WHen the Reader had found, That, by his Statute, No Man might be arrested, imprisoned, or dealt with­all in his Person or Liberty, or put out [Page 30]of his Freehold, Free Customs, or Li­berties; Nor that the King would send forth against any, nor proceed upon any, but by the lawful trial of their Peers, or the Law of the Land; And that the King would not sell, de­ferr, or deny Justice or Right to any; And that that Law of the Land was the Antient custom of the Country, which hath continued ever sithence there was a King here, and that by it the King was made, and had his power and preheminence; And that it was confirmed by the Oath of Kings before the Statute, and sworn to be observed by all the Kings si­thence; And that all Judges are bound to try their doubts, and Judge their Causes accordingly, howsoever [Page 31]their private knowledge, or Consci­ence leadeth them; Then both by Practice, and by the Authority of Books, looking into the course of the proceedings in the Chancery, by the Lord Chan­cellor of England, from time to time, it seemed as though that Office had been besides the Law, erected out of the absolute Authority that the Conquerors claimed; and that it hath been continued from time to time a­gainst the Law, and the Provi­sion of that Charter and Parlia­ment, as it were by a Preroga­tive above the Law; for that he is not tyed to any Form of Tri­al of any point of Fact that fal­leth [Page 32]out doubtfull before him, as other Judges be, but may ex­amine Witnesses as he pleaseth, and when he pleaseth, to inform his Conscience, & also examine the parties by Oath or other­wayes, and to proceed as it shall seem best to his Wisdom, to beat out the Truth, as it seemeth good to him in his privat judg­ment; And that his Lordship may Order & Decree the Cause, as it seemeth to him to agree most with Equity and Consci­ence, howsoever the Law is in the Case; and to Imprison the party if he will not be ruled by him, and forbear the benefit of Law, in every thing that the [Page 33]Lord Chancellor thinketh to be Unconscionable: So as it seem­ed upon the first object, for that his Lordship is neither bound to the trial, nor the judgement that the Statute appointeth to be observed (as it seemed) upon the Letter, that his Authority is above Law, or besides Law, & so the Great Charter of England no further holden than it plea­seth the Lord Chancellor of Eng­land. Also it appeared by pra­ctice, That no Man hath Juris­diction to judge according to the Law, before he hath some Grant or Commission from the King or Queen out of the Lord Chancellors Office, under the [Page 34] Great Seal that is in his keeping: And also by course of the Com­mon-law (saving some particu­lar prescriptions in some parti­cular Courts) the Judges can­not hold plea in any Cause, un­til his Lordship send them it by an Original Writ framed in the Chancery, retornable before the Judges by his Lordships ap­pointment.

But when it was well consi­dered, That the Charter and Statute of Magna Charta was, that none of these things should be done, but according to the Law of the Land; And that e­very King was sworn to ob­serve it, and that the Lord [Page 35]Chancellor is appointed by the King to his Office; It was con­ceived, that the Law of the Land appointed these things to be thus done by his Lordship, for some necessary causes known to them that first in­vented the Law, and so that great Office, and the Great Char­ter, and the Law of the Land might all stand together.

Wherefore then was sought for, when that great Office of Chancery was erected, by whom, and for what cause? and it was found to be erected by the Institutors of the Com­mon Law, as a Member there­of, of necessity to observe order [Page 36]in making of Judges, direction of Sutes, and to relieve and sup­ply in those Cases, where the Judges by the general Grounds and Rules of Law, could not give competent Remedy by Law, according to Conscience and Equity, as shall hereafter be more plainly shewed; And so his Lordship, nor his Office, no derogation to the Law of the Land; but his Office a member, and he a Judge there­of, without whom the Law could not have the perfection, order, and due honour that it hath; For the better perceiving whereof, it was Noted,

First, that those (the Kings, [Page 37]Nobles, and Commons, who­soever, and whensoever they were) that Instituted the Law of the Land, did see that it was best to make it so, as it might stand of General Grounds and Rules, that might comprehend all particular Cases that should fall out, and to bind all that were in one Case, to one judg­ment, without respect of per­sons, or other Circumstances; or else the Law could not di­rect the Judges, how they should proceed in judgement: For if consideration of the per­son, or other circumstance, might have given a scope to the Judges, to judge by one Rule, [Page 38]one Case one way, and another another way, the Judge might have made of the Golden Rule of the Law, a Leaden Rule, to bend at his will, and so con­fusion would have followed, and infinite inconveniences; for avoiding whereof, they made the Rules to reach all persons alike, according to Ju­stice, which regardeth the per­son of no Man in judgement.

Then, they did see, that ma­ny would be over-reached; for some were too simple, and would trust untrusty persons, and be circumvented and were meet therefore to be holpen; Some would fall into the lash [Page 39]of the Law ignorantly, and therefore not to be punished as those that offended of Malice; Many might craftily over reach their Neighbours, by getting the better end of the staff; And some by strength bear them down, if by some extraordina­ry Authority the weaker were not upholden, and the simple provided for, and the subtill prevented. For in many Ca­ses men might offend & wrong their Neighbours in subtil sort, and be wronged by hap, or simplicity, or ignorance, and yet the General Rule of the Law could not fully reach or relieve them, that were so over­reached [Page 40]or circumvented.

Wherefore the Institutors of the Law found it to be a thing of necessity, to tie the Judges to follow the Law in judge­ment in all Cases generally a­like, as the Case required: and yet to constitute one Supreme Judge further trusted than the rest, that might have an Autho­rity absolute and extraordina­ry, to supply and reform those particular Cases, that might happen as aforesaid, according to Equity and good Consci­ence, and to bind the parties not to follow Law, where by Law they might get more by subtil­ty, or the others simplicity, [Page 41]than Conscience would.

Here grew an Objection, That it was a dishonour to the Law to have these wants, by this great Man to be thus sup­plyed; for that it shewd, that she had not sufficiency and cer­tainty in her Grounds and Rules.

But this is nothing, For there is no Law in any Nation, but particular mischiefs have grown upon it; nor ever any Art or Science hath been so exquisitely set down, but dis­putable Questions have been found in it. And that it cannot be otherwise, one example may serve; Moyses that was [Page 42]the Law-giver to Gods Peo­ple, and delivered it him­self by Inspiration, was at the wall, we see, in his own Books, in divers Cases that happened, both in the Political Law, who should inherit, and the Ceremonial Law, touch­ing the uncleanesse that came by touching a dead body; and he was driven to refer it to God to be decided, and could not decide it himself by the general Rule of the most perfect Law that ever was given to any peo­ple. Then if Moyses that man of God found some doubts that he could not decide, in that Law delivered by himself; [Page 43]Good Judges and learned may find some Cases, that by Law they can hardly find a good provision for, but leave it to such as God shall appoint to ut­ter his Will by in Cases of Con­science, sith by Law they are not otherwise provided for.

Then it was Noted whereof his Lordship hath his name of Dominus Cancellarius Angliae, Lord Chancellor of England; wherein all agree, that he is called Cancellarius, à Cancellando. But what he may Cancell, whereby he had that honour, hath been doubted. Some have said, that he had authori­ty Cancellare iniquam Legem Com­munem, [Page 44]& judicare secundum Con­scientiam. But that hath no rea­son, and was rejected; for it is absurd, that sith the Law hath made him a Judge of Law, and his Office a member of the Law, and made thereby, (as as shall be plainly proved) that the Law should give Authori­ty to deface or Cancell her self, or that his Honour should de­face that wherby he sitteth, and hath his Authority. And to that end was cited Mr. Bractons say­ing, Lex facit Regem, attribuat igi­tur Rex Legi, quod Lex attribuitei, id est, dominationem & potestatem; And thereupon it was conclu­ded, à fortiore, If the King, that [Page 45]hath an Authority by Preroga­gative above the Law in many cases, as to pardon and acquit by Mercy, where the Law of Justice condemneth, must at­tribute to the Law Dominion and Power: the Lord Chancel­lor, though he hath an Autho­rity besides Law, and yet al­lowed by the Law, is to at­tribute Dominion and Power to the Law in all that he can, for that it made him an Officer in so high degree, and therefore he may not Cancell or deface it. Which point, that he is made by Law, and hath his Authority therby, is afterwards fully proved. And it is to be [Page 46]Noted, That his Lordship by his Absolute power cannot stay the Course of Law, but onely bindeth the person not to fol­low the Law in any Uncon­scionable Course. This may serve to shew, that it was not said of Cancelling the Law; for in those Cases of Consci­ence it is found by experience, that the Law will take her course if the party call upon it, though the Lord Chancellor hath otherwise ordered the Cause.

But his Lordship hath his Name of Cancelling the Kings Letters Patents, which is a thing of as great Honour to [Page 47]his Lordship and the Law, as th'other had been of Dishonor, and Disgrace to both; where­in it was Noted, That the Let­ters Patents of the Prince once passed the Great Seal, do bind both his or her Majesty, their Heirs and Successors, and all Subjects, yea so far, as the King or Queen cannot call them in, if they find them unfit, nor any Subject can gainsay them, if they be not just. Yet by Law if Letters Patents be past the Great Seal in deceipt of the King or Queen, the Judges by the Law are to adjudge it undue, and not to bind the King or Queen in that respect, wherein [Page 48]they were deceived; but yet they must leave it under Seal, and cannot deface it. But if any Letters Patents pass the Great Seal, injurious to any Sub­ject, or prejudicial to the Law, the Lord Chancellor as a Judge of Law, (and not by his abso­solute Authority) by his Ordi­nary power, and by the course of the Common Law is to judge of it which proveth that the Law, and not Prerogative giveth him that power. For he is to hold plea of it by course of Law, and to call the party in­teressed in it by process of Law, and so proceed accor­ding to the Law, and repeal it [Page 49]by Judgement, if it be found in Law to be injurious. And then the Lord Chancellor may Cancell it, and pull the Seal frō it, and deface it; which nei­ther the King or Queen by Pre­rogative, nor any other Judge of Law, nor other Lord of England can do, but himself, who only hath that Authority. Wherefore, thereof he is called Dominus Cancellarius Angliae, as if it were said, that Lord that only hath Authority in England to Cancell the Letters Patents of the Kings, that bind both the King and the Subjects, if they be injurious to any Subject, or prejudicial to the Law.

In this part, there were Three things Noted; One, that hereof his Lordship took his Name. Another, that this was his highest Authority, for that none but he had the like in the Land. The third, that his Lordship hath it given him by the Law, and is in that respect a Judge of the Law, and proceedeth in course of Law, and not accor­ding to Conscience, and by his Absolute power, or extraordi­nary Authority; for he cannot judge thereof any otherwise, but by the Law of the Land.

3. Then was Noted, As all justice floweth from the King or Queen, as from the Foun­tain, [Page 51]and no Authority or Juris­diction in England is lawfull, that is not drawn from thence; so is his Lordship and his Of­fice, next under the King or Queen, to direct such Commis­sions and Grants as shall give Judicial authority to any judge according to the Law, which must pass under the Great Seal, or they be not sufficient. For example, There is no Judge made by Writ or Commission, but it cometh from thence, nei­ther hath any Man power te­nere placita, but it must grow first by Grant from thence, except it be the petit Sutes, that belong to petit Courts, as [Page 52]Courts Baron, and County-Courts; whereof it is said by Law, de minimis non curat Lex, but the Law left them to the Lords at home, to order them for the Peoples ease; Yet in these Courts if any falle Judgement be given, it cannot be redressed but by Writ out of the Chance­ry, to bring it before better Judges. But here of was noted, That though he must direct out all Commissions, and Grants, before any can have Authority to judge according to the Law, that his Lordship doth that al­so by the Law of the Land; And the Commissions and Grants made by him are to be [Page 53]adjudged by the Law of the Land for their validity or inva­lidity; And therefore that his Lordship therein is a Judge and member of the Law to ap­point and direct the rest in that behalf, and is to do it in that form, and to that effect that the Law hath prescribed him, which his Lordship may not alter; whereby it is apparent that he hath that Authority al­so by the Law of the Land.

4. Then was Noted, That by the Common Law, if any would complain of wrong, or sue for right, he was to come into the Chancery, and set down by one of the Clerks [Page 54]thereof, a Brief of his matter that he would put in Sute, and that was by the Clerk to be set down in form in parchment, and a Precept written before it in the Kings or Queens Name, and that directed to the Sheriff of that Shire where the Plain­tiff allegeth the Defendant was to be best found, or the cause most aptly lay to be sued to Trial; which Precept Com­mandeth the Defendant or Te­nant to render right to the Plaintiff or Demandant, or ap­pear at the day prefixed in the Court appointed to him, to an­swer him to the Law, and that Brief enclosed in Wax sealed [Page 55]with the Great Seal, the L. Chan­cellor is to send out by the course of the Common Law before a­ny Subject can be sued for any matter of weight, by the course of the Common Law. And that Writ is called in Latine Breve; wherein also was noted, a great regard that the Law had, that Men should not be lightly heard to complain of their Neighbours, nor any Subject drawn into Sutes, nor troubled, nor any Causes (but the petit ones aforesaid) should be brought to judgement, but by his Honours direction; so as Judges should not send for whom they would, nor listen [Page 56]to all that complained, but to do Justice to those that were sent to them by the Kings Writ, di­rected by the Lord Chancellor of England to be Retorned be­fore them, as fit to be conside­red of, and meet to be drawn into Sute and Judgement. Though sithence by usage, di­vers Courts have obtained o­ther proceedings, by other pro­cess, according to their Course, and not by Originals, and that is not derogatory either to the Law, or that great Office; for some have grown by Grant, by reasō of the Kings Prerogative, which both the Law and the Chancery alloweth, and are to [Page 57]allow of right, so it be not in derogation of their Authorities, and may stand with the Law of the Land. For the Kings Bench proceedeth by Bill, with­out Original, against such as be Prisoners to the Mareschal there­of, and that justly; for that no Law can prescribe the King a form to proceed in Iustice for those Causes that be before himself, but he may receive any complaint, without Writ, and proceed as it please him, so he observe the Law for Iustice & Iudgement, which is done there, as well as in the Com­mon Pleas, where all come in by Original Writ; For though [Page 58]it be not by like form for pro­cess, yet it is by the same form of pleading and judgement, & in matter & substance of Law all one. And in this part it is manifest, that this Authority also in the Lord Chancellor to direct out Original Writs, is by the Law of the Land given unto him, and his form prescri­bed to him by the Law how he should make them. And to that purpose there is a Book of Law left in the Chancery that the Chancery men are bound to follow, which is cal­led The Register; And if the Writs be not made according to the form of Law thereby [Page 59]prescribed, the Judges will re­ject them, and judge thē void; which is called in Law, aba­ting of the Writ. So as it is apparent, that in this also his Lordship and his Office is by the Common Law, and are members of the Commō Law. and that he doth it not by any other Authority above Law, or besides it.

5. Then was considered of his Lordships authority to judge, which appeareth in 9 E. 4. fol. 14. in a Book-case, to be of two sorts, or by two powers, viz. One according to the course of the Common Law, or Posi­tive Law, which is there said [Page 60]to be Potentia ordinata, which is in process, in pleading, and in judgement, according to the course of the Common Law of the Land; The other is said Absoluta potentia, which is in process according to the Law of Nature, to send for the party to Answer, and receive his An­swer if he will make it, & then proceed to examine the truth of the matter, and if he will not answer, but be Contumax, yet his Honour is to proceed to the examination of the truth, and not to condemn him in the cause for his obstinacy, if it may appear that the matter be not good against him.

And there is noted this diffe­rence, which is apparent and common in practice, That where the proceeding is accor­ding to Ordinary power, mis­pleading on either part may marr his Matter, and the judge­ment must be according to the Law, howsoever the equity of the Case shall fall out: But if the proceeding be according to Absolute power, though the party mis-plead, if the Lord Chancellor shall perceive the matter to be good on his side, his Lordship is to judge for him for whom Equity serveth, be it the Plaintiff or Defendant, for that he is to judge as he shall [Page 62]find the matter to be in Consci­ence good or bad, and not as he shall find the pleading to be for­mal and good, or vicious and evil, or as the Law will in the Case. As for example, in such actions as be brought in the Chancery before the L. Chan­cellor, as an Audita querela to avoid a Recognisance for Non­age, or other good Cause in Law; And in actions brought according to the course of the Law, either by any of the Court, or against any of them by reason of their Privilege, and in Vouchers upon Aid-prayer of the King, and such other, whatsoever actions are [Page 63]pursued there according to the course of the Law, his Lord­ship is not to regard what Con­science would in the Case, but is tyed to the strict course of Law, so as if the matter be a­gainst Conscience in his Lord­ships opinion, yet he is to ad­judge with him that the Law serveth for, yea if his matter ap­pear to be good, and his Coun­sel have lost it by pleading, his Lordship can not help it in judgement; nor if the Law be against him, though Equity & Conscience would seem for him. But on the other side, if the proceeding be by the Ab­solute power, howsoever the [Page 64]party or his Counsel oversee, or set forth their matter, & what­soever the precise Rule of Law requireth, if his Lordship per­ceive by his Wisdom that the cause in Conscience is good on his side, his Lordship is to ad­judge with him; for that then judgement is to proceed secundum Conscientiam & Verita­tem, and not in Forma Juris. But in any Case that is there in form of Law, if it fall out that in Conscience it ought to be re­lieved, the party may put in a Bill, & follow it in that course, and then his Lordship may stay the course of Law.

6. Then was it enquired, [Page 65]Whether his Lordship may take order in all causes which are against Conscience, or that the Law hath limited them also, and allowed of some to hold in that course, and some not? And it seemed, that Con­science whereby his Lordship is to judge, is not to be under­stood simpliciter, and to be Sim­plex Conscientia, but Regulata Con­scientia, and therein to follow Order and Course accustomed; viz. to take order in such Cases as by the Course of the Court hath been ordered before-time, and in Causes of like Equity, or greater; wherfore oftentimes Presidents are sought for and [Page 66]required, and for lack of Presi­dents, it hath been sought how cases in the like reason, or in eodem respectu, with that that is then in question, have been u­sed, to prove that that Court may take cognizance of the Cause.

As for example, it is against Conscience, that a rich Father should suffer an honest Son to begg, & that a rich Son should suffer a good Father to want; yet his Lordship in those cases, cannot make the one to give a­way his goods to relieve the other, according to Conscience; But that, which that Regulata Conscientia relieveth, is not when [Page 67]one keepeth his own uncon­scionably, but when one see­keth an other mans Goods or Lands, or to trouble his per­son unconscionably; either by colour of Law, or extorted power, further or otherwise than in good Conscience it ought to be; then his Lordship proceeding according to the course of that Court, is in Con­science to relieve the party that is so dealt with, or his Lands or Goods so taken or sought, contrary to Conscience.

7. And it was thought, that if it be unconscionable that is done, if the Law in ordinary course may give a competent [Page 68]remedy, and the party suffici­ently able to follow it, and that there be no defect in any circumstance, but that by the Law the party wronged may be relieved; that his Lord­ship ought not to deal in it, but referr it to the Law to be judged. But therein there is no certain Rule but his Lord­ships own Wisdom, and Opi­nion, to discern whether the Law can relieve it, or not, or that there be any defect or not; so as if his Lordship think there is cause to retain it, he may, or dismiss it if it please him, ac­cording to his own Consci­ence, which is in that behalf [Page 69]to direct him, as God shall di­rect it.

8. And some cases there be that seem unconscionable, and yet the Law alloweth them for good and necessary, and never Lord Chancellor thought good to deal in them. As for example, That the Warranty of a Collateral Ancestor that never had any thing in the Land descended upon one that had right, should barr the right Owner from his Inhe­ritance, for that he is Heir to him that made the Warran­ty, though he hath nothing for it. Or that a supposed Re­covery in value in a Common [Page 70]Recovery against a Cryer of the Court of Common Pleas, that is not worth a Groat, nor like ever to be able to make Recompence in value, should stand for a Recom­pence, and be a barr of a mans lawfull Inheritance, and to barr him that he can never de­mand it, seemeth in every Mans particular Conscience to be unconscionable; And yet the Law hath allowed of them, upon this General Rule of Law, Better to suffer a Mis­chif than an Inconvenience, and upon the regard that the Law hath to settle Possessions of Inheritace in certainty, by [Page 71]such Instruments and Policies as the Law hath allowed to assure them by, of which kind these be; wherefore the Law hath not suffered them either by Law, or in Conscience, at any time to be violated or in­fringed, for any respect, or in any case.

9. And it was said, That wheresoever an Act of Parla­ment hath made any provision for any unconscionable thing that was not to be relieved by the Common Law, if the Lord Chancellor think in his Conscience that the Parla­ment hath not sufficiently re­lieved the party, yet his Lord­ship [Page 72]is not to relieve him further than the Parlament hath done, as before the Act he might have done; for that so much is provided for, as the whole Three Estates thought meet, to whose judge­ment his Lordship is to yeeld. But if any go about to defraud any Act of Parlament, or not able to seek relief as the Sta­tute appointeth, Then, as a­foresaid, according to Con­science his Lordship is to deal therein, when and where, as God and his Conscience is to direct, and no other, nor other rule there can be for his direction in that behalf.

Hereupon was it also con­cluded, That his Lordships Authorities Judicial, both by Ordinary power, and by Ab­solute power are limited by the Law of the Land; For in the Ordinary, he is tyed to the strict course of the Law, as other Judges be; and in the Absolute power, though not tyed to the course of the Law, yet he is to deal, per Regula­tam Conscientiam, and accor­ding to the course of the Court; and in such Cases, as in ca­ses of Conscience and Equi­ty likewise hath been relieved before-time, but not in any Case that Law hath allowed [Page 74]of for good and necessary, nor in any that any Parlament hath made provision for, un­less for some circumstances the party can not have that which the true intent of the Law, or the Parlament al­lowed him, but by means of that Court; And many things that a good Consci­ence would will a man to doe in Charity to his Neigh­bour, his Lordship by his Conscience cannot compell him to do, by the course of that Court.

10. But in all that Discourse none could find how farr his Lordships Absolute power [Page 75]went, nor within what limits certain it could be contained, nor by what means he might find out the truth; But that is without limitation referred to his own Gifts, and the Grace of God, that giveth Wisdom to find out the Truth, and Con­science to judge accordingly; sometime to find it out by the Law of Nature, as Solomon did, when no Testimony could be found in the world, yet he found by her bowels of com­passion the true mother of the Child; And sometime it is found out by one mean, and sometime by another: But God never faileth to give [Page 76]wisdom and means to per­form those Offices and Cal­lings, that his Majesty placeth men in; so as they serve him in Fear, and walk before him with a good Conscience, and seek it in Humility, and with prayer at his hands, whose Will, which is Infinite, is the Rule of the Lord Chancellors Conscience, and therefore his Authority in that respect is in­finite, and not limited in cer­tainty.

11. Upon all these Notes the Reader concluded with this Note, That it is certain that his Lordships Office and Authority is by the Law of the [Page 77]Land, and not derogatory thereto, but was constituted by the Law-makers to sup­ply those things that the Judg­es that be bound to the general Rules could not relieve; but in nothing to proceed to the prejudice of the Law. And to that end his Lordship was made a Judge of the Law in some Cases, and also a Judge by Conscience, besides the ge­neral Rule of Law in some o­ther Cases; for that being a Judge of the Law as well as others, his Lordship is with others to uphold the credit of the Law, and that most of all others; for that she gave him [Page 78]greater Authority than any o­ther, and trusted him above all the rest, in that she tyed all the rest to follow strict Rules, and left him to rule by the Grace of God, and his own Conscience, and to ob­serve only the Equity, and not the strict Rules thereof.

Wherefore no man ought once to controll his Lord­ships judgement in any cause that he proceedeth in by his Absolute power, but is with reverence to yeeld unto it, for as much as every one by the Rule of Charity, and of the estimation that we ought to have of them that God hath [Page 79]substituted over us, is to judge the best, that is, that his Lord­ship hath proceeded in single­ness of heart, according to his Conscience, and the Director of a good Mans Conscience is the will of God, which is the perfect rule of Righteous­nesse, howsoever it seemeth to Man in his Wit or Judgement. Wherefore when his Lordship hath set down his judgement as God hath guided his Con­science in any case, where he is Judge by Conscience, though it differ from some other judge­ment given either by himself, or any other good Man that sat in his Seat, all men are bound to [Page 80]think, that the case differed in some circumstance that they cannot see, or hath not understood it; Or that God in this case, according to his good Will, which is subject to no Rule but it self, hath or­dered this thus, and that so, and each being according to Gods good VVill, though dif­ferent in our Understanding the one from the other, both to be Righteous and Just Judgements, and are not to be disliked, or disobeyed of any.

12. But then was it doubt­ed by some, whether his Lord­ships Authority absolute might [Page 81]bind the great Men of the Land, viz. The Nobility as well as the mean Subjects? And the doubt rose upon this, For that their Honours are not to be Arrested by their Bo­dies for any cause between Them and any Subject, by the Law of the Land, and the processe out of the Chan­cery is by Attachment of their Bodies, if they come not in upon a Sub-poena served, and the execution of that Court is Imprisonment, untill the par­ty will yield to obey the De­cree and Order thereof, and by the Great Charter no Free­man ought to be Imprisoned, [Page 82]but by the Law of the Land. But that seemeth no cause, why the Order of the Lord Chancellor should not bind them; for by the Law of the Land, if the Peers commit a­ny contempt to the Crown, they are to be taken by their Bodies as other men. And Mr. Bracton, Lib. 1. Cap. 24. hath these words, Ea quae sunt Justitiae & Paci annexa ad nul­lum peirinent, nisi ad Coronam & Dignitatem Regiam; est enim Coronae Regis facere Justitiam & Judicium, & tenere Pacem, & illa à Corona separari non pos­sunt. And what can be more near annexed to Justice, than [Page 83]when a poor Man complai­neth to the chief Judgement Seat, that he should have ju­stice according to Conscience and Equity, without respect of persons, and that his Might should not overcome the poor Mans right; Therefore, when it is found, and Ordered for the poor Man, and his Right in Conscience, and the great Man thereby appointed and Ordered, that he shall cease his hard dealing with him, and he contemneth it, Must not that contempt needs be, Contra Coronam & Dignitatem Regiam, seeing that Jurisdicti­on cannot be separated from [Page 84]them? And then all Men a­gree, That for any contempt against the Crown their Ho­nours may be arrested and im­prisoned as well as any other Subjects.

But in all these great Cases, neither the Reader, nor any his Associates took upon them to decide the Law, touching the Authorities aforesaid, nor to give any certain Rules for them, but dealt only for Lear­ning to open the points, and leave the judgement to the Judges, (as the manner of that Exercise is) to determine what the Law is; And tou­ching his Lordships Absolute [Page 85]Authority in this whole Dis­course, they all, both the Rea­der and his Associates, submit­ted themselves to the judge­ment of the Lord Chancellor himself, for every thing apper­taining to his Lordships Office; for that God hath not limited how farr, nor wherein, he should go or deal, but guideth his Conscience in every case that shall come before him, by his Grace, to do that which shall be good, just, and equall before God and Men, so farr as God shall direct him in that matter, for his own Glory, and the good, or punishment of the parties, according to his Good will.

13. But the last Note was this, That where every other Judge if he erreth in judge­ment, is subject to a Writ of Error, to have his judgement examined by other Judges a­bove him, and so reversed, and himself not to be repro­ved, if it be but error in judg­ment; and if he erre of falshood, then to be Fined, or punished by the Lords in the Star Cham­ber, and his false Action defa­ced; Yet the Lord Chancellor of England, if he erre in his judgement, which he giveth according to his Conscience, there is no Appeal to any but to God to reform it; for he is [Page 87]the only Judge of the Consci­ence of Man, and he only may condemn any for Error only in Conscience, and he only may direct Conscience into a better course, if Man erre therein; for every Man of his own Nature is subject therunto; and also for that in that respect, there is no Magistrate in England superiour to him, for only the King or Queen is superiour to him in Government, and they are not by the Law to distribute Justice themselves, but are the superin­tendents over all others, imme­diate under God to appoint thē to it, & to see it done by them, and charge them with it, and [Page 88]to maintain them therein.

Thus escaping out of this Laborinth, they left it, as they found it, saving this doubt re­solved, That his Lordships Authority and Office was ere­cted by the Law, and remains a principal Member thereof, and that so of necessity, as without it the Law could not be just and equal to all in every Case.