CHAP. I.

Ps. 115.16. The Origi­nal of pro­priety. THe heaven (saith David) even the heavens, are the Lords: but the earth hath he given un­to the children of men: Yet saith God unto the Father of these Children,Gen. 3.19. In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat thy bread. Dii laborantibus sua munera vendunt. The Donation of the earth by God unto man, cometh unto a kind of selling it for industry, a treasure which seemeth to purchase of God: from the different kinds and successes of this industry, whether in arms, or in other exercise of the mind or body, deriveth the natural equity of domi­nion or propriety; and from the legal establishment or distribution of this propriety, (be it more or less ap­proaching towards the natural equity [Page 7] of the same) deriveth all Govern­ment.

The distribution of propriety,The balance of Empire in propriety. so far forth as it regardeth the nature or procreation of Government, lieth in the over-balance of the same: af­ter the manner, that a man who hath two thousand pounds a year, may have a retinue, and so a strength, that is three times greater then his who hath but five hundred pounds a year. Not to speak at this time of Money, which in small Territories may be of like effect; but to insist upon the main, which is Propriety in Land, the over-balance of this, as it was at first constituted, or cometh insensibly to be changed in a Nation, may be espe­cially of three kinds; that is, in One, in the Few, or in the Many.

The over-balance of Land three to one or thereabouts,The genera­tion of ab­solute Mo­narchy. Gen. 47.19. in one man against the whole people, createth absolute Monarchy; as when Joseph had pur­chased all the lands of the Egyptians for Pharaoh. The constitution of a people in which and like cases, is ca­pable of intire servitude. Buy us and our land for bread, and we and our land will be servants unto Pharaoh.

The genera­tion of re­gulated Monarchy.The over-balance of Land unto the like proportion, in the Few a­gainst the whole people, createth A­ristocracy, or regulated Monarchy, as of late in England: and hereupon saith Samuel unto the people of Is­rael when they would have a King, He will take your fields, 1 Sam. 8. even the best of them, Nec totam libertatem nec totam servitutem pati pos­sunt. Tacit. The genera­tion of Po­pular Go­vernment. and give them unto his servants. The constitution of a people in this and in like cases, is neither capable of intire liberty, nor of intire ser­vitude.

The over-balance of Land unto the like proportion in the people, or where neither one nor the few over-balance the whole people, createth Popular Government; as in the divi­sion of the Land of Canaan unto the whole people of Israel by lot. The constitution of a people in which and like cases, is capable of intire free­dom: Nay, not capable of any other settlement; it being certain, that if a Monarch or single Person, in such a State, through the taint or improvi­dence of Counsels, should carry it; yet through the irresistable force of na­ture, or the reason alledged by Moses, I am not able to bear all this people a­lone, Numb. 11.14. [Page 9] because it is too heavy for me, he could not carry it; but out of the deep waters would cry unto them, whose feet he had stucken in the mire.

Where-ever the balance of a Go­vernment be,Of the Mi­litia, and of the Nega­tive voice. there naturally is the Militia of the same; and against him or them where the Militia is natural­ly, there can be no negative vote.

If a Prince hold the over-balance, as in Turky, in him is the Militia, as the Janizaries and Timariots. If a Nobility hold the over-balance, the Militia is in them, as among us was seen in the Barons Wars, and those of York and Lancaster; and in France is seen, when any considerable part of that Nobility flying out, they are not to be reduced, but by the major part of their order remaining unto the King.

If a People have the over-balance, as in Israel, the Militia is in them,Judg. 20. as in the four hundred thousand first de­creeing, and then waging War against Benjamin; where it may be enquired what power there was on earth, ha­ving a negative voice unto this As­sembly. This, where there is settle­ment, [Page 10] or where a Government is na­tural. Where there is no settlement, or where the Government is unna­tural, it ariseth from one of two causes; either imperfection in the balance, or such corruption in the Law-Givers, whereby a Government is instituted contrary unto the ba­lance.

Imperfect Govern­ment.Imperfections of the balance, that is, where it is not good or down-weight, cause imperfect Governments: as those of the Roman and of the Flo­rentine people, and those of the He­brew Kings and Roman Emperours, being each exceeding bloudy, or at the least stormy.

Tyranny, O­ligarchy, Anarchy.Government against the balance, in One, is Tyranny, as that of the Athe­nian Pisistratus; in the Few, is Oligar­chy, as that of the Roman Decemvirs; in the Many, is Anarchy, as that un­der the Neapolitan Mazinello.

The Divine right of Go­vernment.Where through causes unforeseen by Humane Providence, the balance cometh to be intirely changed, it is the more immediately to be attributed unto Divine Providence: and where­as God cannot will the necessary cause, but he must also will the neces­sary [Page 11] effect or consequence; what Go­vernment soever is in the necessary direction of the balance, the same is of Divine right: wherefore though of the Israelites God saith,Hos. 8.4. They have set up kings, and not by me; they have made princes, and I knew it not: Yet to the small Countries adjoyning un­to the Assyrian Empire, he saith, Now have I given all these lands into the hand of the king of Babylon my ser­vant—Serve the king of Babylon, Jer. 27.6.17. and live.

CHAP. II.

THe Lands in the hold of the Nobility and Clergy of Eng­land, till Hen. 7. cannot be esteemed to have over-balanced those in the hold of the people less then four to one. Whereas in our daies, the Clergy being destroyed, the [Page 12] Lands in hold of the people over-ba­lance those in the hold of the Nobili­ty, at the least nine in ten. In shewing how this change came about, some would have it that I assume unto my self more then my share; albeit they find not me delivering that which must rely upon authority, and not vouching my authours. But Henry the seventh being conscious of infirmity in his ti­tle, yet finding with what strength and vigour he was brought in by the Nobility, conceived jealousies of like power in case of decay or change of affections. (Nondum orbis adorave­rat Romam.) The Lords yet led coun­trey-lives, their houses were open to retainers, men experienced in Mi­litary affairs, and capable of leading; their hospitality was the delight of their Tenants, by their tenures or dependence obliged to follow their Lords in arms. So that this being the Militia of the Nation, a few Noble­men discontented could at any time levy a great Army; the effect where­of, both in the Barons Wars, and those of York and Lancaster, had been well known unto diverse Kings. This state of affairs was that at which [Page 13] Henry the seventh made advantage of troubled times, and frequent un­ruliness of retainers to take his aym, while under pretence of curbing riots, he obtained the passing of such Laws as cut off retainers, in which the No­bility lost their Officers. Then whereas the dependence of the Peo­ple upon their Lords was of a strict tie or nature, he found means to loosen this also, by Laws which he obtained upon as fair a pretence, even that of population:Verulam. H. 7. thus Farmes were so brought unto a standard, that the houses being kept up, each of them did of necessity inforce a dweller; and the proportion of Land laid unto each house, did of necessity inforce that dweller not to be a beggar or cottager, but a man able to keep servants, and set the plough on going. By which means a great part of the Lands of this Nation came in effect to be amortized unto the hold of the Yeo­manry or middle people, whereof con­sisted the main body of the Militia, hereby incredibly advanced, & which henceforth like cleaner underwood less choaked by their staddles, began to grow exceedingly. But the Nobili­ty, who by the former Laws had lost [Page 14] their Offices, by this lost their Soul­diery. Yet remained unto them their estates, till the same Prince in­troducing the Statutes for Alienati­ons, these also became loose; and the Lords less taken (for the reasons shewn) with their Countrey-lives, where their trains were clipped, by degrees became Courtiers, where greater pompe and expence by the Statutes of Alienations began to plume them of their Estates. The Court was yet at Bridewell, nor rea­ched London any farther then Tem­ple-bar. The latter growth of this City, and in that, the declining of the Balance unto popularity, deri­veth from the decay of the Nobility, and of the Clergy. In the Reign of the succeeding King were Abbies (then which nothing more dwarfs a people) demolished. I did not, I do not attribute the effects of these things thus far unto my own parti­cular observation, but alwaies did and do attribute a sense thereof un­to the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, and the wisdom of her Council: There is yet living testimony, that the ruine of the English Monarchy, through the [Page 15] causes mentioned, was frequently at­tributed unto Henry the seventh by Sir Henry Wotton; which tradition is not unlike to have descended upon him from the Queens Council: But there is difference between having a sense of a thing, and making a right use of that sense. Let a man read Plutarch in the lives of Agis, and of the Gracchi, there can be no plainer demonstration of the Lacedemonian or Roman Balance; yet read his dis­course of Government in his Morals, and he hath forgotten it; he maketh no use, no mention at all of any such thing. Who could have been plai­ner upon this point then Sir Walter Raleigh, where to prove that the Kings of Egypt were not elective but hereditary, he alledgeth that if the Kings of Egypt had been elective, The children of Pharaoh must have been more mighty then the King, Hist. of the World, part 1. p. 200. as Land­lords of all Egypt, and the King himself their tenant? Yet when he cometh to speak of Government, he hath no re­gard unto, no remembrance of any such principle. In Mr. Seldens Titles of Honour, he hath demonstrated the English Balance of the Peerage, [Page 16] without making any application of it, or indeed perceiving it, there, or in times when the defect of the same came to give so full a sense of it. The like might be made apparent in Ari­stotle, in Machiavil, in my Lord Verulam, in all, in any Politician; there is not one of them in whom may not be found as right a sense of this principle as in this present Nar­rative, or in whom may be found a righter use of it then was made by any of the parties thus far concerned in this story, or by Queen Elizabeth and her Council. If a Prince (saith a great Authour) to reform a Govern­ment were obliged to depose himself, M. D. L. 1. B. 10. he might in neglecting of it, be capable of some excuse; but reformation of Go­vernment being that with which a Prin­cipality may stand, he deserveth no ex­cuse at all. It is indeed not observed by this Authour, that where through declination of the Balance unto po­pularity, the State requireth refor­mation in the Superstructures, there the Prince cannot rightly reform, un­less from Soveraign power he descend unto a Principality in a Common­wealth; nevertheless upon like oc­casions [Page 17] this faileth not to be found so in Nature and Experience. The growth of the people of England since the ruines mentioned of the Nobility and the Clergy, came in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth to more then stood with the interest, or indeed the nature or possibility of well-founded or durable Monarchy; as was pru­dently perceived, but withall tempo­rized, by her Council, who (if the truth of her Government be rightly weighed) seem rather to have put her upon the exercise of Principality in a Commonwealth, then of Sove­raign power in a Monarchy. Cer­tain it is, that she courted not her No­bility, nor gave her mind, as Mo­narchs seated upon the like order, to Balance her great men, or reflect up­on their power now inconsiderable; but ruled wholly (with an art she had unto high perfection) by humoring and blessing her people. For this but shadow of a Commonwealth, is she yet famous, and shall ever be; though had she introduced the full perfection of the orders requisite unto Popular Government; First, it had established such Principality unto her successors, [Page 18] as they might have held. Secondly, this Principality (the Common­wealth (as Rome of Romulus) being borne of such a Parent) might have re­tained the Royal Dignity and Re­venue to the full,The great Council of Venice hath the So­veraign power, and the Duke the Sove­raign Dig­nity. improved and discharged of all envy. Thirdly, it had saved all the bloud and confusion, which through this neglect in her, and her successours, hath ensued. Fourthly, it had bequeathed unto the people a light not so naturally by them to be discovered, which is pity; For even as the Many through the dif­ference of opinions that must needs a­bound among them, M. D. L. 1. C. 9. are not apt to in­troduce a Government, as not under­standing the good of it: so the Many having by trial or experience once at­tained unto this understanding, agree not to quit such a Government. And Lastly, it had estated this Nation in that full facility, which so far as con­cerneth meer prudence, is in the ca­pacity of humane nature. To this Queen succeeded King James, who likewise regardless of this point (in which nevertheless he was so seen, as not seldom to prophecie sad things unto his successours) neither his new [Page 19] Peerage (which in abundance he crea­ted) nor the old, availed him against that dread, wherein more freely then prudently he discovered himself to stand of Parliaments, as now meer Po­pular Councils, & running unto popu­larity of Government, like a boul down the hill; not so much (I may say) of ma­lice perpensed, as of natural instinct; whereof the Petition of Right, well heeded, is sufficient testimony. All perswasion of Court-Eloquence, all patience for such as but looked that way, was now lost. There remained no­thing unto the destruction of a Mo­narchy retaining but the name, more then a Prince who by striving should make the people to feel those advan­tages which they could not see. And this happened in the next King, who too secure in that undoubted right whereby he was advanced unto a Throne which had no foundation, da­red to put this unto unseasonable try­al; on whom therefore fell the Tower in Silo. Nor may we think that they upon whom this Tower fell, were sinners above all men; but that we, unless we repent, and look better unto foundations, must likewise perish. We [Page 20] have had latter Princes, latter Parli­aments; in what have they excell'd, or where are they? The balance not heeded, no effectual work can be made as to settlement; and heeded (as it now stands in England) requireth un­to settlement no less then the Super­structures natural unto Popular Go­vernment: and the Superstructures natural unto Popular Government, require no less then the highest skill or art that is in Political Architecture. The sum of which particulars amount­eth unto this, That the safety of the people of England is now plainly cast upon skill or sufficiency in Political Architecture: it is not enough, that there are honest men addicted unto all the good ends of a Common­wealth, unless there be skill also in the fo [...]mation of those proper means whereby such ends may be attained unto. Which is as sad, as a true ac­count; this being in all experience, and in the judgement of all Politici­ans, that whereof the Many are in­capable. And though the meanest Citizen, not informing the Com­monwealth of what he knoweth, or conceiveth to concern her safety, [Page 21] commit an hainous crime against God and his Country; such is the temper of later times, that a man having offer'd any ayd at this loss, hath scaped well if he be scorned and not ruined.

But to proceed: if the balance, or state of propriety in a Nation, be the effici­ent cause of Government, and the Balance being not fixed, the Govern­ment (as by the present Narrative is evinced) must remain inconstant or floting, then the process in formation of a Government, must be first by fixation of the Balance, and next by erecting such Superstructures as to the nature thereof are necessary.

CHAP. III.

FIxation of the Balance of proprie­ty, is not to be provided for but by Laws; and the Laws whereby such provision is made, are commonly called [Page 22] Agrarian Laws. Now as Govern­ments through the diverse balance of propriety are of diverse or contrarie natures, that is, Monarchical or Po­pular; so are such Laws. Monar­chy requires of the standard of pro­priety, that it be vast or great; and of Agriarian Laws, that they bar recess or diminution, at least in so much as is thereby entailed upon the honour. But Popular Government requires that her standard be moderate, and that her Agrarian bar accumulation.It is at pre­sent in more hands, but without fixation may come into fewer. In a Territory not exceeding England in revenue, if the balance be in more hands then three hundred, it is upon swaying from Monarchy; and if it be in fewer then five thousand hands, it is swaying from a Commonwealth: which as to this point may suffice at present.

CHAP. IV.

THat the Policy or Superstructures of all absolute Monarchs,The Super­structures of absolute Monarchy. more particularly of the Eastern Empires, are not only contained, but meliorated in the Turkish Government, requi­reth no farther proof then to compare them: but because such a work would not lie in a small compass, it shall suf­fice for this time to say, that such Su­perstructures of Government as are natural unto an absolute Prince, or sole Landlord of a large Territory, re­quire, for the first story, that what demeasnes he shall think fit to reserve being set apart, the rest be divided in­to horse-quarters, or Military Farmes, for life or at will, and not otherwise. And that every Tenant for every hundred pounds a year so holden,Timariots. be by condition of his tenure, obliged to [Page 24] attend his Soveraign Lord in person, in arms, and at his proper cost and charges, with one horse, so often, and so long as he shall be commanded up­on service. These among the Turkes are called Timariots.

The second Story of this building requireth,Beglerbegs that these Horse-quarters or Military Farmes, be divided by convenient Precincts or Proportions into distinct Provinces; and that each Province have one Governour or Commander in chief of the same, at the will and pleasure of his grand Sig­nior, or for three years and no longer. Such among the Turks (unless by ad­ditional honours they be called Ba­shaws or Viziers) are the Begler­begs.

Janizaries and Spa­hies.For the third Story, there must of necessity be a Mercenary Army con­sisting both of horse and foot, for the Guard of the Princes person, and for the Guard of his Empire, by keep­ing the Governours of Provinces so divided, that they be not suffered to lay their arms or heads together, or to hold correspondence or intelli­gence each with other. Which Mer­cenary Army ought not to be consti­tuted [Page 25] of such as have already contra­cted some other interest, but to con­sist of men so educated from their very childhood, as not to know that they have any other Parent, or native Country, then the Prince and his Em­pire. Such among the Turks are the foot called Janizaries, and the horse called Spahies.

The Prince accommodated with a Privy Council,The Divan and the Grand Sig­nior. consisting of such as have been Governours of Provinces, is the Top-stone. This Council a­mong the Turks is called the Divan, and this Prince the Grand Signior.

The Superstructures proper unto regulated Monarchy,The Super­structures of Regula­ted Monar­chy. or unto the Go­vernment of a Prince some three or four hundred of whose Nobility, or of whose Nobility and Clergy hold three parts in four of the Territory, must either be by his personal influ­ence upon the balance, or by vertue of orders.

If a Prince by easing his Nobility of Taxes, and feeding them with such as are extorted from the people, can so accommodate their ambition and avarice with great Offices and Com­mands, that a party flying out, he can [Page 26] over-balance and reduce them by a greater part of their own order, he may have greater power and less se­curity, as at present in France.

The safer way of this Government is by orders: and the orders proper hereunto, consist especially of an He­reditary Senate of the Nobility, ad­mitting also of the Clergy, and of a Representative of the People made up of their menial servants, or such as by tenure and for livelihood have immediate dependence upon them, as formerly in England.

An Aristocracy, or State of Nobili­ty,No such thing as pure Aristo­cracy, or pure Demo­cracy. to exclude the people, must Go­vern by a King; or to exclude a King, must Govern by the People. Nor is there without a Senate or mixture of Aristocracy, any Popular Govern­ment. Whence though for discourse sake Politicians speak of pure Aristo­cracy, and pure Democracy, there is no such thing as either in Nature, Art, or Example.

Where the people are not over-balanced by one man or by the Few,The Super­structures of Popular Govern­ment. they are not capable of any other Su­perstructures of Government, or of any other just and quiet settlement [Page 27] whatsoever, then of such only as con­sisteth of a Senate as their Counsel­lours, of themselves or their Repre­sentatives as Soveraign Lords, and of a Magistracy answerable unto the people as distributers and executio­ners of the Laws made by the people: and thus much is of absolute necessity unto any or every Government, that is or can be properly called a Com­monwealth, whether it be well or ill ordered.

But the necessary definition of a Commonwealth any thing well or­der'd, is,Definition of a well ordered Common­wealth. That it is a Government consisting of the Senate proposing, the People resolving, and the Magi­stracy executing.

Magistracy is a stile proper unto the executive part;Distinction of Magi­stracy. yet because in discourse of this kind it is hardly a­voidable, but such as are of the Pro­posing or Resolving Assemblies, will be sometime [...]prized under this name or stile, it shall be enough for excuse to say, that Magistracy may be esteemed of two kinds; the one pro­per or Executive, the other improper or Legislative.

A Senate may consist of an Heredi­tarySenat [...]s an [...] [...]. [Page 28] order, elective for life by it self, or by some Magistrate or Magistrates of the same; as the Senate of Rome consisted of the Patrician or­der thereinto eligible, first by the Consuls, and then by the Censors. A Senate may consist of Senators e­lected by the People for life, as that of Lacedemon. It may consist of Se­nators eligible by the people for terms without vacation or interval, as the Senate of Venice; or with interval, as the Senate of Athens, which also for another difference was elected by lot.

A Popular Assembly may consist of the whole people,Popular Assemblies, and their kinds. as the great Coun­cil of Venice (for the Venetians, though called in respect of their Sub­jects, Nobility, are all that free peo­ple, which is comprized in that Com­monwealth) or of a Representive, as in Israel. Again, a Representative of the people may be for life, as in the particular Cities or Soveraignties of Holland, improperly called Senates; or it may be upon Rotation, that is to say, by changes or courses, as that of Israel, and the present Representa­tive in England; it may also be by lot, as the Roman Tribes called the [Page 29] Prerogative and the Jure vocatae.

To speak of Magistrates in a Com­monwealth, and all their kinds,Supream Magi­strates, and their kinds. were to begin an endless discourse: the present I shall therefore confine to such only as may be called Supream Magistrates. The Supream Magistra­cy of a Commonwealth may be in one or more; and it may be for life, or for terms and vacations. In one e­lective by the people for life; as in the Duke of Venice, whose function is Civil and not Military. In two Hereditarily; as in the two Kings of Lacedemon, whose function was ra­ther Military then Civil. In nine annually elective by the people; as in the nine Princes or Archontes of Athens. In two annually elected by the people; as the Roman Consuls, whose power was both Military and Civil. In fine, it may be whether in one or more, for life, or for terms and vacations, as shall best suit with the occasion.

Some Commonwealths consist of distinct Soveraignties,Other dif­ferences in Common­wealths. as Switz and Holland; others are collected into one and the same Soveraignty, as most of the rest. Again, some Common­wealths [Page 30] have been upon Rotation or courses in the Representative only, as Israel. Others in the Magistracy only, as Rome: some in the Senate and in the Magistracy, as Athens and Venice. Others in some part of the Magi­stracy, and in others not; as as Lacedemon in the Ephori, and not in the Kings; and Venice not in the Duke not in the Procuratori, but in all the rest. Holland, except in the e­lection of States Provincial (which is emergent) admitteth not of any rota­tion or courses. There may be a Commonwealth admitting of Rotati­on throughout, as in the Senate, in the Representative, and in the Magistra­cy; as that proposed in Oceana.

Rotation or courses.Rotation, if it be perfect, is equal election by, and succession of the whole people unto Magistracy by terms and vacations.

Equal election may be by lot, as that of the Senate of Athens; Popular Election. by suf­frage, as that of Lacedemon; or by Balot, as that of Venice; which of all other is the most equal.

The Balott.The Balot as it is used in Venice, consisteth of a lot; whence deriveth the right of proposing, and of an [Page 31] unseen way of suffrage or of resol­ving.

From the wonderfull variety of parts and difference of mixture,The diffe­rent Genius of Common­wealths. hi­therto scarce touched, result those admirable differences that are in the constitution and Genius of Popular Governments; some being for de­fence, some for encrease; some more equal, others unequal; some turbulent and seditious, others like soft streams in perpetual tranquillity.

That which causeth innate sedition in a Commonwealth, is inequality;The cause of sedition in a Common­wealth. as in Rome, where the Senate opprest the people. But if a Commonwealth be perfectly equal, she is void of sedition, and hath attained unto perfection, as being void of all internal causes of dissolution.

An equal Commonwealth is a Go­vernment founded upon a balance which is perfectly Popular,Definition of as equal Common­wealth. and well fixed by a suitable Agrarian; and which from the balance through the free suffrage of the people given by the Balot, amounteth in the Super­structures unto a Senate debating and proposing, a Representative of the people resolving, and a Magistracy ex­ecuting [Page 32] each of these three orders▪ being upon courses or Rotation; that is, elected for certain terms, enjoyning like intervals.

The diffe­rence be­tween Laws and Orders.Such constitutions in a Govern­ment as regard the frame or Model of it, are called Orders; and such things as are enacted by the Legislative or­ders, are called Laws.

To undertake the binding of a Prince from invading liberty, and yet not to introduce the whole orders necessary unto Popular Government, is to undertake a flat contradiction, or plain impossibility.

Hazard through the want of principles.A People or Assembly not discer­ning of true principles, give least cre­dit unto the best orders, and so come to cast themselves upon men: for where orders are not credited, there men must be trusted; and where men are trusted, they find themselves so well, that they are either for bring­ing in a Commonwealth by degrees, or not at all. The desire of bringing in a Commonwealth by degrees, ari­seth from want of consideration, that the whole of a Commonwealth, as to charge or trouble is less then the half. He who hath a journey to go, doth not [Page 33] choose to have but half a bridle, or but one boot or stirrup, though these be fewer things, and come but unto half the charge; because this would but necessitate unto more things, and more chargeable or dangerous things.

CHAP. I.

SEeing it hath been sufficiently proved, That Empire follow­eth the nature of propriety, that the kind of Empire or Govern­ment dependeth upon the kind of Di­stribution (except in small Countries) of Land; and that where the Balance in propriety hath not been fixed, the kind or nature of the Government hath been floating: it is good reason that in the proposition of a Common­wealth, we begin with fixation of the Balance in propriety; and this being no otherwise to be done then by some such Laws as have been commonly called Agrarian, it is proposed,

That every one holding above two 1 thousand pounds a year in Land ly­ing within the proper Territory of the Commonwealth, Agrarian Laws. leave the said [Page 24] Land equally divided among his sons; or else so neer equally, that there re­main unto the eldest of them not a­bove two thousand pounds a year in Land so lying. That this Proposi­tion be so understood, as not to con­cern any parent having no more then one son, but the next heir onely that shall have more sons; in such sort, as nothing be hereby taken from any man, or from his posterity, but that fatherly affection be at all points ex­tended as formerly, save onely that it be with more piety, and less partiali­ty. And that the same Proposition, in such families where there are no sons, concern the daughter or daughters in like manner.

2 That no daughter being neither heir nor co-heir, have above fifteen hundred pounds in portion, or for her preferment in marriage. That any daughter being an Orphant, and ha­ving seven hundred pounds or upward in portion, may charge the State with it. That the State being so charged, be bound to manage the portion of such Orphant for the best, either by due payment of the interest of the same; or if it be desired, by way of [Page 25] Annuity for life, at the rate of one hundred pounds a year, for every seven hundred pounds so received. The manner whereof being elsewhere shewn, is not needful to be repea­ted.

That these Propositions bar re­source of a Monarchical Nobility, is their peculiar end: wherefore that this should hold weight of an Obje­ction in a popular Balance already introduced through the failure of a Monarchical Nobility, or through a level made not by the people, but by the Kings or themselves, were prepo­sterous. Yet upon this score (for I see no other) is there such Animosity a­gainst like Laws, that wise men have judged it an Indiscretion in such as are affected unto popular Govern­ment, not to temporize in this point, at least till a Commonwealth were first introduced. To which judgment I am by no means inclining: First, be­cause the whole stream of this kind of Government, is so clear and pellu­cid, as abhorreth to have any thing in the bottom that may not appear at the very top. Secondly, because an A­grarian, not brought in with the in­troduction [Page 26] of a Commonwealth, was never yet known to be brought in af­ter the introduction of a Common­wealth. And thirdly, because the change of Balances in States through the want of fixation, hath been so suddain, that between the reign of Henry the seventh, and that of Queen Elizabeth, being under fifty year, the English Balance of Monarchical, be­came popular; and that of Rome, be­tween the Lives of Scipio and of Ti­berius Gracchus, being also under fifty years, of Popular became Monarchi­cal. Nevertheless, if there remain any cure of Animosity that may be safe, it must be prudent: And such a cure (if we be not so abandoned un­to meer phansie, as thereunto to sa­crifice all prudence) there may be, in the addition of this clause.

Additional Clause unto the Agrari­an. That no Agrarian Law hereby gi­ven to this Commonwealth, or to be hereafter given unto the same, or any Province of the same, be understood to be otherwise binding then to the Ge­neration to come, or to the Children to be born seven years after the enacting of the Law.

Upon the addition of this clause, it [Page 27] may be safely said of these Agrarian Laws, That they concern not any man living; and for posterity, it is well known, that to enact a Law, is no more in their regard, then to com­mend a thing to their choyce, seeing they having the will, can no more be devested of the power to repeal any Law enacted by their Ancestors, then we are of repealing such Laws as have been enacted by ours.

To this it may be objected, That Agrarian Laws being once enacted, must have brought Estates unto the standard of the same, before posterity can come into the capacity to judge of them. But this is the onely means whereby posterity can come unto a true capacity to judge of them: First, because they will have had experience of the Laws which they are to judge of: And secondly, because they will be void of all such imaginary interests as might corrupt their judgment, and do now certainly corrupt ours.

The Balance of the Commonwealth of Israel, The first Pa­rallel. through the Distri [...]urion of Lands at the introduction of the same, became popular; and becoming po­pular, was fixed by the Law for the [Page 28] Jubilee.Deut. 25.28. That which was sold, shall re­main in the hands of them that bought it till the year of Jubilee; and in the Jubilee it shall go out, and he shall return to his possession. The ways in Israel, and in the Commonwealth proposed, where the popular Balance is not made but found, are divers; but the Agrari­an Laws in each, as to the end, which is preservation of the Balance, are of like effect.

To rise thus from true foundations unto proper superstructures, the first step from the Balance thus fixed into the Orders of a Commonwealth, is no otherwise to be taken, then by certain Distributions or Divisions of the Peo­ple, whereof some are to be personal, and some local.

The first personal division of a Peo­ple, is into Freemen and Servants.Freemen and Servants. Freemen are such as have wherewith­al to live of themselves; and Servants, such as have not. This division there­fore is not constitutive, but naturally inherent in the Balance; nor, seeing all Government is in the direction of the Balance, is it possible for the super­structures of any to make more Free­men then are such by the nature of the [Page 29] Balance, or by their being able to live of themselves.

All that could in this matter be done, even by Moses himself,The second Parallel. Levit. 25.29. is con­tained in this proviso. If thy brother that dwelleth by thee be waxen poore, and be sold unto thee, thou shalt not compel him to serve as a bond-servant: but as an hired servant, and a sojour­ner he shall be with thee, and shall serve thee unto the year of Jubilee. And then shall he depart from thee, both he, and his children with him, and shall return unto his own family, and unto the possession of his fathers shall he re­turn.

The nature of riches considered, this division (I say) into freemen and servants, is not properly constitutive, but as it were natural. To come unto such divisions as are both personal and constitutive, it is proposed;

That all citizens, that is, free­men, 3 or such as are not servants, be distributed into horse and foot. Horse and foot. That such of them as have one hundred pounds a yeare in lands, goods or mo­ny, or above that proportion, be of the horse; and all such as have under that proportion, be of the foot.

4. Elders and Youth. That all Elders or freemen being thirty yeares of age, or upwards, be capable of civil administration; and that the Youth, or such freemen as are betwéen eighteen years of age and thirty, be not capable of civil ad­ministration, but of military only; in such manner as shall follow in the military part of this Model.

Now besides personal divisions, it is, in order unto a Commonwealth, of necessity, that there be some such as are Local. For these therefore it is proposed;

5. Precinct of the Parish. That the whole native or proper territory of the Commonwealth, be cast, with as much exactnesse as can be convenient, into known and fixed precincts or parishes.

6. Parochial Congrega­tions and Deputies. That the Elders resident in each parish, annually assemble in the same; as for example, upon munday next en­suing the last of Dec. That they then and there, elect out of their own num­ber, every fifth man, or one man out of every five, to be for the terme of the year ensuing, a deputy of that parish; and that the first and second so elected, be overséers, or presidents, for the re­gulating of all parochial congregati­ons, [Page 31] whether of the elders or of the youth, during the terme for which they were elected.

That so many parishes lying nea­rest together, 7. Precinct of the Hun­dred. whose Deputies shall amount to one hundred or thereabout, be cast into one precinct called the Hundred. And that in each precinct called the Hundred, there be a town, village, or place appointed to be the Capital of the same.

That the parochial Deputies ele­cted throughout the Hundred, 8. Assembly or master of the Hun­dred. assemble annually, for example, upon munday next ensuing the last of Jan. at the Capital of their Hundred. That they then and there elect out of the horse of their number, one Iustice of the peace, one Iury-man, one Captain, one Ensigne: and out of the foot of their number, one other Iury-man, one high-Constable, &c.

Though our Justices of peace have not been annual, yet that they may so be, is apparent, in that the High Sheriffs, whose office is of greater dif­ficulty, have alwayes been annual: seeing therefore that they may be an­nual, that so they ought in this admi­nistration to be, will appear, where [Page 32] they come to be constitutive of such courts, as should they consist of a stan­ding Magistracy, would be against the nature of a Commonwealth. But the precincts hitherto being thus stated, it is p [...]posed,

9. Precinct of the Tribe. That every twenty Hundreds, ly­ing nearest, and most conveniently together, be cast into one Tribe. That the whole territory being after this manner cast into Tribes, some town, village, or place be appointed unto every Tribe for the Capital of the same. And that these three pre­cincts, that is, the Parish, the Hun­dred, and the Tribe, whether the Deputies thenceforth annually cho­sen in the Parishes or Hundreds, come to increase or diminish, remain firm and inalterable for ever, save onely by Act of Parliament.

These divisions, or the like, both personal and local, are that in a well-ordered Commonwealth, which staire, are in a good house; not that staires in themselves are desireable, but that without them there is no getting into the chambers. The whole matter of cost and paines required unto the in­troduction of a like Model, lyeth [Page 33] onely in the first architecture, or buil­ding of these staires; that is, in stating of these three precincts: which done, they land you naturally and neces­sarily into all the roomes of this fa­brick. For the just number of Tribes into which a territory thus cast may fall, it is not very easie to be guessed; yet because for the carrying on of dis­course, it is necessary to pitch upon some certainty, I shall presume that the number of the Tribes thus stated, amounts unto fifty; and that the number of the Parochial deputies an­nually elected in each Tribe, amount to two thousand: be the deputies more or fewer, by the alterations which may happen in the progresse of time, it disordereth nothing. Now to ascend by these staires into the upper roomes of this building, it is propo­sed,

That the Deputies elected in the several Parishes, 10. Assembly or Muster of the Tribe. together with their Magistrates, and other officers, both civil and Military elected in their several Hundreds, assemble or muster annually; for example, upon munday next ensuing the last of Feb. at the Capital of their Tribe.

How the troopes and companies of the Deputies, with their Military of­ficers, or commanders thus assembled, may without expence of time, be forthwith distributed into one uni­form and orderly body, hath been elsewhere shewn, and is not needfull to be repeated. For their work, which at this meeting will require two dayes, it is proposed,

11. Magistrates of the Tribe. That the whole body thus assem­bled, upon the first day of the assem­bly, elect out of the Horse of their number one High Sheriff, one Lieute­nant of the Tribe, one Custos Rotu­lorum, one Conductor, and two Cen­sors. That the High Sheriff be com­mander in chief, the Lieutenant commander in the second place, and the Conductor in the third, of this band or squadron. That the Custos Rotulorum be muster-master, and kéep the rolls. That the Censors be governors of the Ballot. And that the term of these magistracies be annual.

These being thus elected, it is proposed;

12. The prero­gative Troop. That the Magistrates of the Tribe, that is to say, the High She­riff, Lieutenant, Custos Rotulorum, [Page 35] the Censors and the Conductor, toge­ther with the magistrates and offi­cers of the Hundreds, that is to say, the twenty Iustices of the Peace, the forty Iury-men, the twenty high Constables, be one troop, or one troop and one company apart, called the Prerogative troop or company. That this troop bring in and assist the Iu­stices of Assize, hold the quarter ses­sions in their several capacities, and performe their other functions as for­merly.

By this meanes the Common­wealth at the introduction, may im­brace the law as it stands, that is, unreformed; which is to the greatest advantage of like reformations: for to reform laws before the introdu­ction of the government, which is to shew unto what the laws in re­formation are to be brought or fit­ted, is impossible. But these magi­strates of the Hundreds and Tribes, being such whereby the Parliament is to govern the nation, this is a re­gard in which they ought to be fur­ther capable of such orders and instru­ctions as shall thereunto be requisite; for which cause it is proposed,

13. The Phy­larch. That the Magistrates of the Tribe, that is to say, the high Sheriff, Lieu­tenant, Custos Rotulorum, the Cen­sors and the Conductor, together with the twenty Iustices elected at the Hundreds, be a Court for the Go­vernment of the Tribe called The Phylarch; and that this Court pro­ceed, in all matter of Government, as shall from time to time be directed by Act of Parliament.

By these Courts the Commonwealth will be furnished with true Chanels, whereby at leasure to turn the Law into that which is sufficiently known to have heen her primative course, and into perfect reformation by degrees, and without violence. For as the cor­ruption of our Law deriveth from an Art inabled to improve her private interest, or from the Law upon the Bench and the Jury at the Bar; so the reformation of our Law must come from disabling her as an Art to improve her private interest, or to a Jury upon the Bench, and the Law at the Bar, as in Venice.

The third Parallel. Deut. 16.18. Judges and Officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates which the Lord thy God giveth thee throughout thy Tribes, [Page 37] and they shall judge the people with just judgment. These Courts, whose Ses­sion-house was in the Gates of eve­ [...]y City,Book 2. were shewn each of them to [...]ave consisted of twenty three Elders, which were as a Jury upon the Bench, giving sentence by plurality of votes, and under a kinde of appeal unto the seventy Elders or Senate of Israel, as was also shewn in the second Book.

This or the like, by all example, and beyond any controversie, hath been and is the natural way of Judicature in Commonwealths. The Phylarches, with a Court or two of Appeal, eli­gible out of the Senate and the Peo­ple, are at any time with ease, and with small alteration, to be cast upon a Tri­ennial Rotation: which for the rest, proceeding after the manner of the Venetian Quarancies, will be in this case perfect Orders.

To return: The first days Election at the Tribe, being as hath been shewn, it is proposed,

That the Squadron of the Tribe, 14. Knights and Burgesses. upon the second day or their assembly, elect two Knights and three Burges­ses out of the Horse of their number, and four other Burgesses out of the [Page 38] Foot of their number. That each Knight upon Election forthwith make Oath of Allegiance unto the Commonwealth; or refusing such Oath, the next Competitor in Electi­on to the same Magistracy, making the said Oath, be the Magistrate: the like for the Burgesses. That the Knights thus sworn, have Session in the Senate for the term of three years; and that the Burgesses thus sworn, be of the Prerogative Tribe, or repre­sentative of the People for the like term.

Now whereas this Proposition is sufficient for the perpetuation of the Senate and the Assembly of the Peo­ple, being once instituted, but not sufficient for the full and perfect In­stitution of them; it necessitateth the addition in this place, not of a perma­nent order, but of an expedient for the first years Election onely; which may be this:

Expedient for the first years Ele­ction. That for the full and perfect Insti­tution of the Assemblies mentioned, the Squadron of the Tribe in the first year of the Commonwealth, elect two Knights for the term of one year, two other Knights for the term of two years; and [Page 39] lastly, two Knights more for the term of three years: the like for the Bur­gesses of the Horse first, and then for those of the Foot.

By this expedient, the Senate in fifty Tribes is constituted of three hundred Knights or Senators, whereof one hundred through expiration of their terms, come annually to fall; and another hundred at the same time to enter. The like for the Preroga­tive Tribe, or Assembly of the people, which consisting in the whole of one thousand and fifty, suffers the like al­teration in one third part, or in the yearly exchange of one hundred and fifty Burgesses: By which means the Motion or Rotation of these Assem­blies is Annual, Triennial, and Perpe­tual. For the full dispatch of the foregoing Elections, there remaineth but one Proposition more, which is this:

That a Magistrate or Officer e­lected at the Hundred, 15. Proviso. be thereby bar­red frm being elected a Magistrate of the Tribe, or of the first days E­lection: that no former Election whatsoever bar a man of the second days Election at the Tribe, or to be [Page 40] chosen a Knight or Burgess. That a man being chosen a Knight or Bur­gess, who before was chosen a Magi­strate or Officer of the Hudnred or Tribe, delegate his former Office or Magistracy in the Hundred or the Tribe, to any other Deputy, being no Magistrate nor Officer, and being of the same Hunred, and of the same Order, that is, of the Horse or of Foot respectively. That the whole and e­very part of the foregoing Orders for Election in the Parishes, the Hun­dreds and the Tribes, be holding and inviolate upon such penalties in case of failure, as shall hereafter be provi­ded by Act of Parliament against any Parish, Hundred, Tribe, Deputy or Person so attending.

Without some such Provision as is contained in the former part of this Proposition, men would be inconveni­ently bar'd of preferment, or the Tribe obliged to return unto the Ballot; and so to spend more time for trifles, then is required by their business.

The fourth Parallel. 2 Chro. 27.The Representative of Israel col­lected monethly by the two thousand out of each Tribe, if we consider what Method must have been used in like [Page 41] Elections, is such as may infer, first, that there were sub-divisions unto that end in each Tribe, perhaps of the nature of our Hundreds and Parishes. Secondly, that there were qualificati­ons in those Elections as to the Patri­archs or chief Fathers, and as to the People with their Captains of thou­sands and Captains of hundreds: which is enough thus far to embrace and encourage the foregoing Propositi­ons.

The Senate, and the Congregation or Representative of the People, are in every Commonwealth the main Or­ders: the stairs or degrees of ascent unto these, being now mounted, it re­mains that I lead unto the rooms of State, or the Assemblies themselves; which shall be performed, first, by shewing their frame; and next, by shewing their uses or functions. To bring you first into the Senate, it is proposed,

That the Knights of the Annual Election in the Tribes, 16. Frame of The Senate. take their places on Munday next ensuing the last of March, in the Senate. That the like number of Knights, whose Session determineth at the same time [Page 42] recede. That every Knight or Se­nator be paid out of the publick Re­venue quarterly, one hundred twenty five pounds during his term of Ses­sion, and be obliged to fit in purple Robes.

17. Senatorian Magistrates That annually upon reception of the new Knights, the Senate proceed unto Election of new Magistrates and Counsellors. That for Magi­strates they elect one General, one Speaker, and two Censors, each for the term of one year; these promis­cuously: and that they elect one Com­missioner of the great Seal, and one Commissioner of the Treasury, each for the term of three years, and out of the new Knights onely.

This Proposition supposeth the Commissioners of the Seal and those of the Treasury to consist each of three, wheeled by the annual Election of one into each Order, upon a triennial Rotation. For farther explanation of the Senatorian Magistracies, it is pro­posed,

18. The Gene­ral sitting and the Speaker. That the General and Speaker, as Consuls of the Commonwealth, and Presidents of the Senate, be, during the term of their Magistracy, paid [Page 43] quarterly five hudred pounds: that the ensignes of these Magistracies be a sword born before the General, and a Mace before the Speaker: that they be obliged to wear ducal Robes; and that what is said of the General in this Proposition, be understood onely of the General sitting, and not of the General marching.

That the General sitting, 19. The general marching. in case he be commanded to march, receive field-pay; and that a new General be forthwith elected by the Senate to suc­ceed him in the house, with all the Rights Ensignes and Emoluments of the General sitting: and this so of­ten as one or more Generals are marching.

That the three Commissioners of the great Seal, 20. Commissio­ners of the Seal and of Treasury. and the three Com­missioners of the Treasury, using their Ensignes and Habit, and per­forming their other Functions as for­merly, be paid quarterly unto each of them three hundred seventy five pounds.

That the Censors be each of them Chancellour of one Vniversity by vertue of their Election: 21. The Censors. that they govern the Ballot, that they be Pre­sidents [Page 44] of the Council for Religion, that each have a silver wand for the Ensigne of his Magistracy, that each be paid quarterly three hundred se­venty five pounds, and be obliged to wear scarlet Robes.

22. The Signory That the General sitting, the Spea­ker, and the six Commissioners above­said, be the Signory of this Common­wealth.

This for the Senatorian Magistrates: for Senatorian Councils, it is propo­sed,

23. Council of State. That there be a Council of State consisting of fifteen Knights, five out of each Order or Election; and that the same be perpetuated by the annu­al Election of five out of the new Knights, or last elected into the Se­nate.

That there be a Council for Reli­gion consisting of twelve Knights, 24. Council of Religion, of Trade. four out of each Order, and perpetua­ted by the annual Election of four out of the Knights last elected into the Senate. That there be a Council for Trade, consisting of a like number, elected and perpetuated in the same manner.

25. Council of War. That there be a Council of War, [Page 45] not elected by the Senate, but elected by the Council of State out of them­selves. That this Council of War consist of nine Knights, three out of each Order, and be perpetuated by the annual Election of three, out of the last Knights elected into the Council of State.

That in case the Senate add nine Knights more out of their own num­ber unto the Council of War, 26. The Dicta­tor. the said Council be understood by such additi­on to be Dictator of the Common­wealth, for the term of three moneths and no longer, except by farther order of the Senate the said Dictatorian power be prolonged for a like term.

That the Signory have Session and Suffrage, 27. Proposers general. with right also joyntly or severally to propose both in the Se­nate, and in all Senatorian Councils.

That each of the three Orders or Divisions of Knights in each Sena­torian Council, 28. Provosts, or particular Proposers. elect one provost for the term of one week; and that any two Provosts of the same Council so elected, may propose unto their respe­ctive Council, and not otherwise.

That some fair room or rooms well furnished and attended, 29. Academy. be allowed at [Page 46] the States charge for a free and open Academy unto all comers at some convenient hour or hours towards the evening. That this Academy be governed according unto the Rules of good breeding, or civil conversation, by some or all of the Proposers; and that in the same it be lawful for any man by word of mouth or by writing, in jest or in earnest, to propose unto the Proposers.

From the frame or structure of these Councils, I should pass unto their Functions; but that besides annual E­lections, there will be some biennial, and others emergent; in which re­gard it is proposed, first, for biennial Elections,

30. Embassa­dors in or­dinary. That for Embassadorus in ordinary, there be four Residences; as France, Spain, Venice and Constantinople: that every Resident upon Election of a new Embassadour in ordinary, re­move to the next Residence in the Order nominated, till having served in them all, he return home. That upon Munday next ensuing the last of November, there be every second year elected by the Senate some fit person, being under thirty five years [Page 47] of age, and not of the Senate nor of the popular assembly: that the party so elected, repair upon Munday next ensuing the last of March following, as Embassadour in ordinary unto the Court of France, and there reside for the term of two years, to be computed from the first of April next ensuing his Election. That every Embassa­dour in ordinary be allowed three thousand pounds a year during the term of his Residences; and that if a Resident come to dye, there be an ex­traordinary Election into his Resi­dence for his term, and for the remain­der of his removes and progress.

That all emergent Elections be made by Scrutiny, that is, 31. Emergent Elections. by a Coun­cil, or by Commissioners proposing, and by the Senate resolving in the manner following: That all field-Officers be proposed by the Council of War: that all Embassadours extra­ordinary be proposed by the Council of State: that all Iudges and Ser­geants at Law be proposed by the Commissioners of the great Seal: that all Barons and Officers of trust in the Exchequer, be proposed by the Commissioners of the Treasury: and [Page 48] that such as are thus proposed, and ap­proved by the Senate, be hedl lawful­ly elected.

These Elections being thus dispatch­ed, I come unto the Functions of the Senate; and first unto those of the Senatorian Councils: for which it is proposed,

32. Function of the Senato­rian Coun­cils. That the cognizance of all matter of State, to be considered, or Law to be enacted, whether it be Provincial or National, Domestick or Forraign, appertain unto the Council of State. That such Affairs of either kinde, as they shall judge to require more secre­sie, be remitted by this Council, and appertain unto the Council of War, being for that end a select part of the same. That the cognizance and pro­tection both of the National Religion, and of the Liberty of Conscience e­qually established in this Nation, af­ter the manner to be shewn in the Re­ligious Part of this Model, appertain unto the Council for Religion. That all matter of traffick, and regulation of the same appertain unto the Coun­cil for Trade. That in the exercise of these several Functions, which natu­rally are Senatorian or Authoritative [Page 49] only, no Council assume any other power, then such only as shall be esta­ted upon the same by Act of Parlia­ment.

That what shall be proposed unto the Senate by any one or more of the Signory or Proposers general; 33. Function of the Senate. Or what ever was proposed by any two of the Provosts or particular Propo­sers unto their respective Council, and upon debate at that Council shall come to be proposed by the same unto the Senate, be necessarily debatable and debated by the Senate. That in all cases wherein power is derived unto the Senate by Law made or by Act of Parliament, the result of the Senate be ultimate: that in all cases of Law to be made, or not already provided for by Act of Parliament, as War and Peace, levy of Men or Money, or the like, the result of the Senate be not ultimate. That what­soever in resolved by the Senate upon a case wherein their result is not ulti­mate, be proposed by the Senate un­to the Prerogative Tribe or represen­tative of the people; except only in cases of such spéed or secrecy, wherein the Senate shall judge the necessary [Page 50] slowness or openness in this way of proceeding to be of detriment or dan­ger unto the Commonwealth.

34. Function the Dictator. That if upon the motion or propo­sition of a Council or Proposer Ge­neral, the Senate add nine Knights, promiscuously chosent out of their own number, unto the Council of War; the same Council as thereby made Dictator, have power of life and death, as also to enact Laws in all such cases of sped or secrecy, for and during the term of three moneths and no longer, except upon new order from the Se­nate. And that all Laws enacted by the Dictator, be good and valid for the term of one year and no longer; except the same be proposed by the Se­nate, and resolved by the people.

This Dictatorian Council (as may already appear) consisteth fundamen­tally of the Signory, and additionally of nine Knights more emergently chosen, and of the four Tribunes of course, as will appear when I come to speak of that Magistracy. Now if Dictatorian power be indeed formi­dable, yet this in the first place is re­markable, that the Council here offe­red for a Dictator, is of far safer con­stitution, [Page 51] then what among us, hither­to hath been offered for a Common­wealth; as namely, a Parliament, and a Council in the interim. For here is no interim, but all the Councils of the Commonwealth not only remaining, but remaining in the exercise of all their functions, without the abatement of any; speed and secrecy belonging not unto any of their functions, but to that only of the Dictator. And if this Dictatorian Council have more in it of a Commonwealth, then hath hi­therto among us been either practised or offered, by what argument can it be pretended that a Commonwealth is so imperfect through the necessity of such an order, that she must needs borrow of Monarchy, seeing every Monarchy that hath any senate, As­sembly or Council in it, thereby most apparently borroweth more of a Commonwealth, then there is to be found of Monarchy in this Council?

To dismiss this whole Senate with one Parallel:The fifth Parallel. The institution of the se­venty Elders in Israel (as was shewn in the second book) for their number related unto an accident, and a custom thereupon anciently introduced. The [Page 52] accident was, that the sons of Jacob who went into Aegypt were so many; these first governing their families by natural right, came as those families encreased, to be for their number re­tained and continued in tha nature of a Senatorian Council, while the people were yet in Egyptian bondage. So we having had no like custom, have as to the number no like inducement. Again, the Territory of Canaan a­mounted not to a fourth of our Coun­try; and in government we are to fit our selves unto our own proportions. Nor can a Senate consisting of four Senators, be capable of so many distri­butions as a Senate consisting of more. Yet we finde in the restitution of the Sanhedrim by Jehoshaphat, 2 Chr. 19.11. that there was Amariah, chief in all matters of the Lord, that is, in judgment upon the laws which having been pro­posed by God, were more peculiarly his matters; and Zebadiah chief in all the Kings matters, that is, in political debates concerning Government, or War and Peace.Judg. 25.11. v. 5, 11. Lastly, When the children of Ammon made war against Israel, the people of Israel made Jepth­tha not only captain, but head over them. [Page 53] So the Judge of Israel, being no stan­ding Magistrate, but elected upon e­mergences, supplieth the Parallel as to Dictatorian power in a Common­wealth.

Debate is the natural parent of re­sult; whence the Senate throughout Latine Authors is called Fathers, and throughout Greek Authors the com­pellation of a popular assembly is Men; as Men of Athens, Men of Co­rinth, Men of Lacedemon: nor is this custom heathen only, seeing these compellations are used unto the Se­nate and the people of the Jews,Act. 7.2. & 22.1. Luke throughout is perfectly well skilled in the cu­stoms of Common­wealths. not only by Steven, but also by Paul, where they begin their speeches in this man­ner: Men, brethren, and Fathers. To come then from the Fathers unto the People, Popular Assembly or Prero­gative Tribe, it is proposed,

That the Burgesses of the annual election returned by the Tribes, 35. Fabrick of the Preroga­tive Tribe. en­ter into the Prerogative Tribe upon Munday next ensuing the last of March; and that the like number of Burgesses whole term is expired, re­cede at the same time. That the Burgesses thus entered elect unto themselves out of their own number, [Page 54] two of the horse; one to be Captain, and the other to be Cornet of the same: and two of the foot; one to be Captain, the other to be Ensigne of the same, each for the term of three years. That these Officers being thus elect­ed, the whole Tribe or Assembly pro­ceed to the election of four annual Ma­gistrates; two out of the foot, to be Tribunes of the foot; and two out of the horse, to be Tribunes of the horse. That the Tribunes be Commanders of this Tribe in chief, so far as it is a Military body, and Presidents of the same as it is a civil Assembly. And lastly, that this whole Tribe be paid weekly as followeth. Vnto each of the Tribunes of the horse, seven pound. Vnto each of the Tribunes of foot, six pound. Vnto each of the Cap­tains of horse, five pound. Vnto each of the Captains of foot, four pound. Vnto each of the Cornets, three pound. Vn­to each of the Ensignes, two pound seven shillings. Vnto every horse­man two pound, and to every one of the foot one pound ten shillings.

For the salaries of the Senate and the People together, they amount not unto three hundred thousand pounds [Page 55] a year; which is cheaper by neer two parts in three, then the chief Magi­stracy ever did or can otherwise cost: for if you give nothing (omnia dat qui justa negat) men will be their own carvers: But to proceed, it is proposed,

That inferiour Officers, 36. Officers of Officers. as Cap­tains, Cornets, Ensigns, be only for the Military discipline of the Tribe. That the Tribunes have session in the Senate without suffrage; that they have session in the Dictatorian Council so often as it is created by the Senate of course, and with suf­frage. That they be Presidents of the Court in all cases to be judged by the people.

That Peculate or defraudation of the publick, 37. Appeal un­to the peo­ple. all cases tending to the subversion of the Government, be tri­able by this Representative; and that there be an appeal unto the same in all causes, and from all Magistrates, Courts and Councils, whether Nati­onal or Provincial.

This Judicatory may seem large:The sixth Parallel. but thus the Congregation of Israel consisting of four hundred thousand, judged the Tribe of Benjamin. Judg. 20. Halicar. Thus all the Roman Tribes judged Gorila­nus. [Page 56] And thus Duke Loradano was tryed by the great Council of Venice, Janotti. consisting yet of about two thou­sand.

This is as much as I have to say severally of the Senate and the People; but their main Functions being joynt, as they make one Parliament, it is farther propo­sed,

38. The main Function of the Senate. That the right of debate, as also of proposing to the people, be wholly and onely in the Senate, without any power at all of result not derived from the people.

39. The main Function of the Preroga­tive Tribe. That the power of result be wholly and onely in the people, without any right at all of debate.

That the Senate having debated and agreed upon a Law to be propo­sed, 40. Promulga­tion. cause promulgation of the same tobe made for the space of six weeks before proposition; that is, cause the Law to be printed and published so long before it is to be proposed.

41. Manner of Proposition. That promulgation being made, the Signory demand of the Tribunes being present in the Senate, an As­sembly of the people. That the Tri­bunes upon such demand of the Sig­nory [Page 57] or of the Senate, be obliged to assemblie the Prerogative Tribe in Arms by sound of Trumpet, with Drums beating, and Colours flying, in any Town, Field or Market-place being not above six miles distant, up­on the day and at the hour appointed, except the meeting through inconve­nience of the weather, or the like, be prorogned by consent of the Signory and the Tribunes. That the Pre­rogative Tribe being assembled ac­cordingly, the Senate propsoe to them by two or more of the Senatorian Ma­gistrates thereunto appointed, at the first promulgation of the Law. That the Proposers for the Senate open unto the people the occasion, motives and reasons of the Law to be propo­sed; and the same being done, put it by distinct Clauses unto the Ballot of the people. That if any materi­al Clause or Clauses be rejected by the people, they be reviewed by the Senate, altered and proposed, if they think fit, to the third time, but no of­tener.

That what is thus proposed by the Senate, and resolved by the people, 42. Act of Par­liament. be the Law of the Land, and no other, [Page 58] except as in the case reserved unto the Dictatorian Council.

The seventh Parallel.The Congregation of the People being monethly, and the Representan­tive proposed being annual and trien­nial, they are each upon Courses or Rotation: the Congregation of Is­rael consisting of twenty four thou­sand, in which the whole number of the Princes of the Tribes, and of the Princes of the Families, amounting not, I might say, unto one hundred, but will say unto one thousand; it follows, that the lower sort in the Congregation of Israel, held propor­tion unto the better sort, above twen­ty to one. Whereas in the Repre­sentative proposed, the lower sort hold proportion unto the better sort but six to four; and that popular Congre­gation where the lower sort hold but six to four, is by far the most Aristo­cratical that is or ever was in any well-ordered Commonwealth, except Ve­nice: if you will have that Gentry to be all of one sort, or if you allow them to be of a better and of a mea­ner sort, not Venice excepted. The Sanhedrim made no Law without the [Page 59] People; nor may the Senate in the Model: but the Sanhedrim with the Congregation, might make Laws;Ezra 10.8. so may the Senate in the Model, with the Representative of the People. Last­ly, as the Congregation in Israel was held either by the Princes in Person, with their Staves and Standards of the Camp, or by the four and twenty thousand in Military Discipline; so the Representative proposed is in the na­ture of a Regiment.

Bate me Venice, where there is a shadow, and but a shadow of Law made by the Senate (for the Sove­raign power is undenyably in the great Council) and Athens, where a Law made by the Senate was cur­rent, as a probationer for one year be­fore it was proposed unto the people; there neither is nor hath been any such thing in a Commonwealth as Law made by the Senate. That the Senate should have power to make Laws, re­duceth the Government unto a single Council; and Government by a sin­gle Council, if the Council be of the Many, is Anarchy, as in the Assem­blies of the Roman people by Tribes, which always shook, and at length ru­ined [Page 60] that Commonwealth: Or if the Council be of the Few, is Oligarchy, as that of Athens, consisting of the four hundred, who nevertheless pre­tended to propose unto five thousand, though they did not. Of which, saith Thucydides, Thucy. Lib. 8. This was indeed the form pretended in words by the four hundred: But the most of them, through private ambition, fell upon that by which an O­ligarchy, made out of a Democracy, is chiefly overthrown; for at once they claimed every one not to be equal, but to be far the chief. Anarchy, or a single Council consisting of the Many, is e­ver tumultuous, and doth ill even while it means well. But Oligarchy, seldom meaning well, is a faction, wherein each one at strife to make himself, or some other from whom he hopeth for advantage, mars all. There is in a Commonwealth no other cure of these, then that the Anarchy have a Council of some few well chosen and elected by themselves to advise them; which Council so instituted, is the Senate. Or that the Oligarchy have a popular Representative to ba­lance it; which curing both tumult in the rash and heady people, and all [Page 61] those corruptions which cause facti­ousness in the sly and subtile Few, a­mout unto the proper superstructures of a well-ordered Commonwealth; as to return unto the example of the Oligarchy in Athens, where the four hundred, whose reign being very short, had been as seditious, were deposed, and the Soveraignty decreed to a po­pular Council of five thousand, with a Senate of four hundred annually e­lective upon Coursers or Rotation. Of this, saith Thucydides, Lib. 8. Now first (at least in my time) the Athenians seem to have ordered their State aright, it consisting of a moderate temper both of the Few and the Many. And this was the first thing that after so many mis-fortunes made the City again to raise her head. But we in England are not apt to believe, that to decree the Soveraignty unto thousands, were the way to make a City or a Nation reco­ver of wounds, or to raise her head. We have a loathing, we are sick of such thoughts. An Assembly of the People Soveraign! Nay and an As­sembly of the People consisting in the major vote of the lower sort! Why sure it must be a dull, an unskilful [Page 62] thing. But so is the Touchstone in a Goldsmiths Shop, a dull thing, and altogether unskilled in the Trade; yet without this, would even the Master be deceived. And certain it is, that a well-ordered Assembly of the Peo­ple is as true an Index of what in Go­vernment is good or great, as any Touchstone is of Gold.

A council, especially if of loose electi­on, having not only the debate, but the result also, is capable of influence from without, of interest from within: there may be a formed, a prejudicated party will haste or cry you from the debate unto the question, and precipitate you upon the result: whereas if it had no power of result, there could remain un­to the same no more then debate only, without any byas upon, or diversion of such debate from maturity; In which maturity of unbyassed debate, lyeth the final cause of the Senate, and the whole light that can be given unto a people. But when this is done, if your resolving assembly be not such as can imbibe or contract no other inte­rest then that only of the whole peo­ple, all again is lost: for the result of all assemblies goeth principally upon [Page 63] that which they conceive to be their own interest. But how an assembly upon rotation, consisting of one thou­sand, where the vote is six to four in the lower sort, should be capable of any other interest then that only of the whole people by which they are orderly elected, hath never yet been, nor I beleeve ever will be shewn. In like distribution therefore of debate and result, consisteth the highest my­stery of Popular Government, and in­deed the supream law, wherein is con­tained not only the liberty, but the safety of the people.

For the remainder of the civil part of this Model, which is now but small, it is farther proposed,

That every Magistracie, 43. Rule for vacations. Office or Election throughout this whole Com­monwealth, whether annual or tri­ennial, be understood of consequence to enjoyn an interval or vacation e­qual unto the term of the same. That the Magistracy of a Knight and of a Burgesse, be in this relation under­stood as one and the same: and that this order regard onely such electi­ons [Page 64] as are national or domestick, and not such as are Provincial or For­raign.

44. Exception from the Rule. That for an exception from this Rule, where there is but one elder of the horse in one and the same Parish, that elder be eligible in the same without interval; and where there be above four elders of the horse in one and the same Parish, there be not above half, nor under two of them eli­gible at the same Election.

Otherwise the people, beyond all peradventure, would elect so many of the better sort at the very first, that there would not be of the foot or of the meaner sort to supply the due number of the Popular Assembly or Prerogative Tribe; and the better sort being barred subsequent elections by their intervals, there would not be wherewithall to furnish the Senate, the horse of the Prerogative Tribe, and the rest of the Magistracies; each of which obstructions is prevented by this exception. Where by the way, if in all experience, such have been the constant temper of the people, and can indeed be no other in reason, [Page 65] it is apparent what cause there can be of doubt who in a Commonwealth of this nature must have the leading. Yet is no man barred from any prefer­ment; only industry which ought na­turally to be the first step, is first en­joyned by this Policy, but rewarded amply; seeing he who hath made himself worth one hundred pounds a year, hath made himself capable of all preferments and honours in this Go­vernment. Where a man from the lowest may not rise unto the due pitch of his unquestionable merit, the Commonwealth is not equal; yet neither can the people under the limi­tations proposed, make choice (as some object) of no other then high-shoon; nor have they at any time been so inclining to do, where they have not been under such limitations. Be it spoken, not to the disparagement of any man, but on the contrary to their praise whose merit hath made them great, the people of England have not gone so low in the election of an House of Commons, as some Prince hath done in the election of an house of Lords. To weigh election [Page 66] by a Prince with election by a People, set the Nobility of Athens and Rome by the Nobility of the old Monarchy, and an House of Commons freely cho­sen by the Nobility of the new. There remaineth but the Quorum, for which it is proposed,

45. The Quo­rum. That throughout all the Assem­blies and Councils of this Common­wealth, the Quorum consist of one half in the time of health; and of one third part in a time of sicknesse, being so declared by the Senate.

How the City-Government with­out diminution of their priviledges, and with improvement of their Policy, may be made to fall in with these or­ders, hath elsewhere been shewn in part, and may be considered farther at leasure. Otherwise the whole Com­monwealth, so far as it is meerly ci­vil, is in this part accomplished. Now as of necessity there must be a natural man, or a man indued with a natural body, before there can be a spiritual man, or a man in capacity of divine contemplation: So a Govern­ment must have a civil part, before it can have a religious part. And if a [Page 67] man but of natural parts can never be so stupid as not to have some re­flection upon Religion, much less a Commonwealth; which necessitateth the Religious part of this Model.

CHAP. II.

THere is nothing more certain or demonstrable unto com­mon Sense, then that the far greater part of mankind, in matter of Religion, give themselves up unto the publick leading. Now a national Re­ligion rightly established, or not co­ercive, is not any publick driving, but onely the publick leading. If the publick in this case may not lead such as desire to be led by the publick, and yet a party may lead such as desire to be led by a party; where would be the liberty of Conscience as to the State? which certainly in a well-ordered Com­monwealth, [Page 68] being the publick Reason, must be the publick Conscience. Nay, where would be the liberty of Con­science as to any party, which should so proceed as to shew, that without ta­king the liberty of Conscience from others, they think not that they can have it themselves? If the publick refusing the liberty of Conscience un­to a party, would but be the cause of tumult, how much more a party refu­sing it unto the publick? And how, in case of like tumult, should a party de­fend their liberty of Conscience, or indeed their throats from the whole or a far greater party, whithout keeping down or tyrannizing over the whole or a far greater party by force of arms? These things being rightly considered, it is no wonder that men, living like men, have not been yet found with­out a Government, or that Go­vernment hath not been yet found without a national Religion; that is, some orderly and known way of pub­lick leading in divine things, or in the worship of God.

A national Religion being thus proved necessary, it remaineth that [Page 69] I prove what is necessary unto a nati­onal Religion, that is, as to the State, or in relation unto the Duty of the Magistrate.

Certain it is, that Religion hath not seen Corruption but by one of three causes; some interest therewithal in­corporated, some ignorance of the truth of it, or by some complication of both. Nor was ever Religion left wholly unto a Clergie that escaped these causes, or their most pernitious effects; as in Rome, which hath brought Ignorance to be the Mother of Devo­tion, and indeed Interest to be the Fa­ther of Religion. Now the Clergie not fayling in this case to be dange­rous, what recourse but to the Magi­strate for safety? especially seeing these causes, that is, Interest and Ignorance, the one deriving from evil Laws, the other from the want of good educa­tion, are not in the right or power of a Clergie, but of a Magistracy. Or if so it be that Magistrates of bounden duty ought to be nursing fathers and nursing mothers unto the Church,Isa. 49.23. how shall a State in the sight of God be excusable, that taketh no heed or care lest Religi­on suffer by causes, the prevention or [Page 70] remedy whereof is in them onely? To these therefore it is proposed,

46. Universities. That the Vniversities being pru­dently reformed, be preserved in their rights and endowments, for and to­wards the education and provision of an able Ministery.

We are commanded by Christ to search the Scriptures. Joh. 5.39. The Scriptures are not now to be searched but by skill in Tongues. The immediate gift of Tongues is ceased; How then should skill in Tongues be acquired but me­diately, or by the meanes of Educati­on? How should a State expect such Education, (especially for a matter of ten thousand men) that provideth not for it? And what provision can a State make for such Education, but by such Schools so endowed and regula­ted, as with us are the Universities? These therefore are a necessary step towards the prevention of such Igno­rance or Interest, as through the infir­mities or byas of Translators, Inter­preters and Preachers, both have and may frequently come to be incorpo­rated with Religion; as also unto the improvement or acquisition of such light as is by the command of Christ [Page 71] to be attained or exercised in searching the Scriptures.

The excellent lerrning of the Le­vites in all kindes,The eighth Parallel. not ordinarily infu­sed, but acquired, there having been among them as well the teacher as the scholar, 1 Chr. 25.8. Mal. 2 12. leaveth little doubt but their forty eight Cities were as so many U­niversities. These with their Suburbs or Endowments contained in the whole (each of their Circuits in Land reckoned at four thousand cubits deep) about an hundred thousand A­cres; that is, if their measure were according to the common cubit; if ac­cording to the holy cubit (as with Levites was most likely) twice so much; which at the lowest account I con­ceive to be far above the Revenues of both our Universities.

These being ordered as hath been said, it is proposed,

That the legal and ancient provisi­on for the national Ministry be so augmented, 47. Augmenta­tion of Li­vings. that the meanest sort of Livings or Benefices, without de­falcation from the greater, be each im­proved to the revenue of one hundred pounds a year at the least.

The ninth Parallel.This, in regard the way is by tythes, cometh up so close unto the Orders of Israel, as in our days may shew that a Commonwealth may come too near that pattern to be liked. We find not indeed that the Apostles either took or demanded Tythes; in which case the Priests who were legally possessed of them, might have had suspition that they, under colour of Religion, had aimed at the violation of propriety. But putting the case that generally the Priests had been converted unto the Christian Faith, whether would the Apostles for that reason have en­joyned them to relinquish their Tythes? Or what is there in the Christian Religion to favour any such surmise? To me there seemeth to be abundantly enough to the contrary. For if the Apostles stuck not to com­ply with the Jews in a Ceremony which was of meer humane inventi­on, and to introduce this, as they did Ordination by imposition of hands into the Christian Church; that they would, upon like inducement, have refused a standing Law, undoubtedly Mosaical, is in my opinion most im­probable. So that, I conceive, the [Page 73] Law for Tythes in being, may or may not be continued, at the pleasure of the Law-givers, for any thing in this case to the contrary. Confident I am, that the introducing of this Model in the whole, which is thought so impra­cticable, were not unto willing minds so difficult a work as the abolition of Tythes.

But Benefices, whether by way of Tythes or otherwise, being thus ordered, it is proposed,

That a Benefice becoming void in any Parish, 48. Ordination. the Elders of the same may assemble and give notice unto the Vice-Chancellour of either Vniver­sity by Certificate, specifying the true value of that Benefice: that the Vice-Chancellour upon receit of such Certificate, be obliged to call a Con­gregation of his Vniversity: that the Congregation of the Vniversity to this end assembled, having regard unto the value of the Benefice, make choice of a person fitted for the Mini­sterial Function, and return him unto the Parish so requiring: that the Probationer thus returned unto a Parish by either of the Vniversities, exercise the Office, and receive the [Page 74] Benefits as Minister of the Parish for the term of one year: that the term of one year expired, the Elders of the Parish assemble and put the election of the Probationer unto the Ballot: that if the Probationer have three parts in four of the Balls or Votes in the affirmative, he be there­by ordained and elected Minister of that Parish; not afterwards to be de­graded or removed, but by the Censors of the Tribe, the Phylarch of the same, or the Council of Religion in such cases as shall be unto them re­served by Act of Parliament. That in case the Probationer come to fail of three parts in four at the Ballot, he depart from that Parish; and if he return unto the Vniversity, it be with­out diminution of the former Offices or Preferments which he there en­joyed, or any prejudice unto his future preferment: and that it be lawful in this case for any Parish to send so often unto either Vniversity, and be the duty of either Vice-Chancellour upon such Certificates to make re­turn of different Probationers, till such time as the Elders of that Pa­rish have fitted themselves with a [Page 75] Minister of their own choyce and li­king.

In case it were thought fit, that a Pro­bationer thus elected, should, before he depart, receive imposition of hands by the Doctors of the Universitie; I cannot see what the most scrupulous in the matter of Ordination could find wanting. But be this so, or other­wise. The Universities by proposing unto the Congregation in every Pa­rish, do the Senatorian Office; and the people thus fitting themselves by their Suffrage or Ballot, reserve that Office which is truly popular, that is, the result unto themselves.

Moses, Th [...] tenth Pa [...]allel. (for so far Divines reach at Ordination) in the institution of the Senate of Israel, wherein he can ne­ver be proved to have used imposition of hands,Deut. 1. Numb. 11. Act. 1. doing the Sanatorian Of­fice, caused the people to take wise men, and understanding, and known among their Tribes, whereof the lot fell upon all but Eldad and Medad. And the Apostles doing the Sena­torian Office, in like manner, without imposition of hands, caused the whole Congregation to take two,Act. 1.26. whereof the lot of Apostle­ship [Page 76] fell upon Matthias. So that this way of Ordination being that which was instituted by Moses, and the prime of those which were taken up by the Apostles,See Book 2. chap. 8. is both Mosaical and Apo­stolical. Nor hath a well-ordered Commonwealth any choyce of those other ways of Ordination, used by the Apostles in complaisance unto worse Government, but is naturally necessi­tated unto this, that is, unto the very best.

Ordination being thus provided for, it is proposed,

49. National Religion, and provi­sion against scandalous Ministers. That the National Religion be ex­ercised according to a Directory in that case to be made, and published by Act of Parliament. That the Nation­al Ministry be permitted to have no other publick preferment or office in this Commonwealth. That a Na­tional Minister being convict of ig­norance or scandal, be movable out of his Benefice by the Censors of the Tribe, under an appeal unto the Phylarch, or to the Council for Reli­gion.

50. Liberty of Conscience That no Religion being contrary unto or destructive of Christianity, nor the Publick exercise of any Reli­gion, [Page 77] being grounded upon or incor­porated into a Forraign interest, be protected by or tolerated in this State. That all other Religions, with the Publick exercise of the same, be both tolerated and protected by the Coun­cil of Religion; and that all Profes­sours of any such Religion, be equally capable of all Elections, Magistra­cies, Preferments, and Offices in this Commonwealth, according unto the Orders of the same.

Upon the whole of these Proposi­tions touching Church-Discipline. Thus neither would the party that is for gifted men, through ignorance (which else in all probability they must) lose Religion; nor the Clergy corrupt it through interest. But decency and order with the liberty of conscience, would still flourish to­gether, while the Minister hath a pre­ferment he sought, the Parish a Mini­ster they chose, the Nation a Religion according to the Publick Conscience, and every man his Christian liberty. He therefore that endeavours to con­fute this chapter, must either shew how these things may be omitted, or more effectually provided for, or [Page 78] tythe Mint and Cumine, and neg­lect the weightier things of Law-giving.

A Commonwealth having in the e­stablishment of Religion, made resig­nation of her self unto God, ought in the next place to have regard unto the natural means of her defence; which introduceth the Military part of this Model.

CHAP. III.

THe Military part, on which at present I shall discourse lit­tle, consisteth in the Disci­pline of the Youth, that is, of such as are between eighteen and thirty years of age: and for the Discipline of the Youth it is proposed,

That annually upon Wednesday next ensuing the last of December,51. Discipline of the Youth. the Youth of each Parish (under the inspection of the two Overseers of the same) assemble and elect the fifth man of their number, or one in five of them, to be for the term of that year, Deputies of the Youth of that Parish.

That annually on Wednesday next ensuing the last of January,52. Their Troops and Sports. the said Deputies of the respective Parishes meet at the Capital of the Hundred [Page 80] (where there are Games, and Prizes alotted for them, as hath been shewed elsewhere:) that there they elect to themselves out of their own number, one Captain, and one Ensigne. And that of these Games, and this Electi­on, the Magistrates and Officers of the Hundred be Presidents, and Iudges for the impartial distribution of the Prizes.

53. Their Squa­drons and exercises. That annually upon Wednesday next ensuing the last of February, the Youth through the whole Tribe thus elected, be received at the Capital of the same, by the Leiutenant as Com­mander in Chief, by the Conductor, and by the Censours; that under in­spection of these Magistrates, the said Youth be entertained with more splendid games, disciplined in a more Military manner, and divided by lot into sundry parts, or Essays, accor­ding to Rules elsewhere given.

54. The second Essay, or the standing Army. That the whole Youth of the Tribe thus assembled, be the first Essay. That out of the first essay, there be cast by lot two hundred horse, and six hundred foot: that they whom their friends will, or themselves can mount, be accounted horse, the rest [Page 81] foot. That these forces amounting in the fifty Tribes to ten thousand horse, and thirty thousand foot, be alwaies ready to march at a weeks warning: and that this be the second Essay, or the standing Army of the Common­wealth.

That for the holding of each Pro­vince, 55. Provincial guards. the Commonwealth in the first year assigne an Army of the Youth, consisting of seven thousand five hundred foot, and one thousand five hundred horse. That for the per­petuation of these Provincial Ar­mies or Guards, there be annually, at the time and places mentioned, cast out of the first essay of the Youth in each Tribe ten horse, and fifty foot, that is, in all the Tribes five hun­dred horse, and two thousand five hun­dred foot for Scotland, the like for Ireland, and the like of both orders for the Sea-Guards, being each ob­liged to serve for the term of three years upon the States pay.

The standing Army of the Com­monwealth consisting thus of forty thousand (not Souldiers of fortune not in body nor in pay) but Citizens at their vocations or trades, and yet [Page 82] upon command in continual readi­nesse: and the Provincial armies each consisting of nine thousand in pay in body, and possessed of the avenues and places of strength in the Province, it is not imaginable how a Province should be so soon able to stir, as the Commonwealth must be to pour forty thousand men upon it, besides the Sea-guards. Nor cometh this Militia thus constituted, except upon marches, unto any charge at all; the standing Army having no pay, and the Provinces, whereof the Sea thus guarded will be none of the poorest, maintaining their own guards. Such is the military way of a Commonwealth, and the constituti­on of her Armies, whether levied by suffrage, as in Rome; or lot, as in Israel.

The ele­venth Pa­rallel. Judg. 20.9. We will go up by lot against Gibeah.

Standing Forces being thus esta­blished: for such as are upon emer­gent occasions to go forth, or march, it is proposed,

56. The third Essay, or Ar­my march­ing. That the Senate and the People, or the Dictator having decreed or de­clared War, and the Field Officers being appointed by the Council of [Page 83] War; the General by Warrant issued unto the Leiutenants of the Tribes, demand the second Essay, or such part of it as is decreed; whether by way of levy or recrute. That by the same warrant he appoint his time and Rendevous: that the seve­ral Conductours of the Tribes deli­ver him the forces demanded, at the time and place appointed. That a Ge­neral thus marching out with the standing Army, a new Army be e­lected out of the first Essay as for­merly, and a new General be elected by the Senate; that so alwaies there be a General sitting, and a standing Ar­my, what Generals or Armies soe­ver be marching. And that in case of invasion the bands of the Elders be obliged unto like duly with those of the Youth.

That an only Son be discharged of these duties without prejudice. 57. Poena [...]; or the Guardian of Educati­on and Li­berty. That of two Brothers there be but one ad­mitted to forraign service at one time. That of more Brothers, not above half. That whoever otherwise refuseth his lot, except upon cause shewn he be dispensed withall by the Phylarch, or upon penitence be by [Page 84] them pardoned and restored, by such refusal be uncapable of electing, or being elected in this Commonwealth; as also that he pay unto the State a fifth of his revenue for protection, be­sides taxes. That Divines, Physi­cians, and Lawyers, as also trades not at leasure for the Essaies, be so far forth exempted from this Rule, that they be still capable of all prefer­ments in their respective professions, with indemnity, and without milita­ry education or service.

A Commonwealth whose Militia consisteth of Mercenaries, to be safe, must be situated as Venice, but can in no wise be great. The industry of Holland is the main revenue of that State; whence not being able to spare hands unto her Armes, she is cast upon strangers and mercenary forces, through which we in our time have seen Amsterdam necessitated to let in the Sea upon her, and to become (as it were) Venice. Unto a Popular Government that could not do the like, Mercenary Armes have never failed to be fatal; whence the last Pro­position is that which in every well-ordered Commonwealth hath been [Page 85] looked unto as the main guard of liberty.

In this Israel was formidable be­yond all other Commonwealths with a kind of fulmination.The twelfth Parallel. Saul when he heard the cruelty of Nahash the Am­monite, at the leaguer of Jabesh-Gi­lead, 1 Sam. 11.7. took a yoke of oxen and hewed them in pieces, and sent them through­out the coasts of Israel, by the hands of messengers, saying, Whosoever cometh not out after Saul, and after Samuel, so shall it be done unto his oxen. Which amounted not only unto a confiscation of goods (the riches of the Israelites lying most in their Cattle) but unto a kind of Anathema, as more plainly appeareth, where it is said, Curse ye Meroz, Judg. 5.23. curse ye bitterly the inhabi­tants thereof, because they came not forth to help the Lord against the migh­ty. Nay this ( [...]) desertion of the military orders and services in Israel, was sometimes punished with total extermination, as after the vi­ctory against Benjamin, Judg. 21. where the con­gregation or Political Assembly of that people, making inquisition what one of the Tribes of Israel came not up to the Lord in Mizpeh (the place [Page 86] where before the taking of Jerusa­lem, they held, as I may say, their Parliaments) and finding that there came none to the camp from Jabesh-Gilead, sent thither twelve thousand men of the valiantest, saying, Go and smite the inhabitants of Jabesh-Gilead with the edge of the sword, with the wo­men and the children: which was done accordingly.

But by this time men will shrink at this as a dreadful order, and begin to compute that a Commonwealth, let her Prerogatives for the rest be what they will, must at this rate be but a dear purchase: whereas indeed, if this way cost something, there is no other that doth not hazard all; foras­much as discarding this order, play your game as you can, you are some­time or other a prey to your enemies, or to your mercenaries. This cer­tainly is that root in (the Penetralia) the bowels of a Commmwealth, whence never any Court-Arts, or Polish, could attain unto the gallan­try or splendour of the education in Popular Governments. For let any man, remembring what it was to be a Gideon, a Miltiades, a Timoleon, a [Page 87] Scipio, or a Magistrate in a Common­wealth, consider if there should be no way with us to Magistracy, but by having served three years at Sea, and three years at Land, how the whole face and genius of education, both in the better and in the lower sort, would of necessity be changed in this Nati­on, and what kind of Magistrates such experience in those services must create unto the Common­wealth. Consider, whether the threat­ned punishments of this order, albeit through unacquaintance they may at the first sight have some brow, would not, as they have done in other Commonwealths of like structure, e­ven with low spirits, expire in scorne and contempt, or through the meer contemplation of the reward of Ho­nour, nay of the honour it self, in which point where right hath not been done, men, under Governments of this nature, have been much more apt unto heats; as where the men of E­phraim fought against Jeptha, for an affront in this kind which they con­ceived him to have put upon them. Wherefore passedst thou over to fight a­gainst the children of Ammon, Judg. 12. and didst [Page 88] not call us to go with thee? We will burne thine house upon thee with fire. Nor is this way so expensive of the purse or of bloud. Not of the pub­lick purse, because it detesteth mer­cenaries; nor of the private purse, because the waies of education thus directed, are all assisted with the States pay; so that a man in this road might educate three children cheaper, and to the most solid ends, then he could any one unto trifles in those which among us hitherto have been usual. And as to bloud, there is no­thing more certain, then that idle­ness, and her inseparable companion luxury, are exceedingly more wastful as of the purse, so of health, nay and of life it self, then is war; which neverthelesse this order is such as doth rather prevent then necessitate, in regard that to be potent in Armes is the way of peace. But whereas in a Martial Commonwealth there may be men having exceeded the thirtieth year of their age, who like those of Ephraim would yet take it ill to be excluded the lists of honour, and it must also be unto the detriment of the Commonwealth that they should; [Page 89] for these, whom we may call Volun­teers, it is proposed,

That upon Warrants issued forth by the General for recrutes or levies, 58. Volunteers. there be an Assembly of the Phylarch in each Tribe; that such Volunteers, or men being above thirty years of age, as are desirous of farther im­ployment in arms, appear before the Phylarch so assembled. That any number of these, not exceeding one moity of the recrutes or levies of that Tribe, may be taken on by the Phy­larch, so many of the youth being at the discretion of this Council dis­banded, as are taken on of the volun­teers. That the levies thus made, be conducted by the Conductour of the re­spective Tribe unto the Rendez­vous appointed. And that the ser­vice of these be without other term or vacation, then at the discretion of the Senate and the people, or such in­structions unto the General, as shall by them in that case be provided.

Thus much for the Military or de­fensive part of this Model. For Of­fences in general it is written,Mat. 18.7. Wo unto the world because of offences: for it must needs be that offences come, but [Page 90] wo to that man by whom the offence cometh. Among offences are offen­sive wars: now it being out of questi­on, that for the righteous execution of this wo upon him or them by whom the offence cometh, a war may be just and necessary, as also that vi­ctory in a just and necessary war, may intitle one Prince or one People un­to the Dominion or Empire of ano­ther Prince or People; it is also out of question, that a Common­wealth, unless in this case she be provided both to acquire, and to hold what she acquireth, is not perfect: which consideration bringeth me un­to the Provincial part of this Model.

CHAP. IV.

THe word Province, is with Ro­man Authors of diverse sense: By these it is taken sometimes for Magistracy; as that of the Consul, which was called His Province: some­time for any Region or Country, in which a Roman Captain or General was commanded to make War; but especially for such a Country as was acquired and held by armes, or by Provincial Right. The word is of like diverse use in Scriptures; as where it is said,Esth. 1.1. That Ahasuerus reign­ed over an hundred and seven provin­ces; by which are understood as well the divisions of the native, as those of the acquired Territories. But where Tanais the Governour writeth unto the King of Assyria concerning the Pro­vince of Judea, Ezra 5.8. it is understood a Coun­try [Page 92] acquired and held by arms; which cometh to the usual signification of the word with the Romans, it being in this sense that the Governour Fe­lix asked Paul of what province he was, and came to understand that he was of Cilicia, Act. 23.34. then a Province of the Ro­man Empire: and this signification is that in which I take the word through­out this Chapter.

The mighty load of Empire which happened unto the Commonwealth of Rome through the Acquisition of ma­ny and vast Provinces, is that where­unto the Songs of Poets, and the Saw of more serious Writers attribute the weight which they say over-swayed her. But this Judgment, though in it self right, is not in the manner they take it, to be swallowed without chew­ing. For how probable it is that the succeeding Monarchy was able to sup­port a weight in this kind, which the Commonwealth could not bear, may at this distance be discerned, in that the Provinces were infinitely more tur­bulent in the reign of the Emperours, then in that of the Commonwealth, as having a far stronger interest through ambition of attaining unto [Page 93] the whole, to tear the Empire in pie­ces: which they did, while divers Pro­vinces made divers Emperours, which before could not hope to make divers Commonwealths, nor to acquire safety by retreat unto a petty Government. But in this, the acquisition of Provin­ces devoured the Commonwealth of Rome, that she, not being sufficient­ly fortified by Agrarian Laws, the Nobility,Plutarch in Grach. through the spoil of Pro­vinces, came to eat the people out of their popular Balance or Lands in Ita­ly by purchases; and the Lands that had been in the hands of the Many, coming thus [...]nto the hands of the Few, of natural and necessary conse­sequence there followeth Monar­chy.

Now that England, a Monarchy, hath been seized of Provinces, (one of them, while France was such, being as great as any one of the Roman) is a known thing; and that the Militia proposed by the present Model, con­taineth all the causes of greatness that were in that of Rome, is to such as are not altogether strangers unto the former, no less then obvious. Now of like causes not to presume like effects, [Page 94] were unreasonable. The safety there­fore of the foregoing Agrarian, as hi­therto proposed, or that Lands be di­vided in their descent, must in this case be none at all, unless there be some stop also given in their Accumulation by way of purchase; lest otherwise the spoil of some mighty Province be still sufficient to eat out the people by purchase.

To submit therefore in this place (for ought I perceive) unto inevi­table necessity, it is proposed,

59. Additional propositions unto the A­grarian. That (great Commonwealths ha­ving been overthrown by the spoil of provinces) an estate of two thousand pounds a year in land, be incapable of any Accumulation by way of pur­chase.

Donations and Inheritances will be fewer then to be dangerous; and as some fall, others will be dividing in their descent. But to resume the dis­course upon the Agrarian Laws, which because they were not till in this Proposition compleat, remains imperfect. That unto Agrarian Laws some standard is of necessity, appear­eth plainly enough. This standard in a well-founded Monarchy, must bar [Page 95] recess; and in a well-founded Com­monwealth must bar increase. For cer­tain it is, that otherwise each of these policies doth naturally breed that Vi­per which eateth out the bowels of the Mother: as Monarchy, by Pomp and Luxury, reduceth her Nobility through debt into poverty, and at length unto such a level with the people, upon which no Throne ever stood or can stand: such was the case of this Na­tion under her latter Princes. And a Commonwealth by her natural ways of frugality, of fattening and coc­kering up of the people, is apt to bring estates unto such excess in some hands, as eating out the rest, boweth the neck of a free State or City unto the yoak, and exposeth her unto the goad of a Lord and Master; which was the case of Rome under her perpetual Dictators. But why yet must this standard of Land in the present case, be neither more nor less then just two thousand pounds a year? Truly, where some standard was of necessity to be named, I might as well ask why not this as well as any other? yet am I not without such reasons why I have pitched upon this, rather then any o­ther, [Page 26] as I may submit unto the judg­ment of the Reader in the following Computation or Comparison of the divers effects or consequences of so many different standards, as by the Rules of proportion may give suffici­ent account of the rest.

Let the dry rent of England (that is, at the rate a man may have for his Land without sweating) be computed at ten Millions: This presumed, if you set the standard at ten thousand pounds a year, the whole Territory can come into no fewer then one thousand hands. If you set it at five thousand pounds a year, it can come into no fewer then two thousand hands; and if you set it at two thou­sand pounds a year, it can come into no fewer then five thousand hands. It will be said, In which way you please, it will never come into so few hands as are capable of having it: which is cer­tain: yet because the effects in their approaches would be such as may be measured by their extreams, I shall pitch upon these as the readiest way to guide my Computation. The Balance in a thousand hands might affect the Government with an hankering after [Page 97] Monarchy; in two thousand hands it might usurp it, so as did the Roman Nobility, and thereby cause fewd be­tween the Senate and the People. These not onely in the extreams, but with much of like nature in the ap­proaches.

But letting these passe, as also the numbers or compasse necessary unto the rotation of such a Common­wealth, none of which inconveni­ences are incident unto the standard of two thousand pounds a year, as that whereby lands can come into no fewer then five thousand proprietors; we will suppose these standards to be each of them, as to the safety of the Government, indifferently practica­ble.

Yet so it is upon the record of expe­rience, and wise Authours, that the true cause whence England hath been an overmatch in arms for France, lay in the communication or distribution of propriety unto the lower sort; and for the same cause let it be considered, if the Commonwealth upon the stan­dard of two thousand pounds a year (caeteris paribus) must not necessarily be an overmatch in the potency of [Page 98] her Militia for the other two. Such are the advantages, such is the glory of like moderation unto the publick. Money (saith my Lord Verulam) is like muck, not good except it be spread. Much rather in Popular Government is this holding as to land, this having upon the State a far stronger influ­ence, at least in larger Territories, then money; for in such, money while scarce cannot over-balance land; and were silver and gold as plen­tiful as brasse or iron, they would be no more, nor would land be lesse worth. And for private men, were it not that it is easier to fill the belly of a glutton then his eye, not only vertue, but the beatitude of riches, would be apparently consistent in a mean. But what need the Divine or the Philoso­pher, upon a Doctrine which is not to diminish any mans estate, not to bring any man from the customs whereunto he hath been inured, nor from any emergent expectation he may have, but regards only the generation to come, or the children to be borne se­ven years after the passing such a law? whence it must needs follow, that put­ting the case this Agrarian be intro­duced, [Page 99] it is unto our age as if there were none; and if there be no Agra­rian, it is unto our age as if there were one. The difference is no more, then that in the one way the Common­wealth is at all points secured, and in the other she is left unto her fortune even in the main. Of such soveraign effect are like laws, that I would go yet farther, and propose,

That in Scotland the standard be set at five hundred pounds a year, 60. Agrarian for Scot­land and Ireland. in Ire­land at two thousand pounds a year, in land; the rest for each as for England.

Narrownesse of an Agrarian for Scotland, being a Martial Countrey, would make the larger provisi n of a good Auxiliary Militia; and large­nesse of an Agrarian for Ireland, being lesse Martial, would cast a sop into the jaws of their avarice, who should think it too much confined at home. And lest the Provincials in this case should think themselves worse dealt withall then the Citizens themselves, the sum of the Agrarian Laws being cast up together, any man in the three Nations may hold four thousand five hundred pounds a year in land, and any small parcel of land, [Page 100] or meer residence in England, maketh a Provincial a Citizen. Should the Commonwealth increase in Provin­ces, the estates at this rate both of her Citizens and Provincials, would be more and greater then ever were those of the ancient Nobility of these Nations, and without any the least hazard unto liberty. For he who considering the whole story, or that only of the Gracchi in Plutarch, shall judge aright, must confesse, that had Rome preserved a good Agrarian but in Italy, the riches of her Provinces could not have torn up the roots of her liberty, but to the contrary must have water'd them. It may be said, What need then of putting an Agra­rian upon the Provinces? I answer: For two Reasons: first, indulgence to the Provincials, and then advantage to the Commonwealth. For the first, it is with small foresight apparent e­nough, that the avarice of the Citizen being bounded at home, and having no limits in the Provinces, would in a few years eat up the Provincials, and bring their whole Countries (as the Roman Patricians did Italy) to sound in their fetters, or to be tilled [Page 101] by their slaves or underlings. And so for the second, would by such means lose the Commonwealth an Auxiliary Militia, to be otherwise in Scotland only more worth then the Indies. These things therefore thus ordered, it is proposed,

That upon expiration of Magi­stracy in the Senate, 61. Provincial Councils. or at the annual recesse of one third part of the same, there be elected by the Senate out of the part receding, into each Provin­cial Council, four Knights for the term of three years, thereby to render each Provincial Council (presuming it in the beginning to have been con­stituted of twelve Knights, divided af­ter the manner of the Senate by three several lists or elections) of annual, triennial, and perpetual revolution or rotation. 62. Provincial Governours or Gene­rals.

That out of the same third part of the Senate annually receding, there be unto each Province one Knight elected for the term of one year. That the Knight so elected, be the Provinci­al General or Governour. That a Provincial Governour or General receive annually in April at his Ren­dezvous appointed, the Youth or Re­crutes [Page 102] elected in the precedent Moneth, to that end, by the Tribes, and by their Conductours delivered accordingly. That he repair with the said Youth or Recrutes unto his Province, and there dismisse that part of the Provincial Guard or Army whose triennial term is expired. That each Provincial Governour have the conduct of Affairs of War and of State in his respective Pro­vince, with advice of the Provincial Council; and that he be President of the same.

63. Provincial Provosts. That each Provincial Council e­lect three weekly Proposers, or Pro­vosts, after the manner, and to the ends already shewn in the constitu­tion of Senatorian Councils; and that the Provost of the seniour list, during his term, be President of the Council in absence of the General. 64. Subordina­tion and function of Provincial Councils.

That each Provincial Council procéed according unto instructions received from the Council of State, and keep intelligence with the same by any two of their Provosts, for the Government of the Province, as to matter of War or of State. That upon levies of native or proper arms [Page 103] by the Senate, and the people, a Pro­vincial Council (having unto that end received orders) make levies of Provincial Auxiliaries accordingly. That Auxiliary arms upon no occa­sion whatsoever exceed the proper or native arms in number. That for the rest, the Provincial Council maintain the Provincials, defraying their peculiar guards and council, by such known proportion of tri­buts, as on them shall be set by the Senate and the People, in their pro­per Rights, Laws, Liberties, and Immunities, so far forth as upon the merits of the cause whereupon they were subdued, it seemed good unto the Senate and the People to con­firm them. And that it be lawful for the Provincials, to appeal from their Provincial Magistrates, Councils, or Generals, to the People of England.

In modeling a Commonwealth, the concernment of Provincial Govern­ment comes in the last place; for which cause I conceive any long Discourse upon these Orders to be at present un­necessary: But certain things there are upon the by, which I am unwilling to let slip without pointing at.

Whethermen or money be the nerve of War.Some will have men, some will have money to be the Nerve of War; each of which Positions, in the proper case, may be a Maxime: for if France, where the main body of the people is imbased; or Venice, which standeth upon a Mercenary Militia, want mo­ney, they can make no War. But it hath heretofore been otherwise with Commonwealths. Roman Hi­storians (as is observed by Machia­vel) in their Military preparations or expeditions, make no mention of mo­ney, unless what was gained by the War, and brought home into the Treasury; as the spoil of Macedon by Aemilius Paulus, being such, as the people for some years after were discharged of their Tribute. Not that their Wars were made altogether without money; for if so, why should the people at any time before have paid Tribute? Or why, upon this oc­casion, were they excused? but that the money in which their Wars stood them, was not considerable in compa­rison of that which is requisite where money may be counted the Nerve of War; that is, where men are not to be had without it. But Rome, by ver­tue [Page 105] of her Orders, could have raised vaster numbers of her Citizens and Associates, then perhaps she ever did, though during the Consulate of Papus and Regulus, she levyed in Italy one­ly, seventy thousand Horse, and seven hundred thousand Foot. Should we conceive the Nerve of this Motion to have been money, we must reckon the Indies to have been exhaulted be­fore they were found; or so much Brass to have been in Italy, as would have made stones to be as good mo­ney. A well-ordered Common­wealth doth these things not by mo­ney, but by such Orders as make of her Citizens the Nerve of her Wars. The Youth of the Commonwealth propo­sed, are esteemed in all at five hundred thousand. Of these there is an annu­al Band, consisting of one hundred thousand. Of this one hundred thou­sand, there is a standing Army consi­sting of thirty thousand Foot and ten thousand Horse, besides such as being above thirty years of age, shall offer themselves as Volunteers; of which the number is no wise likely to be few. To the standing Army, the Pro­vinces, or that onely of Scotland, be­ing [Page 106] both Populous and Martial, can afford at any time an equal number of Auxiliaries.

These Orders, thus summed up together, render this Commonwealth ordinarily able to wage War with fourscore thousand men; a Force, which it is known, not any Prince in Chri­stendom is able to match in Vertue, Number or Discipline. For these, the Commonwealth in her Sea-guard hath always at hand sufficient waftage, or at least such a sufficient Convoy as may make any Vessels at hand a suffi­cient wastage; all this, I say, by vertue of Orders: not but that the March, the Eguipage, the Waftage of so great an Army must cost money, but that it will come to no account in compari­son of a lingring War made by a mat­ter of thirty thousand Mercenaries, the very consumption of a State; whereas fourscore thousand men so disciplined and so furnished, as hath been shewn, being once transported, must suddainly come to be no charge, or make the War defray it self.

But to reckon upon such a Mili­tia, were to suppose a large Coun­try capable of being a Common­wealth; [Page 107] whereas we hold them learn­ed, who say, That no Commonwealth hath consisted of more then some one City or Town.Whether a Common­wealth have consisted of more then one City or Town. But in what Language or in what Geography are the twelve Tribes of Israel; the ( [...]) Peo­pledoms or Prytanies of Athens, which Theseus gathered into one bo­dy; the Tribes and Lineages in Lace­demon instituted by Lycurgus; the five and thirty Roman Tribes planted between the Rivers Vulturnus and Ar­no, or between the Cities now called Capua and Florence; the thirteen Cantons of the Switzers; the seven united Provinces of the Low-Coun­tries, understood to have been or to be but one City or Town? Whether were not the people of Israel under their Commonwealth six hundred thousand? What reason can be given why the Government that could take in six hundred thousand, might not as well take in twice that number? How much short came the Country, plan­ted by the Roman Tribes, of one hun­dred and fifty miles square? Or how much over is England? And what rea­son can be given why a Government taking in one hundred and fifty miles [Page 108] square, might not as well take in twice that compass? Whether was our House of Commons under Monarchy not collected from the utmost bounds of the English Territory? And whe­ther had the Laws by them enacted not their free course unto the utmost limits of the same? And why should that be impossible or impracticable un­to a Representative of the people in a Commonwealth, which was so facile and practicable to a Representative of the people under Monarchy?

It is a wonder how the Common­wealth of Rome, which held as it were the whole World by Provinces, should be imagined by any man to have con­sisted but of one Town or City.

But to return: It is alledged by o­thers, and as to Provincial Govern­ment, very truly, that a Common­wealth may be a Tyranny: Nor do I think that Athens, in this point, came short of any Prince: Rome, on the other side, was (according to the merits of the cause) as frequent in giving liber­ty, as in taking it away. The Provinces of Venice and of Switz, would not change their condition with the Sub­jects of the best Prince. However, [Page 109] the possibility in a Commonwealth of tyrannizing over Provinces, is not to be cured; for be the Commonwealth or the Prince, a State or a Man after Gods own heart, there is no way of holding a Province but by arms.

When the Syrians of Damascus came to succour Hadadezer king of Zobah, The thir­teenth Pa­rallel. 2 Sam. 8.5.6. David slew of the Syrians two and twen­ty thousand men: then David put gari­sons in Syria of Damascus, and the Sy­rians became servants to David, and brought gifts: and the Lord preserved David whither soever he went.

With this Parallel I draw the cur­tain, and close (be it Comedy to such as are for Tragedy) this Model; ap­pealing to the present, or the next Age, whether throughout I have not had God Himself for my Vouchee. In the mean time,See the Co­rollary of Oceana. there is nothing hereby proposed which may not stand with a supreme Magistrate.