THE articles of our foederal union were drawn up by Congress, and adopted by the states, amidst the con­fusions of a most bloody, cruel, and unnatural war, when the attention of Congress who drew, and the states who adopt­ed them, was frequently drawn off by continual alarms, burning of towns, slaughter and bloodshed: No marvel then that every inconveniency attending them when reduced into practice, could not be foreseen, either by those who drew, or those who adopted them; at which period, it would not have been well accepted, had any one discovered, and had ventured to call into question, the propriety of any one of the thirteen articles of our confederation.

It may therefore be adviseable, now we are released from the distressing scenes of war, deliberately to examine, revise, correct and amend them, in every instance, in which when reduced into practice, they may be found—inconsistent with each other—not capable of being carried into execu­tion—or inconsistent with the general sense and understand­ing of those who adopted them. And every man not an enemy to his country, who in any measure tenders its peace and future happiness, will readily give his consent, if the present articles of our foederal union are found on a fair trial, deficient, in either of the foregoing particulars, that they should with care and due deliberation, be revised, corrected, and amended. For, as a late writer observes, "No go­vernment has the prerogative to be immutable—No power how respectable soever, created [...]day, or a thousand years [Page 12] ago, which may not be abrogated to morrow—No govern­ment is authorized to regard the state as its property—who­ever thinks otherwise devotes himself, his family, and his childrens children to misery, allowing, to his ance [...]ors a right to stipulate for him, when he did not exist, and arro­gating to himself a right to stipulate for his posterity before they ex [...]sted.—All authority in this world began either by the consent of the subjects, or the power of their master, in both the one or the other they may justly end—there being no prescription in favor of tyranny against liberty."

The author of the dissertation on which I remark, has not proposed any one alteration of the articles of our foede­ral union thro'out his whole dissertation, but what he pro­poses for the enlargement of the powers of Congress, by which it is very evident he has high notions of prerogative in those who govern, how much soever [...]e may be concerned to maintain the natural and constitutional rights of his fel­low subjects; and rather seems to banter than to support even their right to choose their own representatives, either in the assemblies of the states, or delegates in Congress.

The Honorable Continental Congress having stiled the Confederacy in the first article, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; by the second they have taken due care to se­cure the rights of the separate states in the following words:

"Each state retains its SOVEREIGNTY, FREEDOM, and IN­DEPENDENCE, and every power, jurisdiction and right, not expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled." Every power therefore not expressly delegated to Congress by the articles of confederation, still remains to be exercised by the states separately: and in this consists their sovereign­ty, freedom and independence.

It cannot be difficult to determine what powers the states have expressly delegated to Congress, a careful review of the [...] article will solve the difficulty, and if any thing is [Page 13] doubtfully expressed, they ought as soon as possible to be explained to the sense and understanding which Congress had when they draughted, and which the states had when they adopted them. Or if on a f [...]ir trial it appears that Congress are not vested with all those powers necessary to execute the grand and important ends and designs for which the states entered into confederation, the powers of Congress most certainly must be enlarged, with that care and caution necessary on so important occasion.—But for Congress to assume, or for the states to submit, to any extension of power, beyond the powers delegated to Con­gress, will have an effectual tendency to subvert the consti­tution, and destroy what the states highly value, viz. their own sovereignty, freedom, and independence.

The author of that dissertation on which I am about to remark, says, fol.5, "The supreme authority" (by which he means Congress) "must have the power of making war and peace.—of appointing armies and navies." These powers by the 9th article are expresslyd elegated— "of appointing officers civil and military." Congress in draughting the articles of our foederal union, reserved in their own hands the right of appointing the general officers of our armies.—The officers of our navies, when we have any in existence, and the states have expressly delegated that power to them, to whom in fact it with great propriety belongs, and could not be ex­ercised in any other way but by the supreme authority of the commonwealth.—But it never entered into their minds I presume, as it is not even suggested i [...] the articles, their having any power of appointing the civil officers of the states, which is a prerogative, I presume, the states never will resign, so long as they have any desire to retain their sovereignty, freedom, and independence.—Indeed was the bestowment of places of bonor and profit the gift of the su­preme authority of the states, let it be King, Congress, State­holder, [Page 14] Regent, or Dictator, or by what name soever called, they would (so long as mankind have any fondness for ho­nor, and the emoluments of office) have it in their power to bribe the assembly of the states, and every one who oppose any usurped authority or undue extension of power beyond the limits of the constitution by which they are governed; but in a republican government it saps it to the very founda­tion. So long as all public measures are open to the exa­mination of the body of the electors, and the bestowment of places of crust left to their representatives, and the emolu­ments of office kept within reasonable bounds, so long a commonwealth may be governed with safety, in peace and good order; but grant to the supreme authority in any form of government whatever, the sole prerogative of the bestow­ment of all places civil and military, the prerogative of annexing the emoluments of office, and the bestowment of pensions, and their subjects are slaves to all intents and pur­poses whatever.—True it is a people may be happy under any form of government, so long as good men govern, but whenever they become corrupt—if vested with the power of bestowing all offices civil and military, and at the same time they hold the purse-strings, or which is the same thing, have such grants of money settled for life as will enable the chief magistrate, or supreme authority, to grant pensions, to such as will be the tools and creatures of his court—no matter what the form of government is, or whether govern­ed by a King or Congress, whenever the supreme authority becomes corrupt, and are desirous of extending their pow­er beyond the bounds prescribed by the constitution, they always have it in their power to effect it. This author pro­ceeds and says. "They must have the power of making contracts—emitting, coining, and borrowing money—of regulating trade, and making treaties with foreign powers—of establishing post­offices.—These powers Congress are already expressly vested [Page 15] with by the articles of confederation; but these do not seem fully to satisfy the desire of this author. He then proceeds and says, "In short of doing every thing, which the well being of the commonwealth may require, and which is not compatible, to any particular state, all which require money, and cannot be effected without it, they must therefore of NECES­SITY be vested with the power of TAXATION."

This author may remember the Honorable Continental Congress drew up the articles of our foederal union, they doubtless well understood what powers were necessary to be vested in their hands, "which the well being of the common­wealth required, and which was not compatible to any particu­lar state," at least they understood that matter as well as this author can be supposed to understand it; at the same time they fully understood the foundation of our oppositi­on to the unconstitutional measures of the British parlia­ment, and they well knew the confidence placed in them by the states, as the guardians of all our civil and natural rights, and they then retained in their own hands, by the articles of our foederal union, all those powers they thought neces­sary to be lodged in their hands, which we could with safety commit to them, and still the states retain their sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and they are all judiciously and very expressly pointed out in the 9th articles, viz. "The sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war—of sending and receiving embassadors—entering into trea­ties and alliances—of establishing rules for deciding in all cases, what captures on land and water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by land or naval forces in the service of the United States shall be divided or appropriated—of granting letters of marque and reprisals in times of peace—appointing cour [...]s for the trial of piracies and felo­nies committed on the high seas, and establishing courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of [Page 16] captures"—and have made Congress itself "the last resort on appeal in all disputes and differences now subsisting, or that may hereafter arise between two or more states con­cerning boundary, jurisdiction, or any other cause what­ever;" and in consequence of that authority reserved in their own hands, by public accounts, they have already fi­nally determined, that the state of Connecticut have no just and legal claim, by virtue of their grant or charter by let­ters patent from king Charles the second, extending its limits from Narraganset-bay on the east, to the South-Sea on the west) to hold any lands by virtue of said grant, west of the state of New-York—although I conclude, it must be conceded, the Susquehannah company made the first pur­chase of the right of soil from the natives, who were hereto­fore reputed the lords of the see, which is, in my opinion, virtually denying, that the original natives have any right to the lands of North-America.—In which judgment of our Honorable Continental Congress I could however fully acquiesce, provided they proceed to judge, and finally to determine, that all grants of lands, made by any of their most gracious majesties the KINGS of GREAT-BRITAIN to any of their loving subjects, shall not extend beyond what their majesties had actually purchased or conquered from the na­tives, antecedent to their several grants, or has since been purchased by any of the subjects of these states, by virtue of a proper licence granted them for that end, and that all the lands, not as yet purchased, or conquered by the joint ef­forts of the United States, and now ceded by Great-Britain to the Thirteen United States of North-America, be consi­dered as the property of the aboriginal natives, who were the first discoverers and have the right of prime occupancey, and that the right of pre-emption of the soil from the na­tives, which was all that Great-Britain could cede to us, and that only to the exclusion of British subjects, might be and [Page 17] remain the joint interest of the Thirteen United States of North-America, by virtue of the late treaty and cession, for I never yet could discover either from reason or revelation, or from the laws of nature and nations, that the kings of Great-Britain had any more right to grant to any of his loving subjects, all the lands lying between certain latitudes of North-America, from the Atlantic on the east, to the South-Seas on the west, which gave his subjects a right to drive out the natives, the original proprietors of the soil, because they did not practise agriculture and occupied an extent of territory more than they judged necessary in order to support them by hunting, than his SUBLIME HIGHNESS the GRAND SEI [...]NIOR at this present day has to re grant the same lands to any of his loving subjects, not inhabited by the subjects of any MAHOMETAN PRINCE, which would give them a right to drive us back into the interior parts of this continent, because we have not the knowledge of the cul­ture of poppies, and the manufacture of opium, but instead thereof make use of wine to the dishonor of their prophet Mahomet.—This right, power, or prerogative, call it what they please, claimed by the Christian princes of Europe, I can by no means acknowledge, unless they are able to shew that North-America was distributed to them, "when the Most High divided unto the NATIONS their INHERITANCE when he separated the sons of ADAM."—But to return from this digression—

The states have likewise expressly delegated to Congress "the sole and exclusive right of regulating the alloy, and va­lue of coin struck by their own authority—fixing the stan­dard of weights and measures—regulating the trade and ma­naging all affairs with the Indians—establishing and regu­lating post-offices—appointing all officers of the land forces in the service of the United States, excepting regimen­tal officers—appointing all officers of the naval forces, and [Page 18] commissioning all officers whatever in the service of the Unit­ed States—making rules for the government and regulation of the said land and naval forces, and directing their operati­ons—to appoint a committee of the states—and such other committees, and civil officers as may be necessary, [...]or the managing the general affairs of the United States, under their direction—to appoint one of their num­ber to preside—to ascertain the necessary sums of money to be raised for the service of the United States, and to appro­priate and apply the same for defraying the public expences—to borrow money, or emit bills on the credit of the Unit­ed States, transmitting every half years to the respective states an account of the sums of money so borrowed or emitted—to build and equip a navy—to agree upon the number of land forces.";—These are all the prerogatives which the honora­ble Continental Congress asked, or saw necessary to be vested in their hands, as they had the general superintendency of all the United States; and indeed it was all they judged the states could delegate with safety, and leave any business for the several assemblies of the states to transact, except the regulating of sences, restraining of [...]wine, and preventing old women keeping too many g [...]ese, to the nusance of the public. The foregoing enumerated powers the states have by the 9th article expressly delegated to Congress, and they are as extensive as the prerogatives of [...]he crown of Great-Britain, about which they make so much noise and bustle; except­ing the appointing all officers civil and military, which is a commonwealth would be altogether inconsistent, and for that reason I judge, they did not think would have been pru­dent for them to ask, or safe for these states to grant: in none of which enumerated articles of delegated powers is the power of taxation once mentioned or even hinted at. This power however this author says, "They must of NECESSITY be vested with." However he honestly confesses, and says, fol. [...], [Page 19] "This is a most important and weighty trust, a dreadful engine of OPPERSSION, TYRANNY and INJURY when ill used; yet, from the NECESSITY of the case it must be admitted, for to give a supreme authority, a power of making contracts, without any power of payment.— of appointing officers civil and military, without any money to pay them— a power to build ships, without any money to do it with— a power of emitting money, without any power to redeem it— or a power to borrow money, without any power to pay it, &c. &c. such a solecism in government, (he thinks) is so naturally abjurd, to offer further arguments on the subject, would be to insult the understanding of his readers." This au­thor ought to have known king George the third, our late gra­cious sovereign, has all these prerogatives, and no other I can now recollect, excepting the prerogative of appointing, all officers civil and military, by which, together with a certain sum of money, granted him by his first parliament for life, at the beginning of his reign, which for many years has been usual, in order to gain the favour of their young prince, and to enable him to grant it back into the pockets of his favourites by pensions; by which two powerful arguments, the kings of England, for a succession, of reigns, have gained a majority in the house of commons; or which is the same thing, their ministers have gained it,

By which they have wrecked the civil constitution of that kingdom, the work of ages; and all their boasted liberties are sunk and ab [...]orbed by minist [...]rial tools and hirelings corrupted by their own money, which has been purchase [...] at the expence of the best blood of that nation. No [...]with­standing this prince has not in his power, to tax his subjects a single copper without the concurrence of h [...]s parliament [Page 20] Nor have I ever seen, or read any speech, made to his par­liament, that he has ever moved to have the power of taxa­tion, added to his other royal prerogatives, which this patri­otic author, says must of necessity be vested in Congress,—a power which Congress themselves never once mentioned in the articles of our fo [...]deral union; which power, was it once vested in Congress, they might have it in their power, to establish as many pensioners as they please; and if the time should ever arrive when they should aspire at greater powers than those with which they are already vested, it would be in their power, as effectually to destory our present happy constitution, as the nation from whom we derive our origi­nal have destroyed their own—and enslave a nation that a few individuals may not in luxury and excess.

I would just recite a few passages from a late writer on the civil constitution of England, who says, "The king of England has the prerogative of commanding armies, and equipping fleets—but without the concurrence of his parlia­ment he cannot maintain them—he can bestow places and employments—but without his parliament he cannot pay the salleries annexed to them—he can declare war—but without his parliament it is impossible for him to carry it on—in a word, the royal prerogative, destitute as it is, of imposing taxes, is like a ship completely equipt, but from which the parliament at pleasure can draw off all the wa­ter, and leave it aground, or set it a [...]oat, by granting sub­sidies." Now let any one run the parallel between the prerogatives of the King of Great-Britain, and our Honor­able Continental Congress, their prerogatives are the same, with this exception, the King of Great Britain has the pre­rogative of appointing all officers both civil and military, Our Honorable Continental Congress thought proper only to retain the prerogative of appointing a part, leaving the rest to the states, and I thing the division judiciously made [Page 21] —Congress have the prerogative to declare war—but the states, who most certainly have both a natural and constitu­tional right to judge of the righteousness of it, may either grant or refuse to grant money to carry it on.—The several assemblies of the states by our constitution, in many respects, stand in the s [...]me situation, and have the same restraint on Congress that the parliament or rather the commons of Eng­land once had on the crown;—that authority which grants money, most certainly have a right to refuse granting, when they can neither see the necessity or righteousness of the mea­sure for which it is to be granted—This right originates from the reason and nature of things, and is a self-evident truth.—Again, Congress are vested with power to build and equip a navy—but we shall have little need of a navy, if what this author says in fol. 4 is just, and I conceive in this instance at least he judges right, viz. That these states "will command respect; that our exports are either raw materi­als, or provisions, and their imports mostly finished goods, our trade becomes a capital object, with every manufacturing nation of EUROPE, and all the southern colonies of America, our friend­ship and trade will of course be courted, and each power in ami [...]y with us will contribute to our security." And if we take proper care not to intermeddle in the politics and broils of Europeancourts, this doubtless will be our happy situation for ages.—This being our case and situation, may not the as­semblies of these states, with great propriety, consistent with the articles of our foederal union, refuse to grant mo­ney for the building a navy in time of profound peace, should Congress adopt such a measure, merely for the sake of transporting our American Embassadors to and from the courts of Europe, or with a view to render ourselves re­spectable, as a maritime power, while we lie under a heavy debt, both to our generous allies, as well as to domestic credi­tors? They most certainly may, and ought to do it, under [Page 22] such circumstances—and if the assemblies of the states are warranted and justified in this case, they certainly are in every case, where granting of mon [...]es is their right and prerogative.

Although the king of England has not the power of taxation, he has made out, not only to support the dignity of his crown, but to [...]avage the ocean with his fleets, and to carry fire and sword on to the continent, in support of his German dominions, at the expence of the blood and trea­sure of the nation, in which they are in reality, no more interested than America is in the quarrels of the Nabobs of Asia; all which he has effected by his having the preroga­tive of appointing all officers civil and military, and by means of a custom which has long prevailed, that at the beginning of every reign, the parliament (to court the favor of the young prince) grant him a fixed permanent re­venue for life, by which he is enabled to grant Pensions to so many of his parliament to make them the creatures and tools of his power, as to obtain a majority, and by that means to rule and govern the nation in as despotic a man­ner as the most absolute monarch of Europe. This evil our patriotic Congress, who drew the articles of our con­federation, foresaw, in some future period might happen to these states, and for that reason, no doubt, did not think the power of taxation could safely be lodged in the hands of Congress, where the representation is so small, the interests, tempers, and dispositions of the states so diverse.—Can this author, or any one else imagine the power of taxation of this state could be safely lodged in the hands of two dele­gates, was every member of Congress as upright as we can conceive it possible for the human heart to be, in the pre­sent state of this world.—For my own part I respect and revere Congress, and am willing they should be vested with as many hereditary duties as the crown of England, and i [Page 23] that will satisfy this author, I am willing they should have the very same, viz. "A few hereditary duties on the ex­portation of wool, a branch of which in the reign of George I. was fixed at seven thousand pounds—a duty of two shil­lings on every ton of wine imported—the wrecks of ships, the owners unknown—whales and sturgeons thrown on the coast—swans swimming on public rivers—and a few feudal relicks, compose the whole appropriated revenue of the crown of England—and if these will satisfy this author, without the power of taxation, for my own part should be content they should be granted to Congress; that in no one instance, either in point of prerogative, or appropriated revenues, they should be less respectable than the monarch of Britain.

The King of England by having the right of nominating and appointing all officers civil and military, and by a mode­rate grant of parliament of about a million, sterling annual­ly settled upon him during life, is enabled to grant so many pensions as to purchase his parliament, and thereby to de­stroy the best civil constitution, in many respects, that ever was composed and established on this side Mount-Sinai—an establishment from our peculiar circumstances, we in these states cannot copy after or adopt, and therefore it is the duty of every individual to guard against all innovations, or any infringements that may be attempted to be made on our civil constitution, which the wisdom, of Congress have devised and judiciously draughted, and the states solemnly adopted, which we ought carefully to guard and maintain, otherwise our ruin will be of ourselves.

This author doth not even pretend we have already vest­ed Congress with the power of taxation, but says they must be vested with it from necessity, and urges reasons to support that necessity; but there are others weak and silly, enough to assert, they are already vested with that power, and found their opinion on these words in the 9th article, "to ascer­tain [Page 24] the necessary sums of money to be raised for the service of the United States, and to appropriate and apply the same for defraying the public expences."—But whoever founds his opinion on those words, must be ignorant of the true end and design of our confederation, and the spirit and meaning of those words in the 9th article.

The true end and design of our confederation I take to be this, viz. To unite the strength of the separate states under Congress as their general Head, and to delegate to them the direction of the operations of our military and naval forces against the power of Great-Britain.—And this I take it was the general sense and understanding of the states who adopted the articles of our foederal union, and the whole tenor of the articles themselves support this opi­nion.—Congress are to determine the number of troops ne­cessary for the service of the states.—What service? The ser­vice of the war and general defence—and for that end they were to make requisition to each state for their quota, "and to ascertain the necessary sums of money to be raised for the service" of the war, and to appropriate and apply the same; that matter not being compalible to any particular state, by constitution is vested in congress, whose right it properly is, and is expressly delegated to them.—But this our author cannot put up with, without their being vested with the power of taxation: who says, fol. 6, "This would make all payments dependant on THIRTEEN POPULAR ASSEMBLIES." And adds, "The present broken state of our finances—public debt, and bankruptcies—enormous and ridiculous depreciation of public securities, with a total annihilation of our public credit—prove beyond all contradi [...]ion the VANITY of all recourse to the several assemblies of the states—the recent instance of the duty of 5 per cent. on imported goods STRUCK DEAD, and the Bank­ruptcies which ensued, on the single vote of RHODE-ISLAND." What bankruptcies ensued on Rhode-Island's negativing [Page 25] the impost act, which was to have been collected by officers appointed by Congress, and applied at their discretion, in which the states could have no power to appropriate to the payment of their quota of debt contracted during the war, agreeable to the 8th article, the author can better say than I can pretend—but that the depreciation of bills—failure of public credit, and many bankruptcies ensued before the impost was asked for by Congress, or denied by Rhode­Island, are facts that are notorious, which many attribute to the want of seasonable and adequate taxation, which, cre­ating a demand, would at least have retarded the deprecia­tion of our bills. Our author however appears much out of humour with the state of Rhode-Island for preventing the operation of the impost act, and is desirous to enlarge the powers of Congress to prevent the like mischief in fu­ture; but at the same time seems desirous "to restrain them from doing any mischief in the exercise of those VAST powers, with which he seems very sollici [...]ous Congress should be vested.—This he thinks the most difficult part of the weighty subject he had undertaken," and puts up a short ejaculatory prayer; "That Almighty Wisdom would direct his pen in the arduous discussion," fol. 12. And in truth and reality, the framing a perfect and complete system of government for a rising empire, is a most arduous and very important sub­ject; and as he seems desirous of Divine Aid, I would re­commend it to him once more to consult his bible, and duly weigh and consider the civil polity of the Hebrews, which was planned by Divine Wisdom, for the government of that people although their territory was small; by pre­venting an undue monopoly of lands by their reversion to the original proprietors in the lineal descent of the families at the jubliee, (which was every half century) it supported vast numbers of inhabitants within very narrow limits—their laws were few and simple—their judges the elders of [Page 26] their cities, well acquainted with the credibility of the parties and their evidences—they held their courts in the places of greater concourse, the gates of the city, and their processes were neither lengthy nor expensive.

Our author having informed us with what powers the supreme authority ought to be vested, in the next place has undertaken to let us know how this supreme authority is to be constituted so as to do no mischief with that vast au­thority with which he has cloathed them: he carefully a­voids using the word elected, as he seems to have a mortal hatred of popular elections, in which process he is very me­thodical and says, 1st. "The men who compose this important council must be DELEGATED, not elected, from all the states, and it is to be wished, that none might be APPOINTED, that were not adequate to this weighty business; but a little know­ledge of human nature, and a little acquaintance with the poli­tical history of mankind, will soon teach us, that this is not to be expected. The representatives appointed by POPULAR ELECTI­ONS, are commonly, not only the LEGAL, but the REAL, SUB­STANTIAL representatives of their electors, i. e. there will com­monly be about the same proportion of GRAVE, SOUND, WELL QUALIFIED men—TRIFLING DESULTORY men—WILD or KNA­VISN schemers—and DULL IGNORANT [...]o [...]ls in the delegated assembly, as in the body of electors." What a motly mix­ture this of which our supreme authority and the assemblies of the states are composed!—A most severe burlesque ob­Equely cast on our Honorable Continental Congress, and the assemblies of the states, if the account given of them by this author is just! What a pity it is we have made choice of a democratical form of government, and that all our civil rulers were not made so by birth, or hereditary right, and that kings, lords, dukes barons, carls, and knights, were not the natural and spontaneous growth of North-America; and all their virtues such as knowledge, integrity, skill in the arts of [Page 27] government, but above all, their exemplary piety, and firm attachment to the doctrines of revelation, and the civil con­stitution of the Christian religion as established by our ancestors; and that they were not all made hereditary to descend with their lands to all generations. But what adds to our mis­fortune he says "he knows no way to help this;" if that is truly the case, we are in a very pi [...]iable situation truly! But for once I will just hint at a few things, which if our legi­slatures should think worthy of a trial, I presume many advantages will arise from them, and without some atten­tion, to some or all of them, a commonwealth never was, nor ever will be continued long, without intrigues, cabals, and factions. In the first place, no office or place of trust should be made lucrative, any further than to support the dignity of the station with decency and honor, but not to enrich themselves or families, by the emoluments of office. Secondly, Let all transactions of a public nature, both in Congress and the assemblies of the states, be open to the free examination of all the electors—a printed journal both of Congress and the assemblies of the states, with the yeas and nays to every interesting question that comes before them—No man is worthy of public trust that has not an opini­on of his own, or is afraid to let that opinion be known to his electors—this will make him careful, that he judges and acts according to TRUTH, of which the body of the electors in this state besure, taken collectively, are better judges, both of men and measures, than our author seems to imagine; only let them have the means of knowledge, instead of being abused by bowing, cringing, fawning courtiors, who are always of the opinion of the majority present, un­less they happen to mistake their numbers.—There is not a single proposition in our author's whole dissertation more just than this, "TRUTH loves LIGHT, and is vindicated by it; WRONG shrouds itself in DARKNESS, and is supported by DELU­SION, [Page 28] Lastly; Let there be a regular account of the ex­penditure of all public monies, annually laid before Con­gress and the Assemblies of the states, as those who pay money most certainly have a right to know how, and to what use it is applied.

These means of knowledge, of men and measures, being afforded to the electors of these states, I presume there are sufficient numbers in each state, who are men of ability, in­tegrity and dis [...]ernment, who can distinguish by those helps, (which are in the power of the legislatlures to afford) "the grave, sound, well-qualified men, from trisling, desultory men, and wild knavish schemers, from dull ignorant fools:" who would be faithful to enlighten their less discerning, but ho­nest neighbours, and in that manner regulate their choice better than the sly, insinuating, intriguing patriots of the pre­sent day do, by the means of knowledge we enjoy in this state: and this I judge would be more to the satisfaction of the freemen of this state, ^* and would have a greater ten­dency to serve the interest of the states, than what he propo­ses under his second general head, viz. "That the Congress shall consist of TWO CHAMBERS, an UPPER and LOWER HOUSE, or a SENATE and COMMONS, with the concurrence of both neces­sary to every act, and that every state send one or more delegates to each house." This he says, "will subject every act to two discussions, before two distinct chambers of men, EQUALLY qua­lified for the debate, EQUALLY masters of the subject, and of EQUAL authority in the decision," and if equal in all respects I cannot at present see the necessity of building two cham­bers to hold them.—But another difficulty arises in my mind, as our author has not as yet pointed out any new mode to constitute these delegates, if elected in our present [Page 29] mode, they will still remain not only the legal, but the real substantial representatives of their electors; so that I do not see any real advantages obtained by the division, as both chambers it seems, must be filled with men of equal abili­ties, and of equal authourity, unless as they are equal in all respects, itmust be supposed the houses will be complaisant to each other, and frequently change chambers, which will afford some little amusement in time of peace, when but little business that is urgent, will by our constitution, lie before them, and may prove salutary by changing the air.

Our author under his second general head, it must be own­ed, manages the division of Congress with some art; how­ever he now and them a little drops his mask. In page 15 he has found out Congress "will stand in need of much infor­mation," and has devised a plan to furnish them with the "best and surest information, and of that kind that may be most safely relied upon," which information he thinks may be best made through the medium of certain ministers of state which he has planned out; and first mentions a financier as being uppermost on his mind, who manages the whole business of revenues and expenditures, which high and important office, our author no doubt intends to fill, as he tells us, fol. 7, he is about soon to publish an essay on finance, on which sub­ject doubtless he will shine, and it being attended with a de­cent sallery, it must be supposed it would be agreeable to him to sit at the head of the American treasury; but more especially, should the states be so happy as to see with him, the necessity to vest Congress with the power of taxation, which would save the states the trouble of collecting their own quota of the continental debt, and fall directly into the continental treasury, under his own immediate inspection.

He in the next place supposes a secretary of state would likewise be very necessary to give information; who would have the knowledge of the general policy, and internal govern­ment [Page 30] —To these he adds a minister of war, who must pre­side in the business of war and d [...]ence—of this minister however, by his own account, we shall stand but in little need, as "all the manufacturing rations of Europe, will court our friendship, and contribute to our security," for which reason it will hardly answer to maintain the dignity of that minister, purely to conduct a war with the [...] of the interior parts of America, who I fancy will stand in as much fear of the United States, as the manufacturing nations of Europe (for their own advantage) will court our friendship and con­tribute to our security" ”—To these great ministers of state, this author would have added JUDGES of LAW and CHANCERY—All these GREAT MINISTERS of STATE he would have to serve as ATTENDANTS on the two chambers of Congress, to give them the best information in their several departments of office, whose opinion he would oblige Congress always to take, before they finally pass any bill, without which formality being duly attended to, the act of Congress to be void. But at the same time he is so careful to guard the dignity of the two chambers of Congress, as not to enable these great ministers of state to negative any act of Congress, how contrary soever the same may be to their opinion and advice—so that these great ministers of state are more for ornament, and to add to the dignity of Congress, than any real utility, like the mantling to a [...]oat of arms. Vid. fol. 16,17. And to fill up the rear of these great ministers of state, he adds a chamber of commerce, composed of merchants, to give information likewise to Congress, respecting trade and commerce. So that in reality all these great ministers of state are only to serve Congress in quality of INFORMING OFFI­CERS. And to this fabric of his own structure, in fol. 24, he adds a COUNCIL of STATE, composed of all the aforesaid GREAT MINISTERS of STATE; to which number it shall be the prerogative of Congress to add three others, viz. one [Page 31] from the New-England states, one from the middle states, and one from the southern states; one of which three it shall be the Prerogative of the president of Congress to appoint: "to all of whom shall be committed the SUPREME EXECUTIVE AU­THORITY of the states, (all and singular of them over account­able to Congress) who shall superintend all the executive officers, who shall [...]ver be accountable to, or removeable for just cause by them, or Congress, i. e. either of them." This will keep this supreme executive authority in due decorum, and oblige them always to do the thing that is just and right, at least what shall be so judged by the council of state and congress, both of whom will have the power to remove them for any mal­feasances, which will be a greater restraint than if they were chosen by popular elections.

Our author having displayed much skill in the arts of government, by the addition of all these ministers and officers of state, to encrease the dignity and add importance to Con­gress; in the next place proposes measures to be adopted to enforce the strictest obedience to the requisitions of Con­gress. In fol. 24 he says, “ "There remains one very important article to be discussed, viz. What methods the constitution shall point out to ENFORCE the [...]s and requisitions of Congress thro' the several states; and how the states which REFUSE or DELAY OBEDIENCE to such acts or requisitions, shall be treated." ” This he says, "is a particular of the GREATEST DELICACY, as well as the UTMOST IMPORTANCE, and ought to be decidedly settled in our COOLEST HOURS." In this I perfectly agree with our author; but great, delicate and important, as it appears to him to be, he has undertaken the job; and in fol. 25 he says, "To appoint a Congress with powers to do all acts necessary for the support and uses of the union; and at the same time to leave al [...] the states at liberty to obey them or not with impunity, is in every view the [...] absurdity, worse than a state of nature, without any supreme authority at all, and at best a ridiculous [Page 32] [...]ffort of childish nonsense; and of course, every state in the uni­on is under the highest obligations to obey the supreme authority, and in the highest degree amenable to it, and subject to the highest censure for disobedience; yet all this notwithstanding I think, the soul that sins should die. The censure of the GREAT SUPREME POWER ought to be so directed, if possible, as to light on those persons, who have BETRAYED their country, and expos­ed it to DISSOLUTION, by opp [...]sing that supreme authority, which is the band of our union, and from whence proceeds the principal strength and energy of our government; I therefore propose that EVERY PERSON, whether in PUBLIC or PRIVATE CHARACTER, who by PUBLIC VOTE, or other OVERT ACT DIS­OBEYS the SUPREME AUTHORITY shall be amenable to Con­gress, shall be summoned and COMPELLED to appear before Con­gress, and on due CONVICTION suffer such FINE, IMPRISON­MENT, or other PUNISHMENT as the SUPREME AUTHORITY shall judge requisite. It may be objected here, (and I think very justly) that this will make a member of assembly accounta­ble in Congress for his vote in assembly; I answer, it doth so this case only, viz. When that vote is to DISOBEY the SU­PREME AUTHORITY.— No member of assembly can have a right to give such a vote, and therefore ought to be PUNISHED for to doing.—A government which is but half executed, or whose ope­rations may be stopped by a SINGLE STATE, is the most dangerous of all institutions—I cannot therefore admit, that the great ends of our union should lie at the mercy of a single state." ”—What is got into the head of this good citizen of Philadelphia? What doth he make of our Honorable Continental Congress who draughted the articles of our consederation, that they should make such egregious blunders, as to form such a lax form of government? Has he the vanity to think Congress who framed the articles of our foederal union, could not have foreseen these intolerable blunders and defects in our con­stitution, and provided a proper remedy? they certainly [Page 33] would. But this supposed defect, is in reality our greatest safeguard: and if there is any defect, it is in his own op [...]icks. He expressly owns, fol. 25, The supreme authority are sub­ject to passions like other lesser powers; they may, and often are, HEATED, VIOLENT, OPPRESSIVE, and very TYRANNICAL; and seems disposed to FENCE them out as far as possible, and to give the states as great a CHECK on the supreme authority, as can consist with its necessary energy.—This is the very fence and check which Congress, in their wisdom, saw necessary to pro­vide, for the safety and security of the states, when framing our civil constitution; and we greatly rejoice in their wis­dom, prudence, and precaution:—It is the very same fence and check provided for the seven united provinces of Holland.—No state in the confederation, I presume, will oppose, or neglect to carry into execution, any resolution of Con­gress which they judge to be for the general good of the states included in the union; and until they can see it, he cannot blame them if they oppose it; but especially if they judge such requisition inconsistent with the articles of our foedral union, when he himself owns the supreme authority may be, and often are, heated, violent, oppressive, and very tyrannical.—I cannot conceive why our author should be so very fretful and out of humour with our present happy con­stitution; I fear his expectations were too much raised as a financier; that the disappointment occasioned by Rhode­Island's negativing the Impost Act in the very form pointed out by Congress, has ruffled him too much; and that he did not write this part of his Dissertation "in his coolest hours." I never yet have learned that the state of Rhode­Island have ever refused to fund their quota of the national debt and to make speedy and ample provision for the pay­ment of the interest, and gradual sinking of the principal, as soon as their quota is made our, agreeable to the 8th arti­cle of the Confederation—For my own part, it would [Page 34] greatly affect me to see any member of our honorable Assem­bly dragged down to Congress, with all the whole retinue of evidences pro and con, merely for denying the authority of Congress, and voting accordingly, (when at the same time he thought, and perhaps very justly, that Congress had no consti­tutional right to make such a requisition) and be subjected to fine, imprisonment, and corporeal punishment. This would make our worthy members awfully afraid to support our own constitutional rights, our sovereignty, freedom, and indepen­dence, secured to us by the second article of our foederal union, which we have not expressly delegated to Congress by the ninth. Our author would have discovered more le­nity, and more of a christian frame and temper of mind, if he had been willing to pass over such an error, (if, on strict scrutiny, it should prove to be an error) to have the offender only publicly reproved by the speaker, from his chair, for an error of that kind, committed through ignorance or inad­vertence; as he can be considered only as the legal, real and substantial representative of the common herd of his electors:—For which reason, in behalf of such state offenders, I would humbly supplicate the several legislatures of the states not to admit of such an alteration in the articles of our foederal union, until our honorable Continental Congress shall disco­ver the necessity of such a measure, and recommend the same to be adopted by the states.

Some have suggested, that this author may possibly be employed, by our honorable Congress, to try how far the citizens of these states would submit to such arbitrary and despotic measures: But such suggestions I reject with con­tempt and disdain. It must be impossible that Congress, who drafted the articles of our foederal union, and so care­fully guarded the states against all arbitrary and despotic measures, should so soon attempt so subvert our happy con­stitution; much less would they improve so whimsical a writer [Page 35] as our author appears to be, to effect the design; and that without ever once moving to the assemblies of the states for any enlargement of their powers; which no doubt, they would most readily comply with, if necessary. This state, in order to enable Congress to proportion the quota of debt to each state, I am told, on requisition, have already acce­ded to the alteration of the 8th article, ^* that speedy provi­sion may be made for the payment of the interest, and gra­dual sinking the principal, of our whole debt, contracted during the wa [...].—I rather think him some gentleman of a sovereign, arbitrary, tyrannical turn of mind, and unhappily vindictive; of which he has given a convincing evidence, in fol. 27, in these words— "Further, I propose, that if the execution of any act or order of the supreme authority shall be opposed by force, in any of the states (which God forbid) it shall be lawful for Congress to send into such state a sufficient force to suppress it."—Here, again, our author interlardes this sanguinary proposal with a short ejaculatory prayer to Almighty God; but then I do not understand him to mean to prevent the operation of his proposal, but that God would forbid or Prevent any state from opposing, by force, the execution of any act of Congress: Which, from the pre­sent views I have of the temper and disposition of any of our states, there is not the least danger of; before so long as they regulate their requisitions by the articles of our foederal union; which Congress themselves drafted, and which the states have solemnly adopted. But should Congress ever [Page 36] make any resolutions contrary to the articles of our foederal union, through inadvertence; as this author says, fol. 24, "I know that supreme authorities are LIABLE to err as well as lesser ones;" or should they, from lust of power, and spirit of domination, become "over-heated, violent, oppressive, and very tyrannical," (as in fol. 26 he owns they may) I should think it their indispensible duty to resist all unconstitu­tional extension of power; although not unto blood. But should the states adopt this sanguinary proposal of our au­thor, Congress would constitutionally be vested with power to enter with an armed force, and shed the blood of any of our sister states, merely for supporting the constitutional rights of the states. As Congress have wisely avoided all sanguinary measures, in drafting the articles of our union, I should not think it below the dignity of their high station, to manifest their disapprobation of so sanguinary a proposal.

This proposal gave me a more violent shock, as I hap­pened to read it just as the news arrived, that 1500 of our continental troops, with a proper train of artillery, were on full march for Philadelphia to suppress the turbulent beha­vour of a part of the Philadelphia line of the army, and to protect the honorable Continental Congress from their in­sults. If the form of civil government in that state is so lax, and their citizens not disposed to support it against in­sults; as the officers of that state are on half pay during life, and they can support a body of troops with a small addi­tional expence, it may be well for them to take that method to do it; but I do not think it adviseable or necessary for the states to support an army for that purpose: A mild administration rarely wants an armed force to support it: The rectitude of the measures of Congress, and the Assem­blies of the states, will always afford them the surest protec­tion; and wherever the civil power of a state cannot sup­port itself from insult, without a military force to awe their subjects into submission, there is much reason to fear either [Page 37] their civil constitution is deficient, or something is wrong in the administration.—Standing armies may be necessary to support tyranny, oppression, and arbitrary government; but to have recourse to arms in a civil government, is shocking to humanity!—They may be necessary with a felon, an individual; but with a sister state, a whole com­munity of the same family, the bare mentioning of arms presents to my view the bloody scenes in which we have been involved by our parent state!—The unhappy effects of which, time itself will not repair, or obliterate from our minds.

I think none who duly attends to the whole scope and drift of this author, but will easily discover his design is to subvert our present constitution, and to introduce in its room, a government more arbitrary, sovereign, and despotic. His dividing Congress into two Chambers, he seems to think, will make them wonderful wise; and is much better disposed towards them than when in one house, and subjects of po­pular elections. However, he finds some difficulty even then: He has found out these two Chambers, equal, in all respects, may "grow jealous and ill-natured, and after all their information and advice, grow out of humour and insincere, and no concurrence can be obtained." But he has luckily found out a remedy even in that case, viz. "Sit still, and do nothing, till they get into better humour." This I think as bad a situ­ation, as to have the proceedings of Congress suspended a small period by the vote of a single state. But before he ar­rives to the bottom of page 22, he has discovered a remedy for to cure the two Houses of their [...]ulky humour: They must first agree to come into one house, and lovingly choose "A DICTATOR, who shall have and exercise the whole power of both Houses, till such time as they shall be able to concur in displacing him; and that the whole power of the two Houses be suspended in the mean time." ” (Fol. 22.) Here our author [Page 38] has wholly dropt his mask: The two Chambers being fur­nished with A DICTATOR by the joint election of both Houses, he is to remain Dictator until the Houses can agree to displace him; which period, I presume, will never ar­rive; for he is to be vested with the power of both Houses, so long as they remain out of humour; of course the power of taxation will be his exclusive prerogative; by means whereof, he will have it in his power to keep the two Houses out of humour, until he makes himself a PERPETUAL DICTATOR. There is no chimera in all this—our author is consistent in his own plan—and his views are apparent—to reduce us to an ABSOLUTE MONARCHY; and his plan, carried into exe­cution, will effect the thing.

I trust an absolute monarch is not what would be the choice of my fellow citizens: It most certainly would not be my choice, unless I could be assured always of a wise and good Prince. In a commonwealth, if small, and the electors per­sonally acquainted with public characters, the people may enjoy great happiness; but when a commonwealth becomes numerous—their concerns great and important—the desire of riches, honors and power increasing with their numbers,—if the electors have not the means to obtain the knowledge of the public characters of rulers, by their votes given when acting in their public character, the choice of the electors (which, in general, in these northern states, is the main body of the citizens) will be very precarious and uncertain: Discontent and uneasiness will ensue—factions form and in­crease—frequent alterations and change in civil rulers will ensue;—the greatest calamity that can befal an elective state, or commonwealth, as no man, fit to rule or govern, will suffer himself to be mob'd in, and mob'd out, according as the several parties and factions succeed by their intrigues in courting the populace, and imposing on the credulity of their electors: And what will next ensue, courts of justice [Page 39] may, in the same manner, be contaminated,—which must compleat their ruin. An open line of conduct in a com­monwealth, subject to the examination of the electors, is the only barrier against tyranny,—which, in a common­wealth, is the most cruel and oppressive of any species of ty­ranny whatever.

The form of government planned by Congress, and adopted by the states, is the only form we could adopt un­der our circumstances: And the honor and digni [...]y of Con­gress, as a private citizen, I am determined to support, as much as the sovereignty, freedom, and independence of the states, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which they have not expressly delegated to Congress. But as every de­viation from the articles of our foederal union makes a dan­gerous precedent in future, the defects in the articles of confederation can be known only by practice: And it is time enough to make alterations in our system of government, when the defects are made evident.

I must now revert to some things said by this author, which I have passed over, before I conclude these remarks. He says, (fol. 9,) "Another great object of government, is the apportionment of burdens and benefits,—and that an ill ap­portionment will be an everlasting source of uneasiness and discon­tent."—Again, "The value of lands may be a good rule, but the ascertainment of that value is impracticable; no assessment can be made which will not be liable to exceptions and debates."

This observation of our author is doubtless right; the same objections arose in my mind when I first read the 8th article of our foederal union. And our author says, in fol. 10, viz. "That the number of living souls, or human persons, of whatever age, sex, or condition, will afford us a rule which will forever encrease or decrease with the real wealth of the states; and, of course, will be a perpetual rule, not ca­pable of corruption by any circumstances of future time."

[Page 40] This mode of proportioning the quota of debt first sug­gested to the public by this author, is since recommended by Congress, with this alteration, viz. Two fifth parts of the slaves to be exempted from the capitation; the reasons of which exemption do not at present occur to my mind. If I mistake not, Congress have laid a prohibition on the im­portion of African slaves; but this exemption seems rather an encouragement to the owners to progagate them in pre­ference to horses or other stock; and they are improved for the same purposes in tilling ground in the southern, as oxen are in the northern states, and supported at less expence through our long and tedious winters: And at present I cannot see the reasons of the exemption of two fifth parts from the capitation; but otherwise, this proposal of our author, I acknowledge, would be perfectly reasonable, was all the lands ceded by the late treaty, which were not actual­ly purchased or conquered by the Crown antecedent to the cession, to be considered as the joint interest of all the states in the confederation: But if the western lands ceded by the late treaty, not purchased or conquered by the Crown [...]nce­cedent to the cession, are to be considered as belonging to those states, by virtue of their ancient grants from the Crown; I cannot as yet discover either the justice or equity, that those states which are circumscribed on every side by the adjoining states, whose lands are all located and fully settled, should pay, by that mode of computing the quota, for so large an extent of territory, gained and defended at the joint expence of all those states, who have not gained one foot of land by the cession;—much less can I see what [...]guht the King of Great-Britain had to grant to the Virginia and Plymouth companies, all the lands lying between certain latitudes in North-America, from the Atlantic Ocean on the east, to the South Sea on the west, not inhabited by the subjects of any christian prince; when the aboriginal natives [Page 41] were the first discoverers, and had the right of prime occupan­cy; who they do not seem to consider as having any more right to the soil than the moose, deer, bears and foxes which range the forests.

I well know the Princes of Europe have come into some compacts, that when the subjects of any Prince make a dis­coverty of lands heretofore unknown to the nations of Eu­rope, whether inhabited by any of the human race or not, they take possession of it, in some formal manner, for their Prince; either by giving it some christian or saint's name, setting up a crucifix, &c. Such sort of compacts, made by the Princes of Europe, may be binding on them on the eastern side of the Atlantic, but do not appear in the same light to the Americans, who, heretofore, have been wont to believe, "That God hath made of one blood, all nations of the earth, and hath determined the bounds of their habitation:" And many of us, to this day, think the natives who were the first discoverers, and had the right of prime occupancy, un­less they have sold the same, or that it has been justly con­quered, are still vested with the right of soil; and that a patent from the Crown will not justly give us a right to drive them from their habitations. I well know it is said, here was vacant territory of which they stood in no need: bu [...] as they lived by fishing, fowling, and hunting, and not fur­nished with the best conveniencies of taking game, they only are the proper judges of the extent of territory neces­sary for grazing. By the same rule of reasoning, the Ame­ricans may say, that Britons are chiefly manufacturers, and ought to be cooped up within narrower limits; and may as justly seize on their parks and open fields, and [...] them thereof, as to dispessess the Sa [...]ems of America of their hunting ground, and knock their brains out it they [...] to quit the soil—which people, at least man of them, [...] as just notions of right and wrong. as the [...] [Page 42] pean Princes. If this reasoning is just, (and at least it ap­pear [...] so to me) no state has a right to one foot of lands, be­yond what was purchased or conquered by the Crown ante­cedent to the cession,—and that cession means no more than ceding to the states the right of pre-emption from the natives [...]s it is termed) to the exclusion of British sub­jects. Whether that cession is made to the Thirteen States as joint tenants, or to Congress to hold the same in trust for the confederate states, as I have not seen the Definitive T [...]ary, I cannot say,—or whether Congress are already vested with power, by the articles of our foederal union, to make a disposition of the same, I shall leave to civilians to judge. But when this author says (fol. 10,) such states as by treaty have gained large extent of territory, "ought ei­ther to make grants to the commonwealth of such tracts of de­sended territory, or sell as much of it as will pay its proper [...] of defence, and pay such sums into the public treasury;" ( [...]f what I have urged on that head has any weight, it is the joint interest of all the states already) to use his own ex­pression is "the grossest absurdity, and at best a ridiculous effort of childish nonsense."

The same may with great justice be said with regard to the forfeited estates of loyalists; the crime of which they were guilty, was not a crime committed against any state sepa­rately, but against all the states included in the confedera­tion; otherwise how we in this state have seized the estates of loyalists belonging to the states of New-York and Boston, and consiseated the same, or by what rule of right it could be done, un [...]ets the crime is considered as a crime committed against the confederation, and not against this state individual­ly, I known not; which forfeitures I could wish might be ap­propriated to repair the losses that individuals have sustanied by the burning of towns on our sea coasts by Britons, and the [...] on our frontiers by their Indian allies. Which [Page 43] thought I humbly submit to the wisdom of Congress, and to the justice and compassion of the several assemblies of the states.

As for those unhappy people termed Loyalists, who have shed the blood of their country, and robbed, plundered and distressed their friends, their estates are but an inconsiderable compensation for their repeated outrages, they never ought to be permitted to reside among us, and I leave them to be punished by their own reflections. But all such as went over to our enemies from principles of the Christian religion believing it unlawful to resist the civil magistrate, and all such as through fear of the power of Britain, and from a consciousness of the inability and unpreparedness of the states to resist, went within their lines, but have neither shed blood, nor aided and assisted the enemy, (of which I make no doubt there are many) I could wish (I write it openly and freely) that their property may be restored, and their persons protected; and I think I may be countenanced in this sentiment from a sentence in that form of prayer prescribed by the Saviour of the world, which from the phraseology, it appears to have been the design of the Di­vine Author, that daily use should be made of it by all his followers.