SECT. I. Mr. Edwards hath not shewn wherein the ener­gy of motive consists.

THE enquiry in this place is not, Whether the highest motive hath always a causal influence on the will? But, admitting this to be the case, what it is that causeth any supposed mo­tive to be highest in the mind's view? wherein doth its energy, or power consist? In the next section, we shall examine, whether the will is indeed determined, in every act, by the highest motive.

WHEN, between two or more objects in the mind's view, one appears most agreable; (from whatever cause,) this appearance is the highest or strongest motive, according to our author. Now as there is a manifest difference between an object's actually appearing most agreable, and the cause of this appearance; the proper question, in the first place, is, What is the ground, reason, or cause of the agreable appearance itself. For admitting the strongest motive to be the more immediate cause of volition, how doth this prove that it is the original cause? Whence is it that any proposed object hath the greatest appearance of good? From what cause? Hither we must ulti­mately [Page 2] recur for the ground of volition; [Possibly not stop here.] Till the answer to this question is found, the original ground of volition is not dis­covered. For if every circumstance of things hath an answerable cause, that there is a cause why this or that motive is highest. ^*

THOUGH Mr. Edwards supposed the resoluti­on of this question was 'not necessary to his pur­pose,' ^‡ yet he hath, in several particulars, re­marked what he apprehended may 'have in­fluence' in causing 'the objects of volition to ap­pear agreable to the mind.' He assigns, for in­stance, [Page 3] 'the apparent nature and circumstances of the object—the manner of the mind's view of it—the state of the mind, by nature or educati­on—or the frame it is in on a particular occasi­on.' But how is this any answer? Doth not the question immediately arise, How comes the ob­ject to have such a particular appearance to the mind? Whence is it apparently circumstanced as it is? Whence doth the mind view it in such a particular manner? Or from such a particular idea of it, whether 'faint, or clear, strong and lively?' Whence is the state, temper, or frame of the mind what it is? Until these things are solved, the question, Whence is it that 'a person's pleasure is wrong' or right? hath received no answer, unless 'a very impertinent one.'

THERE is no great difficulty, saith Mr. Ed­wards, in shewing, not only that it must needs be so, but also how it is so, that the mind must be influenced in it's choice by something that hath a preponderating influence upon it.' ^* But if 'a preponderating influence on the mind' implies that the choice is already made, it may 'be a matter of no small difficulty' to shew, how the mind, in making it's choice, can 'be influenced by something that hath a preponderating influ­ence upon it.'

While writing the first part of his book, Mr. Edwards seems to have been sensible, is was no very easy matter 'to shew how it is so,' or why, that the mind is always determined by the high­est motive. His words are, (p. 12.) 'Particu­larly to enumerate all things pertaining to the mind's view of the objects of volition, which [Page 3] have influence in their appearing agreable to the mind, would be a matter of no small difficulty, and might require a treatise by itself, and is not ne­cessary to my present purpose.' But (without tarrying to reconcile this seeming contrast) is this a matter attended with greater difficulty, or of less importance, or would it require a larger trea­tise, than to shew, what determines the will to this side, or that?

WE allow, that 'the common people do not as­cend up in their reflections and abstractions to the metaphysical sources, relations and dependencies of things, in order to form their notion of faulti­ness—They do not wait till they have decided by their refinings, what first determines the will; whether it be determined by something extrinsic or intrinsic. If this were the case, mul­titudes, yea, the far greater part of mankind, nine hundred and ninety nine out of a thou­sand would live and die without having any such notion as that of fault ever entering into their heads; or without so much as once having any conception, that any body was to be either blamed or commended for any thing. They do not take any part of their notion of fault or blame from the resolution of any such questi­ons.' ^* A fuller acknowledgment Mr. Edwards could not have made, that the grand question, the main subject of his book, What determines the will? is a subtle and unprofitable one. We are therefore at a loss for the motive of his wri­ting an elaborate volume to determine a point not to be determined—at least, by his own de­claration, of no use to one out of a thousand of mankind.

[Page 4]P. 39, 40. Our author observes, that 'into the meaning of the word liberty is not taken any thing of the cause or original of choice— how the person came to have such a volition; whether it was caused by some external motive, or internal, habitual bias; whether it was necessarily connec­ted with something foregoing, or not connected. Let the person come by his volition or choice how he will, yet, if he is able, and there is no­thing in the way to hinder his pursuing and ex­ecuting his will, the man is fully and perfectly free, according to the primary and common no­tion of freedom'.

IT hence appears, that Mr. Edwards esteem­ed it neither necessary nor useful for us to know the cause or origin of the will's determination— ' how a person comes to have such a volition.' And yet it was a main point in his view to shew, that the strongest motive is the immediate cause of every act of choice. Now, as was before ob­served, it is just as necessary and important to know the original and ultimate, as the next and more immediate cause of volition. The next and immediate cause is but the effect of some pre­ceeding cause; this of another, and so on. 'The determination of the will, saith Mr. Edwards, supposeth an effect, which must have a cause. If the will be determined, there must be a determiner.' ^*Granted. And if the strongest motive be the determiner, this also must be determined by some preceeding cause. There is a cause or reason of its being strongest—something from which it de­rives, and wherein lies, its great strength. If therefore, it was of any importance to shew, (con­formable [Page 5] to Mr. Edwards's design) what deter­mines the will, and to prove that the strongest motive doth it; it was at least of equal impor­tance to point out, what it is that causeth such motive to be, or appear, strongest. The real cause of volition is not found, till this matter is explained. The enquiry is not pursued to the end, and the plan of Mr. Edwards's book but half executed.

'SUPPOSE a chain hung down out of the Hea­vens, from an unknown height; and although every link of it gravitated toward the earth, and what it hung upon was not visible, yet it did not descend, but kept its situation: And, upon this, a question should arise, What supported or kept up this chain? Would it be a sufficient answer, to say, that the first, or lowest link hung upon the second, or that next above it?' without proceeding to shew what the second hung upon'; 'or rather, the first and second together;' and so on, until it was found 'what supported the whole. Thus it is in a chain of causes and ef­fects. The last or lowest is suspended upon the cause above it. This again, if it be not the first cause, is suspended, as an effect, upon some­thing above it, &c. ^* The original (that is, the true and real) cause of volition is, therefore, yet to be explained. For if it be the immedi­ate effect of motive, still this cause is an effect in regard to something preceeding—and whatever is the next or immediate cause of the strength or energy of motive itself, this again is an effect in relation to a cause preceeding, as well as a [Page 6] cause in relation to motive—And thus the en­quiry may be pursued in infinitum. (Which shews, by the way, the futility, at least, of entering on such an enquiry as that which is the subject of Mr. Edwards's book.) Should it be said, that the energy of motive, in every case, is to be at­tributed to the first and supreme cause, as the im­mediate efficient—this, indeed, is making short work; but it is cutting the knot, rather than untying it. However, when it shall be shewn, that every act of will, in every creature, is an im­mediate, necessary effect of the supreme cause, the dispute will at once be at an end.

'THE vulgar notion of blameworthiness, says Mr. Edwards, is, a person's having his heart wrong, and doing wrong from the heart.' ^* Now hath he shewn, whence a person's heart comes to be wrong? He takes notice of this de­fect in 'the author of the essay on the freedom of the will in GOD and the creatures,' that he had not given a reason why an act of the will is, or why it is in this manner, rather than another. ^† Now how hath Mr. Edwards supplyed this de­fect? Is what he hath said 'a reason why an act of the will is, or why it is in this manner?' Sup­pose the highest motive determines the will, he explains motive to be the apparent good in an object—Now what is it that makes, or causes an object to appear good? For this, by his own principles, is what determines the will. He 'speaks of a certain sovereignty in motive, where­by it has power to determine volition. Wherein consists 'this supposed sovereignty?' From what [Page 7] cause doth it proceed? From what 'exercise' of it can either its sovereignty, or its cause, be in­ferred? ^* 'And so the question returns in in­finitum, and the like answer must be made in in­finitum.' For granting that an object's appear­ing agreable to the mind is the ground of the mind's choice, what account is this of the agre­able appearance itself? Is it a reason why an object appears beautiful or deformed, agreable or disagreable? Doth it shew us, why 'it is most agreable to some men, to follow their rea­son? and to others, to follow their appetites?' Not at all. Nor consequently, doth it shew us 'wherein consists the strength of motive'— whence the motive that determines the will is prepollent—of what antecedent cause its deter­mining power is the effect. Every circumstance of things, it is pleaded, must have a cause. Vo­lition then is the effect of motive—the latter the effect of some prior cause—this of another—and this again of another, &c. &c. &c. Where then are we to seek for the true and original cause of volition?

ALTHOUGH Mr. Edwards cursorily passeth the question, Wherein consists the energy of mo­tive? as beside 'the purpose of his discourse;' yet we must think, that his main 'position,' and 'the thing of chief importance' upon his scheme, absolutely required a clear 'explanation' and full discussion of this question. It is the hinge, on which the controversy, as stated by Mr. Edwards, must finally turn. He appears to have been scrupulous, whether he had not 'failed in ex­plaining [Page 8] this thing,' from his hint that if he had, it did 'not overthrow the position itself, which was the thing of chief importance' in his enqui­ry, 'viz. That the will is always determined by the strongest motive,' ^* This position may not be overthrown by a failure in 'explaining where­in the strength of motives consists;' but we might have expected, and should have been glad to have seen, a rationale of the position. If true, there is a cause, ground, or reason of its truth. That cause hath not been assigned, or discovered to our apprehension. It is soon enough to say, whether the position is true or false, when the foundation of it is understood. But whether it hath a solid support, or is over­thrown by Mr. Edwards himself, may appear in the following section: We conclude the present with this remark.

ALTHOUGH we have no right to require an answer to so subtil a question as this [What de­termines the will?] from any but such as under­take of their own accord to explain the matter; yet, from Mr. Edwards's known abilities, we might have expected a more satisfactory and ra­tional answer—especially as he seems to have apprehended, that the general question concern­ing liberty was thoroughly examined and de­cided in his discourse upon it. But since, after what Mr. Edwards hath said, it still remains ab­struse and undetermined, we conclude it must re­main so. For no author we have seen hath wrote upon the subject with greater strength. And we cannot but observe; that Mr. Edwards [Page 9] in some parts of his book, appears to have been quite sensible that no subject is more intricate and puzzling than this concerning the determi­nation of the will, considered in a speculative view. Should any 'find fault, that we have gone into metaphysical niceties and subtilties;' our reply is, that Mr. Edwards's enquiry is 'a me­taphysical subtilty, and must be treated accord­ing to its nature.' ^*

SECT. II. The will not necessarily determined by the strongest Motive.

IT is not always the nature of the object in it­self, or 'what reason dictates to be best, and most for the person's happiness, taking in the whole of his duration,' that is the strongest mo­tive; since the dictate of reason 'is often over­come by the greater weight of' other considera­tions. ^* And indeed were the dictate of reason always the strongest motive, and were the will invariably determined by motive taken in this sense, it is plain, that sin would never have en­tered into the world. Now the preferableness of the object in its own nature, and as appre­hended by reason, not being always the ground or cause of its appearing most agreable, but something diverse or contrary, in many instan­ces; the question is, How came beings made upright to mistake their happiness upon the whole? For mistake it they must; (by suppo­sition) or otherwise in the first act of sin they could not be determined by the greatest appa­rent good.

HERE we may enquire, Whether in innocence any thing but conformity and subjection to the Creator could appear to be the greatest good? If not, then, on Mr. Edwards's hypothesis, an innocent creature could never rebel. If, on the [Page 11] other hand, rebellion against the supreme cause had the appearance of the greatest good to Adam in innocence, and to apostate angels be­fore their fall, how doth this consist with the general opinion that hath been entertained of the original extent of their rational faculties, and the spiritual image of GOD with which they were endowed? The powers of intellect in innocent Adam, for example, have been sup­posed so great, that consistently herewith it can­not be doubted but he had the fullest view of duty, and of his highest interest as connected with it; and consequently could have no appa­rent superior motive to transgress. If in in­nocence he could not hesitate but it was his highest duty to refrain from the forbidden fruit, he could not, (by supposition) hesitate but such act of forbearance was also his highest hap­piness. Therefore the greatest apparent good was to retain his integrity. Consequently, in transgressing, his will was not determined by, but against, the highest motive. Nor can we conceive of a presumptuous sinner, on any other supposition—meaning hereby, one who acts against present conviction—or directly in opposition to the light he hath in the very article of sinning.

IT will, perhaps, be said, that innocent Adam's highest good was to forfeit his integrity. And indeed, on any other hypothesis, the controver­sy seems to be brought to an issue, and the opi­nion of being always necessarily determined by the highest motive given up. Now should this be said, (which is at least imply'd, if not expres­sed, in what Mr. Edwards hath remarked ^* on [Page 12] the advantage of sin to the creation) we might ask, whether sin could appear most agreable to an innocent creature from the nature of the object in itself? This, we presume Mr Edwards would not say. And if it could not thus appear from its nature, it will be difficult to shew how sin could be, in any sense, the creature's highest good—Or how an innocent creature could appre­hend it to be so. But whenever it can be shewn, that innocent man, or rebel angels before their fall, had a full view of the superior advantages of sin above innocence and righteousness, we be­lieve no body will think it worth while to con­trovert farther about any doctrine of religion. An hypothesis so extraordinary, requires extra­ordinary proof. We shall have occasion to resume this point under another part of our remarks.

IN regard to the first entrance of sin into the world, we acknowledge it is an event, which all denominations of professing christians are equally holden to account for—yea, deists as much as christians. Even atheists are no otherwise excu­sed than as, by their principles, they are not obli­ged to account for any thing The truth is, no body can solve this matter. But if the first sinful volition was the necessary product of the highest motive; then rebellion against GOD was discer­ned to be the highest good, when reason and judg­ment freely dictated and governed; which they cer­tainly did while the creature continued innocent. Yea, it follows, that the highest motive to the Creator, as well as creature, was in behalf of moral evil. How then is sin such an infinite evil as we have been taught to believe it? Does it not turn out an infinite good? Rather, how can that deserve the name of sin, which appears [Page 13] most agreable even to the Deity himself? Or allowing sin to be the greatest evil, that man must have an hard task, who undertakes to shew, that it is also the greatest good: And if not the greatest good, how it could have this appearance to creatures in a state of rectitude—and even to Almighty GOD himself. Or if it could not have this appearance to any being in a state of rectitude, how was it then possible for beings made upright to fall; on supposition that no instance of volition can be mentioned but what is the effect of, or determined by, the greatest apparent good? The very idea of moral per­fection appears to be lost, if we pursue to the end such an enquiry as Mr. Edwards hath led us into.

"THAT the will always follows the last prac­tical judgment of the understanding, hath pas­sed current as a maxim in the schools: So that if a sick man shall, in contradiction to his phy­sician's judgment, and his own, indulge his ap­petite for meat or drink, he must be supposed previously to have convinced himself, that his present indulgence is of more value to him than his health, or even his life. If other men in­dulge their unreasonable inclinations at the ex­pence of interest, reputation, inward peace, and everlasting salvation, they must be supposed to judge with themselves, that this vicious indul­gence ought to be preferred to interest, repu­tation, peace of conscience, and everlasting sal­vation: This way of thinking, which passeth so easily with the learned, goes mighty ill down with men of plain understanding; who, on the contrary, incline to believe, that in the practice of vice men either do not think at all, but act [Page 14] like mere animals by the blind impulse of ap­petite and affection; or if they attend to what they are doing, that they basely and absurdly prefer a present gratification to what they know to be their most valuable interests in this life and the next.

THE truth is, that man is a compound of ra­tional and animal affections, that without at­tending to himself, sometimes the one, and at other times the other, must of necessity prevail, as they happen to be strongest; and that, through the love of present pleasure, and aver­sion to present pain, or through mere pusillani­mity, we too often decline the combat; and, in contradiction to our reason, our conscience, and all the most weighty considerations of honour and interest, respecting this life and the next, suffer the animal to prevail over the rational affections.

FOR the remedy, then, of this greatest of all evils, it is not enough the judgment be well in­formed,; because however desirous we are of having the authority of our judgment for what­ever we do, and however much we will en­deavour to reconcile our judgment with our in­clination; yet when that cannot be done, we will too often pursue our inclination in contra­diction to our judgment. The only remedy therefore under heaven is, to endeavour, by all means in our power, to make our rational a match, and, as much as possible, an overmatch, for our animal affections: In which employ­ment we have a title to all the assistance, which the teachers of mankind can afford us; and to [Page 15] stimulate, direct, and support us in this ardu­ous task, seems to be their chief business." ^*

'THE thing of chief importance in his dis­course,' [Page 16] Mr. Edwards tells us is this, 'That the will is always determined by the strongest motive.' This, he insists, 'is the PREVIOUS ground and reason of every act of volition; so that in the na­ture of things volition cannot take place without, but is connected with it, as the PRODUCING, EF­FICIENT cause.' In this principle his whole [Page 17] scheme is founded—(without having shewn what it is that gives strength and energy to the mo­tive that determines the will—what it is that gives or constitutes the agreable appearance in an object of choice—to what the preponderancy, or efficiency of it upon the will is to be ascribed) Let us enquire how this 'position of chief im­portance' is supported.

AS no authority can be of equal weight to overthrow this main position as the author's own, we beg the reader would consider the following passage; which is so full to our purpose, that we are saved the trouble of a laboured confu­tation of the principle alluded to. 'I have rather chose to express myself thus, that the will always is AS the greatest apparent good, or AS what appears most agreable, is, than to say, that the will IS DETERMINED BY the greatest apparent good, or by what seems most agreable: Because an appearing most agreable; or pleasing to the mind, and the mind's preferring and chu­sing, seem hardly to be properly and perfectly DISTINCT. If strict propriety of speech be in­sisted on, it may more properly be said, that the voluntary ACTION, which is the immediate FRUIT and CONSEQUENCE of the mind's voli­tion [Page 18] or choice, IS DETERMINED by that which appears most agreable, than the preference or choice ITSELF.' ^*

HERE it is fully declared, that, 'properly speaking,' volition and the highest motive are not DISTINCT things—that the former is only as the latter, and not determined by it. Motive cannot be the ground and determiner of volition, and at the same time the act of volition itself. It is not the cause of volition, but the thing, 'if strict propriety of speech be insisted on.' In­stead of the strongest motive's being the cause of volition, the real truth is, that volition is the cause of external action. It is this only, 'which is the immediate fruit and consequence of the mind's volition, that is determined by' the stron­gest motive. The reason is obvious: 'For an appearing most agreable to the mind, and the mind's actually preferring and chusing, are not dis­tinct,' but the same thing. 'It is not, therefore, good sense' to say the former determines the lat­ter—to speak of motive as the previous ground, reason, or cause of the EXERTION of an act of the will—that volition cannot TAKE PLACE without this as the antecedent cause. 'It is not good sense to speak of volition as FROM motive— FROM THE INFLUENCE of the motive, and from the influence that the motive hath on the man for the PRODUCTION of an act of volition. ^†

WHEN Mr. Edwards saith, 'it is the volunta­ry action, and not the will, which is determined by the highest motive,' there can be no doubt but he means corporeal action: For thus he ex­plains [Page 19] himself, 'the voluntary action, which is the fruit and consequence of the mind's volition or choice'—expressly distinguishing it (as in the next following words) from 'the act of voliti­on, or the preference and choice itself.' Instead of shewing, therefore, (as he undertook) what determines the will, Mr. Edwards hath only la­boured to prove, that the will determines the actions of the body—For instance, 'the will de­termines, by an act of volition or choice, which way the hands and feet shall move.' ^* Bodily action is the effect, fruit, consequence of the will's determination, dependent on it, and con­nected with it, as its cause and determiner. The will itself is exercised in prefering, chusing, de­termining; the body in those motions and ope­rations, which are the effect of the will's deter­mination.

THUS volition being nothing diverse from the strongest motive, but the same thing with it—it being improper to say, that the will is de­termined by the strongest motive; there can be 'no such relation between' motive and volition 'as is signified by the terms cause and effect.' We are 'brought to the contradiction of a cause and no cause; that which is the ground and reason of the existence of a thing, and at the same time is not the ground and reason of its existence'—(p. 103, 105) the strongest motive 'is determiner and determined; mover and mov­ed; a cause that acts and produceth effects up­on itself'—(p. 7) 'volition is from a cause, and no cause; the fruit of motive, and not the fruit [Page 20] of motive; the beginning of motion and exer­tion, and yet consequent on previous exertion self-originated, and hath its original from some­thing else. Cause and effect,' though, 'terms of opposite signification,' are the same thing— 'Vo­lition is the effect of volition, and the cause of volition—choice is subject to choice, command­ed by, and the produce of, an antecedent act of choice.' Motive 'is the previous ground and reason of the acts of the will—Yea, the necessary ground and reason of their exertion; without which they will not be exerted, and cannot, in the nature of things, take place: And they do excite these acts of the will, and do this by a prevailing influence; yea, an influence which prevails to the production of the act of the will, and for the disposing of the mind to it. Now if motives dispose the mind to action, then they cause the mind to be disposed; and to cause the mind to be disposed, is to cause it to be willing; and to cause it to be willing, is to cause it to will; and that is the same thing as to be the cause of an act of the will. And yet it is hardly proper to suppose motive to be a cause of an act of the will; or that a principle of will is moved, or caused to be exerted by it; or that it has any causality in the production of it:' And that for this very good reason, that they are not DISTINCT. ^*

WE 'hope' we 'need not labour at all' to shew the absurdity' of this scheme, 'and what an whole heap of inconsistencies we have here. The matter is already so plain, as to render any reasoning upon it impertinent.'

[Page 21]MR. Edwards asserts, as well as Mr Chubb, 'that volition is not governed by superior strength of the motive that is followed, beyond motives to the contrary, PREVIOUS to volition itself.' p. 124) It appears, on Mr. Edwards's 'supposition, that volition must be without any previous ground in any motive; thus: If it be, as he supposeth, that the will is not determined' by the greatest apparent good—that this is nothing 'distinct' from volition; then volition cannot be owing to any previous ground, or causality, or superior strength of the motive that is followed, any more than on the supposition of the will's de­termining itself, there being no distinction be­tween the highest motive, and the act of voli­tion. To say, therefore, that the former de­termines the latter, is to say, that the will is self-determined. Yet Mr. Edwards says, 'There is such a thing as a diversity of strength in mo­tives to choice previous to the choice, itself.' (p. 125) He has not shewn us wherein this diver­sity lies; or how motives have a strength pre­vious to choice, and yet are not distinct from it. Would he say, that motives have a superior strength previous to their standing in the mind's view? or is their appearing strongest to the mind antecedent to the choice; or co-temporary with it. The latter doubtless: For this ap­pearance is not distinct from the mind's choice. Had Mr. Edwards proved, (as he asserts) that there is a ' preponderancy of the inclination previ­ous to the act of choice,' (p. 260) it might have cleared the matter. But 'certainly, there is no need of multiplying words. We presume there is nothing more unintelligible, and void of dis­tinct, consistent meaning, in all the writings of [Page 22] Duns Scotus, and Thomas Aquinas.' ^* (p. 122)

THAT we have not taken advantage of a passage in advertently wrote by Mr. Edwards, the reader may see by turning to it. (p. 11, 12) He is there exhibiting his plan, and intimates his care to express himself with precision, and so as not to be misapprehended. It is at his en­trance on his work. Says he, ' I have rather chosen to express myself thus, that the will always is as the greatest apparent good, than to say, the will is determined by the greatest apparent good'; and proceeds to assign a reason for his thus expres­ssing himself: 'Because an appearing most agreable to the mind, and the mind's chusing, seem hardly to be properly and perfectly distinct. If strict propriety of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that the voluntary action, which is the fruit and consequence of the mind's choice, is determined by that which appears most agrea­ble, than the preference or choice itself.' Who will say Mr. Edwards hath not here 'expressed himself with strict propriety,' and given a good reason for 'expressing himself thus?'

'FROM things that have been' remarked, we [Page 23] think it clearly follows, that Mr. Edwards hath equally failed in pointing out the more immedi­ate cause of volition, as its original cause. By his own declaration, the will is not determined by, but the same thing with, the strongest mo­tive. He hath only shewn what determines ex­ternal action or conduct—a point very different from the determination of the will. And hence (according to Mr. Edwards's own reasoning) the enquiry, 'What determines the will?' is pre­cisely the same with this, 'What causeth an ob­ject to appear most agreable?' A very different enquiry, surely, from this, Whether volition is as, or according to, the agreable appearance of an object? unless we will confound cause and effect. The agreable appearance, saith Mr. Edwards, is the mind's preference, choice, or determination. But antecedent to the mind's view of the object, there must be something in it [the object] to cause it to appear agreable when viewed—something independent on, and prior to the view—or the mind must be in such a particular state, frame, or temper—or view the object under such and such circumstances, in order to it's appearing thus and thus agreable. Now when it can be distinctly shewn, what that is in any object itself, or in the state, manner, and circumstances of the mind viewing it, which causeth (produceth) the agreable appearance; then, perhaps, the determining cause of volition may be discovered. That which causeth the agreable appearance, produceth the highest mo­tive, that is, volition. Upon Mr. Edwards's own state of the question, there is no making any sense of his words, to say, that the highest motive is the cause, or determiner of volition. [Page 24] This he hath, in express terms denied. And yet great part of his book was wrote to prove it. It is the 'position of chief importance in his discourse.'

IT will possibly be said, 'There is no need of supposing the strongest motive to be prior to, or distinct from, volition; but that the latter is de­termined by the former in the very act of voli­tion'. To this it is sufficient to answer in Mr. Edwards's own words, 'that the will is not de­termined by the greatest apparent good, but the action, which is the fruit of volition, is deter­mined hereby'. Though we may insist on this as a full reply to the objection; yet we may also add, with much propriety, Mr. Edwards's remarks ^‡ on the scheme of his opponents, with the small alteration, which the reader will observe by the words not included under inverted com­mas.

FIRST, 'IF the determining act' (the highest motive) 'be before the determined in order of na­ture, being the cause, ground, or reason of its existence, this as much proves it to be distinct from it, and independent on it, as if it were in or­der of time'.

SECONDLY, 'If the determining act' (the stron­gest motive)' is not before the determined, in order of time or nature, nor distinct from it—I would on this observe, that the thing in question seems to be forgotten, or kept out of sight, in a dark­ness and unintelligibleness of speech. The question [Page 25] is, What influenceth, directs, or determines the mind or will to come to such a choice as it does? or what is the cause, ground, or reason, why it concludes thus, and not otherwise? Now it must be answered, according to, Mr. Edwards's 'no­tion, that the will influences, orders, and deter­mines itself'. For the will is determined by the strongest motive, and this is nothing distinct from volition. Now that the strongest motive 'cau­seth, influenceth, and determineth the will, and yet is not antecedent to it;' nor distinct from it, 'is a contradiction.' To say that one 'thing is the cause or reason of another, is to say, that the former is prior to the latter. The cause is distinct from the effect, and prior to it. To say, that the strongest motive, 'orders, influences, determines the act of volition,' and yet is not 'properly distinct, is to make the exertion both cause and effect. The question is, What is the cause and reason of the soul's exerting such an act? To which the answer is, the soul exerts such an act, and that is the cause of it. And so, by this, the exertion must be prior to, and dis­tinct from itself.'

THIRDLY, 'If the meaning be, that volition has no cause, and is no effect, but comes into existence of itself, without any ground or reason'; Mr. Edwards then, 'doth nothing but confound himself and others with words without a mean­ing. ^* There is a great noise made about 'mo­tive's [Page 26] sovereignty and energy', as the source of all acts of the will; but when the matter comes to be explained, the meaning is, that these acts arise from nothing, no cause, no power, no in­fluence, being at all concerned in the matter.' [Page 27] And yet it is maintained, that 'all acts of voli­tion have a prior ground and reason of their par­ticular existence; a cause; which antece­dently determines them to be, and to be just as they are. Now how can these things hang together?'

MR. Edwards criticiseth Dr. Clark for ad­mitting 'the necessary connection of volition with the last dictate of the understanding;' and yet 'supposing the latter not to be diverse from the act of the will itself.' He hath this re­mark on the Doctor. 'If the dictate of the un­derstanding be the very same with the determi­nation of the will or choice, then this determi­nation is no fruit or effect of choice.' And on­wards: If these 'be the same, then liberty con­sists in the mind's having power to have what dictates of the understanding it pleases, having opportunity to chuse its own dictates of under­standing.' [Page 28] ^* Might not one in Dr. Clark's behalf thus reply? 'Mr. Edwards supposeth that volition hath a necessary connection with the high­est motive—and that the later is not properly dis­tinct from the act of the will. If the highest motive be the very same with the determination of the will or choice, then this determination is no fruit or effect of motive. Moreover, Mr. Edwards hath ‘expressed himself thus, it is not proper to say, that the act of volition itself is determined by the highest motive.’ If these be the same, then liberty consists in a man's having power to have what motives he pleases, having opportunity to [Page 29] chuse his own motives. But this is absurd: For it supposeth the choice is already made, be­fore the motive has its effect; and that the vo­lition is already exerted: That is, choice is prior to choice. Mr Edwards recurs to the old ab­surdity of one determination before another, and the cause of it; and another before that, deter­mining that; and so on in infinitum.' Thus might his criticism on Dr. Clark be replied to.

UPON the whole: The question, What deter­mines the will? is 'unanswered, and yet re­turns.' For aught that appears from Mr. Ed­wards's discourse, the will is not properly deter­mined at all. 'Instead of solving the difficul­ty, or answering the question with regard to volition, namely, How it comes to exist? (as he proposeth it) he forgets himself, and answers another question quite diverse, and wholly' re­mote, namely, What determines material action? The question is, How volition itself comes to exist? By what cause it is produced? ' Why the soul exerts such an act, and not another? Or why it acts with such a particular determina­tion? Why its action is thus and thus limited, directed, determined?' If it be said, its acts pro­ceed from the strongest motive, this is saying, they are self-determined; (the strongest motive and volition not being distinct) which is, upon the whole, saying, they exist without a cause.

THEREFORE the supposed strength of motive 'affords no relief from the difficulties, which' Mr. Edwards's ' notion of a self-determining pow­er in the will is attended with; nor will it help, [Page 30] in the least, its absurdities and inconsisten­cies.' ^* Whether corporeal action be always determined by the will, or the greatest appa­rent good, we shall briefly enquire in the next section.

SECT. III. External Action or Conduct not determined by the Will, upon Mr. Edwards's Scheme.

ALL moral good or evil consisting in the disposition or state of the mind or will, it is of small moment, comparatively, what deter­mines material action. Suppose this is indeed determined by the will, the enquiry of chief importance is, What determines the will itself. The question, What determineth the motions and actions of the body? is quite foreign to the subject. But as Mr. Edwards affirms, that the will is the true cause of external action or con­duct, and makes the whole of liberty to lie here, we will examine this position, on his own prin­ciples.

'THE voluntary action, which is the fruit and consequence of volition, is determined by that which appears most agreable;' or by the will which 'always is as the greatest apparent good,' and 'not properly distinct' from it. 'Li­berty is a power, opportunity any one has of doing, or conducting according to his will, be­ing free from external hindrance or compul­sion.—Or a power of executing his will. There are two things that are contrary to liberty. One is constraint; the same is otherwise called force and coaction; which is a person's being necessi­tated to do a thing contrary to his will. The other is restraint; which is his being hindered, and not having power to do according to his [Page 32] will.' ^* In the determination of the will it­self, he supposeth a man cannot be free. 'To talk of liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the very will itself, is not to speak good sense.' ^† He censures Dr Whitby as saying, 'That a man exerciseth liberty, not only in external actions, but in the acts of the will themselves' ^‡ (p. 76, 77) He supposeth there is a cause, prior to the will's own acts, determining volition. 'Let the person come by his volition how he will, if there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing it, he is fully and perfectly free'. Up­on the whole, liberty consists not in a power of ^‡ [Page 33] willing, but in an opportunity of doing what is already willed—of executing a choice already made, not in a power of chusing. It is not at all applicable to the mind. The state of the will is fixed by necessity—and from hence pro­ceed external actions.

NOW how is it possible that action and con­duct should be free, and yet be the effects of a necessary cause? 'There is not more in the ef­fect than in the cause. Those things which are indissolubly connected with other things that are necessary, are themselves necessary.' How is corporeal action determined by the will, when 'the will in no instance is its own determin­er', consequently not in the particular determi­nation to move the body? At least, the will de­termines this no otherwise than as it is itself de­termined hereto by an antecedent, necessary cause. Or how can that be called a voluntary determination, which is the effect of necessity? or that a voluntary action to which a man is ne­cessarily determined? If the act of the will, which is supposed to determine and fix the exter­nal acts of the body, be not itself free, accord­ing to Mr. Edwards's own reasoning, the acti­ons proceeding herefrom cannot be so. ^* 'An act of the will is an act of choice'. Now if there [Page 34] be no liberty exercised in chusing; preferring, wher­in is liberty exercised at all? What is choice distinct from liberty? Yet we are told, that liberty is exercised only in the execution of choice. That we have not a power of election or liberty in the act of volition, at least not in the first and leading act of choice, which determines all the rest.

IF, therefore, freedom be not in the will, we should be glad to know where it is? Whether any being can be said to do, or conduct according to his pleasure or choice. Choice and pleasure (so called) is fixed by a previous necessary cause—and doing or conducting fixed by volition—Now the immediate fruit and consequences of volition must be of the same nature with their cause—alike necessary. In other words, the will is no cause at all. For a necessary cause is not pro­perly speaking a cause; it is nothing distinct from a meer instrument. A cause, strictly so called, must be free; at least so far as praise or blame, reward or punishment, belong to it.

UPON the whole, external actions must ulti­mately be determined, not by the will, but by that cause which determineth the will, agreable to our author's own principles. The will being in no instance it's own determiner, there is in no instance a power or capacity of choice in man­kind. For choice is the same as the will's deter­mination: A power or capacity of choice, there­fore, would be a power of self-determination, which Mr. Edwards's whole scheme is designed to shew the absurdity of.

THE sum of Mr. Edwards's scheme appears to be this. Liberty consists in a man's power to [Page 35] execute his will—to do or conduct according to what is willed. His will is (not determined by, but is) the greatest apparent good. And yet every volition is the necessary effect of the greatest apparent good, produced and determined by it as the efficient cause—which cause, however, is nothing distinct from the effect produced. From what particular cause any object comes to have the greatest appearance of good is yet a se­cret, of no use to be known to nine hundred and ninety nine out a thousand of mankind For the satisfaction of the thousandth person, Mr. Edwards has laboured to explore this secret; and yet his 'having failed here doth not overthrow the po­sition, which was the thing of chief importance in his discourse;' for it only remains to be— explained and proved. Antecedent necessity de­termines the will; this determines corporeal acti­ons; and action is voluntary; i. e. is willed, or caused to be willed—there is no outward compul­sion or restraint in the case, but only a necessary in­ward determination. Liberty is indeed necessary to praise or blame. But the acts of the body be­ing free from outward coaction or impediment, there is no need of liberty in the mind, as a foun­dation of moral government.

THESE, as near as we can come at them, are Mr. Edwards's sentiments: The mention of which sufficiently exposeth the absurdity of the scheme— it's repugnancy to itself; to common sense, to all morality and religion; and consequently the per­plexity and folly of applying metaphysical reaso­ning to a subject, which can be obscured only by the subtilty of argument.

SECT. I. Whether the will be necessarily determined by an extrinsic cause?

MR. Edwards would have his readers 'ob­serve, that when he speaks of connection of causes and effects, he hath respect to moral causes, as well as those that are called natural in distinction from them—that the acts of the will may be as certainly and indissolubly connected with the moral cause, as natural effects with their natural causes—that the connection is as sure and perfect between moral causes and effects, as natural; that moral necessity may be as absolute as natural necessity.' ^* Yea, he advertiseth us, that 'where he useth this distinction of moral and natural ne­cessity, he would not be understood to suppose, that if any thing comes to pass by the former kind of necessity, the nature of things is not con­cerned in it, as well as in the latter. I do not mean to determine, that when a moral motive is so strong, that the act of the will infallibly fol­lows, this is not owing to the nature of things. I suppose that necessity, which is called natural, in distinction from moral, is so called because meer nature is concerned, without any thing of choice; not because nature has never any hand in our choice: For, choice arises from nature as truly as other events.' So that, upon the whole, much the same rules are supposed to take place in the moral world, in GOD's government of [Page 43] moral agents (so called) as in the adjustment and disposal of natural things. What Mr. Edwards intended by a moral cause, we cannot satisfy our­selves. Sometimes he appears to reason as if he supposed there was really no distinction between a moral and natural cause, (31, 32.) or none to be perceived; while more generally he seems to suppose a distinction of great importance; which, however, he hath not so clearly pointed out as were to be wished.

INDEED, if there be not a real and important distinction between moral causes and natural, it plainly follows, that Mr. Edwards hath taken pains to no purpose to shew, that natural necessi­ty wholly precludes from praise or blame, while moral necessity doth not at all. And if there be a real and important distinction, it is of impor­tance that it be clearly seen.

IN the section last referred to, Mr. Edwards suggests, that 'when we speak of choice as dis­tinct from nature, it is without reflection and research; names being given to things according to what is most obvious. But though the de­pendance and connection between acts of volition or choice, and their causes, according to establish­ed laws, is not so sensible and obvious, as that established law and order which is seen in the ma­terial world; and though men make a distincti­on between nature and choice as if they were compleatly and universally distinct; yet choice arises from nature as truly as other events How­ever, these are the names that these two kinds of necessity have usually been called by; (viz. natu­ral and moral) and they must be distinguished by some names or other; for there is a distinction [Page 44] or difference between them, that is very impor­tant in it's consequences: Which difference does not lie so much in the nature of the connection, as in the two terms connected.' The difference is important, but not sensible and obvious. 'The cause, with which the effect is connected, is of a particular kind, viz of a moral nature—the effect also is of a particular kind, being of a moral nature.' But are we not told in this same place, that the effect is also connected with the natural cause, and is owing to the nature of things? There is the joint influence of moral and natu­ral necessity in moral events—their influence is closely linked together. Now till the measure of influence to be ascribed to moral necessity is dis­tinctly apprehended, it is impossible to tell when, and how far, a person is rewardable or punisha­ble—natural necessity (by supposition) being in­consistent with reward or punishment. But let any one examine Mr. Edwards's book, and say, whether he hath shewn when and how far the acts of the will proceed from natural necessity, and when, or how far from moral. Whether the so much labour'd distinction, or difference between natural and moral causes is not con­founded and exploded?

IT is difficult to determine whether Mr. Ed­wards supposed the acts of the will to be the ne­cessary effects of an intrinsic cause, or an extrinsic. These are used so promiscuously and indetermi­nately through his book, volition being some­times ascribed to the one, sometimes to the other, that, though they are essentially different and op­posite, it is hard to say which he more especially intended by that moral necessity, to which he every where supposeth the will is subject. Either [Page 45] internal, original bias, or something extrinsic, is the cause, to whose efficiency, determination, command, decision, the will is as much subject, as the motion of the body to the will—this being 'as passive and necessary with respect to the an­tecedent determining cause of it,' as the motions of the hands and feet with respect to the deter­mination of the will. (183, 184)

WE rather think it was Mr. Edwards's opinion, that the will is determined by an extrin­sic cause. But since this is by no means certain from his book—since he hath not expressed him­self clearly, or we are incapable judges of this intricate subject, we shall take liberty to examine his doctrine on both suppositions—either of an extrinsic, or intrinsic cause. The former shall be the subject of the present section.

WHETHER volition is necessarily determined by an extrinsic cause? Mr. Edwards asserts, that the acts of the will are not necessary in themselves, or in their own nature; but by their connection with some cause that is necessary in itself. In his own words, they 'are necessary by a necessity of consequence.' The only way that any thing that is to come to pass hereafter, is, or can be, ne­cessary, is by a connection with something that is necessary in it's own nature, or something that already is, or has been; so that the one being supposed, the other certainly follows. This also is the only way that all things past, (excepting those which were from eternity) could be ne­cessary before they came to pass, or could come to pass necessarily; and therefore the only way in which any effect or event, or any thing whatsoe­ver that ever has had, or will have a beginning, [Page 46] has come into being necessarily, or will hereafter necessarily exist. And therefore THIS is the ne­cessity which especially belongs, to controversies about the acts of the will.' ^* From all which it follows, that the, acts of the will are necessary [...]Y by their connection with the self-existent be­ing. For he only existed from eternity. His existence only is necessary in itself. He there­fore is the necessary cause of all volition—of sin­ful volitions equally as holy ones. Either there­fore the acts of the will do not come to pass necessarily, ^† (as Mr. Edwards supposes) or GOD is the author and source of that necessity by which they come to pass. Whether the latter is recon­cileable with divine moral rectitude, 'let those who have human understanding in exercise judge.'

THE voluntary, designing cause of the great wickedness creatures are guilty of, must be either GOD or themselves. The whole wickedness must be charged to the one or the other. Now that creatures are not the voluntary designing cause of their own wickedness (if we may call it their own) appears from hence, that wickedness lies in the state of the will, not in the actions which pro­ceed from, or are the fruits of it. Mr. Edwards teacheth, that men must be the authors of exter­nal actions, by being the causes of them by an act of will or choice, in order to praise or blame; but that no such thing holds with respect to the acts [Page 47] of the will THEMSELVES, that they are the de­signing, voluntary cause of them. (277.) In the internal act, (viz. volition) the agent, or ra­ther subject, is not self-determined; i. e. is not the cause of it. 'Freedom of will is not essential to the nature of virtue and vice.' (256.)

'IN external actions men are self-directed, self-determined; and their wills are the cause of the motions of their bodies, and the external things that are done; so that unless men do them vo­luntarily, and the action be determined by their antecedent volition, it is no action or doing of theirs.' (286. 287.) That is, they are the vo­luntary cause, not of the evil will in them, which is the essence of vice, but only of the external action, which is the meer body and form of it. The cause of sin is without themselves. In what constitutes it's nature, they are directed, deter­mined, by some superior agent, who is the cause of every internal act of the will. For volition hath a cause itself, as well as is the cause of cor­poreal action Any one sees, that men's being the authors of corporeal action meerly, 'is no mo­ral evil, any more than sickness, or some other natural calamity, which arises from a' natural 'cause'.

ESPECIALLY when it is farther considered, in what sense men are the authors of corporeal acti­on, upon Mr. Edwards's scheme, will it appear, that they cannot, on this account, be chargeable with moral evil. 'Every act or the will is ne­cessary, because dependent and consequent on a necessary cause.' ^* Therefore the actions of the [Page 48] body are necessary, being dependent and conse­quent on the determination of the will, which is dependent and consequent on a prior cause—'in­dissolubly connected with what is necessary in it's own nature' Therefore men are not the au­thors, the cause, of corporeal action, in any pro­per sense at all; as they are not the authors of inward volition For 'it cannot be, that' they 'should be the active, voluntary, determining cause of' their 'own volitions'—or 'of the first and leading volition, which determines the whole affair.' (224, 225, 70, 71.)

TO what extrinsic cause then, or to whom, are the volitions of men to be ascribed, since they [Page 49] are not the cause of them themselves? By whom or what is the state of men's will determined? According to Mr. Edwards, it is the strongest motive from without. But motives to choice are exhibited to the mind by some agent: By whom are they exhibited? In regard to sinful volitions we know that one man enticeth another, and Satan enticeth all mankind. But this will not be given as an answer to our question; since the sin­ful act of one sinner in enticing another, and of Satan in tempting all men, must be determi­ned by a previous cause—an antecedent highest motive exhibited by some other agent. (Though, by the way, it may be difficult to shew, how one man can be the cause of sin in another, when he cannot be the cause of it himself.) What we are enquiring after is, the cause of 'the first and leading sinful volition, which determines the whole affair.' Nor is there any stop, till we arrive at the first cause, 'whose immediate conduct Mr. Ed­wards saith, is first in the series of events, con­nected with nothing preceeding.'

WILL it now be said, that GOD is the cause of those dispositions of heart, and acts of the will, which are so odious in their own nature? On Mr. Edwards's scheme this must be said. For the acts of the will, not being necessary in their own nature, but by connection with a cause that is so; and no cause being thus necessary but he who existed from eternity, it undeniably fol­lows, that every sinful volition proceeds ultimate­ly from him, as the cause and source [...]. And to say, that the volitions themselves are vicious, but that the cause is not so, equally militates against Mr. Edwards's own scheme, and common sense.

[Page 50]ON reading section I. part IV. of Mr. Edwards's book, it was matter of much surprize to find a gentleman of his abilities using so weak an argu­ment, descending to so thin a subtility, as this, "that the essence of virtue and vice is not in their cause, but in their nature." The pains taken with this, (argument shall we call it?) the stress laid upon it, is indeed no mark of a good cause. But since every thing advanced by so eminent a writer may be thought to merit attention, we shall briefly consider the subject of this section. Mr. Edwards's own reasoning will assist us here, as in other parts of these remarks.

FOR 'there cannot be more in the effect than in the cause.' (62.) Volition therefore cannot be virtuous or vicious farther than it's cause is so. We may not detach the nature of effects from the efficient. 'It may be wickedness in the cause, that it produceth wickedness.' Suppo­sing then, that 'the wicked act of the cause in producing wickedness, is one wickedness; and the wickedness produced another'—what follows is, that in every sinful volition there are two wickednesses—one chargeable to the cause, the other to the subject of the volition. Now if the cause be 'diverse from the subject of' volition, how doth it relieve the difficulty at all, if upon the scheme of necessary connection, GOD stands chargeable with doing wickedly? And is not this the plain consequence of the doctrine, 'that the acts of the will are indissolubly connected with a cause that is necessary in it's own na­ture'? And if it will be allowed, that GOD can do wickedly considered as the cause of sinful volitions, we may just as well ascribe all moral evil to him.

SECT. II. Whether the will be necessarily determined by an intrinsic cause.

HOWEVER repugnant this hypothesis is to that already examined, yet it is frequent­ly made in Mr. Edwards's book. Our busi­ness is not to reconcile him with himself, But to remark on what we find. His meaning would doubtless have been clearer, had the subject he undertook been intelligible. He appears to have been bewildered at times in his own subtilty.

TO say, that the acts of the will are necessary from internal, original bias, is not very consistent with saying, they are the necessary effects of an extrin­sic cause. For what is this but saying, they are necessary in their own nature? therefore not ne­cessary by a necessity of consequence? Yet Mr. Edwards expresly asserts, that every thing which ever had, or will have a beginning, is necessary only by a necessity of consequence. Now if the acts of the will are effects of an extrinsic cause on­ly, then they cannot be the effects of an intrin­sic cause also. But original bias and inclination is intrinsic. If this therefore necessarily determi­neth volition, then the other position of it's pro­ceeding from an extrinsic, consequential necessity, (an eternal, necessary cause) must be given up. For 'how can these things hang together'? Or will any suppose, that Mr. Edwards when he faith, 'the state or act of the will is from the [Page 52] determination of an intrinsic cause,' meant by this cause the Deity inhabiting and actuating eve­ry intelligent creature? by a positive efficiency producing every volition of theirs? Such a sup­position, we cannot believe any one will make, however necessary to reconcile Mr. Edwards to himself. This is a sense of GOD's working in men to will, and to do; of our living, moving, and having our being in him, which we presume none will espouse. For if it makes him the author of virtuous dispositions in men, in the most strict and absolute sense; it will be remembered, that it also makes him, in the same sense, the author of every vicious inclination and propensity. On this hypothesis, there is properly but one agent in the universe.

'MORAL necessity,' saith Mr. Edwards, 'lies in the will, and is the will's propensity'. How then does it lie in something exhibited to the mind from without, which is prior to the will, and gives it a necessary determination? Surely the will's propensity is not prior to its propensity. No­thing in the will itself can be the moral necessity by which it is determined, if this necessity be re­ally prior to will. Besides, to be determined by a cause in itself, is to be self determined, if words have any meaning. And moreover, this is making the will necessary in it's own nature. Both which are contrary to supposition. What confounding again of cause and effect! Volition is the antecedent, necessary cause of volition! The will is necessarily determined in every act by a necessity prior and superior to it; and yet this necessity is nothing diverse or distinct from volition!

[Page 53]MOREOVER, if an intrinsic cause, or origi­nal bias and propensity, be that necessity by which the will is determined, what is this but being determined by nature? For original propensity is natural propensity. Original necessity is na­tural necessity. Agreably Mr. Edwards saith, 'Moral necessity is a species of philosophical'— ^* (294, 295. 30 [...].) that 'moral events a­rise from nature as truly as others.' (31, 32.) Therefore, as was hinted before, moral necessity, as truly as natural, precludes from praise or blame—and that for this good reason, that moral necessity is natural. This is applicable to the necessity of the first sinful volition, if indeed it was necessary before it came to pass—And con­sequent sinful volitions being the effects of the first, it equally holds as to these also.

THERE seems, indeed, to be some difficulty, in regard to the principle implanted in the rege­nerate by the Spirit of GOD, upon this hypothe­sis of Mr. Edwards. For he, we presume, would not deny, that they were born in sin; and that the bias in regeneration is changed from what it was by nature. Consequently, the holiness and perseverance of the saints is not necessary from native, original propensity, but from some other cause.

WHATEVER may be said in regard to the in­ability of fallen man; Mr. Edwards's principle hath equal respect to the moral power of man in innocence, and of the rebel angels before their fall. Their original bias and inclination, it will be allowed, proceeded immediately from the crea­tor. [Page 54] If then their sin was the effect of a necessi­ty originally in their will, or was their will's ori­ginal propensity, it was so entirely owing to the nature of things, that (by supposition) it could not involve them in guilt—Or if connected with the eternal cause, who alone is necessary in his own nature, it could not upon our author's own scheme; be their sin. The whole guilt, if any, must be imputed to the first cause. For the first sin, of angels and man, was once future; and therefore could not be necessary in itself, but only by the aforesaid necessity of consequence. (p. 25.) And then, whatever moral impotency now cleaves to mankind, or damned spirits, this being connected with the first sin, which was connected with the original, necessary bias of in­nocence; it follows, that the sins of fallen crea­tures are necessary in the same way that the first sinful volition was—the only way in which all things and events whatsoever, which are not eter­nal, are, or can be necessary. They do not therefore partake of the essence of sin; or if they do, involve the creator in it.

INDEED the supposition of being necessarily de­termined by original, internal bias, does, upon the whole, lead to much the same consequences with that of supposing the acts of the will to be necessary by a necessity of consequence—since, agreable to the second preliminary proposition, original bias must be ultimately ascribed to the original cause of all things. What is natural is the constitution of the author of nature. Mo­ral events, Mr. Edwards instructs us, are ow­ing, partly at least, to the nature of things—pro­ceed, at least in part, from natural causes. Now, by his own principles, so far as the nature of [Page 55] things operates to their production, neither good nor ill desert is applicable to the subject of voli­tion. Had he told us in what respects, and how far, volition is owing to natural necessity, we might have known wherein, and how far, the creature is accountable. For herein, and so far, Mr. Edwards grants, it [volition] is not pro­perly his own act—he is not the proper subject of command, &c.

IF volition be partly owing to natural causes, and the subject so far is not answerable; what is this but charging the moral turpi­tude of a sinful volition on GOD, so far as it is the effect of natural necessity? Now as well may we attribute the whole moral turpi­tude to God, as the least measure of it.

IT moreover follows, that the holiness of the angels, who never sinned, being among those moral events which are owing to the nature of things, is no holiness; unworthy of praise. The same thing follows with respect so the holiness of the man CHRIST JESUS, and of GOD himself. For 'natural necessi­ty is wholly inconsistent with just praise and blame.' And would Mr. Edwards deny, that the holiness of GOD, his moral rectitude in gene­ral, is necessary in it's own nature? And what is this, but to be necessary by a natural necessity?

FARTHER, by Mr. Edwards's principles, all virtue and vice in creatures is native or original. For every act of volition is the necessary effect of internal, original bias—i. e. is owing to the original frame of the mind. The angels that self, and our common progenitors, were there­fore [Page 56] 'made with a fixed, prevailing principle of sin in the heart.' Otherwise their sin proceeded not from internal, original bias—any more than from an 'indissoluble connection with a cause ne­cessary in it's own nature.' If in truth their ori­ginal bias was not to evil—if they were endow­ed with the moral image of GOD, then their sin­ful volition was not the effect of original pro­pensity—nor did the necessity of it lie in the will, in it's primitive state. Nor consequently will this account for the permanency of holiness in the an­gels in heaven. This cannot be the rationale of the abiding principle of holiness in them; since it appears from fact, that creatures endowed with the moral image of GOD, may deface and forfeit it.

SUPPOSE 'the essence of virtue and vice lies in the nature of volition, not in the cause'; it then follows, that the intrinsic cause, the internal bias or propensity (which is supposed to be the moral necessity that determines the will) is not that which constitutes the goodness, or wicked­ness, of the acts of the will. A vicious man's bias and inclination to sin, is not that which makes him sinful; the essence of his sin lying not in such bias or inclination, but in the nature of the wicked thing. A shrewd solution! as if the character of moral agents were not always esti­mated from their propensity to good or evil. If 'moral necessity lies in the will, and is the will's propensity,' it either follows, that there is no good or evil in any dispositions implanted in the hearts of men by nature; (contrary to assertion, p. 303.) or if there be any good or evil in such dispositions, this is entirely a distinct goodness or wickedness from the volitions themselves, which they are the cause of. 'It would imply a contra­diction [Page 57] to suppose, that these two are the same in­dividual' goodness or 'wickedness. The' good or 'wicked act of the cause, in producing' goodness or 'wickedness is one' goodness or 'wickedness; and the' goodness or 'wickedness produced, if there be any produced, is another.' Will this be called arguing! What doth it amount to? The plain truth is, that when we set ourselves to judge of human actions, we must have no consideration of the source of them, but entirely detach them from their causes. Be the efficient who or what it will, all we have to attend to is, the effect pro­duced—by this we must estimate the goodness or wickedness of men, whether they determine themselves, or are determined ab extra—whether they have power over their own wills, or have not. He therefore that with one original talent makes as great improvement as another with five, is no more praiseworthy—that is, is not ac­cepted according to that he hath. He that offends against five degrees of light originally given, is guilty in no higher degree than he that offends against but one degree of light. The volition, or act, in both cases, we suppose to be the same in regard to the subject matter of duty or sin—the same also in the general nature thereof. What then is the reason of different degrees of punishment for the same crime in different per­sons? Not the nature of the crime as abstract­ed from the circumstances of the agent, but as connected and compared herewith. Now if men are not the cause of their own volitions, then a determination to sin against ten degrees of light differs nothing from the like determina­tion against a single degree of light: In both cases, the determination itself is alike necessary and unavoidable. So that there is no foundation [Page 58] for different degrees of guilt; because, though we are won't to speak of superior and lesser ad­vantages, yet there is no real ground for this distinction, intelligent creatures being in no case the authors, the voluntary designing cause of their inward determinations; at least not of the first and leading act, which decides the whole matter. How then, without having recourse to the cause, can we judge of the natute of sin?

INDEED had Mr. Edwards succeeded in his attempt to shew, that the "essence of virtue and vice is not in their cause, but in their nature", he would not have obviated the objection so of­ten made to the doctrine of necessity, but never answered, that it is charging GOD with sin.

FOR admitting GOD to be the original cause of volition, but that being the cause of a sinful volition in the creature is a distinct wicked­ness from that which the cause produceth in the effect; still the supreme cause is supposed in fault; is charged with producing sin. There is no evading the consequence, indeed, that the whole guilt of men's evil dispositions is chargeable on GOD, not themselves, or on blind necessity and fatality, if the things Mr. Edwards advanceth be true. For who will charge another with what he is acknowledged not to be the author or cause of? If therefore men's volitions are virtuous or vicious, and they not the design­ing causes of them themselves; (which Mr. Edwards throughout his book saith they are not) it follows, that the virtue or vice of their volitions is to be ascribed to the cause, whoever or whatever this cause is. This con­sequence may appear more plainly to follow from the scheme of necessity we are exami­ning, in the succeeding sections.

SECT. III. Upon Mr. Edwards's own Scheme, there cannot be natural Liberty without moral.

WE acknowledge the title of this section contains a position directly repugnant to Mr. Edwards's whole scheme, and yet trust we shall make it appear that the thing asserted plain­ly follows from things he hath advanced.

LIBERTY with respect to natural actions can be neither more nor less than according to the freedom of the will, or mind. For natural acti­ons, by supposition, are dependent and consequent on, the fruits and effects of, the will's determi­nation, which is the cause of them. Now 'there cannot be more in the effect than in the cause. Those things which are indissolubly connected with other things that are necessary, are them­selves necessary.' Therefore if the acts of the will are necessary, those outward acts, which are the effects of necessity in the will, must be ne­cessary 'by a necessity of consequence.' Now eve­ry act of the will is said to be necessary. 'The soul itself is the object of something acting upon, and influencing it. The first and determining act of choice, which decides the whole affair, is out of our power.' So that in natural actions we are 'caused to act by some other agent.' Mr. Edwards faith, 'it is no more a contradiction, to suppose that action may be the effect of some other cause, besides the agent or being that acts, [Page 60] than to suppose that life may be the effect of some other cause besides the liver, or being that lives, in whom life is caused to be.' ^* (286.) The acts of the soul or will being, therefore, necessary effects of some other cause than the agent, let it be shewn how there can be so much as natural liberty—meaning hereby a freedom from out­ward constraint or restraint.

MR. Edwards asserts, 'The liberty of the will is not exercised in any thing but what the will does'. (99.) 'The will in no instance whatever is it's own determiner'. Therefore the liberty of the will is not exercised in any of the determinations of the will. Therefore not in determining to move the body. Therefore corporeal action is not vo­luntary. Therefore the will does nothing. There­fore it is exercised in nothing. Mr. Edwards promiseth to 'demonstrate', that 'if the first act in the train, determining and fixing the rest, be not free, none of them all are free.' And asserts, that ' GOD's own immediate conduct is original in the series.'

In one word, external action is no more in our power than internal. To say that the will deter­mines the former is not true: For this would be to suppose it is its own determiner at least in this particular determination to move the body; con­trary to assertion, that it is in no instance whatever it's own determiner. But suppose material actions to be determined by the will, that herein men are the voluntary causes of their own actions—this is really attributing no power to the will or agent—since all the acts of the will suppose an answerable [Page 61] cause without, as much as creation supposeth a creator. (62.)

If material actions are subject to, and command­ed by, the will, still this is subject to and deter­mined by preceeding necessity. So that natural liberty is given up. For that is a strange kind of liberty, which is founded in, and results out of, necessity. Whether this necessity be natural or moral—whether it proceeds from an extrinsic or intrinsic cause, it equally militates against the sup­position of freedom. The intelligent system is a curious piece of mechanism.

Page 232 (and elsewhere) Mr. Edwards hath an evasion, which scarce deserves a serious an­swer It is this, 'that a man may be said to have a thing in his power, if he has it at his election; i. e. if he now pleaseth, and has a direct and imme­diate desire for it, he is not unable to do it.' This, in most writers, would be esteemed meer quibbling. For if a man is morally incapable of a 'direct and immediate desire' to a thing, how can he be said to have it in his power? Would Mr. Edwards say, that things are in or out of men's power, farther than chusing or refusing is so, as well as the consequent acts depending hereon? It is not improper to say, 'that a person' cannot 'perform those actions, which depend on an act of will, when the act of will itself cannot be pre­sent,' but is forever impossible'—when the dis­position to the contrary is 'as strong and im­moveable as the bars of a castle,' by nature—when want of inclination proceeds from na­ture; or original bias. For 'the event is de­pendent on it's cause.' And the cause not being put, the event cannot take place. Ad­mitting that such a state of the will may be [Page 62] required as is forever impossible; this can be only on a supposition of an ability once gi­ven and possessed, but lost. Who will say, that a man has in his power what is and must be impossible? So that when we are told, 'that the common people, in their notion of a faulty or praise-worthy deed, suppose the man does it in the exercise of liberty; but that their notion of liberty is only a person's having opportunity of doing as he pleases'—i. e. of executing a choice already made, we must esteem this trifting. For what liberty is there when choice itself is out of a man's power—is the effect of an antecedent necessary cause? 'In the first act of choice, which decides the whole matter,' he is necessarily determined. In this Mr. Edwards constantly asserts a man has not power, or liberty of choice, while he grants him a power or capacity of consequent choice. That is, in other words, a capacity of being acted up­on by some other cause or agent.

UPON the whole: Mr. Edwards allows, that liberty is essential to praise or blame, reward or punishment; but teacheth, that the internal state of the mind or will proceeds not from, is not determined by, ourselves. ^* External action on­ly is determimed by us. With what truth and propriety even this can be said on Mr. Edwards's scheme, we trust is sufficiently manifest.

SECT. IV. Of GOD's being the Author of Sin, upon Mr. Edwards's Scheme of necessity; and in what Sense he admits this to be the Consequence of his Doctrine.

MR Edwards teacheth, 'That GOD, when he had made man, so ordered his circum­stances, that from these circumstances, together with the withholding divine influence and assist­ance, his sin infallibly followed.' And when it is asked hereupon, 'why might not GOD as well have first made man with a fixed, prevail­ing principle of sin in his heart?' Mr. Edwards intimates in his answer, that GOD might indeed have done so; but adds, that if man had been thus made at first, 'it would not have been so visible, that sin did not arise from GOD, as the positive cause, and real source of it—that there­fore it was meet man should not be made with sin in his heart, that sin might appear to arise from the imperfection of the creature, 'and not from GOD as the efficient or fountain.' He al­lows GOD to be the author of sin in any sense but being 'the agent, or actor of sin, or doer of the wicked thing.' He 'disposeth the state of events in such a manner, that sin most certainly follows therefrom. In such a sense, I do not deny, that GOD is the author of sin. It is no reproach for the most high to be thus the au­thor of sin. In such a manner GOD is the orde­rer and disposer of sin, though not the actor of it, or doer of the wicked thing.' (Part iv. sect. 9, 10. and p. 402, 408.

[Page 64]Now how doth it appear, on these principles, that God is not the positive cause, and real source of moral evil? Every one perceives a difference between doing (or being the subject of) a wicked thing, and being the efficient cause and fountain of it—Mr. Edwards allows, that the moral turpitude lies wholly in the inward pro­pensity, and can no farther be applied to the cor­poreal action, than as a vicious principle is sup­posed to be the source of it. If then we have no power of self-determination in relation to the internal acts and exercises of the mind—if the only thing wherein human liberty consists, is, a power of executing what is already willed—if volition springs not from man as the source, cause, or efficient of it—if he is only the subject, the doer, the actor of sin—Who then is the po­sitive cause and fountain of it? if not the crea­ture, who but the creator? Every thing but the action or doing of wickedness, Mr. Edwards expresly affirms GOD to be the author of, and saith it is no reproach to him. So that unless he would confound cause and effect—unless he would allow men to be 'the designing volun­tary cause of their own volitions;' (which he constantly denies) there is no evading the conse­quence, that GOD is the source and fountain, the positive cause and efficient, of moral evil—yea, Mr. Edwards saith, that he 'decisively or­ders all the volitions of moral agents by a posi­tive influence'—(40.) which is nothing less than saying in express terms, that he is the positive cause and efficient of them.

Mr. Edwards's notion of human liberty, as being exercised and concerned in outward acti­ons only, in contradistinction from an inward power of self-determination (or activity in voliti­on [Page 65] —or liberty in the mind or will) if viewed in it's direct and immediate consequences, we think must appear to subvert the very foundation of religion and morality. This appears to be the plain consequence by his own principles. For he very justly observes, that 'the essence of all moral good or evil lies in the internal inclinati­ons, dispositions, volitions'—that as these 'are the cause of outward actions, so the moral good or evil of such actions doth not lie at all in the actions themselves, which taken by themselves are nothing of a moral nature; but in the internal inclinations and volitions which are the cause of them'—(276) that 'vice and virtue lie in the state or frame of the soul, and in this only'—that 'the very willing is the doing; when once a man has willed, the thing is performed, and nothing else remains to be done—that the will itself is the proper object of commands, as well as those actions which are the effects of the will. It is manifest the soul only is properly and directly the subject of precepts or commands, that only being capable of receiving or perceiving them. The motions or state of the body are matter of command only as they are subject to the soul, and connected with it's acts.' ^* Now if inward freedom enters not into the notion of human liberty (33, 38, 39, 40, 131, 132, 189, 194, 213,—215, 234, 236, 256,—289, and passim.) then we are not free in that wherein lies the essence of virtue and vice: And if we are not free in this respect especially, how are we free in any sense that is of the least importance? how can we be virtuous or vicious, if liberty (as Mr. Edwards grants) is necessary to moral good or evil? Yea, if we are not free with respect to the [Page 66] thoughts, affections and purposes of our hearts, our inward inclinations and volitions, hath not Mr. Edwards shewn undeniably that we cannot be free in regard to outward actions? 'If there be a series of acts, the determining act is more especially the subject of command—because it is this act that determines the whole affair.' So that we are not at liberty in that which deter­mines the whole character. Nothing can be more futile than the evasion, that 'the essence of vir­tue and vice lies in the nature of volition, not in the cause'—as if meer effects might be virtuous or vicious, and the cause that produceth them not so—Or supposing the cause (of a sinful vo­lition, for instance) to be vicious, as if the passive effect would be another and distinct wickedness. Besides, if the subject of such a volition, who is altogether passive herein, is vicious notwithstand­ing, then how is liberty necessary to praise or blame? If he is vicious at all, he is so on account of the volition itself, and on this account only— Whether he has power or opportunity to exe­cute the volition, does not come into conside­ration.

MOREOVER, outward actions being determi­ned by the will, and partaking of the nature of moral good or evil only with reference to their cause, viz. internal volition—how is this (inter­nal volition) virtuous [...] in it's own nature, when the acts of the body are not? Volition hath a cause, a prior determiner, no less than external conduct. Why then are outward acts declared virtuous or vicious only with reference to their cause, while this is denied of volition? Hath every act of volition an antecedent, necessary [Page 67] cause, which determineth not only volition, but, of consequence, outward actions? And is not the virtue or vice of volition to be attribu­ted to its cause, as much as the evil of external acts to the inward disposition and determinati­on? 'Thus' Mr. Edwards's 'notion of liberty, consisting' in external freedom, 'is repugnant to itself, and shuts itself wholly out of the world.'

WERE it indeed true, as Mr Edwards inci­dentally observes, (contrary to the general doc­trine of his book, and his whole scheme) that we 'have command over our thoughts'—(p. 894) that 'the acts of the will are free'—that 'the soul has freedom'—(p. 116, 224) this might solve the difficulty, as it would be to make men the voluntary designing cause of those inward acts wherein the nature of virtue and vice consists. But, as before observed, Mr. Edwards constantly denies an inward principle, source, or power of activity—and blames those divines who contend for the freedom of the soul in willing. He allows, that a man hath 'pow­er to move his body agreably to an antecedent act of choice, but not to use or exert the facul­ties of his soul.' (p. 131) How then 'hath the soul a power of volition or choice?' (p. 39) of chusing for instance, to move the body, when it hath not a power of exerting its own facul­ties? How much more consistent would it have been for Mr Edwards to have said, that the will's determining is a necessary determining— for the soul to act necessarily is evermore to act necessarily?—(that is, the will does not determine, the soul does not act) than to say, 'the will's determining is a free determining—for the soul to act voluntarily is evermore to act electively'? [Page 68] The will, the soul, may be acted upon, and have such a volition or choice produced in it, in con­sequence, and as the effect, of some cause operat­ing on it, deciding and determining the volition. What Mr. Edwards calls the soul's voluntary, elective acts, are the effects of a cause indepen­dent on man. The acts and exercises of the human mind (if they may be called its acts) are owing not to any active power in the mind, to any thing within its power, but entirely to the energy of a necessary cause, which is prior to what are called its own acts. Volition is free or voluntary with a freedom of moral necessity— a necessity as absolute as natural. And thus it is, that a man's heart comes to be wrong or right.

MR. Edwards teacheth, that GOD 'orders the volitions of moral agents, among other events, with such a decisive disposal, that the events are infallibly connected with his dispo­sal—that an universal, determining providence in­fers an infallible, previous fixedness of all e­vents—that GOD's own immediate conduct is first in the series, and this alone unconnected with any thing preceeding—that he causeth the disposition of the mind to be more in favour of such acts'—(vicious no less than virtuous) 'or bringeth the mind more into view of powerful motives and inducements'—that all things are invariably settled—and 'necessity be­longs to all moral agents.' His scheme, upon the whole, appears to be nearly the same with that exhibited by the celebrated Mr. Hume, an epicurean atheist, which we shall give the reader in his own words. 'There is a continued chain of necessary causes, fore-ordained, and pre-de­termined, [Page 69] reaching from the original cause of all to every single volition of every human crea­ture. While we act, we are, at the same time, acted upon. The ultimate author of all our volitions is the Creator of the world, who first bestowed motion on this immense machine, and placed all beings in that position, whence eve­ry subsequent event, by an inevitable necessity, must result.'

TO this scheme, Mr. Hume supposeth it will be objected in the following form. 'Human actions, therefore, either can have no moral turpitude at all, as proceeding from so good a cause; or if they have any turpitude, they in­volve our Creator in the same guilt, while he is acknowledged to be their ultimate cause and author. Wherever a continued chain of ne­cessary causes is fixed, that being, either finite or infinite, who produces the first, is likewise the author of all the rest, and must both bear the blame, and acquire the praise, which belong to them. Our clearest and most unalterable ideas of morality establish this rule upon unquestion­able reasons, when we examine the consequen­ces of any human action; and these reasons must still have greater force, when applied to the volitions and intentions of a being infinitely wise and powerful. Ignorance or impotence may be pleaded for so limited a creature as man; but those imperfections have no place in our Creator He foresaw, he ordained, he intended all those actions of men, which we so rashly pronounce criminal. And we must conclude, therefore, either that they are not criminal, or that the Deity, not man, is accountable for them. But as either of these positions is ab­surd [Page 70] and impious, it follows that the doctrine from which they are deduced cannot possibly be true, as being liable to all the same objections. An absurd consequence, if necessary, proves the original doctrine to be absurd, in the same man­ner that criminal actions render criminal the original cause, if the connection between them be necessary and inevitable.' ^*

THIS objection, which Mr. Hume states to himself, may be made with the same propriety to the general scheme of our author. From Mr Hume's answer, it is sufficiently manifest what his principles were. He tells us, 'It is not possible to explain distinctly, how the Dei­ty can be the immediate cause of all the actions of men, without being the author of sin and moral turpitude. These are mysteries, which meer natural and unassisted reason is very unfit to handle; and whatever system it embraces it must find itself involved in inextricable difficul­ties, and even contradictions, at every step which it takes with regard to such subjects.' ^†

MR. Hume acknowledgeth, that upon his scheme, the Deity is the mediate, original cause or all the actions of men; and virtually admits the consequence; (that he is therefore the au­thor of sin and moral turpitude) by observing, that it is not possible distinctly to explain, how he can be the one, and not the other. Now let it be shewn, that Mr. Edwards's scheme is not [Page 71] liable to the foregoing objection, or admitting the objection, let the consequence be shewn not to follow, and it will afford no small satisfaction to many, who are greatly embarrassed with Mr. Edwards's scheme or necessary connection. Whoever examines part ii. sect. 3d, 4th, 9th, 12th, and 13th. Part iii. sect. 3d, 4th, and 6th. Part iv. sect. 9th and 10th, and the con­clusion of his discourse, must, we are persuaded, see the objection, as above stated, to be just— And if the consequence also be fairly drawn, doth it not prove the doctrine against which the objection lies to be false and absurd? absolute­ly irreconcilable with the moral character of GOD?

SECT. V. On the supposed Advantage of moral Evil to the Universe.

HAVING taken notice of Mr. Edwards's doctrine, in asserting GOD to be the au­thor of sin, except that he is not 'the actor of it, or doer of the wicked thing; and the eva­sion which such a doctrine needed, that 'the essence of a sinful volition is in its nature, not in its cause'; the next advance he makes, in order to reconcile the existence of sin with the divine choice and determination, in the invaria­ble necessity or it, is, that moral evil is best for the world—that therefore 'an infinitely wise being, who always chuses what is best, must chuse there should be such a thing'—that this is not chusing what is properly evil upon the whole, because 'of the great good which is the consequence of sin, for the sake' of which GOD is supposed to 'will sin.' He therefore asserts, that 'moral evil is not of a bad, but good ten­dency'—that 'the coming to pass of every indi­vidual act of sin is truly, all things considered, agreable to infinite wisdom and goodness.' (Part iv. sect. 9th.)

FOR all this he quotes with approbation Dr. Turnbull, against whom he had before wrote and published part of an elaborate volume. [Page 73] When it is asked, Whence comes evil? this Gen­tleman denies the hypothesis, and answers, 'There is no evil in the universe. What! is there no misery, no vice in the world? or are not these evils? Evils indeed they are; that is, those of one sort are hurtful, and those of the other sort are equally hurtful and abominable; But they are not evil or mischievous with re­spect to the whole. The evil which happens is requisite to the greater good.'

THAT GOD may, and does many times, overrule things so, as to bring good out of mo­ral evil, we deny not. From the apostacy of mankind, he hath taken occasion to manifest the exceeding riches of his grace. He also fre­quently improves vicious and profligate sinners (beside, and contrary to, their own intention) as instruments of great and general good. But doth it therefore follow, that profligate wicked­ness is not of bad, but good tendency? That every individual act of it is agreable to perfect wisdom and goodness, and best for the world?

'THOUGH the constitution of our nature, from whence we are capable of vice and mise­ry, may, as it undoubtedly does, contribute to the perfection and happiness of the world; and though the actual permission of evil may be be­neficial to it: (that is, it would have been more mischievous, not that a wicked person had him­self abstained from his own wickedness, but that any one had forcibly prevented it, than that it was permitted:) Yet notwithstanding, it might have been much better for the world, if this very evil had never been done. Nay, it is most clearly conceivable, that the very commission [Page 74] of wickedness may be beneficial to the world, and yet, that it would be infinitely more beneficial for men to refrain from it. For thus, in the wise and good constitution of the natural world, there are disorders which bring their own cures; diseases, which are themselves remedies. Many a man would have died, had it not been for the gout or a fever; yet it would be thought madness to assert, that sickness is a bet­ter or a more perfect state than health; though the like, with regard to the moral world, has been asserted. ^*

GOD's law, originally given to man, was doubtless good and perfect. It was doubtless agreable to perfect wisdom and goodness, that he should yield a steady and uniform obedience to it. Thus he would have glorified his Crea­tor, answered the end of his being, and provid­ed for his own highest happiness. But suppo­sing moral evil to be no evil upon the whole, but a great good, such consequences as these will follow. That the law given to man at first was imperfect—that it was better, all things considered, that the divine law (the law of man's nature) should be broke than kept—that GOD threatned disobedience with the pe­nalty of death, and yet chose man should rebel, 'for the sake of the great good consequent on sin'—that the ends of infinite wisdom and good­ness could be answered, no possible way devised to advance the highest happiness of the intelligent creation, but by the entrance of infinite evil into the world—that the revolt of men and angels was in compliance with the end of their being, [Page 75] and the wise and gracious intention of the Crea­tor—(and if so, 'why did not GOD make them at first with a fixed prevailing principle of sin?') Yea, it follows, that intemperance, debauchery, oppression, murther, malice, envy, all the lusts of the flesh and spirit, greatly conduce to the good of the world, and are perfectly agreable to the wise and good governor of it. What obli­gations do mankind owe to drunkards and gluttons, to fornicators and adulterers, to the fraudulent and oppressors, to thieves and liars, and false swearers, to robbers and murtherers, and all that great multitude, whom the faithful and true witness hath expressly excluded from the heavenly Jerusalem, and consigned to one common lake of fire and brimstone! ^* Which judgment according to truth the world have been wont to testify their approbation of in their treatment of such persons—that is, their greatest benefactors! Base ingratitude!

HOW sin came to be permitted is more than we can comprehend. To say it could not have been prevented is saying more than any one knows. To say that' GOD chose it, and deter­mined the will of the creature to it, is impious, even supposing it is in fact followed with grea­ter good, than otherwise would have been— which supposition is, however, but meer conjec­ture at best, and without any solid foundation. For unless we can tell what would have been had sin never entered the world, it is impossible we should be able to judge, by way of compari­son, of the greater good consequent upon it; or be able to say, that it was best upon the [Page 76] whole. From the miseries of it, which we see and feel, we have no special reason to infer its superior advantages, and good tendency. And notwithstanding the infinite reason we have to receive it as a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation, that JESUS CHRIST came into the world to save sinners; yet that he came to restore mankind to a better state than they would have been raised to, had they never sinned, is more than we have yet learned from the holy scrip­tures.

BE this as it will: Suppose it to be indeed true, that the consequence of sin is the greater good of the universe, it will not therefore fol­low, that GOD must chuse and determine it. If an apostle supposed their damnation to be just, who do evil with a view to greater good; shall we venture to impute any thing like this to GOD? Suppose (in the instances Mr. Edwards brings) Joseph's brethren had foreseen the con­sequences of their treatment of him, would this have justified their conduct, and rendered it me­ritorious?—what as wise and good men they must have chose? (p. 374, 375) The same question, on the same supposition, offers itself in relation to the murderers of our Savior. To say that GOD wills evil for the sake of its good tendency, is a reproach to an holy and good be­ing, who cannot chuse moral evil at all—any more than a man of reason and conscience can chuse what he knows to be sinful, from the clearest prospect of great publick advantage. The moral Governor of the world will pursue the happiness of it, in such ways, and by such means only, as are just and holy. And we might with more propriety suppose, he will not [Page 77] take care of the happiness of his creatures at all, than that he doth this by chusing sin as the on­ly sure means of the greatest good. ^*

THE late Rev. Mr. Clap, President of Yale- College, in Connecticut, in his 'history and [Page 78] vindication of the doctines of the New Eng­land churches,' (p. 19) has exhibited 'a new scheme of religion,' which he apprehended was prevailing, in opposition to those doctrines— Mentioning 'this fundamental principle' of the new scheme, 'That the happiness of the creature is the sole end of the creation,' the worthy Presi­dent remarks, 'This naturally leads to most, if not all, of the rest' (meaning all the other errors of the new scheme of divinity.) 'For this must be the sole rule of all GOD's conduct to­wards us, and of ours towards him; and it is certain, that GOD's sole end and ultimate design can never be frustrated.' Whether the Pre­sident had Mr. Edwards's book in view, is un­certain. We can only say, that besides the au­thors [Page 79] particularly set down, he mentions 'other books' from which he made his collection of errors, without informing us who the authors were. But though we apprehend Mr. Ed­wards's book as exceptionable as any mentioned by the President; yet we rather think this book was not in his view. For we were some years ago informed, (and upon enquiry found it to be true) that this book was introduced by the Pre­sident to be recited by the students of the col­lege—and suppose it is still continued.

SECT. VI. Containing general Observations and Reflections on the Scheme of Necessity exhibited in Mr. Ed­wards's Book.

NOTWITHSTANDING all Mr. Edwards hath said upon the distinction between na­tural and moral necessity, we cannot but think this 'distinction altogether impertinent in the present controversy.' For 'that which is necessary, is necessary, must be, and cannot be prevented.' If there be a real necessity on the mind in all its acts, it is quite immaterial whether this necessity, by which the mind is in every instance determi­ned, be called natural or moral. Whether will and endeavour is overcome by external, con­straint; or whether such a state of the will or soul is produced by some necessary cause, extrin­sic or intrinsic, amounts to much the same thing in the end. There is exactly the same propriety in saying, that such a thing cannot be done, is impossible, unavoidable, necessary, &c, where there is a moral inability to it, as in applying these epi­thets to a physical inability: For if the act of the mind, on which the natural act depends, be for ever impossible, the natural act must be alike im­possible—unless it be said, that it is possible an effect may be produced without a cause. What Mr. Edwards hath said to shew, that natural acti­ons, [Page 81] which are determined by the mind, are possi­ble, when the determination of the mind itself respecting them is forever impossible, is unsatis­factory, and unintelligible to us. If no being can chuse or act otherwise than he doth, we can­not conceive of a necessity more absolute; and such is the necessity maintained by Mr. Edwards— only he approves not the terms natural necessity, and thinks the word certainty more proper— While he asserts all events to be morally necessa­ry—and that in things thus necessary there is a 'connection prior and superior to will and endea­vour.' (294.)

AFTER all that hath been said, moral necessity is, properly speaking, natural necessity; moral power is natural power. The one is as original to us as the other. The latter is interwoven in our frame no otherwise than the former. The moral faculty, or power, which Mr. Edwards saith belongs to moral agency, is a natural facul­ty or power. So that whatever moral capacity or incapacity is attributed to mankind, the same is natural. If man is a law to himself it is by na­ture that he is so, having the work of the law written on his heart. And as to the inability of man, Mr. Edwards, we presume, believed this to be derived from nature—to have it's source in 'the want of original righteousness, and the cor­ruption of the whole nature.' Now an inability which has it's source in the very nature of man may surely be called a natural inability.

MUCH hath been said to shew, that every mo­ral event must have an answerable cause. Be it so. Every such event must then have a moral cause. And whether any other than an intelli­gent [Page 82] mind can be such a cause, let those who have common understanding judge. If it be admit­ted, that a moral cause must be a moral agent, then it will follow, that we are the causes of our own volitions, or that our maker is the cause of them. Mr. Edwards denies the first—therefore our volitions are to be attributed to GOD as their proper cause. But however this might be ad­mitted of holy volitions, we cannot think it will be admitted of sinful ones. And if not, what regard should be had to a doctrine of which this is the direct consequence? We are self-deter­mined, or determined by the deity. If there be any difference between a cause, and a meer in­strument, the former denotes a mind that hath wisdom, power &c, in a greater or less degree, according to the effects ascribed to it. And if moral events, through a chain of second causes, centre in the deity, as natural effects do, what is this but running up morals to mechanism? any pains Mr. Edwards hath taken to avoid such an imputation on his scheme notwithstanding.

IN our author's scheme, necessity is universal. The divine will is always determined by it, and the will of every creature. Now GOD is either the author of this necessity, to which he himself is subject, or he is not. If he is, then all the [...]ects of it are to be ascribed to him as their proper cause. If he is not, then there is some cause prior to the first cause, binding and deter­mining him— he is caused to determine as he doth by something extrinsic (For to say he is determined by sometning intrinsic, is to say he is self-determined—contrary to supposition.) His being and volitions are effects as much as those of finite creatures. That necessity, which is [Page 83] said to be the cause of every determination of the divine will, the cause and ground of his ex­istence and perfections, is prior, by supposition, to his existence and volitions. And this neces­sity must be determined by something preceed­ing, and so on. Yea, Mr. Edwards makes express mention of the cause of moral necessity—and says, that the cause of this necessity is equally ne­cessary as of natural. That is, there is a neces­sary cause of this cause, and so on in infinitum. Thus we are run back far into non-entity, and have to enquire, By what cause the first cause exists—which cause is an effect in relation to something preceeding, and this an effect with relation to something still preceeding, &c. &c. And if something exterior and prior to the Dei­ty determines him, what is this but affirming him to be the almighty minister of fate? How­ever Mr. Edwards hath expressed his disinclina­tion to fatalism, (in which we doubt not his sin­cerity) we think his reasoning is plainly on the side of absolute fatality; and suppose he was caught in his own subtilty. Upon his scheme it follows, that the actions of all finite beings are the agency of the Deity; and his is not properly speaking agency, but instrumentality— a subjection to blind necessity and fate. There is no self-mover, self-direction, self-determina­tion, or source of activity, in the universe. Li­berty is banished out of the world—and the world must have been eternal.

WHETHER GOD could have acted otherwise than he hath? is a curious rather than profita­ble enquiry. And as to the notion' of 'fitness of things, independent of the things themselves, and without reference to the sovereign mind,' [Page 84] it is difficult even to imagine it; to say nothing of the impiety implied in such a thought.

WE have represented what we apprehend is the plain tendency, and indeed only consistent sense, of the scheme of necessity before us. Whe­ther it was copied from Mr. Hume, Hobbs, Spi­noza, or any of the old heathen Philosophers we do not say. We hint the thing because of a remarkable coincidence we have exhibited at the close of these remarks, in some extracts from them, set over against similar passages of Mr. Edwards's book. Though we have a right to renew valid objections, how oft soever they have been made before, until some tolerable answer is given to them (especially when the old doc­trines, to which the like objections were former­ly made, but not answered, are received.) Yet we would not repeat the charge, without giving a specimen in support of it. We really are per­suaded, that there can be no possible confutation of fatalism on the principles of Mr. Edwards's book. He speaks with satisfaction of the progress of metaphysic science; (325) of which and its 'ter­rible doings,' his own book, among others on fatality, is an alarming proof. [ Epicurus, Mr. Edwards reminds us, was 'the father of atheism and licentiousness,' David Hume, Esq is the fa­ther of modern epicurism: And whoever hath read his essays and Mr. Edwards's enquiry is better able to judge than one can from the few select passages we have extracted, of the agree­ment between them.]

NOT that we suppose Mr. Edwards saw, or allowed, the tendency and consequences of his scheme to be such as we have here represented; [Page 85] he hath repeatedly declared the contrary. Still if the consequences are fairly deduced—if in those passages wherein he professes himself a friend to liberty he is either repugnant to him­self, or allows no liberty that is of any moment, or not connected with moral agency—let any man of reason say, whether his scheme can be safe. His doctrine of necessary connection, if plainly reducible to the consequences we have mentioned, if consistent with itself only in that sense we have taken it, will be rejected by all who have a due regard to the moral perfections of GOD, for which we doubt not in the least but Mr. Edwards had a supreme veneration. But great and good men are not always wise.

IT is very much Mr. Edwards's method to answer objections by endeavouring to reduce the scheme of his adversaries to the same absur­dity; which, though it be a good argument ad hominem, is by no means satisfactory. We might have expected some other answer in particular to the objections of the fate of the heathen, Hobbs 's necessity, making men machines, making GOD the author of sin, as well as other objections, than he hath given. But as we may presume Mr. Edwards gave what appeared to him the best answer to these and such like objections to the doctrine of necessity; so we conclude from his known skill in the subject, no solid answer can be given to these objections; otherwise he would have favoured the world with such an answer, instead of evasive ones. Though we will allow he might think those answers to ob­jections solid, which we must take the liberty to call evasive.

[Page 86]THOUGH we think no book hath been pub­lished in this country of more dangerous ten­dency, yet did we not at the same time sup­pose the author to have been a serious firm believer of religion, natural and revealed, and zealously concerned for the interest of practical godliness, we should not have taken the trouble to enter on this puzzling subject of liberty and necessity—which, as Mr. Hume remarks, 'is the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science.' If what hath been remarked is sufficient to shew the absurd and dangerous consequences of admitting a neces­sary connection of moral causes and effects from the beginning of the world, or a similar connec­tion of moral acts with a supposed necessary cause preceeding, as of natural events with their cau­ses; the inconsistence of our author's scheme with itself; and the perfect futility of entering into nice disquisitions on such a subject, one main end of these remarks hitherto hath been answered. But as it may be thought insufficient to have done this in some measure, without pro­ceeding to exhibit a scheme more consonant to truth and reason, this is what we shall attempt in the following part of our subject.

SECT. I. Internal Liberty belongs to moral Agents.

WITHOUT controverting with Mr. Ed­wards, or any others, the propriety or impropriety of ascribing liberty to the faculty of will, ^* or to any particular faculty: The proper question is, Whether there be internal liberty in moral agents, or moral liberty in dis­tinction [Page 88] from natural? whether there be free­dom in the mind, or soul? If it can be shewn, that the mind or soul is free, it is to very little purpose to enquire, in what particular faculty of the agent freedom lies; or whether in any one faculty exclusively, or especially. Such an enquiry cannot be very edifying. Metaphysi­cians may think it a fit subject of speculation; but to common sense it appears frivolous. The simple notion of liberty we shall argue for, is this, that mankind have inward moral freedom ^*— a power of self-determination. (Not meaning by self-determination such a power in 'the proper­ty or faculty of will,' but in the agent.) It may otherwise be called an inward principle or power of activity. That such a power belongs to mo­ral agents, particularly to mankind, is what we shall endeavour to evince; without endeavour­ing to state the exact measure in which it is pos­sessed, or within what sphere exercised by them. In some it may be in greater perfection, in others less. But some degree of it is essential to mo­ral agency. At least all moral agents, during [Page 89] their probation, possess it in some measure and degree.

MR. Edwards, as hath been shewn, denies all self-determining power, and inward liberty—as­serting, that ' every determination of the will in chusing and refusing is necessary.' (p 111, 113) But that an inward principle of activity, and power of volition or choice, belongs to mankind, we think is in a manner self-evident. For it is granted on all hands, that moral good and evil lie in the state of the mind, or prevailing internal disposition of the agent. Liberty therefore, if at all necessary to virtue and vice, must be ex­ercised in that wherein the nature of morality and religion consists—that is, in the inward man. A freedom from external constraint is a liberty belonging to fools and madmen, and to the brute creatures. These, therefore, are as capable of virtue and vice, praise and blame, as beings endowed with, and in the exercise of reason, if this external (hypothetical) liberty is the only thing necessary to moral agency. Fools, madmen, and brutes, if they are not bound or imprisoned, have natural liberty. They have a power, faculty, or property called will. Their actions are as voluntary (in many respects) as those of mankind, who are of a found under­standing The actions of brutes proceed from inclination and design—an inclination and de­sign proceeding from nature, or internal, ori­ginal bias.

IF then an action's being voluntary (in the sense of Mr. Edwards's book) makes it virtuous or vicious, the lower animals are so as really as intelligent creatures. As we are not accustom­ed [Page 90] to talk of virtuous or vicious herds of cattle, the epithets, as applied to them, may sound something odd and harsh at first; but by the help of metaphysics we may in time be recon­ciled to such language. We are not, indeed, to suppose our oxen and horses are morally good or bad in those actions of theirs which are against their wills—to which they are externally impel­led—Or in regard to any instances of forbear­ance, which are owing to external impediment— to which they have a will, and endeavour to perform, but are hindered from doing as they would. But the cases of coaction and restraint excepted, let it be shewn, on the present hypothe­sis, that they are not proper subjects of commenda­tion or blame, reward or punishment—and by the same arguments we presume it may be shewn, that mankind are not. If power or opportuni­ty to execute a will or choice already produced by some extrinsic cause, be all that is meant by liberty, or that is necessary to moral agency, li­berty is perfectly ideal, and the controversy a­bout it is about a meer word. But if liberty be really essential to moral agency, as Mr. Edwards admits; and if there cannot be liberty of acting or conducting farther than there is liberty of willing, chusing, preferring, as hath been shewn—the plain consequence is, that liberty in the mind is essential to moral agency. Upon Mr. Edwards's scheme of liberty, it is not for the acts and exercises of their minds that men are accountable, but only for their outward actions. There is no moral turpitude in such a state of the soul or will as our Saviour describes, Matt. v. 28, 32, but only in the execution of such a disposition. We know, indeed, that Mr. Ed­wards intended not to assert any such thing as [Page 91] this, that malice, envy, pride, impure desires, &c. are innocent until they become effects: But is not this the consequence of his allowing, that liberty is necessary to moral agency, while he makes this liberty consist only in a power a man hath to execute his will. If Mr. Edwards in­tended not to assert the above consequence, (as it is plain he did not) then in the enquiry where­in the liberty of man consists, something farther is to be considered than material action—There must be internal liberty, if liberty enters into the notion of a praise-worthy deed, or the con­trary. The proper question, is, Whether we have and exercise liberty in that wherein the nature of virtue and vice consists? And one might think this would not be made a question.

TO say that the mind is necessarily determin­ed in all its acts, is making mankind necessary agents in that thing which distinguisheth them from the inferior creatures. Without mo­ral liberty, it is plain their actions cannot be of a moral nature, any more than those can be cal­led naturally free actions, which proceed from natural necessity. Abridge a man's natural li­berty ever so much, his moral freedom may re­main; and if it doth, the willing or unwilling mind is rewardable or punishable. On the con­trary, suppose moral liberty taken away, or ra­ther, never to have been possessed, and there is an utter incapacity of moral action. ^*

[Page 92]THAT we have internal liberty is apparent from our moral discernment, that faculty Mr. Edwards himself speaks of. We shall rest the whole proof of our doctrine on this single point. [Page 93] This moral discernment, it is allowed, is the principal power that distinguisheth us from the brute creation: In respect of this our ma­ker having taught us more than the beasts of [Page 94] the field, and made us wiser than the fowls of heaven: In respect of this man is by nature a law to himself, having the work of the law written on his heart.

[Page 95]THAT we have a power of deliberating, judg­ing, preferring, will not be disputed, being mat­ter or experience. The perception of right and wrong, good and ill-desert, Mr. Edwards justly observes, 'is one of the first ideas children have.' [Page 96] This faculty approves some actions, and con­demns others, detached from the consideration of their effects and consequences. The exer­cises of our minds, our thoughts, affections, de­signs, are the object of this faculty, no less than the conduct they lead to. Yea, for these espe­cially (if not only) it approves or condemns us, as these are the foundation of life and conduct. In censuring or commending the conduct of others, we go upon a supposition of intelligence and design: For we judge very differently of the same actions as performed by an ideot, or mad­man, and by one in possession of reason. And when it appears that an action proceeded not from design, or that a different and contrary purpose was intended from what is actually ef­fected, our opinion of it is changed. We ap­prove good intentions, and condemn evil ones, in ourselves, (and in others so far as such in­tentions can be known) though evil comes of what was meant for good, and vice versa.

NOW our estimating the moral character from internal dispositions is on a supposition that these are within the power of the agent. Whe­ther he shall execute his will or not, depends not on himself. He may be hindered herefrom, or compelled to do contrary to his will—which alters not the internal character. If we are made the means or instruments of what we do not intend, or are externally hindered from what we do intend, we are judged according to what we would have done. The reason is, that we have internal liberty in many instances, when we have not external. It is therefore much more proper to say, that natural necessity, in any supposed case, though it excuseth an external [Page 97] act, or the omission of such an act, yet hinders not but the state of the will may be right or wrong in such case; than to say, that moral necessity is consistent with praise or blame, be­cause not attended with natural necessity. We are condemned or approved of ourselves for a wil­ling or unwilling mind, and have a natural ap­prehension, that the judgment of GOD will se­cond our own. But did ever any man commend or accuse himself for what he knew to be necessary and unavoidable—not within his power, or not determined by himself? The inward perturba­tion vicious men feel proceeds from a convicti­on that they might have cultivated another frame of heart. If external constraint, or natu­ral necessity, renders a person incapable of such commands as respect material action, moral ne­cessity, or internal constraint, must render him equally incapable of such commands as respect the exercises of the mind, or acts of volition— (admitting this to be original, and not the con­sequence of internal liberty abused.) We are said to be the 'voluntary, designing causes of corporeal action.' Be it so, 'the essence of vir­tue and vice lies not in their cause.' And more­over, in a series of acts, connected and depen­dent, the praise or blame is to be attributed to the original act. But of this (which determines all the rest) we are not the voluntary causes. (p. 48, 284, 256) To return from this short di­gression.

THE moral capacity we have been speaking of, including moral obligation undeniably proves the internal liberty of mankind. As it implies a rule or guide of life, with authority and sanc­tions, as we have an inward perception of good [Page 98] or ill-desert, according as we have followed, or departed from, the direction of this leading principle; so we could not perceive ourselves to be under it as a law, and reproach ourselves for disobedience, were we fully persuaded such dis­obedience was a matter of real necessity. We experience, that 'our happiness or misery is not our fate'—Meaning here by these terms, not so much that kind of happiness or misery which depends on a man's outward condition and circumstances, as that which we signify by the words, peace, serenity, and joy of heart, on the one hand; and disquietude of mind, vexation or anguish of spirit on the other. The good man is satisfied from himself. The wicked is like the troubled sea, when it cannot rest. These differ­ent and opposite sensations, which constitute our chief happiness or misery in this world, and are accompanied more or less with hope or fear for futurity, it is impossible we should have, were we not internally free. We may suppose them to be as strong in those who are wholly depriv­ed of external freedom, as in those who are ful­ly possessed of it. So that however external ne­cessity may wholly prevent our being rewarda­ble or punishable for the outward action, it by no means doth for the inward disposition, pro­vided this depends on ourselves. Hence the injunction, Keep thy heart with all diligence; for out of it are the issues of life. It is in the power of man to lay any external necessity upon us, but no internal one. No chains can bind the soul but those of our own imposing. The cap­tive, prisoner, &c. may be as free, in the religi­ous sense, as any man. A person wholly de­prived of his bodily powers of action may yet be free in the noblest sense.

[Page 99]WE shall now proceed to shew, that internal liberty, in finite beings placed upon trial, im­plies an opportunity and capacity of chusing and acting otherwise than they in fact do. Finite be­ings, we say; because we pretend not to know what the perfect liberty of the Infinite Being is 'So far as we are free, we are not necessarily de­termined, so that we could not but make the choice we do.'

WHETHER the holy angels ever had a moral ability of falling, we need not enquire; though we have no ground to determine the contrary. Beings made upright, we know, have revoked. Now if the malignity of apostate spirits against GOD, their unalterable opposition to him, be the consequence of perverting a moral power they once had, it shews that finite beings may possess a liberty of chusing and acting otherwise than they do; and consequently, that liberty may be distinguished from, and opposed to, moral ne­cessity. So with respect to apostate man, if he had originally a moral power of retaining his in­nocence, the inference is, that he possessed liber­ty, not only as opposed to constraint from without, but as opposed to moral necessity. From the fall of angels and man, the inference therefore is not, that they were morally unable to keep their first estate; but that they had a moral power, and abused it, Indeed, in the case of their first sin, moral necessity must have been strictly natu­ral— Not, as we are won't to call habits, a second nature, but a first nature. So that moral or cri­minal inability supposeth a moral power once possessed but forfeited.

IF, on the contrary, it be supposed, that nei­ther [Page 100] man, nor the angels that fell, had a moral ability at first to continue in a state of rectitude, to whom but their Creator must their fall be at­tributed? Their original powers were such as he endowed them with. They could be required to exert no other. Their abilities, relations, and destination being such as their great Former gave and intended, they could be answerable only for what was given. If, therefore, the first act of sin 'necessarily followed from GOD's withhold­ing assistance, or if that assistance was not afford­ed, which was absolutely necessary to the avoid­ing' the first transgression, what is this but mak­ing GOD the proper author of it? How con­sistent this is with his moral character, or the possibility of sin, we need not say. But if GOD be the immediate author of the first act of diso­bedience in the creature, he is consequentially the author of all the moral defilement and inabi­lity proceeding therefrom; since 'the first act in the train determines and fixes the rest.' So that if 'there is not, and never can be, either in ex­istence or idea, a freedom from moral necessity, or a power of self-determination—if every moral event is immediately or ultimately ordered and de­termined by GOD'—(403, 404.) the consequence is, either that there is not, and never can be, sin in the world; or if there is, it is wholly chargea­ble on the first cause. The only way to evade this consequence is to admit, that the duty of an­gels and man, before their fall, was no other than they had a moral as well as natural power to do. To suppose their duty exceeded their abi­lities would be the injustice, which the slothful servant charged his Lord with.

FROM what hath been said, it appears, that [Page 101] there is no need of our examining into any moral impotency derived from the fall, or the moral inability of fallen man. For Mr. Edwards sup­poseth this kind of impotency to have taken place in innocence, as really as since the apostacy. That is, there was a moral necessity of the first sin—therefore a moral incapacity of refraining from it, ^* And if the moral necessity of the first sin, though as real, (p. 230) was not in the same degree with that of subsequent sins; yet the in­creased [Page 102] imbecility being a necessary effect of what was original, that is finally to be resolved into this; and this to be attributed to the first cause—who made man upright indeed, in his own moral image, but really incapable of re­taining his primitive rectitude.

WHATEVER hath been supposed to be the present moral inability of mankind, Calvinistic [Page 103] divines have ever maintained, not that it was original, but consequent to the fall—the judicial animadversion of the Deity upon the first of­fence. We are inclined to think Mr. Edwards was in the same opinion upon the whole, though he hath expressed himself so as to give full rea­son for our attributing the contrary to him—that is, bringing a charge of self-repugnancy. For Mr. Edwards asserts, that man was 'en­dowed at first with the moral or spiritual [Page 104] image of GOD,' in distinction from his natural image—By the latter also he explains himself to mean, 'an understanding to perceive the diffe­rence between moral good and evil; a capacity of discerning that moral worthiness and demerit, by which some things are praise-worthy, others deserving of blame and punishment; and also a capacity of choice, and choice guided by under­standing, and a power of acting according to choice.' (p. 41, 43) Consequently, he had a capacity of making this choice, to continue in the state of moral rectitude wherein he was cre­ated. Consequently, a (moral) power of abid­ing in that state. Consequently, his fall from it was not an event morally necessary. Conse­quently, not infallibly connected with the divine disposal and determination. Consequently, the supposed fixed connection of every moral event with a previous moral cause, could not antecede the apostacy, but must (if real) be subsequent to it. Consequently, in every such event 'GOD's own immediate conduct' cannot be supposed to be 'original in the series.' The difficulty ari­sing from divine prescience we pretend not to be able to clear. It is sufficient that it equal­ly lies against Mr. Edwards's doctrine.

UPON admitting, with the generality of Cal­vinistic divines, original, internal freedom in man; that his moral imbecility was consequent to, and the punishment of, the first offence; that the mo­ral impotency of apostate spirits also is the fruit and effect of their revolt; the moral perfections of GOD are vindicated, and he is freed from the impious charge of being the author of their sin: But how this charge can be removed on the foundation Mr. Edwards proceeds upon is difficult [Page 105] to conceive; nor indeed has he taken much pains to remove it, though he allows it 'is infinitely to be abhorred, and denies it to be the consequence of what he has laid down.' In what sense he thought it was to be 'abhorred,' and will not allow it to be the 'consequence' of what he hath said, has been already remarked. ^* However great that impotency is which mankind derive from Adam, there is a manifest difference between a moral inability or necessity derived from the fall of man, and a like kind of inability or ne­cessity original to the human race. Mr. Ed­wards's doctrine of necessity is inconsistent with the opinion of our having lost our power in A­dam; since he could not lose a power he never had.

WE have but one thing farther to add. While we acknowledge the fallen state of our nature, and the impotency derived from the fall, the proper question on the gospel plan is, Whether salvation is offered to sinners on practicable terms? The offer presupposeth our lost and pe­rishing state. Is it then adapted to this state of mankind? Is there a possibility of accepting it? Rather, is there no impropriety, is there not a palpable contradiction, in speak­ing of an offer on terms known to be morally im­possible? The present question is not, Whether fallen man hath power, independently of the aids of grace, to accept the gospel proposals? but, Whether such assistances are tendered with the call of the gospel as that an acceptance of it is morally possible?

[Page 106]OR suppose it morally impossible, that great numbers, who are externally called by the gos­pel, should accept the invitation of it—suppose their final condemnation to be just notwith­standing, in consequence of their relation to Adam, and the moral inability derived from him; yet who will say that they merit a sorer punishment, a greater damnation, when their re­jecting the gospel is supposed to be the necessa­ry consequence of GOD's withholding that as­sistance, without which they cannot embrace it? A proposal of pardon and life to rebels against heaven, on impracticable terms, accompanied with a threatening of aggravated condemna­tion, seems hardly reconcileable with the disco­veries GOD hath made of himself as having shewn the exceeding riches of his grace in CHRIST JESUS—Not willing any should perish, but that all should come to repentance—Commanding all men every where to repent—Whoever will, let him come, and take the waters of life freely.

IT may be said, 'True indeed, whosoever will let him come. We grant, if they have a will, they may come. But we assert, that none but such as actually come can will to come.' Now what saith the scripture? When our Savi­our upbraids the Jews, 'Ye will not come to me that ye might have life,' doth this imply that it was forever morally impossible for them to have come? or doth it suppose, on the contrary, that they might have willed to come? Why else are they upbraided for not coming? How oft would he have gathered them, but they would not? Was there not a time, therefore, when they might have known the things belong­ing to their peace? I set before you life and [Page 107] death, blessing and cursing; therefore CHUSE life—implying a moral capacity of chusing as well as conducting according to choice: And indeed, without supposing the former, how can the latter be said to be in any one's power? It is so only in consequence of volition or choice. If the cause be out of our power, the effect must be of course. Besides, 'the very willing or chu­sing is the doing: When once a man hath wil­led or chosen, the thing is done.' Had not that servant, who received the single talent, a moral power to have improved that talent well? In consequence of such improvement, would he not have received more? According to that, 'To him that hath, shall be given,' &c. Was he not condemned out of his own mouth?

LET us add here, that the supposition of sin­ners being abandoned and given up of GOD, im­plies, that they once had a moral power to turn and live—Always remembering to include the means and influences of grace when we speak of such a power. For it is GOD that worketh in us to WILL and to DO; which is the argument to our work­ing out our own salvation. Doth not the demand of the Prophet, What could have been done more to my vineyard? imply that means and influen­ces on GOD's part are afforded, or tendered, in such measure to sinners, as renders their compli­ance with the terms of salvation possible at least? We have, indeed, no warrant to say absolutely, that he could not have done more for the con­version of the Jews—that he could not have converted them by an immediate, irresistible in­fluence. He that 'is able to raise up children to Abraham out of the stones,' could, no doubt, have done this, had he seen fit. It is enough [Page 108] that the means used with them were sufficient, though not unconquerable.

BUT we may dismiss this matter. Mr. Ed­wards's doctrine is, that the first sin of angels and man as was really necessary, as the wickedness of abandoned sinners and apostate spirits—So that what hath been last observed, relating to the necessity of the sins of fallen creatures, while on probation, and in the time of GOD's grace and visitation, no way affects our main argu­ment. Mr. Edwards hath offered a chain of reasoning in proof that man hath in no case, and never had, a power of self-determination; but is, and always was, determined by a moral neces­sity, which necessity is as real as any other. This necessity, he affirms, belongs to all finite beings, and to the Creator himself—At the same time he hath taken great pains to shew, that it is con­sistent with the most perfect liberty.

SECT. II. Internal moral liberty, as distinct from external, consistent with the influence of motives, and use of commands, exhortations, promises, warnings, threatenings, &c.

WE readily grant, there can be no act of choice without some motive or induce­ment. But if what hath been observed, with respect to the power of creatures made upright to retain or forfeit their innocence, be admitted, it clearly follows, that the application of com­mands, invitations, monitions, &c. is consistent with a freedom to either side. For who questi­ons but rebel angels had the highest induce­ments, before their fall, to abide in their first estate? We need not scruple to say, the strong­est possible motives could not be wanting in the presence of GOD—that it was the highest apparent good, as well as their highest duty, and what they had a moral ability for, to continue subject to the great Creator. And it is really one of the most inexplicable events, that beings in their situation should fall. This event shews, beyond question, that a liberty to either side is consistent with the most powerful motives to bi­as and incline the will to one side.

SO in the case of innocent Adam, no one will say, that the motives in paradise, to hold fast his integrity, were insufficient—or that their not proving effectual necessarily proceeded from the [Page 110] original, moral state of his will, possessed of the moral image of GOD. That he had a moral capacity to sustain the federal trial is here taken for granted. Among other commands, writ­ten on his heart, or communicated by special intercourse with Deity, he had one prohibition properly positive, which was made the test of his fidelity, accompanied with an express threat, that he should die in case of non-forbearance in that instance; and implying a promise of life, if he refrained in this article. Whatever be un­derstood by the death threatened, the threaten­ing was sufficiently awful. Yet against the clearest warning, against the highest motives to the contrary, he ventured to take and eat. Com­mands, invitations, promises, admonitions, &c. are therefore consistent with a moral ability to hearken or not hearken to them.

FOR the same reason that sin could not be mo­rally necessary at first, it will be difficult to prove, that the continued holiness of good angels was morally necessary from the beginning. Mr. Ed­wards seems to suppose a difference as to the degree of moral necessity; but expressly main­tains, that the reality of it is the same in all in­stances. ^* That is to say, though every act of every creature is certain and fixed decisively be­forehand, yet there are different degrees of ab­solute certainty.

FARTHER, with regard to fallen man, Mr. Edwards allows, that commands, &c. are given to, and means used with sinners, in unregene­racy. From hence he partly argues his doctrine [Page 111] of necessity. ^† They have a moral understand­ing, and the same natural powers of action, with holy and good men—To which end moral in­ducements of various kinds are laid before them.

THE doctrine of necessary connection of means and ends, as stated by Mr. Edwards, implies one or other of the following things: Either that no means are employed with the unregenerate in order to their conversion—or none that have a tendency to the end—or that they have not a moral power of using them—or their use of them is certainly and infallibly successful.

THAT means are used with unregenerate sin­ners, Mr. Edwards grants. But since the doc­trine he defends may seem to imply, that means are never used with the finally impenitent, (at least not to bring them to repentance, but only to confirm them in wickedness, and lead them to destruction) we shall just hint, that the whole oeconomy of providence and grace is a means used with the righteous and wicked in common, for the confirmation, improvement and comfort of the former, and conviction and reformation of the latter. Extraordinary and ordinary means are used to this end. Of the former kind are miracles, prophecy, tongues, vouchsafed at spe­cial seasons, and in divers manners; together with singular and alarming interpositions of pro­vidence. To the latter kind belong a written, standing revelation, a public ministry and insti­tutions of worship, the strivings of the divine spirit, various providential allotments &c. The word of truth in particular is an external ap­pointed [Page 112] means of regeneration, repentance from dead works, convertion, or that faith by which those live who are passed from death to life. If any reject the tender of salvation, the messen­gers of it are directed to wipe off the dust of their feet as a testimony against the despisers of their message; leaving with them this solemn protestation, 'Be ye sure of this, that the king­dom of GOD is come unto you.' We might mention the patience of GOD towards sinners, &c.—whence it is apparent that means, power­ful means, are used for the conversion even of those, who are at length resigned up to their own hearts lust. But as this matter appears not to be contested by Mr. Edwards, we shall pass to the next thing above mentioned.

WHETHER the means used with the unregen­erate have any tendency to the end? The very proposing of this question is enough. For when­ever we use the means, it is in relation to some end. We intend by it the media through which any end is attained. So that to speak of means, and deny their conduciveness to the end, is an affront to common sense, as nothing can properly be called a means farther than it hath, or is supposed to have, a tendency to accomplish an end. And as all who maintain there are any instituted means of conversion, allow them to have been ordained by infinite wisdom, it would be impeaching su­preme wisdom and goodness to say, they are not calculated in the best manner to lead sinners to re­pentance.

NOT that any external means are efficacious in themselves, but only through the divine concur­rence with them. So it is in temporal and world­ly [Page 113] matters; and so it is in the concerns of re­ligion. Means and endeavors do not ensure worldly success. They are in vain except GOD worketh with them. Yet who hesitates one mo­ment, whether the divine concurrence is to be expected in the use, and through the instrumen­tality, of the means he hath prescribed, or the contrary? Exempt cases there are wherein means are superseded in mens temporal affairs: There may be like instances in the affairs of salvation. But these being exempt cases is a reason why spiritual blessings are much rather to be expected in the use, than in the neglect of means.

IT is the united voice of all Calvinistic divines, that there is the greatest possible encouragement to the endeavours of unconverted men in the use of the means of salvation. Mr. Edwards al­lows, that moral inducements are used with them; and says, 'it is of the nature of such in­ducements, that they have something inviting, some tendency to induce and dispose to virtuous volition; to give the mind an inclination or bias to virtue—that they can operate only by biassing the will, and giving it a certain inclination one way—(p. 119, 125.) that motives have in them­selves this nature and tendency in different de­grees, some greater, others less.' Now by Mr. Edwards's principles every inclination, however weak, is of the nature of a disposition to virtue, and leading to it. (For there can be no induce­ments to virtue but such as operate by giving the mind an inclination to it) If then the motives used with the unregenerate may excite a virtu­ous inclination, though in the lowest degree, we may, for the same reason, suppose this inclination increased to than degree as to become prepollent, [Page 114] through the influence of moral means and in­ducements, in subordination to him who wor­keth all in all. And in proportion to the pre­ponderation of the mind in favor of virtue, is the degree of virtue. How consistent these things are with Mr. Edwards's 4th and 5th Sect. part 3d. and other things said in his book, those may judge, who will be at the pains to examine and compare them.

IF it be said, in the next place, that the un­regenerate have not a moral power to use the means of grace: This is the same absurdity as to say, the means have no tendency to the end. For how can means be said to be afforded, which cannot be used? At best, they are as if not af­forded. How then can the gospel be preached for a witness to such as finally reject it? Why is it taken from some, because they bring not forth the fruit of the kingdom, when they never had it in their power to receive its testimony? Can they be liable to an aggravated punishment for not using means, which they could not improve to any purpose? We repeat it to prevent mistakes that when we speak of the ability of unregenerate men to use the means of grace, we mean not an in­dependent power in themselves: (This the regenerate have not) But that such influences of grace are vouchsafed, together with external means, as that those might embrace the gospel call, who, in event, reject it against themselves.

MOREOVER, there is a wide difference in the characters of unregenerate men. Some such are nearer the kingdom of GOD than others. There is more hope of some than others of this cha­racter [Page 115] —Which things cannot be said consistent­ly with the supposition of unregenerate men's being utterly incapable of any good effect from the means of grace, through their own endea­vours in the use of them, and the common stri­vings of GOD's spirit. And yet, what less is implied in the assertion, that they cannot use the means that are employed with them, cannot improve a supposed price in their hands? For how then is the gospel a dispensation of grace to them? Is it not rather a dispensation of wrath? To say that their incapacity is not natural, but moral, is saying nothing to the purpose, as we trust hath been shewn. If the incapacity be real, it is no matter under what name it go [...]. Is it determined beforehand, that any of the un­regenerate shall not use the means, of grace, or shall not succeed? If it is, let any man shew, how the gospel can be a privilege to them, or they liable to a greater damnation for abusing it.

TO say lastly, that the endeavours of the unre­generate in the use of the means of grace are infal­libly connected with success, is to say, that no means are employed with those who die in their sins; contrary to what Mr. Edwards expressly al­lows. And yet he must either say this, or else that none but the regenerate can use the means of grace. We may just as well affirm, that all converted men must profit equally under the means of salvation, as that none can improve them at all but they who succeed. One may venture to assert, that such as hear the word, and anon with joy receive it, use the means of grace, though they should endure but a while.

THE means of religion, as those of this life, are used with different degrees of application by [Page 116] different persons; which is the true ground (ordinarily) of their different success. But we deny that any are commanded, invited, exhort­ed, &c. to exert powers and faculties they are not possessed of—to act from principles they are not endowed with—to use means out of their power. Such faculties, principles, powers, and affections as they are possessed of, such means as are within their power are the only ones they are possessed of, such means as are within their power are the only ones they can be required to act from and improve. Arguments laid be­fore wicked men are adapted to operate on their reason and moral discernment—on the principle of ingenuity and gratitude—on their hope, fear, joy, sorrow, and the various movements of the mind. Nor can it be proposed they should act from the highest spiritual principles while unre­generate, but from such as they are capable of being influenced by as reasonable beings, pos­sessed of a moral faculty, and subjects of moral government—who have an advocate for GOD within them, to whom he hath deputed his au­thority—a principle which is by nature supreme, and implanted to give law to the animal affecti­ons and appetites.

'THE end of laws, we acknowledge, is to bind to one side; and the end of commands is to turn the will one way.' But we cannot agree with Mr. Edwards, 'that laws and commands are therefore of no use, unless they actually turn the will that way' which they require. ^* Mr Edwards would not say, that any of GOD's laws or com­mands are useless—that he might not justly re­quire subjection to his anointed from those who said, Let us break their bands as under, and [Page 117] cast away their cords from us. The title of the section, from which we have extracted the above words, is, Commands consistent with moral inability. Now is the will of those, who are under moral necessity of disobeying, turned and biassed that way the command is? Mr. Edwards has offered many reasons why their will ought to be turned to this side—to evince the propriety of the com­mands given them notwithstanding their original inability to turn this way. But he hath not shewn clearly, that 'commands and laws are therefore of no use,' because the subject will not be bound thereby. Or admitting he had shewn this, we need not say how much or how little it makes for his purpose. One thing is hence obvious, that by his own confession and argument, com­mands, invitations &c, are of no use where there is a moral necessity of being biassed, or going, the contrary way.

MOREOVER, as wicked men may have in­ducements to virtue, consistent with the suppo­sition of their persisting in vice; in like manner good men have allurements to vice. Such al­lurements they meet with from the flesh, the world, and the devil. Hence they are called to watch and pray, that they enter not into tempta­tion—to fight—to strive for the mastery—to deny themselves, and take up the cross—to take heed lest they fall—and in general to work out their own salvation with fear and trembling. Now temptations and allurements to sin 'operate by giving the mind an inclination to it—biassing the will this way.' So that as inducements to holi­ness may be consistently used with those who at present are under the dominion of sin, with a prospect of changing their present prevailing bi­as and inclination; allurements to sin may also [Page 118] be laid before those whose prevailing bias is to holiness, not without a possibility and prospect of their being overcome—with which view they are always proposed by the tempter. Adam, en­dowed with the moral image of GOD, was over­come: And are his fallen sons exempt from danger? The regenerate fall from virtue fre­quently through inadvertence, and the strength of a present temptation. They are, therefore, under no moral necessity of being perfect, nor in­deed can be free from sin in this life. Or will any undertake to shew, that the sins they fall in­to are morally necessary? According to Mr. Edwards's doctrine they are so indeed. To sup­pose farther, as his doctrine doth, that the im­perfect holiness of the saints in this life is neces­sary by a moral necessity, is a palpable contra­diction: For such a necessity being supposed would prove them incapable of any lapse what­ever. Necessity is fixed and uniform, admitting of no variety or dissonancy of character: Where­as the moral characters of good christians are mixed, and in many instances contradictory. David's murther and adultery were very incon­sistent with his general character, and cannot be supposed to have been morally necessary, con­sistent with the opinion, that by the same neces­sity he was a man after GOD's own heart.

UPON the whole, powerful motives to holi­ness, joined with a prevailing propensity this way are yet to be found where there are in many in­stances contrary volitions; and in some instan­ces, on some occasions, to an high degree. Nor have the maintainers of the doctrine of the saints perseverance been wont to ground it on the supposed indefectibility of the spiritual princi­ple in them, in itself considered, but on the co­venant and power of GOD engaged to them.

[Page 119]Mr. Edwards very justly observes, that some crimes are more heinous than others in their own nature: Nor would he deny, but that of some more is required than of others. We may ask, On what ground? if all volition and action is necessary, in the sense of his book. How is a 'person under previous obligation to consider beforehand in some cases more than others?' (p. 262) Can he consider without motives to consideration presented to his mind? Can he be the cause of new motives to himself? Doth he necessari­ly follow those exhibited ab extra? Could he, among many motives to choice, have viewed any one otherwise than he in fact doth? The whole con­troversy, in a manner, terms on the resolution of these questions. Every reader perceives on which side Mr. Edwards was in regard to them: And every reader, 'from the bare proposal of them, may see at once, whether or no, or how far Mr. Edwards's doctrine is reconcileable with the supposition of different degrees of guilt, and obligations to consider previous to making choice. It seems hardly proper to speak of tendency and influence in motives to choice, when all things are settled and determined beforehand by established laws in nature, so that every intelligent creature is necessitated to chuse and improve, or refuse and neglect such and such things, called means. So sure and perfect a connection of causes and ef­fects, antecedents and consequents, as he hath endeavoured to make appear, leaves no room to speak of a meer tendency in motives, which have a certain sovereignty in determining every act of every being in the universe.

SECT. III. Allowing Mr. Edwards's scheme of necessity to be true in theory, it is not applicable to practice.

AS we have supposed the doctrine of necessi­ty maintained in Mr. Edwards's enquiry runs up to absolute fatality, we shall in this secti­on consider it in this view. We shall suppose such a necessity to be indeed agreable to philo­sophic truth. Taking for granted the coinci­dence between Mr. Edwards and a strict fatalist, Dr. Butler's reasoning with the latter is in a good measure applicable to the former. We shall ac­cordingly take the liberty to extract from the chapter of his analogy, entitled, 'Of the opinion of necessity, considered as influencing practice.' He introduces what he there observes with this apology to his readers: 'As the puzzle and ob­scurity, which must unavoidably arise from ar­guing upon so absurd a supposition as that of uni­versal necessity, will, I fear, easily be seen; it will, I hope, as easily be excused.'

WHEN it is said by a fatalist, that the whole constitution of nature, and the actions of men, that every thing, and every mode and circum­stance of every thing, is necessary and could not possibly have been otherwise; it is to be obser­ved, that this necessity does not exclude delibe­ration, choice, preference, and acting from cer­tain principles, and to certain ends: Because all this is matter oi undoubted experience, acknow­ledged by all, and what every man may, every moment, be conscious of. And hence it follows, [Page 121] that necessity, alone and of itself, is in no sort an account of the constitution of nature, and how things came to be and to continue as they are, but only an account of this circumstance, relating to their origin and continuance, that they could not have been otherwise than they are and have been.

NECESSITY as much requires and supposes a necessary agent, as freedom requires and suppo­ses a free agent, to be the former of the world. And the appearances of design and of final causes in the constitution of nature, as really prove this acting agent, to be an intelligent designer, or to act from choice, upon the scheme of necessi­ty, supposed possible, as upon that of freedom.

SUPPOSE then a fatalist to educate any one, from his youth up, in his own principles, that the child should reason upon them, and conclude that since he cannot possibly behave otherwise than he does, he is not a subject of blame or commendation, nor can deserve to be rewarded or punished: Imagine him to eradicate the very perceptions of blame and commendation out of his mind, by means of this system; to form his temper, and character, and behaviour to it; and from it to judge of the treatment he was to expect, say, from reasonable men, upon his coming abroad into the world—I cannot for­bear stopping here to ask, Whether anyone of com­mon sense would think fit, that a child should be put upon these speculations, and be left to apply them to practice? And a man has little pretence to reason, who is not sensible, that we are all children in speculations of this kind. However, the child would doubtless be highly delighted to find himself freed from the restraints of fear and shame, with which his play-fellows were fettered [Page 122] and embarrassed; and highly conceited in his su­perior knowledge so far beyond his years. But conceit and vanity would be the least bad part of the influence, which these principles must have, when thus reasoned and acted upon, during the course of his education. He must either be allowed to go on, and be the plague of all about him, and himself too, even to his own de­struction: Or else correction must be continual­ly made use of, to supply the want of those na­tural perceptions of blame and commendation, which we have supposed to be removed; and to give him a practical impression, of what he had reasoned himself out of the belief of, that he was in fact an accountable child, and to be punished for doing what he was forbid. It is therefore in reality impossible, but that the cor­rection which he must meet with, in the course of his education, must convince him, that if the scheme he was instructed in were not false; yet that he reasoned inconclusively upon it, and some how or other misapplied it to practice and common life. But supposing the child's temper could remain still formed to the system, and his expec­tation of the treatment he was to have in the world be regulated by it; so as to expect that no reasonable man would blame or punish him, for any thing which he should do, because he could not help doing it: Upon this supposition, it is mainifest he would, upon his coming abroad in­to the world, be insupportable to society, and the treatment he would receive from it, would ren­der it so to him; and he could not fail of doing somewhat, very soon, for which he would be deli­vered over into the hands of civil justice. And thus, in the end, he would be convinced of the obli­gations he was under to his wise instructor. Or [Page 123] suppose this scheme of fatality, in any other way, applied to practice, such practical application of it will be found equally absurd; equally fal­lacious in a practical sense: For instance, that if a man be destined to live such a time, he shall live to it, though he take no care of his own preservation; or if he be destined to die before that time, no care can prevent it. Therefore all care to preserve one's own life is to be ne­glected, which is the fallacy instanced in by the ancients.

BUT now on the contrary, none of these prac­tical absurdities can be drawn, from reasoning upon the supposition, that we are free, but all such reasoning with regard to the common af­fairs of life, is justified by experience. And therefore, though it were admitted that this opi­nion of necessity were speculatively true; yet, with regard to practice, it is as if it were false, so far as our experience reacheth; that is, to the whole of our present life. For, the constitu­tion of the world, and the condition in which we are actually placed, is, as if we were free. And it may perhaps justly be concluded, that since the whole process of action, through every step of it, suspense, deliberation, inclining one way, determining, and at last doing as we determine; is as if we were free, therefore we are so. But the thing here insisted on is, that under the present natural government of the world, we find we are treated and dealt with, as if we were free, prior to all consideration whether we are or not. Were this opinion therefore of necessity admitted to be ever so true; yet such is in fact our condition and the natural course of things, that whenever we apply it to life and practice, [Page 124] this application of it always misleads us, and can­not but mislead us, in a most dreadful manner, with regard to our present interest. And how can people think themselves so very secure then, that the same application of the same opinion may not mislead them also, in some analogous man­ner, with respect to a future, a more general and more important interest? For religion being a practical subject; and the analogy of nature shewing us, that we have not faculties to apply this opinion, were it a true one, to practical sub­jects; whenever we do apply it to the subject of religion, and thence conclude that we are free from its obligations, it is plain this conclusion cannot be depended upon.

THE notion of necessity, with respect to prac­tical subjects, therefore is as it were not true. Nor doth this contain any reflection upon rea­son; but only upon what is unreasonable. For to pretend to act upon reason, in opposition to practical principles, which the author of our na­ture gave us to act upon; and to pretend to ap­ply our reason to subjects, with regard to which, our own short views, and even our experience, will shew us, it cannot be depended upon; and such, at best, the subject of necessity must be; this is vanity, conceit and unreasonableness.

BUT this is not all. For we find within our­selves a will, and are conscious of a character. Now if this, in us, be reconcileable with fate, it is reconcileable with it, in the author of nature. And besides, natural government and final causes imply a character and a will in the governor and designer; a will concerning the creatures whom he governs. The author of nature then being [Page 125] certainly of some character or other, notwith­standing necessity; it is evident this necessity is as reconcileable with the particular character of benevolence, veracity, and justice in him, which attributes are the foundation of religion, as with any other character: Sure we find this necessity no more hinders men from being benevolent than cruel; true, than faultless; just than un­just.

WE find GOD exercises the same kind of go­vernment over us, with that a father exercises over his children, and a civil magistrate over his subjects. Now, whatever becomes of abstract questions concerning liberty and necessity, it evi­dently appears to us, that veracity and justice must be the natural rule and measure of exercising this government or authority, to a being, who can have no competitions, or interfering of interests, with his creatures and his subjects.

WE have endeavoured to keep in view the de­sign we mentioned in the introduction, to examine only the ground-work of Mr. Edwards's book with­out entering into consideration of the particular doctrines built thereupon. Whether they stand or fall with the foundation, is beside our purpose to say—Or whether what has been offered at all weakens this foundation is not for us to deter­mine. One thing, perhaps, appears, that men of strong powers and great abilities are wont to wade beyond their depth, and bewilder them­selves and others with speculations abstruse and unprofitable—to say no worse. Great geniuses are fruitful, many times, of great errors. There is a shew of science, falsely so called, which is [Page 126] especially incongruous in handling moral and re­ligious subjects; wherein the simple (who make much the greater part of mankind) are alike concerned as the wise and learned—and which, therefore, ought to be treated with the utmost plainness.

WE do not deny but Mr. Edwards was 'wor­thy of the name of a Philosopher:' (p. 401) But we appeal to the publick, whether some of the most famed Philosophers in the English nation, for many years back, and at this day, have not philosophised themselves into scepticism? One of first distinction in particular (whose essays on some moral subjects are so nearly akin to Mr. Edwards on necessity, that a reader might think the latter copied from the former) appears plain­ly to be a disbeliever in natural religion, not less than revealed. ^* However, we have not the least suspicion of Mr. Edwards's inclination ei­ther to atheism or deism. We doubt not he had a strong practical sense of religion, which overbalanced his theory. But when great dis­putants are possessed of a particular hypothesis, they are apt to defend it many times by a me­thod of reasoning, which leads to most danger­ous consequences—without seeing or allowing those consequences, which, if fairly deduced, demonstrate the hypothesis itself to be wrong, or that they have argued wrong from it.

IF we have misrepresented Mr. Edwards, it has not been through design; nor have we knowingly 'insisted on difficulties not belong­ing to the controversy.' Whether our 'indig­nation [Page 127] or disdain' hath been 'raised at the sight of his discourse,' others must be left to judge. No one, we may presume, will say, that much pains have been used to 'set forth' the doctrines of his book 'in colours shocking to the imagi­nations, and moving to the passions of those, who have either too little capacity, or too much con­fidence of the opinions they have imbibed, and contempt of the contrary, to try the matter by any serious and circumspect examination.' Mr. Edwards, it seems, was aware of being charged with maintaining 'horrid and blas­phemous doctrines, the fate of the heathen, Hobbs's necessity, making men meer machines,' &c. Whether he had any reason to apprehend such an indictment is a matter we refer to the reader: To whose judgment we also submit the following proposed specimen of the coincidence between Mr. Edwards's doctrines, and those of some celebrated infidels.