A. Ne (que) me terret distinctio (quae pueris philosophiam garrientibus in sacco parata est) Entis perfecti & imper­fecti— pag. 58.

[Page 23] THe distinction of the Schools of a Being perfect and G. imperfect, is not I think so childish and impertinent as our Author would have believed. For though Ens Im­perfectum in the Metaphysical sence, be non-sence and a con­tradiction; yet in genere Physico, as they speak, 'tis no ab­surdity: since a being may want some circumstances of natural compleatness and perfection; and yet be Metaphysi­cally compleat and perfect: so that to affirm the soul an imperfect Being nakedly in it self, is to say no more, then that 'twas made with a natural aptitude, and congruity to a body by union with which 'tis perfected and compleated, being then furnish't with the requisites of its nature; which in like manner may be said of a body in humane form, viz. that 'tis defective and incompleat till it be furnished with the principle of Hu­mane actions, for which it was designed. So that there's no ab­surdity in affirming, That a thing may be one in a Physiologi­cal and natural sense; and two in a Metaphysical; And so out Philosopher's inference is no sequel. A.

2. Quando itaque petit, Unde Anima veniat? Repo­nendum est, An dubitet unde Homo veniat?— pag. 59. G.

THe Foundation of our learned Authors Answers to the proposed difficulties being overthrown; and it being made secure enough, That the soul is a distinct substance from the body; 'tis a pertinent and material enquiry to ask, whence the Soul is? And if our Philosopher will call this the Man according to the Maxim, let the question be pro­posed in his own phrase, and there's no danger of an ab­surdity.

A. Ne (que) Majorum quamtumvis Reverendorum me qua­tit Authoritas; non dico illorum qui— pag. 59.

G. IT seems the learned Gentleman would fain reconcile the Authority of the Church asserting the Souls Creation to his main conclusion, that 'tis no distinct substance from the body; and to his inference thereupon, that 'tis improper and impertinent, to inquire whence It came. But whether what is said be a clear salve or a shuffle, let it be determin'd by any equal judgment. For either by Homo quatenus in­tellectivus, our Author means something that is the same with the body; or really distinct and diverse. If the for­mer, he hath not satisfied the Authority of the Church, which affirms, the Soul as a distinct substance, to be the immedi­ate subject of Creation; founded upon that clear distincti­on in the inspired writings [The body to the dust, and the Soul to God that gave it.] But if he mean the latter, he hath not provided for his own assertion and hypothesis. Be­sides (2.) If man as intellective be created, then either he means the whole man, or only that by which he's intel­lective; the former is against all sense and experience. And the latter overthrows all our Author's Answers, with the Proposition upon which they are erected. For if there be some thing in man which is the subject of divine power and action; and some other thing that is the subject of natural production and generation; it seems to me appa­rent that these must be two things really distinguish't. For the same thing cannot be created and naturally produced. For Creation supposeth the production of the whole ex ni­hilo, both sui & subjecti (as the Schools phrase it) with­out the co-operation of any thing with the divine super­lative [Page 25] power: whereas all generation, according to truth and the same Hypothesis, at least supposeth one of them, and is perform'd by natural agents. And I think the case is plain enough when 'tis brought to this, Whether the same thing can be produced of something and nothing, with created assistance, and without it? Since the Actions then are so infinitely diverse, I think I shall not be reprehensi­bly Dogmatical, in affirming the terms distinct. What the Gentleman says more, seems to be involv'd, and looks like a designed evasion. And if [one action produceth a man, a Creature equivalent to a Beast and Angel] I demand, Whether this one action be divine or natural, from God or the generant? If the former, every man is as immediately created as the first. And the latter quite excludes crea ion, and supposeth God no otherwise to act in giving being to our Souls, then in each common production. 'Tis necessary therefore that the terms produced be distinct, when the Actions whereby they are produced are so vastly diverse; and that the Soul have an Origination different from the Formation of the body, of which 'tis more pertinent to in­quire, then easie to return an Answer.

3. Ex hâc Veritate derivamur ad sequentes duos A. nodos patentissimè solvendos.— pag. 60.

IN this and the following Paragraphs our Author suppo­seth G. his Doctrin of the identity of the soul and body for an Answer; And I think after what hath been said, I have as good reason to suppose mine of the diversity for a re­ply. But how the definition of a Part enervates my enqui­ry, I cannot imagine, since if [Parts are, out of which by composition are made one] And the body and soul be supposed [Page 26] parts of the Man (which may well enough be allowed upon the account of what hath been said) I see not but why we may inquire, how these parts, whose natures are so different, can be compounded and united.

A. Currit idem Error in sequenti difficultate, quae lu­get nesciri quomodo Anima moveat corpus,— pag. 61.

G. WHether my supposal be an Error, we have seen al­ready; if it be not, our Philosophers Answer is so. And whither the implyed assertion that the Soul moves not the body be not one, I appeal to any man, that under­stands he hath any claim to such a being. For though ma­ny of our actions, and possibly more then are suspected, may be allowed to be meer Mechanick motions; yet the experience of all the World attests, that our wills deter­mine and excite not a few of our corporeal motions. What else means the distinction of the Schools of actions impe­rate and elicit? And how is it that we can speak and move at pleasure, and in spight of all corporeal impulse, desist from external action! And if Man be a meer Mecha­nicks Engine, farewel Free-will, Virtue, Vice, Laws, Re­ligion, rewards and punishments. A clock were as capa­ble of these, according to our Philosopher's Hypothesis, as an humane Automaton.

A. Vere enim Unum membrum animatum movet aliud, sed non aliqua substantia quae sit pura Anima— pag. 61.

[Page 27] ▪TIs true, one animate member moves another, but the G. motion must somewhere begin. And though those which are purely corporeal in us are excited by material agents; yet others we find, which derive from an higher Principle, viz. a free and unconstrained will. And it seem strange to me that men should be so much in love with their pri­vate speculations, as for their sakes to confront their own, and all the worlds experience. What follows, no body that I know, affirms, viz. [That a substance which is a pure Soul moves a member wherein there is none].

But to what concerns other Animals, the learned Author knows, that the Platonists assign them Souls in­dependent on their Bodies; and the Peripateticks, substan­tial Forms distinct from matter, which are the source and Principle of their Actions. So that according to either of these Hypotheseis, the question may as pertinently be pro­posed concerning their kind, as our own, and will be as difficultly answered. Indeed the excellent Monsieur Des-Cartes, and his followers that affirm, all bruit Actions to be Mechanical, are not concern'd in the inquiry. And if this be the belief of our Philosopher, I'le not indeavour to disturb his Hypothesis. Only this I'le add to our purpose, That though we suppose the Actions of Beasts to be fa­tal and material, yet there's no reason to infer the same of ours, since we feel it otherwise. And 'tis no very rea­sonable method of arguing, to conclude from an opinion of things we can but conjecture, to the denyal of things we certainly feel, and know. So that though, as our Au­thor insinuates, there may perhaps be no kind of corporeal Actions in our selves, which are not in bruits; yet 'tis not therefore necessary to inferr, that they proceed from a like principle in both: much less that we should conclude, that none of our own actions are begun by a principle distinct from the body and immaterial; because we believe that [Page 28] theirs are not so. On the other side methinks the Argu­ment will be stronger to inferr, That because we feel a substance distinct from matter to be the cause of some of our motions; that therefore there may likely be an incorporeal substance that is the principle and spring of some of theirs: And 'tis better to conclude from certainty to conjecture, then from conjecture against certainty.

A. 4. Ultimae, quas in hoc capitulo plangit, tenebrae collo­catae sunt in ignorantiâ illius motus,— pag. 62.

G. THe difficulties about the direction of the Spirits con­cern not only Man, but all other Animals, supposing them to do any thing by a principle of Knowledge and Ani­madversion. Or, though we judge all their actions M cha­nical, yet the Account will be more difficultly rendred that way, then by supposing them to act by an animadversive principle. For how such an infinite variety of motions should be regularly menaged, and conducted in such a Wilderness of passages and distinct avennues by meer blind impellents and material conveyances, I have not the least shadow of conjecture. And though Des-Cartes hath made the best attempts in this kind of any hath yet appear'd in the Theory, yet there are Mechanical difficulties in the way of his So­lutions, which perhaps will never be well satisfied. But our Philosopher confesseth here the defect of his Anatomy; and though he thinks himself secure of the general Cause, yet the particular Direction he acknowledges wonderful, and not yet sufficiently discover'd.

Verùm Author casum proprium Homini constituere vi­detur, A. ostentans voluntatem & fortassis— pag. 63.

TO prove that the Will is not alwayes moved by some G. precedent passion, and consequently that the Soul is the immediate principle of some of our actions, I make this double offer:

(1.) 'Tis clear from experience, that, though many of our volitions are motions from the Passion, yet some of our Determinations are from the Understanding and immaterial Faculties. And sometimes we set our Wills to determine in things that are purely indifferent, to make tryal of our Liberty; when we find not the least provocation or incite­ment to the action from any emotion of the body. And indeed to suppose every action of the Will to depend upon a pre­vious Appetite or Passion, is to destroy our Liberty, and to inferr a Stoical Fatality with all the dangerous consequences of that Doctrine▪

(2.) Our Author's proof that there is no dispassionate volition, is an insinuation, that there is no Knowledge without an impulse from the Phantasms; a Conclusion which may be easily disproved, by those highly abstract Specula­tions which the mind of Man sometimes entertains it self with, when it puts off all the cloathing of the Imagination, and raiseth it self to a temper for those noble enquiries a­bout God and Immaterials: And if there be no Intellect [...], as Aristotle speaks, for ought I know, we lose one of our chiefest Arguments for our Immortality: Besides which, I suppose our learned Author will not think it for his credit, to be told, that he is in the very rode of the Hobbian Hypothesis; which will clearly enough appear, [Page 30] if we consider these his Assertions; [That the Soul is no distinct substance from the Body, that it contributes nothing towards its motion; that our Wills are moved by prece­dent or present Passion, which doubtless is excited by some­thing that is not in our power; that all our Intellections are from Phantasms, and consequently, nothing else but ele­vated sense, and that all both natural and free actions are performed by motions deriv'd from the heart] I say, who ever considers, how these symbolize, yea, and are one with the main Principles of that irreligious Philosophy, must with­out an excess of Charity, suppose our Philosopher to have shaken hands with the Leviathan.

Briefly then, 'tis confest, that the Mechanical way of con­veyance and direction of the Spirits in Animal performances is yet undiscover'd, and that the channels and particular pas­sages of Mechanical motions (which all ours are supposed to be) is yet occult and manifest. And though this Gen­tleman affirms, the Heart to be the Fountain of animate Operations, yet 'tis but an unapproved presumption; and the greatest Master of Mechanicks that ever was, the Il­lustrious Des-Cartes has deriv'd all these motions from the brain, in which he's follow'd by the greatest part of profoundest Speculators; so that it seems we are not certain of the first spring of the motions we enquire of; much less can we certainly determin the minutes and particula­rities of direction: and if any of our actions are deriv'd from our Souls, which our Author seems unwilling to hear of, though I think I have made it sufficiently evident, the difficulties I urg'd upon that supposal have not had the least offer towards solution.

A. 5. Caput quartum Sensationis & Memoriae in­explicabiles esse naturas objicit.— pag. 64.

[Page 31] I Am no further concern'd in the beginning of this Secti­on, G. then to mind this learned Gentleman how different his apprehension of Des-Cartes his Hypothesis of the manner of Sense, is, from that of his ingenuous and applauded friend Sir K. Digby; who calls not his opinion a fanstatical con­jecture, but thus Prefaces to the recital of his Hypothesis. [Monsieur Des-Cartes, (who by his great and heroick at­tempts, and by shewing mankind how to steer and hus­band theit reason to the best advantage, hath left us no ex­cuse of being ignorant of any thing that is worth the know­ing) explicating the nature of Sense—and then goes on to declare his opinion of this matter, which he concludes with this character; of a colour very diverse from our Au­thor's [This then is the sum of Monsieur Des-Cartes's Opi­nion, which he hath very finely exprest with all the advan­tages that opposite examples, significant words and clear method, can give unto a witty Discourse; which yet, is but a part of the commendations he deserveth, for what he hath done on this particular: he is over and above all this, the first I ever met with who hath published any concep­tions of this nature, whereby to make the Operations of Sense intelligible, Certainly, this praise will ever belong unto him that he hath given the first hint of speaking ground­edly, and to the purpose upon this Subject; and whosoever shall carry it any further (as what important mystery was ever born and perfected at one?) must acknowledge to have deriv'd his light from him.] This is the censure that excel­lent person gives of Des-Cartes, and his Opinion, which his dear Friend our Author, hath with so much severity reflected on. And the learned Knight professeth himself of Des-Cartes's mind in all the other circumstances of this Hypothesis, ex­cept the Subject of this Motion. So that I wonder that our Philosopher should so far forget himself, as to put such a [Page 32] slurre upon the judgment of his admired Friend, by speak­ing so contemptuously of a Notion that learned Man had so much, and so deservedly, applauded. What follows is al­ready answer'd.

A. Sed nè nihil novi dicat, calumniatur sensu solo non posse agnosci quantitates rerum, distantias,— pag. 65.

G. OUr Author in this Period, wonders at my Assertion, and I wonder as much at his wonder; which is not oc­casioned by any affirmation of mine, but by a mistake of his own: for my doubt (as plain as I could express it) is, How, since there is nothing in the Brain, the seat of Sense, to represent external objects but motion, (for which I have the suffrage of his noble friend, whose method he professeth to follow) how, I say, we should by that know figures, distances, magnitudes, and colours, things of ano­ther kind from motion; which therefore cannot represent them, but by some knowledge in the Soul, which we are not aware of; and how the scant and narrow images in the Brain should notifie the vastest objects, in their large dimensions, without some secret Inference and Geo­metry in the Soul, is unconceiveable: But what this Know­ledge is, we know not. This is the sense of the difficul­ty propos'd, which, how it is explicated by the Optical de­monstrations the Gentleman talks of, the Opticks of my un­derstanding cannot discover. For the rest I dare venture it without an Answer.

6. Proximus in Memoriam labor expenditur. Illi­us A. explanationem ut impossibilem declaret,— pag. 66.
7. Imprimis, decîdi à moventibus sensum quasdam ex­uvias & corporis delibamenta, quoad tactum,— pag 68.

I Take not upon me to determin of Possibilities; and there­fore G. from the present ignorance of the nature of Memo­ry I infer not, that it will never be explained hereafter: Only I affirm, that no Hypothesis extant hath yet made it ma­nifest; which is sufficient for my conclusion of the present nar­rowness of our Knowledge, though not of my Assailants of the impossibility of enlarging it.

But our Philosopher thinketh the nature of Memory suf­ficiently explained already, and the account he gives is that of Sir K. Digby, which was one of the four that I examin'd in the Discourse impugn'd. This is the Hypothesis which our Author hath adopted, and undertook the defence of; with what success, we shall discover when we have exa­min'd the Answer he makes to my Impugnations. Which after a large recital of the Hypothesis he descends to in the ninth Section.

9. Attamen, perturbat novum Naturae miratorem A. multitudo objectorum cavis cerebri— pag. 72.

THe difficulty I urg'd against the Digbaean account of G. the Memory, was, that 'tis inconceiveable how those active particles, which are the images and representations [Page 34] of things remembred, should keep their distinct and or­derly Situations without confusion or dissipation in a sub­stance wherein there is continual motion? to which the learned Gentleman returns; That 'tis as conceivable as how the Rays of Light should come in a direct line to the Eye; or how the Atomical Effluvia that continually flow from all bodies, especially the Magnetical and Sym­pathetick, should find their way to the place they tend to. To this I rejoyn briefly, (1) what the Gentleman himself suggests, were answer sufficient, that the multi­plying of difficulty doth not solve it: For supposing the direction of the corpuscles of light, and those mention'd Effluvia, to be of a difficult apprehension, as the conti­nuance and regularity of those images in the Brain: yet this only argues another defect in our Knowledge, and so is a new evidence of the truth of my General Conclusion. But (2) the proposed Instances are far more accounta­ble then this before us. For, as to what concerns the light, supposing with Des Cartes (as is most probable) that the action of Light consists in nothing but the conamen of the Aethereal matter, receding from the centre of its motion: The direct tendency of it to the Eye, is no difficulty worth considering, but as clear as the Light it self the subject of the enquiry; or, if the rays be Atomical streams, and effluxes of the Sun, there is no more difficulty in this Hypothesis neither, then in the direct spouting of water out of a Pipe; yea no more, then in the beating of the waves against the sides of a Ship, when it swims in the Ocean. For there's an whole Sea of Atomes which derive from the Fountain illuminant, whose course can no more be diverted, by those little bodies that swim up and down in the air; then that of the Ocean can by those Sands, Pe­bles, Fishes, and Rocks, that are mingled with the waters. And as for the other Instances of corporeal Emissions, it would require to be prov'd that they perform all those [Page 35] feats that are ascrib'd to them: whereas perhaps it is more likely, that those strange operations are not Mechanical but Magical, being effected by the continuity of the great Spirit of Nature, which runs through all things: or how­ever, to suppose this act of the Memory to be as clear as Magnetisme and Sympathies, will be no great advantage to the belief of its certain Intelligibility.

At ego ipsum sic nodum scindo. In majoribus ubi faci­lior A. est experiendi facultas, palàm est multa— pag. 73.

THat what our Author has answer'd in this Period, G. should resolve the difficulty, is to me as great a wonder, as the Mystery we are discoursing of. And if the knot be cut, 'tis certainly by some occult and sympathetick Instrument, for the gross of his Answer comes not near it. The difficulty was; How the Images of such an infinite of Objects, as we remember, should be kept distinct with­out confusion, be brought forth when we have occasion, and remanded back again into their own cells when they have done the errant they were sent for. To which our Author saith no more, but to this purpose (if I under­stand him) That if the Object stays not on the Sense, it makes not impression enough to be remembred, but if it be repeated there, it leaves plenty enough of those Images behind it to confirm and strengthen the Knowledge of the Object: In which radicated Knowledge, if the Memory consist, there would be no need of reserving those A­tomes in the Brain, or calling them forth upon occasion, as the Hypothesis supposeth; or, if there be, the difficulty is untouched.

[Page 36] Besides all which, I might adde, that if these mate­rial Images are a sufficient account of the Memory, how will our remembrance of Distances, Magnitudes, Relations, Words, Metaphysical Notions, and those of Immaterials, which leave no such Idola, in the Brain, be accounted for? Let this Gentleman tell me how— Et erit mihi Magnus—

A. 10. Palàm est me in hâc Responsione Digbaeanam Methodum caeteris praetulisse. Ipsius enim— pag. 74.

G. IF I am mistaken in the Opinion of Aristotle in this matter, (1.) I err with the great body of his Com­mentators and followers; yea, and all the Schools in Chri­stendom, who unanimously concurr in the assignment of the Doctrine of Intentional Species to their Master Ari­stotle; So that if all the Peripateticks hitherto have been so grossly out in imposing an Opinion he never taught upon their ador'd Philosopher, for ought I know, there is no such thing as the Aristotelean Philosophy in the Uni­versities of Europe: For the taking in, or denying these Intentional Species will make material and mighty alte­rations in the whole frame of the Hypothesis; and I see not how the denial of them is consistent with the Aristo­telean Doctrine of Qualities and Forms. But (2.) If Aristotle taught the Digbaean Philosophy, as our Author sayes, he taught the Atomical, which is notoriously known to have been the way of Democritus and Epicurus, which Aristotle frequently and professedly opposeth. That De­mocritus taught the Atomical Hypothesis, we have the affirmative of Aristotle to justifie, [...] (speaking of Leucippus and Democritus) [...], [Page 37] [...]. And neerer to our purpose, that these solved the way of Sensation, by ma­terial Images, we have from Plutarch; [...]. This Hypothe­sis Aristotle endeavours to confute; [...], sayes he, [...]. And again, [...]. Aristotle then thought the Doctrine of Sensation by corporeal Images absurd in Democritus and Epicurus; and therefore certainly would not himself af­firm it; as he must do on the supposal of his having taught the same Hypothesis with Sir K. Digby about the Memory, which is exactly the same with that of these Sages: For that learned Knight affirms, Sensation to be perform'd [by driving of solid material bodies, exceeding little ones, that come from the Objects themselves, (they are his own words) against that part of the brain where Knowledge resideth, which same bodies rebounding thence into certain cells of the Brain, perform the offices of the Memory] as he has largely discourst upon the Subject. Sir K. Digby then pro­ceeds in the Corpuscularian method which Aristotle op­poseth, and particularly in the business of Sensation; and consequently cannot be of his belief in his Hypothesis of the Memory, which the learned Knight gives account of by the same material Idola, which Aristotle laught at. And doubtless the Memory is excited to action by the like In­struments as are the external Senses, consonantly to that of Plato in his Phaedo, speaking of the Senses, [...]. And Aristotle himself [...]. I think 'tis clear then that Aristotle's Doctrine of the Memory is not the same with Sir K. Digby's. And if I have been out in intitling the Opinion of Intentional Species to Aristotle, my mistake is the more venial, because the [Page 38] whole Army of his most devoted Sectators are deceived with me. But our Author is more reprehensible in his mistake, if it be one; because he's alone in his opinion. And an Error hath by so much the more of guilt, as it hath of singularity and self-assurance. But whether this were Aristotle's Doctrine or not, I think 'tis not very ma­terial, since I make this none of the charges against him. If it be not his, 'tis the general Opinion of his Schools; and I have proved it an insufficient Account of the Faculty we are discoursing of.

A. 1. Capite quinto formationis Corporum naturalium, Viventium praesertim, obscuritatem intentat:— pag. 76.

G. TWo methods it seems our Philosopher proposeth, for the giving an account of the Formation of Animals; neither of which seems to me a sufficient solution of the doubt attempted. For first, he that supposeth all the vastly differing parts of a Worm or Insect to be actually contain'd, though in myriate and indivisible proportions, in a drop of dew out of which they are sometimes genera­ted, believes gratis, without any ground of his supposal; and therefore will be very bold to assert this the certain account of the Phaenomenon. (2.) If the Seed contain, though invisibly, all the parts of the Animal; then either in the same Site, and Position, that they are found in in the compleated Body; or they lie there in a confused huddle and mixture; the former, is contrary to all ex­perience, which assures us, that the immediate matter [Page 39] of all generations is a certain fluid, and, as far as can be discern'd, an homogeneous substance. Now fluidity consist­ing in the motion of the parts of the fluid body, as is testi­fied by Experience and the best Philosophy, the Seminal Parts can be of no setled Form or Consistence. And if the second be supposed, which doubtless is the truth, the dif­ficulty under debate will be unanswer'd, (viz.) how such an Infinite of distinct Parts should be brought into their regular and orderly Positions without the guidance and con­duct of some knowing Agent; to fly to a first Cause is Un­philosophical; and he that pretends a second, let him shew it. And fortuitously it cannot be: for Chance is the cause of no constant and regular Effect; and to suppose an un­directed Motion to shuffle these fluid parts into the wonder­ful and exact form of an Animal, or any other regular bo­dy; is as likely, as that the divided Letters of an Alphabet should be accidentally jumbled into an elegant and polite Discourse; which when once I see effected, I'le believe, that there wants nothing to the formation of the World and all bodies therein, but Matter and Motion. Some intelli­gent Principle then must be suppos'd to guide these Elemen­tary parts into their orderly situations. But what that is, who is't will determine?

(2.) The Second Account also is too general, and flies very wide of my particular enquiry. For my Quaery is concerning the principle of the conduct of the parts of the various matter in those rare and methodical Composures; and our Philosopher's Answer concerns only the gross and material parts of the Composition. And therefore little can be collected from the Chymical Processes he speaks of, for our purpose; and the Elementary Solutions mention'd, sig­nifie nothing towards the accounting for the unerring exact­ness we find in Animal Formations. For all these being sup­pos'd, the matter is in the same circumstances of difficulty as before; and this Gentleman's Solution seems to me to [Page 40] signifie no more, then if a man should answer to one that that desires an account of the art and method of the motions of a Watch, or any other ingenious Automaton; that they are perform'd by Steel, Iron, Brass, or Silver, wherein the matter indeed of the work is declar'd, but not the artifice. And in the case before us, I inquire of the principle of direction of those intricate and methodical motions, and am answer'd with an account of the gross and material Ingre­dients. Nor is what follows of any whit more avail to the Solution pretended; for let the matter resolve into parts dry, subtle, and liquid▪ Let the dryer dispose themselves into divers figures, and constitute what Vessels our Philo­sopher is pleas'd to fancy; yet how from hence forward the infinite variety of the parts of an Animal will result, will require something more to help us to conjecture.

A. 2. Haec qui mente comprehenderit, non plorabit Pla­sticam vanum nomen esse & vocem sine re.— pag. 78.

G. THough by a close and recondite search into the Semi­nalities of Plants, and Vegetables, the future processes may be judg'd, as our Philosopher assures us; yet this only argues, that the grown parts were all contain'd pack't up in their Seeds and Berries; so that in the growth and progress Nature did only display and unfold, what before was in the minute proportions more closely laid together; Supposing which, the main doubt still remains unsatisfied, viz. How these SMALLER SEMINAL parts were so order'd, and framed? And this Brachygraphy of Nature cannot be thought less difficult then it's Text. And, secondly, what relates to Ani­mals we have seen already; for 'tis not likely, that the formed parts were ever actually contain'd in the seed, out of which they were produced.

Neque quemquam terreant artificum dicta, admiranti­um A. ea quorum causas non intelligunt,— pag. 79.

I Might well wonder at the specifical uniformity of things, if G. unguided matter were the only principle of their formati­on, against which Hypothesis this doubt was raised; and the variation from the kind which happens in some regions, would not be so observable, as an identity in any.

3. Eodem capitulo duas alias quaestiones movet quas A. absolutè inexplicabiles putat; Mihi contra— pag. 80.

IF the doubts I propose of the union of the Parts, and compo­sition G. of quantity, contain scarce any difficulty at all; our Phi­losopher is more lucky in his enquiries, then others that have dealt in those Theories; most men confessing the perplexity of the mention'd Phaenomena, especially of the latter. And the vast diversity of Philosophers about it, testifies, that the speculation of them is not of so facile an explication. And 'tis strange that the Ancients should keep such ado about an easie Probleme, and the Moderns despair of a solution, so pretendedly obvious.

I will not differ with the learned Gentleman about the order of the questions, and grant, that they both suppose actual parts in Quantity; which because our Author denies, & makes this the foundation of his Answer to these, and some of my former propos'd difficulties, I must be fain to prove it; which I at­tempt (1.) By giving some evidence of my Affirmative, and (2.) by shewing the weakness and insufficiency of the grounds of the contrary Assertion.

[Page 42] For the first then, That there are Actual parts in Quan­tity, I evince it by these considerations. (1.) The formal nature of Quantity is Extension in the notion of Aristotle's Schools; and Divisibility in the Philosophy of Sir Kenelm Digby, and our Authour; Both which suppose parts, and parts actual: for to be extended, in the School phrase, is to have partes extrapartes; and if the extension be actual, the parts must be so: for it is not conceiveable how a thing can be extended, but by parts which are really distinct one from a­nother, though not separate: which seems to me so evident, that nothing can be spoken plainer; and I appeal in this matter to the common sense of all men. Nor can a thing be divided, except we suppose the parts praeexistent in the di­visible: for divisibility is founded upon real distinction, and 'tis impossible to divide what is one without diversity. (2.) Ex­cept there are parts in quantity before division, there are none at all: for after they are divided they are no parts, but have a compleatness and integrality of their own, especially if the sub­ject were homogeneous. (3.) Except there are parts actually in quantity, contradictions may be verified de eodem, with all the other circumstances, which the Metaphysicks teach impossible. For the same body may be black and white, cold and hot, seen and not seen, and partake of all other most contrary qualities. Which contradictions, and inconsistences cannot be accom­modated in the same subject, without supposal of the con­tended-for diversity. Nor will the answer, which Sir K. Dig­by has provided for such Objections help the Hypothesis, viz. [that it is not one part of the thing that shews it self, and ano­ther that doth not, one that is hot, and another cold, &c. But it is the same thing, shewing it self according to one possibi­lity of division, and not another.] For first, these distinct possibilities are founded upon distinct actualities, which are the parts I would have acknowledged. And such a capacity of receiving things so different, cannot be in the same subject, without the supposal of parts actually distinct and divers. [Page 43] (2.) The subjects of these contrary qualities are things actu­al: whereas possibilities are but Metaphysical notions. And these subjects are distinct, or contradictions will be reconcil'd de eodem; from which the inference seems necessary, that quantity hath parts, and parts actual, and distinct possibilities will not salve the business. And (3.) why must the common speech of all mankinde be alter'd, and what all the world cals parts, be call'd possibilities of division? which yet if our Philosopher will needs name so, they being acknowledg'd distinct, and prov'd actual, or at least founded immediately upon things that are so; my question will as well proceed this way as in the common one, viz. How the things that an­swer to these distinct possibilities are united, and of what compounded?

There is another Answer which I find in our Authors Peripatetical Institutions, the sum of which is, [That the contradictions have only a notional repugnance in the sub­ject as 'tis in our understandings: and since the parts have a distinct being in our understanding, from thence 'tis that they are capable to sustain contradictions] which Answer, if I understand, I have reason to wonder at: for certain­ly the Subject sustains the Contradictories as it is in re. And, I never heard of a notion black or white, but in a Metaphor; 'tis the real substance is the subject of these contrarieties; which were impossible, if it had not divers realities answering to the qualities so denominating. And therefore 'tis not the Understanding that makes the divers subjects of these Ac­cidents, as our Author suggests: but there being such is the ground that we so apprehend them. I hope I need say no more then to establish the supposal of the difficulty un­der consideration, That there are parts actually in Quan­tity: only I am obliged by my proposed method to add further,

(2.) That the grounds of the excellent Sir K. Digby, and our Author, on which they built their asserted Paradox, [Page 44] seem to me very insufficient to sustain so great a weight as leans upon them. The Reasons are (1.) Quantity is Divisibili­ty. (2.) Divisibility is capacity of Division. (3) What is only capable of division, is not actually divided. (4.) Quantity is not actually divided, and therefore hath no parts actually, To which in short,

(1.) That Quantity is Divisibility, is presumed; but extension is before it, in nature, and our conception, and is the received notion, though perhaps Impenetrability is the truest. However (2.) even this supposeth parts, and those actual: For Division is but Solution of Union. And Union supposeth Parts to be united. (3.) What is only capable of division in a Physiological and Mechanical lense; may, yea and ought, to be divided in a Metaphysical. That is, they ought to be divers in their being, before they can be separate and distinct in their material bulk and quantity. For separabi­lity must presuppose diversity. (4.) Though Quantity be not actually divided in one sense, 'tis in another: Every part having a distinct place and being of its own, though it doth not yet enjoy it separately and apart from others.

But (2.) it is pleaded against actual parts in Quantity, that if we admit them, we cannot stop till we come down to Indivisibles; of which to suppose Quantity composed, is said to be absurd and impossible. In return to which, I grant the Inference, and have acknowledged the Hypothesis of Indivisibles to be full of seeming inconsistencies; as is the other also: And therefore reckon both among the Un­conceiveables; of which there can be no greater Argument then their having driven so great and sagacious wits upon such an Assertion, (to which out of reverence to these ce­lebrated persons, I shall not affix an Epithete) against the evidence of our Senses, and the apprehension of all the world: That there are no parts in quantity. But (2.) 'tis no good method of reasoning, to deny what is plain and obvious, because we cannot conceive what is abstruse and [Page 45] difficult. And I think the Assertor cannot answer it to his se­verer faculties, who affirms, there are no parts actually in quantity, against all his Senses and the universal suffrage of Mankinde; because he cannot untie the difficulties that emerge from the supposal, that Bodies are compounded of Indivisibles; a nice and in tricate Theory. Yea how will our Author answer for the Assertion to his Master Ari­stotle? who saith [...].

Argumenta asserentium partes actu vel Sensum A. citant, de quo nihil certius est quàm— pag. 81.

I Believe the Assertors of Actual parts may well appeal G. to the Senses, notwithstanding what our Author, and the learned Knight have alledg'd to invalidate their evidence. For what though the sense discovers not the distinct term of the hand or finger; Can it not therefore discern them to be distant and distinguish't from the foot and toes? And is not this enough to ground the belief of their diversity? Can­not we distinguish the motions of our parts; though we know not their first springs and exact beginnings? or discern a dif­ference between the apple and the twig it grows on; except we could see the point where one begins and the other end­eth? And whether an Hypothesis is like to stand, that is put to such poor shifts to defend it self against the grossest of our faculties, I leave to be conjectured?

The supposition then of my doubts, being thus asserted and prov'd, we see yet but small hope to expect their So­lution. Or, if this be an aenswer, t'is an evidence of our in­tellectual weakness, that all the world hath all this while been confounded about a plain Problem upon a false sup­posal.

[Page 46] The Answer to my other difficulty about the union of the parts of quantity, is grounded also upon the presumption that there are actually none; which I think I have sufficient­ly disprov'd.

A. 5. Caput sextum totum motui Rotarum dedicatum est, neque si credimus Authori de cujus— pag. 83.

G. I Conclude not only that no part can move, but the whole must; but also that in the circular motion of a wheel, it seems that the motion of every part must be praerequired to it self, which I think is clear enough in the inference, though the proposition inferred, be impossible and absurd. And what inconvenience there is in this conclusion, that all the parts change their place at once, I have made sufficiently evi­dent, in the place where the difficulty is urged. I confess in our Authors Hypothesis that there are actually no parts in bodies, the doubt is none; and the whole matter will pass in­to words and air: but supposing that in quantity there are distinct realities, I think 'twill be hard to dis-incumber this trite Phaenomenon from the perplexities I mention'd.

A. Subjungit Author secundam difficultatem, quomodo in rotâ circumvolutâ viciniores centro partes— pag. 84.

G. I Say again, however we find it in the event, while yet we consider the remote parts, moving swifter then the cen­tral ones, in the speculative notion, 'tis hard to conceive, but that the Line drawn from the Centre to the Circumfe­rence, [Page 47] should be inflected; since one point of the line rests while the other moves, which in the Theory seems to argue a disunion, and consequently an incurvation. So that though it be true in the experiment and event, yea and while we look upon the reason of the thing, in one position; that the line would be made crooked, were it not for the unequal velocity of the parts; yet it appears as clear to reason, in another posture, that this inequality should inferre it. For if B move swifter then A. A rests some instant while B is in motion. There's no motion, but where there's change of place, viz. of that place, in respect of which the body is said to move: The place in respect of which the body is said to move, is the next superficies that is considered as quiescen'. And consequently it seems if B move any in­stant, in which A doth not: it is proportionably to its mo­tion remov'd from that of A to which it was adjacent, and by consequence one would expect it should be disjoyn'd, or inflected.

6. Jactatum tandem experimentum capite alto in­greditur A. Author ille, prefatus audentisseme— pag. 85.

SInce the publishing my Discourse; I have met an in­genious G. Account, among some excellent Geometrici­ans of this Probleme, which perhaps may satisfie the dif­ficulty. The Account briefly is, That in volutation the whole circumference moves by a motion both progressive and circular: But the centre by the progressive only. And consequently by how much the nearer the parts are to the centre the more they have of the progressive motion, and the less of circulation. So that the little wheel in our ex­periment draws, and hath so much more progression then [Page 48] the greater, as makes amends for it's defect of parts. Which solution I'le acknowledge perfect, if two things answer experiment, which I have not yet had occasion to make tryal of; viz. (1.) Supposing both wheels to be denticulated, the little wheel will with it's teeth describe lines; and the great one with it's make points. And (2.) the disproportion being augmented, suppose to an hundred to one, the drawing of the lesser wheel will be exceeding palpable, and discoverable by the dullest sense. I say, if these circumstances answer experiment; this dif­ficulty is for ought I know well accounted for. And I need add no more to this confession: For our Authors Answer is either materially the same with this, or much less to purpose.

A. 1. In sequentibus aliquot Capitulis satis exquisitè in­vestigat causas Errorum & Ignorantiae— pag. 90.

G. THat the present Age abounds with pratling Ignorance, and vain shews of Science falsly so called, will not be denyed by one, who hath directed some indeavours a­gainst them. And did I not deeply apprehend how much bold affirmers, and lazy Inquisitors have prejudiced the ad­vance of true and substantial knowledge, I had never en­gaged against Dogmatizing and Peripatetick Philosophy. I wonder therefore that my learned Assailant should object my omission of these causes of Ignorance, which had the greatest interest in drawing from me the Discourse he opposeth; in which, I have largely insisted on those rea­sons [Page 49] of the defect of Knowledge, viz. the depth of Truth, the praecipitancy of mens understandings, and aversness to deep search, and close engagement of their mindes. Be­sides which, I have professedly attacqued the disputing way of Inquiry, and the verbal emptiness of the Philosophy of the Schools; which how guilty it is of laying a foundation for sloath and loquacity, is particularly made appear in the Discourse I directed against it. And while the Schools of Learning are under the regency of that kind of Spirit, I fear little is to be expected from Philosophy but bold talk; and endless disputes and quarrels. For what else can be the fruit of a Philosophy made up of occult Qualities, Sympa­thies, Entelechia's, Elements, Celestial Influences, and a­bundance other hard words and lazy generalities, but an arrest of all ingenious and practical indeavour; and a Wil­derness of Opinions instead of certainty and Science? But thanks be to Providence, the World begins to emerge from this state of things, and to imploy it self in more deep and concerning Disquisitions; the issue of which, we hope, will be a Philosophy fruitful in works, not in words, and such as may accommodate the use of Life, both natural and moral.

Testis mihi esto Author qui sub finem prioris Capitis A. conqueritur de obscuritate Speculationum,— pag 90.

HOw justly the Author is made an instance and witness G. of that, which, in the very Discourse, by which only, I suppose, he is known to our Philosopher, he hath so earnestly witnest against, which his spirit is so averse unto, which gave the occasion of the Dispute be­tween us; I say, with what justice I am made an in­stance of that I have so professedly opposed, let it be [Page 50] judg'd by any, that is not unreasonably partial. 'Tis true, I complain of the obscurity of Motion, Gravity, Light, Colours, Vision, and Sounds; and yet am not ignorant of the Accounts Sir K. Digby, and other Philosophers both Antient and Modern, have given of these Phaenomena. My mind is anxious in speculation, and hath engag'd me to look as far, as my capacity could reach, into these Theories; I could never content my self with superficial put▪offs; nor am I apt immediately to dispair, if I find not present sa­tisfaction in my first enquiries. I have with my best dili­gence examined the most hopeful accounts are extant of these appearances, and yet must profess, That though the first sight of their respective solutions is pleasant and en­couraging, and seems to promise my mind a requiem; yet the longer I view the most likely of these Hypotheses, the more liable and obnoxious I apprehend them. Like Pictures they will not bear to be look't upon, but at a distance, and when I come neer, I easily detect their imperfections. So that deep search discovers more ignorance, then it cures; and confidence of Science seems to be built upon a slight and superficial view of things; as Aristotle himself hath somewhere observed, and every one else may, that will but take notice, that young talking Sophisters use to be far more assured of their Assertions, then the deepest and most exercis'd Philosophers.

I'le not disparage the account given by the learned Sir K. Digby of the mention'd Phaenomena; they are to be acknowledg'd pretty, and ingenious: But yet I cannot think, that 'tis an argument of shallowness and impatience in enquiry, not fully to acquiesce in his Hypotheses as infal­lible Solutions. I suppose, that ingenious Philosopher's own modesty and justice will not suffer him to own such a fond­ness for his notions, which I know he proposeth, but as likely and convenient supposals. I confess the most satis­faction. I any where meet with, is in the accounts of Des-Cartes, [Page 51] to whom Sir K. Digby himself bears this Testimony, [That he hath shown the World the way to Science,] And yet that great man, the excellence of whose Philosophick genius and performances, the most improv'd spirits acknow­ledge, propounds his Principles but in the modest way of Hypotheses, and pretends not to have explain'd things as they are, but as they may be. And I believe our Author will not reckon, him among the slight and talkative Phi­losophers; which is so far from being true, that such as love only to skim things, and have not the patience to keep their minds to a deep and close attention, cannot with any face as much as pretend acquaintance with his Princi­ples; the comprehension of which, will require the most severe meditation, and fix't engagement of the mind, of any Philosophy that is intelligible. Not, that this excellent person affects obscurity either in Matter, Style, or Method, being indeed very perspicuous in all of them: but because, his way is unusual, and his Principles so coherent and close­ly pack't together, that the letting fall any link of connexi­on, will spoil the dependance, and hinder the understand­ing of the sequel. But I return from this excursion. If all then must be accounted impatient and shallow Philoso­phers, who acquiesce not in the Digbaean Hypotheses; all the learned Cartesians, Platonists, the whole stock of the ingeni­ous recent Philosophers; yea and All, that follow not the way of Sir K. Digby, must unavoidably fall under the shame of these appellatives; and perhaps that great person him­self, who I dare say thinks not the light his Philosophy hath afforded these perplexing Speculations, to be so clear, as to admit of no shadow or obscurity. What ever haste therefore those discover, that will not be fully contented with the Principles in which our Philosopher is so well satisfied, I am confident that a little reflection will inform him, that he hath betrayed some, in his censure.

A. 2. Altera ab Authore nostro neglecta Ignorantiae causa mihi apparet esse quidam specialis— pag. 91.

G. IF any are so weak to affirm nothing can be demonstra­ted, against which any thing is, or can be objected; let them answer for their Assertion, I am not to account for the mistakes of others: And if there are those who will not admit of certainty or evidence in a conclusion that any hath made a doubt of, as our Author intimates in the following Paragraph, I have as little to answer for their Scepticism and incredulity. For I never expect to see the world agree in any thing; and therefore I assent where I see cause, and proportion the degree of my belief to that I have of evidence, without expecting the hopeless en­couragement of a universal suffrage. Though I confess, where deep and enquiring spirits differ, I judge I have reason to be cautious, and to suspect uncertainty. Our Au­thor concludes with a reprehension of those endless talk­ers, the Modern Peripateticks, and their voluminous tri­fles, in which I dissent not from him: But pass from them to their Master Aristotle, whom our Philosopher un­dertakes to vindicate from my reflections; with what suc­cess, will be the subject of our next enquiry.

1. Et jam defunctus labore imperato videor, nisi A. summâ cum invidiâ Aristotelem omnibus— pag. 95.

OUr Author in this Paragraph is of a very different G. apprehension from all other Aristotelians, if we'l believe Patritius, who saith, Tritum vero jam est ac em­nium Aristotelicorum assensu comprobatum, nullam esse in Ari­stotelicis Libris Scientificam Demonstrationem. Our Philoso­pher then denies all Science among the other Antients, and the rest of the Aristotelians allow none in Aristotle. And if either be true, or both, 'tis an evidence against Dog­matizing, and fond doating upon Authorities.

But this action is professedly directed against Gassendus; some few of whose charges against Aristotle our Author indeavours to defeat and disable; which should he succeed in according to his desires, yet the far greater, and per­haps the more formidable number stands unanswer'd. Briefly then (1.) he excepts at Gassendus's animadverting on Aristotle's manners, which he insinuates, to be more like a crafty Orator, then a close and severe Philosopher. To which in behalf of that excellent Neoterick, it may be rejoyn'd, That if Aristotle were vicious and immoral, there is much the less reason why we should revere his authori­ty: For truth and vertue use to dwell together; and the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. Vice drowns the noble Idea's of the Soul, and fills the mind with those foul steams of the body, which are prejudicial to deep and worthy enquiries; so that with all good men and true [Page 54] Philosophers 'twill not a little detract from the credit of Ari­stotle's Intellectuals, if his Morals are acknowledg'd, or can be prov'd obnoxious. Whither the charge be just or not, our Philosopher makes no enquiry, which seems a tacite con­fession of the truth of the accusation; and then I think he hath no reason to object the impropriety. After this re­mark he descends (2.) to some particular instances of Gassendus's charge, to as many of which, as I am concern'd in, I make this brief rejoynder: (1.) Then Aristotle ex­presly makes God an Animal in these words [...]. If he sayes otherwise elsewhere, 'tis only an argument of the inconsistency of Aristotle, not of the injustice of Gassendus.

(2.) That God acts by necessity, Aristotle clearly enough insinuates in that conclusion of his [...], which is testimony suf­ficient of the truth of my charge; if Gassendus ac­cused him of more, 'tis like he was able to make it good.

(3.) That Aristotle made the world eternal, our Au­thor allows me. But that hereby he prov'd himself the chief of all the Ethnick Philosophers, I cannot grant him so easily. For (1.) Aristotle was not the first in this As­sertion, but had it from Ocellus Lucanus; from whom also he transcrib'd the Arguments he made use of to en­force it: Which yet (2.) are not such, as do so highly commend his Philosophy, and faculty of arguing. He proves the World eternal then, because the Heavens are so; the Assertion of which he attempts by five Arguments: (viz.) (1.) From the Etymology of aether, viz. ab [...]. (2.) From the silence of History of any change or al­teration they have undergone. (3.) From the Opinion of the Antients. (4.) From the freedom of the Heavens from contrarieties. And (5.) from the eternity of the Cae­lestial motions, which he proves with the eternity of time [Page 55] by reasons borrow'd from Ocellus, who was the Author of the main Argument. Now whoever affirms that such arguings as these set Aristotle so much above all the more antient Philosophers, expresses more fondness towards him, then justice to his betters. Nor can the comparative ex­cellency of his wit be any more reasonably concluded from his allowing the natural inference of that acknowledg'd Principle, Ex nihilo nihil; which doubtless the Antients never meant in the general notion; but in a sense which restrain'd it to natural productions; else their Assertion of the Worlds beginning had been nonsense and a contra­diction.

(4.) The learned Gentleman admires that we should charge Aristotle with the denyal of the Resurrection of the dead; which though he acknowledges truly to be alledg'd; yet he thinks it unreasonably objected, since he supposes this doctrine only to be discoverable by supernatural light and revelation. To which briefly, (1.) Though the Re­surrection in the particular circumstances, in which Chri­stianity hath cloathed it, be not known by our unassisted faculties: Yet that the Soul shall live, and live united to a Body in the other State, I think deducible from the meer principles of Nature: For the Philosophy of the Soul informs us, that it uses matter in its highest operations, which is fair ground of conjecture, that it is alwayes united to some body. Besides which, it may be argued from the analogy of Nature, which useth not in other things, to leap from one extream unto another; And therefore 'tis not likely that the Soul should pass immediately, from the state of so deep an immersion into the gross matter, to a condition of pure and absolute immateriality. To which may be further added, that, even according to the prin­ciples of Aristotle, there can be no Knowledge without Sense, nor Sense without corporeal Motion, which cannot well be perceiv'd by a being that is perfectly disjoyn'd [Page 56] from matter. Thus the principles of meer reason suggest, that the Soul is joyn'd to another Body after its discharge from the present. And (2.) others of the Greek Philoso­phers, by the meer conduct of their natural light, believ'd it. The Academicks generally assign'd Bodies to those in the other state, and such as were suitable to the regions of the World they resided in; and therefore Plato calls some of them [...]. And to others of more inferior conditon he attributes Aerial bodies; yea, generally the Greeks appointed corporeal punishments for the wicked in their Acheron, and Cocytus, as Theocritus,

And Virgil,

But the business is so well known that it needs no testi­mony; and from hence 'tis sufficiently evident, that they believ'd the corporeal state of the Soul after its separation from this Terrestrial body: So that Aristotle's Assertion herein, is contrary both to the nature of the thing; and the belief of most of his contemporaries; nay, and the most venerable wisdom that was before him. And indeed, what he taught of the Soul, is at the best uncertain, he using the word [...], for the mind one while, and then for the phan­cy; applying it now to Angels, and at another time to Brutes; so that none of his Sectators could ever tell what was his opinion about it.

1. A Gassendo ad Authorem Vanitatis Dogmati­zandi A. reducenda est oratio, postquam ipse— pag. 104.

I Think still that the Many are very incompetent Judges G. of worth either in Men or things, admiring trash, and slighting excellence; And 'tis my Lord Bacon's Observation, which signifies much more with me; then all our learned Author has said in this Paragraph, viz. [I hat the lowest ver­tues are the subjects of the Peoples praise; the middle ones of their admiration; but the highest they have no sense at all of;] which saying holds not only in Morals, but in all things else which the vulgar use to judge in: for they re­gard nothing, but what is like themselves, that is, mean and trivial; which is the reason of that other Observation of the same great Philosopher; That Time, like a River bears up what is light and chaffy, while the things that are more weighty and considerable, are lost at the bottom.

2. Subjicit Author noster Sapientium arbitrio Peri­pateticam A. esse vocum nihil significantium— pag. 105.

THe excellent Lord Verulam is one of the wise men that G. hath reprov'd the arbritrariness of Aristotle's words, particularly in his Instauratio Magna, where he saith, [I can­not a little marvel at the Philosopher Aristotle, that did [Page 58] proceed in such a spirit of difference and contradiction to all antiquity, not only to frame new words of Science at plea­sure, but to confound and extinguish all antient wisdom] and his affected obscurity, Patricius sayes, All the Greeks confessed; yea Themistius one of his great Sectators sayes of him, Se, veluti sepiam a [...]ramento suo sese occuluisse. And Simplicius another, writes thus in his Prolegomena to the Praedicaments: [...], Besides which clear testimony the Author of the censure prefixt to Aristotle's works cited by Gas­sendus after great praises of him, adds, Ingenium viri te­ctum & callidum & metu [...]ns reprehensionis, quod inhibebat eum, ne proferret interdum aperiò, quae sentiret; Indè tam multa per ejus opera obscura & ambigua. And again the forementioned Themistius, Cum plerè (que) omnia Aristotelis scripta quasi de composito caligine quadam offusa oppleta (que) habeantur: like unto which is that, which Simplicius sayes of him: In Acroamaticis datâ operâ obscurus esse voluit. We see then who the wise Men are, that have accused the ob­scurity of the Aristotelean processes. And that he was not so clear from aequivocatiens as our Author suggests; I'le give but a double instance (1.) of his applying the foremention'd [...] to Beasts and Angels, to the Imagination and abstracted Intellect. And (2.) his calling God, the Quintessence, Form, the Soul, and Motion, by the common appellative of [...] To all which might be added, that 'tis an ar­gument that the Aristotelean method was not so clear and cautious, as our Author would have it believed; since his Commentators have been infinitely divided about his mean­ing: And our Author himself complains, That those of the latter Schools have quite receded from his genuine doctrine, which either accuses their ignorance, or his obscurity. It appears then, that the wise Men I mention to have accused Aristotle's ambiguities and aequivocations were those that un­derstood [Page 59] the Aristotelean Doctrines, being some of them his most genuine and ancient Interpreters; and not those who are so little acquainted with the matters of this Philo­sophy, as to charge Aristotle with the faults of, I know not what, apish Peripateticks, and Pyrrhonians.

3. Prosequitur deinde Actionem in Peripateticos per A. dubia quaedam, quae illi clara non sunt,— pag. 107.

IN this Paragraph I can understand nothing proved, but G. that a thing is possible to be before it is; which possibi­lity our Author will have to be neither quid, nor quale, nor quantum: Though not absolutely nothing. And if this learned Gentleman take this posse of a thing for Aristotle's materia prima, he mistakes the Metaphysical, for the Phy­sical matter: Or, if hereby he would only insinuate, that the first mater may be something, though neither quid, quale, nor quantum; the instance is too short for his con­clusion, since the posse of a thing before it is, is no real bee­ing, but an extrinsecal denomination, and a mode of our conception.

4. Duae aliae Voces molestae sunt Sceptico nostro. Hae A. sunt forma, & educi de potentiâ materiei▪—pag. 109.

I Call the Aristotelean form an empty word, because I G. believe there's nothing real that answers it; All bodies are sufficiently distinguish'd by figure and position of parts, and I see no necessity to introduce such an arbitrary being; [Page 60] However, if our Author pleases, let him call that by which things are distinguish'd, their form: But if with Aristotle he will make this a substantial principle of things; I must be excused in a dissent to which my reason inforces me. And if his Hypothesis be, that forms are accidents, (as it seems, he supposes, by the instances alledged) he recedes from his Master Aristotle, who expresly makes his Form a Substance. [...], And again, [...].

A. 5. Quoad posteriorem vocem, seu educi de poten­tiâ, videat Vir ingeniosus an illud quod— pag. 110.

G. THat which was brought out of the dark, was in it. And Caesar adds nothing to the Marble, but the Fi­gure; which is but a mode of Matter, and answers not our case. But Forms are not supposed Praeexistent in the Matter from whence they were educed; and are Substances really distinguisht from it: which I have prov'd from Ari­stotle, and 'tis the sense of his Commentators, though it seems 'tis not our Authors. I inquire then, are these Sub­stantial Forms produced of something, or of nothing? An Aristotelian will not allow the latter; for this were against the Maxime, Ex Nihilo Nihil, and a Creation. He affirms it produced of something then, and this something is Poten­tia Materia. I enquire further therefore, whether any thing of the Form did actually Praeexist in this Power of the Mat­ter, or not? If so, all possible Forms reside in the Subjects out of which they are educed, which is not consonant to their Hypothesis. If not, the latter part of the disjunction is confest; to avoid the shame of which, they fly to subjective dependence: And this is the Potentia Materiae, [Page 61] they talk of; from which follow the absurdities I inferred. And this is the Philosophy of the Schools; and this the Pe­ripateticism I charge: If our Author saith, it is not accord­ing to Aristotle's Doctrine, let him dispute it out with Ari­stotle's followers; I charge it not on him, but on his Schooles, in which all the world can justifie me.

1. Proximè sagittant duas Aristotelis Definitiones, A. utramque exactissimam & quicquam in— pag. 112.

LEt [...] signifie as our Author would have it, G. viz. That which remains of an Action, and is intro­duced by it. But I enquire then, (1.) Whether this In­terpretation be not arbitrary? I'me sure the word in this sense is so. (2.) Light is then something that remains of an operation: And this Explication notably helps the per­spicuity of the Definition, which is as good a one as that was lately given of a Thought in a University Sermon, viz. A Repentine Prosiliency jumping into Being. And if our Author's Description be all contain'd in Actus Perspicui▪ I shall need no more proof of Aristotle's obscurity in this▪ instance.

2. Idem est reliquae Definitionis Vitium. Est autem A. ipsa Definitio, Motus est Actus entis—pag. 113.

[Page 62] G. IF [...], in the definition of Motion signifie the Mode, whereby the subject is affected in the end of Action, ac­cording to our Author; with what congruity doth Aristotle then apply it to the Soul? except he thought it a mode of matter, and then our Philosopher had no reason to sup­pose he believed its Immortality; But whatever he concluded of this, he affirm'd it to be a Substance, as in that passage, [...]. And Galen of him, [...].

A. 3. Nova calumnia Capite decimo septimo instruitur adversus Aristotelem, tantò indigniùs— pag. 115.

G. THat Aristotle was not so careful in distinguishing the signification of words, as is pretended, we have evinced already: And it appears clearly enough from the last instance; In which things are coupled together by a common appellative that agree in nothing. And for the other mistake this period chargeth me with, I answer; That if I take the Scepticks for Peripateticks, I hope our Philosopher will henceforward absolve me from the so often objected Scepticism. For according to our Author my Peripateticks are Scepticks, and he knows how much friend­ship I have for those. But whether they are Scepticks or not, they are Aristotle's followers, if he have any in the Schools of Christendom; And I leave them to justifie the title they have assumed. It sufficeth for me, that the genuine Aristotelian method is a way of obscurity and dispute; for which, besides the instances I have given, I have alledged the clear testimonies of his acknowledg'd [Page 63] Sectators. And if the modern Peripateticks can prove them­selves Aristotelians, we have a charge of sufficient aggrava­tion from our Author against them also. For thus he cen­sures them under the name of Scepticks [Scepticorum cona­tus esse vanissimos facile agnosco, illos parum de vocum usu sollicitos esse quo liberum sit iis quaslibet nugas vanitatis aut alterius lucri causa divendere, oratorculos vel magis ra­bulas, non Philosophos esse, Aristotelicorum nomen assumere ut corrumpant juventutem, & Discipulos post sese abducant; hos omnibus Scientiae sectatoribus veluti pestem vitandos non inficior, neque quicquam ab iis solidi expectandum esse.]

4. Confirmant fictam adversus Philosophum actio­nem A. ex ipsis Philosophi dictis & gestis.— pag. 116.

IT seems it was not only the abstractedness of the matter, G. that rendred Aristotle's Physiology so difficult of compre­hension, since our Author confesseth that scarce any un­derstand it, but who are assisted by the Commentaries of the Ancients. And certainly all the Moderns had never rece­ded so far from his sense, if his expressions had not been obscure and involved, as well as his matter difficult. And for that which the learned Gentleman calls a more grievous and unhappy calumny: He confesseth it to be Aristotle's Instruction to perfect his Scholars in the method of dispu­ting, which is all I charge him with; And I think ambi­guity and obstinate garrulity in Controversies, which the Philosopher seems to advise them to, is a way of Disputa­tion that will not much commend the Practisers, or In­structor.

A. 5. Merebatur haec actio instantias ex opere. Pre­mit Author tres (ex fide credo Gassendi—pag. 117.

G. THat I have done Aristotle no wrong in the first in­stance alledged, will appear to any one that will take the pains to peruse the first Chapter of his first De Ce­lo. For attempting there the Proof of the perfection of bo­dies in order to the evincing that of the World, he doth it thus: The magnitude that is one way divisible, is a line; two, is a superficies; and what may three ways be divi­ded, is a Body. Besides which there is no other magnitude, for this reason [...], which he proves by a saying of the Pythagoreans, and this Reason in Nature (if it be one) viz. because the beginning, end, and middle, [...] which also is confirmed by that I quoted from him: [...]. And concludes, wherefore since All and perfect, differ not as to their form, Body will be the only perfect magnitude, and that for the reason I assign'd from him, [...]. This is the genuine te­nour of Aristotle's argument, and our Authors sense and interpretation seems to me, (as I suppose 'twill to any one else, who considerately compares it with the Text) forraign, arbitrary, and unnatural.

As to the second Instance, the learned Gentleman hath mistaken the words of my charge. For if he pleaseth to look again into my Book, he will find, that I object no such consequence to Aristotle, as, That if there were more worlds then one, the Moon would fall to the Earth. But on the contrary, that the Earth would fall to that other [Page 65] World. So that our Authors justification of Aristotle's ar­gument, viz. That he fixt the Centre of the World in the Earth, is a strange one, and concludes the quite contrary to what Aristotle would inferre. And why the Moon should fall, upon the suppositions, that the Earth is the Centre, and that there are other Worlds, (as our Author sug­gests) rather then as things are at present, I cannot conje­cture.

My Third Instance of Aristotle's trifling, and inconse­quent arguings, was; That he inferrs the Heavens to move towards the West, because they move towards the more Honourable, and before is more honourable then af­ter. Which is clearly his consequence in the 5. Chapter of his second De Coelo: For thus he argues, [...], Nature doth alwayes what is best. Now saith he, as the motion which is upwards is more excellent then that which is downward, [...]; so in like manner is that which is forward more excellent then that which is back­ward. Thence he concludes this the reason why the Hea­vens move antrorsum. [...]. So that this seems the sub­stance of the Inference; The Heavens move by a motion that is natural, Nature doth what is best, before is better then behind, and consequently that way the Heavens move. The weakness of which argumentation consists in supposing, that those variable respects of before, and after, are rea­lities in Nature, which is a poor vulgar conceit, arising from the meere prejudice of misapplyed Sensations, and ve­ry unbecomming a Philosopher. And that this was the supposal of Aristotle's Argument, is confirmed by the margin of Pacius's Edition, in which he hath given this ac­count of the contents of this period, Coelum movetur ad anteriorem partem, quia hujusmodi motus est praestantior quam motus ad partem posteriorem. Yea, when our Author him­self [Page 66] saith in the Account he gives of the Argument, Mo­tum naturalem esse ad honorabilius, unde clare sequitur occi­dentem esse nobiliorem oriente, he hath given me all I have contended for.

A. Indignatur sub finem Capituli, quod doctorum opera ita in Logicam, Physicam, & Metaphysicam— pag. 123.

G. OUr Author confesseth the Schools neglect of the pro­fitable Doctrines of the Heavens, Meteors, Minerals, and Animals. But his Scepticism, viz. the present Peripa­teticism, is the cause. And this is that which I charge in the place animadverted on. So that I accuse not Ari­stotle here; but by name the modern Retainers to the Sta­gyrite: But whether the notionality and obscurity of the Ari­stotelian method it self do not give occasion to the endless babble of those reprehended Scepticks, I have already past my conjecture.

A. 2. Capite decimo octavo arguit doctrinam Peripate­ticam, quasi ad Phaenomena salvanda— pag. 124.

G. I Am not yet convinced, but that the Aristotelian Phi­losophy is insufficient for the Solution of the Phaenome­na; And yet question not Aristotle's endeavours in that kind, but his success, upon what Accounts my Discourse declareth.

[Page 67] I acknowledge the ingenuity of Sir Kenelm Digbye's Hypo­theseis: But cannot yet understand that to have been Ari­stotle's method. And I think our Author is one of the first that asserts Aristotle to have taught the Corpuscularian and Atomical Philosophy; for all the World hath hitherto taken his, to be the way of Qualities and Forms: Yea Aristotle mentions the Atomical Hypothesis of Democritus in a way of dissent and profest opposition; [...] which last pas­sage is the main substance of the Corpuscularian Philosophy. And elsewhere he recites the same Hypothesis from Leu­cippus and Democritus, to the same purpose; [...].

Urget adversarius systema coeli ab Aristotele se­quiùs A. esse constitutum. Aperi accusationem.— pag. 125.

I Cannot see but that Aristotle without Optick Instru­ments, G. the defect of which our Author thinks excuseth his Astronomy, might have discovered the Motion of the Earth, and Fluidity of the Heavens, as well as the more antient wisdom that believ'd them. He recites the former as the opinion of the Pythagoreans, but could not over­come the prejudice of sense against it. [...]. And in another place hath a pro­fest redargution of this Pythagorean opinion. As for the Hypothesis of the Fluidity of the Heavens, 'Tis said in the [Page 68] Jewish Gemara, Non orbes sed in Coelo liquido moveri si­dera, vetustissima Haebreorum sententia est. And if Ari­stotle had own'd a wit so much more excellent then o­thers of the Antients, as our Author somewhere intimates, I see not why he might not have received these Theories, as well as some of those, to whom Optick Tubes were as much strangers as to the Contriver of the Orbs. That the Christian Doctrine teacheth the Motion of the Heavens by Intelligencies▪ I cannot yet comprehend. And our Author cannot think it so evident as to be believed without proof. Our Air according to the best computations can be made of the weight of the Astmosphear, reacheth not much above 50 miles upwards; and the thin Element there, is nothing to the sphear of Fire supposed under the concave of the Moon.

A. 3. Caput decimum nonum exagitat Aristotelis doctri­nam quasi infaecundam & sterilem.— pag. 126.

G. IF it belong not to Philosophers to make Experiments; the noble Lord Bacon, Des Cartes, our Illustrious Roy­al Society, and all experimental Philosophers, have been needlesly imployed, and out of the way in their inquiries. And if we must use no Experiments but those that are made by ordinary Mechanicks without design of Science, we shall never make any great progress into the knowledg of the Magnalia; which are not known by the common methods of action. He that will erect a lasting and state­ly Fabrick, must have Stones digged from the Quarries, and not expect that the High-wayes should furnish him.

What these common Aristotelian Principles are, with­out which no account can be given of natural effects, our [Page 69] Author would do well to tell us. Some Principles indeed are necessary, and without them nothing can be inquired or determin'd: But such are common to all Philosophers, and not peculiarly Aristotle's.

Those that admit vacuities, think there can be no action without them; holding it impossible there should be moti­on in absolute pleno; And we have but our Author's bare assertion against their arguments.

The Cartesian vortices will serve to account for the Phae­nomena, and teach a way of Theory not unserviceable to experiment. And for the Salvo of Aristotle's credit in those contradictory passages we meet in his Writings; viz. that they are the sayings of others, it seems to me an arbitrary shift and evasion: Since we find them in his Discourses without mention of any such matter. And if it be con­fest his custom to insert forrein Doctrines and Sayings in­to his Works, without any intimation to distinguish them from his own; who then can know when Aristotle speaks himself, or when he speaks the words and sense of o­thers?

4. Caput vicesimum manifestam reddit eminentiam A. Peripatetices supra reliquas Methodos— pag. 127.

IN that Chapter I impugn not Aristotle's Philosophy, but G. had concluded my Reflections in the former. Causali­ties are first found out by concomitancy, as I intimated. And our experience of the dependence of one, and indepen­dence of the other shews which is the Effect, and which the Cause. Definitions cannot discover Causalities, for they are formed after the Causality is known. So that in our Authors instance, a man cannot know heat to be the A­toms [Page 68] [...] [Page 69] [...] [Page 70] of Fire, till the concomitancy be known, and the ef­ficiency first presumed. The question is then, How heat is known to be the effect of Fire? our Author answers by it's definition. But how came it to be so defined? The an­swer must be, by the concomitancy and dependence; for there's nothing else assignable.

But who is our Authors Peripatetick that concludes heat to be the Atomes of Fire? And who that adorer of Des-Cartes that professeth Scepticism?

A. 5. Nihilo validius est Argumentum à varietate Opi­nionum Philosophantium ad impossibilitatem— pag. [...]9.

G. I Urge no such argument as the variety of Philosophers Opinions against the possibility of Science, but from the notion of the Dogmatists; that demonstration supposeth certainty, as Aristotle himself affirms, [...]; And certainty, impossibility of being otherwise; as Ari­stotle proceeds, [...]; I say, from hence I inferre 'tis scarce modest to conclude any thing so a demonstration, and consequently, Science in their notion; The reason of my Inference is fully de­clared in my Discourse, the least view of which will be evidence enough of the wideness of this answer.

Sub finem Capitis assumit nihil sciri posse nisi in pri­mas A. causas resolvatur. Unde diluxisse— pag. 131.

WHen I affirm nothing can be known but by a reso­lution of things into their first causes, I mean the Mechanical, not Metaphysical: For I am of opinion with the excellent Lord Verulam; That Natural Theory hath been very much hindered, and corrupted by Metaphysical admixtures; And this is a considerable fault of Aristotle and his Sectators. Some general notices indeed are necessa­ry to direct us in particular researches, but then they must be such as are concluded from induction in particulars; and perhaps the instances our Philosopher alledges to shew the necessity of Metaphysicks to Physiology will be better determin'd and accounted for in the way of experiment, then notion; and I think our Author's Metaphysical argu­ment against a Vacuum, (the exploding of which he thinks so necessary for the establishment of a grounded Philosophy) I think, I say, his argument is a Sophism, whose greatest force lies in the scarcity of words and defect in language: For this is the sum of the presumed demonstration. A Vacuum is imaginary space; Imaginary space is nothing real, and those bodies are together, that have nothing between them: If the middle of which Propositions be denyed, the argu­ment comes to nothing; and it may without absurdity be affirmed, that though space have not the nature of any of the beings that are in our praedicaments, yet 'tis something real and not meerly imaginary: For the notion of space strikes so close to our minds, that we cannot conceive, but that 'tis infinite and eternal, viz. is every where, and has been alwayes; and therefore has a kind of being, that is no arbitrary figment; Though such a one, for the [Page 72] expressing of which our words are defective: We see then, how this pretended Metaphysical impossibility may be an­swered; For though supposing a Vacuum there be nihil cor­poris between the bodies distant, yet is there aliquid spatii, which is sufficient to avoid the contradiction; so that there may be a vacuum, notwithstanding our Author's Metaphy­sicks: Yea, that Aristotle himself asserted it, though I know he has opposed it also, is affirmed by Aetius in these words, [...]. And again, [...]; and there seems a strong necessity that there should be one, since it looks like an impossibility that there should be mo­tion in pleno, or at least that any thing should be moved, but that all the World must be moved with it; which I alledge only to shew, that Metaphysicks may both ways be urged almost for any thing, and that all matters of noti­on are double-handed. And if we must determine nothing in Physiology till Metaphysicks have concluded it; for ought I know we shall be at an eternal loss, and never fix on any thing. And by this method of mingling Metaphysicks with Natural Philosophy, we shall fill plain Theories with infinite intricacy and dispute. Indeed, the impatient mind of Man, as my Lord Bacon observes, is too apt to fly to general conclusions; and more averse to the way of expe­riment and induction, which he thought the only method for the establishing of a solid and grounded Theory: In which there is none has more happily succeeded then the Phi­losopher Des-Cartes, whose Philosophy is not a prescribed form how things should be made, as our Author injuriously suggests, but professes it self only an Hypothesis how they may be, and how by such Principles the Phaenomena may be salved: And the Mechanicks of Des-Cartes are much more likely methods for the expounding Nature, then the Metaphysicks of Aristotle; Which his own Sectators have confest a meer rhapsody and confused ramble of they knew [Page 73] not what: Yea, and 'tis doubtful whither they are not the spurious issue of some more modern Author, since Diogenes Laertius, who uses to give a full and faithful Catalogue of the Writings of Philosophers, hath omitted this out of the Works of Aristotle, and Philoponus affirms that Book writ­ten by Pasicrates Rhodius. And if so, Aristotle will lose the credit of demonstration in Metaphysicks, with which our Author hath invested him.

7. Sequens Capitulum laborat illo Errore quem Ari­stoteles A. saepius & detexit & confutavit:— pag 132.

IMperfect knowledge, according to the notion of the Dog­matists, G. is not Science, but Opinion. Scire, our Author knows, is per causas Scire; and the conditions of those Causes are that they be true, immediate, and necessary; This is perfect Knowledge, this is the Science the Dogmatist pre­tends to; and to this according to his own Maxime, every thing that is must contribute, as my Discourse declareth. Nor do our Philosophers Instances weaken my Conclusion; for they relate to another kind of Knowledge, viz. that of the Existence, not of the Nature of things; which latter is that which I am treating of; and the knowledge of the be­ing of a thing, as is its object, is a simple act, and consequent­ly, to this, a single evidence is sufficient: But the compre­hension of the nature, like the thing it self, is complex, and requires the knowledge of the things of which 'tis constituted. What is added within this Paragraph about two Persons, see­ing the same object in the same circumstances of sentiment, is our Author's bare assertion, against my proof of the con­trary: And the last period is built upon the fore▪mentioned mistake of my design and intentions.

A. 8. Attamen Academicus noster non dubitat generatim dogmaticè procedentibus affingere quaevis— pag. 134.

G. THe Learned Gentleman is now discended to my Mo­ral Considerations against Confident Opinion: His re­flections on the two first of which are built upon the suppo­sal of my being a Sceptick, which charge I think I've suffi­ciently disabled. The truth of my Third Accusation is con­fest, but the guilt, not acknowledged; since that which ex­cites men to endless bawlings, and altercations; Schisms, He­resies, and Rebellions, by the vehemencies of Dispute, is it seems with our Author no more noxious and criminal, then the Sun that stirrs men up to their work in the morn­ing, by the importunity of it's beams. To the Fourth ab­surdity of Dogmatizing, our Philosopher also gives a kind reception; and it seems can be content with a Confidence that accuseth all the World of Ignorance. But whether be the more modest, the Dogmatist that chargeth all that are not of his mind as Ignorants; or the Sceptick that involves himself also in the common reproach, let them dispute it out when they will, I have nothing to do with their Quar­rel. In the last I'me agreed with our Author in the Truth of his assertion, That Science inlargeth Mens mindes; but cannot acknowledge the pertinency. For he could scarce have named things more opposite then Confidence and Science. Science indeed inlargeth: But there's a Knowledge that only puffeth up. And I'me of Solomon's Opinion, That 'tis the Fool that rageth and is confident. Our Author concludes as he began, in the supposition that I am a Sceptick, and in this I'me certain he is mistaken; And will be Dogmatical in affirming, that I am none.

[Page 75] THus have I concluded my Reply with a Brevity, that shews I am not fond of an occasion of Disputing; and a Carelesness, that will witness the little delight I have in matters that are not of very material speculation. The truth is, I dropt these Reflections with such a dulness and in­activity of humor: That when my pen had traced one peri­od, it was indifferent whether it began another. And I re­member not an heat in the whole performance. For I felt no concernment to defend a Discourse, which perhaps I had less kindness for then one, who hath professedly opposed it. Not to mention the other reasons of my coldness and indifference in this Action. And though I have still a quick resentment of the Vanity of confiding in Opinions, and pos­sibly could with an humor brisk enough have reassailed the spirit of proud and unreasonable presumption; Yet I hitherto see no necessity of adding more to what I have said on the Subject: And the Reflections that engaged my Pen, have made me but few new occasions. So that looking on my im­pugned Discourse as too inconsiderable for a Subject of Pub­lick Vindication, and meeting but little opportunity for ge­neral and discursive notion in that which opposed it; I was, I profess, sometimes more inclined to have throwne away these sheets among the rubbish of my Papers, then to permit them thus to shew themselves to the Publique. But my Civility to this Learned Man obliged me to some Answer, and what­ever I apprehend of it otherwise, my laziness or my judge­ment made me think this sufficient for that service. What others will judge of it I am ignorant and careless, and am sufficiently satisfied with this, that I think it pertinent, and that I have finish't it.