SOME time ago Aristides addressed you on a motion which had been made in the house of delegates for a removal of the seat of government; he was instantly attacked by a pair of writers, whose chief aim seems to have been to depreciate his character. There is, however, a third, who expresses a regard for decency, who premises that he will be­have like a gentleman, and examine the reasons of Aristides with candour and moderation; it is to him only that Aristi­des thinks proper to reply.

In the Farmer's second paragraph, he seems to have for­gotten the promise he had just before made; he taxes Aristi­des with sinister ambitious views, and with feeling a malig­nant pleasure in the prospect of preventing a great public good. Let us then examine this matter, as he says, with the "critical eyes of unerring truth."

From whom flowed the proposition to the general assem­bly? Who are the men that clamour for the measure? The community at large, feeling no inconvenience, were content that things should remain as they are, and, without the sug­gestions of the Farmer and his coadjutors, would not have probably thought of a change. The citizens of Annapolis were opposed to their own destruction; no shadow of argu­ment had been offered to demonstrate, that by quietly giving up their interests, they would have a merit in sacrificing to the public good. Notwithstanding all this, the Farmer, for their conduct on this occasion, reproaches them for yielding to the "never failing influence of private interest." No practice is more common with mankind, than that of con­demning in their neighbours the faults most conspicuous in themselves; it arises from the vain expectation of deceiving the world. But the Farmer's intelligent readers must have anticipated me in the remark.

[Page 4] Has the Farmer then, by his first publication, given a satisfactory answer to the reasons of Aristides respecting the power of the legislature? He has chosen for his publication that paper which has the most general circulation, the editor of which had refused a place to Aristides; he sometimes quotes part of a sentence from Aristides, but it is impossible for his readers, from his state, to comprehend what was the reasoning of Aristides. It is on these considerations that Aristides adopts this mode of publication, in which he will recapitulate some of his former observations, and add such remarks as have since occurred on a more mature delibe­ration.

The 9th article of the declaration of rights directs, ‘that a place for the meeting of the legislature ought to be fixed, the most convenient to the members thereof, and to the depository of the public records; and the legislature ought not to be convened, or held, at ony other place, but from evident necessity.’ The 61st and last clause of the con­stitution and form of government, directs the first legislature to meet at Annapolis, on Monday the tenth of February 1777. I contend, that from the true construction of that article and this clause, taken together, Annapolis is the place fixed for the meeting of the legislature; and that a di­ligent attention to every other part of the declaration and constitution, which has any relation to the subject, will evince my position.

If the convention did not mean, by these two parts, to fix the legislature at Annapolis, it is extremely probable that the 61st clause would have gone further, and directed the le­gislature "then and there to appoint a place where it shall be convened in future;" or, "then and there to appoint a place where it shall be held during the war, after which a place shall be fixed, agreeably to the 9th article of the de­claration."

The surest way of finding the true construction of a law, admitting of two constructions, is to examine the conse­quences of each, and this construction is to be made, from examining and comparing all the different parts. The de­claration and the form of government I consider as making one law, or which is the same thing, as consisting of a va­riety of laws, all having relation to each other, and made by one body of men, at one meeting.

[Page 5] I first [...], What possible inconvenience or incongruity can flow from my construction? Can it be conceived, that an injury can result to the community by continuing the seat of a government at a place where it has so long been held, until two general assemblies shall concur in an act for its removal? It may indeed be urged, that a wise, politic as­sembly, may sometimes pass an act tending greatly to the public good, and their immediate successors may be so blind, or so perverse, as to with-hold their concurrence; be it so; suppose then the seat of government removed by this single wise, politic assembly, May not their unworthy successors, by another single act, undo what they have done? And, if that should be the case, would it not be infinitely better that the thing never had been done?

In support of my construction, I maintained, that the con­vention, in the declaration of rights, laid down rules and maxims for their own government, whilst afterwards they should be framing the constitution, as well as for the govern­ment of all future legislatures, whilst they should be framing laws; and that part of the 61st clause of the one was made in obedience to the 9th article of the other. To this I am told, ‘that it would be absurd for a body of men to prescribe rules for their own government.’ If so, then almost every body of men, who have assembled upon any great and extraordinary occasion, to enter into resolutions which were to have the force of laws, have acted absurdly; for it has been an universal practice with such assemblies, in the first place, to lay down certain principles, agreeably to which their after resolves were to be framed. Advert only to the proceedings of the congress and of your late commit­tees, and to the proceedings of the late popular meetings in Ireland. The declaration of rights contains a variety of such principles, rules and maxims, that were manifestly in­tended for the direction of the convention in framing the constitution, to which that declaration is a species of pre­amble. The 5th article asserts, that elections ought to be frequent; the constitution accordingly directs the election of delegates to be annual, &c. The 6th article maintains, that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government, ought to be for ever separate and distinct from each other; this two is amply provided for by the constitution. Again, the 31st article maintains, that a long continuance in the [Page 6]first-executive departments of power and trust is dangerous to liberty; accordingly, the constitution directs the governor and council to be annually elected, and does not permit any man to act as governor more than three years out of seven.

These instances must certainly establish my principle, that the declaration was intended as a guide to the convention in forming the government, as well as to all future legislatures in framing laws. To me the convention appears to have acted in this respect, as in almost every other, like sage and enlightened law-givers; and it would be extraordinary in­deed, if the important direction contained in the 9th article of rights should have been neglected by the convention, when they must have known it to be impossible (as I shall hereafter shew,) for any succeeding legislature to put it into execution.

Some persons affect to consider this 61st clause, as no part of the constitution. This is pleasant enough! If I attempt to prove, by serious argument, that which is evident in it­self, I may perhaps induce a belief, that there was some co­lour for the suggestion. It is indeed unlucky, that the 61st clause was not placed immediately after those other clauses which respect the legislature, as the title which it claims to be considered as a part of the constitution, would have then been clear and indefeasible.

Say they, the first meeting of the legislature, under that provision, was only for a particular purpose; it was merely to introduce the new government, by appointing an execu­tive, and by filling the other offices. If we admit this, and if the convention, by this 61st clause, did not intend to fix the place of holding the legislature, after that first meeting the constitution remained almost as defective as it was before, because no place was yet appointed for holding the first le­gislature, to be elected agreeably to the antecedent parts of the constitution.

Such would be one consequence of the construction of the Farmer, and his associates; attend to another, agreeably to these antecedent parts of the constitution, there could be no election of the s [...]ate until the third Monday in September 1781, of course, there could be no meeting of the constitu­tional legislature until the first Monday in November in that year, and yet the house of delegates was to be chosen five times before that period, on the first Monday in October in the years 1777, 1778, 1779, 1780, and 1781; in the four first [Page 7]years then, the delegates were to be chosen to no purpose what­ever; in the fifth year, indeed, they might meet the senate, if they would know where to find them. If the convention which was framing, as they thought, a complete form of government, could appoint the first constitutional meeting of the legislature at a period five years distant, and could leave the place of their first meeting to be ascertained by tacit and common consent, they must have committed an oversight which no individual of common sense could have possibly been guilty of.

I agree, nay, I strenuously maintain, that the 61st clause was intended to give life to the new government, and that the constitution was a dead letter without it. How is this done by my opponents construction? Why the people are to meet for the purpose of choosing a special assembly, which is to meet on a special day to do a particular thing, viz. to appoint all the officers of the government, which government may then go on; advert again, I beseech you, to the con­sequences which I have just pointed out, and say, whether a construction, which involves such consequences, can possi­bly be right.

I appeal now to those, who without prejudice or prepos­session, will attentively peruse the whole system of govern­ment, whether the following be not the plain and obvious meaning of the convention, in the 61st clause of the consti­tution.

‘We have already, by the 15th clause, directed the electors of the senate to meet on the 3d Monday in Sep­tember 1781; and we have directed the people to choose their immediate representatives annually, on the first Mon­day in October; now, as the third Monday in September 1781 is distant almost five years, it is necessary for us to make a further provision, for giving life to that system which we have contrived with so much care and attention; we have likewise, hitherto, omitted to fix the place of hold­ing the legislature, which the legislature to succeed us can­not do, as all their acts are liable to be immediately after re­pealed, either by themselves or their successors; we there­fore conclude, by directing the people to choose [...] of the senate on the 25th of November next, who are to meet at Annapolis on the 9th of December next, to elect the senate; and by directing the people in each [...], to [Page 8]choose their delegates on the 18th of the same month. The assembly, so chosen, is to meet at Annapolis on Monday the 10th of February next, and then, or at some future session, one principle part of their business must be to appoint the executive, and all the other officers of go­vernment, for the first time. We thus direct the first ap­pointment of the legislature, for which it is plain, from the 15th clause, that we had reserved ourselves until this last clause, we fix the place of their meeting; and it is thus we complete our great and arduous undertaking.’

I repeat again and again, the new government could not have been introduced without appointing the place for the general meeting of the legislature; this 61st clause is as much a part of the constitution as if it had been placed in the centre, and the constitution having once appointed a place for holding the legislature, it becomes fixed at that place in the manner intended by the 9th article of rights. It is indeed of importance to the Farmer to prove this 61st clause to be no part of the constitution, and that it makes no permanent provision, because the seat of government may then be removed without the odious formality prescribed for abolishing or altering any part of the declaration, and the form of government; but, accustomed as I am to confident assertions at the bar, this proposition has more amazed me than any thing I ever yet have heard.

Is this 61st clause no part of the constitution, because it prescribes the mode in which the new government is to com­mence? Or is it no part, because without it the government never could commence? I beseech you, my countrymen, to reflect seriously what could have been done without it; you might have assembled on the first Monday in October 1777, to choose your delegates, but that would have been fruitless, because they could enact no law without the senate, and the electors of that branch were not to be assembled until the 3d Monday in September 1781. Well, the year 1781 at last arrives, and both branches are elected; but where shall they meet, no place being named by the constitution? It is ex­tremely probable a majority will repair to Annapolis, under the expectation of there meeting their fellow members. By what authority are they to sit there? It is proposed to assem­ble and make an ordinance for the purpose; to this it is re­plied, ‘the 9th article of rights requires the place for hold­ing [Page 9]the legislature to be fixed; this article, like every other, must have the force of a law, and is not to be abo­lished but by two acts of assembly; What is the sense of it? It is, that no act of assembly shall be binding unless made at a place fixed for our meeting; we are mer [...]ly the creatures of the constitution, and must act agreeably to its injunctions. But this constitution, which has so long deferred our first meeting, has enjoined a thing which its own neglect has rendered impossible. The best thing we can do, is to go back to our constituents, and advise them to appoint another convention, either to com­plete this form of government, or to frame an entire new system.’ Says a third, ‘I accede to your construction of the 9th article, it contains a provision which appears founded in policy, and dictated by experience, but I can­not join in your inference; I rather conclude, that as An­napolis was always the seat of the proprietary government; as it contains every public building requisite for the go­vernment; as every convention has met at that place; as this very article, and the subsequent constitution, was framed there; as this place seems to have been re­garded with a favourable eye by the 37th article, which secures it in all its rights, privileges and benefits; those circumstances induce me to thi [...] from a fair and compre­hensive construction of the whole, that Annapolis must have been considered, by the founders of the constitution, as the place fixed for the meeting of the legislature.’ I acknowledge, continues he, ‘from the 15th clause of that constitution it would appear, that the framers did not think the place as yet fixed, or at least, that they consi­dered the point not yet absolutely settled, because, they say the electors shall meet at Annapolis, or such o [...]er place as shall be appointed for convening the legislature. It appears from that very clause, that they did not perform every thing they intended; they surely could not have in­tended the house of delegates to be elected four times before the senate. However, as it is, we must make the best of it; and it is better to give such a construction as will sup­port, than such a one as must set aside, the constitution under which we have here assembled to act.’

In such a manner would the members of the first consti­tutional assembly have probably debated, had the 61st clause [Page 10]never been framed, and had it been possible for the people of Maryland to have remained without government, and with­out administration of law, during the whole of the memora­ble interval between the 11th of November 1776, when the last convention was dissolved, and the first Monday in No­vember 1781, on which day the first meeting of the senate, according the 15th clause, was to take place.

But my antagonists may ask, ‘Why make these unne­cessary suppositions? Although the provision, which you call the 61st clause, be no part of the constitution, it was a necessary measure of the convention, to give motion to the government they had just fabricated.’ This exposition will not serve their turn, because, if this provision were no part of the constitution, it was absolutely void, for it gives the first appointment of the officers of government to the legislature, and the constitution had just before conferred that power on the executive only.

Attend now to the Farmer, he alleges the meeting of the legislature under this 61st clause, to have been ‘special, for a special purpose, and to do a particular piece of business; that the intention of it has long been fulfilled; that its operation now ceases to exist; that it does not expressly, or by implication, enjoin the legislature to meet at Anna­poli [...], at any time thereafter; that the meeting was not on the day prescribed by the constitution for its annual meet­ing.’ From all this I infer his opinion, that the legisla­ture, at that meeting, could only appoint the executive, and other officers of government; that when this particular piece of business was dispatched, this special assembly ought to have been dissolved, and, of course, that no place could have been appointed by that general assembly for the meeting of the constitutional general assembly.

Let it be recorded on your minds, and suffer me to repeat once more, this constitutional general assembly could not have met before the first Monday in November 1781, be­cause, independent of this 61st clause, the first meeting pre­scribed for the electors of the senate, was to take place on the 3d Monday in September 1781; according then to his exposition of this 61st clause, the general assembly was to choose a governor and his council; For how long? For the residue of the year, says the clause. They were likewise to fill, in the first instance, all the offices in the disposition [Page 11]of the governor and council; For how long? Some of them, says the antecedent constitution, are of annual appointment, but the judges are to hold their offices during good beha­viour. Let us see then how all this will work, and what is the consequence of the Farmer's exposition. The special assembly is dissolved. The constitutional general assembly cannot meet, as I have before inculcated, until November 1781. The governor and council drop off at the end of the year, which is the second Monday for the governor, and the second Tuesday for the council, in November 1777; all officers of annual appointment, must likewise cease to act about the same time. Well then, Who are left to admi­nister the public affairs? In such a case, it would indeed be a "fine thing to be a judge," because there would perhaps be a necessity for the judges to exercise, not only the judi­cial, but the legislative and executive powers of government. Such would be the blessed consequences of construing the 61st clause as no part of the constitution, and of limiting the power of that special assembly to the appointment of the officers of government. I think myself then most clearly warranted in denying, that the constitution, without the clause, would have been a "perfect code of constitutional jurisprudence;" and yet, with the Farmer's exposition, this clause made the matter hardly a jot the better.

As few of my readers can have an opportunity of perusing the constitution, I will give them so much of the 61st clause as it is necessary they should see for the purpose of forming a judgment on this point. Here are the words: ‘61. That to introduce the new government, an election be held for the electors of the senate on Monday the twenty-fifth of November in this present year, and that the electors of the senate meet at Annapolis on Monday the ninth of De­cember in this present year, and there choose sena­tors; and that an election be held on Wednesday the eighteenth of December, for delegates to serve in ge­neral assembly, and for sheriffs; and that the said elections be made by such persons, in the same manner, and under the same qualifications, as such elections are herein before directed to be made, at the periodical times before men­tioned; the returns of all which first elections shall be made to the council of safety for the time being; and the general assembly shall meet at A [...]napolis on Monday the [Page 12]tenth of February next, and shall, in their then session, or in such future session, as they shall think proper, choose a governor and council for the residue of the year, in manner before directed; and for filling, in the first instance only, all the offices in the disposition of the governor with the advice of the council; the house of delegates may also propose to the senate a list of all officers in the ap­pointment of the governor with the advice of the coun­cil, &c. &c.’

It may not be unworthy of remark, that in the proceed­ings of the convention, each clause or section of the consti­tution is numbered, and this is numbered among the rest, so that not Aristides only, but the convention itself, has deemed this a clause of the constitution, and not merely an after pro­vision. The convention having gone through the whole, paragraph by paragraph, declared the whole, at one time, to be the constitution and form of government. How con­temptible then is the assertion, that this very necessary clause is no part of the constitution!

The Farmer observes, ‘that the legislature has, from time to time, been held at Annapolis for the convenience of the buildings, by common consent, without the legisla­ture having, by any act, determined that spot for its per­manent residence.’ Would not any person, unacquainted with the history of our transactions, supposed this first special assembly was actually dissolved, after appointing the officers of government? That no other meeting of a legislature took place, until the time appointed for the constitutional meet­ing, which I have before shewn could not, agreeably to the Farmer's construction of this clause, have taken place until the first Monday in November 1781? And that, at this first constitutional meeting, the members assembled, by tacit con­sent, at Annapolis?

Very different from all this is the truth. This special le­gislature, elected for a particular purpose under this special provision, which is called no part of the constitution, did not confine themselves to that particular piece of business; they considered themselves constitutionally chosen; that the power of the senate was to continue until that meeting of the electors which is prescribed by the 15th section; and that the house of delegates was to continue until the first Monday of October in the following year, when another election was [Page 13]to take place, under the constitution. Accordingly, they not only performed this particular piece of business, but they actually sat near three months; and, if I be not egregiously mistaken, the Farmer assisted at their deliberations. In that length of time they passed a variety of laws, some of which are still in force. They adjourned until some day in the fol­lowing June, without naming a place; they met at the time appointed at Annapolis, and passed other laws, and then ad­journed until some time in September, when their meeting was prevented by an invasion of the enemy. The same se­nate met the house of delegates, constitutionally elected, on the first Monday in October 1777, 1778, 1779, and 1780, and no person has ever presumed to arraign them for having usurped an authority. In all that time the general assembly never thought of appointing the place of their own meeting, and for this plain reason; I presume, that they conceived the place fixed, and reasoned on the declaration and form of go­vernment just as I do. ‘The declaration says, the place of our meeting must be fixed; the constitution then appoints a place where the legislature shall meet. No part of either can be altered, but by the joint act of two assemblies. If then the convention in one part says, the place ought to be fixed, in another appoints the place where the first le­gislature is to meet, and in a third says, that all its pro­visions must stand for a law until they shall be repealed by two successive general assemblies, there can [...]e no rational construction, but that the legislature mus [...] meet at this place, until two assemblies shall concur in appointing ano­ther.’ As to the exception in the latter part of the 9th article of the declaration, nobody has yet contended, that it means any thing more, than that the legislature may appoint a particular meeting at some other place, when evident ne­cessity shall at any time require it.

As the Farmer seems constituted, by common consent, the leading advocate for Baltimore-town, I shall patiently examine every one of his reasons; I shall not contine myself to his precise words, let it suffice that I preserve his meaning.

In the first place, he cannot allow the direction of the 9th article to be given to the [...], because it would be no more than directing themselves. I have already [...] a va­riety of instances, where provi [...]ons in the [...] have been manifestly made in pursuance of the principles [...]d [Page 14]down in the decla [...]ation. Instead of being contrary to com­mon sense, it is a prudent part for a man to p [...]escribe rules to himself; for want of this, we too often see men endowed with a competent share of natural abilities, who blast their own reputations, dissipate their fortunes, and live to no wor­thy purpose under Heaven.

But, says the Farmer, ‘the place must be convenient to the members; those who are to use the convenience are the only competent judges of it; besides, convenience de­pends on after events and circumstances not permanent.’ What! Could not the convention judge of the convenience of a place to assemble at and enact laws, when it was itself a legislature of the most exalted kind? The members of that convention certainly were as good judges of that, as the members of any legislature can be of the place which will be most convenient to its successors; indeed, neither the con­vention, nor any future legislature, could determine that any place whatever would always remain the [...]st convenient for men to repair to, and the best calculated, on every ac­count, for the transaction of public affairs, and therefore the seat of government may, at any time, be removed by the joint act of two general assemblies. The Farmer thinks this 9th article of rights only declaratory; by this we are to sup­pose that it means nothing, or is to stand for nothing, and at any time may be dispensed with at the pleasure of the le­gislature; our constitution, however, that sacred palladium of our rights, that strong barrier against the encroachments of power, expressly ordains, that no part of the declaration shall be altered by a single legislature; by this is effectually provided, that the declaration of rights shall remain as a law, and that it shall limit the power of the legislature, which without it might indeed be called omnipotent. The senate, and the representatives of the people, derive their power merely from that constitution, and they are delegated to pass laws in conformity to it; whenever they violate it, by their acts, they betray their trust, and if it were not for the check which is provided by securing the independence of judges, in every instance of an infringement of the declaration or form of government, the whole government would revert to the people. This would be fatal doctrine indeed! As I do not doubt that attempts will hereafter be made to violate the constitution by the arbitrary acts of a single legislature, I [Page 15]conceive it a fortunate circumstance, that the constitution, without containing explicit terms, has been so well under­stood. The power of the judges to reject any acts that, in their opinion, may be repugnant to any part of the declara­tion or form of government, has been asserted on a great va­riety of occasions, and has never yet been disputed, except by a single writer of Baltimore-town. According to his ideas, it seems, the general assembly is the only judge of those parts which respect itself; and, if it thinks proper to disregard both, its acts must nevertheless be admitted as laws. Such an extravagant opinion could never have entered the head of a rational man. What! Are the men who are to be bound by a law, the properest to decide on the law? If that be substantial doctrine, it was in vain for the respectable founders of our constitution to bestow such labour and at­tention on a work calculated to insure the safety and happi­ness of their constituents! It was in vain to expect every part of that work to stand until two assemblies should concur to overthrow it! But a more rational construction has hither­to generally prevailed, and it would be a waste of time to demonstrate, that the judges may reject unconstitutional acts, and that, by so doing, they have a countroul over the legislature, which in other respects has a controul over them. This controul of the judges does not make them legislators, it only enables them to restrain the proper legislature within its proper limits, and such a controul is infinitely preferable to that of the people at large, which could not be exerted without a dissolution of the bonds of government.

It may here be proper likewise to remark, that by accusing all persons who would dare to execute any unconstitutional acts, that grand juries would evince their importance.

As the judges then are indispensably obliged to reject all acts passed in an unconstitutional manner, and as many im­portant things may be transacted under those acts before they shall be declared void; as all this may throw our affairs into confusion, and may bring ruin on individuals, it would sure­ly be prudent for the legislature, before it adopts the Far­mer's proposition, to be satisfied, that by removing to Balti­more-town, without publishing their act three months before a new election, and having that act ratified by a new assem­bly, it will not violate the constitution. For this reason [Page 16]Aristides advised them previously to consult the judges, not that he meant himself to give a judicial opinion. The Farmer expresses a great respect for the judges, but thinks ‘it would be ridiculous to require their opinion on this occasion, because the point is involved in no more difficulty than the question whether one house can adjourn without the other.’ I shall make no comment on the very extraordinary treatment which the Farmer thinks fit to give Aristides; the proper remark on such an occasion can­not fail of suggesting itself to the reader.

It has been asserted, that Aristides was not sincere in his con­struction. He disdains the imputation. He never did, and ne­ver will, endeavour to impress an opinion not entertained by himself. He offers reasons which the Farmer promises to ex­amine, but which the Farmer does not even analize. His opi­nion is confirmed by two of the most eminent council at the bar; indeed, by almost every lawyer with whom he converses. I cannot, however, be persuaded, that the Farmer's confident assertions have proceeded altogether from a thorough convicti­on. In this I am clear, that a thorough conviction could not induce any man to decline a reference in which there can be no impropriety, inconvenience or danger. In what a state shall we be, if a single assembly shall undertake to remove the seat of government, and if the acts passed by them at Baltimore-town shall be hereafter declared null and void! Those who examine the subject merely on the principles of public good, will allow the advice of Aristides to be wholesome; but those who would stir Heaven and earth to bring about a re­moval of the government, will be at all events for rejecting it. ‘Let anarchy and confusion prevail; let even the state itself be thrown into a convulsion; let ruin attend every man who may act under those unconstitutional mandates; let us involve the legislative and the judicial departments in a dispute; the smaller number must soon yield to the re­presentatives of the people; but if even these few men should have firmness to resist lawless acts, no matter, pro­vided we succeed in this our darling undertaking.’ I can­not, however, believe the Farmer capable of thus reasoning within himself; and I am inclined [...] think, his supercilious behaviour proceeds merely from the want of due reflection, and a proper understanding of the constitution and the rules of construction.

[Page 17] We shall however be told, I doubt not, that it would de­grade the sovereign power to await the approbation of a few men, before it shall dare to act. But let it be remem­bered, that these few men have the power to restrain it within the constitutional limits. We shall be told too, that there are men in the legislature, equal in legal abilities to the judges. Be it so; but these men have only each one vote in deciding the question; they are not under obligations, equal to those of the judges; and it is the opinion of the judges only, which is ultimately to decide.

I return now to my argument. That the convention, by appointing the first legislature to meet at Annapolis, intended to fix that place for the meeting of the legislature, would to me be sufficiently clear, from this consideration. They knew that the place could not be fixed by any succeeding legislature; because any act of one session may be abrogated by the next. The word "fixed" is a most significant term; and, supposing my position to be right, I admire the wisdom and foresight of the convention, in preventing artful men, on an occasion so interesting to the public, from taking ad­vantage of a critical season, of temporary sits of disgust in wa­vering capricious minds, of disseminating tales, which cannot be refuted until it be too late; in preventing men, I say, from doing that in a hurry, which ought never to be done but upon the maturest deliberation. The convention must have been impressed with an idea of the propriety of fixing the seat of government, even on account of giving some stability to the real property of the place, where it may happen to be. It would be an unhappy thing, indeed, for the citizens of any capital, if, at every meeting of the legislature, they are to run the hazard of being instantly deprived of their property; if their minds are to be thus agitated, if they are to be thus filled with doubts and alarms, and if all spirit of enterprize, is thus to be effectually checked. I will explain what I mean by spirit of enterprize, as it seems that unlucky ex­pression in my first address ha [...] been more commented on, in Baltimore-town, than all the rest of the publication. It was evident, I did not mean to extol "the beloved city" for its enterprize in commerce. My meaning was, that a proposal of removing from it the seat of government, for a time, puts all business at a stand. Should a man be about to build, he must, in prudence, await the event; if his building has [Page 18]already been commenced, he must suspend the work; if two men are treating about the sale of a house, either the treaty must be broken off, or one party will gain an advantage; a vacant house must remain unoccupied. And when, at last, the question is determined in favour of Annapolis, the appre­hension of what may take place at the next session, cannot fail to affect the value of its houses and lots, and to obstruct all further growth and improvement. These are serious evils, and the men who feel them are entitled to as much conside­ration, as if they inhabited a town of extent, popula [...]n and enterprize, equal to that of the antient city of Tyre. To me there cannot be a more decisive proof of an illiberal soul, than the sport which has been recently made with the anxieties of the Annapolitans. I appeal even to the sober and respecta­ble part of Baltimore-town, whether my construction does not place matters on the proper footing. That the seat of govern­ment may be removed in the way prescribed for altering any part of the declaration of rights, or form of government, no rational being ever could deny. But if it can be removed by a more compendious method, no man who regards the plain well known import of words, could affirm, that it can be said to be fixed. And, as at any rate it may be removed by the joint act of two general assemblies, it cannot with pro­priety be called "immoveable." My construction, therefore, I conceive, is not only the most rational, but the most con­venient. It affords a security against whim and caprice; it may prevent a variety of evils; and it allows a safe remedy, whenever circumstances shall render the further holding of the legislature at the fixed place a public grievance.

The destruction of a capital town is surely a measure which no body of men should have it in their power hastily to adopt; and, happily, our constitution has taken care to prevent the legislature from proceeding with haste in almost every thing that very materially affects our rights and in­terests. When two general assemblies, after a mature de­liberation, shall concur in any measure, it is more than pro­bable that the measure will be right; and, if it be probable, that two general assemblies will concur in the proposed act for removing the seat of government, the citizens of Anna­polis will be able to foresee, and, in some measure, to pre­pare for the event, of which the Farmer, with such confi­dence and exultation, undertakes to give them warning. [Page 19]And after losing the seat of government in this way, they will, perhaps, renounce the fond idea of regaining it, at a future session.

But the Farmer may perhaps say, ‘admitting it might have been good policy for the convention to have fixed the seat of government at Annapolis, or any where else, if words be suffered to retain their meaning, this power has been conferred by the constitution on the future legislature.’ Observe, says he in his first address, ‘the electors of the senate are to meet at such other place as the legislature shall appoint.’ The opinion I entertain of the Farmer's inte­grity, will not permit me, one moment, to suppose him guilty of a wilful misquotation. Such words are found no where in the constitution, and had its framers really intended to confer this power on the legislature, it is astonishing that they never did it by plain and positive terms. Although in several places they speak of the place to be appointed for holding the legislature, they no where have said, this appoint­ment shall be in the legislature; and yet they often speak of things to be done by a future legislature. These considera­tions are sufficient to evince, that they intended themselves to fix the place for the meeting of the legislature.

The words of the 15th clause are these, ‘That the said electors of the senate shall meet at the city of Annapolis, or such other place as shall be appointed for convening the legislature, on the third Monday in September 1781, and on the same day in every fifth year for ever thereafter.’ I was fully apprized of this clause, but did not esteem it ma­terial for either side. I now find it of importance to my ar­gument. Observe, say I, this 15th section is antecedent to the 61st; no section before this gives the least hint where the seat of government shall be; this section does not declare by whom the appointment shall be made, it directs a meet­ing of the electors at a period five years distant from its own date; and the 61st clause afterwards appoints a meeting of the electors at Annapolis, at a very near period, and a meeting of the legislature likewise at Annapolis. Does not all this "most forcibly inculcate and impress on every un­prejudiced mind," that the convention, at the time of framing the 15th clause, intended to do that, which neither in that, nor in any other part, they have directed the legislature to do; that by giving directions for a meeting of the electors [Page 20]five years distant, they reserved themselves for giving direc­tions as to the first meeting of the electors, until they should come to the last clause, which was to introduce the govern­ment; that this clause was absolutely necessary; that, without it the constitution was not a "perfect code;" that, without it, the fixing of the place for holding the legislature, which they had before asserted to be necessary, has not been, and never can be done; finally, that, if he, who made the notable discovery of the 61st clause being no part of the constitution, can support his opinion, he deserves from Balti­more-town much credit for his ingenuity.

The Farmer has derived an argument from the 56th section of the form of government, of which he gives such an extract, as he thought suited his own purpose, ‘That the general court shall sit for transacting business at such prices as the future legislature of this state shall direct and appoint.’ Now, says he, ‘the 9th article of the decla­ration requires the legislature to be held at a place most convenient to the depository of the public records, and the records of the general court are part thereof.’ From all this he infers, that had the framers of the constitution in­tended to fix the place of holding the legislature, they would have likewise fixed the place of holding the supreme courts of justice.

I dislike all partial quotations or abstracts of sentences and clauses; because the reader is entitled to form his judgment of the whole, upon a view of the whole; and because, the discarding of a single word which at first view may not ap­pear material, on an attentive examination may exhibit a very different complexion. The words of the 56th clause we these. ‘That the same court be hereafter called and known by the name of the general court; which court shall sit on the western and eastern shores, for transacting and determining the business of the respective shores, at su [...] times and places, as the future legislature of this state shall direct and appoint.’

The convention, we may suppose, found a difficulty in choosing a place for the court on the eastern shore, and had not themselves yet fixed a place for holding the legislature. It was merely on this account, I presume, that they gave the appointment of a place on each shore to the future legis­lature. They would not make distinctions between the [Page 21]shores; for, had they appointed a place for the western shore, the court would have been fixed there; whereas no future legislature could fix the place for the eastern shore. I now ask, if the convention intended that a future legislature should fix the place of holding the legislature, why it did not say so in explicit terms, such as they have made use of with respect to the general court? Had indeed this 56th section said, ‘the general court for the western shore shall be held at the place hereafter to be appointed by the legislature for its own meeting,’ it would have precluded all argument in support of my position.

The fact is. The constitution no where expressly directs the supreme courts of justice, and the legislature, to be held at the same place; and hence it became necessary for the le­gislature, by a particular act, to direct where these courts shall be held. But if it be clear, that the convention in­tended the legislature and the general court to be held at the same place, and any argument can be drawn from the opi­nion of the first legislature, composed in a great measure of those who had been members of the last convention, the act for appointing the place for holding these courts is highly worthy of attention. That act was passed at the first meet­ing of the legislature, which the Farmer maintains, was held only for a special purpose. And if their construction and the Farmer's be the same, that the supreme courts of justice and the legislature are directed by the constitution to be held at the same place, they have, by implication, given a most de­cided opinion in favour of Aristides; for they have ordained, that the court of appeals, and the general court for the wes­tern shore, shall be for ever held at Annapolis. By so doing, they must have thought Annapolis already fixed for the hold­ing of the legislature, or they would, at the same time, have passed an act for the purpose.

If they conceived Annapolis appointed by the 61st clause for their first meeting only, no body of men ever acted so strange a part; for they passed no act for appointing the the place where the legislature should be held in future; no bill was framed for the purpose in either house, no message on the subject was sent by either house, and, at the end of the journal of each house, is an adjournment to an early day, without naming the place. From all this arises an implica­tion, strong as the most positive words, that this assembly [Page 22]considered the seat of government to have been fixed by the constitution.

It is a settled rule of construction, that the sense of a [...]aw must be collected from the words alone, where those carry any meaning consistent with the general intent of the law. The question is, what did the convention mean by saying the legislature shall meet at Annapolis on the tenth of Fe­bruary text? Does it mean thereby to fix the general place of meeting? I say yes, because that is consistent with the intention clearly expressed in the 9th article of the declara­tion, and because that article could not otherwise have the force of a law.

Says the Farmer, "that article is only declaratory." I reply, that article, as well as every other article in the de­claration of rights, is by the constitution made a law, irrevocable, except by the joint act of two general assemblies.

All the articles of the declaration are, I confess, declara­tory, and there needs no Farmer to tell us that. But what constitutes them laws is, that no act of a single assembly, repugnant to the rules, maxims and principles, which they contain, shall have the force of a law. Well then, the next assembly passes an act for removing the seat of government to Baltimore-town. I maintain, that it is repugnant to the 9th article of rights, which says the place for holding the le­gislature ought to be fixed. The proper mode for the as­sembly to proceed by, in removing the seat of government, would be, to pass an act for repealing that article, and to submit it to the consideration of the people three months be­fore a new election. And if that act be confirmed by the succeeding assembly, then may an act pass for removing the seat of government. Or, the act itself for removing the seat of government, as it would amount to a repeal of the 9th article, might be published for the consideration of the people.

But had the 61st section of the constitution never been passed by the convention, and had the assembly been con­stantly held at Annapolis, without the direction of the consti­tution, or any assembly which has since been held, inasmuch as the 9th article says the place ought to be fixed, I might even in such a case safely maintain, that the uniform practice and usage of the assembly has fixed the seat of government at [Page 23]Annapolis; and that it cannot be removed, unless in one of the ways which I have pointed out.

But suppose that the 9th article of rights had never been inserted, I think, even in such a case, it might well be main­tained, that a single legislature could not appoint Baltimore for the place of meeting, because the last section of the con­stitution has appointed Annapolis the place for holding the legislature. That section directs the first legislature to meet at Annapolis on a certain day, and prescribes a particular piece of business which it is to do at that, or at some future session. Does this look as if the convention intended it to be a special legislature, appointed to do one special act and no other, and that a future legislature might meet wherever they might happen or might agree to assemble? But I have already pointed out the consequences of considering the first legislature in that light; and I dare say even the Farmer will be convinced, that the first legislature did right in proceed­ing to every other act of legislation. Well then, the first legislature chosen under the constitution, is by that constitu­tion directed to meet at Annapolis. It is doing no violence to the rules of construction, and it is agreeable to common sense, to maintain, that the constitution intended the future meetings of that legislature should be there, that all future le­gislatures should meet there, and that no legislature can be held at any other place before that implied direction of the constitution be repealed in the manner which the consti­tution prescribes.

It is another rule of construction, that every word in a law, if possible, must be construed so as to convey a meaning. But, without my construction, the word "fixed," in the 9th article, has no meaning at all. It is totally discarded, and then the clause stands thus, ‘that a place for the meet­ing of the legislature ought to be the most convenient,’ &c. And then, if it were not for the 61st clause, the legislature might move about as it pleased, always taking care, never­theless, to carry with it the public records, and to pitch on a place most convenient to the members.

When the meaning of the law-makers, after a careful consideration of every part, still remains a doubt, a recourse to the history of the times is said to be proper. An honour­able member of the present senate, who was a delegate to the last convention, has declared, he would most strenuously [Page 24]have opposed the fixing of the seat of government, had he discovered such an intent in the convention. Another ho­nourable member of the same body, who likewise had a share in fabricating the constitution, has assured me, that had he conceived the seat of government not to be fixed by the con­stitution as it stands, he would have insisted for more expli­cit terms. I greatly respect both these honourable gentle­men, and I mention their different ideas, to shew how little satisfaction could be obtained by an appeal to the founders of the constitution. Should this point be ever brought before a court of justice, these gentlemen, I am persuaded, would never be interrogated by the judges.

I shall conclude my argument on the constitution with one more observation, and with a brief recapitulation of what I have before said. Admitting the seat of government not to be fixed in the manner I contend, it may be re­moved to Baltimore-town without even the formality of an act. By message the two houses may agree to adjourn to meet at that place. At the next session they may in the same manner adjourn back to Annapolis. If the convention did not mean themselves to fix the seat of government, they must have seen that the 9th article of rights was entirely useless; because the act of any future legislature for that purpose, in whatever terms it might be expressed, could not prevent their successors, or even themselves, from removing it in the very next session. But the convention intended no part of their work to be useless. They intended the 9th article to have some effect; and every article is to remain a law, until it be repealed by two successive assemblies. But that article has no operation, unless it has by itself fixed the seat of govern­ment; or unless the constitution has appointed a place which answers its description; or unless the place for the meeting of the legislature be fixed by uniform practice and usage. The constitution appoints Annapolis for the meeting of the first legislature, and that place, in every respect, answers the description of the 9th article. By appointing that meeting, it meant to ascertain the place at which the legislature should always meet, unless on evident necessity, when it might adjourn, for one meeting only, to some other place. The provision, in the latter part of the 9th article, for cases of evident ne­cessity, was peculiarly adapted to the time when the consti­tution was framed, when an invasion of the enemy might [Page 25]every moment be expected. My construction places every thing on a proper footing, and grati [...]es every part of the declaration of rights, and the form of government; and the conduct of every legislature since the convention evinces, that they have made the same construction with myself.

Thinking as Aristides does on this important point, under a firm persuation that the constitution has fixed the seat of government at Annapolis, and fearing that the legislature might do an act which would involve the state in anarchy and confusion, he conceived his duty as a citizen, obliged him to declare his opinion, although not called upon in a judicial way. He may perhaps have acted an imprudent part. He may have hazarded some part of that reputation which he has been constantly and gradually acquiring. But considerations like these shall never deter him from his duty. If he cannot maintain the good opinion of men, without acting in conformity to their views, he must console himself with the purity of his motives. In his judicial character he never can receive, as a law, any act of the general assembly, which may be repugnant to his sense of the constitution, unless he be first over-ruled by his associates, or by a superior tribunal. At the same time, he is satisfied that his associates will deem binding no acts, which the legislature can be induced to pass, in direct violation of the constitution. And he has that opinion of their firmness and integrity, that as guardians of the sacred palladium of our rights, he is persuaded they will ever stand up against the encroachments and usurpation of any body of men whatever.

The Farmer cannot be so far blinded, by having his eyes continually fixed on this favourite object, as to deny the con­trol of the judges. I demand of him then, what would be the result, should a single legislature attempt to pass the pro­posed act into a law, and should the judges adopt the con­struction of Aristides, and reject all their acts passed at Baltimore-town?

In spite then of the Farmer's confidence, I do not imagine the succeeding legislature, for the sake of gratifying the eager wishes of Baltimore-town, will do an act which may hazard a revolution of the government. Should they be of opinion, that a removal of the seat of government is a measure which the public good absolutely demands, they will act in one of [Page 26]the following ways. They will pass an act, and publish it three months before a new election. Or they will demand of the whole judicial body, whether a single legislature has the power to remove the seat of government; and if the de­cision of the judges shall be in the affirmative, the legislature will then pass a common act, or a resolve, for meeting at Baltimore-town.

It will naturally be supposed, that I consider this point of singular importance. I indeed view it in that light. For, if two assemblies must concur, before the removal of the go­vernment can be effected, there will be little danger of sur­prize, or finesse. The citizens of Annapolis can never be greatly disturbed, until the first of these assemblies shall have passed the act; and a few defeats cannot fail to damp the ardour of its adversaries. In the mean time, it may advance to that degree of improvement of which it is yet capable; and it may attain the very little it wants, of exactly answering the description, which a disinterested enlightened politician would give of a capital best suited to a republic, like that of Maryland.

Its adversaries will endeavour to impress an idea, that should a single legislature, by its arbitrary fiat, transfer the seat of government, the judges would be compelled, from necessity, to give all the acts of the legislature, whether con­stitutional or not, the stamp of their authority. Be assured that this is a vain idea. But in the first place, where is the inducement for the members of the legislature to violate their own solemn oaths? Where is the propriety of precipitating this very important measure, when the preparatory steps, re­commended by Aristides, even if they may constitutionally be dispensed with, would be attended with so little delay, and when these steps would remove every ground of com­plaint?

Had the declaration of rights, and the form of govern­ment, been both silent on this head, it would, notwithstand­ing, be sound policy to adopt no weighty measure that does not require haste, without using the method prescribed by the constitution for the alteration of any part of itself.

There are two parts of that constitution which will excite the admiration of your latest posterity. The first is the re­fined mode of electing a senate. The other is the salutary provision for preventing hasty innovations, and the premature [Page 27]adoption of all momentous measures. May you always possess a due sense of its value, and may it protect the rights and secure the happiness of you and your posterity, till time shall be no more.

I PROCEED to examine the consequences which will flow from a removal of the seat of government, supposing it effected in a constitutional way. The Farmer represents, that this measure will render an essential service to the citi­zens of Annapolis, by curing them of their dependent ways, and by compelling them to adopt the habits of industry. His want of candour, or rather his want of reflection, will appear on the slightest attention to their real situation.

Annapolis, we may conjecture, had a beginning like most other towns within the state. A tavern, or a blacksmith's shop, may have first been erected on the spot, and occasion­ed some little resort. A few tradesmen then, of different kinds, needing occasionally the assistance of each other, and thinking it a likely place to gain employment, may have chosen it for a stand. It might then tempt a merchant or two to establish a store, and thus, by degrees, a small village may have been formed. We know from record and tradi­tion, that in a short time its advantages induced the former government there to fix its seat, and to procure for it a char­ter of incorporation from the British throne. Annapolis then, compared to cotemporary towns, soon became a flou­rishing place. The officers of government found it conve­nient to settle there. These men, with the concourse of people at stated periods, encouraged a competent number of tradesmen and mechanics to fix at a place where there was a certain prospect of employment. Hence it is that a consi­derable number of houses had there been erected. But let it be remembered, although it was thought well situated for commerce, that commerce never thrived at Annapolis, after it became the seat of government. The consideration of its being the residence of insolent great men, and the apprehen­sion of being entirely over-shadowed, deterred many plain, independent, enterprising men, from settling there; and it must be obvious, that the residence of the government has been unfavourable to it as a commercial town.

[Page 28] This was the state of Annapolis at the commencement of the contest with Great-Britain. In the course of the war, it [...], in a [...]reat measure, abandoned. But all dangers be­ing past, and the seat of both governments having always re­m [...]ed there, it has at this time rather more inhabitants than it had before the revolution. A very great majority of these depend not on government immediately for supplies. Their sole dependence is the property they have already ac­quired, and the further successful prosecution of their dif­ferent trades and professions. The men whom a connexion with government has occasioned to reside at the capital; the men whom periodical meetings of the general assembly and superior courts, or the public offices and records, attract to Annapolis; all these, I say, at present afford employment to its private citizens. Some of these citizens have laboured with success, and scraped together wherewithal to build or purchase a habitation. Others, more successful, have ac­quired a number of tenements, which they lease. Scarcely a single house is now standing, that was not built on account of its being the residence of government. Well then. A law passes for transferring the seat of government to another place. What is the certain consequence? The immediate dependents on government, having nothing to detain them at Annapolic, repair to the new capital. There is now no­thing left to occasion, at any time, a concourse of people at the old capital. The merchants, tradesmen and mechanics, must abandon it, to seek employment elsewhere. They have once more to begin the world, and for that purpose, they too will perhaps follow the government, provided they have a sufficient [...] of remaining strength, and provided the seve­rity of the blow hath not deprived them altogether of courage a [...]d hope. Those dwellings, on which the owners may have [...]austed the whole fruits of th [...]ir toil, are left to moul­der for want of tenants; and those more wealthy citizens, who have expended their substance in erecting tenements for rent, must sustain a heavier loss than they might suffer from an earthquake, a deluge, a bombardment, or the incursion of the most barbarous piratical enemy. It were in vain for Annapolic, at this time, to expect an indemnification from commerce, for that has long since centred with its aspiring neighbour. What is there then to prevent it from exhibit­ing, in a few years, gloomy piles of ruins? And what is [Page 29]there to prevent it from becoming a sad monument of that policy, which, however beneficial it shall have proved to another town, was fatal to a great number of honest merito­rious citizens.

Is not this, my countrymen, a probable state of conse­quences? Does it at all resemble the Farmer's? Can you pos­sibly suppose, that almost every man in Annapolis is imme­diately fed by the public, and that the only consequence of the removal of the government would be the laying him un­der the necessity of labouring, like his neighbours, for a sub­sistence? The truth is, that the small proportion of the citi­zens who depend immediately on the treasury for supplies, would the least of all be injured by the measure, since they would not by the removal be deprived of their employments.

The citizens of Annapolis are, notwithstanding, under some obligation to the Farmer. He purposes to convert the stadt-house into a college, which he thinks, may alone falsify the " prophetic mournful prediction" of Aristidas. But you surely must remark, how poor a compensation this would be for the loss of the government. A college can have little influence on the value of private buildings, because the stu­dents from the country are to board in the college buildings. It would afford little custom to shopkeepers and tradesmen, because the young gentlemen at school will be supplied with most necessaries, at those seasons when they shall visit their parents. In short, the college would detain and support few indeed of the inhabitants.

But wherefore the institution of a seminary of learning, renders it expedient or more proper to remove the seat of government from Annapolis, does not yet clearly appear. Should this seminary be actually perfected, con­trary to the well grounded apprehensions of Aristides; should youths be sent thither from all parts to which its fame shall reach; there will be a singular advantage to them, and of course to the community, in permitting the seat of go­vernment to remain where it is.

That you want men of abilities to conduct your affairs, is a sad and acknowledged truth!

The preamble of the act for founding this college, pro­poses an advantage to the state in training up and perpe­tuating a succession of able and honest men for performing [Page 30]the various offices and duties of life. The art of govern­ment, that most noble, most useful, most difficult of all sciences, may be studied with peculiar advantage at a capital like Annapolis. Observation and experience may be here combined with theory; and example, in this, as well as in every thing else, is infinitely superior to the sagest pre­cepts. Besides, that man has a deplorable idea of education, who does not comprehend in it both manners and a know­ledge of the world. The Farmer does not presume to deny, that Annapolis is the seat of elegance, propriety, and resme­ment of manners, although he sneers at these advantages, as if there were nothing solid, substantial or praise-worthy, in­dependent of wealth. He was not aware of the extent of his concessions. Nothing forms manners as well as example, and Annapolis affords the best patterns in the state. There is nothing more advantageous in a republic, where every person must depend on himself for advancement, than a knowledge of the world; and, to acquire this knowledge, there is nothing more proper than to attend public assemblies where order and decency are invariably preserved. At the numerous public assemblies in Annapolis, good order is ever maintained. Annapolis, on account of its size and popula­tion, is precisely the place for a college. It is not so large as that every student may not be known to the inhabitants; and it is not so small but that the whole body of students may be always overawed from breaking forth into riots. But remove the seat of government, and Annapolis, in a little time, will lose every advantage, and with respect to forming the manners of youth, or teaching them a proper knowledge of mankind, would be little superior to the remotest corner of the state. The college would lose that singular advantage of having visitors on the spot capable of superintending its masters and professors. These visitors, at present, may be assisted by others, who occasionally come thither on public and private business; and the idea of excelling in the eyes of these men, will be a strong incentive to the students. But after a removal of the government, it will be difficult at any time to procure a meeting of visitors, and when met, they will not remain long enough to inspect the affairs of the col­lege, to concert proper regulations, to discover and reform abuses. In short, when Annapolis shall become an obscure and decayed village, the college, instead of possessing the [Page 31]highest reputation, will in all probability be one of the last seminaries to which a judicious man will choose to send his son.

A young man, with a thorough knowledge of all that is taught in the schools, who has acquired neither manners nor some tincture of the knowledge of mankind, is scarcely more fit to advance himself in the world, than if he were just brought from the nursery. He has those things yet to learn which are seldom well acquired after early manhood. His Latin, Greek, mathematics, &c. without these, are mere learned lumber, and may rather disqualify him from making that figure which the fond imagination of a parent may have so often pictured. I need not enlarge on a subject which has been so often handled by men of superior talents. Expe­rience too has given men proper ideas. And you particu­larly, my countrymen, who are interested in making Saint John's college the theatre of education, must join me in opinion, that the establishment of it at the capital, so far from operating as an argument for a removal of the govern­ment, affords a most persuasive reason against it.

It has yielded me much secret amusement, to contemplate the zeal of some gentlemen for fixing the college at Anna­polis. I must think, that for once they have tripped in their politics. At the same time, I cannot but lament the oppo­sition which is made to immediately setting on foot the build­ings. I can account for it but in one way. Your repre­sentatives are to be addressed to the following effect.

‘By the removal of the seat of government, the public will incur not one farthings expence, as the town and county of Baltimore will generously undertake to erect noble and spacious buildings, which they will present to the government. On the contrary, you will observe, that by these means the public may be a gainer. The stadt-house will serve admirably for a college, and by transferring it to the visitors, the public may be exonerated from the payment of some part of the £.1750 0 0 which it is now obliged annually to contribute.’

Here too, I trust, is a lost hope. A majority of the visi­tors, acting like visitors and men of sense, would never think of converting the stadt-house into a college, as its situation, independent of any other circumstance, makes it extremely unfit for the purpose, and as their funds are too ample, to [Page 32]permit them, for the sake of a little saving, to choose an im­proper spot. But surely neither you, nor your representa­tives, can be influenced by the prospect of a little saving ^* in a matter of such vast importance, as the removal of the seat of government. I will, on this head, suggest another thing to your consideration; Baltimore-town may make large pro­mises, it may enter into extensive engagements, and, I doubt not, it means perfectly fair; but without wishing to irritate its inhabitants, I cannot help entertaining doubts as to its exact and punctual performance. At any rate, if the government must be removed, for the sake of common sense let it remain until these same buildings shall be prepared for its reception. I am sufficiently skilled in politics to be satisfied, that these buildings will never be completed at the expence of a single town and county. Let them once obtain their wishes, and they will discover, how mean a thing it were for the state to impose burthens on a part for the good of the whole; and one of the first things in which Baltimore-town will exert its influence in the legislature, will be to release itself from an unreasonable engagement. Nay, I make no doubt, that for the money disbursed in the beginning, it will have even the address to procure a compensation.

That the proposed measure will be attended with the hap­py effects of extending commerce, increasing the value of your lands, and preserving an equilibrium with the powerful neighbouring states, is with great solemnity predicted by the Farmer. As his predictions are not upon a footing with those of the antient prophets, it was incumbent on him to shew, that these things must unavoidably take place from mere natural causes. The question between him and Aristi­des is not simply, whether it were beneficial for the state to improve its commerce and agriculture, and thereby to aug­ment the value of its lands. God forbid that Aristides should be opposed to the prosperity of his country! God forbid that [Page 33]a mere local attachment, the prejudice of long residence, or even his private friendships, should make him oppose the means of establishing that prosperity. He is persuaded, that this state may yet considerably increase its riches, without entailing on itself the evils concomitant to excessive wealth; and he wishes to increase its riches to that precise point, be­yond which they cannot be extended, without destroying those virtues, and that simplicity and purity of manners, which are essential to the existence of a genuine repub­lic.

Aristides does not deal in generals. They may well serve to deceive and mislead, but they are of little use in a faithful inquiry after truth. It is from a patient attention to details, that right information is to be acquired. A habit of calcu­lation too, which he did not suppose would be thought ridicu­lous by the advocate of a commercial town, is of excellent use to detect fallacy, and to prevent us from being the dupes of an over heated imagination. Let us then consider calmly, what would be the consequences to Baltimore-town, and to the state at large, of acceding to the measure proposed, sup­posing that the influence of Baltimore-town would not govern the state.

On such an event, Baltimore-town would gain a part of the present citizens of Annapolis, some employed by govern­ment, and others compelled to repair thither, for the purpose of carrying on their trades and professions. It would like­wise attract a greater number than Annapolis does, of those men, whose principal use and employment is that of spending money. Assembly-men, jurors, witnesses, suitors, and others attending the public bodies, and offices, would then lay out in Baltimore-town, the money which at present they spend at Annapolis, and perhaps something more. Of con­sequence, the demand for goods would be increased, and a greater quantity of country produce would there find a market. Thus it is that commerce would be promoted. That is, there would be more buying and selling at a parti­cular spot.

No man of candour and reflection can in [...]r, from Aristides' first address, that he is an enemy of Baltimore-town. With pleasure he has contemplated its rapid growth, and sincerely he wishes it to increase so far as is consistent with its own, and the welfare of the state. But it will ac­quire [Page 34]no real substantial advantage, if it retains not the spirit, the virtues, and the manners, which first enabled it to rise. If Aristides resided in a distant corner of the state, if he had never seen "the beloved city," and if the good of Baltimore-town were his governing principle, he would oppose the measure on which the minds of its inhabitants appear so violently bent. When a large, wealthy, and populous town, which hath risen solely by the enterprize, industry, and fru­gality of its inhabitants, becomes the capital of a free go­vernment, immediately the idle and luxurious, those versed in the arts of luxury and dissipation, the various ministers of vice, are drawn thither, as if it were by instinct. Is it possible that a great change of manners will not be the re­sult? All this discourages from settling there the men who might be of real utility to the place; such men choosing ra­ther a place which is yet in its infancy, and of the prosperity of which, together with their own, they may lay the foun­dation. Let not a plain sober inhabitant of Baltimore-town, after the government shall have been removed, expect to live in the style to which he has ever before been accustomed. Although he may be able to preserve himself from contagion, it is extremely probable that his family will not view things in the same light with himself; and yet, without their con­currence, his rational plan cannot be observed. Can he bear the idea of acting like a tyrant, and doing a perpetual violence to their innocent inclinations? Can he even himself endure to be so far surpassed, and to live in a style inferior to that of his neighbours, with whom he has hitherto lived on strict terms of intimacy and equality? Can he bear that his former habits and manners shall be despised? These things must undoubtedly occasion him great vexation. Suppose him then to glide easily down with the torrent. Suppose that before the removal, his annual income was £.500; that by this event it is increased to £.600, and that in consequence of the event, his income will scarcely defray his current ex­pences. I suppose nothing but what is extremely likely to happen. Is it not probable then, that the inhabitants of Baltimore-town in general, with respect to mere profit, will be in a worse situation than they were before? But the men of real sense and virtue, when they shall observe the general perversion of morals, vice triumphant, and every thing public and private exposed to sale, will regret the event, as one of [Page 35]the most fatal that could have happened to themselves, their families, and their fellow-citizens.

Aristides received his education in the capital of a neigh­bouring state. As at that time it was the metropolis of a province dependent on Great-Britain, as the government of it was in the hands of men belonging to a sect of religious enthusiasts, who did every possible thing for the discourage­ment of vice, it was exempt from almost all the usual vices of capital towns. But mark the change. Upon the break­ing out of the war, it became the seat of congress, the resort of gay military men, and of all idle and curious travellers from the neighbouring states, and from the old world. It became too the residence of foreign ministers. Aristides vi­sited it just before the departure of congress, and instantly perceived the alteration. He discovered many outward signs of increased wealth. In every house which he entered, he saw costly splendid furniture. A vast number of magnifi­cent carriages rolled along the streets; and the habits of the people corresponded with the affected gaiety of their faces. He was astonished at the manners of his former acquaint­ance. Many tales of domestic grief were related to him; and he was told of families, who, with incomes increased, were hastening to their ruin. He was so struck with all he observed and heard, that he was alarmed at the coming of congress to his native state, and to the spot of his residence. Happily it remained but a short time, and the peculiar in­clemency of the season whilst it staid, prevented that con­course, and that dissipation, which might have turned the heads, and perverted the hearts of his fellow-citizens. But it remained long enough to teach them, that the influx of wealth which congress occasioned, would not indemnify them for the increase of their general expences, and the fatal change of their manners. And yet the residence of congress would have occasioned wealth, in some degree, to flow from every quarter into the state. I wish to impress on your minds, that an addition of money does not always make one actually the richer. Perhaps it may be concluded, that from having in some manner or other imbibed a set of old fashioned no­tions, I am, at all events, against enriching the state. I do not insist, that this state would not, by becoming the per­manent residence of congress, have derived more real good than evil. I leave it as a doubtful point, not necessary at [Page 36]this time to be settled. I have endeavoured to demonstrate, that the removal of the government, although it might carry money with it, would not be really beneficial even to Balti­mor [...]-town. And it is my purpose to shew presently, that it would not, in any sense, add to the riches of the state.

Athough Aristides flatters himself that he possesses the true spirit of a republican, he does not consider modern re­publics on the same footing with those of antient Greece. In these days, the strength and security of every government must depend in a great measure on the flourishing state of its trade. In war particularly, the richest states, or those rather whose governments can command the largest sums, will in general have the advantage. But let us not, because we may have occasionally skimmed a few pages of history, be so fond of quoting parallels and examples. Let us first learn a little to distinguish. Is the state of Maryland, which is no more than one member of thirteen which compose the great republic of North-America, is this petty dependent state to be viewed in the same light with a great independent separate state, surrounded by the powerful empires and king­doms of Europe? With respect to these, the Farmer's last address contains many judicious, pertinent observations, the application of which is left to the reader. I am enabled to conjecture the meaning by what I have frequently heard of the politics of "the beloved town." It is there, as I have been told, pretty generally maintained, that we ought to have but one port; or if even the law should not directly confine importation and exportation to a single port, that it ought, nevertheless, to be brought about by political regula­tions, or in other words, by indirect means. If this be found doctrine, and if it be consonant to your wishes, that no foreign goods should be imported unless into Baltimore-town, and that Baltimore-town should be the sole mart for your produce, and if this would promote the prosperity of the state in an eminent degree, then ought not the proposed measure to be longer delayed than is absolutely necessary.

It will be difficult, I conceive, to persuade you, that we may not have several commercial towns. I mean, towns where your produce may be purchased for exportation, and to which goods may be imported immediately from abroad. [Page 37]It will be difficult to persuade you, that by having several such towns, the sum total of the value of your lands throughout the state will not be greater, than if you had but one ^*. George-town, I have the most sanguine expectations, will become a place of considerable trade. The act re­specting the clearing of the Patowmack, excited jealous ap­prehensions in Baltimore-town, and a remembrance of that ought to excite similar apprehensions in you. Havre-de-Grace, from the advantages of its situation, is, by many per­sons, expected to shoot up with a rapidity, equal to the late growth of Baltimore-town. But the narrow selfish policy of this, like that of every other great town, supposes the pros­perity of other places incompatible with its own, and would gladly crush them, either in infancy, or old age. Nothing but the want of a few enterprising men, and a little good policy in the legislature, and discernment in the people, can prevent a town of considerable importance from erecting [...]self on the eastern shore. But, if the seat of government [...] removed to Baltimore-town, the merchants of that place, [...] suspect, will prevent, if possible, a single vessel from loading [...] unloading at any other place within the state, unless un­ [...]er their direction. This would they do for your sakes, [...]y beloved countrymen, to raise the value of your lands, and to preserve your equilibrium with your powerful neighbours!

But let commerce be generally diffused, or let it be con­fined to a single spot, it will be impossible for the prices of your produce ever to exceed a certain point, as these prices must be regulated by the demand in other countries. And let Baltimore-town grow to any size which the proprietors of vacant lots may wish, it is impossible these prices, on an average, can exceed that degree which will admit of some [Page 38]profit to the merchant, upon the exportation of the commo­dities. If there be only one market to which you can or would choose to send them, is there not great danger that this market will, at times be over stocked? In such a case, your commodities must be either sold at an under rate, or be stored for a more convenient season. I ask, whether something of this kind has not been by some of you already experienced ^*. I dare aver, that some of the gentlemen who urge a removal of the government, and whose views extend to the beneficial consequences of that removal, do not wish to enrich the land-holders at the expence of the mer­cantile interest. And yet they would inflame your imagi­nations, by general vague assertions and promises, and would persuade you, that the measures which self-love impels them to promote, are dictated only by a regard to public good.

Without the least pretence to inspiration, I shall, in my turn, deliver a prediction. When the seat of government shall be removed to Baltimore-town, there will soon be an end to all fairness and freedom of legislative debate. It is a sad truth, that in our days, whatever specious pretences may be made to public spirit, private interest is almost the universal principle. With my whole heart I subscribe to the Farmer's culogium on his beloved merchants. It is for merchants in general, that of all orders of men, I entertain the highest opinion. But these particular merchants must excuse me if I think, that like other merchants, and other men, they will exert themselves to bring about those measures which will tend most to the advancement of their own supposed welfare, and the aggrandisement of their town. I deem not so meanly of country members, as to suppose them capable of being bribed by elegant fare, old Madeira, or even a good round sum of money. But I know full well the efficacy of polite atten­tions, [Page 39]and infinuating address, more especially when infidious motives are not even suspected. No class of men in the universe are so apt as merchants to unite in a common cause. No other men pursue their objects with so much perse­verance, steadiness and consistency. The Farmer, I think, gives you plainly to understand the great motive for accom­plishing the first grand undertaking. It is, says he, that the legislature may take the inhabitants of Baltimore-town ‘un­der its immediate protection.’ That is, my friends, that the legislature may pass no law which they shall not dictate; [...]nasmuch as the value of lands is to depend on the encourage­ments given to commerce, and they are the best judges of commercial regulations.

At Annapolis, an undue influence has never been com­ [...]ained of. The reason is, that at Annapolis there is no [...]e powerful order of men to combine for ruling the [...]ate. At Baltimore the case is different, and if ever it ob­ [...]ins the seat of government, you will find, that upon the [...]rival of your representatives at the opening of every session, [...]riguing, crafty, designing men, will practice upon them [...]se arts, which seldom fail of success with the unsuspecting [...] inexperienced, and which have great power even over [...] most experienced and intelligent, with whom, upon oc­ [...]on, other methods may be taken. (That I may not in­ [...]ently offend, I declare solemnly, once for all, that when [...]eak of Baltimore-town, its inhabitants or merchants, I [...]ry my views beyond the present set of inhabitants, of [...]m, I am convinced, very, very few have penetrated in­ [...]ll the consequences which would flow from the measure.) thing is more probable, than that a majority of the house delegates will be frequently gained by those arts, to pass [...]s under the plausible pretext of general good, when the [...]antage of the capital alone, or of a junto of its inhabi­ [...]s, will be the real object. I will suppose the select men [...]o compose the senate, to be superior to such arts, to have [...]etration to view matters as they are, and resolution to [...]h-hold their assents. This is supposing a great deal, be­ [...]se Baltimore-town, with its spirit of enterprize, will al­ [...]ays endeavour to procure a suitable election of the senate, [...] [...]e electors are to meet at that place. But, supposing [...] I have already done, I presume, that in such a case, not­withstanding the profound [...]eneration in which the senate is [Page 40]at present held by the respectable merchants of Baltimore-town, the persons concerned will not quietly acquiesce in the opinions of perhaps only half a dozen men, that every peaceable method will be taken to gain a majority in that branch, and that if these few men persist in opposing the wishes of a powerful party, and contrary to the wishes also of the more numerous branch of the legislature, their office will become odious, i [...]some and dangerous, and it will re­quire more real patriotism than is to be found in any fifteen men among [...] us, to execute it agreeably to the intentions of the constitution. The most exalted species of patriotism is that which impels a man to serve his country, by doing things which are repugnant to the s [...]ntiments and wishes of his de­luded countrymen. And this species is rarely the production of modern times. In short, the senate will, in a little time, lose all its dignity and authority, it will no longer serve as a check or counterpoise to the other branch; the constitution will be no longer preserved; and no man is able to say what government shall next prevail. Should the mere forms of the present be permitted to subsist, as I doubt not they will, be assured, that no government is more arbitrary than that in which, by corruption and intrigue, a few ambitious men conduct every thing under the specious forms of free­dom.

I have spoken of the mischiefs to be apprehended from the intrigues and over-bearing influence of the leading men. There would be hardly less to be apprehended from the po­pulace. Permit me here to transcribe a part of my first ad­dress. ‘No man of reflection can expect, in a large town, that the deliberations of the legislature, without an army to protect it, can be perfectly free. Let us suppose a mat­ter agitated in the assembly, which rouses the passions of a mob, and about which popular clamours have been ex­cited.’ Let us suppose such a case as the late religious bill, (whether that bill was beneficial o [...] not, makes no difference in the argument;) ‘can any man suppose, the house of de­legates could, on such an occasion, have been at liberty to decide, contrary to the opinion out of doors? But in such a place as Baltimore-town, the consequence and power of the senate, consisting only of fifteen members, and those not the immediate representatives of the people, obnoxious on account of superior wealth, and perhaps obnoxious too [Page 41]even for their superior talents and virtue ^*; the conse­quence and power of this branch of the legislature, so ne­cessary to moderate at times the intemperate zeal, and to correct the hasty proceedings, of the other, would be to­tally annihilated. The congress, notwithstanding its doors were shut, at length deemed it necessary, for the purpose of free deliberation; to quit Philadelphia. It had expe­rienced likewise the mischiefs resulting from the perpetual intrigues and cabals of a capital town ^†.’

‘If congress, conducting the affairs only of the union, having nothing to do with the internal government of Pennsylvania, and keeping, as far as it could its delibera­tions secret from the word, found it expedient, for the reasons I have suggested, to remove from Philadelphia; surely a body of men; whose deliberations are public, can­not expect a freedom of debate in a large town, on matters [Page 42]interesting to its inhabitants. I have mentioned the case of congress, as recent, striking and familiar. Many other cases might be produced to the same purpose,’ &c. &c.

To shew that in large and free capitals the open delibera­tions of a legislature are liable to interruption from the po­pulace, I barely mentioned the cities of London and Dublin. I suppose the inhabitants of Baltimore to be neither more orderly, nor more seditious, than those of other large free trading towns. It must be admitted, that all these are, more or less, subject to parties, seditions and tumults. I smile at the suggestion of a mob being always to be overawed and suppressed by the respectable body of merchants. The time will come, when perhaps some of these respectable mer­chants may deem mobs very proper political engines. There will ever be found in great cities, men (no matter to what order they belong) who by courting and humouring the people, will render them subservient to their purposes; and these demagogues, by the weight of the people, will endea­vour to break down every constitutional barrier opposed to the aggrandisement of their own power.

Why does the Farmer so repeatedly wrest the meaning of Aristides? Why does he imagine, I esteem it a fatal policy to permit London to be the metropolis of Great-Britain? For the monarch of an independent nation, I am satisfied that it is a sound policy to bring much force within a narrow compass; and for the king of England to remove his court, and, to establish the seat of his government in a small town, would be directly to seek his own destruction. I assent to all the Farmer has advanced in his paragraph respecting that nation, and the republic of Venice. But he ought to reflect, that, in each of these governments, the deliberations of the legisla­ture are protected by armed guards, continually maintained, and not unfrequently called into action.

His doctrine of concentration can apply only to evince the propriety of drawing together the strength and riches of the United States, provided we could think it necessary to sacrifice everything to the protection of congress, our sovereign power ^*. [Page 43]This might be agreeable doctrine to the state, or rather to the town; in which congress shall fix its permanent resi­dence; but not one of the other states would be easily con­vinced of its propriety. "What have we to do," might they not say, ‘with this kind of policy? We have, thanks be to providence, little to apprehend from invasions. But if we had, we are situated differently from the nations in Europe. We have neither emperor nor king, nor a per­manent hereditary body of nobles, to lord it over us, and to make every thing subservient to their own safety and greatness.’

The congress itself must be against that policy, because it has determined, over and over again, never to choose a large town for the place of its permanent residence. Does not every man in Baltimore-town remember this? And can he possibly forget all the fine things that have been said about an American Hague?

To talk then about concentrating the riches and strength of the United States, would be deviating from former prin­ciples. But to talk of concentrating the riches and force of the state of Maryland, which is only one, and that by no means the wealthiest and most powerful of the thirteen, is really childish in the extreme. Are we to act upon the prin­ciple that the union is to be dissolved, and that every state must shift for itself? Even on that event, in what would consist the advantage of this plan of concentration? Is it meant, that whenever this state shall be at war with Penn­sylvania or Virginia, and our country shall be over-run, we shall still preserve our liberties and independence, by having drawn together every thing at Baltimore? Does the Farmer reflect on the difference between an island and a continent? [Page 44]But I wish not to wade beyond my depth, or to enter into use­less disquisitions. On a dissolution of the confederacy, this state, in spite of the exqui [...]te scheme of concentration, will soon find itself obliged to unite with one or both of its neigh­bours. As it i [...] far too small to be a separate independent state, either it must do this, or in one of those contests which never fail to take place between neighbouring inde­pendent nations, not united by common interests or com­mon danger, it will fall a prey to Pennsylvania or Virginia, or its territory will be divided between the two. Let the legislature do what it will for the aggrandisement of a single town, and let my apprehensions of the ill consequences of the great preliminary measure be ever so groundless, it is im­possible, from the nature of things, that this town will be ever a match for Philadelphia. It is perhaps to be expected, that in time it will be eclipsed even by Alexandria. And I think it not improbable, unless its good habits be perserved, that the commerce of Baltimore-town has already been at its b [...]st.

However be that as it may, I conceive it the true policy of the state, taking not only the present, but future times into consideration, to lend an aiding hand to every rising town. It ought, in a particular manner, to cherish all such as have any natural advantages. It seems ordained by providence that we should have several trading towns; and it would be an insult to that providence, to contemn the blessings, which it has dealt forth with a liberal hand. In our situation, the policy of a plurality of trading towns is beneficial, on a variety of accounts. It is by these, if by any thing, that Maryland as a separate independent nation, would be able to preserve its equilibrium with the neighbouring govern­ments. Suppose we have three towns, consisting each of 15,000 inhabitants, these, on one account at least, must be more advantageous than one town of 45,000, as three towns would raise the value of lands in three neighbourhoods. But luxury, that bane of all genuine republics, that insidious deadly soe to freedom, could never attain so great a height in any of the three, as it would most assuredly do in the one. Besides, many of you would have a choice of markets. And, if a rival hip could take place amongst them, it would operate to thy advantage of all, by stimulating the industry and enter­prize of the merchants and mechanics, and by affording [Page 45]excitements to the farmers and planters. It would be thus that commerce would indeed be promoted, and the value of your lands indeed improved. It is not by paving the way for the principal inhabitants of a single town to acquire immense estates, and by these estates, together with the in­fluence they shall acquire in the legislature, to lord it over the land, that we shall best provide for our own happiness, and that of our latest posterity.

That the merchants of this single town are desirous of engrossing the whole commerce of the state, is, I think, but too evident. The main public reason which they assign for giving them the seat of government, is the necessity of improv­ing commerce, and of concentrating our powers of exertion. Now this argument surely applies to the suppression of all other trading towns; and if they can by any means bring about the projected removal, I think you must perceive the great advantage they will have for compassing any other measure which they may set their hearts upon. When I am calculating their weight and influence in the legislature, con­vened amongst them, I should never think of stating proporti­ons as the Farmer would have me. And he must think very meanly of his countrymen if he imagines they cannot detect the fallacy of his rule! Does any man suppose, that "as two are to thirty-six," so will the interest of Baltimore-town be to the landed interest? If indeed the question could be plainly put, ‘shall the interest of Baltimore-town, or the landed interest be preferred?’ I make no doubt, it would be determined by a vast majority in favour of the latter! Baltimore-town will take care never to contend openly against the landed interest, and it will take care also to gain over or to deceive, those who ought to espouse the interest of the land-holders.

He has not assigned the true causes of the flourishing con­dition of Pennsylvania. That condition is not owing to the government having confined commerce to a single spot. Nature had provided for that, by affording only a single na­vigable river. Pennsylvania owes its prosperity to the esta­blishment of perfect religious freedom, to the other wise re­gulations of its illustrious founder, to the discouragements which have been constantly given to slavery, and to the wise [Page 46]policy and admirable manners of the quakers, under the for­mer government. But that the condition of our country people is far preferable to the condition of the country people of Pennsylvania, is evident to him who has travelled through or sojourned in each state, and who is not blinded by preju­dice and prepossession. The reason is plain. The whole country of Pennsylvania is, at this time, under a kind of vassalage to the metropolis. Every thing depends upon their great town, and it is well known, and greatly lamented, that Philadelphia governs the whole state. It is true, as I have before said, that Pennsylvania is more powerful than Mary­land. Its territory is vastly more extensive; and, on ac­count of the size and bustle of its capical, and i [...] bank paper, it has at this moment the appearance of enjoying a greater de­gree of prosperity than Maryland. Supposing even, that this appearance is not deceitful, for Maryland to confine its com­merce to a single town, because nature has done it in a neigh­bouring state, would be running blindfold into a renuncia­tion of those blessings for which we are the envy of the in­telligent persons in every part of that very state, except the capital.

If a town can be erected somewhere in Talbot county, and the inhabitants of the eastern shore can there find a ready market, it will surely be more advantageous for them to carry thither their commodities, and with them procure the mer­chandise they want, than to be obliged to go a long tedious voyage to the town of Baltimore. Perhaps indeed, the eastern shore might, by means of some beneficial regulations, have two or three considerable trading towns. George-town is nearer than Baltimore is to some parts of the upper counties; of course, it is more convenient to the inhabitants of those parts by land. But, if the obstructions in the Patowmack can be removed so as to afford a water carriage, it would be wicked in the extreme to labour for the destruction of George-town. If the trade down the Susquehanna shall become con­siderable, and a market may be had at Havre-de-Grace, sure­ly you would not compel the people to convey their com­modities, by a dangerous navigation, to Baltimore-town.

There are great advantages to a state in having considera­ble trading towns. Its own citizens may, at one of these towns, dispose immediately of the produce they shall carry to market; and a merchant may there, if he pleases, immedi­ately [Page 47]dispose of a whole cargo at wholesale, load his vessel with dispatch, and in a little time send her back to sea. As in these towns there is generally a competition amongst pur­chasers, the prices of your commodities cannot fail to be as high as can possibly be afforded by the merchant who ex­ports them; and as too there is a competition amongst the sellers of imported merchandise, you cannot fail to procure it as cheap as it can be sold without ruin to the shopkeepers. For one trading town, Baltimore is already sufficiently large; and the growth and commerce of that place has been of great service to the state; but it is not yet large enough to prevent its merchants from taking advantage of you by art­ful combinations, provided we have but one trading town. The true policy of our government, would prompt it to con­fine commerce to just as many spots as the real convenience of all its citizens would require. There is indeed a great seeming advantage for every man to have a port almost at his own door, as the carriage to market is thereby saved; but then the price is much less, and the sale more uncertain, than if he were obliged to carry his commodities some little distance from home. A judicious port law is the only thing wanting to render this state, in a little time, the most flourish­ing and prosperous state, in proportion to its size, in the union. But having a port at every man's door is one extreme, and having only one port is another. A wise politician might soon discover the proper medium. Were three or four ports esta­blished on this and as many on the eastern shore, and were all merchant vessels prohibited from leading or unloading any where else, we should therein soon sind our account, every one, or a competent number of these places, would, in a little time, afford the advantages I have mentioned; you would enjoy the benefit of a competition between these places, and there would be no danger of your suffering from com­binations and monopolies.

Against a scheme like this, I fear the prejudices of my countrymen, and the mistaken notions of private interest, will raise insuperable bars; but I flatter myself, that these prejudices will nevertheless produce some good. They must, I think, prevent the inhabitants of Baltimore-town from suc­ceeding in their present undertaking, provided only you have penetration to foresee all the consequences of the pro­jected removal.

[Page 48] I think that I not only foresee these consequences, but can perceive plainly the views and expectations of some of these inhabitants. They expect, I presume, by the legislature "taking them under its immediate protection," to pr [...]ure, in a fair way, acts of such a nature, that almost all, if not the whole, produce of the state, shall be finally collected at Baltimore, or at least pass through the hands of its merchants; that all imported goods shall be unloaded at that town; and that the vessels which bring them shall there take in their loads, except perhaps a few tobacco ships, which shall, nevertheless, be under their direction. Petty towns there may be in the different parts of the state; but these must contain no capital merchants. They shall contain shopkeepers, tributary to Baltimore; and these shopkeepers shall not presume to load or unload a single ship: If all this can be effected by a re­moval of the government, the town of Baltimore will indeed be a most important place. But can you, reflecting on all I have advanced, and using too your own reflections and observations, can you, I say, perceive, that all this will tend to the general happiness and prosperity to the state? Can you suppose it will raise the value of your lands at a distance from the capital? Can you suppose it will raise the prices of your commodities beyond what they may attain without this [...]azing agrandisement of Baltimore-town? Can you expect, by purchasing commodities from shopkeepers, or by going yourselves to the fountain head, that you will procure them cheaper than you do at present under present cir­cumstances? Can you suppose that this will increase the strength of Maryland more than by having a variety of trading towns, or that it will give a greater weight in the union?

I have endeavoured to demonstrate, (and I trust to your satisfaction,) that if Baltimore does not become the favourite, or in other words, the director of the legislature, the com­merce of that town will not in the end be promoted by a re­moval of the government, notwithstanding that at first more goods will be there sold, more country produce there pur­chased, its houses better filled, and more tenements erected. You must, I think, be satisfied, that your own welfare, and the strength and dignity of the state, do not depend on the completion of the measures against which I have warned you. [Page 49]Ta [...]e it either way, that Baltimore-town will, or will not, govern the state, and no public reason under Heaven ap­pears for presenting it with the seat of government.

Her advocates may tell you that I have slandered her; that her inhabitants have no intention, by law, to engress commerce. But the consequences of a remov [...]l do not at all depend upon the present views, wishes or intentions, of the present inhabitants. These may alter with a change of circum­stances, and even the set of inhabitants, either with or with­out a removal of the government, will be materially changed in the course of a very few years. But in the name of com­mon sense, what is it they do mean? If at any time they can hit upon a scheme for the advancement of the public good, or if they want any local regulations that are just and consistent with the public welfare, what is there to prevent them from laying their plans before the legislature at Anna­polis? The mischief is, that every thing must there undergo a full and fair discussion. The assembly has been ever prone to indulge them in every thing that has had the least appear­ance of propriety; the assembly to have done otherwise must have been wicked and blind; and every one readily allows, that they are, on all accounts, entitled to the greatest at­tention and respect. If, notwithstanding this, they cannot be contented until they get under the immediate protection of the legislature, and yet do not mean to govern the state, I can assign to them no other motives but these. They must have in contemplation some matter of mere private interest, and hence they become advocates for their town. Or they must conceive, that by merely enjoying the seat of government, without having any influence in the legislature, their town will be benefited; and they may think too, that the com­merce of the state will be improved. In both these I have endeavoured to demonstrate they would be deceived. Or their mere pride cannot support the idea of a town, so far inferior to theirs, being the metropolis, bearing all the honours of government, and compelling them at times to at­tend public bodies. But in this matter you are all concern­ed. And you ought surely to keep the seat of government where you may be certain that your representatives cannot be exposed to the arts of cunning, intriguing, interes [...]ed men; where you may be certain that the legislature may [Page 50]quietly and freely debate; where a mob cannot be raised to disturb or intimidate them; where the good of the whole will probably be equally consulted; where the influence of a part may not prevail against the rest; where powerful com­binations may not be entered into against your freedom and rights; where the senate may retain its constitutional impor­tance; where the genuine substance, and not the mere form [...] only, of your constitution may be preserved. Let me en­treat you again and again, to reflect even on this point, whether you ought to consign to destruction a great number of your innocent fellow-citizens, and at the same time ha­zard the loss of many great and sure advantages, without the certain prospect of some mighty good, that may amply com­pensate for every thing we can possibly lose.

By fixing the seat of government at a large commercial town, you put your liberties to the hazard, as much as a single state in the union of thirteen free states can possibly do. True policy does not require us to confine commerce to a single spot; and you are greatly interested in the growth of other towns. The value of your lands will not increase in the same proportion as the size and trade of a single town. The value of all your lands may be augmented by the growth of a number of other towns. The liberal instruction of the rising generation will be best carried on at a small capital, distinguished by the refinement of its manners, purity of morals, and universal good order; and the liberties of your posterity depend on maintaining a succession of honest and able men. There is no use whatever to a state like ours, in concentrating our riches and strength; but by so doing you may run the risk of combinations against your liberties. In all great towns there is a fatal tendency to luxury and dissipation, and of course to a degeneracy of manners; but these evils will be much greater in a large town, when it becomes the capital of a state. The native soil of every species of corruption is an extensive metropolis. The seat of go­vernment, merely as such, is not favourable to the commerce of a town; but as it cannot fail to give any large town an undue influence in all public councils, the fixing of the seat of government at Baltimore, and the adoption of the politics of that town, will probably do an irreperable injury to the community at large. And all these are but a part of the ar­guments [Page 51]which will naturally suggest themselves to every man of plain common sense, who will apply himself to a cool and dispassionate deliberation on this grand and interesting subject.

The Farmer does not hesitate to assert, that no evils have resulted to New-York, or Massachusetts, from holding the seats of their governments in their great commercial towns; and that from those towns they have derived great federal importance. That they have actually experienced the evil [...] against which I am guarding you, I am too little acquainted with their proceedings positively to assert ^*. That in a little time they must feel them, I am as well convinced as I can possibly be of any event which is yet in the womb of time. Of Philadelphia I know a little more; and might safely refer you to a history of that state for an illustration of almost every part of my argument. That state, indeed, to the re­gret of almost all its worthy citizens, has only one branch of the legislature. But say, whether you conceive it possible, amidst the distractions of that government, which have pro­ceeded [Page 52]from the violence of party spirit in their great com­mercial capital, that a senate could have even subsisted until the arrival of their first great constitutional period for elect­ing a council of censors.

Some of the inhabitants of Baltimore-town have set up a kind of claim to the seat of government, and they found it on the amount of their public taxes.

If a thing, merely in the gift of government, were con­tended for between the town of Baltimore and the city of Annapolis, the legislature might determine on the same prin­ciple which actuated the judges in the famous contest for the armour of Achilles; or they might perhaps decide with pro­priety in favour of the town, on account of its great superi­ority of numbers. But if a decision in its favour would in­jure the community, this single town would be bound to give up to the state, on the same principle that Annapolis would be bound to yield to it. The payment of taxes, how­ever, confers no other right, either on an individual or a town, than a right to the equal protection of government; which, as it is milituted for the benefit of all the persons composing society, should, if possible, be administered so as to injure none, and to consult the welfare of all.

That Annapolis has so long been possessed of the seat of government, the Farmer considers as an argument for the removal. He call [...] of the principle of [...]tation. He should con [...]ide, on that principle, that other towns may hereafter put in a claim. However, as on this head he has indulged himself with some jocose expressions▪ I can scarcely consider him in [...] in the argument, and therefore I do not think It worth while to expose the folly of the principle, when ap­plied to the [...]eat of government.

[...] possession is, in itself a strong argument against dispossession. There is re [...]ding in Annapolis scarcely one free men, woman, or child, that would not suffer by a removal of the government. In Baltimore-town, a few rich men, to whose real happiness an accession of wealth cannot be essential, [...] this measure, obtain a considerable augmentation of property. The re [...]due of its inhabitant, whatever they may be [...] the contrary, are in reality interested against it. At any rate, a very considerable ma­jority [Page 53]of them cannot be greatly interested in support of the measure. At least they have not, in the smallest degree, their livelihoods depending on the event. Say even that they would be considerably enriched, and that the community is in no way interested. Would you, on account merely of doing good to your fellow-citizens, prefer the giving to a great number of men that, which they never have possessed, that which, 'till very lately, they never looked for, and that, which is by no means necessary to their happiness? Would you, I say, prefer doing this, to the letting a small number of men retain that which they ever have held, to which no others have a superior right, which cannot be divided, and which is almost essential to their existence? Whether it is better to let a single man retain an estate, just competent to his support, or to take it, and distribute it amongst half a dozen men, who before were as rich as himself? The question will not admit a dispute; and you must at once perceive the vast difference between with-holding from a man that which he never had, and the depriving him of what he has always had. Examine the subject in every point of view, the more you reflect, the better you will be convinced, that Baltimore-town ought not, in this instance, to be gratified. I will not go so far as others have done. I will not say, the attempt for its wickedness, is without a pa­rallel. But I must say, that never yet have I heard of any thing more ungenerous. To view it in its naked de­formity is, indeed, almost sufficient to impress one with horror!

The only arguments in favour of the proposition, which remain to be discussed, are directed to your representatives in their private capacities, and it is your business to take care that these arguments shall not influence them to sacrifice your interest to what they may conceive to be their own private advantage.

‘It is said that at Baltimore-town the members of the assembly may transact their private business, whilst they are managing the affairs of government. This consideration is pressed home to their feelings, as individuals. But surely you cannot be benefited, by having their attention diverted from the public business. Would any pr [...]ent man em­ploy, for the management of a [...], which requires the [Page 54]utmost diligence and attention, a person, who at the same time, is carrying on a business much more interesting to him than that of his employers? I acknowledge, that in general the private business of the members may soon be dispatched. But their staunch friends at election will expect their little affairs to be managed likewise. It is not im­probable, that your representatives will even solicit agen­cies and commissions,’ and will esteem their seats of va­lue, on account of being maintained by the public, whilst they shall be devoting their talents and attention to private concerns. Does not every man know, that to execute pro­perly the duties of a legislator, the closest application, the most intense study, and an entire exemption from all other business, is absolutely necessary? We are told indeed, that few members are distinguished, even at Annapolis, by their application to the business of the session; and that they con­sume a great portion of their time in unprofitable amuse­ments. This I shall not dispute; but let them, at any time, have private business to transact, and I am afraid, that instead of devoting to it their hours of amusement, they will rather employ those hours which belong strictly to the public. There is a danger too of having their minds occupied by this private business, even whilst they shall be within the public walls.

From a gentleman who has called the 9th article of the de­claration of rights only declaratory, I did not expect an argu­ment derived from that article. But it seems, that whenever it suits the purpose of Baltimore-town, this article may serve as a guide to the legislature. The article says, that the place for the meeting of the legislature must be most convenient to the members. He has mistaken the plain and obvious sense of the article. The place is not to be the most convenient for them in their private characters, to conduct their private affairs. In these the public is not interested; but on the contra­ry, it is interested, as I have before said, in letting them have little opportunity of transacting their private affairs, whilst they ought to be engaged in its service. The article means a place the most central, the most convenient for them to repair to, and the best suited to them in their public charac­ters, as members of the legislature. ‘Let us then examine which place is better adapted to the business of the legisla­ture. In Baltimore-town the members may be occupied [Page 55]by private business. In Annapolis, it is presumable, they will have little business,’ except that upon which they shall be sent, the weighty business of securing the happiness of their constituents. ‘I will not say that Baltimore-town, with all its numerous buildings, cannot afford proper ac­commodations, because I doubt not, in the beginning, that great efforts would be made to render the place agreeable. I maintain, that in Annapolis the members may always procure, at a reasonable rate, even elegant fare, comfort­able lodgings, and quiet apartments, remote from all that noise and bustle of business, which is altogether inconsistent with calm thought and sober deliberation.’

That Annapolis is more central, and more convenient for a majority of the state to repair to, you must all know. By your constitution, the annual meeting of the legislature takes place in November, and it rarely ends before January. At that time, as I am informed, the town of Baltimore is ge­nerally inaccessible by water, and therefore the gentlemen of the eastern shore, to return home, might be under the neces­sity of heading the bay, or coming down by land to Anna­polis. At what other season can they so conveniently leave their homes as at the end of autumn? Say that you will change the constitution, and let the annual meeting be in summer, (for it cannot be in the spring,) the heat, the dust, and the apprehension, if not the real danger, of contagion, will soon induce an opinion, that it were better to attend at the present stated period at Annapolis.

There is a set of men, the pretended friends to Annapolis, but in effect its most dangerous foes. These men affect candour and disinterestedness. They yield to the force of the reasons against the measure, but then they argue in this way. ‘The removal is an event which the ordinary course of affairs must inevitably bring about. The citizens of Annapolis can prevent it only a few seasons longer; the delay will afford them very little benefit; and, until it takes place, they must remain in an uneasy state of su [...] ­pense. It were better then for them to yield at once to inevitable necessity, and to let Baltimore enjoy those ad­vantages which must attend the seat of government.’

Suppose a man to address you gravely in the following terms.

Would this harrangue induce a single man to lay violent hands upon himself? Would it prevent him in his sickness from using the means of recovery? There is, however, a capital distinction between the two cases. Death we all know to be inevitable. The removal of the seat of govern­ment I am so far from thinking unavoidable, that I never yet could see the great cause which Annapolis had to fear. In a few years, I am persuaded, the matter will be totally out of the question; for in these few years you will be able to profit from the experience of your sister states; and you will discern your true interests too well to afford Baltimore-town the least room for hope.

That the greatest towns throughout the world are, for the most part, capitals, I cannot deny; but this consideration affords no argument for Baltimore-town. Most of the go­vernments in the world are arbitrary, and for the security of such, large capitals are absolutely necessary. Whenever therefore, in one of these governments, whether it be a des­potism, a monarchy, or an aristocracy, a town increases so far as to overtop the capital, it is good policy for the sove­reign power immediately to change the place of its residence There is perhaps no instance of a large metropolis in a go­vernment entirely free. There is, in every great town, [...] fatal a tendency to corruption, that a government there can hardly fail of becoming arbitrary. For us then to change our capital, because in most other governments their largest towns are capitals, would be acting contrary to the dictates of common sense and experience. In a word, so long as your liberties shall be dear to your hearts, and so long as ye shall be able to understand your true interests, you will per­mit the government to remain where there is nothing to en­danger them.

[Page 57] I DOUBT not, my countrymen, that before the next general election, you will be strongly solicited for your in­structions, and I apprehend, from the industry, perseverance and influence, of Baltimore-town, that most of the solicita­tions will be in its favour. I could invoke Heaven to wit­ness, that in writing this address I have the sincerest wishes to promote your happiness. And all the return I ask from you, is to weigh well the arguments I have used, to carry them with you to all public meetings in your respective counties, and to all upon every man who shall solicit your countenance to the proposed measure, to give them a full, clear, and sati [...]actory answer.

As the election of a senate is at hand, attempts may like­wise be made to instr [...]ct the electors. You surely must re­mark, how imprope [...] it would be to instruct men who are to choose upon oath. It is the evident intention of the consti­tution, that these men shall always be at perfect liberty to exercise their own judgments. If not, wherein is the use of that refined mode of election? It were much better for the people at once to elect the senate, than to choose electors who are bound to obey their instructions. It would in [...]eed be a prostitution of language to call them electors, if instead of naming their own choice, they are only to utter the opi­nion of others.

Permit me now, my countrymen, to remark, that although I do not question your right of dictating to your delegates, you ought to exercise that right in a very sparing manner. Perhaps instructions have never yet been fairly obtained. I will inform you what alone I conceive to be fair instructions, and such as your representatives may be bound to obey. If at a public meeting, of which general notice has been given, any matter shall be freely discussed, and instructions respect­ing it be produced, and read to the people there assei [...]bled, approved, and signed by a majority of the voters in the coun­ty, and by their directions presented to their delegates, the [...] ought the [...]r delegates either to pursue those instructions, or to resign their seats.

But when busy artful men, who are not even residents of the county, shall go about soliciting the people, one after another, to subscribe their instructions; and when the peo­ple have never heard a discussion of the subject; and when even a majority has not signed them; instructions like these [Page 58]cannot, and ought not, on any principle whatever, to be binding. It is notorious, that instructions like these may be obtained for almost any purpose whatever. Sometimes indeed, your representatives take a fancy that they are instructed, when they have not even a writing to shew; when they have not conversed on the subject with a tenth part of their constitu­ents; and when perhaps the subject has not in their county been even generally talked of. The truth is, these men have not a proper sense of their own dignity, and they suffer them­selves to be dictated to by a few bustling noisy men, without whose assistance they are apprehensive they cannot maintain their seats.

It is rarely that the people of a county can have a fair comprehen [...]ive view of a subject to be discussed in the ge­neral assembly. Indeed it is seldom at a popular meeting that both [...]des of a question are permitted to be stated and exammed. Besides, the representatives of each county are, at the same time, representatives of the state, and bound to consult the good of the whole. For all these weighty and most substantial reasons, I would advise you to give your in­structions in those cases only where your rights and liberties may be endangered. In a case like the present, when every e [...]ine will be put in motion to carry a most pernicious mea­sure, and when too there is a danger that your representa­tives may be swayed by personal motives; it is in cases like this, that you may, without the least scruple, interfere.

But I do not urge you, my countrymen, even on this oc­casion, to bind your delegates by instructions. I have ever observed, that the men fondest of procuring them, are those who are fearful of being borne down by superior reason. You will be told, that the friends of Annapolis, at the last session, would not consent to refer to the people the proposi­tion for a removal. It is true that a motion was made for leave to bring in a bill for removing the seat of government. This motion being both seconded and opposed, a day was assigned for the debate. On that day, after a fair and dis­passionate discussion, and when every member was at perfect liberty to vote his opinion, the motion was rejected by 35 against 18. A second motion was then made, for leave to bring in the same bill, to be published under the direction of the house for your consideration. This motion too was re­jected almost without a debate. It was the publication of [Page 59]this bill, by order of the house of delegates, that the Farmer thinks would have been "a reasonable expedient for collect­ing your sense." It would have been indulging the friends of Baltimore-town in a manner, of which, in this state, there never was, and never ought to be, an example; and a small minority had not the least colour of right to expect it. You must indeed have despised the conduct of your repre­sentatives, had they published for your consideration, a bill which, after deliberation, they would not suffer to be brought into their house.

It has been generally believed, that a majority of the gen­tlemen composing the present senate, was opposed to the measure. Of course, one great object may be (if I may use the expression) to pack a senate; and for that purpose it will be expedient, in the first instance, to pack their electors. You will remember, however, that the senate to be chosen in September next, is to last five years, and in that time an improper senate might subvert the constitution. The con­vention were so fully impresse [...]ith an idea of the necessity of having the best characters for that elevated station, that they invented the most admirable mode of election which has ever been known in the universe, and for any single purpose to defeat their salutary provision, would be a disgrace to the people of Maryland. I wish not to be understood, that any person who shall vote for a removal of the government would be unworthy of a seat in the senate. I have no such con­tracted narrow way of thinking. My position is, that such men only ought to be elected, who possess the most culti­vated minds, the most independent spirits, the greates [...] love of country, the most inflexible integrity, and the greatest dignity of character. As few men, indeed, possess all these requisites of a perfect senator, the electors should discard no man of whose worth we have had ample experience. I would dismiss no man merely because he is an advocate for the re­moval, and I would not elect even a plain, honest, ignorant man, merely because he is a staunch friend to Annapolis. Let the electors examine the merits of our present senators, without any regard to their sentiments on any one particular question. Let the opinion of the electors on the present question be what it may, they cannot suppose every thing de­pends on carrying the measure. I conceive, that if an cl [...]or [Page 60]wishes to fix the government at Baltimore, he ought to re­d [...]ble his care in electing a good senate, because the quali­fications of a senator, who will on all occasions perform his duty in that town, must be rare indeed.

I beseech you, my beloved countrymen, to be exceed­ingly circumspect in your choice of electors, and attempt not to lay them under any injunction whatever, except that of examining the conduct of each memner of the present senate, and of making very particular inquiries concerning all those who shall be preposed as objects of their choice, As to the general proceedings of the senate, from the commencement of the government, the whole state bears ample testimony of their worth; and I know not the man in the present body, whose conduct, on the whole, has not merited your appro­bation. However, it is the duty of your electors to make the strictest scrutiny, and let them not think of dismissing any gentleman, until they shall be certain of finding a more wor­thy successor.

It may be expected, that Aristides will not conclude, with­out making some personal retort upon his adversaries; but he will not imitate them in a practice which he contemns. He [...] enter [...]ns not the least resentment, and the only revenge which he wishes to take, is to subdue them by su­p [...]r [...]r reason. As indeed he was conscious, that neither his moral or political character was in any part vulnerable, he thought himself secure from personal reflections; but it seems that his indigence is a matter of reproach. If the narrow­ne [...]ss of his fortune were imputable to folly or vice, the re­p [...]of, although imm [...]terial to the question, might indeed have been just. But when under a necessitous dependence on a government, which has repeatedly, and perhaps from [...] it saith, he has maintained a character [...] by meanness o [...] dishonour; when he has even been [...] by the manly independence of his spirit; the re­pr [...]ch, if it recoils not on his adversary, was at least truly preposterous.

It is not Aris [...] alone, that the advocates of Baltimore have [...] to [...] in your edimation. They would [...], and they speak as if all the ci [...]ens of Annapolis were upon it. Gladly [Page 61]would they revive the prejudices formerly entertained on ac­count of the overweening arrogance of a few powerful men. They tell you, she receives more from the public than she contributes. In what manner can they support the assertion? Will they charge it with the salaries paid to a few civil offi­cers? Or, if these salaries be properly chargeable to the city, will they pretend that they are more than an adequate com­pensation for services? They remark that Annapolis has no place of Divine worship. Would they infer that she has no religion? Or will they contend that any other place excels her in virtue and morality? Are they ignorant, that the old church was taken down just before the war, for the purpose of crecting a new one on the spot? And that ever since, the members of the church of England, who constitute almost the whole of the citizens, have constantly had Divine wor­ship, and have handsomely supported their minister? Many untoward circumstances have concurred in hitherto prevent­ing the new building; but be it known to her enemies, as well as to her friends, that Annapolis is about to wipe away the disgrace, and to erect a place of worship on a [...]o­ble and elegant plan.

I doubt not, that to many of you I have appeared exceed­ingly proli [...]. I have indeed in some places been guilty of repetition; but I wish to be as plain and inve [...]igible as pos­ [...], and I have placed things in a variety of lights, that I might have the better chance of making a [...]m [...]ression, and of being perfectly understood by you all.

Permit me now to conclude with the concluding words of my former address.