§. 1.

THough I would not have you restrained from revealing Truth, yet if I had been worthy to have been of your counsell, I should have advised you to have▪ avoided this quarrelsom way. Our world hath Contention e­nough already; and it comes not from so good a root (Prov. 13. 10.) nor is it so good a symptom, nor doth it produce such lovely effects (Prov. 22. 10. & 17. 19. & 29. 21.) nor doth it bring so good a name (Prov. 21. 24.) as may make it seem desirable in my eyes. Had you consulted Solomon himself, he would have bid you [Strive not with a man without a cause, if he have done thee no harm, Prov. 3. 30.] and [Go not forth hastily to strive, lest thou know not what to do in the end thereof, when thy neighbour hath put thee to shame, 25. 8.] for [The beginning of strife is as when one letteth out water: therefore leave off contention before it be medled with, 17. 14.] It seems a strange thing to me, that you could finde no man to deal with in the main Controversie here chosen out, that was indeed against you, but that you must make to your self, an adversary of one that you confess doth not once deny your Con­clusion. Unless it be because you are likely with such a one to have the easiest conflict. But then you should have remembred, that the Victory will be as small. I pretend not to such a piercing knowledge, nor to such acquaintance in the invi­sible regions, as to determine infallibly of what Province or Degree, of what qua­lity, albus an ater, that spirit was tha [...] raised the storm of your Passions, or to know exactly his name and sirname that animated these your lines: But seeing you are pleased to choose me for your adversary, I must desire you to bear with me if I speak sometime less pleasingly; and to use what patience you have left, as know­ing you have drawn this trouble upon your self. And whereas you put me on a double imployment: one to desend the Truth; and the other to defend my self; so I perform the first successfully, I hope I may be excused if I be more negligent in the later; yea if I give you the day, and free [...]y conf [...]ss as much ignorance as you charge me with. Its true that I have not the [...]i [...]s or Rob [...] of Honour, and as little deserve them, as you here express. But mi [...] I be sure that I have right [Page 2] to that farre better Title (of piety) which you are pleased to bestow on me, I could easily allow you the other. I remember the description of the old Christians by Minutius Faelix, [N [...]s qui non habitu sapientiam, sed mente praeferimus; non eloqui­mur magna, sed vivimu [...]: gloriamur nos consec [...]tos quod ill [...] summa contentione quaes [...] ­verunt, nec invenire potuerunt.] And that of Mirandula [Faelicitatem philosophia quae­rit, Theologia invenit, Religio possidet.] And to contend for the reputation of being Learned, I shall scarce think is worth my labour, till I have higher thoughts of the prize. Mens thoughts and words are a poor felicity. Applause is such an aery nourishment, that I see few thrive by: (though I must confess that in me, as well as in others▪ the unreasonable sin of pride is daily stirring, and convincing me by experience that it is mortified but in part.) O that I may have the honour of be­ing a member of Christ, and then I can spare the vain glory of the world! Vera ibi gloria erit, ubi laudantis nec errore quisquam, nec adulatione laudabitur: Verus honor qui nulli negabitur digno; nulli deferetur indigno: sed nec ad eum ambiget ullus indignus, ubi nullus permittetur esse nisi dignus: saith Austin, de Civit. Dei, li. ult. cap. ult. Only I must crave this of the Reader, that my confessed weakness be no prejudice to Gods truth: and that he will not judge of the cause by the person, nor take the name or person for a fault; which is the thing that the ancient Christians did so deprecate of the Pagans, and therefore I hope every Christian will grant. And I must also desire that want of smooth and pleasing words may not be judged the want of truth. Enimvero dissoluti est pectoris in rebus seriis quaerere voluptatem, & cum tibi sit ratio cum male se habentibus atque aegris, son [...]s auribus infundere dulciores, non medicinam vulneribus admovere: inquit Arnobius li. 1. adv. Gent. p. 49. I confess I do deeply compassionate ordinary Christians, when I think what a hard thing it is for them to discern the truth, among all the smooth words and plausible argu­ments of Learned contenders. Usually they think every mans tale good, till they hear the other; and then they think it bad: and at last when they see what fair glosses a Learned man can put on the worst cause, they are ready to run into the other extream, and to believe or regard nothing that they say. As Minutius Faelix saith, [Altius mov [...]or de toto genere disputandi: quod plerum{que} pro disserentium viribus & eloquentiae potestate, etiam perspicuae veritatis conditio mutetur, Id accidere pernotum est auditorum facilitate, qui dum verborum lenocinio a rerum intentionibus avocantur, sine delectu assentiuntur dictis omnibus, nec a rectis falsa secernunt, nescientes inesse & in in­credibili verum, & in verisimili mendacium. Itaque qu [...] saepius asseverationibus credunt, [...]o frequentius a peritioribus arguuntur: sic assidue temeritate decepti, culpam judicii trans­ferunt ad incerti querelam, ut damnatis omnibus malint universa suspendere, quam de fallacibus judicare.] But let such at least hold fast the Foundation, and remember that we are all agreed in that.

The Reader that I expect should profit by these Writings, must neither be u [...] ­terly unlearned, nor so learned as your self. For the former are not yet capable of it; and the later are beyond it, and will hardly learn from any but the more learn­ed. It is the younger sort of Students whose edification I intend: who are neither quite above, nor below my instructions; nor so engaged to a Party or Opinion, but that their mindes lye open to any evidence of Truth. Praevent [...]s enim falsae opinionis errore humanus auditus, ad veri rationem percipiendam, durus & perdifficilis invenitur, quantiscunque testibus urgeatur. Mavult enim pravi dogmatis sententiam, quae semel infectus est, perversus vindicare, quam hanc [...]andem tantis divinarum humanarum{que} legum authoritatibus refutatam salubrius immutare: inquit Vigilius contra Eutich. li. 1. initio.

Lastly, If you should be in the right and I in the wrong in any one Philoso­phical Controversie, I must expect that the Reader do not thence conclude, that you are right in your Theology. And I could with that you had so mean thoughts of your Philosophy, as that you might not build your Theology on it too much; nor think much the better of your Writings, or of your self. For doubtless when the Canon of a Council forbad the reading of Heathens Books, these things were not so highly valued as now. I approve not of that extream neither: but shall conclude with that serious exclamation of Ahenagoras (Legat▪ per Christian. p. 13, 14.) [...], &c.

§. 2.

FOr the fuller opening of this particular, I will be content to make some Digression from your Book, and to shew 1. That there can be no new immanent act in God, against M ^r Baxter. 2. That there is somewhat like Justification in that immanent act of God, where­by he decrees from eternity to justifie and condemn men. And 3. that yet that immanent act cannot be stiled Justification; nor is it meant so by Dr. Twisse or Mr. Pemble that I know; and so that Justification is not from eternity: and then I shall return to you, &c.

§. 2.

R. B. YOur Digression, methinks, is very sudden, and the occasion to a stranger hardly discernable: Its like it was the uncouth apparition of some ruling wight of another Orb, which made upon your intellect that strange impression, which caused you to reel thus out of your way, and lead you unhappily into this private path, or rather bewildred you in this Maze where we now finde you. But whoever led you in, charity commands me to do my part to help you ou [...], or at least to warn others that they do not follow you.

1. As to your first undertaking, I confess it was very ingenuously done, to say, You will do it [against Mr. Baxter] and not [against his doctrine or opinion,] acknowledging afterwards that I deny not your Conclusion. But I am used to Dispute against Doctrines, and not Persons: and therefore will give you the better in this.

2. Your second undertaking is more admirable then the first. For I have met with some besides you that dare adventure on the former, but never man that durst attempt the later. Is it not enough for you to prove Gods Decree of justifying to have somewhat like Justification? but you must also prove, that the Decree both to justifie and condemn, hath somewhat like Justification? If the Decree to condemn a man have somewhat like justifying him, then the Decree to torment him in hell hath somewhat like glorifying him: and the Decree to kill, hath something in it like quickening him. You must fly to some general point of si­militude, or to the Lord Brookes doctrine, that all things are One, to make this good. But if it were but your oversight, then I hope hereafter you will be more [Page 4] compassionate to your Brethren, and no more so solemnly call men to [see the hand of heaven, in the pompous display of their folly, to appear most ridiculous; and to adore the hand of God in infatuating their parts, &c.] as you do by Mr. Goodwin for a smaller mistake then yours. Alas what man so Learned and accu­rate, as to be free from all oversights.

3. But indeed Sir I cannot so easily excuse your next errour, annexed to the third part of your undertaken-task; where you say [Nor is it so meant by Dr. Twiss or Mr. P [...]mble that I know.] What is it that is not so meant by them? Why that this Immanent act can be stiled Justification. You have boldly ventured to write thus: and I will be bold to try how well. Either its true, or not true that they so meant: If true, and undeniably apparent in the Writings of one of them, if not both, and oft repeated by him, and yet Mr. K. knoweth it not, why then he doth not only write before he knows, and Vindicate men before he understand whether they are guilty or innocent, but makes it the great motive of his underta­king, as [ [...]ot having the patience to see so worthy Divines so unworthily hand­led.] If in the mi [...]st of his impatience he knew not this, then it seems I am not alone ignorant of the business that I meddle with. But I will lay it open to the Judgement of the Reader, whether the thing be true or false? and whether you might not with less learning have known this if you would? and ought not to have known the cause before so zealous a Vindication.

D^r Twiss Vind. Grat. li. 1. part 2. §. 25. p. (vol [...]min) 272, 273. Sic scribit [Omnis actualis justificatio est justificatio, & omnis justificatio simpliciter dicta congruenter ex­ponenda est de justificatione actuali. Nam Analogum per se positum stat pro samosiori significato.] [Sed libet his paulisper immorari. Quaenam erit illa peccatorum Remissio quae fidem consequetur; & quam oporteat Spiritus sancto acceptam referre? Remissio enim peccatorum, si quidditatem inspicias, nihil aliud est quam aut Punitionis Negatio, aut Volitionis puniendi negatio. Sit ergo peccata Remittere, nihil aliud quam nolle punire. At hoc nolle punire, ut actus immancus in Deo, fuit ab aeterno, nec fidem consequitur, &c. Quod vero operatione Spiritus sancti nobis ex hac parte, per fidem contingit, aliud esse non potest quam sensus gratiae Dei, &c. Quare siquid morte sua nobis impetrat Christus, quod ad peccatorum nostrorum Remissio­nem attineat, sensum Are not Christs Merits and the Spirits gifts here highly honoured? istum amoris Divini peccata nostra remit­tentis, nobis impetret necesse est. Et pag. 279. c. 1. [Nam justitia Christi dicitur nobis imputari, & merita ipsius nobis applicari per fidem, non coram Deo, sed apud conscientias nostras: quatenus per fidem generatur in cordibus nostris sens [...]s & agnitio hujus salutaris applicationis ex amore Dei quem ex fide gustamus; & spiritualiter sentimus nos justificantem, & in filios suos adoptantem, ex quo nascitur pax conscientiae. Quare ante fidem haec Christi justitia no­stra suit, quatenus ex intentione Dei patris & Christi mediatoris pro nobis praestita, &c. Sed advenicute fide quam in cordibus nostris Sp sanctus accendit, tum demum agnoscitur & percipitur hic amor Dei erga nos in Christo Jesu. Unde dicitur justitia Christi imputari nobis per fidem, quia non nisi per fidem dignoscitur a Deo nobis imputari: & tum demum justificari dicimur ejus generis justificatione, at{que} absolutione a peccatis nostris, quae pacem ingenerat conscientiis nostris. Hoc autem duobus argumentis confirmo. 1. Quia per ju­stitiam Christi non modò assequimur remissionem peccatorum, sed & fidem ipsam, at{que} re­sipiscentiam, hoc est, cordis circumcisionem, Eph. 1. 3. ergo etiam ante fidem & resipi­scentiam applicatur nobis justitia Christi, utpote propter quam gratiam assequimur effica­cem ad credendum in Christum & agendum paenitentiam. Alterum est, quia justificatio & absolutio, prout fignificant actum divinae voluntatis immanentem, sunt ab aeterno. [Page 5] Unius autem voluntatis notificatio externa, per modum absolutionis cujusdam judicialis & fore [...]fis, quae fit per verbum & spiritum, pro tribunali conscientiae uniuscujus{que} haec est illa justitiae Christi imputatio, item{que} justificatio & remissio atque absolutio quae fidem consequitur.] Et cont. praefat. p. 18. b. Extra controversiam est remissionem peccatorum prout esta actus in Deo immanens antecedere nostram fidem & resipiscentiam: Nobis vere non nisi per fidem innotescit, cujus etiam fiducia multo adhuc confirmatior evadit per re­sipiscentiam.]

Lib. 1. Part. 2. p. 272. [Justificationem verò & Reconciliationem pro codem haberi ab Arminio (quod & verum est) &c. And he oft maintaineth the eternity of Re­conciliation.

Lib. 2. P. 2. pag. 434. [Ergo etiam ante fidem Deus nobis reconciliatus est: neque enim nisi jam reconciliatus & propitius gratificatur nobis fidem. Quid quod remissio peccatorum & acceptatio nostri, Non nisi actus internos & immanentes in Deo no­tant: cujus generis actiones non suboriuntur Deo de novo.] Lege ult. & postea [Juxta ista distinguere poterimus de reconciliatione dupliciter dicta: Nam & Deus reconciliavit nos sibi in Christo quoad rei veritatem: & in ministris suis posuit verbum reconciliationis, quoad ejusdem praetiosae veritatis evidentiam & manifestationem. Sic cum inimici essemus dicimur reconciliati fuisse Deo quoad rei veritatem: quod tamen non nisi per Evangelij praedicationem fit qu [...]ad ejusdem veritatis patefactionem & salutarem communicationem.] Et p. 433. [At A [...]minius applicationem remissionis peccatorum, ita interpretari videtur, ut per applicationem fiat, & jam quasi de novo esse incipiat: quasi vero non requiratur, ut jam antea existat quod applicandum est. Nobis vero sic instituendum videtur. Christus morte sua nobis procuravit redemtionem a peccatis, cum Deo reconciliationem, & pecca­torum omnium remissionem; quae quidem per pradicationem Evangelij & per fidem, nobis applicantur, non ut sint, sed ut nobis innotescant. Nam rationem omnem superat quomodo applicari possit illud quod nondum est, &c.] Pag. 434. Nostra vero interpretatio sic pro­cedit: Christus nobis acquisivit morte sua redemptionem effica [...]em & actualem, id est, actualem peccatorum remissionem, & reconciliationem cum Deo. Applicantur autem ista per praedicationem Evangelij, non ut de novo fiant, sed ut nobis innotescant, &c. At in­quies, actualis Remissio peeatorum est ipsa Justificatio: Justificatio sequitur fidem: nam fide justificamur: ergo nomine peccata remittuntur antequam credat. Respondeo, Cum docet Apostolus nos fide justificari, nihil aliud ex instituto docet, quam nos justifi­cari per sanguinem Christi, sive propter Christum crucifixum.] And in the Index he owns it, that Remissio actualis est Justificatio: and therefore we may take what he saith of remission as meant of Justification.

The like Lib. 3. pag. [...]8. & lib. 1. p. 2. pag. 272. which we before cited part of [Nec sane occurrit species aliqua rationis, cur reconciliatio cogatur in ordinem cum impe­tratione remissionis, Justificationis & redemptionis, potius quam cum actuali Remissione, Justificatione & Redemptione.] So that he puts actual Justification with Remission and Reconciliation.

So contra Corvinum pag. 48. Et quid quaso Adoptio est quam conscquimur per fidem? Di [...]is esse Acceptationem Dei. Quid autem est Acceptatio? Annon actus in Deo imma­nens? An vero actus Deo immanens superverit de novo?]

Its undeniable in this that Twisse doth not only affirm Remission and Reconci­liation and Adoption to be before we are born, immediatly on Christs death; but also to be immanent Acts, and from Eternity: and though he be more sel­dom in thus using the word [Justification] yet he affirms Reconciliation and Remission (which he saith are from Eternity) to be the same thing with Justi­fication: yea he expresly entitleth that eternal immanent act [Justification.] [Page 6] And did he only affirm Remission and Adoption and Reconciliation and Acce­ptation to be immanent acts and from eternity, I beleeve few sober men will think it any better, then to affirm the same of Justification. Yea he plainly intimates a distinction of Justification: one from eternity or from Christs death, and the other upon our believing: And therefore when he speaks of Justification by faith, he cals it [that sort of Justification] intimating the other sort.

Now for Mr. Pemble, as he expresly maintains Justification in foro Dei to be long before we are born, even on Christs dying, so that is all one to our purpose, as if he maintained it to be from eternity. And it were meet that some of you should have shewed before now, what Transient act it is by which particular sinners not yet born (and therefore not yet sinners) are justified at Christs death I pray you Sir remember to do this in your next.? If it were (as Mr. Pemble intimates, I think) Gods accepting the Price, its worth the while to shew that to be Temporal and Transient, when Dr. Twiss will have his accepting of man in Adoption to be immanent and eternal: But if you maintain Gods justifying act at Christs death (whether un­dertaken or suffered) to be an immanent act, then it must be before Christs death, even eternal too. Mr. Pembles words are, Vind. Grat. p. 21. [But with a distinction of Justification. 1. In foro Divino, in Gods sight; and this goeth before all our sanctification. For even whilst the Elect are unconverted, they are then actually justified and freed from all sinne by the death of Christ: and God so esteems of them as free, and having accepted of that satisfaction, is actu­ally reconciled to them. By this Justification we are freed from the guilt of our sinnes: and because that is done away, God in due time proceeds to give us the grace of sanctification to free us from sinnes corruption, still inherent in our per­sons. 2. In foro conscientiae, in our own sense: which is but the Revelation and certain Declaration of Gods former secret act of accepting Christs Righteousness to our Justification.] So pag. 23. he speaks again of the same Justification in foro Dei, and saith, that all the sinnes of the Elect are actually pardoned, the Debt-Book crossed, the hand-writing cancelled, &c. and that this grand transaction between God and the Mediator Jesus Christ was concluded on and dispatcht in heaven long before we had any being either in nature or grace.] This phrase of [dispatching it in heaven] makes me conjecture that it will prove some immanent act which they call Justification at Christs death. Lay all this together, and judge whether it be true that neither Dr. Twiss nor M [...]. Pemble, do mean that the immanent act can be stiled Justification. Or if it were true, whether Justifica­tion before we are born, is not an errour fit to be resisted. Indeed it is true that Mr. K. saith, that neither Dr. Twiss nor Mr. Pemble did ever mean, that [the Decree of God from eternity to justifie and condemn men, is to be called Justi­fication:] For the Decree to condemn men cannot well be called Justification: But I believe this being but Mr. K. oversight, he will not make use of it to justifie his third Proposition.

§. 3.

VVHether there may be a new immanent Act in God?] To the first, By an immanent act, we mean such as is terminated in the Agent; and not in any thing without it. Now that there can be any new immanent act in God, M. Baxter doth not [Page 7] adventure to affirm. Only he is pleased to say this; [That all immanent acts in God are eternall, he thinks is quite beyond our understanding to know. Aphor. pag. 174.] and he casteth out somewhat to render it suspected, p. 173. which I shall examine by and by.

§. 3.

R. B. THey say of those that are bred souldiers and used to bloodshed and Vi­ctory, that the state must make them fresh work and finde them con­stant imployment, or else they will make work and finde imployment for them­selves. A Polemical Divine much used to Disputations, and thereby to the glory and Triumph of Victory, is, as it seems by this Learned man, in the same case. Mr. Goodwin found him not work enough, and rather then he would want more, he makes to himself an adversary (for he saith, it is against Mr. Baxter) which here in the beginning he confesseth, makes not himself one, so much as by a de­nial of his Proposition, or an affirming the contrary. Could you finde never a man in the world to deal with, that affirmed that there may be new immanent acts in God? If you could, they had been fitter for you to take in hand: For its like, they would purposely have maintained that assertion with some shew of reason: If you could not; then your doctrine is so universally received, that I should think it should not need your Arguments now to support it: And then you may well conclude, as you do, that you have done little by this Dispute; if you have but laboriously maintained that which no man denies. But it seems to me it was some reasons ab homine, from the person of your chosen-seigned adversary, rather then from the cause that allured or impelled you to this encounter.

As you well begin with some explication of your sense, so will I also: and the rather seeing I have little else to do. I desire the Reader therefore to under­stand this much of my thoughts about the subject in hand, before I proceed further.

1. In generall, I am very strongly perswaded that it is one of the greatest sins that a great part of Pious Learned Divines are guilty of, that they audaciously adventure to dispute and determine unrevealed things; and above all others, about the Nature and Actions of the Incomprehensible God. And that this is The very thing that hath divided, weakned and ruined the Church, more then any one thing, except plain contempt of God: And that it is under the wounds of these overwise mens Learning, that the poor Church hath lain bleeding many hundred years. Our Contentions, Envyings, Hear-burnings, by perverse zeal, and much of all our warres and calamities, are long of this sinne in these men: That as the Romish Clergy are justly esteemed the greatest Schismaticks on earth, for their audacious and unmercifull additions to the Creed, making such a number of new Keys which heaven must be opened and shut by, which God never made: So are those zealous Learned men, the cruel dividers of the Church, by occasioning our contentions, that will with boldness pry into things unrevealed, and with consi­dence and peremptoriness determine them, and then with long and subtil and fer­vent arguings maintain them, and make them seem necessary to the peace of the Church, or the soundness of our faith. Scarce any one thing hath more fully disco­vered to me the frailty and fearfull pravity of man, then this: To think, that so silly a worm should be no more acquainted with his own weakness, and the infinite distance between God and man; and should so confidently think that he knows [Page 8] what he doth not know! yea and what he cannot know? yea and be angry with all the world that will not say, It's true; and will not believe that he knows what he pretends to know! If a man should perswade me that I know how many An­gels are in heaven, or how many daies it will be till Christs coming to Judgement, one would think it were no hard matter for me to know that I do not know any such thing. But if I should perswade my self that I know it, and should expect that all others should believe that I know it, and would write Volumes to prove it, and count all those ignotant or erroneous that will not believe me, or that will not say they know it when they do not, as well as I, whether this were the part of a man awake and in his wits, let others judge. How much more beyond our reach is the unsearchable nature of God, further then he hath revealed himself in his Works and Word, which, alas, affordeth us but a glimpse of his backparts. Yea the wonder is yet greater that these same Learned Divines, when they are at a non­plus in their arguing, will plead mans ignorance and incapacity to put off their adversary and blame others for too bold enquiries and intrusions into Gods se­crets: and most of our Reformers do speak hardly of the Schoolmen for it (and very deservedly) and yet will not see the guilt in themselves. No man speaks more against his own natural inclination in this then I do: I feel as great a desire to Know, and to pry into any thing that others have disputed, and as much natu­rall delight in the reading of the most audacious subtil Disputers, as others do. I was wont to say, I could get more out of Aquinas, Scotus, Durandus, and such like in a day, then out of many Ancient Fathers, and later Treatisers, in a mone [...]h. But I finde that as desire to know was the beginning of our misery, so is it the continuance. Why do men fear themselves no more, in that which innocent Adam was undone by? I finde that this bait of knowing things unrevealed, doth but entice men into vain hopes, and labours, and self-deluding promises, and flatter men into a pleasant loss of time (and worse:) and in the end faileth all their expectations: and the Learned Disputers come off as Adam did, with Gods acknowledgement that he was like God in knowing good and evil (Ironically, as some Divines think; or expressing his unhappiness plainly, as others.) Those leaves of Bradwardine and Twiss Vind. and de scient. Med. &c. which I was wont to reade with longing and delight, I confess I look on now with fear; and many Learned Schoolmen (specially on the first Book of the Sentences) I read, as I hear men swear or take Gods name lightly in their common talk; even s [...]ldom, un­willingly (looking for other matter) and with horrour. Yet how oft doth Dr. Twisse tell Arminius and D [...]. Jackson of the sinfulness, unsafeness and uncertainty of departing from the Scrip [...]u [...]es in these high things, about the Nature and De­crees of God? And what Bradwardine excellently saith, I desire the Reader to see in him, de Causa Dei, l. 1. c. 1. corol▪ 32. B [...]t especially I desire the Reader to peruse that excellent Epistle of Col [...]ius in Beverovicius de Termino Vitae; which contains what I have a minde further to have said of this: with Gibieus's first Chapt. de Libertate Dei (lib. 2. de lib.) which shews how far God is above all our highest names and notions: and that Deus ab [...]llis [...]iber est: with much more a­gainst the Doctrine that I oppose. See also Car [...]. Contarenus de officio Ep [...]scopi, ope­rum p. 410, 411. and what he citeth out of Dio [...]ysius. And I intreat you to reade seriously that notable passage, 1 Tim. 6. 3, 4, 5. where pride is shewed to be the root, and supposed knowledge said to be b [...]t Do [...]ing, and they are said to know nothing, that thought they knew most, and the sad effects of all are ma­nifested.

[Page 9]2. I do think that most of our profound Disputes, wherewith the Domini [...]ns and Jesuites, the Arminians and Antiarminians have Learnedly troubled the world, are guilty in part, of this hainous sinne before mentioned: and that these great Doctors do dispute for the most part of they know not what. I confess its usual with men that know little themselves, to think that others know as little, and to measure the knowledge of other men by their own: and so its possible I may undervalue the Learning of these men, because having none my self, I cannot un­derstand the largeness of their capacities, and sublimity of their speculations. However I am sure I am wiser and righter in one point then I was: For when I steeped my thoughts in their speculations, and was my self of the same express opi­nion with one of the parties, I thought that I begun to grow somewhat wise my self; but now I know I was deceived, and it was my folly, and that I knew not what I thought I knew. And though I will be bolder to befool such a one as my self, then men of such sublime incomprehensible knowledge; yet its my opinion that they are but men; and what a man is though I do not yet fully know, yet I am daily both studying and trying: and experience which i [...] the teacher of fools, hath taught me this much of him; that he is no Deity; nor one of the Intelligen­ces that moveth or comprehendeth the orbs; that the wisest are not so wise as they would seem, or as they imagine themselves; that all their conceptions which they judge so comprehensive are comprehended in the compass of a narrow skull, and there lodged in a puddle of such brains, and humours, that a little knock if it hit right may make the wisest man an Ideot, and drive out all that profound Learning which M^r K. thinks is so near kin to the knowledge of God. I confess of late I have accustomed my self to such mean though [...]s of man and his imagina­tions, and such high thoughts of God, that I reade many of the profoundest School Divines (whom yet in some respects I honour) as I hear children dis­coursing of State matters, or Theology; or as if I heard two disputing in their sleep. The Serpent hath beguiled us as he did Eve, by drawing us from the sim­plicity that is in Christ. Vain Philosophy hath been the bait to deceive the Church: And so we are judiciously broken in pieces and ruined; and have learn­ed to our cost to know good and evil. I think there is no hope of the Churches recovery but by returning to the primitive Christian simplicity; and using Ari­stotle as a help in Naturals, but not preferring him before Christ in the teaching of the highest speculations of Theology, as if we must go learn Gods nature of Aristotle, where Christ leaveth us at a loss. When those Learned men, who professing themselves wise became—shall become fools that they may be wise, and come quite back again to their cognosce teipsum, then they may know more of God then they yet do, and yet perceive that they know less then they thought they had known: and then their knowledge will edifie which now puf­feth up.

3. I think that man can have no positive proper corception of God, at least besides ens (which the Scotists think proper) and that there is no word in humane language that can express Gods nature in strict propriety, but all our notions of him are so exceeding imperfect, that they express more of our ignorance then of our knowledge. White is bold to say (Institut. Peripatet. l. 4. lect. 9, 10.) that none of the Names that we attribute to God, hath a notion which hath in God a formall object: and that that science is of all other the most sub [...]ime and proper, which inquireth into the impropriety of the names that are spoken of God, and de­nieth them all as to him.

[Page 10]4. I think that there is no such thing in God [...] Understanding, Knowledge, Will, Intention, Decree, Election, Love, &c. as these are by men conceived of, and expressed: And that man knows not what it is in God formally which these terms are used by him to express. And that it is a farre less improper speech to say, that the Firmament is a nutshell, or the sun is a glow-worm, or to deno­minate the reason of men from the apprehensions of a fly or a worm, then to at­tribute Understanding, Will, &c. to God. What the impropriety is, we shall speak to more anon.

5. Therefore all those reasonings concerning Gods Nature or Acts, which are drawn meerly from the nature and acts of man, as concluding from a supposed Analogy of attribution (much more a formal Identity) is a vain deceitfull rea­soning.

6. Yet as Scripture speaks of God in terms improper, according to mans ca­pacity, and fetcht from mans nature and acts, so must we both conceive and speak: that is, not believing that these are proper expressions or conceptions of God, but that there is that in God which we cannot now more fitly conceive of then under these notions, or fi [...]lier express then in these terms. God hath nothing properly called Knowledge or Will▪ but he hath or is that which man cannot fit­lier express or conceive of then under the notion of Knowledge and Will: But what it is, God knows. We must say, God knows, and God willeth; and God must say so to us: For else man could not hear or speak of God, if God conde­scended not to the language and capacity of man. Camero saith, even of our most perfect state of glory, that Frui Deo nil aliud est quam potenti [...], sapientiae, bo­nitatis divinae fructum percipere, quem creaturae modus & ratio ferre potest, &c. Et vi­detur Deus experiundo quis sit (1. Jo 3.) Et qualem se erga nos praestet, caeterum (quic­quid dictitent scholastici, homines acuti quidem, sed in hoc argumento nimis acuti, invi­sibilis est vel Angelis, quibus ad Dei conspectum nulla peccati labes, sola naturae imb [...]eilli­tas▪ (creaturae enim sunt) aditum interclusit. Praelect. de Verb. Dei. Glasc. c. 7. p. 455. I am more certain that even the eye of our understanding hath no direct and proper sight of God, while we are in the flesh.

7. Yet these attributions of Knowledge and Will, to God, are not false­hoods, for there is really somewhat in God which these are made the impro­per expressions of. Equivocals and Analogies are not eo nomine false ex­pressions.

8. I am so farre from thinking that it is by Analogy of Attribution (as the Schoolmen call it) that Knowledge, Will, &c. are attributed to God and the creature; that I think these ascribed to God by an exceeding farre fetcht meta­phor, further then (as I said) if I should call Heaven a nutshell; there being a thousand fold more likeness between these, then between Gods Knowledge and Will, and mans: For between finite and Infinite there is no proportion. Yea I will not undertake to prove that the Ratio homonymiae is not in Us, only, and not at all in the Things.

9. Yet no doubt, the thing meant by Knowledge and Will when attributed to God, is not only, as many say, most eminently in God, but is solely in God; that which is called knowledge and will in man being not the same thing, but toto genere diversum. But yet the conception that we have of Gods Knowledge and Will is but improper derived from the supposed simile, viz. our own understand­ing and will, which representeth it with exceeding imperfection. So that the terms of Knowledge, Will, Decree, &c. are spoken first and properly [Page 11] of the creature, and thence improperly of God.

10. Yet I acknowledge that though all these terms of Attribution, as to God, are exceeding improper, yet there are degrees of impropriety; some being more improper then others are: And so I doubt not but that the terms that are taken from humane passions and imperfections are more improperly applied to God, then these forementioned of Understanding and Will, &c.

And thus I have told you some of my thoughts, that M^r K. may know on what terms to deal with me, and not contend with one whose minde he understand­eth not.

And as to his description of Immanent Acts, I deny that there is any such thing as an Act in God terminated in himself, supposing that you speak not of a meer objective termination (as I know you do not; For else you would call ma­ny of these transient acts, as having an extrinsick object.) As I acknowledge no certainty of a proper Act in God, so I acknowledge no positive termination of that which in him we call an Act; and we call it immanent but in that negative sense which the later clause of your description doth express. We are like to make a good dispute of it, when I am forced to deny the subject, as being a Chymaera.

§. 4.

Mr. K. IN the mean time, out of the respect I bear to the memory of Dr. Twisse, I can­not forbear to say, that Mr. Baxter had better consulted his own honour if he had said nothing to the disparagement of that Reverend and Renowned Doctor: of whom he speaks very sleightingly more then once in his otherwise excellent Treatise of Infant-Baptism, and in all his other Books: In which I could wish there were not some­what of the Doctrinal part not answering that of the Devotional What Dr. Twisse hath said of Justification from eternity, upon this ground, that there can be no new imma­nent act in God, and how much some in the Synod said against him, and how little he replied for himself matters not: he was now grown old,

When he beat Arminius, Corvinus, Tilenus, Penottus, Bellarmine, Dr. Jack­son, and I know not how many more out of the field; & solus vacua dominatus arena left them all bleeding, as Mr. Goodwin would have said, at the feet of his Wri­tings. It may be he was now at last, but magni nominis umbra, but whose very name really did most of the service, and I am sure was that formidable thing to the learned Adversary: But as old as he was, I question not but he could have e [...]sily made this good, There is no new Immanent act in God] against all that opposed him in the Synod, and Mr. Baxter to boot: and I would fain hear any of them all that opposed him, to give a satisfactory answer but to this one Argu­ment.

§. 4.

R. B. 1. YOu need not argue me to a higher respect to Dr. Twisse then I have ever manifested, except you would have me say, He was a God, or an Angel, or an Infallible man.

2. If you cannot forbear, as you say, its pity you should be hindered: Men and women must speak when their list is so great. Who can hold that which will away?

3. I confess that I did not much consult mine Honour in that writing. Else you had not found your self work as you have done in these leaves. If you mean the Honour of my Honesty, your proof must do more to the determination then your assertion: If you mean the Honour of my Learning, do not you know well enough, how little I have to consult? He that hath nothing, hath nothing to lose.

4. [Sleightingly] is a word that will stretch, and therefore I will not charge you with untruth. In one mans sense, he sleights a man that cals him [that famous excellent Divine:] but in another mans, sleighting sig­nifieth the esteeming of a man below his worth, and expressing so much, or setting light by a man. I am miserably troubled with those kinde of people that cannot endure [sleighting] as they call it, above all folks in the world. (I use to call them plainly, Proud people, here in the Countrey; but if I were to talk to Learned men I would use more manners.) They think I sleight them, if I do not applaud them, or complement with them, or if I commend them not with so loud a voice as they expect (and they are a people that are never low in their expectations:) or if I do but praise another above them, or speak to ano­ther before them, or be short with them (when I am busie) when they look for a longer more respectfull discourse; yea if my Hat should be over mine eyes that I see them not, or my memory so fail me as that I forget them; these and abundance more I am guilty of sleighting every day, that I am now grown accustomed to the vice, and shameless in hearing it charged upon me. But I suspect that my sleight­ing Dr. Twisse consisteth in my supposing him to erre, and telling the world so: that is, in taking him to be a man: for h [...]manum est errare: and for saying he knew but in part, that is, that he was not glorifi [...]d on earth by perfection. If you could have charged me with any more then this, would you not have done it? I say, would you not? when the Vindication of this Reverend man was the end of your encountring me? and it boyled so hot on your stomack, that [you could not forbear: you had not the patience to see so Worthy men so unworthily hand­led.] Yea your self affirm that which is his doctrine to be untrue, and yet I sleight him for saying so! Lay this with the commanded Adoration of the footsteps, and it seems, it is high matters indeed that you expect. I doubt, by this, that you will say, I slight you before I have done, either because I praise you not enough, or because I take you not for infallible and indefectible, or because I value Dr. Twisse or Mr. Pemble so very, very, very farre before you; when yet I am accused of slighting them. Sir, these Reverend m [...]n, I doubt not, are perfected Saints in heaven, and hate pride so much, that if they know it, they will give little thanks to him that will contend for the honour of their Infallibility, yea or for the guilding over any of their errours▪ much less, if their honour should be made a [...] snare to▪ the entangling of the godly, and a means to the promoting the [Page 13] Kingdom of darkness, and opposing that Truth which they love better then their Honours, and the dishonouring of that God whose glory is their fe­licity.

Yea let me tell you that I take my self bound in conscience to say more then ever I have yet said, and that is thi [...] [All young Students that will deigne to take advice from so mean a man as I, as ever you would preserve your graces and con­versations, preserve▪ your Judgements; and as ever you would maintain the Do­ctrine of Christ, take heed of the Errors of the Antinomians: and as ever you would escape the snare of Antinomianism, take heed of these principal Articles of it fol­lowing: [That Christs satisfaction is ours quà praestita, before the Application; and that so far, as that we are actually Pardoned, Justified, Reconciled and A­dopted by it before we were born, much more before we believe: yea that Adopti­on and Remission of sin are immanent acts in God, and so are from eternity, even before any death of Christ, or efficacy of it: That pardon of sin is nothing but Ve [...]e non Punire: That Justification by faith is nothing but Justification in foro conscientia, o [...] the sense of that in our hearts, which was really ours from eternity, or from Christs death, or both: That justifying faith is the feeling or appre­hension of Gods eternal Love, Remission and Adoption.] I say, take heed of these master-Points of Antinomianism: And as ever you would avoid these, take heed how you receive them on the reputation and plausible words of any Writer: and especially of D^r Twiss, who is full of such passages, and being of greater learning and esteem then others is liker to mislead you. For you know, if you receive these then you must receive the r [...]st, if you discern the concatenation. For if all your sins were pardoned as soon as Christ died, then what need you pray for pardon, or Repent or Believe or be Baptized for pardon? then God loved you as well when you were his enemies, as since; and then how can you be restrained from sin by fear? &c. And that you may know I speak not this in slighting of the D [...]ctor, as Mr. K. chargeth me. 1. I profess to do it mainly for Gods glory and Truth, and for the love of souls. 2. I take my self the rather bound to it, because I was once drawn my self to some of these opinions by the meer high esti­mation of Mr. P [...]mble and Dr. Twisse. 3. I profess still most highly to love and reverence the names of these two blessed excellent men, as formerly I never honou­red any two men more. For Dr. Twiss, I am more beholden to his Writings for that little knowledge I have then almost any one mans, besides: and for Mr. Pem­ble, for ought I can see in his Book of Justification, he revoked this same errour which in his Vindic. Grat. he hath delivered: sure I am, no two mens Writings have been more in my hands, and few mens nam [...]s are yet so highly honoured in my heart.

This much I take my self bound to publish for a common warning. And I would further advise all to take heed how they entertain Dr. Twiss▪s doctrine about the cause of sin; of which I shall be ready to give my reason when I have a call; but will not now digress so far.

5. For your good wish [that my Books had not something in the Doctrinal part not answering the devotional] I thank you. But, alas, ignorance and errour will not be healed with a wish: Many a year have I studied and praied against them, and yet they stick by me still. But had I erred in the Foundation, it would have spoiled my Devotion: for non recte vivitur, ubi de Deo non bene creditur: And I had rather be defective in lesser doctrinals, then in Devotion. And though I am as confident that you erre in some of your Doctrinals (as I shall anon mani­fest) [Page 14] as you are of my erring, yet I heartily wish your Devotion be as good as your Judgement in Doctrine; and I think I wish you a greater blessing then you wished me.

6. I do not well relish your exceeding coldness in Gods cause, who are so hot for man: When it is for the honour of your Learned Brethren, [you have not patience, you cannot forbear.] But what Dr. Twisse hath said for Justification from Eternity, on the ground that there is no new immanent act in God, this you say, Matters not: Is it a phrase beseeming a Preacher of Christs Truth to say, [It matters not?] When that Truth is contradicted in so high a Point? and the souls of men, and the peace of the Church so much endangered? A G [...]llio might better have spoke thus. England hath not sped so well by the Antinomians of late, as that any knowing friend of it, should say, It matters not, when such great Di­vines promote their cause.

7. And where you also say, that [it matters not what some in the Synod said against him, and how little he said for himself.] I am not of your minde. 1. Is it only the vestigia Doctoris Twissi & M. K. that are to be adored? You shall give me leave to honour you much, and the Doctor more, but the Assembly more then either of you. 2. I do not think the Doctor was so weak, or at least a good cause so friendless in the Assembly, but that himself or some other would have done something considerable to the justification of his cause, if it had been justi­fiable. 3. I will be bold to ask you, the next time I see you, whether all your heat and impatience for unworthy handling or slighting the Doctor be not meant against the Assembly as well as me? or if not, Whether it be not respect of per­sons that made the difference? or rather the securing of your reputation, which you might think would be elevated by a Victory over others, or at least lose no­thing, though the person were so contemptible, as not to adde to your glory; but by an opposition to the Assembly it might have been dasht in pieces? Or if the Antinomians being questioned by the Assembly shall alleadge Dr. Twiss's words (frequently and plainly uttered) for their Defence; and the Doctors cause be­ing hereupon questioned shall fall without any justification; I pray you tell me, Whether there may not be the same necessity for us to take notice of his Errours as the Assembly? and whether after them we may not do it (while we honour his worth as much as I still do) without slighting or wronging him. It is more dishonour to be Questioned by an Assembly and come off unjustified, then to be judged to mistake by so contemptible a person as I.

8. Where you speak of [his very Name doing most of the service.] I do not understand what service you mean. I know you mean not the service done in his Writings: And sure you dare not mean [the service done by the Assembly:] for that were to make them a contemptible Assembly indeed, if a mans Name, yea magni nominis umbra, did most of their service: And it were to think as basely of their service as the worst Sectary doth, that I have met with. It were not worth so much cost, and so many years pains, nor worthy the Acceptation of Parliament or People, if it were but the offspring of Dr. Twisse's Name. But Sir we have received fruits that shew they came from another cause then a name or the shadow of a name. I confess I value their least Catechism for children above all Mr. Kendall's learned Labours, were they twenty times more of the same quality. I never heard but one Learned man speak contemptuously of the Assembly, and his friends say it was because he was not thought Worthy to be one of them (I ex­cept those that were against them in the Warre; where heat of opposition might [Page 15] occasion disesteem: But if this were Mr. K's case, yet methinks when he changed his Cause and Party, he should withall have changed his esteem of the Assembly.) But its likely that Mr. K. means that it was the Doctors Name that did most of the service of a Moderator; most of his own part in the Assembly: It may be so: But if he had nothing to work by but his Name, yet had his cause been good, it would in that Assembly have found some friends. But what you mean then by the following words, I do not well know, that his Name you are sure [was that formidable thing to the Learned adversary.] Perhaps you mean your self, by the Learned adversary, of whose fears I confess you might be sure, and so might know the Name or Word that did affright you: else I cannot imagine who you mean, except it were the Kings party or the Episcopal Divines together: But for Episcopacy, I know of no Disputes that ever the Assembly had upon it, and so had no adversaries in a disputing way; at least during Dr. Twiss's time. And for disputing the Kings Cause, I think they did as little in it. Some chosen men in the Treaties indeed disputed against Episcopacy, but with other weapons then Dr. Twisse's Name. If you should mean that it was Dr. Twisse's Name that made the Learned Episcopal Divines have Reverend thoughts of the Assembly, I must tell you that there were in that Assembly no small number of Divines of that ex­cellency for Learning, Piety and Ministerial Ability, which might command Re­verence from the Learnedest adversaries of you all.

9. But though his Name did all the service; yet you [question not but he could have easily made it good, That there is no new immanent act in God, against, &c.] It seems by this that you think this the easier to prove of the two: And indeed I am acquainted with none that are minded to op­pose it.

10. Nor is it reasonable for you to say, that you [would fain have any of them all that opposed him, to give a satisfactory answer to your Argument,] when you know it was not in that Point that they opposed him. Would you make more your adversaaies against their will as well as me? or do you long for more honourable Antagonists to cope with? And whats your Argu­ment?

§. 5.

Mr. K. IF there be any new immanent Act in God, it must be either of his Under­standing or his Will: Of his Ʋnderstanding there can be none: else must he know somewhat a new, which inferres he was not Omniscient, knew not all before this new act of Knowledge: If of his W [...]ll, then either this new act is for the better or worse or indifferent: If for the better, he was not absolutely perfect before, as being capable of bettering: If for the worse, he is not so perfect since this act as he was before; which is to make him l [...]ss perfect by his new act: If neither, then is this act such as might as well have been out as in: and then it is an imperfection to act so im­pertinently. This same Argument as I take it made use of by Mr. Goodwin himself in a like case, and therefore he will not be offended how highly soever I value it as an irrefragable Demonstration.

§. 5.

R. B. REmember that I say not that your Doctrine is Untrue, but Uncertain. It may be possibly as you say; but whether you can tell that it is so, or prove it to be so, I doubt. To your great Argument, I expect better proof of your major Proposition, which indeed hath none at all. Two things I expected you should have proved: 1. That God hath an Understanding and Will which act; properly so called: or that you know what it is that is improperly called Gods Understanding and Will? 2. That God hath no immanent Act but of his Understanding or Will. To begin with the last: I will not say, datur tertium. For I dare not say properly dantur duo: But I will desire you to prove your major: and I think that in the same sense as God is said to have an Understanding and Will, for ought you know he may have other acts, which those two notions will not express. [...]or 1. You are uncertain whether Angels may not have other fa­culties or acts-immanent, besides Understanding and Will: (If you say, you are sure they have not, prove it:) and so others may be ascribed to God by Ana­logy from them, as these be by Analogy from man. You know perhaps how ma­ny senses you have your self: but how can you prove that no other creature hath a sixth sense, which you are uncapable of knowing the name or nature of? So how know you but Angels may have powers or immanent acts beside Understanding and Willing, which you know nothing of for name or nature? Must all Gods superiour creatures be needs measured by poor man? How much more noble crea­tures hath God, then these below that dwell in dust! 2. But if you were ac­quainted with all the Angels in heaven, and were at a certainty about the number or nature of their powers or acts, how prove you that God hath no other act then what Understanding and Willing doth express? That one unconceivable perfect act in God, which Eminenter (by an unconceivable transcendent eminence) is Understanding and Willing, (yet but Analogically so called) but properly and for­mally is neither, but somewhat more excellent; is in all likelihood very restrain­edly or defectively expressed by these two words; even as to the objective extent. How know we but that in some of Gods creatures, or at least in God himself there may be something found besides Entity, Verity, Goodness; or any thing that is the object of Intellection or Volition, whereof no man had ever any concepti­on. However, is it not unlikely, yea a dangerous imagination, That the pow­ers or acts of such wretched worms as we, should be so farre commensurable with the Infinite Majesty, that as we have no immanent act but of Understanding or Will (or subordinate to these) so God hath no other? or none but what are ex­pressed in these two notions! Alas, that silly worms should so unreverently pre­sume! and pretend to that knowledge of God which they have not! and might so easily know that they have not!

And for the former, How farre God hath an Understanding or Will, I will peruse your words to Master Goodwin when I have done with this Se­ction.

This were enough to your Argument and Challenge: but I proceed to the confirmation of your implied minor. And 1. I easily grant you, that it is certain there is no Addition to, or mutation of Gods Essence. 2. I think all the Acts as­cribed to God are his Essence, and are one in themselves considered. Pardon▪ that I do but say [I think:] For though principles of reason and Metaphysical Axioms [Page 17] seem to lead plainly to this Conclusion; yet I am afraid of pretending to any greater Certainty then I have; or of building too much on the doubtfull con­clusions of mans slippery Reasonings, about the nature of the Invisible Incom­prehensible God. I think it most sutable to Gods Unity and Simplicity, that all his immanent acts (so called by us) are Himself and are One. But I dare not say I am certain that God cannot be Simple and Perfect, except this be true: both because He is beyond my knowledge, and because the doctrine of the Tri­nity assureth us that there is in God a true diversity▪ consisting with Unity, Sim­plicity and Perfection of Essence. 3. You know not what the subject of your Proposition is, (Gods acts of Understanding and Will:) and therefore you are uncapable of such peremptory concluding de Modis, knowingly and certainly, as here you pretend to. 4. You cannot prove that there's any such thing in God as an Immanent Act, or an Understanding or a Will in proper sense: but some­thing there is which we cannot fitlier or more profitably conceive or express then under such notions, drawn Analogically from mans acts of Understanding and Willing. Now if we will speak of Gods Incomprehensible nature by such Ana­logy, and put the names of Understanding and Willing on God, as borrowed from mans understanding and willing, then must we accordingly conceive of Gods understanding and willing, as like to mans in the form of these acts (for we can reach to no higher conceptions, though these be utterly improper.) Now mans actual intellection doth connote and suppose an intelligible object, and his Will doth connote and suppose an appetible object: and consequently it cannot be expected according to the utmost imaginable natural perfection of them, that either should go beyond the extent of their objects, or be such acts without their proper objects: Even as Gods Omnipotency is but dicta ad possibi­lia, Vid. Aquin. 1. q. 25. a. 3. c. These things thus pre­mised, some will perhaps think you sufficiently answered (when you say, it inferres that God was not Omniscient, knew not all, &c.) by telling you 1. That as Omnisciency signi­fies a Power of Knowing all things, Analogically ascribed to God ad captum humanum as distinct from the act of knowing; so God was yet Omniscient. 2. As Omnisciency signifieth the actual Know­ledge of all intelligible objects, so God was Omniscient And no more is requi­site to the perfection of his Knowledge. 3. But an Object may have not only its real but its See Buridane of that question in his Ethicks so far as to shew the great difficulty. intelligible Being de Novo which it had not before; and therefore as Omnisciency sig­nifieth the Knowledge of all things that will be intelligible, as well as those that now are intelligible, so (say they) it be­longs not to Gods perfection to be Omniscient; for it is un­naturally and improperly called Science (and so Omniscience) which hath not an Object. Their foundation (which may seem absurd to you) viz. That some things may de novo become the objects of Knowledge, they declare thus: 1. They suppose, that though God be Indivisible, and so his Eternity be Indivisible, and have neither in it, Praeteritum nor Futurum, nor Nunc neither, as we understand it, as expressing a present instant of time; yet as God knoweth not Himself only, but the creature also, so he knoweth not E [...]e [...]nity only but Time: He knows how things are ordered and take place in mans Divisible mea­sure of motions: and therefore he knows things as Past, Present and Future, quoad hominem & tempus, which are so past, presen [...] and future. And he doth not know a thing Past to be Present (quoad tempus & hominem) nor a thing Future to [Page 18] be Past: but knows things truly as they be. 2. This being premised, they will then assume, that Peter and Paul did not actually exist from eternity: Christ did not actually suffer from eternity: and so the actual existence of Peter in nunc temporis, was not an intelligible object from Eternity: and therefore they think they may conclude, that it could not be known from Eternity. They will urge their reason thus: 1. There was no Time from Eternity (that is, be­fore time:) therefore it could not be intelligible, that Peter did actually then exist in Time. 2. Else you will confound Futurition and Present existence: God did know from Eternity▪ that Peter would exist in Time, i. e. futuritionem Petri: therefore it was not Peter's present actual existence that he knew. 3. The nature of foreknowledge is to know things as future, and therefore must not be con­founded with knowledge of things as existent. 4. This proposition before the creation was not true [Peter doth actually exist:] therefore God could not know it to be then true. But after Peter's birth it did de novo become a true pro­position: and therefore must be de novo known to be then true. Before that, it was only true that [Haec Propositio vera futura est] but not [vera est:] therefore no more but the futurition of the Truth could be known, and not the actual pre­sent existence (as referring to time:) It is not all one to say [Petrus erit] and [Petrus est] nor all one to know it. 5. The contradictory Proposition was then true [Peter doth not exist:] But both contradictory Propositions could not be known to be true together, that is from Eternity. Therefore God did then know the Negative Proposition as then true [Petrus non existit:] and the Affirmative de futuro to be true [Petrus futurus est, vel existet:] but he did not know the Af­firmative de existentia praesenti to be true from Eternity [Petrus in nunc temporis existit] no nor [Petrus in nunc Aeternitatis existit:] for they were then false Pro­positions: nor yet was it then true that [Tempus actu existit.] If you say, That there were no Propositions from Eternity, and therefore they could not be true or false: this alters not the case: for 1. We speak on supposition that there had been creatures to have framed these Propositions. 2. If we conceive not of Gods Understanding as knowing the truth of Propositions, concerning things, we shall scarce have any conception of it as an Understanding at all. 3. The Schools commonly speak of the Eternal truth of Propositions, e. g. de futuris contingenti­bus. 4. There are Propositions in Time, and these God knows: and thats all one to the present case. At Noahs [...]ood God knew not this Proposition to be then true [Petrus existit:] for it was not then true. Nor did he know then that [it is true in nunc temporis quo existit Petrus] but only, that i [...] will be true: For Futura and not things presently existent are the objects o [...] Foreknowledge: and that [Nunc temporis] it self did not then exist. 6▪ Otherwise it▪ would be true that All things do coexist with God from Eternity: (which is disclaimed by those that are now opposed:) and so that they do exist from Eternity. For if this Pro­position were known to be true from Eternity [Petrus existit, vel Deo coexist [...]▪] then the thing expressed is true, Peter did so exist and coexist. For that which is false cannot be known to be at the same time true. If it be granted therefore that Peter did not exist from Eternity, and consequently that that Proposition was not then true, nor intelligible as then true, but only as of fut [...]e Verity, then when God in time knows it to be of present existent Verity, he knows more then when he knows it to be only of future Verity and of present falshood: And so about the crea [...]ures, When he knows that they do exist and knows them as existing, he knows more then when he knew them only to be future and as future. For if it be [Page 19] not more to know a thing as existent then as future, and so knowledge be not di­versified from the object, then it is no more to know something then nothing: For the reason is the same: and future is a term of diminution as to existent. And then it will be all one to know [Judas is damned] and [Peter is saved:] [Jacob is loved] and [Esau is hated.] Yea then it would be all one i [...] (per possibile vel impossibile) it were known [Peter is damned] and [Judas is saved] or [Peter is saved and damned:] and so it would be all one to know falshood and truth.

Many such reasonings as these will be used against you. Of which if you would know my own opinion, I think they are de ignotis, dreams, fightings in the dark, yet much like your own. And though I know severall things that you may say against this reasoning, so do I know much that may be said against yours: and, I think, both sides would do better to profess that ignorance which they can nei­ther overcome nor [...]ide. How constantly do the Schools distinguish between Gods Abstractive and Intuitive Knowledge? Scientiam simplicis intelligentiae & purae Visionis? and tell us that the former in order of nature goes before the other? If this be so, then God hath a Prius and Posterius in the acts of his knowledge. The like we may say between Gods Knowledge of Himself and the creature. If they think it not absurd that etiam in mente Divina there should be a transition of things è numero possibilium in numerum futurorum, and this sine mutatione; why may they not admit a knowledge of things as existent only when they are existent, and of things as future when they are future? and this sine mutatione too? For the distinction quoad momenta temporis, will make but a gradual difference, in point of mutation, from that quoad ordinem naturae, vel momenta Rationis. All distincti­on, that hath real ground, denotes imperfection, according to our highest specu­lators, and so must all be denied of God. I refuse not to say (if I must say any thing) of both as Mr. Barlow doth Exercit. 5. (think him not pedantick, because he is bound with Schibler:) Mutatio illa est solum in objecto cognito, non in cogno­scente, seu cognitione; cum cognitio divina ab objecto non dependet, nec ad mutationem objecti mutationem ullam patitur, &c. Cum ideo admittit Alvarez res primo esse possi­biles solum in ordine ad potentiam & futuras in ordine ad voluntatem, necesse est ut prius cognoscat cognitione abstractiva (quia ut possibiles ea solum cognitione cog [...]sci possunt) & postea cum per voluntatem fiunt futurae, & etiam actu existentes, illas cognitione in­tuitivâ cognos [...]et Deus. At hinc nulla in Deo mutatio sequetur, sed solum in objecto (ut fateatur necesse est) Et per consequens hoc dato, quod scientia Dei ab abstracti [...]a in in­tuitivam mutarctur, tamen non sequetur Deum esse mutabilem, vel cognitionem suam ex parte rei: sed solum quod objecto variato, intellectus noster, varias ei denominationes attribuit: ut quod sit intuitiva, quod [...]bstractiva, quae solum sunt denominationes variae cognitioni divinae ab intellectu nostro impositae, pro diverso respectu ad creaturam, cum in s [...] sit omnino simplex & invariata.]

But then I would fain know whether there be not the same necessity that the difference between objects [only future] and [presently existent] should cause our understandings to put the forementioned various denominations on Gods Knowledge, as the difference inter Possibilia & Futura, doth so cause us to put on it? And also whether in the same impropriety and imperfection, the very notions of [Understanding, Willing, Acting, Immanently, &c.] be not Deno­minationes ab intellectu nostro impositae, or assumed by God in condescension to hu­mane weakness, expressing but some little, very little, of that Divine—I know not what. For that same thing which man hath a true formall conception of un­der the notion of [Knowing, Willing] is varied according to the variety of [Page 20] objects: But if it be not so with God (as I must think and say, It is not, if I presume to think and say any thing of it,) that is because Knowledge and Willing in Him are not the things that we by those terms use to express; nor yet any thing that we can have formall proper conceptions of: And by the same necessity and warrant as we do bring down the Divine nature so low, as to apply to it the noti­ons of Acting, Understanding, Willing; may we also apply to it the notions of Acting, Knowing and Willing de novo; confessing a further addition to the im­propriety of speech. And therefore as God himself doth in Scripture accomo­date himself to our capacity, by assuming the terms and notions of Under­standing and Willing, so doth he also of loving where he before hated, with divers the like, which in man would imply an innocent muta­tion.

I have here given you some reason of several passages of mine, which your fol­lowing Pages carp at, before you discerned my meaning, as I shall shew you fur­ther anon.

So much to your proof that there is no new immanent act in Gods Under­standing. One word to what follows about his Will.

Where you argue thus: [If of his Will, then this new act is either for the Better, or Worse, or Indifferent, &c.] Ans. In strict propriety, it is taken as unproved, that he hath Will, or Immanent acts. But ad captum humanum as we are necessi­tated to ascribe Willing and Acting to him, so they that think they may on the same grounds ascribe New acts of Will to him (as the Scripture undoubtedly doth,) will think that your Argument is sufficiently answered thus:

1. This arguing supposeth mans silly intellect capable of comprehending the Reasons of the Acts of the Almighty; as if it cannot be, except we can appre­hend the reason of it, and whether it be for the better or worse or indifferent; or what it produceth, or to what end it is: which is a most bold arrogant presum­ption in such moles as we are. As I said before, you know not whether there may not be more Affections or Modi entium open to the Divine Intellect and Will, or Nature, then we have any name for or conception of: And though mans will look only at the goodness or appetibility or conveniency of objects, yet you know not what Gods will is; and therefore know not what is its adequate object. Many other reasons also of the obscurity of this might be given.

2. It will be answered you, that the said New act of Gods will, is for the Better: But then they will distinguish of [Better.] 1. They will say, It is Better quoad rerum ordinem: and it is Better to the creature: (as for God to love him that before he hated: or approve of him, whom before he disapproved.) 2. They distinguish also between that which may be said to be Better to God himself: Either Really, by a real addition to his perfection; and so nothing can be Better to God: Or 2. Relatively and Reputatively; as God is said to be Blessed, Glorified, Honoured, Well pleased, Exalted, Magnified, &c. And thus it may be Better to God, though he receive no real addition of felicity; and so not Vain or Indifferent.

3. They will desire you to Answer your own Argument as to transient Acts, and they think it may serve as to immanent acts. (Remembring that they suppose that there be new acts in God without mutation; because they suppose that those very things that we call immanent Acts in him are but denominations of his sim­ple Essence, according to the various aspects or respects of the objects, which make no more mutation then relations do.) Was Gods act of Creation, of rai­sing [Page 21] Christ from death, &c. for the Better, or Worse, or Indifferent? I think you will say as before, that it was not Better as to God in the adding of any real felicity to him: But to God Reputarively and Relatively, and to the creature really, it was Better. So will they say about immanent acts, which may perfect the whole (as the Honour of the Prince is the good of the Commonwealth) and may be necessary to the Good of particular persons; and the reputative Good of God himself. Its said, God made All things for himself, Was it for Better to him­self, or Worse, or Indifferent?

4. Is it Better or Worse for a looking Glass that it receive a hundred various species de novo? You will perhaps say, It is no disparagement to the Glass to be receptive of new species without being made Better or Worse: as also that its re­ception is passive, and so is not Gods Understanding or Willing. I know not what it is: but I confess i [...] must needs be a very improper conception to conceive of God as passive in knowing. And yet man hath no true apprehension of a knowledge which is wholly sine passione: But how prove you that God cannot, if he please, by his active Knowledge, Know de novo, without becoming Better or Worse? or doing it in vain? Are you sure that every new act of intellection (even in a dream) doth make mans understanding better or worse? or else is vain? I confess more may be here said.

5. Having done with your Argument, they will further tell you, that, If God may have new relations without any real change, then, for ought you know, he may have new immanent acts without a real change: But the Antecedent is unquestionably true: (God was not a Creator before he had creatures: nor is he our Father before we are his children; nor our King, Master, &c. before we are his subjects, servants, &c. except de jure only:) The Consequence they prove thus: Relations have as true an Entity, as, for ought you know, these which we call Immanent Acts in God, may have: Therefore the Novation of them will make as great a change. Here they suppose that Actio and Relatio are both acci­dents (taken properly) and neither of them meer Entia Rationis (for in so think­ing they go in the more beaten road) much less nothing: Or if you will say, that Relatio is but Modus entis, they will say so of action too: Or however they tell you, that it may be so for ought you know, with that which we call an Act in God. And here they suppose that his Acts are not his Essence absolutely and in it self considered; and that it signifies not all one to say, God is God, and to say, God willeth the existence of this worm: And therefore they will say, that these which we call Acts, may be, if not Relations, yet some of Scotus his for­malities, or something to us unknown, which have either no more Being then Relations, or at least not so much as to make a real change in God. And that there is in his simple, indivisible Essence, a Trinity of persons, without any im­perfection: so there may be in his Essence, distinct formalities (or somewhat that we cannot name or conceive of) of a lower nature, then Personality, with­out any inconvenience: and as th [...]se may be superadded to the meer absolute Essence of God (as Agere, Intelligere, Velle, are added) without dividing, or multiplying it: so may [...]bey on [...]e [...]ame grounds be New, or renewed, without any Mutation of Gods Essence; but only of the formality of intellection or Vo­lition, which is added to his Essence.

6. They further think that the nature of transient acts, doth prove that imma­nent acts may be renewed: Bu [...] [...]his will be more spoke to anon, when we come to your doctrine of transient Acts. They say, A transient act is not a meer Re­lation [Page 22] or Passion or Effect: But there is in it that which may be called action [...] agente, as well as passion à patiente. Now if actio be efficientis actio here, and God in creating the world did verè agere, then either the world was created from eter­nity, or else God did create it from Eternity, and yet it was created only in Time, and the Causation or Causing creating Act was infinitely before the Effect; or else there was a new act really performed by God in Time. The first none will maintain, that I deal with. The second, say they, is against common reason: For Gods act is the Causa proxima creaturae; and omnis causa proxima reciprocatur cum suo effectu: i. e. Posita causa proxima in actu, necesse est effectum poni: If it be causa totalis, yea and requireth nothing else to the effect so much as by preparation, or disposition, no nor a subject matter, then the act of creation must needs im­mediatly produce the creature; and the Creare and Creari must needs be insepara­ble: Its answered that Gods creating act was from eternity, but the effect, or creature, was not till its Time. But it will be replied, That either God did more for the creatures production or creation at the time of its passive creation, then he did from Eternity, or he did no more: If more, then he did something de novo: If no more, then either the creature would have had its Being from Eterni­ty, quia posita causâ ponitur effectus; or else if you ask whats the reason that the creature was not in Being sooner or later, no cause can be assigned▪ and so God should not be the cause. This holds equally (say they) whether you make the creating act to be only Gods Velle, or [...] superadded execution of that will, as being the effect of power. For either God willed the creatures present existence from eternity, as much as at the time of its creation, or as at this day▪ or he did not. If he did not, then he willeth de novo: If he did, then the creature would have existed, as soon as it was willed. To say, that God willed from Eternity that the creature should be in Time, is true: But is it as much to Will that it shall be, as to Will its present existence? If it be answered, That there is no Past or Future with God; I answer 1. That this was prevented before; when it was said, that God understandeth Time, and propositions concerning time, though time be only mans measure, and propositions mans instruments. 2. The men that I speak to, maintain that all things coexist not with God from Eternity (though indeed the term [from] as here used, contradicteth Eternity:) and they distin­guish between Gods willing rerum futuritionem & existentiam praesentem: and there­fore this seemeth to make against their answer. (But indeed none of all this ar­guing is solid, because of the different manner of producing effects per voluntatem, & per potentiam excquentem voluntati superadditam.) Perhaps it will be said, that if all this be granted, yet it followeth not that immanent acts may be de novo without a change in God, because the Creating act, or any transient act is so: For the former is God himself, but the later is not. To which it may be replied, 1. We speak not now of a product or effect, called the Creation, but of the crea­ting act and then why should not that be God himself, as well as an immanent act? If you say it i [...] a Being, then it is God or distinct from God: If distinct from God, it is a substance or accident, or some modus, or who knows what? Accidents God hath none: Substance it cannot be; except it be God. If you say it is any modus, you know what School contradiction you must expect: Or if you say it is a Reality or a Formality, those that you deal with will tell you, that they can as well prove the immanent acts to be formalities, or such like, as you can the transient. For 2. they say (with others) that these acts are not cal­led Immanent, Pos [...]ively, as if they had any effect or terminus in God himself; [Page 23] but Negatively, because they have no effect, ad extra; and do nihil ponere in objecto. So that as to the nature of the act it self, they say, it is the same, or at least, the later as much essential to God, as the former (though not their effects.) And I have paper converse with a Divine, if I mistake not, full as Learned as M^r K. (to speak sparingly) who maintains, that those which you call immanent acts (viz. Gods Knowing and Willing other things besides himself) are transient, and so to be called; as having as much an extrinsick object, as those that you and I call Transient; though they make no real change on them: and that those only are to be called Gods immanent acts, whose object is himself. 3. Moreover you will acknowledge that Gods Velle i [...] an immanent act▪ But how many and how great are they that maintain that Gods Creating act, was but his Velle that things should be! I need not tell you of Schoolmen that are for this: but when you (doubtless) know that D^• Twisse himself affirms it, in his Vindic. you must either be of his minde, or handle him unworthily by your Dissent, as [...] did in ano­ther case. Now if the act by which God produced the creatures be but his Velle, then it is an act which you call immanent. And you well know how commonly it is maintained that Deus operatur per essentiam: and that there is no act but his essence it self, requisite to any effect, which he produceth, as it is the effect of the first Cause. But this is but ad hominem; for these are not their principles whose arguings I now recite. They suppose that creation and other transient acts, are not meer Volitions, but acts of power, in execution of Gods will. To which purpose [...]ow largely many famous Schoolmen have argued, is obvious to them that are conversant in them. Aurcolus hath fifteen Arguments to this end. Gregor. Arminiensis hath many Arguments to prove that how ever Creation or Conserva­tion be taken, neither of them is God himself. Capreolus I know and other Tho­mists answer these Arguments: and much may be replied and is, to those an­swers: so that in so dark and unsearchable a Controversie, strong wits may finde something to say, against each other, longer then the patience of the wisest of their Readers will hold out to know the issue of their disputes. Aegidius, Thom. de Argent. Occam, and others plead also for a necessity of an executive act of power, distinct from the meer act of willing, or that Creation is not God. So do Jacob. Martini, Suarez, Schibler, and other later Authors. And if (as Aquinas saith) transient acts be formaliter in agente, as well as immanent, then the inception of new immanent acts seems to have no other inconveniences, then the inception of transient acts as to the form. But indeed the Thomists say the same of both, that they are only Gods essence, and that God hath no transient act at all, but only that his Essence or Will or Understanding may be so denominated for the rational Relation of the Object thereto. And therefore Aquinas (1. q. 25. a. 1.) maintaining that there is in God Potentia activa (though not passiva) withall maintains it to be the samething, as the action, and as his Will and Understand­ing. (And yet sometime be calleth Gods actions transient! but in this he speaks unconstantly or doubtfully, as Suarez noteth Met. disp. 20. §. 5.) And the sub­stance of all Capreolus answer to Aureolus fifteen Arguments is this same distincti­on, between Gods act of Creation it self (which is his Will and Essence, im­manent and eternal) and the Relatio rationis between God and the object; from which Gods will is denominated a transient act. But yet in this transient act, it is only the relation, and not the act it self (which is God himself) which may be diversified or renewed. Now if this meer relatio rationis be sufficient ground for our denomination of Gods act to be [Transient] and these transient acts to [Page 24] be new, then it may seem that the relation of the same act to some extrinsick terminative objects (as of Gods knowledge to the present existence of things in n [...]nc temporis) doth give the same ground to call those acts new, though not so properly transient. For if one may be denominated from its respect to its object, why not the other: Nay why the same relatio rationis may not as well denominate those acts transient also, which we now call immanent, is not easie to discern: For both have respect to an extrinsick object, if that suffice. Nay doth not that act which is called immanent, produce or effect? seeing it is only Volendo without any other executive action that God effecteth all things that are effected: and this Vel [...]e from eternity is (say they) causa in actu of those things that are produced in time. And therefore many say, that God hath no Will as to extrinsicks, but what is effective: and so that his Will hath no extrinsick object properly so called, but only products or effects. That omne velle Dei est operativum & efficax eorum quae vult, and that therefore he may not be said to will any thing but what he doth ef­fect. See Gibi [...]uf de Libert. li. 2. c. 24. & 1.

So that in Conclusion, according to the Doctrine of the most Learned Tho­mists, there is in God neither immanent nor transient act in M^r K's sense. (Ex­cept those that are terminated, as they call it, in himself as the object.) Not im­manent; for they are not terminated in the Agent, as M^r K. saith, such are; nay they have respect to things extrinsick; nay, say many, they are productive of these extrinsick things. Not transient; for Gods essence doth not transire in ob­jectum extraneum, but only cause it without any other executive action; and so respecteth it. In the same sense therefore, and on the same grounds as you will maintain the transient act to be in time, and not eternal, will these men think to prove it also of the immanent. For even the transient acts of God (so called) are not in the creature, but only respect and effect them. As Capreolus saith (li. 2. dist. 1. q. 2. art. 3.) Talis actio praedicamentalis & quae est motus, est subjectivè in passo: Divina autem actio non est motus, nec mutatio, licet causet motum & muta­tionem.

7. But they much insist on that before intimated, that if it be no wrong to Gods simplicity to have diversity or multiplicity of immanent acts ascribed to him, then it is not any wrong to his immutability to have such acts ascribed to him de novo: For the reason will prove alike. But that it is no wrong to God to have diversity of immanent acts ascribed to him, is evident by 1. The use of Scripture. 2. The use of all Divines. 3. And the necessity of the thing. 1. I need not tell any man that hath read the Bible, that Scripture distinguisheth of Gods at­tribut [...] that it ascribeth to him Understanding, Will, Memory, &c. that it speaketh not of his Love and Hatred, his Approbation and Disallowance, his Justice and Mercy, as being one, not to be distinguished. 2. And what Divines sp [...]wise? even of them that make the boldest enquiries into Gods nature, and pass of it the most consident conclusions, as if they had seen the invisible Majesty: I mean the Schoolmen of all sorts: To how little purpose were many a Volume in [...] ^m Sent. for the most part, if it were enough to apprehend in God undivisible Unity? How easily on these grounds might we answer all Bradwar­dines, all Twisses sublime disputes, about Gods willing sin, his order of intention, and of his Decrees, his Election and Reprobation, whether absolute or condi­tional, definite or indefinite, and de rerum possibilitate & futuritione ab aeterno, with many the like? Its easie to say, that all these are one and the same thing: and the same is not before or after it self, &c. Yet this is not taken for a satisfactory [Page 25] way of disputing. 3. Yea is it not apparent, that there is a necessity of such di­stinguishing language? How many souls would you be likely to convert, and save? how many sins to prevent, by telling your Auditory, that in deed and truth it is all one thing in God to Decree a man to salvation, or to decree him to damnation? Its all one to Will that you shall sin, and that you shall not sin: that you shall die this day, and that your Neighbour shall live fourty years longer: Its the same thing, without any true difference, for God to Love you now you believe, and to Hate you while you were a worker of Iniquity; to be pleased and displeased, to Approve and dislike; His Love to Peter, to Jacob, and his Hatred to Judas, to Esau was the same thing, only the effects are not the same. I say, how savoury and profitable would this doctrine be?

And are there not the same Reasons for our ascribing to God, the beginning and ending of Immanent Acts, as the Diversity of them? Is not one as consistent with his Immutability, as the other with his simplicity? Doth not Scripture a­scribe to God the Inception and ending of Immanent Acts, as well as the Diver­sity of them? And is ther enot as great a necessity of our using that language as the other? How many souls were you like to save by telling them [God Loved you as well before you believed, yea before Christ died for you, as he doth since! God doth Hate you now as much as he did when you were a worker of iniquity, and is as much offended with you since you believed as he was when you were a childe of wrath! He had the same thoughts of you when you were blaspheming, murdering and committing adultery, as when you repent and pray. God is now decreeing to create the world; he is now decreeing to give the Law by Moses, to save Noah by the Ark, Lot out of Sodom: he is now Decreeing that Christ shall suffer for us; he now knows all these as future: he is no more Reconciled to the world by Christ, or Pleased in or by his Sufferings and Merits then he was before: God knows now that [Christ is now on the Cross] or [Christ is not Risen] is a true Proposition, because he did once know that it is a true Proposition: and he ceaseth not to know it:] would this kinde of doctrine seem sound and edifying? Do you use to preach thus?

But you'le say, That Gods Knowledge, Will, Power, Goodness, Justice, In­finiteness, his Willing the End and the Means, the futurition of things, and their present existence, mens salvation or damnation are all diversified onely as to ex­trinsick denomination, and not really: from the variety of objects it is, that one act of God is variously denominated.

Answ. 1. But Scotus with his followers, Sirectus, Basolis, Trombeta le Roy, Go­thutius, Mayro, Faventinus, and the like, tell us of more then extrinsick denomina­tions: And if there be in God a Diversity of Formalities; it may as well be said, that there is an inception and ending of these Formalities in him. This doth no more derogate from the Immutability of God, then the other from his sim­plicity.

2. Have these extrinsick Denominations any true Ground in the things deno­minated, or not? If not, it seems they are all false, and therefore not to be used. If they have, then what is it? The difference of names should suppose an equal difference in the Things. A meer Relative difference, some are loth to grant. If they should, as they plead for a diversity of Relations, others may as well plead for an Inception and Cessation of Relations: (Could they prove Immanent acts to be but Relations.) If they say they are Modi or Entia rationis, or what ever title rash adventurous wits may impose on them, still others will say as much for their [Page 26] Beginning and Ending, as they do for their Diversity, and that one impli [...]s no more a Change in God, then the other denieth his simplicity. The describers of Extrinsick Denomination that place it between Ens and Nihil, make it to sig­nifie the order of a thing to the subject which yet it is not in. But then it is a meer Relation which is Denominated; or if any more, it should be ex parte objecti only in our case.

3. But suppose that it be but a meer extrinsick Denomination, and have no Reall Ground in the thing denominated; see what follows: But this much: That Gods Knowledge, and Will, and Power, and Justice, and Mercy, his Knowing me to be Godly or ungodly, his decre [...]ing Peter to life, and Judas to death; his loving Jacob and hating Esau, are all one; his knowing one thing to be future, and another not future, is all one: But yet because of the Diversity of objects it is meet and needfull, that we Denominate extrinsecally Gods acts to be divers: and so to distinguish his Intention of the End, from his Election of the Means; his Election from his Reprobation, his Approbation from his dislike, &c. Even so, these acts in God have in themselves no Beginning or End: God did never Begin to Love, to Will this or that, to Know &c. But yet because of the Begin­ning and Ending of objects, it is meet and needfull to Denominate Gods acts extrinsecally as Beginning and Ending, as the objects do, and changing with them. For here the case is the same as to Gods Immutability, as in the other to his simplicity. And if this hold, then those men that should write Voluminous Disputes, about the Beginning and Ending of Immanent acts, would do as war­rantably as D^r Twiss and others do in writing so of their diversity, priority and posteriority in nature. Nay is it not much more Justifiable then many of their Volumes? For from Eternity there was no reall diversity of objects to denomi­nate Gods Immanent acts from. For that esse cognitum vel volitum, which they'le flie to, could be no where, but in mente & voluntate Divina: and if there were no Diversity in mente Divina at all, then what ground can be imagined of the extrin­sick Denominations? For example, Possibilia & futura being nothing, could not in themselves differ from eternity: Yet how great a fabrick doth D^r Twiss build upon this Proposition, that [the transition of things future è numero possibil [...]um in numerum futurorum, being from Eternity, it must needs have an eternal Cause which can be no other then Gods Will.] Now if there were no such transition, but in mente divinâ, and if there were no such notion from Eternity any where else, as is [Future and Possible] and so it must be imagined to be an Ens raetionis Divinae, then it plainly follows that there was no such thing as Future, distinct from Possible: for in God is no distinct Immanent acts, (as knowing Possibles, and Knowing things future;) and in the things was no distinction, for they are nothing.

It seems therefore that upon your own Grounds it is as Justifiable and necessary, to Denominate extrinsecally Gods Immanent acts, as having Beginning and End, when the objects have so, as it is to Denominate them divers from the diversity of the object: and that if we made this our ordinary speech in voluminous Disputes, you could no more blame us for it, then all the exactest School-Divines are to be blamed for the other.

Moreover, some may think, that you do teach Infidels to destroy the Christian Faith, or teach a man to prove or disprove what he will, because Contradictories may consist, e. g. If they would prove that [Christ is not Risen] thus: That which God knoweth to be true, is true: But God Knoweth this Proposition to be [...]rue [Christ is not Risen] Therefore. The minor they prove thus: God did [Page 27] once know this Proposition to be true: Therefore he doth so still: for there is no Ending of any Immanent act of God. It will be answered, That this onely shews a difference in the object, that it was once true, which now is not: but Gods act is the same by which he knoweth these mutable objects. Be it so: (yet whether it be certain and can be proved still, is by them doubted:) but is it fit for us to speak of this act as one only? It seems then, it is all one, in God to know a Proposition to be True, and to know it to be false. For the fore-said Pro­position [Christ is not Risen] was True one day, and False the next; and God knew both. You'le say, It is all one in God to Know that to be True which is True, and that to be False which is False: but in both he knows Verè, etsi non verum. But then you must tell us further, what it is for God to Know [Truly:] Is it the Congruency of his Knowledge to the Object, which we call the Truth of it? I think you will say so: And if so, then it is not obvious to shew how there was such a Congruence from Eternity, when there was Nothing but God; and so no other object for his knowledge to agree to: For in God they were all but one, either in esse cognito, or esse volito; for in him is no reall diversity: and out of him, or in themselves they were not at all: and therefore if God knew all things as many or divers, when they were not at all, and as existent, when they did not exist, where is the Congruence of the act with the object? But all this ar­guing is but light.

But they further argue thus: Gods Immanent acts, which we are speaking of, are not Himself: and therefore as they may be either diversified or multiplied with­out his Division or Composition, so they may begin or end without his Mutation. The antecedent they prove by that common Argument: These Immanent acts about the Creature, are Free; God Freely Willeth the existence of this worm or pile of grass: he so Willed it that he could have not willed it, or nilled it. But his own Being is necessary, and cannot but be: Therefore, &c. It seems hard to say, that God did as necessarily Will the pardoning of your sins, as he is ne­cessarily God: Or that he could no more have Willed one pile of grass more or lesse on the earth, or one sand more or lesse on the Sea-shore, or one day more or lesse to any mans life, then he could cease to be God. This is a short way of an­swering Beverovicius question, and of answering the presumptuous enquiry, Whe­ther God could have made any thing better, and a thousand more? Itane etiam ipsum Numen fato constringitur? Is it a good Argument? Deus est: ergo n [...]cesse est Creaturas esse, nec plures, nec pauciores, nec priùs, nec posteriùs, &c? One of my Rabbi's (by whose name I have acquainted Mr. K. with my ignorance) answereth that Gods Decrees are Free, Solum per terminationem ad extraneum, seu in quantum Volitio Dei, circa objectum aliquod extrinsecum practicè est. But this is as much as to say, No Immanent act is Free: For Immanent acts (at least if Mr. K. know) are not terminated in any thing wihtout: Or if a man should say, that those that have an extrinsick object, are objectively terminated in something extrinsick; yet this seems none of the Authours sense (as the word practicè shews:) and if it were (as perhaps it is) his words would run thus: [Gods Decrees are free, onely as they are such and such Decrees about such objects:] which would but yield the cause, that as such Decrees they are not the same formally with the divine Essence. And were it not for the Connotation of the Object, it were no Decree, nor to be called, but simply Gods Essence. I am sure Dr. Twisse will be fully and earnest­ly enough for those that maintain the liberty of the Divine Decrees which we now mention: and therefore I suppose Mr. K. will be of the same minde.

And that there is not such clear Evidence in this case, as to embolden men to such confident Conclusions, or to build so much on them, as some do, let Suarez perplexed Dispute Metaph. Disp. 30. Sect. 9. testifie, Quomodo cum divina libertate stet Immutabilitas? Where after the producing of many opinions, and the Argu­ments and Answers, he concludes, Ex his quae circa has opiniones dicta sunt, satis (ut opinor) declaratum est quanta sit hujus opinionis difficultas; faciliusque esse quamlibet ejus partem impugnare, quam aliquam probe defendere, aut explicare. Quapropter non vereor Confiteri nihil me invenire quod mihi satisfaciat, nisi hoc solum, in hujusmodi rebus id de Deo esse credendum, quod ineffabili ejus perfectioni magis sit consentaneum, quodque ab omni imperfectione alienum sit, &c.] And how uncertain are men, that some of those things may not consist with the Divine Perfection, which yet they confidently affirm to be inconsistent with it? If it be a point that is so farre past the reach of Suarez and many other such subtil Disputers, I think Mr. K. should not pretend to so full an insight into it, which may raise him to that confidence which is here expressed; much lesse should he think it so obvious to the understandings of his inferiours.

How light so ever Dr. Twiss make of them, certainly they are accounted no chil­dren among the most learned of their side, who do [...]each, That there may be so far a Beginning and Ceasing of Gods Immanent acts, which have a mutable object, without any change in God himself, as that they may have a new transition to the object, and so God may Will that which before he Willed not, though yet it be all by one simple act. Of this minde is Penottus, Lychetus, Fr. a Sancta Clara: And the said Sancta Clara▪ citeth others as countenancing his Doctrine. But though there are but few for this opinion, yet for the formal distinction of Gods Immanent acts (which as is said, seems to be as inconsistent with his simplicity, as this with his Immutability) there are many and that of the most Learned: Vid. quae habet Scotus in sent. l. 1. dist. 8. Qu. 3. & dist. 2. Qu. 4. & 7. & dist. 34. & passim. And Rada saith, that Scoti sententiam ab ejus diebus universa Pariensis Schola semper amplexata fuerit, necnon & Lovaniensis atque Bononiensis Academia; Et in uni­versa Italia apud omnes vivos doctos est celebris & famosa. In Contr 4. And their Reasons are not contemptible, which may be seen in their several Writers: Spe­cially in those that have wrote whole books of the Formalities. Or Rada (a man of a clear understanding and expression) will afford you many in that one Contr. 4. which are worthy consideration. And if Ph. Faber Faventinus his reconciling Interpretation of their Distinction Rationis Ratiocinatae, will prove their sense, then many of the Thomists are also of the same minde. Vid. Faventin. Tract. de for­malitat. cap. 3.

I do not mean by this Argument to conclude that there must be (or in all cases may be) an Inception or Cessation of those Acts which admit of a formal Distin­ction: But only thus, that if a formal Distinction be consistent with the Divine simplicity, then an Inception and Cessation of some such formalities (or acts, quoad formales differentias) may seem consistent with Gods Immutability: (And I know no other Argument of moment then left, if that be solved.) What these formalities are, I do not wonder, if they give but a dark account: Yet that they are different objective conceptions they agree. And as Rada saith, ad Distinctio­nem formalem duo requiruntur. Alterum est, quod utrumque distinctionis extremum di­cat aliquid Positivum in re, seclusa operatione Intellectus: Alterum est, quod utrumque extremum dicat propriam formalitatem, secundum quam sit in rerum natura extra suam [...]ausam. And Scotus himself saith of this as applied to God; Quod Forma in crea­turis [Page 29] habet aliquid imperfectionis, scilicet quod est Forma informans aliquid, & Pars compositi: aliquid etiam habet quod non est imperfectionis, sed consequitur [...]am secundum suam rationem essentialem sive formalem, scilicet, quod ipsa sit quo aliquid est tale, e. g. sapientia in nobis est Accidens, hoc est imperfectionis: sed quod ipsa sit quo aliquid est sa­piens, hoc non est imperfectionis, sed essentialis rationis sapientiae. In divinis autem nihil est forma; secundum illam duplicem rationem imperfectionis, quia nec Informans, nec pars: est tamen ibi sapientia in quantum est quo illud in quo ipsa est, est sapiens, & hoc non per aliquam compositionem, &c. Sent. 1. dist. 8. Q. 3.

Some think yet clearer Arguments might be fetcht from the Hypostatical Uni­on, from the Acts of generation and spiration, or Love, whereby the Son is be­gotten of the Father, and the holy Ghost proceedeth from the Father and the Son, and from the distinction of Persons in the Trinity. But I will stop here (as having run further then I intended) lest you should mis-interpret me, and think, that I own all these Arguments that I touch upon. I know what D. Twiss against Pennotus hath said to one or two of them, and what the Schoolmen com­monly say to the same▪ I mention these only to shew that a full or clear soluti­on of these doubts is not also facile and obvious, as you seem to ima­gine.

I must again intreat you, and every ingenious Reader, to fasten no opinion on me, but what I own, at least none which I disclaim. If I must be of one side in this Controversie, I will be of Mr. Kendals side, and say, that God hath but one act immanent, and that is Eternal. But my thoughts are, that we know not what we talk of when we speak thus, and therefore I will not be of any side in this.

I think, 1. That God hath no Act at all in proper speech: but both Acting, and Understanding, and Willing are by a very, very, very low remote Analogy ascribed to him.

2. Yet I am ready to think, that as we are fain for our own understanding, to speak of God as Acting, Understanding, Willing, Loving, &c. and also for our own understanding to distinguish his Perfections, Properties, Acts, &c. which are but one, so may and must we as much speak of some of his Acts, as begin­ning and ending (which yet perhaps do not in themselves:) For the Reason and Necessity seems to be the same. For because the word [Knowledge or Under­standing] is first used and applied to mans act of Knowledge, and signifieth first only such a Knowledge as is diversified by objects; yea and man can have no pro­per positive Conception of a Knowledge which is not diversified by the diversity of Objects (but onely a Negative Conception;) therefore it is that we are forced to speak of Gods Knowledge (and so of his Will and other Acts) as divers or di­stinct: as Divines generally do. And on the same Grounds, as man hath no positive Conception of any Knowledge or Will, about mutable objects, which is not varied with these objects, as to the Being, Beginning and Ending, therefore we must as necessarily denominate Gods acts about such objects, as Beginning and Ending, as we must denominate them Divers. And so we may well say, God willed from Eternity the futurition of the worlds Creation, and Christs Death, &c. But now he doth not will their futurition, but their preterition: and that he Loveth now (as believers in Christ) those whom he before Hated as Workers of Iniquity; and that he is satisfied and well-pleased in his Son, and his Sacrifice, who was not so before. Me thinks Mr. K. should think this language as fit for the mouths and pens of Divines, as the former, and not to be blamed or accused as [Page 30] erroneous, because improper, as long as we must speak improperly of God, or not at all. And I am sure that Scripture speaks of God in this language, ascri­bing to him Immanent acts, as new or as ceasing, and as moved by exteriour cau­ses: Therefore this way of speaking is not unfit or intolerable.

The Summe of all that I say therefore is but this, That we cannot conceive of Gods Immanent acts, as in themselves they are (nor are they truely the same things that we conceive of, when we apply the several denominations to them:) and therefore we must conceive of them by Resemblance to the Acts of Man so denominated, still acknowledging the Impropriety of the terms, and disclaiming all those Imperfections which in man they do express.

But because Mr. K. hath spoken so much to this point already, its like he will take it ill if I take no notice of it. I will therefore a little insist on the conside­ration of what he saith on it, to Mr. Goodwin, pag. 93, 94. (but briefly, as being not to me.)

§. 6.

Mr. K. THis is such a Reason as most of your Disciples needed your favour to reade a Logick Lecture to them, that they might be in a Capacity to give their Judgements on it: You not having been pleased to do it, I will for once gratifie them with a Cast of my old Office; and now supposing my self again in my Deans Chair, I gravely begin thus. That Univocum is that which is attributed to several things accord­ing to the same Name, and Nature signified by that name; as Animal to a Man and an Asse, to which are opposed on the one hand Aequivocum, which is attributed according to the same Name, but not signifying the same Nature, as Canis which is said of a Starre, a Beast, and a Fish: either hath the same name Canis, but their natures are as differ­ent as Heaven, Earth and Water. On the other hand Analogum, which is attributed according to the same Name, and as signifying the same Nature; but not in the like man­ner. Now this same Analogum is of two sorts; The terms are promiscuously jumbled together by the Logickmongers, but let that be, 1. Proportionis; when the same Name is given to things of the Like, but not the same Nature: as Laughing, &c▪ 2. Attri­butionis: where the same Name is given to divers things, according to the same Na­ture: but this same Nature doth not agree to them alike; but to the one first, to the other afterwards, secundum priùs & posteriùs: yea to the later dependantly on the first: as Substance and Accident are each of them Ens, a thing, &c.

§. 6.

R▪ B. HOld a little. 1. The first part of your task, you have competently per­formed, viz. to acquaint us of the lower O [...]bs of your ancient Dig­nity: Our distance is so great from the Superiour Planets, that we might never have heard of your Deans Chair, had you not happily here informed us: But I hope you had a more noble Imploiment in your Deans Chair, then this poor, common, Inferiour work, to tell men of Univocum aequivocum & Analogum, and to di­stinguish Analogum Proportionis & Attributionis: But though I had not the happi­ness to be educated at your feet, yet in this your Learned, Elaborate, Polemical writing, I may, no doubt, expect the best of your Judgement; and may conje­cture what you were wont to reade to your Pupils by that which you here so grave­ly read to Mr. Goodwin. First, you will not, it seems [jumble the terms so pro­miscuously [Page 31] as the Logickmongers do:] But, when these words had raised my expectations of some more exquisite distribution then ordinary, or at least of more apt terms, I am put off with the old distinction, not only common in the School­men, but in the multitudes of Logick and Metaphysick Writers, which I had thought you had disdained: Not the smallest Senguerdius but hath it; (onely he, with many others term it, but Barbarous; whereas Keckerman terms it Insipid, and Burgersdicius inept:) And Rutgersius saith, that Analogorum nomine solum ea di­cuntur quae secundum proportionem apud Aristotelem vocantur, prout notant interpretes ex cap. 16. post c. 15. maxime verò ex c. 6. 1. Ethic. &c. Usus tamen Latinae Scholae & Philosophorum obtinuit, ut etiam ea quae secundum attributionem vocantur analogorum no­mine censeantur.

But though your Distinction be very ordinary, I confesse there is more then ordinary in your Explication of the members: But it is of such a nature, as makes me begin to abate the apprehensions of my infelicity, in that I had never the happiness to be your Auditor, and to have Learned Logick at your feet. Your Analogum in genere, is that [which is attributed according to the same name, and as signifying the same Nature, but not in the like manner.] Your Analogum pro­portionis, is [when the same name is given to things of the like, but not the same nature.] Analogum in Genere, is of the same nature, as well as Name. Analogum Proportionis, is not the same Nature, but the Like. And so the nature of the Genus is not in the Species: Nay they are contrary one to the other: and onely the later member (Analogum Attributionis) remains an Analogum, and each Species receives not the definition of the Genus. If this be the Doctrine which you so [Gravely deliver from your Deans Chair, I will say as you do [I cannot perswade my self to leave my old Doctors to follow You.] I will even turn to poor Keckerman, Burgersdicius, Suarez again; yea to a Rutgersius, Jacchaeus, Gorlaeus, Serguerdius, Alstedius, or any body that's near me of this generation, before I will swallow what I cannot digest.

§. 7.

Mr. K. NOw if Substance and Accident be Analoga, because of the dependance of Ac­cidents on the Subject, then what ever is predicated of God and the Crea­ture, must be predicated Analogically, because the creature hath it not but by dependance on God, but God independently from the Creature: And as the Being of the Creature, is derived from God in fieri, and depends on him in facto esse; so questionless the Knowledge of the Creature, is but a beam from the fountain of light, which is in God, and cannot longer subsist, then he vouchsafeth to preserve it by a continued irradia­tion, &c.

§. 7.

R. B. 1. I Would rather say that Substance and Accident are Analogata, then Analoga; but you may use your Liberty, and call the Analoga, Ana­logata. 2. I should think that it is not directly and strictly [Because of the de­pendance of Accidents on the Subject, that Substance and Accident are Analo­gata: but because of the Imperfect Entity which through this dependance the Ac­dents have in the more perfect Entity of the Subject. 3. It is not that most Ge­nerall [Page 32] Analogum, [Ens] as appliable to God and the Creature, that we are now in question of. But it is those inferiour of [Fore-knowledge, Knowledge, Will, Election, &c.] 1. Your [Because] is unsound, and I conceive your Consequence is false, viz. [then whatsoever is predicated of God and the Crea­ture must be predicated Analogically] Do you think that nothing may be spo­ken equivocally of God and the Creature? If you do, you are a singular man. 5. I hope you do not think that our knowledge depends on God, as Acci­dents on the Subject: If you do, then God hath many Accidents indeed, were that true: I had rather say plainly, that God effecteth our knowledge (by way of natural Causation in some respect, and by moral Causation in other respects) as that which had no Being before, then to talk of Emanation as a Beam from the fountain of Light; considering what ill use many in these times have made of the doctrine of Emanation. 6. It seems by your former Conclusion [whatsoever is predicated of God and the Creature, must be predicated Analogically] and by your present predication of [The fountain of Light which is in God] that you judge [Light] or [the fountain of Light] to be predicated Analogically of God too. Which if you do, and this also must be by Analogy of Attribution, then it seems Heat, Cold, Gravity, Levity, Density, Rarity, Composition, or what ever is in the Creature may be thus attributed to God. 7. As to the point it self in question, 1. I will not meddle with that old Controversie, Whe­ther Ens be spoken of God and the Creature Univocally, Aequivocally or Analo­gically. I have seen what Scotus saith for his opinion in Sent. 2. dist. 12. & alibi. & 1. dist. 3. q. 1. & 3. And what Anth. Andreas 4. Metaph. q. 1. Meurisse Metaph. Scot. l 1. Qu. 8. p. 108, &c. And Phil. Faber. Faventin. Phys. Scot. Theorem. 95. pag. 654, &c. Rada, and others say for it: And what Occham in 1. Sent. dist. 2. q. 8. And Guil. Rubio, say for the Nominals opinion: And what Cajetan saith against the Scotists. (By which Scotists the sense of Univocation, Aequivocation, and Ana­logy, is a little more subtilly opened, then M^r K. doth out of his Deans Chair.) But the Question that I speak to, is onely how farre Intelligere, Velle and Agere, may be Attributed to God. 2. And for the distribution of Analoga, and the sense of Analogy, I think, it will be long ere the Chair-men are agreed. Meu­risse out of Rubio saith, Univocum opponi soli aequivoco, non verò Analogo, & denomi­nativo: quia Univocum se habet ad aequivocum si cut Unum ad Multa: Unum autem pro­priè solum multis opponitur: se hahet autem ad Analogum & denominativum, tanquam veluti superius ad sua inferiora: Quia Univocum aliud est purum, aliud est non purum: Non purum est aut Analogum, aut Denominativum. Nullum superius autem oppenitur suis in­ferioribus: Itaque Ʋnivocum non opponitur Analogo & Denominativo; sed ab Analogo distinguitur tanquam Univocum purum, & à Denominativo Ʋnivo­cum quidditativum, seu illud quod est & praedicatum Ʋnivocum & Univocè prae­dicatur. Others innumerate Analoga with the Homonyma, distinct from Synonima.

Goclenius (who speaks largely of it) gives this distribution, Lexic. Philos. p. 100. I think in fitter terms then Mr. Kendal.

Analoga sunt Proportione

• Propriâ: ut Ens, bonum, principium, natura, motus, &c.
• Impropria
  • Attributionetantum: ut sanum ad animal & medica­mentum.
  • Translataproportione: Risus, comparatione bominis & prati.

But I think poor contemptible Keckerman and Burgersdicius have better explain­ed and distributed Homonyma and Analoga, then all that ever I had the hap to be acquainted with, not excepting the subtillest Scotists. 3. As for the application hereof to our Question, I still affirm, That the thing which the word [Know­ledge] is spoken of, in God, is not only more eminently and perfectly in him then the Creature, but is only in him, and not in the creature at all: And the thing which the word Knowledge is spoken of, or doth signifie in man, is not at all formaliter in God, but there is in him something of an Infinite, transcendent Excellency above it, which makes it useless; and in God it would be Imperfecti­on: And therefore it may be said to be in God eminenter non formaliter: The word [Knowledge] is first used to signifie the knowledge of man: It is translated to press to us that Incomprehensible perfection of God, which we cannot otherwise conceive of or express. Yet when ever we make use of the term, we cannot by it our selves attain to a conception, positive and true, of any higher thing then such knowledge as our own, with some negative additions, for removal of the Imper­fections; as that it is Infinite, &c. so that man can have no true positive Con­ception of the Nature of that which in God we call Knowledge: Only he appre­hendeth it to be somewhat like that which in man is called Knowledge. But Like is not the same. As Goclenius out of Aristot. [...] non sunt [...]. similia Analogia non sunt ejusdem generis: non sunt eadem genere. It is therefore a proper speech to say [Knowledge is not in God] and proper to say, it is in man: But yet it is a necessary speech to say [God knows] because we have no fitter ex­pression for that perfection of God, which we so call. Aquin. de Veritate Mater. z^da Qu. 1. saith, Et quia nulla Ratio significata per ipsum nomen definit ipsum Deum, nullum nomen à nobis impositum est propriè nomen ejus; sed est propriè creaturae quae de­finitur ratione significata per nomen: Et tamen ista nomina quae suns Creaturarum nomina Deo attribuuntur secundum quod in Creaturis aliqua similitudo ejus representatur. The third Opinion which he there rejecteth is, That Knowledge is attributed to God Metaphorically, as Anger is; against which he opposeth his fourth, Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod scientia Deo attributa significat aliquid quod in Deo est.] As if these might not well consist! Even a Metaphorical expression doth expresse something that is in God, though it expresse it but Metaphorically. And in Qu. undecima, he hath no better answer to the fifth Objection, which is drawn from [the great­er distance between God and us, then between Ens Creatum & non Ens] then this, Ad 5^m dicendum, quod Enti & non Enti aliquid secundum analogiam convenit: quod ip­sum non ens analogicè dicitur Ens: ut dicitur in 4^o Metaph. Ʋnde nec distantia quae est inter creaturam & Deum communitatem analogicè impedire potest. If the Analogy between Gods Acts, Knowledge, Will, and ours, be no nearer then between Ens & non ens, sure it is not such as you imagine, and here express. And contra Gentil. l. 1. c. 31. he confesseth, that in omni nomineà nobis dicto, quantum ad modum signandi imperfectio invenitur quae Deo non competit, quamois res signata aliquo modo eminenti Deo conveniat. Now scire, velle, agere, a [...]e terms properly fitted only to mans imperfect Mode of Knowing, Willing, Acting and do afford us no positive Conception of any other: so that if we could devise some genus which did comprehend Gods acts perfectè and mans imperfectè, as Ens doth substance and Accident, yet that must not be Know­ledge or Will: For these are the proper names of the Genus imperfectum: As if you should say, Substantia est Accidens. A certain kinde of Comprehension of the Crea­ture God hath, whose Nature being to us unknown, the proper name is unknown too, and therefore we are fain to call it by the proper name of mans comprehen­sion, [Page 34] i. e. Intellection and Science. And all Divines confess, that as to the or­der of knowing, and so as to the name we must first begin with the creature, to whom the name is first applicable. So Aquinas contra Gentil. l. 1. c. 35. Quia ex re­bus aliis in Dei cognitionem pervenimus, res nominatim de Deo & aliis rebus dictorum, per prius est in Deo secundum suum modum; sed ratio nominis per posterius: unde & no­minari dicitur à suis causatis. So Goclenius Lexic. Philosoph. de Analog. Duo sunt di­stinguenda; nimirum res ipsae per nomina significatae, & nominum impositio. Ad res ipsas quod attinet, prius ex de Deo prae dicantur, quam de creaturis. Atque hic propriè ordo est & convenientia, quam habent creaturae ad Deum; cujus ordinis causa dicuntur nomina Analogicè de Deo & de Creaturis praedicari. Quod vero attinet ad nominum Rationem & Impositionem prius iis nominibus app [...]llatae sucrunt res creatae quam Deus. Quare quod dicimus analogicè praedicari nomina de Deo & de Creaturis, quia prius de Deo quam de Creaturis: de Analogia reali seu secundum rem, non autem secundum no­minis rationem intelligendum est. Zanchy hath the same words, whose they are first I know not. How fit a speech this is, de Analogia reali, I leave to others to judge: but all grant that the Name is first applied to the Creature, and thence to God. Now all this holds of meer Metaphorical expressions.

To use Burgersdicius dist [...]ibution, I yield that these names applied to God and the Creature, are not Homonyma à casu, (such as Aquinas cont Gentil. ubi sup. expres­seth his meer aequivocals to be) but à consilio. But whether the Ratio Homonymiae be in Rebus, or in nobis, is not easie certainly to determine. Keckerman saith, Ambigua ex similitudine conceptus est, cum rebus toto genere diversis, ut Deo & Crea­turis, idem nomen tribuitur ex cognatione quam mens format. Nimirum intellectus no­ster ut atque idcircò in Deo nihil concipit directè, sed obliquè ex simili­tudine quadam, & imagine rei sinitae tanquam objecti sibi congruentis. Hinc a nobis Deo & attributis ejus voces certae, propriae ac direct [...] imponi nequiverunt, sed indirectae tan­tum, homonymae, & ex similitudine eâ qua Deus nobis repraesentatur in creaturis tanquam effectis, quae repraesentatio valde imperfecta est. Nomen Jehova, i. e existentis, sibi ipsi imposuit Deus, at nos ne id quidem directè concipimus: reliqua autem quae Deo tribuimus, ut misericordiam, Justitiam, &c. cjusmodi vocibus exprimimus quae directè impositae sunt virtutibus hominum significandis, indirectè autem ad Dcum pertinent, quatenus nos tales in Deo virtutes similitudine earum quae in hominibus sunt virtutum concipimus. Ʋnde non minùs pic quam scite Cyrillus, in his quae de Deo dicuntur, Maxima scientia est Ig­norantiam confiteri: & Augustinus, Deus, inquit, magnus est, sed sine quantitate, Bonus, sed sine qualitate: ut verò à nobis magnum sine quantitate, bonum sine qualitate directè & plenè concipi, est impossibile, &c. Et Julius Scaliger, Nullis, ait, vo­cibus tam plenè Deum significamus, quam iis quae Ignorantiam nostram prae­tendunt.

But suppose it be granted, that the Ratio Homonymiae is not only in nobis, sed in rebus, the question will remain, Whether it be ob inaequalem generis attributionem, or only ob similitudinem, vel mutuam rerum ad se invicem habitudinem? and so be Tro­pical? Mr. K. asserteth the former (under the name of Analogy of Attribu­tion.) The Scotists have long defended then Doctors Assertion, that Deus non est in genere. Vid. Fab. Faventin. Phys. Scot. Theorem. 96. his Vindication against Greg. Ariminensis and Bacconius: and many others of them have done this at large. So doth Wickleff. in his Trialog.

And if this hold, then nothing can be attributed to God and the Creature by this Analogy, per inaequalem generis attributionem. Yea Aquinas himself oft saith, [Page 35] Deus non est in genere (as Sarnanus notes) in 1. p. q. 3. a. 5. & 1. d. 8. q. 4. a. 2. 3^m. & 1. cont. Gent. c. 25. though after in q. de Potentia q. 7. a. 3. ad ult. Concedit Deum esse Genere substantiae reductivè: which Scotus refuteth. So Estius in [...] ^m Sent. d. 8. §. 10. denieth God to be in ullo genere. And Sarnanus hath no more to say for it in his Conciliation (pag. 15) then this, Esse in genere stat dupliciter: primo modo ut pars subjectiva contenta in illo genere: Et sic negatur Deum esse in genere. Secundo mo­do, ut principium Continens ipsum Genus: Et hoc modo Deus per appropriationem est in Genere substantiae. Vid. Gab. Biel. 1. Sent. dist. 8. q. 1. But this is not for God to be in genere, but for that Genus to be in God.

As Burgersdicius saith, Omnium longissimè à Synonymis absunt homonyma a Casu, quae{que} causam homonymiae habent in nobis: propriùs ad synonymorum naturam accedunt Tropi­ca, ac imprimis Analoga: at omnium proximè quae ambigua sunt ob inaequalem attributionem. That these words are not spoken of God and the creature univocè all of us agree, and the Schoolmen have fully evinced. Also that they are not spoken purè aequivocè, we are also agreed, and the said Schoolmen have evinced (as particularly Aquin. in sum. de Verit. ubi sup. by many Reasons: And Zanchius de Natura Dei borrows many of them.) But which of the other kindes of homonymy they belong to, is the doubt. Mr. K. thinks that which of all other is the nearest to synonymy: I think not so: but rather to the Tropical or Analogical, strictly so called, that is, vel propter similitudinem simplicem, vel proportionem (if not some of them, to those that have the Rationem homonymiae in nobis) Jacchaeus saith (Metaph. l. 1. c. 6.) Ego vero mallem istam Analogiam r [...]ferre ad proportional [...]tatis Analogiam, non Meta­phoricam illam (quomodo videre attribuitur oculo & menti) sed propriam, quomodo prin­cipium dicitur de corde, & fundamento domus. So he disclaims Mr. K's Analogy of Attribution: If the thing be not utterly uncertain to us, who know so little of Gods nature. But that we may venture on a conjecture, I should rather set the Creature at a greater distance from God then they do: and think that these At­tributes are all Tropical, somewhat Metonymical, but mostly Metaphorical. I never saw (in Aquinas or any other Schoolman that spoke for it) any cogent Rea­son to prove, that Intelligere, Velle, Agere, Amare, are attributed to God in any other kinde then Reminisci, Gaudere, Odio habere, Irasci, &c. Only a gradual dif­ference, I easily acknowledge, viz. That Intelligere & Velle having lesse Imperfe­ction, have therefore lesse impropriety. And who knows not that there is a wide difference of this sort among Metaphors, some being very near, and some so farre fetcht, as to be Catachrestical Durandus saith (in 1. sent dist. 34. q. 4) Nullum nomen attribuimus Deo nisi ex Creaturis: non enim ponimus nomen nisi rei quam intelli­gimus; & quia non intelligimus [...] eum, nisi ex creaturis, & tantum quantum concludi­mus excreaturis, ideo nullum nomen imponimus Deo nisi excreaturis, & quantum ad illa, quae concludimus convenire Deo excreaturis: constat autem quod non omnia nomina quae attribuimus Deo dicuntur de eo translativè & metaphori [...]è, &c. Solum autem illa nomi­na dicuntur de Deo translativè & metaphoricè quae significant speciales qu dditates rerum creatarum: vel perfectiones secundum modum creaturis convenientem, ut Leo, Agnus, Sentire, &c. Quia res significata per haec nomina non est in Deo, sed aliqua ejus simili­tudo, ut fortitudo, mansuc [...]udo, & cognitio singularium, quae in nobis pertinet ad sensum. But I would fain see it proved, That Intelligere, Velle, Agere, do not as properly signifie perfectiones secundum modum Creaturis convenientem, as sentire doth? And when we say segetes fluctuant, fluctnation is no more proper to the motion of the waters, then Intelligere, Velle, Agere, are to the perfections and action of man, or other rational creatures. And whereas they say that the terms are applied to [Page 36] God, with a Remotion of the Imperfections which they imply in us, I answer, So they may say of those lower terms, which they confesse to be Metaphorical, on­ly allowing a gradual difference of impropriety. Nor doth it follow therefore that there is no truth in these expressions of God, or that they are no helps to our knowledge of him, or means of demonstration. For Metaphors are not as pure equivocals: There's some common reason in the similitude, though in the first and proper sense the name be proper to one. When we say, Segetes fluctuant, we expresse not only Motion, wherein both agree, but a motion of the Corn like that of the Water. I think, as I said before, that it is no more proper to call God Scientem, Volentem, Agentem, then to call the Firmament a Nut-shell, because both seem to have a convexity or concavity, or contain something else within, &c. Or to call the Sunne Reptile, or a creeping thing, because it moves, and so do creeping things: or then it is proper to call Knowledge, Light, or to put Video for Intelligo (as Mr. K. cals God the fountain of Light before.) The Scripture saith, God is Light: yet I think this will be easily confessed a Metaphor: and I think it is but Metaphora propinquior, to say, Deus Intelligit, Vult, Agit, &c. And this I judge after long consideration of what Aquinas hath said, 1. q. 14. a. 1. & q. 19. a. 1. & alibi: and many other Schoolmen to the like purpose.

Shall I adde one Argument for the Negative (that it is not by Analogy of At­tribution, that Knowledge, Will, Power, &c. are attributed to God and the Creature; as Ens is to Substance and Accident) ad hominem specially? That Knowledge which is the same thing with Will and Power, cannot be the one of the Analogates with our Knowledge which is not the same; in this kinde of A­nalogy ob inaequalem generis distributionem: (supposing Knowledge to be the Ge­nus Analogum.) But Gods Knowledge is maintained by those that I dispute with, to be the same with his Will and Power) many say, they differ but denominatione extrinsecâ:) Therefore, &c. For the proof of the major, consider: Else on the same grounds [Power] might be thus analogically spoken of Gods Knowledge and mans Power: For where there is no difference in the Thing, there needs to be none in the Name, as requisite from the Nature of the Thing (but only from some extrinsick respect or use) But Power may not Analogically be spoken de Potestate humana, & scientia divina Ergo, &c. Common reason and use of speech confirms the minor. It seems therefore to be evident truth, that as it is from si­militude, or some Tropical respect, that Gods Immanent acts, have divers names, rather then one alone: so is it from the same reason that they have these particular names, rather then other: And consequently that these names are not Analoga inaequalis Attributionis naturae communis; but Analoga Proportionis, or Tro­pical. Durandus (in sent. 1. dist. 2. q. 2.) saith, Alia est opinio quae mihi videtur ve­rior, viz. quod distinctio attributorum, secundum rationem non potest sumi, nisi per com­parationem ad aliquam realem diversitatem actu existentem in creaturis, vel possibilem. Quod prob. 1. sic. Differentia Rationis, nisi sit falsa & vana, licet sit completive ab intel­lectu, oportet tamen quod habeat fundamentum in re: sed differentia attributorum secun­dum rationem non potest habere sufficiens fundamen [...] in natura divina absolutè accepta; nisi comparetur ad realem diversitatem quae in creaturis est, vel esse potest, ergo differentia attributorum divinorum secundum rationem, non potest verè sumi nisi per comparationem ad creaturas. Major patet: ratio enim, quam intellectus format, nisi fundetur aliqualiter in re, ficta est & vana, &c. Vide reliq.

I will only adde the words of Burgersdicius Metaphys. l. 2. c. 8. §. 1. sequuntur ea (attributa) quae creaturis communicari posse diximus, saltem [...]: quae [Page 37] tamen analogia non in ipsis Dei attributis, sed in ipsorum effectis fine operationibus quae­renda est. Nam cum attributa infinita sint, aeque atque ipsa Dei essentia, & at­tributa incommunicabilia, nullam habent c [...]m creaturis [...], nisi in suis suis operationibus circa objecta Creata & finita. Apply this to Immanent Acts.

§. 8.

Mr. K. pag. 94. IF Fore-knowledge in God and the Creature be not univocally the same, as surely they are not, then is this Fore-knowledge attributed to God and the Creature, either Equivocally or Analogically: If Equivocally, then hath the Fore-knowledge of God and the Creature only the same Name: But that is not so; for God, I hope, fore-knows as truly as the Creature, and the Creature may sometimes truly fore-know. So that here is more then a nominal agreement between Gods and the Crea­tures fore-knowledge. It remains therefore that this fore-knowledge be attributed to God and the Creature Analogically: but is this Analogie either of Proportion or Attribu­tion? If of Proportion, then either God or the Creature is is said to fore-know, but ei­ther Metaphorically or Metonymically. If only Metaphorically; I pray which of them is but Metaphorically said to fore-know? Not the Creature, &c. And surely much less may God be only Metaphorically said to fore-know these, and all other things that shall come to pass in all Ages. If only Metonymically, as some things are said to be healthy, because they have the signs of sanity in them, (I am bold to use the Boyes instance in this case) Is either God or the Creature only Metonymically said to fore-know? Not the Creature, &c. Not God, for he is the Author of our fore-knowledge: and therefore though his essence be not the subject of his fore-knowledge, [...]or his fore knowledge an Accident of his Nature, yet is he said to fore-know without being beholden to any such poor Trope for it. It rests therefore that fore-knowledge is attributed to God by more then this Analogie of Propor­oion, and consequently by that of Attribution Now I demand which is the famosius Analogatum? Gods fore-knowledge, or the Creatures? Questionless Gods: there be­ing infinitely greater Cause to set the Crown on Gods fore-knowledge, then on that of the Creatures, then there is to set it on substance rather then accident. If so, &c. then on­ward, as Analogatum per se posi [...]um stat per famosiori Analogato, so true fore-knowledge mentioned by it self, must alwayes be construed of the fore-knowledge of God: and therefore fore-knowledge is most properly attributable to God. And thus being now willing to resign my place, Haec sufficiant pro nunc.

§. 8.

R. B. IF I had once done with you, I would take heed of dealing with a Chair­man again in haste, for your sake: for I finde I run upon a great disad­vantage. For the credit of such mens understandings is so great with themselves at least, that they need no Argument, but their bare affirmation to carry the Cause. Your sole Argument [sic dico] doth put me harder to it, then if you had many: For what to say to this, I do not well know. Dispute against it, I cannot: and to set my Negation against your affirmation, will not do, till we stand on even ground.

1. Aquinas de verit. and many another Schoolman (and Zanchy out of them) might have helpt you to more cogent Arguments, against meer aequivocal deno­mination. When you speak of Gods fore-knowing, as [truly] that word [truly] [Page 38] is either opposed to feigned and false, or to improperly: that in God which the term [fore-knowledge] doth denote, is Truly in him, and him alone, but that which the word [fore-knowledge] doth properly and primarily signifie, is not in God.

2. Our Rabbi▪s (as you call them ab alto with a smile) do seem to us punies, to make a fuller distribution then you; as I have before shewed: and therefore we take yours to be defective, and consequently your reasoning void: I have told you of divers that please me better.

3. How greedily did I reade on, and follow you at the heels, to see how you proved that it is not spoken of God Metaphorically? and when I come to the bu­sinesse, What's the proof? Why you say [surely much lesse may God be onely metaphorically said to fore-know.] You passe your word on it: And this is the knotty Argument that I cannot answer, because I am not of your standing in the University: A little more of the University would have done me no harm (as you say) when I am to deal with this kinde of Argument.

4. Our Tutor Burgersdieius told us, I remember, that in caetoris tropis non minus est homonymiae locus, quam in Metaphora. And therefore Metaphorical and Metony­mical, are not a sufficient enumeration.

5. Do not think ever the worse of your self for using the Boyes instance: for (as you have partly salved your credit by intimating that you are above it, so) Aquinas, Scotus, and most of the Schoolmen that I have read, besides Zanchius, and many another of our great Divines, do make use of the same instance: And to play with this bigger sort of Boyes, is no such disgrace to you.

6. Here I meet with a thing that runs in the form of a Reason: [for he is the Author of our fore-knowledge] therefore he fore-knoweth not onely Metonymi­cally. I confesse the Conclusion is true; but I see not the reason of the conse­quence. As I remember a Metonymy of the effect is, when the efficient is signified by the name of the effect, either by a Verb, as pallet pro metuit, or an Adjective, as mors pallida; or a Substantive, as scelus pro scelesto (I purposely choose the Boyes examples, as best beseeming me.) And I have heard men often call Mr. Nath. Ward, Discolliminium, and the simple Cobler: And the Author of that Comedy, by the name of Ignoramus. I confesse it is a good Ar­gument [He is the Author of our fore-knowledge, therefore he hath fore-know­ledge eminenter, or somewhat that is more excellent then fore-knowledge.) But I dare not say, that God hath formally in himself whatsoever he is the Author of. For he is the Author of Nutrition, Augmentation Composition, of Sorrow, of Fear, of Hell, of Worms, Toads and Vipers. But it was the former (the Metaphorical Denomination, and also that of strict proportion, which some di­stinguish from the Metaphorical) which I had hoped you would have disproved. But I must take what will be had.

7. You think you plead for the Glory of the Divine Majesty, when you tell us he need not be beholden to a poor Trope. As if we should dispute, whether the Sunne do creep as reptilia do? and I say, Yes, Metaphorically: and you will stand up for the honour of the Sun, and say, we debase it; and that it doth creep without being beholden to a poor Trope for it: Or if the Question were, Whe­ther the Sunne be a Vegetative, or sensitive creature? and I say, Yes, Metonymi­cally: for it causeth Vegetation and sense. And you will say, It is Vegetative without being beholden to a Trope. What a Patron is he of the honour of man­kinde, that will prove that he is a Worm, a Beast, Nothing, and his life a sha­dow, [Page 39] a dream, a Weavers shuttle, without being beholden to a poor Trope! Yet are these unspeakably nearer, then the names of man and his acts, to God: for inter finitum & infinitum nulla est proportio.

8. You conclude that the famosius Analogatum, is Gods fore-knowledge, your proof is [Questionless it is so:] As strong as the rest. But, when I look fur­ther I finde somewhat like a Reason: [there being Infinitely greater cause to set the Crown on Gods fore-knowledge, &c.] My dread of Gods most sacred Ma­jesty, forbiddeth me to set on him such a Crown of Vanity. As if the Sun must be the famosius Analogatum inter Reptilia, because the Crown of [Creeping] must be set on its head! What if we should yield to you, that the term [Knowledge, Will, Action, &c.] being first Metaphorically applied to God, that yet it is partly Analogical quoad inaequalem Generis attributionem, the term expressing (though improperly as to one) a Nature common to both? It would not yet fol­low, that here the more noble sort, even Divine Knowledge, &c. were the famo­sius Analogatum: For though it be most excellent and unexpressibly glorious in it self, yet the term agreeing first with the lower, even humane Knowledge, there­fore that is the famosius Analogatum, as being the thing most famously and noto­riously meant by that term. If you ask, Whether the Sunne do glissen (as Glow­worms, or rotten wood) or do Rutilare or Candere? If you say, Yea; yet I think the Sunne here is not the famosius Analogatum, though the light which this word intendeth be more eminently in the Sun, then in the other things.

You conclude, that [true fore-knowledge mentioned by it self, must alwayes be understood of the fore-knowledge of God.] Is that so indeed?

1. Why then do the Schoolmen generally acknowledge, that the names are all first applicable to the Creature, though the thing be most excellently in God?

2. Then, it seems, it is not a strictly proper speech to say [Man knows, or fore-knows, or Wils, or acteth:] for none of the Homonyma, are spoken of both, in strict propriety. But if you would undertake to prove, that God may in as strict propriety be said to Know, Will or Act, as man is, there are many that would undertake to prove the terms Univocal: which in most Divines Judge­ment, would be to prove, that man is God: an opinion, which our new world in the Moon (in Anglia lunatica) have very confidently imbraced of late years.

In a word, Sir, my thoughts of man, and his Acts, Knowing, Willing, are so low, and my thoughts of the Infinite God, so high, or at a losse, when I go about to have any positive, true apprehensions of his Nature, that I conceive you and I can no more tell what that is in God which we call Knowing, Willing, A­cting, then my Horse can tell what Reasoning or Discourse is in me, or there­abouts. And yet I believe that the Knowledge of God is eternal Life too, viz. Now (as to the beginning) to know that there is a God, and that there is some­what in Him which mans Knowledge, Will, Goodness, Justice, &c. have some exceeding, low, distant resemblance of, and which we cannot better apprehend or express then under such notions, and by such terms; it being yet in it self of more unconceivable excellency. And though I know the Schoolmen are confi­dent (without proof) that Scire, Velle, &c. do express no Imperfection, but only Modal, and therefore may be applied to God (which I conjecture will also be your Argument) yet I do not believe that Assertion. Comparatively to lower or equal Creatures, it may be said, that it is not Imperfection, which they express. But [Page 40] absolutely or comparatively as to God, it is Imperfection: Not only some acci­dent or Modus, but the very thing exprest by these terms, is Imperfect: Else the Creature shall have something equal to God, and so be God. And if it were but a Modal Imperfection; yet when the term doth strictly and properly expresse that Imperfect Modus it self, as well as the Thing, then that term cannot be applied to God any nearlier then Tropically. Knowledge, Will, Action, and all the terms fitted to man, are so strictly fitted to express the humane Mode, as well as that which you separate in your Intellect, and call perfect, that it cannot be applied to one without the other, but abusively or tropically; No more then [c [...]e [...]ping] is applicable to the swift motion of the Sun, when the term doth intimately signifie the slowness and Mode of the motion, with the motion it self.

God forbid that I should doubt, whether that in God be Perfect, which we call Knowledge, Will, Action: But what it is that under these names of infinitely remote similitude we do express, what earthly man can tell? Because I believe Gods Immanent acts to be perfect, therefore I believe them not to be the same thing that man apprehendeth under these terms.

Oh that frail man were more acquainted with his Nothingness! then would he not dare so to lift up himself in comparison with his Maker! Then would not the Christian world for so many hundred years have been filled with quarrels a­bout unsearchable Mysteries; and the great Divines of the Church, be the great Dividers of the Church by voluminous contentions, and censo [...]ious, uncharita­ble, zealous emulations about Gods secrets: They would not have fastened upon utter uncertainties, and things unrevealed, and then have stiled their fancies [the Orthodox Doctrine] and reproached or quarrelled with those that were dissenters. The world would not have been altogether by the ears about things that they know no more then a beast knows what is the soul of man; such as many of the Schoolmens writings are, and most of those points in which the Controversies be­tween the Arminians and anti-Arminians, the Jesuites and Dominicans, are unti­mately resolved: Yea, and your Academ cal Chairs would have been better im­ployed: and then God would not have been so provoked against them: Nor should I have needed to fear that your Chair is coming down, while I reade here that you are coming down; nor have cause to salute you so sadly at your descent, as fearing a future vacancy of your resigned place.

§. 9.

Mr. K. Pag. I Shall now see what Mr. Baxter saith, though not to answer this Argu­ment, or any other, yet to detract somewhat from the Reputation of the Conclusion, that there can be no new Immanent act in God, but all are Eternal.

§. 9.

R. B. TO feign a wrong end to a mans speeches, is usually the way to fasten on them a false and alien sense. I therefore who am better acquaint­ed with my own End and meaning then M [...]. K. is (as well as he knows me, by looking through his Prospective, Glass from Cornwell to Kidderminster) shall better acquaint others what was my meaning in the words, which he fastens on. And this is the true and plain Analysis of my words.

Having affirmed Justification to be a transient act, and that therefore the In­ception [Page 41] of it argueth no mutation in God, I was fore't to meet with the opinion of D^r Twiss, who takes it to be an Immanent Act, and therefore if it should begin de novo, it would argue a change in God. (Not speaking of that in fore Conscientiae.)

These two Conclusions therefore I took as certain, and necessary to be held of every knowing Christian.

1. That God doth not change.

2. That God doth not pardon or justifie men from Eternity; (no nor from the time of Christs death) and therefore that he doth in time justifie and forgive men, even when they believe. These two Conclusions being Certain and necessary, I take the later as assaulted by D. Twiss; who thereby would make them seem inconsistent.

His Argument is, Justification and Remission are Immanent Acts, therefore from Eternity. To this I answer, 1. By denying the Antecedent: For I had before shewed, that they are Transient acts, and what Transient acts they are. 2. Having premised, that no acts are Immanent in God Positively but onely Ne­gatively (as Schibler speaks;) I answered, That many doubt whether Imma­nent acts are any further Eternal then Transient acts (which I will open anon when we come to it:) and therefore that this is not a matter of such Certainty as the Proposition opposed is: and therefore Uncertainties must be reduced to Cer­tainties, and not Certainties to Uncertainties: q. d. I am sure God doth not pardon and Justifie from Eternity from plain Texts of Scripture: But you are not sure that all Immanent acts are Eternal any more then Transient are; Therefore if these two Propositions were as inconsistent as you imagine, yet I would rather hold the former, and let go the later, then hold the latter and let go the former. Here I supposed it objected, that it is not to be endured that any should argue God of mutability: but the foresaid Doctrine doth so: Therefore, &c. To which I answered, that there is no change in God: and they that do hold this opinion, do yet hold it is consistent with Gods Immutability: and I gave two or three short touches of their reasoning: If you ask me, whom I mean, I answer, I mean Lychetus, Pennottus, Franciscus a Sancta Clara, and in part Suarez and Bur­gersdicius, in the words which I shall anon cite in his Metaphysicks. And mark that I do not say, that these plead for the Inception or Cessation of Immanent acts: but that Immanent acts are new as Transient are; that is, not quoad sub­stantiam actus, but transitionem in objectum extraneum. For here it is supposed, that it is not those Immanent acts, whose object is God himself, which is spoke of, but only those that are about the Creature; Note also, that I never thought of own­ing this opinion; but had ever owned the opinion of the Eternity of all Imma­nent acts; and so farre as the matter is discernable, do hold to it still: but I take the point in Question to be past our reach; and therefore not of such Certainty, as to encourage us to reject a plainly revealed truth, upon supposition of their in­consistency.

After this I returned to my first Position, and made it my full, final Answer, that Remission and Justification are Transient acts, and not Immanent, and that in this I had most Divines on my side, though they did not ordina­rily explain the Nature of this Transient Act: which thereupon I more fully explain'd.

Thus, Reader, I have given the true Analysis of all these words about Imma­nent acts, which Mr. K. makes the occasion of his quarrel with me: and which [Page 42] he layeth such a heavy charge on. And, I think, if I had said no more to him, but onely given you this true Analysis, it had been enough to satisfie the im­partial, and Judicious, and to free my words from that sandy incoherence and senslesness, which (not understanding them) he doth fasten on them in his charge; and to vindicate my self from those corrupt intentions and errours which he intimates.

§. 10.

Mr. K. FIrst, saith he, Acts have not the respect of the Adjunct to its Subject, but an effect to its cause: Therefore new Immanent Acts will not inferre an al­teration in God: Therefore, &c.

To this antecedent, I answer, that no Act is properly an effect, or relates as such to the Cause: the Act is rather the Causality then the effect, as Mr. Baxter may please to learn from his great Doctors in the Metaphysicks, whom I think enough to name in general, though he useth to quote them so exactly, as it were the Chapter and verse.

§. 10.

R. B. IF I have learning enough to understand your meaning, you endeavour in these words to prove two Conclusions. The first and principal (and I think, the whole scope of your writing) is, that I am Ignorant and unlearned. The second and subordinate is, that Immanent Acts are certainly Eternal, or that the change of them will inferre a change in God. The first you prove by my Pe­dantick citing of Schibler and Burgersdicius, the Boyes companions, and that as if they were Doctors in the Metaphysicks, and that so exactly, &c. which you think it enough to name. To this I answer, 1. Your Argument labours of two diseases, 1. Obscurity: which may make some, that know you not, conjecture that your design was scarce honest, which you so carry under hand by intimations, when yet it seems the great Cause of this your undertaking: For my part, I think you would never have mentioned my name here, but to this end. 2. Of Need­lesness: If you had stooped so low as to consult me in this business, and opened to me your design, I could by three lines have saved you the writing of these leaves: but that's too late: But yet I may prevent your voluminous labour perhaps for the future, if I do it yet. Be it known therefore to all men by these presents that I R. B. do confess my self ignorant and unlearned, especially compared with such as Mr. K. and his Genius. Habetis cons [...]tentem reum. What need you any more Witnesses? I hope now you may save the main labour of your next writing.

Yet, let me tell you the reason of my crime, a little more fully. I take the com­mon good to be the best. I have about thirty T [...]actates of Metaphysicks by me (an ill workman, that needs so many tools) and I value these two or three Com­mon ones which I cited before all the rest: and I think so do the Schools that use them most commonly. Nor do I see any great reason hitherto to take Mr. K. for a more learned, authentick, unquestionable Doctor in the Metaphysicks, then Suarez, Schibler or Burgersdicius, as highly as I value him above my self. Nor indeed did I ever before this, hear of his name (to my remembrance;) much lesse of his Metaphysical writings. But as soon as ever Mr. K's Metaphysicks come [Page 43] to my hands, if I do not bow to them, & vestigiatanti Philosophi adorare, then let him call me an unreverent fellow.

Now to your second business: Where, 1. I might better have been understood, if you had not left out the fore-going words; [by Immanent, they must needs mean Negatively, not Positively.] For by this they that see all might have un­derstood that, 2. It is Gods acts that I speak of, 3. And you do out of your own brain, affix the Ergo, as if it were mine, making that an Argument, which I there take as presupposed. The rest we will come to anon.

§. 11.

Mr. K. THus when the fire warms my hands, the heating is not the effect; but the Heat produced in my hand by the fire. This heat now is considerable three manner of wayes. I shall not honour my Papers with the name of Suarez for this, but referre my Reader, if he be a young Scholar, and not satisfied in it, to his Smith and Brerewood.

§. 11.

R. B. YEt again! You will make men believe that I am grown to some Repu­tation of Learning, when you think it necessary to use so many words, to prove me a freshman. Is not one word of your mouth enough to blast the repu­tation of such a puny?

§. 12.

Mr. K. EIther, 1. As it encreaseth, and in order to the highest degree of heat, and so it is called Motion, which is nothing else but the Terminus in fieri. Or 2. As tis received into the subject, and so it is called Passion, heating like beating being as well taken in a Passive sense as an active. Or, 3. As it is derived from the Agent, and so it is called action: but this action again is considerable two manner of wayes; Ei­ther Physically or Logically. Physically, and so the Patient is the subject of it: the heat which undergoes these several denominations, being in my hand, as was supposed. 2. Lo­gically, and so this action is but an extrinsecal denomination, and the Agent is the subject of it: Now take it how you will, Action is an adjunct, as denominating the agent, no way an effect as an action, &c.

§. 12.

R. B. 1. THe word [Effect] is sometime taken for every thing that hath a Being and a Cause, and so every Action is an Effect, as having a Being dependant on its Cause: sometime it is taken more restrainedly, for that only which is permanent after the Action, or is Effected by it, and so Action is not an Effect. 2. The use of your distribution or distinctions to our business seems to me so small, as that I know not well to what end you bring them forth. 3. The order of your distinguishing I have no great minde to learn. I should ra­ther have distinguished Logical and Physical Action, in the first place, had there been any use for it. 4. But your Logical action we have nothing to say to: Nor did I speak de subjecto praedicationis. 5. Yet I have no great desire of imitating [Page 44] you, in calling the Agent, the subject of the extrinsecal denomination [viz. A­ction.] It is your Physical Action, which is so denominated: Though of the verbal predication [agit] I would willingly say, that the Agent is the subject. 6. But it is your Physical Action which we have now to do with: and that not as it is in Patiente, for so it is Passion, and not formally Action. Whether Scotus opinion of a Real difference be true or not (which yet may have more said for it then some superficial answerers do take notice of) yet formally its like it will be granted, that they are not the same: And therefore you should speak of Action as Action, Ut dicit egressionem & dependentiam ab agente, and not as it signifieth Pas­sion, that is, Reception of Action, and the effect of it: and so the Patient is not the subject of Action; Nor do I believe it a fit speech to say, that Calefaction is in your hand, though Calor be. But we must hear you further; to how great pur­pose we shall see.

§. 13.

M^r K. 1. NOw take it how you will, Action is an adjunct, as denominating the Agent, no way an Effect, as an Action. 2. Nor doth it carry that stile in any of these learned Sophies, commonly quoted by Mr. Baxter with so much reverence.

§. 13.

R. B. 1. SAy you so! is it an adjunct as denominating the Agent, take it how I will? What if I take it, [as it is received into the Subject, and called Passion] which is your second sense? Why said you that your Logical A­ction was an extrinsecal denomination of the Agent, if your Physical Action be so too? When you seemed by this to difference them? 2. I marvel that my Re­verence to these Sophies should be the matter of so many of your lines, and you should think it necessary to rehearse it so oft: Sure you are jealous that your Read­er will be very unobservant of your weighty observations▪ But, Sir, is not Reve­rence a sign of Lowliness? Why then are you offended at it? You should rather applaud me, and say, If R▪ B. do so much Reverence a Suarez, a Schibler, a Burgersdicius, if he knew me, how much more would he reverence me! But, to deal more plainly with you, the further I go in perusal of your learned Labours, the more I perceive my Reverence to aba [...]e. Let any man except your self judge by the next passage, whether you deserve more reverence then these Rabbies and Sophies (as you have honourably be-Titled them.) You boldly and flatly affirm, That Action [is no way an Effect, as an action, nor doth it carry that stile in any of these learned Sophies, &c.] Either this Assertion is True or False. If True, Mr. K. hath got little: but I am false, if this be true. If it be false, either Mr. K. knew it to be so, or he did not. If he did, and yet spoke it, and that so confidently, then he must pardon me for Reverencing these childish Authors before him. If it be false and he knew it not, then, 1. He is one that will speak boldly what he knows not, and accordingly to be believed. 2. And then it seems he knows not what he supposeth his Boyes to know, and he looks at as his A. B. C. I will finde out a Tertium to salve his credit as soon as I can. If there be no other, I'le lay it on a defect of memory, conjunct with a certain audacity, to tell the world in print, that those things are not written which he read when he was a boy, and hath since forgotten.▪

Let us try the truth of his Assertion. I must not [...]ell him of some Schoolmen or any other Philosophical Writers, that call [action] an effect, for then he will say, Those are not the Sophies in Question: It must therefore be the very same men. Let Schibler speak first Met. l. 2. c. 10. Tit. 3. Punc. 2. p. 54. Quod ad actionem immanentem attinet; dicitur ea Immanens ab iramanendo, quod scilicet in agente maneat, Existimo tamen eam non esse intelligendam Positivè, sed Negativè. Nam actio Immanens quâ talis est, est in Agente, hoc sensu, quia non transit ad Patiens. In ipso autem agente non est per modum Adjuncti, sed simpliciter ad ipsum comparatur ut ad Causam. Unde haec Propositio, Homo intelligit, vel disputat, non est ut adjuncti de subjecto, sed ut Ef­fecti de Causa: Et patet: Nam Actio transiens nullum habet subjectum, ne quidem ipsum patiens, ut visum est. Ergo etiam actio Immanens à fortiori non postulat subjectum. Consequentia firma est, quia actio transiens magis est ex subjecto, & magis postulat sub­jectum, quam actio Immanens. Sed actio Transiens in esse Actionis, nullum habuit sub­jectum, &c. Ergo & confirmatur, quod Actio ut sic, non dicit nisi egressum à virt [...]te activa alicujus agentis. Egressus autem opponitur [...] esse in. Et hinc relinquitur genera­tim loquendo de actione ut sic, eam non postulare subjectum. Ne{que} enim Genus debet habere Naturam repugnantem suis speciebus, &c.

Yet more, that you may be past doubt of Mr. K's Veracity and Ingenuity, lib. 1. cap. 22. Tit. 28. Art. 1. Caeterum vox effecti ambigua est, &c. Primò Propriè & Adaequatè significat causatum specialiter, nempe cum conn [...]tato respectu ad cau­sam efficientem, &c. Deinde effectum sumitur generalius & per Synecdochem sp [...]ci [...]i pro genere, quomodo dicitur aequipollenter ad Causatum, quomodo jam Cicero loquebatur, &c. Iam praeterea 3^o effectum (sicut & Causatum) aliquando specialiter accipiuntur; prout significant esse stans & permanens post actionem: In quo distinguuntur contra effe­ctionem vel actionem, vel motum: atque ita aliqui aiunt Actionem non esse effectum: sed id quo producitur effectus. Hic tamen communius Effectum & Causatum sumuntur, Diciturque id omne Causatum quod habet esse per dependentiam ab aliqua Causa sive sit A­ctio, sive Res per Actionem facta. Atque ita etiam Ramus in Logic. l. 1. c. 9. Huc, in­quit, in doctrina Effecti, pertinet motus & res motu facta, &c. Vid. ult. 11. Et Art. 3. De effecto specialiter dicto. Nihil autem occurrit hic explicandum praeter specialia nomina effectorum; qualia sunt [...] & [...]. Igitur [...] hoc loco nihil aliud est quam ipsa Actio, Damasc. lib. 3. de Orthod. fid. c. 15. eam definit, quod sit efficax & substantialis naturae motus. De hoc effectus genere, hoc est, de Actione, intelligendus est iste Canon, Cessante causa cessat effe­ctus: Effectus inquam qui est [...]: Cessante Patre cessat, (non Filius sed) Gene­ratio Filij: Cessante Architecto cessat (non domus sed) aedificatio. [...] autem opus est post actionem manens, &c. [...] quando{que} generatim significat operationem, si­cut & Latina vox Actionis, &c. Vid. reliq.

So in his Compend. Philos de Logic. l. 1. §. 1. c. 5. p. 17. Ad effectum tanquam exemplum ejus pertin [...]t motus, & res motu facta.

And Metaph. l. 2. c. 3. Tit. 17. n. 630. he saith, Resp. Esse ambiguitatem in voce creati entis: Creatum enim Ens quandoque dicitur id solum quod per Actionem creativam incipit esse, quodque est quasi Creationis terminus: Et sic Creatio non est aliquid creatum: Quandoque vero Creatum Ens dicitur omne illud quod▪ dependenter est ab Ente increato, sive id sit per modum Actionis, sive per modum rei factae per actionem. Et hoc modo Creatio est quid Creatum. Callovius Metaphys. Divin. saith, p. 524. In genere causa­tum est operatio, & [...], vel opus & [...]. Simile quid est in voce Effecti vel Effectus: Dicitur enim quandoque effectum pro eo quod est quasi Actionis Terminus, quomodo domus, v. g. est effectum. Aliquando [Page 46] vero sumitur communiùs ut dicatur effectum quicquid à Causa est, sive id sit per modum Actionis seu motus, sive per modum rei per motum factae; Et sic etiam ipsae Actiones di­cuntur effecta, &c. Atque ita sicut nostrae Actiones sunt effecta, ipsae tamen non postulant, ut per alias actiones siant, &c.

So lib. 2. cap. 10. Tit. 3. Art. 3. n. 31, 32. Nam & ipsae Actiones dicentur effectus prae­cise, & in se, quia habent esse dependens aliunde, &c. So n. 41, 42. & n. 49, 50, 51. Et confirmatur per Aristot. l. 3. Phys. T. 20. Ʋbi ait, eundem Actum esse Agentis tanquam à quo, & patientis tanquam in quo, hoc est, ibi habet respectum effecti; hic vero habet respectum adjuncti.

Again, l. 2 c. 3. Tit. 14. n. 418. Potentia ad suum Actum comparatur ut effectum illius, Ʋnde Intellectio, v. g. esset effectus potentiae intellectivae, &c.

Now let Mr. K's auditors consider the next time he ascendeth his Chair, how farre their great Master is to be credited, and with what Cautions his most confi­dent Assertions must be received. Let a man speak never so many Doctrinal un­truths, we may modestly and handsomly confute them without offensive language: but when men speak such palpable untruths in matter of fact, I love not to dispute with them, seeing a man hath no answer for them, beseeming their errour, but a plain desideratur veritas, which seems so unhandsome language that it is usually ill taken what ever be the cause.

But let us hear another of the Sophies, viz. Suarez. Metaph. disp. 18. Sect. 10. n. 8. Quod si nomine Effectus comprehendamus non solum rem productam, sed quicquid à virtute agentis manat, sic concedimus actionem esse aliquo modo effectum agentis, cum sit dependens vel potius ipsamet dependentia ab illo: Esse autem Effectum hoc lato modo, non repugnat causalitati: quin potius in omnibus causis quas hactenus tractavimus, Causalitas est effectus causae, &c.

It were no hard matter to produce more Reverend Sophies for Mr. K. who use the same language and call Actions Effects; but being about so small a matter, I think it is not worth the labour. In thisVid. Alting. Pro­blem. Theolog. part. 1. p. 55. much the Reader may perceive to what a loss of time he may be lead in reading such Controversies, where men leave the Things, and fall upon Persons and Words, out of an earnest desire to finde out some way to cast Contempt upon their Brethren.

§. 14.

Mr. K. VVHat was wont to be more common in horse-fair then An Actio sit in Agente, which with the knack of this hackney distinction, every dull J [...]de could turn at their pleasure, and hold sometimes affirmatively, sometimes negatively. So then thus farre little is said to the prejudice of that truth, that there is no new Immanent act in God?

§. 14.

R▪ B. YOur horse-fair, and hackney distinction, and dull Jade, are passages so profound that I must pass them as unanswerable by any that hath not at­tained to your Degrees.▪ But doubtless you knew also how common it is to main­tain the Negative on other grounds, and to say, that Actio est Agentis, non in A­gente: and this is the language that I have hitherto thought fittest: and your con­trary judgement alone will scarce move me to change. As for the safety of your [Page 47] Conclusion, I must tell you, it is no such glorious Atchievement for you to vindi­cate it against one that never opposed or denied it.

§. 15.

Mr. K. BUt 2. Though this should be granted to Mr. Baxter to be true in acts transi­ent, yet an immanent act is questionless an Adjunct, and not onely denomi­nate the Agent, but inhere in it. For I ask, Is Knowing or Willing a Substance or Accident? an Accident questionlesse. If an Accident; In what Subject? Out of the Agent, you will finde no place where it may set the sole of its foot. Therefore it is in the Agent, and so an Adjunct: and if so, sure Immanent acts in God must needs infer [...]n alteration. For

§. 15.

R. B. I Confess your first on-set (so sudden, so causless against a feigned Ad­versary) made me suspect you to be some pugnacissimum animal (as Dr. Twiss cals his Adversary) but your prosecution puts me out of doubt. 1. Had you confined these speeches of yours only to the Creatures Acts, you had said but as many others have done before you: But it is Gods acts that you speak of, as you ascertain us in your application [and if so, sure Immanent acts in God must needs inferre an alteration.] But indeed do you believe that God is compounded of Substance and Accident? Yea doth the contentious disposition so potently carry you on, that you dare speak in such confident language, as to say that it is [an accident questionless] which you attribute to God? What could Vorstius have said more? I thought you had concurred in opinion with your Brethren, that use to call Gods Immanent acts, as diversified and as distinct from his Es­sence, only Extrinsick Denominations: But it seems you think otherwise (for a little time, while your hast doth hurry you that way per modum naturae.) 2. If you say, That you meant onely this much [Immanent acts are Accidents inherent in man: Therefore they inferre an alteration in God] You might so easily fore­know that I would deny your Consequence, that me thinks so great a Disputant should not so drily have passed over the proof. I do not stick on the strangeness of the Conclusion it self, that [Immanent acts in God must needs inferre an alte­ration;] which is against your self and all Divines, who maintain that there are Immanent acts in God. For I doubt not but your haste which the disputing itch provoked you to, caused you to put [Immanent acts] for new Immanent acts.] 3. But its strange, that you could bethink you of no answer that might be made to your Question [If an Accident, in what Subject?] when you know it is so common to deny that Inhesion is necessary to every Accident; And when you know that in this case an esse ab, or a dependant Egresse, is affirm­ed sufficient by so many. I cited the words of Schibler to that sense even now, where he purposely opposeth that which you asserted, lib. 2. cap. 10. Tit. 3. n. 54, 55. I will not trouble you to rehearse them, it being a Book so farre be­low you. Now to your Proof.

§. 16.

Mr. K. FOr, 3. Though Action as Action logically considered, be but an [...]xtrinsecal Denomination, and so only denominate the Agent, not inhere in it, as much of Reality as there is in all Transient Actions being in the Patient, even Physically, or ra­ther Metaphysically considered; yet these Immanent astions have their Terms too, say the said Sages, and those in the Agent; he that hath a minde to look it, may soon finde it in Suarez, or his Scapula Schibler, in the predicament of Action. Thus then the first bol [...] hath done little execution against this truth▪ that there can be no new Immanent Acts in God.

§. 16.

R. B. IS this all the proof that we have waited for [Immanent actions have their terms too?] 1. Either you mean it of all Immanent acts, or but of some, if but of some, then it is a learned Argument: [some Immanent acts have their terms: Therefore there can be no new Immanent acts in God.] But I suppose you mean it of All: But then by [terms] do you mean [objects] which sometime are cal­led termini? Or do you mean, the form to which the action tendeth, and which by it is produced or induced? If the first, then the Terminus of these Divine acts which we are speaking of, is oft Without, (as we use to say;) as when God know­eth, Approveth, Willeth, Loveth the Creature. And therefore some few will not call these Immanent acts, but onely those whose object is God himself. But I suppose you mean the later, and then, 3. You might easily foresee, that though I had yielded all that you say of the Creatures acts, yet I would deny it of Gods: And blame me not for it, if I be lesse bold then you: and if I dare not imagine that there is in God either Motus or Terminus ad quem, or effect, or form acquired, when he Knows, Willeth, Approveth or Loveth the Creature. I am in hope that you believe no such thing your self, when the disputing itch is a little allayed. But however, could you possibly think it so obvious and easie a point as to need no proof? Why have we never a word here to that end, who need so many? I love not these Happy Disputers that can prove that by silence, which neither them­selves nor any other can prove by Argument. If you will flie to your Analogy, and say [There are Termini actionum Immanentium in man: Therefore there are so in God] I should tell you that you may as wisely say [There are Accidents, Effects and Mutations in man: Therefore there are such in God.] At least I should importune you for the proof of your consequence. 4. But for the Terms of Immanent Actions you say [The said Sages say it] and [he that hath a minde to look it, may soon finde it in Suarez, and his Scapula Schibler] Truly, Sir, I have hitherto hinted your faults in Ironies: but I think it fit to ask you now (see­ing it is not once or twice, nor a slip of your pen) how you dare put such things in print, and set so light by honest Truth-telling, and leave such things on re­cord against your self? You that do tanto fastu referre us to Schibler as our Scapula, sure know his Doctrine: or at least, if you know it not, you should not take on you to know it, and say, we may soon finde that in him, which he so largely and purposely disputes against. He saith indeed, that some Immanent acts have terms, as Syllogizing: but that cannot be your meaning: for you well know it will do nothing to inferre your Conclusion: But doth not Schibler (l. 2. c. 10. Tit. 3. art. 3. [Page 49] punct. 1, 2.) largely dispute it, that many Immanent acts have no terms, no not Vision or Intellection! and answer the Objections against him? and conclude that Acti [...] ut sic non dicit respectum ad terminum? And if Intellection have no Term, then Decree, and the rest that we were mentioning in the beginning, can have none in agente. 5. Nay what a great part of the great Philosophers and School-Divines do deny, that Immanent acts are true acts? Scotus takes them to be qua­lities, and not in the predicament of Action. Soncinus, Ferrariensis (and saith Schibler Thomistae frequenter ita docent) deny them to be true acts. And if so, then sure they have not the terminos of true acts.

And I before told you at the beginning of your Discourse, that we do not all agree with you in your Description of an Immanent act, if you mean that it is such as is not only negatively, but Positively terminated in the Agent, as your words import: You may see Schibler denying it (when you shall condescend to look it in him) in Met. l. 2. c. 10. Tit. 3. n. 54. & Tit. 5. art. 1. n. 64. But let this be how it will in man, I do very confidently deny that there is any such act in God, either of Knowledge or Will, as is either in the predicament of Action, or hath any Terminus in himself, further then as himself is the object of any act. And therefore you should first prove, that such Acts are in God at all, before you dispute whether they may be in him de novo.

§. 17.

Mr. K. COnsider we what follows: [Whether all such Immanent acts are any more eternal then transient acts, is much questioned] saith Mr. Baxter. By whom I pray? A clear difference between them as between heaven and earth▪ transient acts as I told you but now, being in the Patient, Immanent in the Agent.

§. 17.

R. B. 1. O Happy, too happy wit! that hath not onely with Moses seen the back parts of God, but hath taken so full a Survey of his Na­ture, that it can discern as clear a difference between his several acts, as between heaven and earth! I dare not attempt the like survey: but I may receive instru­struction from you that have survey'd it. And what is the difference? Why [transient acts are in the Patient, and Immanent in the Agent▪] What's the proof? Why it is this [I told you so but even now.] This may be a Demonstra­tion to those that are capable of it: but recipitur ad modum recipientis: with me you have lost your Authority, so farre, that I need another kinde of proof. I will rather call it Passion then Action when it is in Patiente. Forma dat nomen: and Passion and Action are not the same formaliter, whatsoever they may be materially. Use the names promiscuously, if there be no difference in the things.

You know the subtil Scotists say, That Action and Passion are not the same, and that Action is in the Agent. And I have yet seen no reason to preferre you before Scotus. But I rather say, that Transient Acts are ab agente, but neither in agente nec patiente; as having a Cause but no Subject, as I have before expressed. And you may finde in my Scapula, Met. l. 2 c. 10. Tit. 3. n. 51. That Omne accidens est in alio sensu Negativo, &c. altas loquendo de generali essentia accidentis, non est ea in Inhaerendo, si rigorose loquamur, sed in eo quod id q [...]od accidens est afficit substantiam extra essentialiter, sive extra essentiam, aut rationem ejus existendo. Proinde etsi actio [Page 50] rigorose loquendo non inhaereat, tam [...]n satis habet de ratione accidentis, quia substantiam af­ficit & denominat extra essentialiter. Ʋnde porrò resp. ad assump. prosyllog. admitten­do quod Actio Transiens non fit in Patiente, loquendo de actione ut fic, & sub esse Actionis. Quod igitur Actio transiens dicitur esse in patiente, id non est Intel­ligendum formaliter, sed materialiter: nempe illa res quae est Actio est in Patiente▪ non tamen sub formali Actionis, sed sub formali passionis: Eadem enim res quae Actio est, est etiam Passio. Now I hope you are more accurate in your speeches then to use to denominate from the matter, rather then the form: and therefore I hope here­after you will forbear saying, that Actio est in Patiente, how common soever it may be. At least remember that you humbled your self but even now, to use a Hack­ney distinction, with which every dull Jade could maintain the Negative at their pleasure. And what if I adventured to use one Argument, Actio est efficientis cau­salitas: At efficientis Causalitas non est in Patiente: Ergò, Actio non est in Patiente. The major I prove by Infallible Authority, viz. Mr. K's, pag. 136. For the minor, If the Causality of the Agent were in the Patient, then we might fitly call it Pa­tientis Causalitas. (For the name should be [...]itted to the thing) But that were absurd, Therefore, &c. Further, That which is in the Patient is a Causatum, or effect of the Agent per Actionem vel Causalitatem. But Causality or Action is not a Causatum or effect of the Agent per actionem vel causalitatem: Therefore that which is in the Patient is not Action or Causality. The major needs no proof; and its meant of every received form. The minor hath a full demonstration, viz. Mr. K's Authority; who denieth Action to be an effect. And those that be not moved with his authority, may observe that I here take the word [effect] in the more restrained sense as it excludeth Causality or Action; and therefore that I say [it is not an Effect per Actionem] and that is proved fully, in that otherwise, there must be another Action to effect this Action, and so in infinitum. But I did not think to have said any thing on this. All that Mr. K. can expect we should grant him is, that Actio qua Passio est in Patiente: but still Actio transiens qua Actio non est in Patiente, no more then is an Immanent action. Or if it were, yet the Au­thority of so many learned gain-sayers, makes the difference seem scarce so clear as that between heaven and earth.

Moreover, that which in God we call a Transient Act, is by the Schoolmen in greatest credit, affirmed to be Gods Essence only connoting the creature-Relatio to it: so that besides the creature it self (which though Scotus cals Creation, yet is sure the effect and not the act) and besides the Relation (which can be no proper act) there remains nothing but Gods essence, to be the substance of the Act which we call both Immanent and Transient. Capreolus saith, Nulla Divina operatio aut actio qua formaliter agit aut operatur, est transiens in passum, sic quod in passo formaliter recipiatur, cum ejus agere sit ejus Velle [...] Intelligere, quae sunt actiones Immanentes. Sed concedi potest quod divina actio dicitur quandoque transiens propter respectum rationis ad realem effectum in Creatura, ut Creatio, Conservatio, &c. l. 2. dist. 1. q. 2. art. 3. And the Thomist [...] (saith Suarez, Met. disp. 20. §. 5.) say, That Non solum Creatio, verum neque ulla actio respectu illius potest esse Transiens. Where then is Mr. K's clear difference as between heaven and earth?

And though I am loth to put my singer into the fire, by medling with Mr. K. any further then he invites me, yet perhaps he may expect I should somewhat take notice what he saith of this point to Mr. Goodwin, pag. 150, 154.

1. When he saith, [There are so many Immutations in Gods Essence] if transient operations be the same with his Essence, &c. I deny the consequence: [Page 51] because the Terminus or effect is not the same with his Essence, though the act be. The Effect only is Many; the Act but one. 2. To his solution of the first Que­stion, where he saith, It is a mystery passing all understanding, that God should incline the heart to believe and not act anew, &c.] I say, I believe him for the mysteriousness. But as all multiplicity comes from Unity, so do all temporals from that act which is Eternal. To all Mr. K's Instances the Schoolmen say, It is the effect only that is New: In giving the spirit, faith, raising Christ; &c. God had no new act: Yet God did it by Velle, which is his eternal act and essence. To his answer to the second Question, I Reply, M. K's Questions are insipid and fallacious. [Did he Plant faith by making Plants? Did he make me to differ by making the world?] For though it was by the same act, yet that act hath divers denominations from its respect to divers objects. To [make the world] conno­teth a particular object, viz. the world: and therefore the act which causeth you to believe, cannot be called [Creating the world] not because the act is not the same, but because it respecteth not the same object. The third Question belongs not to me. To the fourth I say as before: the act is Gods Velle: his Velle is his Essence: Therefore Eternal. His Questions [Whether the world were drowned by the same Act by which it was made? &c.] are answered as before: It was by the same Act, viz. Velle Divinum; but to be denominated variously according to the Variety of objects which it doth respect and connote. Even as it is the same Act which is Immanent and Eternal, which in Time is denominated Transient from its respect to the effect.

But Pag. 154. I finde him citing Mr. G. as saying [Learned men Generally acknowledge, that (the act) is really and formally one and the same thing with his Essence▪] And Mr. K. saith contrary, that [No man ever asserted Transient acts to be the same with the Agent] and that [all Transient acts be the same with the term, say all men that meddle with Metaphysicks] and he appeals to any Reader that hath but tasted the first principles of Logick. Truly these two Di­vines are very contrary: and have bewrayed both of them that which they might have concealed with much more credit to their Reading. Yet Mr. G. may inter­pret [Generally] with such limitations as may bring him off in part: but Mr. K's presumption and boldness is intolerable. When a man of so small R [...]ading as I am, know so well, that the Metaphysical Doctors do some speak one way, and some another: as I undertake by quotations now to manifest when I shall under­stand it worth any time and labour. I remember Mr K's words in his third Epi­stle of the sufficiency of [a pair of Sheers and a met yard.] But it is not so farre sufficient without more Reading, as to encourage a tender conscienc't man, to averre untruths so confidently, that [No man ever asserted, &c.] And where he saith [The Question is not of the acts of his Will, but of his Power, &c.] Know­eth he not that Dr. Twiss and the highly honoured Thomists do make God to work per essentiam, and say, that his Power is but his Will, called Power in respect to the effect which it doth produce? Vid. Aquin. 1. q. 15. art. 1. 4^m. Truly me thinks that Mr. K. doth even to the meanly learned expose himself to great disgrace, to say so boldly, that [all men that meddle with Metaphysicks say, that all Transi­ent acts be the same with the term.] Did he never at least reade Scotus so oft as­serting and arguing for the contrary? Nor any one of his followers, nor one of all the other parties that deny this? If he had not, yet he should have blushed so peremptorily to affirm what he did not know▪ At least he should have known that Schibler hath this Conclusion, which he largely argues for [3^o Actiones quae [Page 52] [...]endunt ad terminum non sunt realiter idem cum termino] and saith, Cal [...]factionem a Calore specie distingui. And he there tels you of Venetus, Aur [...]olus, Suarez & Col­leg. Conimbric. that say as he: At least he that so derides me for citing these puerile Authors, should not have dared to say All men [that meddle with Metaphys.] say as he in this, when both common School-books, and the two most famous Sects of Schoolmen, Scotists and Thomists are against him (as Suarez will tell him, disp. 48. ser. 5. n. 2. of Cajet. Hispalens. Flandr. & communiter Scotist &c.] And for the fuller answering of Mr. K's Questions before mentioned, I desire the learn­ed Reader among others to peruse the foresaid Answer of Capr [...]olus to Aureolus 15. arguments in l. 2. sent. dist. 1. q. 2. a. 3. But I must intreat you still to remember that my own opinion is, That action is not properly ascrib [...]d to God at all; nay farre more Improperly then men will easily believe: Suarez himself Metaph. disp. 48. §. 5. n. 11. maintaineth Gods Immanent acts, Intelligere & Velle are properly not acts, no [...] to be so called. But of this before.

Reade also Gibieuf. de Libert▪ l. 1. cap. 25. §. 13. shewing that the act whereby God made all things of nothing is Eternal: and c. 6. p. 323. And Cardin. Con­tarenus de praedestinatione, pag. (operum) 606. saith, Simplici & Ʋnica Actione, quae cum ipsius substantia eadem est (si tam [...]n substantiam appellare licet) omnes effectus producit: ita nullo etiam tempore aut temporis aliqua parte, actionem ejus contineri, &c.] Vid. Aquin. contr. Gent. l 1, 2. c. 35, 36, 37. 17, 18, 19.

And that the Action is not the same with the Terminus, see the Arguments of Ludovic. a Dola de Concursu Part. 1. cap. 2. §. 6. Aquin. is cited by Capreolus in 2. sent. dis. 1. q. 2. a. 3. as saying thus, de po [...]. Dei q. 3. a. 17. ad 12^m. Dei Actio est aet [...]rna cum sit ejus substantia: dicitur autem incipere agere ratione novi effectus, qui ab aeterna actione consequitur dispositionem voluntatis qui intelligitur quasi actionis principium in or­dine ad effectum.]

2. But the other part of the assigned difference goes down with me no better, but much worse, 1. In that he knows, I think, that it is not such a commonly received opinion [that Immanent actions are in the Agent] in a Positive sense, and not meerly negative, as that he should think it needed no more proof then his mentioning. I gave him the opposition of one Sophie, as he cals him, even now. 2. And if it were so in man, I again tell him, that I will not take his bare word, no nor his oath, that it is so in God.

But Mr. K. must needs know who they be that make question of this. What if it were but some private familiars of mine? Must Mr. K. needs know their names? But I had thought he had been well acquainted with the doctrine of Ly [...]hetus, Penn [...]tus and Sanctâ Clarâ in this Point, Who affirm, That though the act in it self be God himself, and so eternal, yet the transition of it to several objects, and so the denomination may be new; and so that God may to day predestinate him that before was not predestinated, or Love him that before was not Loved, and this without any change in God. Indeed these are the men that I mean. I thought with these men of the higher form you had deigned to be familiar: but because you speak of the matter so strangely, I will come down again to our own form, and rehearse a few words of Burgersdicius familiarly known to those at your foot­stool. Metaph. l. 2. §. 16. Est enim in Deo concipiendus unus actus, qui nihil aliud est quam essentia divina. Hic actus respicere potest diversa objecta creata, seu, quod eodem redit, Deus per istum actum tendere potest in diversa objecta, vel etiam non tendere: & cum in illa tendit, reverâ ea vult: Dixi in objecta creata: Nam semetipsum Deus non potest non amare. Decreta ergo Dei duo involvunt; actum scilicet, & illius actus tendentiam [Page 53] sine applicatione ad diversa objecta creata. Actus ipse liber non est, non ma­gis quam Dei vel Immensitas, vel Aeternitas: sed libera est illius actus applicatio ad objecta: quae tamen quia nihil Deo addit entis, sed solum denominationem quandam ex­ternam, sumptam a connotatione objecti creati, tanquam termini sui, neque compositionem efficere potest, neque mutationem. Quod adeo verum est, ut existimem, si Deus decr [...]ta rescindere posset, illud imperfectionem allaturam Deo, non propter mutationem Decreto­rum, sed propter causam mutationis, quae aut imprudentia semper est aut impotentia.

Suarez hath such a like passage, which Fr. a Sancta Clara reciting, answers this Objection about Imprudence or Impotency, as Posnani [...]nsis before him: Froblem. quart. pag. 31. sed hac ratio ejus est debilis, ut recte notavit Posnaniensis: Nam im­prudentiae vel inconstantiae vitium non est, siquis propositis duolus benis, primo [...]ligat mi­nus bonum & postea majus: nisi forte ex passione vel timore difficultatis, vel alia inordina­ta affectione id proveniat; ut patet de bono caelibatus & conjugii. Deus autem nullo mo­do obligatur, nec passionibus laborat, sed ex mera liberalitate hoc non illud eligit: Ergo potest eligere sine nota inconstantiae. Haec ille. Ʋnde August. Si non es praedestinatus, fac ut praedestineris. Et Ambrosius (in c. 1. Luc.) Novit Dominus mutare sententiam, si tu noveris [...]mendare delictum. Subtilissimus etiam Bradwardinus dicit hanc sententiam suum aliquando pulsasse animum, &c.

Thus I have given you some answer to your incredulous Question [By whom I pray?] But another kinde of answer might be given, concerning another sort of men, who deny the Act it self to be Gods Essence, but somewhat that hath no more Being then a Relation, or a Formality, or Ens rationis ratiocinatae, or at least then a modus Entis: and consequently that as this may be without any composition in God (which they prove by the confession of our own Doctors) so may it begin and end without Mutation in God. But I'le not offend Mr. K's ears with the names of these men.

§. 18.

Mr. K. SUrely transient Acts there could be none before the Creation, there being no term of such Acts, no subject for them, unless there were either somewhat that was not made, or somewhat made before there was a Creation: but as for Immanent Acts, as Knowing and Willing in God, they were before the foundation of the world was laid. It is a very crude passage thus to say [It is much questioned whether ▪all such Im­manent Acts are any more eternal then transient Acts:] For if the meaning be that any transient Act be eternal, that is a mystery beyond all that hath been heard: then somewhat was made from eternity: If the meaning be, that no Immanent Act is [...]ternal, that's af­ter the same rate. The first made the Creature eternal▪ the second denies God to be eternal: Did he not kn [...]w from Eternity, yea fore-know all that hath been since the Crea­tion, is or shall be to the dissolution of the world, he were not perfect, and therefore not God from eternity. So then neither can it be affirmed, that there was any transient act eternal, nor can [...] denied but that some Immanent acts are eternal: and if some, then all, or els a change in [...] must of necessity be granted. So that if the meaning be [Its questio­ned Whether s [...]me [...]mmanent Acts be no more eternal then transient Acts] that is, some immanent Acts be not eternal, the Argument returns with the old charge, that an altera­tion must be yielded in God, immanent Acts being not to be reckoned with any colour among effects, but adjuncts, and no ground of▪ putting any such new immanent Act in God in time, which I demonstrate further thus.

§. 18.

R. B. THe meaning of my words is not hid, but according to the proper literal sense, and I had some respect to the two sorts of men before-mention­ed, but chiefly to one. And what I say in Reply to your words, you must be so just as to take to be according to their grounds, and not mine own: For it is but the unsearchableness of these things that I am all this while main­taining.

And first to your Argumentation against the Eternity of transient acts, it may be replied, that in transient acts you must distinguish between the Act it self, which is called transient, and the Passion or Reception of that act in the subject or the product, or effect of that act. The denomination of Transient is given to that act in the later respect as it doth connote the Product, Effect, Passion and Subject: yea is properly taken so from them, as that it signifieth nothing essential to the Act it self as an Act: So that all that same Act which is in Time denomi­nated Transient, because in time it did produce its effect, was really from eter­nity it self, though the effect were not; and so differs not quoad rationem formalem actus, from an Immanent act. Proved, 1. The Act by which God created the world, was his simple Velle: But Gods simple Velle was from Eternity: Therefore &c. The major is indeed denied by such P [...]nies as Schibler, and many more of his minde: but it needs no proof with Mr. K. for it is the opinion (I am sure the saying) of D^• Twiss: And indeed it comes all to one, as to our business, if you go on the others grounds. The major, Mr. K. maintains. 2. Deu [...] operatur per essentiam immediatè: sed essentia divina est aeterna: Ergo, &c. The major is spo­ken exclusively as to all acts which are not Gods Essence; and is so common with many Schoolmen, that I will spare the proof (for I perceive its easier taking it for granted then proving it) The minor none denieth that confesseth God. So that it is granted Mr. K. that these acts were not to be called Transient from E­ternity, because they were not received, or rather did not produce the effect but in time: But yet the act which in Time received the denomination of Transient, was it self Eternal: God Willed from Eternity that the Creature should Be in time, and produced it in that time by that Will which was Eternal. So much on that side.

Now to your Argumentation for the Eternity of Immanent acts, you would receive two several kindes of Answer from the several men that I before told you of.

One sort of them think that the Thing it self which we call an Act, is nothing but Gods Essence, and so Eternal: but that the transition of this Act to several objects (as Sancta Clara cals it) or the Application of it to these objects (as Burgersdicius speaks) and so the connotation of, and respect to these objects, is not Eternal, where the object is not Eternal: and withall they think that the denomi­nation specifical of the several Acts, yea and the diversification▪ [...] them, is taken from these [...]emporal transitions, or applications and respects to [...]e objects; and therefore that they must be used as temporal denominations, and it is fittest to say, God Knew, Loved, &c. Peter as existing, not from Eternity, but when he did ex­ist: Yea they think the very name of an Act, is most fit to be used in this later sense; rather then applied to the pure Essence of God: however some call him in another sense, a simple Act.

The other sort of men do think, that the very Act it self is some M [...]dus or for­mality distinct from Gods Essence, and may begin without his Mutation, as it may be his without his Composition, as I have before said. Now both these sorts will Reply, that your Charge of [making God not Eternal] and of [making al­teration in God] which you oft repeat, are but your bare word without any proof, and therefore not by them to be regarded. That God fore-knew all things that should come to pass they easily grant you: but if he know not that to be existent, which is but future, or that to be future which is wholly past, they say, this makes not God to be imperfect, or not eternal.

But I marvel that you still call Gods Immanent Acts [Adjuncts in God] which before you also called Accidents; not fearing hereby to be guilty of making a Compounded God, while you maintain him Eternal: Or not discern­ing that you give advantage to your Adversary to maintain, that those Ac­cidents or Adjuncts which may be in God without Composition, may as well Beginne or End notwithstanding his Immutability, if their Ob­ject be such as doth Beginne or End. Now to your New Demon­stration.

§. 19.

Mr▪ K. IF there be a ground of putting a New immanent Act in God; Ergo, This ground must be either in God or the Creature. If a Ground in God which was not before, then an alteration in him beyond reply: a ground in the Creature there can be none to put a new immanent Act in God; for that an immanent Act hath nothing to do with any thing without the Agent, it being herein contradistinguished from transient Acts, that transient Acts terminantur in pas [...], immanent Acts in agente. I confess some­what without the Agent, is many times, yea commonly the object of immanent Acts: but if ever either the Subject or Term, I will publickly burn my Books, as Mr. Baxter desires his may be, when he goes one note beyond Dr. Twiss. I am confident he needs not fear coming so high: I am sure he fals infinitely short in this Argument, as will appear more fully by what he subjoyns.

§. 19.

R. B. THis is the Demonstration. I shall understand that word, in your mouth, better hereafter. Your horned Argument will be thus an­swered. The word [Ground] is ambiguous. If you take it largely for any suf­ficient Reason of the attribution, then there is Ground both in the Creature and in God: But if you take it more strictly for some one sort of Reason, then it may be in one and no [...] in the other. The ground may be in the Creature as the Object, and in God as [...]h [...] [...]fficient: and in one as the relate, and the other as the correlate. But you say [ [...] in God, then an alteration in him, beyond reply:] that's a pret­ty way to prevent a Reply: But your confident Assertions shall hereafter be annu­merated with the weakest of your Arguments, though called Demonstrations.

1. Some will take it for a sufficient Reply to deny your Consequence, and think you had dealt fairlier to have proved it. For they will think that there may be in God an Eternal Ground of a New immanent Act, as well as there is of a New Transient act: The [...]ewness of the Act, will no [...] prove the newness of the Ground. And therefore you easily suppose that it must be [a ground in God which was not [Page 56] before] if the act be such as was not before. But this you should have foreseen would be denied. And if you say, that the newness or change in the effect doth argue something changed or new in the cause; they will deny it; and tell you that then every transient act would argue something new in God.

2. Those (of whom I spoke before) that maintain that immanent acts as acts need no subject, will think they reply sufficiently by telling you, that the novity of immanent acts, having a ground in God, will only prove that aliquid Dei vela Deo is altered, but not that aliquid in Deo is altered: because that action speaks but a dependant egress, and not an inhesion. The like they will say as to any form introduced in the subject by immanent acts, who deny to many and most immanent acts, a terminus; and particularly to intellection. And if you think that there can be no action without some effect within or without, I refer you for an answer to my Scapula, as you conceit him.

3. However many of us will hardly be brought to beleeve that Gods immanent acts have in proper sense a terminus: though mans may.

4. Some will think they Reply sufficiently, by telling you that by [alteration in God] you mean, either [an alteration of his essence] and then they deny your consequence: or [an alteration of some modus, or relation, or formality;] and such they will grant; and say, as oft before, that it is no more against Gods immutability, then the existence of that modus, relation, or formality is against his simplicity.

5. If when God created the world, he had a All consent not the Rela­tion is only ex parte crea­turae and not mutuall. new relation (of Creatour) which he had not before, and this without change, then he may have a new immanent act without change, for ought you know.

6. For Gods acts are not so well known to such Moles and Bats as you and I are, that we should be able so peremptory to conclude that the novity of them must needs argue himself to be mutable: we know not so well how much Being, or of what kinde, those acts have.

So much for Reply to that which is past Reply. Now to the next horn of your Dilemma.

You say [A ground in the creature there can be none to put a new immanent act in God.] And why? Because [an immanent act hath nothing to do with any thing without the Agent.] 1. How? nothing! neither as an occasion, nor an object? do not you confess within a few lines that something without may be its object? It is ordinarily said, and by some of your friends, that the Attributes and Immanent acts of God are diversified only by extrinsick denomination; as an immoveable rock in the sea that is washt sometime with one wave and some­time with another, without its own change: (It seems they take the passion or reception of these motions of the waves, to be no change.) So do diver­sity of objects, say they, diversifie Gods acts and attributes quoad denominationem extrinsecam. If that be so, then objects specifie those act; quoad denominationem ex­trinsecam, which in themselves are but one: and then the said objects may as well cause a novity as a diversity of immanent acts quoad denominationem extrinsecam: And then there is no more impropriety in saying, God doth de Novo Will or Nill; then in [...]aying, that it is not all one, for God to Will my salvation, and to Nill it: see what you have brought your cause to. 2. There are men in the world [Page 57] that conceive of God, as we do of the sun, that is still shining, but not still shi­ning on this or that creature: it may begin or cease to shine on this place or that, without any change in it self or its actual shining: and so they think it is with God as to some of his acts, which have the creature for their objects: And for your objection, That this is a transient act of the sun, I shall reply to it anon, where you mention it.

But you are again harping on your old string; viz. [That immanent acts are terminated in the Agent.] And I again tell you, that Gods acts and mans are not so near kin, as that you may conclude of the termination of his acts from the termination of ours: yea I tell you, that I will not beleeve you that Gods willing or knowing the creature hath any terminus in himself (further then as you may say the creature is in himself;) that is no terminus strictly ascribed to actions distinct from a meet objective termination. A word of proof. 1. Where there is neither motus or mutation there is no terminus? But in God acting immanently there is neither motus vel mutatio: Therefore, &c. I think I need not confirm either part. 2. Where there is no effect or form acquired or introduced, there is no terminus (in the sense in question:) But in God there is no effect or form acquired or in­troduced (by such immanent acts) Therefore, &c. The major is plain from the common definition of a terminus. The minor is past question.

But here you confess that the objects of immanent acts may be extrinsick (Yet I could tell you, that Viguerius Institut▪ and others conclude, that Voluntas Divina non habet objectum extrinsecum:) but if subject or term you will burn your Books, &c. But hold your hand a little. Before I dare be guilty of that, I would fain know what Books they are. But you speak cautelously: for you tell us not who shall be Judge in this business: and if I should shew you never so many that are against you, you may keep your word by saying they all mistake, and by being the Judge your self. But, alas Sir, what cause have you thus to threaten your Books? Who can riddle the occasion of it? I tell you, that as good Philosophers (for ought I yet finde by you) as you, do think that such acts have no subject nor term: and you say, that if any thing extrinsick be the subject or term you will burn your Books! which if you do, let all bear witness that I was no occasion of it: If they have no subject or term at all, then they can have none without. Sure if you were not very quarrelsome you would not in such high words feign him to be your adversary, that saith more against the opposed Point, then your self

As for that out-leap wherewith you recreate your self, of my coming so high as Dr. Twiss, in the sense I spoke I yet desire it not; in the sense you speak (lusorily) I expect it not: nor do I know any man so simple as to compare me with him, or that needed this learned Digression. Yet I confess I thought my self somewhat neerer both Dr. Twiss and your self then you suppose me to be: For though I was ready to obey your conclusive command, of adoring the footsteps of such, yet I thought not that I had come infinitely short, as you here inform me, I do. I thought only God had infinitely excelled the meanest creature. Nay then, if you will be needs our Gods, Numina Academica, I am afraid you will shortly be lower then men; and lest I shall hear that news which I equally fear and ab­horre, that you and such like will ere long be cast out of that Academical Para­dise. But let that go: I suppose [infinitely] was but a high word, by a high spirit, quasi ab alto, from a high place. I have stood my self ere now on a moun­tain, and every thing in the valley seemed small to me.

But I forgot to tell you one thing: that (though I suppose I know what kinde of termination you mean, yet) you should have spoken more cautelously, and distinguished, and told your Reader more plainly what you deny; and not have resolved to burn your Books, if we prove things without the Agent to be a term in general. For you know that we distinguish of Objects into Motive and Termi­native; and ordinarily say that the creatures are terminative objects of Gods Will, though not moving objects. Meurisse saith (Metaphys. Scot. li. 1. Q. 15. pag. 127.) Objectum secundarium non potest movere intellectum divinum ad cognitionem sui, licet possit illum terminare, ut docent Theologi. And Schibler li. 2. c. 3. tit. 15. n. 507. Non quasi putemus esse aliquid quod act [...]et quasi voluntatem divinam, (quod officium alias solet esse objectorum, in ordine ad habitus & potentias,) sed quia apprehendimus volun­tatem Divinam Terminari ad aliquid quod hactenus habet rationem objecti. Est enim ad rationem objecti satis, si terminet actum aliquem. And Punct. 2. n. 510. the assertion is, Dei voluntas terminatur etiam ad res creatas. But enough of that. Now lets see the proof of our infinite distance.

§. 20.

Mr. K. [AS for God to know that the world doth now exist: that such a man is san­ctified, just, &c. Gods foreknowledge is not a knowing that such a thing is which is not, but that such a thing will be which is not: yet doth this make no change in God, no more then the sun i [...] changed by the variety of creatures which it doth enlighten and warm; or the glasse by the variety of faces which it representeth, or the eye by the variety of colours which it beholdeth: (For, whatsoever some say, I do not think that every variation of the object makes a reall change in the eye, or that the beholding of ten distinct colours at one view doth make ten distinct acts of the fight, or alterations on it: Aph. p. 173, 174.] I cannot tell what to make of this rope, but sand it is, and nothing else, as shall strait appear; and how ill a match this Authour was, thus to descend in arenam with Twisse, Pemble, and I dare say all the sober Divines that ever were worthy to speak to a School Point.

§. 20.

R. B. SAnguinolent men do dream of sighting and killing: It seems you have ac­customed your minde so to contending, that through the errour of your phantasie, all words seem chidings, and all actions seem fightings to you: And so you dreamed not only that I was in arena, but 2. that Dr. Twisse and Mr. P. were there with me. 3. Yea and all Divines worthy to speak to a School Point. 4. And that we were there coping for masteries: and in the end of your dream you rise up as Judge and give them the better, and proclaim me an ill match. But 1. he that reades my Book will finde that I argue not as from my self, but only shew how other mens argumentations do manifest such a difficulty in the Point, that we should not lay too great a stress on it; as I have shewed you before in the explication of my own words. Nay I do not once deny the Point (that imma­nent acts are eternal) but only say, It is much questioned (by others) whether they are any more eternal then transient acts: and annex a touch of some mens arguings for it: concluding only in a parenthesis, that the Point is, as I think, beyond our reach. So much to the first fiction. 2. And if I contended not with any then not with Dr. Twiss and Mr. P. on this Point: it being plain that it is [Page 59] on another Point that I deal with them. Thats for the second fiction. 3. The third is mounted with great confidence; you [dare say:] What dare you say▪ Why that I [thus descend in arenam with all the sober Divines that ever were worthy to speak to a School Point.] You are a daring man, that dare say this. But I have tasted so much of your temper before, that I perceive your veracity is oft least where your audacity is greatest: I thought I had contended with no man in those words; and you dare say, I contend with all men, worthy to speak to a School Point. What if it had been true that I had been here contending, and that against a Point which all these hold? doth it indeed follow that I do in are­na [...] descendere with them all? and seek to match them? And what reason have we that know you not, to take you for Judge of all the Divines in the world, who shall be accounted sober, and who not; and who is worthy to speak to a School Point, and who not? Or why should I think you more worthy then the Learned men that I have before named, Ly [...]hetus, Pennottus, Burgersdici­us, &c?

§. 21.

Mr. K. TO know that the world doth now exist when once it did not, and that such a man now is sanctified which before he was not, makes no change in God, but only shews a change in the object: but to know now that the world doth exist which before God did not know, or to know now that such a man is sanctified, who before was not, which before God did not know, makes a change in God, as well as the object.

§. 21.

R. B. VVHo would look for such answers from you, that had heard you judge of School Divines with such Authority? The first part of your Answer is not against any thing that I said: The second is a meer begging of the Question. Some think that quoad substantiam actus Gods knowledge is the same whatever the object be; but yet because [Knowing this or that] connoteth the object with the act, therefore the eternal essence of God simply in it self con­sidered is not to be called [Knowledge] much less [the knowledge of this or that creature;] and that without the object it neither is Knowledge, nor ought to be so called; and so as from the object we distinguish Gods Knowing and Willing, so must we the several acts of his knowledge; and though the act quoad substantiam, which we call [Knowledge] in God be but one, yet the ratio formalis which must give the denomination, being in the respect of that one act to its objects, it is most fit to say that Gods knowledge of Peters salvation and Judas damnation, is not the same knowledge, though it be the same substantial act: the like is said of his Will: And as this must be said without wrong to his simplicity, so the like must be said of his beginning or ceasing to Know, without wrong to his immutability: and that as it▪ is not all one for God to know the Futurity and the present existence of a thing, so we must say, that he began to know the present existence when the thing began to exist, and that God did not know before the creation, that this proposition was true, Petrus existit: and that he ceaseth to know the Futurition of a thing that ceaseth to be future; and that God doth not now know, that Christ will be born and dye and rise: and that therefore immanent acts in God are not [Page 60] to be said to be all eternal; but only those that have an eternal object; because the act is to be denominated from its respect to the object: and therefore it being Gods Knowing and Willing which we call immanent acts here, where it is un­meet to say that act of Knowledge or Will is eternall, then it is unmeet to say, Gods immanent acts are eternal: but when you will express Gods immutability, it is fitter to say [God is unchangeable, or Gods essence or nature is eternall,] then to say, his knowledge, will, or immanent acts (in this sense) are so: because when we connote not the object, we are to call it Gods Essence, and not Gods Knowledge, Will, or such acts: so that here is no real change in God himself, but only a respective, or modal, or formal (as the Scotists speak) or such as we can­not now apprehend, affording new objective conceptions; all the change being in the creature.

Now how doth Mr. K. prove that this doctrine must [make a change in God as well as the object?] why he learnedly affirmeth it. He that can finde a word more, let him make his best of it. But in this case, all the proof lieth on the af­fimer; which we might well have expected from him.

§. 22.

Mr. K. ANd therefore all sober Divines use to be wary in their expressions in this kinde; acknowledging no difference between Gods knowledge and foreknowledge, but this, that his foreknowledge is in order to the object only, and not of any act of Gods: so that it is not opposed to post-science, but it signifieth only a futurity of the object, as was shewed at large in the third Chapter. God knows that that is to day which was not yesterday; but God as perfectly knew it yesterday as to day, and knew at once, all the various successions in time; or did he otherwise, a change cannot possibly be avoided, notwithstanding all Master Baxter alleadgeth to the con­trary.

§. 22.

R. B. 1. IF your first sentence be true, I must lament the paucity of sober Di­vines; for sure I am, that of those which have written on these Points, too few have been wary in their expressions: and no wonder when they are no more wary in their conceptions; and when men dare maintain themselves to have that capacity which they have not, and to know certainly that which they do not, and might easily know they do not: When even such learned men as you will not be perswaded that these things are above your reach, but do with such haughty con­tention oppose one poor sentence in a Parenthesis (which is all my sentence) wherein I say, it is beyond our reach.

2. You lift up your self too high, in taking on you to judge all those Divines to be unsober, that are not in this of your opinion.

3. If the word [prescience] signifie only a futurity of the object, then these are equipollent expressions [Deus hoc praescit] and [Hoc est futurum:] but that is not true.

4. The same humane frailty and distance from God, which makes it necessary to us to ascribe Acting, Knowing and Willing to God, and to conceive of him under these notions, doth equally necessitate us to conceive of his Knowledge and Will, as distinct, and not altogether the same: else we should ascribe a meer name, [Page 61] without any conception of the thing named: For we cannot conceive of any such Knowledge as is the same with Willing, nor of any such Willing which is the same with Nilling; and yet we beleeve the simplicity of God. And the same ne­cessity that compelleth us to conceive of Gods Knowing, Willing and Nilling, as divers, ab objectorum diversitate, doth compell us to conceive of his Know­ledge of things as Future, and his Knowledge of things existent, as divers: yet still we deny a Mutation of God himself; only we conceive as the Sco­tists, that there is a diversity of the objective conceptions, and that our various denominations have fundamentum in re: but what it is, let him tell that knows.

5. Against all this that which you oppose is but your naked assertion, which I regard less then perhaps you expected. I affirm the uncertainty, and you the certainty; and therefore it is you that should prove that certainty which you af­firm to have: For no man hath a certainty without some evidence or other to force assent; and therefore that evidence should be produced, if you are indeed a man of as Angelicall intellectuals as you seem to conceit your self.

6. God did yesterday know tha [...] the sun is not risen to day, i. e. that to day is not come: You will say, he did at the same time yesterday know that to day is come and the sun is risen? some will think to make this true, you must verifie contradictories, and say, [It is] and [It is not] at once, may both be absolute­ly true (and then farewell our first Metaphysicall certainty in composition.) Or else you must assert the coexistence of all things with God in eternity; which how loath you will be to admit, I conjecture partly from the tendency of your tenets, and partly from your adhesion to Dr. Twisse, and others of his minde.

7. For your third Chapter I have said as much to it already as I finde either need or list, being loath you should cast on me Master Goodwins task.

§. 23.

Mr. K. ANd to the first illustration the case is strangely different; yet I confess, if it did hold, it would prove the point a fortiori: Thus the sun, saith he, en­lightens and warms variety of creatures, yet is not changed: therefore nor need God be said to be changed, though he know to day a variation in the creature: I yield all the conclusion: but all that is nothing to the purpose▪ for the question is not whether to know a variation in the creature prove a change in God? but whether a varia­tion of the acts of his knowledge, according to the variation in the creatures do not prove a change in him? now the putting of a new immanent act, as a new knowing, is a putting of variation upon him.

§. 23.

R. B. 1. VVEre my advice of any weight with you, I should perswade you never to expect any illustration of Gods immanent acts by the creature, without a great difference in the case: and therefore that you would no more take such difference as so strange. 2. Your concession that it will prove the point a fortiori, if it hold, is as much as I could desire or expect. 3. A man would think, that the argument you here lay down as mine, were mine indeed, [Page 62] who findes so Learned a Divine saying so, that should abhorre falshood: when you put the words in a distinct character, with a [saith he,] as if they had been my express terms: but I desire the Reader not to judge of all your Writings by such passages as this: He may speak true at one time, that yet takes liberty to speak falsly at another. You did take the easiest course imaginable, to fain a con­clusion which you could grant, and then to grant it and say it is nothing to the business. 4. I will not consent to your stating the question in new terms of your own, in the midst of a dispute. Do not feign me to dispute any question which you make many years after my Writing, and which is not to be found in my Wri­ting in terms. 5. The word [Act] may signifie 1. the Divine essence; and so he that feigns a new act feigns a new God: 2. Or that mode, formality, res­pect (or whatever else it is to be called,) of God, arising from the nature or state of extrinsick objects; which Burgersdicius cals, the Application to the Object The question is only of this now, which some think may most fitly be called, Gods acts. Your naked repeated affirmation that a variation is put on God, when you prove it not, I take no more for a Demonstration.

§. 24.

Mr. K. SEcondly, When we are speaking of immanent acts, what have we to do with the suns enlightening or warming? I had thought those had been transient acts, and so not proper in this case! Yet

§. 24.

R. B. REmember you not the crude question that we were on? [Whether such immanent acts are any more eternall then transient acts?] The Questi­onists mean it quoad formalem naturam actus; for they take the denominations of [immanent] and [transient] to be but from the effect or terminus: And that you may see what they imagined, when they mention the similitude of the sun, let me intreat you to suppose for disputation sake (per possibile vel impossibile) that God had made at first no creature but the sun: I would fain know whether that sun in shining and casting out its rayes and emanation, did act immanently or transiently?▪ I conceive not transiently: because there were no subjects existing into which its act should pass, or which should as its extrinsick terminus receive from it any new form. It seems then it must be immanently: but that is but in sensu Negativo▪ because it is not transient: suppose next that the rest of the creatures were afterwards made, and placed as they are under the influence of this sun, and so were the receptive subjects of its action: Is it not the same sort of Action, without any change in it self, which before was immanent, and now is become transient?

But I need say no more to this; for you are pleased to confess.

§. 25.

Mr. K. YEt thirdly, Did it hold, I yield it were Argumentum a majori ad minus▪ If the sun be not changed notwithstanding all its warmth and lightening, then neither were God. But sure the sun is changed, and changeth perpetually, and could not act as a Universall cause upon the great variety of creatures in the world, did it not rejoice [Page 63] like a Gyant to run its course; did it stand still but one year together at one point, yea or but walk within one Hemisphere for a year, What should we do for that variety of seasons we need? All Summer would be as bad as all Winter. In opposition to this change of the Sun, is the Father of Lights said to be without shadow of turning. He hath no such Solstices or Tropicks; no motions, but a perpetual permanency. There is a great differ­ence between Immanent acts and transient: that supposing the Sun to stand still as in Jo­shua's time, and to act without motion; here were no alteration to be acknowledged in the Sun, notwithstanding all the variety of objects, yea and variety of operations upon those objects, all which might proceed from the same Act as to the Sun, the difference being meerly in the Patient: As for instance, the same live-coal doth at once by its heat melt the wax, and harden the clay; here are different transient acts, but no change or differ­ence at all in the fire; but only in the disposition of the matter on which it works. But in Immanent acts the Case is contrary; for they being in the subject, the variation of them makes an alteration in that, and not the object: as the same man unchanged may be the ob­ject sometimes of mens Love, sometimes of their hatred: the variety of these acts makes a difference in the Agent, doth not alwayes suppose any in the Object; and so here, Gods knowing now that this is, Gods not knowing yesterday, that it is now, makes a change in God, but indeed God cannot be said now to know that such a thing is, but to know that now such a thing is [which was not before] and this he did know, what ever is now even from all eternity, his prescience being a Knowledge in praesenti to him▪ though not de prae­senti, as to the object; against whose being in eternity more shall be said hereafter against M ^r Goodwin, but now I attend M ^r Baxter, who proceeds.

§. 25.

R. B. 1. YOu seem rather to answer in jest then in earnest, when you tell us of the Suns local motion, when our Question was, Whether [the Sun be changed by the variety of Creatures which it doth enlighten and warm] that is, Whether it self receive any change from the terminus or objects of its acts? Do you intend the information of your Reader, or the discovery of Truth, when you shuffle in such an alien Answer? 2. All that its good for, that I know of, is to acquaint us, that you have some full Demonstration against Copernicus, which hath given you a Certainty that he erres; And if one▪ should hear it, perhaps it would prove like your Ordinary Demonstrations: for that which is hint [...]d in your words, seems of kin to them. 3. You yield all that I say concerning the Sun, acknowledging that it is not changed by the variety of Objects: And in the first words you say [Did it hold, I yield it were Argumentum à majori ad minus.] Lay both these together, and judge whether you yield not the whole Cause which you opposed. 4. You still harp on the old string, affirming, Immanent Acts to be in the Subject, and that their variation alters it, when as good Philosophers say they have no Subject, and that Vision, Intellection, &c. have no Termini: Your naked affirmations so oft repeated, rather weary then convince. 5. How­ever you cannot from mans Immanent Acts, argue to Gods, unless they were more like. 6. I am unsatisfied whether a Transient Act (though not qua Tran­sient) make not as much alteration on the Agent as an Immanent? Whether a Transient act be not the same with the Immanent, containing in it all that it contains, with the superaddition of its Reception in, and effect upon a Passive Subject? As in the fore-mentioned instance: If the Sun had been created first alone, its action whereby it now lighteth and heateth, would have been imma­nent; [Page 64] and yet when the same action shall afterwards become transient by the ad­dition of other creatures to be its Objects, who will imagine that it is ever the less in the Subject (as you say) or that the alteration of it would make ever the less change of the Agent? I confess, I conceive not yet why there should in this point of changing the Agent be any difference between Immanent acts and Tran­sient: though I easily conceive that one only doth change the object. 7. Your friend M^r Jeanes, pag. 231. useth the similitude of [a Rock in a River standing immovable, notwithstanding the succession in the waters that glide by it;] which I think is as defective a similitude, as these here used: yet its plain, that you cannot truly say, This Rock toucheth the water that is an hundred miles from it. Suppose the Sun were an eye, and could see all the world at once, and that pura activitate sine receptione specierum ab objectis: Suppose one man be born, or one flower spring up this day, which was not in being or visible yesterday: This Sun would see that to day which it did not see yesterday without any mutation in it self: And yet seeing is an Immanent act. Now I would know, whether it be fit to say, This Sun sees that as in being which is not in being: Or, Whether it be not fit­test to say [It begins to day to see that Creature which begun this day to exist] though by so beginning it be not changed? Its true, God fore-knows all things that shall be: but that is not to know that they be, but that they shall be. 8. M^r Jeans ibid. saith [Yet this is no hinderance but that there may be and is a change in the extrinsecal Denominations of Gods knowledge from the variation of the objects hereof, &c.] so others commonly: And may I not hence conclude, 1. That then I may denominate Gods knowledge of the present existence of things, as Beginning with its object: and his knowledge of the existence or futurity of things, as Ending with its object; that is, when the thing ceaseth to be future or to exist? 2. And may I not conclude, that this Denomination is fittest, and so those that thus speak, do speak more fitly then they that speak otherwise? 3. And that there is some fundamentum in re for such a denomination: or else it were an unfit denomination, seeing names and words should be fitted to the things signified as neer as may be? 9. Do not you imply as much your self, when you say his Prescience is a Knowledge in praesenti to him, though not de praesenti? You confess then that God doth not know de praesenti, the things that now are not: but when they exist he knoweth them de praesenti; I confess the doctrine of the co­existence of all things with God in Eternity, would salve many of these things: but that you here disclaim. 10. Where you say, that [Indeed God cannot be said Now to know that such a thing is, but to know that now such a thing is (which was not before, as in the Errat. you adde)] it is a saying which I under­stand not, and conjecture it is still maimed of some necessary limb which should make it speak your sense: For I hope you do not believe what ever you say, That Indeed God cannot be said Now to know that those things are, which are indeed: If he know it not Now, when will he know it?

§. 26.

Mr. K. AS the glass by the variety of faces which it represents, hoc est, as the glass without any change in it represents various faces, now one, now ano­ther; so doth God know various objects, now one, now another, yet without change. The Antecedent is manifestly false; for that each of these several faces cast a new species on the glass, and those several species make several changes. For this purpose Mr. Baxter [Page 65] might have remembred what his great Logick and Metaphysick Masters say, concerning Ens intentionale, that it is opposed to reale and materiale: The species in the glass is indeed Ens intentionale, in opposition to Materiale, it is not so in opposition to Reale: But their putting and non-putting, or the presence and absence of the species, makes a real change, though not a material one in the glass▪ so real a one as that it may be seen, though not a material one that the childe that catcheth at is ever like to take hold of it; Plainly thus, That is a Real Accident which is in the Subject really, and so is that species, for we see it in the glass; that is a Material Accident which is so in the subject as to de­pend on it alone for its support, without influence of the efficient; heat or cold have such dependance on the subject, as that that alone can maintain them; as the heat will stick a while in the water, though taken off from the fire, and cold in my hand, though taken out of the water: But these Intentional Accidents though really in the subject, yet are so little supported by it, as that if the efficient do not continue its influence, they immediately perish as light in the air, these species, whether in my glass or my eye; who hath so much Logick and Metaphysicks to spill upon all occasions as Mr. Baxter, would have betrayed, I will not say ignorance, but incogitancy in so trivial a punctillio? Onwards, the case is the same for the species in the eye and the glass, and a change is made by the presence or absence of the species.

§. 26.

R. B. DIsputatore nimium foelici, nihil infoelicius; & nimium sapiente quis minus sa­piens? If I spill as much Logick upon all occasions, as you do words, sure I am a voluminous Logician, and make up in number what I want in weight. You wanted an opportunity to multiply words, for ought I know to no purpose, unless to acquaint the unobservant world with your well-furnished Intellect, that they may be assured, that you have all those things at your fingers end, as trivial punctillio's, which I am so ignorant of; and these few words of mine have occa­sioned the opening of your pack, and the expansion of your wares.

But, 1. You are fain to use the old artifice of putting my words but as the ground of your paraphrase, and then dealing with that paraphrase of your own. This is not so innocent as common a trick. I speak of a change [of the glass] and you put [a change in it:] Had not you newly risen up as the final decider, I should have said, it is yet sub Judice, whether the Intentional or Spiritual Being, in question, be indeed Res or not? And so whether it make any Real change in the glass. I confess you easily dispatch the business, which makes me think of Gorlaeus words, Exercit. Philos. 7. §. 2. p. 108. Quid species sint visibiles inquirendum est: Tam enim earum natura intellectui est ignota, quam ee sensibus notae. Peripateti­cis tamen & hic, sicut & alibi facilis expeditio. Qualitates aiunt esse spirituales, & corporis esse objectivum, quod habet in speculo vel simili corpori. Nobis hoc non est sa­tis: qui quaerimus porrò, quid qualitas spiritalis, aut quomodo corpus objective pos­sit esse in speculo? Nam hae videntur contradictionem quandam implicare, cor­poris dari qualitatem spiritalem, & rem extra speculum existentem esse in speculo, &c.

2. But see what unreverent thoughts such Ignorants as I, are apt to have of learned men! I am confidently perswaded, that you, who are so fully acquainted with Gods Nature and Immanent Acts, as to be at a certainty where I am at a loss, for all that do not know what that is that you see with your eyes; nor whether it be in the glass or not! And therefore the Lecture that you have read me of Ens intentionale hath been lost labour as to me!

[Page 66]3. And you had done but your part if you had observed that I speak not of the meer Reception of the agents action, but of the Representation to us of the species: which should not be confounded.

4. Are you sure that it is from the object, that the glass receives that variati­on that you imagine? If it be, Rocks and stones are more active creatures then some dull souls will easily believe; when at the same time the same Rock or moun­tain may perform 100000 actions upon so many eyes or glasses. Yea if in the midst of the Action of this stone or Rock, you do but give your glass a knock, and break it into a hundred pieces, it will multiply the action of the Rock an hun­dred fold; and that without touching or coming near the Agent! Is it not pretty sport to see the activity of these nimble Rocks and Mountains? I am one of those Hereticks, that think these works of God must be the matter of our admiration, but cannot be comprehended by us here: and that it is no good consequence, that be­cause you and your fellows nakedly affirm the contrary (yea notwithstanding all your proofs) therefore Des Cartes, S^r K. Digby. White, Hobbes, besides all the old Adversaries, are certainly in errour. I shall acknowledge more action of the Light, or air on the glass, then of the object, which seems but sine qua non. But withall I suspect, that the same Light or air doth perform the same action in the glass when you stand not before it, or when the object is absent; and yet no spe­cies is then seen; no nor visible. And I think that there is the same action on eve­ry glass-window, yea on every wall, or stone, or other body, as is on your speculum; and yet you see nothing on them as you do on it. And Hobbes saith, That it is in the eye and not in the glass, which you think you see in the glass (his reproaching of our Doctrine of visible species, I pretermit:) and if so, then there is not so much alteration in the glass, as you imagine. And indeed, you say little to prove it. If your Argument from sight would prove any thing, it would prove that the face is a foot or a yard (or more if you draw back) behinde the glass, and not in the glass: And yet if you go behinde you shall see nothing: Will you believe your eyes that things change into such various colours, and shapes, and quantities as some glasses by small mutations of posture do represent them? Will you believe your eyes that a strait staff is crooked in the water? I can tell you by my observa­tion when I was a Boy, that if you will kill a Fish in a River with a Gun, you must allow much to the fallacy of your medium. If then either it be the action of the light or air, or something else, and not the object, then it is nothing to me, who spoke only against a change by variation of objects: Or if the foresaid action being supposed to be the same on the glass, when several objects, or no ob­jects are before it, that which is superadded from the object is nihil reale, this is nothing against me: Or if the species which seems a foot behinde the glass be not in the glass, but in the eye or some where else, and so the glass be more truly an Agent by Reflection, then a Recipient of that species which I see, still this is no­thing against what I said. So that laying aside all that Reception of the action of light, or any thing else, which the glass receives when there is no object pre­sent, and laying aside all that which is Received into the eye and air, and not in the glass, and whereof the glass is but a Causa sine qua non; then call the rest an Ens intentionale or spirituale, or what you will; but prove it to be quid reale altering the glass, and do not nakedly affirm it.

You say, that my great Logick and Metaphysick Masters say, That Ens intentio­nale, is opposed to Reale & Materiale: and yet you say that the species in the glass is not opposed to Ens reale. It is, and it is not, seem reconcilable to you then without [Page 67] a distinction. Indeed as Real is opposed to [feigned] I doubt not it is Real, but as it is opposed to Modes and Relations, and such like, that some place between Ens and Nihil, it must better be known what it is, then the name of Ens intentionale or spirituale will acquaint us, before we can conclude for certain that it is Real.

As for your Material Accident, it will require more ado to prove, that there is any such thing in the world, as an Accident depending on the Subject alone for support, especially a quality, as you instance in: Sure you intend not the withdrawing of the influence of every efficient, but of some lower or instru­mental: I think, at least, Gods efficiency is necessary to be continued, for the Con­tinuation of the being of every Accident, and ordinarily some lower efficiency too.

As for the Logick and Metaphysicks which on all occasions I spill, I take the charge as unfit to be answered, as not coming from your head or heart, but from your Naturals, your spleen and gal.

My Ignorance in comparison of you, I am so easily brought to acknowledge, that I wonder you should think so many words necessary to evince it: (yet you should have done it in intelligible language, and not abrupt expressions, defective of sense, almost such as Hierom describeth in his lib. 1. cont. Jovin. initio.) But how did you prove my Ignorance or Incogitancy of Ens intentionale? Deep si­lence! Because I did not mention it, or else who knows why? By that reason I am ignorant that M^r K. is an honest man, because I do not mention it; But by what is said, you may see its possible to have heard talk of Ens intentionale, and yet to think this similitude tolerable.

And what if you obtain all that you contend for? viz. That the similitude is faulty! Alas, I shall easily grant it of any similitude whereby we illustrate the Nature or Acts of God. Suppose then that this glass did make the same Re­presentations sine receptione specierum: Or because these [...]nanimates are more remote, use the similitude of the Oeulus Ʋniversalis, which I mentioned even now. I am troubled that you force me to weary the poor Reader with so many words on so poor and unprofitable a business: But there's no remedy.

§. 27.

Mr. K. NOw whereas Mr. Baxter addes, That whatsoever some say, he doth not think, that the beholding of ten distinct colours at one view, doth make ten distinct acts of the sight, or alterations on it; I do not think that ever rational man said they do, for it were strange there should be but one view, and yet ten distinct acts of sight; but the question is, Whether the change of one of these objects doth not change the species in the eye, and so occasion another view or sight? Or rather it is beyond all question that they do▪ and yet whether they do or no need not be questioned neither; the point that lies before us, is, Whether distinct or new acts do not Cause an alteration? Which is that that we have just Cause to affirm with confidence, can have no place in God; and consequently no new immanent Act; so then there being nothing produced by Mr. Baxter which may sug­gest a suspition that there may new Immanent Acts be admitted in God, or any but such as are Eternal, Come we to the—

§. 27.

R. B. YOu are minded to play with the ambiguity of the word [View] which I take for all that Reception in the eye, or activity of it which it per­formeth [Page 68] in one Instant; and so for that natural Act whereby I fix my eye on one place at once, seeing as many things as at once I am capable of seeing: You take it, it seems for your intentional Action, or also the act which the visive power performeth, as in reception of that alone. I think the sense I use it in, is more common. And I say again, that it is none of our question, what light, air, &c. do on the eye: for they do no more when I behold one Rock, then when I be­hold the sands on the shore: But the Question is, What the objects do over and above on the eye? And whether if I see many millions of millions of sands at one instant, there be so many Real Actions of my eye at that instant? And whe­ther every distinct sand that is added or taken away, there be one Act added or ta­ken away, and so a real alteration in my eye? The rest which you adde is over and over answered before, and therefore being ashamed that I have, said so much on so unprofitable a point (though constrained) I surcease: Onely adding this brief rehearsal of what is said before.

1. Remember that we speak not of those Immanent acts whose object is Eternal: but of those that have a temporary object, as the actual existence of things, &c.

2. These kinde of Immanent Acts may be called Transient after a sort, in that they do quoad Terminationem objectivam, pass to an extrinsick object.

3. Agere, in the sense now taken, when applied to God, signifieth something more then meerly Esse.

4. The whole Generical Essence of Action is found in the species of Action.

5. Intelligere, Velle, Amare, relate to some Objects: Qui Intelligit, aliquid Intelligit: qui Amat, aliquid Amat. These terms therefore do alwayes (when af­firmed as being in God) connote their Objects.

6. There is a necessity therefore that the acts be variously denominated from the diversity of objects. It is no way fit to say, That God doth Nill Good, or Will sin, or that his Velle & Nolle is all one: Or that his Intelligere & Velle is all one. For, as it is said, the Act connotes the Object: and therefore we are not so much as to ascribe the act to God when there is not an object for it; or as to an aliene Object. Else we might say, Dei Intelligere & Velle sunt idem: Deus Intelligit Peccata: Ergo Deus Vult peccata: And that God Nil­leth Good, because he Willeth Good, seeing in God Vells and Nolle are all one.

7. This necessity of various extrinsecal denominations is ordinarily confessed by the most rigid Divines. I shall cite one more anon.

8. This Denomination hath fundamentum in re, or else it were delusory and abusive; these being the fittest names that most agree to the Things (of which see Mcuriss. Metaph. Scoti, li. 2. c. 3. Conclus. 3. & Durand. l. 1. dist. 19. q. 5. §. 13, 14. & Aquin. de Veritate, Mater. 7. q. 1, 2, &c.) Notions and Names are true or false, as they agree or disagree to the things.

9. On the same ground as God may thus be said to Understand, Will, Nill, Love, &c. and these may be said to be not the same, he may also be said to have divers acts of Intellection, Willing, Nilling, and these not to be the same: e. g. That it is not all one [...]o elect Peter, and to elect John.

10. Whatsoever this diversity of names implieth, as its foundation in God, (whether a bare Relative diversity, or also a Modal, or what ever the like) it is certain that it implieth no Composition in him, but it is onely what is consistent with his simplicity.

11. Some of the objects of Gods Knowledge and Love, are not from Eternity. [Page 69] The Existence is more then the meer Esse Volitum, or Will that they shall exist: And it is not all one to know the Thing it self in it self, and to know it in its Cause. Though God therefore did from Eternity intuitively know the Esse Vo­litum, and know the Creature in himself its Cause, and know its futurity, and so fore▪ know all things: yet it follows not that he intuitively knew the Creature in it self, as existing, (Unlesse we assert the co-existence of all things in Eternity with God.

12. There is therefore the same reason to Denominate Gods Intellection, Love, &c. as beginning and Ending with its Objects, as there is to denominate them as divers from the diversity of objects. And therefore this is a fit and ne­cessary way of speech. It is not fit to say, God is now Creating the world quoad actionis formalitatem, though you over-look the effect: it is not fit to say, That God now knows that the world will be Created (unlesse you respect some new Creation) or that Abraham, Moses, David, shall Die, or that Christ shall rise again, &c.

13. This Denomination of Gods acts as beginning and ending, hath as much foundation in the thing, and is as true as the Denomination of his acts as vari­ous. And this may as well consist with Gods Immu [...]ability, as the other with his Simplicity. The reason is evidently the same.

Now for the one, hear what others say. Schibler Met. l. 2. c. 3. Tit. 6. n. 247, 248. Quastio est de Accidentibus quae in D [...]o sint. Haec enim solum possunt composi­tionem in Deo facere, &c. Unde specialiter relinquitur, quod in Deo non flat composi­tio ex subjecto & accidente, si maximè ei conveniat Agere, tali actione quae praedicamen­talis dici possit. Nam actiones non comparantur ad agens, per modum essendi in, sed solum per modum essendi ab alio, ut infra, &c. Atque ita actiones tantum apprehenduntur ut egredientes ab essentia rei. Quod aut [...]m egreditur ab essentia rei, hoc, eo ipso, non po­test cum essentia facere compositionem, quae extremorum unionem requirit. And n. 97. Nam Actiones Divinae transecuntes, non sunt sub ectivè in Deo, sed solum a Deo proce­dunt; unde nullam compositionem cum Deo faciunt, &c. Quanquam id etiam (verum) est de actionibus Immanentibus: Hac enim non dicuntur Immanentes positivè, quasi in agente rigide loquendo subject entur, sed N [...]gativè solum, quia in externam materiam non transiunt. Ʋnde ad rationem actionis simpliciter & Immanentis & transeuntis, non re­quiritur esse in, sed solum esse ab: Idcoque neutrum facit cum agente Compositionem. Et sic anima nostra, si incipiat intelligere aut Velle, non tamen componitur, tum exsuo es­se & Intellectione & Volitione quà tales sunt: sed in utroque statu aeque est Anima sim­plex. Dixi, quà rales sunt, Quia ad intellectionem potest consequi aliqua compositio, si sit per speciem Intelligibilem.]

Keckerman in System. Theolog l. 1. c. 3. maintaineth, that the Persons in the Tri­nity, differ from the Divine Estence, as Modus a re, and from each other as Mo­dus a Modo, and that Ens and Modus make no Composition. Much more may it be so said of Relations to things external.

Altingius Problem. Theolog. Par. 1. pag. 55. distinguisheth Gods actions, 1. Sunt act us intrinsici & Immanentes qui non transcunt in object um externum & nullum prorsus respectum aut [...] ad [...]. Tales sunt act us personales quos Scholastici notionales vocant, gignere, spirare, &c. Horum absoluta est necessitas absque potentia ad oppositum, & sunt aeterni. 2. Sunt actus extri [...]sici qui non sunt in Deo, sed à Deo; five qui a Deo sunt effectivè, in Creaturis autem subjectivè: velut creare, gubernare, redimere, &c. Deus enim extrinsecus solum ab iis denominatur. 3. Sunt Act us Intrinseci qui­dem in Deo, sed Connotantes respectum ac [...] ad extra, ut scire, velle. Scit enim [Page 70] Deus non solum se, sed etiam omnino quicquid [...]st scibile, sive ut possibile, sive ut futurum. Vult etiam non solum se, sed etiam alia extra se, &c. Hujusmodi act us sunt Decreta, re­lativi nimirum ad extra, & praeter voluntatem [...] statuunt rerum externarum. Com­positio autem hinc male infertur, &c. Matk also, that he names the first sort onely Immanent acts.

And for the fitnesse and necessity of the Denominations, hear what Estius con­fesseth in Sent. l. 1. dist. 39. §. 3. De hac igitur scientia Dei (viz. ad enunciabilia) quamvis & ipsa sine dubio sit in se invariabilis, variè tamen loqui nos oportet, prout vari­antur propositiones secundum tempora. Cum enim nullam propositionem scire quis di­catur, hoc sciendi modo, nisi veram, eademque propositi [...] propter mutationem rerum ac temporum, modo vera sit, modo falsa; consequens cris, Deum nunc scire propositionem aeliquam quam post [...]a nesciat, & contra. Quod per singulas temporum differentias facile est declarare. Nam propositionem veram de praeterito, ut, Christus natus est, ante bis mille annos non sciebat, sed Christo nato scire coepit; eadem tamen nunquam scire desinet, sicut nec ullam aliam quae sit praeteriti temporis, quia propositio de praeterito vera, semper erit vera. Quod intellige de praeterito in genere: Nam si certum tempus designet, ut Heri natus est Christus, scire eam desijt, & de futur [...] simpliciter, ut, Post biduum pascha sict. Rursum propositionem de futuro veram, ut Omnes resurgemus, scivit quidem ab aeterno, nec fieri potest ut talem aliquando incipiat scire, quia propositio de futuro vera sem­per fuit vera, lo [...]uendo similiter de future in genere. Sed eam aliquando scire desinet; nempe post resurrectionem factam, quia tum vera esse desinet ipsa propositio. Denique pro­positionem de praesenti veram, scit tantisper dum ea vera manet, velut istam, Ecclesia mi­litat. Ac talem incipit aliquando scire, & aliquando scire definit; nisi forte veritas pro­positionis sit perpetua, &c. Porro omnis haec loquendi varietas non inde nascitur, quod circa Dei scientiam accidat aliqua Mutatio, sed quia mutantur res subjectae. Ʋnde ne­cesse est & ipsas mutari propositiones, &c. Manifestum est autem rebus mutatis non necessariò scientiam mutari, ne creatam quidem, nisi quid aliud concurrat, velut Com­positio aut divisio, aut certitudo major per experientiam rei praesentis accepta. Quae in Deo locum non habent. Sicut ergo scientia Medici invariata permanet dum eidem homini ob variam ejus affectionem, modo haec pharmaca, modo alia diversa praescribit, &c.]

14. Lastly, I again desire the Reader to remember, that if I seem in all this to speak sceptically, it is no wonder, when all that I intend is but to convince these self-conceited Learned men, that these things are indeed beyond their reach, and that they know not what they think they know: it being my own opi­nion, That Action, Intellection and Will, are but Metaphorically ascribed to God, and that we cannot know what that is in propriety, which these expressi­ons do shadow out in God. Tho. White saith; Institut. Sacrar. li. 2. Lect. 1. pag. 136, 137. Quare dicimus abstrabendo a nostris conceptibus, esse Deum unam simplicitatem simplicissimam, quae neque sit Deus, neque ens, neque aliud formaliter quod nos cogitare possimus; sed nostras cogitationes eam inad equate repraesentare; non quasi accipientes ali­quod unum ex pluribus q [...]ae ibi actu sint, sed accipiendo participationes quasdam inferiores eo quod ipse est, & dissimiliores quam salvia vel pediculus est respectu hominis. Whe­ther this hold or not of the notions, Deus & Ens, I doubt not but it holds of Intellection and Volition: or at least that we men are uncertain what these are in God. And the strange confidence of men in this, that they know that which no man knows indeed, hath made them unreverently vent their conceits, and fill the Church with perplexing co [...]troversies about things that none can determine. As M^r Burgess saith of Justific. Lect. 20. [Only you must take notice that we are [Page 71] in meer darkness, and not able to comprehend how God is said to act or work, &c. Therefore it is a sure truth, De Deo etiam vera dicere periculosum est, & tunc dignè Deum aestimamus, cum inaestimabilem dicimus; then do we rightly esteem of him, when we Judge him above our thoughts or esteem.] Matth. Paris speaking of the Dominicans teaching, which caused that great dissention and confusion in the University of Paris, writes thus (ad annum Dom. 1243. as he is cited by the Prefacer to Guiliel. de Sancto Amore) Incipiebant disputare & disserere subtilius & celsius quam decuit aut expedivit: Qui non verentes tangere montes a gloria Dei oppri­mendi nitebantur secreta Dei investigabilia temere perscrutari, & Judicia Dei quae sunt abyssus multa, nimis praesumptuosè indagare. Deo enim plus placet firmae fidei simplicitas, quam nimis transcendens in Theologiâ subtilitas.] Dr. Twiss Vindic Grat. l. 2. Crim. 3. §. 15. Sed quid fiet si haec humana ratio non ferat? An nihil [...]re­dendum nobis in [...]um [...] nisi quod quomodo fiat, humana ratione ex­plicare See M^r K's own conf [...]ssion, how little we can con­ceive or express of God, in the end of his Epist. Dedicat. possit? Mysteriun hoc forsitan adorand [...]m potius quam scru­tandum, &c. Et li. 2. Crim. 3. § [...]0. pag. (mih [...]) 405. E [...]iam non erubesco fateri, licet nunquam dub [...]trem de sancta Dei natura, tanquam de omni sceleris reatu alien [...]ssima, hoc tamen diu me su [...]pen­sum tenuisse (forte etiam hodie non paucos suspensos tene [...]) quaenam scilicet sit illa vera ratio, qui modus operationis Divinae quo siat ut se in omni actione tanquam Causa efficacissima immisceat, extra tamen omnem vitii contagionem, citra justam culpae suspicionem: Et an hodie per omnia satis explicatum habeamus, Deus novit, &c. Significat etiam Calvinus, multis hunc nodum visum esse inexplicabilem, &c. Hoc modo tutius consulendum censuit nostrae pietati, si fa­teamur hehitudinem sensus nostri my sterium hoc non capere.] And why should not the same Confession extend to the present case also? Though we do not use to con­fess our Ignorance till we are utterly at a loss (and then we say as Cajetan when he was stall'd, It doth not quietare intellectum) yet we have oft as great cause to con­fess it where we are confident sometimes; as perhaps Ariba that blames Cajetan for his Confession of Ignorance, might know as little as Alvarez that commends it for a most holy and pious speech.

I had thought to have said no more to this point, but find­ing a most Learned, I know Mr. Ru­therford hath some jarring with him; and I do not under­take to justifie all that any man hath said, when I call them Orthodox; but I confess I think that for solidity in the controverted points that they meddle with, Davenant, Camero and Baronius are the glory of B [...]itain, as hav [...]ng happily hit on that mean, which many others have mist of, which I would not have understood as disparaging any others: for even in this, they have many excellent Companions, and others have their excellencies, that were not in this so happy as they. Our Renowned B. Usher, D Preston, D. Field, and many another famous light in England, have not only deserved the honour of eminent Learning and Piety, but even in this judicious Discovery of the truth, between the extreams which others have run into, they have helped to reduce the violent to Moderation, and to shew men a surer way to overcome the adversary, then their disadvantagious extreams. Orthodox, Judicious Divine Robert Baronius (Camero secundus, vel Cameroni secundus) to speak so fully in this point, in his excellent Treatise de Peccato Mor­tali & Veniali, I have adventured to transcribe the whole Cha­pter, it being not long, both that the Reader may see the Rea­sons of the like passages in my fore-going Replies more clearly, and that Mr. K. may be yet better satisfied that I am not so sin­gular in these things, as he seems to think me.

§. 28.

Mr. K. Second; THat there is somewhat like to Justification in the Eternal Decrees of God to Justifie men.

§. 28.

R. B. IF this also be intended against me, then, Whether this Learned man did not want work, when he undertook this, I leave the indifferent Rea­der to judge. The former Question which he propounded to dispute, he knew and confessed that I denied not: (Yet he hath forced me to spend many words on it, and to say more then I thought to have done.) This which he makes his se­cond Labour, he will not say that I was ever his adversary in; or that ever I de­bated the Proposition, much less denied it: And yet all this seems intended against me, and by name anon he brings me in. If this man had not somewhat ab ho­mine more forcible then any thing in the matter disputed, which instigated his pugnacious soul to this conflict, then must I confess my self quite mistaken in the Motives of his undertaking. The former part of his Dispute hath convinced me of this. I remember we had such sparks among us when I was a School-hoy, that were wont (for maintaining the reputation of their valour) to appoint fight­ing matches, and to the field they must go, before ever they thought what should be the matter of quarrel, and when they came to the place, they must be dared by a third, to spit in anothers face to make the quarrel; and he that refu­sed was the Coward, and he that spit first, and struck first, had the first glory, though sometime not the last.

What I should do with all these following words of Mr. K's that concern me not, I do not well know. I hope none will expect that I should engage my self against him to prove, that [there is nothing like to Justification in the Eternal Decrees of God to Justifie] nor that I should answer to all that he brings to prove [Page 78] it! Yet because I take his Discourse to be very feeble, and to small purpose, I shall take a brief notice of it in the way, whether it were intended against me Di­rectly, or but Colla [...]erally.

§. 29.

Mr. K. ANd I make it good, not from this, that by reason of this Decree, God i [...] said to have Justified whom he predestinated, Rom. 8. For indeed he is said to have glorified them also; though glorifying of many of them be not till the end of the world, yea that full glorifying of none of them be till then, and the Decree to glorifie all whom he will glorifie at the end of the world, was before the beginning of the world: and yet this expression shews the Certainty of their Justification and Glorifying, who are pre­destinated; the Preter tense being used only to express the Certainty of the future. But this I will not insist on; but run another course, and that is this: Justification is by the Consent of all men (I mean Protestants) a Remission of our sins, and Accepting of u [...] as Righteous: Now this is either a meer immanent; or a meer transient Act, or both. I know no man will say it is a meer transient Act: there being no transient Act of God which doth not suppose an Immanent one; for that he acts nothing upon the Creature, but what he first purposed in himself to act: so then an Immanent act there must be confest, if there be a transient one; and a transient one I shall acknowledge as well as an Imma­nent, and what it is will enquire by and by: But first I contend th [...]t immanent Act there can be no other then the Decree of God to pass this transient Act, and that this Decree of God to pass the transient Act of Justifying, carries in it as much as concerns Gods Re­mission of sins, and Acceptance of us as Righteous; and therefore hath much in it like to Justification; and may be stiled so without Blasphemy, as Mr. Goodwin is pleased to brand it in his Rhetorick. And that this Decree to Justifie us, carries as much as con­cerns Remission of sins, and accepting of us as righteous, I prove thus: If it do not, then the Remission of sins, and Accepting of us as Righteous, are other immanent Acts. But that cannot be, for then, either in the Ʋnderstanding or Will: but neither can be said with sobriety, for sure God cannot be said to Decree to know any thing, or to decree to Will any thing: not to know any thing: for though he know things in his Decree, yet doth he not decree to know, his Knowledge being necessary, his Decree arbitrary: and if he did decree to know any thing, we must conclude he might have not known it; for decrees are only of things which may be or not be: Therefore whatsoever it be, it is no such distinct immanent Act in Gods Ʋnderstanding; and though we use to say, Now a man is Justi­fied in Gods sight, yet doth not this put any new Act of Knowledge in God, but signi­fies only a Testimony given by God, whereby he makes us know that we are Justified be­fore God, or in his sight; and I am sure that Mr. Baxter, who quoteth Suarez, Schib­ler and Keckerman at every bout, cannot be ignorant that the word of fight, though it be for the form Active, is for the substance of it rather Passive, and therefore is not attribu­table to God as it is to us; but in him it signifies a making of us to see, and we are said to be Justified in his sight, when he makes it as it were evident to our sight that we are Justified: as when God is said to know what was in Hezekiahs heart, the meaning is, he made known to Hezekiah what was in his heart.

2. To Decree to Will God cannot be said; for that is as much as to Will to Will, which was never heard of, the object of the Will being at best but the imperate Act, not his own [...]licite Act; for what need of Willing to will a thing, when one Willing is enough? And be that wils to will, wils no more then he doth already, which is to will, one of these Acts must needs be superfluous; and there is no ground to put any such in God, yea or man. [Page 79] I acknowledge a [...] in some cases may be said to Will to be more willing, as when the flesh interp [...]s [...]th and draws him off from willing fully, or at least from executing his will: but this is rather to will a freedom from a disturbance of the sensitive appetite, then to will the exercise of the rational will; now such an incumbrance of the will of God, there can be none, and consequently no ground whereon to raise such an assertion as this, that he may be said to Will, or decree to Will, which is equivolent. And thus it appears in general, that there is no new immanent Act in God required, yea possible, to the Justifying of a man, be­sides his decree to Justifie u [...].

§. 29.

R. B. I Confess I had farre rather be imployed in debating the point of Justifi­cation, then of Gods Immanent acts, which you before insisted on. But to deal freely with you, I never read from a Learned, Orthodox man, a more superficial, unprofitable Discourse on that Subject, or that less expresseth a com­petent understanding of the point, if my Judgement fail not, as probably it may.

1. To what purpose you tell us what Arguments you will not use (viz. from Rom. 8. 30.) I know not.

2. Though I little know to what good use it would be, to acquaint us what is like Justification, yet, me thinks, were it useful, it should have been better pro­ved. And first me thinks your Memory fails you (which you had need to take extraordinary care of:) The last Discourse was much spent in shewing that [there is a great difference between Immanent Acts and Transient] and that [there is a clear difference between them as between heaven and earth: Transient Acts being in the Patient, and Immanent in the Agent] So that to equal them in Eternity [is either to make the Creature eternal, or to deny God to be Eter­nal.] And now the second Discourse must be to prove them to be like: For the Decree which is an Immanent Act hath somewhat like Justification, which you confess a Transient Act. But yet I doubt not but your Learning can make this good: For you that can prove that Gods Immanent Acts which are his Essence, do differ no more from poor mans, then as you have expressed, may well prove, that Gods Immanent Acts are like Transient Acts; much more that Heaven and Earth are like. And doubtless your undertaking is very feasible: For you may well prove, that there is a similitude between Gods Immanent acts, and a stone, or a tree, or a worm, or any thing in the world: For you will say, that Gods Immanent acts are God himself, and that these Creatures are all Good: and then all things that are Good, are somewhat Like to God: Therefore every thing in the world (having some Good) is somewhat Like God: Also they have a Being, and therefore have some likenesse to the first Being. But then what Likenesse this is, or in what Degree, you have more Wit then to undertake to tell.

4. The Reason that you give for your not arguing from Rom. 8. 30 is because [indeed he is said to have Glorified them also.] But how fell it ou [...] that you ob­served not, that on the same Reason, you should have rejected the Argu­ment which you here use? Because indeed it saith as much (for ought I know) to prove Gods Decree to be like Glorification, as to be like Justi­fication.

5. Should you not have told us in what sense you take Justification before you [Page 80] define it? Who knows whether you mean Justification Constitutive, or Sen­tentiall? (not to speak of the many other distinctions of Justification.)

6. Why would you tell the world what all Protestants take Justification to be? as if you knew them all?

7. At least, how comes it to pass that so Learned a man hath read so little, and would bewray it so easily? as to say that [All Protestants consent that Justifi­cation is the Remission of sin, and Accepting of us as Righteous?] Would you be believed in such notorious untruths which you fear not to utter even▪ in a mat­ter of fact, where there is so much visible evidence against you? How many of our English Divines (besides all others) affirm Remission of sin to be a fruit or consequent, and no part of Justification? had you read but Mr. Bradshaw and Mr. Gataker, you would have known some. How many on the other side make Remission of sin antecedent to Justification in order of nature? and Justification to be its immediate consequent? How many take Remission of sin to be the whole of our Justification? yea what full Disputes and Treatises are written only or principally, or at least very much to prove this? and what famous Divines are they that maintain it? How many be there that take Justification to consist part­ly in Remission of sin, and partly in the imputation of Christs own Righteous­ness? and these with the former say, that Accepting us as Righteous is a conse­quent of Justification: Sin must first be remitted, say the former, and Christs Righteousness imputed ours, say the later, before God can Accept any man as Righteous: For man must first be Righteous, before he can be accepted as such▪ Yea Mr. Arthur Dent in his Catechism, defines justification to be, A cleansing and renewing of our nature by the Spirit of God.

The number that are of these several opinions are so great, and the men▪ so eminent, and well known to Divines that have been much verst in this Con­troversie, or are of any considerable reading in our Modern Writers, that I shall think it needlesse to cite any of them. Hath Mr. K. read none of all these▪ or will he blot out their Names from the number of Protestants?

8. Yet more grossely doth he affirm, that he [knows no man that will say it is a meer transient act.] I think then you have either read little of this Controversie, or little remember what you have read: at least, are an unfit man to tell us what All men hold, or all Protestants, when you profess to know so little. You might have seen this in some plain English books, that are in the hands of the multitude of those below you. Mr. Tho. Hooker maintains it, That Justification is not an Immanent but a Transient act. But what need I name any, when it is known to to be the common Judgement of our Divines, and those few that have maintained Justification to be an Immanent act (and consequently eternal) have been taken for Erroneous therein, and as militating so farre for the Antinomians. See Mr. Burgess of Justification, Lect. 20. p. 167, 168, 169.

9. If Justification be a Transient act, and yet not a meer Transient act, then is it both an Immanent and a Transient act. And if so, then either it is two acts, or else the Immanent and Transient act are one. If Justification (Active) be two acts, then it seems it is divisible; yea and one part of it is Eternal, and the other in Time only: And then we must not enquire, What the justifying act is? but What each of these justifying acts are? Of this if I knew your minde, perhaps I might say more. If the Immanent and Transient act be but one, dive [...]sly consi­dered (1. As in the meer form of an Act, having not yet effected any thing; 2. And as the same act is received into the subject Passive, and so is the Passion) [Page 81] then the same act is no more immanent, when it is once transient; and then we must say, that the act of Justification was eternal, but the passion or effect in time only. But this sense seems so much to contradict, both your foregoing discourse of the difference of Immanent and Transient acts, and your after hint of the Transient act which justifyeth, that I will not imagine it to be the sense you intend.

10. But your reason why no man will say it is a meer transient act, is very darkly discovered: It is because [there is no transient act of God, which doth not suppose an immanent one.] But doth it follow that therefore Justification is not a meer transient act, because it supposeth an immanent act? Why did you not tell us whether it suppose it as an antecedent, or as a part of Justification, or as what else? But you know that all that is supposed is not therefore a part. Or if it were never so necessary a foregoing cause, yet it follows not that the neerer cause may not be causa totalis in suo genere, and so be denominated. May not you on these grounds as well say, that there is nothing in the world is a meer transient act, because it supposeth an immanent? The building of a house I think is a transient act; and yet it supposeth divers immanent acts in the builder, and an immanent act of God that willed it.

11. But what is this immanent act? You adde [For that he acts nothing up­on the creature, but what he first purposed in himself to act.] I doubt not but you easily see, that if this reason prove any thing, it will as well prove that Cre­ation, Redemption, Sanctification, Resurrection, Glorification, are none of them meer transient acts: For God acts these in Time: and therefore he first purposed to act them. Yea it will do as much to prove that God never did, nor can perform a meer transient act: because he can do nothing but what he purpo­seth. What need you then apply this to Justification any more then to any thing else? as if Justification had any peculiar participation in this honour, above some other acts! By your reason, the dividing the red sea, the sending of Manna and Quails, the writing of the ten Commandments, were none of them meer tran­sient acts.

12. Immanent acts pass not into the extrinsick objects and make no change on them, and therefore are not causall: and therefore cannot well as causals be denominated from their effects: therefore no immanent act of God can be called Justification, or part of Justification, or a justifying act: For it must be so denominated from the effect of justifying: But it is the transient act only that effecteth Justification (Passive:) therefore it is the transient act only that is to be called Justification.

13. I have oft times asked the Antinomians, what text of Scripture they could shew that calleth any Immanent Eternal act of God by the name of Justification, or of part of Justification? and I could never yet see any that they produced: and I suppose that you are also unable to shew any such; or else you would its like, have done it.

14. When you say [God decreed to Justifie] do not you plainly make [De­creeing] and [Justifying] two things? and denominate only the transient act which is in time [Justification?] So of other▪ acts; as when we say [God de­creed to create:] you do not say, His Decreeing was Creating.

15. You conclude that [an Immanent act must be confest if there be a Tran­sient one.] Ans. It is easily confest that an Immanent act (so called, for our understanding) there is from Eternity concerning every thing that is in Time [Page 82] produced: but that proves not that the producing act in Time, is not meerly transient. I all this while suppose that you mean by denying Justification to be [a meer transient act] to include some other act justifying, or as part of Ju­stification, and not only to prove an antecedency or concomitancy of such an Immanent act. Else your reasoning would be absurd or against your self.

16. Having thus proved that there must be an Immanent act, you next say, that [There can be no other then the Decree of God to pass this transient act.] Your contention for this is bold, your proof of it weak. As Gods immanent acts are the same with his Essence, so he hath but One, that is, he is but One: Un­derstanding, Willing, Nilling, is all One; and so there is but one Immanent act in Justification, Condemnation, or what you will else, because there is but One God: Or rather God hath nothing properly called an Act, because he is God. But as we ascribe One act to God Analogically speaking of him according to our capacity, so must we on the same necessity ascribe to him more then One, and that is by denominating them from the variety of objects which they respect and connote. And so as truly as you can distinguish between the Divine Intelle­ction and Volition, so truly may we distinguish the Volitions of God, according to the divers state of the objects. And so if we could yield to you that there is any Immanent act a part of Justification, or that carrieth in it as much as concerneth acceptance of us as Righteous, we might fairly say as much, at least, for another act, as you can do for the Decree: For the Decree that you speak of, is only [a Decree to pass a transient act] and so hath for its object something future: But the Will of God de pr [...]senti, by which he willeth the relation of the justified per­son, is yet nearer the effect. So is his mentall approbation, and his acceptance of the person as Righteous (Willingly and Approvingly judging him Just;) some call his estimation of us to be Just sententiam conceptam as distinct from senten­tia lata, but neerer to it then the Immanent Decree to pass an act de fu­tur [...].

17. You adde [That this Decree of God to pass the transient act of justifying, carries in it as much as concerns Gods remission of sins, and acceptance of us as Righteous.] By which words you may mean almost what your list; but how any man should understand your meaning that knows not your minde by some better discovery, I do not know. 1. Whether do you mean by [as much as concerns] an essential constitutive concernment, q. d. [as much as constituteth?] But if so, then you should exclude your transient act, and the immanent alone should not be [somewhat like Justification] but Justification it self. For if this imma­nent be as much as constituteth remission of sin, and acceptance of us as Righte­ous, and Justification consisteth of these two only, then the immanent act is the whole of Justification. Or if you mean [as much as concerneth it antecedently ex parte Dei] that were manifestly false: For the giving of Christ, the accepting his Satisfaction and Intercession, and many other acts concerning Remission and Acceptance, are antecedent to Justification. Or if you should mean it in the full latitude, as your words import, viz. That nothing concerneth our Remission and Acceptance but only Gods Decree, then it is yet more palpably false: but this is so gross that I may not suppose you guilty of it, though your unlimited words do seem to express it. Or do you mean [as much of Gods immanent acti­on as concerns Remission and Acceptance is found in this Decree to pass the tran­sient act,] supposing this to be part of our Justification, and the transient act the [Page 83] other part? But 1. your next words before and after seem to contradict that. For you say it is [a Decree to justifie] which therefore cannot be part of the thing Decreed. 2. And what mean you then to plead that it is [somewhat Like Justi­fication] if it be a part, and such a part. Is it worthy a Divine laboriously to prove that a mans soul is Like a man? Or that [laying the Foundation] is somewhat Like to Building? The truth is, your terms perswade me either that you hold that Antinomian eternal Justification, which you are ashamed plainly to reveal, or else that you know not what you hold your self.

18. Yet do you repeat these ambiguous words again, as those, it seems, which best fit your design: and you prove them thus: [If it do not, then the Remission of sins, and Accepting of us as Righteous, are other immanent acts: but that cannot be:] Here you seem to explain your meaning of the former words, that it is [a constitutive concernment] that you spoke of: (but whether as the whole or as a part only I cannot tell.) For you say, that else these [are other im­manent acts] viz. [Remission and Acceptance are either Gods Decree, or other immanent acts.] But 1. why then do you make it your design to prove Gods im­manent act to be somewhat like Justification? Remission and acceptance of us as Righteous, are more then like it. Did not you say before [Justification is, by the consent of all Protestants, a Remission of sin and an acceptance of us as Righ­teous? 2. Why did you before lay your proof no higher then this, [that every transient act supposeth an immanent, viz. Gods Decree.] 3. It seems to me here that you assert eternal Justification in the definition, while you disclaim it as to name. 4. At least, you seem (if I can understand you) to maintain that Re­mission of sin and Acceptation of us as Righteous are from eternity. For you here import that these [are] Gods Decree, and you elsewhere say enough for the eter­nity of the Decrees. But you knew, its like, that this is such gross Antinomia­nism, as that it was not for your credit openly to own it in the plainest terms. You give me not sufficient occasion here to stay long in confutation of this Error: yet briefly this I shall oppose. 1. He that was not a sinner from eternity, was not a pardoned sinner from eternity: (or, he that had no sin, had none remitted.) But you were not a sinner from eternity: Therefore, &c. For the minor: He that was not from eternity, was not a sinner from eternity: but you were not from eternity: Therefore, &c. If you say to the major, that it is enough to make us ca­pable of Remission, that we were sinners in esse cognit [...]: I answer, either you speak de esse futuritionis, or de esse existentiae ut cognito: If of the former, the assertion is false: for [Future] is a term of Diminution, as to any true Being. An inno­cet man is not a subject capable of Remission of sin, [...]o nomine, because he will sin hereafter. If of the later, I say, God knows no man to be a sinner quoad existen­tiam praesentem, that is not a sinner: Else he should know untruly. 2. Where there is no obligation to punishment there is no remission of sin. But on you or me there was no obligation to punishment from eternity: Therefore, &c. The major is proved from the definition of Remission: which is A dissolution of an obligation to punishment. Where there's no obligation, there's none to be dis­solved. The minor is proved thus: He that is not a sinner is not obliged to pu­nishment: But you were not a sinner from eternity: Therefore, &c. Also Qui non Est, non est obligatus ad p [...]nam: At tu ab aeterno non fuisti: Therefore, &c. 3. That which is undone in Time was not done from Eternity. But sin is un­pardoned in Time, (viz. till we be united to Christ by faith, as Scripture abun­dantly witnesseth:) Therefore it was not pardoned from Eternity. 4. God ac­cepteth [Page 84] no man as Righteous that is not Righteous (yea that is not) (for he ac­cepteth men as they are, and not as they are not.) But no man was Righteous from Eternity: Therefore God accepted none as Righteous from Eternity. But enough of that, till you speak more openly.

19. Your proof (that Remission and Acceptance are no other acts immanent but the Decree) is this: [For then either in the Understanding or the Will: but neither, &c.] Ans. 1. I easily yield that Remission is no other immanent act; because it is none at all 2. But your proof seems none to me. You say, [Surely God cannot be said to Decree to know any thing, or to Decree to will any thing.] Your argument I think lies thus: [If God cannot be said to Decree to know or will any thing, then he hath no other immanent act but his Decree: But, &c. Therefore, &c.] But here's no proof of the Consequence; which needs proof. God cannot be said to Decree to know himself (according to you; for I profess I am ignorant of these high mysteries:) Doth it follow that therefore he doth not know himself? I think not. Nor doth it follow that the knowledge of himself is only his Decree, as I hope you will easily confess. Moreover (accor­ding to you) God cannot be said to Decree to know things to be Past. (For you say he cannot be said to Decree to know.) Yet I think God doth know, as his own Eternity, so our Time, and the Futurition, Presence, and Preterition of things in our Time: and therefore it doth not follow that he hath no knowledge of things, but his Decree. For his Decree (as now taken) is de futuris: but besides that God hath. 1. a knowledge de Praeteritis, and 2. de Praesentibus. You argue, from the Necessity of Gods knowledge and the Arbitrariness of his Decree: and many words you use which shew that confidence which I admire at: that you should pretend to be so far acquainted with the Divine Nature, as not only to ascribe to God the acts of man so far as you do, but to determine which acts are necessary, and which arbitrary, and that he cannot Decree to Know or to Will. I confess I am ready to tremble instead of replying, to think into what Mysteries you lead me so boldly. But I resolve no further to follow you, then to manifest your presumption, and to shew you that they are things unsearchable which you vainly pretend so well to know. Gods Knowledge is commonly distin­guished into simplicis Intelligentiae, & Purae Visionis: The former is said to be in order before the Decree, and the later in order after it: therefore neither of them are taken for the Decree it self: and will you overthrow both by reducing all to the Decree? The knowledge of Vision is taken not to be necessary simply, but only on supposition of the Decree, which anteceding in order of nature doth cause the Intelligible objects. For, say they, it is by this Decree that things pass from the number of Possibles, into the number of things Future: and they cannot be known as future, till they are future; and they are made future Freely and not Ne­cessarily: therefore in the knowledge of Futures there is a freedom radicaliter & participativè. And so it is no such hard or absurd concession, to say, God might not have known what he knows: as long as he might not have made it an intelli­gible object.

20. You next proceed to an objection, which you cast in your own way: and though I conceive you would not have made your self any work, but what you were confident you could honourably and easily dispatch, yet here I think it fals out otherwise. The objection is from our use of saying [Now we are justified in Gods sight.] Here 1. you say [This puts not a new act of knowledge in God] of which I have said enough before. 2. You tell us the sense of it: viz. [Page 85] that [It signifies only a Testimony given by God, whereby he makes us know that we are justified before God] and you say [Sight in God signifies a making us to see: and we are said to be justified in his sight, when he makes it, as it were, evident to our sight that we are justified.] This interpretation is to me something strange, and not easily received, both because of its Errour, and be­cause you say so little to cover that Errour, but thrust so gross a conceit upon us upon your own authority. I rather think that the ascribing of such New acts to God, is 1. From the Moral Act of his Law, God being said to do that which his Law doth: and so he is said to judge us Righteous, when his Law of grace doth so judge us: and we are said to be Righteous in aestimatione Divinâ, when we are so in sensu Legis. 2. From the change of the object: For as the variety of objects denominateth Gods acts as divers, so on the same reason the Novity of the objects must denominate them as new, though they be immanent acts. 3. And by an Anthropopathie, Sight is oft put for Gods Remembrance or Obser­vation.

But you thrust upon us pure Antinomian fancies. 1. If your conceits be true, then none is to be accounted [Justified in Gods sight] that do not see themselves to be justified; for you think [Sight in God, signifies a making us see.] Then wo to all those honest souls that see not themselves justified, nay rather think them­selves condemned: But yet if I discourse with such, I will venture to give them better encouragement, for all your doctrine; and to tell them [You may be ju­stified in Gods sight, when you are condemned in your own.] 2. Shall we per­use the Scriptures that use that phrase, and see whether all or any one of them can be understood as Mr. K. expoundeth them in the Antinomian way of Manifesta­tion. Psal. 143. 2. For in thy sight no man be justified. Doth it mean, no man shall see himself justified? Jer. 18. 23. Forgive not their iniquity, neither blot out their sin from thy sight. Is that only meant of hiding the remission from their sight? or letting them know the non-forgiveness? Where the Scripture speaks so oft of doing that which is good in the sight of God, or that which is evil in his sight, Doth it mean Gods making us to see that it is good or evil? What is so good in the sight of sinners as that which is evil in the sight of God? Job 15. 15. The heavens are not clean in his sight. Job 25. 5. The starres are not pure in his sight. Is this sight of God a making the creature see? Heb. 13. 21. Working in you that which is well pleasing in his sight. Is this making us see? It were too long to recite all; if the Reader will peruse the rest, 1 Joh 3. 22. Exod. 15. 26. 2 Sam. 12. 9. 1 Chron. 19. 13. Psal. 72. 14. Hos. 6. 2. Rom. 3. 20. Mat. 11. 26. Luk. 10. 21. & 15. 21. Psal. 19. 14. & 51. 4. & 9. 19. & 5. 5 Gen. 18. 3. & 19. 19. or any other where this phrase is used concerning God, I leave it to his own judgement whether any one of them be taken in Mr K's sense: That of 2 Chron. 32. 31. which he brings, is neither the same phrase, nor hath the same sense, and therefore is nothing to the matter. Yet is not Mr. K's exposition of that satisfactory neither: For he cannot prove that it is meant meerly of discovering Hezekiah's heart to himself. It may be as much the discovery of it by the effects to others for their warning, and so shew the frailty of man: But the plain sense of the text referres that knowledge to God himself and not to any man; even by such an Anthropopathie which is ordinary in Scripture, as in Ezek. 12. 3. It may be they will consider, though they are a rebel­lious house, as if God had been in an uncertain hope of it. So Luk. 20. 13. Jer. 36. 3. So where God is said to repent. If God speak of himself to man after the manner of his own infirmity, must we therefore say, he means [our knowledge] when he men­tioneth his own?

[Page 86]21. That I may know whom he speaks to, he addeth [I am sure Mr. Baxter who quoteth Suarez, Schibler and Keckerman at every bout cannot be ignorant, &c.] The matter which he mentioneth is nothing to his Cause. But see what an overcharged stomack this Learned man hath? How many casts hath he had already in vomiting up the choler of his scorn? And yet it comes up still as fresh and as bitter as if he felt no levamen by all that evacuation. Truly his oft scorn­full repeating my quotation of these childish Authours, caused me at last to turn over all my Book to see how oft it is that I quote them. And I can finde Suarez but once named, and no place of him cited. Keckerman but once cited, and there twice named; and Schibler thrice. Yet doth this man tell the world I quote them at every turn; so well may we believe his confident Assertions about the unsearch­able nature and mysteries of God, who hath the face to speak thus in a visible mat­ter of fact, where any man that will but try it may finde him—Nay, see the mo­desty of the man! I cited two of them once, and the third thrice in a whole Book: and in these five or six leaves he tels me of it, or scorns me for it twelve times!

22. He next addeth [To Decree to Will, cannot be said: for that is as much as to Will to Will, which was never heard of; the object of the Will being at best, but her imperate act, not her own elicite act.] Reply, 1. I still abhor your presumptuous pretence of knowing more of God then you do know, and of so measuring him by man. 2. Still defiderantur modestia & veritas. Who would think that a man pretending so much to Learning, should never have met with Schoolman, or Philosopher that speaks that which he here saith [was never heard of] or having read it (yea or not having read it) durst so boldly speak thus? At least he might have seen it in the most ordinary and obvious Writings of our own Di­vines. In Amesius his Cases of Consc. li. 1. cap. 7. these are the last words: Hinc verè dicimus & ex omnium gentium consensie, Volo Velle. Believe which thou wilt, Reader; but I am sure there's a wide difference between these two men: when one saith, Dicimus omnium gentium consensu; and the other saith [It was never heard of.] Yea Ferrius in Scholastic. Orthodox. cap. 29. (a Chapter worth the read­ing de praedeterminatione & causa peccati) affirms it of God himself [Ideo videtur quod cum Deus permittit lapsum, non se habet mere Negative, sed cum aliquo actu posi­tivo: & ideo non solum non vult, sed etiam vult non Velle, i. e. Voluntas reflectitur supra se non volentem: Dum scilicet non Vult Adamum peccare, suspendendo actum Vo­litionis mera negatione, sed etiam Vult se non Velle: & haec est actualis & positiva per­missio. Itae tamen ut in primo signo sit Negatio pura, &c. Proinde cum Deus Volue­rit ab aeterno non Velle lapsum, habuit actum reflexivum super negationem, &c. At De­terminavit fore inquies. Minime▪ absit hoc.] This is approved by Churches of France. And yet this Learned man dare tell the world in print, that it was never heard of: which that he might have safely done, he had need of more ears then two. And it seems this Learned man hath read little of the contentions of the Jesuites and Dominicans about the nature of free-will, where he might have seen many of them touch this Question, as Petavius doth against Vincentius Lenis, ali­às, Fromondus, and others frequently. Nay it seems he is a stranger to the Schoolmen too: Perhaps in stead of reading them, he contemns them as he doth Schibler, Suarez and Keckerman. Scotus in 4. sent. dist. 49. q. 3. fol. (mihi) 266. B. saith, Finis extra est simpliciter optimum & summe volendum: Ergo inter ea quae sunt ad finem q [...]od est sibi immediatim est magis volendum: sed Velle est sibi immediatius, quia immediatè tendit in ipsum ut in finem ultimum, cum finis ultimus ut hujusmodi sit proprium objectum ipsius Velle. Probo majorem: Illud est magis Volendum voluntate [Page 87] libera quod appetitui naturali naturaliter est magis appetendum: hujusmodi est quod pro­pinquius est ultimo, quod simpliciter maxime appetitur naturaliter. Praetereae Voluntas potest Velle suum actum, sicut Intellectus Intelligi [...] suum actum: aut ergo Vult suum Velle propter Intelligere, aut è converso, aut neutrum propter alterum: & loquor de Velle ordinato.

Nicol. d'Orbellis saith, in sent. l. 2. dist. 25. dub. 2. [Omne quod Vult, appetit ad sui ipsius imperium: quia sic Vult aliquid ut Velit se Velle illud: Et ideo in actu Volendi seipsum movet, & sibi dominatur, & pro tanto dicitur liberum (arbitrium) quamvis immutabiliter ordinetur ad illud.] And Gibieuf shews, that God hath Actum vo­luntatis positivum circa suam permissionem li. 2. de Libert. cap. 24. & cap. 22. §. 7, 8, &c. And why not as well then about his act. And Gods Will is his Essence: There­fore he willeth it. For that Deus vult seipsum hath hitherto been unquestioned, for ought I know (so farre as he may be said at all to Will.) Aquinas 2. 2 ae. q. 25. a. 2. c. saith, Quia enim Voluntatis objectum est Bonum Ʋniversale, quicquid sub ratione boni continetur, potest cadere sub actu Voluntatis. Et quia ipsum Velle est quoddam Bo­num, potest Velle se Velle, sicut & Intellectus cujus objectum est Verum, Intelligit se Intelligere, quia hoc etiam est quoddam Verum.] Vid. & 1. q. 87. 3. 2^m. If I thought it necessary, it were easie to heap up many more that are of the same minde. But I shall only in brotherly duty admonish Mr. K. to make more Conscience hereaf­ter of false speaking: and seeing he hath read so very little, or lost it again, ra­ther humbly to acknowledge his Imperfection (as we that are guilty of the like must also do) then to make a confident vain-glorious ostentation of that which it seems by this, and many the like passages, he hath not.

Let us adde some Reasons, that the Elicite acts may be the objects of other E­licite acts of the Will, and not the Imperate only, as Mr. K. saith.

1. As Scotus argueth before from the proportion with the Intellect. A man may understand that he doth understand, by a reflect act: Therefore he may Will that he Will.

2. That which is an apprehended Good may be Willed: But an Elicite Act of the Will may be an apprehended Good: Therefore, &c.

3. A man may Will his everlasting Happiness: (For if the End may not be Willed, what may?) But his everlasting Happiness consisteth partly in the Eli­cite Acts of his own Will, everlasting to be exercised on God: [God being Objectively our Happiness) Therefore, &c. Velle, Amare, Frui, are acts that must be perpetuated, and either may be Willed, or no man may will his own happiness.

4. Whatsoever is apprehended to be a fit means to this End or Happiness, may be Willed: But the Elicit acts of the Will may be apprehended a fit means hereto: Therefore, &c. They are commanded, and they are made Conditions of Happi­ness: and therefore are a means.

5. The Effects of Gods special saving Grace on the soul may be Willed: But the Elicite Acts of the sanctified Will, are the Effects (and principal effects) of Gods special saving Grace on the soul: Therefore, &c.

6. That which a Christian may pray for, that he may and must Will: But he may pray for the Elicite Acts of a sanctified Will: Therefore, &c. As he may pray, Lord, I Believe, help my Unbelief: So he may pray [Lord I am Wil­ling, make me more Willing, and hereafter Willing, &c.

7. Experience is in stead of a thousand arguments, I feel that my Willingness is the object of my unwillingness; and that in these several wayes. 1. I feel that [Page 88] upon the review of my past Willingness, and the sight of my present Willingness (in any Good) my Will hath a Complacency in it, which is a true Velle, yea the first and principal Elicite Act of the Will. 2. I finde that by a less perfect and intense Act, I do Will a more perfect Act. I am somewhat Willing, but I would fain be more Willing. Nay to procure the Amendment of my own heart by this increase of my Willingness (which is indeed the Increase of most of my Graces) is the main business of my life, committed to me by God, and to be in­tended by my self. And if I should cast off this great business, and neither de­sire more Willingness or Grace, nor pray for more, nor labour for more, because Mr. K. out of his subtilty [...]ess me, that the Elicite Act is not the Wils object, I should be befool'd out of my Christianity and Salvation by a trivial trick of vain Philosophy. 3. I finde that by a present Act of Will, I do Will a future Act. I do Will now that I may also Will to morrow, and to my lives end, and for ever in glory, and that better then now I do. 4. I feel that I do Will a more sincere Willingness. I do Will Salvation with too much respect to my self in it, and too little to Gods honour. Now I would fain Will this more for God then I do. 5. I would fain Nill many things which through my corruption I now Will. 6. I would fain oft suspend a vicious act of my Will, at least. In all these respects, the Elicite Act of my Will is the object of my Will.

But Mr. K. will be Learned in despight of Natural and Gracious Experience (for I hope, for all his Learning, that he Would Love God more, as Love is taken for an act of the Rational part, and that he Wils a greater and a persevering, yea a perpetual Willingness of God and obedience; and a fruition of God, and frui is an act of the Will:) He will therefore prove what he once saith, and that's thus. [For what need of Willing to Will a thing, when one Willing is enough? And he that Wils to Will, Wils no more then he doth already, which is to Will: one of these acts must needs be superfluous, &c.] To which I Reply; You may see in the several Instances which I gave before, that it is needfull, and that it is not superfluous, as you say, and that it is more then he did before; A more perfect act, a future act, a perpetuated act, are more then he did before. Yea its a doubt, Whether a very gracelesse man may not Velle intendere Deum, vel frui Deo yea strictly Will to Will God as his happiness, or to Will Holiness before Volu­ptuousness, who yet doth it not already. And me thinks so acute a man might see that this is not the same act which he performeth already, for it hath not the same object. The man is Willing to be saved from Hell, but Unwilling to be Holy: He is convinced that he shall not be saved, unlesse he become Willing to be Holy: Therefore he wisheth he were Willing to be Holy: If this were but with a Velleity, it is yet an Elicite Act of the Will, but it may be called a Volition, though uneffectual, because there is a stronger con­trary Will: So that it is Volitio quoad actum Absolutum, but quoad actum Com­paratum, he is unwilling. The Object of that Will which he hath, is his Velle sanctitatem: the Object of that Will which he would have, is Holi­ness it self. If that Velle & sanctitas be not all one, then these two Acts be not all one.

But Mr. K. confesseth at last that a man may be said to Will to be more Willing, but he saith [this is rather to Will a freedom from a disturbance of the sensitive appetite, then to Will the exercise of the rational Will.] But why is it that this man would not be disturbed by the sensitive appetite? Is it not because he would Will freely? Doth not he that Willeth the means, much more Will the End? [Page 89] And is not the Removal of the Impediment, a Means to your freer and more In­tense Willing? And do not you your self Will the increase of your Willingness upon the quieting of that Appetite? Besides, I hope you do not think that the di­sturbance of the sensitive Appetite, is the onely Cause of our Imperfection in actual Willing: Or that our own Habitual Corruption and distemper of the Will it self, is not a greater Cause.

After all this you conclude, that [it appears there is no new Immanent act in God required yea possible to the justifying of a man, besides his Decree to justifie.] To which I say, Though it little appear to me from any of your arguing, yet I easily yield to the Negative part of your Conclusion; and I say, that the De­cree it self is no part of Justification, but an Antecedent.

Again, Let it be observed, that all this arguing will as much prove that Gods Immanent act is like to Creation, Sanctification, Glorification, Damnation, or any thing that ever God did, as to Justification: For of all his Works it is as true, that he doth nothing but what he decreed to do. And so it may as well be said that our Glorification is an Immanent act from Eternity, as our Justi­fication.

§. 30.

Mr. K. MOre particularly, it will be as Evident that his Decreeing to Remit our sins, carries a Remission of them tantamount: For who shall charge them on us, where God decreeth to remit them? The Conscience I confess may; so may the Devil joyning with our conscience▪ but all this while their charge is of no great danger to us, when God hath decreed to remit them to us: and though they may trouble us they can­not damn us, for that their charge is to be brought in Gods Nam [...], as for sins committed against his Crown and Dignity: Now where he hath decreed to remit those sins, there is no danger of suffering for them, let what ever accusers manage the Evidence against us, all that they can do is but this, to bring us to cry Guilty, and thereupon to appeal to God for Mercy; who upon our appeal to him for Mercy, he is graciously pleased to pronounce pardon to us. God himself I acknowledge also may charge them on us; and proceed in severity against us for a while; but this charge is not any way obstructive to his Decree to remit sin, but rather subservient to it, and to bring us to see and confess our sins, and cast our selves wholly on his Mercy in Christ, in which respect I might better say, that God doth shew love even in punishing unregenerate men that are Elect, then you did erewhiles, that he may be said to hate Godly men, when he punisheth or rather correcteth them: Punishment ayming chiefly at the satisfaction of Justice, Correction at the amendment of the offender. So then his Decree of Remitting carries in it as much as is required for any [...]mmanent Act in him to our Remission, and so much as necessarily procures the tran­sient Act in the time that he hath appointed for it. His Decrees are like Mount Zion, and stand fast for ever: The Counsel of the Lord standeth for ever, the thoughts of his heart to all generations, Psal. 33. 11.

§. 30.

R. B. YOur [tantomount] is a word made for your use; Causes that dare not see the light, use to go covered with such terms as will stretch. But if you mean plainly, that the Decree doth amount to as much as a remission of sin,] then I must needs say, that your Doctrine is tantamount Antinomianism. Let [Page 90] the conscientious Reader that loves Gods truth and his own Peace, consider by these few particulars following, what a Theology, nay what a Christianity this Learned man would introduce.

1. Doth not this lead men to slight Christ and his sufferings, and to look on his Death as that which did them no great good? For when all our sins were tan­tamount forgiven from Eternity, there was little left for Christ to do by his Death, Merit, Intercession, &c. as to our Remission.

2. How small a matter is left for the Regenerate to receive upon their Repent­ing and Believing in Christ, as to Remission of sins, when they are tantamount (I must use Mr▪ K's School-term) remitted already? Is this the Repenting and Believing for Remission of sin which Scripture mentioneth?

3. How small a matter is left for Baptism to seal and exhibit, as to Remission, when all sin was tantamount Remitted from Eternity?

4. Where is the Excellency and Glory of the Gospel, either as to the Narra­tive, Preceptive, or Promissory part? For the Narrative, it makes a large De­claration how Christ was Promised, Incarnate, Born, how he Obeyed, Suffer­ed, Satisfied, Merited, Rose, Intercedeth to procure a Remission which was tantamount done already even from Eternity. For the Preceptive, it presc [...]i­beth man a way to obtain Remission by coming to Christ, and to maintain that Remission by abiding in Christ, when our sins were tantamount remitted from Eternity. The Promise seemeth to hold forth an excellent benefit, and all men are invited to Receive it; and when all's done, it offereth and promiseth to do that which is done tantamount already from Eternity. If you say, that yet Christ and the Gospel have their Excellency as they respect other benefits, viz. our San­ctification and Glorification: I answer according to Mr. K's grounds, it must be said that these also were done tantamount from Eternity, in that they were Decreed.

5. How small a matter have Christians daily to pray for, in that Petition [Forgive us our trespasses] when they were tantamount forgiven from Eternity? And what a spur is this to prayer?

6. How small a matter have they to Give Thanks for, as received through Christ from the promise, upon prayer, &c.

7. How small a matter as to Remission of sin, do we receive in the Lords Sup­per, when it was done tantamount before?

8. How great a help doth this Doctrine give to Obedience, when men are told that all their sins are tantamount forgiven from Eternity?

9. How small a Difference between the state of the Regenerate and unre­generate, supposing them Elect? The sins of one are forgiven, and the other tantamount.

10. How unsoundly do we perswade wicked men of their misery, and tell them that God hateth all the workers of iniquity, and that they are by nature children of wrath, &c. when for ought we know all their sins were tantamount forgiven from Eternity? And how hard to convince them of any such misery, when they have this Reply? Lay all this together, and see how much of our Religion and Christianity is left!

But he proves all this by a Question [Who shall charge them on us where God decreeth to remit them?] I Reply, The same persons, and as many as might have charg'd them on us, if God had not decreed it. His Decree takes off no charge, nor disables any from charging us. It were not an Immanent Act, if it did ponere aliquid in objecto. 1. We are as much under the Charge, Curse, or [Page 91] Condemnation of the Law, till we believe, as if no such Decree had passed. 2. What the Law doth, God doth by it; for it is his Instrument. 3. Satan may charge us, 4. And so may conscience. 5. And men. But you confess your self that Conscience, Satan, and God may charge us▪ But you say [there is no danger] Reply. 1. What if you were to lie all your life in torment with the stone or gout, and yet were sure that you should die never the sooner, and so there were no danger? Would you think your self tantamount a sound man? Is it so small a matter in your eyes for an elect man to lie under the guilt of sin, and as an enemy to God till near his death, so be it he be not in danger of damnati­on? 2. If you mean that their damnation is non-futura, I confess it: And so it would be if God should but fore-know it, and not decree it (supposing it might be the object of such a fore-knowledge.) 3. But yet I think it is not fit language to say [there is no danger of suffering for sins that God hath decreed to remit.] I see still whither Antinomianism tends. 1. If Christ did die to de­liver us from danger of suffering, then we were in danger of suffering: But Christ did die to deliver us from it: Therefore, &c. Would you make us be­lieve that Christ saved us from no danger by his death? 2. The actual Con­version and Justification of the Elect, is a saving them from danger: Therefore they were in danger. 3. If the Elect unconverted are in no danger, then you must preach no danger to them, nor perswade them to avoid any, nor to repent the incurring of any: or if, because you know not the Elect, you speak to all of danger, you must tell them that you mean it not of the Elect: But what success such preaching would have, is easie to conjecture. 4. Wh [...]re men are bound to Fear and Apprehend danger, there is danger: But God bindeth the Elect (even after Conversion, much more before) to Fear and Apprehend danger: There­fore, &c. There can be no Fear, where there is no Apprehension of danger; no more then there can be Love without the Apprehension of Good to be beloved. Christ bids his Disciples, Fear him that is able to destroy both body and soul in hell fire: And so Heb. 4. 1. Fear lest a promise being left of entring into his rest, any of you should come short of it. God bids us fear: Mr. K. tantamount bids us, Fear not, by telling us there is no danger. 5. Where men are bound to labour, run, strive, and use much means to escape danger, there is danger: But so God hath bound the Elect: Therefore, &c. How many Texts might be cited that binde us to save our selves, and seek our deliverance, and that speak of our escaping, our de­liverance and salvation, which all imply a danger from which we escape, are sa­ved and delivered? 6. Matth. 5. 21, 22. He that calleth his brother Fool, is in dan­ger of hell sire: But an Elect man hath called his brother fool: The [...]efore, &c. 7. Nay if this be true, then God never saved his people from any Danger. For he that never was in danger cannot be saved out of it. And he that was from E­ternity Decreed to be pardoned, according to your Doctrine, was never in dan­ger. 8. And then we ought to give no thanks to God the Father, or to Christ the Redeemer, or to the holy Ghost the Sanctifier, nor to any Preacher or other Instrument, for saving us from any danger of punishment. I think these are not matters to be made light of: nor that Doctrine of Libertinism to be cherished, which plainly leadeth to such unhappy fruits.

But let us peruse your Reasons: You say [the charge is to be brought in Gods name.] Reply. So it may be nevertheless for the Decree; for that takes off none of the charge. You adde [All they can do is but this, to bring us to cry Guilty, and thereupon appeal to God for Mercy, &c.] Reply. 1. Must they cry Guil­ty, [Page 92] and look for Mercy and Remission, that were tantamount forgiven from E­ternity? 2. Either you speak of an uncoverted elect person in this life; or else as supposing he were at Judgement in that estate. If the later be your meaning, then their Accusation might and would do more then you speak of, and would tend to condemnation (if such a case might be supposed.) If the former be your meaning, then these Elect persons do [Cry Guilty, and appeal to Mercy] with true Faith, or without it. If with Faith, then their sins are remitted further then by Decree, and these are not the persons now in Question. If without faith then they are not Forgiven for all this. As long as the Elect remain unregenerate, though that Law, and Satan, and Conscience accuse them, yet they do not Belie­vingly seek mercy: and if they were in that state at Judgement, it were too late to seek Mercy.

Next you [acknowledge that God himself also may charge sin on us, and pro­ceed in severity against us for a while; but this charge is not any way obstructive to his Decree to Remit sin, &c.] Reply. God may be said to charge sinne on the Elect before faith. 1. By obliging them by his Law to punishment. 2. By in­flicting some small part of the punishment on them. You seem to me to take notice notice only of the later. But every Christian must acknowledge that for all Gods Decree, we are all Obligati ad poenam sempiternam, till we are united to Christ by faith. To say this is not obstructive to Gods Decree, is nothing to the question. The worlds being uncreated from Eternity, did not obstruct Gods Decree of making it, and the Elect's being unsanctified or unglorified doth not obstruct Gods Decree of Sanctifying and Glorifying them: and yet this proves not persecuting Saul was tantamount sanctified and Glorified. And what if God make the knowledge of our Damnable state, or our non-remission, a means to Re­mission? That doth not prove that we are before remitted in whole or in part, or tantamount.

Whether you speak to Mr. Goodwin or me, about the phrase of [hating the Godly] I know not: but if to me, I do not believe that ever I so spoke.

Your distinction of Punishment from chastisement, is perverse: so learned a man should know, that Punishment is the Genus and Chastisement is a species of it. All Punishment is for the Demonstration of Justice; but not all for the satisfaction of Justice, Correction is as well for a Demonstration of Ju­stice, as for Amending the Offendor: Else it were meer Affliction, and no Correction.

Your Conclusion next laid down, much differs from the divers formerly laid down, and which you should have proved; and yet I have shewed, for part of this, how ill you have proved it: though, for my part, I know no Cause that I am engaged in that will be any whit prejudiced by yielding you all; as I easily yield you, that the Transient Act will certainly follow.

§. 31.

Mr. K. NExt his Decree to Accept us, carrieth as much too; and there needs nothing but a Transient Act to prove his Acceptance, and evidence it to us: for to decree to look upon us as righteous, is not to look upon us as righteous in our selves, but his son; and to this looking on us, there needs no new immanent Act, beyond his electing us to faith in his Son, and perseverance in that faith: Thus he may be said to give us to his Son [Page 93] before, and so then there is no new immanent act. Gods Remitting our sins, and ac­cepting us as Righteous, though they sound like Immanet acts, are to be sensed as Transient, and how shall be shewed next: in the interim this which hath been said is sufficient to shew, That in the Decree of God to justifie us, there is somewhat that looks like Justification; and no other immanent act in God is required to our Justification; besides his Decree from Eternity to justifie us in time.

§. 31.

R. B. I Shall never think the highest pretenders to exact explications to be the best performers, for your sake. You treat of Acceptance; but who can finde by all that you say, what you mean by [Acceptance.] You say, [Though it sound like an Immanent act it is to be sensed as Ttransient,] but what that Transient act is, for all your promises, I can hardly finde you discovering. Surely [to Accept] in our ordinary speech signifieth an Immanent act of the Will; but so you take it not; else must you yield that Immanent acts may be Decreed. Be­sides this, it may signifie the Moral action of the Law of Grace, which virtually judgeth the person Righteous, and its action is Gods action. But this you can less digest: and therefore what your [Acceptance] means, let him tell that knows. All that I can finde is, either that it is [the Giving of faith] or [the Making us know our Acceptance] of which more anon.

You say [There needs nothing but a Transient act to prove his Acceptance, and evidence it to us.] Rep. Here is then but two Acts needfull: the one is [Decree­ing to Accept us as Righteous:] This is not Accepting, as the word and your own confession witness: The other is [a Transient act to prove and evidence his Acceptance.] This cannot be acceptance neither: For what man will say, that the evidence and proof is formally the same with the thing proved and evidenced? Is it all one [to Accept] and [to evidence and prove Acceptance?] What a maze do you run your self into under pretence of discovering the truth? You have fairly disputed [Acceptance] into Nothing.

You adde [For to Decree to look upon us as Righteous, is not to look upon us as Righteous in our selves but in his Son.] Rep. To Decree to look, is not to Look: else you may say, it is a Decree to Decree. Your phrases of [in our selves] and [in his Son] may be so interpreted as to make your sense true; but if you mean that it is Christ only and not we, who is the subject of that relative Righ­teousness, which formally makes us Just, then it is false.

You say [And to this looking on us, there needs no new Immanent act besides electing to Faith and Perseverance.] Rep. I pray you then tell us what you mean by [Looking on us:] an Immanent act it is not, you think: And is Gods [Looking on us as Just] a transient act? What act then is it? Did you say, That God is said to Look on us as Just, when his Law call us Just, I should not dis­agree with you: but you disclaim that. But I forgot that you did expound your meaning before upon [Gods seeing:] as Gods seeing is a making us to see, so its like you mean [Gods Decree to look on us as Just] is a Decree to make us Look on our selves as Just: and so the person is changed. But if this be your meaning, I had as lieve you said nothing.

But I will tell you again, that if you will take [an Immanent act] formaliter for Gods essence, so there is none new, nor is there any more then one; Knowing, Willing and Nilling, Love and Hatred are all one. But if you will condescend [Page 94] to us of the simpler sort, and speak of Immanent acts as applied to God after the manner of men, and as his acts are formaliter, or modaliter, or relativè, or denomi­nativè, or however else (in a way unknown to us) distinct from his essence, [...]o as they may be diversified among themselves without disparagement to Gods sim­plicity, they may also begin and end without disparagement to his Immutability, for any thing that you have yet said to the contrary. And so as they are diversi­fied or said to begin denominativè ex connotatione objecti, they may as well be said to be the objects of Gods eternal Decree. And thus I conceive, Decree respecting the future, and [Accepting and Approving] being acts that connote a present object, and so may not be said [to be such acts] till the object exist, therefore God may well be said to Decree to Accept us, and Approve us, and Love us, and Delight in us, &c. though all be Immanent acts. And so my conclusion shall be contrary to yours, that you have not proved that there is no other Immanent act in God required to our Justification, besides his Decree; and if you had, yet you had done little to the business: And that you have no more proved [that in the Decree is something that looks like Justification] then that it looks like Crea­tion, Salvation, Damnation; And had you proved it never so strongly, I know not to what purpose it is. It is somewhat like God that is called his Image in his Saints: and yet he that cals the Saints, God, may blaspheme for all that.

§. 32.

Mr. K. 3. THat this Immanent act cannot be called Justification, appears hence, that no Immanent act makes a real change in the subject, as Justification doth▪ That a Will to justifie us, is as Mr. Baxter rightly saith, terminus diminuens, and cannot be the act whereby we are justified, That Justification is on all hands confessed to be pronouncing or declaring of us Righteous, which cannot be done by an Immanent act alone: What then is the Transient act? Before I can speak punctually to this, it is fit to set down that Remission of sins, and estating us in the condition and priviledges of Righteous, are the two main parts distinguished ratione ratiocinata at least, all grant, I must needs say, I think Really. Remission of sins being the first, and which of course draws the other after it, enquire we 1. Whether there [...]e a Transient act of God whereby he remits our our sins? 2. What this is?

§. 32.

R. B. I Am loath to speak against you where you are pleased to plead my cause; yet I must give you these brief Animadversions. 1. That Justification makes on the subject a real change, as opposed to Feigned, Nominal, Potential, &c. I yield: but not as opposite to Relative: Wherefore our Divines ordinarily call Sanctification a Real change, as opposite to the Relative change of Justifica­tion. 2. It is but one sort of [...]ustification which is [on all hands confessed to be a pronouncing or declaring us Righteous:] your self do afterwards speak of Justi­fication in a sense that will not agree with this. Who doth not yield that Consti­tutive Justification goes before Sentential? Doth not God make us Just before he judge and pronounce us so? Yet in this confusion do you go on still; and such a stirre do you make with [Immanent and Transient] as if you would wear these words thredbare, or never have done with them? So Immanent are [Page 95] these Notions in your Phantasie, that when they will be Transient I can­not tell.

So often do you promise us over and over to enquire what is the Transient act in Justification, and talk of [speaking punctually to it] that you raised my ex­pectation to such a height, that I looked for much more then ordinary: But when I had read to the end, and could scarce perceive certainly, whether ever you spake to the Point at all, or at least in so few syllables and so obscurely, that I am un­certain whether I understand what you mean, I confess you left me between ad­miration and indignation! that after all your prologues and promises, and our greatest hopes, you should drop asleep when you should come to the work, or cease before you remembred the performance, made me resolve to set lighter by such pro­mises hereafter.

§. 33.

Mr. K. [TO prove that there is a Transient act, they tell us no more (saith Mr. Baxter) but this, that it doth transire in subjectum extraneum, by making a mo­rall change on our Relations, though not a real upon our persons.] I confess every tran­sitio, to use that word, in subjectum extraneum making a Morall change, is not ne­cessarity a Transient act: For if it be only as upon an Object, whereto is given but an extri [...]secall denomination, not as upon the subject of a Reall change, made by the act, the act hath no title to Transient: for knowledge doth this much: but whereever is a Moral or a Legal change made, there is of necessity a Transient act: for that the Laws of men take no notice of Immanent acts; and the Law of God takes no notice of any change made in the object of bare Immanent acts: A man by lusting after a woman commits Adultery punishable by the Law of God; the woman is nothing the more defiled: So a man that covets his neighbours goods, is lookt on by God as a thief; the goods notwithstanding remain in the same place, and possession of the Owner, nor doth God challenge them as Felons goods; no change made on them; Wherever then there is a Morall, i. e. a Legall change, there is a Transient act, and this being in Justification a Transient act is necessarily required to this change. Now I yield Mr. Baxter that [no Transient act is immediatly termined in a Relation, and the immediate effect of Gods Justification or Re­mission of sins, must be somewhat Really wrought, either upon the sinner, or somewhat else for him.

§. 33.

R. B. I Will not stand to open any weaknesses or impertinencies in this Se­ction, as long as the scope is sound, lest I shew my self as quarrelsome as you.

§. 34.

Mr. K. THe second Question is, What is this? and so what the Transient act is? Mr. Baxter saith, [1. That the passing the grant of the New Covenant, or the promulgation of it, is a Transient act. 2. So may the continuance of it also be. 3. This Law or Grant hath a Moral improper action, whereby it may be said to pardon or justifie, which properly is but virtuall justifying. 4. By this grant 1. God doth give us the Righteousness of Christ to be ours when we believe. 2. And disableth the Law t [...] [Page 96] oblige us to punishment or Condemnation. 3. Which Reall foundations being thus laid, our Relations of Justified and Pardoned in Title of Law do necessarily fol­low.]

I cannot perswade my self to leave my old Doctors to follow Mr. Baxter, for any thing he hath said in all this. Let the promulgation of the New Covenant first and still be a transient act; this Covenant hath an odde empty Morall action in justifying us when we believe; and by the promulgation of this Covenant God doth as improperly give us the Righteousness of Christ, and disable the Law to condemn us, as shall appear by considering that all here spoken of actions, is but of actions improperly so called, and such as cannot suffice to make a Reall effect.

§. 34.

R. B. VVHo your old Doctors are is utterly unknown to me; for I remember not that I have ever read any Doctor before you that goeth your way (if I know it) and am in hope that I never shall reade any such hereafter. For your not following me, as I have not been very eager to obtrude my opinions on any, so if it be no more for your own advantage then mine, I am not so desirous of your company, but that I can be without it. Now to the matter.

I am very glad that I am come to a Controversie more easie and more usefull then that which you made and stuck in so long before. As for my opinion about the nature of Remission of sin, I have had occasion to view and review it since the writing of my Aphorismes, and have received Animadversions on this very Point of another nature then are these of Mr. K's, both for Learning, Sobriety, and Exactness of Judgement; and upon my most faithfull and impartial perusal of all, I must needs profess my self much more satisfied in my first opinion, and confident of its verity, then I was before: And some Learned men (as most England hath) do fully consent to it, and confirm it in their Animadversions; and I remember none of the rest (save the first-intimated Reverend Learned Brother) that doth contradict it, of all those Judicious excellent men that have vouchsafed me their private Animadversions. And even he doth confess all that action of the Law and change made by it, which I mention, as being a known truth beyond Controversie; only he thinketh that the name of Justification is to be given to no act but a Judicial Sentence, which I call, the most perfect sort of Justification. Indeed I am ashamed that I spake so strangely of so easie and familiar a Truth, as if it had been some new discovery, when all that are verst in Politicks and Laws may discern it to be so obvious: but the reason was, that I had not read any thing of it in Divines as to our present case.

Before I come to Mr. K. let me tell the Reader my thoughts of Remission more fully. Pardon actively taken is an act of God. Passive pardon is the terminus or effect of that act. Pardon Active, is 1. Mentall, in a more imperfect, dimi­nute, and less-proper sense called Pardon: As when a Prince doth pardon a tray­tour secretly in his own thoughts and resolution only. This is applied to God speaking after the manner of men (in which manner we are necessitated to speak of God:) and it is not (as Mr. K. imagineth) to be conceived of by us as being the same with his Decree de futuro (so far as we may conceive of Gods Immanent acts as divers:) though it be but the same act that receiveth these divers denomi­nations [Page 97] from▪ the diversity of the objects. 2. The second Active Pardon is Sig­nal, Legal and Constitutive; which by signifying Gods Will, doth Legally con­stitute us pardoned, by causing our Jus ad Impunitatem vel Liberationem, i. e. by dissolving the Obligation to punishment, or by taking away guilt. The action or causation of this pardon, is but such as is that of every Fundamentum in causing its Relation. 3. Pardon taken actively also may signifie the very Grant of the act of Pardon (whether particular or general, absolute or conditional) that is, the act of Legislation (in our case) whereby the Law of Grace is formed, as the remitting Instrument. This goes before that forementioned; as being the cau­sing of that Fundamentum, which in time causeth the Relation aforesaid. 4. The Promulgation or Proclamation of this Law of Grace, or Act of Oblivion, may also be called Pardon. This Legal pardon is an Act of God as Rector supra Leges in respect to the old Law whose Obligation it dissolveth; and it is the Act of God as Legislator in respect of the Law of Grace which dissolveth the Obligation of the Law of Works.

Accordingly Pardon in a Passive sense, is taken as many waies. 1. With men for the effects of mentall pardon in the heart and minde. 2. For the Jus ad Im­punitatem, or the Dissolution of the Obligation to punishment, caused by the se­cond act. 3. For the Law of Grace, or the promise it self. And so the pardon­ing Instrument of a King, is commonly called a Pardon. 4. For the hopefull Relation or state that he is in that hath pardon offered him on very easie and rea­sonable terms (as for the Acceptance with thanks.) I think all these senses the word is used in the Scriptures; I am sure in Writers and common speech it is so. Now it is easie to discern that all the rest are but imperfect pardons, and so called in a diminute sense, except only the second, which is the full and proper pardon. 2. All this I speak of Pardon in Law sense, the same with that which I call Justification constitutive (or but notionally differing:) But besides all this there is Pardon and Justification per sententiam Judicis, which these are but the means to, and which is the most perfect of all. But note that as the word Justifi­cation is most proper to [the sentence:] So the word [Pardon] is most proper to the Civil or Legal act that goes before Judgement. 3. And as God pardoneth 1. as Rector supra Leges by Donation and a new Law, 2. and as Judge by sen­tence: so 3. also as the executor of Law and sentence or his Will: And so par­doning is but Not-punishing. Where note 1. That this sometime may be be­fore and without the first, by meer providence: and so wicked men are pardoned without a promise, in such measure as God abateth and forbeareth punishing them. 2. That in our case this executive pardon quoad initium presupposeth the first Legal pardon, and quoad complementum it presupposeth the sentential absolu­tion. 3. Note that this sort of pardon hath divers degrees, according to the de­grees of any due penalty which▪ is remitted: and so may alter. So that in a word, all pardon is of one of these three sorts. 1. By God as Author of the New Cove­nant, giving Right to Impunity. 2. By God as Judge absolving. 3. By God as executing.

All this being premised our question is, which of these it is that Scripture a­scribeth to Faith, and is called Remission, or Believing, or Justification by Faith? Some say, It is only Gods mental pardon: Some say, It is none of these, but a Declaration to the Angels in heaven, who is Just. Some say, It is none of these, but a Manifestation to our consciences (as some speak) or a sentence of God in our hearts (as others speak.) Some say, It is ipsa Impunitas, or non Punire (as [Page 98] Twisse sometime, or nolle Punire, as other times.) I think it is the Dissolving of the obligation to punishment, or the giving us a Jus ad liberationem vel ad impuni­tatem, or Gods remitting his Jus puniendi: Where the immediate terminus is the Dissolution of the obligation, or our Debitum liberationis, vel jus ad impunitatem: and the remote terminus (which is yet connoted in the term Pardon, as essentially necessary) is Impunity it self, or actual liberation from punishment, or non­punire. And withall, as in man a mentall Remission goes before the actual Sig­nal, Legal Remission, so there is in God, a Nolle punire, and after the manner of men, it may be ascribed to God, as then beginning when the Law remitteth, and the sinner is a capable subject, because it cannot be denominated Remission, but by connotation of the object, and that must be, when there is an object fit: And so after the manner of men, we attribute it to God, as an act which in time he is moved to by an Impulsive cause, viz. the Satisfaction and Merits of Christ: though strictly we use to say, there is nothing ab extra can be an impulsive cause to God: Much more then this I have said for explication of this Point in pri­vate Papers to some Learned Friends; but this may suffice for the right under­standing of what here passeth between Mr. K. and me. And now I proceed to his words.

1. He acknowledgeth the Promulgation of the New Covenant to be a Tran­sient act: It is the same Instrument of God that is called his Covenant and his Law here. And as it is a Law, the term [Promulgation] doth most fitly agree to it. And I doubt not but either Mr. K. implieth Legislation (perhaps he mi­stakes the terms for equipollent) or at least he will as freely acknowledge that a Transient act. But he saith, 1. That [this Covenant hath an odde empty mo­rall action.] Let any man that reades these words of this Learned man, judge whether I be not excusable for that censure in the Preface to the Appendix of my Book of Baptism! A School Divine and a Chair man, and know no more the nature of a Law, Covenant, or any Legal Instrument! A Divine, and an Ari­starchus, and yet dare to speak such words of all the holy Laws and Covenants of God! Why what doth this man study and preach, that thinks so basely of Gods Laws? The Moral action of the Law of Grace or Testament of Christ he calleth [an odde empty Moral action:] Yet its like he knows that Commonwealths are chiefly upheld and ordered by Laws, Contracts, Conveyances, &c. and conse­quently by actions of the same nature. The whole body of the Commonwealth and each member of it, do hold their Estates, Liberties and Lives by such odde empty actions. Take away the odde empty Moral action of Laws, Testaments, Obligations, Deeds of Sale, Leases, &c. and what is a Commonwealth, and what a Rector, and what security have you of any thing you possess? or what or­derly commerce among men? His next assertion is as desperate as the former, that [by the promulgation of this Covenant, God doth as improperly give us the Righteousness of Christ, or disable the Law to condemn us.] Could any words (not certainly destructive to Christianity it self) have fallen from this Learned man more unworthy a Divine? Doth not the Testament of the Lord Jesus properly convey the Legacy? Doth not Gods Deed of gift of Christ and his Righteousness to us, properly convey? and doth not God properly Give thereby? Why how can a more proper way of Giving be imaginable? 1. If a man do pro­perly give, by a Testament or Deed of Gift, then so doth God: But a man doth, &c. Therefore, &c. 2. Where there is a plain signification of the Will of the Donor to confer thereby the benefit on the Receiver, there is a proper Giving: [Page 99] But in the Gospel-promise or Testament of Christ there is such a signification of the Donors Will: Therefore, &c. Doth not an Act of Oblivion or Pardon pro­perly give pardon to all that it pardoneth? Doth not any Act of Grace give the favours expressed?

2. And where he saith, that [God doth hereby as improperly disable the Law to condemn us▪] I Reply. 1. Nothing in the world can more properly disable the Law from effectual condemning us, that is, so as to procure sentence and exe­cution, then a general Act of pardon, or then the new Law doth, which is in its very nature Lex Remedians, & obligationem ad paenam prioris dissolvens. Though still the Law as to its sense is the same, and therefore doth virtually condemn till the said dissolution. How can the Law of the Land be more disabled from effe­ctual condemning all Traytors, for what is past, then by an Act of Oblivion, or a particular pardon under the Soveraigns Hand and Seal? 2. Yea this Learn­ed man disputes against the very formall nature and definition of a pardon: which is to be an Act of the Rector freeing the guilty from punishment by dissolving the obli­gation. And certainly as the obligation it self is one of these [odde, empty Moral actions,] so must the dissolution of it needs be. Indeed Theologus est Jurisconsultus Christianus, a Christian Lawyer: and what a Lawyer he is that knows not the nature, use and force of Laws, is easie to be judged. I could wish men would lay by their over-bold enquiries into Gods Decrees and other Immanent acts, or at least, their vain pretendings to a knowledge which they never had of them, and study this intelligible and necessary part of Theology a little more.

But Mr. K. tels us that he will make all this strange doctrine [appear:] and how? Why [by considering that all here spoken of actions, is but of actions improperly so called, and such as cannot suffice to make a real effect.] Rep. Do you oppose [Real] to [feigned or nominal] or to [Relative?] If the former, it is such doctrine as I dare say, no Divine will believe, no Lawyer, no understanding member of a Commonwealth, and I think, no Christian, that understandeth what you say. Think not the words rash, for I think him not fit to be accounted a Divine, no nor a Christian (supposing him to understand the matter) that will or dare main­tain, That neither the curse of the Law, or threatning of the new Law, whereby so many are adjudged to Hell, nor yet the Testament, Covenant, Promise of the Gospel, whereby Christ and his Benefits, Justification, Adoption, Salvation (quoad Jus) are given, do any of them make a true change? But if you oppose [Real] to [Relative,] then I must tell you, that [Remission and Justification Passive] are no Real effects, but Relative; which I had thought you need not have been told. The act of Legislation and Promulgation makes a real effect; but the Fundamentum once laid, causeth but a relation. Do not you know that the very formal nature of all morality is Relative? What else is Aequum, Justum, Me­ritum, Debitum, Jus, yea bonum morale, & malum, &c?

Again I must tell you, that you do not well to mention Promulgation alone, when I spoke of Enacting, or Granting, or Legislation, before Promulgation. I hope you take not both these for one. Nay indeed Promulgation is proper to a Law as it is obligatory to the subject, and so is necessary after Legislation, ad actualem obligationem: but a Law of Grace which doth conferre benefits, and whereby the Legislator doth, as it were, oblige himself, may be in force in some degree, without a Promulgation: because a man may be made capable of Right to Be­nefit without his knowledge, though he cannot be obliged to duty without his knowledge, except when he is Ignorant through his own fault.

§ 35.

Mr. K FOr first, The Covenant Justifies us, not by any act, but meerly by the tenour of it, as a Law, not Agent, and many things in this kinde are said to d [...], when there, I wis, is no action at all: Quantitas facit quantum; I hope no Action, it doth it formaliter, not efficienter: Paternitas facit patrem; I know no Action that ever was ascribed to Relation, it doth it formaliter, not efficienter: and so doth the Covenant not Justifie a Believer by any Act, let Mr. Baxter mince it as he will, a mo­ral improper Action, but as his great Metaphysical Rabbies would speak aptitudina­liter, and this but extrinsecè too; for foedus non facit Justum of it self, but it must be beholden to many intervenient Causes.

§. 35.

R. B. 1. THanks to Inadvertency (as I suppose) it is here acknowledged that the Covenant doth Justifie, and that as a Law, which i [...] it do, we shall see anon whether it can be any other way then that which I affirm. 2. But little thanks is due to this Authour from the friends of Truth, for his dis­covery of the way of the Covenants Justifying. [It is (saith he) by the Te­nour of it, as a Law:] True: How else should it be? [but not Agent] Not by a Physical proper Action: that's true: But have Laws, Testaments, Cove­nants, Grants, Pardons, &c. no Moral Action? Or is this Moral so contempti­ble a matter, that a Learned Divine should make Nothing of it? When all mens estates and lives depend on it here, and all mens Salvation or Damnation hereaf­ter. But how is it then that the New Covenant Justifies? why he thus proceeds [Quantitas facit quantum; I hope no Action: it doth it formaliter, not efficienter: Paternitas facit patrem▪ I know no Action that ever was ascribed to Relation, it doth it formaliter, not efficienter.] Reply. 1. I though that [facere] had been as improperly applied to a formal Causation, as [Agere] and that I may, at least, as fairly do the later, as you the former. 2. If this Learned man do indeed think that the Covenant doth formaliter Justifie, as Quantitas facit quantum, & paternitas patrem, I shall the less repent that I was not his Pupil: And if I knew who be his old Doctors that he here speaks of, I would never read them, if they be no better in the rest: any, I would take heed of looking into them, lest they had a power of fascination: What is the Matter that the Covenant doth Inform? Gods Act, or mans Quality, Act, or what? What matter doth it concurre with to consti­ [...]ute the Compositum? Is not Justitia that which formally maketh Just? Is the Cove­nant the Relation of Just in the Abstract? Why then doth not the denomination follow the form? Is it the Covenant quod explicat, quid sit Justificatus? Or by which Justus est id quod est? But let us make the best construction imaginable of M^r K's words, and suppose that he would only prove the Negative [what way it is by which the Covenant justifieth not, viz. not efficienter] and not [what way it doth Justifie, viz. formaliter] yet I should demand, 1. What is then the use or purpose of his Instan­ces, or fore-going words? 2. What the better are we for his discourse, if he tell us not what way it is? 3. What Cause will he make it if not an efficient? Will he say it is either Material or Final? I think not. But he saith, that [the Cove­nant doth not Justifie a Believer by any Act, let Mr. B. mince it as he will, a Mo­ral Improper Action, but as his great Metaphysical Rabbies would speak, aptitu­dinaliter, and this but extrinsecè too.] Reply. What Reader is much the wiser [Page 101] for this answer? Would you know whether Foedus facit Justum, ut forma, vel ut efficiens? Why Mr. K. telleth you, it doth it but aptitudinaliter? If so, then cer­tainly, not ut forma: for forma aptitudinalis faciens informatum, is a strange crea­ture. It must then be matter or efficient. I would not think so hardly of Mr. K. as to imagine that he takes it for a Material Cause; much less that he takes it for Materia aptitudinalis Justificationis actualis. I hope such doctrine never dropt from his Chair. What is left then, but that it be an efficient. And if so, is not all efficiency by Action of one sort or other? And moreover, how comes Efficiens tan­tum Aptitudinalis, to be Efficiens Actualis? And if not Actualis, how comes the Effect to be produced, viz. The Believer to be Justified? But I dare not impute this non-sense to Mr. K. Perhaps he takes the Covenant to be no Cause at all of Justification? But that will not hold neither? For he plainly saith, that [the Covenant justifieth] twice here together. And sure Justifying sig­nifieth some Causation.

Yet the amuseth me more by adding [and this but extrinsecè too.] Why, who is it that hath found out another Justifying efficient, But onely the extrinsecal? By this I see he takes it not for Matter or Form; for they are not extrinsecal. But is not the Law, the Jury, the Advocate, the Judge, each of them an extrinsecal efficient in justifying every man that is justified in soro humano? It may be Mr. K. hath respect to the justification of Conscience: But doth he think that there are not extrinsick efficienrs, that do more properly and more nobly justifie then our consciences do? Then let man be his own pardoner and justifier, and be prefer­red before the bloud of Christ, the Law, the Advoeate, and the Judge of Be­lievers. I think it is no disparagement to our Glorious Judge, that he will justi­fie us extrinsecally. Conscience which justifieth (in some sense) intrinsecally, doth it by so low an Act, by so small Authority, that it is very doubtfull whether it be fit to call that Act either Constitutive or sentential Justi­fying, so great is the Impropriety: (Of which I have spoke more fully elswhere.)

If Mr. K. had named some of those Metaphysical Rabbies, and been guilty of naming as it were the Chapter and Verse (of which crime he accuseth me) I should the better have known whether he say true or false, when he tels us that they would say the Covenant justifieth aptitudinaliter, and not by any act. Its true that the Covenant justifieth, Ʋt signum voluntatis Divinae per hoc Peccata re­mittentis: And had he said that it is Signum Aptitudinale to men before they be­lieve, and Signam Actuale after, there had been some sense in his words, though yet they had been defective of Truth or Fitness: For they are signum actuale to mil­lions of the unjustified, though not signum actualiter Justificans. But it is Believers that are actually justified, of whom he speaks expresly: and therefore he hath some other meaning, what ever it is.

Yet if Mr K. had denied to the Covenant in justifying, a proper Physical act only, we were agreed; But he denieth [an improper moral action] as he tels me, I mince it: which if I should do, I should expect to be told, that I were a very singular man indeed: For I doubt not but this Learned man hath read many a large Volume of Politicks, and particularly de Legibus, and there read their Dis­courses de Legum acttonibus, viz. praecipere, prohibere, praemiare, punire: I doubt not but he hath read many a large Volume of the Civil Law in special, and there­in of the Nature of Obligations of all sorts: (For I would not suppose him de­fective in his reading of any thing.) And after all this for so Orthodox a man to deny [a Moral improper action] to Gods Laws, and so to all Laws, and [Page 102] therein differ from all the Lawyers and Divines that ever the world knew (so farre as I can learn) is singularity indeed! Yea and never yet to write one Volume of his Reasons against all the world, that we might be undeceived? Seriously I wonder what he thinks of Gods Laws, Covenants, Promises, Testament, and how he preacheth them, yea or believeth them, or what work they have on his soul, who takes them to have no Moral improper Action? I should think such a merus Physicus were a strange man to make a Divine. But let us hear his reason: [For Foedus non facit justum of it self, but it must be beholden to many interveni­ent Causes] Reply. 1. It seems to be here granted that Foedus facit justum inter­venientibus alijs Causis: And if so, it is an efficient; and if so it hath some kinde of Action. 2. Negatur sequela: What if the Covenant justifie not nisi intervenientibus aliis quibusdam Causis? Doth it thence follow that it hath no moral Action? And we must speak non sense to say, that it justifieth but Aptitudinaliter? 3. I deny that there is any other Cause doth intervene between the Covenant, and the Effect. A Condition on mans part must be performed before the Law or Covenant of Grace will Actu Causare, i. e. Justificare. And this Condition hath its Causes: But Remission and Justification have no intervening Causes.

I have in Answer to other Reverend Brethren so fully and distinctly laid down my own thoughts of this whole business, viz. of the several sorts of Righteous­ness, and of the nature of each, and the Causes, that I will suppose I may be excused that I do it not here. Only I may tell Mr. K. that I take Righteousness as now in Question, to be a Relation (whether predicamental or Transcendental, we will not now dispute; but I suppose it is the later.) And as Relation is so small or low a Being, that it is by some reckoned between Ens & Nihil, so the way of its production must be answerable; and must be by as low a kinde of Action. Yet if it have any kinde of Being at all, it must have some Cause, and tha [...] must have some Action. And therefore Rabbi Keckerman saith, Fundamentum idem sig­nificat quod Efficiens; Terminus idem quod finis. I suppose Mr. K. will acknowledge the Causation of procatarcktick Causes, objectum, occasio, meritum: and yet will finde these efficients to have but an improper Action (at least some of them) as well the Fundamentum hath in causing a Relation. Besides all this, it is found no easie matter to reduce all Politicall Notions to the Notions of Logick or Metaphysicks; and some think that when we speak of Politicks, we must speak in the terms of Politicks, and that it is an unfit or impossible attempt to speak there in the strict language of Logicians, though I am not of their minde in the later.

But suppose that I had granted all that Mr. K. hath hitherto said: What is it to that which he shou [...]d prove? He undertakes to prove, 1. That the Covenants Action (as I call it) is [an odde, empty, Moral Action] and so cannot make this Effect: But he hath not yet proved, that the Relation of our Righteousness may not Result from the Covenant as its Fundamentum, though without a proper Action; as soon as the Condition is performed on our parts to make us fit Sub­jects. 2. He undertakes to prove, that [by the Promulgation of this Covenant God doth as improperly give us the Righteousness of Christ, and disable the Law to condemn us, because all here spoken of Actions, is but of Actions improperly so called] But doth he indeed think that Legislation, or Promulgation, or Cove­nant making is but Improperly called Action? If he do, I will not waste time in such a work as the Confuting him is.

Lastly, If his Argument be good [We are not properly justified by an Action improperly called Action: But the Action of the Covenant is Improperly called Action: Therefore, &c.] then it will follow that we are not properly Justified by any Action of God. For it is generally held, that [Action] is not properly ap­plied to God, but Analogically, and after the manner of the creature. I think this first Argument of Mr. K. deserves no more answer.

§. 36.

Mr. K. 2. GOd is not properly sate to Justifie us by this transient Act of the Cove­nant: For either he Justifies all, or only some. Not all: for all I hope are not justified: not some more then others; for the N [...]w Covenant makes no difference of it self: and so God justifieth none by it.

§. 36.

R. B. 1. EIther you mean, that [it is not by the Transient act Alone that God Justifies] or [not by it at all.] If the former, I confesse it, because the Moral Act which followeth doth intervene to the production of the Effect. It is not by the transient Act of Generation alone, that Pater causat filiationem. But it seems you take it in the later sense, and so it is false. Though the Fundamentum do suo modo Causare Relationem, idque immediate, yet that Act which Causeth the Fundamentum, doth properly Cause the Relati­on too.

2. I seriously profess that it seems to me a very sad Case, that any man that is called a Divine, or a Christian should argue, and that so weakly, and so wilfully against all the efficacy of Gods Testament, Law or Covenant in conveying to us the saving Relative benefits of Christ! If it were only (as some Divines that I deal with) that he acknowledged the thing, and denied onely the fitness of the Name of Justifying to the Act of the Covenant, it were a smaller matter: But it is Remission of sin it self; the giving us Christs Righteousness, the disabling the Law to condemn us, that he speaks of, as you may see before: and so he here dares to conclude, That God justifies none by it. To this lamentable Dilemma here brought for proof, I say, 1. Conditionally God Justifieth All by his Cove­nant, at least All to whom it is Revealed. Actually he Justifieth only them that have the Condition. I oppose Actually to Conditionally, because that while it is but Conditional, it is not Actual in Law sense, that is, Effectual, though it is in Actu, so farre done as it is: And indeed it is not in strict sense that a man is cal­led, Justified, while it is but Conditional: though yet it is a common phrase, because the Agent hath done it quantum in se, when the Condition is but Accep­tance. 2. God doth Justifie some more then others by his Covenant, viz. Be­lievers more then Unbelievers: This me thinks a Divine should not have denied. But he hath reason for his denial: and what's that? Why, he saith [for the New Covenant makes no difference of it self.] A strong Reason: It doth it not of it self: Therefore it doth it not at all. But I Reply: There is a two-fold difference made between men in these spiritual changes. The first is Real, when one that was an Infidel is made a Believer: and this is done by the Spirit and Word ordi­narily; and it is but to prepare men to be fit objects for the justifying Act: The second is Relative, when we are Pardoned, Justified, Adopted, and have a Right [Page 104] given us to other Benefits: This difference the Covenant makes of it self, the former preparatory difference being before made. To say, the Cove­nant makes not the first Real difference; Therefore it makes no difference, is ill arguing.

I would desire the Reader to try how Mr. K's argument will fit the Laws or Conveyances of men. If a Parent bequeath to each of his children an hundred pound on Condition they marry, to become due at the day of Marriage; accord­ing to Mr. K. you may argue thus: Either this Testament Giveth the Legacy to All, or to None: Not to All, if All marry not: Not to some above others: for the Testament of it self makes no difference: Therefore it Giveth it to none. Or if a King give out a Pardon, or passe an Act of Pardon or Oblivion for all Traitors that are up in arms against him, on Condition that they lay down arms, and Accept the pardon: Mr. K. would argue, it seems thus: Either this Act pardoneth All, or Some: Not All: for All will not lay down Armes, and Accept it: Not Some onely; for the act makes no difference of it self: Therefore it pardoneth none. See what an Interpreters hand the Gospel is fallen into at Blisland!

§. 37.

Mr. K. 3. MAn shall properly be said to Justifie himself (a thing which Mr. Baxter looks on, as well he may, as Monstrum horendum) For where there is a promise of a reward made to All, upon a Condition of performing such a service, he that obtains the reward, gets it by his own service; without which the promise would have brought him never the nearer to the reward: and thus a man wisely Justifies himself by Believing, and more a great deal then God doth Justifie him by his Promulgation of the New Covenant, which would have left him in his old Condi­tion had he not better provided for himself by Believing, then the Covenant did by Promising.

§. 37.

R. B. O How much have I been too blame, in my indignation against poor ignorant Christians, for taking up the absurdest Antinomian fancies so easily! When even such Divines as this shall use such reasoning as I here finde!

1. I deny the Consequence, as being verba somniantis.

2. I think, I shall anon shew, that himself is undeniably guilty of this Con­sequence, which here is called Monstrum horrendum.

3. For his reason, 1. Its pity that he cannot distinguish between a Cause and a meer Condition: Where he saith [he that obtains the reward gets it by his ser­vice] I say, it is here By it, as by a Condition sine qua non, but not By it, as by a Cause. 2. And its pity that any Divine should not distinguish between service and service. There is a service which is operari, or some way profitable to him that we perform it to; which therefore may oblige by commutative Justice to re­ward us: and here the Reward is not of Grace, but Debt; and the Work is a Meritorious Cause, properly so called. There is a Work which is a Means of Moral-natural Necessity (on terms of Reason and common honesty) to our or­derly participation of a Benefit freely Given: As if a Traitor shall have a par­don [Page 105] on Condition he will Accept it, and come in: Or as if a Woman▪ Traitor should not only have pardon and life, but also be Princess, on condition she will marry the Kings son, that hath Ransomed her. Here the act may improperly be called service, because Commanded: but properly and in its principal Considera­tion, it is a necessary reasonable means, to her own happiness: And this act is but a meer Condition sine qua non, of her Pardon and Dignity, and no proper Merito­rious, or efficient Cause.

4. What a dangerous reasoning is this, to [...]each men proudly to thank them­selves for their pardon and happiness, and deny God the thanks! To say [Gods promise would have brought me never the nearer the reward, had not I believed: and I did a great deal more to Justifie my self by Believing then God did by his Covenant.]

5. Nay, I would desire the Reader to observe, what shift Mr. K. hath left for himself to disclaim this wicked Conclusion: Is there any of the Premises which he doth not own? 1. I hope he will not deny but the Promise of pardon and sal­vation is made to all that hear it, on Condition, they will Repent and Believe: 2. If he regard not better proof, I hope he will believe Dr. Twiss (so oft repeat­ing it) that salvation is given per modum praemii. 3. I hope he believes, that without believing, the Covenant would not have brought him to salvation. Must not this man then conclude on his own principles, that [he wisely justifies him­self by believing? and more a great deal then God doth justifie him by his pro­mulgation of the new Covenant, which would have left him in his old Conditi­on, had he not better provided for himself by Believing, then the Covenant did by promising.] I am loth to give those words so bad an Epithete as is their due. Why may not any Traitor say the like that Receives a free pardon? Or a beggar that Receives a free alms, when Receiving or Accepting is the Condition sine qua non of their attaining and possessing it?

6. The Gospel hath a promise of Faith it self to some: and this Faith is Caused by the holy Ghost: Therefore it is still God that provideth for the Elect, better then they provide for themselves, howsoever such disputers may talk. But we must not therefore confound the nature of Gods Gifts, nor their Causes or way of production. The Spirit gives us Faith first, which is our Condition, and makes us capable objects or subjects of Justification: which being done, the new Law of Grace doth immediately Pardon, Justifie and Adopt us: which way then doth Mr. K's desperate consequence follow? Or what shew of ground hath it? It seems if this man had forfeited his life, if a pardon were offered him but on Con­dition that he would Take it, and say, I thank you; he would say, he did a great deal more to his own pardon by Thanks and Acceptance, then the King that granted it, did by his Grant; because the Grant would have left him in the old Condition, had he not better provided for himself by Thankfull Acceptance, then the King did by his Pardon.] Yea and in our Case the Acceptance is Given too, though another way. I confess my detestation of this disputing, is beyond my expression.

Zanchy in 1 Joh. 1. loc. de Remiss. p. 41, 42. saith, Baptism is not perpetually a vi­sible Instrument by which Remission is offered [Verbum autem perpetuò est tale In­strumentum▪ Verbum ergo non B [...]ptismus, est illud proprium & perpetuum instrumentum per quod perpetuo p [...]ccatorum remissio nobis offertur & donatur (so multitudes more) And in compend. Theol. p. 764. Per Evangelium Deus gratis Justificat.

§. 38.

Mr. K. ITs clear in this case of the New Covenant, as in that of the Old: The Cove­nant ran, In the day thou [...]atest thereof, thou shalt die: This was Gods Threat▪ I pray who brought death into the world, God or Adam? Just so in the New Covenant, Believe and be Justified: Who justifies the Believer, God or himself?

Turpe est doctori cum culp [...] redarguit ipsum.

§. 38.

R. B. NEver let any cause be thought so bad, but that it may have the greatest confidence to credit it with the world. [Its clear] saith Mr. K. in the beginning, and with his proverbiall Poetry, he trium­phantly concludes. But if ever man met with weaker grounds of such tri­umph and confidence, in a man of such learning, he is of larger experience then I am.

1. To his first Question, I R [...]ply: Adam brought death into the world as the Deserver, God as the Legislator, making it Due to him, if he sinned, and as the Judge, sentencing him to it for sin; and as the principal Cause of the Execution. But Adam was the culpable Cause.

2. To his second Question, I say, God justifieth the Believer, as Legisla­tor, and as Judge, and as Rector [...]pra Leges, and as Donor or Benefactor▪ And the Believer is not so much as the Meriter of his own Justification, as Adam was of his Condemnation. Did I think that any Learned Prote­stant had not known this? That he hath his Condemnation by his Me­rit, and his Justification without his Merit, upon the performance of that Condition which is the Acceptance of Christ that hath Merited it for us? That Death is the wages of sinne, and Eternal Life the Gift of God through Je­sus Christ.

3. But again, I admire what the man means! Whether he own the wicked Conclusion [Man justifieth himself] or not? For he makes it to be the Conse­quence of this [...]enour of the Covenant [Believe and be Justified] And dare he say, that the Covenant doth not say, Believe and be Justified? Yea nevertheless, though it also give faith.

§. 39.

Mr. K. THat first born of Abominations in Mr. Good wins phrase is unluckily laid at Mr. Baxt [...]rs own door; and it may appear it is not wrongfully fathered upon him, by that very argument which be undertakes to answer, and doth well enough for so much as is exprest, but there is more implied in it.

§. 39.

R. B. 1. [UNluckily] must be interpreted [by false accusation] I expect to have such unlucky hands lay more such abominations at my door.

2. Mr. K. confesseth, that I well enough answer the Argument for so much as [Page 107] is exprest: And let the Reader well observe what the implied addition is that he makes.

§. 40.

Mr. K. THat the Promulgation of the New Covenant was from the beginning▪ Many men shall not be Justified till towards the end of the World: No man till a long time after the Promulgation: Therefore not so much by Gods Pro­mulgation of the Covenant, as the man covenanter his performing the Condition, which is the Immediate Cause of it, and therefore he justifies himself, and that more then God in the New Covenant.

§. 40.

R. B. 1. VVHat is here added as implied to that which he confesseth, that I well enough answered? Let him tell that can.

2. How can he prove that Adam was not justified till a long time after the Pro­mulgation of the New Covenant? A bold assertion, me thinks.

3. The Consequence is a putid non-sequitur: What shew doth the man bring to make any man believe his Consequence, but the bare Credit of his own word?

4. What a strait doth this Disputer bring himself into? He must either say▪ that the Gospel or New Covenant doth not promise Pardon and Justification on Condition of Believing. (And is he fit to preach the Gospel that would deny so great a part of it.) Or else he must hold his wicked Conclusion, That man ju­stifieth himself, and that more then God in the Covenant. And for ought I can understand by him he means to own one of these.

5. The ground of all this rotten doctrine, is another notorious errour here ex­pressed, viz. That [mans performing the Condition is the Immediate Cause of his Justification:] when it is properly no Cause at all. A Condition may some­time be also a Moral Cause, i. e. when there is somewhat in the excellency or na­ture of the thing Conditioned, to move the principal Causer: But such a Condi­tion as is purposely chosen for the abasing of man, and the honour of free Grace, and consisteth but either in Accepting a free Gift, or in not rejecting it again, or not spitting in the face of the Giver, this is no Cause, but sine qua non. It seems, this Learned man hath too arrogant thoughts of his own faith, as if it were the Immediate Cause of his Justification, and so he justified himself more then God by his Covenant.

§. 41.

Mr. K. AS for instance: There was a Law made in Queen Elizabeths time, That every English man having taken Orders in the Romish Church, coming into England, shall suffer as a Traitor: That English man, which having taken Orders in the Romish Church, comes now into England, and is condemned, hath not so much reason to charge his condemnation on the Queen, as himself.

§. 41.

R. B. THat is because he is the culpable meriting Cause. Are we the Deservers of pardon?

§. 42.

Mr. K. THe Law condemns him; but she doth not who made the Law, who died many years since: yea the Judge who pronounceth the sentence doth not so properly do it as the Seminary himself: No nor the Law, as the Priest himself; who had he been minded to have secured himself, might have done it at his pleasure, stayed at Rheines or Doway, and condemned the Law of Tyranny; yea and avoucht all those that suffered by it as Traytors to be really Martyrs. The case is the same, though in a different matter.

§. 42.

R. B. 1. YOu confess here that the Law condemneth: and then no doubt it justifieth too.

2. Where you say, [Shee doth not that made the Law] I say, that is because the Law doth operate or cause, as it is a sign of the Will of the Rector, to consti­tute that Jus which he had power to constitute. Now when the Queen and Par­liament were dead, they had no power to oblige them that should live after them, much less if contrary to the Will of their successors: Nor yet had they power while they were alive, so to binde posterity. The Laws therefore were divolved into other hands, and now bindes as signum voluntatis Rectoris jam existentis: For it is his will that it should continue; and that will animates it: Yet where any hath power, the signs of their will may be effectual when they are dead: Or else Testaments were little worth, and Legataries were in an ill case. But whats this to our case? God dieth not, and the Laws of his Kingdom lose not their force, nor change their Master, by the change of Governours. But if you had dealt in­genuously, you should rather have enquired, whether the present Rector and Master of the Law, may be said to condemn him that the Law condemns. And that methinks you should not deny. Yea, and it may be said that dead Ly­curgus was a cause of the condemnation of surviving offendors, for all your bare deniall.

3. Where you say that [the Judge who pronounceth the sentence doth not so properly condemn him, as the Seminary himself.] Seeing you yield that both condemn him, the Judge Sententially, and himself Meritoriously, and the que­stion is but of the greater or less propriety in the word [Condemn] I think it not worth the contending about. Yet Appello Jurisconsultos: and if they say not that it is a more proper speech to say [The Judge condemneth him] then to say [He condemned himself by breaking the Law] then I am content the next time its acted to take Ignoramus his part, and confess that I know little of the Lawyers language. Indeed I still say it is the offendour that is the culpable cause. Where you say that the case is here the same: I answer, then it seems you think you de­serve a Pardon, as a thief deserves the Gallows. I durst not have called these cases the same.

§. 43.

Mr. K. IN a like matter take it thus. A man is found guilty of a felony; the Law saith, He shall be saved if he shall reade: he reads and is saved: Gramercy, saith he, to my Reading more then to the courtesie of the Law: and though he acknowledge pro forma that it is the courtesie and grace of the State to him, yet as the bad English man, God bless her Father and Mother that taught her to reade, else the Law would have been severe enough; he may be said to have saved himself.

§. 43.

R. B. 1. YOu say, [It is a like matter.] But you say so much and prove so little, that you lose much of your labour, as to me. It is not a like matter. The Law for saving him that reads ut Clericus, was made partly to spare Learned men, because the Prince or Commonwealth hath need of them, and su­staineth a greater loss in the death of such then of the unlearned; and partly in a respect to the worth of their Learning, if not with some special indulgence to the Clergy for their Office, and to please the Pope. But Gods Law of Grace pardoning a penitent, gracefull Believer, hath no such intent: God needs not us, as the Commonwealth needs the Learned. Besides the Law hath laid the con­dition of escape in intellectual Abilities, without any Moral respect to the virtue of the party: but God hath laid it more in the meer consent of the Will▪

2. But if you will interpret the Law of the Land otherwise, as if it were an act of purest grace, then I say, your Client with his Gramercy is an ungrate­full fellow, and your bad Englishman, is the picture of a bad Christian, indeed no Christian: But by your speeches I perceive that about these matters experience is a great advantage to the right understanding of the Truth; by the means whereof many an unlearned Christian knows more then some Learned Disputers. He that hath felt what it is to be condemned by the Law, and afterward pardon­ed by the Gospel, and put into a state of salvation by Christ, doth not say as Mr. K. that he is more beholden to his believing then to Gods promise, but hear­tily ascribeth all to God. Faith is the act of an humbled soul accepting of Christ as he is offered in the Gospel. And can any humbled soul give thanks to his own Acceptance, more then to Gods Gift? yea when the power and act of Accepting is his Gift also? If Mr. K. have an imagination that in every conditional Dona­tion, there is more thanks due to the performer of the condition then to the giver, I dare say, he is an ungratefull person to God and men. If his father leave him all his Estate on condition he give a younger Brother 6^d out of it, or that he give 6^d to the poor; it seems he will more thank himself then his father. If he had forfeited his life, and a pardon were given him, on condition he would Accept it thankfully and humbly on his knees, and that he would not spit in the face of him that giveth it, nor seek his death, he would give the chiefest thanks to himself. As for the phrase of [saving himself] he knows it is the Scripture phrase, 1 Tim. [...]. last▪ though pardoning our selves be not.

§. 44.

Mr. K. YEa Mr. Baxter expresseth somewhat in his answer which makes up full mea­sure of evidence against him. He saith, The condition being performed, the Conditionall grant becomes absolute. Ergo, say I▪ He that performs the Condition, makes the grant to be absolute, and so doth more to his Justification then God, who made only a Conditionall grant, and which notwithstanding he might have perisht, yea must without his own act of believing. And truly whoever makes faith the Condition of th [...] New Covenant in such a sense as full obedience was the Condition of the Old, cannot avoid it, but that man is justified chiefly by himself, his own acts, not so much by Gods grace in imputing Christs Righteousness, but more by his own faith, which I hope is his own act, though Gods work.

§. 44.

R. B. 1. ALl's clear against me, if you be Judge; but the whole charge de­pends but on the credit of your bare word. That [Ergo, say I] is the strong proof. Your consequence is none, but a meer fiction. By [Absolute] I mean, it actually conferres without any further Condition, when all the Con­dition is performed. Its a hard case that a man so Learned in his own eyes should be ignorant what a Condition is, in sensu Civili, vel Legali. Were you not so, you would not still make it a cause; when (unless somewhat beyond the meer nature of a Condition be added) it is no cause at all. It is false therefore that the performer in our case makes the grant to be Absolute, if by making, you mean causing, as you before express your self, it is only a performing that, sine qua Do­natio non erit Actualis vel Absoluta. It is the Donor (yea though he were dead before) that makes the Conditional grant become Actual or Absolute when the Condition is performed. And if it still stick in your stomack, that he performeth no new act to do this; I answer, it needs not: the first act of making his Testa­ment, Deed of gift, Contract, Law, &c. doth all this. The Law or other in­strument, is but the signifier of his Will, and therefore conveyeth when and on what terms he will (in a case within his power.) If it be his will that this In­strument shall Jus conferre presently and absolutely, it doth it: If but in dicu and absolutely, it doth it: If sub conditione, it doth it: and in both the last cases, its his will that the Instrument shall give no Actual Right till the day come, or till the Condition be performed▪ so that a Condition is no true cause of the effect: the non-performance of it suspendeth the act of the grant, but the performance doth not cause it; unless you mean it of a causa fatua, which doth but removere impedi­mentum; so that if the Day be twenty years after the Testators death, that the Legacy becomes due, or if the Condition be so long after performed, it is the will of the Donor that maketh that Instrument then convey Right, which did not be­fore; because it works only significando voluntatem Donatoris, and so when and how he expressed his will it should work. Would one think such trivial obvious points should be unknown to Mr. K.?

2. Where you talk of [faith being a condition of the New Covenant in the same sense as full Obedience of the Old.] I say your words [in the same sense] are ambiguous: Quoad rationem formalem Conditionis in genere, it is in the same sense a Condition. But it is not a Condition of the same species. It differs in the [Page 111] matter; one being the humble thankfull Acceptance of Christ and Life freely restored and given; the other being a perfect fulfilling of a perfect Law: the ends are different: One is to obtain part in Life purchased by Christ, when we wer [...] undone by sin: the other to maintain continued interest in the felicity first given by the Creator: One is to abase the sinner by self-deniall, and to extoll Free­grace; the other was to obtain the Reward in a way as honourable to man, as he was capable of. More differences might easily be added.

3. Let the Reader mark what our Question was [Whether God Pardon or Justifie us by the Covenant grant?] and whether Mr. K. hath now carried it? It was all this while maintained, that the performer of the Condition, is not Justified so much by the Covenant as by himself: Now it is come to these terms: [Not so much by Gods Grace in Imputing Christs Righteousness, but more by his own faith.] He seems to me to yield, that we are as sure­ly Justified by the Covenant, as by Gods Grace imputing Christs Righte­ousness.

§. 45.

Mr. K. YEt say I against Mr. Baxter 2. That faith is the Real effect which God works, by a Transient act on a person whom he justifies.

§. 45.

R. B. YOu are resolved, it seems, it shall be against Mr. Baxter whatever you say. But what Rational Animal besides your self can tell how this is against me? If it be against me, its either Directly or Consequentially. If Di­rectly, then I have somewhere denied it, or spoke the contrary: Shew where and shame me. If Consequentially, why is there no hint given us which way it makes against me? or against what opinion or words of mine? It seems it was intenti­onally against me, not against my Doctrine but Me: Your minde may be against me, but Truth is not against me.

§. 46.

Mr. K. THat faith is a Reall effect, others will admit without proving: Mr. Bax­ter who denies faculties and habits distinct from the soul, may be forced to yield it by this Argument. If faith be not a Reall effect on the soul, then neither is any other grace, for all flow from faith, and consequently no reall alteration wrought in Sanctification, and consequently no sanctified soul Really differs from her self when unsanctified, no nor more then numero from unsanctified worldlings; they are all alike. Taking it then that faith is a Real effect: 2. It is acknowledged it is wrought by God, and that not of our selves, it is the gift of God. And 3. that it is wrought by a transient act, as being a Reall effect by God in subjecto extraneo. Let us see now how by this transient act whereby God works saith, he may truly be said to justifie us in time as he decreed from eternity?

§. 46.

R. B. 1. THe man would have his Reader believe that I must be forced by his Arguments to confess faith to be a real effect. 2. Till he prove it, I will take it for a meer slander, that I deny Faculties and Habits distinct from the soul. 1. I said I thought [it would not be proved,] but I rose not to the confidence of a flat deniall; as knowing what is said on both sides. 2. What was it that I said would not be proved? That the faculties were not Really distinct from the soul or one another: but not that they were not distinct, as Mr. K. saith. They may be distinct modally or formally, though not ut Res & Res. 3. When did I say this of Habits, as Mr. K. affirmeth? But I will hereafter expect no more truth from him, even in matters of fact, then according to the proportion of the foregoing dispute. 4. To the point it self I say, we must distinguish of Reality: If you oppose Real either to Feigned, or Privative, or Negative, or Potential, or to an extrinsecall denomination, or to meerly Relative, so its out of doubt that faith and all graces in the act and habit are Real effects. But if by Real you mean more then a distinction formall, or Ratione Ratiocinata, or Modal, I will neither affirm nor deny it, till I better understand it: You that know so well the nature of the Immanent acts of God, may a thousand times more easily know the nature of the Immanent acts and habits of man: but I confess exceed­ing great ignorance of both: and to tell you my opinions of these things would be but vain and unseasonable. 5. Your last words contain the mystery, that by [that transient act whereby God worketh faith, he may be said to Ju­stifie;] we shall have good stuff, I think, when this mystery comes to be o­pened.

§. 47.

Mr. K. M^r Baxter objects against faiths being an instrument of our Justification: and that it is neither mans nor Gods instrument. I shall make it appear to be both Gods and mans in some sense, though in different respects, notwithstanding all he hath said to the contrary. Saith he, If faith be an Instrument of our Justification, it is the Instrument of God or man: not of man; for man is not the principall efficient, he doth not justifie himself. I Answer 1. According to his doctrine, man doth justifie himself, ut supra. 2. That man is not the principall efficient of his saith, more then of his Justi­fication; it is God who must have that honour. 3. That man doth receive his Justifi­cation by faith as an Instrument, as shall be shewed hereafter.

§. 47.

R. B. THis quarrelsome man wanting work, had a minde to take in this Con­troversie also, about faiths Instrumentality in Justifying: but what an unhandsome Transition he makes to draw it in, may be easily discerned. Let the Reader remember, that the thing which I deny is, that faith is an Instrument [Page 113] in the strict Logical sense, that is, an Instrumental efficient cause of our Justi­fication: and that I expresly disclaim contending de nomine, or contradicting any that only use the word Instrument in an improper larger sense, as Mechanicks and Rhetoricians do: so that the Question is de re, whether it efficiently cause our Justification as an Instrument? This I deny. And to his triple Answer I Reply. 1. The first is of the old stamp; a gross untruth, needing no other reply then a deniall. 2. The second if it be sense, implieth the deniall of this maxime, that [Instrumentum est efficientis principalis Instrumentum] and thence inferreth, that [as man may be his own Instrument in effecting faith, though he be not the prin­cipall cause, so may he be in Justification of himself.] If this be not the sense of it (if contradictions may be called sense) then I cannot understand it. But the denied maxime needs no proof: that man is his own Instrument in effecting his faith, needs no more then a deniall to disprove it (speaking thus de homine, and not de parte aliqua hominis organicâ.) That man is not causa principalis in beleeving, is untrue; though God be Causa prima: May none but the Causa prima be called Causa principalis? then no creature is capable of using an Instrument. 3. His third must be considered when we come to the fuller proof which he referres us to.

§. 48.

Mr. K. BƲt when he saith, Faith is not Gods Instrument, 1. I do not say it is pro­perly, but it is his work, and by giving us faith he justifies us, as shall be shewed anon, he giving us that which is our Instrument, whereby we receive the Righte­ousness of Christ.

§. 48.

R. B. 1. EVennow he undertook to prove it Gods Instrument, but now, he doth not say it is properly: and I will not contend against an improper term, when the thing is disclaimed. 2. Here is another touch upon the mystery, that [by giving us faith he justifies us] but we shall be shewed it anon: therefore I must not overhastily anticipate it.

§. 49.

Mr. K. 2. BƲt it is as much his Instrument as the new Covenant is: for faith work­ing in my heart, is that whereby God pronounceth the New Covenant to be of benefit to me for my Justification.

§. 49.

R. B. 1. IF the New Covenant be properly Gods Instrument, and faith be not, then faith is not as much his Instrument as the New Covenant: But the Antecedent is true: Therefore, &c. The second member of the Antecedent Mr. K. now yielded. For the first I will appeal to all Lawyers and Politicians, or any that understands what an Instrument is, what Civil commerce is, and what a Law or any Contract is, whether a Deed of gift, a Testament, or a Law be not as proper Instruments conferendi Jus, constituendi Debitum, as is imaginable, [Page 114] or as the nature of the thing constituted or conferred (Debitum) is capable of. In the mean time, I leave Mr. K. to examine it, by the common Canons and pro­perties of an Instrument. 2. Faith is not [Gods pronouncing,] but your belief of what he pronounceth, and Acceptance of what he offers: Will you confound faith with its object? Divine Testimony is the object of faith, and you make it faith it self. 3. I know the Antinomians take faith to be [the belief of our Ju­stification: or the perswasion or apprehension of Gods love to me in special,] but so do not our modern Protestants. 4. If this be true doctrine, then wo to poor Christians that have no Assurance of their Justification: and then, how few have faith? For I think it is comparatively but a small number that have felt God pro­nouncing in their hearts, that the Covenant is of benefit to their own particular Justification: except by the term [of benefit] be meant, a conditional Justifica­tion, or a tendency or means towards their Justification; and so even ungodly men may know that it's [of benefit] to them for Justification (as Mr. K. phra­seth it.) 5. Doth not Mr. K. shew here that the Truth sticks in his minde, and that he is fain to hide it in ambiguous terms. What can he mean by this saying [God pronounceth the New Covenant to be of benefit to me for my Justificati­on] but this [That the New Covenant justifieth me?] He would not openly tell us which way it benefiteth him to Justification, and yet be no efficient instru­mentall cause of it.

§. 50.

Mr. K. ANd 3. it may be Gods Instrument notwithstanding his Argument: whereof the first is [for it is not God that believeth] nor needs it, say I: it is e­nough that God maketh me believe, and so receive the Righteousness of Christ: yea God by making me believe gives me an hand wherewith to receive, opens my hand whereby I receive it: I alone receive, but these are Gods acts, and though God be not said to be­lieve, he truly may be said to be the Authour of my belief; my belief is an immauent act in me, and so denominates me the believer, a transient act as from God, and denominates him only the Authour of my believing: in me it is an adjunct, it hath to him only the re­lation of an effect. For example, I throw a bowl: the motion of this bowl is more from me then the bowl, and I accordingly am said to have bowled well or ill: but the motion doth not denominate me otherwise then in the Agent, not the subject; and though I be said to bowl well, the bowl in this case is only said to run, not I. So the chief Authour of my Believing is God, and he must have the glory of turning and framing and upholding and working all in my heart, as being the Authour, Preserver and Finisher of my faith, yet I alonc am said to believe, not God; though my faith be more properly Gods work, then it is my own: had not he begun it in me, I had no more believed in Christ, then the bowl would have run to the mark of it self; all the progress of my faith is from him, and to him be all the glory.

§. 50.

R. B. 1. NOne of all this is brought against my Conclusion, for he yieldeth that; (that our faith is not properly Gods Instrument in justifying) but it is to shew the strength of his wit against my mediums. If he yield it to be the truth which I maintain, the matter is the less if I fail in proving it: Or if one medium be defective, it is little matter, if the rest, or any one suffice. 2. What [Page 115] hath he said in all these words, more then what I said in those few words which he opposeth, viz. [It is not God that Believeth, though its true he is the first Cause of all Actions.] Is not this the full substance of his speech? 3. All his words seem to tend but to prove that God may be said to be the principal Cause of our faith, and it to be his act: but what's that to its instrumentality in justify­ing. 4. I intended this first Proposition, chiefly as preparatory to the rest, ra­ther then as a full proof of the Conclusion by it self. Perhaps we may give him some plainer Argument anon, when he hath done with these.

§. 51.

Mr. K. Mr. Baxters second Argument to prove it, not Gods Instrument that man is Causa secunda between God and the Action, and so still said to justifie himself. I answer, 1. Man is indeed Causa secunda, but not between God and the Action, for God doth immediately concurre to it, and man is in regard of the habit of faith purely passive, not active at all, for that though other habits may be acquired, faith is infused both for the effence and degree. 2. Man may not be said by his believing to justi­fie himself, but to Believe to his Justification, and to receive Justification by believing, for that by faith, as it is Gods work, God doth justifie him, viz. declares hereby the Righteous­nesse of Christ to be his own; he doth apprehend or receive the Righteousness of Christ by believing, as it is his own act, whereof still he is the Subject, not the Author, as the Bowl is of it running.

§. 51.

R. B. 1. VVHether God concurre Immediately to all humane actions, I have no minde to dispute: If Mr. K. want work on that sub­ject, he may answer Ludov. a Dola. But it sufficeth me that man also is an Im­mediate Cause of his Believing. 2. Whether man be Passive or not in receiving the habit, is nothing, that I know of, to the matter; as long as the act which ju­stifieth is immediately by him. 3. It is a great uncertainty which you affirm so confidently. You know not but that the Spirit of God by the Word, may excite an act of faith before he infuse a habit, and by that act (or more) produce a ha­bit. 4. And so the habit may be said to be Infused as from God, and acquired by man too: and it is commonly granted, that Infused habits are attained secundum modum acquisitorum.

To the second Answer, I say, 1. For your Receiving Instrument, we shall speak to it anon. 2. Si fides efficit Justificationem, tum Credens per fidem ef­ficit Iustificationem: At fides si modò Instrumentum Iustificationis est, Iustificationem efficit: Ergo, &c. The major is evident, in that man is the immediate proper Cause of the act, therefore if the act doth it, the Agent by that act doth it. The Instrument is his that immediately and properly useth it. The minor is undeniable, speaking of a true instrumental Cause: For there is no instrumental Cause in any kinde, but of efficients.

2. A hint I perceive more here of your opinion, what is Gods justifying act, viz. Working faith in us: but I will wait till this opinion dare come into the light.

3. I perceive also here what you take Justification to be, viz. [declaring Christs [Page 116] Righteousness to be his own] Right Antinomianism. 1. Will you tell us whe­ther [Declaring Christs Righteousness to be mine] do not suppose it to be first mine? Else it is the Declaring of an untruth. And if it were mine before, was not I just before? and so constitutivè justified? 2. Why did you not tell us when and how that was done? And what was the act whereby God did constitute me just? Which is first to be known, and which you knew that I was speaking of. 3. Where, and to whom is it that [God declares this] you speak of? Onely in Conscience, and not to others, no doubt. But I doubt not fully to shame (in due place) this Antinomian fancy, that Justification by faith (in Scripture sense) is but Justification in Conscience. 4. Many a soul hath justifying faith (of As­sent and Consent) who yet doth not believe that Christs Righteousness is their own. 5. May not other Graces declare Christs Righteousness to be ours? (I know not whether it be sano sensu that you speak of Christs Righteousness being made ours, but I will not digresse to enquire further into it now.) 6. You do strangely affirm, that man is not the author of his own act (whether he be the subject, I referre to what is said:) If by the Author, you mean, not the perswa­der, but the Agent, the vital, voluntary self-determiner, then he is the Author; or else I could tell you of such unavoidable consequents, as you will be ashamed to own. If you be indeed one of those that think man a free Agent, is no more the author of his own acts, then your Bowl is, I shall fear, lest you will think your self very excusable for all the evil you do, and therefore little care what you do: I shall be loath to trust a man of such principles, if his carnal interest carry him to do me a mischief. How many Philosophers or Divines are of your minde in this, that man is but the Subject and not the Authur of his own act of Be­lieving?

§. 52.

Mr. K. TO his third Argument, that the Action of the principal Cause, and of the Instrument is the same, is true, and when he asks, Who dare say that faith is so Gods Instrument? I understand not any great danger in affirming, that God giving me faith, the habit and thereby the act of believing, concurs with my faith which he hath given in enabling me to receive Christ; he gives me an hand, stretcheth it out, and opens it, and puts Christs Righteousnesse into it: Why is not my hand here his Instrument whereby he conveys Christs Righteousness to me, as well or more then my own whereby I apprehend it?

§. 52.

R. B. 1. IF it be true, that the Action of the Principal and Instrumental Cause be the same, then it unavoidably follows, that man justifi­eth and pardoneth himself, when God doth it. For then when God effecteth our Justification, Faith, which is his Instrument doth effect it too: When God forgiveth us effectivè, faith forgiveth us effectivè: and consequently the immedi­ate agent man, doth it too. 2. Again, I tell you, the place to examine your Re­ceiving Instrumentality is anon where your self hath designed it. I may not an­ticipate you.

§. 53.

Mr. K. ANd whereas he saith, Fourthly, The Instrument hath an Influx on the effect, by a proper Causality, which who dare say of faith? I answer, 1. That it hath a proper Causality upon our Justification passively taken, that is, upon our Receiving the Righteousness of Christ. And no more need: for we make it an Instrument not to work, but to receive. But secondly, according to him it hath more then the Influx of an Instrumental, that of the principal efficient upon our Justification, as being that which makes this Conditional Grant in the Covenant to become Absolute: And all the benefit we receive by the Covenant is more to be ascribed to our faith, then Gods grace in the Cove­nant, which would have been of no advantage to us at all, had it not been that our faith came in and rendred it of use to us. Thus then we do not deprive God of his Glory in justifying us by faith, though we ascribe Justification to faith; for we ascribe our faith to God, and make our believing his work, which as it comes from him is an active declarati­on, as in us a Passive resenting of his favour to us in Christ, of which we alwayes may though we not actually assure our selves.

§. 53.

R. B. 1. REceiving is either Properly, which is alwayes Passive: Or impro­perly, morally, imputatively, which is the Consent of the will when a thing is offered, and it is active, called Receiving, because it is necessary to the Passive proper Receiving.

In the former sense, to Receive pardon and Justification is nothing but to be pardoned and justified: it is a meer Relative Reception. In the later sense, faith it self is our [Receiving] If Mr. K. mean the former, when he saith, that [faith hath a proper Causality upon it] I say, His words are scarce sense. To have [Causality upon] implieth a subject upon which there may be such Causality: But the Reception of a Relation is no such capable Subject. If he mean only [a Causality of that Reception] I say, There is no natural proper Cause of the Reception of a Relation, but that which causeth the Relation it self, by Causing its foundation: though there may be other Causes of the fitness of the Subject, yet that fitness effecteth not the Reeeption. Moral Causes there may be besides; but this is not pleaded such. An efficient Instrument of the Reception of a Relation, (that is, Justitiae, vel juris ad impunitatem) we shall believe it to be when we first finde sense, and then truth in that assertion. 2. And for the second kinde of Receiving Christs Righteousnesse, it is Faith it self. And to say, that faith hath a proper Causality on it self, is a hard saying.

Your second Answer is the meer repetition of a notorious slander, not onely unproved, but bewraying the grosse mistake of the Nature of a Le­gal Condition; as I have sufficiently shewed, and will not waste time to recite.

I conclude therefore contrary to your Conclusion, that if you make faith the proper Instrument of justifying, you make man his own pardoner, and rob God of his Soveraignty. Your reason to the contrary is such as the Papists bring to excuse their doctrine of Merit: they say, Christ hath Merited for them a power of Meriting, and so the glory redounds to him: so you say, [We ascribe our faith to God, though we ascribe Justification to faith.] But you must needs ascribe it also immediatly to your self, if you be the man that believes.

Again, you touch the way of Gods justifying darkly: [As it comes from him (you say) it is an active declaration, as in us a Passive resenting his favour to us in Christ.] But, 1. do you mean, it is a Declaration Enunciative? Or meerly signal? If the former, it is very false. To speak a Truth, and to Cause one to believe it, are not all one. If the later, then it seems you think God ju­stifies a man, every time he giveth him any Evidence of his Grace. And if so, then other Graces justifie as well as faith; and then Justification is increased upon every increase of every Grace: But more of this when you come to it of purpose.

And Passive Resenting Gods Love or Favour is an ill description of justifying faith, and not a little dangerous.

§. 54.

Mr. K. Mr. Baxter proceeds to take off an Objection. [But some would evade it thus: Faith, say they, is a Passive Instrument, not an Active] I know not who say it, nor matters it much, yea it is needless to say so: But Mr. Baxters answer to this I conceive to be very unsatisfactory: For where he saith [1. Even Passive instru­ments are said to help the Action of the principal Agent, Kecker. log. p. 131. and he that saith faith doth so, in my judgement gives too much to it] I answer, That without offence it may be said, that Faith doth help the Action of the principal Agent, i. e. God in our Justification, God doing nothing in it without faith; I speak of such as are adulti, or of years. 2. That Mr. Baxter must say so, for that according to him faith makes Gods Conditional Grant in the New Covenant to become absolute, and therefore doth the main o [...] Gods work.

§. 54.

R. B. 1. LEt it be observed that Mr. K. takes it for needlesse, to say, Faith is a Passive Instrument: and therefore he must maintain it to be an Active Instrument, or none.

2. I doubt Mr. K. would have thought me near to a Blasphemer (supposing the interest of his Cause to have carried him another way) if I had said and main­tained that mans Faith doth help the Action of God: 1. If Gods Action were ta­ken to be Causa partialis (which I think Mr. K. doth not believe it to be) yet mans Action would help to produce the Effect, only by concurring with Gods Action, but not properly, help Gods Action; for it would have no influx into it. 2. If Gods Action be Causa totalis in suo genere, and mans Action subordinate to it, much lesse can mans Action be said properly to help Gods action. 3. But the truth is in pardoning sin, and justifying us, Mans action of believing is no Cause at all, and therefore no proper Help to Gods action. God hath no need of our help to pardon our sin. The performing of our Condition by Thankfull Accep­ting Christ and Life, is no Helping Gods Action. But its strange to see how Mr. K. reels too and fro! Sometime he dare say it over and over, that if the New Covenant say [Believe and be Justified] and make our faith the Condition of our [...]ustification, then a man justifies himself by believing, and more a great [...] [...]hen God doth by the promulgation of his Covenant, and that he is justified [...] [...]y by himself and his own acts, and not so much by Gods Grace in im­ [...]g Christs Righteousness, but by his own faith.] And yet now he [Page 119] dare say, that mans Believing doth help God in Pardoning or Justify­ing him.

3. And what's his proof? Why [God doth nothing without faith.] A strange proof! So every Matter, Object, Dispositio Materiae, or Condition sine quae non, should help the Action of the Efficient. Sure Helping is acting, and therefore Effecting. So he may as well say, that the preparation of the soul for Receiving Regenerating, Sanctifying Grace, doth help the Spirits Action of in­fusing it.

4. As for his second Answer, that [I must say so too, for that according to me, faith makes Gods Conditional Grant to become absolute] I Reply, that this is an oft repeated slander of a hard fore-head, without shew of proof. If this be mine, it is either directly or consequently. If directly, let him produce my words. If consequentially, let him prove it if he can. If he attempt it, it must be by this Syllogism, [He that saith, Upon the performance of the Condi­tion, the Covenant becomes absolute, doth say in sense, that the performance of the Condition, makes the Covenant become Absolutely, i. e. effects it: But M. B. saith the former: Therefore, &c.] Let him that knows no difference between an efficient Cause, and a meer Condition sine qua non, believe the major. I know so much difference, that I dare say, it is false.

§. 55.

Mr. K. VVHereas he saith [2. It is past my Capacity to conceive of a Passive Moral Instrument.] I answer, what ever Mr. Baxter may conceive, nothing is more obvious then that many men at least are used by others meerly for blindes, to bring about their designes, and so do very much towards them, by doing nothing but standing still.

§ 55.

R. B. I Knew before I heard of your name, that the same thing which in sensu Physico is a Passion or Privation, may in sensu Morali, i. e. reputativè, be Action or an Instrument. But I ever supposed that as it is Moraliter vel reputa­tivè Instrumentum, so hath it Moralem vel reputativam action [...]m. 2. That [some men are used by others meerly for blinds about their designs] this blinde work of Mr. K. doth partly perswade me.

§. 56.

Mr. K. VVHen he saith [how can the act of believing (which hath no other being, but to be an Act) be possibly a Passive Instrument? Doth this act ef­fect by suffering? Or can wise men have a grosser conceit then this?] I answer that this Act is equivalent to suffering, as consisting chiefly in a reliance on Christs righteousnesse, without exalting our thoughts against it, captivating our thoughts to it, renouncing all thoughts of our own righteousness, yea all thoughts that are too apt to rise against it from the consideration of our own righteousness; howbeit for the form it be an action, yet virtually this action is a suffering our selves to be led by the Spirit of God, and by his Authority against the suggestions of our own reason.

§. 56.

R. B. 1. TWo things you have here to prove: 1. That the Act of faith is a suffering. 2. That by suffering it effecteth our pardon or Justi­fication as an Instrumental Cause. For the former, you say [It is equivalent to suffering.] Reply 1. It seems then it is but equivalent. 2. Wherein it is equi­valent? 1. As to its nature? That were a strange act. 2. Or in excellency: so it is more then equivalent to suffering. 3. Or is it as to its use and end? I ea­sily grant you that the use of this Action is to make us capable subjects of pardon, or fit ob [...]ects for Gods act, and disposed matter to receive Justification; as Mr. Benjamin Woodbridge hath plainly and truly, though briefly taught you in his Ser­mon of Justification (think not much to learn of him in that, and other points there touched.) If you have a minde to call this Passio Reputativa vel Moralis, I will not contend with you: it being Conditio activa ad Receptionem propriam requisi­ta. Doubtless the Reliance and Renunciation which you mention, are actions. 3. And where you say, that it is [Virtually a suffering our selves to be led by the Spirit, though it be an action for the form] I never heard before of an Action immanent which was virtually suffering: and that from such a Cause as Authori­ty is: Sure it is somewhat more then such a suffering; and therefore it is new Lo­gick to say, that it is Virtually suffering. Though as I said, if you have a minde to call it a Moral or Reputative Passion, I will not contend. 4. But then what a suffering is that you imagine it? I thought you would have come nearer the mat­ter, and have said that it is Receptio Christi, vel Justitiae donatae: but you say, It is a suffering our selves to be led by Gods Spirit and authority.

2. But now I come to the great business, I finde you as mute as a fish: You had another Assertion to prove, [that this Act doth by suffering Effect our par­don:] On this lay all the controversie: and of this I finde not a word. I pray you remember by the next to satisfie your Reader, that [this Act which is Vir­tually a suffering our selves to be led by Gods Spirit, and by his Authority against the suggestion of our own Reason, doth by that suffering effect our pardon or Ju­stification.] Nay, I thought if you had made it but a Receiving instrument, as you phrase it, that it had been the Receiving Christ or Righteousness, and not the suffering our selves to be led by Gods Spirit and Authority against the suggestions of reason, which (qua talis) would have been affirmed the in­strument of our Justification? But you saw not what Roman doctrine this im­plieth.

§. 57.

Mr. K. VVHereas he adds [4. And lastly, I believe with Schibler, that there is no such thing as a Passive Instrument] I believe he bath seen a man often hold up a fire-shovel to receive coles, which fire-shovel is an Instrument, but in that case meerly passive, and he hath seen questionless boyes at trap hold up their hats to receive the ball; here their hats are Instruments, but meerly Passive. What examples Burgersdicius or Keckerman give, is not considerable; What if they mistook in their instances of Pas­sive Instruments? Follows it there are none?

§. 57.

R. B. 1. THe Smith may call his fire-shovel, a Passive Instrument, and so your boy may do his hat. I will allow them both that name among Mechanicks, Rhetoricians, &c. but I shall not believe that Logicians should so call them, or that either of them is an instrumental efficient Cause, or do effect by suffering, till you have better proved it, then this put-off comes to. 2. I have found no reason yet in all the reading of your labours, to judge your Logick more considerable then Burgersdicius and Keckermans; or that you are likely to finde out fit instances, where they could finde none. 3. Callovius and many more are of the same opinion as Schibler in this.

§. 58.

Mr. K. BƲt say you [the Instrument is an Efficient Cause: all efficiency is by action: and that which doth not act, doth not effect:] You have forgotten that the great Instruments of the Roman State, did all by doing Nothing. Unus homo nobis cun­ctando restituit rem. Their strength, saith the Prophet, is to fit still.

§. 58.

R. B. 1. SUch a thing I now perceive may be: for I think when you have here done all, you had done more if you had done nothing.

2. I answered enough to this before. What if the Consequents of doing no­thing prove better, then if there had been Action, and thereupon you do call [do­ing nothing] by the name of [Action?] Is it therefore Action indeed? Or if you therefore ascribe a Causality to it, is it therefore a Cause indeed? I say again, as such are Moraliter vel Reputativè instrumentae, i. e. Causae efficientis instru­mentales, cum Physicè & reverâ non sunt; so morally and reputatively they are A­gents, and therefore not to be called Passive instruments.

3. Let it be observed what a superficial kinde of answers Mr. K's Chair doth vouchsafe us? He durst neither plainly deny, that an instrument is an efficient Cause; nor yet that all efficiency is by Action: and yet satisfies himself with the touch of an alien instance, implying the denial of the later.

§. 59.

Mr. K. [INdeed (saith Mr. Baxter in the close) as some extend the use of the word, Instrument, you may call almost any thing an Instrument, which is any way conducible to the production of the effect under the first Cause, and so you may call faith an Instrument.] Belike it is Instrumentum quoddam vocatum, what you will in the Lawyers Latine, and you must be beholden to that to make the New Covenant Gods Instrument in Justification. Instrumentum Novum for Testamentum Novum, say the Criticks.

§. 59.

R. B. 1. THese words I spoke, to signifie my resolution, not to contend about words; and if any man will use the term [Instrument] improper­ly, and tell us his meaning, and not make it the efficient Cause of our pardon and Justification, much less make the Papists believe, that in that notion lieth the very kernel of the Protestant doctrine about Justification by faith alone, I am content such a man speak as he thinks meet, allowing others the like liberty. To this Mr. K. gives this learned answer [Belike its Instrumentum quoddam vocatum, what you will in the Lawyers Latine] Out of which words, or any yet spoken by him, if the Reader can pick an argument to prove faith the instrumental Cause of forgiveness or Justification, let him make his best of it. A jest is readier then a good Argument.

2. It ill becomes any Preacher of it, to deny or jest at the instrumentality of of Gods Law, Covenant or Testament. It bewrayes that which you might with more credit have concealed. If Gods Deed of Gift of Christ, Life, Par­don, &c. be any Cause of our Right to Christ, Life, Pardon, &c. then is it an instrumental efficient Cause, constituting that Right: (Let Mr. K. tell me what other cause it is, if not this.) But some Cause it is: Therefore, &c. Onely as Relations have an imperfect Being, so the Causing of them is answerable to it. If Gods Deed of Gift, Law, Covenant, Testament, be no proper instrument, then there is no such thing as a proper instrument known in Laws, Politicks, Mo­rality, for the conveying of any Right. As Sayrus saith, Clav. Regiâ li. 6. cap. 6. n. 23. p. 330. Natura instituit voces & signa tanquam Instrumenta & media fine quibus nu [...] homo alteri non possit obligari. Not only are they certain Instruments when used, but is commonly held that they are so necessary instruments, that by a meet mental Conception without words a man is not obliged to another. So saith Al­main. in 4. d. 15. q. 2. Jos. Angles in flor. 4. sent. q. de voto art. 2. diffic. 4. Armil. verb. promissio. Petr. de Arragon. 2. 2. q. 88. art. 3. dub. 4. Mich. Salon. in 22. to. 1. q. 5. de domino art. 2. dub. 1. Lud. Lopez. p. 2. instr. cons. cap. 30. Emanuel Rodriquez part. 2. Sum. c. 27. Concl. And its certain that conceptions give no Right to men, though the conceiver of a promise may coram Deo be obliged.

§. 60.

Mr. K. THis were not worth the insisting on, but to shew with what tools Mr. Bax­ter endeavours to break the works of so many eminent Master-builders, and with what formidable weapons he valiantly sets himself against those great Cham­pions.

O the miserable fate of poor Divinity! that must be put to School to Burgersdicius and Keckermans Logick! and be so beaten for greasie Jack Seaton! Had not Mr. Baxter been as they say he was [...], he had not set so high a price on these beggarly ele­ments, as to let them make utramque paginam in this noble controversie.

§. 60.

R. B. VVHether this merry Rhetorical Triumph were grounded on such a reall victory as the man dreams of, or whether premises and Con­clusion be any other then a meer Rapsody of windy ostentation, I must leave to the judgement of the impartial, understanding Reader. I confess they shew that he is not only unreasonable; for ridere is proper to a Reasonable Creature. I had thought to have given a particular answer to each passage in this Paragraph, but upon review I finde that the Replying to such like, hath occasioned more iro­nies and sharp passages then I dare approve; and therefore I think it best to say nothing to it, only to reminde him of these few things:

1. That I will be none of his adversary, where he argues only to prove me ig­norant. It never came into my head to make it the Question, whether Mr. K. or I were the more wise or learned man? I have much more ignorance then he is a­ware of.

2. That yet I dare contend with him in point of veracity, if he use to do with others, as he doth with me, particularly to talk of [making utramque paginam] and to scorn at it no less then twelve times in five or six leaves, for my citing these Authours once or twice, and Schibler thrice in a whole book.

3. That all is not Divinity that such Theologues maintain: For I think he is not Theology in the Abstract: and therefore its possible to finde an errour in such a man as Mr. K. without Schooling or beating Divinity: Nor do I think that sound Theology would feel it, though he had a knock or two more.

4. That he proves out of Keckerman, or others such like, that two and two is four, doth not much abuse Divinity by it: Nor he that cites them to shew that all efficiency is by Action, though as learned a man as Mr. K. deny it. Nor do I finde Mr. K. having recourse to the Bible to prove the contrary, viz. that there is efficiency without Action. And I think the Scripture Texts may be soon numbred by which he attempts to prove Faith to be the instrumental Cause of Justification.

§. 61.

Mr. K. HE hath one Question more [But though Faith be not the Instrument of Ju­stification, may it not be called the Instrument of Receiving Christ who Justifies us? I do not (saith he) stick so much at this speech as at the former (we are beholden to you: some indulgence yet in this particular) Yet is it no proper or fit expression neither. For, 1. the Act of Faith which is it that justifieth is our Actual Receiving of Christ, and therefore cannot be the Instrument of Receiving. To say our Receiving is the Instrument of our Receiving, is a bard saying.] Be the act of Faith the actual Recei­ving of Christ: Why I wonder may not faith be said to be the Instrument of Receiving Christ? Is faith only an Act? I had thought it had been an Habit? And though the Re­ceiving be not the Instrument of Receiving Christ, as being the actual receiving of him; yet faith may very well be so called: as though my receiving of a book be not the Instru­ment of receiving it, yet the hand may without any great absurdity be allowed that name.

§. 61.

R. B. 1. I Argued, that if faith be the Instrument of Receiving Christ, then either the Act of faith, or the Habit: but neither the Act nor Ha­bit: Therefore, &c. To prove that the act of faith is not the instrument of Re­ceiving Christ, I used the words that he here cites. What doth this Learned man but confute this by saying, that the Habit is the Instrument? [I had thought (saith he) faith had been a Habit.] Thus he confutes me, who argue that the Act is not the Instrument, by saying that the Habit is. I think he that is [...] need not much lament that he lost the benefit of such a disputants tutor­age, if he be never in a more waking mood then here.

2. His Rhetorick is the best part of his answer. But when will he prove that the Habit of faith so farre differs from the act, and both from the soul, as that the Habit may as truly or fitly be called the instrument of Believing or Receiving, as the Hand is of its Act or the effect? If his similitude would prove any thing it would rather be that the Faculty is the Instrument, then that the Habit is: which yet I finde him not here attempt: I think that the Habit of faith, and the act are not of so different natures as is the Hand and its act.

3. Let it still be remembred, that I do not much regard how this Question is determined (for which Mr. K. doth so humbly tell me, he is beholden,) it being much different from the former Question. For in the former, the term [Instru­ment] is taken properly for an instrumental efficient Cause, in which sense I de­ny that faith justifieth: But here it is taken Metaphorically or Vulgarly, and not properly: For that which effecteth not is not an instrumental efficient Cause. And that which they call an Instrument of Receiving, is in Naturals but Dispo­sitio materiae, and in Morals, but Dispositio Moralis, vel Reputativa, vel Actus ad Receptionem passivam, propri [...]m, veram necessarius; and in our present case, strictly nothing: but a Condition. Now if any will be pleased to speak so vulgarly and improperly, as to call such a Condition, or Aptitude Moral or Natu­ral [an Instrument of Receiving] so he do not build any unsound Do­ctrine upon it, I do again professe that I will not contend with him. But the Reasons why I thought it necessary for all that, to contradict the common Do­ctrine of faiths being the Instrument of Justification, I have fully manifested in answer to other Brethren.

§. 62.

Mr. K. BƲt secondly, saith Mr. Baxter [The seed or Habit of faith cannot fitly be called an Instrument, 1. The sanctified faculty it self cannot be the Instru­ment, it being the soul it self, and not any thing really distinct from it, as Scotus, D' Orbel­li [...], Scaliger, &c. Dr. Jackson, Mr. Pemble think, and Mr. Ball questions. 2. The Holiness of the faculties, is not their Instrument: For, 1. it is nothing but themselves rectified, and not a Being so distinct as may be called their Instrument. 2. Who ever cal­led Habits or Dispositions the souls Instruments? The Aptitude of a Cause to produce its effect, cannot be called, The Instrument of it. You may as well call a mans Life the Instrument of Acting, or the sharpness of the knife, the knives Instrument, as to call our Holinesse or Habitual faith, the Instrument of Receiving Christ.] I answer, you pro­ceed by certain steps, and to deny the Habit of faith to be the Instrument of Receiving [Page 125] Christ, you say, 1. The sanctified faculty it self cannot be the Instrument. And 1. What if it cannot? Who reckons the Habit of faith for a sanctified faculty? This is that which sanctifies the faculties: The faculty is of one Species of quality, potentia naturalis; faith which sanctifies of another, habitus. You are, it seems, now and then out in your Logick, as much as you trouble us with it, and had need review your Burgers­dicius and Keckerman. 2. How prove you that the sanctified faculty is the soul it self, In stead of the few Names you muster up, I may bring you thousands that are against it: and yet a few Reasons weigh more then all these great Names. If the faculty be the same with the soul, then the Holinesse of the faculty cannot be really distinct from the soul, for that this Holiness is to be received into the faculties; and if no faculty be really distinct from the soul, then is there no receiving into it any thing really distinct from the soul, and if Holinesse be not Really distinct from the soul, a holy soul, and an unholy one, are not Really distinct, and so you seem to imply in your second, when you say—

§. 62.

R. B. 1. Mr. K. yieldeth, if I am able to understand him, that the Act of faith is not the Instrument of Receiving Christ: and he layes it on the Habit. Before we proceed here observe,

1. That the Generality of Divines that plead for faiths instrumentality, say, that it is not the Habit, but the Act of faith that justifieth: (I said so too when I wrote my Aphorisms, taking it on trust, but I now recant it.) If that be so, then they cannot (as they do) argue thus: [Faith is the Instrument of Re­ceiving Christ and his Righteousness: Therefore faith justifieth as an Instru­ment] because they speak of the Habit in the Antecedent, and of the act in the Consequent; and so by [faith] mean not in both the same thing: and so there are quatuor termini.

2. Observe, that it is commonly granted, that the Habit of faith is not al­wayes in act: as in sleep, and when we are wholly taken up with thoughts of an ali­ene subject, and all the time of Infancy (according to them that think Infants have the Habit of faith.) This being so, it must needs follow, that faith is not alwayes the Instrument of Receiving Christ, and of Justifying: (nay perhaps, but seldome comparatively) For the Causality of the Instrument is in Action, and faith is not alwayes acting. If therefore faith justifie as an Instrument, and we are alway justified, and yet faith be not alway an Instrument, then either we are not justified by faith, but some other way, at those times when faith acteth not, or else cessante Causâ non cessat effectus: which though in some cases it may be true, yet here it cannot: because the effect being but a Jus ad rem, a transcenden­tal Relation, it hath no nearest Cause, but its Foundation and Subject: and when those cease the Relation ceaseth: And none affirmeth that [...]aith is a Re­mote cause of Receiving Christ, that is, Right to Christ (with his benefits,) And if it were, yet the Fundamentum Relationis must have the sustentation of a continued Cause. But in the way that I affirm faith to justifie, as a moral Con­dition only (having no Causality) all these inconveniences, or rather contradi­ctions are avoided: For it being the meer will of the Donor, that createth the nearest necessity of the Condition, and so requires the Condition to such an end, he may make either act or Habit the Condition, and may make the act the Con­dition of Beginning our Right to Christ and Life, and the Habit continued, to be the Condition of continuing that Right, even when the act is intermitted: [Page 126] and yet the effect may still continue, because the Will of the Donor, and the Law or Covenant which is his Instrument, do both continue; and it is they that are the efficient Causes.

3. Observe also, that both the man for whom Mr. K. is here so zealous, viz. Mr. P [...]emble, and many more, do make the Habit of faith to be nothing else, but our New Life, our Holiness of the renewed faculties, the Spirit of God in us, and that all Graces are in the Habit and seed but one, and so accordingly it fol­lows, that it is our internal Sanctification or Holiness that is the Instrument of our Justification: A Doctrine that I think these men will scarce own upon consi­deration.

4. Observe also, that hence it will follow, that it is other graces that justifie instrumentally as well as faith: because they say, it is the Habit that is the Instru­ment: and this Habit is but one: not one Habit of faith, and another of Love, Hope, &c. but all one: and this one Habit justifies, even when men are Infants, or asleep, and do not act.

5. That which is now commonly called, the Habit of Grace, is in Scri­pture called, [the Spirit in us:] and so the holy Ghost is made our instrument of Justification.

[...]. Now to M^r K's words here. In the words of mine which he cites, I do both indirectly, or in transitu confute a third opinion, viz. that the sanctified facul­ties are the Instrument, though the sanctity of the faculties be not: and directly I argue à forti [...]re, that if the sanctified Faculties themselves may not properly be called the Instrument of Receiving Christ, much lesse can the sanctity of the faculties be so called: But, &c. Therefore, &c. Here­upon this too learned man feigns me to think, or say, or imply, the Habit of faith to be a sanctified faculty; and with seeming seriousness fals a schooling me, and tels me, that [the faculty is of one Species of quality, and faith of another;] yea proceeds in his dream as confidently as if he were waking, to tell me, that I [am now and then out in my Logick, and had need to review my Burgersdicius and Keck­erman.] But would he a little rub his eyes, I would desire him to tell his Reader, where I did directly or indirectly say, that Faith is a sanctified faculty? And I would know of him, whether a man should not understand a matter before he make an answer to it!

Next, it seems, he expected I should have proved, that the faculty is the soul it self: And would not that have been as wise a Digression, and as Necessary, as is this of his? The Scope of my words was but this, q. d. [It is a controvert­ed, doubtful point, Whether the Faculties are distinct from the soul, as Res & Res, and therefore not fit to bear such a weight as those that I oppose do lay upon the affirmative] (and my own opinion inclineth to the Negative: yet so as I dare not be so presumptuous as confidently to interpose among so many learned men, and maintain my own opinion as certain truth.) As wise a man as Mr. K. (and in my opinion an eight at least above him) thought the like answer to be good in another case. Davenant. Determ. Qu 37. pag. 166. Quod philosophantur voluntatem & intellectum esse duas potentias reipsa distinctas, dogma Philosophicum est, ab omnibus haud receptum, & Theologicis dogmatibus firmandis aut infirm [...]ndis, fundamentum mi­ [...]imè idoncum. And he knows, that the two Questions, 1. Whether the faculties be realiter inter so distinct as? And, 2. Whether they be realiter ab anima distinctas? use to stand and fall together in the Determination.

For the few names that he tels me I muster up, its like he may know that it were [Page 127] easie to give him a farre larger muster roll, especially of the Scotists. And as for the thousands that he saith he may bring against it (no doubt he means Writers) I confess plainly, that he hath so farre lost his credit with me, that I do not believe him. For though I know they are many, yet I do not think he hath read many thousands on all sides of that Subject. But if he have indeed read so many thou­sand books of that one point, alas, how many hath he read in all? No wonder if poor Burgersdicius, Schibler or Suarez be despised by him. It may be that's the reason that both the margin and Text of his book are so naked of quotations; he having read so many thousands that he knew not which to preferre, or where to beginne; or else would have few mens names to his Works but his own (except as Adversaries) lest they should share of the honour. Nay, if he should have said or meant, that there are thousands that so write, which others have read though he have not, I doubt he cannot prove it true.

For his great weighing Reasons, I will honour them as soon as I can see them, but he had little Reason to expect me to Reason that Case. If this that he next addes be one of his few Reasons, that weigh so much, I must tell him, Every man to his minde. I doubt he overvalues his own Reasons: For my part, one thou­sand great Names, yea one, will weigh as much with me, as this his Reason. For, 1. I deny his Consequence, and say, that the Holiness may be Really di­stinct from the soul, though the faculties are not; and that Holiness may im­mediately inhere in the soul without the mediation of faculties really distinct from it. It had been easie to have seen the necessity of giving some answer to this de­niall. As wise a man as most we have (if I conjecture not amiss) and a publick Professour in Oxford, and now resident where Mr. K. had his Chait, I mean Mr. Wallis, saith thus: [And so, however it may be true, that a faculty or natural Power may be so far the same with the soul, as that it differ only ratione ratiocinatâ, yet in a Habit we must of necessity grant a distinction ex parte rei: For where there may be a real separation, and not only mental, there must needs be granted a distinction in re.]

But what if I grant Mr. K's hardest Conclusion that Holiness is not Really di­stinct from the soul, nor a holy soul from an unholy as [Really] is taken for a di­stinction inter Rem & Rem. We shall see anon what danger would be in it. But then Mr. K. must be so honest, as not to perswade any that I therefore deny a Real distinction, as [Real] is opposed to feigned, mental, called Rationis, Rela­tive, or Denominative.

§. 63.

Mr. K. YOu say [The Holiness of the faculties is not their Instrument, for it is nothing but themselves rectified, and not a Being so distinct as may be called their Instrument.] But is it nothing but themselves rectified? I had thought it had been the Rectifying of them, which potest adesse & abesse sine subjecti interitu? and consequently it is not the faculties themselves. As well you may say, that the rightnesse of a stick is nothing but the stick made right; and the whitenesse of the wall, nothing but the wall made white Quis tulerit Gracchos sive Graculos!

§. 63.

R. B. 1. ALl that I assert is, that Holiness differs not from the faculties, as Res & Res, but as Res & modus. 2. I think the abstract ha [...]h no existence, but as in the Concrete, but is a meer Notion: Seeing therefore that is so, I think the properest denomination, as most agreeable to the thing denomi­nated, is to speak of it as in Concreto. 3. You did therefore too suddenly start up into your wondering interrogation, as if there were any contradiction between those two sayings! As if he that saith [a Rectified faculty: a white wall] did not as truly expresse the Rectitude, and the whiteness, as you that express them in Concreto! It is too grosse a fiction, if (as you seem) you would make men be­lieve that I intend to prove the Rectitude to be Formaliter the same with the Fa­culty or soul! My meaning is plainly, that Holiness is nothing but the souls Re­ctitude, and though I expressed it in the Concrete, I say not, that it is the Fa­culty as a Faculty, but as Rectified; shewing in the next words what it is that I exclude, viz. [A Being so distinct, &c.] 4. May not a Relation or Mo­dus be present or absent sine subjecti interitu? though it be not a distinct Thing?

For your Quis tulerit? I Reply: Pride makes men impatient. Did you think no more highly of your own Note, then some wise observers do, you would in­stead of your impatient Quis tulerit, have compassionated your self and me, and sit down by me, with a Nos Graculi. However, why should you be so impati­ent with one so farre below you? Will you set your wit to the wit of a Gra­culu [...]?

But I will make bold to try your Patience further. Will you hear the voice of the afore-said Learned and Judicious man M^r Wallis, who is now in the same Nest that you were bred in? See his Truth Tried, chap. 8. pag. 44, 45. [A Habit there­fore whether Infused or Acquired, being but a facilitation of the faculty, cannot be a Thing distinct from that faculty, but only a Modus of it, which hath not in it self a Positive Absolute Being of its own, but is a Modification of another Being: And its Physical Being, Existentia Rei, must be the same with the Being of that which is thus Modificated: For it is not ipsum existens, but Modus existen­di: And this Manner of Existing, hath not an Existence of its own, distinct from the Existence of that which doth Exist in this Manner. Yet its Formal and Metaphysical Being is distinct. Yea and its Physical Existence, such as it is ca­pable of, that is, Existentia modi; for not being Res, but Modus Rei, we must not expect that it should have any Existence of its own, besides the Existence of a Modus: and this Existentia modi is the actual modificating of the Thing Exi­sting after this Manner: The which Existence, though it be not Existentia Rei, yet is it a real Existence (Existentia in re) and not Mental: For the thing Exi­stent is not only supposed to exist in this manner, but indeed doth so, thus order­ed, thus modificated: And therefore that Modus doth actually and really modifi­cate, and is not only supposed so to do. But if you will not admit with Scotus, &c. And thus it is true which his Lordship speaks, that Habitual Knowledge is No­thing but Light more or lesse Glorious. It is Reason cleared: It's only Facultas facilitata, or Facultatis facilitas: And to this Faculty or Readiness to operate, I cannot allow a Physical Existence of its own, as neither to any Habit whatsoever, as be­ing but Modi, and not Entia: It's not a Being, but a Manner of Being: Not [Page 129] Ens, but Aliquid Entis. And I should easily be perswaded to grant the same con­cerning all accidents whatsoever, which have long since been called Entis entia: And however an Accident hath been accounted to be Res, and so to have existen­tiam Rei, yet not subsistentiam Rei.] So far M^r Wallis.

§. 64.

Mr. K. SAy you [Who ever called Habits or Dispositions the souls Instruments? The Aptitude of a Cause to produce its effect, cannot be called its Instrument.] I Answer and yield you, that ordinarily it is not so: In all Acquired Habits, there is meerly an Aptitude gotten: but by [...]aith which is an infused Habit, there is an Ability gotten; this being indeed a Habit, but a Habit equivalent to a new Faculty; and so we hear of a new heart and new spirit, and without faith a man can no more receive Christ nor do ought towards it, then a dead man can walk or speak, and so it gives life to the soul in regard of all spiritual operations: and though life cannot be said to be an Instru­ment, yet I hope that which gives life may; as doth faith, which is as the soul to the soul in all its holy and heavenly thoughts and desires: Life cannot be said to be an In­strument: for Life as Life is no cause at all, but an Union of those causes which are requi­red to the making up of the Animatum.

§. 64.

R. B. 1. IF Habits were never so properiy to be called the souls instruments, yet this reacheth not the Question, whether they may properly be called (Logicè loquendo) instruments of Receiving when they are not instruments Effe­cting. I did therefore give them too much advantage in this arguing.

2. If you grant that acquired Habits are not to be called the souls instruments▪ and yet maintain that infused are, you must give some good reason from the difference.

Your reason is that [This is a Habit, but equivalent to a new faculty.] To which I Reply, 1. What reason is this? When I even now said, That [the sanctified faculty it self cannot be the Instrument] you never did gainsay it: therefore if faith were a faculty or Potentia, it were not therefore the instrument of Reception.

2. The term [equivalent] is so ambiguou [...], that you may yet make your words true or false by an interpretation. 1. If you mean that infused Habits are of the same nature, and of the same species of quality, as the Potentia naturalis is, that should have been well proved, and not nakedly asserted. 2. If you mean that it performeth the same kinde of operations, and quoad usum is equivalent, though not of the same nature or kinde; that also needs great p [...]oof, seeing it contradi­cteth common principles: The operation of things is such as the Being. 3. If you mean but that it is of equal necessity to the Act, thats nothing to the purpose; for the necessity proves it not an instrument.

But I conceive the first of the three is your sense, or else I cannot make sense of it; for the two later do no way tend to prove it an Instrument; and your words do most plainly import that sense. But, if so 1. Sure you forgot your own words but a little before, where you were pleased so farre to School me, as to tell me that [the faculty is of one species of quality, Potentia naturalis, faith which sancti­fies of another, habitus.] And you gravely told me, I was now and then out in [Page 130] my Logick, and demanded of me, Who reckons the Habit of faith for a sancti­fied Faculty? 2. How can you say still that it is a Habit? For if it be truly a Habit, it must be of the same species of quality, as Habit; and admit the defini­tion of a Habit, and therefore not admit the definition of Potentia or Facultas, nor be of that species: and I suppose you will not say it is of both, and be but one Quali [...]y: And I suppose also that you will not say, it is Potentia supernaturalis, and therefore may be of another species then Potentia naturalis, seeing it is not the way of efficiency, but the nature of the Effect or Thing produced, which diversifieth the species of Quality.

But because I have great reason to think, that you will honour the same thing from D^r Twisse, which you contemn from me, will you be pleased to hear him speak to you a few words: Contra Corvinum pag. 361. [Sed quia deventum est ad genus disputationis Philosophicum, agendum secundum principia Philosophiae, sive natu­ralis, sive moralis, sive mixtae, cum doctoribus illis congrediamur. Itaque juxta Philoso­phiam quid aliud est voluntas, quam Potentia volendi? rursus quid aliud est objectum quam bonum? unicui{que} verò quod apparet; non Sybillae folium recito, sed Aristotelis magni illius naturae mystae. Ergo non modo secundum Augustinum▪ sed & secundum A­ristotelem, naturae est hominum posse Velle quod ei appareat esse bonum, posse autem Velle quod vere bonum sit, ne Corvinus quidem hoc loco attribuit gratiae suae communi. Ego vero ultra feror, & ex Augustino disputo, etiam posse credere, posse Deum amar [...], naturae esse hominum, juxta argumentationem superiorem: quod & hoc argumento contendo. Si potentia credendi, vel quidvis boni faciendi, nobis accederet ex gratia, tum potentia sub­jectum esset potentiae; naturalis gratiosae, quod quidem hactenus prorsus est inauditum; nempe ut potentia volendi subjectum esset potentiae volendi. Voluntas fate [...]r est subjectum habituum; etiam omnis potentia rationalis, tam intellectus quam voluntas capax est ha­bituum, sive naturalium, quibus magis idonea flat ad res naturales, tam intelligendas, quam agendas; sive supernaturalium, quibus elevetur ad objecta supernaturalia▪ At ut po­tentia aliqua capax sit potentiarum novarum, ne fando quidem hactenus accepi, priusquam mysteria sua mundo communicaruut Arminiani.] Many more places to the same pur­pose might be cited out of D^r Twisse. Boethius de Trinit. saith, Forma simplex sub­jectum esse nequit: I leave you to gather the consequent. What if I adde a Nove­list or two (they shall not be unlearned) that M^r K. may see that a Graculus is not so solitary as a Phaenix?

Thom. White in his Institut. Sacr. l. 1. lect. 13. p. 90. saith, [Sed & Habitum non esse aliud quam ipsum actum debilius manentem, omninò constat, ex eo quod impressio fa­cta in subjectum▪ abs{que} aliquo contrario destruente, interire non potest: quia est modus ipsius subjecti; & quod alio modo imbui requirit novam actionem. Perman [...]t ita{que} actus donec a contrario destruatur. In anima vero non est alia contrarietas quam contradicti­onis. Donec itaque retractetur, ex necessitate semper manet actus, & dicitur Habitus. Objicies, esse contra manifestam experientiam quod actus maneant, &c. Respondetur, ma­nifestum esse post actum intellectus vel phantasiae, potentiam manere in actu illius objecti q [...]od cognovit. Experientia enim docet, eam posse iterum cognoscere quod vult; quod ante primam cognitionem non potuit, &c. Manet itaque impressio; id est actus substantia, quat [...]nus en [...]▪ & non tantum motio est: Ʋnde cum in anima non possit esse motus▪ ibi adaequate manet impressio; id est actus▪ Quod autem non appareat manere, est quia ani­ma in corpore non agit ex sese; sed praecise quatenus movetur a corpore, seu per corpus; & per consequens non facit sensum sui, nisi in effectu corporeo. Et hinc fit ut cum rursus agi­mus, sentiamus actum faciliorem, vel fortiorem, vel directum & modificatum ab anima, ratione prioris actus; quod arguit impressionem manere: Sed modum ipsius impressionis, [Page 131] in sese, videre non possumas; & ideo credimus ipsum actu non man [...]isse.] And pag. 94. [Ex quibus satis clarum est, non esse habitus supernaturales, suis primis actubus praerequ [...] ­ [...]s▪ neque esse per modum potentiarum, sed omnino sicut habitus naturales; nisi quod circa alia objecta [...]ersentur; & discurrendum esse prorsus de iis, ad modum quo philoso­phamur de naturalibus, observatis specialibus differentiis.]

Yea there are some that think▪ Habits are in the body. Taurellus in Philosoph. Triumph▪ pag. 52. saith, [Vere tamen rem siquis intueatur, nil habitus aliud sunt, quam acquisita quaedam intelligendi, vel alicujus expetendi promptitudo, non animae, sed corpori adscribenda, cum per se anima nec impediatur, nec aptior fieri possit, ad exercendas acti­ones, sed quoniam corpore, ceu instrumento utitur▪ fit ut ejus respectu, vel habiliores, vel ineptiores ad aliquid efficiendum simus.] This he afterward thus correcteth, [Non corpori solum, sed animae etiam, videntur esse ascribendi (habitus) Eundem intellectum & agentem esse dicimus & patientem: Per se quidem actionum causa est, nec pati, nec impediri dicitur; sed respectu ejus cui conjungitur corpori patitur, atque impeditur quo minus probe possit intelligere. Hac habitus accidentis ratione, non menti, sed corporipri­mo possunt attribui; v [...]luti vice versa menti primo actiones, sed corpori secundario adscri­buntur. Eadem voluntatis est ratio.]

I cite not these, as owning them; but to shew Mr. K. that as learned men as he, have not the same thoughts of Habits, and therefore he should not be too ha­stily confident: And I confess, as highly as I think of Mr. K's learning, I do not think he truly and clearly knows what a Habit of the soul is, nor wherein it is di­stinct from the soul, the faculties, and the act, and the intelligible species: no nor a wiser man then himself neither. Every man knows not so much as he boast­eth of, or thinks he knoweth. (And [...]ow likely then he is to know so much of God as he here pretendeth to, we may easily judge.) It was as wise a man as he that said [Nam quomodo intellectu Deum caput homo, qui ipsum intellectum suum▪ quo eum vult capere, nondum capit? August. de Trinitat. li. 5. cap. 1.]

3. I easily acknowledge that grace giveth such a power as is commonly called Moral, distinct from the natural faculties, as our corrupt estate contains an oppo­site impotency. But this i [...] but an applying of the terms [Can] and [Cannot] [Power] and [Impotency] to Dispositions and Undisposedness, to Habits and their Privations.

4. A new heart and spirit, I easily confess necessary. But those words do com­monly signifie in Scripture, only new Inclinations, Dispositions, Qualifications. It is a new heart, though only the old faculties and substance. I hope you will not follow Illyricus.

5. Where you say that [without faith a man can no more Receive Christ, nor do ought towards it, then a dead man can walk or speak.] I Reply 1. That proves not faith to be equivalent to [...] Potentia vel facultas, any otherwise then that it is of as absolute necessity, but not that it is of the same nature. If you shew an illiterate man a Greek or Hebrew book, he can no more reade in it then a dead man, that is, both are truly in sensu composito impossible: But yet it is but a habit that is wanting to one, and a power or faculty natural, to the other. And so it may truly be said that a sinner cannot do well that hath accustomed to do evil, no more then a Leopard can change his spots, or a Blackmoore his skin. Yet if you mean that such are equally distant from an actual change as a dead man, it is but a dead comparison. A dead man wants both natural faculties, and an inclination or moral power. An unbeliever wants but one.

2. That [without faith, such can no more do ought towards the receiving of [Page 132] Christ, then a dead man can walk or speak] is a dead doctrine, like the rest of Antinomianism, tending to licentiousness, and to subvert the precepts of the Gospel, and the salvation of men, and unfit for any man that shall use the Name of Christ, much more unfit for a Divine. The Ranting sect hath got the word too: and when they are reproved for wickedness, or perswaded to duty, they say, [What can the creature do?] To go out of an Alehouse or Whorehouse, and to go to hear the Gospel preached, is somewhat towards receiving Christ: for faith comes by hearing; and can no man do this without faith? Cannot the Eunuch reade a Chapter and ask help of an Interpreter without faith? Cannot men Fast and Pray, if not as Cornelius, yet as Ahab, without faith? Is there not a common Grace of the Spirit, drawing men towards Christ that were farre from him, which goes before the special Grace (at least sometimes) whereby they are drawn to Christ? This that you maintain is not the doctrine of Mr. Tho. Hooker, Mr. Joh. Rogers, Mr. Bolton, Perkins, or any of our experimental practical Divines; no nor of any Protestants that I know; I am sure not of the Synod of Dort; but of the Libertines and Antinomists. To what end do you preach to any unbelie­vers? Do you perswade to any means or duty towards the getting of faith? or do you not? If not, its like you Preach as you Dispute; and then I doubt whe­ther you live at Blisland: If you do, sure that duty tends to faith, and may be per­formed before faith.

3. I think you do more boldly assert, then you can solidly prove that [without faith a man can no more receive Christ, then a dead man walk] if you mean it of the Habit of faith, as, no doubt, you do. If you should mean it of the Act, it were a merry arguing: q. d. [We cannot Receive Christ without Receiving him: therefore Receiving him is a Power, and so an Instrument] Actual faith, is a­ctual moral Receiving Christ. But I suppose you mean it of the Habit, in con­formity to your former Dispute; And then you suppose that God cannot cause the Act of faith by his Spirit, before the Habit, and by the first act cause a ha­bit (as Camero taught, and his followers do still teach.) I suppose if the question were put but de facto, Whether God do ordinarily thus cause faith? it is past Mr. K's power to prove the Negative: Much more if the question be de potentia divina, whether God can do it.

4. Where you say [It gives life to the soul in regard of all spiritual operations.] I Reply, 1. How industriously doth Mr. Pemble prove that faith is not the Mother grace? not properly the root of all other graces, nor the first degree of our sanctification and spiritual life, either in the Habit or the Act: Vindic. Grat. pag. 12, 13, 14. Yet Mr. K. that is so zealous in defending him, sticks not to gain­say it.

2. Knowledge and Love may be said to give life to the soul, if the exciting and assisting other graces, be giving life.

3. It is in effecting or receiving a relation (Jus ad Christum, impunitatem, salu­tem) that we are enquiring after faiths Instrumentality. And you do turn the business to [giving Life to the soul in regard of spiritual operations;] whereby you seem to mean that faith is no otherwise an Instrument of receiving Christ, then as it is an Instrument of every other operation which it performeth; and as every other habit of grace (Love, Fear, &c.) are instruments of their acts.

4. You play with the ambiguity of the term [Life.] You take it for the Union of Causes. You know how commonly it is used for the Forma Viventis.

[Page 133]5. And so faith is, as Pemble saith, part of the souls new life, that is, new spiritual Rectitude; or as others, the whole semen vel principium. But this is only a formall, and not an efficient quickening, or giving life. And if you speak of faith exciting other graces: 1. That it doth by the Act, which you yet affirm not to be an Instrument. 2. So do all graces in their places help the rest.

Lastly, If you did prove that Habits are fitly called the souls instruments in producing the Acts, yet it is all nothing to our business. For we are enquiring how farre it is the Instrument of the effect, or of reception. And I still say, that where the Act is no efficient cause, there the Habit by causing the act, is no in­strument of the effect. But in our Justification, the act of faith is no efficient cause (Justification is the immediate effect of God by the Act of grace now, and by his Sentence hereafter.) Therefore, &c. And for reception, I say it hath no instrument, but as the instrument of the effect, may be called its instrument; ex­cept you will speak as a Mechanick, a Rhetorician, or Vulgariter, and not Lo­gically. And when Mr. K. gives me cogent Reasons against this, I hope I shall regard them.

§. 65.

Mr. K. VVHereas you adde lastly, [The sharpness of the knife cannot be called the knives Instrument.] I must without disparagement to your confest acu­men in other things, tell you, that this is but a dull instance: for faith is not as the sharp­ness, but as the knife; and faith admits sometime a greater sharpness, sometimes a less, which qualifies it in its acting better or worse, more or less. And 2. The sharpness of the knife, may be called an instrument in a larger sense, as first qualities in the elements. The fire is said to act by its heat: the water by its cold; by the heat in­strumentaliter, by its form principaliter. And thus 3. may the soul be said to act by its faith in receiving Christ, without which it were as impossible to receive benefit by Christ, as to return service to him.

§. 65.

R. B. 1. I Acknowledge the instance of little use to the main Question, be­cause it pertains but to the Act of faith, and not the following passion or effect.

2. The sharpness of your Answer, serves but to cut your own fingers. That faith is as the knife, is feigned, and not proved. The knife is the substance, and the keenness is the accident or modus. Faith is not a substance, but a modus or accident of the soul.

3. In your large sense, you may say quid vis ferè de quovis, and so I told you J did not contradict you.

4. J am so censorious as to imagine that you speak more by rote, then on true knowledge in your Physicks, about site; but thats no matter.

5. Who doubts but the soul may, in the sense you mention, be said [to act by faith in receiving?] But once more distinguish of receiving: which is 1. The act of consenting to, or accepting of the offer of Christ and Life; which is Re­ceptio Ethica, metaphorically called Reception. 2. The true passive reception of Right to Christ and Life, which follows on the former. The first is but the [Page 134] Condition, and not the Cause of the late, and is in Morality to the later, as in Naturals the Dispositio materiae is to the Reception of the form: but the efficient Cause of the later Reception is Gods Will, signified by his Law; and his Law signifying his Will, and Constituting the Duness. Now if you will say, that Faith in the Habit is the instrumental efficient Cause of the first Receiving Christ, that is no more then to say, the Habit is the instrumental Cause of the Act, viz. its own Assent and Consent: as Love may be said of its Act. And whether this Speech be proper or improper, J leave it to your self, J will not med­dle with it. But for all Faith might be called the instrument of Believing (sup­posing it may) and that Believing is tropically called Receiving, yet I deny that it can therefore be properly called the Instrument of consequent, proper, Passive Reception of Right to Christ. (The Passion is such as Relations in their Re­ception are capable of.) Yet improperly, vulgarly, as an Instrument is not ta­ken for an Efficient Cause, I did profess and still do, that I will contend with none that will call Faith the Instrument of Receiving (or any Consent of the Will, call it Love, or what you will▪ as well as Belief in Christ, may so be call'd an Instrument.) But that Faith is no true Instrumental Cause of forgiving our sins, or Justifying us, I shall yet maintain till I see stronger Reasons then M. K. hath here produced; and to that I am moved upon Reasons of great weight, which I have elswhere manifested.

Lastly, Mr. K. speaks too unlimitedly [of the Impossibility of Receiving Bene­fit by Christ without Faith.] I dare say, that many a thousand (if not all men) have received Benefit by Christ before faith. What say you by the Gospel? What say you by Faith it self? J hope it is not the Instrument of our Receiving it self? Yea, and it is more then Mr. K. can prove, That God could not if he would, have given pardon it self to some without faith, upon Christs meer Satisfaction. But what need I talk of this, to a man that thinks we have so much of, or towards Remission, Justification, Acceptation before faith, as he before disp [...]ted for, i. e. to be tantamount Justified? Though he takes them to be from Eternity, and so no fruits of Christs Death, yet he cannot de­ny, but as to us, we are as capable of Receiving such Benefits, without faith, from Christ, as without Christ.

§. 66.

Mr. K. ANd I acknowledge I have done very little by this Dispute; only I had not the patience to see so w [...]rthly Divines so unworthily handled, as if they had need to be taught a Logick lesson by Mr. Baxter, who (as I have heard to the disparage­ment of both Universities) was scarce bred in either, but as much as I esteem his excel­lent parts, and I doubt not singular piety, yet may I be bold to say, somewhat more of the Ʋniversity would have done him no harm▪ And I conclude all with this Item to my self, though Mr. Baxter need not take notice of it,

§. 66.

R. B. 1. I Think your first Conclusion (that you have done little by this Di­spute) hath as cogent Evidence, as most that you have maintained in these six leaves. But it had been more wisdom to have foreseen your loss of time, and to have prevented it, rather then to confess it to your disgrace.

2. Where you say, you [had not patience] I say, If you cannot forbear, there's no remedy: who can hold that which will away? The tongue is an unruly member. Perhaps your case is as his Discollimin. p. 54.

3. I dare not excuse, much lesse justifie my tongue or Pen, from too sharp and unmannerly speeches of my betters: Even where I discern no fault, I do suspect some, as knowing so much evil in that heart which is the fountain: And I hope all those pious Brethren whom I shall injure by my rashness, will heartily forgive it; which I earnestly request, and by Gods assistance, shall do the like by others. But yet I must needs say, that my Conscience doth not accuse me of [handling unworthily] D^r Twiss or M^r P. of any men. For as I have excessively honoured them, so do I very highly honour them still; and their mistakes I had not men­tioned, but 1. That I had been by them ensnared in some of them, and thought my self bound to warn others of the danger. 2. The name of such worthy men may do more in propagating an errour, then a thousand unlearned Antinomians can do, and therefore should their mistakes be more diligently disclosed. 3. It is pity Gods gifts and Saints should be a Defensative to errour, and a snare to the Church. 4. I am confident the souls of these two Saints of God, if they know these things below, will give Mr. K. no thanks for his Vindication, nor be offen­ded with me for disclosing their mistakes, which they now do farre more detest then I. 5. It was no such Crime in the late Reverend As [...]embly to question one of them for these mistakes, or in Learned Bishop Downame to write a hundred times more then I against the other: And why then is it a Crime in me? 6. Re­verend Mr. Owen▪ who approves your book, doth say farre more against Dr. Twiss then ever I did, in his late excellent, learned Diatrib. de Just. Vindicat. and yet I hear none accuse him for unworthy handling him: Yea he ingeniously confesseth his own former errour, and writes against it; and why then may not a man for Truths sake be allowed to do by another, what he doth by himself? Had I been my self the Authour of Dr. Twisses Works (pardon the presumption of the suppo­sition) I should say ten times more against several things in them, then I ever yet did. 7. Mr. K. himself here confe [...]eth the opinions that I mention of theirs to be erroneous: And is not that as unworthy handling them as mine? 8. I intreat the impartial Reader to peruse my words themselves, and then let him judge as he seeth Cause. They are but these [A great Question it is, Whether Re­mission and Justification be Immanent or Transient acts of God: The mistake of this one point was it that led those two most excellent famous Divines Dr. Twiss and Mr. Pemble to that errour and Pillar of Antinomianism, viz. Justification from Eternity. For saith D [...]. Twiss often, All Acts immanent in God are from Eter­nity: But Justification and Remission of sins are immanent Acts: Therefore.] Is this such unworthy handling? Mr. K. durst not once say that I falsly accused them; or that it was not their errour. And could I give them a higher Elogy, then to call them [most Excellent, Famous Divines.] I am confident the great­est Archbishops or Cardinals, yea the Pope himself would think such Titles no [Page 136] way injurious to them. The Lord General will be content with lower Titles then [most Excellent and Famous] Do not such as Mr. K. go about to confirm the vile reproaches of the times, as if Ministers were the most intollerably proud men on earth, when this is taken for unworthy handling! And when they that expect that their hearers should bear their sharpest and frequent reproofs, cannot bear such an honourable mention of their mistakes?

4. Whether there be one true word in Mr. K's particular accusation [as if they had need to be taught a Logick lesson of Mr. Baxter] I am content my very ene­mies should Judge. Did I ever contend about any point of Logick with them? It was not, what an immanent Act is? But onely, Whether Justification be an Immanent Act, and so Eternal, that I enquired, and in which I opposed them? I do therefore take it as my duty to Admonish my learned Brother of his great sin, who hath not once, twice, or thrice, but so oft in six leaves spoken such pal­pable untruths in matter of fact, and made so little Conscience of the ninth Com­mandment.

5. If in this Paragraph Mr. K. do discover the very end of his undertaking, not to be so much the Vindicating of any truth of God, but of Worthy Divines, and Academicall Honour (of which I leave the Reader to Judge) then may we hence conjecture at the Reason of severall Passages through the whole: for the Means may not be better then the End; and no wonder if they be suited to it.

6. As for all that follows concerning my [being scarce bred in either Universi­ty, &c.] I have nothing to say. Did Mr. K. ever hear me contend for the Reputation of being Learned? He easily carries the Cause here, having no con­tradiction.

7. And where he saith, that [somewhat more of the University would have done me no harm] I do not believe him: For though I have been as sensible of my want of such happy opportunities, and my defects thereupon, as ever Mr. K. was, at least; yet I believe that all things work together for Good to them that love God; and that by that three-fold Cord (on my Friends, Body, and scrupulous Conscience) by which God restrained me from such advantages, and confined me to a more private course of studies, he did also restrain me from some evil that I might else have run upon, or prevent some that he saw would befall me: (and indeed he hath satisfied me now of the particulars.)

8. What men or other creatures those were that Mr. K. did [hear boast of me to the disparagement of both Universities] J cannot conjecture. But this J will promise Mr. K. that how little soever J have received from the Universities, they shall have my frequent and earnest prayers to God, and my best endeavours with men, for their Prosperity. The Lord purge them from Pride, Sensuality, Man­pleasing and Self-seeking, and cause them humbly to study Christ above all, and zealously to lay out themselves for his Glory, and with considerate, resolved Self-denial and Unreservedness, wholly to resign themselves to his service, and make it their main business to win souls to that true felicity which they have first tasted of themselves; and then J should not so much fear any policy or power of their Enemies.

9. And for Mr. K's concluding Poetical injunction; J heartily confess my ut­ter unworthiness to be annumerated to the Ambassadours of the Lord Jusus, or ever to have been permitted to speak in his Name; much more with any such suc­cess and encouragement as he hath vouchsafed me: And the Lord forbid that ever [Page 137] I should be so arrogant, as to equal my self with the Worthies of the Church, much lesse to envy the honour of their preheminence. Yet in regard of the Chur­ches present necessities, I dare not give over, for all my imperfections. Though I have ever been of a spirit too easily discouraged, and have many a time been under Jonas's temptation, and ready to say as Jeremy, I will speak no more in his Name; yet God hath so suited his providences to my infirmities and necessities, as not only to cure my backwardnesse and despondency, but also to convince me of the pleasantness of his work. I am assured that it was the Lord that sent me into his Vineyard, and without him none shall force me out. He that gave me fewer Talents then others, will expect but an answerable improvement at my hands: but be they never so small, I dare not hide them. He that calleth for two mites will accept them: He despiseth not the day of small things. He some­time revealeth that to babes which he hideth from the wise and prudent: For the wisdome of the world is foolishness with God, and the foolishness of God is wi­ser then men: and no flesh shall Glory in his sight. How many learned men have lost the main end of their Learning, and engaged God so farre against them, as to lay both them and their honour in the dust, because they would not devote it more faithfully to his service! The Lord grant that I may so use the small abili­ties that I have, that I be not condemned as an unprofitable and unfaithfull servant▪ and then I do not fear being condemned for their smalness. There are many learneder men then Mr. K. in hell; and many more unlearned then I in heaven.

But should I deny my self to be Vile against the Accusations of Mr. K. when I daily confess my self Vile to God, I should but prove the hypocrisie of my pray­ers. And therefore Dispute for Reputation that will for me. When I am tem­pted to such a work by Accusers, or by my own heart, I desire God to save me from the Temptation. He that works principally for himself, must be his own Pay­master.

§. 67.

Mr. K. THe summe of all that hath been hitherto said in this Paragraph, is this, That to Justification there is required a transtent act of Gods, or the working of Faith in our heart; which shews, That albeit Gods Decree to Justifie us have much in it that looks so well like Justification, that it may be called so without Blasphemy, yet that indeed Justification is in time, not from Eternity: And it appears further thus: That Justification being the Absolving us from our sins, and the Accepting us as righteous, al­beit God the Father Decreed it, the Son Purchased it, a Grant of it were made, and un­der Seal; yet till it be pleaded there is no Pardoning; as appears by comparing Gods par­don with that of Princes, which is not of Value till Pleaded, and not pleaded till after the Jury hath found the Offendor Guilty: so this Justification which begins at our Believing in foro Conscientiae, a more private Sessions is again made more Publick in Heaven at our death, and this at Gods Bar before Angels and Saints deceased; and yet more publick before all the world at the General Judgement. This pardon was Purchased, Resolved, or Issued out, Sealed, Received, Pleaded at first: but as new sins are committed we plead it again, and so may be said to be particularly Justified from particular sins, toties quoties, but alwayes by virtue of our General Pardon.

§. 67.

R. B. VVE are now past the End, and yet new to begin. If in this Recol­lection he had not stumbled on a word or two, that come from the Core of his Errour, I should scarce have understood any of his minde about the Controversie in hand, save only Negatively, and that he is against Me. And yet it is not much that I can discern of it. Among all the Disserters of all Sects that ever I had to do with, that pretended to Learning, I have seldome met with the like slippery dealing, as in Mr. K. who pretending to make some notable discovery of the Truth, did so lose himself in the eager pursute of a contemptible Adversary, that he seems to have quite forgot his undertaking, and leave his errand behinde him. But to deal truly, it is my opinion, that though the man were drawn to en­gage himself, yet when he had emptied his bilious stomack, he found his work done, and therefore was willing to drop asleep when he should have performed his Promise. He doth over and over again promise us to open to us what is the Tran­sient Justifying Act, yea, pag. 139. to speak Punctually to it; and when all's done, the business is so farre undone, that for my part, I cannot certainly tell yet whe­ther he once name it, or what his opinion about it is. Pag. 141. He saith [by Giving us saith, he Justifies us, as shall be shewed anon, he giving us that which is our Instrument, whereby we receive the Righteousness of Christ.] That [anon] is not yet come; for I finde no fuller discovery of his minde, but only [...] little glance in this Recollection, wherewith he doth conclude. In those former words he seems to make the Immediate Justifying act to be the Giving of Faith; and yet contradicts it in the next words; for that Faith he makes to be Given, that it may be our Instrument of Receiving. Now

1. We are enquiring after Gods act, and not mans Instrument.

2. We are enquiring after the Immediate effecting Act, and not a Receiving, which is no effecting.

Let us see whether these words under consideration will any better discover his sense.

1. He saith [that to Justification there is required a Transient Act of Gods; or the working of faith in our heart] This is all the transient Act I can learn he intends from first to last. But though before he said [by Giving us faith, he Justifies us] yet here he thought it safer to speak more ambiguously, and onely saith, that [this is required to Justification.] But there are many things requi­red to it, besides that Act which doth immediately Effect it: Antecedents, Con­ditions, the Causes of those Conditions, are all Required to it; when yet none of them is the justifying Act. But if indeed he do mean that Fidem dare, is Ju­stificare, I will speak to that anon. Next he saith, that [Gods Decree to justi­fie, looks well like Justification] but that is not it. Next he saith, that [Ju­stification is the Absolving us from our sins, and Accepting us as Righteous] that he may come to shew us what is not, and what is, the Absolving and Accepting Act. And first again he excludes Decreeing from being the Act enquired after: then he excludes Christs Purchase; then he excludes the Grant made and sealed: then he saith [Till it be pleaded there is no pardoning, as appears by comparing Gods pardon with that of Princes.] Perhaps then he means that [Pleading] is Pardoning, or the justifying Act. No, not so neither: For he only saith, that till it be Pleaded, there is no Pardoning] which plainly expresseth, That Plead­ing [Page 139] is but a prerequisite Condition, the want whereof suspendeth the act of Par­don, but is not the Pardoning act it self. In the Conclusion he gives us a little more light to see part of his meaning, where he saith [so this Justification which begins at our Believing in foro Conscientiae, a more private Sessions, is again made more publick in Heaven at our death, and this at Gods Bar before Angels, &c.] Here he tels us more then yet I could gather from him, in quo foro justificamur fide, that it is but in foro Conscientiae, a more private Sessions, so that we are left to search for the justifying Act; which though he vouchsafe not expresly to mention, yet we may possibly conjecture at by this last passage. If the Reader would see the whole mystery which is thus darkly lapt up, as being somewhat afraid of the light, as far as I can gather, it is this.

Mr. K. being of the Antinomian faith, That Remission and Justification are Immanent Acts, and from Eternity (and consequently not purchased by Christs bloud) and that Justification by faith, which the Scripture speaks of, is only Ju­stification in foro Conscientiae, or the apprehension of the former; he thought, in these times, when Antinomianism hath an ill savour with the best, that it is the wisest way to appropriate the name of Remission and Justification by faith (in this life) to this Justification in foro Conscientiae, and to give to the Immanent E­ternal Act, the description without the name. And therefore he thought it fittest to say, that [Gods decreeing to Remit our sins, carries in it a Remission of them tantamount; for who shall charge them on us, where God decrees to Re­mit them?] Pag. 138. That [Gods Decree to passe the transient Act of justi­fying, carries in it as much as concerns Gods Remission of sins, and Acceptance of us as Righteous.] But the change that is made in time by the transient Act, is in our Feeling or Knowledge, and therefore he saith, that when we say [Now a man is justified in Gods sight] it [signifies only a testimony given by God, whereby he makes us know that we are justified before God, or in his sight] and that [in God it signifies, A making us to see: and we are said to be justified in his sight, when he makes it, as it were evident to our sight, that we are justified] p. 138. (Here before he was aware, he gives it the name of justification before we see it.) Now being Resolved to appropriate the name of Remission and Iustifi­cation (in this life) to that which is in foro Conscientiae, he is hard put to it, to deliver his meaning of the transient justifying Act, without opening the shame of his opinion. And therefore sometimes he saith, It is the Giving of saith to be our Instrument: Sometime that this faith is necessary to it: but concludes, that it is in foro Conscientiae, a private Sessions, that we are justified before death: So that the Summe is this: That Iustification, and Remission, and Acceptation do consist in our Conscience's apprehension or feeling of that which God did from Eternity (which must not be called Remission, but Tantamount Remission:) and because Conscience cannot know or feel this, but by Believing, and because we cannot Believe till God give us the Grace of faith, therefore God justifies or pardons us by Giving us that Grace: that is, We by Believing or being Conscious of our Eter­nal Acceptance, do immediately justifie and forgive our selves; but mediately God forgiveth and justifieth us by Ca [...]sing us to Believe, and Causing our Con­sciences to justifie us immediately.

I will not say, that I am certain I have hit of Mr. K's minde in this explication: for who can be certain in such a mist? And therefore I leave every Reader that thinks I mistake it, to gather it b [...]tter, if he can.

What ever it is, I am sure he oft contradicts himself. He that here tels us it is in [Page 140] foro Conscientiae, and talkt before of evidencing it to our selves, doth say Pag. 139. l. ult. [Where ever there is a Moral, i. e. a Legal change, there is a transient act, and this being in justification, a transient act is necessarily required to this change] Now a meer Legal change is de jure, and not in the feeling of Conscience▪ and it is in foro nullo actualiter, sed virtualiter in foro divino, it being actus illius Legis qu [...] est Norma Judi [...]ii: and therefore not in foro Conscientiae, vel aliqu [...] privato. And if it be confest to be a Moral, i. e. a Legal change, what man sees not that it must be a change per Legem? i. e. novam, remedia [...]tem, or per actum moralem? Nay, mark how in the very words of this Conclusion, he yields the Cause and doth not see it. He confesseth that we are pardoned as Offendors are by a Prince's pardon, which is not of Value till pleaded. Now let any man of understanding judge, whether the Princes Pardon Granted and Sealed, be not the immediate, efficient Cause of this Delinquents absolution or passive pardon, when he doth plead it: And whe­ther it be not first a Jus impunitatis that is hereby Given him, which (whatever is here said) is of Value upon the Accepting, before the pleading, though the plea­ding is also necessary to stop judgement, or prevent Execution, and so to have the full benefit. And what though the Pardon Granted and Sealed be not Effectual till Accepted or Pleaded? Doth it follow, that it is not the immediate Cause af­terwards? Let it not seem unmannerly if I speak my thoughts; that all this pro­ceeds from this Learned mans great mistake or inconsiderateness of the Nature of Laws and their Actions, and of the nature and use of Conditions, whose non-per­formance doth suspend the action of the Law or Grant, (because the Will of the Legislator or Donor was, that it should so be) but the performance doth not cause its action, much less immediatly cause the Effect; unless there be something in it that may work as a procatarcktick efficient Cause, by way of Merit, or the like, over and above its meer Office of a Condition. If a man by his Testament leave his Son a thousand pound per annum on Condition that he do voluntaily Register his Thankful Acceptance of it: It is not the performance of this Condition that doth at all causally constitute the Jus ad rem legatam, or conferre Debitum, or Donare▪ though the non-performance may suspend the Collation of Right: but it is the Te­stament that doth immediately constitute this Right, when the suspension is remo­ved, which before it did not, because the Testator would not have it so. Grotius in Cass and. art. 4. p. 280. Promissi enim ea V [...] ut Conditionem implenti Jus conferat. Vid. de Jur▪ Belli. l. 1. c. 1. §. 4. & l. 1. c. 11. §. 1, &c. If then it were true, as M. K. here affirm­eth, that it is at this private Session [...] in foro Conscientiae, that we are first justified on our Believing, then the immediate justifying Act (which Mr. K. hath talked so oft of) can be no other then either our own Apprehension, or belief that we are Pardoned and Righteous, or some such like Apprehension or Conclusion of our own hearts. For if it be in foro Conscientiae, it must be By Conscience as the Agent, that is, By the understandings Concluding us to be what we are▪ But this both supposeth us to be Pardoned and Righteous before (for the Being of a thing go­eth before the true Knowledge that i [...] is in Being: None can be truly Conscious of a Righteousness or Pardon which he hath no [...]:) and also it makes us to pardon and justifie our selves; and the transient justifying Act of God, so long enquired after, should be only Gods cooperating with us in our Believing, or Causing us to Believe. Yea rather, the Act of justifying faith (which is the Acceptance of an offered Christ and Life, 1 Joh. 5. 11▪ 12.) goes before this Act now mention­ed, and this is but Assurance or a Consciousness of the State that by Believing we are in. Let any man that is willing to know the truth, but examine every Text [Page 141] of Scripture that speak of Justification by faith, and he may easily see that they do not (no not one of them) speak of Justification in foro Cons [...]ienciae, or of any con­sciousness of our Righteousness, but of Justification before God.

And that Gods giving faith is not the immediate justifying act, appears 1. From the very name. [To give faith] is one thing, and [to justifie] i [...] another. 2. From the real difference. Faith is given by a Physical act imme­diatly: Righteousness, immediatly by a Legal or Moral act. Faith is a real Quality (in the habit) or Act: Righteousness is a Relation, and is immediatly by a meer Resultancy. Nay the very matter or meritorious cause of the Righte­ousness now in question, is not faith, but Christs satisfaction and merits. The terminus therefore of the justifying act (J speak now of our constitutive▪ Justifica­tion) is Righteousness, a Relation: but the terminus of Gods act in giving Faith, is th [...] Faith so given. The Object also of the justifying act, and the Subject of Justification, is credens, a man already Believing: but the object of that act which giveth faith, is an Unbeliever. 3. Is not this flat Popery? to make Justificati­on to lye in a real change, and not a relative? and so to make it the same with Vocation, Conversion, Regeneration, or Sanctification? Whereas the holy Ghost saith, [Whom he called them he justified, Rom. 8. 30.] For to give faith is Vocation (as those Divines say, that make faith to go before other graces in habit and act:) or it is Vocation, Regeneration and Sanctification, as Mr. Pemble thinks, who supposeth all infused in uno semine. So that if Fidem dare, and Justificare be all one, then to Justifie and to Call or Sanctifie is all one.

I had once thought to have heaped up divers Arguments here in the conclusion on these two last points. 1. To prove that our first Justification by faith, which Scripture speaks of, is not in foro conscienciae. 2. To prove that [to give faith] is not the proper or immediate justifying act of God. But I shall forbear 1. Be­cause Mr. K. gives me so little invitation to it, seeing he gives but a few dark hints of his own minde. 2. In that I finde upon review that almost all this paper is unavoidably taken up with a meer defence of my words against his injury, and he hath not given me occasion for many further profitable explications or disputes: and therefore I will reserve these for a fitter place. 3. Because I have larglier al­ready Argued against both these in private answers to the Animadversions of learned Friends: and though those are not for publique view, yet I have a back­wardness to the doing of one thing so oft. 4. Because this little that I have here said, seems enough, and proportionable to his brevity which doth occasion it.

This one thing seems necessary, in the Conclusion, that I adde a few Reasons to prove that it is in Law-sense that we are first justified by faith, and so that the Moral Act of the Law is the immediate justifying act (and consequently the enacting of that Law of grace, or granting that Deed of gift, is the next foregoing efficient act.) There are Reasons enough in my Aphorismes, but Mr. K. thought it easiest to take no notice of them.

Arg. 1. A termino.

The thing that is given by Remission is Jus ad Impunitat [...]m: But it is only by Laws, Contracts, Deeds of gift, or the like Moral acts, that Right is immediatly conveyed: Therefore it is by these immediatly that we are forgiven: (and so ju­stified Constitutivè.)

I suppose it will not be denied that Remission is a Giving? Qui condonat, Donat. So Lawyers generally say of Remitting a wrong, and it will hold in case of crimes, especially in our case, against God. Fragosus de Regimine Reipub. Christ. part. 7. [Page 142] li. 6. Disp. 17. n. 95. p. 844. saith, Remittere injuriam est Donare, & Donare est jactare suum.

Arg. 2. A malo remoto, contrario, & Termino a quo.

The Dissolution of a Legal obligation, must be by a Moral act of the Rector, of the same kinde with the obliging act. But Remission of sin is a Dissolution of such an Obligation. Therefore, &c.

The major is proved by that common maxime, Eodem modo dissolvitur obligatio, quo contrahitur. The minor is proved by the true definition of Pardon: Which is in criminals, The Act of a Rector dissolving an Obligation to punishment. Remissio est proximè Reatus Remissio; remotius Penae: Reatus est Obligatio ad P [...]nam.

Arg. 3. Ab officio Legis.

If it be the use of the Law to be Norma Judicii, then he that is justified per sententiam Judicis, must be first justified in Law: But the Antecedent is true: Therefore, &c.

When I say [Justified in Law] I do not mean [by the Law] strictly taken as most do, for one only Species of Law: But I mean [by Law] in general, as it is truly defined to be Constitutiva Determinatio Rectoris de Debito. Vel signum Voluntatis Rectoris Debitum Constituens. For many Lawyers do call only written and standing Laws, by the name of Laws, and do exclude verball precepts of a Rector: In this limited sense, as it is taken for [Law by an Excellency] I do not now use it.

Arg. 4. A natura Sententiae.

Declarative sentential Justification or Pardon, presupposeth Justification Constitutive. Therefore Justification Constitutive goes before sentential Justi­fication.

Here I suppose 1. That Constitutive is per Legem, and not per Sententiam, which is past dispute. 2. That it is by faith (as the condition) that we are justified Constitutivè, it being only Believers that are Morally qualified to be fit subjects for this Justification, and whom alone the new Law pronounceth Righ­teous, and to whom alone it effectually giveth Christ and Life. The Antecedent is plain, in that the Judge must sentence a man to be as he is, and according to his Cause. A man must be just, before he justly be pronounced▪ Just. He that condemneth the Righteous, and he that justifieth the wicked, they both are abo­mination to the Lord, Prov. 17. 15. He that saith to the wicked, Thou art Righteous, him shall Nations curse, people shall abhorre him▪ Prov. 24. 24. So that whether the sentence be in conscience or Heaven, it must presuppose Justification Con­stitutive.

Arg. 5. A natura fidei Justificantis.

If the nature of that act of faith which justifieth, be only such as may be the condition of the Laws constitutive Justification, and not such as may be the Instrument of sentencing us Just, then Justification by faith (which Scripture mentioneth so oft) is Justification in Law sense, and not Sentential: But the Antecedent is true; as is proved from the Act, which I have elsewhere pro­ved to be [the Accepting of an offered Christ and Life] (including Assent) and not the Antinomian, special Belief that we are pardoned, or a perswa­sion of Gods special Love to us, or a consciousness of our Righteousness, or Assurance of it, which are said to justifie sententially in foro Conscientiae.

Arg. 6. A communi consensu, & usu loquendi.

It is the common judgement of men to think, and common custom to say, [Page 143] that [A King pardoneth by his written, or verbal Pardon, as his Instrument] and to distinguish [Justificationem Legis] a Justificatione Judicis, the former be­ing presupposed: therefore we must do so here, unless any special reason can be brought against it: For Gods Law hath the common nature of a Law, and his Judgement the common nature of judgement.

To prove the Antecedent I need but to appeal to the common use of men ac­quainted with Legal and Judicial affairs. Yea even Mr. K. himself cannot for­bear acknowledging it: Yea besides the forementioned acknowledgements, he is strangely guided to conclude with it, as the very last word of his Digression, a­gainst me [We may be said to be particularly justified from particular sins toties quoties, but alwaies by vertue of our general pardon.] This general pardon is that which God issued out and sealed as he saith, which becoming effectual when re­ceived▪ and pleaded, doth by its virtue justifie us from particular sins: that is, by its moral or civil action.

Arg. 7. When the Scripture so oft denieth Justification by the Law, it plainly implieth that there is such a thing in rerum natura, as Justification by a Law, and that it is no improper unfit speech: For else God would not use it, Gal. 5. 4. & 3. 11. Yea it opposeth Justification by grace in Christ, to Justification by the Law, Act. 13. 39. By him all that believe are justified from all things from which they could not be justified by the Law of Moses: Where note the opposition that [by Christ and Grace] is opposed to [by works] and so [by the Law of Christ and Grace] is opposed to [by the Law of Moses and Works.] That therefore is af­firmed of the Law of Grace, which is denied of the Law of Works: viz. to justi­fie. And the reason why the Law of Works could not justifie, was for that it was weak through the flesh, and not that it was an action or effect disagreeable to the nature of a Law.

Many other actions of Law to the same purpose, I recited out of several Scriptures, in my Aphorismes, pag. 178, 179. which I will not trouble the Reader to repeat.

§. 68.

ANd thus I have done that ungratefull work which Mr. K. was pleased by Digressing to put me upon: which I confess appears not lovely to me on the review. For I finde though I have easily born the charges of this Learned man, yet it is no very usefull work to the Reader that he hath here called me to; and I thought it not fit to go beyond my call. In the first part I have little to do, but to obtrude his confidence, and to shew that he meerly feigned me his adver­sary, forgetting that of Seneca, Victoriae sine adversario brevis est laus: In the rest I have not much to do, but to open the vanity and fallacy of many words, and to shew what a windy Triumph it is which followeth such a windy Opposition, and what his Reader oweth him, who doth importare verba & sonum pro mercibus: And what can the Reader gain also by such a discovery. I finde also, that though I resolved to forbear all harsh language when I begun, that I have not satisfied my self in the performance. For when I came to his most injurious words, I could not tell how to answer them but by shewing plainly what they are, and calling a Spade, a Spade; which cannot be done in smooth and pleasing words; and I finde that I have used more Ironies then I dare approve of. My resolution there­fore is, to stifle this work till I have a call to publish it, and then to commit it to [Page 144] some moderate hand, to correct all that shall seem too unmannerly. For though I think I have spoken nothing but what Mr. K. ought to hear, yet I doubt whe­ther it be not more then was fit for me to speak. It is my purpose therefore to deal with him no more, lest I be drawn again to the same inconvenience. For I finde I cannot Reply to such a man in such termes as I do to the Moderate and Candide. Till his breath be sweeter or sounder I think it safest to stand further from him. When he disgorgeth his stomack on me, I have not the skill of sha­king it off so mannerly, and cleansing my self without his disgrace, as I could wish I had. And if a man stirre them not very tenderly, Plus faetent stercora mota. I finde also that it is a very hard thing against the guilty to speak both truly and pleasingly: For nemini blanditur Veritas: and I have a natural inclination to speak nakedly and plainly; which being seconded with some degree of opinion, that qui loquitur planè, loquitur sanè, may quickly occasion me to step too farre. But the principal cause is, that I am truly aweary of the Warres of Divines: Many an opportunity and importunity have I put by, as finding here also, that Impendia belli sunt praemiis majora: and especially in this civil uncivil Warre of Brethren, the gainer usually loseth: unless men could be brought to deal more with the Matter, and less with Words and Men. Contentions are both the Daughter and the Mo­ther of Pride. They are (as soot) the fuel of that flame that caused them. If the contender be overcome, he glorieth not as a Christian in the Victory of Truth, but repineth as a man at his own overthrow; and pro plumeis noxis [...]lumbas iras gerit: If he seem to conquer supercilia erigit, and it doth puff him up, and so in­crease his vice, and hasten his ruine: for

Vindicat elatos justa ruina gradus.

However it sets men usually on two eager a studying for their own Reputation; which is the way that god resolveth shall ruine it: For he that will be great must be the servant of all, and he that will be wise must become a fool, and he that will save his honour must lose it: qui propagat nomen, perdit [...]omen. My soul ta­steth an admirable sweetness in Peace: The Churches Peace, the Concord of Brethren is my daily study, prayer and endeavour; which O that I were able any right way to promote! What I do that way, I do with pleasure: my greatest zeal doth carry me to it. But what I do in way of Controversie, yea even when necessitated, so that I dare not forbear, least I should betray or wrong the Truth, yet is it grievous and ungratefull to me: I have little pleasure in it. I am resol­ved therefore to draw back from this work, as much as I finde consistent with my Fidelity to the Truth of Christ; and to do nothing in it till I am satisfied of a Call that must not be resisted. And when I follow God, I may safely commit to him my Way and Labours: for I have found that he draweth forth nothing, which he knows not how to use for good. And the more any Brother is perswaded that I transgress my bounds in writing too sharply, I intreat him the more to pray for the pardon of my fault, and the more watchfully to shun the like himself; and to joyn with me, and all the Churches friends, in daily and importunate requests to God, that he would guide our feet into the way of Truth and Peace; even of that Truth, which lying between extreams, is the only way to stedfast Peace; and of that Peace, which is the Means and End of Truth. Amen.