I will not medle with the question, how farr Princes and States are bound to succour their opprest Neighbours, or to prosecute with Warre the Enemies of Religion, Gouvern­ment, and humane Society: which may receive a different so­lution according to the variety of circumstances, and the con­dition of their owne Affaires: But this may be laid for a ground; that the concurrence of any to the confirmation of the usurped power of such persons, must be very unlawfull to Christians. Among civill Heathens, not only sacriledge against their Gods, but Injustice against their Neighbours were the sole occasion of divers great warrs, as we find related by Historians; they holding themselves bound, without reason of State, to the vindication of Prophanation, and releife of the oppressed: And it were to be wished, that here in Christians were not behinde them, having more apparant obligations by divine revelation, then those Hea­thens by light of nature: And it frequently falls out, that while men looke only at home to their owne Commodity, and neglect the Calamity of their Neighbours, and thinke, prudence directs them to their owne good, and to oversee the considerations of Piety, and Charity, they derive the same evill upon themselves, which they securely permitted to be exercised on others. The greatst scourges of the world have arisen from such security, while Princes and States respected not the growth of some desperate lewde persons by the ruyn of their Neighbours. The Saracens, (and since the Turke) are in most mens knowledge. And the supine neglect of Princes, that introduced the suffrings of Christendome; and their owne ruyn in those times, by the growth of such De­stroyers, are better remembred then remedyed. It's now evident to most Princes and States, that it hath beene more agreable to [Page 4] Religion, Iustice and Prudence, that they had vigorously acted in suppressing the English Rebellion, and the effects of it are worse upon themselves, then they foresaw: especially upon the States of the low Countryes, who now discerne, that by this usurped Ari­stocraticall power of a few, the ancient nationall affection between the Dutch and English is quite abolished, in asmuch as respects the governing Party In England; and the Interest of Trade so farr prosecuted, that the now English Rulers take it for graunted, that their new power in England cannot continue, unles the Dutch be their Vassalls, and that it is impossible they should have a Trade proportionable to their new modelled State, while the Dutch en­joy the former freedome of Trade, they had with the Monarchy: And none, that looke into the Actions of the English Rebells, can conceive the warr begun by them proceeded from private choller or animosity, without predesigne upon reason of State, if eyther the strength of each be considered, or the councells that their con­dition must suggest to them: First the English consider, that all Trade to the South and West must be more difficult to the Dutch then the English, the passage being through the narrow Seas, where the English have so great advantages by their naturall situation, and wil be able to Trade with lesse danger, and with lesse charge annoy the Trade of the Dutch, then they can secure it: for the En­glish Harbours give them the opportunity of all advantages to fight, or forbeare. The English can better suffer a diminution of Trade, in regard of the largenes of their Territory, and a greater store of all necessaries within the land: And the excessive charge which the Dutch must be at to secure their Trade will eate it up. Upon these grounds the English Rebells found themselves, that the issue of the warr must be to their advantage. That it is necessary for them to have a warr, not only to gayne a power over the Dutch, but to secure themselves; for they must of necessity keepe an Army, & a Fleete on foote, ruling now by force, without right by any law Divine, or humane, a people wholy disaffected to their power, and to be kept under only by a Rod of Iron. They discerne their Fleete cannot be maintained by themselves, but by the pillage of the Dutch, who they intend shall bear their charges, there being no Nation els, that they can with more opportunity serve them­selves of in that kinde, the Spanish Trade being not yet to be given over by the English, which is the chiefest that is left their Mar­chants, and the French being of farr lesse importance to them, then the Dutch. These considerations overweigh with those Rebells, [Page 5] that apprehend their strength by Sea, and Land, and the Victories, and Military inclination of their Armies, all thoughts of the op­portunities, that the Dutch can give to breake their power. The warr being begun, and upon these grounds, I dare not advise, but give you my conceptions, wherin I shall not dissent from the com­mon opinion, that the most probable way, to preserve the low Countryes, and to make the warr short, and prosperous, is to de­clare for the Interest of the King of England: And though this way may looke like a motion proceeding from the affection of a Loyall Englishman towards his Prince, yet it, will appeare to be drawne from reasons of the Dutch condition. First take the businesse in ge­nerall as it is a State of warr, all meanes possible are to be used to disunite the Ennemy, and contract all Alliances possible for de­fence: And touching the first, there is no meanes so prevalent to disunite the English, and to divert their forces, as the Dutch to declare for the King: for as all those in His three Kingdomes, that have Loyalty left, will contribute all they can to the King: and to such Princes and States as assist Him: so many newtrall, and indif­ferent persons, in those Kingdomes, will not then account the warr a nationall quarrell, as yet they understand it, but the Intrest of the Rebells only, whence the rupture in England will be wider, and more to their ruyn, for there by all the greivances for want of Trade in England, and oppressions to maintaine their warr will be cast on the true causers, and the people of England will lay hold on the advantage presented for their release, whereas at present many English have a great animosity against the Dutch for not de­claring for the King, having so cleere an occasion, and they inter­pret it as a disaffection to the King and the English Nation, now languishing under a sore oppression, and the Dutch only seeke how to serve themselves without consideration, or sense of their sad sufferings. If the Kings cause were owned by them, many, aswell Sea-men, as others in His three Kingdomes, would imploy them­selves on the Seas to make prize of the trading English, which now they doe not in regard of the doubt they have of the intention of these Countryes for the King, and there would there upon follow a great want of Sea-men in England, and such, as served, would be suspected by them, and not without cause: And the losses the English would sustaine by such English Sea-men, and others, as would imploy themselves in shipps of warr, would be greater then the Fleets set out of Holland doth them. The assistance from for­reigne Princes would be better procured, & more surely reteined, for they are more sensible of the perfidious proceedings of the [Page 6] Rebells against their King and Countrey, then of the losses of the Dutch, and they are doubtfull to embarque themselves in a warr with the Dutch, when they professe no other end then Retorsion for their losses, which is no other, then Letters of Reprisall, and will not beleeve, that the United Provinces have a thorow resolu­tion to make warr against the Rebells in England, untill they shall see that the King of England be taken in by them, whose Interest is so very necessary to the good successe of that warr: and most Prin­ces will sooner be invited before the Dutch have received a losse then after, and the Dutch danger is greater in a losse, then their advantage in a Victory; The one being a ruin to their Trade: The other not a full security: And most men conclude from the not de­claring for the King, that the Dutch wil be content to have peace, even on very hard conditions, while the King is not owned, nor such Alliances made as might remonstrate they intended to try the event of a warr. The Rebells of England likewise make the same collections from the forbearance of the States of the Netherlands to take in the King into their quarrell, and take it to be a feare to provoke them too farr, or a feare, that the King may prejudice their affaires. For the first, the Dutch, in all reason, ought to re­move that conceite, for there cannot be a greater encouragement to an Ennemy, then to know, that his Ennemy feares him, whence their Souldiers take heart, and such as love them not, who are in power, for feare dare not now professe, or act against them. It cannot be expected, that any strangers should so Passionately enter into a warr against those Rebells upon the Injuries they have done the Netherlands, as upon the horrid Regicide and many Murthers, Barbarismes, and vaillaines that they have acted to gaine their power, which hath made them odious to all good Christians and honest men: And it must needes prove a violent motive to any to act in a warr, when the impieties of the Ennemy are more preva­lent then private Interest. Many of those in the very Provinces themselves, that fight in the warr, being not so sensible of the losses of others, that have been robbed by the Rebells, as of the wickednes they have committed at home. And if the States declare for the King, it may be reasonably presumed, that no Prince or State will assist such odious Rebells against them, so as they wil be the declared Ennemyes of mankinde. Such English, as have a de­sire to assist the Dutch against those Rebells are loath to adventure themselves, when they apprehend they advance not the cause of the King, nor contribute to the ruin of the Rebells, but only to a [Page 7] pacifiation of the hostility begun betweene the two Nations, which will render the condition of the English more miserable. It is not unknowne to the Rebells, how great a party is still in heart for the King in the three Kingdomes, nor to others by what means these Rebells seeke to destroy them. And the consideration of the Royall party, being by farr the most numerous in the three King­domes, is a great cause why the Rebells must have a warr, and thence it must follow, that their Ennemies must seeke to make the best advantage of that party, which will be oppressed by the Re­bells during the warr, and be useles to those, that have warrs with them, while they declare not for the Kings Right, which that party desires only to maintaine. And though the readines of the King, party to rise did not appeare at his Maj. last coming into England out of Scotland, that was not for want of will, they being surpri­zed by the Kings sudden, and unexpected coming, whereof they had not notice till the Rebells had formed their army, placed guards in all places, and imprisoned all the principall Persons they su­spected to be well affected to his MAJESTY. I shall not offer the motives of Religion, which as it inclined Queen ELIZABETH to the succour of the United Provinces, ought not to be neglected to the King against the most scandalous Sectaries, hipocriticall Traytours, and bloody murtherers, that any age hath produced Nor those of honour, that those Countries apprehended the op­portunity of reinvesting the King, and destroying the Rebells, & were the first declared Enemies of them upon that ground. The profit is very evident by what hath byn said with this addition, that if they take in the Kings cause, there is likely to be a speedy end of the warr, and all Princes, that have an Interest in the preserva­tion of the United Provinces, must heartily engage in their assi­stance, where at present there is scare hope of the end of a warr, and a peace would be but a snare, when on the one side its like to hold no longer then the first opportunity offers advantage in the breach of it, and would prove as ruinous as a warr could be ex­pected. Those Countryes have the experience of the principles of falshood, and infidelity that these Rebells steere by, that there is no dependance on any promises, or Leagues they make, they considering only their owne advantages: And if they offer to treate for peace, it is only to ly in waite to surprize those they treate with, and to make them unprovided by omitting needefull preparations, or seasonable enterprizes, or losing profitable Al­liances for their support. And it were an indelible infamy, if these [Page 8] Provinces should cast themselves into the subjection of those execrable Rebells, who will never treate with them on better ter­mes, nor thinke themselves secure in any peace with them with­out the possession of cautionary Townes. It were not reasonable that the King should make known the waies of attaining his rights, or the use he can make of his Loyall subjects if an occasion were offred, untill his Interest be taken into the warr, for that were to make all meanes fruiteles, and to betray his cause, and friends to the Enemy: But it may easily finde credit, when so great a part of his Kingdomes are affected to him, that there can­not want many waies, & advantages to weaken the Rebells power, and give an entrance to his right, and the peace of these Count­ries by the helpe of his Allies; And there can be no apprehension of danger from taking in the King, neither to the publique, nor private persons, who may be consident of Iustice, and gratitude from him: it being a rare Example, if any Prince or his posterity hath ever forgotten so great an obligation to those, that have restored him; And they connot thinke, that he wilbe a cause to undermine, or subject that State, that endeavour to advance his, Neyther can it consist with his honour, and Interest to disunite them, or set up parties against one another. It must be his endea­vour to reconcile all differences among that people, that assist him, it being the worke of his Enemies to create jealosies; and disaffe­ctions beetwene his frinds. And such as prefer the preservation of domesticke wellfare in their States before kindnesses to friends, or detestation of bloody usurpers, must conceive the same consi­deration in the King to set his owne Interest before any personall respects: And no jealosy can feare that from him, which will not certenly be acted by his Rebells, if he be not restored. Thus have I breifely delivered you what I apprehend of the present condi­tion of this warr: and I am the more confident, that I am not swayed by Interest, or partiality, finding most men of different nations, and uningaged concurr in the Conclusion. That nothing can render the warr so short, not the Netherlands so strong, and safe, as the speedy ioyning in the cause of the King of England.