Brief Answers to the severall Reasons given by the Commons at a Conference with the Lords, why they will have the three Bills sent and signed by the King before a Treaty.
The Reasons, as collected and printed by an especiall Order of Parliament, are these:
1. Reason. IF these Bills be not passed before the Treaty; the Parliament will leave their friends in such a condition, as they cannot be able to defend them, who have stood for them.
Answer. This Reason looks only to the defence of their friends, who have stood for them: and not to the defence of the Kingdome, Church, and People, who keep and maintaine them.
2. They say of their friends in generall; not qualifying them by just, honest, good; but be they what they will, (if their friends, who have stood to them in their wicked designes, tending to the unsupportable miseries of the People,) yet these they must defend, be they who they will, or be they never so many.
3. But if these friends deserve, or are capable of, defence, why are not the Commons able to defend them in a Treaty? the Lords and your selves, for whom they have stood, being the Treaters or Judges (for the most part) in the case controverted.
4. Stands this to honesty or reason? that rather then not defend such friends in unjust wayes, you will hazzard the declared good of the Kingdome, a Treaty? Me thinks with wise, just and good men, this should not be urged as a Reason. But the second happily will make amends for this, which is,
2. Reason. If they prevaile who p [...]esse on this Treaty, such godly Divines who are placed by the Parliament, shall be put out, and scandalous Ministers restored to their places.
Answer. Before I answer the Reason, I shall examine some passages in the words and phrases; as,
1. Why they call themselves not the House, or Houses in Parliament, but the Parliament it selfe; which cannot be without the [Page 2] King, who by our Lawes, (Sir Edw. Cook, M. St. Johns, Pym, &c.) is the Head, the beginning and end of our Parliaments.
2. That they whom the one or the other House hath placed, are called Divines; as though they were the onely Divines, the learned in that profession: and not so onely, but as though they are the only holy, upright, and therefore called the godly Divines.
3. But the others whom they have put our, although for no other reason then that the other might be put in to serve the two Houses, these and all these without exception, are but Ministers, Servants, and that scandalous too: so that their Geese are Swans, white, godly Divines, all holy Pharisees; and all the rest foule black birds, or scandalous, very Publicans.
4. Where they say, these Ministers shall be restored to their places, imply they not that these places are justly the Ministers, and not lawfully belonging to their Divines?
But not to insist on words and phrases, what reason is there in this, that rather then their so called Divines should leave what they unlawfully hold, or come to a triall (whether they be fitter to hold, or the other Ministers to be restored) that we shall have no peace nor Treaty? Ahab that idolatrous bloody Tyrant was more just and reasonable then these Reasoners; for though he accounted the Prophet the troubler of Israel; yet he would treat, or put it to a triall, whether Elijah the Prophet, or Jezebels Priests were the better, and more deserving for Gods Service; and not hazard all rather then put this to the triall.
3. Reason. If we treat with the King about calling in His Majesties Declarations, wee give a great advantage to the King against our selves.
Answer. If the Declarations on the Kings part be just, and according to Law, why not give the King leave to treat, whether he should reca [...]l them? whereas if they be unjust, what need you fear, but that they shall be recalled?
2. Nay, what need you feare, when as the King hath promised, so a peace may be setled, that be they never so just and lawfull on his part, yet for your sakes he will recall them?
3. But still see, that as the other two Reasons of a Treaty and Peace look'd upon their friends: so this minds only themselves, and that so farre, that they will rather hazzard all, then adventure to give an advantage to the King, (as they say) against themselves.
4. Reason. If the three Bills be not passed; they give oportunity to have the power of Parliament questioned for all the blood spilt in the late warres, which never was questioned by any of his Majesties Predecessors.
Answer. 1. That the Parliament, (i.) the King & the two Houses have power to make warre, (wherein blood may be and is spilt) is out of question.
2. But grant that the two Houses have without just power spilt so much blood: must we want peace rather then they shall heare of it, though without punishment.
3. Or rather then the two Houses should be questioned, whether they have such a power, must we be without a Treaty and Peace, and so fall into a new warre to the spilling of more blood? and must this stand for a Reason too?
4 When they say the like was never questioned by any of his Majesties Predecessors: we usually say a Negative of fact cannot be proved, especially in such a case, and after so great revolution of yeares and times: therefore had the Reasoners said, the like hath not for ought we read, or find; it had been more modest and more worthy of beliefe, then to say the like never was.
5 But if the like never was, the Reason may be, because the like Rebellion or Warre never was in the times of any his Majesties Predecessors. There hath been warres in the times of his Majesties Predecessors, between Party and Party, who should be the right Heire, and so should enjoy the Crowne: or between the King and Barons, for obteining and upholding each others rights; and betwixt the King and the rascality of the People, when those the Taile would usurp a power over the King the Head. But the like Warre as this: when after the King had redressed all their just grievances by so many Acts confirmed; when after he had given them more of his own just Rights from his Crowne, then ever King in this Land before him did; when after promise of granting more, and more then they should in justice and reason demand; yet after all this, to prosecute him with warre; to defame him to the world by black and false aspersions; to draw away the affections of the People; to imprison and hazard his sacred Person to the malice or divellish rage of base and unworthy People: I say (and it appeares by our best Histories) that the like of this was never known in the Reignes of any his Majesties Predecessors: and therefore in this respect well it may be said, that the like spilling [...]f [Page 4] blood was never questioned by any of his Majesties Predecessors. And then from hence, no more in reason can be concluded, then this or the like; That this act of theirs, being unparalell'd, it may with justice be questioned; though not to punish the present Actors, yet to keep after-times from acting the like. But out of question it stands not with reason, that rather then it should be questioned, how, or by whom so much blood hath been spilt, that therefore we should have no Treaty, or peace; but go on, and ingage in a war, to the shedding of floods of innocent, and guiltlesse blood.
1. And by the way observe, what may in some sort answer, confute, or deny these to be Reasons: whereas the three Bills to be sent and signed by the King, are,
- 1. For the Militia.
- 2. Religion and Church-government.
- 3. For the recalling of his Majesties Declarations, &c.
That there is not in all, nor in any part of their Reasons, one word, or syllable, concerning Religion, or Government of the Church; although in their Protestation, Covenant, and Declarations; they have usually to deceive the People, put and profest Religion and the Church in the first place, as the maine peece of their principall care and endeavour.
2 Observe, whether in all their Reasons, there be the least care, or any mention of preserving the Lawes of this Kingdome; of the Rights of the King; or safety of his Person; or of the Liberty and Propriety of the Subject; or of the Publke-weale; how to keep the Kingdome in wealth, safety, and honout, and to preserve the People from effusion of more blood.
3 Observe, whether all and every particular in their Reasons, do not speak, or tend only to the maintenance of their unjust, unlimited, usurped power in Parliaments; thereby instead of our good, certain, known Laws, to rule us by tyrannicall destructive Ordinances; which are daily changeable; and certain only in this, that they tend to the maintenance of the power and profit only of themselves and their friends, but to the disgracing and debasing the King and his Subject; and the impoverishing and ruining the People and Kingdome; or to keep themselves, their wicked Instruments, and Adherents, not only from triall, or judgement, but from giving any answer, or account for all or any their unjustice, oppression, pursing the Kingdomes money: but instead thereof, for want of a Treaty, to be able to defend themselves and their Complices, in [Page 5] the continuance and pursuit of all their wicked courses. And had not the Divell (as we usually say) owed them a shame, or rather had not God suffered them, for their many horrible sins of grosse hypocrisie, injustice, murder, oppression, irreligion, to have blinded them, (who are so wise in their generation) could a man conceive that in all their reasons they would have forgot the Worship of God; the Government of the Church; the good and safety of the King; the welfare of the Kingdome? but let all these sink and swim, so they can provide but for themselves, and for such as they may strengthen to stand by and for them.
1. In conclusion and to summe up the strength of these Reasons: whether or to what end really do they tend, but selera seleribus tueri, to defend mainteine and continue their former exorbitant courses; by a pretext of securing themselves and friends; and at the best the holding up of an usurped power among themselves; which cannot be but by an addition of injustice to injustice, blood to blood and sinne to sinne, untill sinne become unmeasureably sinfull; and such as can expect no better fruit then confusion and destruction?
2. What is the end of all their reasoning, but to preferre the particular beings, estates and powers of some private persons, before the publike worship of God, the weale of three Kingdomes; which are in hazard, if not in a too neere certainty of ruine by a new warre.
3. But that the Commons should be the Reasoners and Judges in this case, is most unjust and unreasonable; for,
Judges ought to be men knowing the Law, and understand-throughly, and perfectly the cases wherein they are to be Judges. Now in sober sadnesse & a little truth, tell me; are all they who have voices among the Commons, & by whose voices these actions & reasons are maintained, are they I say all such known men, in the Lawes of God, and man, of right reason, and best governing a Kingdome, as to be able to distinguish, vote, and judge in such high points? And if you tell me that for matter of Religion and Church, they have the Assembly of Divines to instruct them, for matters of Law Gentlemen of the long robe, and for matters of State some wise and experienced Politick to guide them, and must I take this for a satisfactory answer that all is well done that is thus done, and voted by such ignaroes, for is it fit that he shouln sit as Judge, who wanting knowledge of his owne, must rely upon the judgement of an other, and so make his conscience ride upon another soules back.
[Page 6]But grant that all the Commons were able in point of knowledge to be Iudges, yet can we grant (that which is contrary to all reason, justice, and law) that parties to be judged should be Judges? and who can deny, but that if not all, yet 9. or 8. or 7. parts of the whole Commons now voting are parties in this cause, wherein they take upon them to be Judges? for is not he in all reason, justice and law, held and taken to be a party, who either hath gain'd, doth gain, holds or hopes to gain by the case wherein he is to judge? For, is it not presumed, and on good reason, that such a man by his self-love and proper interest, will forget upright Judgement, and leane to himselfe in his own cause? And if this be granted, which cannot be denied, then tell me, how many either of their Assembly of Divines at Westminster, or of their Gentlemen of the Long Robe in that House, or of the wise men amongst them, either have not had, or now have not offices, places or things of profit and power, which they are unwilling to lose, or be called to question for the holding or abusing of them? and I dare say, that of each hundred in the House there are not twenty, but have had, or now have places of profit and honour, held by the power and continuance of this Parliament, either in Offices, sequestred Estates, Lands of King, Queen, Prince, or Church, or in Pentions, Salaries, keeping of Parks, Forrests, or the like; insomuch that the words of the Prophet are here verified, Micha 3.11: The heads thereof judge for reward, and the Priests thereof teach for hire, and the Prophets thereof divine for money.
Ob. But some happily will say, if these cases debarre the Commons to be the Judges in this case, then we must leave all to the King, or who else shall be the Judge?
Resp. I answer, that the right power of judging is knowne and discerned by the Commission that grants and directs that power; and the Commission (as it were in this case) must be the Writ (as it's called) of Summons to the Parliament; and when the Writ of calling the Commons is ad consentiendum & faciendum, to assent and doe, the Writ as Commission to the Lords is ad tractandum & impertiendum consilium, and (with the King) ad judicandum de arduis negotiis, &c. Whence I conceive I may rightly inferre, that the Lords, or especially the Lords rather then the Commons, should be Judges in this case; and if their judgement may be heard, then a Treaty without sending the Propositions should be had.
[Page 7]Again, if it be required that Judges should be free from partiality, to be led by affection, or interest: then I conceive, that though some of the Lords may be somwhat tainted here with: yet they are not so much infected, or not so many, and so deeply as these of the Commons are.
If I should grant, that in our cases, or at other times, the Commons in such or the like case might Judge, as being the Representees of the People in England: yet if it appeare that these Representees have deceived the generall trust, and have acted either to their own private or wicked publike-ends: why may not the people recall their grant, and resume their own Power to Judge? add, that the Cōmons have deceived their trust is apparent, by their pointblank voting against, and crossing the Petitions of London, other Counties, and the hearty desire of the whole Kingdome for a Treaty.
Ob. But you will aske if this power of judging what is fit to be done, in this point of Treaty bee taken from the Commons, then who shall judge for the People?
Resp. And I aske, who shall judge for them, the People, but the People themselves? for the Commons were chosen but as Representees for them; to put up from time to time, as sodaine occasion should bee offered, the desires and minds of the People; who could not at all times, and upon all occasions be present themselves: Whereas now in this Case, when the People both Understand, Petition, and call for Reliefe, if their Representees will not heare, nor move, nor vote for them; why should they not be heard speaking themselves: and I am sure in the beginning of this Parliament, it was thus practised, and not long since declared by both Houses: That it is the proper byrth-right of the Subject to Petition, that they may be heard; and accordingly they were, for a long time, to effect.
But if you now are against this popular way of pleasing the many, by hearing their Petitions: which at first was held the right way, or the way to guide the two Houses: then why suffer you not the People to heare their chiefe Magistrates, and wise-men, speaking and moving for them: for, can it bee conceived that the People eight yeeres agoe (wrought by feare, favour, wine or money, to choose you [Page 8] their Representees) should bee tied and bound up to defend, doe, and suffer; what you, all dayes of your lives, shall vote; though it bee never so wicked, un-just, or against them or the Kingdome.
Instead then of the Case, as put by the Reasoners, I conceive the Case will bee this: That if no Treaty nor Peace can be had: then unavoidably must follow a decay of Trade; waste of the Wealth and Men of this Kingdome; the confusion of Religion, Law, and Justice, the necessary concomitants and consequents of un-civill-Warre and Arbitrary Government.
And then the question will and must be briefly this: Whether in point of Religion, Law, Justice and Policie, all these should bee certainly and necessarily brought on, rather then some few inconsiderable persons, who have transgressed all Law by God and man, by false worship, taking Gods name in vaine, prophaning his holy-day, dishonouring their parent; by murther, theft, false witnessing, should bee put but in an hazard to answer for their transgressions? I say but in an hazard to answer their transgressions: For unlesse these men shall bee willfully, and obstinately set, to maintain, continue, and goe on in their former wicked wayes; they may have hope; nay they have a royall promise; and themselves are able in the Treaty to make it good, to obteine a generall pardon for all; both for themselves, their friends, and their so called Godly Divines.
And to make this grant, and pardon the more sure, and binding; they shall not only have the words, and faithfull promise, and the assent of the King to an act in Parliament; but the concurrence of this, and the other two Kingdomes; many if not the most of which, are ingaged as well, though not so much, as these commons: So that there is nothing that they can object against this Pardon, and assurance, but that they cannot; which is indeed, that they will not trust; and trust they cannot, or will not; that they may hereby hold, and continue their usurped power, and unjust gain; which in effect is as much as to say: Rather then they will forgoe these by a Treaty and Peace; they will plunge not only the People of this, but of the two other [Page 9] Kingdomes; not only into an hazard, but into the certain losses of estates, and lives, and into a waste if not an utter ruine and destruction of three Kingdoms: which the People of the three Kingdomes (if God shall please to endow them with Wisdome, Judgement, and Resolution) will not suffer, but will rise, and joyne as one man to withstand and prevent.
2. The Reasons why the Commons are more averse to a Treaty, and so to Peace, then the Lords; are especially three; which hang upon these three cords, not easily to be broken (1.) Profit, (2.) Power, (3.) Reputation; in which the Commons gaine, and the Lords, in generall, lose.
For the matter of Profit: some of the Commons by their art and power in Parliament, gaine yeerely many thousands; divers get thousands, and very few of them but by Offices, sequestred-Estates, Pentions, keeping of Parkes, Forrests; enjoying the Lands of King, Queene, Prince, and of the Church, have and receive good yeerely incomes: for it hath beene the policy of the leading men, to invite and perswade some few men (once of reasonable Consciences and more modest Soules) to take such Places and Lands, &c. as before mentioned; thereby not only to keepe them silent from speaking against their Leaders: but hereby to keep their mouthes open to cry I and No: and to so vote for, or against, what shall be directed by them, or as they heare Joller and Jumper mouthe it first: Wheras the Lords the while (though perhaps the Speaker, the Keeper of the Seale, some chiefe Committee-men and others, may gaine by Bribes) Yet such Lords as have great revenues, by the continuall Taxes assessed, quartering of Souldiers, &c. must eyther abate or allow their Tenants in their rents, and so at the yeeres end become loosers.
And if you object that this likewise befalls the Commons as well as the Lords. I answer, that the least part of the Commons have any great store of Lands: and those who have; either by their power they can moderate and lighten [Page 10] their taxes laid on their lands; or else they have recompence 3, 5, 10, 20. for one, by their other places, offices, or wayes of getting.
If therefore according to their selfe-denying Ordinance of 4. Aprill 1645. and their votes of the 10. of June 1647. those Commons should bee deprived of those places, and wayes of gaining; and be left to beare their own charge; and which is worst of all, to stand to the hazard, whether (when all profit ceaseth) they might at last obteine a pardon? you shall find them forward enough; yea try them this way, and I dare warrant they shall out-mouth the Lords for a Treaty.
Especially if you can but clip them of that power, which they have in ruling more then the Lords; or if it be but to take them off the power in ruling the Lords themselves; for how immensely, might I not say, how infinitely have the Commons in this Parliament extended their priviledge, and power beyond all measure and bound? not over and against the King, and all their fellow Subjects; but even over and against the Lords too; for when (as it appeares by their severall writs, which give and limit each of their powers) the Peeres are called to advise and councell the King; and the Commons to assent and doe what shall bee so advised; and when as the Commons, witnesse Sir Ed. Cooke, are but as the grand Inquest to the Peers; who with the King are the only Judges; yet is it not so come to passe, that in this Parliament, when the Commons have first debated and voted; that they then have sent to the Lords, willing them to concurre? and in case that they should not, that then the names of the dissenting Lords should bee transmitted to the Commons, and so by them to bee voted and declared enemies to the State? witnesse the message sent to the Lords by an eminent Member of the Commons Jan. 1641. and when all power of judicature is in the Lords house, by reason of the Kings sitting there; and all Pardons of high nature doth belong only to the King: have not the Commons, witnesse their late Order 17. July 1641. taken upon them to give sentence upon the high insurrection (as they call it) in Kent? and to grant, publish, and proclaim a Pardon to so many as they please? and all this without the Lords.
[Page 11]And the Commons having thus Lorded it in power over the Peeres. it is easie to conceive, whether the Lords or Commons beare the greater sway? or have the greater power in pleasing or displeasing, punishing or rewarding either Souldier, Committee-men or the Subject in generall?
Especially when you consider, what is generally observed, that when the Commons keepe to that which they call their Priviledge, not to bee impeached, sequestred their places, or judged by the Peeres: yet the Peeres in this Parliament have been impeached, sequestred, and sentenc'd by the Commons.
Which being so, believe it, where the power is in ruling there will the opinion follow, of honouring and obeying, and by these two advantages of profit, and power, the Commons have gained to themselves the 3. cord of reputation, and esteeme above the Lords, and therefore will bee, as hitherto they are, more averse to the Treaty, and Peace then the Lords are, or will bee, insomuch as they shall bee greater loosers then the Lords by this Treaty and Peace, and as greater in losse, so more in feare and danger then the Lords.
Not only in that they have over-powred and out-acted the Lords in the highest breach of Law and Loyalty, but in that they have given one to another such large summes of the mony of the Kindome, which by their own Ordinances should have beene otherwise disposed: and for this in a Treaty, some happily feare a questioning, and some, if they be able, a refunding: Others may feare, and justly, that they shall bee called to a reckoning for the vast summes of money by them received, and not accounted for; except perchance in a cursory way one to another: and what satisfaction can this bee to the true man, that the theeves have divided and accounted each to other the true mans goods? might I not adde that divers of them are, or justly might bee afraid of a Treaty; least that they heare of the divers insolencies, injuries, oppressions, bribes, yea and thefts committed by them, contrary not only to law, but to their own Ordinances.
And may I not yet add, the strange never before heard of like priviledge; that for so many yeares, many of them have [Page 12] kept themselves from paying their just debts; yea and hazarding by the length of this Parliament the utter defrauding of their creditors for ever; there being a Statute of Limitation, 21. Jac. c. 16. which confines all suits to certain yeares, which this Parliament hath exceeded already: and by this meanes, all actions against these debtors (being Parliament men) are frustrate and void in Law; and who can or dare sue a Parliament-man? least hee bee either committed to prison, whether the debtor ought to bee sent, or enjoyned to release the debt; as some have beene constrained to doe this Parliament.
Lastly, The guilt and horror of Conscience is so great and clamorous to many of the leading Grandees in this Parliament, that they dare not trust themselves in a Treaty with the King, nor with God, or good men, and not, but only with an Army, and that of such Souldiers as shall bee of their own choice and pay; who therefore will bee ready on all turnes, to prosecute their never so unjust, and divelish commands, bee they either against the King, the Kingdom, or God himselfe? of all which wee have had too great, and too long wofull experience.
3. Some brief Reasons▪ shewing that it is safer & better for this Kingdom & the two houses in Parliament to Treat with the King, though he will not signe the three Propositions before the Treaty: then to engage in a new warre, in Case the King should refuse the so joyning of them.
For 1. It's more then probable that the king wil not signe the Propositions before the Treaty: (1) Because he hath already declared both his will and reasons against the so signing of them; and that when hee had no such hope or appearance of help and relief as now he hath: (2) Because Hee knoweth the Kingdome of Scotland hath protested against his so signing these Propositions; and that the then Protestation is now again avowed in the late Declaration of their Estates to bee the sence of their Kingdom: (3) Because the English Lords in this Parliament have given & publish't many strong and unanswerable reasons against the sending these Propositions before the Treaty: wherein they concur both with the [Page 13] King, and the Kingdome of Scotland. (4) Because not only the City of London, but the greatest and most considerable Counties, Professions, and conditions of men in this Kingdome joyne in the pressing a speedy Treaty, without relation to the Propositions. (5) Because the premitting these Propositions is urged and prosecuted mainly, if not only, by one Faction or Party, and is not seconded but by those who are interessed by places of profit, and honour; or by feare of comming to an account or after reckoning. (6) Because these two last parties, though joyned in one, yet cannot by the hundreth part answer the number and power of those who will and are ready to oppose them in the three Kingdomes.
2. And let those who are apt to engage in a new Warre know, that as the fortune and successe of all, even the best warres is doubtfull; so that the event of this at least on their part is most hazardous; because it is against the desires, the safety, and good of three Kingdomes: all which will first, or last joyn together to maintaine their own desired safety and good against that party; who ever, whose plots, designes, and arts so evidently appeare, tending to the confusion and Destruction of the Church and Common-Wealth.
3. But grant that the party, who are for a Warre rather then a Treaty, should in a battell or two get the better: yet can they conceive that hereby the warre were ended, or that a peace, indempnity, or safety were concluded on their parts? No rather this would stirre up and inflame the people in three Kingdomes to more hot and bloody warres: and these must necessarily draw on a decay of trade, a wasting of the wealth, and men, and thereby hazarding the ruine of this Kingdom: for it cannot be imagined that three Kingdomes, or the greater part of them will rest, and ly down to suffer the tyrany of one faction or Party, because it hath once or twice overcome them in battell.
4. Whereas if this party, who are for a warre rather then a Treaty, should but once bee overcome and scattered in any one pitcht field or battell; it is not probable that they should ever bee able to rise, recruit again, and to stand in battell against all their Opponents in three Kingdomes; who will bee as carefull to keep them, as they were willing to beate them, downe?
5. And if this should come to passe, that they were once beaten & scattered; (1) then in what danger may they be, who have plotted, fomented, and maintained this warre? (2) in what case will all the Monopilizers of Offices and places of profit bee? (3) in what state will not only the Excise and Committee-men be, of the severall Counties? but even they of the two Houses, for the many insufferable injuries and oppressions laid on their fellow Subjects? (4) How may it fare with all those who without any account have for so many yeares together ingrossed the greatest part of the wealth of this rich Kingdome? (5) Yea, may it not bee feared, that not only the Bills which in this Parliament might have beene yeelded unto, but those Acts allready passed may suffer question, opposition, or a repeale, as being obteined by fraud or force? (6) Nay, may it not hereafter weaken the honour, priviledge, and power of Parliaments for ever, when the power of this shall be conquered by the Sword?
6. All which feares and daungers may readily bee taken away by Acts of Pardon and Oblivion; and these may as easily bee obteined and granted by a free-Treaty: I add by a free-Treaty; for if the King cannot obteine Liberty, nor a Treaty, unlesse hee first signe the Propositions; then neither will this signing the Propositions bee of force to binde him, hee beeing not at Liberty at the time of signing: nor can the Treaty it selfe bee construed free, because it was obteined and held per asperte