TO vnderstand a right, the nature of disputation about Religion; we must first know, what Religion it selfe is. We due not here take it in the sense of Schoole-diuines, for a speciall vertue, by which we performe the honours due to almighty God, to his frendes the Saintes, and to what euer holy thinges do belong to him and his. But, Reli­gion, in our present treatie, signifieth a skill or art of doctrine coming to aeternall blisse. To vnderstand this the better, we are to remember, that it hath euer bin receiued as an undoubted truth among the true-beleeuers both in the law of nature and in that of Moy­ses, as also more euidently among Christians, that man hath two lifes: The one, in this state of mortality and corruption, while we live vnder the lawes of change and of necessity in [Page 15] this world: the other, which we expect after the end of this, to dure for euer, in great blisse and happinesse if we behaue our selfes here as we ought to do; or in great miseries and torments, if we neglect our duties in this world.

Now, the life of the next world, being to last for euer; and the consequences of it for good and bad, being so highly exalted aboue the contentments and afflictions of our present life; it follo­weth, that the art or skill of steering a right course towardes it, is incompa­rably more necessary and more estee­mable, then any art or learning what­soeuer belonging to the affaires of this world. Beyond the skill of trading and of gaining wealth, in which the Easter­ne and Arabian wizardes place their wisedome: Beyond the out witting and the ouer powering glory of the Po­tentats and State. Masters of the Earth; whose felicity, is to ensnare the world into the necessily of a willfull bondage to their vnlimited ambition; beyond the selfe-pleasing contentment of those who settling in their owne nest, do laugh [Page 16] att the restlesse negotiations of such as turmoile in the waues of fortune, and to satisfy themselues with the enioying of home-bred and easily-compassed de­lights of body and of minde. So that, the skill designed by the name of Religion, in our proposed discourse, is of an excellency, and of a necessity, not to be paralleled by any other whatsoeuer; and being compared to all others, it outweigheth their worth, beyond all measure and proportion; and at that rate deserueth to be esteemed by vs; and to be sought after with our whole force, and with our vtmost endea­vours.

Besides what we hitherto said; Philoso­phers do offer us yet another considera­tion, not to be neglected. They make a generall diuision of mans actions, into two kindes: whereof the one, they seeme to say are the actiōs of man as he is man But that the others, do proceede from him as he is endowed with some parti­cular quality; yet withall, that such qua­lity is proper onely to humane nature. As [Page 17] for example; no liuing creature but man, cā be a smith, a carpenter, a Pilot, a musi­tian, a Philosopher: And yet, none of the actions peculiar to these persons, are in themselues considered to be the Actions of Man as he is Man. But if any Action bee prudently, valiantly, justly, or temperately, performed; they say that action proceedeth from him who doth it, as he is Man. But truly, according to my judgement, this is not properly a diuision of Actions as Actions; but rather, of the degrees or of the qua­lities of the same kind of actions. For, the smith and the Pilot cannot exercise their respectiue trades, but that their working must needes be either in con­venient measure and circumstances, or out of such; and accordingly, what they do must be either prudent or im­prudent, just or vniust, &c: So that, to be vertuous or vicious, is a quality common to all sorts of Actions; not a speciall kinde of Action: And yet, an Action is said to proceede from Man as Man, as farre as it is vertuous or vicious. Neither is there any Action so [Page 18] proper to vertue and vice, as not to in­clude some other nature within it selfe. Fortitude, requireth some action or pas­sion to gouverne, and wherein to exer­cise courage and stoutenesse; temperance, hath pleasures to moderate, as in meate and drinke, which belong so an other fa­culty; Justice, hath civill actions to re­gulate, which are determined by lawes and by customes: And Prudence, is a common eye over all. Yet possibily, though the actions be the same, the sciences wherein they are concerned may never the lesse be divers: As, the skill of Musike or of Logike, is very dif­ferent from the science which teacheth to make use of them with moderation in due time and place, So, Philosophers assigne Arts to the one; and the science of Morall to the other. Wherefore it is apparent, that what in Christian lan­guage we call Religion, is correspondent to that which the heathen wizards ter­med Morall Philosophy. Correspondent, I say, or rather proportionable; with the imparity of pagan darkenesse, to the light of truth delivered us by almighty [Page 19] God. For, as the next world was alto­gether obscure and unknowne to those old Philosophers; So was also by con­sequence, the true end of humane life and action: And therefore, all their skill and study, fell short, and was nota­ble to bring them to the least action perfect in the way of nature; since it was not possible for any action to be per­fect in respect of nature, which not onely missed but not so much as aymed att her true End; and consequently, was uncapable of reaching to the circum­stances due thereunto.

Now, that which I draw from the mention I have made of these Philoso­phers, is, that Reigion is in propor­tion to Christian life, what they did esteeme Morall Philosophy to bee to­wardes a good or happy life in na­eure.

FRom these premisses, it followeth clearely, that if Mans nature were in its due perfection, Religion would be as well knowne and with as much se­curity assented to, as are now the com­mon principles of nature and of naturall liuing. For, since according to the ma­xime of Philosophers, no one action can be performed by man as man, but that it must be either vertuous or vitious; and by consequence, in euery passage of his life, a rule is necessary for him, by wich to square and regulate his procee­ding, that it may be vertuous: It is ma­nifest, that if he be not very secure and perfect in this discipline, he must vnauoidably faile and swerue from ver­tue and nature, and consequently, he would not be complete in the course of nature nor enioy that perfect State which is conformable to his nature. Therefore, [Page 21] enioy the perfectiō of human nature, it is necessary that he have all security of his beliefe, and a complete rule for his actiōs: and consequently, the principles of Reli­gion, ought to be as euident to him as the principles of nature.

No lesse is euident out of the former part of our discourse. For, if Religion be the skill of obtaining beatitude or hea­venly glory; and if this be the end of our birth and of our liuing in this world; It followeth, that our very life here, can not be so directed as it ought to bee, vn­lesse we have the science and rule of Re­ligion. And because the right direction of our life to aeternall Beatitude, is of greater valew and worth then our con­tinuation in this world, It is euident that the science of attaining Beatitude, ought to be more cleare vnto vs, then the skill of guiding our selfes in our corporal life Wherefore, seeing that we finde, Reli­gion is not now so cleare and certaine vnto vs, as are the Principles of our na­turall and ciuill life, we may easily ga­ther that we are not in the right temper which human nature requireth.

[Page 22]And from hence one may argue, that if the happy state in which our first Pa­rents were created, had continued till their multiplication had filleth the earth, the knowledge of God, and other prin­ciples for gaining so celestiall blisse, would haue bin as naturall to them, as the prouiding of meate, clothes, houses, and such naturall accommodations are to vs now; and would have bin derived from Parents to children with the same connaturallnes, and would have bin embraced by the children with a like or greater heate of affection: And that the vnhappy apple, was the cause it is not now so; as it likewise was, of all other disorders in mankinde, whereof this is not the least, if not the source of most of them, as they who looke into the matter, will easily discerne.

The due way therfore to attaine the knowledge of Religion, is by nature. Such nature I meane, as we may obscure to worke in children when they learne their first languages; which, as it is not effected without the deliuering of them by their mothers and nurses, so neither [Page 23] is it without the endeauours of the litle soules labouring to expresse their thoughts and mindes. And nature hath in her such principles, that neither the one party nor the other, can give over the paines, till they have brought the effect to passe. Afther the same; maner in that happy state of innocency, child­ren would have bin trained vp in Codli­nesse as perfectly as in naturall quali­ties, without any violent straining of them thereunto; and as it were, even before they should have bin awarie of it. And this is clearely deduced out of an axiome that Philosophers do vse in the beginning of Logicke, where they teach vs Logick ought to be learned before other sciences, because it is an instrument or methode to obteine sciences by, and consequently, ought to be possessed be­fore one setteth himselfe to the gaining of science. So, Religion being the in­strument and methode to guide vs for the well acting of our lifes, when once we are come to the vse of reson. It is cleare that it ought to be planted in vs, before we come to the age and vse of [Page 24] discretion. Againe since no action ought to be exempt from the direction of Religion; not, euen the very first, It can not be doubted but that Religion ought to take possession of our hearts, euen before Reason▪ Neither do I spea­ke this as a thing that should haue bin onely in the state of Paradise, but as what is connaturall to vs here, and is practised by many pious Mothers, who teach their children their prayers, and stampe in their mindes a deepe conceit of God and of heauen, before they are capable of judging in matters concer­ning temporall commodities. So that it is plaine, that it belongeth truly to the nature of Religion, to be propagated in man kinde by discipline and by deli­uery ouer from father to sōne, and to be embraced in the meere vertue of such a reception through the naturall credu­lity of children to their parents and tea­chers. Yet I do not hereby exclude, but that as riper yeares come on, so they ought to gaine stronger groundes and maximes to confirme what they first accepted of in a more simple manner.

[Page 25]But here peraduenture it will be ex­pected; that, since we say we meane not in this discourse by the terme Reli­gion, the vertue so named by Divines but the skil of attaining to eternall blisse; we should give the reason why we call this Religion. The answere hereunto is not difficult; for, since the end we ought to ayme at in this life, belongeth to the next; And since we know so very little of that; (even the great Clerks; much lesse, the ordinary sort of Chri­stians, whose chiefe endeavours are be­stowed upon their temporall concerne­ments;) It was requisite for our nature, that this science should be delivered us from God himselfe: And coming from him, the most conf [...]rmable course was that it should be done by way of com­mand; that onely, becoming his great­nesse, and taking away all possibility of dispute in us. Which being so effected, you see, the art of obtaining happinesse, was now become a matter of obe­dience to Almighty God.

Besides; the object of our Beatitude being the diuine essence; the way to [Page 26] attaine it, must consequently be an ar­dent affection to Almighty God: And such affection, proceeding from a high esteeme of him: And the performance of duties, and the acknowledgements of the greatenesse of him wee honour, flowing naturally from such esteeme: It follow­eth, that the chief, if not the whole skill of acquiring blisse; must consist, in making due acknowledgements, and in framing vehement affections towardes the God-head. And thus you see, that the skill which before wee seemed to make different from the vertue of Religion, as preceding and directing it; is now found to be coincident or convertible with it. And though the name of Reli­gion seemed to be spoken aequivocally of the two; and in truth, is so, seeing the notions are quite divers: Yet, because the thinges that are executed by both, are the same; the name, is justly and fitly derived from the one to the other; and so necessarily, that without due conside­ration, we can not finde in what one si­gnification differeth from the other.

OUt of what we have hitherto dis­coursed, it is evident, that, if ac­cording to the course of all other arts and sciences, and according to the cu­stome and rule of nature in all her other proceedings, the way of conquering the high walls of heaven by our violent af­fections, be but one: That is to say, that as our nature and her acts and her defects are proportionable one to an­other, and of one kind in all men; so the happinesse all men ayme at being but one; also the best way unto it ought to be but one; and the defects from the best, one proportionate to an other, that is, the way of all men to bliss proporti­onably considered; ought to be but one then; it followeth clearely, that if God intendeth to direct vs wisely, and con­formably to our Nature, towardes the [Page 28] End he created vs for (which he must of necessity do, vnder forfeiture of his great wisedome and goodnesse; should he make nature, and vs in it, with de­signe to bring vs to our eternall well-being, and not vse the meanes for it) his commandes to vs, can be no other then of such thinges as by their essences do integrate the streight and direct way, in which (did we know the cau­ses of things) we should, of our owne inclinations, and by the skill of morall Philosophy, both march our selues, and guide others in our charge. And out of this, we may conclude manifest­ly, that Religion is but one onely: which if we hit on and put in executi­on, we become happy; but if we misse of it, we become unhappy; whether the fault of missing it, be ours or no. Not, that I suppose the missing can happen without our fault (which is an other disputation) But, that this rule is universally true, that whosoever hath not the true Religion, miscarrieth and faileth of obtaining blisse.

By this we see how dangerous the [Page 29] rocke is, to which so many seeke for refuge of their shippe-wracked consci­ences, solacing themselves with such discourses as these: God is good and mercifull, and therefore commandeth not impossibilities, but is content if I do my endeavour to fulfill his precepts. I, for my part, am very ready if I knew them: Nay, I labour and study to find them out, and yet can not: Therefore why should I trouble my selfe any fur­ther? Rather let me cast away all an­xiousnesse, and trust to the mercies of so unlimited a goodnesse.

For, if what we have hither to la­boured to evince, be true; namely, that Gods commands are not meere volun­tary ones; but of such actions as do na­turally breede the effect for which they are commanded; then, labour as much as you will, if you do not that which is commanded, that is, if you take not the true way of going to heaven, you shall never come there. The prescripti­ons of the Doctour to the Apothecary, are commandes: But if the Apothecary [Page 30] (though he endeavour never so much) do not mingle the right drugges, and temper them according to the Doctours prescriptiōs, the Physick will not prove healthfull to the Patient. The husband­mans prescriptions to his kynde, are commands; Yet if his seruant (though he worke by his greatest wittes) should sow pease instead of wheate, the croppe will not come up fit for the Masters table. So in all other trades and arts; It is not enough to do our endeavour; But the thinges themselves must be really performed; or else the desired effects will not follow. Then assuredly, those who content themselves with this cold comfort, that God is mercifull, do make lesse account of that so impor­tant businesse of their salvation, then they do of those meaner profits which arise out of vulgar arts and occupa­tions.

These two then do stand very well to­gether▪ that the same thing may be a cō ­mand, and withall, a naturall action to­wardes the end for which it is cōmanded. Nay, ordinarily and regularly it is al­wayes [Page 31] so; and no command is otherwise unlesse where there is some fault, either in the commander or in the subject. The Generalls commandes, are of doing such thinges as are ordered to safety and victory; the Statesmans for keeping peace, and for procuring plenty; the Bishops, of those actions which breede vertue and good life in the people; Yet, all these are commands; and have there­fore power of forcing obedience, be­cause they are (or at least ought to be supposed) such as of themselves are ne­cessary for the common good; in re­spect of which one man subjecteth him­selfe to another. And from hence, the sillynesse of this excuse is more evident. For, if it be naturall to all good com­mands, that they be of actions confor­mable to the end for which they are gi­ven; and, that the command be made for the action, as the action is for the end (which must be in Gods commands; by which he ordereth vs to eternall life: his commanding, being the Idea to all actions; and this matter, being the prin­cipall on which he exerciseth that [Page 32] power) it is evidently convincing, that whether the command be possible or im­possible, knowne or unknowne; if it be not fullfilled, the action is not done, without which the end can not be ob­tained: And consequently, the party becometh damned; Not because he did not obey the command; but because he did not the action, nor followed the way, necessary to salvation: which if he had done without command, it would have saved him; for it is in vertue of doing the action, that the fullfilling of the command saveth all those whom it doth save; and without it, none are saved.

THe case standing thus, that either we must do what God hath com­manded us in this world, or else must suffer his indignation in the next; And, that there is no excuse for ignorance: I neede not urge to any one who is sen­sible of their soules interest, that th [...] knowledge of the law of God ought to be certaine, and undoubted, both in it selfe, and to us: That is, that every one, according to his particular circum­stances ought to have a constant and immutable assurance, that it is Gods law in which he walketh: And, that in the Church, there are meanes left by our blessed Saviour to secure us of this truth, (for every one, according to his capa­city) if the execution be conformable to the principles.

[Page 34]The first part is so cleare, that time were spent in vaine to declare it. For, since the end of our faith and know­ledge, is the observing in fact, and not onely in will, the commandements of God; with the losse of blisse, and incur­ring eternall damnation, if it be not done in effect. And since on the other side, it is impossible that he who is un­certaine whither he be in the truth or no, and hath but a changeable opinion con­cerning the law of God, should con­stantly and firmely in all his workes per­forme that law: It is evident that such a man is not fit for Christian life; but is like one that whilest he holdeth the plough, is still looking backe; nor can he hope for any thing from God, because his faith is wavering and un­stable: In his practise he can not choose but be carried too and fro with every wind of opinion; Now forwardes, now backewardes, and never steere any con­stant course towardes heaven and blisse: Whereas this rule of good life (as is be­fore declared) is of a nature that it com­prehendeth all our actions, the highest [Page 35] and the lowest, the first and the last, and all that are comprised between these extreams.

As for the second part of what we have aboue said; Namely, that God hath left in his Church, meanes for all sorts of people to come to this degree of cer­tainty; for euery one, according to his growth: It is of it selfe manifest to all such as have so reverent a conceit of God, as to thinke he doth not his works by halfes, nor leaveth mankinde (for whom he made the world) destitute in the chiefe point, and in that for which (as for his sole end) he created man himselfe; to witte, for bringing him to blisse and eternall happinesse. For, since mans nature is made, in the most ex­cellent part of it, to require evidence; and that it is so laudable, in matters of Geometry, Astronomy, Physicks, Me­taphysicks, and whatsoever is of great importance, not to be satisfyed without evidence and certainty, and to ayme at it with all our strength; and that truely our understanding were abused, if it should be forced to accept of what it [Page 36] doth not clearely see, and is not certainly assured of (its nature, being made to see, and its essence being a power of seeing) How can any rationall discour­ser thinke that God hath failed us in this so materiall and principall concer­nement? Certainly, no man of judge­ment, can suspect it.

But, to satisfy even hard believers, lett vs looke into particulars: And presently wee finde that men, in re­spect of knowledge, are of two sorts; some, who by themselves are capable of vnderstanding truths, others who live upon trust of the former kind of knowing men. Of this latter sort, are all they whom we call schol­lers: who at the first, do trust their masters, till themselves grow up to the ripenesse and ability of knowing and of teaching others. And much more, all those who arrive not so for­ward as to be schollers; which, in some respect or other, are the greatest part of mankinde. The Physitian, trusteth the Pilot when he is at sea, the Souldier, when he is in an army, the baker for his [Page 37] bread, and the brewer for his drinke; the Gentleman, trusteth his husband­man for his corne, the Physitian for his health, the Lawyer for his suites, and every master in his kinde. Now, in mat­ter of Religion, God hath given vs an advantage, which is not in any of the trades or sciences necessary to our tem­porall life. For, he hath provided us, not some one man, or some meeting of a do­zen or twenty (which is a great cōsult, in other affaires) but he hath given vs a whole world of men to consult withal, and that at one meeting. Consider how vast the Church is, which holdeth com­munion with the See of Rome. All that, at once, is your warrant. You can not imagine they will tell you a lye for they speake to you, not in wordes, but in their lives; and therefore they must be cosened thēselves, or else they can not cosē you; there, you have a fidelity pled­ged vnto you, beyond the certainty that Euclide or Archimedes could afforded you. For, it is more impossible, that so great a part of mankind should live in a cōtinuall hypocrisie and dissembling, [Page 38] then that the surest consequences Geo­metry can make should be false. If you seeke skill; that Church is full of lear­ned men in all kindes of Sciences that any other can pretend vnto. Search but the Book-sellers shoppes, and you shall find a hundred Catholike Authors, for one of any other Communion; thou­sands, continually studying in Colleges and Religious houses, whose perpetu­all search may justly challenge the pro­bability of knowing truth. If you looke after outward piety, and the meanes of preseruing and encreasing of lear­ning, you shall finde it there in a higher degree then in all the communities of other sects. So that if one may rely vpon outward signs, there is no comparison betweene any other company of men, and that Church. And consequently, it is beyond all doubt or question, vnto what authority, a discreete person who can not, or will not take the paines to looke himselfe into particular pointes, ought to adhere vnder paine of forfei­ting his judgement. If he be neuer so little conuersant in the learning of the [Page 39] world, he must needes be a mad-man if in the way of moderne authority he fol­loweth any other, or so much as mis­doubteth there can be any other com­parable to this.

As for the other sort of men, who of themselves are able and curious to look into the veins in which the rootes of Religion do runne: Lett them but re­flect on the change that hath been made in the world since Christian Religion began to flourish, that is, since Constan­tines time, and since the first 300. yea­res after Christ, and they may demon­stratiuely conclude, that seeing the long space of 4. or 5 thousād yeares of natu­re, was not able to produce those great and noble effects, which wee evidently see have sprung up so aboundantly in so farre shorter a time; the finger of God must necessarily be in this time; and that Protestants; by rejecting it as Pa­pisticall, do confesse plainely that all the great effects of Christian Religion, are proper to those whom they terme Papists. And seeing that the Ages since the first three after Christ, are the [Page 40] whole flourishing time of the Christian Church, this their disclayming them, will appeare unto any understanding man, to be the very renouncing of Christianity it selfe.

Now, if he who pretendeth to know­ledge, be able to manage humane na­ture, and to see how a freedome of heart from the pleasures and cares of this world, is that which bringeth all good to man, both in temporall and in spirituall considerations: And that this freedome can not be introduced, without a settled assurance of the goods of the next world; nor that persuasion, be wrought by any other meanes then by faith and by the course which Christ tooke for it: He will, not onely for­beare admiring, that the world, though fraught with arts in the first 2000. yeares, should deserve the just revenge of the deluge-waters; But will also discerne, that as in the latter 2000. yeares before Christ, it had advanced nothing att all; So, had it endured 4000. yeares more without the light that Christ brought into it, it would [Page 41] never have growne better; The love of worldly goods, exalting arts and civility to a certaine pitch; and then by its encrease into immoderation, reducing all backe to barbarisme; Or at least, floating mankinde in a cer­taine compasse too and fro, and never permitting it to grow into any heighth of perfection.

THe threade of our discourse, hath by this time woven vs into the con­sideration of the meanes where by one may come to the true Religion. In which, two inquiries occurre vnto vs: the one, concerning the beginning and first publication of Religion: the other, concerning the circumstances that be­long unto it, now, in the present age wherein we live. As for the former, wee, hauing our Saviours command to expresse that it ought to be done by preaching, and hauing the testimony of all Christians euer since, that it was so performed, there remaineth no place to question, how Christian Religion came first into the hearts of mankinde. The Apostles, had (by Gods speciall gift) the knowledge of all languages. By this, they could speake to all nati­tions: [Page 43] And so, it is generally vnder­stood, they did, and that by word of mouth, they propagated through all the world, that faith which themselues had learned from Jesus Christ. But, that they carried any bookes about with them; or, that they did sett the nations they preached vnto, on lear­ning those languages in which the scripture was written, there is no men­tion at all: Nor is it either probable, or possible, that they did so, it is well knowne, that many of the Nations which att that time became Christian, had no writing or reading in many ages after. And so, it is euident that the generall propagation of Christian faith was by vocall preaching, and by vo­call tradition, from father to sonne, of the doctrine first planted among them by the Apostles. And indeed, suppo­sing Nations to be vnlearned, it is clea­re that there can be no other ordinary way of conueying this necessary disci­pline to posterity.

No doubt but the methode of the first institution, is in a manner Ideall to the [Page 44] following continuation: which is but a kind of repetition of the beginning. And so, we might justly conclude with­out any further paines, that the con­seruation of Religion ought to be like­wise effected by original deliuery; that is to say, by Tradition. But, the very thing it selfe, affordeth vs more light to see evidently the truth of our Conclusion. For, looking into the nature of that which is to be done, we shall see plainly that it is impossible it should be effected by any other way. What is it we meane by plan­ting Religion in a Country, but that the People of it should haue the knowledge of the way how to goe to Heauen?

Lett us then examine what signi­fyeth this word People. There are two Notions of it. The first is, that it signifyeth the men, the wo­men, and the Children of a common wealth or nation; so comprising all the individuals of humane Nature, that live in that nation. Now of these [Page 45] it is the property of children to believe what is told them, without doubting wheter it be true or no, or ever judging of the thing proposed. As for women; a great part of them, participateth of the same quality; And the most of them are governed by their husbandes, estee­ming them (if they have any worth in them) the best of men. The third member of this division, falleth under the second notion of the word People, and single, is the whole subject of it: for it signifyeth a multitude of men, employed in seeking and in attending to their livelihoods and subsistance, not looking after learning, or ap­plying themselves to study; for which the greatest part of them wanteth either leisure, or capacity, or in­clination. Now, in which sence soever this word is taken, I [...] appea­reth manifestly, that Tradition is the necessary and onely meanes to establish faith in the people. For, the Maxime is well known, that he who is not of an art, must [Page 46] (in what belongeth to that) trust those whose particular skill and profession that art is. And thus it is euident, that the People taken according to the ex­plication giuen, must rely vpon an Au­thority, for knowing what is the true Religion, and what is not.

But when we once come to Authori­ty; there is no pretence for any, but for that of the Catholike Church, shee onely can speake authoritatiuely, all others speaking from their owne heads; and shee onely, professing to speake from the mouth of Christ and of his Apostles; shee onely, hauing had the sense and meaning of the Apostles deliuered to her; because shee onely hath continued euer since their times, all the rest, hauing nothing but dead words, and the killing letter deliuered to them, whiles for the sense of those wordes, they haue no fur­ther recourses them to their owne ima­ginations and discourses.

In the next place, lett us consider, what is the knowledge of heaven▪ And our first remarke will tell vs, that it is such a knowledge, as God himselfe was [Page 47] forced to take mans flesh upon him to teach it us; because it was so high and transcendent beyond all that our eyes had ever seene, or that our eares had ever heard, or that our imaginations had ever conceiued or fancyed: that a lesse authority then Gods essentiall ve­rity, was not enough to settle our be­liefe upon so sublime and so admirable mysteries. Now, this being so, can we imagin, that the discussion of ambi­guous words, in which such incom­prehensible mysteries are hidden, should be left to the fancyfull change­ablenesse of human apprehensions? Who seeth not, that mans vnderstan­ding must of necessity alwayes incline the ballance towardes those thinges he useth to be conversant with, that he is wont to see, to heare, and to conceiue? Which is in effect directly contrary to the reason of our Saviours coming. And accordingly, we dayly meete with some that laugh at the doctrine of the real presence of Christes Body in the blessed Sacrament, some at the blessed Trinity; euery one, framing grounds [Page 48] to himselfe, according as his fancy dri­veth him, or as the company he cōver­seth with, draweth him. Now, if the scanning of ambiguous wordes will not serve to settle the beliefe of Chri­stian doctrine in the hearts of man­kinde. It is cleare, that nothing but Tradition can performe that worke, since there remaineth nothing else that can pretend there to: And conse­quently, nothing but Tradition can be the meanes to plant and continue Re­ligion in the world.

Lastly, let us looke into the qua­lity of this doctrine. And presently it appeareth to us, that it ought to com­prehend all our actions; and conse­quently ought to precede the very first of them, while as yet there is no judge­ment in us: and when we are growne to the ripenesse of judging, it ought to Master our very judgement it selfe; since the exercising of that, is also one of our actions. How then can it be sup­posed, that Religion ought to be stu­died and learned like a science or skill, when as, it ought to be possessed even [Page 49] then when we begin to study; and, that our very study ought to be regu­lated by it?

SEeing it is agreed on by all parties, that the Scriptures were written by the same spirit, which guided the Apostles in their preaching: There can be no doubt, but that the doctrines con­tained in their witings, must needes be conformable to what they delivered in their sermons, and in other vocall in­structions; with this difference, that there could he no dispute about their meaning in what they preached and catechised, by reason of their often in­culcating and plaine expressing it: Whereas nothing can be more cleare, then that in what they have written, [Page 50] their sense is oftentimes obscure and very difficult to be discovered and pe­netrated into. And therefore, the Scri­ptures are to be interpreted by the law writtē in the heart of that Church, which hath alwayes adhered to the doctrine that from time to time they have re­ceived from their predecessours: though withall, I have no scruple but that if the Scripture be read in such sort as it ought to be, it will of it selfe, bring the man who so readeth it, to the true Reli­gion.

The conditions that I require for the due reading of Scripture, are these: First, that he have a sincere intention and affection to submitt his owne minde and judgement to the Scriptures, and not straine them to his opinion. Secondly, that he have a sound understanding, not apt to be carried away lightly. Thirdly, that he meddle with no commenter or interpreter that is more cunning then himselfe; nor rely upon any thing for the minde and sense of the Scripture, but what the Scripture it selfe affordeth him. Fourthly, that he reade it long and at­tentively. [Page 51] And Lastly, that what he understandeth by reading of the Scri­pture, he endeavour to put it in pra­ctise, and governe his life accordingly: For, practise doth wonderfully enlighten any Booke which giveth rules in any kind of operation. These thinges ob­served, I doubt not but who taketh Scripture for his rule, will not faile of becoming a Catholike, at the last. For, both the reason before delivered, in the beginning of the reflexion, and expe­rience, and the instances of doctrines, whereof part follow and more might be brought, do manifestly declare, that this effect must of necessity follow.

To see what the Scriptures will di­rect us, in order to Catholike doctrine; Let us begin with this very question concerning the interpretation, of the Scriptures themselves. It is planely set downe, that it ought not to be by the private spirit, Pet. 2. c. 1. That Christ sett in his Church, Apostles, Prophets, Evangelists, Pastors, Doctors, for the of building his body; that the faithfull [Page 52] may not be turned round by every blast of doctrine; Ephes. 4. That the Church is the Pillar and strength of our faith. These and many more texts he shall find to shew him that the interpreta­tion of Scripture, ought to depend on the Church. In other places he may reade, that the Scripture is usefull for our comfort, for preaching and for exhorting, &c. But, not one word of looking in it for our faith, unlesse when it selfe is taken into the question; That is to say, when the question is, whether the new Gospell be conformable to the old; which is the sole matter of con­troversy; wherein the Scripture (that is to say, our Saviour in the 5. of St. John, and St. Paul in the 17 of the Acts) di­recteth the searching and looking into Scriptures. For, in both these places, this onely was the point they spoke unto.

If the question be of the Popes supre­macy; (that is to say, of St. Peters Primacy among the Apostles: For, onely so much, can belong to Scripture) Wee have it expressely in the 10. of [Page 53] St. Mathew, Simon, the first: And so he is counted by the other two Evange­lists; Whereas, the order of the other Apostles is not kept. Wee have tri­bute payed for Christ and for him as a speciall officer, Matth. 17. We have him forwardest in the confession of Christ, Matt. 16. The Church promised to be built upon him, and the keyes in a speciall manner to be delivered to him: So that, it is not to be wondered att, if presently after, the tribute was particularly payed for him. We have the sheepe of Christ, in a speciall wise recommended unto him; John the last. We have Christs prayer personally for him, and a charge given him to con­firme the rest, Luc. 22. We have him ordering the Church in the election of St. Matthias, Acts the first ▪ Him first preaching to the Jewes, Acts the 2. Him first receiving the Gentiles, by Gods speciall order, Acts the 10. Acts the 12. the Church praying for him. Hee first giveth the Holy Ghost, Acts the 8. Acts the 16▪ he in the Councell is the first that resolveth [Page 54] the question. So that, if the Scripture be sincerely consulted in this point, there is all appareance, or rather evidence, of St. Peters Primacy, both in word and in deed.

If the question be, of the Churches infallibility or indeficiency: The Scri­pture will tell us, that Christ promised to be with his Preachers for ever, Matt. 28. That the gates of hell should not prevaile against his Church, Matth. 16. That the Holy Ghost should stay with his Disciples for ever, John the 14. That there should be of the Elect at the end of the world, Matth. 24. Marke 13. Luke 17. That persecution should not end in the Church, untill the coming of Christ, Matth. 10. Nay, that after the beginning of the Resurrection, some shall yet remaine, 1. Thess. 4.

If the question be of the reall pre­sence▪ that is to say, that our saviours body is truly in the blessed Sacrament; We shall reade, this is my body, Matth. 26. Marke 14. This is my body which is given for you, Luke 22. This is my body which shall be delivered for you, [Page 55] 1. Cor. 11. And in the former Chapter he presseth it; Is not the chalice we blesse, the participation of the blood of Christ? And the bread we breake, is it not the participation of our lordes body? What can a sincere heart that believeth the Scripture, reply to this?

If the question be, of Remission of sinnes in the Church: Do we not reade, the power of binding and of losing, given to men, Matth. 18? Of forgiving and of retaining, John the 20? We reade, that the Apostles received the ministery of Reconciliation, the word of Recon­ciliation, 2. Cor. 5. James 5. Confesse your sinnes, one to the other. Also Matth. 9. The people glorifyed God, for having given unto men, the power of remitting sinnes.

If Confirmation (that is to say, the giving of the Holy Ghost) be in que­stion: We reade St. John Baptist testi­fying, that he who sent him to baptize in water told him that Christ baptized in the Holy Ghost, Marke 1. and John 1. But in John 3. That he who is not new-borne of water and the Holy [Page 56] Ghost, cannot enter into the kingdome of heaven. And, that this was meaned of that descent of the Holy Ghost which is after Baptisme, is our Saviours own de­claration, who in the 1. of the Acts sayth. You shall be baptised in the Holy Ghost after not many days: Whereof, the whole story is told att length in the 2. Chapter; And in the 8. the Apostles were sent to Samaria, to impart there this giving of the Holy Ghost. In the 11. St. Peter remembred in the saying of our saviour in the same sense. And in the 15. St. Paul useth the same Ceremony to 12. Persons af­ter they were baptised, with the same reflection on Saint John Ba­ptist.

As for the Sacrament of Order; there are two parts in it; the Mission; and the outward Ceremony: Both which, are largely expressed in the Conse­cration of Aaron, and of his sonnes. Levitic. 8. The designation and Mission, Matth. 10. Marke 3. Luke 6. and againe 22. when he gave them command to consecrate the blessed [Page 57] Sacrament for the faithfull. Luke 10. He designed the 72. Disciples. Hebr. 5. The Law is established in generall; As also Rom. 10. How shall they preach, unlesse they be sent? As for the outward Ceremony, though we can not doubt but it was performed by our saviour, when he sent his Apostles and Disciples; Yet we have ex­pressed also in the 20. of St. Iohn, where we are told of insufflation, with these wordes receive the Holy Ghost. In the 13. of the Acts, we are told of fasting and of impo­sition of hands; and in is it specifyed, that they who were so sent, were sent by the Holy Ghost. And in the 1. to Tim. 4. We have the imposition of the handes of the Presbytery by Pro­phecy.

For Matrimonies being a Sacrament: We reade every where, that the con­junction of Man and Wife is from God. Gen. 2. He brought her to Adam. 1. Cor. 11. Neither Man without woman, nor woman without man, in our Lord, Matth. 19. And Marke 10. [Page 58] What God hath coonjoyned; let not man separate. Nature, giveth to all cultiuated Nations, to do this with an outward ceremony; and therefore, surely, among those who hold it a spe­ciall action of God, it is most fit to be performed by the minister of God. Now, that sanctification is due to it: We reade 1. Cor. 7. The unbelieving man, is sanctifyed by the faithfull wo­man; and the unbelieving woman, by the faithfull man (to wit, in their com­mon operation) otherwise your chil­dren would be uncleane; whereas now they are holy.

Of extreme Unction, there is not so frequent mention; But, most manifest, and undenyably obvious. We are told in the 6. of St. Marke, that the Apostles annointed the sicke with oyle, and cured them. Ja. 5. Is any man sicke among you; Lett him bring in the Priests of the Church; and lett them pray over him, annointing him with oyle in the name of our lord: And the prayer of faith shall save the sicke man: and our lord will ease him; and if he be [Page 59] in sinne, his sinnes shall be forgiven him.

I doubt not, but if what I have al­ready alledged out of Scripture, do light into an even soule, not by assed by interest or prejudice to the contrary party; It will be sufficient to satisfy him fully that the out side and letter of Scripture, is clearely on the side of antiquity and of the Catholike Church. Yet I can not leave this subject, till I have mentioned one point more, be­cause it is so much vaunted by our Ad­versaries, though with very litle reason. The Catholike Church administreth the holy Eucharist, sometimes in one kinde, some times in both: Protestants, alwayes in both kindes. The question ariseth, which of these practices is fa­voured by Scripture. It is evident that the Scripture speaketh sometimes of receiving both the bread and the cuppe▪ But much oftener, of one alone. Jo. 6. This is a bread coming downe from heaven; that whosoever eateth of it, may not dye. I am the bread of life, which descended from heaven. [Page 60] If any one eate of this bread, he shall live for ever. He that eateth this bread, shall live for ever. Luke the last, he tooke bread, and blessed, and brake it, and gave it to them; and their eyes were opened, and they knew him; and he vanished out of their sight. Acts 2. And they were persevering in the do­ctrine of the Apostles, and the commu­nion of breaking of bread, and prayer. Acts 20. When they were assembled to breake bread. So that, if we distinguish betweene the time of giving the com­munion, and the time of the Priestes consecration (in which the Catholike Church, observeth inviolably the doing it in both kindes) we shall finde more places in Scripture for communicating in one kinde, then for doing it in both. But what shall we say to this speech of St. Paul 1. Cor. 11. Therefore, whosoever shall eate this bread, Or drink this cuppe, unworthily; he shall be guilty of the body, and bloud of our sa­viour? what meaneth this Or, but that some, even then, tooke the one without the oher? Else, there had [Page 61] been no place for that disjunctive Syl­lable.

I easily believe, that many a pert bat­chellour will be ready to tell us, that he can find wayes to salve all these places of Scripture, and many more if they were urged. But that cōcerneth not me. I enquire onely, what the outward face of Scripture is; and to what belief it wil leade an honest heart, left to its owne strength. For if those queinte disputants do encounter with a person that is not enured to the Sophistry; they will turn blacke into white, make two egges three (as the tale goeth of the imperti­nent forward scholler) and bring to passe whatsoever they undertake. Therefore it was necessary to impose among the conditions of reading the Bible, this for a principall one; That they, who by Scripture, ayme at coming to the truth, should admitt of no Inter­preter. And this, because of the danger in lighting upon a false one, instead of a true one, before one, hath groundes to discerne which is a false one and which a true one. For, the case is very indifferēt [Page 62] betweene a Catholike Interpreter, and any other. The Catholike, knoweth the doctrine of Christ (that is to say, the sense of the Scripture) indepen­dently from the words of the Scripture. And therefore, in substantiall points which concerne Christs doctrine he cannot teach or interpret amisse, without swerving from his owne faith. But it is evident that every other, who hath no rule for his beliefe, besides the bare letter and words of Scripture, is subject to errour, through every pas­sion and prejudice, which hiddenly swayeth his heart awry and corrupteth his judgement, by pride or other affe­ction: So that he may be rightly com­pared to a rotten cane; that being leaned upon, will breake, and with its splinters, wound and gore him that ex­pected support from it.

IT seemeth strange to mee, that any man who acknowledgeth Scripture, should reject the Fathers: since he can not renounce them; without professing att the same time by so doing, that he believeth himselfe to be able (with his little witte, and generally lesse study and learning) to penetrate deeper into the intelligence of Scripture, then so many ages eminent for industry, sciēce, and holynesse, could reach unto. And all this, upon no other pretence, but because they were men; and conse­quently, liable to erring: As if him­selfe were not a man; but something else, so farre beyond comparison with all other men, that we ought rather to confide in his ability and honesty, then [Page 74] in all mankinde that went before him. Which is so unworthy and so intole­rable a pride, that I admire how any auditory can endure it.

But to come more closely to the point. I say, that seeing the Holy Fathers, did, both receive the prevaching of the Apostles neerer hand then wee do; and did hold the truth of Scripture as strongly as we do; and did spend much time in the earnest study of it, and proceeded therein with as sin­cere hearts as wee can: It may in no wise be doubted, but that they had the meanes and the wills of having the true faith; and consequently, that they had it.

Therefore, what was their universall Tenet in Matters of faith, can not bee false nor ought to be rejected; Or, with any colour of reason, be que­stioned by us as disagreeing with Scripture. Besides; their writings being large and numerous, (in which, upon severall occasions and in diffe­ring circumstances, they repeate and [Page 65] inculcate the same thinges by different wordes and expressions) it must needes thence follow, that their sense and meaning, in most things of impor­tance, can not choose but be suffi­ciently explicated. So as who ever shall reade them with candour, inge­nuity, and judgement, can not possibly doubt of it.

And accordingly, experience hath shewed us, that the judicious Prote­stants who gave themselves to the rea­ding of the Fathers, were in judgement neere unto Catholikes, in most of their opinions: And that which detained them from being absolutely Catho­likes, was (besides the chaines of in­terest) nothing but a secret pride of not submitting themselves to the Tradition of the Church, in some particular points in which Tradition was not so cleare to them. Though withall I deny not, but that a wrong apprehen­sion of some Catholike Tenets (pre­sumed upon the explication of some particular Doctors) might unhappily [Page 66] contribute to this their obstinacy. No doubt then, but if any indifferent per­son, not preimbibed with any wrong maxime, shall bestow competent paines in reading the Fathers, he will infal­libly become Catholike. Especially, if hee take this rule along with him; to compare the practise of Protestants, with the practise of the Fathers and of the former Church. By which he will see, that this which they call Refor­mation, hath cut away under pretence of abuses, not the abuses, but the very thinges themselves in which the abuses were; like unskillfull Chirurgians, that cut of a leg, to cure a small sore in it; or like Mahomet, who tooke away all use of wine, to cure drunkennesse. And in the meane while, they cavill att petty questions, in which they strive to shew that the Church hath erred.

As for naturall reason; No man will expect that it should be an entire meanes of attaining to the knowledge of the supernaturall truths which are contained in Christian Religion; But [Page 67] onely, that it may be a helpe thereunto; by shewing, that they are so farre from contradicting reason, as indeed nothing can be more conformable to true reason, then the whole oeconomy of them is. And I dare promise whosoever shall seeke this; that, if he come unto it, armed with true and sound Philosophy, he may arrive to a full contentment of his understanding and heart, in all that concerneth so noble an enquiry. Now, since Catholike Religion hath been so intelligibly divulged in the world. St. Augustin maketh mention, that he found the Mystery of the Trinity, in the Platonists Bookes. Now, if you aske me how this came to passe; I answere, that God provided in Alexan­dria (a City much addicted to learning) one Ammonius Hermias, a great Philo­sopher and a Christian. Hee, to make Christian Religion more acceptable, sought to joyne it with Platonicke Phi­losophy: Which was no hard matter to do; Plato having bing been (as Nu­menius sayth of him) Moses speaking Greeke; that is to say, one who having [Page 68] lighted upon the Hebrew learning, had sucked much out of it. Now, this Am­monius; finding in Plato the Ideas of Being, and of Vnity, and of Life, and such other ayery notions, easy to be wrought upon to what hee designed; endeavoured by these, to instill into his Schollers the Mystery of the Tri­nity. Which he did with such happy successe, that of the three prime wittes of his Schoole, the one ( Origen) be­came so great and eminent a Doctor of the Church, as antiquity hath acknow­ledged him.

The other two, Amelius and Plo­tinus, prooved two Conductours of the Platonicke Schoole; and brought into it the imitation of the Trinity which is found in their discourses and in the writings of their followers: So amiable is truth, that the very likenesse of it enamoureth the understanding: How much more, would the sub­stance do so, were it rightly pursued and truly discovered? Which without question, it may be, even in this very particular; the termes, in which [Page 69] this sublime Mystery is delivered, being so naturall; and the thing it selfe, being the connaturall substance of Al­mighty God, that dependeth not upon any chance or free disposition; and the intention of revelation, being (ge­nerally) to bring us to the knowledge of the thing that is revealed.

And therefore (you will say) the wonder is not so great, that since Chri­stian Religion was knowne and voyced about in the world, these Mysteries should be treated of by Philosophers in their Schooles and writings: But if in any of them before the coming of Christ, there shoud have sprung, out of pure nature, the least intimation of any of these supernaturall Mysteries; That, would be a strong confirmation of what we have here said.

Certainely, if this may be expected from any, it must be from Aristo­tele; He being of the onely person amongst the Heathens that hath written with solidity. Of him then it is reported, that as he lay upon his death-bed, considering the miseries that [Page 70] poore man-kinde falleth dayly into through Errors, and that it is not in the power of Nature to deliver Man from them, hee pronunced this great sentence. That Homer had much reason to make the Gods take human shapes upon them, to draw by that meanes poore Men out of Errours. Behold the Incarnation of the sonne of God 'as so lively grounded, as any Christian can speake of it; And this, by the meere strength of reason. And is it possible, that now, after so glorious publication of the Christian faith through the whole earth, there should be found any Christians so un­reasonable, as to thinke it unreasonable that God should become man, to save us from our sinnes; which are the true roote of all our miseries?

The like is of the holy Eucharist. Did but men understand so much of Meta­physickes, as to know the Nature of their owne growth or augmentation, they would find no difficulty, in that, now by many so disbelieved and decryed, though in it selfe so heavenly and neede­full a Mystery. But, ignorance and pride, [Page 71] maketh that to be held for absurd, which in truth is most conformable to Nature.

I will adde but one word more upon this occasion, for their sakes who are affected with reason, and are best sa­tisfyed with discourses built upon that foundation. This Principle being sup­posed, that all thinges are governed in the perfectest manner that may be, in conformity to the generall rules of nature (which Divines use to expresse in these wordes, that God, ever doth that which is best) then presently; All the Mysteries of Christian Religion. Namely, the creation of Man; the fall, the oeconomy, or conduct of the world untill the coming of Christ; since Christ; the end of the world; the last Judgement; the Resurrection; the severall States of soules before it, and of men after it. Beatitude; Damnation; And whatsoever else is in Catholike beliefe, as, the Doctrine concerning the Church, Church-gouvernement, the Sacraments; and whatsoever else belongeth of necessity to credulity [Page 72] and obedience. All these (I say) will appeare so mainely evident and rea­sonable, that no man of a just capa­city and unpassionate mind, can take any exception against it. Whosoever will employ his time and endeavours in this search; and shall begin it with a right understanding of Nature; will find, with unspeakable comfort and satisfaction to himselfe, that what I have here said, is true. I confesse, some paines are required to know these thinges; as also there are some neces­sary to comprehend the demonstra­tions of Archimedes and the Cronickes of Apollonius Pergeus; about which we see so many straine their wittes to un­derstand them, for the delight that is in them, when they are once mastered; And yet, the importance ad conse­quence of them, is not comparable to the knowledge of these truths; which looked after with a like attention, in a due progresse, will become as evident as they. But wee must not expect to attaine to the depth of all these pointes, by onely discoursing of them in fami­liar [Page 73] conversation, for our divertise­ment and recreation; or by reading some treatise of them, in such sort as one would do a Romance, only for en­tertainement or passe-time and delight. They who are skilled in Geometry or Algebra, do well know they never purchased those sciences so cheape. Seeing then that this is of so much higher a straine in it selfe, and of so farre greater a concernment towardes the governement of their lifes: Lett them, if they can not be satisfyed with simply believing these truths, use in­dustry to finde Masters able to instruct them, and employ a competency of labour in pursuite of them.

AFter the way of reading; there offe­reth it selfe to our consideration, that of personall discoursing or Dialo­gising. This may be performed, in two Manners. The one; when hee who is to learne, contributeth on his side; bearing himselfe with a desire to come to truth; and helping it on, by acknow­ledging candidly, what seemeth to him true out of his former persuasion; and proposing, wherein hee findeth diffi­culty; and asking no more, then to have that opened unto him, which some pre­occupation hath obstruted. This Manner of treating is called Conference. And no doubt but it is a farre shorter and more efficacious way to come to know­ledge, then reading. Provided, the teacher be an able Man and Master of [Page 75] his profession. For, a writer can speake but in common; whereas such a teacher, knoweth by the answers of his op­poser, wherein particularly lyeth the difficulty he is to to remove; and accor­dingly, spareth and contracteth many discourses wihch the writer is forced to deliver att ayme and att hazard. Besides; the very orall delivery, is farre more intelligible, and giveth a singular energy to what is so taught.

The other Manner of Dialogising, is, when the Auditour standeth upon his guard, and yieldeth nothing upon fore-knowledge; but will bee co [...]vinced, and see evidence, for every thing he is to allow: And this, is properley called Di­sputation. The parties in this, are clearely two; a [...]d no third to moderate the Disputation: though oftentimes one be necessary to moderate the Dispu­tants, Who otherwise, through con­tention and earnestnesse, may bee apt to neglect the rules of Disputatiō ▪ whereof the first or chiefe is, that the one, meddle not with the others office, as long as he holdeth to the rules of Disputation.

[Page 76]The parties being two; a disputāt, and a respondent. The first thing the dispu­tant is to doe, is to state the question; or rather, to require of the respondent to do it, if it bee necessary: That is, if he suspecteth the termes of the Thesis to be equivocall. Then, is he to oblige the respondent to explicate his meaning in the position: For, that belongeth to the respondent; who can not be forced, to hold by the wordes of his Thesis, any more then himselfe meaneth by them, He may also oblige him to yield the reason of his Tenet, if it be such a one, that the opposite is the more com­mon, or of Authors that he is bound not to forsake without great reason. For, as in truth it is an impudence to main­taine any thing without a reason; So, the reason failing, the maintainer is putt from his position; though perad­venture, the position it selfe be not con­futed. Neither ought there to be re­quired more reasons then one, for one truth. Not, but that many arguments may be framed to prove the same con­clusion; but because, among them, one [Page 77] at the least, ought to be irrefragable, and which cā not be cōvinced of defect. For, if none be such, the respondent ought not to maintaine his assertion for true▪ since he himselfe must needes thinke that peradventure it is false, not having evidence or knowledge that it can not be otherwise then as he affirmeth it.

The second duty of the disputant, (in a serious disputation intended for the finding out of truth) is, to propose no argument but such as in his opinion is convincing. We can not oblige a man to know so much; For, all of us are fallible in particulars; and even Geometricians themselves, do sometimes mistake a truth for demonstrated, when really it is not so. But that which we may exact of our disputant, is, that he esteem his ar­gument convictive, and propound it for such ād he is to make account that him­selfe is overcome, if (fair law being givē him) he do not overcome, For, his part being to prove; if he do not that, faileth of his end; which is, to lose the day: and if before he begin, he doth not expect to do this, he cometh not to dispute, but to [Page 78] mock the Auditory, and to persuade them or to make a shew of that which in reality he knoweth he can not per­forme.

His third duty is to proceede in forme. Now, by true and rigorous forme, is meaned Syllogisticall forme. So that, in rigour, every attempt of his should be a Syllogisme. But among ex­pert and ingenuous Logitians, This is not exacted; unlesse it bee upon a pinch, where there is a controversy upon the consequence: For then, the rigour of forme concludeth the question. Other­wise, to goe (as they call it) by Enthy­memes (that is, by putting one onely Antecedent, whence the denyed pro­position is averred to follow) is the shorter and the clearer way. For, it taketh away both lenghth and confu­sion from the respondent.

And because, if the Antecedent be false, it is but one; and so the deniall or distinction of it putteth the arguer in his ready way; and if the consequēce be naught, that is to be proued, the Di­sputation goeth the more smoothly on.

[Page 79]His fourth duty is, to prove what is immediatly denyed him, and to bring that in his consequent; whether it be a proposition, or a sequele he ought to make good.

These are the necessary and maine duties of the disputant. For, although anciently he was allowed to make what demandes he pleased of thinges pertinent to his proofe, before the re­spondent could discern what he aymed at by his questions: Yet our latter Schoole-practise hath cutt of this li­berty, as being very subject to circum­vent the respondent; and rather ca­ptious, then a solide meanes to arrive att truth.

As for the Answerer: His first duty is, to remember his name; that is to say, that he sitteth there to answere; and therefore, ought to speake no more then he is asked. His solemne wordes, are knowne to be, I grant, I deny, I distinguish. As for granting, it is att his danger. As for denying; he ought not to deny any proposition, that of it selfe is knowne to be true. [Page 80] As for distinguishing; he must shew that the Arguers wordes do bear more senses then one; or else he giveth no distinction. Hee must also shew, that the parts of his distinction, are to the purpose of the ar­gument; otherwise, his distinction is frivolous. This he must do, when the Actour requireth it. Otherwise, he must onely give his distinction, and grant the one part, and deny the other; to the end, the arguer may choose, whether he will accept of that which is granted, or prove that which is denyed. If he grant a pro­position formerly denyed; or if he deny a proposition formerly granted; he hath lost the day. Whether he may distinguish a proposition, that he hath before simply granted or denyed, is a question touching the honour of the defendant. But without doubt, in rigour it is lawfull to be done: For, no proposition can be supposed to be granted or denyed in all senses possi­ble; And therefore, upon further occa­sion, it may be declared in what sense it was formerly allowed or denyed.

BUt, to apply these observations to our present subject, we must cast our eyes upon the ayme and scope of our disputation. Other disputations, that are not of Religion, wee see are sometimes done for the exercise of yong Schollers, to inure them to a subtile and rigorous Manner of discoursing, and to make them perfect in the consequences to their Tenets: which is a laudable course, according to the worth of the sciences they are about. Other whiles, men meete to dispute, either for recreation sake, or for ostentation of their wittes. The lat­ter is pardonable in yong men; and the former, is a commendable Manner of passing their time, for those who have no better meanes of spending it.

[Page 82]But when all this is applyed to Re­ligion, it taketh an other hew. For, here, wee looke for truth in the most necessary part and businesse of our life; in which, to be deceived, is the greatest mischiefe that can befall us. Beyond the ruine of our estate: Beyond the ta­king away of our life; Beyond the ex­tinguishing of our family; And beyond the losse of all that is deare to us in this world. Wherefore, he that in this Matter maintaineth any position, meerely for ostentation of his witte is guilty of a most Sacrilegious action; and committeth upon the party he se­duceth, the worst sort of murther that Mans Nature is capable of. in like Manner, to make a meere recreation of such disputing; Is a high contempt of God, of eternall Beatitude, and of Divinity. For exercise, it may be ne­cessary, so it be knowne to befor that end; and, that under colour of exercise, no wrong persuasion be induced into the Auditory.

Yet is all this, from our present bu­sinesse. For, the Disputation, for [Page 83] which these rules are intended, is a kind of trial of the truth of Religion; By which, the Auditory may take an Ap­prehension of what they are to follow during their whole life. So that it is not to be allowed, without just security from both parties: From the Arguent, for his disputing, and from the Defen­dant, for his answering. And accor­dingly, since it is well knowne, that nothing but Demonstration, can give security of a disputable truth: He who in a Disputation of this nature under­taketh to prove an assertion, ought first to engage his credit that in his con­science hee esteemeth the argument hee intendeth to propose, to be Demon­strative: How ever he may apprehend a failing on his part in pressing it, either through want of sufficient skill, or through the over proportion of his ad­versaries abilities, or through the dif­ficulty of well opening the Matter and making the truth appeare. If hee re­fuse to do this, he is to be protested against for a thiefe and a robber (as our Saviour himselfe styleth such) who [Page 84] hath a designe to abuse his hearers, and to draw their soules (for some private in­terest of his owne) into eternall damna­tion: And the Auditory is to be conte­sted, that such a disputation as the Arguer intendeth, is a meere juggle and im­posture; a brabbling, base, counter­scuffle, not fitt for a grave Man to have a share in; but a meere scolding, losse of time, and vexation, both to the hearers and to the actours.

The Respondents taske, is not so ri­gorous. It is enough for him to main­taine, that his adversary can not con­vince his Tenet of falsity: Hee being, for this passage, but a defendant; not a prover.

Thus farre, for Opponents and De­fendants in common; But now, to apply this to Catholikes, and to those who have parted from them; Let us begin with considering, how their maine dif­ference consisteth in this, that the Ca­tholike holdeth his doctrine, because it came to him by his fore-fathers from Christ; and relyeth upon his fore-fa­thers for the truth of this: The Adver­saries, [Page 85] Universally, do rely upon, either Scripture, or reason. As for reason, it is evident that it can not bee a sufficient ground of a doctrine that is held by au­thority. And as for Scripture, the Ca­tholike maintaineth it as strongly as they. Neither have they it, but upon the credit of Catholikes: And there­fore all the arguments they can bring out of Scripture against Catholikes, do beare in their fore-head a prejudice of being either false, or att least uncer­taine.

OUt of these premisses, there follow some very considerable differences betweene Catholikes and Protestants, in point of Disputation. The first is: That a Catholike, ought not, for his owne satisfaction, to admitt of any disputation att all, in Matters of Religion. For, he relyeth upon a better ground, then any his Adversary can offer to him: Name­ly, an infallible and irrefragable Au­thority. Hee taketh reason for an insufficient Judge in controversies of this Nature. And against disputing out of Scripture, he hath two prejudices: The one, that he holdeth his faith by the same rule by which hee receiveth the Scripture, and therefore, if Scri­pture should proove any thing against his faith (which is impossible) it would make him believe neither; and so, would [Page 87] not change him to be of a new Religion, but cause him to be of none.

The other prejudice is, That he who argueth out of Scripture, proceedeth Texts whose sense is disputable in the words themselves: Whereas the Ca­tholike, is before-hand assured of the sense, as farre as concerneth faith; There­fore, it were in vaine for him to search, in an uncertaine instructer, the know­ledge of that which he already knoweth certainly.

Yet further: If any Catholike doe admitt Disputation for his owne sake and satisfaction; he leaveth being a Ca­tholike. For, the end of Disputation, is to cleare a doubt: And therefore, where is no doubt, there is no neede of dispu­ting. Neither can a Catholike have any doubt in any Matter of faith, unlesse hee suspecteth his rule: Which if he once do, he is no longer a Catholike. On the other side; The Protestant, building all his faith upon the ambiguous words of Scripture (so loud disputed, and eternally disputable) must necessarily, if he bee a rationall man, live in perpetuall doubt. [Page 88] For, the very oppositiō of so many wise and learned men as affirme that the wordes he alleageth do not signify that which is necessary for his position: is sufficient to make any rationall man be in doubt of an exposition of wordes that may beare severall senses, which he seeth is so obvious and ordinary a rock of mistaking. Therefore, a Protestant were not rationall, if he should not al­wayes demand searching and disputing untill experience shall have taught him, there is no End of it, or by it. Hee must resolve, either to be ignorant and to trust, or else to dispute without end. And in very truth, his disputing is to no end. For, suppose he be the arguent, and do convince his adversary; yet after all his paines, he hath gained no more then onely to perceive that his adversary is a weaker disputant then hee; or that per­advēture he was at that time surprised; so that when he shall be in his better wittes, he may happily be able to salve his arguments. And if he be the Defen­dant, and chāce to maintain his positiō, yet it followeth not, that a better Op­ponent [Page 89] then he had to deale withall, mought not have convinced him. So that, on neither side, there is any security to him, because he bringeth no Demon­stration, but onely the bare appearance of ambiguous wordes.

There is an other impurity betweene Catholikes and their adversaries, in this, that if the Catholike be the Opponent, he can dispute but of one point; namely, of the Infalliblity of the Church, because his adversary is obliged to no other. For, take what point you will besides; and one may be a perfect Protestant, whether he hold it, or deny it. The au­thority of Bishops, is the maine point of Protestācy, by which it is distinguished from all other Sestaries: Yet, when it is for their turne, the French Presbyterians (so great enemies to that governmēt of the Church) are their deare brethren. The Greeks, the Lutherans, the Socinians, the Anabaptistes; how many positions, do they maintaine different from the Pro­testants? Neverthelesse, when it pleaseth a Protestant to make his boasts of the large extent of the Reformed Churches; all these are of this communion. Nay,

[Page 90]Nay, when he talketh of the Vniver­sall Church: No Arrian, Eutychian, Ne­storian, or other Professour of what­soever damned Heresy that hath a share against Popery, is excluded by him from being an Orthodoxe Member of the Catholike Church; but all are re­gistred in his Kalendar, as Professours of the onely true faith, and as wit­nesses of Christs doctrine. So that, if a Catholike be to argue, he looseth his labour in disputing of any point but of the Infallibility of the Church; be­cause he advanceth nothing by having the victory in any other. For though he should reduce his adversary to be of his minde, in all other articles: yet not being so in this too, he is as farre as ever from being a Catholike; since the not believing of any one ar­ticle of faith, maketh a man no Ca­tholike, or (which is all one) a Pro­testant.

On the other side; If it be the Ca­tholikes share to be the Defendant: He is bound to make good, many points; That is to say, all that doctrine which [Page 91] we maintaine to be of faith, and to have received by Tradition.

The Conclusion therefore is, that the Catholike hath much to maintaine, and little to oppose: The Protestant hath great choice of what to oppose, and little to maintaine. So that his ad­vantage, on this hand, is very great, in regard of disputation. Since, if he receive a wound in any limb of that great body he is to defend, it is a mor­tall one to his cause: And his adver­sary is invulnerable to him, every where but in one pointe. The reason of this difference, dependeth of the knowne Axiome,

The Catholike Party, hath a Religion; hath an Art and skill of living well, and of going to heaven. Such a thing, must have a body: And a body, can not con­sist without many members and parts: Every one of which, must be defended and made good.

All other Sects, are but deficiencies, more or lesse, from this rule: Those, [Page 92] more; who cleave fastest to the rule of deficiency; that is to say, to the reje­cting of all that cannot be convinced out of Scripture: Those lesse; who perceiving the inconveniencies this bringeth upon them, do soonest re­cede, in practise, from this crooked rule, and to contradict their maine ground of all being fallible, by forcing their subjects to hold their Tenets; that they have no authority for; themselves having forsaken the legitimate autho­rity, by which the Catholike Church sticketh to Tradition.

THe Catholike defendant, having so hard a taske; some few notes will be necessary for him. As first; that he should not ofter to maintaine, against arguments drawne out of na­ture, such positions as he is not able to satisfy himselfe in: for example; against an Arrian or Sabellian, lett him not un­dertake to dispute and argue, in reason, how the same thing can be one and three; unlesse he be first sure that hee understandeth it well, and that him­selfe resteth satisfyed with reason in that point. For, it is impossible to give the Auditory satisfaction, if he hath it not himselfe; Especially, if the disputant be subtle, and able to ma­nage his Argument.

[Page 94]The like is of the blessed Sacrament, to shew how one body can at the same time be im more places then one.

In this case therefore, the Defendant is to keepe himselfe upon the generall defence, that wee believe Mysteries of faith, whether we can answere Argu­ments against them, or no; That the word of God, is able to give us cer­titude, above all demonstration, and above all that wee can understand. Neither are wee without the example of our Adversaries themselves, when we do thus. For, in this very Mystery of the Eucharist, they will tell us that Christ is really and truly present in it. But that the Manner how he is there, is not understandable. In the Trinity, and in the Incarnation, Protestants do the like; acknowledging these Myste­ries to be true, but withall professing them to be above their understan­ding.

Yet, this rule is not so peremptory, but that by discretion it may admitt exce­ption. For, our Adversaries are so weake; that they ground most of their [Page 95] Axiomes and proofes, rather upon con­fidence wee will not deny them, then that themselves are able to make them good. So, in the Mystery of the Eu­charist; when they insist upon the Ma­xime, that the same body can not be att the same time in two places; If you putt them to proove it, you shall finde that their word will be to say that even our owne Doctors confesse it, or that experience assureth us of it: Whereas, experience is no Argument against Gods Omnipotency: And as to what pri­vate Doctors affirme, it is att every Mans pleasure to grant or deny it. So that, if you understand your Adversaries strength, you may non-sute him by putting him to prove what you know he can not. But this is a hazard: And you are shamed, if you faile.

An other Caveat for our defendant, is; Not to engage himselfe in a Con­troversy, upon the opinion of one party of Devines; Nor undertake to defend against his Adversary a position which some of our owne Devines do oppose; and so, is rather a question of Schola­sticall [Page 96] Divinity, then a Controversy of faith. To this purpose it is to be noted, that some opinions are of a greater lati­tude, then others; establishing faith upon that, whereof others confine it but to some one part.

As, in the Matter of Infallibility; some place it in the Pope, some, in a gene­rall Councell; some, in both; some, in the whole Church; which conteineth all these, and more. Here, the cautious Controvertist that hath care of his Safe­ty, will be sure to choose that which is most ample; and so quitteth himselfe from the trouble and danger of answe­ring Arguments made against the single parts; and keepeth himselfe to the strong hold of Christianity, wherein all parties agree. True it is, that if the defendant be putt to declare his position: and an Argument do presse him: Hee may sometimes be obliged to choose one opi­nion of Divines before an other; or rather, is forced to follow that which he is best acquainted with. But the rule I give, must serve where, and when there is place for it. And besides the already [Page 97] mentioned advantages that this course giveth; It causeth a great narrownesse or brevity in controversies; which brin­geth the dissenting parties, farre neerer to agreement; and setleth more stable­nesse in Religion, by making men di­cerne what belongeth to faith, and what doth not; but is the opinions of particular Doctors.

THe next thing we are to look into, Is, the quality of the Arguments which are to be used in those Disputa­tions. By [...]he precedent discourse, it is evident, [...]hat they are of three kindes; Out of Scripture, out of Fathers, and out of reason. To begin with Scripture; It is again [...] cleare, that arguments may be thence deduced, two wayes, The one, out of the pure force of the wordes: The other, out of the con­nexion of the sense and discourse acknowledged [...]n the wordes: With the conclusion that i [...] to be proved.

In the former way, Arguents, either presse the wordes of one single sen­tence which they bring, thinking to make it evident that their assertion is the very meaning of those wordes: Or [Page 99] else, they bring a conglobation of sundry places, of which the one forti­fyeth the other; so as to make it evi­dent, that the plaine sense of wordes so often reiterated, cannot choose but be the true meaning of the Scripture.

To begin with the first branch of the Manner of drawing arguments out of single Texts of Scripture; we may di­vide into two kindes, the Texts that are produced for this purpose. For they are either such as say, or are pretended to say, in expresse termes (or equivalent ones) the proponents Conclusion; so that the outward face of the wordes is plaine for his Tenet: As when Catho­likes produce the following Texts; this is my body; Simon the first; The Gates of hell shall not prevaile against my Church: whose sinnes you forgive, shall be forgiven, and any the like (upon which occasion, I may not forbeare to note, that Protestants have not any one text of this kind, against Catholikes unlesse they make use of the precept of not making graven images, which concerneth Christians no more, then [Page 100] doth the sacrificing of a Lambe att Easter: Both of them being commands given singly to the Jewes.) Or else they are such Texts, as though they do not containe the proponents conclusion in expresse wordes, yet he pretendeth that it followeth out of the sense of them.

Now in these Texts, there may be a double incertitude; First, whether the place alleaged, do signify what the pro­ponent pretendeth; Secondly, whether his conclusion would follow, though that were granted.

Now in both these kindes of Texts; When the Argument is drawne out of the force of the words; and their force, no other then from the Grammaticall or Dictionary-sense of those wordes; it is ordinarily a pitti­full weake Argument, and the whole Disputation is no better then boyes-play, and but like a construing of Te­rence: It being, almost, if not all­together impossible, in our con­troversies to find a Text of Scri­pture absolutely convincing, and consequently fitt to be insisted upon.

[Page 101]The reason whereof is, that the downe right signification of a word (especially, in discourses when, the Author doth not deliver his mind in a Dogmaticall way) is more wave­ring and changeable then the Aspin leafe.

I remember how, as I once pressed to a disputant, this which I now say, hee immediatly objected this Text to me, Abraham genuit Isaac; which he took to be unexplicable in any other sense, then that Abraham was Isaacs Father.

I was not att the present furnished with the diverse explicationse of the word Genuit: But God provided me an answere out of the first of St. Ma­thew, where it is said, Ioras genuit Oziam; and yet there were some in­termediate generations betweene Ioras and Ozias.

Whence it was clear, that out of the bare wordes, Abraham genuit Isaac, it could not be Demonstratively in­ferred that Abraham was Isaacs Fa­ther.

[Page 102]Now, after such an instance, what evidence can be expected out of the simple signification of wordes? Be­sides; who can be so shallow as to ima­gine that a Sect which hath men of any wit in it, should maintaine a position against that sense of the letter which every Boy can penetrate; but that it hath armed it selfe with some subter­fuge; which (ordinarily speaking) can not be weaker then the argument that dependeth upon so variable a ground as the use of wordes in human speech? Neverthelesse, this kind of arguing, is the most used, and much vaunted of.

As for example: The Lutherans and the Calvinists agree, in saying there is bread in the blessed Sacrament. Their argument against Catholikes (who allow it not to be so) is, that Christ called it bread after Consecration. If you answer them, that he doth not call it barely Bread, but this bread, or bread of life; or with some other character to distin­guish it from ordinary Bread; They presently cry out, that the wor Bread signifyeth bread made of wheate; and [Page 103] turne to their Dictionary to justify that signification; and sing victory, as if nothing were answered. So, when they presse these wordes out of the En­glish translation, Hee tooke bread, blessed it, broke it, and gave it: If you desire, in­stead of the word blessed it, to putt in turned it into his body; telling them, that the blessing, was the saying, this is my body: and the saying so, was the very turning of the bread into his body: If you reply thus, they will grow impa­tient, as if you committed an intolle­rable absurdity, and aske you in what Dictionary, or in what Author, to blesse signifyeth to turne into ones body▪ and will not heare that since in this case blessing was the pronouncing of such words, it must of necessity signify the turning into his body. Is it possible, that otherwise witty men, should be so overweaned of their owne side, as to believe there is any force in such alle­gations, which every Schoole-boy that construeth (not by rote, but under­standeth what he sayth) is able to dis­cover?

[Page 104]The reason (as I conceive) of this low and shallow impertinency, is, that this disputative kind of men, never raised their understanding to Geometricall Demonstrations, or to any solide dis­course; and indeed, not beyond the practise of Grammar rules in Scri­pture, and some quainte Criticisme of the same pitch: and therefore, may be of a fitt cise to talke in a pulpit to a vulgar auditory, or to cavill about wordes before unlearned per­sons, who were never present att a solide Disputation, nor are capable of the rigour or strict lawes of such a one: But they are not strong enough to frame an argument that may beare water and endure the touch, among ju­dicious examiners; Though, like junior Sophisters, they can pop out a great many slight objections, and ruine a large course from one to an other, to make a shew of learning without any substance of it.

Such a kind of Argument (in the last mentioned question of the Eucharist) is their great Achilles out of Theodoret, [Page 105] and an obscute writer called Gelasius, who say, the nature of bread remai­neth after consecration. If you answer them, that the word Nature signifyeth Quality, even in our ordinary Manner of speech; and that so they have gained nothing by the allegation of these au­thorities, since we acknowledge and se that the Quality of bread remaineth after Consecration; They againe cry Victory as before, as if the most Gram­maticall signification of one single word must cawy the bayes, without any consideration of the circumstant words or of the connexion of the sense. Which if any Schoole-boy of an upperforme should doe, he could not but expect a smarte reward from his Master. And yet these petty, slight, argumēts out of Scri­pture, are in a Manner the strōgest they have, by which they endeavour to over­throw the Religiō of their fore-fathers.

An other kinde of argument is fre­quent with them, which is, yet weaker thē this. It is whē from some superficial sound of words, that signify no such thing as the conclusiō they are to prove [Page 106] they take occasion to alledge a sentence of Scripture, that in effect is nothing to the question in hand; and yet they will make a noise that Scripture is cleare against you. As when ( Esay 58.) they cite, your wills are found in your fastings, to proove that voluntary fasts are unlaw­full; or ( Matt. 15) That which entereth into the mouth, defileth not the soule: But that which cometh out frō the heart. And against works of super errogation ( Luke 17.) When you have done all that is commanded you, say, you are unprofitable Servants. In all which Texts: Neyther is that said (so much as by the outward wordes) which they intend by alledging them; nor is there any shew of connexion with what they pretend. But rather, for the most part, such places do favour the adverse party. As, the first repre­hendeth the fastinges of the wicked Jewes, because they continued their impieties, notwithstanding their affli­cting themselves: Which signifyeth, that the fasts themselves, were good; but that the Manner and circumstances in which they were done, were naught. [Page 107] The second, clearely concludeth, that seeing the disobedience in eating for­bidden meates floweth from the heart, it is sin not to abstain from them.

The third, supposeth evidently, that the commandements may be fullfilled (which is denyed by Protestants) and implyeth that more may be done; and consequently, admitteth workes of super errogation.

I deny not, but that both these sorts of arguments, are common to both parties. Yet it is with this difference; that the Catholike relyeth not upon them; as being fixed upon his owne firme and solide basis, of having received his faith by succession from Christ: And therefore, in his mouth, such are condesciences to the weake­nesse of his auditory: Whom he hopeth, by this milke, to make capable of a stronger settlement. But among Pro­testants, such arguments and conje­cturall inferences, are the very foun­dation of their Religion; Unto which sandy ground, they strive to bring their auditory, hindering them from setling upon the rocke of the Church.

BUt, leaving these shuttle-cocke ar­guments, which are easily bandyed from either side; Let us looke upon the next kind of argument, which ma­keth use of a heape of Texts, to prove the Conclusion intended.

I do not deny but that this is a strong proceeding; If it finde, either an able Logician to manage it, or an Auditory capable of it; both which, are very rare; And there­fore, this course is fitter for writing, and for reading with deliberation; then for a sudden conflict upon the place.

[Page 109]There are two wayes of using this weapon. The one, simply accumula­teth many Texts; giving every one its force, in short; and overwhelming the Auditour by their multitude.

This doth well in an Oration or Sermon, and carrieth a great resemblance of strength in it.

But if the whole discourse cometh to be anatomised by the adversary, and the wakenesse of every e text shewed in particular: Then, the conclusion standeth naked and ashamed: and the author Amazed a see his owne opinion so unexpectedly changed. And therefore, in a Disputation, where the adversary hath his law to answere onely one, this accumulation of Texts serveth to little purpose, more then to spend time.

The other way of employing a con­globation of Texts, is to pretend to bring all the Texts that may be found in Scripture favourable to either side, and by comparing them, to shew which party standeth with Scripture, which against it.

[Page 110]But first, it is evident that this procee­ding is not proper for a regular com­bat. For, the adversary will have right to clayme the planting of his owne batterye himselfe; and may refuse to accept it from his enemy. Againe, to do this thing well, and to make this comparison in due Manner: So many things are to be considered, that it is rather the subject of a Booke, then fitt for the proposall of one party, to which the other is to answere immediatly upon the place. For, the Texts ought to be examined, that it may be deter­mined, which of them do formally containe the position that is to be pro­ved; And which, onely some verity connexed to it, from whence it may be drawen; and the degrees of such con­nexion. Againe, what speeches are proper, what Metaphoricall, and the degrees of translation in them. Like­wise, the occasions of the speaking those wordes, and their coherence with actions or wordes, precedent and sub­sequent. All which considerations, are so manifold, and so tedious to be well [Page 111] performed, that they can by no meanes be brought into the brevity of a Dialogisticall opposition: But will re­quire the making of long speeches, like whole sermons, on each side: Which can not choose but be irkesome and displeasing to the Auditory: And in conclusion, must necessarily be without effect, seeing that it is impossible, ordi­nary memories should beare away such a multitude of notions, so perfectly as to be capable of framing an exact jud­gement of them. Besides, if any one Text of these were absolutely convin­cing, the rest would be burthensome, and but hinder and embroile the evi­dence of the Conclusion: And if none of them do prove it clearely: Then, all of them together, can but make one side more probable then the other: Which signifyeth no more, then that, since the best of them is but probable, you can rely on neither of them, as true and certaine: And consequently, all that is said, is of no effect towardes the ending of controversies; but is purely a superfluous labour and a tryall of [Page 112] wittes; not a deciding of questions, or a settling of the auditory in the right way to heaven.

It now remaineth onely (in order to Scripture-disputation) that we speake of such arguments as are drawne from places of Scripture, which do plainely containe such verities, as are knowne and agreed upon by both parties, with­out the authority of Scripture to prove them: So that, the sense and meaning of those places is not att all ambiguous, or controverted by either side: And out of these, you make your way, to your conclusion, or to other truths that are as yet unknowne to you, but that you desire to have certainty of.

Now cleare it is, that, it would avail as much, to take the naked Truths in themselves, without the words of Scripture; as to alledge the words in this case. For, the Truths themselves being acknowledged by both parties, it is needelesse to bring any proofe of them, And therefore, Scripture ser­veth but for an ornament in this dis­course: And the whole force of the [Page 113] argument, is drawne from the con­fessed Truths▪ And consequently, it is cleare that this is a discourse of reason not of authority: however, a farre off, it may in some sort depend on Scripture. Therefore, we neede not trouble our selves att present with discussing this sort of arguments; but shall remitt it to the examination of reason, where on it dependeth.

I should here end speaking of arguing out of Scripture. But because it is that which our adversaries do use most (at least, the Protestants and Calvinists, and the Sects of their growth) and because some persons are so maddely carelesse of their owne salvation, that they will content themselves with probability for their Religion; especially if Scri­pture be made the pretence of it: I am forced to adde yet a few lines, in regard of such persons as making Scripture the onely ground of their Religion, and judge their Controversies, do not so much as ayme att convincing argu­ments by the allegations that are brought out of Holy Writte; [Page 114] Nor whether the point proposed, be true or false: But whether side is the more probable or plausible, purely in relation to Scripture.

Clearely, he who in any point will proceede according to conscience and prudence in this way of arguing, is ob­liged to consider all that is contained in the whole Scripture concerning that point; Weighing what he putteth in each side of the ballance, with the best judge­ment God affordeth him; that so he may judiciously pronounce sentence. For the doing of which, he ought to con­sider, not onely the number of places that concerne his purpose, but their qua­lities also; and be able to compare those, one with an other. Now this is so hard a taske, that the learnedst and ablest man a live, may despaire of ever being able to effect it. For, how can he, or any Man, with reason persuade himselfe, that either he, or any other, hath ever produced, or ever can produce, out of Scripture, all that may from thence be alledged for any point in controversy; since our Saviour himself, hath given us [Page 115] a cleare example that arguments may be drawne (and those, efficacious ones) from Texts where we least dreame of any such sense? As, when disputing against the Sadduces, he made this ar­gument: God, is God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. But he is not God of nothing: Therefore Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, shall rise againe, or do remaine in soule, hoping for their body and resurrection: who can be confident of saying or know­ing all that is in Scripture, concerning any point, when the proofes of truths may lye in such unlikely places? Surely it must be, either a great ignorance, or a great temerity, to undertake it. And therefore we may conclude, that it is im­possible we should ever arrive so farre in this way of search, as to know really what is more, or lesse probable out of Scripture. But all that we may hope to attaine unto, is, onely to be able to judge what is more or lesse probable, out of those places which well our selves do know; or att most, out of those places which the Authors we have seene, do bring. And so, it is evident, that they [Page 116] who relye on Scripture, or rather that professe to do so; do not in truth relye upon it; but upon their owne, or their Teachers diligence, whom they sup­pose to know the whole latitude of Scripture-proofe. Which is not onely false, but impossible for any man to do.

THe second nest of Authority, out of which, Arguments take wing. Is the copious library of Fathers. Wherein it is to be considered, that whether Ca­tholike or Protestant be to argue, the Text he alledgeth hath a double remove from the conclusion he would prove, For, whereas in allegations of Scri­pture, both sides agree, that what it sayth is certainly true (and so, all the difficulty consisteth in knowing what is true meaning of the place alledged) it is otherwise allegations of Fathers: For, in them, there arise two questions; The one, whether that which the argu­gent pretendeth, be the Fathers opi­nion; the other, whether that which the Father sayth be true, after it is agreed to be his opinion.

[Page 118]For, neither Catholike nor Protestant, doth agree to all things that one or two Fathers may hold. But, indeed, Pro­testants do defie them all, And Catho­likes require an universality in them, to make them infallible. So that, if either Catholike or Protestant be the Arguer, he ought to settle before-hand with his adversary, that such a Father or Fa­thers, as he intendeth to produce, be of unquestionable authority between them; Or else, not to meddle with them; for it were but labour lost, and breath cast away.

The Protestants use to make two comparisons in Fathers: The one, in Age or Antiquity; the other, in learning or reputation. As for the former; they in­sist much upon the three first Ages; sup­posing them to be purer then the rest. In doing of which, it is evident that their ayme is to reject all: For, when they list, and that it concerneth them, they will tell you that the impurity of do­ctrin began as soon as the Apostles were dead. Now, if by this Impurity, they meane damnable errors; then, by saying [Page 119] so they evacuate all the authority of Fa­thers: For, they allow it no further, then as it pleaseth every disputant or Minister to declare the point controver­ted, to bee, or not to bee, a damnable error. And thus, even the three first Ages, are blowne away with the rest. But if the point in Controversy, be no damnable error, then the Fathers au­thority importeth litle; erring being but of small consequence in such Mat­ters as do not concerne salvation, and there being no obligation upon a Chri­stian to know unnecessary truths.

In a word; If the Church can erre, and hath erred these thousand yeares; it is but courtesy, to say she did not so, in the former six hundred: And so, in truth, the Fathers have no authority att all. But if it can not erre; nor hath erred; Then, the Fathers of the latter Ages, own as good wittnesses, as those of the former, so they be induced with Univer­sality.

The other comparison or distinction, that Protestants use to make of the Fa­thers, concerning their learning and re­putation; [Page 120] is as little to the purpose as that of their Antiquity. For, we do not cite Fathers, as Doctors (whose opinion, is no better then the reason they bring for it) but as wittnesses; whose authority consisteth in a grave and moderate knowledge of what is believed and practised by the Church, in the ages respectively wherein they lived. And out of this it followeth, that for wittnessing of Christian faith, no one Father is to be preferred before an other. It is true, in some sense the testi­mony of a more antient Father, may be sayd to be preferred before a more mo­derne one; because the formall wit­nessing of it, is of more neerenesse to Christ, and of longer durance towards us. But in regard of learning: No Fa­ther hath more authority, nor is more to be valued then an other, for what concerneth faith; though in other re­spects it be very considerable. For, a lesse learned Father, is as credible a wittnesse as the learnedst, of what is the present practise and beliefe of Chri­stians; so he have learning sufficient [Page 121] to warrant his understanding and knowing so much.

And in reality, any Father whose authority carrieth us beyond the appa­rent memory of mankind att present living, is as good as the best, for decla­ring the faith of the Church in the time he lived in. Which because it received its doctrine by entaile from age to age; every Fathers testimony (in such Mat­ters of faith) is firme and irrefragable.

To conclude therefore; The Ca­tholike maketh no difference of the quality of Fathers, nor much of their Antiquity; but admitteth all, so they come with universality.

The Protestant; though he will a little simper att it, yet in Conclusion he reje­cteth all; setting his owne judgement (which he calleth Scripture) for high Umpire of what in them is right, what wrong. Therefore it is fruitelesse to dispute against a Protestant out of the Fathers; unlesse you first settle what proof of Fathers he will admit. Neither is it easy for a Protestāt to argue strōgly against a Catholike out of the Fathers. [Page 122] For, if the Catholike will binde him to it, he must bring an universality of them; or else, the Catholike is not obliged to receive them: And how can he go about to do this, I understand not. I meane, in a private disputation; where a Matter of three or foure testimonyes, are capable of spinning out the whole time, that peo­ple generally are willing to lend unto such an entertainment. Neverthelesse the presumptuous and vaine Sophisters, are forward to cry out that all the Fathers are on their side; as their Patriarche Iewel begā the tune to them, so shamefully, that his owne Chaplaine forsooke him for his impudent falshood.

But, concerning this point, It is to be noted, that although they break (avow­edly and confessedly) from the universall face of antiquity in all Church-practise (as, in the Liturgies, Letanies, Masse, praying to Saints, praying for the dead, most of the Sacraments, Relikes, Altars, Pilgrimages, Fastings, Processions, Co­chibate of Priests, religious men and wo­men, and almost all things of that nature) yet have they so little ingenuity, or [Page 123] rather they are so impudent, as before women and ignorant persons, to boast themselves Sectators of antiquity: and they undertake to prove it by certaine broken ends of Texts, concerning some speciall circumstance or nice point, in which they have found some dark place in some Father.

I therefore putt these questions to any juditious person, who is curious to heare disputation in Religion: Whether, in so large a Booke as the Scripture, it be possible (morally speaknig) that there should not be divers hard and obscure passages. And then; whether an eloquent Sophister may not make use of such places, to circumvent and delude weake soules, unable to remember or marke the contrary Texts, and to judge betweene them. Which if he also graunt (as he can not choose but do) I aske him againe, what security he hath or can have, that his disputant is not such a one; or at least may not be such a one. And what I say of Scripture, may be with much more force transferred to the workes of the Fathers, which are much more ample; [Page 124] and besides that, may containe errours in them. So that in conclusion, all dis­putation out of Fathers, is but beating the ayre; unlesse the parties be first agreed, what Fathers authorities shall be allowed sufficient to decide and ter­minate their differences.

Yet after all this; the Protestant that is carried away with a beliefe of his disputants abilities; will be still apt to reply, that at the least it can not be de­nyed, but that he who hath studied the Fathers so well, as to be able to make out of them, against Catholikes, a ran­ged battaile of such obscure places, must needes be an able and a learned Man: and therefore he is not to be blamed for following such a guide, who hath read so much, and is conversant in the Fathers; Seeing that they who are un­learned, and cannot upon their owne stocke judge of such Matters, must rely upon those who have made them their long and serious study. To him who shall make such an objection, it ought to be represented; How meane and pittifull a change it is, to fall from the [Page 125] splēdide authority of the whole Church, to the obscure authority of a private Do­ctor, be he what he will. As also, that to retire from the authority of few, or but of one, were a, great imprudence in an unlearned man; Who because hee is not able to judge of the quality of Do­ctors, hath reason to adhere to the quan­tity and number of them. Besides, in all likelihood, this great Doctor (especially, if he be yong) hath not read the Fathers themselves; but hath taken out of other Authors, that write of controversies, such places as he hath found cited in them for his purpose. And this argueth but a small Modicum portion of learning; though happily he may make a great shew with it, among unlearned persons; like one who can recite three verses of Homer, in a country Schoole.

THere remaineth yet to be discour­sed of, the last kind of arguments that may be employed in disputations of Religion; whose store house, from whence they may be drawne, is reason. For the performance whereof, lett us consider; how Religion is apprehended generally to be a knowledge above nature, and to be derived by authority from a source of higher understanding then ours is. Yet on the other side, It is evident that it can not be planted in us, otherwise then that the roote of it must of necessity be in Reason, seeing that Reason is our nature. Now then, the roote and basis of believing, is mani­festly from this, that we are perswaded we ought to believe; which importeth as much, as that it is reasonable we should [Page 127] believe. And therefore, the arguments, which in Matter of Religion, ought chiefely to be managed out of Reason, should be in common, whether it be Reasonable to believe what is propo­sed unto us. And because no man can doubt whether it be reasonable to be­lieve what God proposeth; the whole question is reduced to this point, whe­ther it be reasonable to believe what the Church or our fore-fathers deliver unto us, as the doctrine which Jesus Christ (whose authority, no Christian excepteth against) did teach and deli­ver to the world, from his eternall Fa­ther. In which question, the affirma­tive reasons, belong onely to Catho­likes; the negative, to all others.

Here, the Catholike disputant, hath two wayes to proceede: The one, is in a manner Metaphysicall, and of a rigorous consequence; by shewing that this principle, of Adhering to our forefa­thers doctrine, in the way that the Catholike Church relyeth upon it, could not have been taken up in any middle age; but must of necessity have been continued [Page 128] from the beginning. And then, by pro­ving, that if this Principle hath conti­nued from the beginning, it is impos­sible that any errour should have crept into the Church.

After the doing of which; It is as evi­dently demonstrated, that Catholike faith, is the sole true Christian faith, as that the three Angels of a Triang­le, are equall to two right Angels, or any other verity in Euclide or Archi­medes.

The other way is, to assume, to pru­dent morall men, that whosoever seeth a like evidence for Religion, as he jud­geth, sufficient to venture his life, or his estate, or his honour upon (and not be excused) neither in prudence, nor in conscience, nor in honor, if he doth not embrace it. For, if he seeth the same advantage in two severall cases; and will venture in the one, and not in the other: It is evident, he proceedeth not according to Reason in one of them.

And in our case, whatsoever he may say to justifye himselfe, he cannot be [Page 129] excused from making (in truth) no reall and serious apprehension of the future life, and of the goods of it. But, that sense prevayleth in him above rea­son.

Now, that the Catholike faith, hath all the advantages, upon which wise men, do use to adventure their lives, estates, and honors, wil easily and clear­ly appeare, if the right way be taken to shew it; the authority of the Church, being so farre beyond all wittnesses used in judgments, and all probabilities men use to rely upon in warre and in marchandising, that there is no compa­rison betweene them.

And the objections which Heretikes use to bring, to hinder their clients from embracing the Catholike faith; are for the most part but authorities of the na­ture of those we have discoursed of be­fore: Which, in such abundance of writings as are in Scripture, and in the Fathers, cannot faile of being easily mett with, by those who pur­posely seeke them; there being in them so many sayings delivered upon [Page 130] the by, whiles the Author is attentive to some other question, or in circum­stances not well knowne to us: In fine, such difficulties as is impossible to be avoided in much speaking; and that neither convince the Authors minde, nor (much lesse) the verity of the que­stion debated.

The Arguments which are drawne from reason, for the proofe or disproofe of particular points, are chiefly about Mysteries difficult in nature; against which, Heretikes use to frame the or­dinary obvious objections. As, against the blessed Trinity, how the same thing, can be one and three? against the In­carnation, how the same person, can be God and Man? and against the Holy Eucharist, how can Christes body, be divided like a homogeneall body; or be at the same time in different places? such kind of arguments, Universally, are hard to be answered; because, nei­ther the propounder, nor the auditory, have (usually) Philosophy enough to understand the solution: and sometimes, the answerer himselfe falleth short. [Page 131] For, not every Catholike, nor yet every Catholike disputant, is necessarily a great Philosopher. At the least, if the Catholike disputant suspecteth his ad­versaries subtility in questions of this nature, he ought either to bee provided for him, or abstaine from disputing, or professe himselfe no Master in such spe­culations, and so rather wave them with his owne disparagement, then attempt them with the dishonour of the cause.

In other points, the objections against Catholike Truths, are generally very triviall ones. As, against the Popes au­thority, that there cannot be more heads or foundations then one; and that Christ, is that one. Against satisfaction for sinnes, that Christ satisfyed suffi­ciently for all mankinde. Against pray­ing to Saints, that there is but one Me­diatour, or, that Saints have no eares, and therefore can not heare: And the like; which are pittifull pulpit-bables, to fill the mouths of weake persons; as soone as with one of these they have troubled some simple persō, that them­selves are fitt to dispute with the Pope [Page 132] of Rome. Such toyes, are obvious against any thing: And an exercised disputant, can not be ignorant of the answeres to them; though he may soone be weary of the employement in answe­ring them, and ashamed of having suffered himselfe to be drawne unto it.

As for arguments from reason, to proove Catholike Truths: They may have as much strength, as the dispu­tant is capable of. For, no argument is so strong, but that if it be shott from a weake hand, it may prove wholly blunt and impenetrant.

And therefore, I leave the Catho­like disputant to his owne discretion in this part: Which will tell him, that he ought not to engage himselfe in it, un­lesse he be assured, both that his dart is a good one, and that he hath the dexterity to ayme it right, and the strength to throw it home.

Out of this short survey of the na­ture of arguments; a good Logician will easily discerne, that it is meere losse of time to fall on disputing with [Page 133] one who is not able, or will not so much as professe, to bring a demonstration for what he intendeth to prove: It being indeed to no more purpose, then the tossing of balls in a tennis court.

So that the reason, why wee answer, or att least ought to answere Hereticks arguments is; because they thinke them demonstrative, which are not for want of sufficiency in Logick; and wee make oppositions which are not de­monstrative, because they are not able to judge what a demonstration is, for to please them with apples, whose stomachs loaht strong food.

HAving said thus much of the dispu­tants; It is reasonable to say a word or two of the Auditory. Those then, before whom you are to dispute, are ei­ther favorable to you, or cōtrary, or in­different. And because these qualities, arise either out of the understanding, or out of the will, we will take a survey of these two faculties. To begin with the understanding: It is cleare, that in order to that, nothing rendereth a man unfitt to be at such a disputation, but incapa­city. And this, is either naturall, or for want of study and art, or by custome. The incapacity of nature, is helped by much explication, and so is that which proceedeth from want of study: with this difference: that natural incapacity, is taken away by explicating the par­ticular Matter in hand (which is tole­rable, [Page 135] because it doth not draw the dis­putation out of its owne boundes. But when the incapacity is through want of study: It is because the disputation supposeth some principles, whereof the Auditory is ignorant. And these are of two kindes. The one, Logicall: the other, Theological.

The first, happeneth chiefely in the use of disputation. As, if the Auditory be ignorant of the forme that ought to be used in disputing: and so, wil have the disputant play the defendants part: or contrariwise, the defendant act the disputants part: or desireth, that instead of rigorous forme, they fall on discour­sing or preaching at large. Likewise, if he be ignorant of the right use of distinction: And so, either hindereth the defendant from distinguishing, when it is necessary he should, or per­mitteth it him, when there are not truly two senses in the wordes, the disputant speaketh: But the defendant, by adding some wordes of his owne, seemeth to finde two senses, where indeed there is but one. As for example: If the dispu­tant [Page 136] should assume that it is the nature of a man, to have two legges: And the answerer should distinguish, allowing it to be the nature of white men, but not of blacke men; or the nature of Europeans, but not Africans.

Now if this be allowed, the dispu­tant is wronged: For, taking his rise from this, that to have two legges is the nature of a Man; hee might prove that Africans have two legs, because they are men.

So, for want of Logcik in the respon­dent, and in the Auditory, the defendant is not allowed to take the nature of Man in common, but is confined to the nature of an European, and so is putt be­side his argument.

The second happeneth, when the Auditory is ignorant of some Theolo­gicall point, with is out of the listes of the Matter; So that the debate is drawn to an other businesse: And the Audi­tory remaineth unsatisfyed and dis­contented, thinking it is the dis­putants fault, whereas it is their owne▪

[Page 137]After the Incapacity which arriveth by nature, and that which proceedeth from want of study: The third is, that which accrueth out of Custome. And this is likewise twofold. The one ge­nerall, the other particular.

The first is, when the Auditor hath been used to slight discourses in Mat­ters of study or learning; and so never bendeth himselfe to penetrate deepely into the proposed question, but taketh his resolution by fancy, who speaketh well, who doth not.

The particular incapacity of the Au­ditor proceeding from Custom, is when he is meanely versed in the question it selfe; and hath been used to heare cer­taine termes for the finall solution of it; unto which when the disputants are arrived, hee taketh it for granted that all is sayd that can be sayd; and never considereth, whether the solution be solide, or the reply upon it be effica­cious, or no.

This incapacity, is proper to halfe-witted men, and to that kind of science [Page 138] which is called Inflans; That is, a por­tion great enough to make one talke, and thinke himselfe wise, but not able to make him know any thing so­lidely.

Thus having gone through what concerneth the understanding; We are now to consider what imperfections springing from the will, may render an Auditory unfitt to assist att a dispu­tation.

Lett the first be, a Vanity or secret pride, which maketh some men come to it, not to see the truth of the thing in question (for, they suppose they are already perfect in that; as thinking themselves to know more then any man else doth; and esteeming all know­ledge to be but flashes of wit) but meer­ly for passe-time, or to censure the dis­putants.

Now these Men, having no ayme or desire to improve themselves in any truth; If any good happen to them, by being present att a disputation, it is against their will: For they seeke none.

[Page 139]There is an other sort of Auditors, faulty through the contrary disposi­tion. For, they are so diffident of them­selves, that they dare not judge of any thing: Or (which is worse, though possibly, themselves know it not) they have their opinions and beliefes, ab­solutely tyed, either to the repute of wisedome ad learning, or to the Elo­quence, of some particular person they passionately esteeme.

Now clearely, it were labour lost, to dispute for their sakes, who dare not trust themselves to see the evidence of what you say; But either, conferre afterwardes with your adversary about it, and have not an equall re­course to you; Or will not heare you speake, unlesse they have some body by, toblott out the notions you en­deavour to imprint in their under­standings, before they can settle in them.

So that it is in vaine to cast your seede into such high wayes; Where the birdes of the ayre, are continually [Page 140] picking it up, before it can take roote.

A third, (and that, the most Univer­sall) imperfection of the Will in an Au­ditour; consisteth in some affection or interest; which he who hath it, either can not, or doth not see.

Some are in awe of their Parents, or some powerfull Friends; others, appre­hend their wife, or some familiar ac­quaintance; some, are afraid of per­scription; some have pretences and hopes of rising in the world; some, of marrying themselves, or their children; some, are carried away with the esteem of other persons, either for their lear­ning, or for their wisedome: Every one of them, is byassed by some re­spect, or other.

Yet if you tell them so; they are ready to protest, that were the truth evi­dent unto them, they would value none of these thinges, more then the durt of their shooes.

God forbid, I should thinke they counterfeit when they say so: For, [Page 141] you may often perceive in them, evi­dent tokens that their hearts go along with their wordes; So that they de­ceive themselves, more then they do others.

And (which is their greatest unhap­pinesse) they never suspect that these interests, do prevent their seeing the truth, and hinder them from pene­trating and sticking, to what they heare and weakely apprehend.

OUt of what hath been hitherto said, it followeth, that Disputation sel­dome happeneth to be the meanes of advancing any man in the truth of Re­ligion. For, laying for your foundation, that disputes in Religion betweene con­trary parties, are not to be instituted, but for the finding out of truth; you pre­sently discerne, that all such arguments, as pretend not certainly, ought to be ex­cluded: Else, Religion is not to be taken for a speculative truth. This being done, disputation is in a Manner cutt off. All Grammaticall arguments are taken away and layed aside: as a lau­dable exercise for boyes, but unworthy of grave Men.

All such arguments as are called pro­bable, are likewise banished the lists. [Page 143] And these two being taken away, there remaineth little, worth the noise of Dis­putation.

On the other side, in relation to the Auditory; It is not to be undertaken, but before such a one as is able to judge of the due forme and lawes of disputa­tion; that can determine what is per­tinacy, what well replyed; and can mo­derate the heate of the disputants.

Now, such a one, where may we hope to finde? Surely, men indued with parts fit for such a purpose, are not to be mett with in multitudes.

Therefore, to have any good pro­ceede from such a conference; the Au­ditors should not be above two or three, or some very small company. For, as it is not easy to find many, so qualifyed, as is necessary, for such an Action: So likewise, if they were found and assembled, they would not easily concurre to the right governing of it; some of them, understanding thinges one way; some, another.

After the manner of disputing; and the qualities requisite in the Auditory, [Page 144] that is, to be present att the disputa­tion; there remaineth a third thing to be considered: Which is the subject or Matter to be disputed of. This ought to be confined to such points as are ne­cessary to be believed. Though in very deed, this caution is onely for Catho­likes: all others being free to what ever they can defend, doth not contra­dict Scripture. So that, being bound to maintaine nothing att all, they have (in their owne behalfes) no occasion to dispute. And when they do it; it is meerely for the unsettling of others; especially, of Catholikes: who onely, have a settled rule, and are bound to a knowne doctrine. Wherein, if Ca­tholikes would hold themselves to such Tenets, as are truly necessary, without engaging themselves in others that are not so; they would mainely disappoint the large objections of their Adver­saries.

But, to approach to our Conclusion. If disputation do carry in it such diffi­culties, as it can scarce ever be either necessary or profitable; And yet, the [Page 145] worke of drawing to the true Religion [...] those who are gone astray from it, be so important and perpetuall as it is. What shall we determine to be the best course, to deale with erring people, to reduce them into the path of Salvation? The answer is not hard, for either their wil, or their understanding is faulty. If the will, you are to consider, what be the particular obstructions of it; whether, some love of temporall thinges; or meer­ly tepidity. Of the former, the common remedy is to inculcate the vanities of this world, and to represent what will become of us in the next. Tepidity, pro­ceedeth from not being sufficiently ac­quainted (as I may say) with the affaires of Religion, and the next life, or out of a dullnesse of nature. The first is to be­cured, by engaging the party in familiar conversation with good compāy, where he may heare such spirituall Matters of­ten handled and discussed (whether it be by sermons, or by discourses, or by col­loquies and conferences) whereby, in pr [...]cesse of time, the fire may kindle of it selfe, and breake out into a quicke flame. [Page 146] But, the second is to be wrought upon with feares; as, by frequent commemo­ratiō, and of hell-fire. For, by any other course, nothing will be gained of such a temper; especially, if the dullnesse be of that nature, that allurements have little force upon it.

If the fault be in the understanding: It is, because the true motives of Chri­stianity, do not sinke deepely into his soule. Now seeing that both experience and reason do teach us, how the soule judgeth best. When it is most at rest and in quiet; you are to draw your patient, what you can, into a kind of solitude. That is; to chuse the seasons, when least turmoyle, either of businesse or of plea­sures, doth infest him: procuring also, that there be no adversary, at that time, to hinder your reasons from taking root in him. For it is cerraine, that he who will heare nothing but in opposition; and under contestation; shall never, or but very slowly, come to understand truth: his soule being like a Cistrne, into which the water runneth by a spoute at one end, and emptieth it self as fast by a [Page 147] hole at the other end. For, if as soone as one maketh a proposition or short dis­course to enlighten the hearers under­standing, that hee may see the truth of what is layed before him; an other att his elbow presently crosseth it, saying it is false, or raysing difficulties, before it be rightly apprehended; such a man shal never come to understand what is said to him. Not but that happily he may gett some glimpse of it: But it will be like a flying vision; which permitteth not the judgement to worke upon it.

Let him therefore weigh deliberatly with himselfe, how Religion is the se­riousest, the severest, and the most im­portant affaire we have, or can have in our whole lives: That it containeth many propositions or parts; that every one of them, requireth a quiet and a settled judgement to determine it: That this judgment can not be made by him, but in a calme, serene, and quiet position and state of his braine: And after all this, he will clearly see, that it is impos­sible, he should be able to performe that duty of Assent which is required in so [Page 148] grave a concernement; whiles two ad­versaries doe disquiet and importune him with their earnestnesse and wran­gling; in which their sayings doe slide by with great violence, and multiply themselves, before any one of them can be quietly possessed.

But, what then? Must he not heare oppositions, and the conflict of both parties? Yes, by all meanes. But in doing so; he must be sure, first, to make himselfe Master of what one party sayth: And when he findeth himselfe able to propose his difficulty to the bottome; then, in the name of God, let them encounter the adverse party. For, when onely two ratio­nall men discourse of a point, it will not be hard for him who seeketh truth, to penetrate so farre as to see whether or no the adverse party is able to give satisfaction to the argument propo­sed.

If he can salve it; then no change ought to be made in the inquirers opi­nion and judgement; seeing both sides are equall.

[Page 149]But if he can not, then it is apparent on which side the truth lyeth; as farre as may be discerned, out of the learning of these two men.

So that, we may conclude there is no solide way but this, of arriving to truth in matters of Religion: To con­verse first with the maintainer of one opinion: Afterwardes, with the main­tainer of the contrary opinion: with both of them, as much without passion, as is possible: But never to bring them to conflict together; when, both ani­mosity, and shame of being overcome, shall debauch their endeavours; and their quicke replyes, and many am­bayes, shall leave the auditour unable to judge solidely of what they say; though there were nothing besides, to obscure and hinder the cleare sight of Truth.

I finde still remaining, a disadvantage to the disputant of either side: which I must strive to remove, if it be possible. It is a certaine pre-possession, settled in the beliefe of the Auditory, or of him that is to be perswaded; of the learning and goodnesse of some private person or Doctour; upon whose authority, truly, dependeth the beliefe of the party; though perhaps he pretendeth the au­thority of Scripture, or of Fathers, or some other rule for his assent. This en­forced by custom (as impetuous a cause, almost, as nature it selfe) lyeth like a great loade upon the heart of him, who hath a long time (either by his owne judgment, or by the constant cry of his neighbours, and of those with whom he converseth) fixed and redoubled in him­selfe [Page 151] a deepe apprehension of such a persons ability and honesty.

I shall therefore adde here, some few markes, or rather distinctions, of lear­ning; to hinder men from erring in their judgments concerning it.

And first I must note, that there are divers sortes of learning: And that it doth not follow, that he who is eminent in one sort, must therefore (of necessity) excel in another. Geometry, Physicke, Law, Philosophy, Metaphysikes, and Di­vinity; are all of them different sorts of learning; all, so independent of one another, that he who is excellent in one of them, may have but a small share in any of the rest. Neverthelesse, I often see that, if a man hath any of these in such a measure as to deserve re­putation for it; the common sort of people thinketh he knoweth all things, and hath recourse to him for what be­longeth to another science: As if all learning were but one, because the name is but one. Nor is this proper to the vulgar alone; but even they of bet­ter ranke, do often mistake the true [Page 152] kind of learning that concerneth their present occasion and purpose; expe­cting to finde it in him, who hath some­what like it: as will appeare by fur­ther discourse.

The next observation then which we have to make, is, That not every ability which is oftentimes taken for learning, is truly such; though it bee a commendable quality, and such a one as peradventure belongeth properly to learned men; however others acquire it, and there by gaine the opinion of being learned men. Of this kinde, is the knowledge of languages. The which, are divided into two sortes; some of them being termed vulgar tongues others learned. The name of vul­gar imparted ordinarily, that such a language is spoken naturally in some country, and is proper to the people of that place, or to some part of it. That language is generally accounted lear­ned, which requireth bookes to the lea­ving of it, and hath grammers and di­ctionaries to Study it by. Though in­deed, the terme of a learned language hath a higher signification; to witte, a [Page 153] language necessary to the attaining of learning; or, in which learning was or is delivered. For, learning generally being brought into our Northerne cli­mates from the Eastern ones; and being first written in the languages of those parts they have gotten the preroga­tive among us to be estemed the learnd ones. First, the Latine came out of Ita­ly; then the Greeck, then the Hebrew and consequently, the Arabick, the Syriack, the Chaldaick, even the Per­sian, the Cophtick, and the Abyssive: though the principall ones, are the three first; in which, the Chiefe of sci­ences, Divinity, is originally delive­red unto us. Out of which it is cleare, that the knowledge of these languages in themselves, is not true learning; but that it is the knowledge of thinges de­livered in them, which deserveth truly to be esteemed so: and the knowledge of languages, onely instrumētall to true knowledge or learning, so that, as we do not accompt a man who is expert in French, Spanish, and Italien (properly speaking) to be a learned mā for having them, but a well-qualifyed Gentleman

[Page 154]In like manner, we should also say of him who is expert in the Orientall, or learned languages, that by such excel­lency alone, he doth not deserve the title of a learned man; but of a well-qualifyed man; ranking this quality (in its due degree) with the arts of Musike, designing, Painting, Fencing, Dancing, [...]iding, and such other innocent em­ployments of unbusied persons. Yet, because they are as it were a steppe to learning, and do belong to learned per­sons, they have a higher ranke then those lowe and meerely fancyfull ex­ercises, both in themselves, and in their clayme to the attribute of learning.

This mistake of the terme learning, in applying it to the knowledge of wordes; is of so great consequence, that it forceth me to looke further into the nature of learning. Learning then, is that which is made and begotten in a Man by teaching. A teacher, is a master and an instructour. Now, seeing that the exercise of both these qualities, is proper to men, and not to beasts; he is truly a teacher, who teacheth those [Page 155] thinges which belong to Man as Man: That is to say, such thinges as make him more man, or more perfect in the nature of man; which are, those on which dependeth the government of himselfe. The doing of this, depen­deth first and principally, of Divinity among Christians, as of Metaphysikes and Morals, in the way of pure nature. It dependeth in the next place, on the knowledge of the world, the which is taught us by the science of Physikes or of naturall Philosophy: And to this, Arithmetick and Geometry are necessary: though peradventure these two may also have an other clayme, upon their owne right for admittance, to a share of informing our soule of nature, seeing that Quantity is the highest condition of naturall thinges or bodyes.

After these, the notion of learning, is derived to the science of Medicine or Physike, by which we governe our bodyes. Lastly, and of all the rest most weakely, to the knowledge of Law, by which we governe our fortunes: our disordinate affections, having made it [Page 156] necessary to us, and in a manner a part of the Governement of our selves.

These then, and onely these know­ledges do make a learned man. What besides these, is called learning, is through mistake of the name: All other knowledges, belonging onely to some accidentall action, or circumstance of mans life; not to the governing of him as he is man. Not that I will quarrell about the use of the word: But I endea­vour to prevent the abuse of the things, arising from the aequivocation of the word. For, it importeth not how the name is used; as being att the will of the Speakers: but it importeth, that the well-meaning auditor be not abused by the mistaking of that for reall and true learning, which is not so, nor can availe him for his pretended use and be­hoofe. Lett this then be concluded, that no knowledge of wordes, ma­keth a learned man; but onely the knowledge of those thinges which belong to the Governement of mans life.

There is yet an other quality, which [Page 157] more seemingly, though peradventure not with so good ground, pretendeth to the appellation of learning. It is a faculty of talking of those thinges which sciences or true learning do pro­fesse and teach. And because true tea­ching consisteth in a verball, and that chiefely orall delivery of the teachers minde; this hath a strange force (mong persons, not well able to judge of the matter it selfe) to perswade that such talkers are truly learned. He nee­deth have a strong judgement, to be able to avoyde the snares these men use to lay. The knottes of their aequivoca­tions, are to close; the thread of their discourse, is so subtle; the smoothnesse of their wordes, and the well-ordering of their pathetick expressions, is to pe­netrant; that no ordinary Auditor can escape them. Hee who is to cope with such agamester, must either be truly learned, or beyond measure cautions. And yet (as I said before) this plausible speaker, hath not so faire a clayme to learning, as the Grammarian hath, against whom we lately discoursed.

[Page 158]For, the Grammarian, truly knoweth what he professeth: But this man, after he hath made a discourse of an houre long, after he hath quite perswaded you: If after all this you have accesse to the cabinet of his soule, and there enquire of him, what opinion himselfe hath, of what he hath so handsomely spoken, and that he will ingeniously disclose his heart to you: he will tell you, that he knoweth not whether what he hath sayd be true or no, but att the most, that of any thing he knoweth, it is the likeliest to be true. Some ages pas­sed, there was in one of our Universi­ties a man, who having made a long speech in defence of Christian religion, with exceeding great applause of all his auditory, who were ravished and fully satisfyed with what he had sayd, did, through excesse of vanity (the predo­minant humour of such falters) breake out into this horride blasphemy. Little Jesus! how much art thou beholding to me? For if I would have spoken against thee, how farre more effica­ciously could I have declaymed? The [Page 159] story sayth, that he was suddenly strucken with such a losse of memory, that he was faine to learne of new to reade. Deservedly hee: But what I de­duce out of this relation, is, first, that his reasons, though in his owne judgment they were not efficacious, yet they con­vinced the whole auditory; and that, of no common persons. By which we may understand, that the reasons he brought, were not demonstrations; nor were the best that might have been alledged for that subject; Celse better could not have been opposed.) And neverthelesse they carried so great an Auditory. From whence we may inferre, how violent a power, the force of this art of talking must necessarily have upon the ordinary sort of men, to make them take their Master for a great Doctor. An other note that I make upon this occasion, is that all the talking of such men, is not, or ought not to bee, sufficient to perswade us, not onely, that they speake the truth, but even, that they speak their owne mindes. And after all their earnestnesse, we may suspect their discourse is framed [Page 160] but to comply with the humour of the times, or to promote their present inte­rest, or to please their auditors. Tully professeth the same of his Oratours; and sayth he also practised it himselfe. But here I may not omitt the story of that ex­pert generall and understanding man, Hanniball the Carthaginian. Antiochus having furnished him with a puissant and flourishing army, would entertaine him also with an Oration, concerning the art of warre, and the manner how he ought to proceede in it, made by a fa­mous and long-practised Oratour, Phor­mio: who in the presence of Antiochus and his Captaines, discoursed to Hanni­bal of this subject, to the great applause and admiration of all that heard him, excepting Hannibal; who being asked how he liked him, answered that in all his life-time he had never heard such an old dotardly foole prate. A strange cen­sure, one would thinke, on a man so ge­nerally exacted and cryed up. Yet if we consider, that Phormio had learned his skill of warre, onely in written discour­ses and Histories; but Hannibal, in the [Page 161] field and in action it selfe; wee may easily conceive that Phormios Oration talked of thinges in the ayre, and for­med his adversary in his fancy: whereas Hannibal had studied the thinges in themselves; and so, knew groundedly what he spoke; and saw that all the Oratours glorious speech, was but a painted pageant, not any effectuall ex­hibition of truth. Hence we may con­clude, that the ability of discoursing in a high straine and in a pathetike manner, is no argument of true learning in him that exerciseth it; unlesse juggling and folly in impertinency, may passe for learning. Who were better talkers, or better discoursers then the Academikes? Yet their profession was, that they had no truth; and that (indeed) there was none to be found.

LEtt us now apply this to practise, and to our present subject. Religion (as we have already said) is the most im­portant and the most necessary businesse, that belongeth to Mans nature and action. It is so precisely one, that if a man chance to mistake in it, be the cause what it will, he is lost for ever. For, as hee that misseth his way, cometh not to his journeyes end; whether it be his fault, or others misguidance, that hath made him misse his way. So, who treadeth not in the true path of Religion, never arriveth at eternall happinesse; lett the fault lye where it will. Now, if learning in Religion, be the skill of shew­ing the path to heaven; and if all the great noise that these talkers make, hel­peth one never a steppe thitherwards, [Page 163] as not delivering any point of truth that may be relyed upon: It is evident, that the pretended learning of such persons, is much further from the notion of true learning, then the Grammar learning we spoke of before. For though learning be lowe ad meane, as being onely of wordes; yet, of them att least the Gram­marian hath knowledge. Whereas this prating, this parrate-vertue; though it be of thinges; yet is it not a science of them; but all is meere wordes and winde. I heare them reply (as they want nei­ther wordes, nor impudence to dispute against evidence,) that though it is true they promise no certainty, because none can be had; yet they make out high probability; which is the Princesse that governeth humane affaires. I will not at present discusse whether there be any certainty or no. It is enough that the Catholike Church professeth certainty, and ever hath done so: and nature for­ceth even the denyers of this truth, to act as if they had certainty, in perswa­ding and forcing others to their opi­nions. But I wish that these men would [Page 164] speake plaine English; and that in lieu of this quaint terme High probability, they would tell us the meaning of it in wordes, that honest men may under­stand.

Lett me see if I can helpe them. That which they meane by prohability, must either be, some accesse towardes truth, on the objects side; Or a strong per­swasion made in the Auditor. If it bee a perswasion In the Auditory, without any approach to the object; clearely, it signifyeth nothing else but a high cheate, or an excellent juggle, with prayse, neither may I deny, nor do I envy, to such men. Then, for the objects side; If there be no fixednesse or certainty of the object, by all the arguments of this high Oratour: I can not comprehend, there is more in all he sayth, then peradventure it is true, peradventure not.

So that, High Probability, signifyeth High Peradventure. Which how great a Non-sence it is, if applyed to fixed verities, that are not subject to the mu­tability of change and chance (that is, [Page 165] how ridiculously it is applyed to Reli­gion, and to truths of faith) is evident to every sensible man. If now, men will needes have one termed a Divine, be­cause he can thus finely talke in the ayre, of God, and of thinges belonging to him; he must be a Divine of blind Tiresias his tribe, who in the Poët professeth his Divinity in these termes;

The last part of the reply, telleth us, that Probabiliry governeth all human action, I deny it not. But withall, I take notice, that Action, is one thing; Beliefe, an other.

Human action, is about the gaining of a future End, which dependeth on fallible principles; as all mortall thinges doe; Which are continually involved in a thousand uncertainties and changes.

[Page 166]But faith, is of unchangeable verities; which nothing hath power to make otherwise, then it is already settled. It is a parallel to science; I meane, to true science; such as we se exercised in Geo­metry: for which, no man looketh into probabilities. And to expect that faith should depend on probabilities, is no lesse ridiculous then to thinke the like of Geometry; since it is more necessary, and more important then Geometry; and the way to heaven is missed with greater danger and losse, then Geometry is neg­lected. Therefore it were a great folly to imagine, that faith should not be as certaine, and as easy to arrive unto, as Geometry is: But that, whiles there are certaine and infallible rules for the mea­suring of lines and angles; there should be no certainer course to secure ones eter­nall happinesse and, avoyde endelesse woe, then to venture it upon the hazard of the dice, or to play it att crosse and pile: For, his condition is no better then so, that taketh his faith and Religion, upon the recommendations of Proba­bility.

[Page 167]But, when ones affection is once engaged, it maketh his eares flow, and his understanding dull, to any thing that can be said in oppo­sition to what it is sett upon. And so, me thinkes I heare these men redouble their complaint, and aske me with in­dignation; what can we thinke? that one who hath spent 30. or 40. yeares so well, should after so long earnest study be still accounted an unlearned man? To this question, I dare scarce reply what is fitting. Yet with their leave, I shall aske againe of them, whe­ther he that should have spent 30. or 40. yeares in gathering ragges out of the kennels, to furnish the paper milles, or had cryed card-matches as long; must of necessity, be thought worth a thousand pound a yeare att the end of his labour; though no exceptions could be made against him, either for dili­gence in getting, or frugality in con­serving what he had gained. In like manner; he that will judge a right of a scholler or learned man; must, not onely reckon up the yeares of his [Page 168] study, and the paines and industry he hath employed in it; but consider also in what he hath bestowed it. For, if it were applyed, onely to seeke out the proprieties of Latin, and Greek words; if onely in Criticismes, whether of Grammer, or of History; It will avayle him no more towards the attai­ning of true learning, then the selling of Card-matches, towardes the purcha­sing a Mannour of a thousand pounds a yeare.

But peradventure some may object, that the comparison holdeth not in these two cases. For, the Student here spoken of, is supposed to have spent his age, not in turning over tryffling bookes; but much of it, in reading the holy Scriptures and Fathers; in which, by our owne confession, true learning is contained. Therefore how can he be suspected of ignorance and want of learning? Neverthelesse, even this objection shaketh not my resolution. Onely, it obligeth me to take new in­formation, of what it was he looketh for, all this while, in those learned [Page 169] books. It is sayd of the Kinges of Nar­singa and of Pegu, that in their prospe­rities, they gathered such vast treasures, both of pretious mettals and stones, that they were faine to lett them lye heaped up in great courts, because chambers were not able to containe them; the Successour ever vying to out doe his Predecessour. Now I aske if a dung­hill cocke had been turned into these courtes, how much richer would he have come out then he went in? Cer­tainely, nothing att all: Because he loo­ked not there for the heades of Gold or Diamonds; but searched about for some graines of wheate or barley, or scrat­ched the ground for some wormes, and such thinges fitt for his stomack.

In like manner; when a yong Gentle­man that travelleth into forraine coun­tries upon pretence of endeavouring thereby to enable himselfe; if during his abode in any great citty, as Paris or Rome, his enquiry is after nothing, but where the best Tavernes and entertain­ments are; Can it be expected, that att his returne home, he should be able to [Page 170] give a good account in substantiall matters of the places he hath been in? So, if these great Students looke into the scriptures or Fathers, to find out what a Metreta, or a Corris, or an Ephod is, or in fine, sift out Genealogies or Chronologies, and spend there fourty yeares in such peddling divinity; can it be imagined that att the end of them, they should be any neerer the true qua­lity of Divines, then when they be­gan?

Besides, though they should seeke for true knowledge; yet if they take not the right way, it is impossible they should ever acquire it. As those pi­ctures which are contrived by the in­geniousnesse of Mathematicians, to be looked upon, either through some kind of glasse, or purely by choo­sing a certaine position, do require some one determinate Situation for the eye to be placed in; else they appeare not: so, is the nature of all wordes and their objects, as farre as the truths are dependent from the cloathing of the wordes.

[Page 171]Especially, there is a degree of at­tention belonging to them: which if it be too little, the words are not under­stood: If too great; that which before was cleare to you, becometh dimme by equivocations of wordes and their constructions: And the more you look upon them without passion, the more changeable is their aspect to you, and you grow lesse certaine of what they meane. Whereas, with Reason it fareth contrary wise. The more, and the more impartially, you looke upon a demonstration; the more cleare, and the more certaine it becometh to you. Therefore in a text where Reason and the nature of the wordes, do concurre to the explication of those wordes; they will be better understood by arguments from Reason, then the sense and reason from the wordes: And when ever it happeneth, that the sense and meaning is certaine by reason, but the text or letter ambiguous, it is evident, that the latter ought to be governed by the for­mer. And accordingly, they who in matter of Religion, do receive know­ledge [Page 172] of the truths belonging to it, by a way not depending on a certaine forme of wordes; have a mighty advantage in the explication of scripture, over those who do but, as it were, shake the wordes together like lottes in a bagge: which is the condition of those who have nothing but the bare wordes of scripture to rely upon, to understand the true meaning of them. It is not thē the number of yeares, that a man hath spent in turning over the bible, or that he hath employed in reading greeke and latin authors, which can justify him to be a great Divine: but there must be considered also, what he sought there, and how he sought it; and with what freedome from passion and partiality; which alone hath a huge stroke in making a man understand rightly or erroneously what he readeth.

Upon this occasiō, there cometh into my minde a truth; which peradventure may seem a Paradox; but being looked into, will appeare evident of it selfe: and it is, that a boy, who can neither write nor reade, may be a greater Di­vine [Page 173] them some man who hath studyed scripture his 40. yeares. He who doub­teth of this; lett him remember, that divinity hath for its End, the know­ledge of these truths which are to guide us to heaven; and that the know­ledge of them is so necessary that without it, no excuse of that ignorance can hinder our perishing eternally; and therefore, that the knowledge of them ought to be as certaine, as any de­monstration can be. Then, lett him consider, that 40. yeares study may be employed, without arriving (by the force of such study) to demonstration sufficient to assure a man of all points necessary; as the hundred yeares debate betweene Catholicks and Protestants, (without being one foote further ad­vanced, then the first day) doth amply make manifest. The conclusion then is evident, for as much as concerneth the students part, that 40. yeares study doth noth necessarily make a man a Di­vine. Now lett us turne to the other side, and consider a childe of a dozen yeares old, never putt [Page 174] to Schoole, further then in the Church to be taught in a Catechisticall way the summe of Christian doctrine; and to know that it is to be held because it is descended from Christ, by the perpe­tuall handing it from age to age in the whole Catholike Church. And lett us enquire whether this child be a Divine or no. If the question be of the matter: He knoweth what is sufficient for him, to bring him to heaven; to breede in him the love of God, and obedience to the Church, set by God to direct us in doing our duties for the attaining eter­nall salvation.

Againe, this childe hath that ground for his beliefe, which is more certaine then any demonstration in Euclide or Archimedes. Why then should we doubt but that this boy hath all that is necessary for the being a Divine; and much more, then the long studied pre­tender to divinity can shew for him­selfe? One may object, that he doth not penetrate the force of succession, which is the foundation upon which his divinity is built.

[Page 175]But whether that be or no, this is certaine; that he holdeth it upon that rule and Principle. And if we should oblige a science, or any kind of certi­tude, to understand throughly all its principles, we must take away all sciences but Metaphysikes, and blotte out of Logike, the distinction of scien­ces subalternative and subalternated, and deny Geometry and Arithmetike to be sciences because the most of Ma­thematicians do not understand, nor teach the force of those Maximes, by which a syllogisme necessitateth our assent.

Peradventure, some may reply that divinity, properly, signifyeth a science drawne out of articles of faith, either alone, or joined with certainties of Phi­losophy: And that this boy can not pretend to such a science. To this we answere, that speaking rigorously in the use and phrase of the Schoole, Theology or divinity signifyeth indeed such a quality as the objecter sayth. But in ancient writers, it is also taken for the knowledge of faith; And that [Page 176] when we speake of a boys being a Di­vine, wee meane it in this latter sense. Neverthelesse, if the comparison be made in the former sense of the science of divinity, (which is properly such; and which neither of them hath) the boy is neerer to it, then this Doctor. For, as it is true, that he who know­eth never a demonstration in Euclide, can not be called a Geometrician, though he have learned the Axiomes and Petitions and definitions premised before the demonstrations: so, neither is he a Divine that knoweth onely faith yet (to continue the same comparison) as he who acknowledgeth the defini­tions and other prerequisite truths, is neerer being a Geometrician, then he who doubteth of them: so, the boy, who believeth all the articles of Chri­stian faith which he already knoweth; and hath the rule by which to be cer­taine of any other, when they are pro­posed to him; is neerer being a Divine, then he who calleth himselfe a Divine; because for 40. yeares together he hath doubted and disputed of the Prin­ciples [Page 177] of divinity; which must be a­greed unto, before divinity it selfe can be so much as commenced. And out of this, may easily be understood, how great a cheate and imposture is put upon well-meaning people, when such teachers are termed Divines, and passe for Doctors; who truly are but petty sophisters and wranglers in that noble and holy science.

BUt it is no easy Matter to allay a passion once raysed. One objection cannot be so soone quelled, as an other boyleth up and breaketh forth. And so the same men presse, that be their Masters learned or ignorant; however, they are good morall men, and that ci­vility att least is due to them, and that they ought to be treated with honour and respect. Farre be it from me to deny it. For, civility is a duty betweene man and man, upon the score of man­hood; not upon any spirituall account: and therefore, every one who maketh not himselfe unworthy, is the object of it. But least, out of generall sayings, there should grow mistakes in parti­cular; it is fit we should a little un­fold the common Axiome.

[Page 181]The name of Civility, cometh from that of a Citty: because, both first, and most generally, the sweetenesse of be­haviour expressed in this terme, is seene and practised in Citties. It extendeth it selfe no further then to conversation; those vertues, which beare a man to goodnesses of more serious considera­tions, purchasing to themselves nobler denominations. It consisteth of two parts: The one negative, to prevent offence; the other positive, to afford content and satisfaction. It dwelleth (as most vertues do) betweene two contrary vices; being infested with rudenesse below, and with flattery above. Its matter, is both in Action and in wordes. Rusticity, is in action, boy­sterous; in wordes, offensive. Adula­tion, is in action, Apish, in wordes, hy­perbolicall and lying. Now Civility▪ in all actions, bewareth giving offence, and is prompt to any convenient ser­vice. In wordes, as farre as it can, it taketh no notice of others defects, and giveth the true poise to their perfe­ctions. And human actions are so or­dered [Page 180] by God and Nature, that there are very few, which lye not open to reprehension on some side or other; and none, but may deserve to be com­mēded for something, so that it is in the power of a judicious man, to commend or to discommend, with truth, the acti­ons of any man whatsoever: And much more, the actions of those persons, unto whom a great variety both of actions and of qualities, must necessa­rily appertaine.

Prudence therefore ought to govern Civility (as it doth other vertues) and instruct a man, when, and how farre, in particular circumstances, any Acti­on is to be blamed or commended. And as it governeth the language that be­longeth to civility, so it ought to do the like in the action relating to it, which are apt to fall into excesse or defect, unlesse the bridle of Prudence do guide them to march in the streight middle path. Out of all which it is apparent to the discreet Reader, that the modera­tion of Civility, is a taske hard enough to describe; and many times disputable [Page 181] both sides, how farre the duty of it obligeth.

To apply this doctrine to our parti­cular use, we must adde one little note with it, that the civility exhibited, may be in respect of the present action or quality out of which the action for­mally is considered; or else, in respect of some other quality of the same per­son.

To speake more clearly. A Ca­tholike, who writeth or disputeth against a Protestant, or conferreth with him, may deferre to him, either in his very argumēt, or in other things not concerning it, as, he may acknow­ledge him an eloquent man, a good Linguist, a subtile Critike, or some other commendation belonging to either his understanding or his will:

Or else, that his argument is good, or hard to be solved, or that his skill in divinity, is extraordinary, or the like. Now as for this last com­mendation; It is evident that it can not be given him without prejudice to the cause the Catholike maintaineth.

[Page 184]And therefore, even if it should prove true (which it is impossible it shoud) Prudence would advise his adversary to wave taking notice of it, as farre as in­genuity will allow him. But he needeth not apprehēd being reduced to streights upon this account. For, Protestant ar­guments out of authority, are easily answered: And if some drawne from reason, be difficult and intricate; it is, be­cause that nature upon which the que­stion dependeth, is obscure and un­knowne; not because the Divinity part hath any speciall difficulty in it. What the pitch of Divinity is, that a Prote­stant may arrive unto, wee have already declared. As for other qualities both humanity requireth we should afford them a friendly esteeme of their good parts; and the very ayme we have in discoursing with them, (which is, to change their judgements, to agree with ours) maketh it no small part of our businesse, to proceede with a faire and just difference towardes them; if we un­derstand, how much the will conferreth to incline the judgement, and how [Page 185] powerfull courtesy is over the will.

As for the arguments themselves; it is necessary (especially in writing, which alloweth descending to many particulars) to shew that they are but slight ones, and that they proceede out of ignorance, and that they imply a great distortion in the will of him that maketh them (which onely causeth them to be well esteemed of) and the like, according as there shall be cause. It is necessary also to display, how the producer of such arguments, is not a man to be replyed upon; nor hath those qualities which are requisite in a teacher. For, either his braine is weake; or the will of maintaining an evill cause, worketh upon him to throw out pittifull and triviall obje­ctions, instead of framing strong and solide ones, which is the worse condi­tion of the two. Now, with what justice, may one give the commenda­tions of an honest man, to one that for his owne honour or interest, will main­taine a proposition himselfe knoweth [Page 184] to be false; especially, of that nature, that the salvation or damnation of the hearer (as well as his owne) dependeth on it.

Were it not better, he cheated me of my purse, robbed me of my credit, tooke away my life; then to bring my soule into the hazard of perpetuall damnation? How then can hee who doth this, bee esteemed an honest man, and worthy of such civill testimonyes, as shall enable him the more to ensnare poore soules; who will rely the more upon him for his receiving such ap­plause?

He may peradventure defend him­selfe, by saying, that if he seduceth others, he is first seduced himselfe; and so, ignorance excuseth him, att least from being malicious and wicked.

But, he mendeth his cause very little by this plea: since, he who underta­keth to be a Master of others, (especi­ally, in matters of so great consequence and hazard) must not be admitted to alledge ignorance for an excuse. Why doth he undergoe the office of a [Page 185] teacher, if he understandeth not what he undertaketh to teach? He who will affirme any thing, must first know it: Else, he is a lyar; and if it be in a matter of great prejudice, a knave. Perhaps he will againe answere for himselfe, that there is no meanes to come to certainty in Religion; and that therefore he is not more faulty for being a teacher, then every one else is that doth the like. In saying thus; first, hee blasphemeth against God; as not having provided man-kind of that, which farre beyond all other thinges, is most necessary to it. Secondly, he proceedeth very rashly; for, how doth he know, or what demon­stration hath he made, or can he make, that he knoweth all that can be said to the cōtrary? Thirdly, he knoweth (with out the least doubt) that either himselfe or his very late predecessours, did leave the way they were bred in. Now if it were but for likelihoods, and that there be no certainty in Religion, how was it honestly done by the first that made the breach; or is now, by him who maintaineth it, onely upon peradven­tures.

[Page 188]But to make it appeare more evi­dent, that they who have left the Ca­tholicke Church, or that still keepe out of it, are unexcusable; and to take away their mis-understāding of some points, wherein their mis-taking of what we believe, may seeme to justify (in some sort) their deserting us: I will set downe a short explication of Catholike doctrine, as farre as it is controverted by judicious and sensible men on both sides: Against which, I scarcely be­lieve that any prudent person will thinke it fitt to make an objection: un­lesse it be, out of naturall reason, where the Mystery is difficult; not for it selfe, but because wee understand not na­ture. As he who perfectly understan­deth Logick, will have no difficulty to believe the Trynity: who knoweth the composition of body and soule in Man, will easily admitt the Incarna­tion. And who comprehendeth how living Creatures do nourish them­selves, will not sticke at the Mystery of the Eucharist.

I pretend not to set downe all: For, [Page 189] as there is no All, of those demon­strations (for example) which may be made of the natures of a Triangle or of a circle; So farre lesse, of the de­pendencies of the Mysteries of our faith; which the opposition of Adver­saries may make necessary to be known and professed. Therefore I content my selfe with those, which I appre­hend to be the most troublesome, among the points in controversy now att present.