THE Eyes of Europe seem at this time to be turn'd wholly upon the King of Spain's New Undertaking against the Em­peror. The Reasons of his making this Attempt, his Catholick Maje­sty has published by his Ministers, and the Memorials, or Letters, which they have given in to the several Courts of the Princes where they reside, fully express the Preten­sion of the King of Spain, and the Reasons why he takes this Occasion to break with the Emperor.

These Memorials, or Letters, are first, The Letter of Seignior Grimaldi, Secretary of State to the King of Spain, directed to the Spanish Ambassadors, or Residents at [Page 2] Foreign Courts; Secondly, The Memorial of the Marquis Beretti Landi, Minister for the King of Spain to the States General, and the Memorial of the Prince de Cellamere at Paris, to the Regent of France, all on the same Subject, and all tending to justify the Conduct of the King of Spain in this Affair, besides the declaration by word of Mouth from the Marquis de Monteleone, the Am­bassador of Spain, to his Britannick Maje­sty.

The sum of all these Memorials, for they are too long to repeat here, may be drawn up and abridg'd in the following Heads, viz.

• 1 st. That the Emperor does not acknow­ledge King Philip to be King of Spain, but gives him only the Title of Duke of Anjou, assuming to himself the stile and Dignity of King of Spain, Spanish Majesty, like­wise all the Titles attending the Possession of the Spanish Monarchy; that He (the Emperor) whom the King of Spain there­fore calls only Arch Duke, has Erected a Council at Vienna, which he calls the Coun­cil of Spain; That he Confers Titles and Honours, such as Grandee of Spain, as if he was really King of Spain in Possession, and the like.
• 2 dly, That these things are Evedences of his resolving to attack King Philip, and Chace him out of Spain it self if he was able, [Page 3] or when he shall be so; and in the mean time, takes all Occasions to shew himself a mortal Enemy.
• 3 dly, That the Emperor Broke the Terms of Peace and Neutrality, even as soon as they were made, viz. That when (his Im­perial Majesty) consented by Treaty to quit Catalonia, where in a few Days more he must have been overcome, and been redu­ced to the necessity of having fallen into the King of Spain's Hands; yet he did not quit the Towns and Strengths, as he ought to have done, by Consigning them into the King of Spain's Hands, to whom they were to be surrendred, but gave them over to the Rebels the Catalans, encouraging them to hold out against his Spanish Majesty, by pro­mising to return and assist them, which occa­sion'd the shedding of much Blood, and the Expense of an Infinite mass of Treasure, to reduce those Places to Obedience.
• 4 thly, That he not only encourag'd the Rebel Majorkins in their Rebellion against his Spanish Majesty, but actually sent them Ships, Men, Money, Arms, Provisions, Ammunition, &c. to support them in their Rebellion against the King of Spain; Ex­horting them also to maintain their Rebelli­on, in hopes of farther Assistance.
• 5 thly, That the Imperial Governor of the Milanese, has, by order from the Em­peror, Arrested, and put in Prison, the Abbot Molinez, a Person Sacred by his Cha­racter [Page 4] of Grand Inquisitor, Reverend by his Age, and who ought to have been so by the Pasports which were given him at Rome from the Pope, with Approbation of Count Gallas the Imperial Minister there; and lastly, who having given no Offence in Person to the Emperor, is visibly Arrested, as an Af­front to his Spanish Majesty, and an Insult upon his Government.
• 6 thly, That his Imperial Majesty has him­self broken the Neutrality of Italy, by ex­torting Immense Sums of Money from the Princes of Italy, on pretence of its being their just Due to pay towards the carrying on His War against the Turks.
• And Lastly, That this being a particular Conjuncture for the King of Spain's Purpose, favourable for his Designs, and the like, his Spanish Majesty thinks he cannot let slip so fair an Occasion, as well respecting the Troubles in Hungary, as the general Discon­tent of the People of Italy, and their readi­ness to enter into Measures, for the effectu­al delivering themselves out of the Hands of the House of Austria.

These are the General Heads of the Charge, as may be seen by the said Memo­rials or Manifestoes of the Spanish Ministers, to which I refer, they having all been made publick in the common Printed Papers of the Town, as to the pretence of the Emperor using Artifices to secure to himself the Suc­cession [Page 5] to the Estates of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, That I look upon as Trifling and without Foundation, and therefore not worth naming among the rest.

It is not our business to enquire here, whether these Objections are just, and whe­ther what is Alledged can be made good in Fact, viz. That the Emperor has done so and so, as above: Nor is it the present Question, whether if these Allegations are just, they are a sufficient Argument for the King of Spain to take up Arms, and begin a War in Italy.

But the Design of this Tract, is to En­quire how these things respect the other Powers of Christendom; and what Part it is probable they may take in the Quarrel; and by other Powers here, I am to be under­stood, to mean in particular the Dutch, the Kings of France and Britain, the King of Sicily, and the Cantons of Swisserland, what share they are like to have in the Quarrel, and whether they are bound by the Treaty of Neutrality to Concern them­selves in a War for the keeping the Posses­sion of Italy to the House of Austria, yea, or no.

I begin with the King of Sicily. To make short with his Story, I shall look on him as one of the Princes of Italy, for such he [Page 6] is: We see his Majesty acting a very subtle Part, as indeed it stands him in stead at this time to do. It is true, the Im­perialists threaten him, and notwithstand­ing all his Protestations of being resolved to pursue the Neutrality, they mistrust him, and seem as resolv'd to fall on him in their Way; nay, some say, they resolve to begin with him. No Man will be so weak as to ask what is his Sicilian Majesty's Bu­siness if he is attack'd; but the Question with him seems to be, whether his Majesty having now a very great Army on Foot, in a Readiness for Action, and apprehending the Imperialists will certainly attack him, ought not, by way of Prevention, to begin first, having so clear an Advantage, and an Opportunity, which it is very probable, may not be offer'd again, I mean, as that of joyning with Spain?

This is the Question which the Politicians who consider not what is right, or what is wrong, but what is fittest to be done, respe­cting the Interest of the Party; I shall in brief state what I think will be the Case here, and as therein I give only one Opinion, let others judge as they see Cause, and let the Event determine. In a Word, I say, I think it seems unavoidable, and the King of Sicily cannot be unconcern'd in a War, if it follows, and that his Majesty will not fail to oyn his Arms with the [Page 7] K. of Spain; only that this cannot be expected till the Spaniards have landed a considerable Body of Men on the Coast of Italy, either in the Kingdom of Naples, or perhaps high­er up, towards the King of Sicily's own Country, which is more than probable, by the Spanish General's demanding Passage of the State of Genoa, for an Army into the Parmesan.

This therefore being so near a Decision, and at present, representing it self to our View as unavoidable, I lay it down as a thing most certain, either voluntarily of himself, or forced by the Imperialists them­selves, will certainly joyn with Spain in this new Enterprize; and I must tell the Impe­rial Ministers, who talk so loudly of the Certainty of the King of Sicily's Ruin in such a Case, and let the Event be what it will, there is great Reason to believe, ma­ny, if not all the Princes of Italy, seem to resolve to run the Venture of it, if the Spa­niards give them but a little more Encourage­ment. What their Dependence and Encou­ragement are, Time will not fail to disco­ver.

I will not say, but these Princes may have their several Grievances, and may have just Reasons to complain of the Violences and Oppressions of the House of Austria, I am willing in Compliment to their Integrity, to [Page 8] suppose, tho' not to grant, the Imperial Governours have perhaps exceeded their Commissions, or that even their Commis­sions have been in some things invasive of the Right of the several Powers complain­ing, contrary to Justice, and to a Treaty of Neutrality; and I will give these Complaints their full Weight, when I come to examine the grand Question, viz. Whether for this they ought to take up Arms, and de­stroy the Neutrality, in which the preser­ving their Rights is not the only Question; but by which the Ballance of Power in Europe is preserv'd: In which Ballance of Power, most, if not all the other Powers of Europe are concern'd, at least those Powers are, of whom I am more particularly to speak.

In this Circumstance then I lay down the State of things in Italy, at this time, viz. That the Princes of Italy are in a present Disposition to Revolt, and that the King of Sicily is in the same Case, and that they on­ly want a powerful Protection of some other Potentate to support them, and that there­fore we may expect, if the King of Spain ap­pears thus able to protect them, they will certainly joyn with him whenever a pow­erful Army appears.

The King of Spain's Pretensions then, and the Princes of Italy, being thus stated, the [Page 9] Plot among them seems to be discover'd, viz. That the King of Spain, on the Foun­dation of his own Grievances only, shall be­gin the War, and according to the Success his Spanish Majesty meets with, the other Princes shall declare themselves; so that if the King of Spain should not be able to car­ry on the Design, they may all retreat to their Solemn Protestations of not being con­cern'd in the Quarrel of Spain, and may make smooth Water with the Emperour, when they find themselves unable to raise a Storm: But on the contrary, if the King of Spain can force his Way into Italy, and dis­possess the Imperialists, so as to protect them, then they will declare themselves.

Upon this Foot I shall treat the Affair in general; if I do any Wrong to the Princes of Italy, it will be time to acknow­ledge it when the Wrong appears.

But to proceed to the History of Fact: The King of Spain, according to this Scheme, has begun the War, and serving himself, of the Emperor's being perfectly destitute of a­ny Marine Power, and of the unhappy Con­juncture of a furious War with the Turks, he invades the Dominions of his Imperial Majesty, in particular, the Island of Sardig­nia, which the Spaniards, having a power­ful Fleet, and the Imperial Government not [Page 10] three Men of War, could no ways be re­liev'd.

Here we stop a while, and make a Tran­sition at once to the Courts of Great-Britain and the Hague. The Spaniards were not so ignorant, as not to know, or so dull, as not to think of it; That the Powers or Courts above mentioned, who had all severally so great a Share in making the Capitulation, or Treaty for the Neutrality of Italy, would interest themselves in this Affair, as having charg'd themselves with the Guarantee of that Neutrality, and therefore his Spanish Majesty caus'd, not only the Letters and Memorials mentioned above, to be pre­sented in the Nature of Manifesto's to the said Courts, but made often a repeated Pro­posal of stopping their Proceedings, till time might be given to the pacifick Princes and Powers, who he thus appply'd to by such Methods as they thought most proper to bring his Imperial Majesty to listen to Rea­son, and to do Justice to his Spanish Ma­jesty's Pretensions.

These Proposals being taken Ad Referen­dum, did indeed entitle the said Princes and Powers to make the needful Representations to the Emperor, and to make use of all the good Offices they found for their Purpose, to induce the Emperor to refer likewise the Matters in Dispute to their Mediation, as the King of Spain likewise offer'd to do.

[Page 11] By the way, I must here observe as I go, in order to make every thing clear to the Reader of this Enquiry. 1. That these Powers were more or less, all of them en­gag'd before as Guarantees of the Treaty of Neutrality in Italy. 2. That tho' their be­ing so Guarantees qualified them the better to be Mediators; yet this Mediation, if they had accepted it, does not by any Means tye up their Hands from, or lessen the Right they have to act as Guarantees of the Neutrality of Italy. 3. That we do not find in the Proposal, any Conditions made with them, that this Offer should subsist on­ly in case they declar'd themselves accepting the said Mediation. 4. We do not find that the King of Great-Britain, their High Migh­tinesses the States General, and the Regent of France, did actually engage in any such Mediation. But 5. that being willing to do all good Offices, for the preserving the Peace and Tranquility of Europe, they have concerned themselves, in the most earnest Manner to his Imperial Majesty, in what the King of Spain demands, and to induce him to accept of the Proposals of his Spanish Majesty, in Order to a Treaty.

But while this is depending, and before they have been able to obtain any Answer, or enter into any Negociation on the Pro­posal, we find Spain entirely regardless of the offer'd Suspension of her Conquests, and [Page 12] taking no Notice of the Engagements she had enter'd into with his Britanncik Ma­jesty, and other Powers, as above? I say, we find Spain vigorously pushing on her Advantages, making Preparations for new Enterprizes, and even by her Ambassador, the Prince de Cellamare, at the Court of France, declaring publickly, that she in­tends to do so; this last Declaration being indeed so inconsistent with those mentioned above, deserves to be remark'd as follows;

[Page 16]Before I enter then upon the main Que­stion of a War, I think here occurs a parti­cular or previous Question to be Consider­ed, viz. Is this proceeding of Spain an Af­front to the King of Great-Britain, and to all the Powers to whom those pacifick Pro­posals were made, and who so willingly be­gan their good Offices with his Imperial Majesty, or is it not? Is it using his Majesty well, or is it oftering the highest Contempt to his Person, and to the Interposition of his Interest, as is possible to be offer'd? Is it not a Breach of Faith and Honour? In a Word, Is it not dealing Deceitfully and Dishonourably with His Majesty, making use of his good Offices to Amuse and De­ceive the Prince who they were proposed to serve; and in a Word, making a Property of the three most Potent Powers of Europe, in order to advantage himself of their Civili­ties; and, as before, he had Deceived Eu­rope in the matter of his Armament by Sea, on Petences, and indeed Promisses, of fitting out a Fleet for the Assistance of the Venetians against the Turks, so now Deceiving the Emperor by the fraud of a specious Propo­sal, which no Prince could have such mean thoughts of the King of Spain, as to believe he was not sincere in? It cannot be sug­gested that in this the King of Great-Britain is used well, or used really as one Crown'd Head ought to use another; nor can it be suggested, but that when Occasion presents, [Page 25] and Circumstances concurs, His Majesty knows very well how to Resent it, and is not without the Means of making his Spa­nish Majesty sensible of it.

But our question at home is it seems of another nature, and indeed something of a new fashion, viz. whether we shall be wil­ling the Honour of the British Throne shall be so far asserted, as that His Majesty shall, upon the single Point of being Affronted, Engage in this matter? or whether we shall leave the British Powers to be so far depre­ciated, as to take no notice of such Usage, and consequently to be Affronted on all oc­casions by all the Kings of the Earth?

However for once, and to gratify the Op­posers far beyond their Expectations, and to leave room for all their specious soft ways of covering these things over, I shall give way to their Harangues upon the cir­cumstances of the Nation, viz. That we have lately been involv'd in a heavy War, which has brought an insupportable Burthen of Debt upon the whole Kingdom; That we are but just entering upon Methods for working out of those things, and have scarce tasted the sweet part of any one Arti­cle worth naming; That all the Savings of the last Year have not eased the People of one Tax, neither can they in some years yet [Page 16] [...] [Page 25] [...] [Page 26] to come, and that it will be a great many years before we can possibly give such Ease to the poor People, as to bring their living, and keeping their Families, to be as Cheap to them as before, and yet their Provisions are even dearer than in time of War: That all neighbouring Countries are reducing their Expence and lessening their Debts, and in a fair way to be out of Debt before us, even tho' no new War should be Com­menced: But that every year brings with it some new load upon Britain to keep her low, as for Example, the Rebellion for one Year, the Swedish Affair for another, and if now we Engage in a War with Spain, we are in a fair way to continue the Charge of all the Taxes and Funds that are upon us, be­sides what new Demands may be necessary, and so the Nation will for ever sink under a weight already own'd to be insupportable.

To all these things, they add the supposi­tion of a War with Spain, the Consequen­ces of it to our Commerce, which after a long Decay, and suffering infinite Convul­sions in the last War, began to revive again in all parts of the World; but will imme­diately be overwhelm'd in the most sensible parts of it, such as the Trade to Spain it self, the Assiento Contract, the Trade to Italy, and the like; and perhaps the Effects of our Merchants and South-Sea Company, &c. be seized by the Spaniards.

[Page 27] This is a long Detail of plausibles, which indeed our People begin to fill their Mouths with in this Case, and in some of the parti­cular Cases they are not without weight; It is true, our Debts are many and great, and the Nation wants a recess of Taxes; it is true, our Spanish Trade is Considerable, and the Effects of our Merchants are Great Abroad, and may be liable to be Confisca­ted by the Spaniards.

I'll add to this, That we have Reason to believe from the Wisdom, and the pacifick Disposition of His Majesty himself, from the Prudence and Moderation of his Coun­cils, from the just Desire the King must ne­cessarily have to restore the Tranquility of His Subjects, and from a willingness once to Enjoy his new Dominions in Peace, and see his People flourishing in Arts and Trade, by which they are now in a fair prospect of making themselves more than ever, the Greatest and most Opulent Nation in the World.

But against all these Things, doubtless there are other matters that weigh some­thing in the Scale of this Question, and which merit to be considered by themselves; I shall fetch nothing remote to make good the deficiency, for the Subject is but too fruit­ful of Argument, and the Necessity will ap­pear [Page 28] even at first sight, if we go back Histo­rically but a little way into things past, and compare them with the visible pro­spects of things to come.

The Great, and indeed the true Reason, which was always alleg'd for the pushing on the late War at so vast an Expence, and the continuing it thro' so many Difficulties, as at first for many years obstructed the Suc­cess of it, was the fixing the Ballance of Power in Europe.

It was for this, That so many Powers of Europe Confederated to reduce the Exorbi­tant Power of France, by whose Conquests and Ambitious Designs that Ballance was destroyed, and the Nations of Europe in Danger of submitting at last to an Univer­sal Tyranny in the Conqueror.

It was for this that the Glorious King Wil­liam fix'd the Pyrenean Treaty, as the boun­dary of his Demands from France; and de­clar'd, if Spain went beyond those limits, he would be then as much a Frenchman, as he was then a Spaniard.

It was for this that such long Struggles were made to prevent the Spanish Monarchy falling into the Hands of the House of Bour­bon.

[Page 29] It was for this we Complain'd so warmly of the Measures in the last Reign, and of the Conditions of the late Peace, as betraying the Confederacy, and destroying the Great End of the War, by giving up Spain to King Philip, who at that time was entirely in the Interest of France.

It was for this all the Renunciations of the Treaty of Ʋtrecht were entred into, and the weight of the Argument acknowledg'd, even in those very things which were said Eventu­ally to betray it, and by those very People who have been so openly Charg'd with lea­ving it unprovided for, or not sufficiently se­cur'd.

It was on the Pretence of this being suf­ficiently secur'd, that the People who made the Peace of Ʋtrecht justify themselves, and tell us that it was a good Peace, and that it fully answered the end of the War.

It must then follow, that even those very People ought to be the first to declare, that what ever Prince breaks in upon that Bal­lance, Destroys the Efficacy of the Peace, and brings us into the same necessity of re­newing a War, that there was at that time for Beginning and Carrying it on.

[Page 30] As the Ballance of Power was the Reason of the War, so it is the only Basis of the Peace; whatever Prince makes an attempt upon that Ballance, declares War against all the rest, as they are naturally Guarantees of the whole; or else they tacitly declare that there was no just Reason at first, from the Interruption of that Ballance, to begin the former War, much less to carry it on as they did, which would Arraign all the Princes of the Confederacy, and Charge them with Ambition, Unjust Invasion, and Blood.

These Points carry their own Evidence with them, and admit so little dispute, that it would seem a meer spinning out our Dis­course, to go about proving, or farther ex­plaining any part of them; all the publick Transactions, Declarations of War, Memo­rials and Treaties, which were severally di­spers'd thro' Europe in the Time when these things were done, are full of it, and may be all call'd up as Evidences to this one Great Prin­ciple of the Policies of Europe, viz. That Preserving the Ballance of Power in Europe, was the Reason of the War, and the Grand Preliminary of the Peace.

This then being laid down as a Funda­mental to argue from, it follows to enquire in few Words, Is the dispossessing the House of Austria of their Dominions in Italy, and [Page 31] reuniting those Dominions to the Spanish Monarchy, a Breach of this Ballance of Power, or is it not?

I need go no further for Arguments to set forth the Importance of those Italian Domi­nions, than those made use of by the Gen­tlemen, who magnified them as most mighty Additions to the Austrian Greatness, when they would have perswaded us, that giving those Parts to the Emperor, would make him too great for the rest of the World, and overthrow that Ballance they were given to preserve.

If then those Dominions, whose Depen­dencies and Influencies are indeed equal to their Power, were scarce thought safe to be given to the Emperor, and were not thought safe to remain to the King of Spain, because of the Ballance, which would thereby be in Danger; How then can it consist with the Ballance, to have them snatch'd out of the Emperor's Hands again, and return back to the same Hand from whence they were taken?

This Consideration alone, obliges not Great-Britain only, but even the whole Confederacy, as one Man, to Declare against this Invasion of the King of Spain, and to oblige him to put a Stop to his Attempts, [Page 32] or make War upon him; otherwise, the End of the late War is defeated, and the Effect of the late Peace is destroy'd.

Nor is it sufficient to say, the Emperor had those Dominions conquer'd for him, and put into his Hands, and he ought to take Care to maintain his Possession; for, if the Emperor is, by any Incident of War, as the present War with the Turks, for Ex­ample, expos'd to the Possibility of a Surprize, it would shew a very ill Concern for the general Good of Europe, to let his Domini­ons, which we thought our selves so much concern'd to get for him, be lost again, be­cause he (the Emperor) may not be able to prevent it.

It was for our own Sakes, and for the Publick Safety of Europe, in which the whole Confederacy were concern'd, that the War was carried on; it was not to aggrandize the House of Austria, that these Dominions were conquer'd, but to weaken the oppo­sing Enemies, whose Power was too great; and they were allotted to the Emperor, not because his Arms had Conquer'd them, for without the Help of the Confederates, he neither did conquer them, nor could have Conquer'd them; but because it was meet, in Order to preserve this great Article of the Ballance, I say, it was meet for the Good [Page 25] of all Europe that the Emperor should have them.

Likewise speaking of the present Con­juncture, it is not meerly in Compliment to the Emperor, whose immediate Interest or Family, we have no Concern in, that we are interested in this Affair; but it is the common Interest of Europe, the same which so many Years War was carried on for, and the same which the Peace was; or ought to have been made for: For this common Interest it is meet that these Places, these Domini­ons in Italy, should remain to the House of Austria; and they must remain to that House, or that Ballance be so far destroy'd, and the Ends of the Confederates are not answer'd.

It remains then to judge, whether Great Britain can quietly and unconcernedly look on, and see the great Ends for which they laid out their Blood and Treasure with so much Chearfulness, and for so many Years, destroy'd at once, and a Foundation laid for the same Necessity of Blood and Trea­sure to be laid out again? Can we sit still, and see Measures taken, which have in themselves a direct Tendency to renew the War? Those pacifick Gentlemen who plead so earnestly in Behalf of Peace, should tell us the Meaning of the ancient well known [Page 26] Maxim, Pax quaeretur Bello, and whether a timely Exerting the Strength which is now in our Hands, may not be the only Way to establish Peace, and prevent War?

It is much easier to keep things in the Posture they are in, than to restore them again after the Blow is given; Italy is a large Country, a Conjuncture offers to the ambitious Views of the King of Spain, which perhaps may be in it self tempting enough; the delicious Morsel, seems, as it were, dropping into his Mouth; the Discontents of the People there are represented as very great, and perhaps they are so; it may be, the Germans have not treated them very kindly, they have oppress'd them with heavy Taxes, preferr'd Foreigners to the Places and Preferments which the Natives have claim'd a Right to, carried away their Native Troops to serve the Emperor in his Wars in Hungary, Extorted great Sums of Money and the like: What can we say to this, had they applied to any Foreign Princes to have interceeded for them to his Imperial Majesty, none of the Con­federates would have refus'd their good Offices, as far as the Custom of Nations would admit one Prince to concern himself in the Government of another: But that these Grievances should entitle them to Re­volt, and to go back to a Prince from whom [Page 27] the whole Interest of Europe was concern'd to separate them; This quite alters the Case: And to say we must sit still, and per­mit and suffer it, as we have acted in the same kind our selves, and from the Princi­ples of Liberty we insist upon for our selves, this is saying nothing to the purpose, for our Views are in this the Liberties of Eu­rope, and not the Liberties of Italy; the first we are Nationally concern'd in, not the last: Nay, if they were together in one bottom, we should no otherwise be con­cern'd in the Liberties of Italy, than as they were on one bottom with those of Europe; but when they are opposite to one another, the Case is quite alter'd. The particular Rights of the Italian Princes or People are quite out of the question; the thing be­fore the Confederates is, the preserving that Ballance, which is the Foundation of the Liberties of all Europe.

Nor can we say in this Case that the Con­federacy is Dissolv'd, and the Affair is now no more a Common Concern: The Com­mon Interest is the same, and the Princes, as I said, even Natural Guarrantees for the preserving it.

Much might be said here for the Nature of this War, the Injustice of the manner, as well as that of the pretences for it: But [Page 28] it is true, these regard the Emperor rather than us: However, I shall collect the Par­ticulars, that we may view them, and that the World may judge of, what Honour, what Equity, is to be expected from those Powers, who can satisfy themselves to give Europe Cause for such Complaints as these. Some of them are to be found in the Pope's Letter to the King of Spain, where his Holiness expostulates warmly, and even almost calls it perfidious Treatment, viz. 1. That his Spanish Majesty promises and engages his Royal Word, to him the Pope, that he would not offer any Disturbance to his Imperial Majesty's Dominions in Italy, during his being thus engag'd in a War with the Turks. 2. That his Spanish Ma­jesty engaged to his Holiness, to send a powerful Fleet into the Levant, in Aid of the Christian Princes against the Turks, which Fleet was to joyn the Venetians, and act in Conjunction with the other Auxili­aries; whereas, on the contrary, this Fleet was not only not sent to the Levant against the Turks, but has been employ'd against the Christian Emperor, at the same time when his Imperial Majesty had employ'd his whole Force to resist the Enemy of the Christian Name, and not only has been thus employ'd; but the Venetians have been thereby abandon'd, and left to struggle with the superior Force of their Enemies, to [Page 29] their great and unspeakable Loss and Disap­pointment, and to the great Hazard of Chri­stendom; and the Turks being hereby left Masters of the Seas, after two bloody En­gagements; which had the Spanish Fleet been joyn'd, would either not have been fought, or if they had, the Christans might have obtain'd a most glorious Victory, or at least, the Triumphs of the Infidels had been prevented, and the Effusion of the Christian Blood been saved. 3. That in order to this Equipment for the Service of Christendom, his Spanish Majesty demand­ed of his Holiness, a Brief for the raising a great Sum of Money from the Clergy of Spain, which his Holiness granted. Likewise, a Hat was insisted for the Ab­bot, now Cardinal Alberoni; upon the granting which, and the King of Spain's pro­mises of sending the said Squadron with all Speed against the Turks was renewed; yet all these Engagements were laid aside, and the Power rais'd to fight with the E­nemies of Christ turn'd against the Chri­stian Emperor in a Manner so surprizing, as to the Faith and Honour of his Spanish Majesty, as is not to be express'd in better Terms than in the Pope's Letter above­said, to which I particularly refer.

[Page 30] It is true, as I have observed, that these Breaches of Faith and Honour, do not in particular affect us, or relate to Britain; but the Reader may consider them, and compare them with the Memo­morials and Declarations of the Marquis de Beretti Landi, in Holland, and some the like here; wherein his Spanish Ma­jesty offers, or promises to stop his Prepa­rations, and proceed no farther than the Conquest of Sardignia, but leave the Mat­ters in Dispute with the Emperor, to the Mediation of his Britannick Majesty, and their High Mightinesses the States Gene­ral, &c. And yet, as all Advices now say, and even the King of Spain's Mi­nister in France acknowledges, his Spa­nish Majesty resolves to push his Advan­tages to the utmost, in Pursuit of his Quarrel with the Emperor.

I am loth to make indecent Reflections upon Persons exalted to the Dignity of Sovereign Princes, and always retain a Reverence to the Majesty of Crown'd Heads; and therefore, forbear all those Reflections which some People make upon his Spanish Majesty, as a Branch of the House of Bourbon, suggesting that such things as these seem to be Copying after the Pattern of France. I wish his Spanish Majesty would adhere to the Maxims of [Page 31] Honour, so strictly adher'd to, and so no­bly practis'd by some of his glorious An­cestors on the Throne of the Spanish Mo­narchy, rather than send us back to his particular Progenitors, or to a Court, where such things have formerly been too much practis'd; and which I mention with the more Caution, as the World seems to acknowledge, the Court of France it self is acted now by other Principles, and may be expected, in a few Years, to esta­blish other Maxims, as well of Policy as of Honour, differing from those which brought it so eminently to the Gate of Destruction.

I see nothing can be said then why the King of Spain should be suffer'd unopposed, to push on his present Designs, which are founded on such Trifling pretences, and on such Dishonourable Measures, unless we can say, that we have no Concern in the General G [...]od of Europe, and that we are not as much [...]oncern'd to keep any new Power from Growing too Formidable and Exorbi­tant in Europe, as we shall be afterwards to pull it down; and if it will be our Con­cern, as most certainly it must, to reduce every Exorbitance of Power in Europe, and preserve the Ballance on which the Tranquility of Europe Depends, it must be our [...]rudence to prevent the first rise of such Exorbitance.

[Page 32] As to the disadvantages to our Commerce Abroad, our inability to Engage in the Ex­pence at Home, our being in Debt, and oppress'd with Taxes, and the like, they are all Granted, and I make no doubt, that as it is natural to infer from thence, that we should by no Means Engage in any New Expence if it be possible to avoid it; so I believe, as is said above, That His Majesty will not be prevail'd on to use Force in this Case, if all possible Good Offices between the Parties can prevent it, and if Reason will take place; in a Word, that His Ma­jesty will not bring us into a War without an absolute and apparent Necessity.

But let us not Depreciate our Country so much, or lay our selves so low neither, as to suggest that we cannot do, what we cannot in Honour and Justice avoid; that would be to say, We are so weakned by the late War, that we are not able even to re­sist an Enemy, if we are Attack'd.

If our Power is Contemn'd if the Ho­nour of the British Crown is slighted, if Princes come to think so meanly of Britain, as not to think it worth while to keep their Words with us, it is indeed attacking us: They that will break their Promises with Great Britain, How long do we think they would be before they would break the Peace [Page 33] with his Majesty, if they found it for their advantage to do it?

To be Treated thus, is to be attack'd in the worst manner, and Great Princes have always resented the breach of Faith with them, as the worst Affront that could be put upon them; and I hope, none will sug­gest in this Case, that a Breach of Faith with the King, is not a Breach of Faith with the Kingdom, and that in a manner more particularly provoking.

As to our Trade, perhaps it may be true, that the King of Spain may take some ad­vantages against our Merchants; but let such People who are frighted at those ap­pearances, remember what infinite Advan­tages our superiority at Sea gives our Sub­jects in War with Spain; let them remem­ber Queen Elizabeth's Reign, when the whole Nation was visibly enrich'd by a War with Spain; and to this, let me add, should we now heartily set about a War with Spain, Spain giving the Occasion, it is no hard matter to shew how infinite Advantages may be made of it in the Spanish West-Indies, Capable to make full Reparation for all the Damages our Trade can suffer: But of that hereafter.

[Page 34] Laslty, Let it be observ'd, that this Dis­course does not tend to an immediate De­claring War against the King of Spain; it takes it for granted, that Necessity ob­liges some Princes of Europe to joyn to pre­serve the Neutrality of Italy, and as has been hinted to the Spaniards, to act against those that would break that Neutrality; if this leads us to act against the King of Spain, it is not Britain, but the King of Spain that leads us to it; and if in doing this, the King of Spain takes if for a Breach of the Peace, it is his Spanish Majesty that begins the War, and not the King of Bri­tain, and the Consequences must lye at their Door, and not at ours.