THESE are the words of our Lord Jesus Christ: and the occasion of them seems to have been as follows—He had been preach­ing the gospel in Jerusalem, and the neigh­bouring cities of the Jews; and had, by the purity of his doctrine, the holiness of his life, together with the nature and number of his miracles, convinced many persons, that he was the Messiah that was to come, [Page 2] and that they were not to look for another. However the chief of the Scribes and Pharisees rejected him as an impostor, attributing his miraculous works to the power of magic, or his supposed familiarity with evil spirits.

Now it is easy to see what an influence this conduct of the Scribes and Pharisees in vilifying our blessed Saviour, must unavoidably have upon the generality of the people. For they were in the highest esteem amongst the Jews, both because they were supposed to have the deepest insight into things of a religious nature, and, at the same time, to be men of extraordinary piety. This favourable opinion concerning them, was indeed ill-grounded. But they had the talent of imposing upon the people, in great perfection; and, in fact, managed matters with so much craft and subtilty, that they were thought almost the only saints in the world, and the great oracles to be consulted upon all occasions. The people placed an implicit faith in their dogma's and decisions. Nothing was thought to bear the genuine stamp of truth, unless they had had the coining of it: And their censure of any particular person, or doctrine, was sufficient to make either of them odious to the multitude.

WHEN, therefore, these infalliable guides stigmatized our Lord as an ill man; when they reproached him as one, who, without any reason or authority, was attempt­ing to discredit certain opinions which they had received to have and to hold from their fore-fathers; when they accused him of making innovations in the old established religion, to the great hazard of the souls of men; I say, when they talked and railed in this pious strain, it gave a general alarm to the people, especially to the supersti­tious vulgar; and exposed our Lord to their contempt and hatred and insults. They gave themselves no far­ther trouble to inquire into the grounds of his pretensions to the messiah-ship; concluding that he must needs be a [Page 3] deceiver, who was condemned by such a learned and holy body of men, as that of the Scribes and Pharisees.

FEW of them condescended so far as to come and hear him preach, (this being represented to them as dangerous) that so they might know what he had to say for himself: and those that did, came rather as spies, that they might find occasion to cavil, and to ac­cuse him to the Priests and Pharisees, than with such an unprejudiced and candid disposition as became inquirers after the truth.

BUT although the generality of the Jews were such abject slaves to the dictates of their spiritual instruc­tors, never daring to hesitate concerning the truth of what they asserted upon religious subjects, but receiving every thing, how absurd soever, with all the humility of implicit faith; yet it seems, that in their temporal and worldly concerns, they were cautious enough. Here they were not fond of taking up satisfied with any man's word; but were forward to think, inquire and judge for themselves.

THIS is a short character of the people to whom our Lord speaks in the text. And this being kept in view, his address will appear very natural and seasonable.— And he said also to the people, When ye see a cloud rise out of the west, straightway ye say, There cometh a shower; and so it is. And when ye see the south-wind blow, ye say there will be heat; and it cometh to pass. Ye hypocrites, ye can discern the face of the sky, and of the earth: but how is it, that ye do not discern this time? Yea, and why even of your selves judge ye not what is right?

THESE Words seem to be very plain of themselves: but the sense of them may be expressed more at large in the following paraphrase.—

[Page 4] ‘AND after these things, Jesus addressed himself to the Jews, who were generally prejudiced against him, thro' their blind attachment to their spiritual guides; and said—Ye that suffer yourselves to be led blind­fold by others, with regard to me and my doctrine, and things of a religious concern in general, are never­theless sagacious enough in matters of equal difficulty, and much less importance—Ye are apt and skilful enough at distinguishing the signs and tokens of things that are to come to pass in the natural world, in which your present interest is concerned. ^† Ye can, (for example) by observing the colour of the sky, and the blowing of the wind, form a true judg­ment concerning the future change of the weather. How comes it to pass, then, ye deluded hypocrites, that amidst all your sagacity in things that relate to the present world, ye are still blind and undiscerning in things of a religious nature? why do not ye that can presage various changes from the appearance of the earth and heavens, discern also the periods and revolutions of things; the various dispensations of providence in the moral world? In particular, how comes it to pass that ye do not distinguish the present season, in which God is erecting a new dispensation, to succeed that of Moses? There are signs and tokens enough to convince you that such a revolution is now taking place, if ye would but examine them atten­tively. Why, then, will ye suffer yourselves to be blinded by the authority of the Priests and Pharisees, when God has given you sufficient abilities to gain the knowledge of the truth? Why will ye not exert your own faculties, and judge for yourselves what is true and right in this matter, as ye do in things of a worldly nature?’

[Page 5] THUS I have endeavoured to give a true idea of the original scope and meaning of the words which I have chosen for the subject of my present discourse. I shall now wave every thing in them peculiar to the time and circumstances wherein they were spoken; and observe from them several universal truths which concern all times and persons and places alike.

As

• I. THAT there is a natural difference betwixt truth and falshood, right and wrong.
• II. THAT men are naturally endowed with faculties proper for the discerning of these differences.
• III. and lastly, THAT men are under obligation to ex­ert these faculties; and to judge for themselves in things of a religious concern.

I. THEN, there is a natural difference betwixt truth and falshood, right and wrong.— Why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right?

BY what is right, it is probable that our Saviour here more immediately intends, what is true; for his discourse in this place turns upon examining, judging, and inferring one thing from another. But whether by this term we understand, what is true in theory, or what is right in practice, it will come to much the same thing at last; for there is an inseparable connexion betwixt them. If certain things are true in speculation, there must be some correspondent fitness of actions resulting therefrom. And, on the other hand, if any thing be allowed fit in a practical sense, that fitness or rightness must be founded in certain truths and relations before subsisting. I shall, therefore, take it for granted, that the text supposes, That there is in nature both a True, as distinguished from speculative Error; and a Right, as distinguished from [Page 6] Wrong in Conduct. And the remainder of this discourse will be taken up with these important distinctions.

INDEED the spending of time to prove that there are really such differences as those mentioned, may appear to some to be rather childish impertinence, or formal trifling, than a proper employment for reasonable Crea­tures, it being such a plain and obvious truth. However it is to be remembered, that no notion is too absurd to deserve to be refuted, while some are absurd enough to propagate, and others to believe, it: especially if it be such an one as strikes at the root of all religion, and every thing wherein the happiness of mankind consists.

AND such is the notion of an absolute indifference in nature with relation to truth and falshood, right and wrong. For this being allowed, it follows that we have no invariable rule of life and conduct. No man, upon this supposition is under a possibility either of judging or acting amiss; or of the contrary. Each man thinks as justly as another, how contrary soever his sentiments are: And so also each one acts as rightly as any other, let him act how he will. This is to make short work with all questions and debates concerning truth, religion, and the rule of human conduct: it supersedes all inquiries about them, by presupposing that they have no existence but in the idea of certain doting men who have employed themselves in inventing arbitrary distinctions.

THERE seem to have been two species of Scepticks in the World: one of which exploded the whole notion of truth and right, as opposed to falshood and wrong con­duct: and another which seemingly allowed such differ­ences to have an existence in nature; but held it impos­sible for us to discern them. It is only the first of these opinions that we are concerned with at present; the latter will be considered in our next discourse.

[Page 7] To begin with truth—Notwithstanding what some are pleased to pronounce with their lips concerning the indifference of truth and falshood, it is hardly possible but that their hearts should be at variance with their mouths, and give them the lie, even while they are de­nying there is any such thing as falshood. For if there be any thing existing, (which surely no body was ever so absurd as to deny) there must necessarily be such a thing as truth; truth, as abstracted from mind or intel­ligence, being nothing distinct from the real nature and properties of things existing. Whatever exists, has a real existence; and if so, it cannot be true that it has no existence. Whatever has a being, must also exist in some certain, determinate manner; with such and such properties, affections and attributes; with such and such proportions, aspects and relations. And we can as little alter these by our opinions, as we can cause the things themselves to exist and not exist, alternately, as our thoughts vary concerning them. Thus truth is some­what determinate in itself; it exists indpendently of our notions concerning it: And the precise boundaries be­twixt that, and falshood, are also determined by the real nature and properties of things, whether they are per­ceptible to us, or not.

TRUTH, as it exists in the mind, is nothing but the perception or knowledge of that independent truth now mentioned; or a knowledge of things as they really exist. And as it relates to words and propositions, it is nothing but the right use of certain arbitrary signs, having a meaning annexed to them by common consent; i. e. the using them in such a manner that they shall be con­formable to, and expressive of, the real nature and pro­perties of the thing treated of.

To return—Can any man think it equally true that he does, and that he does not, exist? I instance in this, because it is familiar; but the same question may be [Page 8] asked concerning every thing else. This is an universal dilemma, applicable to every thing that comes under con­sideration—"It is, or it is not." No middle way can be taken. This is indeed no new discovery: it is self-evident, and a first principle.

THUS, that we either do, or do not, converse with sensible objects, so that one may be truly affirmed, and the other denied, is as plain as it is, that we either do, or do not exist. We may proceed in the same manner to consider things, which, if they exist at all, lie beyond the reach of our animal senses. It is as certain in itself, that there are, or that there are not, spiritual and invi­sible agents, as it is that there are, or are not sensible ob­jects. And with relation to the being of a GOD, it is as plain, that there is, or that there is not, such a Being, as that there are, or are not, invisible agents in general.

WE may descend in the same way to all the particular questions that have arisen concerning the particular na­ture of this Being, upon supposition he exists—concern­ing the nature of his government—concerning the reality of a revelation from him—concerning the im­mortality of our souls, &c. There must necessarily be a true and a false, with relation to every question that can be proposed, or come into our minds. We cannot so much as doubt of the truth of any particular proposi­tion, without supposing that truth lies on one side or the other.

IT will be observed that I have not attempted to de­termine any of the above-mentioned questions. This was beyond my present design. All I aim at, is to show, that there is, and must be, a natural distinction betwixt truth and error, in general; a distinction which does not depend upon the precarious humours and opinions of men: Whatever judgment we may form in any particular [Page 9] case, it no ways affects the truth of it. Truth still re­mains the same simple, uniform, consistent thing, amidst all the various and contrary opinions of mankind con­cerning it.

THE natural distinction betwixt truth and falshood being exploded, such paradoxes as these must follow—That no man's opinions are either right or wrong—That however contrary the sentiments of different men are to one another, they are both equally conformable to the nature and reality of the things they judge upon—That there are neither any knowing nor any foolish men in the world—That what we usually call wisdom and folly, are the same—And, what is stranger than all, That these paradoxes are neither true nor false—

IF there be any such thing as wisdom, as opposed to ignorance and folly, it consists in knowing the truth; and a man is wise in the same degree that he does so. There is no knowledge, but of some truth or fact: Or, in other words, knowledge presupposes the being of truth, or something to be known. Now if there be no such thing as truth, there is nothing to be known: and consequently every man, yea, every being whatever, must be intirely ignorant and destitute of knowledge; as de­stitute of it, not only as the horse and mule which have no understanding, but as any part of senseless inanimate mat­ter. So that notwithstanding all the noise there has been in the world about wisdom and folly; notwith­standing the universal applause that has been bestowed on some persons, as gloriously distinguished from the rest of mankind by a happy genius and peculiar sagacity; yet in reality all this is at bottom nothing but empty words without any meaning at all. Socrates and Plato, Locke and Newton, were not superiour, in point of wisdom, to the most illiterate husband-man. Nay; upon this sup­position, even Pyrrho and Arcesilaus themselves, the great leaders of the sceptic tribe, knew no more than those [Page 10] whom they upbraided with their ignorance. This, in­deed, is a consequence which the Pyrrhonists will hardly be perswaded to own. For there are none more apt than they, to value themselves upon their superiour wisdom and penetration. And they please themselves in par­ticular with the thought of their being the discoverers of this mighty arcanum, that there is no such thing as truth, as distinguished from error. But if there be no such thing as truth, why will they please themselves for their sagacity in making this discovery? Or why will they endeavour to bring others over to their opinion, when by their first, and I might add, their only, principle, those others are no more in an error than themselves. Such is the perplexity, the endless labyrinth, that a man brings himself into, by asserting for truth, that there is no such thing as truth.

WE are indeed left intirely in the dark with respect to many things; our knowledge is, at best, but of small extent; and the opinions of men are various. It is this that has given some men occasion to confound truth and error, as though there were in nature no differ­ence betwixt them. But I hope it is needless to say any thing more in opposition to an opinion so directly contrary to common sense.

I proceed now to the other distinction mentioned above; the distinction betwixt right and wrong in conduct And, as it was before observed, such a distinction must necessa­rily take place in consequence of the former. There are, perhaps, some things so indifferent as no ways to affect practice, whether they are true or false. But there are other principles which, being allowed true, imme­diately induce upon us an obligation to act in a particu­lar, determinate manner; so that to act thus shall be right and reasonable; and to do the contrary unfit and wrong.

[Page 11] THUS, for example, it being supposed, That there is some particular course or method of acting, which tends to promote our happiness upon the whole; and that a contrary conduct tends to our misery, (which by the way are not bare suppositions, but plain facts) a fitness of the former course of action, in opposition to the latter, necessarily follows. For happiness being in itself a good, and misery an evil, it is in itself right and reasonable to pursue the former, and to avoid the latter. If to this we add, (which experience shows to be fact also) that the same course of action which tends to private hap­piness, tends to publick also, this lays us under a twofold obligation to take that course. For it is in itself right to do good to others, as well as to ourselves, happiness being as valuable to them as it is to us. From this general principle our obligation to what is usually called moral and social virtue; to fidelity, justice, charity; to humility and temperance, may be easily inferred. For it is appa­rent, from experience, that by the steady, uniform prac­tice of these virtues, both the good of individuals, and of the publick, is promoted. Indeed it seems impossible but that such a practice as tends to the good of one, should tend to the good of the other also. For publick happiness is nothing but the happiness of a number of in­dividuals united in society: So that if the individuals of which the society consists, be happy, the community must necessarily be happy also. And on the other hand, the community is rendered miserable in the same degree that individuals are so. Virtue, then, is what we are under obligation to practise, without the consideration of the being of a God, or of a future state, barely from its apparent tendency to make mankind happy at pre­sent.

AGAIN, let us suppose, (what is at least supposeable) That there is a God; a being who created, and who governs the world, in infinite wisdom and goodness: i.e. in such a manner as to communicate the greatest possible [Page 12] happiness to his creatures considered collectively.—This being is plainly the object of esteem, gratitude, love, reverence, trust, &c. to all his rational creatures. His character is in itself amiable and perfect. To treat him with contempt, or disregard, is to treat him as being what he is not; which certainly cannot be right. Piety, therefore, is what we are under obligation to, upon sup­position there is any such being as this, existing.

BUT farther—If there be such a being, he is perfect in all moral excellence, and therefore we, and all other intelligent beings, are under obligation to copy after, and imitate, him, according to the condition and capa­city of our natures, without the consideration of his en­joining it upon us by any express and positive law. For so far as we fall short of him, we fall short of per­fection, according to the supposition, he being the rule and standard of perfection. And so, on the other hand, we are perfect, in proportion as we resemble him in the tem­per of our minds; and imitate him in the conduct of our lives. And this brings us in another way, to the former conclusion, viz. That we are under obligation to practise what is usually called moral virtue; for by this we imitate God: and fall in with his benevolent design in creating and governing the world.

AGAIN—It follows upon the supposition of such a being, That his declared will ought to be universally the rule of our actions, in whatever manner it is made known to us, whether by natural reason, or supernatural revela­tion; and whether we are able to see the reason and grounds of his injunctions, or not. For, properly speak­ing, our obligation to obey the commands of such a being as knows and wills always what is best, does not arise in any degree from the particular manner in which we come to the knowledge of his commands; or from our seeing the grounds of them: but solely from our knowing that they are in fact his commands: Thus if [Page 13] this being has, commanded us, besides practising such moral virtues as those mentioned above, to do certain things not dictated by the light of nature; if he has commanded us to submit ourselves to Jesus of Nazareth as his Son and Delegate, and our Lord and Master; we ought to comply immediately with his will, assoon as it is made known to us. For it is apparently wrong and unreasonable to thwart the will and authority of him who is infinitely wise and good, although he had no power to chastize us for it. It will not so much as bear a dispute, whether it is wrong or not, to act counter to the injuncti­ons of that being in any case, who in every case injoins that, and that only, which is reasonable for him to in­join.—If he command with wisdom and goodness, we cannot disobey without folly and wickedness.

BUT after all, there is really no necessity of going so far to find our obligation to what is usually called moral virtue, as to consider its tendency to happiness; its ren­dering us like to God, the standard of perfection; or to inquire whether the practice of it be injoined upon us by the positive will and command of God. We may find the grounds of this obligation nearer home, even in our own breasts. There is such a law written in our hearts; such an internal consciousness of the moral excellency of virtue, and of the odiousness of its contrary, as really leaves us no room to doubt of our obligation to it; and so, in a great measure supersedes all other arguments. For we cannot ordinarily violate the rules of justice, &c. without violating our own minds at the same time; and turning our own accusers.

THE principal objection that can be urged against the moral difference of actions, is taken from the difficulty there is, in some cases, to determine the boundaries be­twixt right and wrong; the variety of opinions that have prevailed in the world concerning questions of right, especially in political affairs; and the different, yea, [Page 14] contrary laws, enacted by wise men in different ages and countries, and all equally under the notion of their being right and equitable. ‘But (to use the words of a learned writer ^*) as in painting, two very different colours, by diluting each other very slowly and gradually, may, from the highest intenseness in either extreme, terminate in the midst insensibly; and so run one into the other, that it shall not be possible even for a skilful eye to determine exactly where the one ends and the other begins; and yet the colours differ as much as can be, not in degree only, but intirely in kind, as red and blue, or white and black: So though perhaps it may be very difficult in some nice and perplext cases (which yet are very far from occuring frequently) to define exactly the bounds of right and wrong, just and unjust, and there may be some latitude in the judgment of different Men, and the laws of divers nations; yet right and wrong are neverthe­less totally and essentially different; even altoge­ther as much as white and black, light and dark­ness.’

THE admirable writer whose words I have here quoted, seems very charitably to attribute men's intirely con­founding right and wrong, to the difficulty which they find in some cases, to determine what is right and equita­ble, and what wrong and injurious; or to discern the ter­minating line betwixt them. And this difficulty is doubt­less what gives men an opportunity to oppose the notion of such a moral difference in actions, under some little colour of argument. However an internal perception of the moral difference of things in general, is so inter­woven with our very nature, that it is hardly credible that any man should really think all actions to be indif­ferent in their own nature. Or if any actually entertain such an opinion, it is not natural. It does not proceed [Page 15] so much from men's originally wanting clear ideas of the difference in general betwixt right and wrong, as from their having made these things indifferent, as far as their own practice could effect it. Men have naturally as clear a conception of the general difference betwixt moral good and evil, antecedent to all consideration of human laws and compacts, yea, to the consideration of the will of God himself, as they have of the difference betwixt light and darkness. But as the organs of sight may be abused and weakened to such a degree that a man shall at last perceive no difference betwixt the night and the day: and as most of our other animal senses may be perverted and debauched, so as to be incapable of an­swering their original design; so also men's natural consci­ence of good and evil, may, by frequent violations, lose its quickness; and the mind itself become blind, cal­lous and insensible. Our natural sense of the moral dif­ference in actions and characters, may be rendered dull and useless. And thus the law written in the hearts of men by the finger of God himself, may be repealed, and erased by the powerful influence of vice: whereupon they deny that there was ever any such law engraved on their minds. This is just as if Moses, when his anger wax­ed hot, and he cast the two tables of the law out of his hands, and brake them beneath the mount, should have immediately denied that God had ever written them, or given them to him to preserve. It is natural for men of corrupt minds and morals, to endeavour to get rid of all uneasy reflections upon what is past, and terrible pre­sages of what may be future, by intirely throwing aside the distinction betwixt moral good and evil, as if these were but empty names without any meaning, invented by civil and ecclesiastical tyrants to keep the world in awe.

HOWEVER, although the vices of men may go far towards darkning their understandings, it is not to be supposed that the most degenerate of them ever arrive at [Page 16] such a state of blindness as to have no real sense of the difference betwixt right and wrong, whatever they may pretend. For such a sense in some degree of it, seems inseparable from a rational nature: and cannot be totally extinguished, but with reason itself. And it is worth ob­serving, That with how good a conscience soever the great masters of scepticism pretend they commit the most flagrant immoralities, under the notion of all things being indifferent in their own nature; yet they cannot help betraying themselves, and showing their natural sense of right and wrong, upon certain occasions. For who are more averse than they, to take the character of knave to themselves, though they generally take no care not to deserve it? They chuse to be esteemed as men of honesty and integrity. And when it comes to their own turn to be injured, they are as ready as any of their neighbours to accuse the aggressor of wrong and injustice. If their moral sense were before asleep, suffering injuries awakens it in a moment. And if they are not right down atheists, they are ready to think strange that God should let his thunder sleep while such villanies are perpetrated.—Thus hard is it for men to disguise the inward sentiments of their hearts in this case: the mask will drop off, and nature peep out in some unguarded hour—

IF men would go no farther than to assert, That there are some questions of right, so intricate and complicated, that it is difficult, or even impossible, to determine them, none would contradict them but such arrogant and con­ceited persons as imagine their knowledge has no limits. But when, not content with this, they boldly strike at the foundation of every thing that is good and praise worthy, by denying the moral difference of actions in general; and yet upon every turn, are complaining of injuries and abuses, done, or offered to themselves; it is hard to say whether they are more proper objects of pity or contempt; of indignation or ridicule: For they have doubtless a good title to all.

[Page 17] THERE can be no danger of being too severe in cen­suring men of this stamp. For what they say concerning the absolute indifference of actions is either false or true. If it be false, nothing is too bad to be said of them for thus setting aside the moral difference of actions; for putting the most excellent virtues and the most odious vices upon the same footing; for making it as in­nocent for a child to murther his aged parents, as to kill a viper; and to blaspheme his Maker, as it is to deride a sot; and, in this way, dissolving all the ties and obligations both of private and of social virtue. But, on the other hand, if what they assert be true, there is not even a bare possibility of injuring them; for there can be no such thing as wrong or injury, if all actions are absolutely indifferent in their own nature.

I hope it in some measure appears from what has been said, That as truth has a real existence in nature, so the distinction betwixt right and wrong necessarily takes place in consequence thereof. And thus I have done with the first thing proposed.

THE next thing proposed was to show, That men are naturally endowed with faculties proper for the discerning of those differences of which we have been speaking. But this must be left for the subject of another dis­course.

I shall conclude for the present with an obvious infer­ence from what has been said; viz. That since truth and right have a real existence in nature, independent on the sentiments and practices of men, they do not necessarily follow the multitude, or major part: nor ought we to make number the criterion of the true religion. Men are sickle and various and contradictory in their opinions and practices: but truth and moral rectitude are things fixed, stable and uniform, having their foundation in the nature of things. They will not change their nature out of [Page 18] complaisance to the most numerous and powerful body of men in the world. We may conform to them; but they will not condescend to us. Were number the mark of truth and right, religion itself would be a perfect Proteus, sometimes one thing, and sometimes another, according to the opinion that happens to prevail in the world. But if one man may err, why not two? And if two, why not two thousand? And then, why not all mankind? If truth and right are somewhat fixed, and men sickle and various, men may err both with respect to principle and practice. But upon the other hand, if truth and right have no existence but in the opinions of men, then indeed they might depend upon number and mul­titude. But then it may be reasonably asked how many votes are necessary to change a great lie into a glo­rious truth? how many, to change a flagrant crime into a meritorious virtue? and a sinner, into a saint? The church of Rome has been trying a great while to bring about these wonderful changes and revolutions: and has indeed effected it to the satisfaction of many. But ne­vertheless these are but some of the lying wonders of him, whose coming is after the working of satan, with all de­ceivableness of unrighteousness. It is still false that bread is flesh; or wine, blood. Murther remains a vice still nor is breach of faith and perjury any virtue at all.

THE multitude may do evil, and the many, judge falsly, Iniquity may be established by a law; it may have all the power and wealth of the world engaged on its side to support it, while truth and right may be left solitary and friendless. Noah was left alone; singular indeed, but still a preacher of righteousness. He was a perfect and upright man in his generation; and, for that reason, was preserved in the ark, the multitude being first drowned in a flood of vice, and then deluged in a flood of water. Thus also was Lot singularly righteous, while the multi­tude in Sodom and Gomorrah first burned with impure lusts, and were then devoured with flames from heaven, [Page 19] being set forth for an example, suffering the vengeance of eternal fire. And how few were there that adhered toour blessed Saviour while he was in this world? He was despi­sed and rejected of Men, as well as a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief. It was the body of the people that was against him. They did not discern the time, nor judge what was right. Even to this day, how small is the number of those who worship the Father in spirit and in truth, according to the simplicity of the gospel, com­pared to those that are immersed in gross ignorance, superstition, and all kinds of immorality. The whole collective body of christians, makes but a small com­pany, compared to the rest of mankind. The Roman Catholicks again are much more numerous than the Pro­testants: and they have long ago voted Us, Hereticks. However there is no man in his senses that will allow himself to be in an error, because he cannot get so many hands held up in favour of his tenets, as another. Infallibility cannot be the result of a great number of fallibles: nor perfection be found in a large body of such as are each of them, considered singly, imperfect. But nevertheless we daily see that the principal argument with which some endeavour to propagate their opinions is, that they are generally received, i. e. in that particular place or country: and if they can but add, that they were the doctrines embraced by their pious fore-fathers, this they reckon such demonstration as no man in his senses can resist. Such idle, superficial cant may gull the thoughtless multitude: but will be despised by all others.

IF we must needs be governed by number in the choice of our religion, it is certainly reasonable to be governed by the greatest number. And if so, we must be neither Calvinists nor Arminians; Trinitanians, nor Unitarians; Quakers, nor Anabaptists; Churchmen, nor Presbyterians; Papists, nor Protestants; nor Jews, not Mahometans; but we must even turn Heathens at once, [Page 20] Paganism being the most universal Orthodoxy in the world.

IT will be observed, that I have said nothing for, on against, any of the different parties here enumerated: All I propose, is to show the unreasonableness of chusing our religion by vote. This, considering the fickleness and capriciousness of mankind, amounts to much the same thing with chusing it by lot. For whether the major or minor part shall have truth and right of their side, is intirely precarious: To day it may be so; To morrow, otherwise.

NOR is it needless for us to be upon our guard in this matter, considering how natural it is to the generality of mankind, especially to such as are of an indolent, in­curious make, to follow the most numerous and powerful party, both in principle and practice, without troubling themselves about the merits of the cause. Many would almost shudder at the thought of an unfashionable vice, or an unpopular doctrine, who would nevertheless readily embrace the same vice and the same doctrine, when un­attended with the disadvantage of being contrary to the mode. What we abhor when out of date and fashion, we are apt to admire upon a change of times, when it comes to be reputable. It is most agreeable to us to herd with the multitude; to believe and act as they do, right or wrong. This gratifies our innate propensity towards society: and many advantages naturally attend him that has the majority on his side. He procures the good-will of all about him, by falling in with their favourite opi­nions and practices, while the dissenter is either ridiculed or railed at, and labours under innumerable inconveni­ences. Hence it often comes to pass, that we are insen­sibly attached to such corrupt opinions and practices as we should have abhorred, had they not been reputable and popular. For the sake of being with the many, we daily see some not only renounce their reason and under­standing; [Page 21] but break through all the ties of honour, friendship, humanity, charity and piety, making intire shipwreck of a good conscience. Afterwards they ima­gine that number is the principal criterion of truth; and flatter themselves that they are always secure of being in the right, while they adhere to that side that can carry the vote. This conforming humour is too prevalent in the world at present; and always was. Particularly it was so amongst the Israelites in the time of Moses. For which reason, that great Jewish Lawgiver gave them the prohibition with which I shall close the present dis­course— Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil: neither shalt thou speak in a cause to decline after many to wrest judgment.

THE second thing proposed, was to show,

II. THAT as there is a natural difference betwixt truth and falshood, right and wrong; so men are na­turally endowed with faculties proper for the discerning of these differences.

[Page 23] THIS is evidently implied in my text— How is it that ye do not discern this time? Yea, and why even of your selves judge ye not what is right?

IT must be acknowledged that the Pyrrhonists, who demand great encomiums for teaching men (not to know any thing, but) to doubt of every thing, have not ge­nerally carried their Scepticism any farther than to deny all certainty in a relative sense, or with respect to us. To the most of them it appears too gross to affirm that there is no difference in things themselves; and so no such thing as truth and right absolutely, in opposition to error and wrong conduct. What they principally in­sist upon is, that all things are totally incomprehensible by us; that there is no criterion of truth and right; by which they may be distinguished from error and wrong action: So that although there be, in nature, a difference betwixt them, yet we have no faculties for discovering it.

Now upon this state of the case, it is evident that the questions in the text would be altogether imperti­nent—as impertinent as they would have been upon the former supposition, That there is no real difference in things; but all propositions, equally true; and all actions, equally right. When it was asked— How is it that ye do not discern this time? Yea, and why even of your selves judge ye not what is right? it would have been easy and natural to answer— ‘Because we have no faculties to distinguish betwixt truth and error, right and wrong. These things are left so uncertain and precarious with respect to us, that after all our re­searches, we are as distant from them as ever. It is not possible for the most critical inquirer to find the truth in any instance, this being like a bird that constantly flies from us with a speed proportioned to that with which we pursue it. All we can do, is first to fatigue our selves in quest of truth, and then [Page 24] to delude our selves by fancying we have found her.’

SUCH is the dark and unhappy condition in which the sceptical doctrine supposes mankind! doomed to total ignorance, and wandering from the right path: Or if, in any case, they think and act right, it is by mere chance; nor can they have the pleasure of knowing it, if they happen to be in the right. But it is to be hoped that the Author of our being has not been so sparing of his favours to us, as to leave us at such uncertainties about every thing, especially about what concerns our own welfare. However, were this really our case, one would think that those who are sensible it is so, instead of deriding the doctrine of a supernatural revelation, (as is the practice of modern Scepticks) should accommodate the words of David to their own case and circumstances— Who will shew us any good? Lord, lift thou up the light of thy countenance upon us! The blinder we are naturally, the more need we have of supernatural light and instruction.

THE doctrine of our total incapacity to distinguish be­twixt truth and falshood, right and wrong, has much the same aspect upon common life, civil society, philosophy and religion, with that of the absolute indifference of all things in their own nature: And the like absurdities will follow from it. Thus (for example) it follows that there is no difference at all in men with respect to wisdom and knowledge. For in order to constitute such a difference, it is not only necessary that there should be a natural distinction betwixt truth and falshood; but also, that some, at least, should have faculties for disco­vering it. Knowledge, if there be any such thing, con­sists in seeing or perceiving truth. But if no men have a capacity for this, all men must be intirely destitute of knowledge; as destitute of it, as if there were in nature no distinction betwixt truth and error.

[Page 25] THE doctrine of our inability to discover truth and right, has much the same aspect upon common life, civil society, philosophy and religion, with that of the absolute indifference of all things in their own nature. It as effectually precludes all inquiries concerning truth and virtue, private and publick good; and every other subject. For what does it signify to us, that there is a true and a right in nature, while it is supposed, we have no faculties for discovering them. If they lie intirely beyond our reach, we have no more concern with them, than if they had no existence at all: and it is folly for any one to busy himself about them. Nor can any man consistently take satisfaction in his own opinions and ac­tions, as though the former were true, and the latter, right; or blame another for error in principle or prac­tice, while he asserts that there is equal evidence for the truth of all opinions, and for the regularity of all ac­tions; i. e. no real evidence for the truth and regularity of any. Upon this supposition, he that denies his own existence, and commits murther, adultery and robbery, has as much to say in his own vindication, as he that as­serts a circle is not a square, and saves his country from ruin. And from hence it appears, that those who carry their scepticism no farther than to question the abilities of men to discover truth and right in all cases, are guilty of the same inconsistency with those who explode the whole notion of a real distinction betwixt truth and right, and their contraries. For why will they attempt to in­vestigate truth? Or why will they plume themselves upon their supposed discovery of this notable truth, That men are unable to discover truth? Why will they up­braid their antagonists with ignorance? Why will they, in any case, attempt to vindicate their own conduct, under the notion of its being right? Or why will they censure that of others, and resent things under the no­tion of injury? This has ever been their practice; which goes wholly upon the supposition, that truth and right are not only somewhat real in nature; but also, that they [Page 26] be distinguished from their contraries, at least by these sagacious men themselves. What Ariadne's clue can be found to extricate them from this labyrinth of folly and contradiction? If there be no criterion of truth, let them not pretend to have found one themselves; and then deride others for supposing that truth may be dis­covered. There are many dogmatists about the world, who allow themselves only to be the proper judges of truth and right; which is arrogant enough. But no bigotted dogmatist in half so absurd and insolent as the Sceptic. For he endeavours to make a monopoly of truth, and to engross the whole of that sacred treasure, to the beggaring of the rest of mankind, even while the first (and I might add, the only) article of his creed is, That truth cannot be discovered by any. It is hard to say, whether this conduct has in it more of stupidity or of insolence. But thus much is certain, that a thorough-pac'd Sceptic is the most silly, conceited and inconsistent bigot in the world.

HE that allows of no certainty in any case, cannot even be sure that he imagines there is no such thing as certainty. Perhaps he may be mistaken in thinking he believes what he says he believes. To say he is certain he believes what he thinks he does, is to admit of cer­tainty in general, which is to give up the point in question. But supposing him certainly to know what his own sentiments are, how comes he to know that any one contradicts them; or differs from him in opinion? He need not make himself uneasy at the opposition of any supposed adversaries: For, upon his own scheme, these adversaries and their opposition, may not be real, but wholly imaginary. And if one should call him hard names, persecute him for his opinion, and answer his argu­ments with a brick bat instead of a syllogism, this may be imaginary also. At least, he has nothing to complain of, upon his own principles; for such a conduct towards him, may possibly be as right and reasonable, as it in to [Page 27] feed the hungry, and clothe the naked. And indeed such treatment might possibly be the most effectual way to bring him to his senses. ^†

BUT to come more directly to the point—Some things are in themselves so evidently true, that no criterion is necessary in order to our knowing them with certainty. Thus, for example, that we exist, is what we have an immediate and intuitive certainty of. And the same may be said concerning the reality of all our own ideas and perceptions. That we experience pleasure and pain; that we converse with various objects which affect us in a dif­ferent manner; that colour is one thing, and sound another; and that smelling is not tasting; these things are self-evident, and no medium can make them plainer. But it will perhaps be said, that all this is only phansy and imagination, there being no archetypes existing without us, of which these perceptions are the images or representations. Be it so: still the perceptions and ideas themselves are real: this we are certain of, whether there be any thing external, of which they are the an­titypes, or not. So that certainty may be had in some respects at least. And this is sufficient to our present purpose; for we are not speaking concerning the extent, but the certainty, of human knowledge.

OF the truth of other things we may be certain in a different manner, viz. by reason, deducing them from other truths of which we have an intuitive knowledge. Thus it is that a thousand mathematical truths are de­monstrated; and that with a certainty little or nothing [Page 28] inferiour to those first principles from which they are deduced, the connection in every step through the whole process being so apparent, that to suppose the contrary would be a plain contradiction, and amount to the de­nying a thing to be what it is acknowledged to be. And in the same way many moral and religious truths may be demonstrated also—As the being of a God; his power, wisdom, goodness and providence: and our obligation to obey him.

For the truth of many other things we can, indeed, have no more than probable evidence; but which is, in many cases, almost as satisfactory to the mind as intuitive and demonstrative certainty. Thus who doubts but that the sun will set in a few hours?—that the sea will ebb and flow to morrow, as usual?—that autumn will suc­ceed to summer; winter, to autumn; and spring, to winter, as in times pass? But of these things there is no certainty. For God has power to put a stop to the usual course of nature; and we cannot be certain that he will not do it the next moment. Thus also probable evi­dence is all we can have for the truth of facts recorded in ancient history. Men may possibly deceive us. But who has ever been in such a doubting humour, as to question whether there have been such men as Alexander the Great, and Julius Caesar; whether they fought, and triumphed, &c? Indeed we can have no more than probable evidence that food and sleep will refresh us for the future, as heretofore. Our whole institution of life, as it relates to the present world, is grounded upon evidence of this sort, and not upon intuitive or demon­strative certainty. Such evidence is easy to be had; and is sufficient to the purposes of life, as daily experi­ence shows us. We may, if we please, perplex ourselves about the nature of time, place and motion: But men who are no philosphers, find the way home at one o'clock without any difficulty. We may puzzle ourselves about the essences of things, and the manner in which one ope­rates [Page 29] upon another: But experience teaches the husband­man how to manure his fields, so as to make them fruit­ful: We all know that drink allays our thirst, and food, our hunger; nor do we ever hesitate whether we shall make use of them, or of something else, to remove those natural uneasinesses. But still there is no infallible and necessary connection betwixt those causes and the effects that are usually produced by them.

NOR is there more room for scepticism in relation to morals and religion, than in common life; nor indeed so much, with regard to the principal branches of our duty. But, however it comes to pass, men take more pains to doubt in one case than in the other. We have stronger evidence for the proof of the chief articles of religion, than we have for most other things, of which we are fully satisfied. The being and perfections of God may be known without much difficulty; and these being known, it is as easy to know how we ought to conduct ourselves towards him in general, as it is for a servant to know how to please a master whose temper and character he is ac­quainted with. And it is at least as plain that the Sovereign of the world will make a distinction betwixt the righteous and the wicked, as that a wise and good prince will make a distinction betwixt dutiful subjects, and rebels.

THUS it appears, in general, that men are able to dis­tinguish betwixt truth and falshood, right and wrong. But I shall now make several observations upon this pro­position, in order farther to explain the real intention of it, to obviate some objections against it, and to guard it against those abuses to which it may appear liable.

And

1. IT is not intended in this assertion, that all men have equal abilities for judging what is true and right. The whole creation is diversified, and men in particular. There is a great variety in their intellectual faculties. [Page 30] That which principally distinguishes some men from the beasts of the field, is the different formation of their bodies. Their bodies are human, but they are in a man­ner brute all beside. Whether the difference that there is in the natural powers of men, proceeds from the ori­ginal make of their minds, or from some difference in those bodily organs upon which the exercise of the rational faculties may be supposed to depend; it is apparent that there is, in fact, such a difference. And therefore when it is said that men are able to judge what is true and right, it must be understood in such a sense as is consistent with this fact. Those of the lower class can go but a little ways with their inquiries into the natural and moral constitution of the world. But even these may have the power of judging, in some degree. However, upon sup­position that some were wholly ignorant even of their own existence, it does not follow that all must be so, any more than that all bodies must be round, because some are of that particular figure. From the most dull and stupid of the human species, there is a continual rise or gradation, there being as great a variety in the intellec­tual powers of men, as in their bodily and active powers. And so it may be true of some in an higher and more proper sense than of others, that they may even of them­selves judge what is right. Many things are obvious, and, in a manner first principles to them, which to others are mysterious and incomprehensible.

2. As a farther limitation of this assertion, I would observe, that it does not imply, that the same persons are equally adequate judges of truth and right, in all con­ditions and circumstances. There is a great difference in the powers of different men: But no one differs more from another than he does from himself, considered in childhood and mature life, before and after his mind is cultivated by study and exercise. The man knows what the child was ignorant of. We come into the world ignorant of every thing. But he that, in his natural, [Page 31] rude and uncultivated state, is unqualified to judge what is true and right, unless it be in a few obvious cases, is capable of considerable improvements by study and ex­perience. Our intellectual faculties were given us to improve: they rust for want of use; but are brightened by exercise. Exercise strengthens and invigorates our mental faculties as well as our bodily. And the more a man habituates himself to intellectual employments, the greater will be his aptness and facility in discovering truth, and detecting error. Without some previous study and application, it is as impossible that men should be accurate judges of truth and right, as it is that they should be compleat artificers in any mechanical business, without spending time to learn the trade. They may bungle and cobble; but can do nothing that will bear the inspection of a master-workman. It is the unhappiness of a great part of mankind that they do not sufficiently consider this natural weakness, ineptitude and awkward­ness of human reason before cultivation; but sit down contented with their imaginary sagacity and prompt­ness of understanding, without using the proper means to qualify them for judging of things that may come under their consideration. Hence it is that we have so many quacks and ignorant pretenders in all arts and sciences—What need of study to come at an acquain­tance with those subjects which we may understand at any time only by opening our eyes? Who will descend into the bowels of the earth to dig for gold, while it lies in plenty within his reach upon the surface of the ground? Who will dive for pearls, while he imagines they float upon the waves? Or what need has that field of tillage, whose soil is so fertile, that, like that of Eden, it pro­duces spontaneously the richest fruits? When men ima­gine that the depths of science may be fathomed by a single glance of thought, without any previous appli­cation to intellectual exercises, it can not be expected that they should be able to determine justly upon any points but some of the most familiar and obvious. In [Page 32] this case, he that was born like the wild asses-colt, must needs continue to be so; or, at best, come to maturity, and grow up into an ass himself.

THE alteration which time and study make in the abilities of men for judging concerning truth and right, is sufficient to account for the diversity of sentiments entertained by the same persons at different periods of their life, without having recourse to scepticism, or sup­posing all our notions, from first to last, to be mere phansy and illusion. A man may err once without erring always. Nor can we argue from the reveries of youth, and the absurd conceits of the illiterate, that all mankind are but a mighty nation of fools and luna­ticks, pleasing themselves with idle dreams and delusive appearances, instead of realities.

3. THAT men are able even of themselves to judge what is right, does not imply, that they can receive no assistance from books, and the conversation of learned men; Or that they may judge as well without these helps as with them. Although all men are capable of discerning truth and right in some degree, by the bare exercise of their own natural faculties, it does not follow that they can stand in no need of any foreign aid, in order to their judging in a more perfect manner. The more knowing may be helpful to others in their pursuit of knowledge. And the abilities of men for reasoning justly, and judging truly, may depend, in a great measure, upon the method of their education, the books they read, and the genius and abilities of the persons they converse with. Who will pretend that the natives of Greenland, or the Cape of Good Hope, enjoy the same, or equal, means of knowledge, with those that are born in the polite and learned nations of Europe? Who ima­gines that one brought up at the plough is as likely to form right notions of things, as if he had been educated at a university? Or that a man who has con­versed [Page 33] only with ordinary Mechanics, has the same advantages with those who have enjoyed the fa­miliarity of the greatest proficients in literature? To suppose these things, is to contradict daily experi­ence. And, therefore, to decline all assistances from others in the search of knowledge, under a notion, that we are able to judge even of ourselves what is right, is pride and vanity, and not the part of an ingenuous in­quirer after truth. This may be allowed by the most strenuous asserter of mens natural abilities, and natural right, to judge for themselves, without any appearance of inconsistency or contradiction. For it amounts to no more than this, that some men are superiour to others, and may help them to the knowledge of some things which they would not have known without their assistance.

4. IT is not implied in this doctrine, that mens intel­lectual powers have no bounds at all; or that they are equally able to determine upon all points, although they should improve all the helps to knowledge, and culti­vate their reason in the best manner possible. There are many cases wherein the wisest of men are unable to form any judgment at all—difficulties which they cannot solve—heights which they cannot climb—depths which they cannot fathom—Some may, per­haps, think this a reflection upon human understanding. And indeed it is so, if it be any reflection upon it to say, that it is not infinite like that of God; but not otherwise. To say that human reason is confined to a certain sphere, beyond which it cannot penetrate, is, in reality, no more than to assert that man is a finite, and not an infinite, being; a creature, and not the Creator. There are probably created intelligences much superiour to man even in his best estate: But it is no derrogation from their real dignity, to say they are not omniscient. Why then should man grasp at omniscience? imagine he may know every thing because he may know some? [Page 34] and look upon it as a reproach, when it is said that his reason, and all his other faculties are circumscribed?

WE may know what is proper to be known by beings of our rank, so as to fill our place, and answer the design of our creation, without being able to comprehend all things. We may know that this earth is inhabited by creatures, the law of whose nature is virtue, and its end happiness; although we cannot certainly tell whether the planets are inhabited, or not; or, if they are, by what kind of beings, and what their condition and cir­cumstances. We may know, in general, what tends to health and felicity in this world, although the real essen­ces of things should be beyond our reach. We may know that whatever came into existence, (as it is demon­strable that every thing did which we behold) must have some invisible cause adequate to it, although we were not able to form a clear idea of creative power, or the manner of its exertion. We may know that beauty, order, harmony and design, in the works of nature, pre­suppose a designer, or, intelligent artificer; although we cannot comprehend the system of the universe. We may know that a constitution of things, actually tend­ing to happiness, must be the product of goodness, al­though we are not able exactly to define, beforehand, that system the correspondent parts of which shall be so adjusted as to effect the greatest possible good. We may know in general that the Author of the world must be a wise and good being, although the final causes of some things which we see in it, are beyond our sight. In fine, we may know that God is, and that he is a rewar­der of them that diligently seek him; although we cannot by searching find out the almighty unto perfection; or comprehend his nature; or see through the whole scheme of his works, government and providence.

THE wisest of men was not ashamed to own this imperfection of human reason, even under its greatest [Page 35] improvements, and carried to its most exalted pitch. When I applied mine heart to know wisdom, says Solo­mon, then I beheld all the work of God, that a man cannot find out all the work that is done under the sun; because though a man seek it out, yet shall he not find it; yea farther, though a wise man think to know it, yet shall he not be able to find it. However Solomon was no Sceptic. In the same book we find him saying, that wisdom excel­leth folly, as much as light excelleth darkness: And with him the conclusion of the whole matter is,— Fear God, and keep his commandments; for this is the whole of man. Whatever he might be in doubt about, he was satisfied of this, That there was a God who governed the world, that his will and commandments might be known, and that the business and happiness of man, con­sists in obeying them.

Again,

5. WHEN it is said we are able even of ourselves to judge what is right, this is not designed to suggest that our in­tellectual faculties are so capacious as to render a su­pernatural revelation of no use or importance to us. Certainly we cannot suppose this to be the intention of him that uttered the words of our text, since one of the titles which he took upon himself, was that of a Prophet, or a Teacher sent from God. And indeed it necessarily follows from the supposition of our rational faculties be­ing limited, that there is room for our being instructed by revelation. If one man may instruct another, much more may we suppose it possible for him that is perfect in knowledge to supply the natural defects of human reason by a supernatural communication of light and knowledge. When, and how far, it is expedient for him to do this, He only knows. However upon sup­position of such a revelation, we must be supposed to be able to see the evidence of its being such. It is the proper office of reason to determine whether what is proposed to us under the notion of a revelation from God, be attended with suitable attestations and cre­dentials, [Page 36] or not. So that even in this case, we may of ourselves judge what is right. If there be no rational evidence of its coming from God, no rational man can receive it as such: And, on the other hand, if it be ac­companied with rational evidence, no reasonable man can reject it. Indeed what Jesus Christ, particularly blames the Jews for in the text, is their not exercising their reason in this way. He had sufficiently proved his divine mission; but they would not discern the time, nor judge what was right, being under the influence of prejudice, and not of reason.

MOREOVER, it is the proper office of reason to de­termine the meaning of the particular parts of a re­velation, after the divine authority of it in general is established and allowed. And this mens natural fa­culties qualify them for, much in the same manner that they qualify them for interpreting other writings. If God gives men a revelation, he gives it to be under­stood by men: And if he gives it to be understood by men, he must give it in human language, and accommodate it to human capacity. For otherwise, a second revelation would be necessary to explain the first: And then, why not a third to explain the second; and so on in infinitum? And so nothing would be really revealed after all.

I shall just add in the

6th, and last place, as a farther limitation of the proposition before us, That it does not intend that we are able to determine, with an equal degree of certainty, all points which we are capable, in some sense, of com­ing to a conclusion about. Although truth does not ad­mit of degrees, yet the evidence of truth does. So that of various propositions equally true in themselves, some may be known with greater certainty than others. Probable evidence is indeed all that can be had in most cases, as was observed before. It is by virtue of this, [Page 37] that the intercourse of man with man, and all the business and commerce of the world, is carried on. Experience shows that such evidence is sufficient in secular affairs: And it may be sufficient in religious affairs also, in those cases where absolute certainty cannot be had.

I shall now conclude this head concerning the cer­tainty and sufficiency of human knowledge, with the words of Mr. Locke. ‘If—any one, says he, will be so sceptical as to distrust his senses, and to affirm that all we see and hear, feel and taste, think and do, dur­ing our whole being, is but the series and deluding appearances of a long dream, whereof there is no rea­lity; and therefore will question the existence of all things, or our knowledge of any thing: I must desire him to consider, that if all be a dream, then he doth but dream that he makes the question; and so it is not much matter, that a waking man should answer him. But yet, if he pleases, he may dream that I make him this answer, that the certainty of things ex­isting in rerum natura, when we have the testimony of our senses for it, is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs. For our facul­ties being suited not to the full extent of being, nor to a perfect, clear and comprehensive knowledge of things, free from all doubt and scruple; but to the preser­vation of us in whom they are; and accommodated to the use of life; they serve our purpose well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of those things which are convenient, or inconvenient to us. For he that sees a candle burning, and hath experimented the force of its flame, by putting his finger in it, will little doubt that this is something existing,—which does him harm, and puts him to great pain: which is assurance enough, when no man requires greater certainty to govern his actions by, than what is as certain as his actions themselves. And if our dreamer pleases to try, whether the glowing heat of a glass [Page 38] furnace, be barely a wandring imagination, in a drowsy man's fancy; by putting his hand into it, he may per­haps be wakened into a certainty, that it is something more than bare imagination. So that this evidence is as great as we can desire, being as certain to us as our pleasure or pain, i. e. happiness or misery; be­yond which we have no concernment, either of know­ing or being. ^†’

THUS it appears that men are naturally endowed with faculties proper for distinguishing betwixt truth and error, right and wrong. And hence it follows, that the doctrine of a total ignorance, and incapacity to judge of moral and religious truths, brought upon mankind by the apostacy of our First Parents, is without foundation. How much brighter and more vigorous our intellectual faculties were in Adam, six thousand years before we had any existence, I leave others to determine. It is sufficient for my purpose to consider mankind as they are at pre­sent, without inquiring what they were before they had any being. And it appears that they have now a natural power to judge what is true and right, with the restric­tions mentioned above. But it is, nevertheless, the man­ner of vain Enthusiasts, when the absurdity of their doctrines is laid open, to fall a railing, telling their oppo­sers that they are in a carnal state, blind, and unable to judge: but that themselves are spiritually illuminated. Thus they endeavour to palm the grossest absurdities upon their neighbours, under the notion of their being divine truths and holy mysteries: So that these en­lightened Ideots make inspiration, and the Spirit of truth and wisdom, the vehicle of nonsense and contradictions. Whatever is reasonable, is, with them, carnal: and nothing is worthy of belief, but what is impossible and absurd in the eye of human reason.

[Page 39] WE see that our Blessed Saviour did not suppose that the minds of men had suffered any such total eclipse, or were wholly overspread with darkness. He addresses the unbelieving Jews as if they had proper faculties for judging of religious truths; and blames them for not ex­erting them— why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right?—The candle of the Lord which was lighted up in man at first, when the inspiration of the almighty gave him understanding, was not extinguished by the ori­ginal apostacy, but has kept burning ever since. The divine flame has catcht from father to son; and has been propagated quite down to the present generation: Nor will it be put out 'till the sun himself shall be dark­ned, and the moon shall not give her light.

LET us retain a suitable sense of the dignity of our nature in this respect. It is by our reason that we are exalted above the beasts of the field. It is by this, that we are allied to angels, and all the glorious intelli­gences of the heavenly world: Yea, by this we resem­ble God himself. It is principally on account of our reason, that we are said to have been created in the image of God. So that how weak soever our intellectual faculties are, yet to speak reproachfully of reason in ge­neral, is nothing less than blasphemy against God. Let us, therefore, instead of contemning this inestimable gift, in which consists the glory of our nature, employ it to the ends for which it was designed, in the service of the great Father of our spirits.

BUT we have had occasion, in this discourse, to speak of the imperfection, as well as of the strength, of human reason. He that is not sensible of this imperfection, is so far from being the wisest of men, that he knoweth nothing yet as he ought to know it. Professing himself to be wise, he becomes a fool; the knowledge of ourselves being the first, last, point, the alpha and omega of human wherein. The knowledge of our own ignorance, is the [Page 40] most important and beneficial of all sciences. This will naturally lead us to humility; and excite us to improve, with gratitude and diligence, all the means of knowledge which we are favoured with; especially that revelation which God has given us by his Son, whom he has sent from heaven to be a light unto the Gentiles, as well as the glory of his people Israel. A Sense of our ignorance would also teach us modesty in criticising the works of nature and providence. The scheme of God's govern­ment is vast; our understandings are narrow, and not proportion'd to it. We are at present, as it were, but rational beings in embrio, unborn to light and knowledge. At least we are mere babes in speculation; we speak as children; we think as children; we understand as chil­dren: But perhaps we may e'erlong become men, and put away childish things. 'Till we arrive at that maturity of life and knowledge, towards which we are in progress during our abode in the present world, we ought not to think strange that our understandings are baffled; or that many things remain mysterious and unaccount­able to us, both in the natural and moral government of God. And instead of boldly censuring the author of the universe, as taking wrong measures in any respect, it becomes us to use that humble language, not only of a great man, but an inspired apostle—O! the depths of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments; and his ways past finding out!—Now to the King eternal, immortal, invisible, the only wise God, be honour and glory forever, through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

HAVING attempted to show, in two former dis­courses up on these words, That there is a natural difference betwixt truth and falshood, right and wrong: And, That men are naturally endowed with fa­culties proper for the discerning of these differences: I proceed now to show in the

[Page 42] IIId. And last place, That men are under obligation to exert these faculties; and to judge for themselves in things of a religious concern. It cannot be doubted but that this is fairly implied in my text. For the words evidently carry in them a severe censure and reproof of the persons to whom they were originally addressed, on account of their neglecting to judge for themselves concerning our blessed Saviour, and his doctrine. He makes this neglect, an argument of their hypocrisy, one of the basest vices— Ye hypocrites, ye can discern the face of the sky—and why, even of yourselves judge ye not what is right?

THE subject before us being the duty of private judg­ment, I shall briefly explain what I intend by persons judging for themselves; or by freedom of thought and inquiry in religious matters: And then show, that this is what we are all obliged to.

Now what I intend by a man's judging for himself with freedom, and exerting his own faculties in the search of truth and right, may be comprised under the following particulars—

THAT he suspends his judgment intirely concerning the truth or falshood of all doctrines; and the fitness or unfitness of all actions; 'till such time as he sees some reason to determine his judgment one way rather than the other. He that desires to come to the knowledge of the truth, puts himself in a state of indifferency with regard to the point to be judged of; that so his mind being as it were, in aequilibrio, his judgment may be de­termined solely by reason and argument. He does not bring his old prejudices and prepossessions to determine the point; but comes prepared, by an unbiassed mind, to receive the impressions of reason, and of reason only. All propositions are the proper subject of inquiry and examination, except first principles, which are few in [Page 43] number, and which do not extend to any doctrines either of natural or revealed religion, how nearly soever they may be connected with some of both. And therefore, in order to our judging with true freedom, we ought to consider all such doctrines with an eye of indifferency, neither fancying them to be true or false; nor even wishing them to be so, till we see they are connected with, or contrary to, some of those first principles of human knowledge, which being self evident, are not the subject of examination. Thus, for example, we ought not to believe that there is, or that there is not a God; that the Christian religion is from God, or an imposture; that any particular doctrine fathered upon it, is really contained in it, or not; or that any particular sect of christians, is in the right, or in the wrong; 'till we have impartially examined the matter, and see evidence on one side or the other. For to determine any point without reason or proof, cannot be to judge freely, unless it be in a bad sense of the word. So that suspense or indif­ferency, is the first thing implied in free inquiry: or, to speak more properly, it is a pre-requisite, and prepara­tory to it.

AGAIN: The next step towards freedom of exami­nation and judgment, is the exerting of our own reason in weighing arguments and evidences that offer them­selves to us, or that are offered by others. He that in­quires freely after truth, is not content with barely sus­pending his judgment till such time as evidence forces it self upon his mind. In this way, a man may perhaps avoid error; but will not gain much knowledge; for truth is coy, and must be courted. To gain any conside­rable degree of knowledge, it is necessary that we are active and vigorous in the pursuit of it; that we make use of all the means and helps to knowledge that are within our reach; that we inquire into facts; that we view things in different lights, not taking up satisfied with first appearances; that we weigh the arguments [Page 44] that are brought to support any doctrine or practice; that we balance them with contrary arguments; and the like.

ANOTHER thing implied in the freedom of judgment is, that a man honestly embraces for truth, whatever there appears evidence for, without endeavouring to evade it, to shift it off, or stifle the conviction of his own mind. To inquire into evidence, is to no purpose, unless we fol­low it wherever it leads, and chearfully receive the truth wherever it is to be found; whatever notions it may contradict; whatever censures it may expose us to. It is an idle and inconsistent thing to examine, if we are determined before hand to retain our former sentiments; to believe as our fore-fathers did, or as any particular body of men does at present. A man does not really inquire after truth and right at all, unless he determines from the very first, to have no superstitious veneration for great names; but to yield himself up to evidence wherever it appears; and how much soever it might have contributed to his present interest and reputation to have embraced other tenets.

LASTLY: Judging with freedom and impartiality, implies, that in giving our assent to any proposition, we give it in proportion to the degree of evidence that ap­pears to support it. All truths are not equally clear and incontestible: Innumerable lie quite beyond our sight; some just down upon our minds; others appear in a strong and convincing light, tho' not so strong as to exclude all doubt; while others glare upon us with all the force of demonstration. Now as there are innumerable degrees of evidence betwixt the lowest probability, and that in­tuitive certainty which we have of first principles; so a man ought not to give the same degree of assent to every thing he receives for truth; but to proportion his assent to the nature and degree of the apparent evidence, whe­ther it be greater or less. Not to assent to what is, in [Page 45] the lowest degree, probable upon the whole, discovers a backwardness to entertain the truth. And, on the other hand, to give an assent to any truth, over and beyond what the nature of its evidence naturally demands and calls forth, is much the same thing with believing without any evidence at all. For all that redundancy of assent, if I may so express it, is mere credulity and rashness: and this is as unbecoming a reasonable creature as ob­stinacy and perverseness.

HAVING thus briefly explained what I intend by judg­ing for ourselves, with freedom, I proceed now to show, That this is what every man is under obligation to do. This I propose to prove directly by reason and revela­tion; and then to answer the principal objections that are urged against it.

EACH individual has an interest of his own depending. We find, by experience, that we are all capable of being happy or miserable to a great degree. Pain and plea­sure, at least, are private and personal things. And even they that arrogate to themselves the right of judging for us, do not pretend to feel for us also. Now if it be of any importance to us to be happy for ourselves, it is of importance to judge for ourselves also; for this is ab­solutely necessary in order to our finding the path that leads to happiness. Indeed if others can afford us any assistance in finding this path, it is reasonable to make use of it; but not to give ourselves up intirely to their di­rection. It is the greatest folly imaginable, to give our­selves no concern about our own welfare, unless we were certain it is secured to us already, so that we cannot pos­sibly miss of it, which is a supposition contrary to daily experience. We find that our happiness depends, at least in some degree, upon our conduct; and that we often take some wrong step, through ignorance; which ought to be a warning to us to look about us, and take heed to our ways.—Without knowing which is the [Page 46] right path, we can never take it, unless it be by chance; and though we should be so fortunate as to get into it, we cannot have the satisfaction of knowing it.

IN our present imperfect state, such inquiries as the following, become every man that has not yet resolved them in his own mind— ‘What is my chief good? Where is the road that will convey me to my happi­ness? Where shall I find this inestimable jewel? this pearl of great price? In what mountain shall I dig for it? In what ocean shall I dive? Amidst the various opinions, and contrary pursuits of mankind, what road shall I myself travel? What course shall I steer? Shall I find my felicity in retirement and solitude? Or in the noise and bustle of the world? Is it to be found in the humble and quiet cottage? Or in proud and envious courts? Is it to be found in peace at home? Or in war abroad? Does it consist in indulg­ing to my animal nature without controul? Or in im­proving my mind in what some men call wisdom and virtue? Shall I seek it in my own country? Or ex­plore some distant region in hopes to find it? Shall I search it upon the seas, or upon the dry land? In the earth beneath, or in the heavens above? In this world, or in some other? Is my spirit immortal? Am I to survive the dissolution of my body, and to live forever in some other state? Or shall this vital spark that thinks, perceives and wills, and is anxious about futu­rity, be wholly extinguished in a few days, when my body falls to dust? Is there any being who created, and who governs the world? Or is this beautiful and stupendous fabrick of the universe, the offspring of chance? And without any guide, overseer or ruler?—a fatherless World, which the next moment may fall into ruins, or into nothing? If there be a God, what is his character? Is he powerful, wife, righteous and good; or is he not? Does my happiness depend upon pleasing and obeying him, and conforming my­self to his will? If it does, what is his will? What are [Page 47] his laws? What does he expect of me? What kind of government is it I am under? What is the particular and certain way, in which I may obtain the good-will of this great Parent of the world, in whose favour is life, and whose loving-kindness is better than life?’

THESE, methinks, are such inquiries as every man should endeavour to get some satisfaction about in his own [...]nd—satisfaction of quite another kind than any that can be had barely from the decisions of others con­cerning them. The questions are too interesting and im­portant to be submitted to the determination of a second person.

BUT were we disposed to leave matters of this con­sequence to reference, who shall be the judges? There are almost as many opinions in the world, as there are men. The Talapoins of Siam have one system of religi­on: the Mufti at Constantinople, another: and Christians, a third; and so on. And almost all alledge divine revela­tion in their own favour. There are even some fools who say in their heart, there is no God; and not only in their heart, but repeat it with their lips also. Now shall we submit to the Theists, or to the Atheists? How shall we know on which side the truth lies, without examination? But suppose we embrace Theism, what sect of the Theists shall we fall in with? With those who deny, or those who maintain, a revelation from God? Is it reasonable to give in to either party, before we inquire which has the best of the Argument? But suppose we fall in with the latter, there are several sects of them, the principal of which are Jews, Mahometans and Christians. It cannot be a reasonable part to fall in with one, in opposition to the other two, without reason. But suppose we are con­vinced that the Christian religion is true, do not Christians differ very widely in their sentiments? Do they not dif­fer so much in explaining the doctrines of their common revelation, as to agree in hardly any thing besides the name [Page 48] of Christian? Are they not divided into many sects, the most of which strenuously maintain, that not only truth, but salvation also, is confined to themselves? Do they not deal out their curses mutually with a liberal hand? Are they not continually throwing fire-brands, arrows and death, (not indeed in sport, like other fools, but) in sober earnest?

Now amidst these differences and altercations, what is the part of a reasonable man, but to sit down, and ex­ercise, as well as he can, his [...] intellectual powers; and so to judge even of himself what is right? What system of doctrine—what mode of worship—what form of church-government and discipline, is most agreable to scripture and reason—what sect of Christians he shall unite with—and whether with any one, in all its minute and distinguishing tenets and usages—? ‘A man must join himself to the true, primitive and catholic church.’ What church is that? all churches lay claim to that title: and the question to be decided is, which of them supports its claim the best? which cannot be decided with­out previous inquiry. ‘But there is a living infallible guide upon earth, to whom it is easy to repair; and then we may be sure of being in the right without any farther trouble.’ Where is he? Many deny there is any such unerring guide, and infallible umpire, as confidently as others affirm it. But even those who agree that there is such a sovereign judge of religious controversy, are not yet fully agreed who he is; or whe­ther infallibility be to be found in one single person or more. The heads of all sects usually decide disputable matters with full as much assurance and lordliness as it would become infallibility itself to do it, although they do not all, in so many words, pretend to be exempted from a possibility of erring. Those who claim infalli­bility, often decide and order as if they were fallible: And those who do not claim it, are often full as positive, and given to dominineering as much, as if it unquesti­onably belonged to them.

[Page 49] WE know the King of Great Britain (or the Queen, in a female reign) is the Supreme Head of the church of England, as by law established; which church claims power to decree rites or ceremonies, and authority in con­troversies of faith.

BUT his Holiness at Rome thinks this a bold in­fringement of his prerogative, and universal jurisdic­tion in ecclesiastical matters. Whose word, then, is to be taken? How shall we act a rational part without judging even of ourselves which is in the right? Or whether either of them be so. Indeed there is no doubt but his Ho­liness is really the Supreme Head of the church of Rome; and, as such, has authority therein in matters of faith, worship and discipline. Thus also the King or Queen of Great Britain, is doubtless the Supreme Head of the truly pri­mitive, apostolical church of England, as lately established by human laws. But nevertheless, it may perhaps admit of some dispute whether Jesus Christ is not the Supreme Head of his own church? and consequently, whether these are not three different churches, they having each of them a different Supreme Head? It is of some impor­tance to us to be settled with regard to these points; and they are such as cannot be well determined without some examination, though perhaps a very little may suffice.

THUS it appears that a regard to our own interest ought to put us upon examining and judging for our­selves in religious concerns. The same thing might be argued from the faculty of reason itself, which is com­mon to all. If we suppose an intelligent author of our nature, who had some design in giving us our present constitution, it is plain that his end in endowing us with faculties proper for the investigating of truth and right, was, that we should exercise them in this way. Each of our bodily organs, and animal faculties, has an apparent final cause. Our eyes are for seeing; our ears, for hear­ing; our hands, for handling; our feet, for walking­ing; [Page 50] &c. Nor is it less apparent that our understandings were given us to be employed in the search of truth, and in embracing it. Truth is the natural object of reason, as much as any thing else is the proper object of that particular faculty or passion, to which God and nature have adapted it. Our obligation, therefore, to inquire after truth, and to judge what is right, may be found within us, in our own frame and constitution. This ob­ligation is as universal as reason itself; for every one that is endowed with this faculty, is, by the very nature of it, obliged to exercise it in the pursuit of knowledge; especially of moral and religious knowledge. All men are not obliged to study the mathematicks, law and physick. But all are obliged to acquaint themselves with their duty—what they owe to God, to their neighbour and themselves. If one man is to think and judge for all the rest of the species, why was reason given to all? why was it not confined to him alone who has a right to use it? In short, we may say with as much propriety, that we are to see only with another's eyes, hear with another's ears, speak with another's tongue, and walk with another's feet, and neglect our own; as, that we are to think and judge and believe, with another's un­derstanding.

IT appears, then, that reason is no enemy to free in­quiry, and private judgment, in religious matters. And I shall now endeavour to show that the Christian religion is no enemy to it; but, on the contrary, enjoins it upon us as a duty.

OUR Lord Jesus Christ, the author and finisher of our faith, constantly appealed to the senses, and to the reason of mankind, as the proper judges of his miracles, divine mission and doctrine. He did not demand of men an implicit and blind belief in himself, without offering matter of conviction to their understandings; but put them upon examining in a sober rational way, whether [Page 51] he was authorized from heaven, or were an impostor; and so, whether his doctrine were of God, or whether he spake of himself. He reasons with the Jews in my text: he blames them for their blind attachment to the Scribes and Pharisees, their spiritual guides; and for not judging for themselves in religious matters. Our Lord, pretended (at least) to prove his divine mission to the unprejudiced reason of mankind in a sober, argumenta­tive way. In disputing with the Jews, he appealed to their ancient writings whose divine authority they ac­knowledged; and to the miracles which he wrought, in order to convince them that he was the Messiah. This is evident from almost every page of the evangelical his­tory, notwithstanding what the disingenuous author of Christianity not founded upon argument, has confidently as­serted upon this subject, taking advantage of what some weak Christians have advanced concerning the nature and grounds of faith. Whether the arguments which our Lord used for the conviction of the Jews, were con­clusive or not, is a question which I am not now con­cerned with. But it is plain that he considered them as being so, requiring people to examine them, and to judge whether they were conclusive or not. Barely pro­posing arguments to the consideration of another, is a disclaiming of authority properly so called: for it im­plies, that the arguments are to be judged of by the reason of him to whom they are proposed. I might bring many passages from the Evangelists, to show that the method which our Lord took to gain proselytes, was to reason them into faith. But I must content myself with quoting one passage only to this purpose, for the present— John V. 31. and onward, If I bear witness of myself, my witness is not true [i. e. my testimony in my own favour—my declaring myself to be the Messiah, ought not to be depended upon as true, without farther evidence.] There is another that beareth witness of me—Ye sent unto John, and he bare witness unto the truth—But I have greater witness than that of John; for the [Page 52] works that the Father hath given me to finish, the same works that I do, bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me—Search the scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life; and they are they which testify of me—There is one that accuseth you, even Moses, in whom ye trust. For had ye believed Moses, ye would have believed me. But if ye believe not his writings, how shall ye believe my words? There cannot be a more explicit appeal than this, to the reason and understandings of men, or a fairer invitation given them to examine and judge for them­selves. And this also shows that our Lord aimed at bringing men to believe in him, only by dint of argu­ment. And as our Lord performed his mighty works with a design to beget in those that beheld them, a rati­onal belief, a belief resulting from proper evidence; so the Evangelists committed those facts to writing, that they might have a like effect upon those that had not been eye-witnesses of them— These things are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ the Son of God; and that believing, ye might have life through his name. John XX. 31.

THE apostles also constantly incouraged free inquiry, as it is natural for honest undesigning men to do. It is for the interest of some to discourage it, and to keep people muffled up in darkness and ignorance, that so they may submit to their dictates with the more readiness and humility. Their craft is in danger of being detected, and their doctrine, of being exploded, as soon as people have so much presumption as to open their eyes. Free inquiry bodes ill to the design which they are ingaged in; for they are sensible it will not be safe for themselves to be knaves any longer than others are fools. But he that has nothing in view but the interest of truth and virtue, desires nothing more, than that persons would give them­selves the trouble of a free and impartial examination. Now the apostles knowing the goodness of their cause, and following the example of their divine Master, made [Page 53] it their practice to incourage liberty and freedom of thought; never intimating, a most of their pretended successors have done, that this is hazardous to men's souls.

IN the apostolic age there were many impostors and enthusiasts; false pretenders to inspiration, as there are at present, and as there have been in almost every age of the christian church. And for this reason the apostles directed christians to examine the pretensions of all, that so they might distinguish betwixt really inspired persons and deceivers—Thus 1 John iv. 1. Beloved, believe not every spirit; but try the spirits, whether they are of God; for many false spirits are gone out into the world. No one, surely, will be so absurd as to suppose this was a direc­tion to try deceivers only; and not true prophets and apostles. For this would suppose that they might be known one from the other, without trying them at all: and then no examination of either of them would be necessary. "Determine first; and then examine," is the pleasant advice of some grave divines: But the apostles exhorts us to examine all things, before we be­lieve any thing. The Jews at Berea are celebrated, Acts xvii. 10. and onwards for not believing the apostles themselves without critically examining their doctrine, and comparing it with the writings of Moses and the prophets: and in the same passage, an implicit censure at least, is passed upon the Thessalonians, as being indo­lent, credulous, and too easy of belief. The words of the historian are these, And the brethren—sent away Paul and Silas—unto Berea; who coming there, went into the synagogue of the Jews. These were more noble than those of Thessalonica; for they received the word with all rea­diness of mind: and searched the scriptures daily whether those things were so. By their receiving the word with all readiness of mind, nothing more is here intended, than that they gave a ready and candid attention to what Paul and Silas had to say: Afterwards, like prudent and [Page 54] rational men, they examined into the truth of it. And it follows immediately in the next verse— There­fore many of them believed—A natural consequence of a free and impartial inquiry into the grounds of the christian religion. I observed above, that the Thessalo­nians are censured in this passage, for their credulity, and not using suitable precaution in receiving christianity. And it is probable that the apostle Paul had a view at this incurious and over credulous humour of theirs, in his 1 Epistle to them, Chap. v. ver. 21. Prove (or examine) all things, says he; hold fast that which is good. This advice was, indeed, proper for all; but peculiarly so for those who were backward to examine, and forward to believe, these being in the greatest dan­ger of being seduced.

AGAIN, What besides free inquiry after truth and knowledge, does the apostle intend, Phil. xix. 10? And this I pray, that your love may abound yet more and more in knowledge and in all judgment, that ye may approve things that are excellent—(Or as some understand these last words, that ye may try things that differ, and are controverted.) To the same purpose are the Words of this apostle, Eph. vi. 14, 15. That we be henceforth no more children, tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men, and cunning craftiness whereby they lye in wait to deceive: but speak­ing the truth in love, &c. So. St. John cautions the elect lady and her children, against seducers, and de­ceivers— Many deceivers are entered into the world—Look to yourselves—9. John 7, 8. The apostle here al­ludes to those deceivers who confessed not that Jesus Christ was come in the flesh. And in his first Epistle he cautions those to whom he wrote, against another kind of deceivers, whose doctrine is equally fatal, viz. those who taught that faith without works, denominates a man righteous— Little children, let no man deceive you: He that doth righteousness is righteous—He that commit­teth [Page 55] sin is of the devil—1 John iii. 7, 8. Thus also the apostle Paul, Eph. v. 5, 6.— Ye know that no whore mon­ger, &c. hath any inheritance in the kingdom of Christ, and of God. Let no man deceive you with vain words: for because of these things cometh the wrath of God upon the children of disobedience. Do not all these exhorta­tions given to christians, to take care that no man de­ceive them, imply that they are to examine and judge for themselves; and not to submit implicitly to the dictates of any, even though they pretend to a com­mission from heaven? Unless it be their right and duty to do thus, nothing can be more impertinent than exhor­tations of this kind.

ALTHOUGH the apostle Paul were an inspired writer, yet he is far from putting on those dogmatical airs which are now too common amongst those who do not pre­tend to inspiration. He often condescends to make an appeal to the reason and judgment of those to whom he writes, and invites them to examine what he says. Thus 1 Cor. x. 15. I speak as to wise men; judge ye what I say. And so, Chap. i. ver. 12. Judge in your­selves, is it comely, &c.

IN a controversy betwixt the jewish and gentile con­verts at Rome, the apostle gave his own sense concern­ing the point in debate: he exhorted them to mutual love and forbearance: and then, like a reasonable, catho­lick man, and a friend to the rights of private judgment, he concludes— Let every man be fully perswaded in his own mind. Rom. xvi. 5.

WHEN the jewish converts in Galatia (being still zealously attached to the law of Moses) were for im­posing certain opinions and practices upon the Gentiles, this same apostle took the part of the latter; and even enjoined it upon them to vindicate their religious and christian rights against all such encroachments— Stand [Page 56] fast, says he, in the liberty wherewith Christ has made you free: (i. e. assert your freedom from the mosaic law, and all the old jewish institutions) and be not again in­tangled with any yoke of bondage. ^† (i. e. stand up in defence of your christian liberty, not only against these your judaizing brethren; but also against all others who shall attempt to exercise any kind of spiritual tyranny over you.) So that it is not left to the option of christians whether they will relinquish their natural liberty in re­ligious matters, or not; they are commanded to assert it. God has given us abilities to judge even of ourselves what is right: and requires us to improve them. He forbids us to call any man master upon earth. And as he has forbidden us to submit implicitly to the dictates of any man; so he has also expresly forbid all chri­stians to assume or usurp any authority over their bre­thren. Ye know, says our blessed Saviour, that the princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them, and they that are great exercise authority upon them: But it shall not be so among you. But whosoever—will be chief among you, let him be your servant, even as the son of man came not to be ministred unto, but to minister. ^* How does our Lord upbraid the Scribes and Pharisees, who sat in Moses's seat, for assuming an unreasonable autho­rity, and affecting more honour and submission than was due to them? The Scribes and Pharisees—love the upper­most rooms at feasts, and the chief seats in the synagogues, and greetings in the markets, and to be called of men, Rabbi, Rabbi. But be not [...] called Rabbi, for one is your master even Christ; and all ye are brethren. ^‖ The first propagators of Christianity carefully observed this prohibition. They were meek, humble and charita­ble. They claimed no dominion over the faith of Chri­stians, but were content with being helpers of their joy. 2 Cor. i. 24. They preached not themselves to be the Lord or Lords; but Christ Jesus; and themselves [Page 57] the servants of Christians for Jesus sake. 2. Cor. iv. 5. This was the manner in which the holy apostles de­meaned themselves in their office. But since their day, Ecclesiasticks have been for less humility and more power. The style of servants is below their dignity: And they must be called of men Lords, Reverend and Right Reverend Fathers in God, &c. Their fellow chri­stians and brethren must approach them upon the bend­ed knee: Sovereign princes must think themselves ho­noured in having the liberty to kiss the toe of an old Monk, who calls himself Christ's Vicar: And thus it is that the Pope imitates him who was meek and lowly in heart; and who condescended to wash his disciples feet.

I hope it appears from what has been said, that both reason and scripture oppose the claims of those arrogant men who love to lord it over God's heritage; and had rather have dominion over our faith, than be helpers of our joy: And that it is the duty of christians to as­sert their right of private judgment in religious mat­ters, in opposition to all that are for usurping autho­rity over them. I promised, in the next place, to consider the principal objections against this doctrine. But I believe I need make no apology for deferring this to another opportunity.

I shall, however, beg leave, from what has been said already, to look upon the point as proved; and so to close with a few reflections suitable to the subject.

IT appears, then, that all who any ways discourage freedom of inquiry and judgment in religious matters, are, so far forth as they are guilty of this, encroachers upon the natural rights of mankind; that they set up their own authority in opposition to that of al­mighty God; and that they are enemies to truth, and the gospel of Jesus Christ.—They are encroachers upon the natural rights of mankind, because it is the natural [Page 58] right and priviledge of every man to make the best use he can of his own intellectual faculties—They set up their own authority in opposition to that of almighty God, because God has not only given us liberty to examine and judge for ourselves; but expresly required us to do it—They are enemies to truth, and the gos­pel of Jesus Christ; because free examination is the way to truth, and the gospel in particular, gains ground the faster, the more its doctrines and evidences are ex­amined.—While other tyrants enslave the bodies of men, these throw their chains and fetters upon the mind, which (as the Jews said of themselves) was born free; and which ought not to be in bondage to any man: but only to the Father of Spirits. If it be asked who these spiritual invaders are, it may be answered, all in general who set themselves up to judge for their neighbours; All who are for imposing their own opi­nions upon others: All who any ways distress and af­flict such as differ from them in their religious senti­ments: All who make use of any other weapons be­sides those of reason and argument, in order to de­molish error, and propagate truth. If a man has a right to judge for himself, certainly no other has a right to judge for him: And to attempt it, is to strike at the most valuable interest of a man considered as a reasonable creature.

THOSE that are guilty of this crime in the highest degree, are such as inflict capital punishments upon those that embrace opinions contrary to their own. The heathens sometimes practised this barbarity among themselves before christianity made its appearance in the world. Afterwards they united their force against the doctrine of Christ, as the most dangerous heresy that had ever been heard of: and butchered millions. Scarce had they laid down the practice, when Chri­stians filled with more than pagan cruelty, took it up, and persecuted one another: Nor is it quite laid [Page 59] aside to this day in some parts of Christendom. The mother of harlots, who has long made herself drunk with the blood of the martyrs of Jesus, has still her in­quisition; and is frequently adding to the number of those whom St. John saw, in his vision, under the altar, while they cried with a loud voice, saying—How long, O Lord, holy and true! dost thou not judge, and avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth!

IN a somewhat lower degree are they chargeable with the same crime, who punish dissenters and non-subscribers, by fines and imprisonments, and by de­priving them of those civil privileges, emoluments and honours, which, as good subjects and friends, to the state, they might justly expect. It is well known in what church this inhuman practice has been carried to a prodigious length: and in which it is not yet wholly laid aside. It is well that, not Jesus Christ, but another Person, is said to be the supreme Head of this church. For it would be absurd to suppose, that He who said his kingdom was not of this world, should allow of any such practice among the members of that body of which He is the Head.

AGAIN: Another practice akin to those mentioned above, and which has an apparent tendency to hinder men from judging for themselves, is that of Creed-making; setting up human tests of orthodoxy, instead of the infallible word of God; and making other terms of christian communion than those explicitly pointed out in the gospel. For any man, or any set of men whatever, to do thus, is plainly to arrogate to them­selves the right of judging for their neighbours; and to deter people, as far as they are able, from seeing with their own eyes, and judging even of themselves what is right. Indeed this practice is not so criminal as that of persecuting and murthering men for their re­ligious sentiments: for any reasonable man had rather [Page 60] be the object of a thousand anathema's than have his life, or even his temporal substance taken from him. But still, if these faith-maker's I am speaking of are so compassionate as only to give their brethren to the devil, for not submittting to their doctrines and de­crees, even this has some tendency to intimidate them; especially such as are naturally of a weak and pusillani­mous make. For when a creed is begun, or eked out with several reverend, ecclesiastical curses; and when it is confidently affirmed, that unless a man believe faithfully every article contained in it, he shall without doubt perish everlastingly; it cannot be supposed, that the ge­nerality of people should ever have the courage to he­sitate in the least concerning the truth of it, although it may be really an affront to common sense, a medly of nonsense and contradiction. Nor are there wanting innumerable instances of persons, who have, in this way, been first frighted out of their senses, and then into the belief of the grossest absurdities; and paying a sacred regard to them under the notion of their being orthodox, soul-saving truths and divine mysteries—such as are not to be examined with reason, but to be believed and adored without it.

IT is indeed pretended that all these different me­thods of keeping men from exercising their own rati­onal faculties, are entered upon with a very pious and godly design; and with an holy zeal to keep heresies out of the church; to reclaim those that are unsound in the faith; and to preserve the christian verity pure and undefiled. But the proud, domineering, unchristian spirit that has been betrayed by these holy murtherers, robbers, and faith-imposers, leaves us but little room to think that they were actuated by a real concern for the interests of christianity, and the salvation of men's souls. However, to let alone their views and intentions which we have little or nothing to do with, these prac­tices themselves are unjustifiable: they are imperious [Page 61] and tyrannical: and contrary to the spirit and doctrines of the gospel. They are an infringement upon those rights of conscience, which ought to be sacred; they have an apparent tendency to prevent all improve­ments in religious knowledge, and to entail ignorance, error, and superstition upon future generations. What improvements can we suppose would have been made in the several arts and sciences comparable to the pre­sent, had the study of them been incumbered with such restraints, and almost insuperable difficulties?

LET us suppose, for example, that some great Mo­narch a few centuries ago, together with the Philosophers of that age, had interposed with their authority in the sciences: Let us suppose that an oath of supremacy to the King, or Queen, had been required; and devised in such terms as these— That the King or Queen for the time being, is the supreme Head of the society [or church] of Philosophers— Vested with all power to exercise all manner of philosophical discipline: And other phi­losophical persons have no manner of jurisdiction philosophical, but by and under the King's or Queen's most Excellent Majesty; who hath full power and autho­rity to hear and determine all manner of causes philoso­phical, and to reform and correct all philosophical er­rors, heresies, enormities and abuses whatsoever, within his, or her realm. Let us suppose farther that phi­losophical creeds and articles of faith had been com­posed, and authoritatively issued out with certain minatory and damnatory clauses; and that they had been registred among the other laws of the land. Let us suppose farther, that philosophical courts had been erected, where hereticks in philosophy, and all non-subscribers to the philosophy by law established, were to be arraigned, harassed, fined, whipt, hanged or burnt. I say, if such measures as these had been entred upon a few centuries ago, must [...] not sup­pose that they would have been very absurd and in­jurious? [Page 62] Must we not suppose also, that they would have damped the greatest and most enterprizing Geni­us's; and so have been a means of keeping the world in ignorance? Would not this have prevented those valuable improvements in natural knowledge, which the world is blest with at present? Had such me­thods been taken seasonably, might it not have been Heresy still, to think this earth a globe? to deny that the sun revolves about us once every twenty-four hours? or to question the equality of the sun and moon? And might not the orthodox philosophy at this day, have possibly been that concerning the great cow and tortoise, &c? In short, we cannot think of supporting and propagating the sciences, by dint of authority, without smiling. And it is equally ridi­culous to attempt to propagate religious knowledge and the doctrines of the gospel, by authority. And every one that pleases may easily see what attempts of this nature have usually issued in; and what must necessarily be the effect of them, viz. ignorance and hypocrisy. Error, as well as iniquity, may be established by a law. And when it is so, a man must either subscribe to it, contrary to his sentiments; or seri­ously embrace it for truth: A sad dilemma! when a man is thus forced to be a knave or a fool! Man­kind in general seem to be quite indolent enough, backward enough to examine into moral and religi­ous subjects, without those unnatural restraints which are put upon them by the setting up of authority in matters of faith. There are indeed some foolish and conceited men who take a pleasure in being sin­gular in their opinions; and who never suppose they think freely enough, till they are run wild and mad; and have rejected every thing that others have be­lieved before. But these instances are not frequent. Men are generally too prone to follow the multitude, to embrace implicitly the tenets of their spiritual in­structors, their fore-fathers, their good mothers and nurses; [Page 63] and to fall in with the opinions of the rich and pow­erful, which is the road to wealth and preferment. And there is really much more need of incouraging freedom of thought, and an inquisitive turn of mind, by handsome gratuities; than there is of keeping people in the old beaten track by the terror of penal laws, gibbets, inquisitions, spiritual courts, and carnal curses. Whatever is pretended, these compulsive me­thods were not those by which the truth as it is in Jesus, was at first propagated and defended: neither can they be of any service to the cause of truth and re­ligion at present. A pecuniary mulct may impoverish a man in this world; but it cannot make him rich in faith, and an heir of the Kingdom—The rack may torture his limbs; but it cannot draw out the sting from a guilty conscience.—A dark and fil­thy dungeon may throw us into a mortal distemper; but it cannot bring light and health into our minds, and make our souls prosper—A burning faggot may set our bodies in a light blaze; but it has no tendency to illuminate the understanding. To attempt to dra­goon men into sound orthodox Christians, is as unnatu­ral and fruitless as to attempt to dragoon them into good poets, physicians or mathematicians. A blow with a club may fracture a man's skull; but I suppose he will not think and reason the more clearly for that; though he may possibly believe the more orthodoxly, according to the opinions of some. And upon this account it must be confessed that those who make use of these methods to propagate their sentiments, act very prudently: for their doctrines are generally such as are much more readily embraced by a man after his brains are knocked out, than while he continues in his senses, and of a sound mind.

I shall conclude with the words of the apostle Paul to Timothy, in which he points out the method of defending and propagating the doctrines of the [Page 64] gospel— The servant of the Lord, says he, must not strive; but be gentle unto all men; apt to teach; pati­ent; in meekness, instructing those that oppose themselves, if God peradventure will give them repentance to the ac­knowledging of the truth.

HAVING, in the preceeding discourse, proved the right and duty of free inquiry and private judgment in matters of religion, by direct and plain arguments both from reason and revelation, there was, perhaps, no occasion for my exercising your pati­ence any further, by entering upon a consideration of the objections that have been raised against this Doctrine. For no objections can signify any thing against a doc­trine once proved true in fact: However, since some men may think themselves ill used, unless their argu­ments are distinctly considered, I shall devote the follow­ing hour to examine the principal objections against the [Page 66] of the foregoing discourse, setting them in the strongest point of light I am able. The spiritual tyrants and lord­ly bigots of the earth have indeed triumphed gloriously, as though they had gained a mighty victory over free­dom of thought, their old and mortal enemy; and laid her bleeding and gasping at their feet. But whether these are the triumphs of real heroes, or only the vain gasconades and Te Deums of imaginary conquerors, will, perhaps, be easy to determine, when we come to take a view of their weapons, and to see the manner in which they have employed them.

I shall not have much regard to order and method in proposing the objections now to be considered; but mention them just as they present themselves to my mind. And, in the first place, it may be ob­jected,

1. ‘THAT God himself under the mosaic dispensa­tion, required that idolaters, and dissenters from the established church, should be punished with death.’ From hence it may be argued, ‘That uncontrouled liberty in religious matters ought not to be allowed of; but the true church is obliged in duty to restrain and correct infidels and schismaticks; and all in ge­neral that she judges unfound in the faith.’

To this it may be answered,

1st. THAT we cannot argue from what was lawful un­der the jewish oeconomy, to what is lawful since that is abolished, and superseded by another so different from it as the christian. There might be, and doubtless were, some peculiar reasons for authorizing and enjoining such a discipline then, which do not take place at present. This might be as peculiar to Judaism as circumcision, or the sacrificing of beasts, &c. And in reality it does not any more follow from the Jews being commanded [Page 67] to extirpate idolaters, that christians may destroy hea­thens and hereticks, than it does from Abraham's being commanded to sacrifice his son, that all parents may and ought to sacrifice their children now.

IT is to be remembred, that Judaism was at least as much a political as a religious institution. The Jews had God for their immediate king and lawgiver, both in church and state. Their civil and ecclesiastical polity were blended together; and being derived from the same source, every violation of the law of Moses might be considered and punished as an offence against the state, in a greater or less degree: And idolatry being in these circumstances equivalent to high treason, it is not strange that a capital punishment should be annexed to it. But the case is much altered since the promulgation of the christian religion. Christ's kingdom is not at all a kingdom of this world. It is wholly a religious institu­tion. The laws, the penalties, the rewards of it, are wholly of a spiritual nature: And men are to be won over to it, and kept in it, only by spiritual and moral means.

BUT 2dly, If the true church ought to punish such as she looks upon to be erroneous, heretical or schismatical, then a war must immediately commence in Christendom; and continue till all are destroyed, but one party: For each sect thinks itself in the right; and that all the rest are tinctured with heresy: This must certainly be the conse­quence of this maxim, that the right of using violence and persecution is the prerogative of the true church; which one would think sufficient to convince any reason­able man, that the maxim is false. Besides, from whence comes this doctrine, that true orthodox christians have a right to persecute hereticks and unbelievers? (i. e. to be more wicked and immoral than hereticks and unbeliev­ers?) The scripture, indeed, (and experience very of­ten) teaches us, that those who will live godly in Christ [Page 68] Jesus, must suffer persecution; but not, that they must persecute others.

BUT perhaps it will be objected in the second place,

2. ‘THAT our Lord himself required his apostles to use external force, in order to bring men over to the true faith, if gentler methods failed of success.’ The objection will be taken from the parable of the supper, Luke 14. When the guests that were bidden, refused the invitation, the master of the feast is represented as saying to his servant, ver. 23. Go out into the high ways and hedges, and compel them to come in, that my house may be filled. ‘Now as the servant was commanded to compel the guests to come to the supper, so the apo­stles were injoined to use external violence, if necessa­ry, in order to bring men over to a belief of the gos­pel; from whence it follows that men are not left to their freedom in religious matters.’ The

1st THING I would observe with relation to this ob­jection is, that great caution is necessary in the applica­tion of parables and allegories, lest the similitude should be carried farther than was originally intended. Nor is it by any means safe to build such a doctrine, (or rather such a practice) as that of compulsion in religious mat­ters, but upon the most plain and express command.

2dly, THIS parable, at most, only authorizes the com­pelling of infidels to embrace the gospel: And so it has nothing to do with the controversies amongst the differ­ent sects of christians.

3dly, ALTHOUGH it should be allowed, that this pa­rable injoined the inspired apostles to compel men, by external violence, to embrace christianity, it will not fol­low that uninspired men since, men who have no commis­sion immediately from heaven, have a right to do the same.

[Page 69] 4thly, IT is to be observed, that according to the pa­rable, the persons to be compelled are [...] the same who had before obstinately rejected the kind invitation given them; but such as had not yet been sent to. For when the master sends out his servant a second time, to compel people to come in, it follows— For I say unto you that those men who were hidden, shall not taste of my supper. So that even according to this parable, those who will not be perswaded by gentle methods, are to be given over, and not to have any farther means used with them. From whence it follows,

5thly, THAT none at all are to be compelled by ex­ternal violence: for we cannot suppose that force should be applied first of all; and before other methods prove ineffectual, if at all.

6thly, EITHER the apostles did not understand this as a command to use violence in propagating christian­ity, or they neglected to obey it; neither of which can be supposed, had there really been such a command. They never attempted to use force; but declared, on the contrary, that the weapons of their warfare were not carnal, but mighty through God to the pulling down of strong holds, &c. 2 Cor. X. 4.

7thly, THAT this cannot be the sense of the parable, appears from hence, that it is, in the nature of the thing, impossible to force men really to believe the gospel, and become good christians, though one had more dragoons to employ in this pious work, than Louis the XIVth sent to convert the Hugonots. Faith and repentance are the work of reason and the spirit of God; and cannot be wrought in a man by a cudgel, a sword, or a gallows.

8thly, WERE this in itself possible, how could twelve unarmed apostles, who were allowed to carry only a staff [Page 70] with them in their journies, convert the whole world by force of arms?

9thly, AND lastly; After all the flourish that has been made with this passage by Roman-Catholicks, and popish Protestants, the word we render compel, as often signifies a moral, as a physical compulsion. And the subject here spoken of, necessarily determines it to such a signification in this place. It is as if the master of the feast had said to his servant, ‘Since the persons before invited to my supper, [the Jews] refuse to come, go to others, [the Gentile nations] and give them the same invitation: And use the greatest importunity with them; reason with them, exhort and perswade them; use all ra­tional methods to convince them, and bring them in.’

BUT I must proceed to another objection: And per­haps one may be urged in some such manner as this—

3. ‘IF every man is allowed to think and judge for himself, the consequence will be that many will fall into erroneous and hurtful opinions. This doctrine opens a door for heresies to enter into the church: it gives men a liberty to trample upon all our creeds and confessions of faith; to depart from the doctrines of their pious fore-fathers; and to despise their spiritual guides. And what will this issue in, but the over­throw of all religion.’ To this objection I would answer,

1st. THAT it does not follow from men's being at liberty to judge for themselves, and to chuse their own religion, that they are at liberty to judge wrong, and to reject the true religion, let it be what it will. If they are obliged to judge and chuse, for themselves at all, they are obliged to judge truly and justly, and to reject only what is wrong. The right of private judgmen [Page 71] does not imply, that it is indifferent whether a man judges truly, or not, any more than a man's right of disposing of his own property, implies that he may as innocently squander it away in rioting and drunkenness, as pay his debts with it, or appropriate it to charitable uses. As a man has not a right to do what is wrong with his own substance, so neither has he any, to judge wrong with his own understanding. He is under a moral obligation to reject error, and to embrace truth, as far as he is able to detect the former, and to discern the latter.

2dly, AS the right of private judgment, does not leave men at liberty to judge wrong, and to embrace a false religion; so neither has the exercising that right any tendency to mislead men, as the objection supposes. The tendency of it is directly the contrary way. Free examination, weighing arguments for, and against, with impartiality, is the way to find the truth. Who ima­gines that free inquiry into philosophical subjects, has any tendency to lead men into a wrong idea of the na­tural world? No one was ever so infatuated as to assert this. And it is in all respects as improbable, that free enquiry into religious subjects should lead us into wrong notions concerning the moral world. One would think that a man who had received his religious principles upon mature and deliberate consideration, and so had in his own mind rational arguments to support them, could not have the least apprehension of their suffering any thing by being thoroughly scanned and examined to the bottom. Error and imposture fly from the light, like the owl and bat: But truth and honesty, like the noble eagle, face to the sun. The cause of error and supersti­tion may suffer by a critical examination; its security is to lurk in the dark: But the true religion flourishes the more, the more people exercise their right of private judgment. This is apparent: And therefore it is no uncharitableness to suppose, that all who are backward to have their doctrines called in question, and to stand a [Page 72] fair trial at the bar of impartial reason, have at least some secret suspicion in their own minds, that they will not stand the test, and come forth as gold when it is tried, but be found no better than dross. We pay but a bad compliment to our religion, when we cry out that it is in danger, if men are left to the free exercise of their own rational faculties in judging of it. A man that is con­scious his cause at court is good, chuses it should be tried by the most severe and critical eye. But he that either knows, or suspects, he has a dirty one, had much rather that people would spare themselves the trouble of exa­mining into its merits, and take his own word for the goodness of it. But

3dly, As to the lamentable havock which the objec­tion supposes will be made amongst our creeds and for­mularies, if the doctrine of free inquiry should prevail; this is, doubtless, a very natural consequence: for this would probably prove fatal, at least to many articles contained in them. For it is plain that many of them are stuffed with the most ridiculous jargon, and are as contrary to scripture, as they are to common sense. But this, instead of being an objection against free inquiry, is one of the strongest arguments for it. If these creeds and formularies were true, agreeable to reason and reve­lation, the more thoroughly they are examined the bet­ter; for then their truth would appear: But if they are false, it is still best they should be examined, in order to their being exploded. It is no matter how old, or how new they are. Truth does not die with age, and then revive again, as is fabled of the phaenix: it flou­rishes in immortal youth. Error may indeed become venerable and gray headed with length of time: but a falshood of a thousand years standing, remains as much a falshood as ever, although it may have been consecrated by the church, and transmitted to posterity in a creed. Whatever truths it may have had to keep it company; and however it may have been preserved amidst the [Page 73] storms that have beat upon the church, it is only like one of Noah's unclean beasts preserved in the ark, amongst those of a pure, and more useful nature. There is no­thing more foolish and superstitious than a veneration for ancient creeds and doctrines, as such; and nothing more unworthy a reasonable creature, than to value principles by their age, as some do their wines. But, in­deed, this is as common as it is ridiculous. With many people, "Antiquity! Antiquity! Antiquity!" is the cry: And, ‘Who will be so hardy as to dispute the truth of what was believed a thousand years ago?’ Just as if what was false formerly, were not so still; but might be ripened and refined by age into a doctrine of grace. Most things are, indeed, changed by time. Time makes the child a man: Time makes the ignorant wise: Time often turns a friend into a foe, and a foe into a friend: The fashion of the world passeth away by time: And time shall change the whole face of nature. But truth, like the Father of lights, is without variableness, or shadow of turning.

To proceed,

4thly, IT is supposed in the last mentioned objection, that freedom of inquiry will naturally bring our spiritual guides into contempt, and weaken their authority. To this I reply, That it cannot possibly be of any disadvan­tage to the sober and rational part of the clergy; but has a tendency to make them more esteemed. But as to the vain and proud; the ignorant and assuming; the enthusiastic and superstitious; it has doubtless a natural tendency to bring these into contempt: And the sooner the better, that so they may not have so much power to do mischief. These are the persons that are generally the most averse to people's seeing and judging for them­selves: And the reason why they are so, is too apparent to need mentioning. But

[Page 74] 5thly, AND lastly, Upon supposition that the cause of truth and real religion, might suffer in some respects, by persons exercising their right of private judgment; yet this is no just reason for denying them such a liber­ty. This right is given them by God and nature, and the gospel of Christ: And no man has a right to de­prive another of it, under a notion that he will make an ill use of it, and fall into erroneous opinions. We may as well pick our neighbour's pocket, for fear he should spend his money in debauchery, as take from him his right of judging for himself, and chusing his religion, for fear he should judge amiss and abuse his liberty.

BUT I must hasten to another objection, which is fre­quently urged with a great deal of confidence, and very little reason. It is near akin to that last mentioned; and may be put into some such form as this,

4. ‘IF all are left at liberty to chuse their own reli­gion, and to enjoy it unmolested, we shall have innu­merable sects springing up amongst us; which tends to confusion, and destroys the peace and unity of the church. It is therefore expedient that the governors of the church should injoin upon all, the belief of certain articles of faith, and the observation of certain modes and rites of worship. Without some common rule of faith, worship and discipline, beyond what the scrip­tures contain, there can be no sufficient bond of union amongst christians. And so the church must inevi­tably be crumbled to pieces; whereas there ought to be no schism in that spiritual body.’

WITH relation to this objection I would observe,

1st. THAT if any rule of faith, worship and disci­pline, besides that which our Saviour and his apostles have left us, be necessary in order to the peace and good government of the church, then the church had no peace [Page 75] and was not well governed during the apostolic age. For christians had then no common rule of faith, worship and discipline besides that which they received from our Lord himself, or his apostles, who were under the extra­ordinary influence and direction of his spirit. Which rule is transmitted to us in the writings of the new testament; and is sufficient now, for the regulation of the church, if it was then. That this was sufficient then, is not denied; and therefore it cannot be deficient at pre­sent. But

2dly, IF any farther regulations had been necessary in order to preserve the peace and unity of the church, it is strange that neither our blessed Saviour, who loved the church and gave himself for it, nor the apostles, who liv'd and dy'd in the service of the church, should have taken more care to provide for its peace and prosperity. Can we suppose that they did their work to the halves, and left others to finish and perfect it?

3dly, WHO gave the governors of the church, any authority in matters of faith, worship and discipline? Do we find one word of it in scripture? No. The church of Christ, as such, has no legislator besides Christ himself, whom the Father has made head over all things to the church. And whatever church that be, whose rulers have any power of legislation, so far forth it is not the church of Christ. For Christ equally forbids all his disciples to assume authority over their brethren; and to submit to any who shall arrogate to themselves any au­thority in matters of a religious concern.

4thly, and lastly, As no order of men has any au­thority to enjoin the belief of any articles of faith; or the use of any modes of worship, not expresly and ex­plicitly pointed out in the scriptures; so neither has the enjoining any such, a tendency to preserve the peace and harmony of the church; but directly the contrary. The [Page 76] confusion and disorder that have hitherto been in the church, have not arisen from christians exercising their own judgment, and worshipping God according to their consciences; (though in a manner somewhat different from others) but from the pride and insolence of those who deny their christian brethren this liberty; and who undertake to prescribe authoritatively to others what they shall believe, and how they shall worship. Were it not for the turbulent, domineering spirit of some Ecclesiasticks, who desire more power than Christ saw sit to intrust them with, there would be but little of that wrangling and discord which have hitherto disturbed the peace of the church. The divisions and contentions that have hitherto happened, and still subsist in the christian church, are all, in a manner, owing to the unchristian temper and conduct of those who could not con­tent themselves with scripture orthodoxy, with the sim­ple and spiritual worship of the Father, enjoined by our Saviour, and with the platform of church disci­pline contained in the new testament; but must go to coining new articles of faith, new modes and rites of worship, making new canons, and prescribing new rules for the regulation of the church. It is about these com­paratively novel inventions, that the governors and fathers of the church, (as some affect to call them) have generally been more warm and zealous, than about an holy and godly life. They have ordinarily given pretty good quarter to the most vicious and debauched of men, provided their own authority was acknowledged; their own peculiar whimsies embraced; and their decent (or rather ridiculous) forms and ceremonies were religiously observed. But the most peaceable, sober and virtuous persons, who would not submit to their tyrannical yoke, have all along been treated with contempt and inhuma­nity, as being hereticks, scismaticks, &c. And all this, perhaps only for not practising such rites, as have no more relation to christianity than telling beeds, or cracking the fingers; and for not believing such doctrines as have [Page 77] no more to do with the gospel of Jesus Christ, than the idle stories of bell and the dragon, or Tobit and his dog. Here is the true source of religious discord. Had Ecclesiasticks, instead of lording it our God's heri­tage, and setting up their own authority in the room of Christ's, put on the meekness and gentleness of Christ; and set a better example to the flock; had they endeavoured to remove all stumbling blocks out of the way, instead of insisting upon indifferent things as necessary terms of christian communion; had they taught and practised the weightier matters of law, instead of spending their zeal upon trifles; had they taught mutual forbearance and charity, instead of fomenting a furious party spirit, and exciting ignorant bigots to rail at sober peaceable chri­stians; had they done thus, the peace and harmony of the church might have been very well preserved, without creeds and formularies, or an exact uniformity in faith and worship. Our blessed Saviour and his apostles, it is plain, have left matters so that there may be a considerable latitude and difference in the sentiments of good chri­stians, and in the manner of their worship. But His am­bassadors, and their successors, it seems, have found out that this is a great defect. Accordingly they under­take to supply it, under the notion of preserving the peace of the church. And this is what has hitherto been, and must continue to be, the cause of angry de­bates and endless contentions; a means of dividing the church, in stead of uniting it; and of inspiring christians with mutual rage, instead of mutual love and brotherly affection.

IT may be objected, in the fifth place,

5. ‘THAT the doctrine of private judgment is in­consistent with that of a standing ministry in the chri­stian church, appointed by Christ to instruct people in religious matters. An order of men was divinely in­stituted to do the office of instructors, or teachers in the [Page 78] church: Consequently there must be others whose duty it is to learn of them, and not to pretend to a right of judging for themselves. It is incumbent upon the Laiety to go to their spiritual guides; and to receive their instructions with humility and rever­ence, without pretending to dispute the truth of what they assert in the name of the Lord.’ This, we know, is the manner in which many express themselves upon this subject. And the positive, dogmatical air with which most of our pulpit-discourses are delivered is a sufficient proof, that these sentiments are adopted by the generality of those that stile themselves the ambassa­dors of Jesus Christ. But to this objection it may be answered in the first place,

1st. THAT, allowing there is somewhere in the christian church, a set of Men whose office it is to teach authoritative­ly, and by divine right, still people must judge for them­selves who these men are. Almost all publick teachers of religion pretend a divine right to be so. But they do not all teach the same doctrines. How then shall we know whom to chuse for our spiritual instructor, without exa­mining into, and judging upon, the claims of those who demand our attention, and the direction of our under­standings and consciences? But

2ly. SUPPOSING we have found who these persons are, to whom this authority is given, it does not follow that they are to be implicitly believed in every thing they say, or even in any thing. No man is to be believed implicitly, unless he is infallible: but infallibility is not necessarily connected with a divine right to teach. Al­though it should be allowed, that kings reign by divine right, in the highest sense pleaded for by the advocates for passive obedience and non-resistence, still it is possible that they may make an ill use of their power; command things expresly forbidden by God, and forbid what God has injoined. In either of these cases, it will be allowed [Page 79] that they have no title to the active obedience of their subjects. So also, he that has a divine right to instruct others in religion, may possibly speak false, either ig­norantly or with design: And if he does so, no one will be so extravagant as to say, that he ought to be believed. God has given him a right to teach; but it is only to teach truth; if, therefore, he teaches for doctrines the commandments of men, and lies, for the gospel of Christ, he exceeds his commission; and has no more right to demand our assent, than any other liar, or deceiver who is unconsecrat­ed. So that let us carry our idea of the authority of christi­an teachers ever so high, yet if we stop short of infallibity, we are in reason obliged to examine all that they say, and either to receive or reject it, as evidence of its truth does, or does not appear. Even the apostles them­selves (who were divinely authorized teachers in a much higher and more proper sense than any set of men can pretend to be at this day) never pretended to such a right of dictating to others what they should believe and do, as interfered with the right of private judgment. Chri­stian teachers in after ages are (or at least ought to be) only commentators upon the scriptures: and we cannot suppose their commentaries have greater weight and authority than the text itself.

A man of superior knowledge and integrity may be of great advantage in a christian society, by helping his brethren and neighbours to a right understanding of the scriptures, although he be not infallible, and although nothing he advances is to be received for truth without examination and proof. We have authorized professors and teachers of law, physic, philosophy, &c. who are doubtless helpful to such as devote themselves to the study of these sciences. But who ever imagined that the end of their institution was authoritatively to dictate what is true in their respective provinces, in such a sense as to preclude examination; and to render it unnecessary for their pupils and auditors to inquire into the founda­tion [Page 80] of what they assert? This is so far from being the case, that 'tis confessed their chief business is to open and enlarge the minds of their scholars; to propose reasons and arguments to their understandings, and to endea­vour to make them apprehend their force; and in this way to bring them acquainted with the sciences to which they respectively apply themselves. A mathematician would think his pupil had made but a small proficiency, if he only believed upon authority, all the propositions in Euclid, and other books of the same kind, without seeing what principles they were grounded upon, or be­ing able to demonstrate them himself. And as the bu­siness of an instructor is not to inforce certain dogma's purely by dint of authority; so the bu­siness of a learner is not to receive for truth whatever his instructor in any science advances as such; but to exercise his own intellectual powers, and to enter into the reasons and grounds of what is taught, and to receive nothing without evidence. No one imagines that a per­son's exercising his own understanding in this manner, is inconsistent with the notion of his having somebody to lead and instruct him in any branch of natural know­ledge. And the case is much the same in morals and religion. A man's being an authorized (if you please, a divinely authorized) instructor in religious matters, is no ways inconsistent with the right of private judgment in others. Indeed if they reject the truth when it is suffi­ciently proved, they do it at their peril; and that, let it be offered by whom it will. But still all are left at as much liberty to examine and judge for themselves, as if there were no public teachers at all.

I proceed now to the sixth, and last objection I shall have time to consider. The objection I intend may be put into some such form as this—

6. ‘ALTHOUGH men may be at liberty to judge for themselves, and to chuse their own religion, when [Page 81] the civil magistrate does not interpose with his autho­rity; yet when articles of faith have once received a royal sanction; and a particular religion is establish­ed by the laws of the land; then certainly we are bound to dismiss all our former scruples of conscience, and to submit to the religion of the state. For the a­postle has told us expresly, That the powers that be, are ordained of God, that he that resisteth the power, re­sisteth the ordinance of God, and shall receive to himself damnation.’

With respect to this objection, I would beg leave to query in the first place, whether christians are bound in conscience to believe and conform to that religion, what­ever it be, which is established by law, in the countries where they respectively live? This is a plain question: and they either are, or are not so obliged. There is no medium. If they are not so obliged, but only in case they apprehend the established religion is agreeable to the word and will of God, this supposes a right of pri­vate judgment, and so gives up the whole point in de­bate. But on the other hand, if they are bound in con­science to conform in the manner before expressed, from hence it follows, that he that lives in Scotland is bound in conscience to be a Presbyterian; he that lives in Eng­land to be an Episcopalian; he that lives in Italy, France, Spain or Portugal to be a Roman Catholick; he that lives in Constantinople must be a Mahometan; and he that lives in a Heathen country, must conscientiously comply with all the idolatrous rites that are injoined by the civil authority; and so be an Heathen in order to obey the gospel-precept concerning submission to lawful autho­rity. Moreover, upon this supposition, it follows that a traveller who has occasion to pass through all those dif­ferent countries, must change his religion with his climate. He must be successively a Presbyterian, Episcopalian, Papist, Mussulman, and a Heathen; and then be a good orthodox believer when he comes into Christendom again. [Page 82] These consequences are unavoidable upon supposition that the subject ought universally to embrace the religion of the supreme magistrate. And some men will not be shocked at these consequences; for nothing pleases them better than to change their religion as often as they can with conveniency and profit; oaths and subscriptions are, with them, of no signification; if they swear to their own hurt, it is but to change. They are governed by the fashion in their religion, as much as they are in the cut of their cloaths; they have none but a state con­science; and either rail or smile at those who are so whimsical and superstitious as to pretend to have any other. What they have to do in order to know the true religion, is not to inquire into the nature of things, and the infallible oracles of God, but to search the Codes and Registers and Law-books in the country where they live. However it is to be hoped that some others do not trifle with their Maker in this manner; but think it of some importance to know the will of God; and to obey it conscientiously, whatever may be the religion by law established. Is it not possible for the command of the civil magistrate to interfere and clash with the laws of God? No man will pretend to deny this. Whose authority, then is to be regarded, that of the King, or that of the Monarch of the universe, the King of Kings and Lord of Lords? Will any man say it is not our business as men, and especially as christians, to judge whether the injunctions of the civil magistrate may be complied with consistently with our allegiance and loyalty to the supreme Majesty of heaven and earth? And if they cannot, will any one make it a serious question, whether it is better to obey God or man? But

2dly. I would humbly inquire how any civil majestrate came by any authority at all in religious matters; and who gave him this authority? Has the supreme magistrate of every nation, as such, a right to make a religion for his subjects? No. For then a heathen magistrate, would [Page 83] have a right to enjoin idolatry and paganism; and to punish all christians that came within his territories, if they would not conform. Does the gospel of Christ give the christian magistrate authority in matters of faith and worship? No. It says not a word about any such thing. But

3dly. AND lastly here, It is evident beyond all dis­pute, that the apostle in injoining obedience to the civil magistrate, had no thought of injoining obedience to him in religious matters. For all the supreme magistrates then in the world were Pagan; and idolatry was the re­ligion by law established. And certainly we cannot sup­pose that the apostles could injoin it as a christian duty to embrace the established religion, when that was di­rectly opposite to Christianity. To have threatned dam­nation to those who disobeyed in this case, would have been to threaten damnation to themselves, and to denounce an anathema against all the christians in the world, and even against Jesus Christ himself; for these were all dissenters from the established religion; and thousands gloriously suffered martyrdom, for refusing to comply with the religion of the state, and for asserting that right of private judgment which we are now endeavouring to defend.

ACCORDING to St. Paul, the magistrate is ordained of God for a terror to evil doers; and for a praise to them that do well. His office is to preserve the liberties and natural rights of his subjects, one of the most important of which rights is that of private judgment, and an unmolested enjoyment of a man's own religion, let it be what it will, provided he is a peaceable sub­ject, and a good member of society. These and such like are the ends for which, according to scripture, the magistrate is ordained of God, and not to make a religion for his subjects. This would be to invade, and incroach upon, those natural rights of his subjects, which [Page 84] it is his business to preserve inviolable. As the Jews said occasionally to Pilate, We have no king but Caesar; so christians, as such, may say, We have no king but Jesus Christ: And they are traitors to him their lawful sovereign if they swear allegiance to any other as the lord of their faith, and the director of their religious conduct. And indeed the very mention of articles of faith established by law, is as great a solecism as mathematicks established by law; and deserves a worse name than I chuse to give in this place.

THUS I have endeavoured with all possible brevity and plainness to answer the most material objections against freedom of thought, and the rights of conscience in re­ligious concerns. I have aimed at provoking no sect of christians whatever; nor at pleasing any; but have spoken my sentiments, such as they are, with the honest simplicity that I think becomes a christian: And with such freedom as I apprehend is agreable to the cause I have been attempting to defend; the cause of religious liberty; that liberty which God and the gospel of his Son have granted to us; that liberty, for the sake of which our pious fore-fathers forsook their native land, where they had a goodly heritage, and sought a safe retreat in this western world, a wilderness inhabited by savage beasts and more savage men; though both were less savage than some of those episcopal blood-thirsty tyrants from whose rage they fled. This is a cause of no less importance even to the present happiness of human society, than that of civil liberty, in opposition to ar­bitrary power. And here I beg leave to use the words of a truly catholic prelate of the church of England— ‘To liberty and property, says he, I add the free exercise of religion as necessary to the happiness of a governed society: because as there is no tyranny so odious to God, as tyranny over the conscience; so is there no slavery so uneasy and ignominious, as a forced religion, or a worship imposed upon—men by the fear or applica­tion [Page 85] of outward inconveniencies: besides that nothing promotes the flourishing condition of a nation more than the indulgence of this freedom to all whose prin­ciples are not manifestly inconsistent with the publick safety.’ Thus the bishop of Winchester, the noted scourge of civil and ecclesiastical tyranny.

I shall now close with a few words by way of applica­tion. And

1st LET us all stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free; and not suffer ourselves to be intangled with any yoke of bondage. If we have submitted to the yoke hitherto, and ingloriously subjected ourselves to any human impositions in religious matters; it is better to throw off the yoke even now, than to let it gall us all our life-time: It is not yet too late to assert our liberty, and free ourselves from an ignominous slavery to the dictates of men.

LET us take pains to find out the truth, and after we are setled in our judgment concerning any religious tenet or practice, adhere to it with constancy of mind, till convinced of our error in a rational way. Let us despise the frowns and censures of those vain con­ceited men who set themselves up for the oracles of truth and the standard of orthodoxy; and then call their neighbours hard names—We have not only a right to think for ourselves in matters of re­ligion, but to act for ourselves also. Nor has any man whatever, whether of a civil or sacred Character, any au­thority to controul us, unless it be by the gentle methods of argument and perswasion. To Christ alone, the su­preme and only head of the christian church, and the final judge of mankind; to him alone we are accounta­ble for not believing his doctrines, and obeying his com­mandments, as such. And whosoever attempts to re­strain or controul us, takes it upon him to rule another [Page 86] man's servant, forgetting that he also is a man under authority; and must hereafter stand or fall by a sentence from the same mouth with ourselves.

DID I say, we have a right to judge and act for our­selves? I now add—it is our indispensible duty to do it. This is a right which we cannot relinquish, or neglect to exercise, if we would, without being highly culpable; for it is absolutely unalienable in its own nature. We may dispose of our temporal substance if we please; but God and nature and the gospel of Christ injoin it upon us a duty to maintain the right of private judgment, and to worship God according to our consciences, as much as they injoin us to give an alms to the poor, to love God and our neighbour, and practise universal righ­teousness: and we may as well talk of giving up our right to the latter, as the former. They are all duties, and not rights simply; duties equally founded in the reason of things; duties equally commanded by the same God; duties equally injoined by the same Lord; duties equally required in the same gospel. And a neglect of the duty of private judgment may possibly be attended with worse consequences to ourselves and others than the neglect of almost any other. For he that does not examine for himself what is true and right, acts in­tirely in the dark, and so may run into the most irregular and destructive practices that can be conceived of, just as his weak or wicked guides are pleased to prompt him. He is fit only for a tool to the devil and his emissaries: and may flatter himself that he is doing God good service, while he is imbrueing his hands in the blood of the innocent, and persecuting the church of Christ.

But

2ly. AND to conclude, while we are asserting our own liberty and christian rights, let us be consistent and uni­form; and not attempt to incroach upon the rights of [Page 87] others. They have the same right to judge for them­selves and to chuse their own religion, with ourselves. And nothing is more incongruous than for an advocate for liberty, to tyrannize over his neighbours. We have all liberty to think and act for ourselves in things of a religious concern; and we ought to be content with that, without desiring a liberty to oppress and grieve others. However we have some ignorant railing zealots amongst us, fired with a furious party spirit, who are not satisfyed that they enjoy their own liberty, but mourn that their neighbours enjoy the same, and that they have it not in their power to afflict them for their religious sentiments. They groan under the righteous act of toleration, as much as our fathers groaned under the unrighteous one of uniformity. However, through mercy, we have but a few men of this stamp amongst us; and those are such ignorant and despicable creatures, that they are more proper objects of pity, than of anger. My brethren, God forbid that we should discover any thing of this same unchristian temper; or begrutch others the enjoyment of those rights which we ourselves esteem so dear, sacred and valuable. Let us, as much as in us lies, live peaceably with all men; but suffer none to lord it over our con­sciences. Let us avoid a contracted, censorious spirit in ourselves, and pity and despise it in others. Let us be courteous and friendly to all men of what denomination soever they be; and how much soever their religious principles may differ from our own. If we think them erroneous, let us not rail at them, but reason with them in the spirit of meekness. Let us use no methods but those of sober argument and kind perswasion, in order to bring men over to a belief and practice of the truth as it is in Jesus: and let us scorn those who are for using any other methods with us. God grant that how different soever our sentiments are, we may be united in love and charity; and that christians of all perswasions, and [Page 88] all churches, may live and behave in such a manner, as to meet at last above: and join the general as­sembly and church of the first-born which are written in heaven. Amen.

THAT which renders it a matter of the highest importance to examine with freedom into moral and religious subjects, is not so much the advan­tage simply of knowing what is true and right, as the necessity of this in order to true and right action. It is scarce of any importance to us to gain a speculative knowledge of true religion, but as this has relation to practice; and may teach us what temper of mind to­wards our Creator, and one another, we ought to culti­vate; and what an external conduct we ought to adorn our lives with, in order to answer the end of our being; [Page 90] in order to our filling up our place in the creation, and acting our part well in the great drama of the world. This is the view which ought to accompany all our in­quiries into religious subjects. If we are sollicitous only about knowing what is true and right, and terminate our desires in such knowledge, we pursue as an end what ought to be looked upon only a means to somewhat farther and beyond, viz. such a conduct as may render us acceptable to our creator, and lay the foundation for rational happiness here and hereafter. Knowledge can hardly be said to be valuable for its own sake, but only as it may be improved to good and excellent purposes: Nor is it eventually advantageous to us, any farther than we conform ourselves to truth and right in our be­haviour.

FOR what end does the marriner study the art of navi­gation? Not, surely, for this only or chiefly, that he may please and amuse himself with the theory of it: but rather, that he may be able to steer his course aright through the ocean, and arrive safe at length at the port for which he is bound. Without applying his knowledge in this way, all the advantage it will be to him, is that of being shipwrecked with his eyes open, while others run upon ruin blindfold, and purely through ignorance.—We also are marriners; bound to another country, to another world. We sail at present upon a boisterous stormy ocean, in which we are in danger of suffering shipwreck. For the moral world, as well as the natural, has its rocks and whirlpools; its scylla and carybdis, and a thousand en­chanting sirens. To know the middle and safe way, will not secure us, unless we keep in it, and avoid the danger on either hand. And to be castaways through our own negligence, while we know the course we should steer, instead of diminishing, will augment our sorrow. Religious knowledge applyed to its true ends and pur­poses, is the only knowledge that can be finally profitable and gainful; for, to use the words of St. James with a [Page 91] little variation, as the body without the spirit is dead, so knowledge without practice, is dead also: And it is the voice of reason as well as of revelation, That the servant that knows his Lord's will, and doth it not, shall be beaten with many stripes. What, then, has our Lord declared to us to be his will? And what does he require of us? One of the most comprehensive accounts of our duty to­wards our Maker, and each other, is contained in the words which I have chosen for the subject of the present discourse. They are the words of our Lord Jesus Christ to a person whom the historian stiles a lawyer, in answer to an important question, but proposed by him, perhaps, with no very good intention. The question to be re­solved was this— Which is the great commandment in the law? And our Lord determines it in this manner— Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets. In discoursing upon these words I shall inquire

• I. INTO the nature and obligation of the two duties here mentioned— The love of God, and of our neigh­bour.
• II. IN what sense, and upon what account it is said, that to love God, is the first and great commandment.
• III. WHAT our Lord intends by the assertion, That on these two commandments, viz. the love of God and of our neighbour, hang all the law and the prophets.
• IV. AND lastly, I shall endeavour to show, that these two commandments have the same place and preheminence under the gospel dispensation, which they had under the legal: Or, that all the Gospel of Jesus Christ hangs on [Page 92] these two commandments, in the same sense in which all the law and [...] [...]phets did.

I. THEN, let us inquire distinctly into the nature and obligation of the two duties here mentioned; the first of which is expressed thus, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind.

WE know that in scripture language and indeed in common discourse, it is usual for one duty or virtue to stand for all the rest. A righteous, a godly, a merciful a just, or an upright man, often signifies a good man in ge­neral. And so, when we are commanded to love or fear God, or to work righteousness, the meaning is not that we should practise only the particular duty men­tioned, as distinguished from others; but often, at least, that we should become good men in general, and walk in all the commandments and ordinances of the Lord blameless. And this is the sense which is sometimes put upon the precept now under consideration. However it seems plain, that this cannot be the true intention of it. For were it to be understood in this latitude, as injoining obedience to the commandments in general, it would in­clude in it the love of our neighbour, which is expresly distinguished, in this place, from the love of God. Here is plainly a comparison made betwixt two command­ments, one of which is said to be the first and great com­mandment, and the other to be like unto it. This, there­fore, which is stiled the first, must be altogether distinct from that with which it is compared. Love is, indeed, the duty injoined in both; but the object of the first, is our Creator only; of the latter, only our fellow-creatures. This precept, therefore, does not include any of the du­ties of the second table of the moral law, as they are com­monly called. The most it injoins, is, all the duties of the first table, as distinguished from those of the second. But, if I mistake not, this command still admits, and [Page 93] requires a farther limitation. It injoins certain disposi­tions and affections of the heart, towards God, as dis­tinguished from all external acts of devotion and religion; such as praying, offering sacrifices, fasting, observing sabbaths and ordinances, &c. The manner in which the precept is expressed, seems to show, that the duty it in­joins is wholly internal—Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart; i. e. sincerely and unfeignedly— and with all thy soul—in the exercise of thy understanding, and rational faculties— and with all thy mind—freely, voluntarily, without reluctance or constraint. These ex­pressions seem to relate wholly to the mind. And that which determines this to be the true intention of the command, is what we find in the parallel place in another Evangelist. St. Mark relates the story of a person's com­ing to our Saviour with the same question which is here answered; and the answer to it is in effect the same. Upon which the Scribe (as he is called in St. Mark) replied thus— Master, thou hast said the truth; for there is one God; and to love him with all the heart—is more than all whole burnt offerings and sacrifices—From this reply of the Scribe, it appears, that in proposing his question just before, he had a particular eye to the external services required under the Law, compared with an in­ward regard to God, and sincere benevolence to man­kind: And that he accordingly understood our Lord in his answer, as making a distinction and comparison, not only betwixt the duties of the first and second table; but also, betwixt the several duties of the first table; and pre­ferring the internal love and reverence of God, to all burnt offerings and sacrifices; and consequently, to all ex­ternal acts of piety and devotion, as injoined in the cere­monial law. This is plainly the sense of the Scribe; and it is equally evident that our Lord approved his sense: For it follows immediately in the next verse— And when Jesus saw that he answered discretely, he said unto him, Thou art not far from the kingdom of God. I shall, there­fore, take it for granted, or rather proved, That the pre­cept [Page 94] which our Lord calls the first and great command­ment, is distinguished not only from all the duties of the second table, but likewise from many of the first; particularly, from all external acts of devotion; from all rites and ceremonies and legal institutions; and in short from all duties whatever, besides those internal ones of the heart and affections; and of which God is the only and the immediate object. The duty here required, is wholly a spiritual sacrifice; and the heart is the only altar upon which it is to be offered. Accordingly, in the following discourse, we shall have no concern with any thing besides the inward sentiments of the heart; the dispositions and sallies of the soul towards its Creator, the Father of spirits. But let none think I am going to inculcate enthusiasm, because I speak of the religion and devotion of the heart. I propose to speak of nothing but what has its foundation in scripture, and the nature of things: Nor will any enthusiasm be incouraged, be­sides that which sober reason requires.

WHAT then is it to love the Lord our God, in the sense of the text? Or wherein does this duty consist? I answer in general, That it consists in exercising those internal regards towards our Maker, which the perfections of his nature, and our relation to him require. And here I shall not spend time to prove, but take it for grant­ed, That God is infinite in power, knowledge and goodness;—That he is able to perform whatever he plea­ses;—That he knows universally what is wisest and best;—And that the moral rectitude of his nature is such, that his will and actions are always conformable to truth and right:—That as he created all things, so he constantly upholds them, and governs them with per­fect wisdom and equity, accommodating and attemper­ing his laws to the common good of his creatures—That as he is the father of all, so his government is paternal, free from all unnecessary rigor;—uniform and steady, in opposition to all capriciousness and arbitrary proceedings; [Page 95] And finally, in the words of the Psalmist, That he is good to all, and his tender mercies, over all his works.

IT is sufficient to our present purpose, just to have hin­ted in this general way at the character and perfections of God: For it being supposed that he is really such a Being, it will not, perhaps, be very difficult to point out the principal of those movements of mind, and internal regards, which are due to him: and so to ascertain the nature of the duty under consideration. And I think the various things included in this important and com­prehensive duty of loving God, may not unfitly be re­duced to the following heads— Love, in a strict restrained sense—Gratitude—Desire of the divine approbation, and delight in the consciousness of it—Trust in, and dependence upon God—Absolute resignation of heart to his will—And lastly, Joy in the consideration of our filial relation to him.

WHAT I mentioned first, was the love of God in the strict restrained sense of the word. By this I do not in­tend those flashy and rapturous sallies of the heart to­wards God, which may proceed only from a fond conceit, that we are singled out to be the peculiar favourites of heaven. We may easily fall into an extasy, and run mad in religious contemplation, without having any thing of that divine love which is due to the perfecti­ons of our Creator. The love of God is a steady, so­ber, calm and rational thing, the result of thought, and consideration—It is indeed a passion, but a passion excited by reason presenting the proper object of it to the mind. Nor ought we to be so sollicitous about avoiding one extreme, as to fall into the contrary. We ought not to run so far from enthusiasm, as to lose sight of real devo­tion; we ought not to be so fond of a rational religion, as to suppose that religion consists wholly in cold dry speculation, without having any concern with the affecti­ons. Real piety necessarily supposes, that the heart is touched, affected, warmed, inflamed: and not barely [Page 96] that we have right speculative notions concerning God. A religion consisting in nothing but a knowledge of God's attributes, and an external conduct agreeable to his laws, would be a lifeless insipid thing: It would be neither a source of happiness to ourselves nor recom­mend us to the approbation of him, who requires us to give him our heart.

INDEED St. John says, That this is the love of God, that we keep his Commandments. But it is plain, both from the nature of the thing itself, and from the design of the apostle in this place, that his meaning is no more than this—That the natural effect or consequence of love to God, is obedience to his commandments: And not strictly speaking, that keeping the commandments, is a proper definition of the love of God. These are evi­dently two distinct things; as distinct as love and obe­dience to any other being or person; or as any two things whatever. And how close a connection soever there may be betwixt them, they ought not to be con­founded. It is evident at first view, that this com­mand, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, carries in it something altogether different from an in­junction of external obedience. The precept relates to the heart and affections, as distinguished even from the un­derstanding, whereby we discern and contemplate the di­vine perfections; and much more distinct from all ex­ternal actions of what kind soever. Let any one see whether the following passages in the writings of the royal poet and prophet, do not carry in them the warmest expressions of inward esteem, approbation and love. Whom have I in heaven but thee? and there is nothing upon earth that I desire besides thee. My flesh and my heart faileth me; but God is the strength of my heart, and my portion for ever. Like as the heart panteth after the water-brooks, so longeth my soul after thee, O God. My soul is a thirst for God; yea even for the living God. [Page 97] When shall I come and appear before him!—It is plain that this is the language not barely of reason; but of passion and fervour and emotion of spirit. Nor can any tolerable account be given of these, and such like ex­pressions in the devotional parts of scripture, without supposing that the affections of those who uttered them, were raised to a great degree of warmth; and that they terminated in God himself, as their proper and ultimate object, without regard to any farther or future advantage: they terminated in him as their end, in much the same manner that our animal affections and appetites centre in their respective objects. Nor is there any thing that is absurd or romantic in this supposition; any thing that will not approve itself to our understandings upon the closest examination.

THERE is a natural distinction betwixt actions and characters, some being in themselves morally good, and others evil. Mankind have faculties for discerning these moral differences: and what is in itself right and good, is also in itself amiable in the eye of every rational be­ing: it is in itself right to approve and love what is right, and wrong to approve and love what is wrong. Our Creator, besides endowing us with reason to distinguish betwixt moral good and evil, has moreover given us another faculty which is sometimes called a moral sense; and which St. Paul speaks of under the titles of the law written in the heart, and the law of the mind. By virtue of this faculty, moral good and evil, when they are objects to our minds affect us in a very different manner; the first affording us pleasure, the other pain and uneasiness: And this, as unavoidably as the eye is differently affected with regular and irregular figures in the body; or the ear, with the most grateful harmony, and the most harsh and grating discord: I say as unavoidably; but neither of them are absolutely unavoidable. There are some who have no ear for musick, and others who have no eye for architecture, painting or statuary. And [Page 98] so there are some, perhaps, who have little or no taste in morals. However, as to the latter, this is not the natural state of their minds; but proceeds from their abusing and perverting nature. (And all our animal senses may be viciated also.) But take a man who has not violated frequently the natural law of his mind; and he can no more approve of what is commonly called malevolence, cruelty and injustice, than a skilful architect can approve of the most irregular and aukward pile of building: And on the other hand, he can no more hate and nauseate what appears to be honest, generous and benevolent, than the other can be displeased at the sight of an edifice, all the parts of which are adjusted by the exactest rules of proportion, and the whole brought to the greatest perfection of art. What man for example, who is not become depraved to a great degree in his own moral character, can read the contrary characters of Cataline and Socrates with the same complacency? Can he that has any remains of virtue, help being fired with indignation at the baseness and perfidy of the former; and with love, at the virtue and integrity of the latter? Does a man that lives by plunder; that swells his stores by rapine, and fattens on the blood of the innocent, appear as amiable as one, that as Job elegantly expresses it, is eyes to the blind, and feet to the lame? One whose benevolence is diffused to all about him? None can avoid looking upon the former as the proper object of displeasure, and upon the latter as the proper object of love and com­placency, although his own interest is no ways affected by the conduct of either.

BUT what relation, it may be asked, has all this dis­course to do with the love of God? I answer, a very near relation: For God, according to the supposition mentioned above, is perfect in all those moral qualities and excellencies which we esteem amiable in mankind: and which if any man does not esteem and admire and love, he is looked upon as a monster, debased below hu­manity, [Page 99] and unworthy to be reckoned among rational creatures. Now if it be reasonable to esteem and love our fellow-men in proportion to their justice, integrity and be­nevolence, must not he who is perfect in all moral excel­lence be in proportion the proper object of those same affections? The goodness of God so far transcends that of the best of his creatures, that our blessed Saviour has told us, There is none good but one, that is God. The most that any can pretend to without arrogating too much to themselves, is a faint resemblance of the divine per­fections. And can it be reasonable to love and admire the mere portrait of moral excellence, and to let the substance, the source and standard of it, remain unre­garded. If goodness in a limited degree be worthy the esteem of all rational beings, shall not that goodness that is without bounds, and absolutely perfect, be thought worthy to excite in all, a real inward esteem also? an hearty and sincere complacency? an ardent, inextinguish­able love? A love strong as death? A love which many waters cannot quench, nor the floods drown? In this there is no enthusiasm: in this there is nothing unreasonable and fanciful: For undoubtedly those qualities which be­ing found in a limited degree, are really amiable, do not cease to be so, when they become infinite; but instead of this, become infinitely amiable.

WERE it possible for us to contemplate the divine perfections without considering our own relation to God; our own dependance upon him, and his providential care of us; could we consider him only as exercising his moral perfections towards other beings with whom we have no concern, still it would be rational to love and esteem him. For these perfections are in themselves amiable, and consequently they are so to all beings who are capable of discerning them. And we find ourselves in a manner necessitated to love those virtuous characters which we meet with in history;—characters of men who lived in remote ages, and the distant parts of the [Page 100] globe; although our own interest neither has, nor can be, any ways affected by their virtue. And thus also the moral perfections of God demand our love, separate from the consideration of our own particular relation to him. But when we consider him under the notion of being our Creator, our moral Governour, our Father, our Friend, our Patron; this brings the matter home to ourselves, and tends still farther to endear him to us.

AND this naturally brings us to another of those re­ligious regards which we owe immediately to God: I mean gratitude. This is nearly allied to the former; but intirely distinct from it. The love of God, in the most proper sense of it, is an inward esteem, and de­lightful admiration of the divine perfections, without the consideration of any good we have either received or expect from them. But gratitude has respect to some­thing past; 'tis a thankful sense and recognition of cer­tain benefits which we have actually received. And it is plain that if the moral attributes of God, are in them­selves a proper object of love, their being exerted in positive acts of goodness and beneficence to us, calls for the returns of gratitude. Ingratitude is always looked upon as an indication of a base, sordid and degenerate mind: It is what we cannot avoid condemning in those to whom we have shown favour in any instance: we expect, at least, that they should retain in their minds a sense of our munificence. All the world are agreed that this is what every man owes to his neighbour who has proved a benefactor to him. Why then should not the same temper of mind take place in us with relation of God? If we think ourselves obliged to thank our fellow men for those inconsiderable favours, which they are scarce more than the instruments of conveying to us, what degree of gratitude can be sufficient for us to exercise towards our constant and infinite Benefactor? towards that Being to whom we are indebted for our existence; for all the faculties of our minds and bodies? that Being who is [Page 101] the original, voluntary bestower of all that is valuable and dear to us? that Being from whom descends every good and every perfect gift? And as we are christians, I may add, that Being who so loved the world as to give his only begotten son that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life?—What shall I render to the Lord for all his benefits? Bless the Lord, O my soul; and all that is within me praise his holy name. Bless the Lord, O my soul, and forget not all his benefits. He hath redeemed thy life from destruction: he hath crowned thee with loving kindness and tender mercies.

BUT to proceed—Another branch of that religious temper of mind which is implied in the love of God, is a desire of his approbation and delight in the consciousness or the prospect of it. We desire to be thought favourably of, by mankind; and to be thought so by the wise and good, yields no small satisfaction to ingenuous and vir­tuous minds. But as God is the only perfect judge of real merit, to gain his approbation ought to be the highest ambition of every reasonable creature. We are apt to lay traps and snares to catch the fluttering applauses of the multitude; and delight to be hosanna'd by them. But are they the supreme judges of what is really worthy of applause? Is it reasonable to be sollicitous about the sentiments of the world concerning us, and to take no thought about the approbation of the great Inspector and Censor of that world whose esteem we court? No man that has any just conceptions of God's perfections can be regardless with what eye he views his conduct upon that stage where his place of action is assigned him. God himself is a spectator in this great theatre of the universe. A desire of his applause, therefore, and of the honour that comes from him, should in a manner exclude all lower ambition from our breasts. And the prospect of it must afford the highest satisfaction to every virtuous man, without the consideration of any reward consequent there­upon. The approbation of a perfect judge, is itself a re­ward. [Page 102] Nor is there really any pious regard to the sen­tence that God passes upon our behaviour, any farther than our hope and delight terminates in that sentence itself. This is divine ambition. But to look forward to some consequent advantage beside and beyond this, is religious selfishness. However, even this is not to be con­demned, although it does not strictly fall under the notion of piety. Piety respects God himself, and him alone.

To proceed— Trust in God and dependance upon him as our portion [...], is a duty which his perfec­tions, and our own weakness, requires we should live in the constant exercise of. None of us need to be in­formed of the internal want and poverty of our nature: we all feel it in a greater or less degree. It is the sense of this insufficiency at home, that makes us rove abroad after some foreign support. ^* We have commonly re­course to diversions and amusements; to the company and conversation of our Friends, to mammon, and animal pleasures. Upon things of this nature we lean for sup­port; upon these we depend for that sedate happiness and satisfaction, which our penurious nature craves. But they are found to be absolutely insufficient to answer this purpose. Our inborn thirst of happiness is not to be allayed with such shallow draughts as these, Vanity of vanities, said Solomon, all is vanity and vexation of spirit, after he had searched a long time for substantial happiness in worldly possessions and enjoyments. The most that these things have it in their power to do, is to intoxicate us for a little while, and so to make us think ourselves great and happy. But as soon as we grow sober, and come to ourselves again, the fool's paradise, and the airy castles disappear: we find our wants remaining, and sol­liciting for something else. The constant language of our hearts is— who will shew us any good?—Who will do the friendly office to point us to our happiness? Now [Page 103] whither shall we go to find something that may fill our minds, and afford us a sincere, constant and uniform sa­tisfaction? Is there no object that is adequate to our wants and capacities? none that may be firmly relied and depended on, as a certain source of quiet and happiness? Doubtless there is; and indeed that Object is not far from every one of us: for in God we live, and move and have our being. His power, wisdom and goodness, may be a prop to our tottering and desponding spirits; and if we please we may enjoy present happiness in relying upon the care of his providence. We may thus get rid of all our wants at once; of all our anxiety and sollicitude about what may be on the morrow. He, without whom a sparrow cannot fall to the ground; He that opens his hand, and satisfieth the desire of every living thing; He that even heareth the young ravens when they cry; cannot fail to provide suitably for us who are his offspring. The very hairs of our head are all numbered by him: And we may cast all our cares upon him, as the apostle expresses it; for he careth for us.—Behold the fowls of the air, says our blessed Saviour; for they sow not, neither do they reap; nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly father feedeth them. Are ye not much better than they?—Con­sider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin: And yet I say unto you that even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these—Therefore take no thought for the morrow; for the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself; sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. Obedience to this command, understood with such limitations as common sense sug­gests, would disburthen us of a thousand fruitless cares, and be a source of constant serenity to our minds, in this various scene, this inconstant ocean we are passing through. The consideration of an universal kind pro­vidence presiding over the world, is, to them that will give themselves time to attend to it, a ground of con­tinual peace, and composure of soul. All we need con­cern ourselves about is to do our own duty: the rest be­longs [Page 104] to God; and he will doubtless do his part well; and they that put their trust in him will have no cause to be ashamed; but find their expectations answered to the full. He that is conscious of the integrity of his own heart, may have confidence towards God; and exult in the language of David, in hope of happiness both here and hereafter— God is my refuge and strength, a very present help in trouble. Therefore will not I fear, though the earth be removed, and though the mountains thereof be carried into the midst of the sea; though the waters thereof roar and be troubled; though the mountains shake with the swelling thereof—There is a river, the streams whereof shall make glad the city of God—Because he is at my right hand, I shall not be moved—Therefore my heart is glad, and my glory rejoiceth; my flesh also shall rest in hope—

NEAR akin to that trust and confidence in God now mentioned, is absolute resignation to his will in all cases and circumstances. There are indeed some things which, in one sense, will unavoidably give us uneasiness, such as sickness, the loss of our deceased friends, and ill usage from our surviving ones, and the like. It is in vain to attempt to throw off human nature so far as not to be in any measure moved with things of this kind. But it is our indispensable duty to discharge our minds of all mur­murings at providence; and to acquiesce patiently in the lot assigned us. Things could not, upon the whole, have been better ordered than they are, if the world be really under the government of a perfect Being. When we consider that known unto God are all his works from the beginning; his whole scheme and plan of govern­ment; and that by the goodness of his nature, he is dis­posed to order every event through the boundless uni­verse, and through all periods of time, so that all shall finally concur, to promote the common happiness of his creatures? what reason have we to be submis­sive in all circumstances; and to say with our blessed saviour, not my will, but thine, be done!

[Page 105] UPON this subject of resignation to the will of God, I shall beg leave to use the words of an admirable writer— ‘The consideration, says he, that the course of things is unalterable, hath a tendency to quite the mind under it, to beget a submission of temper to it. But when we can add, that this unalterable course is appointed and continued by infinite wisdom and good­ness; how absolute should be our submission, how in­tire our trust and dependance?’

‘THIS would reconcile us to our condition; prevent all the supernumerary troubles arising from imaginati­on, distant fears, impatience; all uneasiness besides that which necessarily arises from the calamities themselves we may be under. How many of our cares should we by this means be disburthened of? cares not pro­perly our own, how apt soever they may be to intrude upon us, and we to admit them; the anxieties of ex­pectation, sollicitude about success and disappoint­ment, which in truth are none of our concern. How open to every gratification would the mind be, which was clear of these incumbrances? Our resignation to the will of God, may be said to be perfect, when our will is lost, and resolved up into his; when we rest in his will as our end, as being in itself most just and right and good. And where is the impossibility of such an affection to what is just and right and good, such a loyalty of heart to the governour of the universe, as shall prevail over all sinister indirect desires of our own? Neither is this at bottom any thing more than faith and honesty and fairness of mind; in a more en­larged sense indeed than those words are commonly used. And as in common cases, fear and hope and other passions are raised in us by their respective ob­jects, so this submission of heart and soul and mind, this religious resignation, would be as naturally pro­duced, by our having just conceptions of almighty God, and a real sense of his presence with us. In how [Page 106] low a degree soever this temper usually prevails a­mongst men, yet it is a temper right in itself; It is what we owe to our Creator: It is particularly suitable to our mortal condition, and what we should endeavour after for our own sakes in our passage through such a world as this; where is nothing upon which we can rest or depend: nothing but what we are liable to be deceived or disappointed in. Thus we might acquaint ourselves with God, and be at peace. This is piety and religion in the strictest sense, considered as an habit in the mind: An habitual sense of God's presence with us; being affected towards him as present, in the man­ner his superiour nature requires from such a creature as man: This is to walk with God.’ Thus the Bishop "of Bristol.

BUT to submission to the divine will, we may fitly add even joy and triumph of heart, in the consideration of our relation to God. The superintendency of divine provi­dence, if conceived of in a right manner, is one of the most pleasurable and delightful considerations that can enter into the mind of a reasonable creature, sensible of his own weakness and various imperfections. Indeed, if instead of a wise and infinitely gracious Being, one whose kind regards are extended to all his intellectual creatures; and one who governs the world with a view at promot­ing the moral rectitude, and so of advancing the happi­ness of his creatures and offspring; I say, if instead of such a Being as this, we, in our imaginations, place at the head of the universe, a capricious, humoursome and ty­rannical Being; one who loves and hates at random, and has no uniform, consistent, and benevolent design; we form a scheme of principles, more destructive of rational happiness than that of Atheism itself. For any man had rather be left to the mercy of atoms, and fate, and chance, or any other chimerical Deity, than be subjected to the pleasure of such a monster, as an all-knowing, in­finitely powerful Being, destitute of a steady, uniform [Page 107] principle of justice and goodness; delighting himself in the exercise of a wanton, licentious omnipotence—But whatever schemes of religion have been propagated, in which the supreme ruler of the universe is represented in such a gloomy and formidable dress as this, they are equally inconsistent with the religion of nature, and the religion of Jesus Christ. These teach us to look upon God as transcending all his creatures in mercy and good­ness, no less than in power and greatness. Nor shall we behave ourselves as becomes our relation to him, unless we always think of him with inward joy and pleasure. What can be more unreasonable than for those who in God have a Father and Friend and Patron; one who is tenderly concerned for their welfare, and does what he can consistently with the rules of wisdom, to promote their best interests; what is more unreasonable than for such, to entertain gloomy and melancholly thoughts; and indulge superstitious fears, and groundless suspicions? Were God a malevolent Being; were he an unreasonable Tyrant; were he an hard Master; were he an implacable and revengeful Being; instead of a merciful and faithful Creator; a compassionate Parent; a gentle Master, a righteous Judge; we might well think of him with horror and dread; and even wish a period put to his existence. For whilst such a Being sways the scepter of the universe, no one can be secure a moment; but had better, were it possible, vanish into nothing, than have his future welfare depend upon the precarious pleasure of such a Sovereign. Such a Being were unworthy of any love, trust, confidence or reverence; and would be the proper object of dread and horror, and hatred to every rational creature. But God forbid that we should con­ceive of him in this manner. While God is our Father; while we are the objects of his love and care; while he looks on all our involuntary failings with an eye of pity, remembering we are dust, and even passes by our wilful sins upon our showing the tokens of contrition; while his liberal hand supplies our wants in this world; [Page 108] and while he offers us eternal happiness hereafter, upon the gracious terms of the gospel; what is there in this idea of God to make us fearful and uneasy? Does the idea of a Father carry any terror in it? Do we dread the thoughts of our gracious benefactor? Do we look upon our Father, as our executioner, as Isaac looked upon Abraham? Do we tremble at being in his presence? imagining that he inspects our conduct with the sagacious malice of an Inquisitor; instead of the bowels of a parent? While the Fool says in his heart, there is no God, do we wish there was none? If so we are Fools also. The doctrine of God's Being and providence is the most de­lightful and elevated subject of contemplation, that can enter into the mind of man. ^* Upon the truth or falshood of these great principles of natural and revealed religion, depends the just idea of the universe; and of our own scituation, business, end, and expectations in it. And the whole system of nature immediately puts on a quite different face, if the notion of an over-ruling be­nevolent mind be excluded. The world, in that case, appears like a forlorn desolate wilderness; nor can we have any security; or safe dependance upon any thing—We know not to what infinite disorders and irregularities, the whole world may run the next moment; and how soon all rational beings may be involved in ruin and misery—Thoughts that excite the most terrible appre­hensions in the mind of every considerate man—Such is the world without a providence—an helpless Orphan—deprived of its vital animating principle—the support of the virtuous—the hope of the distressed—and a re­straint upon unbridled lust and violence—But once esta­blish the doctrine of a superintending providence, and creation revives; it puts on its former chearful counte­nance. If the world be under the government of a perfect Being, from this consideration naturally springs, peace, tranquility, joy and satisfaction to every conside­rate [Page 109] man— The Lord reigneth, let the earth rejoice—Let the multitude of the isles be glad thereof.—Righteous­ness and judgment are the habitation of his throne—This is a consideration, which instead of dejecting our minds, and filling us with gloomy fears, ought to put us upon anticipating that triumphant song of the blessed—Rev. xix.—And I heard a great voice of much people in heaven, saying alleluia—Salvation and glory, and honour and power be unto the Lord our God; for true and righte­ous are his judgments—Alleluia, for the Lord God omni­potent reigneth. Let us be glad and rejoice and give honour to him.

THUS I have endeavoured to give some account of that religious temper of mind which I take to be injoined in that precept which our Lord calls the first and great commandment. The next thing to be considered, is the nature and obligation of the duty commonly called the love of our neighbour. But this must be left to another opportunity.

IF it be possible that any one should doubt of our ob­ligation to love God in the sense above explained, let us reverse the scene, and try whether we can approve a temper of mind contrary to this. Let us suppose the divine attributes and conduct to be the same with respect to mankind, as we have hitherto supposed them, and made the ground of our obligation to the duty we have been discoursing upon. But let us suppose that a people in some remote part of the globe, instead of making those returns of love, gratitude, &c. to God, thought it their duty to hate his infinite perfections,—to blaspheme their Creator for his goodness to them—to dread his ap­probation—to court his displeasure—to be continually suspicious of him—to be discontented at the methods of his providence, and to mourn when they considered their filial relation [...] him, and his paternal government over them—Co [...] we approve of such a scheme as [Page 110] this? Could we think that those who embraced it were in their right minds? Or should we think that they were not barely destitute of what is called reason and common sense, but had some principle directly contrary to it.—A sort of anti-rational faculty?—Well then, there is no medium between these two, unless we suppose that God is not to be regarded by us in any man­ner at all; than which, nothing can be more absurd.—If he be the object of any affections in the human constitution, it must either be of those of love, esteem, honour, reverence; or the contrary one's of hatred, resentment, anger, contempt, and the like. But we at first sight see the shocking absurdity of the latter sup­position; the former therefore must be true—

WHEREFORE to conclude, Let us consider of the re­lation which God stands in to us, and of our obligations to him; and give him the glory that is due unto his name— Great and marvellous are thy works, Lord God Almighty! Just and true are all thy ways, O thou King of nations! Who shall not fear thee, and glorify thy name! Who shall not admire thee, thou eternal, inexhaustible fountain of all good! Who shall not love thee, thou sovereign beauty! Thou great original of all perfection! Blessing and glory and wisdom and thanksgiving, and honour and power and might, be unto our God forever and ever, through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

IN the preceeding discourse we inquired into the na­ture and obligation of the love of God. The love of our neighbour is to be the subject of the present. The precept injoining this duty, is thus expressed in the text— Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self. Now the general question, What is implied in this precept, naturally resolves itself into these three particulars and subordinate inquiries.

• [Page 112]1st. WHO is here intended by our neighbour?
• 2ly. WHAT the love of our neighbour implies in it?

AND, lastly, what is intended by our loving our neighbour as ourselves? A resolution of these three par­ticular inquiries will give us a full idea of the nature and extent of the duty under consideration.

1st. THEN, who is intended by our neighbour? I answer, primarily and strictly, those who dwell near us; with whom it is to be supposed we have a frequent inter­course;—and so have more opportunities either to serve or injure them, than we have to serve or injure those that are far separated from us. But the term also includes all those with whom we have any thing to do—all who come within the reach of our abilities, so that we can do them good either by communicating positive hap­piness of any kind to them, or by removing the causes of their misery. Any person with whom we have any kind of intercourse, whether he be one of our kindred or not; whether he be an acquaintance or a stranger; whether he be a friend or an enemy; whether he pro­fess the same religion with ourselves, or a different one; whether he be in a private or a publick station; whether he be our own countryman, or a foreigner; let him be who he will, he is our neighbour in the sense of the text, when providence puts it in our power to relieve his wants, and render him happy. That this is the sense in which our Lord uses the word neighbour, appears by St. Luke's account of what passed betwixt him and a cer­tain lawyer upon this same subject. Our Lord had told him that if he loved God with all his heart, and his neigh­bour as himself, he should live. Upon this the lawyer asked the question which we are now endeavouring to answer— And who is my neighbour? Luke x. 29. Upon this our Lord relates a story concerning a Jew who fell into the merciless hands of robbers. He was found in [Page 113] the road by two travellers, a bigotted hard hearted priest, and a levite of the same disposition. Neither of them afforded the pitiable object any relief, although he were one of their own nation and religion. But when a Sa­maritan, a man of another country, and a different re­ligion, a man who had less orthodoxy and more charity, than the other, found this unhappy stranger, he had com­passion on him, and relieved him. Which now, says our Saviour, of these three was neighbour unto him that fell among thieves. And he said, he that shewed mercy on him: Then said Jesus unto him, go thou and do likewise. Go thou, and act the same neighbourly part: Look upon thy self to be a neighbour to every man, and every man a neighbour to thee, who has any wants and calamities to recommend him to thee. Think not that thou dis­chargest the duty of loving thy neighbour, by returning the kind offices of thy friends; by doing good to thy acquaintance; to thy country-men; to those of thine own sect in religion; but extend thy friendship to all whom thou art capable of serving.

FROM this piece of history, or this moral fable, (call it which you please) it appears, in general, that the charity which is injoined in revelation, is infinitely more noble, generous and disinterested than the love of our country, as such, so much extolled by some deistical writers: And than that friendship which is recommended by wri­ters of the same stamp—A friendship confined to a particular knot of men, whom humour or interest, or perhaps only a similitude of vices, has tied and united together. To be a friend in the usual sense of the word, is to act a kind part to some one, or more particular persons; but to love our neighbour, in the sense of scripture, is to [...]ve the world; and to be that to all with whom we have any concern, which friendship is to one or two.

[Page 114] LEST we should take up a notion that the proper objects of our love were our friends, our kindred, those of our own party, or our country only, our blessed saviour took care particularly to enjoin upon his disciples the love of their enemies, after his own example, who died for us while we were enemies in our minds by wicked works; and after the example of his God and our God; his Father and our Father, who maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just, and on the unjust Our enemies are included in the general term neighbour; but it was highly proper and necessary that they should be particularly, and expresly pointed out to the Jews, because they were generally such blind, narrow-hearted bigots, that they looked upon all the world besides their own nation, to be the proper objects of their contempt and hatred. This national hardness and stinginess of soul, was continually increased by the influence of the Scribes and Pharisees, who, like too many modern teachers and doctors, instead of inculcating the great duty of universal charity, expended their zeal upon frivolous matters; and laboured more abundantly to make the populace adore themselves; and to raise their in­dignation against all such as dared to say any thing against their old traditions, or new whims, by which they made void the law of God. And that which made it necessary for our Saviour particularly to recommend to his hearers the love of their enemies, makes it proper for every other preacher to do the same, where bigotry and a party spirit prevails; and would to God, that there were not enough of this wretched spirit to be seen in our own land, at the present day, to make the same thing necessary now!

HAVING thus considered the object and extent of the love recommended in the text; we proceed to inquire,

2ly. INTO the nature of the thing itself. What then is implied in the love of our neighbour? I answer, it is [Page 115] the same thing with benevolence, good-will, or charity; a disposition to do good and communicate happiness. The same word that is used in the text to express that temper of mind which becomes us towards our Maker, is used also to express the temper and disposition of heart which is required towards our neighbour. Both are expressed by the word love—Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart—and thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self. However, although the words are the same, the things intended by them are very different; as different as the objects of this love. When it is referred to God, no one imagines it means benevolence, or wishing well, or doing good to our Creator; but esteem, complacency, admiration, reverence, submission, and the like. The reason of the thing, considering God's independency, power and wisdom and moral perfections, and our own relation to him, plainly points out these to be the things intended, when we are commanded to love him. And it is equally plain that when our neighbour is proposed to us as the object of our love, it cannot intend that we should pay him that same internal reverence, honour, resignation, &c. which we pay to our Maker. This would be idolatry instead of charity. So far as our neigh­bours resemble God, so far indeed they are proper objects of the same kind of internal regards which we owe to him: And it is doubtless our duty to esteem, and rever­ence them in proportion to their real greatness and merit. For God requires us to give honour to whom honour is due. However, this is not what is primarily or princi­pally intended by the love of our neighbour. This is a duty which we owe to all in common, with whom we have any concern; too many of whom have little or nothing in them that renders them the proper objects of delight, complacency, esteem and reverence. Nor can they be all in common the object of any other passion besides that of benevolence or good will: This, there­fore, is what the precept in the text injoins upon us. And our blessed Saviour plainly leads us to this general idea [Page 116] of the duty, in his discourse with the lawyer before re­ferred to, Luke 10. When the lawyer asked, who was in­tended by his neighbour whom he was to love as himself, our Lord told him the story of the Jew who was neg­lected in his misery by the priest and levite; and kindly relieved by the schismatical Samaritan—and then ad­ded, Go thou, and do likewise. This shows that the primary and most proper notion of the love of our neighbour, which he had just before recommended, is a kind and charitable disposition. It also shows farther, that the love of our neighbour, as the word is used by our Saviour, is not restrained to the heart and affections, in the same manner with the love of God: but is used in such a large complex sense as to include be­nevolent action as well as benevolence of mind.—"Go thou, and do likewise." As the natural, and perhaps unavoidable, consequence of God's being good, is his doing to his creatures; so there is a close connexion betwixt these, in all other beings. We cannot conceive of a man's being truly charitable in his heart towards his neighbour, without doing good to him also, when it is in his power, and the pro­per occasions present for calling forth this internal prin­ciple into action. What a man really wills and wishes in his heart, he effects also, when it does not exceed his abilities. So that benevolent action will always be in proportion to the strength of the benevolent principle, allowing for the different powers, talents, and opportuni­ties for doing good, which take place in the world. This I take to be the intention of St. John, in his 1 Epis. chap. 3d. ver. 7. Little children let no man deceive you: be that doth righteousness, is righteous, even as he is righ­teous. He that acts well, is really good to the degree that he acts well; and he doth righteousness in proportion to the righteous principle in his heart: these things keep pace, and the one is always the measure and standard of the other.

[Page 117] LOVE is, in its own nature, an active and vigorous principle. This godlike guest, does not lie dozing in that breast where it takes up its abode, and conceal itself from the observation of mankind, like eastern monarchs in their palaces. Its light shines before men, and they see its good works. It is constantly exerting itself for the benefit of those we love: The charitable man loves not in word and in tongue only, but indeed and in truth. Cha­rity contents not itself with good wishes; with kind speeches, and a courtly address; but does substantial acts of beneficence, according to the exigences of our neighbours, and our own abilities. It contents not itself, with saying to the naked be ye clothed; and to the hungry, be ye filled; but administers to their necessities. Love is infinite and the methods of its acting various, and innu­merable. It originates in the heart, and from thence points every way, like various lines drawn from the centre of a circle, or rays issuing from the sun. It shines with its benign influence upon all that come in its way. It is eyes to the blind; and feet to the lame; it draws upon it the blessing of him that is ready to perish, and causes the widows heart to sing for Joy. It is instruction to the ig­norant; and consolation to the sorrowful; it is a timely redress to the injured and oppressed; and liberty to the captive. Charity suffereth long and is kind; charity en­vieth not; charity vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly; seeketh not her own; is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil; rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth: Beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things.

THE apostle describes charity, or the love of our neighbour, as comprehending all these virtues in it: And very naturally; for they are plainly but so many differ­ent branches of the same tree. Charity suffereth long—We naturally bear a great while with those whom we sincerely love—It is kind—It is benign, courteous, obliging; and sweetens our manners, purging away all roughness, [Page 118] moroseness and asperity—It envieth not—does not grieve and fret at the prosperity of others, but rejoices in their happiness— It vaunteth not itself—It is not in­solent or assuming, but is meek and condescending to others— It is not puffed up—It does not swell a man with vain thoughts of his own goodness and importance, compared with others; but leads him to think others better than himself—It doth not behave itself unseemly—It prevents men from all indecencies in behaviour; such as may be shocking and offensive to his neighbours; and leads him to such a deportment of himself as may be agreable to those with whom he converses— It seek­eth not its own—It is not selfish, but excites a person to consult the benefit of others— Is not easily pro­voked—or rather is not greatly provoked (as the word signifies.)—It is not angry to an excess upon any occasion, violently imaged, and beyond measure; but observes a mean, where there is real ground for re­sentment and anger. It thinketh no evil—It puts the most favourable construction upon the conduct of others; and is not apt to impute to them ill designs and inten­tions— It rejoiceth not in iniquity—It is not pleased and delighted with the vices and misconduct of mankind; but pities and laments them—It rejoiceth in the truth—It is pleased to see truth and righteousness prevail in the world, they being the foundation of happiness—It beareth all things—or rather, it covereth all things,—agreably to 1 Pet. iv. 8. Charity shall cover the multitude of sins.—It believeth all things—It is not suspicious that our neighbours design to deceive and im­pose upon us; but is prone to believe what they say, presuming upon their honesty and integrity.—It hopeth all things—It will not suffer, us to despair of our neigh­bour repentance and reformation, although he may have wandered far in the ways of error and sin; but hopes he may still be reclaimed—Once more— Charity en­dureth all things—It is patient and sedate; not fretful and tumultuous; it bears calamities and injuries; it bears with [Page 119] the faults and follies that are to be seen in the world, so far as is consistent with the love of truth and virtue and piety: It is a calm and unruffled self-enjoyment; a com­posed temper of soul, amidst all the tumults and disor­ders of the world. Thus comprehensive is the duty of charity, or the love of our neighbour, in the scripture sense of it; neither indeed, have we yet carried it to its full extent. Charity, considered in its greatest latitude, comprehends in it all moral and social virtues. He that is a real lover of mankind will, from this simple uniform principle, practice all those virtues upon which the good order and happiness of the world depends: Benevolence naturally and necessarily leads to this; i. e. to the prac­tice of every virtue without exception. For there is not any particular one that can be omitted, nor any vice that can be indulged, without detriment to the world. The connexion betwixt the practice of all moral virtues, and publick happiness, is close and intimate: Nor are those more private virtues that fall under the denomination of temperance, exceptions to this general assertion. It would take us too long a time to show how all particular vir­tues, (or if you please christian graces) that respect either ourselves or our neighbour, may be derived from this one source of benevolence: But St. Paul's authority will be sufficient to justify the assertion, without any far­ther proof. He that loveth another, saith the apostle, hath fulfilled the law: For this, Thou shalt not commit adultery; thou shalt not steal; thou shalt not bear false witness; thou shalt not covet; and if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. Love worketh no ill to his neighbour; therefore love is the fulfil­ling of the law. And for this reason the same apostle calls charity by that emphatical name— The bond of perfectness, Col. i 14—The tie and nexus, the common source and fountain of all moral perfections and excel­lencies: From that they all flow, and into that they may all be resolved again: As benevolence in the supreme [Page 120] Father and Lord of all things comprises in it all the moral perfections of God: And as that simple principle, under the direction of infinite wisdom, exerting itself in a variety of ways, in order to accomplish the greatest possible good in the whole, receives the various denomi­nations of goodness, grace, mercy, forbearance, justice &c. so all particular social virtues, may be only the various modifications of charity, exerted into action.

WHEN we are speaking of the virtue of charity in mankind, it should always be remembered that we are not speaking of a blind impulse or instinct; a sort of mad—good nature, that diffuses itself abroad without prudence, fore thought or discretion; but of the bene­volence of rational beings towards their fellow-creatures; which supposes, that benevolence is always under the direction of reason, pointing out to it the ways in which it is to exert itself, and the channels in which it ought to flow. Simple benevolence, not directed by know­ledge, would be only a loving, kind sort of phrenzy or distraction, which it is probable might do as much hurt as good. For a being without reason to govern his ac­tions by, would be as likely to do wrong as right; to make the object of his kindness miserable, as happy. But he that is wise as well as benevolent, will observe those methods of acting, which are the most conducive to happiness; that is, he will use the most effectual means to bring about his end.

THERE is no conceiveable goodness or evil in the actions of an intelligent creature, but as they conduce to some good or bad end. And since happiness, in a large sense of the word, is the only good end, the only thing that is valuable for its own sake, it follows that an action is so far good, and no farther, than it produces happiness: And this is the general rule which we ought to govern ourselves by in our intercourse with the world. To do good is what we should aim at. But then there are [Page 121] other particular, and subordinate rules of conduct, flowing from this general one, which ought to be the more im­mediate regulators of our actions, in order to our doing the greatest good we are capable of; such as adhering to truth, justice; doing good to a benefactor rather than to another; providing for our own families and kindred rather than for others; and the like: For there are cer­tain peculiar ties and relations, which make it reasonable to give the preference to some in our kind offices, rather than to others. And this is so far from being inconsistent with universal charity, that it is upon the whole most advantageous to the world. Our benevolence would be too vague, and diffuse; it would be in danger of evaporat­ing without doing much service to any, had not the wise author of our nature by the constitution he has given us, and certain particular affections, pointed it to some particular objects more especially. In general our kindred demand our first concern; our other friends and bene­factors the next; those of our neighbourhood the next—and so on to our country, our nation; and from our own nation, to all others. This seems to be the order which God and nature have pointed out to us; and if so, then to observe it, and to arise in our good-will by those gradations, must certainly be the most conducive to the general happiness of mankind; for the order established by God can never thwart, or interfere with, the good of his creatures. To break in upon the order of nature, or to act out of our proper sphere, can never issue in greater happiness to ourselves or others, than keeping strictly to both. And the method of being serviceable to mankind, whatever our station, and circumstances in life are, is ordinarily plain enough to those who have any real inclination to follow it. But I must hasten to the third and last inquiry under this head, viz.

3ly. WHAT is intended by our loving our neighbour as ourselves?

[Page 122] IT has been observed ^† by some, That this expression is capable of three different senses—It may intend that we should love our neighbour with as great a degree of intenseness as we do ourselves: and be as sollicitous about his happiness as about our own. This would indeed be a glorious temper of mind. But it may be reasonably questioned whether it is possible for mankind in this world, or perhaps in any other, to be so benevolent, as not to have a peculiar feeling for themselves. And as the possibility of this may be questioned, it may, in the same degree, be questioned whether this is the true in­tention of the precept. For all God's commands are adapted to our state, circumstances and capacities. Again, the precept may intend that we should have a love to our neighbour of the same kind with that which we bear to ourselves: i. e. that as we are all naturally concerned for our own welfare, so we should also have a real concern, in some degree for the welfare of others. But this in­terpretation seems to be as much too low and jejune, as that above mentioned was too sublime and elevated. For a man may have a real love to mankind in this sense, and yet be a wicked, and unjust man, by reason that his benevolence is not strong enough to be a balance for his principle of self-love. All men have doubtless some degree of real benevolence; but a regard to their own private good may be so strong as to counter-act and defeat it; and so lead them habitually to the most cruel and inhuman practices.

IT seems necessary, therefore, that we pitch upon some third way of interpreting the precept before us. And perhaps the sense of it may be this—That we should not barely love our neighbour; but that our love to him bear some certain proportion to our self-love; that we love him to such a degree, as shall prevent us from do­ing any injury to him for the sake of private interest; [Page 123] that in all our intercourse with him, we should do to him, as we would that he should do to us. More cannot be well intended in the precept; and it is certain that less cannot. And such a love to our neighbour as this, does not only imply that we abstain from all acts of injustice towards him; but also that we are active in serving him when he stands in need of our assistance; for certainly this is what we should expect of him. It is impossible exactly to determine how far we ought to go in acts of beneficence to our neighbour; but certainly something is justly expected of us, besides not injuring him. I shall beg leave to use the words of the Bishop of Bristol upon this subject, who seems to prefer the last mentioned sense of the words. ‘Both our nature and condition, says he, require that each particular man should make particular provision for himself: And the inquiry what proportion benevolence should have to self-love, when brought down to practice, will be, what is a competent care and provision for our­selves. And how certain soever it be, that each man must determine this for himself; and how ridiculous soever it would be for any to attempt to determine it for another; yet it is to be observed that the pro­portion is real; and that a competent provision has a bound; and that it cannot be all which we can pos­sibly get, and keep within our grasp, without legal in­justice. Mankind almost universally bring in vanity, supplies for what is called a life of pleasure, covetous­ness, or imaginary notions of superiority over others, to determine this question: But every one who desires to act a proper part in society, would do well to de­termine how far any of them come in to determine it in a way of moral consideration. All that can be said is, supposing, what as the world goes is so much to be supposed that 'tis scarce to be mentioned, that persons do not neglect what they really owe to them­selves; the more of their care and thought, and of their fortune they employ in doing good to their fel­low [Page 124] low creatures, the nearer they come up to the law of perfection, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self.’

WE have now done with the three inquiries which we proposed to answer—Who is our neighbour? what is it to love our neighbour? what is it to love him as our­selves? We shall conclude the present discourse with a few words concerning our obligation to the duty, the nature of which we have been considering. And if it be asked why we should live in the exercise of benevo­lence, I answer

1st. No man wants, that any one should point out the particular grounds of the obligation that others are under to love and assist him. Every man naturally and unavoid­ably expects, and thinks he has a right to expect, kind usage from those about him. But will any man be so vain as to imagine that himself is the only person in the world that has any title to such treatment? Can he, if he tries, perswade himself, that all are obliged to love and do good to him, according to their abilities, and his own wants; and yet that he is under obligation to none? No man can seriously believe this, 'till the light that is in him is become darkness. Let us deal fairly with ourselves: Let the same reason, whatever it be, that sa­tisfies us, that others ought not to injure us, but to be beneficent and humane to us, satisfy us also, that we ought not to be injurious to them, but studious of their happiness. Happiness is what each man desires for himself as a real good; and he cannot be ignorant that others desire it also, and have a right to expect it upon the same terms with himself. Either no one had a right to expect kindness, candour and good will; or all men have the same. And then mutual benevolence, and an intercourse of good offices, ought to take place in the world universally.—But

[Page 125] 2ly. GOD has required us to be benevolent, and friendly to each other. He that commands us to love himself with all our heart, commands us also to love our neighbour as ourselves. And the will or law of a per­fect Being, a Being who is in all respects fit to be obeyed, is what constitutes obligation in the primary and most formal notion of obligation. We cannot properly be said to be under obligation, but to some Being, who has a right to give us law; and the more perfect that right is, the stronger is our obligation. But

3ly. To inquire why we are obliged to be beneficent just and charitable, is to inquire why we are obliged to be morally good; a question that seems to carry its own answer with it—To suppose there is such a thing as moral goodness and excellence, is to suppose that all ra­tional beings are under obligation to conform to the rules of it. It is a contradiction to suppose that any parti­cular temper, or course of action is right, and yet that it may be right for us to deviate from it. It is eternally right to conform to what is right: Nor need we look out for any farther obligation after we are satisfied that a thing is really right: This of itself supposes we are un­der obligation to do it; and that we cannot do the con­trary without acting a wrong and unreasonable part.

4ly THE nearer we conform to the great law of be­nevolence, the nearer we conform to the perfections of the Deity. God is infinite in goodness. In this the moral perfection of the divine nature consists. And if this be what renders God perfect, it must in proportion render us perfect also. And so far as we fall short of it, so far we fall short of perfection.

5ly. THE order and the common good of the world evidently depend upon the exercise of mutual benevolence. From what proceed the tumults and principal calamities that are daily seen in the world, but from a neglect of [Page 126] this duty, and from the indulgence of a narrow selfish spirit? Were men to put on, as the elect of God, bowels of love and compassion; did they feel for others as well as themselves; we should no more hear of strife and de­bate betwixt private families; there would be no longer those contentions and animosities that disturb the peace either of church or state: We should no longer hear of the tyranny and oppression of princes; or the envy and rebellion of subjects; we should hear no more of wars and rumours of wars; of fields drunk with human gore, and garments rolled in blood; we should hear no more of cities stormed; countries laid desolate; men devour­ed by their fellow-men; or carried into inglorious cap­tivity and slavery; but all the world would be hushed into peace, every one sitting securely under his own vine, and under his own fig-tree. It is selfishness, prevailing over charity and humanity, that has spread destruction and desolation through the world; that has depopulat­ed the earth; that has turned the whole ocean into a red sea; and the whole world into Golgotha and Aceldema, the place of a skull, and a field of blood.

The constitution of the world is such, that plenty, peace and happiness can prevail no farther than a foun­dation is laid for them in mutual benevolence, and an exchange of good offices. Love is the spirit that ce­ments mankind together; and preserves that order and harmony amongst them, which is requisite in order to the general safety and welfare; just as the regular mo­tions and harmony of the heavenly bodies depend upon their mutual gravitation towards each other: Let this catholic and universal principle be once destroyed, and confusion, discord, and the crush of worlds inevitably follow: And disorders similar to these unavoidably suc­ceed in the moral world, upon the neglect of those so­cial duties that have their foundation in love.

[Page 127] IT is this divine principle that makes a good king; a good subject; a good master, and a good servant. This is such a temper of mind as would lead every man to fill up his own particular station in life with honour to himself; and so as to contribute to the general happiness of mankind; it would sweeten the nauseous draught of life, and make us all pass the days of our pilgrimage in this world with pleasure; it would spread joy through out the earth. How glorious would it be if that time should come, that every man was sure, that he saw his friend every time he saw his neighbour! Would men take as much pains to do good, as they do to afflict and grieve and devour one another, the society of men on earth would resemble that of angels in heaven: But as things generally are, there is so much strife and envy, and malice, and revenge, that a good man is sick of the world: And is ready to cry out with the prophet, Oh that I had wings like a dove; for then would I fly away and be at rest. But

6ly. AN argument for charity may be taken from self-love. That which tends to publick good, tends to private good also. To suppose the contrary is a manifest contradiction. For publick happiness is increased no far­ther than the happiness of individuals is so. The temper of love is in itself, the temper of happiness, and serene, self-enjoyment: And if the world be under the govern­ment of a righteous and wise providence, those must, in the final result of things, be found best to have consult­ed their own interest, who have been the most industrious to advance the happiness of others. Wherefore, let these considerations laid together excite us to put on the divine temper of love. That charity which reason dic­tates, is so far from being the love of any sect or party of men, that it ought not to be confined even to the whole human species. It ought to extend to every order of beings that is capable of happiness. There are none so high and so much above us, as not to have a just claim [Page 128] to it; none so low and despicable as not to deserve our kind regards. The reason why we are not commanded to extend our love to the angels, and all the glorious inhabitants of the other world, is not because they are a different order of beings; but because they are out of the reach of our abilities; because their happiness is not placed in our power, like that of our neighbour. And as to the lower animal world, it is as truly a transgression of the laws of benevolence and humanity to put them to misery out of mere wantonness, and when no good end can be answered by it, as it is groundlesly to afflict our fellow men. Nothing ought to be below our no­tice, that is not so low in the scale of being, as to be ex­empted from pain, and incapable of happiness. The lower animals are not; and Solomon makes it one part of the character of a righteous man, that he regardeth the life of his beast. They are all, in a good sense, the offspring of God: God is the common parent to us and them: And we may say▪ without a metaphor, even to the worm, Thou art my sister. Although we may be apt to think that our great superiority to the other inhabitants of this earth, sets us above an obligation to regard their happiness; yet God had a particular regard to them in the institution of the sabbath; he even heareth the young ravens when they cry; and not a sparrow falleth to the ground without him. If we would avoid a narrow, selfish disposition, we should consider the whole universe as one magnificent building, with different apartments for different inhabitants, all subjects of the same King, and children of the same Father, whose general law is bene­volence and kindness. Him we should consider as sitting upon the circuit of heaven, and saying with a loud voice to all, what St. John said only to a few—My children! Love one another; for love is of God.

THIS earth, where mankind have their residence, bears but a small proportion to the universe. And this earth is again divided into different countries and na­tions; [Page 129] these countries and nations, into different cities and towns; into distinct societies and corporations and families. This is necessary and convenient; and every one ought to be principally concerned for the welfare of those to whom he is the most nearly allied. But he ought not to let any part ingross the whole of his bene­volence. As a man's belonging to a particular family, does not destroy his relation to the whole common­wealth of which he is a member; so his particular re­lation to one political or civil society, does not destroy his relation to the greater society of mankind in general; not this, his relation to the whole rational creation. He that seriously considers himself in this light, as a member and part of one stupendous whole, will find little need of any farther arguments to convince him of the folly of being selfish, and contracted: He will be ashamed of any thing that looks like a party spirit: A vitious self-love will naturally be weakened in him: Benevo­lence will spring up in his heart; it will diffuse itself like light from the sun; it will spread from kindred to a country; from a country to a kingdom; and from one kingdom to another, till it reach not only all the inhabi­tants of this little spot of ground called the earth, but till it grasp the universe; and then a man bears the nearest resemblance to that one God and Father of all, who is good to all, and whose tender mercies are over all his works.

SPECULATIONS of this kind may sometimes be of service to us, in order to open and enlarge our hearts: But our proper business lies chiefly much nearer home. It is our neighbour that we are more immediately con­cerned with; it is him that we are commanded to love as we do ourselves; and if we comply with this precept, according to its true intention, we cannot be deficient in our kind regards to those that are more remote from us. Benevolence and charity will be the general turn and bent of our mind; and will naturally be felt towards all beings when they present themselves to our thoughts. [Page 130] What connexion and dependence there may be of the various parts of the universe upon each other, we cannot tell; our goodness, perhaps, may not extend to all, so as to influence their happiness. But this we are certain of, that the happiness of mankind depends upon mutual kindness and charity. And this being the case, it is a call from God and nature, to improve all the powers and capacities we are endowed with, in doing good to those about us.—God grant that we may all be inspired with this divine principle of love, that so we may be the children of our Father which is in heaven; and the faithful followers of Jesus Christ, who has said, By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye love one another.

HAVING, in two former discourses, considered the nature and obligation of the two duties here mentioned, viz. The love of God, and of our Neighbour, I proceed now, in the second place, to in­quire,

II. IN what sense, and upon what account, it is said, That to love God, is the first and great commandment.

[Page 132] WE may observe, that this assertion of our Lord con­tains an express and positive answer to the question pro­posed just before by the lawyer. It seems that the Jews (as was observed in the first discourse upon this subject) were not agreed amongst themselves which command­ment in the law [of Moses] was the greatest, or most important. Some pitched upon that relating to circum­cision; others that concerning the observation of the sabbath; and so on. Now it was a resolu­tion of this point, which the lawyer, in his query, desired of our Lord. And consequently, the sense of our Lord's answer will be this— ‘In making a comparison be­twixt the various precepts of the mosaic institution, the pre-eminence ought to be given to that which respects the love of God; this is the principal, the most important and fundamental of all duties; and which, therefore, demands your chief care and at­tention.’

THIS is the purport of our Lord's answer. Now the inquiry which naturally arises here, is, What is the reason and ground of this preference? Or, upon what account does our Lord stile this, the first and great com­mandment? The reason is too obvious to need mention­ing, why the pre-eminence or first place should be given to this commandment, had the competition been only betwixt the internal love and reverence of the one true God, and the rituals of religion ordained in the cere­monial law. But it appears that the comparison is made betwixt all the commandments in general, moral as well as ritual. And that which may seem strange to some, is, That the love of God should be looked upon as of more importance than the love of our neighbour. As God is not externally worshipped of men's hands, as though he needed any thing; so neither can our loving him with all our heart, be any advantage to him, he being abso­lutely independent. But our righteousness and charity may profit men like ourselves: our neighbour may be [Page 133] really benefited by our love and good offices. And as we must suppose that the end of all God's command­ments, must be the advancement of the happiness of his creatures, and not his own, so one might possibly think that those commandments should be esteemed the most important, and claim our primary regard, in which the good of mankind is the most immediately concerned, such as justice, charity, and, in short all those particular duties which are comprehended in the general one of love towards our neighbour. It might, therefore have been expected, that our Lord's answer should have run thus— Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self; this is the first and great commandment. But we find, on the contrary, that he has assigned only the second place to this duty, and reserved the first for the love of God. Now if this should appear a difficulty to any, as pro­bably it does, the difficulty may, possibly be removed by the following considerations, which I shall scarce have more than time enough to mention.

1. IF it be our duty to love God at all, this is the duty which is plainly first in the order of offices. Our obliga­tion to our Creator is prior in the order of nature to our obligation to our fellow-men. This appears particularly from hence, That our obligation to love our neighbour arises principally from the will and command of God: but we could not have been under any obligation to comply with his will in this particular instance, had we not been under some antecedent obligation to him in general. It is the perfections of God that induce upon us an obligation to obey him at all. Our obligation, therefore, to acknowledge the divine perfections, to cul­tivate a proper regard to our Maker, or in the words of the text, to love the Lord our God with all our heart, is, in the nature of things, prior to all others: And upon this account it may be said, that this is the first and great commandment. If, in our imaginations, we divest God of those perfections, which at present we suppose him to [Page 134] be possessed of, our obligation to obey him in any in­stance vanishes of course. But suppose him infinitely wise, good and powerful, and our obligation to love, honour and obey him, takes place immediately. So that our obligation to God is the first which we are under; it is, indeed, that into which all others may be resolved. There is no duty which we owe to our neighbour, con­sidered as a religious duty, but what derives its obliga­tory force from the will and authority of God. And as the divine perfections are the original and sole ground of all religious obligations in general, so to have a suitable internal love and esteem of, and regard towards, those perfections, is the primary and principal of all duties and obligations. But I shall explain myself farther upon this head, under a second observation, namely,

2. THAT the whole of religion, in the largest sense of the word, ought to be considered as the service of God, the supreme Governour of the universe: and in this light it is usually considered in scripture. Now 'tis apparent, that the first thing, not only in point of order, but of importance also, is to form just sentiments con­cerning the Being whom we serve; to be suitably af­fected towards him; to cultivate those regards of esteem, love, reverence, &c. which the perfections of his nature, and his relation to us, demand. Religion must originate here; there can be really no religion, no service, that God can look upon as done in obedience to him, but what proceeds from this principle of love to him; and such a principle does, as it were, insure our obedience to him in all other instances. Loyalty of heart to our earthly sovereign; a proper sense of our duty to him, in general, is the foundation of obedience to him in all par­ticular instances. The more our hearts are attached to our prince, the better prepared, and, the more likely, are we, to yield a thorough and universal obedience to his laws. I speak now of a temporal prince; but this holds equally with regard to God, the King of kings and [Page 135] Lord of lords. Piety, or the love of God is the first and principal thing is religion, as much as loyalty to our earthly sovereign, is the first and principal thing in the character of a good subject. And this is, doubtless, the reason why the decalogue, that summary of man's duty, begins with our immediate duty to our Creator. When the law was given at mount Sinai, it was ushered in thus, I am the Lord thy God, &c. Thou shalt have no other gods before me. This injunction of loyalty, to the one true God prepared the way to, and ushered in, all the other commandments. Nor was this order in delivering the law, accidental, or without any particular design. It would be preposterous for a legislator to promulge any particular laws to his subjects, without first asserting his own authority, and requiring his subjects to own, ac­knowledge and honour him as their prince, or lawgiver. This is the purport of the first commandment in the decalogue: it requires those to whom it was given, to own, acknowledge and honour the only true God; or, in the words of my text, to love the Lord their God with all their heart. And there is something analogous to the divine conduct in this particular, in the conduct of earthly princes, who, in the first place, require an oath of allegiance from their subjects, in order to make way for their laws to be cordially received and obeyed. This is a custom which has prevailed pretty generally in the world; and it is plain that it answers good ends in government. Nor is it less proper in the divine go­vernment, than in human, that we should be required in the first place, and as the ground-work, the sum and substance of all, to have a suitable regard towards him, whose subjects we are; i. e. to honour and respect him as our prince. The general reason of this, is the same in both cases, viz. the necessity of our acknowledging the legislator, in order to our obeying his laws. And this brings me to observe, in the third place,

[Page 136] 3. THAT the love of God is the only sure and steady principle of virtue and righteousness in our conduct to­wards our fellow-men. The moral and social virtues are, indeed, amiable in themselves; worthy to be prac­tised; and it would (ordinarily at least) be the interest of mankind to practise them, even although there were no God at all. But considering the weakness of human reason, the strength of human passion, and the force and variety of temptation; considering what men are in themselves, and what a world they live in; it cannot well be supposed that they should uniformly act a vir­tuous part, from those considerations alone. Virtue is amiable, and excellent in itself: But the bulk of man­kind are not formed to be so powerfully struck with the beauty and amiableness of it, as to disarm temptation, and cause them to adhere to truth and right at the ex­pence of their present ease and pleasure. To the con­sideration of the fitness of righteousness, and all other moral virtues; and the usual tendency of them towards happiness, it is necessary that the consideration of a righ­teous Governour of the world should be added; whose positive will and command it is, that we should invari­ably practise those virtues which are in themselves good▪ and who will finally render to every man according as his work shall be—To exclude a God, and a righteous pro­vidence from the world, is (I will not say, wholly to break down the fence betwixt vice and virtue, and to make it wholly indifferent whether we practise the former or the latter; but it is) to deprive virtue of one of its greatest supports and guards. And it is to be remem­bered, that not to love God, not to cultivate those reli­gious regards towards him, which the perfections of his nature demand, is to exclude him to all intents and pur­poses, as to any influence which the knowledge and be­lief of him, can have upon our behaviour. The ac­knowledging of a God can have no good effect upon our conduct any farther than our hearts are suitably af­fected towards him. So that there can be little or no [Page 137] real virtue without piety. If any thing puts men upon doing their duty towards their neighbour, and deters them from vice, when the eye of the world is not upon them, and when their temporal interest is forfeited thereby, it must be a sense of the divine perfections upon their hearts; i. e. a principle of love to God, in the large sense in which that duty was before explained. Without this he will be continually in danger of relapsing into vice, whenever a present advantage is to be gained thereby, notwithstanding the beauty and amiableness of a contrary conduct. But let a man once have a suitable sense of the Deity upon his mind; let him really love the Lord his God with all his heart, and this will be a constant principle of virtuous conduct in all conditions and circum­stances of life. It amounts to little less than a contra­diction to suppose that a man should really love God, and yet indulge himself in the practise of those sins which God has forbidden; and which he knows are con­trary to the divine perfections. The connexion betwixt the love of God, and obedience to his commandments, is so close and inseparable, that St. John tells, That this is the love of God, that we keep his commandments: and again, Hereby do we know that we know him, if we keep his commandments—He that saith, I know him, and keep­eth not his commandments is a liar, and the truth is not in him—The love of our neighbour (which includes all moral virtues in it) necessarily flows from the love of God, according to the same apostle— If any man say, I love God, and bateth his brother, he is a liar.—Nor is this less evident from reason than revelation. The love of God is the love of the divine perfections; 'tis the love of truth, goodness, justice, holiness, and all moral excellencies. And he that loves these perfections, can­not indulge himself in those vices which are contrary to them: but will, of course, practice all the moral vir­tues in his own life. It is a common observation, that similitude begets love; and it is equally true, that love be­gets similitude. What we love and admire in others, [Page 138] we imitate, as naturally as we love in others those dispo­sitions and humours that prevail in ourselves. So that if a man love God, who is possessed of all moral perfec­tions, he must, of course be moulded into the same image himself; he will naturally conform his own temper and behaviour to the moral character of God, and be perfect, even as his Father which is in heaven is perfect.

FROM these considerations it follows, that although the ultimate design of all the divine commandments, were to bring us to a suitable temper and behaviour towards each other, in order to our mutual happiness; yet still, to love the Lord our God with all our heart, would be the first and great commandment; upon account of the influence which the performance of this duty must ne­cessarily have upon our moral conduct towards our neighbour; and the impossibility of our adhering stead­fastly to the practice of virtue without such a principle of divine love. Where the love of God takes place, the love of mankind and all the virtues that are com­prehended in it, must necessarily take place also: Nor can the latter take place to any good purpose or degree, where the former is wanting. The love of God is the fountain from whence the love of our neighbour flows: and to expect to find the latter in the breast where the former is not, is as vain as to expect to find a stream which has no source from whence it is derived. All moral excellencies in mankind have their origin here, in a proper regard and disposition of heart towards God: and this is sufficient, of itself, to intitle this command to the place which our Lord has assigned it. But

4. AND lastly here, This may be said to be the first and great commandment, because the happiness of good men in this world consists principally in exercising those re­ligious regards which are intended by the love of God. The duty consists in delight and complacency in God; [Page 139] in contemplating his perfections; in resignation of heart to his will; in trust and dependance upon him; and hope and confidence in his goodness. And he that is formed to such a divine and heavenly temper as this, has the temper of happiness. He has within him a secret spring of peace and consolation, that not only forbids him to be miserable, but also causes him to rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory. Without this principle of divine love, and trust in God, there can be but little happiness injoyed in such a world of confusion and dis­order as this, where every thing is in a fluctuating con­dition; where nothing can be depended upon. God is the adequate, the only adequate, object of our affections; and our supreme felicity in this world, as well as in the next, consists in the enjoyment of him. So that had God consulted only our present happiness, he could not have commanded us to do any thing which has so great a tendency to promote it, and is so closely connected with it, as loving him with all our heart. This will, indeed, appear wild and fanciful to some men, who value them­selves much upon their reason, but have no parts or capacity for devotion. However the happiness of those whose souls are formed to the love of God, the supreme and everlasting good, is not the less, because some men have no taste or relish, for the sublime and exalted pleasures of piety.

HAVING thus, briefly shown some of the grounds of that pre-eminence which our Lord gives to this com­mandment, I proceed

III. To inquire what our Lord intends by the asser­tion, that on these two commandments, viz. the love of God, and of our neighbour, hang all the law and the prophets? Now the full sense of this assertion may possibly be comprehended in the following particulars.

[Page 140] 1. UNDER the Mosaic institution, and during the ministry of the Jewish prophets, the love of God and man, were the principal and most important duties; more excellent in themselves, more acceptable to God, and more beneficial to mankind, than the most punctilious observation of the ceremonial parts of the law. The love of God, comprehending a sincere regard to, and hearty complacence in, all the divine perfections; and the love of our neighbour, compre­hending all moral, social and relative virtues, were the sum and substance of religion under the legal dispensation. This is plainly implied in the assertion, That on these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets. Every thing was of little account when put in competi­tion with these great and excellent duties. And this is plainly the light in which the prophets constantly taught the Jews to look upon the various precepts of the law. I shall have time to quote only two or three passages, where such a pre-eminence is evidently given to the un­alterable duties of inward piety, and a life of charity and holiness. To this effect are the words of the prophet Isaiah, chap. i. To what purposes is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me, saith the Lord?—Bring no more vain oblations—your hands are full of blood. Wash ye, make ye clean, put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes, cease to do evil, learn to do well, seek judgment, re­lieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow. So Micah vi. 5, and onwards— Hear O my people! remember now what Balak king of Moab consulted—wherewith shall I come before the Lord, and bow myself before the high God? shall I come before him with burnt offerings, with calves of a year old? Will the Lord be pleased with thou­sands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers of oil? shall I give my first born for my transgression; the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul? He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good; and what doth the Lord thy God re­quire of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God? These duties are the same [Page 141] with those in the text; and the same which our blessed Saviour stiled the weightier matters of the law, Matt. xxiii. 23. and with the omission of which, he upbraids the Pharisees, Luke xi. 42. But woe unto you Pharisees; for ye tythe mint and rue and all manner of herbs; and pass over judgment and the love of God; these ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone.

2. THE assertion before us may carry something more in it, than that the love of God and man, were the most important of any duties of the law— On these two com­mandments hang all the law and the prophets—This may possibly intend, that these two general precepts, do in effect, and in some sense, comprehend all other duties in them, of what kind soever.—Not strictly, indeed; for then no comparison could properly be made betwixt them, and others—But as he that obeys them, he that has a real principle of love to God and man in his heart, will naturally be led to do his duty in every other in­stance—to worship God in such manner as he requires, and to discharge all the duties which he owes to himself, and to his neighbour, in his particular station. These two virtues, as [...] were, comprehend all others in them. For he that sincerely loves and honours God in his heart, cannot fail to perform all the external acts of piety which God has injoined, all the duties of the first table; and from the love of our neighbour naturally flow, all the duties of the second, all the duties which we owe to one another. So that to love God and our neighbour, is, in effect, to obey the whole law and the prophets; and to do all that God requires of us. And thus do all the law and the prophets, hang on these two commandments.

3. AND lastly; In this position it may be implied, That the end and design of all positive institutions; of all precepts not strictly comprehended in these natural and unalterable duties of piety and charity, was to bring men to the practice of them. All the rituals of religion, [Page 142] as appointed under the law, had some reference to these essential duties; they were not injoined under the no­tion of having any natural and inherent excellence or goodness in them; but as means to bring men to a proper temper of mind towards their Maker, and one another; neither were they valuable or beneficial any farther than as they promoted this end, even sincere piety, and a life of holiness and charity. In these things consisted real religion; and every thing besides, had no other relation to religion, but that of means to an end. The rituals of religion, though observed with the greatest exactness, were rather an abomination, than a pleasure, to the Lord, when they were not accompanied, or followed, by these natural and essential duties. Thus much is plainly implied in those words of the prophet, Isai. lxvi. 2—5.— To this man will I look, even to him that is poor and of a contrite spirit, and trembleth at my word. He that killeth an ox, is as if be slew a man; he that sacrificeth a lamb, as if he cut off a dog's neck; he that offereth an oblation, as if he offered swine's blood; he that burneth incense, as if he blessed an idol: yea, they have chosen their own ways, and their soul delighteth in their abominations. I also will chuse their delusions,—because when I called, none did answer; when I spake they did not hear; but they did evil before mine eyes, and chose that in which I delighted not.

THUS do all the law and the prophets hang on these two commandments—They are the most important duties of the law and the prophets—All duties and virtues naturally flow from them—And all the ceremonials of religion were designed as a means for promoting the practice of them. They were the sum and substance, the alpha and omega, the beginning and end, of the Jewish religion.

SUCH was the religion of the old testament; and such also is the religion of the new. Which brings me to the fourth and last thing proposed, namely,

[Page 143] IV. To show, that these two commandments have the same place and pre-eminence, under the gospel-dispensation, which they had under the legal: Or, in other words, That all the gospel of Jesus Christ hangs on these two commandments, in the same sense that all the law and the prophets did.

NOW, that I may avoid obscurity, and obviate some objections which the ignorant, or the cavilling, might, perhaps, raise against this assertion, I shall briefly premise two or three things for the explanation of it, before I proceed to prove it.

FIRST then, it may be observed, That this assertion relates only to duty, or practical religion, as distinguished from faith or belief. When our Saviour said that all the law and the prophets hang on these two commandments, he spake of the preceptive part of the law, and the duty of Jews, who were supposed already to believe the law and the prophets, and to be fully convinced of their di­vine original. To such persons as these he says, that there were no commands of so much importance, as those which related to the love of God, and of their neighbour. In these things consisted the sum and substance of duty under the Jewish oeconomy. Our Lord was not speak­ing of what was the substance of natural religion, but of the mosaic, which was of divine institution, and received as such by the posterity of Abraham. And accordingly, when it is now said under the gospel-dispensation, that all the gospel of Jesus Christ hangs on these two commandments, the love of God and man, it is presupposed that christianity is believed; that Christ is received as a teacher sent from God; as the promised Messiah; and that the doctrines of his incarnation, death, resurrection and ascention into heaven; and, in short, all the doctrines delivered either by himself, or his inspired apostles, are firmly believed. This being supposed, if the question were asked, which is the great commandment in the gospel? the true answer [Page 144] to it, (putting only the term gospel instead of law and prophets) would be the same our Lord gives to the lawyer in the text— Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment: And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self: on these two commandments hangs all the Gospel.

SECONDLY, It is not implied in this, that it is of no importance, whether christians obey the positive institutions of the gospel or not, provided they practice the natural duties of piety and charity. As our Lord did not set aside the rituals of religion under the law intirely by giving the preference to the love of God, and of man­kind; so neither are they set aside by those who apply his assertion concerning the law and prophets, to the gospel. The contrary is rather implied. And it is a truth obvious to common sense, that all God's command­ments, without exception, are to be obeyed; those of a ritual, as well as those of a moral, nature. But still, as there were the weightier matters of the law under the mosaic dispensation, when a comparison was made be­twixt the several commandments of it; so there are the weightier matters of the gospel also; and these are exactly the same under both dispensations.

LASTLY here: When I speak of the substance of christian duty, and the weightier matters of the gospel, as consisting in the natural duties of piety and charity; or the love of God, and man; I would be supposed to intend, that these duties should be performed upon evan­gelical principles. The duties in themselves are really duties of natural religion; but being adopted into christianity, they are to be performed upon christian principles, and from gospel motives; with a proper re­gard to, and dependance upon, the Mediator of this new covenant, who gave himself for us.

[Page 145] WITH these explanations, I hope none will think the assertion strange, That these two commands contain the sum of christian duty; and that they ought to have the same pre-eminence under the gospel, which they had under the law.

THE main design of the christian institution is evi­dently to bring men to that moral purity of heart and life, which is comprised in the love of God and of our neighbour. Neither the most exact compliance with the positive precepts of the gospel, nor any kind or de­gree of faith, unaccompanied with a principle of sincere piety and charity; nor, indeed, any thing else, where the love of God and man are wanting, can intitle us to the divine acceptance hereafter; or make us meet to be par­takers of the inheritance of the saints in light. If we believe in Christ and his gospel, so far it is well: but this does but lay the foundation for our doing that, upon which our salvation finally turns. A right faith is an excellent and valuable thing; but it is advantageous no farther than it purifies the heart, and works by love; no farther than it transforms our minds into the divine likeness; and leads us to live an holy and godly life. Thus the apostle Peter exhorts us, to give all diligence, and to add to our faith, virtue; [constancy, resolu­tion, fortitude] and to virtue, knowledge; and to know­ledge, temperance; and to temperance, patience; and to pa­tience, godliness; and to godliness, brotherly kindness; and to brotherly kindness, charity. For, says he, if these things be in you, and abound, they make you that ye shall neither be barren nor unfruitful in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ. But he that lacketh these things is blind—2 Pet. i. 5—It is practical religion, the love of God, and a life of righteousness and charity, proceeding from faith in Christ and the gospel, that denominates us good men and good christians—Not wearing the form of godli­ness—Not the belief of any doctrines, however true, concerning the atonement of Christ—Not a lazy recum­bency [Page 146] upon the righteousness of another—Not any en­thusiastic fervors of spirit—Not a firm perswasion that we are elected of God, and that our names are written in the book of life—Some of the worst men in the world, have as much faith as any in it—attend upon sermons and sacraments as often— rely as confidently—have as warm frames and lively imaginations—and are as fully perswaded of their being chosen to salvation. But what does all this avail, if that faith be without works? if that form of godliness be without the power? if that reliance upon the righteousness of Christ, be thought to supersede personal and inherent holiness?—if those fervors of soul, are unattended by divine love and charity?—if those tow­ring imaginations, are but the vagaries of a wild fancy?—and that perswasion of their election, proceed from vanity only, and not from their having given diligence to make their calling and election sure?

THE apostle Paul, in the iid chap. of his epistle to Titus, charges him to inculcate various moral and rela­tive duties in his preaching; and then inforces this charge with an argument taken from the general design of the gospel.— For the grace of God, says he, has ap­peared unto all men, teaching us that, denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly and righteously and godly in this present world, looking for the blessed hope, and the glorious appearing of the great God, and our Saviour Jesus Christ, who gave himself for us, that he might re­deem us from all iniquity; and purify unto himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works. These words are plainly expressive of the main scope and intention of Christ's me­diation, viz. the bringing of mankind to real holiness of heart and manners; or, in other words, to the love of God and of our neighbour. In the next chapter this same apostle commands Titus to teach the importance and necessity of christian obedience, and good works. This is a faithful saying, says he, and these things I will that thou affirm constantly, that they which have believed in [Page 147] God might he careful to maintain gook works: these things are good and profitable unto men. In what does St. James place the substance of religion? Pure religion and unde­filed before God, even the Father is this, to visit the father­less and widows in their affliction, and to keep a man's self unspotted from the world. Does he not tell us that the devils believe and tremble? that faith without works is dead? that faith cannot save us? and that by works a man is justified, and not by faith only? The love of our neighbour is so essential, that St. John makes it a certain evidence of a man's being in a state of favour with God; and the want of it as certain an evidence that our religion is of no value. We know, says he, that we are passed from death to life, because we love the brethren—But whoso hath this world's good, and seeth his brother have need, and shutteth up his bowels of compassion from him, how dwelleth the love of God in him. St. Paul also makes the want of charity, a certain mark of a man's being nothing in a religious estimation, whatever faith, whatever gifts, whatever accomplishments, he may be endowed with. Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity I am nothing. And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity it profiteth me nothing—Now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity. It would be endless to quote all the passages to this purpose in the writings of the apostles.

OUR Lord's preaching tended to the same point. What is his sermon upon the mount, but a moral discourse wherein the excellency and necessity of internal piety, and holiness of life, is declared in the strongest terms? Has he not made charity the distinguishing character of [Page 148] his true disciples?— Hereby shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye love one another. And herein, says he, is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit. So shall ye be my disciples. Has he not told us, that not every one that saith unto him Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doth the will of his Father which is in heaven? Has he not assured us, that many will say unto him in the last day, Lord, Lord, have we not pro­phesied in thy name; and in thy name have cast out devils; and in thy name have done many wonderful works? to whom he will them profess, that he never knew them, because they wrought iniquity? Has he not said, If ye keep my command­ments, ye shall abide in my love, even as I have kept my Fathers commandments, and abide in his love—This is my com­mandment that ye love one another as I have loved you? If we look to the account which our Lord has given of the proceedings at the final judgment, when he shall sit upon the throne of his glory, all nations being gathered before him to receive their doom; I say if we look to this ac­count, what shall we find represented as the ground and reason, of the righteous being acquitted, but charity and good works?— Come ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for your from the foundation of the world; for I was and hungred and ye gave me meat; thirsty, and ye gave me drink, &c. And what on the other hand, is represented as the ground and reason of the condemna­tion of others, but the neglect of these same duties?— Depart from me ye cursed; for I was an hungred, and ye gave me no meat; thirsty, and ye gave me no drink, &c. In short, the whole tenor of our Lord's preaching was moral: he seldom inculcated any thing upon his hearers besides piety towards God, and righteousness and charity towards man: and all his discourses were just as con­trary to the solifidian doctrines which too many have given in to since, as light is to darkness, or Christ to Belial; nor can the former any more have communion together, than the latter. Our Lord insisted so much upon moral duties, that some of late, in order to vindicate their own un­scriptural [Page 149] and irrational manner of preaching, have even been compelled to deny that he preached the gospel, or designed to do it; alledging that his doctrines and manner of preaching were legal. The irresistible conviction which these men have, that their own doc­trines and discourses are of a very different cast and tenor from those of our blessed Saviour, has put them upon making this wretched and impious evasion. They apo­logize for themselves by condemning their Lord and master. And rather than acknowledge, as they ought, that they do not preach the real gospel of Jesus Christ, they deny that Jesus Christ himself did. But notwithstanding they assert our Lord's preaching was legal St. John the Baptist was plainly of a different opinion: for St. John the Evangelist informs us chap. i. that he bare witness of him—saying—The law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. And our Lord himself, when the Baptist sent to inquire of him who he was, told the mes­sengers to tell John, among other things, that the poor had the gospel preached to them; and this in order to satisfy the Baptist, that he was the true Messiah, and that another was not to be looked for. I must, therefore, beg leave still to think, that our Lord really preached his own gospel, although this may possibly be looked upon by some as an heterodox opinion; and a certain mark of my denying the doctrines of grace.

I hope it appears from what has been said, that the love of God and of our neighbour; that sincere piety of heart; and a righteous, holy and charitable life; are the weightier matters of the gospel, as well as of the law. Indeed these are more evidently the substance of christian duty, than of jewish. Under the gospel, rituals are in­deed of less account than they were under the law. It is not on this mountain, or that, that God is to be wor­shipped; every place is a christian temple; for the Father seeketh such to worship him, as will worship him in spirit and in truth. Rituals were but a yoke and a burthen, weak [Page 150] and beggarly elements even under the law. And they are much more so under the Gospel, when compared to that spiritual sacrifice which christians are to offer to God. And as to charity, this is more peculiarly an evangelical, than a legal duty. For which reason it is that St. John stiles this a new commandment, that we love one another.

UPON the whole then, the case seems to stand thus—Although the christian revelation brings us acquainted with many truths besides those which the light of nature suggests, or Judaism plainly taught; although it injoins us to do several things which would not have been ob­ligatory without an explicit command; although it furnishes us with a great variety of new and excellent motives to excite us to the practice of our duty in all its branches; and although christianity cannot, for these reasons, with any sense or propriety, be said to be the same with natural religion, or only a re-publication of the law of nature; yet the principal, the most important and fundamental duties required by christianity are, nevertheless, the same which were injoined as such under the legal dispensation; and the same which are dictated by the light of nature. They are natural moral duties, inforced with revealed and supernatural motives; and to be performed from principles peculiar to the gospel. And, indeed, it is plain beyond dispute, that the sub­stance of true religion must necessarily be the same, not only under the jewish and christian dispensations, but also, in all countries, to all rational creatures, in all parts of the universe, in all periods of time. Modes and cere­monies of religion may, indeed, be various as the circum­stances and condition of men; and God may afford dif­ferent degrees of light and knowledge in different times and places: But the sum of our duty results from the nature of God, our relation to him, and one another. And this must therefore be as immutable as God himself, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning. As God is the same in all times and places; as mankind [Page 151] bear the same general relation to him in all times and places; and as our relation to each other is always the same, except as to some trivial and merely circumstantial difference; so the substance of human duty must neces­sarily be the same also in all times and places. There cannot be any other than circumstantial differences in the duty, obligation and religion, of creatures who are the offspring of the same God; creatures endowed with the same common nature; and creatures bearing the same general relation to each other. Now that religion which must remain invariably the same, under every change of circumstance, through all ages, in all places, and to all rational beings, consists in the love and veneration of the supreme Father and Lord of the universe, and in the practice of righteousness and charity. This is the reli­gion which is common to earth and heaven: It is the religion of angels and arch-angels above, as well as of saints below: This was the religion of paradise before the apostacy of mankind: This was the religion of Noah before the flood: This was the religion of the Patriarchs afterwards: This was the religion of the Israelites in Egypt before the law: This was the religion which was ra­tified by God at mount Sinai: This was the religion of the law and the prophets to the day of the Messiah: This was the religion which He and his apostles principally inculcated upon mankind, under the gospel dispensation: And this will be the religion, the employment and the happiness of the spirits of just men made perfect here­after in the kingdom of heaven; for the love of God, and charity shall never fail, although whether there be pro­phecies, they shall fail; whether there be tongues, they shall cease; and although, whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away.

THUS do these two duties claim the same place and pre-eminence under the evangelical dispensation which they had in the law and the prophets: On these two commandments hangs all the gospel of Jesus Christ.

[Page 152] I have now done with the four particulars which I proposed to discuss when I first entered upon this subject. There are various moral reflections and inferences which naturally arise from what has been now discoursed; and so I must beg your patience a few minutes longer.

1. THEN, if the love of God and of our neighbour be the weightier matters of the gospel as well as of the law, we are naturally led to bewail the folly, and un­happy condition of those who, in a manner, leave these out of their religion. There are innumerable persons even in the christian world, who, neglecting that sub­stantial religion which consists in the practice of these sublime and heavenly duties, employ all their zeal, care and diligence about things of little or no importance. Christianity is principally an institution of life and man­ners; designed to teach us how to be good men, and to show us the necessity of becoming so. But there are multitudes who call themselves christians, who content themselves with an idle, speculative belief of certain notions and doctrines, without troubling themselves about that holiness, without which we are told, that no man shall see the Lord. They know their duty so exactly, and be­lieve it so firmly, that they imagine they may well be excused from doing it. If they have but a great deal of faith, and rely strongly upon the righteousness of Christ, they think they cannot miss of salvation, al­though, by their sins, they daily crucify the son of God afresh, and put him to an open shame. Some are pleasing themselves with a round of empty formalities, imagining that religion consists chiefly in frequent fastings, attend­ing upon sacraments, and worshiping God with a great deal of outward pomp and ceremony. They forget that God is a spirit; and to be worshipped chiefly in spirit: and love all kinds of ordinances much better than they love their neighbours. There are many, were they asked, which was the first and great commandment, if they gave an answer agreable to their own practice, [Page 153] must say—Thou shalt tell beads devoutly; visit the sepulchres of antient saints; fall down before reliques; pay homage to painted canvas, to carved stones, and moulded clay, pray frequently to the mother of God; or the like: and if they thought at all of the love of God, and our neighbour, would assign them only that low place which our Lord gives to tything mint, anise and cummin. Others place religion chiefly in having frequent raptures, and strange transports of mechanical devotion; in which the less they exercise their reason, the better and more glorious it is. For 'till they have lost all human understanding, they think it impossible they should get a divine one. Thus they go on, raising them­selves from one degree of religious phrenzy to another, till they run quite divinely mad; and then they imagine, that with St. Paul, they are caught up into the third heaven; that they hear unspeakable words; that they see visions, and have a multitude of revelations given to them. And the consequence of this is, that they are lifted up above measure. They then look down with contempt upon all moral duties, as being below such spiritual men. They are for a religion that consists in something more refined and sublime than the love of God and their neighbour; these are but barely rational and natural duties, and fit only for carnal men, or, at best, babes in grace. Nothing can hit the refined taste of these Goliah's in christianity, but what has some my­sterious sublimity in it, and is quite remote from reason. What is plain and obvious is too low and vulgar for such great proficients in grace and spiritual knowledge. God forbid that I should say any thing to discourage a lively and warm devotion. But such enthusiastic flights as these, have no countenance from the gospel of Christ. And the almost invariable consequence of indulging them, is the neglect of solid, substantial religion; a rational love of God, of mankind, and the practice of moral virtue. When persons once get to gasping thus eagerly after immediate inspiration, they generally bewilder them­selves, [Page 154] lose sight of common sense, and neglect sober religion for the sake of having fermented spirits, and superficial flashes of joy. They impute all their ravings and follies and wild imaginations to the spirit of God; and usually think themselves converted, when the poor, unhappy creatures are only out of their wits.

2. SINCE the substance of christian duty consists in the love of God and of our neighbour, and in the practice of morality, this shows us what a gospel-minister's preaching ought chiefly to turn upon. When he is con­cerned with such as are already christians in belief and speculation; that which he has to do still is to bring them to be christians in heart and behaviour—Not to dwell upon speculative points—upon trifling distinctions, and upon metaphysical niceties, which can only perplex his hearers, without bettering their minds and morals—But to ex­cite them to put on a temper of mind and an outward conversation, which corresponds to their holy profession; and, in the words of my text, to love the Lord their God with all their heart, and their neighbour as themselves However, this is too plainly neglected by many. Their constant cry is—"Believe, believe"—"Come to Christ"—"Depend upon his righteousness." As for holiness and good works, they very rarely mention them; and when they do, it is rather with a design to undervalue them, and perswade people that they are good for nothing, than to inforce them as the indispen­sable condition of salvation. Nay, these things are not only spoken of very often as being perfectly useless, but even hazardous to the fouls of men. Good God! that the design of thy gospel should be thus frustrated by those whose immediate office it is, to inforce the holy precepts of it upon mankind!—

3. HENCE it follows, that those people who are of­fended with moral discourses, under the notion that they are not evangelical, are grosly ignorant of the very spirit [Page 155] and design of christianity—They know not what they say, nor whereof they affirm; and need to be taught what are the rudiments and first principles of the oracles of God. Such ignorant, licentious perverters of the gospel, the apostle speaks of in his second epistle to Timothy. The time will come, says he, when they will not endure sound doctrine. But after their own lusts shall they heap unto themselves teachers, having itching ears; and they shall turn away their ears from the truth, and be turned unto fables. And, indeed, of all fables that ever were devised, there was never one that, either for silliness or impiety, equalled this, that faith without works, without the love of God and man, and a life of holiness, is sufficient to bring us to heaven.

4. FROM what has been said, we may see what those doctrines of the gospel are, which ought to be defended and propagated with the greatest zeal, viz. those which more immediately relate to practice; to the love of God and man—A zeal for all such doctrines is a zeal ac­cording to knowledge. But it is apparent, that these have been but little regarded by many christians, in comparison of others which a man might disbelieve without hurting his morals, or endangering his salvation. Those things which have kept the christian world in an eternal fer­ment; which have sharpened the spirits of men; and set little angry bigots a snarling and growling at one another, are nice metaphysical fooleries, scholastic distinctions without any difference, and mere words without a mean­ing. These are the things, (or rather the nothings) which have been disputed about, to the neglect of the weightier matters of the gospel; and even to the destruc­tion of all piety and brotherly love; of every thing be­coming a man and a christian. So hot and furious have many professed christians been in all ages, and so wrath­ful their contentions, about nothing, or mere trifles, that one unacquainted with the genius of their religion, would be apt to think it a very different thing from what it is. [Page 156] He might be apt to think that the master of these furi­ous, railing, and burning disputants, had left it in express charge, as the distinguishing character of his disciples,—not that they should be wise as serpents, and harmless as doves—not that they should love one another; and prac­tice mutual forbearance and condescention—and do unto all men as they would be done by—but that they should be venemous and malicious as serpents—hate one another with all their hearts—do to every one as they would be willing to be done to by none—go together by the ears about words and sounds—drag each other to goals and gibbets—to dungeons, and the flames—and consign all over to hell-fire at last, who could not immediately pronounce their uncouth shibboleths—But O blessed Jesus! thou Saviour of the world! is this for thy disciples to love one another as thou hast loved them? Or didst thou mercifully make peace betwixt God and man by the blood of thy cross, that men being at peace with God, might thus make war upon one another, and inhumanly shed each others blood! But

5. AND to conclude: suffer me to beseech you all seriously to consider of the nature, the great end and design of the gospel, and principally to regard what is of the great­est importance. Content not yourselves with believing well—with being zealous either for, or against, any particular doctrines—with practising the rituals of religion—with being sanguine in the vindication of any particular sect or party, or in opposing any—These things will not secure your salvation. 'Tis then and then only, that you will be the real disciples of Christ, such as he will own and reward at the last day, when your faith has its genuine influence upon your hearts and lives; when it inspires you with the love of God, and of your neighbour; when it causes you to break off your sins by repentance, and your iniquities by turning to the Lord. This moral purity of heart and life, is that religion which our blessed Saviour has taught; it is that religion which employed [Page 157] his lips; and which all his behaviour preached to the world, more eloquently and louder than a thousand tongues. For God's sake, for your own sake, for the honour of the gospel, and your profession; let no man deceive you with vain words. He that doth righteousness, and he only, is righteous. Let no man amuse you with idle, impious stories, as if faith, and reliance upon Christ, were all that the gospel made necessary in order to your salvation. As surely as the gospel is a real revelation, so surely are these notions a mere dream—a fable—a fable wherein folly and wickedness seem to strive for prece­dency—As sure as there is a God in heaven, no man will go thither to behold his glory, and to enjoy the ever­lasting pleasures that are at his right hand, unless he for­sakes his sins, and becomes holy as God is holy. I con­clude with those words with which our blessed Saviour concluded his sermon upon the mount, Mat. 7. 24—28.— whosoever heareth these sayings of mine, and doth them, I will like him unto a wise man which built his house upon a rock: And the rain descended, and the floods came, and the wilds blew, and beat upon that house▪ and it fell not, for it was founded upon a rock. And every one that heareth these sayings of mine, and doth them not, shall be likened unto a foolish man which built his house upon the sand: And the rain descended, and the floods came, and the wilds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell, and great was the fall of it.