SECT. 1. The case, and the Question upon it stated.

IT is necessary I begin with the Author of that Fuller Answer, for he begins with a discourse of his owne, and the better to set it off, will needs doe mee the favour to rectify the Case, and state the Question for mee. Blowing aside, sayes he, the Pindust of the stile, which guilds but inter­cepts the letter of his Treatise, I finde the Sub­stance of it to be a groundlesse supposition of the Parliaments taking Armes, upon a bare supposi­tion of the Kings meere intention to subvert Lawes and Liberties; for who ever maintained they might take Armes upon such a bare suppositi­on? Pag. 1. also I am inforced to answer what he would have said, for he resolves upon a Question, that never came in question, pag. 2.

First I must deprecate what here and every where this Answerer [Page 2]imputes unto mee, as if I charged the Parliament (i.e.) the two Hou­ses with this Warre; it was no where said, they did take up these Armes, but often insinuated and proved, that, if that were the Case, they might not doe it, the more forceably to convince them that have now done it, under the name and pretence of Parliament.

Then I must tell him, it is an easie but commonly deceitfull way of Answering to say the Question is mistaken, and make the Reader be­leeve all that was written is nothing to the purpose, when as the mi­stake is in him that complaines of it. For if this Answerer in blowing a­side the Pindust of the Letter, as he speakes, had not received much of it into his eyes, he might have seen (the Consciencious Reader will) that the Question for the Rationall part of it, was put to the g [...]e [...]est advan­tage of them that plead for Resistance not as he renders it whether they may take Armes upon a bare supposition of a meer intention in the King to subvert Lawes and Liberties? as if he knew not what the word (sub­pose) meant in putting of a Case, but to this sense, suppose or grant the King will not discharge the trust, but is bent or seduced to subvert Lawes and Liberties, whether then may Subjects take Armes? this implies in the case as much or more, then he himselfe pretends here to bee the cause of your Armes, viz.

The actuall invasion of Liberties, the invitation and detention of De­linquents from tryall by Law, to be a party in Armes against the Parlia­ment, to dissolve or remove it, the importation of forraigne. Armes, and Souldiers, illegall Commissions to imploy them, &c. so he, pag 1. To take no notice for the present of the falshood of these imputations where­with His Majesty is here charged, we must look upon them, as the supposed causes of their Armes.

And first I cannot but wonder, why among these particulars here's no mention of Religion, when as the people are made to beleeve that's it they fight for; happily he included it in the &c. as indeed in the consultations of these unhappy daies, the care of it (though time­ly moved by worthy Members of both Houses) has been cast off to the fagge end of other more necessary occasions, that I may not say Designes, a likely way to make all prosper.

When the people are dealt with by such men as these Answerers, then Religion is the main Engine to draw them into Armes, and in­deed were they not abused with that plausible pretence, they could never have been so farre engaged against their Soveraigne: but when [Page 3]these men enter the lists with an Adversary about the cause of this warre, Religion is not insisted on, not once touched in this, expresly declined in the other Answers: but Nature is rather sought unto by them, for a ground of selfe preservation; for upon strict examination these men know, it will appear what actuall invasions have been made upon Religion against the known Lawes of this land, and who are to answer for them; they know also what offence it would give to seve­rall Sects (which are and will be alwaies serviceable to new designes) should Religion be either countenanced, as it is by Law established, or any one way declared for.

But secondly I would fain know, whether they can in Conscience be perswaded, that some actuall invasions of Lawes and Liberties can be a sufficient cause for Subjects to Arme and Resist, when it evident­ly appeares their Soveraigne is not bent to continue in that destru­ctive way; will it not suffice, if he restore those Liberties, and with­draw the encroachments made upon them? If he promise security and passe severall Acts of Grace for further assurance of them? If he be content that, All Armes laid aside, the Law shall judge who are Delinquents, and accordingly censure them?

They that have formerly written for Resistance in some Cases, have thought it unreasonable that Subjects should pretend to Armes, till they find their Prince in such a Condition, as was insinuated in the case proposed, viz. Bent or seduced to subvert Lawes, Liberties, Religi­on, or to make havock of the Common-wealth or Church, as D. Willet ha's it in Rom. 13. q. 17 and as we see by the limitations, testimo­nies, examples in Paraeus upon Rom. 13. and in Phil. Par. his an­swer to M ^r Owen.

But our Pleaders for Resistance at this day, because they cannot find His Majesty in such a condition; or hope to make men (that know a­ny thing of His Personall Vertucs, or His Acts of Grace passed this Parliament) believe, he is so bent, doe now pretend they have cause enough for taking Armes, what ever the Kings mind be and although there be no such horrible things intended by him as the Doctor speakes of, so M ^r Bu [...]r. pag. 140.141. and to the same pu [...]pose this Fuller An­swer insists upon actuall invasions of Liborvies, Lawes, as the cause of their Armes.

Yet that they may seem to have better pretence of Reason for what they doe, and more win upon the people, that least know the [Page 4]gratious disposition of their Soveraigne towards them, they doe en­deavour to charge His Majesty with the like destructive intentions, as were to be supposed in the case.

To this purpose we find this Answerer every where rendring the reason of their taking Arms to be, b [...]use the King refuses to performe His trust, and in the first page; because His Majesty has drawn in Delinquents to be a party in Armes thereby to dissolve or remove the arliament; where he puts the Cause upon His Majesties intention. And we well remember upon His Majesties first Guard at Yorke, it was (I will not say voted above) given out among the people, He in­tended to make Warre against His Parliament, and still we have it ur­ged as a Cause of these Arms, that His Majesty is seduced by wicked Councell, and the like.

Therefore the Case being so laid upon his supposed intentions to continue in a subversive way of Lawes, Liberties, the question upon it was put to the full, for the rationall part, whether, such a case being supposed or granted, it were Lawfull for Subjects to take Armes and resist? Then for the other part of the question, which concerned mat­ter of Fact, Whether that case were now? (i.e.) whether it were true of His Majesty which they supposed and took for granted, and ende­voured to make the people believe of Him? it was of a second consi­deration, and examined after by it selfe.

Every mean understanding might easily conceave this to be the sense of the Question, the briefe of the Cause, and of my Treatise.

But this Answerer it seems, had a discourse of the power of Parlia­m [...]n [...]s lying by him, (for no man will think it occasioned by my book, but applyed to it) and therefore thought fit to quarrell at the Question as proposed by mee, and in stead of my three Resolves, to give the Reader three Propositions of his own, he should have made them moe, but for observing number. And then he boasts, How many weekes soe­ver the Doctor has been about the Treatise, it is well known to many, the Answer cost not many houres the doing, pag. 3. he means the apply­ing of what was done before; but any one may perceive by his confu­sed jumbling of things, and his frequent mistakes when ever he re­peats and answers what I had written, that he was ambitious of doing the businesse hastily, rather then surely.

Wee'l follow him as we may, first examining how he makes good his Propositions or grounds he goes on, then how he applyes them to [Page 5]what I had written, where we shall tak in the other Answers, as oc­casion requires.

SECT. II. The frame of this Government as it is fancied in the Fuller Answer.

HIs whole resolution of the Cause is laid down in his first Propo­sition, which is this.

The Parliament may with good Conscience in defence of the King, Lawes, and Government established, when imminently endangered, take up Armes without or against the Kings Personall commands if He re­fuse. His other two Propositions are subservient to this, tending to the proofe of it; That the finall result of this States judgment, what those Lawes, Dangers, and meanes of prevention are, resides in the two Houses of Parliament, Prop. 2. That in this finall resolution the People are to rest, and in obedience thereto may with good Conscience bear and use Armes, Prop. 3.

To make this good he first endeavours to shew this Monarchy is mixt, by a Coordination of the two Houses with the King in the very su­premacy of power it selfe, so he pag. 3. Whereupon if the King refuse to provide for the safety of the Kingdome according to their advice, then His coordinates; the two Houses must according to their trusts sup­ply, so he tells us, p. 3.8.10. And that this power was reserved by the people at the first constitution of this government, pag. 24.25. and that this constitution was made by consent of King and People in the first Coalition of Government, pag. 4. by the Consent of the People th [...]t first made the King, pag. 13. Contrived by the people in the first constitution [...]f Gov [...]ernment, pag. 8.

These Particulars we find in this his discourse confusedly spoken of, if we give his conceptions their due order, they stand thus. First, he supposes all the Power of government to be derived from the peo­ple, and that the Constitution of this Government was their contriv­ment, when first they made a King; then, that by this first Constitu­tion, such a Coordination of the two Houses with the King was con­trived, by which they have power reserved, not only to consent in making Lawes, but to supply the refusalls of the King, as they shall [Page 6]think good for the safety of the State; and for this, the finall result of the States judgement is in them to declare what is Law without him, and unto their finall resolution, and commands thereupon, though arbitrary (as this answerer acknowledgeth Pag. 17) the people ought to obey.

Thus has he fansied the reason and constitution of this Government, but I suppose the honourable houses of Parliament will not thanke him for raising them to that height of Supremacy, he has placed them in; I am sure we Subjects have not cause to thank him for that arbi­trary power he has placed in them.

If any man expect from this his discourse, satisfaction for consci­ence, he shall find nothing but uncertainties, and improbabilities, not fit grounds for it to restupon; and if conviction of Reason be look't for here, I suppose there is no man that upon serious consideration of what this Answerer brings us to, will not think it more reasona­ble to be under the arbitrary Government of one, then of many, nay, under the Government of one that challenges not obedience as due, bat according to Law, then of many, whose commands are Law un­to us; as this Answerer makes them.

And here we doe not undertake to set down the extent of the po­wer, and Priviledges of Parliament; no more then of the Kings Po­wer, and prerogative. They are both of them beyond our skill, and we may not take the boldnesse to meddle with either of them, farther then the necessary information of Conscience doth inforce: to which purpose as we may by use of Reason certainly conclude, the King has not this or that Power, as to make Lawes by himselfe, to rule arbi­trarily; so of the two Houses without offence we may as certainly conclude, That they have not such a power by the first Constitution of this Government, as this Answerer every where beggs for them, but no where proves it.

It is granted that the two Houses of Parliament are in a sort Coor­dinate with His MAIESTY, ad aliquid, to some act or exeacising of the supream power, that is to the making of Lawes by yeelding their consent; and that they have this by a fundamentall Constitution. But that they have such a fellow ship with His MAIESTY in the Supremacy it selfe, as this man imagines, or such a Power of resist­ance reserved at first to supply His MAIESTIES refusa's; or such a finall and arbitrary Power and c [...]mmand, as he attributes to them, Conscience can never be truly convinced off.

SECT. III. Of the Originall of Governing power, and of the beginnings of Government in this Land.

WE will begin with his ground-work, Which lies scattered through all his discourse, That first Coalition or Consitituti­on of Government in this Land, which he supposes to be framed by the agreement or Contrivement of the people when they made the first King; wherein they intrusted him with such Power as was thought fit, and reserved to themselves what power they held necessary for their owne safety, upon extraordinary times and occasion of dan­ger.

So then Conscience, if it will obey the power of Armes now usurp­ed by Subjects, must be clearly convinced (which is impossible) of these particulars, That the Governning Power is from the people, that Monarchy was here raised upon such a contrivement, wherein such a power of supply, and of resistance, was reserved to the People, and that all Kings since, do consent to such conditions, and are admit­ted under them.

All the proofe that I can any where find this Answer ha's brought for all this, is from the words of Fortescue, Hanc potestatem a populo effluxam, this Power the King ha's derived from the People; and from the mutuall Oath of King and People, pag. 5. Let the Reader give me leave to speak a little of the Governing power simply; then of the beginning of Government in this Land, that Conscience may see what little satisfaction this or any man els can give it, to perswade either that the governing power is derived from the people, or that the Government of this Land began in such a Contrivement or consti­tution as this man phansies.

It was said in my other Treatise, that the Governing power was from God, not only as an ordinance of the precept that commands Go­vernment, but also as an Efflux or issue of that providence, which sets up & pulls down, which translates Kingdomes, and governs the whole world, Creatures Reasonable and unreasonable; and this not obscurely in the Apostle, Rom. 13. where the powers are said to be not only [...] from God, but also [...] as orders ranked by him and under him.

Well then, this Governing power was not a populo effluxa, as he a­bove said, but flowed from that providence at first through the veines of nature in a paternal or Fatherly rule, and by that as by a pattern in a Kingly Rule or Government, upon the encrease of people and Nati­ons; for when the Reins of Paternall Government could not reach them for their extent, or hold them in for their unrulines, & injustice, it in larged it selfe into a Kingly power, which bore and used the sword; for that is given them to use streight after the Flood. Gen. 9.6.

This is plain by the booke of God, that the first Fathers of Mankind, were the first Kings and Rulers; for we see the Earth divided among Noah's three Sons, and upon the Encrease of their Children many Co­lonies were sent into Countries farre distant, and thereupon many in­dependant Governments raised; which must be by the direction and order of Noah, that first sent them out and assigned them those parts of the Earth; And still as they encreased, they spread farther upon the face of the Earth, new Colonies being excluded and thrust forth (like swarmes of Bees) under their Rulers, who were the cheife Fathers of those new Progenies, and had the Government, both Regall and Sa­cerdotall by Primogeniture, unles the chiefe Patriarch, from whom they all issued, saw cause to order it otherwise.

Therefore of all the Sons of Noah & the Nations sprung from them it is said, Gen. 10. these are the Sons of Noah —after their Families in their Countries and Nations. vers. 5, 20, 31. and we find many of those first Princes and rulers to leave their names to the people that came of them, and to the Countries they were seated in; as may be seen, Gen. 10.

Hence it appeares. First, that Monarchy was the first Government it being late ere any Popular Rule, Aristocraticall or Democraticall ap­peared in the world. Secondly, that the first Kings were not by choice of the People, but that Monarchy (however we cannot say it is jure divino, by divine precept commanding all Nations to be so governed, or jure naturae by natures law enforcing it) is plainly ductu naturae, by nature leading men from Paternall to Regall Government, and ex­emplo divino, as I may say, by divine example and insinuation; the Go­vernment that God set up over his people, being Monarchicall still, in Moses, the Iudges, the Kings; whereas Aristocracy, and Democracy, (that I'may not call them Defections and Revolts from the Naturall [Page 9]way of government) are meer inventions of man; In severall Mo­narchies indeed we see divers limitations & qualifications of power, and severall offices & wayes of executing that power, these are meer inventions of man. And this I note for explication of what was in the other Treatise said of Monarchy in relation to Ius divinum, which by this Answerer is often interpreted, as if I granted Monarchy, and Aristocracy, and Democracy to be equally of humane invention.

Thirdly, it appears that the power of Kings was as of Fathers, and that the people had no power of coertion over them, more than chil­dren over Fathers. Fourthly, that albeit within few ages after the flood, people began to chuse themselves Rulers, (as likely they did that departed from the building of Babel in severall companies, ac­cording to your severall languages) yet was such popular election to be accounted a kind of defection from, and a disturbance of that na­turall way of the descent of governing kingly power, by a Paternall right; and this irregular way began in the progeny of Cham. Lastly, that albeit when a people are free, as upon the utter failing of the royall Line, they may chuse a Governour, (there being then no other way to set up one but by choice) yet then do they no more give the power, than if they received a King by naturall descent, or by Gods designment, and still the King so chosen is a Father, as in the fifth Commandement, and the people as children in the same relation for obedience and coertion, as at first in the generations of Noah.

Accordingly kings at first among the Nations though chosen, ruled as Fathers, arbitrarily, their discretion being law unto the people, as was observed out of Iustin, in the former Treatise, and as we may really see in the fiction of the Golden Age.

Now for the beginning of Government in this Island, how shall conscience find any certainty, that it was so set up & contrived as this Answerer supposeth? If he will begin simply at the very first coaliti­on of Government (as he phrases it) he must suppose a multitude of people meeting together to contrive a Government, and these either to spring on a suddain out of the earth, as Cadmus his race, but then in all likelyhood they would not so well agree; or to live dispersedly in caves & woods, and so to be brought together by some Orpheus his pipe, but then we cannot imagine such rude men to be so politique and cautious as to make such a contrivement, for he tells us the rea­son which we see in this State, is that same reason that first contrived [Page 10]the Government when they made the first King; Or lastly, he must suppose this land was peopled by a colony from France or Germany, and then as likely they had the constitution of the Government from the King which sent them, or that the government which the first Kings used here was arbitrary, as it was every where else at first.

But let us come down to times of more certainty, and, as the De­claration of Parliament, 24. H. 8. c. 12. directs us, looke in Histories and Chronicles, which tell us, this Realm of England has been accep­ted for an Empire, governed by one supream head; unto whom a body po­litique, compact of all sorts and degrees of people, of the spiritualty, and Temporalty, are bounden to bear, next to God, a naturall obedience, so in that Statute. Now this first constitutionof government in this Land, (as this Answerer ha's phansied it) can neither consist with the sub­stance of this Parliamentary Declaration, as we shall see anon, nor can it have any footing in Histories and chronicles to which that De­claration refers us.

For those chronicles, and Caesar in his commentaries tells us, there were in this land then divers Princes independent, in which of them shall we look for this constitution? or shall we seek it among the Brittish kings, whom the Saxons drove into Wales? if we could find it there, it would not concern us, for we are not now upon the Brittish but English government, which followed the Saxons. If the Answe­rer will begin his constitution and first king at this period or revolu­rion of the Monarchy, (for higher he cannot, & lower at the conquest, I trust he will not) why did not he tell us so, that he might have givē conscience some direction to find out his first constitution and first King? He knew well enough there was little help for him here.

For we find this English Saxishgovernment at the beginning, bran­ching it self into an Heptarchy, & rising in arms; it is likely those Captains took upon them as kings by the consent and acclamation of the souldiers, as when in the state of Rome the pretorian guard, or some army abroad saluted an Emperor, and thrust him upon the peo­ple. But what then will become of his first constitution by the con­trivement of the people, when they made their first king? should any of these seven Monarchs come in by such a popular contrivement; (wch cannot be imagined) must our government needs be the same? Or can we think that Egbert who made himselfe sole Monarch was bound up by such a constitution & reservation as he says was contri­ved [Page 11]at their making of the first King? from that Egbert to King CHARLES, our Authentique Histories and Chronicles (to which the Declaration of Parliament above mentioned refers us) do shew a glorious succession of Monarchs, not one made by election, but Ha­rold, who yet ha's not obtained the stile of Rex Haroldus, and his title, if any, dyed with him.

We see upon what uncertainties and improbabilities, conscience is left for this first election and precontrivement; this Answerer ha's not directed it any wayes how it should be assured of it, much lesse of that reservation of power, which he imagineth to be made by the people, at that first election of a King. He gives us no record to wit­nes it, turnes us to no authentique History or chronicle, shews us no constant practice or judgement of foregoing Ages; what he ha's from the mutuall oath of King and people, pag. 5. may be good upon af­ter agreement between them, as will appear; and his hanc potestatem a populo effluxam, out of Fortescue, although it supposes derivation of power from the people; (the usuall mistaken principle of Govern­ment, which later times have given cause to examine and find un­sound) yet doth it not imply, the people ha's reserved any power, much lesse such a paramount power, as he imagines.

Conscience has this certain by the continuall practice of this Go­vernment, that there is such a constitution as gives power of consen­ting to the two Houses in making and declaring Law, when ever the beginning of it was; it cannot see that it began by a contrivement of the people at the supposed choice of the first King, but rather that it was subsequent to Monarchy, and procured by the people for their greater security, not precontrived by them.

If objected. The constitution is fundamentall, therefore prece­ding the first King; we answer it followes not, for it may be a funda­mentall, yet not of Monarchy simply, but of government as now it stands, a fundamentall not of the Regall power, but the peoples secu­rity. For Government may receive a change & qualification by con­sent of King and people, from more absolute to mixt; & such a con­stitution is a fundamentall, because all after-lawes are built upon it, but not a fundamentall to the Regall power, for it gives no power to him as it doth to the two Houses, but rather lessens his power by li­miting it upon agreement, that he will not impose any laws upon his people without their consent.

But as for that reserved power of declaring law without the king, and of commanding all, when they shall judge it expedient for the safety of the kingdom, upon the Kings refusall, Conscience has no as­surance from this Answerer, that such a power was reserved (which is enough to leave it without excuse, if it obey such a power) but on the contrary, has strong presumptions and reasons against.

For first, it cannot see how such a reservation of power can consist with the beginnings of government in this land, whether we consi­der the Norman or the Saxons entrance. Secondly, it cannot see how it can consist with the known established Government, for by such a power the Supremacy would be plainly setled in the two Houses, they may when they judge it necessary, use this reserved power, which transcends all ordinary power in the King.

Thirdly, should the Kings of this Land be admitted upon such a­greement for this reserved power, Conscience cannot but think it an unreasonable condition, and neither for the Kings nor peoples securi­ty, but a very seminary of jealousies and sedition; as if in Matrimony (for the King is also sponsus Regni, and wedded to the kingdom by a Ring at his Coronation) the parties should agree, upon such and such neglect of duties, to part a sunder; or children (for the king is also a Father of the kingdom, and the body politique owes to him naturall obedience, 24. H. 8. c. 12.) should condition with their Parents upon such or such usage to be acquitted of their duty and obedience; what our Saviour said of their light & unlawfull occasions of Divorse, non fuit sic ob initio, it was not so from the beginning, when God at first joyned man and woman, may be said of such a reserved power of re­sistance, it was not so from the beginning, when at first Rulers and Kings were Fathers, and so are stil called in the fift Commandement, not to be resisted or abdicated by their children, their subjects.

Lastly, this contrivement seems plainly to contradict it selfe, for it places this reserved power in the Comites and Barons, which can­not be before the first King, for Bracton tells us (as he is cited by Sir Edw. Coke in mag: Cart.) Reges associant sibi Comites & Barones or­dinances eos in magno Honore, Earls and Barons are made by the King, and assumed for Councell, therefore invested with a long Robe, and for defence, therefore girt with a sword; which shews the power they have, is not by a contrivement or reservation at the supposed making of the first King, but from the King by grant and of grace; [Page 13]much lesse is it such a transcendent and paramount power as this An­swerer imagineth to be reserved in them, and the House of Com­mons, at the first constitution of government in this Land.

We have hitherto searched into the ground-worke of this frame of Government, as he had layd it in a supposed contrivement and reservation of the people when they made their first King, and have found it to be groundlesse, so that Conscience cannot rest upon it, to make resistance in obedience to such a reserved power which this man tells Us is in the two Houses, but gives no proofe for it at all, nor indeed can. So that this which has been sayd against it, were enough to overthrow the Co-ordination, supply, Finall resolution, and Arbitrary Commands, that he has built upon this fiction; but we will particularly examine his discourse upon them, which is but an opening and enlarging of his phancies upon the new Principles of these dayes, set off with plausible shew of reason to deceive the unwary.

SECT. IV. Of the Co-ordination of the three Estates, and of the Supremacy of Power.

HIs Co-ordination he has thus expressed, This mixture or Co­ordination is in the very Supremacy of power it selfe, and the Monarchy or highest power it selfe is compounded of three Co­ordinate estates, pag. 3. There is but one Highest, but that one is a mixt one, pag. 4. It was granted, there is a Co-ordination to some pur­poses, but not such as he urges it for, in the matter of Supremacie and Supply; which that we may the better discern, we must accor­ding to our skill (and that shall be no farther, than the common use of reason, and the Grammaticall construction of what the knowne Law does plainly declare, may lead every mans apprehension) un­fold wherein Supremacy of power doth consist.

There is a power of Enacting and of Executing or administration; accordingly the Supreame power shews it selfe in making new Laws, and abrogating old, in calling assemblies to that and other pur­poses, in Treaties with forreign Princes, sending Embassies, appoin­ting Officers of State, Judges of Courts, and other Ministers of justice through the Kingdome.

Now if the Co-ordination of the King and two Houses of Parlia­ment, were such as he doth expresse & would seem to inferre by the supply they are to make upon the Kings refusall, they should be Co­ordinati ad omnia, simply co-ordinate and equall in those powers & acts of Supremacy, wheras in plain speech he cannot say they are co­ordinate with His Majesty, but only in consenting to the making of Laws, pag. 4. in all the rest the King is solely supream, and all power of administration derived from Him. So then their consent is requi­red to one act or exercise of supream power, but not to the deniall of His Supremacy, for He is still by Law acknowledged the onely supream Governour, and the supream Head; which being urged in my former Treatise, this Answerer should have shewn us how the King can be so, and yet this co-ordination of his, stand good to all purposes as he would have it.

If he restrain that only supream Governour, and supream Head, to supremacy of power in Execution or Administration, it would be plain that none can use power in this government, but derivatively from His Majesty, which were enough for the purpose, I urged Su­premacy in the former Treatise, viz. to shew His Majesty cannot be resisted; for resistance is a taking of the sword or power without him, and from him, and also a using of it against that power of admi­nistration which is setled in him, and therefore against him, as he is the only supream Governour.

This would be enough to checke any mans conscience that will dare to resist, yet must not the supremacy be so restrained; for albeit, for the greater security of the people, Kings have bound themselves from imposing Laws upon them without their consent, yet may wee also see the beams of His Supremacy shining in the power of enacting exercised with their consent. For he has the power of calling them to that purpose, and the constitution that has given them power of consenting, has left in him power of dissolving them: Also, ancient­ly (as I have heard knowing men say) the Law enacted began thus, Rex statuit, the King ordains, and before the Laws and Statutes in each Kings Raign, we find the title or introduction thus usually ex­pressed, The King by the advice and assent of the Prelates, Earls, and Barons, and at the instance and request of the Commonalty has ordai­ned, &c. And still for the procuring of his assent, we see them Petitio­ning under the stile of Loyall Subjects, and while they sit in that co­ordination [Page 15]there is still that other relation of Head & Body between them, and accordingly He was declared in Parliament to be Supream Head of the body politique, He being instituted and furnished by the good­nesse and sufferance of Almighty God with plenary, whole entire power, preheminency, authority, praerogative, and Iurisdiction, to render and yeeld Iustice and finall determination to all manner of Subiects within this Realm in all causes. Also that sundry Laws and Ordinances had been made in former Parliaments, for sure and entire conserving the Prerogative and preheminency of this Crown. 24. H. 8. c. 12.

From all this so plainly declared in Law, & confessed, can we con­clude with this man, that the two Houses are Co-ordinate with his Majesty in the very Supremacy? or that the highest & Supream head is a mixt one? No! but that the Legislative power is Supreamly in the King, only this power is excited by the instance and request of the Commons, representing to him the grievances of his people abroad, and cannot be exercised or come to the act of Ordaining, but with consent of them & the House of Lords. This may easily be conceived, if we consider, that Kings at first ruled arbitrarily, and then the Le­gislative power was solely in them, afterward the people obtained such limitations and qualifications of that power, as might make for their security; as for example, That they should not have Laws im­posed on them without their consent: this does not make them co­ordinate with their King in the very Supremacy of power it self, (as this man has conceived it) but still leaves the power of Ordaining supreamly in him as in the fountain, though the efflux or exercise of that power be not solely in his will, but expects the consent of the People.

Now let us gather up his scattered proofes as we can find them. Such a co-ordination there must be, or els, saith he, the Monarchy is not mixt, pag. 3. & 4. It doth not follow, if there be a mixture in it, therefore such an one of equall ingredients; or if it be mixt secundùm quid in some respect, therefore simply, or as he would have it; though we say not the Monarchy is mixt, as he, yet we grant, the Government is mixt; not as he, by placing such power in the co-ordinate parts; but mixt, that is, not absolute or arbitrary in his Majesty, yet not without Subordination on their part, and predominancy on his; And to say the Monarchy it selfe is compounded of three Estates as hee doth, is absurd.

But the Treatiser himselfe calls it that excellent temper of the three Estates in Parliament, confessing them to be the fundamentalls of this Government; and if Fundamentalls, what subordination can there be in them, they admit not of higher & lower; all foundations are alike, pag. 3. The Treatiser acknowledged it a Fundamentall of Government, that provided this temper of the three estates in Parliament as the reaso­nable means of our safety; therefore saith the Answerer, the three e­states are Fundamentalls, a good argument A genere adgenus; from the constitution that places this power in the two Houses, to the per­sons that bear the power; for when we speak of Fundamentalls, we speak of Laws and constitutions, which may provide such a tem­per, and yet do it with subordination, that it be not temperamentum ad pondus, but ad justitiam, not with Arithmeticall, but Geometricall pro­portion, not with exact equality of all, but with a predominancy of one; otherwise it would sometime fall out, that this body of the Com­monwealth could not act or move any way, like as the naturall body could not, if all the elements were equally tempered in it.

And to shew he is for an Arithmeticall proportion in this temper of the three Estates, he wonders we cannot see that the King is Universis minor, when as we may easily reckon that of three, one is lesse than two. pag. 3. Very good, we shall have enough of such arguments as these for the present we will make a note of this in the Margin, and shall have occasion anon to call him to his reckoning upon it.

Then he keeps a trifling to shew how the two Houses are subjects divisim, taken singly, and not subjects conjunctim, in the co-ordination pag. 4. In one word, their consent is not subject to the Kings com­mand, yet they are subjects even collectively taken, for so they re­present subjects that chose them; they are subject to his command still, to remove or rise, when He Prorogues or dissolves, and so they acknowledge themselves Subjects in all their addresses to His Maje­stie, which they make as a body collective. He is the Head of them not taken severally (for then He should be Head of many bodies) but as joyntly making one body.

And left he should seeme to forget they are his Councell, which would take off from that fellowship in the supremacie, where he has placed them, he grants they are his Councell, but by the first constitu­tion not to be elected by him, but assigned to him, not assumed as Moses his under Officers were upon Jethero's advice, pag. 4. How this of [Page 17] fes is pertinent (though often hinted in this book) I see not, for Mo­ses did not assume them as Counsellors about making of Lawes, for neither he, nor they, nor both together could make any, but as Offi­cers to ease him in the execution, or judging of the people accord­ing to those Laws they received from God.

As for the Commons in Parliament, they being a representative body, could not be chosen but by them they represent, yet are they sent upon his command and have a trust upon them, not onely from those that elected them, but also from the King that sends for them to represent unto him the grievances of his people, and faithfully to consult about the remedies; accordingly it is in relation to his Maje­sty that they take the oaths of sup remacy & allegiance at their admit­tance into the House, and although they have there the power not onely of consulting, but of consenting also, and denying for the se­curity of the people whom they represent, yet who sees not by all this, in what relation they stand to his Majesty.

For the Lords, they are assumed by the King, Bracton said above Reges associant sibi Comites & Barones, and we see the King calls by his Writ whom he pleases to that House; nor doth it helpe that hee saith pag. 5. the Lords are Consiliarii nati born Counsellors to the State, for though Nobility in some be Native, yet was it at first Dative as they speake, by the grace of the King.

We may adde here what he saith in the same place, The very stile of Comites and Peers implies a Co-ordinate society with his Majesty in the Government, they are in Parliament his Comites his Peers. Yet Bracton tells us, Rex non habet parem has no Peer, & gives us another reason of the stile Comites (as he is cited by sir Edw: Coke in Mag: Charta) quia sunt in Comitatu, without relation to Parliament, because they are either in the Traine of the King, or because set in each county adregendum populum, and so assumed by the King to the like end that Moses did his under Officers in ruling his people; So that other place of Bracton cited by this Answerer, pag. 4. Rex habet Superiorem—Curiam suam viz, Comites & Barones, is not meant of the Court of Parliament, for ther's no mention of the Commons, but it follows in that place debent Regi fraenum imponere, it is likely hee spoke this in favour of the Militia raised against Hen. 3. (for then he wrote) and might call that assembly of Earls and Barons then com­bined against the King, curiam, the higher Court or Councell. But [Page 18]when he speaks like a Lawyer, he saith plainly, Rex in Regne parem habere non debet, cùm par in parem non habeat poteflatem, multo forti­us non habeat superiorem, which how it agrees with that above, let this man, or the skilfull in the Law judge.

Let us examine what reason will conclude by his argument from the style Comites; it would follow thence, That the Commons must be his Comites, and Peers too, for they are co-ordinate with his Ma­jesty, as well as the other; and so this Answerer must set up three thrones, one for the King, another for the Lords, and a third for the House of Commons; I should not think any thing too honorable for the Houses of Parliament, but only Majesty. Now it is a rule in policy, Majestas cum supremà potestate conjuncta est, Majesty goes along with the supream power, as in the popular State of Rome, it was usually and properly said, Maiestas populi Romani, and so might it be said here too, were this mans contrivement good, but I know the honorable Houses of Parliament look not for it.

But we return to the beginning of pag. 5. In reading the first line of it, I was in hope he would have blest us with some demonstration of this constitution to be such as he has borne us in hand it is, how doth it appear that the constitution of this government is such? I answer, by the mutuall oath that the King & people take to maintain the laws that have so constituted it; Altogether inconsequent; The King takes oath to maintain the Laws-therefore they are such as this man fansieth them; it shews indeed an obligation on his Majesty to perform, it does not shew such a co-ordination, supply, reserved power, &c. surely never a­ny King swore to it in that sense, or had reason to understand it so; for he findes he is expresly bound by that oath to preserve the immu­immunities & liberties of &c. to protect &c. which he should not be well able to do if his power might be taken from him at the pleasure of others.

So when he answers to that which I have said, the King is King be­fore he take the oath; True, but he is King but upon the same trust, which his Predecessors swore to, and the Oath, which the Law provides for the King to take, virtually bindes him before he takes it. He An­swers nothing, unlesse he could shew that the trust which this Oath implies to be in the King, was such a trust upon which the people in their first contrivement (as he phansieth) conditionally admitted the first King, and that the Law which provided this oath, was that first constitution or contrivement, which would be absurd, for the oath [Page 19]speaks the Language of later times, and would not fit the Mouth of the first King in the first Coalition of Government, for it binds Him to preserve the immunities of Holy Church, which if it should be of an after addition to the Oath, yet surely Leges and Consuetudines Angliae were in it from the beginning; now those are customes of Govern­ment, and customes must have some continuance of time past to make them so, therefore the first King in the first Coalition of Government swore not this Oath; what he shews indeed by this argument we admit, that the King is bound to take the Oath, is bound to perform the duty of it, but this is nothing to prove such a first Constitution as he dreams of.

He brings a proof out of Fortescue, Hanc potestatem a populo ef­fluxam habet, &c. Principatu nam (que) nedum Regali, sed & politico suo populo dominatur, now the word Politico implies the Principat of many, especially when opposed to Regali, pa. 5. This place tells us what manner of power the King ha's, does not tell us the two Houses of Parlia­ment have such power as this man pretends; We examined that Ef­fluxam a populo above, whether the power of the King was derived from the people by agreement in the first coalition of Government. Here we grant the King ha's a limited power, but not so limited as this Answerer would have it, which he might have read in the words cited: for he sees there the King ha's His Regalis potestas, but Rules not only by that (i.e.) by a power meere Regiased & politico princi­patu, by a politicall power also, in as much as in the making of Laws the advice and consent of many is required, and his power regulated by such Law.

But this Principate of many, as it is ill rendered out of the Latine, so is it ill meant, to the excluding of His Regalis potestas, & so to make this government Democraticall, or Aristocraticall, rather then Monar­chicall; Now there cannot be such a blend or mixture of the Forms of government, but that one must be predominant, and Supream, be­cause else the body Politique could not move or act any thing, as it was said above, when we spoke of the Temper of the three Estates.

This Answerer, to free this body Politique, (when the three E­states lock and binde one the other by their Negative voyce, as upon the Kings refusall) and to make it active without him to all ends and purposes, places the Finall resolution in the two Houses, to which all must obey, and so indeed places the Supremacie there, but why then [Page 20]should this be a Monarchy rather then a popular government, were it not for Supremacy in the King? or why should that first Constitu­tion, which he saith placed this finall resolution in the two Houses, leave such a power in the King, to dissolve them? which power, say we, looses the Body Politique, when through the aforesaid binding it cannot move a new way by a new Law, and gives it motion by the former Laws, which will appear anon to be with lesse inconvenience, then if in such a case it should be moved by such a finall resolution.

Having thus far spoken of his Coordination, before he comes to the Supply, the two Houses are thereupon to make, he spends two Pages, the 6th and 7th in repeating his Notes he ha's taken at Court-Sermons, where he saith, the Divinity of Monarchy, and the absolute­nes of this in the Kings sole person, ha's been usually cryed up, as if there were no medium between such an absolute Monarchy, and such a co­ordinative one as he ha's phansied; Let them bear their burden that speak not their conscience at Court, I would they would now do it sincerely at S. Margarets Westminster, for I could tell him what stuffe is preached there too, what omnipotency is ascribed to some in the world, I would also this man would have used a conscience in repeat­ing and interpreting my words, for he often makes me speak contra­dictions through his own inadvertency, and in this place he absolves me in the beginning of his relation, and charges me thus at the end;

This and much more was preached, and all upon this errour, that the Dr. resolves on, that the sole Supremacie of power was in the Kings Per­son, and that His Judgment was the sole Supream rule of Power. He should have done well to have cited the place where I resolve so, for they are not my words, nor do they render my sense any where ex­pressed to that purpose. For when I say (as I did, and proved in my other Treatise) that the King is Supream, or the higher power, I do not mean he is sole and absolute in making or imposing Laws (the contrary was often expressely acknowledged by me) but that He is still, notwithstanding the consent of the two Houses, required to that act or exercise of supream Power, the only supream Governour, accor­ding to the oath of supremacie, which was enough for the purpose I urged it; viz. not for his absoluteness, but against our resisting of him. It is well known the consent of the Senate and people of Roms was required to the Laws their Emperour would have enacted, and yet He was Supream, so acknowledged, 1 Pet. 2.13. And it is well [Page 21]known, The King was in Parliament acknowledged the Supream Head of the Body Politique.

And now what can conscience conclude hence? First, that the two Houses of Parliament are in some sort coordinate with the King, by reason of that consent necessarily required in the making and declaring Law, and that's enough for our security against an ab­solute or arbitrary government. Also that the King, notwithstand­ing such their coordination and consent, is, and has been so declared in Parliament, the Supream Head of the Body, Ecclesiasticall and Civil, also the onely Supream Governour, and that is enough to de­ter conscience from resistance.

SECT. V. Of the Supply which is phansied upon the for­mer Coordination.

NOw lest it should appear unreasonable, as needs it must, that the two Houses of Parliament should have power to make Laws and Ordinances without the King, which He acknowledges He can­not do without them, and to seize the Militia or power of Arms, with which His Majesty is entrusted, as this Answerer confesseth; the device to make this good, is by a rule misapplyed, Coordinata invicem supplent, which Rule he gave us, Pag. 3. and now comes to misapply it, Pag. 8. If the King fail in His trust, His coordinates in the mixture of this Supream power, must according to their trusts supply. But before we shew how weakly this coordination inferres the supply, let us first see wherein this supply stands, and when the time is for them to make use of it; this Supply, he tells us, is in applying the means of safety to its end, that is in setling the Militia as may be most safe for the king­dom; and the time when it is necessary to apply them, is in imminen­cie of Danger; to this purpose, Pag. 8, 9, 10.

The King acknowledges imminencie of Danger in His Writ of Sum­mons, Consideratis periculis imminentibus, Pag. 9. There may be imminent dangers sufficient to move his Majesty to call a Parliament, and require their advice, though not sufficient to cause them to use this Supply, by taking the Militia into their hands. Where by the way (saith he) we may take notice, that His Majesty is by Law to call a Parlia­ment, [Page 22] when there shall be any imminent danger, ib: and by the way we may take notice, that the King is the sole Judge of those imminent dangers, when he calls a Parliament, and also (which is not the way to make him hasty in calling a Parliament) that according to this mans contrivement, so oft as his Majesty calls a Parliament, they may use this supply, and seize the Militia, because of those imminent dan­gers in the Writ of Summons.

This imminency of danger ha's a competent Judge, the two Houses, (wherein the Law makes the Reason of the Kingdom to reside) who have by Vote concluded it. Pag. 9. so it was by Vote concluded, that his Maj [...]sty, upon the raising of a Guard at Yorke, for the safety of his person, intended to make Warre upon the Parliament, are they com­petent Judges of his intentions too? indeed those horrible imminent dangers that were pretended, have been for the most part as invisible as Intentions are.

But the King refused to passe the Bill for the Militia, according to the advice of the two Houses, which is (saith the Law) the same ever living Reason of the State that first advised the Government, and must still ad­vise the way of applying it, pag. 9. His Majesty did not barely refuse, but gave his Reasons for it, and if they had their dangers and fears moving them to gain the Militia, so had he his to withhold it, as he had amply testified to the world. But here's a Reason of State, to which his Majesties Reason must give way; and that surely is Law. Certainly the Militia is to be applyed by the Reason of State, but we must not make the King no part of the State as he does, and as he saith the Law does, but we would fain see that Law; we are sure it is decla­red 25 H. 8.21. Your Royall Majesty, and Your Lords and Commons re­present the whole Realm. This restraining of the whole Reason of State to the two Houses, is but the same device with that which made the first constitutiō of this government, to be the contrivement of the people when they made the first King, and was above confuted; So this necessity that is here laid upon the King, alwaies to follow the advice of the two Houses, is but a strain of that device which places a finall and Arbitrary resolution in them, and shall be handled anon.

His Majesty will apply the Militia, but by the advice of them against whom it is to be secured, whom the Parliament has Voted enemies to the State, against whom especially it was called, pag. 10. This is shooting at Rovers; if he should tell who those voted ones were, and who [Page 23]those enemies against whom this Parliament was called, I do not think he would find any of them about his Majesty, when he refused to passe the Bill for the Militia; but he tells us a little after, pag. 10. The King gathers these voted enemies into an Army against the Parlia­ment, that had voted them such; and a little after, What shall the two other States do, but use that power of Arms, which the government in such case of the Kings refusall has entrusted them with, to its own pre­servation (that's alwayes supposed, never proved) especially when 'tis but for the apprehending of such enemies to it, as (beside that voted de­linquencie) are sufficiently convinced by their own flight; Now we know who those voted delinquents are, against whom the Militia was by bill to be secured; some five or six that fled beyond sea. But these though beyond sea, are gathered together into an Army here by the King: to passe by this, let us see what is more materiall; The Kings Army is raised against the Parliament, Their army against those delin­quents to bring them to justice; But can any man in conscience bee perswaded, that was the Kings design? was that a time to provoke them that were so powerfull with the people? or was the King in a condition then fit to enterprize against them that were so furnished with all the Arms of the Kingdom, he not knowing where to have sufficient for a small guard? Nay, let his offers, sent them from Not­tingham many moneths after speak to Posterity, by whose refusall it was, that we are not now in safety; when as it pleased God within a few weeks after to raise him such an assistance, that he was able to appear against those forces that pretended they were sent from the Parliament.

And now that it comes to blows, why should it be interpreted, that the King intends to overthrow the Parliament, because he fights against those pretended Parliamentary forces, more than that the Par­liament intends to overthrow the Kingly power, because their force fight against those that assist him? certainly, as they desire the conti­nuance of his Kingly power, so does he the continuance of free Par­liaments; knowing he cannot suffer by such.

And for the apprehension of those Delinquents which fled, being here pretended as the cause of their seizing the Militia, and taking Arms, Can we think them so considerable? or that they would have been with-held, when as those that were greater and neerer to His Majesty, had been delivered up to the justice of the Parliament? cer­tainly [Page 24]this would not have made the Breach, if first a great Delin­quent on that side had not been denied to be delivered up to tryall, if the Militia had not been seized, and some further design thereby threatned according to His Majesties apprehension.

Having done with these pretences, we come to his argument for this supply, Co-ordinata invicem supplent, if the King refuse, His Co­ordinates the two Houses must supply.

We answer, Co-ordinates doe supply each others failings, not alwayes and to all purposes, but then and so far forth as is appointed by that constitution that makes them so, there are two parts of this Answer.

First, they do then supply when it is expressed so in the constitu­tion that has co-ordinated them, and not els; he gave us as an instance of this co-ordination, the example of a father and son, entrusted with lands to certain uses, pag. 5. Now put case, the father refuses to expend any thing upon such uses as his son presents to him, because he apprehends them not such as were intended; may then his sonne supply and do it himselfe, unlesse it be so expressed in the deed of En­feoffment? which is improbable it should, for then the whole power would be placed in the son. So if this power of supplying may bee challenged by the two co-ordinate parts, upon the refusall of the third, it must be as expresse in the constitution of the Kingdome, as the co-ordination and power of the three is: We see such reservati­ons expresse in meerly conventionall Kingdoms, where the Prince is chosen and admitted on such conditions.

He tells us indeed it is fundamentall and of the first constitution, but proves it not, we see it not expressed in the Enfeoffment, as I may say, wherein we find three Estates entrusted.

If any would know what are those fundamentall Laws, so much jeered at in this and other Pamphlets; It is that originall frame of this Co-or­dinate Government contrived by the people in its first constitution, and since in every severall Raign confirmed by mutuall oaths between King and people; and in the Parliament summons of Ed. 1. this Law is cal­led Lex stabilitata & notissima, pag. 8. If any man would know what jeering is, he may read the premonition before this fuller Answer, and the first leafe of the answer; but if he would know what these Fundamentals be indeed, he must not expect to know them truly by this Answerer, that layes the foundations of this Government, in the [Page 25]airy conceptions of his own phancie, such are, a contrivement of the people when they made the first King, A reservation of power to up­ply upon the Kings refusall, and the like; such fundamentals as these were reasoned against (which is not jeering) from the analogie and proportion that must be betweene the foundation and the building, the fundamental constitutions and the Written Laws; in my former Treatise.

It is a known and written Law that declares the King Supreame head of the body Politike, also that declares him the only supreame Governour in this Realme, can the fundamentals, as this man layes them beare this superstructure, or rather consist with this fundamentall thus openly declared and laid in Law? So it is a knowne Fundamen­tall Constitution, that the making of Laws is in three Estates, secured against each other by a power of denying, and that it is in the Kings power to dissolve the Court; can this consist with the fundamentalls of this mans laying? Also the contrivement of the people at the suppo­sed election of their first King, was proved above altogether uncertain, improbable, and unreasonable.

What is sworn to by the Mutuall oathes of King and People, wee granted above to binde them, but not to prove such a Constitution; What that Lex notissima is, he should have done well to have expres­sed it, for we know he is apt to deceive us with generals, and to con­ceive, where ever he meets with Fundamental Law or constitution of Government, it is his Law and constitution as he hath framed it.

The Coordination of the three Estates, we grant is fundamental & Lex notissima, but this power of Supply would not be so strange and new a Doctrine now, if it had been then Lex Notissima. Nay the Rule of Coordination is against it, which, when three are expresly entrusted, gives not power to two, unlesse it be so expressely provided in the Ori­nall constitution; and this coordination is such that it gives us an argu­ment against it too, that the originall constitution of this Government, meant there should not be a supply by two Estates, because it hath set­led the provision of the Kingdome in three, secured against each other by a Negative voice, and hath left the power of dissolving in the King, which would make such a power of Supply vain.

Secondly, we Answer to the Rule, Coordinates supply only in that whereunto they are coordinate. Now the two Houses are Coordi­nate with His Majesty only ad Consentiendum for the making new [Page 26]provisions of safety by new Lawes, we doe not finde them Coordinate with him in command of the Militia, or appointing officers for it, or designing Ministers of Justice through the Kingdome, therefore the Supply cannot hold in these; for if one part of the body can supply the defect of another, yet cannot they supply the office of the head.

But the Answerer may reply, though the King alone is ordinarily entrusted with the Militia, the designing of officers, &c. yet may these fall under their ordinance of Supply, as the substratamateria, the matter about which that ordinance may be conversant, as about the meanes of preventing imminent dangers. We Answer, that Ordi­nance cannot extend it selfe farther then Law will give it leave, it may not over-rule knowne Laws; if it be Law and the Constitution of the Kingdome, that when the preventing of imminent dangers require new provisions, those provisions or new Laws be made by three E­states entrusted, and strengthened with power of denying, then it's plain, such supply or provision cannot be made by an ordinance; and better run the hazard of inconvenience by the refusall of one then to leave the whole power in the other two. Otherwise an Ordinance shall prevail to divest the King of all the power setled in Him by Law, what then will become of the property of the Subject? No marvaile this proceeds on to an arbitrary power, as we shall have this Answerer confessing anon.

But he told us above, Pag. 3. that the three Estates are fundamen­talls. If therefore the King be one of the Fundamentals, according to his phrase, then according to his argument, Pag. 8. the King is not to be stirred out of his Place, so long as the government stands, for there he tels us foundations are not to be stirred so long as the building stands; shall He then be like a loose stone in the Foundation, to be taken out and laid aside, when they shall judge He is not fit to beare his burden, the Trust the Law hath put upon Him? howsoever some stone in the side wall may be so used, the chiefe corner stone cannot.

If he reply as he doth, Pag. 9. This Vote or Ordinance of the two Hou­ses takes not away the Kings negative voice in making Laws, 'tis not an Act of Parliament, 'tis but an occasional supply of this Coordination, least the whole should ruine. Yet will you tell us presently, The Hou­ses in case of the other parts absence and refusall, are virtually the whole, and have the Parliamentary power, if so, why then can they not make an act of Parliament as well as such an Ordinance? but call [Page 27]it what you will, Act or Ordinance, whereby either King or Subject are despoiled of what is theirs by Law, it matters not greatly, seeing that Ordinance is of force so long as they please to judge necessary, who, according to this Answerer, have the finall and arbitrary resolu­tion; what will it satisfie the King to tell him this is but an occasionall supply, if He see it is in their powers to take or make the occasion? or to let Him know, that ordinarily he hath the power and is entrusted with it, but upon extraordinary times and dangers it is theirs, He re­fusing their direction, if He knows it is in their power to make that di­stinction when they please, and to apply it? Or when will some think themselves safe enough to part with this power again? seeing greater feares are now likely to prevaile with them for the holding it, then did at first for the seizing it.

But he supposes, Pag. 11. That the two Houses upon the absence and refusall of the other part, are virtually the whole, and then askes, whether there be not a Parliament actually in England? if so, why have they not then a Parliamentary power? This tearm virtually doth often stand him instead, for under that he can enlarge the power of the Houses to the extent of his fancie; but let us know in this great point, wherein Conscience expects cleare ground to rest on, whether the Law hath actually invested the Houses with such power.

A Parliament we grant, and a Parliamentary power in it, and if any deny the two Houses to bee the Parliament, it is because in proper speech and in truth the name and power of Parliament which belongs to three Estates, should not be restrained to two. The two Houses have stil the power belonging to them, and what ever is now by them presented to the King, and by Him passed, it is done with full power of Parliament, what is done without his consent is not: it is no more now, then if the King were present in the House, and should deny to passe a Bill; for presence or absence is nothing, His power of denying is all.

For put the case the King and the Lords should agree, and the Com­mons stand out, there were a Parliament still, but where is the Parlia­mentary power? I doubt hee will not say the King and Lords have then the full power of Parliament; but where then is this Supply? will he say in the House of Commons? we must call him now to his reckoning, Pag. 3. where he tels us; Of three Estates one is lesse then two, and also to his rule he gives us, Pag. 4. Coordinates supply each [Page 28]others failings, and Pag. 11. The refusall of one part exempts not the other from their duty; So that if this man hold to his own conceit, hee must grant the King and Lords may Supply, if the Commons refuse. But if in that case he will not stand to his own reckoning and his owne Rule, then must he quit his vain conceit of Supply by the two Houses, in case the King refuse.

After this he seekes a reason of this Supply in the necessity of pro­viding for the safety of the whole, which else would be frustrated of its safety. However this Resolver sleight the Observators Argument, drawn from the highest end of Government, the peoples safety, he cannot deny, but the Rule holds always, finis quò ultimatior eò in fluxu poten­tier; to that end all other subordinate stand but in the office of meanes, and this is evinced by the text, the higher power is a Minister for thy good, Pag. 11. The Observators argument deserved to bee sleighted by the Resolver as inconsequent, but it was confuted at large, by shewing such meanes make not for that end (the safety of the State) but are remedies worse then the disease; Nor hath this full Answerer strengthned the consequence one whit; We grant the safety of the Common-wealth is the highest end, and unto that end all other are as meanes, and that the higher power ought to minister unto that end. But doth it follow, therefore such a Supply by divesting the Kingof His power, by turning the highest Minister out of His office, is the means to that end.

The joynt agreement of the three Estates is the meanes for new provision for that end; but in case they agree not about that provision, which may happen by the refusall of the Lords, or the Commons, or the King; then that the two agreeing parts, what ere they be, should supply the defect of the third, had beene far more reasonable, then that the supply should be made onely by the two Houses, (i.e.) by the body only without the Head; For this is not only to the notorious prejudice of the Supream Head with whom the Kingdome is immediately and chiefly entrusted, but also it is alame provision, and argues the first Contrivement (as this man fancies it) very inconsiderate, in not pro­viding, in case the King and Lords, or the King and Commons should joyne.

Now as the not providing in such Cases, and the power of dissol­ving (which resides in the King) doe plainly shew that such a Supply is not the Contrivement of the first Constitution, but a phansie of late [Page 29]popular Statesmen, from whom this Answerer hath borrowed it; so in very deed this way of Supply would not be a meanes of safety, but of more inconveniency, as at this day experience teacheth us, and at large was shewed in the former Treatise.

Therefore if the three Estates cannot joyntly agree, which is the reasonable meanes of making new provision for safety. There is in the King by the same Constitution power to dissolve, and protect His Sub­jects in their Religion, and properties, and Liberties, according to the former Lawes established; And although His Majesty hath bound Himself from dissolving them without their consent, for this time, (of which this Answerer does vainly endeavour to make advantage in many places) yet have not they thereby any more power then what they should have had without that Grant, and so they have acknow­ledged themselves.

To conclude, Conscience cannot be truly perswaded this power of Supply, is in the two Houses by the Constitution of this Govern­ment. But must needs see it is inconsistent with it, and with that power the known established Law declares to be in the King, and ther­fore Conscience cannot yeeld obedience to that power in making resist­ance against the King.

The Answerer immediately after the text above cited by him, The higher power is a minister for thy good, hath these words, Pag. 12. Yes a fine way you'l say of preserving the King by fighting against Him. So starting from the safety of the people (which was there spoken of as the highest end) to the Consideration of the Kings safety, as if he had been struck on a suddain, with the terrour of that Battle that was made against the King, or else because Truth it selfe upon the mention of the higher Power wrung from him a thought and acknowledgment of His Majesty in it. Well, let us see how he will have the King pre­served by their fighting against Him.

No such matter (saith he) the King hath a double Capacity, Poli­tique and Naturall, in fighting for the preservation of the Kingdom, they fight for Him in His Politique Capacity as King—in that He cannot be divided from His Kingdom or Parliament—They fight to disingage His Person from that unsafe and unworthy imployment those Enemies to Him and His Kingdome put it to — however he be per­swaded by them it is His cause that hath ingaged them; it is their own guilt and danger, Pag. 12.

So we are usually answered, when we tell them of their Hands so many times lifted up in Battle against the Lords Annointed, and of Davids resolution upon it, who can lift up — and be guiltlesse? 1 Sam. 26. They reply it is but against the Cavaleir's and that unwor­thy Company that is about Him, and have thus engaged Him; and in so doing they fight for the Kingdome, and for the King too, in His Po­litique Capacity. A shift that will no more save them from the Guilt, then it will doe Him from their violence. If He had been taken away in His naturall Capacity at Keinton Battle, had there been any such thing as a King at Westminster? had it not divided Him in His Politique Capacity from the Parliament there? take away the Body, and the shadow too, destroy Him in His Person or Naturall Capacity, and you destroy Him in His Politique, and the Parliament too, which ceases upon it.

Nor is that distinction of His double Capacity altogether vain, but only in this point of Armes and resistance by force; As just sentences of Iudges, against His Personall Commands, are for Him in His Poli­tique Capacity; so all denyalls of active obedience to unjust personall commands; why! heres all this while no power taken from Him, or usurped against Him, No danger to His Person, to His Naturall Capacity; but in resistance by force of Armes, especially in a Battle against Him, (which not onely takes the sword out of His Hand and usurpes the power, but may also take Him away in His Naturall Ca­pacity) the distinction is most vaine.

For the Enemies that are said here to enthrall His Person and per­swade Him, I suppose he meanes those Voted ones of which we spake above; if any of them be entertained lately; for one of them there's above a thousand of His good Subjects, whose Noblenesse and honesty hath still engaged them honourably, though to the weaker side; before in behalfe of the Subject groaning under former grievances, now in service to His Majesty opposed by popular fury, Subjects that out of Conscience of their allegiance cleave unto him, as they did to S [...]ul, whose hearts the Lord had touched 1. Sam. 10. On the contra­ry it is well known how the guilt and danger of some desperate per­sons have engaged the poor people and opposed them as a buckler be­twixt themselves and the stroke of Iustice. And how ever this man thinks His Majesty is carried away; We are sure he hath spoken so much reason in His Expresses and Declarations, that it plainly ap­peares, [Page 31]He is not perswaded by Enemies to Himselfe or the Kingdom, but hath been forced to this just and necessary defence of Himselfe; and hath cause to think, He may be safer every way by his own Army, then by that which pretends to preserve him in his Politique, but gave him Battle to the most imminent danger of His Person and Na­turall Capacity.

SECT. VI. Of the finall Resolution of this States Iudgement, and power of declaring Law.

THe Answerer goes on to his second Proposition, placing the finall Resolution of this States Iudgement in the two Houses, unto which all must yeeld obedience. Pag. 13. How proves he this? In this mixture of Supream power and trust of Government the two Hou­ses make a part, what's their share? to consult? nay, but to consent with the King in making Lawes. Be it so, that share we grant them; but if you will place the finall resolution in them, you must not speak of a share, but challenge the whole, The King is but a Cypher.

Then he tells us againe of the first Constitution of Government, when the people made the first King, but nothing at all to the pro­ving of such a Constitution, or clearing of such a finall resolution set­led in the two Houses; And as if there were no way to overthrow the first Constitution of this Government, as he hath contrived it, but onely by Conquest, he leapes from this Finall resolution, of which he should give us some proof, to speake of the Title by Conquest.

Conquest I confesse may give such a Right as Plunderers use to take in houses they can master, Pag. 13. I had not mentioned Conquest, but to take away the exception made to the Apostles prohibition of Resi­stance from the absolutenesse of the Roman Emperors, and to shew they made themselves so absolute by force of Armes; but seeing this Answerer will make a businesse of it, he must take notice that Con­quest is one of the meanes by which God translates Kingdomes; and that David being provoked by the King of Ammon, brought that people under, and had a right over them by Conquest, 2. Sam. 12. that the Edomites were so brought under the Dominion of Iudah, from which they revolted, 2 Chro. 21.8. The Romans also had a right [Page 32]over Iudou, by Conquest, our Saviour acknowledges it in Caesar, give to Caesar, &c. and in his substitute Pilate, that he had power given him from above. If this Answerer should looke through all Christen­dome, he would scarce find a Kingdom that descends by inheritance, but it had a beginning in Armes, and yet I thinke he will not say the Titles of these Kings are no better then of Plunderers; for though it may be unjust at first in him that invades and Conquers, yet in the succession, which is from him, that providence which translates King­domes, manifests it selfe and the will of God; and there are momen­ta temporum, for the justnesse of such Titles, though we cannot fixe them.

If he say they begin to be just, when the consent of the people is yeelded; were it so; and not so till then; yet is that in all likelyhood an overawed consent (as he grants the consent of the people of Rome was to their Emperors, Pag. 21.) and little to the advantage of the people; however let their consent be free, what the people gaine up­on that consent, is by an after agreement, and grant of the Prince, not by precontrivement at their making of the first King; as he dreames it to be in this Kingdom; We need not looke farre for instance, we see Mag: Char: begins each clause with a Concessimus to the antient liberties of the Subject.

By which we see how vainly he breakes into passion in the words following, How undoctor all, how unchristian, inhumane Barbarisme it is, to talke of a right by Conquest in a Civill, a Christian State? Pag. 13. and a little after, how many wayes doth this Resolver abuse His Majesty herein? I had indeed abused Him, had I talked of His Right as fondly as this man hath done; I said, he King claimes from the Con­queror, and that of uncertain plea of supposed first Election could not give Subjects such power against him, as is now pretended to. I shewed the Emperors of Rome made themselves such by force of Armes, so did the Saxons here, so did the Normans after them master this people; this Answerer speakes nothing to these beginnings of this Government in the Saxon and Norman Lines, but still tells us of a first Election, and 'tis un-Christian to talke of Conquest, that is, to speake the truth.

David, as it was said above, being provoked by the King of Am­mon, tooke away his Crown, made that people to serve as sl [...]es. The Conqueror had a Title from the Saxon Kings, being denyed, [Page 33]he pursu's it, and in the pursuit of it by Armes subdues this Land; can we thinke he was bound to such a first Constitution, as this man con­ceives? We see it otherwise; and what has been consented to by suc­ceeding Kings.

My Collection then was, shall the pretended right of the people by such an Election be good against a King that claimes not by it, but receives the Crown by succession, descending through severall Con­quests, and yet the right of the Roman people not good against their Tyrannicall Emperours that made themselves of Subjects, Lords over them by force of Armes! I know not how this should be injurious to Christianity, unlesse it be un-Christian to restraine the resistance and rebelling of Christians against a Christian Prince, when as the Apostle did forbid Christians and all the people of Rome, to resist their Empe­rour, though Heathen and Tyrannicall.

Let us see whether it be injurious to His Majesty, How do's he abuse His Majesty herein? A Title he yeelds Him by Conquest; and yet He must not rule by it, a King as Conquerour, and yet He must not rule as a Conqueror. How injurious does he make the King to His posterity, in that he subscribes and sweares to a limited title, and has a free one the while to hold by? pag. 13. it was no injury to his Majesty, to say, He cannot rule as Conquerour, for he is not a Conquerour, but claimes from him that was; nor is it injurious to His Majesties posterity, that he sweares to a limited power (that limited title, as this man has it, is a phancy) for he has not a free one as a Conquerour had, yet not limit­ted by such a first election and contrivement, as this Answerer dreames of, but by priviledges and immunities granted or restored to the people since the Conquest, unto which His predecessors bound themselves by oath, and so doth he.

It is not for me to settle His Majesties Right, but should I doe it, as this man hath presumed, I had been injurious to Him and His poste­rity, for as he sayes here of right by Conquest, though falsely, it may give ius in re, not ius ad rem, so I of the right by such an Election as he ha's contrived, however it might give His Majestie ius adrem, it seemes to lend him but a slender ius in re, a weak assurance of holding it, making Him like a Tenant at will, to be outed of Possession, so oft, and so long, as they that have the finall resolution, shall judge expedi­ent; So has he conceived it.

Now let us goe on, and examine how he makes good this finall re­solution. [Page 34] The power of declaring Law, saith he, Pag. 14. must rest some where; true; In those, say we, that have the power of making Lawes, (i.e.) in the King and both Houses.

Here the Answerer puts two Cases. First, what if they be divided, as at this time? does it rest in the King or the two Houses? In neither say we, fully, and to the like purpose, as it doth in the three Estates, which power is suspended while one part suspends.

He endeavours to shew, Pag. 15 & 16. this finall resolution should rest in the two Houses rather then in the King, from their ability and skill. their fidelity, their ends and interests, which do not interferre so with those of the Subiect, Property, Priviledge, &c. as those of the Kings do, absolutenesse of Rule, Monopolies, Patents, &c. the comparison is odious, though we are to hope the best of the Members of the two Houses, yet we know they are men subiect to like passions, as others are, and we are assured the King is intrusted with us as well as they, and has beside Rights and Priviledges of His owne to looke to; But seeing this is Comparative onely, rather in them then the King, not absolute, that it ought to rest in the two Houses; we may let it goe.

His second Case is, Pag. 17. What if either of the Houses be divided into equall parts? it is easily resolved, The Speakers voyce casts it; True. But he should have put two cases more; First, what if an oppor­tunity be watched, and one of these equall parts do not exceed the fif­teenth part of the whole number, by reason of the absence of the rest; we are in an ill condition, when that must be the finall resolution of this States judgement; nay, of that number that prevailes, may be scarce any Lawyer of known abilities, which was one of his prejudices he layed against the King in his Comparative between Him and the Houses for declaring what is Law.

The other case is, what if the two Houses be divided in judgement the one from the other? where then resides this finall resolution? It may be it will be replied, they ought to sit together and vote together; so indeed some would have it, but it is confest that the Parliament con­sists of three Estates, and that the Lords and Commons are two several Estates. Well then, if the King concurre in judgement with the Lords, why should not the finall resolution be in them? for we must here call him againe to his reckoning, and tell him as he did us, Pag. 3. it is easie to reckon the one is lesse then two.

And the more strange this will seem, if we consider what it is, that [Page 35]is now to be declared, no case mis-judged in inferiour Courts, no late written Law, whose sense is doubtfull, but the very constitution of Parliament that has continued so many Ages, whether in that Con­sticution there be such a Law as gives this power of Supply by seizing and commanding the Militia; We understand the literall sense of the Oath of Supremacy and Allegiance, and have it confessed by this An­swerer, that the Trust of the Militia is ordinarily in His Majesty, Pag: 10. and we suppose, no man can think that when the Kings of Eng­land sweare to observe the Lawes and Customes of, &c. they ever took the Oath in such a sense as to binde them to take for Law, what ere the two Houses shall, without them, declare to be so; or that when we bound our selves by Protestation to maintaine the power and pri­viledges of Parliament, we meant what ever they declare to be such; for this were too much to resigne up our faith to man.

Well then, if there be a disagreement upon such a declaring, it is better we follow what the known Law commands us to, and that there be a suspension of such a declaring, till all that are entrusted for us can agree, then that such a power of declaring be assumed by any two of the three Estates, for in the same 17. Pag. it is acknowledged Arbitrary.

SECT. VII. The finall Resolution is not Arbitrary in the two Houses, but onely in the three Estates.

IT appears then, that this power is as arbitrary in the two Houses as it would be in the King, I answer, it cannot be denied nor avoided, &c. It would not be so in the King, so long as the two Houses have, what He denies them not, the power of dissenting; But to tell us plainly, The Power is arbitrary in the two Houses, is very ingenuous; this Answerer is seldome so, but here beyond all reason, for it fol­lows as an admirable proof of what he hath confest. As the Govern­ment in the forme of it, was at first an act of the will, and so Arbitrary, so it still remaining the same, it must remain some where arbitrary still, else our fore-fathers should not convey that same government to us, which they began, they cannot binde us in that wherein they were themselves free, Pag. 17. when were they free? it must be before they set up the [Page 36]Government (i. e.) when they were without government. We can­not see when the people were so free, or that the frame of this Go­vernment was an arbitrary act of their will; enough has been said be­fore against such conceits; The like we have in those words, the Go­vernment still remaining the same; the same with what? it must be with that arbitrary act of their will, which is supposed to frame that government, or else no force of argument in the Consequence, to prove our Government is still arbitrary some where; and if so, then no sense in the Antecedent, that our government should be said to re­main the same with the arbitrary act of will, which at first framed it.

But to pardon his antecedents, let us see what follows; They were free when they began, or set up this Government, therefore we are not bound, now it is set up; that frame of Government was an act of their will, and arbitrary, therefore the Government is still arbitrary in them; when people set up an absolute Monarchy over themselves (as he sayes the people of Rome did, when they consented to their Empe­rors) that form of Government was an act of their will, and arbitrary when they began it, therefore still it is arbitrary in them; These are good proofs, such indeed as this Answerer uses to bring, framed only to deceive the unwary.

But sometimes he expresses that first Constitution, as made by con­sent of King and people, sure then that Consent of the King at first was an act of His Will, and Arbitrary; and so it follows, that the Go­verment for making of Laws and Constitutions, is Arbitrary in the King and people (i. e.) in the three estates consenting and agreeing together, and that is the very truth. Onely this depends not upon an arbitrary Act of the peoples will, preceding all Government when they were free, as he said (for that is not imaginable in this Govern­ment) but must needs proceed from an after consent or grant of the King, admitting them to this arbitriment or freedom of will in the making of Laws, which is enough to binde Him and secure us.

Nor is this Arbitrarines best secured from doing hurt in the Votes of Parliament (that is of the two Houses) by reason of their number, trust, and selfe interest as he tells us, Pag. 17. But it is better secured in the three Estates, that is, in all that are entrusted for us; for Arbitra­tines is likely to doe least hurt, where it depends upon those that have severall wills, and severall private Interests, as the three Estates have, but whose publike Interest is the same; so that if the King pursue [Page 37]His private interest, it is crossed by the private interest of the Subject, if they theirs, then will his private interest hinder the compassing of it, if he may have, what for that purpose is left in him by the Consti­tution of this Government, the power of denying; that so being crossed in their private wayes, they may meet in their publique inte­rests the good and welfare of the whole State, which is best for them both.

But he tell us, in the body Naturall the will followes the last dictate or resolution of the understanding, that being in this body Politique the wis­dom of its Great Councell, pag. 17. That I may not trouble him in his Philosophy by telling him, The will has an influence back again upon the understanding; I know what he means by the application of it, That the King must always follow the final resolution of the two Hou­ses; which if so, what would he be better then a Duke of Venice, or this State other then Popular. And to this end have we so many discour­ses tending to the praise of Aristocraticall Government; and he that put out the third Answer against my Book prefers the State of Venice before all for the surest Government. Give me leave to note this by the way, Although it be well known what inconveniences that State lyes under, by reason of the severall sactions and sidings of their great Families, yet this means of security they have, Their resolutions of high concernments are not carried but by such a number of the whole Senate, though many be absent; And let me take the boldnesse to say, We should conceive our selves in a suret condition, if such businesser, which nearly concern the Kingdom and the very Constitution of Go­vernment, were not carried by the major part of those that are present, but by a more unanimous consent, that is by the better halfe, at least, of the whole number, that belong to each house; such businesses, if need were, had better stay till the triall could be made by such a number, then to run the hazard of a watched opportunity, when sew are pre­sent; and such resolutions would better sway with his Majestie, and better satisfie the whole Kingdome.

Now to this Argument of the last dictate; The debates and reso­lutions of the two Houses are indeed great helps to inform His Ma­jesties understanding, but not as the last dictate immediately to deter­mine his will, for they are extrinsecall to him, as the resolution of one House is to another, They being three severall Estates: His will must needs follow the dictate of his own understanding, having re­ceived [Page 38]information from them. And whereas I said concerning the Kings Judgement upon such an advantage, He sees with the eyes of O­thers, even of those that are of different Judgement from him, this An­swerer makes me say, as he would have it, that the King is to see with the eyes of others, as if, should they present him with black for white, He were bound to think it so.

Then for the binding of the Subject to obedience by this finall re­solution of the two Houses, he tells us, pag. 18. As their interests with us tye them more to doe aright, so our elections of them tie us more to suffer what they doe, if not aright. It would trouble this Answerer to give the Clergy any assurance from these mutuall interests; for they have none to represent them, they have no voice in the election of them that vote there again; this reason from representation and E­lection concerns onely one of the Houses; and how men of publike trust may, and have pursued their private interests under pretence of the publique good, Experience has heretofore shewn it, and time will discover it ere long to eyes, that yet cannot see it. For their tye up­on us we grant it, but not to all purposes without His Majesties consent; who is intrusted for us as well as they, nay, in whom the Supream trust of the Kingdom is. It is not a tie to bind us to obey their arbitrary commands. M. Burrowes will tell us in his Answer to the fifth Section, should a Parliament so far degenerate as to enslave us, he thinkes the light of nature would shew us a way to provide for our selves by re-assuming the power given to them.

There is nothing more usuall in these mens mouthes then the Law is our inheritance, we are born unto it. It is true, and it concernes us to look to it; but shall our freedom and inheritance, our Petition of Right, our liberties and Priviledges be only good against the King, and the resolution of the Houses inevitable to us for all our interests, all we have? So this Answerer would make us beleeve.

In the pursuit of his third proposition, he tells us, pag. 18. They are not in themselves infallible, but to us inevitable; here is no Parliament Papacy, as the Doctor pleases to descant. Certainly the Pope himself does not beleeve himself to be infallible, nor do his learned flatterers, that would maintain it; but the deceived people beleeve it down right, and it is for the advantage of the other, that they do so; The Do­ctor said not there was infallibility in the great Councell, but wish­ed the misled people to examine whether they have not such a [Page 39]thought, to worke them into an implicite faith of beleeving and recei­ving without Examination what ever is concluded there.

He leaves us a private dissent of judgement from their determinati­ons, but we are bound by them from gainsaying, or resistance, and so it is to us inevitable. Such a power of binding has a generall Councell to its decisions, and why should a Civill Generall Councell of England have lesse power in it? So he, pag. 18. We Answer the great Councell of Eng­land has such power of binding inevitably if you adde the assent of the King; as all Ecclesiasticall Councels expect the Confirmation of the supream Civill power for the binding of those, that are under them, to their Canons and decisions; But if we keepe our selves from gainsaying or resistance, will it satisfie? no, their Resolution or Ordi­nance cals us all to active obedience, to Arme, kill, and slay; and this we must believe after so many ages to be a fundamentall Law; when as we heare the known Law (which is inevitable to us) not onely binding us from being active against His Majesty, to the endangering of His Person, or diminution of His Crowne and Dignity, but also not suffe­ring us to be silent or sit still when the defence of His Rights, or Person requires our aid.

We have now done with his propositions, and his discourse upon them, whereby he hath wound himselfe up to the pitch of Bractons speech, which he brought and rejected as too high to be attempted, pag. 4. the King hath above him besides God and the Law, His Court of Earles and Barons. But this Answerer has placed both them and the House of Commons in that height, by this finall Resolution and arbi­trary inevitable Command; and this reserved by them in their first choice of a King, which according to the rules of Policy, makes the King to have but imperium communicatum, leaves the supream comman­ding power in them.

From the Premises he concludes his resolution for Conscience, pag. 19. This great Centurion of the Kingdome, the Parliament, saies to one of this now necessary listed Army, Goe and he goes, to another come and he comes — what other authority hath a Sheriffe to put a Malefactor to death? We have had enough of the Centurion already, too much (God knowes) of the Military Commands; we should have liked it better if he had likened the Parliament to that wise and peaceable woman which gave advice to throw the Rebels heads over the walls, and so the matter was ended, 2 Sam. 20.18. But hath the Sheriffe no [Page 40]other Authority but such as a Centurion gives to Kill and Slay? He ha's it derived from the only Supream Governour the King, and so should every one that takes the Sword.

Conscience also ha's Gods warrant too, first of Charity, by the sixth Commandement, which not onely forbids Murder, but commands preser­vation of ours and our Neighbours life; Secondly of Justice, Render to all what is due; to the great Councell what is due to it upon the Kings refu­sall; lastly, of obedience, Submit your selves to every Ordinance of man —Hence every Souldier in this Army hath warrant enough for his Con­science if he apply it. I am sure his three warrants here from Gods Law are misapplyed and will not secure their Souldiers Conscien­ces. First, that warrant of selfe defence and preservation tels us we must not doe it by murthering of others, which may happen when our selfe preservation uses meanes not allowed by the Law, it is to be re­gulated by; if it be the defence of the body Naturall, then must it be according to the Law of God and Nature; if of the body Politique, then according to its Law, which this man has not any waies pro­ved to prescribe this way of preservation by Subjects taking Armes; we see by the Law, the King is the onely supream Governor, and so the Sword is put into His hand for preservation of order, and executing of wrath, from whom the Authority of the Sheriffe and all other Mini­sters of power is derived. But he that takes the Sword by his owne au­thority, and not by Commission from or under Him, commits murder, and shall perish by the Sword; The Law is yet to make, that may de­rive the warrant of killing and slaying from any other fountaine of power.

Secondly, [...]ender to all what is due, is a good rule of Justice, and tels us what is due to the King by the fift Commandement, Honour, and Feare, and Tribute, as the Apostle goes on in that place, Rom. 13. but it's misapplied by the Answerer to urge the rendring of Obedience to the Arbitrary commands of the two Houses, for unto such it is not due (as has been shewn) though this man phancy it never so strongly.

Lastly, The submission to every Ordinance of Man is also misapplied by him, for there was never any such Ordinance or Contrivement, which reserved such a power at the first Constitution of this Govern­ment, as he supposes, but never could prove.

Therefore I may conclude according to my first resolve in my for­mer Treatise, Conscience cannot finde any warrant or safe ground to goe [Page 41]upon for making this resistance. For, according to the principles of the now pleaders for this resistance, It finds nothing but a pretended Con­stitution, at a supposed Capitulating Election, contriving and reser­ving for the people such a power; finds this un reasonable in it selfe, inconsistent with the usuall and established government of this Land, and so cannot thinke it safe to rest on, or fit to give it warrant against the known Law which places the power of Armes in the King, which acknowledges him Only supreme Governour, which challenges, by Our Allegiance, ayd and assistance from us for the defence not onely of His Person but also of His Rights, His Crown and Dignity, which are most injuriously wronged by this Contrivement, or frame of Government, and exceedingly invaded by this resistance and power of Armes raised and used against Him at this day.

SECT. VIII. A Confutation of what is replied by the Answerers upon the first Sect. of the former Treatise.

NOw we come to the application of what hath been hitherto said, to see how it meets with what was written in the former Trea­tise, where we shall take in the other Answerers also; And first we must cast an eye over Mr. Bridge his grounds, which he layes for this resi­stance, before he enters upon the first Section.

He tels us, there are three grounds of their proceeding by Armes. 1. To fetch in Delinquents to be tryed in the highest Court. 2. To de­fend the State from forraine invasion. 3. To preserve themselves and their Country from the insurrection of Papists; And that all this is done as an act of selfe-preservation, not as an act of Iurisdiction over their Prince, Pag. 2. That Delinquents should be brought to a Legall tryall, and the State defended, is just and necessary, yet to be done in an or­derly and Legall way; not by an Army raised by Subjects, taking the Militia and power of the Kingdome out of chose hands, in which the Law has in [...]sted it. And if Conscience were to speake the Truth, it could not say, that any Delinquents were denied or with-held, till the Militia was seized, and a great Delinquent in the matter of Hull was denied to be brought to tryall at His Majesties instance, of which see more above, Sect. 5. Neither can Conscience say, that Subjects have [Page 42]had cause upon feares and pretences of forrain invasion, or insurrection of Papists to Arme and resist,

Whether this be done by an Act of jurisdiction, we may discerne by the plea of the fuller Answerer, for he would have us believe, they are inabled to this by Law and the Constitution of this Government, and that they doe it by an act of judgement, the States judgement residing in their finall resolution, and that this power of theirs is transcendent to any power ordinarily in the King, for it declares Law without Him, it does arbitrarily command the power of the Kingdome, and the obedience of the people without and against the commands of the King (so we found it in the examination of his discourse) and what is more required to an act of Jurisdiction I know not; let Him and Mr. Bridge agree it.

Mr. Bridge gives us proofes for this way of preservation; First, from the Law of Nature, selfe preservation is naturall for a Man, for a Com­munity; and therefore when a Community shall trust a Prince with their welfare, that act of trust is but by positive Law, and cannot destroy the Naturall Law, which is selfe-preservation, pag. 2. But the Fuller Answer will tell him there must be a Constitution to enable them to this selfe-preservation. And were this Argument good, then might private men, or the people without the Parliament, take Armes and resist; for selfe-preservation is naturall to them, and no positive Law (which according to the Fuller Answer, restraines their resistance upon their trust given to the Houses of Parliament) can, according to Mr. Bridge his reason, destroy that naturall Law. Also absolute Princes (with whom the people have intrusted their welfare without any resevati­on might be resisted, (which the Fuller Answer againe denies) for that act of trust is but by positive Law, and according to Mr. Bridge it must not restraine them, for it cannot destroy the Naturall Law of self-preservation.

But he should have observed, that as the naturall body is to pre­serve it selfe according to its Law, and no otherwise, so a Community or politique body, must doe it according to its Law, which prescribeth the order, and way, and means of preservation; and for want of hol­ding to that way, we see people often, under pretence of this selfe-preservation, drawne by seditious Leaders into Armes to their owne destruction.

Secondly, he proves it from the Law of God, by places of Scrip­ture, [Page 43]but so wildely, that I am ashamed to repeat them; yet the judi­cious Reader must give me leave for the peoples sake, that are abused by these mens abusing of Scripture.

1 Chron. 12.19. It is expresly said, that David went out against Saul to battail, but he was Sauls subject at that time, pag. 2. A despe­rate undertaking, to make people beleeve this is expresse Scripture, for Subjects to go out to Battaile against their King, but he should have added what is expressed there, it was with the Philistines that he went out, and that He helped them not, for he did but make shew of tendring his service to Achish. See below, Sect. 9. where this place is touched again.

Rom. 13. Be subject to the higher powers. But the Parliament is the highest Court of Justice, pag. 3. this is well assumed; but we grant the Conclusion, there is a subjection due to them; and if he means by the Parliament, the three Estates concurring, then all manner of subjecti­on and obedience is due to them. But he takes them as divided; for it follows, Though the King be supreame, yet they have the high power of declaring Law, pag. 3. this is a good explication of the Supremacy. Yea this Doctor confesseth they are most fit to judge what is Law. Take in all my words which were these (none so fit to judge what those fundamentalls are, as They that have power to build new Laws upon them) and then make what you can of them, or look what is spo­ken above of Supremacy. Sect. 4. of the power of Declaring Law, Sect. 6.

Then he undertakes to shew out of Scripture, that Kings receive their power from the people, and has the ill hap to light on Saul, Da­vid, and Solomon, for examples, because it is said, They made Saul King before the Lord, 1 Sam. 11. and so of David and Solomon; which was the peoples not giving of power, but receiving and acknowledging him for King whom the Lord had designed.

Lastly, he has found an example and proofe for the trust of Parlia­ment in Davids time, 1 Chron. 13.1, 2. David consults with the Cap­tains and Leaders, and with all the Congregation about the fetching of the Ark; what then? These were Officers not of the King but King­dom, and though under him, yet were they with him trusted in the affairs of the Kingdom, pag. 5. Excellent Collections! The Fuller Answer will tell him presently, that the Kings of the Iewes were absolute Monarches; though I say not so, yet this I say, those were Officers of [Page 44]the King and Kingdom, meerly designed by him, not the people, and called by him to that trust; what he infers, that the Parliament is en­trusted by the people, though not deduceible from that place, I grant; yet so, as that they have a trust from the King upon them too; as was above shewn, Sect. 4. But that in case they think the King misled, it be­longs to their trust, to take the Armes of the Kingdom, as M. Bridge would inferre, can neither be drawn out of that place of Scripture, nor any Law of this Land, that ever could yet be seen. The like rambling discourse he has upon the 5. Sect. touching the Monarchicall Government which God set up over his people, wherein as he is for the conclusion altogether contrary to the Full Answerer, who held the Jewish Monarchy absolute, so for his proofes and places of Scripture alleaged, altogether impertinent.

At length he will seem to give us Law for it, Inferiour Courts have power to send for by force, if need be, those that are accused, much more the Parliament, the highest Court, pag. 6. And therefore also inferiour Courts have power to raise Armies to force in the Accused, if they refuse to come in upon Summons; that would make good work.

But the Law has provided a force, if need be, a Posse Comitatûs, and the Kings Officer or Minister for that is the Sheriffe; but this new way turnes both the King out of His power, and His Ministers out of their Office, sending Voluntiers and listed Souldiers into every Coun­ty to force in Delinquents.

But he tells us, they may send a Sergeant at Armes for a Delin­quent, therefore twenty if twenty be accused, and therefore an hun­dred, and so goes on till he has made an Army of 10000. Sergeants at at Armes, pag. 6. I did not know before, that the Souldiers pretended to be sent from the Parliament: were all Sergeants at Armes? what need so many? certainly before this Army of Sergeants was raised, very few would have served to have warned in Delinquents; it has made many a sorrowfull Father in the Countrey to see his sonne called to such an imployment, whom he had bound Apprentise in London to another trade; Nay, the whole Kingdom has rued the sending of such and so many Sergeants at Armes (who do not onely arrest mens per­sons as they please, but also plunder their Estates) and does earnestly desire, that as it is pretended Delinquents must be brought to triall by Law, so they may be fetched or forced in, by the way and meanes, the Law (as was said) has provided.

He concludes with an Answer to an Objection, If the power of the Prince be derimed from the people, then they may take it away, when abu­sed, and depose their Prince. Answ. No, we doe not say so, the people need not think of such an inference, because they never gave away the power of selfe preservation, pag. 7. These are but cold denials, though you say they need not go so farre, yet you have opened and paved the way for them, to be led on so far upon these principles: and what shall withhold them? because they have the power of selfe preservation by taking Armes, whereas if they had not that power, it were the way to breake all in pieces, pag. 7. So it seemes, the way to keepe people in obedience, is to give them liberty of Rebelling; but what securitie has the Prince, that they will trust him with the power againe, if a few seditious Preachers tell them, their Prince will not use the pow­er well, if they trust him again with it? they gave it him at first, and now they may conferre it upon another, who will manage it better in order to their safety; Or if they doe lay downe their Arms and trust Him with power again, it shall be to his prejudice, he shall be forced first to consent to what they please, and what this is called by our Law, every one, that understands any thing, knows.

Then in Answer to what was said in the first Section of the former Treatise (that our Divines by denying resistance unto Subjects, doe not endeavour to raise the King to an arbitrary power, for they allow the denying of Obedience to all commands unlawfull by the Law of God, or the established Lawes of the Land) M. Bridge first would seem to returne me to a Catalogue of Protestant Divines, allowing re­sistance in some Cases, and then tells me, if we may not resist, we yeeld the King an arbitrary power. For His forreigne Divines; the testi­mony of the Centurists, speaks not to his purpose; Of the French, and Low-Countrey Divines he brings no testimonies, but for proofe tells us, we know their practice; so I for Answer may returne him his owne words, we know what has beene the practice of those Prote­stants, and so they are parties interessed, not so fit to give in witnesse; but this I will say for them, they can justifie the cause of their Armes, better then M. Bridge can doe his; Now for our English Divines, its plaine they speake of such Government, such States, such cases as will not agree to this Kingdom, or this time; yet doe some of them allow of resistance in some cases; true, for since the revolt of the Low-Coun­tries, and the first motions of the Protestants in France. I finde in many [Page 46]of our Divines a willingnesse to excuse, as much as may be. But if we looke beyond those times into our Homilies, we shall finde the Do­ctrine of our Church expresly against Subjects taking of Armes.

Then he tells us, though we may deny Obedience to the Kings un­just Commands, yet if we may not resist, but suffer, when He pleases to punish for not obeying, we raise him to an arbitrary power, Pag. 12. Answer: To say He may command any thing not repugnant to Gods Law, and punish lawfully for not obeying, is to raise him to an Arbitrary power; but to say He may not command any thing against the Law of the Land, and if He punish for not obeying such His com­mand, it is unjust and against the Law; yet unlawfull also for us to take Arms against Him for it, is not to raise him to an arbitrary power; For Arbitrary and limited power is distinguished by the Restraint, which the Law or Constitution of Government casts upon the governing power, not by the abuse of that power, which sometimes in the most limited Governments may break out into a licentious arbitrarynes; If force and not Law must tell us what Arbitrary power is, and releeve us against it in the Prince, I fear we should too often feel it from the hand of Subjects.

The Fuller Answerer would make me contradict my selfe, in deny­ing the King an arbitrary Government, Sect. 1. and yeelding him the finall Iudgement, Sect. 5.

Now the Reader will discern, this is not my failing, but his usuall mistaking of what I say; the place he aimes at, is Sect. 5. Pag. 26. where in answering the objection, many see more then one, and more safety in the Iudgement of many, then of one, it was said. The King sees with the eyes of those many, and all times have thought it reasonable to have Monarchy, which settles the chief power and finall Iudgement in one. That was for the generall, which I suppose is the reason and frame of Monarchy; how it was good in our King, by His power of denying, appears in that place, for the finall Judgement was no otherwise challenged for him; Now if such a Judgement of the Kings be called a finall Iudgement, because it is the last, and after the Judgement of many, it matters not, it will not infer an arbitrary power, as the finall Resolution, which this man placeth in the two Houses, doth; for if it be dissenting from the Judgement of those many, it is onely Negative, it is not Conclusive any other way. Such, I say, is the Kings finall Trust or Judgement, by consenting to those many, or denying, not by [Page 47]concluding, or commanding any other way, as he pleases.

The last exception of these Answerers to the first Section, is against my interpretation of Omnes ordines consentientes, to imply a generall and unanimous consent of the Members of the two Houses in this point of resistance; First; they say it is enough if the major part agree, or else many Acts of Parliament would be voyd. Answer: however it is enough to other votes and Acts, if the major part agree upon it; yet in the concluding for resistance, if the condition of it by there grants be, omnibus ordinibus consentientibus; and their reason for it be, Rex est uni­versis minor, and resistance it selfe be an opposing of the body against the head; there must be in all equity an universality in the consent, and an unanimous inclination of the whole body, and not a part of the body against the head, and another part of the same body.

Secondly, Mr. Bridge replies. If this be our sentence, why doth the Dr. object against us, that the Christians in the primitive times did not take up Armes against the Emperors, seeing they had not the consent of all the Or­ders of the Empire, Pag. 13. The Doctor never intended that objecting of the Christians for an argument by it selfe, and therefore to the Chri­stians persecuted, did usually subjoyn the Senate and people enslaved, shewing they might not resist, being all under that higher power or Su­pream (as St. Peter cals the Emperor,) and contained within that uni­versall, whosoever resists.

SECT. IX. A Confutation of what was replyed upon the second Section of the former Treatise, touching places of Scripture pretended for, or alleadged against Resistance.

THe Fuller Answerer speakes confidently. The instances of Resi­stance (of the peoples in behalfe of Jonathan, of Davids, of Eli­shah's,) we make no use of, we need them not, and therefore need not Answer the refutation of them, Pag. 21. But all your fellowes make use of them, who having not so fine a wit to contrive a power of resistance reserved by the people when they made the first King, did conceive they stood in need of Examples to defend the peoples assuming of such a power.

Well, however this Answerer pretends, he needs them not, yet [Page 48]does he sticke upon the example of David, and tels us, Pag. 21. what use of His Army, but to fight against? nay, a reach above all his fellows, that David (though against the King) is said to fight the Lords battels, 1 Sam. 25. The words are Abigails, and the Comment is his, more then once given us in this booke, he had before spent two pages, the fixth and seventh, in repeating what notes he had taken at Court-Ser­mons, now he gives us a taste of what is preached at St. Margarets, and up and down the City. That to fight against the King now, is to fight the Lords battels, or as Mr. Burrows in his Sermon, that the Armies now against the King, are the Hosts of the Lord, and in his Epistle, he cals the Earle of Essex, the Lord of their Hosts, so usually doe they interesse the Lord in their quarrell, and are bold againe with his Titles; We know that to fight the battels of the Lord, was against the Enemies of his people, Philistins, Ammonites, &c. and that David was designed to it; that he had done it already under Saul against the Philistins, and was to doe it more fully after Sauls death, against the enemies of Israel round about; and accordingly the words of Abigail have this mea­ning; though it be known that my Lord is appointed to fight the Lords battels, and to deliver his people from their enemies round a­bout, yet is there risen up a man to pursue after, &c. Certainly if to fight against Saul had been to fight the Lords batrels, David had not fought them well, that declined all battel with him, made use of no advantages when he had Saul twice in his power. David knew the battels of the Lord, which he was to fight, were against the Lords enemies abroad, not against the Lords annointed at home.

But this Answerer said, what use of an Army, unlesse to sight against? we see David did not put it, did not intend it for that use; yea, but he would have put it to that use at Keilah, if the Inhabitants would have been faithfull to him: So they conclude upon Davids intention, for defending of what was actually done at Hull; I call'd that an uncertain supposition not fit to ground Conscience on.

Mr. Burrows tels us, the case is as plaine for Davids intention, as if Sir John Hotham, upon comming of the Kings Forces against Hull, should inquire of the Townes-men, whether they would deliver him up or no, and upon knowledge that they would, should flie away; were this an uncer­taine supposition that Sir John would have defended himselfe there? In Sir John Hotham it would be a very probable supposition, because we know the inclination of his mind, and the intent for which he came [Page 49]thither, but in David it is not onely uncertaine but improbable, for we know his resolution and custome was still to flie as the King pursued, and to that end he enquires what they intended against him, and in case they were minded to deliver him up, he might more timely provide for his flight, and prevent their shutting of him up in that City, which, as the text notes, had gates and barres.

M. Bridge upon the Answers in the former Treatise made to their instances of resistance, replies, that, in saying it was a loving violence by which the people rescued Ionathan, and Davids Armes were meerely for defence without all offence, the Doctor gives away the Cause, and allows Subjects more then prayers and teares, Pag. 14.5. The Doctor had no where (though M. Bridge makes him often say so) prayers and teares, as the onely remedy left to Subjects; but beside their Cries to God, he allowed them Petitions to their Prince, intercessions, reproofes, de­nyall of Subsidies and Aydes; and the peoples rescuing of Ionathan was by intercession set off with a Souldierly boldnesse, such as the peo­ple used to David, 2 Sam. 18.3. and Ioab to David, 2 Sam. 19.5. Nor is it the giving away of the cause to acknowledge Davids Armes were for such defence; for the severall answers returned to Davids example were given, to shew they that have now taken Armes may not doe so much as David did, for his example was extraordinary, and also that they have done more then David did, for he used those armed men meerely for his guard, without all offence to Saul or them that were about him; and so Davids example can no waies be pre­tended to those that have now taken Armes, and use them as they have done.

If his example be extraordinary, then he had an extraordinary command for what he did, if so, how doth the Doctor say, there is no command or war­rant in Scripture for such a practice or kind of Resistance, Pag. 16. As if all extraordinary warrants and instincts given to speciall persons should be written in Scripture, Ehud sure had one to goe and slay the Tyrant Eglon, Iudg. 3. yet not expressed; Or as if extraordinary Commands, though expressed, were warrants for all to doe so; as that which the Israelites had for spoyling the Aegyptians, were now good warrant for the pretended Parliamentary forces, to spoile all those they call Ma­lignants, and esteem little better then Aegyptians.

But a meere defence, how then a worke extraordinary in David? ibid; if his were not an extraordinary example, then may private and single [Page 50]men doe so too; But tis nor for Subjects private or publique of them­selves to draw armed men together. The Houses when they conceived it fit to have a guard, could not raise armed men for that purpose, but by desiring it of the King. Now we see Armies of Subjects raised by Subjects, flie up and down all Countries. giving the King himselfe and His men battell, where they can fall upon them with advantage, and yet Davids example is pretended; And Mr. Bridge will yet give us one more instance from it, not much unlike what the Fuller Answer had above, concerning Davids fighting the Lords battels against Saul; it is this.

David would have gone with the Philistins into battell against Saul, 1 Chron. 12.19. and said to Achish what have I done, that I may not goe fight against the Enemies of my Lord the King? 1 Sam. 29.8. Now among those Enemies was Saul, Pag. 15. Desperate shifts that these men are put to, when pretences and simulations must be made Scripture grounds for Conscience to secure it in battell against the King; David a little before had made shew of madnesse before King Achish, 1 Sam. 21. had pretended to Achish, he had made an inrode upon the South of Judah, 1 Sam. [...]7. now might Mr. Bridge as well inferre, therefore he was mad, therefore he did fight against the Subjects of Saul, and its lawfull for Subjects to fight against Subjects of their King, but e­nough of this.

In the example of the Priests, and King Ʋzziah out of 2 Chro. 26. he cannot see why they should be commended for Valiant men if not for resi­stance, nor how it appeares by Scripture that Gods smiting him with leprosie should discharge him of the Kingdom, Pag. 17. Surely they deserve the Commendation of Valiant men, that when a King doth or comman­deth unlawfully, dare withstand either by a home reproofe, or by withdrawing from him the holy things, he is not to meddle with. For the other matter, he might have remembred, that by the Law the Lepet was to be put out of the Congregation and dwell apart, which is not consistent with Government, therefore it is said of this King, He was a Laper and dwelt in a severall house, and Jotham his sonne reigned in his stead, 2 King. 15.5.

What is replyed by Mr. Bridge, or Mr. Burrowes upon the Answer to the example of Elisha, may be answered by what is said above, Sect. 8. concerning the preservation of the body Naturall and body Politique, and concerning the sending for Delinquents.

Now for the instances that were brought in the former Treatise against Resistance or Armes taken up by Subjects. To that of the power of the Trumpet placed in the Supreame Magistrate, Numb. 10. M. Bridge replyes. The Parliament hath sounded no Trumpet for Warre, but what the Supreame Power hath given Commandment for; For it is an established Law that the Parliament should have power to send for Delinquents, and such Law is to be obeyed, because (as the Doctor saith, Sect. 1.) it has the Kings deliberate consent, however he is plea­sed now to sound a retreat by his suddain will, pag. 20, 21. The King has given His consent to that Law, that gives power to the Houses to send for and censure Delinquents, and is still willing that accord­ingly, all Armies laid aside, Delinquents should be brought to a legall triall; but He never gave consent to a Law that should inable them to raise Armes under that pretence, for there is no Law prescribes them that way or means to bring in their Delinquents.

M. Burrowes replies. That of the Trumpet was a Iudiciall Law, and binds onely in the equity of it; Else it would be a sinne to put the Mi­litia into any other hands for any time, for it might not then be done, no not with Moses his consent. True, it was a Judiciall Law, and that might have told M. Burrowes his many exceptions from the circum­stances and specialties of that Law were needlesse. But an equity he grants, and so there is in all Judiciall Lawes, and we require no more in this then the equity of it, which tells us (and we see it in all Go­vernments) the power of the Trumpet, or calling assemblies for War, is still placed in the supream Magistrate, and cannot be put into other hands, without His consent.

To that place of 1 Sam. 8.18. The people had no remedy against the oppression of their unjust Kings, but crying to the Lord, M. Bridge replyes, Samuel tells them not what should be their duty, but what their punishment. The Lord will not heare you, pag. 20. It seems their duty was to take Armes and bring their Kings into order; but he tells them not of their duty, he tells them of their punishment, It was in­deed their punishment, because all the remedy they had (which was by crying to the Lord) should not helpe them; which had not been such a punishment, if they had meanes to help themselves by power of Armes, the power of selfe preservation, as these men call it.

To that which was said of the Prophets, It is a marvellous thing, that none of them should call upon the Elders of Judah and Israel for [Page 52]this duty of resistance against their cruell and Idolatrous Kings, Master Bridge replies, see here is a Prophet Elisha calling on the Elders to im­prison the Kings messenger, Pag. 22. How happy are these men in their application of Scripture: But what Elders were these? of the Citie without doubt, where Elisha was. And I feare that some of the El­ders of our chief City, have been animated by Preachers, that never were brought up in the Schooles of the Prophets, upon such abused examples, to lay hold on the Kings Messengers comming with not such an illegall commission, as this did, but lawfull and necessary Commands and Proclamations; Againe, what did Elisha call upon these Elders for? to imprison the messenger? that's more then the text will bear, unlesse to shut the doore against a man be to imprison him; for this performance there needed not the authority of the Elders; had any else been with the Prophet they might have done it without command, had they known the Messengers errand as the Prophet did. It is no more then any Debter may doe, shut the door of his house against a Sergeant though comming legally to arrest him; Had our City Elders (that now have Forces at their command to secure themselves against all Ministers of Justice, that have entred the Kings House and Castles, keeping the gates shut against Him) done no more, but contained themselves within their owne houses, keeping the door fast against the Sergeant, the King would not have had cause to com­plain of them.

To that place, 1 Sam. 8.18. and to that observation (that none of the Prophets called upon the Elders for this duty of resistance) the summe of M. Burrowes answer is, Pag. 118. and 122. the Argument is Negative, and he brings severall Instances negative, which hold not. Answ. It is true that many times such Arguments faile, yet may they be within their own compasse very convincing, as in this case: It was said, the Apostles prohibition against resistance was very expresse, and that Conscience could finde no warrant or exceptions against it from other places of Scripture; how should this be cleared, but by answering such seeming instances as they brought, and by bringing such places, as were most likely to have given allowance to this remedy which is placed in the power of resistance? for if Consci­ence cannot finde allowance for it in Scripture, how should it adven­ture upon it against the expresse prohibition of the Apostle, delivered without any exception or limitation?

One of his Instances I must touch, as seeming to concerne the bu­sinesse more neerly, when the ten Tribes cast off Rehoboams Government for his oppression, no Prophet rebuked them, Pag. 122. They were not at that instant rebuked, for the thing was from the Lord, and to take effect; yet as it was from their licentious will of revolting, it is called Rebelling against the house of David, 2 Chro. c. 10. v. 19. and reproved by Hosea, c. 8. v. 4. which is enough to tell Conscience, what to think of it.

Now we come to the Fuller Answerer. To the Instances brought against Resistance in the former Treatise he replyes, They are all in simple and absolute Monarchies, those of the Iewes and Romanes, nothing to our case, Pag. 21. This is short worke; yet doth M. Bridge, Pag. 40. tell us by the example of the Jewish Monarchy, what government pleaseth him best: That, wherein the people have choice of their King, and make a Covenant with him at his Coronation, and have power to take up Armes against the Monarch when cause requireth, all this he endeavours to exemplifie in the Jewish Monarchy, very im­pe tinently, I must needs say, yet enough to shew his disagreement, with this Full Answerer.

Let us then see what satisfaction Conscinece can receive from this Answer, either in the generall, that Resistance is lawfull in limited, not absolute Monarchies, or in particular, that those of the Jewes and Romanes were such. An absolute Monarch is he, that may impose Laws without consent of people; a limited or not absolute one is he that hath bound himselfe to require their consent, and to rule accor­ding to Law so made. Now Conscience findes in Scripture Manasses and such wicked Kings subverting Gods worship. Justice, and all good government, and no resistance allowed, the Prophets never calling upon the Elders of the people for it; also among the Roman Empe­rours, It finders the like Tyrants, and still hears the Apostle forbidding resistance: Well, It is under a Christian King, one not wicked but commended by many vertues, yet one that has invaded some liber­ties granted to the Subject upon agreement; How shall it thinke it has warrant to resist this King, because he is limited by such an agree­ment, and the other not to be resisted? for it sees, that safety of the State (in order to which this power of resistance is challenged) is the end of government as well in the absolute as limited Monarchy. It sees also, that the absolute Monarch is bound by the Lawes of God [Page 54]and nature, and by that duty of a Prince, which is upon him in order to that end, the safety of His people, and it cannot be satisfied how the breach of something due by a civill agreement or Nationall positive Law should more expose the so limited Monarch to this power or re­sistance, then those outrages against the Lawes of God and Nature, against the very end of Government do the absolute Monarch; It will not think if it may not resist this for such heinous provocations that it hath power to take Arms against the other for the breach of some li­berties due to the people by a civill compact.

If it bee replyed that the King is limited by such a Condition as leaves power of resistance in the people, reserved to them in the first constitution: we answer, It has been cleared, that such a Condition is a meer fiction and most unreasonable, a seminary of Tumults and Sedition; The King is limited, yet not so, but (as above declared) by reason he cannot impose Laws by himselfe upon his people.

Now in particular of your Jewish Monarchy; How appeares it to be absolute? we know those Kings could not make any Laws either with or without the consent of people, but were limited by the po­sitive Laws which God gave them for that policy or Government; and me thinks that this man should have conceived, it would make too much for the approving of absolute Government in Kings, to say God set up an absolute Monarchy over his people; and if it was the wise­dom of God to entrust his people with absolute and unlimited Kings, why should not Christian Kings be trusted a little more then Subjects would now have them?

But something he sayes by way of proofe that it was absolute. The Jewes desired to be governed after the manner of the Nations which was arbitrarily (as the Doctor observes out of Justine) and thereupon it is that God by Samuel tells them, what such a King would doe to them, not what he might doe, as the Doctor seems to infer out of that place, pag. 21. To say the Doctor seems to infer so, is a grosse mistake, not to have been admitted by him, if he would have me or himself speak any sense; if I had inferred the Kings of the Iewes might doe so, my argument thence had been none; but I concluded it plainly to be unjust violence and oppression, and thence shewed such usage of a people was not just cause of resistance to them. As for his Argument, it concerned him to infer they might do so, or else how does he shew they had absolute and arbitrary rule?

But his other inference from the Text is as good, That the people in desiring to have Kings after the manner of the Nations, desired to be governed arbitrarily, and that arbitrary government was set out in what Samuel declares their King would doe; As if the people here desired to have a King to oppresse and spoile them, the thing they complai­ned of in Samuels sonnes, vers. 5. The truth is, the people desired to have a King to judge them, we know in what meaning that phrase (to judge them) is used in the booke of Judges, and explicated, Hos. 13. v. 10. viz. to goe in and but before them, to save them from their Ene­mies, and how that God had raised up hitherto Judges among them to that purpose: Now they desire, not to have Judges extraordinarily sent them as before, for they saw they lay long under oppression ma­ny times ere such came, but to have a King among them as other Na­tions had by an ordinary succession, so they thought they should not be to seeke upon all occasions for one, to goe out before them against their Enemies; this is the summe of their desire, not to have a King to Rule arbitrarily, to use them as he pleased, or as Samuel told them he would, nothing here to prove the Kings of the Jews were absolute Monarches.

The Monarchy of the Romans he tels us was absolute too, by the consent of the people, so doth M. Burrows also. And this is one of their Answers to the 13. to the Rom. They might not be resisted for they were absolute Monarchs. It concerned them to bring proofe, for I had spoken to this in my other Treatise; here again this Fuller An­swer saith barely, they were absolute Monarch's; and M. Burrowes saith it rested upon me to prove they had not absolute power, and so puts it off; Indeed in strictnesse of dispute it is enough for the Answerer sim­ply to affirm or deny, but in giving an exception to a place of Scripture by writing, and that for the satisfaction of Conscience, it had beseemed them to prove what they say, theirs being the affirmative, mine the Negative.

I will therefore give my reasons against it, that there was not such a formall consent on the peoples part, and such a totall resignation of themselves to be governed by those Emperours, as is required to make them lawfull absolute Monarchs. First, because its altogether impro­bable, that a people so addicted to liberty should so consent to such a subjection, and againe set up that Regiam potestatem, that absolute Kingly power they so much hated; Therefore we see how Brutus [Page 56]and Cassius were honoured for restoring their invaded liberty; and how againe they were sensible of that recovered liberty, when Nero was taken away; but they held it not, the Souldiers still putting Empe­rours upon them one after the other.

Secondly, because unto all the Lawes and Edicts of those Emperors, there was required the consent of the Senate and people of Rome; they could indeed force that consent upon all occasions, yet for forme of Law still, Senatus Populusque Romanus was added. Thirdly, we find in Suetonius how Caligula intended to assume the Diadem, (which was the Signe of that Regia potestas) that is, to professe he would Raigne absolutely; but He was disswaded by his friends.

This therefore being certaine, that by force of Armes they made themselves masters of that people, my inference is, as it was in the o­ther Treatise, If the Senate and people of Rome, who a little before had the Supreame Government, might not resist the then Emperors, that of Subjects had made themselves Lords over that people, much lesse can the people of this Land have power of resistance, against the succession of this Crown descending from the Conqueror, who by like force of Armes, but with more Justice, gained this Kingdome.

But the Answerer excepts concerning our King. His Title of Successi­on waies excludes consent, for it began in the election and consent of the people, Tag. 21. The Roman Emperours by consent of the people were absolute (saith this man) and not to be resisted, our Kings by consent of the people are so limited that the people have reserved a power of resistance; one as true as the other. If we begin the title of succession from the Conquest, where is that election? that consent, and reservati­on? if higher, we run Conscience upon uncertainties; it cannot see how such an Election should give beginning to this Crown, but finds the beginnings still in Armes, as the enterance of those Emperors was; which beginnings might over-aw the consent of the people (as he saith of the consent of the Senate given to those Emperors, that it might be an over-awed consent) or else draw it; but cannot be imagined to arise from such a capitulating Election such a pre-contriving arbitrary con­sent of the people, as this man feignes.

M. Burrowes is very angry that I call'd Election, a slender plea, and saith, I cannot get a better and surer claime for the Kings of England, Pag. 129. But he might have considered, I call'd it a slender plea, not fot succession of a Crown, whensoever it is made by a people that are [Page 57]free, as upon the failing of the Royall line, but for resistance against it; it being all the plea that is made for these Arms, or power of re­sistance, and a slender one, because it appears not how election gave beginning to this succession, but that such an election, & contrive­ment of the people reserving the power of resistance should do it, is altogether improbable and unreasonable.

For the beginning of this succession at the Conquest, & the kings of England claiming from thence (against which M. Burrows here inveighs) see above, Sect. 6. and below, Sect. 11.

The Fuller Answerer goes on with his replyes to the 13. to the Rom. If not written particularly to the Romans who were under an Absolute Monarchy, and then not concerning us, yet suppose it referre to all Government in generall; pag. 21. I would this Answerer would leave his uncertainties, now he deals with conscience; the reasons the Apostle gives us in the 3.4, 5, 6. vers. plainly shew it concerns all times and Government, so long as in all government there is or­der to be preserved, there is a minister of God to execute Wrath, there is one that bears not the sword in vain; reasons essentiall to government, and perpetuall against resistance, as was shewn in the former treatise, if this man would have pleased to take notice of them.

Well, now that it refers to all Government, what then? It makes (saith he) altogether for us, it requires obedience to ordained powers, that is, legall commands, not wilfull pleasures of Governours. True, but we would know, not what is required, but what is forbidden; we spake not of obedience, but resistance; we grāt active obedience is to be yielded to ordain'd powers, and denied to the illegall com­mands; but we may resist their power, if they imploy it tomake good those illegall commands? We must supply his Answer out of Mr. Burrows pag. 113. If one that is in authority command out of His own wil, I resist no power, no authority at all, if I neither actively nor passve­ly obey. Also, we distinguish between the man that hath the power, and the power of the man, the power must not be resisted, the illegall will of the man may, and p. 124. the Apostle requires them not to resist their power their [...], does not charge them not to resist their Tyrannie. Between the power, and the person that bears it, as also between the power & the illegall will, or the abuse of the power, we may di­stinguish in conceit, abstracting the one from the other, and by our [Page 58]active and passive obedience we may distinguish them, yielding this to the power & person that bears it, denying that to his illegall will, but in resistance wee cannot sever them, for the resisting of him that bears the power, though unlawfully commanding, is a re­sisting of the power also; it is plain by the Apostle, who speaks not here of power abstractly taken, for so it cannot be the objectof our obedience or resistance, but Concretely as in the subject or the Ma­gistrate that bears it; therefore presently it follows in the Apostles reasons against resistance, for he is the Minister, he beares the sword; so St. Peter tells us what he meanes by the Ordinance the King as su­pream, or they that are sent by him; for though the will and com­mand be illegall, yet because he that bears the power lawfully, u­ses that power (though illegally) to compasse that will and execute that command, the power it self is resisted in resisting him that so uses it; as Saul had lawfully the power and command of Arms, but that power he uses unlawfuly; in pursuing his unjust wil against Da­vid; And I aske, when these Emperours took away lives and goods at pleasure, was that a pwoer ordained by God? no, but an illegall will, a Tyranny; therefore, according to M. Burrows, they might have been resisted in doing so; No, for that power and soveraignty they imployed to compasse those illegal commands was a power or­dained and settled in them. When Pilate condemned our Saviour it was an illegal will, yet our Saviour acknowledges in it Pilates pow­er that was given him from above.

Again this answerer of theirs makes void that distinction of private men, and of publick states in the point of resistance, it voids also their other distinction of absolute Monarchs, & limited; For accor­ding to this answerer, it shalbe lawfull for private men to resist their Princes, though absolute, if they command illegally, and to say as M. Burrows teaches them; We resist no power, no authority at all, but the illegall will and pleasure of man; and so might the Christians have resisted, and so replyed, if then answer be good.

The truth is, the lawfull power is resisted, when armes are ta­ken against Princes abusing that power to the compassing of unlaw­full commands; which also I insinuated often in the other treatise, & that from the Apostles reasons in this place against resistance, drawn from that order, that good, for which the power is ordain'd, though then the execution of the power in those Emperours was nothing answerable to that end.

That which the fuller Answerer presently adds pag. 22 There are two kinds of tyranny, Regiminis and Usurpationis; that of Govern­ment must be endured though never so heavy; Not only to the good but to the froward also, 1. Pet. 2.18. That other of Ʋsurpation hath no right at all. I know not what it means, if it be not a plain confir­mation of what I have sayd against resistance, and a direct confuta­tion of what himselfe and M ^r Burrows has answered for it. M. Bur­rowes also tels us, pag. 113. VVe professe against resisting power and authority though abused. A man would think he came home to us, and so he must if he will speak reason; but his device is, If those who have power to make lawes shall make wicked lawes, and force obedi­ence to them, there is nothing left us but flying or passive obedience. In this hole he often lurks to defend himselfe against the prohibition of resistance, by making us believe the abused power, that must not be resisted, is only seen when sinfull lawes are made and imposed; but I ask, have they power to make such Laws? No, for it is not of God; they have power from Him to make Laws, but such Laws and Commands are their illegall wills; then may they that resist say, in M. Burrowes words, we resist no power, no authority, but the illegall wills of men. Pilate had power from above to judge the accused brought before him, not to condemne the innocent, that was the abuse of the Legislative power; and the power it selfe is resisted by resisting the abuse of the one, as of the other.

Now all this has bin said against resistance, in case His Majesties Commands, in the use of that power which is in Him, were unlaw­full; but Conscience, that knows He ha's by Law a power to com­mand assistance for the defence of Himselfe, and protection of His Subjects, will easily conclude it a Legall power and command, not only not to be resisted, but also to be actively obeyed, as all Legall & ordained powers ought to be. Notwithstanding these Scriptures so plain against Resistance, or Arms taken up by Subjects, M. Bur­rowes professeth his Conscience is not one whit scrupled; I hope he will better consider it, ere he come to dye and give an account of those poor souls he ha's seduced.

Finally, we must subjoyn M. Bridge his replyes upon this 13 to the Romans, he, as if his conscience were as little scrupled with the Apostles prohibiting, as M. Burrowes his was, thus begins. The Dr. [Page 60] indeavours to sear the tender Conscience with the word Damnation; but it is rather to be translated judgement, & by it, is meant the punish­ment of the Magistrate in this life, pag. 14. M. Bridge might have had respect to our translation which renders it damnation, & with good reason, for resistance is a breach of the 5 Commandement, it is a re­sisting of the ordinance of God, as in this chapter, and M. Bridge knows it is no vain scaring of Conscience to tell it, the breach of Gods Commandement & ordinance makes it guilty of damnation.

And if we consider the condition of the Christians in those times, what great matter had the Apostle told them, in assuring them they should be punished by those Emperors if they resisted? when as they were sure of that, whether they resisted or resisted not; but he gives them to understand, however those Emperors were enemies to chri­stianity, the resisting of them was an offence against the ordinance of God: or if we consider the principles of these daies, which teach people to take the sword out of the Princes hand, & seize the Arms of the Kingdom in order to their own preservation, what great matter would the Apostle threaten to such, in telling them they should be punished by the Mag strate? when as they have provided for their indemnity by taking the sword from their Prince, or cau­sing Him to bear it in vain; therefore there is the stroke of a higher hand also to be expected, and those that have been lately taken in actuall resistance, and through His Majesties mercy escaped the de­served punishment of this life, must, if they continue not in obedi­ence, look for a greater condemnation.

Again, M. Bridge answers, That only active obedience to lawfull Commands is there enjoyned, not passive under unlawfull Commands, pag. 23. Both say we, as appears by the injunction of subjection & prohibition of resistance; for if the Apostle had enjoyned onely obedience to just commands, he had given the Romans; that lived under such unjust Emperors, but a lame instruction; the refore in ease they had unjust commands imposed on them, he tels them how to behave themselves, that is, not to resist: what then remains but passive obedience.

But he would prove it thus, The power they were to be subject to, and not resist; is the ordinance of God, and the minister of God for good: but when a Prince Commands a thing unlawfull, He is not so, pag. 23. Answ. A lawfull Prince, though commanding unlawfully, is still [Page 61]the minister of God for our good (i.e.) appointed for that end, and the power he is invested with, though abused to the execution of such a command, is the ordinance of God; And that is it which for­bids our resistance according to the Apostles reasons here, which are taken not from the actuall ministration of any prince, as if we ought to obey when he commands justly, and might resist when un­justly, but from the end, for which God has ordain'd him to mini­ster for our good; from which end though princes sometime swerve (as these Emperors did usually) yet are they not to be resisted, for that strikes at the power and Ordinance it selfe.

Yea, M. Bridge a little after acknowledgeth, that inregard of their place they are Gods ministers, but in regard of the unlawfull thing com­manded they are not. Therefore when princes command unlawfully we must look upon them with a double regard, the one to the thing commanded, the other to their place, to the unlawfull command we must return a deniall of obedience, but in regard of their place use no resistance. Deniall of obedience can sever the illegall command from the place and power they bear, but resistance cannot; for it cannot oppose the unlawfull command, but by usurping the power, and invading the place God hath appointed them in.

But M. Bridge concludes, It is the Doctors continuall mistake to thinke the Apostle forbids the resisting of the higher powers in their un­lawfull commands, when as he forbids the resisting of them in things lawfull. We must beare with the importunity of these men, who wil not conceive the force of the Apostles reasons, though laid op [...]n to their eyes, which was so often done in the former Treatise, that they tell me, I had worn the place thred bare, and yet they will not see the web and texture of it. Once more therefore; if the Aoostle forbid resistance only in things lawfull, it would not have bin a suf­ficient instruction, whether we respect the duty of subjection, which by this would not have bin directed, how to answer the unlawfull commands of Princes; or whether we consider those higher powers which then were tyrannicall, usualy commanding things unlawfull; also this would have bin the way to leave the gap open to Rebel­lion, for how easy would be the inference, therefore we may resist, when they command unlawfully?

These Answerers it seems, are still willing to keep the gap open, or else they might have seen how the Apostle brings reason enough [Page 62]to stop up the way against all resisting of power though abus'd, for he takes it not from the use of the power, but from the end for which God ordained it, the higher powers then being nothing answerable to that end, not ministring for good, but rather subverting of that which was good and just.

We come now to the other scripture, 1. Pet. 2.13. To the King as supream, or unto Governours, as those that are sent by Him. Out of which was proved, that the higher power, in St. Paul, not to be resi­sted by any, was the King in that state; and that in this Kingdome All, who have power, fall under that distinction of St. Peter.

Now see how acutely M. Bridge replyes (for these men have sim­plicity enough to abuse the people) Dr. Bilson (saith he) tels us by higher powers must be understood not onely Princes, but all publique States where the People or Nobles have the same intrust to the sword as princes have in this Kingdome. How then will the Dr. have the King only meant by these higher powers? As if the D. meant to prove that a King was the supream or higher power in the republicke of Vinice, or the Low-countries. But the Dr. acknowledges the Parlia­ment is the highest Court of justice, therefore they fall under these words, the higher powers. It is the highest Court, but you must not then exclude the king, in whom is the fountain of power; we farther grant, the two Houses by themselves doe also fall under the words higher powers in regard of the people, but not under the word su­pream, so were those, that were sent by the Emperor, higher pow­ers, yet subjects and inferior to him that is here called supream.

Yea, but (as Calvin and other Interpreters tell us) the prononn (him) is referred to God by whom all in authority are sent. ibid: 'Tis true, all are sent by God, which might serve to check the bad construction and use these men make of the foregoing words, every Ordinance of man. But it is as true, that the Governours of the provinces, where these scattered Christians lived, unto whom St. Peter writes, were sent by the King or Roman Emperor, and that he is here called su­pream; which being a word including a relation, might have told M. Bridge, that al who had authority beside in the Roman Empire, were inferiour to him, and immediatly sent by him, though originally their power was also from God, or from above, as our Saviour ac­knowledgeth in Pilate the Governor of Judea under that Emperor.

The Fuller Answerer replyes. The D. takes advantage in the words [Page 63]Supream and Sent, but the two Houses are called, not sent, a difference (at least) as great as between to and from, Pag. 23. Very good. It seemes he will have the people suppream that sends them from the Country to the King; so are the Clerks of the Convocation also sent from them that chuse them. We speak not of Terms of place but Reasons of Authority; if they be called by him, the authority is his, they come not of themselves but at his call, & therefore sent by him.

But he addes, They are a Coordinate part with him in the supream power, otherwise they could not hinder him from making Laws, nor finally declare Law without him, the two highest acts of supream power. Declare Law without him? then are they supreame without Him, and he is sent by them, He must go and do as they declare; Can we think that he sends for them with such an intention? or that they, which are called to advise and consent, come to such a purpose, to do the businesse without him? But enough of this feigned Coordi­nation, and of the Supremacy above, Sect. 4.

SECT. X. A Confutation of what is replyed upon the third Section of the former Treatise.

AT the beginning of that third Section it was said. The ground­work of their Fundamentalls is this; Power is originally in & from the people, therefore if the Prince intrusted with the power wil not discharge his trust, it falls to the people to see to it, they may reassume the power and resist. M. Bridge replyes. Then indeed it fal­leth to the people to look to it, which they do as an act of selfe preserva­tion, not of jurisdiction over their Prince, and this is not to reassume the power, or turn the Prince out of Office — as if we went about to depose our King, Pag. 52.53. For your act of selfe preservation, and Juris­diction, we examined them above. Sect. 8. if we consider what power of Law and Arms is now challenged & usurped by subjects, I think it cannot but appear to be a resuming of the power entru­sted with the King (for it leaves him none) and a turning him out of office for the time, though you intend not to depose him, but to trust him again, when and how you please.

And according to M. Bridge his similitude (so much used amongst [Page 64]them) if the carelesse steersman, during the storm, be made to stand by, and another set at the stern by the passengers, then is that steers­man out of office, or put from the execution of his office for the time but now for the application of this his similitude: The Prince is not as the steerseman (for he executes by his Ministers) but as he that stands above and commands to the Star-bord or Lar-bord, & if the Prince command amisse, that is contrary to the Law, His Ministers under him for execution may deny actively to obey, and may give within the bounds of their place and office, direction according to the law and their oaths, this does not put him out of office.

Then to that which was said in the same Sect: That the governing power, as it is a sufficiency of authority for command & coercion running through every form of governmēt, is from God, though the limitations and qualifications of it for the severall wayes of execu­tiō. it be of man by consent: & proved, Ro. 13.1. The powers that are &c. M. Bridge replies. None denieth it, only he will make it incon­sistent with what was said before. But if none deny it, why then up­on this principle of derivation of power from the people, do you ground your resistance? for in doing so, what power or sufficiency of authority for command or coercion, do you leave your Prince, the thing he has received (as you deny not) from God alone?

But let us see how its inconsistent. By those words, The powers are of God, Rom. 13.1.1. the D. must understand the power it selfe of Ma­gistracy, distinguished from the qualifications thereof, and the person de­signed thereto, how then did he say, Sect. 2. that the higher power in Paul is the same with the King as supream in Peter? Ans. The power of Magistracy, abstractively taken, may be these words be proved to be of God, though the higher powers here be understood concrete­ly with connotation of the persons that bear the power, for they are here proposed as objects of our obedience, which cannot be di­rected but upon power in some person, and here it's said [...], the powers that are, now power cannot be [...] existent, but in some person. Yet do these words prove the power it selfe to be of God, for why else should these Magistrates or Princes chosen by the people be said to be powers ordained of God, but because the power and authority they bore was from God.

In like manner the Dr. proves the power is of God, because the Ma­gistrate is called the minister of God, slipping from the power it self to [Page 65]the Person designed to the power, for the power it selfe is not called the minister of God. Good stuffe. I must come home to M, Bridge to make him understand the force of my inference; The Major of Norwich is the Kings Minister, therefore his power is from the King; will M. Brigde reply, no, for the power it self is not the Major, or call'd the Minister of the King.

Then the Answerers come to the [...] in S ^t Peter, the Ordinance of man, which in the former Treatise was said to be taken subjectively in regard of the power it selfe, which is from God cau­sally, and placed in man as the Subject; and if there be in that phrase any causality, or Creation, or invention of man implyed, it is to be un­derstood of the qualifications and severall wayes of executing that power in severall formes of Government. Hereupon the Fuller An­swer and M. Bridge every where takes it for granted by me, that Mo­narchy, Aristocracry and Democracy, are equally the inventions of man, which followes not, as was explained above, Sect. 3. concerning the originall of the governing power, and the first beginning of Monarchy.

Lastly, M. Bridge concludes, that my proving of the governing power to be of God, but the qualifications of it & the designation of the person to be of man, gaineth nothing against resistance, or depo­sing of a Prince that doth not discharge his trust; for stil the peoplemay say, we may alter the government, and depose the Person, because he was of our designing, Pag. 55. Nothing so, for if they resist they usurp a power that God ha's not given them, and invade the power that God ha's given Him; if they depose Him, they quite take away that pow­er which God, and not they, placed in Him, for although they ele­cted and desgned the Person, yet is He the Minister of God, & from God he ha's His Power and Commission; as if Citizens should take upon them to turn the Major, that ha's his power and Commission from the King, out of office, because they chose him. For altering the government, unlesse they be altogether free (as upon the utter failing of the Royall Line) they cannot doe it, no nor alter any Lawes or qualifications of the governing power, for they were not made by them alone, but also, and cheifly, by the consent and authority of the Prince.

Vpon that place, Psal. 82. I have said yee are Gods, alleadged in the former Treatise, the Fuller Answerer replyes, all Rulers are Gods [Page 66]alike, that word of God comes to them All alike, to Pilate as well as Cae­sar, pag. 24. This text was brought to prove the governing power was derived from God, because Rulers were so called, as His Vice­gerents, as having their Commission from Him, and in his stead over the people, this was urged to take off the derivation of that power from the people. He Answers, Inferiour Magistrates are Gods too; that's nothing to the purpose, but Gods alike, that's plainly false; for that word and power comes first to the Supream, and from Him to them that are sent by Him, from Caesar to Pilate. Inferiour Magi­strates are as Gods to the people under them, but the Supream as a God to those Gods; Aaron was so to the people, but Moses was as God to Aaron, Exod. 4.16.

SECT. XI. A Confutation of what is replyed upon the fourth Section in the former Treatise.

HIs fourth Section (saith the Fuller Answerer) is spent against the Peoples reassuming the power be trusted to the King, which no man maintaines; what need they reassume that, which in the first constitution of Government they reserved? pag. 24. This man ha's often told us, the power of Arms is ordinarily intrusted to the King, & that by the people in the first Constitution of government to use it for the safety of the State. VVell, He does not use it so, as they conceive; they therefore dispose of it, taking the Sword into their own hands, what is this but a reassuming, or (which is worse and more unreasonable) an using of an higher power reserved and inherent in themselves; which is to place the very Supremacie in the people, as ha's been of­ten shewen above.

M. Bridge bestowes more labour upon this Section; But first He complaines, The D ^r charges us, that we hold the people may reassume the power entrusted to the Prince, making the World beleive we contend for the deposing of Kings, pag. 24. What some of you have contended for all this while, the Lord knowes, that knowes your Hearts, yet this we know, the same principles will carry you so farre. But there is a difference between deposing the Prince, and reassuming the power; for though you have not deposed the King, yet have you seized the [Page 67] Militia; and Armes of the Kingdome, have commanded obedience from all His people, have left Him nothing ye could take from Him, and what is this but, as much as in youlyeth, to reassume the power? if there be any impropriety in the speech, it is in calling that a reassu­ming, which indeed is rather a taking away or dispoyling Him of that, you never gave Him.

But if you doe not reassume the power, what meanes the difference you make of things disposed by trust, from things disposed by dona­tion, because they may be recalled, these may not; so you say, Pag. 25. and in applying it, you tell us the King ha's His Power by trust from the people, and should have proceeded to confesse, they may recall (i. e.) reassume it, you must hold it, if you hold to your principles.

But let me tell you, that God entrusts the Prince with the power, and with the people, and therefore the people cannot reassume it, And when they elect one to bear that power, they doe commit them­selves to his trust, not giving so much as receiving a benefit; and such elected Kings (as was said in the former Treatise) are the Lords An­nointed and his Ministers.

Then cannot Princes, whose coming to the Crowne is meerly Pactio­nall, be deposed, for they are also the Lords Annointed and his Mini­sters, but the Doctor granted, that the argument (speaking of the for­feiture of the Princes power) has force in Governmente meerly Elective and Pactionall, Pag. 26. The Doctor by way of supposition passed it o­ver in these words (although such argument may seeme to have some force in states meerly Pactionall) to the undenyable clearing of this State from the danger of such forfeiture. But if M. Bridge will have me deliver my opinion absolutely, the reasons above mentioned will not suffer me to thinke, the people may depose any King they have chosen, upon what conditions soever they admitted him; and if they should chuse & admit one upon such condition of forfeiture it were turpis Conditio, most unreasonable, the very Seminary of Jealousy and sedition; neither profitable for King nor people, a plain encroachment of the peorle upon the governing power, which was at first derived from God not through their hands, and should alwayes be left in the Governour sufficient to rule them.

The Doctor also confesseth, it is probable that Kings at first were by election here as elsewhere, yet will he not have the King claime by it, pag. 27. It is like they were so, as generally among the Heathen they [Page 68]began by election; what then? must our King now claime by the first Kings in this Land? and Conscience be put to drive into the ob­scure fabulous times before Caesar or Brute his entrance, for that firste­lection? We are upon the English government, which followed the Saxons, or rather upon the Norman which followed the Con­quest; and as I said in that place, how can Conscience be satisfied, that the argument drawn from the supposed first Election to prove the peoples assuming this power, can have any force in this govern­ment, which began not so, but as we see by the entrance of the Sax­ons and Normans: Thus it is with our Prince, although he succeeded the Conqueror, yet doth he also take in the voluntary and free consent of the Commonwealth unto His Crowne, pag. 28. That was not the Con­sent of the first supposed election, but an after Consent following the Conquest, as the Prince and the People could agree, which agree­ment was not likely to leave them a power of resistance.

Now we see the Doctors mind plainly that he contends for an Arbi­trary government, for he saith, pag. 11. the Emperors ruied absolutely and arbitrarily, and here he saith, how came they of Subjects to be abso­lute Manarchs, but by force of Armes, the way that the Saxons and Normans made themselves Masters of this people? The Doctor did not contend for an arbitrary government, but did often (because he knew he should meet with those that would made bad construction of his words) expresly declare the contrary; His intent was to answer the Reply there made (that those Emperors might not be resisted because they were absolute) by shewing they made themselves so by Armes; and if the people could not upon any former right re­fist in that Empire, no more can they doe in this, upon pretence of right by a first election, for here also the Government began in Armes. None of my Adversaries have bitten at the edge and strength of this answer, but only catched at the shadow of those two words Conquest and Arbitrary. More was spoken above of Conquest, Sect. 6. and this I may adde, We see in the titles of many of our Kings before the Acts of Parliament made in their times, a reference to the Conquest, as Edward the third after the Conquest, which does relate not only to the Edward before the Conquest, but also to the Conquest it selfe, as to a beginning of claime and government, or else the number should have none on, and our Edward the third should have been numbred the fourth. So Henry the seaventh, and Henry the eight, after the Con­quest, [Page 69]quest, which relates to no such name before, but only to the Conquest as a beginning of Claime and Government.

Then the Doctor comes to the matter of Covenant, to which we say, Every breach of Covenant makes not a forfeiture, but we esteem a neces­sity of a Covenant, which we see in Kings designed by God, 1 Chron. 11.3. and that this bindes as well the King to the People, as the People to the King, pag. 29. That Covenant was not there a Condition on which those Kings were admitted to the Crown, no more is it in this King­dom, but a confirmation and strengthning of their naturall duties by promises and Oaths. That every breach the Prince makes in that Covenant should forfeit his power, you cannot say indeed for shame, but you canenlarge the breach as you please til you have made it wide enough for Armies of seduced people to enter in upon Him. And we cannot but observe, how you prepare for it in those words, the King as well bound to the people, that is, they stand equally accom­ptable to each other; for you immediately inferre, Therefore it is as well unlawfull for a King by force to oppresse His Subjects & to take up Arms against them, as for Subjects to take up Arms against him. Both are unlawfull and unjust, but not equally; for doe not the mutu­all duties of the fifth Commandement run betwixt superior and infe­rior? and is it as heinous for the father to strike the sonne, as the son to lift up his hand against the Father? If a King oppresse His Subjects, it is an abusing of that power which is in him, if people take Armes it's an usurping of power that belongs not to them, which is of more dangerous consequence; if the people doe what is unlawfull, the Ma­gistrate bears not the sword in vain, God has appointed him to pu­nish them; if the Supream Magistrate doe unlawfully, he is not to be punished by the people (for that were to overthrow the order God has set) but is reserved for a Divine judgement.

In the Covenant twixt King and People though it be not expressed, that the state of the Kingdome may take Armes and provide for its safety, in ease the King will not discharge, yet must it in all reason be im­plyed, that safety being the end of that trust, and ratio Legis is Lex; as in Marriage it is not verbally expressed, that the party committing A­dultery shall he divorced, yet that Covenant carries the force of such a Condition, pag. 31. That the King ought to discharge is Law, and the end or reason of it is the safety of the state, but that, in case he does not, or not according to the opinion of the people, they by Armes [Page 70]should resist & provide for it, is neit her Law nor Reason of any Law, but an unreasonable condition, were any King admitted under it, and no rea onable means of safety, but the way of confusion and destructi­on, as experience has alwayes shewn.

That Adultery is the breach of the Mariage Covenant and cause of Divorce, both in the institution of Marriage, They two shall be one flesh, doth in reason imply, and the Law of God doth expresly de­clare; and the like implication of reason and declaration of Law must appear, before we can see any warrant for Subjects to resist and pro­vide for their own safety: for as of the parties married, so of a Prince and the people entrusted to him by God, it may be said; whom God hath enjoyned let no man put asunder; and let not the woman usurp au­thority over the man, nor Subjects over their Prince.

SECT. XII. A Confutation of what was replied upon the 5 ^th. Sect: of the former Treatise.

VPon that which was said, They sharpenmany weapons for this resistance at the Philistins forge, borrow arguments from the Papists, M. Bridge replyes, There is much difference betweene them and us in this particular.

I. The Papists contend for the Lawfulnesse of deposing Kings, wee not. Difference there must needs be betweene you in this particular, for they Challenge such a power for the Pope, you for the people. But you doe not contend for the power of deposing, or as you told us above, the people from their power of resistance need not make that inference; here is great security for the Prince. We see your party making use of those Examples, which the Papists bring for the depo­sing of Kings, as that of Saul, Vzziah, Athalia, and one of your fellow Answerers has endeavoured to prove such a power of depo­sing (with whom we shall meet at the end of this Section;) and we know your principles wil carry the people so far if they wil follow them, if, as you teach them, they have justly taken Armes in order to their own safety, so they shall thinke in order to th [...] [...]fety they cannot lay them downe, or any longer trust their safety with the for­mer Prince.

[Page 71]II. The Papists plead for power of deposing a Prince in case he turn Heretick, we hold a Prince may change his Religion, and yet the Sub­jects thereby not excused from their Allegiance. You will give him leave to change Religion himselfe, so will the Papists, if all His Sub­jects may have free liberty of their Religion; but in case he also ende­avour to force that contrary Religion upon his Subjects (for that must be supposed) how then will your Allegiance hold? When you chal­lenge the power of Armes in order to your own and the States safe­ty, will you think that the preservation onely of your goods, Estates and out ward liberty is concerned in it, and not of your Religion too? How have you wrought the people into Armes against their Sove­raigne but by this name Religion? and that, not because He is turn'd Heretique and changed his Religion, or has imposed a Contrary Re­ligion upon his Subjects, (that you could not tell them) but only by making them beleive He favours Popery, and there is feare He will change Religion; which is as weak and low pretence as any Iesuit can descend to for drawing People into Armes against their Sove­raigne.

III. The Papists hold it lawfull to kill a Prince, and that a private man invested with the Popes Authority may do it; We abhore it. That is their new forge under ground, set up of late by Iesuits; I did not mean you sharpned your weapons there, but at the old forge, where the Popes power of acquitting people of their Allegiance, and commanding them into Armes has been beaten out some hundreds of years. And however you say you abhor this Doctrine of killing Kings, that is, of Butchering them by privat hands, yet I feare, and tremble to think, if your Soveraigne had falne in Battell by the edge of your sword or shot of your Artillery, yee would have ac­quitted your selves, and found him guilty of his own death, in that he would not, being desired, forbeare to go down himselfe into Battel against his Enemyes. Some of your Fellowes, M. Bridge, are much wronged, if they did not after the businesse of Brainceford, play the Popes in absolving the Souldiers, there taken, from the Oath, where­by they had again bound themselves from bearing Armes against his Majesty; and I can witnesse how the best of your party in Yorkshire had plited their faith for conserving of the Pea [...]e of the Country, and how they were dispensed with and commanded into Armes.

Let us proceed. The Fuller Answerer also complaines, The fift Secti­on, [Page 72]is a plain begging of three Questions the Resolver would have us maintain, Pag. 25. To pardon your abuse of speech, we know what you mean, and must tell you, we need not put upon you more then you undertake to maintain, which is more then you can prove, more then former Ages have been Conscious of, enough to make your Re­ligion, if you have any, heare ill in after times. But let us see what you say in vindication of your selves. We say not that every State hath these meancs of safety by resistance unlesse reserved by them. Answer, Yet is the safety of every State as deare and heare to it selfe, as This; and for any thing you have shewn for it, any State may pretend such a Reservation, as well as This; for you have not proved such a Re­servation, and the generall argument, your Party useth, is from selfe preservation, which is common to all.

Then to the Argument of the Churches safety, (under pretence of which the Pope challenges a power upon the failing of the Civill Magistate, as the people now upon the refusall of their Prince) you say The Church is not a State by it selfe, so also M. Burrowes and M. Bridge. It is not indeed the whole State, comprehending the Civill State too, yet is the good Estate thereof, of as great consequence as a­ny Concernment of the body Politique. But the Church is not of its own Constitution but of Christs. What then? therefore it must be preserved by the laws instituted by Christ; true, so must the Civill State by its established lawes, we desire no more; yet will you not give Him leave to be as carefull for the good Estate of His Church, in providing meanes of preservation for it, in case the Civill Magistrate faile in his trust, as you are to provide or reserve this power of resist­ance upon the Kings refusall? But he did not provide such forceable meanes as are challenged by the Bishop of Rome, under that pretence; and these meanes of a reserved power for resistance are as unreasona­ble on your part: if both of you should be put to prove your Traditi­ons, He for his Excommunicating or deposing of Kings in order to the Churches safety, and you for your reserved power of resistance in or­der to the States preservation, Conscience would find as little satis­faction in the one as in the other.

As for the matter of the Church, we turn (saith M. Bridge, pag. 33.) the Doctors argument upon himselfe, thus. If the Church cannot be preserved where the officer is an Heretick, unlesse it has power to reject him, neither can a Kingdome; when the officer is unfaithfull, unlesse it [Page 73]has power to reject him, neither can a Kingdome, when the Officer is un­faithfull, unlesse it has power either to depose Him, or to looke to it selfe. It was not my argument; I did but shew how the Papists use the like argument for the Churches safety, as you doe for the States; and if you back again wil gather strength for your assertion from their reasons, be as like as you will one to the other, I cannot helpe it, but I am for­ry for you (at least for the Religion you professe) that you are put to such shi [...]ts. But the Church hath Excommunication granted to it by Christ for its own preservation from Evills and Errors; and the Body Naturall hath power to deliver it selfe from its burden, therefore the Common wealth also cannot preserve it self, unlesse it have power to deli­ver it selfe from its burden, ibid. Then has this Church a Power of Ex­communication still; so it should be indeed, and the power cannot be taken away by any mortal authority; but since the Act, which tooke away the High Commission, and (as the party, you plead for, would have it interpreted) all Ecclesiasticall Censure too, where doth the Exercise of that power rest? upon whom now is the Argument turned?

The Body Naturall has power to disburden it self, so has the Com­mon-wealth too, but wil you have the naturall body disburden it self of the Head, or worke without it, and say I have no neede of thee? Or will you use letting of blood for the disburdning of the Natural body, when sweating or gentle purges may doe it? So in the Body Politick, when a calme Reformation may purge out noxious humors, will you put the sword into the rough hand of the people, which in stead of opening a veine will cut the Arteries and Sinewes of the Common­wealth? Ye are too desperate Physitians, and that is plainly seene by the Consumption and languishing Estate of this Kingdom.

It was urged in the former Treatise, as a reason against these meanes of safety by this power of resistance. (If the representative body of the people upon the Kings sailing in His trust, may take this power, then may the multitude by the like rule, upon the failing of their representatives in the discharge of the trust they were chosen for, take the power to themselves, for it is claimed by them) the Fuller Answerer replies, They cannot doe it, for the people have not re­sorved any power to themselves from themselves in Parliament, pag. 25. But it will be as hard for him to make them believe they have power no otherwise, as to make it appeare to us, there was any such power [Page 74]reserved at all; for when the people come to be spoiled in their E­states and Liberties, they will think it most unreasonable, that they should entrust themselves, and all they have, to such Arbitrary dispo­sing of their own Representatives; especially having been taught by this rule so easily to disclaime the Trust of their Soveraigne.

He that wrote the book called Plain English, saith expresly, that if the Representative body cannot or will not discharge their trust to the satisfaction of reason in the people, they may resume (if ever yet they parted with a power to their manifest undoing) and use their po­wer so far as conduceth to their owne safety; and M. Bridge (though here he brings reasons against the peoples recalling their Trust given to their representative body, yet) by his argument of selfe preser­vation at the beginning of his book, has taught them to say, It is na­turall for them to provide for themselves, and the act of Trust given to their Representative body is but by positive Law, and cannot destroy the Naturall.

But forgetting what he said of the Naturall Law of selfe pre­servation, he gives us reasons why the people should not take the power in such a case. 1. Because they cannot be so ready to think the Parliament (that is, the two Houses) neglect their trust, pag. 36. not think so? but if by Ordinances thence issuing, they be spoiled of their property and liberty (which is supposed in the Case) they will quickly feele it is so. 2. Because there is not that actuall designing and election af the Prince to the present affairs of the Commonweal, as there is of the Parliament men chosen for these particular businesses. This is bold, and sets aside both King and house of Lords, putting all upon the Sentence of those that are chosen by the people for the present affaires of the Kingdom, those are his words; and unto their sentence the people bind themselves to stand as parties disagreeing to doe the sentence of an Vmpire or Arbitrator, that is his similitude. What can be said more to the dissolving of the temper of three Estates in Parliament, and to the overthrow of this Government? 3. Because if the people, upon such surmises, should call in their trust and their power, they would leave themselves naked of all authority, and be private men. pag. 37. Naked of all authority? to doe what? to take up Arms? that must be your meaning; but what authority had they before the King cals them together? were they any other then private men? or does he by call­ing them give them authority to take Arms against him? And if the [Page 75]people should recall their trust, why should they think themselves in that condition more private men, then they were when at first (as you suppose) they elected a King? did they then being private men give (as you maintain) all power of Government, and will they conceive they cannot now use any? will they not as easily conclude they may free themselves from their Trust given to those Parliament men chosen by them, as renounce, according to your lessons, their Trust given to their Prince? in all reason they will hold their Repre­sentatives more accountable to them, then their Prince can be; who is entrusted for them immediately by God and themselves.

To this we may adde what he replies to the same purpose, pag. 42. The people doe all acknowledge that we are to be governed by Lawes, And they feel the want of it, and doe earnestly desire they may once again see this Kingdome so happy; Now the Parliament (as the Do­ctor saith) is the Iudge what is Law. He never said so, unlesse you mean the three Estates of Parliament; How then can the People think the Parliament doth any thing contrary to Low, when they are the Iud­ges of it? This is to make them Arbitrary; and all their commands Lawes, and to lead the people after them by an implicit faith; But e­nough of the power of declaring Law, and of these Arbitrary com­mands, Sect. 6. & 7.

Finally, M ^r Bridge endeavours to shew how they can answer the Oath of Supremacie, and the Protestation, by taking of Arms. If the Popish party should prevail, who knowes not that they will force the King to another Supremacie, or quickly make an hand of Him, Pag. 44. But who knowes not that the King (by Gods blessing) may prevail in the maintenance of His Crowne and Right (for which he is now forced to fight) without any prevailing of the Popish party? And who knowes not, if that party of Brownists and Anabaptists (which are now so prevalent in the Arms taken up against the King) should get the upper hand, what would become of the Kings Supremacy and this Government?

In the Oath of Supremacie we Sweare Him our Soveraigne to be Su­pream, in opposition to the Pope, or any other particular person. How doth our Doctrine or Practice infringe this, ibid. Is this all you can say for your Soveraignes supremacie? the Declaration of Parliament (as was shewn, Sect. 4.) teaches you another Doctrine, that He is Su­pream not so much in oppositiō to particular Persons, as in relation to [Page 76]the whole Body Politick of which he is the Head, and accordingly you should regulate your practice and obedience.

In our Protestation we protest to defend the Kings Person, and hom can we say with a good Conscience we do it, if we do not take up Arms in this time of Popish insurrection? ibid. you protest also to defend his Honour and Rights, which your Armes invade. And if the comming in of some Papists, in the duty of Allegiance, to His aid against your violences may be called a popish insurrection, (as you have the Art to make all things seem odious on the Kings part) it was caused by your [...]al [...]ing up Arms first, which the next Age will truly call an In­surrection.

Or can we (if we take not Arms) in Conscience say, we defend the Priviledge of Parliament in bringing in Delinquents to their Tryall, or the liberty of the Subject, or the truth of Religion? I presume every good man that makes conscience of his wayes, will not be backward to ad­vance this publique designe. You cannot in conscience say, but you have had the security of all those particulars offered and promised & might have had them better assured without your taking Armes, if you had not some farther reach in your Publick design. However you can overrule your own, and your Peoples conscience, yet all good men, that seriously consider your wayes, cannot but conceive, the priviledges of Paraliment, Liberty of the Subject, and truth of Religion have suffe­red most by this your pretended defence of them.

And now it is high time I say something (there need not much) to the Answerer that would not be known by his name, but would be noted by his Margin painted with Greek and Latin. He begins with Scripture, but staies not long upon it, speaking indeed lesse from that, then any of the other Answerers to whom I have already replyed. He insists chiefly upon the grounds of Reason borrowed from Anistotle, out of whom he would prove severall conclusions; those, which con­cern us, are touching elective Kingdoms, touching a power in the State to bring Kings to an account, and to depose a Tyrant.

We reply to what he has brought out of Aristotle touching those particulars; The Philosophers reasons may be good and usefull in the founding of a Government, but must they therefore obtain in this that is founded? If Aristotle like of Kingdoms that goe by choice, and approve the power which the Ephori had over their Kings in Sparta, would this man have it so here? Let him speak his Treason plainly in [Page 77]his own, not Aristotles words, and say, He would have a new Govern­ment, and Kings here made by choyce, and some Ephori set over them; surely he thought, as many moe did, of a new erection, and had fitted himselfe to give advice for it out of Aristotle. But however that Philisopher gives us many fine hints of Politicall prudence, if this man were put to it, to draw up that frame of that Government, which Aristotle seemes to approve, and by piece-meal to deliver, he would find the task very difficult, and we the Government very strange, such as I believe, never was nor will be, deserving almost as well to goe into the Proverb, as his master Plato's did; as for example, He would have Government goe by choyce, and that choyce to follow excellen­cy, now seeing excellency, as he notes in 3. Pol. is in Riches, or Pow­er, or Nobility, or Virtue, we cannot see now he provides for the con­tenting of those which excell in Riches, Power, or Nobility, that facti­ons may be prevented, and yet they, that excell in virtue, to carry the Government and be willingly obeyed of all, as he would have it in that book; but where and when will it be so unlesse in Plato's com­mon-wealth?

Well; Aristotle's reason may be good, and yet my reasons, in the 5. Sect. of the former Treatise against this power of resistance now assumed, stand firm too; why? because if that power be used to bring this Government into such a Mould, as this man phansies out of Aristole, can we expect any thing but a succession of Givill war? for will it not alwaies be more just for the Prince to endeavour the recovery of his Rights and power, where with he is invested by law, then it was for Subjects to force him from them? and this is not a­gainst Aristotle, who speaking of Kings in Barbarous Nations that have a power very neare to Tyranny, those Kingdomes, saith he, have their security, because the Government is established by law and the Custom of the Nation. l. 3. pol. c. 14. Will this man then have A­ristotl's reasons, belonging to such Governments as he described, take place here against the Regall power established by law and the Custom of the Nation? which establishment might give us Security too, but for such unquiet spirits as this man pleads for.

One step farther; this Answerer has also a long plea against, Ty­rants, for the forceable bringing them to account and taking them away, upon which, after he has spent many pages, he layes the con­clusion thus, It is lawfull for the Kingdom to depose a Tyrant, Pag. [Page 78]25. but many of his proofes seem to allow, it may be don by assassina­tion; I will not say it is his opinion, but he tells us of the praise of Cassius and Brutus, that they were Romanorum Vltimi, and according­ly styles some, in resistance now against the King, Anglorum Vltimos: he speakes of the taking away of Caligua, Nero, Domitian, of the sentence of Plotinus, Evil Kings rule by the Cowardlines of their Subjects, of which more below; so that the people had need to use more discretion in refusing such instances, then this man did in alledg­ing them; but if it must be done by deposing, his fellow Answer­ers are against it: and for the two Parliaments which he cites, the Observatour tells us, No King was ever deposed by a free Parlia­ment, let this man make the application.

He tells me he cannot find what I spoke out of Tertullian his Apol. yet cites me words within two lines of it. It runs thus in the Author, Si hostes, non tantum vindices occultos agere vellemus, deesset nobis vis numerorum & Copiarum? Vestra omnia implevimus, urbes, insulas, Castella, Castra; Cui bello non idonei, non prompti fuissemus, etiam im­pares copiis, si secundum istam disciplinam non magis occidiliceret, quàm occidere? Let the Answerer Consture these words, and he shall easily perceive they will render the sense that I gave of them, The Christi­ans had number and force sufficient to resist; but they had not warrant; And if he had looked a little before these words, he might have seen Tertullian affirming, the Christians had none such as Cassius among them.

Then out of his great reading, but small judgement (for he seems to turn his books by their Indices onely) he tells us, He believes the primitive Divines held not such Tenets as are of late started up concer­ning Kings, for if they did, surely the Parliament should have heard of it, Pag. 22. I beleive they did not indeed hold such, as are newly started up by those that the Houses have been willing to heare; for my part, it was not my purpose (though the performance had not been difficult) to tell the Parliament what the primitive Divines held, but only to let the people know, what Scripture and reason taught them to hold and rest upon.

But you give us some instāces out of antiquity. 1. Theoderet cites Plo­tinus his saying, Evil men raign by reason of the Cowardlines of their subjects, we must not so think of providence as to think our selves nothing. Ans. If Plotinus had spoken to your sense for the Deposing of Tyrants, [Page 79]the Authority had rested barely on Plotinus; for Theoderet cites him not to any purpose concerning Kings, but only to shew that Plotinus acknowledged Providence. Nor is your sense the meaning of Plotinus, for his drift is to shew that Providence expects our endeavours (not to the deposing or killing of Tyrantrs, as you desperatly insinuate, and therefore translate the word Cowardlines, which here signifies sloth­fulnesse, effeminacy, luxury, but) to the attaining of an happy and quiet life; unto which purpose he there shewes, how some men do bear the punishment [...], of their sloath and luxury; how others though evill, yet being laborious do reap more fruit of their tillage; and accordingly how evill men rule through the negli­gence and sloathfulnesse of others, that is, they being sedulous doe gain the Dominion, or being in it, they turne evill for the punishment of the sloath and vitiousnesse of their Subjects, for it followes immediat­ly, [...], (which you have left out) this is just; just? how? that they should be so punished; and no reason their happinesse should be procured by providence or good Governours, when they will doe nothing towards it themselves; this is the full and only meaning of Plotinus. Ennead. 3. l. 2. cir: med.

Secondly, Nicephorus you say, tells us, of the Godly zeale of a Noble­man who took down Dioclesians Proclamation, and tore it in pieces: I could also tell you out of Scripture of Peters zeale who did strike with the sword in defence of his Master; but was rebuked for it; for the zeale may be good and commendable when the action is not so, but an excesse, and not to be drawn into a Rule or example.

Thirdly, That Nicephorus tells us, The Christians under the King of Persia fled to Rome for succor, and how Atticus then Bishop of Rome obtained aid for them—and they were denyed to the Persian King de­manding his fugitive Subjects—we acknowledge such a story in Ni­cephorus, though no such matter when Atticus was Bishop of Rome, unlesse you should mean new Rome, that is Constantinople; it seems Nicephorus his manner of Calling those of that Eastern Empire by the name of Romans deceived you; but what does the true part of your story prove? that Subjects may fly from their persecuting King? or that one Prince may protect the Subjects of another Prince, when they are come into his Dominions for releife? be it so, neither of them will help your cause. But enough of these impertinences.

SECT. XIII. An Answer to what was replyed upon the two last Sections of the former Treatise.

IT was there said. The defence of Religion, and the Subjects Li­berty can be no other then pretences of this War — and, It con­cern's them that will resist upon the Principles, now taught, to render their Prince odious to his people—To these and the like sayings Mr. Bridge Replyes, These are sad charges, bold and scandalous asserti­ons, to charge a Parliament in the face of the world with Hypocrisie; He declamed against uncharitablenesse in others, where is now the Chari­ty of this man? These were not Charges upon a Parliament, but upon the chiefe Contrivers of, and Actors in this Resistance, as Mr Bridge might have observed in the former Treatise; upon these indeed they will lye sad and heavy, when he that knowes the heart shall disco­ver the Hypocrisie, and all those generous, and honest, and noble spi­rits, to whose eares the true information of things abroad is not suffe­red to come, shall see it (yea, and M ^r. Bridge too, if his heart be right) to their amazement. Nor does Charity bind the Conscience to con­tradictions, or to judge against sense; or from condemning one part, when it must Iudge between two, as at this time between the King and Subjects in Armes against Him; which rules of Charity were laid down and applyed towards the end of the former Treatise.

Whosees not how tender the Parliament hath beene of the Kings Ho­nour? therefore they charge all upon His Counsellors, as David [...]id up­on those about Saul, 1 Sam. c. 26. v. 19. If the Lord hath stirred the [...] up against me let him accept an assering; but if they be the Children of men, cursed be they before the Lord, for they have driven me out this day. And who sees not how tender His Majesty hath been of the reputati­on of Parliament charging the fault upon them that give the Counsell, and are the contrivers of all that is done against Him. Or who see [...] not how Davids words agree more properly to the King that ha's been driven out and hunted up and downe, then to His adversaries that have had their abode at pleasure, and Raigned without Him? but if they will needs speake the word, let them learn this lesson from them, If such as have unlawfully engaged a King, cannot other­wise [Page 81]be brought to Justice then by Subjects taking Armes and fighting against their King, it must not be done that way, but by referring the matter to God, as David did here.

The King is no more bound by vertue of His Oath to maintaine the Government of the Church, as by Law established, then any other Law of the Kingdome, which if the King and Parliament thinke fit to repeale, They may without breach of the Kings Oath. Suppose they should think fit to doe it, is it no more to take away a Government, which had the consent of the Catholike Church, and has been received and continued in this Land ever since the planting of the Christian Faith here, then to repeal any Law made but yesterday in comparison, and in materia particulari, of no such concernment? A fundamentall of the Government of the State may not be stirred, nor may the privi­ledges of some men be touched, and may the government of the Church be so easily torn up by the root and foundation? the Estates and Immunities of so many free Subjects taken away? But the King doth not think fit to do it, shall he then by Armes be forced from that, which He is both by Oath and Judgement bound to maintain?

Upon those words of the former Treatise (the Government of the Church by Bishops is simply the best; the abolishing whereof is one of those many inconveniences, which this Land is now threat­ned with, and which the King hath reason by power of Arms to di­vert) Mr. Bridge enters upon a loose discourse against Episcopall Go­vernment. I refor him for his better instruction to a book intituled, Episcopacy asserted, lately published and learnedly written. Then he breaks out. Now the Dr. shewes himselfe, be had rather the King­dome be embrewed in a bloody Warre, then Episcopacy should downe; Iudge yee, O all Englishmen, whether it bee better for you, to have this order taken away, then for the whole Kingdome to lye embrewed in their owne gore? Nay Mr. Bridge, you and your party in Armes shew your selves hereby what spirit yee are of, who will have this Land em­broiled in a bloody Warre, rather then Episcopacy, and some other things by Law justly established, shall not down; for that is the case, and so proposed in the former Treatise: and then judge all yee En­glish men, whether it be better for you to embrew this Kingdome in its own Gore, then to hold the ancient and primitive Government of the Church; and hear, O Heavens, and judge upon whom the guilt will lye; upon the King that will continue that Government, accor­ding [Page 56]to Law and oath, or upon them that by Armes would force Him from it?

To that of Sauls speare restored, Master Bridge replies; Though re­stored before demanded, yet not before Saul had humbled himselfe to Da­vid, saying, I have sinned, J will no more doe thee harm, because my soule was precious in thy sight this day.—We know what you looke for; If you blush not yet to have expected it, His Majesty has not been asha­med to doe it with a great condescention; He has even supplicated for Peace, He has redressed former miscarriages of Government with new additionalls of Grace, He has promised and protested for the fu­ture; Oh that He could say, My Soule has been precious in your eyes this day, this whole yeere; or that He could finde answerable humility in the hearts of Subjects, whose Ambition has caused His troubles and our miseries.

The Doctor defends the Kings entertainment of Papists by Davids ex­ample; but he must prove that Ziba, or those that resorted to David in his distresse were of another Religion, and by Law to be disarmed. What needs that? for the Doctor intended onely by those examples to shew, that a Prince in His necessary defence may entertaine such men, as otherwise He would not make use of, and may give some countenance to such as have relieved Him in distresse, though otherwise as ill deserving His Grace as a dissembling Ziba. And though, by Law, Papists are not to have Armes at their disposing, yet are they not quit of the duty and service of Subjects, they may by just authority beare Armes to use them according to the direction of that authority; and if a List of the Army against his Majesty were examined, there would be found, if not a con­fiderable number of Papists; yet of such as they, that imploy them, would have cause to be ashamed of, such as by Law are to abjure the Land, as men not to be held in with any government.

Upon the former particulars the Fuller Answerer is more bitter and malicious, interpreting every thing, that had sharpnesse in it, as spoken of the Parliament. It was said, That in such a case the State would be unreasonably exposed to the danger, that every prevailing Faction might bring upon it; This is, according to this mans inter­pretation, to call the Parliament, a prevailing Faction. It was said, That the people are made to believe by their good teachers, that the King was so and so affected, to whom no more need be said then the Arch­angell did to he Arch-accuser, The Lord rebuke thee, also that their [Page 57]preachings were the doctrines of this giddy age, and that many wicked Pamphlets, and bookes written by Enemies to Peace, were suffered to issue forth into every corner of this Land, This is according to this mans apprehension, to call the Parliament Declarations wi [...]ked Pam­phlets, and scandalous imputations of this giddy ag [...], and to liken them to the Devill the Arch-accuser. I had need say again to this man, the Lord rebuke thee.

Lastly, it was said. If the Papist will shew himselfe a good Subject, it is just and reasonable that the King, when He is put to it, admit his helpe, and the more shame for them, that professe the Protestant reli­gion, to force him to it. This is, according to this mans sense, to call the Papists good Subjects, better then the Parliament, how will Romering of this? The Papists have no cause to applaud themselves for any thing spoken by me, but this I can say, and say it upon experience, that they take occasion to be confirmed and hardened in their way, by the principles and practice of the adverse party: for how will Rome ring of this, That Protestants should take Armes against their King professing the same religion? that a concealed Tradition of a reserved power of resistance should so farre prevaile, and the people be so finely led on by an [...]mplicit faith to build upon it, that by vertue thereof the Oathes of Supremacy and Allegiance should be so easily dispen­fed with? that the Jesuites themselves should be cleane out done in the cunning of Lies and Forgeries to uphold a cause, that pretends religion?

This Answerer after a fit of railing concludes with Prayer. I shall onely [...]dde this short prayer, and with my very soule I speake it, God blesse the King and send us peace, and if it must not be till one side have prevai­led, I pray God it may be that side that loves the King best. Truth would not let me bitherto accord with this Answerer, but Charity now bids me joyne with him, and to adde unto his prayer; That it would please God to forgive that fide, which under pretence of love to the King, has so deeply wounded him in his Person and Kingly power, also that our peace may be restored, not through an absolute prevailing of either side by Armes, but through a loyall submission of that side, which has done the wrong to His Majesty and His People, by this Law­lesse resistance. Amen.

We have done with this man; Let us see how Mr. Burrows con­cludes the businesse, pag. 140. to the two last Sections which concer­ned [Page 84]matter of fact, he briefly thus answers, The Doctor puts the case thus Whether Conscience can be perswaded that the King is such, and so minded, as that there may be sufficient cause to take up Armes against Him? In this he is as miserably mistaken as in all his other grounds from Scripture and Re [...]son; for we take up no Armes against the King, and whatsoever the Kings minde be, there is sufficient cause to take Armes, to defend our selves against others that seek our ruine. Is it so that the Law is in your hand, and it concerns you not, What ever the Kings minde be? He is bound by Oath to protect you against those that seek your ruine, and accordingly has the power of the sword, and the de­fending of Armes; will you not then know whether it be his minde to defend you, but take the sword into your own hand? surely herein you are miserably mistaken, if you thinke this is not to take Armes against the King, and against that power which God and the Law en­trusts him with, for your protection. Or have you not read how Armes taken up by some in the latter end of the Queens time, to remove evill Counsellors, such as they pretended sought their ruine, were ad­judged a leavying of warre against the Queen? it will not helpe you, to say Your Arms are taken up by authority of Parliament; those were not, for that's not the point, you may see by this, your Armes are against the King, and his power and authority, if without it, under what pretence soever you may take them up.

If the King doe but deny to assist in delivering us from such dangers, and in delivering up Delinquents, there is cause enough to satisfie our Consciences in taking of Armes. It seems now it concernes you to know, what the Kings minde is, though not cause sufficient here to sa­ti [...]ie your Consciences, for you cannot say he denied this, till you put your selves out of His protection, and were your own protectors in Armes; Nay after you appeared in this posture, what was denied you from Nottingham, that might give you cause to proceed in Armes till you brought them to give the King battell? you take away His Armes and power against His will, you use them in battell to the im­minent endangering of His Person, and yet you take not Armes against him, and you can satisfie your Conscience of the lawfulnesse of it.

See now whether you can set such a Conscience before Gods tribu­nall, and there lay the plea as you doe, pag. 142. Lord thou who art the searcher of hearts knowest we aimed at no hurt to our King, we desi­red [Page 85]to live in Peace, to deliver our Kingdome and Parliament from the rage of ungodly men, to preserve what thy Majesty, what the Law of Nature, and of this Land hath made our own. Dare you justifie your selves thus at his Tribunall? you may blush to speak it before man, that knows not your hearts, but sees, how you have actually inva­ded the Kings Right and Power, and imminently endangered His Person, if the mercy of the Lord had not preserved Him; how you break through the Lawes of God and Nature, not to preserve what is your own, but to gain the Lord knows what? Thou tellest us, that it is not the part of a Christian, but of an Infidel, not to provide for his fa­mily. Dare you thus entitle Him to your blood-shed and rapines, whereby you provide for your selves? has he taught you to provide for the family of the Common-wealth by binding the master of the family, and smiting your fellow-servants? as those did, Mat. 24.49. For the substance of what we have done, it hath been in thy name, that we may be faithfull to our King, Kingdome and Parliament, Pardon we beseech thee the failings. Let your ends which you pretend, be never so specious, if the means you use be not Lawfull and Warrantable, as they are not, for the very substance of them, either by the Law of God or Man, your plea will not hold, but your account will be heavy for all the blood shed and miseries this Land has groaned under, which might have been prevented if Reason would have satisfied you: Now the Lord that is at hand, grant you moderation, and then we doubt not, but (with his blessing) we shall have Peace in good time, to the restoring of his truth, the Kings Honour and Rights, the due Priviledges of Parliament, and the Subjects Liberty.