WE shall first explain the doctrine of human li­berty in the sense in which we maintain it. Se­condly, Make a few cursory observations on Mr. Edwards's scheme of liberty.

Power, motion and agency are terms of various signifi­cation. The two first are frequently used in mechanics, and all of them may be applied to animal creatures. "Power may reside in a subject that is no agent; as in the case of physical or natural powers."

When we speak of the motions and revolutions of in­animate bodies, it may amount to the same thing at last, whether we attribute these to an established original law of nature, or to the constant agency of the Deity upon matter. The course of nature is the constitution of the author of nature. It is demonstrably not so fixed as to preclude special divine interposition, whereby the opera­tion of second causes is suspended or counteracted. We cannot, indeed, determine how far this is the case. Many events may be brought about (at least in part) by second causes, which we may imagine belong to the head of spe­cial interpositions, over-ruling those causes. 'Tis difficult to ascertain the powers of nature, as well as those of moral agents.

There is a sense in which there is no power but of God. And if any chuse to say, that natural causes (so called) are really no cause at all; that God actuates all the powers of nature, and that from his energy every effect in the natural world proceeds, we have no objection to make. We only desire it may be remembered, that mechanic powers, the motions of inanimate bodies, bear no resemblance to, and give us no idea of, the powers of moral and accountable [Page 10] creatures. Shou'd one undertake to illustrate conscious­ness by the vibrations of a pendulum, it would not be more ridiculous than a pretence to explain the powers of human nature by the motions of the planets, the growth of vegetables, &c. These are so far from being any exem­plification of moral agency, that they bear no likeness even to animal motion. For this is voluntary. And we pre­sume it will not be said that voluntary motion is predi­cable of inanimate things—not even by those philosophers who have resembled the powers of moral nature to those of material bodies.

Nor will the consideration of animal motion and agency, any more than the motions of inanimate bodies, afford us any proper illustration of moral agency. Voluntary mo­tion and exertion is indeed common to moral agents and the lower animals. These have natural power, forecaste, memory, can move this way or that as they please, or ac­cording to the determination of their will. They are agents— voluntary agents—'Tis apparent they "act electively"— from design—to certain ends. They are capable of being taught many things. From the sagacity some of them discover, many have conjectur'd that they have an immor­tal spirit, and are accountable. This, we apprehend, is going too far, and find Mr. Edwards concurs with us. ^* Whatever gradations there are in the creation, mankind appear to be the lowest order of intelligent moral agents. The appearances of reason in many of the brute creatures are easily accounted for without supposing them possess'd of a moral faculty—in much the same manner as we ac­count for many instances of the conduct of ideots, who never had the exercise of this faculty; of madmen, who have lost it; and of children before they arrive to the exercise of it. What they see and experience from day to day affords them instruction, and influenceth their conduct, without their having any perception of good and evil in a moral view. The same holds, in a degree, in the inferior creatures. The ox knoweth his own­er, and the ass his master's crib. And those animals, who have no guide, overseer or ruler, give proofs of sagacity and forecaste, the consideration of which wou'd be of [Page 11] use to many who have reason for their guide. The ani­mal creatures are also the subjects of certain internal dis­positions and affections. They have a common care and tenderness for their young. Some of the feebler sort as­sociate for the double purpose of protection and com­mon usefulness. Some kinds of them are of a fierce, ve­nomous, or ravenous disposition; others are mild, gentle and harmless. "Spontaneous voluntary exertion" belongs to every species of them. But though spontaneous ani­mal motion may approach the nearest to moral agency, of any thing in visible nature; yet it is essentially diffe­rent thereform, nor doth it give us any proper idea there­of. A just notion of moral agency we can derive only from attending to the nature and operations of the hu­man mind—not from a contemplation of inanimate or ani­mate nature. The inspiration of the Almighty hath given us understanding. I will praise thee; for I am fearfully and wonderfully made; marvellous are thy works, and that my soul knoweth right well. God created man in his own image.

It seems, notwithstanding, that some gentlemen need to be inform'd, that man hath a distinctive power from animals. We scruple not to risque the whole controversy on their being able to point out a difference, still retaining their own principles.

Hard is our task to be obliged to explain the difference between a man and a brute in regard of liberty and self-determination. Such minds as acknowledge no difference, we fear cannot be convinc'd. In regard to truths we are immediately conscious of, every medium of proof, all rea­soning, not only seems needless, but rather serves to ob­scure than elucidate what is proposed to be proved. As tho' by removing the object to a greater distance, we wou'd obtain a more distinct and full view of it.

The distinctive faculty of moral agents we before en­deavoured to state and explain—and we think it was shewn, that moral liberty really differs from animal, and that, "in finite beings placed upon trial, it implies an opportu­nity and capacity of chusing and acting otherwise than they in fact do." ^* Further to illustrate and confirm the [Page 12] same thing, we desire the capacity moral agents have of examining and considering before they make their choice, or proceed to act, in any given case, may be well attended to. They can determine to consider the reasonableness or unreasonableness of any proposed object of choice—whe­ther it be consistent with, or contrary to, their duty—whe­ther it be for their interest upon the whole—and conse­quently, whether it is the part of wisdom to chuse or re­fuse it. They have this power in regard to speculative prin­ciples, as well as with respect to life and conduct. They can examine the nature and evidence of what is proposed to 'm for truth, and embrace or reject it as it shall appear to be true or false upon diligent and impartial en­quiry; or give it that weight which its greater or less im­portance shall demand. Error in principle is one great source of men's practical deviations from the paths of righteousness. Hence it is, not infrequently, that they justify and boast themselves in a way that is not good, im­agining they are doing God service, when in reality they are fighting against him. Now so far as men judge wrong, and in consequence thereof act wrong, thro' their own care­lessness, or neglect, or through partiality in their enquiries af­ter truth; so far they are criminal, and chargeable with all the practical consequences of their wrong judgment. If the mistakes of mankind on practical subjects are search­ed to the bottom, the probability is, that the greater part of such mistakes will be found to proceed from that cause our Lord mentions, Every one that doeth evil, hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, lost his deeds shou'd be re­proved. And this is their condemnation. For what hath that man to plead, who receives not the love of the truth, because he hath pleasure in unrighteousness? From whatever cause men refuse to examine the foundation and reasona­bleness of those religious principles they profess to main­tain, or reject; whether it be from education, interest, or partial affection; they are criminal, and must answer it to him who has given them a capacity to discern the diffe­rence between right and wrong, good and evil—who has granted them the necessary means of knowledge, and re­quires that they prove all things; and hold fast that which [Page 13] is good—that they judge even of themselves what is right. Had that rule, which some have laid down to themselves and others, "first determine and then examine," been univer­sally adopted, knowledge cou'd never have increased— ignorance, superstition and barbarism must have over­spread the earth.

Then in matters which more immediately respect the heart and life, moral agents have the same power of ex­amining and attending to what is laid before them. Most of their vicious elections and pursuits probably proceed from want of attention and consideration. They have a power of reflecting—of acquainting themselves which is the wise choice and course. But they do not stop and consider what is before them—what choice they are about to make—what will be the consequence in this world or another. Their conclusions are precipitate, and they proceed to action as the horse rusheth into the battle. What strikes their external senses, and promises a present gratification to their particular affections, lusts or passions, is wont to be greedily embrac'd and pursued—what re­quires some self-denial and mortification of these is quick­ly rejected, before that faculty, which is naturally supream, and was given to direct and controul the bodily appetites, instincts and passions, can pass judgment in the case. Wrong apprehensions, wrong affections and conduct, pro­ceeding in so many instances as they manifestly do from the neglect of reason and reflection, shew of what vast im­portance it is that moral agents set down and consider be­fore they pass judgment, or make their election, and de­termine what course to take, in things that concern them. Experience concurs with the sacred oracles in attesting, that the want of attention and examination is a principal source of the fatal mistakes and miscarriages of mankind: And how cou'd it be expected it shou'd be otherwise, when the regulating faculty of our nature, instead of being im­prov'd in the search of truth and duty, is used, if at all, as a servant to the sensitive appetites? This is a like contra­diction in morals as it is in civil life to see servants on hor­ses, and princes walking like servants on the earth—or as if the feet should usurp the place of the head in the natural body.

[Page 14]When in any given case it is dubious what course is our duty to take, or wou'd be most prudent all things con­sidered, by deliberating on the matter we may come to be clearly satisfied; whereas if we proceed immediately to action, we are liable to err fatally—and shou'd it be other­wise, we can't have the pleasure of knowing that we are right—'tis accidental that we are so—we merit no com­mendation, but rather deserve blame for runing the hazard of being in the wrong, when we might have obtained full conviction had we been at the pains, and given ourselves time, to reflect a few moments.

Or suppose the sense of duty is sufficiently clear, but we are beset by numerous and powerful temptations, have we not power to make a pause? By this means, we may ob­tain such a view of the particular evil to which we are en­ticed, such considerations may be suggested to our minds, as that a present temptation, however strong, shall not pre­vail, but gradually loose strength and be overcome. Will you say that men in this case have not power to forbear immediate action? to reflect a moment? Doubtless they have power to determine immediately with themselves to consider the matter. Especially must they be admitted to have this power, if we take into the account the operations of divine grace on their hearts. In this way many good tho'ts are often injected in the moment of danger. May they not be cherish'd, and made our own? By reflections on the nature of virtue and vice; their rewards and pun­ishments present and future; the past peaceable and hap­py fruits of the one; and contrary effects of the other, in our own experience, or observation of others; by re­flections on the moral perfections and government of God; the person and offices of Jesus Christ, and calling to mind other considerations suggested by the oracles of truth, the force of a present temptation may be speedily weakned thro' the influences of grace suggesting and concuring with such moral considerations. While the force of conscience is abated by stifling it's remonstrances, and hearkning to the sollicitations of lust and appetite in opposition there­to; it's sensibility is, on the contrary, proportionably in­creased by reflection and attention. Now to say that those [Page 15] who live very much without moral reflection and attenti­on; therefore cannot determine otherwise with themselves, is implicitly to deny that they have the faculty of reason. They can deliberate on the means and opportunities of gratifying their lusts. What good reason can be offer'd to shew they have not power to turn their meditations in­to another channel?

But as it is an important duty of moral agents to ac­custom themselves to diligent enquiry and mature conside­ration, that they may know what they ought to chuse and pursue, and what to refuse and avoid, and not act as the horse and mule who have no understanding—so it shou'd not be forgotten, that they sometimes deliberate with a very different and opposite view—not to discover their duty where it is doubtful, but to explain it away where it is plain. In cases where an uprignt mind can be at no loss, but makes immediate choice, a dishonest heart will hesitate, and, under a notion of deliberating in order to discover what may or ought to be done, contriveth ex­cuses for the violation of a clear command. Sometimes great and scandalous vices are refined upon till they are tho't to be no vices; perhaps are transformed into vir­tues. Well were it if some men were as dexterous and ingenious, in calling to mind arguments to their duty as they are in finding out reasons against it, and means of darkning and perplexing the sense of it—as they are in the palliations and excuses they contrive for their sins, and in what they offer in justification of themselves. They had rather sin with their eyes shut than with them open. Hence they take abundant pains to obscure the sense and mean­ing of the plainest commands, that they may possess the hope of religion, while they walk according to the course of this world. A single example will set this matter in a strong light. Balaam, we read, loved the wages of unrigh­teousness, while he hoped to die the death of the righ­teous. Hence he wou'd not go in direct contradiction to his duty in order to obtain Balak's reward, but set himself to reconcile his duty with his views of worldly gain and preferment. After God had plainly told him once, that he should not curse Israel, it was enough—he shou'd have enquired no further, Yet after this he held [Page 16] one consultation and another with Balak's messengers, and enquires of God again and again concerning the matter whereof he had already been fully certified. Not succeed­ing according to his mind, though he persisted in his reso­lution not to curse Israel without an explicit divine per­mission, yet he proceeded to counsel Balak to lay a stumbling block before them, which prov'd their destruction. In this way he pacified his conscience, while he as effectually broke over the divine instructions as if he had cursed Israel in the name of God. In many (perhaps most) cases men's duty is plain at the first proposal. It is difficult to mistake it. In such cases, deliberation is but a subterfuge to break o­ver the obligation of it. Hence it is that men affect to doubt in the plainest matters, i. e. the most important. By indirect means, they evade the sense of moral and reli­gious obligation, and keep all quiet within, while they do those things in effect, which they wou'd start back at the thought of doing in a direct manner. Had they made their choice and acted according to the first appearance of things, they wou'd have chosen the good and right way: But some favourite hypothesis must be maintain'd, some lust or passion gratified, at all events; and hence it is that they labour to reconcile things contrary, as light and dark­ness, righteousness and unrighteousness. 'Tis hard to give up the hopes of religion, but harder to sacrifice their worldly views.

Some (and these men of fine parts) have gone further, and prostituted their superior talents in embellishing vice, and attempting to take off from it it's just odium; em­ploying their powers in the cause of infidelity, saping the foundation of every religious principle, and consequently of all virtue. As though the gift of reason were bestow­ed on us to subserve the gratification of the appetites and passions—that we might make ourselves more vile than the beasts that perish—might sin with more delicacy and malignity indeed, but with no remorse. We cou'd wish there were not so great a similarity between the writings of some authors of this stamp, and Mr. Edwards's book on the will.

That attention and examination, which, as moral agents, [Page 17] we are capable of, and is our bounden duty, is of such evident importance that to the neglect of it are attribut­ed in scripture most of the sins and miseries of men. My people will not consider. O that they were wise, that they—would consider! Consideration is represented as necessary to, and a likely means of, the reformation of sinners. And the exhortation to consider our ways is in effect the same as that, amend your ways. This capacity of consider­ing and judging, of distinguishing virtue and vice, "and their fruits in the present life, which are the proper sam­ples of" their consequences in another, is an important distinction of mankind from the animal creatures, and shews that the former determine themselves in a sense which the latter do not. Especially when we further consider, that "shou'd reason neglect it's post, consci­ence is appointed as an instinctive kind of monitor, perpe­tually to remind us both of our interest and our duty." The animal creatures act as impelled by instinct and ap­petite. They have not a power of deliberating, reason­ing, reflecting—they wait only for an opportunity of acti­on, without being able to consider the consequences. And when moral agents act without consideration, they forget the distinction put on their nature, and haste as a bird to the snare, not knowing it is for their life.

By suspending judgment, election and action, new rea­sons often arise to the mind—many times diverse from, and opposite to, those first extant in it, and an overmatch for them. This observation may be applied to matters of speculation and practice, ^* and to that two-fold design mo­ral agents have in deliberating and suspending, of which we have been speaking, viz. either to discover the truth and their moral obligations, that they may the better ful­fil their duty—or to get confirmed in error, to darken the sense of moral right, and find means to justify or excuse themselves in their various vicious pursuits. By suspend­ing [Page 18] and reflecting with the former view, a full persuasion may be begotten in the mind that that is truth, which be­fore was supposed to be falshood or error—that which was doubtful may be clear'd up—the path of duty may become plain—new arguments in support of truths before receiv­ed may be suggested—new inducements to profess and live according to them. To which may be added, that the spirit of truth and holiness is ever ready to direct and suc­ceed the enquiries of those who have probity of mind; to suggest to them the most convincing reasons for the truth, the most powerful motives to duty, and to operate there­with. None of the wicked shall understand, but the wise shall understand.

On the contrary, those who suspend and deliberate from the latter view mentioned above, justly expose them­selves to be given over to strong delusions; their foolish heart becomes darkned, and hardened through the deceit­fulness of sin. They become an easy prey to the god of this world, who is permitted to blind their eyes, so that the arguments and motives of reason and religion have little or no weight with them.

Much the same may be said of those, whose lusts and passions precipitate their moral judgment, as of the more deliberate workers of wickedness who take much pains to darken and bribe it. They alike expose themselves to be delivered over to the will and power of the deceiver of the nations, the enemy of all righteousness.

But it is objected, that suspending implies, the mind hath already made its choice; that is, it hath chosen to deliberate and examine—that the difficulty, therefore, still returns, and the cause of this determination to suspend re­mains to be pointed out.

To this we answer, that a moral agent either hath pow­er to originate an act of suspension, and so bring himself into the view of new motives; or the suspending act pro­ceeds from a motive extant in his mind at the same in­stant with some motive to immediate election or action. The former will not be allowed, as it would be at once to admit self-determination. And on the latter suppositi­on, the motive to suspend, must be previous to the act of [Page 19] suspension, else it cannot be the cause of that act—cannot move or excite to it. There must be the exertion of the cause before the effect can take place. But if the mo­tive to suspend be previous to the act of supension, then the other motive to immediate election and action must determine the will till the motive to suspend has produc­ed its effect: That is, the agent is determined, his choice is made, before he determines to suspend; the act of sus­pension is an after act. In other words, there is, proper­ly speaking, no suspension at all. Or viewing the mat­ter in the most favourable light, it will stand thus: A moral agent cannot be the source of suspension in himself. No motive ab extra to suspend being extant in his mind, he must immediately make his choice. To say he had a power of awakening in himself a motive to suspend, or of negativing a present motive to action, would be to as­sert self-determination; or to say, that the act of suspen­sion had already taken place, which, by supposition, can be only in consequence of some previous motive. There was, then, a temptation exhibited to the mind of Lucifer, while a son of the morning, to rise up in rebellion against the Most High. It had positive influence to excite and move him to this thing. He had no intrinsic power to negative it, or to suspend election, or view the temptation in any other light than he in fact did. It necessarily de­termined him. Upon his revolt, he was an instrument in suggesting a similar temptation to our progenitors in pa­radise—which they could view no otherwise than they did— their choice was determined in the same way. Thus sin and misery came into the world. Here is the true source of all the wickedness of men and devils. Can it be de­fended on the maxims of reason, experience or religion? Is it not wholly forgotten, that moral agents have the faculty of reason, the power of reflection? Let this single question be decided, Whether vicious beings derive the state of their wills from the author of their frame? and the whole dispute will be determined accordingly. The affirmative makes God the cause and fountain of wicked­ness; the negative makes moral agents themselves the [Page 20] cause. Let reason and religion say, which opinion is to be prefered.

There can, strictly speaking, be no motive to the choice and determination of a rational creature, but such as com­ports with the dignity of his nature, conscience being al­ways considered as supreme. Hence motives of interest, honor, pleasure, are motives to pursue what is, upon the whole, beneficial, honorable, pleasurable—not what may casually gratify the lower affections and appetites, in op­position to reason, to the true interest, dignity and enjoy­ment of a moral and accountable creature. To say, that such a creature, in case of a competition of objects, cannot stop and consider which reason directs to, and govern him­self accordingly, is either to deny him the power of reflec­tion, or to suppose him given over to a reprobate mind. When the animal propensities and the dictates of reason are at variance, (as they often are) may not the former be negatived? And is it not somewhat of a solecism to say, a rational creature can have a motive to act unreasonably? In a loose way of speaking, we are indeed wont to say, that the covetous, ambitious and voluptuous have motives to the pursuit of unjust gain, unlawful pleasure, and to make their way to preferment by dishonorable means. But it may be worthy of consideration, whether, in strict propriety, a motive to such a choice and pursuit, as con­tradicts the leading and distinguishing principle of our na­ture, really deserves to be called a motive to such a being as man? Be this as it will, we evidently have a power of deliberating, reflecting, or suspending—of considering what is before us—Moral agents ‘have a capacity of being in­fluenced in their actions by moral inducements and mo­tives, exhibited to the view of understanding and reason, to engage to a conduct agreable to the moral faculty.’ This capacity in moral agents, admitted and maintain'd by Mr. Edwards, is a demonstrable proof of self-determination, as it implies the power of suspending, which we have been arguing for. A power of suspending election and action is plainly a power of determining whether we will be go­verned by reason and the principles of religion, or not. [Page 21] And can this power be allowed to moral agents consis­tently with the denial of self-determination? ^*

While the agency of the animal creatures is as necessary as the rotation of the earth and revolutions of the planets, the cause of moral volitions is in the mind itself which is the subject of them, as will appear, we apprehend, from a little attention to the moral faculty of understanding. This regulating power of moral agents ideots and madmen have not, and therefore are not moral agents any more than brutes. And though, as was said before, the motions of inanimate bodies or of animals are not similar to moral agency; yet were the dictate of the moral faculty follow­ed without deviation, mankind would as regularly fill up their place in the creation, as the lower animals do theirs —as regularly as the seasons revolve, or the heavenly bo­dies move. There would be as great harmony in moral nature as appears in the other works of God.

Superior intelligences, in other worlds, we may suppose, are as regular to the duties of their station, and fulfil the pleasure of the Creator with a like punctuality and con­stancy, as the luminaries of heaven shine. That men on earth do not, in their measure, fulfil his will as it is done by higher orders of beings in heaven, is their sin; as they have the same general faculty to direct and govern 'em, how much soever the inhabitants of the world above may excel in intellectual strength. Were there not a proper cause in the mind, the exercises and actions of mankind wou'd uniformly be such as the order of our nature points out. And the supposition of the fall of angels or men wou'd be as wild, as the supposition of the everlasting mountains moving out of their place, or the interruption of the harmony of the spheres. At least it wou'd be view­ed [Page 22] in no other light than any alteration in the material world, or suspension of the laws of nature. The latter might as well be judged criminal and morally evil as the former. If the cause of the exercises and actions of moral agents be not in themselves, then the Deity is the proper efficient cause of them. Now we see that all his operati­ons, all the effects of his agency in the material world and animal nature, are uniform and harmonious—the same from age to age. If the moral exercises and conduct of rational accountable beings proceed from the efficiency of the same cause, from the same lover of order and harmony, why then are they so irregular and out of course? This single consideration is enough to satisfy us, that the mind of a moral agent is the true cause of his own election, and actions. ^*

The author of our beings is the proper cause of our moral capacity—the father of our spirits. This capacity the effect of his inspiration, is the proper cause of voliti­on. It may be well improved, or neglected and perverted. There are created beings who have improved it well, as there are who have perverted it. The latter might have made the same use of it as the former, and herein wou'd have fallen in with the design of the creator, and been workers together with God for his glory and their own felicity and honour. Therefore the perversion of this capacity is not to be attributed to God as the cause: For God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man. In their innocent state, men and angels were capable of attending to the calm dictates of reason—of perceiving clearly the [Page 23] superiority of this principle to the instincts and appetites of animal nature. There was nothing "in their wills" that cou'd indispose them to attend to the voice of reason. God made them upright—designed they shou'd continue so, and gave them power to abide in their first state—in the knowledge, love and enjoyment of himself. And how­ever this depended on continu'd divine communications, these wou'd not have been withdrawn till the creature had first abused and forfeited them—as is proposed to be shewn in the sequel. The ablest philosophers and divines have maintain'd, that God originally endow'd mankind with freedom of will—that from the abuse of this "freedom all misery and sin, all natural and moral evils, derive their existence—it being more eligible that" man "shou'd be" created "a free agent, than a mere machine." ^*

It may be difficult exactly to determine what the powers of human nature now are, or what they were in Adam in his innocent state. We may yet safely assert, that his duty did not exceed his abilities as he came out of the forming hands of God. To say it did, wou'd be impeaching the maker and governor or the world with the injustice which the servant in the parable complain'd of, Thou art an hard master, reaping where thou hast not sown. And shall we presume to say of him who is righteous altogether, that he [Page 24] demanded improvement beyond the number of talents gi­ven? If not, then the fall of man was not owing to any want of power to continue upright, but to his abuse of original ability. His dependance on divine influence for the preservation of his moral rectitude, as well as of his existence, proveth nothing to the contrary, if it be true, that that influence wou'd not have been withheld, had not man, by some act of rebellion, incur'd the forfeiture of it. For we pretend not that any creature ever had an inde­pendent power, either for the purposes of life or godliness. But the creature may neglect or abuse what he hath re­ceived; and in consequence of that, what he hath may be taken away. Man, therefore, had at first such powers and communications from God as were sufficient to his con­tinuing and improving in the knowledge, in the moral re­semblance and enjoyment of his maker. His original sin appears to have been a neglect of reason and hasty listning to the sollicitations of appetite. In all probability it was a very sudden act. By this he forfeited the presence and grace of God; whereof he was immediately convinc'd, and fear'd to appear before that glorious being whose displea­sure he had incurred, and with whom his correspondence before was most intimate. But upon the exhibition of a savior to him, under the character of the seed of the woman, his hopes revived. With the delivery of this original promise to him, he was put under a capacity of recovering by repentance and faith in the seed promised what he had lost by hearkning to the tempter. In this promise life and blessing were again set before him, and his offended creator said to him, Chuse life. Whatever power was lost, what­ever inability incur'd, by the first apostacy, in regeneration, a similar power is restor'd as man in innocency had—not indeed a power of living wholly without sin; but a gene­ral habit of holiness; such exercises and dispositions of heart as conform the creature to the creator, and which in scripture are signified by being renewed after the image of God—renewed in the spirit of our minds—sanctified in Christ Jesus—being new creatures, &c. Out of a regard to the me­diator, great and precious promises are made to the apos­tate sons of men-particularly the promise of the aids of the [Page 25] spirit, through which alone any are renewed in know­ledge, and become partakers of God's holiness. Repen­tance and faith in Christ hold the same place in the re­ligion of a fallen creature, as unsining obedience did in that of our progenitors while they remained upright. By the gospel God calleth upon all men every where to repent, and believe in his son for reconciliation and salva­tion. He also gives his spirit with his gospel, of which unregenerate men receive a measure. And to him that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance. We do not ascribe any self-derived, independent power, ei­ther to unregenerate or regenerate men; but such only as they have received from God, of which they are not, strictly speaking, the proprietors, but stewards. The lat­ter are faithful stewards of the gifts and grace of God; the former are unfaithful, and waste his goods. And what­ever impotency is derived to us from the human apostacy, 'tis sufficient that in regeneration such power is restor'd as is equal to the purposes of salvation—that as men have re­ceived grace, so God is ever ready to support them in duty, while they acknowledge their dependance, and draw nigh to him. For every one that asketh, receiveth; and he that seeketh, findeth.

The things that have been offered are sufficient to prove, that moral volitions proceed from a cause in moral agents themselves, and to explain in what sense we main­tain this. They serve further to illustrate and establish our doctrine of human liberty. ^* The remaining part of [Page 26] this section will be taken up in shewing, that Mr. Edwards, though he admits animal and external liberty, denies mo­ral, [Page 27] and in a few cursory observations on this part of his scheme.

[Page 28]He defines liberty thus: ‘Liberty is power, opportu­nity or advantage that any one has to do as he pleaseth. If he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is fully and perfectly free.’ Whence it is manifest, that Mr. Ed­wards had no other notion of liberty than what respects external action or conduct. ^* The pleasure of the mind, and acting or conducting according to it, are entirely dif­ferent. The act of volition or choice is a different thing from the pursuit or execution of what is willed or chosen. And if liberty consists in the latter only, it cannot be at all re­quisite to moral agency and accountableness. There may be a willing or an unwilling mind when there is not "pow­er, opportunity or advantage for one to do as he pleas­eth." And moral agents, it is conceded, may be worthy of praise or blame in cases where they cannot execute their wills, by reason of external impediment or restraint—and in cases where they are compelled to act contrary to their wills. And where natural necessity doth not take place, it is con­ceded, that virtue or vice consists not in the external doing or forbearing, but in the state and disposition of the mind or will. Now as, on Mr. Edwards's principles, the whole of liberty consists in a "power or opportunity to do as one pleaseth—to pursue and execute his will;" it clearly follows, that liberty, according to his definition of it, is not essential to virtue or vice, praise or blame, Yet he affirms it is necessary and essential hereto.

Mr. Edwards's reasoning on this point, reduced to pro­per form, will stand thus: Liberty is essential to praise or blame. Liberty consists in a man's pursuing and exe­cuting his will. Ergo, If he he cannot execute his will, [Page 29] he cannot be worthy of praise or blame. Would Mr. Ed­wards abide by this consequence? If not, let any one res­cue his doctrine from it.

In truth, whether moral agents shall execute their wills depends not on themselves. Their natural liberty may be abridged of taken away, and yet their freedom as ac­countable creatures remain. If then liberty be really ne­cessary to praise of blame, it must consist in a power either to chuse or refuse that wherein virtue and vice consist. And consequently the will itself, its state, volitions or acts, must be determined by moral agents themselves—at least in some instances, and within a certain measure. There is no occasion to add any thing further to what we before wrote on this point, Examination part I. sect. 3. and part III. sect. 1.

But admitting Mr. Edwards maintained internal free­dom: We ask, of what sort? moral freedom, or only ani­mal? The latter may be called natural liberty, as well as the freedom of the executive powers be so denominated. But it is not essential to praise or blame. Ideots, lunatics and brutes have this liberty, but are not therefore moral agents. Virtue or vice, reward or punishment depend not on the having this liberty. Yet Mr. Edwards admits no other. If he means any thing by the freedom of the soul as a moral agent, it is this, that moral agents are so framed, have such dispositions con-created with them, or infufed into them by the author of their beings, that they exercise freely what is created with or infused into them, and can do no otherwise. The state and bias of the mind, the par­ticular bent of their wills, by which all their pursuits are determined, is fixed by necessity. As suppose one hath a propensity to intemperance; another to uncleanness, a third to theft, a fourth to covetousness and extortion, a fifth to pride, malice or revenge, &c. in exercising, pursuing or executing these different passions they are respectively free, they act as they please, or according to their will; but have no hand in the formation of these various propensities. ‘Let them come by their’ several inclinations and propen­sities ‘ how they will, yet if they are able, and there is no­thing in the way to hinder their pursuing and executing [Page 30] them, they are fully and perfectly free.’ ^† So are the dif­ferent species of animals, who pursue and execute their pe­culiar propensities—who follow nature—that is the instincts and dispositions implanted in them by the author of nature. We may venture to challenge any man to point out the least material difference between animal and moral agency on Mr. Edwards's scheme of liberty.

There is a near resemblance between his sentiments on this point, and those of a late writer. ^*

‘Our actions proceed from our wills, but our wills must be derived from the natural dispositions implanted in us by the author of our being: Wrong elections proceed from wrong apprehensions, or unruly passions; and these from our original frame or accidental education. These must deter­mine all our actions, for we have no power to act dif­ferently, these previous circumstances continuing exact­ly the same. Had God tho't proper to have made all men with the same heads, and the same hearts, which he has given to the most virtuous of the species; they would all have excelled in the same virtues; Or had the bias implanted in human nature drawn as strongly towards the good side, as it now apparently does towards the bad, it would have operated as successfully, and with as little infringment on human liberty. Men, as well as all o­ther animals, are exactly fitted for the purposes they are de­signed for; and have inclinations and dispositions given them accordingly. He who implanted patience in the lamb, obedience in the horse, fidelity in the dog, and innocen­ce in the dove, might as easily have inspired the breast of man with these and all other virtues; and then his actions would certainly have corresponded with his for­mation. Therefore, in the strict philosophical sense, we have certainly no free-will; that is, none independent of our frame; our natures, and the author of them.’ ^‡

Other things belonging to the general subject of this section we intended to have added; but as they will na­turally enough fall under the next branch of our design, we will relieve the reader's patience for the present.

THE near relation this part of our subject hath to the preceeding naturally leads us to such observations as may be explanatory of the things already offered, and strengthen their evidence: While what hath been said may answer the same purpose with respect to what we shall now offer on the relation motives have to the voliti­ons of moral agents.

The whole dispute turns on the decision of this question, Whether moral agents have a principle of efficiency in them­selves? In what follows, we shall endeavor further to sup­port the affirmative.

By motives we mean external reasons or inducements exhibited to the view of a moral agent. Mr. Edwards, in a more general way, intends (as we suppose) an extrinsic moral cause, by the term motive. ^*

He affirms motives to be moral causes, by way of dis­tinction [Page 32] from natural causes; and, according to his rea­soning, they produce their effects in the same way—that is, through the divine energy. Moral effects necessarily fol­low the efficiency of their cause—moral causes are as absolute as natural. (P. 103; 261, &c.)

It might be abundantly shewn that Mr. Edwards as­cribes efficiency to motives, from his whole book; and more especially from Part II. Sect. 10. But we shall only quote the following from p. 134, 135. in confirmation hereof. ‘If motives excite volition, then they are the CAUSE of it's being excited—To excite, is positively to do something; and certainly that which does something, is the CAUSE of the thing done by it. To create, is to cause to be created; to make, is to cause to be made— to quicken, is to cause to be quickened; and to excite, is to cause to be excited. To excite, is to be a cause in the most proper sense, not meerly a negative occasion, but a ground of existence by positive influence. The notion of exciting, is exerting influence to cause the effect to arise or come forth into existence—The production of an effect is certainly the causing of an effect; and produc­tive influence is causal influence, if any thing is; and that which has this influence prevalently, so as thereby to become the ground of another thing, is a cause of that thing, if there be any such thing as a cause.’ Those who are still disposed to question whether Mr. Edwards ascribes causality or efficiency to motives may call to mind the story he tells of the animal in Terra del Fuego. (p. 282.)

However, we see not what advantage can accrue to Mr. Edwards's scheme, or what injury to our own, should it be granted, that upon his plan motives are not, in a strict sense, the cause of moral volitions. For if so, what was he about when he wrote his book? Was it not his decla­red design to point out the cause of volition? Doth he not labour abundantly to prove, that this cause must ever­more be that motive, which, in the view of the agent, is highest? If by this moral cause, as he speaks, nothing more be meant than the occasion of volition, not the cause in a strict and proper sense, how has he then answered the question proposed, viz. "What determines the will? To [Page 33] say that motive is the occasion of the will's determination; is nothing to the purpose. We want to be directed to the efficient. This enquiry is of no less importance than it is to know the proper cause of every moral event. It Mr. Edwards did not suppose motives to be efficient causes, volition can have no such cause at all on his scheme.—In other words, there could be no such effect as a moral vo­lition. For a moral effect cannot exist without a cause any more than a natural effect: And Mr. Edwards denieth that the subject of such volition, can be the efficient or producer of it, So that to deny motives efficiency to pro­duce volition, is, upon his principles, to say, that all moral events are without a cause—rather, that there are no such events existing.

Should it be said, that creatures to whom moral agency belongs are the proper efficients of their own volitions, this would be directly to admit our doctrine—to assert a self-determining power, and make this the foundation of praise and blame, rewards and punishments. Should it be said that the first cause is the proper efficient of every mo­ral volition, this would rather increase than relieve the dif­ficulty. For it equally militates with Mr. Edwards's scheme to suppose a self-determining power in the creator, as in the creature. And then to ascribe the sinful voliti­ons of creatures to divine efficiency, is to affirm that God is the proper cause and author of wickedness. In every view Mr. Edwards's scheme is strangely embarrassed. It is conceded, that every moral volition hath an efficient cause. And is it a trivial point whether this cause be sup­posed to be in the subject of such volition, or extrinsic to him?

As, on Mr. Edwards's principles, the efficient cause of the moral volitions of creatures must be either extrinsic motive, or God himself through the intervention of motive, each of these cases shall be distinctly examined: And if neither of them can be maintained, the other opinion must be the truth, that moral agents are the cause of their own volitions.

Now it cannot be that motives are themselves efficient causes. For an efficient must needs be an agent. A mo­ral [Page 34] efficient must be a must agent. ‘Abstract notions (as all reasons and motives are’) are not agents. Or should it be said that moral agency belongs to them, it would no way serve Mr. Edward's cause. For if motives are agents, then they are themselves determined by motive. To be an efficient is to act, and action implies agency. If motives are not agents, then either the subject of a moral volition is also the moral cause of it, or some other agent is that cause. To say some other agent is the cause, is ei­ther to ascribe self-determination to this supposed cause, or to run back the efficient of volition in infinitum.

Mr. Edwards himself saith, that the act of volition is determined always by that in the mind's view of an object, which causeth it to appear most agreable, not by the agre­able appearance itself; for this, in his opinion, is nothing distinct from volition (P. 11, 12.) This matter was par­ticularly considered, Examination, part I. sect. 2. To save the reader (and ourselves also) the trouble of repetition, we beg leave to refer moreover, to the notes p. 91,—95.

If motives are not themselves efficients, let us next en­quire, whether God is the efficient cause of all moral voli­tions in the creatures through the medium of motives. Now in a moral estimation, it makes no difference, whe­ther the Deity be the immediate or mediate cause of sin and moral turpitude. To say he is the efficient in either sense is equally and infinitely reproachful to him. To say, the will necessarily follows the last dictate of the understand­ing—that the understanding follows the appearance of things ^* and that these appearances are all minutely order­ed [Page 35] and disposed by the governor of the world, is ultimately to ascribe all moral evil to his efficiency. But how con­sistently with his moral character? For can it be that the efficient cause of wickedness is not wicked?

Suppose a parent, who had given it in charge to a child, be sure to shun this and the other vice, should yet lay be­fore such child the strongest temptations to the vices cau­tion'd against, would not the child naturally conclude that the parents admonitions are only words of course? that he shou'd not affront, but please his parent, by listning to the enticements of his own proposing? Would not all men lay the blame to the parent for seting invincible temp­tations before a child? Now the supposition that the pa­rent of the world exhibits to the minds of his rational offspring, in an irresistible manner, motives to vice, is re­ally more reproachful, since (by supposition) 'tis through his operation and efficiency with them that vice is produ­ced, as the necessary effect. Doth the father of angels and men (who compared with him are children in understand­ing) seduce them in this manner, taking advantage of their ignorance and weakness, and exert his own influence for their ruin? When Mr. Edwards says, ‘God is the source of all moral ability and agency,’ (p. 42.) doth he mean that he is the source of all moral evil? There is a sense in which this observation is doubtless true. But if a di­vine efficiency in sinful volitions was meant to be com­preheded under it, this is greatly to err.

But if motives are not efficient causes, nor the Deity through the intervention of them, then moral agents themselves are. If the cause of volition be not extrinsic, it must be intrinsic, in the agent himself; which is to say, in other words, that moral agents are self-determined.

By affirming this we mean not, however, to deny the influence of motives in moral volitions. We may admit the operation of motives on moral agents without attribut­ing causality to motives. They are reasons exhibited to us to determine ourselves by; but are not moral causes, as hath been shewn from the nature of them, and from Mr. Edwards's own doctrine on the article of motives.

Still it may be said, If moral agents invariably determine [Page 36] themselves according to the greatest apparent good, this effectually establisheth the doctrine of moral necessity; and, consequently, proves that the highest motive necessi­tates volition, if it be not, strictly speaking, the cause of it.

This matter requires a careful examination. For with­out determing at present, whether a principle of causation in the mind or agent, in distinction from motive, is or is not reconcileable with moral necessity; the admission of this would, doubtless, much weaken the evidence of the point we contend for. It must be allowed, that if the volitions of moral agents always are as the greatest apparent good is, this amounts to a proof of necessity in the philoso­phic sense of the word. Is there, then, such a constant and unfailing connection or coincidence between volition and the greatest apparent good, as is pretended? We are clear in the opinion there is not.

Necessity is uniform and fixed: ^† On the supposition of it, no moral agent can ever chuse or act differently from what he doth. A single instance, therefore, of the before-mentioned coincidence failing, wholly subverts the doctrine of necessity. Now two instances of this kind were produced and insisted on in our examination of Mr. Edwards, viz. the apostacy of angels and mankind, They were under no moral necessity of apostatizing. Mr. Edwards seems to admit their fall might have been prevented. Consequently, liberty may be distinguish'd from moral necessity. We believe no tolera­ble answer can be given to these instances. What hath been already said upon them is sufficient, till something is offered to invalidate or weaken the evidence arising from them. ^‡

Should it be admitted that motives may, in some cases, be exhibited in so strong a light, that the mind in which they are extant could not but make the choice it doth; yet unless this can be shewn to hold true in every instance, the doctrine of necessary determination cannot be support­ed. Admitting, for instance, this irresistible exhibition of motives to take place, with reference to angels and glori­fied spirits in heaven, and in some cases of good men on [Page 37] earth, and vice versa; it will not follow that the same thing must hold true as a general principle in regard to mankind upon trial. It was not fact in reference to a­postate spirits, and mankind in their first state.

We have not pretended to state the degree of moral li­berty, or sphere of its exercise by moral agents. All that we have argued for is this, that accountable creatures either have, or at least originally had, a freedom to chuse differently from what they do. This is no more than the generality of reformed divines have maintained. A liber­ty of indifference we have no where asserted. For though we agree with Dr. Watts and some other writers, who use this term, in the thing they intend by it; yet as we do not entirely approve the manner of expression, so we have ne­ver once used this term to express our sense of liberty.

Mr. Edwards represents those writers who argue for a liberty of indifference, particularly Dr. Watts, as meaning hereby two contrary things, neither of which was their sentiment. He more generally would have it, that they mean perfect indifference, or equilibrium. But he has also intimated by his own use of the word, (p. 9.) that his op­ponents mean, by indifference, something neither agreable nor disagreable, eligible or the contrary. These are two notions of indifference, altogether diverse, and even contrary. (One thing may be far from being absolutely indifferent, while another is preferable.) However, nei­ther of these was the notion of indifference maintain'd by the authors Mr. Edwards opposeth. The sense in which they assert liberty of indifference is precisely this—a freedom in moral agents to chuse otherwise than they do— what was called in the schools, Libertas indifferentiae ad op­posita, ‘a liberty of indifference to chuse one thing, or its opposite.’ Such a sense of liberty is so far from being the peculiar notion of ‘ Pelagians, Semi-Pelagians, Jesuits, Socinians, Arminians, and others’ of the same stamp, as Mr. Edwards injuriously represents, ^* that it has been maintained by the most eminent divines called Calvinists, as we shall be ready to shew should there be occasion. The examples of such a liberty, in the defection of beings made upright, are far from being the only ones that might be [Page 38] adduced—but they are sufficient in the controversy with Mr. Edwards. ^*

Virtuous or vicious elections must proceed upon motive. And we grant that the greatest good really ought to deter­mine moral agents; but that it in fact always doth, even where it is perceived, we deny. Where there is both a real and evident preferableness, there can be no dispute as to the obligations of moral agents. But even where there is a manifest as well as real preference, their election is not always governed hereby. 'Tis too common, indeed, that the passions bias and pervert the moral judgment. Some­times they precipitate this judgment, when a little reflecti­on would have been sufficient to preserve the rectitude of it. Sometimes they blind and corrupt this judgment by re­tarding [Page 39] it, (in the manner observed in the preceeding section) to find out palliations, excuses, or justifying circumstances for vice, that men may indulge their various lusts, and yet be on good terms with their consciences. By such means, the light in men becomes darkness; they call evil good, and good evil; put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter.

Still we think nothing is more evidently false than the opinion, that the affections evermore follow the last prac­tical judgment of the understanding. Perception and vo­lition are as different as sight and taste. Moral agents ma­ny times sin immediately against present light and convicti­on, while they have full in their view the wiser choice. And what is this but to determine themselves contrary to the greatest apparent good? Through the impetuosity of their lusts and passions, they break over the clearest bonds, [Page 40] natural, civil and religious—the force of which they have sometimes a lively sense of even in the article of sining; perceiving the direct tendency of such violations to ruin them in this world and another. So far are they from acting on the view of the greatest apparent good, that they have a present sight of the ruinous consequences of that rash and mad conduct they determine upon.

Every delaying sinner acts against the greatest apparent good, while he promiseth himself a future time of repen­tance, and repenteth not immediately. When such hear the importance and excellency of religion represented in some judicious moral discourse, or see the same exemplifi­ed in real life, they highly approve it in their judgment; they see it to be their wisdom; but their practice is at va­riance with the apparent good—So much at variance, that they are obliged to make ineffectual promises of becoming wise soon, and are much dissatisfied with themselves that they have not been long ago. The situation of many great sinners on a sick bed, in the apprehension of death, is wont to alarm others of a like character. They see the right and good way; but persist in their sins against their evident interest.

Different considerations are adapted to influence diffe­rent persons, who have diverse apprehensions of interest, according to the diversity of their temper and talents, education and circumstances. But to confound all dis­tinction between motives and moral habits, as Mr. Ed­wards doth, is to blend things that differ—to contradict reason and himself. For he tells us, volition follows per­ception, is excited by it, and the effect of it—that motives are extrinsic causes. Surely then they are different from volition. And if (as has been shewn) volition is not al­ways as the highest motive; then, when these really meet, it is not necessarily; that is, not in the way Mr. Edwards contends for. One instance failing, the chain is broken. One link, or "10,000, breaks the chain alike."

Motives exhibited to a moral agent may be strong or weak according to the attention given to them. Most presumptuous sins may proceed from sudden passion or inattention. It has been hinted, that Adam's first sin may [Page 41] be accounted for in this way. And if the manner of the mind's viewing an object may be the cause of its chusing or refusing, (as Mr. Edwards observes) we enquire, Whence is it, but from a cause in itself, that the mind views an object as it doth?

On Mr. Edwards's scheme and our own, extrinsic mo­tives are concerned, as they have positive influence, in moral volitions. The difference is, Mr. Edwards (more gene­rally) teacheth, that they are moral causes▪ and that the will and the highest motive necessarily unite. We assert, that moral agents are themselves the efficients of their own volitions, and that there is no such necessary union between volition and the highest motive. The advantage our scheme hath may, perhaps, appear from applying the doc­trine wherein we are agreed with him to a particular case —that of the first sinful volition of the prince of darkness. The motive to this volition was extant in his mind. It had positive influence to excite and move to the volition. His rebellion was the consequence. Was it therefore the greatest apparent good? Had he a principle of action within himself, either to concur with or reject the exhibited motive? If he had, then the cause of this volition was in himself, and our doctrine of self-determination is establish­ed. If he had not, then let it be granted that the motive exhibited was the efficient of the volition. But what ad­vantage will this concession be to Mr. Edwards's cause? It follows from it, either that this efficiency is ultimately to be ascribed to God, and that the energy or causality is ultimately his; (since by his disposing and determining providence such efficacious motive to rebel was presented to the view of an innocent and holy being) or that God himself is properly no moral cause, but subject, as crea­tures are supposed to be, to some extrinsic efficiency and de­termination. And indeed this is the true result of Mr. Edwards's scheme. The divine being is not self-deter­mined—is no proper efficient cause. Fatalists and Atheists will not fail to make improvement on this system. On the subject of moral agency, it is therefore of great impor­tance to keep up a distinction between the influence of motives, and causality or efficiency.

[Page 42]To say that volition springs from itself, is a very diffe­rent thing from saying, that the subject is the cause of it. Dr. Watts did not deny that volition hath a cause, as Mr. Edwards would insinuate; but maintain'd, that an intel­ligent spirit is the cause of it's own volitions.

Upon the whole, it is agreed that moral agency may consist with the want of spontaneous, animal agency, or the liberty of the executive powers. Besides, where there is neither force nor impediment from without, the exertion of our natural powers depends on our being willing to ex­ert them; but whether we are willing, depends not at all on ourselves. For though ‘our actions proceed from our wills,’ yet ‘our wills must be derived from the dispo­sitions implanted in us by the author of our being.’ Such is Mr. Edwards's scheme. Where, then, is liberty! where moral agency! what pre-eminence hath a man a­bove a beast! The lower animals follow the instincts and dispositions implanted in them originally, or in which they are "accidentally educated." They have not a moral faculty, indeed: But if this makes only a constitutional or adventitious difference in their elections and actions, it is a difference no way material; since such accidental diffe­rences make no beings either virtuous or vicious. It seems apparent, that Mr. Edwards has totally excluded liberty from every thing wherein the nature of virtue and vice is properly concerned.

TO make his doctrine of universal necessity consistent with moral agency and accountableness, Mr. Ed­wards insists much on two kinds of necessity; one of which he calls natural; the other, moral. It is needful to exhibit his doctrine, and make a few remarks thereon, that the reader may judge of the merits of this distinction. After which some things will be observed with a view, if possible, to cast a little light on the abstruse subject of ne­cessity, rendered more abstruse than before, by Mr. Ed­ward's refinements and subtilties.

He frequently advertiseth his readers, that when he ap­plieth the term necessity to moral subjects, he useth it "as a term of art"—that when the words necessary, impossible, irresistible, unable, &c. are applied to moral agency, they are ‘either used in some new sense diverse from their o­riginal and proper meaning, or with perfect insignifican­ce and nonsense: For no inability whatsoever, which is meerly moral, is properly called by the name of inabi­lity.’ (P. 21, 22, 232, 287. et passim.) Did not Mr. Edwards then mean by moral necessity any real necessity? Did he use words as "nonsensically" as other metaphysi­cians?

While in common speech no proper necessity at all is meant by the use of the terms moral necessity, ^* Mr. Ed­wards [Page 44] manifestly intends hereby a real necessity, and in his definition of moral necessity includes what properly be­longs to natural—applying to it the following epithets, infallible, unalterable, unfrustrable, unavoidable—and saying (P. 30.) "moral necessity is as absolute as natural." But let us more particularly attend to his own explanation of the distinction between natural and moral necessity.

"By natural necessity, as applied to men, I mean," saith he, ‘such necessity as men are under through the force of natural causes; as distinguished from what are called moral causes, such as habits and dispositions of the heart, and moral motives and inducements. By moral necessity is meant that necessity of connection and consequence, which ariseth from the strength of such moral causes as the strength of inclination, or motives, and the connec­tion which there is in many cases between these, and such certain volitions and actions.’ (P. 29.) To pre­vent any mistake of his meaning, he gives us notice of these three things. First, that moral necessity may be as abso­lute [Page 45] as natural necessity. Secondly, That moral events are owing to the nature of things. Thirdly, that necessi­ty, as applied by him to moral subjects, is not used accor­ding to the original design and meaning of the word.

Here we have occasion to apply Mr. Edwards's own words, P. 287. ‘'Tis very evident, that in the metaphy­sical distinction between’ natural and moral necessity, ‘due care has not been taken to conform language to the nature of things, or to any distinct clear ideas—which has occasioned inexpressible difficulty, contention, error and confusion.’ (P. 279.) ‘Those are a precarious sort of demonstrations, which men build on the mean­ing they arbitrarily affix to a word; especially when that meaning is abstruse, inconsistent, and entirely di­verse from the original sense of the word in common speech.’ We know of no writer that his used words more arbitrarily, and abstrusely; or built more precarious demonstrations on such use of them. What is offered on the article of necessity seems peculiarly liable to this ex­ception.

To recur to the distinction of natural and moral neces­sity. The great jumble and confusion of ideas in the a­foresaid explanation is to be regretted.

By "necessity of connection and consequence" we ob­tain no idea of moral necessity as distinct from natural. To say in explanation hereof, that the volitions of moral agents are connected immediately or mediately with what is necessary in its own nature, and so are necessary by a necessity of consequence, (P. 25; 29.) is so far from help­ing us to distinguish moral necessity from natural, that the attempt to explain doth but confound the distinction, which is supposed to be of much importance. According to this explanation, moral actions are effects of natural necessity, when traced up to their true cause. For saith Mr. Edwards, ‘Things which are perfectly connected with other things that are necessary [in their own nature] are themselves necessary, by a necessity of consequence.’ The volitions of accountable creatures not being in their own nature necessary, are so inasmuch as they are perfectly con­nected with, and certainly follow from, the divine exis­tence [Page 46] and perfections. As this is to assert, that God is the original moral cause of sin, so it is finally to assert that sin arose from a necessity in the nature of things. Do we yet perceive any difference between natural and moral necessi­ty, on this state of the matter? The divine existence is eternal, and therefore absolutely necessary in its own na­ture. ^* The volitions of creatures are perfectly connected with the divine existence and conduct. And are they not then necessary with a natural necessity.

Further, What doth Mr. Edwards mean by a moral cause? ^‡ In the passage under present examination, and through his book, he blends moral motives and induce­ments with moral habits, inclinations and dispositions, as though they were precisely the same, and indiscriminately calls them moral causes. Here are several things unintel­ligible.

First, The difference between a moral disposition and a moral volition should have been pointed out. For moral volitions and actions, upon this scheme, are immediately connected with moral habits and dispositions as their moral cause. Or if there be no difference, then it should have been shewn,

Secondly, How the same moral habit, which is a moral volition or act, is also the moral cause of itself—cause and effect at the same time, and in regard to the same thing— the subject of its own efficiency. Were this conceivable, still,

Thirdly, How is a moral habit [or motive] before and previous to itself? How hath it a tendency, by positive in­fluence and action, to move and excite to itself? How is it the cause of that exertion, which, by supposition, is ex­erted before its influence and motion is applied for the purpose?

Fourthly, If motives are nothing distinct from moral habits and inclinations, then they are not extrinsic causes of [Page 47] such inclinations and habits, as Mr. Edwards often stiles them—are not the medium of producing such habits.

Fifthly, If moral volitions are connected with their moral cause by a necessity of consequence, then it seems, the cause and necessity are prior to the volitions, and that the volitions themselves follow, as effects follow their causes. But how can they be consequent, if a moral motive be a moral disposition, as it is certain a moral disposition is a moral volition? We would, if possible, discover the peculiar connection which Mr. Edwards supposeth there is between one and the same thing, so as to discern how it is a moral cause and a moral effect of—itself! We cannot easily apprehend what he means by moral necessity; or perceive where the difference lies, according to him, be­tween natural and moral necessity.

Further, When Mr. Edwards saith, that the nature of the connection between moral causes and effects is the same as in natural causes and effects—that they differ only as the terms connected are dissimilar, this doth but en­tangle the subject still more: For if there be no difference in the nature of the connection; if this be alike indissolu­ble in the one as in the other, is not then the necessity the same? what proper distinction is there between natural and moral necessity? Doth he mean also to confound na­tural causes and effects as he doth moral? to say, in like manner, that a natural effect is the natural cause of itself? the object of its own influence and action? producer and produced?

Further, This connection between moral volitions and their moral causes is said to take place in many cases. If it ever fails, how is the connection ‘sure and perfect—ac­cording to established laws?’ If the connection may in any case be broken, there is no necessity. 'Tis not as ab­solute, as unfrustrable as natural necessity.

Further, As nothing except the divine existence and per­fections is necessary in itself, or in nature; according to Mr. Edwards himself; when he saith moral necessity is as ab­solute and irrsistible as natural, doth he mean that the mo­ral volitions of creatures are as necessary as the existence of God? Apply this to his own doctrine respecting the [Page 48] origin of evil, and either the absoluteness of moral necessi­ty must be given up, or the moral character of the Deity disbelieved. Was it Adam's original bias and disposition to rebel against God? If it was, he was created a rebel. And what tho'ts must we entertain of the creator, from whom immediately he derived this bias? Can we distin­guish his being created in sin from natural necessity? If this was not his original disposition, but the contrary, then he was far from being under a necessity of sinning, as ab­solute as natural necessity—his fall was ‘not owing to na­ture.’

Or suppose the first sinful volition really necessary in the way Mr. Edwards contends for, what essential diffe­rence could there be between a necessity without the will, and a necessity within it? Evil dispositions originally im­planted in the creature, or infused into him afterwards, or proceeding from the want of divine influence and assistance, cannot render the subject thereof criminal, nor can pro­perly be called evil as relative to him, as may be shewn in the next section. To say in this case, ‘'Tis his very nature; he is of a vile natural temper, 'tis as natural for him to act so as it is to breathe; he can't help ser­ving the devil,’ &c. ^† would be a full excuse, provi­ded such a nature and temper were originally implanted or infused by the creator, or arose from the want of his assistance. And as the first sinful volition was as absolute­ly necessary as any following ones, and the first in the series determineth all the rest, on Mr. Edwards's plan—as the necessity he pleads for is not even pretended to de­rive from the fall, nor the sin of Adam once mentioned as the source of it, but took place in his innocent state, and was prior to the fall of angels; so we may well ob­serve, that in the creature's original state a necessity in the will or without it must amount to the same thing. In such state, to suppose an indisposition, or moral inability, or op­position of will to holiness would be to admit as full an ex­cuse as any inability extrinsic to the will can be—it would be a proper natural necessity—an original defect of pow­ers or advantages to do what was required.

[Page 49]Might not then the fall of angels and man have been prevented? Mr. Edwards has intimated that it might. If so, then it is clear, it could not be necessary with the irre­sistible, absolute necessity he pleads for. To suppose it was really necessary, though in the lowest degree, ^* is the same as to suppose it necessary in the highest degree, the event being alike sure on either supposition. To illustrate the matter by an instance from Mr. Edwards. Suppose a man required to lift a weight of 101 lb. whose natural strength is only equal to a weight of 100 lb. he is as really unable to lift 101 as 1000 lb. And it would be as really contrary to reason to require him to lift one pound beyond his strength as nine hundred. Was there a moral inabili­ty similar to this in our first parents in their primitive state? In this case "doing wrong with the will," or ‘from the heart,’ would be far from being ‘the sum total of the matter,’ in our estimation of blame-worthiness. (P. 298, 299.) We naturally ascend to the source and fountain of this wrong will or heart, and enquire whe­ther the subject had the necessary means of willing other­wise? If the state of his will or heart was originally fixed by necessity, common sense at once acquits him of blame. Were angels and our common progenitors thus abandon­ed of God!

In the first sin, there was a want or opposition of will to what was required by the Creator. Was this want or opposition of will necessary before the first sin took place? If not, then there was a freedom from moral necessity at least with respect to the first act of sin. Or if the first disinclination to, and non-compliance with, duty, was founded in necessity, who placed the creature under that necessity? He must have had power originally to preserve his innocence, or the necessity of his forfeiting it must have been a natural necessity. Which side soever Mr. Ed­wards's scheme embraceth, it is subverted.

To evince the consistency of his doctrine of necessity with the highest worthiness of praise and moral esteem, Mr. Edwards takes frequent occasion to observe, that God possesseth the most perfect liberty, and is notwithstanding [Page 50] necessarily holy, &c. In the same view he mentions the necessity of Christ's holiness. We grant that God is ne­cessarily holy—that Jesus Christ is so; but see not how this "clearly and absolutely determines the controversy,"

For,

First, Mr. Edwards maintains, that the perfection of the divine understanding is the foundation of the immutable rectitude of his will. Now as the moral intellect in crea­tures is so very imperfect, there can be no infering the necessity of their wills from the necessity of the divine. Mr. Edwards would not say, that the volitions of holy angels are determined to the right side in the same manner as the divine will is determined to holiness. For then their knowledge must be perfect as his. Or if, notwith­standing the imperfection of their knowledge, their wills always have been, are, and will be as unalterably deter­mined to holiness, then it must be in some other way, on some other foundation, equally sure and stedfast, not yet pointed out. Should it be supposed further, that they are now confirmed in a state of holiness beyond the possibility of a defection; yet we conjecture that they (as well as other finite beings) have been, in some part of their dura­tion, upon trial in such sense as implies danger of miscar­rying. Beings in their situation once, have actually fallen.

Secondly, We have no objection to the opinion, that the rectitude of the divine will is necessary. But why this necessity should be called moral, by way of distinction from natural, we see not. When we distinguish the moral from the natural perfections of God, we do indeed suppose that the latter would be no perfections were it not for the for­mer. At the same time, there is an evident contradiction in supposing a being to exist, possessed of the attributes, which for distinction's sake are called the natural perfec­tions of God, without possessing perfect moral rectitude.

Holiness, justice, goodness belong to the divine nature as much as power, omniscience, immensity, &c. He is by necessity of nature holy, just and good, no less than he is, by the same necessity, eternal, infinite, omnipotent, omnis­cient. When it is said, God cannot do wickedly, this is to be understood as denoting a strict necessity. Who ever [Page 51] says, 'Tis morally impossible for God to lie? as tho' it were naturally possible. The terms can, cannot, necessary, impossible, &c. as applied to God, denote no less a necessity of nature than of will. ^* Admitting this, 'tis not altoge­ther proper to apply to the divine moral rectitude the dis­tinction of natural and moral necessity. For to say that God is holy by the necessity of his will, is the same as to say he is holy by the necessity of his nature.

It doth not, however, follow, from the necessity of the divine moral rectitude above asserted, that therefore God could have done in no respect differently from what he hath. In what properly belongs to moral rectitude, we maintain the necessity of the divine will, strictly speaking. But did moral rectitude require there should be exactly so many orders of creatures—such a certain number of each order—brought into existence at such certain time and place—endowed with such particular powers and properties—placed in such circumstances? That there should be exactly so many grains of sand, drops of water, particles of light, &c. &c? The scriptures tell us, that God was able to raise up children to Abraham from the stones. If he was able, then he might have done it. For to say he is able to do what contradicts moral rectitude, is to say he may deny himself, which we know he cannot. Omnipotence cannot do any thing contradictory to moral perfection. But this is very different from saying, that God actually doth every thing that is possible with him.

"To say that God has exerted his power or his wisdom, ad ultimum posse, so that he can proceed no further, is to say a great deal too much; But we may with reason assert, that he has discovered infinite wisdom and infinite power; or in other words, that none but a being possessed of these perfections in the highest possible degree could have crea­ted this stupendous universe." ^†

Jesus Christ the righteous is also holy with the same necessity as is above ascribed to God—not a moral necessi­ty [Page 52] by way of distinction from natural, but a real and pro­per necessity. Nor was he upon trial in the sense that im­plies danger or possibility of miscarrying, as finite beings have been and are.

Now to say that the holiness of angels in heaven is, and always was, as infallibly and unalterably necessary as the holiness of God and Jesus Christ, is to say they never were capable of sining—and is to make them equal with God, who chargeth the angels with folly; in whose sight the stars are not clean. To say, on the other hand, that the defection of angels which fell was unalterably necessary, is to say they never were able to stand in their primitive state; and is to ascribe their sin and destruction, not to themselves, but to him who is immutably holy, just and good.

There is, indeed, a qualified sense in which confirmed an­gels and perfected spirits in heaven may be said to be ho­ly by a necessity of nature; having passed their trial, and being finally established in a state of moral rectitude— which admits of endless improvement. We may say, 'tis their nature to be holy—to be like God. Hence it will follow, that apostate spirits, and such from among man­kind as have died impenitent, having neglected and abused the time of their visitation, are, by a like necessity, enemies of righteousness, and cannot but remain so. In neither case was the necessity original, but the consequence of improving well or ill a time of previous trial.

The same thing holds, in a lower degree, with respect to some of mankind in this world. There are those the height of whose moral attainments and whose establish­ment in the divine life are such, that the allurements and temptations of the world make but a feeble and transient impression on them: Whether the regenerate principle be or be not, in its own nature, indefectible, Calvinistic di­vines have universally maintained, that the promise of God stands engaged to keep them from falling. On the other hand, there are those who appear to be given over to vile affections—or, if not given up of God to their own heart's lust, have proceeded so far in the paths of error and un­righteousness, their recovery is become so extremely diffi­cult [Page 53] and improbable, that the words of the prophet are ap­plicable to them, Can the ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots? Long confirmed habit is a kind of se­cond nature: So that both the former and latter may be said to have superinduced on themselves a sort of natural necessity.

This notion of necessity Mr. Edwards appears to recur to through his book. Yet he makes no distinction between a necessity supposed to be original, or such as is formed and confirmed by custom or use; and the necessity of moral voliti­ons under circumstances altogether diverse. He proceeds, for example, on the supposition of a strict, real and absolute necessity in all these cases. The sins of the unregenerate, under the greatest illumination and conviction from the spirit of God, the slips and failings of the regenerate, and the first sinful volition, are as really necessary, on his plan, as the crimes of abandoned sinners and apostate spirits. ‘The will is necessarily determined, in every one of its acts, from a man's first existence, by a cause beside [with­out] the will, and a cause that don't proceed from, or depend on, any act of the will at all.’ ^†

Who can believe Adam's first sin, or the slips and defects of good men on earth, necessary with the same necessity as the perverse wickedness of abandoned sinners and re­bel angels?—that the moral inability of all unregenerate men is the same with that of those whom God hath given over to a reprobate mind?—that the means and assistances of grace, either produce their effect necessarily, [irresisti­bly] or have no tendency to excite to that which is the great end and design of them? Did Mr. Edwards believe himself in these things? that last mentioned especially. ^*

Preparatory and regenerating grace are the operation of the same spirit. The transition from one to the other is not very easily discerned. 'Tis a nice thing to draw the line exactly between common and special grace, admitting a specific difference. Can it yet be said of unregenerate men, under those influences of the spirit which Mr. Ed­wards alloweth to persons in their circumstances, that their [Page 54] moral inability is like that of those who have long grieved and quenched the spirit, and hereby provoked God to take it from them?

But whatever moral inability belongs to unregenerate men by nature, and notwithstanding the means and assistan­ces of grace, nothing is plainer than this, that Calvinistic divines have ever considered the inability of mankind to holiness as the natural and judicial consequences of sin. They suppose the first sin of Adam to be the source of such inability in him, and in his posterity. They suppose it was not natural to Adam, but is to his descendants. They don't represent this inability in the race of Adam as meerly moral, but as both natural and moral. They e­qually assert the impotency of the understanding, as of the will. Were there occasion, this might be abundantly shewn. Yet Mr. Edwards, though he maintains the same inability in the creature, while innocent, as in fallen creatures, and asserts it to be of the moral kind only, all along holds his own doctrine up to view as the doc­trine of Calvinists; and represents the opposers of it, through his whole book, as Arminians, Pelagians, Soci­nians, Jesuits, &c. With what fairness, let the public judge. By his own concession Dr. Watts deserved to be ranked with writers of a very different class. Yet the Doctor's essay on freedom of will is as diverse from Mr. Edwards on the will as the Christian's bible is from the Mahometan's. He asserted, with the whole current of Calvinistic divines, both the natural and moral impotency of mankind. ^* How Mr. Edwards could deny the former consistently with ad­miting total depravity (which he would be supposed to believe) is utterly inconceivable. And while he affirms it to be the doctrine of Calvinists, That ‘there is need of a physical operation of the spirit of God on the will,’ in order to regeneration, why doth he represent the inability of the unregenerate as meerly moral? (P. 111; 232.)

"The most rigid predestinarians," says Professor BEAT­TIE, ‘suppose freedom of will to be in one way or other [Page 55] consistent with eternal and unconditional decrees: If they cannot explain in what way, they call it a myste­ry; it surpasses their understanding; But it must be so; for otherwise the morality of actions is altogether incom­prehensible.’ ^*

In our controversy with Mr. Edwards, there is, indeed, no occasion to examine the impotency of fallen man. Ac­cording to him, Adam in innocence was morally unable to retain the spiritual image of God, with which he is suppos­ed to have been endowed. (This must have been, by the way, a natural as well as moral inability—an inability ori­ginal to him, no less in his understanding than in his will.) If he had power to have viewed things in a different man­ner, the scheme of necessity is overthrown. His first want or opposition of will to what was required of him was his first sin. How came he by this want or opposition of will? It was not original to him, if he was created with the moral image of God. To the efficient cause we must attribute his first indisposition or opposition to his duty, whoever or whatever that cause be. ^† 'Tis indeed absurd to say, that after this opposition to duty was become effect, he could have annihilated it, or caused it not to be. But might he have preserved the same actual will to worship and obey God after the exhibition of satan's temptation, as before? Did the extancy of this temptation in his mind make or constitute him a sinner? (No surely; for our Lord himself was tempted by the devil, yet without sin.) After the temptation was extant, had he an immediate power to call the motives of religion to view, and resist the suggestions of the adversary? If not, how could sin lie at his door? Was his moral inability of his own procuring? or could he remove it? If neither, Mr. Edwards's distinc­tion of natural and moral necessity must appear trifling. ‘The state of the moral world depends on the use they make of natural agency, and so depends on their voli­tions,’ (Edwards p. 162.) which volitions are indepen­dent of themselves, and proceed from an extrinsic cause— even from him who gave them being. On this plan na­tural [Page 56] beauty or deformity, superior natural understanding or the want of common, high or low birth, great wealth or extreme poverty, bodily health or sickness, are as much virtuous or vicious, in relation to the subject, as any moral qualities whatever.

Some European writers of late years have made much use of the distinction of natural and moral necessity: But it is manifest for a pretence only. They plainly suppose natural and moral necessity do not materially differ; and maintain necessity in such sense at renders the existence of sin, even in their own apprehensions, impossible. Particu­larly Mr. Hume, and the author of the letters on the origin of evil. The latter boldly asserts, ^* that ‘omnipotence was obliged, either to afflict innocence, or be the cause of wickedness; it plainly hath no other option: What then could infinite wisdom, justice and goodness do in this situation more consistent with itself, than to call into being creatures formed with such depravity in their dispositions, as to induce many of them to act in such a manner as to render themselves proper subjects for necessary suffer­ings—just punishments?’ Can this author be tho't to be serious? Could he believe that creatures formed wicked originally may be on that account the objects of just punish­ment? With the Pagan orator, he resolves all into divine necessity and fatality.

‘The scheme of necessity in the actions of an intelligent being, or that all our volitions, determinations and ac­tions proceed from God, as infrustrable effects from their proper cause, hath hitherto been embraced by a very few, except infidels, and those of the most malignant class, who have very consistently given up the doctrine of future punishment. In this they discover that they have more just and honorary thoughts of God, than those Christians, who first make God the author of sin, and then represent him as inflicting eternal punishment on men for it; for that which is originally, and in strict construction, his own act.’ Mr. Howe calls it ‘a black conception of God, that he should be supposed irresti­bly to determine the will of man to the hatred of his [Page 57] own most blessed self, and then to exact the severest pun­ishments for the offence done. We should rather chuse’ says he ‘to have our sight, hearing, and motive power, or what not besides, disputed or even torn away from us, than even suffer ourselves to be disputed into a be­lief, that the holy and good God should irresistibly de­termine the wills of men to, and punish the same thing.’ ^‡

Whether certainty and necessity are the same, as Mr. Edwards insists, we reserve for enquiry under the section on foreknowledge.

MR. Edwards's opinion on this subject is, that ‘sin infallibly followed from God's ordering man's circumstances when he made him, and withholding or withdrawing divine influence and assistance.’ This he otherwise expresseth by saying that ‘sin arose from the im­perfection which properly belongs to a creature, as such.’ ^‡ Again to the same purpose, (p. 365.) ‘Sin ariseth from the withholding of the action and energy of the most High, and—necessarily follows on the want of his influence’—Men never commit sin, but only when ‘God leaves them to themselves, and necessarily sin when he doth so’—(p. 403; 405.) ‘God's own immediate con­duct is original in the series of events—in his providence he decisively ordereth all the volitions of moral agents.’ Yet he allows not that ‘sin is the fruit of any positive agency or influence of the most High.’ Upon the whole, he takes frequent occasion to illustrate his doctrine concerning the existence of sin by observing, that there is a vast difference between the sun's being the cause of light and warmth in the day, by its presence and positive in­fluence; and its being the occasion of darkness and frost in the night, by descending below the horizon. Hence he supposeth, that ‘no action of the divine being is the pro­per cause, efficient or producer of the evil of men's wills.’

In these things we doubt not it may be made to ap­pear, that he alike contradicts himself, and the foundation principles of reason and religion.

First, He contradicts himself. We shall take notice on­ly of two respects in which he doth so. His own illustra­tion of the subject goes upon the supposition,

(1.) That the existence of sin is the consequence meerly [Page 59] of something negative on God's part, or follows from the want of his influence, and from this only. Whereas Mr. Edwards constantly asserts, that God is the determiner, or­derer, and decisive disposer of this event. 'Tis not sufficient with him to say, that God is ‘the permitter, or not a hin­derer of sin;’ but he is careful immediately to add, ‘and at the same time a disposer of the state of events, in such a manner, that sin will most certainly and infallibly fol­low.’ (P. 3 57, 367.) Now is God's determining, order­ing and actually disposing things in his providence, in a deci­sive manner, a meer negative? Doth not his ordering and disposing an event, with all the previous circumstances, imply something more than forbearing to act? even his influence and energy, or active providence therein? Are the determinations and decrees of God, the dispositions of his providence, nothing positive? Mr. Edwards saith express­ly, "To direct, decide, or determine any thing, is to act." (P. 51.) He connects the active and permissive providence of God—maintains an efficient determination of, and effi­cacious providence in sin.

2. Admit the existence of sin to be the consequence, not of any positive influence of the deity, but to follow only from his forbearing to influence and assist the creature, in like manner as darkness and frost in the night follow upon the departure of the sun—admit that God is not the efficient cause of sin; it will then follow, that the sinful being him­self must be this cause. Now to say that the perpetrator of wickedness is the efficient cause of it, is to establish a power of self-determination, contrary to the principal design of Mr. Edwards's book. He must either maintain the positive energy and action of the deity in the introduction of sin into the world, or else admit that it arose from a cause in the mind of the sinner—in other words, that he was self-determined. And tho' this would involve his scheme in the absurdity he speaks of, p. 7. that the will ‘acts and produceth effects upon itself, and is the object of its own influence and action,’ yet there is no evading it. The actor, agent, or doer of sin, as Mr. Edwards speaks, can­not, according to him, be the efficient cause of it. Either [Page 60] then the deity is, in this sense, the cause and author of sin, or it hath no proper cause at all. ^*

Secondly, His doctrine is repugnant to the fundamental and most important principles of reason and religion. It is ascribing sin as really, and in as obnoxious a sense, to God, as to affirm, his positive agency and efficiency herein. Mr. Edwards would have been more consistent with him­self, had he embraced the latter opinion. His scheme can hang together on no other supposition. And on this sup­position, the moral perfections and government of God, and revealed religion, must be disbelieved.

But his doctrine respecting the manner of sin's coming into existence shall be examined somewhat distinctly.

If sin arose from God's withdrawing his assistance and influence, it will then follow that the creature had origi­nally such influence and assistance as was sufficient to pre­vent apostacy. Otherwise this would not be the conse­quence of the withdraw of divine influence, but more pro­perly the consequence of the deficiency of such influence. And the case of the sun's departure from our horizon would be very impertinently used to exemplify this event. For suppose the creature never had sufficient divine influence and assistance to secure his primitive rectitude, his state would have been analogous to primitive darkness and e­ternal night. And because he did not walk in the light of the sun, without having ever enjoy'd its enlivening beams, he is consigned (or obnoxious) to blackness or darkness forever.

If therefore there is any pertinency in the instance Mr. [Page 61] Edwards brings, the creature once had such light, influ­ence and assistance as might have forever secured his in­tegrity. Consequently, the apostacy might have been pre­vented. The only enquiry is, whether it were owing to God, or the creature. Mr. Edwards maintains it was ow­ing to the former. Let us see whether his opinion be re­concileable with the wisdom, holiness and goodness, or e­ven justice of God.

To say that the apostacy was the consequence of God's forbearing to communicate his influence and assistance, yet that it was a blameable thing in the creature, is not less glaringly false and impious than it would be to say, that God requires a rational conduct of those whom he hath not endowed with the natural understanding of men—or that he requires moral exercises and behaviour of the brute creatures—or requires a creature to live after he hath taken away the breath of life. Either would be contrary to reason and justice—to demand more than was given—contrary to that fixed rule of divine government, To him that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance.

Again, we might much more consistently suppose, that God would have put an end to the existence of a rational creature, than have continued such an one in being and withdrawn his influence, previous to any direct forfeiture on the creatures part. The latter would imply injustice: But the former might not. Existence being a free gift at first, the continuance of it would have been so, had the creature not sinned. The creator might have discontinued it without doing any wrong, even supposing sin had not taken place. But to continue the creature in being, and withhold divine influence from him, in conse­quence of which he is necessarily plunged into a state of sin, misery and desperation, would be to give and con­tinue being on terms worse than not to be at all. If there is no reason for the former supposition; much less is there for the latter.

This doctrine gives us such an idea of the parent of the universe as shocks the first principles of reason, and con­tradicts the clearest notices God has given of himself by the light of nature and scripture. Moral agents are the off­spring [Page 62] of God. Now is it indeed true, that the father of the whole family in heaven and earth casts off his children be­fore they have done any thing to forfeit his paternal care, or incur his fatherly displeasure? Is their forsaking him the consequence of his first leaving them? Doth he expose them defenceless, and cast them off as orphans, that they may, in consequence of his dereliction, forget and forsake him, and then be thrust out from his family, and treated as bastards and renegades! Is this to represent the parent of angels and men in an honorable light! Can such a thought sit easy on the mind! Do not reason and re­ligion turn from the hideous sight with abhorrence! Is this the representation given us of God in the holy scrip­tures? Do they instruct us, that he first forsook his rati­onal offspring, and that, as the consequence of this, they forsook him? Do they not, on the contrary, teach us, The Lord is with you, while ye be with him? and if ye seek him, he will be found of you; but if ye forsake him, he will for­sake you? As a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pi­tieth them that fear him. Yea, earthly parents may for­get; yet will not he forget: For his compassions fail not. These things confirm our natural apprehensions of God; and shew, that there could not be the least danger of God's withdrawing his influence and assistance from the creature, had not the creature first departed from him.

Mr. Edwards's supposition, that creatures ‘never com­mit sin, but only when God leaves them to themselves, and necessarily sin when he doth so,’ leaves no room for a distinction between the case of an innocent creature, and that of those from whom God withdraws the assist­ances of his grace in consequence of obstinate impiety and wickedness, and as the punishment thereof; whom he is said to give up to their own hearts lust, to walk in their own counsel—Or that of rebel angels, whom he hath reserved in chains under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day. Surely there is a difference, and one of great im­portance, in these cases. Can we suppose that the off­spring of God, in their primitive state, were left to them­selves in that awful manner which abandoned sinners and devils are? But what difference is there, if we admit Mr. [Page 63] Edwards's scheme? Can we think of the present state of rebel angels, with the judgment that awaits them, and believe that their fall, their present condition, and the torments to which they are destined, are the conse­quence of God's first departing from them—withdrawing his influence, support and energy, and leaving them to themselves! To suppose that sin first came into the world through the want of divine influence and assistance; and then reflect on the terrible punishments of it in this and the eternal world, exhibits such a character of the creator and governor of the world, that universal scepti­cism is preferable to such a scheme. We mean not to ‘set forth this doctrine in colours’ more ‘shocking to the imagination, and moving to the passions,’ than it de­serves. 'Tis impossible. We misrepresent it no other­wise than in not painting it in it's true horrid colours. This will be allowed, if it can be shewn, as we now pro­pose,

That to ascribe the origin of evil to the want of divine influence and assistance is not materially different from as­cribing it to the positive energy and efficiency of God. For Mr. Edwards connects with ‘the want or withholding of divine influence,’ the divine determination, ordering and disposal of sin, with all the circumstances leading to it, so as infallibly and necessarily to bring it to pass. He asserts an efficacious permission of sin—and supposeth that a train was laid from the beginning of the world to bring to pass the first sin, and, in consequence of that, every one that hath succeeded, or shall succeed, to the end of time. His ‘own immediate conduct is original in the series, either his acting, or forbearing to act.’ ^*

[Page 64]On these things we observe, that divine communicati­ons were as necessary to preserve innocent beings in a state of rectitude, as they are to support and perfect the spiri­tual life in the regenerate, who are kept by the power of God. But if the creator not only withdrew his influence and assistance from upright beings, or forbore to act in their behalf; but also in his providence so ordered and dis­posed the circumstances previous to the apostacy, as deci­sively and necessarily ensured this event, what shall we say? Will it not follow, that there is unrighteousness with God? For the same duty was required after the withdraw of divine assistance; as before. The consequence of which is, that the duty required of beings in a state of rectitude exceeded their abilities. For the creature might as well continue to live, after God taketh away his breath, as continue holy after the withdraw of divine influence. We might just as reasonably suppose him to be culpable for that act of God which puts an end to his life, as for the forfeiture of primitive righteousness through an act of di­vine forbearance, in withholding the assistances of grace.

The representation Mr. Edwards's scheme gives us of the wise and good governor of the universe is summarily this, By the suspension of divine influence, beings made holy become unholy, no longer capable of holy exercises—every imagination of their hearts only evil continually—dead in sin—obnoxious to all the dismal effects of God's wrath in this world and that to come—and an innumera­ble [Page 65] progeny involved with them in the same deplorable cir­cumstances.—All in consequence of being forsaken of their creator and father, before any thing had been done by them to expose them to such a dereliction. This derelic­tion was the next and immediate cause of the first sin of mankind, and by consequence of all after sins.

No reason can, indeed, be given why divine influence & as­sistance should be withdrawn from men and angels antecedent to their fall, which would not equally justify the governor of the world had he never imparted such influence and assist­ance to them. And suppose the case had been so, would their departure from righteousness have been their fault, when they never had the necessary means of attaining to, or continuing in it? To say that their defection ‘arose from the imperfection which properly belongs to a creature, as such,’ wou'd not at all relieve the difficulty. For this wou'd be saying that sin properly arose from the creature's original frame. And if it arose from a defect in this, who but the author of his frame could be in fault? The creature cannot be answerable for more than he hath received. This way of accounting for the origin of mo­ral evil is very singular as well as impious. 'Tis to ac­count for its existence in a way that denies the possibility of its taking place in the creation. Now where is the dif­ference between saying, that the want of divine influence and assistance was the ground and reason of the apostacy; and saying, that such influence and assistance was from the beginning denied the creature? Is there a difference that in the least affects any doctrine of religion? On either supposi­tion the Deity is made the positive cause and fountain of moral evil—or it hath no proper cause—or it doth not exist. The first of these Mr. Edwards's scheme embrac­eth, while it seems to deny it: And this is what we con­test with him. He denies that moral agents are themselves the efficient cause of their own vicious volitions; as it is certain this would imply a power of self-determination in them: Now if they are not the efficients of their own sins, the Deity must be; else sin would have no efficient cause at all—every sin would be an effect without a cause—to say which, we agree with Mr. Edwards, would be absurd.

[Page 66]Admitting then, that God is the efficient cause of sin, mediately or immediately, what is this but saying that he is the producer and author of it? Is not the efficient cause of an effect the producer and author of that effect? And can we say that God produceth sin without attributing to him the sin produced? It the perpetrator of wickedness is only the subject of certain effects from the operation of the supreme cause, how can we ascribe moral blame to him? This doctrine of the efficiency of God in moral evil destroys his own moral character, and renders it impossi­ble that the creature should be a moral agent. It is to ascribe the sin of man to God in such a sense as we cannot attribute it to the devil, without bringing a railing accusation against him. For he can only tempt men to sin: He is not the efficient or producer of it—has not power over their voli­tions and actions—cannot command their choice. These are reserved in their own power, notwithstanding the sol­licitations of the devil. Every man is then tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lusts and enticed. Shall we then, by saying that God is the efficient cause of sin, reproach our maker in a manner which a good man would not re­proach even the enemy of all righteousness?

When Mr. Edwards saith, that "sin arose from the im­perfection which properly belongs to creature, as such; we suppose he means the same as when he saith it arose from the want or withholding of divine influence and as­sistance. If by imperfection no more had been meant than the want of absolute perfection—or had he only meant to say, that the creature was not made incapable of sining, we should have had no dispute with him on this point. But if by imperfection be intended a want of original pow­ers and advantages to do the duty the Creator required, we by no means admit this, and deny that such ‘imperfection properly belonged to the creature;’ as it would be to ascribe arbitrary requirements to the most High, all whose ways are judgement. Yet Mr. Edwards must be supposed to assert the creature's imperfection in this sense, inasmuch as he connects herewith God's ‘so ordering his circumstances’ in his innocent state, ‘and withhold­ing divine influence,’ that herefrom ‘sin infallibly and necessarily followed.’

[Page 67]If the creature originally had sufficient divine influence and assistance, we may say, that to continue holy was ‘what properly belonged to him as’ a creature. This may be said with more evident propriety than the contrary. For this was his duty. He had a capacity and advantages for it. It was the end of his formation in the image of God. It would have been his perfection, glory and felici­ty. The degradation of his nature and turning his glory into shame, did not properly belong to him. What properly belonged to him must have been his perfection, not his im­perfection. Sin did not properly belong to him. It was contrary to his nature and bias considered as endowed with the spiritual and moral image of God. Angels and men were made perfect in their order, as creatures, howe­ver capable of improvement, both intellectual and moral. They were, in this sense, perfect, till iniquity was found in them. God's work (what is properly his) is perfect— that part especially which he created in his own image. Sin, therefore, could not proceed from any defect in his con­stitution—from unavoidable imperfection. The imper­fection of the creature, as such, i. e. as a creature, is una­voidable, in a natural as well as moral sense. If therefore ‘sin arose from the imperfection proper to the creature, as such,’ then it was necessary by a natural necessity— which on all principles of morality and religion (even on Mr. Edwards's) is a full excuse: That is, sin could not have been at all on Mr. Edwards's plan. For what fully excuseth, and takes away all blame, is inconsistent with the being of sin.

What shall we then say to a scheme which makes the existence of sin the inevitable consequence of the deficiency of that nature the creature received immediately from God, and of those circumstances wherein he was originally plac­ed? Wherein doth it essentially differ from the suppositi­on that men and angels were first ‘made with a fixed pre­vailing principle of sin in the heart?’ Man never had sufficient divine influence and assistance in order to his be­ing and continuing holy, according to Mr. Edwards's opi­nion of original imperfection. For tho' he seems to sup­pose he had, by attributing sin to the withdraw of divine [Page 68] influence; yet he immediately denies it by saying, that sin arose from the imperfection properly belonging to the creature, as a creature: That is, as a creature he was de­ficient to the purposes of holiness, both in respect of ori­ginal powers and divine assistance; and God, by his effica­cious providence, so ordered his circumstances, that he was under an original necessity of sining—a necessity resulting immediately from a defect of nature and advantages— that is, from God the author of his nature; and disposer of his circumstances. Now what material difference is there between forming an intelligent creature so, that from the imperfection properly belonging to him, and the cir­cumstances he is placed in, the want of divine assistance, he necessarily sins; and creating of him with an evil dispo­sition? If there is no material difference, and if on the lat­ter supposition the Creator must be the efficient and foun­tain of sin, then this is also the consequence on the former supposition. To suppose sin really proceeds from God, is to suppose he is the author and cause, whether it be sup­posed to proceed from him directly or indirectly—imme­diately, or mediately and remotely. To say that it pro­ceeds from him in either way, is to say he is the efficient and fountain of it—the actor and exerciser of wickedness. Mr. Edwards allows, that ‘the cause which produceth wickedness may be wicked: A cause may be to blame for being the cause of vice.’ ^‡

On the whole, his doctrine, while it acquits the creature from all blame, impeacheth the Creator as the positive cause and source of the revolt of angels and mankind, and ultimately fixeth all the criminality in the universe on him. How infinitely reproachful must that scheme of doctrine be, which involveth so horrid and blasphemous an imputa­tion on the supream creator and governor of the universe, who will be justified when be speaketh, and clear when he judgeth! For if men and devils are indeed destined to do all their abominations, how then shall God judge the world? Doth he exert as real an influence in moral evil, as in na­tural good and evil—as in the conservation of natural life? Why then are not moral agents culpable for continuing [Page 69] to exist because God's visitation preserves them, as for going on in sin through his energy and influence? Did he, who at first commanded the light to shine out of dark­ness, in the same manner produce a contrary effect in the moral world, by the withdraw of his presence, and saying, "Let there be sin," involving the moral creation in black­ness of darkness! What a defiance must such a supposi­tion be to the first dictates of reason! What a contradic­tion to the holy scriptures! where we are taught, God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man. Shall any man then presume to say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God? But what less doth the doctrine before us amount to than this, that God secretly designs all moral evil; placeth temptations to it before his creatures in an irresistible manner; and deserts them in the hour of dan­ger? What impiety is this! Were such things spoken against God by the openly profane and ungodly, the injury and reproach would be comparatively small. But when they are said under a notion of honoring his name and go­vernment, by the professed friends of religion, we must beg leave to think, that the utmost candor can find no sufficient excuse for those who are bold and positive herein. Humility and modesty in disquisitions of this kind will al­ways be applauded by the wise and good; but assurance and confidence in asserting, that God is the cause and pro­ducer of moral evil; accompanied with uncharitableness towards those who cannot believe such doctrine, must be very forbiding. Holy and reverend is his name. When we speak of his counsels and determinations, the ends and reasons of his government, it should be with much diffi­dence—with jealousy and godly fear, lest we should re­proach and dishonor him, whose glory is above the hea­vens. Counsel may be darkened by multiplying words, and ignorance and temerity manifested rather than know­ledge and piety. Behold! God is great, and we know him not. How small a proportion have we heard of him? Canst thou by searching find out God! This, however, we clearly know, that God cannot do wickedness, and hath no pleasure therein; but delighteth in exercising judgment, righteousness and loving-kindness in the earth.

[Page 70]Some, with a view to exalt divine sovereignty, may have detracted from the moral perfections of the Deity, which are his glory. Is it not far more honorary to his glorious name and character to conceive of him as the parent of the universe? to represent him like a prince who is the father of his people, and accounts it his glory to advance their happiness—rather than a tyrannical, arbitrary prince, who aims only at his own grandeur, and the display of his own power, instead of the good of his subjects, having no other measures of governing than caprice and licentious will? If the former representation excites the greatest re­verence, esteem and confidence in an intelligent mind, it is most worthy to be ascribed to our maker.

Mr. Edwards agrees with the writer of the letters on the origin of evil in rejecting the usual solution, which derives sin from the abuse of free-will. And when the latter puts the question, Can it proceed from a wise, ‘a just, and a benevolent God? Can such a God form creatures with dispositions to do evil; and then punish them for acting in conformity to those evil dispositions’? the reader will stand amazed at the answer, which is in the following words: ‘Strange and astonishing indeed must this appear to us, who know so little of the universal plan! but is far, I think, from being irreconcileable with the justice of the supream disposer of all things—Omnipotence is oblig­ed to afflict innocence, or be the cause of wickedness; it hath plainly no other option.’ ^* We shall take the li­berty, having had frequent occasion to quote this author, to give the reader a concise view of his general scheme.

Taking his lead from this principle, that all evil, natu­ral and moral, political and religious, ariseth from the ne­cessary imperfection of creatures, he endeavours to shew, that all government among men is founded in violence and corruption, and all religion in delusion and absurdity—that our vices are the support of government, our follies the pre­servation of religion ^†—that religion, particularly Christi­anity, is deficient in every principle requisite to its answering its own end ^‡—that natural evil was unpreventable by God's power, and moral evil expedient in consequence of [Page 71] natural—that with regard to God, vice is the consequence of misery—that God is, and must be, the author of sin, as the contrary would be to say, that something exists with­out any cause at all— that he is the author of all natural evil, and in the same manner, on the same principle, the author of all moral evil—that he made creatures with morally evil dispositions ^*—This scheme, the author affirms, is the only one, on which the doctrines of original sin, predestination and redemption can be vindicated—that Christianity can be defended on no other plan. ^† On the same general principle, the necessary imperfection of the creature, this writer endeavours to establish the doctrine of transmigration, and an eternal succession of states. (P, 55,—75.) What friend he was to Christianity, or even to natural religion, let the reader judge! ^‡ But this author's principles will have a firm support, if once we admit those of Mr. Edwards on the same subject. It is a matter of notoriety, that some writers in Europe, who have of late years distinguished themselves in the cause of irreligion and scepticism, (both before and since Mr. Edwards's book appeared) have built on the same foundation of necessity. 'Tis to be la­mented, when the friends and public teachers of religion adopt and set themselves to defend, a scheme of doctrine which gives countenance to infidelity. There are those a­mong ourselves who have the confidence to insult the re­ligion of their country and the bible, by publickly deli­vering the same doctrine, for substance, as the aforesaid author, with little reserve. There is reason to apprehend people may soon be taught from the pulpit, in so many words, that almighty God first infused wickedness into the creature. It is unhappy Mr. Edwards's book has gi­ven [Page 72] so much countenance to this profane, blasphemous tenet. It seems better not to believe a God, than to enter­tain such an opinion concerning him. Whether this be not the result of Mr. Edwards's scheme, we are content the impartial should determine.

We have now offered the reasons of our dissent from Mr. Edwards respecting the origin of evil. We are fully persuaded it did not, could not, come into existence in the way he supposeth—Yet how it in fact came to pass, that beings made upright have fallen, we acknowledge is to us incomprehensible—and apprehend it is so to any hu­man understanding; not excepting theirs who have at­tempted to account for it. There is a sense in which it is doubtless true, that sin ‘arose from the imperfection of the creature;’ that is, the creature was not made incapable of sining. He was originally endowed with a freedom to holiness or sin: He might have chosen the for­mer, though eventually he chose the latter. His felicity or misery was made to depend on his own election. There was no want of original powers and divine communica­tions in order to his continuance in a state of moral recti­tude. It therefore remains, that moral evil arose from a neglect or perversion of the powers and divine communi­cations he had in innocence. Angels and men might have continued holy; but misimproved the gifts of God, and thus forfeited his influence and friendship. So far seems clear: And this is sufficient to vindicate the providence of God in permitting sin and misery to enter into the world. How it came to pass, that liberty was originally abused, seems to be a matter of unprofitable speculation. To those who reject this solution of the matter, and object, that sin could not arise from the abuse of liberty, some farther reply may, however, be made in the ninth section.

N. B. In our examination of Mr. Edwards, (p. 64.) it was incidentally noted from him, that "God decisively orders all the volitions of moral agents by a positive in­fluence"—he adds in the place refered to, "or permission." We trust it has been fully shewn, that he intends an effica­cious permission—to "decide, determine, direct, is to act," [Page 73] as he saith himself. At the same time he makes a distinc­tion, it should seem, between an efficacious permission, a decisive efficient determination, and positive influence: This distinction we had not so particularly attended to. And though we see not the least room for it, and have no doubt but what he has said clearly implies a positive influence of the Deity in sin; yet on revising the aforesaid quotation we find he meant not to express it. We readily take this opportunity to correct the undesigned misrepresentation, and wish we could say his doctrine doth not contain the thing, which was not meant to be explicitly affirmed. Some of the advocates for his scheme maintain a positive influence of the Deity in sinful volitions, and say it was his real opinion, that God is the efficient cause of sin.

IT is a favourite distinction with Mr. Edwards, that ‘the essence of vertue and vice lies in the nature of volition, not in the cause.’ We before took some slight notice of the futility of this distinction. We knew, in­deed, that the consistency of Mr. Edwards's scheme de­pended not a little on the propriety of distinguishing the nature of moral actions from their cause: But had we re­presented such a distinction as really important, upon his plan, possibly it might have been esteem'd invidious. However, we are now constrained to say, such a represen­tation wou'd have been the exact truth. And though we still think the distinction futile and evasive, yet we have a reason, which we had not when we wrote before, for giving this matter a particular consideration. Our having been publickly called upon (not in very obliging terms ^*) to point out the weakness of this distinction, will excuse us with the reader, shou'd he think more notice is now taken of it, than it really deserves.

We shall first examine the merits of this distinction— and then remind the reader of the importance of it on Mr. Edwards's plan.

First, Of the merits of it. To say the essence of virtue and vice lies in their nature, is only saying, that the nature of them consists in their nature. Or the proposition might be transposed thus: The nature of virtue and vice lies in their essence. The word nature needs explaining as much as the word essence. To use the former as a definition or ex­planation of the latter, wou'd not be less trifling than to attempt to explain the term necessary, by the words must, can, cannot, of which Mr. Edwards takes notice. (P. 18.) We don't advance one step in our understanding of the subject by such explanations. Shou'd any one ask, where­in doth the essence of virtue and vice consist? and receive [Page 75] for answer, It consists in it's nature—wou'd he think the answer less impertinent, or be less disposed to laugh at him that offers it, than if upon asking an explanation of the word necessity, he shou'd be answered, that which is neces­sary, must and cannot but be?

We desire no logical proof that the nature of virtue and vice lie in the nature of a virtuous or vicious disposi­tion. We allow that such a disposition is what it is; and think there was no occasion to fill the page with proofs of this sort. For who is fool enough to dispute the thing! But doth this show us what constitutes the nature of virtue and vice? what it is that makes any particular action or disposition virtuous or vicious? Or doth it follow, from admitting that ‘the nature of vertue and vice lies in their nature,’ that therefore their nature is seperable from their cause? or that one can be judged of detach'd from the o­ther? Were vertue and vice, as effects in the natural world, produc'd by the efficiency of some cause extrinsic to the subject, and in which he is but a passive recipient, then, indeed, we might detach their cause from their nature. But this is beging the question. It still remains to be proved, that vertue and vice in rational agents are the pro­duction of a cause extrinsic to themselves.

This distinction of Mr. Edwards's is, therefore, subtil and evasive, as it carries in it an intimation, that his op­ponents deny the essence of volition to lie in it's nature, and maintain it lies in it's cause by way of distinction from it's nature. But when or where have they affirm'd the lat­ter, or deny'd the former? Again, this distinction is evasive, inasmuch as it takes for granted, that if the essence of voli­tion lies in it's nature, then the nature of volition may be seperated from the cause—which consequence is by no means admitted. It is evasive also, as it takes for granted that the cause of moral volitions is not in the mind of mo­ral agents. For if it be indeed true, that the cause of such volition is in the mind or agent willing, we presume, in this case, no one wou'd attempt to disjoin the cause and nature of volition. Least of all could Mr. Edwards.

To treat of moral causes and effects in the same manner as a philosopher wou'd discourse on natural causes, is a [Page 76] method of handling moral subjects altogether improper, but much used by Mr. Edwards—With what advantage to his own scheme? For in this way of reasoning we as­cend from the effect to the cause. ‘The cause must be proportionable and agreable to the effect, nor can there be more in the effect than in the cause,’ ^* as Mr. Ed­wards hath observed. Admit then that vertue and vice in moral and accountable creatures are the production of a cause extrinsic to their own minds, have we not shewn, that the cause which produceth wickedness, is wicked? The subject in whom vice is thus produced cannot be vi­cious at all. Or to speak more properly, the supposition that a creature can, in this way, be the subject of a vicious disposition, is a palpable absurdity. A disposition thus produced cannot partake of the nature of vice, viewed in relation to the subject, however it doth as view'd in relation to the cause and producer of it. If then this cause be God, (as on Mr. Edwards's scheme we have shewn it must be) who wou'd not shudder at the consequence!

That the nature of moral evil cannot be detached from it's efficient cause, we presume will clearly appear from stating a few cases. And since it is the origin of evil we are ultimately enquiring after, these cases shall be stated upon the different schemes of accounting for the introduc­tion of moral evil, which have been embraced by divines and philosophers. The first shall be Mr. Edwards's own.

Suppose then the existence of sin arose from the imper­fection properly belonging to a creature, as such, and from God's withholding or withdrawing his grace. On this plan can the first sin of angels and man be disjoined from the cause? If the creature had not original abilities and communications from God adequate to the duty requir'd of him; or if these abilities and communications were sus­pended or withdrawn before any forfeiture was incur'd; cou'd the moral evil of that disposition, which the first sin involved, be attributed to the subject of it, any more than if he had been created with it? Or any more than if it had been infused by the positive influence of some other agent? Mr. Edwards wou'd admit, that if a moral agent was [Page 77] "first made with a fountain of evil in his heart," or had a vicious disposition afterwards produced in him by the efficiency of the Deity, this wou'd be to make God the actor and doer of wickedness. Now hath it not been shewn, that his own scheme runs up to this? Doth it not, therefore, follow, even on his own doctrine, in the case we are now supposing that the obliquity of sin cannot be seperated from the cause—though (shocking to mention!) he makes the Deity himself that cause? Doth this scheme give us an idea of the moral governor of the world at all different from what the scriptures give us of the arbitrary prince of Egypt in the time of Moses, who demanded of the Israelites the usual tale of brick, after he deny'd them straw? Or of those who bound heavy burthens, and grie­vous to be born, and laid them on mens shoulders, but them­selves wou'd not move them with one of their fingers? Should a master require of his servant such a task as he cou'd well perform, having proper tools to work with—but ne­ver allow him such tools, or for no fault of the servant's take them from him, so that he necessarily fails of the per­formance of his task: Wou'd any body pronounce such servant wicked and slothful—accuse him of idleness and want of respect to his master? Wou'd not every one pity him as having an hard, and unreasonable master, and attribute all the blame to the latter for denying his servant what was requisite to his performing the task required? But is there such unrighteousness with God? There are, indeed, but a very few divines of eminence, if any, who account for the existence of sin in this way which Mr. Edwards doth.

Suppose in the next place, that the positive agency and efficiency of God was the cause of sin's first enterance into the world. Can we disjoin the nature of sin from the cause, in this case, and in this supposition? Wou'd not this be to make the creature answerable for the act of God? Are moral agents only the subjects of certain effects from divine agency? Wherein then do they differ from ma­chines? And if there is no material difference, wherein con­sists the moral evil of any dispositions in them? But what an horrid impeachment of the most High doth this doctrine [Page 78] contain? This is, indeed, the clear consequence of Mr. Edwards's scheme, though he chose not to affirm it in words. 'Tis more directly to arraign the perfections and government of almighty God: And hence many, who have thought favourably of Mr. Edwards's doctrine, re­ject this with pious indignation; and did they suppose his doctrine was reducible to such a consequence, wou'd im­mediately give it up. But as this ascription of the first sin, of all sin, to the influence, energy, agency or efficiency of God, differs nothing essentially from the next case we shall state, we will proceed directly to

Suppose moral agents created with vicious dispositions—Suppose a creature formed with the temper of Lucifer—suppose he himself had been created with his present tem­per. Such a temper is, in it's own nature, exceeding odi­ous. But cou'd it be so esteem'd seperate from the cre­ating cause? Wou'd it satisfy any rational man to be told in this case, that the having such a disposition argu'd the high criminality of the subject of it, without our being o­bliged ‘at all to consider how he came to have it—that let him come by it how he will, he is fully and perfectly free in exercising of it, and therefore deserving of blame and punishment.’ Wou'd not this be to make the crea­ture culpable for the constitution and temper he receiv'd immediately from the forming hands of the Creator? Might we not as justly suppose it, a culpable thing in any human being that he is not formed with the capacity of Gabriel? or in ideots, that they have not natural understanding? or in brutes, that they are not endowed with reason? Can the thing formed be answerable for the act of the former of it? What is properly God's constitution cannot be the sin of the creature. Consequently, in the case now put, the having the malignant disposition supposed, would not infer criminality in the subject, however detestable such disposition is in itself: But the criminality, if any there be, must be ascribed to the immediate author and efficient of it—that is, to the creating cause. Nor is the suppositi­on of a creature made at first with such a disposition ma­terially different from Mr. Edwards's opinion concerning the introduction of sin, view'd in it's natural consequence; as we trust hath already been proved.

[Page 79]Whether, therefore, we suppose that sin arose from the want or withdraw of divine influence and assistance, or from divine agency and efficiency, or that creatures were made wicked at first, the nature of sin cannot be seperated from it's cause. Now except these opinions concerning the origin of evil, there has been no other that deserves to be mentioned but that maintain'd by the generality of moralists and divines, that it arose from the abuse of free-will—in other words, from a cause in moral agents themselves.

Before we dismiss the instances above adduced, we wou'd subjoin this further observation, that if that energy be an holy energy, which angels and saints are the subjects of, then that is a sinful energy, which devils and wicked men are the subjects of, or thro' which their wills are inclined and determined to vice—That if one moral agent (whether creature or creator) is supposed to be the positive cause of sin in another, so much sin as is to be attributed to the efficiency of the former, is to be taken from the crimina­lity of the latter, and set to the account of the cause and producer of it. ^*

We go on to observe, that as moral agency involves accountableness to a moral governor, so the laws of God have respect to the inward and outward man. They re­quire not only such inward principles and affections as correspond to his perfections and gifts to us, and the rela­tions we stand in to our fellow-creatures; but also exter­nal acts of devotion, justice, charity, self-government. The matter and substance of morality and religion are as much the subject of command, as the internal principles and af­fections of heart, which shou'd regulate and influence to 'em. Now the nature of an external action is the same, whether perform'd by a good or bad man. The prayers and alms of a Pharisee, in themselves considered, or as to the matter of them, are as commendable as those of the most approved Christians. Mr. Edwards insists, that moral good or evil lies in the state and disposition of the mind, and allows of no vertue or vice in external actions, detach'd from their cause—the principles they proceed from, the ends aim'd at. But why are internal exercises then disjoined from their cause? It is as evident a truth, that material actions are good [Page 80] or bad in their own nature, as that the inward principles and affections are so. External acts are what they are in their own nature, not depending on the sentiments and vo­litions of the agent. Though in a relative view and esti­mation they vary, according to the temper, circumstances and advantages of the agent; yet their nature is unaltera­ble. Men's doing things in their own nature right, with an evil intent; or doing things in their own nature very evil, meaning to do God service, doth not alter the nature of the things done. Therefore let us connect both internal exercises and external actions with their causes, or neither.

Again, The same sin may be very differently aggravated in different persons, or in the same person at different times. But any sin is in it's own nature the same, by what­ever moral agent committed, or however circumstanced. The precise definition of sin is A NOMIA—i. e. without law, or a non-conformity to law. But to determine the degree of guilt in regard to any particular sin, besides the general consideration of the nature of the vicious affection or act, the advantages, opportunities and circumstances of the transgressor must also come into consideration. Moral writers have ever kept up this distinction. Besides maintain­ing that some crimes are more heinous than others view'd in their own nature, they have also maintain'd, that ‘some are more heinous than others by reason of several aggra­vations.’ The same sin admits of a variety of circum­stances, which either aggravate or extenuate the guilt of it: These distinctions are carefully preserved in the sacred writings. Now the particular aggravation and circumstan­ces of crimes are as different from their nature, as one sin is different from another—(as different as blasphemy is from some idle word men may speak) and therefore ought to come under a seperate consideration. But Mr. Edwards's doctrine precludes this plain and important distinction. For if the seperate consideration of the nature of any vici­ous volition in itself be all that is necessary to determine the matter of criminality, then the fame crime must be e­qually heinous in every person that commits it, and in the same person at all times. Difference of circumstances can have no weight, as they do not belong to the nature of any particular vice—they only make a gradual, not a specific dif­ference. [Page 81] But the former, it seems, is of no estimation. In other words, there is nothing that can either heighten or extenuate the same transgression. ^*

The foregoing observations may be sufficient to shew, that commendation or blame is not to be seperated from the cause of a virtuous or vicious disposition, and to expose the weakness of that distinction of Mr. Edwards's, on which we have been remarking. It is at least true with respect to the origin of evil, that it's nature cannot be se­perated from it's cause, nor even in idea conceived to be so.

Having examined the merits of the distinction itself, we promised, in the next place, to remind the reader, that however futile and evasive it really is, yet on Mr. Ed­wards's plan, and in his view, it was of much importance.

The sense he had of it's importance appears from what he has wrote on this point—particularly Part IV. Sect. 1. [Page 82] Nor did he mis-judge, provided this fundamental principle in his scheme be true, that moral agents do not originate, in any case, their own actions—in other words, provided the cause of their actions be not in themselves. For on this principle, one or other of these things must follow—either that vertue or vice is not predicable of moral agents, or that the essence of them depends not on their cause. The first Mr. Edwards wou'd by no means admit; the other he saw was a plain consequence of his principles. He therefore set himself to defend it as well as he could, that he might exempt the Deity from the charge of being criminal, while, by supposition, he originates the volitions of his intelligent creatures.

Hence appears the occasion Mr. Edwards had to sepe­rate the nature of vertue and vice from their cause. This is very much a turning point in the controversy on liberty and necessity, as he hath stated it. Whether the distinc­tion can be vindicated as just and proper, we leave the reader to judge. If it cannot, one or other of these con­sequences must follow—either first, that there is no sin in the world—or secondly, that God himself is the only cri­minal being—or thirdly, that the cause of sin is in the mind of the sinner. Either of the three subverts Mr. Ed­wards's scheme. The last is the only eligible opinion.

Mr. Edwards's subject naturally led him to be explicit on this question, Whether God or the creature be the pro­per cause of moral evil? It must have been full in his view while writing every part of his book. But we don't recollect that he has once said, or so much as hinted, that the creature is the efficient cause of sin; though he hath said many things which imply that God is the efficient. Whether he declined being explicit from a conviction, that though his scheme made God the cause of moral tur­pitude, the minds of Christians were not yet prepared to receive this astonishing doctrine, we shall not say. It is of vast importance, who is the cause of sin. We could wish Mr. Edwards had not evaded a direct answer to a question, which his subject, in every part of it, required him to answer in clear and determinate language.

"I BELIEVE," saith Mr. Edwards, ‘there is no per­son of good understanding, who will venture to say, he is certain that it is impossible it should be best— that there should be such a thing as moral evil in the world.’ Be it so: Is his inference just? ‘It will cer­tainly follow, that an infinitely wise being, who always chuseth what is best, must chuse that there should be such a thing.’ ^† Many intelligent persons apprehend there is a medium between being peremptory on either side. While their modesty and humility prevent their saying, they are certain moral evil is not for the best, they make as great a scruple of saying, they are certain it is best sin has taken place. It would be no difficult matter to shew, that the latter assertion is as daring as the former, altho' Mr. Edwards has "ventured" to affirm the one, and to impeach the goodness of their understanding who may affirm the other, or chuse not to express themselves with the assurance he doth. Whether it argues "good under­standing," or prejudice and confidence, that he is so ‘ex­ceeding peremtory in this opinion (as he is in every opi­nion which he maintains in this controversy with the’ ^* deniers of necessity) we leave to others to judge.

To one that enquires, "Why did God permit sin?" it would be a proper answer, You have no right to know: 'Tis sufficient that he is not the cause of it. The reasons and ends of the permission of sin, as well as of other events, the Father hath reserved very much in his own power. 'Tis not for us to know them. Whatever the consequences of sin are, or might have been, had no redeemer been pro­vided, God and his throne will be guiltless, if the fall of angels and men is laid at the right door. Our duty is to bless God who hath not permitted the human apostacy without the provision of an all-sufficient savior, in whom whosoever believeth shall not perish, but have everlasting [Page 84] life—who hath made us partakers of his gospel and grace in Christ; and to give a practical assent to this faithful saying, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sin­ners. For thus only can we be saved from the wages of sin, and become the subjects of that grace which reigneth through righteousness unto eternal life, by Jesus Christ our Lord.

The question respecting the reasons of the divine permis­sion of sin, being useless and impertinent at least, if not presumptuous, we would only take occasion to observe, that "it is the inevitable result of the nature and condition of created free agents, that they may possibly err, and act contrary to right; and the placing them in such a possibi­lity is by no means to be imputed to any deficiency of wisdom and goodness in God. For example, such a crea­ture as man, compounded of flesh and spirit, must have a variety of affections; some higher, and some lower; some which determine him to pursue the proper perfection of his superior faculties as the chief end of his being, and o­thers which attach him to the inferior part of his consti­tution; which must also be preserved by his care, during the time appointed for his subsistence. Since then, there are such different tendencies in the nature of man, and liberty also essential to him, he must be capable of acting differently according to the different direction of his in­stincts and affections; and his acting always right could not be absolutely secured, or the possibility of moral evil avoided, without such an interposition of almighty power, as would import an essential change in his frame and his state. In other words, if the divine perfections required that sin should be absolutely prevented, or not at all per­mitted, they required that such a creature as man in a state of probation, should not be created: Which scarcely any considerate person will have the hardiness to affirm." ^‡

Mr. Edwards, it will be remembered, proceeds upon this supposition, that the infinite creator, before the world was, having in contemplation all possible systems, gave the preference to one including moral evil, as best calculated to manifest his perfections. Hence he affirms it to be [Page 85] part of God's own infinite scheme of things to chuse what he hates, and what is in itself, as man's act, disagreable to his heart. (p. 380.) He accordingly instructs us to view the world, with all the wickedness that ever was, is, or will be in it, as the projection, ordination and production of that glorious being, who hath not pleasure in wicked­ness, with whom evil shall not dwell. Nothing has ever taken place but in prosecution of his original plan: Mo­ral evil is a necessary means through which he effects his designs: and (it is intimated p. 163,) hath not "mar'd his system,"—nor indeed can this be supposed, if sin is so essential and material "a part of his infinite scheme of things."

Now were it admitted, that moral evil is for the best, as Mr. Edwards declares he is certain it is; this would by no means be a bottom broad enough to support his doc­trine; that it came into existence through the divine de­termination and decisive disposal. For if he "disposeth the mind to" moral evil, then he " causeth the mind to be dis­posed to, and to will" it; "and that is the same thing as to be the cause of" moral evil (p. 136.) Again, Mr. Ed­wards insists, that the determiner of volition is the cause of it. So that to say (as he does through his whole book) that God determineth every volition of moral agents from their first existence; is to say, he is the cause of every sinful volition. But enough has been offered on this head. The opinion, that moral evil is for the best, is much more ten­able on the principles of those who ascribe causality and self-determination to the creature, and suppose sin arose from the abuse of free-will, maintaining no influence or disposal of the divine being in it, but only his permission of it, or suffering it to come to pass—than on the principles of those who ascribe moral evil to his efficiency. The for­mer opinion shews a respect to the moral character of God: The advocates for it say, he taketh occasion to bring good out of evil—to over-rule the existence of sin for the best. The espousers of the latter opinion seem boldly to say, that God doth evil, that good may come. Can a being of perfect moral excellence give existence to sin by his influ­ence? Can it be faulty in the subject, and yet proceed from [Page 86] him as the cause? We presume it has been made evi­dent, that neither of these things can be true.

The scheme under examination supposeth God to be the cause of every thing, and consequently of sin—hence sin is infered to be best, because it is supposed to proceed from God in this manner. Were moral agents left to de­termine themselves, then it is pleaded, the events depend­ing on their determination would be contingent, and might not come to pass; which is supposed to be irreconcileable with the prescience and decrees of God—the plan of his government. Moral evil being part of his plan, to render it's existence certain, he determined, it is said, to effect it by his providence—by his own power and agency; as much as he determined to create the world by an exertion of his power. The difficulty from divine prescience shall be examined in it's place. But if the above mentioned foun­dation be false, the inference, that sin is for the best cannot be supported by it, even granting the thing infered to be true in itself.

On his principles Mr. Edwards (with good reason) sup­posed it would be objected, that God may do evil that good may come. But how hath his answer removed the objection, if it be indeed true, as he teacheth, that moral evil is a part of God's infinite scheme—an effect of his determining and disposing—and therefore best? If so, is it unfit and unsuitable in it's nature, or of bad tendency? Can that be a necessary means of the greatest good in the divine system, which is upon the whole either unfit and unsuitable in it's nature, or bad in it's tendency? In order to accomplish his own holy and benevolent ends, is infi­nite wisdom compelled to make use of unholy and male­volent means? means unfit and unsuitable in their nature, and in their tendency bad? How can such things stand in the relation of means to the proposed end? Mr. Edwards must either say, that God doth evil that good may come, or else that moral evil is a thing fit in it's nature, and good in it's tendency. For to be the cause of an evil effect is evidently to do evil; and though such evil be improved as a means of great general good, the end will not sanctify or alter the means. No being can, with a good intent, [Page 87] be the designed cause of moral evil. Yet it is insisted on, that moral evil is determined and designed by God—"a part of his own infinite scheme." And if it is his deter­mining act, then he is the cause of it. Plain common sense, unperverted by metaphysics, teacheth the world, that holy means only are adapted to an holy end; and that no sup­poseable reference of moral evil to a good end can justify any moral agent in having recourse to it to effect his de­signs—much less can a being of infinite perfection, who can be at no loss for proper means to accomplish his own ends, first be the cause of wickedness, that by this, as a ne­cessary means, he may bring to pass the purposes of his holiness and goodness. The nature of the means will be the same, whatever be the end in view. After all the so­phistical pains that have been taken to shew, that moral evil, though infinitely hateful in it's nature and tendency, is yet a necessary well-adapted means of the greatest good, and as such first effected by the deity, and then improved by him to advance the greatest happiness in his system, it yet remains problematical, or far from being proved that unspotted purity can be the author of sin. If we should grant it to be best that moral evil hath come into existence, will it therefore follow, that it is an effect proceeding from divine efficiency? or that it is best the supreme cause shou'd be the author of it? "They who think and talk in this strain ought to remember," that they have no reason to complain, if the world esteem it "an instance of the greatest arrogance" and audacious impiety.

"Though the actual permission of evil," says bishop Butler, ‘may be beneficial to the world: (that is, it would have been more mischievous, not that a wicked person had himself abstained from his own wickedness, but that any one had forcibly prevented it, than that it was permitted:) Yet notwithstanding, it might have been much better for the world, if this very evil had never been done. Nay, it is most clearly conceivable, that the very com­mission of wickedness may be beneficial to the world, and yet, that it would be infinitely more beneficial for men to refrain from it. For thus, in the wise and good constitution of the natural world, there are disorders [Page 88] which bring their own cures; diseases, which are them­selves remedies. Many a man would have died, had it not been for the gout or a fever; yet it would be tho't madness to assert, that sickness is a better or a more per­fect state than health; though the like, with regard to the moral world, has been asserted.’

With most Christians it might be laid down for a postulatum, that the knowledge, imitation and enjoyment of God were his end in the formation of moral and ac­countable, creatures. Whence it will follow, that the greatest good of the intelligent creation is to fall in with that instruction in the oracles of truth; (contrary to ma­ny in modern metaphysics) Let him that glorieth, glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth me, that I am the Lord, which exercise loving-kindness, judgment and righteous­ness in the earth: For in these things I delight, saith the Lord. This clearly points out the Creator's view and design in giving being to moral agents—what his own scheme is—what should be their first and last end, and re­garded by them as the one thing needful—shewing them how they may fall in with the designs and exertions of in­finite wisdom for the advancement of their holiness and highest happiness, and thereby attain the end of their cre­ation. To live without remembrance or knowledge of God, in contradiction to the above mentioned moral per­fections, which he displays in his own government of the world, and propounds to the imitation of the subjects of his moral government—to sin against him without fear— we need not scruple to say, this would be to oppose his designs. If his end in the creation of moral agents was, that they might be conformed to him and blessed in his likeness and friendship; perhaps it may be infered, that he had no secret design contrary to this. Perhaps it may follow, that he did not make rebel angels at first with this view, that he might be the cause of their rebellion, and then punish them eternally for what was the effect of his own determining act, as a means of displaying his holiness and justice and mercy, of establishing his dominion and authority, of promoting and securing the moral rectitude of their fellows. "They who talk or think in this strain," [Page 89] seem not to understand what they say, nor whereof they affirm. Such things published by unknown authors would be generally supposed to proceed from disbelief of religion, natural and revealed.

From what has been observed, it follows, that moral evil was not God's end in the creation of moral agents; and consequently, that it was not part of his scheme to bring them to the enjoyment of himself, or secure to them this felicity, by means of moral evil. They who say so ought to prove these two things. First, That moral evil is a necessary means of qualifying moral agents for the enjoyment of God, or of their everlasting security of his friendship. Secondly, That he hath prescribed it as the true medium to this end, and determined it's existence with this view. In other words, that sin is the appointed me­dium of holiness and happiness—necessary to the moral perfection of the intelligent creation. We are too sensible what sort of employment he must have who undertakes this, to spend time in exposing the absurdity of such a scheme.

That holiness is the greatest good of the moral world, we beg leave to take for granted. We don't desire to maintain a controversy with those who deny it. This prin­ciple being admitted, the enquiry is, what hath the di­rectest tendency to promote holiness? For that is for the best, which hath this tendency. Now we may appeal to common sense, whether moral evil is most eligible in this view. Whether that which stands in direct opposition to holiness hath the most direct tendency to it, or conduceth to the highest degrees of it. Do contraries promote and advance each other? Is greater happiness attained by a partial remedy of an evil, than would be by preventing it? Which is most honorable to the infinite Creator, to say, that the original powers and assistances imparted to the creature were sufficient to his continuing upright, and that his fall arose from the abuse of them? Or to say, that his fall arose from a defect of original advantages, or the withdraw of divine influence?

Natural evil appears plainly to be the consequence of moral, and not moral the consequence of natural, as a late [Page 90] writer supposeth. ^* Evils of the former kind are the judi­cial as well as natural consequence of the latter sort, and designed to correct and amend them—the evil of punish­ment or affliction is designed and adapted to cure the evil of sin—or to lead sinners to repentance; and promote a reformation in them.—So that moral evil supposeth their deviation from the greatest good, from what would have been best for them. And if their restoration to righteous­ness is best, let any one shew that their departure from righteousness was for the best—that their original perma­nency in it would not have been the greatest good—that the permanency of the whole intellectual system, as well as a part of it, in holiness, would not have been best.

Mr. Edwards supposeth, that all events which have taken place may therefore be inferred to be agreable to infinite wisdom and goodness and part of the scheme of the superin­tendent of the universe—and that all events which ever will take place fall within his plan and design, for the same reason. Whence it follows, that whatsoever hath not, or will not come to pass, is disagreable to him, contrary to his scheme of government. For were it agreable to his wis­dom and goodness, he would chuse it; and if he chose, he would determine it; and if he determined it, he would bring it to pass. Consequently, he chuseth and desireth not the repentance of such as die impenitent. For this would be to chuse something in contravention of his infinite scheme. Consequently, he hath not commanded them to repent; or if he hath, then he hath commanded what is not a­greable to his wisdom and goodness. Or if his desire is expressed in his commands, then the thing desired not taking place; he must be infinitely crossed and grieved, in proportion to his infinite love and desire of righteous­ness, and hatred of wickedness. For this is Mr. Ed­wards's own inference, if any thing is supposed to come to pass which God chuseth and desireth not—or fails of com­ing to pass which he chuseth should come to pass. Doth he therefore not chuse (notwithstanding the frequent de­clarations and assevertaions in his word) that impenitents (finally remaining such) should turn and live? Are the rich­es [Page 91] of his goodness and forbearance, in the day of visitation, not designed to lead them to repentance? Is it not ques­tionable, upon the whole, whether he is a lover of holiness? For how much would the renovation of impenitents add to the sum total of holiness in the universe? But this is not a thing chosen and desired, because it doth not come to pass—and for this good reason it would not be best. Or will any undertake to shew, that the impenitency of great multitudes is a means of proportionably more holiness in other beings—that the holiness of a small number com­paratively is so amazingly increased by this means, that the amount of holiness and happiness in the system will be great­er, than if all abandoned sinners had been led to repentance? greater than if all created free-agents had continu'd holy? Or admit this, the consequence then is, that the impeni­tent wickedness and eternal punishment of the greatest part of the intelligent creation is a necessary means, thro' which the governor of the world effects the ends of holi­ness and goodness with respect to a remnant that shall be saved. But it yet remains to be shewn, that such means are adapted to the ends of the greatest holiness and hap­piness, upon the whole.

‘If moral evil, and the punishment of it are necessary towards promoting universal good, then the more wick­ed men are, the more they promote that good; and the more they co-operate with their Creator in compleating his great and benevolent plan of universal happiness.’ It is argued, that since ‘misery brings with it it's utility, why may not wickedness?’

‘That though sin in us, who see no farther than the evils it produceth, is evil, and justly punishable; yet in God, who sees the causes and connections of all things, and the necessity of it's admission,’ it is not so, but very good. ‘Thus, robbery may disperse useless hoards to the benefit of the public; adultery may bring heirs and good humor too into many families where "they would other­wise have been wanting; and murder free the world from tyrants and oppressors. Luxury maintains its thousands, [Page 92] and vanity its ten thousands. Superstition and arbitrary power contribute to the grandeur of many nations, and the liberties of others are preserved by the perpetual contentions of avarice, knavery, selfishness and ambition. Thus the worst of vices, and the worst of men, are of­ten compelled by providence to serve the most benefici­al purposes—and thus private vices become public be­nefits.’ ^* Therefore these vices are for the best—and by consequence the vicious persons some of the most benefi­cial members of society. The universe would by no means be so happy without them as with them. Why then do the ministers of religion warn the wicked, and call upon them to turn from sin to God? why beseech them to be reconciled to God? Why do they not rather wink at their crimes, and even encourage them therein? For though by their hardness and impenitency they treasure up to them­selves wrath, yet their incorrigibleness in sin, and their eternal punishment for those vices to which they were de­termined by providence, being necessary to advance the holiness and happiness of the universal system, they may be excited and exhorted to persist in sin by the motive of public benevolence; and may have this consolation under the apprehension of that indignation and wrath, tribula­tion and anguish, which await them, that their destruction soul and body in hell, is for the good of the universe!

Suppose the ministers of the gospel were to preach to their people, tha [...] [...] conversion of the many who live a­bandon'd and die impenitent is not what God chuseth or desireth, not agreable to his infinite wisdom and goodness— that it is a desireable thing they should live and die in sin—that God hath pleasure herein—and that, to render the event infallibly certain and necessary, he "actually ef­fects, by a positive agency and disposal of his own," or by his "determining providence," the "hardness of their hearts"—and this as a necessary means of manifesting his perfections, and advancing the greatest good, in the eter­nal salvation of a small number, whose security in holiness and happiness depends on their reflecting upon the tor­ments of the damned.—Would not people justly say, "We [Page 93] are delivered to do all these abominations!" When they hear the words of the curse, will they not bless themselves in their hearts, saying, "We will walk in the imagination of our heart: We shall act in subserviency to God's infi­nite scheme, and promote the holiness and happiness of the system, by doing every one what is right in his own eyes. We will rejoice and be exceeding glad in the addi­tion we make to the public good by our vices, and will make ourselves more vile." Indeed, he is an enemy to the world, who doth not take satisfaction in moral evil, and praise God for it's existence, if the doctrine we are ex­amining be true. For hath it contributed so much to the perfection and happiness of the moral world? could not the divine character have been manifested to the creatures to good advantage without it? is it's existence the effect of divine determination? and doth it become us to la­ment or repent of that which was a necessary means of the greatest possible good? Shall we grudge the happiness of the moral world? Shall we bewail ourselves, or call up­on others to bewail, that which is the grand security of the virtue and happiness of moral agents? the only means of illustrating the divine perfections to angels and men, and of establishing his dominion and authority over them? And if moral evil be an effect of divine operation, why are we not as much obliged to celebrate his praise for the production of this, as for his other works which declare his glory—especially since MORAL EVIL MORE IL­LUSTRIOUSLY DISPLAYS HIS NAME THAN ALL HIS OTHER WORKS?

Upon what evidence, by what reasoning, do men fix down in this conclusion, that the moral rectitude of holy angels would have been peculiarly endangered had there been no apostates, the terror of whose punishment is sup­posed to secure the inhabitants of the world above in their allegiance? How does it appear that holy angels would have reverenced their maker and father less, or been less apprehensive of his authority, had moral evil never taken place? Whither will this doctrine lead, that the divine perfections could have been exhibited to the intelligent creation only through the intervention of sin? Apply it [Page 94] to the character of a wise, just and benevolent earthly so­vereign. Can the ends of his government be attained, and his true character made to appear, only by means of the rebellion of his subjects! Is it necessary to secure him that respect and reverence to which he is intituled, that a great part of his people should revolt, and be capitally punished! Thanks to the lawless, rebels, and traitors! For it is doubtless best the character of such a sovereign, and the nature of his administration, should be known, and that the ends of his government should be effected. In a word, will not the doctrine before us terminate in this, that it is best there should be no law or government human or divine? For better no law or government than such as it is best should be violated and contemned. Yet it seems that from such violation and contempt of autho­rity, the true excellence and dignity of government is to be learnt, and it's ends answered; and from hence only. How sagacious are the reasonings of some men, who mea­sure the Deity by themselves!

'Tis well that the understandings of the generality of mankind are not perverted by metaphysical subtilties. Common people have no manner of doubt but sin is an evil thing and a bitter—the source of all misery. They have no doubt but it had been well for the world had this accursed thing never entred into it. They never once imagine that God hath pleasure in it; that he is the cause of it, or determines moral agents to it—they suppose that moral evil is a thing to which creatures are determined of themselves, agreable to the plain sense of the apostle's words, ‘Let no man say, when he is tempted, I am tempt­ed of God: For God cannot be tempted with evil, nei­ther tempteth he any man. But every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed.’ Common people have penetration enough to keep up a distinction between God's being the cause of natural good and evil, and his being the cause of moral evil—They rea­dily admit a positive influence of the Deity in holiness, but not in wickedness. If some modern metaphysicians had the sense and discernment of the vulgar in these matters, it would be happy for themselves and the world. The [Page 95] common people have been educated in the belief of such things as these; that the most exalted motives to holiness are a consideration of it's intrinsic beauty and excellence, it's tendency to dignify the intelligent nature, to advance the divine glory and secure his approbation. They have believed that the fear of eternal punishment is but an infe­rior principle of action—a spirit that ruleth in slaves, not in sons. Are these mere vulgar errors? So it should seem, if it be true that the punishment of devils is what secureth the persevering holiness of angels and glorified spirits, and establisheth the divine authority in their hearts.

Mr. Edwards hath no where said, that moral evil might not have been prevented, but rather intimated the contra­ry. Nor hath he denied but the human apostacy might have been permitted without the provision of a savior. However, on his principles neither of these things may be supposed. For he hath ventured to say, he is CERTAIN that moral evil is for the best—and that an infinitely wise being must therefore chuse it. Whether it follows or not from the hints that have been given, that moral evil is not best for the world, we are by no means very sollicitous, because we chuse not to be peremptory and confident. Yet we apprehend enough has been said to create such a degree of suspicion whether it is indeed best, that few "per­sons of good understanding will say, they are certain it is best." Or thus much at least we suppose will follow from the things that have been observed, that the advantage of moral evil to the world is not proveable in the way Mr. Edwards has attempted to prove it—the result of which is, that God may do evil, that good may come. Two pro­positions appear to be mutually assumed by him to prove each other: One while he makes a postulatum of this, that whatever is, is therefore best; and proceeds to argue, that God determines moral agents to sin. At another time, making a postulatum of this last position, he proceeds to argue, that sin must therefore be infinitely beneficial to the world. What part soever of his discourse be examined, the plain consequence appears to be this, that God is the cause of all wickedness.

NO question on the subject of morals hath more per­plexed the learned than this, How is divine presci­ence reconcileable with liberty in the creature? While most (and among these the wisest of men) have modestly confessed their ignorance, and looked upon the question as unanswerable by an human understanding; some few have attempted to solve the difficulty. But the attempt hath been executed in such a manner as hath rather evi­denced the folly and arrogance of the undertakers, than cleared the subject. The reader will hence conclude, that the solution of this difficulty is not what we propose in the present section.

But since some gentlemen seem to suppose, that presci­ence and liberty cannot both be firmly believed unless the mind of man can reconcile them—since Mr. Edwards seems to think his own scheme altogether clear of this dif­ficulty; and since from the divine prescience he infers his doctrine of necessity; these things shall be briefly exami­ned in this place.

To say that prescience and liberty are absolutely irre­concileable, because we ourselves cannot reconcile them, would be to take the dimensions of the divine mind from our own. An infinite understanding may be able to re­concile them, when a finite cannot. If any subject in­volves difficulties, which we cannot solve, we may not immediately infer a contradiction in it. For what subject can be mentioned that doth not involve such difficulties? If we determine to believe no doctrines, till we see how these things can be, this will land us in absolute scepticism. [Page 97] Do we believe nothing but what we can give a rationale of? 'Tis manifest then, that we do not believe the di­vine existence, nor that of any other beings or things— not even our own existence. For who pretends to know after what manner God exists? or to be acquainted with the essences of other things? The divine eternity, infinity, omniscience, &c. transcend all our conceptions. We are wholly ignorant how our own souls and bodies are united— are lost in the contemplation of our own frame. The tri­nity and satisfaction are inexplicable mysteries. The scheme of Christianity, and the whole moral government of God, are incomprehensible. Nor would they be other­wise, and be worthy of him who is perfect in knowledge. His judgments are unsearchable, and his ways past find­ing out. As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are his thoughts and ways above ours. Although we have such evidence in general of the truth and reality of the things above-mentioned as in a manner compels our be­lief; yet when the question is put, How can these things be? we discern insuperable difficulties—at the same time we are conscious infidelity would involve us in difficulties still greater.

With respect to the question before us, if the voice of scripture or reason be hearkned to, we must admit both prescience and liberty—and that they are consistent, tho' after a manner inconceivable by us. For we cannot be­lieve evident contradictions.

We use the term foreknowledge in accommodation to our own narrow views and way of conceiving things. In an infinite understanding, there is no before or after— no succession of ideas. To him who calleth things that are not as though they were, and with whom a thousand years are as one day, the knowledge of futurity is present, knowledge. How then can a finite mind conceive the manner of his knowing futurity? Is there any thing in visible creation that affords a resemblance of what we call prescience. When we undertake to speak on a subject so high and too wonderful for us, it becomes us to be dif­fident of ourselves, and very sparing of words, remember­ing that we are of yesterday—Those seem not aware of [Page 98] their own ignorance, and the danger of speaking of God the thing that is not right, who attempt to explain this matter; as though by searching they could find out God —as though he had taken counsel with them. Hast thou heard the secret of God? And dost thou restrain wisdom to thyself?

Some men are apt to depart from evident truth out of regard to abstruse speculations. They turn aside from the plain road of common sense, disdaining a beaten track, and are carried away with the error of the wicked, under pretence of new and important discoveries. If any truth be plain, this is, that man is free. Next to the conscious­ness of our own existence is that of our moral freedom. Yet a truth so obvious is called in question by some men, because they cannot make it agree with the idea they have formed of God's infinite knowledge and eternal counsels.

‘As to the manner of God's foreknowing certainly contingent future events, that is, which have no neces­sary cause, nor are to be accomplished by his own power, and the determination of his will, but produc'd by other free agents; this seems to be incomprehensible by the human understanding. That any mind should foresee with certainty a distant event, which does not necessarily proceed from the nature of things, nor is fix'd by the purpose of a voluntary agent, is wonderful to us and far surpasseth our conception. For as our knowledge of futurity can only rest on one or other of these founda­tions, we can form no distinct notion of any foreknow­ledge without them. It is probably their apprehending the divine prescience after the same manner, and limit­ing it to the same grounds, which has occasioned so much perplexity in the minds of men, and involved their speculations upon this subject in so much confusi­on. Some imagining that contingent events could not otherwise be so ascertained, as to be infallibly known, have supposed peremptory eternal decrees concerning all of them, even the freest actions of men; and not only so, but a previous divine influence on the active powers of rational creatures, exciting them to action: But others judging this to be utterly inconsistent with human liber­ty, [Page 99] and, with respect to evil actions, inconsistent with the purity and goodness of the divine nature, yet still adhering to the same limited foundation of foreknow­ledge, have denied the doctrine of prescience altogether, or doubted concerning it. I believe the best way for us to get rid of these difficulties is wholly to neglect the hypotheses, which have been invented to account for the manner of the divine prescience, acknowledging that it is to us inexplicable, and yet concluding that this is no sufficient objection against a doctrine, other­wise well confirmed.’ ^*

"I admire," says Dr. Eliot, ‘the modesty, as well as goodness of heart, discovered by the great Mr. Locke, in one of his letters to Mr. Molineux; "I freely own," says he, "the weakness of my understanding, that though it be unquestionable, that there is omnipotence and om­niscience in God our maker, and I cannot have a clearer perception of any thing than that I am free; yet I can­not make freedom in man consistent with omnipotence and omniscience in God, though I am as fully persuad­ed of both as of any truths I most firmly assent to, and therefore I have long since left off the consideration of the question.’ The Doctor subjoins to these words of Mr. Locke the following pertinent and seasonable reflec­tion: ‘If some of our modern reasoners, who have not a tenth part of his understanding, had a little more of his humility, the world would be free from those angry disputes about fate and free-will, liberty and necessity, which puzzle the heads, but seldom mend the hearts, of those who engage in them.’ ^†

To proceed: Prescience is a difficulty that encumbers Mr. Edwards's own scheme no less than that of his oppo­nents. For he saith, ‘There must be a certainty in things themselves before they are certainly foreknown,’ and affirms that the former "is the foundation" of the latter. (P. 22; 175.) Events have ‘a fixed certain futurity prior to’ foreknowledge, and this antecedent necessity of their coming to pass is the cause of their being certainly foreknown. What is meant by the certainty in things [Page 100] themselves prior to their existence, is as unintelligible as his opinion, ‘that there is in the nature of things a foun­dation for the knowledge of the being of God, without any evidence of it from his works;’ of which notice was taken, Examination, p. 36. marg. If by this certainty be meant any thing different from the divine decrees and determinations, then his argument will stand thus: The certainty there is in things themselves is the foundation of the divine decrees; the divine decrees are the foundation of foreknowledge; and foreknowledge is the foundation of that necessity which belongs to all events in the natural and moral world. This seems to be arguing in a circle. On the other hand, if by this certainty in things themselves be meant the same as the divine decrees and determinations, then these being the supposed foundation of foreknow­ledge, the latter cannot be the cause of events, as Mr. Ed­wards represents, but the former. Necessity is the cause of the knowledge of events, and not the knowledge of them the cause of their necessity.

Further, If the purposes and decrees of God, or his de­terminations as to futurity, be antecedent to foreknow­ledge, and the foundation thereof, then his will is deter­mined "at random, by blind contingence," without design or foresight— ‘guided by no wisdom, no motive, no intel­ligent dictate whatever—he only acts by an Hobbistical fatality.’ (P. 330, 334.) To speak of the divine will as determined prior to knowledge, is plainly to suppose it determined without counsel and wisdom, undirected by knowledge and intelligence. And what holiness can there be in such determinations? It was surely through want of "reflection and research"—through inattention to his own scheme, that Mr. Edwards grounds the certainty of fore­knowledge on an antecedent necessity of events arising from the divine counsels and purposes. He represents the opinion of those who teach that God's foreknowledge is antecedent to his decrees, as a servile subjecting the Deity to fatal necessity; and saith, it argues inferiority and ser­vitude unworthy of him, and comports with the heathen notion of fate as above the gods; because this is to sup­pose, saith he, that events have a fixed certain futurity, to [Page 101] which the divine volitions and designs are subject, and must be accommodated. (p. 352, 353.) 'Tis not a little surprizing, that Mr. Edwards did not perceive this objec­tion was much more applicable to his own doctrine, than to that of his opposers. Besides, How do these things agree with his own words, p. 325. ‘We must conceive of the perfection of the divine understanding as the foun­dation of his wise purposes and decrees.’ As he is not herein reconcileable with himself, so his principles are not consistent with the admission of forkenowledge. To say, the certainty of things, or divine determination of events, is antecedent to his perfect knowledge of futurity, is to deny prescience, and only to ascribe after-knowledge to God. So that while Mr. Edwards supposeth his own scheme of ne­cessity clear of all difficulty from the head of fore-know­ledge, it appears not only to militate with itself, but utterly to preclude that prescience from which he infers the neces­sity of all events.

We will now enquire, in the last place, whether pre­science implies necessity. Mr. Edwards useth the terms certainty and necessity, as tho' they were perfectly synony­mous; and saith, ‘Philosophical necessity is nothing dif­ferent from certainty.’ (P. 22.) It is granted by all who believe fore-knowledge, that this really implies the certainty of all future events—not only that they will come to pass, but also that they will come to pass in such a cer­tain manner. But the inference is not, that they will come to pass necessarily because fore-known—that they are indis­solubly connected as effects with prescience as their cause. Now it is in this sense that Mr. Edwards maintains neces­sity. If fore-knowledge infers necessity (in his sense of the word necessity) then it implies an irresistible determination of the wills and actions of moral agents.

Prescience has no causality in the coming to pass of these things which are the objects of it. So far is it from hav­ing any efficiency to produce them, that it hath no influence to their production by way of motive or excitement. For a motive is something extant in the mind's view. Now can any moral agent know, previous to any given volition or action, that he shall certainly be determined to such vo­lition [Page 102] or action? If not, then he cannot know that such voli­tion or action is certainly foreknown. For this would be to say, that what may never become effect may be foreknown. And if moral agents cannot tell beforehand what is fore­known with respect to themselves, then foreknowledge can have no influence in determining their actions. For what is not perceived cannot excite or move to action; or de­termine the wills of moral agents; nor consequently be considered as the cause, ground, or reason of their being de­termined to this or that. "Nothing," says Mr. Edwards, ‘can induce or invite the mind to will or act any thing, any further than it is perceived, or is some way or other in the mind's view.’ (p. 8.) To say that prescience is in the view of the creature's mind, wou'd be to ascribe an incommunicable attribute of the Creator to a creature. Foreknowledge, then, has no influence in bringing any moral volitions to pass—nor is it even an occasion of their becoming effect. It doth not stand in the relation of a cause, motive, reason or occasion to the existence of things to come, any more than our knowledge of things past or present has such relation to their existence. Herein we have Mr. Edwards's concurrence, p. 175. ‘I freely allow that foreknowledge don't prove a thing to be necessary, any more than after knowledge.’ Now doth our know­ing that a thing is already come to pass imply that it came to pass necessarily? If not, then neither doth foreknow­ledge of a future event imply that such event must come to pass by necessity. That we know certainly an event hath already taken place, doth not imply that the nature of that event, or the manner of it's coming to pass, are de­termined by our knowledge. No more doth divine pre­science affect the nature of events, or the manner of their coming into existence.

Mr. Edwards, as hath been observed, makes the di­vine determination, and decisive ordering and disposing of all events, the ground of their being foreknown—he supposeth the divine determinations alike concern'd in moral volitions and actions, as in those things which are the mere work of God—that it properly belongs to him to dispose, fix and determine the wills of all moral agents, [Page 103] in every act, from the beginning of their existence. And though he asserts not in words a positive agency of God in evil actions; yet the thing in effect is asserted, as hath been shewn. ^* Upon his scheme God is the author and cause of sin; no less than of natural good and evil—the author and cause of men's vices, no less than the giver and upholder of life, and fountain of their natural endow­ments and external advantages and enjoyments—the au­thor of evil dispositions, no less than of holy and virtuous ones. But do not reason and scripture shew us, that there is an important difference between his being the author of the former and his being so of the latter—? that his ope­ration, his determining and disposing providence, cannot extend to moral evil? ^‖ Doth foreknowledge infer such necessity? We need not scruple to say that the certainty of events, which foreknowledge implies is as diverse from Mr. Edwards's philosophic necessity as truth is from fals­hood, or light from darkness. To support his inference from foreknowledge, it was incumbent on him to shew, that this is an extrinsic efficient cause, whose influence and operation brings into effect the things foreknown. To say, that foreknowledge is an antecedent, and the things foreknown consequents, is but trifling, unless it can be shewn that the latter are indissolubly connected with the former as the cause of their existence. Mr. Edwards may [Page 104] claim the honour of being the only author that attributes causation to foreknowledge.

"Foreknowledge," saith an excellent writer, ‘has no influence at all upon the nature of things, to make the least alteration in them. The events which are necessary are foreknown as necessary, and those which are contingent and voluntary, are foreknown no other­wise than as contingent and voluntary.—The futurity of contingent events is real, though we cannot tell the cause of it, or upon what grounds it is to be known. A free action now done, was yesterday, or in any preceed­ing point of duration, as truly future, as it has to day actually come to pass; therefore it is not impossible (for our minds can discern no contradiction in it) that an infinite understanding should foreknow such events, though that knowledge is too high for us, or perhaps any finite mind, we cannot attain to it. And here we may safely rest, as we find ourselves obliged to do in our enquiries concerning the other perfections of God, which are evidently proved to belong to his nature, and therefore believed, though to us incomprehensible.—We cannot indeed believe contradictions, and to impose them upon us is to affront the rational nature; but it is no absurdity to believe the existence and properties of a being, whom we cannot by searching find out, nor un­derstand to perfection.’ ^‡

To support his peculiar notion of divine foreknowledge and decrees, Mr. Edwards denies moral agents all liberty except what is merely external, and the result of necessity in the mind. What pity is it that men, otherwise discerning, are tenacious of favorite hypotheses, tho' most absurd and prejudicial in their consequences! If intelligent creatures are not free in a sense different from the inferior animals, they cannot be said to be moral agents—the accountable authors of the things done by them: What they do must, in a moral estimate, be considered as the action of some other being. There must be self-determination, or free­dom, somewhere, in some one being at least. And is it not very bold to assert, that God is the producer of all the [Page 105] wickedness in the world, by his agency? He that main­tains this principle, that all our volitions and actions are necessary, would soon be convinced of his folly were he to reduce the principle to practice. For mankind will think he is free—that his actions are his own—and will treat him accordingly. He must soon become intolerable to society; and from the reception he meets with, he may clearly infer, that his fellow-creatures universally look up­on him as a moral agent, and suppose he might have act­ed otherwise. And he must be a strange creature indeed, if, finding the opinion of necessity in the moral actions of men (when reduced to practice) disavowed, with one voice, by mankind, it doth not create in him some suspicion wherether it be true, speculatively considered.

‘It is a conclusive argument against such a fatal ne­cessity as some men plead for, that it is contrary to the perceptions of the human mind,—we have a conscious­ness of liberty, we perceive no external influence, we have a moral sense, we pass a judgment on our own actions, approve or disapprove ourselves and others. It shows the difficulty, to which a very sensible writer ^* of the present day is reduced, who allows this inward perception, that we are necessitated to think ourselves and others free; and yet denies the reality of liberty. God has, according to him, implanted a delusive sense in us, our feeling is deceitful, the God of truth doth continually by a positive influence deceive and delude us. What strange notions have some men of that glorious being, all whose ways are truth, and who is righteous altogether! Is it not better to set limits to our enquiries, and to suppose there may be a mistake in some curious speculations, than to entertain senti­ments so dishonorable to God, and so entirely subversive of all moral government?’ ^†

IF from what has been said it should appear, that Mr. Edwards's scheme of necessity may justly be charged with making an holy and good God the proper cause of sin, (which is the leading objection we have all along had to his book on the will) it can be to every little purpose to alledge texts of scripture in support of it. A doctrine so repugnant to our natural apprehensions of God and his providence cannot be supported by any pretence of autho­rity from him. The holy scriptures were not given to contradict and subvert those notions of his moral perfecti­ons and government, which God hath given us by reason and the light of nature; but to confirm and improve them, as well as to afford us important instruction in things which unassisted reason would never have discovered. If any, therefore, should bring this doctrine to us, that God is the cause of moral evil, the direction given to the Isra­elites, in the case of being enticed to idolatry, ^* is for our learning, and may serve to regulate our conduct. We know not what right the advocate for such a doctrine can have to any other answer. His appealing to the word of God to support what he advanceth is not very consistent. For if a doctrine of such a nature be true, what faith can be had in any supposed revelation from God?

Yet it may be of use to some readers to take notice of the scriptures which are adduced to confirm the aforesaid scheme. As it would be tedious minutely to examine e­very particular text, we shall select two or three only, on which the principal stress is laid. Should these be found not to favour the scheme they are brought to support, the argument will conclude a fortiori with respect to other texts, which are supposed to have less weight. The pas­sages in the sacred writings made use of by Mr. Edwards may be reduced to three general heads. First, Such as re­present the taking place of moral evil to be by the deter­minate [Page 107] counsel, prescience and ordination of God. Second­ly, such as speak of his hardening moral agents in sin. Thirdly, Such as are supposed to favor the opinion of the advantage of moral evil to the universe.

First, Of such texts as represent the taking place of mo­ral evil to be by the determinate counsel, prescience and ordination of God.

Under this head, such texts are chiefly insisted on as re­fer to the crucifiction of the LORD OF GLORY. ^* Now these texts either imply an efficient determination of the Deity in this event, or they do not: If they do not, they are nothing to the purpose for which they are produced by the advocates for necessity. On the other hand, if it can be shewn that they really imply a divine efficiency on the minds of the murderers of our Lord, influencing and necessitating them to this horrid deed; then we shall not hesitate to admit, that every species and degree of wicked­ness proceeds from the same efficiency. For if God may be supposed to effect by his agency a crime of such enor­mity, what should hinder our believing that all moral evil is the product of his action and influence? But let us com­pare spiritual things with spiritual, and form our judg­ment from such a comparison in the present case. Hence it may appear much clearer, that an efficient determinati­on is not intended, than it will from these texts taken by themselves that such a determination is intended.

There is a twofold sense in which those moral events, which imply blame in the agents, may yet be said to come to pass by the determinate counsel, fore-knowledge and or­dination of God, without implying any active concurrence or efficiency of divine power herein.

First, Whatever comes to pass agreable to the predicti­ons of his word, may be said to take place by his determi­nate counsel and foreknowledge: Such events may be cal­led what his hand and counsel determined before should be done.

Secondly, Such events as he determines not to prevent by the interposal of his power, may also be said to come to pass in the same way. As all possible futurity was fore­ver [Page 108] known to God, it hence follows, that in this sense the existence of all moral evil is by his determinate counsel and foreknowledge: Nor is there any other difficulty in apply­ing this scripture language to all moral evil that hath taken place, or ever will, than in the application of it to the par­ticular case to which it immediately refers in scripture,— viz. the sufferings of the holy one and the just.

What one evangelist hath delivered thus, The son of man goeth as it was determined— ^† another expresseth in these terms, The son of man goeth, as it is written of him, ^‡ To the same purpose saith St. Peter, Those things which God before had shewed by the mouth of all his holy prophets, that Christ should suffer, he hath so fulfilled. ^* So Acts xiii. 27. They that dwell at Jerusalem, and their rulers, because they knew him not, nor yet the voices of the prophets, which are read every sabbath-day, they have fulfilled them, in condemning him. See also ch. xvii. 2, 3. Luke xxiv. 25, 26. Thus it was the determinate counsel of God, that Christ should suffer; and in order to this "it was neces­sary God should" permit him "to fall into the hands of wicked men, (for they could have no power over him, unless it were thus given them from above) and that he should lay no restraints upon them, from executing their malici­ous designs upon him; and this unrestrained permis­sion is all that is, or can be signified by God's delivering up Chirst into their hands—His power could not actually concur, or effectively incline them, to the crucifiction of the holy Jesus." For although "the hand of God is joined with his council, and applied" to this event; yet "the hand of God relates not so much to his power, as to his wisdom and providential dispensations." ^‖

The construction Mr. Edwards's scheme fixeth on the scriptures under consideration precludes all distinction be­tween the active and permissive providence of God—a dis­tinction which hath hitherto been esteemed important by the Christian church. A writer who spared no pains in collecting the sentiments of criticks and commentators, an­tient and modern, upon the scriptures, and hath discovered equal judgment and learning in this useful undertaking, [Page 109] has given us the sense of Christians on this point with so much perspicuity and precision, that we shall take liberty to make the following extracts. Constitutum est aeterno Dei consilio, et in S. S. declaratum, &c.

In English thus: It was appointed in God's eternal counsel, and declared in the holy scriptures. Though God foresaw, and decreed to permit, Judas's betraying Christ, yet it is not said that God determined Judas should betray, but that Christ should go. There is indeed a divine decree respecting the sins of men; but then God only permits, and over-rules for good, their sins, and by no means wills or determines their commission of them— (Lucas Bru­gensis.) If we enquire concerning the actions of Judas, Pilate and Herod, it is certain, indeed, that they did not happen without the father, inasmuch as a sparrow doth not fall to the ground without him. But the will of God re­specting them was permissive, not efficient; which distincti­on is more agreable to scripture, and the judgment of all the primitive Christians, than their opinion who would discriminate actions from the viciousness that is in them. This, in regard to many actions, contradicts the nature of things; for instance, theft, adultery, and the like, the very naming of which is unintelligible, if the idea of sinfulness be seperated therefrom. Those also are equally unworthy of regard, who say, that the Deity impels men to such ac­tions for a good end. For the end alone cannot make such actions right, or justify those decrees which antecedently impose an absolute necessity of committing them.—It may be added, that the name of sin is absurd, according to the hypothesis some proceed upon. For we cannot commit sin in those actions, which infinite goodness, by a decree subversive of the liberty of our will, determineth we should do. 'Tis more just by far to say with St. Paul, (Acts 14.16.) God permitted the nations to walk in their own ways; and if there are any obscure passages elsewhere in scripture to expound them in this sense; which all the antients did. (Clemens Origen, Alexandrinus, Origen, Cyprian, Chrysos­tom, Salvianus.) Agreably all the antients constantly affirm, that divine prescience imposeth on men no necessity of action; [Page 110] which were unmeaning, if foreknowledge itself be suppos­ed dependent on efficient decrees.

Origen, in his disputation, Whether what is foretold must be done? accurately distinguisheth necessity from permission, thus: If the meaning be, necessarily done, we declare for the negative; for it might not have been done, nor was there any necessity that Judas should be a traitor. On the other hand, if no more is meant than not hindering the event, which yet might not have become effect, we are for the affirmative. ^*

P. 362. of Mr. Edwards's book, Dr. Doddridge is in­troduced in a manner which may lead the reader to sup­pose his opinion was the same with Mr. Edwards's. Only the first part of the Dr's note on Luke xxii. 22. is quoted. In the latter part of the note on that text, the Dr. has taken particular care to guard that part Mr. Edwards has quoted against such a construction as this partial view may induce the public to fix upon the Doctor's words. If the reader turns to the place in Dr. Doddridge, it may give him a different view of the Doctor's sentiments from what Mr. Edwards's quotation exhibits.

In his note on Acts iv. 28. the Dr. saith, "It is—rati­onal—to explain this determination in such a manner, as to make it consistent with the free agency of the persons con­cerned. When God's hand and counsel are said to have determined these things, it may signify God's having point­ed out this great event so wisely concerted in his eternal counsels, and marked beforehand as it were all the boundaries of it—in the prophetic writings."

What the Doctor's opinion was respecting the necessity of moral actions, as proveable from the prescience and de­crees of God, we further learn from the following passages. Jude v. 4. " Who were registered to this condemnation. The word [Progegrammenoi] may well signify described and put up­on record; that is, whose character and condemnation may be considered as described in the punishment of other noto­rious sinners, who were a kind of representatives of them. Which interpretation I prefer to any other, as it tends to clear God of that heavy imputation which it must bring [Page 111] on his moral attributes, to suppose that he appoints men to sin against him, and then condemns them for doing, what they could not but do, and what they were, independent on their own freedom of choice, fated to. A doctrine so pregnant with gloomy, and, as I should fear, fatal conse­quences, that I think it a part of the duty I owe to the word of God, to rescue it from the imputation of contain­ing such a tenet."

Rom. ix. 13. "These words in their connection with the preceeding and following, do indeed prove, that God acts with a sovereign and unaccountable freedom in the dispensation of his favors,—Nevertheless it is certain, the apostle does not here speak of the eternal state of Jacob and Esau, (whatever some may suppose deducible from what he says,) nor does he indeed so much speak of their persons, as of their posterity; since 'tis plainly to that posterity that both the prophecies, which he quotes in support of his argu­ment, refer. Gen. xxv. 23. Mal. i. 2, 3. His laying waste the heritage of the Edomites for the dragons of the wilderness, is so different a thing from his appointing the person of Esau to eternal misery by a mere act of sovereignty, without re­gard to any thing done or to be done by him to deserve it; that I will rather submit to any censure from my fellow-servants, than deal so freely with my maker, as to conclude the one from the other."

Rom. ix. 22, 23. "Every attentive reader will, I doubt not, infer for himself the great difference of phrase, in which they who are vessels of wrath, and they who are vessels of mercy, are spoken of: It being said simply of the former, that they were fitted for destruction; but of the latter, that GOD prepared them for glory. A distinction of so great im­portance, that I heartily wish we may ever keep it in view, to guard us against errors, on the right-hand, or on the left."

Secondly, Of such texts as speak of God's hardening moral agents in sin. A single instance under this head may serve instead of many. The case of Pharaoh is much insisted on, of whom it is repeatedly said, that God har­dened his heart.

As Mr. Edward's scheme inseperably connects the active and permissive providence of God, so unless it can be [Page 112] shewn that God actually effects the hardness of sinners' hearts by a positive agency and influence, the scriptures produced under this head by no means help his cause. Now that God did not, could not, thus harden Pharaoh is manifest from the clearest notices we have of the divine moral per­fections. The oracles of inspiration and reason instruct us, that God hath no pleasure in wickedness, that evil shall not dwell with him; that he is of purer eyes than to be­hold it—that there is no unrighteousness with him. There­fore, let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: For God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man. Is God the cause of that in which he hath no pleasure?—to which he hath an infinite aversi­on? Doth he produce and effect by his positive influence that which the eyes of his purity cannot behold? Will he punish with eternal torments that which is the production of his own agency on the creature, and is there yet no un­righteousness with him? can the Judge of all the earth do right notwithstanding? Doth he determine men to, and by his own operation effect in them, what he cannot be tempted with, nor entice his creatures to perpetrate? In­deed, to effect by his power and influence such dispositi­ons and actions in the creature as involve all moral turpi­tude, is more than merely to tempt moral agents. They may be tempted, and resist the tempter. But to say such dispositions and actions are produced in them by the a­gency of the Deity himself, is to charge him, not merely with being accessary to, but the author of, what we call sin in the creatures. It must forever be impossible to se­perate the moral turpitude of such dispositions and actions from the producer or efficient of them. The scheme of necessity excludes, indeed, the possibility of sin. For sin is opposition to the will of God. But suppose creatures determined thereto by divine efficiency, this "would ei­ther be a mere passive obedience to the will of God, or an active compliance with it; but neither way a contra­diction to it."

If then God could not harden Pharaoh by a positive in­fluence and efficiency, it remains that he hardened him no otherwise than by suffering or permitting him to harden [Page 113] himself not interposing by an irresistible influence to pre­vent his obduration—or withdrawing divine influence and assistance from him after enduring him with much long-suffering, and using various means to humble and reform him. The riches of divine goodness and forbearance, in­tended and calculated to lead him to repentance, hardened Pharaoh, as evidently appears from the scripture account of this matter. Agreably we read, Psalm lxxxi. 11, 12. But my people would not hearken to my voice, and Isra­el would none of me. SO I gave them up unto their own hearts' lust; and they walked in their own counsel.

Worthy of remark is the note in Mr. Pool, on Exod. ix. 12. In quinque precedentibus plagis, &c. In the five first plagues, the hardening of Pharaoh's heart is ascribed to himself; in the five last, to God. As many times as he hardened his own heart, God hardened it for punishment. (Lightfoot's Spicilegium.)

The supposition of the divine agency in the obduration of sinners, is, upon the whole, incapable of support from the sacred writings. So gross a contradiction to reason, so glaring a repugnancy to the general doctrine of the bi­ble, so blasphemous a reflection on the divine author of the scripture, is implied herein, that it is not a little astonish­ing any persons who have a veneration for either should embrace a scheme of doctrine which contains it, and at­tempt to defend such scheme by the word of God. It leaves no room for a difference between physical and mo­ral necessity. It supposeth that God may deceive us. For it is allowed that we act with the conviction of being free agents, and that the scriptures consider and treat us as such; when in truth we are necessary agents, all our voli­tions and actions being determined by divine agency. ‘One writer affirms, that though man is a necessary a­gent, having all his actions determined by fixed and immutable laws; yet this is concealed from him—Who conceals it? Does the author of nature conceal it, and this writer discover it? What deference is not due to the judgment of a metaphysician, whose sagacity is so irresistibly (I had almost said omnipotently) penetrat­ing! But, good sir, as you are powerful, you should have been merciful. It was not kind to rob poor mortals of [Page 114] this crumb of comfort which had been provided for them in their ignorance; nor generous to publish so openly the secrets of heaven, and so bafflle the designs of providence by a few strokes of your pen. If the laws of nature, after maintaining their authority for six thousand years, are so little able to stand before him, who knows what havoc he might have made among them in the infancy of their establishment.’ ^*

Lastly, Of such passages of scripture as are supposed to favor the opinion of the advantage of moral evil to the uni­verse. Whether moral evil is really for the best—especial­ly whether it be so in that way which the scheme of necessity supposeth, has been already examined. (Section VI.) And what was offered on this head has in a good measure super­seded the occasion for a particular reply to the texts pro­duced here. Joseph's being sold by his brethren, and the crucifiction of Christ, are particularly alledged as proofs from scripture of the bestness of moral evil.

It is granted, that the wisdom of divine providence is many times conspicuous in bringing good out of evil— particularly in the instances mentioned, over-ruling for great and important good, what was in its own nature, and in the intention of the authors thereof, exceeding vile. The means wicked men and devils employ to bring to pass their devices, under the superintendency of the wise and gracious governor of the world, are made to answer bene­ficial purposes, which they thought not of, and contrary to their designs. He taketh the wise in their own crafti­ness, and carrieth headlong the counsel of the froward. But what is this to the purpose of proving, that their wick­edness is for the best? How doth it hence appear to be best, that God should effect this wickedness by his own agency. Unless this consequence is shewn to follow, it will be remembred, that the instances refered to prove no­thing to their purpose who maintain the necessity of moral evil. It may be best God should not interpose to over-rule and necessitate the wills of moral agents; and yet it might have been best that they themselves had refrain'd from sin. It may be best that God did not prevent the [Page 115] existence of sin by an irresistible influence; while yet it might have been best had fallen angels and men never abused their liberty, but persevered in virtue.

That moral agents should be necessitated to be vicious, as a means of the greatest holiness and happiness, is a strange position.

To recite scripture testimonies in opposition to this hy­pothesis would be needless, the whole tenor of the bible being in direct contradiction to it. When the scriptures describe sin as the accursed thing, which seperates the crea­ture from the Creator—the root of all bitterness—the ruin of individuals and communities—the wages whereof is death temporal and eternal—Shall any undertake to shew, notwithstanding, that it is for the good of the world—a means of advancing the divine glory, and therefore the production of his power—and attempt to support such a doctrine by the oracles of truth? In order to this, they must prove from these oracles, that God prefereth sin to holiness—that the apostacy of men and angels will be mat­ter of eternal praise in heaven—that we should sin greedily, that grace may abound—that sin is not opposite to the will of God, nor to his moral rectitude—that the least sin is yet infinitely opposite to God, and therefore an infinite evil—that infinite evil infinitely promotes God's glory, and therefore is an infinite good—that his wisdom and holiness require he should be concern'd in it by an efficient decree and active providence—that the divine influence and agen­cy are alike concern'd in the vices as in the virtues of his creatures.—When these and similar difficulties are cleared up, it will be soon enough to answer arguments, formed from texts of scripture to prove, that moral evil is for the good of the universe, through divine efficiency.

In the next succeeding section, some things will be of­fered, which may be applied in this place. We only add here, that while the friends of revelation exhibit such an idea of it, its enemies triumph. The author of the let­ters on the origin of evil, proceeding on the same founda­tion, takes occasion to burlesque the doctrine of the gos­pel in the following manner: ‘This principle of the ne­cessity of moral evil, and its punishment, is the foundati­on [Page 116] on which the whole fabric of the Christian dispensa­tion is erected; the principle itself is avowed by the author of that dispensation in clear and express words: It must needs be that offences come; but woe unto that man by whom the offence cometh: That is, it is necessary to­wards compleating the designs of providence, that some men should commit crimes; but as no individual is compelled by necessity to commit them, woe unto all who are thus [i. e. necessarily] guilty.—The expediency of moral evil, arising from the necessity of natural,—is a master-key, which will, I am certain, at once unlock all the mysterious and perplexing doctrines of that a­mazing institution, [Christianity] and explain fairly, without the least assistance from theological artifice, all those abstruse speculations of original sin, grace and predestination, and vicarious punishments, which the most learned, for want of this clue, have never yet been able to make consistent with reason and common sense— all evils owe their existence solely to the necessity of their own natures, by which I mean they could not pos­sibly have been prevented without the loss of some su­perior good, or the permission of some greater evil than themselves.’ ^* This author's view, in attempting to evince the necessity of moral evil, appears to have been no other than the utter subversion of natural and revealed religion.

IF the book which hath been under examination really concludes in this principle, that God is the efficient cause of sin; but few of our readers will think it needful to spend much time in considering objections. Whether this appears to be the true conclusion of Mr. Edwards's principles, from each of the foregoing sections taken se­perately, or from the evidence exhibited in them all taken together, must now be left to the judgment of the reader. Some of his friends acknowledge the conclusion we have drawn, adopt it as a principle, and undertake to defend it.

Can God then be the cause of that which is acknow­ledged to be contrary to his nature, law and government? Must it not be a fruitless employment of any man's time to attempt to make the negative more manifest than it al­ready is to such as "have plain sense and can follow it?" If the above-mention'd conclusion is clearly fastned on Mr. Edwards, it is such a reductio ad absurdum as must be a full confutation of his doctrine before believers, either Christians or Theists. Such as adopt the conclusion, and undertake to vindicate it before the world, should openly declare on the side of atheism, and scepticism, before they can reasonably expect any reply.

‘But if it is taken for granted, that Mr. Edwards's scheme concludes in nothing short of the divine effici­ency in moral evil, why then is this section devoted to the consideration of objections?’ Our answer (or ra­ther apology) is, to cut off occasion from them that seek it. Though all who believe in God may well take for granted, that there can be no real weight in any reasoning adduced to prove, that moral evil is an effect proceeding from him as its cause; or in any objections to the contrary principle—that whatever subtilty and deception there may be in such reasoning and objections, there can be no va­lidity therein—And though we are by no means fully sa­tisfied, that any objections, which can with propriety be [Page 118] made on the footing of the divine agency in moral evil, merit attention; yet we shall take notice of two objecti­ons principally, passing others which cannot so properly be made on the present hypothesis; or if they could, are less considerable. We shall, for instance, excuse ourselves from particularly considering this objection: That to say moral agents might in any instance chuse or act otherwise than they do, is to suppose an effect without a cause—an objection which has no weight, if moral agents in any case determine themselves, or are the cause of their own voliti­ons—as we trust hath been shewn.

We shall also pretermit the objection, that the opinion of self-determination makes the creature independent on the creator—yea, brings the creator into a state of depen­dance on the creature. The reader may, moreover, find the seeming weight there is in these objections removed, p. 77, 78. of the examination, in a note.

It must further be added, that some objections Mr. Ed­wards has made to the scheme of liberty in opposition to necessity are fully answered in that essay of Dr. Watts's, which he had before him. Mr. Edwards hath proposed the objections anew without taking notice of the pertinent answers the Dr. hath given them. If the reader will turn to the 6th section of the Doctor's essay, he will there find many objections fully answered.

The first of the two objections proposed to be consider­ed, and which Mr. Edwards much insists on, is, That on the principles of those who assert self-determination, ‘the will of God is infinitely crossed by every act of sin that happens—that he endures what is infinitely disagre­able to him—infinite grief or pain from every sin’— that creatures have it ‘in their power to thwart and frus­trate the designs of the creator,’ and to ‘make him infinitely the most miserable of all beings.’ This, he says, certainly follows, if sin be not, upon the whole, a­greable to the divine will, and what God chuseth as part of his infinite scheme. ^*

To this we say, first, It is acknowledged that moral evil is in its nature infinitely contrary to the perfections, law [Page 119] and government of God. Now we may with as much reason say, he is frustrated, grieved and pained by the ex­istence of it viewed in its nature, as that he chuseth and is pleased with it viewed in its consequences—even admitting it is for the best, all things considered, that moral evil hath taken place. So that if it follows from the opinion of self-determination, that God is ‘infinitely crossed and grieved by every individual sin;’ the same consequence follows on Mr. Edwards's own principles. Should it be granted, that every act of sin is, in one view of it, agreable to the will of God, what he produceth by his efficient de­termination; yet, in another view, it is admitted, that it is infinitely contrary and hateful to him. Doth it not then follow, on Mr. Edwards's principles, that God must needs be infinitely pained and grieved by it, in proportion to his hatred of it? He vieweth it in its nature and tendency, as well as in its consequences. Must he not then be ‘infinitely the most miserable of all beings, as his hatred of sin is infinite?’

Secondly, It would be conformable to the advice of a wise man of old ^* to reply to such an objection, that there are plain and positive declarations from God himself, that he is grieved and repenteth at the sins of his creatures. We read, that it repented the Lord that he had made man, and it grieved him at his heart—that he is angry with the wicked every day—that they weary God by their iniqui­ties— vex and grieve his spirit—walk contrary unto him. We read of his heart being turned within him, and his re­pentings kindled together. Now which shall we admit for truth—these express and clear declarations of scripture, or the conjectural reasoning on which the objection pro­ceeds? If it be said, Such scriptures are spoken after the manner of men. The answer is, They who thus object have no right to this plea. For their own reasoning (if reason­ing it may be called) represents that as a reality, which the Scriptures doubtless mention figuratively, and by way of accommodation to our way of conceiving things. If their notions of the ends of providence in the permission of sin are not admitted as indubitable truth, they immedi­ately [Page 120] infer, that the Deity must needs be affected in the same manner that human beings are, when any of their schemes are frustrated—that he is thwarted, pained, griev­ed, and made infinitely miserable.

Thirdly, This way of objecting, to say the least, is high­ly irreverent and unbecoming. It has the appearance of an inclination to bring down to a level with man that is a worm, that being whose glory is above the heavens. It is treating the character and government of the LORD GOD OMNIPOTENT with less deference than is shewn to an earth­ly potentate. Such leveling notions introduced into reli­gion are of most pernicious consequence. Is the infinite God to be treated with a familiarity, which we should scarce presume to use with a fellow-mortal, who happens to be elevated a little above us! Under a notion of doing honor to his sacred name and government, shall we speak of him as though he were altogether such an one as ourselves! Shall we subject the absolutely perfect spirit to human passions and feelings! Would it be less absurd, or less presumptu­ous and reproachful, to suppose the Godhead like to gold, silver, or stone, graven by art and man's device? Doth it be­come a creature to speak with such freedom of THE HIGH AND LOFTY ONE WHO INHABITETH ETERNITY, WHOSE NAME IS HOLY! Angels, who excel in strength, and on whom he shines with the full beams of his glory, confess their ignorance in the deep things of his nature and pro­vidence. They acquiesce in the will of him who is won­derful in counsel—whose ways are past finding out—and humbly adore his, unsearchable wisdom in his works and administration. Yet man, instead of imitating these sons of God above, would be wise beyond the measure of his capacity, and rank in the scale of beings. With the short line of his own reason he would fathom the abyss of the Deity—and is wont to view him through the dark medi­um of human prejudices and passions. Can God approve our taking the measure of his nature from our own? Can he be pleased with being brought to a level with creatures, who dwell in houses of clay, and whose foundation is in the dust? Hath he not admonished us, My thoughts are not your thoughts; neither are your ways my ways, saith the [Page 121] Lord. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts.

What we have further to offer in reply to this objection will properly enough fall under the other objection refered to above; and which we shall therefore proceed to consi­der. The objection is this: To suppose moral evil is an effect of fire-will abused, or of internal causation in the creature, is the same as to suppose God himself the cause of it, since he trusted this matter with the creature, who he knew would abuse liberty. And since ‘the most im­portant measures of his conduct towards mankind, all known to him from the beginning, were formed upon the supposition of the being of moral evil, which he could have prevented, how can the permission of it con­sist with the moral perfections of the Deity,’ any more than the supposition of his efficiency in it? ‘It must eter­nally be the same thing whether a Creator of infinite power and knowledge created beings originally wicked and miserable, or gave them power to make themselves so, fore-knowing they would employ that power to their own destruction.’ ^*

It is indeed a dismal dilemma, that God must either for­cibly prevent wickedness, or be himself the cause of it. The former he hath not done: For it is certain that wick­edness is in the world. Must we then embrace the other part of the dilemma? Is it the most rational way of ac­counting for the existence of sin to say, that God createth beings originally wicked, of infuseth wickedness into them afterwards? What relief can it be to the mind of one who really believes a God to say, that sin proceeds from him as the cause? What answer can the maintainer of this principle make to the atheist? For whether is better, to say there is no God? or to say there is a God indeed, but that he, and he only, is the cause of wickedness? Suppose moral evil is for the best; it is still a most daring assertion to say, it was best the divine efficiency should bring it into existence.

Some argue, if sin is not for the best, it would certainly have been prevented, since God foreknew and might have prevented it. On these premises they conclude, that sin [Page 122] must be an effect of divine operation and production.—A consequence which by no means follows; and which in­volves such impiety, that no supposeable difficulties attend­ing the existence of moral evil should compel us to admit it. To embrace this consequence in order to rid ourselves of one difficulty, would be to involve ourselves in a far greater—an inextricable one, absolutely irreconcileable with the moral perfections of God. And when he is rob'd of these, his glory is taken from him: The name of a Deity may be retained, but no more.

On the hypothesis before us, how is it possible to know that God is holy? that he loves righteousness, and hates wickedness? For can he hate the effects of his own pro­ducing—the operation of his own power—his own acts? By supposition all sin is his act—the fruit of his agency or efficiency. Why then is not sin very good, as much as any part of the Creator's work? If the disposition in aban­doned sinners and apostate spirits, no less than the contrary temper in saints and angels, is the product of divine energy, by what rule can we determine that holiness is pleasing, and wickedness offensive, to him? Though the operations of our own minds clearly declare to us, that moral evil is contrary and odious to God; yet what else can we con­clude than that those perceptions are a delusion? And if our own feelings are delusive, this particular impression or idea, that there is a God and moral governor, may be so. The supposition of the existence of matter or spirit may be a delusion. Our own consciousness may be so. We may be deluded in supposing that we ourselves exist, though the very supposition clearly implies our existence. No ‘paradoxes were ever brought forth by the most abject superstition, or the most frantic enthusiasm, more in­credible’ than the wisdom of the present age hath pro­duced. To suppose that the alwise Creator and governor of the world effects by his own agency what is infinitely repugnant to his pure and holy nature, is as marvellous a paradox as was ever published. We might rather say, that his wisdom required all rebels should perish everlastingly, than say, that an holy God first effected by his own ener­gy their rebellion, as the medium of displaying his own [Page 123] perfections and communicating the greatest happiness to the universal system. We might with as much appear­ance of reason say, that the happiness of the universe is not the care of the infinite Creator and parent of it, as say, that he produceth moral evil as a necessary means of this happiness. As well might we say, that wisdom required God should not create the worlds—should not form crea­tures capable of moral evil. What weight, then, should be allowed to objections which proceed on a supposition so reproachful to that being whose work is perfect—? a God of truth, and without iniquity? A scheme founded in a principle so horrible, so shockingly absurd and impious as this, that an holy, wise and good God is at the same time the efficient of sin, and an avenger to execute wrath upon the subjects of it, neither demands, nor will admit any other answer than that in the book, of Job, Far be it from God that he should do wickedness, and from the Almighty, that he should commit iniquity. No man should suffer him­self to be in the least staggered by objections formed on the supposition of the truth of such a scheme, whether he is able distinctly to answer the objections or not. An at­tempt to support such a scheme deserves to be rejected with contempt and abhorrence. No possible objections founded on such a basis can have any weight by reason of the TERRIBILITY of the hypothesis itself. The public will not think there is occasion for, or even propriety in, taking up time to consider objections stated on this basis. 'Tis suf­ficient to say with the excellent Mr. Howe, ‘That God doth by an efficacious influence move and determine men to wicked actions, I most resolvedly deny.’

Some seem to suppose, that the ‘goodness of God, or his rectitude, require the exertion of his utmost power for preventing evil.’ But this ‘is not to be imagined— The wisdom of God requires that his operation should be according to the order which he has established, and to the nature of things which he has wisely framed to be preserved inviolable. As in the government of the inanimate creatures, he acts suitably to their natures, mov­ing and disposing of them by the irresistible determina­tion of his sovereign will, so his influence on moral a­gents [Page 124] is such as does not destroy the essential powers which he has given them.’

"Let it be more particularly considered, first, that perhaps there is not, nor can be, any being of a limited understanding above the possibility of being misled in its moral conduct; and all the orders of created free agents must naturally be in a state of trial, till by a right use of liberty their integrity is confirmed—Every imperfect a­gent, having a variety in his frame, must have propensi­ons to particular objects which are adapted to the indi­gence of his condition; which propensions in a regular moral constitution, are under the government of consci­ence; but their being does not depend upon it. They are excited by the presence of their suitable objects, or per­haps without it; and though their first motions, and per­haps their continuance in the mind for some time, may be innocent, yet it is easily conceivable that they may de­mand a gratification, in circumstances and degrees, which conscience forbids."

"Here then is a tendency or temptation to evil, from which the creature by the right use of its own powers may escape, and thereby be more confirmed in virtue; but a possibility of falling and corrupting itself seems to be inseperable from every finite nature; and even the danger of it seems naturally to attend the state of all finite moral agents, during some part of their existence—We know that we are capable both of doing right and wrong; and our moral powers so constituted, with such a freedom, we cannot help thinking a very high privilege; whereby we are raised above the condition of many other beings, and have the essential foundation of noble enjoyments."

"Secondly, The human mind necessarily appears to itself the cause both of the moral good and evil which is done by it—The capacity is derived wholly from God, and is preserved by him; the particular determination is from ourselves; only influenced, so far as is consistent with our free agency, by setting before us sufficient mo­tives to good. Yet the mind has natural power of making a wrong choice. We must then be condemned by our own hearts, in charging the human constitution as defec­tive [Page 125] to the purposes of virtue, and thereby of happiness, and impeaching the goodness of its author; since we are conscious to ourselves, that we are furnished with all that is necessary, and know of no power that is wanting to our doing good and eschewing evil."

"Thirdly, Whereas it is alledged that since God fore­saw men would abuse their liberty,—goodness requir'd that the occasion of such an abuse should have been pre­vented. The answer is,—that the futurity of the actions of free agents, of which themselves are the sole causes, is no more determined by the divine appointment, than the actual production of them is affected by his power."

"Fourthly, It must be acknowledged that, strictly speaking, God—could have created moral agents much more perfect than men are; given them a greater measure of knowledge; set the motives of virtue in so strong a light before them, as more effectually to secure their attach­ment to it—could have placed them in a state much more free from temptations, and consequently in less dan­ger of making detection—could have prevented the con­juncture of circumstances in which he foresaw liberty could be abused. But—shall we take upon us to say, that the order of the creation, and the ends for which it was made, did not require, or even allow, that there should be such a rank of beings in it, constituted as we are, with under­standing, liberty, and moral affections, but capable of sin, tempted to it, and thereby in danger of becoming unhap­py through their own fault? or that the present constitu­tion, in this branch of it which relates to free agents, is inconsistent with the wisdom and moral perfections of the supreme Being." ^*

WE mean not to speak contemptibly of metaphysics, as such, and properly applied. There is probably no science but may (in addition to its advantages in other respects) claim some merit as being subservient, more or less, to the elucidation and confirmation of religion and morals. Logic, natural philosophy, the mathematics, po­lite literature have been greatly serviceable to mankind in this view. And possibly metaphysic hath been of some small advantage in the same respect: Though the injury which the misapplication of it hath done religion, at one time and another, if put into the opposite scale, might far outweigh it's advantages.

[Page 127]Admitting metaphysics may be profitably applied to religious subjects; yet (without undertaking to prescribe the exact limits) it will doubtless be granted

It may be submitted to public consideration, whether first principles can, without danger, be brought to the test of metaphysics. The being of a God we call one of these principles; the immediate consciousness mankind have of liberty and accountableness, another; and since the supposition that God is the cause of sin wholly robs him of his moral character, we venture to add, that the negative of this is another first principle. The works of creation without us, and the witness for God within us, instantly attest the truth in these points, as soon as they are mentioned. 'Tis very questionable whether metaphy­sics have been, or can be, used to any advantage, on these manifest points, even against the sophistry of infi­dels. We see not why a philosopher and metaphysician is not obliged to take up with that evidence here which affords clear conviction to men of plain understanding. When believers in God have refered the sophistical reason­er against his being and perfections to that incontestible proof of them which the visible world exhibits, they have done their duty—all that is required, or that can indeed be done. Abstract reasoning, it may be presumed, will afford no conviction, where the constant attestations to the being of a God in creation and providence do not. The opposing metaphysics to metaphysics will keep the infidel in countenance. It is an intimation to him, that he has some reason for his incredulity. For he pretty naturally concludes, that the being of a God would not be brought into the field of debate by those who believe it, were there not some reason to doubt it. Principles manifest on first proposal, if men will open their eyes, nei­ther need nor can receive any assistance from metaphysics; and those who would make them undergo the peril of a metaphysical scrutiny may find they have exposed them to be rejected.

The other two principles mentioned [...] evident [Page 128] as the being of a God, and require no metaphysical proof— viz. God cannot be tempted with evil, and tempteth no man; (or, in other words, is not the cause of sin;) and that mankind are not necessitated or destined to chuse and act in every instance as they do, but might chuse and act otherwise— at least in some instances. Metaphysics have been so far from strengthening the evidence of these ob­vious truths, that, on the contrary, hereby they have been perplexed and made dubious—yea, some seem to think they have demonstrated them to be false.

Not one in an hundred of mankind can apprehend a metaphysical proof of religion—a subject in which all ranks are alike interested. Common people are, indeed much better physicians, than metaphysicians. Nor is every good natural Philosopher skilled in moral philosophy or versed in the abstract nature of immaterial beings. It is sometimes said, that physic oftner kills than cures. Such is metaphysic to the mind. Where it prevents or removes a slight moral indispo­sition in one instance, it probably brings on a fatal distem­per in more instances. Nor is a corrosive ever eligible, when a lenitive will answer the end.

The plainest and most important principles of revelation would not endure a metaphysical disquisition. At least, the sacred writers have not used such reasoning—not those of them who were best able to reason in this manner. Moses, Isaiah, Ezekiel and St. Paul have not. Unparralleled sam­ples of eloquence and the sublime have been often produced from their writings; but we don't call to mind that any instances of their metaphysical reasoning have been adduced. Instances of strong reasoning their writings abound with particularly St. Paul's. But he disclaims metaphysics—not surely as being above his abilities; but as of no use on the most essential point of religion—rather injurious than helpful. As he is the principal new-testament writer, we beg leave to make a few strictures on his character and writings, with a more immediate view to the subject of the present section.

He was possessed of an "amazing force of genius, as well as invincible courage, and a spirit of patience, which no fatigue could overcome, and which no sufferings or trials could [...]. He was versed in the learned arts, [Page 129] and able to combat the Jewish doctors and Pagan philo­sophers with their own arms." ^* His noble birth, added to his natural genius, literary acquirements, ardent zeal and unshaken firmness of mind, seemed, even in the eye of the world, to qualify him for a principal instrument in the defence and propagation of the gospel. Did then the au­thor of Christianity, in the appointment of St. Paul to this business, proceed on maxims of worldly wisdom? By no means. These accomplishments, which distinguished St. Paul from his fellow-apostles, were the most powerful ob­stacles to his embracing Christianity. They were em­ployed to root out the gospel. No one persecuted it more furiously than he—no one despised it more. But when it pleased God to reveal his Son in him, his shining talents were fervently applied to the purpose for which they were given, and became eminently subservient to the further­ance of the faith, which once he destroyed. Let us reflect a moment in what manner he used them as an apostle of Christ—as his example is for succeeding ministers.

Here we have many striking instances of his zeal, elo­quence and reasoning. We mean to take notice of the last more especially—his reasoning with Jewish doctors and pa­gan philosophers—on the principles of natural religion, and the revelations of God to the Jews. He well knew what expectations of a magnificent temporal prince the doctors of the law had raised in mankind—how opposite the Christian system was to the reigning philosophy of the world—particularly what exception the pride of the Gre­cian philosophers took to it on account of its plainness and simplicity. He would naturally also call to mind his own prejudices against the gospel on these accounts. And as he had frequent occasion to confer with men of this character at Jerusalem, Rome, Athens and Corinth, it may be worth while to enquire in what manner he rea­soned with them? Metaphysical reasoning would have been best accommodated to their taste: And if ever there is a propriety in introducing this kind of reasoning into reli­gion, Paul had occasion for it, and was able to manage it to advantage. It might particularly be conjectured, that [Page 130] a man of Paul's learning would have offered a laboured dissertation on the abstract nature of the supreme spirit, (which would have been reasoning metaphysically) when encountered by the learned philosophers from among the Epicureans and Stoics; when accused of being a setter forth of strange gods—when brought unto Areopagus— surrounded by philosophers, senators and plebeians—under­taking to convince them of their superstition, and reclaim them from their idolatry. But to lead them to the know­ledge of the true God, (their ignorance of whom was proclaimed in the inscription on one of their altars) what method did he take? Observable to this purpose is his speech, while he stood in the midst of Mars-hill. ‘Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious—God that made the world, and all things therein, seeing that he is Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands: Neither is worshiped with mens hands, as though he needed any thing; seeing he giveth to all life, and breath and all things.’

How plain, and yet how forceable, is this reasoning?— adapted equally to wise and unwise. He does not dis­course as a philosopher would on the nature of spirit ab­stracted from matter, but makes a familiar appeal to the works of visible creation and providence, in proof of the existence and perfection of God, and thence infers the ac­countableness of mankind to him, as moral governor and judge. This was to reason as became a minister of that master who sent him not to preach with wisdom of words.

To the same purpose he observes, that the works of vi­sible nature, and particularly the operations of their own minds, should have been regarded by the pagan Romans as demonstrable proofs of the being, attributes and pro­vidence of God—that their not being induced to glorify him as God, on this clear evidence, was so far from be­ing any argument of their superior wisdom, that, on the contrary, it proved them inexcuseable and fools, notwith­standing all their professions of wisdom. ^† In like manner he says, God left not himself without witness among the [Page 131] heathen, in that he did good, and gave rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons. ^*

These instances are examples of Paul's reasoning with Pagan idolaters. He argues from the works of creation and providence, which lie open alike to learned and un­learned. Here is no abstract, metaphysical reasoning— all is easy to be understood. And he declares he had ra­ther speak five words with his understanding, that he might teach others, than ten thousand words in an unknown tongue. ^§

When he treated with the Jewish doctors, or the people of Israel, he did not (as before heathen) recur to the works of nature; but taking the principles of natural religion for granted, he reasoned with them out of those scriptures, which they acknowledged were given by inspiration of God. And though all his writings discover the good reasoner, as well as the good man, full of the holy Ghost; yet we do not recollect that he reasoned metaphysically, either before Jews or heathen—Great plainness of speech ap­pears in all his reasonings, as became a minister of the new testament. ^† He was not ashamed of the gospel of Christ before the Jewish Rabbi's or pagan philosophers, although it's distinguishing doctrine was to the former a stumbling block, and to the latter foolishness. The Greeks held the gospel revelation in great contempt, because they found not that wisdom of this world which they sought in it. The apostle held their worldly wisdom in equal contempt, be­cause it set itself in opposition to that gospel which is the power of God, and the wisdom of God. He came not with excellency of speech or of wisdom (which he, if any man, could have used) declaring the testimony of God. His speech and preaching was not with enticing words of man's wisdom; but in demonstration of the spirit, and of power, that the faith of Christians might stand, not in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God. He with his brethren renounced the hidden things of dishonesty, not walk­ing in craftiness, nor handling the word of God deceitfully, but by the manifestation of the truth commending themselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God. I deter­mined, says he to the Corinthians, not to know any thing [Page 132] among you, save Jesus Christ and him crucified—and ex­presseth his fears, lest by any means the minds of his Chris­tian friends at Corinth should be corrupted from the sim­plicity that is in Christ. He enters a caution to the Colos­sians, Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudi­ments of the world, and not after Christ. He admonisheth Timothy to avoid oppositions of science falsely so called— to withdraw from such as dote about questions and strifes of words. Upon the whole he declares, that the world by wisdom knew not God—that what the pride of philosophy stigmatized as the foolishness of preaching, was the scheme infinite wisdom had determined upon for the salvation of believers—that the foolishness of God was wiser than men, and the weakness of God stronger than men.—Thus was fulfilled what was foretold, ‘I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent. Where is the wise? where is the scribe? where is the disputer of this world? hath not GOD made foolish the wisdom of this world?’

From what has been observed it appears, that the chief of the apostles, notwithstanding his learning, was so far from making use of metaphysical reasoning in treating with those who believed the gospel, that he made no use of it for the conviction of infidels, either among Jews or heathen—that he rather disclaimed it as dangerous, than patronized it as helpful, to the cause of truth. Speaking of his own ministry, and that of his fellow-apostles, he saith, We speak not as pleasing men, but God who trieth our hearts. For neither at any time used we flattering words—nor of men sought we glory. And doubtless the fleshly wisdom mention'd 2 Cor. 1.12. denotes the same as the wisdom of this world, mentioned in the former epistle, through which it came to pass that the gospel was despised and set at naught; and in opposition to which the apos­tles of Christ had their conversation in the world, in simpli­city and godly sincerity, by the grace of God.

It may be said, St. Paul must have used abstract reason­ing on some occasions, or his beloved brother Peter would not have testified, that there are things in his epistles hard [Page 133] to be understood. But may not this be owing wholly to the nature of epistolary and controversial writings? their referring to rites and customs since altered or laid aside? or to disputes then agitated, with which distant places or after ages cannot be supposed to be perfectly acquainted? A general hint might be sufficient for the information of those to whom his epistles were immediately wrote. Were such hints as well understood by others, his controversial pieces might be as plain as any other part of his writings. But if we have not the means of understanding them so clearly, 'tis a just conclusion, that we are not so nearly concern'd in them.

"It is become a fashion," says Dr. Sherlock, ‘to dress up the great doctrines and proofs of religion in axioms, and theorems and demonstrations—Had the gospel set out at first with this air of mathematics, it had lost one strong proof of its divine original, arising from the plainness of its doctrine, and the simplicity of the evidence which was offered in its behalf; which made the gospel to be a proper tender to all mankind.’

But it is more than time to remind the reader what im­provement Mr. Edwards hath made of metaphysical rea­soning. This we shall do by adducing a number of in­stances, which may serve to shew the precariousness, sub­tilty and danger of such reasoning. All the argumentati­on of his book really concludes in this, that God is the cause of sin. This is the capital error, which, we trust, a pro­fessing people will never admit. And though he doth not acknowledge it, yet it must be embraced if his foundation be firm. The following specimen may shew, that his con­clusions are by no means fairly drawn from his premises— or that one or the other are false.

Because inert matter cannot begin or alter its own mo­tion; hence Mr. Edwards infers, that an intelligent spirit can in no case begin or alter its own volitions and actions.

If there can be no effect without a cause; he infers, that there can be no principle of efficiency in moral agents.

If a moral agent is supposed to determine his own voli­tions; then he infers, that the act of volition itself is self-determined, and hath no cause.

[Page 134]He takes for granted, that volition, even with respect to the most casual thing, is an act of preference; and then concludes, that, in the most indifferent thing, there must be an apparent reason for willing as we do rather than otherwise.

Because a perfect equilibrium or absolute indifference is not essential to liberty; he concludes, that a power to chuse one thing or its opposite is incompatible with liberty.

If every moral volition hath some motive, then that motive is the cause of the volition—and therefore moral agents themselves are not the cause.

Because a thing is in our power, if consequent to our election; therefore it is in our power, though the election of it is not.

Because the opposition of one's will to what is required, may be no excuse; therefore the want of a power to be willing is none.

(His reasoning on self-determination may be well sum­med up thus: Because a man cannot take the second step without the first; therefore he cannot take the first without a previous one.)

Because Adam's lapse may be the source of a blameable impotency in his posterity; therefore original impotency in himself might be blameable.

Because the essence of sin lies in its nature; therefore the doer of wickedness is not the cause of it—and therefore it is no reproach to say, that God is the cause of sin.

It is laid down for a principle, that a creature never commits sin till divine influence and assistance is with­drawn; hence it is infered (not unjustly, if the principle assumed be true) that man's first apostacy was owing to the want or withdraw of divine influence and assistance.

Because natural (or necessary) effects, and moral habits of holiness, proceed from the positive influence and exer­tion of the Deity; therefore moral evil doth.

Because God is necessarily holy, &c. therefore the holi­ness or pollution of creatures is necessary—therefore a real and original necessity of sin is consistent with blame and punishment.

Because God permits sinners to harden themselves; [Page 135] therefore their obduracy is the effect of his ordination, disposal and determination, as the cause.

Because God certainly foreknows the sinful volitions and actions of his creatures; therefore they are necessary —therefore they proceed from his efficient determination.

If we are not certain sin is not for the best; then we are certain it is for the best.

Because God brings good out of moral evil; therefore it is best—therefore it is a necessary means of the greatest good—therefore it is part of the divine plan—therefore the divine perfections could not have been manifested, had not sin entred the world—therefore glorified intelligences are preserved in their allegiance through terror of the pu­nishment of the damned—therefore what is infinitely op­posite to the divine nature, law and government is not contrary, but agreeable, to his will—therefore God is the efficient cause of sin, and infinitely pleased with the great good it brings to the world, otherwise he would have pre­vented it. ^*

[Page 136]This is a just representation of Mr. Edwards's reason­ing, though he is not explicit in the whole of it. If it should be thought, that in such a way of reasoning any thing may be proved by any thing, it will, doubtless, be acknowledged, that it is neither eligible nor safe to bring the principles of religion to such a trial. We cannot be persuaded, that the pains taken in this way is doing service to men of thought and contemplation: And what occasion Mr. Edwards could have for it, seeing he ‘had to do with those who believe the bible,’ we cannot imagine. It tends to bewilder common people—to mislead them, it may be, fatally. It gives occasion to infidels and libertines. Nor can it seem strange, if from thinking favorably of such a religious system as his book contains, men come to be unsettled and sceptical as to any religion.

Under a notion of doing honor to the divine perfections and government, men may push their enquiries far beyond their capacity and the means of their knowledge. Instead of sailing along the shore with their slender bark, they run the hazzard of launching forth into the main ocean, and plunge themselves in deep waters. In consequence of such bold enquiries, such efforts to fathom the abyss of the Deity, no wonder hard and reproachful things are said of him; which, however piously they may be intended, are extremely injurious to religion. It seems as if an honest intention can very hardly excuse the freedom and confi­dence with which some speak of that Being who possetheth infinite perfection, and whose nature and operations are unsearchable. As a fine writer ^* hath observed, "The Deity is to the human minds, what the main ocean is to narrow vessels: They may take in as much of his nature as their scanty dimensions can admit, and yet there will remain an infinite surplus still, which they want capacities to receive."

MR. Edwards's book was wrote with a view to sub­vert the opinion of self-determination, and esta­blish the doctrine of universal necessity. He endeavoreth to prove, that the volitions and actions of moral agents have a like dependence on a cause without themselves as effects in the natural world—that all events, from the be­ginning of the world to the end, are unalterably, unavoid­ably and circumstantially determined. And while he teach­eth, that this necessity, in reference to moral events, is of the moral kind, and therefore supposeth it consistent with the most perfect liberty, he yet maintains that moral acti­ons are all subject to an original real necessity as absolute as natural.

In support of this general system, he sets himself to shew, What determines the will? and it is particularly and very largely insisted, as a thing of chief importance, that the will is always determined by the highest motive, or by what appears most agreable to the mind; which is called a moral cause, and the determination of the will hereby a necessary determination.

Three things have been proposed in the examination of this system. First, An enquiry into the supposed connec­tion of volition with the highest motive. Secondly, The indissoluble connection of moral causes and effects. And thirdly, An attempt to shew, that internal, moral liberty, as distinguished from external or animal, belongs to moral agents—that Mr. Edwards's scheme of necessity, if admit­ted in theory, is not applicable to practice.

Under the first of these heads, it was shewn, that if the highest motive were allowed to be the next and immediate cause of volition, this is no resolution of the question, as it doth not shew the original and true cause thereof. The enquiry is not pursued to the end, the foundation of the will's determination is not discovered. What it is that gives causal influence to motive, or wherein its energy [Page 138] consists, remains still to be pointed out. But it was en­deavored to be proved, in the next place, by various consi­derations, and particularly from Mr. Edwards's own au­thority and reasoning, that in truth the strongest motive is not the moral cause of volition, and that there is no ne­cessary coincidence between the one and the other. And lastly, that volition is not the proper cause of external action, any more than the highest motive is of volition.

After the mention of some preliminary principles, it was enquired, under the next head of the proposed exa­mination, whether the wills of moral agents are necessarily determined by an extrinsic, or by an intrinsic cause, and whether there can be natural liberty without moral, on Mr. Edwards's scheme. This scheme was represented as making God the author of sin, by plain and direct consequence—the supposed advantage of sin to the universe was briefly noticed; and general observations & reflections subjoined, with a view to make it manifest, that if no being can, or ever could, chuse or act otherwise in any case, 'tis very immaterial by what name this necessity is called, since a necessity more absolute cannot be conceived of—that the runing up mo­ral events, like natural, through a chain of second causes to the first, is confounding the agency of intelligent crea­tures with mechanism—making their volitions and conduct the agency of the Deity, properly speaking—or rather, that, upon the principles of Mr. Edwards, the Deity him­self is not an agent, but an instrument of necessity and fate. There is no self-mover—direction—determination, or source of activity, in the universe. Wherein our author professeth himself a friend of liberty, he either contradicts his own principles, or allows of no liberty that is of any moment, or at all connected with moral agency.

We endeavoured, under the last branch of our general design, to exhibit a scheme more consonant to reason and truth; shewing from the discernment that distinguisheth moral agents from the brute-creation, and their capacity of chusing and acting otherwise than they in fact do, that internal moral liberty and self-determination belong to them—that it no way interferes with this liberty to admit the exhibition and influence of motives in moral volitions. [Page 139] The scheme of necessity exhibited in Mr. Edwards's book, if true in speculation, was, upon the whole, shewn to be false in its practical application—of most dangerous ten­dency and consequence. A specimen was also annexed of Mr. Edwards's agreeing, in his leading sentiments, with antient and modern fatalists.

This is a view of the subject so far as it was considered in our former publication. In the present, the same gene­ral design has been resumed and continued. A further proof of self-determination hath been adduced from the capacity in moral agents of deliberating, suspending, &c.— the distinction of rational agency from animal has been stated—a distinction entirely confounded in Mr. Edwards's book, which has been further shewn to contain a full de­nial of moral liberty. It has been argued, that events in the moral world are not uniform, as in the material—that the Deity must be the efficient cause of moral evil, or it hath no such cause, unless self-determination be admitted— that motives do not necessitate, nor are the cause of voliti­on, which hath a moral person or agent for its cause. The distinction of natural and moral necessity hath been parti­cularly attended to, and, in Mr. Edwards's use of it, shewn to be groundless; since, if he means any thing, a strict and absolute necessity is equally intended by the former as by the latter—we have touched the argument from the necessi­ty of the divine moral rectitude, and presume it was made to appear, that there is no infering herefrom a strict neces­sity in the moral volitions and actions of creatures. From Mr. Edwards's notion of necessity, it follows, that God is the author or cause of sin, or it hath no cause. This same conclusion has further been shewn to follow from his plan of the origin of evil, which we have distinctly examined—a plan which, indeed, renders the existence of sin forever impossi­ble. His hypothesis, which derives moral evil from the withdraw of divine influence and assistance, has been shewn not to differ materially, either from theirs who explicitly ascribe it to divine efficiency, or from theirs who suppose God might make creatures originally vicious. The only consistent hypothesis is that which derives evil from the abuse of moral liberty. The distinction of the essence of [Page 140] virtue and vice from their cause, has, we flatter ourselves, been evinced to be futile and evasive, by no means to ans­wer Mr. Edwards's purpose, however important he esteem­ed it, and how much soever his principles required it. It has been considered, whether moral evil is indeed best for the world; or suppose it is, whether it be best that God should effect it by his agency. We have also examined the argument from divine prescience, and particularly shewn, that the certainty of moral events is altogether different from necessity, the former not affecting their nature, or the manner of their coming to pass, or any way influencing them, as the latter doth—that prescience stands not in the relation of cause to the things foreknown. Texts of scrip­ture usually alledged in support of the scheme of necessity have been shewn to be misconstrued. A reply has been made to some principal objections, and a dissertation ad­ded on metaphysical reasoning, shewing that it rather serves to bewilder than elucidate the present subject. We have, therefore, made but little use of it; although it has in some measure been evinced, (as we suppose) in the course of our examination, that the metaphysician is easily repulsed with his own weapons.

In the examination some arguments were touched, a­mong many which occur'd, evincing the aspect Mr. Ed­wards's scheme hath on the moral perfections and govern­ment of God, and its consequent practical tendency. O­ther arguments have been now mentioned with the same view. The opposite truth was there exhibited in part; we have now further explain'd ourselves, and pursued the design before opened, as far as appeared needful at present. To save the trouble of repetition, we have several times re­fered the reader to things said in the examination.

Our aim has been to attend to the principal point in de­bate, not to dwell on lesser and circumstantial things. If the former hath been kept in view, it may be reasonably requested, that if any gentleman shall think it needful to publish remarks on what we have written, he will not make incidental things a principal object of attention. To di­vert his own or the reader's mind from what is most mate­rial would be alike injustice to both, as well as uncandid to [Page 141] the examiner. The main objection to Mr. Edwards's scheme is, that he argues for a necessity which can be de­fended on this only hypothesis, that God is the cause of sin. To this single question, the whole controversy is re­ducible. Whoever would defend his book must either shew, that the leading principles of it do not suppose the deity to be the efficient of moral evil; or else that such a supposition is no reproach to his character and government. We dare affirm he is not the efficient cause of moral evil; yea, should we presume to affirm that he is this cause, it would, we doubt not in the least, be striking at the founda­tion of all religion.

The pulic attention and candor would now have been asked no longer, had it not been the opinion of a number of respectable gentlemen, that we are called upon to take some notice of the "essay on moral agency" &c. through which are interspersed remarks on what we wrote before, and in some parts of which the author has condescended more professedly to attend to the examination. Our strictures on this essay shall be dispatched with all convenient brevity.