IN the constitution of England, the three principal forms of government, monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, are blended together in certain proportions; but each of these orders, in the exercise of the legislative authority, hath its peculiar department, from which the others are excluded. In this division, the granting of supplies. or laying taxes, is deemed to be the province of the house of commons, as the representative of the people......All supplies are supposed to slow from their gift; and the other orders are permitted only to assent, or reject generally, not to propose any modification, amendment, or par­tia [...] alteration of it.

This observation being considered, it will undeniably appear, that in framing the late Stamp Act, the commons acted in the character o [...] representative of the colonies. They assumed it as the principle of tha [...] measure, and the propriety of it must therefore stand, or fall, as th [...] principle is true, or false: For the preamble sets forth, that the com [...]mons of Great-Britain had resolved to give and grant the several rat [...] and duties imposed by the act; but what right had the commons [...] Great-Britain to be thus munificent at the expence of the commons America?........To give property not belonging to the giver, and wit [...] out the consent of the owner, is such evident and flagrant injustice, ordinary cases, that few are hardy enough to avow it; and therefo [...] when it really happens, the fact is disguised and varnished over by [...] m [...]st plausible pretences the ingenuity of the giver can suggest...... [...] it is alledged that there is a virtual, or implied representation of the co [...]nies springing out of the constitution of the British government: [...] it must be confessed on all hands, that, as the representation is [...] actual, it is virtual, or it doth not exist at all; for no third kind of presentation can be imagined. The colonies claim the privilege, [...] is common to all British subjects, of being taxed only with their [...] consent given by their representatives, and all the advocates for Stamp Act admit this claim. Whether, therefore, upon the [...] [Page 6] matter, the imposition of the Stamp Duties is a proper exercise of con­stitutional authority, or not, depends upon the single question, Whe­ther the commons of Great Britain are virtually the representatives of the commons of America, or not.

The advocates for the Stamp Act admit, in express terms, that ‘the colonies do not choose members of parliament,’ ‘but they assert that the colonies are virtually represented in the same manner with the non-electors resident in Great Britain,’

How have they proved this position? Where have they defined, or precisely explained what they mean by the expression, virtual represen­tation? As it is the very hinge upon which the rectitude of the taxation turns, something more satisfactory than mere assertion, more solid than a form of expression, is necessary: for how can it be seriously expected, that men, who think themselves injuriously affected in their properties and privileges, will be convinced and reconciled by a fanciful phrase, the meaning of which can't be precisely ascertained by those who use it, or properly applied to the purpose for which it hath been advanced?

They argue, that ‘the right of election being annexed to certain species of property, to franchises, and inhabitancy in some particu­lar places, a very small part of the land, the property, and the peo­ple of England are comprehended in those descriptions. All landed property, not freehold, and all monied property, are excluded. The merchants of London, the proprietors of the public funds, the inha­bitants of Leeds, Halifax, Birmingham, and Manchester, and that great corporation of the East-India company, none of them choose their representatives, and yet are they all represented in parliament, and the colonies being exactly in their situation, are represented in the same manner.’

Now, this argument, which is all that their invention hath been [...]ble to supply, is totally defective; for, it consists of facts not true, and [...] conclusions inadmissible.

It is so far from being true, that all the persons enumerated under [...]e character of non-electors, are in that predicament, that it is indu­ [...]tably certain there is no species of property, landed, or monied, [...]hich is not possessed by very many of the British electors.

I shall undertake to disprove the supposed similarity of situation, [...]ence the same kind of representation is deduced, of the inhabitants [...] the colonies, and of the British non-electors; and, if I succeed, [...] notion of a virtual representation of the colonies must fail, which, truth, is a mere cob web, spread to catch the unwary, and intangle [...] weak. I wou [...]d be understood: I am upon a question of propriety, [Page 7] not of power; and, though some may be inclined to think it is to little purpose to discuss the one, when the other is irresistible, yet are they different considerations; and, at the same time that I inva­lidate the claim upon which it is founded, I may very consistently re­commend a submission to the law, whilst it endures. I shall say no­thing of the use I intend by the discussion; for if it should not be perceived by the sequel, there is no use in it, and, if it should appear then, it need not be premised.

Lessees for years, copyholders, proprietors of the public fund [...] ▪ in­habitants of Birmingham, Leeds, Halifax, and Manchester, merchants of the city of London, or members of the corporation of the East-India company, are, as such, under no personal incapacity to be electors; for they may acquire the right of election, and there are actually not only a considerable number of electors in each of the classes of lessees for years, &c. but in many of them, if not all, even members of par­liament. The interests therefore of the non-electors, the electors, and the representatives, are individually the same; to say nothing of the connection among neighbours, friends, and relations. The security of the non-electors against oppression, is, that their oppression will fall also upon the electors and the representatives. The one can't be in­jured, and the other indemnified.

Further, if the non-electors should not be taxed by the British par­liament, they would not be taxed at all; and it would be iniquitous as well as a solecism, in the political system, that they should partake of all the benefits resulting from the imposition, and application of taxes, and derive an immunity from the circumstance of not being qualified to vote. Under this constitution then, a double or virtual representation may be reasonably supposed. The electors, who are inseparably connected in their interests with the non-electors, may be justly deemed to be the representatives of the non-electors, at the same time they exercise their personal privilege in the right of election; and the members chosen, therefore, the representatives of both. This is the only rational explanation of the expression, virtual representation. None has been advanced by the assertors of it, and their meaning can only be inferred from the instances, by which they endeavour to elu­cidate it, and no other meaning can be stated, to which the instances apply.

It is an essential principle of the English constitution, that the subject shall not be taxed without his consent, which hath not been introdu­ced by any particular law, but necessarily results from the nature of that mixed government; for, without it, the order of democracy could not exist.

[Page 8] ^† Parliaments were not formerly so regular in point of form as they now are. Even the number or knights for each shire were not ascer­tained. The first writs now ex [...]ant for their choice, are 22d Edward I. by which, two, as at th [...]s day, were directed to be chosen for each county; but the king not being satisfied with that number, other writs were issued for choosing two more. This discretionary power being thought inconvenient, was afterwards restrained by the statutes of Richard II, Henry IV, and subsequent acts.

In earlier times there was more simplicity in the rules of govern­ment, and men were more solicitous about the essentials, than the forms of it. When the consent of those who were to perform, or pay any thing extrafeudal, was fairly applied for and obtained, the manner was little regarded; but, as the people had reason to be jealous of de­signs to impose contributions upon them without their consent, it was thought expedient to have formalities regulated, and fixed, to prevent this injury to their rights, not to destroy a principle, without which, they could not be said to have any rights at all.

Before the introduction of those formalities, which were framed with a view to restrain the excu [...]sions of power, and to secure the pri­vileges of the subject, as the mode of proceeding was more simple, so perhaps this foundation of consent was more visible than it is at pre­sent, wherefore it may be of use to adduce some instances, which di­rectly point out this necessary and essential principle of British liberty.

The lords and commons have separately given aids and subsidies to the crown. In 13th Edward III, the lords granted the tenth of all the corn, &c. growing upon their demesnes, the commons then granting nothing, nor concerning themselves with what the lords thought fit to grant out of their own estates. At other times, the knights of shires, separating from the rest of the commons, and join­ing with the lord [...], have granted a subsidy, and the representatives of cities and boroughs have likewise granted subsidies to the crown sepa­rately, as appears by a writ in 24th Edward I, which runs in these words, Rex, &c. cum comites, barones, milites nobis, &c. fecerunt unde­cimam de omnibus bonis suis mobilibus, et cives et burgenses, &c. sep [...]imam de omnibus bonis suis mobilibus, &c. nobis curialiter concesserint, &c. The earls, barons, and knights, having given unto us in parliament, the e­leventh part, and the citizens and burgesses the seventh part of their goods and chattels, &c. When an affair happened, which affected only some individuals, and called for an aid to the crown, it was common for those individuals alone to be summoned; to which purpose several writs are [Page 9] extant. In 35th Edward III, there is a writ (which Dugdale ha [...] printed in his collection of writs of summons to parliament) directed to the earl of Northampton, which, after reciting the confusion the affairs of Ireland were in, and that he, and some other English lords had possessions in that kingdom, and were therefore more particularly obliged to the defence of it, follows in these words: Volumus vobis­cum, et cum aliis de eodem regno (Angliae scilicet) terras in dicta terra habentibus colloquium habere, &c. We will confer with you, and others of the same kingdom (viz. England) possessed of lands in the said country.

But, that the reader may perceive how strictly the principle, of no person's being taxed without their consent, hath been regarded, it is proper to take notice, that, upon the same occasion, writs were like­wise directed even to women, who were proprietors of land in Ireland, to send their deputies to consult, and consent to what should be judged necessary to be done on the occasion▪ e. g. Rex, &c. marioe, &c. sa­lutem, &c. vobis, &c. mandamus quod aliquem, vel aliquos de quibus con­fidati [...] apud Westmon. mit [...]atis ad loquendum nobiscum super dictis negotiis, et ad faciendum et consentiendum nomine vestro, super hoc quod ibidem or­dinari contigerit. We command you to send to Westminster, some person or persons, whom you may confide in, to confer with us, on the abovesaid af­fair, and to do and assent, in your name, to whatever shall be there decreed.

A reflection naturally arises from the instances cited:—When, on a particular occasion, some individuals only were to be taxed, and not the whole community, their consent only was called for, and in the last instance it appears, that they, who upon an occasion of a general tax, would have been bound by the consent of their virtual representa­tives (for in that case they would have had no actual representatives) were in an affair calling for a particular aid from them, separate from the rest of the community, required to send their particular deputies: But how different would be the principle of a statute, imposing du­ties without their consent who are to pay them, upon the authority of their Gift, who should undertake to give, what doth not belong to them.

That great king, Edward I, inserted in his writs of summons, as a first principle of law, that quod omnes tangat ab omnibus app [...]obetur, what concerns all, must be approved by all, which by no torture can be made to signify that their approbation or consent only is to be requi [...]ed in the imposition of a tax, who a [...]e to pay no part of it.

The situation of the non electors in England—their capacity to be­come electors—their inseparable connection with those who are elec­tors, and their representatives—their security against oppression result­ing [Page 10] from this connection, and the necessity of imagining a double or virtual representation, to avoid iniquity and absurdity, have been ex­plained—the inhabitants of the colonies are, as such, incapable of be­ing electors, the privilege of election being exerciseable only in per­son, and therefore if every inhabitant of America had the requisite freehold, not one could vote, but upon the supposition of his ceasing to be an inhabitant of America, and becoming a resident of Great-Britain, a supposition which would be impertinent, because it shifts the question—should the colonies not be taxed by Parliamentary im­positions, their respective legislatures have a regular, adequate, and con­stitutional authority to tax them, and therefore there would not neces­sarily be an iniquitous and absurd exemption, from their not being re­presented by the house of commons.

There is not that intimate and inseparable relation between the elec­tors of Great-Britain, and the Inhabitants of the colonies, which must inevitably involve both in the same taxation; on the contrary, not a single actual elector in England, might be immediately affected by a taxation in America, imposed by a statute which would have a general operation and effect, upon the properties of the inhabitants of the co­lonies. The latter might be oppressed in a thousand shapes, without any Sympathy, or exciting any alarm in the former, Moreover, even acts, oppressive and injurious to the colonies in an extreme degree, might become popular in England, from the promise or expectation, that the very measures which depressed the colonies, would give ease to the Inhabitants of Great-Britain. It is indeed true, that the inte­rests of England and the colonies are allied, and an injury to the colo­nies produced into all it's consequences, will eventually affect the mo­ther country; yet these consequences being generally remote, are not at once foreseen; they do not immediately alarm the fears, and engage the passions of the English electors; the connection between a freehol­der of Great-Britain, and a British American being deducible only thro' a train of reasoning, which few will take the trouble, or can have opportunity, if they have capacity▪ to investigate; wherefore the re­lation between the British Americans, and the English electors, is a knot too infirm to be relied on as a competent security, especially against the force of a present, counteracting expectation of relief.

If it would have been a just conclusion, that the colonies being ex­actly in the same situation with the non-electors of England, are there­fore represented in the same manner; it ought to be allowed, that the reasoning is solid, which, after having evinced a total dissimilarity of situation, infers, that their representation is different.

[Page 11]If the commons of Great-Britain have no right by the constitution, to GIVE AND GRANT property not belonging to themselves or o­thers, without their consent actually or virtually given; If the claim of the colonies not to be taxed without their consent, signified by their representatives, is well founded; if it appears that the colonies are not actually represented by the commons of Great-Britain, and that the notion of a double or virtual representation, doth not with any pro­priety apply to the people of America; then the principle of the stamp act, must be given up as indefensible on the point of representation, and the validity of it rested upon the power which they who framed it, have to carry it into execution.

‘Should the parliament devise a tax, to be paid only by those of the people in Great-Britain, who are neither members of either house of parliament, nor their electors; such an act would be unjust and partial,’ saith the author of the claim of the colonies, &c. who yet allows that the ‘Non-electors would have a security against the weight of such a tax, should it be imposed, which the colonies have not; viz. that the members of parliament and the electors, must be relatively affected by it; but the industrious North-American, and the opulent West-Indian may have their properties taxed, and no in­dividual in Great-Britain participate with them in the burthen: On the contrary, the members of parliament would make their court to their constituents must effectually, by multiplying Taxes upon the subjects of the colonies.’

Is it not amazing that the above author, with these sentiments, should undertake the defence of the stamp duties, which, by his own conces­sion, appears to be more unjust, and more partial than the tax he sup­poses, and upon which he bestows, very properly, the epithets of unjust and partial.

He infuses a dangerous drug, without skill to know the proper point between its good and ill effects.

But it has been objected, that if the inhabitants of America, because represented in their respective assemblies, are therefore exempted from a parliamentary tax, then the citizens of London, who are represented in their common council, may plead the same immunity. If it were not for the authority upon which this objection is urged, it might be safely passed over without a particular answer; but since it hath been introduced with an appearance of reliance, and the opinion which it retails, is said to have been delivered with great gravity, and pronounced [Page 12] with decisive confidence, I would not be so wanting in respect to an eminent character, as to neglect the ceremony of a direct refutation.

But I must observe, that when the opinion of a lawyer is taken in a matter of private concern, in which he is under no bias to deceive, a concise declaration of it may generally suffice; he who applies for it being generally obliged to depend upon his council's character of in­tegrity and knowledge; not only because the expence of a methodical and minute discussion would be too bu [...]thensome, but because the force of legal reasoning is not generally understood. But in a question of public concernment, the opinion of no court lawyer, however respectable for his [...]candour and abilities, ought to weigh more than the reasons adduced in support of it. They ought to be explained, they may be examined. Considering his temptations, credit ought to be cautiously and diffidently given, to his assertion of what is his opinion.—Con­sidering the consequence of a decision, not to one man only, but to millions that exist and myriads that may exist, and [...]he exceeding fal­libility of legal knowledge, nothing short of clear conviction, after the fullest explication of the reasons of the opinion, and the most ac­curate and intense consideration of their validity, can justify an acqui­escence under it.

On the present occasion, so immensely important, nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri; unused to swear on any master's word; I shall pin my faith upon the dictum of no lawyer in the universe; and when his ipse dixit is authoritatively urged, I shall be [...] no pains to repress my suspicions that his reasons are concealed, because, if fairly produ­ced and held up to the light, many flaws in them would be discovered by a careful examiner. I have lived long enough to remember many opi­nions of court lawyers upon American affairs; they have been all strong­ly marked with the same character; they have been generally very sententious, and the same observation may be applied to them all. They have all declared that to be legal, which the minister for the time being has deemed to be expedient. The opinion given by a general of the law, in the late war, on the question, whether soldiers might be quartered on private houses in America, must be pretty generally re­membered.

The very learned gentlemen has, it seems, declared that, ‘upon mature deliberation, he has formed his opinion, that the colonies are in their nature, no more than common corporations; and that the inhabitants of a colony are no more entitled to an exemption from parliamentary taxations, because represented in an American assembly, than the citizens of London.’

[Page 13]This opinion may be incontestably just in the judgment of that accomplished politician, and elegant writer, who chooses to distinguish himself by the titles of late G...rn..r of the J- [...]s-ys, of the M [...]ss-ch s-ts B—, and of S—th C [...]r-l-a; and who does not choose to be distinguish'd by the title of late Maitre d' Hotel of the late Sir D—v—s O-b—e; or that exactly fitting, and characteristical ^† appellation conferred on him, by an incensed culprit in an American court of star-chamber, an appel­lation rather adapted to signify those powers, which are useful in in­trigue, and that lead to promotion, than expressive of respect and dig­nity; but having considered the subject in the best manner my very slender and limited capacity will allow, neither doth the opinion of the one, nor the approbation of it by the other, influence my judgment.

Let a great man declare a similitude, and he will soon find a Polonius to acknowledge, that, " yonder cloud is, by the mass, like a camel indeed" ......or, black like an ouzle," ....or, very like a whale."

The objection having been stated, the answer is obvious and clear.

The colonies have a complete and adequate legislative authority, and are not only represented in their assemblies, but in no other man­ner. The power of making bye-laws vested in the common council is inadequate and incomplete, being bounded by a few particular sub­jects; and the common council are actually represented too, by having a choice of members to serve in parliament. How then can the rea­son of the exemption from internal parliamentary taxations, claimed by the colonies, apply to the citizens of London?

The power described in the provincial charters, is to make laws, and in the exercise of that power, the colonies are bounded by no other limitations than what result from their subordination to, and depen­dence upon Great Britain. The term bye laws is as novel, and im­proper, when applied to the assemblies, as the expression, acts of assem­bly, would be, if applied to the parliament of Great Britain; and it is as absurd and insensible, to call a colony a common corporation, be­cause not an independent kingdom, and the powers of each to make laws and bye-laws, are limited, tho' not comparable in their extent, and the variety of their obj [...]ct [...], as it would be to call lake Erie, a Duck-puddle, because not the atlantic ocean.

Should the analogy between the colonies and corporations be even admitted for a moment, in order to see what would be the consequence of the postulatum, it would only amount to this, The colonies are vested with as complete authority to all intents and purposes to tax them­selves, as any English corporation is to make a bye-law, in any imagi­nable instance for any local purpose whatever, and the parliament doth [Page 14] not make laws for corporations upon subjects, in every respect proper for bye-laws.

But I don't rest the matter upon this, or any other circumstance, however considerable, to prove the impropriety of a taxation by the British parliament. I rely upon the fact, that not one inhabitant in any colony is, or can be actually or virtually represented by the British house of commons, and therefore, that the Stamp duties are severely imposed.

But it has been alledged, that if the right to give and grant the pro­perty of the colonies by an internal taxation is denied by the house of commons, the subordination and dependence of the colonies, and the superintendence of the British parliament can't be consistently esta­blish'd.....That any supposed line of distinction between the two cases, is but ‘a whimsical imagination, a chimerical speculation against fact and experience.’ ......Now, under favour, I conceive there is more confidence, than solidity in this assertion; and it may be satis­factorily and easily proved, that the subordination and dependence of the colonies may be preserved, and the supreme authority of the mother country be firmly supported, and yet the principle of representation, and the right of the British house of commons flowing from it, to give and grant the property of the commons of America, be denied.

The colonies are dependent upon Great Britain, and the supreme authority vested in the king, lords, and commons, may justly be exer­cised to secure, or preserve their dependence, whenever necessary for that purpose. This authority results from, and is implied in the idea of the relation subsisting between England and her colonies; for, con­sidering the nature of human affections, the inferior is not to be trusted with providing regulations to prevent his rising to an equality with his superior. But, though the right of the superior to use the proper means for preserving the subordination of his inferior is admitted, yet it does not necessarily follow, that he has a right to seize the property of his inferior when he pleases, or to command him in every thing; since, in the degrees of it, there may very well exist a dependence and inferiority, without absolute vassalage and slavery. In what the superior may rightfully controul, or compel, and in what the inferior ought to be at liberty to act without controul or compulsion, depends upon the nature of the dependence, and the degree of the subordination; and, these being ascertained, the measure of obedience, and submission, and the extent of the authority and superintendence will be settled. When powers, compatible with the relation between the superior and inferior, have, by express compact, been granted to, and accepted by, [Page 15] the latter, and have been, after that compact, repeatedly recognized by the former— When they may be exercised effectually upon every occasion without any injury to that relation, the authority of the su­perior can't properly interpose; for, by the powers vested in the infe­rior, is the superior limited.

By their constitutions of government, the colonies are empowered to impose internal taxes. This power is compatible with their de­pendence, and hath been expressly recognized by British ministers and the British parliament, upon many occasions; and it may be exercised effectually without striking at, or impeaching, in any respect, the su­perintendence of the British parliament. May not then the line be distinctly and justly drawn between such acts as are necessary, or pro­per, for preserving or securing the dependence of the colonies, and such as are not necessary or proper for that very important purpose?

When the powers were conferred upon the colonies, they were con­ferred too as privileges and immunities, and accepted as such; or, to speak more properly, the privileges belonging necessarily to them as British subjects, were solemnly declared and confirmed by their charters, and they who settled in America under the encouragement and faith of these charters, understood, not only that They might, but that it was their right to exercise those powers without controul, or preven­tion. In some of the charters the distinction is expressed, and the strongest declarations made, and the most solemn assurances given, that the [...]ettlers should not have their property taxed without their own con­sent by their representatives; though their legislative authority is limited at the same time, by the subordination implied in their relation, and They are therefore restrained for making acts of assembly repugnan [...] to the laws of England; and, had the distinction not been expressed, the powers given would have implied it, for, if the parliament may in any case interpose, when the authority of the colonies is adequate to the occasion, and not limited by their subordina [...]ion to the mother country, it may in every case, which would make another appellation more pro­per to describe their condition, than the name by which their inhabi­tants have been usually called, and have gloried in.

Because the parliament may, when the relation between Great Britain and her colonies calls for an exertion of her superintendence, bind the colonies by statute, therefore a parliamentary interposition in every other instance, is justifiable, is an inference that may be denied.

On some emergencies, the king, by the constitution, hath an abso­lute power to provide for the safety of the state; to take care, like a Roman dictator, ne quid detrimenti capiat respublica, [That the common [Page 16] wealth may not suffer.] and this power, is not specifically annexed to the monarchy by any express law; it necessarily results from the end and nature of government; but who would infer from this, that the king, in every instance, or upon every occasion, can, upon the principles of the constitution, exercise this supreme power.

The British ministers have, in the most effectual terms, at different periods, from the reign of Charles II, to that of the present king, re­cognized this distinction in their requisitions, transmitted to the colo­nies to raise and levy men and money, by acts of assembly; and re­cently, in the course of the last war, they were so far from thinking that it was proper for the British house of commons to give and grant the property of the colonies to support the military operations in America, upon which not only the immediate protection of that part of the British dominions, but the most important interests, perhaps the ulti­mate preservation of Great Britain from destruction, essentially de­pended; I say, on this great occasion of the most important, and na­tional concernment, the British ministers were so far from calling upon the house of commons, in their peculiar department, to give and grant property, belonging neither to themselves, nor their constituents, that they directly applied to the colonies to tax themselves, in virtue of the authority and privilege conferred by their charters, and promised to re­commend it to the British Parliament to reimburse the expence they should incur in providing for the general service.......They made good their promise; and if all the money raised in the colonies, by acts of assembly, in pursuance of the requisitions of the British ministers, hath not been repaid by parliament, a very considerable part of it hath.

Could they, who made the requisitions I have mentioned, or the assemblies that complied with them, intend, or imagine the faith of the English government was to be preserved by a retribution, at one time, of the money disbursed at the instance, and upon the credit of the British ministry, enforced and supported by [...]oyal assurances, and by taking it back again at another time? is this method of keeping the faith of government to be ranked among the ‘improvements which have been made beyond the idea of former administrations, con­ducted by ministers ignorant of the importance of the colonies, or who impotently neglected their concerns, or were diverted by mean pursuits, from attending to them?’ Is it absolutely certain, that there never can, at any future period, arise a crisis, in which the ex­ertion of the colonies may be necessary; or, if there should, that it [Page 17] will bring with it an oblivion of all former indirection?—But this is a subject fitter for silent meditation, than public discussion.

There was a time when measures of prevention might have been taken by the colonies.—There may be a Time when redress may be obtained........Till then, prudence, as well as duty, requires sub­mission.

It is presumed that it was a notable service done by New-England, when the militia of that colony reduced Cape-Breton, since it enabled the British ministers to make a peace less disadvantageous and inglorious than they otherwise must have been constrained to submit to, in the humble state to which they were then reduced.—That the general exertion of the colonies in North-America, during the last war, not only faciliated, but was indispensably requisite to the success of those ope­rations by which so many glorious conquests were atchieved, and that those conquests have put it in the power of the present illustrious mi­nisters to make a peace upon terms of so much glory and adv [...]ntage, as to afford an inexhaustible subject during their administration, and the triumph of toryism, at least, for their ingenious panegyrists to ce­lebrate.

An American, without justly incurring the imputation of ingratitude, may doubt, whether some other motive, besides pure generosity, did not prompt the British Nation to engage in the defence of the colonies. He may be induced to think that the measures taken for the protection of the plantations, were not only connected with the interests, but even necessary to the defence of Great-Britain herself, because he may have reason to imagine that Great-Britain, could not long subsist as an independent kingdom after the loss of her colonies.—He may, with­out arrogance, be inclined to claim some merit from the exertion of colonies, since it enabled Great Britain ultimately to defend herself; I mean that kind of merit which arises from benefits done to others, by the operation of measures taken for our own sakes......a merit most il­lustriously displayed in the generosity of Great Britain, when, with their co-operation, she protected the colonies to preserve herself.

When an house is in flames, and the next neighbour is extremely active, and exerts his endeavours to extinguish the fire, which, if not conquered, would catch, and consume his own dwelling, I don' say, that if the owner of the house which had been in flames, should, after the fire subdued, complaisantly thank his neighbour generally for his services, he would be absurdly ceremonious; but, if the assistant should afterwards boast of his great generosity, and claim a right to the furniture of the house which he had assisted in saving, upon the [Page 18] merit of his zeal and activity, he would deserve to be put in mind of the motive of his service.

If the advantages gained by the late most glorious and successful war have been secured by an adequate peace......if the successes that attend­ed the military operations of the British arms, were the effect of the conjunct efforts of the British Nation and her Colonies, roused by the spirit, excited by the virtue, animated by the vigour, and conducted by the wisdom of the ablest minister that ever served his country, has there been no compensation received for the charges of the war? are the colonies entitled to no credit for it?

When the design is to oppress the colonies with taxes, or calum­niate the late patriotic minister, the expences of the war, and the enor­mity of the national debt are proclaimed: When the present all accom­plished administration is to be celebrated, then is the immense value of the new acquisitions displayed in the brightest colours, ‘acquisi­tions vast in extent, richly productive of the valuable commodities belonging to their several climates. The possession of those in North-America, ensures the safety of the other colonies there, inso­much that our only dangerous neighbours, the French, do not think the pittance left worth retaining, having, by the cession of Louisi­ana to the Spaniards, avowedly given up for ever those great objects, for which alone they began the war.....The ceded islands are almost of equal advantage, for protecting our own, and annoying the set­tlements of the French and Spaniards, if they should be again our enemies. Part of Nova Scotia, since the removal of the neutral French, hath been already settled by 10,000 inhabitants, within the compass of six or seven years, a province lately considered as no more than a proper situation for a fortress, whose [...]rrison it could not subsist: Even Cape-Breton, that barren appendage to the province of Nova Scotia, is known now to contain treasures so worthy of attention, as to be reserved to the crown. The mines there are not veins; they are mountains of coal; vast clifts of no­thing else, stand open, and accessible; no boring necessary to find it; no pit necessary to come at it; no fire engines requisite for car­rying on the works. This island, and all the neighbouring shores in the gulph of St. Laurence, have another fund of wealth in their fisheries. Canada is already a very flourishing colony, inhabited by 90,000 people, and their demand on Great Britain for a supply of manufactures, must be immediately considerable. The peltry will be another great branch of commerce. West-Florida is surprisingly fertile, and luxuriantly productive in its natural state, of every [Page 19] thing, and not only promising, but actually producing wines and silk, and indigo, &c. &c.’

Is no part of this description the ebullition of an exuberant fancy, and shall we not cast one glance of retrospection towards the man, who, when his country was despised, and insulted, and sunk into the most abject condition of despondence, by inspi [...]ing her sons with that invincible vigour of patriotism, with which himself was animated, not only dispelled her fears, secured her safety, and retrieved her ho­nour, but humbled her enemies, and tore from them the resources of their strength, and the supports of their insolence?

Are the acquisitions of the war retained by the peace, so inestima­bly valuable, and ought not the colonies to have some consideration that were instrumental in the successes whence those acquisitions flow­ed, and strained every nerve in the general service, to that degree of exertion, that without it, all the power of Great-Britain, all the a­mazing abilities of her minister, and all the discipline, and unparallel­led bravery of her national troops and seamen, could not have avail­ed beyond meer defence, if happily so far? if the war was expensive beyond all former example, so were the successes of it beneficial. If the expences attending the military operations in America, are justly to be charged to the sole defence of the colonies, and no part of it to the security of Great-Britain, or to the views of extending her domi­nions by conquest, if all the successes of the war have been atchieved by the national arms of Great Britain ALONE, without any assistance, or co [...]operation of the plantations, still ought not the claim against the colonies in equity, to be mitigated upon reflection of the advan­tages deri [...]d from them, and of their contribution to the national re­venue for [...]ong course of years, during which, their protection put the British nation to very little, if any particular expence?

If moreover, Great Britain hath an equitable claim to the contribu­tion of the colonies, it ought to be proportioned to their circumstances, and they might, surely, be indulged with discharging it in the most easy, and satisfactory manner to themselves. If ways and means convenient, and conciliating would produce their contribution, as well as oppressive and disgusting exactions, it is neither consistent with humanity or poli­cy, to pursue the latter.....A power may even exist without an actual exercise of it, and it indicates as little good sense as good nature to ex­ercise it, only that the subjects of it may feel the rod that rules them. Moderation may be observed, and equity maintained, at the same time that superiority is asserted, and authority vindicated, whatever the ap­prehensions [Page 20] of pusillanimity, or the insolence of usurpation may sug­gest.

What is the annual sum expected from the colonies—what proportion from each—how far do their abilities extend? These matters have been, without doubt, precisely ascertained, or easily may be, at a time ‘when the real, the substantial, the commercial interests of Great Britain, are preferred to every other consideration, and it is so well known, that the trade whence it's greatest wealth is derived, and upon which it's maritime power is principally founded, depends upon a wise and proper use of the colonies,’ which implies, at least, such an understanding of their circumstances, as must render it extreme­ly easy, to form a reasonable estimate of their comparative wealth, and the extent of their abilities. The proportion of each colony, be­ing so easily ascertainable at this period of uncommon knowledge of their affairs, why has the course observed by former ministers, when supplies have been expected from America, been neglected by the present? Why was there not the usual requisition communicated to the provincial as­semblies, instead of exacting an uncertain and unequal sum from each colony, by a law abruptly passed, without any previous default of those who are affected by it?—I shall not call it a law repugnant to their genius, cancelling their charters, infringing the most valuable rights and privileges of British subjects, derogatory from the faith and honour of government, unjust and cruel in its principles, rigorous and oppressive in the means provided for its execution, and as pernicious in its consequences to the mother country, as injurious to the colonies in its immediate operation; but I may call it a rigorous and severe law. It is in vain to attempt a palliation of this useless severity, (useless I mean to the purpose of raising a revenue) by fallaciously [...]etending that, as all the colonies were to be taxed, and the authority of each is limited, the interposition of the parliament became necessary, since nothing can be less disputable, than that each colony hath a compe­tent authority to raise it's proportion, and consequently nothing is more evident, than that all the colonies might raise the whole. ^* The [Page 21] assertion that the colonies would have paid no regard to any requisiti­ons, is rash and unauthorized, and had the event actually happened, the trouble and loss of time to the ministers in making the experi­ment, would not have been considerable or detrimental to the nation, and after its failure, an act of parliament might still have been made to compel the contribution, if the power which hath been exercised is defensible upon the principles of the British constitution.

A measure so extreme, could hardly be at once pursued, because the ministers did not know what to demand, who have made so many regulations in regard to the colonies, ‘founded upon knowledge, formed with judgment, and executed with vigour.’ Had the re­quisitions been communicated, I make no doubt but they would have been entertained with respect, and productive of all the effects that could reasonably have been expected from them. A petty American assembly would not, in answer to such requisitions, have impertinent­ly recommended the reduction of exorbitant salaries, the abatement of extravagant, and the abolition of illegal perquisites, the extinction of useless places, or the disbanding of undeserving, or ill deserving pensioners, as a more proper and beneficial method of relieving the public burthens, than a new and heavy imposition upon useful and industrious subjects.

Have great things been promised for the ease of the people of Eng­land, and hath a measure been fallen upon, that, by putting the ac­complishment of them at a distance, and keeping expectation alive, it may contribute to the prolongation of a power, which, in the inte­rim, will find sufficient opportunities to gratify the views of ministe­rial avarice or ambition?

If a sum had been liquidated, and a precise demand made, it might perhaps have been shewn, if proportioned to the circumstances of the colonies, to be of no real consequence to the nation; and, if above [Page 22] their circumstances, that it would, with the oppression of the planta­tions, prove ruinous to the British manufactures; but, whilst matters are thus vague, and indeterminate, any attempt to shew that the stamp duties will be inadequate to the promised relief, distress the colonies, and consequently beggar the British manufacturers, may be obviated by saying, that ‘the act is in the nature of an experiment; if ina­dequate, other methods may be superadded; if inconvenient, it may be repealed, as soon as discovered;’ and hints may be thrown out at the same time, to cherish the hopes of the nation, that there are the best grounds to expect ^† the measure will be productive of all that can be desired or wished.

The frugal Republicans of North-America, (if the British inhabitants there are to be distinguished by a nick-name, because it implies that they are enemies to the government of England, and ought therefore to be regarded with a jealous eye) may be allowed, without deroga­ting from the vast and prodigious knowledge of a minister, to be ac­quainted with their own internal circumstances better than a stranger, who must depend upon information: and that too, most frequently, of men not the most eminent for their candour, distinguished by their sagacity, or respectable for their integrity. Had requisitions been made, and the sum demanded been equitable, and proportioned to their circumstances, they could have fallen upon ways and means less oppressive than the stamp duties. They have frequently taxed them­selves: They have tried various methods of taxation: They know, by experience, the easiest and least expensive. The meaning, or con­struction of their levy-act is settled: They can be carried into execu­tion, not only at a small expence, without exhausting a considerable part of their produce by the multiplication of officers, and their sup­port; but without heavy pains and grievous penalties, without oppres­sion of the innocent, giving countenance to vexation, and encourage­ment [Page 23] to profligate informers, without the establishment of arbitrary and distant courts of ^† admiralty.

The national debt is heavy, and it is a popular scheme to draw from colonies a contribution towards the relief of the mother-country. The manner of effecting it is not carefully attended to, or nicely re­garded by those who expect to receive the benefit. The end is so ar­dently desired, that, whether the means might not be more moderate, is not scrupulously examined by men, who think themselves in no danger of injury or oppression from their severity. It is affirmed to those who cannot detect the falacy of the assertion, that millions have been expended solely in the defence of America. They believe it, and thence are easily persuaded that the claim of a contribution from the colonies is just and equitable, and that any measure necessary to secure it, is right and laudable. It is represented, that unless the colonies are stripped of the trial by jury, and courts of admiralty are esta­blished, in which judges from England, strangers, without connection or interest in America, removeable at pleasure, and supported by libe­ral salaries, are to preside; unless informers are encouraged and fa­voured, and the accused most rigorously dealt by, that the tax will be eluded......and these severities are excused on account of their supposed necessity. The colonies are described to be a numerous, flourishing, and opulent people: It is alledged that they contribute to the national expence, by taxes there only the pitiful sum of 1900 l. per year, for the collection of which, an establishment of officers, attended with the expence of 7600 l. per annum, is necessary. Upon these premises, the uneasiness of the colonies, at being forced to bring more into the common stock, appears to be unreasonable, if not rebellious; and they seem rather to deserve reprehension and correction, than favour and indulgence.

The successes of the war were obtained as well by the vigorous ef­forts of the Colonies, as the exertion of Great-Britain......The faith of Great-Britain hath been engaged in the most solemn manner, to re­pay the colonies the monies levied by internal taxations for the sup­port of the war. Is it consistent with that faith to tax them towards sinking the debt in part incurred by that re-payment? The immense accession of territory, and value of the acquisitions obtained by the [Page 24] peace, is the consequence of the successes of the war.....The charge of the war is lessened by the advantages resulting from the peace. The colonies, for a long course of time, have largely contributed to the public revenue, and put Great-Britain to little or no expence for their protection. If it were equitable to draw from them a further con­tribution, it does not therefore follow, that it is proper to force it from them, by the harsh and rigorous methods established by the stamp act; an act unequal and disproportioned to their circumstances whom it affects; exempting opulence, crushing indigence; and tear­ing from a numerous, loyal, and useful people, the privileges they had, in their opinion, earned and merited, and justly held most dear. If they are really in debt, the payment of it hath not been refused, it hath not been demanded. If one subject, grown giddy with sudden elevation, should, at any future period, rashly declare, that the colo­nies should be taxed, at all events, in the most rigorous manner; and that millions of industrious and useful subjects should be grievously op­pressed, rather than himself depart from his character of perti [...]acity and wilfulness, check the impulse of a tyrannical disposition, or forego the gratification of his vanity, in a wanton display of power; submis­sion would be an admirable virtue indeed, if not the effect of impo­tence.

That the contribution arising from the stamp duties is disproportion­ed to their circumstances from whom it is exacted, is manifest; for they will produce in each colony, a greater or less sum, not in propor­tion to its wealth, but to the multiplicity of juridical forms, the quan­tity of vacant land, the frequency of transferring landed property, the extent of paper negociations, the scarcity of money, and the number of debtors. A larger sum will be exacted from a tobacco colony tha [...] from Jamaica; and it will not only be higher in one of the poorest colonies, and the least able to bear it, than in the richest; but the principal part of the revenue will be drawn from the poorest individu­als in the poorest colonies, from mortgagors, obligors, and defen­dants. If this be true, does the act deserve the encomium of being a mode of taxation the easiest, and the most equal, a duty upon property spread lightly over a great variety of subjects, and heavy upon none?

The commons of Great-Britain, moreover, in their capacity of re­presentative, not only give and grant the property of the colonies; but in my construction of the stamp-act, (however every reader may ex­amine and judge for himself,) give and grant also to certain officers of the crown, a power to tax them higher still; for these officers will not, I presume, be called virtual representatives too; and what they [Page 25] think fit to [...]evy, by an ingenious extent of the fiction, will not be considered as levied with the consent of the colonies....The instances, I believe, are rare, in which the representatives of the people of Eng­land have delegated to officers of the crown, the power of taxing their constituents, nor hath any distinction yet been advanced to prove, that in their capacity of virtual representatives of the colonies, the house of commons not having the same confidence reposed in them, ought to proceed upon peculiar rules. There was a statute of Henry VIII, by which, I think, the king's proclamations, with the consent of the privy council, were to operate as laws; and another statute of Richard II, that the power of the two houses should be vested in twelve lords; but these acts bear no resemblance to the stamp-act.

The stamping instruments are to be retained in England. Vellum, parchment, and paper, are to be sent to America, ready stamped........ The first commissioner of the treasury, or the commissioners, or any three or more of them, are, by the act, impowered to set any price upon the vellum, parchment and paper, and the payment of that price is secured and enforced by the same pains and penalties that the stamp-duties are.

If the substitution of an arbitrary civil law court, in the place of the legal judicatories, and that deserved favourite, the common-law-trial by jury, would not justify the assertion, that the stamp-act hath stripped the colonies of the guards and securities provided by the constitution against oppression in the execution of laws, I would much less presume to say, the vesting in the commissioners of the treasury a power to tax the colonies, will amply justify the assertion, that the stamp-act hath not left them even the shadow of a privilege. It is indeed something difficult to imagine how the order of democra­cy, which is as much a part of the constitution, as monarchy or aris­tocracy, can exist when the people are excluded from a share in the executing, and a share in the making of laws; but that is not the present case; and, though I may not be able to answer a specious ob­jection, formed upon general principles, I am not obliged to adopt it, 'till I am convinced of its solidity.

A little examination will find how unfair and deceptive the repre­sentation is, that the colonies in North-America, ‘two millions of British subjects, an opulent, thriving and commercial people, con­tribute to the national expence, no more than 7 or 800 l. per an­num by taxes raised there;’ for though it should be acknowledged, (which I neither acknowledge nor deny, because I do not know, no [...] have an opportunity of coming at the fact) that the impositions upon the inhabitants of the colonies do not raise there, a greater sum than [Page 26] hath been stated, it doth not follow that ‘the inhabitants of the co­lonies are indulged at the expence of Great-Britain, and that the neediest British cottager, who out of his scanty pittance hardly earn­ed, pays the high duties of customs and excise in the price of his consumptions, has reason to complain,’ if immense sums are raised upon the inhabitants of the colonies elsewhere.

By such artifices and sophistry, i [...] ignorance misled, credulity de­ceived, and prejudices excited. Thus oppression gains the credit of equity, cruelty passes for moderation, and tyranny for justice, and the man who deserves........reproach, is celebrated by adulation▪ and ap­plauded by delusion for his wisdom and patriotic virtues.

The truth is, that a vast revenue arises to the British nation from taxes paid by the colonies in Great-Britain, and even the most ignorant British cottager, not imposed upon by infamous misrepresenta­tion, must perceive, that it is of no consequence to his ease and re­lief, whether the duties raised upon America are paid there, and thence afterwards remitted to Great-Britain, or paid at first upon the produce of the colonies in Great-Britain.

In the article of tobacco, for instance, the planter pays a tax upon that produce of his land and labour consumed in Great-Britain, more than six times the clear sum received by him for it, besides the ex­pences of freight, commission and other charges, and double freight, commission and charges upon the tobacco re-exported, by which the British merchants, mariners and other British subjects, are supported —a tax, at least, equal to what is paid by any farmer of Great-Britain, possessed of the same degree of property; and moreover the planter must contribute to the support of the expensive internal go­vernment of the colony, in which he ^* resides.

Is it objected, that the duties charged upon tobacco, fall ultimately upon the consumers of this commodity in the consequential price set upon it? Be it so, and let the principle be established that all taxes upon a commodity, are paid by the consumers of it, and the conse­sequence of this principle be fairly drawn, and equally applied.

The British consumers therefore, ultimately pay the high duties laid upon tobacco, in proportion to the quantity of that commodity which they consume....The colonies therefore, in proportion to their con­sumption of British Manufactures, pay also the high duties of customs and excise, with which the manufacturers are charged in the conse­quential pri [...] set upon their consumptions....In their passage more­over, from the British manufacturers to the American importers, the [Page 27] commodities go thro' a great many hands, by which their costs are enhanced; the factors, the carriers, the shop-keepers, the merchants, the brokers, the porters, the watermen, the mariners, and others, have their respective profits, from which they derive their subsistance, and the support of their families, and are enabled to pay the high duties of customs and excise, in the price of their ^* consumptions.

The policy of the la [...]e regulations of the colonies is of the same character with their justice and lenity. The produce of their lands, the earnings of their industry, and the gains of their commerce center in Great Britain, support the ar [...]cifiers, the manufactories, and navi­gation of the nation, and with them the British land holders too.

Great Britain had ALL before, and therefore can have no more from the colonies; but the minister, in the pursuit of a ‘well di­gested, consistent, wise and salutary plan of colonization and go­vernment, a plan founded upon the principles of policy, commerce and finances,’ chuses to demolish at one blow, all their privileges as they have understood them, that he may raise in America, a part of what was before paid in Great-Britain. But if the execution of it, instead of improving the advantages already possessed, confirming the blessings already enjoyed, and promoting the public welfare, should happen to distress the trade, reduce the navigation, impoverish the manufacturers, and diminish the value of the lands in Great-Britain; should it drive the British mechanics and manufacturers to America, by depriving them of their best customers at home, and force the colonies upon manufactures, they are disabled from purchasing, other topics of eulogy must be discovered by his ingenious encomiasts, than his wisdom or his political atchievements. Upon such an event, an American will have very little reason to exclaim

The right of exemption from all taxes without their consent, the colonies claim as British subjects. They derive this right from the common law, which their charters have declared and confirmed, and they conceive that when stripped of this right, whether by preroga­tive [Page 28] or by any other power, they are at the same time deprived of every privilege distinguishing free-men from slaves.

On the other hand, they acknowledge themselves to be subordinate to the mother country, and that the authority vested in the supreme council of the nation, may be justly exercised to support and preserve that subordination.

Great and just encomiums have been bestow'd upon the constitution of England, and their representative is deservedly the favourite of the inhabitants in Britain. But it is not because the supreme council is called parliament, that they boast of their constitution of government; for there is no particular magical influence from the combination of the letters which form the word; it is because they have a share in that council, that they appoint the members who constitute one branch of it, whose duty and interest it is to consult their benefit, and to assert their rights, and who are vested with an autho­rity, to prevent any measures taking effect dangerous to their liberties, or injurious to their properties.

But the inhabitants in the colonies have no share in this great coun­cil. None of the members of it are▪ or can be of their appointment, or in any respect dependant upon [...]. There is no immediate con­nection▪ on the contrary, there may be an opposition of interest; how puerile then is the declamation, ‘what will become of the colonies birthright, and the glorious securities which their forefathers hand­ed down to them, if the authority of the British parliament to im­pose taxes upon them should be given up? To deny the authority of the British legislature, is to surrender all claim to a share in its councils, and if this were the tenor of their charters, a grant more insidious or replete with mischief, could not be imagined, a forfei­ture of their rights would be couched under the appearance of pri­vilege, &c.’

We claim an exemption from all parliamentary impositions, that we may enjoy those securities of our rights and properties, which we are entitled to by the constitution. For those securities are derived to the subject from the principle that he is not be taxed without his own consent, and an inhabitant in America can give his consent in no other manner than in assembly. It is in the councils that exist there, and there only, that he hath a share, and whilst he enjoys it, his rights and privileges are as well secured as any elector's in England, who hath a share in the national councils there; for the words parliament and assembly are in this respect, only different terms to express the same thing.

[Page 29]But it is argued, that ‘if the common law of England, is to be brought, as justifying a claim of exemption in any subject of Great Britain from a parliamentary tax, it will plead against a tax impo­sed by a provincial assembly; for as all the colony assemblies de­rive their authority from the meer grant of the crown only, it might be urged that any tax imposed by them, is imposed by au­thority of the prerogative of the crown, and not by full consent of parliament. That if this right in the crown, is acknowledged to exempt the subject from the jurisdiction of parliament in the case of taxation, its power to dispense with acts of parliament, or to de­prive the same subject of the benefit of the common law, can't be denied.’

One would be inclined to suspect that it is supposed, something else than reason, may on this occasion conduce to persuasion.

The English subjects, who left their native country to settle in the wilderness of America, had the privileges of other Englishmen. They knew their value, and were desirous of having them perpetuated to their posterity. They were aware that, as their consent whilst they should reside in America, could neither be asked nor regularly given in the national legislature, and that if they were to be bound by laws without restriction, affecting the property they should earn by the utmost hazard and fatigue, they would lose every other privilege which they had enjoyed in their native country, and become meer tenants at will, dependant upon the moderation of their lords and masters, without any other security....that as their settlement was to be made under the protection of the English government, they knew, that in consequence of their relation to the mother-country, they and their posterity would be subordinate to the supreme national council, and expected that obedience and protection would be con­sidered as reciprocal duties.

Considering themselves, and being considered in this light, they en­tered into a compact with the crown, the basis of which was, that their privileges as English subjects, should be effectually secured to themselves, and transmitted to their posterity. As for this purpose, precise declara­tions and provisions formed upon the principles, and according to the spirit of the English constitution were necessary; CHARTERS were accordingly framed and conferred by the crown, and accepted by the settlers, by which all the doubts and inconveniencies which might have arisen from the application of general principles to a new subject, were prevented.

[Page 30]By these charters, founded upon the unalienable rights of the subject, and upon the most sacred compact, the colonies claim a right of exemption from taxes not imposed with their consent.—They claim it upon the principles of the constitution, as once English, and now British subjects, upon principles on which their compact with the crown was originally founded.

The origin of other governments is covered by the veil of antiquity, and is differently traced by the fancies of different men; but, of the colonies, the evidence of it is as clear and unequivocal as of any other fact.

By these declaratory charters the inhabitants of the colonies claim an exemption from all taxes not imposed by their own consent, and to infer from their objection to a taxation, to which their consent is not, nor can be given, that they are setting up a right in the crown to dispense with acts of parliament, and to deprive the British subjects in America of the benefits of the common law, is so extremely absurd, that I should be at a loss to account for the appearance of so strange an argument, were I not apprized of the unworthy arts employed by the enemies of the colonies to excite strong prejudices against them in the minds of their brethren at home, and what gross incongruities prejudiced men are wont to adopt.

Tho' I am persuaded that this reasoning hath already been sufficiently refuted, and that no sensible and dispassionate man can perceive any force in it, yet I can't help remarking, that it is grounded upon a principle, which, if it were possible for the examiner to establish it, would entitle him to the applause of the inhabitants in Great Britain, as little as to the thanks of the colonies.

From what source do the peers of England derive their dignity, and the share they have in the British legislature? are there no places in England that derive their power of chusing members of parliament from royal charters? will this writer argue, that the crown may, by prerogative, tax the inhabitants of Great-Britain, because the peers of England, and some representatives of the people, exercise a legis­lative authority under royal patents and charters? it must be admitted that all the members of the house of commons are freely chosen by the people, and are not afterwards subject to any influence of the crown or the ministry: And are not the members of the lower houses of assembly as freely chosen also by the people; and, in fact, as inde­pendent, as the members of the house of commons? if the truth were confessed, the objection would not be, that the colonies are too de­pendent upon the crown, or that their claim of exemption from all taxes, [Page 31] not imposed by their own consent, is founded upon a principle leading to slavery. At one time, the North-Americans are called republicans; at another, the assertors of despotism. What a strange animal must a North American appear to be from these representations to the genera­lity of English readers, who have never had an opportunity to admire, that he may be neither black, nor tawny, may speak the English lan­guage, and, in other respects, seem, for all the world, like one of them!

"The common-law, the great charter, the bill of rights," are so far from ‘declaring, with one voice, that the inhabitants of the co­lonies shall be taxed by no other authority than that of the British parliament,’ that they prove the contrary; for the principle of the common law is, that no part of their property shall be drawn from Bri­tish subjects, without their consent, given by those whom they depute to re­present them; and this principle is enforced by the declaration of the GREAT CHARTER, and the bill of rights, neither the one nor the other, introducing any new privilege. In Great-Britain, the consent of the people is given by the house of commons; and, as money had been levied there for the use of the crown by pretence of prerogative, without their consent, it was properly declared at the revolution, in sup­port of the constitution, and in vindication of the people's rights, that the levying of money, by pretence of prerogative, without grant of par­liament, i. e. without their consent who are to pay it, is illegal, which declaration was most suitable to the occasion, and effectually establishes the very principle contended for by the colonies.

The word parliament, having been made use of, the letter of the declaration is adhered to, and the consequence drawn, that no British subject can be legally taxed, but by the authority of the British parlia­ment, against the spirit and principle of the declaration, which was aimed only to check and restrain the prerogative, and to establish the necessity of obtaining the consent of those on whom taxes were to be levied. Is not this a new kind of logic, to infer from declarations and claims, founded upon the necessary and essential principle of a free government, that the people ought not to be taxed without their con­sent, that therefore the colonies ought to be taxed by an authority, in which their consent is not, nor can be concerned; or, in other words, to draw an inference from a declaration or claim of privilege, subver­sive of the very principle upon which the privilege is founded? How aukwardly are the principles of the revolution applied by some men! What astonishment would the promoters of that glorious measure, those patrons and friends of liberty, did they now tread the stage of [Page 32] this world, express, that a word, by which they meant to assert the privileges of the subject, and restrain despotic power, should be relied upon to demolish the very principle by which themselves were anima [...]ted, and after all their pains and hazards to establish the generous sen­timents of liberty, that those who feel and enjoy the blessings of their successful struggles, should not be able to raise a thought beyond the ideas affixed to systematic terms.

It was declared also by the bill of rights, that the elections of mem­bers of parliament ought to be free, and the common law laid down the same rule before, which is as applicable to the election of the re­presentatives of the colonies, as of the commons of Great-Britain. But with the help of the examiner's logic, it might be proved from the letter of the bill of rights, that the elections only of members of par­liament ought to be free; for the freedom expressed in the bill of rights, is as much attached to elections of members of parliament, as the authority to grant money is to the British parliament, and if the declaration in the one case implies a negative, there is the like impli­cation in the other. If, moreover, the common law, the great char­ter, and the bill of rights, do really, as the examiner asserts, with one voice declare, that the inhabitants of the colonies ought to be taxed only by the British parliament, it is not consistent with that cha­racter of vigilance, and jealousy of their power, commonly ascribed to the British parliament, that, from their first regular settlement to the reign of George III, the American assemblies should not only have been suffered, without any animadversion, without one resolve, or e­ven a single motion to restrain them, to encroach upon the jurisdiction and authority of the British parliament; but that the parliament should never before the late stamp-act, in one instance, have imposed an inter­nal tax upon the colonies for the single purpose of revenue, and that, even when acts of assembly passed in consequence of ministerial inforced by royal requisitions have been laid before them, they should be so far from objecting to their validity, as actually to recognize the authority of the provincial legislatures, and upon that foundation superstruct their own resolves and acts.

But tho' it hath been admitted, that the stamp-act is the first statute that hath imposed an internal tax upon the colonies for the single pur­pose of revenue, yet the advocates for that law contend, that there are many instances of the parliament's exercising a supreme legislative au­thority over the colonies, and actually imposing internal taxes upon their properties—that the duties upon any exports or imports are in­ternal taxes—that an impost on a foreign commodity is as much an [Page 33] internal tax, as a duty upon any production of the plantations,......that no distinction can be supported between one kind of tax and another, an authority to impose the one extending to the other.

If these things are really as represented by the advocates for the stamp act, why did ^* the chancellor of the exchequer make it a question for the consideration of the house of commons, whether the parlia­ment could impose an internal tax in the colonies or not, for the single purpose of revenue?

It appears to me, that there is a clear and necessary distinction be­tween an act imposing a tax for the single purpose of revenue, and those acts which have been made for the regulation of trade, and have pro­duced some revenue in consequence of their effect and operation as regu­lations of trade.

The colonies claim the privileges of British subjects......it has been proved to be inconsistent with those privileges, to tax them without their own consent, and it hath been demonstrated that a tax imposed by parliament, is a tax without their consent.

The subordination of the colonies, and the authority of the parlia­ment to preserve it, have been fully acknowledged. Not only the welfare, but perhaps the existence of the mother country, as an inde­pendent kingdom, may depend upon her trade and navigation, and these so far upon her intercourse with the colonies, that, if this should [Page 34] be neglected, there would soon be an end to that commerce, whence her greatest wealth is derived, and upon which her maritime power is principally founded. From these considerations, the right of the Bri­tish parliament to regulate the trade of the colonies, may be justly de­duced; a denial of it would contradict the admission of the subordina­tion, and of the authority to preserve it, resulting from the nature of the relation between the mother country and her colonies. It is a common, and frequently the most proper method to regulate trade by duties on imports and exports. The authority of the mother country to regulate the trade of the colonies, being unquestionable, what re­gulations are the most proper, are to be of course submitted to the de­termination of the parliament; and, if an incidental revenue, should be produced by such regulations; these are not therefore unwarrant­able.

A right to impose an internal tax on the colonies, without their consent for the single purpose of revenue, is denied, a right to regulate their trade without their consent is admitted. The imposition of a duty, may, in some instances, be the proper regulation. If the claims of the mother country and the colonies should seem on such an occa­sion to interfere, and the point of right to be doubtful, (which I take to be otherwise) it is easy to guess that the determination will be on the side of power, and that the inferior will be constrained to sub­mit ^*.

The writer on the regulations lately made with respect to the colo­nies, who is said to have been well informed, asserts a fact, which in­disputably proves, that the impositions mentioned, were only regula­tions of trade, and can, with no kind of propriety, be considered in any other light. The fact he asserts, is, that ‘the whole remittance from all the taxes in the colonies, at an average of thirty years, has not amounted to 1900 l. a year, and in that sum, 7 or 800 l. per annum only, have been remitted from North-America; and that [Page 35] the establishment of officers, necessary to collect that revenue, amounts to 7600 l. per annum.’

It would be ridiculous indeed to suppose, that the parliament would raise a revenue by taxes in the colonies to defray part of the national expence, the collection of which taxes would increase that expence to a sum more than three times the amount of the revenue; but, the impositions being considered in their true light, as regulations of trade, the expence arising from an establishment necessary to carry them in­to execution, is so far from being ridiculous, that it may be wisely incurred.

The author of the claim of the colonies, &c. gives (as hath been observed) the epithets of unjust and partial, to a tax which should be imposed upon the non-electors, only in Britain, and in that very in­stance, proves, that a tax upon the non-electors in the colonies, is more unjust and partial, and yet undertakes to defend the justice of it; and the writer on the regulations of the colonies declares, that it is in vain to call the acts he has cited as precedents, by the name of mere regulations, notwithstanding he hath irrefragably proved, that they are ridiculous, if considered in any other light. See the regula­tion of the colonies, &c. ^† page 105—57, and the claim of the colonies, &c. page 28, 29, 30.)

Though I conceive that the distinction which hath been suggested▪ is sufficiently evident, and that the argument from precedents hath been refuted, yet, as there have been two or three instances particu­larly enforced and relied upon, I must beg the reader's patience whilst I examine them separately, without undertaking the task to remove every incongruity to be found in the writings of the enemies of America on this occasion; for it would require an Hercules to cleanse the stable.

The 5th Geo. II, it is alledged, ‘ abrogates so much of the common law as relates to descents of freeholds in America, takes from the son the right of inheritance in the lands the crown had granted to the father, and his heirs in absolute fee, makes them assets, and applies them to the payment of debts and accounts contracted by the father without the participation of the son; it sets aside the sort of evidence required [Page 36] by the common law, and established by every court of justice in Ame­rica, in proof of a debt, and enjoins the admission of an ex parte affidavit. The power of parliament having been exercised to take away the lands of the people in America, the most sacred part of any man's property, and disposing of them for the use of private persons in­habitants of Great-Britain, who can question,’ says the examiner, ‘the parliament's right to take away a small part of the products of those lands, and apply it to the public service?’

It is very observable, that in applying this statute, a language is made use of, which gives the idea of violence; and it must be con­fessed, that great aggravation of features, and strong colouring, were necessary to make it in any d [...]gree resemble the impositions of the stamp act.

It would be useless, as well as tedious, to point out every misre­presentation in this application, since that will be effectually done, by briefly shewing the effect of the 5th Geo. II, and suggesting the occa­sion of making that statute.

Lands, negroes, &c. in the plantations, are made assets for the satisfaction of all debts owing to his majesty, or any of his subjects, in like manner as real estates are, by the law of England liable to the satisfaction of debts due by specialty.

If the creditor resides in Great-Britain, the affidavits of his wit­nesses taken there, are to be allowed as evidence, and to have the same force their testimony would have, if given, vivâ voce, in open court.

The evidence mentioned in the statute, prevailed in most, if not all the colonies, before the statute, and lands were also liable to the satis­faction of all debts in most instances, by the method practised also in the court of chancery in England, of marshalling assets. In some of the colonies, without this circuity, lands were immediately liable to simple contract debts.

Independent of the statute, when the creditor obtains a judgment against his debtor, all his lands, &c. over which he has a disposing power, are liable, and, since the statute, only such lands, &c. are assets, as the debtor had a power to dispose of. It appears then, that all the effects of the statute on this head, is to subject real estates to the payment of debts after the death of the debtor, (for the most part the case before the statute) which might have been made subject before his death.

In many of the colonies, the provincial creditors of deceased debtors, were preferred to the British, in the same degree, by acts of assembly [Page 37] which carried the appearance of partiality; tho' in fact, the effect of the laws of England gave rise to them; for, upon bankruptcies in Great-Britain, the steps required by the statutes to entitle creditors to a satisfaction, effectually exclude colony creditors in most cases, and their distance, when their debtors die in Great-Britain, where colony creditors have not standing agents as the merchants have in the planta­tions, and there happens a deficiency of assets, shuts them out like­wise from all chance of satisfaction in the usual scramble among cre­ditors for the debtor's estate on such events.

In some of the colonies they changed, by acts of assembly, certain species of personal property, e. g. negroes, into the nature of real estates, by making them descendible; and, by this alteration of the common law, and confusion of the former distinction of property, very considerably diminished the personal fund liable to all debts.

As these circumstances were represented and believed to be great discouragements to the trade of the mother country, after repeated re­quisitions to provide a remedy in the colonies, in which the grievance was most sensibly felt, had been disregarded, the statute was finally made.

This was, without doubt, a subject upon which the superintendence of the mother-country might be justly exercised; it being relative to her trade and navigation, upon which her wealth and her power de­pend, and the preservation of her superiority, and the subordination of the colonies, are secured, and therefore is comprehended in the dis­tinction.

After citing, and applying this statute, the examiner takes occasion to insult a gentleman of a most amiable and respectable character, be­cause he presumed it seems, to question the universality of parliamen­tary power, and appears to be so totally occupied in the business of defamation, as not to be aware of his running into the most egregious inconsistencies. If the examiner is a lawyer, he has betrayed the most shameful ignorance; if an agent, the most infamous unfaithful­ness. Had the American Chief Justice acted in England, as too many of his countrymen have done—had he paid his court to power, by mean compliances, and endeavoured to recommend himself, by in­venting accusations against the colonies, by representing the inhabi­tants in them, as a refractory, disloyal, and rebellious people, and by proposing schemes for their depression—had he not firmly main­tained his character of honour and probity, we should not have seen [Page 38] this impeachment of his understanding; but he left the task of prosti­tution to the man of sordid views,

"Had the colonies," says the examiner, ‘agreed to the imposi­tion of the stamp-duties, a precedent would have been established for their being consulted, before any imposition upon them by par­liament would hereafter take place.’ He intimates that they were advised by some of their agents to take this course: If such advice hath been given, it was weak or insidious, and the agents, who re­commended the measure, ought to be removed for their incapacity or their treachery.

How would the precedent have been established, or, if it had, what would have been the advantage? This conduct would have admitted, that the colonies might be taxed at any time, and in any manner, without their consent; and consequently, would at once have been an effectual surrender of all their privileges as British subjects.

If precedents were to be regarded, when a tax in America, for the single purpose of revenue is required, they are not wanting. Upon such occasions, the course hath always, and uniformly been, 'till the im­position of the stamp duties, to transmit requisitions to the colonies; and, if the instance cited by the examiner, is, in any degree pertinent, he has shewn in his appendix, that the method of requisition was in that pursued; for, the lords of trade, in their report, expresly mention the refusal of the colonies to comply with the requisitions transmitted to them, to remove the grievance complained of.

The clause in the mutiny act during the late war is also relied upon, but with how much propriety, few words will evince.

The acts of assembly of each colony, could have no obligatory force beyond the limits of each; but the service of the colony troops, was not confined within the same colony in which they were raised; it is therefore evident that the provincial legislatures, had not an au­thority adequate to the great object of the military operations in Ame­rica, which was not merely the defence of the plantations, by mea­sures executed within their boundaries, but the enemy was attacked [Page 39] in his own country, and for this purpose the British and American troops acted conjunctly. On this occasion it was not only conve­nient, that the troops employed in the same service, should be subject to the same discipline, but it was indispensably necessary that this discipline should be established by act of parliament, the authority of the provincial legislatures being deemed incompetent. And it is to be remarked, moreover, that the provincial troops were raised and paid by the colonies, and that it was in the power of their assemblies, a power exercised by some of them, to disband or reduce them when they pleased, and therefore their supporting and keeping them up, was an effectual consent to the act of parliament; but as hath been shewn, an internal tax may be as compleatly and adequately laid in every co­lony, by the authority of the respective assemblies, as by the British parliament, and therefore there is not the same necessity for the inter­position of the mother-country in this, as in the other instance, and the colonies with reference to the stamp-act, are not called upon to do any act expressive of their assent to it, nor is it in their power to hinder its taking effect in the fullest exent.

The act for the establishment of a post-office in the colonies (9 Anne, [...]. 10,) comes the nearest to the subject of any regulation that hath been mentioned; but yet it is materially distinguishable from the stamp-act. For the same reason that an act of parliament was neces­sary to secure the discipline of the provincial troops, acting in con­junction with the British forces during the late war, the authority of parliament might be proper for the general establishment of a regular post-office, for as the laws of each colony are in their operation con­fined within the limits of each, prohibitory and compulsive clauses to inforce a general observance, without which the establishment would fail, might be eluded. If a man should maliciously give a wound in one colony, and the wounded person die in another, the offender could not be convicted of murder, because the whole fact constituting that crime, would not be cognizable in the colony where the wound was given, or the death happened; and the same principle is appli­cable to every other inferior offence, and intimates in what manner prohibitory clauses might be evaded. This matter therefore of the post-office, may be referred to the general superintending authority of the mother country, the power of the provincial legislatures being too stinted to reach it. In this view, and upon the consideration of the general convenience and accommodation arising from the establish­ment, the people of America, have not complained of it, but if this instance were more pertinent than it is, it would only prove what hath [Page 40] been too often proved before.......when men do not suspect any designs to invade their rights, and subdolous steps taken to that end, are pro­ductive of immediate convenience without pointing out their destruc­tive tendency, they are frequently involved in ruin before they are a­ware of danger, or that the conduct flowing from the negligence of innocent intentions, may afford a handle to men of different dispo­sitions, for the commission of oppression......of the truth of these ob­servations the histories of all people who have once been blessed with freedom, and have lost it, exhibit abundant examples.

When instances are urged as an authoritative reason for adopting a new measure, they are proved to be more important from this use of them, and ought therefore to be reviewed with accuracy, and can­vassed with strictness. What is proposed ought to be incorporated with what hath been done, and the result of both stated and considered as a substantive original question, and if the measure proposed is incom­patible with the constitutional rights of the subject, it is so far from being a rational argument, that consistency requires an adoption of the proposed measure, that, on the contrary, it suggests the strongest motive for abolishing the precedent; when therefore an instance of deviation from the constitution is pressed as a reason for the establish­ment of a measure striking at the very root of all liberty; though the argument is inconclusive, it ought to be useful.

Wherefore if a sufficient answer were not given to the argument drawn from precedents, by shewing that none of the instances adduc­ed are applicable, I should have very little difficulty in denying the justice of the principle, on which it is founded. What hath been done, if wrongful, confers no right to repeat it. To justify oppres­sion and outrage, by instances of their commission, is a kind of ar­gument which never can produce conviction, though it may their ac­quiescence, whom the terror of greater evils may restrain from resist­ing, and thus the despotism of the east may be supported, and the natural rights of mankind be trampled under feet. The question of right, therefore, doth not depend upon precedents, but on the prin­ciples of the constitution, and hath been put upon its proper point al­ready discussed, whether the colonies are represented or not, in par­liament.

As the name of Hambden occurred to the examiner in his design of casting an oblique reflection upon the colonies, it is surprising he did not recollect, that very numerous precedents have been applied in the defence of an arbitrary and oppressive proceeding, destructive of the essential principle of English liberty. But though meer acts of power [Page 41] prove no right, yet the real opinion entertained of it, may be infer­red from forbearance; for mankind are generally so fond of power, that they are oftener tempted to exercise it beyond the limits of justice, than induced to set bounds to it from the pure consideration of the rectitude of forbearance. Wherefore if I had denied the principle of this kind of reasoning, without shewing the defects of the artificial painted precedents which have been produced, I might still very con­sistently urge, that, the repeated and uniform requisitions of the Eng­lish ministers, as often as occasions for the single purpose of revenue have happened, transmitted to the colonies to tax themselves by pro­vincial acts, and the acts of parliament regulating the trade of the plantations, as well as of Ireland, without one instance, before the stamp act, of a tax imposed by parliament upon either, for the un­mixed purpose of revenue prove, that the imposition of a tax upon them without their consent, hath constantly been held to be incon­sistent with their constitutional rights and privileges. I have joined Ireland with the colonies, and presume it will hardly be contended that Ireland, over which the courts of justice in England have a super­intendant power, is not, at least, as subject to Great-Britain as the colonies are.

A most extraordinary reason hath been given, why the method of requisition would have been improper, viz. that ‘the sums raised must be paid into the exchequer, and if levied by the provincial assemblies, the parliament would have no right to enquire into the expenditure of them.’ This is so extremely futile, that it would be almost absurd to bestow a serious refutation upon it.

Why must the sums raised be paid into the exchequer? If the in­tention is to apply them in the colonies to any internal purpose, why must they be remitted to Great-Britain? if armies are to be kept up in America, to defend the colonies against themselves, (for it can hard­ly be imagined that troops are necessary for their protection against any foreign enemy) or are to be employed in the national service of cropping the ears, and slitting the nostrils of the civil magistrates, as marks of distinction ^*, why must the money be paid into the exche­quer? or, if it should be paid into the exchequer, in order to be ap­plied towards sinking the national debt, why might not the parlia­ment enquire into the application of it? does the examiner, in his idea of the parliament, figure to himself a monster with an hand that [Page 42] can reach to the utmost verge of the British dominions, and clutch and crush millions of subjects at a gripe; but, when the object is near, apt to be rendered by some magical influence, so short, and so [...]eeble, as not to be able to reach the exchequer, or to squeeze the chancellor of it?

We are assured that there never can be any irregular ‘attempts of the prerogative upon our rights, whilst we are blessed with a prince of the glorious line of Brunswick upon the throne of Great-Britain.’ I have all the confidence in the excellent dispositions of our present most gracious sovereign that an Englishman ought to have, but I can­not penetrate into futurity; and, as the examiner hath not yet esta­blished the character of a prophet, I must consider this assertion rather as a curious specimen of lip-loyalty, I will not call it extravagant adu­lation, than as a sober recommendation, to surrender all those guards and securities of liberty, which the constitution of a free government hath provided; but, if the British Americans should ever be reduced to the unhappy necessity of giving up their natural rights, and their civil privileges, I believe they would as soon make the surrender to a prince of the line of Brunswick, as to any other mortal, or number of mortals, in the universe.

We have seen too a piece in some of our late news-papers, all be­dawbed with the lace of compliment.....there is no end to human am­bition▪ it is perpetually restless, and pushing forward. If a little P—ct—r ^† is raised to the title of excellency, and the rank of a kind of viceroy, there is still a summit beyond the eminence to which he hath been elevated, that he is sollicitous to gain.

It hath been truly said, that ‘it will be no easy task to persuade the Americans to forsake the culture of their lands, to leave the ways their fathers trod, and in which themselves were trained, to drop a business they al [...]ady understand, in which they have had long ex­perience, and by which their families have thriven, to change all their habits of thinking, and their manner of life, in order to apply to arts which they do not know, or know but imperfectly, and that where estates may be easily raised by mere tillage, the temptations to manufacture are wanting, and men, who can depend upon their industry alone, will not have recourse to arts for subsistence.’ But that which persuasion might not effect, and to which peculiar cir­stances [Page 43] might be adverse, necessity, and an alteration of those circum­stances, may accomplish. When the alternative is proposed, and the one part of it assures success, and a comfortable support by a mode­rate application of industry, familiarized by use, and rendered easy by practice; and the other affording only an experiment of precarious issue, calling for an application unexperienced and dreaded, attended with perplexity, and productive of irksome anxiety, the generality of mankind would not hesitate in choosing the former. But, though it would gain the preference of choice, yet, if the alternative is taken away, and choice yields to necessity, the enterprizing will form pro­jects, the judicious improve, the industrious execute them. Success, in one instance, will animate the timid to make trial of the means which have succeeded under the direction of others, stimulate the phlegmatic, and rouse the indolent—should the necessity after a little time, cease, new habits may become as strong as the old, and the alternative would therefore be altered, the choice be an act of deliberation, rather than of blind impulse; old prejudices would be greatly abated, if not ex­tinguished, new attachments, perhaps, be formed. From this change, different consequences may be conjectured or foretold, and perhaps the most confident might be disappointed by the event. It is not so difficult for men to strike into new employments and methods of life, when impelled by the urgency of distress, nor so easy to call them back to their old manner of life, and divert them from new pursuits experienced to be profitable, and productive of the best security against oppression, as some seem to apprehend.

It is not contended that the colonies ought to be indulged in a ge­neral liberty of exporting and importing every thing in what manner they please, but, since they are hindered from making all the advan­tages they might do, and what advantages might they not make, if under no checks? they have a good plea against all rigour and seve­rity, not absolutely necessary. That British manufactures come dearer, and not so good in quality to America, as formerly, is a very general complaint, and what effect it may have, should they still grow dearer and worse in quality, or the colonies be rendered less able to consume them, is a consideration which concerns Great-Britain, at least as much as the colonies. An increase of price, and falling in the good­ness of quality, is the usual effect of monopolies; there is no danger of foreigners taking advantage of this circumstance in America, what­ever they may do in other countries, but the industry it may give rise to in America, when other circumstances concur, is not difficult to be foreseen.

[Page 44]It must be acknowledged, that the balance of trade between Great-Britain and her colonies, is considerably against the latter, and that no gold or silver mines have yet been discovered in the old American settlements, or among the treasures of the new acquisitions. How then is this balance to be discharged? The former trade of the colonies, which enabled them to keep up their credit with Great-Britain, by ap­plying the balance they had gained against foreigners, is now so fettered with difficulties, as to be almost prohibited. In order therefore to re­duce the balance against them upon the trade between the colonies and Great Britain, this trade must be contracted, so as to bring the scales to an equilibrium, or a debt will be incurred that can't be paid off, which will distress the creditor as well as the debtor, by the insolvency of the latter. The income also of the colonies, which was before invested in their trade, will be diminished in proportion to the produce of the stamp-act, and therefore the amount of that pro­duce must be drawn out, which will create a further reduction of the trade.

I confess that I am one of those who do not perceive the policy in laying difficulties and obstructions upon [...] gainful trade of the colo­nies with foreigners, or that it even makes any real difference to the English nation, whether the merchants who carry it on with com­modities Great-Britain will not purchase▪ reside in Philadelphia, New-York or Boston, London, Bristol, or Liverpool, when the balance gained by the American merchant in the pursuit of that trade centers in Great-Britain, and is applied to the discharge of a debt contracted by the consumption of British manufactures in the colonies, and in this to the support of the national expence.

If in consequence of the obstructions, or regulations as they are called, of their commerce, and the imposition of taxes upon their properties, the colonies should only be driven to observe the strictest maxims of frugality, the consequence would rather be disagreeable than hurtful—should they be forced to use new methods of industry, and to have recourse to arts for a supply of necessaries, the difficulty in succeeding would prove less than the apprehension of miscarrying, and the benefit greater than the hope of it. There are few people of the highest, and even of the middle rank, but would upon a strict scru­tiny into their ordinary disbursements, discover some articles that would admit of defalcation.

A prudent man, constrained to abridge his outgoings, will consider what articles of expence may be retrenched or given up without dis­tress or discomfort, and if, after this saving, he still finds that his ex­pences [Page 45] exceed his income, he will then consider of what articles he can provide a supply by the application of domestic in­dustry, or whether some tolerable substitute may not be fallen upon to answer the purpose of what he can neither buy, nor hath skill or ability to fabricate. He will reflect that the expedient which is at first but an indifferent shift, use and experience will improve into con­venience, that practice will confer knowledge and skill, and these fa­cility and satisfaction, and tho' the progress should be slow and gradual, habit will grow with it, and produce reconcilement and content.

What are called in North America, luxuries, ought for the most part to be ranked among the comforts and decencies of life, but these will not be relinquished, if a supply of necessaries may be provided by domestic industry.......for food, thank GOD, they do not, and for raiment they need not, depend upon Great-Britain.

Any thin covering in the summer to preserve dece [...]cy, and substan­tial cloathing in the winter to repel the cold, are sufficient for domes­tic servants and labourers, and these may be provided without any re­mora to the business of tillage, for there are many intervals in which it is suspended. There are times too, when the employment is so slight as to be rather a moderate exercise, than a laborious task, when the work that is done might be performed by hal [...] the number of la­bourers without excessive exertion, or exhausting fatigue. There are besides in most families those, whom the feebleness of immature years, or their sex, at particular periods▪ or the decripitude of old age, discharge from the duties of tillage. Leather, and wool, and cotton, and flax, are at hand: How easy then is the necessary cloathing provided for those whose station does not require any attention or regard to fashion, or elegance; so easy that many have already gone into this manufacture without any other impulse, than the spirit of industry, which can't bear inaction, tho' the savings on this head have afterwards been neglected. In this very considerable branch so little difficulty is there, that a beginning is half the work. The path is beaten, there is no danger of losing the way, there are directors to guide every step. But why should they stop at the point of cloathing labourers, why not proceed, when vigour and strength will increase with the progression, to cloath the planters? When the first stage is arrived at, the spirits will be re­cruited, and the second should be undertaken with alacrity, since it may be performed with ease. In this too, the experiment hath been made and hath succeeded▪ Let the manufacture of America be the symbol of dignity, the badge of virtue, and it will soon break the set­ters of distress. A garment of linsey-wolsey, when made the dis­tinction of real pa [...]tism, is more honou [...]ble and attractive of respect [Page 46] and veneration, than all the pageantry, and the robes, and the plumes, and the diadem of an emperor without it. Let the emulation be not in the richness and variety of foreign productions, but in the improve­ment and perfection of our own—Let it be demonstrated that the subjects of the British empire in Europe and America are the same, that the hardships of the latter will ever recoil upon the ^‡ former.

In theory it is supposed that each is equally important to the other, that all partake of the adversity and depression of any. The theory is just, and time will certainly establish it; but if another principle should be ever hereafter adopted in practice, and a violation deliberate, cruel, ungrateful, and attended with every circumstance of provocation, be offered to our fundamental rights, why should we leave it to the slow advances of time (which may be the great hope and reliance, probably, of the authors of the injury, whose view it may be to accomplish their selfish purposes in the interval) to prove what might be demonstrated immediately—Instead of moping, and puling, and whining to excite compassion; in such a situation we ought with spirit, and vigour, and alacrity, to bid defiance to tyranny, by exposing it's impotence, by making it as contemptible, as it would be detestable. By a vigorous application to manufactures, the consequence of oppression in the co­lonies to the inhabitants of Great-Britain, would strike home, and [Page 47] immediately. None would mistake it. Craft and subtilty would not be able to impose on the most ignorant and credulous; for if any should be so weak of sight as not to see, they would not be so callous as not to feel it.—Such conduct would be the most dutiful and bene­ficial to the mother-country. It would point out the distemper whe [...] the remedy might be easy, and a cure at once effected by a simple al­teration of regimen.

Of this measure should there be apprehensions, and ministerial ora­tors and panegyrists endeavour to obviate them by observing, that, ‘it would always be easy to reinstate things where they were, and that by easing the colonies of their burthens, and giving encou­ragement to their produce; the establishment of any manufacture in America might be prevented.’ We should mark well this rea­soning, and avail ourselves of the instruction given by our enemies, which would point out to us the remedy, and the more speedy the application of it the better, and that would depend upon ourselves.

Besides the urgency of such an occasion (should it happen) there would be another powerful inducement to this simple, natural, easy method.......the good or bad success of one attempt to oppress, gene­rally produces or prevents future impositions. In common life a tame­ness in bearing a deprivation of part of a man's property, encourages [...]apacity to seize the rest.

Any oppression of the colonies, would intimate an opinion of them I am persuaded they do not deserve, and their security as well as ho­nour ought to engage them to confute. When contempt is mixed with injustice, and insult with violence, which is the case when an injury is done to him who hath the means of redress in his power; if the injured hath one inflammable grain of honour in his breast, his resentment will invigorate his pursuit of reparation, and animate his efforts to obtain an effectual security against a repetition of the out­rage.

If the case supposed should really happen, the resentment I should recommend would be a legal, orderly, and prudent resentment, to be expressed in a zealous and vigorous ^* industry, in an immediate [Page 48] use and unabating application of the advantages we derive from our situation......a resen [...]ment which could not fail to produce effects as be­neficial to the mother country as to the colonies, and which a regard to her welfare as well as our own, ought to inspire us with on such an occasion.

The general assemblies would not, I suppose, have it in their power to encourage by laws, the prosecution of this beneficial, this necessa­ry measure; but they might promote it almost as effectually by their example. I have in my younger days seen fine sights, and been cap­tivated by their dazzling pomp and glittering splendor; but the sight of our representa [...]ives, all adorned in compleat dresses of their own leather, and flax, and wool, manufactured by the art and industry of the inhabitants of Virginia, would excite, not the gaze of admira­tion, the flutter of an agitated imagination, or the momentary amuse­ment of a transient scene, but a calm, solid, heart felt delight. Such a sight would give me more pleasure than the most splendid and mag­ni [...]cent spectacle the most exquisite taste ever painted, the richest fancy ever imagined, realized to the view....as much more pleasure as a good mind would receive from the contemplation of virtue, than of elegance; of the spirit of patriotism, than the ostentation of opulence.

Not only, "as a friend to the colonies," but as an inhabitant ha­ving my all at stake upon their welfare ^† I desire an ‘exemption from taxes imposed without my consent, and’ I have reflected longer than "a moment upon the consequences:" I value it as one of the dearest privileges I enjoy: I acknowledge dependance on Great-Bri­tain, but I can perceive a degree of it without slavery, and I disown all other. I do not expect that the [...]nterests of the colonies will be considered by some men, but in subserviency to other regards. The effects of luxury, and venality, and oppression, posterity may perhaps experience, and SUFFICIENT FOR THE DAY WILL BE THE EVIL THEREOF.