The REFLECTIONS upon the XXVIII PROPOSITIONS, &c. maintain'd.

THough there is nothing in the third Defence of the 28 Propositions, &c. that can (as far as I can per­ceive) enervate the least Objection that is urged in my Letter; yet be­cause the Doctrine therein maintained tends to subvert the Foundation of the Christian Religion, by introdu­cing a Plurality of Gods, I cannot but think my self in Conscience oblig'd to shew the Vanity of those Pretences that are urg'd in its behalf, especially since the Defender's writing with so great an Assurance of his own Per­formance, and so much contempt of the Reflections, may have some influ­ence upon some weak and prejudiced Readers.

Had the Author design'd a just De­fence of the Doctrine of the Trinity, he should have taken notice of what is said against it in general, but more especially of what is urged against the real Trinitarians, wherein he is equally concerned with them, and not only of those additional Absurdities of his own Hypothesis. Therefore I shall now set down his Opinion, both as I find it in his Propositions, and in the Defences of them, and then shew the weakness of his Notions, either with new Arguments, or at least with en­forcing those that were mentioned in my Reflections.

The Defender in his Propositions asserts, ‘That there are three Eter­nal and necessary Divine Beings or Substances, each of which has un­limited Power, Wisdom and Good­ness; and that so many Men or Angels are not more expresly di­stinguished in Scripture, as different Persons or Substances, Prop. 16, 17. And pag. 8. of the second De­fence; I do affirm the Son and Spi­rit to be absolutely perfect Beings, in reference to the Perfections of their Nature, they are all boundless and Infinite; So pag. 10. The Fa­ther's Existence being without a Cause, does not make him to have another sort of Nature from that of the Son and Spirit, which may be a necessary Nature and uncreated, and constituted of all the boundless Perfections of which the Nature of the Father consists, abstracted from the consideration of the manner of his Existence: and in the same [Page 4] Page, The Divine Nature (speak­ing of the Nature of each) doth comprehend all Perfections. So pag. 11. An Essence of the same Kind, though not the same nume­rical One.’ So that here are three divine eternal necessary Natures or Essences, as different as three Human or Angelical Natures; which at first sight appear as much to be three Gods as three human Natures to be three Men; which is a revolting to Polythe­ism or Plurality of Gods, except he can shew that either two of these Di­vine Natures are not Gods, or that these three Divine Natures are but one God. We will therefore see what he saith to these two Points.

1. He says, that the Name of God is used in more senses than one in Scripture. In the highest Sense the Father alone is God; he is the only Independent, the only True, the only Good and Great, and Self-existent God. The Son and Spirit have a right to the Name of God, next to that which is appropriated to the Fa­ther; they depend on him with an entire dependance, both for their Be­ing and continuance in Being. But is not this inconsistent with what is said before, because it is first to assert, that the different Ways or Manners of having their Natures does not make any difference in their Natures, the second and third are as truly Divine as the First; and then in effect to sup­pose it does, because the Father has several Perfections the others are un­capable of? To this he replies, the Perfections the Father has above them belong immediately to his Existence, not to his Nature: but what is Exi­stence abstracted from the Nature that exists, but a Chimera? If the Nature did not exist, it would not be a Na­ture. To say such a Nature exists, is to say, it is not only in our imagina­tion, but really or in act: To make the Existence of a Nature a distinct thing from the Nature that exists, and to suppose it to be the Subject in which the Attributes or Perfections of Independance, and being the first O­riginal of all things, do exist, is to suppose it a Substance, because we have no other Idea of a Substance, but that it is a Subject in which Properties exist, which would be to make two distinct Substances in God; his Na­ture that exists, and the Existence of his Nature abstracted from the Nature. What is the Existence of God the Fa­ther, but the Existence of the Nature of God the Father, except he exists distinct from his Nature? And con­sequently, if Self-existence be so great a Perfection, it sheweth that the self­existent Nature of the Father is more perfect than the not self-existent Nature of the Son.

But suppose Self-existence, which is Existence of the Father, belongs to the Existence of the Father, (which by the way is only supposing Existence to be­long to Existence); yet Self-existence, as I observed in my Letter, is only a Perfection as it supposeth necessary [Page 5] or independant Existence, and all those Perfections that belong to a ne­cessary or self-existent Nature: so that Self-existence barely considered in it self, abstractedly from those Perfecti­ons, notwithstanding his denial, is no more a Perfection than any other way of having Existence, if that way sup­poseth the same Perfections. As sup­pose there was some Matter self-ex­istent, and some other Matter not self-existent, and the Nature of the one were not any way different from the Nature of the other, would they not be both equally Perfect? and a parcel of Guinea's made of the One, be as good as a parcel of Guinea's made of the other? Or how could it be possible (they being alike for Weight, Colour, Duration, &c.) to distinguish them? And if it be so in lower Natures, the reason is the same in the highest Natures. But however, to carry the Simily as high as we can: suppose a Human self-existent Father had two Sons, who had all the Per­fections of Human Nature, and did as necessarily and independently ex­ist as He; there can be no reason as­signed, but that they would be Men in the highest Sense, and as absolute­ly perfect as the Father. He saith, in pag. 44. of the first Defence, That if a Human Father could be suppos'd to be Self-existent, and that his Sons had the now mentioned kind of Dependance upon him, (viz. as the Light on the Sun) the consequence must be, that their Nature is short of the Perfection of their Father's Nature, notwithstanding the many Properties they agree in: which is owning, that Self-existence and Independence be­long to the Nature, and that there­fore the Nature of the Father is dif­ferent from the Nature of the Son and Spirit, whose Natures are short of the Perfections of the Father's Nature, and consequently their Natures are not Divine, because the Divine Na­ture contains all Perfections; but theirs want those that not only in themselves are the greatest and most excellent, but the want of which is (as he saith pag. 7.) an abatement of all other Perfections: And if the Fa­ther's Nature is independent, and the Son's and Spirit's dependent, it shews they have different kinds of Nature, as different, nay as opposite as De­pendent and Independent.

But what can be a more staring Contradiction, than that Beings that do eternally and necessarily exist, and are Almighty, yet notwithstanding this have not a Power to keep them­selves in Life and Being, no not a Moment, and yet at the same time have a Power inherent in themselves from all Eternity, to give Life and Be­ing to all things whatever; which al­so do entirely depend on them for the continuation of the same? It is a contradiction to say a necessary Na­ture is dependent, because a necessary Nature is that Nature which contains in it self the formal Reason why it cannot but be: but a dependent Na­ture [Page 6] is so far from having any thing in it self that makes it necessarily exist, that it not only owes to another its Existence, but hourly depends upon another (having no Power in its self) to continue it in Existence; which is the dependence of a Creature, not of a Creator: Is not a dependent Creator as great a Contradiction as an inde­pendent Creature? And did ever any but our Author join necessary Exi­stence and Dependence together? How can they, as I intimated Sect. 62. ha­ving necessary Existence, be said more to depend on the Father for their con­tinuance in Being, than the Father on them? since they as necessarily and as eternally exist as he, who can no more hinder theirs, than his own Ex­istence; nor could he more forbear emaning them from all Eternity, than existing himself. And if his Existence was without a Cause, his emaning must be so too, since the one was as necessary and eternal as the other: In created Beings all necessary Emanati­ons have the same cause as the Beings from whence they emane; but God having no Cause of his Being, his necessary Emanations must have no cause also. And consequently eternal and necessary Existence, as I observ'd in the same Sect. 62. is as great a Per­fection as Self-existence, since one is without a Cause as much as the other; nay, there can be no difference be­tween them; for if the Father is self-existent, the Emanations that issue forth from him must be so too, since they are emanatory Substances, which were not produced by the Will and Power of the Father from nothing, but they emaned from something; which since there was nothing else to emane from, must be the Father's self-existent Substance, to which it was essential to have Emanations, and consequently they have the same Existence as the Substance in which they existed when they emaned; nor could their emaning make them lose their Self-existence. But more of this hereafter.

But he says they depend on the Fa­ther for the continuation of their Be­ing, as the Streams on the Fountain, or the Rays on the Sun; But there's no material Substance that depends upon another for its Existence or continuance in Existence; all Matter is equally old, and has subsisted ever since the Creation; and Generati­on and Corruption is nothing but Matter according to the Laws of Motion changing its Shapes and Fi­gures: and therefore such Similies are not to the purpose, because we are not speaking of any supposed Form or Fi­gure of the Son and Spirit, but of the Existence of their Substances, viz. whether they have them by any third way different from both Creation and Self-existence. As to the Streams depending on the Fountain, it is no more than this, that if the Water did not issue out of the Ground, it could not run along the Ground; if it did not bubble up in the Fountain, it [Page 7] could no more flow to the next Place, than if it stop'd there it could flow to a third: but this does not make one part of the Water give being to another part, or continue it in Being; it is the same Body of Water which was in the Fountain that is now in the Streams. And as to the Rays, they no way depend on the Sun for their Being or continuance in Being, except the Sun by a creating Power makes them to exist, and by the same Power continues them in Existence: If the Rays are (as some imagin) parts of the AEther set in motion by the Sun, they no more depend on the Sun for their Being or continu­ance in Being, than the Sun does on them; but if they emane from the Body of the Sun, they have the same cause of their Being and continuance in Being as the Sun it self, because they like unto all other necessary E­manations, were parts of the Body whence they emaned, and consequent­ly have the same Origin as the Sun it self. And if the Sun had been self-existent, they, because parts of it, would have been so too: nor would their emaning destroy their Self-exist­ing, or any ways cause them then to depend on the Sun for their continu­ance in Being; since the least Sub­stance is as much a Substance as the greatest, and consequently equally a­ble to subsist by it self; so that not­withstanding his altogether unlike Similies it's evident, if the Son and H. Spirit are Eternal and Necessary, they are as self-existent and independent as the Father; and consequently Gods in as high a Sense as he, who if he were not a necessary Being would not be independent nor self-existent, and consequently those three must go to­gether: but if their Natures are de­pendent and not self-existent, they are so far from containing all Per­fections, and being as truly Divine as the Father's, that they are truly cre­ated Natures, or from no-beings made to be, and like all such Beings (as I observ'd Sect. 62.) in God they live, and move, and have their Being.

I said Sect. 62. If the Persons have the same unlimited Perfections, tho the manner of their getting them was different, this would not cause any inequality between them: to which he answers it would; that is, in re­ference to their manner of Existence, though not in reference to their meer Essence. But if there is not only a different manner of their getting their Essences, but their Essences when gotten exist after a different manner, (which he must mean, or else contra­dict himself and agree with me) it's impossible they should have the same kind of Nature, because to exist is common to all Natures: it's the dif­ferent manner of Existence that makes the difference between Natures; and consequently a Nature that has a more excellent manner of Existing, will be a more excellent kind of Na­ture. And therefore if the Natures of the Son and Spirit had not only a [Page 8] different way of having their Existence, but do exist after a different manner; their Natures or Essences must be of different kinds or sorts: But if they exist after the same manner, though they have different ways of coming by their Existence, there can be no in­equality or difference between them.

I asked Sect. 63. How the Father could be greater than the Son and Holy Spirit, and be the only Good when they have the same, that is, un­limited Power and Goodness: he answers, they have unlimited Power, but not the same, which is, since the Father's Power exceeds theirs, to sup­pose that there is some Bounds and Limits of their Power, and conse­quently theirs is an unlimited limited Power and Goodness. He further adds, That the Son's Power is not as great as the Father's ad intra, be­cause he could not beget the Father, as the Father begat him: But it be­ing a Contradiction to suppose the Son could beget the Father, and Con­tradictions being (as he observes, pag. 50.) Objects of no Power, cannot be Objects of Divine Power; therefore it could be no diminution to the Son's Greatness, that he could not beget the Father who always was in Being: though upon supposition that the Son always was in Being, it is equally a Contradiction to say, That the Fa­ther gave him a Being. But if it were an essential and necessary Per­fection of the Father's Nature, to beget or emane two Sons, and the Son and Holy Spirit are not capable to emane Sons; it shows there is a mighty Difference in their Natures, or that they want some Perfections that is necessary and essential to the Na­ture of the Father, nay, which be­longs (as he observes, pag. 13.) to every Creature, where he makes this remark, ‘That if there is not a Crea­ture but can communicate his Na­ture; what a Boldness is it to af­firm, That the infinite Creator cannot do the like? He that hath planted the Ear, shall he not hear? and he that hath form'd the Eye, shall he not see? He that has given a Generative Power to the meanest of Creatures, shall he not have the same Power himself? &c.’ So that by his Argument, to deny to the Son and Spirit a Power to multiply their Species as the Father does, is to de­ny to the infinite Creator (since each is the infinite Creator) a Perfection the meanest of Creatures have.

As to the Father's being called the only Good by our Saviour, There is none good but God; that Phrase (says he) signifies the Father's being the O­riginal and Fountain of Goodness, which he may be, though not the only perfect Good: He refers to Grotius, but Grotius speaks of the Goodness of God, as the Fountain of Good­ness in Creatures. But if the Streams be as perfectly good as the Fountain, it would be very false to say, the Fountain is the only Good. I shall only apply to himself, which he justly [Page 9] (Prop. 11.) says concerning the other Trinitarians, If such a Liberty as this in Interpreting Scripture be allowable, what Work may be made with Scrip­ture? Besides, if the Son and Spirit are, as he saith, necessary and eternal, they must be as much the Original and Fountain of Goodness, as the Father himself who is so, because he is the eternal and necessary Being.

The notion of Three necessary eternal Beings is in it self sufficiently absurd; for the meaning of a neces­sary eternal Being, is a Being which in the Nature of things, and our con­ceptions concerning them, could not but be or exist: it was impossible it should be otherwise, because it im­plies a contradiction that any Being or Person should now be, if either it had not been from all Eternity, or were not produced from that which was from Eternity; for of nothing comes nothing: but it was not necessary there should be more than one such Being, because one such Being, since he is all-sufficient, is in all Reason suf­ficient for it self and all other Beings whatever; and if one is sufficient, two or more cannot be necessary; for that implies this Contradiction, That one is sufficient and not sufficient, a­nother is necessary where one is All­sufficient.

As the supposition of three neces­sary perfect Beings is in it self absurd, so it is more absurd to say, that two of these necessary perfect Beings want some Perfections; because necessary perfect Beings cannot want any Perfections. There was, 'tis true, an eternal necessity that some Being should exist of it self, or without a Cause, and have all Perfections; yet there could not be any necessity of a­nother Being which should want any of those Perfections the first had; for it is as much as to say, that it was eternally necessary there should exist a Being in some respects imperfect, that is, an imperfect God; nay, not only imperfect, but useless and super­fluous. And therefore it must be ab­surd to suppose it should be necessary and essential to the Divine Nature of the Father, to have two Natures to e­mane from him, which though they are supposed to be each Almighty and All-sufficient, yet must be as needless to himself or to any Creation, as he is All-sufficient for both; and who can serve for no other end, than to rob Him of that Honour, Power, Do­minion, Glory, Praise, Adoration, Love, &c. which without those E­manations he would wholly enjoy to himself, and which he can now only share with two others; so that no­thing can be a wilder Notion, than of one God emaning two Gods.

If it be not contrary to Reason there should be more than one neces­sary Divine Nature; I demand a Rea­son why the Heathens were blam'd for believing a Plurality of such, since there can be no reason assign'd for above one, which will not equally hold for as many or more than they worshipped; all which but one they supposed were not self-existent, but emaned Gods. And if they were without excuse for worshipping more [Page 10] than one God, it must be plain by the Light of Nature what that one God is; otherwise the generality of Mankind could not distinguish be­tween Theism and Polytheism. And does not the Light of Nature de­monstrate, that one God is but one e­ternal necessary Being? And can it be suppos'd that the Scripture should so severely condemn the Heathens as sinning against the clearest Light of Nature, in adoring more than one; and at the same time require the Chri­stians upon pain of eternal Damna­tion, to worship three eternal neces­sary Natures? which is to make the Holy Scripture to contradict not only the Light of Nature, but it self; and let him if he can produce any one Argument against a plurality of Gods, which will not equally hold a­gainst a plurality of Divine Natures. There are none that have wrote a­gainst Heathenism, but have thought the Impossibility of more than one ne­cessary Nature, a Demonstration against the Plurality of Gods; and conse­quently they suppos'd it most evident, that there can be no more but one such Nature, because they use it as a Medi­um (which ought always to be clear­er than that which is prov'd by it) to prove the Existence of but one God.

I shall only instance one Authority which may be instar omnium, and that is Grotius de verit. relig. Christ. The first Attribute of God (saith he in the beginning of that excellent Book) is, that he is one God and no more. This is thence collected, that he is that Be­ing which is necessarily and by himself; for whatsoever is necessarily or by it self, is not considered in Kind, but as it is in Act: but if you suppose more Gods, then you will find nothing in each of them, why any of them should necessa­rily be, and no reason why there should be rather two than three, or ten than five: Add hereunto, that the multi­plicity of singular things of the same kind, proceeds from the fecundity of Causes, by reason of which fewer or more things are brought forth; but God has no Origin nor Cause. So that this great Man is contrary to our Author in every thing. 1. In supposing it im­possible there should be more than one necessary Being. 2. That more than one such necessary Being would infer more than one God; and that God could not out of the Fecundity of Causes multiply his Kind. 3. What­ever had a Cause or Origin, could not be God. 4. That there is no differ­ence between necessary Being, or Be­ing by it self, or without a Cause; they are really one and the same with Him, and so they are with all that have writ on this Subject: They sup­pose God self-existent or without a Cause, because he is necessary and e­ternal. They never make use of our Author's admirable distinction, pag. 50. of having necessary Existence from a­nother, and necessary Existence from one's self.

He asks me pag. 48. whether I think that God can be the necessary Cause of nothing; or whether the Per­fection of his Nature does not determin Him to do what is best, or to do what [Page 11] he in his infinite Wisdom knows fit to be done? To which I answer, That the Question between us is not what the Perfection of his Nature doth de­termin him to; but what the Perfecti­on of his Nature is? whether three perfect necessary Natures or one only? which is questioning whether the Unity of God be a Perfection or not. Whatsoever is necessarily in God must contain the highest Perfection, o­therwise it would not be essential to his Nature: but God being in his own numerically one Nature, absolutely and infinitely Happy and Perfect, two other Divine Natures cannot be in Him, or (which is all one with our Author) emane from him necessarily, because they can add no Perfection great or little to Him, who in his one Nature contains all Perfections what­ever. He and they together can be no more Good, Powerful, Wise, than he is alone: He alone is All-sufficient, and two other such Natures can make him no more. Therefore it must be directly contrary to the Nature of God and highly injurious to his Honour, to suppose his Nature necessarily to emane two Persons, who must be needless ad intra to God himself, and as useless ad extra as God himself is All-sufficient. But if God gave a Being freely to the Son and Holy Spi­rit, because he in his infinite Wisdom knew it fit to be done, they are no more necessary Beings than all other Beings which God also produced, be­cause he in his infinite Wisdom knew it fit to be done, or that the Perfecti­on of his Nature did determin him to what was best; and consequently they as all others continue in Being, because God's Wisdom thinks it best. But to say that God acted otherways than so, that is necessarily, in producing or causing the Son and Holy Spirit to ex­ist, who are as distinct and different from Him as two Men are from all o­ther Men, is either to make him act without understanding, or else to act contrary to his Mind: for Necessity only takes Place where Thoughts are wholly wanting, or else the Power to act or forbear acting according to the Direction of Thought. But if God did not give them then Beings, neither as necessitated, nor because he in his Wisdom thought fit, (which our Au­thor calls necessarily) he could not (there being no middle way) give them their Beings at all, or be the Original or Cause of them; and con­sequently they having no Origin or Cause, must be as much without a Cause, or self-existent, as the Father and the same necessity (if I may so say) that made the Father to exist, must make them exist. And the Father, upon sup­position that they necessarily eman'd, can be no more the Original of them than of his own Nature, because the same Necessity that made his Nature exist, made it emane: It was as essen­tial to it to emane, as to exist; and con­sequently the emaning Natures must be as self-existent, and independent as his own Nature, since they no more depend on him for Existence, or con­tinuance in Existence, than his own Nature does. Which very thing would the Defender seriously consider, it [Page 12] would make him abate of his confi­dence in his Hypothesis. But more of this hereafter.

2. Now I shall remind him, that tho the Design of his Propositions is to prove the Doctrine of the Trinity is not contradictory to natural Reason, yet they (as I observ'd, Sect. 64.) di­rectly destroy the Unity of God, which is the second Point I am to examine: and that we may be assured there are not three Persons or Divine Natures in the Godhead, he affirms, Prop. 13. That the Godhead, or GOD in the high­est Sense, can be but ONE NUME­RICALLY, and therefore the One­ness so frequently affirmed of him in Scripture, is a numerical Oneness: and in his Answer to the Consid. (to which he refers me) he says pag. 23. That the Name of GOD in Scripture is ever to be understood in the absolutely highest Sense. How could an Unitarian in more direct Terms deny a Trinity? What he urges in behalf of the Trini­ty is pag. 17. where he says, The Holy Scripture doth abundantly declare the Unity of God, but no where distinguish­eth of Unity, nor says of what Na­ture that Unity is which it ascribes to God. But is not this directly contra­dicting Prop. 13. where he declares of what Nature or sort the Unity of God is, to wit, a numerical Unity; and pag. 22. That the Name of God in Scripture is ever to be understood in that highest Sense? And indeed it had been very absurd to suppose the Scrip­ture did frequently inculcate that God is one, and yet not let us know in what Sense he is one, except it be obvious to common Reason what that One­ness is, to wit, one eternal absolutely perfect necessary Being. It's most certain that when we ascribe any thing to God as a Perfection, we a­scribe it in the highest Sense, and con­sequently the Oneness of God must be taken in that Sense. I desire to know what will destroy the Unity of God, if every thing Treble in him will not do it, as three Natures with three un­limited Powers, Wisdoms, Goodnesses.

But he pleads, they are not three Gods, because there is an immediate Union in their spiritual Substances: But I say, no Union whatever can make three, each of which is one God, to be but one God; because it is first saying, each is one God, and then de­nying it by saying, all three are but one God; so that it cannot without a manifest Contradiction be said, that while each remains one God, they can any way be united into one God: for three of the same kind will be thrice what one of the same kind is. If Uni­on make them one God, it must either identify them by making them one and the same God; and consequently there can be no real distinction between them, or it must make none of them God by making them parts of God, which by Union compose one God. For we have no other Idea of Compo­sition, but of one thing being made up of several, which by being united con­stitute that one; and which whether material or immaterial we cannot conceive, but as parts of the thing they constitute. For since each is not the whole, it must be only a part of [Page 13] the whole, whatever our Author pag. 54. says to the contrary. I would willingly know why they are not as much three Gods, though suppos'd substantially united, as if they were not united, since each has in himself distinctly from the others all the Per­fections of the Divine Nature, and they could have no more if they were separate. It is as much Idolatry to a­dore three united as three ununited Gods, since in both Cases you equally rob God of his Honour, by paying it to two numerically diverse and dif­ferent Gods: And being Substances, they are in their Natures capable of subsisting apart from one another.

He pag. 53. misrepresents what I say concerning Union, as though I argued against the bare possibility of their being united, and not of their becoming one God by Union, while each remain'd God distinct from the others: and then makes a long Ha­rangue about Mystery, in which he says, if he do not seriously cry My­stery, I know what I know of him.

But however to do him the fuller Justice, I will mention what he further says concerning this Union. In his first Defence, pag. 19. He saith, They are as much one with one another, as they without the most apparent contra­diction are capable of being one. A Heathen would not have scrupled to have said as much of his Gods. But he goes on and says, They are much more than specifically one: but then it is evident they cannot be so much di­stinguished as so many Men or Angels which are but specifically one. But he will not allow that they are identified or numerically one, (p. 53.) but if we cannot apprehend any Medium be­tween numerical and specifical One­ness, then in professing to believe it, we profess we know not what. But I suppose he will say at this turn, as he does in his second Defence, pag. 26. Well, suppose this! Is it impossible for a thing to be of which we sorry Mortals have no Idea? I say no, by no means; but with humble Submission he's a very sorry Mortal that requires us to believe Words without any Idea's an­nex'd to them. But let our Author say what he will, he has still a Simily to help him out. This Medium be­tween specifick and numerical Unity, is as great a Unity as that between the Sun, its Splendour, and the Light of both: But those must be either dif­ferent or the same thing; if different, though of the same Kind, there can be but a specifick Unity, or if the same, a numerical Unity. If by the Light he means a thin Collection of minute Particles, as he, pag. 58. defines it, then he supposes the Splendor to be a second Sun, emitting a small sort of active, subtile and piercing Particles: but if by Light and Splendor he means those Idea's those Particles cause in us, he cannot distinguish between Splen­dour and the Light of the Splen­dor, because Splendour is but a great­er degree of Light caused by those minute Particles in a greater Quanti­ty, or more directly striking our Eyes; so that his Simily is every way faulty.

But because in his often repeated Similies about the Sun, its Light and [Page 14] Heat, he supposes somewhat in the Sun, or which does exist by emaning from it, analogous to our Idea's of Light and Heat; I told him, Sect. 69. That though there is in the Sun a Power to produce in us Heat and Light, as well as Pain and Pleasure, yet there are no such Sensations or Qualities in the Sun, which though (pag. 57.) he argues against, yet he says the very same thing; but lest his Reader should perceive it, he calls the Effects (which when one pretends to talk Philosophically, is very improper) by the Names of the Causes, and will not say that Heat is caused by, but that Heat is a close Collection of mi­nute, subtile, active, piercing Parti­cles, and Light a thinner Collection of them. But do Clothes and Exercise by causing Heat, Produce a Collection of such Particles? Why do they not some­times produce Light, which is but a less close Collection? But in arguing thus, he grants all I would have, viz. That there are no such Qualities in the Sun, or emaning from it: but the Sun being a Body in perpetual Agita­tion, there are minute Particles flow­ing from it, which by their Figure, Texture and Motion, alter the Fi­gure, Texture and Motion of some of the smallest parts of our Hands and Eyes, and thereby produce in us Light and Heat, which are as much meer perceptions as Pain and Pleasure. And I say again, there has not been any Book writ these late Years on this Subject, but what proves there's no­thing in Matter, besides Bulk, exter­nal Figure, and internal Configurati­on of its minute Parts, which by their Motion produce in us Heat, Light, Colour, Sound, Taste, &c. But enough of this.

Our Author says in his first Defence, pag. 20. That outwardly and in re­ference to the Creation, they [the three Divine Natures] are perfectly one and the same God, as concurring in all the same external Actions, though in relation to one another there is a real distinction between them. But if there is no distinction between them in re­spect of the Creatures to whom they are one and the same God; why do the Trinitarians worship them as nu­merically different Gods? for if they adored them as the same God, it would be as impossible to worship the one and not the other, as to worship and not to worship the same God. But can there be a real and not a real di­stinction between them? The reason he gives why the three Divine Natures are but one God, is as surprizing as the thing it self; it is because they con­cur in all the same external Actions: But if each is God, does it not sup­pose three concurring Gods? Can one and the same God be said to concur with himself? Is it not directly agaisnt the Honour of the Father, who is God in the highest Sense, to suppose him but a concurring God? It is in a manner ungodding him, since we can­not say then that we owe more than the third part of our Being, Preser­vation and Happiness to him. For to attribute them wholly to him, would be robbing the other two who equally concur with him, of what is their [Page 15] due: and no Action can be wholly at­tributed to one, which jointly belongs to Three. But if it be injurious to each Divine Nature to ascribe to it but a Third of those Benefits we receive; it must be injurious to say they con­cur'd in conferring them. But if he says each wholly does all external Actions, then he contradicts himself in supposing each concurs; for he that wholly does an Action, can never be said to concur in doing it. And if the Father be the Original of Mankind, there cannot be a second and third O­riginal, except Men can have as ma­ny Origins. A second Original is as great nonsense as a Second First, and a first Original is no more Sense than a First First: But I refer the Desender to my Letter, from Sect. 77, to 83. where I have handled this Point more fully. By this time I believe it is evi­dent to an impartial Reader, that no­thing our Author has affirmed of the Son and Holy Spirit does abate of their being Gods in the highest Sense, or make them one and the same God with the Father; and consequently there cannot be a more open and gros­ser Polytheism than his Hypothesis of three eternal and necessary Divine Na­tures. But,

The Defender is not content with asserting three such Natures, (which one would think sufficiently absurd) but he also runs into a Number of Inconsistences concerning the Manner of the Existence of two of these Na­tures in making them such, and yet not self-existent, or from none; but that they had their eternal Beings from another. Now as it is evident that whatsoever is self-existent is eternal, because there is no Author or Cause of its being; so it is as evident, that whatsoever is not self-existent, but has receiv'd its Being from another, or has been caused to be, cannot be from Eternity; because to receive a Being, or to be caused to be, sup­poseth the Non-being to precede Be­ing. They must once not be, other­wise they were not capable of being caused to be; and consequently they could not always have been in being or from Eternity. What can be a more manifest Contradiction, than that that which had ever been, should once be caused to be? or that that which had been from all Eternity, should from not-being be produced, caused or e­maned into Being? Or must not that which is emaned into being, some­time or other begin to be? Or can that which has a Beginning be from Eternity, which necessarily supposeth no Beginning? For we have no Idea of any thing being from Eternity, but that it had no Origin. But our Au­thor, pag. 46. says, That the Son and Spirit had an Origin. And Prop. 6. The Father is the Original of all other Beings, in which the Son and Holy Spi­rit are comprehended. So that we must (if we can) believe that two ne­cessary Natures had an eternal Origin or Beginning; and that they have been caused to be, tho they have al­ways been. It's as great a Contradi­ction to say, that that which has had an Origin has been from Eternity, as that that which will have an End shall [Page 16] last to Eternity: And if what has had an Origin, can be from Eternity, Cre­ation, which is but giving an Origin to things, may be from Eternity. And why might not God cause a thing to be voluntarily as well as necessarily from Eternity, since in both Cases Being is equally bestow'd? And eve­ry Being that is not without a Cause, (as God the Father alone is) must have a Beginning; for there is no Me­dium between having Being from none, and from some one: and what has Being from some one, must once be without Being, and so have a Be­ginning. And if God be Eternal be­cause he is Self-existent, by parity of Reason, what is not Self-existent can­not be from Eternity: Eadem est ra­tio contrariorum, is as undoubted a Maxim as any whatever; so that no­thing can be more evident than that, To have an Origin or Cause, or not to be self-existent, and to be from E­ternity, are inconsistent. And if they are inconsistent in themselves, what­ever Terms you express them in, they will be still inconsistent. Whence it favours (to say no worse) of great prejudice, and fondness of an Hypo­thesis, that when a thing is a Contra­diction in some Terms, to seek out o­thers to hide the Contradiction.

But our Author is so unhappy in his Attempt, that the very Terms he makes use of, (viz. To have Existence from God by way of necessary emanati­on) contain in themselves a direct Contradiction: for whatsoever sub­stantial Being or Nature emaneth from another, must before its Emanation exist some way or other in the Nature it emaneth from, otherwise it is im­possible to emane from it, but it must emane from nothing, which is the ve­ry same as Creation: For every Na­ture must either emane from nothing, or from the Nature in which it pre­existed. But to suppose a Nature to exist by emaning, is to suppose it did not exist before its Emanation, and consequently could not emane from another Nature, but from nothing: Except it first emaned from the Na­ture and afterward existed; which puts me in mind of a certain Poet, who introduces Adam in great haste going to be created. So that if the Son and H. Spirit did not exist before their Emanation, it is impossible they should emane from God, otherwise than that God by the voluntary exer­cise of his Divine Power emaned them from nothing; and consequently they could not emane or issue forth (as he Prop. 15. terms it) from the Divine Nature. But if the Son and Holy Spirit did exist before they emaned, they did not exist by Emanation, but were self-existent as the Nature of the Father. Upon my asserting of which, Sect. 58. he answers pag. 47. But I say with as great assurance, that what­soever Substance emanes from another, must owe its existence to that other; and the contrary is a manifest Contra­diction, but to whom I know not ex­cept to himself. But I must beg leave to dissent and tell him, that all Sub­stances whatsoever owe their existence to God, and not to the Substance they emane from; and that all Ge­neration, [Page 17] Emanation, or Procession in created Beings, is only the different Forms and Figures which the various Coalitions of Matter, according to the Laws of Motion, do produce: and consequently whatever Substance e­manes from another, however it may be modified by it, does not owe its Existence to it, but is as old as the Creation it self. And by Parity of Reason, whatsoever emanes from a self-existent Substance, does not owe its Existence to the Substance it emanes from, but is as self-existent as that Substance. Though to exist by e­maning except from nothing, be, as hath been shown, nothing less than a Contradiction; yet our Author tells us, pag. 18. it is a very presumptuous Conceit, and in the second Defence, pag. 25. an intolerable Presumption not to conclude it possible. Though he fur­ther says, we have a clearer Idea of it than voluntary Creation; yet all the Idea he gives us of it is, That it's a more excellent way of existing than that of Creation.

But before I proceed in the Exa­mination of his Hypothesis, it will be necessary to obviate an exception he takes at my using words taken from material Substances, in discoursing of Spiritual ones; which is a most frivo­lous exception, because it is impossible to be avoided, since we have no Ideas, and consequently no words to express them in, but what we have from sen­sible or material Objects, and the o­perations of our Minds about them, as is fully demonstrated in Mr. Lock's Essay of Human Understanding: And it is sufficiently evident from Holy Scripture it self, which that we may understand it, represents God with Face, Eyes, Hands, Bowels, back parts, Motion from Place to Place, &c. and so Spirits are describ'd as Stand­ing, Falling down, &c. and in a Word, so are all other things relating to spiritual Beings. But this excep­tion is very strange from one whose Hypothesis is built chiefly upon Ema­nations, which is a Word borrow'd from Matter, and signifies those mi­nute Parts or Effluvia's of Matter which flow from Bodies: and his Hy­pothesis makes the whole, or the one Divine Essence, either to emane from it self, or to be divisible, and have parts emane from it; or else what he says is wholly unintelligible.

The first Argument I made use of, Sect. 57. to shew it impossible the Son and Spirit could emane from the Father, was, That they being both infinite Substances, and as such being equal; to suppose two Infinites to e­mane from one, is to suppose twice as much to emane from a Being or Substance, as the Being is. To which he answers, I change his Phrase, Be­ings whose Perfections are unlimited, and who have all they can have with­out a manifest Contradiction; which Phrase by the way, is not to be found in his Propositions. But why might not I call them infinite Substances, since twice in his Propositions by way of Explication, he calls them Substances, and every where talks of the Union of their Substances: and pag. 56. of his third Defence, de­fines [Page 18] Person by Substance? And it is evident, that if the Substances do not emane, the Perfections that subsist in them cannot emane; and if the Per­fections are infinite or unlimited, the Substances cannot be finite or limited: and pag. 8. he expresly says, The Son and Holy Ghost are all boundless and infinite. But where is the Difference between Infinite and his own term un­limited? Does not the one signify without Bounds, as the other without End? and the Argument will equal­ly hold with the one Term or the other. Therefore I have no Reason to change those Terms, nor did I injure him in using them. But that all In­finites are equal, is as evident as that there is an inequality between Finite and Infinite: for if one Infi­nite were less than another, there must be some bound or end of that Infi­nite, which would be to make it Fi­nite; wherefore for two Infinites to emane from one, is to say, twice as much emanes from a Being as the Be­ing is. Nay, if the Son and Holy Spirit were both but one Infinite, to suppose them to emane from but one other Infinite, is to suppose the whole Infinite to emane from it self; but if their Nature each of them is as truly Divine and Infinite as that of the Fa­ther, they must each of them be equal to him, and consequently cannot e­mane from him. Can two Suns (which is a more proper Simily for equal Natures, than the Sun and the Rays) emane from one Sun? Would it not be to suppose twice as much to emane from the Sun as was in it?

The Defender upon better thoughts, though I did not make use of his Phrases, thus replies, Be he pleased to take notice, that there is nothing in this acute arguing, except he means by infinite Substances, Substances of an infinite bigness. He might as well have said, To be and not to be was a Contradiction only in Substances of infinite bigness; for the Reason is the same, of what Nature or sort soever the Substances be, provided they were capable of emaning: Because the Ar­gument does not depend upon a Be­ing having Bigness or Quantity, but upon the equality of Beings that e­mane from one another: For let an equal number which has neither Mat­ter nor Bulk emane from an equal; does not the whole Number emane from it self? So substract an Hour from an Hour, and see what becomes of the first Hour. So that if the Na­ture of the Father emanes from it self an infinite and boundless Nature, it must wholly exhaust the Nature of the Father, which is but Boundless and In­finite. But to suppose two such Na­tures to emane from him, is to sup­pose twice as much to emane as the Father's Nature is. It is (as I ob­served Sect. 59.) dividing one infinite Substance into three infinite Parts. To which he replies, How does our Author already run Taplash? But I will not therefore forbear replying, and I answer, No doubt it is a horrid Contradiction so to affirm: but how rank doth this smell of the gross thing called Body? his Mind runs al­together upon material Substances, which [Page 19] alone, I say, have Parts to be divided into. Then he goes on to demonstrate, that an infinite Spiritual Substance can­not be divided into infinite Spiritual Parts; which is the absurdity, or if he pleases, the Taplash I am condemn­ing as the immediate consequence of his Hypothesis. For what difference can we perceive between one infinite Nature emaning out of it self two in­finite Natures, by which it so far parts with them, as they become two di­stinct and diverse Natures from it, as distinct and different as so many Men or Angels, and one infinite Nature divided into three infinite Parts? And by our Author's leave we not only attribute Parts to Matter, but we are forc'd to do so to every thing (whe­ther Finite or Infinite) we can in our Minds add to and abstract from, which we cannot but conceive as Parts. So we say that Numbers and Duration, and Space though Infinite, have Parts. And the sober Enquirer, in his View of the Considerations, pag. 92. owns that conceptible parts in the Deity no Man can avoid: And if neither the whole Divine Nature nor a part of it emaned from it self, it is a Contra­diction to our Idea's, that any thing should emane from it: What is a Contradiction in those Terms, will be so in any other.

But to gratify our Author as much as possible, we will express his Do­ctrine in the softest Terms we can, viz. one self-existent, eternal and ne­cessary Nature, which alone is first in Nature, not in Time, whilst it remains such, being not subject to any altera­tion whatever, becomes necessarily and eternally, three eternal and necessary Natures, two of which are not self­existent. Or in other words, one im­mutable God necessarily and eternally becomes three Gods of the same Na­ture, but not three self-existent Gods: which though they are monstrous Contradictions in themselves, and to our conception of but one God; yet our Author is so happy as to be able to tell us how this is done, namely, by Emanation, whereby two of these Natures issued forth (as he terms it) from the self-existent Nature. And though each of these Natures is equal to the Nature from whence they e­maned; yet the emaning Nature is not capable of the least Diminution: Though one would think to have two Natures to emane from one single Nature, so as to be distinct and different in Number from it, must be a diminution to that Nature, since it has two Natures by emaning them from it self less than it had. But if the Nature of God is indivisible, and consequently no part nor any thing of it can emane; nothing can be more evident but that all other Natures, be­cause not self-existent, must be pro­duc'd from nothing. But he says, pag. 13. There is not a Creature that generates another of the same kind, but may be properly said to communi­cate its own Nature, and yet notwith­standing forgoes not its own individu­al Nature, nor any part of it. But by his leave every generating Crea­ture does part with some of its Sub­stance, (which he may call Nature) [Page 20] whereof the Foetus is form'd, and which by Accession of Nourishment grows at length to be a Nature or Substance equal to its Parent. But in the divine Generation the Son and Spirit have their whole Beings and Na­tures from the Father's Nature, and not by accession from without, but all at once, and from all Eternity. So that for the Father to communicate his Nature to each of them, whose Natures are equal to his, would be doubly to annihilate himself.

For a Nature to multiply its kind, is a sign of Defect and Weakness in that kind of Nature: for the same Reason that makes it capable of Propagating, makes it subject to Corruption and Dissolution, because it supposes it divi­sible and subject to augmentation and diminution, which Beings in their Na­ture immortal are not; and therefore what can be more absurd than to ar­gue from Beings that are divisible, and for that reason alone capable of Ge­neration or Emanation, to Beings that are indivisible, and consequent­ly not capable of having Emanations flow from their Substances? I know none in his Senses ever supposed so gross a thing of finite Spirits as pro­pagating their kind: however some Men take the Liberty not only to sup­pose it of God himself, but that he acts therein necessarily as inanimate Beings do; nay, they suppose it to be one of the highest and most essential Perfections of his Nature, which I conceive to be most absurd, as well as a most high Affront to the sole infinite Majesty of God; and it carries this in it, that it necessarily inferreth not only a Plurality, but an Infinity of Gods: For if God does not constant­ly and necessarily multiply Divine Na­tures, he has lost a Perfection which they say is essential and necessary to his Nature; which change cannot hap­pen in the Nature of God, but if (as the Sun successively emits an in­numerable company of new Rays) he does from Eternity to Eternity pro­duce new Natures, they must needs be infinite in Number. But if he says God is eternally emaning into Exi­stence the Son and Holy Spirit, it is so far from being true, that they were eternally begotten or emaned into actual Being, that they never will be, so, though the Father is in doing it from Eternity to Eternity, by a con­tinued successive Generating. But how can they that were, as he says, bound­less and infinite from Eternity, be ca­pable of any farther Production? And every new or farther Production must be as infinite and boundless as each of them.

Having thus fully (as I suppose) shown the impossibility of the Fa­ther's issuing forth Emanations from his own Nature, I shall be the shorter in my Remarks upon his Answers.

I said, Sect. 59. upon Supposition that the Son and Spirit are necessary Emanations, I cannot see how they owe their Origin more to the Father, than the Father to them, since they are all three of a Substance, which is self-existent; Which is (he says) ve­ry surprizing, and as much as to say, that the Root no less owes its Origin [Page 21] to the Tree, or the Rays to the Sun, than vice versâ. As to his Simily from the Sun, I have sufficiently spo­ken to it already. As to that about the Root and the Tree, it is evident (not to mention that the Tree cannot owe its Origin to the Root, because it is part of the Tree) that the Trunk and Branches do not owe their Origin to the Root, but are all visibly in the Seed, which by Nourishment received from without, do equally increase to their designed Bulk. But to make it any ways parallel, Suppose a self­existent Root to emane necessarily from it self (without any new Matter added to it) two Trunks, each of which is as big as the emaning Root; would not the Substances of all three be self-existent, since they are all three of the self-same self-existent Sub­stance; and consequently one can no more owe its Origin to another, than the self-same Substance can owe its Origin to it self?

In the same Section I said, What­soever [Substance] proceeds from a­nother, must first be in it, except it can be in it and proceed from it at the same time. Upon which he asks, Whether the Rays are not as old as the Sun? or whether all Thoughts must be younger than Minds, because they have their Original from them? As to the first, I grant the Rays are as old as the Sun, and the reason is, be­cause they have the same Origin as the Sun; yet they cannot be in the Sun, and emane from it at the same time. As to the second, Whether Thoughts are younger than Minds, it is not to the purpose, because we are discoursing of Substances, and of sub­stantial Emanations; which if he sup­poses Thoughts to be, how many Substances would be created and an­nihilated in a Minute? But however, to answer his Question, All Thoughts must be younger than Minds, because Thoughts are Operations of the Mind, in conceiving and comparing Idea's together, consequently Minds must be before Thoughts. But though all Thoughts must be younger than Minds, because they owe their Origin to the Mind, as being meer Operati­ons of the Mind; yet the Powers or Abilities that are essential to the Mind, must be as old as the Mind, be­cause they do not owe their Origin to the Mind. Here he blames me for calling Emanation a Separation, and says, That Distinction, Separation and Difference, are several things. I suppose most of the Trinitarians think Distinction and Difference to be so, because their Books are full of Di­stinctions without Difference. He further says, That tho the Son and Spirit proceed from the Father, yet they are still in him, and ever have been in him. But to emane from, to issue forth and proceed from, and yet still to be in, are Contradictions in our Conceptions. And our Author, Pag. 45. makes emaning from, and kind­ling, the same. But what is kind­ling, but separating the Parts of any thing one from another, by a violent rapid Motion? And what is the E­manation of the Rays, which he so much insists on, but their separation [Page 22] from the Body of the Sun?

In the next, Sect. 60. he wholly mistakes the Argument, and then wanders to God's Decrees; which is nothing to the Purpose, in a Dis­course of substantial Emanations.

Upon my saying, Sect. 63. What greater Absurdity can there be, than that Beings which have infinite Perfections, should want some? Be­sides a long Harangue about Infi­nite, he answers, It is no monstrous Business to imagine, that a Being which has not every Perfection, may have those it is possest of, in the high­est degree. To which I reply, that it is monstrous that a Divine Nature which he owns contains all Perfecti­ons, should want some Perfections, and those the chiefest: Or that Na­tures, that are, as he says, boundless and infinite, should not have infinite Perfections; which is to make them (to use his Word) unlimited in Es­sence, but limited in the Perfections of Essence, as wanting the greatest; the want of which abates, (as he says, pag. 7.) and consequently bounds their boundless Perfections. Nor can they have in the highest Degree those Perfections they are possest of, as un­limited Power, Wisdom and Good­ness: For if the Father be the only Wise, the only Good, and greater than the Son and Spirit, they have not those Perfections in the highest De­gree, nor are they (as I have already proved) unlimited. God cannot communicate any of his Attributes, without communicating all; because he cannot communicate any, without communicating his Divine Essence, in which (as all Properties do in a Substance) they inseparably exist. And if God communicate his Essence, he must communicate with it his Self­existence and Independency, which are also inseparable from his Essence.

I must now beg leave to transcribe my Sect. 68. that the Reader may the better see whether it contains so GROSS A CONCEIT, and such BEASTLY STUPIDITY, as our Author, pag. 55. charges it with.— ‘If they, the three supposed infinite Substances, are more than one, they cannot be Infinite, because being Substances of the same Sort, they must be bounded and limited one by another. If the Substance of the Father be every where, How can the Substance of the Son be every where too, at the same time, and after the same manner? For if Beings can be in the same Place at the same time, in the same man­ner as they must be if they are of the same sort, it is impossible to distinguish them; because we have no other mark of distinction be­tween Beings, but that they can­not be in the same Place, at the same time, in the same manner.’

I hope our Author will grant that two Numbers will determine one the other, because if they did not, they would be one and the same: and con­sequently whatever things we predi­cate two or more of, they must bound one another, otherwise they could not be two: what makes them two, must necessarily limit them; so that two [Page 23] Infinites are a plain Contradiction, be­cause nothing can be Infinite which is determined: but if they are two, they must be determined, otherwise they would not be two but one and the same. One Infinite cannot con­tain or comprehend another Infinite; if it did, it would be the same and not another; therefore that other must determine it: What is not all of the same kind, and so is singular, must have bounds or limits, other­wise it would be all; and this is so ve­ry plain, that should a Man in any o­ther Case affirm more than one Infi­nite of the same kind, he would scarce be thought to be in his Senses. Who was ever so ridiculous as to assert more than one Infinite Space, more than one infinite Duration? yet nei­ther Space nor Duration are corporeal Substances. To suppose two infinite Spaces or Durations, must we not ne­cessarily suppose an end or limit to one, before the other can commence? To suppose two Infinites of the same sort, is to suppose an infinite addition to that which is already Infinite; therefore it's very evident that what­ever Nature or sort a Being is of, if we conceive more than one, we can­not conceive any of them as Infinite; nor can we believe that the three Per­sons are (as he supposes) as different as so many Men or Angels, and yet be­lieve that each of them can be after the same manner every where, be­cause holding both, is to believe them distinct and not distinct, different yet the same. And this must necessarily be, as long as we have no other marks of Identity and Diversity, but that Beings cannot be after the same man­ner, in the same Place, at the same time: If our Author had any other marks of Identity and Diversity, he ought to have discovered them before he was so free of his obliging Expres­sions. If there can be more than one Infinite of a sort, there can no reason be assign'd why there may not be an infinite Number as well as two or three; so that it would not be absurd: to suppose an infinite number of Spa­ces, Durations, &c. And if more than one infinite Being can be every where, an infinite Number may as well be every where; and by parity of Reason a vast Number of finite Spi­rits may be in the very same Space as contains one, which our Author ve­ry roundly supposes, and says, They that do not suppose it have no manner of Notion of what they believe. But Mr. Lock (whom I never heard charg'd with beastly stupidity, or of having no Notion of what he says) in his Essay of Human Understanding, Ch. Identity, speaks thus: ‘We have Idea's but of three sorts of Sub­stances; first God, second finite In­telligences, third Bodies. Though these three sorts of Substances do not exclude one another out of the same Place, yet we cannot conceive but that they must necessarily each of them, exclude any of the same kind out of the same Place, or else the Notions of Identity and Di­versity would be in vain. There could be no such distinction of Sub­stances or any thing else from one another.’

[Page 24] And if other Authorities after this great Man were not needless, I might add the Learned Cusanus, who Lib. 3. de mente, says, Impossibile est plura esse Infinita, quoniam alterum esset in altero finitum. There cannot be more than one Infinite, because the one would make the other Finite. And another Learned Author says, Quic­quid actu est infinitum, ei nequit dari mensura. Deus est actu infinitus, ne­quit ergo ei dari mensura qua mensu­retur. At si plures essent Dei, unus esset mensura aliorum, & sic nullus eorum esset infinitus. There can be no measure of that which is actually in­finite: God is actually infinite, there­fore there can be no measure of him. But if there were more Gods than one, none of them would be Infinite, be­cause they would be a Measure one to another. Therefore his three Divine Natures being (as he supposes) every way united to one another, cannot but be a Measure to one another. And the greater part even of the Tri­nitarians the Modalists, look upon our Author's Doctrine of three infi­nite Natures, as a notorious Contra­diction.

But the Defender to prove his as­sertion asks, How can God be in those Spaces fill'd with Body? or how can Body and Soul be in the same Space? Which Questions I thought I had pre­vented, by adding —Beings of the same sort after the same manner: but that he says, can be only for a Blind. To which I shall no otherwise reply, than by putting him in mind of the Proverb, There are none so blind as those that will not see. How­ever by the by, it's a pretty-way of answering Arguments, to tell his Reader, That that wherein the Strength of his Argument lies, can be only for a Blind, pag. 55. But this Argu­ment holds not only in Substances of all sorts, but in Modes and Properties; as for instance, more than one with infinite Power is a Contradiction; be­cause infinite Power necessarily sup­poses Supream Power, which because all delegated Power is contain'd in it, comprehends all Power. And since our Author, pag. 61. has a distinct Notion of a Being absolutely Perfect, and Beings of unlimited Perfections; I desire to know what Idea's he has of three having each of them su­pream or unlimited Power over the Universe? Is it not first asserting that one has it, then denying it by saying another has it? The Christians of the first Ages thought it an unanswerable Argument against the Heathens, that there could not be more than one God, because there could not be (supream Power being indivisible) more than one that could enjoy it. How easily could the Heathens have retorted this Argument upon the Christians, had they held with our Author more Na­tures than one, each with supream or unlimited Power: So that if the Father has all or supream Power, it's evident the Power of the Son can be no other than a delegated subordinate Power, and consequently not unli­mited and infinite; and the Reason will equally hold for all other Divine Perfections: So that by what has been [Page 25] said it appears, that to suppose more than one Divine Nature, is to make God a Finite and limited Nature with Finite and limited Perfections, which is in a manner as dishonourable to God, as to deny he has any Being at all.

But our Author is not content with what he says here, but pag. 58. after a long Dialogue of his own framing, (where he makes a Man of my Head­piece (as he phrases it) not hesitate at replying that Space is a real nothing, and a great many silly things besides) he charges me with prodigious, mon­strous Presumption, in drawing most confident conclusions from Premises that are unspeakab [...]y above the reach of human Understanding—and with Fol­ly and Madness in the Liberty I take with the most profoundly adorable De­ity (he should have said Deities.) In answer to which, and all his harangue concerning Mystery, and the difficul­ties pag. +6) about Eternity, &c. which a Polytheist might as well make use of for a Million of Gods, or a Papist for Transubstantiation, or any other Contradiction though never so palpable; I shall only ask our Author, Are Infinity and Eternity mere empty Sounds without Idea's annext to them? If they are, why does he use such words? If they are not, is it not possible to join other Idea's to them, which are manifestly inconsistent with them? which if he has done, then all his Common-place-Harangue will not make them consistent. To what end is such an Harangue? except he will say, there's no knowing a Con­tradiction from a Difficulty. Or must a Man be oblig'd to solve all the dif­ficulties in Nature and Metaphysicks, before he can have a Right to tell him, that he is chargeable with as gross Contradictions, as to be, and not to be. For though our Idea's of Infinity and Eternity are not compleat and ade­quate, (as perhaps our Idea's of few other things are) yet as far as they reach, they are as distinct and clear as any other; otherwise we could not demonstrate that there is an infinite e­ternal Being, of which we have as great a certainty as of any Mathema­tical Demonstration. Our Idea of Infinity consists in a supposed endless Progression of the Mind, which is still adding on to those large steps it first takes: Whatever besides the In­exhaustibility of the Subject, puts a stop to the Mind's adding on, is di­rectly contrary to our Idea of Infini­ty. As for instance, suppose you join a beginning to infinite Duration, you thereby necessarily put a stop to the Mind's adding: and therefore our Au­thor's assertion of an eternal Begin­ning or Origin, is as plain a Contra­diction as To be, and Not to be e­ternal. So in adding one Infinite to another, you put a stop to the pro­gression of the Mind concerning the first Infinite; because instead of ad­ding on, the Mind has actually past over one Infinite, and is viewing ano­ther. To add two Infinites together, is (as Mr. Lock says, Ch. Infinity, §. 20.) too gross an absurdity to be confuted. What is it then to suppose three Infinites, and those two every [Page 26] way closely united to one another? In this case, which way soever the Mind turns it self, its Idea of Infinity is destroy'd; their Continuity or Union every way terminating one another.

So that at last all the monstrous pro­digious Presumption I am guilty of, is, in owning the weakness of my Understanding, the shortness of my Idea's, and consequently the narrow­ness of my Belief, in not giving as­sent to what appears to be a Contra­diction to the Unity and Infinity of the Divine Nature.

I hope by this time the Reader is satisfied, that the 68th Section in my Letter, did not deserve those hard words the Defender was pleas'd to be­stow upon it. Had I asserted (as he does, pag. 52.) the Infinity of Quan­tity, I had deserv'd some such Com­pliments. But I must excuse him since I find what he there says is too true, that he understands nothing of Infi­nite, and that it is an amusing confound­ing word for his Brains; which, all Unitarians must think, is some excuse for his asserting the Son and Holy Spirit to be all Boundless and In­finite, as pag. 8.

I said, Sect. 70. As there can be no Inequality, such as he supposes between infinite Beings; so we cannot pay a lower degree of Honour to the Son and Spirit than to the Father, with­out supposing an infinite distance be­tween them. For as long as we pray to each as having necessarily in­herent in himself infinite Power, Wisdom, &c. our Devotion termi­nates in each, we give each the same Divine Honour. To which he says, p. 58. ‘This is a very false Charge, for we heartily acknowledg that all the Honour we pay to the Son and H. Spirit, ought to be ultimately ter­minated in the Father; and I am sure he cannot think otherwise of those he calls the real Trinitarians, because their Hypothesis necessarily obliges them so to believe, whatever the Hypothesis of the others does. But the Holy Scripture is so express upon this Point, that I should think no Christian should find it hard to believe it, no, tho there were no o­other Text but this for it, viz.—That at the Name of Jesus every Knee should bow—to the glory of God the Father, Phil. 2. 9, 10, 11.’

We will now first set when it can be said, that the Honour we give a Person is not for his own, but for the sake of another on whom it ultimate­ly terminates; and then examine whether it be such an Honour which the Trinitarians give to the Son and Holy Spirit.

The Honour we give a Person, does not ultimately terminate on him when it is not for any inherent Quality in himself, but for the sake of some Pow­er, Trust or Office that is receiv'd from another, and which he holds during the Will of that other. Thus we pay Honour to a Vice-roy, a Judg, a Magistrate, because they are the Image, or some way represent that Person who endued them with Power. Whate­ver Honour or Deference we pay such Persons, it still terminates in the Su­preme; it is for his Sake and to his [Page 27] Honour: And the Reason is, because such Persons, how much soever they may be advanced above their fellow-Subjects; yet in respect of the Person that advanced them, they have no Power at all, but are meer Ministers and Servants. So our Lord Christ, tho he is highly advanced as a Re­ward of his perfect Obedience above all his fellow-Creatures; yet in re­spect of God he is a meer Minister and Servant, wholly impotent, can (as he saith) do nothing of himself: and the Reason why the Honour given him in Scripture is not for his own sake, but for the Glory of God the Father, is, because it is a delega­ted Honour, God has made him a Prince and Saviour, giving him all Power after his Resurrection: or be­cause (as this Text says) God has highly exalted him, and given him a Name above every Name. And there is no instance in Scripture where any Honour, Glory, Power and Dignity is ascribed to Christ, either by him­self or any Man or Angel, but is ex­presly given to him either as a Man, or as the free gift of God to a Man. And it's more than probable, that this is so done, lest it should administer oc­casion to People to terminate their Worship on him, as a Divine Nature, with all Perfections necessarily and e­ternally inhering in him. It would be absurd, if he had such a Nature, not to worship him for himself ulti­mately; except an eternal and neces­sary Divine Nature is not to be wor­ship'd for its own sake, which would be to say, that the Father is not to be worship'd ultimately for the sake of his Divine Nature. The Honour that does not terminate on the Person, is never given to the Creator but to the Creature: and of this Nature is that Honour or Worship we give to those Gods or supreme Powers which are the Deputies or Representatives of the most high God: which Worship does not ultimately terminate on them, because what they have they have from God, and hold it only du­ring his Pleasure: What then can be a stronger Argument that the Son is not God than this, that the Honour we are oblig'd to pay him, does not ultimately terminate in him but in a­nother? If any thing were strange from our Author, this would be, that he that is God is not to be worship'd for his own sake, or that a supream Being must not have supream Honour.

But let us now see what sort of Worship it is which the Trinitarians pay to the Son. They, of whatso­ever Denomination, are so far from honouring the Son for the sake, and to the Glory of God the Father, that in their publick Prayers and Liturgies, they give him equal Honour with God the Father; and both Papist and Pro­testant Trinitarians in their damning Creed make them equal, and declare that none is before nor after another, none greater or less than another, the Glory equal, the Majesty coeternal. Which equality is as much to the Glory of God the Father, as it would be to the Glory of a King to have his Subjects set up two others with equal Power and Majesty. Therefore I [Page 28] wonder with what assurance our Au­thor can deny, that the Trinitarians have 3 Objects of supream Worship: and he himself in this Treatise is for giving Divine Worship to the Son and Holy Spirit; and Divine Worship can be no other than Supream, and con­sequently must terminate in the Per­son to whom it is given. Nay, he cannot terminate his Worship more in one than in another, since all three are (as he says) one and the same God with respect to the Creatures.

All that our Author can say is, that it is to the Honour of God the Father, because they depend on him; but the more dependent he supposes them, the more absurd it is to pay the same Honour to a dependent, as he does to the independent Being. But their de­pendence, since he makes them neces­sary Beings, is Independence: And because our Author is much taken with Similies, I shall oblige him with one that is more parallel than that of the Sun and Rays. Suppose (for there has been such a thing in Nature) one Man born with, and growing out of the side of another, who was a distinct Man, though necessarily united to him, which was manifest by their discour­sing one with another. Now in this instance, we have one intelligent Sub­stance emaning from another; yet this did not make him owe his Being or continuance in Being to the other, since they had the same cause of Be­ing and continuance in Being, on which cause both were equally depen­dent, and not one upon the other: nor did the Honour and Respect Men paid the side-man terminate in the o­ther; for in honouring the one, they no way honour the other. The Pa­rallel is very easy and natural: for as the two Men depended on the same Cause, and therefore the emaned Man was no way obliged to the other; so God's Nature having no Cause, his supposed Emanations must be as much without a Cause; for what is necessary to the Nature, is as much without a Cause as the Nature it self: therefore they could no more be obliged to God for their Divine Na­tures or their being Gods, than God is beholden to himself for his own Nature; since there was the same ne­cessity of his emaning them as of exi­sting himself, and consequently they are as independent as he and therefore have a right to be worshipped ultimately without reference to him, who can be no more said to give them that right than to give it himself. So that if our Author's Hypothesis be true, there are two Divine Natures or Gods, who en­joy all the Rights of their Godheads by as good a Title as the most High God himself; which if they are not three Gods in the highest Sense, it is impos­sible to imagine what are three Gods, and as such it is too notorious that all Trinitarians worship them. And tho they may with the help of Distincti­ons, without any difference, deny and wrangle about the plainest Contradi­ctions; yet it would be in vain to de­ny matters of Fact, since it is evident they have three Objects of supream Worship, each of which they adore apart one from the other; which is [Page 29] either owning three Gods, or else owning themselves guilty of wilful Idolatry, in paying Supream Wor­ship to what they do not believe to be God.

The reason why it is so necessary a Duty to believe the Unity of God, is, because we ought to have but one Ob­ject of supream Worship; whoever has more, destroys that Unity, and is guilty of Idolatry: For it is most e­vident that if the having one Object of Supream Worship, be the adoring of one God or supream Being; the ha­ving three such Objects and the ado­ring each singly and by himself, is the Worship of three Gods. And in this point, whether it be lawful to have more than one Object of supream Worship, turns at present the whole controversy between the Trinitarians and Antitrinitarians. This was the Point I chiefly insisted on in my Let­ter; and this is what I still desire a se­rious answer to: For our Author's answer is a plain denial of Matter of Fact in their Worship, and a condem­nation of those that so worship.

But to return, let the Relation be­tween the Divine Persons be what it will, that is wholly ad intra, with­out any respect or reference to Crea­tures, who being equally oblig'd to each for their Beings and all the Bles­sings they do here or shall hereafter en­joy, (which are the things they ought to pay the highest Adoration for) ought to pay to each the highest; and consequently not worship one for the Sake of the other, but each for his own sake. And this is evident from this farther Reason: For suppose (as we very well may, if there are three Divine Natures) that two of them no way concern'd themselves with human Affairs, and that our Happi­ness or Misery no way depended upon them, there would be no reason why we should give them Divine Wor­ship; but we ought to give it to him wholly from whom we have our Be­ing, and expect our Happiness: and for the same Reason, if we are equal­ly indebted to each, Justice and Gra­titude will oblige us to pay to each equal acknowledgment, and to ter­minate our Devotions no more on one than on the others. And I challenge him to produce any Text of Scrip­ture where there is any ground laid for the Worship of God, but it will agree to him that has unlimited Wisdom, Power and Goodness, &c. necessarily and eternally; and who bestows up­on us our Life and Happiness: and what Worship we exhibit to God is certainly for his own Sake, and ulti­mately terminates in him. Thus if there be the same Reason for termina­ting our Worship on the Son as on the Father, it's absurd to do otherwise.

Nay, were the Trinitarians consi­stent with themselves, they ought to pay a thousand times more Acknow­ledgments to the Son than to the Fa­ther, since the Benefits they receive from the one, so much exceed the Be­nefits they receive from the other. For suppose one should owe to two Per­sons, to whom he was otherwise e­qually oblig'd, an immense Sum, with­out payment of which he must for [Page 30] ever suffer the Miseries of an intolera­ble Imprisonment: would he not owe almost infinitely more to that Person who not only freely and generously forgave him himself, but even volun­tarily paid to the other, though with loss of his Life by an ignominious and painful Death, whatsoever their com­mon Debter owed him; to whom he was no further oblig'd than for ac­cepting the full Satisfaction of him that became his Surety. The applica­tion to the Father and the Son is very easy. As to the Father's sending his Son, if the Son were not his Subject, and so he could command him, it could amount to no more than the Fa­ther's being willing to receive and ac­cept of the Satisfaction the Son was as willing to pay in the stead of the Debter.

But let us suppose the Father, Son and H. Spirit as equal in Nature, so also equally obliging to us, and there­fore each of them deserving from us our whole Hearts and Souls, which it is impossible for us to give to more than one: we must wittingly and willingly by bestowing them on one, either commit Sacrilege against the other two, or else by dividing them, give each but a Third of that which is wholly due to each of them, which would be Sacrilege against all three. These are the Mischiefs of our Author's Scheme of Religion, which it is im­possible for him to avoid, but by own­ing with the Unitarians, that there is but one eternal necessary Nature, which is to be lov'd and honoured infinitely above all, and all others as his Crea­tures, but for his Sake and for his Glory.

And now let the Reader judg what great reason our Author has to triumph and insult over his Antagonist, as he does all along, but more especially p. 62, 63, 64. where amongst other things he says, he cannot but suspect, it is the encreasing or upholding of a Party, &c. which has very much the ascendent of the Love of Truth. How may the Learned Socrates shame the self-con­ceited Dogmatizers? How much rather would I be modest Socrates, than a Chri­stian who so leans to his own or his Par­ty's Understanding? Our Author is a little unlucky in so much mentioning Socrates, who chose rather to embrace Death than our Author's beloved Hy­pothesis of more than one Divine Na­ture, though that was the Religion of his Country and of the World: but I cannot blame him that sets up for more than one such Nature, (which appears to be contrary to the clearest Reason, as well as the most express Scripture) for condemning others for leaning upon that Guide, which the one God has obliged them to follow, their own and not others Understand­ing. As to his suggestion of our having other Motives, not the Love of Truth, in opposing him, it is as groundless as uncharitable. For what design but the Love of Truth is it almost possible for a Man to have in defending a Do­ctrine, the doing of which exposes him to be ruin'd by Penal Laws, and which is worse, makes him an Object of the Aversion and Detestation of all Sects? But since our Author has given me the occasion, I shall presume [Page 31] to ask him, how he can, not only own the Churches Faith, the Atha­nasian Creed, but (if he is of the Clergy) solemnly subscribe to it, and devoutly read it with all its damna­tory Clauses, when it asserts but one Substance, one Uncreate, one Eter­nal, &c. and affirms the Holy Spirit to proceed from both the Father and the Son? the contrary of all which he asserts in his Propositions, and makes God the Father to have two Sons, both issuing from him by way of Emanation: and consequently the Son is not (as contrary to all Creeds as well as the Scripture) God's only Son.

But I shall conclude, only adding, that as it is contrary to the Genius of Religion, and is the way to eternize Errors, so it betrays a mean and low Spirit, to embrace an Opinion for the sake of a Party though never so venerable. And for my part, as I have been taught to call no Man Master but Christ, so I will own no other Name but that of Christian, and not of any distinguishing Party or Sect; and therefore will be chargeable with no controverted Doctrine further than what I expresly own; and that I do the Unity of the Nature of God, which is certainly of all Doctrines the most fundamental; and which I have abundantly shown from the Conside­ration of his Essence, his Attributes, his Works, and from the Duty and Worship we owe him.

A REPLY to the SECOND DEFENCE of the XXVIII Propositions, said to be wrote in Answer to a Socinian Manuscript.

I NOW find by Notice in the Gazette, that your Learned and Worthy Friend, whose Name you concealed from me, is the Lord Bishop of Glocester. He has pub­lished an Answer (which he calls, A Second Defence of his Propositions) to a private Manuscript, which he calls Socinian. Which MS. to excuse his not publishing it, he tells his Reader he had returned to you, and had it not by him, nor a Copy of it. He saith he collected the Substance of it: I be­lieve what he thought the Substance; but how shall the Reader judg of that? since as a great Master tells us, The Context, the Stile, and the Phraseo­logy of an Author must be well con­sidered by one that means to under­stand him perfectly. But it seems he was not willing to lose an Opportu­nity to expose a Heretick, tho' he strain'd Civility in so doing. In the mean time, my MS. gave occasion to encrease the Number of his explana­tory Propositions. But after this far­ther Explanation of his Explanation, he is as obscure as ever, tho' that (to deal ingenuously) is rather his Mis­fortune than his Fault; for there are some things which will never be ex­plain'd while the World stands: such as necessary and eternal Emanation, Divine Fecundity, the Difference be­tween Order of Time and Order of Nature.

One thing, before I begin my Re­ply, let me acquaint you with: I am advised to pass by whatever does not concern the Cause, to bear the Impu­tation of affected Poedantry, Igno­rance and Arrogance. Contemptuous Charges enough to exercise the Pa­tience of a well-compos'd Man, and urge one of my Make to take out Let­ters of Reprisal; at least by way of Self-defence, to say something like that of Tully, Non video in hâc meâ medio­critate ingenii quid despicere possit An­tonius. But I will submit my Resent­ment to my Adviser, as obedient Sons are wont their Faith to their Mother; and that not only for the Reason aim'd at by my Friend, but also out of Re­spect to my Adversary, (and therein I shall please you) whom I believe to [Page 4] be as you character him, one of the most deserving of his Order. But yet I beg leave to tell you, that I do not hold my self oblig'd by this Promise, to forbear exposing the Weakness of an unconcluding Argument, or set­ting two contrary Sayings to stare one another in the face: but from all Re­vilings, from foolish Words, designed to lessen his Lordship's just Esteem, I shall religiously forbear. If I sprinkle Salt, it shall not grieve his Person.

P. 1. of the Defence, &c.] where­as I had affirmed that the Trinitarians had in vain tried their Strength against the Unitarians; his Lordship answers, There's no doubt of it, if their Adver­saries may be Judges. I now affirm it, if the Trinitarians themselves be Jud­ges; for the Modalists will not allow the Hypothesis of the Realists, and the Realists despise theirs: and then again, the Ignoramus, or Mystery-trinitarians, esteem the Methods taken by both these Parties, not only vain and fruit­less, as to the refuting the Unitarians; but also dangerous, and likely to over­throw their own great Article; while both these Parties join, and with full consent condemn the Ignoramus-trini­tarians, who press the Belief of a Tri­nity in the Godhead, but cannot say what is meant by it. What the modern Unitarians have taught in their late Tracts concerning this controverted Article, some or other of their Adver­saries teach as well as they. For exam­ple, the Unitarians have taught, that if by Persons are meant Relations, Ca­pacities, or Respects of God to his Creatutes, then there may be more Persons than 3 in the Godhead; be­cause God hath the Capacities, Re­spects or Relations of a Judg, of an Oeconomus, or Provider, &c. They have taught, that a Mode or a Posture cannot be a Person; that a Mode can­not be in God, because Modes are changeable, and God is not. They look upon it as an inconceivable Ex­travagancy, to fancy that God in one Mode or Posture, begat himself in ano­ther; and breath'd forth his Self, by the help of his begotten Self, in a pro­ceeding third-Self: And as to all these things, Dean Sh—k, Mr. H—w, and the Bp. of Gl. have the same Sense as the Unitarians. The Unitarians have taught, that there are not 3 Persons in the proper Sense of that word, not 3 distinct Essences, Natures, Spirits, Minds, or intelligent Beings, in the Unity of the Godhead; but that it's down-right Tritheism to say it, and e­qually idolatrous with the Polytheism of the Heathens. Dr. S—th teaches so likewise; Dr. Wallis is of the same O­pinion; and the famous Bps. of Wor­cester and Sarum, who will not de­clare plainly their own Sense, both de­clare against this. The Unitarians have taught, that that Article, which is pro­pos'd ro be believ'd as necessary to Salvation, is capable of being explai­ned; and that it's very unjust, not to say ridiculous, to require Men to be­lieve words, whereof no certain Sig­nification can be given: Now if Dean Sherlock, with all the Realists, and his Friend Dr. South, with all the Moda­lists, were not of the Mind of the Uni­tarians in this Point; would they, [Page 5] think you, take such Pains to explain the Article, each after his own parti­cular Manner? Whatsoever single Af­firmation you arraign the Unitarians upon, upon the same you arraign a Majority of Trinitarians. For I think I may reckon, that no one of the three chief Divisions, is equal to the other two. In short, the Majority of the Church must be guilty of Heresy with the Unitarians, or the Unitarians must be Orthodox with them. Thus, I think, I have justified that Censure, The Trinitarians have in vain tried their Strength against their Adversa­ries; and that not those Adversaries, but even the Trinitarians themselves being Judges.

His Lordship seems angry that I should be amaz'd at his distinguishing between Intelligible and Comprehensi­ble: But that I have since consider'd the Necessities which a good Man may be put to, in the Defence of a bad Cause, I should be more amaz'd at his Lordship's Defence of that idle Distinction. I have many things to say in answer, but because I hear you are not pleas'd with this fruitless Con­tention, I will wave it; and only tell you, that since his Lordship sent me to the Dictionary to learn that com­prehendere signifies something that in­telligere doth not, I put that Labour on one of my Children, and I'll take his word, that the metaphorical Sig­nification of comprehendo, is just the same with intelligo.

P. 6. l. 9. his Lordship has an ob­scure Period; in which, if there be any Meaning, it must be this, That he holds it possible to understand the Manner how Three are One; else he would not have offer'd at an Explica­tion of the Doctrine of the Trinity a­greeable to natural Reason. And what Account has he given of the Manner? why, in pr. 15. of 21. but 22. of 28. he declares, that there is an UNCON­CEIVABLY close, and inseparable Union in Will and Nature between them, [the 3 numerically distinct Per­sons.] And is this all he knows of the Manner how they are one? i. e. after such a Manner as cannot be known nor told? Well! those So­phists (in rebuke of whom Socrates professed, all that he knew was, that he knew nothing) were not so un­reasonable as to make the Inconceiva­bleness of the Manner, wherein a Do­ctrine might be true, a Proof that they knew the Manner in which it was true.

I said, that Three are One is not true in a Sense disagreeable to Reason: The Explication which he gives how 3 are 1, is disagreeable to Reason, and therefore not intelligible, not compre­hensible, not true. The latter part he an­swers with his usual Distinction, Tho' intelligible, yet not therefore compre­hensible: But I pray him to tell me, why a Prop. not disagreeble to Rea­son, should not be capable of being compleatly understood, when it is com­pleatly revealed.

I said, 2. He that understands the Truth of a Prop. understands the Man­ner in which it is true, &c. I now ap­ply it thus: He that understands the Truth of this Prop. There are three Persons in one God, understands the [Page 6] Manner how that can be, or the Sense in which it is true; and if he does not understand the Manner or Sense, then, let him pretend what he will, he does not understand the Truth of the Prop. and if not understanding the Manner or Sense how the Prop. is true, he pro­fesses to believe it; then it's manifest he takes it on Authority, believes it in deference to others.

Prop. 2. That Being which wants any one Perfection, cannot be absolutely or infinitely perfect. Upon this I ob­served this Consequence, That Christ was God only in a metaphorical Sense. Nor shall he ever be able to avoid the Consequence; for the strict Sense of a Word or Phrase is the proper Sense of it; and every Sense besides the strict and proper, is metaphorical.

Prop. 4. God the Father alone [strictly speaking] is a Being abso­lutely perfect, because he alone is self­existent; and all other Beings, even the Son and H. Ghost, are from him. He seems to allow my former Cen­sure: I now observe, That his Hypo­thesis is unluckily built on vain Di­stinctions. Indeed he could tell me, that Intelligible and Comprehensible was an old Distinction, and very com­mon; but now he brings forth one, which is wholly new, which no Man ever us'd before him. It is this: AB­SOLUTELY PERFECT in the stristest Sense, and ABSOLUTELY PERFECT with reference to the Na­ture of a Being. Of which (to be as free with him as he with me) I can make no better Sense than this; That a Being which hath all the Perfections of its Nature, may in some sort be said to have all Perfections without Re­striction, all whatsoever. That a Ma­gistrate may be said to exercise all Power without Limitation, when he exercises all that was delegated to him. But if one Being can be more abso­lutely perfect than another, I would fain know why one cannot be more omniscient, more omnipotent than another; more infinite, more eter­nal, both à parte post, and à parte ante. If a Man would study to restrain a word of some Latitude, he could not do it more effectually than his Lord­ship has restrain'd the Predicate per­fect, by the Adjunct absolutely. Sup­posing the word Perfect may be taken in a stricter and a looser Sense, yet the Phrase absolutely Perfect, cannot possibly admit of any other Sense—Ha­ving all Perfections. Every Man un­derstands this Term absolutely so as to imply, that nothing more than what thereby is, can be predicated of the Subject. But if this Distinction must pass in this Controversy against the common Sense of Mankind; then let the equivocating Jesuits, who were formerly content with very childish Salvo's, to take off the Infamy of a Lie, learn the way of distinguishing, worth a Volume of their old mental Reservations, when the Treason they solemnly disavow, is unluckily dis­covered.

Prop. 9. A Being which hath all the Divine Perfections that are capa­ble of being communicated, may be pro­perly said to be essentially GOD upon the account of those Perfections, or to [Page 7] be indued with the Divine Nature. It seems I was so rude as to call this a gross Prop. contrary to Sense and Rea­son, and to all that the Proposer had rationally advanc'd before; nay, I was so perverse as to prove it by Induction of Particulars. I refer to my Animad­versions. His Lordship here complains, 1. That I us'd too many words: but the Nature of the Argument required them. 2. He tells me, he had no such Expression as, DERIVES it self from God: But he has a bad Memory; for in his 3d Prop. he says, 'Tis an Abate­ment of a boundless Perfection, not to be originally in him who hath it, but DE­RIVATIVELY. 3. He affirms that I am a little injurious, in representing him saying, that the Son and H. Ghost have only SOME Perfections; where­as I ought to have represented him as saying, that they have all that are ca­pable of being communicated. But I'll justify it, that I ought to have repre­sented him as I have done; for 'tis my Business to expose, not to cover the Weakness of his Arguments, and I have not misrepresented him; for if the Son and H. Spirit have not abso­lutely all Perfections, then they have but some: But how comes it to pass that they have no more than they have? That's nothing to my Purpose, let him look to that. Incapacity to be greater, cannot surely make a rational Being as great as the greatest. I come next to consider how his Lordship has answered 4 Questions which I put.

1. Does the Divine Nature com­prehend all Perfections, or can it want one or two of the chiefest, and be still the same Divine Nature? To this, thus he; Self-existence is a Perfection relating immediately to the Father's Existence, not to his Nature or Essence. I reply, that this is not an­swering the Question, but a very sorry shuffling it off; for let the Perfection of Self-existence belong to what he pleases, yet I hope it is a Perfection; and if the Divine Nature comprehends all Perfections, that Nature which does not comprehend all, must not be the Divine Nature. 2. If Self-existence (as he teaches) relates immediately to the Father's Existence, and (as he seems to mean) be but as good as no Perfection; yet to be first Original of all things, and Independent, must re­late to his Nature, or none of all the rest relate to his Nature. The Nature of a Being is that by which he is, that which he is: and if you abstract from the Divine Nature, Independence, and being the first Original of all things, you do not conceive God to be that which he is. 3. Even the Man­ner of God's Existence (as his Lord­ship once phras'd it) belongs to his Essence; nay, it is the very funda­mental Notion of a God. Whatever Excellencies you ascribe to a rational Being without self-existence, you raise him not above the Character of a most excellent Creature; nay more, you cannot ascribe infinite Perfections to any but the Self-existent God: For his Lordship grants, that the Perfecti­ons of all other Creatures are in them but derivatively, and by being so, re­ceive Abatement. But if he can make these two things consist, I will give [Page 8] him this Gift, he shall never be able to contradict himself while he breathes. 4. Tho' he will not allow Self-exi­stence to belong to the Essence of God; yet he says, that it speaks a more excellent Manner of Existence, peculiar to the Father. I argue then, If the Father does exist after a more excellent Manner than the Son; then he is a more excellent Person than the Son, and has a more excellent Nature: even as created Adam (it is his Lord­ship's Simily) is more excellent than any of the Sons of Men. And if the more excellent Nature of the Father be not another sort of Nature than the less excellent Nature of the Son, who can help it? But then I'll tell him, that One absolutely perfect God with all Perfections; all and every, Self-exi­stence, Being the first Original, and Independence not excluded; and his 2 Gods not absolutely perfect, but as perfect as 2 Gods can be, that are not absolutely perfect; is a Dream, which would make sport for any Man, that has not more Reverence for his Ver­tue than his Reasoning.

But his Lordship is positive that the Nature of the Son may be a necessary Nature, and uncreated, for all that I can object, or he has said: Well! I will try that; I object that the Na­ture of the Son is not said to be ne­cessary or uncreated in Scripture. He offers no Reasons why it should be thought so; I will produce some why it should not. 1. Because there can be but one numerically necessary Exi­stent: Dr. Cudworth, tho'a Trinita­rian, could not but own this, p. 200. The true and proper Idea of God, is a Being absolutely perfect: absolute Perfection includes in it all that be­longs to the Deity, and is that alone to which necessary Existence is essen­tial, and of which it is demonstrable. The Nature of the Son cannot be un­created, because there can be but One numerical uncreated Nature. Indeed the Athanasian Creed pronounceth, The Father uncreate, the Son uncreate, the H. Ghost uncreate: but the Com­piler did not believe it; for he deter­mines, not Three uncreate, but One un­create. His Lordship hints sometimes, that the Nature of the Father, Son, and H. Ghost is specifically the same; sometimes that it is closely, insepara­bly, unconceivably the same: but he constantly teaches, that their Natures are numerically distinct: and now if every one of them is uncreate, it un­deniably follows, that there are 3 nu­merical, distinct, uncreated Natures: But this methinks he should scarcely venture to assert, if it be but out of Re­verence to the Athanasian Creed, how much soever he may be tempted to trespass upon evident Principles of Reason. 2. Neither the Son, nor the H. Ghost, is a necessary Nature; be­cause a necessary Nature must be also self-existent, and independent. That Being which exists necessarily, could exist from no other: but the Son exists from the Father, therefore does not exist necessarily. He will say, The Son exists from the Father by eternal necessary Emanation; what that is, I shall presently enquire: I argue on, If a Being could exist necessarily, then [Page 9] it would not depend on God for its Existence; but the Son (according to his Lordship) does depend on the Father for his Existence, therefore he does not exist necessarily. If the Na­ture of the Son were necessary, as is the Nature of the Father, no reason could be assigned why the Father should not as much depend on the Son, as the Son on the Father. In short, two necessary Natures there cannot be: but if there were, they would both be independent.

To my 2d Question, he bids you, Sir, read again what he said to the former; I have done so, and find I have not censur'd these words: God the Father's Existence being without a Cause, doth not make him to have ano­ther sort of Nature, from the Son and H. Ghost.] Here it is implied, that the Nature of the Son, and of the H. Ghost, had a Cause; whereas the Na­ture of God had none: Will not this pass for a sufficient Character, to di­stinguish them as different Natures? I'm sure, no two different Natures which he can name, do differ half so much as a Nature that had a Cause, and a Nature that had not. And then again, To have a Cause, and to be uncreated: if that be not a Contra­diction, I am satisfied he may talk backward and forward securely.

My 3d Question, Can a Being that depends on God, be properly said to be essentially that God on whom it de­pends? He answers, Such a Being can be properly said to be essentially that God in one Sense, but cannot in ano­ther; i. e. can have an Essence of the same kind, tho' not the same numeri­cal One. But by his favour, an Es­sence of the same kind, can at most but make a Being to be a God, not make him to be that God, on whom himself depends. If a Being can be that God which depends on another; and that very God also, on whom himself depends, then such Being may at once be Two Gods; and so the Se­cond Person in the Trinity is the Fa­ther that caus'd the Son to be, and the Son that was caus'd by the Father. Thus by his Lordship's Answer to my 3d Question, it appears he holds the Three Persons to be One God, as ha­ving an Essence of the same kind; but to be Three numerical Gods. And to make his Polytheism look as heathe­nishly as possible, he saith, p. 19. that the individual Nature of the Father, is not a Divine Nature more truly than that of the Two other Persons. And then Self-existence, Being the first Original, and Independence, sig­nify much.

His Lordship makes the same An­swer to my 4th Prop. as he did to my 2d; i. e. he has answered it already. What can be more extravagant than this Fancy, on which the Weight of more Hypotheses than one depends; viz. that Angels exist by voluntary Creation, but the Son and H. Ghost by necessary Emanation? It's com­mon with the Trinitarians, to use these Terms, Generation, Emanation, Procession: it's common also with the most eminent of them to acknow­ledg, that it's a difficult Thing to un­derstand, a dangerous Curiosity to en­quire, [Page 10] a bold Presumption to deter­mine, wherein these Terms differ: and the Reason is, (tho' they are a­sham'd to own it) because they know not what they would have their Terms signify.

In common speaking we know what is meant by To generate or be­get, To emanate or flow from, To proceed, To go or come forth: but those Terms cannot be applied to the Father, Son, and H. Ghost, in that na­tural obvious Sense; why then should they be applied to them at all, when no Man can distinctly say what they are to signify? 'Tis granted we have not an adequate Conception of God; there may be something in his Na­ture, whereof we have no just Idea: but that which we cannot understand, how can we talk of? How can we form Propositions of Things out of the reach of our Knowledg? But by this one particular Term EMANA­TION, his Lordship will venture to say, This is what is meant, A more excellent Way of Existence than by Creation; and to his Term Emana­tion, he adds this Epithet Necessary: so then, the more excellent Way of Existence than by Creation, is neces­sary Existence; and so it is: but then the Son does not necessarily exist. That Being which could not but be, ever was; and that Being which ever was, could be from no o­ther. But because his Lordship is wont sarcastically to deride my Ar­guing, (who am indeed an obscure and unlearned little Fellow) tho' for ought he knows, I may equal the very great Abilities of that DYING MARTYR (yet a Trinitarian to my Knowledg) who starves, to the Re­proach of this Nation; to whom the envious Jovian allow'd the Praise of Mediocrity: I shall therefore seek a lit­tle shelter from Authority; that his Lordship may not renounce his Senses, if any Man of Sense be of his Mind. The Author I am going to quote is Dr. Cudworth, a good Man, and very near of his Lordship's Make too; who in his Intellectual System, contradicts his own and his Lordship's Hypothe­sis, as plainly and liberally as heart can wish; p. 210. Self-existence and necessary Existence, are essential to a perfect Being, and to none else. But his Lordship teaches, that the latter, and not the former, is essential to a perfect Being; and that the Son is ab­solutely perfect (tho' not in his strict­est Sense) without Self-existence, and that the Self-existence which belongs to the Father does not belong to his Essence: tho' he who can separate Self-existence from the Father's Es­sence, may with as much Reason de­ny the Existence of his Essence; for the Father is as certainly self-existent, as he is existent.

Cudworth again, p. 726. Nothing could exist of it self from Eternity, naturally and necessarily, but that which contains necessary and eternal Self-existence in its Nature. I am apt to believe, this Author put in that Phrase of it self to save an Emanation or two: but it will not do it; for he constantly makes Self-existence and necessary Existence inseparable Per­fections. [Page 11] And p. 748. he speaks full and home against his own and the Bp. of Gloucester's Tritheism, in these words: Tho' it be certain that some­thing did exist of it self necessarily, from all Eternity; yet it is certain likewise, that there can be but one such thing, Necessity of Existence being es­sential to no more. Now if Necessity of Existence be essential but to One, I pray, Sir, what will become of his Lordship's necessary Emanations? Cudw. p. 764. Because something did certainly exist of it self from Eternity unmade, therefore also is there actual­ly a necessary existent Being. The Doctor proves the necessary Existence of a Being, from its Existing of it self from Eternity; i. e. from its necessary Existence, as I had done before. Let the Reader judg if it be not a good Argument.

P. 13. his Lordship says, A Crea­ture communicating its Nature, does not forgo its own individual Nature, [but neither does he communicate his own individual Nature] nor any part thereof. Here I beg his Pardon; for the Creature does forgo a part, a seminal part thereof; the bodily Substance of the Foetus is by the won­derful Providence of God, made from the bodily Substance of the Parents; and as far as the bodily Substance of Men may be call'd their Nature, they waste their Nature, to produce their like. How Souls are produced, he says not, neither I. But hitherto he has not offer'd any thing to make me re­tract my Assertion; That we have no other Notion of the word Communi­cate, but to impart or give; and what one Person doth impart or give, of any essential and singular thing, THAT himself hath not, but he hath it to whom it is given. Who questions the Power of God to generate his Like? He made Man in his own Likeness, endued him with rational Faculties, with noble Excellencies of Mind: but the Unitarians do not see, how God can communicate all his infinite Perfections; for that is to communi­cate himself, to beget himself, to mul­tiply himself; which deserves a har­der Name than I can give it.

Prop. 10. ‘There seems to be no Contradiction, nor the least Ab­surdity in asserting, that God is a­ble to communicate every one of his Perfections, except those of Self-existence, and being the first Original of all things.’] Against this, I did affirm, (and see no Cause I have to retract) that for the same Reason, as Self-existence, and being the first Original of all things, are in­communicable; for the very same, Infinite Power, Wisdom, and Good­ness were incommunicable also: and to make good this Affirmation, 'twas proper for me to declare why the for­mer were incommunicable, that the Reader might judg wherein the lat­ter were not so likewise, for the Rea­son alledg'd. All that his Lordship has to offer, is, that I attempt to prove a self-evident Principle: but that's not so great a Fault I hope, as to at­tempt to prove an evident Contra­diction; such as, That two Persons have all Perfections necessary to essen­tiate [Page 12] a perfect God, tho' they have not absolutely all Perfections; That God the Father has more Perfections than are necessary to essentiate a perfect God; That the Father who has more, and the Son and H. Spirit, who have just so many Perfections, as are neces­sary to essentiate a perfect God, are still all Three of them but One God. But supposing I have us'd in re non dubiâ argumentis non necessariis, in a plain Case needless Arguments; yet he cannot charge me to have obscur'd the self-evident Principle: but I defy his Lordship, to illustrate his Obscu­rities. I proceed in my Defence, Whereas it's very absurd and contra­dictious to suppose more than One self-existent; so it is equally absurd and contradictious to suppose more than One infinitely powerful, wise, and good Being. And by equally I mean, as evidently so. Nor am I the only Man that will say this, as I shall prove presently; tho'he pretends to be sure of the contrary, and civilly tells me, I cannot think so, let me say what I will. I make him but this temperate Return; I will suspect his Understanding sooner than his Vera­city. I said farther, that Infinite Power, Infinite Wisdom, Infinite Goodness go together, and may all of them as well as either of them, be in all Beings whatsoever, as well as in more Beings than one. He replies, that this as much needs to be prov'd, as that which it is brought to prove; and that my only Answer is like to be, It must be taken on the Authority of my Lord of Canterbury. But then by my Lord of Gloucester's Favour, I am not the only Man that will say, more than One infinitely powerful, is as absurd as more than One self-existent. And if the Judgment of that Lord of Cant. (which he passes with unbe­coming Contempt) is of no value, I will laugh at the Man who thinks to credit his Discourse with the Autho­rity of Athanasius, or the Nicene Fa­thers; Men moderately skill'd per­haps in brangling Philosophy, amus'd with mysterious Platonism, and full of themselves: whereas the Name of TILLOTSON shall be ever bless'd, if sound Learning and wondrous Mo­desty, true Piety and just Moderation do not grow out of fashion and e­steem. To that Passage I cited out of his Sermon on 1 Tim. 2. 5. my Lord of Gloucester thinks it enough to an­swer, that he had not the Sermon by him, and I had not distinguish'd his words. A fair Answer! I will now cite them in a distinguishing Cha­racter. P. 13. Absolute Perfection is the most essential Notion which Mankind hath always had of God, and necessarily supposes Unity; 'tis essen­tial to the Notion of an absolutely per­fect Being, that all Perfections be uni­ted in him: to imagine some Per­fections in one, and some in another, [i. e. in God the Father, which are not in God the Son] is a Contra­diction to the most natural and easy Notion Men have of a God; i. e. that he is a Being, in whom all Perfections do meet and are united. Now had his Grace been a Prophet, he could not more directly have pointed his [Page 13] words against the Hypothesis of the 28 Propositions. And if his Grace was so honest as to believe the Truth of what he affirmed, why may not I who have said the same things in o­ther words, believe what I have said? That odious Insinuation to the con­trary, must needs reflect hardly upon his Lordship, rather than on me; for I will be his Proselyte, if the major Part of the Trinitarians do not believe with me, that it is equally absurd and contradictious, to assert more than One infinitely powerful Being, as to assert more than One self-existent Be­ing: Nay, amongst the Trinitarians, there is one, a late eminent and wor­thy Writer; who in his Intellectual System, p. 652. l. 19. teaches thus: ‘The genuine Attributes of the Dei­ty, namely, such as are demonstra­ble of an absolutely perfect Being, are not only not contradictious, but also necessarily connected together, and inseparable from one another. For there could not possibly be one Thing infinite in Wisdom only, another Thing infinite only in Pow­er, and another Thing only in­finite in Duration, or eternal; but the very same Thing which is in­finite in Wisdom, must needs be also infinite in Power, and infinite in Duration. That which is infi­nite in any one Perfection, must needs have all Perfections in it. Thus are all the Perfections of the Deity, not only not contradictious, but also inseparably concatenate.’ In the very next Page Dr. Cudworth farther asserts, ‘That there is nothing in the genuine Idea of God, and his Attributes, but what is demonstra­ble of a perfect Being, and that there cannot be the least either ad­ed to that Idea, or detracted from it, any more than there can be any thing added to, or detracted from the Idea of a Triangle, or of a Square.’] Whence it follows unavoidably, that the Son and H. Spirit can no more be omnipotent than self-existent, inde­pendent, and first Originals; if they have one infinite Perfection, they have all; if they want one, they want all: and if Three distinct Beings have each of them all infinite Perfections, they are Three Gods in the highest Sense.

Prop. 11. It seems evident from H. Scripture, that the Son and H. Spi­rit have all Divine Perfections but those two, such as unlimited Power, Wisdom and Goodness, and unspotted Purity. Here his Lordship notes, that in my Animadversions I said, Unspot­ted Purity was but the Perfection of a Man or Angel, not an infinite Per­fection of a God. And here I say again, notwithstanding what he has said to the contrary, that even Saints made perfect, and Angels that never fell from their blessed Estate, are unspot­tedly pure; he will not deny it, and yet they are not Gods: he will not assert that they are, and therefore un­spotted Purity is the Perfection of Saints and Angels, not the infinite Perfection of a God. As to his Re­proach, so frequently cast upon me, that I have a large Stock of Confi­dence; I reply, If my Discourse is reasonable, my Confidence is just.

[Page 14] I excepted, as I justly might, a­gainst his Lordship's Expression, It SEEMS evident from Scripture that the Son and H. Spirit have all Per­fections but two. My Reflection, on which he descants, but thought not good to set down, was this: That which does but seem evident, is not re­ally so; and that which is evident, does more than seem so. What he ex­cepts, and my Reply thereto, I'm not willing to trouble the Reader with, and therefore I omit it, and proceed.

In my Animadversions, I wish'd he had cited some of the plainest Texts, from which he thinks the Son and H. Spirit have all Perfections but two. He now has cited; What! plain Texts? no such matter, but naked Texts, without taking notice of the Account already given of them by the Unitarians: and then with a faint stroke of Rhetorick, says, This Text doth at least seem to speak Christ in­finitely powerful, and that seems to speak him infinitely wise, &c. But I tell him, no, not one of the Texts al­ledg'd doth so much as seem to speak his Sense to an impartial Reader: for sometimes what he supposes said of Jesus Christ, is not said of him, but of God his Father; and what is re­ally said of the Lord Christ, does only prove him to be more honourable than his Brethren, but still leaves him inferiour to his Father. I will give one Instance of each Remark: His Lordship affirms, that the Author to the Hebrews, chap. 1. ver. 10, 11, 12. expresly applies (he means in the strict literal Sense) some Verses of the 102d Psalm to the Son of God: I af­firm he doth not; To prove my Ne­gative, I premise, 1. That those Ver­ses, if then extant in that Epistle, did not seem to Clemens Romanus, (the most antient Father we have) who lived in the first Century, to be so applied; neither to Aquina in the 13th, nor to Deodati in the last Age. The two last were Trinitarians. 2. Al­lowing those Verses genuine as we have them, the Account given by the Unitarians is most agreeable. 3. Set­ting aside those two Considerations, yet it's most manifest that the 10th Verse, as applied to the Son of God, was not so intended by the Divine Author: for ver. 2. the Author says, God the Father made the Worlds; and if he should, v. 10. ascribe laying the Foundation of the Heavens and the Earth to the Son, then he contra­dicts himself in the same Chapter. If his Lordship should say the Text tells us, God made the Worlds by his Son; I reply, That's not enough for his Hypothesis; it will not therefore follow that the Son has unlimited Perfections, Infinite Power, &c. but rather the contrary.

He cites Rom. 9. 5. to prove the Knowledg and Wisdom of Christ to be Infinite, without taking notice of the different Pointings, and conse­quently Readings, mentioned by E­rasmus and Curcelleus; and other Observations given in the Answer to Mr. Milbourn: and besides, does not fairly read the Text as it is even in our English Translation. To prove the Power of Christ to be limited, [Page 15] and not infinite, I cited Mat. 26. 53. where he says to Peter, Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my Father, and he shall presently give me more than twelve Legions of Angels? His Lordship answers, There's no Necessi­ty it should be implied in these words, that Christ had not Power to deliver himself without praying to his Father. If so, would it not then be a Mockery to pray to his Father for that which he had in his own Power before he pray'd for't? He pursues his Answer thus: Greater Works are recorded of Christ, without any mention of his praying for Ability to do them. If I studied to nick him with his own Raillery on me, here I might ask, Who told him so? and what were those greater Works? It's certain Christ had not before he pray'd for it, that Power for which he pray'd. Well! but (says his Ldp.) Christ's Power being originally from the Father, he took all Opportunities of giving the Father the Glory of what he did. If he designs this to prove Christ's Power infinite, he has very ill luck at Argument; for this is a fair and full yielding up the Cause. To give Glory to the Father for the Works which he did, signifies no less than to acknowledg he did them, not by a Power of his own, but by a Pow­er communicated from the Father, and for which he praises the Father; which are the Characters of a depen­dent finite Being. His next Remark is still more against himself, viz. when Christ thus said, that he could have obtain'd Legions of Angels by Pray­er, he thought fit to declare in the Ears of his Enemies, how dear he was to God, tho' they hated him. The dearer one is to God, the greater must be his Power; but he that is dearest, acts by a borrowed Power; and that may perhaps be greater than we can imagine, but cannot be infinite. To rivet his Pleadings against himself, he is pleas'd to add, that Christ did industriously conceal the highest Sense in which he was the Son of God. This is a most weak Conceit; and if Chrysostom was the Author of it, his Ldp. is as much beholden to him as Ajax was to Hector for the Sword wherewith he stabb'd himself. If Christ conceal'd the highest Sense wherein he was the Son of God, then it is very disingenuously done of the Trinitarians to pretend to prove that highest Sense from any Words of Christ; and if the Words of Christ do not deliver that Sense, I am afraid it will be found, that the Apostles did as industriously conceal it as their Ma­ster; for the Words of Christ are in­deed strain'd when interpreted this way, but not more than the Words of the Apostles for the same Purpose. And if Christ conceal'd that highest Sense from his Enemies, he also con­ceal'd it from all others; for those Discourses which were industriously fram'd to conceal it from Men not dispos'd to believe it, could not suffi­ciently reveal it to Men dispos'd to be­lieve it.

Prop. 12. It's intolerable Presump­tion to conclude, &c. Here his Ldp. is pleas'd to disown the Grammatical and Natural Signification of his Cen­sure, [Page 16] in that angry Phrase intolera­ble Presumption: He does not mean by it a Presumption that should not be tolerated. But if I let him take sanctuary in his Meaning, it shall be upon condition, that he will excuse my having display'd the odious Con­sequences of his Words taken in their proper Signification. By intolerable Pre­sumption, he meant a most high Pre­sumption; and he will still say, that to conclude, there is no way of being immediately from God but by Crea­tion, is a wonderful Boldness. I will leave it with the Reader, whether it be not a greater Boldness for any Man to determine, there is a way of being immediately from God, be­sides by Creation, when neither do the Scriptures speak of, nor can the Reason of Man apprehend any such; which tho' he does not positively de­termine, yet he builds upon it. I admire and honour him, that he would not persecute when it was in his Power. I had affirmed, that ne­cessary Emanation was a thing whereof we have no Idea; which not being able to deny, he asks, Is it impossible for a thing to be whereof we have no Idea? Is God bound to give us Idea's, of what he can or has produc'd? I answer to the first, It is possible. To the second, God is not bound to give us Idea's of what he can or has produc'd; but then we are no ways concern'd, nor can we reason or discourse about those things whereof we have no Idea's: There­fore it's high Presumption to affirm this or that concerning them; but to impose such Affirmations on the Faith of others, is the raging Mad­ness of a persecuting Spirit, which it is the Honour of his Ldp. to de­test. But what he seem'd but just now afraid to assert, here he makes no Scruple to assert: We have (says he) a clearer Idea of necessary Ema­nation than of voluntary Creation. Of voluntary Creation we have this Idea: God of his own Free-will, and by his Almighty Power, did out of nothing bring into being all things that now are. His Ldp. understands the Terms, and believes the thing: Let him, if he can, tell me as distinct­ly what Idea he has of necessary Emanation. Will he explain it by eternal Procession? I reply, That which was from all Eternity cannot be imagined to proceed from ano­ther, without reversing the certain fixt Sense of words. He says, that necessary Emanation is the Word of the Fathers, and a better cannot be found out, to express what is intended by it: and I tell him, no Man could ever yet intelligibly declare, what is intended by it. His Ldp. bids as fair as any Man for it, when he calls it a more excellent Way of existence than by Creation; which, till it be explained, how shall we judg whe­ther it be so or no? If there be, which I know not; there may be for ought he knows, a more proper Phrase for it.

P. 27. his Ldp. quotes Lines from my MS. Papers; he quotes right, but I omitted two words, I would have that Period read thus: That [Page 17] some thing should NECESS ARILY and ETERNALLY come from God, which wants some Perfection that God has, is A. T's prodigious Supposition, under the Name of Necessary Ema­nation. Now whereas I endeavou­red to display the Absurdity and Im­possibility of this in some few Que­stions, his Ldp. seems to agree with much of what I would infer; only merrily taxes me for giving Reasons for things so plain they need none: which is a mortifying Stroke to me; for he takes such care of giving no Reasons for what he says, that I shall never have an Opportunity to be re­veng'd on him. But in the Conclu­sion of the Page he tells me it is Non­sense to talk of God's begetting infi­nite Power, Wisdom and Goodness: I grant it, just such Non-sense as it is to talk of begetting an infinitely power­ful, wise, and good Being.

As for his Lordship's metaphysical Distinction of Priority of Time, and Priority of Nature whereby he would defend his 13th Prop. 'tis a dark Rid­dle, and a tempting Subject for Sar­casm: but out of Reverence to his Ldp. all I shall say is, that it is a Di­stinction that can explain nothing, nor can any one explain that. We know what's meant by Priority of Time, and Priority of Excellence; if Priority of Nature be neither of these, 'tis an empty word, devis'd, I believe, with a bad Design; but us'd now by those that are themselves deceiv'd by it.

P. 30. his Ldp. is pleas'd to un­dertake the Defence of an Instance: Which, he says, he gave in this men­tion'd Prop. of an Effect every whit as old as the Cause of it; namely, of the Sun the cause of Light: In which, if there be any Possibility of Truth, then we must add new Significations to words, and acutely distinguish be­tween Causes, by the Force of which other things are effected, and Causes which have no Causality in them; between Effects which are effected by their Causes, and Effects that are self-existent. For that 2 and 2 make 4, is not more evident, than that Causes, by the force of which other things are effected, are older than their Effects; and that Effects that are effected by their Causes, are later than their Causes. He may as well make one and the same Body, to exist in more places than one, at one and the same time. Thus Miracles are confined to no particular Church nor Age; only there is this Difference, Christ and the Apostles wrought Miracles to confirm their Doctrines, but with the modern Teachers the Doctrines themselves are the Mina­cles. To what I objected against this his coexisting Cause and Effect, the Sun and its Light, he gives me an Answer he meant for sacetious: He could find in his Heart to grant me, that the Sun was not the Cause of that Light, which was created be­fore the Sun. I thank him: But up­on second Thoughts he will not grant me that, l. 23. No, not for all the Book of Genesis: He might have spar'd the Book of Genesis; he may use me as pleases. He knows the [Page 18] Sun is the Cause of Light by his Eye-sight: He might as well say, His Head is the Cause of his Heel by his Feeling. I say, the Sun and Light, which together began to be, could not one be the Cause of the other; but God the Cause of both, at the same time, and in the same manner of Causality. His Lordship quotes a Scrap from my Papers, and makes me, by mangling my words, talk Contradictions: but my reason­ing was, what I have said, that if the Sun and Light did begin to exist in the same Point of Time, then the one cannot be the Cause of the o­ther; for that thing which is the Cause of another, must be in respect of time before that other whereof it is the Cause.

That I may not omit any thing his Lordship thinks material, I am oblig'd to take notice, that in his first Defence of his Propositions, p. 19. he tells the Reader, His Explication speaks as great an Unity between them [the Persons,] as is between the Sun and its Splendor, and the Light of both. Which in very plain English, sounds thus; between the Sun and its Light, the Light of the Sun, and the Light of the Sun's Light. But that he may not pretend I misrepre­sent him, let the Reader take his Discovery in his own Terms; 1. Here's the Sun, 2. The Splendour of the Sun, 3. The Light of the Sun, 4. The Light of the Sun's Splendour. After the Reader has mus'd a while on the distinct parts of his Lordship's Simi­litude, let me recal to his Mind his Lordship's Notion of One God abso­lutely perfect in the highest Sense; and of Two, each of which is God, but not absolutely perfect in the highest Sense, yet as absolutely per­fect in a lower Sense as two, each of which is God, can be; who are not absolutely God in the highest Sense: and then let me ask, whether there is any thing in any other Hypothesis more apt to make Sport for Here­ticks? In truth, had I not a greater Reverence for his Lordship's Vertue than his Reasoning, I should not slip the Occasion of diverting my Friend.

Whereas I have told him, that the two Propositions he boasts of, for contradicting Arianism and Socinia­nism, do also contradict some of their fellow-Propositions; I now prove it by Induction: If the Son and H. Spi­rit do necessarily and eternally exist, then they are as self-existent, as in­dependent, as pure Originals as God the Father; if they necessarily and eter­nally exist, then the Father as much emanates from, and depends upon them, as they emanate from, and de­pend upon him; so that his Hypothe­sis does not more contradict Arianism and Socinianism, than it contradicts it self. Heathenish Doctrines by their Inconsistency, meet the Fate of Rome Heathen; suis & ipsa Roma viribus ruit. I may now tell his Ldp. he has no way to expose me but by ex­posing my Argument: but it's much easier to play with Expressions by chance ambiguous, than to answer Arguments.

Upon my Remark to his 15 Prop. [Page 19] he asks, Who are they that determine any Notion to be true, while they cannot conceive it to be so? Why, Sir, in ge­neral they are the Trinitarians, but in particular and more especially his Ldp. he is the Man; for does he not expresly determine in this very Prop. that there is an unconceivably close Union between them [the supposed 3 Persons?] Therefore unless he can conceive an unconceivable Notion, or doubt of that which he determines to be true, he is notoriously guilty of determining that Notion to be true which he cannot conceive to be so. I grant him, there may be a stricter Uni­on between God and Christ than we know of; but here I am bold and fixt, there can be no such Union be­tween them, as contradicts the Noti­ons he has implanted in us. Accor­ding to him, the 3 Persons are 3 di­stinct Beings, and there can be no di­stinct Being without its distinct Na­ture; so 3 distinct Beings are 3 di­stinct Natures, and 3 distinct Natures continuing so, can never become one single Nature: what Union soever there is between them, I wonder the Trinitarians should so constantly amuse their Readers with that unsu­table Comparison of Soul and Body in Union; for 'tis plain, that in their Union, they are that one thing which neither of them can be in a State of Separation.

Prop. 16. ‘Such an Union as this between them being acknowledg'd by us, together with the fore-men­tioned intire Dependence of the Son and H. Spirit upon the Father, the Unity of the Deity is as fully to all Intents and Purposes asserted by us as it is necessary or desirable it should be.’] The End for which the Unity of the Deity was ever asser­ted: What does he mean by this very odd Phrase? My Sense is, that it's as­serted because it is true; and that the Consequence of its being true, is this; the Service of our whole Hearts is therefore due to him alone, and our lower Respects to other Objects, ac­cording as his Word, and our own Reason directs us: but we cannot both to God and Christ pay the Ser­vice of our whole Hearts, notwith­standing their Union in Will and like Natures: For if we love one Master with our whole Hearts, we have no Affections left for any other, but as he shall direct us; and he cannot di­rect us to love another equally with himself. Unity of Nature, or 3 Be­ings united in 1 Nature, is no better nor worse than 3 Beings in 1 Being, 3 Natures in 1 Nature, 3 and not 3 in the same respect, which is a Con­tradiction if any thing be so.

Upon his 17 Prop. I had told him he was an Ismaelite Trinitarian, whose Hand is against all the Heads of Trini­tarian Expositors. To this he re­plies, 'Tis false. But since he deals so bluntly with me, I will, 1. Set down some of his Contradictions, not con­sequential, but broad Contradictions. 2. Not to be wanting in the least to the Vindication of my Censure, I will plainly show, that I said no worse of his Lordship upon the ac­count of his Hypothesis, than he [Page 20] himself had said before of him­self.

The first of his 28 Prop. is this, The Name of GOD is used in more Senses than one in H. Scripture: but in his first Def. p. 23. speaking of Per­fections necessary to essentiate a God in the absolutely highest Sense, he has these words; Which the Name of God is ever to be understood in in the H. Scripture. In the same Def. p. 17. he affirms, that H. Script. saith not of what Nature that Unity is, which it ascribes to God. But Prop. 13. of the 28. he says, The Oneness so frequent­ly affirmed of him in Script. is a nume­rical Oneness. In his second Def. p. 13. he says, The individual Nature of the Father is not a Divine Nature more truly than that of the Two other Per­sons. But Prop. 15 he says, Each of them has a Right to the Name of God, in a Sense next to that, in which it is appropriated to the Father. This Con­tradiction he is in love with, it often occurs. P. 10. of 2d Def. distinguish­ing between Perfections which he makes to belong to the Father's Exi­stence, and Perfections which belong to his Divine Nature or Essence, he contends that the Son and H. Spirit have all the Perfections of the Divine Nature, as well as the Father: But p. 23. of first Def. he observes, that Athanasius, S. Basil, Greg. Nazian­zen, and S. Chrysostom, with several of the Latin Fathers, interpret those Words of Christ, MY FATHER IS GREATER THAN I, to have been spoken not of his Humanity, but his Divinity; and himself gives his Judg­ment to their Sentence. Prop. 16. of the 28. he affirms it to be evident from H. Script. that the Son and H. Spirit have unlimited Power, &c. which also he allows, 2d Def. p. 10. to be an essential Perfection: but 2d Def. p. 24. he acknowledges that the Power of Judging the World, was a Power committed to Christ, not as Man, and not essentially in him. Prop. 17. he determines, that they [the 3 Persons] are always spoken of in Script. as distinct Beings or Persons, according to the proper Signification of this word, both from the Father and from each other; nor are so many Men or Angels more expresly distin­guished as different Persons or Substan­ces, by our Saviour or his Apostles, than the Father, Son, and H. Ghost are. But 1st Def. p. 20. he says, They are outwardly, and in reference to the Creation, perfectly One and THE SAME God, as concurring in all the fame external Actions. I hope the Rea­der will allow me at least, that these Instances do sufficiently prove, that his Lordship's Hand is against one of the Heads of the Trinitarians, I mean himself. That it is also against all the other, he will excuse me the Labour of proving by a tedious Induction of Particulars; for Prop. 17. of the 21. he affirms, that his Explication is the best and easiest way of reconciling those Texts; which according to the other Hypothesis, are not reconcilable, but by offering extream Violence to them. Here he prefers his Hypothesis indefinitely to all other Hypotheses. Here's no Restriction, no Exception. [Page 21] Nay, in the Conclusion he doubts not to pronounce, that the many Expli­cations of the adorable Mystery, have had little better Success than to make Sport for the Socinians.

My Animadversion on his 18 Prop. I have a better Opinion of, since I saw his Answer, than when I first pen'd them. However, I shall examine a few Lines: P. 37. l. 30. How can he say (saith his Ldp.) that Jesus Christ de­sir'd not Divine Honours to be paid to him? except he mean it when he was on Earth. I mean as a plain Reader would imagin, that Christ desired not any Divine Honours to be paid him, either in one State or other; meaning by Divine Honours such as are due to him that is by Nature omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent: but if we mean by Divine Honours, such as agree to him that could do nothing of himself, that judgeth as he hears, and hath all Judgment committed to him by the Father that sent him, that all Men should honour the Son even as they honour the Father that sent him; I agree that such Divine Honour is due to the Son. Divine Honour in the former Sense, the Son himself forbad to be paid him, even after he should leave the World and go to the Father, Joh. 16. 23. At that day ye shall ask me nothing; verily, ver [...]y, I say unto you, whatsoever ye shaell ask the Father in my Name he will give it you: and ver. 26. At that day ye shall ask in my Name. I think he does not well to take no notice of the Account which the Unitarians give [...] that Text. Will he build so great a Duty as is the worshipping of another besides one, with the Worship due only to the One God, upon the Interpretation of the Particle as; which, he cannot de­ny, does in several places of Scripture import, not an Equality in the things spoken of, not the just Measure and Nature of the Duty enjoin'd, but the Necessity of it, and some Similitude, which it bears to what was before­mentioned? To love our Neighbour as our self, is not to be understood e­qually with our self; for that is im­possible, and contrary to the very Principles of Humane Nature; for omnes sibi melius esse malle quam al­teri: but we should do the one as certainly as we do the other. It is but just and equal, that the great and only God be honoured with all the Pow­ers and Faculties of our reasonable Natures; and that Jesus Christ be ho­noured with an Honour next to that. He saith, Christ is not God in the highest Sense; therefore say I, the highest Honour is not to be paid him.

I said upon his 19th Prop. that the Socinians are not willing to confess, that the Honour of the Father is as muoh taken care of in his Explication, as they do wish it were. He answers, Sure they will not say, that their own Hypothesis doth give more Honour to the Father, than THAT which speaks him the Author of all that the other Persons either have or are. I re­ply, Yes, they will; because it's more honour to be the voluntary Author of what the Son and H. Spirit have and are, (as the Unitarians hold) than [Page 22] to be the necessary Author [or in­deed no Author] as his Ldp. holds.

Upon my saying, that it is not our Duty to think as honourably as we can of any Person, but God the Father Almighty; his Lordship answers, He meant by as honourably as POSSI­BLY we can, as honourably as LAW­FULLY we can. Dr. S—th made Dean Sherlock pay dear for this Eva­sion; but I will not write after that furious Example, preserving my Re­spects to his Lordship: All I say is, His Ldp. is a well-meaning Man; and in 20 other places, where his Words sound tritheistically, and contradicto­rily, I believe he meant honestly.

P. 40. From that Text, I will not give my Glory to another, his Lord­ship argues, that the Son of God is not a Creature; as if God had said, I will give my Glory to no other but my Son: But it's a plain and good Consequence, This, [taking the Words in an universal Sense] be­cause God will not give his Glory to another; therefore no other, no not the Son, is to be worshipped with that Honour which is due to the Father.

As to my Animadversion on his 20th Prop. he appeals to you, my Friend, to judg. Every Man that reads will judg, and some will be biass'd by one Prejudice, and some by another; and some may chance to examine di­ligently, to consider freely, and to judg impartially: among this latter sort of Readers, I fancy I may have the most Friends; but the other I fear are all his.

Prop. 21. he says, His Explication agrees well with that of the Nicene Fathers and Athanasius.] I grant it of what some of them have said in divers places of their Works, con­cerning the Trinity: but it's never­theless true, that in other places it dis­agrees with what that Council and Saint have taught. For you must know, Sir, that even they are not all of a piece; but sometimes Ortho­dox, sometimes Heterodox; and of­ten need the Assistance of a candid Rea­der, to interpret them according to a pretended sound Meaning, quite con­trary to the Grammatical Sense of their words. As for his agreeing with them, I wonder which of the Antients ever taught, That 2 Beings which depend on God, are as almighty as the God on whom they and all things depend: I wonder which of the Antients found out the two Senses; in one of which, the Son and H. Ghost were each of them essentially God, and in the other not. I question whether there be any such Stuff among the School-men; but if he can produce me the Father who has fallen into this particular Weakness; that, Tho' the Name of God is us'd in more Senses than one in H. Script. yet the Name of GOD in H. Script. is always to be understood in the highest Sense; I will never question but he has Antiquity on his side, whether any Truth and Sense or no.

As for his Compliment, that he knows not whether there be more of Arrogance than Ignorance, or Igno­rance than Arrogance in the Remark, about Credit from the Judgment of [Page 23] the Antient Fathers; it looks as if it was borrowed from Dr. S—th, it has the Air of his impatient Opiniative­ness, but does not at all become the better Nature of the Bp. of Glocester. But he finds I am a sort of an Adver­sary, that would not permit him to treat me otherwise. And how did I compel him to treat me (as he suspects he has done) with too much Freedom? Why! I took a Liberty with him: But, Sir, you can assure him, that when I compos'd my MS. I knew not who was the Author of the 21 Pro­positions, and could not dream they should have been printed: my Aim was only to let you (then my very new Acquaintance) privately know my private Judgment. I am none of your Proselyte, nor no Man's else. I profess sincerely, I fell into what I hold touching the Trinity, by freely thinking and seriously considering, what I occasionally met with, here and there, now and then.

To conclude, I thank his Lordship for his good Wishes; and I do really believe, now he has vented his Anger, that he is sincere in them: for which I make him this Return: I heartily wish all Good to him, as I ought up­on many Accounts; 1. In general, because he is a very worthy and good Man. 2. In particular, because he hates Persecution. 3. Because he has not only sworn to the Government, but looks upon King William, who gave him his Preferment, as our De­liverer, not Conqueror; our just and lawful King, and no Usurper. But I cannot thank him for his Advice: He would have me think it possible, that those Opinions, which I take for most evident, and most necessary Truths, may be gross and dangerous Errors. Why! my Opinion is, that the Being of God, and the Reasonableness of H. Religion, are most evident and neces­sary Truths; and no Man living shall perswade me to that Modesty, as to think it possible for these to be gross and dangerous Errors. Again; He would have me believe that I may be mightily mistaken, when I am most confident: Indeed this Piece of Ad­vice has not so ill a face as the other, but his Lordship might have spar'd it; for I will not be most confident, but when the Truth is most plain and e­vident. I am, Sir, Yours.