USurpation is an intrusion into the Seat of Authority, a presuming to possesse, and manage the place & power thereof without a lawfull calling, right, or title there­unto. A lawfull call or title to that rule, and Govern­ment which is supreme (of which I have to speak) is derived, or comes from God, There is no power but of God, (saith the Apostle) the powers that be are ordained of God: Rom. 13.1. It were a sense too large, and not to be defended to take these words absolute­ly, and unlimitedly of all power, in regard either of title, or measure, and use. An unjust power in regard of Measure, or the stretching of Power beyond its due bounds, or the abuse of it is generally denyed to be of God by way of warrant; and an unjust power in regard of title, or an Authority set up, and ad­mitted against, or without right, God himself denyes to be of him. They have set up Kings, but not by me; they have made Princes, and I knew it not: saith he, Hosea 8.4. Which speech is by the cur­rent of Zanchius, Iu­nius, Geneva interpret. Pa­reus, Diodate: Anotations of Divines in Iocum. Expositors applyed to Jeroboam, and his successors, coming in to be Kings of Israel in that manner as they did; For although Jeroboam had a prediction (yea, suppose it a grant) that he should be King of ten Tribes, 1 King. 11.29. yet the peo­ple, at Solomons death, had no command, or direction from God to cast off Rehoboams government, and make him their King; it was therefore sedition, and rebellion in them; and both a mani­fest breach of the fifth Commandment; Vide Paraeum in Hos. 8.4. and of the positive Law of God, Deut. 17.14, 15. and Jeroboam was faulty in that, though he had Gods preconcession of a Kingdom over ten Tribes; yet having had no order from him about the time, manner, or the particular ten which they should be; he did not seek and tarry for a further direction, and calling from God; as David did in the like case 2 Sam. 2.1.. And although the Lord, when it was done, testi­fied [Page 2] that the thing was from him 1 King. 12.24; yet we must understand it to have been so by his permissive counsell, and generall con­course, or providence onely, as all actions as they are actions, and all events that are evils of punishment; and as they are such, are, though the actors among men that bring them be ne­ver so sinfull in them; but not by his approbation, appointment, or constitution; the event was from God; but not the sinfull means by which it was accomplished; he ordered the evil carri­age of men to that effect, but he gave them no order for that evil carriage: so that though, in a sense, it was of him; yet in re­gard of authorizing, it was without, and against him, and, in the Apostles sense, none of Gods ordinance. But of this we shall have occasion to speak again hereafter.

God giveth a calling, or invests with a right to Soveraignty, either immediately, by making and declaring the choice, and designing the person himself; or mediately, by committing it to the people to elect, and constitute both their form of Govern­ment, and the persons that are to sway it over them, which he hath done to all Nations; yet with a reservation to himself of power to interpose with his own immediate designation when he pleaseth: and when he doth not so, the vote of the people is the voice of God, (ordinarily) and they passing their consent when a Magistrate is to be set over them, that power, so consti­tuted, is of God, as his ordinance. And this may be the reason why that, which in one place is called the ordinance of God, is, in another called the ordinance of man, or an humane creature: 1 Pet. 2.13. By the former way the Judges and Kings of Israel had, or ought to have had their admission to rule, Deut. 17.14. and that was extraordinary, and peculiar to that people; the latter is the onely ordinary, lawfull, and warrantable way of creating a right, and title to the helme of Magistracy in other Nations. And as in the former the call of God was sometimes personall, or of one single person; as was that of Moses, Joshua, Samuel, Saul, and others: and again, sometimes lineall, or of a whole race: as was that of David and his seed 2 Sam 7.12.: So it is in the latter, Prin [...] [...] [...]in mu [...] appe­ [...]unt, nec boni ipsi. nec boni fine, quos re­press [...] tamen mos sive le [...] Gentium re­pagulo duplici, Elect onis & lu [...]cessionis, &c. Iusti Lipsi polit: l. 2. c 4. the peo­ples constitution of their Governors may either be individuall, or intransient; as in those kingdoms, or States which are called (in a strict acception) Elective; or it may be continuated, and successive; as in those Kingdoms, or Principalities which are [Page 3] called hereditary, and possessed by descent: both wayes Princes are by the peoples Election, and Consent; and the latter is pre­ferred, by many wise Statists, before the former Minore dis­crimine sumi principem qu [...]m quaeti. Tacit. Hist. l. 2.

I shall not insist on the distinctions, that might be observed touching the manner of the peoples passing their consent; nor determine which of them is sufficient, and which not, to make this right or title, whether it must be antecedent to possession, or may be consequent, expresse, or tacite: collective, or repre­sentative: absolute, or conditionated: free, or enforced: revo­cable, or irrevocable. The consideration of these is not mate­riall to the resolution of what is in question; it sufficeth that it be yeelded, that the peoples consent is (besides that which is by commission immediately sent and signed from heaven) the one­ly derivation of a lawfull call, or claim to Government Quirtum ver [...] regalis Monarchiae genus est quae iam tempori­bus Heroicis voluntate civi­um, & patriis legibus atque institutis ap­probata est. Aristot politic. li 3. num. 8 [...]. Luk. 12.13, 14. When our Saviour Christ (who being such an extraordinary person, might have warrant to do what would have been presumption in any other) was appealed to in a cause that appertained to the civill Magistrates decision; he refused to deal in it, with these words, Who made me a Judge, or a divider over you? accor­ding to which words of him, who was the truth, he that may rule, must be placed in that office by some body, and may not undertake it of himself: no man may take this honour to him­self, or be his own advancer to the Throne; but he must be in­stalled by another: and what other creature, besides the Nation it self, can challenge a power to appoint over it its Rulers is not to me imaginable. Angels are not of this Oeconomie, do not intermeddle in this businesse, and for other people, or forrein States they are but in an equalitie, and have no partnership in this matter; they have no more to do to impose Governors over their neighbours, then they have reciprocally over them; and to whichsoever may attempt it towards the other, by the ana­logy of our Saviours words, it may be said, Luk. 12.13, 14. Who made thee a Judge, or Rule maker over me?

A calling from the people, who are to be subject being so ne­cessary, and essentiall to a humanely constituted Magistracie; it is easie to discern what is Usurpation, viz: that which is op­posite to it, or privative thereof, which is a snatching hold of the Scepter, and wresting it out of the hands of those who are to dispose of it, or have it committed to them: it is ordinarily [Page 4] termed, a tyrannie in regard of title, or without title: The di­stinction betwixt lawfull Magistrates and Tyrants is thus given by Aristotle: Reges enim non solum se­cundum legem, sed etiam vo­lentibus, Ty­ranni autem invitis impe­rant. Aristot. polit. l. 3. num. 87. Etenim si no­lentibus impe­ratur, regnum protinus esse desinit. Tyran­nis efficitur quae vi domi­natur. Verum reg­num est impe­rium voluntate civium dela­tum: at si quis vel fraude, vel violentia domi­natur manife­st [...] Tyrannis est. idem. li. 5. num. 112. Kings do reign, not onely according to the Law, but over them that consent to them; Tyrants rule over men against their wils. If any govern against the minde of the governed, it ceaseth to be a King­dom, and becometh a Tyrannie which ruleth by force. All lawfull power then is founded upon the wils of those over whom it is set; Contrariwise Usurpation is built upon the will and power of them that hold the Government; it is a self-created, or self au­thorised Power, such was that of Deinde Cinna, Carbo s [...]se, sine comi­ [...]iis consules creabant in bi­ennium. Chro. Carion. li. 2. Cinna, and Carbo, who made themselves Consuls, without any Court-election, in the time of the Romane sociall war betwixt Sylla and Marius; and that of Ex Dictatore Consulem se cum P. Servilio ipse facit. Clu­ver. Hist. li 7. pag. 235. Julius Caesar who made himself Consul, together with Publius Servilius; such was that of the Chaldeans over the Jews, Hab. 1.7. Their judgement and their dignity shall proceed of themselves, saith the Prophet, that is, as Deodate expounds it, they received no Law, nor assistance from any; their right consists in their will, and the execution in their power.

Usurpation being defined, we may proceed to distinguish of it according to severall heights, or degrees it is capable of; as 1. It is either where the Throne is vacant, and undisposed of (which may happen sundry wayes, as when a Common­wealth is new erected, or the possessors of the Government re­signe, or are extinct, and none left to lay claim to it) or, where it is full, and possessed de jure, and the Rulers are onely violent­ly extruded, and kept out.

2. Usurpation is either meerly in point of Title, and admi­nistration of a received and settled Government; or by way of innovating in the Government it self; over-turning the consti­tution of it, and forming it a new.

3. It may come to be acted either from those without, viz: Forreiners, and strangers to the State; or by Natives, and natu­rall Subjects of the Kingdome.

4. It is done by these, either against the single tye and duty of obedience and Allegiance owed to the present lawfull Au­thority; or against Allegiance bound with Oaths and sacred Covenants. All the sorts of each of these distinctions are direct, and formall usurpations, but the latter of each far surpasseth the other respectively, and a conspiration of them all makes an [Page 5] Usurpation of a meridian altitude; when a party owing obe­dience and subjection to a long continued, and undoubted law­full power, and solemnly sworn to submit too, and support that Government, shall rise up, and presume to thrust out the possessors, and invest it self, yea, and not onely seize on the Power; but of its own minde, and will, or, by its force alone, abolish the settled, and set up a new mould of government; this is Usurpation to the culmen or height of it.

Having thus found out what Usurpation, and what the Ze­nith of it is; we may put a case wherein it will be easie to give a Judgement cleerly. Suppose a Nation in America, whose fun­damentall government is, and hath been anciently and con­fessedly constituted, and placed in a King, an House of Peers, and an House of Commons sitting in a collaterall, or coordi­nate rank, in regard of supremacy of power; the King being the supreme in order (unto whom, in such an association, Oaths of Allegiance and supremacy are generally sworn) next to him the Peers as the Upper, and the Commons as the Lower House of Parliament. Suppose also, the King, according to his place, summoning them, and they conformably assembling together in Parliament, and he and they personally concurring to act in the highest affairs of government; in the processe whereof differences arise betwixt the King, and the said two Houses; which grow to that height, as that he in person departs from them, a war breaks out betwixt them; the Kingdom is divided by partieship with them, on the one side or the other; the two Houses continue acting joyntly, no: onely in managing their military defence; but in the other publick, both religious and civill affairs of the Kingdom; they petition, remonstrate, and declare for a necessitie of an association, and conjunction of the King and the two Houses as the fundamentall constitution, and government of the Kingdome; they enter into, and prescribe to the people. Protestations, Vows, Oaths, and Covenants, for the upholding of the Authority and Power of both so constitu­ted: they professedly fight for that associated Power, they pro­claim them Enemies and Traitors, they prosecute them with fire and sword, sequestration of estates, and other punishments, that go about to divide them asunder, or oppose the aforesaid Authority; and all this they do, and avow as the indispensably [Page 6] necessary discharge of their trust. Suppose after all this, the Army raised and imployed by the said two Houses in the afore­said war, confederating in their Leaders (as by the immediate sequell manifestly appears) with a small party in the Lower House; Remonstrates to that House (without any addresse to the other) many high and strange things they would have done by them, and amongst the rest, that the King be proceed­ed against, as for treason, and other capitall crimes; in like manner his two eldest Sons, if they render not themselves with­in a day to be set them: that it be declared that the peoples Re­presentatives in the House of Commons shall have the supreme Power, and all other shall be subject to them; in which de­mands, that House not being so obsequious to them as they ex­pect, but standing upon the collegueship of that Government, which they with their associates, the King, and the House of Peers are intrusted with; the Army, forthwith, marcheth up to the doores, and by force of Arms seizeth on, and shuts up in hold one sort of them; and by a strong guard set at their doores shuts out another, suffering onely a small number of them, and such as please them to sit in the House. Suppose lastly, this little number, left in the House, shall approve of, and second these proceedings of this Army; and by their act, or Vote confirm the seclusion of that greater number of the Members of that House; and, taking upon them to Act in the name of that House, shall Enact or declare themselves to be the onely Supreame Autho­rity in the Nation, and by that pretended solitarinesse, and su­premacy of power shall take away, and abolish the other House of Parliament, destroy the life of the King, deny, and disanull the Title of his Heirs, and Successors, to the Crown and King­dome; abolish the office of a King, and ordain and govern soli­tarily over the people, as their onely supreame Power, and re­quire their obedience, and subjection as to such. The quaere, in this case thus propounded is, whether this said party, as thus acting, and as to this latitude of Authority, be usurpers, yea, or no? whether this their removing others from the Seat of Su­preame Power, and assuming it peculiarly to themselves, be, or be not Usurpation (as Usurpation hath been before prescribed) and that to the very apex, or highest pinacle of it; yea, whether they be, or be not guilty of a double Usurpation?

First, in usurping the name and Authority of that House. It may haply be said for this. 1. That possibly they may make a quorum, or as many in number as are required to act. R: But are they not supposed to be under actuall and present force, which hath been, without contradiction by any, adjudged a ground of nullity to Parliamentary proceedings. For though all are not required to be present, yet the House must be free for all to come to, that their acts may be free and authorative.

2ly, That perhaps they may be most willing, voluntary, and free in their acts, and the force that hath taken away others may be no force but a security to them, being of the same prin­ciples, apprehensions, and designes with them. R: But though they as men may be free, yet taking upon them the name of the House, are they free as an House? the House includeth virtually every Member of it, many whereof being violently excluded by those that guard the meeting place, how free soever those persons are that sit, how can the House be said to be free? nay, doth not their voluntarinesse and free complyance make the Usurpation compleater? Could they be said to be enforc'd to declard, and act such things, we might by a favourable inter­pretation, onely judge their Acts to be null; but when their pro­ceedings flow from their own wils, and they so concur to the exclusion of others more then themselves from the exercise of the power they with them are intrusted with, and assume to themselves a power, never confirmed on them by the people, but meerly of their own creation, how can this be lesse then Usurpation to the life?

2ly, In usurping (in the name of that House) the sole supre­macy of Power in the Nation. It will be pleaded: perhaps, that the House of Commons, in the supposed case, is the onely Re­presentative of the people, to whom alone the Nation hath committed the Supreme Power. R: 1. That House is not a Re­presentative of the whole Nation, but onely of the Commons, which though the bulk, and far more numerous part; yet can­not stand for the whole in choosing a Representative, but one­ly for themselves. 2. If it could be made good, that to that House, the whole Nation, in the originall constitution of Go­vernment, had committed the sole Power; the quaere would ea­sily be cast in the negative: but how will that be proved? The [Page 8] case, at it is put, presupposeth Antiquitie, and by past practise: and the actings of the present House of Commons, untill brought under force, to proclaim the quite contrary. 3. If no­thing, ab origine, can be shewed for that, did the King that sum­moned this Parliament, or the People that chose this House of Commons, supposed in the Case, passe over any such preroga­tive to them de novo; If either of them did, let us hear how. 4. It is too grosse an absurdity to be charged upon the suppo­sed present, and all former Representatives; that being intrust­sed by the people with the sole Supremacy, they have of them­selves associated to them the King, and the House of Peers, it being beyond the power of the constituted, and onely in the Constitutors to make such an alteration in the fundamentall Constitution; as Representatives cannot make Representatives or Proxies, so can they not take in Associates, or advance others, not impowered by them that impowered them into a Collegue­ship with them. I leave it therefore to every Reader to deter­mine the Case, and passe Judgement. Whether the sole supreme Power, in the presupposed party, be derived to them legiti­mately, or be not a Self-created power, and so a meer Usurpa­tion, and that of the fullest dimension; being against a lawfully settled Government, in prejudice both of the just Magistrates and the people: and in contradiction to both the single tye of Subjects Allegiance to Soveraignty, and the sacred sanction of Vows, Oaths, and Religious Covenants.

COncerning Obedience to an usurped Authority, I meet with two opinions, which I shall severally examine. 1. Is of those who hold obedience as due, and necessary; and that in as full a manner to such, as it is to the lawfullest Power. This is held, and argued for in a Tract, entituled, The lawfulnesse of obeying the present Government: as also in A Discourse, wherein is exa­mined, what is particularly lawfull, &c. By Ant: Ashcam Gent: See in his 2d. Part. cap: 9. Although indeed they both propound their [Page 9] opinion in the Title of their Discourse for obedience as lawfull; yet, in the prosecution, they plead for it in that fulnesse of la­titude as due, and necessarie. This their Tenent they strive to maintain in relation to the present State of England. I shall deal with it in reference to the case above proposed, and in thesi: 2. Is of those who, reserving their obedience as due and devoted to the lawfull Power, supposed to be still existent; do yet con­ceive they may submit and act under a usurped Power for the time, and during the intervall of its prevalency.

I begin with the former; wherein it is asserted by one of the foresaid Authors A Discourse, wherein is ex­amined. &c. by Ant: Ashcam Gent: Part. 2. Chap. 9. pa. 84., ( [...]nd the other comes not short of him in the sense and current of his Discourse) That upon the issue of a warre, and the Expulsion of a just party, a man may lawfully give up himself to the finall Allegiance of the unjust party. Against this Position must my Judgement stand, which dictates to me that I owe no obedi­ence to an Usurper; and to yeeld up my self in obedience or Al­legiance unto Usurpers, who have no other title but their usur­pation, is unjustifiable, and unlawfull, and that upon these grounds.

1. I cannot (if I would) yeeld up my self in obedience to him that hath no authority over me; take him as a Usurper, and my Allegiance is incompetible to him; obedience and au­thority; Magistrate, and Subject, are tearms of relation, and do Se mutuo ponere & tollere: they are inseparable from one another; if there be no Magistracy in him, there can be no obedience properly, and formally in me to him. I may (either warrant­ably or unwarrantably) do an act possibly which he command­eth, but that cannot be truly and properly said to be an act of obedience to him: his authority is null, of no reality Tyrannus absque t [...]tulo, qui est inva­sor, quilibet privatus potest, debet e medio tollere: neque enim ille Rex est, sed privata persona, &c. Alsted. Theol. Cas cap. 17. Regul 8. He is no Magistrate, but a private person; my fellow Subject, (if one of the Nation) or a forreiner to me; his commanding over me and others is, as if a private Souldier should take upon him to give orders to his Company, or an inferiour Officer to an Army; or a servant should offer to rule over his fellow servants.

In saying he is a usurper, you say enough for the nullifying of his Authority, and my obedience; whatever strength he may have to compell, he hath no Authority to command me: He is a Magistrate that hath the Subjects committed to his charge and care, say the Leyden Divines Magistratus subditos fidei, ac curae suae commissos tanquam Dei minister guber. nat. S [...]nops. pur. Theol dis­put. 50. thes. 3. in their Synopsis, and principality, [Page 10] Lypsius Principatus est imperium moribus aut legibus dela­tum susceptum, gestumque parentium bo­no. Iust. Lyps. polit. li. 2. c. 3. defines to be, A government delivered by Custome, or Law, and constitution to him that sustains it; and undertaken and managed by him for the good of the Subjects. Another defines a Magistrate to be Magistratus est publica persona succes­sione, sorte, aut suffragio ele­cta, &c Io: Can̄ Sphaera, Cin l. 4. cap. 15. A publick person, elected by succession, lot, or suffrage; which hath the right and power of Consultation, Judgement, and Command.

2. I may not (if I could) yeeld up my self as a Subject to the Usurper; in so doing, I should take away the right of the law­full Magistrate which he hath over me, and injure him in the allegiance which I stand tyed in to him, and he still retaineth the claim of at my hands. The Magistrate is (in the case in hand) granted to be in being; he is but deprived of possession and enjoyment, not of property or title; he is yet standing in the relation of a Magistrate to me; and is onely outed of his sta­tion perforce. The obedience of a Subject is not so arbitrary, or loose a thing, as that I may place and remove it at pleasure, or as affairs go; Rom. 13.7. but it is a debt which I must render to him un­to whom it is due. Neither is Soveraignty so common, ambu­latory, or prostitute a matter, as that its title ceaseth unto him that is violently extruded, or dispossessed of it, and becometh any ones that by force captivates it to himself; the expulsed Magistrate still standing upon his claim and right, and the power in possession having no title but his injurious and forcible entrance; the Subject is not disobliged from him that is expel­led, nor at his choice to transfer his obedience to another, nei­ther can the violent intruder challenge it. But in respect of the consequence of that which I here assert as unto resolution in this case, and for that I find the Gentleman, in the afore-named Discourse Discourse of Ant: Ashcam part. 2. ca 9. page 88. positively delivering the direct contrary to it; and that which is (as I think) very strange doctrine both in Chri­stianity and politiques, viz: That we are bound to own Princes so long us it pleaseth God to give them power to command us; and when we see others possest of their Powers, Part. 1. Chap. 5 page 22, 23. Part. 2. cap 9. page 90. we may then say, that the King of kings hath changed our Vice-royes; And further, that the point of right is a thing alwayes doubtfull; — possession generally is the strongest title that Princes have. And if possession was really the truest evidence to us of their (to wit, the expelled Princes) rights, then it is equitable to follow it still, though it be perhaps in a person of more injustice then they were. And the other book, I before cited, (viz: The lawfulnesse of obey­ing the present Government) maintains the same thing (both [Page 11] whose arguments, for what they say, I shall take notice of, when I have layed down mine own sense and Reasons) I shall therefore here labour to make good these two things: 1. That meer forcible extrusion deprives not any lawfull Magistrate of his right and title to supreame Power. 2. That violent possessi­on gives no right to the Seat of Authority; and consequently the Subjects allegiance is not turned about by the changes of powerfull possession, and dispossession.

1. Forcible extrusion or dispossession divests not of Dominion, that the state of the Subjects allegiancec should be altered by it.

First, if the vindication or recovery of a Princes, or peoples right of Dominion, out of which he, or they are ejected, or ex­cluded be a justifiable ground for his, their, and others in their behalf leavying and waging war, and prosecuting with the sword those that withstand the said recovery; then the right of him that is expulsed by force is not cancelled, or disanulled. The reason of this consequence is of it self evident, for nothing can be the ground of a war but a just and reall title, either to be defended, or recovered; but I assume, the recovery or redempti­on of a Princes or peoples right to a Kingdome with-held, or wrested from him or them, is a just ground of drawing the Sword, and commencing a war. This is proved (if it needeth any proof) by the war of the Judges & people of Israel, against the Kings and Nations that at severall times invaded and ru­led over them; against whom they rose up, and rescued them­selves, and the Dominion of their Land from them: the story of which acts, we have in the book of Judges, and by the warres of Samuel and Saul against the Philistines recorded in the 1. Book of Samuel: as also by Davids warlike undertaking against, and suppression of Absolom, who had carried away all Israel after him, into a Rebellion against David, & expulsed him out of the Land, 2 Sam. 15. &c. and 19.9. In like manner by Jehoiada's and the peoples rising in Arms against Athalia, the usurping Queen, 1 Macca. chap. 1. &c. in the right of Joash; and their suppressing, and destroying her, and enthroning him by force of Arms. 2 King. 11. And by the wars of the Maccabees against Antiochus, Epiphanes, and his succes­sors. Ioseph. de Bell: Iudaic. lib. 1. cap. 1. Cron. Carion. lib. 2. And the many undoubtedly lawfull wars of other Princes and States in such causes as these, which to insist on is super­fluous in so clear a matter.

Secondly, If right and title to Soveraignty be not built upon possession, but upon the Law of the Land, or other consent of the people, then it is not lost by dispossession; this consequence is founded upon that which a learned Statist Considera­tions touching a warre with Spaine, written by Francis Lo: Ve [...]ulam, &c. pa. 3d. saith, Is a received maxime almost unshaken, and infallible, Nihil magis naturae consenta­neum est, quam ut iisdem modis res dissolvantur quibus constituantur: There is nothing more agreeable to nature, then that things should be di­solved by the same means they are constituted. From which he infers, very pertinently to our case in hand, That if the part of the people, or Estate be somewhat in the Election, you cannot make them nulloes or ciphers in the prorivation or translation. But the right and title of Soveraignty is not built upon possession, (which the proof of the latter Position will clear) but upon the peoples consent, which hath gone for so currant an axiome, especially of late, that it will certainly passe without contradiction.

Thirdly, If a private property be not lost by losse of possession, neither (or rather much lesse) can such a publique property be lost by that means; there can be no such difference made be­twixt them as to enervate this consequence, and however, who sees not the incongruitie of this, that that which is the conser­vatory and protection of a private mans property, should be of a so much more slipperie tenure then it; but a private property is not lost by dispossession, if it were, for what use serveth the Law, or Magistracy? one main end of which hath been, to vin­dicate the Subjects right from usurpation, or what call you pro­perty? But he that either hath any, or granteth such a thing to be as property, will let this assumption passe.

Fourthly, If violent extrusion take away a Soveraignes right, then rebellion where it prospers and prevails is no treason; for there can be no treason, or other crime imputed as against the Crown, dignity, or authority of them, whose right therein is extinct and null; so that they are onely (according to this opi­nion) traitors or rebels, that rise up in Arms, and rebellion against the lawfull Power, and do not succeed and speed accor­ding to their desires. By this account, treason and rebellion shall consist, not in the maliciousnesse of the intent or attempt; but in the misfortune of successe, or impotency of the prosecution of it.

Fifthly, If force dissolve Magistracy; then that prohibition of [Page 13] resistance under pain of damnation: Rom. 13.2. is in vain, in that it concerns onely them that cannot resist effectually, and is no more then if he had said, resist not ye that want power to do it, lest if ye do, ye incur damnation: for they that have power, and please to use it to the deposing of the Magistrate, being that in so doing they put an end to his right, how can guilt remain on them?

2. Violent intrusion into, and possession of the Seat of Au­thority gives no right to it; and consequently neither draws allegiance after it, nor evacuates it in relation to another.

First, an unjust action cannot produce, or create a right. Non est ae­quum ut ex actu injusto, ius sibi quis acquirat D. Sand. de Iura­menti oblig. Praelect. 6. Sect. 4. Mo­rall good, and evill are at such distance, that the one cannot be the cause, the other the effect; but violent intrusion into Au­thority is an unjust action: Luk. 12.14. Man who made me a Judge, &c. and that whether it be by one that should be a Subject to that power, Rom. 13.2. Whosoever therefore resisteth, &c. ver. 5. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, &c. Tit. 3.1. 1 Pet. 2.13. or by a Forreiner, Judg. 11.12.27. 2 Chron. 20.10.

2ly, If violent occupation made a right; O pubes do­mitura Deos, quodcunquae­videtis pugnan­do dabitur: praestat victo­ria mundum. Cl. Claudiani Giganto ma­chia. then it were law­full for any, that could make a sufficient strength for it, to rise up in Arms, invade, and seise on any Kingdome or Territory, he can prevail over; yea to kill and destroy men and Countreys for Empire and Dominion, as Cicero scri­bens de officiis tertio libro semper Caesa­rem in ore ha­buisse Euripi­dis versus, quos sic ipse con­vertit: nam si violandum est ius regnanti gratia violan­dum est. aliis rebus pietatem colas Sucton. in lul. Caes. Caesar inclined to hold; for that which is of it self the way and means to place a man in a law­full estate, or calling, and makes him a lawfull possessor of it, must needs be lawfull: but it cannot be held lawfull for any, that can finde power, and advantage, to invade Crowns and Countreys, as is evident by the proof of the Assumption of the preceeding Argument.

3ly, If possession by power give a title; then its unlawfull for an oppressed Prince, or people to raise warre, or use any other means to expell an Invader, or remove such as have come in, and hold meerly by force; for its unlawfull to resist, or fight against a just Magistrate, Rom 13.1, 2. But it is lawfull for an oppressed Prince or people, by Arms, or otherwise to free them­selves from a forcible Usurper, as manifestly appeareth by those presidents given in the proof of the assumption of the first ar­gument for the former Proposition, to wit, the wars of Israel [Page 14] in the book of Judges, and 1. of Samuel, of David, Jehoiadah, and the Maccabees, and by the known Law and practise of all Nations, and consent of all Divines, and Christians, who with one vote allow defensive and recuperative Arms, excepting the Anabaptists, and some ancient Hereticks of their stamp.

4ly, All force ought to presuppose a right in that about which it is conversant; whether for the defence or recovery of its wars (saith Francis Lord Verulam, Considera­tions touching a warre with Spaine. pa. 2d. &c.) (I speak not of am­bitious predatorie wars) are suits of appeal to the tribunall of Gods justice, when there are no superiors on earth to determine the cause, and they are as civill Pleas, either Plaints or Defences: Force therefore cannot create a right, seeing it is to follow it, and both give it the precedencie in time, and own it as its ground-work; Adde to this, that the Sword is committed to the Magistrate ( and to him alone, saith Peter Martyr Gladius (ut ad Romanos habetur) pote­statibus dun­taxat est datus. Loc. commun. [...]l [...]ss. 4. ca. 20. loc. 12.) as its subject or owner; so that the Magistrate is before it, not made by it. The Sword makes not the Magistrate, (that is, it is not its principle of Generation,) but the Magistrate à warranto authorizeth the Sword; the sword may make for his conservation, but not for his Creation.

5ly, If force give a title (renitente populo) then that late so much decantated Aphorisme, All Power (to wit, Authority) is from the People, must be called in again; yea all Donations, Elections, Compacts and Covenants betwixt Prince and people are void, and null businesses. A third person that can get hold or power, and lists to usurp, may dissolve and evacuate them all; yea the Prince that comes in by them, when once he hath possession of the Power, holds by his power, and not by them, and can no longer, nor further look to retain his right to Au­thority then he can enforce it; and what Turkish and tyranni­call practises doth this doctrine put him upon of necessitie, if he will sit fast.

Mr. Ashcam part. 1. ca. 2. Sect. 4.6ly, No man naturally is more a Magistrate then another: Magi­stracy being in truth not a naturall, but a civill relation; as is that of husband and wife, master and servant: it must therfore be founded on some mutuall and reciprocall act, or agreement of both parties, to wit, Rulers and Subjects; and cannot result out of the action of one alone of them, nor can neither partie be meerly passive, in contracting such a relation. A mutuall civill obligation cannot arise but of the joynt or interchange­able [Page 15] concurrance of both.

7ly, Power and right, as also possession and right, are separa­ble, as all experience demonstrates; so it was in the controver­sie betwixt David and Absolom, and so it frequently happens to be: successe and victory doth not seldome follow the wrong party; and he would be thought irrationall amongst all men, wheresoever in the world, but where reason it self is brought under tyrannie, that should say, successe is the onely Arbitrator of Controversies of right, and is ever infallible.

8ly, Strength and Authority also are two distinct and sepa­rable things, and rarely meet in the same subject, but where ei­ther bruitishnesse, or all miseries prevail; man hath dominion given him over the beasts, many whereof are (and were by creation) stronger then he; What is a Generals natural strength to that of the Army over which he commands? What is a Kings, or a Counsels personall strength to that of the body of the peo­ple over which it sways? yea what is the hand in the naturall body to all the members under its government, in point of force? We see a small board or two, put in the place of a rud­der, guides the whole vessell. Amongst some beasts indeed the strongest rules; but amongst men it is not regularly so: yea, among some unreasonable Animals, not force, but fitnesse de­signed by Election obtains the rule. Bees, they say, choose their king, of whom Plin. Nat. Hist. lib. 11. Chap. 17. Plinie observes, that either he hath no sting, or Nature hath denyed him the use of it; being onely armed with majestie. And Aristotle saith, Arist. politic. lib. 1. num. 8. Naturali enim jure merito (que) fit ut qui pro­vida mente sa­gacique fuerir, is imperet, ac dominatur, qui autem cor­poris viribus & lacertis haec ipsa obire pos­sit, is contra subjiciatur, & serviat. It is by a kinde of naturall equitie and merit, that he that is of a sage and discreet understanding should rule; on the other hand he should obey, and be in subjection, that hath more strength of body, and Arms to perform service.

9ly, Where there is no title but power, there can be no rule for Government but power and will: onely that which gives right to Magistracy must set bounds to it; how can they be tyed to Laws, in exercising Government, that are tyed to none in coming by it? If the basis or bottome of Government be power, that must also be the measure of it; Nec quis­quam imperi­um flagitio quaesitum bo­nis arti [...]us ex­ercuit. Tacit. Histor. 1. so that a Magistrate, so holding, is confined to no justice, or Law; restrained from no violence, or sacriledge that his Power may extend to. That power, against whose forcible intrusion the Laws, and Consti­tutions made by Prince and people, for the settling of the [Page 16] Crown or Soveraigne rule, are of no validity, can reasonably have no obligation upon it from any other Laws made by the same parties; Magistratus est lex anima­ta. P. Martyr. the Authority that makes the Law is the Soul that quickens it; the Law springs from Authority, as the act doth from its habit or principle; so that grant, or prostitute Au­thority to the Sword as its right, and you subvert all settled Laws, whether fundamentall or superstructory; and this all ex­perience, as well as reason, dictates; for where, or in what Age did meer force assume the Empire without a lawlesse arbitrari­nesse challenged to it self?

10ly, If you yeeld the Sword such a right where it can be master in the publick or civill State; why should it not have the same interest in the private, domesticall, and personall? So that pyrates, theeves, and robbers, may justly claim a right to that which they can lay their hands on, and be accountable to none for their spoil and rapine.

[...].11ly, Whereas the Apostle to the Romans Chap. 13.2. for­biddeth resistance (or contraordination) to the lawfull power ordained of God, and that upon pain of damnation to be received by him that doth it, if force give a right to that power; his action, that resists with victory, shall be justifiable, and the resister shall gain a Crown instead of receiving damnation; and none shall fall under the guilt and penalty of resistance, but he that offers to resist, and cannot make it good. The sense then which this Posi­tion puts upon this text is catachresticall, and it glosseth the words so, as to be an incouragement to resist the power, for he that resisteth the power prosperously (according to it) posses­seth justly that ordinance of God, and in truth purchaseth to himself (not damnation, but) domination.

Having thus, I hope, sufficiently cleered the duty of Allegi­ance to be not the violent intruders, but the oppressed and vio­lently extruded Magistrates; I shall proceed to other Reasons against Subjects giving up themselves to the obedience of a u­surping party.

3. If I should do that, I should yeeld assistance to the Usurper in his wrong doing, and usurpation; and so become a partaker of his sin: obedience to one, as the supreame Magistrate, is a comprehensive thing, and includes many duties towards him at a power, viz: Receiving Commission from him for offices, [Page 17] or acts otherwayes not competible to me; maintaining and defending him in his power by pay, counsell, intelligence, Arms, and prayers; all which I am bound to yeeld the Usur­per, to my power, if I resigne mine allegiance up to him: and how shall I do these things, and not 1. support, and have communion with him in his wickednes. 2. Combine against, betray, and resist the right of the injuriously dethroned Ma­gistrate. 3. And make my self uncapable of obedience, or be­ing a Subject to the lawfull Power hereafter.

4. It were a publick wrong to the Nation I am a member of so to bestow mine allegiance; were I and the Countrey free from all tye of subjection (in the presupposed Case) to the expulsed Magistrate; yet I could not lawfully make such a private bargain of my allegiance, its the part and duty of a particular person in a Nation (that is joyned together as one body politick or Common-wealth) not to choose his head, or supreame Governor by his single election, or vote, but, when a new Magistracy is to be erected, or Magistrate ad­vanced, to attend the common and generall vote of the peo­ple, or body politick he is of; solitarily, or with a small party to alter the state and posture of my publick allegiance (in this case) would be sedition, and faction; the current of the people or community I am of is to be followed, at least where they justly dispose of the Soveraignty over them. It was in it self a loyall, and right resolution (had it been in such a case as this, and not misapplyed) which Hushai exprest, Nay, but whom the Lord and this people, and all the men of Israel choose; his will I be, and him will I follow; It would be to me (I confesse) a difficult case, and harder then I will here undertake to resolve, if the body of the Kingdom (in the case in hand) should either collective­ly, or representatively conspire; notwithstanding their oaths, vows, and Covenants, to abrogate the ancient Soveraigne Power, and to set up the Usurpers; but that's not the present case, here is no generall consent of the Kingdom presupposed, or pleaded for in behalf of the Usurper; the dispute is about obedience to meer Usurpation. And in this state of things, to leave every man free, to make over his allegiance by himself, is to open a doore to more divisions then ever yet were in any Age, or Nation, and would confound all, not an heptarchy; [Page 18] but a chiliarchy, 1 Sam. 10.27. 2 Sam. 19.41.20.1. or myriarchy might follow. When Saul had a generall vote of the people to be King, they were children of Belial that refused him; and at Davids re-investing after Ab­soloms treason, and fall, the men of Israel challenged them of Judah for going about to restore the King without them; the far greater part of the Kingdom, and that man of Belial, She­ba, the son of Bichri, was justly pursued with the sword unto death, for blowing a trumpet of defection from David, when they both had consented to re-advance him.

5. But there is a bar yet behinde, of as main a strength as any yet stood on, to keep back such a submittance to the Usur­per, and that is the Oaths, Vows, Protestations, and Cove­nants presupposed above to be taken by the people, for their owning, obeying and defending the power or Magistracy dis­placed, and in opposition to whose right the Usurper comes and continues in.

I have hitherto discussed the question in a case without re­flection upon any particular Kingdom, or reall Subject; and so I shall do still, onely I shall borrow leave, in the prosecution of this Argument, to presuppose, in the aforesaid Case, the Oaths and Covenant were the same that have been taken in this Kingdom of England. The Author of the book called, The lawfulnesse of obeying the present Government, in his 11. page mo­veth an inquiry thus: It were good to consider whether there be any clause in any Oath, or Covenant, which, in a fair and common sense, forbid obedience to the Commands of the present Government, and Au­thority: and proceeding, he onely makes enquiry into one clause of the Oath of Allegiance, which he strives to bow to his sense, and passeth by all besides. I shall speak to what he saith on that clause anon; and shall here onely interrogate, or propound by way of quaere, concerning divers clauses in the Oaths, Protestations, Vows and Covenants.

First, concerning the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, whereas in the former, it is sworn, I shall bear faith, and true Al­legiance to his Majestie, his Heirs, and Successors: and him and them will defend to the uttermost of my power, against all conspiracies, and attempts whatsoever, which shall be made against his, or their persons, their Crown, or dignity. And in the latter, I shall bear faith, and true allegiance to the Kings Highnesse, his Heirs, and lawfull Succes­sors: [Page 19] and, to my power, shall assist, and defend all jurisdictions, privi­ledges, preheminencies, and Authorities granted to the Kings High­nesse, his Heirs, and Successors; or united and annexed to the Imperiall Crown of this Realm. First, do not these Oaths binde, whomso­ever hath taken them, clearly, plainly, and in terminis to an Allegiance, over-living his Majesties person, and pitched upon his Heirs and Successors; so that he is not tree from the Oaths at his Majesties decease, or then left at randome to pay his allegiance to whom he will choose? 2. Do they not intend, by His Ma­jesties Heirs and Successors, the same persons, joyning them to­gether with the copulative (and) and not using the discretive (or) and the former Oath twice comprizing both in the fol­lowing clauses under the same terme or pronoune, ( viz: them, theirs) so that, according to these Oaths, His Heirs, are of right his successors, and none can be his Successor, (whilest he hath an Heir, and longer the Oath lasts not) but his Heir; and if any conspiracy or attempt should be made to prevent his Heir from being and continuing his successor, or to make any one his successor that is not his heir, (if he hath one) is not the Subject sworn, by vertue of this Oath, to continue his allegiance to his Heir as the right successor, and to defend him in that his right to his uttermost? 3. And doth not the tearm (lawfull) an­nexed to Successors (in the Oath of Supremacy) manifestly ex­clude all cavill of a distinction betwixt Heirs and successors; the word (lawfull) (whether you interpret it of legitimation of birth, or proximity of succession in regard of line, according to the Law of the Land, entailing the Crown upon his Maje­sties issue; or rather both the latter including the former, re­straining successors from meaning any other then his heirs? 4. And do not both these Oathes binde the swearer to assist and defend to his uttermost power, against all attempts, Mo­narchy, or the Kingly Office, and Government (in the race of his Majestie) cleerly expressed by many tearms, to wit, Their Crown or dignity, all jurisdictions, priviledges, preheminences, and Au­thorities, granted to the Kings Highnesse, his heirs, and successors, or united, and annexed to the Imperiall Crown of this Realm. How then can he yeeld obedience to them that are not his heirs, nor law­full successors, nor do so much as wear his Crown, or sway the Regall Scepter? How can he not oppose, and withstand [Page 20] them in the assistance and defence of the right of his Majesties heirs and lawfull successors?

2. Concerning the Vow and Protestation of the 5. of May, 1641. and the Solemn League and Covenant. 1. How can any that hath taken the said Protestation according to it, maintain and defend the true Protestant Religion, expressed in the Doctrine of the Church of England, against all Popery, and Popish innovations within this Realm, contrary to the same Doctrine; and yet yeeld obedience to an usurping authority, coming in, and holding in derogation of, and opposition to the lawfull Prince; when as the publick doctrine of that Church (layed down in the 2. Tome of Homilies, and the last Homily thereof approved of by the 35. Article of Religion) fully and flatly refuteth, and condemneth any Subjects removing, or disposing their Prince, upon any pretence whatsoever?

2ly, How can any man according to the Protestation, main­tain and defend, the power and privileges of Parliament, and accor­ding to the Covenant preserve the rights and privileges of Parlia­ment; and yet yeeld obedience to a small party of one of the Houses of Parliament, as the Supreame Power, the said party excluding the rest of that House, and the other House wholly; and deposing the lawfull Prince, and abolishing the Office of the King, whose presence, personall, or legall, and politicall, hath been declared inseparable from the Parliament, and joyning with an Army, that with force hath demanded, and carried on these things?

3. How can be, according to the Protestation, maintain and defend the lawfull rights, and liberties of the Subject; and, according to the Covenant, preserve the liberties of the Kingdom; and yet obey, and own a meerly usurped power. Whereas the most fundamentall civill Liberty of a Kingdom, and Subjects is to have a Government over them, set up by the constitution, or consent of the people; not obtruded on them by those, who of their own will and power, without any calling from them, assume it to themselves?

4. How can he, according to the Covenant, preserve and de­fend the Kings Majesties Person, and Authority, &c. and yet yeeld obedience to those usurpers, who, after his death, cast down his Authority, and place themselves instead thereof as the [Page 21] Supreame Power; whereas his Authority, in the plain inten­tion of the Covenant, is to be preserved and defended beyond the tearme of his life, and in his posterity; as it appears from this clause compared with those words in the preface, Having before our eyes the glory of God, — the honour and happinesse of the Kings Majestie, and his posterity?

5. Lastly, how doth he, according to the Protestation, to his power, and as far as lawfully he may, oppose, and by all good wayes, and means endevour to bring to condigne punishment all such as shall either by force, practise, counsels, plots, conspiracies, or otherwise, do any thing to the contrary of any thing in this present Protestation contained; and, according to the Covenant, not suffer himself directly, or indirect­ly, by whatsoever combination, perswasion, or terror to be divided, or withdrawn from this blessed Ʋnion and conjunction; whether to make defection to the contrary part, or give himself to a detestable indifferen­cie, or neutrality in this cause, which so much concerneth the glory of God, the good of the Kingdome, and honour of the King, but, all the dayes of his life, zealously, and constantly continue therein against all opposition, and promote the same, according to his power, against all lets and impediments whatsoever, that yeeldeth allegiance, and obe­dience to a party standing, and leading all those that agree to obey them in so palpable contradiction, and opposition to some materiall points, and concernments of Religion, divers most fundamentall rights of the Parliament and people, and all the Authority and whole being of the King, contained and covenanted for, in the aforesaid Protestation and Cove­nant respectively.

I Now come to enquire into the other opinion before men­tioned, viz: That one may submit, and act under a usurp­ed Power, for the time, and during the intervall of its preva­lency; with reservation of allegiance, as due and cordially devoted to the lawfull Power expulsed. And about this we [Page 22] shall not insist long, because we finde not much contestation or difficulty.

In regard of the justnes, and necessity of some things which may be the subject, or matter of the Usurpers command, and the Arbitrarinesse of others, and the lawfulnesse of either, not depending upon the command or warrant of a superior, but resulting out of the nature of the action it self; so that a pri­vate man might do it, were there no Magistrate to command it, or no command from the Magistrate for it. We must needs grant, there are things which may be done upon the Usurp­ers command or injunction, (though not because or by vertue of it) for the command of him that unwarrantably assumeth power, cannot, by it self, make that unlawfull which were lawfull if that were not. For instance, the performance of acts of common equity, charity, order, publick utility, and self-preservation is requisite: suppose it be in concurrence with a Usurpers command, and in thus doing we do materially, but not formally obey him; the ground of acting, in such things, being not at all any relation, or principle of subjection to him; but conscience of obedience to the will of God, and due respect to others, and our own safety, and good. Under this sort of actions I comprehend:

1. Taking up Arms for the preservation of our selves and the Countrey against a common Enemy, upon the Usurpers summons; the which we might do of our selves, were there no Authority; or if a just Authority were in being, yet if it could not, or did not, maturely enough call us forth to it.

2. Payment of taxes, and bearing other impositions for the usurping Power, where, and while we are under his compul­sive power, because such contributions may, and will be taken whether I will pay them or not; and I yeeld them under his enforcement, as a ransome for my life, or liberty, or somewhat else that is better to me then the payment; and consequently I am to choose the parting with it as the lesse evil, rather then with that which is better, which to loose is to incur a greater evill for the avoidance of a lesse. In this point Mr. Ascham, the afore named Author, (Part. 2. Chap. 1. page 35.) determineth well (had he not contradicted (as I understand him) that he delivers in this and the next Chap. with that assertion of his [Page 23] part. 1. cap. 6. page 25.) distinguishing rightly betwixt that which cannot be had, nor the value of it, unlesse I actually give it; and that which may be taken whether I contribute it or no. Of this latter kinde is paying of Taxes in this case; Nolite igitur fortunam in culpam conver­tere; neque re­gis injuriam hujus crimen putare; nec consilium ex necessitate, nec voluntatem ex v [...] interpretari. Cicero Orat. 39. pro C. Ra­bino postumo. So he defend­eth Posthu­mus his changing his Romane gown for a cloak at Alexandria as compelled by K: Ptolomie. herein I am but mo­rally passive, as a man that is fallen into the hands of a pack of bloodie theeves; and, being demanded it, takes his purse out of his pocket, and delivers it to them, though with his own hand (saith that Author) he puts his purse into their hands, yet the Law cals not that a gift, nor excuseth the thief for taking it, but all contrary. Or a man, apprehended by a party of the invading Enemies, or Usurpers Army, walks or rides along with them to their muster or battell, when as he cannot escape them, and otherwise they would draw him. But it is commonly object­ed thus. Obj. This payment or other charge is taken, and will be used to an evill use as to maintain Usurpation. R: But that's beyond my deliberation, not in my power to prevent; it will not be avoided by putting them to force it from me, but rather more gain will accrue to them, and damage to me, if I stand out; my denying will be made an occasion by them to take more: this case is like that of entering into a Covenant with those that in covenanting we know before hand will swear by a false god, wherein, Divines Augustinus ad publicolam. Epist. 15 4. Gen. 21.31.31.31. resolve, the partie swearing by the true God participateth not in his sin that swears by a false one, in as much as he communicates with him in the Covenant, not in the oath taken on his part, and provides thereby for his necessarie security; and thus did Abraham, and Jacob, in their respective Covenants with Abi­melech and Laban.

3. Complaining, petitioning, or going to Law before the Magistrates or Courts authorized by the Usurpers. (Provided, you give not the Usurpers, to whom you petition, such Titles as you give to the lawfull Magistrate.) In thus doing, I seek my necessary self preservation; neither do I yeeld, Excusantur à peccato indu­cendi tyran­num ad actum, & opus illici­tum petentes ab illo iustiti­am, quia non petunt actum illicitum, sed justitiam illius actus illiciti pre interpre­tandae sunt pe­titiones tam iustitiae quam honestae gra­tiae quae este­rantur Tyran­nis, scilicer si vis, seu ex quo vis detinere, & exercere hoc deminium, utere illo iuste, utere honeste, utere pie, utere ad utilitatem publicam, & privatorum, prout deceret dominium nec intendunt, nec petunt actum usurpatum, sed qualitatem sanctam inactu usurpato exer­cendo. Ca [...]etan summula, Tit. Remp. tyran­nice, &c. or ascribe to them to whom I have recourse any just power of judicature, or participate in their sin of usurping it; onely I acknowledge they have might and ability in their hand to right me; which, though they ought not to assume, yet I may take the benefit of their unjust use of it; as a poore man may receive relief at the hands of him that hath gotten those goods he distributeth [Page 24] unjustly; and I may receive my money, with a good consci­ence, from the hands of a thief that is willing to return it to me, though he took it by robbery, from another thief that robbed me of it; and if the party, with whom I have a con­troversie for my right, will agree to refer the matter, betwixt us, to a private person as an Arbitrator, and stand to his ar­bitrement; that is a lawfull means of coming by my own, though by his help, and award that hath not claim of Autho­rity over me; my submitting therefore my private right to the judgement of an usurping Magistracy, is no placing or owning a publick power of judicature to be in him. It hath been ordinary (and there is no doubt of the lawfulnesse of it) for a Souldier to ask quarter, a prisoner liberty, a man his plundered goods of his Enemy: yet in all this there is no con­cession of a legall power in that Enemie to be a Judge over the said Petitioners, either in case of life, goods, or liberty; onely in the form of addresse to the Usurper, we had need be caute­lous that such a style be not used as will be a plain concession of his title to the power which he usurps.

But, in granting liberty of concurrence with some com­mands of an usurped Authority, we neither yeeld any obedi­ence at all to be due, or performable to it; nor can we allow a correspondence with it in divers things, and therefore we are to put a difference.

First, betwixt things that are in themselves necessary, and those that are of a middle or an indifferent nature in them­selves considered. In the latter, though, in some cases, I may act upon the Usurpers injunction; as our Saviour payed tri­bute where he was not bound to it, to avoid scandall; yet I must be cautious, 1. of owning, justifying, or upholding the usurpation, or injustice of the party commanding, the very appearance whereof I must as much as I can avoid. So did our Saviour, in paying the tribute gatherers their demand, by declaring his freedome, and the consideration upon which he payed, viz: not the equity of the demand, but his willing­nesse to prevent scandall. And therefore in the observing of a duty of Religion, necessary in it self, and appointed, by un­justifiable Authority, to be kept on such a set day, which is in it self, arbitrary; the best way is, to take another day for it, [Page 25] for the shunning of the appearance of the evill of obeying an unjust power. 2. Of doing any thing that I may foresee will bring a worse scandall being acted, then the omission of it would; it being required of a Christian, where scandall-take­ing lyes both wayes (as not seldome it doth) to shun the of­fence that is of worse consequence, which is usually that which is more generally taken, or by persons more consider­able, or worthy of tender respect. The Apostle Paul, condem­ning Judaisme in Peter, and others at Antioch, practised in fa­vour of a few, where the most part were Gentile Christians, Gal. 2.11. &c. but admitted it at Jerusalem, where the greater sort were beleeving Jews, Act. 21.20, &c.

2. Betwixt morall, or prudentiall acts competible to pri­vate men, or subjects, and politicall acts, or judiciall proceed­ings that flow from power, and Authority inherent in the person that acts them, or are the issues of distributive justice, and either come forth from a person clothed with Govern­ment, or unto which is requisite a stamp of Authority to make them lawfull, and justifiable: as to bear the office of a Magi­strate, or Commander in Civill or Military affairs, or to be any under Agent, or servant in carrying on, or assisting the Government. An Usurper, in giving out Commissions, Com­mands or Warrants for proceedings of this nature, I conceive may not, in this kinde, be obeyed. Men are not to act as sub­ordinate rulers, or agents, under such a power, or as sent by him as supreame in the Apostles sense, 1 Pet. 2.14. For,

1. The Usurpers authority being indeed null, and of no ef­fect, he being in truth but in a private mans capacity, as to the power he assumes; he cannot communicate, or derive any authority unto me, whereby I may act, that which before I could not; so that those actions, which require the seal of Au­thority to make them lawfull, and which without it would be irregular and sinfull, it must needs be clearly unlawfull for me to do, by vertue of his Commission. Conscientious advised men will generally judge it presumption, violence, oppression, bloodshed, respectively for a private man to take upon him of himself, to imprison, chastise, amerce, or put to death any supposed, or really manifested malefactor; and if I have no other humane warrant but the Usurpers, it leaving me but in [Page 26] a private mans capacitie, will leave my actions of that nature under no better a character. If I should, being about such un­dertakings, be asked that question of our Saviour, Luk. 12.14. Man, who made thee a judge, or a divider over us? What satisfacti­on would it be to him that so enquireth, or to mine own con­science to alledge the name of the Usurper, who, as to supreme Authority, and consequently to the making of a competent Officer of Justice, is as good as no body.

2ly, So to act would make me a usurper also, and bring me in to be a partner in the supreame usurpers sins; in as much as politicall or State instruments, to wit, their subordinate agents, share together with the superior in the morall qualifi­cation of the work of Government.

3ly, This were manifestly to uphold, and maintain Usurpa­tion; thus I should contribute assistance and support to the un­just power, and oppose the right of him, or them against whom he holds it; they that favour this kinde of acting as requisite, in regard of the subjects protection, and safetie, seem not to consider, that a subordinate officers acting looketh upward, as well as downward; and he that is such a one to the Usur­per, serves his turn of subsistence in an unlawfull possession as much, or more then the subjects benefit. For first, he acknow­ledgeth and justifieth his authority as sufficient and valid by officiating under, and by it. 2. He keeps up that authority, and extends it to as many as he hath to do with. 3. He gives an example and encouragement to others to embrace and propagate it, as he himself doth. 4. He layes an ingagement upon himself to stand or fall with the Usurper; and so to do his utmost for him. 5. He involves himself, either wittingly, or blindfoldly in a concurrence with those counsels, and acti­ons, which both in their own nature, and in the intention, and projection of the Usurper, directly tend to the Usurpers esta­blishment, and the impeachment of the lawfull Governors claim, and re-advancement.

Upon these grounds, and the like, the secluded and the se­joyned members (in the case stated, Chap. 1.) had need be ad­vised well before they enter, or act among the presupposed Usurpers: though they might be admitted by them without questioning, or purging, I question how they can enter [Page 27] amongst them without self-soyling: though they should, in going in, resolve to act honestly, yet, I see not how they can be untainted in a concession with those, who in their present com­prehension or totality, assume a power not legally in them, and act legislatively, and otherwise in the highest sphere of Supreamacie: a force being upon the House, and the majority of Members, and the Authority of the King, and the Lords-House being professedly excluded by them. They that are out may do well to resolve, before they joyn, how it can be law­full for them that sit to act at all (though never so just things) the whole, or body, to which they belong, being so mangled in its Members, and manacled in its freedome. And, if at all they may act, how according to Law, conscience, and their Oaths and Covenants, they can govern in that solitarinesse of supreamacie, and deposition of their compeers: if they think these things unjustifiable in them that sit, have they not cause to be warie how they involve themselves in such mens actings, whilest they stand in that posture? Besides, that they in coming in help to strengthen the usurpers by increasing their number, and giving them countenance in the eye of the Kingdom, as much as if they in all things concurred with them; for without the House, who knows how men sway, or give their votes? And, on the other hand, they weaken and much prejudice the claim of the lawfull Power, by appearing on the contrary party, putting themselves into an incapacity to act for it, as otherwise they might, and ingaging themselves to assist, or at least, not to oppose the Usurpers.

Finally, let them recollect, before they enter that doore, what they have sworn to his late Majestie, his Heirs, and law­full Successors; what to the Parliaments Power, rights and priviledges, and what to the Kingdom, Et magnum sit [...], veni­endumne sit in Consilium ty­ranni, si i [...] aliqua de re bona deliberaturus sit. Quare si quid ejusmodi evenerit ut accer­samur, quid censea [...] mihi faciendum, ut (que) scribito. Nihil enim mihi adhuc accidit, quod majoris consilii est. M. T. Cicero, epist. ad T. Pomp. Atticum. l. 10 ep. 1. and Subjects lawfull rights and priviledges; and deliberate how they, keeping of those things, and sitting down with these men, will be recon­ciled. I finde that even wise Heathens have scrupled at this, without the supposition of such Oaths.

BEfore I take in hand to answer Arguments that are brought for the confirmation of those two opinions for obedience to Usurpation, and against which I have argued in the preceding Chapters; it will be convenient in this place to take notice of such allegations and Exceptions, as are made against the obligation of the Oaths and Covenants before ur­ged as binding out from that obedience: sundry late Authors having pleaded that the Oaths, and Covenant either are not now in force, but expired, or do not extend too, and binde in the case to which they are applyed. I begin with the Remon­strance presented to the House of Commons, Novemb: 20. 1648. which unto the clause in the Solemn League and Covenant, Art: 3. obliging to endevour to preserve and defend the Kings Ma­jesties person and Authority, in the preservation and defence of the true Religion, and liberties of the Kingdom: alledgeth divers things, some of which concern onely the obligation to the preserva­tion of the Kings person, those are past consideration, other reflect upon it in relation to his Authority, as unto which I have urged it to be still in force, and therefore shall examine what the Remonstrance saith for the invalidating of it as un­to that, bringing in onely so much of its argumentation, as can be construed to tend to this purpose: and of this nature I observe two Allegations.

1. The words (in the preservation and defence of the true Religion, and Liberties of the Kingdoms) are a restriction to the engagement for preservation of the Kings person, and Authority, so as to oblige them to no further, nor in any other way then shall be consistent with the preser­vation and defence of the true Religion, and liberties of the King­doms, but if by reason and experience we finde the preservation and de­fence of his person to be not safe, but full of visible danger (if not cer­tainly destructive) to Religion, or publick interest, then surely (by the Covenant itself) the preservation of his person or authority is not to be endevoured so far, or in such a way, or at least the Covenant obligeth [Page 29] not to it, but against it: page 55, 56.

1. It is not necessary nor proper to take the words, in the preservation, &c. as restrictive to the engagement either way, that is either for the preservation and defence of the Kings person and Authority on the one hand; or of the true Religion and Liberties of the Kingdoms on the other: It is not necessa­rie (I say) for those words in the Article (in our severall voca­tions) are an expresse, and fully sufficient restriction, taking in, and binding to all lawfull and just wayes of preserving and defending each of them, and excluding all unlawfull. Neither is it proper, [in] there being clearly conjunctive, and as much as [with] and equally looking both wayes, that is, both to the preservation and defence of that which goes before, and that which follows, unto the preservation and defence of all which (though they be not of equall worth or intrest, so that one of them must come behinde the other in the order of our endevours of their preservation and defence, yet) the Cove­nant binds equally (in regard of the firmnesse of the obliga­tion) yet if any shall still contend, that clause to be restrictive in that manner which the Remonstrance saith, I will not strive in a verball contention with him; for the taking of it so no more lesseneth our obligation to the preservation of the Kings Authority, then if it had not been inserted; we being tyed notwithstanding it, to all just wayes of preservation ther­of, and no more had been involved if it had been left out.

2. But the sinews of this Argument lyeth in the pretended or implyed inconsistency betwixt the preservation and de­fence of Religion and the Kingdoms liberties; unto which I say:

1. There is doubtlesse a fair consistencie, non-opposition, or agreement betwixt the safetie of every one of these, the be­ing of each of them may and can stand with the other, it is a groundlesse surmise, and grosse absurditie to imagine an in­consistency betwixt the just intrests of any of them, our taking of them together into the Covenant yeeldeth thus much; if there were any incoexistency amongst them, we could not have sworn to their joynt preservation; or if we did, the Oath was of impossibles, and so (as to this branch) both unlawfull and void, or non-obliging in the making of it Regula juris rei impossibilis nulla obliga­tio..

[Page 30]2. An endevour to preserve the one and the other will well enough stand together; a lawfull power indeed actually and effectually to preserve them all may happen to be wanting, and any one of them may fall under danger, and I may want just means to relieve it, but an endevour (which can onely im­port a doing what is within power and warrant) may be yeelded still to the preservation of every of them.

3. Seeing then that an inconsistibility either of the things one with another, or of the endevouring their preservation cannot be pleaded as possibly incident or occurrent, evident it is, that there cannot at any time lye a necessitie of taking a way of any of them, and that the obligation of the Cove­nant to the endevour of preserving every of them continually stands in force during their respective existence, and conse­quently it bindeth out from intending, seeking, attempting, or prosecuting the abolishing or destruction of any of them; for that is indeed truly inconsistent with the said endevour, and therefore a palpable violation of the Covenant.

It must here be granted, that the lawfull and necessary de­fence and preservation of one of them, sometimes may so im­ploy me that I cannot at that time by the same means act for the others safety; ye [...] what I act for one, may put the other in hazard, and in the issue not onely be accompanied with, but (though against my will, and endevours to the utmost of my lawfull capacity) contingently, and besides my intention prove the losse and ruine of the other: and this is incident not from any contrariety or inconsistency that is betwixt them, but both because they are distinct, and separable things, and so cannot alwayes, and by the same medium be concurrently prosecuted: and because some of them are more worthy then the other, which must therefore have the preheminency thus far, that if they cannot altogether with my best endeavours be secured, I am to prefer the security of the most precious, and expose any of the other rather to danger then it. As for instance, it will (I suppose) be admitted to be agreeable to the Covenant, for the Kingdoms rather to omit the safe­guarding of their Liberties, and put them to the hazard then the true Religion,, where both cannot be joyntly put out of danger: but all this amounts not to a disobligement from [Page 31] the endevour of preserving them all; nor to a liberty upon any emergency of active, direct, and purposed making away, or removing of any of them, though under pretence of secu­ring the other. I have read of one Alcon, who finding his son fast on sleep upon the grasse, and a Serpent creeping upon his breast, he not apprehending how otherwise it was possible to save his son, took his Bowe, and shot at the Serpent upon the boyes breast, which (though to the manifest endangering of his life) yet the chose rather to take that course, then by suffer­ing the Serpent to leave his life to a more certain destruction; and either his art or good hap was such, as that he prevented and slew the Serpent, and preserved his Son: Ars erat esse patrem [...]cit [...] ­tura pe [...]ic [...]m: Et par [...]er [...] ­venem somno­que & mort [...] levavit. Manilius li 3. those whom we are bound and most solicitous to preserve, we may upon an extreame exigence put in some hazard that we may preserve them; but there is a great difference betwixt this, and a deli­berate purposed, declared prosecuting them to destruction.

3. But how doth the Remonstrancer prove the Assumpti­on, viz: The inconsistency pretended betwixt the endevour of the pre­servation of the Kings person and Authority, and the preservation of Religion and liberty? thus he saith, By reas [...]n, and experience we finde the preservation and defence of his person and Authority, to be not safe, but full of visible danger (if not certainly destructive) to religious or publick Interest.

If the one could be said to be certainly destructive to the other, you would have said it without an [if not] but it seems you have not confidence to assever so much, and yet they can­not be purely inconsistent without such a destructivenesse; so that your own extenuation sufficiently discovers the weaknes of your proof; all that you affirm is, That there is no safetie, but a full visible danger in the preservation which you impugne.

1. The danger you pretend is in the disposall and use of the things to be preserved, not in the nature of the things. For instance, the Kings Authority is politically and morally good, the ordinance of God, and if well used may be eminently ad­vantagious; if evilly used may be dangerous enough to Reli­gion and liberties: the like may also be said or the privileges of the Parliament, and of the liberties of the Kingdoms in relation to Religion, and to each other; will you thence infer an inconsistency of these with Religion, or a disobligement [Page 32] from the Covenant for preservation and defence of these?

2. As there may be danger that way to the things specified, so there may be danger and insecurity to the same things on the other hand, viz: in the destruction of the Kings person (suppose it were undone) and Authority, and let impartiall Reason and Experience judge, whether the preservation or destruction thereof hath more danger in it to Religion, and the Kingdoms Liberty.

3. But seeing there may be some danger on each side, and in the preservation of the Kings Authority, there is no more pretended but danger, and that but of suffering, not of sin, it is apparent, that as there is no such inconsistency as is intima­ted, so the obligation of the Covenant to the preservation of the Kings Authority stands good, and our safest way is to avoid the horrid sin, and greater danger of Covenant-break­ing, by standing upon the said preservation.

2ly, The other thing which the Remonstrance alledgeth, and is to be cleared is this. Where severall persons joyning to make a Covenant, do make a covenanting clause therein to the good or benefit of another person not present, no party to the agreement, but whom, and whose Interest they would willingly provide for as well as for their own, to the end be might joyn with them in the agreement, and partake the benefit thereof as well as themselves, if this absent party (when it is ten­dered to him for his conjunction) shall not accept the Agreement, but refuse to joyn in, and oppose it, and begin, prosecute and multiply con­tests with all the Covenanters about the matters contained in it. Sure­ly that person in so doing by his once refusing upon a fair and full tender, sets the other Covenanters free from any further obligation, by vertue of that Covenant, as to what concerns his benefit or interest therein. Now whether this be not your case, &c.

1. True indeed, a releasement from Covenants and pro­missory oaths, which concern matters betwixt man and man is granted lawfull some wayes: But, 1. this must be done by the party with whom the Covenant, and to whom the Oath is made Si is cui ju­ratur ratum habuerit iura­mentum, & ve­li [...] servari, non potest ab alia quacunq, tertia persona relax­ari ratio est, quia nemo po­test ius alteri acquisitum, nisi ipse consense­rit adimere. D Saunderson de iuram: 1. rom oblig. praelect. 7. Sect. 8., but as the Remonstrancer acknowledgeth, this Co­venant was made the King being not present, nor a party co­venanting, or covenanted with but a third person, the persons covenanting, and covenanted with mutually (as by the In­troductory part is manifest) were the Noblemen, Barons, [Page 33] Knights, &c. in the Kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland, it was it may be desired, and hoped that the King and his Issue would afterwards approve and joyn in it, but the Cove­nant was actually plighted, and therefore did actually binde in every branch of it they not taking it; and (the parties with whom we covenanted not releasing us) the pretended refusall of the King could be no discharge from it. 2. A releasement can be made by the party covenanted with and sworn too, onely where the Covenant is for the particular and proper interest of that party, or so far onely as concerneth him, but not to the prejudice of a third parties concernment without his consent Dico sexto, relaxationem partis valere ad vinculum ju­ramenti sol­vendum, quan­tum ipsius in­terest: non ta­men valere in praeiudicium tertiae perso­nae. Ratio est, quia potest quilibet per actum suum de iure proprio quantum vult remittere: sed non potest quisquam de alieno iure quicquam de­mere, ipso vel inconsulto vel invito, si alte­rius cuiusquam intersit ex ali­quo suo iure obligationem non solvi, ob­ligatio non solvitur. Ibid.; but the Covenant (even in that part of it) was not meerly or chiefly of a private or personall importance to the King himself, but was, and is of a publick interest to the Covenanters themselves and the Kingdoms; the Kings re­fusall therefore and opposition to it could be no release from it: we say on all hands, the King is for the Kingdom as the means is for the end. We have ten parts in the King, said the men of Israel of David; and at another time they said and sware, Thou shalt no more go out with us to battell, that thou quench not the light of Israel. What portion have we in David? and we have none in­heritance in the son of Jesse, the ten Tribes said, when they made a revolt from, and rebelled against Rehoboam.

The Introduction of the Covenant in laying down the con­cernments and ends for the making of it, expresseth it self thus: Having before our eyes the glory of God, and the advancement of the kingdom of our Lord, and Saviour Jesus Christ, the honour and happinesse of the Kings Majestie, and his posterity, and the true pub­lick liberty, safety, and peace of the Kingdoms wherein every ones pri­vate condition is included. And a little afterwards, We have for the preservation of our selves, and our Religion from utter ruine and de­struction, resolved, and determined to enter into a mutuall and solemne, League and Covenant, &c. And Art: 6. it styleth its cause, This Common cause of Religion, liberty and peace of the Kingdoms: which cause, it saith presently after, so much concerneth the glory of God, the good of the Kingdoms, and honour of the King.

2. The King never refused to agree to, nor did he oppose the matter of this particular clause: as touching this there could be no dissent on his part, his prescribing and standing [Page 34] upon the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, wherein this clause is contained, his avowing the difference and war on his part to be for the defence of his person, and authority; his putting forth Oaths to them that adhered to him for the pre­servation of these, makes it as clear as noon-day that he re­fused and opposed not this branch. Now upon this confide­ration, the Remonstrancer hath not onely failed in his alle­gation, but overthrown his own argument; he saying in the place before cited, Although the Kings refusing sets the Covenanters free from any further obligation by vertue of that Covenant, [...] to what concerns his interest and benefit therein, yet the Covenant as to other matters concerning the right and benefit of the Covenanters one from another stands still obliging, and in force. I may by the same rea­son say, the Kings refusing the Covenant upon exception against other clauses, not this, and his opposing other matters in the Covenant, not this, could not dis-ingage or release the Covenanters from this, about which there was not the least dissent or reluctancy, but a concurrence full enough on his part; so that the Covenant must stand still obliging and in force as to this part.

3. If the Kings said refusall and opposition could have dis­charged us from this member of the Covenant as to his own person and interest in the Authority, yet with all your strain­ing you cannot stretch them to our release from preservation and defence of the Kingly Authority in relation to his poste­rity, who were in proximity to him interested in it; and for whose interest therein the Covenant was also made Having be­fore our eyes the honour & Happinesse of the Kings Ma­jestie, and his posterity.; and whose refusall of it, nor yet a tender of it to them, you do not, cannot once plead.

I have done with the wrong glosse of the Remonstrancer endeavouring to impeach the obligation of this clause of the Covenant. I finde another (a deare friend of his) tampering with it also to clude the tye of it; and he offers it no lesse vio­lence, but in a more unhandsome and grosse manner. It is that Polemick, or Army-Divine, Mr. J.G. in his Defence of the Ho­nourable Sentence, &c. The man in that book undertaketh, and bends his skill to a double unhappie, and crosse designe, to wit, to varnish and guild over that which is very foule, and to besmear and obscure that which is very clear. In his pro­secution [Page 35] of the latter he fals upon this sentence of the Cove­nant, in dealing with which he correspondeth with the Re­monstrancer, and as this hath challenged to himself a prero­gative to enforce men and Magistrates, so doth he arrogate to himself to be a bold enforcer of words and Covenants; a more strange and presumptuous perverting of plain words, I never read nor heard, then that which he useth to this clause, when he saith, page 51. Evident it is, that those words in the Covenant in the preservation and defence of the true Religion, and liberties of the Kingdoms, import a condition to be performed on the Kings part, with­out the performance whereof, the Covenant obligeth no man to the pre­servation or defence of his Person or Authority. And this condition he makes to be, page 52, 53. That he preserve and defend the true Religion, and liberties of the Kingdom: and of this his paraphrase of the words he saith, If this be not the clear meaning and impor­tance of them, the Covenant is a Barbarian unto me, I understand not the English of it. The vast exorbitancy, audaciousnesse, and impietie of this his wresting, and straining of these plain words, I leave the Reader to take the measure of: I shall onely endeavour to free them from this his distortion.

1. Let the words themselves speak, they do not say in his preservation and defence, &c. but in the preservation and de­fence, &c. plainly referring to the same preservation and de­fence of Religion and Liberties which is before promised, and sworn in this and the preceding Articles, and as evidently re­ferring to the same persons preservation, and defence of them here, which are to preserve and defend them in the former clauses, and which are to preserve and defend the Kings Ma­jesties person and Authority in this, viz: the Covenanters. If the Covenant had intended to pitch the preservation and de­fence in this clause upon another person, or persons, as the performers besides those to whom the same actions are refer­red immediately before, it would have pointed them out di­stinctly; but when it expresses no other, ordinary construction will attribute them to the parties before nominated; and no regular construction can put them upon any other. This read­ing is plain English to him that knows the language, and will understand, and Mr. G. proves himself a barbarous dealer with the covenant, in that he will have it, either to admit of [Page 36] his antigramaticall sense, or to be a Barbarian to him. I dare appeal to Mr. Gs. own conscience, if it be not either speechles, or a Barbarian to him, whether, when he took this Covenant, he understood this clause in the meaning he would now thrust upon it; or rather hath not played the Doedalus since, in sha­ping, and bringing forth this sense to serve his turn, and de­fend what hath been since acted.

2. In making this the importance of those words, Mr. G. contradicts his friend, or Patron the Remonstrancer, in his ex­pounding of them, and takes away the very medium, or ground of his argument before brought in out of his book, page 55, 56. and answered above. For he page 55. takes those words either as a restriction to the engagement for preservation of the Kings person and Authority, to wit, as obliging no further then is con­sistent therewith: yea he proposeth whether the said engage­ment may not be so understood as to be fulfilled in the preservation of Religion and Liberties; neither of which senses can carry that clause to the King as the performer: and in page 56, he ex­plaineth this preservation, and defence of Religion, and liberties to be the Parliaments Covenanted utmost endevour to preserve them. Let Mr. J. G. then leave endeavouring to reconcile the Covenant and his cause which are at too great odds to be reconcileable, and go make the Remonstrancer and himself friends, who differ so diametrically in their sense of these words.

3. How will Mr. G. make this sense of his, and the proceed­ings against the late King stand together? for before the King was so proceeded against, he had consented to all that was positively proposed to him for Religion, at least for 3. yeers; and for the privative part propounded, to wit, the Abolition of Episcopacy he had not denyed it, but granted the present suspension, and referred the utter extirpation of it to the deli­beration of the Assembly, and ordering of Parliament; against whose consent he had agreed nothing should be done for the restoring of it: and had granted fully the Parliaments over­tures for Liberties. Neither doth the Remonstrancer, or any other (as far as I have observed) insist on the shortnesse of the Kings concessions in any particulars of either nature, as the ground of those capitall proceedings, but on the inexpiable­nesse of his former facts, and the unsafenesse of trusting him [Page 37] for future upon any tearms. If then the King, immediately before the fatall prosecution against him, did (as his present state would permit) concur so amply in the preservation of Religion and Liberties, they were bound that had taken this Covenant by vertue of this clause taken in Mr. Gs. sense, what­ever had been his former carriage) then to endeavour the pre­servation of his person and Authority. The Covenant in this branch is indefinite, and unrestrained in regard of time; it doth not say (suppose Mr. Gs. meaning had been its words) we shall preserve the Kings person and Authority, if he shall (within a yeer or two after this) preserve Religion, and Li­berties; but obligeth the Covenanters whenever the King should joyn in preserving Religion and Liberties (as Mr. G. understandeth it) to the preservation of his person and Au­thority. Here then Mr. G. instead of weakning the Covenant, as to the end it was urged by those whom he opposeth, hath by wringing turned it against himself, and that his adored cause which he would have defended, and that with more strength then is in any of those reasons (or rather shifts and colours) brought by himself or any other Roscius — for it.

4. If that indeed were the sence of that clause which he would out-face us into the accepting of, what can be said against the binding of it to the preservation and defence of the kingly Authority still? (though the then King be decea­sed) it being before proved, that this clause obligeth to it in reference to the Kings posterity, against whom there can be Objection of a fail in this supposed condition, it being unper­formable without default whilest possession of the Authority is with-held; and the Authority being with-held before, ei­ther any refusal of the supposed condition, by him that should perform it, or any overture to him, for the obtaining of it be made.

I have thus done with the exceptions made against the ob­ligatorinesse of the Covenant, in the matter in hand; I now passe to the Examination of what is pleaded against the force of the Oaths of Allegiance amongst the impugners of them; Ile begin with him whom I had last to deal with, Mr. J. G. who in the same book, pag: 58, 59, 60. thinks to discharge us from these bonds, with a Reason framed as followeth.

(In recitall whereof I shall rehearse as much of him as expres­seth his Argumentation, omitting those two hetorogeneous instances [of keeping back a mad mans sword, and of a States dis-en­gagement from league with another State that hath first broken league with it] as impertinent both to his reason and our case.)

Peter Martyr (saith Mr. G.) well observes concerning the promises of God [that they are to be understood according to the present state and condition of things when they are made] meaning that no performance of them is intended [...]y God in case men shall decline from that integrity under which, and in relation unto which such promises were made un­to them: so neither are the promises of men, whether made with oath, or without to be so understood, as if the makers of them stood bound to perform the tearms of them under any possible change or alteration what soever in the persons to whom they are made. Chrysostome writing upon those words, Matth. 19.28. shews, that Judas, though the promise of sitting upon a throne was made unto him as well as unto any other, yet by reason of that change which afterwards appeared in him, through his wickednesse, forfeited and lost his right of interest in that promise, nor doth any promise though confirmed with an oath, of allegiance, obedi­ence, or subjection unto a King, and his Successors, or posterity, binde any longer or otherwise, either before God or men, then whilest, and as this King or his successors, shall continue in the same deportment of them­selves in the discharge of their trust, and administration of their power, whereby they commended themselves to us at the time when we sware such allegiance to them, and in consideration and expectation whereof the same was sworn by us; therefore the King being so notoriously chan­ged, &c. evident it is that God himself by the tenor and importment of his promises, and Jesus Christ by the like tenor and import of his, fully and fairly acquits us from all engagements, and tyes which the Oath of Allegiance at the time of our taking it layed upon us.

2 Pet. 1.4. Psal. 138.2.What? and must the exceeding great and precious promises of God, and his fidelity and truth therein, which he hath magnified above all his Name, be thus traduced? must the honour of God, which is so much concerned in taking, and violated in breaking an Oath, be yet much more impeached in the bringing in, and mis-reporting of his example to patronise mens fa [...]shood and perjury therein? And when an Oath cannot lawfully be dis­pensed with, or justly rendred non-obliging, must the forcible and ungodly bursting of it asunder be fathered on him, who [Page 39] is the Truth, the Amen, the faithfull and true witnesse?

But to endeavour a vindication briefly.

1. Mr. G. you have here done that learned and solid Di­vine P. Martyr a double wrong. 1. In curtailing his sentence, and breaking it off in the middle, suppressing those following words which would have cleared his sense to be none of yours. 2. In mis-translating the words which you cite, his words truly rendered and rehearsed out are these, Therefore those promises of God, (to wit, that of our Saviour, Matth. 19.28. which he had in the Section last before brought in, with Chry­sostomes interpretation upon it, quoted by you, and those of Gen. 9.2. Jer. 18.7, 8. with Chrysostome also upon them) are to be understood with reference to the present state of things, wherefore when we bear the promises of God, it behoves us thus to conceive, either they have some condition annexed, or they are layed down absolutely; Furthermore either they are of force onely for the present time, or they must be fulfilled in after time Promissiones itaque illae De [...] prostatu prae­senti rerum in­telligendae sunt. Quamo [...]. rem cum Dei promissiones audimus sic oportet cogita­re: vel conditi­onem aliquam conjunctam habent vel ab­so u [...]è ponun­tur. Dei [...] vel in hoc tantum tempus valent velin posterum sunt implendae. P. Martyr loc. com class. 3. ca. 13. Sect. 5. mis cited by him ca. 12.. It is by this recitall evident, how you by leaving out the word [illae] have falsified P. Martyrs text, who is speaking onely of some particular promises, con­ditionally made, and (as he saith) respecting the present time which he distinguisheth from others; but you would have him understood of any promises, and draw an universall ne­gative from his words.

2. You are not content to misconstrue this servant of God, but you dare to mis-represent, and mistate the minde of God himself; you say indefinitely of the promises of God, That no performance of them is intended by God, &c. whereas the Scripture is clear, (and most unhappie were men if it were otherwise) that 1. there are absolute promises wherein performance is intended by God, notwithstanding men shall decline in their said integrity, and whereunto such promises have no relation as to their validity or fulfilling. Take for instance, Psal. 89.33, 34. Hosea 14.4. Ezek. 36.25. &c. Heb. 8.10. &c. 2. In condi­tionall promises, though there may be partiall and tempora­ry declinings in men from their said integritie (as there was eminently in Peter, one of those parties to the promise, Matth. 19.28.) yet God performeth the promise to true beleevers, through, and for Christs sake, In whom all the promises are yea and Amen, and that alwayes, 2 Cor. 1.20. if it be a promise of the life [Page 40] which is to come; and often, if it be a promise of the life that now is, namely, when it is good for them, according to those promises, Psal. 84.11. Rom. 8.28. 1 Cor. 3.21. And if there be a performance by God, certainly there was an intention in him of that performance, notwithstanding such declining, For he worketh all things after the counsell of his own will. And for this you might have hearkened to P. Martyr your own Author, in the place whither he referreth you in the Section quoted by you, speaking thus. But because the conditions of legall promises could not be performed by men, God out of his own mercy hath substitu­ted Evangelicall promises in their place, which though they have con­ditions annexed, yet they are held out gratis. And a little further he saith, The Evangelicall promise may stand good without those con­ditions. How this is, he presently after explains thus. Therefore impossible conditions are annexed, that men warned of their infirmity, and fully understanding it, they may betake themselves to Christ, of whom they being received into favour, and justification being obtained, they may obtain those very promises, for as to them they of Legall are made Evangelicall Sed cum illae ab hominibus praestari non potuissent, Deus ex sua misericordia subjecit promissiones Evangelitas illorum loco: quae quam vis con­ditiones adiectas habent tamen efferuntur gratis. Promissio Evangelica fine illis conditioni­bus constare potest, idcirco enim conditiones impossibiles adiecta sunt, ut homines suae in­firmitatis admonerentur ea que penitus intellecta, se conferent ad Christum à quo recepti in gratiam, adepte iam iustificatione, illa eadem promissa possent obtinere. Nam quod ad ipsor attinct, iam ex legalibus redduntur Evangelicae. P. Mart. loc. com. Class 3 c. 12. Sect. 4..

3. You rest not in this mis-alledging of Gods promises, (though in it, you bewray audaciousnesse, and unsoundnesse enough) but you rise higher in presumption, making an odi­ous comparison, or rather equalitie between God and man, in promises and covenants, whereas the case of the covenant­ing of these two is far enough different; for if it were granted, that God in some of his conditionall promises intendeth no performance nor obligation on his part, but upon condition of mans perseverance, must there needs be therefore an equi­valency, or conformity throughout thereunto in mans Cove­nants with man? must they therefore be all of them so made or understood? or rather is there not of right a vast disparity? God is no mans debtor, he is not bound to man, there is no right in the creature from God, he can claim nothing from [Page 41] him, otherwise then by promise: God may do what he will with his own, and all is his own. But with man it is not so, Alia enim ra­tio est obliga­tionis ubi debi­tum fundatur inpromissione, ubi vero pro­missio fundatur in debito longè alia. D. Sand. de jurament. praelect 6. Sect. 9. either towards God, or man, he stands in divers relations, and is tyed in many duties, even towards men, before he covenant or swear, unto which single tye, the bonds of Oaths and ex­presse and solemn Covenants are often in weightie matters added, for confirmation and greater security. And thus it is in the point in hand, there is Allegiance due without the in­terposition of an Oath, or any such engagement by particular persons; we are in a settled State, born Subjects, and both claim the immunity and protection, and owe the duty of such, without personall indenting, or oath-taking; and this obedi­ence is owing to Princes, or Magistrates without condition of Religion, or Justice on their part performed; the Scripture is clear for an irrespective (and in regard of the Rulers demea­nor) absolute subjection: Exod. 20.12.21.25. Rom. 13.1, 2, &c. Tit. 3.1. 1 Pet. 2.13. 1 Sam. 24.6, 7. 26.9, 10, 11. Jer. 27.12.29.7. Matth. 22.21. And the Doctrine of orthodox Divines generally is, that obedience is due to the most degenerate, ty­rannicall, and oppressive Magistrates Cal. Instit. l. 4. c. 20. Sect. 24.25. &c. P. Mart. loc­com. clas. 4. ca. 20. Sect. 12.18 19. Alsted. Theol. cas. cap. 17. Reg. 8. num. 9. Schar. [...]ymph. 5. epot. Quaest. 44. & 45. cur Perk. cas. consci. B. 3. cha. 6. Sect. 1.. When therefore this necessary and unconditionated duty (as to the parties beha­viour) becomes the subject of an oath, or personall engage­ment, it is not capable of capitulations or conditions to be performed by the persons sworn to, upon which the obliga­tion of the oath shall be dependent; to admit such qualifica­tions, would frustrate the end of a promissory oath, which is to give assurance and security (and that the strongest men can give) to the party unto whom the oath is made, of what, ei­ther was before, or is then made due by promise; instead whereof the inserting of conditions of this nature in this case would make what was before clearly owing now more dubi­ous and uncertain to the expectation of the proprietor: and would be apt to beget in the debtor a perswasion, (upon non­performance of conditions) of a discharge as well from the matter, as from the obligation of the Oath.

4. Of Humane Covenants, or promissory oaths, whereof the subject or matter is arbitrary, and we are not otherwise bound to then by Covenant, or Oath, there are severall sorts, Vide Alsted. Theol cas c 5. Reg. 2. num 3. some are absolute, having no expresse condition annexed, [Page 42] but are simply undertaken, saving that those generall and constant provisoes of every promise or oath which need not expressing, are to be understood therein, viz: that the thing when it comes to be performed be lawfull and possible, and notwithstanding the understanding of which the obligation is absolute. As for instance, such was that promise and oath of Joseph to his father Jacob, Gen. 47.29, 30, 31, &c. and that of the children of Israel to each other, Judg. 21.5. And that of Jonathan to David, 1 Sam. 20.12, 13. Others again are condi­tionall, wherein something future, that is contingent, or de­pending upon mans will is particularly, and expresly compri­sed as a qualification of the matter to be performed, the fail­ing of which is a discharge of the person engaging from the promise or oath. Such was that of the servant to Abraham, Gen. 24.2.3.4.8.9. And that of the Spies to Rahab, Joshua 2 12. to 21. Now then for Mr. G. to say generally of all oaths and promises whatsoever, whether they be of things in their own nature necessary, or of things arbitrary; whether they be ab­solute, or conditionall; and to say specially of all promises and oaths of Allegiance, or subjection, and particularly of these oaths in question, that they are conditionall, and binde no longer, nor any otherwise then whilest, and as the partie covenanted with, or sworn to, behaves himself as he did at the time of covenanting, is both in it self, and by what is here said, as also by the ordinary practise of men in Indentures, and oaths apparently inconsistent, and absurd; and to infer such an universall loosening of men from Oaths and Cove­nants, of what nature soever, upon the parties miscarriage to whom the engagement is made, from the conditionality of some divine promises, is (besides the impietie of it above de­noted) an insupportable non sequitur, and by Mr Gs. [...]ophistry never to be maintained; yet this is all the Logick of this Ar­gument.

Having thus (I hope) sufficiently taken away the Excepti­ons of this Author against the force of the Oath of Allegiance, I leave him straining and travailing about that stone of Sisi­phus, (to wit, the guilt of Royall blood) which he labours to [...]oul away in that his book, and proceed to another.

The next I meet with that strikes at the obligation of this [Page 43] Oath, is one that asserteth himself to be of those whom he that I had last to do with, professeth himself a Champion against, that is, the Presbyterian part, but in this (as far as my ken will reach) he is alone for them: I mean the Author of The lawfulnesse of obeying the present Government, who in his 11. and 12. pages pleadeth against it with the Reasons which fol­low, being here set down by parcels, with my Answer to them so distinguisht.

1. It were good (saith he first) to consider, whether there be any clause in any Oath or Covenant, which in a fair and common sense for­bids obedience to the Commands of the present Government, and Autho­rity, much lesse when no other can be had, and so the Common-wealth must go to ruine.

1. The many clauses of severall Oaths, and of the Cove­nant and Protestation, which strictly forbid such obedience, I have urged [Chap. 2.] whither I refer him.

2. But by his last sentence recited [ much lesse when no other, &c.] together with his marginall quotation [of a Popish Schoolman or Casuist telling us, When a thing sworn is too diffi­cult, or he that swore is by the change of abilities or estate rendered lesse apt to perform: or lastly, when the thing sworn is an hindrance to the swearer from consulting the publick good, then there is a lawfull cause of dispensing in the Oath] he seems as if he would insinuate a ces­sation of the Oath in our case, unto which I say.

1. Take dispensation, in the usuall Popish acception, and all power of dispensing in Oaths and Vows, in whomsoever it be supposed to be, is denyed with one consent, (as far as I have observed, or ever heard) by Protestant professors: and it is a meer popish doctrine, and papall arrogation exploded from amongst us. Vide D. San­derson de jur. oblig. praelect. 7. Sect. 3. & 4. They say, in omni voto, aut juramen to subintelligi de­bere illam con­ditionem si Domino Papae placuerit. And this Oath hath it self precluded and cut off all use of this shift of a dispensation in these words. I do be­leeve, and in conscience am resolved, that neither the Pope, nor any other person whatsoever, hath power to absolve me of this Oath, or any part thereof. And this I the rather note, upon occasion of this Au­thors quoting a Doctor of the Papacy for the dispensabilitie of an Oath, in regard that some of late (if I mistake not) have taken upon them to discharge people from this Oath, or (which is all one) from the Allegiance therein sworn to. Unto which act I shall onely speak thus much, either they assume [Page 44] power to do this as the party to whom the Oath is taken, or as a superior, by the analogie of that Law, Numb: 30.3, 4. But, 1. they cannot do it as the party sworn to in that Oath, for they are not that partie in the Oath, the King, and his Heirs, and Successors are the onely persons to whom, and in whose behalf the Oath is taken, and consequently they onely that can release from it as parties; nay they are the party swear­ing, and therefore far from a capacity of discharging others from that Oath, as presently I shall shew. 2. Neither can they do it as a superior by the equity of that Law, Numb: 30. For, 1. their lawfull superiority in the case they now stand, is the matter under question. 2. The power of a superior to undo the Oath, or bond of the inferior, prevails onely in those mat­ters wherein the party is under the power of the superior, and not in other matters, which are without the extent of the supe­riors authority Vide D San­der. de iuram. oblig. praelect. 5. Sect. 5. & praelect. 7. Sect. 6. Animadver­tendum tamen est penes hos non esse facul­tatem rescin­dendi quodli­bet iusiuran­dum subdito­rum; sedillud duotaxat, cu­ius materia est corum potesta­al subiecta Al­stod. Theol. Cas. cap 15. Reg. 2. num. 16.. Now this Oath concerns a duty owing to another, which they that interpose to discharge from it have no right to dispose of. 3. But however the superior can onely by the Law cited, or any other right come in to make void the Oath of the inferior, which was taken without his knowledge and consent, and that also he may onely do in the day that he hears of it; but if he either allow the making of it, or declare not against it presently, when he comes to know of it, he hath no power thenceforth to recall it, as is clear by the Text. Now the Oath of Allegiance was so far from being disallowed, or declared against as soon as it was known, that it was inacted and injoyned by both Houses of Parliament, and moreover it was constantly to be taken by all the Members of the Lower House at their entrance into that House; so that besides their incompetency to discharge from the Oath who have assented to it; Let any man shew how they who are parties to the oath, and have themselves taken it can disanull it; the obliged parties disanulling is a strain above Papall dispensation.

2. But to speak to these causes of dispensing with an Oath according to the Casuists Divinity, which the Author apply­eth to the case in hand. 1. When the thing sworn is too difficult, or the swearer is by the change of ability, or estate, rendred lesse apt to per­form. If by this difficulty of the thing, and unaptnesse of the person sworn, he mean, the thing is become impossible, and [Page 44] the partie utterly unable to observe it. All reasonable men will grant so far as the impossibility lyes and so long as it con­tinues the Oath binds not, but this is not to our Authors pur­pose, for to cease from an act, that is, from obedience to the present Government, can never be impossible Qui facit quod in se suit ut adimpleret quod promise­rat iuramenti fidem exolvit. D. Sanders de iuram. oblig. praelect 2. Sect. 10. Obligatio tolli­tur quoad id solum quod est factu impossi­bile quoad re­liquum vero maner, & qui non potest om­ne quod debet, debts tamen omne quod po­test. Idem Sect. 12. Est regula in­ris, rei impossi­bilis nulla est obligatio.. But if he in­tend by difficultie and unaptnesse, that the thing sworn to will bring hard tearms upon the swearer, or breed him temporall losse, and trouble, this is no cause to infringe the tye of an Oath, or give a discharge from it; He that hath sworn to his own hurt, must not therefore change from it: Psal. 15.4.

2. When the thing sworn is an impediment to the swearer from consulting the publick good.

1. If the thing sworn should become privative of, or oppo­site to, the publick good, or well-being of the Nation in its own nature, & necessarily, it were unlawfull, and consequent­ly the oath would be void, for to a sinfull thing there can be no obligation. But if it be onely of that nature which they call impeditive of a greater good, that is, if it stand in the way (not of the good of the Kingdom simply, and absolutely respected, but onely) of some higher degree of good supposed to be attainable; this consideration will not bear that weight, as to frustrate an oath. As for example, when a people that hath sworn obedience to a lawfull form of Government, which yet is not absolutely the best, as suppose to a Democra­cy, or Aristocracy, or that hath sworn obedience to a lawfull Prince, who yet is not simply the ablest that can be found for regall parts and qualifications, such may not take themselves discharged from their Oath, because there may be a better modell of Government, or a better qualified person to make a Prince sound out, and for that cause cast off their present Government and King, and set up another because compara­tively better. It was doubtlesse better for the people of Israel, that the Gibeonites had been destroyed, as the rest of the Ca­naanites were (if there had been no oath to the contrary) then that they were spared (besides that the sparing of them was against an expresse positive Law: Deut. 20.16.) and so the con­gregation judged, and therefore grudged at the sparing of of them: yet in that case the Oath for sparing them stood in­violable. Josh. 9.15.18, 19. 2 Sam. 21.1, 2, &c. It was in like [Page 46] sort for the Kingdoms greater good, that Zedekiah and his people should be free from Nebuchadnezzars subjection, yet that was not a dissolution of that Kings Covenant and Oath, Ezek. 17.12, 13, &c. 2. It will at no hand be granted, that to with­hold obedience from a usurped Power is in it self impeditive of the publick good at all, I know inconveniencies are by this Author urged to follow, if such a Power be not obeyed; as that, Else all Authority must fall to the ground, and so confusion, (which is worse then titular tyrannie) be admitted. But all Authority hangs not upon the back of Usurpation, this may come down shortly again, and that recover it self, and stand upright. Pre­sent quietnesse and security are like to be but in a sickly state, obey, or obey not; and for justice, as there is none where every man is left to himself, so there is usually little to be had from the hands of an unjustly gotten Power; Dominion being wont to be worn as it was come by Nec quis­quam impeti­um flagitio qu [...]situm bo­ni [...] artibus ex­ [...]cui [...]. Tacit.. An Issachar-like bowing down under the Common-wealths oppressions is not for publick good (neither were we told thus when the Parliament began to stand up, and awaken the people to shake off Expilation and oppression) the Orator will tell us, Servitude is the worst of Evils, and to be repelled at the charge not onely of war, but death Et nomen pa­cis dolce est, & ipsa res saluta­tis, sed inter pacem & servi­tutem plu [...]i­mum interest; pax est tran­quil [...]a libertas: servitus malo­ [...]um omnium postremum, non modo bel­lo sed morte etiam repel­lendum. Cice­ro in M. An­ton. Philip 2 ae. Prov 14.34.16.12.. Nay Religion will dictate to us in the words of the wisest earthly King, That righteousnesse exalteth a Nation; and, The throne is establisht by righteousnesse. Under Usurpation then we can ex­pect no settlement; and to submit to it, is to help to fasten that which is certain to fall, and to fall with the greater confracti­on, by how much it is more favoured. Commotion and tu­multuousnesse is sure (in reason) to follow violent domina­tion. Let Israels many and turbulent changes of their Kings (after their departure from the house of David) be a president for it, of whose kings for their speedie and fatall ends, it may be said, as it was of many of the Romane Caesars, that they ra­ther seemed to be kings in a Scene, or personated on the Stage then reall Authorities. The standing off from obedience is but like to speed the Commotions, and make them easier. To per­swade men to couch down under Usurpation, when it is got­ten up to [...]ave troubles, is as if a man that is got into the briars should stick therein, because he may rake himself in offering to get out; or he that hath a festered sore, or grown disease in [Page 47] his body, should let it alone, and go on, because it will stir the humours, and cost him some pain to be cured.

2. The same Author proceeds, And whether it, (to wit, any clause in any Oath or Covenant) forbids obedience to the present Authority, more then to Laws that have been formerly enacted, by those which came into Authority meerly by Power. 1. You have not yet produced any former Princes that had any hand in the making of a Law, that came into the regall Authority meerly by power; for although some of them got possession by the Sword, yet (to omit the alledging of other title) they were confirmed, by the Kingdoms consent in Parliament, before they concurred in Enacting Laws for the Kingdom. 2. The Laws you reflect on were not meerly made by those Princes whom you pretend to have come in meerly by Power, but were constituted by Parliamentary Enacting; And for any former Parliaments coming into the Authority meerly by force, you neither do nor can alledge any thing.

3. He urgeth further. If it be said, that in the Oath of Allegi­ance, allegiance is sworn to the King, his heirs and successors, if his heirs be not his successors, how doth that Oath binde? Either the word successors must be superflu [...]us, or it must binde to successors as well as to heirs; and if it binde not to a successor that is not an heir, how can it binde to an heir that is not a successor? And if you will know the com­mon and usuall sense (which should be the meaning of an Oath) of the word Successors, you need not so much ask of Lawyers and learned persons, as of men of ordinary knowledge, and demand of them who was the successor of William the Conquerour, and see whether they will not say W: Rufus, and who succeeded Rich: the 3d: and whether they will not say, Hen: the 7th: and yet neither of them was hei [...]: so in ordi­nary acception the word Successor is taken for him that actually succeeds in Government, and not for him that is actually excluded.

This Author in these lines raiseth much dust, that it may serve him for a double end: 1. To obscure the genuine sense of this clause of the Oath, that it may not seem to make a­gainst him, as indeed it doth; and then to detort and wrest it, to the advantage of his Usurpers interest. 1. He would cast a mist upon the words of the Oath, to over cloud its true sense, and this he attempts in the fore-cited Discourse untill you come to this mark ‖: he endeavours it by placing an ambi­guity [Page 48] in the word [Successors], and setting it at odds with the word [Heirs] whereas this clause of the Oath is clear enough in it self, and far enough from the use he would make of it; and firm enough to the sense which he opposeth. Which that I may evince, I desire the Reader to observe these two things.

1. That the Oath intends by Heirs, and Successors, the same persons which may evidently appear, 1. By the manifest drift of the Oath, and intention of the Authority that prescribed it, which is the continuance and assurance of the Crown (up­on concession of his then Majesties just title) to his Heirs in succession after him, and one another lineally, and the defence of them therein against all other corrivals or opposers; this I cannot see which way will be gainsayed; and being so, it will inforce us to grant the Oath, and Oath-giver, could not mean by successors any other then heirs. 2. In that the words [heirs and successors] are joyned by the copulative [and], whereas if they should have intended different parties, the discretive [or] should, in true syntaxis have been put betwixt them. 3. In that his heirs and successors are immediately in the Oath de­noted by the same pronounce [them], and again by the same possessive [their] in those words, ( and him and [them] will de­fend to the uttermost of my power, against all conspiracies and attempts whatsoever, which shall be made against his or [their] persons, [their] Crown or dignity) but if they be not the same persons, how come they to be thus particled together? especially how can they immediately after his Majestie be instituted to the same Alle­giance, and defence therein in relation to the same Crown and dignity; admit them divers, and the Oath will import a contradiction: and will any man imagine, so irrationall a thing as that Authority hath so long imposed, and the King­dome, especially the most intelligent persons in it, have uni­versally taken an Oath so irreconcileable to it self. 4. The Law of the Land (unto which this Oath must needs be yeelded to be consonant) ordains his Heirs to be his Successors.

2. That the Oath understands by Successors, those onely that are so de jure, and not any others, that contrary to right may intrude into the royall Seat, and injuriously make them­selves successors onely de facto. For, 1. In the Oath we swear Allegiance, and defence to Successors; now what man of con­science [Page 49] would ever impose, or take an Oath of this nature to any (but in his intention) a just party, for to such a one alone could he swear in righteousnesse according to Jer. 4.2. 2. The Oath appropriates the Crown and dignity to Successors, as theirs, in these words, [their Crown and dignity] now theirs, and their right are all one. 3. The Oaths of Allegiance, and Su­premacy must needs accord, and this may be the best Expla­natorie of that: now this, viz: the Oath of Supremacy prefix­eth the word [lawfull] to Successors, and confineth our allegi­ance to his lawfull Successors in these words, The Kings high­nesse, his Heirs, and lawfull Successors: which epithite will not permit the word Successors, either in that or in the Oath of Allegiance (unlesse you will unreasonably make them jar­ring) to be carried to any successor but him that is such of right. And this reason will also irrefragably confirm the for­mer Proposition, viz: that the Oath intends by Heirs and Suc­cessors, the same persons, for who are his lawfull Successors? the Law will tell you, his Heirs.

By these two Propositions (sufficiently cleared I hope) we may understand how the Oath (in that clause) binds; and that, 1. There is no superfluitie in the word Successors; for an Identity in sense of divers words is no vain Tantalogie, many words signifying the same thing being ordinarily used (and especially in Oaths, and such like punctuall forms, and parti­cularly in the Oaths of Allegiance, and Supremacy in divers other clauses) for explication, and significancies sake. And though heirs and successors in the clause in hand mean the same persons, yet it may be in a divers consideration, as thus: They are Heirs in his Majesties life time, and Successors at his death respectively. 2. That the Oath binds neither to his Heirs, nor Successors disjunctively, or the one taken from the other, but to both conjunctively, as one: and taking Succes­sors aright, that is, for lawfull successors, we need not, cannot say that it binds either to a successor that is not an heir, or to an heir that is not a successor, viz: de juce, though perhaps he may be prevented, or delayed from actuall succession, or ra­ther possession.

2. But this Author will have [Successors] to signifie such as are so de facto, and do actually succeed in Government; And [Page 50] by this means this passage of the Oath shall make for the U­surper if he be in possession. I have said (I think) that which is enough to fore-stall this alreadie, but let his Argument be heard, and receive a formall Answer; it is in effect thus.

The common and ordinary acception of the word Successor, means him that actually succeeds in Government; but the word Successor in this Oath, must be understood in the common and ordinary acception: Ergo, the word Successor in this Oath must mean him that actually suc­ceeds in Government.

1. I answer to the major by denying it if taken universally; and if it be not, the Syllogisme is false: the major not being universall in the first figure. For although one common sense of the word Successor, is he that actually succeeds whether by right or wrong, yet that's not the sole usuall acception of the word, and this I shall evince the same way that he goes about to prove his acceptation to be the common one; and in so do­ing, confute also his proof of his major which is thus. If you would know (saith he) the common sense of the word Successors, ask not so much Lawyers and learned persons, as men of ordinary know­ledge, and demand of them who was William the Conquerours suc­cessor? they will say, W: Rufus. Who succeeded Rich: the 3d: they will say, H: the 7th: and yet neither of them was heir. R. Although I yeeld not his rule to be the best (for if Successor be a tearme used in the Law (as it is in this Oath prescribed by Law) Lawyers, and learned men in the Law, were there any obscu­rity would be the fittest Interpreters of it; for it is a maxime, we must beleeve every one in his own facultie or Art Credendum est cuilibet ar­tifici in arte sua.) yet I shall refer the matter to it so the question may be rightly pro­pounded, and as the case in hand will allow. This Author propounds it fallaciously, and unapplicably to the present purpose, in that he demands de praeterito, and so as the questi­on onely interrogates of an actuall Successor [who was suc­cessor, or did succeed such a one?] and then the answer (whe­ther made by men learned or unlearned) must needs bring in him that did succeed in fact. But let the question be put de fu­turo, and thus onely it is sutable to a promissory oath which respecteth the future time, and a thing to be done in it; and consequently to this Oath which is promissory, and runs de futuro. I shall bear faith and true Allegiance; and I will defend, &c. [Page 51] and was taken of a successor not that had succeeded, but that was to succeed, and it will be this, who is to be his Majesties suc­cessor? and then let even the man of ordinary knowledge an­swer it, and see whether he will not say, not every one that can catch it, but he that hath right to the Crown. And by this fitting of the question to the current of the Oath, and the re­solution that the thing it self gives to it, as the proof of his Proposition is taken off, so the contradictory to it is necessa­rily inferred, to wit, that the sole, common and ordinary ac­ception of the word Successor, is not him that actually suc­ceeds in Government. But if the word Successor be capable of a divers acceptation, what obligation can there be to succes­sors in the Oath? R: Although Successor in common usage may be taken two wayes, to wit, either for a successor in fact, or a successor in right, yet in the Oath it can be taken but in the latter sense. For, 1. It is a rule for the finding out of the sense of an Oath agreed on among Casuists, that in Oaths in­joyned, or imposed by others, we must construe them in that sense which is known, or may most probably be judged to be the prescribers Vide D San­ders. de juram. oblig. praelect. 6. Sect. 9. Ant. Ashcams Discourse 2d. part. Chap. 41.; but his end in this Oath being the support of his Crown in a lineall succession from himself, according to his right settled by the Laws, his sense intended by Successors could onely be, they that are such de jure, and the same that are his heirs. 2. To take the word in the other sense, viz: for Successors de facto, how unjustly soever possessed is inconsistent. 1. With the nature of an Oath, which must be taken in righ­teousnesse: Jer. 4.2. that is, to oblige onely to that which is just. 2. With the word Heir, which being placed first in the Oath, must first be served; and successor can be onely under­stood in congruity with it. 3. With the Oath of Supremacy, which bindeth us to the lawfull Successors. 4. With the Law of the Land, which appointeth succession to the Heir. 5. With a possibility of keeping the Oath, for if heirs and successors mean divers persons, how can the Oath of Allegiance, and de­fence of the Regall dignity be observed towards both?

Having vindicated this passage of the Oath of Allegiance from this Authors distortion, I cannot let him passe without without a brief animad version or two more. 1. Whilest he contends about the sense of Successors, and would have it [Page 52] understood of actuall succeeders, that it may favour the U­surpers, he forgets what is the object of that succession, viz: a Crown, and regall dignity, wherein by vertue of that Oath those Successors are to be defended: wheras they whose power he pleads for, (and in whose behalf he undertook to answer this clause, as not forbidding obedience to them) have not onely put by the rightfull Successor, but abolished the Crown and Regall dignity it self; unto what then would he have his mecenates to be successors? or how will he reconcile obedience to them with defence of the Crown, and royall dignity? 2. It is to be admired, that a person of so fair a character (as is gi­ven him by the worthy Authors of the Religious Demurrer) should begin this Section of his with a generall deliberative, (It were good to consider, whether there be any clause in any Oath or Co­venant, which forbids obedience to the Commands of the present Go­vernment,) and yet take no notice of any thing in this or the other Oaths and Covenants, save of this clause onely in this Oath, which it seems he thought he could not onely loosen from obliging against him, but draw over to be accident to him, which how well he hath performed, I leave the Reader to consider. And I further admire how (seeing he accounteth Oaths sacred bonds, and reverend obligements) he feared not to use such enforcement to the clear letter of so tender and sacred a thing; for though any body can say a tyrant sine titulo, or a Usurper is a Successor de facto when he is in, yet that he is such a successor as the Oath intends, viz: one that we are sworn in allegiance to, and are bound by that Oath to defend to the uttermost of our power, &c. Having withall (probably at the same time) sworn in the Oath of Supremacy Allegiance to the lawfull Successors, and to our power to assist, and defend all jurisdictions, priviledges, &c. belonging to those Successors, is a grosser interpretation, then I hope he himself will own when he considers it, or any considering and conscientious men can receive. And I could wish he would consider, whe­ther when he took the Oath he had this sense in his minde, or rather it be not newly excogitated, upon the coming into que­stion of these late transactions; and how neerly this practise entrencheth upon perjury Alterum per­jurii genus est ubi recte jura. veris, non syn­cerè agere, sed novo aliquo excogitato commento iu­ramenti vim (salvis tamen verbis) decli­nare & cludere D. Sanders. de Iuxam. oblig. praelect. 6. Sect. 7..

4. But having said what he thinks fit to the clause, he will [Page 53] have one glance at the urgers of it. Yet withall this quaere may be added, while the son is in the same posture in which the father was, how comes this Oath at this time to stand up, and plead for disobedience in regard of the Son, that was asleep, and silent in regard of the Father?

1. They that plead this Oath for disobedience, or rather denying obedience to the present Power in regard of the Sons right, did the same in regard of the Father; when it was ap­parent, that not a meer defence of Religion and Liberties, and a recovery of the Kings personall presence to the Parlia­ment was the end of the war, but the Fathers death, and the Sons dis-inheriting, with the deflowering of the Crown, and over-turning of the Throne it self. Witnesse (amongst other testimonies) what the London, Essex, Lancashire, and Banbury Ministers have declared publickly in their respective writings, they are alike sworn to, have according to their power and vocations, stood for the Authority of both, and not allowed the deposition of either, or the usurpation of their Power by others: they have prayed against, bewayled, stood astonied at, witnessed against the proceedings that have been against both of them: and to this day they lament that the clear Word of the Lord, held forth by their testimonies, hath not prevailed for the prevention or retractation of those direfull, and (the world throughout) scandalous courses.

2. The Son cannot yet be in the same posture his Father was in, whilest an overture or proposall for satisfaction hath not once been made to him, wherein he is in the view of the Kingdom more harshly and extreamly dealt with then even his Father was; and as his Fathers sufferings as to life were without president, so are his as to succession to the Crown.

Mr. Ashcam (whom I had in hand before, Chap. 2.) hath di­vers strange, and unapproveable passages reflecting upon the Oaths under debate; which I shall cull out as I meet with them in severall places. In his 2d. part, Chap. 8. Sect. 6. he layes down foure Cases, wherein he saith, Subjects are freed from their sworn Allegiance. His three first, ( viz: 1. If a Prince abandon. 2. If he alienate. 3. If Nero-like through mad furie or folly, he seek in an hostile way the destruction of his whole Kingdom) will I presume be taken not to concern our case in hand; the fourth possibly may be judged applicable to it, [Page 48] which therefore I shall take notice of: and a brief animadver­sion will serve, he delivering it (as he doth other odde and un­sound stuffe) with a pythagoricall magisteriousnesse, and without the assistance of reason to induce a perswasion to it in the Reader.

Fourthly, (saith he) if the Prince have part of the supreame right, and the people the other part, then notwithstanding an Oath of Allegi­ance to him, he may be opposed if he invade the other part of Supreame right. And a few lines after he affirms with Grotius, He may lose his right by the Law of War. And in the next Section he saith of all those foure Cases, and therefore of this, That they shew how we are absolved in our own consciences from all Oath and Contract, when one party forfeits his Conditions first.

The defensive opposing of a Prince, invading his Compeers part by the party invaded where the Supreame right is so shared, (supposing the Oath of Allegiance to be cautioned ac­cording to that sharing) I shall not dispute, it being beside the present question; but his losing his right by the Law of War; and the Subjects absolution from Oath upon that his suppo­sed forfeiture of conditions, I shall a little call into question. 1. He tels us (if we will take it upon his word) if the Prince invade the others right, he may lose his right by the Law of War. What the Law of War means (if diverse, or varying from Gods, and other humane Laws) I understand not, nor is it materiall; in discerning into the permanency, or cessation of right, and of an oath concerning it, we are to have recourse to the Law of God, and Nature; and if by these the Princes title, and Subjects oath remain firm, notwithstanding his in­vading the peoples right, the Law of war like Alexanders Sword may violently cut in sunder, but it cannot unloose either the single tye of right, or the superadded of an oath. How should this forfeiture come? if any wayes, by way of satisfaction for the trespasse upon the others right. But theologicall Justice ap­points not, that where one invadeth anothers right, the In­vaders right should thereupon be cancelled; and that it may be lawfull for the invaded, upon that injury received, to invest himself therewith, and finally to alienate and disposse him of it. A liberty of defence it permitteth to the Invaded in rela­tion to his own right, and a prosecution of the Invader unto [Page 44] his full satisfaction for the wrong inferred by him, and for that end (if there be no other mean but war left to effect it) the invaded (if he have power of war) may sease the Invaders right unto a just recovery or restitution of his own; but that being compassed, and proportionable satisfaction for the tres­passe being given or gained, the Invaded party must sit down therewith, and not extend his line over all his late Invaders right. Every transgression towards man cals for satisfaction; and whoso doth wrong, is bound to make reparation; and his right is responsible, or obnoxious so far: but it is more then summum jus to carry this compensation to a totall and perpe­tuall translation of the Injurers possession to the Injured: to­tall confiscation is too high a penalty to be set upon every en­croachment. Look into the laws and rules of satisfaction in Scripture, as Exod. 22.1, 2, &c. Levit. 6.4, 5. 2 Sam. 12.6. Luk. 19.8. and it will appear the deepest amounts but to a foure-fold restitution of the damage. Nay look into that order (which comes home to our Case) concerning the Princes of Israel, who having formerly used oppression, violence, spoil, and exaction towards the people of God, are not therefore ad­judged to be deprived of their whole Inheritance (Office, and all) but are onely reduced to their own portion: Ezek. 45.7, 8, 9. But because this Gentleman flies to the Law of War for this his extreame dealing with Princes, hear what a learned Judge, and profound Statesman delivers, in the case, in relation to that very rule. It is the Lord Verulam, who (insisting on the justnesse of a war on the King of Englands part with Spaine, for the recovery of the Palatinate, although the Paulsgrave in whose behalf that war should be commenced, should be accounted to have made an unjust war in Bohemia, Considerati­ons touching war with Spaine, writ­ten by the right honour­able Francis Lord Verulam pag. 3, 4, 5, 6. by means whereof he came to lose the Palatinate) resolves thus: An offensive warre is made, which is unjust to the Aggress [...]ur, the prosecution, and race of the war carrieth the Defendant to assail, and invade the ancient and indubitate patrimonie of the fi [...]st aggressor, which is now turned De­fendant, shall he sit down, and not put himself in defence? or, if he be dispossest, shall he not make a war for the recovery? No man is so poore of judgement as will affirm it. This resolution he confirms with many instances worthy to be perused in the Author; and in the end with this Reason: Wars are vindict; revenges, reparations; [Page 56] but revenges are not infinite, but according to the measure of the first wrong or damage. And within a few lines after he saith of the case he is arguing: It is the more clear on our part, because the pos­session of Bohemia is settled with the Emperour. For, though it be true, that Non datur compensatio injuriarum, yet were there somewhat more colour to detain the Palatinate, as in the nature of a Recovery in value, or compensation, if Bohemia had been lost, or were still the stage of War. According to the rule of Justice then, yea even that of War, the peoples right being recovered, and satisfaction gi­ven or tendered for the securing of it for future, the late inva­sive Prince should injoy his right again, and the oath that was given for the securing of it stands in force, and obligeth to it. And this may be further cleared, in that the Solemne League and Covenant was prescribed, and taken when the King was judged to be in the actuall invasion of the peoples rights; when the people could not be reasonably required to swear the said Covenant in behalf of the Kings right, if such an in­vasion did forfeit it, and absolve the Subjects from their oaths to him; and if they did then swear, they cannot afterward plead an absolution from their Oaths by vertue of that inva­sion. And if the late Kings actions could be a forfeiture of all rights, and dissolution of all Oaths as to himself (which I cannot yeeld) yet how can either of them be said to be dis­anulled in relation to his Heir, upon whom the right legally descends, and unto whose title the Oaths were sworn. If it be said, he was partaker in the same actions, the Religious Demur­rer will tell you, 2. part. pag. 8. that the right and title to the Crown upon his Fathers death, doth quit him from all stain by the Laws of the Land.

2ly, Whereas he would infer this absolution from all oaths, by the Princes forfeiture of his Conditions first. What Conditions doth he mean? 1. If he understand any conditions to be in the Subjects Oaths which are to be fulfilled by the Prince, up­on which tearms the Subjects Oaths shall binde, he is besides the book; the Oaths of the people put no conditions upon the Prince, but are all absolute and irrespective, and run without ifs, or and's; in like manner as the obligation of Subjects al­legiance to their Soveraigne is irrespective according to Di­vine Institution, as I have before (in this Chap.) proved. If [Page 57] this Author fancy any such conditions in the peoples Oaths, let him shew where they lye, and what they are. 2. If he mean conditions in the Kings Oaths of Government, they are also unconditioned, or not dependant on tearms to be kept on the Subjects part: and, as the Subjects miscarriage is not a release­ment of the King from his Oath of Government, so the Kings failing is no discharge of the Subject from his Oath: the vali­dity, or obligation of either cannot be said to hang on the performance of the other; unlesse it could be proved that each part swore with respect to the others observation of his duty and oath, which neither the tenor of the Oaths, nor the sub­ject matter of them will permit to be granted; nor hath this or any other Author that I have seen, said any thing to prove that.

3ly, If by conditions he mean the capitulations which the Kingdom may be supposed to have made with him at his In­stallment in the Throne, upon the keeping, At si duo ho­mines mutuo se obligent promissis di­versi generis, aut non codem tempore, aut alias citra mu­tuum respe­ctum: violata ab uno fides non liberat al­terum obliga­tione; sed uter­que tenetur id servare quod ipse juravit, etiamsi alter qoud suarum erat partium non effecerit, exempligratia. Rex aliquis simpliciter, & citra respectum ad fidelitatem sub­ditorum iurat se regnum administratum iustè & secundum leges: subditi alio tempore simpliciter & citra respectum ad Principis officium iurant se ei debitam fidelitatem, & obe­dientiam praestituros, utrique obligantur quod suj est officii fideliter facere, et si defecerit al­tera pa [...] à suo o licio: ita ut neque Rex solutus sit a suo iuramento, si subditi debitum obse­qui [...] non praestiterint; nec subditi suo, si Rex a [...]ustitae tramite dest x [...]rit. D Sanders de Iurament. oblig. praelect. 4. Sect. 8. or breaking where­of he should enjoy, or lose his dignity; there are no such ca­pitulations made either with him personally, or with any of his predecessors to be alledged; they are inconsistent with the Supreame Power entrusted with him. The truth is, it is a weak error, though somewhat apt to possesse the minds of uncon­sidering men, that in those estates of life ordained of God for the help of man, wherein there is a mutuall relation, and an­swerable offices to be performed (as of Magistrate, and Sub­ject; parent, and childe; husband, and wife, Master, and ser­vant) where there is a departure from duty on the one side, there is a cessation of the debt of duty on the other. If this were so, it were a frivolous thing for men, subject to corrupti­on, to contract any relations; and there would be no place left for the exercise of gentlenesse, patience, charity, betwixt rela­tives, nor for the inferiors passive obedience in case of inno­cencie; [Page 58] but this is directly contradicted by that of the Apostle Peter, 1 Pet 2.18, 19, 20. and those rules of the Apostles, Rom. 12.17. 1 Thes. 5.15. 1 Pet. 3.9. There are indeed some parti­cular cases wherein the beneficiall duty of those relations is expireable, as is that of the married in case of adultery; that of parents when their children are rebellious un [...]e [...]cla [...]mably; that of Magistrates towards a Subject capitally offensive. But such particulars are warranted by Scripture; otherwise, wherein God hath not given a discharge, man may not. Now let any case, wherein the Subject is dis-engaged by Divine Warrant upon the Magistrates mis-administration, be produ­ced, and made out to extend to the point in hand, and it will be yeelded; But this is yet to be done. But I go on to another passage of the Author.

In the same Chap: Sect: 7. he hath these words. Now I shall endeavour to shew how a man may take an Oath from an [...] just inva­ding party, contrary to those Oaths which perhaps he to [...]k fl [...]s [...] from the just party, who p [...]ssibly brake no conditions with him. This his un­dertaking he prosecutes in Sect: 10. where he saith thus. I con­ceive but two wayes of taking such opp [...]site Oaths. To take an Oath in contradiction of a former Oath, is so high a matter, that the way to it had need to be very clear; and it can be no way allowable save one, that is, when the former Oath ceaseth to oblige; let us examine therefore whether his two wayes fall under this [...]ne [...]. When it is in a thing wherein a man may justly presume that the right party for a time releases him of his former Oath or duty to him. 1. The swearers presumption that the partie sworn to, doth release him from his former Oath, un [...]esse he hath actually released him, and declared so to him, is unto him no dis-obligation; there can be no just presumption of such a releasement, without such an antecedent act of the same party; without it evidently appearing, it is but a ground­lesse presumption, and highly impious: if it carry on to the taking of an opposite Oath, the content of the party [...] to being not passed, o [...] made known to him, this presumption is but the swearers own act, and his own act cannot di [...]charge him; what is it that must be the ground of this presumption? The obliged persons perswasion of the equity o [...] reasonable­nesse of the thing? that's but his own judgement, the party [Page 59] he is bound to may haply judge otherwise; however it is at the best but a probable, not a certain ground to conclude up­on, that another doth a thing because it is just, and that the party thereupon consents to a release is but his own fiction, till he hath so exprest himself to him. This were an easie way of escaping out of any promissory oath to man, and would be ordinary if it would hold; for men would be apt to induce themselves to beleeve an expediencie and justnesse of an abso­lution from the party, when their oaths pinch them in the performance; but this presumption is but a superficiall de­vice.

2. The party sworn (in the case in hand) standing upon his title, preventeth this presumption, and plainly declareth the contrary: 3. In the Solemne League and Covenant, the party sworn to (as before hath been manifested) is not the King, Dico relaxati­onem istam in juramentis, faederibus, pa­cti, alusque contractibus humanis locū habere, non item in votis. ratio discrimi­nis est, quia vota Deo fiunt ut parti: ab ho­mine autem ea sola rel [...]xari fas est quae ho­mini facta sunt D. San [...]. de jurament. oblig. praelect. 7. Sect. 8. but the people of all ranks within the three Kingdoms entring into the same Covenant: and how can they be presu­med to release one, whilest they hold themselves bound by it? 4. The Protestation of the 5. of May, 1641. is a Vow; now Divines resolve, that though an Oath may be cancelled by the party to whom it is made, yet a Vow no man can remit, be­cause it is made to God as the party, and no man hath to do in altring the right wherein we are bound to him. The things therefore concerning the Government included in that Vow, cannot so much as be pretended to be unloosed by this way.

2. His other way he thus layes down. A man cannot by Oath be obliged further to any power, then to do his utmost; and the Oath is to be understood conditionally, if the action, or passion may be for that Powers advantage. In an Army each man being obliged by Oath to lose his life for the Prince, rather then turn back, or avoid any danger; this Army having done its utmost, is beaten; and now the Souldiers can do no more for their Prince then dye; in these straights therefore it is not repugnant to their Oath to ask quarter, or a new life, and having taken it, they are bound in a new and just obligation of fidelity to those whom they were bound to kill few houres before. They who live under the full Power of the unjust party, may be said to take quarter, and to be in the same condition with the former: and so have the liberty to oblige them­selves to that which the Prince now cannot but expect from them, viz: to swear to those under whose Power they live, that they will not attempt [Page 60] any thing against them. All that this amounts to is, it is praeter, non contra prius juramentum; and as the condition which is the ground of this promissory Oath is such, that it is impossible for a man in it to ad­vance his parties cause, so it is impossible for him to be bound to an im­possibility. Here is much strength of confidence in asserting, but none of Reason to a warrant, and prove what is here intended to be concluded. That a Souldier, or Subject, being sworn to serve his Prince to the utmost of his power, may ask, and take quarter, and passively submit to a captivating Enemy, when he is fully under his power, I shall not call into question; his Oath binding him to do what he can, for his Soveraigne for­bids him not to yeeld when he can do no longer; and for him to suffer death, or harder usage by contesting with his enemy, when he lyes at his mercy, as his Oath binds not to it, so it is for his Princes disadvantage, there being yet hope that his life may be reserved, and his liberty recovered, for his Princes further service according to his Oath, in regard whereof he is rather in that case bound to ask, and take quarter, then bound out from it, but what of all this? will it thence follow, That the Souldier, or Subject thus brought under an adverse party to his Prince, oweth fidelity, and may oblige himself by Oath to that party not to attempt against him? If his Allegiance and Oath were expi­red, there were some probable way for it; but here is little said, or can be said for that. Let us particularly examine, what this man alledgeth.

1. He hath done what he could, and the Oath bound him to no more. R: He hath done what he could hitherto, and so far hath kept his Oath; but if the Oath was (as the Oaths in the case under debate are) not limited to that particular designe, or battell, wherein the Prince hath the worse, and his sworn followers are fallen into the unjust parties hands, but to indure whilest life lasts, and the Prince hath any service for him, he hath not done what possibly he may yet do, nor hath he satisfied his Oath, so that it can demand no more of him.

2. He hath a new life given him of his conquering Enemy, and thence becomes bound to him. This is but a rhetoricall flourish, or complement, and hath no Logick in it, his life is the same it was, and therefore the man is still under the same obliga­tion [Page 61] of his duty and oath which he was before under. If this Author can prove his life to be really another, I will grant an evacuation of all his former contracted obligations. And in truth although the custome of War cals an Enemies sparing of the life of a worsted person Mercy, yet if that persons cause were good, though he hath found bad successe, he hath not forfeited his life to his prevailing Enemy, neither is he be­holding or in debt to him for it, no more then a true man oweth his life to those theeves that onely rob him; or a weak man is indebted for his life to a strong man, because he kils him not. 3ly. This is besides, and not against the former Oath. 1. If it be not against it, you are besides your undertaking, and prevaricate it, for you promised to shew how a man might take an Oath contrary to his former Oaths. 2. But it is plain­ly against the former, for to swear to do the utmost that can be for, the Prince, and to swear not to attempt any thing against that Princes Enemy which hath dispossest him of his right can be no other then contraries. 4. It is impossible for him to be bound to an imp [...]ssibility, Sed rei impos­sibilis ex acci­dente tantum aliquantum diversa est ra­tio. Vt si quis [...]uratus solv [...]re centum infra mensem, quod non est per se impossibile ca­su aliquo in o­pino in [...]rim impediatur, ut non possit tan­tum pecuniae summam tem­pore p [...]aefi [...]to consi [...]et si non obligetur in foto conscientiae ad faciendum quod promisit, scil: ad solv [...]ndum totum de­bitum debito tempore quod i [...]m redditum est e [...]mpossibile; obligatur [...]men ad facen [...]um quod in se est, viz. ad sulvendum qu [...]ntum potest, & quam cito potest Ratio ut [...]iu [...]que est q [...]a cum in hoc casu sola impossibilitas impediat obligationem: obligatio tollitur quoad idso [...]um quod est factu impossibile, quoad reliquum vero manet, & qui non potest o [...] quod debet, deb [...]t tamen omne quod potest. D. Sanders. de Iur. oblig. praelect. 2. Sect 12. and it is now impossible for him to advance his parties cause. That which is in it self, or in its own nature impossible, an oath cannot binde to; but that which is in it self probable, and therefore promised under an Oath, may by accident, or by the interposition of some casuall impediment become impossible, this is very ordinary, and this kinde of impossibility doth not dissolve an Oath, but on­ly suspends it for the time, untill the present impediment be removed: so that though the Oath binde not to the hic and nune of the accidentall impossibility, yet it stands in force still, and obligeth to the thing is it is in it self possible, and may (the obstacle being removed) be hereafter fealible. 2. Whilest it is impossible for him to advance his parties cause, it is a f [...]i­volous thing for him to swear that he will attempt nothing for his party against the Enemy, for so he onely swears not to [Page 62] attempt an Impossibility; and when this impossibility ceaseth, the former Oath to his Prince taketh place: so that this ob­jected Impossibility can be no warrant for such a latter oath.

Our Author in his Chap: 9. Sect. 3. thus opposeth the obli­gation of the Oaths: God saith, By me Princes reign: the governing Powers which are, are of God. God hath declared that he will chastise, and change Princes, and Governors; and when we see the changes and chastisements, we may be sure they are by Gods order, yea, though the invading or succeeding Governors be like Jehu, Nebuchadnezzar, or those who by cruelty shew us nothing but Gods wrath. Wherefore it can be no lesse then sin in us, or treason against God, to swear we will never obey any, but this, or that Prince, or State, or any but of such a Family: for this depends on Gods Providence and Justice, which sets bounds to the duration of Governors, and Governments. 1. It is cer­tain that all the Kings and Potentates of the Earth are set up and pulled down by God, and every change of Governors, even the advancement of those who are heavie scourges to the people, is in a sence by and from him; and it is as certain, that some Princes in some sence are not of God, as is clear enough, Hosea 8.4. We must therefore distinguish thus. 1. A thing is said to be of God, in that it was fore-seen, and pre-ordained of him before it came to passe; and falleth out by his provi­dence and disposall. And thus every act or event is by him, whether it be right, or wrong, agreeable or repugnant to his revealed will or Commandment: 2 Chron. 25.20. 2 Sam. 24.1. So are all thefts, robberies, oppressions, murthers, violent dis­possessions, and occupations. Thus even Antichrists power that is derived to him by the divell is yet given him of God, Rev. 13.5.7.17.17. And so was Pilates power to crucifie Christ: Joh. 19.10, 11.2. To be of God, importeth the thing to be in­joyned, warranted or approved by his word, or revealed will; and thus Gamaliel useth the tearms, when he speaks hypothe­tically of the Apostles preaching and working miracles. If it be of God, in opposition to that which is of men, although in the former acception nothing is of men, but it is of God also. Act. 5.38, 39. Now to discern what is of God, so as to impose upon us, we must not go to his secret will or providence, many things come about to us that way which we are not bound to embrace and acquiesce in, but may, yea ought to use remedy [Page 63] against, and strive to avert, or remove, such as are tentations to sin, diseases of the body, captivity, oppression, dishonour, defamation, and such like. These evils, albeit we are patient­ly and submissively to bear them for the present, as they come from Gods correcting hand, when they are come to passe; yet we are allowed and required to seek the preventing of them when threatned, and the removall of them when befallen; Unjustly advanced Magistrates are of this nature; A passive submission under whom as a divine castigation, whilest we can finde no redresse, is expedient; but an embracement of them (as those that are authorised and warranted by God) active obedience to t [...]em, and maintenance or support of them (which is the matter in question) cannot upon this ground be inferred as necessary. To do evill, because it is in the power of our hand by Providence, or to perswade others, or our selves to sit down under intolerable wrongs, because they are come to passe that way, is an ungodly and foolish constructi­on of Divine Providence, and of a late invention in these eve­ry-way erring times.

2ly, This Author in urging obedience upon this account, not onely crosseth Scripture and reason, but cont [...]adicteth himself in what he saith elsewhere: for the making good of this, I shall onely present the Reader with his own words pa. 79. God many times finding some Nations grosly peoc [...]nt, and obnoxi­cus to his severest just [...]e, instead [...]f [...]esh [...]ing gives them up as a prey to another Crown [...] thus were the seven Nations; and afterwards Israel it self was thus in the hands of Nebuchadnezzar: which particular case is not a generall argument, or consequence (as some a [...]oue it) for the manner of Government, or latitude of subjection in all Kingdoms. And pag. 89. he speaking of Antichrists dominion, saith, There is one kinde of Ʋsurpation which by no possession or prescription can ever become lawfull; and a Christian can never submit himself to it, without wounding his conscience and faith. And yet let this man say if this power of Antich [...]ist be not of God, and by his pro­vidence in the sense wherein his Argument runs. 3. Who ever said, that men might swear they will never obey any but this or that Prince, State, or Family? or who ever knew it requi­red, or done? All oaths, and particularly those of obedience, carry still in them a caution of possibilitie; and when the [Page 64] matter becomes in it self impossible, the Oath ceaseth, and is void: We therefore swear to obey Princes, and States, whilest it pleaseth God to continue them to us; and this tye a present interruption of Government (though to an Invaders full pos­session) cannot dissolve: the oath, and allegiance of Israel con­tracted with David, 1 Chron. 11.4. continued till his death, though Absolon rose up against him, drew all Israel after him­self, and drave him out of the Land: 2 Sam. 19.9. But when a Prince or Family is irrecoverably lost to a Kingdom the Oath expireth.

THe next, and last part of my work is to answer those Ar­guments that I have met with, which are brought for the obedience which I have disallowed in the 2d. and 3d. Chap­ters: the book entituled, The lawfulnesse of obeying the present Go­vernment, saith the most for such obedience of any that I know; it therefore I shall chiefly deal with.

1 Argument.First, his first and main Argument is taken from that of the Apostle, Rom. 13.1, &c. from this text his Argument set in frame is this: If the Apostle commands submission and obedience, and that for conscience sake unto those in his time that came unlawfully into their power, and authority, then obedience to such may be now lawfull. But the Apostle commands submission, and obedience, and that for con­science sake unto those that in his time came unlawfully into their power and authority. Ergo. The major will not be stood upon. The minor is to be denyed; And for his full confutation therein, and vindication of the Apostle in this text, I shall, 1. by way of Elenchus make good the contradictory to this Proposition. 2. Answer what he brings for the maintenance of it.

1. Then I am to clear this contradictory to his minor, viz: That the Apostle in commanding obedience to the higher powers, can onely be understood of such as possesse their Authority lawfully, or have a just title, and regular calling thereunto. And this I shall under­take to do out of the Apostles own words, or by the characters he gives of the Powers he would have obeyed.

[Page 65]1. There is (saith the Apostle) no power but of God.

1. To be of God here must import not meerly a permissive counsell, or providence, but a divine approbation, authoriza­tion, and vocation; they are said to be of God thus, that come in by Gods way, or are called to their places as God hath ap­pointed in his Word; and that, not the former onely, but this stricter sense of being of God must be here taken, appears thus. 1. Otherwise the Apostle had said no more for Magistrates in this Character then the Scripture saith of plagues, famines, and other judgements Fanatici di­cant potestates omnes sic a Deo esse, sicut pestes, morbi, & paenae a Deo sunt. Pa­reus in loc., yea of the sins of men, which in the first and larger sense are said to be of God, 2 Sam. 24.1. 2 Chron. 25.20. 2. A derivation of them from God in regard of provi­dence meerly, could be no argument for obedience, non-re­sistance to them, and maintenance of them; for we are not to subject our selves to, support, and refrain from resisting a thing meerly upon this ground, because it comes by providence; then a forrein Enemy that invades us, or a robber must be submitted unto, and may not be resisted; the plague or other sicknesses in the body, nay the outward temptations to sin might not be prevented or removed, for all these come by pro­idence But the Apostle alledgeth their being of God, here as an argument for subjection to, non-resistance, and mainte­nance of them.

2. By Powers in this place, this Author tels us, he means not meerly power, or authority abstracted from persons, but persons clothed with that Authority. Now that persons clothed with Authority may be said to be of God, there must be not onely Gods insti­tution of the office, or magistracy in the abstract, for the meer ordaining of the office makes not this or that man a Magi­strate more then another, but also his ordering of the persons to the office, but they that are thus ordered of God ( viz: not providentially alone, but by way of vocation, approbation, and authorization, as it is above proved, the sense of the words [of God] must import) to the Magistrates place, must needs be granted to be lawfully possest of it, or to have to it a just title. This universall negative therefore of the Apostle, There is no power but of God, must not be taken in the simply universal sense, as if there were no other power in the world but such, but as a restrained universall, to wit, There is no lawfull power but of [Page 66] God: and so alone can I conceive it consistable with that of the Prophet, Hosea 8.4. They have set up Kings, but not by me; they have made Princes, and I kn [...]w it not. These two sayings of the holy Ghost must needs be true, and therefore must not be contradictories; which they are not, if you take them uttered in a divers re­spect, the former of a lawfull, the latter of an illegall magi­gracie.

2ly, The powers here are said to be ordained of God: and v. 2. to be the ordinance of God; Jud [...] 4. Ier. 33.25. that is, not by his decree, or handie­work meerly, as ungodly men are said to be ordained to condemnation: and the being and posture of heaven and earth are said to be Gods ordinances, but by his word or written sanction, a person in this acception is to be tearmed Gods ordinance, that is, by di­vine rule put into a place, or state: those Magistrates then one­ly can be said to be ordained of God; and his ordinanance, that (for the substance at least) enter by the doore that he hath made, or the means and manner he hath prescribed. The sons of Aaron in their priesthood, and the Levites in their ministery were Gods ordinance, in as much as they were or­dained according to Gods appointment. Whereas Korah, and his company, Levit. 8. Numb. 8. though they officiated as Priests, yet they were not so, because they wanted that ordination. A man and a woman are by Gods ordinance husband and wife, who are espoused together according to divine rule, and not they who onely perform the acts of such one to another. In like manner, not whosoever can get into the Seat of Authority by any means are Gods ordained, but they who come in according to Gods prescript and regulation. Abs [...]l [...]m, and Adenijah, though they got into the kingdom of Israel, were not Gods ordinance; but David, and Solomon, whose places they usurp­ed were, these being put into the place by Gods direction.

3ly, The Power here may not be res [...]sted under pain of damnation: v. 2. But, 1. An usurped Power, or they that get men under their command by force without right, may be resisted, and subdued. Gen. 14. Abraham and his confederates justly took up Arms, and by them rescued Lot, and the Sodomites from Chederlao­mer, and his participhants. The Judges and Tribes of Israel righteously warred against, and vanquished the Nations that successively obtained and exercised dominion over them, in [Page 67] the book of Judges: so did Samuel and Saul against the Phili­stines, that were for a time their masters: 1 Sam. So did David, whilest he was king in Hebron, with the house of Judah, a­gainst Ishbosheth, Abner, and all Israel: 2 Sam. 2.8, 9, &c. 3.1. 2 Sam. 18. 2 King. 11. so did David and his men against Absolom and the people that followed him: so did Je­hoiadah in the right of Joash, against Athalia. Lastly, thus did the Maccabees against Antiochus and his race; Which examples I but mention, having urged the most of them before Tyrannum absque titulo qui est invasor, quilibet priva­tus potest, de­bete medio tollere, neque enim ille Rex est, sed privata persona. Alsted Theol. Cas ca. 17. Reg. 8.. And indeed to imagine the Apostle here to tye men conscientiously, and under pain of damnation to obey, and sit down without any reluctancy under, yea to maintain, assist, and sight, for them, who do by force, without any right at all, usurp Au­thority over them; though they were Turks, theives, Irish, Re­bels, Papists, or whoever, the worst of men, and cruellest of Ty­rants, and though the sufferers should come to have strength in their hands to relieve themselves, is an imposition (I think) beyond the thoughts of any sober minde, and that which none, but they of the Anabaptisticall spirit will advisedly own, and them also we may rather finde saying, then doing so; the proceedings of the Parliament, yea of all parties on both sides in the late warre disclaim this doctrine; yea the Army it self may be judge in this matter, who must either con­demne this sense, or all their own warlike actions: this would make the Apostle not onely to put an insupportable passive­nesse upon people, but to discourage just Magistracy, if oppo­sed, and grown weak, whereas his manifest scope is to uphold it. 2. They that come in by meer force, with expulsion of the just Magistrate, have apparently committed this crime of re­sisting the Power that is the ordinance of God, and so have in­curred the sentence of damnation, or condemnation (which may be understood of punishment by men) and its a strange conceit to think, that the Apostle dosh here at once both con­demne their act, and confirm their authority gotten by it, and that the same persons should by the same means be both the resisters that are [...], or set in an opposite order to that ordinance, and condemned for it, and the power and or­dinance it self that is to be obeyed, and not resisted. 3. If they that come in by force against the just Magistrate are the resist­ers of the Power here to be submitted unto, then those that [Page 68] shall obey those resisters in the full latitude of obedience here injoyned (which comprehends assistance and maintenance of them) do become therein resisters of the said just Power also: so that obedience to the Usurpers is rather forbidden, then taught in this text.

4ly, The Power here to be obeyed, is the minister of God to thee, a revenger to execute wrath, &c. v: 4. 1. No man can be cal­led a minister of God, but he that is called of God to that ser­vice, wherein he is his Minister, not onely the office must be authorized, but the person must be invested with it by God; there must be some act of God, either immediately or medi­ately put forth towards the person, or this relation to him of being his Minister cannot be founded; now whosoever is the subject of such a divine act or vocation, hath without contro­versie a just title to Magistracie. 2. He that is a Revenger to execute wrath under and for God, (that is not by providence onely, as thieves, robbers, and forrein invaders are, but by place and calling) not for destruction, but for good, he must receive a warrant from God for it: vengeance is Gods alone, by property, so that none can take it in hand but by deputa­tion from him: others whatever power they have to do it, are expresly prohibited to be avengers, immediately before this text, Chap. 12. 17. Now he that receives a warrant from God for it, is lawfully impowered.

By every one of these Characters affixed by the Apostle, to the Magistracy spoken of in this text, it must needs be evinced, That the Apostle in commanding obedience to the higher Powers, can onely be understood of such as possesse their Authority lawfully, or have a just title thereunto: and this is the contradictory to his Minor, which I undertook to make good.

2. I come in the 2d. place to give Answer to what he urgeth for the proof of his Minor, which may be gathered up thus. The Romane Emperors, Claudius and Nero, came unlawfully into their Power, or Authority: but the Apostle commands submission and obedience to them: Ergo.

In this Syllogisme both his premises are peccant, and may be denyed. 1. For the minor the Apostle speaks in the gene­rall of powers, without particular application to the Roman, or any other Non de hoc vel il [...] [...]rin­cipe loquitur, sed de ipsa re. Chrysost. apud Parcum in loc.; the carrying of them to the Romane Emperors [Page 69] is this Authors own. If he shall say he may safely argue a the­si, ad hypothesin, or from the generall to the particular, tis true, if he hold to such hypotheses, or particulars as are conteined under the thesis or generall: but it is not granted to him, that the Apostle in this text speaks illimitedly, and without ex­ception of all men that by any means may get power into their hands; but on the contrary it is stood upon, that he intends his precept onely of lawfully called Magistrates, (the which I have above proved) he cannot therefore include under the Apostles generall, them whom he supposeth to have unlaw­fully got into their power, this were Transire à genere in genu [...], or to argue A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. Neither can he be allowed to argue after that manner here, seeing he hath begun his Argument ab hypothesi, ad thesin, or from the particular to the generall, for this were to walk in a round, and to prove this by that, and that by this circularly. As for that which he hinteth on as if he would prove the minor by it, viz: this Epistle was written in the time of Claudius, or Nero, it hath no shadow of proof in it: for they were not the onely Powers then in being: there were others even among the Ro­manes as wel as they, himself nameth the Consuls, and Senate, as those to whom the power of right belonged, and they were then existent, and in some possession and use of the power: al­though the Emperours ruled with them, and in some things over-ruled them, as they were haply in other things ruled by them Quinetiam speciem quen­dam libertatis induxit, con­servatis sena­tui & Magi­stratibus, & maiestate pri­stinâ & pote­state: neque tam parvum quidquam, ne­que tam mag­num publici privatique ne­go [...]i fuit, de quo non ad P. C. referretur, &c. Vide Sue­ton. Tibet ca. 30, 31, 32. Heb. 13.7.17.; there being a kinde of mixture of power, and alter­natenesse of prevalency betwixt them. Now that the Empe­rors were then in place (whereas others also were in power) is no more a proof that the Apostle commands obedience to the Emperours, then the being of false Apostles, and Ministers among the Churches, when the Apostle wrote to Christians to obey, and follow them that had the rule over them, proves that he commanded them obedience to those false Apostles and Mi­nisters.

2ly, The major Proposition ( That the Emperours Claudius and Nero came unlawfully into their Authority) must also be deny­ed: taking [unlawfully] in the sense of the question, or case in hand, that is, in regard of title: for, although the tumultu­ousnes of the Souldiers, and the craft of the persons intrested, [Page 70] were ingredients in the manner of their entrance, yet they were not the basis of their claim, or ground-work of their title: but they had, or came to have, before this precept of the A­postle could intervene, sufficient challenge thereto, otherwise; we must therefore distinguish betwixt an error, or unlawful­nesse in the way, or manner of a Princes coming in, or obtain­ing possession of the throne, and an unlawfulnesse in regard of title, or of that which is of the substance or essence of his calling to that place. The former is that which can onely be objected against these two Emperours; the latter is the un­lawfulnesse in the case, or question, viz: when the Rulers hold meerly by usurpation, or have no other colour of claim but force, or other intrusion: and to argue from the former to the latter, is plainly fallacious, being A dicto secundum quid ad di­ctum simpliciter. But let us hear what unlawfulnesse the Author urgeth against the Emperours, and see whether it be not short of that which is under debate, multis parasaugis.

The Consuls and Senate (he saith) anciently had the chief power of Government, these at the death of C: Caligula entred into a con­sultation how they might restore the Common-wealth to her ancient freedome, which by the Caesars had been taken from them, Claudius in the intrim is proclaimed Emperour by the Souldiers, and takes it up­on him: [...] Nero his successor was also first saluted Emperour, by the Soul­diers: Britannicus, who was Claudius Son being kept in by the cun­ning of Nero's Mother.

Unto all this the Answer is easie. Notwithstanding all these disorderly proceedings, these two had a title (for substance) sound and good enough to the rule they bare: take for this a short narration out of History.

The Romane State was often changed, and received many forms of Government successively Tacit. Annal. l. 1. c. 1., the beast in the Apoca­lyps wherein the great Whore sitteth, is by the current of Ex­positers understood to be the City or State of Rome: and his seven heads are construed to be seven forms of Regiment that have been in it, viz: Kings, Consuls, Tribunes, Decemviri, Di­ctators, Emperours, and Popes. Brightman, Mede, Sy­monds, Na­pier, Forbs, est Apuc. 17. If Antiquity must decide which of these Governments had the best title to be over the Romanes, it will give it to the Caesars, for the kingly (from which that of Emperours essentially differs not) was the first [Page 71] in time among them Vthem Ro­mam a princi­pio Reges ha­buete. Tacit. Annal. l. 1 c. 1.. If possession must determine it, the Emperours were at this present in the Throne, and had been for a considerable time, for foure of them had reigned in suc­cession to one another before Claudius came in. It the consent and constitution of the people (which is the truest ground­work) must carrie it, the Emperours also were supported with this title, both originally, as to the form of Policy, at the first setting up of kings, in the infancy of this State, and personal­ly at their respective comings in. By what means this consent was gained from the people, it is not necessary to insist, it were easie to prove, that if there were any unworthy carriage in it, it was as much at least on the submitters as on the Caesars part. Vide Tacit. Annal. li. 1. ca. 1, 2. Julius Caesar (the first of them) had a concurrent agreement of the State which was (for substance) valid enough; Tum vero abs [...]ns Romae Dictator crea­tus pacis (que) & belli dominus. Cluveti Histor. mundi, lib 7. pag. 236. Vide Chronicon. Carion l. 2. pa. 180, 181. Mu­neribus, mo­numentis, lon­giariis, epulis multitudinem impertitam le­nierat: suos praemiis, ad­versarios cle­mentiae specie devinaerat. Quid multa? attulerat jam liberae civitati, pattim metu, partim patientia consuetudinem serviendi. Cicero in N. Anton Philip 12. Orat. 44. so had Augustus after him Caesari quia arma sump [...]erat Reip: pro [...]op. Romano imperium à Senatu datum, cum Consularibus ornamentis. Cluveri Histor. lib. 7. pag. 240.: the same had Tiberius his next successor. Sex. Pempeius, & Sex. Apuleius Coss primi in verba Tiberii Caesaris iuravete; apudque cos Seius Strabo, & C. Turranius: mox Senatus milesque & po­pulus Tacit. Annal. l 1. ca 2. Vide Sueton in Tiber. c. 24. Caligula the next to him had the cheerfullest, and most affe­ctionate assent that ever Prince had Sic imperium adep [...]s, populum Romanum, vel ut ita dic [...]m, hominum genus voti compotem fecit, exoptatissin us Princeps, &c Vide Sueton. in Caligula. c. 13, 14.. By this time the Go­vernment of the Caesars had by these reiterated acts of consent, establishment from the people sufficient to give it a just title, and free it from usurpation; The next that followed was Claudius, who was left by Tiberius joynt Heir with Caligula Vide Sueton in Tiber. c. 76., but was put by for the time by the excessive love which the people bare unto Caligula Vide eundem in Calig c. 14.; after whose death, the Consuls, Senate, and City Regiments talked indeed of standing up for a publick liberty. But Claudius being saluted Emperour by some of the watch, and the cry of the City Souldiers being at length that one should have the rule; the Consuls, and Senate, perceiving the Souldiers bent that way, and thereupon fear­ing a combustion, and suspecting their own inability to make good their designe, they being divided also among themselves, and other competitors for the Empire beginning to start up, [Page 72] and Agrippa the king of the Jews, strongly counselling and perswading them to it, they withered, and shrunk in with their undertaking, and at last accepted of Claudius Verum po­stero die Sena­tu segniore in exequendis co­natibus, per taedium, ac dis­sentionem di versa censen­tium, & multi­tudine quae circumstabat unum rectorem jam, & nominatim exposcente, armatos pro concione jurare in nomen suum passus est. Su [...]ton in Claud c 10. Ad firmandum eius imperium non parum contulit Agrippa Rex Iudaeorum, autor & Claudio retinendat dignitatis, & Senatui non offendi veteranos. Ita­que Senatu segniore in exequendis conatibus, & milite urbano Praetorianis se aggregante, in Claudii nomen iuratum est. Cluver. Histor. lib. 8. pag 267. Hoc exemplo optimates deserti in magno metu esse caeperunt, ac deinceps videntes sibi adversationem tutam non esse, secuti milites ad Claudium transierunt. Claudius susce pit in castris advenientem senatum, & in­dulgenti honore complexus, egreffus cum patribus confestim obtulit Deo hostias, ut mos est pro imperio supplicari. Ioseph. de bello Iudaie. lib 2. ca. 10. Vide eundem Antiq. Iudaie. lib. 19. c. 3.: as for Nero who came in next, Britannicus indeed was neerer to the Em­pire in succession then he, but Agrippina, mother to Nero had prevailed with her husband Claudius to adopt Nero, and prefer him before his own Son Britanicus; which he did with the Senates consent p: Nero accordingly succeeded him, and had the consent of the State at his inauguration, without any re­luctancy Sententiam inclitam secuta pattum consulta; nec dubitatum est apud provincias. Tacit. Annal. lib. 12. c. 14..

It appears by all this, that the Caesars, and particularly Claudius, and Nero, (insisted on by this Author) had other foundation for their Empire besides the Souldiers promoting, and sufficient to give them a lawfull calling, and title to their rule, and to excuse them from Usurpation, such as hath been afore described. And that Claudius came in (though crosse to some unripened motions, and consultations of theirs, yet) not against any Act or Decree of the Senate; but with their con­current or subsequent approbation.

If it be objected in behalf of the Usurpers in our case, that they also have a consent of the people, by the act of the pre­supposed House of Commons. I answer, besides what hath been said in the close of the first Chapter, of the peoples non­committance of any power to their Representees, to alter any thing in the constitution of the Supreame Power, or to erect a new one; all that they have to do, being to manage that pro­portion which is committed to them: there are moreover two main things that impeach that Acts validity. 1. That the Lords who are an eminent integrall part of the Kingdom, as [Page 73] also the far greater part of the elected Commons, are, not only absent (so that a very small part of the Kingdom, even locally considered is represented by them that sit) but not permitted to come in, and professedly shut out (and consequently the parts of the Kingdom which they represent are excluded) at the passing of this consent. 2. That the object and actors in this consent, the promoted and promoters are the same per­sons; on whom is the new Supreme Power conferred, but on themselves that confer it? You cannot finde two parties in this act, an agent, and a patient; so that it is so far from being a legitimate contract, or transaction, that it is no politicall act at all. What reckoning shall we make of that consent which men bestow on themselves, in relation to an interest of power over others? if such a grant could create a right, few men that could get strength would lack preferment.

Having thus answered this Authors main Argument, I shall in the rest be briefer. 2. He alledgeth, In this Nation many per­sons have been settled in supreame Authority by meer force, without title of Inheritance, not any three immediately succeeding each other have come to the Crown by true lineall succession. Five Kings on a row (the Conquerour being the first) had no title at all by proximity of blood, Hen: the 7th by meer power came in, was made King, in, and by an Army, upon this foundation of military power he got himself crowned at Westminster, and called a Parliament, wherein the Crown was entailed upon him, and his Heirs. Those that came in thus, the main body of this Nation did obey, yea doth yeeld subjection unto their Laws to this day. Not to stand to examine what he asserts in these premises: 1. The mistake of this Argument is, that be­cause the Kings by him mentioned came not in by true suc­cession, or proximity of blood, they therefore must needs be granted to have come in by force alone, or otherwise unlaw­fully; whereas though, some of them entred by the Sword, others by anticipation, yet they all, whose persons were, and Laws now are obeyed, had the concurrent, or subsequent con­sent of the Lords and Commons in Parliament, and that without their Houses being dismembred, and a force set at their doores. 2. The Laws made by those Princes were not made by them alone, but by them with the Parliament; and by them, not as so entring, but as received by Parliament, [Page 74] and so legally invested. 3. The three last Princes of this Realm did come in by an indubitate lineall succession, and proximity of blood, and the Son of the last is in being, and claiming by that title. It is observable then that this title should be de­nied, and cut off, when it was at the clearest state. 4. No doubt there have been unjustifyable proceedings about the Crown by some of the former possessors of it: which have been follow­ed with remarkable punishments, and publick calamities suf­ficiently pointing out their injustice, and fore-warning others from making them their examples to practise by. What hath been, is no warrant to conscience that the same may be done.

3ly, He cites some Divines, and Casuists as concurrent with him in his opinion. Their words are too many for me to recite, and the nature of this kinde of Argument exacteth no long An­swer. In a word therefore. 1. Azorius his words allow obedi­ence to Tyrants in regard of title, with restriction, and in some cases, (such as are granted by me, Chap. 3d.) But your part is to prove obedience to them, in its full latitude as you have propounded your thesis, without limitation, and concluded (though not validly) by your first Argument.

2. Alsted distinguisheth of Tyrannus, titulo, & exercitio, a Ty­rant in regard of title, and in regard of use: and his words im­mediately before these alledged by you are spoken of the lat­ter, and so may therefore these be understood; but the former onely is the subject of our question. Besides within a few lines before he hath this passage: A Tyrant without title, who is an in­vader, every private man may, and ought to destroy, for he is not a Prince but a private person Alsted: The­ol: cas cap. 17. reg. 8.. Which wil not stand with the words quoted by you, if understood of a Tyrant in regard of title.

3. Paraeus in your place speaks nothing pro, or con, of obedi­ence to Usurpers, but is explicating how the Apostle is to be taken in those words, The powers that be, are of God, ordained of God: and he distinguishes thus in the words brought in by you. The power which is of God is one thing, the getting, and use of the power is another, which is indifferent, sometimes lawfull, sometimes unlawfull, ut in dublis Aliud est potestas quae a Deo est, aliud acquisitio, & usus potestatis, quae indiffe­rens, alias legi­tima, alias il­legitima. Par. in Rom. 13.. Whither if you had followed him, you should have found him answering the doubt about Nimrods power thus We must discern betwixt the power which is ever of God, and betwixt the getting and usage of the power, which as to men is often [Page 75] most unjust not of God, but of mens lusts, and Satans malice Discernendū est inter pote­statem quae [...]emp [...] d [...] Deo est, & inter ac­quisitionem. & us [...] pationem quae quoad ho­minessae potest iniustissima non a Deo sed ab hominum affectibus, & Satana malitia. Ib. in Dub. 3.. By which words it is evident, you have but half quoted him, as well as impertinently; and if his Authority may sway with you, unjustly gotten power is not of God, in regard of the per­son, or man, owning it, and consequently not to be obeyed by vertue of Rom. 13.

4. For the rest I have not their books to peruse, but their sayings set down by you reach not the case at all. This there­fore I offer you produce any one, or more Authors, of any ac­count amongst Protestants, that allow obedience to an unlaw­full Power, [in the full latitude of obedience to a Magistrate, where there is a [...]e-ingagement of conscience pleaded by Law, ancient inheritance, and oaths sworn to another Power in being, claiming, and endeavouring to recover his right] and I will (by Gods assistance) return you a particular An­swer.

4ly, His next Reason is, Either that authority which is thus ta­ken by power must be obeyed, or else all Authority and Government must fall to the ground, and so confusion be admitted.

First, why must this needs follow? 1. May not Usurpation fall to the ground, how strongly soever it be set up, and lawfull Government be raised up again? The experience of former times hath observed, That no ill gotten power can be long lived Nulla quae­sita scelere po­tentia diutur­na esse potest. Q Curt. apud Lyps. Poli [...]. li. 2. c 4. Quam­vis enim de­mersae sint le­ges alicujus o­pibus quamvis tremifacta li­bertas, emergunt tamen haec aliquando — nec vero ulla vis imperil tanta est quae premento metu possit esse diuturna. Testis est Phalaris, cuius est preter caeteros nobilitata crudelitas —in quem universa Agrigentinorum multitudo impetum fecit Quid? Macedones nonne Demetrium reliquerunt, universique se ad Pyrrhum contulerunt? Quid? Lacedemonios in iuste imperantos nonne repente omnes fere socit deseruerunt, spectatoresque se otiosos prae­buerunt leuctricae calamitatis? Cicero de officiis lib 2. Ad tempus fortasse insidiosa & violenta valere possunt inventa hominum, sed absque iuslitia, & aequitate prevalere non pos­sunt diu: quippe vana & infirma sunt stratagemata civitatis quae columna virtutis non fulci­untur. Boter. Tractat. lib. 8. cap 6.. Although (saith Cicero) Laws should be plunged over head, and Li­berties over-awed by the power of a party, they will sometimes recover again. There is no strength of any power so great, that it can continue by keeping men in aw, &c.

2ly, If Usurpation have a party to joyn with it, that party will suffice to administer such justice as that Authority will afford; if it have no party, it fals to the ground (for it subsists onely perforce) and a clear way is open for the right Govern­ment [Page 76] to take place: which will be so much the more readily entertained, by how much it hath been interrupted Arciores autem morsus sunt intermissae libertatis, quam tetentae. Cicero de offic. lib. 2..

2ly, However things succeed, evill of sin must not be done, that good of profit may be attained. It must first be proved lawfull to obey, before this Reason can be heard, which will onely plead its expediencie, if it be honest. Though commodum may be consulted, especially publicum, yet we must first be sa­tisfied of the justum of it. It was not long ago pleaded, Fiat ju­stitia, ruat coelum. And we were not told thus, when the late wars for Laws and Liberty were first begun: If this be a cogent reason now, it was to have been so then; and we might better have prevented the miseries of a war by he [...]ning to it, then by refusing it, have, by so dear a means, purchased to our selves an harder condition, and now be bound to bide under it for that very reason.

3ly, If Government fall, and Confusion come, let them bear the guilt that have wrought these effects: we that detract from obedience shall onely bear the misery of it, which will be lighter to us, it may be hoped, then their greatnesse with the guilt it is gotten, and kept by, will be to them.

Fifthly, he addes, Otherwise the King being for the Common-wealth, and not the Common-wealth for the King, the end should be destroyed for the means, the whole for a part. First, the King as a man, yea as a royall person, or most noble part of the Com­mon-wealth, is not the prime matter to be layed on the bal­lance; but if the King may be lookt at as ours, and so as we are in piety, and justice bound to him, to seek his preservation, and yeeld him our obedience; thus considering him, equity and a good conscience are the things stood for as the end; which although they may undergo the notion of means in re­ference to the Common-wealths good, yet they are desirable, and to be sought absolutely, and for themselves; and the sub­ordinate means of the Common-wealths politicall good, must be subordinated or submitted to them, and that end is onely so far, and by such means to be pursued, as will consist with these. 2ly, The Parliament, and the Army also, a [...] no more then a means, or a part in relation to the collective Com­mon-wealth. Must not the rights of these therefore be stood for, with the hazard of the whole? If this rule might have [Page 77] guided men in relation to their claims, such courses and e­vents as have been, had been prevented. 3ly, Though certain destruction of the end, or whole, must not be run upon for the means, or part, yet those may be hazarded for the saving of these from certain destruction. As we see it ordinarily, men do adventure their lives and liberties for the preservation, or re­covery of their estates by war; and their whole bodies for the regaining of their healths, or one wounded, or festered mem­ber, by Physick or Chyrurgery. 4ly, We are not active in the destroying of the end, or whole (if they be destroyed) and we were better both to suffer their destruction, and suffer in it, then sinfully to concur in destroying the means, or a part, or in substituting an unlawfull means, or part for the legitimate, that we might preserve them.

Sixthly, If a masters mate had thrown the master over-board, and by power would suffer no other to guide the ship but himself, if the mar­riners will not obey him, commanding aright for the guiding of the ship, the ship and themselves must needs perish. 1. I conceive the mar­riners may in this case obey the Masters Mate for self-preser­vation, till they come to shore; in like manner that we may obey an Usurpers power, that is, act according to his com­mand in a thing which is not onely lawfull, but simply neces­sarie both to be done, and to be done by us, as in the case of self-preservation, by repelling a forrain Enemy, or common danger of certain and important consequence; but shall it be inferred from hence, that the marriners are bound to obey the Mate, or we an Usurper, in all other things of his own con­cernment, or separable from self-preservation, and every other necessary duty. I am bound to submit my selfe to the whole­some, and necessary direction of my Pastor, and Physician in their respective ordering, touching my soul and body: must I say therefore I must resigne up my self in obedience to them in all other matters? 2ly, The case is not parallel. For, 1. The mariners (without respect to their exigence) in that posture are bound to obey none, the Master being dead, and so are conscience free. But the people (in the case) have a Magistrate surviving, and challenging power over them, to whom they have sworn Allegiance. 2ly, The Mariners are supposed with­out obedience to the Mate, to be sure of destruction: but by [Page 78] what hath been above said, it cannot be pleaded that the Na­tion, or the scruplers at obedience without obeying are sure to perish.

Seventhly, you quote a saying out of Cajetan Summula. Tit. Rempub. Tyrannice, &c., but it suits not with the obedience you stand for; he in all that Discourse speaks nothing at all for any obedience to Tyrants in respect of title, his subject being the point of going to such Tyrants for Law and Justice Nunquid gubernanto Tyranno pec­cent illi qui recurrunt ad ipsum pro ju­stitia., (of which I have spoken Chap. 3.) and his whole speech being confined to it.

Eightly, lastly, (for I will not follow you in repeating again what you had said before, and I have answered above) What can the common people do in this case? they cannot judge of titles; but they see who doth visibly, and actually exercise Authority. 1. Bruit beasts do indeed onely see him that actually leads, or drives them; and therefore they follow without making difference betwixt the owner and a thief: but are men, though but com­mon people so stupid? The people you speak of are not altoge­ther so bruitish, they themselves disprove you, if you observe (as it is easie to discern) whom they generally abhor from, and whom they look towards: and whoso shall compare their visible bent with your present book, they whom you make but like Balaams dumb Asse, yet in this case do speak with mans voice, and forbid the madnesse, &c. 2ly, If they be so in­capable of discerning of titles, wherefore hath not onely the late King, but the Parliament published so many Declarati­ons, and Appeals to the people, wherein they plead for the justnesse of their title, to what they stood and fought for? yea why hath the Parliament drawn the people into the Protesta­tion, the 2d. Vow, and Oath, and the Solemne League and Covenant, all which concern the severall claims and rights of King and Parliament? either they are thereby supposed to be somewhat competent to judge of those titles; or it was both vainly, and irreligiously done to lead them into such sacred bonds, which we may neither take, nor cause others to take, but in judgement. Jer. 4.2.

3ly, Although they, yea the primest Statesmen, may finde it difficult enough to judge of titles in some nice, and intricate cases that may happen, yet the present case is not so deep or doubtfull, the right of title in this question is written with [Page 79] clear and capitall letters, in Laws, Oaths, and actions open be­fore all. Yea this Author in the title and current of his book, (as doth Mr. Ashcam in his) plainly enough grants where the right of title is.

This Author in the latter end of a second Edition of his book, viz: beginning at pag. 15. addeth some things upon the question of active obedience, and acting under this present power, and government. Although this Edition come in late, and in some passages is but an amplification in tearms, not in matter, of what he had said before; yet I shall take a brief notice (whe­ther sufficient let the Reader judge) of the things in it, that may seem materiall.

First, he premiseth, That the present Power is in possession of the whole Land, and no visible force to oppose, and so it is not like that be­tween David and Absolom, when David had an Army in view. Consult the text, and you shall finde the case exactly parallel. 1. The present Power is in possession of the whole Land; you say, you mean of this side the Sea, not of Ireland also; sutable hereunto Absolom was possest of all the Land unto Jordan, yea, and he went over Jordan, and pitched in Gilead, and all the people throughout all the Tribes of Israel had anointed him King over them: on the other hand David and his men fled out of Je­rusalem, and out of the Land, beyond Jordan, and stayed not till he came to Mahanaim by the ford Jabock. 2 Sam. 15.14, &c. 17.22.24, 25, 26.19.9, 10.

2ly, You adde, And no visible Force to oppose, whereas David had an Army in view. David had no Army in view within that land before spoken of: all that he had was at Mahanaim. And though there be no visible Force to oppose in England, yet there is said to be a considerable Force in Ireland, and it may appear by the Preparations sent thither. Besides there is one thing indeed wherein Davids condition, and his whom the present Power excludeth, differ, but not to the advantage of this Authors Reason, which is, that David had no other Kingdom to own, and declare for him, which yet he hath.

Secondly, You come with Arguments. 1. Obedience to such a Power in good things is lawfull. But acting for Justice and order is a good thing: Ergo: I have before distinguisht betwixt morall acts which are for private men to do, though there were no Autho­rity; [Page 80] and politicall acts, which flow from magistracy. The lat­ter sort of acts may not be done in obedience to an usurped Power, for the Reasons given before. The execution of justice is a good act in it self, but it is not good to be done by every man, nor upon every mans command; but is onely good in him that is lawfully authorized to it.

2ly, You say, what reason is it, that those that will not act because they hold it unlawfull, should expect that others should do an unlawfull act to benefit them? To this let Cajetan (an Author cited by you, and that in the place you cited from him) answer you; They are excused from the sin of inducing the Ty­rant to an act unlawfull for him, that ask Justice of him, because they do not petition him for the unlawfull act, but for the justice of that un­lawfull act: it is honestly done to perswade him to use his power lesse sin­fully. This Petition is in effect thus much. Seeing thou wilt-hold and exercise this power, use it justly, use it honestly, use it religiously; use it to the benefit of the publick, and of private men, as it would become the Power. It is plain such Petitioners intend not to ask the Tyrant to usurp the act of Judicature, because they had rather he would give it over: but seeing he doth usurp dominion, and judgement, they intend he should use justly and honestly his usurped Power and Judgement: and that which they intend, that they petition for: so that they neither intend nor peti­tion for and usurped act, but an holy quality in the exercising of that usurped act Excusatur à peccato indu­cendi Tyrannum ad actum, & opus sibi il­licitum peten­tes ab illo iu­stitiam: quia non petunt actum illici­tum, sed justiti­am illius actus illiciti. Sanctè suadetur, quod minus mase utatur domi­nio illo; scil: si vis seu ex quo vis detinere, & exercere hoe dominium, utere illo iuste, utere honestè, utere pie, utere ad utilitatem public [...]m, & privatorum prout deceret dominium Constat [...]mque quod non intendunt ipsi petere, ut tyrannus utatur tyrannide, ut usurpet actum Judicis [...]quo­niam mallent ut cederant tyrannidi, & iudicio; sed ex quo usurpat libi dominium ac iudi­cium, intendune ut iuste, ut pi [...] utatur usurp [...]to dominio, & usurpato iudicio, & qu [...]d inten­dunt hoc petunt; ita quod nec intendunt, non petunt actum usurpatum, sed qualitatem san­ctum in actu usurpato exercendō Caietan Summul Tit. Remp. Tyranni [...]e, &c..

Again, Why should others give right to them, that will not give right to others? A fallacious, and frivolous interrogation in the true meaning of it. In commutative justice (wherein the rule of doing as we would be done unto) onely holds, with refe­rence to persons that are to do it) they who refuse magistra­ticall acts, are ready to render every mans right to him. But this question would have a private man (such as they are) to have no distributive justice, or right by the Magistrate done him, even when the Magistrate is lawfull, because he cannot, [Page 81] and therfore will not vicissim administer distributive justice to the Magistrate. Every common Judgement knows that a private sub­ject is to receive judiciall right, but not to give it.

3ly, It is cleared before in this Discourse, that those who have gotten to be Powers (though by force) ought to give justice to those whose government they have undertaken, but (supposing them to be but one, or a few) this they cannot do without subordinate agents; to disallow acting under them then, is to say in effect they shall not give justice. 1. Suppose them but one or a few, and they cannot get or keep the place by force. Sup­pose them many, & they have no need (in that respect) of others to be their under-agents. 2ly, If this that you say be cleared, or so much as said before, I have forgotten it, though I have read all that is before, and rest confident there is no such thing. When you shew where this is said and cleared, I shall then find by what reasons it is maintained, and so give you an Answer thereunto. In the mean time, that which is here but barely affirmed, it is sufficient for me to deny. If you could clear this, the whole que­stion were decided. If he ought to give justice, he hath a speciall warrant, and calling to it, and how Force can give such a cal­ling you have not yet aslayed to clear, the contrary I have brought many reasons for (Chapter 2.) and am therefore be­fore hand with you in this point. It will be confest, that if a man will take upon him to administer judgement he were bet­ter, or it is a lesse evill in him, to do right, then wrong therein: but of two evils of sin, neither is to be admitted.

4ly, This Doctrine of not acting is the very doctrine of Levelling. For when no man may act, every man may take freely from his neighbour, &c. 1. Levelling may be the consequent of non-acting, but it cannot be the consequent of it; it is the consequence of thei [...] doings, who take away the settled Magistracy. 2. Levelling in point of goods, you like not it seems: but why do you not as well abhor from it in point of Government? that's but levelling the private, this is levelling the publick Interest; that Levelling can never come in, till this Levelling go before, and lead the way, but who are Le­vellers this latter, and (as you see) worse way, but they that teach, or practise the deserting of the lawfu [...]l, establisht Magi­strate, and the competency, yea duty, of any that have force to play the Magistrate. Hence ariseth that which they cal an interpretative consent of the people: because it is supposed every rationall man doth consent that there should be order, property, and right, given under a tyrant, ra­ther [Page 82] then all to be under confusion, &c. 1. Every rationall man con­sents indeed that there should be order, property and right; and his being under a tyrant (by experience of the want) confirms his consent to the necessity thereof: but that such things should be maintained magistratically by a tyrant (in regard of title) you see (if all that are your Antagonists in this question be not stark Irrationals) some rationall men deny. And in this they ap­pear rationall, in that they would hear some reason for it, before they consent to it. Which rather then you will strain yourself to give (for truly it is hard to do) you choose to suppose them that will not consent without it, to be out of the number of rationall men. 2ly, This shift of an interpretative consent of the people, that the Usurper shall administer judgement, will not serve you. For, 1. It will be difficult to finde out, and agree, when such an interpretative consent is given by the people. 2ly, What thing is it? as near as I can conjecture it is possibly. 1. Either that these men shall be the Power, or Magistrate; and then, 1. Either the people had power to give this consent, and this makes these men no U­surpers, but lawfull Magistrates, & so puts them out of the com­passe of this question. 2. Or they had no power, being pre-inga­ged, and then this consent is void, and null, because it prejudi­cates anothers right. 2. Or it is, that these men, though they have no consent of theirs to be Magistrates, but come in, and hold a­gainst their wils, and by their own meer force, and against ano­thers right, yet they shall for present execute judgement, because it cannot be had otherwayes. This consent (suppose it really past by the people) cannot bottome their acting, or others under them. For it is in the essence of it an unlawfull act, and therefore of no force. It is of the same validity as was that of the people which joyned with Korah, and his company, who gave consent, that though Korah, and the rest were no Priests, yet they should offer incense; or as that would be, if the people of a Congrega­tion now, that can procure no lawfull Minister, should take a private man, and say, this man is no Minister, yet he shall, in this defect of one, preach, and administer the Sacraments to us. Such consents are contradictions to the establisht ordinance of God, appointing that no stranger to those functions shal execute those acts. In like sort it is in this point of Magistracy.

5ly, How could Ezra, and Nehemiah justifie their acting under the Persian Monarch, who had no right to the Crown of Judah, either by blood [Page 83] or just conquest. 1. That the Persian Monarch had not that right, you say, but prove it not, but if just conquest give a title, Cyrus the first Persian King justly warred against Balshazer the last Chal­cedon Monarch as Historians Crusus fidu­cia potentiae inferi bellum Cy [...]o gerenti justum bellum adversus Ty­rannum Baby­lonicum Chr. Carion. li. 2. pag. 69. Balshasar con­spicatus Cyri, & Medorum potentiam co­alescere, Crae­sum ad Infrin­gendas eorum vi [...]es incitat. Cluveni Hist. li 6. pa. 64. say, and therefore justly conquer­ed him, and his Empire; under which the Jews were then sub­jected, and that by speciall warrant from God. Jer. 27.12. to 16.29.1. to 8.21.8, 9.38.17. to 21. 2ly, But Cyrus had both an in­dubitable title to that Empire, and an unquestionable Commis­sion for what he did in reference to the Jews releasement from captivity, and restauration of their Temple, Keligion, and Civill State; and that from God himself, by immediate designation. Hear what he himself saith in his Proclamation, unto which he was stirred up in spirit by the Lord. Thus saith Cyrus King of Persia, all the kingdoms of the earth, hath the Lord God of heaven given me, and he hath charged me to build him an house in Jerusalem which is in Judah. 2 Chron. 36.22, 23. Ezra 1.1, 2. And compare this with what the Lord saith not onely of, but to this Cyrus. Isa. 44.28.45.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13. and a clear calling or title to the Empire of the world, and to the acting of what he did in reference to Judea, will appear to be in him. It is conceived that Cyrus had certain knowledge of this Commission, recorded and given to him by name, in that Prophesie of Isaiah, and that by means of Daniel the Prophet Agnovit hoc ipse Cyrus, & publico est edicto ad hunc modum testa­tus: Haec dicit R [...]x Persarum, &c primo Esdra. Musculu­in Isaiae 45.1. Cyrus lecto vaticinio Isaiae de se nomina­tim edito Isa. 45. proposuit edictum quo Iudae is in Ba­bylonia capti­vis, reditum in partiam, & facultatem, in staurandi templi concessit. Chytraei Chronol. in [...] Herodat p. 147. Arbitror autem & tunc cum rexit Persiam Daniel, praesos in Susis fuisse ejus auditorum Cyrum adolescentem, & [...]b eo dediciste veram de Deo, & de Mossia doctrinam, & praedictiones Isaiae in qua nomen Cyri expresse positum est. Chron Carion. li. 2. pa. 69.; and that which is therein written he understood to be his charge given of God, which he mentioneth in the aforesaid Proclama­tion See Annotations of [...]ivn [...]s on 2 Chron. 36.22. & Ezra 1.2. Diodat. ibid. Musculu: in Isa. 45 1.13.. Adde to this that Mr. Diodati interpreteth that speech of God to Cyrus, viz: I girded thee. Isa. 45.5. of the Lords making him King, and giving him power and authority: v. 1. And that of ver. 13. I have raised him up in righteousnesse, he understands thus. That is, by a firm decree of my justice, and by a just calling. Now if Cyrus the first of the Persians had a valid title, what can controul his Successors right in Judea?

2ly, If there had been no right in the Persian King over Judea, yet the acting of Ezra and Nehemiah, could be no president or warrant for a now acting under a usurped Power in the case we have in hand. 1. Consider the speciall qualification, and call of [Page 84] these two persons. Ezra 7.1.2. 1. For Ezra, he was a Scribe, and a Priest, and some think one of the highest, to wit, that he was that Josedech, who was the father of Joshua, the high Priest (this is Jerome opi­nion Ludovivlves, in August. de civet. Dei lib. 18. cap. 36.; and so might be authorized by vertue of that office, to transact all that he is said to have done in his book. 2. He is said by some of the Ancients to be a Prophet, Neither can he be denyed so to be, (saith a late learned and solid Divine Mr. Roberts his Clavis Bibliorum on Ezra.) in that he was a Pen-man of Scripture. 3ly, And besides these functions, he seems to have had a speciall call of God in his undertaking what he did: it is said, The hand of the Lord his God was upon him, when he first enterprized his work: Ezra 7.6. which phrase is often ro­lterated upon the severall passages of his imployment. Chap. 7.9.28. &c.

2ly, Nehemiah was the Governor, Neh. 8.9.10.1.12.26. it is not any where said (that I finde) that he was sent with that power by the Persian King, but it is more probable he was chosen to that office by the people of Judah, both because he was one that was very zealous for the interest and publick advantage of that Nation, and by reason he came thither some yeers Ezra 7.7. cōpared with Nehe. 1.1. after Ezra, and acted in conjunction with him. Neh. 8.9. Now in Artaxerxes letter to Ezra, at his first going up from Babylon to Jerusalem, it is committed to Ezra's trust, To set Magistrates and Judges up among the people: Ezra 7.25. with this proviso, After the wisdome of thy God that is in thine hand; by which is meant the Law of God. But by the Law of God the people of Israel were to create their own Ma­gistrates and Kings, Deut. 16.18.17.14, 15. And besides his Go­vernorship it seems he had (in like manner to Ezra) a divine in­stigation, and vocation to his work. It is said, That God put that in his heart to do at Jerusalem; Neh. 2.12.18. which he went about, and when he was come thither, he told them of the hand of his God which was good upon him: upon which report, they said, Let us rise up and build.

2. Let it be more narrowly observed, what Ezra's Commission was from Artaxerxes, and it will be found, 1. That he himself was not authorized to fine, imprison, and put to death, as this Au­thor affirmeth; let the text be better marked, Chap. 7.26. 2. In the charge of setting up Magistrates and Judges, it cannot be thought he was intended to do it; otherwise then as a private man, or Priest might be instructed to do it, viz.: with the peoples concurrence; For he (as I even now observed) was to manage that businesse after the wisdom of his God that was in his hand, to wit, [Page 85] according to divine Law, which appointeth the people to do it.

3ly, That in all this Commission he and the rest that went up with him were authorized to do no more, and in no other man­ner then the Law of God required: Ezra 7.14.18.23.25. and con­sequently they were warranted before by it, to do all that they did, and this of Artaxerxes was but an encouragement, & streng­thening of them to it. 4ly, Whatsoever he acted, Chap. 10. in the matter of the Oath, Proclamation and reformation in the point of marriage. Besides that there was nothing done by him in it, that was solely appertaining to the Magistrates office; all that he transacted was by the motion, appointment, and consent of the Congregation, the Princes and the Elders: Ezra 10.1.3.7.8. &c. ver. 12.19. yea even by the free assent of the parties. 3ly, As for all the authoritative actings of Nehemiah, which he alledgeth they must be attributed to his place of Governor, and whence that is to be derived, I have spoken before.

Lastly, You bring in the Judgement of two or three Popish Di­vines. Which I shall altogether passe over, for that their reasons taken from the tacite, or interpretative consent of the people, the confusion that comes in by having no government, and the expedience of choosing the lesser of two evils, I have answered before. Only one thing brought in, by the last of them being not before answered, I shall here re­ply to; which is as followeth.

It is manifest that the Romanes by tyranny did possesse Judea, in that very time wherein Christ and John Baptist did preach, yet Christ, Matt. 22. did teach, that tribute was to be given to Caesar, yea himself did give it, John Bapt: Luk. 3. commanded the souldiers this onely, that they should do violence to no man, and he content with their wages, wherein he did ra­ther perswade them to continue in the service of Caesar.

First, To that of Christ, Matth. 22. wherein the main of this al­legation lyeth w ^ch is stuck at by many, I have two things to say.

First, His Answer to the Question about the lawfulnesse of gi­ving tribute to Caesar is to be weighed, and therein it may be questioned, whether he positively taught that tribute was to be rendred to Caesar. His words are, Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesars: and unto God the things that are Gods. Here Christ delivers a precept of giving to God and Caesar each their right in the generall, without asserting, or explaining what the right of either is in particular, or m [...]king application to the case, then before him; he seems to leave them that moved the [Page 86] question to do that. His words determine not the point either way expresly; all that can be inferred from the plain current of them, is a conditionall rule equally favouring the affirmative, and negative; if it be Caesars due, render it; if not, &c. Such a wa­ving answer will not appear unbeseeming him, if it be consi­dered who they were that propounded the quaere, to wit, the Pha­risees, with the chief Priests and Scribes; and with what inten­tion it was put forth by them, viz: to entangle him, and so to be­tray him to the Governor for his destruction: See v: 15. and Luk. 20.19, 20. and how well this was known to him: v: 18. The case was put not so much of conscience, as of designe; and there was this biformed, or cornuted trap in it. If he should disallow that tri­bute paying, they would accuse and prosecute against him, before the Ro­mane Governor as an enemy to Caesar; if he should hold with it, they would traduce him to the people, as one that consented to the Romanes tyranny, and sacriledge Marlorat. Muscul. Diete­rius Iansenius, Deodate.: Upon this ground he might prudently (and just­ly enough) give an Answer not to satisfie the doubt, but to silence the propounders. And unto this interpretation Mr. Calvin incli­neth Ita tempe­ravit responsū admirabili sua sapientia, ut neutri parti se redderet ob­noxium. Calv. apud Marlorat. in locum.. He so tempered (saith he) his answer by his admirable wisdome, that he might render himself obnoxious to neither party If he did indeed so expresly command tribute paying to Caesar in these words, which were publickly, and before all uttered in the Temple, with what face or colour could they, within two or three dayes after, accuse him unto Pilate; as one whom they found perverting the Nation, and forbidding to give tribute to Caesar. Luk. 23.2. This accusation would import to us, his Answer under question to have been so positive, and punctuall, for tribute paying; for though no doubt these men accused him maliciously, and would not stick to do it falsly, yet they would have some hint, or appea­rance of occasion for it, as in other their accusations they by straining, and misconstruction had.

2ly, But unto those who will not beleeve, but that in the said words he teacheth paying tribute to Caesar: I further answer. Let the notion under which he is supposed to enjoyn it be observed, and the so understanding him will help not to strengthen, but to answer the Argument. He commands them to render that which he speaks of to Caesar as a due or right: Render as a debt. Rom. 13.7. Anno [...] of Divines. Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesars; now if tribute or any thing else belong­ing to a Magistrate were Caesars due and right, then was Caesar no Usurper, but a lawfull Magistrate, for tribute of due can onely [Page 87] belong to a rightfull Soveraigne. A debt on the Subjects part of tribute must needs infer a right to it in the Magistrate, to whom it is payable; and a right in him to it must needs infer a right in him to all allegiance Non dicit date ergo, cum illi interogas­sent, liceretur dare se dicit reddito tan­quam caquae eius sunt, quae­que ab eo ac­cepistis. Reddite, in­quit, Caesari, sed quae Caesa­ris sunt, qu [...] (que) tunquam sua iure postulare potest. Jansen. com. in conc. c. 116.. How it came about that the Romanes were invested with the Soveraignty of Judea, is not necessary for me to clear, when there is (taking the words in this latter sense) so plain a proof that it was so in these words of our Saviour.

But for the Readers sake, I will observe thus much out of Hi­story to him. About 152 ye [...]rs before the birth of our Saviour, the government of Judea came to be in the Maccabees who were Priests. At that time Judas Maccabeus being in fear of that grand Enemy of the Jews, Antiochus sought aid of, and entred into a League of friendship with the Romanes; Ioseph. de be [...]o Iudaic l. 1. c. 1. 2. Chro. carion li. 2. pag. 138. which continued till about 60 yeers before the birth of Christ, when Hircanus and Ari­stobulus, the Sons of Alexander falling into contention for the Kingdom; and Aristobulus the more warlike man having possest himself of it, and usurped it from Hircanus the elder brother, in whom the right then was, the said Hircanus fled to the Romanes for remedy, and by the mediation of Antipater, he procured Pom­pey (then nigh that Countrey with an Army) to undertake his aid; who thereupon besieged Jerusalem: Hircanus his party with­in the City immediately delivered it up to him, and Aristobulus friends withdrew into that part where the Temple stood, which was by Pompey taken by storme; and by this means that City came into the hands of the Romanes, and Hircanus was restored to the high priesthood and kingdome of Judea. Who, with the party that cleaved to him against Aristobulus, having gained the upper hand of those that usurped over them, they were fain by the same means to k?ep it, by which they got it, to wit, by the Ro­mane power and protection Iofe. de bello Iudaic l. 1 c 4. 5 6. Antiq. Iudaic l. 14 ca. 1.2 &c chron. carion li. 2. pa. 148. Stella in lo c 20.22.. Whence it may appear, that the Jews under Hircanus, were not brought under the Romane sub­jection by meer force, but (through the necessity of their affairs, whereinto they were driven by the factions within themselves) from their own consent and choice. And to this dedition of the Jews to the Romanes, agreeth that saying of Josephus concerning Pompey, when he had taken Jerusalem Per quae sicut bonum impe­ratorem decu [...] bene volentia potius quam timore plebem conciliavit. De bello udaic. li. 1. ca. 5.: He did as becometh a good Generall, rather by good turns, then by terror conciliate the people to him­self. And another passage in the same Author plainly proves it. He telleth that Antipater replying to the accusations of Antigonus the Son of the aforesaid Aristobulus, layed in by him against Hi [...] ­canus, [Page 88] and himself before Caesar, Non propter inoptam desi d [...]rare faculta­tes sed ut in cos qui dedis­sent Iudaeo­rum seditiones accederet. De bello Iudaic & li. 1. en 8. complaineth of Antigonus, That be sought not relief of Caesar, because he was poore, but that he might kindle Jewish seditions against those who had made a dedition of themselves. And thus continued this relation and subordination of the Jews unto the Romanes, to our Saviours time, and that still with a faction, part of them adhering to the Caesarian Authority, and part reluctating; which division among themselves occasioned the question to be really controverted amongst them, which is here insidiously propounded to Christ about the lawfulnesse of giving tribute to Caesar; Nam divisi erant Iudaei interse, ita ut pars dandum censeret cribu­tum Caesari, pars negaret qui negabant faciebant cum Pharilaeis, qui sentiebant po­pulum Dei de­bere liberum esse, nec tributa pendere impiae potestati Cae­satis, qui dan­dum sentie­bant facicbant cum Herode, qui Caesaris partes tuebatur, at (que) ideo Herod [...]ni di­cebantur. Muscul in loc. Vide etiam Ians. in com­ment. in con­cord. ca. 116. the party that was for the negative were the Pharisees faction, whose reputing and speaking of the Ro­manes as Usurpers, might occassion that vulgar opinion of their power which we meet with in some Authors, viz: that they were indeed in our Saviours time Tyrants without title over Judea; Although it is evident (by what is here said) that they came in­to their Authority by the consent of the Juster, and better autho­rized party, and at this time had one part agreeing to them.

2ly, That which is further alledged, viz: That our Saviour him­self payed Caesar tribute, and that John Baptist perswaded the souldi [...]s to continue in his service, is taken off sufficiently by what is already said; for if Caesar was a lawfull Prince to the Jews, these things make nothing for the Arguer.

I have thus gone through, and endeavoured to give a satis­factory Answer to every Argument, which by this Author, or any other I have observed to be urged for the obedience which in this Treatise I impugne. If I had been apprehensive of, or could have extracted any materiall argumentative grounds out of. Mr. Ashcams Discourse, for his high assertions mentioned in my 2d. Chapter, I had here taken notice of them. If he hath any brief and slender hints of Reasons, I suppose them to be Answered in what I have already said.