CHAP. I. Of Politique Communities.

1. THE Sense and Apprehension of Mans self-insuffi­ciency, Aphor. 1. was the first thing that link'd men in­to communities. For Man finding himselfe unable to stand alone, was compell'd by Necessity to betake himselfe to the support of others.

2. Dominion therefore re­quires the Union of many in­to one Body, which is called thence a Community, a Poli­cy or Body; because no Man can Politically be his owne Lord nor the Lord of any one singular person.

3. Dominion is two fold.

• 1. Naturall, or
• 2. Violent.

By the Naturall, the Soule rules the Body, Parts, and Af­fections.

By the Uiolent, the Affecti­ons sometimes Lord it over the Reason.

Observator.

4. Man is borne to hold Society with All Men: an e­vident signe whereof is, his Speech, and naturall tender affections, if they be not cor­rupted by Education.

5. 6. There is a threefold Community

• 1. Of Soules or Mindes.
• 2. Of Bodies.
• 3. Of Fortunes.

First, the Community of Minds, which is call'd RE­LIGION, and that is the chiefe community, which is the very Soule of Policy, & the shield of Naturall Justice: and it is the great Tye that links man to God, and man to man, whence Religion hath its name, à Religando.

Observat.

This Religious Union, is evident amongst the Jewes, but more amongst True Chri­stians: amongst Mahumetans very little: amongst Pagans none at all: unlesse we rather regard the bare sound of the Name, then any Morall ef­fect.

2. The Community of Bo­dies. This stands in the second ranck of Tye's or Combina­tions. By this the Great Turk rules over Mahumetans, Iewes and Christians, which under his Empire are united in Body, although in Soule and Religion far differing.

3. Community of For­tunes or Goods, obtaines the third place. By this the Turk rules over the Turks, and Ra­gusians too, and the King of Spaine over the Genoese, Ne­apolitane and Spaniard: for the Geneoese have estates ly­ing in that Kings Territories, and traffique there.

Some Communities there are mixt of all these three.

CHAP. II. Of the Function and Degrees of Lords and Rulers, whence flowes the divers kinds of Republiques and regiments, &c. Of their Circulations, &c.

HEe Naturally Rules, that excells in vertue. Max. 1. He na­turally serves that is Inferiour in vertue, or has none at all. Where the contrary is, there the dominion is violent.

2. Politique Excellency con­sists either in the

• 1. Mind, or
• 2. Body, or
• 3. Both.

3. He rules best that excells in both, as CAESAR did.

He Rules next-best that ex­cells in Mind, as Vlysses.

Thirdly, He that excells in Body, that is, in strength and activity, as Ajax.

Observator.

4. The first thing that gained Dominion amongst Men, was

• 1. POWER.
• 2. WISEDOME.
• 3. LOVE.

5. The Supreme Power is the Power of the Sword, that is the Power of Life and Death, which resides in them to whom the last appeale in Criminalls is referred.

6. Domini­on of one Good man is called Monarchy

Domini­on of one Evill men, Tyranny.

The Domini­on of many Good ones, Aristocracy.

The Domini­on of many Bad ones, Oligarchy.

The Domini­on of all Good ones, Policy.

The Domini­on of all Bad ones, Democracy.

It is the Office (or Duty) of those that Rule

• 1. To teach and instiruct Their subjects
• 2. Defend Their subjects
• 3. Nourish or Feede Their subjects
• 4. To maintaine the rights of Their subjects

Which seeing no King can undergoe of himselfe alone, he does the

• 1. By Priests, Doctors, and Lawes.
• 2. By Souldiers.
• 3. By Husband-men, Mer­chants and Artificers.
• 4. By Judges, that judge according to Law.

On the other side, the peo­ple owe to their Prince two things

• 1. Reverence &.
• 2. Obedience.

8. Those are called Kings which preferre the publique [Page 9]before their own private good: but Tyrants which doe the contrary.

9. A Kingly Government, does very rarely degenerate (except by degrees) into a De­mocratique, yet in Athens it did so: which Originally was a Monarchy.

10. When a Popular State, by Mis-government, is cor­rupted; there springs up in lieu of it, either a Tyrant, as Pisistratus, at Athens, or a He was a Dubs equall to a King. King: as Cosmo Medices, at Florence. Or Vassalage under strangers, those of Pisa, by this meanes, became slaves to the Florentines. Common­wealths by Luxury and Pride, shrink and contract themselves into an Oligarchy. So Some fell into the hands of a Dece­mvirate or Government by [Page 10]Ten-Men: which lasted not long, but was quelled (observe it!) by the People Rising un­der the conduct of Virginius: so the Athenians, under the conduct of Thrasybulus, cut off and suppressed the Thirtie Tyrants.

11. Strife betwixt Com­mons and Nobles, encreaseth a Common-wealth: but if the Commons bee Con­querour, so as To draw the Nobles to their Bent: The Republique goes to wrack: as it hapned in Flo­rence: a state of all others most subject to changes. But if the Noblest win the day, Tyranny forthwith steps in: as heretofore in Genoa: and the Republique falls to ground. But Contentions about the Change of Religion, or the [Page 11] Sharing of State (which by a new Name, we call Level­ling) is ever the utter undoing of all, especially where the Conquerors are but few. Yet in Flanders, Holland, and Friesland; they are not so much wasted by varieties of Religion, as the French, Po­lack, and English are: be­cause they are compell'd into Union by the common enemy the Spaniard.

Observator.

That they may live secure: and the Supreme Ma­gistrate makes not their secu­rity good to them in good Earnest, whereupon Tumults and jarrs about Religion have [Page 13]risen that have vexed Ger­many, but almost quite de­stroyed both France and the Netherlands.

So much for Internal changes.

Externall follow. Such are Forraign Invasion, Plagues, Corrupti­ons Ex­ternall. Inundations, and Conflagra­tions Uuniversall.

Which Disasters oft-times so change the face of things, that Inhabitants are glad to begin the world again.

Venice subject to Oblima­tion. The City of Venice is sub­ject to Oblimation: or the casting up of Mud, and Sands; which may in time choake her up, and be her ruine: which of her self is so admirably complexion'd, that she can ne­ver Perish.

Observator.

‘ Some remedies for this disease (though perhaps not strong enough) shee [Page 16]has already invented: and may devise more and better:’ Yet this advantage her Seas bring, that they are her Bul­wark against strangers: upon confidence whereof, shee has no Militia of her own; yet fears a Tyranny from her own strength: and hence perhaps it may fall out, that by hyring of forreign Commanders, she may at last come to ruine.

CHAP. III. Of the Essence, Constitution, and Division &c. Prince­dome and Dominion, &c.

THE Romans, upon the suddain Emergencies of danger, by War, or seditions, did chuse themselves an ex­temporarie [Page 17]Monarch: Addit. which they called a Dictatour:

1. The Dominion of one good man, is alwaies better then the Dominion of many, nay, of all good ones. Yea,

2. The Male-administration of One, is much to be desi­red, rather then that of Many, or of all in a Princedome, or Rule.

3. Simply and naturally, God is the Sole Lord Para­mount: as having Power-Ab­solute over all: whose Will (as most wise) is a law to it self, and transcends the whole Scale and Predicament of things. But

4. Man is onely Lord in De­gree and Measure: because his Will cannot be a Law; unlesse Regulated and bound up by the Law of God, either Natu­rall, or Positive.

5. An Ex­cellent Gradati­on. Hee knows not how to rule a Kingdome, that cannot manage a Province nor can he wield a Province, that cannot order a City; Nor he order a City, that knows not how to Regulate a Village: nor hee a Village, that cannot guide a Family: Nor can that man Govern well a Family that [Page 19]knowes not how to Governe himselfe: neither can any Govern himselfe unlesse his reason be Lord, & c. Will and Appetite her Vassalls: Nor can Reason rule, unlesse her selfe be ruled by God, and [wholy] be obedient to him.

Ergo.

Conclusi­on there­upon. Without the Divine Rule, no Man is truely a King, or Prince, according to Na­ture, but rather to be counted, a Scourge of God, & c. Execu­tioner of men.

But neither, according to the Divine Rule, is any Prince simply a LORD: but a RULER and PASTOR of his People: Victrii Domini De, &c. and the Vice-gerent of the LORD GOD by whom Kings Reign.

6. Therefore ought a good [Page 20]Prince so farre to Excell his Subjects in Vertue, as the Shepheard does his Flock: who is of a Superiour species to them: Now seeing all men are equall as to the Spe­cies, it must here follow that Princes (as such) must have somewhat of God, & c. pecu­liar Impresses of Elohim, the Deity in them. Therefore

7. Wisdome alone Rules best of all: not Sophisticall, but Philosophicall [yet] not the wisdome of the Cloister, or the * Cell, but Civil Wis­dome, not opposite, but Sub­servient to God.

8. The Dominion of The

• [Page 21]1. Of strong Intellectu­als, though weake in constitution of Bodies to be Priests, Philosophers, Councellors.
• 2. Active and strong bo­dies, with couragious minds to be—Soul­diers.
• 3. Gross braines and rude hands to be husband­men.
• 4. Heavy and robustuous for the Cavalry or Horsemen.
• 5. Laborious and nimble­handed to weaving, and other Manufa­ctures.
• 6. Ready tongues, and learned, for Embassies, and Orations.
• 7. Other sharp wits for Merchandize.
• [Page 22]8. Just men for the Bench, or Tribunall.
• 9. Weak in Body and mind, for
  Ani­madvers. They are like to make but sorrie ser­vants and instru­ments: that are weak bath in body and mind.
  service, and to be instruments for their bet­ters.
• 10. Men of abilities both of body and mind, to be Commanders, Kings, and Masters of the Militia.

10. That therefore there is the best Republique, where e­very man bends himselfe to those duties and imployments which Nature hath fitted him for: For then Reason and Wisdom bear sway: and that the worst, where men are put upon imployments, which are contrary to thein grain, and Genius: for then Fortune, and Chance, (that is the force of Ignorance) rule the rost.

11. Whence Magistrates are chosen, because they are the Sons of Nobles, or Sons of ☞ friends of such as are in pre­sent power, or for their Wealth, or bought Honour, and not because they are good, or wise men; There the Republique falls to ground.

12. A Common-wealth goes to wrack soonest, when the Portion makes marriages, and Equality of Wealth, and not an equall Valor Lat. strength of body and mind, whence (ac­cording to the Pythagorean) the best Issue is to be expected: Observa­tor. though Plato think (more rightly) the best breed to be of strong bodies, and good wits: or on the contrary.

13. All mischiefs sway, where women have the Li­berty to do, and say what they please, &c.

14. These wee count CI­TIZENS who not onely are capable and partakers of dignities and honors, in the Republique, but such, as by any Function, be it never so mean (as the members of the body) contribute to the use and advantage of the whole. The rest wee count strangers, Excrements of a Common­wealth: such as are many No­ble-men now adaies.

15. The [true] Office of the Noblenesse or Peereage [in any Republique] is to defend that, and private per­sons.

The Office of the Com­mons to seed, and sustaine it.

The Office of the Wiser sort, to rule and Instruct it.

He that takes no prosession, [Page 25]or calling at all upon him is to be look'd upon, as an Excre­ment, or Drone: But they that mediate betwixt God and Man, are to to be esteemed as the Diviner part of a Com­mon-wealth: Such are the Le­gitimate Priest-hood.

CHAP. IV. Of Laws and Customes, and that which is called the Reason of State.

1. THat Lat. Optimis nascuntur. Good Men may be borne, and imploy­ed in those Offices and Fun­ctions, to which they were born, every Community stands ever in need of a Law.

2. As Virtue is the Private Law, of Individualls [or [Page 26]singular Persons] so Law is the Publique Vertue of a Commu­nity. Therefore being Virtue is the rule of Actions, and Af­fections in a particular Person, ordained by the Decree of a Potent and Volentis. pliant Reason, for a chief private good: so Law is the Rule of affections, and Actions Publique: Constitu­ted and published from the Dictates of Common Reason, which respect the chiefest common good.

3. The chief good is Preserva­tion: & that either Private or Publique. which is (as far as may be ga­thered) from Conservatives [simply] or Expulsives of De­structives. Simply to Coserve is to Enternize [or perpetuate] Therfore simply, both the Pri­vate [Page 27]& Publique chief good is from [GOD] that Eternall chief Entity. But partiall from other things: as namely, In­strumentally and Dispositive­ly from the Rules of Reason.

4. Wherefore—No Re­publiques ☞ can make Laws, where there is not common Reason and common consent; unlesse where by common Reason (and consent) The Matter is put into the hands of the Wise-men; Such as were Solon, Lycurgus, and Nu­ma.

Or unto one whom God has Delegated [for his Vice­geret] as Moyses, &c.

As for Minos and Maho­met, either Craft or the the Devill led them on, to be Apes of the true messengers from God, as Moses was.

Observat.

Here the Observator steps in and saies, ‘ I see no reason why the Edicts of one or many Ru­lers may not deserve the name of Lawes, not at all awaiting the Peoples Con­sents: For neither in pre­scribing medicines, do Phy­sicians require the consent of their Patients.’

5. Yhe Divine Law. The Eternall and first Law is that, whereby God did Fashion, Create, Govern, and change all things and bring them about to his own ends: Even changable things, unchangably.

Law Naturall. From this is derived the Law Naturall planted in the minds of men, and in the whole Volum of nature which [Page 29]is * Gods Art, and Natures Di­rectory: Qua est Ars Dei: Ejusdem­que Di­rectrix. Neither can it be vio­lated but by God: [and that by him] as a Lord, not as a Legislator.

Law of Nati­ons. From the Law Naturall is is derived the Law of Nations, Common to all men.

Posi­tive Law. From the Law of Nations, the Positive Civill Law is de­rived, and so farre as it is a­greeable to Nature, it is inva­riable: but as it serves present necessities, it may, and some­times ought, to be alte­red.

God himselfe also gave a Positive Law—which is immutable, where it con­taines the Law of Nature, where our necessities [onely] mutable, as the Law of Moses in the Decalogue, remains [in full force] for ever, but not in [Page 30]the forbidding of Swines­flesh: which was made on purpose to Lepram non] alendam. Lat. avoid Leprosie. Yet,

☞No man can alter Lawes, but he that made them, or he that is Created his substi­tute, for that very purpose.

Observator. Note. This obser­vation cannot refer to any thing in the Antecedent Paragraph.

6. Politique Reason, which some call the Reason of State: and of old, was the same with Equity, does transgresse the [strict] Letter of the Law, but not the sence and scope of it: becauses it does not abro­gate or interpret, & c. any thing but for a greater good: as in the case of Fabius Vitu­lanus: to whom the Roman Senate granted his life which was forfeited to the Law: and Horace that slew the three Curatis, In the behalf of] or rather for the Empire. in the quarrell of the Roman Empire.

But the Reason of State, as it is now adaies, is nothing else but a devise of Tyrants, that carries the face of Equity, supposing it lawfull for them to transgresse, not onely their [Page 32]owne, but even the Lawes of God, either to gaine or maintain their petty Domini­ons. But,

The difference between Rea­son of State, and Equity is this. For Equity respects the Pub­lique Good and Truth: but Reason of State looks upon [onely] the private and seem­ing good of the Power in be­ing.

Now since Machiavel was found to play Achitophel, the name being confessedly impi­ous, Princes began, (that they might cover the shame of it) to call it the Reason of good Government. Which names though given by a kna­vish Godfather, may bear an honest meaning. As for exam­ple.

Cleonymus put to death the [Page 33] Ephori of Lacedamon by a right reason of State: but so does not the [Great] Turk his Brethren: because although he seem to do it for the Com­mon good; yet being it is a­gainst the Law of God, and some other way might bee found out to prevent their as­piring to the Throne, the fact is [Barbarous and] unreason­able.

7. A good Prince wants not this Reason of State, be­cause his owne goodnesse is a perpetuall shield unto him: and if any rise up against him: all the People stand for him: as for David: whom his rebelli­ous Son had deprived of his Kingdom.

But a thousand thousand Machiavillian Arts cannot protect a wicked Prince: be­cause, [Page 34]cause, he is [both] Odious to the People, and to God the King of all [the World]

Now, hee that jarrs with [God] the Prime Cause, does foolishly depend upon second causes: as it happen'd to Caesar Casar, Valen­tine Bor­gia, Lat.] Borgia: who under themost wary, and provident [Disci­pline and] Mastership of Ma­chiavell, lost, both his life, and Fortune.

Thus are Machiavillians alwaies taken in their owne snare: for want of Divine and Heavenly Knowledge, and by conceiting that by their owne Wisdome they can Fa­thome, and foresee, all things.

10. Those Lawes are best, which are 1. short. 2. easie. 3. few. and 4. fitted to the Manners [or Genius] of the [Page 35]People and the Publique good. Tyrannical Lawes 02 are Many, and [those] ob­scure, difficult, like so many snares: that serve the turnes of some one, or few, but not at all accommodated, either to the Manners, or advantage of the Publique.

9. Where Lawes are often changed: they are the fore­runners of the instant raine of a Republique: as Florence found it therefore [by sad ex­perience.

Observator.

‘ Lawes belonging to Go­vernments, ought not to be alter'd unlesse necessity com­pell: nor yet others, but where the profit is [very] evident, and [very] Great.’

10. Where there are more [Page 36]Laws to Puniti­ve quam Instructi­ve. punish, then to direct or instruct, it is a sign of an ill tempered Government.

11. The Acts of Laws are: to command what is good: to restrain what is evill: and to tollerate things indifferent.

12. Reward, and Punish­ment are the two [2] spurrs of the Law [to prick men forward to observation] of them.

Observat.

‘ No Law can stand without punishment [of the trans­gressors of] and where no punishment is expressed, there it is Arbitrary: other­wise it were rather a Coun­sellthen a Law: but whe­ther a Reason ought to be annexed to every Law, it cannot universally be de­fined: Saleucus, and Cha­rondas, [Page 37] and Plato too, follow'd this course; being to make Laws for Free Peo­ple, they thought good to use perswasions. Where as Sene­ca ( having an eye upon his Under Nero. own Times) affirmes: A Law with a Preface to be a foolish thing: being a Law should command and not per­swade: and Dio Chry­sostome compares Custome, to a King, but Law to a Tyrant: in that Custome gives Law to men willing [to receive it] but Law binds the unwilling also.’

13. The three Guardians or Keepers of Laws are,

• 1. Honour.
• 2. Love.
• 3. Fear.

Hee that secures not his Law by these three, is either [Page 38]a weak or Ignorant Lawgi­ver, or elsea Tyrant &c.

14. Where a thing which once was good, becomes hurt­full, it is to be forbidden: Where an Evill thing does prosit [the Publique] if it be Evill of Punishment, and not Evill of Offence, it is to be Commanded. Where in its own Nature indifferent as it falls oui, Good or Evill to the Republique, it is to be [accor­ding] Commanded or For­bidden.

15. The Laws of men make rather good Citizens, then simply good men. Yet Princes [and Rulers]ought to be simply good, because they are the Aliorum Lux & Lex. Light and the Law of others.

16. The Law ought to make and ordain Equality as the [Page 39]Nurse of the Common­wealth, but not a Levelling; for as the Observator saies ex­cellently, such strings make no Harmony but an Equali­ty opposite to that destructive Inequa­litas Con­sumptrix. Lat. consiming inequality, which is fatall to Common-wealths. For example: Extrem Pover­ty makes Theeves, Insidious, Perjur'd, Ignorant, and Instru­ments, of Rich wicked men. On the contrary, very Rich men are Proud, Luxurious, Unlearn'd, Contumelious, [ and I may adde out of Rhe­tor. A­ristotle, Injurious too]

Very crasty men are [com­monly] given to change. Ve­ry stupid, are voluntarily ser­vants [or slaves] Onely mo­deratemen are Stable in their place, and stations where they live.

The Florentine Republique was ever the most unstable, by reason of the subtlety of their wits: The Venetian, the most firm and stable of all, by reason of a Mediocrity: and allay of Dullnesse.

17. A good Custome is a second Law: which does more preserve a Common-wealth, then the Law it self.

Five Customes, made Rome, the Princesse of Republiques: as Cato in Salust witness­eth.

• 1. Publique Wealth.
• 2. Private Poverty.
• 3. Just Government a­broad.
• 4. Freedome of speech at home.
• 5. Unliablenesse to fears, or designes.

All these [Customes] the [Page 41]Commonwealth of Venice observes as a Law: Except onely that shee lies open to Fear: yet not in her Counsels: but from Forraigners, through want of a Militia of her own.

For want of the first [Pub­lique Wealth] the Genoesse, are not Lords of the Sea: nor of the new world, &c.

For want of the fifth [that is unliablenesse to feare, and desire] the Genoesse are as it were fervants to Forraign Princes.

For want of the Third [ vix, Just Government abroad] the French could never fix their Dominion, without the Verge of France. In which the Spa­niard is peccant too: Every where severely and ceremoni­ously Lording it; not at all [Page 42]regarding the manners, [and Temper] of the People [they rule over.]

For want of the Fourth [Custome] [that is freedom of speech] the Florentine Re­publique went to wrack.

Observator.

‘ Manners doubtlesse(i.e. Customes) can do more then Laws: and either add vigour to the, or take it from them.’

Customs have brought Laws under their subjection.

Obs. Customs are either from

• 1. Disposition of People or
• 2. Institution and Edu­cation.

18. Good governors bring in good customes, ill men and women ill customes. Ergo, neither ill men, nor [any] wo­man are fit to rule: the law of Nations is the custome of the whole species. (1) All man­kind.

19. Not a Rigid but easie government fit the N [...]rthern Nations, ☞as being by nature a fierce people, and will hardly [Page 44]brook the Fetters of a Repub­lique; as Tartars, Muscovites, Suedes, Germans, Switzers, & c.

Where they have Kings by succession, the people have much liberty, and the Prince little power; yet after the Ro­man Culture, they began to live more severely [and regu­larly, then before.] But

For Southern People, espe­cially those that live under the Tropiques, no Dominion fits them but the Despotique (1) Lordly Rule: and the se­verest Lawes: because they are weak in strength: but strong in subtlety. For which Reason they were ever [very much] addicted to Ceremonies, Su­perstitions, & c.

Observat.

‘ The Muscovite and Tar­tar are Addictè Despoticè. Slavishly Govern­ed: [Page 55]for there the North bears Easterly. The King dome of Swethland is be­come Hereditary, by occasion of Religion: but under such Lawes, as are observed in Elective Kingdomes.’

20. Eastern People incline much to the disposition of the Southern: as the Western to to the Northern, by reason of the Sea adjoyning to them: and for other Causes: but the Spaniard is like in condi­tions to the African by his Vicinity, or Neighbourhood.

CHAP. V. Of Legislators.

1. A Legislator is he, who Foundeth a New Em­pire: commonly upon new Laws, Religion and Armes, [Page 46]Rites, and Fortunate Essayes, or Enterprises: as Moyses, a good Legislator, Mahomet a Perver­sus. L.] wicked one.

A Lawgiver therefore is either a God, as Christ: or the messenger of God as Moses: or a subtle Politician, ☞that can counterfeit the good ones: as Minos, Osiris, Jupiter, Maho­met, Zamolxis, and the like: who to gain belief and love from the People, feigned them­selves to be sent from God. For

☞ A Lawgiver should be most renowned, most wise, most Divine, and most Reverend.

Observator.

‘ To pretend the Commands of God might perhaps bring some successe to a Perito. Cunning] skillfull man, amongst a rude and ignorant People: as [Page 47]Sertorius amongst the Spa­niards: or to the Spaniard (now Iam E­ruditis. grown civill, and learned too) amongst the Americans: by the help of Naturall Philosophie, Phy­sick, and Astronomic: But in a learned age, and place, This Plot and Artifice, is cold [and ridiculous.]’

2. Every Artist, because is wise, is a King in his owne Art: for a Physician, hee's Lord and Ruler over a sicke King: and so a Mariner, in a Tempest, saies to the Priests and Captaines, and the prin­cipall men, Sit you here; stand thou there, &c. Therefore must the Lawgiver be versed in all these Arts: at least un­derstand their ends: how they conduce either to the prosit, or prejudice of the [Page 61]Republique—to purge out the superfluous and retain the necessary. Hence it was Plato banish'd Poets out of his Republique: because they were full of lies, and Ribaldry: and by crying up wicked men, cry'd down goodnesse, and discouraged vertue. Hence Moyses expell'd false Pro­phets and Painters (that pictured the Deity) and Huck­sters, and whoremongers, &c.

A Legislator must bee throughly skill'd, in the Tem­perament and manners of Countries, by the * Air and the Earth: as likewise happy or unhappy accidents that usually befall such and such a place, &c. as Inundations, Fires, Leprosies, Famines, &c.

3. Legislators ought to re­form and purifie, not Exth pate Religion.

4. The Noblest Profession in Mountainous Countries, are, 1. Shepheards, as in Swit­zerland, and Scythia.

In plain Conutries 2. Hus­bandmen: as in AEgypt.

In Maritime Countries 3. Seamen and Merchants: who for the profit they bring in; the monies that they returne [and exchange] and arts and Trades they bring from For­raigne Countries: have ever been held in highest place and esteem. But Where other (especially superfluous) Arts are preferred before these, Imminent, both losse and ruine must needs fol­low after.

5. A Divine Legislator hath [Page 50]the Idea of his own Repub­que in the Court of Heaven.

The Humane [Lawgiven] in the Government of the U­niverse: and mans Body.

A body Politique how actu­teda. 6. Man (Male and Female) are the Elements of a Re­publique: who consists of

• 1. Soul.
• 2. Body, and External.
• 3. Goods.

1. The Soul of a Repub­lique, is Wisdome and Reli­gion.

2. The Body, a Senate or [Grand] Councell: or who­ever bear any Office advanta­gious to the Publique.

3. For Externall good [the Republique hath] Souldiers, Mercenary, and Auxiliary: and Forraign Merchants and Artificers.

For spirits, she hath Lawes.

For Eyes, the searchers into Arts, and Sciences.

For ears, Spies and Mer­chants.

For a Tongue, Preachers, and Doctors, and Embassa­dors.

For hands, her own Militia:

For feet, Husbandmen and Tradesmen.

7. As naturally the Soul rules the Spiri­tus.] sing, I at. Spirits Policically, but the Body Despotically [(1.) by an Imverious, and arbitrary way] and the Body rules the Estate as the Soule dictates to it: so Religion has a Politique Dominion over Lawes, and the Senate: but over Souldiers, Tradesman, & such like, both *Senate, Law, Pro rata. and Religion, rule proportio­nably.

8. Goods of the Mind are [Page 52]first to be look'd after: next, those of the Body. Those of Fortune, in the third place.

Observat.

The Lawes of friendship, have a stricter tie then those of Civill society.

CHAP. VI. Of Colonies and Cities.

THey that Rule over Countries lying un­der several Climes, must either govern them by distinct Laws, or make exchanges of Inhabitants, by mutuall transplantations. So the Romans (to secure their Empire) carried Colonies o­ver into Germany, that by [Page 54]their example, the Germanes, (unaccustomed to Romane Lawes,) might be the better acquainted with, and subject to them:

Observator.

‘ The Trans-Rhine (which are the true, and proper) Germanes, for the much greatest part, were never Conquer'd by the Romans: but retain'd (sans mixture) their own Language, and Manners, till, under Lo­tharius, they [...]oluntarily submitted to the Romane Yoak. You shall find more Germane Families in Italy, then Roman Families in Germany.’

2. Colonies are best made up of Citizens bred up in the Metropolis of the Kingdome: or in the Neighbouring [Page 55]Towns: for example either of Romans or Latines; and be­cause so many be planted, as will be able to defend the Province [and any Enemy whatever]

3. If Colonies be sent from a Free-State, it is good to build their Cities on the tops of the Hills, for defence of their Li­berty: if from a Monarch, bet­ter in the Plain.

4. That Cities may wax great, 'tis expedient they be Situate [either] upon the Banks of Rivers, or [neare] the Sea-shore, and in a Plain; Where necessaries for life are easiest to be had: & commerce with strangers is most con­venient: But, for the Defence of Liberty and Lawes, and the Non-impayring of Valour, they are more commodiously [Page 56]seated upon Mountaines and Rocks. Withall great respect is to be had to the wholesom­nesse of Water and Air, and Winds, and the Prospect to the severall Quarters of the Heavens.

5. Planters of Colonies are to be divided— into

• 1. Governors: as Priests, and Judges.
• 2. Protectors: as Soul-diers and Comman­ders.
• 3. Artizans: and such as
  Nutri­tios] Reip. L.
  feed the Repub­lique.

  As Husbandmen, Shepherds, and the like.

Observator.

‘ Nothing hinders but he that Vses Husbandry, may also follow a Trade, ei­ther [Page 57]by himselfe, or his Wife’

Rules that prescribe exact proportions of allowances for every person in a Plantation, do often faile in the Pra­ctique.

Plaines bear most Corn, Mountaines most Wool, & c. Hence came Chaffering, and Exchanging and Merchan­dizing, and stamping of Goynes, & c. and for want of Souldery [hereupon] were Forts, and Guns invented.

CHAP. VII. Of the instruments to gain & keep Kingdomes, &c.

TO gain, keep and govern Kingdomes, there are three [principal l]instruments: The

• 1. Tongue,
• 2. Sword,
• 3. Treasure.

1. For the Tongue; tis the instrument of Religion, and Prudence. That is, of the Goods of the Minde.

2. The sword is the [pro­per] Instrument of the Body and its Goods.

3. Treasure is more [the In­strument] of Fortunes, and Estates: which serves the Bo­dy [Page 59]and Minde [onely] Se­condarily: but the true Instru­ments are the Tongue and the Sword.

2. They that use the sword only, founding their power upon that, those quickly lose their dominion; as Tamber­laine, Attila, and Brennus, and most of the Northern nations.

The Jesuites in Japan gaine [first] soules, then Kingdomes to Spaine and the Papacy, by their tongues.

There be that gaine Do­minion by crying up some new sect, built upon some specious colour of truth, by sowing discord betwixt the old Religion, & the new Sect, which shall be attempted and fitted to the gust and palate of the multitude: But such Do­minion is of it selfe not very long liv'd.

Ring-leaders of Heresies, although [commonly] they gain much, they keep little: as for example, John of Ley­don, Dulcinus & Theudas.

Observat.

‘John of Leydon was an ignorant fellow, a person of of no worth at all, who through the hatred against the Priests of his time (whose lives were abominable in the eyes of all men) gathered to­gether a rabble of the basest people.’

They that use well the sword and tongue, do lay the foun­dations of durable Domini­on; but then the sword must be just, and the tongue vera­cious. Thus did Moses build the Empire of the Jews, [namely, in veracity and ju­stice,] which impious Machia­vell [Page 61]never took into conside­ration. p. 147.

The Law of Moises survi­ved the Empire of the Jews, but Mahomets Laws shall sink with his Empire: Thus fell the laws of Alexander with his person and power; Thus Numa's, Belus, and Minos, Pythagoras, and Zamolxis his lawes are extinct, even for want of justice and veraci­ty. He, that knows not how to give lawes to those he con­quers, doth quickly lose the Kingdome he has gain'd. Thus Charles the fifth lost Tunis and Germany which he had wonne, for want of skill to secure his conquest by the addition of Lawes and Colo­nies. This misfortune often befell King Pirrhus; but not so the Romans.

Observ.

‘ He had need be a very wise man, that can give lawes to men of a different Religion, that shal be lasting and fitted to the disposition of them that receive them, as it appears by the Romans in Jewry, who did the ut­most of their endeavour, & with all their skill strived, to establish the state and tranquility of that untracta­ble people, by lawes, conforme to their tempers and humors, as the excellent orations of King Agrippa, and Josephus made to their Countrymen, [the Jews] do witnesse.’

5. he that defends his Domi­nions by sword and tongue, preserves them better and more safely, then he that makes use but of onely one. For

6. Men of Arts are [usually] oppressed by Men of Armes. Thus Saturn (being a Priest, as antient Kings were) left his Kingdome to Jupiter; and Perseus the Warriour, de­thron'd Atlas the [Scholler and] Astrologer: Thus was Pythagoras supported by souldiers; Of Cro­ton [...]. and the Pope, till such time as he felt the use of his weapons, was often made a prey to his enemies, and many times (good man) to his friends.

Observator.

‘ Here the thrice worthy Grotius, notes well upon this late passage, concerning the Bishop of Rome; that the benigne aspects of opportuni­ty, made way for that power which the Pope now enjoyes: as for instance, the Christian [Page 64]World split into many petty Kingdomes, Italy torn in pieces, and sluggish with­all: an age too dull to ap­prehend the meaning of that Artifice in due time, and diverse other causes, which you may find in Guicciardin, and Machiavell.’

7. He that uses only Armes for the defence of his Em­pire, and neglects witt and eloquence, makes but a paper building, rules but weakly: and this is the reason why the Emperor of Germany pre­vailes no more, having a peo­ple of different perswasions in Religion to rule over: and usually such Princes become a prey to those that make the best use of their witts. Hence came it that the Popes did so frequently make and un-make [Page 65]Emperors at their pleasure. Therefore (as Salust observes) did the Romans [wisely] e­ver exercise both mind and body together. For,

He that exerciseth both, makes his Empire last longest, as the King of the Turkes, and Abassines, Dux. Lat. and the Dake of Muscovy. Fabulous Philoso­phy affirms as much, whiles it gives Pallas (the Goddesse of wisdome) a Book and a Spear to make her invincible; but to Mars only Arnour, who (as the Poets sings) was therefore often Conquered. Hence was it that

9. The Northern Nations that fell like swarms of Bees upon the Southern Regions, who excell'd them in religion and Policy, received Laws from them they had conquer­ed: [Page 66]So the Tartars and the Turks a Northern people, had lawes from the conquered A­rabians, and Religion too; and the Hunns, Vandals, Lombards, and Goths, from the Romans, whose Territo­ries they had invaded.

Here the observator justly ‘ gives a check to the Author, and saies that, Both the Goths that rul'd in Italy and Spain, and the Vandals in Asrick, to alienate and estrange the minds of their own people from the Romans, Jeroboam- like, en­d: avoured with barbarous cruelties to promote the A­rian Heresia, by all possible means they could’.

10. God that he might plant Religion and Learning among the Northern people, [Page 67]and Armes and Numbers a­mongst the Southern, did of­ten make an enterchange, and engrafted them one into an other, like Plants to make them the more generous; but in both destroyed the degene­rous Plants from the sonnes of Japhet: Empires descended from Sem, Priesthood and Laws from Cham, Servants, and as the Author (but mi­stakingly) affirms, Tyrants; ‘for (as the observator notes) the greatest Tyrants that ever were, came rather out of Asia, then Africa, which was Chams portion’.

CHAP. VIII. Of the causes of policies, and first of the first cause, God, and Religion.

THere are three causes (if we speak politically) which found and govern Em­pires, that is

• 1. God.
• 2. Prudence.
• 3. Occasion.

But in some, one is more e­vident then the other. As

In the Kingdome of the Jews, God was most evident; in that of the Romans Pru­dence; in that of the Spaniard occasion: albeit (to speak Phy­sically) God is the cause of all causes.

2. All Dominations (except impious Machiavels) have [Page 69]confessed, that prudence hath not power sufficient to foresee the good and evill, which all waies and in all things do a­wait them: Therefore did all Nations fly to God, some by a straight, others by a crooked way. Therefore,

The Assyrian, AEgyptian, and Persian Kings, consulted the will and pleasure of God, and implored his ayde, by A­strology in the starres: The Greeks by Oracles of the Si­bylls: The Romans by sooth­saying and Auguries, whom the Brasilians do but a little recede from: but the Christians in a direct path [seek God] and fly to the spirit of God in his Prophets, Vica­rium, &c. Papam. and councel­lors, and his Ministry.

3. Every Princedome is protected by its own proper [Page 70]Angell, and every Law as it is good is from God, neither can their be any Law established which is void of all good; as Divines and Nature teach us.

4. The Priesthood supplies the place of God in every Do­minion, and therefore no Common-wealth, no assem­bly of men, either was, or can be, without a Priesthood, be­cause not without God.

5. Priests ought to be wise, but rather in contemplatives then practicalls; Valiant, but most in suffering; sober, libe­rall, ingenious, true, not ly­ing so much as in jeast, faith­full, cheerfull, but enclining more to austerity, then scur­rillity; gentle, prone rather to meeknesse then Rusticity, whose Character should be Piety, Wisdome, Charitie, [Page 71]and tender-heartednesse, with­out hypocrisie.

Priests consult what is to be done, Rulers command that to be done, which is contem­plated or cousidered, and souldiers and artificers put commands and consultations in execution.

6. Religion ever ought to be had in high esteem and ve­neration, not in vulgar and mean account.

7. The Priesthood ought not to be prostitute to the people, lest it lose its honour and reverence.

Therefore Aristotle, no less ignorantly then impiously, would make old Souldiers Priests. Here the Author puts the foole upon the Calvi­nists (under which notion he comprehends the worst of [Page 72]Schismaticks) who (saith he) both all and some, count them­selves Priests, which the fa­mous Observator here seems to prove, to defend, out of places (with reverence be it spoken) mis-urged both out of the Scripture and Fathers, in de­fence of common or universall Unction. and (by an injurious Concession) makes the Calvinist guilty of the Schismatiques Phrensies: whereas 'tis most evident, both out of Calvin, and Beza, in their severall discourses, and conflicts with the Antiministeriall Enthusi­asts, that they were quite of an other temper, and opinion; ever bearing high for an Ordinate Ministry: though they brought not clean, or Primitive hands, to that great Work.

8. That Religion which [Page 73]contradicts Naturall Policy, ought not to be retained. Therefore the Maccabees in time of necessity taught, that Warre might be piously made on the Sabbath day, when the Jewes under Pompey and Antiochus (being that day assailed) not defending them­selves, perished. God gives no Law to his People, [whereby his People should be destroy­ed] which is opposite to their own being.

Observator.

9. The Doctrine of fatall Necessity is pernicious, in, and to Commonwealths: for it makes Subjects seditious, and Princes Tyrannous: both pleading Necessity for the Mischief they Act: and thus much Cicero acknowledged. But

10. This Doctrine of Ne­cessity does no hurt among the Turks, because they are rude, and illiterate, and are kept [Page 75]within compasse by force, not by Law. But in Italy, where they are a sharp witted Peo­ple, it would make them stark mad, and all turne Libertines, and lay all their sinns upon Gods score, as the Author of all Evill: but above all, it would make their Princes Tyrants, in Imitation (forsooth!) of God, craftily imputing their own offences to their subjects, that they might [God-like] Torment them, to their owne glory: Then which, what can bee more destructive to a Com­monwealth?

11. Sophisticall Sciences that thwart Religion, ought to be Banish'd the Common­wealth: as Plato teacheth.

Aristotle his School, did the Jewes much mischiefe, [Page 76]under Antiochus; and now to Christians: as Averroes did too, both to us, and his own Saracens. See S. Vin­centius [Lirinensis,]

Observat.

‘ What is spoken here of Aristotle does very well a­gree with the opinion of the antient Christians. In whose Iudgement Aristotle was ac­counted Impious. In the judgement of all the Greeks, and (amongst the Latines) Saint Austin, Plato's Phi­losophy is more consonant to Christianity: Aristotle com­ing but very lately into esteeme, and reputation, with the World.’

Animadversions.

What the Fryer, or Groti­us affirme of Aristotle is onely true, Accidentally, & Vitio [Page 77]Utentis: and so all the Sect of Philosophers fall (as well as Aristotle) under Tertullians Character, that they are PA­TRIARCHS of HE­RETIQUES: but I am clearly of opinion, that Pla­to's Idea's in the head of an ENTHUSIAST, or NATIONAL THE­OLOGUE, have done much more hurt to Christianity, then Aristotles subtleties ever did: who being (as himself justly boasts) the Father of Syllo­gisme, and the first discoverer of Fallacy, might advance all Truths (both Natural, Mo­rall, and Sacred) more, (did not men abuse him to Sophisti­call ends) then all the whole RACE of Philosophers e­ver did, or will do.

12. Religion that is repug­nant [Page 78]to common Policy, al­though it be beneficiall to one particular City or Province, is subject to a change, or Re­formation: and therefore can­not last long, as the decree of Moyses, about the choise meates: and the Apostles, of abstaining from Idols, and things strangled.

• 1. There are therefore some Lawes, convenient for time, and Place, [and Person] as abstinence from swines flesh, for the Jewes, subject to Le­prosie.
• 2. Other Lawes are eter­nall, profitable for all Nati­ons: as to Honour our Pa­rents.
• 3. Some againe are pernici­ous to all places, and times: as that a man doth sin by desti­ny, and does profit in any [Page 79]thing without liberty [in some degree] of his own Wil.

Observator.

13. All Religions and Sects have their proper Circles and Revolutions; as Republiques have from Monarchy into Tyranny: thence into Ari­stocracy, thence into Oligar­chy, from that into a Polity, and so into a Democracy; and then revert back again into Monarchy at last: either by the same, or some other Track.

So, when Sects arrive at Atheisme, the very Extremes of all mischiefe fall upon the Peoples head: and the fierce­nesse of Gods wrath breaks in upon them: upon which, (but [Page 81]through many affections) they return to their Pristine good Condition.

☞ But when once they come to that passe, that they deny the Providence of God, and the Immortality of the soule, they must needs suffer either an [absolute] change, or a Re­formation: because the Curb of Conscience is taken out of the peoples mouth: and so being themselves wicked, they become a prey to no lesse wicked Princes: and thereup­on, tyred with evils past, they gladly embrace any Lawgi­ver, whether hee be good or bad.

14. The Sects of Philoso­phers, passed not from one opinion to an other, ☞ any fur­ther then Epicurus: and there they stopt: who denying [Page 82]God, and Providence, all their Sects were utterly de­stroy'd, as Laertius [excel­lently] observes.

The Religion established by Moyses, when once the Sadduces crept in, that denyed the Immortality of the Soul, suffer'd a Reformation by our Lord CHRIST The Lat. is ambi­guous. who brought immortality to all our soules.

When the Gentiles fell into down-right Atheism, they fell into a world of miseries: as appears under the Romane Emperors: whose lawlesse Li­centiousnesse marr'd all: as Cato in Salust, and Lucan, the Poet, observe.

The Sect of the Libertines, that held sin to be no sin, spring out of the Calvinists, as the Author (but most [Page 83]slanderously) affirmes.

Most of the Transylvanians, deny the Immortality of the Soul, and the Holy Trinity.

That most impious Book of the three Impostors, Add. the Fry­er would gladly fasten also upon the Reformed Churches: ‘But, as Grotius notes, it was Father'd long since up­on the Emperor Frederick the second: but adds with­all, that hee never saw the man, that saw that Book.’

15. The Author (as it becomes a Fryer to do, Ex Officio) Pleados high for the Temporall sword of the Pope, and an armed Priesthood: affirming that the great Turk, the King of Persia, Tartarie, Moors, and the King of Fez, living all under an unarmed, naked Priesthood, are, by that [Page 84]meanes, split into so many Hereticall opinions: whereas the Kings of France, Spain, Germany, and the Republique of Venice, and [many] other potent Princes united in one Religion under an armed Priest, the Pope, have no He­resies started amongst them, but with manifest hazard of their Crownes and King­domes.

Observator.

Because (saies he) The Pope

• 1. Poyzes the differences of Christendome, being Umpire of Peace and War.
• 2. That he [alwaies] takes part with those that suffer wrong: neither permits he any King to invade an other Christian Kings Dominion.
• 3. Hee links and unites Christian Princes,
  Cruciatus Lat.
  against the [Common] Enemies of the Christian faith. And,
• 4. By his * Crusado's and [Page 86]Indulgences and Excommuni­cations, for good, and against evill Rulers, he does erect and defend the Christian Com­monwealth.

So that without that Pope (to speak as a man, and Poli­tiquely) Christianity had, ere this, gone to utter ruine. And the Author adds his opinion (in fine) That all Christian Princes, would be as one: se­cure from one an other, and from strangers too, and bee alwaies Victorious: would they but once make one Grand Senate at Rome. And, that the reason why never any one Prince could attain an U­niversall Monarchy, over the rest of Christian Princes, was no other, then the Temporall Power of his Holinesse; which was a Curb in their months. [Page 87]But (saies hee in the close of all) 'Tis likely that the Mo­narchy of Christendom, will by little, and little, fall totally into the Popes hands.

The Observator answers thus, to these two Para­graphs.

‘ He that, with care and diligence, will look into story, shall find that [farre] more Warrs have been rai­sed amongst Christians by the Popes of Rome, then have been composed. But so farr is it from them, that they either could or would oppose themselves against the Spaniard ( that glutton of Empires) that, on the contrary, the Papall Au­thority [alwaies] gave colour and countenance to the Spanish avarice; as Na­varre [Page 88] can [sadly] witnesse: and France, in the times of Henry the third. And lately, with most notorious injustice, Armes were raised against the Duke of Mantua; yet would h [...]e receive no Assistance at all from the Pope, although no bad man. The Papall [Bulls and] Edicts if they availe any thing at all, it is with such as are not able to resist them. They catch poor flyes, but Eagles break through them. That Christendom fell not long since into the hands of an Universall Monarch, it was no thanks to the Papall Power, that hindred it: but the Germanes were hindred by their own Discords, and Germany hindred France, [Page 89] and France Spain, just as the Persian and Tartar keep the Turk [from being Emperor of the World.]’

18. Charles the great, and Constantine declared them­selves Defenders of the Pope; but Henry and Frederick enemies: for under Frede­rick those pernicious factions of Guelfes & Gibellines (that is, Imperialists, and Pontifi­cians) arose in Italy.

• Julian [the Apostat] endea­voured to make Gentilisme and Judaisme aemulate one the other, and vie for the Mastery, but perished under the attempt.

  The Mahometan Sect has many defects in it.

  First, because if their armes faile, they fall.

• 2. Because it admitts not of divers Princes.
• [Page 90]3. Because in many things it opposes God. And.
• 4. Because it is as a place of torture to all its enemics.

The Duke of Muscovy (a Country assailed by no man) defends himselfeby his scitu­ation and schisme; and stands rather by the discords of Chri­stendome, then upon his own bottom, as indeed the Turk himselfe partly doth.

‘Charles the fifth, was a man that bid fairest for the Universall Monarchy. When Constantius countenunced the Arians, and Julian Paganisme, the Pope was not a man in power, had no dominion then. Here therefore then is an error [or fallacy] of no cause, put for a cause’.

Here in this Paragraph, the fryar seems to dream of the [Page 91]return of a Golden age, of Innocence, under one (I know not what) Monarch of all, as Adam was at first, and seems to point at the Spaniard for the man: the Observator sus­pects some poison here; but I think there is much more va­nity then venome.

20. That the world may be governed by one man, the Empire of Augustus does partly prove it.

That the Spaniard does rule the 2 Hemisphears by Re­ligion, which is the very soule of an Empire, and Dominion, being all in the whole, and wholly in every part.

21. If the World were go­verned by one man, as Alex­ander said by one Sun, warres would cease, and Pestilence, by communication of Arts [Page 92]and Medicines, and by trans­migration from infected into wholesome ayre: By the same transmigrations might Inun­dations and fire be avoided; so famine likewise might be averted, by transportation of provision from plentifull into needy Countries, &c.

Animad.

These are but the fumes & fancies of an idle braine, do­ting upon the Spanish interest, and the Papall; and so I dis­misse them proceeding to

CHAP. IX. Of the second cause of gaining and governing Kingdomes, which is prudence.

A Monarchy is fitter to gain a Common-wealth [Page 93]then to conserve Dominion.

Monarchy is sooner de­praved then many Rulers. Grotius confesses then a few (as Oligarchy) which I un­dèr stand not; neither of them gives their reason, nor I my assent. The Observator adds.

‘ For duration, no Common-wealth in the world is worth the naming, but the Veneti­an: and yet the Egyptian, Assyrian, France­runs Franks. and French King­domes have lasted longer then that.’

• 1. By Nature Rationall [as it were Kings of wisdome] as Socrates and Cato.
• 2. By Fortitude, as Domitian and Vitcllius.
• 3. By both, as Alexander. Augustus. and David.
• [Page 94]4. More by Nature then Fortune, as Scipio, and Hannibal
• 5. More by Fortune then Nature, as Tiberius & Galba.

3. Prudence (the second cause of Dominion) does pro­perly belong to those that are truely Kings; and to such next under God, is Dominion due which prudence is direct­ly opposite to Craft or Sub­tlety, which is proper only to Machiavels Tyrant.

Prudence is consonant to God, that is to eternall wis­dome.

Craft agrees to nothing but a mans own will and pleasure: that is, acts all Arbitrarily.

Prudence is magnanimous, Craft base, yet proud.

Prudence [alwaies] advan­ces wise and valiant men, and puts them in place of power [Page 95]and trust. Craft depresses and destroyes them, that she may rule over Bastard-Subjects, when the Legitimate are cut off.

Prudence treasures up riches for the good of mens souls and that their numbers may en­crease: Craft aymes at money and strong holds, and rejoyces in the Diminution and lessen­ing of her subjects.

Prudence even in losing con­quers, Craft by conquering is a loser.

Prudence is mercifull, Craft is cruell.

Prudence is that of prin­cipall men and Chieftaines, such as Cesar, craft belongs to servile persons, such as Davus.

Prudence has an eye to the Stern, but Craft to the Oare.

Prudence makes Lawes for [Page 96]every mans good, but Craft only for her own.

Prudence punishes, and gains good-will by it, and makes subjects the better; Craft pu­nishes and becomes odious, and the people the worse for't. It is proper to magnanimity and valour, to gain Domini­ons, as to Cesar, and Charles the fifth; but to justice and temperance to preserve them, as to the Venetians: and he that is adorned with all ver­tues, is fit for both, as Au­gustus.

5. He that acquires Do­minions, must have such a Prudence as is magnanimous, stout, liberall, just, &c. but somewhat inclining to pride, boldnesse, prodigality; but severity mixt with it, &c.

He that keepes and preserves [Page 97]Dominions, must have the same prudence, but inclining to Pusillanimity, to fear, Tenacity, and [some] Licen­tiousnesse, &c.

6. Hee that gaines a King­dome, different from him in Religion: must either Tran­slate the Seat of his Empire thither: as the Turk did into Constantinople: or else Tran­slate the Inhabitants into an other Region, as Nebuchad­nezzar did the Jewes, into Babylon: and plant new Co­lonies, in the Metropolitane Cities of the Conquer'd Pro­vince; which shall be of thine own Religion, and Laws; place [new] Preachers there, change Laws, and bring down the chief of the People; as Cyrus did in Lydia, and the Spani­niard in America: But if they [Page 98]will buckle to thy Religion: thou maist make them Artists, and Mechanicks, serviceable to thy Colony: if not, doom them to slavery, and Trans­plant them farre enough [be sure] from thy seat Imperi­all.

But if they embrace the same Religion with thee (as the Neapolitanes with the Spaniards) treat them gently, receive them into Common friendship, and change not their Customes, nor Polirie, but by degrees: let the Supreme Judges be made out of thine own men; the inferiour out of theirs. If they did violently op­pose thine entrance, Levell the Peers, with the People: but if they did receive the as friends: Transplant them out of their Native soyle, and drill them [Page 99]with Honors, Rewards, and Promotions; but be sure let not the chief heads be left be­hind: for they will either grow insolent, upon Familia­rity, and render thee odious to the People, or else they will rebell. By these defects, Pyr­rhus and Charles the fifth, lost all the Provinces they had gain'd, on a suddain. But be­ware, lest by Calumnies, and fraud, you depresse any man; for by that meanes you [on­ly] prepare Ruine and Con­spiracies against your self, and so alienate their Affections, that upon the least occasion, they will rebell against you.

7. He that invades an others Kingdome, must not stick at the mischiefs following. viz. To strike at the Head, change Lawes, pull down Forts, and [Page 100]Castles; Extinguish the Blood-Royall, or Translate it.

Animad.

This savours of Machiavel: whom the Fryer so much de­tests: or (which is worse) of the Jesuit.

8. A Prince should be known to do no evill, except that of punishment: and that too, such as the People wish: as to Fleece Usurers, and ra­venous Magistrates, to banish Superfluous, and effeminate Arts: doom the sluggish to the Oare: to punish Adultery, Pride, and all Enormous sins and sinners.

9. The People are kept in obedience, by [plenty of] Provisions, Souldiers by good Pay: Nobles by Honors.

10. For the advance, and encrease of Republiques, and [Page 101]Kingdomes; these Rules fol­lowing are to be observed.

• 1. All persons must take upon them those Functions and callings, for which Na­ture has fitted them.
• 2. Magistrates are to be cho­sen, rather by Nature then Fortune.
• 3. The greater good is ever to be preferred before the lesse, and the Common before the Private.
• 4. Let there be a free Commu­nity of Goods, of Knowledge, and of Religion.
• 5. Foment the Emulations of aspiring to Honors, by Ver­tue.
• 6. Preferre ever Divine things before Humane.
• 7. Let every man learn this Logick. viz. That God is: Ergo, He is wise, and good: [Page 102] Ergo, He has a tender care o­ver us: Ergo, he is just: And we are his Children, and therefore after death, will reward or punish us. If this be not so, Ergo, God is not just, not good, Ergo, nei­ther is he God: The contrary whereof; All Nature, the Fa­brick of the Universe, and its severall Parts, and the use. Order and function of cach Particle of it, do wonderfully [and loudly] proclaim. As also his revealing himselfe to his Saints [on Earth] An­gells, and Devills, and Poli­cies, and all Sciences in the World, [confessing it.]

CHAP. X. Of the third Cause, &c. viz. Occasion.

THE occasions of acqui­ring Dominion, are in­numerable. But the chief are,

• I. Thine own Valour, and Numbers; and the Imbecillity of thine Enemies, and their Associates.
• 2. The Division of the Province to be surprized, into petty Kings, or jarring. Re­publiques; but especially into various Seots, and Schisms.
• 3. But most of all, if any man call thee in, for his Pro­tectour.
• 4. If the Rulers Son be in his Minority.
• 5. If the Ruler be hated of his People.
• [Page 104]6. If the People be covetous of change.
• 7. If the Nobles [or Patri­cians] may be bought and sold [ as those of Rome were, in Jugurths daies.]
• 8. If there be any Inter­regnum, &c.
• 9. All grosse and Enormous sins, and Vices, are so many Inlets, and doors for a Con­queror, to come in by: as Ido­latry, and Anthropophagie above the rest.

CHAP. XI. Of the Decay, Downfall, and Change of Monarchies: and the cause and remedies thereof.

ALL Monarchy dies, or sinks [at least] either

1. Through want of Vertue in him that succeeds in it: so the Assyrian Monarchy ended in Sardanapalus. Or

2. For want of a Successor; which evill Augustus preven­ted, by adopting Sons, to succeed him.

3. By Division, or Discord of many successors: so the Romane Monarchy under Con­stantius, became a Dyarchy under Constantine, and Con­stance, and afterwards, in Arcadius and Honorius, and the Spanish Monarchy was Rivall'd by Alonzo, Ferdi­nand, and Sanctius.

The Turk prevents this mischief by killing his Bre­thren: but the King of China by banishing them into some Mountain: which the King of the Abassines does likewise.

4. Because the Kings Son is young and contemptible, as the Son of Scanderbeg, and Antiochus, and Alexander the Great: and the last Duke save one, of the line of Sforza Duke of Millaine: who all being Minors and Pu­pills, were commited to Guar­dian Kinsmen, or Tutors, or strangers, and so, were either murther'd or deposed.

5. The Election of a King, if it be made by Souldiers, is dangerous, and Schismaticall; because they are [easily] car­ried from one to another, in their affections. For,

Souldiers are naturally a dull kind of People: and value them most, who pay them best, at present: not at all con­sidering, the Publique good: as it happen'd in the times of [Page 107] Galba, Vitellius, Vespasian, and Otho in the Romane state; and under Omri in Isra­el: with very much dammage [to the Publique.]

6. Election also made by all the People, is dangerous: for they understand not the deep designes, of hidden, and disguised Tyrants: but are distracted, and carried away with smooth Orators, whi­thersoever they please to lead them. Besides, the People are ever at odds, with one ano­ther, and alwaies changing opinions. Hereupon Florence by such Popular Elections, sustained a world of dam­mage, and prejudice. Nei­ther does the Populacy con­fide in their Nobles, but call in strangers to pacifie their Tunmults; So the Florentines [Page 108]call'd in the Commander of Athens: by whom, they were more devour'd then before.

The remedy is: if onely the heads of Families be sum­mon'd to Election: but this is a weak one.

7. Elections are best made by a prudent Senate: out of the body of the Senate it self; as the Pope, out of the Con­clave of Cardinalls.

8. If an Election suffer a Schism in it, or Fracture, viz. an Interregnum (or as they cal it) a Vacant See; the Empire may go to wrack; and there­fore the Germane Emperor doth make choice of his Suc­cessor before his death; as also the King of Fez, before he dies, advances one of his own Sons into his Throne.

Observat.

‘ It often falls out other­wise: for the Romane Empe­rour of time dies and ap­points no Successor: and the Polack cannot endure any such thing should be done in that Kingdom.’

9. The best is not alwaies elected: but he whom the dy­ing King loves best: as Solomon chose Rehoboam.

Observat.

‘ The odd number over does best in Elections: and ther­fore the King of Bohemia was superadded to the six old Electors of Germany.’

10. A Monarchy may bee ruin'd likewise, by the inso­lency and pravity of a mans Children [as in Tarquin the proud] or of his wife: who often hates the best deserving [Page 110]men: as Sophia, the Wife of Justinian the Emperor, hated Narses [the Gallant Eunuch] who therefore call'd in the Lombards into Italy, to the hazard of the whole Empire.

☞11. Monarchy may be in danger also, and be ruin'd by the Authority of some Pro­phet, or [bold Popular] Preacher: that dares cry it down. ‘ The instance here is made in Samuel, and the Pope: which is an handsome comparison indeed. Here the Fryer draws the Curtain, and laies open the whole scene of the Popes Encroach­ments upon Temporall Prin­ces: which part I leave the Fryer to Act by himself, and thither referre the Reader:’ only he tells us ( pag. 198.) that never any Prince pros­per'd [Page 111]that opposed his Holi­nesse, but fell at last; as Frede­rick of Swevia, Roger Guis­cand, &c. Yet

Some Princes call'd a councell against Julius the second, and Pope Eugenius the fourth.

All Clergy-men (under the Papacy) love the Pope in their heart, Princes only for pre­ferment. Armed Religion was alwaies Invincible, Vid. ani­mad supr.

It is better for a Prince to yeeld to the Priest, as Theodo­sius did to Ambrose, then to treat him ill, as Eudoxa did Chrysoctome; For he was con­firmed in his Throne, whereas she dyed an infamous death.

12. Division in Religion, albeit Monarchy be not preached downe, does destroy [Page 112]☞it, as it appears in France, Germany, and Poland, &c. for it divides mens minds; and therefore both their bo­dies, and fortunes, and armes, and both parties hate the King: The evill, because he favours the good, and the good, because he does not extinguish the evill.

Obser.

Here Grotius (the great est advocate and favouror of to­leration that lived in our age) opposes the Fryar, and affirms, ‘ That there does not upon difference in opinions, seem so much hazard of divulsi­on (as he calls it) of minds, or animosity amongst men, if the Magistrate would compell the Ministry to forbear mu­tuall and publique railings, Condem­nationes Lat. and resutations one of ano­ther, [Page 113]and if by a publique Law of State, every man might be secure in the use and exercise of his own re­ligion, as it is in Japan and Poland; which liberty the reformed Churches of France being abridged of, Tumults and Warrs, were occasioned by it.’

13. A Monarchy also failes by its own vastnesse and bulk, for which reason it cannot [well] be governed by One, and he is therefore faine to call to his assistance some to lend their shoulders to this great burthen, who afterwards will admitt no superiours, and so share the government; as we have often seen it fall out in the Roman Empire.

The Remedy for this is, to keep an Empire within its [Page 114]own bounds, lest the com­manders and governors, be­ing at too great a distance, u­surpe the Dominion: As the Monarch of Japan [is a great example of this] who never sets foot beyond his sixty six Kingdomes; and the King of China can or possess claime nothing beyond those bounds which he hath set himselfe, by walls and Rocks, Woods, and Seas. Another remedy for this dis­ease is, for a Prince to keep the Wives and Children of Go­vernors and Provincialls [a­broad] at home with him [as pledges] and engage them by Oath to Fidelity and Allegi­ance, &c. which in part the King of Spain observes.

14. Sometimes a Kingdom's lost for want of provisions, be­cause it has no fruitfull soyle [Page 115]about it: This is the condi­tion of Genoa, and Venice, and therefore they provide against this [mischief] by Merchants and Factors, and exchangers of commodities, by Granaries, Munitions, &c.

15. A Monarchy may al­so fall by Pestilence; against which, Civita­tem portat idem. L. the King of the Abas­sines has provided a movable City, and so removes his Seat at pleasure for the bene­fit of wholesomer Ayre; which thing the Tartars [now] and heretofore the Veientes ob­served; nay the very Birds do the same: But with us there be Officers for health purpose­ly appointed, which the Au­thor calls Magistratus Sani­tatis, like our Masters of the Pest houses

16. A Monarchy likewise is [Page 116]ruined by invasion of forraign Princes, that over-power the right owner; as the King of Persia was by Alexander of Macedon; and the Sultan of AEgypt by Selemus the great Turk.

The best remedy against this, is the love of the subjects to their Prince, & their gallantry on his behalfe; next is, to pro­cure a strong & ready Militia, and to enter into league with many Princes, that may over­power the Rivall of his Crown: as the Macchabees did with the Romans, being affraid of Antiochus, and the Venetian with the French when they fear'd the Spaniard. Neither is it amisse to sow seeds of discord and hatred amongst the powers you stand in fear of; as the Spaniard [Page 117]does betwixt the Turk and Persian, ths Abassine and Muscovite, Polack and Tran­silvanian, all around, &c. and amongst the Nobles of France, which is his Rivall.

When the Nobility grow too rich and potent, as the Nobles of Iapan, and often those of Naples, and the French likewise and the Ger­man Peers, they have destroy­ed the Monarchy under which they lived, defining every one to live for himselfe. The remedy for this is, to cut off Entailes of Land & Honours; The Author means in the words, Ne feuda transeant ad Haeredes that they be not e­stablished, as the Turk does. Next is to levell their Forts and strong holds with the ground, or garrison them [Page 118]with the Princes own souldie­ry, and then under pretence of advancing, to humble the Nobles.

18. A Kingdome may be lost too, by the treachery of a Kings owne Souldiers, as it happened to Antiochus.

The remedy against this is, to keep them in their dutie by art and cunning, and divide them; and to fortifie thy selfe with a strong guard of thy best friends, whom thou must oblige with perpetuall fa­vours, and benefits, as the Turk does his Janizaries.

19. A Crown may be lost by the suddain incu [...]sion of Barbarous people.

The remedy against this is, to oppose wisdome and reli­gion to barbarous folly: So Pope Leo opposed Attilla, [Page 119]and Jaddus the high Priest in Hierusalom, clad in his Priestly Robes, met, and a­dored, and so pacified Alex­ander the great.

20. A man may lose his Kingdome too for want of Souldiery of his owne, and by entertaining too many Auxi­liaries and Mercenary men; which was the ruine of Lodo­vick Sforza, Duke of Mil­laine, &c.

The Remedy of this is to have a choice Militia of thine owne alwaies in readinesse; to arme and unite thine own men, but to disarme and dis­sipate the strangers. For this reason also it is expedient, that none [of any Family] but the first-born inherit any estate, and let the rest be made Souldiers; or else do as the [Page 120]Turk does, keep Schooles or Colledges of Cloistered boyes, to be trained up in Military Discipline, which shall know no other Father but the Mo­narch.

21. Sometimes a Kingdome is lost after a Victory, by the insolency of the Conquering Army; or after a truce [or league] as it happened to Car­thage after the first punick warre, under Hamilcar.

The remedy for this is, on a sudden to divide the Ar­my into distant quarters: and not to be embodyed till the Generall commands.

22. A Kingdome may bet lost for want of present pay for the Souldiery, when the Warre is on foot, as it fell out to Maximilian of Austria.

Publique treasuries are the [Page 121]best remedy against this. Be­sides the Rich (at such a pinch) are to be compeli'd by Religion] be meanes sure Anathema's and Terrors of Ecommunication] and other Penalties, to throw all their Money and Plate into the Publique Treasury: For so, neither can they rebell, and hereby is the Kingdome con­firm'd, and Established: which was usuall at Rome, and Ve­nice. And it is lawfull too, in extreamity, to melt down Consecrate Church Plate: and to make the very Souldiers themselves part with their Gold to this publique pur­pose: but to sweeten them with fair hopes, and the Pil­lage of the Field. Thus did Caeser, in the beginning of the Civill Warre: and thus did [Page 122] Henry (the third I take it) King of France the Frer ad­vises too: to make leaden Coin (if need be) to be cur­rant as long as the War shall last, as the Venetians have done.

23. Kingdomes are lost too, by the Luxury of the conque­ring Army, that does breake and effeminate it self: by the spoiles, and delicates of Con­quer'd Provinces: as it fell out, to the Lombards, Goths, Huns, and Gaules; who possessing themselves of Sou­thern Kingdomes, full of de­lights and pleasures. They [quickly] lost, both their strength and Empire: Which happen'd also to all Kings of Naples; by reason of the soft delicacies of Air, and Soyle. Josuah found out a good re­medy [Page 123]for this; who would not quite extinguish all the Na­tives, [of Canaan] that his People might [still] have some body, whereon to whet, and exercise their Valour. So [Scipio] Nasica advis'd [the Romanes] not quite to de­stroy Carthage, lest Rome should grow effeminate [by losing her Rivall.]

24. By joyning in Com­merce and Traffique, & c. with two potent Princes. Thus came the Raguscan to serve the Turk, and thus the Geno­esse, to be under the Spaniard: But the [Wise] Venetian prevented this. For he would never put to Sea with the Spa­niard; neither would he ever Traffique with him, nor hold any thing by way of Tenure or Homage, in the King of [Page 124] S'pains Dominions, [as the Genoesse and others do]

25. Heavy Taxes, and Im­positions, often lose King­domes, and enrage the People into Mutinies, and Rebellion; as it hapned in Israel under Rehoboam; and the Duke of Alva in Flanders.

26. The Cruelty of Provin­cialls: may be the losse of a Kingdom: which rule by pride and Avarice. This the Axe must cure, as Goesar Bor­gia did by Orcus of Cesena.

Punishments must ever be exacted by the sword, Tri­butes by the tongue; the Mili­tia by both.

27. A Crown gain'd, may be lost, if the Issue Royall find friends to help them to their right: as in the case of Ioas: who was establish'd in his [Page 125]Throne by the high Priest: against Athaliah and her usur­pation, & c.

28. A Kingdome may be lost by the conspiracy of strong and Potent men; as the Tar­quins were Erected by Bru­tus, and Lucretius, and the Magi of Persia by Darius and his Complices.

Hidden Vertue in any man is a dangerous thing, especially if it be afraid of the Prince that rules: for it will at last break out to the Princes loss, if not Ruine: as it did in Bru­tus and his confederate. Va­lour and Light must be ever set high on a Candlestick. Smother'd Fire may do, and indeed ever does, most mis­chief.

Observat.

‘ How dangerous it was for [Page 126]Tiberius to advance Seia­nus [himselfe a well born Person] to so great Honor: the Frince perceived and remedied: but not without hazard. Therefore both hee from that time forward and others, took a couse to cast Honors upon meaner Persons: and those but Tem­porary.’

Animad.

‘ This observation becomes a man born in a popular state: But God himself seems to make it a curse: when the Honorable person is over­top'd by mean fellowes.’ Isa. 3.1, 2. & 3.

The conspiracy of one man with himselfe to murder a King, &c. is Inevitable, as that of Adad against the He means. Ehud & Eglon. lud. 3.6.20.21. King of Edom: and Pausanias against [Page 127] Philip of Macedon: and Frier Clement against Henry the third of France.

A conspiracy of many is hardly to be avoided: There­fore Probity and the Peoples love [when all is done] is the strongest Guard a Prince can have.

26. Lastly, a Kingdome may be lost, when the Sub­ject are wasted by Warre: and so through want of Defen­dants, it lies open to Invasion; as now (saies the Author) Spaine does.

Enfranchizing, or Endeni­zation, is the onely cure for this disease: by admitting Forreigners into your Free­dome: as the Romans did the Latines: and so fill up your number.

CHAP. XII. Of the fall and change of Re­publiques where many Go­vern, &c.

1. TO take off the dissenti­ons, between Peers, and People, the Author would have them all participate of Honors: as, at this time, it is amongst the Biscainers: Or, as amongst the Jewes, that one Family chosen out of all the rest should rule.

Observat.

‘ 'Tis expedient, that be­twixt the Peers, and the Plebeians, there should be a middle sort, and degree of Persons, as a Seminary of Nobility: such as were the Knights and Gentlemen of [Page 129]Rome: for this degree is a kinde of tye, or Ligament of both the other’.

2. The Peeres contend with the people [usually] about ho­nours, Offices, Tributes, and Matrymonie, and Lands, and the like: and if the Nobility get the day, the Republique is ruin'd; for it is necessary for them to keep under a jea­lous and suspicious people, and thence comes their downfall. But if the people gain the day, the matter's worse then before, for either the Nobles are driven into banishment, or else they call in strangers, and so the people become a prey to every crafty Citizen, or for­reign potentate, or valiant Commander.

If once the Nobles mix and couple themselves with the [Page 130]Plebians, to the end they may partake of the government with them; they grow vile and despicable both together, and so the common-wealth falls to ground; as it alwaies happen­ed in the Florentine repub­lique, and divers times in that of Genoa.

The remedy is, if the Peo­ple (of a middle Size betwixt the Nobles and the pelting Plebeian) get the upper hand, and share Magistracies and honours now and then, and Lands and Provinces also, By such contentions Rome flourished and grew great, and yet granted the honour of Victories, and the credit of them, to the Commons: but Florence perished under them.

3. A republique is often de­stroyed, when Lawes are made [Page 131]to the advantage of great ones, and pressure of the peo­ple.

4. When the Powers in be­ing, usurpe Anthority [over the people] and keep guards for their defence; as the De­cemviri did at Rome, and the Thirty Tyrants at Athens.

5. The Luxury of the No­bles, and their neglect of Armes [and Arts] makes them vile and cheap in the peoples eyes; and so makes a repub­lique sink into a base Demo­cracy.

6. When a Patrician grows too rich or potent, and E­mulations grow rife about priority, then the republique's lost: So Sylla when he had subdued Marius, and Cesar when Crassus was slaine, and Pompey conquered (who were [Page 132]then Rivalls in the Empire) carried all before them, and were Tyrants at pleasure.

7. Correspondency with some forraign Prince, of any person in power, may ruine a republique.

8. When any fawning Poplicola, in a time of Famin, or other occasion, endeavours to gain the people by oppor­tunity and advantage, and by such arts, gets the power into his own clutches; these must be lookt to, and suppressed, as Metius was in Rome, &c. and Manlius &c. which King David neglecting in Abso­som, run the hazard [of his life and Crown.]

9. A Republique falls: to ground oft-times, because it wants a Militia; when the people & Patritians mutually [Page 133]fear one another, and there­upon call in forraign Com­manders, which is usuall in Venice.

Which commanders after some signal Victory obtained, either themselves seize upon the common wealth (as Sfor­za did at Millain, or Colion. and Bar­tholomew Coline might have done at Venice) or else they be­tray it to forraign Princes, as Malatesta did Florence.

10. The faction of Citizens, that bear affection to some faction of strangers, ruine a republique; so all the repub­liques of Italy split themselves into Guelfes and Gibellins, or (which was worst of all) into Neuters; whereupon dire and dismall slaughters and times ensued.

A Republique must never [Page 134]be Neutrall, because it must necessarily be a prey to the Conqueror, not being sup­ported either by friends or enemies [Nec amicis nec ini­micis fota Lat.]

11. A Republique falls, when the People confide not in the Nobility, nor the Nobi­lity in them; and therefore they call in a forraign Umpire, that will devour them both: as Florence call'd in King Ro­bert, & or Gene­rall Dux., the Duke of Athens.

The remedy is, to com­mit the Vmpirage of the quarrell (not to strangers, but) to religious men, Priests that are Natives; as Moises did by Gods command, and as the Observator well notes, ‘ The old Gauls did to the Dru­ides, and oft times both they and the Germans, to [godly [Page 135]and] grave Matrons. But this latter is a crude obser­vation.’

12. Changes of Republique are innumerable, as their causes are. Read the Floren­tine History (for that City ran through all varieties of change) and in opposition to that the Roman.

CHAP. XIII. Of the Fate and change of Po­pular, or Democratique state, &c.

1. A Democracy, or Po­pular State assu­redly goes to wrack, when Ignorant Plebeians rule, that canno agree amongst them­selves, and determine all things [Page 136]☞by chance or affection.

2. Popular elections are e­ver attended with jarring, and noise of the multitude, and obstreperous rabble.

3. In the Senate or Parlia­ments of Popular States, he that has the smoothest tongue, is likeliest to cheat the peo­ple, and make himselfe be e­lected, [rules in chief]though he be the veriest Knave in the Pack

4. It marres a Popular State, when the poorest of the people endeavour to grow rich by publique Offices, and the wealthier sort grow Ty­rannous by their riches.

It is dangerous to call in a stranger to the administration of justice, as the Florentines used to do; for this is a sym­ptome of dissention amongst [Page 137]the Natives, and oft brings ruine with it, [yet has it been practised else-where of late, but with like successe.]

5. This Paragraph about provisions and supplying the publick necessities by Corn, &c. is treated of in the precedent Chapter.

6. The next Barre of a Democratique State is, the Generall that fights their Battails abroad, and returnes home a King as well as a Conqueror; as Sforza return­ed to Millain, and Cesar to Rome, &c.

Observ.

‘ The Romans provided ex­cellently against this mis­chief, they had ever at hand good store of sitt and able men for the conduct of any Warre, and ever and anone [Page 138]changed their Commanders, whereby they both secured their liberty, and by emu­lation provok'd them to ver­tue and valour.’

7. An other Engine to bat­ter down Democracy, is a Publique Benefactor: that has got Power into his hands: and pretends himself in hazard of his life by Conspirators: and thereupon desires a kind of Life Guard for the safety of his Person, against his accusers & those he would accuse, and so being thus well provided, hee invades the Throne, (if I may so say) and dubbs himself King; so did Pisistratus at Athens.

To prevent this: The Peo­ple must commit themselves, to the care and Providence of wise and religious men: repo­sing all trust, and confidence [Page 139]in them: For by not believing Solon the Philosopher, who discover'd to them the design of Pisistratus, the Athenians lost their Liberty.

8. A Common wealth may fall, by the approach of sud­dain [and unexpected] dan­gers: the Common people be­ing dull & heavy in deliberati­ons. So the Romanes lost Sa­gunt um whilst they [slowly] consulted, how to get it: and the Venetians Cyprus, whilst they coldly deliberate how to relieve it.

In this case a Dictator must must speedily be pitch'd upon: to Rule, and dispatch every thing as himself sees most Ex­pedient, without Counsell or controll of any man. Necessity it self will compell the people to pitch upon none, but the [Page 140]best and ablest man for that service: as the Practice of the Romanes [in that case] does witnesse.

9. A Popular State may miscarry too by some wealthy Citizen: who does favour and foster Poets and Oratours, and Preachers, & Grammari­ans, and all sorts of men, that have Eloquence or wit, and by his riches, keeps an Academy in his own house: of men that can Blazon, & Trumpet forth his praises and worth to the People &c. Thus became Cos­mo Medices Dake of Florence.

Let no man, that sets his wits and tongue to sale, have any pare in any Senate or Par­liament. Greece quite lost her self, by the Liberty of Orati­ons: so did Germany and France [by sermons] and the [Page 141] Switzers too late provided a remedy against this disease.