogative to have mercy on whom he will, and to harden whom he will. And on good ground; for it doth essential­ly and necessarily belong to him.

ARG. II. Justice and mercy are essential to the di­vine character—a character, complete in all perfection. Therefore it belongs to God, to have mercy on whom he will have mercy, and to harden whom he will har­den.

1. IF justice, even punitive justice, be not a perfec­tion it is an imperfection. And, if it be an imperfection, then the character of Jehovah revealed in the Scrip­tures, "To me vengeance belongeth, I will repay saith the Lord," is a bad character. And the Bible doth not give us the knowledge of the true God. Like­wise, if mercy be not a perfection, it is an imperfec­tion. For, in a moral consideration, there is no me­dium between perfection and imperfection. We see then, it is impossible that mercy and justice should not be a beauty, or a blemish in the divine character. And we see with equal evidence, that mercy and justice are included in the idea of absolute perfection.

2. IF mercy and justice are essential to the divine character; it is proper that these should be made to appear in exercise, in events. The propriety of these being made to appear is the same, with the propriety of the divine character or absolute perfection, being [Page 27] made to appear: because the character cannot be ma­nifested, if any thing essentially distinguishing in the character, is [...]eft out. Moreover, the character cannot be seen, cannot be understood by creatures; unless it is manifested in some suitable effects, or work, For none but God himself, by intuition, self consciousness can know who, and what he is.

By this it appears, that in denying the propriety of mercy and justice being exercised, there is implied a denial of the propriety of absolute perfection being made to appear, as belonging to the divine character. And this will run us into a denial of absolute perfecti­on: and in fine the denial of a God—will land us in atheism.

3. IF sin had not taken place, never had and never should take place, there would have been no room and opportunity; and consequently no possibility, that pu­nitive justice and redeeming mercy should be exerci­sed. It is no limitation of divine power, on such a supposition, to say there would not be a possibility. For, in such a case, the possibility implies a contradic­tion. And it is no limitation of divine power to say God cannot do what implies a contradiction, A con­tradiction is not the object of power. Hence it fol­lows, That sin must be comprehended in the projection of a plan, designed and calculated to exhibit absolute perfection of character to the minds of creatures. And in the same view, a divine decree relative to sin in e­vent, and such a disposal of things in the system, as should be followed with this event, wholly by the fault of the creature, was necessary.

4. SIN hath taken place in this lower world, by the fault of man, according to the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God. And, in unsearchable wis­dom, he hath devised a method, that of redemption by Christ, according to which mercy can be exercised in the salvation of sinners, consistently with justice, and to the honor of the divine law and government. It there­fore [Page 28] belongs to God—is his essential prerogative to bestow mercy on whom he pleases, and inflict deserved punishment on whom he pleases. Mercy on those, in his unsearchable wisdom, he finds it best should be made the subjects of mercy: And punishment on the rest, the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction, and en­dured with much long suffering.

By this it is demonstratively evident, That the de­termination of the character, & disposal of the state and circumstances of creatures, particularly the eternal state of men, is God's peculiar province, and essential prero­gative. That it belongs to him originally, and inde­pendently; is what he cannot be divested of by any, and indeed is that of which he cannot divest himself: It being essential as absolute perfection, involving jus­tice and mercy, is essential; and the denial of it, in­ferring the denial of divine existence.

ARG. III. GOD actually hath mercy on some, and hardeneth others, Therefore it belongs to him to have mercy on whom he will and to harden whom he will.

1. THE fact is certain, because it is asserted in the Holy Scriptures. He hardened Pharaoh and his servants to their destruction. He had mercy on Paul, and many others have been the subjects of his saving mercy. The fact cannot be questioned, unless we will question the truth of the Bible.

2. IF it be so done in a few instances or a single instance of each sort; it may be done in more, even [...]s many as God sees fit and best. And as the weight of objection, supposing any are disposed to object, must lie against his hardening whom he will; because it may be fairly presumed none will find fault, that God exercises sa­ving mercy, except it be in this point of light, that he ex­ercises it, toward some & not others, those toward whom he exercises it, being no less guilty & ill-deserving, an­tecedent to the exercise thereof, than those in whose favor he doth not exercise it. But this will bring the [Page 29] objector to the other point, whom he will he harden­eth. I say, then, If God doth harden any—doth so dis­pose of things in the system that they are hardened to their eternal destruction, as testimony concerning fact evinces he hath done. Then it belongs to him, it is his province so to do. For he never did, and it is impossi­ble he ever should act out of his real province, contra­ry to his essential prerogative. It also follows; that it is his prerogative to harden whom, and as many as he will. For, if the thing itself implies any oppositi­on to absolute perfection—the holiness of the Deity; such opposition will be implied in a single instance. And if one instance doth not imply opposition; neither will two, ten, or ten thousand; because ten thousand nothings are nothing.

3. By what hath been said it is manifest; that from the instance of Pharaoh and the other instances men­tioned in the context, with great propriety the Apostle drew the consequence. Therefor hath he marcy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hard­eneth. If he hardened Pharaoh he may harden whom he will. There can be nothing to object against his con­duct, let him do it in another, and ever so many other instances, as many as he pleases; any more than there is for his having done it in that instance.

WE must therefore prove, that he did not harden Pharaoh, and that he never hath hardened any; other­wise the consequence will follow, let us make ever so many, attempts to evade it.

ARG. IV. THE potter hath power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, & ano­ther to dishonor. Therefore it belongs to God to have mercy on whom he will, and to harden whom he will.

THIS illuminating proof is suggested by Paul himself as an answer to the objection stated thus, verse 19. "Thou wilt say unto me, Why doth he yet find fault? for who hath resisted his will?" After having said, "Nay but O man, who art thou that repliest against [Page 30] God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? He adds, "Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dis­honor?"

THE same comparison is frequently used to represent God's sovereign power and uncontroulable authority in his disposal of men and things. Isaiah saith XLV. 9. "Woe unto him that striveth with his maker, Let the potsherd strive with the potsherds of the earth. Shall the clay say to him that fashioneth it, What makest thou? or thy work, He hath no hands?" And Jeremi­ah, XVIII. 2—7. "Arise and go down to the potter's house, and there I will cause thee to hear my words. Then I went down to the potter's house, and, behold he wrought a work on the wheels. And the vessel that he made of clay was marred in the hand of the potter; so he made it again another vessel, as seemed good to the potter to make it. Then the word of the LORD came to me saying, O house of Israel, cannot I do with you as this potter? saith the LORD. Behold, as the clay is in the potter's hand, so are ye in mine hand O house of Israel."

HERE several things may be observed. As,

1. THE potter acts in regard to the clay just as he pleases. He holds no consultation with it; and if he should the clay could not inform him what is proper to be done. He only consults himself; he forms his own plan; he moulds and fashions the clay according to his own skill, and pleasure. Of the same lump he makes some into larger some into smaller vessels; some into one shape, some into another, some he designs for this, some for that purpose, just as he will—as he conceives will best answer his own ends; in displaying his work­manship, or in gaining profit.

2. IN this affair no one pretends to find fault. It is readily granted by all that the potter hath power over the clay; that it belongs to him—is his unquestionable [Page 31] prerogative to fashion the clay as he pleaseth.

3. IT appears from the above cited passages, That as clay is in the potter's hand; so are men, and all crea­tures in the hand of God. And that there is no room to question his power, right and prerogative, to dis­pose of them as he pleaseth; any more than to questi­on the power the potter hath over the clay, to mould and fashion it as he pleaseth.

4. WE may add, that this figure is not sufficient to give a full idea. Nor can any similitude be introdu­ced that will every way answer the purpose: Because it is a prerogative absolutely without a parallel. Per­haps no figurative illustration can be devised, better adapted to render the idea clear and familiar, than that of the potter and clay. But this fails. For, Should, it be asked, What right hath the potter to the clay? The answer must be. He hath not an original underiv­ [...] & title to it. The potter doth not make the clay, he only fashions the clay already made to his hand; and made by God, as also was the potter himself. Therefore the potter hath not a right to the clay, as he would have, were he the maker of it. God grants him liberty to use the clay himself hath formed. So that it is only in a secondary sense, and by derivation the potter hath the least right to make use of clay for his work. Whereas the divine right and propriety in all creatures and things is absolutely original, and wholly underived. And it ought to be remembered, that men are at an infinitely greater distance from God than the clay is from the potter. And that he hath infi­nitely more important designs, to be accomplished in his disposal of men and things; than the potter hath in forming different vessels from the same lumps.

5. WE may therefore argue from the less to the greater. If the potter hath power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and ano­ther unto dishonor: Much more doth it belong to God to determine the character, and dispose of the eternal [Page 32] state of men as he pleaseth. It belongs to him in a much higher degree, and in the most absolute sense. And it appears, that God exercises condescention, when he compares his power and prerogative to that of the potter over the clay: Because, although there is some likeness; yet it represents the case only in a very faint manner. However, as no one pretends to question the right of the potter to make what vessel he pleases, and appropriate them to his own purposes: much less ought any to dispute God's right to bestow his saving mercy on whom he pleases, and withhold it from whom he pleases.

ARG. V. EVERY possible [...]othesis respecting the determination of the character and disposal of the e­ternal state of men, except that which is resolved into the wisdom, and good pleasure of the Deity, is weak and insufficient if not impious and absurd. Therefore it belongs to God—is his essential prerogative to have mercy on whom he will have, mercy, and to harden whom he will harden.

To finish the series of argumentation. Let us for once suppose, That God doth not claim it as his inalie­nable prerogative to determine the character, and dis­pose of the state and circumstances of creatures; and in particular the character, and eternal state of the indi­viduals of the human race. And then ask, Who doth or shall determine and order such a variegated, infinite­ly important scene of things? And consider withal what the probable; yea certain consequence must be. In doing this it may be expected. That they who attend without prejudice, and with becoming seriousness and care, will be throughly convinced of the folly and absur­dity of denying, or calling in question, the divine pre­rogative to have mercy on whom he will, and to har­den whom he will.

I WOULD premise, That this supposition ought not to be admitted a single moment, in any other view, than to manifest the falshood, the vast absurdity of that doc­trine [Page 33] which teaches, that it doth not belong to God to exercise a wise and holy sovereignty in the salvation and damnation of sinners. And this is to say, it doth not belong to God to exercise his justice and mercy as he pleases—as he sees it to be necessary, and best they should be exercised. Unless I mistake the point en­tirely, it doth, appear by what hath been said that there is no room to make the supposition, as though God might consistently relinquish his claim to such a prerog­ative. For, if the precedent reasoning be just, it is ab­solutely essential and inalienable. It so belongs to God, that he cannot relinquish it any more than he can deny himself; can diminish his perfection, which would be the same as to undeify himself.

WITH this premised let us proceed. If it doth not belong to God to determine the character, and ascertain the eternal state of men, the question will return. To whom doth it belong?

IN the first place. "Is this to be determined and or­dered by the skill and power of some created being, or by the united deliberations, the joint consent of finite intelligencies?"

IT is very weak indeed to imagine this great affair may be determined and ordered by any one created be­ing. Gabriel alone is not sufficient. And there is no room to suppose the united deliberations of finite intel­ligencies, not those of the human kind; Because they come into existence by succession, and only a few are a­live on earth at once. And should the supposition only comprehend those who are alive on earth at once. It would be impracticable for them to meet together, and unitedly consult and determine who should, and who should not be the objects of saving mercy. Moreover, if they could meet together, and the affair, in respect to each individual, might issue, according to the deter­mination in which they should be united; there is not the shadow of a probability they would unite. Their various selfish biases, and desigus would necessarily, [Page 34] and effectually prevent an agreement.

IN the next place, "Shall we suppose it is the pro­vince of the angels to determine and order who of the human race shall be saved, and who shall be left to pe­rish?" But what angels? The good? Or the bad? Or shall we say? That the good angels determine how many, and who of the human kind shall be the subjects of saving mercy. The evil angels how many, and who shall be hardened to their destruction."

IN regard to the evil angels it may be observed. That they fain would have all without exception hard­ened and destroyed. And are unwearied in their attempts to accomplish the eternal ruin of mankind. Are represented going about as roaring lions seeking whom they may devour. Not for the sake of justice, the support of government, and vindication of the di­vine character; but to gratify their malice, and re­venge.

As to the holy angels—They would find the affair so awful, so deeply involved, and attended with such infi­nitely important and eternal consequences, as that they would not dare to attempt it, were it to be proposed to them, and if they should attempt, would find them­selves wholly unequal to it.

IN the last place, "Shall we say this great affair is left to men themselves? Each one is to determine and ascertain his own character and eternal state?" This indeed is not morely supposed; but asserted, and stren­uously insisted upon by many. It is not as God wills and disposes; but as men themselves will and order. There are who say, "Men shall be blest as far as man permits; A nature Rational implies the power Of being blest or wretched as we please. Heaven wills our happiness, allows our doom; Heaven but persuades, Almighty man decrees; Man is the maker of immortal sates."

IF this supposition should fail; I apprehend it will be [Page 35] allowed that every other hypothesis must be given up.

CONCERNING what is now before us, it may be pro­per to mention several things, and proceed by steps. Here then.

1. IT may be granted, That it was referred to Adam (as far as any such thing could be referred to a crea­ture) to determine his own, and the character and state of his posterity. It is certain, however, that Adam had not that liberty of indifference, that self-determining power, that power of originating volitions, which is urged by many as being essential to moral agency; and necessary to render the volitions and actions of men worthy of praise, or blame. Because such power and liberty is no where to be found, in men, angels, or the Deity; the very notion being absurd. Real perfect indifferency in such a state of mind as takes away the very idea of will or inclination. And to suppose a power to choose without motive, and even against the strongest motive, or motives, is to suppose a power to do nothing. For without motive there can be no choice; because motive is implied in choosing. It is in reality to say, men have a power to choose without choosing, without being able to choose any thing. And if a real indifferency might be supposed without absur­dity it would be evil—sinful. For there ought to be no indifference, respecting holiness, in the hearts of moral agents. To return,

IT may be granted; that, in a low qualified sense, it was referred to Adam to determine his own, and the character and state of his posterity. And we well know the issue of that trial was sin and ruin. As the affair stood at the first fail of man: Adam, and all the human race would have been hardened, to his, and their eter­nal destruction, if not prevented by a special divine in­terposition.

2. THE work of redemption by Christ hath opened the way to prevent the eternal destruction of the hu­man kind. But it is ever to be remembered, that the [Page 36] work Christ finished on the Cross, in itself considered, doth make no alteration in the state of mens minds. The bias of their minds, while unregenerate, is only in favor of sin. Certainly it is not in favor of holiness: For then there would be no need of being born again. And our Saviour did not prea [...] and inculcate the truth when he said, "Except a man be born again he can­not see the kingdom of God." Were the decision, therefore, to be left to men themselves, as the case now stands, they would determine in favor of sin, of persevering opposition to God; would reject salvati­on, unless they might be saved in their own way, and on their own terms. And truly, the very mercy—the salvation itself, holiness being essential thereto and as it were the whole thereof, would be rejected on whate­ver terms it might be proposed. And so the conse­quence would be no salvation: but destruction to the whole race: notwithstanding what Christ hath done, and suffered to procure redemption.

3. THE way of recovery and salvation by Christ being revealed, offers made, and calls given to men; Should it be conceded, that some may possibly be pre­vailed upon to accept the proposals of the Gospel, without any special supernatural influence to change their hearts, and captivate them to the obedience of Christ: Yet, it must be uncertain, whether any would comply. It might turn out so in event, that Christ should not see his seed; not see of the travail of his soul, and be satisfied; and might have none finally to present to his Father. In a word, his death, as to its sa­ving effects, might be wholly frustrated.

4. THIS will lay us under a necessity of maintaining that God (with awe may it be spoken) hath projected a vague plan—a plan some of the most important parts of which are undetermined—a plan full of [...]certain­ty —the event of which himself could not know before hand; although it is said, "Known unto God are all his works, from the beginning." For, if there is no [Page 37] certainty who shall, and who shall not be saved, it can­not be known who shall share the saving effects of divine mercy. Because the previous certainty of an event is implied in the knowledge, or foreknowledge of the e­vent. For, to know that an event shall take place when it is uncertain that it will take place, and may never take place, is a contradiction in terms. And it is no limitation of divine knowledge to say, God can­not know that which is unknowable; any more than it is a limitation of divine power to say, God cannot do that which is impossible—that which implies an absurd­ity. For, as the latter is not the object of power; so neither is the former the object of knowledge.

5. FROM this view of things it appears to be no ways sitting, that the determination of the character, and dis­posal of the eternal state of men should be left to men themselves; nor to any created beings. And if it were, the utmost uncertainty and confusion would be the con­sequence. And as God could not know what would be the event of things in the system; he might be brought to vary and shift, to alter and amend; so as to accomo­date himself to the fickle changing humors of creatures. The folly and absurdity of which doth clearly evince, that it belongs to God to determine the character, and dispose of the eternal state of men according to his own wisdom, and good pleasure.

[Page 38]6. As without this supposition, the system of things is a chaos, without any consistent design: So when we admit the idea, He hath determined, and ascertained the character, and eternal state of men according to his wise and holy will; it appears at once, there is order, connection and effect. JEHOVAH takes, and fills the throne—acts in character of a glorious independent so­vereign —hath a plan of operation settled—knows what he is about to effect—can speak of things that are even­tual, as if they were already in event—has the issue so determined as to be liable to no disappointment—his counsel stands, and he doth all his pleasure. Hence,

7. THIS dilemma is unavoidable. Either the Dei­ty hath no will, no pleasure respecting the salvation, and damnation of the individuals of the human race, or his counsel doth not stand; Unless it be true that he hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and harden­eth whom he will; as fully and definitively as hath been mentioned.

To say his counsel doth not stand, is not only to de­ny the spirit, and express letter of the scriptures by a daring contradiction. But is also to affirm in effect, that "the blessed and only Potentate" is liable to mutation; is subjected to caprice, multiplied beyond expression; and exposed to experience and less disappointment.

ON the other hand; to say he hath no will, no pleasure respecting the character and eternal state of men, is as much as to say, he is unconcerned in regard to what takes place in this part of the system. And we may as well say he is unconcerned in regard to what takes place in another, and in every other part of the universal sys­tem. Or say he hath no system, no plan of operation. And for any to urge, "That the divine will is conditi­onal. There is nothing definitively fixed in the divine mind respecting the individuals that shall be saved, and that shall perish: Only this in general: He is resolved to have mercy on all who repent, and to harden and destroy all those who remain impenitent. And this be­ing the sum of his will and counsel: he not only hath a will in the matter; but his counsel must stand, let it fall as it may with the individuals of the human race." I say, to urge this will afford no relief. Because re­pentance is implied in God's having mercy on any, in the sense of the text; and impenitence continued to the last is implied in his hardening whom he will. To say God is determined to have mercy on whom he will, less or more, on supposition they repent; when, at the same time, his having mercy comprises their repentance on whom he will have mercy. And to say God is doter­mined to harden whom he will, less or more, on suppo­sition [Page 39] they remain impenitent; when impenitence is what is meant by being hardened, is plainly absurd—is, absolutely, saying nothing to the purpose. By this it may be seen, that there cannot be any conditional de­cree or determination in the divine mind, respecting his having mercy on some, and hardening others.

8. THEREFORE on the whole. Since a denial that it belongs to God—is his essential prerogative to have mercy on whom he will have mercy, and to harden whom he will; is so full of weakness, and absurdity. Since there are no other beings to whom it doth or can belong. And since the admission of this sets God upon the throne; subjecting the materials and the intellectu­al world, to his authority and will. And in fine, leads us to see how his own, which are the wisest and best ends, may be certainly and infallibly accomplished. We ought to be established in a clear conviction, and full persuasion of this great truth: That it belongs to God—is his essential prerogative to determine the cha­racter, and dispose of the eternal state of men; in holi­ness, and salvation; or in sin, and damnation, accord­ing to his own good pleasure.

THE THIRD PART. Containing answers to ob­jections, and an improvement of the subject.

I APPREHEND the following are the most considerable objections any can pretend to advance against what hath been stated and urged.

OBJ. I. "THE preceeding representation must ne­cessarily be contrary to truth, and is really chargeable with blasphemy: For it makes God the author of sin."

ANS.1. IF, by author of sin, is meant acting, loving sin, or being a sinner; to say God is the author of sin would be full of blasphemy. And any scheme any sen­timent fairly implying this, ought to be rejected with the greatest abhorrence. What hath been said upon the subject implies no such thing. It is not asserted, that God is the creator of sin. It is not said, he wills sin, as desiring it to take place, for its own sa [...]e. And [Page 40] the divine agency and disposal are not concerned in the event, in any such sense, as to render the sinning crea­ture less to blame than he would be, should sin take place, without any divine agency and disposal respecting it.

Now when all these ideas are removed, should any insist that God's hardening whom he will doth make him the author of sin; he must be the author of it, without any thing criminal being implied, or any denial of his infinite holiness, his absolute perfection, And conse­quently, without any thing to be faulted, to be object­ed against with any really colourable pretext.

2. SINCE the phrase, author of sin, is odious, and calculated to excite the prejudices of mankind against any doctrine. It may not be uncharitable to suppose, there are who strenuously insist, that the taking place of sin, and the damnation of sinners, in consequence of any divine decree and disposal; makes God the author of sin, and the ruin of his creatures, on purpose to pre­judice the minds of men, against admitting such doc­trine. And in event, against what the scriptures plainly and unequivocally declare, and even urge, as being es­sential in the plan of the divine counsels and works.

3. IF to have sin, as an event, comprehended in the divine plan, and such a disposal of things in the system that a certain number shall be hardened in wickedness, entirely by their own fault, to their eternal destruction, makes God the author of sin: Then, that God is the author of sin is implied in what hath been stated and de­fended. But, what is there in this to disgust an inqui­sitive, unprejudiced mind? In this case, it would be a harmless, misapplied epithet—misapplied; because the word author is calculated to convey some other idea, and prejudice the mind against the doctrine—yet harm­less; because, in reality, it would not imply the impu­tation of blame, or any thing wrong on God's part.

4. WILL, the objector insist, "that sin in event was not comprehended in the divine plan. And that God [Page 41] meant every way as much as possible, to guard against and prevent such an effect?"

HE may as well say there was no plan, & there is no divine disposal; and deny there is any such thing as moral evil in the system. But the fact is clear and in­disputable: Sin has taken place, and is constantly ta­king place in this world. And it is fact that sin takes place under the divine government. God, therefore, hath not interposed so as to prevent sin taking place.

FROM this it follows. Either first. That God did not design effectually to prevent sin taking place. Or secondly. That he was not able to accomplish his own purpose. And certainly, it is too much for any to say he could not possibly have prevented it. But, if any will insist that he did design to prevent it, and has fail­ed in accomplishing his purpose. Then it will follow thirdly. That he is disappointed. Because disappoint­ment consists in this very thing, a rational being not reaching, not accomplishing his intention and expecta­tion. Moreover, the disappointment, in this case, must needs be great, vastly ineffably great. So that, accord­ing to this doctrine the counsel of God, instead of stan­ding, is broken and destroyed in instances and ways in­numerable.

5. IT will not avail any thing to say, "That, al­though sin was not comprehended in God's original plan; and it has taken place contrary to his intention and will in every view: Yet, upon the taking place of sin, in his unsearchable wisdom, he hath devised a me­thod to defeat the sinner; to vindicate and establish his character and government most fully and most glori­ously; and in the end gain by disappointment, of which sin is the occasion, in the frustration of his original plan and scheme of things." For this in effect would be a denial of his eternal existence, and absolute per­fection; a denial of his omniscience, omnipotence, and immutability. For, if something hath taken place which he did not comprehend before, he cannot be [Page 42] "the high and losty One that inhabiteth eternity." And if he has changed his original plan he must be a metable being; and not that father of lights—that fountain of knowledge, excellence, power and glory "with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning." This therefore, is a futile impious evasion; full of atheism and blasphemy.

6. IT is evident that the work of redemption is more glorious than any, than all the other works of God. In the contrivance and execution of which there is the clea­rest and fullest exhibition of the divine character. Al­so the display of perfection therein to be made, and the good thereby to be produced, was the ultimate end of creation. Now to deny this was comprehended in the divine plan is to deny, that the most illustrious display of perfection, and that in reference, and some sort of subservience to which all other divine works are done, was comprehended therein. Which is a weakness, and an absurdity too gross to be admitted a single moment. But, if the work of redemption was comprehended in the divine plan sin was comprehended therein: because the work of redemption supposes, and necessarily im­plies sin. For without sin there would have been no room, no need of atonement for sin. If there had been no sinners, lost perishing creatures, in the nature of the case, there could be no saviour of sinners. If God had not been dishonored his character could not be vindi­cated by the obedience, and death of Christ. There would have been no opportunity for the united, and contrasted display of vindictive justice, and redeeming meray. Therefore, by excluding sin in event from [...] comprehended in the divine plan, we exclude [...]. In a word, we must turn atheists; and a­ [...] whatsoever takes place to chance, or blind sate; lest by admitting a providence, and foresight we should make God the author of sin. And when we have done this, all talk of sin and moral evil will be vain and fool­ish.

[Page 43]OBJ. II. ACCORDING to what hath been advanced "it is necessary that some should be hardened to their destruction. If so, liberty is destroyed; men are mere machines; and there can be no reason to impute guilt and blame to them."

ANS. 1. I THROW several ideas and different ex­pressions into this objection; because they seem to be united, and will stand or fall together. For, if men are moved and acted like a wind mill, or a watch, there is no liberty—no moral agency. And if there is no li­berty, and moral agency doubtless men are not to blame; and there can be no reason to impute guilt when they commit, what are called, the grossest crimes. And finally, the doctrine of a natural absolute necessi­ty and fatality must be admitted. But none of these horrid consequences do follow from this position, He hardeneth whom he will. Men are not machines, are not acted like machines when they are hardened in sin: For they are voluntary, they move and act of choic [...] Whereas in a mere machine there is no volition, [...] acted upon; but doth not act, doth not put forth any exertion. There is then, an essential difference. A mere machine cannot exercise liberty, cannot be to blame; because it has no design, no volition. But God in hardening sinners doth not influence them in a­ny such manner, as to prevent sin being their own act— or to prevent their actins of choice. And because they act voluntarily, respecting that which is evil and make the evil their own, they are to blame, are whol­ly without excuse. Sinners are not compelled to do wickedly. Whatever extrinsic influence there may be in the production of volition it is not of the nature of compulsion. For we mean by compulsion, that power which effects a thing against, or at least, without our will and consent. But there is nothing of this. Nei­ther hath it been maintained that God infuseth hardness into men. There is no necessity, therefore, of mens' sinning at all, and remaining under the power of lust, [Page 44] of any such kind as will exculpate them; as will exte­nuate their sin and guilt in the lowest degree, by taking away their liberty.

2. THE most hardened sinners are, to all intents, moral agents and accountable; because they act freely. And the more hardened they are the other criminal; be­cause this is no more than voluntarily and freely acting wickedness to a higher degree.

3. ALTHOUGH there is, in some sense, a necessity of being hardened when it is said, "Whom he will he hardeneth" i. e. a necessity of a moral kind—a certain­ty: yet this is no such necessity as is opposed to liber­ty. The greatest certainty or moral necessity may be consistent with the highest liberty. It is necessary God should act in a holy manner; yet he acts with the most perfect freedom. And there is a certainty that the glo­rified saints will be holy and happy forever; by which their liberty, their moral agency will not be destroyed, or infringed; but confirmed, and exalted.

OBJ. III. "THE sentence, Whom he will he harden­eth as it hath been stated, implies a denial of the divine holiness. For the moral law is a transcript of the divine perfections; discovers the heart—the will and pleasure of the Deity. He there forbids sin upon pain of his eternal displeasure, and represents it to be that abominable thing which his soul abhors. But, if sin was comprehended in his plan and disposal of things it must be agreeable to his mind that sin should take place. And it is false to say, He is of purer eyes than to be­hold iniquity: for he must, according to this doctrine, behold it with complacency rather than abhorrence; be­cause it is hischoice & the consequence of his disposals.

ANS. 1. IF the sentiment which has been advanced doth really imply a denial, or any repugnancy to the holiness of the Deity, it ought to be rejected. Cer­tainly God is a holy being, infinitely holy. With the greatest propriety do Seraphim, and Cherubim cry, "Holy, holy, holy is the LORD of hosts." So that [Page 45] no sentiment that denies God's essential infinite purity is to be endured 2 moment. Also, sin is diametrically opposite to holiness—is what God must necessarily hate with perfect detestation. Evil doth not, cannot dwell with him.

2. THERE is no denial of holiness in saying, God wills the event; or wills not effectually to prevent sin taking place, and disposes things so as not effectually to prevent it. Indeed this is so far from implying a deni­al of holiness, that his will and disposal in reference to sin is entirely holy—is done in the exercise of his infi­nite purity. And his perfect hatred of sin itself is im­plied therein. For,

3. A DISTINCTION is to be made between God's pre­ceptive, and decretive providential will. The Bible teaches us to make such a distinction. And it is neces­sary to reconcile what otherwise might appear to be ir­reconcileable. A distinction of this kind is evidently implied in what is said, respecting the conduct of Jo­s;eph's brethren, in selling him to the Ishmaelites—In what is said respecting the king of Assyria—and the part the Jews acted in the crucifixion of Christ.

Now were sin in event as contrary to the decretive and providential, as sin itself is to the preceptive will of God; we may be sure it never would take place, on supposition there was no possibility of preventing it. And to say there was no possibility is to limit the di­vine power. But God certainly could prevent it, if no other way, by withholding existence. And this he no doubt would do rather than sin should take place, were sin in event, as contrary to his providential, as it is to his preceptive will.

4. WHATSOEVER takes place through the system from beginning to end, takes place in consistence with the decretive and providential will of God; but sin takes place in perfect [...]nosition to his preceptive will. From which it doth not follow, that the decree is in re­pugnance to the command—it doth not follow, that [Page 46] God's will in the former case opposes his holy will in the latter—it doth not follow that God hath two wills thwarting each other. Were there a real opposition insisting on the distinction would run us into the Ma­nichean heresy, or what would be as gross. And would even amount to a denial of divine existence. For God is one and ever consistent with himself in all he purpo­seth, faith and doth. Let me add,

5. THERE may be a clear ground for distinction where there is no opposition. Order and harmony im­ply distinction; but no opposition, So that while the exercise of one and the same, will of the Deity is distin­guished, it is and may appear, even to our understand­ings, perfectly harmonious.

HERE it may be urged. "Sin is in full opposition to the preceptive will of God. And it appears that his preceptive will is holy; because it forbids, and by for­bidding opposes sin. But the providential will of God, as allowed above, is in favor of sin taking place. Now if this doth not imply a contradiction, What doth or can? For, if that will which forbids sin be holy, that will which decrees and gives it event must be unholy."

REPLY. THERE is no opposition. The will of De­ity in both is perfectly holy: For, although God deter­mined not to prevent the taking place of sin, and doth dispose things in the system so as not effectually to pre­vent it; and the certain consequence of his not pre­venting it is, that sin doth take place by the creatures fault: Yet his decretive providential will is not at all in favor of sin itself; doth not imply a disposition to be pleased with sin or any the least approbation of it; but the contrary. Sin is considered by God, in his de­cree and providence relative to it, as being perfectly e­vil and hateful. And as such by him to be opposed. Perhaps the matter may be rendered more intelligible, and satisfactory to some, by expressing it thus. The will of Deity, in his decree and disposal of things rela­tive to sin, doth not fix upon and cleave to sin, as its [Page 47] object. Properly speaking sin is not the object in view; the object, strictly speaking, is that which the mind rests upon—that which is ultimate. The divine mind doth not terminate on sin; but his own glory, and the final establishment and reign of holiness to be accomplished, through his overruling wisdom and providence, by oc­casion of sin taking place. And as the advancement of holiness, and the divine glory were ultimate in his de­creeing sin, and in all the disposals of his providence re­latively to it: So his decretive providential will, must be perfectly holy, and entirely concordant with his pre­ceptive will.

SHOULD any, hoping to evade, or greatly embarrass this reply, ask, "Why may not God command his crea­tures to sin with a view to his own glory, and the ad­vancement of holiness; as well as decree sin in event with such a view? Also, Why may not creatures com­mit sin, they having the same thing in view, that God is said to have in decreeing it—to give him occasion by their opposition eventually to honor himself, and e­stablish holiness? And in sine, Why may not sinners express their good will in sinning, as it is insisted God expresses his good will in permitting sin to take place?"

To all that can be urged in any such line this will be a sufficient rejoinder. That Paul has obviated and re­pelled with indignation a similar insinuation, as if it were a just consequence from the doctrine lie had advanced. See Rom. III. 7.8.

MOREOVER, it is a plain absurdity, a manifest contra­diction. The case stated or supposed, in the above queries, destroys itself. For in sinning the love of evil is implied: But none can love evil, which necessarily implies the hatred of good, an overlion to holiness, with an ultimate view to that good—that holiness— To say this is an evident contradiction: Whereas in God's de­creeing sin, and his disposal of things no love of evil is implied; but a perfect hatred thereof, & a determination to counteract its bad tendency. & bring good out of evil. [Page 48] Or thus. Creatures in sinning ultimately regard them­selves. This essentially belongs to the idea, the true description of sin. Now it is a contradiction to say creatures may ultimately regard themselves, with an ul­timate view to the glory of God. And it is equally ab­surd to say, God may require creatures ultimately to re­gard themselves, in a view to their ultimately regarding or glorifying himself, in that very regard they bear to themselves.

OBJ. IV. "If God hath mercy on whom he will, and hardeneth whom he will, in the sense which hath been stated, he is the most tyrannical being in the uni­verse: For it represents him as exercising an odious partiality in his treatment of his creatures—As making a multitude of rational beings on purpose to damn them. And as acting manifest injustice and cruelty in his dis­posal of things."

ANS. SUCH kind of language, which many are free to use under the notion of discrediting God's sovereign­ty in his decree and disposal of things, is calculated to fire the imagination, and inflame the passions; but not to convince the reason and conscience. The doctrine itself, rightly understood, is not calculated to excite such ideas, or prompt men to use such language, And it greatly behoves those who do not admit the doctrine to take heed how they pass their censures upon doc­trines, too plainly revealed in the Scriptures to be ques­tioned with propriety, much less to be denied and ridi­culed; lest they should be found fighters against God. —If this may not be taken as sufficient to refute the objection, which in what hath been said, is viewed rath­er as a cavil than a serious objection. Let me answer,

1. THE subject above stated and vindicated repre­sents God as being an awful, infinitely amiable and glo­rious sovereign: But not a tyrant; Not a respecter of persons, as this character is given to denote something wrong and mean in the conduct of a judge. And not exercising the least injustice and cruelty.

[Page 49]SOME in their minds seem to blend sovereignty, and tyranny. With them, to act in a sovereign manner is the same as to act without reason and propriety; or ra­ther against reason and justice. And they may have been led to blend these together, by considering what commonly is exhibited in the character of those who take the stile of earthly sovereigns and potentates. O­dious tyranny and despotism, the greatest injustice and cruelty being exercised by them, in sporting with the fortunes and lives of men to gratify their pride and am­bition. But were it allowed, that there is no proprie­ty in calling any mortal advanced to a throne a sove­reign. And should all who are so called prove tyrants, this would not make sovereignty and tyranny the same: Because the abuse of sovereignty doth not make sove­reignty to be the same with tyranny. Therefore, if a­ny are used to blend these together, it is owing to their weakness or prejudice. God is an absolute sove­reign. This is no other than to say, He has an origin­al inalienable right and propriety in all things to dis­pose of them as he pleases. Not indeed that he ma [...] his pleasure the principle and law of his conduct to­wards his creatures in that sense, the great ones of the earth make their will their law; which is to trample on the rights and privileges of others, because it is in the power of their hands to do so, without any conside­ration of wisdom, or regard to justice. But God doth and there is perfect propriety he should determine who shall be the objects of his favor, and who the subjects of his wrath according to his own wisdom and pleasure, without asking counsel of any. And it is utterly im­proper any creature should say, What doest thon? or why doest thou so?

2. IN making one man unto honor & another unto dis­honor, there is not the shadow of injustice. This might be ur [...]d with good reason if God had, or should d [...]e men to destruction without any consideration of their [...] and should i [...] a greate punishment [Page 50] than they deserve. But this is not, and never will be done. By what hath been said I trust it appears: That men are no less criminal in the commission of sin, than they would be, were there no decree and divine dispo­sal relative to sin in envent. And as the misery to be brought upon the finally impenitent will not exceed their just deserts, no injustice [...] be done to them whom he hardeneth. On the o [...]d; justice will be glorified in their punishment [...] destruction.

"WHA therefore if God willing to shew his wrath, and make his power known on the vessels of wrath fit­ted to destruction" by their own demerit, "and endu­red with much long suffering." What complaint or objection can be reasonably made? Surely none.

3. As no injustice; so no cruelty will be exercised. Cruelty is a disposition to wound and grieve without, cause; a disposition to delight and sport with the mise­ry of others. No such narrow revengefulness of dispo­sition will be exercised by God in making the vessels of wrath suffer amazing, endless misery. It is true, God will take pleasure in himself glorified; in order, and the reign of holiness established and increased by means of their torment; but not in their torment itself. God will certainly inflict endless punishment upon finally im­penitent sinners: Yet he doth not delight in the death of snners. "He hath sworn by his own life, that he delighteth not in the death of him that dieth." He is induced to punish them by considerations of wisdom, propriety, justice and necessity. Or because it is im­portant they should be destroyed; and on the whole, all things considered, most desirable.

4. HARDESING some, and saving others doth not make God to be a respecter of persons, in the sense the Scripture saith He is no respecter of persons. The sen­timent advanced is not denied by saying, "In every nation he that feareth God, and worketh rightcousness is accepted with him:" Because it is true, that they in every nation on whom God hath mercy do, or will fear [Page 51] him, and work righteousness.

WHEN a judge favors one and condemns another con­trary to the law, the rule by which characters, well and ill deserving are to be decided, and sentence to pass; for instance when he passes sentence from repossession, or some wrong bias, as being nearly related, or having received a bribe, he is a respecter of persons, is guilty of a mean odious partiality. So; if God should bestow his mercy on one merely because he is a Jew, and refuse it to another because he is a Gentile, the Gentile having the same qualification with the Jew by complying with the condition required. And more evidently and emi­nently still, the Gentile complying, and the Jew refusing a compliance. He would then be a respecter of persons in a truly objectionable sense.

Now, although for a judge to act as hath been repre­sented would imply a criminal partiality: Yet the same person, or any other not a judge, having an estate and no natural heir, might select one, or a few just as he should please, on whom to confer his estate; and no one would have a right to tax him with being a respec­ter of persons, because he did not bequeath it to all without discrimination. And if such a prerogative is allowed to men, in respect to what they possess, and call their own, shall not God bestow his special favors on whom he pleases, without the imputation of being an o­dious respecter of persons?

OBJ. V. "THE subject, as it hath been stated and defended, makes God to act in a trifling insincere man­ner, and impose upon men in the calls and offers of the Gospel. Because he appears to express great kindness and tenderness towards sinners, willing rather that they should turn and live; when he is determined, at the same time, to withhold his saving mercy from mul­titudes, and make them monuments of his eternal wrath.

WHAT possible kindness and sincerity can there be in offering salvation to any, except those on whom he [Page 52] [...] mercy? And why may it not with propriety be deem [...]d Indicrous to invite and urge ALL to come? using language to which carries the appearance of pather and zeal, and proceeding so far as to beseech sinne [...]s to be reconciled; when by an unfrustrable de­cree [...] hath excluded from a share in his saving mer­cy, [...] may be the greater part of those, to whom he make [...] the proposal and gives the invitations, so warm­ly and pathetically urged and enforced? And is deter­mined that they shall be hardened to their eternal de­struction?"

ANS. 1. GOD is perfectly sincere in the offers he makes and the invitations he gives to sinners. He is as serious, sincere and kind in making the offer of salva­tion to those who do not and never will accept, as he is, in making it to those who do accept. And his having mercy on whom he will, and hardening whom he will doth not militate against this in the least. God doth not trifle with sinners when he invites them to accept of salvation, any more than he doth when he commands men to be holy as he is holy. His calls and invitations are authoritative; they point out what is good, & in it­self desirable. This implies, that he is as willing all should comply with his calls, as he is, that all should o­bey him. God looks upon himself really and greatly slighted, dishonored and undervalued by their refusal. And that he has good reason to dislike and punish the ill treatment of those who scornfully, and obstinately re­ject them. Therefore,

2. I SAY again, the sentiment advanced doth not mili­tate against the divine sincerity at all: Because the sen­timent has no concern with the calls and offers of the Gospel, in the sense put upon them by the objector. They are distinct things. It is sufficient to vindicate the divine sincerity, that God stands ready to fulfil and be­stow what is set forth in the calls and offers he gives and makes, on supposition they are complied with by sin­ners: For this is clear and certain, "Whosoever will, [Page 53] may come; and him that cometh Christ will in no wise cast out." There is no decree or divine disposal to pre­vent their coming if they will, if they are cordially in­clined to come. And being, [...] re [...]ning unwilling [...] entirely their own fault.

PERHAPS some will urge; "that he [...]e lies the difficul­ty. Sinners are unwilling. God knows they are, and must continue so, unless, in the day of his power, he makes them willing, What kin [...]ness and sincerity then can there be in making offers, giving invitations, and using intreaties; when he knows they will, and has determined they shall be rejected?

REPLY. 1. THERE is the sa [...]e kindness and sinceri­ty as if God knew the offers would be most cordially accepted. And his having mercy on some, by disposing them to accept, is a distinct thing, and superadded to the calls and offers themselves. Therefore, although it is readily conceded, that much greater kindness is exerci­sed by God towards those on whom he hath mercy, by making them willing in the day of his power, than to­wards those who are not made willing: Yet this great­er mercy is not exercised in the calls that are given, the offers that are made; but in respect to the offers, and the arguments used to induce a compliance, there is precisely the same kindness and sincerity towards all.

2. GOD might be sincere in making the offer to all on supposition none did, and not one ever should ac­cept it. Even as he is sincere, serious and earnest in requiring the subjection and obedience of all those who are in a state of unregeneracy; although none in that state do yield any cordial subjection and obedience to his commands, and he knows perfectly well that they will not. Also, their not doing it is as much the result of the divine decree and disposal, as hardening whom he will to their destruction is the result of his decree and disposal. Therefore,

3. WE may as well say, God acts sarcastically, and tantalizes his creatures when he requires their subjec­tion [Page 54] and obedience, they being and remaining indispo­sed to yield obedience, as that he doth so when he makes offers, they being indisposed to accept them. Now this is as much as to say. The will, the inclination of crea­tures is the measure of their obedience. If they have no inclination to obey, there is no reason they should be required to obey. And this again is as much as to say. Every creature ought to do as he pleases, and God has no right to exercise any authority; and if he pretends to do it he treats them in a ludicrous abusive manner, and they have good reason to complain and find fault. But,

4. WHO art thou that thus repliest against God? Let thy mouth be stopped; or surely, thou shalt be most justly condemned.

OBJ. VI. "THIS is a gloomy uncomfortable doc­trine calculated to lead men; especially awakened sin­ners to despair: Or else to stifle their convictions. The natural tendency of it is to render means and en­deavors vain and useless. For, if it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth: If the unregenerate may not lay any claim to saving mercy after all their most painful seekings and strivings: If there is a cer­tain number on whom God will have mercy, and a cer­tain number whom he will harden to their destruction— to what purpose can it be to seek and strive? Each sin­ner may say. If I am to be saved, I shall be saved, and if I am to perish I shall perish, let my exertions be as they may. And since it is not left with men to deter­mine their own character, and ascertain their eternal state; but it hangs on a decree and disposal which they cannot frustrate; let them stand still, and see what God means to do, whether to save or to damn; and give themselves no exercise and concern about that which doth not belong to them; and which to say that it doth belong to them implies a denial of God's essential, ina­lie [...]able prerogative."

ANS. 1. IT is true, that the doctrine is calculated [Page 55] to lead men to despair of help from themselves; and to see the vanity of priding themselves in those distinc­tions, in which mankind are exceedingly disposed to glory. To shut out all boasting, and make men know that salvation is of God alone. It is true accor­ding to this doctrine, and many other things revealed in the Holy Book, that the unregenerate do not, and can­not lay God under any obligation to save them, by their exertions. Nor will any of their exertions render their salvation certain. Their salvation, if they are sa­ved, will not be the proper fruit of their exertions; but wholly the effect of sovereign mercy. So that, this doctrine being true, men must be brought to renounce dependence on themselves altogether, and submit to di­vine sovereignty.

2. ALL this notwithstanding; the doctrine is so far from being gloomy, and calculated to drive men, par­ticularly awakened sinners to despair, that it is their only proper source and ground of hope. It is the hinge, on which the door turns from despair to a ray of hope. For were it not so, that God hath mercy on whom he will have mercy there would be no hope at all. Or whatever expectations might be raised, would be no o­ther than deceiving presumptions. It is most falla­cious and preposterous for sinners to think they can, by their doings, confer any obligation upon God, and re­commend themselves as worthy of his regard. The unregenerate do not remove; nor lessen their guilt by their exertions. Therefore, if God could, or would not exercise his saving mercy, unless by their strivings unregenerate sinners should recommend themselves to his favor; there absolutely would be no ground of hope; their case would be remediles [...]ly desperate.

BUT since the way is open for God to have mercy on whom he will have mercy; sinners whose minds are exercised about their eternal concerns need not despair. They are in the hand of a holy and [...]; yet merciful being. God can save them; it m [...]e he will. And [Page 56] although they find that they have sinned exceedingly; find themselves ever so guilty, ill and hell-deserving; yet God can, and it may be, he will have mercy upon and save them. Add to this,

3. IF any are awakened, and solicitously inquiring after God and salvation, it is more probable [...]at saving mercy is intended for them; than if they were not awa­kened and inquiring. And more probable; than that it is intended for others who are going on carelessly and daringly in ways of impiety. Because; before God visits sinners with saving mercy, he is wont to bring them into an exercising situation. And if any continue to give themselves no concern about their souls, and ob­taining salvation, it is a token of dereliction.

4. THERE is not the least ground from the doctrine to say, If we are to be saved we shall be saved let us live as we may, and whether we take any pains or not. Because repentance, faith, and obedience are implied in, or will certainly follow the exercise of saving mer­cy, whenever it is bestowed upon any. And it is pal­pably absurd to say, If God purposeth to have mercy on such an one he will have mercy upon him, although he should remain careless and impenitent, and continue to live in wickedness to the last; because repentance is comprised in God's having mercy. For this would be to assert, and at the same time deny his having mer­cy, in the sense intended.

5. THAT any may on good ground be persuaded they are the subjects of saving mercy, they must find, must experience those exercises and effects, which the Scrip­tures state, as what will proceed therefrom. Such as humility, faith, self denial and obedience. They must live in the exercise of the graces, and practice of the vir­tues and duties of Christianity. We are to make our calling and election sure by adding to our faith virtue, Knowledge, temperance, patience, godliness, brotherly kindness and charity. Finally, they who have any ex­perience of God's saving mercy are, from the doctrine [Page 57] vindicated [...], as well as [...] of [...] in­cited "to work out their own salvation with fear and trembling," by this most pertinent, and weigl [...]y argu­ment. "It is God which [...] in you, both to will and to do of his own good pleasure!"