Jannoti's Division of Govern­ment, (of which the Author of Oceana is so well perswaded that he builds up his Definitions of Government, and the frame of his whole Discourse upon it) may [Page 2] safely be admitted if he means only that the Greeks and Romans were before the Goths and Van­dals, or that Solon and Brutus were dead long before Theodoricus or Genseric were born; But if his in­tention be (as Mr. Harrington seems to understand him) that be­fore Caesar in the time of Antient Prudence the Greeks and Romans observed a way of Government free from those imputations of passion and violence with which the government of succeeding a­ges (and that generally proves to be Monarchicall) is chargeable, it will be necessary to propose some Considerations.

1. It seems to be a defect of Ex­perience to think that the Greek and Roman actions are only con­siderable in Antiquity; It is very frequent with such as have been conversant with Greek and Ro­man Authors to be led by them [Page 3] into a belief that the rest of the World were a rude inconsidera­ble people, &c. which is a term they very much delight in, alto­gether barbarous. This humour was even among them a mean & servile addiction to narrow Prin­ciples, and a piece of very Pedanti­call pride; but in us who have not the same temptation of interest, it would be downright folly. In this question the Examples of the Baby­lonians, Persians, and Egyptians, (not to insist upon the new discoveries of the Chinese History) cannot without gross partiality be negle­cted; and their government will not onely be found to have been Monarchical, but also in a more absolute and arbitrary form (if I mistake not very much) then is to be met with at present in any kingdom of Europe.

2. But then, they who have not yet passed their Novitiat in Hi­story [Page 4] are not ignorant that origi­nally all Government among the Greeks was Regal; At the War of Troy we find them commanded by their Kings & Princes, & Thucy­dides Lib. 1 says expresly that it was not till after the taking of Troy, which filled Greece with arrogance and riches, that hereditary Monar­chies degenerated into tyrannies. And then it was that the Grecians out of an extreme a version to that which was the cause of their pre­sent sufferings, slipt into Popular Government; not that upon calm and mature Debates they found it best, but that they might put themselves at the greatest di­stance (which spirit usually ac­companies all Reformations) from that with which they were grown into dislike. Yet Macedon an im­portant part of Greece, and that which lifted the Grecian name to the highest pitch of glory, never [Page 5] suffered this change, but conti­nued under a successive Royalty.

3. The foundation of the Ro­man state was in Kingship; and if it be considered how accidental, tumultuary, and violent the change was, there will be very little from thence to be inferred to the credit of the succeeding go­vernment.

After these Considerations I must profess I am not convinced of any utility in this Division of ancient and modern prudence, or that a Court of Claims would al­low of the pretentions to ancient prudence, which are laid by that kind of government which Oceana endeavours to assert.

If then this Division of govern­ment have lost it's credit, the De­finitions of the several Members of it need not be considered fur­ther then that they come not at all up to the first and remotest Noti­ons of government, in the foun­dation and origination of it, about which is all the difficulty; and being here neglected, there is little reason to hope the subsequent Discourse can have in it the Light of probable satisfaction, much less the force of infallible Demonstra­tion.

I do not think my self bound to undertake all Challenges that are sent to Mr. Hobs: but the easinesse of the Defence in this Particular that Men Govern and not Laws, tempts me to be his second. To say that Laws doe or can Govern, is to amuse our selves with a form of speech, as when we say Time or Age or Death does such a thing; To which indeed the Fan­sie of Poets or Superstition of Women may adapt a Person, and give a Power of Action; but Wise men know they are only expressi­ons of such Accidents and Quali­fications as belong to things and Persons. He that requires Obe­dience from another, cannot ra­tionally do so unlesse he declare what those things are, both to be done and not to be done, in which this obedience is to be paid; This [Page 8] Declaration of the Will of the soveraign Power is called Law, which if it outlives the person whose Will it was, it is only be­cause the persons who succeed in power are presumed to have the same Will, unless they manifest the contrary, and that is the abro­gation of a Law: So that still the Government is not in the Law, but in the person whose Will gives a being to that law. This declared Will of those who have power is of the Essence of law; the punishment exprest, I conceive is not so; For it is enough for me to obey the Will of a person, that I know hath power to hurt me, though I do not know particu­larly what the hurt is he will doe me; and therefore as some laws are, so all might have been with leaving the punishment at the discretion of the Magistrate.

In the similitude, the great Gun [Page 9] is not well traversed to this point. If the Proportion of things be accurately considered, it will appear that the laden Canon an­swers not to the laws but to the power of the person whose Will creates those laws, without which power he might be as as safely disobeyed, as that Gunner may be contemn'd who hath neither powder nor Bullet in his Piece.

The whole force of the next Objection against Mr. Hobs a­mounts but to this; That because Hervey in his Circulation hath fol­lowed the principles of nature; therefore Aristotle and Cicero have done so in their Discourses of Go­vernment.

The partition of Government, with reference to the persons in whose hands it is, into Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, without Question is very natural; for necessarily either One or All, or some number between both must have the power; nor do I see how we can have a Conception of any other Government, unless at the same time we can conceive the power may be resident in more then All, or less then One. It is not to be denied but that in History the names of Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy are to be found applied to such go­vernments, the parts of which se­verally taken may serve to com­pound a new individual Govern­ment [Page 11] differing from all of them: But this Mixture and Difference is no more then this (which not being enough attended to, hath been the cause of great Mistakes) that some points of the Govern­ment are administred by one or few persons, or by the body of the people; as perhaps one single per­son governs the Militia, some select few dispatch affairs of State, the whole people meet for Electi­on of Officers; And yet the Sove­raignty or supreme power belongs but to one of these three; and the Actions in which it is truly seated are no waies communicable to the other two.

In considering the Principles of Government, Mr. Harrington gives us cause to complain of a great Disappointment; We hoped to receive from his hand that satis­faction about them, which several great Wits have in vain studied to derive to us; but we find him instead of the first principles thru­sting upon us such things as are at best but fair endowments of persons fit to be intrusted with a Government already settled or resolved on. The Wisdome, Courage, or Riches of another man can never give him a Title to my obedience, nor take from me that liberty with which I was born: There must be something before all these in the Nature of Government, without which it will be as unjust to define Sove­raignty and subjection, as it would [Page 13] be to oblige Mr. Harrington to give his cloaths or money to the next man he meets wiser or richer then himself.

There is a great Contention between Leviathan and Oceana (whose names might seem to pro­mise a better Agreement) whether power or propriety be the Foun­dation of Dominion; but they seem to me to mean the same things; For what is propriety but Riches? and Riches are (Pag. 3.) confest to be power: The Diffe­rence then is only in Words; and propriety the Ballance; the Agra­rian, &c. make up onely a new Lexicon to express those things we knew before.

But the Assertion will appear too positive that propriety produ­cing Empire consists only in land, except in such places as Holland and Genoa which have little or no land: Experience instructs us that it is not a large possession in lands, but an Estate in ready mony [Page 15] which is proper for carrying on a great and sudden Enterprise. And we know of what importance Banks or Monti are, even in other places besides Amsterdam and Ge­noa. I will propose a Case, which was once so neer being a true one, that I presume it canot be rejected as improbable. England is defined to have been under the Gothick Ballance, that is, having the pro­priety in the hands of a Nobility and Clergy, and consequently to have been a mixt Monarchy, where the King was not absolute: To a King of England, Hen. 7. was the first proposition of discovering America made by Columbus, which if it had been embraced, the Silver of Potosi had sailed up the Thames instead of the Guadalquivir, and by this the Kings Revenue would annually have been encreased a­bove a Million, the rest comming into the hands of private Mer­chants [Page 16] and Adventurers, and not of the principall Nobility. In this case I ask whether this Acces­sion of Revenue would not have preponderated on the Kings part, and changed the Ballance, though the Lands at home had still been possest by the Nobility in the same Proportion as before. It is not to be doubted but that a Revenue sufficient to maintain a Force able to bear down all Opposition, does equally conduce to Empire, whi­ther it arises from the Rents of lands, the Profits of ready moneys, the Duties payable upon Manu­factures and Traffique, or any other kind of Income.

That Empire is well divided into National and Provincial, shall be admitted without Opposition, if I may be satisfied in this de­mand, whether there may not be a mixture of these two, by which the Ballance of Government shall [Page 17] receive Alteration: which in effect differs little from this, That the severall parts of a Nationall Empire may so poise one another as to produce a new Ballance. For example, The Crowns of Castile and Arragon were of a differing Ballance, the power of the King being more absolute in the for­mer, and the interest of the Com­munalty greater in the latter; The union of these two Crowns did not render the Government of Arragon purely forrain or provin­cial; And yet the Ballance in Arra­gon hath been so far changed by it, that the power of the King hath devoured the Interest of the people. This is no nice and un­profitable speculation; for it is the case of almost all the present Soveraignties in Europe, hardly any one of which is all of one piece, but is composed of distinct Provinces differing in Genius, [Page 18] Laws, Customes and Ballance, which have come to be united at distant times, and by as various Titles.

I know not how it comes about, but Mr. Harrington hath taken up a very great unkindnesse for the Clergy, which (though it be most discovered towards the end of the book, and in another little Discourse of a later Date) here begins to manifest it self: For he invades one part of their Office without asking their leave; He falls a preaching, and taking that of Solomon for his Text, I have seen servants upon horses, &c. he pro­ceeds to make us a very goodly Sermon.

From thence he slips into some Metaphysical considerations of the soul of Man, and its opera­tions, which being translated to Government must evince the Truth of this Assertion, That a Commonwealth is an Empire of Laws and not of men. If I could be perswaded he were so far in earnest as to expect any Man should be convinced by the Me­taphorical use of two or three Words, some further considerati­ons might be proposed; In the mean while it is enough to desire, that seeing the whole force of the Argument rests upon the simili­tude of Government with the soul of Man, we may be instructed what the soul is, and what the whole Philosophy belonging to it: And then and not before, will [Page 20] it be time to consider how far the similitude between that and Go­vernment will hold true.

The Argumentation about the Reason or Interest of Mankind is little less infirm: For the Question being, Whether there be any such primary Interest of Mankind dif­fering from that of every particu­lar Man, He takes it for granted there is such a common right or Interest, more excellent then that of the parts, without proffering any other proof then the Testi­monies of Hooker and Grotius; Whose Opinions cannot oblige us beyond the Reasons on which they are founded. Mr. Hooker's Expressions are altogether figura­tive, and it is easier to prove from them that Things wanting sense [Page 21] make Discourses and act by Ele­ction, then that there is such a thing as a common Interest of Mankind. For Grotius his words, They carry a great Restriction with them, and the way of pro­ducing Action in Beasts is so diffe­rent from the Emanation of humane Reason, that the Infe­rence from one to the other must needs be very weak.

And therefore it was a very judicious part to foresee that the Difficulty would still remain, and no less ingeniously done to confesse That a man doth not look upon reason as it is right in it self, but as it makes for him or against him; That is, that the common Interest stoops [Page 22] to every mans peculiar one. But we are promised a solution so facile, that it is obvious to such as have the Green sicknesse. Let two Girles, saies he, have a Cake given between them, that each may have what is due: Divide saies the one that I may choose, or I will divide and you shall choose; And this is the whole mystery of a Commonwealth. An Oven it seems is the best Em­bleme of the World, and a Bake-house the only School of Policy. Let us obey Mr. Harrington when he send us in Pistrinam, and consi­der a while this mystery. The Cake was given that each might have what was due; so the Laws of this society proceeded not from any Natural Right, or from the consent of the Girles, but were limited by the Person who gave the Cake with this intent that it might be equally divided between them. Again, these Girles live [Page 23] under the Discipline of the Rod, that is, under a Government al­ready establisht, and she that had been wronged in the Division might upon appeal to the School Mistress or the Person who gave them the Cake, have obtained an equal share. But now suppose the two girles had met by chance, and found the Cake in their way, and suppose them out of the influ­ence of all such persons whose power might constrain them to an equal Division, must we still believe they would have strained courtesie, and not rather think the stronger of the two Girles would have eaten up the whole Cake if she found her stomach serve her for it? This is no great mystery, but will be found to be the true Case of a Common wealth: For ei­ther Government is founded upon Paternity and the Natural Ad­vantage the first Father had over [Page 24] all the rest of Mankind who were his sons, and then there will be no such thing as dividing and choosing, but being content with what portion he allows; Or else Government flows from the en­crease of strength and power in some Man or Men to whose Will the rest submit, that by their sub­mission they may avoid such mischief as otherwise would be brought upon them; And then here also there is no room for dividing and choosing, but ac­quiescing in the Will of him whose power cannot be resisted. There may perhaps be degrees of this power as it more or less ex­ceeds the strength and force of those who are to obey, the pro­portion of which degrees being duly observed will I conceive teach us the true Nature of those things which are commonly re­puted to be Conditions imposed [Page 25] upon the supream power. If the power of the Government exceed in any great proportion the power of those that are under his Go­vernment, so that he stands not in need of any thing he can have from them, The Govern­ment becomes absolute and unli­mited; But if he exceeds them in a less proportion and be in conti­nual want of something that they may allow him, he must buy it by some concessions or other as cheap as he can; But this amounts not to a mixture of the Government; for without an excess in Power there can be no Government. Thus a General of an Army sitting down before two Towns, the one very weak, the other of good strength, will have the first at discretion, to the second he allows good and honourable Conditions, out of a desire to save his time or Men, or to preserve the place from [Page 26] being defaced, and the Ammuni­tion imbezeled: Or to take Mr. Harrington's own example, The stronger Girle gives the other a piece of Cake to fetch her some water to drinke after it. Since Mr. Harrington hath brought these Actors upon the Stage, he will not I hope take it ill if one of the Girles give him an Answer; and tell him in her proper style, That his Cake is dough.

In the next example of the twenty men, the Paralogism lies [Page 27] in this. Let us take twenty men, saies he, and forthwith make a Com­monwealth; He first supposes them a Commonwealth, and then considers how they would dispose of the Government; But it is to be denied that they could ever have been a Commonwealth, unless in one of the cases last exprest, in which the Government would not have been free for them to dispose of. The sence of want among Men that are in equality of power, may beget a desire of Exchange; as let me have your Horse and you shall have my Cow, which is the Fountain of private Contracts; but it is not to be with reason imagined that this should be enough to make a Man part with a natural Freedom, and put himself into the hands of a Power from which he can after­ward have no shield though it should be used to his own Destru­ction.

But Mr. Harrington hath not in this lost his way without com­pany; for I have observed very frequently that while men profess to consider of the Principles of Government, they fall upon Noti­ons which are the meer Effects of Government, not unlike the com­plaint of Grotius, that they who treat of Jus Gentium do commonly mistake some part of the Roman Jus Civile for it.

To consider this instance of the twenty men a little further. What security can Mr. Harrington give us, that the six in their consulta­tions shall not aim rather at their own advantage then that of the fourteen, and so make use of the eminence of their parts to circum­vent the rest? Or on the other fide how shall we be satisfied that the fourteen will not soon begin to think themselves wise enough to consult too, and making use of [Page 29] their excess in power pull the fix off their Cushions, where they must needs appear to sit at better Ease then the fourteen were in while they stood at the Door waiting for the Result of their Debates.

I am willing to gratifie Mr. Harrington with his Partition of them into six and fourteen; but if I had been in an humour of con­tradiction, it had been as free for me to have said that some one of the twenty would have excelled all the rest in Judgement, Expe­rience, Courage and height of Genius, and then told him that had been a Naturall Monarchy establish't by God himselfe over Mankind.

In exchange of this fair dealing, I expect Mr. Harrington should [Page 30] inform me what it is he means when he saies the Decrees of the Senate are never Laws, nor so called, but Senatus consulta; The word Senatus consultum is a Latine name, and belongs not properly to the Decrees of any Senate but that of the Romans; so I must at present necessarily understand him, That the Roman Senatus con­sulta never were Laws. It is true they were not called Leges, no more were the Plebiscita, the Edicta Praetorum, and other parts of the Roman Jus Civile; but they had the power of Laws, and equally with them required the obedience of the whole Roman people. Coepit Senatus se interponere, & quic­quid constituisset, observabatur; Id (que) D. de ori­gine juris. P. necessa­rium de­inde quia. jus appellabatur Senatus consultum. Thus the Senatus consultum Mace­donianum, with many more came to have a place allowed them by Justinian in the compilement of [Page 31] the Roman Laws. Nor can it be pretended that the Senatus consulta were (like the orders of one single house of Parliament) binding only to their own members; for though it were so at first with the Plebis­cita, to avoid the discord which was by it occasioned, It was soon agreed that the distinct Decrees of the Senate and People should be extended to the Nature of Laws, and oblige the whole body Cujac. com. ad. s. of the Commonwealth, as is pro­ved by Cujacius.

To lay down what hath been said upon a smaller Scale: It hath been shown, That Ancient Prudence differs not from Mo­dern, and serves not at all to enforce Oceana's project of Go­vernment; That Commonwealths are no more then Monarchys the Empire of Laws and not of Men; That there is no such thing as a mixt Government, but that the [Page 32] supreme Power and the Actions in which it truly and properly resides must belong to one or all or some Number between both; That Oceana falls short in conside­ring the principles of government, and takes for Principles things that are a great deal on this side of them; That to say propriety is the foundation of Empire is all one to say that power is; That this propriety may as well consist in ready Money, or any other forraign Revenue as in Possession of Lands; That there is a Ballance producible by distinct Govern­ment united into one person, which Mr. Harrington did not consider; That the common Right or Interest of Mankind, dif­fering from that of every particu­lar Man, is not firmly made out to us; That the notion of dividing and choosing cannot subsist; And that the Instances alledged for it [Page 33] are mistaken; That the consent of the people is an improbable and weak Hypothesis of the Ori­ginal of Government, which is better deduced either from Pater­nity or Force; And finally that there can be no Government without excess of power.

After this I hope it will appear no ill grounded confidence in me to say, that there is very little, if any thing, of consequence in the first and General part of the Preli­minaries left unanswered: And the principal Stones being thus taken from the Foundation, a little Wind will be enough to re­verse the superstructure.

I am now come to Mr. Harring­ton's Appeal to past Ages for justifying these Principles of a Commonwealth; which Appeal is made to God in the Fabrick of the Commonwealth of Israel, and unto the World in the Ʋniversal series of Ancient Prudence. Of the Com­monwealth of Israel, anon; For the World I must remind Mr. Harrington of my just complaint put in against him for partiality in omitting the Examples of the Assyrians, Persians, and Egyptians, and all other old Monarchical Go­vernments, which certainly are included in the Ʋniversal series of Ancient Prudence. But perhaps I am too blame to think Mr. Harring­ton should have lesse Discretion then a common Atturney, who will be sure to examine only those Witnesses that seem to make for the cause in which he is enter­tained.

One particular in this appears more then strange to me; It is, that having said the Heathens have all written their Common­wealths, as if they had no other Copy but that of Israel in the holy Scriptures, (Page 18) in the Enu­meration he brings in Switz and Holland. Which is it? Are these two within the series of Ancient Prudence, or must they be recko­ned among the Heathen Com­monwealths?

I applied my self so late to the reading and considering of Oceana, that before I could reach so far as to examine what is asserted con­cerning the Commonwealth of Israel, I was made a spectatour of the Paper-combat between the Author and Dr. Ferne, the publi­cation of which proclaims the Author's conceit of the Victory. He indeed deserves the reputation of making rude Charges, and in [Page 36] these Disputes the last Reply gains the Opinion of the same Ad­vantage, as in Battels it does to stay last upon the Field. If the Doctor's Leisure and Inclination serves him, we may see the Fight renewed; However there is so much reason to expect that some of the Clergy (against all of whom the Author hath declared War) will undertake the Quarrel, that I think it cannot justly be counted any subterfuge in me to wave this part of the Dispute, and leave it in the hands of those men whose Interest and Obligation gives them a propriety in it.

Not to examine then whether it be a true or false Picture which Mr. Harrington hath drawn of the Republique of Israel, I will only consider how far we are now bound to work after that Origi­nal, and whether there may not be Proportion, Force and Beauty in [Page 37] the Face of Government, though it differs from the Air of that of Israel: And this the rather, be­cause the Commonwealth of Israel seems proposed with more Autho­rity then belongs to a bare Exam­ple, and the Christian World accused of blindness or negligence (Page 18) for not transcribing from it.

It must not be denied but that whatsoever shall appear to have been an establishment of God in the Jewish Republique, is to be allowed consonant to the Laws of Grotius de jure bel. & pac. lib. 1. Nature, Justice and Wisedome; seeing a Legislator supremely Good, Just and Wise, cannot be supposed to have made Laws which do not bear the impression and character of that hand from which they proceed. Yet if we should admit of Mr. Harrington's Position that the people of Israel had the power of confirming all [Page 38] their Laws, so that without their consent they had not (Page 16 and 17) been Laws, We must abate much of the precedent Proposi­tion; for it is a great deal less to be the Adviser or Perswader of a thing then to be the Author and Commander of it. He instances in this power of the people in that Act where they make God King, Exodus 19. So that in his Opinion the Laws given in that and the next Chapters (for they are but a continuation of the same Action) take their validity from the con­sent of the people, who had a li­berty of dissenting by which they might have exempted from those Laws. These Laws are the Ten Commandements, and if the peo­ple of Israel need not have been subjected to them without their own consents, there is no reason but we should enjoy the same pri­viledge. In this Mr. Harrington [Page 39] proves an huge benefactour to Mankind; for he hath with no greater expence then the with­holding their consents asserted them into the mighty Liberty of being free from the whole Morall Law. But I ask pardon for this Digression, and come to another consideration of the influence of the Jewish constitutions upon our practise.

It is now lawful in making of Laws and modelling a Common­wealth to tread in the steps of Moses unless in such things as ei­ther by their own Nature termi­nated with the Revelation of the Gospel, or have been altered by some general or special constitu­tions of Christ.

Beyond these considerations I am not aware of any prerogative of Authority belonging to the Israelitish more then any other Republique: For a Law can ob­lige [Page 40] onely those to whom it is given, which were the children of Israel only; And as no other Na­tion was at that time (according to the opinion of the soberer of the Jews themselves) bound to observe the Jewish Laws or form of Government; so it would be much more unreasonable at this distance of time and place, to im­pose upon us any Obligation of following either their Govern­ment or their Laws. In conside­ring of Laws and frames of Go­vernment it is not enough to look at the Dignity of the Legislator, but regard must be had also to cir­cumstances of times, places, and persons, with which the Lawgiver is often so fettered that he cannot take those Resolutions which in themselves are best. Now there were many conditions and quali­fications of the people of Israel vastly differing from the present [Page 41] Age, some of which I shall have occasion to touch when I speak of the Agrarian.

Here I will not conceal the pleasure I have taken in observing that though Mr. Harrington pro­fesses a great Enmity to Mr. Hobs his politiques, underhand not­withstanding he holds a corre­spondence with him, and does silently swallow down such Noti­ons as Mr. Hobs hath chewed for him: Of this sort is the Fancy of the compact between God and the children of Israel, by vertue of which he received the Civil Power, and was enabled to enact Laws for them; His conceits taken from the Notation of the Words [...] and [...] are also of the same breed.

The invitation sent to Mr. Hobs is not I presume so personally in­tended to him, but that it may indifferently concern any Man who concurs with him in giving the Advantage for perfection unto Monarchy of all other Govern­ments: In that Proposition I ac­knowledge my self a Zelote, and have Temerity enough to expose my body to the receiving those Blows which were aimed at ano­thers Head.

Though Mr. Harrington thinks the first Assertion requires no proof, it may admit of some Ex­planation. [Page 43] To give such a Go­vernment as no Man nor Men in or under it, can have the Interest to disturb with Sedition, is alto­gether impossible; For that were to suppose there should not be in an whole countrey one Ambitious Boor man who might hope for Advantage, nor one Vicious Rich man who might expect security from the perturbation of the Go­vernment: The whole matter then must be reduced to the want of power to doe it. And that will appear to be in no other Libration but this, That the Power of which the Governour is possessed does so vastly exceed the power remaining with those who are to obey, that in case of a contest it must be desperately unreasonable for them to hope to maintain their Cause and Party. The true Me­thod then of attaining to perfecti­on in Government, is to make the [Page 44] Governour absolute; for if there be any who can Dispute upon probable Terms the power with him, the State can never be free from Tumult and Sedition.

But this is not attainable in a Monarchy, saies Mr. Harrington's second Assertion; For a King be­ing but a single Person, that kind of Government hath this Flaw in it, that the Instruments of Ruling whether they be an Army or a Nobility, have both interest and power to disturb the government; for the proof of which the Exam­ples of Turky and Oceana are pro­posed.

In a Monarchy by Arms it is in­deed very apparent that the Mu­tinies of the Soldatesca are always dangerous, and often Fatall; But then they happen solely among the Militia of the Court; for the Troops dispersed through the Provinces (upon whom the secu­rity of the Government depends) can seldome, perhaps never, be shown to have caused such Disor­ders; And yet such a Militia at Court seems necessary for the pre­servation [Page 46] of the Prince's person, and the Reputation of the Go­vernment: But it will not be hard to find a Temperament, by which all may be secured, which I think will lie in this, That the Guards of the King's person be not en­creased beyond necessity of secu­rity, that they be not suffered to stagnate at Court, but be by a per­petual circulation drawn out upon service, and chiefly that they consist not of one intire Body united under the same Head, but be divided into distinct Parties and Commands: As we may see in France, where though (in pro­portion to the extent of their Do­minions) the Kings Guards be more numerous then those of the Roman or Turkish Emperours; yet being divided into the distinct Bodies of French, Scotch and Switz Guards, under their several Colo­nels and Captains, they have never [Page 47] been the Authors of any the least Sedition. And in Turky of late years they begin to learn the Art of poising the Janizaries by the Spahis, and so have frequently evaded the danger of their Mu­tinies.

In like manner in Monarchy by a Nobility, there never arises any Danger to the Crown, but when either a great part of the Sove­raign power is put into the hands of the Nobility as in Germany and Poland, or when some Person or Family is suffered to overtop the rest in Riches, Commands, and Dependance, as Princes of the blood and Lorrain not long since in France, and of old the Montforts and the Nevils in England. The first is a vicious constitution of the Government, and a Monarchy only in name; the second easily admits of this cure, That these Great Ones be reduced to a lesse [Page 48] volumn, and levell'd into an equa­lity with the rest of their Order.

But I see no Necessity of admit­ting the Division of Monarchies which Mr. Harrington hath made, when the most Natural and Ex­cellent form of Monarchical Go­vernment arises from the Mixture of them both. The Prince who governs meerly by an Army, not only is exposed to the danger of their Mutinies, but is also forced to run this hazard, That up­on any potent Invasion, the loss of a Battel or two draws inevita­bly along with it the losse of his Crown: On the other side he that rests wholy upon a Nobilty, leaves himself in a manner at their Dis­cretion, and is with no great diffi­culty Dispossest of the Throne. Let me then have leave to assert that the perfection of Monarchy is free from those flaws which are charged upon it, and that it con­sists [Page 49] in Governing by a Nobility weighty enough to keep the peo­ple under; yet not tall enough, in any particular person, to mea­sure with the Prince; And by a moderate Army kept up under the Notion of Guards and Garri­sons, which may be sufficient to strangle all Seditions in the Cradle.

In this place it will be no great impertinence to desire to know of Mr. Harrington his Opinion of the Way of Governing by Councels, which I confesse I have alwaies thought admirable; I do not mean such as are coordinate with the Prince, (which have been seen in the World) but such as those of Spain, purely of Advice and Dis­patch, with power only to inform and perswade, not limit the Princes Will: For almost all the weaknesses which have been thought incident to Monarchy, [Page 50] are by this course prevented, and if there be any steadiness and ma­turity in the Senate of a Common­wealth, this takes it all in. If the Delays of the Spanish Councels be objected, the answer is obvious, that they proceed more from the grave retired temper of the Spa­nish Nation, then from the Nature of these Councels; And this ob­jection is much more forcible against all Popular Governments.

The third Assertion remains, which shall receive a Discussion through all the five Branches of it.

1. The first of which seems intended for a tryal of our Noses, whether they will serve us to dis­cover the Fallacy of an Inference from the prosperous successe of Arms, to the Perfection of Go­vernment: As if on the one side great and well policed Empires had not been subverted by people so eloigned from the perfection of government, that we scarce know of any thing to tie them together but the desire of Booty; And on the other side we had not the Ex­amples of the little Republiques of Ragusa and San Marino, which are commended for their upright and equal frame of Government, and yet have hardly extended [Page 52] their Dominions beyond the size of an handsome Mannour. It is not the perfection of the Govern­ment, but the populosity of a Na­tion, the natural Valour of the Inhabitants, the Abundance of Horses, Arms, and other things necessary for the equipping of an Army, assisted with a good Mili­tary Discipline, that Quality a people for Conquest; And where these concur, Victory is intailed upon them, whether it be of one Monarch over another, or of a Commonwealth over a people of the same form of Government. Nay, I will add of a Monarch over a Commonwealth, though Mr. Harrington hath pawn'd his Credit that this was never known from the beginning of the World unto this day. He foresaw the instance that might be made of the Kings of Macedon [...]nd Commonwealths of Greece, [...]d therefore would [Page 53] have us believe that had not hap­ned if they had not been first broken by themselves; At this rate of argu­ing Mr. Harrington shal have much adoe to produce any one Feat of Arms of a Commonwealth, which will not be easily strip't of it's Glory by attributing the successe to some Miscarriage or Disorder of the Enemy. And it is worth observing, that to evade the F [...]rce of this Instance, He admits of somthing in the Commonwealths of Greece that will evince them to have been of a turbulent mutinous Temper, & ignorant of their true Interest. But to help a bad Me­mory, let me ask Mr. Harrington what he thinks of the little Gre­cian Republiques planted round the coast [...] of Asia Minor, and of the servitude into which they were brought first by the Lydian, Pausan. messen. and then by the Persian Monarchs, the asserting whose Liberties was [Page 54] the most plausible pretence the other Greeks had for the Persian War? What account likewise is to be given of the Sicilian Com­monwealths, which (before that the Island came under the Power of the Carthaginians and Romans) were reduced under the yoak of one Monarch? And, not to wan­der in the obscure Paths of Anti­quity, let me beg his judgement of the Commonwealth of Genua, which fell under the Dominion of the Dukes of Milan, and after­ward (upon pretence of their Ti­tle) of the Kings of France. If it be told me that this Common­wealth subsists to this day, I shall only need to reply that Andrew Doria did rather erect a new then restore an old Republique, (as will appear by the alterations he made in the Laws and Form of the old Government) and that it is altogether as rational to fortifie [Page 55] the claim of the present States of Holland from the freedom injoyed by the Ancient Batavians, as to pretend that the present Com­monwealths of Genua is the same with what it was before it paid obedience to the Dukes of Milan. I will afflict Mr. Harrington but with one particular more, and that is of the Florentine Repub­lique, which having chased away all of the Family of Medici, and restored it self to a plenary Li­berty, was by the Arms of Charles Guicciard. lib. 20. the 5 ^th. under the Command first of the Prince of Orange, and then of Don Ferrando Gonzaga, forced to submit to that Monarchical Government which it now ac­knowledges.

2. In the second Mr. Harring­ton runs upon the Foile, it being [Page 56] only the conversion of the First.

3. The third Branch is, me­thinks, a very pleasant One, and not unlike the Procedure of the judiciary Astrologers; Who grounding their Art upon wild and Arbitray, but as they pretend, infallible Notions, are fain to ap­peal to the successe of some few lucky Predictions; And when these are confronted with the foul and ridiculous Mistakes of the greatest Masters of their Art, They presently shelter themselves under this answer, That the Error is not in the rules of Art but in the Man, who therefore is convinced to have mistaken in his calcula­tion, [Page 57] because his Predictions have not been justifyed by the Event. So if we complain of the seditions which have infested almost all Commonwealths that ever were, Mr. Harrington tels us, It hath not been from any imperfection in the kind, but in the particular Constitu­tion; which where ever the like hath happened must have been unequall. For my part I despair of cutting off the Retreat, and think him to be dealt with only by those who know how to drive the Irish from a Bog.

4. We shall have somewhat firmer footing in the Next, in which the Commonwealths of Lacedaemon and Venice are brought upon the Carpet for such as by the [Page 58] equality of their Government have been redeemed from all Seditions. Of Lacedaemon first.

If Lacedaemon hath enjoyed a more then ordinary exemption from Domestick Troubles, it is upon the same Accou [...]t that he that works his Horse hard and gives him no Provender is secure of being run away with: The design of Lycurgus in framing their Laws seems only to have lookt at making them good Souldiers, and accordingly they were seldome free from War, and when they were, the hardnesse of their Diet, Plutarch. in Licurg. the strictnesse of their Conversa­tion, the Toyl of their Sports and Exercises made Peace it self little lesse rigorous then War uses to be, The greatest landed man in the whole Countrey had not enough to maintain a Teme, and for per­sonal Estate, all but Iron money being prohibited, what would [Page 59] now go into one of our little Poc­kets, with them would have loa­ded a Waggon; Riches, Luxury and Excesse, being thus banished, it is no wonder they continued quiet, seeing there was nothing left for which they should con­tend; the condition of the mean­est Spartan being in every point (bating meerly the Reputation of Power) as desirable as that of their Kings. And yet even thus they did not scape.

For first, They were infested with frequent and dangerous sol­levations of their Helots or slaves; These Mr. Harrington hath no reason to call external Commoti­ons, (Page 167.) being the Helots were not strangers but inhabitants and spread over the Face of the whole Countrey; Nay more, They were Fundamental and Essential to the Commonwealth; For the Spartans were by their [Page 60] Laws and Institution to neglect all Occupations, even Agriculture it self, and attend solely to the service of the Publique, which could not possibly have been done unlesse they had had the Helots to perform those Offices.

And then have they often been in distractions about the successi­on to the Crown, some of which it will be proper to relate. A quarrel breaking out between the two Kings Cleomenes and Demara­tus, the latter was accused of Ba­stardy, and as it was then the custome of Greece in difficult cases, a reference is made to the Oracle Pausan. Lacon. at Delphos, which having been bribed by Cleomenes, pronounces against Demaratus, who thereupon is deposed and seeks Protection from the King of Persia to the pre­judice not only of the Laconian, but of the whole Grecian Interest. Of the same nature was the con­tention [Page 61] about the succession, when by the power of Lysander and his faction Agesilaus was pro­moted to the Crown, with the Plutar. Agesil. Exclusion of Leotychides the true heir. But much more Fatall was the contest between Cleonymus and his Nephew Arens the son of Acro­tatus, who being Jure Representa­tionis (as the Modern Lawyers speak) preferred before him, Cleo­nimus made shift to get some forces together with which he gave beginning to a civil War in which the City Z [...]rax was de­stroyed, and which was far worse Pausan. Lacon. Plutarch. Pyrr. he drew King Pyrrhus into the Countrey, who made himselfe Master of the Campagna, besieged the capital City, and reduced the Commonwealth to the last Gasp. The Reign of Agis and Cleomenes were so full of Turbulency and Sedition, that it is sufficient to name them.

Nor have they been priviledged from another sort of Attempts, which being secretly managed by some few Conspirators discover not themselves till the danger be almost inevitable; This will ap­pear by the Treason contrived in the beginning of Agesilaus reign, at Xenoph. Gr. Hist. lib. 3. which time the Republique was in its greatest health and vigour at home and highest Reputation abroad; The Author of this con­spiracy waa one Cinadon a bold gallant young fellow who excited by ambition was resolved to make himself Master of the State, and had engaged in the Design divers Persons of courage and execution, provided them with Arms, and had prepared all things ready to fall upon the King, the Ephori and the Senate in the Market-place, which being done He made no doubt by a plausible Declaration to draw over to his Party the [Page 63] slaves, the mean People and the Borderers. Things were at this Passe when one of the conspira­tors revealed all to the Ephori, by whose extraordinary Wisedome and conduct the Heads of the Party were surprised, and the Design broke in pieces. The practise of Lysander for altering the Government shall not be in­sisted on; for though the Contri­vance was admirable, yet the Discovery having been prevented by his Death, it will not be amisse to let it sleep with him.

The City of Venice is possest, by Mr. Harrington's own confession, of several Advantages by the be­nefit of her situation, which she were not to expect from the man­ner of her Government; Among these there is just cause to reckon her Immunity from Seditions, which notwithstanding hath not been so intire that we need be put [Page 64] upon any difficulty in the retri­ving of Instances to prove she hath been subject to Tumults and Faction.

Not to insist upon the continual Disorders to which she was expo­sed before the settlement of the Commonwealth upon the Election of her Dukes, Let Giannotti be the computer and from the first to Seba [...]tian Ciani the 39 ^th. Duke, We shall have an account of three Donato Giannotti. Dukes meeting with violent Deaths by intestine broiles, and of Nine who after having suffered Excaecation died in Exile. In the time of Duke Piero Gradenigo (under whom the Commonwealth received it's last Reiglement a­bout 360 years ago) We meet first with Marrino Boccon who not fin­ding the new constitutions to his Gust endeavoured to opp [...]se them by open Force: But the me­mory of this Attempt is lost in [Page 65] that more great and dangerous One (which happened also in the Reign of the same Duke though not till the year 1311) of Baja­monte Tiepoli, by which the Com­monwealth was reduced to that Exigence, that the onely hope of her preservation consisted in the well defending the stairs of the Gasp. Contarim. Palace of St. Mark. After that in the year 1355. the Health of the Commonwealth became her Dis­ease, I mean the power of the Dukes by which she had gained so much Order, Grace, and Firmness, was made an Instrument to the mabition of Duke Marin Falier for dissolving the Frame of the Go­vernment; But at this Time the Power of the Dieci was salutary to the Republique in the Deposition and Execution of Falier.

Of late days indeed the Com­monwealth of Venice hath enjoyed tranquillity enough at home, (for [Page 66] though partialities and factions be kept up between the Old and New families of Noblem [...]n, yet having never made any scandalous Eruptions, they do but little harm) for which She is a Debtor to the nice and dangerous Estate of her Affairs abroad; On the one side She is next Neighbour to the Devouring Ottomon Empire, and on the other her Frontire reaches to the Territories of the King of Spain, a Prince of as good Appe­tite though of a slower digestion; Nay the Rope himselfe for all his Age and Holinesse hath often en­deavoured to commit a Rape upon her: In this condition it is no more wonder that the Appre­hension of a Publique Enemy be­gets Union and Concord within her self, then it is to find Agree­ment among the Mariners of that Ship which is ready to be boarded by Pirates.

5. After all this in answer to the fifth Branch, I will only tell Mr. Harrington that the Libration He speaks of in Government, is of the same Nature with a perpe­tual Motion in Mechanicks; for as the one is not attainable as long as there is in Matter a resistence to Motion, or a Propensity in it by which it is determined to some other Motion; So will the other be impossible as long as Men have private Interests and Passions by [Page 68] which they are biassed from the publique Ends of Government: And as all Motion will grow faint and expire unlesse renewed by the hand of a continuall Mover; so there is no Frame of Laws or Con­stitution of Government which will not decay and come to Ruine unlesse repaired by the Prudence and Dexterity of those who Go­vern. Now that this may not be expected from a Monarch as well as from a Senate or any Assembly of Men, I have not yet met with any conviction, but rather find it reasonable to think that where Debates are clearest, the Results of them most secret, and the Exe­cution sudden, (which are the Advantages of a Monarchy) there the Disorders of a State will soonest be discovered, and the ne­cessary Remedies best applied.

Wherfore it is not this preten­ded equality of a Commonwealth that causes her stability and secu­rity, but rather the contrary; For, a [...] Mr. Harrington hath well ob­served, (Page 5.) where there are two Parties in a Republique with equall power, (as in that of Rome the Nobility had one half and the People the other half) Confusion and Misery are there entailed: And to avoid this there can be no way but to make the Common­wealth very unequal, that is to make the scale of Power gravitate on the part of those persons who are possessed of the Government. This will be found to be the [Page 70] practise of Venice, which though alledged as the example of a most equall One, is as much as any in the World, an unequal Common­wealth; The power there is wholly in the hands of the Noble Families, who make up the num­ber of about 3000 heads, though formerly they have amounted to 4500, and the people are not con­cerned in it more then that they are admitted to the Offices of Chancellours and Secretary ship, which are places of no power though of some Trust: Nor is it material perhaps not true) which Mr. Harrington (Page 9.) hath de­livered, that the Senate of Venice at the first Institution took in the whole people; for the Question belongs not to the first Original Institution which was rude and not well digested, but to the pre­sent Frame of that Republique a [...] it was perfected under the Go­vernment [Page 71] of Piero Gradenigo. To conclude this point, Contarini himself a Noble Venetian and very likely to discern the true temper of their Government, when he enquires into the reasons of the fidelity of the Venetian people to the Senate, never thinks upon this equality in the constitution of the Commonwealth, but proposes the plenty of Bread, the Provision made for the poor by so many Hospitals, the lucrative employ­ment of Artificers in the Arsenal, things purely Accidental and Ex­trinsecal, as the most probable causes which can be assigned of so happy an Effect.

To him that makes propriety, and that in Lands, the Founda­tion of Empire, the establishing an Agrarian is of absolute Necessity, that by it the power may be fixt in those hands to whom it was at first committed: But if an Estate in ready money, or any other Re­venue conduces as much to Em­pire as the Possession of Lands, (which was shown in its Place) the true importance of an Agrarian will come to no more but this, that the government be provided of a Revenue sufficient to make good that advantage of Power which it enjoys over all persons and parties living under that Go­vernment. The examples of an [Page 73] Agrarian are so infrequent that Mr. Harrington is constrained to wave all but two Common­wealths, and can find in the whole extent of History only Israel and Lacedaemon to fasten upon. What the Nature of these Agrarians was, and how they differ from that which Mr. Harrington goes about to establish, w [...]l be the businesse of my present Disquisition.

When in obedience to God's command Abraham had abando­ned his native soil, and the inhe­ritance of his Fathers, and like an Adventurer in prosecution of his Fortune had wandered as far as the Land of Canaan, He received a promise of God in reward of this submission that his posterity should enjoy as a possession the Land in which he now l [...]ved as a stranger; The hopes of seeing this promise performed had al­ways so much influence upon the [Page 74] Israelites, that when in Egyp [...] they fell into an Affliction of the grea­test Pressure and Duration that ever Nation suffered, They not onely bore up against it by their care in maintaining their National Interest, but with extra­ordinary Diligence attended to the preserving their Genealogies through their Tribes and Fami­lies: The time of impletion of the Promise being come, There was no Man that was able to make out his descent from Abra­ham by Jacob, but had an un­questionable Title to the Possessi­on of the Land, and consequently it was necessary to divide the Land viritim among the people of Israel. Yet it will not be easie to determine whether they all inhe­rited by equail Portions, or whe­ther in the Division respect was had to the Princes of Tribes and Heads of Families. The Publique [Page 75] Division upon the return of the Survey (Jos. cap. 18.) it is evident went no further then to assign by lot the Seat of every Tribe, or at most of the Families in that Tribe; For the shares of particular Men it appears not how they were laid out (unlesse in the cases of Joshuae and Ca [...]eb which were peculiars) except the place in Numbers, cap. 26. 54. belongs to them, To many thou shalt give the more inheritance, and to few thou shalt give the lesse inheritance; to every one shall his inheritance be given according to those that were numbred of him. But it is more probable that this is meant of families then of persons, if we consider that the Dignity of the Princes and Heads of Families could not have been preferved without some Advantage in Estate; And besides if none could have been Rich, none could have been Poor, and yet we find Poor [Page 76] abounding in the Commonwealth of Israel even to that extremity as to addict themselves into servi­tude. Let the Nature of this Di­vision of Lands be what it will, [...]are was taken for the preserva­tion of the people in and upon it; and therefore there could be no alienation of Land but with a De­feasance or power of redemption, and once within 50 years, in the Jubile, all Sales were rescinded and lands reverted to the possessi­on of the former owners. The most considerable though withall most obvious observation concer­ning the Jewish Agrarian remains, which is that having extirpated the inhabitants of the Land, they might Tailler en plein drap, and so avoid the almost insuperable Dif­ficulties which will cleave to a project that must be introduced by alteration of possession.

This was the condition of the [Page 77] Jewish Agrarian, which will, if I mistake not, prove very little conformable to the Notion Mr. Harrington hath of it; He thinks not upon the promise of God to Abraham, but considers the Divi­sion of the Lands as a politick constitution upon which the Go­vernment was founded, though in the whole History of the Bible there be not the least Footstep of such a Design: But in the name of Wonder how can this Agrarian be the foundation of that Government which had subsisted more then 45 year without it? The Constitution of the Jewish Government by Mr. Harringtons compute (Pa. 16) bears date before the sending the dozen spies to discover the Land, but from that Action to the Division of the Land was 45 years, Jos. 14. 10. Again, If this Agrarian was meant as Fundamental to the Government, the provision was [Page 78] weak and not proper for the at­taining the End proposed, there being nothing in the nature of the Agrarian to hinder but that the whole Countrey might for the space of neer 50 years, that is the time between two Jubiles, have come into the hands of one Man, which had been enough to de­stroy the Ballance and turn the Agrarian it self, as well as all other points of the Government, out of Doors.

As to the Agrarian of Lacedae­mon, it may be comprehended by what hath been already said of that Commonwealth, that the Design of Lycurgus in it was not so much to attain an equality in the Frame of the Government, as to drive into Exile Riches, and the Effects of them Luxury and De­bauchery: This will further ap­pear by his endeavour to intro­duce this Law not only into Reall [Page 79] but Personal Estate, though after­ward he laid it down upon expe­rience that it proved of too hard Digestion, and instead of it substi­tuted the Law forbidding all but Iron-money by which in a way more secret and artificial he ob­tained the fame End: The same is manifest also by the Proportion of Lands which he assigned to every particular Man, which might have been far greater with­out endangering the Equality of the Commonwealth, The success also is clearly of the same side; for no sooner had Lysander by filling the City with Gold and Silver broke the Vow, as I may call it, of Voluntary poverty, but the Commonwealth fell in Virtue and Reputation though she continued a long time after firm in her Agra­rian. It is to me as strange as any thing in History that Lycurgus should find credit enough to settle [Page 80] a Government which carried along with it so much want and hardship for particular Men, that the totall Absence of Government could scarce have put them into a worse Condition; The Laws that he made prohibiting the use of those things, to enjoy which with security, is that onely which to other Men makes the yoak of Laws, supportable: But it may well be thought, this would have been impossible to Lycurgus, had he not wisely obtained Responce from D [...]lphos, magnifying his per­son and the Government he went about to introduce after which all Resistance would have been downright Impiety and Disobe­dience to the Gods. And who­soever shall have the Fortune to be the Founder of such a Govern­ment must encounter a very su­perstitious people▪ apt to be wrought up into a Beliefe that [Page 81] their Legislator holds a more then ordinary Correspondence with Heaven.

But all this will seem to con­cern Mr. Harrington very little, who (though to bring his Agrarian into Credit he had before made a great flourish with that of Lacedae­mon) does let us know (Page 106.) that there is much Dissimilitude between the Agrarians of Lacedae­mon and Oceana; Indeed he is thus far in the right, that the Voice of the first was, Every man shall be thus Poor; but that of the latter is, No man shall be more then thus Rich. I will then leave the Ashes of Lycurgus at peace, and examine a little the Moddel of the Agrarian which Mr. Harrington hath pro­pounded to the World.

1. The first Discovery I make of it, is that it is Unjust. If it be truly asserted that Government is founded on Propriety (Page 4.) [Page 82] then Propriety subsists in Nature before Government, and Govern­ment is to be fitted to Propriety, not Propriety to Government. How great a sin then would it be against the first and purest Noti­ons of justice to bring in a Go­vernment not only differing from but directly destructive of the set­tled propriety of Oceana, in which there are confest (Page 101.) to be 300 persons whose Estates exceed the Standard of 2000 l. per annum. Let me not be choakt with the Example of Lacedaemon till Mr. Harrington hath shown Us the power of his perswasion with the Nobility of Oceana, as Lycurgus with them of Lacedaemon, to throw up their Lands to be parcelled by his Agrarian, (Pag. 113.) And when that is done, I shall cease to com­plain of the injustice of it. Not need any one of these 300 be put to own a shame for preferring his [Page 83] own Interest before that of a whole Nation; for though when Government is once fixt, it may be fit to submit Pri­vate to Publique utility, when the Question is of choosing a Government, every particular Man is left to his own Native Right, which cannot be pre­scribed against by the Interest of all the rest of Mankind. But in this Case the Interest of three hundred is not ballanced with that of a whole Nation, but that of some few extrava­gant spirits, who by making Dams in the Current of other mens Estates, hope to derive some Water to their own parcht Fortunes.

2. In the second Place the Nature of this Agrarian is such that it can never be Fixt, but as 2000 l. is held now to be a due Standard of Estates, so [Page 84] hereafter they may be brought down to 1000 l. or a far lesse Sum; For the whole Body of the People being intrusted with giving a Vote and kee­ping a Sword, may easily e­ther by the way of Counsel or Arms agree to make this Change, in which they need not value the Opposition of such as enjoy 2000 l. whose greatest number can never exceed Five thousand persons, (Page 100.) a Company too inconsiderable to withstand Two hundred thousand Men. (Page 200.) It will not be enough to reply that the Law by which the Agrarian shall be settled will hinder this, For it is not to be imagined that those Five thousand can have a more Legal Title to their 2000 l. then the Three hundred now have to the Sur­plus [Page 85] above 2000 l. Where­fore this Agrarian must needs be unfixt and flitting, and cannot terminate in any thing but Levelling, or at least Re­ducing the Rate of Estates to that passe, that the keeping it from going any lower shall be the Concern of a greater Number of Men then they make up who have an In­terest in the further debasing of it.

3. But thirdly. As the Jews who have no Land are every­where great Traders; so the possession of Lands being li­mited by this Agrarian, Men who are either Covetous or Ambitious, will imploy them­selves and Estates in Forraign Traffique, which being in a manner wholly ingrost by the Capital City of Oceana; that City already too great will [Page 86] immediately grow into an Ex­cesse of Power and Riches ve­ry dangerous to the Common­wealth. The Republique of Venice would long since have been sensible of this inconve­nience, but that her Extent being no greater then the Isles on which the City stands; (for Mr. Harrington hath truly observed that to all her other Dominions her Government is provincial) the encrease of that one place is the equall Augmentation of the whole Commonwealth. But the case stands not so with our Neigh­bours of Holland, where every Province consisting of the Uni­on of severall Townes, and the Republique of the Union of those Provinces, the Town of Amsterdam hath within a few years been so aggrandized by Commerce, that it is be­come [Page 87] of almost equall impor­tance with all the other Provinces, and hath been a­ble of late to exercise a Ty­ranny in the Disposal of some publique Affairs much to the prejudice both of the Liberty and Interest of the Residue of the Union. An equall if not greater incommodity to Oceana would be created by the Agra­rian, which making Emporium a City of Princes, would ren­der the Countrey a Common­wealth of Cottagers, able to dispute precedence with the Beggars Bush.

4. Another Consideration suggests it self from the great Difficulty in making this A­grarian equall and steady; Not only in reference to the various Tenures and Rents of Land in Oceana, (which with all other Objections pro­duced [Page 88] by Mr. Harrington him­self (Page 88.) I on purpose omit) but with respect to the Flux and Inconstant value of Money by which this Agrarian is computed; We have the experience of all Ancient Sur­veys of Lands and Rates of Commodities how vastly they recede from the present Esti­mation of Money, which ha­ving no natural Value rises and falls by a thousand Ac­cidents; And who knowes but that 2000 l. per annum, may Two hundred years hence differ as much in Value from this present Age, as 2000 l. per annum does now from what it did Two hundred years agoe? So the Agrarian which is represented as the firme immoveable Basis of the Com­monwealth, must like a floa­ting Bridge undergo all the Vi­cissitudes [Page 89] which Money is subject to in its Ebbs and Flows.

But if there were as many Demonstrations to Evince an Agrarian as there are Argu­ments to impugne it, I should notwithstanding despaire of the issue, because it must make War against an Univer­sall and Immemoriall custome; The power of Custome is without doubt more preva­lent then that of Reason, and there is nothing of such Dif­ficulty as to perswade Men, at once and crudely, that they and their Forefathers have lived in an Error.

That Ancient Republiques have through a malicious jea­lousie made it unlawful even for persons of the clearest Merit to continue long in Command, but have by a perpetual vicis­situde substituted new Men in the Government, is manifest enough; but with what suc­cesse will best appear by Vetu­rius, Varro, Mancinus, and the residue of weak and passionate Commanders which have by this means come to be imploy­ed [Page 91] by the Romans: And no lesse by the rabble of Generals often made use of by the A­thenians, while Men of Valour and Conduct have lain by the Walls. It is an Argument of much imperfection in a Go­vernment not to dare to im­ploy the whole Virtue of her Citizens. And those Orders must needs be against Nature which excluding persons of the best Qualifications, give Ad­mission to others who have nothing to commend them but their Art in Canvasing for the suffrages of the people. Yet this Law hath been as often broke as a Common­wealth hath been brought into any Exigency; for the hazard of trusting Affairs in weak hands then appearing, no scruple hath been made to trample upon this Order for [Page 92] giving the power to some able Man at that time render'd uncapable by the Vacation this Law requires. The con­tinuation of the Consulship to Marius is sufficient to be al­ledged for proofe of this, though if occasion were it might be backed by plenty of Examples. The Dilemma into which a Commonwealth is in this case brought is very dangerous; For either she must receive a Mortal wound from without, or she must give her selfe one by gaining the Habit of infringing such Orders as are necessary for her Preservation. I know not what Advantage Mr. Harring­ton may foresee from the Or­ders of this Rotation, (Page 213.) for my part I can dis­cover no other Effect of it but this, That in a Common­wealth [Page 93] like that of Oceana taking in the many (For in Venice Mr. Harrington Page 24. confesses it to be otherwise) where every Man will presse forward toward Magistracy, This Law by taking off at the end of one year some Officers, and All at the end of three, will keep the Republique in a perpetual Minority, no Man having time allowed him to gain that experience which may serve to lead the Com­monwealth to the understand­ing her True Interest either at home or abroad.

Were the Agrarian he aims at once establisht, the Nobi­lity would be so throughly plumed, that they would be just as strong of wing as Wild­foule are in moulting time. And therefore where Mr. Har­rington goes about (Page 25.) [Page 94] to perswade the people they need not feare the Nobility, I am of Opinion he might have spared his Pains as I shall mine in any further Con­sideration of the first part of his Preliminaries, seeing what remains of any Consequence will properly belong to those Men to whom I have recom­mended the Disquisition of the Jewish Commonwealth.