SIR,

I Have of late heard much of a Common-wealth, but know not what it meaneth: I presume your late comming from Oxford, can somewhat informe me what it i [...], and its my earnest d [...]sire to know?

A Common-wealth is a multitude of Men, ruled by one government.

Our Auntient acquaintance en­couraged me to demand this question of you, and I now perceive by your short Answer, which is so knotty and difficult to my understanding, that you have a d [...] ­sire to renew our old familia [...]ity, by more questions from m [...]; I sh [...]ll there­fore desire, if your leasur [...] will permit, to [Page 2] unfold to me in our country Language, what this word Government is? and not answer me by Scholasticall resoluti­ons, which make me farther of from, be­ing informed, then when I first deman­ded the question.

My friend and Country man, by your last question, I am sensible, you either go about to inquire of my proficiency at the Vniversity; or else do propound the questi­on throughly to be informed; friend, [...]nre­gard of your former love to me, I will make bold to borrow so much time, if your pati­ence will give audience throughly to in­struct you in this matter, by a more larger unfolding the particulars of this your Que­re, that so I may not put you to unnecessary Questions.

Sir, I am greatly beholding to you that you have not forgotten your old friend, but are willing to have discourse with him, I pray proceed to the Answer, [...]nd I shall attentively give eare.

Government is a setled order of Com­manding and obeying; Order is maintained by three things, viz. Religion, Lawes, and Magistrates: the definition of Religion, I presume you know, but because of my pro­mise [Page 3] to you; and to avoid multitude of que­stions, I will describe it what it is.

Religion is that worship of God publike­ly professed and practised, and is maintained by Lawes and Magistrates.

Do all Nations agree that there is a God?

Yea; all Nations agree in those three Propositions.

1. That there is a God:

2. That God is the punisher of offen­ces and rewarder of vertues.

3. That whatsoever is a God ought to be worshiped.

Is there not a difference amongst Nations concerning God?

The difference of Nations, co [...]sisteth i [...] th [...]se two points.

1. In their opinion, what is God, Chri­stians Iews and Turks, do all hould there is but one God.

The Heathens in times past, and now many of the Americans: as also the people farre Northward, do hould that there are many Gods, and wor­ship them accordingly.

2. The second difference amongst Nati­ons is, In the manner of worship­ping [Page 4] of God, and so the Christian Jewes, and Turks, do mainly differ.

What is the Center of a Common­wealth?

The Center of a Commonwealth, where the hearts of all men in the same State doe meet, is Religion. The force of L [...]es is sh [...]wn [...] only upon occasions. The better sort of the people will be sure to observe them, Lex non est justo posita. The Law is ma [...]e for the offendor: As for offendors, Law can lay hold no farther then prooffes may be ma [...]e of offences: Scelera tan [...]um Proba­talege P [...]n [...]untur. Religion holdeth a per­petuall strength, and aw [...]t [...] the Conscience, restraining facts, dicta, cogitata, by the power of the which, Nemo nocens, se judi­ce, absolvitur.

What is the chiefe disturbance in a Common wealth?

Nothing s [...]oner divideth a State, th [...]n distraction in Religion, as may appeare in old stories, by the distraction, as the Egip­tians who worshipped several Gods in th [...]ir Countries, a [...]d of latter times, by the strange Tumults in Germany, the Civill Warres in France, and the sad condition of England, Scotland, and Ireland, at this time.

What then is the best way to ma [...]n­taine Amity in a State?

The greatest band of unity in a State, is unity & conformity in Relig [...]or, [...]either can any State safely s [...]ff [...]r divers Religions to be publiq [...]ely mai [...]tained, or men of different Religion, from that which is maintained, to have any power to work a charg.

Shew me by what Divine power, Magistrates can enforce contentious men to conformity, in the publique exercise of Religion?

You now put me to it in deed; but I will not now take it upon me to resolve you in such a point; our onely dis [...]ourse now is, what the greatest Politit [...]a [...]s hold for the suppa [...]tation of a Weal [...]-publick o [...] State.

I may not then pin my faith, on what you relate, but I am to take it as the writing of antient State [...] men, who la­bor to uphold that Government, they have set up, or have lived under, I pray then go on, and shew me what Nations have b [...]en most strict in enforcing men to outward consormity?

The Spaniard is the most observant of this, of all Nations, m [...]i [...]taini [...]g an In­quisition, not only to censure dict [...] & facta, [Page 6] of any that se [...]m to differ from th [...], but to search th [...] very [...]g [...]ts of [...], [...] by any m [...]ans th [...]y s [...]sp [...]ct different.

Are the Turks so [...]re, to those [...] live with in their Territorie [...]?

No [...]. The T [...]rks [...]so [...]ver [...] in­quir [...] into no man, [...]rly for Religio [...], if he do not scandalize theirs yet they suffer neither Christians, nor Iews, nor any [...]p­p [...]si [...]s to their Religion, to have either Ar­ [...]or or A [...]thority.

Did the Ancient Romans make Warre for Religion?

The old Romans in their m [...]nif [...]ld Conquests, never pretended occasion of quar­r [...]ll, by difference of Religion: but either revenge of wrong offered to their Citizens, or to their State, or else the roleeving of their Confederates oppressed, or maintai­ning of their weak Neighbours.

Did the Roma [...]s regard the Religi­on of their Enemies?

The Religion of [...]ir Enemies, they had of it rever [...]nd esteem; how soever they strictly observed Patri [...]s Rit [...]s, yet they of­ten brought home Peregrinos Deos. and in the besieging of Cities, they had many Ce­remonics and expiations, ad evocandum [Page 7] tutelares loci Deos, to shew they sought not against their Gods, but d [...]sired they would not succour their people, and so should be reverenced in the Roman Territory.

After the Roman Empire was grown to the height, and could not sustaine their own greatnesse, and the Civill weeds sprang, all those Rites were omitted or forgotten. Am­bition openly professed, that it fought Pro imperio, neither was there any cause pre­tended between the Concurre [...]ces, but the getting of the Empire. On th [...]se termes the world passed untill Mahomet devised a new and strange Religion in the East parts, which set the world in a mighty difference, laying two grounds to encourage his follow­ers, the first, that whosoever dyed in War a­gainst the Christians or other Enemies to the Mahometan Law, did instantly passe to all pleasure and delights in Paradise. The s [...]cond that death was so necessarily or­dained to men, that n [...] violence would end a man befo [...]e his time, nor wearinesse avoid it at the time. Of this Mahomet the Sara­cens first, and after them the Turks a migh­tie people borrowed their Religion. Of him ther Haman family l [...]arned to cover the fier of Ambition, wish t [...]e Ashes of Religion, [Page 8] and under pretence to propogate it, to per­swade their followers both to fight and [...]o dye resolutely?

I partly beleeve that the Pope and his Pred [...]c [...]ssors have hitherto walked by the Mahometan Rule you last discoursed of.

The Papa [...], in th [...] generall, have very much followed this course or rule, as you call it; concealing all their privat revenges and ambitions desires, under the pretence of the Catholick cause: And that with that con­fident perswasion and c [...]edulity of heir fel­lowes, that many of the Pap [...]sticall Souldi­ers, if he hath a Cro [...]e o [...] his back, and the Papisticall benediction over his head, think that either they are not of danger in earth, orif they dye, they have a present passage to Heaven, at least shall passe through Pur [...] gatory, and so escape Hell.

In this point there is great difference be­twix [...] the present and anci [...]nt Romans, [...]hat the ol [...] Romans had a reverend opinion of the Religion of all Countries, though diffe­rent from them, and would never suff [...]r a­ny despight or wrong to be sh [...]w [...]d to the Conq [...]r [...]d under that name of R [...]ligion, which is not in perticular mens power to [Page 9] take or leave as they list.

The present Papists m [...]ke their decrees, the R [...]les of all truth in Religion, and those that are different, th [...]y curse, and mis [...]hiefe by all m [...]ans th [...]y can invent, accounting them Atheists, Miscreants, and Hereticks &c. which violent proceeding hath enforced the like vehemency in the opposites to judge of him and his, in like sort, which hath been the sole cause of the great distraction in Christendome, and laid it so open to the Ma­hometans.

There is no mischiefe that works so dan­gerously as that which is carryed with a Colour of Religion. Simulata sa [...]ctitas duplex iniqu [...]tas. For that nothi [...]g can carry a multitude so forci [...]ly, as blind z [...]l and superstition in any cause undertaken. In times past, Sortorius a Roman, raised Portugall, and the better part of Spaine, de­feated the Roman Armies, wo [...]king credit with his followers by pretendi [...] confer [...]nce with Diana, by means of a White hart. Ma­homet by his Dove and Bull of late times, the Seriff [...] in Africa under a pretended Ho­linesse, gate first his strength, by which [...]e turned the lawfull Prince out of the State and setled himselfe and his. John of Ley­den [Page 10] at one time, and Muncerus at another time, raised those great Tum [...]lts in Ger­many.

Sir, in your description of Go­vernment, I remember you told me that order was maintained or supported by those three things, Religion, Law, and Magistrater, you have given me ample satisfaction concerning Religion. I de­sire you would now discover to me what Law is?

Lawes are certaine Rules written, or customs continued, by which the right of persons, actions, or things are determined.

Ius triplex est.

1. Ius naturae, Is the light of nature, by which we know what is wrong, be­ing offered unto us, and that the same is wrong, being committed by our selves a­gainst others.

2. Ius Ge [...]tiu [...], The Law observed by all Nations, how different so ever, and is the rule deciding right between men of sundry Common we [...]lths, and it spe­cially concerns Leagues, Contracts, Captives, &c.

3. Ius Civile, Is that by which the [Page 11] Citizens of every state are ruled, and it is of two sorts.

1. Ius C [...]m [...]une, or Ius Iusticiae, the Common Law which is contey­ned in the letter of the Law, or in the Customes of the Country, and this in particular causes may somtimes be the cause of wrong, as is often spoken, Summa jus, s [...]mma inj [...]ria.

2. I [...]s Equitatis, The Law of E­quity, when a particular case by reason of some circumstance, de­sireth help and ease against the rigor of the Law; such wa [...] Ius Pretorium amongst the Romans, and the Court of Chancery with us in England.

In the Case where the stranger saved the City by mounting on the Walls, and encouraged the Citizens to keepe the Town against the Enemy, contrary to the Law, Peregrinus in mures si ascenderi [...] Capitale e [...]t [...]: the action in it selfe most honourable, is by the letter of the Law, Capitall.

Besides all these there is Ius Pr [...]rogativae, which resteth wholly in them, be they [Page 12] one or more, in whom the Supreame power and Authority resteth. Such have Princes in absolute Monarchies, and such a Power had the people of Rome, wh [...]n the State was Popular, to receive appeals from any of their Judges, to call matters determined by L [...]w to a new audience, to suspend the [...]xecution of any sentence, or to pardon the punishment: S [...]c [...] also hath been the accustomed power of the Parliaments of E [...]gl [...]nd.

The Law is nec [...]ssary for every State, for that Leges fiunt p [...]opter bomines; homi­nes non fiunt p [...]opter L [...]ges. Men a [...]e not made to satisfie the Law in its rigor, but Lawes are made for the safety [...]n [...] preser­vation of men. Salus Populi suprema L [...]x.

D [...]e all N [...]ions [...]gree in their Lawes?

Noe.

How then a [...] their Lawes to be dis­cerned or known?

There are two Rules by which the Lawes and Custom [...]s of Countries are to be discerned.

1. By the Law of Nature, spoken of before, by that light, by which we kno [Page 13] what is right or wrong, either in doing or suffering. Altrine facias, quod tibi fa­ctum nolis; in this all good estates agree, in the substance, framing their positive Lawes against Atheisme, Murther, Adul­tery, Theft, &c. Things in the light of Nature Condemned. Nations also differ in the punishment and means of restrai­ning which is not in Nature defined. If any Law in a State be made against this of Nature, it must needs be inconvenient as implicating a contradiction in the Go­vernment to other Lawes. For that the whole Law of nature, is most agreeable, and conformable, in all the severall parts unto it selfe.

2. The second Rule by which the Law of Nations are discerned; is, by the Sup­position of the State, that is; by compa­ring the Law or Custom, with the maine government in Practise, for if a Law be made which holds not on scope with th [...] present Government establish [...]d, it must needs breed variance and discord, and in the end some occasion for one party to assaile the other. As it must needs hap­pen to a Monarchy, if the people get any power to deale in the State; but most [Page 14] commonly in a popular State; if either they continue their great Offices for too long a time, or yeild too great authority, [...]y Decree, [...]o any one man. Sylla first, and afterwards Caesar gate the whole state in­to their hands, by the name of perpetuall Dictators. Augustus, [...]y a more popu­ler name, Tribune of the people.

By this I understand, that its a dan­gerous thing, suddenly to alter a standing Law, or custome of a Nation or State; for you say that divers distractions and broyles do ensue thereupon?

Auntient Lawes and customes, are not to be suddenly changed, though they be but of small importance. Plato thinks that the change of M [...]sick ought not to be suffe­red, least that should also change mens con­ditions. Amongst the Thurans whosoever attempted a new. Law, must perswade it with a Halt [...]r about his neck, with which he was to be [...]anged, if he failed in shewing the necessity of it.

New Lawes are seldome [...]eceived with intire consint, and hardly observed at the first, if there be not great necessity; which necessity seldom appeareth, but with hazard, [...]hich may breed much danger before the L [...]w be established.

Few Lawes make shew of much vert [...]e and [...]bedience, yet it is more security when all Lawes necessary have been together framed, and by continuance gotten strength. It is bet­ter to prevent a mischiefe, then to seek for a remedy, after it is happened; for though it be true, that (in corruptissima Rep. plures sunt leges) yet its true ratione signi, not ratione Causae, for that Lawes do not make any corruption, but shew it, which would be greater if it wer [...] not hindred by Law, and men, must be supposed as they are, not as they should be; that as occasions of all na­tures do arise, so in time vices of all soets will sooner shew themselves then v [...]r [...]ues.

What you have allready spoken concerning Law sufficeth, I shall now intreat you, for my more cleare and di­stinct apprehension, to resolve Magistra­cy into the severall heads and branches thereof?

Magistracy, is a power in men which boldeth all in obedience to Religion and Law.

You are againe harping on your old string, the power of Magistrates in matters of Religion, but I beleeve you will not now resolve me, in regard you [Page 16] have denyed me formerly?

I told you before, and I tell you a­gaine, I cannot now resolve you, because it is a matter of great consequence, and the greatest Schollers are (if I may so say) to their Ne plus ultra, concerning this thing, but I shall [...]re long take some opportunity to give you my thoughts herein, I will let it passe now and proceed to the matter in hand, relating to Magistrates.

Magistrates are of two sorts.

1. Supreame, who have the first place in Honour, and the cheifest in power to inforce obedience, that Religion and Lawes may be observed.

2. Subordinate, be all Magistrates that have delegate power, from the Supreame authority, to hold men in obedience in their severall places.

In the supreame Magistrate is especially considered, capacity of the State. which is two wayes.

1. By his owne understanding and experience, knowing and intending what to advise in all occurrences, which is al­most impossible in the variety of acci­dents which befall in State businesse; yet such we read Augustus to have beene; [Page 17] who kept written with his own hand large remembrances, of all his Legions, Officers, Rents, Customes, Allyes, Leagues &c.

2. By Election of advice, propounded by others, which appeareth in the choyce of the best Councellors, and in the choice of best Councell in hard mat­ters, neither blind by weaknesse of judge­ment, nor inclined by partiall affection: for the Princes choice is the life of any advice be it never so wise. If we looke into any of their falls, they must have fallen not for want of fit Counsell pro­pounded, but for want of Judgement, or partiall affection in the choice of that Counsell which they followed. Qui nec sibi potest recte consulares, nec aliis bene consulentibus auscultare velit, extremi est ingenij.

What are the generall Suppositi­ons holden by the wisest Magistrates?

1. To prevent all inconvenien­ces, in the beginning, and not to think those things which severally to the vul­ger sort seeme little, to be little., being joyned together. Insensible vapors, do breed horrible Tempests, and small grains great heaps.

[Page 18]2. In avoiding inconveniences, to have speciall regard to the manner of a­voyding them. In making their people obedient a [...]d quiet, not to suffer them so to forget Armes that they may be a prey, to their forraigne Enemies, in making themselves strong against the Enemies, carefully to provide against disobedience and muti [...]ing, which often happeneth a­mongst Military people.

3. Not to suffer any one part, how good so ever in shew, to attaine an over­swaying power, or dependance, which cannot be brought and holden in order, and obedience, if opposition should hap­pen, occasio facit ambitiosis. And mens powers are more certainly ruled, then their wills.

4. To distinguish warily offences and good deserts, rewards and punishments, that neither great deserts may breed In­solency, or hope of impunity for future offences, nor [...]ff [...]nces take away all hope of reward for future vertues.

5. Especially to have men from their beginnings, to be brought up to the Com­mon-wealth in which they live. Legum optimarum nulla est utilitas nisi sint, qui [Page 19] ad Rempub. informentur.

6. It is imposible, in civill cases, sub­ject to such variety of times and other circumstances, alwayes to finde out opti­mam ex bonis: It is often times enough to take that which is mimimum ex malis &c. In those passages there is not re­spect alwayes to be had to the greater part, nor yet to the better part, but to the whole State intirely considered: Pars quicquid est totius est.

I conceive those six foregoing sup­positions or Rules are peculiarly inci­dent to the supreame M [...]gistrate, but how ought a subordinate Magistrate to be qua­lified?

Three things are to be considered chiefly in a subordinate Magistrate:

1. That they do affectionatly love the State established.

2. That they have sufficient power to execute that which is required by their Office.

3. That their parts be answerable to that charge which they undertake, in the Common-wealth. Viz. Valour and Bounty fit for a Souldier, Wisdome and Justice for a Judge, Frugality and hone­sty, [Page 20] for an Officer of account.

What are the accidentall differen­ces of States?

They are two.

1. Good, Bad.

2. Weak, Strong.

How or in what respects are Com­mon-wealths said to be Good or bad?

Three wayes.

1. In respect of their good or bad Lawes, so the Lacedemo­nian Respublick, was thought wanting, which by Lawes permitted Theft, and Adul­tery.

2. In respect of Good or Bad Magistrates, so the Lacedemo­nian Respublike was holden the best, in that the Magistrates most strictly observed the Lawes and Customes of their Countrey, and the supposition of their State, which was A­ristocraticall, and Military.

3. In respect of both, as all good Common-wealths, whose Lawes agree with the Law of Nature, and the Magistrates [Page 21] acting according to the Lawes

Is the Law, alwayes to be executed according to the letter of I?

No. fo it is neither safe that Law alone should rule which can not distinguish of times, occasions, nor actions. Neither is it safe that Magistrates should rule alone Without Law, for men are so subiect to ha­tred love, fcare, passion reward &c. It is best where both have their place, for that Law directeth best actions; but discretion and true iudgement best distinguisheth cir­cumstances.

How shall a man discerne the strength of a State?

By observing these three things.

1. Whether it be strong in the frame it selfe of present Government, so if Mo­narchy is held more strong, and in lesse hazard of distraction and division then a popular state.

2. Whether it be strong by continuance of time, having long holden on forme, so New Principalities are weak, as wan­ting time to confirme them; Auncient Principalities are strong, where the peopl have been inured to reverence and obedi­nce, Monarchy could not have been taken [Page 22] from the Assyrians, if Sardanapalus had not been a beast, nor from the blood of the Cesars, if Nero had not been rather a Monster then a Man.

3. Whether it be strong only by vertue, Wisdome, and Valour [...] of them, which are in present Authority. So only New Principalities have strength by them which raise them, Such was the Gre­sian Monarchy, which appeared in the world, and vanished againe like lightning; the strength whereof wholy consisted in Alexander, and with his death perish­ed.

What are the reall differences of Common-wealths, and from whence have States their Denomination?

The reall difference of Common-wealths are taken from the different order in commanding and obeying; the Name of every State is given according to the Su­preame and highest Authority.

Wherein is the Supreame Authori­ty manifested?

In these foure things.

1. Potestas belli et pacis.

2. Potestas vitae & Necis.

3. Po. faciendar. [...]egum.

[Page 23]4. Po. Creandor. magistrat.

By these foure powers, States are deter­mined in themselves, and distinguished one from another.

In whom those four powers, or most of them do rest, whether in one, some few, or in many, in them is the supreame Au­thority, and they give the Name to the State. If they be absolute in any, the state of them is called an abfolute Monarchy, or Aristocraty &c. If they be partly in some, and partly in others, then the State is said to be a mixt Common-wealth.

According as these powers are diversly setled, so States are really distinguished.

If those powers be in one person, well used, to the good of the people under him, the State is called A Monarchy.

If in the person of one, abused, to the profit only of that one, and of his who hath the Authority in his hands, its called

A Tyranny.

If in some few, well used to the com­mon safety it is called,

An Aristocraty.

If in some few abused, to the profit and pleasure of some few.

An Oligarchy.

If the fore said powers, be in the mul­titude, well used, to the safety of all, Law having power above the people, i [...]s then called,

A good Democraty.

If in the multitude, abused to faction. and the setting up the basest of the people, the multitude over-ruling Law,

A bad Democraty.

Which of these Governments do you esteem the best?

Heretofore most Historians were of the iudgement that regulated Monarchy, was the best, but the State of England, as now it stands, admits not such weak iudge­ments as mine to distinguish.

SIR, I see you are silent in your thoughts, I pray tell me what you ac­count the worst.

The worst State is a Tyranny, as be­ing opposite to the best, Bonum & malum in suo genere maxime distant.

I have heard of an Anarchy, I pray what government is that?

Anarchy is no State, but a confusi­on of all order, much worse then the worst Tyranny, whi [...]h well appeared at Rome, [Page] after the death of Nero, when all men did what they list, which caused an honourable Senator to say, that if that misorder should continue, they should have occasion to wish for Nero againe. It is better living where nothing, then where all things are lawfull.

I remember you told me, that if the forementioned powers were in one person, it was an absolute Mon [...]rchy; by which I conceive there are severall kinds of Monarchies?

A Monarchy is the government of one to the preservation of all, But Monarchies are of two sorts.

1. Absolute where the chi [...]f doth rule all causes by his absolute Authority, not any way determined by Law, and the [...]e are good, so farre as the Authority is well used, and the cheif doth hold it, Sa­lus populi suprema L [...]x▪ For govern­ment was before positive Lawes, and in Nature, there is absolute priority and power of the Father over his Children.

2. Limited, and that three manner of wayes.

1. By Lawes a lore, where the Sub­ject may have lawfull audience, and he [...]p in Law, for holding, or recovering his [Page 26] right against the Prince.

2. By Overseers alone, where there be Officers of Sta [...]e, which may demand [...]enson, wh [...]n the cheif stretcheth his power [...]o the d [...]triment of the Subject, such have been the Electors in Germany.

3. By Lawes and Overseers, as in times past in France. when the twelve peeres held their places, and their Parliaments had their full power for the processe of Lawes.

Just Principalities are generally main­tained by hould [...]ng the favour and love of the Subject.

Imperium est in voluntate obsequenti­um.

Wh [...]t meanes is a Governour to use to gaine the love and affection of his people; and being gained; how is it to be kept, and preserved?

The peoples love is houlden by these meanes.

1. By being Religious, towards God, for that men will never s [...]ek, nor desire the overthrow of them, whom they are perswaded to be gua [...]ded with divine pro [...]ection.

2. By shewing Care of the pulike safe [Page 27] ty not of privat gaine, men doe most willingly contribute, when they are per­swaded that money is either imployed or reserved for publick benefit.

3. By building publick works, and releiving publick misfortunes.

4. By bestowing honours and re­wards upon men of great worth by de­serts.

5. By referring all matters of Justice and punishment to their offences, never shewing contentment in the shame or misery of any.

6. Generally, by bounty, magnanimi­ty, and all honourable and vertuous acti­ons.

Tyranny you say is the worst of governments, I shall earnestly desire, you would branch it forth, into its severall parts, by which I may perceive the ini­quity of it.

Tyranny is the government of one man according to his own will, and respecting only his owne profit, Tyrants have used two wayes to support and uphold their Tyran­ny.

1. By taking away all desire and know­ledge of altering their government, which [Page 28] is thus done. First by working pusilla­nimity. Ignorance, and distrust in the people; which is acted five manner of wayes.

1. By taking away all Schooles, and discipline; by which men might under­stand what is right or wrong; A thing practised by the Turks &c.

2. By taking away all societies and fra­ternities, by which they might be ac­quainted one with another.

3. By placing Guards in the strongest places, by which they might suppresse a­ny sudden attempt.

4. By placeing privy spies to entrap such as talk of State matters, and so make all jealous of one another.

5. By often making shew of forraigne forces, which may be feard to be ready if any need require.

2. By taking a way all power from the people, which is thus wrought:

1. By banishing or putting to death, or shutting up in Prison the men of account and their ofspring, that no male contents may know where to finde a leader that the people would follow; the house of [Page 29] Bela took this course in the Moscovite State, It was Perianders Counsell to Thrasibulu [...]; the house of Ottimau is so jealous, that the Grandsenior never thinks his Estate sure, before he hath cut of his Brethren.

2. By utterly impoverishing their Su [...]jects by exactions. Dionysius in 5 years gatt all the treasury of Sicily into his hands.

3. By maintaining disscention between the great men and the Commons, or of the greater men between themselves, ta­king part with neither, that they may know and use the griefes and wants of all.

4. By not suffering the great men to live at home, but attend there, where the higher power do obscure them, or if they be imployed to keep their Children as Hostages, so useth the Magnus Mogor in Asia.

5. To commit no trust to the Natives, or men of great blood or kindred, but to E [...]naches or strangers, such as can not be popular, nor hold place, but by their Tyranny, such are the Turkish Bassaes.

6. To suffer no m [...]n to be [...]re Armes, but their sworn Souldiers, to give Lands [Page 30] only to such, the inheritance depending still at their proper disposition, the Mo­scoveticall and Turkish practise, the one to his Gen [...]le [...]en, the other to his Tima­rio [...]s; All other are slaves to them, as they are to their cheif Lord.

By what properties shall I know a King from a Tyrant?

These four differen [...]es will distinguish them.

1. Kings were first chosen out of the best, and by the best, to guard them, and to rule the rash multitude.

Tyrants had their beginning ex Dema­gogis; such as flattered the people, and stirred them up against the worthyest persons, and so under shew of prote­cting of them, made away, all such as might with stand them, Pisistratus at A­thens, Dionysius at Syracuse.

2. The second scope of a King is vertue and honour.

The scope of a Tyrant, profit and pleasure.

3. A King is the protector of all, Rich, and poore, that on neither doth, nor suf­fereth wrong of the other.

A Tyrant only regardeth the profit [Page 31] and security of him self, and his leaving others open to al wrongs.

4. The trust of a King is in his Sub­jects, and of them he maketh his Guard.

The trust of a Tyrant is only in stran­gers, and to them he commits his safe­ty.

How are Principalities over­thrown?

Two Wayes.

1. By forraign power, when one state assayleth and overthroweth another, the conquered receiveth such govern­ment as the Conqueror thinketh meet, so the Romans ov [...]rthrew many King­doms, and turned them into principali­ties; to be governed by their Lif [...]ten­nants.

2. By Domestic [...]ll seditions, which are commonly raised by th [...]se occasions, in number Six.

1. By the Iustice of the Rulers.

1. In Injuries towards th [...]ir persons, which is acted two manner of wayes.

1. In murthering, and ravishing their Kinsfolks. As the T [...]r­quin [...]s at Rome.

[Page 32]2 In bea [...]ing like sl [...]ves men of account.

2. In oppressing with exactions, so far that by [...]xtream poverty, subjects grow desperat, havi [...]g nothing to lo [...]e, but th [...]ir If [...], whereof want hath made them wea­ry.

2 By contempt of th [...]m.

1 For their folly, and incapaci­ty of state.

2 For esseminate manners, as Sard [...]n [...]palus.

3 For Drunkenn [...]sse, as C [...]mbisis and Dionisius Junior.

3 By feare of death or disgrace in the subject.

1 Either through knowledge or suspicion of anger conceived in the Cheif himself.

2 Or fe [...]re of sland [...]r from them which are about him in Au­thority.

4 By hope of profit and w [...]al [...]h, which moveth specially base Rebells, which pretend a community of all.

5 By Amb [...]tion or desire of Honour, the most dangerous motive, for that it possesseth only great spirits, which are of [Page 33] resolution, to their [...]utmost power, As S [...]aev [...]la which a [...]t [...]mpted upon King Po s [...]nna, and t [...]e Confed [...]rats that slew Caesar in the Senat.

6 By desire of change in Religion, which hath only moved men in these lat­ter times, being never made a pretence or motiv, f [...]r either forraign Conquests, or Dom [...]call s [...]ditions, before Mabo­met. Pa [...]t supra.

You formerly told me, that Ari­stocraty was the power of Ruling in some few, well u [...]e [...], to the Common sefety: I pray acquaint me of what sort of [...]he people they [...]re or ought to b [...]?

Aristocraty, is a gou [...]n [...]e [...]t of the best, for the safe [...]y of all, but there ar [...] three kinds.

1. The first, where [...]respect is had, to both wealth, and vertue, in the cheif of all Officers.

2 The second where respect is only had of wealth, this inclyneth to an Oli­garchy.

3 The third, where respect is only had of virtue, leaving it free to all, to make way to the cheif places, this inclineth to a Democr [...]ty.

What means have been used to maintain and uphold States Aristocrati­c [...]ll.

These Nine Maximes [...]ave bee [...]e held and practis [...]d.

1 Compelling the Nobility to bring up their Children in feats of Armes, and politick Discipline, suffering the r [...]st to do as they list.

So the La [...]edemonians brought up all their Children in publick places, to­gether, where they learned exercise of Armes and knowledge of government.

2 Constraining the Nobility upon great penalty, to be present at their pub­lick Assemblies, suffering the rest to at­tend their profit and businesse.

3 Receiving the Citizens into their sp [...]ciall patro [...]ages, that in Popular quarrells, every man severally might pacifie his Clyents, or followers, this was often practised by the S [...]nators of Rome, to uphold their State.

4 Suffering none to continue in the greatest Offices for long time, that he might procure too many dependents, or weak [...]n his opposites.

5 Giving noe man that honour whch [Page 35] others might not hope to obtain.

6 Imploying them which were too great, in forraign businesse, that absence might make them forgotten.

7 Keeping Offices of Honour, wholly amongst the Nobility, leaving them of petty matters and gain to the people.

8 Suppressing the first occasions of quarrells amongst the greatest men, To that end to hold friendly meetings in pla­ces indifferent, where pacifications may be made.

9. Holding the people in fehre of pub­lick dangers, to make an enemy if there were none, by that means, to draw from home such as were mutinous: A thing much practised by the Roman Senate, while their power held.

You have decla [...]ed nine M [...]xims or Sophims, that are the props of a [...] Aristo­craticall State, but by wha [...] means is that government overthrown and changed?

Three things alter and [...]hange an A [...]istoc [...]aty.

1. The Sedition of the great men, when their numbers do so increase, that the Ho­nours to be devided, are not enough to sa­tisfie their Number, th [...] Lacedemonian, [Page 36] for remedy of this, sent the Parthen [...]an [...] into Italy which built Tarentum.

2 The Transgression of that suppositi­on in not making vertuea mean between the we [...]lth of the great men, and liberty of the people; yeelding too much to th [...] peoples liberty, makes the State Demo­craticall, but wholy to wealth Oligar­chicall.

3 Negligence in small matters, suffe­ring inferior Officers to be perpetuall, which after giveth example and occasion that the greatest likewise should be [...]o.

By this it is evident to me that A­ristocraty may be turned into a State De­mocraticall or Oligarchycall: my re­quest is, that you would more fully shew me what Oligarchy is, and wherein it differeth from the State last mentioned?

Oligarchy is a Government of some few to their owne profii; and it may be branch­ed forth into 4. kinds.

1 Whereall che [...]fe Officers, are ch [...] ­sen only by valuation of wealth and possessions.

2 Where men of middle wealth, are admitted to Offices, but the pre­ceedent Magistrate c [...]useth his suc­cessor.

[Page 37]3 Where, the Magistrates succeed, as in In [...]eritances, The Son in his Fathers place.

4 Where all power is in some few, which rule above Law as they list, and this is like the worst kinde of Democraty.

How is this Rule of Government kept from fall or [...]uine?

The Fabrick of this government is pre­served from fall or ruine, by those Axioms or Sophismes, as Sir Walter Rawleigh calls them, in his Book, called the Prince of State, which are these.

1 By suffering no Elections, to passe either by Lo [...] or by Common suffrages, but by a s [...]t number.

2 By suffering no choice to be made, but out of certaine, which likewise had such a valuation of goods.

3 By making their Officers perpetuall or of long continuance.

4 By maintaining great Troopes of Horse, imposed on them in Authority, which make a Terrible shew, and can not be maintained but with great wealth so did the Eretrians and C [...]alcedonians. But Aristrocratyes and Democratyes have [Page 38] rather maintained [...] foo [...]-men for their Souldiers. As the Lacedemonians, the Romans, and at this day the Swissers.

5 By keeping the people poore and without Armes, that they might neither know how to arme themselves, or give pay to them which should take Armes in their behalfe.

6 By raising many Warres, or ru­mors of Warres; Common people are easily awed in publique dangers.

7 By making Marriages only with themselves, where Marriages are Com­municated, the greater sort is lesse estee­med.

8 By providing means of employment in Warres, or Colonyes, when their Is­sue groweth too great, and all can not be in honour.

I conceive those political Fabricks are destroyed, and brought to nought, by fewer means and wayes: they are upheld like a house built by many hands, yet one man or two can pluck it downe. My request [...]ow is, that you would shew and unf [...]ld unto me the occasions of Oligarchyes fall?

Oligar [...]hies are overthrowne three [...]ayes

[Page 39]1 By them that are not in Authority. As at Heraclea and Massilia, where th [...] younger Brethr [...]n rose against the Elder, for that they were excluded from the Common-wealth.

2 By them in Authority, these five wayes.

1 Either by reason of the smal num­ber, the Father and Son, or two Brethren can not be in Offi [...] ­gether.

2 When the few in place would yet have fewer.

3 When the [...]ew having Luxuriously spent their goods and Estates, seek to spoile the Common Trea­sury.

4 When of those few which Rule, all can not come to the Chei [...]est place.

5 When they in Authority by any occasion fall at dissention and as­sayle onn another, the weaker fetching in the people for his Guard, maketh either a Tyrany or a Democraty.

3 By Accident two wayes.

1 In time of Warre through di­strust [Page 40] in the people, those few enforced to hire forraig [...]e Soul­diers, which committed to one that is populer, with them makes himselfe Lord of all.

2 In time of peace, whe [...] the people and those few being at v [...]riance, commit themselves to a third, which oppresseth them both.

I remember in your d [...]scription of States, you mention a two fold D [...]mo­craty; I request your patience to unfold to me the particulars thereof, and what difference hath been used in their Electi­on of cheif [...] Officer [...].

A Democr [...]ty, is a Government of all, to [...]he good of all, or else A government of a multitude which are the greater part of the State, to that end they propou [...]d to themselves, and this is called a bad Demo­craty, and of neere kin to Tyranny.

As concerning their choice of State Offi­cers, they had divers fashio [...]s of Liberties.

1 In some; all might be capable of the highest Offices, and all had voices in the Choice.

2 In others; all had suffrages, but yet they made their choice by [Page 41] certaine estimation of wealth.

3 In some all might be Rulers, Ita ut Lex dominetur.

In others all might rule. Ita [...]t Po­pulus dominetur.

In my Judgement, those popular States, that are not governed by the Rule or Square of Law, can have no strength, neither can their basis be well fixed.

A popular State, hath n [...]ither strength nor goodnesse in th [...] frame it selfe; besides it is subiect to such daily factio [...]s and dis­sention, and mak [...]ing way for every impu­dent flatterer to grow mighty, by fawning [...]n people, and slandering them whose good vertues and fortunes for their greatnesse might be occasion of envy.

How then is it supported, if it want strength and goodnesse?

The strength of it only consisteth in the g [...]odness [...], morall vertues and civill parts of their Citizens, [...]nd according to the di­vers sorts of people popular States doe dif­fer.

1 The most ancient is of Husband­men supposed the b [...]st, because their life being laborion, and full of businesse, they [Page 42] have least leisure to mutiny from their private cares. So the Medians are re­ [...]o [...]ted to have lived before Deiocius alte­ [...] government. [...] [...]cond of Shephards much like [...] for their kind of life. [...] third of Artisans and Merchants [...] must needs be full of innova­ [...] roug [...] their continuall whispe­ri [...]g [...] private devices at their mee­ti [...].

4 [...] other is a mixture of all those kinds [...]. Ari [...]totle condemneth utterly [...]; and yet wee read not of any of [...] first, any thing memorabl [...] The Ath [...]ians admitted of all sorts to the choice [...] Magistrates, the making L [...]wes, and to [...] great censure, when they ba­nished [...] by Ostracisme.

So did the Romans in the latter times howso [...]ver the [...]uncient did hold it a suf­ficient commendation to be commended. As Bonus C [...]lon [...]s & strenuus miles.

What banishment was that Ostra­cisme, and [...]or what time, and what the Transgression tha [...] made men liable there­unto?

It was a kinde of banishment used [...] ­amongst [Page 43] the Athenians, and th [...] party exiled was to remaine ten yeares in Exile, which was thus executed; by delivering Shells, with the names of the persons con­d [...]mned written therein; It was used not so much to p [...]nish other Offences, as to abat [...] the immoderate power of the Noblemen.

What are the pretexts of a popu­lar State, and what meanes doe they use to maintaine the same?

The supposition of a popular State pretendeth two things, which in themselves are plaufible.

1 Equality.

2 Liberty.

The means of maintaining their sup­position have beene these seaven.

1 By choosing all Magistrates by th [...] voices of all, and out of all. Ne quis sit exclusus á Republica.

2 By giving no power to any Magi­strate, to put any to death, though con­demned by Law, if they appealed to the people. Vt libera sit pr [...]vocatio ad Popu­lum, abs [...]luta Potestas in Populo.

3 By causing all to know the use of Armes, that they neither should feare Forraigne forces or powers, nor one [Page 44] pa [...]tie to stand in awe of another.

4 By suffering no man to contin [...]e long in Office, and to be called to an ac­count, his Office being ended and expi­red.

5 By diminishing the power of them which were growne to great by what meanes soever. As the Athenians used their Ostracismus, The Syracnsans their Petalismus, the parties name written in Olive leaves, upon which he was to be exiled.

6 The more simple, otherwise. If hee can but understand their Lawes, and cu­stomes to see execution on Offendors, the fitter and saf [...]r for a popular Estate. In some Democraties the chiefe Officer hath beene tied to such kindes as are mecha­nicall.

7 By compelling all to be at Assem­blies, especially the m [...]aner sort, who in some popularities have been invited by rewards.

Sir, I have exercised your pati­ence long, and I feare I am to bold with you; but your freenesse of discourse hi­therto, encourageth me to demand, or request some other few resolutions before your departure.

The time I have spent with you, I account it not l [...]st, for I have made a two fold gaine thereof, by renewing our old acquaintance, and thereby our loves.

2 By bringing to my remembrance what I have read out of divers au [...] ­tient Authors concernin [...] STATE-POLICIE. I shall willingly resolve you, if your demandes come within the reach of my weake Lear­ning. I pray proceed to your Que­stion.

How are Democraticall States alterd?

D [...]mocraties are [...]a [...]ged into O­ligarchyes, by the banding of them, in great favour with the people; if they can agr [...]e betweene themselves: if they disagree, the one ass [...]yling the other, the conq [...]eror rayse a Monar [...]hy.

The Popular State of Rome, by the conf [...]d [...]racy of Cras [...]us, Pompy, and Caesar, proved in effect Oligarchicall, All things being act [...]d as they would have them.

Aft [...]r Crassus death, Pompy and [Page 46] Caesar falling at variance, on [...] assayling the other, the Conqueror drew the whole State to himselfe.

After Caes [...]rs deat [...] it became againe Popular. The [...]w Tri [...]mverate m [...]d [...] it Oligarchicall, their diss [...]nti [...], Mo­n [...]rchicall ag [...]in [...].

What things are those, without which, neither of those forementioned States can be supported, or continue without ruine.

Aristotle sayeth, Sex sunt quae di­cuntur necessaria Alimenta, Artificia, Arma, Pecunia, S [...]cra, Jndici [...]. More­over [...]lse where he saieth. Quin [...]ue sunt [...]rcana quae in potestate superioris M [...] ­gistratus reservare solent Resp. Ther [...] ­for [...] it behoveth the Supreame p [...]r of [...]y State, to h [...]ve a specia [...] ca [...], that those fix thi [...]gs be duly [...]ad inreg [...]rd, and according to the respective qualiti [...]s and numb [...]r of their Subiects.