NUMBER I. On the Foederal Government, and first on the safety of the people, from the restraints imposed on the President.

IT is impossible for an honest and feeling mind, of any nation or country whatever, to be insensible to the present circumstances of America. Were I an East Indian, or a Turk, I should consider this singular situation of a part of my fellow creatures as the most curious and interesting. Intimately con­nected with [...] country, as a citizen of the union, I confess it entirely engrosses my mind and feelings.

To take a proper view of the ground on which we stand, it may be necessary to recollect the manner in which the United States were originally settled and [Page 4]established. Want of charity in the religious systems of Europe, and of justice in their political govern­ments, were the principal moving causes, which drove the emigrants of various countries to the Ame­rican continent. The Congregationalists, Quakers, Presbyterians and other British dissenters, the Catho­lics of England and Ireland, the Hugonots of France, the German Lutherans, Calvinists, and Moravians, with several other societies, established themselves in the different colonies, thereby laying the ground of that liberality in ecclesiastical affairs, which has been observable since the late revolution. Religious liber­ty naturally promotes corresponding dispositions in matters of government. The constitution of En­gland, as it stood on paper, was one of the freest, at that time, in the world, and the American colonies considered themselves as entitled to the fullest enjoy­ment of it. Thus, when the ill-judged discussions of late times in England brought into question the rights of this country, as it stood connected with the British crown, we were found more strongly impress­ed with their importance, and accurately acquainted with their extent, than the wisest and most learned of our brethren beyond the Atlantic. When the great­est names in parliament insisted on the power of that body over the commerce of the colonies, and even the right to bind us in all cases whatsoever, America, seeing that it was only another form of tyranny, insisted upon the immutable truth, that taxation and repre­sentation are inseparable; and, while a desire of har­mony and other considerations induced her into an acquiescence in the commercial regulations of Great-Britain, it was done from the declared necessity of the case, and with a cautious, full, and absolute saving of our voluntarily-suspended rights. The parliament was persevering, and America continued firm, till hostilities and open war commenced, and finally the late revolution closed the contest for-ever.

[Page 5] It is evident, from this short detail, and the reflec­tions which arise from it, that the quarrel between the United States and the parliament of Great-Bri­tain did not arise so much from objections to the form of government, though undoubtedly a better one by far is now within our reach, as from a difference concerning certain important rights, resulting from the essential principles of liberty, which their constitution actually preserved to all the subjects residing within the realm. It was not asserted by America, that the people of the island of Great-Britain were slaves, but that we, though possessed absolutely of the same rights, were not admitted to enjoy an equal degree of freedom.

When the declaration of independence compleated the separation between the two countries, new go­vernments were necessarily established. Many cir­cumstances led to the adoption of the republican form, among which was the predilection of the people. In devising the frames of government, it may have been difficult to avoid extremes opposite to the vices of that we had just rejected; nevertheless, many of the state constitutions we have chosen are truly excel­lent. Our misfortunes have been, that in the first in­stance we adopted no national government at all; but were kept together by common danger only; and that in the confusions of a civil war, we framed a foederal constitu­tion, now universally admitted to be inadequate to the pre­servation of liberty, property, and the union. The questi­on is not, then, how far our state constitutions are good, or otherwise—the object of our wishes is, to amend and supply the evident and allowed errors and defects of the foederal government. Let us consider a while, that which is now proposed to us—let us compare it with the so much boasted British form of government, and see how much more it favours the people, and how com­pletely it secures their rights, remembering, at the same time, that we did not dissolve our connection [Page 6]with that country so much on account of its constitu­tion, as the perversion and mal-administration of it.

In the first place, let us look at the nature and powers of the head of that country, and those of the ostensible head of ours.

The British king is the great bishop or supreme head of an established church, with an immense patronage annexed. In this capacity he commands a number of votes in the house of lords, by creating bishops, who, besides their great incomes, have votes in that assembly, and are judges in the last resort. These prelates have also many honorable and lucrative places to bestow, and thus from their wealth, learning, dig­nities, powers, and patronage, give a great lustre and an enormous influence to the crown.

In America, our president will not only be without these influencing advantages, but they will be in the possession of the people at large, to strengthen their hands in the event of a contest with him. All religious funds, honors and powers, are in the gift of numberless un­connected, disunited and contending corporations, wherein the principle of perfect equality universally pre­vails. In short, danger from ecclesiastical tyranny, that long standing and still remaining curse of the people —that sacrilegious engine of royal power in some coun­tries—can be feared by no man in the United States. In Britain, their king is for life—in America, our President will always [...] one of the people at the end of four years. In that country, the king is hereditary, and may be an ideot, a knave, or a tyrant by nature, or ignorant from neglect of his education, yet cannot be removed, for "he can do no wrong." This is a favorite maxim of their constitution. In America, as the President is to be one of the people at the end of his short term, so will he and his fellow citizens remember, that he was originally one of the people; and that he is created by their breath. Further, he cannot be [Page 7]an ideot, probably not a knave or tyrant, for those whom nature makes so discover it before the age of thirty-five, until which period he cannot be elected. It appears, we have not admitted that he can do no wrong, but have rather pre-supposed he may and some­times will do wrong, by providing for his impeachment, his trial, and his peaceable and complete removal.

In England the king has a power to create mem­bers of the upper house, who are judges in the high­est court, as well as legislators. Our President not only cannot make members of the Senate, but their creation, like his own, is by the people, through their representatives: and a member of Assembly may and will be as certainly dismissed at the end of his year, for electing a weak or wicked Senator, as for any other blunder or misconduct.

The king of England has complete legislative pow­er, while our President can only use it when the other servants of the people are divided. But in all great cases affecting the national interests or safety, his modified and restrained power must give way to the sense of two-thirds of the legislature. In fact it amounts to no more, than a serious duty imposed upon him to re­quest both houses to re-consider any matter on which he entertains doubts or feels apprehensions; and hers the people have a strong hold upon him from his sole and personal responsibility.

The President of the upper-house (or the chancel­lor) in England, is appointed by their king, while our Vice-President, who is chosen by the people, through the electors and the Senate, is not at all dependant on the President, but may exercise equal powers on some occasions. In all royal governments, an helpless in­fant or an inexperienced youth may wear the crown. Our President must be matured by the experience of years, and being born among us, his character at thirty-five must be fully understood. Wisdom, virtue and ac­tive [Page 8]qualities of mind and body can alone make him the first servant of a free and enlightened people.

Our President will fall very much short indeed of any prince in his annual income, which will not be hereditary, but the absolute allowance of the people, pas­sing through the hands of their other servants from year to year, as it becomes necessary. There will be no burdens on the nation, to provide for his heir, or other branch­es of his family. It is probable, from the state of property in America, and other circumstances, that many citizens will exceed him in show and expence,—those dazzling trappings of kingly rank and power. He will have no authority to make a treaty, without two thirds of the senate, nor can he appoint ambassadors or other great officers without their approbation, which will remove the idea of patronage and influence, and of per­sonal obligation and dependence. The appointment of even the inferior officers may be taken out of his hands by an act of congress at any time; he can cre­ate no nobility or titles of honour, nor take away offices during good behaviour. His person is not so much protected as that of a member of the house of repre­sentatives; for he may be proceeded against like any other man in the ordinary course of law. He appoints no officer of the separate states. He will have no influ­ence from placemen in the legislature, nor can he prorogue or dissolve it. He will have no power over the trea­sures of the state; and, lastly, as he is created through the electors, by the people at large, he must ever look up to the support of his creators. From such a servant, with powers so limited and transitory, there can be no danger, especially when we consider the solid founda­tions on which our national liberties are immoveably fixed, by the other provisions of this excellent consti­tution. Whatever of dignity or authority he posses­ses, is a delegated part of their majesty and their political omnipotence, transiently vested in him by the people themselves, for their own happiness.

NUMBER II. On the safety of the people, from the restraints imposed upon the Senate.

WE have seen that the late honorable conventi­on, in designating the nature of the chief exe­cutive office of the United States, have deprived it of all the dangerous appendages of royalty, and provided for the frequent expiration of its limited powers—As our pre­sident bears no resemblance to a king, so we shall see the senate have no similitude to nobles.

First, then, not being hereditary, their collective knowledge, wisdom, and virtue are not precarious, for by these qualities alone they are to obtain their offices; and they will have none of the peculiar follies and vices of those men, who possess power merely because their fathers held it before them, for they will be educated (under equal advantages, and with equal prospects) among and on a footing with the other sons of a free people. If we recollect the characters, who have, at various periods, filled the seats of congress, we shall find this expectation perfectly reasonable. Many young men of ge­nius, and many characters of more matured abilities, without fortunes, have been honored with that trust. Wealth has had but few representatives there, and those have been generally possessed of respectable personal qualifica­tions. There have also been many instances of per­sons not eminently endowed with mental qualities, who have been sent thither from a reliance on their vir­tues, public and private—As the senators are still to be elected by the legislatures of the states, there can be no doubt of equal safety and propriety in their future ap­pointment, especially as no further pecuniary qualifi­cation is required by the constitution.

[Page 10] They can hold no other office civil or military under the United States, nor can they join in making provisi­on for themselves, either by creating new places, or en­creasing the emoluments of old ones. As their sons are not to succeed them, they will not be induced to aim at an increase or perpetuity of their powers, at the expence of the liberties of the people, of which those sons will be a part. They possess a much smaller share of the judicial power than the upper house in Bri­tain, for they are not, as there, the highest court in civil affairs. Impeachments alone are the cases cog­nizable before them, and in what other place could matters of that nature be so properly and safely de­termined? The judges of the foederal courts will owe their appointments to the president and senate, there­fore may not feel so perfectly free from favour, affection and influence, as the upper house who receive their pow­er from the people, through their state representa­tives, and are immediately responsible to those assem­blies, and finally to the nation at large—Thus we see, when a daring or dangerous offender is brought to the bar of public justice, the people, who alone can im­peach him by their immediate representatives, will cause him to be tried, not by judges appointed in the heat of the occa­sion, but by two-thirds of a select body, chosen a long time before, for various purposes, by the collected wisdom of of their state legislatures. From a pretence or affecta­tion of extraordinary purity and excellence of cha­racter, their word of honour is the sanction, under which these high courts, in other countries, have given their sentence—But with us, like the other judges of the union, like the rest of the people, of which they are never to forget they are a part, it is required that they be on oath.

No ambitious, undeserving or inexperienced youth can acquire a seat in this house by means of the most enormous wealth, or most powerful connections, till [Page 11]thirty years have ripened his abilities, and fully discovered his merits to his country—a more rational ground of preference surely than mere property.

The senate, though more independent of the peo­ple, as to the free exercise of their judgment and abilities, than the house of representatives, by the longer term of their office, must be older and more experienced men, and are vested with less effective power; for the public treasures, the sinews of the state, cannot be cal­led forth by their original motion. They may indeed restrain the profusion or errors of the house of represen­tatives, but they cannot take any of the necessary measures to raise a national revenue.

The people, through the electors, prescribe them such a president as shall be best qualified to controul them.

They can only, by conviction on impeachment, re­move and incapacitate a dangerous officer, but the punish­ment of him as a criminal remains within the province of the courts of law, to be conducted under all the ordinary forms and precautions, which exceedingly diminishes the importance of their judicial powers. They are de­tached, as much as possible, from local prejudices in fa­vour of their respective states, by having a separate and independent vote, for the sensible and conscientious use of which every member will find his person, honor and character seriously bound—He cannot shelter himself, under a vote in behalf of his slate, among his immediate colleagues. As there are only two, he cannot be vo­luntarily or involuntarily governed by the majority of the deputation—He will be obliged, by wholesome pro­visions, to attend his public duty, and thus in great na­tional questions must give a vote, of the honesty of which he will find it is necessary to convince his con­stituents.

The senate must always receive the exceptions of the presi­dent against any of their legislatve acts, which, without [Page 12] serious deliberation and sufficient reasons, they will seldom disregard. They will also feel a considerable check from the constitutional powers of the state legislatures, whose rights they will not be disposed to infringe, since they are the bodies to which they owe their existence, and are moreover to remain the immediate guardians of the peo­ple:

And lastly, the Senate will feel the mighty check of the House of Representatives—a body so truly popular and pure in its election, so intimately connected, by its inte­rests and feelings, with the people at large, so guarded against corruption and influence—so much, from its na­ture, above all apprehensions, that it must ever be able to maintain the high ground assigned to it by the foederal consti­tution.

NUMBER III. On the safety of the people, from the nature of the House of Representatives.

IN pursuing the consideration of the new foederal constitution, it remains now to examine the na­ture and powers of the House of representatives— the immediate delegates of the people.

Each member of this truly popular assembly will be chosen by about six thousand electors, by the poor as well as the rich. No decayed or venal borough will have an unjust share in their determinations—no old Sarum will send thither a representative by the voice of a single elector. ^* As we shall have no royal mini­sters to purchase votes, so we shall have no votes for sale; for the suffrages of six thousand enlightened and inde­pendent freemen are above all price. When the increasing population of the country shall render the body too [Page 13]large at the rate of one member for every thirty thou­sand persons, they will be returned at the greater rate of one for every forty or fifty thousand, which will render the electors still more incorruptible. For this regulation is only designed to prevent a smaller number than thirty thousand from having a representative. Thus we see a provision follows, that no state shall have less than one member, for if a new and greater number than thirty thousand should hereafter be fix­ed on, which should exceed the whole of the inhabi­tants of any state, such state, without this wholesome provision, would lose its voice in the House of Repre­sentatives—a circumstance which the constitution ren­ders impossible.

The people of England, whose House of commons is filled with military and civil officers and pensioners, say their liberties would be perfectly secured by trien­nial Parliaments. With us, no placeman can sit among the representatives of the people, and two years are the consti­tutional term of their existence. Here, again, lest wealth, powerful connections, or even the unwariness of the peo­ple should place in this important trust an undeserving, unqualified, or inexperienced youth, the wisdom of the Convention has proposed an absolute incapacity till the age of twenty-five. At twenty-one a young man is made the guardian of his own interest, but he cannot, for a few years more, be intrusted with the affairs of the nation. He must be an inhabitant of the state that elects him, that he may be intimately acquainted with their particular circumstances—The house of Re­presentatives is not, as the senate, to have a President chosen for them from without their body, but are to elect their Speaker from their own number—They will also ap­point all their other officers. In great state cases, they will be the grand inquest of the nation, for they possess the sole and uncontroulable power of impeachment. They are neither to wait the call, nor abide the prorogations and dis­solutions [Page 14]of a perverse or ambitious Prince, for they are to meet at least once in every year, and to sit on adjourn­ments to be agreed on between themselves and the other servants of the people. Should they differ in opini­on, the President, who is a temporary fellow-servant, and not their hereditary master, has a mediatorial power to adjust it for them, but cannot prevent th [...] constitutional meeting within the year. They can [...] the attendance of their members, that their public duty may not be evaded in times of difficulty or danger—The vote of each representative can be always known, as well as the proceedings of the house, that so the people may be acquainted with the conduct of those in whom they repose so important a trust. As was observed of the Senators, they cannot make new offices for themselves, nor in­crease, for their own benefit, the emoluments of old ones, by which the people will be exempted from needless ad­ditions to the public expences, on such sordid and mercenary principles—They are not to be restrained from the firm and plain language, which becomes the independent re­presentatives of freemen, for there is to be a perfect li­berty of speech. Without their consent, no monies can be obtained, no armies raised, no navies provided. They, alone, can originate bills for drawing forth the reve­nues of the union, and they will have a negative upon every legislative act of the other house.—So far, in short, as the sphere of foederal jurisdiction extends, they will be controulable only by the people, and, in conten­tions with the other branch, so far as they shall be right, they must ever finally prevail.

Such, my Countrymen, are some of the cautionary provisions of the frame of government your faithful convention have submitted to your consideration— such the foundations of peace, liberty and safety, which have been laid by their unwearied labours—They have guarded you against all servants but those "whom choice and common good ordain," against all masters, "save preserving Heaven."

NUMBER IV. The security for national safety and happiness, resulting from other parts of the foederal Government.

IN considering the respective powers of the Presi­dent, the Senate and the House of Representa­tives, under the foederal constitution, we have seen a part of the wholesome precautions, which are contained in the new system. Let us examine what further securi­ties for the safety and happiness of the people are contained in the general stipulations and provisions.

The United States guarantee to every state in the union a separate republican form of government. From thence it follows, that any man or body of men, however rich or powerful, who shall make an altera­tion in the form of government of any state, whereby the powers thereof shall be attempted to be taken out of the hands of the people at large, will stand guilty of high trea­son; or should a foreign power seduce or over-awe the people of any state, so as to cause them to vest in the families of any ambitous citizens or foreigners the powers of hereditary governors, whether as Kings or Nobles, that such investment of powers would be void in itself, and every person attempting to execute them would also be guilty of treason.

No religions test is ever to be required of any officer or servant of the United States. The people may em­ploy any wise and good citizen in the execution of the va­rious duties of the government. In Italy, Spain, and Portugal, no protestant can hold a public trust. In En­gland every Presbyterian, and other person not of their esta­blished church, is incapable of holding an office. No such impious deprivation of the rights of men can take place under the new foederal constitution. The con­vention [Page 16]has the honour of proposing the first public act, by which any nation has ever divested itself of a power, every exercise of which is a trespass on the Majesty of Heaven.

No qualification in monied or landed property is requir­ed by the proposed plan; nor does it admit any pre­ference from the preposterous distinctions of birth and rank. The office of the President, a Senator, and a Representative, and every other place of power or pro­fit, are therefore open to the whole body of the people. Any wise, informed and upright man, be his proper­ty what it may, can exercise the trusts and powers of the state, provided he possesses the moral, religious and political virtues which are necessary to secure the con­fidence of his fellow citizens.

The importation of slaves from [...] foreign coun­try is, by a clear implication, held up to the world as equally inconsistent with the dispositions and the du­ties of the people of America. A solid foundation is laid for exploding the principles of negro slavery, in which many good men of all parties in Pennsylva­nia, and throughout the union, have already con­curred. The temporary reservation of any particular matter must ever be deemed an admission that it should be done away. This appears to have been well understood. In addition to the arguments drawn from liberty, justice and religion, opinions against this practice, founded in sound policy, have no doubt been urged. Regard was necessarily paid to the peculiar situation of our southern fellow-citizens; but they, on the other hand, have not been insensible of the delicate situation of our national character on this sub­ject.

The people will remain, under the proposed con­stitution, the fountain of power and public honour. The President, the Senate, and the House of Representa­tives, will be the channels through which the stream [Page 17]will flow—but it will flow from the people, and from them only. Every office, religious, civil and military will be either their immediate gift, or it will come from them through the hands of their servants. And this, as observed before, will be guaranteed to them under the state constitutions which they respectively approve; for they cannot be royal forms, cannot be aristocratical, but must be republican.

The people of those states which have faithfully dis­charged their duty to the union will be no longer sub­jected alone to the weight of the public debts. Proper ar­rangements will call forth the just proportion of their sister states, and our national character will again be as unstained, as it was once exalted. Elevation to inde­pendence, with the loss of our good name, is only to be conspicuous in disgrace. The liberties of a people involved in debt are as uncertain as the liberty of an individual in the same situation. Their virtue is more precarious. The unfortunate citizen must yield to the operation of the laws, while a bankrupt nation too easy annihi­lates the sacred obligations of gratitude and honor, and be­comes execrable and infamous. I cannot refrain from reminding my fellow-citizens of our near approach to that deplorable situation, which must be our miserable condition, if the defects of the old confederation re­main without amendment. The proposed constitu­tion will cure the evil, and restore us to our rank among mankind.

Laws, made after the commission of the fact, have been a dreadful engine in the hands of tyrannical governors. Some of the most virtuous and shining characters in the world have been put to death, by laws formed to render them punishable, for parts of their conduct which innocence permitted, and to which pa­triotism impelled them. These have been called ex post facto laws, and are exploded by the new system. If a time of public contention shall hereafter arrive, [Page 18] the firm and ardent friends to liberty may know the length to which they can push their noble opposition, on the foundation of the laws. Should their country's cause impel them further, they will be acquainted with the hazard, and using those arms which Providence has put into their hands, will make a solemn appeal to "the power above."

The destruction of the ancient republics was occasi­oned in every instance by their being ignorant of a great political position, which was left for America to discover and establish. Self-evident as the truth appears, we find no friend to liberty in ancient Greece or Rome asserting, that taxation and representation were inseparable. The Roman citizens, proud of their own liberty, im­posed, in the freest times of the commonwealth, the most grievous burdens on their wretched provinces. At other times we find thousands of their citizens, though residing within the walls of Rome, deprived of legislative representatives. When America assert­ed the novel truth, Great Britain, though boasting her­self as alone free among the modern nations, denied it by her legislature, and endeavoured to refute it by her arms—the reasoning of tyrants. But the attempt was vain, for the voice of truth was heard above the thunders of the war, and reached the ears of all nations. Hence­forth the people of the earth will consider this position as the only rock on which they can found the temple of liberty, that taxation and representation are inseparable. Our new constitution carries it into execution on the most enlarged and liberal scale, for a Representative will be chosen by six thousand of his fellow-citizens, a Sen­ator by half a sovereign state, a President by a whole nation.

The old foederal constitution contained many of the same things, which from error or disingenuousness are urged against the new one. Neither of them have a bill of rights, nor does either notice the liberty of the press, because they are already provided for by the [Page 19]state constitutions; and relating only to personal rights, they could not be mentioned in a contract among sove­reign states.

Both the old and new foederal constitutions, and indeed the constitution of Pennsylvania, admit of courts in which no use is made of a jury. The board of property, the court of admiralty, and the high court of errors and appeals, in the state of Pennsylvania, as also the court of appeals under the old confedera­tion, exclude juries. Trial by jury will therefore be in the express words of the Pennsylvania constitution, "as heretofore,"—almost always used, though sometimes omitted. Trials for lands lying in any state between persons residing in such state, for bonds, notes, book debts, contracts, trespasses, assumptions, and all other matters between two or more citizens of any state, will be held in the state courts by juries, as now. In these cases the foederal courts cannot interfere. ^* But when a dispute arises between the citizens of any state about lands lying out of the bounds thereof, or when a trial is to be had between the citizens of any state and those of another, or the government of another, the private citizen will not be obliged to go into a court constituted by the state, with which, or with the citizens of which, his dispute is. He can appeal to a disinterested foederal court. This is surely a great advan­tage, and promises a fair trial, and an impartial judg­ment. The trial by jury is not excluded in these foede­ral courts. In all criminal cases, where the property, liberty or life of the citizen is at stake, he has the be­nefit of a jury. If convicted on impeachment, which is never done by a jury in any country, he cannot be fined, imprisoned or punished, but only may be dis­qualified from doing public mischief by losing his office, [Page 20]and his capacity to bold another. If the nature of his offence, besides its danger to his country, should be criminal in itself—should involve a charge of fraud, murder or treason—he may be tried for such crime, but cannot be convicted [...] a jury. In trials about pro­perty in the foederal courts, which can only be as above stated, there is nothing in the new constitution to pre­vent a trial by jury. No doubt it will be the mode in every case, wherein it is practicable. This will be adjusted by law, and it could not be done otherwise. In short, the sphere of jurisdiction for the foederal courts is limited, and that sphere only is subject to the regulations of our foederal government. The known principles of justice, the attachment to trial by jury whenever it can be used, the instructions of the state legislatures, the instructions of the people at large, the operation of the foederal regulations on the pro­perty of a president, a senator, a representative, a judge, as well as on that of a private citizen, will certainly render those regulations as favorable as pos­sible to property; for life and liberty are put more than ever into the hands of the juries. Under the present con­stitution of all the states, a public officer may be con­demned to imprisonment or death on impeachment, with­out a jury; but the new foederal constitution protects the accused, till he shall be convicted, from the hands of power, by rendering a jury the indispensible judges of all crimes.

The influence which foreign powers may attempt to exercise in our affairs was foreseen, and a wholesome provision has been made against it; for no person hold­ing an office under the United States is permitted to enjoy any foreign honors, powers or emoluments.

The apprehensions of the people have been excited, perhaps by persons with good intentions, about the powers of the new government to raise an army. Let us consider this point with moderation and candor. As enemies will sometimes insult us, invade our coun­try [Page 21]and capture our property, it is clear a power in our government to oppose, restrain or destroy them, is necessary to our honor, safety and existence. The military should, however, be regarded with a watch­ful eye; for it is a profession that is liable to dangerous perversion. But the powers vested in the foederal go­vernment do not go the length which has been said. A standing army is not granted or intended, for there can be no provision for its continuing three years, much less for its permanent establishment. Two years are the ut­most time for which the money can be given. It will be under all the restrictions which wisdom and jealousy can suggest, and the original grant of the supplies must be made by the House of representatives, the immedi­ate delegates of the people. The Senate and President, who also derive their power from the people, appoint the officers; and the heads of the departments, who must submit their accounts to the whole legislature, are to pay and provide them, as shall be directed by the laws that shall contain the conditions of the grant. The militia, who are in fact the effective part of the people at large, will render many troops quite unnecessary. They will form a powerful check upon the regular troops, and will ge­nerally be sufficient to over-awe them—for our detached situation will seldom give occasion to raise an army, though a few scattered companies may often be necessa­ry. But whenever, even on the most obvious reasons, an army shall be raised, the several states will be called, by the nature of things, to attend to the condition of the militia. Republican jealousy, the guardian Angel of these states, will watch the motions of our military citizens, even though they will be the soldiers of a free people. There is a wide difference however between the troops of such commonwealths as ours, founded on equal and unalterable principles, and those of a regal government, where ambition and oppression are the profession of the king. In the first case, a military officer is the occasi­onal servant of the people, employed for their defence; in [Page 22]the second, he is the ever ready instrument to execute the schemes of conquest or oppression, with which the mind of his royal master may be disturbed.

Observations have been made on the power given to the foederal Government in regard to the elections of Representatives and Senators. The regulations of these elections are, by the first part of the clause, to be prescribed by the state legislatures, who are certain­ly the proper bodies, if they will always execute the duty. But in case the union or the public safety should be endangered by an omission of this duty, as in the case of Rhode-Island, then the legislature of the United States can name for the people a convenient time, and do other matters necessary to ensure the free exer­cise of their right of election. The exception, in regard to the places of chusing Senators, was made from due respect to the sovereignty of the state legislatures, who are to elect the Senators, and whose place of meeting ought not to be prescribed to them by any authority, ex­cept indeed, as we always must, by the authority of the people. This power given to the foederal legislature is no more than what is possessed by the governments of all the states. The constitution of Pennsylvania permits two-thirds of such cities and counties, as shall elect representatives, to exercise all the powers of the General Assembly, "as fully and amply as if the whole were present," should any part of the state neglect or refuse to perform their duty in this particular. In short, it is a power necessary to preserve the social compact of each state and the confederation of the United States.

Besides the securities for the liberties of the people arising out of the foederal government, they are guard­ed by their state constitutions, and by the nature of things in the separate states. The Governor or President in each commonwealth, the Councils, Senates, Assemblies, Judges, Sheriffs, Grand and Pettit Juries, Officers of Militia, Clergy and Lay Officers of all churches, state and county Treasurers, Prothonotaries, Registers, [Page 23]Presidents and other officers of Universities, Colleges and Academies, Wardens of ports and cities, Burges­ses of towns, Commissioners of counties, County Lieu­tenants, and many other officers of power and influ­ence, will still be chosen within each state, without any pos­sible interference of the foederal Government. The separate states will also choose all the members of the legislative and executive branches of the United States. The people at large in each state will choose their foederal represen­tatives, and, unless ordered otherwise by the state le­gislatures, may choose the electors of the President and Vice-President of the Union. And lastly, the legislature of the state will have the election of the Senate, as they have heretofore had of the Members of Congress. Let us then, with a candor worthy of the subject, ask ourselves, whether it can be feared, that a majority of the Representatives, each of whom will be chosen by six thousand enlightened freemen, can betray their country?—Whether a majority of the Senate, each of whom will be chosen by the legisla­ture of a free, sovereign and independent state, with­out any stipulations in favour of wealth or the contemptible distinctions of birth or rank, and who will be closely ob­served by the state legislatures, can destroy our liberties, controuled as they are too by the house of representatives? or whether a temporary, limited, executive officer, watched by the foederal Representatives, by the Senate, by the state legislatures, by his personal enemies among the people of his own state, by the jealousy of the people of rival states, and by the whole of the people of the Union, can ever endanger our Freedom. ^*

[Page 24] Permit me, my fellow-citizens, to close these obser­vations by remarking, that there is no spirit of arro­gance in the new foederal constitution. It addresses you with becoming modesty, admitting that it may con­tain errors. Let us give it a trial; and when expe­rience has taught its mistakes, the people, whom it pre­serves absolutely all powerful, can reform and amend them. That I may be perfectly understood, I will acknowledge its acceptance by all the states, without delay, is the second wish of my heart. This first is, that our country may be virtuous and free.