1 Of Ceremonies and civill Complements.

ONE saith wisely, that Ceremonies are but the trans­lation of Vertue into the [Page 2] knowne Tongue, the distin­ctions and ful poynts, with­out which they could not be understood: If we be so carefull in the set formes of Speech and Language, why not in Action & Ge­sture? the one speakes to the eye, the other to the eare: They are but Tran­sitory Hyeroglyphicks; and not to use them, be­speakes neglect to others, when themselves are best exprest by a seeming neg­lect. It is the minde that is capable of a decent carriage, which if you first make expert, they will be better exprest to the life, [Page 3] than onely by an apish imitation of corporall action. To use them too much towards inferiours, is popularity: to use them towards equalls, is civili­ty and love: towards su­periours, they become re­verence and companions of their honour; for bow­ed heads, bare caps, cere­monies and respects doe make honor so desireable; and the weakest look no farther than to these out­ward accidents; never thinking that true bravery and honour conststs in Honerante, non honorato, not onely in formality of [Page 4] worship, but a mentall re­verence to their vertue, which is the most worthy part of dignity. Though of themselves they be light and vaine, yet they have that command in the respects of men, by reason of that which they use to signifie; that some whose minds are below the performance of no­bler vertues, doe seeke re­putation by comlinesse of going: it is good to have a commanded carriage, and not to let the errours of the mind bee discove­red by the negligence of looks: it appeares by the [Page 5] truth of the old Adage, that they are significative, and not onely Mutes: Nil interest habere ostium apertum, vultum clausum.

2 Of the Multiplicity of Bookes.

THe most Books adde rather bulke to the body of Learning, than spirit and quicknesse of inventions, as a soule an­swerable, which by diffu­sion weakens and makes slow the course of know­ledge.

In Bookes, the relati­ons of affaires are framed in the mold of the under­standing, by way of ex­pression, which makes those things that are writ have a shape and appea­rance of a more perfecti­on than those things which are done. They endeavour to bee either Delian divers of Questi­ons, or to have the ilumi­nation of an Interpreter or the name of an exact Methodist: and for the variety of them and their adulatory Dedications, I may say of them as of our Farthings, the im­pression [Page 7] makes them goe the curranter, though the matter debaseth them: books are only freed from the power of Oblivion, which is the occasion the Poets did promise to themselves an immortali­ty of name; esteeming all other things as subject to the inconstancy of af­faire and period of time.

Which is the meaning of that Fable of theirs, how that in the end of the threed of every mans life [Page 8] there is a certaine coyne affixt, upon which is writ the name of the dead par­ty; which as soone as the Sister hath cut, shee throwes them into the River Lethe; but about the River there flyes a great company of Birds, which do carry the coyne a little way in their beaks, and afterward carelessely let them fall againe: but amongst those Birds there are found some Swans, which if they light with a Coyne upon ones name on it, they presently carry it to the Temple, devo­ting it to perpetuity: [Page 9] Bookes are the Coynes on which mens names are writ; those of an ordinary flight, they endure for a time, but presently are forgot; but if there bee one who can sing well, they are carryed on the wings of true Fame, and as Swans leave the swee­test notes to posterity. Bookes are the best Coun­cellors, the best Compa­nions, and the best heires of a mans knowledge; they be the Monuments wherein lye hid the sacred reliques of Knowledge & Wisedome; and the rea­son, why the multiplicity [Page 10] of Bookes yeelds not ad­vancement to learning is, because they are but as ri­volets, drawne as it were from the Fountaine of some Author, and con­veied by the secret passa­ges of mens understan­dings and fancies, returne to it againe; keeping still the same levell with the Well-spring, which de­nies a further rise. It is a good rule in Naturall Philosophy, Interitus rei arcetur per reductionem ejus ad principia, which is a good rule also in the course of Learning; for commonly for preven­tion [Page 11] of corruption in Letters, there needs the reducing of the under­standing to the first O­riginall: and sometimes if they beginne not againe the sent will grow cold: To write in that in which there is no beaten path, is most honourable; for hee that leads hath this advan­tage above others, (saith learned Hooker) if others follow him, he hath the glory of it: if not, hee hath the excuse of prejudice.

3. Of Fortune.

I Will not speake of the actions of men, as they are the children of Divine providence: Nor will I ascribe an Apotheosis to Fortune; but will onely view the power and acti­vity of mans reason, in the nimble apprehension and taking hold of occasions, to see how farre outward Circumstances doe con­duce to the making of a mans owne Fortune. It was the saying of a [Page 13] great one, that however he knew that rule, that quisque fortunae suae faber, yet the most in number were those, who spoyled their owne fortunes. It is an Art which most mens invention have flowed into; & yet is still capable of renovation, as it were, by the incertainty of af­fairs so curiously involved by mutuall relation, which is Tacitus his observa­tion of a too superstious Constancy in that Empe­rour to his old way, in which once hee proved fortunate, idem manebat, & idem dicebat: So that [Page 14] some through an imbecil­lity of mind, not knowing to make a departure from the gravity of their usuall pace, doe oftentime, with that Spaniard in the story, undergoe the lash of For­tune: Qui respicit adven­tos non seminat, saith So­lomon; so that there is re­quired a judicious obser­vancy of time, as well as a prudent making of occa­sions. He that would be a Master in the Art, must discerne his Elogium, who was said to be adeo versa­tilis ingenij, ut quocunque loco viveret; fortunam sibi fabricare visus est. There [Page 15] are some of that temper; the pulse of whose affecti­on still beats after the mo­tion of honour, who had rather be not good than not great; & therfore will cast about the mist of de­ceite, to blind the eye of your apprehension, and by corrupt counsailes endea­vour to rise from the clouds of disgrace, to see the sunne of honour; but apparent rari. Others will bring all their Elogies of their worth upon the stage of honour, where they would gladly display themselves; they will cry after Fortune, and court [Page 16] her, like a peevish Mistris, into disdaine of them, till at last they prove but swolne bubles, which the least winde of adversity makes them evapourate into their owne element. Honor is vertues reward, and is no more than the reflexive beames of the sun of vertue, and gives only to good wils in a lar­ger extent to exercise themselves in, as an open field; & therfore it must be used as in the open region of the Common-wealth, not in the inclosures of ones own particular ends and respects: Hee must [Page 17] study well the nature of the present times, who would bee an instrument of state; for otherwise his understanding may prove an unfit match for service of Majesty; impar con­gressus Vlysi. Hee must know himselfe as well as the times, and others as well as himselfe: Qui sapit innumeris moribus aptus orit; and as Tully saith pro­prium hoc esse prudentiae statuit, conciliare sibi ani­mos hominum, & ad usus suos adjungere. To prosti­tute a mans time too much to the fleshy thoughts of Fortune, tasts [Page 18] of the stomacke of the Is­raelite: and surely those thoughts spent on riches, will devoure those which should bee for the Tem­ple: whence comes those corrupt axioms, Prosperū & felix scelus virtus voca­tur. Aesope saith wittily, multa novit vulpes, sed n­uum magnum felis; which is no more than the cer­tainty of a friend for ones fortune, and ho­nesty for ones selfe: its like the Sun which gives a great light; whereas the Starres, though more in number, doe not all shine so bright, sapiens domina­bitur [Page 19] astris. It is no small part of policy to distin­guish of fortune and occa­sion, its easier to see the one than retain the other: faciliùs for tunam reperias, quam retineas: Riches are sometimes vertues orna­ment, sometimes vices punishment; and surely it hath a diverse operation, according to the diffe­rence of the materialls it meets withall; The prospe­rity of fooles shall slay them; Limus nt hic durescit, &c. Some in the making of their owne fortunes, are well studied in men, but know not the nature of [Page 20] businesses, nor worth of favours: others onely wise by rule; and maxims of particular government looke not into the nature and quality of their com­petitors, and those whom they have to deale with: so that betwixt these two observations of extreams, one might extract an exact patterne: take some of both, and it will prove a good composition; as well some of the know­ledge of persons, as excel­lency of art of policy.

4 Of Wisedome of Speech.

SPeech (saith Scaliger) being but a Sarment of Nature, covereth either the souldier as with Arms for necessity; or as a Gowne the Senator for profit; or as a more dain­ty garment the curious Ci­tizen for pleasure: it con­sociateth the remotest re­gions of mens hearts, by the participation of one anothers thoughts: and [Page 22] therefore I can call Dis­course by no apter title, than to be the vehicula co­gitationum, and therefore they should still runne e­ven with the wheeles of their thoughts. These were the ancient decrees of truth, they counted it an happinesse of the un­derstanding to be inlight­ned with it, a weight of labour to search it, but the glory of humane nature to speake it. Ante omnia mi fili custodi cor tuum, thoughts are but the chil­dren of the heart, as speech is of the thoughts; the prudency of whose [Page 23] direction is of excellent use, view it either in the glasse of Divinity or Poli­cy: and even in the buil­ding up of the fabricke of a mans own fortune, there is no small wisedome in polishing and framing the materialls of ordinary talke: Every speech ac­quaints us either with the matter which we aske, or the minde of the speaker which hee delivers: the perfection of the art of speech to others, consists in a volubility of applica­tion, and as one saith, if a man would come to an excellency of it, if he were [Page 24] to speake with a hundred persons, he should vary his stile to each: which Art Alexander seemes well to have knowne: whilst hee animates his Souldiers, some with the hope of Wealth, incenst the am­bitious with the heat of Honour, provoked the malicious, with the re­membrance of the former grudges betwixt the two Nations: Thus speeches which have an edge, enter sooner the affections; than dull and slow expression. It would not be unusefull to have the knowledge of the severall formes of [Page 25] speech; of suddaine que­stions, of suspended an­swers, and a great variety of others, in which they thinke▪ no small policy consists: together with the apprehension of the colours of praise and dispraise of vice and ver­tue: but in the use of these a man should have rather a largenesse of understan­ding, to turne themselves in with dexterity, than to be tied to the straightnesse of a few rules of remem­brance. To have wise­dome grounded in the heart, and no too much in the tongue, becomes [Page 26] policy: Loquendum ut vulgus, sentiendum ut sapientes. Words ought to become the person who useth them: which Tacitus intimates, spea­king of Augustus: Augusto profluens & quae principē deceret, fuit oratio. Se­neca notes also a danger, when words are not quickned with the life of reasons; but are onely ut­tered with a kind of plau­sibility of the speaker. No­cet illis eloquentia quibus amorem facit sui, non ora­tionis: imitatiō of others, however usefull, yet is servile; because it should [Page 27] come from the fluency of a happy imitation: but this is rather to be refer­red to the characters of stile and oratory, than to a serious observation: E­loquence makes for the credit of the matter; but to speak agreeably to whom you direct your speech, shews more of the wisdom of the person: Those who have the stile of eloquēce, do rather use the applause of it for pardon of faults, than for suffrage to ver­tues merits. Thus to know the parts of speech, is not onely the part of a good Grammarian, but a Polique.

5 Of Trust and Distrust.

IT cannot be denyed but that the safest rule to trust to, not to bee decei­ved, is to to distrust. A Religious suspition is a good antidote against the poyson of Vice, which still the divell instills into us with a deceitfull plea­sure, putting an imposture upon their understanding. Our Saviours prophecy of the latter times enjoyns this Caution: Cum venerit [Page 29] filius hominis, non inve­niet fidem super terram. There is a distrust com­manded to Doctrines, to Men, to Times: and how­ever we bee all from one common lumpe of the earth, that we might seem to keep a greater distance from men, than the com­mon Relation of Nature doth require, hee who said love one another, which is Charities Rule, the same bids us joyne the innocency of the Dove with the wisedome of the Serpent; which is Prudence Rule. It is a di­gressiō from the ordinary [Page 30] Law of Charity, to enter­tertaine suspitions, which onely flye in the night of a mans ignorance. It's the stile of Policy to di­strust, where by probabi­lity of appearance it may give security. To let e­very thing receive a mans owne additions; which are formed in the weake modell of a doubtfull fan­cy, distracts judgement; and though men that are most sensible of their own imperfections, wil soonest expect deficiencies from others: yet it is safe to thinke there is somewhat lyes hid, which he doth [Page 31] not apprehend; for it col­lects the understanding, admits not of any thing without due examinati­on; for many through want of venting the exta­sies of their breasts, have turned, dyed with the palenesse of envy, which have put the whole frame of their composition out of joynt▪ and we may wel decline from the trust to others, when it is not al­wayes safe to trust: our selves. The heart of man is deceitfull, which like a Magicke glasse, represents the forms of things which are not: Therefore first [Page 32] proceede from a know­ledge and caution to your selfe, to that of others; so it may prove a wholsome exorcisme, lest you might swell too great in selfe e­steeme: the flatterer com­poseth the modell of your owne desires, your selfe being the Archetype: therefore first let them be viewed in reasons light, & the others as things im­perfectly mixed, are obscu­red: Palle scunt phoebo ra­dios jaculante cometae. Machiavell doth well to acquaint the world with the common practice of men: for it induceth vi­gilancy [Page 33] to faire seeming actions and gestures pre­tending to amity, which are nothing but the ali­menta socordiae: For you shall have a man give you the smoothnesse of his countenance to bee taken hold of; whilst he studies evasion by the sliperinesse of his fancy. A fairer looke than ordinary to­wards the Spaniard, puts him into a present suspiti­on of his owne safety. In friendship it is a good rule odi tanquam amaturus, & ama tanquam oditurus. In­sinuations of amity are dangerous symptomes of [Page 34] a perfidious disposition. It is an ordinary custome for one man to build his fortunes out of the ruines of another: wee see the manner of Natures production of things, how commonly the cor­ruption of one thing, is the generation of ano­ther: and how many have generated their owne for­tunes, for taxing the cor­ruptions of other men: And ever note, that where there is too great a facili­ty of beleeving, there is also a willingnesse of de­ceiving: and although beliefe carries with it a [Page 35] colour of innocency, yet distrust still carries strēgth off safety. Tutius peccat qui diffidit, innocentius qui credit.

6 Iests.

IT is the best compositi­on of speech to use gra­vity of matter, and reserve a liberty of stile: which is no more than to turne aside from the ordinary wayes of expressions to certaine pleasant walkes made for the recreation [Page 36] of the mind. Jests in the wiser sort of men, serves as ornament; in the wea­ker they be but levity; if you use them concerning persons, the truest nature of a Iest, is to want truth, for they should have som­what of the invention: but if they taste of malig­nity, and beginne to flye on the wings of insolen­cy, they draw too nigh the nature of Libells. Therefore the State, and those heavenly bodyes of Majesty, admits not the presence of humane au­dacity: Nemo ad Deorum conviviū admittitur, nisi [Page 37] ad ludibrium: too much use of them in serious af­faires, relishes of the spirit of vanity: for Jests never penetrate farther than the superficies of the matter; which as one notes is the properplace of a Jest. They may come to the esteeme of light bodies, w ^ch ever swim on the top, but ne­ver with solidity goes to the depth of knowledge. They should never looke towards the Temple, for then the Jesuite meetes with him in his Epigram, Tu cave sed fiat ni io [...]s iste focus: they ought not to passe over greatnes [Page 38] of businesse with a slight of the minde; but they enjoy their use, when they mollifie sharpnesse of words, with sweetnesse of conceite: they are good companions in discourse, & are most facetious, whē attended with a happy concurrance of circum­stances. It is a Poeticall vertue, and where this kinde of ingenuity lights in men of more solid professions, it is a happy conjunction; for the one makes him usefull, the o­ther delightfull: they must be used like Physicke; you must not accustom others [Page 39] eares with them too much: for they lose their operation, by reason of the too much familiari­ty they have with the hea­rers.

But touching these kind of elegancies, I shal use the words of the learned Ve­rulam, who saith, That of all the excellencies of the gifts of the Minde, as to repeate after another a great number of names at once reciting: to write many Verses ex tempore of a Theame: to be quick in Satyricall similitudes: or ready to turne Iest in­to Earnest, or Earnest [Page 40] into Iest: these and the like I esteeme no more than the agility of a Dancer of the Ropes, or a Pantomime: for they are the like things: the one a­buses the strength of the body, the other of the minde.

7 Of Love.

THere is no precept commands that ap­plication over a man, as the power of Love; It drawes the affections by a [Page 41] kind of sweetnesse; wher­as rules doe it by distor­tion. Sometimes its like Circes wand, sometimes like Mercuries Caduceus: sometimes it corrupts, sometimes it makes chast: beauty commonly as it is either found or apprehen­ded, is the object of that fancy, which still proves like a Gorgon, which while men admire, it makes them blind in the eyes of the understan­ding; which causes one to extoll the vertues of the party loved so farre above truth. Vertue it selfe is faire, (which made [Page 42] him say) that if it could be seene, it would stirre up a great many lovers of it: Virtus nil aliud nisi internaforma, forma ex­terna virtus. It is the strongest of the passions, and often found in the weakest mindes; whose breasts not fortified by the strength of Councells; such amorous conceites have the easier accesse to. Every soule is imprinted with the character of this desire, which being tur­ned from the love of the Creatures to piety, it be­comes divinity: it makes all things seeme pleasant: [Page 43] and therefore it is the ad­vice of a great one, not to bee without some strong affection: for sine proposito vita languida est: Glances and gestures doe often procure affection, whether it be by strength­ning the imagination or not I know not: it is most fervent when most opposed: nor is it without a Mystery in Nature the secret attracting of affecti­ons betwixt particulars, without any knowledge or apprehension of their conditions; for there are certaine vertues which want a name, which is [Page 44] the cause some hardly can give a reason of their love.

It is prevalent, some­times in the wisest men, which shewes it hath a proximity with good.

Youth is most subject to those inclinations, which shewes that it is for the most part the Child of Vanity; whilst he is steeped in his affe­ctions, it becomes like a Dew which falls in the morning of his Youth, [Page 45] scarce got out of the night of his ignorance; and is expelled by the rising of the Sunne of his Knowledge.

Young men are amou­morous, middle-age af­fectionate, old men do­ting.

8 Of Action, Medita­tion, and Contem­plation.

THere is as much diffe­rence betwixt medi­tation, and Action in ci­vill [Page 46] knowledge, as is be­twixt Dreames and things really performed: the one hath the apprehension of a thing by the view of the understanding, the other the knowledge of the par­ticulars by the guide of experience. And al­though God and Angels must be onely spectactors, yet a nigh conjunction of Action and Meditation hath ever beene esteemed as a thing full fraught with vertues: for as Action would cease if it received not nourish­ment by Meditation; so Meditation, if not put in [Page 47] practice, would lose its vertue towards man. The publicke commands the best of every mans thoughts: even as in na­ture, Quod est conservati­vum formae majoris, id activitate potentius. Yet certainly they have all felt the influence of hea­venly joy in the quiet repose of their owne thoughts. Observation is the companion of me­ditation, as experience is of action: in the framing of a mans owne fortune, actions doe most con­duce: the worth of which is exprest by our Saviour: [Page 48] opera sequuntur eos. Those who wholly dedicate themselves to bee their owne readers, must know they are not at all times politicke: and those who meddle in multiplicity of action, will finde they are sometimes not wise: but the prayse of Con­templation, I leave as a subject to some Fryer, and will view the vertues of both: Publicke actions are commonly uncertain, which doe put on severall countenances, according to the variety of occasi­ons: the Notions which wee may get of mens [Page 49] thoughts are most cre­dible: for commonly we are most prone to thinke of that which wee are naturally inclined to. Naturall Pallats doe dis­gust the meditation of the Scriptures, till they be fed at Christs Table, they be sharpned for these hea­venly joyes: the corrupt opinion of Politicks have cast no little darknesse on the glory of letters, estee­ming them but as the Pa­trons of idlenesse, and that they doe reduce a mans minde from great­nesse of workes, to smal­nesse of speculation: when [Page 50] as every thought is an in­ternall act of reason, and first settles the mind with the knowledge of its du­ty, before it put it for­ward to execute; for o­therwise they may exer­cise their errous as well as vertues. In civill con­versation it is commonly said, that actionem esse cum stultis; lectionem cum sapientibus: Meditations in civill matters doe too much abstract the minde, when it is a good Rule; Minus pecuniae, minus fi­dei, minus prudentiae in mundo, quam homines co­gitent: The best rules [Page 51] in Prudence: consists in the apprehension of the smallest affaires; and yet makes up the body of one of the greatest knowled­ges. The best instances give the securest informa­tion, as Aristotle affirmes, Optima cujus que rei natura in portionibus ejus mini­mis observatur. Medita­tions in envious men are to be feared: Pallidos ti­meo, rubicundos amo: in religious men it is capable of divinity; in politicke men, it is generative of Counsells. Actions are like precedency of place, most honourable when [Page 52] they lead: Things that have beene once done, though they have more difficulty, yet they have lesse praise: in the one you must not bee too stupid, in the other not too prag­maticall. Meditations are like parents, which doe generate: Post varios usus meditando extunderet ar­tes. Actions are like chil­dren which doe perpetu­ate; ut non solum fuisse vi­deantur, sed vixisse.

9 Of Errours and Deceits.

ERrors be the cunning Artists of Vice, as De­ceit is of Errors. Cunning men are most dangerous; whē they seem most wise, Serpens putredo magis contagiosa, quam matura: they take no more of ver­tue than serves for their turne; and desires onely an opinion of honesty, to procure him other mens faith, a chiefe instrument [Page 54] for him to worke by: those whose mindes are not capable of vertuous intentions, they divert to sinister & by wayes, to co­zen the simplicity of other mens beliefe: thus true & solid wisedome often de­generates into poore slights of the mind, while they wrap all their actions in deceite, the better to carry them invisible: so that they are growne to that subtilty of the Art, that as one wittily saith, Qui indissimulantèr omnia agit, ae (que) decepit; nam plu­rimi aut non capiunt, aut non credunt: so that it is [Page 55] become a hard matter not to deceive: the greatest advantage of deceite is o­ther mens imperfections: they practise them in words, in gestures; in the composing of which, they are so curious, that if you should looke into the re­alty of their actions, they would prove but a poore labyrinth of vanity: which having found out by the even thread of truth, and having unfolded them, you will finde them to bee but a poor rable of deceit: Qui fraudum minutijs ne­gotiorum frangunt solidi­tatem. You never heard [Page 56] of any man of more than ordinary worth, but whose wisedomes were made of the same stuffe as the Souldiers credit was: è telâ crassiore, and not admirable for its fine thinnesse: To use them to others, is the way to make them take the like liberty in the use of them to you againe: so that you will hinder your selfe so much of the know­ledge of the certainty of their intentions.

There are three Cha­racters noted of deceite in the Scriptures: Devi­ta prophanas vocum novi­tates, [Page 57] & oppositiones fal­si nominis scientiae; inep­tas & aniles fabulas devi­ta. Nemo vos decipiat in sublimitate sermonū. Cun­ning men soonest deceive, when not knowne; there­fore I may well change the Poets Verse.

10 Of Content.

OVr endeavours in the pursuit of this, re­sembles the Sunne, which gives us light into the knowledge of these terre­striall bodyes; but againe obscures those Starres and the heavenly globe: so wee still dive into the practises and workes of men on earth, while we never thinke of the glori­fied bodies of the Saints in heaven: it is a mystery [Page 59] in nature, that all men doe desire some stay or pole upon which the rest of their thoughts may bee turned: and how happily a man may make this Re­ligion, I appeale to the joy it affords: a generall view of the understan­ding of the whole world, and all that dwell upon it, makes much for the na­ture of Content. This was Solomons prospect, when hee looked upon all the workes of his hands, hee pronounced them to bee vanity and vexation of spirit: Men (according to the divine Aphorisme) [Page 60] are borne to trouble, as sparkes flye upwards: and thus we may best obscure the false light of worldly delights with the sunne of true wisedome and know­ledge. The place of con­tent, is the content of the place you are in: the highest feete of honour, may bee below the true sence of it: for ambition is like a Fever, which ever seekes to heale and perfect it selfe by changing of place, when it is not the local person, but the mind that is capable of serenity. It is an axiome in the Phy­sicks: Quod corpus non [Page 61] ponderare nisi extra locum suum: The stone weighs not till it it bee lifted off from the body to which it tends: no more doth the soule feele the weight of labour and care, while it hath its conversation in heaven (its proper place) from whence originally it came.

Folly is joy to him who is destitute of understan­ding; but a man of under­standing walketh upright­ly. There is nothing so much breeds greatnesse of Spirit, as to know the smalnesse of the worth of things: for those men [Page 62] who are onely intent up­on the petty things of the world, doe sacrifice themselves to the incon­stancy of Fortune, by rea­son the object of their de­sires is so capable of vicis­situdes; and doe for feit their content: but re­move a little these Elysi­ums, the joyes of Humane fancy, and those severall motions of desires which may seeme to arise even from the variety of our composure: and bee ravi­shed a little with a delecta­re ô anima mea in Deo: The sweetnesse of which musicke drownes all the [Page 63] lesser sounds of worldly delights: it settles all the distempers of the soule, and makes it smooth with a constant equality to­wards humane dangers. Thus, you may invert the order of humane delights, while the Worldling is taken with the riches of Gods mercies; while we here build up the ad­mirable Fabricke of our salvation, wherein Christ is the chiefe corner stone. Here you may have your Gardens for meditation, and hence translate to your owne breasts the flowers of Vertue, which [Page 64] may make it flourish as a paradise to it selfe: Here you may enjoy the prospect of the Worlds Vanities, beneath the high pitch of thy subli­mer soule: where to bee conscious of well-doing, is the per­fection of Hu­mane feli­city.

11 Of Friendships.

FRiendships are enter­tained for credit, for affection, for necessity: the chiefe use of them for cre­dit is with great men: for affection with persons of moderate estate: for ne­cessity with poore men. However men put on faire forms of friendship, yet parity was a thing much celebrated by the Ancients: rich men will be more cautious, because [Page 66] they have somewhat to lose; men of like fortunes will commonly sticke clo­ser to you: poore men will bee ever suspitious of your love towards them. They are a reme­dy against solitude: if they be entered with good men, they restore the per­fection of man; if with bad they corrupt it: craf­ty men abuse them, simple men know them not, wise men use them. One alone makes not a par­radise; so let them bee few but vertuous. For it is a thing wherin a man doth interpret himselfe, [Page 67] Nam qui amicitias arct as copulat novas necessitudi­nes sibi imponit: In the making of a mans owne fortune he is fittest; Qui sapit innumeris moribus. All the caution touching bad men, shall bee like the learning of Sophismes, the better to avoid them: keeping of company hath still a kinde of assimilati­on, as the Physiciās speak, though it happēs through divers distempers of the minde: some desires you through malice to defame you; others through cor­ruption of manners to make you bad, some [Page 68] through cunning to have you feede their sinnes, which themselves are not able to maintaine. In dealing with these men you must imitate that musicall troope of decei­ving the sence: ut cum jam adesse videatur, placide ela­betur, because friends love not to have con­tempt cast upon their wayes: good men enjoy, cunning men interpret, malitious avoyde, scof­fers neglect: these offer themselves to my penne, as they are commonly u­sed in civill conversation. The knowledge of all [Page 69] persons reacheth but to this, to teach men to play their cards the bet­ter, and to performe busi­nesse with more dexterity and readinesse.

6 Of Silence.

A Man had neede to be very well verst in the parts of speech, that needs not the help of this Mute. To forbeare to speake truth or piety, through too superstitious reve­rence to the goddesse of [Page 70] Silence, were to make a man liable to his Paradox who told one who was silent, Si prudens sis, stul­tus es, si stultus prudens. Liberty of speech shewes freedome of minde, and yeelds a man informati­on by others answers. Silence is the vertue of a friend, for men love com­monly to lay the things of most value in the surest place; which is the reason the secret mans bosome doth participate of so many Councells: He who offends through Speech, offēds rashly, who throgh silence safely. Wisedome resteth [Page 71] in the heart of him that hath understanding: but that which is amongst fools shall be made knowne. It hath a strange kinde of vertue in it: and in the Pythagorean Schoole was thought to breed know­ledge, like those who in dreames receive influen­ces: In matters of con­sequence qui silet est fir­mus; For Fame is like a river which gather strēgth by going. In some cases a thing not spoke doth expresse more, than if it had beene spoke, saith Sophocles. Silence often shewes a depth, though [Page 72] they say the Currant stream is most cleare. Men very politicke are noted by Tacitus to use a kinde of freenesse in opening of themselves. Caesar pub­lickly profest that he had rather bee first in a poore Cottage than second at Rome; but he knew them to be his friends to direct them, not his competitors to awake them. It is a kinde of darknesse, for it makes you walke in ob­scurity, and rather to bee guest at then knowne. In discourse it is good to heare men first; for silence hath the same effect with [Page 73] authority, it procures a kinde of respect to your words: Meritis si forte virum quem conspexere si­lent. Commonly they are well tuned, but gives the pleasantnesse of the musick inwardly to them­selves: and are as a shut booke, which if you open and reade, you may find much good discourse ther­in. It nourisheth Meditati­on, & is no more than that which Seneca expresses, Sapiens semper in se recon­ditur, but in case of devo­tion you must still use it, ut eo sis melior, non occul­tior.

13 Of Questions.

SOme men doe rather employ their inventi­ons in raising of questi­ons; then their judgments in determining them: the one makes learning fruit­full of disputes, the other of workes. Asking of questions proceeds com­monly from some preno­tion of that which hee doth aske, which occasio­ned that opinion in Plato, to thinke that all know­ledge [Page 75] was but onely re­membrance: Qui aliquid quaerit, generali quâdam notione comprehendit, ali­ter qui fieri potest, ut illud quod fuerat inventum ag­noscas. It is a great part of learning not to teach onely what to assert, or affirme, but prudently to aske. Men that are ve­ry froward in asking, doe often use the same liberty in telling: Like Vessells which want a bottome, they receive most, because they vent most: in cun­ning men they are dan­gerous, for Questions in them are like Beggers [Page 76] gifts, sua munera mittit in hamo, which are onely to draw somewhat backe againe by way of answer, to betray you. Suddaine Questions doe often pro­cure the truest relation of matters, which on con­sidiration they doe begin to colour: they must bee warily raised in religion, for in it we have still more respect to the author of divinity, than the matter: and as delight in humane Learning is inferiour to that which is divine, so faults committed in di­vine knowledge are more dangerous than those in [Page 77] humane. The ancients did raise them with a jea­lousie, which is Gods at­tribute; not with the spi­rit of contention, which is the Divells: In the life of Christ it is observed that his humility did conquer all the vaine prac­tises of men; so in religion, which is the Christians life, humblenesse of spi­rit doth often goe beyond the subtilety of humane understanding: for a man may let his soule slip a­way, and yet dispute of the highest points of divi­nity: and therefore it is safer with some of the [Page 78] Saints to sit at Christs feet with humility in medita­tion of his passion, than in the Chaire of subtile con­troversie.

14 Of Life.

MEn desire Life, as Children doe the light: and as the love in the one is encreased by the sight of glorious trifles, so is that in the o­ther. The desire of hu­mane honours, the glo­ry of splendid miseries, the [Page 79] comforts of friends, and all the passions which we attract in the course of our life, by too much fa­miliarity with them, doe make it so desireable. The consideration of life as it is a passage and journey is good and wholesome; but the feare of the brevi­ty of it, tastes of a weake and vaine spirit: there is some mixture of va­nity in the contemplatiōs of them, who would make the space of a whole life but a preparation for the pains of death; when wee know it should bee spent after the comforts [Page 80] of a better life; in hoc quod mortem prospicimus, falli­mur; quicquid enim retr [...] est, mors est. And we fol­low a better Oracle, who hath told us that Death hath lost his sting, which might sharpen our feares. The Satyrist speakes not onely like a good Poet, but a good Morallist: Quid Turpiùs esset, quam propter vitam, vivendi perdere causam: while wee desire to advance our lives, we neglect the per­formance of those duties for which it was given us. The Ethnicks did terminate the desires of [Page 81] life in the happinesse of it: great men oft slight it in others, abuse it in them­selves. Nero preferred Seneca's livings before his life, though he had for­merly beene his schoole­master. Vertues perfect life, innocency restores it, vices debase it: the pas­sions contemne it: prospe­rity shewes the riches of life, adversity the wealth of the minde: hunc volo, laudari qui sine morte po­test. The true esteem of the worth of life, raises a man to the highest pitch of Heroicall valour. This made Iohn the Duke of [Page 82] Saxony, being condem­ned to dye, esteeme no more of his life than a game at Chesse came to. This made Sir Thomas Moore (while hee jested with the Barber about the Controversie between his head and the King) esteem so little of his life; I mean not the bare dissolution of his frame into their se­verall elements; but in a true consideration of life, and her severall stages, we may safely repose our thoughts in Solomons Parable: una generatio mi­grat, & altera venit, sed terra manet in aeternum [Page 83] veluti the atrum in quo haec fabula pregitur: it is the best conjunction to be an old man in wisedome, and a child in innocency. Life commonly gives not that fame to men of excellency of parts, as Death which is the life of Fame, which rises out of her ashes; ex­cept some turne a lover of men, and devote them­selves to the Common­wealth: then laudem mors alijs quam tibi vita dedit.

15 Of Sciences.

SInce Learning is the perfecter of Humane reason; its happy when it selfe is perfected by reason of experience: Theology is the safest starre to direct our course in the wayes of the intellectuall world, in which, as in other parts of the greater world, you shall meet with some pla­ces barren, some for use, others for delight: some Sciences are fruitlesse of [Page 85] workes, others usefull in direction, others pleasant in speculatiō. They should not be altogether Virgins, but should sometime bring forth and bee gene­rative; and as they be the improvement of humane reason, so its reason men should endeavour to im­prove them; multi per­transibunt, & augebitur scientia, was the prophe­cy of the last and worst times. To have Sciences still runne after the stile of Master & Scholler, is Pe­danticall, to have them labour for production of workes, is Philosophicall. [Page 86] Disputes rise from the search into the understan­ding, workes from the scrutiny into nature; wherefore saith Heracli­tus, Let men seeke the truth of things in the greater World, not in their owne little Worlds. Elenches (the idols of mens brains) are come to that sinnesse of slight, as Seneca seemes well to expresse them, whiles he compares them to the tricks of Juglers; which we know not after what manner they bee done; but we know sure enough that it is not so, as it seemes to us [Page 87] to be. Rationall studies doe still sharpen the un­derstanding for the or­derly capacity and metho­dicall apprehension of a­ny matter. Morall Phi­losophy guides the affecti­ons, Logicke the under­standing, Policy the Com­mon-wealth; Astrology is conjecturall; Mathe­maticks certaine, Meta­physicks sublime: Poetry rises from the strength of a Naturall wit, Rhetorick from a dainty minde; Natural Philosophy from deepe Caves and Mine­ralls, saith a learned one: History springs from [Page 88] times, matters, persons. Knowledge and learning without experience, is like the statue of Poly­phemus, which wants an eye: And therefore men who are wholly immer­sed in their own thoughts are lesse nimble for taking hold of occasions. To go alwaies by the straight­nes of rule, doth not so wel agree with the crosse lines of fortune, which requires a fashioning head: so that little learning falling in­to men of strength of ca­pacity, nimblenesse of ap­prehension, ability of judgement, will produce [Page 89] greater effects than a con­tinued study in an unexpe­rienc'd man. Knowledge of Sciences, brings forth such workes, which accor­ding to the parts of the re­ceiver prove the Nobler. Cunning men, it makes them able to deceive: the judicious it makes them apply thēselves to nobler ends and intentions: in Stoical natures they breed a neglect of things. Grave studies make a man lear­ned, ingenious studies praised, religious happy; and sometimes the foolish studies most fortunate.

16 Of Dangers.

ELegant was his obser­vation of the gazing Philosopher, how that if hee had looked downe, he might have seen the stars in the water; but looking up hee could not see the water in the starres: and commonly inspection in­to low matters, discover the knowledge of those things, which by the con­templation of themselves might expose us to dan­ger; [Page 91] melior est oculi visio, quam animi progressio. Dangers have somewhat of the nature of the Coca­trice; and as the one is be­got of prodigious mix­ture, so is the other of dis­parity of circumstances; whom if you chance to observe first the feare of danger is past; but if hee penetrate you first, he en­dangers your safety. Some are more quick on the pre­sent to avoyd the blow, than of fore-sight to pre­vent it; security is the Mo­ther of them, so that they have the quality of an ene­my, Dolus an virtus quis [Page 92] in hoste, they often deceive as well as overcome: to whom they seeme light, they soonest light into them: Changes and pe­riods of Cōmon-wealths, in some sort exceede the reach of humane Pru­dence: which as the King­dome of heaven comes not by observation, but reaches to an high act of Providence. The avoy­ding of danger, altoge­ther wants not danger; for sometimes Physick, which is given against the vio­lency of one diseasese, en­clines the body to a worse, and are so much the more [Page 93] hurtfull, by how much the more secret. Dangers doe shew prudence, safety temperance. Some doe vainly affect a kinde of glory in running into them: but hee that loves danger shal perish therein. They are well cōsidered in private, but are ill feared in action; for then nil ter­ribile nisi ipse timor. Its wisdom to oversee them, valour to overcome them, desperatenesse to run into them.

17 Of Precepts of Policy.

THe extent of this dis­course, is as large as the actions of men them­selves: and Speeches in this kinde being but the children of observation, have the liveliest repre­sentation of action, when experienced men write them. Therefore I will borrow some from that King, whose heart was said to be like the sands of [Page 95] the Sea; and will set them without order, to shew that they are still capable of additions.