1 LAW. Object. 1.

The first and strongest Objection, (which I shall therefore propose to the most advan­tage of the Objectors) is that which is grounded upon the LAWS, and their Ob­ligation, For it may be objected,

1 That an Humane Law rightly esta­blished, so long as it continueth a Law, obligeth the Subject (and that for Conscience sake) to the observation thereof, in such manner and form as in the said Law is pre­scribed, and according to the true meaning and intention of the Law­giver therein.

2 That a Law is then understood to be rightly established, when it con­taineth nothing but what is honest and lawfull, and is enacted by such person or persons as have full and sufficient Authority to make Laws.

3. That a Law so established, conti­nueth a Law, and is in force till it be either repealed by as good and full Authority, as that by [Page 12]which it was made, or else anti­quated by a long continued (un­enforced) disuse, with the tacite presumed consent of the Law­giver.

4 That the Act printed before the Common Prayer Book, and enti­tled [ An Act for the Ʋniformity of, &c.] was such a Law: being it was established in a Full and Free Parliament, and in peaceable times, and ratified by the Royal Assent.

5 That it still continueth in force; Be­ing not yet repealed, but by such persons, as (at least in the opinion of those that maintain the dispute) for want of the Royal Assent, have not a sufficient Right or Authority to do such an Act: nor disused, but of late time, and that by enforce­ment, and (as is presumed) much against the Mind and Will of the Law-giver.

6 That therefore it still reteineth the power of obliging in point of Con­science: That power being so es­sential and intrinsecal to every [Page 13]Law, quatenus a Law, that it can in no wise be separated from it.

7 And that therefore no Minister pub­lickly officiating in the Church can with a good Conscience, either omit any part of that which is com­manded by the aforesaid Law; or use any other form then what is conteined in the aforesaid Book: But must either use the form pre­scribed in the Book, or else for­bear to officiate.

The Answer to this Objection, (granting all in the Premises besides) dependeth upon the right understanding of that which is affirmed concerning the obliga­tion of Laws, according to the intention of the Law-giver. Which if it should be understood precisely, of that particular actual and immediate intention, which the Law-giver had in making of any particu­lar Law, and is sufficiently declared by the words of the Law, will not hold true in all cases. But there is supposed besides that, in the Law-giver, a more general habitual and ultimate intention, of a more excellent and transcendent nature then [Page 14]the Former, which is to have an influence into, and over-ruling power over all particular Laws; viz. An intention by the Laws to procure and promote the publick good.

The former intention bindeth, where it is subservient to the Letter, or consistent with it; and consequently bindeth in ordinary cases, or else the Law is not an wholesome Law. But where the obser­vation of the Law by reason of the con­juncture of circumstances or iniquity of the times (contingencies which no Law­giver could either certainly fore-see, or, if fore-seen, sufficiently provide against) would rather be prejudicial then advan­tagious to the publick, or is manifestly attended with such inconveniences and grievous consequents to the observers, as all the imaginable good that can redound to the publick thereby, cannot in any reasonable measure countervail; in such case the Law obligeth not, but according to the latter and more general intention only. Even as in the operations of Na­ture, particular agents do ordinarily move according to their proper and particular inclinations: Yet upon some occasions and [Page 15]to serve the ends and intentions of uni­versal Nature (for the avoiding of some­thing which Nature abhors) they are sometimes carried with motions quite contrary to their particular Natures: as the Air to descend, and the Water to ascend, for the avoiding of vacuity, &c.

The common received Maxime (which hath been sufficiently misapplied, and that sometimes to evil purposes, since the be­ginning of these unhappy divisions) in the true meaning of it looketh this way; Salus populi suprema lex. The equity of which Maxime, as it leaveth in the Law­giver a power of dispensing with the Law (which is a suspension of the obligation thereof for the time, in respect of the proper and particular intention) as he shall see it expedient in order to the pub­lick good: So it leaveth in the Subject a liberty upon just occasions (as in cases of great exigency, and for the preventing of such hazards and inconveniences as might prove of noisome consequence to the publick) to do otherwise then the Law requireth. And neither is the exer­cise of that power in the Law-giver, to be thought an unreasonable prerogative, nor the [Page 16]use of this liberty in the Subject, an un­reasonable presumption: In as much as the power of dispensing with particular Laws is such a prerogative, as without which no Common-wealth can be well governed, but Justice would be turned into Gall and Wormwood; nor can the Supreme Go­vernour, without forfeiture of that faith­fulness which he ows to the publick Weal, divest himself thereof. And he that pre­sumeth of the Law-givers consent to dis­pence with him for the observing of the Law, in such needfull cases (where he hath not the opportunity to consult his pleasure therein) presumeth no more then he hath reason to do: For it may well be presumed that the Law-giver, who is bound in all his Laws to intend the safety of the publick, and of every memeber thereof in his due proportion; hath no intention by the strict observation of any particular Law to oblige any who is a member of the publick to his destruction or ruine, when the common good is not an­swerably promoted thereby. Upon which ground it is generally resolved by Casuists, that No Constitution (meerly humane) can lay such obligation upon the Conscience of [Page 17]the Subject, but that he may (according to exigence of Circumstances) do otherwise then the Constitution requires; provided it be done extra casum scandali et con­temptus, that is to say, Without either betraying in himself any contempt of the authority the Law-giver by his carriage, or giving any just occasion of scandal to others by his example in so doing.

I have been somewhat the larger in ex­plaining this point, not only for the better clearing of the present doubt, but also in re­spect of the usefulness of this consideration, for the preventing and removing of many scruples that may happen to consciencious men in such times as these, wherein so many things are (and are like to be) commanded and forbidden, contrary to the established Laws, and those (as they are perswaded) yet standing in force. The best Rule that I know, to guide men in their deliberations and actions in such emergent cases (according to what hath been already delivered) is advi­sedly and impartially to weigh the Bene­fits and Inconveniencies as well on the one side as on the other, and then com­pare them the one with the other, as [Page 18]they stand in relation to the publick good. And if after such examination and comparison made, it shall then evi­dently (or but in judgment of probabi­lity) appear, that the observation of the Law, according to the proper inten­tion of the Law-giver therein, though with hazard of Estate, Liberty or ever Life it self, hath a greater tendency to the publick good, and the preservation of Church or Common-wealth in Safety Peace and Order, then the preventing of the aforesaid hazards or other evil con­sequents, by doing otherwise then the Law requireth, can have: Or (which cometh to one) if the violating of the Law shall then appear to be more preju­dicial to the publick good, then the pre­servation of the Subjects Estate, Liberty or Life, can be beneficial thereunto. In such case, the Subject is bound to hazard all he hath, and to undergo whatsoever inconveniences or calami­ties can ensue thereupon, rather the violate the Law, with contempt of that Authority to which he oweth subjection. But if it shall, after such comparison made evidently (or but more probably then [Page 19]the contrary) appear, that the preservation of such a persons Life Liberty or Estate, would more benefit the Church or Com­mon-wealth, then the punctual observa­tion of the Law, at that time, and with those circumstances, would do: It were an unseasonable, unreasonable and perni­cious scrupulosity, for such a person to think himself in that case obliged, for the observing of the Law (perhaps but once or twice) with little or no benefit to the publick, to ruine himself, whereby to render himself unusefull and unservice­able to the publick ever after.

To bring this discourse home, and to apply it to the business now under dis­pute: Suppose we, ten, twenty, or an hundred godly Ministers, well affected to the established Liturgie, and actually possessed of Benefices with charge of Souls to them belonging, should think them­selves in conscience obliged to use the whole form of the Book, as is by the first appointed, without any addition, omission or alteration whatsoever, and should not­withstanding the present conjuncture of Affairs, [...]resolve to use the same accord­ingly; it would be well considered, what [Page 20]the effects and consequents thereof would be. Besides other evils these three are visible, which must all unavoidably fol­low, one upon another, if any body shall be found (as doubtless within a short time there will be found some or other) to inform and prosecute against them.

1 The utter undoing of so many wor­thy persons, fit to do God and his Church service, together with all those other persons that depend upon them for livelihood; by put­ting the fruits of their Benefices whereby they should buy them­selves Bread, under Sequestration.

2 The depriving those persons of the opportunities of discharging the Duties that belong unto them in their Ministerial Calling; in not permitting them after such Sequa­stration, to teach or instruct the people belonging to their Charge or to exercise any thing of their Function publickly in the Church.

3 The delivering over the Sheep of Christ, that lately were under the hands of faithful Shepherds, into [Page 21]the custody of ravening Wolves; when such Guides shall be over the several Congregations, as will be sure to mis-teach them one way or other: viz. either by instilling into them Puritanical and superstitious Principles, that they may the more securely exercise their Presbyterian tyranny over their Judgements, Consciences, Persons, and Estates: Or else by setting up new Lights before them, to lead them into a maze of Anabaptistical Confusion and Frensie.

These Consequents are so heavie to the Sufferers, so certain to ensue upon the use of Common Prayer; and so much without the power of the Law-givers (in this state of Affairs,) either to remedie or prevent: That it is beyond the wit of man to imagine, what benefit to the publick can accrue by the strict observa­tion of the Act, that may in any propor­tion countervail these mischiefs. In which case, that man must needs suppose a strange austerity in the Law-giver, that dares not presume of his consent, to dis­oblige [Page 22]him (for the time) from observing the same.

It would be also well considered, whe­ther he, that by his over-nice scrupulo­sity runneth all these hazards, be not (in some measure) guilty of his own undoing, deserting his Station and betraying his Flock: and do not thereby lose much of that comfort, which a Christian Confes­sour may take in his sufferings, when they are laid upon him by the hand of God, and not pulled upon himself with his own hands. And more I shall not need to say as to that first Objection.

2 SCANDAL. Object. 2.

The next thing Objected is, The dan­ger of the SCANDAL, that others might be ready to take at the example: Who seeing the Law so little regarded by such men (men that have Cure of Souls, and per­haps also of some eminencie and esteem in the Church, and whose Example will be much look'd up­on) will be easily encouraged by [Page 23]their Example, to set light by all Authority, and to take the liberty to obey and disobey the Laws of their Soveraigns at their pleasure.

But this Objection after we are once well satisfied concerning the former, need not much trouble us. For

1 First, It seemeth a very unreasonable thing, in cases of great exigency (such as we now suppose) that the fear of scanda­lizing our weak Brethren (which is but Debitum charitatis only) should lay upon us a peremptory necessity of observing the Law punctually, whatsoever inconveni­ences or mischiefs may ensue thereupon: Whereas the duty of obedience to our known Governours (which is Debitum justitiae also, and therefore more obliga­tory then the other) doth not impose upon us that necessity; as hath been al­ready shewn.

2. Besides, Arguments drawn from Scandal, in things neither unlawful, nor (setting the reason of Scandal aside) in­expedient; as they are subject to sundry frailties otherwise, so are they manifestly of no weight at all, when they are coun­terpoised [Page 24]with the apparent danger of evil consequents on the other side. For in such cases there is commonly equall danger (if not rather sometimes more) of Scandal to be taken from the Example the quite contrary way. We may see it in debating the point now in hand. It is alledged on the one side, that by laying aside the use of Common Prayer, men that are not over-scrupulous will be encouraged to take a greater liberty in dispensing with the Laws (to the des­pising both of Laws and Governours) then they ought. And why may it not by the same reason be as well alledged on the other side, that by holding up a necessity of using Common Prayer, men that have tenderer Consciences may be induced to entertain Scruples (to their own undoing, and the destruction of their people) when they need not?

3 But that in the third place, which cometh up home to the business, and taketh off the Objection clearly, is this That in judging cases of Scandal, we are not to look so much at the event, what it is or may be, as at the Cause whence it cometh. For sometimes there is given [Page 25]just cause of Scandal, and yet no Scandal followeth, because it is not taken: Some­times Scandal is taken, and yet no just cause given: And sometimes there is both cause of Scandal given, and Scandal thereat taken. But no man is concern­ed in any Scandal that happeneth to another, by occasion of any thing done by him, neither is chargeable with it, farther then he is guilty of having gi­ven it.

If then we give Scandal to others, and they take it not, the whole guilt is ours; they are faultless.

If we give it and they take it, we are to bear a share in the blame as well as they; and that a deeper share too; (Vae homini: Wo to the man by whom the offence cometh, Matt. 18.7.) But if they take offence when we give none, it is a thing we cannot help, and therefore the whole blame must lie upon them. Wherefore, if at any time, any doubt shall arise in the case of Scandal, how far forth the danger thereof may or may not oblige us to the doing or not doing of any thing propo­sed: The resolution will come on much the easier, if we shall but rightly under­stand [Page 26]what it is to give Scandal, or how many wayes a man may become guilty of scandalizing another by his Example.

The wayes as I conceive are but these four.

1 The first is, when a man doth some­thing before another man, which is in it self evil, unlawfull, and sinfull. In which case, neither the the intention of him that doth it, nor the event as to him that seeth it done, is of any consideration. For it mattereth not whether the doer hath an intention to draw the other into Sin thereby or not; neither doth it matter whether the other were thereby induced to commit Sin or not. The very matter and substance of the action being evil, and done before others, is sufficient to render the Doer guilty of having given Scandal; though neither he had any in­tention himself so to do, nor was any other person actually scandalized thereby. Because whatsoever is in it self, and in its own nature evil, is also of it self and in its own nature scandalous and of ill example. Thus did Hophni and Phineas the Sons of Eli, give Scandal by their wretched profaneness and greediness about the Sa­crifices [Page 27]of the Lord, and their vile and shameless abusing the women, 1 Sam. 2.17.22. And so did David also give great Scandal in the matter of Ʋriah, 2 Sam. 12.14. Here the Rule is, Do nothing that is evil, for fear of giving Scandal.

2 The second way is, when a man doth something before another, with a direct intention and formal purpose of drawing him thereby to commit Sin. In which case, neither the matter of the Action, nor the Event is of any consideration. For it maketh no difference (as to the Sin of giving Scandal) whether any man be ef­fectually enticed thereby to commit Sin or not: neither doth it make any diffe­rence, whether the thing done, were in it self unlawful or not; so as it had but an appearance of evil, and from thence an aptitude to draw another to the doing of that (by imitation) which would be really and intrinsecally evil. The wick­ed intention alone (whatsoever the effect should be, or what means soever should be used to promote it) sufficeth to induce the guilt of giving Scandal upon the Doer. This was Jeroboam's Sin, in set­ting up the Calves with a formal purpose [Page 28]and intention thereby (for his own secular and ambitious ends) to corrupt the puri­ty of Religion, and to draw the people to an idolatrous worship: For which cause he is so often stigmatized with it, as with a note of infamie, to stick by him whilst the world lasteth; being scarce ever mentioned in the Scripture, but with this addition, Jeroboam the Son of Nebat, that made Israel to sin. Here the Rule is, Do nothing, good or evil, with an intention to give Scandal.

3 The third way is, when a man doth something before another, which in it self is not evil, but indifferent, and so according to the Rule of Christian liberty lawful for him to do or not to do, as he shall see cause, (yea and perhaps other­wise commodious and convenient for him to do;) yet whereat he probably fore­seeth the other will take Scandal, and be occasioned thereby to do evil. In such case, if the thing be not in some de­gree (prudentially) necessary for him to do; but that he might, without very great inconvenience or prejudice to him­self, or any third person leave it undone: he is bound in charity and compassion to [Page 29]his Brothers Soul (for whom Christ died) and for the avoiding of Scandal, to a­bridge himself in the exercise of his Chri­stian liberty for that time so far, as rather to suffer some inconvenience himself by the not doing of it, then by the doing of it, to cause his Brother to offend. The very case which is so often, so earnestly, and so largely insisted upon by Saint Paul. See Rom. 14.13-21. Rom. 15.1-3. 1 Cor. 8.7-13: and 9.12, 15, 19-22: and 10. 23-33. Here the Rule is, Do nothing, that may be reasonably forborn, whereat Scandal will be taken.

4 The last way is, when a man doth something before another, which it is not only lawful, but (according to the exigency of present circumstances) pro hic & nunc, very behoofefull, and even (prudentially) necessary for him to do: but foreseeth that the other will be very like to make an ill use of it, and take encouragement thereby to commit Sin, if he be not withall exceeding carefull, as much as possibly in him lieth, to pre­vent the Scandal that might be taken thereat. For, Qui non prohibet peccare cum potest, jubet. In such case, the bare [Page 30]neglect of his Brother, and the not using his uttermost endeavour to prevent the evil that might ensue, maketh him guilty: Upon which consideration standeth the equity of that judicial Law given to the Jewes, Exod. 21.33, 34. which ordereth, That in case a man dig a Pit or Well, for the use of his Family, and looking no further then his own conveniency, put no Cover upon it, but leave it open, where­by it happeneth, his Neighbours Beast to fall thereinto and perish. The owner of the Pit is to make it good, in as much as he was the occasioner of that loss unto his Neighbour; which he might and ought to have prevented. Here the Rule is, Order the doing of that, which may not well be left undone, in such sort, that no Scandal (so far as you can help it) may be taken thereat.

To apply this, The thing now under debate (the action proposed to present enquiry) is, The Laying aside of the Com­mon Prayer Book enjoyned by Law, and using instead thereof, some other Form of Church Service of our own devising. And the Enquiry concerning it is, Whether it may be done with a good Conscience, in regard [Page 31]of the Scandal that is given, (or at least) may be taken thereat; yea or no? Now for as much as in this Enquiry we take it for granted, that the thing to be done is not in its own nature and simply evil, but rather (in this state of affairs) prudentially necessary; and that they who make scruple at it upon the point of Scandal, have not the least intention of drawing either the Laws into contempt, or their Brethren into Sin by their example: It is manifest that three of the now mentioned cases, with the several Rules to each of them appending are not pertinent to the present enquiry. But since the last of the four only proves to be our case; we have therefore no more to do for the setling of our Judgments, the quieting of our Consciences, and the regulating of our practise in this affair, then to consider well what the Rule in that case given, obligeth us unto. Which is, not to leave the action undone, for the danger of Scan­dal, (which besides the inconveniencies formerly mentioned, would but start new Questions, and those beget more, to the multiplying of unnecessary scruples in infinitum:) but to order the doing of it [Page 32]so, that (if it were possible) no Scandal at all might ensue thereupon, or at least­wise not by our default, through our careless or undiscreet managery thereof. Even as the Jew that stood in need to sink a Pit for the service of his House or Grounds, was not, for fear his Neighbors Beast should fall into it, and be drowned, bound by the Law to forbear the making of it; but only to provide a sufficient Cover for it, when he he had made it. The thing then in this case, is not to be left undone, when it so much behoveth us to do it: but the action to be carried on (for the manner of doing, and in all respects and circumstances thereunto be­longing) with so much clearness, tender­ness, moderation and wisdom (to our best understandings) that the necessity of our so doing, with the true cause thereof, may appear to the world, to the satisfa­ction of those that are willing to take no­tice of it; and that such persons as would be willing to make use of our example to do the same thing, where there is not the like cause of necessity, may do it upon their own score, and not be able to vouch our practise for their excuse. Which how [Page 33]it may be best done for particular dire­ctions, every charitable and conscien­cious man must ask his own discretion: Some general hints tending thereunto, I shall lay down in answering the next Objection (where they will fall in again not unproperly) and so stop two Gaps with one Bush.

3 SCHISM. Object. 3.

The last Objection is that of SCHISM. The Object [...]rs hold all such per­sons as have opposed against either Liturgie or Church-government, as they were by Law established a­mongst us within this Realm, for no better then Schismaticks: and truly I shall not much gainsay it: But then they argue. That for them to do the same thing in the publick worship of God, that Schismaticks do, and for the doing whereof especially it is that they justly account them Schismaticks; would (as they conceive) involve them in the Schism also, as parta­kers [Page 34]thereof in some degree with the other; and their Consciences also would from Rom. 14.22. con­demn them, either of Hypocrisie in allowing that in themselves, and in their own practice, which they condemn in others, or of unchari­tableness in judging others as Schis­maticks, for doing but the same thing which they can allow them­selves to practice. For all that such persons as they call Schisma­ticks do in this matter of the Church Service, is but to leave out the Churches Prayers, and to put in their own. Or say, this should not make them really guilty of the Schism they so much detest; yet would such their symbolizing with them seem (at least) a kind of un­worthy complyance with them, more then could well become the simplicity of a Christian, (much less of a Minister of the Gospel,) whose duty it is to shun even the least appearance of evil, 1 Thess. 5.22. Besides that by so doing, they should but confirm those men in [Page 35]their Schismatical Principles and Practise.

This Objection hath three Branches. To the first whereof I oppose the old saying, Duo cum faciunt idem non est idem. Which although spoken quite to another purpose, yet it is capable of such a sense as will very well fit our present purpose also. I answer therefore in short, That to do the same thing that Schismaticks do (especial­ly in times of confusion, and untill things can be reduced into better order, and when men are necessitated thereunto, to prevent greater mischiefs,) doth not ne­cessarily inferr a partaking with them in Schism: no nor so much as probably, unless it may appear, upon probable presum­ptions otherwise, that it is done out of the same Schismatical Spirit, and upon such Schismatical Principles as theirs are.

The other two Branches; ( viz. That of seeming compliance with Schismaticks; and that, of the ill use they may make of it, to confirm them in their Schism) do upon the matter fall in upon the aforesaid point of Scandal; and are in effect but the same Objection, only put into a new [Page 36]Dress: and so have received their answer already. And the only remedy against both these fears (as well that of Scandal, as this of Schism) is the same which was there prescribed: even to give assurance to all men, by our carriage and beha­viour therein, that we do not lay aside the Common Prayer of our own accord, or out of any dislike thereof; neither in contempt of our rightfull Governours, or of the Laws; nor out of any base com­pliance with the times, or other unwor­thy secular own-ends; nor out of any Schismatical Principles, Seditious Design, or innovating Humour: but meerly en­forced thereunto by such a necessity as we cannot otherwise avoid, in order to the glory of God, and the publick good: for the preservation of our Families, our Flocks, and our Function: and that with the good leave and allowance (as we have great reason to believe) of such as have power to dispence with us and the Laws in that behalf: This if we shall do bona fide, and with our utmost endeavours, in singleness of Heart, and with godly dis­cretion; perhaps it will not be enough to prevent, either the censures of incon­siderate [Page 37]and inconsiderable persons, or the ill use that may be made of our example, through the ignorance or negligence of some; (scandalum pusillorum;) or through the perverseness and malice of other some ( scandalum Pharisaeorum, as the Schools term them:) But assuredly it will be suf­ficient in the sight of God, and in the witness of our own Hearts, and to the Consciences of charitable and considering men, to acquit us clearly of all guilt either of Scandal or Schism in the least degree.

Which we may probably do, by ob­serving these ensuing (and such other like) general directions: (the liberty of using such meet accommodations, as the cir­cumstances in particular cases shall re­quire, ever more allowed and reserved,) viz.

1 If we shall decline the company and society of known Schismaticks, not con­versing frequently and familiarly with them, or more then the necessary affairs of Life, and the rules of Neighbour­hood, and common Civility will require: Especially not to give countenance to their Church Assemblies by our presence among them, if we can avoid it.

2 If we shall retain as well in common Discourse, as in our Sermons, and the holy Offices of the Church, the old Theolo­gical and Ecclesiastical terms and forms of speech which have been generally received and used in the Churches of Christ, which our people are well acquainted with, and are wholsom and significant: And not follow our new Masters in that uncouth affected garb of speech, or canting lan­guage rather (if I may so call it,) which they have of late time taken up, as the signal distinctive and characteristical note of that, which (in that their new Lan­guage) they call the Godly Party, or the Communion of Saints.

3 If in officiating we repeat not only the Lords Prayer, the Creed, the ten Commandements; and such other pas­sages in the Common Prayer Book, as (being the very words of Scripture) no man can except against: but so much also of the old Liturgie besides, in the very words and syllables of the Book as we think the Ministers of State in those parts where we live, will suffer, and the Au­ditory before whom we officiate wil bear; sith the Officers in all parts of the [Page 39]Land are not alike strict, nor the People in all Parishes alike disaffected in this respect.

4 If where we must of necessity vary from the words, we yet follow the order of the Book in the main parts of the Holy Offices; retaining the substance of the Prayers, and embellishing those of our own making, which we substitute into the place of those we leave out, with phrases and passages taken out of the Book in other places.

5 If where we cannot safely mention the particulars expressed in the Book, as namely for the King, the Queen, the Royal Progeny, and the Bishops, we shall yet use in our Prayers some such general terms and other intimations devised for the pur­pose, as may sufficiently convey to the understandings of the people, what our intentions are therein, and yet not be sufficient to fetch us within compass of the Ordinance.

6 If we shall in our Sermons take oc­casion, now and then, where it may be pertinent, either to discover the weakness of the Puritane Principles and Tenents to the People; or to shew out of some pas­sages [Page 40]and expressions in the Common Prayer Book, the consonancy of those ob­servations we have raised from the Text with the Judgement of the Church of England: or to justifie such particular passages in the Letany, Collects and other parts of our Liturgie, as have been un­justly quarrell'd at by Presbyterians, In­dependents, Anabaptists and others, by what Name and Title soever they be called, of the Puritan Sectaries.

Thus I have freely acquainted you, both with my Practise and Judgment, in the point proposed in your Friend's Let­ter: How I shall be able to satisfie his or your Judgement in what I have written I know not; However I have satisfied both your desire and his in writing, and shall rest