A DISCOURSE Concerning the TRUE REASON Of the SUFFERINGS of CHRIST.
CHAP. 1. B
Of the Socinian way of interpreting Scripture. Of the uncertainty it leaves us in as to the main articles of Faith, manifested by an Exposition of Gen. 1. suitable to that way. The state of the Controversie in general concerning the sufferings of Christ for us. He did not suffer the same we should have done. The grand mistake in making punishments of the nature of Debts; the difference between them at large discovered, C from the different reason and ends of them. The right of punishment in God, proved against Crellius, not to arise from meer dominion. The end of punishment not bare Compensation, as it is in debts; what punishment due to an injured person by the right of Nature; proper punishment a result of Laws. Crellius his great mistake about the end of Punishments. Not designed for satisfaction of Anger as it is a desire of Revenge. Seneca and Lactantius vindicated against Crellius. The Magistrates interest in Punishment distinct from that of private persons. Of the nature of Anger D in God, and the satisfaction to be made to it. Crellius his great arguments against satisfaction depend on a false Notion of Gods anger. Of the ends of divine Punishments, and the different nature of them in this and the future state.
ALthough the Letter I received from your hands contained §. 1. The introduction, concerning the Socinian, way of interpreting Scripture. in it so many mistakes of my meaning and design, that it seemed to be the greatest civility to the E Writer of it, to give no answer at all to it, because that could not be done, without the discovery of far more weaknesses in him, than he pretends to find in my discourse: Yet the weight and importance of the matter may require [Page 240] a further account from me, concerning the true reason of A the sufferings of Christ. Wherein my design was so far from representing old Errors to the best advantage, or to rack my wits to defend them, as that person seems to suggest; that I aimed at nothing more than to give a true account of what upon a serious enquiry, I judged to be the most natural and genuine meaning of the Christian Doctrine contained in the Writings of the New Testament.
For finding therein such multitudes of expressions which to an unprejudiced mind attribute all the mighty effects of the Love of God to us, to the obedience and sufferings of Christ; B I began to consider what reason there was why the plain and easie sense of those places must be forsaken, and a remote and Metaphorical meaning put upon them. Which I thought my self the more obliged to do, because I could not conceive if it had been the design of the Scripture, to have delivered the received Doctrine of the Christian Church, concerning the reason of the sufferings of Christ, that it could have been more clearly and fully expressed than it is already. So that supposing that to have been the true meaning of the several places of Scripture which we contend for; yet the C same arts and subtilties might have been used to pervert it, which are imployed to perswade men that is not the true meaning of them. And what is equally serviceable to truth and falshood, can of it self, have no power on the minds of men to convince them it must be one, and not the other. Nay, if every unusual and improper acception of words in the Scripture, shall be thought sufficient to take away the natural and genuine sense, where the matter is capable of it; I know scarce any article of Faith can be long secure; and by these arts men may declare that they believe the Scriptures, and yet D believe nothing of the Christian Faith. For if the improper, though unusual acception of those expressions of Christs dying for us, of redemption, propitiation, reconciliation by his blood, of his bearing our iniquities, and being made sin and a curse for us, shall be enough to invalidate all the arguments taken from them to prove that which the proper sense of them doth imply; why may not the improper use of the terms of Creation and Resurrection, as well take away the natural sense of them in the great Articles of the Creation of the World, and Resurrection after death? For if it be enough to prove E that Christs dying for us, doth not imply dying in our stead; because sometimes dying for others imports no more than dying for some advantage to come to them; if redemption being sometimes used for meer deliverance, shall make our redemption by [Page 241] Christ, wholly Metaphorical; if the terms of propitiation reconcilation, A &c. shall lose their force because they are sometimes used where all things cannot be supposed parallel with the sense we contend for: why shall I be bound to believe that the World was ever created in a proper sense, since those persons against whom I argue, so earnestly contend that in those places in which it seems as proper as any, it is to be understood only in a metaphorical? If when the World and all things are said John 1. 3, 10. to be made by Christ, we are not to understand the production but the reformation of the World and all things in it, although the natural sense of the Words be quite otherwise; what argument B can make it necessary for me not to understand the Creation of the World in a metaphorical sense, when Moses delivers to us the history of it? Why may not I understand in the beginning, Gen. 1. for the beginning of the Mosaical Dispensation, as well as Socinus doth in the beginning, John 1. for the beginning of the Evangelical? and that from the very same argument used by him, viz. that in the beginning is to be understood of the main subject concerning which the author intends to write, and that I am as sure it was in Moses concerning the Law given by him as it was in St. Iohn, concerning C the Gospel delivered by Christ. Why may not the Creation of the Heavens and the Earth, be no more than the erection of the Jewish Polity? since it is acknowledged, that by New Heavens and new Earth wherein dwelleth righteousness, no more is understood than a new state of things under the Gospel? Why may not the confused Chaos import no more than the state of Ignorance and darkness under which the World was before the Law of Moses? since it is confessed that it signifies in the New Testament such a state of the World before the Gospel appeared? and consequently, why may not the light which made the first D day be the first tendencies to the Doctrine of Moses, which being at first divided and scattered, was united afterwards in one great Body of Laws, which was called the Sun, because it was the great Director of the Iewish Nation, and therefore said to rule the day; as the less considerable Laws of other Nations are called the Moon, because they were to govern those who were yet under the night of Ignorance? Why may not the Firmament being in the midst of the Waters, imply the erection of the Je [...]ish State in the midst of a great deal of trouble, since it is confe [...]ed, that Waters are often taken in Scripture in a Metaphorical E sense for troubles and afflictions? and the Earth appearing out of the Waters, be no more but the settlement of that state aft [...] [...]t [...] troubles; and particularly with great elegancy a [...]ter [...] p [...]age through the Red Sea? And the production [Page 242] of Herbs and living Creatures, be the great encrease of the People A of all sorts, as well those of a meaner rank (and therefore called herbs) as those of a higher, that were to live upon the other, and sometimes trample upon them, and therefore by way of excellency called the Living Creatures? And when these were multiplied and brought into order, (which being done by steps and degrees, is said to be finished, in several days) then the State and the Church flourished and enjoyed a great deal of pleasure, which was the production of Man and Woman, and their being placed in Paradise (for a perfect Man, notes a high degree of perfection, and a Woman is taken for the Church B in the Revelations): But when they followed the Customs of other Nations which were as a forbidden tree to them, then they lost all their happiness and pleasure, and were expelled out of their own Country, and lived in great slavery and misery, which was the Curse pronounced against them, for violating the rules of Policy established among them. Thus you see how small a measure of wit, by the advantage of those ways of interpreting Scripture, which the subtilest of our adversaries make use of, will serve to pervert the clearest expressions of Scripture to quite another sense than was ever intended by the Writer of C them. And I assure you, if that rule of interpreting Scripture be once allowed, that where words are ever used in a Metaphorical sense, there can be no necessity of understanding them in a proper; there is scarce any thing which you look on as the most necessary to be believed in Scripture, but it may be made appear not to be so upon those terms: for by reason of the paucity and therefore the ambiguity of the Original words of the Hebrew language, the strange Idioms of it, the different senses of the same word in several Conjugations, the want of several modes of expression which are used in other D Languages, and above all the lofty and Metaphorical way of speaking used in all Eastern Countries, and the imitation of the Hebrew Idioms in the Greek translation of the Old Testament, and Original of the New, you can hardly affix a sense upon any words used therein, but a man who will be at the pains to search all possible significations and uses of those words, will put you hard to it, to make good that which you took to be the proper meaning of them. Wherefore although I will not deny to our adversaries the praise of subtilty and diligence, I cannot give them that, (which is much more praise worthy) E viz. of discretion and sound judgement. For while they use their utmost industry to search all the most remote and Metaphorical senses of words, with a design to take off the genuine and proper meaning of them, they do not attend to the ill consequence [Page 243] that may be made of this to the overthrowing those A things, the belief of which themselves make necessary to salvation. For by this way the whole Gospel may be made an Allegory, and the Resurrection of Christ be thought as metaphorical as the Redemption by his Death, and the sorce of all the Precepts of the Gospel avoided by some unusual signification of the words wherein they are delivered. So that nothing can be more unreasonable than such a method of proceeding, unless it be first sufficiently proved that the matter is not capable of the proper sense, and therefore of necessity the improper only is to be allowed. And this is that which Socinus B seems after all his pains to pervert the meaning of the places in controversie, to rely on most; viz. That the Doctrine of satisfaction doth imply an impossibility in the thing it self, Socia. de Servat. Part. 2. Cap. 4. [...] and therefore must needs be false; nay, he saith the infallibility of the Revealer had not been enough in this Case, supposing that Christ had said it, and risen from the dead, to declare his own Veracity; unless he had delivered it by its proper causes and effects, and so shewed the possibility of the thing it self. And the reason, he saith, why they believe their Doctrine true, is not barely because God hath said it, but they believe certainly C that God hath said it, because they know it to be true; by knowing the contrary Doctrine to be impossible. The controversie then, concerning the meaning of the places in dispute is to be resolved from the nature and reasonableness of the matter contained in them: for if Socinus his reason were answerable to his confidence, if the account we give of the sufferings of Christ, were repugnant not only to the Justice, Goodness and Grace of God, but to the nature of the thing; if it appear impossible, that mankind should be redeemed in a proper sense, or that God should be propitiated by the Death of his Son as a Sacrifice for D sin; if it enervate all the Precepts of Obedience, and tends rather to justifie sins than those who do repent of them, I shall then agree, that no industry can be too great in searching Authors, comparing places, examining Versions, to find out such a sense as may be agreeable to the nature of things, the Attributes of God, and the design of Christian Religion. But if on the contrary, the Scripture doth plainly assert those things, from whence our Doctrine follows, and without which no reasonable account can be given either of the expressions used therein, or of the sufferings of Christ; if Christs death did E immediately respect God as a sacrifice, and were paid as a price for our Redemption; if such a design of his death be so far from being repugnant to the nature of God, that it highly manifests his Wisdom, Justice and Mercy; if it assert nothing but [Page 244] what is so far from being impossible, that it is very reconcileable to the common principles of Reason, as well as the Free-Grace of God in the pardon of sin; if, being truly understood, it is so far from enervating, that it advances highly all the purposes of Christian Religion, then it can be no less than a betraying one of the grand Truths of the Christian Doctrine, not to believe ours to be the true sense of the places in controversie. And this is that which I now take upon me to maintain.
For our clearer proceeding herein, nothing will be more necessary, than to understand the true state of the Controversie; §. 2. The state of the Controversie in general. which hath been rendred more obscure by the mistakes of some, B who have managed it with greater zeal than judgement; who have asserted more than they needed to have done, and made our Adversaries assert much less than they do: And by this means have shot over their Adversaries heads, and laid their own more open to assaults. It is easie to observe, that most of Socinus his Arguments are levelled against an opinion, which few who have considered these things do maintain, and none need to think themselves obliged to do it; which is, That Christ paid a proper and rigid satisfaction for the sins of men, considered under the notion of debts, and that he paid the very C same, which we ought to have done; which in the sense of the Law, is never called Satisfaction, but strict payment. Against this, Socinus disputes from the impossibility of Christs paying the very same that we were to have paid; because our penalty was Eternal death, and that as the consequent of inherent guilt, which Christ neither did nor could undergo. Neither is it enough to say, That Christ had undergone Eternal death, unless he had been able to free himself from it; for the admission of one to pay for another, who could discharge the debt in much less time than the offenders could, was not the same which the Law D required. For that takes no notice of any other than the persons who had sinned; and if a Mediator could have paid the same, the Original Law must have been disjunctive; viz. That either the Offender must suffer, or another for him; but then the Gospel had not been the bringing in of a better Covenant, but a performance of the old. But if there be a relaxation or dispensation of the first Law, then it necessarily follows, that what Christ paid, was not the very same which the first Law required; for what need of that, when the very same was paid that was in the obligation? But if it be said, That the Dignity of the person E makes up, what wanted in the kind or degree of punishment: This is a plain confession that it is not the same, but something equivalent, which answers the ends of the Sanction, as much as the same would have done, which is the thing we contend for. Besides, [Page 245] if the very same had been paid in the strict sense, there A would have followed a deliverance ipso facto; for the release immediately follows the payment of the same: and it had been injustice to have required any thing further, in order to the discharge of the Offender, when strict and full payment had been made of what was in the obligation. But we see that Faith and Repentance, and the consequences of those two, are made conditions on our parts, in order to the enjoying the benefit of what Christ hath procured: So that the release is not immediate upon the payment, but depends on a new contract; made in consideration of what Christ hath done and suffered B for us. If it be said, That by Christs payment we become his; and he requires these conditions of us; besides the contrariety of it to the Scriptures, which make the conditions to be required by him to whom the payment was made; we are to consider, that these very persons assert, that Christ paid all for us, and in our name and stead; so that the payment by Christ, was by a substitution in our room; and if he paid the same which the Law required, the benefit must immediately accrue to those in whose name the debt was paid: For what was done in the name of another, is all one to the Creditor, as if it had been done C by the Debtor himself. But above all things, it is impossible to reconcile the freeness of remission, with the full payment of the very same which was in the obligation. Neither will it serve to say, That though it was not free to Christ, yet it was to us: For the satisfaction and remission must respect the same person; for Christ did not pay for himself, but for us, neither could the remission be to him: Christ therefore is not considered in his own name, but as acting in our stead; so that what was free to him, must be to us; what was exactly paid by him, it is all one as if it had been done by us; so that it is impossible D the same debt should be fully paid and freely forgiven. Much less will it avoid the difficulty in this case to say, That it was a refusable payment; for it being supposed to be the very same, it was not in justice refusable; and however not in equity, if it answer the intention of the Law, as much as the suffering of the offenders had done; and the more it doth that, the less refusable it is. And although God himself found out the way, that doth not make the pardon free, but the designation of the person who was to pay the debt. Thus when our Adversaries dispute against this opinion, no wonder if they do it successfully, E but this whole opinion is built upon a mistake, that satisfaction must be the payment of the very same; which while they contend for, they give our Adversaries too great an advantage, and make them think they triumph over the Faith of [Page 246] the Church, when they do it only over the mistake of some A particular persons. But the foundation of this mistake, lies in the consideration of punishment, under the notion of debts, and that satisfaction therefore must be by strict payment in rigor of Law; but how great that mistake is, will appear in the subsequent discourse: but it cannot but be wondred at, that the very same persons who consider sins, as debts which must be strictly satisfied for, do withal contend for the absolute necessity of this satisfaction; whereas Socinus his Arguments would hold good, if sins were only considered as debts, and God as the meer Creditor of punishment, he might as freely part B with his own right without satisfaction, as any Creditor may forgive what summ he pleases, to a person indebted to him; and no reason can be brought to the contrary, from that notion of sins, why he may not do it. But if they be considered with a respect to Gods Government of the world, and the honour of his Laws, then some further account may be given, why it may not be consistent with that, to pass by the sins of men, without satisfaction made to them.
And because the mistake in this matter, hath been the foundation of most of the subsequent mistakes on both sides, and C §. 3. Of the difference of debts and punishments. the discovery of the cause of errours, doth far more to the cure of them, than any Arguments brought against them; and withal, the true understanding of the whole Doctrine of satisfaction depends upon it, I shall endeavour to make clear the notion under which our sins are considered; for upon that, depends the nature of the satisfaction which is to be made for them. For while our Adversaries suppose, that sins are to be looked on under the notion of debts in this debate, they assert it to be wholly free for God to remit them, without any satisfaction. They make the right of punishment meerly to depend D on Gods absolute Dominion; and that all satisfaction must be considered under the notion of compensation, for the injuries done to him, to whom it is to be made But if we can clearly shew a considerable difference between the notion of debts and punishments, if the right of punishment doth not depend upon meer Dominion, and that satisfaction by way of punishment, is not primarily intended for compensation, but for other ends, we shall make not only the state of the Controversie much clearer, but offer something considerable towards the resolution of it. The way I shall take for the proof of the difference E between debts and punishments, shall be using the other for the Arguments for it. For besides, that those things are just in matter of debts, which are not so in the case of punishments; as, that it is lawful for a man to forgive all the debts which [Page 247] are owing him by all persons, though they never so contumaciously A refuse payment, but our Adversaries will not say so in the case of sins; for although they assert, That the justice of God doth never require punishment in case of Repentance, yet withal they assert, That in case of Impenitency, it is not only agreeable, but due to the nature and decrees; and No [...] re [...]pi [...]ntib [...]s [...]mam ro [...] conc [...]de [...]e, id d [...]m [...]m naturae divinae, & decretis ejus & propterea rellitudi [...]i & aeq [...]itati debitu [...] est ac con [...]e [...]ta [...]e [...]m. Socin. de Servat. l. 1. c. 1. No [...] resipis [...]eates [...]oe [...]â non lio rare tum p [...]r se aequitati est admodum cons [...]nta [...]eum, & positis quibusda [...] fi [...]ibus quos D [...]us sibi in re [...]dis hominibus pr [...] sixit [...]lo necessari [...]m. Crell. c. Grot. c. 2. sect. 29. therefore to the rectitude and equity of God not to give pardon. But if this be true, then there is an apparent difference between the notion of debts and punishments; for the Impenitency doth but add to the greatness of the debt: And will they say, it is only in Gods power to remit small debts, but he must B punish the greatest? what becomes then of Gods absolute liberty to part with his own right? will not this shew more of his kindness to pardon the greater, rather than lesser offenders? But if there be something in the nature of the thing, which makes it not only just, but necessary for impenitent sinners to be punished, as Crellius after Socinus frequently acknowledges, then it is plain, that sins are not to be considered meerly as debts, for that obstinacy and impenitency is only punished as a greater degree of sin, and therefore as a greater debt. And withal, those things are lawful in the remission C of debts, which are unjust in the matter of punishments; as it is lawful for a Creditor, when two persons are considered in equal circumstances, to remit one, and not the other; nay, to remit the greater debt, without any satisfaction, and to exact the lesser to the greatest extremity; but it is unjust in matter of punishments, where the reason and circumstances are the same, for a person who hath committed a crime of very dangerous consequence, to escape unpunished, and another who hath been guilty of far less to be severely executed. Besides these considerations, I say, I shall now D prove the difference of debts and punishments, from those two things whereby things are best differenced from each other; viz. The different Reason, and the different End of them.
The different Reason of debts and punishments: The reason of debts is dominion and property, and the obligation of §. 4. The reason of humame punishment is the publick interest. them, depends upon voluntary contracts between parties; but the reason of punishments is Justice and Government, and depends not upon meer contracts, but the relation the person stands in to that Authority to which he is accountable for his actions. For if the obligation to punishment, did depend upon meer E contract, then none could justly be punished, but such who have consented to it by an antecedent contract: If it be said, That a contract is implied, by their being in society with others; that is as much as I desire to make the difference appear, [Page 248] for in case of debts, the obligation depends upon the voluntary A contract of the person; but in case of punishments, the very relation to Government, and living under Laws doth imply it. And the right of punishment depends upon the obligation of Laws, where the reason of them holds, without any express contract, or superiority of one over another; as in the case of violation of the Law of Nations, that gives right to another Nation to punish the infringers of it. Otherwise Wars could never be lawful between two Nations, and none could be warrantable, but those of a Prince against his rebellious subjects, who have broken the Laws themselves consented B expresly to. Besides, in case of debts, every man is bound to pay, whether he be call'd upon or no; but in case of punishments, no man is bound to betray or accuse himself. For the obligation to payment in case of debt; ariseth from the injury sustained by that particular person, if another detains what is his own from him; but the obligation to punishment, arises from the injury the Publick sustains by the impunity [...] of crimes, of which the Magistrates are to take care; who by the dispensing of punishments, do shew that to be true which Grotius asserts, that if there be any Creditor to be assigned C in punishment, it is the publick good: Which appears by this, that all punishments are proportioned, according to the influence the offences have upon the publick interest; for the reason of punishment is not because a Law is broken, but because the breach of a Law tends to dissolve the community, by infringing the Authority of the Laws, and the honour of those who are to take care of them. For if we consider it, the measure of punishments is in a well ordered State, taken from the influence which crimes have upon the peace and interest of the community. No man questions, but that Malice, Pride D and Avarice, are things really as bad as many faults, that are severely punished by humane Laws; but the reason these are not punished is, because they do not so much injury to the publick interest, as Theft and Robbery do. Besides, in those things wherein the Laws of a Nation are concerned, the utmost rigor is not used in the preventing of crimes, or the execution of them when committed, if such an execution may endanger the publick more than the impunity of the offenders may do. And there are some things which are thought fit to be forbidden, where the utmost means are not used to E prevent them; as Merchants are forbidden to steal customs, but they are not put under an Oath not to do it. And when penalties have been deserved, the execution of them hath been deferred, till it may be most for the advantage of the [Page 249] publick: as Ioabs punishment till Solomons Reign, though he deserved it as much in Davids. So that the rule commonly talked of, Fiat justitia & pereat mundus, is a piece of Pedantry, rather than true Wisdom; for whatever penalty inflicted, brings a far greater detriment to the publick, than the forbearance of it, is no piece of Justice to the State, but the contrary, the greatest Law, being the safety and preservation of the whole body. By which it appears, that in humane Laws, the reason of punishment is not, that such an action is done, but because the impunity in doing it, may have a bad influence on the publick interest; but in debts, the right of Restitution B depends upon the injury received by a particular person, who looks at no more than the reparation of his loss by it.
We are now to consider, how far these things will hold in Divine Laws, and what the right of punishment doth result §. 5. The right of Divine punishment not meer Dominion. Crell. Respons. ad Grot. cap. 2. sect. 1. &c. from there. For Crellius, the subtillest of our Adversaries, knowing how great consequence the resolution of this is, in the whole Controversie of Satisfaction, vehemently contends, That the right of punishment doth result from Gods absolute Dominion, and therefore he is to be considered as the offended party, and not as Governor in the right of inflicting punishment; for which his C first Argument is, That our obedience is due to Gods Law, on the account of his Dominion; but when that is not performed, p. 144. the penalty succeeds in its room, and therefore that doth belong to God on the same account: His other arguments are, from the compensation of injuries due to the offended party, and from Gods anger against sin, in which he is to be considered as the offended party: These two latter will be answered under the next head; the first I am to examine here. He therefore tells us, that the right of punishment belongs to Gods Dominion, because the reason of his Government of mankind is, because he D is the Lord of them. But, for our better understanding this, we are to consider, although the original right of Government doth result from Gods Dominion; for therefore our obedience is due, because of his Soveraignty over us; yet when God takes upon him the notion of a Governor, he enters into a new relation with his creatures, distinct from the first as meer Lord. For he is equally Lord of all to whom he gives a being, but he doth not require obedience upon equal terms, nor governs them by the same Laws: Dominion is properly shewed in the exercise of power; but when God gives Laws according to which he will E reward and punish, he so far restrains the exercise of his Dominion to a subserviency to the ends of Government. If we should suppose, that God governs the world meerly by his Dominion, we must take away all rewards and punishments; for then the [Page 250] actions of men, would be the meer effects of irresistable power, A and so not capable of rewards and punishments; for there could be neither of these, where mens actions are not capable of the differences of good and evil, and that they cannot be, if they be the acts of Gods Dominion, and not of their own. But if God doth not exercise his full Dominion over rational creatures, it is apparent that he doth govern them under another notion than as meer Lord, and the reason of punishment is not to be taken from an absolute right which God doth not make use of, but from the ends and designs of Government, which are his own Honour, the Authority of his Laws, and the good B of those whom he doth govern. And Crellius is greatly mistaken, when he makes punishment to succeed in the place of the right of obedience; for it is only the desert of punishment, which follows upon the violation of that right, and as we assert, that the right of obedience is derived from Gods Soveraignty, so we deny not, but the desert of punishment is from the violation of it; but withal we say, that the obligation to punishment depends upon the Laws, and Gods right to inflict punishment (Laws being supposed) is immediately from that Government which he hath over mankind: For otherwise, if the C whole right of punishment did still depend upon Gods Dominion, and the first right of Soveraignty, then al sins must have equal punishments, because they are all equal violations of the fundamental right of obedience; then it were at liberty for God to punish a greater sin, with a less punishment; and a lesser sin, with a greater: And lastly, this would make the punishment of sin, a meer Arbitrary thing in God; for there would be no reason of punishment, but what depended upon Gods meer will; whereas the reason of punishment in Scripture is drawn from a repugnancy of sin to the divine purity and holyness, D and not meerly from Gods power or will to punish; but if that were all the reason of it, there would be no repugnancy in the nature of the thing for the most vitious person to be rewarded, and the most pious to be made everlastingly miserable. But who ever yet durst say or think so? From whence it appears that the relation between sin and punishment is no result of Gods arbitrary will; but it is founded in the nature of the things, so that as it is just for God to punish offenders, so it would be unjust to punish the most innocent person without any respect to sin. But if the right of punishment depends E meerly on Gods Dominion, I cannot understand why God may not punish when, and whom, and in what manner he pleaseth; without any impeachment of his Justice, and therefore it is to be wonder'd at, that the same persons who assert the [Page 251] right of punishment to be meerly in Gods dominion, should A yet cry out of the injustice of one person being punished for anothers faults; for why may not God exercise his dominion in this case? yes, say they, he may his dominion, but he cannot punish, because punishment supposes guilt, and cannot be just without it; how far that reaches, will be examined afterwards; at present, we take notice of the contradiction to themselves which our Adversaries are guilty of, that they may serve their own hypothesis, for when we dispute with them, against absolute remission without satisfaction, then they contend that the right of punishment is a meer act of dominion, and God may B part with his right, if he please; but when they dispute with us against the translation of punishment from one to another, then they no longer say that the right of punishment is an act of dominion, but that it is a necessary consequent of inherent guilt, and cannot be removed from one to another. And then they utterly deny that punishment is of the nature of debts; for one mans money, they say, may become anothers, but one Soc. de Servat. l. 3. c. 3. Prae [...]ect. c 18. mans punishment cannot become anothers: Thus they give and take, deny and grant, as it serves for their present purposes.
2. The different end of debts and punishments, make it appear §. 6. 2. The end of punishments not bare compensation as it is in debts. [...] C that there is a difference in the nature of them; for the intention of the obligation to payment in case of debt, is the compensation of the damage which the Creditor sustains; but the intention of punishment, is not bare compensation, but it is designed for greater and further ends. For which we are to consider the different nature of punishments, as they are inflicted by way of reparation of some injury done to private persons, and as they do respect the publick good. I grant, that private persons in case of injuries, seek for compensation of the damage they sustain, and so far they bear the nature of D debts; but if we consider them as inflicted by those who have a care of the publick, though they are to see that no private persons suffers injury by another; yet the reason of that is not meerly that he might enjoy his own, but because the doing injuries to others tends to the subversion of the ends of Government. Therefore, I can by no means admit that Position of Crellius, that a Magistrate only punishes as he assumes the person of the particular mon who have received injuries from Crell. [...]. G [...]ot. cap. 2. Sect. 2. p. 14 [...]. Sect. 17. p. 162. other; for he aims at other ends than meerly the compensation of those injured persons. Their great end is according to E the old Roman Formula, nè quid Resp. detrimenti capiat: the reason of exacting penalties upon private men is still with a regard to the publick safety. Supposing men in a state of nature no punishment is due to the injured person, but restitution of damage, [Page 252] and compensation of the loss that accrues to him by the A injury sustained; and whatever goes beyond this, is the effect of Government, which constitutes penalties for preservation of the Society which is under Laws. But herein Crellius is our adversary, but with no advantage at all to his Cause; for he offers to prove against Grotius, that something more is due by an injury beyond bare compensation for what the other is supposed to lose by the right of nature; for saith he, in every injury there is not only the reall damage which the person sustains, but there is a contempt of the person implyed in it, for which as well as the former, he ought to have compensation. To which I answer, B 1. That this doth not prove what he designs, viz. that punishment doth belong to the injured person in a state of Nature, beyond bare restitution, but that it is necessary, that men should not continue in such a state, that so they may be vindicated from that contempt, and others compelled to restitution. Both which, as they are punishments, are not in the power of the offended party as such, but shew that it is very reasonable there should be Laws and Governours, that private persons may be preserved in their just rights, and offenders punished for the vindication not only of their honour, but of the Laws too. And C Laws being established, the injured person hath right to no more, than the compensation of his loss; for that being forced upon the offending party, is a sufficient vindication of his honour. 2. If the contempt of a private person makes a compensation necessary, how much more will this hold in a publick Magistrate; whose contempt by disobedience is of far worse consequence than that of a private person. And by this argument Crellius overthrows his main hypothesis, viz. that God may pardon sin without satisfaction; for if it be not only necessary, that the loss be compensated but the dishonour too; then so much D greater as the dishonour is; so much higher as the person is; so much more beneficial to the world as his Laws are; so much more necessary is it that in order to pardon there must be a satisfaction made to him, for the affronts he hath received from men. And if the greatness of the injury be to be measured as Crellius asserts, from the worth and value of the thing, from Crell. c. Grot. cap. 2. p. 174. the dignity and honour of the person, from the displicency of the fact to him, which he makes the measure of punishment; this makes it still far more reasonable, that God should have satisfaction for the sins of men, than that men should have for the injuries E done them by one another; especially considering what the same Author doth assert afterwards, that it is sometime repugnant to justice, for one to part with his own right in case of injuries, & Sect. 29. p. 198. that either from the nature and circumstances of the things themselves, [Page 253] or a decree or determination to the contrary, for the first A he instanceth in case of not orious defamation; in which he saith, it is a dishonest and unlawful thing for a man, not to make use of his own right for his vindication, and for the other, in case of great obstinacy and malice. By both which, it is most apparent, that Crellius puts a mighty difference between the nature of debts, and punishments, since in all cases he allows it lawful for a person free, to remit his debts; but in some cases he makes it utterly unlawful for a person not to make use of his right for punishment. And withal if a private person may not part with his own right in such cases, how unreasonable is it not to assert the B same of the great Governour of the world? and that there may be a necessity for him upon supposition of the contempt of himself and his Laws, to vindicate himself and his honour to the world, by some remarkable testimony of his severity against sin.
But Crellius yet urgeth another end of punishment which §. 7. Of Crelli [...]s his great mistake about the end of punishments. Crell. cap. 2. sect. 2 sect. 28. though the most unreasonable of all others, yet sufficiently proves from himself the difference of debts and punishments, which is, the delight which the injured person takes in seeing the offender punished. This he so much insists upon, as though he made it the most natural end of punishment, for saith he, among C the Punishments which a Prince or any other free Person can inflict, revenge is in the first place, and the more there is of that in any thing, the more properly it is called a punishment; and he tells what he means by this ultio; viz. solatium ex alieno dolore, the contentment taken in anothers pain. But saith he, no P. 191. man must object, that this is a thing evil in it self; for although it be forbidden us under the New Testament, yet in it self it is not unlawful for one that hath suffered pain from another to seek for the case of his own pain, by the miseries of him that injured him: and for this purpose, saith he, we have the Passion of D Anger in us, which being a desire of returning injuries, is then satisfied when it apprehends it done. But how absurd and unreasonable this doctrine is, will be easily discovered, for this would make the primary intendment of punishment to be the evil of him that suffers it. Whereas the right of punishment is derived from an injury received, and therefore that which gives that right, is some damage sustained, the reparation of which is the first thing designed by the offended party: Though it take not up the whole nature of punishment. And on this account no man can justly propose any end to himself in anothers evil, but E what comes under the notion of restitution. For the evil of another is only intended in punishment as it respects the good of him for whose sake that evil is undergone. When that good may be obtained without anothers evil, the desire of it is unjust [Page 254] and unreasonable: and therefore all that contentment that any A one takes in the evil another undergoes, as it is evil to him, is a thing repugnant to humane nature, and which all persons condemn in others when they allow themselves in it. It will be hard for Crellius to make any difference between this end of punishment which he assigns, and the greatest cruelty; for what can that be worse than taking delight in making others miserable, and seeing them so when he hath made them. If it be replyed, that cruelty is without any cause, but here a just cause is supposed, I answer, a just cause is only supposed for the punishment, but there can be no just cause for any to delight in the miseries B of others, and to comfort themselves by inflicting or beholding them. For the evil of another is never intended, but when it is the only means left for compensation; and he must be guilty of great inhumanity, who desires anothers evil any further than that tends to his own good, i. e. the reparation of the damage sustained; which if it may be had without anothers evil, then that comes not by the right of nature within the reason of punishment; and consequently where it doth not serve for that end, the comfort that men take in it is no part of justice, but cruelty. For there can be no C reason at all assigned for it; for that lenimentum doloris which Crellius insists on is meerly imaginary, and no other than the Dog hath in gnawing the stone that is thrown at him; and for all that I know, that propension in nature to the retribution of evil for evil any further than it tends to our security, and the preservation for the future, is one of the most unreasonable Passions in humane Nature.
And if we examine the nature of Anger either considered §. 8. Of the nature of ang [...] and revenge in m [...]n, and whether punishments are designed to satisfie them. Naturally or Morally, the intention of it is not the returning evil to another, for the evil received, but the security D and preservation of our selves, which we should not have so great a care of, unless we had a quick sense of injuries, and our blood were apt to be heated at the apprehension of them. But when this passion vents it self, in doing others injury to alleviate its own grief, it is a violent and unreasonable perturbation; but being governed by reason, it aims at no more, than the great end of our beings; viz. Self-Preservation. But when that cannot be obtained without anothers evil, so far the intendment of it is lawful, but no further. And I cannot therefore think those Philosophers, E who have defined Anger to be [...], by whose Authority Crellius defends himself, when he makes Crell. c 2. sect. 22. [...]. 177. anger to be a desi [...]e of revenge, did throughly consider what was just and reasonable in it, but barely what was natural, [Page 255] and would be the effect of that passion, if not governed by A reason. For otherwise Iul. Scaligers definition is much more true and justifiable, that it is appetitus depulsionis; viz. that whereby we are stirred up to drive away from us, any Exert. 313. thing that is injurious to us. But because Crellius alledgeth a saying of Seneca, that would make vindicta of the nature of punishment, duabus de causis punire princeps solet, si aut se vindicet aut alium: We shall oppòse to this the sense of Seneca de Clem. l. 1. c. 20. the same Author in this matter, which may sufficiently clear the other passage: For, saith he, Inhumanum verbum est, De Irâ. l. 2. c. 32. & quidem pro justo receptum, ultio, & a contumelia non B differt nisi ordine: qui dolorem regerit, tantum excusatius peccat. And no man speaks with greater vehemency against the delight in others punishments than he doth; for he always asserts, the only reason of punishment, to be some advantage which is to come by it, and not meerly to satisfie anger, or to allay their own griefs, by seeing anothers: For, saith he, the punishment is inflicted, Non quia delectetur ullius De I [...]á l. 1. c. 6. poena (proculest enim à sapiente tam inhumana feritas) sed ut documentum omnium sint: So that it is only the usefulness of punishment according to him, which makes it become C any wiseman; and so far from a satisfaction of his grief by anothers punishment, that he makes that a piece of inhumanity, not incident to any who pretend to wisdom. Nay, he denies, that a just punishment doth flow from Anger; for he that inflicts that, doth it, non ipsius poenae avidus sed quia oportet, not as desiring the punishment, but because De Irâ. l. 1. c. 9. Cap. 12. there are great reasons for it: And elsewhere, Exsequar quia oportet, non quia dolet: he is far enough then from Cap. 13. approving, that imaginary compensation of one mans grief by anothers. And he shews at large, that the weakest natures, D and the least guided by reason, are the most subject to this anger and revenge. And although other things be pretended, the general cause of it is, a great infirmity of humane nature; and thence it is, that children and old men, and sick persons, are the most subject to it; and the better any are, the more they are freed from it:
He makes Cruelty to be nothing else, but the intemperance De Clem. l. 2. c. 4. of the mind in exacting punishment; and the difference between a Prince and a Tyrant to lye in this, That one delights De Clem. l. 1. c. 11, 12. in punishing, the other never does it but in case of necessity, [Page 256] when the publick good requires it. And this throughout his A discourse, he makes the measure of punishment; who then could imagine, that he should speak so contradictory to himself, as to allow punishment for meer revenge, or the easing ones own griefs, by the pains of another? In the places cited by Crellius, (if taken in his sense) he speaks what commonly is, not what ought to be in the world; for he disputes against it in that very place, therefore that cannot be the meaning which he contends for. The common design of punishments by a Prince, saith he, is either to vindicate himself or others. I so render his words, because vindicare, B when it is joyned with the person injured, as here, vindicare se aut alium, doth properly relate to the end of punishment, which is asserting the right of the injured person; but when it is joyned with the persons who have done the injury, or the crimes whereby they did it, then it properly signifies to punish. Thus Salust useth, Vindicatum in eos; and Cicero, In milites nostros vehementer vindicatum, and Salust. in Catalin. Cicero 7. v. for the fact very frequently in him, maleficia vindicare: but when it relates to the injured person, as here it doth, it cannot signifie meerly to punish; for then se vindicare would C be to punish ones self, but to assert his own right in case of injury, though it be with the punishment of another: For Vindicatio, as Cicero defines it, est per quam vis & injuria & omnino quod obsuturum est defendendo aut ulciscendo Cicero de Iaveat. 2. propulsatur. So that the security of our selves in case of force or injury, is that which is called Vindication; which sometimes may be done by defence, and other times by punishment. And that Seneca doth mean no more here, is apparent by what follows; for in case of private injuries, he saith, poenam si tutò poterit donet, he would have the Prince forgive D the punishment, if it may be done with safety; so that he would not have any one punished, to satisfie anothers desire of revenge, but to preserve his own safety: And afterwards he saith, It is much beneath a Princes condition, to need De Irâ. l 1. c. 21. that satisfaction which arises from anothers sufferings: But for the punishments of others, he saith, The Law hath established three ends, the amendment of the persons, or making others better by their punishments, or the publick security, by taking away such evil members out of the body: So that in publick punishments, he never so much as supposes, that contentment E which revenge fancies in others punishments, but makes them wholly designed for the publick advantage. For the Laws in punishment do not look backward but forward; for as Non praeterita sed futura intuebitur; nam ut Plato ait, remo pr [...] de [...]s punit quia pe [...]catum est, sed ne pec [...]r. Sen. de Irâ. l. 1. c. 16. Plato saith, No wise man ever punished, meerly because men [Page 257] had offended, but lest they should: For past things cannot A be rec [...]ed, but future are, therefore forbidden, that they may be prevented. So to the same purpose is the saying of Lactantius, produced by Grotius, Surgimus ad vindictam Lact. de ira Dei. c. 17. non quia laest sumus, sed ut disciplina servetur, mores corrigantur, licentia comprimatur: haec est Ira justa. To which Crellius answers, That this signifies nothing, unless it can be proved, that no man may justly punish another, meerly Cap. 2. sect. 13. because he is wronged. If he means of the right to punish, we deny not that to be, because the person is wronged; but if he understands it of the design and end of punishment, B then we deny, that it is an allowable end of punishments, any further than it can come under the notion of restitution, of which we have spoken already. When a Master (which is the instance he produceth) punisheth his servants, because they have disobeyed him: The reason of that punishment, is not the bare disobedience, but the injury which comes to him by it; the reparation of which he seeks by punishment, either as to his authority, security or profit. But he adds, That where punishment is designed, for preservation of discipline, and amendment of manners, and keeping persons in C order, (which are the ends mentioned by Lactantius) it is where the interest of the person lies, in the preservation of thes [...], and is thefore offended at the neglect of them. To which I answer, That the interest of such a one, is not barely the interest of an offended party, as such, but the interest of a Governor; and no body denies, but such a one may be an offended party: but the question is, Whether the design of punishment be meerly to satisfie him as the offended party, or to answer the ends of Government? For Crellius hath already told us, what it is to satisfie one as an offended party, D that is, to ease himself by the punishment of others; but what ever is designed for the great ends of Government, is not to be considered under that notion, although the Governor may be justly offended at the neglect of them. And there is this considerable difference between the punishment made to an offended party, as such, and that which is for the ends of Government, that the former is a satisfaction to Anger, and the latter to Laws and the publick interest. For Crellius disputes much for the right of Anger in exacting punishments; the satisfaction of which, in case of real injury, E Cap. 2. sect. 1. p. 143. Sect. 13. p. 161. he never makes unlawful, but in case that it be prohibited us by one, whose power is above our own: nay he makes it otherwise the primary end of punishment. So that anger is the main thing upon these terms to be respected in punishment: [Page 258] but where it is designed for the ends before mentioned, A there is no necessity of any such passion as anger to be satisfied, the ends of punishment may be attained wholly without it: And publick punishment, according to Seneca, Se [...]. de [...]a, l. 1. c. 14. & 15. non ira sed ratio est, is no effect of anger, but reason; for, saith he, nihil minus quam irasci punientem decet: nothing less becomes one that punisheth, than anger doth; for all punishments being considered as Medicines, no man ought to give Physick in anger, or to let himself blood in a sury: A Magistate, saith he, when he goes to punish, ought to appear Cap. 16. only vultu legis quae non irascitur, sed constituit, with B the continuance of the Law, which appoints punishments without passion: The reason of which is, because the Law aims not primarily at the evil of the man that suffers punishment, but at the good which comes to the publick by such sufferings. For the first design of the Law was to prevent any evil being done, and punishment coming in by way of Sanction to the force of the Law, must have the same primary end which the Law it self had; which is not to satisfie barely the offended party for the breach, any further than that satisfaction tends to the security of the Law, and preventing C the violation of it for the future. The substance of what I have said upon this subject, may be thus briefly comprized, That antecedently to Laws, the offended party hath right to no more than bare reparation of the damage sustained by the injury; that the proper notion of punishment is consequent to Laws, and the inflicting of it is an act of Government, which is not designed for meer satisfaction of the anger of the injured person, but for the publick good, which lies in preserving the authority of the Laws, the preventing all injuries by the security of mens just rights, and the vindication D of the dignity and honor of him, who is to take Quibus (sc. solatio & securitati) addi poss [...]nt honoris ac dign tatis, per iajuriam violatae, & aliquâ ratione immi [...]tae vi [...]diciae, ass [...]tioque juris nostri Crel. cap. 2. sect. 28. p. 191. care of the publick good. For these Crellius himself acknowledgeth, to be the just ends of punishments, only he would have the satisfaction a man takes in anothers evil, to come in the first place; wherein how much he is mistaken, I hope we have already manifested. Because the proper nature of punishment depending upon Laws, the Laws do not primarily design the benefit of private persons (supposing that were so) but the advantage of that community which they are made for. E
And in those cases wherein the Magistrate doth right to § 9. The Interest of the Magistrate in punishment distinct from that of private persons. particular persons in the punishment of those who have injured them, he doth it not as taking their person upon him, for he aims at other things than they do; they look at a bare [Page 259] compensation for the injury received; but the Magistrate at A the ill consequence the impunity of injuries may be of to the publick: they, it may be at the satisfaction of their disoleasure; but he at the satisfaction of the Laws; they at their own private damage; he at the violation of the publick peace. And from hence among those Nations who valued all crimes at a certain rate, in matters of injury between man and man, the injured person was not only to receive compensation for his wrong; but a considerable fine was to be paid to the Exchequer for the violation of the publick peace. This Tacitus D [...] [...] German. c. 12. G [...]. de. [...]. G [...]h. i [...] [...]. a [...] [...]. Go [...]h p. [...]7. [...] G [...]. ad [...]o [...]. [...] A [...]. F [...] [...]. Gloss. [...]. F [...] observes among the old Germans, Grotius of the old Gothick B Laws, and from them (as most of our modern Laws and Customs are derived) Lindenbrogius of the Salick, Alemannick, Lombardick, Spelman of the Saxon, who tells us in case of murder there were three payments, one to the Kindred, which was called Megbote; the second to the Lord, called Manbote, the third to the King, called Freda from the German Frid, which signifies peace, it being the consideration paid to the King for the breach of the publick peace. And this, saith he, in all actions, was anciently paid to the King, because the peace was supposed to be broken, not by meer force, C but by any injuries; and if the action was unjust, the Plain tiffe paid it; if just, the defendant. And the measure of it, saith Bignonius, was the tenth part of the value of the thing Big [...]o [...]. not. i [...] M [...] [...]m cap. 20. as estimated by Law; which by the Customs of the ancient Romans was deposited at the commencing of a suit by both, and only taken up again by him who overcame; and was by them called Sacramentum, as Varro tells us. And the same [...]a ro. de. L. [...]. l [...]b. 4. custom was observed among the Greeks too, as appears by Iulius Pollux, who tells us it was called [...] among I [...] Pollux. l 8. them, and in publick actions was the fifth part, in private D the tenth. But that which was paid to the publick in case of murder, was among the Greeks called [...], the same with poena, for Hesychius tells us that is [...], and to the same purpose the Scholiast on Homer on those words, Iliad. 1. [...], by which the Original of the name poena, comes from a payment made to the publick, according to that known rule, interest reip. delicta puniri, that persons may see how much the publick safety is concerned, that crimes be punished. From which and many other things which might be insisted on, Crellius his Hypothesis will E appear to be false, viz. that when the Magistrate doth judge in the affairs of particular men, he doth it only as assuming the person of those men; whereas it appears from the reason of the thing, and the Custom of Nations, that the interest of the [Page 260] Magistrate is considered as distinct from that of private persons, A when he doth most appear in vindication of injuries. But all this is managed with a respect to the grand hypothesis, viz that the right of punishing doth belong only to the offended party as such, that the punishment is of the nature of debts, and the satisfaction by compensation to the anger of him who is offended. The falsity of which this discourse was designed to discover.
Having thus considered the nature of punishments among men, we come more closely to our matter, by examining how far this will hold in the punishments which God inflicts on the B account of sin. For which two things must be enquired into, 1. In what sense we attribute anger to God. 2. What are the great ends of those punishments God inflicts on men on the account of sin.
For the first, though our Adversaries are very unwilling to §. 10. Of the nature of Anger in God; the satisfact on to be made to it. Crell. cap. 2. sect. 1. p. 145. p. 177. allow the term of punitive justice, yet they contend for a punitive anger in God, and that in the worst sense as it is appetitus vindictae: for after Crellius hath contended that this is the proper notion of anger in general; neither ought any one to say, he adds, that anger as other passions is attributed improperly C to God; for setting aside the imperfections, which those passions are subject to in us, all the rest is to be attributed to him; taking away then that perturbation, and pain, and grief we find in our selves in anger, to which the abhorrency of sin answers in God, all the rest doth agree to him. I would he had a little more plainly told us what he means by all the rest, but we are to ghess at his meaning by what went before, where he allows of Cicero, and Aristotles definition of Anger, whereof the one is, that it is libido, or (as Crellius Cicer. T [...]. 4. Arist. Rhet. l. 2. c. 2. would rather have it,) cupiditas puniendi, the other D [...], &c. and himself calls it poenae appetitio, and in another place, that it may be as properly defined cupiditas vindictae as cupiditas poenae, or affectus vindicandi, as well as puniendi: in all which places, he doth assert such an Crell. c. 2. sect. 22 p. 177. anger in God as supposes such a motion, or desire, or inclination to punish sin when it is committed, as there is in us when an injury is done us, only the perturbation and pain excluded. But he hath not thought fit to explain how such new motions or inclinations in the divine nature every time sin is commited, are consistent with the immutability and perfection of it; E nor what such a kind of desire to punish in God imports, whether a meer inclination without the effect, or an inclination with the effect following: if without the effect, then either because the sin was not great enough, or Gods honour [Page 261] was not concerned to do it, and in this case the same reasons A which make the effect not to follow, make the desire of it inconsistent with the divine wisdom and perfection: or else because the effect is hindred by the repentance of the person, or some other way which may make it not necessary to do it; then upon the same reason the effect is suspended, the inclination to do it should be so too; for that must be supposed to be governed by an eternal reason and counsel as well as his actions; unless some natural passions in God be supposed antecedent to his own wisdom and counsel, which is derogatory to the infinite perfection of God, since those are judged imperfections in our selves: If it be taken only with the effect following it, B then God can never be said to be angry but when he doth punish, whereas his wrath is said to be kindled in Scripture, where the effect hath not followed; which if it implies any more than the high provocation of God to punish (as I suppose it doth not) then this inclination to punish is to be conceived distinct from the effect following it. But that conception of anger in God seems most agreeable to the divine nature, as well as to the Scriptures, which makes it either the punishment it self, as Crellius elsewhere acknowledges it is often taken so; or Crell. de verâ Relig. l. 1. c. 30. C Gods declaration of his will to punish, which is called the revelation of the wrath of God against all unrighteousness of men, God thereby discovering the just displeasure he hath against sin; or the great provocation of God to punish, by the sins of men; as when his wrath is said, to be kindled, &c. By this sense we may easily reconcile all that the Scripture saith concerning the wrath of God; we make it agreeable to infinite perfection, we make no such alterations in God, as the appeasing of his anger must imply, if that imply any kind of commotion in him. And thus the grand difficulty of Crellius Crell. cap. 7. sect. 3. p. 350. D appears to be none at all, against all those passages of Scripture which speak of appeasing God, of attonement, and reconciliation, viz. that if they prove satisfaction, they must prove that God being actually angry with mankind before the sufferings of his Son, he must be presently appeased upon his undergoing them. For no more need to be said, than that God being justly provoked to punish the sins of mankind, was pleased to accept of the sufferings of his Son, as a sufficient sacrifice of Attonement for the sins of the world, on consideration of which he was pleased to offer those terms of pardon, E which upon mens performance of the conditions required on their part, shall be sufficient to discharge them from that obligation to punishment which they were under by their sins. And what absurdity, or incongruity there is in this to any principle [Page 262] of reason, I cannot imagine. But our Adversaries first A make opinions for us, and then shew they are unreasonable. They first suppose that anger in God is to be considered as a passion, and that passion a desire of revenge for satisfaction of it; and then tell us, that if we do not prove, that this desire of revenge can be satisfied by the sufferings of Christ, then we can never prove the doctrine of satisfaction to be true; whereas we do not mean by Gods anger any such passion, but the just declaration of Gods will to punish upon our provocation of him by our sins; we do not make the design of satisfaction to be, that God may please himself in the revenging B the sins of the guilty upon the most innocent person; because we make the design of punishment, not to be the satisfaction of anger as a desire of revenge, but to be the vindication of the honour and rights of the injured person, by such a way as himself shall judge most satisfactory to the ends of his Government.
2. Which is the next thing we are to clear: For which §. 11. Of the ends of divine punishments. Crell. c. 2 sect. 29. p. 129. end we shall make use of the Concession of Crellius, That God hath prefixed some ends to himself in the Government of mankind; which being supposed, it is necessary, that impenitent C sinners should be punished. What these ends of God are, he before tells us, when he enquires into the ends of Divine punishments, which he makes to be, security for the future, by mens avoiding sins, and a kind of [...], or pleasure which P. 195. God takes in the destruction of his implacable enemies, and the asserting and vindicating his own right by punishing, and shewing men thereby, with what care and fear they ought to serve him; and so attains the ends of punishment proposed by Lactantius, and manifestation of the Divine Honor and Majesty, which hath been violated by the sins of men. All these D we accept of, with this caution, That the delight which God takes in the punishing his implacable enemies, be not understood of any pleasure in their misery, as such, by way of meer revenge; but as it tends to the vindication of his Right, and Honor, and Majesty; which is an end suitable to the Divine Nature: but the other cannot in it self; have the notion of an end; for an end doth suppose something desirable for it self; which surely the miseries of others cannot have to us, much less to the Divine Nature. And that place which Crellius insists on to prove the contrary, Deut. 28. 63. The Lord E will rejoyce over you, to destroy you; imports no more, than the satisfaction God takes in the execution of his Justice, when it makes most for his honour, as certainly it doth in the punishment of his greatest enemies. And this is to be understood [Page 263] in a sense agreeable to those other places, where God is said A not to delight in the death of sinners; which doth not (as Ezek. 18. v. 23, 32. c. 33. 11. Crellius would have it) meerly express Gods benignity and mercy, but such an agreeableness of the exercise of those attributes to Gods nature, that he neither doth nor can delight in the miseries of his creatures in themselves, but as they are subservient to the ends of his Government; and yet such is his kindness in that respect too, that he useth all means agreeable thereto, to make them avoid being miserable, to advance his own glory. And I cannot but wonder that Grotius, who Grot. de satisfact. c. 2. p. 43. Ed. 1617. Grot. de jure belli, &c. l. 2. c. 20. sect. 4. had asserted the contrary in his book of Satisfaction, should in his books De Iure belli ac pacis, assert, That when God punisheth B wicked men, he doth it for no other end, but that he might punish them: For which he makes use of no other arguments, than those which Crellius had objecte [...] [...]gainst him; viz. The delight God takes in punishing, and t [...] judgements of the life to come, when no amendment can be expected; the former hath been already answered, the latter is objected by Crellius against him, when he makes the ends of punishment, meerly to respect the community, which cannot be asserted of the punishments of another life, which must chiefly respect C the vindication of Gods glory, in the punishment of unreclaimable sinners. And this we do not deny to be a just punishment, since our Adversaries themselves, as well as we, make it necessary. But we are not to understand, that the end of Divine punishments doth so respect the community, as though God himself were to be excluded out of it; for we are so to understand it, as made up of God as the Governor, and mankind as the persons governed, whatever then tends to the vindication of the rights of Gods Honor and Soveraignty, tends to the good of the whole, because the manifestation of that D end is so great an end of the whole.
But withal, though we assert in the life to come, the ends of §. 12. The ends of Divine punishments different in this and the future state. punishment not to be the reclaiming of sinners, who had never undergone them, unless they had been unreclaimable; yet a vast difference must be made between the ends of punishments in that, and in this present state. For the other is the Reserve, when nothing else will do, and therefore was not primarily intended; but the proper ends of punishment, as a part of Government, are to be taken from the design of them in this life. And here we assert, that Gods end in punishing, is the advancing E his honor, not by the meer miseries of his creatures, but that men by beholding his severity against sin, should break off the practice of it, that they may escape the punishments of the future state. So that the ends of punishment here, [Page 264] are quite of another kind, from those of another life; for A those are inflicted, because persons have been unreclaimable by either the mercies or punishments of this life; but these are intended, that men should so far take notice of this severity of God, as to avoid the sins which will expose them to the wrath to come. And from hence it follows, That whatsoever sufferings, do answer all these ends of Divine punishments, and are inflicted on the account of sin, have the proper notion of punishments in them, and God may accept of the undergoing them as a full satisfaction to his Law, if they be such as tend to break men off from sin, and assert Gods B right, and vindicate his honor to the world; which are the ends assigned by Crellius, and will be of great consequence to us in the following Discourse. C D E
CHAP. II. A
The particular state of the Controversie, concerning the sufferings of Christ. The Concessions of our Adversaries. The debate reduced to two heads: The first concerning Christs sufferings, being a punishment for sin, entred upon. In what sense Crellius acknowledgeth the sins of men, to have been the impulsive cause of the death of Christ. The sufferings of Christ proved to be a punishment, from Scripture. The importance of the phrase B of bearing sins. Of the Scape-Goats bearing the sins of the people into the Wilderness. Grotius his sense of 1 Pet. 2. 24. vindicated against Crellius and himself. [...] never used for the taking away a thing by the destruction of it. Crellius his sense examined. Isa. 53. 11. vindicated. The argument from Mat. 8. 17. answered. Grotius constant to himself in his notes on that place. Isa. 53. 5, 6, 7. cleared. Whether Christs death be a proper [...], and whether that doth imply, that it was a punishment of sin? How far the punishments of Children C for their Fathers faults, are exemplary among men. The distinction of calamities and punishments, holds not here. That Gods hatred of sin could not be seen in the sufferings of Christ, unless they were a punishment of sin, proved against Crellius. Grotius his Arguments from Christ being made sin and a curse for us, defended. The liberty our Adversaries take in Changing the sense of words. The particles [...], being joyned to sins and relating to sufferings do imply those sufferings to be a punishment for sin. According to their way of interpreting Scripture, it D had been impossible for our doctrine to be clearly expressed therein.
THese things being thus far cleared concerning the nature and ends of punishments, and how far they §. 1. The particular state of the controversie concerning the sufferings of Christ for us. are of the nature of debts, and consequently what kind of satisfaction is due for them, the resolution of the grand Question concerning the sufferings of Christ will appear much more easie; but that we may proceed with all E possible clearness in a debate of this consequence, we must yet a little more narrowly examine the difference between our Adversaries and us in this matter; for their concessions are in te [...]ms sometimes so fair, as though the difference were meerly [Page 266] about words without any considerable difference in the A thing it self. If we charge them with denying satisfaction, Crellius answers in the name of them, that we do it unjustly; Crell. praes. p. 7. for they do acknowledge a satisfaction worthy of God, and agreeable to the Scriptures. If we charge them with denying that our salvation is obtained by the death of Christ, they assert the contrary, as appears by the same Author. Nay, Ruarus attributes merit to the death of Christ too. They acknowledge, Ruarus in Epistol. Crell. cap. 9. sect. 2. Cap. 10. sect. 10. Cap. 7, 8, &c. Cap. 1. sect. 57. that Christ dyed for us, nay, that there was a commutation between Christ and us, both of one person for another, and of a price for a person; and that the death of Christ B may be said to move God to redeem us; they acknowledge reconciliation, and expiation of sins to be by the death of Christ. Nay, they assert, that Christs death was by reason of our sins, and that God designed by that to shew his severity against sin. And what could we desire more, if they meant the same thing by these words, which we do? They assert a satisfaction, but it is such a one as is meerly fulfilling the desire of another; in which sense all that obey God may be said to satisfie him. They attribute our salvation to the death of Christ, but only as a condition intervening, upon the performance C of which the Covenant was confirmed and himself taken into Glory, that he might free men from the punishment of their sins. They attribute merit to Christs death but in the same sense that we may merit too, when we do what is pleasing to God. They acknowledge, that Christ died for us, but not in our stead, but for our advantage; that there was a commutation; but not such a one, as that the Son of God did lay down his blood as a proper price in order to our redemption as the purchase of it; when they speak of a moving cause, they tell us, they mean no more than the performance of any condition D may be said to move, or as our prayers and repentance do. The reconciliation they speak of, doth not at all respect God but us; they assert an expiation of sins consequent upon the death of Christ, but not depending upon it any otherwise, than as a condition necessary for his admission to the office of a High Priest in Heaven, there to expiate our sins by his power, and not by his blood; but they utterly deny, that the death of Christ is to be considered as a pròper expiatory sacrifice for sin; or that it hath any further influence upon it, than as it is considered as a means of the confirmation of the E truth of his Doctrine, and particularly the promise of remission of sins, on which, and not on the death of Christ they say our remission depends; but so far as the death of Christ may be an argument to us to believe his Doctrine, and that faith may [Page 267] incline us to obedience, and that obedience being the condition A in order to pardon, at so many removes they make the death of Christ to have influence on the remission of our sins. They assert that God took occasion by the sins of men to ex ercise an act of dominion upon Christ in his sufferings, and that the sufferings of Christ were intended for the taking away the sins of men; but they utterly deny, that the sufferings of Christ were to be considered as a punishment for sin, or that Christ did suffer in our place and stead; nay, they contend with great vehemency, that it is wholly inconsistent with the justice of God to make one mans sins the meritorious B cause of anothers punishment; especially one wholly innocent, and so that the guilty shall be freed on the account of his sufferings. Thus I have endeavoured to give the true state of the controversie with all clearness and brevity. And the substance of it will be reduced to these two debates.
- 1. Whether the sufferings of Christ in general are to be considered as a punishment of sin, or as a meer act of dominion?
- 2. Whether the death of Christ in particular were
a proper expiatory sacrifice for sin, or only
an antecedent condition to
Chis exercise of the Office of Priesthood in Heaven?
1. Whether the sufferings of Christ in general are to be considered §. [...]. Whether the sufferings of Christ are to be considered as a punishment of sin. as a punishment of sin, or as a meer act of dominion? for that it must be one or the other of these two, cannot be denyed by our Adversaries; for the inflicting those sufferings upon Christ, must either proceed from an antecedent meritorious cause, or not. If they do, they are then punishments; if not, they are meer exercises of power and dominion; whatever ends they are intended for, and whatever recompence be made for them. So Crellius asserts, that God as absolute Crell. cap. 2. sect. 1. p. 142. D Lord of all, had a right of absolute dominion upon the life and body of Christ, and therefore might justly deliver him up to death, and give his body to the Cross; and although Christ by the ordinary force of the Law of Moses, had a right to escape so painful and accursed death, yet God by the right of dominion had the power of disposal of him, because he intended to compensate his torments with a reward infinitely greater than they were: but because he saith, for great ends the consent of Christ was necessary, therefore God did not use his utmost dominion in delivering him up by force as he might E have done, but he dealt with him by way of command, and rewards proposed for obedience, and in this sence he did act as a righteous Governor, and indulgent Father, who encouraged his Son to undergo hard, but great things. In which we see, that [Page 268] he makes the sufferings of Christ an act of meer dominion in A God, without any antecedent cause as the reason of them; only he qualifies this act of dominion with the proposal of a reward for it. But we must yet further enquire into their meaning, for though here Crellius attributes the sufferings of Christ meerly to Gods dominion, without any respect to sin, yet elsewhere he will allow a respect that was had to sin antecedently to the sufferings of Christ, and that the sins of men were the Crell. cap. 1. sect. 7. &c. So [...]i [...]. de Christo servat. l. 3. c. 10. Crell. cap. 1. sect. 16. Socia. l. 2. c. 7. impulsive cause of them. And although Socinus in one place utterly denies any lawful-antecedent cause of the death of Christ, besides the will of God and Christ, yet Crellius in his Vindication B saith, by lawful cause, he meant meritorius, or such upon supposition of which he ought to dye; for elsewhere he makes Christ to dye for the cause, or by the occasion of our sins; which is the same that Crellius means by an impulsive, or procatartick cause. Which he thus explains, we are now to suppose a decree of God not only to give salvation to Mankind, Crell. c. 1. sect. 11. but to give us a firm hope of it in this present state, now our sins by deserving eternal punishment, do hinder the effect of that decree upon us, and therefore they were an impulsive cause of the death of Christ, by which it was effected, that this C decree should obtain notwithstanding our sins. But we are not to understand as though this were done by any expiation of the guilt of sin by the death of Christ; but this effect is hindred by three things, by taking away their sins, by assuring men that their former sins, and present infirmities upon their sincere obedience shall not be imputed to them, and that the effect of that decree shall obtain, all which, saith he, is effected morte Christi interveniente, the death of Christ intervening, but not as the procuring cause. So that after all these words he means no more by making our sins an impulsive cause of the D death of Christ, but that the death of Christ was an argument to confirm to us the truth of his Doctrine, which doctrine of his doth give us assurance of these things: and that our sins when they are said to be the impulsive cause, are not to be considered with a respect to their guilt, but to that distrust of God which our sins do raise in us; which distrust is in truth according to this sense of Crellius the impulsive cause, and not the sins which were the cause or occasion of it. For that was it which the doctrine was designed to remove, and our sins only as the causes of that. But if it be said, that he speaks not only of the distrust, E but of the punishment of sin as an impediment which must be removed too, and therefore may be called an impulsive cause, we are to consider that the removal of this is not attributed to the death of Christ, but to the leaving of our sins by the belief of his [Page 269] Doctrine; therefore the punishment of our sins cannot unless A in a very remote sense be said to be an impulsive cause of that, which for all that we can observe by Crellius, might as well have been done without it; if any other way could be thought sufficient to confirm his Doctrine, and Christ, without dying, might have had power to save all them that obey him. But we understand not an impulsive cause in so remote a sense, as though our sins were a meer occasion of Christs dying, because the death of Christ was one argument among many others to believe his Doctrine, the belief of which would make men leave their sins; but we contend for a neerer and B more proper sense, viz. that the death of Christ was primarily intended for the expiation of our sins, with a respect to God and not to us, and therefore our sins as an impulsive cause are to be considered as they are so displeasing to God; that it was necessary for the Vindication of Gods Honour, and the deterring the world from sin, that no less a Sacrifice of Attonement should be offered, than the blood of the Son of God. So that we understand an impulsive cause here in the sense, that the sins of the people were, under the Law, the cause of the offering up those Sacrifices, which were appointed C for the expiation of them. And as in those Sacrifices there were two things to be considered, viz. the mactation, and the oblation of them, the former as a punishment by a substitution of them in place of the persons who had offended; the latter as the proper Sacrifice of attonement, although the mactation it self, considered with the design of it, was a Sacrificial act too: So we consider the sufferings of Christ with a twofold respect, either as to our sins, as the impulsive cause of them, so they are to be considered as a punishment, or as to God, with a design to expiate the guilt of them, so they are D a Sacrifice of Attonement. The first consideration is, that we are now upon, and upon which the present debate depends, for if the sufferings of Christ be to be taken under the notion of punishment, then our Adversaries grant, that our sins must be an impulsive cause of them in another sense than they understand it. For the clearing of this, I shall prove these two things.
- 1. That no other sense ought to be admitted of the places of
Scripture which speak of the sufferings of Christ with a respect to sin, but this.
E
- 2. That this Account of the sufferings of Christ, is no ways repugnant to the Iustice of God.
[Page 270] That no other sense ought to be admitted of the places of A Scripture, which speak of the sufferings of Christ with a respect § 3. The sufferings of Christ proved to be a punishment from Scripture 1 Pet. 2. 24. Isa. 53. 45, 6, 7, 10, 11. 2 Cor. 5. 2 [...]. Gal. 3. 13. Rom. 4. 25. to our sins, but that they are to be considered as a punishment for them. Such are those which speak of Christ hearing our sins, of our iniquities being laid upon him, of his making himself an offering for sin, and being made sin and a curse for us, and of his dying sor our sins. All which I shall so far consider, as to vindicate them from all the exceptions which Socinus and Crellius have offered against them.
1. Those which speak of Christs bearing our sins. As to which we shall consider, First, The importance of the phrase B in general of bearing sin, and then the circumstances of the particular places in dispute. For the importance of the phrase, Socinus acknowledges, that it generally signifies bearing the Soc. d [...] s [...]rvat. l. 2. cap. 4. punishment of sin in Scripture: but that sometimes it signifies taking away. The same is confessed by Crellius, but he saith, it doth not always signifie bearing proper punishment, but it is Crell. cap. 1. Sect. 32. enough (he says) that one bears something burdensome on the occasion of others sins: and so Christ by undergoing his sufferings by occasion of sins, may be said to bear our sins. And for this sense he quotes Numb. 14. 33. And your Children shall C wander in the Wilderness forty years, and bear your whoredoms, untill your carcasses be wasted in the Wilderness. Whereby, saith he, it is not meant that God would punish the Children of the Israelites, but that by the occasion of their parents sins, they should undergo that trouble, in wandering in the Wilderness, and being deprived of the possession of the promised Land. But could Crellius think that any thing else could have been imagined, (setting aside a total destruction) a greater instance of Gods severity, than that was to the Children of Israel all their circumstances being considered? D Is it not said, that God did swear in his wrath, they should not enter into his rest? Surely then the debarring them so Psal. 95. 11. Heb. 3. 11. long of that rest, was an instance of Gods wrath, and so according to his own principles must have something of Vindicta in it, and therefore be a proper punishment. The truth is, our Adversaries allow themselves in speaking things most repugnant to Humane Nature in this matter of punishments, that they may justifie their own hypothesis. For a whole Nation to be for forty years debarred from the greatest blessings were ever promised them; and instead of enjoying them, to endure E the miseries and hardships of forty years travels in a barren wilderness, must not be thought a punishment, and only because occasioned by their Parents sins. But whatever is inflicted on the account of sin, and with a design to shew Gods [Page 271] severity against it, and thereby to deter others from the practice A of it, hath the proper notion of punishment in it; and all these things did concur in this instance, besides the general sense of mankind in the matter of their punishment, which was such, that supposing them preserved in their liberty, could not have been imagined greater. And therefore Vatablus, whom Socinus and Crellius highly commend, thus renders those words, dabunt poenas pro fornicationibus vestris quibus Doc [...]issi [...]e & [...]ga [...]tissi [...]è Vata [...]lus [...]t f [...]e [...]olet. Soc. d [...]v. l. 1 c. 8. Crell. cap. 1. Sect. 31. defecistis a Deo vestro: they shall suffer the punishment of your forications. And that bearing the sins of Parents doth imply properly bearing the punishment of them, methinks they B should not so earnestly deny, who contend that to be the meaning of the words in Ezekiel, The Son shall not bear the iniquity of the Father; viz. that he shall not bear the punishment Ezekiel 18 20. of his Fathers sins. Where in bearing iniquity with a respect to their Parents sins, by their own confession, must be taken for the proper punishment; for otherwise they do not deny, Crell. cap. 4. Sect. 15. but Children, notwithstanding that sentence, may undergo much affliction on the occasion of their Parents sins.
But Socinus further objects, that bearing sins doth not imply §. 4. Of the Scape-Go [...]ts bearing away the sins of the people. the punishment of them, because the Scape-Goat under the C Law, is said to bear upon him the iniquities of the people, and yet could not be said to be punished for them. To which Grotius answers, that Socinus takes it for granted without reason, that the Scape-Goat could not be said to be punished for Socil. 2. c. 4. Lev. 16. 22. Grot. de sat. cap. 1. the sins of the people; for punishment in general, may fall upon beasts for the sins of men, Gen. 9. 5. Exod. 21. 28. Lev. 20. 15. Gen. 8. 21. and Socinus hath no cause to say, that the Scape-Goat was not slain; for the Iewish Interpreters do all agree that he was, and however the sending him into the Wilderness was intended as a punishment; and most probably D by an unnatural death. To which Crellius replies, That in Crell. cap. 1. Sect. 56. the general, he denies not but punishment may fall upon beasts as well as men; but (that he might shew himself true to his principle, that one cannot be punished for anothers faults,) he falls into a very pleasant discourse, That the Beasts are not said to be punished for mens sins, but for their own, and therefore when it is said, before the flood, that all flesh had corrupted his way; he will by no means have it understood only Gen. 6. 12. of men, but that the sins of the beasts at that time, were greater than ordinary, as well as mens. But he hath not E told us what they were, whether by eating some forbidden herbs; or e [...]g into conspiracies against mankind their lawful Soveraigns, or unlawful mixtures; and therefore we have yet reason to believe, that when God saith, the ground G [...]n. 8. 21. [Page 272] was cursed for mans sake, that the beasts were punished for A mans sin. And if all fl [...]sh, must comprehend be [...]sts in this place, why shall not all flesh seeing the glory of the Lord, take Isa. 40. 5. in the beasts there too: for V [...]ablus parallels this place with the other. But if, saith Crellius any shall contend that some beasts at least were innocent, then, he saith, that those though they were destroyed by the flood, yet did not suffer punishment, but only a calamity by occasion of the sins of men. I wonder he did not rather say, that the innocent beasts were taken into the Ark, for the propagation of a better kind afterwards. But by this solemn distinction of calamities and punishments, B there is nothing so miserable, that either men or beasts can undergo, but when it serves their turn, it shall be only a calamity and no punishment, though it be said to be on purpose to shew Gods severity against the sins of the world. And this excellent notion of the beasts being punished for their own sins, is improved by him to the vindication of the Scape-Goat from being punished; because then, saith he, the most wicked and corrupt Goat should have been made choice of. As though all the design of that great day of expiation had been only to call the Children of Israel together with great solemnity; to let C them see, how a poor Goat must be punished for breaking the Laws which we do not know were ever made for them. I had thought our Adversaries had maintained that the Sacrifices (on the day of expiation at least) had represented and typified the Sacrifice which was to be offered up by Christ; and so Socinus and Crellius elsewhere contend: he need not therefore have troubled himself concerning the sins of the Goat, when it is expresly said, That the sins of the people were put on the head of the Goat; Whatever then the punishment Lev. 16. 21. were, it was on the account of the sins of the people, and not D his own. But Crellius urgeth against Grotius, that if the Scape-Goat had been punished for the expiation of the sins of the people, that should have been particularly expressed in Scripture, whereas nothing is said there at all of it, and that the throwing down the Scape-Goat from the top of the rock, was no part of the Primitive Institution, but one of the superstitions taken up by the Iews in after-times, because of the ominousness of the return of it; and although we should suppose (which is not probable) that it should dye by famine in the Wilderness, yet this was not the death for expiation, E which was to be by the shedding of blood. To this therefore I answer. 1. I do not insist on the customs of the later Jews to prove from thence any punishment designed by the primitive institution. For I shall easily yield, that many superstitions [Page 273] obtained among them afterwards about the Scape-Goat; A as the stories of the red list turning white upon the head of it, the booths and the causey made on purpose, and several other things mentioned in the Rabbinical Writers do manifest. But Cod. Ioma. tit. 6. yet it seems very probable from the Text it self, that the Scape-Goat was not carried into the Wilderness at large, but to a steep mountain there. For although we have commonly rendered Azazel by the Scape-Goat, yet according to the best of the Jewish Writers, as P. Fagius tell us, [...] doth not come from [...] a Goat, and [...] abiit; but is the name of a Mountain very steep and rocky near Mount Sinai, and therefore B probably called by the later Jews, [...] the name of a Rock: and to this purpose, it is observable that where we render it, and let him go for a Scape-Goat into the Wilderness in the Lev. 16. 10. Hebrew it is, [...] to send him to Azazel in the Wilderness: as the joyning the preposition [...] doth import, and the Arabick Version where-ever Azazel is mentioned, renders it by Mount Azaz: and the Chaldee and Syriack to Azazel; so that from hence, a carrying the Scape-Goat to a certain place may be inferred; but I see no foundation in the Text for the throwing it down from the rock C when it was there; and therefore I cannot think, but that if the punishment intended did lye in that, it would have been expresly mentioned in the solemnities of that day, which had so great an influence on the expiation of the sins of the people. 2. I answer, that the Scape-Goat was to denote rather the effect of the expiation, than the manner of obtaining it. For the proper expiation was by the shedding of blood, as the Apostle Heb. 9. 22. tells us; and thence the live Goat was not to have the sins of the people to bear away into the desert, till the High Priest Lev. 16. 20. had made an end of reconciling the Holy Place, and the Tabernacle D of the Congregation, and the Altar; and by the sprinkling of the blood of the other Goat which was the sin-offering for the people; which being done, he was to bring the V. 15. live Goat, and to lay his hands upon the head of it, and confess over it all the iniquities of the Children of Israel, and all their transgressions in all their sins, putting them upon the head of the Goat, and shall send him away by the hand of a fit man into V. 21. the Wilderness; and so the Goat shall bear upon him all their iniquities unto a land not inhabited, and he shall let go the V. 22. Goat in the Wilderness. So that the former Goat noted the E way of expiation by the shedding of blood, and the latter the effect of it, viz. that the sins of the people were declared to be expiated by the sending the Goat charged with their sins into a desart place; and that their sins would not appear in the [Page 274] presence of God against them, any more than they expected, A that the Goat which was sent into the Wilderness should return among them. Which was the reason that afterwards they took so much care that it should not, by causing it to be thrown off from a steep rock; which was no sooner done; but notice was given of it very suddenly by the sounding of horns all over the Land. But the force of Socinus his argument from the Scape Goats bearing the sins of the people, that therefore that phrase doth not always imply the bea [...]ing of punishment, is taken off by Crellius himself, who tell us Crell. c. 1 Sect. 56. that the Scape-Goat is not said to bear the sins of the people in B the Wilderness; but only that it carried the sins of the people into the Wilderness, which is a phrase of another importance from that we are now discoursing of. As will now further appear from the places where it is spoken of concerning our Saviour, which we now come particularly to examine.
The first place insisted on by Grotius with a respect to Christ, is 1 Pet. 2. 24. Who his own self bare our sins in his §. 5. Grotius his sense of 1 Pet. 2. 24. vindicated. Crell. c. 1. Sect. 35. own body on the tree, which, saith Crellius, is so far from proving that Christ did bear the punishment of our sins, that it doth not imply any sufferings that he underwent on the occasion C of them. He grants that [...] doth signifie to carry up, but withall (he saith) it signifies to take away; because that which is taken up, is taken away from the place where it was. Besides, he observes, that [...] doth answer to the Hebrew [...] he hath made to ascend, which is frequently rendred by it in the LXX. and sometimes by [...], but that Hebrew word doth often signifie to take away, where it is rendred in the Greek by one of those two words, 2 Sam. 21. 13. Iosh. 24. 32. Psal. 102. 25. Ezra. 1. 11. To which I answer, 1. That the signification of [...] in this place, must not be D taken from every sense the word is ever used so, but in that which the words out of which these are taken do imply; and in Isa. 53. 11. it doth not answer [...] but to [...] a word which by the confession of all is never properly used for taking away, but for bearing of a burden, and is used with a respect to the punishment of sin, Lament. 5. 7. Our fathers have sinned, and are not, and we have born their iniquities, where the same word is used; so that the signification of the word [...] here, must depend upon that in Isaiab, of which more afterward. 2. Granting that [...] doth answer E sometimes to the Hebrew [...] yet it makes nothing to Crellius his purpose, unless he can prove that [...] doth ever signifie the taking away a thing by the destruction of it; for where it answers to that word, it is either for the offering [Page 275] up of a Sacrifice, in which sense [...] is very frequently A used, as is confessed by Crellius; and in that sense it is no prejudice at all to our cause; for then it must be granted, that Christ upon the Cross is to be considered as a sacrifice for the sins of men; and so our sins were laid upon him as they were supposed to be on the Sacrifices under the Law, in order to the expiation of them, by the shedding their blood; and if our Adversaries would acknowledge this, the difference would not be so great between us; or else it is used for the removal of a thing from one place to another, the thing it self still remaining in being, as 2 Sam. 21. 13. And he made Sauls B bones to ascend, [...], he took them away, saith Crellius; true, but it is such a taking away, as is a bare removal; the thing still remaining; the same is to be said of Iosephs bones, Iosh. 24. 32. which are all the places where [...] is used; and although [...] may be sometimes taken in another sense, as Psal. 102. 25. yet nothing can be more unreasonable than such a way of arguing as this is; [...] saith Crellius signifies taking away; we demand his proof of it; is it that the word signifies so much of it self? No; that he grants it doth not. Is it that it is frequently used in the C Greek Version to render a word that properly doth signifie so? No; nor that neither. But how is it then? Crellius tells us, that it sometimes answers to a word that signifies to make to ascend: well, but doth that word signifie taking away? No; not constantly, for it is frequently used for a sacrifice: but doth it at any time signifie so? Yes; it signifies the removal of a thing from one place to another. Is that the sense then he contends for here? No; but how then? why [...] is used to render the same word that [...] doth, and [...] though it signifies too a bare removal, as Ezra 1. 11. yet Psal. 102. D 25. it is used for cutting off, [...], the Hebr. is, make me not to ascend in the midst of my days. But doth it here signifie utter destruction? I suppose not; but grant it, what is this to [...], when the LXX. useth not that word here, which for all that we know was purposely altered; so that at last [...] is far enough from any such signification as Crellius would fix upon it, unless he will assert, that Christs taking away our sins, was only a removal of them from Earth to Heaven. But here Grotius comes in to the relief of Crellius against himself; for in his Notes upon this place, though he E had before said, that the word was never used in the New Testament in that sense, yet he there saith, [...] is abstulit, for which he refers us to Heb. 9. 28. where he proceeds altogether as subtilly as Crellius had done before him, for he tells [Page 276] us [...] is put for [...] Numb. 14. 33. Deut. 14. 24. A Isa. 53. 12. but [...], i. e. [...] is put for [...], Lev. 10. 17. Num. 14. 18. A most excellent way of interpreting Scripture! considering the various significations of the Hebrew words, and above all of that [...] which is here mentioned. For according to this way of arguing, [...] shall signifie the same with [...], and [...], for [...] signifies all these, and is rendred by them in the Greek Version, so that by the same way that Grotius proves that [...] signifies [...], we can prove that [...] doth not signifie to take away, but to bear punishment; nay, [...] signifies the bearing punishment B in the strictest sense, Ezek. 16. 52, 54. and bearing sin in that sense, Ezek. 16. 58. Thou hast born thy lewdness, and thy abominations, [...] So that when [...] is more frequently used in this than in the other sense, why shall its signifying [...] at any time make [...] be taken in the same sense with that? Nay, I do not remember in any place where [...] is joyned with sin, but it signifies the punishment of it, so [...], Lev. 19. 8. to bear his iniquity, Lev. 20. 17. [...], bearing their iniquity in one verse is explained by being out off from among their people, in the next. And in the places cited C by Grotius, that Numb. 14. 33. hath been already shewed to signifie bearing the punishment of sin, and that Deut. 14. 24. is plainly understood of a Sacrifice, the other, Isa. 53. 12. will be afterwards made appear by other places in the same Chapter, to signifie nothing to this purpose. So that for all we can yet see, [...] must be taken either for bearing our sins as a sacrifice did under the Law, or the punishment of them; in either sense it serves our purpose, but is far enough from our Adversaries meaning.
But supposing we should grant them, that [...] may signifie D to take away, let us see what excellent sense they make of these §. 6. Crell. his sense examined. words of St. Peter. Do they then say, that Christ did take away our sins upon the Cross? No, they have a great care of that, for that would make the expiation of sins to have been performed there; which they utterly deny, and say, that Christ only took the Cross in his way to his Ascension to Heaven, that there he might expiate sins. But doth not St. Peter say, that what was done by him here, was in his body on the tree: and they will not say, he carryed that with him to Heaven too. Well, but what then was the taking away of sin which belonged E to Christ upon the Cross? is it only to perswade men to live vertuously, and leave off their sins? This Socinus would have, and Crellius is ‘contented that it should Soc. deserv. l. 2. cap. 6. Crell cap. 1. Sect. 39. be understood barely of taking away sins, and not of [Page 277] the punishment of them, but only by way of accession and A consequence: but if it be taken (which he inclines more to) for the punishment, then (he saith) it is to be understood not of the vertue and efficacy of the death of Christ, but of the effect: and yet a little after he saith, those words of Sect. 44. Christs bearing our sins, are to be understood of the force and efficacy of Christs death to do it, not including the effect of it in us; not as though Christ did deliver us from sins by his death, but that he did that by dying, upon which the taking away of sin would follow, or which had a great power for the doing it.’ So uncertain are our Adversaries, in affixing B any sense upon these words, which may attribute any effect at all, to the death of Christ upon the Cross. For if they be understood of taking away sins, then they are only to be meant of the power that was in the death of Christ, to perswade men to leave their sins; which we must have a care of understanding so, as to attribute any effect to the death of Christ in order to it; but only that the death of Christ was an argument for us to believe what he said, and the believing what he said would incline us to obey him, and if we obey him, we shall leave off our sins, whether Christ had died or C no: supposing his miracles had the same effect on us, which those of Moses had upon the Iews, which were sufficient to perswade them to believe and obey without his death. But if this be all that was meant by Christs bearing our sins in his body on the tree; why might not St. Peter himself be said to bear them upon his cross too? for his death was an excellent example of patience, and a great argument to perswade men he spake truth, and that doctrine which he preached, was repentance and remission of sins: So that by this sense, there is nothing peculiar attributed to the death of Christ But taking D the other sense for the taking away the punishment of sins, we must see how this belongs to the death of Christ: Do they then attribute our delivery from the punishment of sin, to the death of Christ on the Cross? yes, just as we may attribute Coesars subduing Rome, to his passing over Rubicon, because he took that in his way to the doing of it: so they make the death of Christ only as a passage, in order to expiation of sins, by taking away the punishment of them. For that shall not be actually perfected, they say, till his full deliverance of all those that obey him, from hell and the grave, E which will not be till his second coming. So that if we only take the body of Christ for his second coming, and the Cross of Christ, or the tree, for his Throne of Glory, then they will acknowledge, that Christ may very well be said, to take [Page 278] away sins in his own body on the tree: but if you take it in A any sense that doth imply any peculiar efficacy to the death of Christ, for all the plainness of St. Peters words, they by no means will admit of it.
But because Crellius urgeth Grotius with the sense of that place, Isa. 53. 11. out of which he contends these words are §. 7. Isa. 53. 11. vindicated. Crell. c. 1. sect. 35. taken, and Crellius conceives he can prove there, that bearing is the same with taking away sin: We now come to consider, what force he can find from thence, f [...]r the justifying his assertion, That the bearing of sins, when attributed to Christ, doth not imply the punishment of them, but the taking B them away The words are, for he shall bear their iniquities. As to which Grotius observes, that the word [...] which signifies iniquity, is sometimes taken for the punishment of sin, 2 Kings 7. 9. and the verb [...] is to bear, and when ever it is joyned with sin or iniquity, in all languages, and especially the Hebrew, it signifies to suffer punishment; for although [...] may sometimes signifie to take away, [...] never does: so that this phrase can receive no other interpretation. Notwithstanding all which, Crellius attempts to prove, that [...] here, must be taken in a sense contrary to C the natural and perpetual use of the word; for which his first Crell. c. 1. sect. 44. argument is very infirm, viz. because it is mentioned after the death of Christ, and is therefore to be considered as the the reward of the other. Whereas it appears: 1. By the Prophets discourse, that he doth not insist on an exact methodical order, but dilates and amplifies things as he sees occasion: for Verse 9. he saith, He made his grave with the wicked, and with the rich in his death; and Verse 10. he saith, Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him, he hath put him to grief: Will Crellius therefore say, that this must be consequent to his D death and burial? 2. The particle [...] may be here taken causally, as we render it, very agreeably to the sense; and so it gives an account of the fore-going clause, By his knowledge, shall my righteous servant justifie many, for he shall bear their iniquities. And that this is no unusual acception of that particle, might be easily cleared from many places of Scripture if it were necessary; and from this very Prophet, as Isa. 39. 1. where [...] is the same with [...] 2 King 20. 12. and Isa. 64. 5. Thou art wroth, for we have sinned [...] where the same particle is made the causal of what went before. But E we need not insist upon this to answer Crellius, who elsewhere makes use of it himself, and says, They must be very ignorant of the Crell. c. 9. sect. 7. p. 463. Soc. Prae [...]. c. 14. sect. 6. Hebrew Tongue, who do not know, that the conjunction copulative is often taken causally; and so much is confessed by Socinus [Page 279] also, where he explains, that particle in one sense in the beginning A and causally in the middle of the verse: And the 2 Sam. 24. 1. Lords anger was kindled against Israel, [...] for he moved, &c. but if this will not do, he attempts to prove, That [...] in this very Chapter, hath the signification of taking away, v. 4. For he hath born our griefs, and carried our sorrows, which is applied by St. Matth. 8. 17. to bodily diseases, which our Saviour did not bear, but took away, as it is said in the foregoing verse; he healed all that were sick, on which those words come in, That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Esaias, &c. To which I answer: 1. It is granted by our Adversaries, B that St. Mathew in those words, doth not give the full sense of the Prophet, but only applies that by way of accommodation, to bodily diseases, which was chiefly intended for the sins of men. And in a way of accommodation it is not unusual to strain words beyond their genuine and natural signification, or what was intended primarily by the person who spake them. Would it be reasonable for any to say that [...] signifies to give, because that place Psal. 68, 18. where the word by all is acknowledged to signifie to receive, is rendred to give, Eph. 4. 8. so that admitting another sense of the C word here, as applied to the cure of bodily diseases, it doth not from thence follow, that this should be the meaning of the word in the primary sense intended by the Prophet. 2. The word as used by St. Matthew, is very capable of the primary and natural sense; for St. Matthew retain words of the same signification, with that which we contend for, [...] and [...], neither of which doth signifie taking away, by causing a thing not to be. So that all that is implied hereby, is the pains and trouble which our Saviour took in the healing of the sick. For to that end, as Grotius well observes D upon that place, the circumstances are mentioned, That it was Matth. 8. 16. at even, and multitudes were brought to him in St. Matthew, that after Sunset all that were diseased were brought, and all the City was gathered together at the door, in St. Mark; That he departed Ma [...]k 1. 32, 33. Luke 4. 42. not till it was day, in St. Luke; that we might the better understand how our Saviour did bear our griefs, because the pains he took in healing them were so great. And here I cannot but observe, that Grotius in his notes on that place, continued still in the same mind he was in, when he writ against Socinus; for he saith, ‘Those words may either E refer to the diseases of the body, and so they note the pains he took in the cure of them; or to our sins, and so they were fulfilled when Christ by suffering upon the cross, did obtain remission of sins for us, as St. Peter saith,’ [Page 280] 1 Pet. 2. 24. But upon what reason the Annotations on that A place come to be so different from his sense expressed here, long after Crellius his answer, I do not understand. But we are sure he declared his mind, as to the main of that Controversie, to be the same, that it was when he writ his Book which Crellius answered; as appears by two Letters of his to Vossius, not long since published; and he utterly disowns the charge of E [...]ist. Eccle. p. 747, 748. Discuss. p. 16, 17. Socinianism, as a calumny in his discussion, the last Book he ever writ.
But we are no further obliged to vindicate Grotius, than he did the truth; which we are sure he did in the vindication B §. 8. Isa. 53. 5, 6, 7. vindicated. of the 53 of Isaiah, from Socinus his interpretations, notwithstanding what Crellius hath objected against him. We therefore proceed to other Verses in the same Chapter insisted on by Grotius, to prove That Christ did bear the punishments of our sins, v. 6, 7. The Lord hath laid on him the iniquities of us all: It is required, and he was afflicted, as Grotius renders those words. Socinus makes a twofold sense of the former De Servat. l. 2. c. 5. clause; the first is, That God by or with Christ did meet with our iniquities; the latter, That God did [...]ake our iniquities to mee [...] with Christ. The words saith Grotius, will C not bear the former interpretation, for the verb [...] being in Hiphil, must import a double action, and so it must not be, That God by him did meet with our sins, but that God did make our sins to meet upon him. To which Crellius replies, That words in Hiphil are sometimes used intransitively; but Crell. c. 1. sect. 52. can he produce any instance in Scripture, where this word joyned with [...] and [...] is so taken? for in the last ver [...]e of the Chapter, the construction is different: And [...] uncertain way of interpreting Scripture will this be, [...] every Anomalous signification, and rare use of a word, shall be made D use of to take away such a sense as is most agreeable to the design of the place. For that sense we contend for, is not only enforced upon the most natural importance of these words, but upon the agreeableness of them with so many other expressions of this Chapter, that Christ did bear our iniquities, and was wounded for our transgressions, and that his soul was made an offering for sin: to which it is very suitable, that as the iniquities of the people were (as it were) laid upon the head of the Sacrifice; so it should be said of Christ, who was to offer up himself for the sins of the world. And the Iews E themselves by this phrase do understand the punishment either for the sins of the people, which Iosias underwent, or which the people themselves suffered, by those who interpret this prophesie of them. To which purpose, Aben Ezra observes, [Page 281] that iniquity is here put for the punishment of it, as 1 Sam. A 28. 10. & Lam. 4. 6. But Socinus mistrusting the incongruity of this Interpretation, flies to another; viz. That God did make our iniquities to meet with Christ: And this we are willing to admit of, if by that they mean, That Christ underwent the punishment of them; as that phrase must naturally import, for what otherwise can our iniquities meeting with him signifie? For the word [...] taken properly (as Socinus acknowledgeth it ought to be, when he rejects Pagnins Interpretation of making Christ to interceed for our iniquities) signifies, either to meet with one by chance, or out of kindness, B or else for an encounter, with an intention to destroy that which it meets with. So Iudg. 8. 21. Rise thou [...] [...] LXX irrue in nos, fall upon us; i. e. run upon us with thy sword, and kill us, Iudg. 15. 12. Swear unto me, that ye will not fall upon me your selves; where the same word is used, and they explain the meaning of it in the next words, v. 13. We will not kill thee, Amos 5. 19. as if a man did flee from a Lyon, and a Bear met him, [...] i. e. with a design to kill him. Now I suppose they will not say that our sins met with Christ by Chance, since it is said, that C God laid on him, &c. nor out of kindness; it must be there fore out of enmity; and with a design to destroy him, and so our sins cannot be understood as Socinus and Crellius would have them, as the meer occasions of Christs death: but as the proper impulsive cause of it. Whether the following word [...] be taken with a respect to sin, and so it properly signifies It is required, or with a respect to the person, and so it may signifie he was oppressed, is not a matter of that consequence, which we ought to contend about; if it be proved that Christs oppression had only a respect to sin, as the punishment D of it. Which will yet further appear from another expression in the same Chapter, vers. 5. The chastisement of our peace was upon him, and by his stripes we are healed. In which Grotius saith ‘the word [...] doth not signifie any kind of affliction, but such as hath the nature of punishment, either for example or instruction; but since the latter cannot be intended in Christ, the former must. Crellius’ thinks to escape from this, by acknowledging, that the Crell. c. 1. Sect. 57. sufferings of Christ have some respect to sin; but if it be such a respect to sin, which makes what Christ underwent a punishment E (which is only proper in this case) it is as much as we contend for. This therefore he is loth to abide by; and saith that chastisement imports no more than bare affliction without any respect to sin, which he thinks to prove [Page 282] from St. Pauls words, 2 Cor. 6. 9. We are chastised, but not A given over to death; but how far this is from proving his purpose will easily appear, 1. Because those by whom they were said to be chastened, did not think they did it without any respect to a fault; but they supposed them to be justly punished; and this is that we plead for, that the chastisement considered with a respect to him that inflicts it, doth suppose some fault as the reason of inflicting it. 2. This is far from the present purpose, for the chastisement there mentioned is oposed to death, as chastened, but not killed; whereas Grotius expresly speaks of such chastisements as include death, that these cannot be B supposed to be meerly designed for instruction, and therefore must be conceived under the notion of punishment. The other place Psal. 73. 14. is yet more remote from the business; for though the Psalmist accounts himself innocent in respect of the great enormities of others; yet he could not account himself so innocent with a respect to God, as not to deserve chastisement from him.
But Crellius offers further to prove that Christs death must be considered as a bare affliction, and not as a [...], or exemplary §. 9. Whether Christs death be a proper. [...], and whether that doth imply that it was a punishment of sin. punishment, because ‘in such a punishment the guilty C themselves are to be punished, and the benefit comes to those who were not guilty, but in Christs sufferings it was quite contrary, for the innocent was punished, and the guilty have the benefit of it: and yet (he saith) if we should grant that Christs sufferings were a [...], that will not prove that his death was a proper punishment.’ To which I answer, That whatever answers to the ends of an exemplary punishment, may properly be called so: but supposing that Christ suffered the punishment of our sins, those sufferings will answer to all the ends of an exemplary punishment. D For the ends of such a punishment assigned by Crellius himself, are, ‘That others observing such a punishment may abstain from those sins which have brought it upon the person who suffers.’ Now the question is, whether supposing Christ did suffer on the account of our sins, these sufferings of his may deter us from the practice of sin or no? And therefore in opposition to Crellius, I shall prove these two things: 1. That supposing Christ suffered for our sins, there was a sufficient argument to deter us from the practice of sin. 2. Supposing that his sufferings had no respect to our E sins, they could not have that force to deter men from the practice of it: for he after asserts, That Christs sufferings might be a [...] to us, though they were no punishment of sin. 1. That the death of Christ considered as a punishment of sin, [Page 283] is a proper [...] or hath a great force to deter men from A the practice of sin: and that because the same reason of punishment is supposed in Christ and in our selves, and because the example is much more considerable, than if we had suffered our selves. 1. The same reason of punishment is supposed. For why are men deterred from sin, by seeing others punished; but because they look upon the sin as the reason of the punishment; and therefore where the same reason holds, the same ends may be as properly obtained. If we said that Christ suffered death meerly as an innocent person out of Gods dominion over his life; what imaginable force could this have to B deter men from sin, which is asserted to have no relation to it as the cause of it? But when we say, that God laid our iniquities upon him, that he suffered not upon his own account but ours, that the sins we commit against God were the cause of all those bitter Agonies which the Son of God underwent, what argument can be more proper to deter men from sin than this is? For hereby they see the great abhorrency of sin which is in God, that he will not pardon the sins of men without a compensation made to his Honor, and a demonstration to the world of his hatred of it. Hereby they C see what a value God hath for his Laws, which he will not relax as to the punishment of offenders, without so valuable a consideration as the blood of his own Son. Hereby they see, that the punishment of sin is no meer arbitrary thing depending barely upon the will of God; but that there is such a connexion between sin and punishment as to the ends of Government, that unless the Honor and Majesty of God, as to his Laws and Government may be preserved, the violation of his Laws must expect a just recompence of reward. Hereby they see what those are to expect who neglect or despise D these sufferings of the Son of God for them; for nothing can then remain, but a certain fearful looking for of judgement and fiery indignation which shall devour the Adversaries. So that, here all the weighty arguments concur which may be most apt to prevail upon men to deter them from their sins. For if God did thus by the green tree, what will be do by the dry? If he who was so innocent in himself, so perfectly holy, suffered so much on the account of our sins; what then may those expect to suffer, who have no innocency at all to plead, and add wilfulness and impenitency to their sins? But if it be replied E by Crellius, that it is otherwise among men: I answer, that we do not pretend in all things to parallel the sufferings of Christ for us, with any sufferings of men for one another. But yet we add, that even among men the punishments inflicted [Page 284] on those who were themselves innocent as to the cause of A them, may be as exemplary as any other. And the greater appearance of severity there is in them, the greater terror they strike into all offenders. As Childrens losing their estates and honors, or being banished for their Parents treasons in which they had no part themselves. Which is a proper punishment on them of their Fathers faults, whether they be guilty or no? and if this may be just in men, why not in God? If any say, that the Parents are only punished in the Children, he speaks that which is contradictory to the common sense of mankind; for punishment doth suppose sense or feeling of it; and in this B case the Parents are said to be punished, who are supposed to be dead and past feeling of it, and the Children who undergo the smart of it must not be said to be punished; though all things are so like it, that no person can imagine himself in that condition, but would think himself punished, and severely too. If it be said, that these are calamities indeed, but they are no proper punishments, it may easily be shewed that distinction will not hold here. Because these punishments were within the design of the Law, and were intended for all the ends of punishments, and therefore must have the nature of them. C For therefore the Children are involved in the Fathers punishment on purpose to deter others from the like actions. There are some things indeed that Children may fall into by occasion of their Fathers guilt, which may be only calamities to them, because they are necessary consequents in the nature of the thing, and not purposely designed as a punishment to them. Thus, being deprived of the comfort and assistance of their Parents, when the Law hath taken them off by the hand of justice: this was designed by the Law as a punishment to the Parents, and as to the Children it is only a necessary consequent D of their punishment. For otherwise the Parents would have been punished for the Childrens faults, and not the Children only involved in that which unavoidably follows upon the Parents punishment. So that Crellius is very much mistaken either in the present case of our Saviours punishment, or in the general reason of exemplary punishments, as among men. But the case of our Saviour is more exemplary, when we consider the excellency of his person, though appearing in our nature, when no meaner sufferings would satisfie, than of so transcendent a nature as he underwent, though he E were the Eternal Son of God, this must make the punishment much more exemplary, than if he were considered only as our Adversaries do, as a meer man. So that the dignity of his person under all his sufferings may justly [Page 285] add a greater consideration to deter us from the practice of sin, A which was so severely punished in him, when he was pleased to be a Sacrifice for our sins. From whence we see that the ends of a [...] are very agreeable with the sufferings of Christ considered as a punishment for sin.
We now consider whether as Crellius asserts, supposing Christs death were no punishment, it could have these effects § 10. Gods hatred of sin could not be seen in the sufferings of Christ, if they were no punishment of sin. Crell. c. 1. p. 69. upon mens minds or no? Yes, he saith, it might, because by his sufferings we might see how severely God would punish wicked and obstinate persons. Which being a strange riddle at the first hearing it, viz. that by the sufferings of an innocent B person without any respect to sin as the cause of them: we should discern Gods severity against those who are obstinate in sin; we ought the more diligently to attend to what is said for the clearing of it. ‘ First, saith he, If God spared not his own most innocent and holy and only Son, than whom nothing was more dear to him in Heaven or Earth, but exposed him to so cruel and ignominious a death; how great and severe sufferings may we think God will inflict on wicked men, who are at open defiance with him?’ I confess my self not subtle enough to apprehend the force of this C argument, viz. If God dealt so severely with him who had no sin either of his own or others to answer for; therefore he will deal much more severely with those that have. For Gods severity considered without any respect to sin, gives rather encouragement to sinners, than any argument to deter them from it. For the natural consequence of it is, that God doth act arbitrarily, without any regard to the good or evil of mens actions; and therefore it is to no purpose to be sollicitous about them. For upon the same account that the most innocent person suffers most severely from him, for D all that we know, the more we strive to be innocent, the more severely we may be dealt with, and let men sin, they can be but dealt severely with, all the difference then is, one shall be called punishments, and the other calamities, but the severity may be the same in both. And who would leave off his sins meerly to change the name of punishments into that of calamities? And from hence it will follow, that the differences of good and evil, and the respects of them to punishment and reward, are but aiery and empty things; but that God really in the dispensation of things to men, hath no regard E to what men are or do, but acts therein according to his own Dominion, whereby he may dispose of men how or which way he pleases. If a Prince had many of his Subjects in open rebellion against him, and he should at that time [Page 286] make his most obedient and beloved, Son to be publickly exposed A to all manner of indignities, and be dishonoured and put to death by the hands of those rebels; could any one imagine that this was designed as an exemplary punishment to all rebels, to let them see the danger of rebellion? No, but would it not rather make them think him a cruel Prince, one that would punish innocency as much as rebellion; and that it was rather better to stand at defiance, and become desperate, for it was more dangerous to be beloved than hated by him, to be his Son than his declared Enemy? So that insisting on the death of Christ as it is considered as a [...], (for of B that we speak now) there is no comparison between our Adversaries hypothesis and ours; but, saith Crellius, the consequence is not good on our side, if Christ suffered the punishment of our sins, therefore they shall suffer much more who continue in sin, for Christ suffered for the sins of the whole world; but they suffer only for their own, and what they have deserved themselves. To which I answer, that the argument is of very good force upon our hypothesis, though it would not be upon theirs. For if we suppose him to be a meer man that suffered, then there could be no argument drawn from C his sufferings to ours, but according to the exact proportion of sins and punishments: but supposing that he had a divine as well as humane nature, there may not be so great a proportion of the sins of the world to the sufferings of Christ, as of the sins of a particular person to his own sufferings; and therefore the argument from one to the other doth still hold. For the measure of punishments must be taken with a proportion to the dignity of the person who suffers them. And Crellius himself confesseth elsewhere, that the dignity of the person is Crell. c. 8. sect. 43. to be considered in exemplary punishment, and that a lesser D punishment of one that is very great, may do much more to deter men from sin, than a greater punishment of one much less. But he yet further urgeth, that the severity of God Crell. c. 1. sect. 57, [...]0. against sinners may be discovered in the sufferings of Christ, because Gods hatredagainst sin is discovered therein. But if we ask how Gods hatred against sin, is seen in the sufferings of one perfectly innocent and free from sin, and not rather his hatred of innocency, if no respect to sin were had therein? he answers, that Gods hatred against sin was manifested, in that he would not spare his only Son to draw men off from sin. For E answer to which, we are to consider the sufferings of Christ as an innocent person, designed as an exemplary cause to draw men off from sin; and let any one tell me, what hatred of sin can possibly be discovered, in proposing the sufferings of a [Page 287] most innocent person to them without any consideration of A sin as the cause of those sufferings? If it be said, that the Doctrine of Christ was designed to draw men off from sin; and that God suffered his Son to dye to confirm this Doctrine, and thereby shewed his hatred to sin. I answer, 1. This is carrying the dispute off from the present business, for we are not now arguing about the design of Christs Doctrine, nor the death of Christ as a means to confirm that, but as a [...], and what power that hath without respect to our sins as the cause of them, to draw us from sin, by discovering Gods hatred to it. 2. The Doctrine of Christ according to their B hypothesis, discovers much less of Gods hatred to sin than ours doth. For if God may pardon sin without any compensation made to his Laws or Honour, if repentance be in its own nature a sufficient satisfaction for all the sins past of our Lives; if there be no such thing as such a Justice in God which requires punishment of sin committed; if the punishment of sin depend barely upon Gods will; and the most innocent person may suffer as much from God without respect to sin as the cause of suffering, as the most guilty; let any rational man judge whether this Doctrine discovers as much Gods abhorrency C of sin, as asserting the necessity of vindicating Gods honour to the World, upon the breach of his Laws, if not by the suffering of the offenders themselves, yet of the Son of God as a sacrifice for the expiation of sin, by undergoing the punishment of our iniquities, so as upon consideration of his sufferings, he is pleased to accept of repentance and sincere obedience, as the conditions upon which he will grant remission of sins; and eternal life. So that if the discovery of Gods hatred to sin be the means to reclaim men from it, we assert upon the former reasons, that much more is done upon our D Doctrine concerning the sufferings of Christ, than can be upon theirs. So much shall suffice to manifest in what sense Christs death may be a [...], and that this doth imply, that his sufferings are to be considered as a punishment of sin.
The next Series of places which makes Christs sufferings § 11. Grotius his arguments from Christ's being made sin and a curse for us defined against Crellius. to be a punishment for sin, are those which assert Christ to be made sin and a curse for us: which we now design to make clear, ought to be understood in no other sense; for as Grotius saith, ‘As the Jews sometimes use sin, for the punishment of sin; as appears, besides other places, by Zach. 14. E 19. Gen. 4. 13. so they call him that suffers the punishment of sin, by the name of sin; as the Latins use the word Piaculum, both for the fault, and for him that suffers for it. Thence under the Law, an expiatory Sacrifice for [Page 288] sin, was called sin, Levit. 4. 3, 29—5. 6. Psal. 40. 7. A Which way of speaking Esaias followed, speaking of Christ, Esai. 53. 10. [...] he made his soul sin, i. e. liable to the punishment of it. To the same purpose St. Paul, 2 Cor. 5. 21. He made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him. To which Crellius replies, ``That as there is no necessity, that by the name of sin, when applied to sufferings, Crell. cap. 1. sect. 60. any more should be implied, than that those sufferings were occasioned by sin, no more is there when it is applied to the person; nay, much less, for he saith, ``No more is required B to this, but that he should be handled as sinners use to be, and undergo the matter of punishment, without any respect to sin, either as the cause or occasion of it. So he saith, The name Sinner is used, 1 King. 1. 21. and in St. Paul, the name of sin in the first clause is to be understood, as of righteousness in the latter; and as we are said to be righteousness in him, when God deals with us as with righteous persons, so Christ was said to be sin for us, when he was dealt with as a sinner. And the Sacrifices for sin under the Law were so called, not with a respect to the punishment of C sin, but because they were offered upon the account of sin, and were used for taking away the guilt of it, or because men were bound to offer them, so that they sinned if they neglected it. So that all that is meant by Esaias and St. Paul is, That Christ was made an expiatory Sacrifice, or that he exposed himself for those afflictions which sinners only by right undergo.’ But let Crellius or any others of them tell me, if the Scripture had intended to express, that the sufferings of Christ were a punishment of our sins, how was it possible to do it more Emphatically than it is done by these expressions D (the custom of the Hebrew Language being considered) not only by saying, that Christ did bear our sins, but, that himself was made sin for us? those phrases being so commonly used for the punishment of sin. Let them produce any one instance in Scripture, where those expressions are applied to any without the consideration of sin? that place 1 King. 1. 21. is very far from it; for in all probability, the design of Bathsheba in making Solomon King was already discovered, which was the reason that Adonijah his elder Brother declaring himself King, invited not him with the rest of the E Kings sons: All that she had for Solomons succession, was a secret promise and oath of David; and therefore she urgeth him now to declare the succession, v. 20. Otherwise, she saith, when David should dye, I and my son Solomon shall be accounted [Page 289] offenders; i. e. saith Crellius, We shall be handled as A offenders, we shall be destroyed: But surely not without the supposition of a fault; by them which should inflict that punishment upon them: The plain meaning is, they should be accused of Treason, and then punished accordingly. But we are to consider, that still with a respect to them, who were the inflicters, a fault or sin is supposed as the reason of their punishment, either of their own or others. But of our Saviour it is not said, That he should be counted as an offender by the Iews; for although that doth not take away his innocency, yet it supposeth an accusation of something, which in it self B deserves punishment. But in Esai. 53. 10. it is said, He made his soul sin; and 2 Cor. 5. 21. That God made him sin for us, which must therefore imply, not being dealt with by men only as a sinner, but that with a respect to him who inflicted the punishment, there was a consideration of sin as the reason of it. We do not deny but Gods suffering him to be dealt with as a sinner by men, is implied in it, for that was the method of his punishment designed; but we say further, that the reason of that permission in God, doth suppose some antecedent cause of it: For God would never have suffered his only C Son, to be so dealt with by the hands of cruel men, unless he had made himself an offering for sin; being willing to undergo those sufferings, that he might be an expiatory Sacrifice for the sins of the world. And although Socinus will not yield, That by being made sin for us should be understood Soc. l. 1. c. 8. Christs being an expiatory Sacrifice for sin; yet Crellius is contented it should be so taken in both places: Which if he will grant, so as by vertue of that Sacrifice, the guilt of sin is expiated, we shall not contend with him about the reasons, why those Sacrifices were called sins, although the most proper D and genuine must needs be that, which is assigned by the Law, that the sins of the people were supposed to be laid upon them, and therefore they were intended for the expiation of them: But it is very unreasonable to say; That Expiatory Sacrifices were called sins, because it would have been a sin to neglect them: For on the same account, all the other Sacrifices must have been called so too; for it was a sin to neglect any where God required them, and so there had been no difference between Sacrifices for sin and others. To that reason of Crellius, from our being made righteous, because dealt with as such, E to Christs being made sin only, because dealt with as a sinner, we need no more than what this parallel will afford us; For as Crellius would never say, that any are dealt with as righteous persons, who are not antecedently supposed to be so; [Page 290] so by his own Argument, Christ being dealt with as a sinner, A must suppose guilt antecedent to it; and since the Apostle declares it was not his own, in those words, Who knew no sin, it follows that it must be the consideration of ours, which must make him be dealt with as a sinner by him, who made him to be sin for us. But to suppose that Christ should be said to be made sin, without any respect to sin, is as much as if the Latins should call any one Scelus, and mean thereby a very honest man; or a Piaculum, without any supposition of his own or others guilt. But we are to consider, that the sufferings of Christ, seeming at first so inconsistent with that relation B to God as his only Son, which the Apostles assert concerning him, they were obliged to vindicate his innocency as to men, and yet withal to shew, that with a respect to God, there was sufficient reason for his permission of his undergoing these sufferings. That he knew no sin, was enough to clear his innocency as to men; but then the question will be asked, If he were so innocent, why did God suffer all those things to come upon him? Did not Abraham plead of old with God, That he would not slay the righteous with the wicked, because Gen. 18. 25. it was repugnant to the righteousness of his nature to do so; C That be far from thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked, and that the righteous should be as the wicked, that be far from thee; shall not the Iudge of all the earth do right? How then comes God to suffer the most perfect innocency to be dealt with so, as the greatest sins could not have deserved worse from men? Was not his righteousness the same still? And Abraham did not think the distinction of calamities and punishments, enough to vindicate Gods proceedings, if the righteous should have been dealt withall as the wicked. And if that would hold for such a D measure of righteousness as might be supposed in such who were not guilty of the great abominations of those places, that it should be enough, not only to deliver themselves, but the wicked too; how comes it that the most perfect obedience of the Son of God, is not sufficient to excuse him from the greatest sufferings of Malefactors? But if his sufferings had been meerly from men, God had been accountable only for the bare permission; but it is said, that he fore-ordained and determined these things to be, that Christ himself complained, that God had forsaken him; and here, that he made E him sin for us: and can we imagine all this to be without any respect to the guilt of sin, as the cause of it? Why should such an expression be used of being made sin? might not many others have served sufficiently to declare the indignities [Page 291] and sufferings he underwent, without such a phrase as A seems to reflect upon Christs innocency? If there had been no more in these expressions than our Adversaries imagine, the Apostles were so careful of Christs honour, they would have avoided such ill-sounding expressions as these were; and not have affected Hebraisms, and uncouth forms of speech, to the disparagement of their Religion. But this is all which our Adversaries have to say, where words are used by them out of their proper sense, that the Prophets and Apostles affected tricks of wit, playing with words, using them sometimes in one sense, and presently quite in another. So B Crellius saith of Esaiah, That he affects little elegancies of words and verbal allusions, which makes him use words Crell. c. 1. sect. 57. sometimes out of their proper and natural sense; thence he tells us, The sufferings of Christ are called chastisements, though they have nothing of the nature of chastisements in them: And from this liberty of interpreting, they make words (without any other reason, than that they serve for their purpose) be taken in several senses in the same verse: For Socinus in one verse of St. Iohns Gospel, makes the World be taken in three several senses: He was in the World, So [...]i [...]. ex [...]l [...]cat. 1 cap. Ioh. v. 10. C there it is taken, saith he, for the men of the world in general: The world was made by him, there it must be understood only of the reformation of things by the Gospel: and, the world knew him not, there it must be taken in neither of the former senses, but for the wicked of the world: What may not one make of the Scripture, by such a way of interpreting it? But by this we have the less reason to wonder, that Socinus should put such an Interpretation upon Gal. 3. 13. Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the Law, being made a curse for us; for it is written, Cursed is every one that D hangeth on a tree: In which he doth acknowledge by the curse, in the first clause to be meant, the punishment of sin, but not in the second: And the reason he gives for it is, amavit enim Socin. de C [...]isto servat. l 2. c. 1. Paulus in execrationis verbo argutus esse. St. Paul affected playing with the word curse, understanding it first in a proper, and then a Metaphorical sense. But it is plain, that the design of S. Paul and Socinus are very different in these words: Socinus thinks he speaks only Metaphorically, when he saith, that Christ was made a curse for us; i. e. by a bare allusion of the name, without a correspondency in the E thing it self; and so that the death of Christ might be called a curse, but was not so: but St. Paul speaks of this not by way of extenuation, but to set forth the greatness and weight of the punishment he underwent for us. He therefore [Page 292] tells us, what it was which Christ did redeem us from, A The curse of the Law; and how he did it, by being not only made a curse, but a curse for us; i. e. not by being hateful to God, or undergoing the very same curse, which we should have done; which are the two things objected by Crellius against our sense; but that the death of Christ was to be considered, not as a bare separation of soul and body, but as properly poenal, being such a kind of death, which none but Malefactors by the Law were to suffer; by the undergoing of which punishment in our stead, he redeemed us from that curse which we were liable to by the violation of B the Law of God. And there can be no reason to appropriate this only to the Iews, unless the death of Christ did extend only to the deliverance of them from the punishment of their sins; or because the curse of the Law did make that death poenal, therefore the intention of the punishment, could reach no further than the Law did; but the Apostle in the very next words speaks of the farther extension of the great blessing promised to Abraham, That it should come upon the Gentils also; and withall those whom the Apostle speaks to, were not Iews, but such as thought they ought to joyn the Law C and Gospel together: that St. Paul doth not mean as Crellius Crell. Annot. in loc. would have it, that Christ by his death did confirm the New Covenant, and so take away the obligation of the Law; (for to what end was the curse mentioned for that? What did the accursedness of his death add to the confirmation of the truth of his Doctrine? and when was ever the curse taken for the continuance of the Law of Moses?) but that Christ by the efficacy of his death as a punishment for sin hath redeemed all that believe and obey him from the curse deserved by their sins, whether inforced by the Law of Moses, D or the Law written in their hearts, which tells the consciences of sinners, that such who violate the Laws of God are worthy of death, and therefore under the curse of the Law.
We come now to the force of the particles which being joyned with our sins as referring to the death of Christ, do §. 12. The particles [...] being joyned to sins, and relating to sufferings, do imply those sufferings to be the punishment of sin. imply that his death is to be considered as a punishment of sin. Not that we insist on the force of those particles [...] and [...], as though of themselves they did imply this (for we know they are of various significations according to the E nature of the matter they are joyned with) but that these being joyned with sins and sufferings together, do signifie that those sufferings are the punishment of those sins. Thus it is said of Christ, that he dyed, [...] [Page 293] for our sins, [...], that he suffered once [...], that Rom. 4. 25. 1 Cor. 15. 3. 1 Pet. 3. 18. Heb. 10 12. Crell. c. 1. Sect. 6. A he gave himself, [...], that he offered a Sacrifice [...]. To which Crellius replies, ‘That if the force of these particles not being joyned with sufferings, may be taken for the final and not for the impulsive cause, they may retain the same sense when joyned with sufferings, if those sufferings may be designed in order to an end; but if it should be granted, that those phrases being joyned with sufferings, Sect. 14. p. 17. do always imply a meritorious cause, yet it doth not follow, it should be here so understood because the matter will not bear it.’ To this a short answer will at present serve: for, B It is not possible a meritorious cause can be expressed more emphatically than by these words being joyned to sufferings: so that we have as clear a testimony from these expressions as words can give; and by the same arts by which these may be avoided any other might; so that it had not been possible for our Doctrine to have been expressed in such a manner, but such kind of answers might have been given as our Adversaries now give. If it had been said in the plainest terms, that Christs death was a punishment for our sins, they would as easily have avoided the force of them as they do of these; C ‘they would have told us the Apostles delighted in an Antanaclasis, and had expressed things different from the natural use of the words by them; and though punishment were sometimes used properly, yet here it must be used only metaphorically because the matter would bear no other sense.’ And therefore I commend the ingenuity of Socinus after all the pains he had taken to enervate the force of those places which are brought against his Doctrine; he tells us plainly, ‘That Socin. de servat. l. 3. c. 6. if our Doctrine were not only once, but frequently mentioned in Scripture; yet he would not therefore believe the D thing to be so as we suppose. For, saith he, seeing the thing it self cannot be, I take the least inconvenient interpretation of the words; and draw forth such a sense from them, as is most consistent with it self and the tenor of the Scripture.’ But for all his talking of the tenor of the Scripture, by the same reason he interprets one place upon these terms, he will do many, and so the tenor of the Scripture shall be never against him: and by this we find, that the main strength of our Adversaries is not pretended to lye in the Scriptures; all the care they have of them is only to reconcile them if possible E with their hypothesis; for they do not deny but that the natural force of the words doth imply what we contend for; but because they say the Doctrine we assert is inconsistent with reason, therefore all their design is to find out any other possible [Page 294] meaning which they therefore assert to be true, because A more agreeable to the common reason of mankind. This therefore is enough for our present purpose, that if it had been the design of Scripture to have expressed our sense, it could not have done it in plainer expressions than it hath done, that no expressions could have been used, but the same arts of our Adversaries might have been used to take off their force, which they have used to those we now urge against them, and that setting aside the possibility of the thing, the Scripture doth very fairly deliver the Doctrine we contend for; or, supposing in point of reason there may be arguments enough to B make it appear possible, there are Scriptures enough to make it appear true. C D E
CHAP. III. A
The words of Scripture being at last acknowledged by our Adversaries to make for us, the only pretence remaining is that our Doctrine is repugnant to reason. The debate managed upon point of reason. The grand difficulty enquired into, and manifested by our Adversaries concessions, not to lie in the greatness of Christs sufferings, or that our sins were the impulsive cause of them, or that it is impossible that one should be punished for anothers faults: or in all cases B unjust: the cases wherein Crellius allows it, instanced. From whence it is proved that he yields the main cause. The arguments propounded whereby he attempts to prove it unjust for Christ to be punished for our sins. Crellius his principles of the justice of punishments examined. Of the relation between desert and punishment. That a person by his own consent may be punished beyond the desert of his own actions. An answer to Crellius his Objections. What it is to suffer undeservedly. Crellius his mistake in the state of the question. The instances of Scripture considered. In C what sense Children are punished for their Parents sins. Ezec. 18. 20. explained at large. Whether the guilty being freed from the sufferings of an innocent person makes that punishment unjust or no? Crellius his shifts and evasions in this matter discovered. Why among men the offenders are not sreed in criminal matters though the sureties be punished. The release of the party depends on the terms of the sureties suffering, therefore deliverance not ipso facto. No necessity of such a translation in criminal, as is in pecuniary matters. D
HAving gained so considerable concessions from our §. 1. The ma [...]ter debated in point of reason. Adversaries concerning the places of Scripture, we come now to debate the matter in point of reason. And if there appear to be nothing repugnant in the Nature of the thing, or to the justice of God, then all their loud clamors will come to nothing; for on that they fix, when they talk the most of our Doctrine being contrary to reason. This therefore we now come more closely to examine, in order E to which we must carefully enquire what it is, they lay the charge of injustice in God upon, according to our belief of Christs sufferings being a punishment for our sins.
[Page 296] 1. It is not, That the offenders themselves do not undergo A the full punishment of their sins. For they assert, that there is no necessity at all that the offenders should be punished from any punitive justice in God: for they eagerly contend that God may freely pardon the sins of men: if so, then it can be no injustice in God not to punish the offenders according to the full desert of their sins.
2. It is not, that God upon the sufferings of Christ doth pardon the sins of men: for they yield that God may do this without any charge of injustice, and with the greatest demonstration of his kindness. For they acknowledge, that the sufferings of B Christ are not to be considered as a bare antecedent condition to pardon, but that they were a moving cause as far as the obedience of Christ in suffering was very acceptable to God.
3. It is not, in the greatness or matter of the sufferings of Christ. For they assert the same which we do. And therefore I cannot but wonder Ce tum est Christum innocentissimum à Deo gravissimis cruciatibus, ipsaque morte suissé assectum; cum [...]on in materiâ poenae absolute & per se consideratá, adeoque etiam in eâ afflictione à quâ poe [...]ae forma abe [...]t, injuria residere à nobis dicatur. Crel. c. 4. Sect. 3. Potuit autem id Deus facere, atque adeo fec [...]t, [...]re dominii, q [...]od i [...] Christi vitam ac corpus habebat; accedente praesertimipsius Christi co [...]s [...]rsu. Id. Ib. Sect. 4. to meet sometimes with those strange out-cries of our making God cruel in the punishing of his son for us: for what do we assert that Christ suffered, which they C do not assert too? Nay doth it not look much more like cruelty in God to lay those sufferings upon him without any consideration of sin? as upon their hypothesis he doth; than to do it supposing he bears the punishment of our iniquities, which is the thing we plead for. They assert all those sufferings to be lawful on the account of Gods dominion, which according to them must cease to be so on the supposition of a meritorious cause. But however from this it appears, that it was not unjust that Christ should suffer those things which he did for us: D the question then is, whether it were unjust that he should suffer the same things, which he might lawfully do on the account of dominion with a respect to our sins as the cause of them.
4. As to this, they acknowledge, that it is not, that the sufferings of Christ were occasioned by our sins, or that our sins were the bare impulsive cause of those sufferings. For they both consess in general, that one mans sins may be the occasion of anothers punishment, so far that he might have escaped punishment, if the others sins had not been the impulsive cause, E of it. And therefore Crellius in the general state of this question, would not have it, whether it be the unjust to punish one Quod si ex thesi speciale sacere velis general [...]m, [...] erit, i [...]justum esse punire innocentem, quacunque tandem de causá idsiat; non vern simpli i [...]r, puaire quem, iam ob alie [...]a delicta; id enim concedi potest non s [...]mper esse inj stum. Crel. c. 4 Sect. 3. [Page 297] for anothers sins; for that he acknowledges it is not, but whether, A for any cause whatsoever it be just to punish an innocent person? And likewise in particular of Christ, they confess, that our sins were the impulsive cause, and the occasion of his sufferings.
5. It is not, that there is so necessary a relation, between guilt and punishment, that it cannot be called a punishment which is inflicted on an innocent person. For Crellius, after a long dicourse of the difference of afflictions and punishments, doth acknowledge, ‘That it is not of the nature of punishment, that the person who is to be punished, should really deserve the C [...] ne illud quide [...] ad naturam poenae req [...]iratur, ut is ipse, q [...]i p [...]ie id [...]s est, poenam reverà fu [...] rit commeritus, Id. Sect. 5. punishment; and afterwards when Grotius urgeth, that B though it be essential to punishment, that it be inflicted for sin, yet it is not, that it be inflicted upon him who hath himself sinned, which he shews, by the similitude of rewards, which though necessary to be given in consideration of service, may yet be given to others besides the person himself upon his account’. All this Crellius acknowledgeth; who saith, ‘They do not make it necessary to the nature, but to the justice of punishment, that it be inflicted upon none but the person who hath offended. So by his own Confession, it is not against the nature of punishment, that one man suffer Poena quidem simpliciter ia innocentem cadit, justa no [...] cadit. Crell. c. 4. Sect. 28. C for anothers faults.’ From whence it follows, that all Socinus his arguments signifie nothing, which are drawn from the impossibility of the thing, that one man should be punished for anothers faults; for Crellius grants the thing to be possible, but denies it to be just; yet not absolutely neither, but with some restrictions and limitations. For,
6. It is not, but that there may be sufficient causes assigned in §. 2. In what cases Crellius grants some may be lawfully punished for the sins of others. some particular cases; wherein it may be just for God to punish some for the sins of others. For Crellius himself hath assigned divers. ‘When there is such a neer conjunction between D them, that one may be said to be punished in the punishment of another: as Parents in their Children and Posterity, Kings in their Subjects, or the body of a State in its Members, Q [...]ia Deu [...] h [...]c p [...]i [...]do ill [...]m q [...]oq [...]e alterum ob cujus peccati cum dicitur [...]rt, si [...]l p [...]nire possit, ob arctio [...]em [...] i [...]ter i [...]os i [...]te [...]ce [...]at co [...] [...]. Crell. [...]b. sect. 5. Crell. p. 242. either in the most, or the most principal, though the fewest:’ but we are to consider, how far he doth extend this way of punishment of some in others. 1. At the greatest distance of time, if they have been of the same Nation; for he extends it to the utmost degree of Gods patience towards a people; ‘For saith he, God doth not presently punish as soon as they have sinned; but spares for a great while, and forbears, iu expectation E of their repentance, in the mean while a great many guilty persons die, and seem to have escaped punishment. But at last the time of Gods patience being past, he punisheth their Posterity by exacting the fu l punishment of their sins upon [Page 298] them, and by this means punisheth their Ancestors t [...]o, A and punisheth their sins in their punishment; for, saith he, all that people are reckoned for one one man of several Ages, and that punishment which is taken of the last, may be for the sins of the first, for the conjunction and succession of them: of which we have an example, saith he, in the destructiof Hierusalem.’ By which we see a very remote conjunction, and a meer similitude in comparing a succession of Ages in a people with those in a man, may (when occasion serves) be made use of to justifie Gods punishing one Generation of men for the sins of others that have been long before. 2. When B sins are more secret, or less remarkable, which God might not punish, unless an occasion were given from others sins impelling him to it; but because God would punish one very near them he therefore punisheth them, that in their punishment he might punish the other. Or in case sins spread through a Family or a people, or they are committed by divers persons at sundry times, which God dot [...] [...] severally punish, but sometimes then, when the Head of a People or Family hath done something which remarkably deserves punishment, whom he will punish in those he is related to, and therefore generally punisheth C the whole Family or People. 3. That which may be a meer exercise of dominion as to some, may be a proper punishment to others; as in the case of Infants, being taken away for their Parents sins; For God, as to the Children, he saith, useth only an act of dominion, but the punishment only redounds to the Parents, who lose them; and though this be done for the very end of punishment, yet he denies, that it hath the nature of Punishment in any but the Parents. 4. That punishment may be intended for those who can have no sense at all of it; as Crellius asserts in the case of Sauls sons, 2 Sam. 21. 8, 14. that D Crell. ib. sect. 11. sect. 19. the punishment was mainly intended for Saul, who was aheady dead. From these concessions of Crellius in this case, we may take notice, 1. That a remote conjunction may be sufficient for a translation of penalty, viz. from one Generation to another. 2. That sins may be truly said to be punished in others, when the offenders themselves may escape punishment, thus the sins of Parents in their Children, and Princes in their Subjects. 3. That an act of dominion in some may be designed as a proper punishment to others. 4. That the nature of punishment is not to be measured by the sense of it. Now E upon these concessions, though our Adversaries will not grant, that Christ was properly punished for our sins, yet they cannot deny but that we may very properly be said to be punished for our sins in Christ, and if they will yield us this, the [Page 299] other may be a strife about words. For surely there may be A easily imagined as great a conjunction between Christ and us, as between the several Generations of the Iews, and that last which was punished in the destruction of Hierusalem: and though we escape that punishment which Christ did undergo, yet we might have our sins punished in him, as well as Princes theirs in their Subjects, when they escape themselves; or rather as Subjects in an innocent Prince, who may suffer for the faults of his people; if it be said, that these are acts of meer dominion as to such a one, that nothing hinders but granting it, yet our sins may be said to be punished in him; as B well as Parents sins are punished properly in meer acts of dominion upon their Children; if it be laid, that can be no punishment where there is no sense at all of it, that is fully taken off by Crellius; for surely we have as great a sense of the sufferings of Christ, as the first Generation of the Iews had of the suffering of the last, before the fatal destruction of the City, or as Saul had of the punishment of his Sons after his death. So that from Crellius his own concessions, we have proved, that our sins may very properly be said to be punished in Christ, although he will not say, that Christ could be properly punished C for our sins; nay he and the rest of our Adversaries not only deny it, but earnestly contend, that it is very unjust to suppose it, and repugnant to the rectitude of Gods nature to do it.
And so we come to consider the mighty arguments that are §. 3. Crellius his arguments propounded. insisted on for the proof of this, which may be reduced to these three; viz. 1. That there can be no punishment but what is deserved, but no man can deserve that another should be punished. 2. That punishment flows from revenge, but there can be no revenge where there hath been no fault. 3. That the punishment of one, cannot any ways be made the punishment of another; and D in case it be supposed possible, then those in whose stead the other is punished, must be actually delivered upon the payment of that debt which was owing to God.
1. That one man cannot deserve anothers punishment, and therefore one cannot be punished for another; for there is no just punishment, but what is deserved. This being the main Argument insisted on by Crellius, must be more carefully considered; but before an answer be made to it, it is necessary that a clear account be given in what sense it is he understands it, which will be best done, by laying down his principles, as to the justice of E punishments, in a more distinct method than himself hath done; which are these following: 1. That no person can be justly punished, either for his own or anothers faults, but he that hath deserved to be punished by some sin of his own: For he [Page 300] still asserts, ‘That the justice of punishment ariseth from a A Crell. c. 4. sect. 3 p. 239, 240. mans own fault, though the actual punishment may be from anothers: But he that is punished without respect to his own guilt, is punished undeservedly; and he that is punished undeservedly, is punished unjustly.’ 2. That personal guilt being supposed one mans sin may be the impulsive cause of anothers punishment, but they cannot be the meritorious. The difference between them he thus explains, ‘The cause, is that which makes a thing to be; the impulsive, that which moves one to do a thing, without any consideration of right that one hath to do it: Merit, is that which makes a man worthy of a B thing, either good or bad, and so gives a right to it; if it be good, to himself; if bad, to him at whose hands he hath deserved it. Now he tells us, that it is impossible, That one mans sins should make any other deserve punishment, but the person who committed them; but they may impel one to punish another, and that justly, if the person hath otherwise deserved to be punished, unjustly if he hath not.’ The reason he gives of it is, ‘That the vitiosity of the act, which is the proper cause of punishment, cannot go beyond the person of the offender; and therefore can oblige none to punishment, C but him that hath committed the fault.’ And therefore he asserts, ‘That no man can be justly punished beyond the desert of his own sins, but there may sometimes be a double impulsive cause of that punishment; viz. His own and other mens, whereof one made that they might be justly Crell. ib. sect. 18. punished, the other that they should be actually: but the later, he saith, always supposeth the former, as the foundation of just punishment; so that no part of punishment could be executed upon him, wherein his own sins were not supposed as the meritorious cause of it.’ These are his two main principles D which we must now throughly examine, the main force of his book lying in them. But if we can prove, that it hath been generally received by the consent of mankind, that a person may be punished beyond the desert of his own actions; if God hath justly punished some for the sins of others, and there be no injustice in one mans suffering by his own consent for another, then these principles of Crellius will be found not so firm as he imagines them.
1. That it hath been generally received by the consent of §. 4. That a person by his own consent may be punished beyond the desert of his own actions. Grot. de Satisf. c. 4. mankind, that a person may be justly punished beyond the desert E of his own actions. For which purpose Grotius objected against Socinus (who appealed to the consent of Nations, about one being punished for anothers fault) ‘That the Heathens did agree, that Children might be punished for their Parents [Page 301] saults, and people for their Princes, and that corporal punishment A might be born by one for another, did appear by the Persians punishing the whole family for the fault of one. The Macedonians the near kindred in the case of Treason, some Cities of Greece, destroying the Children of Tyrants together with them; in all which, the meer conjunction was supposed a sufficient reason without consent; but in case of consent, he saith, They all agreed in the Justice of some being punished for the faults of others. Thence the right of killing hostages among the most civilized nations; and of sureties being punished in Capital matters, if the guilty B appear not, who were thence called [...] who were bound to answer body for body.’ In which cases, the punishment did extend beyond the desert of the person who suffered it; for no other reason is assigned of these sufferings, besides the conjunction of the person, or his consent; but no antecedent guilt is supposed as necessary, to make the punishment just. We are now to consider what Crellius doth answer to this: 1. As to their acknowledgements of Gods punishing Children for their Parents faults, he gives the same answer which he doth to the examples recorded in Scripture to that C purpose, That either they were punished for the sins of others, but their own sins deserved the punishment; or that the Parents were punished in the Children, but the Children were not properly punished. 2. As to punishments among men, he answers two things; 1. ‘That such persons were truly punished, but not justly: for he acknowledges, That in Crell. c. 4. sect. 5. p. 244. such a case it is a proper punishment, and that it is enough in order to that, that any fault be charged upon a person, whether his own or anothers, whether true or false, on the account of which he is supposed worthy to be punished: D And that such a conjunction is sufficient for cruel, angry, or imprudent men; for where ever there is a place, saith he, for anger, there is likewise for punishment.’ So that he consesseth, there may be a true punishment, and that which answers all the reason and ends of punishment assigned by him, where there is no desert at all of it in the person who undergoes it. But then he adds, that this is an unjust punishment, to which I reply, That then the reason of punishment assigned by Crellius before is insufficient; for if this answers all the ends of punishments assigned by him, and yet be unjust, E then it necessarily follows, that those ends of punishment are consistent with the greatest injustice. For he before made punishment to have a natural respect to anger, and makes the ordinary end of punishment to be a satisfaction of the desire of [Page 302] revenge in men, yet now grants, that these may be in an unjust punishment. Neither can it be said, that he considered punishment A only naturally, and not morally; for he tells us, that this is the nature of divine punishments, which are therefore just, because designed for these ends; but in case there be no supposal of a fault at all, then he denyes that it is a punishment, but only an asfliction, and an exercise of dominion. So that according to him, where-ever there is a proper punishment, it must be just, when-ever God doth punish men: and the only difference between God and man supposable in this case is, that we have assurance God will never use his dominion unjustly; but that men do so when they make one to suffer for anothers B fault, notwithstanding a consent and conjunction between the man that committed the fault, and the person that suffers for him. But this is begging the thing in question, for we are debating, whether it be an unlawful exercise of power or no? for we have this presumption, that it is not unlawful, because it may answer all the ends of punishments, and what way can we better judge, whether a punishment be just or no, than by that?
But we are to consider, that we do not here take the person we speak of, abstractly as an innocent person, for then there C §. 5. Objections answered. is no question, but anger and punishment of one as such is unjust; but of an innocent person as supposed under an obligation by his own consent to suffer for another. And in this case we assert, since according to Crellius the natural and proper ends of punishments may be obtained, and the consent of the person takes away the wrong done to him in the matter of his sufferings, so far as he hath power over himself, that such a punishment is not unjust. For if it be, it must suppose some injury to be done; but in this case let them assign where the injury lies; it cannot be to the publick, if the ends of punishments D may be obtained by such a suffering of one for another, by a valid consent of the suffering party; it cannot be to the person in whose room the other suffers, for what injury is that to escape punishment by anothers suffering; it cannot be to the suffering person, supposing that to be true, which the Heathens still supposed, viz. that every man had a power I [...]o quenq [...]am pun [...]re est injust è punire. Crell. p. 240. over his own life. If it be said still, that the unjustice lies in this; that such a one suffers undeservedly, and therefore unjustly. I answer, if be meant by undeservedly without sufficient cause or reason of punishment, then we deny that such E a one doth suffer undeservedly. Immerito in the Greek Glosses is rendred by [...] and Merito by [...] and [...], and in Cicero, jure & merito are most commonly joyned together. [Page 303] So that where there is a right to punish, and sufficient reason for A it, such a one doth not suffer immerito, i. e. undeservedly. If it be said, that such a one is not dignus paena, that implies no more than the other, for dignus, or as the Ancients writ it dicnus, comes from the Greek [...] jus as Vossius tells us, ut dign us sit cui tribui aliquid aequum est: so that where there is an equity in the thing, there is a dignity in the person, or he may be said to be worthy to undergo it. But doth not this lay open the greatest innocency to as great a desert of sufferings, as the highest guilt? By no means. For we make a lyableness to punishment, the natural consequent of guilt: and he that B hath committed a fault, cannot but deserve to be punished, so that no sufferings of others can take away the natural consequence of a bad action, which is a desert of punishment; So that as we say, a wicked action cannot but deserve to be punished, i. e. there is an agreeableness in reason and nature, that he who hath done ill, should suffer ill; so we say likewise there is necessity in nature and reason, that he that hath thus deserved it, must unavoidably suffer it. And on the other side, we say, no man by his innocency can deserve to be punished, i. e. no mans innocency makes him by vertue of C that obnoxious to punishment; but yet we add, that notwithstanding his innocency, the circumstances may be such that he may be justly punished, and in that sense deservedly. So that the Question is strangely mistaken, when it is thus put, Whether an innocent person considered as such, may be justly punished; for no one asserts that, or is bound to do it; but the true question is, whether a person notwith standing his innocency may not by some act of his own will oblige himself to undergo that punishment which otherwise he did not deserve? which punishment, in that case is just and agreeable D to reason: And this is that which we assert and plead for. So that innocency here is not considered any other ways, than whether that alone makes it an unlawful punishment, which otherwise would be lawful, i. e. whether the Magistrate in such cases, where substitution is admittable by the Laws of Nations (as in the cases we are now upon) be bound to regard any more than that the obligation to punishment now lies upon the person, who by his own act hath substituted himself in the others room; and if he proceeds upon this, his action is justifyable and agreeable to reason. If it be said, E that the substitution is unjust, unless the substituted person hath before hand deserved to be punished; it is easily answered, that this makes not the matter at all clearer; for either the person is punished for the former fault, and then there is no [Page 304] substitution; or if he be punished by way of substitution; then A there is no regard at all had to his former fault, and so it is all one as if he were perfectly innocent.
And by this Crellius his answer to the instances both in Scripture §. 6. The instances of Scripture considered. and elsewhere concerning Childrens being punished for their Parents faults, will appear to be insufficient, viz. ‘That God doth never punish them for their Parents faults beyond the desert of their own sins, and therefore no argument can be drawn from thence, that God may punish an innocent person for the sins of others, because he hath punished some for what they were innocent:’ For the force of the argument doth Bnot lye in the supposition of their innocency, as to the ground of punishment in general, for we do not deny, but that they may deserve to be punished for their own faults: but the argument lies in this, whether their own guilt were then considered as the reason of punishment, when God did punish them for their fathers faults? And whether they by their own sins did deserve to be punished not only with the punishment due to their own miscarriages, but with the punishment due to their fathers too? If not, then some persons are justly punished, who have not deserved that punishment they undergo; if they did C deserve it, then one person may deserve to be punished for anothers sins. If it be said, as it is by Crellius, That his own sins make him capable of punishment, and God by occasion of others sins doth execute that punishment, which he might not have done for his own. I answer, we are not enquiring into the bare capacity of punishing, but into the reason of it: was the reason of punishment his own or his fathers sins? If his own, then he was punished only for his own sins; if his fathers, then the punishment may be just which is inflicted without consideration of proper desert of it; for no man (say they) D can deserve to be punished, but for his own sins. But it's said, that the sins of Fathers are only an impulsive cause for God to punish the Children according to the desert of their own sins, which he might otherwise have forborn to punish. Then, the sins of the Fathers are no reason why the Children should be punished; but their own sins are the reason, and their Fathers the bare occasion of being punished for them. But in Scripture, the reason of punishment is drawn from the Fathers sins: and not from the Childrens: For then the words would have run thus, if the Children sin, and deserve punishment E by their own iniquities, then, I will take occasion from their Fathers sins to visit their own iniquities upon them: Whereas the words refer to the Fathers sins as the reason of the Childrens punishment. So in the words of the Law, wherein the reason [Page 305] of punishment ought to be most expresly assigned, it is not, A I will certainly punish the Children, if they continue in the Idolatry of their Fathers; but, I will visit the sins of the Fathers upon the Children, unto the third and fourth Generation Exod 20. 3. of them that hate me: If it were only because of imitation of the Fathers sins by the Children, there could be no reason for the limitation to the third and fourth Generation; for then the reason of punishment would be as long as the imitation continued, whether to the fourth or tenth Generation: And as Alphonsus à Castro observes, ‘If the reason of punishment were the imitation of their Fathers sins, then the Children Alph. à Castro de justâ haeret. punit. l. 2. c. 10. B were not punished for their Fathers sins, but for their own; for that imitation was a sin of their own, and not of their Fathers.’ Besides, if the proper reason of punishment were the sins of the Children, and the Fathers sins only the occasion of it, then where it is mentioned that Children are punished for their Parents sins, the Childrens sins should have been particularly expressed, as the proper cause of the punishment: But no other reason is assigned in the Law, but the sins of the Fathers, no other cause mentioned of Canaans punishment, Gen. 9. 25. but his Fathers sin; nor of the punishment of the people in C Davids time, but his own sin; Lo, I have sinned, and I have done wickedly, but these sheep, what have they done? 2 Sam. 24. 17. Which is no hyperbolical expression, but the assigning the proper cause of that judgement to have been his own sin, as the whole Chapter declares: Nor, of the hanging up of Sauls sons by the Gibeonites, but, that Saul their Father had plotted Sam. 21. 5. their destruction. And in an instance more remarkable than any of those which Crellius answers; viz. the punishment of the people of Iudah, for the sins of Manasses in the time of Iosias; when a through Reformation was designed among D them, the Prince being very good, and all the places of Idolatry destroyed, such a Passover kept as had not been kept before in the time of any King in Israel, yet it then follows, Notwithstanding the Lord turned not from the fierceness of his great wrath, wherewith his anger was kindled against Iudah, 2 Kings 23. v. 4. to v. 21. because of all the provocations wherewith Manasses had provoked him withal. Who can say here, that the sins of Manasseh were only the occasion of Gods punishing the people in Vers. 22. Vers. 26. the time of Iosias for their own sins, when their sins were much less in the time of Iosias, than in any time mentioned E before, after their lapse into Idolatry? Nay, it is expresly said, That Iosiah took away all the abominations out of all the 2 Chron. 34. 33. countries that pertained to the Children of Israel, and made all that were present in Isreal to serve, even to serve the Lord [Page 306] their God. And all his days they departed not from following A the Lord God of their Fathers: To say, that this was done in hypocrisie, and bare outward compliance, is to speak without book; and if the reason of so severe punishments had been their hypocrisie, that ought to have been mentioned; but not only here, but afterwards it is said, that the reason of Gods destroying Iudah, was for the sins of Manasseh; viz. 2 Sam. 24. 3, 4. his Idolatries and Murther, which it is said, the Lord will not pardon. And if he would not pardon, then he did punish for those sins, not barely as the occasion, but as the meritorious cause of that punishment. What shall we say then? Did B the people in Iosiah's time, deserve to be punished for the sins of Manasseh, Grandfather to Iosiah? Or was God so highly provoked with those sins, that although he did not punish Manasseh himself upon his repentance, yet he would let the world see, how much he abhorred them, by punishing those sins upon the people afterwards; although according to the usual proportion of sins punishments, the sins and of the people in that age did not exceed the sins of others ages, as much as the punishments they suffered, did exceed the punishments of other ages: which is necessary according to Crellius his Doctrine; C for if God never punisheth by occasion of their Fathers sins, the Children beyond the desert of their own sins; then it is necessary, that where judgements are remarkably greater, the sins must be so too; the contrary to which is plain in this instance. By which we see, that it is not contrary to the Justice of God in punishing, to make the punishment of some on the account of others sins, to exceed the desert of their own; measuring that desert, not in a way common to all sin; but when the desert of some sins is compared with the desert of others: For it is of this latter we speak of, D and of the method which God useth in punishing sin here, for the demonstration of his hatred of it, according to which the greatest punishments must suppose the greatest sins, either of their own, or others which they suffer for.
But hath not God declared, That he will never punish the Children for the Fathers sins? for the soul that sinneth it shall §. 7. Ezek. 18. 20. explained. Exek. 18. 4, 20. dye; the son shall not bear the iniquity of the Father, &c. To which I answer, These words are to be considered, as an answer to a complaint made by the Iews, soon after their going into Captivity, which they imputed to Gods severity in E punishing them for their Fathers sins. Now the complaint was either true or false; if it were true, then though this was looked upon as great severity in God, yet it was no injustice in him; for though God may act severely, he cannot act unjustly: [Page 307] If it was false, then the answer had been an absolute A denial of it, as a thing repugnant to the Justice of God. Which we do not find here, but that God saith unto them, v. 3. Ye shall not have occasion any more to use this Proverb in Israel: if the thing had been plainly unjust, which they complained of, he would have told them, they never had occasion to use it. But we find the Prophets telling them before hand, that they should suffer for their Fathers sins, Ierem. 15. 3, 4, where he threatens them with destruction and banishment, because of the sins of Manasseh in Ierusalem; and in the beginning of the captivity they complain of this, Lam. B 5. 7. Our Fathers have sinned, and are not, and we have born their iniquities. And Ierem. 31. 28. God saith by the Prophet, that he had watched over them to pluckup, and to pull down, and to destroy, and to afflict: but that he would watch over them to build, and to plant, and in those days they shall say no more, The Fathers have eaten sowre grapes, and the Childrens teeth are set on edge; but every one shall dye for Jer. 31. 29, 30. his own iniquity. Which place is exactly parallel with this in Ezekiel, and gives us a clear account of it, which is, that now indeed God had dealt very severely with them, by making C them suffer beyond, what in the ordinary course of his providence their sins had deserved; but he punished them not only for their own sins, but the sins of their Fathers: But lest they should think, they should be utterly consumed for their iniquities, and be no longer a people enjoying the Land which God had promised them, he tells them by the Prophets, though they had smarted so much, by reason of their Fathers sins, this severity should not always continue upon them; but that God would visit them with his kindness again, and would plant them in their own Land, then they should see no reason D to continue this Proverb among them; for they would then find, Though their Fathers had eaten sowre grapes, their teeth should not be always set on edge with it. And if we observe it, the occasion of the Proverb, was concerning the Land of Israel, [...] super terra Israel, as the Chaldee Paraphrast renders it more agreeable to the Hebrew, than the Ezek. 18. 2. other Versions do. So that the Land of Israel was the occasion of the Proverb, by their being banished out of it for their Fathers sins: Now God tells them, they should have no more occasion to use this Proverb concerning the Land of Israel; E for they, notwithstanding their Fathers sins, should return into their own Land. And even during the continuance of their captivity, they should not undergo such great severities for the future, but they should find their condition much more [Page 308] tolerable than they imagined; only, if any were guilty of A greater sins than others, they should themselves suffer for their own faults, but he would not punish the whole Nation for them, or their own posterity. This I take to be the genuine meaning of this place; and I the rather embrace it, because I find such insuperable difficulties in other Interpretations that are given of it: For to say as our Adversaries do, That what God saith, should not be for the future, was repugnant to his nature and justice ever to do, is to charge God plainly with injustice in what he had done: For the Prophets told them they should suffer for the sins of their Fathers: Which sufferings B were the ground of their complaint now, and the answer here given must relate to the occasion of the complaint; for God saith, They should not have occasion to use that Proverb: Wherein is implied, they should not have the same reason to complain which they had then. I demand then, Do not these words imply, That God would not do for the future with them, what he had done before; if not, the proper answer had been a plain denial, and not a promise for the future he would not; if they do, then either God properly punished them for the sins of their Fathers, and then God must be unjust C in doing so; or it was just with God to do it, and so this place instead of overthrowing will prove, that some may be justly punished, beyond the desert of their own sins: or else, God did only take occasion by their Fathers sins, to punish them according to the desert of their own iniquities: But then they had no cause to complain, that they were punished for any more than their own iniquities; and withal, then God doth oblige himself by his promise here, never to punish men for the future by the occasion of others sins: which is not only contrary to their own Doctrine, but to what is plainly seen afterwards D in the punishment of the Iews for their Fathers sins, mentioned by our Saviour after this: And if this be a certain rule of equity which God here saith, that he would never vary Matth. 23. 35. from, then the punishing of some on the occasion of others sins, would be as unjust, as our Adversaries suppose the punishing any beyond the desert of their own sins to be. But is it not implyed, that Gods ways would be unequal, if he ever Ezek. 18. 25. did otherwise than he there said he would do? No, it is not, if by equal he meant just, for his ways never were, or can be so unequal; but here if it be taken with a respect to the main E dispute of the Chapter, no more is implied in them, but that they judged amiss concerning Gods actions, and that they were just, when they thought them not to be so: or if at least, they thought his ways very severe, though just, God by remitting [Page 309] of this severity, would shew that he was not only A just, but kind; and so they would find his ways equal, that is, always agreeable to themselves, and ending in kindness to them, though they hitherto were so severe towards them in their banishment and captivity. Or if they be taken with a respect to the immediate occasion of them both, Ezek. 18.—33. They do not relate to this dispute about Childrens suffering for their Fathers sins; but to another, which was concerning Ezek. 33. 20. a righteous mans sinning and dying in his sins, and a wicked mans repenting, and living in his righteousness; which were directly contrary to the common opinion of the B Iews to this day, which is, that God will judge men according to the greatest number of their actions good or bad: as appears by Maimonides and others. Now they thought it a very hard case, for a man who had been righteous the far greatest part of his time, if he did at last commit iniquity, that his former righteousness should signifie nothing, but he must dye in his iniquity. To this therefore God answers, that it was only the inequality of their own ways, which made them think Gods ways in doing so unequal. This then doth not make it unequal, for God either to punish men, upon the occasion, C or by the desert of other mens sins, supposing such a conjunction between them, as there is in the same body of people, to those who went before them. And Crellius himself grants, ‘That Socinus never intended to prove, that one mans suffering for anothers sins was unjust in it self, from this place: Crell. c. 4. sect. 15. no, not though we take it in the strictest sense, for one suffering in the stead of another.’
Having thus far cleared, how far it is agreeable to Gods Justice, to punish any persons either by reason of his dominion, §. 8. The deliverance of the guilty by the sufferings of an innocent person by his own consent, makes not the punishment unjust. or the conjunction of persons, for the sins of others, D and consequently whether any punishment may be undergone justly beyond the proper desert of their own sins, I now return to the consent of Mankind in it, on supposition either of a neer conjunction, or a valid consent which must make up the want of dominion in men without it. And the question still proceeds upon the supposition of those things, that there be a proper dominion in men over that which they part with for others sakes, and that they do it by their free consent; and then we justifie it not to be repugnant to the principles of Reason and Justice for any to suffer beyond the desert of their E own actions. And Crellius his saying, that such a punishment is true punishment, but not just; is no answer at all to the consent of Nations that it is so. And therefore finding this answer insufficient; he relies upon another, viz. ‘That [Page 310] it was never received by the consent of Nations, that one A Crell. c. 4 sect. 30 32, 34, & [...]. man should suffer in the stead of another, so as the guilty should be freed by the others suffering. For he saith, neither Socinus nor he do deny that one man may be punished for anothers sins; but that which they deny is, that ever the innocent were punished so as the guilty were freed by it, and so he answers, in the case of Hostages and Sureties, their punishment did never excuse the offenders themselves. And to this purpose he saith, Socinus his argument doth hold good, that though one mans money may become anothers, yet one mans sufferings cannot become anothers: For, saith B he, if it could, then it would be all one who suffered, as it is who pays the money due: And then the offender must be presently released, as the Debtor is upon payment of the debt.’ This is the substance of what is said by him upon this Argument. To which I reply; 1. That this gives up the matter in dispute at present between us; for the present question is, Whether it be unjust for any one to suffer beyond the desert of his own actions? Yes saith Crellius, it is, in case he suffers so, as that the guilty be freed by his sufferings. But we are not enquiring, Whether it be just for another person to be freed C for a mans suffering for him? but whether it be just for that man to suffer by his own consent, more than his own actions, without that consent deserved? The release of another person by vertue of his sufferings, is a matter of another consideration. Doth the freeing or not freeing of another by suffering, add any thing to the desert of suffering? He that being wholly innocent, and doth suffer on the account of anothers fault, doth he not suffer as undeservedly, though another be not freed, as if he were? As in the case of Hostages or Sureties, doth it make them at all the more guilty, because the D persons they are concerned for, will be punished notwithstanding, if they come under the power of those who exacted the punishment upon them, who suffered for them? Nay, is not their desert of punishment so much the less, in as much as the guilty are still bound to answer for their own offences? If we could suppose the guilty to be freed by the others sufferings, it would be by supposing their guilt more fully translated upon those who suffer, and consequently, a greater obligation to punishment following that guilt. From whence it follows, that if it be just to punish, when the person is not delivered E from whom the other suffers, it is more just when he is; for the translation of the penalty is much less in the former case, than in latter; and what is just upon less grounds of punishment, must be more just upon greater. I look on this [Page 311] therefore but as a shift of Crellius, hoping thereby to avoid A the consent of mankind in one mans suffering for another, without attending to the main argument he was upon; viz. The justice of one person suffering for another. 2. It is a very unreasonable thing, to make an action unjust for that, which of it self is acknowledged by our Adversaries to be very just; viz. The pardoning the offenders themselves. If it were just to suffer, if the other were not pardoned, and it were just to pardon, whether the other were punished or no, how comes this suffering to be unjust, meerly by the others being pardoned by it: nay, is it not rather an Argument, that those B sufferings are the most just, which do so fully answer all the ends of punishments; that there is then no necessity that the offender should suffer; but that the Supreme Governor having obtained the ends of Government, by the suffering of one for the rest, declares himself so well pleased with it, that he is willing to pardon the offenders themselves. 3. Many of those persons who have had their sins punished in others, have themselves escaped the punishment due to the desert of their sins. As is plain in the case of Ahab, whose punishment was not so great as his sins deserved, because the full punishment of them was C reserved to his posterity. If it be said, as it is by Crellius, That Ahab was not wholly freed, his life being taken away, Crell. c. 4. sect 25. 1 King 21. 19. for his own sins: That gives no sufficient answer; for if some part of the punishment was deferred, that part he was delivered from; and the same reason in this case will hold for the whole as the part. As is plain in the case of Manasseh, and several others, the guilt of whose sins were punished on their posterity, themselves escaping it. 4. Our Adversaries confess, that in some cases it is lawful and just for some to suffer, with a design that others may be freed by their suffering for them. Thus D they assert, That one Christian, not only may, but ought to lay down his life for another, if there be any danger of his denying the truth, or be judges him far more useful and considerable than himself: so likewise a son for his Father, one Brother for another, or a Friend, or any, whose life he thinks more useful Crell. cap. 6. sect. 39. than his own. Now I ask, whether a man can be bound to a thing that is in its own nature unjust? if not, as it is plain he cannot, then such an obligation of one man to suffer for the delivery of another cannot be unjust, and consequently the suffering it self cannot be so. But Crellius saith, The injustice E in this case lies wholly upon the Magistrate who admits it: but I ask wherefore is it unjust in the Magistrate to admit it? is it because the thing is in it self unjust? if so, there can be no obligation to do it; and it would be as great a sin to undergo [Page 312] it as in the Magistrate to permit it; but if it be just in A it self, we have obtained what we contend for; viz. that it may be just for a man to suffer beyond the desert of his own actions; for he that lays down his life for his Brethren, doth not deserve by his own actions that very punishment which he undergoes. And if the thing be in it self just, how comes it to be unjust in him that permits it? 5. The reason why among men the offenders themselves are punished, is because those were not the terms, upon which the persons suffered. For if they had suffered upon these terms that the other might be freed, and their suffering was admitted of by the Magistrate on that consideration, then in all reason and B justice the offenders ought to be freed on the account of the others suffering for them. But among men the chief reason of the obligation to punishment of one man for another, is not, that the other might be freed, but that there may be security given to the publick, that the offenders shall be punished: and the reason of the sureties suffering is not to deliver the offender, but to satisfie the Law, by declaring that all care is taken that the offender should be punished, when in case of his escape, the surety suffers for him. But it is quite another thing when the person suffers purposely that others might be C freed by his suffering, for then in case the suffering be admitted, the release of the other is not only not unjust, but becomes due to him that suffered, on his own terms. Not as though it followed ipso facto as Crellius fancies, but the manner of release doth depend upon the terms which he who suffered for them, shall make in order to it. For upon this suffering of one for another upon such terms, the immediate consequent of the suffering is not the actual discharge but the right to it which he hath purchased; and which he may dispense upon what tèrms he shall judge most for his honour. 6. Although D one persons sufferings cannot become anothers so as one mans Money may; yet one mans sufferings may be a sufficient consideration on which a benefit may accure to another. For to that end a donation, or such a transferring right from one to another as is in Money, is not necessary, but the acceptation which it hath from him who hath the power to pardon. If he declare that he is so well pleased with the sufferings of one for another, that in consideration of them, he will pardon those from whom he suffered; where lies the impossibility or unreasonableness of the thing? For Crellius grants, E Crell. ib. sect. 18. that rewards may be given to others than the persons who did the actions in consideration of those actions; and why may not the sufferings of one for others, being purposely undertaken for [Page 313] this end, be available for the pardon of those whom he suffered A for? For a man can no more transfer the right of his good actions, than of his sufferings. From all which it follows, that one person may by his own consent, and being admitted thereto by him to whom the right of punishing belongs, suffer justly; though it be beyond the desert of his own actions; and the guilty may be pardoned on the account of his sufferings. Which was the first thing we designed to prove from Crellius, in order to the overthrowing his own hypothesis. For it being confessed by him that such sufferings have all that belongs to the nature of punishments, and since God hath justly punished B some for the sins which they have not committed; since all Nations have allowed it just for one man by his own consent to suffer for another; since it cannot be unjust for the offender to be released by anothers sufferings, if he were admitted to suffer for that end, it evidently follows, contrary to Crellius his main Principle, that a person may be justly punished beyond the desert of his own actions: And so that first argument of Crellius cannot hold, that one man cannot by his own consent suffer for another, because no man can deserve anothers punishment, and no punishment is just but what is deserved. C His second argument from the nature of anger and revenge hath been already answered in the first Discourse about the nature and ends of punishments, and [...]s third argument, that one mans punishment cannot become anothers, immediately before. And so we have finished our first consideration of the sufferings of Christ in general, as a punishment of our sins, which we have shewed to be agreeable both to Scripture and Reason. D E
CHAP. IV. A
e Death of Christ considered as an Expiatory Sacrifice for sin. What the expiation of sin was by the Sacrifices under the Law; twofold, Civil and Ritual. The Promises made to the Iews under the Law of Moses, respected them as a People, and therefore must be temporal. The typical nature of Sacrifices asserted. A substitution in the Expiatory Sacrifices under the Law, proved from Lev. 17. 11. and the Concession of Crellius about the signification of [...] joyned with [...] B Lev. 10. 17. explained. The expiation of uncertain murther proves a substitution. A substitution of Christ in our room proved from Christ being said to dye for us; the importance of that phrase considered. In what sense a Surrogation of Christ in our room is asserted by us. Our Redemption by Christ proves a substitution. Of the true notion of Redemption: that explained, and proved against Socinus and Crellius. No necessity of paying the price to him that detains captive, where the captivity is not by force, but by sentence of Law. Christs death a proper [...]: and therefore the C [...] attributed to it, cannot be taken for meer deliverance.
WE come now to consider the death of Christ, §. 1. The death of Christ considered as an Expiatory Sacrifice for sin. as an Expiatory Sacrifice for the sins of mankind: Which is as much denied by our Adversaries, as that it was a punishment for our sins. For though they do not deny, That Christ as a Priest did offer up a Sacrifice of Expiation for the sins of men; yet they utterly deny, That this was performed on earth, or that D the Expiation of sins did respect God, but only us; or, that the death of Christ, had any proper efficacy towards the expiation of sin, any further than as it comprehends in it all the consequences of his death, by a strange Catechresis. I shall now therefore prove, that all things which do belong to a proper Expiatory Sacrifice, do agree to the death of Christ. There are three things especially considerable in it: 1. A Substitution in the place of the Offenders. 2. An Oblation of it to God. 3. An Expiation of sin consequent upon it. Now these three, I shall make appear to agree fully to the death of E Christ for us.
1. A Substitution in the place of the Offenders. That we are to prove, was designed in the Expiatory Sacrifices under the Law, and that Christ in his death for us, was substituted in our place. [Page 315] 1. That in the Expiatory Sacrifices under the Law, there was A a Substitution of them in the place of the Offenders. This our Adversaries are not willing to yield us, because of the correspondency which is so plain in the Epistle to the Hebrews, between those Sacrifices, and that which was offered up by Christ. We now speak only of those Sacrifices, which we are sure were appointed of old for the expiation of sin, by God himself. As to which the great rule assigned by the Apostle was, That without shedding of blood there was no remission. If we Heb. 9. 22. yield Crellius what he so often urgeth; viz. That these words are to be understood, of what was done under the Law: They Crell c. 10. sect. 14. B will not be the less serviceable to our purpose; for thereby it will appear, that the means of Expiation lay in the shedding of blood: Which shews, that the very mactation of the beast to be sacrificed, was designed in order to the expiation of sin. To an inquisitive person, the reason of the slaying such multitudes of beasts in the Sacrifices appointed by God himself among the Iews, would have appeared far less evident than now it doth, since the Author of the Epistle to the Hebrews hath given us so full an account of them. For it had been very unreasonable to have thought, that they had been meerly instituted C out of compliance with the customs of other Nations, since the whole design of their Religion, was to separate them from them: and on such a supposition the great design of the Epistle to the Hebrews signifies very little; which doth far more explain to us the nature and tendency of all the Sacrifices in use among them, that had any respect to the expiation of sins, than all the customs of the Egyptians, or the Commentaries of the latter Iews. But I intend not now to discourse at large, upon this subject of Sacrifices, either as to the nature and institution of them in general, or with a particular respect to the D Sacrifice of Christ, since a learned person of our Church, hath already undertaken Crellius upon this Argument, and we hope ere long will oblige the world with the benefit of his pains. I shall therefore only insist on those things which are necessary for our purpose, in order to the clearing the Substitution of Christ in our stead, for the expiation of our sins by his death; and this we say was represented in the Expiatory Sacrifices, which were instituted among the Iews. If we yield Crellius what he after Socinus contends for; viz. That the Sacrifice Crell. c. 10. sect. 13. of Christ was only represented in the publick and solemn Expiatory E Sacrifices for the people, and especially those on the day of Atonement: We may have enough from them to vindicate all that we assert, concerning the Expiatory Sacrifice of the blood of Christ.
[Page 316] For that those were designed by way of Substitution in the A place of the offenders, will appear from the circumstances and §. 2. What the expiation of si [...] was by the sacrifices under the Law. reason of their Institution: But before we come to that, it will be necessary to shew what that Expiation was, which the Sacrifices under the Law were designed for; the not understanding of which, gives a greater force to our Adversaries Arguments, than otherwise they would have. For while men assert, that the expiation was wholly typical, and of the same nature with that expiation which is really obtained by the death of Christ, they easily prove, That all the expiation then, was only declarative, and did no more depend on the sacrifices offered, than B on a condition required by God, the neglect of which would be an act of disobedience in them; and by this means it could represent, say they, no more than such an expiation to be by Christ; viz. Gods declaring that sins are expiated by him, on the performance of such a condition required in order thereto, as laying down his life was. But we assert another kind of expiation of sin, by vertue of the Sacrifice being slain and offered; which was real, and depended upon the Sacrifice: And this was twofold, a Civil, and a Ritual expiation, according to the double capacity in which the people of the Iews may be considered, either C as members of a Society, subsisting by a body of Laws, which according to the strictest Sanction of it, makes death the penalty of disobedience, Deut. 27. 26. but by the will of the Legislator, did admit of a relaxation in many cases, allowed by himself; in which he declares, That the death of the beast designed for a Sacrifice should be accepted, instead of the death of the offender; and so the offence should be fully expiated, as to the execution of the penal Law upon him. And thus far, I freely admit what Grotius asserts upon Grot. de Satisf. c. 10. this subject, and do yield that no other offence could be D expiated in this manner, but such which God himself did particularly declare should be so. And therefore no sin which was to be punished by cutting off, was to be expiated by Sacrifice; as wilful Idolatry, Murther, &c. Which it is impossible for those to give an account of, who make the expiation wholly typical; for why then should not the greatest sins much rather have had sacrifices of expiation appointed for them: because the Consciences of men would be more solicitous for the pardon of greater than lesser sins; and the blood of Christ represented by them, was designed E for the expiation of all. From whence it is evident, that it was not a meer typical expiation; but it did relate to the civil constitution among them. But besides this, we are to consider the people with a respect to that mode of Divine [Page 317] Worship which was among them; by reason of which, the A people were to be purified from the legal impurities which they contracted, which hindred them from joyning with others in the publick Worship of God, and many Sacrifices were appointed purposely for the expiating this legal guilt, as particularly, the ashes of the red heifer, Numb. 19. 9. which is there called a purification for sin. And the Apostle puts the Heb. 9. 12, 13. blood of Bulls and of Goats, and the ashes of a heifer sprinkling the unclean, together; and the effect of both of them, he saith, was to sanctifie to the purifying of the flesh; which implies, that there was some proper and immediate effect of these B sacrifices upon the people at that time, though infinitely short of the effect of the blood of Christ upon the Consciences of men. By which it is plain, the Apostle doth not speak of the same kind of expiation in those sacrifices, which was in the Sacrifice of Christ, and that the one was barely typical of the other; but of a different kind of expiation, as far as purifying the flesh is from purging the Conscience. But we do not deny, that the whole dispensation was typical, and that the Law had Heb. 10. 1. a shadow of good things to come, and not the very image of the things, i. e. a dark and obscure representation, and not the C perfect resemblance of them. There are two things which the Apostle asserts concerning the Sacrifices of the Law: First, that they had an effect upon the Bodies of men, which he calls purifying the flesh; the other is, that they had no power to expiate for the sins of the soul, considered with a respect to the punishment of another life, which he calls purging the Conscience from dead works; and therefore he saith, that all the gifts Heb. 9. 9. 10. 4. and sacrifices under the Law, could not make him that did the service perfect, as pertaining to the Conscience, and that it was impossible that the blood of Bulls and Goats should take D away sin. So that the proper expiation which was made by them, was civil and ritual, relating either to corporal punishment, or to legal uncleanness, from whence the Apostle well proves the necessity of a higher Sacrifice to make expiation for sins, as pertaining to the Conscience: But that expiation among the Iews did relate to that Polity which was established among them, as they were a people under the Government of a body of Laws distinct from the rest of the world. And they being considered as such, it is vain to enquire, whether they had only temporal or eternal promises; for it was impossible E they should have any other than temporal, unless we imagine, that God would own them for a distinct people in another World as he did in this. For what Promises relate to a People as such, must consider them as a People, and in that [Page 318] capacity they must be the blessings of a Society, viz. peace plenty, A number of People, length of days, &c. But we are far from denying that the general Principles of Religion did remain among them, viz. that there is a God, and a rewarder of them that seek him; and all the Promises God made to the Patriarchs, did continue in force as to another Country, and were continually improved by the Prophetical instructions among them. But we are now speaking of what did respect the people in general, by vertue of that Law which was given them by Moses, and in that respect the punishment of saults being either death or exclusion from the publick Worship, the expiation of them, was taking away the obligation to either of these, which B was the guilt of them in that consideration.
But doth not this take away the typical nature of these sacrifices? No, but it much rather establisheth it. For as Socinus argues, ‘If the expiation was only typical, there must be something in the type correspondent to that which is typified Soci [...]. de servat. l. 2. c. 10. Prael [...]ct. Theolog. cap. 22. by it. As the Brazen Serpent typified Christ, and the benefit which was to come by him, because as many as looked up to it were healed. And Noahs Ark is said to be a type of Baptism, because as many as entred into that were saved from the deluge. So Corinth. 10. the Apostle saith, that those C things happened to them in types, v. 11. because the events which happened to them, did represent those which would fall upon disobedient Christians.’ So that to make good the true notion of a Type, we must assert an expiation that was real then, and agreeable to that dispensation, which doth represent an expiation of a far higher nature, which was to be by the Sacrifice of the Blood of Christ.
Which being premised, I now come to p [...]ove, that there was a substitution designed of the Beast to be slain and sacrificed §. 3. A substitution proved from Levit. 17. 11, &c. in stead of the offenders themselves. Which will appear from D Levitious 17. 11. For the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it you upon the Altar, to make an Atonement for your Souls; for it is the blood that maketh an Atonement for the Soul. The utmost that Crellius would have meant by Crell c. 10. sect. 9. this place is, that there is a double reason assigned of the prohibition of eating blood, viz. that the life was in the blood, and that the blood was designed for expiation; but he makes these wholly independent upon each other. But we say, that the proper reason assigned against the eating of the blood, is that which is elsewhere given, when this Precept is mentioned, E viz. that the blood was the life, as we may see Gen. 9. 4 Levit. 17. 14. but to confirm the reason given, that the blood was the life; he adds, that God had given them that upon the [Page 319] Altar for an Atonement for their Souls: So the Arabick Version A renders it, and therefore have I given it you upon the Altar, viz. because the blood is the life: And hereby a sufficient reason is given, why God did make choice of the blood for atonement, for that is expressed in the latter clause, for it is the blood that maketh an atonement for the Soul; why should this be mentioned here, if no more were intended but to give barely another reason why they should not eat the blood? what force is there more in this clause to that end, than in the soregoing? for therein God had said, that he had given it them for an Atonement. If no more had been intended, but the B bare prohibition of common use of the blood, on the account of its being consecrated to sacred use, it had been enough to have said, that the blood was holy unto the Lord, as it is in the other instances mentioned by Crellius, of the holy Oyntment and Perfume, for no other reason is there given, why it Exod. 30. 32, 33. 37. 38. should not be profaned to common use, but that it should be holy for the Lord; if therefore the blood had been forbidden upon that account, there had been no necessity at all of adding, that the blood was it that made atonement for the Soul: which gives no peculiar reason why they should not eat the blood, beyond C that of bare consecration of it to a sacred use; but if we consider it as respecting the first clause, viz. For the life of the flesh is in the blood, then there is a particular reason why the blood should be for atonement, viz. because the life was in that; and therefore when the blood was offered, the life of the Beast was supposed to be given instead of the life of the offender. According to that of Ovid,
This will be yet made clearer by another instance produced D by Crellius to explain this, which is the forbidding the eating of fat, which, saith he, is joyned with this of blood, Levit. 3. 17. It shall be a perpetual S [...]atute for your Generations, throughout all your dwellings, that ye eat neither fat, nor blood. To the same purpose, Levit. 7. 23, 25, 26. Now no other reason is given of the prohibition of the fat, but this, All the fat is the Lords. Which was enough to keep them Lev. 3. 16. from eating it; but we see here in the case of blood somewhat further is assigned, viz. that it was the life; and therefore was most proper for expiation, the life of the beast being substituted E in the place of the offenders. Which was therefore called anamalis hostia among the Romans, as Grotius observes upon this place, and was distinguished from those whose entrails were observed; for in those Sacrifices as Servius saith, sola anima Servius ad Aencid. 4. [Page 320] Deo sacratur, the main of the Sacrifice lay in shedding of the A blood, which was called the Soul; and so it is [...] in this place. From whence it appears that such a sacrifice was properly [...], for the same word [...] is used, both relating to the blood and the soul, that is expiated by it: and the LXX do accordingly render it, [...], and in the last clause, [...]. From Eus [...]b. demonst. Evang l. 1. c. 10. whence Eusebius calls these Sacrifices of living Creatures, [...], and afterwards saith they were [...]. And Crellius elsewhere Crell. cap. 8. sect. 23. Denotat e [...]im vo [...] [...] eos quorum alter pro altero animam po [...]at aut devoveat, & fie id malum quod alteri sube [...]nd [...]m erat ejus loco subire non detrectet. grants, that where [...] is joyned with [...] it doth imply B that one doth undergo the punishment which another was to have undergone, which is all we mean by substitution, it being done in the place of another. From whence it follows, that the Sacrifices under the Law being said to be [...] doth necessarily infer a substitution of them in the place of the offenders. And from hence may be understood, what is meant by the Goat of the Sin offering, bearing the iniquity of the Congregation, to make atonement for them before the Lord, Levit. 10. 17. for Crellius his saying, That bearing is as much as taking away, or declaring that they are C taken away, hath been already disproved: And his other answer hath as little weight in it; viz. That it is not said, that the sacrifice did bear their iniquities, but the Priest: For, 1. The Chaldee Paraphrast, and the Syriack Version, understand it wholly of the Sacrifice. 2. Socinus himself grants, Soci [...]. de servat. l. 2. c. 11. That if it were said, the Priest did expiate by the sacrifices, it were all one as if it were said, that the sacrifices themselves did expiate; because the expiation of the Priest was by the sacrifice. Thus it is plain in the case of uncertain murther, mentioned Deut 21. from the first to the tenth; If a D murther were committed in the Land, and the person not known who did it, a heifer was to have her head cut of by the Elders of the next City; and by this means they were to put away the guilt of the innocent blood from among them: The reason of which was, because God had said before, That blood defiled the Land, and the Land cannot be cleansed Numb. 35. 33. of the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it. From whence it appears, that upon the shedding of blood, there was a guilt contracted upon the whole Land wherein it was shed, and in case the Murtherer was not found to expiate that guilt by his own blood, then E it was to be done by the cutting off the head of a heifer instead of him: In which case, the death of the heiser was to do as much towards the expiating the Land, as the death [Page 321] of the Murtherer if he had been found: And we do not contend, A that this was designed to expiate the Murtherers guilt (which is the Objection of Crellius against this instance) Crell. c. 10. sect 9. but that a substitution here was appointed by God himself, for the expiation of the peo [...]: For what Crellius adds, That the people did not deserve punishment, and therefore needed no expiation; it is a flat contradiction to the Text: For the prayer appointed in that case is, Be merciful, O Deut. 21. 8. Lord, unto thy people Israel, whom thou hast redeemed, and lay not innocent blood unto thy people Israels Charge, and the blood shall be expiated; for the same word [...] is B used here, which is in the other places where Expiation is spoken of. So that here must be some guilt supposed, where there was to be an expiation, and this expiation was performed by the substitution of a sacrifice in the place of the offender. Which may be enough at present to shew, that a substitution was admitted by the Law, of a sacrifice instead of the offender, in order to the expiation of guilt; but whether the offender himself was to be freed by that Sacrifice, depends upon the terms on which the sacrifice was offered; for we say still, that so much guilt was expiated, as the sacrifice C was designed to expiate; if the sacrifice was designed to expiate the guilt of the offender, his sin was expiated by it; if not his, in case no sacrifice was allowed by the Law, as in that of murther, then the guilt which lay upon the Land was expiated, although the offender himself were never discovered.
I now come to prove, that in correspondency to such a substitution §. 4. A substitution of Christ in o [...]r room proved by his dying for us. of the sacrifices for sin under the Law, Christ was substituted in our room for the expiation of our guilt; and that from his being said to dye for us, and his death being D called a price of Redemption for us.
1. From Christs being said to dye for us. By St. Peter, 1 Pet. 3. 18. 2. 21. 4. 1. For Christ hath also once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust; by whom he is also said, to suffer [...], for us, and, for us in the flesh: By St. Paul, he is said to dye [...], for all, and [...], for the ungodly, and to give himself [...], a ransom for all, and, to 2 Cor. 5. 14. Rom. 5. 6. 1 Tim. 2 6. Heb. 2 9. John 11 50. Luke 22. 19, 20. taste death [...], for every man: By Caiaphas, speaking by inspiration, he is said to dye [...], for the people. So Christ himself instituting his last Supper said, This E is my body which was given, and my blood which was shed [...], for you; and before he had said, That the Son of man came to give his life [...], a ransom for many. Matth. 20. 28. We are now to consider, what arts our Adversaries [Page 322] have made use of to pervert the meaning of these places, A so as not to imply a substitution of Christ in our room: 1. They say, That all these phrases do imply no more, than a final cause; viz. That Christ died for the good of mankind; 1 John 3. 16. Colos [...]. 1. 24. for the Apostle tells us, We are bound to lay down our lives for the Brethren, and St. Paul is said to suffer for the Church. To which I answer; 1. This doth not at all destroy that which we now plead for; viz. That these phrases do imply a substitution of Christ in our room: For when we are bid to lay down our lives for our brethren, a substitution is implied therein; and supposing that dying for another, B doth signifie dying for some benefit to come to him, yet what doth this hinder substitution, unless it be proved, that one cannot obtain any benefit for another, by being substituted in his room. Nay, it is observable, that although we produce so many places of Scripture, implying such a substitution, they do not offer to produce one that is inconsistent with Christs suffering in our stead; all that they say is, That [...] doth not always signifie so, which we never said it did, who say, that Christ suffered [...] not instead of our sins, but by reason of them; but we assert, C that when one person is said to dye for others, as in the places mentioned, no other sense can be so proper and agreeable, as dying in the stead of the other. 2. Socinus himself grants, ‘That there is a peculiarity implied in those Soc de servat. l. 2. c. 8. phrases, when attributed to Christ, above what they have when attributed to any other. And therefore he saith, It cannot be properly said, That one Brother dies for another, or that Paul suffered for the Colossians, or for the Church, as Christ may truly and properly be said to suffer and to dye for us. And from hence, saith he, St. Paul D saith, was Paul crucified for you? implying thereby, that there never was, or could be any, who truly and properly 1 Cor. 1. 13. could be said to dye for men but Christ alone.’ How unreasonable then is it, from the use of a particle as applied to others, to infer, that it ought to be so understood, when applied to Christ? when a peculiarity is acknowledged in the death of Christ for us, more than ever was or could be in one mans dying for another. 3. It is not the bare force of the particle [...] that we insist upon; but that a substitution could not be more properly expressed, than it is in E Scripture, by this and other particles, for not only [...] is used, but [...] too: which Socinus saith, Although it may signifie Socin. io. something else besides in the stead of another, yet in such places, where it is spoken of a ransom or price, it signifies [Page 323] the payment of something which was owing before, as A Mat. 17. 27. [...], and so he acknowledges, that where redemption is spoken of, there [...] doth imply a commutation, because the price is given, and the person received, which, he saith, holds in Christ only metaphorically: for the redemption according to him being only Metaphoricall, the commutation must be supposed to be so too.
And this now leads us to the larger Answer of Crellius upon §. 5. In what sense a surrogation of Christ in our room is asserted by us. Cr [...]l [...]. 9 sect. 3. Ib. sect. 2. this argument. Wherein we shall consider, what he yields, what he denies, and upon what reasons. 1. He yields, and so he saith, doth Socinus very freely, a commutation: but B it is necessary that we should throughly understand what he means by it: to that end he tells us, That they acknowledge a twofold commutation; one of the person suffering, the kind of suffering being changed, not actually but intentionally, because we are not actually freed by Christ dying for us, but only Christ dyed for that end, that we might be freed. And this commutation, he saith, that Socinus doth not deny to be implied in the particle [...], in the places where Christ is said to dye for us. Another commutation, which he acknowledges, is, that which is between a price, and the thing or C person which is bought or redeemed by it; where the price is paid, and the thing or person is received upon it. And this kind of commutation, he saith, is to be understood in the places where [...] is mentioned; which price, he saith, by accident may be a person; and because the person is not presently delivered, he therefore saith, that the commutation is Ib sect. 6. rather imperfect than metaphorical; and although, he saith, [...] doth not of it self imply a commutation, yet he grants, that the circumstances of the places do imply it. 2. He denies, that there is any proper surrogation in Christs Ib. sect. 7. D dying for us, which, he saith, is such a commutation of persons, that the substituted person is in all respects to be in the same place and state wherein the other was; and if it refers to sufferings; then it is when one suffers the very same which the other was to suffer, he being immediately delivered by the others sufferings. And against this kind of surrogation, Crellius needed not to have produced any reasons; for Grotius never asserted it; neither do we say, that Christ suffered eternal death for us, or that we were immediately freed by his sufferings. But that which Grotius E asserts that he meant by substitution was this, that unless Christ had died for us, we must have died our selves, and because Christ hath died we shall not die eternally. But if this be all, saith Crellius, he meant by it, we grant Ib. [...]. 3. [Page 324] the whole thing, and he complains of it as an injury for any A to think otherwise of them. If so, they cannot deny but that there was a sufficient capacity in the death of Christ to be made an expiatory Sacrifice for the sins of the world. But notwithstanding all these fair words, Crellius means no more than Socinus did; and though he would allow the words which Grotius used, yet not in the sense he understood them in; for Crellius means no more by all this, but that the death of Christ was an antecedent condition to the expiation of sins in Heaven, Grotius understands by them, that Christ did expiate sins by becoming a Sacrifice for them in his death. B However, from hence it appears, that our Adversaries can have no plea against the death of Christs being an expiatory Sacrifice (from want of a substitution in our room) since they profess themselves so willing to own such a substitution. But if they say, that there could be no proper substitution, because the death of Christ was a bare condition, and no punishment, they then express their minds more freely; and if these places be allowed to prove a substitution, I hope the former discourse will prove that it was by way of punishment. Neither is it necessary, that the very same kind of punishment C be undergone in order to surrogation, but that it be sufficient in order to the accomplishing the end for which it was designed. For this kind of substitution being in order to the delivery of another by it, whatever is sufficient for that end, doth make a proper surrogation. For no more is necessary to the delivery of another person than the satisfying the ends of the Law and Government, and if that may be done by an aequivalent suffering, though not the same in all respects, then it may be a proper surrogation. If David had obtained his wish, that he had died for his Son Absolom, D it had not been necessary in order to his Sons escape, that he had hanged by the hair of his head, as his Son did; but his death, though in other circumstances, had been sufficient. And therefore when the Lawyers say, subrogatum, sapit naturam ejus in cujus locum subrogatur: Covarruvias Covarru To. 1. p. 1. sect. 4 n. 3. tells us, it is to be understood secundum primordialem naturam non secundum accidentalem; from whence it appears, that all circumstances are not necessary to be the same in surrogation; but that the nature of the punishment remain the same. Thus Christ dying for us, to deliver us E from death, and the curse of the Law, he underwent an accursed death for that end; although not the very same which we were to have undergone, yet sufficient to shew, that he underwent the punishment of our iniquities in order [Page 325] to the delivering us from it. And if our Adversaries will A yield us this, we shall not much contend with them about the name of a proper surrogation.
But in the matter of Redemption, or where [...] is used, §. 6 Our Redemption by Christ proves a substitution. Crellius will by no means yield that there was a commutation of persons between Christ and us, but all the commutation he will allow here is only a commutation between a thing, or a price, and a person. Which he therefore asserts, Crell. c 9 sect. 2. that so there may be no necessity of Christs undergoing the punishment of sin in order to redemption, because the price that is to be paid, is not supposed to undergo the B condition of the person delivered by it. Which will evidently appear to have no force at all, in case we can prove, that a proper redemption may be obtained by the punishment of one in the room of another; for that punishment then comes to be the [...] or price of redemption; and he that pays this, must be supposed to undergo punishment for it. So that the commutation being between the punishment of one, and the other redeemed by it, here is a proper commutation of persons implied in the payment of the price. But hereby we may see that the great subtilty of our Adversaries C is designed on purpose to avoid the force of the places of Scripture, which are so plain against them: For when these places where [...] and [...] are joyned together, are so clear for a substitution, that they cannot deny it; then they say, by it is meant only a commutation of a price for a person; but when the word [...] is urged to prove a redemption purchased by Christ, by the payment of a price for it, then they deny that [...] doth signifie a proper price, but is only taken metaphorically; and yet if it be so taken, then there can be no force in what Crellius saith, for a bare D metaphorical price may be a real punishment: Two things I shall then prove against Crellius. 1. That the [...] as applied to Christ, is to be taken in a proper sense. 2. That although it be taken in a proper sense, yet it doth not imply a bare commutation of a price and a person, but a substitution of one person in the room of another.
Both these will be cleared from the right stating the notion §. 7. Of the true notion of Redemption of redemption between our Adversaries and us. For they will not by any means have any other proper notion of redemption but from captivity, and that by the payment of E a price to him that did hold in captivity, and therefore because Christ did not pay the price to the Devil, there could be no proper sense either of the redemption, or the price which was paid for it. This is the main strength of all the [Page 326] arguments used by Socinus and Crellius, to enervate the A Socia. de servat. [...]. 2. c. 1, 2. Crell. c. 8. sect. 11. force of those places of Scripture which speak of our redemption by Christ, and of the price which he paid in order to it. But how weak these exceptions are, will appear upon a true examination of the proper notion of Redemption, which in its primary importance signifies no more, than the obtaining of one thing by another as a valuable consideration for it. Thence redimere anciently among the Latins signified barely to purchase by a valuable price, for the thing which they had a right to by it; and sometimes to purchase that which a man hath sold before, thence the pac [...]um B redimendi in contracts: still in whatever sense it was used by the Lawyers or others, the main regard was, to the consideration upon which the thing was obtained, thence redimere delatorem pecunia, h. e. eum à delatione deducere; so redimere litem; and redemptor litis was one that upon ulpia l 29. D. de [...]re fi [...]i. certain consideration took the whole charge of a suit upon himself: and those who undertook the farming of customs at certain rates, were called redemptores vectigalium, quiredempturis auxissent vectigalia, saith Livy. And all those Budaeus ad Pa [...]dect. p. 189. Liv. l. 23. Festus v. red. ul [...]ian. l 39. D. de rei vend. who undertook any publick work at a certain price, redemptores C antiquitus dicebantur, saith Festus and Ulpian. From hence it was applied to the delivery of any person from any inconvenience that he lay under, by something which was supposed a valuable consideration for it. And that it doth not only relate to captivity, but to any other great calamity, the freedom from which is obtained by what another suffers; is apparent from these two remarkable expressions of Cicero to this purpose. Quam quidem ego (saith he, Cicer. ep. [...]a [...]il l. 2. cp 16. speaking of the sharpness of the time) a rep. meis privatis & domesticis incommodis libentissimè redemissem. And D more expresly elsewhere, Ego vitam omnium civium, statum Or [...]t. [...]o Syll [...]. orbis terrae urbem hanc denique, &c. quinque hominum amentium ac perditorum poena redemi. Where it is plain, that redemption is used for the delivery of some by the punishment of others; not from meer captivity, but from a great calamity which they might have fallen into, without such a punishment of those persons. So vain is that assertion of Socinus, redimere, nihil aliud propriè significat, quam eum captivum e manibus illius, qui eum detinet, pretio Soc. de [...]rvat. l. 2. c. 1. illi dato liberare. E
And yet supposing we should grant that redemption as used §. 8. No necessity of paying the price to him that detains captive. in sacred Authors doth properly relate to captivity, there is no necessity at all of that which our Adversaries contend so earnestly for, viz. That the price must be paid to him that [Page 327] detains captive. For we may very easily conceive a double A sort of captivity, from whence a redemption may be obtained; the one by force, when a Captive is detained purposely for advantage to be made by his redemption; and the other in a judicial manner, when the Law condemns a person to captivity, and the thing designed by the Law is not a meer price, but satisfaction to be made to the Law, upon which a redemption may be obtained; now in the former case it is necessary, that the price be paid to the person who detains, because the reason of his detaining, was the expectation of the price to be pald; but in the latter, the detainer is meerly B the instrument for execution of the Law, and the price of redemption is not to be paid to him; but to those who are most concerned in the honour of the Law. But Crellius Crell. c 8. sect. 11. objects, that the price can never be said to be paid to God, because our redemption is attributed to God as the author of it, and because we are said to be redeemed for his use and service, now, saith he, the price can never be paid to him for whose service the person is redeemed. But all this depends upon the former mistake, as though we spake all this while of such a redemption, as that is of a Captive by force; C in whom the detainer is no further concerned, than for the advantage to be made by him; and in that case the price must be paid to him who detains, because it would otherwise be unsuccessful for his deliverance: but in case of captivity by Law, as the effect of disobedience, the Magistrate who is concerned in the life of the person, and his future obedience may himself take care that satisfaction may be given to the Law for his redemption, in order to his future serviceableness. From hence we see both that the [...] is proper in this case of our redemption, and that it is not a meer commutation D of a price for a person, but a commutation of one persons suffering for others, which suffering being a punishment in order to satisfaction, is a valuable consideration, and therefore a price for the redemption of others by it. Which price in this sense doth imply a proper substitution; which was the thing to be proved. Which was the first thing to be made good concerning the death of Christ being a sacrifice for sin, viz. that there was a substitution of Christ in our stead as of the sacrifices of old under the Law; and in this sense the death of Christ was a proper [...] or price of redemption E for us. Nothing then can be more vain, than the way of our Adversaries, to take away the force of all this, because [...] is sometimes taken for a meet deliverance without any price, which we deny not; but the main force of our [Page 328] argument is from the importance of [...], where the [...] is mentioned; and then we say that [...] when applied to A sins, signifies expiation, (as Heb. 9. 15. [...],) but when applied to persons, it signifies the deliverance purchased by the [...], which is not to be considered as a bare price, or a thing given, but as a thing undergone in order to that deliverance: and is therefore not only called [...], but [...] too, which Crellius confesseth doth imply a commutation, and we have shewed, doth prove a substitution of Christ in our place. B C D E
CHAP. V. A
The notion of a sacrifice belongs to the death of Christ, because of the Oblation made therein to God. Crellius his sense of Christs Oblation proposed. Against him it is proved, that the Priestly office of Christ had a primary respect to God, and not to us. Expiatory Sacrifices did divert the wrath of God. Christ not a bare Metaphorical High-Priest. Crellius destroys the Priesthood of Christ by confounding it with the exercise of his Regal Power. No proper expiation of sin belongs B to Christ in Heaven, if Crellius his Doctrine be true. Ephes. 5. 2. proves the death of Christ an Expiatory Sacrifice, and an Oblation to God. The Phrase of a sweet-smelling savour, belongs to expiatory Sacrifices; Crellius his gross notion of it. His mistakes about the kinds of Sacrifices. Burnt-offerings were Expiatory Sacrifices both before and under the Law. A new distribution of sacrifices proposed. What influence the mactation of the Sacrifice had on Expiation. The High-Priest only to slay the Sin-offering on the day of Atonement; from whence it is proved, that Christs C Priesthood did not begin from his entrance into Heaven. The mactation in Expiatory Sacrifices no bare preparation to a Sacrifice, proved by the Iewish Laws, and the customs of other Nations. Whether Christs Oblation of himself once to God, were in Heaven, or on Earth? Of the proper notion of Oblations under the Levitical Law. Several things observed from thence to our purpose. All things necessary to a legal Oblation, concur in the death of Christ, His entrance into Heaven hath no correspondency with it; if the blood of Christ were no sacrifice for sin. In Sin-offerings for the D People, the whole was consumed; no eating of the Sacrifices allowed the Priests, but in those for private Persons. Christs exercise of Power in Heaven, in no sense an Oblation to God. Crellius, his sense repugnant to the circumstances of the places in dispute. Objections answered.
THE Second thing to prove the death of Christ a Sacrifice §. 1. Of the O [...]lation made by Christ unto God. for sin, is the Oblation of it to God for that end. ‘ Grotius towards the conclusion of his book, E makes a twofold oblation of Christ, parallel to that of the Sacrifices under the Law, the first of Mactation, the second of Representation; whereof the first was done in the Temple, the second in the Holy of Holies; so the first [Page 330] of Christ was on Earth, the second in Heaven; the first is A not a bare preparation to a Sacrifice, but a Sacrifice: the latter not so much a Sacrifice, as the commemoration of one already past. Wherefore, since appearing and interceding are not properly sacerdotal acts, any further than they depend on the efficacy of a sacrifice already offered, he that takes away that Sacrifice, doth not leave to Christ any proper Priesthood, against the plain authority of the Scripture, which assigns to Christ the office of a Priest distinct from that of a Prophet and a King.’ To which Crellius replies: That the expiation of sin doth properly belong to what Christ doth B Cr [...]ll. c. 10. sect. 45. in Heaven; and may be applyed to the death of Christ only, as the condition by which he was to enjoy that power in Heaven, whereby he doth expiate sins; but the Priest was never said to Ib. sect. 55. expiate sins when he killed the beast, but when the blood was sprinkled or carried into the Holy of Holies, to which the Oblation of Christ in Heaven doth answer: but mactation, saith he, Ib. sect. 47. was not proper to the Priests, but did belong to the Levites also. And Christ was not truly a Priest, while we was on Earth, but Ib. sect. 53. only prepared by his sufferings to be one in Heaven, where by the perpetual care he takes of his People, and exercising his Power C Ib. sect. 54. Sect. 56. for them, he is said to offer up himself, and intercede for them, and by that means he dischargeth the Office of a High-Priest for them. For his Priestly Office, he saith, is never in Scripture mentioned as distinct from his Kingly, but is comprehended under it; and the great difference between them is, that one is of a larger extension than the other is, the Kingly Office extending to punishing, and the Priestly only to expiation. This is the substance of what Crellius more at large discourseth upon this subject. Wherein he asserts these things. 1. That the Priestly Office of Christ doth not in reference to the expiation D of sins respect God but us; his Intercession and Oblation wherein he makes the sacerdotal function of Christ to consist, being the exercise of his power for the good of his People. 2. That Christ did offer up no Sacrifice of expiation to God upon Earth, because the mactation had no reference to expiation, any other than as a preparation for it; and Christ not yet being constituted a High-Priest till after his Resurrection from the dead. Against these two assertions I shall direct my following discourse, by proving; 1. That the Priestly Office of Christ had a primary respect to God, and E not to us, 2. That Christ did exercise this Priestly Office in the Oblation of himself to God upon the Cross.
[Page 331] 1. That the Priestly Office of Christ had a primary respect A to God, and not to us; which appears from the first Institution Tha [...] [...]e Priest [...]y Office of Christ had a primary respect to God, and not us. Crell. in Heb. 5. 1. of a High-Priest, mentioned by the Apostle, Hebr. 5. 1. For every High-Priest taken from among men, is ordained for men in things pertaining to God, that he may offer both gifts and sacrifices for sins: Id est, saith Crellius elsewhere, ut procuret & peragat ea quae ad colendum ac propitiandum numen pertinent; i. e. That he may perform the things which appertain to the worshipping and propitiating God: We desire no more, but that the propiating God, may as immediately be said to respect him, as the worshipping of God doth; or let Crellius tell us, B what sense the propitiating God will bear; if all that the High-Priest had to do, did immediately respect the people: nay, he saith not long after, ‘That it was the chief Office of a High-Priest, to plead the cause of sinners with God, and to take care, that they may find him kind and propitious, and not angry or displeased.’ In what sense God was said to be moved by the Expiatory Sacrifices, is not here our business to discuss; it is sufficient for our purpose, that they were instituted with a respect to God, so as to procure his favour, and divert his wrath. In which sense, the Priest is so often in the Levitical Law said, C by the offering up of Sacrifices, to expiate the sins of the people. But Crellius saith, ‘This ought not so to be understood, as though God by Expiatory Sacrifices, were diverted from his Crell cap. 10. sect. 3. anger, and inclined to pardon;’ which is a plain contradiction, not only to the words of the law, but to the instances that are recorded therein; as when Aaron was bid in the time of the Plague to make an Atonement for the people, for there is wrath gone out from the Lord: and he stood between the living and the dead; Numb. 16. 46. and the plague was stayed. Was not Gods anger then diverted here, by the making this Atonement? The like instance we read Vers. 48. D in Davids time, that by the offering burnt-offerings, &c. the Lord was intreated for the Land, and the plague was stayed from Israel: By which nothing can be more plain, than that the primary 2 Sam. 24. 25. intention of such Sacrifices, and consequently of the Office of the Priest who offered them, did immediately respect the Atoning God: But yet Crellius urgeth, ‘This cannot be said of all, or of the most proper Expiatory Sacrifices:’ but we see it said of more than the meer Sacrifices for sin, as appointed by the Law; viz. of burnt-offerings, and peace-offerings, and incense, in the examples mentioned. So that these Levitical Sacrifices E did all respect the atoning God; although in some particular cases; different Sacrifices were to be offered; for it is said, the burnt-offering was to make atonement for them, as well as the Lev. [...]. 4. 4 20. 5. 7. sin and trespass-offerings (excepting those sacrifices which were [Page 332] instituted in acknowledgement of Gods Soveraignty over them, A and presence among them, as the daily Sacrifices, the meat and drink offerings, or such as were meerly occasional, &c.) Thus it is said, that Aaron and his sons were appointed to make an 1 Chron 6. 49. Atonement for Israel: So that as Grotius observes out of Philo, ‘The High-Priest was a Mediator between God and man, by Grot. in Heb. 5. 1. whom men might propitiate God, and God dispense his favours to men.’ But the means whereby he did procure favoursto men, was by atoning God by the Sacrifices, which he was by his Office to offer to him. We are now to consider, how far this holds in reference to Christ, for whose sake the B Apostle brings in these words; and surely would not have mentioned this as the primary Office of a High-Priest, in order to the proving Christ to be our High-Priest, after a more excellent manner than the Aaronical was, unless he had agreed with him in the nature of his Office, and exceeded him in the manner of performance.
For the Apostle both proves, that he was a true and proper, and not a bare Metaphorical High-Priest, and that in such a capacity, §. 3. Christ no barely metaphorical High-Priest. he very far exceeded the Priests after the order of Aaron. But how could that possibly be, if he failed in the primary C Office of a High-Priest; viz. In offering up gifts and sacrifices to God? If his Office as High-Priest did primarily respect men, when the Office of the Aaronical Priest did respect God? To avoid this, Crellius makes these words to be ‘only an allusion to the Legal Priesthood, and some kind of similitude Crell. cap. 10. sect. 3. between Christ and the Aaronical Priests;’ but it is such a kind of allusion, that the Apostle designs to prove, Christ to be an High-Priest by it; and which is of the greatest force, he proves the necessity of Christs having somewhat to offer from hence: For every High-Priest is ordained to offer gifts, D Heb. 8. 2. and sacrifices; wherefore it is of necessity, that this man have somewhat also to offer. This is that which he looks at as the peculiar and distinguishing character of a High-Priest; for interceding for others, and having compassion upon them, might be done by others besides the High-Priest; but this was that, without which he could not make good his name, what order soever he were of. If Christ then had no proper sacrifice to offer up to God, to what purpose doth the Apostle so industriously set himself to prove, that he is our High-Priest? when he must needs fail in the main thing, according to his own assertion? How easie E had it been for the Iews, to have answered all the Apostles Arguments concerning the Priesthood of Christ, if he had been such a Priest, and made no other Oblation than Crellius allows him? When the Apostle proves against the Iews, that there was [Page 333] no necessity, that they should still retain the Mosaical Dispensation, A because now they had a more excellent High-Priest than the Aaronical were; and makes use of that character of a High-Priest, that he was one taken out from among men, in things pertaining to God to offer gifts and sacrifices for sins: ‘Well, say the Iews, we accept of this character, but how do you prove concerning Christ, that he was such a one? Did he offer up a Sacrifice for sin to God upon earth, as our High-Priests do?’ No, saith Crellius, his sufferings were only a preparation for his Priesthood in Heaven: ‘But did he then offer up such a Sacrifice to God in B Heaven?’ Yes, saith Crellius, He made an Oblation there. ‘But is that Obligation such a Sacrifice to God for sin, as our High-Priests offers?’ Yes, saith Crellius, it may be called so by way of allusion. ‘Well then, say they, you grant that your Iesus is only a High-Priest by way of allusion, which was against your first design to prove; viz. That he was a true High-Priest, and more excellent than ours. But suppose it be by way of allusion, doth he make any Oblation to God in Heaven or not?’ No, saith Crellius, really and truly he doth not: for all his Office doth respect us, C but the benefits we enjoy coming originally from the kindness of God, you may call it an Oblation to God if you please. ‘But how is it possible then, say the Iews, you can ever convince us, that he is any High-Priest, or Priest at all, much less, that he should ever exceed the Aaronical High-Priests in their Office? for we are assured, that they do offer Sacrifices for sin, and that God is attoned by them: but if your High-Priest make no atonement for sin, he falls far short of ours, and therefore we will still hold to our Levitical Priesthood, and not forsake that for one barely Metaphorical, D and having nothing really answering the name of a High-Priest.’ Thus the force of all the Apostles Arguments is plainly taken away, by what Crellius and his Brethren assert concerning the Priesthood of Christ. But Crellius thinks to make it good by saying, That things that are improper and Crell. cap. 10. [...]ect. 3. I [...]. s [...]ct. 56. [...] 547. figurative, may be far more excellent than the things that are proper, to which they are opposed; so that Christs Priesthood may be far more excellent than the Aaronical, although his be only figurative, and the other proper. But the question is not, Whether Christs Priesthood by any other adventitious E considerations, as of greater Power and Authority than the Aaronical Priests had, may be said to be far more excellent than theirs was; but, Whether in the notion of Priesthood, it doth exceed theirs? Which it is impossible to make good, [Page 334] unless he had some proper oblation to make unto God, which A in it self did far exceed all the Sacrifices and Offerings under the Law.
But what that oblation of Christ in Heaven was, which §. 4. Crellius destroys the Priesthood of Christ. had any correspondency with the Sacrifices under the Law, our Adversaries can never assign; nay, when they go about it, they speak of it in such a manner, as makes it very evident they could heartily have wished the Epistle to the Hebrews had said as little of the Priesthood of Christ, as they say, any other part of the New Testament doth. Thence Smalcius and Crellius insist so much upon the Priesthood of Christ, being distinctly B Smalc. c. Smiglec. Crell cap. 10. p. 544. mentioned by none but the Author to the Hebrews; which, say they, had surely been done, if Christ had been a proper Priest, or that Office in him distinct from his Kingly. Which sufficiently discovers what they would be at; viz. That the Testimony of the Author to the Hebrews, is but a single Testimony in this matter; and in truth, they do (as far as is consistent with not doing it in express words) wholly take away the Priesthood of Christ: For what is there which they say his Priesthood implies, which he might not have had, supposing he had never been called a Priest? His being in Heaven, doth C not imply that he is a Priest, unless it be impossible for any but Priests ever to come there: His Power and Authority over the Church, doth not imply it; for that power is by themselves confessed to be a Regal power: his readiness to use that power, cannot imply it, which is the thing Smalcius insists on; for his being a King of the Church, doth necessarily imply his readiness to make use of his power for the good of his Church. His receiving his power from God, doth not imply that he was a Priest, although Crellius insists on that, unless all the Kings of the Earth are Priests by that means too, D and Christ could not have had a subordinate power as King, as well as Priest. But his death is more implied, saith Crellius, in the name of a Priest, than of a King; true, if his death be considered as a Sacrifice, but not otherwise: For what is there of a Priest in bare dying, do not others so too? But this represents greater tenderness and care in Christ, than the meer title of a King: What kind of King do they imagine Christ the mean while, if his being so, did not give the greatest encouragement to all his subjects? nay, it is plain, the name of a King must yield greater comfort to his people, because that implies E his power to desend them, which the bare name of a Priest doth not. So that there could be no reason at all given, why the name of a High-Priest should be at all given to Christ, if no more were implied in it, than the exercise of his power [Page 335] with respect to us, without any proper oblation to God: For here A is no proper Sacerdotal act at all attributed to him; so that upon their hypothesis, the name of High-Priest, is a meer insignificant title used by the Author to the Hebrews, without any foundation at all for it. By no means, saith Cellius, for his expiation of sin is implyed by it, which is not implyed in the name of King: True, if the expiation of sin were done by him in the way of a Priest by an oblation to God, which they deny; but though they call it Expiation, they mean no more than the exercise of his divine power in the delivering his people. But what parallel was there to this in the expiation of sins by the B Levitical Priesthood? that was certainly done by a Sacrifice offered to God by the Priest, who was thereby said to expiate Levit. 4. 26. v, 31. 35. the sins of the people: how comes it now to be taken quite in another sense, and yet still called by the same name?
But this being the main thing insisted on by them, I shall prove from their own Principles, that no expiation of sin in §. 5. No proper expiation of sin belongs to Christ in Heaven, if Crellius his doctrine be true. their own sense can belong to Christ in Heaven, by vertue of his Oblation of himself there, and consequently that they must unavoidably overthrow the whole notion of the Priesthood of Christ. For this we are to consider, what their notion of the expiation C of sins is, which is set down briefly by Crellius in the beginning of his discourse of Sacrifices, ‘There is a twofold Crell. cap. 10. sect. 2. power, saith he, of the sacrifice of Christ towards the expiation of sin, one taking away the guilt and the punishment of sin, and that partly by declaring, that God will do it, and giving us a right to it, partly by actual deliverance from punishment; the other is by begetting Faith in us, and so drawing us off from the practice of sin:’ Now the first and last Crellius and Socinus attribute to the death of Christ, as that was a confirmation of the Covenant God made for the D remission of sin; and as it was an argument to perswade us to believe the truth of his Doctrine; and the other, viz. the actual deliverance from punishment, is by themselves attributed to the second coming of Christ; for then only, they say, the just shall be actually delivered from the punishment of sin, viz. eternal death; and what expiation is there now left to the Oblation of Christ in Heaven? Doth Christ in Heaven declare the pardon of sin any other way than it was declared by him upon Earth? What efficacy hath his Oblation in Heaven upon perswading men to believe? or is his second coming, E when he shall sit as Judge, the main part of his Priesthood; for then the expiation of sins in our Adversaries sense is most proper? And yet nothing can be more remote from the notion of Christs Pristhood, than that is; so that expiation of [Page 336] sins according to them can have no respect at all to the Oblation A of Christ in Heaven, or (which is all one in their sense) his continuance in Heaven to his second coming. Yes, saith Crellius, his continuance there, is a condition in order to Crell. cap. 10. sect. 3. p. 476. the expiation by actual deliverance, and therefore it may be said, that God is as it were moved by it to expiate sins. The utmost then, that is attributed to Christs being in Heaven, in order to the expiation of sins, is that he must continue there without doing anything in order to it; for if he does, it must either respect God or us: but they deny (though contrary to the importance of the words, and the design of the places B where they are used) that the terms of Christs interceding for us, or being an Advocate with the Father for us, do H b. 7. 25. Rom. 8. 3. 1 John 2. 1. note any respect to God, but only to us; if he does any thing with respect to us in expiation of sin, it must be either declaring, perswading, or actual deliverance; but it is none of these by their own assertions; and therefore that which they call Christs Oblation, or his being in Heaven, signifies nothing as to the expiation of sin: and it is unreasonable to suppose that a thing, which hath no influence at all upon it, should be looked on as a condition in order to it. From whence C it appears, that while our Adversaries do make the exercise of Christs Priesthood to respect us and not God, they destroy the very nature of it, and leave Christ only an empty name without any thing answering to it: But if Christ be truly a High-Priest, as the Apostle asserts that he is, from thence it follows that he must have a respect to God in offering up gifts and sacrifices for sin: which was the thing to be proved.
2. That Christ did exercise this Priestly Office in the Oblation §. 6. Ephes 5. 2. Proves the death of Christ in Expiatory Sacrifice and an oblation to God. Ephes. 5. 2. of himself to God upon the Cross. Which I shall prove D by two things, 1. Because the death of Christ is said in Scripture to be an Offering, and a Sacrifice to God. 2. Because Christ is said to offer up himself antecedently to his entrance into Heaven. 1. Because the death of Christ is said to be an offering and a sacrifice to God, which is plain from the words of St. Paul, as Christ also hath loved us, and given himself for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God, for a sweet-smelling savour. Our Adversaries do not deny that the death of Christ is here called an Oblation, but they deny, ‘That it is meant of an Expiatory Sacrifice, but of a free will E Crell. cap. 10. sect. 47. offering; and the reason Crellius gives is, because that phrase of a sweet-smelling savour is generally and almost always used of sacrifices which are not expiatory; but if ever they be used of an Expiatory Sacrifice, they are not applyed to [Page 337] that which was properly expiatory in it, viz. the offering up of the blood, for no smell, saith he, went up from thence, but to the burning of the fat, and the kidneys, which although required to perfect the expiation, yet not being done till the High-Priest returned out of the Holy of Holies, hath nothing correspondent to the expiatory Sacrifice of Christ, where all things are persected before Christ the High-Priest goes forth of his Sanctuary.’ How inconsistent these last words are with what they assert concerning the expiation of sin by actual deliverance at the great day, the former discourse hath already B discovered. For what can be more absurd, than to say, that all things which pertain to the expiation of sin are perfected before Christ goes forth from his Sanctuary, and yet to make the most proper expiation of sin to lye in that act of Christ which is consequent to his going forth of the Sanctuary, viz. when he proceeds to judge the quick and the dead. But of that already. We now come to a punctual and direct answer, as to which two things must be enquired into. 1. What the importance of the phrase of a sweet-smelling savour is? 2. What the Sacrifices are to which that phrase is applyed? 1. For C the importance of the phrase. The first time we read it used in Scripture was upon the occasion of Noahs Sacrifice after the flood, of which it is said, that he offered burnt-offerings on Gen. 8. 20. 21. the Altar, and the Lord smelled a savour of rest, or a sweet savour. Which we are not to imagine in a gross corporeal manner, as Crellius seems to understand it, when he saith, the blood could not make such a savour as the fat and the kidneys; for surely, none ever thought the smell of flesh burnt was a sweet-smelling savour of it self, and we must least of all imagine that of God, which Porphyry saith, was the D property only of the worst of Daemons to be pleased, and as it were, to grow fat, [...], with the smell and vapours of blood, and flesh, (by which testimony Porph [...]r. de abstinent. l. 2. sect. 42. it withal appears, that the same steams in Sacrifices were supposed to arise from the blood as the flesh:) But we are to understand that phrase in a sense agreeable to the divine nature, which we may easily do, if we take it in the sense the Syriack Version takes it in, when it calls it. Odorem placabilitatis, or the savour of rest, as the word properly signifies; for [...] is the word formed from the Verb [...] which E is used for the resting of the Ark, v. 4. of the same Chapter, and so it imports a rest after some commotion, and in that sense is very proper to Atonement, or that whereby God makes his anger to rest; so Aben Ezra upon that place expounds [Page 338] the Savour of rest, to be such a one which makes God A cease from his anger: Thence in Hiphil [...] signifies to appease, or to make peace; in which sense it is used by R. Solom. upon Isa. 27. 5. Munster tells us the sense is, Deus nunc quievit ab ira & placatus fuit, and to the same purpose Vatablus: which sense is most agreeable to the design of the following words, in which God expresseth his great kindness, and the Lord said in his heart, I will not again curse the ground any more for mans sake; which are words highly expressing, how much God was propitiated by the Sacrifice which Noah offered, and therefore Iosephus doth well interpret this to be a B proper Expiatory Sacrifice; that God would now be aioned, Ioseph. A [...]tiq̄. Iud. l. 1. c. 4. and send no more such a deluge upon the world; which he saith, was the substance of Noahs prayer, when he offered this Burnt-offering, and that God would receive his Sacrifice [...], That he would no more receive such displeasure against the earth: So that the first time ever this expression was used, it is taken in the proper sense of an Expiatory Sacrifice.
And by that the second enquiry may be easily resolved; viz. What kind of Sacrifices it doth belong to, which we see in C §. 7. Crellius his mistakes about the kinds of sacrifices. the first place is, to expiatory, which Crellius denies by a great mistake, of the sense of the phrase, and of the nature of the Offerings, concerning which this expression is most used; viz. Holocausts, as though those were not Expiatory Sacrifices: But if we can make it appear, that the Holocausts were Expiatory Sacrifices, then it will follow, that this phrase doth most properly agree to a Sacrifice designed for Expiation. But Crellius here speaks very confusedly concerning Sacrifices, opposing Holocausts and Freewil-offerings to Expiatory Sacrifices; whereas the Freewil-offerings might D be Expiatory, as well as Eucharistical; that denomination not respecting the end the Sacrifices were designed for, but that the precise time of offering them was not determined by the Law; as in the stated and solemn Sacrifices. For the general distribution of Sacrifices, seems most proper into Propitiatory and Encharistical; which distinction is thought by some to hold from the first time we read of Sacrifices in Scripture; because the Sacrifice of Cain was of the fruits of the ground, and of Abel, of the Firstlings of his flock. Although Gen. 4. 3, 4. there seems to be nothing meant by this difference of Sacrifices, E but the diversity of their imployments, either of them Sacrificing according to them; and I cannot say what some do, that the reason of Gods rejecting Cains Sacrifice, was because it was not designed for expiation. But the practice of [Page 339] after ages, wherein we have a fuller account of the grounds A of the several Sacrifices, makes it appear, that the Expiatory Sacrifices before the Law, were all Burnt-offerings; and of all those who were not under the particular obligation of that Law: As is plain in the Expiatory Sacrifices of Iob for his sons, and for his friends, which were Burnt-offerings; and among the Iews, all the Sacrifices that were offered up before Job. 1. 5. 42, 8. the Levitical Law, were, as the Iews themselves tell us, only Burnt-offerings: And after the setling of their Worship among themselves, they did receive Burnt-offerings for expiation Selden de jure [...]a [...]. & [...]e [...]t. a [...]u [...] Eb [...]a. l. 3. c. 2. &c. 6. from strangers, as Mr. Selden at large proves from the B Iewish Writers. It seems then very strange, that since Burnt-offerings before the Law were Expiatory, and under the Law they continued so for strangers, they should be of another nature for the Iews themselves. But what reason is there for it in the text? not the least that I can find, but expresly the contrary. For in the beginning of Leviticus, where the Law for Burnt-offerings is delivered, the words are, And he shall put his hand upon the head of the Burnt-offering [...], and it shall Levit. 1. 4. be accepted for him, to make atonement for him; which is as much as is ever said of any Expiatory Sacrifices: And in the C Verse before, where we render [...] of his own voluntary will; it is by the vulgar Latin rendred, Ad placandum sibi Dominum; by the Syriack Version, Ad placationem sibi obtinendam à Domino; and to the same purpose by the Chaldee Paraphrast; but no one Version considerable that so renders it, as to make Burnt-offerings to be Freewil-offerings here, which Lev. 7. 16. 22. 18. &c. Levit. 6. 7. are spoken of distinctly, and by themselves afterwards: And the Chaldee Paraphrast, Ionathan thus explains, This is the Law of the Burnt-offering; i. e. Quod venit ad expiandum pro cogitationibus cordis; but although the Iews be not fully D agreed, what the Burnt-offerings were designed to expiate, yet they consent that they were of an Expiatory nature. Which might make us the more wonder, that Crellius and others should exclude them from it, but the only reason given by Crell. c. 10. p 530. him is, because they are distinguished from Sacrifices for sin, as though no Sacrifices were of an Expiatory nature but they, and then the Trespass-offerings must be excluded too, for they are distinguished from Sin-offerings as well as the other. The ignorance of the Iews in the reason of their own customs, hath been an occasion of great mistakes among Christians, concerning E the nature of them; when they judge of them according to the blind or uncertain conjectures which they make concerning them: So that the Text is oft-times far clearer than their Commentaries are. Setting aside then the intricate and [Page 340] unsatisfactory niceties of the Iewish Writers, about the several A reasons of the Burnt-offerings and Sin and Trespass-offerings, and the differences they make between them, which are so various and incoherent, I shall propose this conjecture concerning the different reasons of them, viz. That some Sacrifices were assumed into the Jewish Religion, which had been long in use in the world before, and were common to them with the Patriarchs, and all those who in that age of the world did fear and serve God, and such were the Burnt-offerings for expiation of sin, and the fruits of the earth by way of gratitude to God. Other Sacrifices were instituted among them, with B a particular respect to themselves, as a people governed by the Laws of God: And these were of several sorts; 1. Symbolical, of Gods presence among them, such was the daily Sacrifice, instituted as a testimony of Gods presence, Exod. 29. from v. 38. to the end. 2. Occasional, for some great mercies vouchsased to them, as the Passover and the Solemn Festivals, &c. 3. Expiatory, for the sins committed against their Law: And these were of three sorts; 1. Such as were wholly consumed to the honor of God, which were the Burnt-offerings. 2. Such, of which some part was consumed upon C the Al [...]ar, and some part fell to the share of the Priests; and these were either sins particularly enumerated by God himself, under the [...], or else generally comprehended under the [...] as being allowed to be expiated, because committed through inadvertency. 3. Such, whereof a less part was consumed, as in the Peace-offerings of the Congregation, mentioned Levit. 23. 19. whereof the blood was sprinkled, only the inwards burnt, and the flesh not eaten by the persons that offered them, as it was in the Peace-offerings of particular persons (of which as being private Sacrifices, I have here no D occasion to speak) but only by the Priests in the Court; and these had something of expiation in them: For thence, saith Vatablus, the Peace offering was called by the Greeks [...], i. e. Expiatorium, and the LXX. commonly render it, [...], and several of the Iews think the reason of the name was, That it made peace between God and him that offered it: But the great reason I insist on, is, Because all the things which were used in an Expiatory Sacrifice, were in this too; the slaying of the Beast, the sprinkling of the blood, and the consumption of some part of it upon the Altar, as an E Oblation to God, which are the three ingredients of an Expiatory Sacrifice; for the shedding of the blood, noted the bearing the punishment of our iniquity; and, the sprinkling of it on the Altar, and the consuming of the part of the Sacrifice, [Page 341] or the whole there, that it was designed for the expiation of A sin. From whence it follows, that the phrase of a sweetsmelling savour, being applied under the Law to Expiatory Sacrifices, is very properly used by St. Paul, concerning Christs giving up himself for us: so that from this phrase, nothing can be inferred contrary to the Expiatory nature of the death of Christ, but rather it is fully agreeable to it.
But Crellius hath yet a farther Argument, to prove that Christs death cannot be here meant as the Expiatory Sacrifice; §. 8. What i [...]fluence the mactation of the sacrifice had on expiation. Crell. cap. 10. p 533. viz. That the notion of a sacrifice, doth consist in the oblation whereby the thing is consecrated to the honour and service of B God, to which the mactation is but a bare preparation; which he proves, Because the slaying the sacrifice might belong to others besides the Priests, Ezek. 44. 10, 11. but the oblation only to the Priests. To this I answer, 1. The mactation may be considered two ways, either with a respect to the bare instrument of taking away the life, or to the design of the Offerer of that which was to be sacrificed: As the mactation hath a respect only to the instruments, so it is no otherways to be considered than as a punishment; but as it hath a respect to him that designs it for a Sacrifice, so the shedding of the blood, C hath an immediate influence on the expiation of sin. And that by this clear Argument, The blood is said to make an Atonement for the soul; and the reason given is, because the life Levit. 17. 11. of the flesh is in the blood: So that which was the life, is the great thing which makes the Atonement; and when the blood was shed, the life was then given; from whence it follows, that the great efficacy of the sacrifice for Atonement lay in the shedding of the blood for that end. Thence the Apostle attributes remission of sins to the [...] the shedding of the blood; and not to the bare Oblation of it on the Altar, or the Heb. 9. 22. D carrying it into the Holy of Holies, both which seem to be nothing else but a more solemn representation of that blood before God, which was already shed for the expiation of sins, which was therefore necessary to be performed, that the concurrence of the Priest might be seen with the sacrifice in order to expiation. For if no more had been necessary but the bare slaying of the Beasts, which was the meanest part of the service, the people would never have thought the institution of the Priesthood necessary, and least of all that of the High-Priest, unless some solemn action of his had been performed, E such as the entring into the Holy of Holies, on the day of expiation, and carrying it, and sprinkling the blood of the sin offering in order to the expiation of the sins of the people. And it is observable, that although the Levitical Law be [Page 342] silent in the common Sacrifices, who were to kill them whether A the Priests or the Levites; yet on that day whereon the High-Priest was to appear himself for the expiation of sin, it is expresly said, that he should not only kill, the bullock Levit. [...]6. 11, 15. of the sin-offering, which is for himself, but the goa [...] of the sin-offering, which is for the people. And although the Talmudists dispute from their Traditions on both sides, whether any one else might on the day of expiation, slay the sin-offerings besides the High-Priest; yet it is no news for them to dispute against the Text, and the Talmud it self is clear, that the High-Priest did it. From whence it appears, B Codex Ioma. cap 4. sect. 3. cap. 5 sect. 4. there was something peculiar on that day as to the slaying of the sin-offerings; and if our Adversaries opinion hold good, that the Sacrifices on the day of expiation did, i [...] not a [...]one, yet chiefly represent the Sacrifice of Christ, no greater argument can be brought against themselves than this is, for the office of the High-Priest did not begin at his carrying the blood into the Holy of Holies, but the slaying the sacrifice did belong to him too: from whence it will unavoidably follow [...], that Christ did not enter upon his Office of High-Priest, when he entred into Heaven, but when the Sacrifice was to be C be slain which was designed for the expiation of sins. It is then to no purpose at all, if Crellius could prove that sometimes in ordinary Sacrifices, (which he will not say, the Sacrifice of Christ was represented by) the Levites might kill the beasts for Sacrifice; for it appears, that in these Sacrifices, wherein themselves contend that Christs was represented, the office of the High-Priest did not begin with entring into the Sanctuary, but with the mactation of that Sacrifice whose blood was to be carried in thither. Therefore if we [...]peak of the bare instruments of mactation in the death of Christ, those D were the Iews, and we make not them Priests in it, for they aimed at no more than taking away his life (as the Popae among the Romans, and those whose bare Office it was to kill the beasts for Sacrifice among the Iews did:) but if we consider it with a respect to him that offered up his life to God, then we say, that Christ was the High-Priest in doing it; it being designed for the expiation of sin; and by vertue of this bloodshed for that end, he enters into Heaven as the Holy of Holies, there ever living to make intercession for us. But the vertue of the consequent acts, depends upon the efficacy of the blood E shed for expiation; otherwise the High-Priest might have entred with the same effect into the Holy of Holies with any other blood besides that which was shed on purpose as a sin-offering, for expiation of the sins of the people; which it [Page 343] was unlawful for him to do. And from hence it is, that the A Apostle to the Hebrews insists so much on the comparison between the blood of Christ, and the blood of the legal sacrifices, and the efficacy of the one far above the other, in its power Heb. 9. 13, 14 1 [...]. 4, 10. of expiation; which he needed not to have done, if the shedding of his blood, had been only a preparation for his entrance on his Priesthood in Heaven. So that the proper notion of a Sacrifice for sin, as it notes the giving the life of one for the expiation of the sins of another, doth properly lye in the mactation, though other sacrificial acts may be consequent upon it. So it was in the animales hòstiae among the Romans, Ma [...]rob. Sat [...]a. l. 3. c. 5. B in which, saith Macrobius, Sola anima Deo sacratur: of which he tells us Virgil properly speaks in those words,
And that we may the better understand what he means by the anima here, he saith elsewhere (as Macrobius and Servius observe out of his excellent skill and accuracy in the Pontifical rites) C
Which shews, that the expiation was supposed to lye in the blood which they called the Soul, as the Scripture doth. And the Persians as Strabo tells us, looked upon the bare mactation as the Sacrifice, for they did not porricere as the Romans called D it, they laid none of the parts of the Sacrifice upon the Altar to be consumed there, [...]. For God regarded nothing but the Soul in the sacrifice: Strabo l. 15. which words Eustathius likewise useth upon Homer; Eustath. i [...] Hom. Iliad. [...]. of the Sacrifices of the Magi. And Strabo affirms of the ancient Lusitani, that they cut off nothing of the Sacrifice: Strabo l. 3. but consumed the entrals whole; but though such Sacrifices which were for divination were not thought expiatory, and therefore different from the animales hostiae, yet among the Persians, every Sacrifice had a respect to expiation of the whole E people. For Herodotus tells us, that every one that offers Sacrifice among them, [...], prays for good to all Persians and the King. But thus Herod. l. 1. much may serve to prove against Crellius, that the mactation [Page 344] in an Expiatory Sacrifice, was not a meer preparation to a Sacrifice, A but that it was a proper Sacrificial act, and consequently that Christ acted as High-Priest, when he gave himself for us, an offering and a Sacrifice to God for a sweet-smelling savour.
But this will further appear from those places wherein §. 9. Whether Christs Oblation of himself once to God, were in Heaven or on Earth. Christ is said to offer up himself once to God: the places to this purpose are. Heb. 7. 27. Who needeth not daily as those High-Priests to offer up Sacrifice, first for his own sins, and then for the Peoples, for this he did once, when he offered up himself. Heb. 9. 14. How much more shall B the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God, purge your Conscience from dead works, to serve the living God. V. 25, 26, 27, 28. Nor yet that he should offer himself often, as the High-Priest entreth into the holy place every year with the blood of others; for then must he often have suffered since the foundation of the World: but now once in the end of the World hath he appeared to put away sin by the Sacrifice of himself. And as it is appointed to men once to dye, but after this the Iudgement: so Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many, and unto them that look C for him shall he appear the second time without sin unto salvation. Heb. 10. 10, 11, 12. By the which will we are sanctified through the offering of the Body of Iesus Christ once for all. And every High-Priest, standeth daily ministring and offering oftentimes the same sacrifices, which can never take away sins: but this man after he had offered one sacrifice for sins for ever sate down on the right hand of God. To these places Crellius gives this answer, ‘That the name of Oblation as applyed to Cr [...]ll. cap. 10. sect. 54. Christ, primarily signifies Christs first entrance into Heaven, and appearance before the face of God there, but consequently D the continuance of that appearance; so that when a thing is once actually exhibited and presented, it is said to be once offered, although being offered, it always remains in the same place, and so may be said to be a continual Oblation. But this first appearance, saith he, hath a peculiar agreement with the legal Oblation; and therefore the name of Oblation doth most▪ properly belong to that, because Christ by this means obtained that power on which the perfect remission of our sins depends: but although the continuance of that appearance, seems only consequentially E to have the name of Oblation belonging to it, yet in i [...]s own nature, it hath a nearer conjunction with the effect of the Oblation, viz. the remission of sins, or deliverance from punishment, and doth of it self confer more to it than [Page 345] the other doth. And therefore in regard of that, Christ is A said most perfectly to exercise his Priesthood, and to offer and intercede for us, from the time he is said to sit down at the right hand of God.’ Against this answer, I shall prove these two things, 1. That it is incoherent, and repugnant to it self. 2. That it by no means agrees to the places before mentioned. 1. That it is incoherent and repugnant to it self in two things. 1. In making that to be the proper Oblation in correspondency to the Oblations of the Law, which hath no immediate respect to the expiation of sins. 2. In making that to have the most immediate respect to the expiation of B sins, which can in no tolerable sense be called an Oblation. For the first, since Crellius saith, that the proper notion of Oblation is to be taken from the Oblations in the Levitical [...]aw, we must consider what it was there, and whether Christs first entrance into Heaven can have any correspondency with it. An Oblation under the Law was in general, any thing which was immediately dedicated to God, but in a more limited sense it was proper to what was dedicated to him by way of Sacrifice according to the appointments of the Levitical Law. We are not now enquiring what was properly C called an Oblation in other Sacrifices, but in those which then were for expiation of sin; And in the Oblation was, first of the persons for whom the Sacrifice was offered. So in the Burnt-offering, the person who brought it, was to offer Lev. 1. 3. it at the door of the Tabernacle of the Congregation: i. e. as the Iews expound it at the entrance of the Court of the Priests, and there he was to lay his hands upon the head of it, and it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him. This V. 4. Offering was made before the Beast was slain; after the killing the beast, then the Priests were to make an Offering of the D blood, by sprinkling it round about the Altar of Burnt-offerings, the rest of the blood, say the Iews, was poured out by the Priests, at the South-side of the Altar upon the foundation, where the two holes were for the passage into the Channel which conveyed the blood into the valley of Kidron: thus the blood being offered, the parts of the beast, were by the Priests to be laid upon the Altar, and there they were all to be consumed by fire; and then it was called an Offering made by fire, of a sweet savour unto the Lord. The same rites were used in the Peace-offerings, and Trespass-offerings, as E to the laying on of hands, and the sprinkling the blood, and consuming some part by fire: and in the sin-offerings, there was to be the same imposition of hands: but concerning the sprinkling of the blood, and the way of consuming the remainders [Page 346] of the Sacrifice, there was this considerable difference; A that in the common sin-offerings for particular persons, the blood was sprinkled upon the horns of the Altar of Burnt-offerings, but in the sin-offerings for the High-Priest and the Lev. 4. 25, 30. Congregation, or all the People, he was to carry the blood within the Sanctuary, and to sprinkle of it seven times before the Vail of the Sanctuary; and some of the blood was to be put upon the horns of the Altar of Incense; but the remainder V. 6. of the blood, and the same things (which were offered by fire in Peace-Offerings) were to be disposed of accordingly, on the Altar of Burnt-offerings. And withal, there was this B great difference, that in other sin-offerings the Priests were to eat the remainder of the sacrifice in the Holy place; but in these there was nothing to be eaten by them; for the whole Bullock L [...]vit. 6. 26. was to be carried forth without the Camp, and there he was to be burned till all were consumed. For it was an express Lev. 4. 11, 12. Law, That no sin-offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tabernacle of the Congregation, to reconcile withal in the Holy-place, shall be eaten: it shall be burnt in the fire. Levit. 6. 30. All the difference that was on the great day of Atonement, was this, that the High Priest himself was to slay the Sin-offerings, C and then to carry the blood of them into the Holy of Holies, and there was to sprinkle the blood with his finger Lev 16. 14, 15. towards the Mercy-seat seven times: after which, and the sending away the scape-goat, the ceremonies were the same for the Atonement of the people, which were at other solemn sin-offerings, for the Priest or the people.
From all which being thus laid together, we shall observe several §. 10. All things necessary to a legal oblation concur in the death of Christ. things, which are very material to our purpose: 1. That in the oblations which were made for expiation of sins, the difference between the mactation and the oblation, did arise from the D difference between the Priest and the Sacrifice. For the Priests Office was to atone, but he was to atone by the Sacrifice; on which account, although the Priest were to offer the Sacrifice for himself, yet the oblation did not lie in the bare presenting himself before God, but in the presenting the blood of that Sacrifice, which was shed in order to expiation. If we could have supposed, that the High-Priest under the Law, instead of offering a Goat for a Sin-offering for the people, on the day of Atonement, should have made an oblation of himself to God, by dying for the expiation of their sins: In this case, his death being E the Sacrifice, and himself the Priest, the mactation, as it relates to his own act, and his oblation had been one and the same thing. For his death had been nothing else, but the offering up himself to God, in order to the expiation of the sins [Page 347] of the people; and there can be no reason, why the oblation A must be of necessity something consequent to his death, since all things necessary to a perfect oblation do concur in it. For where there is something solemnly devoted to God, and in order to the expiation of sins, and by the hand of a Priest, there are all things concurring to a legal oblation; but in this case, all these things do concur, and therefore there can be no imaginable necessity of making the oblation of Christ, only consequent to his Ascension, since in his death all things concur to a proper oblation. In the Law, we grant that the oblation made by the Priest, was consequent to the death B of the beast for Sacrifice; but the reason of that was, because the beast could not offer up it self to God, and God had made it necessary, that the Priest should expiate sins, not by himself, but by those Sacrifices, and therefore the oblation of the blood was after the Sacrifice was slain; neither could this have been solved barely by the Priests slaying of the Sacrifices; for this being an act of violence towards the beasts that were thus killed, could not be a proper oblation, which must suppose a consent antecedent to it. All which shewed the great imperfection of the Levitical Law, in which so many several C things were to concur, to make up a sacrifice for sin; viz. The first offering made by the party concerned, of what was under his dominion; viz. The beast to be sacrificed at the door of the Tabernacle of the Congregation: but the beast not being able to offer up it self, it was necessary for the offering up its blood, that it must be slain by others; and for the better understanding, not only of the efficacy of the blood, but the concurrence of the Priest for expiation, he was to take the blood, and sprinkle some of it on the Altar, and pour out the rest at the foundation of it. But since we assert a far more D noble and excellent Sacrifice, by the Son of God freely offering up himself, to be made a Sacrifice for the sins of the world, why may not this be as proper an oblation made unto God, as any was under the Law, and far more excellent, both in regard of the Priest and the Sacrifice: why should his oblation of himself then be made only consequent to his death and resurrection? Which [...]latter, being by our Adversaries made not his own act, but Gods upon him, and his entrance into Heaven, being given him (as they assert) as a reward of his sufferings, in what tolerable sense can that be called an oblation E of himself, which was confer [...]ed upon him as a reward of his former sufferings? From whence it follows, that upon our Adversaries own grounds, the death of Christ may far more properly be called the oblation of himself, than his entrance [Page 348] into Heaven; and that there is no necessity of making A the oblation of Christ consequent to his death, there being so great a difference between the Sacrifice of Christ, and that of the Sacrifices for sin under the Levitical Law.
2. We observe, That the oblation as performed by the Priest, did not depend upon his presenting himself before God, but upon the presenting the blood of a Sacrifice, which had been already slain for the expiation of sins. If the Priest had gone into the Holy of Holies, and there only presented himself before the Mercy-seat, and that had been all required in order to the expiation of sins, there had been some pretence for our B Adversaries making Christs presenting himself in Heaven, to be the oblation of himself to God; but under the Law, the efficacy of the High-Priests entrance into the Holy of Holies, did depend upon the blood which he carried in thither, which was the blood of the Sin-offering, which was already slain for the expiation of sins: And in correspondency to this, Christs efficacy in his entrance into Heaven, as it respects our expiation, must have a respect to that Sacrifice which was offered up to God antecedent to it. And I wonder our Adversaries do so much insist on the High-Priests entring into the most holy C place once a year, as though all the expiation had depended upon that; whereas all the promise of expiation, was not upon his bare entrance into it; but upon the blood which he carried along with him, and sprinkled there: In correspondency to which, our Saviour is not barely said, to enter into Heaven, and present himself to God, but that he did this Heb. 9. 12. by his own blood, having obtained Eternal Redemption for us.
3. We observe, That there was something correspondent in the death of Christ, to somewhat consequent to the oblation D under the Law, and therefore there can be no reason to suppose, that the oblation of Christ must be consequent to his death: for that destroys the correspondency between them. Now this appears in this particular, in the solemn Sacrifices for sin, after the sprinkling of the blood, which was carried into the Holy place to renconcile withal, all the remainder of the Sacrifice was to be burnt without the Camp, and this held on the day of Atonement, as well as in other Sin-offerings for the Congregation. Now the Author to the Hebrews tells us, That in correspondency to this, Iesus that he might sanctifie E the people with his own blood, suffered without the gate: What Heb. 13. 12. force is there in this, unless the blood of Christ did answer to the Sin-offerings for the people, and his oblation was supposed to be made before; and therefore that he might have all [Page 349] things agreeable to those Sin-offerings, the last part was to be A compleated too; viz. That he was to suffer without the gate; which after the peoples settlement in Ierusalem, answered to the being burnt without the Camp in the Wilderness.
4. We observe, That the Oblation in Expiatory Sacrifices under the Law, by the Priest, had always relation to the consumption of what was offered: Thus the offering of the blood, in token of the destruction of the life of the beast, whose blood was offered; for no blood was to be offered of a living creature, nor of one killed upon any other account, B but for that end to be a sacrifice for sin, and after the sprinkling and pouring out of the blood, the inwards of some, and all of the other, were to be consumed by fire. And it is observable, that the greater the Sacrifice for sin was, always the more was consumed of it; as appears plainly by the forementioned difference of the Sin-offerings for private persons, and for the people; of the former, the Priests were allowed to eat, but not at all of the latter. And so it was observed among the Egyptians, in the most solemn Sacrifices for expiation, nothing was allowed to be eaten of that part which was designed C for that end. For Herodotus gives us an account why the Egyptians never eat the head of any living Creature; which is, That when they [...]. Herodot. l 2. c. 39. offer up a Sacrifice, they make a solemn execration upon it, that if any evil were to fall upon the persons who Sacrificed, or upon all Egypt, it might be turned upon the head of that beast: And Plutarch adds, that after this solemn execration, [...]. Plutarch. de Iside. They cut off the head, and of old, threw D it into the River, but then gave it to strangers. From which custom we observe, that in a solemn Sacrifice for expiation, the guilt of the offenders, was by this rite of execration supposed to be transferred upon the head of the Sacrifice, as it was in the Sacrifices among the Jews, by the laying on of hands; and that nothing was to be eaten of what was supposed to have that guilt transferred upon it. From hence all Expiatory Sacrifices were at first whole Burnt-offerings, as appears by the Patriarchal Xenoph. Cy [...]opaed. l. 7. 8. Strab. l. 4. Plutarch. Symp. l. 6. probl. 8. Sacrifices, and the customs of other Nations, and among the E Jews themselves, as we have already proved in all solemn offerings for the people. And although in the sacrifices of private persons, some parts were allowed to be eaten by the Priests; yet those which were designed for expiation were consumed. [Page 350] So that the greater the offering was to God, the A more it implied the Consumption of the thing which was so offered: How strangely improbable then is it, That the Oblation of Christ should not (as under the Law) have respect to his death and sufferings; but to his entrance into Heaven, wherein nothing is supposed to be consumed, but all things given him with far greater power, as our Adversaries suppose, than ever he had before. But we see the Apostle parallels Christs suffering with the burning of the Sacrifices, and his blood with the blood of them, and consequently his offering up himself, must relate not to his entrance into Heaven, but B to that act of his whereby he suffered for sins, and offered up his blood as a Sacrifice for the sins of the world.
From all which it appears; how far more agreeably to the Oblations under the Law, Christ is said to offer up himself §. 11. Chri [...]ts entrance into Heaven could not be the Oblation of himself mentioned. for the expiation of sins by his death and sufferings, than by his entrance into Heaven; For it is apparent, that the Oblations in expiatory Sacrifices under the Law, were such upon which the expiation of sin did chiefly depend; but by our Adversaries own confession, Christs oblation of himself by his entrance into Heaven, hath no immediate respect at all to the C expiation of sin: only as the way whereby he was to enjoy that power by which he did expiate sins, as Crellius saith; now, let us consider, what more propriety there is in making this presenting of Christ in Heaven to have a correspondency with the legal Oblations, than the offering up himself upon the Cross. For 1. on the very same reason that his entrance into Heaven is made an Oblation, his death is so too; viz. Because it was the way whereby he obtained the power of expiation; and far more properly so than the other, since they make Christs entrance and power the reward of his sufferings, but they never D make his sitting at the right hand of God, the reward of his entrance into Heaven. 2. His offering up himself to God upon the Cross, was his own act, but his entrance into Heaven was Gods, as themselves acknowledge, and therefore could not in any propriety of speech be called Christs offering up himself. 3. If it were his own act, it could not have that respect to the expiation of sins, which his death had; for our Adversaries say, that his death was by reason of our sins, and that he suffered to purge us from sin; but his entrance into Heaven was upon his own account, to enjoy that power and authority, E which he was to have at the right hand of God. 4. How could Christs entrance into Heaven, be the way for his enjoying that power which was necessary for the expiation of sin, when Christ before his entrance into Heaven, saith, that all [Page 351] power was given to him in Heaven and earth: and the reason Matth. 28. 18. A assigned in Scripture of that power and authority which God gave him is, because he humbled himself, and became obedient Phil. 2. 8, 9 to death, even the death of the Cross: So that the entrance of Christ into Heaven, could not be the means of obtaining that power which was conferred before; but the death of Christ is menti [...]ned on that account in Scripture. 5. If the death of Christ were no expiatory Sacrifice, the entrance of Christ into Heaven could be no Oblation proper to a High-Priest; for his entrance into the Holy of Holies, was on the account of the blood of the sin-offering which he carried in with him. If there B were then no Expiatory Sacrifice before, that was slain for the sins of men; Christ could not be said to make any Oblation in Heaven, for the Oblation had respect to a Sacrifice already slain; so that if men deny that Christs death was a proper Sacrifice for sin, he could make no Oblation at all in Heaven, and Christ could not be said to enter thither, as the High-Priest entred into the Holy of Holies with the blood of the Sacrifice; which is the thing which the Author to the Hebrews, asserts concerning Christ.
2. There is as great an inconsistency in making the exercise C of Christs power in Heaven, an Oblation in any sense, as in §. 12. Christsexercise of power in Heaven in no sense an Oblation to God. making Christs entrance into Heaven, to be the Oblation which had correspondency with the Oblations of the Law. For what is there which hath the least resemblance with an Oblation in it? Hath it any respect to God, as all the legal Oblations had? no; for his intercession and power, Crellius saith, respects us, and not God. Was there any Sacrifice at all in it for expiation? how is it possible, that the meer exercise of power should be called a Sacrifice? What analogy is there at all between them? And how could he be then said most D perfectly to exercise his Priesthood, when there was no consideration at all of any Sacrifice offered up to God? so that upon these suppositions the Author to the Hebrews must argue upon strange similitudes, and fancy resemblances to himself, which it was impossible for the Iews to understand him in, who were to judge of the nature of Priesthood and Oblations in a way agreeable to the Institutions among themselves. But was it possible for them to understand such Oblations and a Priesthood which had no respect at all to God, but wholly to the People; and such an entrance into the Holy of Holies without the blood of an E Expiatory Sacrifice for the sins of the people? But such absurdities do men betray themselves into, when they are forced to strain express places of Scripture to serve an hypothesis, which they think themselves obliged to maintain.
[Page 352] We now come to shew that this interpretation of Crellius A §. 13. Crel [...]ius his sense repugnant to the circumstances of the place [...]. Heb. 7. 27. 9. 26. 10. 10. doth not agree with the circumstances of the places before mentioned, which will easily appear by these brief considerations. 1. That the Apostle always speaks of the offering of Christ as a thing past and once done, so as not to be done again; which had been very improper, if by the Oblation of Christ, he had meant the continual appearance of Christ in Heaven for us, which yet is, and will never cease to be till all his enemies be made his foot-stool. 2. That he still speaks in allusion to the Sacrifices which were in use among the Iews, and Heb. 9. 12, 13. 10. 4, 5. therefore the Oblation of Christ must be in such a way as was B agreeable to what was used in the Levitical Sacrifices, which we have already at large proved he could not do in our Adversaries sense. 3 That the Apostle speaks of such a Sacrifice for sins to which the sitting at the right hand of God was consequent; so that the Oblation antecedent to it must be properly that Sacrifice for sins which he offered to God; and therefore the exercise of his power for expiation of sins, which they say is meant by sitting at the right hand of God, cannot be that Heb. 10. 12. Sacrifice for sins: Neither can his entrance into Heaven be it, which in what sense it can be called a Sacrifice for sins, since C themselves acknowledge it had no immediate relation to the expiation of them, I cannot understand. 4. The Apostle speaks of such an Offering of Christ once, which if it had been repeated, doth imply, that Christs sufferings must have been repeated too. For then must he often have suffered since Heb. 9. 26. the foundation of the World: but the repeated exercise of Christs power in Heaven doth imply no necessity at all of Christs frequent suffering, nor his frequent entrance into Heaven; which might have been done without suffering, therefore it must be meant of such an offering up himself D as was implyed in his death and sufferings. 5. He speaks of the offering up of that body which God gave him when he Heb. 10. 5, 10 came into the World; but our Adversaries deny, that he carried the same Body into Heaven, and therefore he must speak not of an offering of Christ in Heaven, but what was performed here on Earth. But here our Adversaries have shewn us a tryal of their skill, when they tell us with much confidence that the World into which Christ is here said to come, is not Crell. cap. 10. sect. 53. to be understood of this World, but of that to come, which is not only contrary to the general acceptation of the word E when taken absolutely as it is here, but to the whole scope and design of the place. For he speaks of that World, wherein Sacrifices and Burnt-offerings were used, and the Levitical Law was observed, although not sufficient for perfect expiation, [Page 353] and so rejected for that end; and withal he speaks of that A World wherein the chearful obedience of Christ to the will of his Father was seen, for he saith, Lo I come to do thy will O God, which is repeated afterwards; but will they say, that Heb 10. 7, 9. this World was not the place into which Christ came to obey the Will of his Father? and how could it be so properly said of the future World, Lo I come to do thy will; when they make the design of his ascension to be the receiving the reward of his doing and suffering the will of God upon Earth?
But yet they attempt to prove from the same Author to the Hebrews, that Christs entrance into Heaven, was necessary to §. 14. Object [...]ons a [...]wered. [...]. 7 26. 8. 4 7. 16. B his being a perfect High-Priest; for he was to be made higher than the Heavens; and if he were on earth, he should not be a Priest; but he was a Priest after the power of an endless life: Neither could he, say they, be a perfect High-Priest, till those words were spoken to him, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee; which as appears by other places, was after the Resurrection: 5. 5. But all the sufferings he underwent in the world, were only to qualifie him for this Office in Heaven; therefore it is said, That in all things it behoved him to be made like unto his 2. 17. brethren, that he might be a merciful and faithful High-Priest, C &c. This is the substance of what is produced by Crellius and his Brethren, to prove that Christ did not become a perfect High-Priest, till he entred into Heaven: But it were Crell. cap. 10. sect. 53. worth the knowing, what they mean by a perfect High-Priest; Is it that Christ did then begin the Office of a High-Priest, and that he made no offering at all before? No, that they dare not assert at last, but that there was no perfect Sacrifice offered for sin, otherwise S [...]cinus contends, That Christ did offer upon earth, and that for himself too: So that all kind of offering is Soci [...]. p [...]aelect. c. [...]lt. not excluded by themselves, before Christs entrance into D Heaven: But if they mean by perfect High-Priest in Heaven, that his Office of High-Priest was not consummated by what he did on earth, but that a very considerable part of the Priest-hood of Christ was still remaining to be performed in Heaven; it is no more than we do freely acknowledge, and this is all we say is meant by those places: For the Apostles design is to prove, the excellency of the Priest-hood of Christ above the Aaronical; which he doth, not only from the excellency of the Sacrifice which he offered, above the blood of Bulls and Goats; but from the excellency of the Priest, who did ex [...]el the Aaronical E Priests; both in regard of his calling from God, which is all the Apostle designs, Heb 5. 5. not at all intending to determine the time when he was made, but by whom he was made High-Priest, even by him that had said, Thou art my Son, &c. and in regard of [Page 354] the excellency of the Sanctuary which he ent [...]ed into, which A was not an earthly, but ia heavenly Sanctu [...]ry; and in regard of the perpetuity of his function there, Not g [...]ing in once a year, as the High-Priests under the Law did, but there ever living to make intercession for us: Now this being the Apostles design, we may easily understand why he saith, That he was to be a heavenly High-Priest, and if he had been on earth, he could not have been a Priest: The meaning of which is only this, that if Christs Office had ended in what he did on earth, he would not have had such an excellency as he was speaking of; for then he had ceased to be at all such a High-Priest, having B no Holy of Holies to go into, which should as much transcend the earthly Sanctuary, as his Sacrifice did the blood of Bulls and Goats: Therefore in correspondency to that Priesthood, which he did so far excell in all the parts of it, he was not to end his Priesthood meerly with the blood which was shed for a Sacrifice, but he was to carry it into Heaven, and present it before God, and to be a perpetual Intercessor in the behalf of his people: And so was in regard of the perpetuity of his Office, a Priest after the Law of an endlesslife: But lest the pe [...]ple should imagine, that so great and excellent a High-Priest, being C so far exalted above them, should have no sense or compassion upon the infirmities of his people, therefore to encourage them to adhere to him, he tells them, That he was made like to his Brethren; and therefore they need not doubt, but by the sense which he had of the infirmities of humane nature, he will have pity on the weaknesses of his people; which is all the Apostle means by those expressions. So that none of these places do destroy the Priesthood of Christ on earth, but only assert the excellency, and the continuance of it in heaven: Which latter, we are as far from denying, as our Adversaries D are from granting the former. And thus much may suffice for the second thing, to prove the death of Christ a proper sacrifice for sin; viz. The Oblation which Christ made of himself to God by it. E
CHAP. VI. A
That the effects of proper Expiatory Sacrifices belong to the death of Christ, which either respect the sin or the person. Of the true notion of expiation of sin, as attributed to Sacrifices. Of the importance of [...], as applied to them. Socinus his proper sense of it examined. Crellius his Objections answered. The Iews notion of [...]. The Sacrifices not bare B conditions of pardon, nor expiated meerly as a slight part of obedience. Gods expiating sin, destroys not expiation by Sacrifice. The importance of [...] and [...], relating to Sacrifices. Expiation attributed to the Sacrifice of Christ, in the same sense that it was to other Sacrifices: and from thence, and the places of Scripture which mention it, proved not to be meerly declarative. If it had been so, it had more properly belonged to his Resurrection than his death. The Death of Christ not taken Metonymically for all the Consequents of it; because of the peculiar effects of the death of Christ in C Scripture, and because Expiation is attributed to him antecedently to his entrance into Heaven. No distinction in Scripture of the effects of Christs entrance into Heaven from his sitting at the right hand of God. The effects of an Expiatory Sacrifice, respecting the person, belong to the death of Christ, which are Atonement and Reconciliation. Of the signification of [...] and [...]. The Reconciliation by Christs death, doth not meerly respect us, but God; why the latter lessused in the Now Testament. Atwofold Reconciliation with God mentioned in Scripture. Crellius his evasion D answered. The Objections from Gods being reconciled in the sending his Son, and the inconsistency of the Freeness of Grace with the Doctrine of Satisfaction answered, and the whole concluded.
THE last thing to prove the death of Christ a proper Expiatory Sacrifice, is, That the effects of a proper §. 1. Of the true notion of Expiation, as attributed to Sacrifices. Sacrifice for sin are attributed to it. Which do either respect the sins committed, and are then E called Expiation and Remission, or the persons who were guilty of them, as they stand obnoxious to the displeasure of God, and so the effect of them is Atonement and Reconciliation. Now these we shall prove do most properly and immediately refer to [Page 356] the death of Christ; and are attributed to it, as the procuring A cause of them; and not as a bare condition of Christs entrance into Heaven, or as comprehending in it the consequents of it. I begin with the Expiation and Remission of sins; as to which Socinus doth acknowledge, That the great correspondency doth Soci [...]. de Christo servat. p. 2. l. 13. C [...]ell. cap. 10. sect. 26. lie between Christs and the Legal Sacrifices. We are therefore to enquire: 1. What respect the Expiation of sins had to the Sacrifices under the Law. 2. In what sense the Expiation of sins in attributed to the Sacrifice of Christ: For the due explication of the respect which Expiation of sins had to the Legal Sacrifices, we are to consider in what sense Expiation is understood, B and in what respect it is attributed to them. For this we are to enquire into the importance of the several phrases it is set sorth by, which are [...] and [...] in the Old Testament, [...] in the New; all which are acknowledged by our Adversaries to have a peculiar respect to the Expiation made by a Sacrifice. We shall begin with the former, because Crellius objects this against Grotius, That he imployed Crell. cap. 10. sect. 38. his greatest diligence in the explication of the Greek and Latin words for Expiation of sin, and was contented only to say, that the Hebrew words would bear the same signification: Whereas, C saith he, he ought to have proved, that the Hebrew words do require that sense which he takes them in. But by Crellius his leave, Grotius took the best course was to be taken in words, whose signification is so obscure as those are in the Hebrew Language. For [...] being so very rarely used in Scripture in that which Socinus and Crellius contend to be the proper and natural signification of it; viz. To hide or cover, and so frequently in the sense of Expiation, what better way could be taken for determining the sense of it, as applied to Sacrifices, than by insisting upon those words which are used in the New-Testament, D to the very same purpose that [...] is used in the old? For they cannot pretend that which they say is the most proper sense, can be applied to this subject, viz. To cover with pitch, or a bituminous matter, which is called [...] Gen. 6. 14. therefore it must of necessity be taken in another sense here. But Socinus contends, That it ought to be taken in a sense most agreeable to that, which is, saith he, that the Expiation Soci [...]. de Servat. p. 2. c. 11. of sin be nothing else, but the covering of it, by Gods grace and benignity. Thence, saith he, David saith, Blessed Psal. 32. 1. is the man whose iniquity is covered. But how can this prove, E that the proper signification of [...] as applied to sin, is covering by Gods Grace, when neither the word [...] is here used, nor is there any respect at all mentioned of an Expiation by Sacrifice, which is the thing we are discoursing of? And is the [Page 357] covering of sin such an easie and intelligible phrase, that this A should be made choice of to explain the difficulty of [...] by? What is it that they would have us understand by the covering sin? surely not to make it stronger and more lasting, as the Ark was covered, with that bituminous matter for that end, and yet this would come the nearest to the proper sense of [...]. So that from their own interpretation it appears, that [...] as applied to the expiation of sin by Sacrifices, cannot be taken so much as in allusion to that other sense; for their sense of Expiation, is either by the destruction of sin, or deliverance of the sinner from the punishment of it, but what resemblance B is there between the covering of a thing, in order to its preservation, and the making it not to be, or at least destroying all the power of it? But supposing we should grant that it hath some allusion to the sense of covering, why must it necessarily be supposed to be done by the meer Grace of God, as excluding all antecedent causes which should move to it? would not the propriety of the sense remain as well, supposing a moving cause, as excluding it? What should hinder, but that God may be said as well to cover sin upon a Sacrifice as to forgive it, and this is very frequently used upon a Sacrifice, That the Lev. 4. 26. Verse 31. 35. C sin shall be forgiven? But yet themselves acknowledge, that the Sacrifices were conditions required in order to expiation; if then [...] hath an immediate respect to Gods immediate favour and benignity, how comes it to be used where a condition is necessarily supposed in order to it? Had it not been more agreeable to this benignity of God to have pardon'd sin without requiring any sacrifice for it, than so strictly insisting upon the offering up Sacrifice in order to it, and then declaring that the sin is expiated, and it should be forgiven? from hence we see that there is no necessity why [...] should be used D as applyed to sacrifices in a sense most agreeable to that of covering with pitch, nor that it is not possible it should have such a sense when applyed to sins; and withal that it is very consistent with an antecedent condition to it, and therefore can by no means destroy satisfaction.
Yes, saith Crellius, it doth, for expiation is explained in the Crellius his O [...]j [...]ctions answered. Law by non-imputation, Deut. 21. 8. Be merciful, O Lord, unto thy people Israel wh [...]m thou hast redeemed, and lay not innocent §. 2. Cr [...]ll. c. 10. sect. 9. blood unto thy people of Israels charge; and the blood shall be forgiven them. But not to impute, saith he, and to receive true and E full satisfaction overthrow each other: and so expiation being the same with that, will overthrow it too. To this I answer, 1. I grant that [...] is here used both as applyed to God, and to the sin, and that the sense of it is used as to the people, when [Page 358] the prayer is, that God would not lay it to their charge, which is A the same with expiating of it. 2. We are to consider, what the foundation of this Prayer was, viz. the slaying of the Heifer for expiation of the uncertain murder; and when the Elders had washed their hands over the head of the Heifer, then they were to protest their own innocency, and to use this prayer. [...] Expiate thy people Israel, &c. i. e. accept of this Sacrifice as an expiation for them, and so charge not on them the innocent blood, &c. and upon doing of this it is said, [...] and the blood shall be expiated, i. e. as the Vulgar Latin explain it, the guilt of the blood shall be taken from B them. But how then should the expiating sin upon a Sacrifice slain in order thereto, dest [...]oy that satisfaction which we assert by the blood of Christ being shed in order to the expiation of our sins? Nay, it much rather sheweth the consistency and agreeableness of these one with another. For we have before proved, that the Sacrifice here did expiate the sin by a substitution, and bearing the guilt which could not have been expiated without it. But Crellius further urgeth, that God himself is here said to expiate, and therefore to expiate cannot signifie to attone or satisfie; in which sense Christ may be said to expiate C too, not by atoning or satisfying, but by not imputing sins, or taking away the punishment of them by his power. To which we need no other answer than what Crellius himself elsewhere gives, viz. that Socinus never denyes but that [...] doth signifie to appease or atone; which is most evi [...]ently proved from the place mention'd by Grotius, Gen. 32. 20. [...] Cum ro [...] neget, Socinus hoc verb [...]m placandi significationem habere. Crell. c. 20. sect. 38. Expiabo faciem ejus in munere, saith the interlineary Version, placabo illum muneribus, the Vulg. Lat. [...], the LXX. and all the circumstances of the place make it appear to be meant in the proper sense of appeasing the anger D of a person by something which may move him to shew favour. And if Crellius will yield this to be the sense of expiation as applyed to the Sacrifice of Christ, he need not quarrel with the word satisfaction. But why should he rather attribute that sense of expiation to Christ, which is alone given to God, wherein the expiation is attributed to him that receives the Sacrifice: rather than to him that offers the sacrifice in order to the atonement of another? since it is acknowledged that Christ did offer a sacrifice; and therefore there can be no reason why that sense of expiation should not belong to him, which was E most peculiar to that; which we shall now shew to be of the same kind with what is here mentioned, viz. an appeasing by a gift offered up to God. So we find the word used to the same sense, 2 Sam. 21. 3. [...], and [Page 359] wherewith shall I make the Atonement, i. e. wherewith shall A I satisfie you for all the wrong which Saul hath done unto you? and we see afterwards it was by the death of Sauls sons. In which place it cannot be denyed but that [...] not only signifies to appease, but such a kind of satisfaction as is by the death of some for the faults of others; and so comes home, not only to the importance of the expiation belonging to a Sacrifice in general; but to such a kind of expiation as is by the suffering of some in the place of others. Which though it be more clear and distinct, where one man suffers for others, yet this was sufficiently represented in the sacrifices under the B Law, in which we have already proved that there was a substitution of them in the place of the offenders.
And in this sense the Iews themselves do understand [...] viz. such an expiation as is made by the substitution of one in the §. 3. The Iew [...] notion of [...] place of another. Of which many instances are collected by Buxtorf, wherein [...] is taken by the Rabbinical Writers for such an expiation, whereby one was to undergo a punishment Buxtorf. [...]exic. Talmud. v. [...] in the place of another. So when in the title Sanhedrin the people say to the High-Priest [...] simus nos expiatio tua, let us be for an expiation for you, the Gloss explains it C thus, hoc est, in nobis fiat expiatio tua, nos (que) subeamus tuo locò quicquid tibi evenire debet. And when they tell us how Children ought to honour their Parents after their death, they say when they recite any memorable speech of their Fathers, they are not barely to say, My Father said so: but my Lord and Father said so, would I had been the expiation of his death: i. e. as they explain it themselves. would I had undergone what he did, and they give this general rule, Where ever it is said, behold I am for expiation, it is to be understood, behold I am in the place of another to bear his iniquities. So that this signifies D the same with [...] or a price of redemption for others. Hence [...] is taken for a price of redemption of the life of another, and rendred by [...], Exod. 21. 30.—30. 12. Numb. 35. 31, 32. where we render it satisfaction, and by [...], Psal. 48. 7. and thereby we fully understand, what our Saviour meant when he said, that he gave his Soul, [...], a ransome for many, and to this day the Iews call the Cock which they kill Matth. 20. 28. for Expiation on the day of Atonement, by the name of Cappara; and when they beat the Cock against their heads thrice, they every time use words to this purpose, Let this Cock be an E exchange for me, let him be in my room, and be made an Expiation for me; let death come to him, but to me and all Israel life and happiness. I insist on these things, only to let us understand, that the Iews never understood [...] in the sense our [Page 360] Adversaries contend for, when applyed to an Expiatory Sacrifice, A but as implying a Commutation, and a Substitution of one in the place of another, so as by the punishment of that, the other in whose room he suffers, may obtain deliverance. Which is the sense we plead for. But the utmost which Socinus and Socia. l. 2. c. 11. Doc [...]t Socinus victima [...]um oblationem obedientiam quandam Deo praestandam, quanq [...]am lev [...]m contin [...]isse, quam ex [...]romisso Dei levium quoru [...]dam errator [...]m ac peccatorum venia co [...]se [...]eretur. Creli. c. 10. sect. 10. Crellius will allow to the Sacrifices in order to Expiation, is barely this, That the offering of them is to be considered as a meer condition (that hath no other respect to the expiation of sins, than the paring a mans nails would have had, if God had required it) upon which slight obedience, the pardon of some light sins might be obtained. But can any one imagine, that B this was all that was designed by the Sacrifices of old, who considers the antiquity and universality of them in the world in those elder times before the Law, the great severity by which they were required under the Law, the punctual prescriptions that were made in all circumstances for them, the vast and almost inestimable expence the people were at about them, but above all, the reason that God himself assigns in the Law, That the blood was given for expiation, because it was the life; and the correspondency so clearly expressed in the New Testament, between the Sacrifice of Christ, and those Levitical Sacrifices? C Can any one, I say, imagine upon these considerations, that the Sacrifices had no other respect to the expiation of sin, than as they were a slight testimony of their obedience to God? Why were not an inward sorrow for sin, and tears and prayers rather made the only conditions of Expiation, than such a burthensome and chargeable service imposed upon them, which at last signified nothing, but that a command being supposed, they would have sinned if they had broken it? But upon our supposition, a reasonable account is given of all the expiatory Sacrifices; viz. That God would have them see, how D highly he esteemed his Laws, because an expiation was not to be made for the breach of them, but by the sacrificing of the life of some Creature which he should appoint in stead of the death of the Offender; and if the breach of those Laws which he had given them must require such an expiation, what might they then think would the sins of the whole world do, which must be expiated by a Sacrifice infinitely greater than all those put together were; viz. The death and sufferings of the Son of God for the sins of men? But if the offering Sacrifice had been a bare condition required of the person who committed E the fault, in order to expiation; Why is it never said, That the person who offered it, did expiate his own fault thereby? For that had been the most proper sense; for if the expiation did depend on the offering the Sacrifice, as on the [Page 361] condition of it, then the performing the condition, gave him A an immediate right to the benefit of the promise. If it be said, That his own act was not only necessary in bringing the Sacrifice, but the Priests also in offering up the blood: This will not make it at all the more reasonable; because the pardon of sin should not only depend upon a mans own act, but upon the act of another, which he could not in reason be accountable for, if he miscarried in it. If the Priest should refuse to do his part, or be unfit to do it, or break some Law in the doing of it, how hard would it seem that a mans sins could not be expiated, when he had done all that lay in his own power in order to the expiation B of them, but that another person, whose actions he had no command over, neglected the doing his duty? So that if the Sacrifice had no other influence on expiation, but as a part of obedience, in all reason the expiation should have depended on no other conditions but such as were under the power of him, whose sins were to be expiated by it.
But Crellius urgeth against our sense of Expiation, That if it §. 4. G [...]d [...] ex [...]i [...] ting sin, des [...]o [...]es n [...] ex [...]xp [...]ation by sacrifices. C [...]ell. ib. sect. 39. were by Substitution, then the Expiation would be most properly attributed to the Sacrifices themselves; whereas it is only said, that by the Sacrifices the Expiation is obtained, but that God or C the Priest do expiate; and to God it belongs properly, because he takes away the guilt and punishment of sin; which is, saith he, all meant by expiation; to the Priest only consequently, as doing what God requires in order to it; and to the Sacrifices only as the conditions by which it was obtained. But if the Expiation doth properly belong to God, and implies no more than bare pardon, it is hard to conceive that it should have any necessary relation to the blood of the Sacrifice: but the Apostle to the Hebrews tells us, that Remission had a necessary respect to the shedding of H [...]b. 9. 22. blood, so that without that there was no remission. How improperly D doth the Apostle discourse throughout that Chapter, wherein he speaks so much concerning the blood of the Sacrifices purisying, and in correspondency to that, the blood of Christ purging Verse 1 [...], 14. Verse 18, 19, 20, 21, 23. our Consciences; and that all things under the Law; were purified with blood; Had all this no other significati [...]n, but that this was a bare condition that had no other importance, but as a meer act of obedience when God had required it? why doth not the Apostle rather say, without Gods favour there is no remission, than without the shedding of blood; if all the expiation did pr [...]perly belong to that, and only very remotely to the blood E of the Sacrifice? What imaginable necessity was there, that Christ must shed his blood in order to the expiation of our sins, if all that blo [...]d of the Legal Sacrifices did signifie no more than a bare condition of pardon, though a slight part of obedience [Page 362] in it self? Why must Christ lay down his life in correspondency A to these Levitical Sacrifices? for that was surely no slight part of his obedience. Why might not this condition have been dispensed with in him, since our Adversaries say, that in it self it hath no proper efficacy on the expiation of sin? And doth not this speak the greatest repugnancy to the kindness and Grace of God in the Gospel, that he would not dispense with the ignominious death of his Son, although he knew it could have no influence of it self on the expiation of the sins of the world? But upon this supposition, that the blood of Sacrifices under the Law had no proper influence upon Expiation, the Apostles B discourse proceeds upon weak and insufficient grounds. For what necessity in the thing was there, because the blood of the Sacrifices was made a condition of pardon under the Law, therefore the blood of Christ must be so now; although in it self it hath no proper efficacy for that end? But the Apostles words and way of Argumentation doth imply, that there was a peculiar efficacy both in the one and the other, in order to Expiation; although a far greater in the blood of Christ, than could be in the other; as the thing typified, ought to exceed that which was the representation of it. From hence we see, C that the Apostle attributes what Expiation there was under the Law, not immediately to God, as belonging properly to him, but to the blood of Bulls and Goats, and the ashes of an Heifer, sprinkling the unclean. Which he had very great reason to do, since God expresly saith to the Iews, that the blood was given them [...] ad expiandum, to expiate for their souls, for the blood [...] shall expiate the soul. Than which words, nothing Lev. 17. 11. could have been more plainly said to overthrow Crellius his assertion, that Expiation is not properly or chiefly attributed to the Sacrifices, but primarily to God, and consequentially D to the Priest: who is never said to expiate, but by the Sacrifice which he offered, so that his Office was barely Ministerial in it. But from this we may easily understand, in what sense God is said to expiate sins, where it hath respect to a Sacrifice (which is that we are now discoursing of, and not in any larger or more improper use of the word) for since God himself hath declared, that the blood was given for Expiation, the Expiation which belongs to God, must imply his acceptance of it for that end, for which it was offered. For the execution or discharge of the punishment belonging to him, he may be said in that sense to E expiate, because it is only in his power to discharge the sinner from that obligation to punishment he lies under by his sins. And we do not say, that where expiating is attributed to him that accepts the Atonement, that it doth imply his undergoing [Page 363] any punishment which is impossible to suppose; but that A where it is attributed to a Sacrifice, as the means of Atonement, there we say it doth not imply a bare condition, but such a Substitution of one in the place of another, that on the account of that, the fault of the offender himself is expiated thereby.
And to this sense the other word [...] doth very well agree; §. 5. The importance of [...], and [...], relating to sacrifices. for Socinus and Crellius cannot deny, but that Gen. 31. 39. it properly signifies Luere, or to bear punishment; although they say, it no where else signifies so, and the reason is, because it is applyed to the Altar, and such other things, which are not capable of it; but doth it hence follow, that it should B not retain that signification where the matter will bear it, as in the case of Sacrifices. And although it be frequently rendred by [...], yet that will be no prejudice to the sense we plead for in respect of Sacrifices, because those words when used concerning them, do signifie Expiation too. ‘ Grotius proves, that they do from their own nature and constant use in Greek Authors, not only signifie an antecedency of order, but a peculiar efficacy in order to Expiation. Thence expiatory Sacrifices among the Greeks were called [...], and [...], frequently in Homer, C applied to Sacrifices, [...] in Plutarch, and [...] used in the same sense; an Expiatory Sacrifice in Herodotus is call'd [...], and to the same purpose it is used in Hermogenes, Plato and Plutarch: as among the Latins, placare, purgare, purificare, conciliare, lustrare in the same sense, and piare when used in Sacrifices, he proves to signifie Luere per successionem rei alterius in locum poenae debitae. Thence piaculum used for an Expiatory Sacrifice, and expiare is to appease by such a Sacrifice, so Cereris numen expiare is used in Cicero; filium expiare in Livy. So that all D these Sacrifices among them, were supposed still to pertain to the atoning the Deity, and obtaining a remission of sins committed by them. And from hence (because where there was a greater equality and nearness, there might be the greater efficacy of the Sacrifice for expiation) came the custome of sacrificing men, which Grotius at large shews to have almost universally obtained before the coming of Christ.’ We are now to consider what Crellius answers to this; the substance of which lies in these two things, 1. He denies not but that [...] and [...] do in their proper use in the Greek Crell. c. 10. sect. 23. & 24. E Tongue signifie the purging of guilt, and the aversion of the wrath of God and punishment, but that those and such other words are attributed to Sacrifices, because those were supposed to be the effects of them among the Heathens; [Page 364] but the attributing such effects to them, did arise from their A superstition, whereby greater things were attributed to Sacrifices, than God would have given to them, either before or under the Law. 2. He denyes not, but that those words, [...] and [...], being used by the Author to the Hebrews more than Ita (que) quod ad [...]es Graecas [...] & [...] attinet, quic [...]s i [...] hoc ar [...]u [...]nto non semel [...]titur D. scriptor ad Heb. t [...] ad Christi Sacrifici [...] & Sac [...]rd [...]i [...]ctionem relatae [...]o etiam [...] [...]s [...]r [...]antur q [...]m Graeca [...]i [...]gua recep [...]rat, b. c. de [...]xp [...]gatio [...]e r [...]atus & aversio [...] irae n [...]mi [...]is a [...]t p [...]ae. Crell. c. 10. p. 499. once with respect to the Sacrifices and Priesth [...]od of Christ, were taken in the same sense in which they are used in the Greek Tongue, viz. For the purging of guilt, and the aversion of the wrath of God, and the punishment consequent upon it: But all that he contends for is, That there is a difference in the manner of effecting it, which he acknowledges the words themselves B do not imply; and the reasons he gives for it are, That the other were proper, but Christs an improper Sacrifice; and that the other Sacrifices were offered by men to God, but the Sacrifice of Christ was given by God to men, and therefore he must be supposed to be reconciled before. From whence he would at least have other senses of these words joyned together with the former; viz. Either for purging away the filth of sin, or for a declaration of a deliverance from guilt and punishment, in imitation of the Idiome of the Hebrew, in which many words are used in the New Testament. From hence it follows, that Crellius C doth yield the main cause, if it appear, that Christ did offer up an Expiatory Sacrifice to God in his death, for then he grants that [...] and [...] being applyed to the Sacrifice of Christ, are to be taken for the purging away of guilt, and the aversion of the wrath of God, and the punishment of sin. And it is to no purpose to say, that it is not a proper Sacrifice, for if the effects of a proper Sacrifice do belong to it, that proves that it is so; for these words being acknowledged to be applyed to the Sacrifice of Christ by the Author to the Hebrews, what could more evince that Christs D was a proper Sacrifice, than that those things are attributed to it, which by the consent of all Nations, are said to belong to proper Sacrifices, and that in the very same sense in which they are used by those who understood them in the most proper sense. And what reason could Crellius have to say, that it was only the superstition of the Heathens, which made them attribute such effects to sacrifices; when himself acknowledges that the very same sense doth belong to the Sacrifice of Christ under that notion? and as to the Iews we have already proved that the sense of expiation among them was by vertue of the E Law to be taken in as proper a sense as among the Heathens, for the purging of guilt, and the aversion of the wrath of God. And why should Crellius deny that effect of the Sacrifice of Christ as to the atonement of God, because [Page 365] Gods love was seen in giving him who was to offer the Sacrifice? A since that effect is attributed to those Sacrifices under the Law which God himself appointed to be offered, and shewed his great kindness to the people in the Institution of such a way, whereby their sins might be expiated, and they delivered from the punishment of them. But of the consistency of these two, I shall speak more afterwards, in the effect of the Sacrifices as relating to Persons.
We now come to consider in what sense the expiation of sins §. 8. Expiation attributed to the Sacrifice of Christ in the same sense that it was to other Sacrifices. is in Scripture attributed to the Sacrifice of Christ, and therein I shall prove these two things. 1. That the expiation is B attributed to the Sacrifice of Christ in the same sense that is attributed to other Sacrifices, and as the words in themselves do signifie. 2. That what is so attributed doth belong to the Sacrifice of Christ in his death, antecedent to his entrance into Heaven. 1. That the expiation is to be taken in a proper sense, when it is attributed to the Sacrifice of Christ. Crellius tells us, the controversie is not about the thing, viz. whether Crell. c. 10. sect. 24. expiation in the sense we take it in for purging away guilt, and aversion of the wrath of God, doth belong to the Sacrifice of Christ, for he acknowledges it doth; but all the question is about C the manner of it: which in the next Section he thus explains: There are three senses in which Christ may be said to expiate sins; either by begetting Faith in us, whereby we are drawn off from the practice of sin, in which sense, he saith, it is a remoter antecedent to it; or as it relates to the expiation by actual deliverance from punishment, so he saith, it is an immediate antecedent to it: or as he declares that they are expiated, but this, he saith, doth not so properly relate to Christ as a Sacrifice, but as a Priest. But never a one of these senses comes near to that which Crellius grants to be the proper importance D of [...] and [...], as applyed to a Sacrifice, viz. the purging away guilt, and the aversion of the wrath of God, and punishment, not any way, but by the means of the Sacrifice offered. For in the Legal Sacrifices nothing can be more plain than that the expiation was to be by the Sacrifice offered for Atonement: supposing then that in some other way (which could be by no means proper to those Sacrifices) Christ may be said to expiate sins, what doth this prove that there was an expiation belonging to his Sacrifice agreeable to the Sacrifices of old? But as I urged before in the case of Christs E being High-Priest, that by their assertions the Iews might utte [...]ly deny the force of any argument used by the Author to the Hebrews to prove it: so I say as to the expiation by Christs Sacrifice, that it hath no analogy or correspondency at all [Page 366] with any Sacrifice that was ever offered for the expiation of A sins. For by that they always understood something which was immediately offered to God for that end, upon which they obtained remission of sins; but here is nothing answerable to it in their sense of Christs Sacrifice; for here is no Oblation at all made unto God for this end; all the efficacy of the Sacrifice of Christ, in order to expiation doth wholly and immediately respect us; so that if it be a proper Sacrifice to any, it must be a Sacrifice to us, and not to God: for a Sacrifice is always said to be made to him whom it doth immediately respect; but Christ in the planting Faith, in actual B deliverance, in declaring to us this deliverance, doth wholly respect us, and therefore his Sacrifice must be made to men, and not to God. Which is in it self a gross absurdity, and repugnant to the nature and design of Sacrifices from the first institution of them; which were always esteemed such immediate parts of divine Worship, that they ought to respect none else but God, as the object to which they were directed, though for the benefit and advantage of Mankind. As well then might Christ be said to pray for us, and by that no more be meant but that he doth teach us to understand our duty; as be C made an expiatory Sacrifice for us, and all the effect of it only respect us and not God. And this is so far from adding to the perfection of Christs Sacrifice above the Legal (which is the thing pleaded by Crellius) that it destroys the very nature of a Sacrifice, if such a way of expiation be attributed to it Crell. c. 10. sect. 26. (which though conceived to be more excellent in it self) yet is wholly incongruous to the end and design of a Sacrifice for Expiation. And the excellency of the manner of expiation ought to be in the same kind, and not quite of another nature; for, will any one say, that a General of an Army hath D a more excellent conduct than all that went before him, because he can make finer speeches; or that the Assomanaean Family discharged the Office of Priesthood best, because they had a greater power over the people; or that Nero was the most excellent Emperour of Rome because he excelled the rest in Musick and Poetry: by which we see that to assert an excellency of one above another, we must not go to another kind, but shew its excellency in that wherein the comparison lies: So that this doth not prove the excellency of the Sacrifice of Christ, because he hath a greater power to perswade, deliver E and govern, than any Sacrifice under the Law; for these are things quite of another nature from the consideration of a Sacrifice: But therein the excellency of a Sacrifice is to be demonstrated, that it excells all other in the proper end and dedesign [Page 367] of a Sacrifice, i. e. if it be more effectual towards God for A obtaining the expiation of sin; which was always thought to be the proper end of all Sacrifices for expiation. Although then Christ may be allowed to excell all other Sacrifices in all imaginable respects but that which is the proper intention of a Sacrifice; it may prove far greater excellency in Christ, but it doth withal prove a greater imperfection in his Sacrifice, if it fail in that which is the proper end of it. So that if we should grant that the expiation attributed to Christs Sacrifice signified no more than reclaiming men from their sins, or their deliverance by his power, or a declaration of Gods decree to pardon, B this may prove that there are better arguments to believe the remission of sins now under the Gospel; but they do not in the least prove that Christ is to be considered as a Sacrifice; much less that he doth far excell in the notion of an Expiatory Sacrifice all those which were offered up to God for that end under the Law.
But we must now further consider, whether this be all attributed to Christ in order to expiation in Scripture; i. e. Whether §. 7. Expiation by Christ not meerly declara [...]ive. those words which of themselves do imply the aversion of the wrath of God, when used concerning other Sacrifices, C when applied to the Sacrifice of Christ, do only imply the begetting faith in us, or a declaration of pardon. The words which are used to this purpose, are [...], which are all applied to the blood of Christ, and the dispute is, whether they signifie no more but a declaration of pardon, or a means to beget saith in us. The first words [...] and [...] Crellius acknowledgeth do frequently signifie deliverance from guilt and punishment; but, he saith, they may Crell. cap. 10. sect. 28. p 506. likewise signifie a declaration of that deliverance, as decreed by God, or a purging from the sins themselves, or from the D custom of sinning. So that by Crellius his own confession, the sense we contend for is most proper and usual, the other are more remote, and only possible; why then should we forsake the former sense, which doth most perfectly agree to the nature of a Sacrifice, which the other senses have no such relation to, as that hath? For these being the words made use of in the New Testament, to imply the force and efficacy of a Sacrifice, why should they not be understood in the same sense which the Hebrew words were taken in, when they are applied to the Sacrifices under the Law? We are not E enquiring into all possible senses of words, but into the most natural and agreeable to the scope of them that use them: and that we shall make it appear to be the same, we plead for in the places in dispute between us; as, 1 John 1. 7. The blood [Page 368] of Iesus Christ his Son, [...], purgeth A us from all sin, Heb. 9. 13, 14. If the blood of bulls, and of goats, and the ashes of an heifer, sprinkling the unclean, [...], sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh: How much more shall the blood of Christ purge your consciences from dead works, [...], Heb. 1. 3. [...], when he had by himself purged our sins. So [...] and [...] are used with a respect to the blood of Christ, Heb. 10. 22. Apocalip. 1. 5. And because remission of sin was looked on as the consequent of expiation by Sacrifice under the Law; B therefore that is likewise attributed to the blood of Christ, Matth. 26. 28, This is the blood of the New Testament which was shed for many, [...], for the remission of sins, Eph. 1. 7. In whom we have redemption through his blood, the remission of sins, and to the same purpose, Coloss. 1. 14. And from hence we are said to be justified by his blood, Rom. 5. 9. and Christ is said to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, Rom. 3. 25. The substance of all that Crellius replies to these places is, That those words which do properly signifie the thing Crell. cap. 10. sect. 28. it self, may very conveniently be taken only for the declaration C of it, when the performance of the thing doth follow by vertue of that declartaion: which then happens, when the declaration is made of the thing decreed by another, and that in the name and by the command of him who did decree it. And in this sense, Christ by his blood may be said to deliver us from the punishment of our sins, by declaring or testifying to us the will and decree of God for that purpose. But this answer is by no means sufficient, upon these considerations; 1. Because it doth not reach the proper and natural sense of the words, as Crellius himself confesseth; and yet he assigns no reason D at all, why we ought to depart from it, unless the bare possibility of another meaning be sufficient. But how had it been possible for the efficacy of the blood of Christ for purging away the guilt of our sins, to have been expressed in clearer and plainer terms than these, which are acknowledged of themselves to signifie as much as we assert? If the most proper expressions for this purpose, are not of force enough to perswade our Adversaries, none else could ever do it: so that it had been impossible for our Doctrine to have been delivered in such terms, but they would have found out ways to evade E the meaning of them. It seems very strange, that so great an efficacy should not only once or twice, but so frequently be attributed to the blood of Christ for expiation of sin, if nothing else were meant by it, but that Christ by his death [Page 369] did only declare that God was willing to pardon sin? If there A were danger in understanding the words in their proper sense, why are they so frequently used to this purpose? why are there no other places of Scripture that might help to undeceive us, and tell us plainly, that Christ dyed only to declare his Fathers will? but what ever other words might signifie, this was the only true meaning of them. But what miserable shifts are these, when men are forced to put off such Texts which are confessed to express our Doctrine, only by saying that they may be otherwise understood? which destroys all kind of certainty in words; which by reason of the various use B of them, may be interpreted to so many several senses, that if this liberty be allowed, upon no other pretence, but that another meaning is possible, men will never agree about the intention of any person in speaking. For upon the same reason, if it had been said, That Christ declared by his death Gods readiness to pardon, it might have been interpreted, That the blood of Christ was therefore the declaration of Gods readiness to pardon, because it was the consideration upon which God would do it: So that if the words had been as express for them, as they are now against them, according to their way of answering C places, they would have been reconcileable to our opinion. 2. The Scripture in these expressionś, doth attribute something peculiar to the blood of Christ; but if all that were meant by it were no more, than the declaring Gods will to pardon, this could in no sense be said to be peculiar to it. For this was the design of the Doctrine of Christ, and all his miracles were wrought to confirm the truth of that part of his Doctrine, which concerned remission of sins as well as any other: but how absurd would it have been to say, that the miracles of Christ purge us from all sin, that D through Christ healing the sick, raising the dead, &c. we have redemption, even the forgiveness of sins, which are attributed to the blood of Christ? but if in no other respect, than as a testimony to the truth of the Doctrine of Remission of sins, they were equally applicable to one as to the other. Besides, if this had been all intended in these expressions, they were the most incongruously applied to the blood of Christ; nothing seeming more repugnant to the Doctrine of the Remission of sins, which was declared by it, than that very thing by which it was declared, if no more were intended by it: E For how unsuitable [...]a way was it to declare the pardon of the guilty persons, by such severities used towards the most Innocent! Who could believe, that God should declare his willingness to pardon others, by the death of his own Son; unless [Page 370] that death of his be considered as the Meritorious cause for A procuring it? And in that sense we acknowledge, That the death of Christ was a declaration of Gods will and decree to pardon, but not meerly as it gave testimony to the truth of his Doctrine (for in that sense the blood of the Apostles and Martyrs might be said to purge us from sin, as well as the blood of Christ) but because it was the consideration upon which God had decreed to pardon. And so as the acceptance of the condition required, or the price paid, may be [...]aid to declare or manifest, the intention of a person to release or deliver a Captive: So Gods acceptance of what Christ did suffer for our sakes, B may be said to declare his readiness to pardon us upon his account. But then this declaration doth not belong properly to the act of Christ in suffering; but to the act of God in accepting: and it can be no other ways known, than Gods acceptance is known; which was not by the Sufferings, but by the Resurrection of Christ. And theref [...]re the declaring Gods will and decree to pardon, doth properly belong to that: and if that had been all which the Scripture had meant, by purging of sin by the blood of Christ, it had been very incongruously applied to that, but most properly to his Resurrection. But C these phrases being never attributed to that which most properly might be said to declare the will of God; and being peculiarly attributed to the death of Christ, which cannot be said properly to do it; nothing can be more plain, than that these expressions ought to be taken in that which is confessed to be their proper sense; viz. That Expiation of sin, which doth belong to the death of Christ, as a Sacrifice for the sins of the world.
But yet Socinus and Crellius have another subterfuge. (For therein lies their great art, in seeking rather by any §. 8. The death of Christ not taken Metonymically for all the consequents of it. means to escape their enemies, than to overcome them.) D For being sensible, that the main scope and design of the Scripture is against them, they seldom, and but very weakly assault: but shew all their subtilty in avoiding by all imaginable arts, the force of what is brought against them. And the Scripture being so plain in attributing such great effects to the death of Christ, when no other answer will serve turn, then they tell us, That the death of Christ is C [...]ell. cap. 1. sect. 103. Sect. 119. c. 10 Sect. 45. p. 527. taken Metonymically for all the consequents of his death; viz. His Resurrection, Exaltation, and the Power and Authority which he hath at the right hand of his Father. But how is it E possible to convince those, who by death, can understand life; by sufferings, can mean glory, and by the shedding of blood, sitting at the right hand of God? And that the Scripture is very far from giving any countenance to these bold Interpretations, [Page 371] will appear by these considerations; 1. because the effect A of Expiation of our sins, is attributed to the death of Christ, as distinct from his Resurrection.; viz. Our reconciliation with God, Rom. 5. 10. For if when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son; much more being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life. To which Crellius answers, That the Apostle doth not speak of the death of Crell. cap. 1. sect. 112. Christ alone, or as it is considered distinct from the consequences of it; but only that our Reconciliation was effected by the death of Christ intervening. But nothing can be more evident to any one, who considers the design of the Apostles B discourse, than that he speaks of what was peculiar to the death of Christ: for therefore it is said, that Christ dyed for Rom. 5. v. 6. the ungodly. For scarcely for a righteous man will one dye: but God comm [...]ndeth his love towards us, in that while we 7. 8. 9. were yet sinners, Christ dyed for us. Much more then being now justified by his blood, we shall be saved through him; upon which those words follow, For if when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, &c. 10. The Reconciliation here mentioned, is attributed to the death of Christ in the same sense, that it is mentioned before; C but there it is not mentioned as a bare condition intervening in order to something farther; but as the great instance of the love both of God and Christ; of God, in sending his Son; of Christ, in laying down his life for sinners, in order to their being justified by his blood. But where is it that St. Paul saith, that the death of Christ had no other influence on the expiation of our sins, but as a bare condition intervening in order to that power and authority whereby he should expiate sins? what makes him attribute so much to the death of Christ, if all the benefits we enjoy D depend upon the consequences of it; and no otherwise upon that, than meerly as a preparation for it? what peculiar emphasis were there in Christs dying for sinners, and for the ungodly; unless his death had a particular relation to the expiation of their sins? Why are men said to be justified by his blood, and not much rather by his glorious Resurrection, if the blood of Christ be only considered as antecedent to the other? And that would have been the great demonstration of the love of God which had the most immediate influence upon our advantage: which could not have been the death E in this sense, but the life and glory of Christ. But nothing can be more absurd than what Crellius would have to be the meaning of this place, viz. that the Apostle doth not speak of the proper force of the death of Christ distinct from his life; but [Page 372] that two things are opposed to each other for the effecting of A one of which the death of Christ did intervene, but it should not intervene for the other; viz. it did intervene for our reconciliation, but it should not for our life. For did not the death of Christ equally intervene for our life as for our reconciliation? was not our eternal deliverance the great thing designed by Christ, and our reconciliation in order to that end? what opposition then can be imagined, that it should be necessary for the death of Christ to intervene in order to the one than in order to the other? But he means, that the death of Christ should not intervene anymore; what B need that, when it is acknowledged by themselves, that Christ dyed only for this end before, that he might have power to bestow eternal life on them that obey him? But the main force of the Apostles argument lies in the comparison between the death of Christ having respect to us as enemies in order to reconciliation, and the life of Christ to us considered as reconciled; so that if he had so much kindness for enemies, to dye for their reconciliation, we may much more presume that he now living in Heaven will accomplish the end of that reconciliation, in the eternal salvation C of them that obey him. By which it is apparent that he speaks of the death of Christ in a notion proper to it self, having influence upon our reconciliation; and doth not consider it metonymically as comprehending in it, the consequents of it.
2. Because the expiation of sins is attributed to Christ antecedently to the great consequents of his death, viz. his sitting §. 9. Expiation attributed to Christ antecedently to his entrance into heaven. at the right hand of God. Heb. 1. 3. When he had by himself purged our sins, sate down on the right hand of his Majesty on high. Heb. 9. 12. But by his own blood he entred in D once into the Holy Place, having obtained eternal redemption for us. To these places Crellius gives a double answer. 1. That indefinite particles ( [...] and [...]) being Crell. cap. 10. sect. 50. joyned with Verbs of the praeterperfect tense do not always require that the action expressed by them, should precede that which is designed in the Verbs to which they are joyned; but they have sometimes the force of particles of the present or imperfect tense; which sometimes happens in particles of the praeterperfect tense, as Matth. 10. 5. [...] so [...]; and several other instances produced by him: E according to which manner of interpretation the sense he puts upon those words, Heb. 9. 12. is, Christ by the shedding of his blood entred into the Holy of Holies, and in so doing he found eternal redemption, or the expiation of sins. But not [Page 373] to dispute with Crellius concerning the importance of the Aorist A being joyned with a Verb of the praeterperfect tense, which in all reason and common acceptation doth imply the action past by him who writes the words antecedent to his writing of it, as is plain in the instances produced by Crellius; but according to his sense of Christs expiation of sin, it was yet to come after Christs entrance into Heaven, and so it should have been more properly [...] than [...]; not I say to insist upon that, the Apostle manifests, that he had a respect to the death of Christ in the obtaining this eternal redemption, by his following discourse: for v. 14. he compares the blood of B Christ in point of efficacy for expiation of sin, with the blood of the Legal Sacrifices: whereas if the expiation meant by him had been sound by Christs Oblation of himself in Heaven, he would have compared Christs entrance into Heaven in order to it, with the entrance of the High-Priest into the Holy of Holies, and his argument had run thus. For if the High-Priest under the Law did expiate sins by entring into the Holy of Holies; How much more shall the Son of God entring into Heaven expiate the sins of Mankind: but we see the Apostle had no sooner mention'd the redemption obtained for us; but he presently C speaks of the efficacy of the blood of Christ in order to it, and as plainly asserts the same, v. 15. And for this cause he is the Mediator of the New Testament that by means of death, for the redemption of the transgressions which were under the first Testament, they which are called might receive the promise of eternal inheritance. Why doth the Apostle here speak of the [...], the expiation of sins by the means of death; if he had so lately asserted before that the redemption or expiation was found not by his death, but by his entrance into Heaven? and withal the Apostle here doth not speak of such a D kind of expiation as wholly respects the future, but of sins that were under the first Testament, not barely such as could not be expiated by vertue of it, but such as were committed during the time of it, although the Levitical Law allowed no expiation for them. And to confirm this sense, the Apostle doth not go on to prove the necessity of Christs entrance into Heaven; but of his dying, v. 16, 17, 18. But granting that he doth allude to the High-Priests entring into the Holy of Holies, yet that was but the representation of a Sacrifice already offer'd, and he could not be said to find expiation by his entrance; but that was already E found by the blood of the Sacrifice, and his entrance was only to accomplish the end for which the blood was offer'd up in sácrifice. And the benefit which came to men is attributed to the Sacrifice, and not to the sprinkling of blood before the Mercy-seat: [Page 374] and whatever effect was consequent upon his entrance into the A Sanctuary, was by vertue of the blood which he carried in with him, and was before shed at the Altar. Neither can it with any reason be said, that if the redemption were obtained by the blood of Christ, there could be no need of his entrance into Heaven; since we do not make the Priesthood of Christ to expire at his death; but that he is in Heaven a merciful High-Priest in negotiating the affairs of his People with God, and there ever lives to make intercession for them.
Crellius answers, That granting the Aorist being put before §. 10. No distinction in Scripture of the effects of Christs entrance into Heaven from his sitting at the right hand of God. the Ver [...] should imply such an action which was antecedent B to Christs sitting at the right hand of God, yet it is not there said, that the expiation of sins was made before Christs entrance into Heaven; for those, saith he, are to be considered as two different things; for a Prince first enters into his Palace, before he sits upon his throne. And therefore, saith he, Christ may be said to have made expiation of sins, before he sate down at the right hand of his Father, not that it was done by his death, but by his Crell. c. 10. sect. 50. p. 537. entrance into Heaven, and offering himself to God there, by which means he obtained his sitting on the right hand of the Majesty on high, and thereby the full Power of remission of sins, C and giving eternal life. To which I answer, 1. That the Sripture never makes such a distinction between Christs entrance into Heaven, and sitting at the right hand of God; which latter implying no more but the glorious state of Christ in Heaven, his entrance into Heaven doth imply it: For therefore God exalted him to be a Prince and a Saviour; and the reason of the power and authority given him in Heaven is no where attributed to his entrance into it as the means of it; but our Saviour before that tells us that all power and authority was committed to Matth. 28. 18. him; and his very entrance into Heaven was a part of his glory; D and given him in consideration of his sufferings; as the Apostle plainly asserts; and he became obedient to death, even the death of the Cross, wherefore God hath highly exalted him, &c. Phil. 2. 8, 9. There can be then no imaginable reason to make the entrance of Christ into Heaven, and presenting himself to God there, a condition or means of obtaining that power and authority which is implyed in his sitting at the right hand of God. 2. Supposing, we should look on these as distinct, there is as little reason to attribute the expiation of sin to his entrance, considered as distinct from the other: For the expiation of sins in Heaven E being by Crellius himself confessed to be by the exercise of Christs power, and this being only the means to that power, how could Christ expiate sins by that power which he had not? But of this I have spoken before, and [Page 375] shewed that in no sense allowed by themselves the expiation A of sins can be attributed to the entrance of Christ into Heaven as distinct from his sitting at the right hand of God. Thus much may suffice to prove, that those effects of an Expiatory Sacrifice, which do respect the sins committed, do properly agree to the death of Christ.
I now come to that which respects the person, considered as §. 11. Of the Atonement made by Christs death. obnoxious to the wrath of God by reason of his sins; and so the effect of an Expiatory Sacrifice is Atonement and Reconciliation. By the wrath of God, I mean, the reason which God hath from the holiness and justice of his nature, to punish sin B in those who commit it: by the means of Atonement and Reconciliation, I mean, that in consideration of which, God is willing to release the sinner from the obligation to punishment he lyes under by the Law of God, and to receive him into favour, upon the terms which are declared by the Doctrine of Christ. And that the death of Christ was such a means of Atonement and Reconciliation for us, I shall prove by those places of Scripture which speak of it. But Crellius would seem to acknowledge, Crell. c. 7. sect. 3. That if Grotius seem to contend for no more, than that Christ did avert that wrath of God which men had deserved C by their sins, they would willingly yield him all that he pleads for: but then he adds, That this deliverance from the wrath to come, is not by the death, but by the power of Christ. So that the question is, Whether the death of Christ were the means of Atonement and Reconciliation between God and us? and yet Crellius would seem willing to yield too, that the death of Christ may be said to avert the wrath of God from us, as it was a condition in order to it; for in that sense it had no more influence upon it than his birth had: but we have already seen, that the Scripture attributes much more to the death and blood D of Christ, in order to the expiation of sin. We do not deny, that the death of Christ may be called a condition, as the performance of any thing in order to an end, may be called the condition upon which that thing is to be obtained; but we say, that it is not a bare condition, but such a one as implies a consideration, upon which the thing is obtained, being such as answers the end of him that grants it: by which means it doth propitiate or atone him, who had before just reason to punish, but is now willing to forgive and be reconciled to them, who have so highly offended him. And E in this sense we assert, that Christ is said to be [...], a propitiation for our sins, 1 John 2. 2.—4. 10. which we take in the same sense that [...], is taken for the Sin-offering for Atonement. Ezek. 44. 27. [...], they shall [Page 376] offer a sin-offering; for so [...] there signifies: and in the same A sense [...] is taken, Ezek. 45. 19, and the Ram for Atonement ts call'd [...], Numb. 5. 8. And thence the High-Priest when he made an Atonement, is said [...], 2 Maccab. 3. 33. which is of the greater consequence to us, because Crellius would not have the sense either of [...] or [...], to be Crell. 7. sect. 10. taken from the common use of the word in the Greek Tongue; but from that which some call the Hellenistical use of it; viz. That which is used in the Greek of the New Testament, out of the LXX. and the Apocryphal Greek; in both which we have found the word [...] in a sense fully correspondent to what B we plead for. But he yet urges, and takes a great deal of pains to prove, that [...] and [...] do not alwayes signifie to be appeased by another; but sometimes signifies to be propitious and merciful in pardoning; and sometimes to expiate, and then signifies the same with [...] and [...]: which if it be granted, proves nothing against us, having already proved, that those words do signifie the aversion of the wrath of God by a Sacrifice, and that there is no reason to recede from that signification, when they are applyed to the blood of Christ. And we do not contend, that when the word [...] or [...] is applyed C to him that doth forgive, it doth imply appeasing; but the effect of it, which is pardoning; but that which we assert, is, that when it is applyed to a third person, or a thing made use of in order to forgiveness, then we say it signifies the propitiating him that was justly displeased: so as by what was done or suffered for that end, he is willing to pardon what he had just reason to punish. So Moses is said, to make Atonement for the people by his prayers, [...], Exod. 34. 14. and we may see Verse 11. how much God was displeased before. And Moses besought D the Lord his God, and said, Why doth thy wrath wax hot against thy people: and Verse 12. Turn from thy fierce wrath, and repent of this evil against thy people: and then it is said, Verse 14. The Lord was atoned for the evil which he thought to do unto his people. I would therefore willingly know, why Moses might not here properly be said, [...], as it is said, [...], and therefore since it is so very often said in the Levitical Law, [...] and [...], as [...], and the accusative case scarce ever put but in two cases; (viz. When E these words are applyed to inanimate things, as the Altar, &c. or when to God himself, implying forgiveness) what reason can we assign more probable for this different construction, than that when [...] is used, the verb hath a respect to [Page 377] the offended party as the accusative understood? as Christ is A said in the places mentioned to be [...], which ought in reason to be understood as those words after Moses his intercession, [...]. But Crellius asks, Why then do we never read once concerning the Priest, that he did [...] or [...], but we read that he did [...], and God is said, [...]. To this I answer; 1. That the reason why the person propitiated, is not expressed, is, because it was so much taken for granted, that the whole Institution of Sacrifices did immediately respect God, and therefore there was no danger of mistaking, B concerning the person who was to be atoned. 2. I wonder Crellius can himself produce no instance where [...] is used with respect to the Sacrifices, and the persons whose offences are remitted by the Atonement; but where [...] hath a relation to that, it is still joyned with a Preposition relating, either to the person or to the offences; if no more were understood when it is so used, than when God himself is said to do it, why is not the phrase [...], as well said of the Priest, as it is of God? From whence Grotius his sense of Hebr. 2. 17. [...] for C [...], is far more agreeable to the use of the phrase in the Old Testament, than that which Crellius would put upon it. Therefore since the [...] is attributed to Christ, we ought to take it in the sense proper to a Propitiatory Sacrifice: so it is said by Moses, where God is left out, but is necessarily understood, after the people had provoked God by their Idolatry; Ye have sinned a great sin: And now I will go up unto the Lord, [...], That I may make an Atonement for your sin: What way could Moses be said to make this Atonement, D but by propitiating God; yet his name is not there expressed, but necessarily understood. So [...] is used in the most proper sense for appeasing the anger of a person, Gen 32. 20. and [...], 2 Sam. 21. 3. which places have been already insisted on, in the signification of the word [...]. And that those places wherein Christ is said to be a propitiation for our sins, are capable of no other sense, will appear from the consideration of Christ, as a middle person betwen God and us; and therefore his being [...], cannot be parallel with that phrase, where God himself is said, E [...], for Christ is here considered as interposing between God and us, as Moses and the Priests under the Law did between God and the people, in order to the averting his wrath from them. And when one [Page 378] doth thus interpose in order to the Atonement of the offended A party, something is alwayes supposed to be done or suffered by him, as the means of that Atonement. As Iacob supposed the present he made to his Brother would propitiate him; and David appeased the Gibeonites by the death of Sauls Sons, both which are said [...]. So the shedding of the blood of Sacrifices before and under the Law, was the means of atoning God for the sins they committed. What reason can there be then why so received a sense of Atonement, both among the Iews, and all other Nations at that time when these words were written, must be forsaken; and any other sense be embraced, which B neither agrees with the propriety of the expression, nor with so many other places of Scripture, which make the blood of Christ to be a Sacrifice for the Expiation of sin?
Neither is it only our Atonement, but our Reconciliation is attributed to Christ too, with a respect to his Death and §. 12. Of Reconciliation by Christs death. Sufferings. As in the place before insisted on: For if when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son; and more largely in the second Epistle to the Corinthians. Rom. 5. 10. 2 Cor. 18. 19, 21. And all things are of God, who hath reconciled us to himself by Iesus Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of C reconciliation: To wit, that God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them, and hath committed to us the word of reconciliation. For he hath made him to be sin for us who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him. And to the Ephesians, And Ephes. 2. 16. that he might reconcile both unto God in one body by his Cross, having slain the enmity thereby. To the same purpose to the Colossians, And having made peace through the blood of his Cross, by him to reconcile all things to himself, by him I Col. 1. 20, 21, 22. say whether they be things in Heaven or in Earth; and you D that were sometimes alienated and enemies in your mind by wicked works, yet now hath he reconciled, in the body of his flesh through death. Two things the substance of Crellius his answer may be reduced to concerning these places. 1. That Crill. c. 7. sect. 15, 16, 17, 18, &c. it is no where said that God was reconciled to us, but that we are reconciled to God, and therefore this reconciliation doth not imply any averting of the anger of God. 2. That none of these places do assert any reconciliation with God antecedent to our conversion, and so that the Reconciliation mention'd implyes only the laying aside our enmity to E God by our sins. I begin with the first of these, concerning which we are to consider not barely the phrases used in Scripture, but what the nature of the thing implyes; as to which a difference being supposed between [Page 379] God and man on the account of sin, no reconciliation A can be imagined but what is mutual. For did man only fall out with God, and had not God just reason to be displeased with men for their Apostasie from him? If not, what made him so severely punish the first sin that ever was committed by man? what made him punish the old World for their impieties by a deluge? what made him leave such Monuments of his anger against the sins of the World in succeeding Ages? what made him add such severe sanctions to the Laws he made to the people of the Iews? what made the most upright Psal. 6. 1. 38. 1. Psal. 5. 5. 7. 11. 11. 5. Levit. 26. 30. among them so vehemently to deprecate his wrath and displeasure B upon the sense of their sins? what makes him declare not only his hatred of the sins of men, but of the persons of those who commit them; so far as to express the greatest abhorrency of them? Nay, what makes our Adversaries themselves to say, that impiety is in its own nature hateful to God, and stirrs him up to anger against all who commit it? what Crell. de Deo & Attrib. l. [...]. c. 30. means, I say, all this, if God be not angry with men on the account of sin? Well then; supposing God to be averse from men by reason of their sins, shall this displeasure always continue or not; if it always continues, men must certainly suffer the C desert of their sins; if it doth not always continue, then God may be said to be reconciled in the same sense that an offended party is capable of being reconciled to him who hath provoked him. Now there are two ways whereby a party justly offended may be said to be reconciled to him that hath offended him. First, when he is not only willing to admit of terms of agreement, but doth declare his acceptance of the mediation of a third person, and that he is so well satisfied with what he hath done in order to it, that he appoints this to be published to the World to assure the offender, that if the D breach continues, the fault wholly lies upon himself. The second is, when the offender doth accept of the terms of agreement offered, and submits himself to him whom he hath provoked, and is upon that received into favour. And these two we assert must necessarily be distinguished in the reconciliation between God and us. For upon the death and sufferings of Christ, God declares to the World he is so well satisfied with what Christ hath done and suffered in order to the reconciliation between himself and us, that he now publishes remission of sins to the World upon those terms which the Mediator E hath declared by his own doctrine, and the Apostles he sent to preach it: But because remission of fins doth not immediately follow upon the death of Christ, without supposition of any act on our part, therefore the state of favour doth [Page 380] commence from the performance of the conditions which are A required from us. So that upon the death of Christ God declaring his acceptance of Christs mediation, and that the obstacle did not lye upon his part; therefore those Messengers who were sent abroad into the world to perswade men to accept of these terms of agreement, do insist most upon that which was the remaining obstacle, viz. the sins of Mankind, that men by laying aside them, would be now reconciled to God, since there was nothing to hinder this reconciliation, their obstinacy in sin excepted. Which may be a very reasonable account why we read more frequently in the writings B of the Apostles, of mens duty in being reconciled to God; the other being supposed by them as the foundation of their preaching to the world, and is insisted on by them upon that account, as is clear in that place to the Corinthians, That God was in Christ reconciling the World to himself, not imputing 2 Cor. 5. 19. 20. unto men their trespasses, and hath committed to us the Word of Reconciliation; and therefore adds, Now then we are Ambassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech you by us, we pray you in Christs stead be ye reconciled to God: And least these words should seem dubious, he declares that the reconciliation C in Christ was distinct from that reconciliation he perswades them to; for the reconciliation in Christ he supposeth past. v. 18. All things are of God, who hath reconciled us to himself by Iesus Christ, and v. 21. he shews us how this Reconciliation was wrought: For he hath made him to be sin for us who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him. Crellius here finds it necessary to acknowledge a twofold Reconciliation, but hopes to escape the force of this Crell. cap. 1. sect. 118. [...] cap. 7. sect. 24. place by a rare distinction of the Reconciliation as preached by Christ, and by his Apostles; and so Gods having reconciled D the World to himself by Iesus Christ is nothing else but Christs preaching the Gospel himself, who afterwards committed that Office to his Apostles. But if such shifts as these will serve to baffle mens understandings, both they were made, and the Scripture were written to very little purpose; for if this had been all the Apostle had meant, that Christ preached the same Doctrine of Reconciliation before them, what mighty matter had this been to have solemnly told the World, that Christs Apostles preached no other Doctrine, but what their Master had preached before? especially if no more were meant by it, E but that men should leave their sins, and be reconciled to God. But besides, why is the Ministery of Reconciliation, then attributed only to the Apostles, and not to Christ, which ought in the first place to have been given to him, since the Apostles [Page 381] did only receive it from him? Why is that Ministery of Reconciliation A said to be, viz. that God was in Christ reconciling the World to himself? was this all the subject of the Apostles preaching, to tell the World, that Christ perswaded men to leave off their sins? how comes God to reconcile the World to himself by the preaching of Christ, since Christ himself saith, he was not sent to preach to the world; but to the lost sheep of the house of Israel? Was the World reconciled to God by the preaching of Christ before they had ever heard of him? Why is God said not to impute to men their trespasses by the preaching of Christ, rather than his Apostles; if the not imputing B were no more than declaring Gods readiness to pardon; which was equally done by the Apostles as by Christ himself? Lastly, what force or dependance is there in the last words, For he made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin, &c. if all he had been speaking of before had only related to Christs preaching? How was he made sin more than the Apostles, if he were only treated as a sinner upon the account of the same Doctrine which they preached equally with him? and might not men be said to be made the righteousness of God in the Apostles, as well as in Christ, if no more be meant, but C being perswaded to be righteous, by the Doctrine delivered to them?
In the two latter places, Eph. 2. 16. Coloss. 1. 20. &c. it is plain, that a twofold reconcilation is likewise mentioned, the one of the Iews and Gentiles to one another, the other of both of them to God. For nothing can be more ridiculous than the Exposition of Socinus, who would have [...] not to be joyned with the Verb, [...], but to stand by it self, and to signifie that this reconciliation of the Iews and Gentiles did tend to the glory of God. And Crellius, who stands out D at nothing, hopes to bring off Socinus here too; by saying, Crell. cap. 7. sect. 30. that it is very common, for the end to which a thing was appointed to be expressed by a Dative case following the Verb; but he might have spared his pains in proving a thing no one questions; the shorter answer had been to have produced one place where [...] ever signifies any thing but to be reconciled to God as the offended party; or whereever the Dative of the person following the Verb importing reconciliation, did signifie any thing else but the party with whom the reconciliation was to be made. As for that objection concerning E things in Heaven being reconciled; that phrase doth not import such a Reconciliation of the Angels as of Men, but that Men and Angels upon the reconciliation of men to God, become one body under Christ, and are gathered [Page 382] together in him, as the Apostle expresseth it, Eph. 1. 10. A
Having thus far proved, that the effects of an Expiatory §. 12. Obj [...]ctions answered. Sacrifice do belong to the death of Christ, nothing now remains but an answer to be made to two Objections, which are commonly insisted on by our Adversaries. The first is, That God was reconciled before he sent his Son, and therefore Christ could not dye to reconcile God to us. The second is, That the Doctrine of Satisfaction asserted by us, is inconsistent with the freeness of Gods grace in the remission of sins: Both which [...] admit of an easie Solution upon the principles of the foregoing discourse. To the first I answer, That we assert nothing inconsistent B with that love of God, which was discovered in sending his Son into the world; we do not say, That God hated mankind so much on the account of sin, that it was impossible he should ever admit of any terms of Reconciliation with them, which is the only thing inconsistent with the greatness of Gods love, in sending Christ into the world; but we adore and magnifie the infiniteness and unexpressible greatness of his love, that notwithstanding all the contempt of the former kindness and mercies of Heaven, he should be pleased to send his own Son to dye for sinners, that they might be reconciled C to him. And herein was the great love of God manifested, that while we were enemies and sin [...]ers, Christ dyed for us, and that for this end, that we might be reconciled to God by his death. And therefore surely, not in the state of favour or Reconciliation with God then. But it were worth the while, to understand what it is our Adversaries mean, when they say, God was reconciled when he sent his Son, and therefore he could not dye to reconcile God to us. Either they mean, that God had decreed to be reconciled upon the sending his son, or that he was actually reconciled when he sent him: if he D only decreed to be reconciled, that was not at all inconsistent with Christs dying to reconcile God and us in pursuance of that decree: if they mean, he was actually reconciled, then there was no need for Christ to dye to reconcile God and us; but withal, actual Reconciliation implies pardon of sin; and if sin were actually pardoned before Christ came, there could be no need of his coming at all, and sins would have been pardoned before committed; if they were not pardoned, notwithstanding that love of God, then it can imply no more, but that God was willing to be reconciled. If therefore the E not remission of sins were consistent with that love of God, by which he sent Christ into the world, then notwithstanding that he was yet capable of being reconciled by his death. So that our Adversaries are bound to reconcile that love of God, [Page 383] with not presently pardoning the sins of the world, as we are A to reconcile it with the ends of the death of Christ, which are asserted by us.
To the other Objection, Concerning the inconsistency of the §. 13. The freeness of Grace asserted in Scripture, destroys not satisfaction. Freeness of Gods Grace, with the Doctrine of Satisfaction. I answer, Either Gods Grace is so free as to exclude all conditions, or not: If it be so free, as to exclude all conditions, then the highest Antinomianism is the truest Doctrine; for that is the highest degree of the Freeness of Grace, which admits of no conditions at all. If our Adversaries say, That the Freeness of Grace is consistent with conditions required on our part, Why B shall it not admit of conditions on Gods part? especially, when the condition required, tends so highly to the end of Gods governing the world, in the manifestation of his hatred against sin, and the vindication of the honour of his Laws by the Sufferings of the Son of God in our stead, as an Expiatory Sacrifice for our sins. There are two things to be considered in sin, the dishonor done to God, by the breach of his Laws, and the injury men do to themselves by it; now remission of sins, that respects the injury which men bring upon themselves by it; and that is Free, when the penalty is wholly forgiven, C as we assert it is by the Gospel to all penitent sinners: but shall not God be free to vindicate his own Honor, and to declare his righteousness to the world, while he is the Iustifier of them that believe? Shall men in case of Defamation, be bound to vindicate themselves, though they freely forgive the Authors of the slander, by our Adversaries own Doctrine? and must it be repugnant to Gods Grace, to admit of a Propitiatory Sacrifice, that the world may understand, that it is no such easie thing to obtain pardon of sin committed against God; but that as often as they consider the bitter Sufferings of Christ, D in order to the obtaining the forgiveness of our sins, that should be the greatest Argument to disswade them from the practice of them? But why should it be more inconsistent with the Sacrifice of Christ, for God freely to pardon sin, than it was ever presumed to be in all the Sacrifices of either Jews or Gentiles? who all supposed Sacrifices necessary in order to Atonement; and yet thought themselves obliged to the goodness of God in the Remission of their sins? Nay, we find that God himself, in the case of Abimel [...]ch, appointed Abraham to pray Gen. 20. 7. for him, in order to his pardon; And will any one say, this E was a derogation to the grace of God in his pardon? Or to the pardon of Iobs Friends, because Iob was appointed to Sacrifice f [...]r them? Or to the pardon of the Israelites, because God out Job 42. 7. of kindness to them, directed them by the Prophets, and appointed [Page 384] the means in order to it? But although God appointed A our High-Priest for us, and out of his great love sent him into the world, yet his Sacrifice was not what was given him, but what he freely underwent himself; he gave us Christ, but Christ offered up himself a full, perfect and sufficient Sacrifice, Oblation and Satisfaction for the sins of the world.
Thus, Sir, I have now given you a larger account of what I then more briefly discoursed of, concerning the true Reason of the Sufferings of Christ; and heartily wishing you a right understanding in all things, and requesting from you an impartial consideration of what I have written, B