WHETHER the Bank shall be abolished or establish­ed, is one of those important questions which will in course attract your notice. The heat of disputa­tion will then give birth to many arguments. But disputants do not always convey information. There is (no doubt) a great majority of members who will vote according to their dispassion­ate judgment; and such men will naturally wish to form opini­ons on plain reason plainly delivered. To them therefore this paper is addressed. And, in order that we may have a clear view of the object, let us consider (first) whether admitting the institution of the Bank to have been pernicious, a law to abolish it would be wise, and (secondly) whether it is really a pernici­ous institution.

First then, admitting the institution of the Bank to have been pernicious, would a law to abolish it be wise. The answer to this question depends on two points. First, whether such a law would be effectual; and secondly, whether it would be prudent. An enquiry whether the law would be effectual, involves a doubt of your power, and may therefore offend the weak or illiberal, but wise representatives of free citizens, will listen with candour and form a dispassionate judgment. They know that the boasted omnipotence of legislative authority is but a jingle of words. In the literal meaning it is impious. And whatever interpretation lawyers may give, freemen must feel it to be absurd and uncon­stitutional. Absurd, because laws cannot alter the nature of things; unconstitutional, because the constitution is no more, if it can be changed by the legislature. A law was once passed in New-Jersey which the judges pronounced to be unconstitutional, and therefore void, surely no good citizen can wish to see this point decided in the tribunals of Pennsylvania. Such power in judges is dangerous; but unless it some where exists, the time employed in framing a bill of rights and form of government was meerly thrown away.

The doubt which arises on this occasion, as to the extent of your authority, is not founded on the charter granted by Con­gress: [Page 4] but supposing the incorporation of the Bank to have been the same in its origin as that of a church, we ask whether the ex­istence and the rights acquired by law, can be destroyed by law. Negroes have by law acquired the right of citizens, would a subsequent law take that right away? It is not true that the right to give, involves the right to take. A father (for instance) has no power over the life of his child, nor can a felon or traitor pardoned by act of grace, be by repeal of that act condemned and executed. Should an act be passed to cancel the public debts, would that act be valid? Where an estate has been granted by law, can it be revoked by a subsequent law? Could the lands forfeited and sold, be resumed and conveyed to the original own­ers? Many such questions might be put, and a judicial decision (either affirmative or negative) would be inconvenient and dan­gerous. Look then to the end e'er you commence the labor.

Secondly, admitting your power, ought it (in prudence) to be exercised. You will certainly consider, that (as a violation of private property) it must sully the reputation of the state. Good men are careful of their own reputation, and protect that of their country, from sentiment. Wise men are confirmed in this sentiment, by reflection and information. Facts are sometimes bet­ter than arguments. It is then a fact, that applications made by citizens of Pennsylvania to borrow money in Holland, have been defeated by those attacks already made on the Bank. It is also a fact, that the credit of our merchants has been greatly in­jured (in foreign countries) from the same cause. This is the argument which foreigners use. If your government so little res­pects the property of their own citizens as to overturn an institution like the Bank, how can our property be safe among you? It will not be easy to answer that question, and you know gentlemen that your merchants cannot give credit, unless they can get credit; and you know also how important credit is to the frontier inhabitants at least, if not to those of the more settled country.

Deeply therefore are we interested in preserving unsullied fame. But if this consideration has not sufficient weight, re­flect on the domestic consequences of abolishing charters. What is practice to-day, becomes precedent to-morrow. And sure it is worth some serious thought, whether this dangerous practice shall be introduced. Every man is interested in the establish­ment of such precedent, as a member of some religious society, or of particular corporations for the promotion of science, or the purposes of humanity. Attention to the changes of human affairs, like meditation among the tombs, teaches solemn and [Page 5] affecting lessons of wisdom and moderation. Look back to the disputes which convulsed this commonwealth twenty years ago. Mark the succeeding revolutions. See how friendships and how enmities have changed. See how power has been wrested from one, and grasped by another. This generation will soon pass away. Who can designate the men that will sit in seats of au­thority twenty years hence? or five? or one? You are here to-day, and gone to-morrow. Beware then how you lay the foun­dation for future encroachments. While justice is the principle of government, to be innocent is to be secure. Be not then se­duced by the momentary bauble of power; for place it where you will it is dangerous, and the tyrannous use of it is always tyranny. Those who live by the sword shall die by the sword. The violent must, of necessity, become victims of violence. Should the next election give power to those who may now be oppressed, what bounds shall be set to unbridled resentment? May not all charters be at once laid low, by a general law de­claring the existence of corporations to be incompatible with the public welfare? Since, then, these consequences may fol­low, we may reasonably doubt whether a law to abolish the Bank would be wise, even if the institution had been pernicious. But is it really a pernicious institution?

This question is of great magnitude. Some objections against the bank may perhaps be well founded. Let us examine them. They are first, that it enables men to trade to their utter ruin by giving them the temporary use of credit and money. Secondly, that the punctuality required at the Bank, throws honest men into the hands of usurers. Thirdly, that the great dividend on bank stock induces monied men to buy stock rather than lend on interest. Fourthly, that rich foreigners will (for the same reason) become stockholders so as that all the property will fi­nally vest in them. Fifthly, that the payment of dividends to foreigners will be a constant drain of specie from the country. Sixthly, that the Bank facilitates the exportation of coin? Seventh­ly, that it injures the circulation of bills of credit. Eighthly, that the wealth and influence of the Bank may become dange­rous to the government. Ninthly, that the directors can ob­tain unfair advantages in trade for themselves and their friends. And tenthly, that it is destructive of that equality which ought to take place in a free country.

These objections, though artfully made and industriously circulated, do not consist very well together. For if it be true that the Bank enables men to overtrade themselves, by the use [Page 6] of money at an easy rate; it cannot be true that it throws men into the hands of usurers, who exact for the use of money an exorbitant rate. If it be true, that foreigners will buy out stockholders (even as is said at fifty per cent advance) so as to be­come proprietors of the whole; it cannot be true that the money of our rich citizens will be vested in bank stock, and none remain for loans. If it be true, that the Bank facilitates the exportation of coin; it cannot be true that it injures the circulation of bills of credit, which bills are always expressly emitted to supply the real or supposed want of specie. If it be true, that the use of money obtained by discounts at the Bank ruins the trade; it cannot be true that the directors and their friends would gain any advantage by it. If it be true, that the Bank has a tenden­cy to lock up in its vaults the money of rich citizens; it cannot be true that it facilitates the exportation of coin. If it be true, that foreigners will continually bring in money to buy the prin­cipal of the stock; it cannot be true that the country will conti­nually be drained of specie by paying the dividend on that prin­cipal. If it be true, that the funds of the Bank must finally vest in foreigners; it cannot be true that it is destructive of equality among the citizens.

Thus much in general. Let us next consider each objection by itself; and first, that it enables men to trade to their utter ruin, by giving them the temporary use of money. It is true that the Bank has given great facility to commercial people, of which some have made an imprudent use, by engaging in rash and ruinous enterprizes. But this abuse of commercial ad­vantages cannot be prevented, otherwise than by the destructi­on of commerce itself, or by confining the trade (as in China) to an exclusive company. Neither of these modes would suit the genius and temper of Pennsylvania. We must therefore (as in former times) leave the foolish to suffer the consequence of their folly, and not punish (for their sakes) the sober and dis­creet. The convenience merchants derive from being able to obtain money for short periods, and on easy terms, is of the greatest consequence to them. And it would be a marvellous thing indeed, if the use of water were prohibited, because some people chuse to drown themselves.

Secondly, It is said that the punctuality required at the Bank throws honest men into the hands of usurers. This objection will admit of nearly the same answer with the last. If men who borrow for a short term, will engage the funds borrowed in long speculations, thereby depriving themselves of the means of [Page 7] payment, who is to blame? Is it the benevolent lender, or the foolish and dishonest borrower? Why did he incur the debt and undertake the payment? or why divest himself of the means? But say, that a man is (by misfortune) in want of a consider­able sum, without which his credit would suffer. The Bank advance the sum for forty days, and save him from ruin. If within that period he collects his funds, and repays the advance, has he derived no benefit from the Bank? If at the end of forty days he should be unable to pay, is the situation worse than it was? If in that case the Bank renew the discount for forty days more, (which has usually been done) is not the benefit increas­ed? And if after all (when they will trust him no longer) he apply to usurers, (which he must otherwise have done in the first instance) is the Bank to blame? But the man it seems has been unfortunate, and is ruined, which ruin the Bank did de­lay, but could not prevent. Now what is the conclusion drawn from these premises, and how is it drawn? Why thus. Mis­fortune is the cause of loss. Imprudence is the source of disap­pointment. Loss and disappointment demand supplies of cash. Usurers exact enormous interest. Bad voyages, wild specula­tions, mismanagement, and usurious interest, produce ruin. Therefore the Bank must be destroyed. It must be destroyed, because it would not continue to trust men who were no longer trust worthy. Before this objection be repeated, let these men, or at least one of them, be openly named; so that the direc­tors may have an opportunity fairly to combat the charge: and then, if they do not show that the party received every indul­gence he had any right to claim, expect, or even hope for, let the charge be established. But until this opportunity be given, let not the voice of slander be heard in the sanctuaries of legislation.

Rely on it, Gentlemen, that however calumny may cast the aspersion, no proof will ever be adduced. It might therefore be abandoned to the merited contempt. But since such pains have been taken to inculcate a false idea that the Bank promotes usury, let us recur to facts. Before the establishment of the Bank, usury had been carried to an alarming degree. Men of the greatest property, who happened to be here from the neigh­bouring states, were forced to pay as high as ten per cent. for one month's anticipation of their remittances; merchants who met with misfortune were driven to the greatest distress, and the public could not obtain advances upon any terms. Under these circumstances, the Bank was instituted; and there are many in this city and elsewhere whom it saved from destruction. [Page 8] The number of usurers and the rate of usury, were soon dimi­nished. But as there still remained some objects whose distresses the Bank could not relieve, because most of its funds were employed in the public service, so there still remained some usurers to prey on those distresses. In proportion as the number who want money is increased, or (which comes to the same thing) as the means of obtaining money are diminished, in the same propor­tion will usury abound and flourish. This the usurious know, and therefore they have never intermitted their efforts to destroy the Bank, as the sure means of increasing and securing their un­righteous gains. Beware then, Gentlemen, that ye be not dupes to the artifice of such wretches. It is indeed but a slen­der and despicable artifice. A poor attempt to persuade you, that an institution which lends for one half per cent. per month, drives folks to borrow at ten per cent. And on this ground they suggest, that the best mode of preventing men from giving ten per cent. for a month's use of money, is to disable them from obtaining it on any other terms.

Thirdly, It is said the dividend on bank stock induces monied men to buy it rather than lend on interest. The object of this assertion is to persuade you, that the difficulty of borrowing money arises meerly or chiefly from the Bank; which is not true. For first, it is notorious that few stock holders are of that class who were in the habit of lending on interest. Such as are fo­reigners or inhabitants of the neighbouring States (and these it is said own half the stock) would not lend their money in Penn­sylvania, even if circumstances favoured such loans. A consi­derable part of the remaining half belongs to small stock hold­ers, who would not send their money into the country. And a far more considerable part is the property of merchants, who would be obliged immediately to employ their funds in their own business, if deprived of those facilities which the Bank affords. After making these deductions from the capital of the Bank, the remainder (belonging to those who would and could lend) will be inconsiderable. But such as it is, to whom would it be lent? Not to farmers who pay interest irregularly, and from whom the principal cannot always be recovered without legal process. No, it would be lent to merchants, and the greater part to such as (through necessity) give more than legal interest. Can it be be­lieved, while usurers get ten per cent. per month for the use of money, and pledges in hand for security, that the twenty or thirty thousand dollars (now vested in bank stock) which belong to men not engaged in active business, would be lent on bonds [Page 9] and mortgages for six per cent per annum? It is true that money cannot be borrowed, and it is also true that the purchase of bank stock is more profitable than lending on interest. But trace the evils complained of to their true sources, and it will be found that they flow from that usury which has been occasioned by the pe­culiar circumstances of the times, and from that opposition which has been excited against the Bank. Why is money scarce and not to be borrowed? Why is it so desirable to own bank stock? An answer to these two questions will lead to the solution of a third. How is money to be made more plenty, and to be ob­tained with more ease?

First then, why is money scarce and not to be borrowed. It is a melancholy truth, that during the late war many were ruin­ed by payment of their debts in paper greatly depreciated. Some who received the paper while it was valuable, put it in the loan office. Some purchased land. And some kept it till it was good for nothing. It is evident, that these persons (who before the war were lenders of money) have no money to lend now; and that every shilling so paid and disposed of, must be deducted from the sum formerly at interest in Pennsylvania. The remain­der of that sum, is still in the hands of those who borrowed it ten years ago, and cannot be lent before it be paid. It may perhaps be said, that some merchants made money during the war. But it will be found that the gainers were few, the losers numerous; and that taking the merchants collectively as a body, it is poorer by millions. The reason therefore why money is not to be bor­rowed is that no one has money to lend, and even admitting that there should be a few who can lend, there are none who will; for the following reasons: Those who want are always willing to borrow, but those who owe are not always willing to pay. If therefore the laws of a country, or the administration of those laws, countenance unreasonable delays of payment, the owners of money (or any thing else) will not dispose of their pro­perty on credit, unless they be tempted by great interest, or great profit. And such as disdain usurious dealing, will not be tempted at all. A prudent peaceable man would rather buy stock in the British funds, and receive regularly but five per cent, than take a mortgage at six, on the best estate in Pennsyl­vania. Because he may suffer for years, a detention of both in­terest and principal, and because he apprehends some things which have happened already, [...]nd may therefore happen again —For instance, he trembles lest a long train of paper emissions, with a legal tender at the tail of them, should cancel his debt for a tenth of the value. He fears also, that a tax on his bond may [Page 10] reduce the precarious interest of six per cent to four, and even oblige him to pay the two per cent tax, though he cannot re­cover the six per cent interest. Thus we find, on fair investiga­tion, that money is scarce, because (in one way or other) it has been taken or withheld from the owners. And that money is not to be borrowed, from a well grounded apprehension that (when due) it will not be repaid.

Let us then, in the second place, enquire why it is so desirable to own bank stock. Three causes present themselves. First, that the dividend gives something more than legal interest, al­though by extension of the capital, and contraction of the busi­ness, it yields less than formerly. Secondly, that this dividend is payable with rigid punctuality at the end of every half year, so that the proprietors can count with certainty on their income, to defray their expences. Thirdly, that in case of unforeseen de­mands, the stockholder can (for legal interest) command a tem­porary accommodation; and if unfortunate events should oblige him to collect all his resources, he can speedily sell and there­by command the value of the stock. To these three reasons, which strike every person at first sight, must be added a fourth as applying more directly to the charge, that the benefits of bank stock incline men to purchase it rather than lend. After the peace, when the advantages of the Bank had been felt, and the property of stock had become secure, an opposition was raised by some of the same persons who are now the opposers, but on ground somewhat different. For then, instead of consi­dering a Bank as pernicious, it was declared to be so highly be­neficial that they must needs have two. They did indeed com­plain of the old Bank. But for what? Not because the capital was so large as to threaten general ruin, but because the directors would not open a subscription to make it larger. And what was the modest request of that day? Why truly such an extension of the capital, as might enable those who had waited for events in perfect ease and safety, to enjoy the same advantages with those who had borne the burthen, and ran the risque of the contest. It was indeed a hard case, that many worthy gentlemen who would not have given a shilling to save the state, should be o­bliged either to pay five hundred dollars for a share in bank which had cost but four, or to lend their money on bond and mortgage to the farmers of Pennsylvania. A very hard case! And so loud­ly did they complain of it, that at last many sensible members of Assembly were prevailed on to believe it would be a good thing to have two Banks. Two shops to go to; for that was the fashion­able [Page 11] phrase. And they were the more easily led into this opinion, because it was laid down by some in high station for whose sen­timents they had acquired an habitual respect. But that respect may perhaps be diminished, if those who pronounced decisive judgment two years ago that two Banks were necessary, should now as positively [...]onounce that no Bank at all is necessary; and (wonderful to relate) go cackling round the country, that one Bank is pregnant with ruin to the State. The language of truth is uniform, and these sudden changes of hasty opinion, shew so great a want of temper and knowledge, that those who really mean the public good will quit such blind guides, and think for them­selves. The consequence of the noise made at that time must be well remembered. The Assembly were plagued with long ar­guments on both sides, which might as well have been spared, and then all at once the thing was hushed up and accommodated. Because such of the promoters of the new Bank as had money, found out that most of their new friends had none. Because they all found out, that the scheme did not promise so much either of profit or security as was imagined. And because they had not too much confidence in each other, being (like Nebuchadnezzar's image) composed of discordant materials. They agreed, there­fore, to abandon their project, on certain conditions acceded to by the old Bank, one of which was to extend the subscription; and this it is which has converted all the surplus money of the State into bank stock. For otherwise, let the price of a share have risen ever so high, nay had it gone to four thousand instead of four hundred dollars; not one penny would have been added to the bank capital. But in proportion as stock rose, the divi­dend would have been less valuable, till at length it would have been more profitable to lend at six per cent, than to purchase bank stock. For instance, if the dividend on a share of four hundred dollars had continued to be forty dollars, and the price of such a share had risen to be eight hundred dollars, then the purchaser would have got only five per cent for his money, instead of six.

Thirdly, then, let us inquire how money may be rendered more plenty and easier to be obtained. And first, the surest way to render money plenty is to bear the evils of scarcity. To make it plenty (according to the desire of some) would be, as in the continental times, to make it no money at all. For when it can be obtained without labor, and found without search, it is of no use to the possessor. Those nice politicians, therefore, who try to make money so plenty that people may get it for nothing, will find that their money is good for no­thing. [Page 12] The scarcity constitutes the value. And when that scarcity is such that men will do a great deal for a little, it will become plenty; for those will always have most money, who will give most for it. The complaint that money is scarce, is generally made by the idle or the unfortunate; by those who will not, or those who cannot give any thing in exchange for money, except bare promises which they cannot or will not perform. Now such men would suffer more from the want of cash in Amsterdam or London, where it is most plenty, than in any part of the state of Pennsylvania. If folks are idle they must be relieved by labor, and if poor by charity. Till this be done, the complaint that money is scarce will continue, and though very loud will not be very just. There was (for in­stance) a grievous complaint of the want of money at the close of the war; and yet every man who had a bushel of wheat could get eight or nine shillings for it. People in general plunged into extravagance, and laid out their coin for foreign fripperies, and the merchants (unable to remit for payment of these things in produce, except on ruinous terms) sent away the coin; so that in two years there has been more money exported from this country (in which a scarcity was then complained of) than is necessary for a circulating medium. The several states are now issuing paper, that what little specie is left may also be exported, instead of the wheat, corn, rice, tobacco, &c. Flour has long been cheaper in London than in Philadelphia. We buy fine coats, and handsome buckles, and a thousand other hand­some fine things in London, and then when called on to pay, though our barns be full of wheat, we will not sell it as former­ly for five shillings the bushel, but sit down and cry because money is scarce. The waggon is in the mud, and we beg Her­cules to pull it out without putting our own shoulders to the wheel. The legislature must relieve us, for we will not relieve ourselves. And against what do we want to be relieved? Why against our idleness, extravagance and folly.

But, secondly, another means of making money plenty is to render it less necessary. For this purpose enforce the punctual payment of debts, so that those who trust can be sure of reco­vering, in season, from those whom they have trusted. This will produce two happy consequences. First, that men will no longer run in debt for idle gewgaws, which they must pay for with their substance when pay day comes. Executions for debt will then be as wholesome warnings to the extravagant, as ex­ecutions for crimes are to the profligate. Secondly, a man who [Page 13] wants to buy land or needful goods on credit, will then obtain the credit desired. The punctuality of his payments will ex­tend his credit. Those payments will also enable the merchant to comply with his engagements, which will (in like manner) extend his credit at home and abroad. In proportion to the punctuality of remittances, the merchant will get longer credit, and on better terms; and thus money will be plentier because the trading people (who have always a preference in such things) will be relieved from the necessity of borrowing.

Thirdly, another means of making money plenty, is to enforce a collection of taxes, make solid provision for paying the interest of our debts in coin, and introduce order and oeconomy into the administration of affairs. This will restore the public confi­dence, and then the value of certificates will rise, and the pos­sessors be able to dispose of them for cash. Thousands will thereby be relieved who are now in great want of money, and under the dire necessity of getting it from usurers, or going to gaol.

Lastly, these plain and simple measures will make money not only plenty but easy to be obtained. Because industry and fru­gality (which want but little) will thereby be introduced; and we can always command money when we are not in want of it. As to those blades who must forever want, because they spend their time in streets and taverns, and occupy themselves with state affairs, instead of their own affairs, and who dress and feast and will not work, but wish to borrow; let them meet the re­buff given by an old philosopher to one of their predecessors. ‘Friend borrow of thy back and belly, they will never ask thee for the money, but I should be very troublesome.’

A fourth objection made against the Bank is that rich fo­reigners will be induced to become stockholders, so as that all the property will finally vest in them. This objection has some weight, and if it be allowed to operate as a bar to measures of public utility, will save a deal of time and trouble to the govern­ment, though it may not conduce to the prosperity of the state, and must prove injurious to those by whom it is made. People in general seem now to expect some permanent provision for the interest of the public debts, and if that should happen, foreign­ers will purchase a considerable share. The Dutch are said to hold about thirty millions sterling in the British funds, bearing an interest of four per cent. and they lent five million guilders to Congress at five per cent. when no funds were provided, and during the war. Hence we may with certainty infer, that they [Page 14] will buy up the certificates bearing six per cent. when placed on a solid footing. Is that a sufficient objection against providing for the public creditors? And if not in one case, why in the other? The practice some men have of affirming to-day, and denying to-morrow, is neither decent nor becoming. A griev­ous complaint is made of the want of money, and yet as grievous a complaint of the only means to obtain any. We have it not at home, and we must not receive it from abroad. Do these gen­tlemen suppose it will rain money now, as it did manna of old? And because they have the same perverseness with the children of Israel, do they expect the same miracle? To experience a want of public credit is (they say) terrible, but to destroy the only means of supporting public credit, is (they say) desirable. Let us appeal to facts. No country on earth enjoys extensive cre­dit which has not a public Bank. We have ourselves experien­ced its good effects, when we were in the greatest distress. And shall we now be told that the Bank must be destroyed, and yet public credit be supported? People who speak in this way shew great ignorance, or something worse. They ask how a Bank contributes to public credit; and (if no reply be made) think they have gained a victory, when they have puzzled an oppo­nent. For the sake of those who love truth, and not with any hope of making such men sensible either to shame or conviction, their question shall be answered. The Bank may be likened to that which bears the same name, a bank or dam for collect­ing the waters. After a head is raised, some part turns the wheels of the mill, and some part waters the adjacent grounds. Take the bank away, and the water will still flow, but not with the same beneficial effect. If revenues were appropriated to the interest of the public debt, and other important objects of go­vernment; should any delay take place in collections, a similar delay of payment would also happen. The want of punctuali­ty, would lessen the value of stock. And, on the other hand, if collections were more rapid than the payments, much money might be taken out of circulation, and lodged in the public cof­fers. The consequence would be, either that commerce must suffer (as at present) for the want of it, or that the state must procure more money than is necessary; which might not be very easy, if we may judge from past experience. But with the aid of a Bank, the same stream turns the wheel, and fertilizes the ground; being prudently applied to either purpose as occasion requires. And so the same sum of money, will not only supply the business of the merchant and of the state, but the funds proceeding [Page 15] from trade, and those arising from taxes, will (when thrown into the same mass) mutually aid the operations of each, and jointly se­cure the objects of both. Nor is there the least danger that foreign­ers will hold even a great proportion of the bank stock. Bank stock will always be most useful for the mercantile man who lives on the spot. Because he (and he alone) can at once receive the divi­dend, and when occasion requires have (by loan for a short time) the use of his money: So that he will naturally outbid the fo­reigner. And as the object of the foreigner must be to secure a certain annual income from his funds, make but the interest of the public debt as regular and safe as the bank dividend, (which by means of the Bank is easily done) and the foreigner will as naturally wish to change bank stock, for an amount of funded loan office certificates yielding more annual interest, as the mer­chant will to change such an amount of certificates for bank stock. And so far from any danger to the State, by the interest of foreigners in their funds, there is a great security. Every fo­reign creditor is an advocate for us with his own government, in times of public calamity, and is induced to lend more, as the means of securing what has been already lent; especially if he has been regularly paid the interest of his capital.

The next objection against the Bank is, that the payment of the dividend to foreigners will be a drain of specie from the country. This has already been answered in part, but farther; a man who has bought a piece of ground, wants to borrow mo­ney for the purpose of clearing, fencing, draining and culti­vating it. He would not relish the advice of a neighbour who might tell him not to borrow, lest the payment of interest should drain him of cash. He might indeed be glad to get the money at a low interest, or for no interest, but he would certainly get it if he could; and by industrious attention, and a prudent ap­plication of it, he would pay both principal and interest from the profits of his farm. And thus by degrees a wilderness is con­verted into beautiful cultivation. From the discovery of Ame­rica to the present hour, we have been paying interest for what we owe on the other side of the Atlantic. Our debt and our pro­sperity have gone hand in hand. And yet when people now complain of the difficulty of borrowing money, they must be told it is for their advantage not to obtain the principal, because they will not (in that case) be obliged to pay the interest. If a farmer in Pennsylvania has to pay annually five pounds for the use of a hundred pounds borrowed, is it of any consequence to him whether the lender lives in Philadelphia, New-York, [Page 16] Boston, London, or Amsterdam? Twenty bushels of wheat do the business. And when he has parted with them, whether they are eaten in Philadelphia, or sent to Lisbon, is none of his affair. On the large scale, indeed, it might be convenient that wealthy men should cross the Atlantic to become citizens of Pennsylvania; and so they will, if equal just laws, and a mild firm administration give that security to property without which it is a curse instead of a blessing. But if bad laws be made, or the good laws be badly executed, and if solid esta­blishments can be overturned by every capricious breath, the wise and the good will avoid us as they would the pestilence. Then indeed there will be a constant drain of wealth, for none will leave property in a country where it is insecure.

But farther, though we admit that borrowing does every year carry a sum out of the country for payment of interest, it will not follow that the country is impoverished by the amount of that sum. When a farmer wants necessaries, and has not cash, he must either take them on trust, or borrow money on interest. Every body knows that the difference between buying with rea­dy money, and buying on credit, is much greater than the in­terest on the price of the goods, and therefore it is cheaper for the farmer to borrow, than to run in debt at the store. Just so it is with the country. Most of the articles we want (when pur­chased at the first hand) must be immediately paid for; and when merchants abroad lay out their cash to buy goods, and after sell them to us on credit, we pay (in the price of such goods) not on­ly an interest on the purchase money, but for the trouble foreign merchants take, and the risque they run. To all this is added a handsome commission, and then a round profit into the bargain. Thus, for instance, since it has been the practice to buy tea with cash at the first hand, we get that article for nearly one half of what it used to cost. Let any man therefore calculate the difference between paying fifty pound per annum instead of a hundred, in price, and six per cent (or even ten per cent) per an­num for interest on the fifty, and he will be convinced that we are recompenced five fold for the dividend paid abroad. On the whole, the matter stands thus. The merchant whose business it is, and who must for that reason be the best judge, tells you that the advance of money by foreigners for bank stock, and the facility which the Bank can thereby give to commercial opera­tions, enable him to carry on business more advantageously though he sells imported commodities lower, and buys produce higher, than before the war. The farmer (who perhaps neither [Page 17] comprehends nor cares for the reasons on which this assertion may be founded) prudently brings it to the test of experience. The tree (says he) is known by its fruits. Let me examine the facts. He does so, and finds that most of the articles imported can be purchased for much less than formerly and that he can get half as much again for his wheat. So that duties properly laid on ar­ticles, the consumption of which is chiefly unnecessary, and some­times pernicious, would pay the interest of the public debts and not cost the consumer more than before the war. Thus, without imposing new burthens, full relief may be given to the public creditors, and they be thereby enabled more chear­fully and more easily to sustain their share of such burthens as circumstances may hereafter require. All which advantages we must (it seems) forego, and preclude ourselves from the possibi­lity of establishing public credit, lest foreigners should derive an interest on lending us money. Overturn the Bank say they and perhaps you may get a little of their money. Kill the goose that lays golden eggs, and you may wear her feathers.

Sixthly, it has been said that the Bank facilitates the export­ation of specie. Of all the charges in the world, this is the last which one would have expected. The operations of the Bank depend (as every body knows) on the quantity of specie in their vaults. When that is gone, the Bank is done, just as the mill stands still when the pond is dry. And therefore to suppose the directors would facilitate the exportation of coin, is the most absurd of all suppositions. Truth is, the directors of the Bank are extremely solicitous to prevent the exportation of coin, and happily for the state, have the means in their power. The Bank capital is about a million of dollars, part of which is in their vaults, and the remainder lent for short periods. The amount of their loans is supposed to be twice as much as their capital. A part of the sum lent is in bank notes, the remainder in coin. Now therefore when the directors find that cash is ex­ported (which they do at once, by perceiving that any consider­able sum goes out of the Bank in a week more than is received) they are not meerly led by inclination, but driven by necessity, to lessen or to stop their discounts, according to the nature of the case and the degree of the evil. This stoppage has the effect; for not only the money is prevented from going abroad, but if the stoppage continue, it is brought in from every quarter. The operation is so powerful, that on one occasion many thousand dollars were brought to the Bank, and there taken out of those [Page 18] packages in which they were (next morning) to have been ship­ped to London.

In this place it may be proper to notice the strange opinion, that in the present state of trade a bank is injurious. This opi­nion seems to have been founded on the idea, that because mo­ney is collected in the Bank it may easily be taken out of the Bank. And so indeed it might by an armed force, but those who have tried the experiment in any other way have been dis­appointed. The money is collected in bank 'tis true, but how is a man to get it out? Either he must sell property for the pur­pose, and then it is of no consequence whether the payment comes out of the Bank, or out of the Treasury, or where it comes from. The owner may dispose of it as he thinks meet; and we might as well say that David Rittenhouse, Esq. facili­tates the exportation of money, when he pays for arms or cloth­ing to a merchant who sends it to Europe, as lay that blame on the Bank. The other mode of getting at money in bank, is by borrowing for the short period of forty days, and if the bor­rower ships it off, he will be obliged (when the forty days ex­pire) to hunt for it, and will sometimes pay dearly for his trick. Perhaps it will be found on examination that some of those who complain of being driven to deal with usurers, had been dabbling in this way, and proved too cunning for them­selves, as cunning men generally do. So far is the Bank from being injurious to the present state of trade, that the converse of the proposition is true, viz. that the present state of trade is in­jurious to the Bank. And it would have been ruinous to the commonwealth, but for the seasonable checks given by the Bank, which checks are among the causes of the present com­plaints. They say the Bank facilitates the exportation of coin, and that therefore they complain; but in truth the Bank pre­vented them from exporting the coin, and therefore they com­plain. While a man spends more than he earns, his coin must go to pay the difference, and he will have less of it when the year ends than when it began. Just so it is with a country. We import great quantities of goods, we either cannot or will not give produce on moderate terms to pay for them, and yet we grumble that our cash runs low. We will not acknowledge our own imprudence, but accuse the Bank, which has alone resist­ed the general torrent; by which means Pennsylvania is better off than any of the neighbouring states.

A seventh objection against the Bank is that it injures the cir­culation of bills of credit. This is a popular argument and there­fore it is made. But as to the truth of the assertion, the authors [Page 19] do not trouble their heads about it. Their maxim is, Let us lay it on and let them take it off as they can. Some will stick. Suppose this kind of morality were extended a little, and when these charitable kind hearted people walk the streets one of their proselytes should bedaub them with the contents of the kennel, hugging himself in the idea that some will stick, would they not find the practice of their own principles rather unpleasant? Pray how has the Bank injured the circulation of paper money? Why the paper is not received in bank as specie. And did ever any man suppose it would, or could, be so received? If it had, would not the directors have been guilty of an infamous breach of trust? Could they have excused themselves to those of whose specie they had the custody? The Bank might indeed have giv­en currency to the bills, as long as their coin lasted, by ex­changing one for t'other; and no one can doubt that in this case the coin would, as fast as exchanged, have been packed up and sent to our good friends and favorites in London. Under such circumstances, those candid Gentlemen who prayed and voted for paper currency, and afterwards refused to receive it, would perhaps have played their patriotic game quite through. And we may reasonably suppose too, that when the coffers of the Bank were filled with their emissions, they would have found as good reasons to abolish the paper, as they now do to abolish the Bank. If a refusal to give money for bills of credit be an injury, what shall be said for those who (though patrons of the plan) would neither give money nor any thing else for the bills. It would be difficult to make an apology, if the generality of the refusal were not a sufficient reason for each individual. Let us then be candid, and far from reprehending the practice, calmly seek the cause. Paper can only circulate on a par with specie, from a general belief that it is equal to specie. The faith makes the thing. If there be not such a general belief, it cannot be equal to coin, because it will not so generally answer the pu [...]e. The holder may think (as in the continental times) that his three pound bill is worth eight dollars, and be very angry that his neighbour is not of the same opinion. But unless he can persuade the person whose goods he wants, that the paper is really equal to the silver, his own conviction will be of small avail. Admitting then, for argument sake, that every merchant in Philadelphia did really and truly believe the new bills to be worth what they specify; still they could do no­thing with them, unless the farmers (whose produce they want to purchase) had the same belief, and would sell that produce for paper as freely as for gold. Because the merchants being [Page 20] either in debt, or wanting to purchase goods, in foreign coun­tries, can make no other use of the paper than to buy such things as may be sent abroad. And further, they must be able to buy not only such things, but at such prices, as may answer in foreign markets. If, therefore, the country Gentlemen will agree to sell wheat for five shillings the bushel in paper money, merchants will be as solicitous to receive, as they are now to avoid paper. But while produce continues at the present prices, wise merchants will not sell but for specie, which they can export safely, because they must lose by sending away produce; a practice which some have pursued to their ruin. Having thus hinted at the true means to give paper a brisk and lively circulation, candor requires that a few words be said in favor of the landed interest, on whom the blame might otherwise be thrown. Supposing, therefore, the charge to be made against an honest farmer, he would perhaps make the following reply— How can it be expected that I should repose confidence in go­vernment, who for eight years past have been the victim of that confidence? A piece of my land was sold for continental bills; these are all sunk in the gulph of depreciation. Part of my pro­perty was seized by officers of Congress, and part was sold to officers of the state. For all this I have nothing but useless cer­tificates. When every body had grown sick of the old money, Congress issued new, and though experience was against the measure, yet (relying on their wisdom) I took the new bills chearfully; but found, to my sorrow, that the new travelled in the same road with the old, and the only difference was that they travelled faster. The bills issued (about that time) by the state, had what they call funds for redemption, but they soon fell to six for one. I have observed too, that when these bills become of little value, the government joins in and agrees to the depreciation; so that every one who receives them is sure to suffer in the end. Now, therefore, until I have eight years experience that government may safely be trusted, I cannot forego the benefit of that experience which I have bought so dear. By trusting government, one half my substance is gone; the other half must be kept to provide for my family.

These reasons, or reasons like these, are not confined to any one body of men, either merchants, husbandmen or manufac­turers. They pervade all ranks and degrees. The citizens of Pennsylvania will not give free circulation to the state paper, because they have not confidence in the government. We know that confidence cannot otherwise be established, than by the stea­dy pursuit of just measures, for a number of years. It is self evi­dent, [Page 21] and every man must feel as well as see it. Every man therefore can judge of the excellent sense of those who cry, down with the Bank if you could give circulation to the bills. Break a promise made three years ago, by way of inducing men to rely on the promise you make now.

But eighthly, it is said that the wealth and influence of the Bank may become dangerous to the government. It is a politi­cal monster whose property may be ten millions of dollars, whose duration is perpetual. These circumstances are so terrible, that some are for putting the poor monster to instant death, while others (in their great goodness) would only give him a hectic which should work his dissolution in a dozen years. Of each in turn, but first of those who would limit the duration of the Bank to a few years, and limit the capital to what suits their own ideas of propriety. These are really the worst of the two, for their half way conduct, would be every way wrong. Such a law would be as unjust, and have every essential circumstance of vio­lence, with the immediate dissolution of the charter. And how­ever they may deceive themselves into an opinion of their own lenity, not a man among them would either as juryman or judge, admit it to be a good defence against a charge of murder that the act had been performed by a slow poison. Public credit must suffer alike in both cases, for in both the rights of private property will be alike violated. What then are the advantages held out? Why it seems, that if the charter be limited to a short period, the legislature can (at the expiration) renew it on such terms and conditions as may to them seem meet. And these terms or conditions must of course be some benefit to the com­monwealth, which could not otherwise have been obtained. And to prove these things, the Bank of England is quoted. But the choice of an example is rather unlucky, for that limitation of their charter which one cunning minister introduced, other cunning ministers have at different times taken advantage of, till at last all the substance of the Bank has been squeezed out. And for what purpose? Was it to open navigations? To clear new roads? To extend a lucrative commerce? No it was to sup­port the power of the minister for the time being, and feed the expence of those ruinous wars, which the people would not other­wise have borne. Standing then on the ground of their experi­ence, let us look forward to the probable consequence of such a limitation in Pennsylvania. Suppose the period arrived when the charter is to expire. Is it certain the state would then want aid from the Bank? If not, the object of the limitation is gone. But even supposing the state should stand in need, what tempta­tion [Page 22] could they offer to obtain relief? Not a prolongation of the charter, because the supposition implies a breach of the contract made when the Bank was first instituted, and therefore no reli­ance could be placed on any subsequent contract. For if the Bank should lend to the government, then the cancelling of that debt would be an additional motive for dissolving the Bank. Nor is this suspicion injurious, for one act of moral turpitude is always the prelude of another. But admitting that the Bank would purchase a few years existence; from whom would the purchase be made, and for what price? The directors of that day, would naturally cast their eyes on the leading members in Assembly, and open the negociation with them. Men of great wealth and in­fluence (should any such arise) would make use of the Bank to ex­tend and increase their authority. They would watch this mo­ment to obtain seats in Assembly. And if a majority could be prevailed on to vote with such leaders, the purchase would be made of them, and the price would be some private gain, and no the public good. In like manner, if the capital be limited, it is not the state but great men in the state would receive the benefit of an enlargement. And why should the capital be limited within narrower bounds than at present? It is notorious that if the di­rectors had not been under compulsion they would not have ex­tended the subscription beyond the first four hundred thousand dollars. It is notorious also, that every addition to the number of shares lessens the value of each. And therefore we have the best security in the world, (the interest of the proprietors them­selves) against an increase of the capital. In like manner there is every reason to believe that the Bank will continue to afford that aid to government, which has never yet been withheld when it could with propriety be granted. And if they should extend their capital (a thing so contrary to their interest) it can only be on some trying occasion, to support the government of which they are citizens, and preserve the ship in which all are embarked. The charter being held sacred (as chartered rights ought ever to be) applications for aid by the state, will be plain and manly transactions, not dirty jobs. The Bank will candid­ly state their means, the extent to which they are willing to go, and the security they are willing to accept. They will perhaps (on such an occasion) point out the ill treatment they have re­ceived when funds appropriated by the Assembly to payment of a former loan, were diverted to another object: and in their quality of citizens as well as that of directors, they will perhaps go a little farther, and state with becoming firmness the dangers which must ensue if any individual shall dare to alter appropriations [Page 23] of public money made by legislative authority. But surely this can do no harm. Calm reflection will therefore convince a candid man, that the wealth and influence of the Bank can only become dan­gerous to the state, by laying it at the mercy of great men in the state. For it is utterly inconceivable that four or five hundred stockholders, (of all ranks, parties and denominations) should join in chusing directors who would attempt to overturn the go­vernment. On the contrary it is a truth vouched by uniform ex­perience (from the earliest ages) that the monied interest of a country will ever oppose, check, and counteract, all changes and convulsions of government; because that interest is sure to be the victim of confusion and disorder. This last consideration applies forcibly also to the arguments of those who would now dissolve the charter. Let them further consider, that the busi­ness of banking is not (of necessity) to be carried on by public Banks alone. One or more individuals may form a banking com­pany, whose operations will be extensive and lucrative, in pro­portion to the degree and extent of their credit and connections. Over such a Bank (or such Banks) there can be no controul. The citizens of Philadelphia will have no vote in chusing direct­ors, nor will any person be particularly interested in observing their conduct. Dissolve the national Bank in March, and by the first day of May a private Bank will rise on its ruins. The merchants of Philadelphia will pour in their coin, with as much confidence as they now do into the national Bank; and experi­ence has so clearly shewn the advantages of such an institution, that they will not, cannot, be without it. If therefore the ene­mies of the Bank will look round, and see who are the men that will probably set up such a private Bank, it may do more towards bringing them to a right judgment, than the most con­clusive arguments.

The ninth objection is, that the directors can obtain unfair advantages in trade for themselves and their friends. And it must be owned, that there is some force in this objection. But it cannot be alledged that the supposed advantages are unfair. Some advantages are necessarily attendant on the place of a di­rector, and some inconveniencies are as necessarily the ap­pendages.

It is not possible that things should be otherwise, and the only check is in the annual election, by which the stockholders have an opportunity of testifying their sense of each director's con­duct. This will always prevent any great mischief. For the Bank being an institution in which the money of many acts for [Page 24] the benefit of all, by being jointly applied to each in his turn; every stockholder is a centinel, bound by his private interest to discover unfair practices, and sound the alarm, when undue advantages are obtained. Because the preference of one, must operate the exclusion of another. After all, however, we must acknowledge, that this evil will in some degree prevail; for we know that nothing on earth is perfect. But must we fore­go a great advantage to all, because a greater advantage will result to a few? We might as well object to the existence of government, because it must be administered by fallible men, and confer on them superior eminence and authority; or to the use of money, because it is sometimes applied to vile purposes, as object to a money government or bank, because the labors of a director are compensated (or more than compensated) by commercial advantages.

Lastly then, let us consider whether the Bank be destructive of that equality which ought to take place in a free country. And the first question is, whether by equality is meant equality of property, or equality of rights. If it be the former, then it may perhaps be doubted whether the opposers of the Bank would themselves agree to an equality (that is to say, a general division) of property among all the citizens of Pennsylvania. This might suit eight or ten thousand gentlemen who came over last year, from Ireland and Germany to give us the honor of their good company. But will the substantial freeholder, or wealthy mechanick, be willing to pay for that good company such an exorbitant price? We have in general (it must be con­fessed) been ready enough to give a preference to strangers, over our own brethren and countrymen, but there is reason in every thing. If an equality of rights be meant, then the objection va­nishes, for any man may purchase the right of a stockholder in the Bank, for less money than he can purchase a farm, even in the back counties: So that he may be a stockholder, on easier terms than he can be a freeholder. And if it suits one man to be a stockholder and the other to be a freeholder, neither ought to grumble at the rights or possessions of the other. But, if (which is most likely) the objectors mean here under a plausible cry raised about equal rights, to cover the dictates of envy at supe­rior fortune and success in the world, then they had best consider again, whether by overturning the public Bank they would not assist in setting up a private Bank. And whether such private [Page 25] Bank, would not bring very great accessions of wealth to those whom they particularly dislike.

You, gentlemen of the assembly, who are the guardians of Pennsylvania, and bound by every principle which can actuate honest men, to promote her welfare and prosperity, it is with you to consider this great object in all its lights. The objections rais­ed will doubtless be varied. The answers given will certainly be disputed. Perhaps the arguments in support of the Bank, are not so strong as the advocates believe. One thing however is certain, that consequences of the last importance to your con­stituents, must follow from your decision. If therefore the e­vent be doubtful, nay if the destruction of this charter should not be absolutely necessary, pause a moment and consider most deeply what you are about to do. How can we hope for public peace and national prosperity if the faith of government so so­lemnly pledged, can be so suddenly violated? If private proper­ty can be so lightly infringed? Destroy this prop, which once gave us support, and where will you turn in the hour of distress? To whom will ye look for succour? By what promises or vows can you hope to obtain confidence? This hour of distress will come. It comes to all, and the moment of affliction is known to him alone, whose divine providence exalts or depresses states and kingdoms. Not by the blind dictates of arbitrary will. Not by a tyrannous and despotic mandate. But in proportion to their obedience or disobedience of his just and holy laws. It is he who commands us that we abstain from wrong. It is he who tells us, " do unto others as ye would that they should do unto you."