Dialectica est ars bene disserendi.

WE have heard what Encuclopai­dia is, and of Ars, and that the subject of it is Res, that hath an [...]: We have heard more­over the affections of Arts, and the Species of them, that they are general of the thing acting, or special of the thing acted. Now then the first thing in nature is reason, and here remember what we heard before, that we [Page 36] may see as God governed things in general by Arts: so in special reason by Logick; and it is most gene­ral, because it is of most general use, not in regard of his Precepts, for so it is as special as any, but for use, because there can be nothing without Logick, yet Logick may be without speech, quantity, &c. ergo, this is most general. Now true it is, that this, as also the [...] proceed from the thing in nature; yet Lo­gick is more general than any of the rest in regard of his use, for it is in it self in speech, in quantity, &c. so that look where any art is, there Logick is: but it doth not follow, that where Logick is, there Arith­metick, Geometry, &c. should be. Again, it pleased the Lord to make man his Steward under him over all the Creatures, ergo in this respect it is necessary he should behold all the creatures, to the imployment of the use of the principal Lord, therefore he must first see them, therefore must be prepared with such a fa­culty, that he may see all things by it. Now this is omnium [...]. That there is such an Art, I shew it thus.

If there be reason, then there is an art of it, because reason is ens a primo, and it is for an end, therefore there must be that art, that is of reasons act. For the proposition I proved it before, for reason was for an end; for the Assumption none will deny, but that there is reason, if they will acknowledge themselves to be but men. Our Author cals this art Dialectica, which comes of [...], or [...], signifying secer­no, separo, seligo; as for example, if there were many things together, I would sever them, and this name fitteth reasons act very well; for Logick is like a fire among the Chimists, for as fire will congregare homo­genia, and segregare heterogenia: so Logick is the fire [Page 37] of all Arts, severing in the same act that fire doth, Logick from Grammar, and Rhetorick from both, &c. and then it congregates to Logick that which is congreans to it, to Grammar that which is homogenie to it, &c. so that when it invents, it picks out homoge­nies, it disposeth them, and layes them in several pla­ces, therefore this name Dialectica is very fitly given to this art, that works this wonderful effect. Won­derful I may call it, for the Chimists can do great ef­fects, but the Logicians can do greater, for they can see Gods Logick in the things, and had not man faln, he might have come to have seen all the wisdom of God in the Creatures. Now if Logick doth [...], that is, congregare homogenia, and segregare hete­rogenia by the same effect, it may fitly be so called: now this art is so called, saith Diog enes Laertius, first by Plato, if he were the Author, he was more ancient than Aristotle, and antiquity should have honour with good reason, if we have any reason: nay, Geo­metry is so called from its subject rather, not metiri from antiquity; but Zenophon in his fourth book of remembrances saith, that Socrates was Platoes School-master, and he never writ any thing, but Plato alwayes: so that Socrates might read it, and Zeno­phon hear it, for he was his Schollar, for Zenophon & Plato fuere aequales, and Diogenes Laertius might read it in Plato, as he had noted it from Socrates: and the Oracle witnesseth that Socrates was the wi­sest man in his time, and he was more wise than Ari­stotle; for Plato that was Socrates Schollar, was his Master; so that for this name we see how fitly it a­grees to this art, and also the confirmation of it from antiquity. Now Aristotle cals it Logick, I do not deny but the name is good, but it is later, as Laer­tius [Page 38] witnesseth that Aristotle gave it first, but it is from the subject [...]eason, as the names of most arts are. Arithmetick of [...], numerus; Geometry of [...], terra, &c. but it doth not so lively name this art as Dialectica doth, which names the life, and delivers the quintessence of Logick: so that Logica, as it is conjugate of [...], names it well, but doth not set it out with that vigour that Dialectica doth: So thus we see the reason of the name.

Est Ars.

What art is we have heard before, this it is, every thing hath an [...], which is accomplished by many petty [...], which causes the precepts of art to be answerable thereunto; so that Logicks main end is bene disserere: bene invenire, and bene judicare are the petty acts of it. Now if Logica, and Diale­ctica shew the [...] and frame of mans reason, and di­rect it to the chief end, its happiness, where the [...] esteth, then it is ars: at, ergo.

Est ars bene disserendi.

First disserendi, for the explanation of the word, dissero comes of dis and sero, sero signifies first to sow and dis a sunder, or dissero, that makes disserui▪ to sow asunder; whether it be so used I find not, I for my part ever read it in this Logical signification, and that which I told you of concerning dialectica, is true [...] his, that as there was things to be sown, and a sa­ti [...] secernendorum, and a sowing them asunder: so there are first semina, which are arguments in inven­tion: Secondly, a satio of them, that is, a disposing of them Axiomatically, and syllogistically; and lastly, a disserio, that is, a disposing of them according to true method and order; so that in this disserere we have the nature of reason quite through, as we had in Dia­lectica. [Page 39] So that this name delivers also to us very fitly the very soul of Logick; for as in mans body there is a soul or a form per quam res est, id quod est, & a caeteris rebus distinguitur; so there is of this art, or rather of the subject of it, reason: and as in other things the Lord hath wrought so cunningly, that we cannot see their forms, but onely the next acts to the formes: so here our Author desireth to give to us the form of reason; which because he cannot do, therefore he delivers it by the final cause, the next act to the form: so that when he saith dialectica est ars bene disserendi, he means it is such an art that hath such a form that doth bene disserere, therefore I conclude thus: if this be the happiness, the act, and soul of reason, then it is defined fitly Ars bene disserendi, at. ergo.

Bene.

Here it is an adverb, for Grammar here doth de­clare some controversie, and an adverb is a part of speech joyned to the verb to shew his signification, therefore bene is here added to make perfect the act of this disserere, ergo, bene disserere is not two things, but one thing, and this is a commendation in defining arts, to break the forms of them, as little as we can, be­cause the form is but one argument; and if we put two or more words into the form, we break it into so many peices. Now for the reason of bene in a Art, this it is, Art is the rule of the frame of Ens a primo: so Logick is the rule of reason, as it is Gods creature, ergo, as it is good, ergo, bene is here put in well to shew the Act of the goodness of this reason. Now since the fall of man, his reason is weakned, & darkned, & so there is a bona ratio, and a mala ratio▪ though mala ratio is not ratio indeed, but the errour of rario, and [Page 40] this act is to guide reason, as it doth bene disserere, not [...] disserere, ergo, it is well put in to sever them. For if Dialectica be ars rationis bene agentis, then it is ars bene disserendi onely, and not male disserendi, at, ergo. So Grammar is the Art onely bene loquendi, though it discrie male loqui: now here among the Logicians are many questions, and controversies against our Author. As some except against the name dialecti­ca, and makes it more special than here Ramus takes it, and they distribute reason into three parts, Dia­lectica, Sophistica, and Apodictica, which was the di­stribution of the Aristotelians, not of Aristotle him­self; but Simplicius that chief fellow, was the first man that brought it up, and afterward it was gene­rally received in Schooles from him. By Dialectica they understand all probable reason, and probality in Schools is taken in two significations, sometime it is taken for a contingent true axiome, ergo it belongs to one little particle of the doctrine of axioma. Some­times it is taken for axioma dubium, or quaestio, and then it belongs to the doctrine of Syllogismes; so that we shall find probability in these two places; but to make Dialectica so special, is to make a Camel go through the eye of a needle; is [...] no more general then so? doth it not go through all judge­ment, yea and invention too?

Again, for Apodictica, which is de necessariis, that belongs to a necessary axiome, for no syllogismes are necessary, but the axiomes which they consist of; but the syllogistical judgement is the same both of neces­sary and contingent axiomes, and a syllogisme of con­tingent propositions is necessary as well as that, which is of necessary axioms. Now for Sophistica, that is shut out, for if I see the truth, what need I look far­ther: [Page 41] and whereas they alledge that it is of the ap­parency of truth, what care I for that? yet it is counterfeit: so that they would have all Logick to consist in a necessary and a contingent axiome, for no syllogismes are so: and that is the reason, that Ramus denies that demonstration; for their neces­sary that they speak of, is in axiom, not in syllogisme. Again, Sophistica is general to all arts, and not special to Logick, for all arts have their errors. Now the Schools distribute Logick into Dialectica, Gramma­tica, and Rhetorica, which savours of a notorious equi­vocation. [...] indeed signifies ratio, and oratio, but this is onely a distributing of the name, not of the thing, as if they should say Logica signifies ratio, or speech: many also there are that find fault with Ra­mus, for the reason of this name, some say it comes of [...], colloquor; but that is not because of their collocutio; but because of their reasoning in their speech together: but again, what hath Logick to do with words, and to name Logick from speech hath no rea­son at all, for it may be without it. There is also a great question, whether Dialectica be Ars, as Scali­ger will have it; because saith he opus post se reliquit; or if it be facultas, as Craelius holds, or whether it be scientia, as others say. These are bables, we have heard that the wisdom of God is Ars in the thing, it is called scientia by a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject, which is properly the judgement of a rule of art: so that here is a double trope, first a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject, the know­ledge of the art for the art it self: then a Synechdo­che of the part for the whole, the rule for the whole art, for facultas, that is the subject ratio: ergo, Crae­lius speaks by metonimy of the subject for the ad­junct; [Page 42] for the faculty is reason it self; so that dia­lectica est ars: as for their distribution in Schooles, that ars doth [...], and scientia onely [...], or contemplare, it is a bable, we see scientia is the know­ledge of the Art, and ars is rei, as A [...]ithmetick is of number, Geometry of magnitude, &c. and Logick of reason, so that the scientia or Theory of Art is fallacia accidentis, to take it for the art it self, and is as if we should say, a painted man is a true man, ergo, when we say a man is a good Logician, we mean a man hath that knowledge of reason, and so for o­ther arts; so that our knowledge of an art is no more of the essence of it, then my knowledge of a man is of the essence of the man. Again, when I say the knowledge of an Art, I say two things, know­ledge, and art, which are subject and adjunct, ergo, knowledge is but accidental to the art. For bene disserendi there are many adversaries, and one grand enemy, some say it is rather ars bene utendi ratione, but [...] is an adjunct to art, and it is [...] not artis, as for example, we cannot say, the Merchant, or Marriner useth the Shipwrights art, but his work, but this is the chief absurdity that it breaks the form into peices.

Kickerman cries out against Ramus for this defi­nition, and sayes it is a trope, ergo, ought not to be in art, he forgets his rules, for Rhetorick is a general art, ergo, it may be every where, but saith he, is it not bet­ter to teach with proper words, then with tropical, they are fit for simple men, not for judicious? I will confess it, and Ramus too, for Grammar is before Rhetorick, ergo, should be preferred: yet Tropes may be as plain, and as significant as other words some­times; but I make no doubt, but that disserere is ever [Page 43] used in other sense then this Logical signification: but if it be, let him give me a better word; but he cannot, because he doth not but sayes, logica est ars dirigendi mentem in cognitione rerum▪ and so breaks all in peices. Again, what doth dirigere here? It be­longs to art in general, for dirigere is as large as rege­re, and regere as regula, and regula as praeceptum; so that here he cannot be content to horse me up to art in general, for the genus onely, but for the form too. Again for mens, he cannot abide Tropes; but what means he by mens? [...] signifieth properly the divine part of the soul of man, and sometimes it is taken for the faculties of the soul, but here he must take it for reason, ergo, here are two Tropes, first a metonimy of the subject for the adjunct, the faculties for the soul it self. Secondly, a Synecdoche of the part for the whole, reason for the soul. For cognitio it comes of con and notio, to see things laid together, and it is the judgement of an axiome, and belongs to it, which is but a little particle of Logick.

Lastly, for res, that is as general as ens, which is as general as ars, ergo, thus he hoists me up, and down, first to ars in general; then down again to natural Philosophy, for mens belongs thither, then to one peice of Logick: then again up to ars; and thus much for the explanation of the rule: the practise of it stands in this: God hath made all things for man, therefore he must have an eye to see them, and all of them must be liable to it, ergo, this rule tels us, first, if we would look at any thing we must take it with us, for it is ars bene disserendi, and so we shall see it: so that if we would do any thing with reason this puls us by the ear and sayes it is the art to reason well: so that here we may see the commendation of this [Page 44] art not onely in respect of the general use of it, but in that it teacheth us how to work by it, as God hath done before us: so that it first teacheth us Gods will and pleasure in things; and then what he would have us to do in the managing and governing of them: and here we may see, that all things at the first were made for one man.

Eodemque sensu Logica dicta est.

We have heard what Dialectica is, and have seen the reason of every word therein. Now Ramus doth commorari upon this rule, and tels us that eodem sensu Logica dicta est: the reason of it is, because here he tels us of a controversie betwixt him and Aristotle, which I prevented before, when I spake of their di­stribution of Logick into Dialectica, Apodictica, and Sophistica. Now Ramus onely sets down the rule according to truth, for thus it stands, if Dialectica delivers the Art of reason, then Logick and it are all one, but this is the Art that appertains to reason, and that is but one, ergo, so then if Logica signifie the same that Dialectica doth, therefore there is the same definition of them both, for they are one in indivi­duo, as the Schools speak, ergo in form, ergo but two names signifying the same thing.

Dicta est.

Meaning that that name of Aristotles is the same with that Socrates gave; and whilst Plato doth in­terpret Logica to be [...], and Aristotle saith it is [...]: they grant it to be the same with Dialectica, and for the distinction of Logick in­to those three, they must needs hold that those parts contain as much as the whole, but they do not by their own confession; so that this distribution was made by Simplicius, which did not understand Ari­stole, [Page 45] or at leastwise Logick, otherwise let them tell me any thing in Logick, that is not in Dialectica, ac­cording to our Authors definition of it. For Ra­mus will not deny but Dialectica and Logica are ta­ken specially in Aristotle, as ratio is sometimes used for argumentum, but that is by a Synecdoche, for he wanting special names cals things by general words: as an exhalation he cals a fume, whereas a vapour is also a fume, and often he useth it in his Politicks, Eodemque sensu, &c. that is, Logick is so defined, ars bene disserendi, even as Dialectica is, and whatso­ever other conceits men have had concerning Dia­lectica, they are out of the way, for if they will say there is a necessary, a probable, and a sophistical ar­gument, as many do speak, that belongs to an axiome, not to an argument, and whereas they say syllogismus is necessarius, that is Apodicticus, contingens and so­phisticus, if we look at a necessary syllogisme in Bar­bara, why there may be a contingent syllogisme, that is a syllogisme consisting of contingent axioms, for so they mean, nay I will make a false syllogisme in Barbara, that shall be true and good, as omnis homo est lapis, omnis afinus est homo, ergo omnis asinus est lapis: and a demonstrative syllogisme, as omne animal ratio­nale est visible, omnis homo est animal rationale, ergo omnis homo est visibilis: so that these lie not in the syllogisme, for then a dialectical syllogisme would not be an apodictical, or sophistical, aut contra, but these lie in the axiome: for why? whatsoever is ne­cessary is true, and a contingent axiome doth pro­nunciare aliquid esse verum, though it may be false, ergo whither truth belongs, thither they belong; now truth and falsehood follow upon affirmation, and negation, and they arise from an axiom, neither doth [Page 46] a man say aliquid esse, aut non esse, when he means an argument alone, till there be a disposition, ergo those that make a distribution of syllogismes by their matter deceive us: so that here we see it is true that our Author tels us, that eodem sensu Logica dicta est.

Dialecticae partes duae sunt, inventio, & dispositio.

NOw we come to the second rule, having heard that Dialectica est ars bene disserendi; this rule needs nothing to make it plain, but that which went before scilicet ars in general, to shew this to be an Art, and the [...] of every ens a primo, to shew that this Arts end is bene differere, both which we heard of in the doctrine of Art, therefore this rule shewing what is pictured in this book needs no more expla­nation, therefore it is the first rule of all, for it gives light to all the rules following, and takes light of none: therefore doth this second rule give light to the former? no, it rather obscures it, for I must first know what Dialectica is before I hear it divided, for how can I divide I know not what? therefore this rule will give no light to the first, therefore never a rule following, and the first rule is a comment to this. Dialectica, that is, that which was ars bene disse­rendi, hath two parts, bene invenire argumenta, and bene disponere argumenta: why? because they are portions of this Art tending ad bene disserendi partes. Can Dialectica, this Art be parted? If it be that wisdom of God that is one most simple being, how [Page 47] comes it to be divided into branches? I have shewed howsoever it is one in God, yet he hath made reason twisted in the thing, so that before it can bene dissere­re, it must bene invenire, and bene judicare: so that now reason as it is the subject of Logick, namely as it doth act, and is for an [...] and reason according to his frame hath these two operations, invenire and judicare, therefore the Art being the Idea of this frame, that hath two parts, must have two parts, for Logick behold reason, not as it is a faculty belong­ing to natural Philosophy, but as it acts. Now thus I argue. If reasons frame run into two heads, or actions, that it may [...], then the Art must do so, now that reason is framed to run into these two heads, thus I shewed it, All things were made for man, therefore he must have an eye to see them: now all things that God hath made are considered in themselves, or with others, for the world is one consi­sting of many parts, and they are considered alone or with others, therefore mans reason must run accord­ingly. God onely is entire in himself having no re­spect to any other thing, he is simple, and hath no parts, therefore he is not liable to Logick: all other things are composed, that it might appear, that he is simple, so that every thing else is composed, or dispo­sed with others, yet first it must be in it self, in use: for if I say a brick-wall, there must needs first be bricks, and what use have we of words alone in Grammar, but in Syntax, and first we must see the Etimologie of them: nay in every Art except Rhe­torick there is no use of the first part without the se­cond, neither is invention ever without judgement, therefore when every thing hath his double conside­ration, there must be two parts of reason, for as [Page 48] things are, so must reasons act be, for every thing must be so administred as that it be liable to reason, and be considered alone before it be disposed: there­fore invention is first, so that any man that hath rea­son will acknowledge the necessity of this distribu­tion: now these two parts are called Invention and Disposition. First for the reason of the name Inven­tion, man was to see all Gods creatures, and so to see his order in them: now how should man see them? were they written in his understanding? no more than Pauls steeple is in my eye, for man came furnish­ed into the world onely with Logick, Grammar, Rhetorick and Divinity, neither with the knowledge of these Arts, but with the faculties of them, and therefore the Arts must needs be there, for we read the Arts in the things: so that for Arithmetick, Ge­ometry and nature, man was to learn them by the creatures, as he was also to learn the knowledge of Logick, Grammar, Rhetorick and Divinity. The reason is this, the Genesis of every thing is Gods, and man must see the rules of Art, therefore man must see them from singulars, by analysis: now then if man must learn these, and know them by his senses obser­vation, induction and experience, then he must seek, and find out these, for they are not written in him: again, whereas every thing is in disposition, it is re­quisite that man find them out, and see them several­ly, therefore in this respect is this Art of reason cal­led Invention, namely as he is sent by God to find out these things in his creatures; now if man must find them out with this act of his eye of reason, then is it fitly called invention, at, ergo. And this teach­eth man thus much, that he is to seek out, and find this wisdom of God in the world, and not to be idle; for [Page 49] the world, and the creatures therein are like a book wherein Gods wisdom is written, and there must we seek it out. Why is not this first Art called Dispo­sition, because that is more familiar, and easie to us, for all things are disposed; but we are by this Art to sever them, and to look at them simply, so that this name teacheth man what he is to do in this act of his reason, namely, invenire argumenta, as in mists to look at the elements, &c. Now Kickerman cannot away with this distribution, and yet sayes nothing to this purpose against it, for I suppose Invention to be an ambiguous name, and have equivocation with it, as I do not deny, but it is taken sometimes for judgement, but that is tropically, yet while my Au­thor tels me what it is, that is sufficient to know his meaning how here it is taken.

Object. But Invention is never without judgement saith he, no inventions use is ever without judgements use: so he may say Etimologie is never without Syntax, I but, saith he, you cannot invent without judgement, therefore they are no parts of Logick? as for example, a chest is made of wood, by this rule materia est causae ex qua res est, therefore here is syllogistical judgement, which is concluded a defini­tione, and this is Aristotles demonstration, as if you should make a syllogisme thus, That whereof the thing is, that is materia, But wood is that ex quo the Chest is, ergo. But here is onely Logicks practise, and not any rule of Art taught us. The question be­twixt Ramus and him is, whether any rule of inventi­on belongs to judgement. This it is, the rules of in­vention give precepts of nothing at all concerning judgement, aut contra: therefore these are the true parts of Logick: and whilst he argues from the pre­cept [Page 50] to the rule, it is fallacia accidentis, as if he should reason: Socrates est animal, animal est genus, ergo Socrates est genus; whereas we know the thing ani­mal is not that Logical notion, neither Socrates, for they belong to natural Philosophy, but genus is no adjunct attributed unto them, so this invention is onely of simple arguments, and of the simple consi­deration of them, and therefore our Art runs along according to Gods order, and though we cannot pra­ctice any rule of invention, but by judgement, yet it doth not therefore follow that they are the same, for it is as if he should say this, homo, quae pars orationis? Nomen, here is the practise of Syntax, ergo Etimolo­gy, and Syntax, are all one.

Inventio est prima pars Dialecticae de inveniendis argumentis,

We have heard of the reason of the name Inven­tion, why it is given to the first part, and that with great reason, for we must find by much seeking be­fore we can see things. Again, Logick being the first help to see Gods wisdom in his creatures, and this use of invention being to be found in the thing, it is hard to find, therefore it is fitly called invention from the act of it: So again in dispute, a man is fain to seek a third argument to prove his question. Judgement the second part is properly the act of our understanding, when it looks at arguments disposed, therefore here it is a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject, when it is put for dispositio: and again it is properly the disposing of arguments together, which is of Axiomes and Syllogismes.

Method doth not look at the disposing of argu­ments, but at the placing of axioms: so that if I would distribute Dilectica thus, Dalecticae partes duae [Page 51] sunt, inventio, & dispositio: dispositio is judicum, or Methodus, judicium est axiomatic [...]m, or syllogisticum: my reasons are these: the arts of reason are perfor­med by the internal senses, the best phansie invents best, and that is performed by a hot brain: cogita­tion serves judgement axiomatical, and syllogistical, and that is dry, and the best memory is an ayrie moist brain: ergo, whilst I see from this reason in natural Philosophy, that axiomatical and syllogistical judge­ment are thus combined, and the other severed, I think this art should be thus divided according to their instruments, as nature hath severed them. A­gain, our Author distributeth the second part into axioma, and discursus, and under discursus he placeth syllogismus and Methodus: now these two cannot be joyned together: for why? what hath method to do with syllogismus? Method doth not dispose syl­logismes, but axiomes. Again, the use of a syllo­gisme is to make clear that that is obscu [...]e, and to manifest truth; and the rule of truth belongs to axi­omatical judgement if it be clear; if not, then to syl­logistical judgement: but we bring our question af­ter again to an axiome to see the truth of it, ergo, these two work about one thing, namely about truth, therefore they should be combined together. So that syllogistical judgement is to make clear that, which axiomatical judgement could not, yet the doctrine of axioma is before, and syllogistical judge­ment hath for his subject axioma dubium. The ex­ceptions against this rule are these: first, Kickerman saith, There is no invention, but there is judgement withal, that is confessed to be true in use, as in Gram­mar the use of Etimologie is never without Syntax, but the use is one thing, and the rule another: there [Page 52] is no precept of invention, that belongs to judge­ment aut contra: then he saith, Who can invent, but he must also judge? for (saith he) must not a man judge a cause before he find it? this is also a fallace of use: we cannot find a rule, but we use both in­vention and judgement, but by his argument, there should be no judgement, but syllogistical: then again he saith, invention was used for a third argument, and not as Ramus taketh it.

True it is, the Schools thought it onely to belong to syllogismes, and that there was but the use of an argument, not the doctrine of it, but thus I argue: Is invention of a third argument, ergo, it is of an ar­gument, ergo, then it belongs not to judgement: for the doctrine of a simple conceit, as he calls it, is di­stinct from the doctrine of judgement. Again, if it be a third Argument, there w [...]s two before, ergo, there are Arguments disposed. Again, when a third Argument is found out, do we not dispose pars con­sequen [...] quaestionis in propositione, and antecedens in as­sumptione. and so make the proposition an axiome, and likewise the assumption: ergo, an argument is placed in an axiom as well as in a syllogisme by their own confession: therefore we see evidently here, that the use of an Argument is common both to syl­logistical and axiomatical judgement. And I would ask, whether causa est cujus vi res est, when it is dispo­sed with the effect, be the same, and have the same de­finition in an axiome, that it hath in a syllogisme? If they say it is the same, ergo, common to both, ergo, the doctrine of causa, and effectum, &c. must go be­fore the doctrine of an axiome, and a syllogisme, and Method, and must be distinct from them all: for as method is distinct from ax [...]omatical, and syllogisti­cal [Page 53] judgement, and is before them, because an axiom may be without them, not contra: So is the doctrine of arguments before the doctrine of axiomes for the same reason: and Kickerman confess [...]th as much, whilst he distributes Logick into terminus simplex, complexus, and discursus: he saith Authors of Arts are called Inventors, as Hypocrates of Medicina, Aristotle of Logick, but did they not all judge them? yes, but doth it therefore follow, that invention and judgement are not divers things, so that this distribu­tion stands firm and sure, and as for his conceit to have invention taught in a syllogisme, we shall hear of it when we come there, for it is very silly. Now for his distribution into three parts, it comes to one with ours, for his first part terminus simplex, so much of it as is Logick belongs to invention, so terminus complexus belongs to axiomatical judgement, and discursus to syllogismes, and he would have it belong to method too. But first the absurdities are these, he does not follow reasons [...], which Logick deli­vers, for conceptus simplex is properly the judgement of a thing, when we see the truth thereof: so that this is not so proper as invention. Now when I say in­ventio, I say that part that directs my reason to seek out things secretly wrapt up in nature; again whi­lest he makes a distribution of the precepts of Lo­gick, by these precepts we must understand the syste­ma of Logick by a Metonimie of the material cause, and when he sayes a systema of precepts, that is a far fetched trope: again we never have more parts than two in a distribution, but there is some thing left out, for to admit of his distribution: but is there not a community betwixt his terminus complexus, and discursus, namely dispositio? ergo, here he wants the rul [...] [Page 54] of dispositio, and so makes his Art imperfect. Now he P [...]eads for the antiquity of it, which we are not to admit of, but of truth: why? his Logick was not in ancient time, is it therefore nought now?

The use of this rule is this, as we heard before, Lo­gick took my reason, and told me the marks to shoot at, so here it tels me that I must first invent, and so I shall go orderly to work, and then dispose, for the Brick-layer must first have bricks before he can make a brick-wall, and the Grammarian must have words before he can make a sentence, and (as before) arguments are more general than axiomes, axiomes than syllogismes, &c. for the one may be without the other, not contra, as one is more general than two, two than three, &c. because one may be without two, or three, &c. not contra: so first we must inve­nire and then judicare, that we may bene disserere, for there is nothing betwixt them, but when we have stones then we may build, and whilst we find in the creatures of God things considered, as they are in themselves, and then in respect of others, therefore so must reason be distributed into his two acts, and now we come to invention, which is prima pars Dialecticae de inveniendis argumentis, first we have heard the reason of the name inventio betokening actively: the reason inventing or finding out, and howsoever we may find it taken for the whole act of Logick, yet it is a Synecdoche, and though we cannot but use judgement in it, yet it is but inventio, ergo, est pars. He rather keeps this word than membrum, though it be more general, because it is more in use: and again, because in Schools membrum hath been usually taken for the members of a man, as head, armes, legs, or the like: so that not having told us [Page 55] what membrum or pars is, he chooseth the more usual Dialectica; we heard concerning Dialectica before, therefore to hear it again were superfluous, it is Dia­lecticae, ergo, it is the integrum to it, as inventio is the membrum. Now indeed the Rhetoricians have ta­ken invention to be a part of Rhetorick, and so judge­ment, but when they come to explain them, they teach Logick: and their dissertus is not onely Rhe­torician, but the Grammarian, and Logician, their Orator is omnium horarum homo, a man for every turn, so that he is a man in whom there is a confusion of all Arts: neither is Orator belonging to Rhetorick, but he is a general man, that hath all the Arts, and chiefly he is a Logician: now the Rhetoricians did imagine, because they used invention, and judgement, therefore they belonged to Rhetorick: so they might say of Law, Arithmetick, Geometry, natural Phi­losophy, or any other Art: now then those are the two parts of Dialectica onely; and whereas men say commonly Ramus Logick serves for Rhetorick, not for natural Philosophy, as some do, they speak sim­ply, for what use of Logick hath a Rhetorician in any other Art, as in Politicks, is it not to prove some The­sis? therefore if he dispute here as a Politican by the rule of Logick, so may a natural Philosopher do, so causa, effectum, subjectum, adjunctum, and all other arguments are the same in all Arts, ergo, to make a special invention to Rhetorick, and another to na­ture, or any other Art, is simple. Now it is pars Dia­lecticae, we do not mean to make pars a genus of in­vention here, for it is a Logical notion, and belongs to Logick: but the reason of this definition is to bring in Dialectica, so that when we will analyse this definition, we must not say pars is genus, but Dialecti­ca est integrum.

Prima pars.

Est prima pars, because it is more general than judgement, for it may be where judgement is not, for simple arguments are before the composition of ar­guments both in nature and working. The Carpen­ter must have his timber in several peices to square them before he can joyn them together. Quod prece­dit natura in Dialectica, id prima pars est Dialec. at in­ventio: ergo,

De inveniendis argumentis.

As if he should say, inventio, that act of reason doth invenire argumenta, de inveniendis, why? he means the precepts of this act, for in this part de inveniendis argumentis is the subject, but these precepts of inven­tion are first concerning a seeking: but to find what? it teacheth me first to hunt, and then to find a Hare, as if he should say, take the rule of causa, that Hound, and hunt, and you shall find a cause: as if he should say, would you seek a cause? first seek the artificia­lity, then the primative, then how it is simplex and consent aneum &c. and so come to causa, so that inven­tion is not taken for judgement here, but for the seek­ing, and finding out of arguments.

Argumentis.

De argumentis inveniendis: Arguments to be sought out: why? because the Lord hath so commanded man to seek out his reason in his creatures, so that we must seek an argument, which is a term in latine be­longing to Law, as the Rhetoricians thought, but it is more general to Logick: but because they used [...], which in Greek is to plead like an Orator, and so arg [...]e [...]e in Latine, therefore they thought them pro­per to th [...]m, yet argumentum here signifies any thing of arguere, that can charge another thing, and so [Page 57] doth [...] in Greek: so here we see what inven­tion seeks out, argumentum, and by it the thing, but at the second hand, quatenus there is Logismos in it: so that invention takes not the thing immediately, but by argumentum, so that argumentum is here as the Schools speak, concretum, that is, it is argumentum, as it doth arguere: so that when we hear argumentum, we must consider two things, first ens the subject of Art, and then the [...], and so by that the thing: as I see a Post with my outward eye by the colour, so that invention sees the thing mediante argumento: then observe again that argumentum is the subject of invention: now the Schools make a simple conceit, and so make a great ado about vox, as Kickerman and Schaliger do to bring it into Logick, they say vox quatenus it consisteth of letters, belongs to Grammar, but quatenus it signifies a thing, it belongs to Logick: but as for example, homo, what arguments are homo, and the thing it signifies? subjectum, and adjunctum, why? but these are but examples there­of, shall these come into Logick, because Logicks use is here? So the wall is white, is subjectum, and ad­junctum, doth that axiom therefore belong to Lo­gick? but let them but go to the definition of vox, and they shall see it belongs to Grammar, quatenus it signifies a thing: but they may see it in the general rule of ars generalis: for as ens is the subject of Lo­gick at the second hand, so also of Grammar. Now he prosecutes vox, and sayes it is to be lookt at ad modum significationis, or jure significata, or the like: ad modum significationis is categorematica, or suncate­gorematica, as homo: because, saith he, it signifies that thing, which may be an argument: why homo doth not signifie an argument, it belongs to natural Philo­sophy, [Page 58] and the argument is but an affection to the thing that homo signifies, but what reason is there that homo should come into Logick, because it names the thing that is categorematica? it is fallacia accidentis: that meat you bought on Saturday, you did eat on Sunday; but it was raw meat you bought on Satur­day, ergo. But for vox therefore it comes not into Logick, onely there are conjugata and notatio, which belong to Logick, not because they signifie things, for there is not in them any respect of the thing, and the name, but in conjugates how one name is deri­ved from another, and in notation the reason of the name from some argument. Then he sayes vox ca­tegorematica is primae, or secundae intentionis, which he knows not how to utter but by certain comparisons, as of a dyal, the stile is prima intentionis, and the sha­dow secundae: but this vox primae intentionis is the word that names the thing, vox secundae is the word of Art. Now true it is this distribution is an old said saw, but there is no such thing, it is the same fallace ab accidente. Homo and genus do not signifie the same thing, homo is primae intentionis at the first hand, genus of the second, but genus doth not signifie the same that homo doth: again genus hath his significati­on, as well as homo, that appears thus, because it hath a distinct definition from homo, therefore they are di­stinct re: so that genus is primae intentionis, to the thing it names, as homo is primae to that thing it names. Again, are there not termes of Art as well in Gram­mar, &c. as in Logick? why then doth he bring it in here? as homo est nomen, here nomen is the name of the thing, not the thing it self, ergo, homo, and nomen, are not voces primae & secundae intentionis, for they are divers things: so argumentum is concretum, that [Page 59] is, it is evermore with the thing, not that it is the thing, as homo is argumentum, and it doth arguere, which is an adjunct to the thing, for so every Logical notion is an adjunct to the thing it self, but here it is, because we cannot sever the Logical notion from the thing, because it is never but in re, that is the rea­son why argumentum is alwayes in the concrete, whereas [...] may be severed from the thing, but this rule bids us onely find, but tels us not what as yet: so that it runs most orderly.

We have heard the first part of Logick to be cal­led Invention, in respect we are set to seek out the simples in the work of God. De inveniendis argu­mentis, because there is never a rule here, but it is a blood-hound to find a Deer: Again, we heard it was an argument that was to be hunted, not the thing but the argument, the [...] in the thing, for the thing doth not belong to Logick, but to every Art, and Logick doth look at the thing, by the logismos, as the outward eye beholds bodies, by light and co­lour: and this is called argumentum, a concrete, be­cause Logick is never severed from the thing, nor the thing from Logick, for we cannot see the thing but by reason, therefore because these are inseparably to­gether, for that cause the subject of invention is ar­gumentum: so that in argumentum we are to consi­der two things, first the thing as it is the subject of Art in genere, and of the general Arts: and then that same bird-lime, that is, in the thing, whereby it may cleave to another thing, which bird-lime is the Lo­gical notion; as when I say a chest is made of wood: in Greek they have two names for it, [...] is the arguing, the abstract as it were, [...] the argu­ment: but our Author rather keeps the concrete, be­cause [Page 60] it is alwayes with the thing, and cannot be severed from it: then the subject of invention is ens at the first hand, but argumentum at the second. The tearm argumentum (as we heard) is from Law, as the Greek names also be, [...] is concione concio­nare, and thus we see how farre Logicks rule reacheth, & this same argumentum was used at the first, for that which we call praedicatum a [...] a barbarous word made first by Boetius, but it is more general, as we may see by the third argument in a syllogisme, which may be an antecedent in the proposition, or assumption, as well as the consequent.

Kickerman saith vox is the subject of this first part, and he hath many distinctions of it, as it is ab­stracta, or concreta; this is nothing but a distributi­on of nomen into substantivum, and adjectivum, qua­tenus voces, and therefore the old Grammarians did so teach it: if they look at the thing, they belong to conjugates in Logick, and there we shall see them to signifie the same thing; one absolutely the other as it hath respect to another, and they are there, not quatenus they are words, nor quatenus they signifie, if we go no farther, but quatenus they contain, sym­bolize the nature of first arguments. Again, he saith, vox is univoca, or aequivoca: alas there is vox univo­ca in the world, as homo his example is vox aequivoca: if we call a painted man a man, as we may call tropi­cally, but this belongs to a distribution, and is but an example thereof, not a rule: as canus is sidus, or a­nimal terrestre, or m [...]rinum, is a distribution, ex ad­junctis: so that to make a precept of an example is great confusion: and the definition of a thing will take away the ambiguity of the word. More di­stinctions he hath, which all are nothing, but several [Page 61] sorts of aequivocation, as if he should say, there may be aequivocation of Grammar, and there may be aequivocation in Rhetorick, &c. he tels us further; that a word must be certa, absoluta, &c. what hath Logick to do with this? let Grammar look to that, for it breaks the definition of vox est nota qua, &c. if it name not the thing fitly; as if vox should say, vox est vota qua unumquodque vocatur; will you call a man a spade, then he brings in predicament, and praedicables. The world of Logicians doth imagine, that Architas Tarentinus was the first inventor of them, and taught them to his Scholler Pythagoras, now the reason that brought them in was this, that they might be furnished with matter to work about Logick. So that they were store-houses for them to lay up things one way or other, either analogice or a latere.

Kickerman approves that purpose of them, for saith he, things do not belong to Logick, now the Lo­gick in a predicament is this, the order of things be­ing placed one before another, and so he saith the predicaments are of great use, for the finding of sim­ples: Secondly they conduce for terminus complexus, because we see what may be a subject, and a predicate in a proposition: then another use of them (he sayes) is for discursus, for when we know what is above, and below, we may quickly know what is in the middest; and they are also of use for method.

For the first Invention of them, they are not store-houses, for there is nothing but hath an [...], therefore belongs to some Art: so that the Arts are the true store-houses of things: so that his table of substantia is nothing but a draught of natural Philo­sophy, [Page 62] but I must tell you untowardly, and that of quantity nothing but a draught of the Mathema­ticks, that of quality nothing but a draught of natu­ral and moral Philosophy. Other things he brings in, which are not so as he makes, ubi to be a genus of intus and foras: ad aliquid comes under relates. Quando belongs to adjunctum, &c. but because Lo­gicks use is there, they think they belong to Logick, by the same argument let them bring all Arts in Lo­gick: but saith he, the things themselves belong to the special Arts, but for the series they belong to Logick, that is, as if he should say, for their Logical notion they belong thither, but when he sayes series, he is presently in method: for his series is nothing but methods work; and if he reason that Arithme­tick, Geometry, Nature, &c. belong to Logick, be­cause methods use is there, that is fallacia accidentis, now the doctrine is one, and the use is another, the doctrine is distinct, the use confused: then again, whereas he sayes here you have genus summum, and subalternum, why we heard of them in the distribu­tion ex effectis: but because substantia is corporea, or incorporea, here is a distribution as a genus into his species: therefore, saith he, this belongs to Logick: so let him bring in the daubers Art too; for Logicks use is there. Thus do they make a confusion, not seeing things distinct. Again, whereas they help to find out a subject, and predicate, they have shut out some, namely incompleta, as a mans hand, which may be a subject or a predicate, and when I say the world is made of the first matter, is not the first matter here a predicate? so they shut out transcendentia, as ens: but is not homo ens, therefore a predicate? Again, is not a predicate an argument, ergo, artificiale, aut in­artificiale? [Page 63] if artificiale, then fetched out of some Art, therefore let me carry my subject to the Art whereunto it belongs, and there will I find any pre­dicate: again for the help of a medium, is every me­dium a genus subalternum? Suppose we shall fetch a medium, that is genus summum, or an individuum, but let me go to the Art of my subject, and if I will take that which is above it, or below it, there I shall have it done to my hand. Again, he sayes the doctrine of the predicaments serve for definitions, and differen­ces, &c. Why let me go to the Art, and there I shall see every thing taught to my hand, so that the do­ctrine of predicaments quatenus they are adumbrati­ons of the Arts, are to be seen in their Arts. But to reason, that because Logicks use is there, therefore they belong to Logick, is very absurd. Again, if there be this predicament, to shew the summum and subalternum genus, and species subalterna, and infi­ma, why is there not a predicament to know causa? for by the same reason, there should be a predicament to find out causas, and let them say what they can of the predicaments, we shall find all in the doctrine of distribution, and definition, as substantia is corporea, aut incorporea is a distribution, and belongs to natu­ral Philosophy; and so the next distribution of sub­stantia corporea, &c. so if we take quantity, we shall see we are in some special Arithmetick, or Geome­try, &c. for the predicables, genus, species, differentiae, proprium, accidens, these we know are special argu­ments, the two first belong to distributio ex effectis: differentia belongs to forma, for it is called forma, in respect of the thing formed; and differentia, as it di­stinguisheth the thing from all other things. If they shall say, I, but here is distributio per formam, that is [Page 64] accidental to forma, and belongs to distributio, so that forma is the better word taken from the nature of it, for proprium is nothing but propriam adjunctum, and there it is taught as it hath respect to his subject, not as it is an act, and accidens is also a special kind of ad­junct.

Now the laws of Art require, that every precept deliver the principia thereof, and therefore be either definitions, distributions, or properties, which they after a sort seeing, made these to be helps to the pre­dicaments; now for substantia quoad res it belongs to natural Philosophy, quoad serim or ordinem to me­thod: for quantity it belongs to Mathematicks? quality to moral Philosophy, yea, and to natural too: for relates, they belong to Logick; but there can be no series or order of them, for they are but examples of relates, as causa and effectum are relates; but onely examples, ergo, infimae species: for actio it is nothing but motus; quando is nothing but the ad­junct of time, passio a subject, ubi a special kind of subject also of place, situs belongs to Geometry, otherwise it is an adjunct, and habitus is a special kind of adjunct, therefore there can be nothing beneath these, but examples: so that do but look at his table, and you shall see him presently go out, as he sayes qualitas is naturalis, and moralis: this is false, for na­turalis, aut moralis are two examples of that adjunct qualitas, and justice is no more a quality because it is a vertue, then Socrates est genus, because animal is genus: so that argumentum is the true subject of Invention, and not the predicables, and predicaments, any further than they are arguments.

Argumentum est quod ad aliquid arguendum affectum est.

Now we come to the definition of argumentum; we heard that Dialectica is a general Art, and is con­versant about every thing, and about non ens gratia entis, now then argumentum must be in every thing, therefore it is quod, any thing whatsoever, and thus it is demonstrated, because Logick is a general Art; so thus here we see argumentum est quod, which is as large as aliquid, quod affectum est: we know this is a borrowed word, affection is a disposition natural, as the eye is affected to see: but that we may see it the better, we will dig deeper, there is an efficient work­ing, then his working, which is eff [...]ctio, which as it is about it, so it is affectum, ad effectum: as if my hand be wounded with a sword, there is first an efficient, then there is wounding which is effectio, then there is a wound which is effectum, then my hand is the af­fectum to be wounded, so that affectus is nothing but a nature in that thing, by which nature can perform that action: so argumentum is affectum, as if he should say, that that is made, or factus ad, or effected to ano­ther thing, or which hath this [...] in it to work with another thing.

Why affectum? It is a property of an argument as homo est risibilis, when he doth not ridere: so that he defines argumentum in invention, from that power or faculty: for as a man may have an affection to that thing he never doth: so an argument may have an affection to argue, when it acteth not: so that he teacheth from that disposition of it to act, so that he delivereth it not from his act, for that is but the use of it, but from its true nature; as the common Logi­cians call it praedicabile, that which may predicate, and [Page 66] sayes it is not an argument, till it be disposed, but this is accidental to argumentum; then in an axiom they call it praedicatum actu, which also is accidental to an axiome, for it may be subjectum as well, and both are accidental ad arguendum. Why ad arguendum? be­cause the end of an argument is to argue, to play the argument, as the eye to see: ad arguendum, because evermore when we fetch an argument to shew any thing, that is the arguens, and doth agere, the aliquid is also an argument, but it doth pati: so that as quod was general, that is arguens, or does argue, so it tels me that any thing may be argued: so h [...]mo est aliquid, here homo is the aliquid, and is argued by his genus, which chargeth homo, therefore there is nothing in the world, but is an argument, and may argue, or be argu­ed: but remember that both quod, and the aliquid, that is both the arguens, and argutum do arguere, but the one firstly, the other secondly; the one doth age­re, the other doth pati, and so reagere. The aliquid tels me it is the first, and then quod comes, and argues it: now would you argue, then evermore look first, and that carefully, whether your quod will argue your aliquid: as will you build an house with sand? that will not serve the turn, for it is not affectum to it, nei­ther hath it that [...] in it: so that by any meanes let us keep close to our rule, and we shall not doe wrong. The fallacian of the common Logicians of Coxismus, or petitio principii, or Cuculi cantus, for they are all one. As the Cuckow cries Cuckow, the Cuckow is Cuckow, ergo the Cuckow cries Cuckow, for here is no third argument; and this is common­ly the womans reason, because it hath so little reason in it, as they will say it is so, because it is so. So that simplex conversio among Logicians is a breach of this [Page 67] rule: as omnis homo est animal, ergo aliquod animal est homo: other Logicians as Polanus, cals argumentum Thema, which is too special, for thema is taken among Schools for a question to be judged by way of orati­on: again, every argument is not taken as thema, then he sayes thema est simplex, which is argumentum, or compositum, which is quaestio; and thus we see how our Logick goes most orderly, and that it looks at ens as it is simmonted with another thing.

Quales sunt singulae rationes solae, & per se consideratae.

We have heard what argumentum is, and the first thing that we are to look at in simples is this, the glue to be affectioned: as if we should look for a cause, see whether it be affected to be so: we have heard the fallacians in part before; as first, where there is no argument, but petitio principii, and that either where there is no petitio principii, and that either where there is no petitio at all, or where the same thing is uttered in a synonymie, or to the same purpose. Again, it is a breach of this rule, when that is brought for an argument, which is no argument, as baculus stat in angulo; or when the third Argument is more obscure and doubtful, then the arguments of the que­stion, these and all other petitiones principii are breaches of this rule in general, and not of any special ones. Again, it is a breach of the definition of an argument, when we mistake the aliquid, though the argument be good, and so that Heterozetesis is a fal­lace of argumentum in genere; as when I talk of Chalk, he talks of Cheese. Now we come to the commoration after argumentum, quales sunt fingula rationes solae, &c. He hath defined argumentum from that affection that is continually in it; for the act is accidental, and may be wanting, for potentia (as we [Page 68] hear in nature) ariseth from the act of the form up­on the matter. Now he saith singulae, that is, argu­ment by argument, the cause alone, the effect alone, and so all the arguments from the beginning to the end. He saith rationes rather than argumenta, first because there is an equivocation in that word, many have thought it to belong to a syllogisme onely; and so when we say, I deny your reason, there it is taken for an axiome. Now it is taken sometimes for the faculty of reason, sometimes for the [...] in things. Here he shews that it is taken for the same with argu­mentum. Solae, that is as they are to be considered in invention without judgement, and that he explains further per se, that is, they are in their definitions not respected with some thing externally, these are tales, that is such as I have defined unto you: so that he doth here commorari, because of difference with Ari­stotle, or rather with the Aristotelians, even as he stayed before upon the definition of Dialectica, for they thought there was no argument but in judge­ment, and therefore have question with Ramus whe­ther an argument be to be taught before we come to a syllogisme. Ramus here propounds it, and deter­mines it for his own part, that it may be without judgement, and look at others, and you shall see them define all arguments, from their use in a syllogisme, as we may see in all topick places of Aristotle, so that it is not so strait as they take it, and Ramus would teach us here, that to argue is accidental to an argument and disposition to: so that their mistaking makes him here to demurre and stay upon it: Now indeed there must of necessity be a simple considera­tion of argumentum, for though things in nature are disposed together, yet they were severed at the first; [Page 69] and again we are to consider them so still, though they be together▪ Consideratae, he useth this word, because thought, invention and judgement are joyned together in nature, yet he would here tell us, that we are to sever them by our consideration, as thus, I can see heat without fire, cold without water, &c. So that singulae ratione [...] are solae, & per se consideratae non in usu, for so they cannot be: but they are solae, & per se consideratae, in consideration, for so they be, he saith quales, because argumentum was defined, from his qua­lity, or property of affection, and properties are qua­lities.

Argumentum est artificiale, aut inartificiale.

This affection, or glue is artificiale, or inartificiale, as if he should say argum [...]ntum hath this affection ex sese, and it is in artificio rei, or it is not ex sese, but from some other thing: so that every argument is affected, but two wayes, one as an artificial argument, the other as an inartificial: now the reason of this distribution is this:

God hath made all things for man, and at the be­ginning for one man, and they are to conduce to one, but all things cannot come under one mans eye of reason: therefore that he may be better furnish­ed herein, God hath provided these two: the one whereby he may see by himself, the other whereby he may see by another mans eye. Again, that which we are to see is either in artificio rei, or not in artificio rei: so that all things are seeable, but not to be seen with one mans eye, but by many. This word artifi­ciale teacheth us these things: first there is no artifi­cial argument, but you shall see it in fabrica rei, therefore belongs to some Art, because Art delivers the frame of the thing, therefore there is no axiom [Page 70] that consisteth of artificial arguments, but it belongs to some Art. Now though we hear no arguments in Arts, but the causes, and properties, yet notwith­standing we have all arguments indeed; for there is no quality, but is proton in some general thing, as heat in fire, cold in water: now this gives us great light, yet effects must be there if they be proper: and the effect belongs to that rule where the property is taught, and dissentanies belong to Art too; as na­ture is constans, or inconstans, argumentum est artifi­ciale, aut inartificiale: so that there are no axioms af­firmed, or denyed, true, or false, but we shall find them in some Art, either as a first rule, or a deduct by consequence necessary: so that hence is the greatest light that can be to a Scholler, to analyse his example, and bring every thing to his Art, where he shall see it in causa: so that if one would make a common place book, let him make the Rules of Arts his heads, and let him take any example, and see whether argument is more special, and so carry the axiom to that Art, and to that rule of the Art whether it belongs. As homo est justus, homo belongs to nature, justitia to mo­ral Philosophy, ergo this axiom belongs to the do­ctrine of justice: so that moral Philosophy bo [...]rows man from nature to deliver it self.

The use of this is unspeakable, I cannot deliver it unto you, the use it self will better testifie it; for thus may a man try every thing whatsoever, yea though it be a contingent axiom; as audentes fortuna juvat: audacia belongs to Ethicks, fortuna to Logick; and in audacia we shall find this, for it is that which thrusteth a man desperately: and here we may see what a true predicament is, not the predicaments but the Arts are the store-houses; for whatsoever is in [Page 71] artificio rei, we may see there, not onely genus, species, &c. but all other arguments, for they are too nar­row, and false too; for that distribution, substantia est creata, or increata, will not fail in any Art, and the three first predicaments (as we heard before) are nothing but practises of method. Now if it be objected, we must not have those things before we see them: no, we must first see them, that we may lay them up in store. We have our eye first, and then things appointed for us to see.

Artificiale est quod ex sese arguit.

Now here is that affection, that is in this kind of arguments, that glue that was before, is here quod ex se: so that this makes that more special, which before was more general: so that we shall still see what our eye of reason sees: we heard before that we see the thing, as it is an argument; here we see it, as it is af­fectioned to argue ex se. Ex se, what is that? as if he should say, look into the artificium of the thing, there shall you see his artificial arguing, ex se, that is it argues natura, or it is causa natura of its arguing: so that these arguments concurre for the being of the thing. So wood is affected to argue a chest ex se, that is, it is in the artificio of wood to argue a chest made of wood ex se: so then this artificial argument ariseth from nature, from a vis ingenita, that is, in ar­tificio rei: so the efficient argues ex se, as if I should say, if there were not that cunning in the efficient of a chest to make it, it would not be one. So that it is thus defined, quodex sese arguit. Argumentum was the next genus, and he doth not express it, but under­stand it here, because we heard of it so lately before: then again he hath it here, but after another manner, because he could not deliver the form of it, without [Page 72] the genus: for arguit is not here taken for act, but for potentia: as we say animal vidit, though he doth not actually see, but have the faculty of it: so we say, Does he eat or drink: meaning, can he eat or drink. For if it were taken for the act of arguing, then it should not be no where but in judgement: so that quod arguit, is as much as argumentum, and ex se is the form: if he had said artificiale est argumentum ex sese, he had said the same that ex sese arguit: but it had not been so plain to a young Schollar, and he had also newly done with argumentum before: so that this is the second thing that our eye of reason is to look at, namely, an artificial argument, which can ex sese arguere. Now fallaces may be in every rule. In the first, as if any abuse it to deceive and abuse reason: for the second, if any go about to judge be­fore he see the invention, it is a fallace, and a prepo­sterous course. So argumentum is artificiale, or in­artificiale; they break this rule that will give testi­mony of a thing, whose artificial arguments they have not seen: so do the Papists in their implicite faith, when they beleive as the Church beleives, not know­ing what the Church beleiveth. So Schollers that take any thing that their Authors deliver them, with­out any examination at all of the things they read. Kiekerman saith, an inartificial argument may be re­ceived before an artificial. I do not deny it, but yet you must examine it afterward: Gods testimonies onely are undeniable, because he cannot lye; but no mans.

Artificiale est primum aut ortum.

We are farther to look at this glue, whereby a thing is put to another thing in artificio rei, it is there firstly, or secondly: this affection or going to the act [Page 73] is there at the first hand, or at the second hand: now it is the same still, but is looked at, as it is originally, or as it is arising from the first: as to make up me, there goes a soul and a body, and of the formes of the four elements is the form of my body made, and of their matter the matter of my body made: now the elements are firstly there, as making my body, and se­condly my body is in me, as a part in me: so a man is first consisting of body and soul, and then is animal: now this wisdom of God is wonderful to consider, how he makes things first of causes, effects, &c. and then ranketh them under a general head. And if we go to the Creation, we shall see them evidently: first he made a first matter, then the first forms, and then mists that had their complements, and did differ one from another, then they might be compared to­gether, then they had names, and were ranked under general heads, as a part to a whole, &c. and then they might be defined, and their limits shewed how farre they reach; for here our Author leads us to see every thing there, and to see how it is there, the reason of this distribution we shall see in every thing whatsoever: as in an ink-horn, there must be the matter of it, then it self, and it must have his adjuncts, &c. and then will it hold your ink; then when it is this, it is not a tree, or a stone, though it may be com­pared, and be equal, or unequal, like, or unlike: so that first we see what is in it firstly, then we may call it round, deep, made of horn, then range it under a head, then lay it out in its limits, and then give testimony of it.

Primum quod est suae originis.

This definition doth somewhat stick in my teeth before it come out, for it is a far fetched trope, and [Page 74] onely one is suae originis▪ namely God: but he means this clamminess or glue that is suae originis, is first there, the ortum is not: as the son hath the nature of his father, but is another thing than his father: but first argumentum est quod affectum est ad arguendum, then artificiale est affectum ex sese; so primum is ar­gumentum artificiale primitus: so that we must look at the argument, as it doth argue, not as it is suae ori­ginis, but quod originaliter arguit: he meanes that is there first, as we shall see by the nature of the thing: as homo justus; here justitia is firstly in homine, as an adjunct, for he must first have that vertue before he can be denominated justus; then secondly, it is in him as he is denoninated from it: so a chest is made of wood; here is the cause and effect, and this is first­ly; then from hence I may say a woodden chest, and this is secondly, arising from the first.

Quod est suae originis.

As if he should have said, that hath this affection to argue ex se primitus: now then we may go won­derful deep, if we will go by these degrees, what may we not see? if we would make a breef: Argumen­tum est quod ad aliquid arguendum affectum est: arti­ficiale ex se, primum primitus. The fallacians are many, as they that think they are conjugates that are in name: as he hath vertue, ergo, he is studiosus: so homo dormit, quia somnit: here is nothing but causes, and effects, and so synonimies; for conjugata are no­mina: so again when orta are taken for prima, or taught before, aut contra: so do the common Logi­cians in the predicables, when they teach genus, spe­cies, differentia, proprium, accidens: First see the orta contain the prima, whence they arise symbolice, as it were in a cognizance. Here we learn this, we must first [Page 75] look at the affection of an argument, then we must be ex sese, then primitus: now ortum contains the same nature that primum doth; and some say the effect ariseth from the causes, and the subject and adjunct from the effect. But doth the effect argue with the affection of causa? it doth not: or doth the subject or adjunct argue with the affection of an effect? No.

Estque simplex aut comparatum.

We have heard what the end of Logick is, and all shoots at this mark, to reason well, that is, that we may handle our reason well; now that we may doe thus, we must have invention first, afterward judge­ment. Invention teacheth us to find out simples, Judgement teacheth us how to lay them together, we may compare invention or arguments, to the hook and nails in a thing; judgement to the fasten­ing of them together. Now invention beholds argu­ments. Argumentum in Logick is a concrete, as the Schools call it, signifying the thing, together with the affection that is in it to argue another thing: as a Taylor is a Taylor quatenus, he hath that affection in him to make a garment: so that invention intends immediately the affection, and mediately the thing: for ens quatenus ens, is general to ars quatenus ars, but ens quatenus it is affected ad arguendum, so it belongs to Logick alone, and thus we go by degrees; for the Lord doth not let us see any thing immediately: now the very name invention tels us what we must doe, namely, seek out, it tels us the Lord hath hid things secret in nature, and we must labour for the simples, and so find them: now we seek argumentum, which we heard to be of two sorts, artificiale, or inartificia­le: artificiale is that which is in artificio rei; where­as [Page 76] the inartificiale doth but cary to us what other men have seen by the artificials; and because none can testifie of a thing before he have seen it himself, ergo, artificiale is before inartificiale: and also because he that seeth inartificialiter, can but testifie so far forth as he sees the thing, which is not at all, ergo, they that give testimony of that thing, whose artificial argu­ments they have not seen, are sophisters, and break this rule: and this is a sophisme of the Papists in their implicite faith, which do beleive as the Church be­leiveth, neither knowing the artificial arguments of the thing, nor the thing it self that they beleive. Now the artificial arguments are in the artificio of the thing, ergo, we must of necessity know all the artifici­al arguments in things, if we will know the things themselves wholly. And here by the way artificiale tels me, that every thing must be in some predicament, that is, in some Art, quod ex sese arguit: this affecti­on is in the thing, and it is ex se, drawn out of the thing as it were: so that this hook whereby it layes hold on another thing, is natural to it, for so he means. Artificiale est primo, or secundo in artificio rei, as if the thing had a second kind of making, na­ture, or being: so a thing is made of matter and form, primitus: but when we consider how first singular parts are made of that matter, then organically are made of the singulars, and the whole made of the organical: here is the second invention, and here the matter is considered immediately in the parts, me­diately in the whole. This is something subtle, but yet evident and plain: as first, imagine that thing justice in a man; here is subjectum, and adjunctum: and this is the first invention: then from that quali­ty in him, I can denominate him a just man, and this [Page 77] is the second invention: so I look at a thing whose matter is made of wood, and can conjugate a name to it wooden: as a wooden chest, &c. so when I say a man is made ab humo, here is the material cause, and effect: but at the second hand, when I consider how man is made ab humo, and from thence denomi­nate him homo, there it is that second Logick. So that the first invention onely looks at the thing, without consideration of the names; the second invention looks both at the thing, and at the names. So when I denominate homo from that thing justice in him, to be justus, I mean not the name; nor the thing, but the name and the thing together: for orta a primis per­inde sunt ad id quod arguunt, sicut prima unde oriuntur, ergo, there must be both the nature of the first argu­ments in them, and that affectio also. So in a distri­bution, if we shall speak of distributio ex effect is, as in navi, alii malos scandunt, alii per fores cursitant &c. here malos scandere, per fores cursitare, sentinam ex­haurire, are causes and effects firstly; but as these nautae are distributed by their effects, here is the orta categoria, the arising, arguing. So in a distribution ex causis of integrum into membra, the first invention is matter, and form, the second invention is them two together in the members making up the integrum. So in a distribution of the genus into the species; as in animali, there is essentia corporea plena vitae, & sensus, which are the causes of homo, and brutum: then there is a symbolum of them when we jumble them toge­ther: so in a distribution ex adjunctis, homo is aeger, homo is sanus, here is both subjectum, and adjunctum: but when I make a distribution, and say, homo est aeger, aut sanus, this is the second Logick: and this is no­thing but the consideration of the community of a [Page 78] cause, an effect, a subject, an adjunct, for that causeth these distributions: so in a definition there is firstly genus, which ariseth from matter and form; then the second invention of them is the heaping of them together: so as they make but one argument, name­ly, definitio: so in a distribution, though there may be more arguments, yet are they also heaped together to make one argument, namely, descriptio, quod est suae originis: this is true in respect of ortum, which made Ramus so define it: but I had rather respect the de­finition of argumentum, quod ad aliquid arguendum affectum est, and to say artificiale ex se, primum pri­mitus: and so we shall deliver it as it acteth, which is best.

Primum est simplex, seu absolutum, aut compara­tum: I rather say absolutum, because absolutum and simplex are more opposed, and so, [...], and [...] are opposed, now these simple arguments do look at those that are in artificio rei, as they are in their own nature; for that is his meaning: as when I say the wall is white, here I look at the wall as it is simple and absolute in its own nature: and in like sort at white­ness as it is simple and absolute in its own nature: so that the absolute argument looks evermore at the things as they are absolute in themselves: as when I say a chest is made of wood, I look at both of them, as they are simple in their own nature: now the com­parate doth not consider the thing absolutely, but with another. So in a chest if I consider the quan­tity of it, here the chest and its quantity are simple arguments: but when I say it is greater than a lesse Chest, or contra, then they are comparates: so that the comparison lyeth as it is respected with some o­ther thing: so that the comparative quantity, or qua­lity [Page 79] is another thing, the absolute greatness or little­ness, likeness, or unlikeness, for that which is abso­lue greatness may be comparative littleness, aut con­tra.

Absolutum est consentaneum, aut dissentaneum.

Object. But how are disagreers in artificio rei.

Answ. True it is, that the one part of disagreers is not, but the other is: so that the absolute conside­ration hath respect either to the thing wherewith it agreeth, aut contra, as ratio in respect of it self, so it is argumentum simplex, seu absolutum, in respect of ho­mo it is consentaneum, and goes to his constitution, consider it with irrationale, and there it tels me, it will not be that: so that which makes fire not to be wa­ter is in the artificio of fire: so that which causeth dissention is in the artificio of that thing that is dissen­taneum: so that the same thing is consentaneum, and dissentaneum; consentaneum if we look at the thing wherein it is, dissentaneum if we look at another thing, that it is not: so in black, and white, there is that in black which makes it to be black; and there is moreover that in black which makes it not to be white: so that the same thing in divers respects is consentanie, and dissentanie: so that white or black considered with the wall may be consentanie, consi­der it with that which dissents from it, so it is dissen­taneum, and all these must we see if we will see any thing throughly: First we must see the affectio in artificio rei, then primitus, then absolute, then consen­tanie; then absolute, quod consentit cum re, therefore this is clearly in artificio rei, and so is dissentaneum too; that consentit, hence we see consideration to be gene­ral between things, and they are made so, for else they [Page 80] would never make up one whole, as all creatures make up the world, for it is concordia discors, and dis­cordia concors, that makes all things. Now as there is consention in all things, so also there is dissention, for else all things should be one: thus the Lord made all things to shew forth his wisdom, and mighty pow­er, that all things should consent together, and yet be many.

Consentaneum est absolute aut modo quodam.

For some things agree absolutely, others but after a sort, absolutum is absolutely required for the being of the thing, the other is but complemental: so that here he tels us if we would see any thing, first look what is in artificio rei, then look what is primitus there, then what is absolute, then what is consentanie, then what is simply required to the being of the thing. Absolute, that is, so agreeing to the thing, that if the one be not there, the other will not be there & contra, as if any one cause be wanting, there will be no effect, if there be a concurring of all the causes, then an effect, if no cause no effect, & contra, if an effect then all the causes, if no effect no concur­rence of causes: so that this absolute agreement doth put a necessity of each others being: now absolute, and modo quodam are definitions of themselves, for he wanted words, and therefore delivered the definitum, by the definitio: so that to ask a definition of absolute, or modo quodam, is as if one should ask a definition of animal ratione.

Absolute ut causa & effectum.

The causes give esse to the effect, therefore with­out these esses the thing cannot existere, ergo, there are absolutely required. In like sort in the existere of the effect you may see the concurrence of all the esses, [Page 81] of all the causes, therefore these are absolute consenta­nea: Hence we learn, that all the causes must go to the making up of the effect. And again, if any ef­fect, then there must be all the causes; so then we see how the ones being depends necessarily upon the other, ut causa & effectum, therefore the cause must first be looked at, as if I would look at ens, or any thing whatsoever, therefore our Author taking this course takes the very way of God in his creatures. Can any man see any thing throughly, and not see the causes first? he cannot: and is there any thing to be seen in a thing before the causes? there is not: therefore that is alwayes first in nature, and therefore first also in reason. Now here are falla­cians, as to think an effect may be from some causes, and to think the causes may be removed from the ef­fect, which is a common fallace.

Aristotles organon, Tullies offices, &c. here is Aristotles and Tullies casuality still, though they be dead. Now we see how orderly we go to work, if we had not done so, we could not have come to cau­sa, all the arguing of them before, as of artificiale, primum, absolutum, consentaneum, simplex, are here in causa and effectum So that there are many clasp [...] as it were, as the cause is in artificio of the effect, it is also there primitus, and absolute, and consentanie, and simpliciter: so that this discent doth very much clear truth, we have our flesh, bloud, bones from causa, then afterward we have our complements from modo quodam consentanea, then we may see we are not this, or that. See an imperfect gar­ment at the Taylors, and you may ask what it is, but let the Taylor make it up compleat with all its cuts, and jagges, then you may see it your self, [Page 82] and need not ask what it is for further knowledge of it.

Causa est cujus vires est.

REmember the purpose of Logick is to direct man to see the wisdom of God, which that reason may do well it acts doubly, first by taking at simples, then by laying them together: that which we take with the first eye is argumentum, that is any thing so farre as it hath the affection to argue, first as it is in artificio rei, which therefore is in an Art, now it is first­ly there or secondly: first it is there absolute by way of consention, respecting the thing wherein it is, or dissenting from the thing wherein it is not, those that consent are absolutely consenting, or modo quo­dam, absolute as the causes, and effect, that proceeds from the causes; here we must begin, because the first thing that cometh to mans reason is the cause, so if we take the world, or any part thereof, let us re­solve it, and in the end we shall come to the first cau­ses, a first efficient, &c. So God is the first cause of all things, and himself without all causes, ergo, the cause is first of all things, then the first matter is first in his kind, the first form in his kind, and the first end in his kind.

So Aristotle saith, God is primum intelligibile: so then if we will see the wisdom of God in the crea­tures, we shall see the cause, the beginner: then again [Page 83] Aristotle doth confess, that causa is primum motus. Again, what is the initium of every thing, but his be­ing, and that is from the causes, therefore they are first; again, the next cause is the farthest thing we can go unto, as if we work any thing, now if we take causes, and look into them, then we make them ef­fects not causes, as if I look at the causes of a garment, I find the Taylor to be the cause, but if I look at his cause, I make him an effect, yet I cannot make the first efficient an effect, &c.

The Greeks call causa [...] or [...] of [...] peto, because it is that which is first granted or requi­red, as the Geometricians require a petitum, or as our Author should say there can be no demonstration of the first cause. Est argumentum absolute consentane­um, &c. causa est: if a cause be absolutely required for the effect, then there is a cause: then again Lo­gick serves us to behold the wisdom of God, and himself also through the creature: now all things but God are made, and are composed, ergo, they must have causes, est absolute consentaneum, because they are essential to the effect. No shipwright no ship, no wood no ship, no form no effect, no end, no effect; and all these together an effect, & contra.

Cujus vires est.

First here he tels us of a vis, then he sayes it is vis essendi, then vis essendi rei: so that as there are four words, so four things, causa is here a concrete signify­ing the thing causing, as argumentum was before sig­nifying the thing arguing, for our Logick that brings us to the first cause, doth but shew him as he argueth, not as he is in his being, causa is the thing arguing, cujus, that is, est res causans, cujus vi, this vis and vertue [Page 84] is of the thing, but Logick looks at it as it is in the thing, and then at the thing: for if the thing had not vim esseficandi an effect, it could not be a cause, as wood will not make a gown: so that it is here se­condly required, that the thing causans have vim causandi: and against this word is that common fal­lacian of non causa pro causa, as he that will lay to the charge of a childe that which a man can onely doe: so when we ascribe to Nature that it cannot doe, as the making of a World, which is peculiar to God, est.

Est.

Esse is a general term, and may signifie the essence of a thing, or the tying of some thing to some thing that is not of the essence, as first when I say vir est, secondly, vir est doctus, where I do not respect homo from his causes, but as he hath this adjunct doctrina, and the reason why est is so general, is because this esse is from the causes, which are most general, for nothing can be said to be this, or that, before it be, which is from the causes: by this vis we must under­stand, that power, and faculty in the thing, that cau­seth another thing, as if he should say, the cause is affected to argue the effect forcibly, for vis is here the same that affectio is in argumentum. Esse indeed is general to all the causes, and existere is from them all, which appears by this, we say mundus est a Deo, est ex nihilo, est formata, &c. so that est is nothing but the act of the cause, to make the effect: so we shall see in a knife, there are all the four causes, to be in it, and the three former for the end, and therefore if we will not be deceived, here see that whatsoever is de esse of a thing that is a cause, res not effectum: for we have heard what res est, that is the subject of Art, [Page 85] but if we had said effectum it had bene a posteriore, for we have not the effect wrought: Again, we are but yet in causa in general: by res he meanes res effici­enda, not yet effecta. Now another fallacie is of non causa pro causa, when we take that to be the cause, which hath the potentia efficiendi, but doth not effice­re, but is causa, quatenus it hath an hand in that effect: so that if one bring a cause, that is not a cause, though it have vim efficiendi, yet is it not causa.

Itaque primus hic locus fons est omnis scientiae.

This is a deduction out of the first rule, following this, if the thing be causae vi, then this is primus locus inventionis, for it is first in the cause, before it be in the effect: then again it is primus locus in respect it is the first argument we must look at. Locus, here Ramus tels us closely, that the Aristotelians topick places are these arguments, the first whereof is causa.

Fons.

We know the fountain is the first place where wa­ters spring, so all things spring from the causes, yea subjects, adjuncts, &c.

Fons scientiae.

For if we know the causes, then we know the effects because they arise from them, and subjects, &c. and again that is the principal part of know­ledge.

Scirique demum creditur, &c.

For till we know the causes we know but the out­side of a thing, and that which may be removed from the thing without destroying the thing, but knowing the causes of a thing, we know it as it is, the things being arising from the causes, and thus knowing the [Page 86] thing, we know it intus, and in cute. Here Ramus doth commorare telling us what Aristotle meant by these words: And again too tels us that Aristotles demonstration is nothing but the scientia of an axi­ome consisting of causa, and effectum, and he teacheth it to every cause in general efficient, matter, form, and end.

No Aristotle saith, that a demonstration concludes the property of a subject by the definition, because that layes forth the essence of a thing, but it doth not tell us all the esse, ergo, not all the scientia, for the esses of the efficient and end do not go into a defini­tion.

Ʋt merito dicatur a Poeta, &c.

Here he prefers the Poets authority before Aristo­tle, for Aristotle being more imployed in this doctrine might speak of it as a private man, but the Poet as a publike man, foelix meaning a contemplative happi­ness, not a practick.

Causa est efficiens, & materia, aut forma, & finis.

Every cause yeelds an esse, but all together make the effect, now it is of two sorts efficiens, & materia, aut forma, & finis, for he cannot give it to us in two words, but makes a distinct axiom, and couples the parts with a conjunction copulative, by reason where­of they have a community, but where lyes it, this it is I may call the two first potential causes, the other two acting causes: this the Schools tels us, when they call materia potentia, and the form actus, and this is Ramus meaning, as we shall see in many examples, as when a Taylor sets buttons on a doublet with thread, they are not done till all the causes are there: so a house is not an house so soon as it hath an efficient, and mat­ter, [Page 87] but when it hath also a form, and end. Now our Author would not use potentia, and actus; first be­cause they are barbarous words, secondly, they are improper, because they cannot be called potentia, and actus, but potentiating, and acting: then again, the form and end are potentia, as well as efficiens and ma­teria, & contra: therefore he makes two couple of causes, for so we see the efficient is the first mover, moving quite through with the matter singly, and the form and end move them inseparably together, therefore they are thus distinguished, efficiens est mo­tus a quo in a line, the matter ex qua, and form per quem, finis ad quem: but because there is a scope at matter, therefore there is a distinction. For as the ef­ficient, and end terminate the thing, so the form and matter mediate the thing running quite through the same. So God made a matter, and gave it a form, and so an end, ergo, reason must see them thus. The same order there is also in Gods providence: so man also doth imitate God, when he doth any thing or­derly; the first care is for a workman, then a matter, then a form, and then an end: though we may have cloth before a Taylor, yet it is not a matter till it be­gin with the Taylor to bring an effect to pass. So then the efficient is in nature before the matter, and the matter before the form, for the form is an ad­junct to the matter, and the form before the end, the end being an adjunct to the form; and again a thing must be formed before it can have an end. The first efficient had the first matter and forms effect to him, the second forms are adjuncts to the matter. Now the first efficient is absolutely first, for it hath nothing before it: the first matter is not res prima, nor causa prima, but first for matter, ergo, it is from the first effi­cient [Page 88] onely, ergo, never hath any existency in the world, but is ens incompletum: so the first form is from the first efficient, not of the first matter, but onely in it, ergo it is ens also completum: hence our soules are not our forms, for then our forms should be res in­compl [...]tae. Now the end is last, and the first end is the last end; it is first because it is most general, last be­cause it is not made for another end, ergo it followeth of necessity that the last end is not made: so that the end as it is last, as the thing is acted: so it is first as it is most general, for all the former causes work to effect the end. As we say in Schools, finis est primus in intentione, posterius in executione: so God made all things for his glory; here his glory is first in inten­tion of him that works by counsel, but is acted last of all by all things that he made. And here Aristotles bonum quo communius eo melius, is true of the last end of all things, which is God: for he is as we may say, finis communissimus, ergo, optimus.

Efficiens est causa a qua res est.

We have heard of causa, and of his kinds, and that they are disjoyned, by which means there is made two couple of causes, the two first working joyntly, even as the other do. Efficiens, & materia, here is a se­cond distribution, and here the efficient is first; for it is first eujus vi res est: again, by the rule of method it is first in nature, because it giveth light to that which followeth; and that the efficient moves first we see it in every thing; he layes hold on the matter, which in respect of the efficient is moved, and by a natu­ral appetite moves, and runs to make an effect of it self; and doth effect the effect, as well as the ef­fi [...]ent, and that from the natural appetite it hath to the effect: but the mover or efficient is [Page 89] before the thing moved, and before the effect also.

Efficiens.

Efficiens, quasi exfaciens, moving quite through: for besides his first moving, as being the first cause, he moveth also together with the matter, form and end; and his working with the rest is the cause of his name.

Est.

Every cause is required to the effect, efficiens est causa, ergo: again, first there must needs be a mover to move the matter, before there can be a table wrought: this appears plainly by the creation of the world: and because every thing is an effect, there­fore the efficient is the first cause: for take any thing, and you shall see the vis of the efficient to run quite through the same; so look into the world, and every part thereof, and you shall see Gods finger in every thing, without which they could not be: so that ef­ficiens est causa, and because an effect cannot be with­out its esse, ergo it is of the esse of it, a qua, from whom it is: as if he should say, it is terminus a quo, &c. so as the world began with God: so in every thing in nature, the beginning of motion is first from the next cause: so that efficiens est causa a qua, telling us that this is the first being the effect hath.

Res.

Here res is general as before to all the Arts, and it is the subject of the general Arts. Ramus doth not here break the rule of method not defining what res is. Again, if he had said a qua est, we should have had reference to res: again, if he had named effectum, it had been a posteriore, not having learned what effectum est. Res est, this is general to every cause, [Page 90] ergo it is taught in the definition of causa in general: but that he may not be so obscure, he borroweth some thing that went before, for else the perfect de­finition had been efficiens est a qua. Now this teach­eth us to look first at the efficient in every thing: for Logick tels us not onely of an esse in general, but of four several esses from which existere doth arise; as efficiens est causa a qua, materia ex qua, forma per quam, finis cujus gratia: why doth he not say, causa est cujus vi res sit? because something may be a cause, and yet is not; but if it do causare then it is a cause. So if I say will do a thing, and yet do it not, yet am I an efficient; for est doth here com­mend to us the adsignification of time, but the essence that so soon as it beginneth to move, so soon it is an efficient, though the effect be not till the matter, form, and end be there.

Cujus et si vera genera, &c.

Here Ramus doth commorari, telling us that those many species which the Aristotelians make, are not species, but modi efficientis, because more of them may be in one and the same efficient: as one man may be causa precreans and conservans, sola, and cum aliis, per se, & per accidens, because they may be in the same efficient. Even as actio and passio do not distinguish the thing, but are divers modi of the same thing. Here Ramus will find no species of efficiens, neither are there any of the other three; for the matter that is lowest, ergo it hath nothing under it, but examples: and so is the efficient: ergo he needed not say, Cujus etsi vera genera, &c. for how could rhat appear to him, that is not? we know the effect is single, ergo as the single matter, form and end, make that, so the thing efficient makes it, neither hath it any species.

Ʋbertas tamen per magna, &c.

There is great and plentiful use of the efficient, and as it is first of all, so is it most general of all, for mat­ter cannot be a matter, till the efficient move it, and so of all other arguments: now these make cause the efficient to be commended, or discommended, and according to these modi is the effect more or less ar­gued: as if a child kill his father, it is parricide: so if it be a good thing that is wrought by one alone, he is more to be commended than if he had done it, cum aliis, aut contra. Again, if a thing be done well na­tura, it is better than if it had been done necessitate; and more commendable when a thing is done by counsel than fortuna: now because these modi doe urge and press the effect more or less, ergo there is reason in them, and therefore they belong to Logick: modi, that is, adjuncts not making these effects species, but onely distinguished by accidents: that fallaci­an, non causa pro causa, is general to causa: and it is also particular to efficiens, making that causa efficiens which is not: as the Hereticks in Divinity were deceived, which said that the Angels did make the world.

Primo quod procreat, qut tueatur.

These are first because they are more general than the rest, and also they are more in use: for we shall have this first modus in use twenty times for one to the other modi: so we respect God as causa procre­ans, and tueans, before we respect him alone: then again this procreant cause brings the thing first to his esse, and the preserving cause is the Keeper of the thing in his esse. Now in reason he that is the pro­creating cause, should also be the preserving cause: as God is not onely causa procreans of the World, but [Page 92] also causa conservans, and so should parents, as they procreant children, so should they in like sort preserve them. The procreant cause is first, because things must needs have a being, before they can be preser­ved: now they are distinguished, because when a thing is procreated, it is not preserved, aut contra: and the modi are joyned with the cause, not with the effect, because they are first in the efficient, as essen­tial, for actio is before passio: so that here mark that next after we see the efficient we are to look at these modi. As we are saved by faith alone; here is effi­ciens sola. Our Author brings in an example of O­vids, the 4. remedii: and Kickerman hath a fling at Ramus for his examples, and would have him bring his examples out of Divinity. But first Logick being a general Art, it is therefore best to fetch his examples out of the most common and general Writers, as out of Poets, and Historians, which the Gentiles and Turks may receive, these being more generally known to the world, than are the Scriptures: and again, Di­vinity is the most special Art of all. And so Ramns findeth fault (but justly) with Aristotle, for fetch­ing his examples out of Geometry, which is too ob­scure: for it is a fallace to fetch examples to prove any thing, if the examples be not as well or better known to them to whom we demonstrate any thing as to our selves. As they say in Geometry, A is not B, &c. for so they say in Geometry, angulus A, and angulus B. &c. Now Logick is a general Art, ergo it is best to fetch examples out of Poetry, &c. which belongs to Rhetorick a general Art, the example is this; first proper, otia are proper and conserving causes of love: then tropical, causa est procreans, cibus the cherisher.

Otia si tollas, &c.

Thus [...]e reasons, otia are the causes of love; for take them away, and love is gone: hence it appeares they were of the essence of love; so that because causa is of the essence of the effect, ergo put idleness, and you must put love, aut contra: for the essence will be wanting, and we have a rule sublata causa, tollitur effectum, and it is general to all causes, for they are all necessary to the esseficating of the effect: all the rules of causa in common Logicians you shall have here, as posita causa ponitur effectum, yet not one cause but all the causes must concurre: many other rules they have, all which are inwrapt in the definition of causa: now it holds contingently in every cause; for if we put one cause, we put all the causes, and so it holds in the special causes, that posita causa ponitur effectum, & contra: as take away otium from Egi­stus, and you take away love: so that sublata causa a tertio tollitur effectum: so in judgement it is also true; as give otium to Egistus, and you may give him love, which argues from the efficient.

Sic pater & mater procreant, nutrix tuetur.

Before he shewed us an example out of an Author, he wils us to look for the use of them out of Authors. The matter of the first belongs to Ethicks, the mat­ter of the second to History. Logick is a general Art, ergo his examples are best out of Poetry, and Oratory, wherein the use of all Art is. Now the aliquid before is love, which we should have heard of, against which Ovid makes a medicine. In this example Dido is the aliquid, for here the aliquid is the causa. Dardanus had two sons, Assaracus and An­chises, and of him came Aeneas: now here she takes away the true causes, and sayes Caucasus begot thee: [Page 94] so there Caucasus in duris cantibus is causa procreans, and Hyrcanae tigres are preserving causes: but this is false, for here is non causa pro causa.

Object. But doth he well to bring fallaces?

Answ. Yes out of Poets, for here non ens, or ens fictum, hath the nature of ens in it: neither are all fables lyes, but by continued allegories they teach us notable truths: now she challengeth Aeneas with this for his manners, because he forsook her.

Sic Romulus conditor Romanae urbis, &c.

He makes examples of his own, and there is genesis, teaching us that though genesis be before analysis, yet genesis imitativa is nothing but the imitating of a for­mer analysis. Again, our Author makes choice of such examples as may be paradigmaes, and whereunto any other example may be brought, as in the first he makes an accident to be the cause of an accident, in the se­cond he makes a substantial effect to be from substan­tial causes naturally, but fainedly: in the last he brings substantial causes working substantial effects ordina­rily in artificial things: and here we may see who first shot the arrow, before we can see where it lights, or through what it flew, or whence.

Secundo causa efficiens sola efficit, aut cum aliis.

VVE are still in the efficient: the first thing that we can see in the artificio of any thing, is the efficient, and the modi of it: rhe most general modi was procreans and conservans before, now we come [Page 95] to the second modi, sola, aut cum aliis, which are more general than per se, and per accidens in use, but not so generall as the first. Secundo sola, &c. this is next, ergo next after the first: sola, that is where this mo­dus efficiendi is considered, and the force and vertue of this argument from the efficient cause stands in this modus sola: for so we are to consider always when any efficient is brought to argue any thing: see which modus is brought with it, as in the example before; the effect is pressed with the modus of procreans, and with the modus of conservans: as you would take away love, take away idleness, for it is the procreant and conserving cause of love. Now as God is the pro­creant and conserving cause of all things, so he is cau­sa sola first, ergo that is before causa [...]um aliis, after­ward he is causa cum aliis, working together with the creatures, and we finding this in the first efficient, we may also find it in the first, in the second, and in every one; because all things are simulacra of the first. Now these belong to Logick, for there is reason in them, and any thing deserveth more or less, praise, or dispraise, as he doth good or evil sola, aut cum aliis.

Earumque omnium, saepe alia principalis, alia adjuvans, & ministra.

That is, earum omnium, quae cum aliis efficiunt, saepe alia principalis, alia adjuvans, & ministra, for so saepe here is part of the axiom, and thus often it fals out, that one among the rest in doing of things is principal, and (as we say) ring-leader to the rest, though sometimes likewise all be hail fellows. So that as the Lord did at the first, work all things alone, and then with others: so likewise do the creatures in nature, and here again as the Lord is princi­pal [Page 96] when he worketh with others, so also when creatures work together, one for the most part is prin­cipal.

Alia adjuvans, & ministra.

That is, as it were a minister, and an instrument, Here we are to understand there is the principal cause, which is holpen, and doth not help: causa adjuvans is principally of living things, ministra is commonly of instruments, which have not life, though both of them may be of either. Virgil 9. of his Aeneidos. Nisus avocat ab Euriolo, &c. Me me adsum qui feci, &c. Nisus alone did the deed, mea fraus om­nis, there lies the argument, therefore he was sola causa, ergo, in me convertite ferrum, O Rutuli. Eu­riolus was taken, Nisus escaped, and he reasons not from the doing of it, for so both might have de­served punishment, but from the manner of doing it, mea fraus omnis; and for Euriolus thus he saith, nihil iste nec ausus nec potuit. The syllogisme is this.

He that hath done this murder, is to be punish­ed.

The Assumption is thus proved by denying auda­cia to Euriolus, whereby he might have done it, and potentia whereby he might have accomplished it. Slaughter is to punishment a subject.

Solitaria causa cum plerisque, & principalibus & sociis pro Marcellio varie adhibetur.

In the former example we see sola causa delivered in a strange phrase, this is causa cum aliis, and here dux is causa principalis, militum virtus, locorum opor­tunitas, &c. are the helping causes: and fortune is [Page 95] another principal cause, quae mavimam partem sibi vindicat, he reasons thus, thou art a valiant fellow Cae­sar, but thou hast helping causes, of which fortune is the cheif. At vero hujus gloriae Caesar, &c. here Caesar hath no companion: so that Caesar in pardo­ning Marcellus is solacausa. Nihil centurio, nihil praefectus, &c. here he removes the species of efficiens that should be cum aliis, and he removes also fortune, which is a cheif help in war; this example belongs to Polemica.

Instrumenta etiam in catsis adjuvantibus connumerantur.

That is whether they be cattle that have life, which are instruments for husbandry, or whether they be things without life, they are counted among helping causes: so a man writing with his pen, is principal, and his pen instrumental: but here we are to know, that we must alwayes analyse, as our Author layes that down, which is to be analysed, as when I say he did this alone, though he had an instrument: here he is causa sola in respect he had not another man to help him, he is causa cum aliis as he hath an in­strument.

Quo argumento impius Epicurus, &c.

The Epicure reasons thus, if God had no instru­ments to help him in making the world, then he made it not, but he had no instruments, &c. therefore this we know to be false, by a rule of Divinity, for to make the world was an infinite work, ergo nothing being finite could help him. Now many times there are fallaces from all these, as when causae non procreans is put for causa procreans, non conservans pro conser­vans, non sola pro sola, non cum aliis pro cum aliis: all which we are to determine by this rule.

Tertio causa efficiens per se efficit, aut per accidens.

THe modi are of most special use, and indeed Ra­mus was long in determining about the doctrine of them, but this was his last determination. Now the former are more general than these, because these are more special in use: and again the other belong to these, these may be where the other are, but the other include these: these modi per se, and per acci­dens are more particular than the other, for their reach. Now natura belongs to natural Philosophy, as it were, consilium to moral as it were. Tertio cau­sa efficiens, &c. these we have heard before, efficit per se sua facultate, that is, not onely having it own na­ture in it self, whereby it worketh, but the beginning of its motion from it self, causa per accidens hath it from another.

Sua facultate.

By facultas here we are to understand the same, that vis was generally in the definition of causa, but he means here, that which hath his principium of motus of it self: if one do a thing per accidens, he doth it vi, but not sua: so sua facultate, that is, whose motus whereby it worketh is determinated in it self, ut quae natura vel confilio faciunt: these two names should seem to belong to natural and moral Philosophy, but we are to understand by Nature that thing whose na­ture is to work such an effect: yea any thing be it na­tural, or artificial, which hath that principium of motus in it self to work any thing.

Ʋt quae natura vel consilio faciunt.

Counsel is that which doth a thing by deliberation willingly, and wittingly, as God, Angels, and men onely work by counsel: causa natura is as a knife cutteth sua natura, so all things are subject to nature: and when I find that a thing worketh propria vi, and that beginning of motus is with the nature of it taught, not from it nature, that is causa natura, as when another man crouds me, and so I croud ano­ther, and fling him down, I do it with my nature, not from it. So in a Clock the lead goes down by a rule in nature, because it is heavy, and that puls the rope, and the rope puls the wheeles, &c. all these move with their natures, though not from them.

Ventorum naturalis efficientia est.

In this example:

Here these three Eurus, Notus, and Affricus, are natural causes of tempests on the Seas, they are also causae cum aliis, and each of them is as principal as the other.

Suscepto bello Caesar gesto etiam magna ex parte, &c. those things that fall under Logick, them doth he de­fine, as causa per se he defines to be quae sua facultate efficit, but if he should define what nature & counsel are, he should run into natural & moral Philosophy, for counsel belongs to Pollicy, yet for the modus of it in working an effect, it belongs to Logick, for a man may take counsel of himself, without Counsellers, as Kings have. Suscepto bello Caesar, &c. judicio meo, as voluntate: in these words lies the modus, which he [Page 98] proves a disparatis nulla vi coactus, &c. Fallaces here are very common, as when we take that for causa per se, which is causa per accidens, & contra: Now the reason why he gives these modi to the efficient, and not to the effect is, because they are modi movendi, and do not belong to the thing moved.

Per accidens efficit causa, quae externa facultate efficit: ut in his quae fiunt necessitate, vel fortuna.

Causa per accidens is that which worketh an effect, but non sua facultate, but is moved by some other thing, and yet notwithstanding it works after a sort sua facultate, but not sua facultate if we respect the effect, as fire drieth a cloth by removing the moi­sture, and so leaves the cloath dry, which drought is in the cloth.

Ʋt in his quae fiunt necessitate vel fortuna.

Necessitate cum efficiens vi cogitur ad effectum. Here we see a necessity in invention, which is all one with coaction.

By fortuna we are to understand the special provi­dence of God, or ignorance of the next cause, for ignorance of the providence of God in all things, and of the next cause, hath caused that men say what fortune had I, when they are crossed in play, or such like.

Now necessity answereth to nature, cum efficiens cogitur: so that this necessity here is a coaction, and yet is it efficiens though vi cogitur, cogitur when as the work of it per se is rather of some other thing: now the same thing in one respect may be causa per se, and in another respect causa per accidens, for they are but modi, vi externa ad effectum, so that it doth it not na­tura, or consilio.

Object. Why saith he effectum rather than res?

Answ. All comes to one, for he means res, neither doth he define effectum here. Here he means violence, not that vis in causa; this vis doth not work the ef­fect, but works upon the cause, and is that facultas whereof he spake before.

Qualis est Pompeianorum excusatio.

At mihi quidem (ait Orator) si proprium & verum nomen &c. Before he said he was causa consilio of go­ing with Pompey against Caesar, he saith he was com­pelled fatali necessitate, and hither belongs fatum in Schools,

Fortuna est causa per accidens quando praeter, &c.

Our Author before did tell us of fortuna in the ab­lative case, here he puts it in the nominative, because fortune is a principal cause of that effect that another doth per accidens: the arguing we ascribe it to fortune, and say fortune did it: so that our Author would have us consider, first that it was fortune did it, secondly, that it takes away the title of doing it from him that did it.

Per accidens.

That is working externa facultate, now where­as he saith he doth it per accidens, he meanes for­tune as it is commonly taken, when we make her blind not seeing what she doth, for hence it doth arise, when we doe not a thing by counsel, but [...]ab nab as they say, that causeth us to make fortune blind.

Quando aliquid accidit.

That is, happeneth, for here it is principal, the im­providence as it were, he neither sees himself a cause, neither doth he see who is the cause, and there­fore he saith accidit, not efficit, for he saith I did it not; so again, ask him who did it, and [...]e will say, I [Page 100] know not: so that accidere is the special efficere of this modus.

Praeter scopium efficientis.

Fortune may seem to be opposed to counsel, which evermore hath a scope whereat it levels, now when any thing happeneth praeter scopum, it is for­tuna we say. Now things in nature may have a scope, which is beyond their nature, and then it is fortuna: so that praeter scopum is as much as if he should have said, praeter scopum fortunae, if it be causa fortuna: or praeter scopum naturae, if it be causa natura.

Sic Pheraeo Jasoni profuit hostis, &c. here his enemy going about to kill him, healed him.

In hoc genere causarnm imprudentia connume­rari solet.

I unawares have seen that, which hath done me harm. Then Ovid was causa per accidens of work­ing that effect he should not. So Acteon was causa inscius of seeing Diana washing her self: and here Ovid reasons a simile, as Acteon was torn in peices of his dogs for seeing Diana unawares, so am I banished for seeing that I would.

Scilicet in superis etiam fortuna luenda est, &c. He means Augustus.

So if a man go forth, and a tile fall from an house, and break his head, this is causa fortuna, it is natura as it break his head, being harder than his head, and fortuna as it hit him, and consilio it breaks his head if it be flung, for it hath a scope: true it is nothing but counsel hath his end in its intendment, yet [Page 101] there is no cause but hath his end of the effect it wor­keth.

Hinc sumitur deprecatio, &c.

For our Author said before accidit, therefore we are causes, ergo, it ought to be pardoned, deprecatio is from this manner of working fortuna: so they will say he is a proper man, but hath no luck.

Fortunae autem nomen ignorantia causarum confinxit, &c.

Here Ramus doth commorari in the name, lest he should be mistaken, it is an unchristian word, it is ignorance not onely as it is opposed to counsel, but as it is unknown to the thing that worketh by for­tune. Many other modi there are among other Lo­gicians, all which may be brought hither, as causa [...] is either causa necessitate, or efficiens in ge­nere, [...] is causa per se, if he shall say, anger did it, then there is a trope in it, as when I say, he writes, I mean his pen writes: if I say he writes with his pen, then I make him causa cum aliis: if I say he writes, he is efficiens. Now for the order of causes, one effi­cient may be cause of another efficient, &c. and so causa causae be causa causati, but this will fail, as when I look at a child, and commend him from his grand­father, not respecting the mean causes, there is not causa causae, but causa causati So when I say he came of Scipio, &c. Hactenus de efficiente, and this we must alwayes look at first in artificio rei: moreover ob­serve here in every thing the manner of working: for so God is said to do some thing necessitate, as when we say he doth that he would not, though he would it in another sense, and fortuna, as mans fall was praeter sc [...]pum Legis.

De Materia. Materia est causa ex qua res est.

VVE have heard of the efficient cause, and his manner of moving in that work of his: now these are essential to Logick, because in the very man­ner, there lyeth the force of the argument, and what­soever hath reason belongeth to Logick, many distin­ctions there are among the Logicians, all which may be brought to these, that of [...], and [...] they say is that efficient cause that worketh internally; the Physitians call it causa evi­dens, and meat, and drink, is causa [...] of a dis­ease: [...] is that cause that worketh exter­nally; the Physitians call it causa continens: but here is no distinction of cause, neither have these quatenus causae [...] and [...] any force to argue the effect, but onely quatenus efficiens, whereas we hear in every special modus of Ramus that they did press the effect strongly: as didst thou kill thy fa­ther? or didst thou it alone? &c. so also in causa per se, and per accidens, there is great difference in ar­guing a conclusion; if he did it natura, there is no rebuking of that, for it was from his nature: if he sin­ned by counsel, the punishment is so much the grea­ter: if he did it well consilio, he deserves the more praise. Fortuna indeed is such a cause, as it is not a cause by Ramus definition, for fortune is but Gods providence unknown: now if there be any other re­spect of [...], and [...], it will fall to the same with causa cum aliis.

Now we come to materia, that (as we have heard) had a community with the efficient, which commu­nity was to move with it a great while before the form and end come: so soon as the efficient moves, presently the matter moves, but the form and end move not a good while after. Now because this dif­ference (which causeth the distribution of causa) appears in greater things, ergo it is also in less things: but our Logick tels us, that the efficient must go be­fore the matter, and how agreeable doth our Logick go to Gods work in the creatures? if we shall take a thing and resolve it into his causes, and make them effects, and look at their causes, (for so when we look at their causes, we make them effects: so that absurd is that definition of causa, to be either going before, or concomitans to the effect) at last we shall come to a first efficient that hath nihil prius to him, ergo he was not made, ergo he ever was, ergo all other things once were not, for they were made, ergo they now being were from the first, ergo the first matter was not eter­nal, as Aristotle dreamed; but indeed he would cross Plato in what he could; yet one may confute him by his own rules, for he grants there is a primus motor, ergo he is movens, but not moved, for then he should have some thing to move him, and so not be first, ergo it is easie to make Aristotle beleive he is immoveable, because he is first, ergo he must move others onely, for he is infinite, ergo without limits of place, ergo in eve­ry place, ergo nusquam inclusus, or exclusus, ergo un­moveable.

Now the first matter is first in his kind, namely, the first matter, but not the first thing: and we may conclude from this, that the first efficient was before the first matter: for if both were first, neither were [Page 104] first: for if the one should say he were first, the o­ther would say nay, I am as forward as thee, and so there would be none absolutely first: and again, one is before two, ergo he that is absolutely first, can be but one.

Materia.

For his name, as efficiens was extrafaciens, moving all the rest, and not moved of them, but as it were pater; so materia is quasi mater, out of which the thing springs, as out of a mother: so that we may see the name to be given a simili, but yet with very good reason; as the child is not a patre, but of the mother; so the effect is from the efficient, but springs out of the matter. Now that there is such a matter thus it may appear; there is nothing composed, but its es­sence, and it self a distinct; for to make essentia and ens to be the same, is peculiar to God. Again, what­soever is finite, that may be limited in his essence; now God onely is infinite, and every other thing fi­nite, ergo may be defined, ergo it self and its essence are distinct, ergo it must have a matter. Again, if every thing have not essence, as they speak of Angels, why are not they finite? ergo they may be defined, ergo their essence and themselves are distinct: again, if they have not a matter, what have they? nothing but an efficient, and an end? then they should be imper­fect, and be either the first matter, or the first form: again, if they have a form, and no matter, then this form must be another thing from them, and how is that possible? for if the form and they be all one, then the cause and effect will be the same. But Logick is a general Art, and because every thing hath a matter, ergo materia belongs hither, and the first matter had not a matter, for then it should not have been first, but was incomplete.

Materia est.

For it gives esse, and as the force of the efficient was requisite for the esseficating of the thing, so the mat­ter much more, for not onely its esse, but its nature and self couches in the effect, and makes a bulk: and if the vis of the efficient were essential, because there could be no essefication of the effect without it, much more must the matter be essential; for if we take a­way the matter, we take away both the force and the thing it self. Now we must understand that ens and non ens are the subject of Logick: and as argumen­tum was concretum, and also causa, so when I say mate­ria, I mean a thing that was made of a matter.

Ex qua.

That is, out of which it is raised, it is the mother of every thing, as we often speak of the earth: because every thing indeed is made of the four elements, but more especially nourished of the earth. Now the matter doth not onely by his vertue cause the effect, but is interessed in it, and the effect riseth out of it, as if it were a child springing out of the mo­ther, onely it goes further in that its essence goes to the making up of the effect: now though the essence be from [...]atter and form, yet the ens it self is from all the causes.

Res est.

That effect as we shall hear hereafter; for in this doctrine of causa, effectum is the aliquid, which we must call res, till we come to it.

Est.

Every cause gives an esse to the effect, and this esse is the bulk of it, and from whence ariseth the great­ness or littleness of the effect by the form; now it is a great question in Schools, whether the matter doth [Page 106] any thing? indeed in respect of the efficient it is pa­tiens, but in respect of the effect it doth causare, and so doth agere. For if it be an effect in respect of every cause, then every cause is after a sort the effi­cient of that effect: and if you ask me what his acti­on is, I answer, it doth materia, or substantiare the ef­fect, as the efficient did efficere the effect: It is also passive in regard of the form, but both together co­work to make the effect; though forma be principi­um motus in the thing by the matter. Now this is the next thing to be inquired, after we see who made it, then whereof it was made: both which we see in e­very thing, and see them as they are done.

Now the common Logicians bring in distinctions of Materia: As Kickerman saith, it is proxima, or remota: but he may say so of every argument, as well as of materia: he saith man is made of the first mat­ter, then of the elements, which are more remote, but ex semine, that is nearer: alas we do not here consi­der priority, or posteriority, neither do these any more press the effect; here is no Logick still, but materia est causa, ex qua, ergo this will not fall in Lo­gick: and if you mark it, presently when he comes to materia prima, and to the elements, he is in natural Philosophy, ergo here is no distinction of materia in Logick, but of the particular thing, that belongs to a particular Art.

Hoc argumento ficto apud Ovid. 2. Metam. Solis domus, auro, pyropo, ebore, argento componitur.

Here Ramus brings an example out of Ovid, which [Page 107] is a common School book, and here a fained cause ar­gues a fained effect: ens and non ens are the subject of Logick, but non ens gratia entis, for so Logick looks at them first, and gives entity to ens fictum, and there­fore Grammar and Rhetorick must follow it, for they are attendants on it. The Regia Solis is here distri­buted into his parts, and they are argued by their mat­ter: it had his pillars of gold for their matter, and pyropus another matter of the columnes, the co­vering or seeling of Ivory: the leaves of the doors made of silver. Observe how these causae cum aliis in the matter do not force the effect any thing at all, ergo he doth not teach them here; for whether they be made of one matter, or of more matters, all is one, ergo there is no Logick in that, ergo it doth not belong to Logick.

Caesar 1. belli civilis. Imperat militibus Caesar ut, &c.

Here milites are the efficient causes of the ships; then he distributes the ship into his parts, keels, ribs. Carinae primum, and statumina ex leui materia, the rest was viminibus contextum, lined within with leather: so that here is distributio integri in membra, and every part is argued by the material cause.

Causae primum genus est inefficiente & materia secundum sequitur.

VVE have heard of the efficient, and of the matter, and this is the conclusion of it: now we come to the second which is in forma, & fine: so [Page 108] that whilest he saith, Causae primum genus ejusmodi est, &c. he tels me it was a distribution before, where the genus is subsistent in speciebus efficientis, & materiae, for so genus is totum partibus essentiale, and is never but in speciebus: so that the genus of them is compre­hended in the doctrine of them two parts.

Secundum sequitur in forma, & fine: he doth not say, Secundus est forma & fine: now as the efficient and matter were combined together, as moving to­gether a while without the form and end: so the form and end, though the form be before, yet the end comes presently after, and is as it were the pedissequa to the form: and indeed where we cannot find the form of a thing, we put the end, as being next to it, and best expressing it. So bene disserere, the end of Logick, is put for the form of Logick; now as this distinction of the motion of the causes is seen in grea­ter matters, so is it also in less: for there is a co-ope­ration of the efficient and end together first, then of the form, and end together also, though not without the efficient and matter. In forma & fine, for the form is before the final cause; for before the form be induced, or ingenerated in the matter, it cannot be good for his end, and the end is causa in respect of the effect, not of the efficient. So we say a coat hath a form before it have an end, for it may be a coat, and yet not fit to serve me: now then as the efficient be­gan the motion, and the motion redounded out of the matter, so it runs per formam, & finem.

Forma est causa.

[...] is the same that forma is in Latine, there is but a transposition of the letters, and [...] properly sig­nifies the face; and fas and facies in Latine comes of facio, because when it is made it hath the face of a [Page 109] thing: so a thing when it hath its form, it hath a face, it will seem something: so that the efficients esse is not facies rei, nor the matters esse, for they might be otherwhere, ergo the efficient and matter are com­mon causes: this is a particular one, which is one reason why the efficient and matter go before, being more general: so that when once he hath the face of a man, then is he a man; this word forma both in La­tine and Greek is taken abusive for the outward fi­gure of a thing; it is a metonimy of the subject for the adjunct; for figuration is not forma; as we may see in water put in a round glass, or in a square glass, the same water having the same form will have a round figure, or square figure, according to the glass where­in it is: now because the figure is adjoyned to the form, ergo they say it is forma, and in Schooles they call it forma accidentalis: now the figure follows the form, but it is not so essential, but it may be changed, and yet the water is the same, because the water is va­riable into divers figures, as we heard before in water. The Schooles say, that no artificial thing hath any o­ther form, ergo ask them in what predicament any ar­tificial thing is, and they will answer in quality: but thus they will make Geometry to give the formes of things. Figura is a quality, ergo to make quality a form is very absurd: again, as before one and the same thing had divers figures, and onely one form that makes the thing one: again, is the figure of a table the form of it? then the table belongs to Geo­metry, not to the Joyners Art: again, whether doth the matter of the table belong to substantia? ergo the form too, or else it is in divers predicaments: again, figura is an accident, but forma is a cause, and gives essence to the thing.

Est causa.

We heard before that causa was cujus vi res est, now forma therefore gives vim esseficandi, it agrees with the matter in that their two essences constitute the effect; then again by how much the form yeelds his esse in a more special manner, then the matter, so much more the form is causa, the matter yeelds a por­tion of it self, but all the form is there, for the matter is common to both species, ergo must give matter to them both, ergo forma is a more inward cause than the matter: again, forma is principium actus, and therefore it is called actus, ergo est causa.

Per quam.

Through which, or by which the efficient was from the which, and the matter of the which, the form by which: so here we may see what the form doth; and if res be per formam, it must needs follow that the forms force is there in general, as the efficients, there is no more per quam, but all the form is there, ergo forma tota est in toto, and it is in qualibet parte partly: not wholly, and this is plain; as for example, by ano­ther rule of Logick, the members we know are essen­tial to the whole, that is, containing a portion of the matter, and of the form of the whole, ergo, every mem­ber contains a part of the esse of the thing, ergo, it cannot contain the whole, ergo those that make ani­ma rationalis, sensitiva, and vegitativa, forms of men, beasts and plants, and make it tota in toto, and tota in qualibet parte, break this rule directly; for then they must be divided: but the truth is this, they are not forms, for if they be, whereof are they forms? viven­tis: what is the matter of them? as in animali: is corpus the matter of them? that cannot be, for it is forma animalis, not corporis; why then what is he [Page 111] but composed of them, ergo they are not the matter, and form, if there rise a third thing from them, then the thing hath another thing then either of them, er­go they are not the form, but contain a portion of the matter and form. Again, the body hath a form it self, for it hath his particular members, ergo they contain a portion of the matter, and of the form of the body, ergo, it is composed of a form besides the form of the whole, so that this it is, per quam, mean­ing it is quite through that portion of matter that makes that effect: so that there is not onely matter, but also forma in every thing, & contra.

Res est, quod est.

There it essefies the thing, as well as the efficient, and the matter, id quost est: so that this esse from the form doth not onely make it to be, but makes it to be that which it is: so that hereby we shall know the form, and as for the efficient and matter, for them a chest might have been a stool, or a table, but the form onely makes it that which it is, and no other thing; again a body is the genus to a man, ergo not the matter, because he is corpus.

Now we hear what the form is, such a thing as is rei superstrata materiae, the matter is substrata, and the form is laid upon it. Now question might be made what a thing forma is. The efficient, and matter we see what they are, the chestity, or tability, or these do deliver the form as well as they can, but the end deli­vers it better, The way to know this is onely by the other rules of Logick, every member (as we heard before) contains a portion of the matter, and the form of the whole; how can that be? it is true, be­cause membrum is essential to the whole. Indeed the doctrine of forma hath troubled the Schools very [Page 112] much, and how to name it I cannot tell, onely it is causa per quam res est, this it is. The first efficient in time made the first matter, then he did superstruere a form upon it, so that the matter is the foundation of the form, whereby it is retained. Now in the ele­ments both the matter and form are uniform, and therefore their parts are singular not making a mix­ture, but taking hold one of another, for so the matter is principium passionis, and the form actionis, and then again they both conspire to make up the whole. The next things are mingled of the elements, where all the elements are in every part; by this means there is a matter made of the matter of the four elements, and a form made of the forms of the four elements, and this is the best way to see the forms of any thing: a mans arm contains a portion of the matter and form of the whole: and again, it is made of singular parts which still contain a portion both of the matter, and of the form of it: so that in the end the forms of things arise from the elements by mistion; and this is that which Galen and Hippocrates mean when they call forma crasis: so for artificial things their forms arise from the forms of their parts: so that to know the forms of things this is the right, forma est causa per quam, &c. Now if we take this course to see the forms of things we shall easily see the truth: look how many members there are in a body, so many por­tions of matter and form there are, ergo, vita vegita­tiva, and sensitiva, are not the forms, but that is it that ariseth from the union of the elements forms: now by this means neither do we teach that the forms of things perish, and are annihilated, as the Philosophers say, neither are their forms divers, but conspire toge­ther to make one; neither is life a form, so that a [Page 113] bone is a bone, and hath the form of a bone when life is gone.

Id quod est.

This is peculiar to the form, for let forma be done away from a thing, and presently it is another thing: id quod est, namely that whereby it comes to be ran­ged under a general head is from the form.

Ideoque hinc a caeteris rebus distinguitur.

Because forma est causa, &c. it is not distinguish­ed by the efficient, or matter, because all the force of them is not in the thing, as the forms force is: ideo­que, &c. then we see evidently, that so farre forth as the form runs with the matter, so farre forth the thing is, id quod est; and so far forth also is it distinguished from all other things, now this is a necessary conse­quution from the first rule.

Object. How can it be a first rule arising from a first rule?

Answ. It is not simply and absolutely first, but first in his kind. So Dialecticae partes duae sunt, is not the first rule of Logick, because the definition is before, yet notwithstanding it is first in his kind; now the reason of it is thi [...], every consectary that makes a rule [...] must be a rule of Art, for it is [...], and is a first property in his kind, though there be more of them together: now it is here proton, and agrees to the parts afterwards, as risus first agrees to homo, and to Richard, William and John. &c. It is [...], because it agrees [...], and [...]; so that all real distinction is from the form: and here is the doctrine of differentia with other Lo­gicians, it is nothing but a property: and is here ide­oque hinc a caeteris rebus distinguitur: so that that which is differentia constitutiva in regard of the effect, [Page 114] is differentia divisiva as it makes it differ from other things.

Et forma simul cum reipsa ingeneratur.

Again, here is another property, he saith, forma si­mul▪ &c. here are two things adjoyned to forma, as properties, the first is that forma ingeneratur, the se­cond is that simul cum reipsa ingeneratur. For the first there is much question how the forms come to things, the Philosophers say it is an heavenly nature, and comes by influence of the Sun, Moon and Stars, as if it were a quinta essentia from the elements, and must be extrinsice. Now these influences they know not what they are, if they be qualities of the Sun, Moon and Stars, then they cannot be forms, for the forms give essence, ergo, is no quality: if they be not qualities, then they are substances, what substance are they? If they be of their substance, then they are cor­ruptible, shall it be from their matter? then it should be celestial, for they are not made of the elements, neither can matter make a form: and again, it can­not be of their matter, for then they should be dimi­nished, neither can it be of their forms alone, for one thing cannot make a third distinct from it, ergo, it is not from them, but the Sun, Moon and Stars send down fire, which makes a mistion with the other ele­ments, and so from their forms ariseth the forms of mists, for so mistio is alteratorum unio, ergo, it is made one, and it is evident that the forms of the four ele­ments are all operative, that is, their qualities are in e­very thing. But they hold as it were a meeting of ma­ny Stars together at the conception of things, but as for their work, it is not so to be respected, for we see Esau and Jacob born at the same time, and yet of di­vers manners.

Ingeneratur.

Some are of opinion, that the form is in the thing before the thing be, but now it is educted, and brought out; true it is, it was before in the parts, but they were not membra: so that after that sort it was before, cum reipsa; how can this be whereas the end comes be­tween the form, and the effect?

Answ. This is a propriety, and every propriety is an adjunct to the thing, and the adjunct is after the subject, so that this comes after the form.

Cum re.

As if he should tell us the form lies in the matter after an hidden manner, but this property is before the end; ingenerari is another thing, then the form, ergo, forma is before it, but it is together with the thing.

We have made an entrance into the formal cause, and have heard how that it is after the efficient, and the matter: again whereas every cause gave an esse, the form did that, and more too, the efficient gave a bare being, the matter gave a being and part of his essence, and the form gives his whole essence, and make it that which it is, and that reason of that makes it differ from all other things, and this the common Logicians did consider, when they made differentia to be divisiva, or constitutiva. Now here was their mistaking, that they called it differentia, which doth not arise from the essence of it, but from this proper­ty, that forma simul cum reipso ingeneratur.

The Theory of the form is hardest of all humane learning, for it cannot be seen with our senses, but onely by the effects of it we come to grope at it, be­cause it is principium agens of every thing strengthen­ed by the matter; but the contemplation of that be­longs [Page 116] to natural Philosophy; and thus we may seek the formes of things. When I know that membrum is essentiale toti, and that the matter and form consti­tute the effect, it must needs be, that so many portions of matter, so many portions there are of forma, ergo, the Schools are deceived, which think the form may not be divided, for it may, because it is portionated from the members.

The organical parts of a thing are made of simu­lar parts, and the simular parts are made of the ele­ments, both for matter and form, the elements of the first forms; now if you ask me further what they are, I can onely say they are the works of the first effici­ent incomplete in themselves; so that if you will penitus introspicere, this is the way, and look what ele­ment is most predominant in the mist, so much more the neerer you shall come to see the form ingenera­ted: if we speak of the forms of the elements, they were extrinsice, and were ing [...]nerated in the mat­ter, again, if we shall speak of the soul of man, this is extrinsice infused, but the forms of other things are within, and are educed out of the matter, but there is nothing new in this, for the matter is so too.

Ingeneratur. True thus farre as the form is not made but by composition of the elements, when the forms are not made, but in nature there is that mi­sture, or in Art that composition, that there is a new form: as in a stone by the misture is made one form arising from the forms of the four elements, by their action and passion. So in artificial things, the form is a compound form made of the forms of the parts, and because that thing is now that which it was not, ergo this form must needs be that now, which it was not, ergo, ingeneratum: and the whole work of the [Page 117] efficient whilst he doth dolare, or hew a thing, is no­thing but his preparing of it together with the rest of the matter to make a new thing. Forma is diversly ingenerated, if it be by composition, then it is com­posed, if it be of simples, then it is made by shaving or cutting it.

Now whilst he saith simul at once, it may seem by this that the form and effect are together; he means not together in nature, for the form must be before the effect, because it constitutes the effect, and the constituter is before the thing constituted, therefore how are they simul? he means forma simul ingene­rat: thus, I suppose two go together, and yet one of them goeth before the other, here is a priority, and simul too, he that is before goeth first, the other fol­loweth, yet both move together: and as two hands laid together do move together, and yet one before the other, so is it with the formal cause and effect, the formal cause moves, and the effect also, but the effect follows it in every step, and the final cause follows the form, as the shadow follows the body, and the effect comes last: again, this is a property, ergo, an adjunct, ergo, is after the subject, for the form is an ef­fect before it be a subject: so that the efficient doth as it were make the form, and the effect still follows as we may see in artificial things, so that so far forth as the form is ingenerated, so farre forth the effect is accomplished.

Anima rationalis est forma hominis, &c.

Here our Author doth commorari, and stay upon the doctrine of forma, for it is so deep, and subtil, as that it can hardly be perceived. This example is not true, because anima rationalis may subsist from the bo­dy; now as there can be no matter without a form, so [Page 118] there can be no form without a matter, therefore this example will not serve his turn, yet he brings that he could get; many in Schools have stumbled at this, and have gone about to mend it, but indeed they have marred it.

Some say ratio belongs to Angels, ergo, it is not the proper form of homo, and therefore they have added mortale, and say homo is animal rationale mortale. Now if they joyn mortale to ratio, it is not mortalis. Again, animal ratione mortale doth detract from man, unless we speak of his body.

Et distinguitur a caeteris omnibus naturis.

That is not so, for the Angels though they be ani­mae, and so have not animam rationalem, yet they have rationem; again, doth not the body of man distinguish him from other thing? so I suppose we admit of the Pythagorians metam, [...]. A mans soul in a bird will not make it a man.

Geometricarum figurarum in triangulis, quadrangulis sua forma est.

He brings such examples as he could find, and those whereof greatest question might be made; it hath been a question among Logicians, that this forma is peculiar to substances, not accidents; and hence have made a distinction of forma to be substantialis, or accidentalis: but they are deceived, for Logick is a general Art, and every thing that is made hath cau­ses, ergo, may be defined, ergo, hath matter and form; for otherwise we could not have a perfect definition in Grammar, Rhetorick and Arithmetick, or in any other Arts that have accidents for their subjects: ergo, accidents behold a form as well as an efficient, ergo, he saith in Geometry, take a triangle, it consists of three lines with three angles, which by their unition [Page 119] in their angles, make up one form, as well as one matter.

Phisicarum rerum, coeli, terrae, arborum, piscium sua forma est.

He doth commorari here long for two causes: first, in respect the form is deep, and needs illustration. Secondly to confute other Logicians, that say acci­dents have no forms, unde praecipua rerum ut natura est, &c. if it be causa per quam res est id quod est, then it is praecipua rerum natura. Nature proper is res nata, that is, that springeth principiis, that is matter and form: so that the whole nature consisteth of them, and this is the proper signification of it, afterward it comes to signifie the principia themselves; hence is materia and forma called natu [...]ae: so that in natural Philosophy, when you read of nature, they tell you commonly some tale of materia or forma: then a­gain by a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject, it signifieth the qualities natural in things: all this shews forma to be praecipua rei natura. Praecipua, first because it makes the thing to be id quod est, so doth not the matter: again, forma, why it is principi­um actus, from whence the qualities principally arise: for as the Philosophers teach, though not truly in e­very point, materia is principium passionis: for­ma actionis, and actio is better than passio, ergo the form more excellent than the matter, but both matter and form do agere, for they are causa; yet the forms be­gin, and the matter is but the sustentation of it, and the forms act is the stronger by the matter, not onely as it acts internally, but when it acts upon external things by resistance by the way. Now as it hath chief interest in esseficating the effect, so it is praecipua rei natura, so also there is of it praecipua rei explicatio, si possit inveniri.

Si possist inveniri.

He saith it neither can be found out, nor that it cannot be found out. Si possit inveniri: sure it is findable; I prove it thus, it is lyable to Logick, if it be objected to the eye, then the eye may see it; it may but hardly be found, because it doth not descry it self to the outward senses by qualities, as bodies do: a­gain, the form in nature is so subtil that we can hard­ly find it, but see as it were the shadow of it, ergo di­vers have thought the forms of things to be divine. Some have gone so farre as to think them to be influ­ences: but subtile it is indeed, and harder to find out, then either the efficient, or matter, ergo we com­monly call that the matter, which contains the form too, because it is rather seen as it hath a material cause, than as it hath a formal.

Ʋt in artificiofis rebus facilius occurrit.

That is the reason why he that makes natures is more cunning than any man can trace his wisdom: as we may see in the elements, ergo no man can make a thing in nature; man may further nature, but he cannot make any thing: again, the parts are so fine in the mixture of things, as it is beyond the acies of mans eye to see them.

In artificiosis rebus facilius occurrit.

Why? because artificial things are the works of men, and one man may trace another, though every man cannot.

Caesar. 7. Muri autem omnes Gallici, &c.

As for example, in artificial things this very de­scription will declare how hard a thing it is to find out the form, but we use to point at it by the matter, and by the position of it. There stood great beams all along, two foot asunder, put into the earth, & the [Page 121] distances between them were stuffed with great stones: when these were so fastned, then there was a new or­der begun, where they laid the beams against those stones that were laid before, and filled likewise the distances with stones which were against the first lay of beams: but what hath he told us now? why saith he, I am a French-man, and I will tell you the form of a French wall, where if you do but look at the forms of every part, and of them, you shall see a composed form: so that the Logician doth not look at the outward face of a thing, but at the inward es­sence: here he is fain to deliver the form by many other arguments, and indeed it is a description of forma.

Est in secessu longo locus: ensula portum, &c.

Here he hath by the position of the parts of the haven, told us the form of it.

De fine.

Finis est causa cujus gratia res est.

VVE have gone through the esse of a thing, we have but heard of three, when the fourth comes, that makes up the perfection of the thing, namely finis.

Finis, for the name, it is borrowed from Geome­try; for that that is terminus there, is here called fi­nis, and it is brought hither to signifie that final cause that serveth to make up the effect: so that it is [...], if we keep the proportion of the esses, but it is not [Page 122] the last part and member thereof, as they make [...] the last member of some whole, as Method is the last member of Logick. Finis is the [...] of the esse of a thing, not of the members of it. Now it is called finis, because it limits the thing for his [...], and for his essence, and it is the last thing that limits it, er­go it is called finis.

Est causa.

Because with force thereof the thing is, and the end though it do not enter into the essence of the ef­fect, by it own essence yet by it vertue it doth efficere, as doth the efficient.

Cujus gratia.

Therefore the final cause is that that graceth the effect, and thence hath the thing his commendation, cujus gratia, for whose grace; for gratia here signifi­eth not onely for whose sake, but for whose grace, as if the final cause were that which doth grace the ef­fect, and so indeed it doth. For as bonum quo commu­nius, eo melius, so communior finis hath more grace than finis specialio [...]: for that cause, that which is next the chiefest end is more noble and excellent, then that which is more remote. Hence man is more ex­cellent than any other creature, because he is made immediately for God. So then the end graceth it evermore: and the more excellent the end is, the more excellent is that effect. This then is the esse that the final cause doth give to the effect, namely, that which is good for that effect: so that the good­ness of a thing is that vis in the effect, that it hath from the end: As in a knife, the efficient may be a slave, the matter likewise naught, the form though that be something, yet were it not for the end, nei­ther the efficient, matter or form would move, ergo [Page 123] the final cause is said to be the happiness of the thing: so that a thing is not to be accounted happy till it be serviceable to that end for which it was made. A garment well made as touching the skill of the ef­ficient, and of good stuffe for the matter, and fit for a garment, and so of a good form, yet not fitting him for whom it was made, it wanteth his end, or happi­ness, and so is not perfect: Again, this shews the dif­ference between the formal cause and the end, for the form may be as we see, and not the end. Again, we know there are many things that have not their per­fection but by growth, and yet have all the causes, yet notwithstanding the end presently follows after the form: so man was made by God; here God is the efficient, earth the matter, reason the form; yet here is not his end, namely, fitness to serve God. And thus we have heard the doctrine of the causes, which are the foundations whereon the effect is builded.

Physicis rebus finis homo propositas est; homini Deus.

Of natural things man is the end: the grace of man is God, and God makes him good, not as an efficient, but as an end.

Omnium artium est aliquod summom bonum & finis extremus.

That is that end which they reach unto, but that is not the summum bonum of all things: for Logicks end is bene disserere, Grammars bene loqui, &c. these are the furthest ends of Logick and Grammar, but not the furthest end of all: they are indeed the proper end of them, but not the summum bonum: so that he means by summum bonum the outmost or farthest end of them, and the end of Logick lies in the precepts of it, as they act bene disserere. This is the difference [Page 124] between the end and the effect. A house is made to dwell in, though it never be dwelt in: so for a gar­ment, to be worn is one thing, and to be fit to wear another. So if I go forth to speak with one, and he be gone, yet I obtain my end: they commonly say he was frustrate of his end, but not frustrate of finis, qua­tenus finis, but quatenus effectum.

Juno primo Aeneidos connubii finem assumit, cum Aeolo Deiopeiam pollicetur, solatii scilicet prolisque gratia.

Sunt mihi his septem praestanti corpore Nymphae, &c.

Here Juno perswades Eolus to let his wind out, and she would give him one of her Nymphs, which she presseth upon him by final causes: first, that she may spend all her years with him: and second­ly, that she may make him the father of a fair off­spring.

In defensione Ligarii Cicero Tuberonem accusa­torem urget, &c.

Et certe (ait) contra ipsum Caesarem est congres­sus armatus, &c. As if he should say, Tubero thou hadst thy sword drawn at the battle of Pharsalio, thou didst strike his side: mark the variety of the phrases, and so of the ends. What meant thy sword? what was thy mind? here was the propositum. What meantst thou to have done? even to have killed Cae­sar. So that the final cause is not accidental to the thing, but even substantial; and therefore we have it so often in the definition of Arts used for the form, and that for this reason: because it is the next ar­gument to it, and presupposeth the form: so that this is the use of the final cause in the definition of Arts.

As Dialectica est ars bene disserendi, here bene disse­rere [Page 125] is the end, and it is as if he should say, Dialectica hath such a soul, as that it is able to perform and exe­cute this or that thing, for which it was made. So [...] is the end of all Arts: I but what [...] in general, why, [...], and [...] is the effect of all Arts?

Answ. But as every thing is [...], so [...] is the end of it ergo, if a man will do any Logicum o­pus, he must [...]: and thus we have heard the doctrine of the causes.

De effectis. Effectum est, quod e causis existit, siveigitur gignatur, sive, &c.

NOw we come to see a thing made up: it is worth the consideration, to see how we begin at the farthest thing, and at the first. There are four esses distinct, which we must look at distinctly and order­ly, if we [...]ill see things a [...]ight. First the efficients, then the matters, &c. now then let us see effectum. Effectum: for the name it seems to be nominated onely from the efficient; for it comes of efficior, which comes o [...] efficio, whence efficiens comes: and howbeit it might be denominated materiatum, for­matum, or finitum, yet he rather names it of the effi­cient; but we are to understand, that it hath re­ference to all the causes, even materiatum, formatum, finitum.

Object. Why should there not be as many several kinds of effects, as there are of causes?

Answ. Because no one cause alone can make an effect, for it is existent from them all: the causes are distinct in nature, and their forces are their own, ergo their doctrine must be distinct: but because essectum must be made of the composition of the four esses, er­go it can be but one: so that I cannot say, effectum efficientis, effectum materiae, effectum formae, or effectum finis, ergo we must see effectum alone in one lump, as it is in nature. Now because it hath all the esses of the causes, ergo good reason that the efficient that is [...], and worketh generally quite through with every other cause, matter, form and end, should have the effect denominated from it, so that this child brought forth by the four causes is denominated from the efficient.

Est.

All things are effects, but God alone, ergo, effectum est: therefore whereas all things are made lyable to our eye of reason, it is requisite that as we see the causes that make up the thing, so the effect, which is a quinta essentia arising from them.

Quod.

He means argumentum absolute consentancum: now we see plainly how the causes are absolutely agree­ing to the effect, but how is the effect absolutely a-agreeing to them? yes, for if the effect be from them, it will vouchsafe to acknowledge it self to be from them: and we see in nature, that if an effect be, then all the causes are, & contra: again, that we may see it plainly, if we take away the efficient, the effect will be imperfect: so put the effect, and we put the matter and form substantially, and the esses of the other: so [Page 127] take away the effect, and you take away them. Now if the efficient be rotten, yet it is an effect, as this Lo­gick is Ramus his effect, though he be dead and rot­ten: for here we respect not time, but the esse. Again, he puts efficiens generally a qua, materia ex qua, for­ma per quam, finis cujus gratia, and here effectum quod: the reason why he used quod so often, is, be­cause he would tell us that Logick is general to every thing.

Existit.

Esse is of any one cause; existere is a compound of them all, not that existere hath respect of time and place, as some teach: true it is, time and place attend every thing, when it doth existere, but they are not of the esse of the thing, but are onely complemental; est is a causa qualibet, existere ex omnibus, subsi­stere ex modo quodam consentaneis. Existere comes of ex and sto, now it doth stand upon its feet, and doth estare out from all the causes, being a fift thing from them.

Ecausis.

Here e is as much as a, ex per, and gratia: ecausis, that is, ab efficiente, ex materi, per formam, gratia finis. Causis not causa, and therefore it is that all four cau­ses must absolutely concurre, or else the thing cannot existere, as the first matter did not: ergo, if Angels do existere, they must have all the causes: so the soules of men after they be out of the body, they can­not per se existere without they have all the causes, for if any one cause be wanting, they will be incom­plete.

Sive igitur gignatur, sive corrumpatur.

Ramus doth here commorari upon this doctrine of effectum, because the common Aristotelians referre [Page 128] the doctrine of motus not to Logick but to natural Philosophy: but Ramus teacheth it here in Logick in the doctrine of effectum, sive igitur gignatur, sive corrumpatur, &c, whether it be made or corrupted, sive modo quodam moveatur, quidlibet, that is, whether it be augmented, or diminished, &c. generatio, and corruptio are substantial motus, augmentatio, and dimi­nutio quantitatis, alteratio, and loci mutatio qualitatis: and all these are effects: then again, whereas the Ari­stotelians teach, that distruens causa, is not causa, Ra­mus teacheth that it is, for whether a man doth [...] or [...] by the same rule he doth both, ergo, both of them are motus of his act to the opus, ergo, causa di­struens is a motus, and a cause, as well as opus destru­ctum is an effect, and privations though they be pri­vations in respect of their habits, yet they are effects in respect of their causes, ergo, they are causes both alike: they teach as if a man had done nothing when he did sin, whereas he spoiles the Image of God in him: ergo, whilst they are more nice than wise they become foolish. If the Lord should bring to nothing that which he hath done, it would be his effect, at least the corruption of nothing. Now the effect is double, motus, and res motu facta, every thing is made motu, God onely is sine motu, and doth not move when he works, for else he should not be primus movens, but motus: but if we resolve all things, it must needs bring us in the end to that which is immoveable: for so Aristotle found out most things by motus: now again, there are those that sever motus, and res motu facta, as the Aristotelians, which makes Ramus to commorari; they say, somethings rest motu onely without a res motu facta, but that is not so, for there is nothing that God hath made, which doth movere, but [Page 129] there is a res motu facta of that motus: they conceit that some Arts motion hath no opus post se relictum, as when one playes on the Virginals, they say there is nothing left behind.

Answ. What care I for that, Logick looks not to that, but as there is playing, so there is something playd, which is res motu facta: and as there is wri­ting, so there is something written. These, namely motus, and res motu facta, are never distinct asunder one without another, but onely in that the one is not the other.

Hujus loci sunt laudes, & vituperationes.

As if Ramus should say, if you would commend a thing indeed, let it be from the effect, we may com­mend one from his fair building, but that is beggerly, as Tully saith, or a woman for her beauty, but this is childish, for the true commendation is from the effect: so man is here to be dispraysed from his sin: so the Lord is to be praised from his effects.

Quarum pleni sunt libri sacri, & prophani.

Why in Scripture? because Divinity stands in acti­on, not in Theorie, and therefore we have them so of­ten commended that have done well, & contra.

Aenei. 6. facta variorum populorum, &c. Excudent alii spirantia mollius aera, &c.

The Romans are commended from their effects; first, regere imperio populos: again parcere subjectis, &c. these are compared with the acts of other peo­ple, and they are made minora to the effects of the Ro­mans. Excudent alii spirantia, &c. As the Corin­thians will carve you any thing. Orabant causas meli­us, as the Orators among the Athenians, Coelique meatus, &c. as the Caldeans and Egyptians will do.

Huc dicta scriptaque referenda sunt.

That is, dicta and scripta in respect of Authors, but if we look at the things written, or spoken, so they are testimonies. So Pericles and Hortensius are famous for speaking well. Demosthenes and Tully for both.

Ad hunc locum referuntur consilia, & delibe­rationes, &c.

Counsels and deliberations are effects of them that consult, and deliberate, etiam si omnio ad exitum per­ductae non fuerint. And this appears evidently in that Parmenio and Philotas were put to death, being suspected of conspiracie against Alexander. So also were Lentulus, and Cethegus, and other companions of Cataline.

Sunt etiam effecta virtutum & vitiorum. Quid non ebrietas designat? operta recludit, &c.

Now it is a common conceit that nothing is an ef­fect, but that which is substantial, but accidental cau­ses as I may call them, may have accidental effects. As drunkenness first operta recludit, secondly, in praelia trudit inermem, it makes a man go to warre leaving his weapons behind him, it will make a man think himself as good as my Lord Maior. Faecundae calices, here are cups for drink, and drink for drunkenness, quem non fecere desertum, that is a dizard, he meanes a Logician, contracta quem non, &c. it makes a man in poverty a brave minded fellow.

De subjecto. Argumentum modo quodam consentaneum succedit ut subjectum & adjunctum, &c.

VVE have heard of the essential parts of a thing, and so have seen the thing in his essence, and we see how Logick doth direct the eye of our reason, to see the most inmost thing in it. Now we come to see the complemental things, that belong to a thing, not belonging or concurring to the existere of it: so that the causes were as it were the simular parts, these are as it were the blood in the sinews, &c. to make them full, and complemental: Modo quo­dam consentaneum, as if he should say, the causes were required ad esse rei, these are but required ad bene esse rei: so that the causes looked at the inside of the thing, and now we come to look at the outside of it.

Argumentum modo quodam, &c.

This is an imperfect transition containing onely the proposition of that which follows, modo quodam: as if he should say, if they be there it is well, notwith­standing if they be wanting it is no prejudice to the essence of the thing, for they are but circumstances, whereas argumenta absolute consentanea are penetralia; again, argumenta modo quodam consentanea come after the being of the thing, for accidens inseparabilis, as ho­mini risus aequo hinnitus, are but acts of the soul work­ing in the bodies of their subjects,

Succedit.

Why? because they are after those that agree ab­solutely: we have heard that the effect ariseth from all the causes, and cannot existere without them, ergo, it must be a thing of necessity before it be subject, or adjunct, or before it can have a subject, or adjunct, for that which hath adjuncts is a subject, & contra.

Ʋt subjectum, & adjunctum.

A subject is by nature before an adjunct, and a thing is first a subject before it be an adjunct, and there must be a thing subjected to an adjunct before a thing can be adjoyned to a subject: again the sub­ject is more general than the adjunct, not that there are more subjects to one adjunct, for it is quite con­trary, for there may be twenty adjuncts to one sub­ject, but I mean it is more in use, and argues more strongly than the adjunct doth, As when I say the King is there, ergo, the Guard is there, is stronger than to say the Guard is there, therefore the King, and here we see as before, priority and posteriority. Now our reason is to behold things according to the course of God, for whatsoever we see it was first in God, and when he hath made a thing then it is a subject, and it is capable of adjuncts before it have them, ergo, sub­jectum is before adjunctum in the practise of God, and also of man. Now subjectum as it is first, so must it be taught first. The name subjectum tels me it is a thing laid undermost in regard of the adjunct, and it doth support it, and yet it is not of the essence of it, but onely laid under it, and adjunctum is to ride on it as a pack-horse: now as the efficient was most inmost, then the other three, or the ef­fect, so is subjectum here, ergo it is by nature before adjunctum.

Subjectum est cui aliquid adjungitur.

He omits the genus, and the reason why he doth not teach the genus namely argumentum modo quodam consentaneum is because it is a definition it self, as absolute consentaneum was, for there is no definition of a definition, but if he had defined it, he had brought a definition to a definition, he wanted a word to name the thing, and therefore gives me a description instead thereof, cui aliquid, this aliquid is that ens we heard of in Art; so that this aliquid is any thing, not simply, but quatenus it hath an affection to be joyned. A thing being an effect, is fit to receive outward things; and subjectum is defined by his relate ad­junctum, for it is cui aliquid adjungitur, and what­soever is subjected to another thing is his ad­junct, as whiteness is an adjunct to a wall that is white.

Adjungitur.

Adjungitur, so that subjectum is the argument, and adjunctum the aliquid, adjungitur, so that here he tels us that the adjunct is adjoyned to the subject, th at which is must needs be after the thing to which it is tyed, ergo, subjectum is before adjunctum, he saith it is but adjunctio, not entring into the essence of it, but that it may be taken away: so that as subjectum doth intimate a thing laid underneath, so the adjunct doth intimate a thing laid upon it: so that the ad­junct doth depend, and hang upon the subject as up­on a hook; or as one thing tyed to another: thus have we heard the subjects argument to be so, as if his adjunct be removed from him, or he from his ad­junct, yet he stands firm in his causes. Now for the manners.

Anima est subjectum scientiae, ignore antiae, virtutis, vitii, quia haec praeter essentiam accedunt.

Anima is a spiritual thing, so are these adjuncts, sci­entia, ignorantia, &c. of the same kind too, now these take hold one of another quodam modo, ergo, if they be removed, yet the soul remains intire, ergo, it is but sub­jectum of them, scientia, &c. Now are but adjoyned to it, the anima his esse is not of their esse, aut contra. Some are of opinion (as Scaliger) that the Angels and mens souls esse, and agere, are the same, but then their actus should be perpetual: again then they have no adjuncts, then no causes, then God, ergo, they have their qualities. Again, it is a most sound, and sure argument that they are creatures, not God, be­cause they are finite, ergo, have causes, ergo, are effects, ergo, have adjuncts.

Object. But how are these joyned to the soul? it hath two faculties; reason and will, now the facul­ties of the understanding are the intellectual vertues, when it can promptly, and readily perform its act, as when it is prompt and ready in inventing, then it is inteligentia, when it is prompt in seeking out truths, then it is sci [...]ntia, when it is ready in discoursing, then it is sapientia, &c. so that these intellectual vertues are habits of the faculty of reason, and lye in the promptness of its act: so by vertues he meanes moral ve [...]tue, not intellectual, and that is of the will. For when the will can promptly perform the act of boun­tifulness, or justice, then it is in like sort liberality, or justice, and so for the rest, and the contrary makes [...] ergo, these are but adjuncts, quia praeter essentiam accident, that is, these come over, and above the es­s [...]ce. The soul is tanquam tabula abrasa, and these vertues come afterward.

Corpus sanitatis, morbi, roboris, infirmitatis; pul­chritudinis, deformitatis.

The soul had his spiritual adjuncts, the body hath his proper adjuncts also, and this definition of his teacheth us to look at the proper adjuncts of things. So sanitas is a proper adjunct to the body, for there ariseth an [...] and a [...] and thence comes sanitas, and morbus: robur ariseth principally from the bones and sinews, beauty ariseth from the fresh­ness of blood, and the analogie, and proportion of the parts, for if there be comely visage, and not blood, it is not beauty, we call it good favour, but not fair, but here it is opposed to deformity, and contains not onely well favour, which stands in the symmetry of the parts one to another, which belongs to Physick, but colour which belongs to blood.

Homo, subjectum est divitiarum, paupertatis, honoris, infamiae, vestitus, comitatus.

Here homo hath his adjuncts general both to soul, and body; now here we see that subjects and ad­juncts are not as the common Schools take them namely, onely substances to be subjects, and acci­dents adjuncts: for accidents may be subjects, & contra, ergo, that distribution of ens into substantia, and accidens, will not follow in any Art, but here, and they a [...]e special kinds of subjects and ad­juncts.

Locus est subjectum rei locatae.

Locus is a modus of subjectum, the Schools both ancient and of latter time have maintained locus to belong to natural Philosophy, because (say they) it ariseth from every thing in nature. Now first true it is, that there is nothing, but it is res naturalis, even reason, speech, quantity, &c. are res naturales, [Page 136] and it doth not therefore follow because it is res na­turalis, ergo it belongs to nature, for it is a meer af­fection, and it is taken away, if we take away the lo­catum: and as causa may be no causa, effectum no effectum; so may locus be no locus. Again, cannot things in Art be in place, as well as things in nature? are not Angels finite and terminated? and locus, if we take it properly, is nothing but subjectum rei loca­tae: as in causa there was the thing causa, as it cau­seth: so there is locus as there is the thing receiving: as when I say such a one is in my chamber: here I consider my chamber not as it is in his building, but as it is receiving him. Again, if it should not be in Logick, it should rather be in Geometry than in Na­ture, for limitation of place is next and immediately from the limitation of quantity, and there we hear of locus, as there is repletio loci: locus here is put for the space of that place, by a metonimy of subject for the adjunct.

Est subjectum.

Here that which we heard of in adjuncts is res loca­ta: because it doth apply that special kind of ad­junct that answers to this subject locus. Now it is not essential to the thing, ergo is but complemental: again, that which is now in one place may remove to another place, ergo is not absolutely consenting to the thing: and thus we see it must needs belong to Lo­gick, as being but in respect: they say onely corpus is in loco descriptive, and not spirits, they are but in ubi, or in loco designatione: but what is this but a rule of Geometry? where we hear of completio loci by corpus: and therefore Aristotle brings locus to quantity. Then again they question whether the space that contains a thing be locus or no.

Answ. Space belongs to nature, and is nothing but the measure that doth fill the place, and is nothing but that quadrangula sex complent locum, or a pint will receive a pint: and therefore to receive is to measure the space. I confess you may name it in Na­ture, but not define it.

Sic Philosophi divinis entibus, licet parte, & magnitu­dine carentibus attribuunt locum.

So the Philosophers give place to the intelligences, whereas he making them to move the heavens, saith they are on the superficies of them.

Licet parte, & magnitudine carentibus.

Here he speaks according to the common conceits in Schools, but I marvel how he or any other can say so. Scaliger saith, they are in divine predicament of quantity, but not in this gross predicament of quan­tity, and they have a figure. In what figure were Angels first created? An. In what figure was water first made? they can take any figure as water can; but I think they were first made in the figure of roundness. So Aristotle saith they were made as puncta. So is fire round, for that is figura capacissima, ergo, perfectissima. I have thought also that the Ark was made for all the world like a man, and there was the proportion of length proportionable to a mans breadth, and the heighth proportionable to a mans thickness. Now for the wanting of parts it is not so; for Angels may be divided, though their parts be si­mular: so are the elements parts; and as some write, the wicked spirits may be struck, and so the Sun light; but it will too quickly return into it self: and as the light may be divided, so may they. And whereas they say, anima is tota in toto, and tota in qualibet par­te, they wrong God, and the creature, for what is the [Page 138] reason? God can have no parts, ergo no causes; other things whatsoever must needs have causes, ergo must have membra, ergo we cannot say they are all in every part. Yes, the reasonable soul is in my little finger? Content, but is that very portion of it that is in my head also in my little finger? There is a dis­continuance, and the same thing should be here, and not there, which is flat contradiction: but God is not in this or that finger, but also between them. The Papists absurdity appears notably in this, in that they will have Christs body to be really in the Sacrament in the bread, and in heaven also, and yet not in the air, but make a discontinuance: ergo it is in the bread, and not in the bread; in heaven, and not in heaven; for if it is in heaven, there it is shut up, and so in the bread.

Sic Geometrae locum, locique differentias in rebus geometricis.

Here he appoints several places to several things, and here locus is but subjectum, and they adjuncta.

Sensilia sensuum, & res virtutibus, ac vitiis propo­sitae, subjecta vitiorum, & virtutum hoc modo nominantur.

Here are objecta, as the common Schools teach, because the sense is cast upon them: so vertues and vices; though they have their subjects themselves in one kind, yet here they are adjuncts, rebus virtutibus ac vitiis propositae. Now it is a fallace of non subje­ctum, when we give that to subjectum which is not subjectum. As Tully jested with Piso his little son, and said, who hath hanged my son to yonder sword?

Ejusmodi subjecto Cicero 2. Agrar. disputat, inter Campanos nullam contentionem esse, qui nullus sit honor.

Non gloriae cupiditate (ait) afferebantur, &c.

Honour is the subject of ambition; the Campani had no honour among them, ergo no ambition: where there is no honour there is no ambition, but inter Campanos there is no honour, ergo no ambition. Here the proposition contains the subject, and adjunct, and by removing the subject, he removes the ad­junct.

Eodem argumento a Propertio dictum est.

Navita de ventis, de tauris narrat Arator, &c.

The Mariner he tels of the winds whereabout he is occupied, and vulnera are adjuncts to Souldi­ers; yet here as he talks of them he is adjunctum: and thus have we heard of the first complement of a thing, namely, to be a subject, or to have a subject.

De adjuncto.

Adjunctum est, cui aliquid subjicitur: quod argu­mentum etsi subjecto est levius, attamen est copio­sius & frequentius.

NOw we come to adjuncts, which are after sub­jectum, and because subjectum and adjunctum have divers natures, ergo they must be taught distinct­ly, and in distinct Chapters; now therefore we come to adjunctum, which is the outmost thing, and it is [Page 140] called adjunctum, because it is adjoyned to the thing, and it is put to another thing after it hath its being. Now there is nothing in the world, but may be a cause, an effect, a subject or adjunct; and therefore Logick is general of [...]: but in that he tels us, that it is but adjoyned, he tels us that it doth agree but quodam modo, that is, conditionally; but many ad­juncts be removed from their subjects, sith their cau­ses are in them.

Answ. Sure there may be an alteration of them by the hinderance of the act of the form upon the matter, or the act externally. So the Adamant stone if we put but the juyce of garlick upon it, it will not draw iron unto it. Again, the causes may be altered in the subject, ergo the adjunct may be removed, ergo it is but argumentum modo quodam consentaneum, and not absolute requisitum.

Cui.

Because any thing whatsoever may have the respect of an adjunct, as any thing may be a cause.

Aliquid.

That is, that that is propounded, or that which we are to argue, or that that is argued, so that that which the adjunct is adjoyned to, is subjectum.

subjicitur.

Adjunctum doth presently tell me, that there is some thing cui aliquid adjungitur: he rather sayes subjicitur than adjungitur, because adjunctum hath re­ference to subjectum, and it is better to define them from the relation between them, then a comparatis; because relats are mutual causes one of another. Now here he shews that the adjunct is that that is builded upon the subject: and as the subject did presuppose a thing already made, but must support another thing; [Page 141] so adjunctum tels me it is a thing already made, but must lye upon the subject: subjectum signifies a sup­porter, or a suppository as it were: adjunctum, that is more common than subjectum, and subjectum lyes alway under; but adjunctum it may either lye over, or under, or be tacked to either side, yet it will fall off, unless it be nailed, or adjoyned to the subject. Now that which tacks it to the subject is that affection which it hath to subjectum, every thing will not be an adjunct to every thing, nor every thing a subject to every thing. Salomon saith, if we bray a fool in a morter, as wheat is brayed, he will not be wise: the reason is, for that his spirits are so dry, dull and earthy. Now wisdom hath so fine a hand, as that she cannot take hold of such hard things, but they will hurt it, so that it cannot be subjectum or adjunctum to any thing: and this shews that Logick is in the things in nature, and not in mans brain onely. So this rule wils us to look how subjectum is able to support the adjunct, and when he sees how God hath done them for him, to use them to his turn. Again, this rule is of great use to see how things are tacked together in nature, so as the one being taken away the other will remain entire: then again, though the adjunct in nature can­not be severed from the subject, yet by my eye of Lo­gick I can sever them.

Quod argumento etsi sub: est levius, attamen est copio­sius, & frequentius.

Our Author doth commorari, and tels us with very good reason, that the adjunct is more light to press the subject than contra.

Object. But this might have been before, if it be copiosius and frequentius; now he teacheth argu­ments according to their more strong manner of ar­guing; [Page 142] and subjectus is fortius, for because the cau­ses of the adjuncts are in the subject, you may not therefore easily remove the subject, but you will de­stroy the adjunct, nor contra: yet some adjuncts may be taken away; and yet take away any adjunct, and there will be some imperfection in the thing: so that adjunctum will be levius, if we weigh them in a pair of ballance: which appears many wayes: as if Mr. Fanshaw be at London, his servants are there: this is more strong arguing than to say contra. Sub­jectum est fortius, because it is by nature before, and the adjunct is eatenus adjunctum, as it lies on the subject.

Attamen est copiosius, & frequentius.

For one adjunct can have but possibly one sub­ject, but one subject may have an hundred adjuncts: now such a kind of copiousness or frequentity, doth not make the adjunct more general than the subject, in respect the subject is of more strength for the su­stentation of the adjunct, than contra: and as it is more copius, so frequentius, that is, more often in com­mon use, because it is of all arguments most familiar to men, even men unlearned: for the inmost thing is the efficient, then the matter, then the form, then the end, then the effect, then the subject, and lastly the adjunct, ergo because it is so plain as that a plain man may see, ergo it is frequentius.

Itaque de ejusmodi signis ait Ovidius 2. de remedio.

He illustrates this by Ovids testimony, which said as much, Forsitan haec aliquis, &c. meaning of signes: Sunt parva, because these are common qualities, which may be in divers things: so that one will not argue so strongly: multa juvant, that is where there is a concourse of many together, [Page 143] there is as it were a description, which argues strong­ly.

Animi corporis que & totius hominis bona, & mala, quae dicuntur adjuncta sunt animi; corporis, hominis.

As he hath shewed before, anima, &c. to be sub­jects, so here he shews virtus, vitium, &c. to be ad­juncts: now he takes them bona & mala, because there are tria genera honorum, namely, of the soul, of the body, and of man, so contra, tria genera ma­lorum.

Denique quic quam ulli subjecto extrinsecus accidit adjunctum ejus est.

Again, here is another modus of adjunctum quic­quid extrinsecus accidit, that is, comes unto it not as causes, effects, or subjects, but as it were adjoyned to it accidentally, ergo he saith extrinsecus: for it was not our Authors mind that qualities were from with­in, though of necessity they must be.

Ʋt [...]utem locus est in subjectis, sic tempus est in adjunctis.

That locus we heard of before was subjectum, and because it was a general affection, ergo it belongeth to Logick, and it was nothing but the application of a continet, to a contained: so time is nothing but the application of one thing to another thing; as when I say he came on munday, or at three of the clock, that is not time, but the adjunct of time: and here is the application of the course of primum mobile, or of the Clock to his act: it is duratio, the meting of a thing. Time may well be compared to a line; and as fluxus punctum is linea, so fluxus nunc is tempus: he went in the turning of a hand, that is, whilest one might have turned his hand: so that I measure it by the du­rance, [Page 144] not by his length, or Geometry.

Rei.

For Logick is rei: and as causa is res, so tempus est res, or duratiorei, that is of the subject praesens, praete­rita, & futura: here he doth distribute this time, to shew that this distribution of time belongeth to Logick, and not to any other Art. Much descanting there is about time among other Logicians, which teach that it hath a double respect, one to the thing measured, and so it is properly time, another to the thing measuring, and that is not time, but as one is measuring it: now for the logical notion of time it is all one whether it be active or passive, and it is one and the same thing diversly respected, and be­cause active and passive go alwayes together, ergo, the time must needs be general to both; praeterita, praesens and futura. So for things that are subject to our Logick are divided into past, present and to come, for onely God is not subject to time, because he is eternal, ergo is omne non esse ante post, neither can we say be is now if we respect time, for what should measure him, should primum mobile, or day and night? no, so that though he be at all times according to our Logick, yet he is with out respect of time at all times, for time is not eternal, ergo not omne non esse ante post. And Grammar, which is the garment of Logick, doth speak by the verb of time past, present, and to come; now we give it in Grammar to verbs, not but that it may be given to every thing, as well as to actions, and passions, but that we deliver it actively or pas­sively.

Again, primum mobile which God hath made a com­mon globe to all the world, and is measured accord­ing to praeterita, praesens, and futura, ergo, time is in [Page 145] every thing, and Angels, and mens souls are without respect of primum mobile, and day and night: be­cause they are beyond them, but they are not with­out duration passive, because they were made crea­tures by God: so that though their tempus be called avum, yet is it this tempus.

Object. May praeteritum being past be said to be? no, if we respect pr [...]sens, for they are as we see here distinct things, but if we respect the thing, it is, yet not in time, but in its essence: how in it essence? not as it doth existere in rerum natura, but as it is in a rule, that is external: so that though Socrates now be not, yet this axiome Socrates est homo is now, and will be to the worlds end: so praeteritum, praesens, and futurum all of them are, for we do not respect the adsignification of time, but look at the argument as it is a being: so that time future is a true thing, though the time be not yet come: and that duratio past, present, and to come are, because the thing still is: so that time is an adjunct. But here as lo­cus must be a thing with that affection of recei­ving, so time must be a thing with this affection of measuring,

Omninoque qualitates subjectis praeter causas adiunctae, &c.

Again, another modus of adiunctum is called qua­litates, which is adjoyned to this, or that, not being causes, here comes in their predicament of qualitas, and qualitas is no genus of any thing, ergo, that di­stinction of qualitas to be naturalis, or moralis is not at all, but a special use of a thing that is taught in a general Art, for qualitas is but a logical term, and as adiunctum is genus to them, so is qualitas. Every ex­ample is infima species in Logick: so that calor is [Page 146] an adjunct to fire, and when I have said so, I have con­sidered the logical respect, and no more.

Praeter causas.

We have heard that there can be nothing but must have causes: and so the existere of a thing is from the esses that the causes give, and then the adjuncts come over, and above the thing. Now qualities are of two sorts, proper and common, these are but speci­al modi of these qualities: they may be proper, be­cause they argue at proper, common because they ar­gue at common, or at random, as we say. Now what­soever hath affection to argue, that belongs to Lo­gick, ergo, these, because they have affection to argue, rather as modi, that as adiuncts; as modi efficientis before. So therefore they are distingushed thus So risus doth argue homo, not so much in regard of his adiunctity as of its property. Now qualitates propriae have these properties with them, conveniunt they come together with the subiect, and are [...] with the whole, and afterward with the parts, ergo, he sa [...]th well conveniunt.

Omni.

This is somewhat hard, for omni non dicitur de uno, aut de duobus, but tria simul omnia, that is, three will make an omne; and our Author teacheth in iudge­ment, that a special axiom is quando consequens non om­ni, and there it may be of one or two: but here it must be taken more general for one or two, &c. but because the Schools thought properties convenire om­ni speciei onely, and thought that individua had no properties, as they also thought that forma was onely speciebus, and individua were distinguished accidenti­bus. But our Logick teacheth that every thing hath a form, and therefore hath properties, for commonly [Page 147] properties arise from the form, ergo, he saith, con­veniunt omni, whether it be omni speciei, omni indi­viduo.

Soli.

Soli shuts out all others, else it is not a property.

Semper.

So that if they agree omni, and non soli, or soli and non omni, or omni and soli, sed non semper, semper sed non omni & soli, they are no properties, ergo, a proper­ty doth argue with this vertue, that it argues omni, so­li, and semper; and so it is meet, because they will come into Art, and will make a rule [...], for this it is, every Art ought to deliver the causes, qua­lities, and act of a thing; for so there is in nature first the thing, then the qualities, or faculties, then the act which points out the [...]: so that if one would make an Art of homo that part of natural Philosophy, he must speak of risus, because he doth some thing in nature by vertue of that quality: so heat, and cold, first agree to elementum calidum and frigidum, and af­terwards to the species, not by the immediate acts of their forms upon their matter, but by the common acts of fire, and agree to produce heat, and water and earth to produce cold.

Ʋt homini risus aequo hinnitus, cani latratus, &c.

He meanes the faculty, not the act: so neighing to a Horse: every beast hath his peculiar voyce though we cannot discern it so well. Common adiuncts are such as agree to that which is not [...], but is first in the parts, and then in the general, as learning first agrees to Socrates, Plato, &c. and then to man, and this is the difference between proper and common adiuncts, the proper adiuncts agree first to the generals, and then to the singulars. The com­mon [Page 148] agree first to the singulars, and then to the gene­rals.

Hoc genere argumenti Faunium Chaeriam, Cicero pro Roscio Comaedo cavillatur. Nonne ipsum caput, & supercilia illa penitus abrasa, &c.

He had not an hair, for he shaved them off, ergo, he reasons from thence, that he was a knave, and it may be true, because they are hot headed that are bald, this is a new modus, and he reasons from signes, which are common qualities, they do not agree omni, soli, and semper, and yet a knave doth omni soli, and semper commonly.

Sic Martialis 2. lib. Zoilum ludit. Crine ruber, niger ore, brevis pede, lumine luscus, &c.

The cause of these not making a good man is this, the cause of a red head is colour, ergo, there is much heat, and where there is much heat there will be much fancy, and where there is much fancy, there will be much iuggling. Niger ore that comes from melan­choly, that lies in the muscles about the mouth; bre­vis pede, that may have some reason with it, for such a one will go apace; lumine luseus, for when a man thinks he looks on him then he looks asquint, and when one would think he looks asquint, then he looks on him.

Siv vestitus, & comitatus res adiunctae sunt, quo circumstantiae genere Dido, &c.

Oecan [...]m intera surgens aurorarelinquit &c.

So that not onely accidents, but substances may be adiuncts; a man may be an adiunct as he is a servant. So Dido going a hunting is argued first from the time a [...]rora, then the attendance of young men, then their hunting instruments, &c.

Est vero adi [...]nctorum ad subiecta quibus occu­pantur usus item magnus.

There is another kind of adiunct, which are occu­pantia, as we heard before of subicta occupata. So Plato proves that those Cities are m [...]serable, which want Physitians, and Judges, quia multa quoque & int [...]mperantiam, & iniustitiam in ea civitate versari necesse est.

Sed consentaneorum categoria sic est, unde quidvis alteri consentane [...]m vel id [...]m, vel un [...]m di [...]i possit.

We have now seen both what goes to the esse, and bene esse of a thing; now he cals it categoria the ar­guing, categeria signifies to plead against, and they that gave it that name first to argue, did discern truth by the contrary, which is borrowed from the Law­yers: and we know when we would see a thing, that if we take the contrary, it will make it mag is illucesce­re: afterward it came to signifie not that gain-saying one of another, but one mans pleading alone for his client, then it came to signifie the arguments that he used in his speech for his client: and lastly, it came to signifie any argument, and thence comes argumen­tum, the predicaments are called so, namely categoria, and so Ramus would have us consider every argu­ment to be a predicament.

Id [...]m vel unum.

Moreover he doth commorari a while telling us that id m and unum, as the Aristotelians teach are nothing but these consentanie arguments: so id m genere doth arise from idem causa: so gemelli are idem tempore, that is adiuncto: so all modi of theirs arise from hence tanqu [...]m a primis, & simplicibus fontibus. We shall hear of idem genere, and idem specie, and idem i [...]divid [...]o, as if he should say, but all of them, [Page 150] huc sunt tanquam ad primos, & simplices fontes refe­rendi.

De diversis. Argumentum primum consentaneum expo­situm est, &c.

VVE have heard of consentaneum, and why he should put in primum rather than simplex I see not, for if he meant to have repeated them, he should have put in all, ergo primum would be put out, now the use of a transition is to hang things toge­ther, when the one part is newly gone before, as it were half forgotten, then we must have an imperfect tran­sition, otherwise a perfect one: this method obser­ved for memories sake: now it remains that we con­sider what the thing is not, and thus we go orderly to work. Before, we saw what went to a thing, for the making of it up: now we cannot well see what a thing is not, till we see what it is, for nonens is seen gratiaentis: now this respect ariseth not by way of argument: but by seeing what it was.

Dissentaneum sequitur.

This is opposite to consentaneum: sentio is general to them both, seutire is taken for intelligere, consentire is said of things that have the same iudgement, mind and reason; dissentanies are of them that have not the same judgement, ergo, seem to have no reason in them in respect of consentanies, ergo, Aristotle deny­ed diss [...]ntanie arguments and made them fol­low. [Page 151] Sequitur, ergo, it is by nature after, second­ly, it is next to consentanies because they are simple arguments.

Quod a re dissentis.

That differs from the thing it argues, are still ge­neral: so that because the creatures of God are dis­creet, and many, ergo, there is dissention, and because reason was made to behold the creatures of God, er­go, it was necessary that they should be handled in Logick.

Sunt autem dissentanea.

Here he cals them dissentanea in the plural number, for that which was res before, is become dissentaneum, as it hath a dissentany to argue it, secondly, because here dissention agrees to them both as they are com­pared together.

Aeque manifesta

Here dissentanies are made paria, arguing equally for manifestation, qua aequa manifesta, ergo, this pro­perty contains thus much, that one dissentanie is not before another, for the manifesting of it, as causa was before effectum, &c. Is not invention before judgment, and they are opposite? Ans. True for doctrine, but in­vention doth not clear judgement more, nor contra.

Alterumque ab altero aequaliter arguitur.

As there was not a priority, and posteriority, so they have equal force to argue, contrary to consenta­nies; so that manifestation is for the clearing of them, and arguing because they have the same doctrine, but then what use of them.

Tame [...] si sua dissensione, clarius elucescant.

Here it is, why they come principally into Logick, as black is not so black till it be set by white, &c. ma­gis carendo quam fruendo, we see things, for when we [Page 152] have a thing, and see not the privation of it, we make not much reckoning of it, sua dissentione, this is a dis­cretion from the other prop [...]rties: so then we see why a contrary makes a contrary most clear, namely this, ergo, when we would shew a thing that is obscure, we shew it by a contrary, quia sua dissentione clarius elucescant.

Hitherto of the properties, which would not be in consentanies, for one was more manifest, ergo, before another, and more strongly arguing. Dissentanea in the plural number, because one argument serves for them both, ergo, one name, and because they a [...]e e­qually manifest: again, to set one before another is to say it is stronger than the other. Again, they would not be aeque manifesta.

Sunt diversa, vel opp [...]sita.

We are to look at the dissention of things, now there is a more weak and a more strong dissention, the one turn but a little aside, others turn clean back, and are foes, ergo, accordingly doth he divide these: now remember it is ens, as ens that Logick considers, and many times it fals out, that one thing might be taken for another, but for diversity, and commonly our di­stinctions are diversa. Diversa is a more light dis­sention, and opposites contain them: so that diversa will give great light to opposita, but not contra, ergo, diversa are before. Diversa a divertendo, of turning a side, because they agree one with another common­ly in dissention, onely they divert a little the one from the other, and this is it that the name commends unto us: they may agree in nature, but are made to divert ratione, ratio we know belongs to Logick, and it is the same with argumentum: so that he means they differ but only in some logical respect: they are the subtlest [Page 153] of all arguments, because of their little dissention. Sola ratione, ergo, they do not of necessity make a de­nyed axiom:

Quo de genere sunt illa frequentissima. Non hoc sed illud: quanquam, tamen.

This is not a rule of Art but a commoration, as if he should say, these arguments have not been in Schools before, but I have observed them by my ex­perience, and then again they are subtil, ergo, I will help you, when you find, ergo, these notes commonly commend unto you diversa: so forma, and facundia are made to disagree in their adjunctive nature in respect of Ʋlisses: so that they differ not in their nature, but onely in logical respect, as if he should say they may both be adjuncts to one subject, but yet dif­fer in Ʋlysses.

Priamus was ready to perish, and yet with-held not his hands, a man perishing should hold his hands, but Priamus did not: so that causa, and effectum which might consent are here diversa, not in respect of Pria­mus, but of themselves.

Paula secus in Eunucho.

He means there is a difference of modus. Suppose I be worthy of this reproach, yet thou shouldest not tell me of it, here is subjectum and adjunctum, the di­versity is in respect of the cause, they are diversa in respect of him that offered it.

Item alia aliusmodi.

Scelus tu illud vocas Tubero. Here is a little dif­ference too, this fact was called scelus by Tubero, Tully tels him, others gave it other names, alii enim errorem appellant, alii timorem, &c. but no man besides thee call it scelus. Here these names are made divers in respect of him that called it scelus: as if he should [Page 154] say, call it any of the rest, but call it not scelus, and thus we have heard diversa. If I say though he be rich or poor, yet he is honest here is a diversity, for so a discreet axiom may be affirmed: they are divers, because riches commonly make unhonest, and also poverty: so we may make diversity between the cause and effect, or in giving many causes to one ef­fect, aut contra, or one subject to an adjunct, aut con­tra, or many subjects to one adjunct, aut contra, and according to these wayes also, there may be several modi thereof.

De disperatis. Opposita sunt dissentanea, que ratione, & re dissentiunt.

IN looking at things we first see the causes that give esse, then the complements, that give bene esse to the thing, then we see what it is not, and easily do by seeing them arguments that give esse: and first we are to see the diversity, which though they be con­formable, yet they do divert somewhat one from ano­ther, and they are first, because they give light to all the rest that follow. Now we come to see their opposition, that is, those things which have their causes, effects, subjects and adjuncts, are not onely dissenting in a logical respect, but are distinct reals. Opposita, gain sets, it cometh of ob and pono, as it were set against: ob is as it were a bolt to bar one thing from another: so that their nature is to be barred, [Page 155] not onely ratione, but it is principally in their realty, and herein do diversa differ from opposites. Diversa are made to disagree in that wherein they might a­gree, whereas opposites dissent in their nature.

Sunt dissentanea.

We heard they were called dissentanea by reason of their disagreeing, they do not sentire idem, but quot capita, tot sensus sunt among them, whereas consentanies are of the same judgement, and these names do well fit arguments, because they are as it were the senses of things. Dissentanea that is, such as think asunder, are severed, and distract our thoughts.

Que ratione, & re dissentiunt.

Ratione, that is, as diversa did, because they do not onely disagree quatenus argumenta, that is, as they have logical respect in them, but quatenus they are res, as black is not white, they are opposites, and there is a barre that black cannot be white, & con­tra, which opposition is in their dissention, be­ing clean of another judgement: so that there is dis­sention betwixt them in sensu nostro in beholding of them.

Re.

As if we say black is not white, we say not one­ly, that black is not the cause, not the effect, sub­ject, or adjunct of white, but that they are divers things in nature, ergo, this must be observed, that the bar is not onely the bar of rational respect, but of reality.

Itaque eidem attribui secundum idem, & ad idem, &c.

Surely if they be bar'd from coming one at ano­ther, and that in nature, then non possunt eidem attri­bui. [Page 156] As first when I say blackness is not whiteness: and again when as I say blackness and whiteness can­not be given to the same subject: here the one dissen­tion is in essence, the other is in accident, ergo this idem must be understood of the essence it self, and likewise the subject. Non possunt takes away all pos­sibility of joyning in one, ergo, whatsoever make [...] them consent, breaks this rule, for whereas this rule saith, sunt dissentanea, they make them consentanea, and again, whereas this rule saith, non possunt eidem attribui, they say, they may.

Attribui.

The attribute is alwayes the consequent part of the axiom: so that if we give them to subjects, they cannot be given to one and the same subject: they may be the consequent, but not the antecedent part: so that contraries must be attributed, for when I say homo est animal, aut brutum, I give them both to ani­mal, but not eidem. Now antecedent contraries will have contrary consequents, est enim par ratio, now they do dissentire ratione, & re, ergo, cannot any wayes be consentanies, ergo, cannot be made by any means to agree.

Secundum idem.

According to the same, divers think this is put in in respect of relates, because of the example that fol­lows, pater & filius ejusdem: but it hath a more ge­neral respect of opposites in their whole nature: else it should have been taught more specially in the do­ctrine of relates. Now two contraries may be given eidem, but not secundum idem, & adidem, & eodem tempore: eidem, that is, eidem genere, not eidem specie, as a man may be well, and a man may be sick, but not the same man: so that secundum idem hath respect [Page 157] to the same individuality as it were, or species: so homo may be aeger and sanus, but not secundum idem, for that identity cannot be: now ratio is given homi­ni secundum idem, for herein omnis homo est idem, & ad idem, still there is idem, for if we consider them not about idem, they are not opposites: then again there must be the same respect: and also ad idem, that is the very same point, for whiteness in the wall, and white­ness in my hand, are neither attributed eidem, nor secundum idem; eodem tempore; for if they be diver­sis temporibus, then they may both agree eidem, as ho­mo nunc sedens potest deinceps ambulare: so all these respects came from being dissentanea ratione, & re: so that all these must be respected: so that black and white in general are not opposites, but as they are considered in their dissenting and opposite nature: so that this is the true nature of opposites. If ex indocto fit doctus, here is a difference of time, and by this rule we may answer almost all the fallations that are made: that fallation a divisione is from hence, therefore this is a consequution from the definition going before, and principally from the word re. Sic Socrates albus & ater eadem parte esse non potest.

Itaque ex altero affirmato alterum negatur, & e contra.

Et e contra follows from hence, for Ramus left it in his edition, and if econtra be not put in, the rule is not [...], for if we have an example where ex altero negato alterum affirmatur, that hath otherwise no rule here, ergo we must say & e contra, for they that leave it out, as most have done since Ramus, here is their mistaking, because they think it is not a neces­sary consequution, but contingent. Now Ramus [Page 158] doth not teach us consequution that belongs to syllo­gisms, but arguments use, & if it be but contingently true, yet it may belong to Logick, as well, as if it were necessary: and it is very common in speech to say, it is not this, or that, but another thing: again the mea­ning of these two is this, ex altero affirmato alterum negatur, that is, they both cannot be affirmed, for he teacheth invention here, and not judgement, & e con­tra, that is, they cannot be both denied. They may be both denied, as a stone is not vertuous or vitious, are these opposites? yes by our rule, if & e contra be left out, but here they are neither of them attributed: so that I do not mean negation in an axiom, but the not giving of them to a thing, if both arguments be denied, they may be paria, as when I say, if it be not Thomas, it is not William, as if I should say, it is as much reason it should not be Thomas, as not William: so also if both be affirmed they may be paria, as when I say it may be Thomas as well as William, for all is one for that, and thus we must look at all these con­sectaries, because most fallaces are from hence, and they are very subtle.

Opposita sunt disparata, aut contraia.

They are of two sorts, that are barred disparates, that is unmatchable, or contraries such as are directly set one against the other, now the disparates are when the sides are not matching one another, for there is more against one, ne Hercules quidem con­tra duos, ergo, here the fight is not so violent, but the duellio is more strong, so that according to this opposition of things in nature must our Logick proceed.

Disparata sunt opposita.

Disparata are first because they will give light to [Page 159] the stronger dissention, as being contained in it: these destroy one another, but not with that violence and force that contraries do, they are called disparata, because here is impar congressus, and they are un­matchable: but contraries are well matched striking down right blows, whereas disparates steal one be­hind another. Sunt opposita, that is, dissenting re & ratione.

Quorum unum mult is pariter opponitur.

Here first unum opponitur multis, and then par oppo­nitur to every one of them, and not unum uni: now that we may see it more throughly, this it is, whereas a thing is said not to be another thing, with the same reason that it may be said not to be a third, or a fourth, &c. that is, unum multis, and again opposed toge­ther, and that we may see this more particularly, here is the reason disparates are alwayes under some more remote genus, whereas contraries will come un­der one next head, be it genus or what it will be, and that is the reason why they are unum multis, and pariter.

Object. Why doth he say unum mult is rather than multa multis? for sometimes there are multa mul­tis.

Answ. First, because when there are multa mul­tis, there is one more especially opposed to all the rest, then any of the other, ergo, he saith unum multis: se­condly, because where there are multa multis, there is unum multis: thirdly, because in use we find unum opposed multis more frequent than multa multis. Homo is opposed to brutum as unum uni, but to Leo, and equus, as unum multis; again, he is opposed to brutum as Leo, and equus, as unum multis, but not pa­riter, Pariter alike, that is, there is not another kind of [Page 160] argument, when homo is opposed to Leo, then when he is opposed to equus, and here we may see that if opposites be onely of two branches, then are they not disparates: then again, if they be of two sides onely then are they contraries, ergo, if there be any di­stribution in Art where the parts are not opposed one to one, there will be a genus lost.

Ʋnum multis.

He doth not mean alwayes in use, as if one dispa­rate might not argue another, but he meanes as they are in nature, ut viridum, cinereum, rubrum, &c. are disparates.

Quae singula extremis, & inter se disparata sunt.

For colour is simplex, aut mistus, simplex is white and black, mistus the other colours, so that these come not under the next genus, sic liberalitas, & avaritia inter se disparantur: because prodigality may be where these are not, habit is vertue, or vice, vertue is this, or that, or liberality: vice is avaritia, or pro­digalitas, so that these are unum multis, that is, not having one next genus, but a more remote genus of opposites, and avaritia, and prodigalitas are opposite in vice to liberality, and here is many to one, and a like.

Virgilius 1. Aeneidos. O quam te memorem virgo: namque haud tibi vul­tus, &c.

She is a Goddess, or a Virgin, she might have been a third, but he lookes not at that. Not a wo­man, for she had not the countenance of a woman: again not a woman, for nec vox hominem sonat: ergo, Dea, and thus we see how one thing is not another.

De relatis. Contraria sunt opposita, quorum unum uni tan­tum opponitur.

VVE have heard of a thing in his essence, and in his complements, and so also we have seen it is not, for that if it be declining but in a respect, it is a divers; if it decline re, then it is an opposite: a divers when it is considered with another thing in a­greement, yet still severed in respect: and again when one thing is not another, by common opposition, that it makes with another, that is a disparate: then again it is a contrary by some peculiar nature in him direct­ly against some other thing: so in a man we consi­der his causes, flesh, nerves, sinews, bones, &c. then his complements, then we respect him as one divert­ing, or turning a side from another thing: then we look at his common nature whereby he is opposed to many things at once in the same nature, and so he is a disparate: a divers he is, as when I say, though a man was there, yet his horse was there also: again there is that whereunto he is opposed directly, as he is not brutum: and so he is a contrary. Now though there was not in one thing any thing to make it more plain, yet set them together, and the one will make the other more manifest, therefore this opposition is either where one fighteth against many; and these are disparates, or where the fight is more strong, and those are called contraries.

Contraria, by reason here is but one to one, ergo [Page 162] these stand contra, that is face to face, when one did fight with many, some stood aside, some behind, but these face one another, so that if the one turn away, the other will turn to him again. Sunt opposita, that is, they have bars in their nature, namely ratio and res.

Quorum unum uni tantum opponitur.

So that this battle is a duellio, a battle of one against one, and so they fight, that the one things force is benr onely against the force of the other thing. Ʋnum uni tantum, for disparates may be unum uni, but not tantum, unum uni because they come to communi­cate in one next nature, as homo and brutum in ani­mal; or else the one so denies the other, that it takes away the entity of the thing affirmed. Ʋni; but we shall hear afterward that contraria negantia are no­thing in themselves.

Answ. They are something gratia entis, and our reason gives something to it, and apprehends it as some thing in respect of the contrary, and here we may see the force of our reason that can make of no­thing something. Now something is made of no­thing divers wayes, first by our reason, secondly, by our fancie, or by the hallusination of the eye. Lo­gick makes onely two kinds of nothings, the contra­dicent, and the privant. Homo is a contrary to bru­tum, but to Leo and equus he is a disparate, because [...] is opposed to equus in the same nature that he is op­posed to Leo.

Contraria sunt affirmantia, vel negantia.

This distribution of contraries runs on, as the for­mer did, for as the least dissention began first: so we still proceed to the greater: now by affirmantia and negantia, he means things positive, or privative, for [Page 163] there is either a thing opposed to a thing, or a thing opposed to nothing, and the fight between something and nothing is stronger than the former: for when one thing fights with another thing, then let them fight as long as they will, or can, yet they leave some­thing behind them, but the other leaves nothing at all: so that contraries are where both are things in na­ture, or where the one is nothing, and are called ne­gantia of the later part: as the other are called of both parts affirmantio.

Affirmantia, as if he should say, they are things in nature, or things positive, as a Father, a child, &c.

Affirmantia quorum utrumque affirmat, &c.

He doth not say affirmatur, but affirmat, be­cause he would willingly describe them from their act, for he would deliver the nature of the arguments, ut relata & adversa. There is likewise among these a difference of contrariety, for there are some affir­mantia that may be reconciled, and [...]e to agree, there be some also that will [...] [...]gree, but perpetuo adversantur. The [...] if you set them face to face will be [...] [...]riends, but set them back to back, and [...] be foes: but set them adversa how you [...], and they will be foes: so then relates have not so strong a fight betwixt them as adversa. Now they are called relates by reason of a certain reference they have one to another continually, yea indeed they are by reason of their reference, for the causes of the one relate are in his correlate, for the cause of the fa­thers relation is not in him, but he receives his whole relative being from the correlate: so that in Divinity we know there is nothing added to the Godhead by giving to it the persons mutually. Sunt contra, here is [Page 164] one to one, for though a father have many children, yet the relation is but one, namely, betwixt father-hood, and son-hood; and though many stand on the one side, yet there is but one relation: so in the high mystery of the Trinity, there is a double relation, first between the Father, and the Son; secondly be­tween the Father and the Son on the one side, and the holy Ghost on the other side. So when I say Aristotle est discipulus Platonis, these are relates, yet when I say Aristotle est discipulus, this is subjectum and adjunctum: so cousen and cousen are relates, if we respect the relative quality, and not the men. Now that term of relates is used confusedly, as we say he is his father, meaning his procreant cause, quo­rum alterum constat.

Quorum alterum constat e mutua, &c.

Constare is to stand together of causes, e mutua alterius affectione, so that these relates have not their causes from the thing in whom they are, but from their correlates: as when I define a husband to be him that hath a wife, or a wife to be her that hath a husband; these are definitions e relatis, and so e cau­sis. But what causes do relates contain? all the causes, both efficient, matter, form and end. E mutua, e is a sign of the effect, quod e causis existit: so that this is their nature.

Atque inde nominande sunt relata.

They are called relates in regard of the reference they have one to another: so that we may here see what relates are, and how they belong hither: they that think all arguments are relates, why they are so, as the cause, and effect, &c. but so I cannot call them species of argumentum consentaneum, for here they are examples, ergo, lowest of all. Again, if I say argu­mentum [Page 165] est artificiale aut inartificiale, and so go on, thinking that all these are genera to causa and effectum, I deceive my self as they are relates; but if all arguments should be relates, as the argu­ments are taught in Logick, then all the examples of all arguments should be relates, as God, and the world: but when I make them relates, I analyse Lo­gick even as I make the definition of Dialectica an ex­ample of definitio, so that (as I say) if relation were a common affection to all arguments, all examples also should be relates, which they are not; again, if cau­sa and effectum were relates, then they must be toge­ther, for relates must be simul natura, ergo, this is fal­lacia accidentis, they thought the words of Art (as they call them) were relates, ergo, the doctrine of relates must go generally with all arguments. We know again that the causes, efficient, matter, form, and end, and the effect are distinct things, and do not constare e mutua alterius affectione, ergo, are not re­lates: again, causa est cujus vi res est, and the effect quod e causis existit. Now each relate contains the effi­cient, matter, form and end of his fellow, ergo, if they should be taught generally, then in the efficient alone, in the matter alone, in the form alone, and in the end alone there should be all the causes. Some would have relates taught as consentanie arguments, because they do agree; it is true, but they do disagree also, and if they should be taught in consentanies, their dissentio also should be taught there, or else they should make a double doctrine of one thing, and this kind of teaching had been a posteriore; again, where should they have been taught? they are mutual cau­ses, ergo, not causa and effectum, but both causes and effects: again, the doctrine of causa efficiens, materia, [Page 166] forma, and finis are distinct: here they are confoun­ded together in one. Now the Aristotelians have a predicament of relates, and have also their series, but their gradus of them will not stand, for relates have no species, but are lowest save onely examples: and they go clean out, and say relates are of this nature, or that nature, as if they should say relates whose species are in this Art, or in that Art. As in Oecono­mie in a family they are free, or bound, free husband, and wife, bound children, and servants, &c. but now the husband and wife are not relates, because the bound, and free are relates: all these are special ex­amples of relates containing nothing under them, so that relates cannot possibly be a predicament accor­ding to their own doctrine, no more than causa and effectum, and by that course that they take, I can prove that Socrates est genus in going backward, and saying he is substantia, he is genus, &c. Now because the whole relation stands in their mutual causation, for that cause they are called relates.

Ʋt pater qui filium habet, &c.

So we say, is he such a mans son? here is a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject, son put for man; when I say Paul is a servant of Christ, here I mean Pauls cal­ling: servant hath a double respect in it, one as it is in Oeconomy, another as it hath logical relation, which we may see thus, for if he be Christs servant, then Christ is his master.

Relata dicuntur simul esse natura.

The reason stands in this, the whole being of the one relate is contained in the other, ergo, they are si­mul, for if they be mutual causes, they must be mutual effects, ergo, as one is the cause, so the other is the ef­fect, & contra, ergo, they must be simul.

Natura.

Because their nature springs from them mutually, for nature is arising from causes, here we may see in the Trinity, that one person is not before another, there is no respect of priority, or posteriority in the rest of contraries, because there is no force of argu­ing from thence, we heard before that all of them were aeque manifesta, that is, aeque intelligibi [...]ia, and not as consentanies, where the cause cleareth the effect more, then contra, because the causes are more simple and single: so likewise the subject is not beholding to the adjunct, but contra; again, the [...]ause and sub­ject did more argue the effect, and adjunct, than con­tra Again, from hence it is, that qui alterum perfecte norit, norit & reliquum, for they are mutual causes, and our scientia est e causis.

Pro Marcello.

Ex quo profecto intelligis, quanta in dato beneficio sit laus, cum in accepto tanta sit gloria. Dare and acci­pere are relates, as if he should say, if it be glorious to receive, then it is much more glorious to give; now his principal dri [...]t of arguing is a minore, but yet the arguments are relates: so that a thing is not given till it be received; and again he that knows the one knows the other.

Sosibian is a servant to his father, because he is his master.

Sic portorum Rhodiis locare honestum est, & Her ma­creonti conducere.

If it be honest to let out, then it is honest to hire, for they are mutual causes, and in usury I think both taking on usury, and letting out to usury are unlawful, [Page 168] by reason of this relation, as Jeremy speaks. So disce­re and docere are relates,

Jamilla (inquit) matura uxor generi, noverca, filii, filiae, pellex.

Here he playeth with the names: and indeed all names of kinreds are relates.

Atque argumentum talis relationis contrarium ni­hil habet, &c.

Indeed here is no contrariety in these examples, neither consention in that respect, but they are paria: happily he could find no example of them in their disagreeing nature, and so would here commend un­to us their use to be more often in the consentany affection, then in their dissentany nature, as when we say, how could that be, why he was his son.

De adversis.

Adversa sunt contraria affirmantia, quae inter se vel [...] ­ti e regione perpetuo adversantur.

VVE have heard what a thing is, that is, what goes to the being, and what to the well­being of it: and how thereby it dissenteth from o­ther things by a diversity, or opposition: divers might consent between themselves, but they are made to di­vert one from another. Again, for opposition it is [Page 169] re & ratione dissenting either by a disparate nature, or by a contrary nature.

Contraries are either of one thing to another thing, or of one thing to nothing, the former kind also is of things that might agree, or of them that will never be at peace: now therefore we come to adversa, and these have their name of turning not aside as diversa, or as one to many as disparates, neither as relates, w ^ch have a double aspect, a conjunct aspect being set face to face, and an opposite aspect being set back to back. But adversa are in an oppsite aspect; hence a line drawn from the point of the one aspect through the center, to the point of the other aspect will be a right line: so that here is no peace, they are overthwart neighbours continually. Sunt contraria, contraries were opposed one to one, so that a thing is not an adverse, but as it is opposed to some other thing.

Sunt affirmantia.

That is, they are things positive, whereof the one thing is not nothing, but both are something.

Adversantur.

That is, according to their nature set one against another, by a right line.

Perpetuo.

2. Relates might be friends, though they would be foes, but adversa can never be reconciled: this dissention of adversa doth arise from a particular form; for homo is adverse to brutum, as brutum is animale irrationale, and as man is animale rationale, [Page 170] and these can never be reconciled, and every thing hath his contrary, though we cannot see by reason of the forms subtilty; for contrarieties arise from the forms.

Inter se.

This sheweth that contraries are not opposite but when they are set one against another, as black­ness in a shooe is not opposite to whiteness in a band.

Veluti e regione.

As if he should say, if one stand here or there, the other will face him, and if the one remove, the other also will remove: so that they are two overthwart neighbours directly opposed one to another conti­nually. Disparates were behind one another, or on the one side one of another, never before one another. Relates also might be friends, but these will alwayes be foes. In that he saith veluti e regione, he sheweth that they differ from disparates, and perpetuo sheweth that they differ from relates.

Virgilius Aeneidos 11.

Sic albor & niger, calidum & frigidum, virtus & vitium opponuntur. Indeed we make them things, though their original be defects, for vice is sin, and we consider it as it acteth, and so it is ens.

Paradox 2. contra Epicureos.

Illud tamen arcte tenent, accurate que defendunt, vo­luptatem esse summum bonum, &c.

Here he reasons that pleasure cannot be the good­ness of a man, because it is the goodness of a beast; and man and beast are contraries.

Sic libertas & servetus, apud Tibullum 2. lib. Sic mihi servitium video: dominamque paratam:

Tu mihi libertas illa.

Now I see bondage shall befall me, ergo, fare well liberty.

Pro Marcello.

Nunquam enim temeritas cum sapientia commisce­tur, nec ad consilium casus addmittitur.

He makes temeritas and sapientia, adversa; consili­um and casus contraries, but indeed they are dispe­rates, for temeritas is a special kind of modus efficiendi, namely necessitate, aut fortuna, and consilium belongs to causa natura, aut consilio, so that they are not under one next genus.

De contradicentibus.

Contraria negantia sunt, quorum alterum ait, alterum negat idem, eaque sunt contradicentia, aut privantia: contradicentia sunt contraria negantia, quorum alte­rum negat ubique, &c.

WE have heard what a thing is, we have also heard that a thing is not this or that, as a di­vers, or as an opposite: as an opposite either by a general nature, which are disparates, or by a more par­ticular nature, which are contraries: we have heard that one thing is opposed to one thing, or one thing is opposed to nothing; one thing is opposed to one thing, either as a relate, or in adversa: now we come to shew how a thing being from his causes, is not a nothing.

Contraria.

Where there was a fight of one to one.

Negantia.

Here one of them is nothing, ergo, it cannot proper­ly be said that here is one to one; yet our Logick here makes nothing something, per oppositum ens, and in very deed it is requisite that ens being from his causes, that it should not be another thing, so it should not be nothing. Negantia, not that he speaks here of the negation, that we shall hear of afterward in an axiom, but he meanes a not being. Ramus had not a better word, ergo, he keeps this delivering it in the active voice, desiring to commend to us the act, or arguing, or the faculty whereby arguments do act. Now nothing gives name to contradicentia, of contra, and dicens, because the affirmer: that that is a thing we have heard of before, it is common to affirmantia, ergo, because that is it which is onely special: here he means them by the negative part.

Sunt.

For as there is a something so there must be a no­thing; because every thing that is, (except ens pri­mum) as it was not once, so may it not be again.

Quorum alterum ait, alterum negat idem.

That is, the one is a thing in rerum natura: alterum negat, that is, the other is not a thing in rerum natura. He hath not better words to utter them to the act of our understanding, ergo, borrows these words, ait, ne­gat, which are a metonimy of the adjunct for the sub­ject; but remove the Rhetorick, and you shall see what he means.

Idem.

For it is by oppositum ens, that non ens is ens: and it is by reason of nothings contradicent, that nothing [Page 173] is an argument. Here we see the force of reason, that maketh non ens to be ens, but it is by oppositum ens on­ly: so that if there were not an idem, they were not contraries, no not opposites.

Object. But might it not have been left out, being taught generally before?

Answ. No: there must be a denial of the same thing, for the whole entity that we give to a ne­gant, is per oppositum ens, ergo, it must have reference to idem.

Sunt contradicentia, aut privantia.

As the consentanies proceeded from causes to ef­fects, and so to subjects and adjuncts: so do dissen­tanies disagree less or more. The less dissenting ar­guments must go before, because they are common to the other, and are contained in them: now oppo­sites are not this or that, by a lesser or a more earnest opposition; contraries are of one thing to another, or of one thing to nothing; and here is a sharper con­tention: and again, among these the contradicent, though it take away the same thing ubique, yet it leaves something in room of it. Sunt contraria negantia, which we heard before.

Quorum alterum negat ubique.

Quorum alterum, namely the denyed; negat ubique, that is in every subject, and puts another thing in room thereof, as visus, non visus, non visus denyes visus in my eye, hand and foot, and in every part of my body, yet it doth not take away every thing, but there may be some thing that should be there.

Negat Ʋbique.

Good reason, for when it pursues the contrary in e­very part, it cannot be so strong a fight, as where the contrary fights with the other in the same subject; ut justus non justus, for the use of them, we seldom find them directly opposed, but in an axiom we chiefly find them: as when I say, it is so, it is not so: or we shall find them often by way of mocking, as when we cry at a thing, and say, If it be not, it is not: here is the antecedent negative, and the antecedent affir­mative.

Sic in defensicne Murenae, &c,

Nihil ignoveris, saith the Stoick, imo aliquid, non om­nia. Here be contradicent axioms, making one axiom to consist of contradicent arguments. So that by this example we may see where they are used. They are called contradientia, because the contrariety is in the denyal of the word affirmed, quasi contrarietas in dictione, but it is in re indeed: so that this is contra­diction, when two talk together, and the one denies that which the other said, as Dives, non Dives, bella, non bella, puella, non puella.

So Cicero counts Atticus an Epicure by professi­on, that mortui non sunt miseri, because non sunt: now when we find contradiction in a speech, we shew it by the rule; we find many arguments among the Pa­pists to be of this kind, and also among our own men, The fallaces are general to opposites, and there are non-contradicents, for contradicents when men con­tend about nothing.

De privantibus. Privantia sunt contraria negantia, quorum alterum ne­gat [...]in eo tantum subjecto, in quo affirmatum suapte natura inest.

NOw we come to see a thing in his being and with his complements, may not be that absence of a thing where it should be for privans is nothing else; privans will neither let the habit of the thing it de­nieth be there, nor any other thing but it selfe, ergo, there is the greatest contention that can be, and be­tween somthing and nothing in the same place, there is the greatest distance: and nothing pulls out some­thing, as it were by the roots, and makes that some­thing to be an absolute nothing.

Privantia.

They are so called, because of the privant that pulls the habit out of his house, as it were.

In eo tantum subjecto.

He doth not mean that privantia are alwayes ad­juncts to some subject, for they may be of the same thing: as when I say, sight is not blindness: but this he means, that the habit is denyed, and the denyer takes away the very same thing without leaving any deputy thereof: as cecity denies the very entity of visus, where it should be, and plucks up as it were the first causes of it.

Suapte natura inest.

He doth not understand by nature, as if it were a thing considered in naturall Philosophy, but in that [Page 176] thing where unto it might be consentany, ergo, by nature is to be considered that, that any way, or by any Rule of Art should agree to the thing. so that simplex natura is as much as consentaneum, or that which is confentanie, as a cause, effect, &c. to the thing.

At que hic affirmatum, dicitur habitus negatum au­tem privatio.

He keeps the common terms, it is called habitus, be­cause it should be habituall to the thing whereunto it is given,

Negatum autem privatio, because it pulls out the habit by the roots.

Sic motus & quies, sic ebrius & et sobrius.

Our Author brings such examples as are received in Schools, otherwise ebrietas is a vice: and indeed all vices are privantia. So sin is a habit, as it causeth the subject to act imperfectly; so non es ebrius quia so­brius: he takes away the privant by putting the ha­bit.

Sic cecum esse, et videre.

Existat igitur ex hac familia aliquis, ac potissimum caecus ille.

Let blind Appius come, because whilest he cannot see, he will take the lesse grief at her.

So pauper, and dives, mors, and vita, and indeed this shews what sin is, that brought death, a privant cause, a privant effect,

Item tacere, et loqui: so mortalitas is the privation of immortality, though it seem to make it a privant.

Sed dissentaneorum categoria sic est, &c.

Our Author told us before, that there was a cate­gorie of consentanies, shewing us where Aristotles ten categories are: and here are categoremata of dis­sentanie [Page 177] also, and a categoria of them. Now because we cannot see categoria, or arguing without we first see the arguments, ergo we are here first taught the categoremata for the categorias sake.

Ʋnde quidvis ab altero differre quolibet modo potest.

Ʋnde quidvis, that is, any thing, as if he should say there is nothing, that is, not another thing, or no­thing, but it is some of these wayes.

De paribus.

Argumenta simplicia it a fuerunt in consentaneis et disentaneis: comparata sunt, quae inter se comparan­tur &c.

VVE have heard of a thing as it is in it self com­pleat, and as it is first in the causes, and after­ward with his complements: and seeing it thus, we see how it is not another thing. Notwithstanding we come now to see that there may be a comparison betwixt it and another thing, happily to match it, or to be unequall, like or unlike: now whilest we see things thus we see the inside & outside of them. The arguments are called comparates, for this afection in them resteth as it were to argue so soon as they are sundred; as for example, lay one thing to another, it may be greater, though less to another, &c. so that these doe not look at things as they are absolute, but as they are laid together. The reason of these argu­ments in nature is this, there are more things in na­ture than there are degrees of quantity or resem­blance [Page 178] of similitude, ergo, some of them must be matches, some greater some lesse, and as the reason of that question one being asked, whether there were any two men in the world that had a like number of hairs upon their head? He said yes, because there were more men in the world than any man had hairs on his head: so it is here, there are more things in nature, than there are degrees of quantity, and they are finite, ergo some have the same quantity, and some have not: and again, because some things are like others, and some unlike, ergo, there must be a looking at that.

Argumenta simplicia, &c.

Here is a transition containing the doctrine of that which went before, and this is the conclusion.

Comparata sunt, &c.

Therefore it is imperfect wanting the proposition, the name comes of con and paro, to bring together, or lay together: so that howbeit the denomination of Comparates may seem to rise principally from pari­tie, yet we must take them more generally, because imparia, similia, and dissimilia, are also compared, but are unmatches, for as our English word Matches may be taken for equall matches, or unequall, so may the Latine word comparata be taken for paria, or imparia, &c.

Quae compar antur.

So that this word delivereth the reference that one thing not being another, hath to it by way of reference.

Inter se.

That is, the one being compared with the other, and the other with that, and both comparates, the cause was of the effect, the subject of the adjunct, [Page 179] et contra: dissentanies had one denomination too, but comparates though they have the same denomi­nation, yet we doe not consider them absolut ely as dissentanies are, but as they are laid one to another, and the other to it.

Quae tamet si ipsa comparationis natura aeque nota sunt, attamen alterum altero, &c.

Here he tells us that comparats are like unto dis­sentanies in this, that they are aeque nota natura, as dissentanies are aeque manifestae, but though they be so, yet herein they dissent from dissentanies, that the one in respect of one man may be more known and more notable than the other: so that though they be aeque nota natura, yet quoad nos, the one may be better known to a man than the other, ergo, here we must alwayes take heed, that when we make comparisons (which do not conclude, but illustrate as they say) that we take our comparison from a thing, as well or better known to him to whom it is made, than the thing we go about to prove, otherwise we teach so­phistically, and break this Rule.

Saepeque notis brevius judicantur, aliquande partibus plenius distinguntur,

Again, this is generall to all comparats, judicantur, that is declared, shewed, painted, ergo, he saith ra­ther judicantur, than demonstrantur.

Notis.

He means this, comparats use is double, they are either shorter either with notes, or made full with parts.

Quae propositio, redditioque nominantur.

The parts of a full comparison are these, where the proposition is the argument arguing, and the redditio the aliquid.

Atque omnino comparata etiam ficta arguunt, fidemque faciunt.

Whereas a fained cause cannot argue a true effect, aut contra, a faigned subject a true adjunct, and so in dissentanies, why in comparats we may faign one, and will argue another true one, and here is the ground of all Fables, which are full comparisons, similia, hence we say comparates doe magis illustrare, than concludere: so that these are the three properties be­longing to comparates in generall.

Comparatio est in quantitate, vel qualitate.

He doth not sa [...] comparata, are quanta, or qualia, but comparatio est in quantitate, vel qualitate, looking at the categoria, or arguing; now it is not quantitas or qualitas, but in quantitate or qualitate, as if he should say, things that are compared, are laid toge­ther in their quantity, or quality, for we are not to understand any Arithmetical or Geometrical quanti­ty or quality here, which is alwayes the same, but it is Logical quantity and quality, that is, that quantity and quality which we consider in one thing with a­nother: so that if you would know what this Loi­gicall quantity is, it is nothing but equality or in­equality,

In quantitate

That is, when things are compared in their equa­lity or inequality, for parity and imparity, simili­tude or dissimilitude belong to Logick; now compa­ratio in quantitate is first because quantity is by na­ture before quality, for this parity and imparity must needs be considered in the thing arising from the na­ture thereof, before we consider the quality in nature arising from the quantity; as for example, I must first consider the greatness of a wall, then I shall see that [Page 181] quality whiteness to be extended according to the greatness of the wall.

Qua res comparatae, quantae dicuntur.

Qua, that is, it is that aff [...]ction of things that are laid together, for that he means when he saith qua,

Res comparatae, &c.

Quantity is an affection Logicall to res: now in that he thus defines them, he doth not mean quantae in respect of the word, but in respect of the nature of the thing: for this it is, we know every thing hath this logismos, or Logicall affection, whereby it may be called quanta; so qualities may be compared toge­ther, and be made greater or lesse, by reason of the finite nature of them.

Est que parium vel imparium.

Now because there are more things than degrees of quantity, for that cause it comes to pass, that some things are equally matched, and some unequally: so then, when we compare things together, and they be matches, those are paria: this parity is of those things which chance to be equall.

Pari sunt quorum est una quantitas.

First he calls them paria, as if he should say matches or fellows, or as we call them paires, as a pair of gloves or garters, &c. else it may be they are imparia or dissimilia, for so somtimes that word imparia is used for dissimilia, quorum quantitas est una. He doth not mean that the things are one, but their quantity is parity, ergo, he saith, quorum quan­titas est una: here he doth not mean that their quan­tity is one, but it is called parity.

Argumentum igitur paris est, cum par explicatur a pari.

This follows from the definition: by explicatur he means arguitur, but he saith explicatur, because it is the nature of those to unfold one another.

E [...]sque notae sunt par, aequaie, aequore, &c.

Because others have not taught these kinds of ar­guments before, ergo, he pleaseth to stay a while up­on them, and would teach us to judge of them by the phrase, as it were, but we must look at the matter.

Par levibus ventis.

Here Crusa, Aeneas first wife, is compared to the winds

Et nunc aequali, &c.

Here the age of one is compared with the age of a­nother.

Again, the Empire of Rome shall be equall to the whole earth, and their courage to the height of heaven.

Cujus res gestae at que virtutes es, &c,

Now follows full comparisons, his gallant deeds are compared with the whole course of the Sun, the proposition is here with what limits the earth is con­fined, with them is the earth limited.

Littora quot conchas, quot amaena rosaria flores, &c.

Here are many propositions to one reddition, as many shels as are on the sea shore, &c, so many are mine adversities: quae si comprendere coner, &c. again his repeating of them would be as if he should tell the drops of the Icarian sea.

Hujus vero loci sunt consectaria illa è contrariis quidem orta, &c.

These kindes of arguments though they seem [Page 183] to have in them contraries, yet by laying them toge­ther, and seeing their contrary consequence they come to be comparates. As Sosibian is a servant to his father because his fat [...]er is his master.

Ex adversis sunt frequentiora.

For the fo [...]mer examples were onely true in relates, and privants, but ex adversis sunt fre­quentiora.

If one accuse him whom I defend, then I may ac­cuse him, whom he defends.

Quod cum fateantur satis magnam, &c, If vice make miserable: shall not vertue make happy.

Contraria enim c [...]ntrariorum sunt conse­quentia, &c.

This rule holds not when it is genus, but when it follows from it, then it will be true, as I cannot say the father is good, ergo, the son is evil, because good­ness and evilness do not follow from fatherhood, and sonhood, for consequentia is here as arising from contrary causes, or from causes in the thing, or as adjuncts.

Dic quibus in terris (& eris mihi magnus Apollo) &c.

This is a common argument among the common sort. One propounds a riddle, and the other not being able to answer, propounds another, and this also is common when one sayes give me this, and I will give you that.

Paria vero ficta sunt illa, &c.

Now we come to ficta paria. As Zenophons wife would not rather have her neighbours husband than her own: so she should not rather desire his gar­ment, or gold, &c. and as Zenophon would not rather have his neighbours wife than his own, so he should [Page 184] not rather desire his neighbours horse, or ground, rather than his own: and here we see the use of the third property.

De majoribus. Imparia sunt, quorum quantitas non est una. Impar est majus aut minus. Majus est, cujus quantitas ex­cedit.

VVE have heard how things may be compared with things, and this comparison was either in quantity or quality, which quantity was a logical quantity, not a geometrical quantity, for it was of things where Geometry cannot be considered. A­gain, this is general to every thing, not special to Geo­metry: and the reason hereof we heard to be, because there are more things in nature, than there are de­grees in quantity; it was parium, or imparium. Pa­ria were pairs, matches and equals, and imparia are such as agree not in any one of these three: but the aliquid here as it is greater to one, so is it less to ano­ther. Imparia therefore are such as are not pairs, but the one is greater than the other.

Quorum quantitas non est una.

We have heard concerning quantity, that paria were quorum una est quantitas, imparia sunt quo­rum non est una quantitas, that is, as parity was the quantity of paria, so imparity is the quantity of im­paria.

Non est una.

Because the ones quantity is called majus, and the others minus: so that as paria had but one quantity, so imparia have two, one majus and another minus.

Impar est majus, aut minus.

Having shewed what imparia are, here he distribu­teth them into majus and minus, as if he should say, imparity is either in majority or minority, and here is all logical quantity, and they that will make a predi­cament of quantity should indeed bring in this quan­tity, and not the table of Arithmetick and Geome­try: the reason why this quantity is general, is be­cause all things whatsoever are finite in essence, ergo, in quantity. Majus goes before minus, because it containeth in it the quantity of the minus, and exceed­eth: so that the majus gives light to the minus, not contra. Majus is so called, because it is evermore con­sidered in comparison of one thing to another: and therefore is not called magnum aut parvum, maximum aut minimum.

Majus est, cujus quantitas excedit.

Here majority is the quantity of majus, and this majority exceedeth, because that the majus is active in comparison of the minus, for the stronger acts up­on the weaker, rather than contra.

Propriae notae sunt, &c.

Our Author doth commorari upon this doctrine, because others have taught them confusedly, there­fore to keep us in order, that we may not be mistaken, he pleaseth to set down these notes, for our further help.

Tostitur emedio, &c.

Verbosa simulatio prudentiae, which is the third ar­gument [Page 186] is argued a majori, domina illa sapientiae.

There is not onely contempt of the babbling Orator, (which is the aliquid) but of the good Orator.

Hinc sumitur Logica quaedam gradatio, &c.

That is, as a modus belonging nither is that logical gradation, &c. as the people and the Senate are com­pared, the Senate and the publique garrisons, and they and the Generals, &c so that here is a climbing up the majus, in one respect, being made the minus in ano­ther respect.

It is better to be the son of Thirsites, and an A­chilles, then contra: the majus is before, the reason is this, that that is of his progenitors is not his own, but that which he hath of himself,

Aeneas perswades his fellows to stay and bear these, because they have born greater.

Thou openest thy fountain to thy enemies, give us leave to open our little springs to our friends.

She gave thee great thanks, yea as big as great mountains. Now the majus is, quam abs te esse da­tum.

Ficta vero majora etiam plurimum valent.

As we heard before generally, that ficta comparata, might argue vera: so here ficta majora may argue ficta minora.

If a Duke should love her, he could not keep her much less canst thou.

If Jupiter should do it, I could not hope to do it, much less if Aeneas should bid me.

De minoribus Minus est, cujus quantitas exceditur.

MInus is a logical quantity that may be in every thing, as I have said before of majus: and mino­rity is the quantity of minus, ergo, it is exceeded by the majus, because the majus contains the minus, and much more, double, treble, &c.

Minus autem sepa indicatur, &c.

As majority hath been abused by Authors, so hath minority, ergo, he would help us by notes, lest we should be deceived. Saepe, not alwayes, as we shall hear afterward.

Nemo non modo Romae, &c.

Rome is compared with every corner of Italy, and the argument is drawn a minore. Catilin had sought out all the rascals in Rome, and all in every corner of Italy, which is the minus.

Catalin would fain have been Consul to trou­ble the State, here Consul is the majus, and exul the minus.

Ovid. 1. Reme. amoris.

Here the body and soul are compared, the body is minus, the soul majus. If thou wilt labour for the good of the body, much more for the good of the soul.

At que hujus ejusdem speciei sunt hae formalae, quae fi­unt negatione parium.

Hither we refer those manner of speeches, which are made by denials of equals.

Omnes ex omni aetate, &c.

If all the Lawyers of the Common-wealth were here, they are not comparable to Servitius Sulpitius: who is the majus.

Aliquando not a nulla est.

He was so far from finishing his work, which is the majus, that he had not laid so much as the foundation; which is the minus.

We ought to be moved with the voice of Poets: why? stones, woods and wild beasts will be ordered by musick, the minus.

Gradatio illa est a minoribus.

As in majoribus there was a climbing up from the lesser to the greater: so here there is a falling down from the lesser to the greater.

Facinus est, vincere civem Romanum, is less than ver­berare, and verberare less than necare, and necare less in crucem tollere.

Finguntur etiam minora.

As we heard before of majora that were fained: so here we hear of fained minora.

Ante leves ergo pascentur in aethere cervi, &c.

The remembrance of kindness is compared with these fained comparisons.

O horrible thing, &c. that is the majus: to spew in thy own house at supper is a beastly thing, that is the minus: in caetu vero populi Romani, &c. that is the majus.

De similibus.

Adhuc compaeratio in quantitate fuit, sequitur compara­tio in qualitate, qua res comparatae quales dicuntur: nempe similes aut dissimiles.

THis is not that quality in an adjunct which was absolutely considered: sequitur comparatio in qualitate, before he told us of comparata in quantita­te, here he saith comparatio in qualitate, because all is one: but the categoria is that that Logick looks at rather, then the categorema, ergo, he saith here compa­ratio. By comparata in qualitate, we are to consider the things compared; by comparatio in qualitate we are to understand the arguing or categoria of them, and categorema is more in use than categoria, because Logick is evermore concreat with the thing, ergo com­paratio in qualitate is all one as if he had said compa­rata in qualitate.

Sequitur comparatio in qualitate.

Or as I may say, comparativa qualitas, qua res com­paratae quales dicuntur, as if he should say, by which res comparatae are comparata: so that whilst he saith res, he tels us we consider Logick together with the thing.

Quales dicuntur.

Because he doth define by conjugates, ergo he saith dicuntur, for conjugata are nomina, and so dictiones are nomina: quales, that is, similes or dissimiles: so that by quales we do not consider any absolute quality in any thing, but that which hath reference to some o­ther thing.

Nempe similes, aut dissimiles.

As before we heard the ratio of comparata quanti­tate, so here we shall see the reason of similes, aut dissi­miles in qualitate, which is because there are more things than qualities; and hence it comes to pass that some things are like to others, because they have the like quality: and some again are unlike, because they have not the like quality. Again, similia must go before dissimilia, as quantity went before quality, because it did arise immediately from the limits of the essence: now qualities are the acts of the form upon the matter, and there is no act till the essence be li­mited, ergo, till the thing hath quantity, ergo, quantity is first. Now similia are first, as the names shew; for when we see unlikes, we know them to be dissimilia, by seeing them not to be similia: again, the dissimile is as it were the denyal of simile.

Similia sunt, quorum est eadem qualitas.

Here we may see whither similitude belongs, name­ly, to Logick, and they are fitly called similia, because they stand in comparison with a thing.

Quorum est eadem qualitas.

From quality he doth define these qualia, and he saith eadem, not una as in quantity, which was quorum quantitas est una, yet the quantity of these is one, and the same: but he saith here eadem, because as we know una belongs to quantity, and eadem to qua­lity.

Similitudo proportio dicitur, &c.

Here he doth commorari, because the Schools have abused this property, teaching that it doth belong to quantity: so we also abuse it in our common speech, as when we say he is a well proportioned man, when we mean that his members are correspon­dent, [Page 191] or like one to another. Ʋt similia proportionalia: this also follows, which also shews that proportio be­longs hither.

Notae similitudinis, &c.

There are no Topick places of Logick wherein the Schools have been so mistaken as in these, therefore he sets down the notes to help us the better.

Servius Sulpitius and his son are compared as si­milia.

Augustus cure of Ovid is compared with Achilles cure of them onely whom he wounded.

The day of Tullies return to Rome from banish­ment was like immortality.

He was made Verres, my Lord bore-pig (this shews that their orignial was from a base beginning, in that they gave themselves such names) as it were by drinking of Circes cup, which turned Ʋlisses com­pany into swine,

They behold Pompey as a man come from heaven: non ex hac urbe, &c. there is also a dissimilitude, the commandement and doing are similia.

Similitudinis partes deinceps explicantur.

Hitherto we have heard short and contract com­parisons; now we shall hear them at the full, either where the parts are disjoyned, or where they are lin­ked one in another.

Di juncta quando termini quatuor, &c.

He cals them termini, because they make as it were two axioms, in both which there is a consequent, and an antecedent part: two termini go to the Protasis, and two to the Antapadosis.

Here the sick man, and his meat, and the wicked man, and his tasting of praise are made similia.

These are the first verses that Virgil shewed him­self by, and set them on the gates where Augustus was to come out to be made Emperour, and verses then were rare, onely one Ennius (as Tully witnes­seth) had made some, which were no good ones, yet they were read for their matter: Virgil was at this time poor, and had not been thereabout long, being as it were a groom in Caesars stable, and Augustus see­ing them, demanded who made them, and none would challenge them, but one Batillus a simple fellow, praemium que magnumerat adeptus. On the next mor­ning Virgil seeing that, sets on the gates again. Hos ego versiculos feci, &c. and Sic vos non vobis, four times, then Augustus called Batillus to perfect them, and he could not, then Augustus promised a great re­ward to him that could: so Virgil perfected them, and hereby mocked Battillus: the quatuor termini are these, first Virgils labour, and the reward that was gi­ven Batillus, the other two the oxes plowing, and others reaping the corn, &c.

Aliquando nulla prorsus est nota.

As we have heard before in minoribus, so here sometimes there are no notes at all, but they are un­derstood: as when we use allegories. As white Dazies are not esteemed, and black Violets gather­ed: so a white boy sometimes may not be esteem­ed of, and a black boy regarded. Remember that alwayes in those full comparisons that the pro­position is the third argument, and the reddition is the aliquid.

Continua est quando, est primus terminus, &c.

This onely it hath special, first it hath onely three [Page 193] terms, then onely one of them, namely, the middle­most is used twice, ergo, this is more composite the disjuncta similitudo, for there was but one reference of two terms to two, but here is a reference of three terms, where the middlemost hath a double re­ference.

Ficta similitudo.

As we heard before in general, that ficta compara­ta might argue true ones, so it is true especially, for indeed all fables for their matter are nothing but be­long to Logick, and are full comparisons.

If Horace be asked why he used to play on the fid­dle in galeries, and why he came not into the City, he will answer by a faigned similitude of the Lyon being sick, and the Foxes excuse of not coming to him.

De Dissimilibus.

Dissimilia sunt comparata, quorum qualitas est di­versa.

THese have their names of dis, and similia, because there is a dissimilitude with them, but a little dif­ference, dissent, or rather a diversity; and as dissen­tanea of dis, and sentio, contain diversa which might be consentanies, but for their little difference in lo­gicall respect: so dissimilia contain similia, but with a diversity.

Sunt Comparata.

He should say comparatae in qualitate, for other­wise [Page 194] comparata is not their next genus, ergo, that should be put in.

Quorum qualitas est diversa.

Therefore it cannot be said to be the same, now he saith it is but diversa, not opposite: shew wing that similia are very diversa, but by way of comparison: so that we shall find dissimilia to differ onely ratione, but handled comparatione.

Dissimilitudinis propriae notae sunt.

He still telleth us how to distinguish them.

Heu domus antiqua, &c.

The house and the master might be subjectum and adjunctum, but here they are dissimilia: dispar here is not impar, but dissimile, but they that gave it to dis­similia at first mistook the matter: and use hath changed it.

The three Countries of France were unlike in speech, in order and in laws.

It was all his labour to look with one countenance, to sound with another voyce, to go with another pace, &c. these are effects handled with a diversity, and made comparates.

Neoptolinus, and Achilles, father and son, causa and effectum are made divers, and are handled with a comparison.

Wit and age adjuncts are handled by a dissimili­tude.

A day for sacrifice and a day for counsel are Dis­similia.

I thought, O Meliebus, that Rome had been like Mantua: here is an example of similia, if we look at both: but Virgil meant not so.

Nota plerumque nulla est.

And yet there is a ful comparison. Brutus the first [Page 195] Consul of Rome put his son to death for betraying Tarquinius. Manilius put his son to death for kil­ing one who challenged him to fight.

De conjugatis. Hactenus prima argumenta sunt exposita, sequuntur or­ta de primis, quae perinde sunt ad id quod arguunt, sicut prima unde oriuntur.

HItherto we have heard of that that goeth to the being of a thing, and to the well being of the same, and how many wayes it may not be another thing, and yet it may be compared with it, to see whe­ther it be a greater, or less, like, or unlike, &c. and having seen things thus, now we come to consider how they may be named, and likewise how they may be ranged under some general head, and then be li­mited in their essence, and accordingly as we see good, may we give restimony thereof. And hither­to we have heard of those arguments that are firstly in the thing: now we come to consider how these first may argue, secondly by reason of the first.

Hactenus prima argumenta sunt exposita, &c.

This is an imperfect transition containing the con­clusion of that which went before, and the proposi­tion of that which followeth, this course that our Author keeps is most natural, for when we see a thing in all the arguments before, then it is requisite that we give it a name.

Sequantur orta de primis.

They are called orta because we shall see in the particulars every one to have a being from the first.

Quae perinde sunt ad id quod arguunt, sicut prima unde oriuntur.

And for their arguing they carry themselves ad id quod arguunt, that is, to the aliquid, sicut prima unde oriuntur: so that this is their definition, so that look with what affection the first argue, with the same af­fection also do these argue: so that the difference of the first, and orta argumenta is not so much in the force of the arguments: as in that these argue after a new manner. These orta are of two sorts, either such as arise more simply, or such as arise more composite­ly: more simply as conjugata and notatio, for they arise but from one argument alone: more compo­sitely as distributio, and definitio, for they arise from more arguments at once, therefore conjugata and no­tatio go before distribution and definition, for a di­stribution doth arise from consentanies, and dissenta­nies: a definition may arise from orta which are after consentanea and dissentanea. The first kind of orta are conjugata and notatio.

Conjugata, sunt nomina, &c.

So that these lie principally in the name for their arguing, ergo, they have this in particular: as to spring simply from the first, so to denominate things. Conjugata are before notatio, because they arise onely from consentanies, notatio from both con­sentanies, and dissentanies: now for conjugata, they are yoked words, sunt nomina, so that these lye in the name.

Varie deducta.

Varie, not so much in respect of their ending, as in respect of their use.

Ab eodem principio.

That is, proceeding from one and the same begin­ning, principium is the thing signified, as the thing ju­stice, &c. as if he should say, conjugates are nomina varie deducta, that is pulled in sunder, but have the same signification: signifying the same abstract as justitia, the concret as justus, the act as juste: so that he doth not mean varie d [...]ducta, as if they were deri­vatives, but in respect of the thing: so that here we may see how nomina belong to Logick, namely, as they are things.

In conjugatis symbolum est consentaneorum argumentorum.

By conjugates he means a casting together: as if he should say you have consentanies onely in conju­gatis: so that in them is the symbolum, badge and to­ken of consentanies onely, and good reason, be­cause these are denominations from one and the same thing continually, ergo, cannot be possibly from dissentanies, for then they should be from divers principia.

Libertas quoniam nulli jam rest at amanti, &c.

Liberty is not to him that is in love, ergo, a lover cannot be free, here the thing libertas is not the cause of liber, but curtu sis liber, looking at the effect to­gether with liber. Now conjugates arise onely from agreeing arguments, ergo, there is nothing that goes to the casuality, effectity, subjunctity, or adjunctity of a thing (as we may say) but we may denominate from it. As I may call a chest made of wood, a woodden chest: for indeed the reason of the name conjugata is from yoaking the thing unto the man, or unto the act.

C [...]cero 3. de natura Deorum cum Dionysio tyranno lo­quitur. Jam mensas argenteas de omnibus delubris jussit auferri, &c.

Dionysius coming into Greece, robbed their Tem­ples, they used to have fine things in their Temples dedicated to their Gods, which they called [...], thence came [...] accursed, because they dedicated them to their Idols: now he took these things, and there was engraven in them, bona Deorum, ergo, he said, he would be so bold as uti eorum bonitate.

I will not use him as a Consul, because he used me not as a consular, that is, as one that hath been a Consul.

The cause was consularis, and senatoria, ergo he needed the help of the Consul, and the Senate, res consularis, and senatoria are the adjuncts to consul, and to senatus.

De Notatione. Notatio est nominis interpretatio: nomina siquidem sunt nota rerum, &c.

NOw we come to notatio, conjugata did nominate the thing from some thing that was in it, but did not name it properly, but so as it might agree to ano­ther thing that had the same consentany argument in it, from which that name was fetched, but notatio is the name of a thing, that is proper to it, he called the first conjugata; for as we were taught by them to give the thing a name which may be common to [Page 199] some other thing: so here notatio teacheth us to give the thing a name arising from some property in it: so that it be not common to other things; neither is the name and the thing the same, as we heard in conju­gates, justitia, justus, and juste, were the same, onely they were delivered diversly.

Est nominis interpretatio.

That is, not the laying out of the name, but the reason of the name: so that the arguments arguing are nomen, and notatio nominis. Notatio is after con­jugata, because it ariseth from dissentanies also, and comparats, whereas conjugates arise onely from con­sentanies.

Nomina siquidem sunt nota rerum.

So saith our Grammar, vox est nota, qua unumquod­que vocatur. Now as there are nomina, so ratio reddi potest, si vera notatione fiant. The denomination comes from something, as homo ab humo, for as humus signi­fieth the earth, so homo names not man earthy, but it is a new name drawn from humus.