AMBITION is of a greedy nature, not content with the bodies and estates of men, but strives to attaque their souls also, and to take-in that by policy or the force of Argument, which will hold out against all the force of Armes.

The rise and progresse of Mahomet, and the Ottoman Family, are solemn testimonials of this sad truth; but we have nearer instances of it: A few Members of the House of Commons of late, stealing into the Seat of Government, by the help of Sampson and his Locks, are not content to seize our Bodies and Estates at pleasure; but, with the strength of his Jaw-bone onely, would force our Understandings also, and perswade us to be mad with reason.

We thought Generall Monck might have been our Pilot, and were so fond as to believe, He would steer us towards harbour, not by faction and private inte­rest, but by Reason, and Christian prudence; that, see­ing we could not avoid the horrour of a fearfull storm, we might evade the error of a finall Shipwrack: but, instead thereof, being dispossest of our Estates by Violence, he would argue us into a belief, that 'tis best to entail our welfare on them that wrong us; and [Page 4]prove it more rationall, that we suffer our Vessell to remain in a continuall storm, than to return again to that harbour, from whence we first took sail.

And thus he displaies his strength, Before these un­happy Warres, the Government of these Nations, was Monarchicall in Church and State: These Wars have gi­ven birth and growth, to severall interests, both in Church and State, heretofore not known: though now upon many accounts very considerable, as the Presbyterian, Indepen­dent, Anabaptist, and other Sectaries of all sorts, as to Ecclesiasticks; And the purchasers of the King's, Queen's, Prince's, Bishops, Deans, and Chapters, and all other forfei­ted Estates; and all these engaged in these Wars against the King, as to Civils. These Interests again are so inter­woven by purchases, and inter-marriages, and thereby for­feited, as, I think, upon rationall grounds, it may be taken for granted, that no Government can be either Good, Peacefull, or Lasting to these Nations, that doth not rati­onally include, and comprehend the security, and preser­vation of all the aforesaid Interests, both civill, and spiri­tuall. I mean so far as by the Word of God, they are war­ranted to be protected and preserved. But,

1. If the Sects he mentions, had their Birth in the Wars, 'tis without dispute, that all of them are grosse Errors, (truth being of an elder off-spring) and so not fit to be secured, unlesse he means, in the Souldiers Dialect, to be restrain'd; nor are they then to be preser­ved, unlesse it were lawfull to do evill, that good may come thereof.

2. If the parties he mentions, were engaged in Wars against the King, they were perjured, and faith­lesse Persons, and so no security to be had for their ill­gotten Estates; they swearing with hands lifted up to the most High, to maintain his Person in Honour and Safety; and, during all the Wars, declaring their in­tents to remove his evill Counsellors only from him; and to say, There was a condition in their Oath to pre­serve him, till they had him in their power, is a strain beyond the invention of Machiavill, and a mentall reservation, first found out in Hell. But to destroy his [Page 5]Person, take his Estate, and then to provide for the security of the purchaser, will make us worse then Heathens, and their practices to upbraide our provi­sions; for, Majores nostri religiosissimi, (saith Salust) nihil victis cripiebant, praeter injuriae licenciam. And Sene­ca commends the practice, nihil ex Rege victo praeter gloriam sumere.

3. Suppose the interests aforesaid are to be preser­ved and secured: Why cannot Monarchy preserve them as well as any other species of Government? in regard, it partakes with all the advantages of the other forms, without sharing in their disadvantages. Sure if they ought to be preserved, Monarchy is no more exclu­sive of them in England, than of Hugonets and Sects in France; or the like interests upon the admission of Charls the fourth, into that Kingdome: Yet let the People have their free Elections in Parliament, and there chuse their own Government, (sure they know what is best for them) and what ever they shall there establish, no doubt the Nation will acquiesce in, and yield conformity and obedience unto it; but 'tis un­reasonable to put them upon that election of a Junior in the messe in Cambridge, either to take the Rump or Nothing.

But, because the Generall supports his Arguments in part upon Mr. Harrington's principle, that the sup­port of Monarchy being taken away, that Govern­ment cannot be admitted; I must first remember him, that the King's Lands are not all the support of Mo­narchy: and then tell him, Mr. Harringtons principle, that all Government is founded upon over-ballance in propriety, is a weak and an uncertain proposition. For,

1. He might with as much truth have told us, that the Government of a ship is founded upon over-bal­lance of propriety in that ship; or the Government of a Town, in the over-ballance of Estate in that Town. But his thinne fallacy is transparent to him that can di­stinguish that which is constitutive of a thing, from that which is consequutive of it.

2. I think he is no Peripatetique; Arist. 2. Analyt. lib. 1. cap. 2. for, his principle hath nothing of Aristotle's requisites in principles, that is, that they be vera necessaria, immed ata, priora, notiora, & causae conclusionis; I mean, principia com­plexa sen praemissa Demonstrationis [...] — His Over-ballance is not a new coyn'd word, but 'tis analogum proportionis, purely Tropicall, and so unfit to be used in a principle of Demonstration.

3. If by propriety he intends all the species of it, whereof Principality is one, Parturiunt montes, &c. And yet that is not alwayes true, for he that hath the Legi­slative, Judiciary, and Military power, and not the Right also, hath the Government; that is, he hath jus possessionis, but he hath not jus proprietatis, the propri­ety of it. But if by Propriety, he intends onely the largest Estate in Lands or Goods, his assertion is every way false: for one may have the largest Estate, and yet not the power aforesaid; and one may have the power aforesaid, and not the largest Estate; because they are genera co-ordinata, &, by consequence, eorum differentiae sunt specie diversae, I mean ultimatè constitutivae. The Law of the Land might have inform'd him this. Indeed, it calls them both Inheritances: yet he that incroacheth upon the power of the Soveraign, is said to dis-inherit him; but he that enters upon his Estate, is onely term'd an Intruder, and works no change at all upon the Estate: It is also manifest in the distinction of te­nures in Capite, from th'other tenures which Littleton acquaints us with.

4. Lib. 2. cap. 3. De jure Belli & Pacis. Moreover all Government is relative to the peo­ple, and an Estate is so far from being the foundation of it, that Prince and People both, may consist with­out it. Let Grotius judge: Imperium (saith he) duas solet habere materias, sibi subjacentes: primariam, Personas (quae materia solùm inter dum sufficit, ut in exercitu virorum, mulierum, puerorum, quaerente novas sedes): Secundariam, Locum, (qui Territori [...]m dicitur, &c.) Quanquam autem plorumque uno actu quaeri solent, Imperium & Dominium; sunt tamen distincta.

5. Examples of the rise of Governours make against [Page 7]him John de Medices, the raiser of his Family in Florence, got the government of the City by his wisdom and great dis­cretion, not by over-ballance in propriety, as Guicciardine may inform us. And to instance in Sparta; What over-ballance of propriety had Lycurgus in Lacedaemon, being onely Protector of Carilaus? yet He, by his own power, could mould the Government as he list, make a Senate, and bestow the Supream Power as he pleased. I could produce moreapt instances, were it not to serve the Common-wealths men, in their own Country.

6. It is unreasonable, that a rich man (in a reduplica­tive sense) shall govern me, because he hath contracted a larger estate than I; but it is naturall for the strong to rule the weak, as, for a man to govern a child, or the wise to govern a fool.

7. His Principle is destructive of his Equall Common­wealth: for, if all Government be founded upon Over-ballance in Propriety, his Equall Common-wealth is no Government: But all Government is founded upon Over­ballance in Propriety: Therefore, &c. The Connexion is plain: for where there is an Equality, there is no Over-ballance; where no Over-ballance, (upon his ground) no foundation for Government; and where there is no Foun­dation, there can be no Superstructure: the assumption is his own principle: therefore 'tis necessary, that his Com­mon-wealth be no Government. Thus, while others in fighting for Propriety in Government, haue reduced us to no Government at all, Mr. H. by laying foundations for his imaginary Common-wealth, hath principl'd us for a no Common-wealth at all.

But the Generall hath another Argument, we may well call Argumentum Hercul [...]um, That the Army will never endure Monarchy. I answer, 1. Who made Cromwell Protector? ab esse ad posse is a good Argument. 2. 'Tis in vain for him that will do good, to ask advice of him that never intends any. Nulla fides pietasque viris qui castra sequuntur, is the Motto of most Souldiers; and hath seldom been falsified, but in that noble Legion, which chose rather to die Martyrs, than live Traitors. 3. If the Souldier rule us, then 'tis their Government, not Repub­lique; [Page 8]for 'tis not Republique to be under force. 4. It is Aristotle's Argument, Arist. polit. lib. 4. cap. 2. That Monarchy is the best Govern­ment, because Tyranny, its opposite, is the worst: It shall be my Argument, ad hominem, by way of retortion, To have Monarchs as the best Governours, because Souldi­ers, the worst of Tyrants, are the most against it. Opposi­ta juxta se posita magis elucescunt.

Lastly, The Generall hath one other Argument deserves more consideration, to wit, That Introduction of Monar­chy will occasion a new war. But, 1. Will the seclusion of it procure us Peace? or rather intail a War upon us and our posterity? 2. Can we ever purchase peace with the price of iniquity? 3. Can there be any way imaginable to re­concile all interests, but by a full and a free Parliament, where the grievances of all parties may be heard, and the injuries of the greatest be redressed? for without this, let a brib'd Orator prate what he will, or a seditious Burgess plot what he can, 'tis as impossible to obtain peace and safety, or for a man to be at ease while he is upon the Rack; as to empty a River, untill the Springs thereof be stopt. And set up by force what Tribunitiall Power you please, you will find to be true the words of Livie; Tribu­ni militum, lib. 4. consulari potestate, quatuor creati sunt (saith he), Quintius Paenus ex consulatu, C. Furius M. Posthumius, A. Cornelius Cossus. Ex its Cossus, praefuit urbi. Tres, delectu habito profecti sunt Veios, documentoque fuerunt quam pluri­um imperium bello inutile esset. I endendo ad sua quisque consilia, cum aliud ali [...] videretur, aperuerunt ad occasionem locum host: incertam namque aciem, signum altis dare recep­tui, al [...]is cani jubentibus, invatêre opportune Veientes: Castra propinqua turbantes, ac terga dantes accepere. Plus itaque ig­nominiae quam cladis est acceptum. Moesta civitas fuit, vinci insueta; odisse Tribunos, poscere Dictatorem, in eo verti spes ci­vitatis. Iliad 2: And you will be forced to say with Homer at last, (with which Aristotle concludes the twelfth of his Meta­physicks)