IN my last, of the 17th of December, published in the supplement to your Gazette N ^o. 1428, I promised you a copy of col. Grant's letter, wrote from Keehowee to our lieutenant-governor the 3d of July 1760; and that I would also endeavour to vindicate our Rangers from his [...]nju­rious treatment: my copy of this letter I now send you, and will be answerable for the exactness of it, as I compared it myself very carefully with the original laid before the assembly the 11th of July 1760, when I had the honour of a seat there. The observant reader of my former letter, might easily perceive it could not have been long about, from several matters contained therein; particularly general Amherst's let­ter, taken from the London Gazette of the 19th of September, which arrived here but a day or two before its publication. The sight of col. Grant's insinuation against the Rangers, in the general's letter, with re­spect to their behaviour in the first campaign, deter­mined me to publish the colonel's second letter, not only in hopes of clearing these people, but, by doing so, of answering a still more material purpose that will be mentioned hereafter: this, and another of the 4th of June, were all the letters that were laid before the assembly from any regular officer that campaign: The last was published by authority, and why the [Page 4]other was not too, has been often admired as; it was certainly expected at the time: however, as it was not, the insinuations therein, is we [...]l as the colonel's difficulties, were only laughed at, [...] by m [...]st of the gentlemen that saw that letter. And as not one of the Rangers, or [...], were [...] called to account by the [...] their [...] the day of action, though he [...] and ought to have done it, the public was [...] their con [...] must have been irrepro [...]able: [...] we find he h [...] revived that mat [...]r himself and him [...] it to the genera [...] too (which it was though▪ HE would have been ashamed of doing, as [...] letter was not published, his friends as I imagine [...] pre [...]enting [...]:) it has become too public not to be taken [...] notice of. This was not possible to be done in the short time between the arrival of the gaze [...] the general's let­ter and the colonel's [...]a [...]ing, as much of the old affair was forgot; besides, to r [...]collect it again, enquiries were to be made from many persons, some at a great distance, which necessarily took up time, and in the interim the colonel sailed for Martinique. Their vin­dication was, at first, [...] I intended and thought sufficient to answer all my purposes; but, in doing that, I was led insensibly [...] many other observations on the colonel's letters, and on the first c [...]m [...]aign that occasioned them; and, from thenc [...], to make some remarks on the second, by which it will incidentally appear, whether the first was of any and what use to the second, as a matter of mere experience. Since these materials could not be got ready ea [...]ly enough for the colonel's entertainment b [...]fore he left this place, it was thought immaterial when they were published, and therefore that I might take my own time to do the whole together, and introduce the affair of the Rangers in its most natural and proper place among my observations. This is the best reason I can give why you had them not before.

In the weekly Gazette of the 4th of June and 16th of July, are two letters from "THE CAMP" at Ninety-Six and Fort Prince George, dated the 27th [Page 5]of May, and 2d of July, 1760, the first of which furnishes only a few hints; the last seems calculated (notwithstanding its being dated the day before) to be explanatory of the colonel's last letter, in which manner it will be chiefly made use of. Whenever these letters are referred to, to avoid long repetitions, I beg leave to mention only the numbers of the gazettes they are contained in, N ^o. 81 and 87.

'Tis needless to say, how commendably and indus­triously cautious the publisher of that paper h [...]s been, to prevent being in the least suspected of any prej [...]ice against col. Grant: his many corrections, from time to time, of any and every thing di [...]evered to have es­caped him, that might even seem to have the most distant tendency that way, sufficiently prove it (of which one instance will be men [...]ed presen [...]ly) and at the same time render any quotations from his gazettes the less liable to objection from the coloned; however [...] [...] shall confine myself almost, if not altogether, to those let­ters and now proceed, to shew upon what founda­tion they stand.

In the paper N ^o. 80, immediately preceding the first letter, the publisher informs us, " as it is expe [...]ted the advices from the army will henceforth [...] daily more and more interesting, the public are desired to observe, that ALL the intelligence published in this paper, and dated from the Camp, is from good authority, and may SAFELY be depended on; sometimes perhaps, reperts from or concerning the army may be mentioned, but the next succeeding advices from "the Camp," will confirm, correct, or contradict them."

The authority of the second letter must be unex [...]ep­tionable, as, besides its standing equally with the first on the above foundation, being date [...] from "the Cam [...]," the publisher, in his paper of the 30th of July, has given it the following farther s [...]nction, " On saturday last arrived from the camp at Congarces, lieutenant colo­nel Grant, by whom we have a confirmation of ALL the particulars of the action near Et [...]h [...]y, contained in the letter in the first page of this paper of the 16th instan [...] excepting as to the quantity of corn found in Etch [...]y, [Page 6]which was there said to be 500 bushels; but the report of Mr. Wi [...]sox, the commissary, who is now here, under whose care the [...]rn was put, is, that the quantity was not lest than 600 bushels, all which was destroyed, except what was made use of by the detachment, besides a quan­tity of calav [...] or Indian beans, between 80 and 100 bushels, and a great many large heaps of [...]rn flour."

This extraordinary letter the curious reader is desi­red to compare throughout with the colonel's; to en­able him so to do, notwithstanding its length, I must beg you'll give it a place next before his: indeed it would go very much against me to part them, as they seem so nearly related; the printed letter appear­ing to be an excellent prophetical commentary on the other, and, as some think, wrote by the colonel him­self, especially, since a passage in the postscript that seems to contradict this supposition, is declared to be s [...]urious. This postscript I must beg leave to give the reader here (and is the only notice I intend to take of it) together with that important discovery made three weeks after it was printed; how necessarily, will soon be perceived, on comparing it with a passage or two in the co [...]onel's last letter.

"P.S. Col. Montgomery and col. Grant are well, but busy writing dispatches: They have both had some hair­breadth [...]s [...]apes, as all of us had, but [...] nothing: How [...] Grant escaped their rifles is amazing, as he was the only man in the line of foot on [...]o [...]seback. The pro­vincial officers, Merrisor, Grinnan, Macpherson, Mac­donald, T [...]all and Be [...]j [...] [or Bosher] behaved ex­tremely [...], and distinguished themselves; as likewise a [...]d caps. O'Niel, and [...]icut. Dargan of capt. Russel's company of ditto [this ditto should be of Rangers] (cap [...]. Russel being [...]) who were part of the baggage guard under capt. Peter Gordon; Mr. Colquhoun, capt. Mor­rison's [...]e [...]tenant, after his captain fell, led on the com­pany with spirit."

The remark on this postscript, in the weekly Gazette of the 6th of August following, runs thus, "the pa­ragraph in the second page of [...] paper of the 16th ult. relating [...] and Da [...]gan, designed to [Page 7]appear in a separate article, was inadvertently put as part of a postscript to the letter in the first pa [...] of the same paper; a mistake which a severe fit of sickness pre­venting the usual and necessary attention is such matters, occasioned to pass unnoticed and uncorrected, which we hope the gentl [...] who favoured us with th [...] letter will excuse."

Before I leave this matter, I would desire the reader to observe, that, excepting in this suspicious postscript, Col. M********Y is no where m [...]ioned, either di­rectly or otherwise, throughout this very long and wonderful letter that col. Grant has so particularly a­dopted. The reason of this observation you will soon discover.

As I shall make great use also of the colonel's first letter, dated from Keehowee the day after the success at the Lower-Settlements, published in both ga­zettes, I must beg the favour of you to reprint that letter too, immediately after the letter N ^o. 81 from Ninety-Six, and both before the colonel's adopted and second letters, that gentlemen may, without the trouble of referring back to their old news-papers (which may perhaps be mislaid) be possessed, in an un­prejudiced manner, of my principal authorities in one view, and thereby more easily judge, whether the quo­tations and reasonings from thence are fair and to the purpose: but, 'tis necessary to observe here, that the two passages in the colonel's first letter, printed in italicks, were, at the time of its publication, suppressed, for obvious prudential reasons.

Referring my reader to my principal vouchers, the letters just mentioned, which will be printed at the end (especially to the three last) for all matters rela­ting to the first campaign in 1760, let me here inform him, in a few words, that I shall endeavour to prove the following propositions:

• First. That col. Grant had the principal direction of the first campaign.
• Secondly. That he lost two fine opportunities that campaign, of relieving Fort Loudoun, and glo­riously and effectually reducing the Cherokees.
• [Page 8] Thirdly. That our Rangers did not deserve the cruel treatment they met with seem him — N.B. It will be necessary to [...]ew this, before we come to the second opportunity the colonel lost.

After these three propositions are discussed, I shall pass to the colonel's second camp [...]ign in 1761, in order, first, to discover, if the former was of any, and what, use to the second, as a matter of mere experience. And here it will be shewn.

That col. Grant remedied none of the matters he complained of in his first campaign; that his con­duct glaringly demonstrates, his whole dependance was on the known cowardice of the I [...]ians; for which and other reasons, he might have gone to the Valleys with ease, in the time he took before he returned to Keehowee, and several times afterwards. The situa­tion the colonel has reduced us to with the Indians, will be s [...]ewn to be very shameful and precarious; and that he may be sent to us perhaps a third time to compleat his work, the consequence of which will be pointed at.

I am now, in the first place, to prove, from the colonel's letters, especially from the first, that he had the principal direction of the campaign in 1760; and consequently, that to him we and our posterity will be long indebted, in the highest degree, for the mighty wonderful seats done therein. This having bean of late made a question by some few, who, parti­cularly since col. Grant favoured us with his last visit, have complimented col. M—y with it, makes it necessary to discuss it here in limine; and how can we decide this point better, than by the as­sistance of these two letters, which were both laid be­fore the legislature of the province, and the first prin­ted by authority, the only one that was so during that campaign? Col. M —y, 'tis generally believed, had the THE NAME, which is not worth disputing about: but who assumed the THING is the question. It plainly appears then, by the first letter, beyond all contradiction, so much so, that it is needless to trou­ble you with any quotations, that col. Grant thought [Page 9]himself at least upon an equal footing with col. M— —y, from the share he claims of the merit in plan­ning and ordering, as well as in executing the success­ful enterprize there mentioned; which, though it is amazing to think, how he could aim at making it of half the importance he did, may be truly called a well­conducted soldier-like transaction; the only one in both campaigns worth relating. In HIS supposed con­sequences of it, in regard to the most essential object of the war, a Peace, does he not step still higher? when alone declaring, "the correction you will allow has been pretty severe; and I dare say, the whole nation will readily come into terms, and will not be very fond of breaking them; and I think peace with them is a desira­ble event for this province;" which most improbable dare-say, that he takes so much care to assure his ho­nour is peculiarly his own (for col. M—y's opi­nion in this grand concern he is left to guess at) we find prevailed (by what immediately follows in that letter, which deserves the reader's particular attention) and undoubtedly occasioned the long unhappy delay at Fort Prince George, at that most critical juncture, when a moment's time ought not even to have been risqued. This in all probability was the great cause (as I shall endeavour to shew more at large by and by) of the loss of Fort Loudoun; the massacre of great part of the garrison; and of the lasting dishonour then brought upon his majesty's arms; together with the long tram of misfortunes and heavy taxes, entailed upon the province ever since, and for years to come, even supposing the Indians to continue quiet, which I am afraid I may in my turn " dare say" too they will not very long (should the French but have an opportuni­ty of supplying them) even if we submit to pay for our people they have still prisoners amongst them.

To return from this digression, does not col Grant also assume a right of advising his honour, and corres­ponding with him, when he says, "it will be necessary you should write a letter to encourage some of the Rangers to go to Fort Loudoun," &c. &c and "I sh [...]ll be glad to hear from you as s [...]on as p [...]ssible," &c. Since we find [Page 10] [...] in this and the last instance seizing and possessing himself of the most conspicuous station, the top of all, and thence viewing, judging and directing every thing around him, we cannot wish him nor he push himself h [...] h [...]r; therefore 'tis time, on the other hand, to en­qui [...]e a little after col. M—y; and here give me leave to ask, if there is one single passage in all that so important letter, where he is represented as transact­ing alone any one thing, or even giving his opinion sepa [...]ately, relative to either war or peace with the Che­rokees? is not the language throughout either, "col. M — y and I were convinced"—"were resolved," &c.—"WE shall make use of Tifto [...]y,"—"WE shall send off an express,"—or, "I informed you,"—"I dare say"—"I think," &c.—"I have been obliged to s [...]nd a guard"? Can this be the stile of one under command? Does it not rather plainly shew the contrary? As to the title to the printed letter, which belies the contents, any person may see how unnaturally it stands there: 'tis certain no such was to it when laid before the assembly, and how so apparently a [...]kward and in­consistent an head-piece came to be tacked to it after­wards, is not easily accounted for: surely, whoever did it, must not have read the letter, or he could ne­ver have been drawn into so unlucky a mistake, to the prejudice of col. Gran [...]'s military fame, and per­haps modesty too, with all who read that account, without the honour of knowing HIS so respectable abilities.

Part of the last clause in this letter, as some gentle­men understand it, is too material to this question not to be quoted here, "Col. M—y desires his respects to you; he does not trouble you with a letter, as I have wrote so fully." Doubtless, this passage is in­tended to make it appear the colonel saw this letter before it was sent; but I must beg to be excused for doubting that he did, from the cautious wording it, for it is not said that he did: however, if he did see it (as these gentlemen argue) and admitted col. Grant's right to make use of the remarkable expressions there­in, it establishes, beyond all contradiction, the point [Page 11]com [...]ded for. As to the letter col. M—y begs his honour to forward to general Amherst, nothing positive can be drawn from thence, to invalidate this matter, unless the contents were known, and known to be his, for it is not said whose letter it is, and it is not unlikely to be one o [...] those several letters, which col. Grant takes so much pains to tell his honour he was "so fatigued in writing;" besides, many officers might have the honour of writing a letter to the general.

'Tis time now to see, what the second letter con­tains relative to this point; but first, 'tis necessary to guard you not to lose sight of the subjects of each, which are of somewhat different complexions; the first, a pom­po [...]s exaggerated account of an advantage gained over the Indians; the other, a most curious apology for an unaccountable retreat.—This clue will help you to dis­cover col. Grant's admirable delicacy in one or two nice hints, and particularly in the following passage, the only one in either letter where col. M—y is even permitted to appear to have the sale direction, which he is honoured with just before "we stole a mare [...] upon them in the night" to get safe back to Keeho­wee! a most suspicious ill-favoured junc [...] indeed! "in this situation" (we are told) "col. M—y thought it adviseable to return to Fort Prince George," &c. No I, no We here! what modesty! what self­denial! When the action was a little more conspi­cuous, as in a pretty little affair at the close of this letter, who but "I was obliged to march a company of light infantry into the fort to bring them to reason," and in the first letter, " both col. M—y and I were re­solved to take the advantage of their [...]eg [...]gence, by a forced march that night."

Though I am apt to think there is some very mate­rial mistake in representing the first and last of these actions (unless they are averaged, and col. M — y had the whole honour or the first allowed him by col. Grant, in order to rep [...] him for what col Grant had before borrowed of him out of the last, if so, then to be sure this point is f [...]irly settled) as I have heard them related in a quite diff [...]ent manner, that this last was [Page 12]the particular remarkable case, wherein col. M—y, for once, contrary to col. Grant's opinion, "resolved to take advantage of the Indians negligence," &c. and in the other situation, that col. Grant, contrary to col. M—y's judgment "thought it adviseable to return to Fort Prince George," to which col. M—y as usual, but with great reluctance, consented, other­wise the destruction of the Middle Settlements, per­haps, would not have been deferred, to produce those glorious laurels reaped there the succeeding campaign, at least without trying a second "brush" with the Indians: and here I cannot help lamenting (supposing this to be true) how unfortunate it was for the province, that col. M—y, if he was clearly commander in chief, who had begun this campaign with so spirited and suc­cessful a specimen of his judgment at Twelve-Mile creek, should ever afterwards, and most unhappily at Etchowih, give it up (begging col. Grant's pardon, with all his accomplishments) to an officer every way so manifestly beneath him.

If there can be any person unacquainted with any of the gentlemen that were on that campaign, who, not­withstanding all that has been said, still remains dubious in this point, he is requested to compare the printed accounts of the two campaigns in 1760 and 1761 to­gether; and the great similarity, or rather "SAME­NESS" of the transactions, and miraculous relations of both, will, if any thing can, amply convince him, that none but one and the same great negotiating genius, ad­mirably skilled in Indian politicks, presided throughout.

Upon the whole of this matter, as it appears, by these two letters and from other circumstances, that col. Grant had the greatest share in the direction of all the principal actions of this campaign, even in thinking "it adviseable to return to Fort Prince George" which his over-nice delicacy to col. M—y, to be sure, made him desirous to conceal; I shall therefore most readily concur with him, in giving him the credit of them all, excepting that which took its rise from Twelve-Mile creek, which he must pardon me, for the reason just now mentioned, for doubting of his [Page 13]right to any share in, unless in entirely marring the good effects of it, by that singular ill-timed "dare say" of his, which not only rendered that action altogether useless, but made it prejudicial too. Henceforward, when I speak of the colonel, without mentioning any name, I would be understood to mean col. GRANT, and him only.

I shall now proceed to shew, that the colonel lost two fine opportunities in 1760, of relieving Fort Lou­doun, and gloriously and effectually finishing the war with the Cherokees▪

The first and best opportunity of all was lost, by the ill judged unaccountable delays at Keehowee, after the surprize of the Lower Settlements: for, had a proper and speedy advantage been taken of the apprehensions those Indians were then undoubtedly under, the army might, immediately after that stroke, have run through all the towns in the nation, with little hazard, as the terror of it would have spread, faster than the troops could have marched, and they would have been in the midst of the Indian towns, one after another, in all probability, before the Cherokees could have had time to recollect themselves, and act properly in their own defence: besides this, the uncommonness of the thing, would have made a durable impression on those savages, and not unlikely on their abettors, the Creeks too, to the honour and dread of his majesty's arms for many gene­rations, and the lasting security of this his province. This supposition col. Grant cannot possibly object to as improbable, because he has said, " we shall make use of Tistory, &c. to inform their nation, that though they ARE IN OUR POWER, we are ready to GIVE them peace"? From this speech to our lieutenant governor too, whom surely he would not, for the good of his majesty's service and the safety of the province, endea­vour to deceive, it plainly appears, he cannot deny this step to have been feasible. Now let us see if it was not absolutely necessary too. Had the attempt been made, and success crowned it, the utmost expectations and wishes of the people would have been thereby an­swered, together with general Amherst's intentions, [Page 14]signified to our then governor, in the following words, "that at present the troops new in the province must solely pursue the ends they were sent for, viz. the most effectual punishment of the Cherokees and their abettor [...]." —" So soon as that work is compleated, they must that instant come away;" their own declared designs would at the same time have been accomplished too [See N ^o. 81] " of throwing in a supply of flour, cattle, and other necessaries into Fort Prince George and FORT LOU­DOUN," the latter then in a known miserable starving condition, as appeared from a letter, in the weekly gazette, from that garrison, by the express that passed through the camp (mentioned in letter 81) when at Ninety-Six, with dispatches dated from thence the 17th of May, at which time they, after "having bartered away every thing, even their shirts and blankets, yet had not five weeks provision left." Ought not every motive of honour, generosity and humanity too, to have concurred to excite a speedy endeavour to relieve those forlorn people, even if col. Grant had not de­clared the nation to be "IN HIS POWER? but as he did, what could be his motive to hesitate? was there a moment to spare? Is it usual, when a garrison is redu­ced to the last extremity, to desist from taking all ad­vantages of an enemy, especially a savage one, when not only our friends liberties, but their lives too, were known to be at stake? why then were three weeks suffered un­feelingly to be trifled away at Keehowee, for runners to go backwards and forwards upwards of 300 miles, by that means give some of the Rangers time and occasion to cool, be disgusted, and desert; our friendly Indians to leave us; and the Cherokees an opportunity to recover their spirits and despise us, to steal our horses, and col­lect themselves together by calling in all their hunters? and, above all, to risque the lives of above 200 fellow-subjects at Fort Loudoun, then looked upon by the Indians as their certain prey? when, by col. Grant's largest accounts, we had but 40 Indian prisoners, and all of them, excepting two or three, women and chil­dren (and the women they are known to regard very little) to insure our 200. Could it be thought, the [Page 15]Cherokees were such fools, to let slip so fine and cri­tical an opportunity of imposing upon us, given them by the colonel, and to make so stupid an exchange? give up the means of glutting their darling passion, re­venge, and reduce [...]s besides to what terms they almost pleased, then so evidently, for the sake of that garrison, just falling with it into their own power? Are not these natural and obvious arguments that must be sup­posed to occur at the time? and if just, where then was the least shadow of a reason, to support that most improbable, preposterous, and presumptuous "dare-say," the cause of so many and such lasting mischiefs and disgraces?

But here give me leave to observe, that though the expectations of the army's proceeding to Fort Lou­doun were so general, as to be the subject of most conversations, especially after the troops left our back settlements, and the passage of a letter, just now quo­ted, from the "the Camp" at Ninety-Six, confirm­ed those designs, which had also reached the fort at Keehowee, where it was heard, that it was fully de­termined to relieve Fort Loudoun, and they wished it might be done in time. I say, that notwithstanding this, it should be asserted so roundly, after the return from Etchowih, that the army never intended to go to Fort Loudoun at all, appears, amongst the many extraordinaries done and said, and unsaid at that time, al­together the most extraordinary of all; especially when col. Grant says, in his first letter, "WE shall send off an express this evening to capt. Demere, &c. to tell the Little-Carpenter, that he may come down with some other headmen, to treat; but that it must be done in a few days, or he may expect to see ALL the towns in the UPPER nation in ashes." For God's sake, what could be the view of this cruel tantalizing message to that unfortunate gentleman? for such it must be, if never intended to be performed: what purpose could it answer but to throw him off his guard, by making him depend on relief (which he certainly did) that was never intended, and thereby prevent his making a push in time, before the strength of the garrison was [Page 16]too much exhausted by short allowance and bad pro­visions? and farther, to make his majesty's arms appear still more contemptible to the Indians, by such despicable childish threats, mere gasconading! which I am sorry to say has been kept too steadily to ever since, and with just as much success.

'Tis true, the colonel says, " in MY OWN opinion, 'tis next to impossible for us to think of proceeding over the mountains; and if they had not been surprized, the very country we have been in was impractible, if they had spi­rit, which I much doubt of." This is the first hint of any objection to go to Fort Loudoun, which was so new and surprizing to the assembly, that, in their answer to his honour the lieutenant-governor's congra­tulatory message, sent them on the success at the Low­er-Towns, together with the colonel's letter, they could not help joining with his honour in sentiments, and words too, that " that important event might be a means of restoring and establishing peace with the Indians upon a sure and lasting foundation, IF PROPERLY IM­PROVED." These words of his honour, were then thought ominous, and to allude to the above expression of the colonel's.—How could the colonel, consistent with the above declaration, write to his honour, "the nation was in our power," and threaten, if the upper Indians, or those "over the mountains" did not come "to treat," to lay all "their towns in ashes"? or, how could he desire the governor "to encourage some of the Rangers to carry flour and cattle to Fort Loudoun"? Could part of the Rangers do, what was "next to im­possible" for the whole army to do? I believe the colonel was, resolv'd indeed, not to proceed, "over the mountains;" and, that his "own opinion" SHOULD prevail, notwithstanding "he much doubted of the In­dians spirit," the only thing that could prevent him, —but more of this by and by.

If it was never intended to go "over the moun­tains" to Fort Loudoun, what can be the pretence for not pushing immediately as far as was? the utmost expedition was required, as well to return to the ge­neral, as to relieve that garrison; this would have [Page 17]saved time at least, and added no little weight and authority to the express to the Little-Carpenter. If the messenger, together with Tiftowih and the Old-War­rior of Estatowih, could have assured the upper nation, that the army set out with them, the Little Carpen­ter would then have had something to work upon their fears, and urge them to secure the garrison for their friends, by laying them in immediately the corn re­quired, which in all probability would have been done too, had the army marched with the messengers, [...] 'tis well known they were much frightened when they first heard of the troops destroying the Lower Towns: but when they had time and opportunity GIVEN them: to make use of evasions, was there room to expect any other? especially, as the army's unaccountable halting must certainly look suspicious, and give these wily people just reason to think (as 'tis known they did) that the colonel was afraid of proceeding further; and in the interim while they were amusing us, must not this suspicion, especially at that most critical junc­ture, be a fine topic for their warriors to enlarge upon in their town-houses, to excite their nation to conti­nue a resistance which that circumstance, and that ONLY, made so likely would terminate in their favour to the utmost of their most sanguine wishes?

I am very sorry to be obliged to acknowledge here, that the province did not, just at that time, properly consult [...] own safety, and act with that spirit it apparently has ever since. Of this the remarka­ble regiment of 1000 men, so hastily voted for the 13th of February 1760, to be raised, paid, and dis­charged again by the 1st of July following, is a very conspicuous instance. The members then met toge­ther (only 21 besides the speaker) were divided in their opinions of the proper measures to be taken at that most critical juncture; ten were for agreeing with the committee, to provide for only 500 men, to proceed with some Rangers, to relieve Fort Prince George, at that time closely beset by the Indians; this the other eleven disagreed to: immediately after this, a motion was made and carried, to provide for [Page 18]1000 men; and in about ten res [...]lves, one after ano­ther, the pay of the officers and men was determined upon; but two more resolutions at the close, that the field officers pay should not commence 'till the regi­ment was formed, nor that of the captains 'till they had raised half their men, together with no tents be­ing allowed, bounty-money, or even present pay pro­vided, effectually destroyed every thing that was car­ried before: whether its being almost a b [...]re house, or what else prevented that necessary matter being then properly and usefully designed, is difficult to say; however, this is certain, that the gentleman that made the motion was, the same evening, very sorry he had not joined the other ten, and so carried the 500 men only, which, 'tis not unlikely, would have been better en­couraged and provided for: but, the end of his mo­tion was, in order to relieve Fort Loudoun, which, in the message to the governor upon these matters, was THEN very rightly declared by the house, as "not to be done by the province in its present calamitous state," for before that message was ordered to be drawn, when the two last res [...]lves were carried, many gentle­men thought not an hundred men of that regiment would ever be seen together, and so it proved. The small-pox then raging in Charles-Town, prevented the public business being carried on in a proper man­ner, as considerably above half the members of the house, upon that account, were afraid of coming to town, which in all probability was the princi­pal reason of matters being carried in that uncom­mon manner at that time; for they no sooner met in larger numbers at the sorry, but every thing went in a prudent, proper, and spi [...]ited manner. Could that regiment have been raised, that, with the Rangers then provided for, would have been thought full suffi­cient to have gone to Fort Loudoun. Most of those gentlemen that were for the regiment, were of opi­nion general Amherst could not have been able to spare us any men, from that important campaign he was then engaged in, and therefore the matter seemed to depend on ourselves entirely▪ The other gentlemen [Page 19]flattered themselves he would, and were not disap­pointed; indeed the [...] of that scheme must have occasioned their [...] it must have been absolutely impossible for a gentleman of the t [...]nth part of his excellence's penetration and judgment in military [...], to [...] a copy of these extraordinary votes of the house were sent by governor L [...]elton, to be a moment in suspence to give them their just weight, and [...]e at the same time convinced, how little we were acquainted, at that time, with the proper encouragement to raise troops; and the large detach­ment of picked m [...]n he sent us so immediately after­wards, which he could very illy spare at that impor­tant season, sufficiently shews his excellency placed NO dependance on the assembly's resolves in that matter, exclusive of the many difficulties he might ap­prehend from the small-pox, th [...]n known to be raging amongst us.

However, the same excuse may be pleaded, for this government's acting in this manner at this time, as has been pleaded by all the Northern provinces, when first in like circumstances; none of them (when under no providential distresses) took less time than Carolina to recollect themselves and act properly; the war was entered into only a few months before; time and ex­perience had not then convinced us of our errors, and taught us to f [...]ll upon the properest expedients; indeed when the people did, so soon as August following, they proved to no purpose; but this was not the fault of the representatives of the province, who acted pro­perly; not a moment's time was lost by them, after the troops returned from the Cherokee country; at that period, and ever since, they have acted with as much spirit as any assembly in America without ex­ception.

When the troops arrived here, and marched into the Cherok [...]e country, an entire dependance was pla­ced on them, that they would certainly do our business, as they were reckoned so fully sufficient, that all other expence to raise more men was thought absolutely needless. The army certainly "might have gone to [Page 20]any town in the nation," as col. Grant himself, in his second letter, tells us, even after the action at Etchowih, or, in other words, might have gone through the na­tion; no pretence of want of men there hinted at, a [...] one of the causes of their return; but the impractabili­ty of carrying their wounded with them: And that there was no complaint of this sort, when the army marched from Ninety-Six to the nation, appears by the letter dated from thence (N ^o. 81) which tells us 138 were LEFT, as scouting parties, to guard the back settlements, a service that might have been done according to law by the militia of the province; be­sides, the settlers thereabouts would have chearfully done that safe and easy duty for the short time wanted, if those scouts could not have been spared. In short, more men would have been rather an incumbrance than of any service, and was thought so at the time, and I believe found so the year following, upon account of the additional number of waggons, &c. that must have been got: besides, the same letter (N ^o. 81) also says, "it is but justice, to mention the hearty manner in which the [...]ieutenant-governor has co-operated with us, without which we could not have been thus far advanced."

Now it will be necessary, before we proceed to the second opportunity the colonel lost, to introduce a vindication of our Rangers, from his most severe re­flections upon their conduct the day of action, in his letter to our governor.

This is the more readily undertaken, and particularly scrutinized, as I think the poltroonry that whole corps, and indeed all our people (excepting three captains) is accused of, an oblique reflection on the province: for whoever can suppose so considerable a sample arrant cowards, must imagine most of the rest only wanted opportunity to prove themselves so too; for it seems hinted, that capt. Morrison also, of our only company of provincials (not Rangers, as letter 87 calls him) might not have been killed "but he unfortunately was abandoned by his people." The waggoners are inclu­ded in the same condemnation with the Rangers; and even the poor guides, were, most of them "not worth [Page 21]a [...]illing," or perhaps had some "little design." The charge against the Rangers is very heavy, " I think there was a waggoner and a Ranger killed, and five or six of the [...] wounded: I am sorry that I cannot say [...] thing in their favour; they behaved most infamous­ly, [...] fifty deserted the night before we marched, and they run off to a man the m [...]ment they heard the firing begin, "excepting capts. Grinnan and O'Neil, who don't seem exempted out of any particular favour to them, but that it was necessary they should be tick [...]ed into a difficulty of utterance, that the reproach might sall the surer on the rest. What pity this famous let­ter had not been printed at the time; then no doubt this pretty stratagem must have taken. To this heavy accusation, let me add a passage of col. Grant's letter to general Amherst, upon his return to Keehower, after the notable exploits last summer, as taken from the London Gazette N ^o. 10140, alluding to this old affair " they [the Rangers] seem now to despise the In­ [...]i [...]ns, as much as they were susp [...]cted to fear them be­fore." Now you have the whole of this indictment before you, of which I shall grant, first, that " [...] fifty" did deser [...] at Keehowee; and then attempt to shew, that [...] a SINGLE man of the rest, who were ALL in th [...] action near E [...]chowih, run off or deserted, and lastly, endeavour to prove, that these men, so far from behaving most infamously, did not give the least reason to be even SUSPECTED of [...]ea [...]ing the Indian [...].

Gr [...]nting that near fifty, or rather about forty, as letter 87 expresses it, did desert at Keehowee though by the victualling receipts not above thirty appears to have done so without returning again, fifteen of which, not fifty " the night before the army marche [...];)" this is not surprizing at all; but that three times as many did not, I confess to be very much so; for a [...] desertion or such as are acquainted with the woods and by passes, is ever to be expected in an [...] Ame­rican camp, on a remore frontier, where [...] have only the barest necessaries of life to subsist [...] amongst our back settlers, who are mostly [...], [Page 22]and the least used to confinement of perhaps any sort of people whatever, besides, many of our Rangers have been for years accustomed to the Indians, and perfectly know their dispositions, some of which must be supposed not to want sagacity and discernment, at least that scanty pittance it required, to see that such a destructive hast, and unnecessary consumption of pro­visions, for three weeks at Keehowee, at that most critical juncture, must, in all probability, according to the then latest accounts, overset one of the princi­pal ends of their coming, the relief of Fort Lo [...]doun, and therefore might go [...]ff upon that account: Be­sides, must it not incense these people, to find their comrades pick'd off in looking after their horses, and the colonel not only tamely submitting to those, and other continual, almost daily insults of their [...]lping parties, [...]iting upon, killing, and scalping the troops, within hearing, and sometimes within sight, of the picque [...]: But when one ruinous and unconditional op­portunity, given to Tiftow [...]h to bring about a peace, was [...], still to see six days more added afterwards; did it, from these circumstances, require much conju­ration to discover the colonel's resolves? was it not [...] that neither Tif [...]owih nor the Old War­ri [...]r, [...] influence lay entirely amongst the Lower Settlement Indians, should not be threatened, that the army would march immediately, upon the first insult from [...] scalping [...]? Add to these things, that the [...] were well [...] with the woods, the Reg [...]l [...]rs [...] strangers; those therefore might [...] with impunity, while the chief merit perhaps of [...] these lay in necessity. However, I would not be understood, by any means, to endeavour to [...] who did behave "infamou [...]y," [...] to be owing to a far other [...] cowardice: but thus much may be said, [...] [...]he army pus [...]ed forward immediately, after the success at the Lower Towns, there would not have been any occasion to take any of their horses from them for pack-horses, and then not a man of them, by all accounts, if well used, would have [...]; and [Page 23]a suspicion of so common a thing as this, ought, a­mongst other reasons, to have had its due influence, and prevented that, I was going to say " [...] inf [...]m [...]:" halt that occasioned it. Had the colonel proceeded to the Divisings, or Middle Settlements, before he halted, it would have had the appearance, at least, of doing business, and made them easy; besides, the risque of falling into the savages hands, ther [...] all round them, would have been so very great, almost inevitable, as to have prevented this evil effectually.

I pass now to those of our people that deserve to be vindicated, who were in the action near Etchowih, and continued with the army 'till they returned to Keehowee; no [...] one of which run off. Where could they run to? into the Indians mouths? And here, begging the colonel's pardon, would not the expression have been a little more candid and suitable to the pre­sent case, if the Word IN had been made use of, in­stead of OFF? If it had been said, "they ran" IN "to a man, the moment they heard the firing begin," it would have implied, they were before off from the main body, to which they run in, without any ambi­guity; whereas, though they run off to a man, may infer the same thing, yet it also signifies, and much more aptly, especially with strangers to the Cherokee country, their running off altogether, and deserting the army entirely; which 'tis known, by the provi­sion receipts, dated the day before the action and the day after the return to Keehowee, that not a single man did: in fact, it would have required ten times more courage to have done so, than to remain with the troops. But, to be sure, there could be no "little design" here to mislead, only a small in [...]ertency: however, though I have ventured to a [...]end [...] so far as it regards our Rangers, capt. Grinnan's in parti­cular, who were near a quarter of a mile from the main body when the firing began, I am not half satisfied with it yet: this place, and another similar to it, may still undergo another correction; I mean the reflection on capt. Morrison's men: 'tis said, " he was unfortunate­ly abandoned by his people:" Is not this expression too [Page 24]general, taking in, as may be thought, ALL his small company, that is, all the provincials? whereas, 'tis known, he had not more than twenty three men with him, advanced a full quarter of a mile in front of the army: the rest were in the rear, mixed with the Ran­ge [...]s, under his lieuts. Colquhoun and Tatnal.

Now, instead of ab [...]nd [...]ning or running in or off, had any of the clever little dapper fellows that, we are informed, were so much admired by marshal Brog­lio, for their wonderful prowess, been in either of these situations (and why some of their brethren were not, is surprizing) then truly, we should have been told, as­sist me all ye puffing deities, to express myself proper­ly on this so arduous an occasion! that these handful of heroes, after making a noble stand, being over­powered with numbers, were obliged to retire (or retreat) to the main body, or perhaps return, as the colonel did to Keehowee; and why [...] two advanced parties, one consisting of only 23 provincials, the other of a few Ran­gers, who pretend to no heroism, only a common share of manly rational courage, should be expected to support themselves al [...]n [...], (87) "'till the grenadiers and light-infantry formed," against the shock of such "a very con­siderable body of Indians, of the Lower, Middle, and Upper settlements, with some Creeks and Chactaws, advanta­geously posted," cannot easily be accounted for. Were any of the regulars upon these advanced parties when the firing began? I am told no, by numbers I have enquired of. Was there a fair trial then? Perhaps our people were blamed for taking to trees. If so, why were not the Highlanders there, to prevent them, and teach them better? Being left to themselves, with their own officers, was it not natural to fight in their own way, the Indian manner? If there can be any who are not yet convinced, that the words "run off" ought to be changed to "run" in, before they can be applied here to the Rangers, let such only endea­vour to reconcile the following passage to their own manner of understanding their running off to a man: " the number of Rangers much diminished, some of their horses employed in carrying flour, OTHERS not very fond [Page 25]of walking," or, as letter N ^o. 87 expresses it, " [...] were in great [...] for horses to [...] the wounded; MANY of the Rangers dismounted." But the thing it­self is in no manner of way applicable to the cattle-guard or body of Rangers, who was in the rear of all, as we learn from N ^o. 87. " In the center of the pack-horses, was an officer and twenty [...] from the pi [...]quet; and in the [...] the where was the captain of the pi [...] ­quet with fifty men and [...] officer, followed be the cattle under [...] care of a body of Rangers." Now, I say, this body of Rangers, under capt. O'Neil, neither re­tired, retreated, were drove in, or run off, or on, unless it was to take care of the cattle, their particu­lar charge, and keep them together, which was so ef­fectually done, that "every thing was saved:" "nay, we have [...]ot l [...]st a bag of flour by the enemy, or a [...]," according to letter N ^o. 87. The colonel indeed says, that "capt. Peter Gordon s [...]eved every thing:" Very true. The merit of the whole is very justly given to that brave officer, who commanded the picquet, and had the captain of the cattle-guard, who was it seems of "use in the [...]ear," under his direc­tion during the ma [...]ch: But if it is implied, from this passage, that the Rangers did not enable captain Gordon to [...]ve the cattle, may it not be equally so too, that the other men, who were not more under his command, did not assist to save the pack-horses?

I shall now, in the last place, endeavour to prove, that the Rangers, so far from behaving "most infa­mously," did not give the le [...]st reason to be even "sus­pected" of fearing the indians. The proof of this point, is in a great measure [...]viated, by what has been just now said, that " every thing was saved, and not a bu [...]lock lost." What greater [...] be desi­red, that these people did their duty? especially, if we consider, how hardly [...] Gordon must be pres­sed, when "he took up the best post he [...] find, and sustained th [...] i [...] attack," that is, the attack of the whole body of Indians, for we are told just before, without any [...], " when THE Indians sound, that it was im­possible to prevent our getting to the [...], THEY endeavoured [Page 26]to cut off outpack horses and cattle, [...] the c [...]tain of the picquet, from doing us any harm i [...] that way." Now is it reasonable to think, that this gentleman, without the assistance of the Rangers, with only his picquet-guard, when he too "unfortunately was [...] ­d [...]ned," by his colonel, six miles from Et [...]ow [...]h, and never had a reinforcement sent him, though ear­nestly pressed for, 'till after the army got there, could in the interim defend himself, so many hours, against an attack that we are told (N ^o. 8 [...]) "came in such a va­riety of quarters, that they were obliged to divide them­selves into small parties, some with officers, some with serjeants; they were pressed [...] on by the enemy," &c. Is it probable, I say, that to small a number of men, could defend themselves on all sides, and at the same time take care of such a number of pack-horses "before," and such a large gang of cattle "be [...]nd" them, so as not to lose a single one, on foot too? Does not this matter speak for itself? and is it not re­markable, that such a piece of general and notorious poltroonry should not be as generally e [...]posed, and branded with infamy? But, on the contrary, their general behaviour in that action, was applauded in numbers of letters. A particular fellow or two might have behaved "infamous [...]y" (though I don't know of any that did) as will often be the case among a body of men, which will always pass unregarded by the can­did.

Who could have expressed himself more strongly in their favour, than the colonel himself, in his first let­ter, dated only 24 days before this astonishing change? where, after a long encomium on their good beha­viour, and desiring his honour to thank them for it, he concludes, " in fo [...]rt, I am extremely pleased with THE WHOLE." Can any man, the least acquainted with human nature, be made to believe, that any consider­able body of troops, consisting of two distinct corps (suppose regulars and provincials) of the same nation, shall have behaved so extremely well at one time, as the whole to merit applause, and, only 25 days fol­lowing, that one of th [...]se [...] corps. still acting in [Page 27]conjunction with the other, should to a man turn out out such arrant Poltroons? Perhaps history might furnish us with a rare instance of the same entire uni­ted body behaving, the whole, just afterwards in this scandalous manner, owing to some general, unaccoun­table pa [...]nic, and much such an instance is mentioned in marshal Saxe's reveries; but I believe no example can be pretended to be shewn, where one corps, after having a little while preceding so remarkably distinguish­ed themselves, should, almost immediately afterwards, when intermixed in different places with the same body of troops they acted in conjunction with just before, to a man picked out, behave so infamously; while, on the other hand, " when the action (87) was expected to be were general than ever, hath fronting each other, that the valour, discipline, and steadiness of the [other body o [...]] troops, stewed itself in a manner worthy of admiration; they received the fire of the Indians, looking them boldly in the face, with shouldered arms, and with as little concern, seemingly, as ever you sa [...] a contine [...] on his past by a town guard." Is not this proving too much?

Credat Judaeus Apeila

Quad cunque astendis mihi sit, incredulus [...].

Farther, if one of these distinct corps had advanced parties out "when the firing began," the other none, is it fair and candid, to judge, or can any judgment rather be formed, on so unequal a footing, from these parties being obliged to retire to the main body? Where the case was otherwise, as in the cattle-guard in the rear, there 'tis plain, by the best proof that can be given, the after-delivery of THE WHOLE they had in charge, that their conduct could not, and ought not, to be even "suspected." Was it candid in the colonel, not to have informed the governor, of the situation Morrison's and Grinnan's people were in, "when the firing began," and of the number of men they had with them each? As to the sneer, "I think there was a waggener and a Ranger killed," &c. it might as well have been spared; for the return at the end even of the letter N ^o. 87, shews, there were 13 of our people altogether, killed and wounded, and 84 [Page 28]of the regulars; which is not very far from a propor­tion, and without at [...] men [...]oo; and our people acquainted with the Indian manner of fi [...]h [...], would occasionally, according to the American custom, take to trees, especially the handful that were on ad­vanced parties, by themselves, which would, and ve­ry likely did, save many.

The behaviour of the colonel, then only major Grant, to our neighbours the Virginian, at Fort [...] Ques [...]e, in 1758, will [...] give [...] off it of our Rangers, [...]s [...]hese two [...] simi­lar. We were the told, " the [...] so, that the surprize was compl [...]t; [...] must have succeeded, but for an [...] or­ders, in a provincial officer, the might they [...] the Ohio: and by this man's quitting his [...] morning, the party was in a manner [...] to piece [...]." This man must have been either major Lewis or capt. Bullet, the only provincial officers who commanded any separate parties. But capt. Bullet, after a useful and noble stand, was obliged to retreat, and got safe back to the army; where, we find, on account of these insinua­tions, he desired, and obtained from general Forbes, a court martial on his conduct, which was approved of, and he of consequence acquired with honour. Major Lewis was unfortunately taken prisoner with major Grant, and remained upwards of a year in cap­tivity; and, at his return, we find him continued in his rank in the Virginia regiment, which is no sign of any misbehaviour of that gentleman: And, whether major Grant's being taken prisoner, and general For­bes's success, and then dying while he was so, were lucky or unlucky circumstances to him at that time, is not a little dubious; but, 'tis more than probable they alone prevented that miscarriage being strictly and properly enquired into, which no doubt the colo­nel greatly [...]ments. But pray give me leave to recom­mend to your perusal, that part of general Forbes's expedition that relates to this affair, and the very hu­mourous answer thereto by a New Englandman, as you will find them in the Gentleman's Magazines for [Page 29]April and May 175 [...]; I am persuaded they will not only clear up several matters very smaller to the point before us, but highly divert you betides. In that af­fair, as w [...]ll as this, it was [...] lay the blame somewhere, and where could it [...] possibly more judiciously and conveniently placed in to [...] on the provincials, who, to be sure, know [...] of military matters, even rewarding their [...]. N [...]w [...] are not ALWAYS to be [...] regu­lars, is it much to be wondered [...] to be expected, they will grew [...] Where is the encouragement for any gentlem [...]n in the pro­vinces, of spirit and fortune, who [...], to turn [...]ut? Have they ever an opportunity of shewing them? Are they not always commanded? Of [...] vail are the new regulations by act of parliament in their savour? Will not, and does not, a [...], a particular commission, and even a rotation commis­sion, supercede, notwithstanding that act, a provincial officer, of any rank, merit, or standing whatever; as well in purely Indian matters as others? And not­withstanding this great and constant care to put it out of their power to do any mischief, yet (to [...] this head with the [...] New-Englandman) " Un­happy provincials! if [...] are you are [...] the regulars, they [...], through not is truth part of your [...]: If [...], it is all years, though you happen to be [...] a small part of the [...], and have no [...]; [ [...]he exact case of ours] at if regulars were in their [...] when not [...] with provincials, and provincials of no kind of vain [...] without regulars." —

Now let me proceed to the second opportunity the colonel, in all probability, lost, of effectually and glo­riously finishing the war with the Cherokees, by his unnecessary return from Etchowih.

Here, though several very forcible arguments a [...] hominem might be drawn up, from th [...] 40 dead bodies that he tells us, six days after the action, so grave­ly and positively, without any restriction whatever, [Page 30] "were found in three different [...]les," to convince you how such a circumstance must naturally have spi­rited up the forces to proceed, especially as that num­ber is of ITSELF double of our killed, notwithstand­ing the Indians were so advantageously posted; yet I shall make no use of it at all to that purpose; and here I am sorry, that it is entirely out of my power to a­void perhaps giving offence to my readers of sentiment and delicacy, by calling this a most barefaced attempt to impose on the public, by this his ipse dixit alone, unsupported by any evidence, and void of even the least appearance of probability to any attentive and re­flecting reader: for, was not the "march stole upon the Indians in the night, in order to get clear of the dan­gerous passes near that town"? Does not the colonel say himself, " the Cherokees, &c. gave us no trouble 'till we got near (the town) Etchee"? Does he not farther represent the place of action, where this trouble hap­pened, as having passes, "the Indians had taken pos­session of every pass"? Were not th [...]n these at least, some of the passes that the night march was to avoid? If so, is there any probability of any party's being so owl-eyed as to discover these three holes? farther, who, the least acquainted with the Indians customs, can think, that they would leave their friends bodies so exposed, upon so suspicious a place as the field of battle, for above two days; when, at six miles distance from the army, they had so many fine opportunities, during that time, of carrying them off, at least of burying them, when they took the pains to throw them into holes? and if they were buried, as letter 87 says " the next day (the 28th) the Indians went to bury their dead, and they scratched up ours and left them above ground;" is it credible, that any man would wait to dig them up and count them, when 'tis well known the army marched that night, and the succeeding day, to their old camp near War-Woman's creek, which, accor­ding to the same letter, is 30 miles? What time, in this case, had any party, supposing them equipped with spades, if not, with long nails, to be so dangerously curious? If there was a party, who was the officer? [Page 31]If a single person was so hardy, what was his name and character? These were questions often asked, by numbers of gentlemen of the assembly, besides others, when the army returned, especially when it became ne­cessary to scrutinize into the particulars of the colonel's letters, to take off that fatal influence they had upon too many (which I pointed out in my last) who could not think any gentleman that regarded his character, and especially one that bore so considerable a commission in his majesty's service, would attempt to assert any thing so roundly, of such consequence too, that he could not support: But, notwithstanding this strict enquiry, by such numbers, neither the party, nor a single man of any character, could ever be named, that saw this re­markable phoenomenon, though from the colonel's own words "were found" and those of his adopted letter N ^o. 87 "we had occasion to see," &c. this must be thought to be a notorious and general fact, that every man in the army knew, or might know, the certainty of.

Now, though I despised taking any advantage, to prove the point before us, from the last article, which is given up as altogether fabulous; yet the colonel must not be allowed to take any, in his marvellous ac­count of the wounded, represented to be, every one of them, in a terrible condition, beyond probability: in­deed, it may be called a traveller's letter altogether, for not one thing in the ordinary way happened to this gentleman during that campaign. The return referred to in letter N ^o. 87, tells us, there were 20 killed and 77 wounded, 67 rank and file, 1 drummer, 1 serjeant, Mr. Monro, surgeon's mate, and 7 commission offi­cers, viz. ensign Eddington, and capt. Peter Gordon, of the Royals; capt. Sutherland, lieut. McMartin and lieut. McKinnon, of the Highlanders; lieut. Tatnal, of the provincials; and capt. Farrel, of the waggoners. This account corresponds better with the colonel's "above sixty men," than it does with his "many officers;" however, that's a trifle. What I would chiefly observe, is, that of the eight gentlemen here named, only the two first were disabled, the rest very [Page 32]slightly hurt, Mr. McMartin and Mr. Tatnal the most; [...] certain the whole six thought nothing of it. Now, if out of eight officers named, we find only two, that is, the fourth part of them, much hurt, after being told too, that "none of them can walk, every one of them must have an attendant:" Have we not occasion to suspect, from thence; from the story of the dead bodies; and that of the Rangers (wherein "I am sorry that I cannot say any thing in" his "favour," and it would be too indelicate to say he "behaved most infamously" to them; that the remainder of the woun­ded, returned by the lump, were not in a worse con­dition in proportion, especially as it is well known, that not more than 3 or 4 at most died before the ar­my reached the Congarees: indeed I have been in­formed, by those that were in the action, by some, that not above a dozen, by others, not exceeding 20 at furthest, were so badly off as the colonel represents, however, let us allow 27 were, and that the other 50, if left in a good post, would have been able to give their assistance, only to defend it if attacked, which that they ought to have been I shall attempt to shew presently.

Enough has been said already to prove "the Ran­gers are much diminished" ought not to have been lugged in here as one of the causes of this famous re­turn, for "they run off to a man" he told us before: but if he intends those that deserted at Keehowee, what is meant by "some of their horses were employed in carrying flour"? dild they go without their horses? so far from it, his darling letter N ^o. 87 tells us, "they deserted with not only their own, but a great many m [...]e:" We are told farther, that "others" (which? horses?) "not very fond of walking;" why were they not whipped then? no switches at hand? hard indeed! If the men are meant, I agree entirely with the colonel; I believe they were not a little out of humour, to re­turn to their friends to be certainly laughed at; but if they had been ordered to face to the right about, it would perhaps have made them happy, and as "fond of walking" as any of the rest: I wish they had been tried.

[Page 33] Now, Sir, the mist being so far cleared away, as to enable us to discern things a little more in then na­tural proportions, let us return to our point, and en­quire, whether the actual condition of the army at this time at Etchowih, only 20 killed, 27 at most disabled, and 50 slightly hurt, made it adviseable for the colo­nel, merely out of compassion for the wounded, to return; not run off, by no means, my gentle render, think so; none but Rangers act so "most infamously" as that: The colonel, he, truly, at midnight (N ^o. 87) "(leaving the huts standing and fires burning.)" "STOLE" away, very quie [...]ty and slowly, ONLY 30 miles! not a step farther, before he camp'd; so ease and gentle a march in that smooth level country, could not possibly you know even disturb, much less distress the wounded; besides, what [...] astonishing effect this inconceivable piece of smart generalship must have had upon the savages! In short, this warlike stratagem, equally surprized all sides. The Indians were as sur­prized in the morning, to find the troops were on their march back, as they, it is well known, were and surprized at midnight, with such marching orders; and the whole province was surprized at the reasons given, after so many and so great encouragements that the colonel, by his own accounts, appears to have had to proceed. Could it be expected, to penetrate into the Cherokee country without one general "brush," even before, and much less after, the suspicious and shameful delays at Keehowee, which served no pur­pose but to instil a mechanical unknown courage into the Indians, by finding their continual insults tamely (and as THEY said) not warrier-like borne by the co­lonel? After so many incitements for the Indians to stand one general "brush," could it be expected to lose fewer men than he did? Did the colonel think there would be no wounded? If he thought otherwise, why did not HIS insuperable difficulties, about them, prevail at Keehowee, and prevent his marching from thence at all? He tells us himself, "we might have gone to any town in the nation;" and who doubts it [...] why did he not go then? "it was absolutely impracti­cable [Page 34]to proceed with the wounded." Why was not a post fixed, to secure them? He no where gives us the reason; and does not venture to say openly himself, that he had not men enough to spare, for that purpose: however, as he says so through his adopted letter (87) let us quote that entire curious passage here, " the towns of the Middle-Settlements, satisfied by this time that they could not obstruct our progress, had nothing for it but to carry every thing away; and our number of wound­ed made it IMPRACTICABLE" (his own word) " to carry them farther: we had no FORT to lodge them in, nor could we SPARE a detachment to cover them; hu­manity could not allow of their being left a sacrifice, for the sake of burning a parcel of empty houses." Here, Sir, the whole difficulty, that occasioned this famous return, is said to be, the want of forts, and want of spare men to cover the wounded. Did not capt. Pe­ter Gordon glaringly shew, how easily both these pre­tences might be obviated? Did not that brave officer, from the best post he could FIND, beat off the diffe­rent attacks of "THE INDIANS," repeated for so many hours, notwithstanding he was then so hampered with such a number of pack-horses before, and cattle behind? And did he not do it effectually, so as to save "EVERY THING;" not so much as (87) "a bag of flour lost by the enemy, or a bullock." Is not this a KNOWN and allowed fact, that capt. Gordon did so? If he had not, I don't know what the colonel would have done for his breakfast next morning, or his troops either, unless their knapsacks were full; but perhaps he would rather have gone without, to have had a better excuse for returning. The leaving the cattle and pack-horses six miles behind him, for so many hours, looks a little suspicious; especially after he had wrote from Keehowee, " in MY OWN opi­nion, 'tis next to impossible, for us to proceed over the mountains," and seems, as if he was determined, to make his opinion good. What else can account for such conduct? If two hundred men, which were the most that capt. Gordon had with him, including pro­vincials, Rangers, packhorse-men, &c. could, from [Page 35]the best post they could find, or rather no post at all, defend themselves so long "and save every thing," what danger could there be, when a post might have been CHOSEN OUT, intrenched and stockaded, in little time and with ease, of a few men, free from all incum­brances, defending the wounded from any attacks whatever of the Indians? Would not their feeble at­tempts, so far from being dreaded, been laughed at? Were Indians alone ever known to attack the slightest stockade or entrenchment by assault, much less the cowardly Cherokees? Might not what materials the ruined houses did not supply have been easily furnished from the neighbouring woods? Would not this have eased the wounded greatly, supposing they had been left at Etchowih, where, by the colonel's corrected account of letter 87, there were provisions full sufficient for these people, without taking any from the army, ex­cepting a little beef, for a change? Though it would perhaps have been rather more spirited, and answered several good purposes, to have carried the wounded with them one very easy march more (not even 30 miles) or a second, if they were not attacked in the first, and then left them in a post: Would not 20 men, be­sides the 50 that were so slightly hurt, with a few ri­fles from the Rangers or provincials, been fully suffi­cient for this purpose? besides, carrying the disabled a march or two, might have deceived the Indians, and made them conjecture, this post was more for the tired men, or other purposes, than entirely with a de­sign to secure the wounded. Is there any reason to think the colonel might not have taken these steps, and proceeded as far at least as he did the second cam­paign, but that he did not try? And did not every motive, that could possibly actuate the mind of a man of honour, urgently press the experiment at that time, even supposing the risque had been much greater? Was he not convinced his enemies were contemptible? Were not the full 1180 regulars, rank and file, he had with him, including serjeants, equal to any in his ma­jesty's service? Did they shew any signs of fear? on the contrary, does he not tell us, "the troops behaved [Page 36]remarkably [...]"? and had he not 270, rank and file, of Rangers, and provincials besides, exclusive of pack­horse-men and guides? Was he not acquainted, at Ninety Six, with the "very disagreeable news from the Greeks" (8 [...]) who had just murdered many of our tra­ders, and seemed to wait only the event of that expedi­tion to break out entirely against us? Did not this point out the necessity of striking some blow, to inti­midate those Indians, and make them give us satisfac­tion? Is it not wholly owing to the want of such a blow, at that time, that we were obliged tam [...] to put up with so many murders of our fellow-subjects, by these wretches, in cool blood, without daring ever since to resent them? Did he not recollect too, that the honour of his majesty's arms was at stake, when he silly stole that surprizing march in the night, which though the Indians might admire, as the monkey did the wonderful feats of the rope-dancer, as very smart indeed considering who did them, yet might they not [...] had the s [...]me reason as pug had, to think, they were nothing to what they could perform themselves, and therefore be plumed on thus discovering their own supe­riority? Besides these strong motives, where was his compassion that we have been told so much of, and which alone induced him to return? Was it all con­fined to his own wounded? Had he no fellow feeling for our back-settlers; no bowels for the poor distres­sed garrison of Fort Loudoun, whom he had deceived too by tantalizing them with expectations of relief? Had the 200 poor souls cooped up in that sort, any the least chance to escape the butchering "hands of the savages" but by his assistance? Was he not acquain­ted, before the march from Keehowee, there could be no hopes from Virginia? an express having arrived at Charles Town from thence 13 days before, then bring­ing accounts, that only the 24th of the preceding month (May) the assembly of that colony had passed an act to make provision for 700 men; which it could not possibly be expected, could be raised, armed, sup­plied with carriages and provisions, and march, time enough to save that garrison.

[Page 37] But all these motives of encouragement, honou [...], humanity, and necessity, united together, we find were not sufficient, to prevail with the colonel, after one general "brush" with the Indians, and that a successful one too, to march on; [...]s surprizing, that such an adept in Indian matters should not recollect, that no people under the sun are more remarkable than Indians, especially the cowardly Cherokees, for never rallying again, in a large body, if once routed; had he thought of this, he might have expected to have proceeded without interruption, but then, that would have been acting contrary to "his own" FIRST " [...]pi [...]ian." Is it not a most mortifying aggravation, to be told, at this most calamitous juncture, "we have succeeded in every thing we have attempted; the In­dians have been best every where; they never had the smallest advantage:"—"The Indians will not forget this attack sorn." What does the colonel mean? Was he sneering at our distresses; letting us know, that he could have answered the general's intentions, and as­sifted us, but would not? Upon the whole, may not every man see, the troops could not be seized with a pannic? and I don't believe there is a man in the pro­vince thinks they were. What then could be the co­lonel's inducement to return at any rate? Was his honour offended at the provoking officiousness of the printers, or others, who had so publickly contradicted his first letter to our governor, by their impertinent title? Did this therefore oblige him to think another expedition absolutely necessary, where he might have the NAME also, the only thing this then acting lieutenant colonel wanted, to make a complete commander in chief, and, by an appare [...] conquest, GAIN ALL to himself: and that he was not without expectations of returning again, may be gathered, from his being beard to tell some gentlemen, before he went aw [...], that "it was mere th [...] probable, he should return to Carolina again, before Christmas;" about which time to accord­ingly did return, not only a real lieutenant-colonel of his majesty's 40th regiment, obtained in the interim (by his merits perhaps in painting) at New-York, but an ex­traordinary [Page 38]commander in chief besides: but these cir­cumstances, however strong, to be sure, cannot, and ought not to be expected to have any weight, against a gentleman so extremely remarkable for his delicacy, candour, and tenderness for the reputation of others.

If general Amherst's orders were so contrary (which is hardly credible) to his declaration to his honour the lieutenant governor, why did not the troops imme­diately return after the surprize of the Lower Towns, without a moment's loss of time? It would certainly have been less prejudicial to have done so, and looked like dispatch, and not improbably have answered all the purposes those forces were sent for; the general's, by rejoining him early enough to be of service upon that most important campaign he was then engaged in; and ours, by the mischief being done so suddenly and unexpectedly, and the troops immediately vanishing, having such a strong resemblance to the Indians own manner of fighting, which they dread indeed, that they might not unlikely, through apprehensions of such an­other dreadful and unlook'd for visit in a different quar­ter, have been so intimidated as to give us the satisfaction we wanted. 'Tis surprizing this had no weight with the colonel, one so thoroughly versed in Indian matters! As the affair was managed, that large detachment was not of the least service any where that campaign; for it joined the general (as was before supposed it would) too late; when his glorious business was compleated; though the troops were uncommonly fortunate, for the time of year, in getting expeditiously over the bar, and in having an unusual fine passage to New-York. To us indeed, the army may be said to have been of prejudice, for the stroke at the lower settle­ments, though a fine one for a beginning, losing all its favourable weight, by the suspicious delays at Kee­howee, and the lamentable retreat from Etchowih that presently followed, served only to exasperate those Indians the more, which was, very soon after, woe­fully experienced by our back settlers: And our re­presentatives in assembly, as soon as they were infor­med the troops were on their march back, were so [Page 39]much alarmed threat, as immediately to address the lieutenant-governor, and represent to him, " that they apprehended the province to be in a much more dangerous situation, at this juncture (11th of July) than at the time the troops arrived here."

Amongst so many scarce plausible excuses that the colonel makes for his RETURN, as he calls it, is it not surprizing, that the only short and sufficient one (had it been true) should not be so much as once hinted, throughout this curious apologetical letter; I mean that which was verbally propagated, with so much industry, when the colonel, several days before the army, made his appearance amongst us, that the troops were obliged to come away as they did, and that it was never intended to go to Fort Loudoun at all. Had experience shewn it to be safer and easier, after such reports had answered their intended purposes, to unsay an hundred of them, ever so universally spread, rather than one unguarded assertion expressed in writing?

Though almost endless reflections might be made here, on the colonel's letters relating to this campaign; yet I shall conclude this head, with only one or two observations more, and then pass to the next [...] First then, let me ask, how the colonel came to know, " that there was not an Indian within 60 miles of the fort; the frontier is therefore much advanced"? Was his camp near War-Woman's creek half that distance? Did he not march to this camp the first day, upon his return from Etchowih? And does he not tell us, "the Indians gave us no trouble the first day's march"? And were they not so complaisant, "the second, that they intended to entertain us in a very strong pass"? Indeed, if they had not waited on the colonel so far, they must have been very nimble the next day after he marched from Keehowee, to have had it in their power to resent the contempt he had shewn their intended entertainment, by killing and scalp­ing one Jefferson, a Buff soldier, in sight of Fort Prince-George: This is a known fact, and publickly mentioned at the time, though as publickly unsaid a­gain, [Page 40]and that in the same paper too that informed us, a week or two afterwards, of the colonel's return to Charics-Town, which he did, on particular business, some days before the army reimbarked.

How will the colonel clear the following passage of a glaring contraction, not to say imposition. "'Tis really unlucky, that a peace could not be brought about; we have succeeded in every thing we have attempted:" Was not this peace attempted? What else made him halt three shameful weeks at Keehowee, before he marched?

Let us now proceed to make some remarks on the second campaign, in 1761: in order, amongst other things, to discover, if the first was of any, and what use, to the second, as a matter of mere experience.

Here, Sir, I must acknowledge myself extremely puzzled, to find out any improvement made in the second, upon the first campaign, notwithstanding the colonel was so many months appointed to the com­mand before he took the field. The marches were certainly much more slow and tedious now than be­fore, and excepting that the pack horses were divided into brigades, and these severally interspersed, and guarded by the different corps, a general sameness ap­parently runs through both, This "disposition" the colonel tells us, "was right in the country we were to act in," and to be sure it must be so; otherwise, were it not too presumptuous, one would be apt to think that disposition was more rightly calculated for the peo­ple he was to act against, than for the country he was to act in; and nothing can more evidently demonstrate, that the colonel's chief dependance, from the very be­ginning, was, on the known cowardice of the Indians, than his setting out with this order of march; for had they suddenly and vigorously attacked any one corps, might not that have been cut to pieces before the next saw its danger, or if it did, could have come to its as­sistance in time, when itself was so encumbered with two or three brigades of provision-horses, besides batt horses, between it and the other.

From the complaints in 1760, for want of posts and [Page 41]spare men, it might have been reasonably imagined, that the colonel would, as he had it in his power, have remedied those HIS then insuperable difficulties, for sure­ly HE could not pretend to be any stranger, either to the Indians want of spirit, way of fighting, or na­tural advantages of situation, after he had before (87) " penetrated into their country, in spight of the uni­ted force of lower, middle, and upper Cherokees, I mean such as were disposed for war, which most of them were, excepting a few old men:—and what is equal to forcing our way to their town and destroying them, have returned and carried a large train of wounded men, sixty miles at least, through the most hazardous country in the world, in spight of all their efforts to distress us." If any dif­ficulty still occurred to him, had he not time and op­portunity to get abundant satisfaction, while in Charles-Town and in our settlements, regarding the situation, distance, number of warriors and houses, &c. of every town in the nation; and to provide himself with ho­nest intelligent guides, void of any "little design," and worth more then "a shilling"? Is it not rea­sonable to think, this experienced officer, so well ac­quainted with every thing that could be necessary for the campaign, would take care to provide accordingly? especially, when he had so much time, and might have taken much more if he thought proper, as there was no necessity for taking the field so early as he did.

Supposing him thus furnished with every thing ne­cessary, for it would be a reflection on his military ca­pacity to think otherwise, we will endeavour to see, presently, if with the troops he had when he marched from Keehowee, whether he might not have gone to the Valleys at least.

Might it not, I say, have been expected, that the colonel would certainly have fixed posts as he went a­long, to secure the wounded, which we were told, "in a remote frontier is a distressing circumstance," and "it was absolutely impracticable to proceed with them," "nor could we spare a detachment to cover them." (87) Were there any complaints for want of men this last summer, or any other assistance whatever? Were not [Page 42]about 50 negroes, at his own request, furnished him, particularly for this purpose; as appears by his honour the lieutenant governor's message to the assembly, da­ted the 2d of April last? " Cal. Grant, same days be­fore be marched out of town, represented to me, that in order to penetrate into the midst of the Cherckes towne, through their mountainous country, with the more success, and with as much safety as possible to the troeps, he pro­pesed to secure his communication with Fort Prince-George, by establishing posts as he advanced, where he might lodge his wounded, sick, and his provisions; there­fore he thought it necessary, that I should assist him with about 50 able negrae men expert in the use of axes and spades.—I thought it reasonable to consent thereto, and desire you to make provision for the same."—Notwith­standing he had these negroes, was any communica­tion secured with Fort Prince George; any post esta­blished at all, excepting he four days 913 men, with the wounded, &c. halted at Cowhih, while the colo­nel went with 1448 rank and file to Stickowih branch; were they not lugged about every where else with the army, for thirty days, from the action near Etchowih until its return to K [...]owee? Does not this shew the tenderness for the wounded in 1760 a mere pretence? Does it not also plainly shew, that the colonel was de­termined to aval himself of them this campaign, in an indirect manner, by unnecessarily, though ingeriously and over carefully, carrying them every where with him, that they might unobservedly retard the march, fatigue the men with carrying them, and give a colour to such laboriously dilatory proceedings?

The colonel told us in 1760, "destroying an Indian town may be creditable, but 'tis in fact a matter of no great consequence, when the savages have time to carry off their effects;—we might have gone to any town in the na­tion" but " then we should have found it, or indeed rather them all, abandoned." 'Tis true, the corn-fields were destroyed last summer, as far as the colonel went; but would not these have been abandoned too the year be­fore as well as the houses, and therefore as easily de­stroyed? Did they not carry off their effects last year? [Page 43]If they had not, would it have been much matter? Ex­cepting a few pieces of gold, or perhaps a watch or two, that some of them might have got from the Fort Lou­doun officers, or others they murdered, I believe "their most valachle effects" and the " every thing that might have been left in their houses, which you may believe would not [...]scape," would have consisted in a few deer-skins, some paint, beads, and a few strings of wampum. It would very much o [...]ge the curious, and no doubt highly entertain them besides, if the co­lonel would be kind enough to publish an account of the Cherokee moveables, in his own fine picturesque manner.

From the extraordinary risques the colonel run of his own character, and the pains he and his friends took in one thousand seven hundred and sixty, to MAKE us believe " the Indians would not forget that attack soon —they lost at least 50 men," &c. it appears plain, that he knew, as well a [...] the assembly, what WOULD please us, what WOULD distress the Indians INDEED, destroy­ing them whereever they were met with, the only thing that can: Is it not surprizing then, that notwithstanding this, the colonel should still go on in the old road, and be kind enough to give his friends the Cherokees as little trouble as possible? Why else was not a commission officer sent to major Thomson, in the last action near Etchowih, with that most interesting order "to go to the left, behind the hills, and endeavour to get in the rear of the enemy"? Was not a commission officer sent with all the other orders of little moment to that most important one; this, upon which so much depended, must be trusted, truly, to a nameless blundering ser­jeant of the Rangers? Was it this same nameless blockhead, that found the 40 dead bodies in the three different holes the year before? If it was, it is highly necessary the colonel should tell his name, and be so far cleared of entirely inventing that story himself. We were also told the first campaign "we might have gone to any town in the nation." It was not doubted then; and the last summer's exploits have demonstra­ted, that he might. What hindered him in 1760? [Page 44]why " [...] should have had a brush to get at it," &c. Have we not the greatest reason to think, that, had the colonel only then made the experiment, and pro­ceeded one march farther, that he would have had rea­son to think himself mistaken, and to expect no more interruption the first than he had last year? After the general brush the 10th of June last, did the colonel meet with the least opposition afterwards? Excepting one indiscreet waggoner, who was shot by a few scul­king warriors as be was going with a torch in his hand in the night to get water, the army, or any party, not even the straggling packhorse-men, who were sometimes, only two or three together, a mile or two from the camp, looking for their horses, w [...] not so much as fired at, 'till he returned to Keehowee. What did the colonel chiefly depend on this last campaign? Was it not on the KNOWN cowardice and ignorance of the Indians? What excuse but that, could be have had, for that otherwise most rash enterprize to the towns on Stickowih branch, supposing an unexpected miscarriage had happened; and would not that have been a good and sufficient plez with all the candid? Had he not had numerous instances to confirm him, that their general national character was justly fixed, as being abjectly pusillanimous to the last degree? What signifies fortifications, natural or artificial, if the people are known not to have spirit or skill to defend them? Was not the rou [...] to Stickowih branch so difficult, that the men and horses, many of them, could not keep their feet, but were frequently tum­bling down? I am informed, by many of the gentle­men who were there, and have favoured me with their journals, that one hundred men of spirit and conduct might have kept off and ruined the colo­nel's whole detachment. Did not all the guides say, that route was vastly more difficult and dangerous than any besides, all the way even to Fort Loudoun? Yet, notwithstanding all these dangers and difficulties, did not the colonel effectually accomplish these designs, with that detachment only, and return to the 913 at Cowhih the 4th day, about 11 o'clock, without the [Page 45]loss of a man, or being so much as fired upon, after marching in all, backwards and forwards, full forty miles, equal, upon account of its difficulty, almost to double the distance, of any route the army had already p [...]ssed, or were to pass in their march back? Does not this plainly shew, how happily, how honourably, and how easily, all our disgraces, miseries and heavy taxes, might have been p [...] an end to last year, had no de­lays been made at Keehowee, or had only ONE march more been ventured upon from Etchowih? The co­lonel, in 1760, in one respect, would have run less risque than he did the year after, as the grand design was, or ought to have been then, the relief of Fort Loudoun: there would have been no necessity for sepa­rating the troops to destroy the corn fields, which might have been omitted 'till their return: they might have pushed forward with all expedition, in one compact body, 'till they had first answered that most material purpose. Now let us compare the two armies toge­ther. In 1760, the colonel had full 1450 rank and file, including serjeants, of regulars, rangers and pro­vincials only, that warched from Kechowee; and had he made no delays there, he would have had 1500, be­sides Indians. Last year, he had about 2400 rank and file, including guides, waggoners (now packhorse­men) Indians and negroes. Were not 800 out of the 1200 picked Royals and Highlanders he had in 1760, returned to New-York? In the room of these, he had 980 men, including serjeants, of the battalion corps and Burton's regiment, that marched from Kee­howee. Were tho [...] troops he had before, and these men of Burton's, just raised, so hastily collected toge­ther, and so ordinary that nothing but the name of regulars could recommend them, to be compared to­gether? The colonel will hardly say they were, not­withstanding it must be allowed, that regiment had all the advantage that a diligent and experienced major could possibly give it, who did honour to his majest [...]'s service, by his indefatigable application to his duty and care of those troops under him; yet the whole 800 pick [...]d men that went away, taken collectively, were certainly [Page 46]vastly more than preserable to the 980 that the colonel had in their room. The battalion corps were as good troops as the former, but there were but few of them. The 380 Royal, he had both campaigns. The rest, were provincials, Rangers, waggoners, guides, Indians, and 40 negroes. What value he would set on the first four of these (especially the Rangers) his opinion last year plainly shews; And were they not all new-rai­sed troops, particularly the provin [...]ls? 'Tis true, he passed great compliments on both, and they deserved them: but did he not do the same at first, in 1760? and may it not be purely owing to the same cause, success? He thought mighty matters were done at the lower settlements his first campaign, and therefore to be sure it was pity to rob the Rangers of a little praise. In short, he was then "extremely pleased with the whole." But did not he himself do vasily more wonderful things, last summer, by his own accounts? How then could we expect any other, than to hear "the whole" praised again? Had it been otherwise, we should soon have been told the old story of the provincials "aban­doning" their officers; "the Rangers and waggeners running off to a man;" and most of the guides being "not worth a shilling." As to the Indians, does he not say himself, in his letter to the lieutenant-governor da­ted the 15th of July last, " he never could bear an In­dian, before he was acquainted with the upper Chicke­saws?" The Catawbas leaving him at K [...]ehowee, in 1760, 'tis certain he thought of n [...] moment. Upon the whole, the number of troops employed in 1760, were amply sufficient to have gone through the nation: he then said as much himself; at least they were en [...] [...] to have prevented the business of the last campaign; which has fully confirmed that opinion, the superiority in 1761, was more in numbers than in real strength; especially, as no posts were fixed, and the additional quantity of provisions carried about [...]ry where with the army, must have greatly weakened, encumbered, and retarded the line of march, much more so, than the additional number of raw and ordinary troops could have strengthened it.

[Page 47] Let us begin with the army's arrival at Keehowee, the 27th of May last. Did not the colonel then find the Little Carpenter there, and give him a talk to the In­dians, to this effect, that " if any would come in as friends, and s [...]ay at [...] peaceably and quietly as friends, they should not be [...]lested or any of their effects meddled with"? Did not the Little-Carpenter set out with this talk to the Great-Warrior, the 29th, and promise to return in twelve days? Was not the giving or sending any talk, at that time, entirely inconsistent with the go­vernor's advice, asked for by the colonel? Was there any the least propriety in then giving a talk at all, much less in sending one, especially to the Great-Warrior, after his monstrous and notorious murder of capt. De­mere and all his officers but one, 25 of his men, and making prisoners of the rest, when he had granted a capitulation too? Must not the Great-Warrior think this savoured a little of [...] year's behaviour at Keeho­wee; of which what the Indians then thought has been hinted already. Only supposing all the Cherokees had remained peaceably in their town [...] what satisfaction could the colonel have taken of them? He would [...] not have broken his word surely, after promising that their persons and effects should be secure?

He marched from Keehowee the 7th of June, with full thirty eight days provision, and reached Stickowih old-town, 34 miles from thence, on the 9th early in the morning the day the Little-Carpenter's 12 days expired: this place is also called the Dividings, from the path to the Middle and Valley settlements parting just there; and would have been an allowed good place to have fixed a post at, and secured a communication with Fort Prince George. The colonel knew, from the guides, that he must return here, before he could proceed to the Valleys, a thing then expected, and ge­ [...]rally and publickly, talked of throughout the army; and what does the colonel say prevented him, when, at his return to Keehowee, he wrote to his friends, that he intended even [...]n to go, if the Great-War­rior did not come in; which account was very care­fully and industriously propagated in town; but, not­withstanding [Page 48]this, general Amherst's printed letter in the London Gazette, and col. Byrd's to our lieute­nant governor, laid before the assembly by his honour in September last, that must have both been wrote just at his return to Fort Prince-George, plainly shew, he had no intention of going there at all. Now sup­pose only, a post had been fixed here, and full one half, or more, of the p [...]ckhorse loads of provision [...] had [...]en left, under the care of [...] men with a few ri [...]es: That day, with the number of men he had, properly disposed (which to be sure the colonel, who had seen so much service, could not be at any loss a­bout) would have been full sufficient to have com­pleted this necessary matter, and made it impregnable to the Cherokees: However, let us allow two days more to do that business, and march to his camp near Estatow [...]h old-town, only 7 miles farther; this would have eased and secured the line of march, vastly more than the want of these 100 men would have weakened it; and besides, the colonel would have had many spare horses, for the sick, wounded, and other pur­poses. The 12th, the colonel would have march­ed from hence, and the action have happened (suppo­sing the Indians had waited for him) at the same place, and at night he would have reached Etchowih as before. The day after the action (now the 13th) suppose the troops had reached Noucasih, where there was a warm town-house that the sick and wounded might have been placed in, the bulk of the remaining provisions might have been left here too; they would have been secured from an attack from the Indians, as the land all round was cleared at a sufficient distance: but supposing the colonel had liked the situation of Cow [...], as it had been described to him, better, 'tis not much matter; this place was only three miles farther, and that whole day's march, supposing he had gone there, would not have been, at most, above six miles, only one fifth part so far as the march the year before, upon his return to Keehowee, when there were fewer carriers, abundantly more wounded, and they too, by description, in a far worse condition, [Page 49]though, by the bye, more of the wounded died this campaign, before the army returned to Ke [...]howee, than the year before 'till they reimbarked. Supposing then the colonel had pushed to Cownih the day after the action, letting alone the interjacent towns 'till his return, some of them might have been useful in his march back. This day, the 13th, suppose an express had been sent off to Ninety-Six, as before to capt. Russel, for a fresh supply of provisions to be sent to Keehowee, to wait the colonel's orders. And, at Cowhih let us halt the next day, the 14th; when parties might have been sent out to destroy the Indian houses, or rather huts, at Eyoree, only two miles distant from his camp, and the corn-fields thereabouts and about Cowhih, in all about 40 houses and 200 acres of corn; this would have been easy work for that day, and discovered whe­ther the Indians were inclinable for another brush. The next day, the 15th, supposing parties were sent to destroy the other towns thereabouts, or, that the co­lonel proceeded to Stickowih branch; 'tis not so very material which was done first; it will ma [...]e no altera­tion in time; however, as the enterprize to Stickowih branch seems rather to claim the preference, because, from yesterday's proceedings, the Indians might have been induced to think the army would go to work at the other towns to day: let us then suppose, the colonel moved off as before, to Stickowih, with his 1448 rank and file, including Indians, negroes and guides, the 15th; and left 813 rank and file, instead of the 913, to guard the sick, provisions, &c. then allowing him his own time, he would have destroyed the five towns thereabouts, vi [...]. Stickowih, Kittow [...]h, [...]roe­tchih, Tasantih, and Ellijoy, and returned to Cowhih the 18th before noon, and these troops had the re­mainder of the day to rest. The next day, and for two days afterwrds, suppose 700 of the detachment that had halted at Cowhih, had been sent, with 300 others, to destroy the 120 houses and 180 acres of corn at Usa­nah, Cowhihtchih, and Burning-Town, the farthest of them only seven miles distant from Cowhih, march­ing from town to town, this work would have been [Page 50]as safe as easy; for, after the affair at Eyoree, that at Stickowih branch, and that of capt. Peter Gordon the year before, the colonel must have been convinced, no body of Indians would dare to interrupt so large a de­tachment. The 21st, at night, let us suppose these troops return to the colonel at Cowhih. The next day, the 22d, halt at Cowhih, and destroy those hon­ses. The 23d, the whole army march back to Nou­casih, only 3 miles: a sufficient detachment of light troops might have been sent before, to destroy the 160 houses and 420 acres of corn at that place, and at Taffih, Whatogah, Canugah, and Noihowih, in the way thither. And the next day, the 24th, suppose the army halt at Noucasih, and complete yesterday's work if necessary. Now the Middle Settlements also, on this side Stickowih branch, are completely destroyed; the colonel has been allowed sufficient time too, se­ven days, to march backwards and forwards from town to town, not 30 miles, besides the day the army is sup­posed to do nothing else but march from Etchowih to Cowhih, only 6 miles, which are included in the 30, to destroy in all 390 houses and 800 acres of corn, and 70 of these houses and 100 acres of the corn close to his camp too at Cowhih; was it not abundantly more la­borious and difficult, besides dangerous, to march backwards and forwards full 40 miles, with only his 1448 rank and file, to destroy the 190 houses and 530 acres of corn on Stickowih branch, and at Ellijoy in his way back to Cowhih? which he did in less than half the time. But supposing the detachment left at Cow­hih had been ordered, might it not, in the time it had, have completed a post, sufficient, with 100 tired men, to have secured all the wounded, and what provisions were left, only for a few days? This post need not to have been very strong; a few scouts might have been ordered to watch it; the army too would have been all round it; and then the whole body, when both divisions joined again, might have been employed in destroying those middle towns, &c. by detachments, which would have saved several days. However, as one would be determined to differ from the colonel as little [Page 51]possible, all possible contrivance has been made use of, to go the most round-about way to work that could be thought of, and I believe it would puzzle any inge­nuity but the colonel's to spin out the time one day longer; besides all this, the colonel had the whole summer before him; supposing he had first of all laid in a sufficient stock of provisions at the Dividings, he might have taken his own time and way too, and com­pleted every thing we wished for, long before the 16th of October, when, and not before, he left Keehowee to march downwards. The 25th of June, let us march from Noucasih to the Dividings, only 22 miles: when the colonel was last at Etchowih, only 3 miles within Noucasih, he could go with all his wounded, LOADED pack-horses, and litters, from thence to his camp near War-Woman's creek, full thirty miles: this shews he can make no difficulty here, unless he is so very unfor­tunate as never to be able to make one single good march, upon the same ground too, but when 'tis a stolen one.

Now we are at the Dividings, let us halt the next day, the 26th. On the 27th, suppose 500 men had been dispatched to Fort Prince-George, without or with all the sick and wounded, with the pack-horses, to bring back the fresh supply of provisions that was ordered from Cowhih the 13th (to be sure it would have been hurrying matters too much, to have left or sent such orders before); and the same day, suppose 1200 light troops, free from any incumbrance, only six or eight days provision each, had been dispatched to the Valleys, might not these men have done that work too with ease, and returned back again to the Dividings in that time; the whole march, backwards and forwards, not exceeding 100 miles at farthest; as good a route too as any the troops had gone yet; and the seven Valley towns lay all in one open valley, from the first to the last not exceeding 12 miles. These 8 days would have brought the 4th of July, when at least 10 days provision would have been left for the colonel's detachment at the Dividings; indeed there would have been more, because the 500 with the [Page 52]sick, &c. that went away 8 days before, need not to have carried above three days provision with them at most, so their allowance would have been saved for the remaining five days, and in fact [...]till they returned.

If the colonel th [...]nks I march too fast, I would only beg leave to remind him of the affair in 1760 that t [...]k its rise from Twelve-mile creek. He told us then, that " after marching 8 [...] miles from Ninety-Six in three days, without a ba [...]ting day," notwithstanding they had drawn the carriages up the steep and rocky banks at Twelve-Mile creek, "by the force of men; the horses could not do it, being fatigued and worn out;" and " the men were a little fatigued with a march of 20 miles that morning, from Beaver-Dams to the river;" yet those troops could still proceed from thence the same night, and never halt 'till they had effectually destroyed the Lower-Towns, much more scattered than the Middle; which they did after a march of 60 miles by 4 o'clock the next evening, without sleeping. Here are 124 miles marched in five succeeding days (should be six from 28th of May to 2d of June) with­out a halt, and three of then encumbered with waggons, that is, 20 or 25 miles a day for 5 or 6 days together. Now is there any more than one single day's march, according to the foregoing scheme, so long? the only long one proposed is 22 miles; the rest are very easy indeed. In the march to the Valleys, eight days are allowed to light troops, free the whole time from all incumbrances but their provision, to march only an hundred miles at farthest, not thirteen miles a day. Is there any comparison between the marches in 1760 and last summer? In those, 124 miles are marched in five or six days, many towns destroyed, and much other fatiguing business done: in these, only 176 miles, backwards and forwards, in 33 days, even including the separate marches of detachments (see the scheme at the end) about 5 miles a day: And if the colonel had gone to the Valleys, as was expected, that would have been but 100 miles more, about 8 miles per day on an average, only a third part of the mar­ches in the first campaign.

[Page 53] It may not be amiss to observe here, by the bye, that ten acres of Indian co [...] are much sooner and ea­sier pulled up, and effectually [...]ro [...]ed, th [...]n one of wheat or any British grain; as, 'tis supposed, there are at least 1000 stalks of wheat for one of Indian corn in an [...]re of ground, and a stalk of this may be [...]ed up with very little trouble or stooping.

The colonel, if he had planned his matters well, mi [...]nt have met the 500 at the Dividings, on his re­turn from the Valleys; if not, an express sent off im­mediately, would, in a day or two at most, have in­formed him, whether they might be expected in time. If a disappointment had happened, he could have re­turned to Keehowee immediately; if not, another 500 if necessary, might have been sent to escort the provi­sions, &c. to him. Now, had this step been taken, the colonel, two days after he had received a fresh supply of provisions, might have proceeded to Fort Loudoun, to take ample satisfaction of those principal aggressors, the Great-Warrior and the rest of the mur­derers there bouts and convinced those savages, that we had spirit and power enough effectually to [...]umbl [...] their insolence; and then, very probably, this would have had some effect on the Creeks too, and made them glad to give us satisfaction. As [...] dependance was to be placed on the Virginia forces last year as the year before; but if the colonel did really expect (which is hardly possible) that col. Byrd would be near the up­per towns about this time, would not his marching have greatly facilitated his enterprize, and confounded those Indians. However, if the scheme to Fort Lou­doun, which I believe was just as much intended as that to the Valleys (though this was expected, the other not) had no: been undertaken, has there not been at least enough said, to shew, the colonel had fall suffi­cient time, and to spare, to have gone to the Valleys and done the necessary business there; which had he done, there would not have been occasion for above a week or ten days halt at his return to Keehowee, at most; indeed, what purpose could a longer halt have answered? as this would have more than completed [Page 54]"HIS work." Is it usual to send repeated messages to enemies that we have so terribly mauled, to c [...]x them to come to a tr [...]aty▪ Would they not have come fast enough of themselves, at least with the first invitation? Must it not be expected, if the Indians were over pre­vailed upon to send any deputies, that they would send such as they did? a few second-rate fellows to cajole us, that had no interes [...] at all; with the Little-Carpen­ter, who had lost all his, and was besides always known to be our friend, at least in appearance: And indeed how could he shew himself more so, than by so kindly mediating, and endeavouring to pocify the Great-War­rior, the Standing-Turkey, and Judd's-Friend? How condescending, to stand proxy for all these three head-warriors of the nation, when the colonel had declared he would treat with no others? When this tripple proxy was asked, "are you come to sue for peace?" how could he but take the hint, and answer Yes? When this limited plenipotentiary objected to the rea­sonable and known satisfaction wanted, only four of the principal murderers to be delivered up, and said, "he must return to the nation and consult his people, as he could not agree to it himself;" was not the colonel as good-natured to save him the trouble, by telling him, that "if the governor would pass over that matter he should have no objection"? This could not be in­tended, to be sure, to give him the least expectation, that that principal article, the sole object of the war, would be remitted? However, was not this subtle In­dian politician as ready here to take the hint again, and visit Charles-Town to try, notwithstanding he had not a jot more power to consent to that matter here, if not given up, than when with the colonel? He could not but see, what weight the colonel's dex [...]rous conduct and powerful abilities must certainly have, to oblige us to concur. Now, supposing the colonel had not staid at all at Keehowee, when "his work was compleated already," if the Valleys had been part of it, might not the Indians have sued for peace, or let it alone, just as they pleased? (Or, was he sure, that WE could not possibly perform our part in treating, [Page 55]so wonderfully well as HE did his in fighting?) [...] there, in this case, have been any great danger o [...] sudden attack from the Cherokees, in want of p [...] ­sions that they could no where be supplied with from the upper nation?

The repeated messages, and fruitless solic [...]tions, [...] the Great-Warrior, to come down, could [...] serve to make him despise us the more, and [...]ncrease his im­portance, already too great, in his own nation. What greater proof could the colonel desire, to be convinced of the nothingness of his laborious peregrination, than the Great-Warrior's not coming at once? Was not this abundantly sufficient to convince him he was mis­taken; and that it was absolutely necessary to make [...] "generally expected march to the Valleys" as soon as possible! But all could not persuade him to keep his word, when a detachment of 1000 or 1200 light troops would have been sufficient and might have gone almost ten times to the Valleys, in the time he so de­structively negotiated away at Keehowee and Ninety-Six, 'till numbers deserted▪ Every body was tired out and dissatisfied, excepting the favourite suttling company, who were all of them well pleased " I DARE SAY." You must have heard, how a curious certifi­cate, relative to the colonel's honour in this marter, was obtained in Charles-Town, which, 'tis to be ho­ped, was at last amended, and generally, as well as o­bligingly signed, entirely to his satisfaction, with no other view, to be sure, but, at a proper time, to be laid before the public; for what use else can this ge­nuine proof of conscious innocence be of, so condescen­dingly and so timely anticipated? and the emphatical man­ner in which it MUST be penned, no doubt will im­mediately, upon sight, remove every outward scruple. Had it not been for the 14 weeks unnecessary delays at Keehowee, and five week more at Ninety-Six, the colonel might have been in Charles-Town long before the general's orders arrived to go to the West-Indies; but these had well nigh made him come too late to Martinique, to be present even at its capitulation.

Would not the coming away from Keehowee, with­out [Page 56]sending to the Indians at all, have shewn we despised them at least, and bid them defiance? especially, if the colonel had but DONE HIS UTMOST to destroy as many as be could the day of action, the only thing that can have any lasting effect upon them, as the assembly, the best judges of the temper of the Cherokees, plainly de­clare, in their advice to his honour the lieutenant-go­vernor in September last, when the Little-Carpenter first came down to treat: which message is so much to my purpose, not only in this, but so many other things I have advanced relative to this campaign, that I must beg leave to quote the greatest part of it here. " We are very sorry to find ourselves obliged, by the necessities and particular circumstances of the province, to advise your Honour to recede from the first, and what you con­sidered as the grand article, that must be infist [...]d on to sa­tisfy our honour, and shew to the world an evident acknow­ledgment of our superiority in arms, and at the same time to revenge the blood of our fellow subjects the late unhappy garrison of Fort Loudoun. We flatter ourselves we do not err, when we think that no province in America can have exerted themselves more vigorously than we have done this year: and with the assistance his majesty has been gra­ciously pleased to afford us, we had the greatest reason to hope, a solid and lasting peace would have been the happy conclusion of the campaign; especially, as the commanding officer had declared, "that he would not agree to any terms till he was in the center of the Cherokee nation, and that no preliminaries should ever be signed by him but in one of their town-houses." Had this been done by a speedy, and, we may say, generally expected, march, to the Valley, since the army's return to Keehowee, we flatter ourselves we should not be reduced to this disagree­able necessity, of advising your Honour to accept a peace, upon terms so precarious, and less honourable than we had reason to expect: but notwithstanding these expectations, we have foundation to think, by col. Byrd's letter to your Honour, dated only seventeen days after col. Grant's re­turn to Keehowee, that a peace was determined upon; for col. Byrd says, "my orders were, to co-operate with, and assist, col. Grant. That gentleman writes me, he [Page 57]has completed his work already; so that could [...] pro­ceed, I should not answer that end."— We dread the unhappy consequences that may attend col. Grant's depend­ing too much on the importance of destroying the Middle Towns; a thing be made light of last year, for in the letter your Honour then laid before this horse, dated 3d July, 1760, he says, "Destroying an Indian town may be credit­able; but, in fact, 'tis a matter of no great consequence, when the savages have time to carry off their effects" Again; "we might have gone to any town in their nation; but we should have had a brush to get at it, and then we should have found it, or indeed rather them all, abandoned," which was the case this year. We con­ceive that the ONLY THING in a Cherokee way, that will any effect to bring those savages to a firm and lasting peace, is, to destroy as many of their people as we can, and when an opportunity offers so to do, to miss it by no means, which, we fear, has been too much the case in the late ex­pedition and defensive action: and we are not without our apprehensions, that your Honour's information, that "their young men entertain no very respectable opinion or dread of the English manner of fighting Indians, tho' our numbers are formidable," may be too well ground­ed. From these reasons; as the province is already greatly loaded with taxes; and as we have little prospect of the war being carried on in a different, and what we conceive more effectual, manner, than hitherto has been done; or that the colonel of the provincial regiment, though of great influence, merit, and abilities, and well acquainted with the interest of the province, and the proper manner of treating the Cherokees, will ever be consulted: we are REDUCED TO THE NECESSITY of advising your Honour to agree to a peace, &c. &c."

In consequence of the above advice, the representa­tives of the province "were reduced to the necessity of giving," for the reasons therein mentioned, his ho­nour and the Little-Carpenter agreed upon the twelve articles which were signed by both the 23d of Septem­ber last, and then published in the gazettes. The first, and part of the last, is all I will beg leave to mention here.

[Page 58] Article 1st. " All the English prisoners, negroes, hor­ses and cattle i [...] their possession to be delivered up IMME­DIATELY to [...] Grant." Part of the last article, "That some of the he [...]amen from the Upper, the Valley, the [...] and Lewer Settlements, shall come down to Charles Town, to confirm these stipulations," &c. What was the principal reason that th [...]se articles of peace were not con [...]med and ratified at this time? Was it not, [...] had not brought down our people that [...] amongst them? If there was any other [...] not, that the quality of the eight pret [...]n [...] [...] C [...]rp [...]nter had then with him, [...] sufficient even to gloss over [...] our g [...]ea [...] necessities might [...] to [...] at the d [...]lusi [...]n?

When to [...] were signed the Little-Carpen­ter returned to his nation, and visited us again in De­center, fin by to rati [...]y and confirm them, with about 70 men, women and [...] only eight, by his well known [...] November given to capt. Mac [...] in coming down, were dubbed headmen; of these, perh [...]ps one or two at most, might have some little influence, in his or their own particu­lar town, but not one of any general weight in their settlements, much less THROUGHOUT the nation, not even the Little-Carpenter himself, as the Fort Loudoun affair glaringly demonstrated; for, what weight had he then, even in the upper towns alone? Did not the Great-Warrior and Standing-Turkey sign the garri­son's capitulation; and was it not soon after fatally convinced of their weight and treachery? What could the Little Carpenter then do? Why, he saved one gentleman's life. How? Did he not give all he had for him, even his rifle? 'Tis true, with his great inte­rest among the Indian wenches, he now and then procured the garrison some small pittance of provisions; but did not the other warriors threaten to kill these wenches, if they could find them out? Need any thing more be said, to prove he had lost all his interest even among his own people? The Great-Warrior, Standing-Tur­key, and Judd's Friend, the three KNOWN leading [Page 59]men of the Cherokee nation, thought, to come down would shew a condescention beneath them; and when these brevetted occasional headmen came, were they not again without our prisoners? (horses and cattle, to be sure, are not worth notice.) Notwithstanding this, we still finally confirmed and ratified the peace the 18th of December: and why could we not have done it as well in September, and saved our 500 pounds, not tribute, to be sure, the Indians won't take it in that light, but charity-money, besides other expences? Indeed the dread of ill usage to our unhappy fellow subjects amongst them, was the principal motive in the assem­bly, for giving that sum; next to the colonel's ma­nagement having so uselessly exhausted our funds, and disgusted our people in general, that it would be next to impossible for the province to raise any respectable body of men, even to oppose them should they break out again, and much more has he put it out of our power to raise troops for other purposes: Besides, as the peace WAS FINALLY RATIFIED, the assembly, though they did not approve of its being so without our prisoners being FIRST delivered up, yet, that they might throw no impediment in the way of so desirable an event, were induced to vote this sum. But I would ask here, if there was a pin to chuse, between the eight acting headmen the Little-Carpenter had with him in September, and those that attended him in De­cember? Why did they not the last time bring our prisoners? They told us truly they were still a hunt­ing; and so they have been ever since, to this day, poor fellows! Instead of getting any skins by their long hunt, I wish they may be able to save their own. —Surely capt. Watts must have been right, when he said, in the council-chamber, at the time the peace was ratifying, that the Little-Carpenter, "demanded presents, by way of ransom, for the prisoners not yet de­livered." I wish no mistake has happened, as it is believed we shall find that to be the case, directly or indirectly, at last, if we have them at all, which is much doubted by many.—What the representatives of the province, at this time thought of this peace, and [Page 60]the methods taken to bring it about, cannot be laid before the reader in a clearer and better manner, than by some of the transactions that passed in assembly at this time, relative to a certain curious talk o [...] the Little-Carpenter's, delivered to capt. Mackintosh at Fort Prince-George, the 15th of November▪ copy of which I shall subjoin, as it came to my h [...]s the other day from a gentleman, who had it from one of our warriors that was present when the Little Carpenter gave it, and then took it down AS he sp [...]ke it, with capt. Mackintosh's answers ▪ This talk the then assem­bly could not be favoured with a [...]ight of, though re­peatedly desired, in order to judge properly of the tem­per of the Indians, and advise his honour the lieutenant governor accordingly, upon that most essential matter the final ratification of the peace; for which, and other reasons, that vigilant assembly, with great pru­dence, spirit and judgment, took care not to slip the only critical moment they had, just before their dis­solution, that happened almost immediately after his present Excellency's arrival, to make him acquainted, as well as they could, in so short a time, with their opinion on that so momentous a concern to the pro­vince.

Here follow, in their order, all the messages, and parts of messages, relative to that talk, together with a letter from capt. Mackintosh, and part of a message regarding the Rangers, and the talk itself; on all which I shall leave the judicious reader to make his own observations, and beg leave to refer him to my last for some of mine, if they are thought worth his attention.

Capt. Mackintosh's letter is as follows:

Part of his honour the lieutenant governor's message regarding the Rangers, dated the 17th of December, is as follows:

Now, Sir, you plainly see the aukward and con­temptible situation the colonel's fine management has reduced us to with the Cherokees, even with our old friend too the Little-Carpenter. The expence this province alone (exclusive of any assistance) has been at in the war with these savages, for very little more than two years, amounts to upwards of £. 750,000 currency, more than equal to £. 107,000 sterling, of which full two-thirds might have been saved, had the colonel, in 1760, only marched immediately after the surprize at the Lower Settlements, without any delays, and loss of time spent in negotiations with the Indians, which no body, as ever I heard of, thought he had any business with; the province wanted his assistance only to fight them.

The Indians remain still quiet, and perhaps they may continue so 'till the French are able to supply them, tho' even this is very doubtful, for the spring is not yet far enough advanced, so as to cover the trees with leaves, and give them the opportunity of that secure cover they so much value in war. Our prisoners are still out upon the hunt, and if they are permitted to keep them (as well as the horses and cattle) or are paid for them, [Page 66]perhaps they may take compassion on us, and trouble us no more, especially as, 'tis to be hoped that, it will soon be out of the power of the French to supply them; this the matter seems entirely to turn upon: but only suppose this contingency should happen, what one rational security have we, that they would not immediately break out again and join them? Do not all their talks, all their behaviour, plainly shew, they will do only what they please, and are so far from fearing, that they despise us and make us their dupes; and will keep in with us just as long as it suits their humour, or 'till they can be supplied elsewhere, and no longer?

The colonel, very soon after his return from the French, after the affair at Fort Duquesne, was sent to us the first time, and did worse than nothing: He was sent to us again, a second time, and did twice as much: And, 'tis very probable, he has not yet shewn us half he can do in the same way; another expedition may be still necessary; the Valleys, the Upper towns, the principal aggressors, have not yet lost any of "THEIR most valuable effects;" only suppose (no unlikely thing) that those should break out again, may we not have the colonel sent to us a third time " to bring them to REASON"? and does the province want any thing more, than his presence a third time, as a commander in chief, to make all our estates as purely negative, as the pay of the soldiers and many of the officers was to them, when the monopolizing company of suttlers took their last leave of the camp.

This, Mr. Timothy, is my apprehension, and the principal occasion of this second trouble to you; and if the matters that are here taken notice of, are in the least degree instrumental to prevent so terrible an evil, I shall think I have done the public some service; if not, liberavi animam mea [...]. But, are we not particu­larly and extremely unfortunate, in these glorious and happy times all round us, when the numerous officers in his majesty's service have so generally distinguished themselves, that it is impossible to name them all, and to particularize any, would be shewing a want of de­licacy [Page 67]to the rest; that in these times, I say, we should twice running have this gentleman sent to our assis­tance, upon a most easy business indeed [...] which he had each time very evidently in his power to accom­plish, and completely answer all our wishes; but in­stead of doing it, has made matters abundantly worse, by mistaking his talents and business too. Have we any thing to blame for this but pure ill fortune? Ma­ny have thought indeed, that the transactions in 1760 ought to have been timely laid before the general, which would perhaps have had some effect, to prevent this complete master of insinuation, painting, and de­sign, from coming here the second time; but whose business was this? You'll say, the assembly ought to have concurred to give them the proper weight and sanction; but this could not be had from that assem­bly, whose three years sitting, according to law, ex­pired a few days after the colonel left us, in August, 1760; and very soon after the next assembly met, [...] account of his late majesty's demise arrived, which very soon occasioned that too to be dissolved, before any thing of this sort could have been properly done; and in the interim this gentleman was appointed again.

Numberless advantages, no doubt, attend the pre­sent glorious times, wherein his majesty's arms have so universally succeeded every where, but here; not in the colonel's rhetorical figurative manner, on paper only, but really in the downright honest British man­ner. But even amongst us, who are so particularly unfortunate as to be the only exception, is it a small advantage, arising purely from these times, to be able to point out the cause of our misfortunes, in a more open, plain and easy manner, than the times (as re­ported) no very great interval since, would have suf­fered us to do consistent with safety and prudence? when it was suspected to be, av'rice all, and

Our flag, inverted, trail'd along the ground. Then, how could it be expected, that WE should be able to make use of those delicate expressive hints,

[Page 68]Now, even an American may tell out the grievances of an injured province, in his own uncouth manner, without danger of giving offence, tempera mutantur. The heart is now sound, the touch'd parts are not a­bove skin deep at most, are soon distinguished, and as soon removed, to the great case and advantage of the rest. Avarice, artifice, pretence, imposition, design­ing self-sufficiency, neglect, and gross misrepresenta­tion, may be pointed at, whatever little dirty corner they may sneak into and huddle together, without that nice and difficult delicacy that must have been absolute­ly necessary heretofore, when so general a room was supposed to be afforded them. To make use of that nice stile now, would, if we were able, be not only al­together unnecessary, but an affront to the times, and imply a doubt of that so general and visible change for the better.

I gave you some reason to expect in my laft, that I would furnish you with a calculation of the profit gained on a hogshead of rum sold by the suttlers in Mr. Lyttle­ton's camp at Keehowee in December 1759; and also of that gained by the suttling company last summer at same place, in col. Grant's camp. The two principal suttlers in 1759 paid 32 s. 6 d. per gallon for their rum in Charles-Town. The beginning of last summer this article might have been bought for 14 s. per gallon, and even at 13 s. 9 d. as I have been well informed a con­siderable quantity was then bought by the suttler. Now supposing a hogshead of rum of about 110 gal­lons to weigh about 1000 lb. which I am informed is allowed for a hogshead one with another.—

But allowing 16 gallons for leakage and pilferage, which is about 15 per cent. then the remaining 94 gallons, [Page 69]supposed to be sold at Keehowee, must cost there the above 238 l. 15 s. that is about 50 s. 9½ d. per gallon.

Then deducting 16 gallons as before for leakage and accidents, the remaining 94 gallons will cost 137 l. at Keehowee, that is about 29 s. 2 d. per gallon.

Then as one gallon of rum that cost at Keehowee in 1759, 50 s. 9½ d. was never sold for more (though sometimes for considerably less) than 6 l. per gallon. The same quantity that cost only 29 s. 2 d. last sum­mer, ought to have been sold there, in order to gain the like proportional profit, at 3 l. 8 s. 10¼ d. (say 3 l. 9 s. or even 3 l. 10 s.) which leaves above 140 per cent. clear gain; but it was still sold at 6 l. therefore the diffe­rence, 50 s. currency, upwards of 7 s. sterl. per gallon, that is above 170 per cent. MORE (over and above the other moderate profit of ONLY 140 per cent.) was exorbi­tantly squeezed out of the poor soldiers pockets.— N.B. As the army in 1759 did not then halt above three weeks, and that in the middle of winter, at Keehowee, and the troops last summer were fourteen weeks there, the suttling company this last campaign, besides other advantages in so long a halt, had an opportunity of putting off a prodigious quantity of other goods, more than the suttlers in 1759 could; for which rea­son, the company might have afforded their goods much cheaper, in proportion, than the others were able to do▪ in the summer too, when grass was plen­ty, it would have been worth while to have had wag­gons and horses of their own, especially for so long an opportunity, and this I am told that company had, which must make their freight much lower still, as there was no danger then of their horses perishing in the woods for want of food. In my last I took notice of the advanced price on several other articles.

[Page 70] 'Tis high time, Mr. Timothy, to finish this tedious letter. The matters mentioned therein, happened dur­ing the three difficult and laborious assemblies I had the honour to serve in. Whether my remarks are to the purpose, or no, the candid reader will certainly be the best judge: I am sure, he will at least be convinced, that I have not, in that time, been inattentive to the most materials concerns of the public. I shall hardly ever trouble you with a third letter. I am conscious of no prejudices against any man, or that I have exceeded the bounds that truth, honour, sincerity, and duty to the public prescribe.

Prejudices of MOST sorts, of a national nature, be­tween man and man, are contemptible to the last de­gree; but ALL those of a domestic nature, are not only so, but infamous and hurtful too, and subversive of the true general interest of the community. I call all those demestic prejudices between man and man, where any set of individuals of the same monarchy, because they happen accidentally to be born in this street, this parish, this county, or this larger division of it, or for any other as partial trifling distinction whatever, are influenced thereby in their interdealings, connections and judgments, to the injury of their fellow subjects born in a different part. All the individuals of the same monarchy, from one extreme to the other, ought to be thought countrymen, and have such a regard for each other as is consistent with the whole. The small limited preferences that nature may point out among friends and relations, can be but few, and if not car­ried beyond her bounds, cannot have a bad tendency, as none of her rules have. All the men in a parish, and more so in a large division of a monarchy, cannot be thought to know each other; time and accident ought to be allowed their due effect with all subjects alike; and nothing can be more despicable and prejudicial to a community, than for any set of men, to make the intervention of what they contractedly call a countryman, the fine quâ non, or test of their sincerity, friendship, and favours. Is not this dividing a kingdom against itself, the consequence of which we know very well from [Page 71]the highest authority?—There cannot be many, sure­ly, amongst us, if any, of these narrow destructive sentiments; but if there should, they ought to be pi­tied: And, if a contrary behaviour, of impartiality and generosity among their fellow subjects, receiving them with open arms every were, will not open their eyes, and make their little hearts glow with more en­larged and grateful sentiments, and restore them to their true, general, and equal gravitation, they must be left to feel the natural consequences such a selfish behaviour, when generally perceived, must occasion. NOTHING can possibly be said for ANY of these domestic preju­dices between man and man; they must be ALL as o­dious as hurtful. As to SEVERAL of the national while mankind are divided into different monarchies and go­vernments, and, according to the fluctuating situation of all human affairs, frequently involved unhappily into a state of war with each other, SOMETHING may be faid in their favour: for instance, under the many gal­lant and prudent officers at this time in his majesty's navy, may not, and has not, a good use been frequently made, of that common prejudice that our most useful experimental philosophers, the honest British tars have among them, that one Briton is as good as six Frenchmen. In short, national prejudices between man and man may be sometimes serviceable; but domestic, are always de­structive and abominable, and whatever may be thought,

That for his generous well-timed intrepidity when the national circumstances required it, to despise all dan­gers, and attempt every thing, even under such great and numerous disadvantages as he had to encounter at Quebec: This for his determined steadiness and fortitude, to be overcome by no difficulties, but still to push forward, and clear his way as he advanced, 'till he had fully accomplished his most important work at the Ohio, though at the same time death-struck, and carried upon a litter many hundred miles, through frosts and snows, in the midst of winter. Military heroism cannot well be carried farther, than it was by these [Page 72]two gentlemen, who will ever be remembered with honour, as long as any spark of it remains in the Bri­tish American colonies.

My aversion to appear in print, was the only reason I did not sign my name to my first letter: As I did not do it then, that is an additional reason for my omit­ting it now: Indeed the sensible reader will regard the arguments and them only; if they are not to the purpose, no name whatever can make them so, and much less mine. However, it may be necessary to conclude here, with what I told you when I delivered my last, not to conceal from any person, whose mo­tive of enquiry is not impertinent curiosity only, what is the real name of