I Was not a little surpriz'd at the length of your Second Letter, con­sidering the shortness of the Answer contained in it: But it put me in mind of the Springs of Modená mention'd by Ramazzini, which rise up with such a plenty of Water upon opening a Pas­sage, that the Undertaker is afraid of being overwhelm'd by it. I see how dangerous it is to give occasion to a Per­son of such a fruitfull Invention to write; for Letters become Books, and small Books will soon rise to great Volumes, [Page 4] if no way be found to give a Check to such an Ebullition of Thoughts, as some Men find within themselves. I was apt to think the best way were, to let Nature spend it self; and although those who write out of their own Thoughts do it with as much Ease and Pleasure as a Spider spins his Web; yet the World soon grows weary of Controversies, especially when they are about Personal Matters: Which made me wonder that one who under­stands the World so well, should spend above fifty Pages of a Letter in renewing and enlarging a Complaint wholly concern­ing himself. Suppose I had born a little too hard upon you in joyning your Words and anothers Intentions together; had it not been an easie and effectual way of clearing your self, to have declared to the World, that you owned the Doctrine of the Trinity, as it hath been Received in the Christian Church, and is by ours in the Creeds and Articles of Religion? This had stopt the Mouths of the Clamorous, and had removed the Suspicions of the Doubtfull, and would have given full Satisfaction to all reasonable Men. But when you so carefully avoid doing this, all other Arts and Evasions do but leave the Matter more suspicious among the [Page 5] most Intelligent and Impartial Readers. This I mention, not that you need be a­fraid of the Inquisition, or that I intend to charge you with Heresie in denying the Trinity; but my present Design is to shew, That your Mind is so intangled and set fast by your Notion of Ideas, that you know not what to make of the Do­ctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation; because you can have no Idea of One Nature and three Persons, nor of two Na­tures and one Person; as will fully appear afterwards. And therefore, out of re­gard to Publick Service, in order to the preventing a growing Mischief, I shall endeavour to lay open the ill Conse­quences of your Way of Ideas with re­spect to the Articles of the Christian Faith.

But I shall wave all unnecessary Repe­titions, and come immediately to the Matter of your Complaint as it is re­newed in this Second Letter, which I shall briefly answer, before I proceed to that which I chiefly design. Your Com­plaint, you say, 2d. Letter▪ p. 2. was, That you were brought into a Controversie wherein you had never meddled, nor knew how you came to be concerned in. I told you, ‘It was because the Person who opposed the [Page 6] Mysteries of Christianity went upon your Grounds, Answ. to first Letter, p. 46. and made use of your Words; although I declared withall, that they were used to other purposes than you intended them; and I con­fess'd, that the reason why I quoted your Words so much, was, because I found your Notion as to Certainty by Ideas, was the main Foundation on which the Author of Christianity not Mysterious went; and that he had no­thing that look'd like Reason, if that Principle were removed; which made me so much endeavour to shew, that it would not hold, and so I supposed the reason why I so often mention'd your Words, was no longer a Riddle to you.’ These Passages you set down in your Second Letter; 2 d. Letter, p. 48. but you say, all this seems to you to do nothing towards the clearing of this matter. p. 49. Whether it doth or not, I am content to leave it to any indifferent Reader; and there it must rest at last, although you should write Volumes about it.

But for what cause do you continue so unsatisfied? p. 50. You tell us, It is, that the Author mentioned, went upon this Ground, That clear and distinct Ideas are necessary to Certainty, but that is not your Notion [Page 7] as to Certainty by Ideas; which is, That Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, such as we have, whether they be in all their Parts perfectly clear and distinct or no: And you say, that you have no Notions of Certainty more than this one.

This is no more than what you had said before in your former Letter, First Let­ter, p. 57. and I took particular notice of it, and gave three several Answers to it, which I shall here lay together and defend, because you seem to think I had not answered it.

‘(1.) That those who offer at clear and distinct Ideas bid much fairer for Certainty than you do (accor­ding to this Answer) and speak more agreeably to your Original Grounds of Certainty. p. 80.’ For it is a very won­derfull thing in point of Reason, for you to pretend to Certainty by Ideas, and not allow those Ideas to be clear and di­stinct? You say, the Certainty lies in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagree­ment of Ideas: How can I clearly per­ceive the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, if I have not clear and distinct I­deas? For how is it possible for a Man's Mind to know whether they agree or dis­agree, [Page 8] if there be some parts of those I­deas, we have only general and confu­sed Ideas of? And therefore I had great reason to say, that if Certainty be pla­ced in Ideas we must have clear and di­stinct Ideas. You may as well say, a Man may be certain of the Agreement and Disagreement of Colours in a confused or uncertain Light. For so much as the I­dea fails of Clearness and Distinctness, so much it fails of that Evidence which it is necessary to judge by. Where-ever there is Obscurity, Confusion or Imperfecti­on in the Ideas, there must be so much Uncertainty in the Perception of the A­greement or Disagreement of them. And to pretend to Certainty by Ideas without pretending to clear and distinct Ideas, is to judge without Evidence, and to determine a thing to be certainly true, when we cannot know whether it be so or not; for how can you be sure that your Ideas agree with the Reality of things (wherein you place the Certainty of Knowledge) if there be no such Ideas of those things, that you can perceive their true Nature, and their difference from all others? For therein you will not de­ny that the Notion of clear and distinct Ideas consists.

[Page 9]But you say more than once or twice, Letter II. [...]. [...], 9, 10.12, 14, 15, 16, 23, 38, 39, 41, 47, 50, 56, 61, 107, 114. or ten times, That I blame those who place Certainty in clear and distinct Ideas, but you do it not, and yet I bring you in among them; which is the thing you so much complain of. I will give you a full Answer to this Complaint. I do not deny, but the first occasion of my Charge was the Supposition that clear and distinct Ideas were necessary in order to any Certainty in our Minds, and that the only way to attain this Certainty was by comparing these Ideas together: But to prove this, your Words were produced, and your Principles of Certainty laid down, and none else; and I could not imagine that you could place Certainty in the Agreement or Disagreement of I­deas, and yet not suppose those Ideas to be clear and distinct. But finding your self joyned in such Company which you did not desire to be seen in, you rather chose to distinguish your self from them, by denying clear and distinct Ideas to be necessary to Certainty. But it must be here observed, that our Debate about Certainty by Ideas is not about any other Certainty, but about Certainty of Know­ledge with regard to some Proposition, whose Ideas are to be compared as to [Page 10] their Agreement and Disagreement. For your Words are, Essay, B. 4. ch. 6. Sect. 3. Certainty of Knowledge is to perceive the Agreement or Disagree­ment of Ideas as expressed in any Proposi­tion. This we usually call knowing or be­ing certain of the truth of any Proposition. First Let­ter, p. 57. So that a Proposition whose Ideas are to be compared as to their Agreement or Dis­agreement, is the proper Object of this Certainty. And therefore this Certainty is to be distinguished,

1. From a Certainty by Sense; or that by which we come to know the Existence of External Objects. B. 4. ch. 11. Sect. 1. For you say, That the Knowledge of the Existence of any other thing we can have only by Sensation. For there being no necessary Connexion of Real Existence with any Idea a Man hath in his Memory; no particular Man can know the Existence of any other Being, but only when by actual operating upon him it makes it self perceived by him. But that this is quite another Certainty from that of Ideas, appears from these follow­ing words of yours; For the having the Idea of any thing in our Mind, no more proves the Existence of that thing than the Picture of a Man evidences his being in the World, or the Visions of a Dream make thereby a true History. Therefore this is [Page 11] a very different Certainty from that of Ideas.

2. From a Certainty by Reason; When from the Existence of some things evi­dent to Sense, we inferr the Existence of another thing not evident to Sense: As to take your own words in your former Letter. Letter p. 57. As to the Existence of bodily Substances, I know by my Senses, that something extended, solid and figur'd does exist; for my Senses are the utmost Evi­dence and Certainty I have of the Exi­stence of extended, solid, figured things. These Modes being then known to exist by our Senses, the Existence of them (which I cannot conceive can subsist without some­thing to support them) makes me see the Connection of those Ideas with a Support, or as it is called, Subject of Inhesion, and so consequently the Connection of that Support, which cannot be nothing, with Existence.

Granting all this, yet it by no means proves that we can have a Certainty in the way of Ideas, where the Ideas them­selves by which we have the Certainty are obscure and confused; but that suppo­sing the Ideas we have by our Senses to be true, we may from them inferr the Existence of something of which we have only an obscure and confused Idea; [Page 12] which is the Case of bodily Substances. Of which I grant you may come to a certain Knowledge, but not a Certainty by Ideas, but by a Consequence of Rea­son deduced from the Ideas we have by our Senses. And this can never prove that we may have a Certainty by Ideas, where the Ideas themselves are not clear and distinct: For there is a great diffe­rence between having a Certainty by rea­son, of a thing whose Idea is confused and obscure, and having that Certainty by obscure and confused Ideas. For in this Case the Idea of Substance is obscure: but the way of Certainty is by a clear De­duction of Reason from the Ideas we have by our Senses.

3. From a Certainty by Remembrance; By which I mean the remaining Impres­sion on the Mind of an Original Cer­tainty by Demonstration. As to use your own Instance; B. 4. ch. 2. Sect. 15. A Man hath found by Mathematical Evidence, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two Right Angles; The Perception of this at the time of the Demonstration was clear and distinct; but afterwards, the Method of Demonstration may have slipt out of his Mind, yet he retains a Certainty of the thing by virtue of that Demonstration; [Page 13] but this is not a clear Perception, as you would have it, where the Ideas are con­fused; but it is an obscure Remembrance of the grounds of that Certainty which he once had; and hath never seen any Reason since, why he should call it in Question.

These things then being put out of the Question, which belong not to it; the Question truly stated is, whether we can attain to any Certainty of Know­ledge as to the Truth of a Proposition in the way of Ideas, where the Ideas them­selves by which we come to that Cer­tainty be not clear and distinct?

Another thing to be observed is, that Des Cartes who first started this way of Certainty by Ideas, thought it a ridicu­lous thing in any to pretend to it, un­less their Ideas were clear and distinct. He saith, Princip. l. 1. n. 44, &c. That when we assent without clear Perception, we are either deceived, or fall into Truth by chance, but we do often err when we think we have clear Per­ception, and have not. But to a certain Iudgment, it is necessary that our Percep­tion be not only clear but distinct: that is, when the thing not only lies open to our view, but we see it on all sides, and so can distinguish it from all other things. [Page 14] You agree with him in placing Certain­ty in Ideas, but you differ from him in that which alone made his Opinion rea­sonable, viz. That these Ideas be clear and distinct. If it were possible for us to come to clear and distinct Ideas of the things we pretend to be certain of, it were a just Pretence to Certainty in that way; but since we cannot come at them, we must be content with such Measures of Knowledge as we are capable of. But for you to talk so much of Certainty by Ideas, and yet to allow Obscurity and Im­perfection in those Ideas, is like a pur­blind Man who would pretend to judge exactly of the differences of Colours in the Twilight, because another pretended to do it at Noon-day: Or like one, who would undertake to shew certainly the Agreement or Disagreement of two Men at a distance from him, in their Habit, Features, and Stature, and yet at the same time confess that he could not clearly distinguish one from the other. So that if I did think you spake more consistent­ly to your Hypothesis, than you say now that you did, I hope you will forgive me that Wrong, if at least it be a Wrong to you; for after all, there are several Passages in your Essay, which [Page 15] suppose clear Ideas necessary to Cer­tainty.

For in one Place you say, B. 4. ch. 18. Sect. 8. That the mind not being certain of the Truth of that it doth not evidently know. What is this but to make clear Ideas necessary to Cer­tainty?

In another, B. 4. ch. 4. Sect. 8. yet more plainly, That which is requisite to make our Know­ledge certain is the Clearness of our Ideas.

In a third Place you say; B. 4. ch. 12. Sect. 14. For it being evident that our Knowledge cannot exceed our Ideas; where They are either imperfect, confused or obscure, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect or clear Knowledge.

In a fourth; B. 4. ch. 2. Sect. 15. But obscure and confused Ideas can never produce any clear and cer­tain Knowledge, because as far as any Ideas are confused or obscure, the mind can ne­ver perceive clearly whether they agree or disagree. What can be more express? And yet you have complained of me in near twenty Places of your second Letter for charging this upon you. By this the World will judge of the Justice of your Complaints, and the Consistency of your Notion of Ideas.

(2.) I answer'd, Answ. to Let 1. p. 36. ‘That it is very possible the Authour of Christianity not [Page 16] mysterious, might mistake or misapply your Notions, but there is too much reason to believe he thought them the same, and we have no reason to be sorry that he hath given you this oc­casion for the explaining your mean­ing, and for the Vindication of your self in the matters you apprehend he had charged you with.’

Let. 2. p. 36.Here you enter upon a fresh Com­plaint, and say▪ This can be no Reason why you should be joyned with a Man that had misapplied your Notions; and that no Man hath so much mistaken and misappli­ed your Notions as my self, and therefore you ought rather to be joyned with me. But is this fair and ingenuous dealing, to represent this matter so, as if I had join­ed you together, because he had misunder­stood and misapplied your Notions? Can you think me a Man of so little Sense to make that the Reason of it? No, Sir, it was because he assigned no other Grounds but yours, and that in your own Words, however now you would di­vert the meaning of them another way. And although I was willing to allow you all reasonable Occasions for your own Vindication, as appears by my Words; yet I was sensible enough, that you had [Page 17] given too just an Occasion to apply them in that manner, as appears by the next Page. Answer to Letter 1. p. 37. But because these words follow some I had quoted out of your Postscript, you fall into a nice Piece of Criticism a­bout them, Letter 2. p. 45. which, you say, in Grammatical Construction, must refer to the Words of the Postscript; but any one that reads without a design to cavil, would easily interpret them of your Words and Noti­ons about which the Debate was; and not of the Postscript which comes in but as a Parenthesis. This looks like Chica­ning in Controversie; which no Man, who knows his Cause is good, ever falls into.

But if, you say, by an unintelligible new Way of Construction the word Them be applied to any Passages in your Book: What then? Why then, whoever they are, P. [...]6▪ you intend to complain of them too. But the Words just before tell you who they are, viz. The Enemies of the Chri­stian Faith. And is this all that you in­tend, only to complain of them for making you a Party in the Controversie against the Trinity? But whether you have not made your self too much a Party in it, will appear, before we have done.

[Page 18]I had with great Kindness, as I thought, taken notice of a Passage in your Post­script: in which I was glad to find that in general, you owned the Mysteries of the Christian Faith, and the Scripture to be the Foundation and Rule of it: From whence I inferr'd, that I could not be­lieve you intended to give any Advan­tage to the Enemies of the Christian Faith. P. 41. This Passage, you say, you were surprized to find in a Paragraph design'd to give you satisfaction. There are some Persons I find very hard to be satisfied. For I speak of my satisfaction in this Pas­sage, and that I was glad you agreed so far with me, although you could not come up in all things to what I could wish. But what Reason have you to ex­press so much dissatisfaction at these Words? P. 43, 44. You call it an extraordinary sort of Complement; and that they seem to in­timate as though I took you for a Heathen before.

How like a cavilling Exception is this? Do not we know that in the De­bate about the Mysteries of Faith our Ad­versaries are no Heathens; but they deny any Mysteries: I was glad to find that you owned them; and resolved your Faith into the Scripture as the Founda­tion [Page 19] of it. Did not this look more like a good Opinion of you as to these mat­ters, than any Inclination to suspect you for a Heathen?

But you say, P. 4 [...]. It must not be taken for granted, that those who do not write or appear in Print in Controversies of Religi­on do not own the Christian Faith, and the Scriptures as the Rule of it. I was far enough from any such Apprehension; but the Case is quite otherwise, with those who are not sparing of writing a­bout Articles of Faith, and among them take great Care to avoid some which have been always esteem'd fundamental Articles by the Christian Church. And I think it was no want of Humanity or Christian Charity in me, that I was so glad to find you own the Mysteries of the Christian Faith in general: which shews at least, that you cannot object against any Articles of Faith, because they con­tain something mysterious in them.

But I said, That in all things your An­swer doth not come fully up to what I could wish. And I think I gave sufficient Proof of it, as to your Idea of Substance, the Nature of Ideas, the Materiality of the Soul, the disparaging some Arguments to prove the Existence of God, the Tendency [Page 20] of your Principles; and the Ground of Cer­tainty, &c. Which are put off to another Letter, except the last, which is there­fore now to be examin'd.

(3.) The third Answer I gave was, ‘That your own Grounds of Certainty, Answer to Letter 1. p. 38. tend to Scepticism; and that in an Age wherein the Mysteries of Faith are too much exposed by the Promoters of Scepticism and Infidelity, it is a thing of dangerous Consequence to start such new Methods of Certainty, as are apt to leave Men's minds more doubtfull than before.’ Letter 2. p. 46. These words, you say, con­tain a farther Accusation of your Book, which shall be consider'd in its due Place. But this is the proper Place of consider­ing it. For I said, ‘That hereby you have given too just occasion to the E­nemies of the Christian Faith, to make use of your Words and Notions, as was evidently proved from your own Con­cessions.’ And if this be so, however I was willing to have had you explained your self to the general Satisfaction; yet since you decline it, I do insist upon it, that you cannot clear your self from laying that Foundation, which the Au­thor of Christianity not mysterious built upon. For your Ground of Certainty is [Page 21] the Agreement or Disagreement of the I­deas, as expressed in any Proposition. Which are your own Words. From hence I urged, ‘That let the Proposition come to us any way, either by Humane or Divine Authority, if our Certainty de­pend upon this, we can be no more certain, than we have clear Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas contained in it. And from hence the Author of Christianity not mysteri­ous thought he had Reason to reject all Mysteries of Faith which are con­tained in Propositions, upon your Grounds of Certainty.’ By this it evi­dently appears, that although I was wil­ling to allow you all fair ways of inter­preting your own Sense; yet I by no means thought that your Words were wholly misunderstood or misapplied by that Author: but rather that he saw into the true Consequence of them, as they lie in you Book. And what An­swer do you give to this? Not a word in the proper Place for it. But after­wards (for I would omit nothing that may seem to help your Cause) you of­fer something towards an Answer. For there you distinguish the Certainty of Faith, Letter 2 p. 95. and the Certainty of Knowledge, [Page 22] and you humbly conceive the Certainty of Faith, if I think fit to call it so, hath no­thing to do with the Certainty of Know­ledge; and to talk of the Certainty of Faith seems all one to you as to talk of the Knowledge of Believing, a way of speaking not easie for you to understand. So that if I shake never so much the Certainty of Knowledge, it doth not at all concern the Assurance of Faith, that is quite distinct from it, neither stands nor falls with Know­ledge. Faith stands by it self and upon Grounds of its own, nor can be removed from them and placed on those of Knowledge. Their Grounds are so far from being the same, or having any thing, that when it is brought to Certainty, Faith is destroyed, 'tis Knowledge then and Faith no longer. So that, whether you are, or are not mistaken in the placing Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, Faith still stands upon its own Basis, which is not at all alter'd by it; and every Ar­ticle of that hath just the same unmoved Foundation, and the very same Credibility that it had before. This is the Substance of what you say about this Matter, and is the most considerable Passage in your Book towards clearing this Matter.

[Page 23]But I was aware of this, Answer to Letter 1. p 83. as appears by these Words; ‘Is Faith an unreasonable Act? Is it not an Assent to a Proposi­tion? Then, if all Certainty in Acts of Reason be derived from the percei­ving the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas contained in it; either there can be no Certainty in the reasonable Act of Faith, or the Grounds of Cer­tainty must be laid some other Way.’

But this is a Matter of too great Weight and Consequence to be easily past over, because the main strength of your De­fence lies in it, and therefore I shall more strictly examine what you say; and set this Point of the Certainty of Faith in as good a Light as I can, and shew the In­consistency of your Notion of Ideas, with the Articles of the Christian Faith. To talk of the Certainty of Faith, say you, seems all one to you as to talk of the Know­ledge of Believing; a way of speaking not easie for you to understand.

But how comes the Certainty of Faith to become so hard a Point with you? Have not all Mankind, who have talked of Matters of Faith, allow'd a Certainty of Faith as well as a Certainty of Know­ledge, although upon different Grounds? In your former Letter you told us, that [Page 24] if we knew the Original of Words, we should be much helped to the Ideas they were first applied to and made to stand for. Now what is there in the Original of the word Certainty which makes it uncapable of being applied to Faith? I had thought that our Word was taken from the La­tin; and that among the Romans it was opposed to doubting, Nil tam certum quam quod de dubio certum.

And therefore where the Mind upon examination of the Grounds of Assent saw no Reason for doubting, it might properly be said to be certain: If it sees no Cause to doubt from the Evidence of the Thing it self, or the clear Deduction of Consequences, that is Certainty of Knowledge; but where it sees no Reason to doubt from the Authority of him that speaks, that is Certainty of Believing; and the greater the Authority of him that speaks, the less Reason there is to doubt, and therefore the greater Certainty of Faith. And this I think is very easie to be understood, and so have the Generality of Mankind thought to this Day. But it seems our old Words must not now pass in the current Sense; but then it is fit they be called in, and new stampt, that we may have none but New milled Words [Page 25] to talk with; but in common Justice, a competent Time ought to be allow'd for it, that none be surprized; and in the mean time they ought to pass in their current Sense; and that is all the Favour I desire in this Matter. But I am utterly against any Private Mints of Words; and think those Persons assume too much Authority to themselves, who will not suffer common Words to pass in their general Acceptation; but will set such Bounds and Limits to the Sense of them, as suit best with their own Speculati­ons.

But is not this all one as to talk of the Knowledge of Believing? For what Rea­son? Knowledge and Faith are too distinct things, the one relates to Evidence, and the other to Testimony; but Certainty is common to them both, unless you think it impossible to be certain upon any Te­stimony whatsoever. Postscript p. 3. You tell us in your Postscript (which I hope may be brought hither without Offence) that it is a shame among Christians to raise such a Doubt of this, Whether an infinitely powerfull and wise Being be veracious or no. Then I suppose the Veracity of God is a certain and undoubted Principle; and if there be sufficient Means to as­sure [Page 26] us of Divine Revelation (as I doubt not but you yield there are) what should hinder one, that believes upon such Grounds as are sufficient to convince him, from attaining to a Certainty of Faith? But you take Certainty as belong­ing only to Knowledge. So do the Papists, as belonging only to Infallibility, and say there can be no Certainty of Faith, where there is not an Infallible Proponent; but neither you nor they are to impose upon the Understandings of Mankind, who know how to distinguish the Grounds of Certainty both from Knowledge and In­fallibility. You allow such a thing as Assurance of Faith; P. 96. and why not Certain­ty as well as Assurance? I know no reason, but that you have appropriated Certain­ty to the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas in any Proposition; and now you find this will not hold as to Articles of Faith; and therefore you will allow no Certainty of Faith; which I think is not for the Advantage of your Cause.

But you go on and tell us, That if this Way of Certainty by Ideas doth not hold, yet it cannot affect Matters of Faith which stand immoveable upon other Grounds; Faith in your own words stands still upon [Page 27] its own Basis; and every Article of it has just the same unmoved Foundation, and the very same Credibility that it had before. This will appear to be an extraordinary Answer, when we have throughly exa­min'd it. Here we see Faith is taken not with respect to the general Grounds of Certainty, but to the particular Articles of Faith, i. e. the Propositions contained in that Revelation which we embrace on the Account of its Divine Authority; now these Propositions are of several Kinds.

1. Some that are more clearly expres­sed therein, but such as might be attain­ed to by the Light of Reason without Revelation. And such are the funda­mental Principles of natural Religion, viz. The Being of God and Providence, and the Rewards and Punishments of a future State. These Mankind may at­tain to a Certainty in, without Revelati­on, or else there can be no such thing as natural Religion in the World; but these things are more fully and plainly revea­led in the Scriptures. Let us now sup­pose a Person by natural Reason to at­tain to a Certainty, as to the Being of God and Immortality of the Soul; and he proceeds upon your general Grounds of [Page 28] Certainty, from the Agreement or Disa­greement of Ideas; and so from the Ideas of God and the Soul, he is made certain of those two Points before mention'd. But let us again suppose that such a Per­son upon a farther Examination of your Method of Proceeding finds, that the Way of Ideas in these Cases will not do; for no Idea proves the Existence of the thing without it self, P. 131. no more than the Picture of a Man proves his Being, or the Visions of a Dream make a true History, (which are your own Expressions.) And for the Soul he cannot be certain, but that Matter may think, (as you affirm) and then what becomes of the Soul's Im­materiality (and consequently Immor­tality) from its Operations? But for all this, say you, his Assurance of Faith re­mains firm on its own Basis. Now I ap­peal to any Man of Sense, whether the finding the Uncertainty of his own Prin­ciples which he went upon in Point of Reason, doth not weaken the Credibili­ty of these fundamental Articles when they are consider'd purely as Matters of Faith? For before, there was a natural Credibility in them on the Account of Reason; but by going on wrong Grounds of Certainty, all that is lost; and instead [Page 29] of being certain he is more doubtfull than ever. And if the Evidence of Faith falls so much short of that of Reason, it must needs have less Effect upon Mens Minds, when the subserviency of Rea­son is taken away; as it must be when the Grounds of Certainty by Reason are vanished. Is it at all probable, that he who finds his Reason deceive him in such Fundamental Points should have his Faith stand firm and unmoveable on the account of Revelation? For in Matters of Reve­lation, there must be some Antecedent Principles supposed before we can believe any thing on the Account of it.

And the first is, that there is a God; but this was the very thing he found himself at a loss in by his way of Cer­tainty by Ideas; and how can his Faith stand firm as to Divine Revelation, when he is made Uncertain by his own Way, whether there be a God or no? Besides, to suppose Divine Revelation, we must be certain that there is a Principle above Matter and Motion in the World; but here we find, that upon the Principles of Certainty by Ideas he cannot be certain of this; because he doth not know but Matter may think; and consequently, all Revelation may be nothing but the [Page 30] Effects of an Exalted Fancy, or the Heats of a disordered Imagination, as Spinoza affirmed. Again, before there can be a­ny such thing as Assurance of Faith upon Divine Revelation, there must be a Cer­tainty as to Sense and Tradition; for there can be no Revelation pretended now without immediate Inspiration; and the Basis of our Faith is a Revelation contained in an Ancient Book, whereof the Parts were delivered at distant Times, but conveyed down to us by an Univer­sal Tradition. But now, what if your Grounds of Certainty can give us no As­surance as to these things? I do not mean, that they cannot demonstrate Matters of Fact, which it were most un­reasonable to expect; but that these Grounds of Certainty make all things uncertain; p. 131. for I think I have proved, that this way of Ideas cannot give a sa­tisfactory Account as to the Existence of the plainest Objects of Sense; because Reason cannot perceive the Connexion be­tween the Objects and the Ideas. How then can we arrive to any Certainty in perceiving those Objects by their Ideas? And I was in the right, when I said this Way tended to Scepticism; and I do not think that consistent with the Assurance of Faith.

[Page 31] But this is an Imputation you take ve­ry ill, Lett. II. p. 170. and say, that I have brought no Ar­gument for it, but only that my great Pre­judice against this Way of Certainty is, that it leads to Scepticism. ( Sceptism is the New Mill'd Word.) This is very strange, when that Expression is only the Introduction to the Arguments from p. 125 to 132, to which no Answer at all is given. And so I leave it.

There are other Propositions or Arti­cles of Faith which wholly depend on the Sense of Words contained in the Scri­pture, 2. and we are to enquire, whether the Assurance of Faith, as you call it, be consistent with the overthrowing your Grounds of Certainty; i. e. whether those who embrace the Articles of Faith in the Way of Ideas, can retain their Cer­tainty of those Articles when these Ideas are quitted. And this alone will be a plain Demonstration in the Case, that the Certainty of Faith cannot stand with such Men, if this way of Certainty by Ideas be destroyed. And by this which I am now to make out, let any one judge how true your Words are like to prove, when you say, Let the Grounds of Knowledge or Certainty be resolved into what they please, it touches not your Faith; [Page 32] the Foundation of that stands as sure as before, and cannot be at all shaken by it. Of this we shall judge by some impor­tant Articles of Christian Faith according to your Ideas.

The first shall be that of the Resurrecti­on of the Dead. The Reason of believing the Resurrection of the same Body upon your Grounds is from the Idea of Iden­tity; which I take to be this from your own words. Essay, B. 2. ch. 27. n. 3. 1. That the Identity of li­ving Creatures depends not on a Mass of the same Particles, but on something else; for in them the variation of great Parcels of Matter alters not the Identity; for which you instance in the growth of an Oak and a Horse. n. 6. 2. That the Identity of a Man consists in nothing but a Participati­on of the same continued Life by constant­ly fleeting Particles of Matter, in Succes­sion vitally united to the same Organized Body. n. 9. 3. That Personal Identity, i. e. the sameness of a Rational Being lies in Self-consciousness, and in that alone, whe­ther it be annexed only to one Individual Substance, or can be continued in a Succes­sion of several Substances. n. 11. 4. That those who place Thought in a purely material, animal Constitution, void of Spirit, do place Per­sonal Identity in something else that Iden­tity [Page 33] of Substance, as Animal Identity is preserved in Identity of Life and not of Substance. n. 16. 5. That it matters not to this point of being the same self, whether this present self be made up of the same or other Substances. n. 18. 6. That in this Personal I­dentity of Self-consciousness is founded all the Right and Iustice of Reward and Punishment, Happiness and Misery, be­ing that for which every one is concerned for himself, not mattering what becomes of any Substance not joined to, or affected with that Consciousness. n. 26. 7. That the Sen­tence at the Day of Iudgment will be ju­stified by the Consciousness all Persons shall have that they themselves in what Bodies soever they appear, or what Substances so­ever that Consciousness adheres to, are the same that committed those Actions and de­serve that Punishment for them. This I suppose to be a true and just Account of your Sense of this Matter; and so the Article of the Resurrection is Resolved into your Idea of Personal Identity. And the Question between us now is, Whe­ther your Certainty of this Matter from your Idea have no influence on the Be­lief of this Article of Faith? For the main of your Defence lies upon this Point, Whether your Method of Certainty [Page 34] by Ideas, doth at all shake, or in the least concern the Assurance of Faith? which you absolutely deny, Letter 2. p. 96. and affirm, That Faith stands upon its own Basis, and is not at all altered by your Method of Certain­ty; and every Article of that has just the same unmoved Foundation, and the very same Credibility that it had before. Now I take this Article of the Resurrecti­on of the Dead to be an Article of Faith, and we are to consider, whether if your Method of Certainty by Ideas do hold in this Matter, it continues as firm, and in the same Credibility it had before? I shall not urge you with the Sense of our own or other Christian Churches in this Point of the Sameness of the Body in the Resurrection of the Dead, But I shall continue my self to the Scripture as the Foundation and Rule of our Faith; and the main Point is, Whether accor­ding to that, it be not necessary for the same Substance which was united to the Body to be raised up at the last Day? I do not say the same individual Particles of Matter which were united at the Point of Death; for there must be a great Alteration in them in a lingring Disease, as if a Fat Man falls into a Con­sumption: I do not say, the same Par­ticles [Page 35] which the Sinner had at the very time of commission of his Sins; for then a long Sinner must have a vast Bo­dy, considering the continual spending of Particles by Perspiration; but that which I suppose is implyed in it is, that it must be the same Material Sub­stance which was vitally united to the Soul here. You mention the Hypothe­sis of those, who place Thought in a purely Material Animal Constitution void of Spi­rit: but you agree, n. 25. that the more probable Opinion is, that this Consciousness is an­nexed to the Affection of one Indivi­dual Immaterial Substance. It is very well that it is allowed to be the more probable Opinion; but it seems without any Certainty as to the Truth of it. For you have told us, what the Effect of Probability is, Essay, E. 4. ch. 15. Sect. 1. viz. That it is enough to induce the Mind to judge the Proposition true or false rather than the contrary; and that it is conversant about things whereof we have no Certainty, Sect. 4. but only some Inducements to receive it for true. Thence I cannot but observe, that we have no Certainty upon your Grounds, that Self-consciousness depends upon an individual immaterial Substance, and consequently that a Material Substance [Page 36] may, according to your Principles, have Self-consciousness in it; at least, that you are not certain of the contrary. Now I pray consider, whether this doth not a little affect the whole Article of the Re­surrection? For, if it may be only a Ma­terial Substance in us that thinks, then this Substance, which consists in the Life of an Organiz'd Body, must cease by Death; for how can that, which con­sisted in Life, be preserved afterwards? And if the Personal Identity consists in a Self-consciousness depending on such a Substance as cannot be preserved with­out an Organiz'd Body, then there is no Subsistence of it separate from the Bo­dy, and the Resurrection must be giving a new Life. To whom? To a Materi­al Substance which wholly lost its Per­sonal Identity by Death. So that here can be no Personal Identity at all; un­less you say the very same Life which was long since at an end can be Repro­duced. Which I suppose you will not assert.

But let us take the more probable Opi­nion; which I think certain, viz. That Self-consciousness depends upon an Im­material Principle in us; and then the Question is, How far the Scripture de­termines [Page 37] the sameness of the Body at the Resurrection, i. e. of that Material Substance, which was vitally united with that Immaterial Substance in this Life. The Doctrine delivered by our Saviour is, John 5.28, 29. that All that are in the Graves shall hear his voice; and shall come forth; they that have done good unto the Resur­rection of Life, and they that have done evil to the Resurrection of Damnation. What is the meaning of all that are in their Graves? Doth this relate to any o­ther Substance than that which was uni­ted to the Soul in Life? Can a different Substance be said to be in the Graves and to come out of them? Is it not mate­rial, as you say, whether the present Self be made up of the same or other Substan­ces? If it be not so to your Idea of I­dentity, it is as to the Sense of our Sa­viour's Words: unless you can make it out, that a Substance which never was in the Grave may come out of it. But it may be said, That if these Words be ta­ken strictly they confine the Resurrection to those Particles of Matter only which were in the Grave; if not, then they may extend to another Substance. I answer, that by comparing this with other places we find that the Words are to be understood of [Page 38] the Substance of that Body to which the Soul was united; and not to those Individual Particles. 2 Cor. 5.10. So St. Paul, For we must all appear before the Iudgment Seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad. Can these words be understood of any other Material Substance, but that Body in which these things were done? How could it be said, if any other Substance be joyned to the Soul at the Resurrecti­on, as its Body, that they were the things done in or by the Body? Curcellaeus his Copy reads it, [...]; the Complutensian [...], and several of the Fathers so took it; either way, it must relate to that which was the real Body in which the Person lived and acted, whether Good or Evil. And St. Paul's Dispute about the manner of raising the Body might soon have been ended, if there were no ne­cessity of the same Body. 1 Cor. 15.16. If there be no Resurrection of the Dead, then is not Christ raised. It seems then, other Bo­dies are to be raised as his was; and can there be any doubt whether his Body were the same material Substance which was united to his Soul before? And the [Page 39] Apostle lays so much weight upon it, that he saith, 17. if Christ be not raised your Faith is vain; doth he mean, if there were not the same personal Identity, as to the Soul of Christ and the Matter united to it after the Resurrection? That cannot be his meaning, for then there would have been no necessity of Christs own Body being raised; which he asserts and proves by undoubted Wit­nesses. Were they Witnesses only of some material Substance then united to his Soul? 6. He saith, He was seen of five hun­dred Brethren at once. What He was this? 4. It was Christ that died. Yes, the Person of Christ; but personal Identity doth not require the same Substance, but the same Consciousness; and so if Christ were conscious to himself in another Substance, there was no necessity of the same Body. And so truly from the seeing the Person of Christ they could not prove it was the same Individual Body. John 20.25. But Thomas said, Except I shall see in his hands the print of the Nails, and put my Finger in­to the print of the Nails, and thrust my Hand into his side, I will not believe. The doing whereof convinced him it was the same Individual Body; but there will be no such proof at the great Day. And there [Page 40] is no Reason there should, since the Resur­rection of Christ was a sufficient proof of God's Power to raise the Dead, and the Dissimilitude of Circumstances can be no Argument against it, since the Power and Wisdom of God are concerned in it.

But the Apostle insists upon the Re­surrection of Christ, not meerly as an Ar­gument of the Possibility of ours, but of the Certainty of it; because he rose as the first Fruits; 1 Cor. 15.20, 23. Christ the first Fruits, after­wards they that are Christs at his coming. St. Paul was aware of the Objections in Mens Minds about the Resurrection of the same Body; and it is of great Conse­quence as to this Article, to shew upon what Grounds he proceeds. 35. But some Man will say, How are the Dead raised up, and with what Body do they come? First he shews, that the seminal Parts of Plants are wonderfully improved by the ordinary Providence of God in the man­ner of their Vegetation. 36, 37, 38. They sow bare Grain of Wheat, or of some other Grain, but God giveth it a Body, as it hath plea­sed him, and to every Seed his own Body. Here is an Identity of the Material Sub­stance supposed; [...], that pro­per Body which belongs to it; every Seed having that Body in little, which [Page 41] is afterwards so much inlarged; and in Grain the Seed is corrupted before its Germination; but it hath its proper Or­ganical Parts, which make it the same Body with that which it grows up to. For although Grain be not divided into Lobes as other Seeds are, yet it hath been found, by the most Accurate Ob­servations, that upon separating the Membranes these Seminal Parts are di­scerned in them; which afterwards grow up to that Body which we call Corn. St. Paul indeed saith, that we sow not that Body that shall be; but he speaks not of the Identity but the Perfection of it. And although there be such a diffe­rence from the Grain it self, when it comes up to be perfect Corn with Root, Stalk, Blade and Ear, that it may be said to outward Appearance not to be the same Body, yet with regard to the Seminal and Organical Parts, it is as much the same as a Man grown up is the same with the Embryo in the Womb. And although many Arguments may be used to prove, that a Man is not the same, because Life which depends upon the course of the Blood and the manner of Respiration and Nutrition is so diffe­rent in both states, yet that Man would [Page 42] be thought Ridiculous that should seri­ously affirm, that it was not the same Man. Sect. 4. And you grant, that the variati­on of great parcels of Matter in Plants, alters not the Identity: and that the Orga­nization of the Parts in one coherent Bo­dy partaking of one common Life makes the Identity of a Plant; so that in things ca­pable of any sort of Life, the Identity is consistent with a continued succession of Parts; and so the Wheat grown up is the same Body with the Grain that was sown. And thus the Alteration of the Parts of the Body at the Resurrection is consistent with its Identity, if its Orga­nization and Life be the same; and this is a Real Identity of the Body which de­pends not upon Consciousness. From whence it follows, that to make the same Body, no more is required but restoring Life to the Organized Parts of it. And you grant likewise, Sect. 6. That the Identity of the same Man consists in a Participation of the same continued Life by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter in Succession vitally united to the same Organized Body. So that there is no difficulty as to the sameness of the Body, if Life were con­tinued; and if by Divine Power Life be restored to that Material Substance [Page 43] which was before united, by a Re-uni­on of the Soul to it, there is no Reason to deny the Identity of the Body. Not from the Consciousness of the Soul, but from that Life which is the Result of the Union of Soul and Body. But St. Paul still supposes that it must be that Ma­terial Substance to which the Soul was before united. 42. For saith he, It is sown in Corruption, it is raised in Incorruption: It is sown in Dishonour, 43. it is raised in Glory; It is sown in Weakness, it is raised in Pow­er; It is sown a Natural Body, 44. it is raised a Spiritual Body. Can such a Material Substance which was never united to the Body be said to be sown in Corruption, and Weakness, and Dishonour? Either therefore he must speak of the same Bo­dy, or his meaning cannot be compre­hended. For what doth all this relate to a Conscious Principle? The Apostle speaks plainly of that Body which was once quickened and afterwards falls to Corruption; and is to be restored with more noble Qualities. 53, 5 [...]. For this Corrup­tible must put on Incorruption, and this Mortal must put on Immortality. I do not see how he could more expressly affirm the Identity of this Corruptible Body, with that after the Resurrection, and [Page 44] that without any Respect to the Princi­ple of Self-consciousness; and so if the Scripture be the sole Foundation of our Faith, this is an Article of it, and so it hath been always understood by the Christian Church. And your Idea of Personal Identity is inconsistent with it; for it makes the same Body which was here united to the Soul not to be neces­sary to the Doctrine of the Resurrecti­on, but any Material Substance being united to the same Principle of Consci­ousness makes the same Body. The Dis­pute is not, how far Personal Identity in it self may consist in the very same Material Substance; for we allow the Notion of Personal Identity to belong to the same Man under several changes of Matter; but whether it doth not depend upon a Vital Vnion between the Soul and Body and the Life which is conse­quent upon it; and therefore in the Re­surrection the same Material Substance must be reunited; or else it cannot be called a Resurrection, but a Renovation; i. e. it may be a New Life, but not a raising the Body from the Dead.

2. The next Articles of Faith which your Notion of Ideas is inconsistent with, are no less than those of the Trinity, and [Page 45] of the Incarnation of our Saviour. The former by the first Article of our Church is expressed by three Persons in the Vni­ty of the Divine Nature: the latter is said Art. 2. to be by the Vnion of the Divine and Humane Nature in one Person. Let us now see whether your Ideas of Na­ture and Person can consist with these. But before I come to that I must endea­vour to set this Matter right, as to the Dispute about the Notion of Nature and Person, which you have endeavour'd with all your Art, to perplex and confound, and have brought in several Interlocutors to make it look more like an Entertain­ment. Of which afterwards: The Ori­ginal Question was, whether we could come to any Certainty about the Distin­ction of Nature and Person in the Way of Ideas; and my business was to prove that we could not, because we had no simple Ideas by Sensation or Reflection, Essay B. 2. c. 1. Sect. 5. without which you affirm that our Vnder­standing seems to you not to have the least Glimmering of Ideas: and that we have nothing in our Minds which did not come in one of these two Ways.

These are your own Words. Vindicati­on of the Trinity, p. 252. &c. And then I undertook to shew, that it was not possible for us to have any simple Ideas [Page 46] of Nature and Person by Sensation or Re­flection: and that whether we consider'd Nature as taken for Essential Properties, or for that Substance wherein that Pro­perty lies: whether we consider it in di­stinct Individuals or abstractly; still my Design was to shew that in your Way of Ideas, you could come to no Certainty about them. P. 260. And as to Person I shew'd, that the Distinction of Individuals is not founded meerly on what occurs to our Senses, but upon a different manner of Subsistence, which is in one Individual, and is not communicable to another. And as to this I said, that we may find within our selves an intelligent Substance by inward Perception; but whether that make a Person or not, must be under­stood some other way; for if the meer intelligent Substance make a Person, then there cannot be the Union of two such Natures, but there must be two Persons. Which is repugnant to the Article of the Incarnation of our Saviour.

That this was the true State of the Question will appear to any one that will vouchsafe to look into it. But what said you in your first Letter in Answer to it?

[Page 47]As to Nature you say, Letter 1. p. 165. That it is a Collection of several Ideas combined into one complex, abstract Idea, which when they are found united in any Individual existing, though joyned in that Existence with several other Ideas, that individual or particular Being is truly said to have the Nature of a Man, or the Nature of a Man to be in him; forasmuch as these sim­ple Ideas are found united in him, which answer the [...]omplex, abstract Idea, to which the specifick Name is given by any one: which abstract specifick Idea, he keeps the same when he applies the specifick Name standing for it to distinct Individuals.

And as to Person, P. 216 in the way of Ideas, you say, that the Word Person in it self signifies nothing, and so no Idea belonging to it, nothing can be said to be the true Idea of it. But as soon as the common Vse of any Language has appropriated it to any Idea, then that is the true Idea of a Person, and so of Nature.

Against this I objected in my Answer to that Letter, Answer to Letter 1▪ p. 103. that if these Terms really signifie nothing in themselves, but are only abstract and complex Ideas, which the common Use of Language hath ap­propriated to be the signs of two Ideas; then it is plain that they are only Notions [Page 48] of the Mind, as all abstracted and com­plex Ideas are; and so one Nature and three Persons can be no more. Letter 2. p. 109.

To this you answer in your second Letter, That your Notion of the Terms Na­ture and Person is, that they are two sounds that naturally signifie not one thing more than another, nor in themselves signifie any thing at all, but have the signification which they have barely by Imposition. Who­ever imagined that Words signifie any otherwise than by Imposition?

But the Question is, whether these be meer Words and Names, or not? Or whether there be not a real Foundation in things for such a Distinction between Nature and Person? Of which I gave this evident Proof, that if it were not the same Nature in different Individuals, eve­ry Individual must make a different Kind.

And what Answer do you give to this plain Reason? Nothing particular that I can find. But in the general you say, that all that you can find that I except a­gainst in your Notion of Nature and Person is nothing but this, P. 100. viz. that these are two sounds which in themselves signifie nothing. And is this all indeed? Did not I tell you in these Words, (which I am forced to repeat on this occasion, although I am [Page 49] very unwilling to fill Pages with Repe­titions.) ‘The Question now between us comes to this, Answer to Letter 1. p. 107. whether the common Nature or Essence of things lies only in an abstract Idea, or a general Name, and the real Essence consists only in particular Beings from which that Na­ture is abstracted? The Question is not whether in forming the Notion of common Nature, the Mind doth not abstract from the Circumstances of par­ticular Beings; but it is whether there be not an Antecedent Foundation in the Nature of things, upon which we form this abstract Idea? For if there be, then it cannot be called an Universal Name only; or a meer sign of an I­dea, which we have formed from put­ting many simple Ideas together, which Name belongs to all of such a sort, as have those simple Ideas united together.’

In these Words, which you cannot de­ny to be in the place mention'd, I thought I had stated the Case fairly between us. And why do you not return an Answer to them? But instead of that you only men­tion another Passage more liable to cavil­ling, where I say, ‘That upon your No­tions of Nature and Person, I do not see [Page 50] how it is possible to defend the Do­ctrine of the Trinity. P. 103. For if these Terms really signifie nothing in them­selves, but are only abstract and com­plex Ideas, which the common Use of Language hath appropriated to be the sign of two Ideas; then it is plain that they are only Notions of the Mind, as all abstract and complex Ideas are; and so one Nature and three Persons can be no more.’

Upon this you charge me with affir­ming that of you which you never said, viz. that these Terms are only abstract or complex Ideas: Letter 2. p. 112. but your Words are, Ta­king therefore Nature and Person for the sign of two Ideas they are put to stand for: Letter 1. p. 27. and by enumerating all the simple Ideas, that are contained in the complex Idea, that each of them is made to stand for, we shall immediately see the whole difference that is between them.

These are your own Words. Now from thence it appears, that Nature and Per­son are Terms which are the signs of two Ideas by your own Confession: but you never made these, or any other Terms to be Ideas: and you should be ashamed of such Iargon.

[Page 51]But have not you said in your Essay, Essay B. 4. c. 6. Sect. 1. that it is a very common Practice for Names to be made use of instead of the Ideas themselves, especially if the Ideas be very complex. Nature and Person you grant to be complex Ideas; and these Terms you confess are appropriated to be the signs of two Ideas: Therefore here is an Ambiguity in the Use of these Words, for they are complex Ideas themselves, and they are made the signs of them; and so the Words of the Sentence are capa­ble of both those Senses.

For it is true, according to you, that these Terms, Nature and Person, real­ly signifie nothing in themselves, but are only complex and abstract Ideas; and those Terms are appropriated to be the signs of two Ideas. So that Nature and Person are both Ideas themselves, and those Terms are the Signs of two Ideas: and the Sense had not been liable to Exception, if And had been inserted; ‘For if these Terms really signifie nothing in them­selves, but are only abstract and complex Ideas; And which the common Use had appropriated to be the Signs of two Ide­as, &c.’ But whether this be properly ex­pressed or not, according to your Sense of Ideas, the Weight of the Controver­sie [Page 52] depends not at all upon it; but whe­ther Nature and Person can be any other but abstract Ideas, according to your own plain Expressions; and if they are so, they are no more than Notions of the Mind, and then the Consequence must hold, that One Nature and three Persons can be no more. Upon which I said, I did not see how it was possible to defend the Doctrine of the Trinity, (and I now add of the Incarnation) which was the thing I undertook to make out.

Letter 2. p. 113.But you very freely say, whether I rightly deduce from it this Consequence, viz. And so one Nature and three Persons can be no more; is what you neither know not are concerned to examin. Which I think is an Expression could hardly drop from a Person, who did know how to declare his Belief of three Persons in the Vnity of the Divine Nature. But you pretend these are none of your Notions of Nature and Per­son, nor indeed any thing you can under­stand. But it is plain, that this Con­sequence follows from your own Noti­ons of Nature and Person; as they are set down expresly by your self in the former Letter.

P. 109.You tell me, I made this Inference a little in haste! Whether a Man write in [Page 53] haste or not, the World will judge by what appears, and not by what he or any other saith. And I think it will appear, that I did not make this Inference in haste, but from a deliberate Considerati­on of your Notion of the Ideas of Nature and Person. P. 109. But by those Terms signifying nothing in themselves, you say, that you meant, that they are two sounds that na­turally signifie not one thing more than an­other, nor in themselves signifie any thing at all, but have the signification which they have barely by Imposition. And was this truly all that you meant by it? And do you think that Peter, and Iames, and Iohn signifie any thing by Nature? Are not all Words made significative by Im­position? But is there no difference in the signification of Words as they stand for signs of Things? If they be Words for particular Substances, then you grant, that there is something really existing which is meant by those Words; but if they relate only to the Conceptions of the Mind, then they signifie them and no more. And the Question is, which of these two you meant by those Words Nature and Person? And you plainly af­firm both of them to be complex Ideas, which are made only by an Act of the [Page 54] Mind, and therefore your meaning can be no otherwise understood.

You presume, that upon more leisurely thoughts, both my self and the rest of Man­kind will concur with you. I never affe­cted Singularity, and am ready to com­ply with the rest of Mankind in any rea­sonable thing. P. 110. But you say, that this Notion of Nature and Person, That they are two Words that signifie only by Impositi­on, is what will hold in the common Sense of Mankind. No doubt of it: But I must again and again tell you, that is not the Point in Question, but whether they are only abstract and complex Ideas, which have no other Being but in the Mind. And to this you answer not a Word. I do not in the least think as you suggest, that it is necessary to the Defense of the Trinity, P. 111. that these two Articulate sounds should have Natural significations, and that unless they are used in those significations, it were impossible to defend the Doctrine of the Trinity. But I do affirm, that those who make Nature and Person to be only abstract and complex Ideas; can neither defend nor reasonably believe it. P. 112. And this is making no extraordinary Supposi­tion necessary to the Belief or Defence of it; but only that which in the common [Page 55] Sense of Mankind is necessary to it. For, if you have expressed your own Mind in your former Letter; that must guide us in your Notion of Nature and Person, where you undertook to explain them. For if Nature and Person be abstract, and complex Ideas, as you say, and such are only Acts of the Mind, I do not see how it is possible for you to reconcile these Notions with the Articles of the Trinity and Incarnation.

I do not go about to accuse you of de­nying these Doctrines; I hope you do not. But I impute all this Hesitancy, and doub­ting only to your Notions of Ideas; which you had been so long forming in your Mind, that as it often happens in such Cases, one darling favourite Notion proves too hard for some Points of far greater Consequence, when they are found inconsistent with it. And because you had first fixed your Notion of Ideas, and taken much Pains about them, you thought all other things were to be en­tertained as they appear'd consistent with them. But you could not but find, that the Articles of three Persons, and one Na­ture; and two Natures, and one Person, were not reconcileable with your Ideas of Nature and Person; which is that they [Page 56] are complex Ideas, which depend upon the Act of the Mind; for this were to make the two Natures in Christ to be on­ly two complex Ideas. For if Nature, as you say, be a Collection of several Ideas combined into one complex, abstract Idea; then two Natures can be nothing else but two such Collections, or two abstract­ed and complex Ideas. It may be said, that when you make Nature an abstracted and complex Idea, you speak of a specifick Idea, but the Humane Nature in Christ was a particular Substance, and this you assert to be a real thing, and not to depend on the Act of the Mind.

But this doth not clear the Matter. For in your former Letter you said, that all the Ideas we have of particular distinct Substances, Letter 1. p. 32. are nothing but several Combina­tions of simple Ideas: which in Corporeal Substances are sensible Qualities, in In­corporeal are Operations of the Mind. The utmost then which the Idea of Humane Nature in Christ comes to is, that there were in him the sensible Qualities and In­tellectual Operations of a Man, with an unknown Substance to support them: which belongs not to the simple Ideas, but is supposed by them. This is all I can make of your way of Ideas: and so [Page 57] the Incarnation of Christ is the assuming the sensible Qualities, and intellectual Operations of a Man, to which a Sub­stratum doth belong: but is no Part of the simple Ideas. So that we can have no Idea at all of the Humane Nature of Christ; but only an Inference, that since those are but Accidents, there must be a Substratum to support them; and con­sequently there was a particular Substance in him made up of Mind and Body. But if this had come in the Way of Ideas, yet it cannot make out the Humane Nature of Christ. For if it were in him no o­therwise than in other Men, then the Mystery of the Incarnation is quite gone, and Christ is to be consider'd but like other Men; which doth not answer to what the Scripture saith of the Word's being made Flesh, and that God was mani­fest in the Flesh. There must be there­fore something beyond the meer Hu­mane Nature in him; and either it must be only some Divine Operation upon, and with it, and that is no Substance; or if it be a Substance, it must either co­habit with it, or else be united to it. If it only co-habits, then there are two Persons dwelling together in one Body, and the Actions of one cannot be attri­buted [Page 58] to the other; If there be a real Union between them, so as the Acts be­long to one Person; then there must be such a Manner of Existence in the Hu­mane Nature of Christ, which is diffe­rent from it in other Persons. For in all others, the Acts belong to the Humane Person; but if it were so in Christ, then the Divine Acts of Christ must flow from the Humane Nature as the Princi­ple of them; which is to confound the Divine and Humane Nature, and Opera­tions together; If they come from the Divine Person, then the Humane Nature must have another kind of Subsistence, than it hath in others, or else there must be two Persons; Essay l. 2. ch. 27. Sect. 26. and Person being as you say, a Forensick Term, there must be two different Capacities of Rewards and Punishments; which is so absurd an O­pinion as I think no one will assert.

If there be then but one Person and two Natures, how can you possibly re­concile this to your Way of Ideas? Per­son, say you, Letter 1. p. 216. in it self signifies nothing; but as soon as the common use of any Lan­guage has appropriated it to any Idea, then that is the true Idea of a Person, i. e. Men may call a Person what they please, for there is nothing but common use re­quired [Page 59] to it: They may call a Horse, or a Tree, or a Stone a Person if they think fit; but since the common use of Language hath appropriated it to an In­telligent Being, that is, a Person.

And so you tell us, Essay, l. 2. ch. 27. Sect. 9. That Person stands for a Thinking Intelligent Being that hath Reason and Reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking Being in different times and place. How comes Person to stand for this and nothing else? From whence comes Self-consciousness in different times and places to make up this Idea of a Person? Whether it be true or false, I am not now to enquire, but how it comes into this Idea of a Person? Hath the common use of our Language appropriated it to this Sense? If not, this seems to be a meer Arbi­trary Idea; and may as well be deni­ed as affirmed. And what a fine pass are we come to in the Way of Ideas, if a meer Arbitrary Idea must be taken in­to the only true Method of Certainty? But of that afterwards. We now pro­ceed in the Way of Ideas as you give it us. But if this be the true Idea of a Person, then there can be no Union of two Natures in one Person: For if an Intelligent Conscious Being be the Idea [Page 60] of a Person; and the Divine and Human Nature be Intelligent Conscious Beings, then the Doctrine of the Union of two Natures and one Person is quite sunk, for here must be two Persons in this Way of Ideas. Again, if this be the Idea of a Person, then where there are three Per­sons, there must be three distinct Intelli­gent Beings; and so there cannot be three Persons in the same individual Es­sence. And thus both these Doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation are past re­covery gone, if this Way of Ideas hold. So great a difference there is, between forming Ideas first, and then judging of Revelation by them; and the belie­ving of Revelation on its proper Grounds, and interpreting the Sense of it by the due Measures of Reason. You may pre­tend what you please, that you hold the Assurance of Faith, and the Certainty by Ideas to go upon very different Grounds; but when a Proposition is offered you out of Scripture to be believed, and you doubt about the Sense of it, Is not Recourse to be made to your Ideas? As, in the present Case, whether there can be three Persons in one Nature, or two Natures and one Person; what Resolu­tion can you come to upon your Prin­ciples, [Page 61] but in the Way of Ideas? You may possibly say, That where Ideas are clear and distinct, there you are to judge of Revelation by them; and this is what you assert in your Essay, Essay, B. 4. ch. 18. Sect. 5. That in Propo­sitions whose Certainty is built on clear and perfect Ideas and evident Deductions of Reason, there no Proposition can be re­ceived for Divine Revelation which con­tradicts them; from hence you conclude it impossible for the same Body to be in two Places at once. And yet there is a Per­son who hath lately told the World, Evangel. Medici Art. 14. p. 170. that there is one certain secret Way how by Di­vine Power, the same Body, but not the same Person, may be in very distant Places at once; but he is advised to keep it up as a Secret; which was good friendly Advice: But till it be discovered there is no judging of it. Here I observe, that you require clear and distinct Ideas; and yet we find, if a Man's Word may be taken, these clear and distinct Ideas do not prove the thing impossible. But what is to be said when the Ideas are not clear and distinct? You say, Your Me­thod of Certainty is by the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, where they are not in all their Parts perfectly clear and di­stinct. And this is your Secret about [Page 62] Certainty; which I think had been bet­ter kept up too: For I pray, in the Case now before us, Are your Ideas of Na­ture and Person clear and distinct or not? if they are, then it is plain from your own Doctrine, that if Revelation be pre­tended, you are to reject it. How then comes the Certainty of Faith to be pre­served firm and immoveable, although the Grounds of Certainty be disputed? But suppose they are not clear and distinct? What is to be done in a Matter of Reve­lation contrary to your Ideas? Are you to submit to the Revelation or not? Ch. 18. Sect. 10. Whatever God hath Revealed is most cer­tainly true, no doubt can be made of it. This is the proper Object of Faith; but whether it be a Divine Revelation or no, you say, Reason must judge. Yes, Rea­son proceeding upon clear and distinct I­deas. But suppose you have Ideas suffi­cient for Certainty in your Way, but not clear and distinct; what is to be done then? In things that are above Rea­son, you say, when they are Revealed, they are proper Matters of Faith. What is here being above Reason? Either a­bove the Discovery of Reason▪ as the Fall of Angels, the Resurrection of the Bo­dy, &c. and about these, you say, Rea­son [Page 63] hath nothing to do. (What not if there be an Idea of Identity as to the Bo­dy?) Or such as are above the Compre­hension of Reason when discovered. And they are either such as we have no Natural Ideas of; and then you grant, that they are pure Matters of Faith; or they are such, as you have certain Ideas of, but not clear and distinct. Now here lies the pinching Difficulty, as to your Way of Ideas. Sect. 8. You say indeed, That Re­velation must carry it against meer Proba­bilities to the contrary; because the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it doth not evidently know, but is only pro­bably convinced of, is bound to give up its Assent to such a Testimony, which it is sa­tisfied comes from one who cannot err and will not deceive. I pray observe your own Words, you here positively say, That the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it doth not evidently know: So that it is plain here, that you place Certainty only in Evident Knowledge, or in clear and distinct Ideas; and yet your great Complaint of Me was, that I charged this upon you, and now I find it in your own Words (which I observed before.) But let us allow you all you desire, viz. That there may be Certainty [Page 64] by Ideas, where they are not clear and distinct: and let us now suppose that you are to judge of a Proposition delivered as a Matter of Faith, where you have a Certainty by Reason from your Ideas, such as they are: Can you assent to this as a Matter of Faith, when you are al­ready certain by your Ideas of the con­trary? How is this possible? Can you believe that to be true, which you are certain is not true? Suppose it be that there are two Natures in one Person; the Question is, Whether you can Assent to this as a Matter of Faith? If you had said, there had been only Probabilities on the other side, I grant that you then say, Revelation is to prevail; but when you say you have Certainty by Ideas to the contrary, I do not see how it is possible for you to Assent to a Matter of Faith as true, when you are certain from your Ideas that it is not true: For how can you Believe against Certainty? The Evidence is not so great as when the I­deas are clear and distinct, but the Bar a­gainst Assent is as strong; because the Mind is actually determined by Certain­ty. And so your Notion of Certainty by Ideas must overthrow the Credibility of a Matter of Faith in all such Propositi­ons [Page 65] which are offered to be believed on the account of Divine Revelation.

I shall now summ up the Force of what I have said about this Matter.

Your Answer is, That your Method of Certainty by Ideas, shakes not at all, nor in the least concerns the Assurance of Faith ▪ Against this I have pleaded. (1.) That your Method of Certainty shakes the Be­lief of Revelation in general. (2.) That it shakes the Belief of Particular Propo­sitions or Articles of Faith, which de­pend upon the Sense of Words con­tained in Scripture. Because you do not say, that we are to believe all that we find there expressed; but in case we have any clear and distinct Ideas which limit the Sense another way than the words seem to carry it, we are to judge that to be the true Sense. But in case our Ideas are not clear and distinct, yet you af­firm as your proper Doctrine, That we may come to Certainty by Ideas, although not in all Respects perfectly clear and di­stinct. From whence I infer, That where you have attained to a Certainty by your imperfect Ideas, you must judge of a Matter of Faith, by those Ideas, and consequently, if the Union of two Natures and one Person, or three Persons [Page 66] in one Nature be repugnant to your I­deas (as I have shewed that they are) you must by virtue of your own Princi­ples reject these from being Matters of Faith. And thus I hope I have proved what I undertook, viz. That your Notion of Certainty by Ideas is inconsistent with these Articles of the Christian Faith.

But you have this Comfort left, that you are not the first Person who hath run himself into insuperable Difficulties as to Matters of Faith, by this way of I­deas. For Des Cartes himself did so in a remarkable manner: He was a Person of a great Reach and Capacity, and spent many Thoughts in laying the Foun­dations of Certainty from Ideas, both as to Incorporeal and Corporeal Substances; and yet was miserably foiled as to both of them. His Demonstrations from his Ideas in his Metaphysical Meditations, did not meet with the Entertainment he promised himself from the Inquisitive part of Mankind; for his Objective Rea­lity from his Idea gave no Satisfaction; and his other Argument was thought to have no Force, unless it were taken off from the Idea and placed upon the Ne­cessity of Existence in the Nature of the Thing. As to Corporeal Substances, his [Page 67] fundamental mistake was in a wrong I­dea of Matter, which he made to be the same with Extension; and upon this he built his Systeme of Nature. But against this first false step many things were objected by his Adversaries, as may be seen by the late Disputes in France about his Principles; they objected, that his Notion or Idea of Matter made it ne­cessary, and impossible for God to Annihi­late it; and his Defenders are driven to such shifts as to God's Will and Power, that an indifferent Person might thereby see how dangerous it is to take up with Ideas as to the Ground of Certainty, although neither himself nor his Follow­ers pretend to place it in any thing but clear and distinct Ideas. But when they came to reconcile their Ideas with Mat­ters of Faith, they were so plunged, that they could see no way to get through their Difficulties. Censur. Philos. Cartes. c. 8. Sect. 3. n. 4. For as Monsieur Hu­et observes, Although Des Cartes profes­ses great submission to Divine Revelation, yet when it came to the Trial, he judged his Opinions could not be repugnant to it, because he was certain of the Truth of them; which shews, that he judged of Re­velation by his Rules of Certainty, and whatever he pretended, he did not take [Page 68] his Measures of Truth from Revelation. A late Defender of Des Cartes in answer to this, produces the Words used by him in his Principles, wherein he owns, That in case of Divine Revelation if God declares any thing concerning himself or others which exceed our Capacity, as the Mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation, he would not refuse to believe them, al­though he could not clearly understand them.

This Monsieur Huet denies not, viz. That he made such a general Profession of Submission to Revelation and owning the Mysteries of Faith; but, saith he, when it comes to particular Points, then Ideas are to be the Standard by which we are to judge of Revelation. Monsieur Regis in his Reply saith, That Matters of Faith and Philosophical Truths are of different kinds; and that there can be no Contra­riety but between things of the same kind. Which makes him run into that great Absurdity, that although in a Philosophi­cal Sense God cannot do things repug­nant to Reason, yet in the Way of Faith he may; and all this to preserve the Certainty by Ideas, when nothing can be more repugnant to all kinds of Certain­ty than such a Supposition. But ano­ther [Page 69] great Admirer of Des Cartes, Philoso­phia Scri­pturae In­terpres, c. 5. n. 56. thinks this way unreasonable; But Des Cartes, he saith, hath shewn the right Method of Certainty by clear and distinct Ideas, and therefore he calls it no less than a Di­vine Certainty; c. 8. and he adds, that Truth cannot be contrary to it self; and he laughs at the Distinction of Philosophi­cal and Theological Truths; or the two ways of Certainty by Knowledge and Faith: For, Truth is always one and the same, and changes not its Countenance: and if Truth be an Agreement of Words with Things, how can the same Words a­gree in one Book and differ in another? for the same God is the Author of Truth where-ever it is: and therefore he calls it, A most absurd Opinion of those who say, that God who is immutable should teach that as Truth in Philosophy, which is false in Divinity. But I return to you.

You seem to be not a little concern­ed, that I say, ‘That as you have sta­ted your Notion of Ideas it may be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of the Christian Faith which I had en­deavoured to defend.’ Such an Accu­sation, you say, brought into any Court in England, would be thought to shew a great Inclination to have the Accused be [Page 70] suspected rather than any Evidence of be­ing guilty of any thing; and so would im­mediately be dismissed without hearing a­ny Plea to it. But you must give me leave to say, that you have quite mista­ken my Design, which was not to ac­cuse you, but to shew my own Dissatis­faction, as to the Way you had taken to clear your self. I hoped you would have said so much for your own Vindi­cation, as would have satisfied the World, that your Notion of Ideas was far from any Tendency that way to which it was carried by him who made use of your Expressions: But, instead of that you explained it in such a manner as made it far more suspicious that he had not perverted your meaning. And that made me to say, That as you had sta­ted it, it may be of dangerous Conse­quence. It may be, p. 58. say you, this is no Evidence, but only an Inclination to ac­cuse you. So far from it, that it shewed an Inclination to favour you, when I only said it may be; for now you see, that I think it is of such dangerous Conse­quence, and I must think so till you have cleared it better.

But the Notion of Ideas as you have stated it, relates to your whole Book: [Page 71] Why should you carry it farther than I intended it? The stating of it I menti­oned was in your first Letter; where you told us what you meant by Nature and Person. p. 60. But you have found out two Particulars wherein it may be of dange­rous Consequence, first in making so much use of the word Ideas, and your placing Certainty in Ideas. As to the Term of Ideas, I have no Objection to the use of the word it self; provided it be used in a common Sense, and no Weight be laid upon it more than it can bear; for I am for no new affected Terms which are apt to carry Mens Minds out of the way; they are like Ignes fatui, which seem to give Light, but lead those that follow them into Bogs: Like Fontanges, which seem to set Peoples Heads that wear them higher, but their Understan­dings are just what they were before. I always dislik'd the Stoical Improvements by New Words, or giving New Senses to Old ones. But I told you, ‘I should ne­ver have mention'd this Way of Ideas, but for the ill use I found made of them: and you might have enjoy'd the Satisfaction you had in them long enough, unless I had found them im­ploy'd in doing Mischief. p. 63.’ Which, as [Page 72] you humbly conceive amounts to thus much and no more; that I fear Ideas; i. e. the Term Ideas may some time or other be of dangerous Consequence. Can you possibly think this was my Meaning? I know of no Antipathy I have to the Term Ideas; nor do I understand any Mischief that lies in the bare use of the Term. If it gives you any Satisfaction I pray make what use you please of it, so you do not set it up in your Way of Ideas for a new Method of Certainty; nor weaken Mens Belief as to Matters of Faith by it. These were my Prejudices against your Ideas, and they are increased by your Defences; for I can find nothing that hath any force to remove them.

You tell me, my Quarrel must be with the Term Ideas as of dangerous Con­sequence: But why so? It was the Way of Certainty by Ideas which I insisted upon, and the new Terms as imploy'd to that purpose. I confess, I say, ‘The World had been strangely amuzed with Ideas of late, and we have been told, what strange things might be done by the help of Ideas, i. e. as to Matter of Certainty.’ But you tell me more than once, that I own, p. 65, 79. That these come only to be common Notions of things, which I have no A­version [Page 73] from. This is a way of turning things upon Me, which I could not ex­pect from You. For those Words are brought in by me on this Occasion, you had said, that you see no such Opposition, but that Ideas and sound Reason may stand toge­ther, i. e. Reason rightly managing those Ideas, so as to produce Evidence by them. Upon this, I used these Words. ‘But what need all this great Noise about Ideas and Certainty; true and real Certainty by Ideas, if after all it comes only to this, that our Ideas only re­present such things, from whence we bring Arguments to prove the Truth of things? But the World hath been strangely amused, &c.’ Judge now how fair and ingenuous this Answer is. That which I bring in as a Consequence of your Assertion, you make to be my own Sense as to your Notion of Ideas: when I all along distinguish the Way of Reason, by deducing one thing from another, from your Way of Certainty, in the Agreement and Disagreement of Ideas; and I therefore mention it as an Argument of your own departing from your beloved Notion of Ideas. I never said any thing against Reason rightly managing Ideas, so as to produce Evidence by them. I was glad [Page 74] you came so far towards my own Ap­prehension as to the Use of Ideas, and I declare soon after ‘That if you mean no more by your Certainty from Ideas, but a Certainty from Reason, I was not so unreasonable a Man to disagree with you. From p. 63. to p. 73.’ And yet you spend many Pages to justifie your Use of the Term Ideas: which is all lost upon me. For in short, it is not your Way of Ideas, but your Way of Certainty by Ideas, which I was unsatisfied about, and am so much the more by the Method you have ta­ken to defend your self. And this was the thing I found fault with, as you could not but see; but you found it much easier to run into a long Discourse, to no purpose, about the Use of the Word Ideas. How far your Use of the Term is new I will not dispute with you; be it new or old the thing you do pretend to by your Ideas is that which I disliked, and am forced to do so still; for you give me no manner of satisfaction about it, as will appear by the Examination of what you say, about the new Method of Certainty, which is the matter in Question: p. 87. You desire to know whether there be any other or older Method of Certainty? That is not the [Page 75] Point, but whether yours be any at all? Which I deny. If there be no Older, you say, the World is obliged to you for this New one: Very true, if it were what it pretends. p. 88. But you tell me, I ought to set the World right in a thing of that great Concernment, and to overthrow yours, and thereby prevent the dangerous Consequence of your unseasonable starting this new Me­thod of Certainty. I did never pretend to inform the World of new Methods, and therefore am not bound to go any farther than to that I found fault with, which was your new Method; and al­though I thought I had said enough before, to shew how far it was from what it pretended; yet because you call me to it in such a manner, I shall en­deavour more freely to represent to you the Vnsatisfactoriness and Inconsistency of it. For it is still to me a strange thing, that you should talk so much of a new Method of Certainty by Ideas; and yet allow, as you do, such a Want of Ideas, so much Imperfection in them, and such a want of Connexion between our Ideas, and the things themselves. One would think, that he that owned these things rather design'd to prove there could be no Cer­tainty by Ideas. And when I had ob­jected [Page 76] these things in the Conclusion of my former Answer, you do not deny them; and all the Return you make is, that it is better to have some way of Cer­tainty (though it will not lead us to it in every thing) than no way at all. p. 171, 172. As though the Dispute between us had been, Whether any Certainty be not better than none. No doubt any true Certain­ty is desirable, but it is, as I have of­ten said, of ill Consequence to set up such a Method of Certainty, as if it hold, will overthrow our Faith, and if it doth not, must deceive all those that follow it. And it is the Certainty of Faith which I defend against your pretended Certainty of Knowledge. But to let you see what Ground I had to be unsa­tisfied with it, I shall now wave all the Instances of Ideas I insisted on before, as to Substances and sensible Qualities; and I shall single out one remarkable Idea, by which the Uncertainty of your way of Ideas will be fully discover'd. And that is the Idea of Space; upon which a famous Systeme of Natural Philosophy hath been built, and as upon a clear and di­stinct Idea; and yet you will by no means allow it to be so; and think you have a clear Idea to the contrary; al­though [Page 77] those who will not allow it to be true cannot deny it to be consistent with it self, and that the Ideas in it have an Agreement with one another.

As to Space, Essay, B. 2. ch. 13. Sect. 2. you say, that we have it both by Sight and Touch, which inform us of the Distance between Bodies: which in several Respects may be called Distance, Capacity and Extension; and so Extension, you say, is an Idea belonging to Body on­ly, but Space may, as is evident, be con­sider'd without it. But here now arises a great difficulty to me in the way of Certainty by Ideas: viz. that some very thinking Men in this way of Ideas, have look'd on the Idea of Space, and exten­ded Matter to be the same; for say they, it appears to us from clear Ideas, that Body and Extension are the same thing, and therefore if there be Extension in Space there must be Body. But, you say, Sect. 12. those that do so, either change the signification of Words, and so render it a doubtfull Idea, or they confound very dif­ferent Ideas with one another, and so can never come to Certainty by the Agree­ment or Disagreement of Ideas. But you conclude, Sect. 14. that the clear and distinct Idea of simple Space distinguishes it plainly and sufficiently from Body. Here we see you [Page 78] pretend to a clear and distinct Idea. But it falls out very unluckily for the Way of Ideas, that the first starter of this Way of Certainty is as positive, Princip. p. 11. n. 16. that the Idea of Space and extended Body are the same. So that here we have clear and distinct Ideas both Ways. And is not this an admirable Method of Certainty, when in one of the plainest Ideas which de­pend upon our Senses, the greatest De­fenders of Ideas differ so fundamentally. What can other Men hope for in this Way of Ideas, if such Men can agree no better in one of the most evident to our Senses? But then we must consider, who hath the better Reason? This is not Cer­tainty by Ideas, but by Reason upon them, which is another thing: Let us go to Reason. Is that Reason built only on some intermediate Idea, which makes it clear? I find intermediate Ideas on both sides, and urged with equal Assu­rance. Des Cartes saith, that from Ex­tension we rightly conclude a Body to be a Substance; because it is a Repugnancy that there should be an Extension of Nothing; and therefore, if there be Extension in Space there must be Body. And he proves it from the Idea of Body; for, if we cast off all such things as are not necessary to [Page 79] Body, as Hardness, Colour, Gravity, Heat, and Cold, and all other Qualities, we shall find nothing to remain but Extension, and therefore nothing but Extension is in the Idea of Body, which being likewise in Space the Idea of Body and Space are the same. But say you on the other side, Essay, l. 2. ch. 13. Sect. 12. I appeal to every Man's own Thoughts, whether the Idea of Space be not as distinct from that of Solidity, as it is from the Idea of a scarlet Colour. 'Tis true, that Solidity cannot exist without Extension; but this hinders not but they are distinct Ideas. One appeals to Thoughts, and the other to Reason: Had Des Cartes no Thoughts? Yet his Reason convinced him, that whatever Thoughts he had, he must be perswaded by Reason, which was the true Idea. You say, that is a clear and distinct Idea that a Man's thoughts dictate to him to be so. No, saith Des Cartes, that only is the true Idea, which a Man comes to by the Exercise of his Reason; and he look'd upon those others as meer Ideas of Imagination, and not Rational Ideas. So that here we have another Work to do, and that no easie one, which is to distinguish the Ideas of Imagination from those of Reason: and what way have you laid down to prevent so great [Page 80] a Mistake? Of what Rules have you to judge, how far Imagination is to be al­lowed in the Matter of Ideas? For in all Objects of Sense the Impression is made upon the Imagination; which is the Seat of Ideas, that come in by Sensation. now here lies a very considerable Diffi­culty, how far Reason is to judge of these Ideas or Imagination? For if all our sim­ple Ideas of things without us come in by Sensation, then one would think those Ideas are to be allow'd which come in that Way; and so the Impressions of Fancy are to be the Standard and Rule of Certainty, which I think you will not affirm. But what Rule then have you when, and where, and how far, you are to correct the erroneous Ideas of Ima­gination?

I cannot deny but you were sensible of the Difficulty from the Ideas of Ima­gination, and thus you propose it. B. 4. ch. 4. Sect. 1. To what purpose is all this stir? Knowledge, say you, is only the Perception of the Agree­ment or Disagreement of our own Ideas, but who knows what those Ideas may be? Is there any thing so extravagant as the Ima­gination of Men's Brains? Where is the Head that hath no Chimaera's in it? Or if there be a sober and wise Man, what [Page 81] difference will there be by your Rules be­tween his Knowledge, and that of the most extravagant Fancy in the World: They both have their Ideas, and perceive their Agreement and Disagreement one with an­other. Let us now consider the Answer you give to it, and by that we shall bet­ter judge of your Way of Certainty.

Your general Answer is, Sect. 2, that if our Knowledge of our Ideas terminate in our Fancies, our Assurance would go no farther than that of Dreams, or the Visions of a heated Fancy. But our Knowledge is real, only so far, as there is a Conformity be­tween our Ideas, and the Reality of Things.

All this is undoubtedly true. But you say, How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own Ideas, know that they agree with Things themselves?

There indeed lies the Difficulty, but how do you remove it?

There are two sorts of Ideas, you say, we may be sure, agree with things.

And these are worth the knowing.

1. The first are simple Ideas, Sect. 4▪ which since the mind can by no means make to it self, must necessarily be the Product of Things operating on the Mind in a natural Way. [Page 82] and producing therein those Perceptions which by the Wisdom and Will of our Ma­ker they are adapted to. From whence it follows, that simple Ideas are not Fictions of our Minds.

All that can be proved from hence is no more, but that the Objects of our Sen­ses do make those Impressions upon them, that from them we may be certain there are such things without us, which pro­duce those Impressions. And this is all you mean when you say, that you are certain these Ideas are no Fictions of our Brains. But let us apply this to the pre­sent Case. Our Senses truly inform us of a Distance between Bodies; and so far we are certain of an Idea of Space, but the Question about the Idea of Space goes farther; viz. Whether the Idea of Space imply something or nothing? How can nothing be extended? If it be something extended it must be Body; and so Space and Body are the same.

And so your simple Ideas give no man­ner of satisfaction in this Matter.

Sect. 5.2. All our complex Ideas, except those of Substances, you say, being Archetypes of the Mind's own making, not referr'd to the Existence of any thing, cannot want any Con­formity [Page 83] necessary to real Knowledge; for that which is not designed to represent any thing but it self, can never be capable of a wrong Representation, nor mislead us from the true Apprehension of any thing by its dislikeness to it.

Where are we now? What in the Way to Certainty still? Methinks it seems to be too intricate and winding to be that plain Way. What is meant by these Archetypes in the Mind which cannot de­ceive us? I confess here are such things said in order to Certainty, which are a­bove my Understanding, if taken with respect to Things; as how we cannot but be infallibly certain, that all the Know­ledge we attain concerning these Ideas is real, and reaches things themselves, and yet they are Archetypes of the Mind's own making, not intended to be the Copies of any thing, nor referr'd to the Existence of any thing. How can the Certainty by these Ideas reach the things themselves, if they are Archetypes of the Mind, not re­ferr'd to the Existence of any thing? But I suppose all this is meant of Mathemati­cal Truths, and so reaches not the Case, which is concerning the Certainty of our Knowledge of things that really exist.

[Page 84] Sect. 11.3. You say, there is another sort of complex Ideas, which being referr'd to Archetypes without us may differ from them, and so our Knowledge about them may come short of being real. Now these were the things we desired to be made certain in; and to find out such Rules as would make our Knowledge real. But for all that I can see, the hopes of any Criterion is quite lost, as to the Point in Question: How shall the mind when it perceives nothing but its own Ideas, know that they agree with the things them­selves?

For upon these Grounds we can have no Certainty as to simple Ideas, but on­ly as to the Power of making Impressi­ons on our Senses; but as to complex Ideas as of Substances, our Knowledge a­bout them may come short of being real, i. e. we cannot arrive to Certainty about them in the way of Ideas; because, they may differ from the Archetypes without us. And you confess, Sect. 12. that our Ideas are not very exact Copies, and yet are the Sub­jects of real, (as far as we have any) Know­ledge of them; which will not be found to reach very far. But to make it real con­cerning Substances, the Ideas must be taken [Page 85] from the real Existence of things. And if our complex Ideas may deceive us as to the things from whence they are suppo­sed to be taken, what an Account of Cer­tainty in the way of Ideas is here? And yet you conclude this Chapter in that Triumphant manner; I think I have shewn wherein it is that Certainty, real Certainty consists, which whatever it was to others was to me heretofore one of those Desiderata's, which I found great want of: And for all that I can see may do so still. For here is nothing said to distinguish the strong Impressions of Fancy from the Appearances of things, from that Cer­tainty of Knowledge which comes from the things themselves. For, a confident Opiniator will talk with greater Assu­rance of the Agreement and Disagreement of things with his Ideas; than a Man of far greater Judgment and more Modesty. And you have given us no Rules to make a difference between Opinion and rational Certainty; especially when the Ideas of Fancy are found to agree with one an­other.

But I shall go a step farther to shew, that the Agreement of Ideas is no Ground of Certainty, and that from a Suppo­sition [Page 86] relating to the present Case.

We have seen how possible it is for an ingenious Person skilled in the Phaeno­mena of Nature to contrive such an Hy­pothesis, that one Part may agree with another, so as that no discernible Incon­sistency may be found in it, and yet all this may be built on such a Foundation, as cannot be consistent with your Cer­tainty by Ideas; nay, such as you are cer­tain cannot be true.

The Hypothesis, I mean, is that of Des Cartes; for allowing him his Laws of Motion, and his three Elements, the Phaenomena of Nature, or the Ideas of it agree with one another, and yet all this is built upon Space being the same with Body; and consequently, that there can be no Vacuum: upon which his Laws of Motion, and his Solution of the Phaenomena is all built. And therefore, when a lear­ned Man of our own objected that to him, and thought it of no great Consequence to his Philosophy; he replied with some smartness, Des Cartes Epist. [...] 1. Ep. 87, 88. that he was mistaken, for he took it for one of the most certain Princi­ples of his Philosophy. What Certainty then can there be in Ideas, when so ab­surd a Principle as that shall be look'd on [Page 87] by so great a Man, as so certain a thing in the Way of Ideas, as to build his whole System of Natural Philosophy upon it? And his followers to this day stifly de­fend it, who are otherwise ingenious Men.

Nothing now remains to be answer'd in your second Letter, but what relates to the Defence of what I had said in my Book concerning Nature and Person. For I cannot but observe, that instead of clearing some pressing Difficulties in my Answer to your former Letter, you run back to my Book, and begin a new Cri­tique upon that Part of it; and take in the help of some ingenious Persons of your Acquaintance, to whom I must shew so much Civility as to take notice of their Objections. Which I shall the ra­ther do, because the Doctrine of the Trinity is expressed in the first Article of our Religion by one Nature and three Persons, and so it hath been understood by the Christian Church long before. And it is the Sense of the Christian Church which I am bound to defend, and no particular Opinions of my own.

You tell me, p. [...]17 that there hath not been one of your Acquaintance who owned that [Page 88] he understood my Meaning; but confessed that the farther he look'd into what I had said, the more he was at a loss about Na­ture and Person. But I hope I am not to answer for other Men's want of Un­derstanding in these Matters: which re­quires greater Application of Mind, than most Men are willing to allow themselves about them. But I am to judge no other­wise of their Sense and Capacity, than as you have represented them.

p. 118. One said I began with giving two signi­fications of the word Nature; One of them, as it stood for Properties; and this he un­derstood; but the other wherein Nature was taken for the thing it self, wherein those Properties were, he said he did not understand. But he said he was not very well acquainted with Greek, and Aristotle was brought to explain and settle the Sense of Nature.

But why did not this Gentleman in the first Place consider what it was I under­took to shew, which was, that we had an Idea of Nature, which came not in by our Senses; and in the very next words I said, ‘That Nature and Substance are of an equal Extent; and so, that which is the Subject of Powers and Proper­ties [Page 89] is the Nature, whether it be meant of bodily or spiritual Substances. And although by Sensation and Reflection we know the Powers and Properties of things; yet it is by Reason we are satisfied there must be such a Nature or Substance, because it is impossible that they should subsist by themselves.’

Methinks if the Gentleman were so much at a loss as you represent him, you should have helped him out by your relative Ideas: For hard things go down much better with some Men's minds in the Way of Ideas, (which is a sort of gilding the Pills) and I doubt not but you could have satisfied him, that the Understanding may by virtue of a rela­tive Idea be very well satisfied of the Being of Nature, as well as Substance, when I declared that I took them to be of equal Extent; as they were the Subject of Powers and Properties. But he saith, that this he understood not, p. 120. because Nature extended to things that were not Substan­ces. Did I not say, that Nature was some­times taken only for Properties, but that there must be another Sense proved, be­cause there must be a Subject wherein these Properties are, and in that respect, [Page 90] I said, that Nature and Substance were of equal Extent. But he doth not understand the Deduction; Aristotle takes Nature for a corporeal Substance, therefore Nature and Substance are of an equal Extent. What a hard Fate doth that Man lie un­der, that falls into the hands of a severe Critick! He must have a care of his But, and For, and Them, and It; For the least Ambiguity in any of these will fill up Pages in an Answer, and make a Book look considerable for the Bulk of it. And what must a Man do, who is to answer to all such Objections about the Use of Particles? But let any indifferent Rea­der judge, how I am used in this Place. My words are ‘Sometimes Nature is taken for the Thing it self in which those Properties are; and so Aristotle took Nature for a Corporeal Substance, which had the Principles of Motion in it self; but Nature and Substance are of an equal Extent.’ Doth not a­ny Man of Common Sense see, that I oppose this to Aristotle's Sense of Na­ture for a Corporeal Substance? He con­fines it to that only; I say, That it is of equal Extent with Substance whether Bodily or Spiritual: and those very [Page 91] words follow after. If you had really such a Conversation with a Gentleman, I am sorry for him; and I think you did not deal so like a Gentleman by him, to expose him thus to the World.

But I perceive he is a Philosopher too; for he proves, p. 119. That Aristotle 's Notion of Nature for a Corporeal Substance will not hold. Did I ever say that it would? I am far enough from thinking, that a Corporeal Substance hath a Principle of Motion from it self; but might not I mention Ari­stotle's taking Nature for a Substance, al­though I presently add, his Sense was too short and narrow, because Nature and Substance were of equal extent? But did not his Notion of Nature imply that it was a Principle of Motion in it self? Whatever Aristotle thought, the Notion of Nature doth not depend upon a Prin­ciple of Motion from it self; but it was considered, not as in it self as the Cause, but in it self as the Subject. And that Philosophical Gentleman might be pleased to consider, that Aristotle did not make Motion to arise from Matter, but assert­ed it to come from a first Mover, and said, That those Philosophers talked like Men not well in their Wits, who attribu­ted [Page 92] Motion to Matter of it self; as I could easily prove, if it were needful. And methinks you should not have been such a Stranger to Aristotle, to let your Acquaintance run into such Blun­ders, and then to print them for them.

But the Gentleman is farther plun­ged and knows not how to get out. p. 121. He cannot for his Life understand Nature to be Substance and Substance to be Nature? Where lies the Difficulty? Is the Repug­nancy, in the Words, or in the Sense? Not in the Words or Sense either in Greek or Latin. For the Greek, (if I may have leave to mention that Lan­guage in this Case) those who have been very well acquainted with the force of Words therein, have made Nature of the same importance with Substance. So Hesychius renders it by [...], Substance; but I shall not bring the Testimony of Criticks but of Philosophers. And Ari­stotle may be allowed to understand his own Language, Arist. Me­taph. l. 5. c. 4. he saith positively, [...]; every Substance is called Nature, and the Reason he gives for it is, [...], because Na­ture is a Substance. It may be said, That Aristotle said this, because he took Na­ture [Page 93] for such a Substance as had the Power of Motion in it self; I do not deny, but he look'd on that as the proper Accep­tion of Nature; but from hence it follows, that whatever Substance had such a Principle of Motion in it self was truly and properly Nature; not as ex­clusive of a Superiour Principle of Moti­on, but as having an internal self-mo­ving Principle. And herein Aristotle differed from some modern Philosophers, who make all Motion to come from the Impulse of another Body, and to be a meer Mode of Matter continued from one Body to another. I confess Aristotle was of another Opinion from those Gentlemen, and look'd on Motion as an Effect of an inward Principle; and not meerly of an External Impulse: but whether Aristotle were mistaken herein is not the Question; and it is possible he was not; however, it plainly appears, that Substance with a Power of Motion in it self, and Nature, had the same Sense; and none of those who have been the most severe Criticks upon Aristotle have disputed, that I remember, against this Sense of Nature in him. P. Rami Schol. Me­taph l. 9. c. 4. One of them finds this fault, that it was but a Repe­tition [Page 94] of what he had said in his Physicks; Physic. Ausc. l. 2. c. 1. where he doth likewise treat of the Sense of Nature. And there he takes it for such a Substance which hath the Principle of Mo­tion and Rest within it self and by it self; which he opposes to artificial things, as a Bed or a Garment. And as much as this Definition hath been run down by some Men, if we set aside some affected Obscurity in his Philosophical Writings, there is no such Absurdity in it; when he explains himself not to understand it of meer Local Motion, or change of Place, but of all Alterations incident to Bodies. So that Nature in his Sense, was a Substance endued with a Principle of Life and Action. And all those things which did partake of Nature in this Sense, he said, were Substances; [...]. For Nature is always a Subject and in a Subject; i. e. the Sub­stance it self is Nature, and that which is in it is according to Nature. And this Sense of Aristotle Plutarch relies upon, Plut. de Plac. Phil. l. 1. c. 1. as the true Notion of Nature which he saith is the Principle of Motion and Rest; because the beginning and ending of things depend upon it: But Plutarch by no means approves of those Mens Opinion [Page 95] who made Nature to be an Original Self-moving Principle; c. 3. For, saith he, Matter of it self cannot move without an Efficient Cause, no more than any Metal can frame it self into a particular Form without an Artifi­cer. From whence we see that Aristotle's Notion of Nature was very consistent with an Efficient Cause of Nature. But your Gentleman saith, Letter II. p. 119. That to those who admit not Matter and Motion to be Eternal, no Nature in that Sense will be left, since Nature is said to be a Corporeal Substance which hath the Principles of Motion in it self, and such a sort of Corporeal Substance those Men have no Notion of at all, and consequently none of Nature, which is such a Corporeal Substance. But if Aristotle did not suppose Matter to move it self, without an Efficient Cause, (as cer­tainly he did not) then all this falls to the Ground, and his Notion of Nature for a Substantial Principle of Life and A­ction may remain good.

But it may be said, That this was one of his singular Notions, and that no other Philosophers took it so. Which is so far from being true, that a great Enemy of Aristotle's confesses, Fr. Patrit. Discuss. Peripat. T. II. l. 2. p. 207. That the Name of Nature among the Writers before him ex­tended [Page 96] to all kinds of Beings, and not on­ly to Individual but to Specifick Na­tures.

Aristotle's fault lay in applying Na­ture only to Corporeal Substances; and whatever was above them he look'd on as above Nature; but the Pythagoreans and Platonists took Nature to extend to Spiritual as well as Bodily Substances. Which appears by Timaeus Locrus his Book of Nature; in the beginning whereof he divides Things into two kinds, Intellectual and Corporeal; and the former, whose Nature was more excellent, he derives immediately from the best Principle, viz. God himself.

But to make this plainer, we are to consider, that there were four Opinions, among the Old Philosophers about Na­ture. Some held Nature to be the same with Matter, and attributed the Begin­ning of all things to that alone; such were the followers of Anaximander and Democritus. Others rejected this Do­ctrine as absurd and impious, and held a Divine Being above Matter, which gave the beginning to Motion and framed the World, and they asserted Spiritual as well as Corporeal Natures, and these were [Page 97] the followers of Pythagoras and A­naxagoras. Others asserted the Be­ginning of Motion and of the World from a first Cause; but confined the Sense of Nature to the Course of things established in this Visible World by an Universal Providence at first. And this was the Notion of Aristotle and his followers to the time of Strato who attributed all to meer Nature. Lastly, there were some who made Nature to be the first Prin­ciple which formed all things; which sometimes they called God, and sometimes Nature, as is obvious in all the Writings of the Stoicks; Vis il­lum Naturam vocare? non peccabis; saith Seneca: Nat Quaest. l. 2. c. 45. and in another place, Quid aliud est Natura, quam Deus & di­vina Ratio? De benef. l. 4. c. 7, 8. and again, Nec Deus sine Naturâ est, nec Natura sine Deo, sed i­dem est utrumque, which he else­where calls, De Cons. ad Helv. c. 8. Incorporalis Ratio ingen­tium operum Artifex. With which Balbus in Cicero agrees, Cic. de Nat. l. 2. when he de­fines Nature from Zeno, to be an In­telligent Fire that produces all things. For what he calls Ignem artificiosum ad gignendum, &c. Laertius calls [...] [Page 98] [...]; and it is called in Cicero, Natura Artifex, Con­sultrix & Provida, &c. which can agree to nothing but a Spiritual Sub­stance; and when he explains what Nature is, he saith, That Epicurus cal­led all by the Name of Nature; and di­vided it into Matter and Vacuity and the Accidents of both: but we (saith he of the Stoicks) by Nature understand no Inanimate Things which have no Principle within to unite them, as Earth and Stones; but a living Substance, as an Animal, in which is no Chance, but Order and Contrivance. And so Plato said, Plato in Phi­leb. That Nature or­dered all things with Reason and Vn­derstanding. By which he understood the Divide Being. If we come low­er down among the Philosophers, we shall find Nature taken for a Principle of Life. Sext. Empir. l. 8. c. 2. So Sextus Empiricus distin­guishes the Union of Matter in Stones and Wood from that which is in Plants, p. 324. and this he calls Nature, which is the lowest degree of it; for afterwards, he speaks of Rational and Intellectual Natures, and places God in the head of them. Anton. l. 6. sect. 14. Antoninus distin­guishes [Page 99] Nature in Plants from a heap of the Particles of Matter in Wood and Stone. l. 10. Sect. 2. But in another place he distinguishes that which is meer Na­ture in Man, viz. what he hath in common with Plants, from the Na­ture of an Animal in him; and that again from the Nature of a Rational Creature in him. Here indeed he speaks of the Properties of those Natures; but he still supposes, that where they are separate, they are founded in di­stinct Substances.

So that I hope, if the Philosophers of old, of all kinds did understand the Sense of Nature and Substance, the Gentleman may not continue in such a peremptory Humour of saying, That for his Life he cannot understand Nature to be Substance, nor Substance to be Nature. For they all agreed in this, however they differed in their Opini­ons of Nature.

But I have something farther to add concerning the Sense of the Christian Church in this Matter; which I think is by no means to be despised.

It is observed by Damascen, Damasc. Dial. c. 32. that some of the Philosophers made this [Page 100] difference between [...] and [...]; that the former was taken for simple Es­sence, but the latter for Essence with a Specifical Difference; but that the Chri­stian Writers took both of them for that which was common to more than one, as an Angel, a Man, a Horse, &c. So St. Chrysostom calls Angels [...], Chrysost. Hom. 22. in Gen. and [...], and Theodoret [...], Theod. in Gen. Qu. 2. St. Basil [...]; but they all agree, Basil. in Hex. Or. 1. that Incorporeal and Invisible Substances are real Natures. And the Reason Damascen gives is, That they have both the same Original (and you know that it is a good way to find out the true Idea) for as [...] is from [...], so [...] is from [...], both which are the same. So that if Real Existence belong to Substance, and Nature hath its Name from thence too, then Substance and Nature must be of the same Importance. And this Notion of Nature they do not take up meerly from the Etymology of the Word, but from the Sense of it in Scripture; as when St. Paul saith, They worshipped those which by Nature are no Gods; Gal. 4.8. [...] [Page 101] [...], as the Alexandrian Copy hath it more clearly; i. e. which are not really and substantially Gods. They had the Names of Gods, and the Divine Properties were attributed to them; but because they had not the Divine Essence, they are said not to be Gods by Nature. And what Sense would this Gentleman make of the A­postle's words, who cannot for his Life understand that Nature is the same with Substance? He must understand this only of the Properties which belong to God. But these Properties must be somewhere, and so a Substance must be supposed as the Subject of them; and what Reason can there be to exclude that which is the Sub­ject of those Properties? For there must be a Divine Being, as well as Properties; and that Being must have Essential Properties belonging to it; and what imaginable Reason can there be, why that should not be cal­led the Divine Nature? And if it be, then Substance and Nature are the same. I might easily pursue this farther, but I design to bring things into as little a compass as I can.

[Page 102]But it may be there is something in our own Language which hinders Nature from being taken for a Sub­stance; and for this I appeal to a late Ingenious and Honourable Person and Philosopher of our own; I mean Mr. Boyle, Mr. Boyle of the Notion of Nature, p. 27. who hath written a Philo­sophical Enquiry into the Notion of Nature; and he tells us of the va­rious Acceptations of it. (1.) For the Author of Nature. (2.) For the Essence of a Thing. (3.) For what comes to Men by Birth; as a Man is Noble by Nature. (4.) For an Internal Principle of Motion: as that a Stone is carried downwards by Na­ture. (5.) For the established course of things; as that Nature makes the Night to succeed the Day. (6.) For an Aggregate of Powers belonging to a Living Body; as that Nature is strong or weak. (7.) For the Sy­stem of the Universe; as when we say of a Chimaera, there is no such thing in Nature. (8.) For a Semi-Deity; which is the Notion he op­poses. But we may observe, that he allows God and all the real Beings of the Vniverse to have Nature belong­ing [Page 103] to them; and he saith, P. 35. The Word Essence is of great Affinity to it, if not of an adequate Import. But the Real Essence of a thing is a Substance; and therefore Nature and Substance are of the like Importance.

The next thing fit to be considered is, How far your Certainty by Ideas and the Certainty by Reason differ from each other.

The occasion of this Debate stands thus.

I had said in my Book, Discourse of the Trinity, p. 25. ‘That I granted, that by Sensation and Re­flection we come to know the Pow­ers and Properties of things; but our Reason is satisfied, that there must be something beyond these, because it is impossible that they should subsist by themselves. So that the Nature of things properly belongs to our Reason and not to meer Ideas.’

In answer to this you said, That you can find no Opposition between Ideas and Reason; but Ideas are the Objects of the Vnderstanding, and Vnderstan­ding is one of the Faculties imployed about them.

[Page 104]To which I replied, ‘No doubt of it. But you might easily see, that by Reason I understood Prin­ciples of Reason, allow'd by Man­kind; which I think are very dif­ferent from Ideas. But I perceive Reason in this Sense is a thing you have no Idea of, or one as obscure as that of Substance.’

If there be any thing which seems too sharp and reflecting in the Man­ner of Expression, I do not go about to defend it; but the worst of it is, That your Idea of Reason is as ob­scure as that of Substance. And whether there were not a just Occa­sion for it, the Reader must judge when the Faculty was put for the Principles of Reason. Could any Man judge otherwise, but that you had a very obscure Idea of Reason, who could mistake the Vnderstanding for it?

P. 124. But Reason, you say, taken for the Faculty is as different from Ideas in your Apprehension. But what is that to the Point in Dispute, whether the Notion of Nature be to be taken from Ideas or from Reason? You say, the Vnderstanding is imploy'd about [Page 105] them. And what then? I shewed that the Nature of things belongs to Reason and not to bare Ideas; because Ideas come in by Sensation and Re­flection; by which we come to know the Powers and Properties of things; but we cannot come to know the Notion of Nature as the Subject of them, but by this Reason that we are convinced they cannot subsist of themselves. And is this no more than to say, the Vnderstanding is im­ployed about Ideas? But now you an­swer farther, That if Reason be taken for the Faculty or the Principles of Rea­son allowed by Mankind, Reason and I­deas may consist together. This leads me to the Examination of that which may be of some use, viz. To shew the Difference of your Method of Certainty by Ideas, and the Method of Certainty by Reason.

And the Way of Certainty by Rea­son lies in two things;

• 1. The Certainty of Principles.
• 2. The Certainty of Deductions.

As to the former, the Gentleman your Defender in your Book saith, That in your Essay, Ibid. in more places than [Page 106] one, you have spoken, and that pretty largely of Self-evident Propositions and Maxims; so that if I have ever read them, I cannot doubt, but you have Ideas of those common Principles of Reason.

Book 4 ch 7. Sect. [...].What Ideas you have of them must appear from your Book. And I do there find a Chapter of Self-evi­dent Propositions and Maxims; which I cannot but think extraordinary for the Design of it; which is thus summed up in the Conclusion, viz. That it was to shew, That these Max­ims, as they are of little use where we have clear and distinct Ideas, so they are of dangerous use, where our Ideas are not clear and distinct. And is not this a fair way to convince me that your Way of Ideas is very consistent with the Certainty of Reason; when the Way of Reason hath been al­ways supposed to proceed upon Ge­neral Principles; and you assert them to be Vseless and Dangerous.

Sect. 4.Your first Design you say is to prove, that the Consideration of these General Maxims can add nothing to the Evidence or Certainty of Knowledge; [Page 107] which overthrows all that which hath been accounted Science and Demon­stration, and must lay the Foundati­on of Scepticism. Because our true Grounds of Certainty depend upon some general Principle of Reason. To make this plain, I shall put a Case grounded upon your Words, which are, Book 4. ch. 7. Sect. 17. that you have discoursed with ve­ry rational Men, who have actually de­nied that they are Men. These Words, I. S. understands as spoken of them­selves, Solid Philos. asserted Pre­face, Sect. 16. Reflex. 19. p. 378. and charges them with very ill Consequences; but I think they are capable of another meaning: How­ever, let us put the Case that Men did in earnest question, whether they were Men or not; and then I do not see, if you set aside general Maxims, how you can convince them that they are Men. For, the way I look on as most apt to prevail upon such extraordina­ry Sceptical Men, is by general Maxims and Principles of Reason. As in the first place, that Nothing can have no Properties; which I take to be the Fundamental Principle of Certainty, as to real Beings. For, all our inward Perceptions are only of some Acts or [Page 108] Properties, as of Thinking, Doubting, Reasoning, &c. and if a Man proceeds so far as to question every thing, in order to the discovering the true Ground of Certainty, he cannot be satisfied with finding out only some Modes of Being; but that which he aims at is, satisfaction as to his real Existence.

But this wholly depends upon the Truth and Certainty of this Funda­mental Maxim; That Nothing can have no Operations; and therefore, whatever thinks, or doubts, or reasons, must certainly be. And since by another Fundamental Maxim, it is impossible for the same Thing to be and not to be; he cannot entertain any possible doubt of his own Existence.

It may be said, that this reaches only to bare Existence, and not to the Being Men. I answer, that for the Cer­tainty as to that, there are other ge­neral Maxims of necessary Use; As, That all different sorts of Beings are distinguished by Essential Properties; That the Essential Properties of a Man are to Reason, Discourse, &c. That these Properties cannot subsist by themselves [Page 109] without a real Substance: And there­fore, where these Properties are found, those who have them must be real and substantial Men.

You may possibly say, Book 4. ch. 9. Sect. 3. that these Maxims are useless, because you affirm that nothing can be more evident to us, than our own Existence; and that we have an internal infallible Perception that we are.

But I answer, that these Maxims do not at all appear to be useless, be­cause the Certainty we enquire after is a Certainty of Reason, and not of bare Perception. And if it be a Cer­tainty of Reason, some Ground of Reason must be assigned for it: but all that the Perception reaches to, are those Acts mention'd by you. I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain: but the Question goes farther as to the Subject of those Acts, and the Na­ture of that Subject, whether it be a Man or not.

Now here lies the main Difficulty, whether without the help of these Principles you can prove to any that doubt, that they are Men? And I shall now shew, that in your Way of Ideas you cannot. For,

• [Page 110](1) You suppose that we must have a clear distinct Idea of that which we are certain of in the Way of I­deas.
• (2) You deny that we have any such clear and distinct Idea of Man.

1. You suppose, that we must have a clear and distinct Idea of that we are certain of. For in your Chapter of Maxims, Book 4. ch. 7. Sect. 4. you say, that every one knows the Ideas that he has, and that distinctly and unconfusedly one from an­other. Which always being so (I pray mark that, and judge whether you do not make clear and distinct Ideas ne­cessary to Certainty) he can never be in doubt when any Idea is in his mind, that it is there, and is that Idea it is, and that two distinct Ideas when they are in his mind are there, and are not one and the same Idea: From whence you infer the Necessity of Certainty, when the Ideas are clear and distinct. This is so plain and clear, that I wonder how you came to forget it, and to think that I did you wrong when I charged you with holding clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty. But of that in the Beginning of this Discourse.

[Page 111]2. But let us now examine your Idea of Man, whether that be clear and distinct or not; and if not, then according to your Principles very ra­tional Men cannot be certain that they are Men. For if they have no Way of Certainty but by Ideas, and you al­low no clear and distinct Idea of Man, then they can come to no Certainty; and I hope you will not deny them to be very rational Men, if they follow the Way of Ideas.

First, Book 4▪ ch. 7. Sect. 16. you shew, that there can be no Demonstration in the Way of Principles what Man is.

Secondly, Sect. 17. that there are very diffe­rent Ideas of Man, some, you say, make the Idea of a Man without a Soul; as Children do. Others add Laughter and rational Discourse, and these may demonstrate by general Principles that Ideots and Infants are no Men by this Maxim, that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be; and you have discoursed with very rational Men, who have actually denied that they are Men.

Others take in the Idea of Body in general, Sect. 18. and the Powers of Language and Reason, and leave out shape; and [Page 112] so a Man may be a Four-footed Crea­ture, or in whatever Body or Shape he found Speech and Reason joined, that was a Man.

But where is the clear and distinct Idea of a Man all this while? We can have no Certainty by Principles, you say, and you offer none in the Way of Ideas; for the Ideas are very confu­sed, imperfect and repugnant to each other; and so in this new Method of Certainty by Ideas, we cannot be so much as certain that we are Men.

But is it possible to suppose, that a rational Man should talk of Certainty by Ideas, and not be able to fix the Idea of a Man? One would have thought this had been only an Omis­sion in this place out of pure Zeal a­gainst Principles; but certainly in o­ther places this Idea of a Man must be made clear and distinct. So far from it, that in other places, you industriously set your self to disprove the common Idea of a Man. Book 3. ch. 6. Sect. 26. It could not possibly be, say you, that the abstract Idea to which the Name Man is given, should be dif­ferent in several Men, if it were of Na­tures making; and that to one it should be animal rationale; to another animal [Page 113] implume bipes latis unguibus. From whence it is plain, that you allow no clear and distinct Idea of Man; and you endeavour to expose the sacred Definition, as you call it, of animal ra­tionale; which was never exposed by any Man without Cause. But you conclude, Sect. 17▪ That we are far from know­ing certainly what Man is; though per­haps it will be judged great Ignorance to doubt about it. And yet you think you may say, That the certain Bounda­ries of that Species are so far from be­ing determined, and the precise Num­ber of simple Ideas, which make that nominal Essence so far from being setled and perfectly known, that very material Doubts may still arise about it. So that I begin to think I. S. was in the right, when he made you say, That you had discoursed with very rational Men who denied themselves to be Men. But this is a little too hard to deny them­selves to be Men. If it had been only, who doubted whether they were Men or not; you could not deny them to be very rational Men, because they went upon your Grounds, that we can have no Certainty either by Principles, or [Page 114] by any clear and distinct Ideas, what a Man is.

Thus I have shew'd how inconsi­stent your way of Ideas is with true Certainty; and of what Use and Ne­cessity these general Principles of Rea­son are.

I now come to the Certainty of Rea­son in making Deductions. And here I shall briefly lay down the Grounds of Certainty, which the Ancient Philoso­phers went upon, and then compare your way of Ideas with them.

Aristot. Me­taph. l. 5. Aristotle observes, that Socrates first brought in Definitions and Inductions in order to Certainty; and went no far­ther. Plato allowed no Certainty, but only Opinion, as to External Objects; but he said▪ that Certainty depended upon abstract and separate Ideas, which were always the same. This he took, Answer to the first Lett. p. 32. (as I observed in my former Letter) from the Pythagoreans, only changing Numbers into Ideas. For by Numbers, they understood first Princi­ples, not gross and material; but im­material and eternal, Iambl. in Ni­com. p. 5. as Iamblichus saith; and therefore Moderatus Gadi­tanus, one of the most understanding [Page 115] Men among them saith, the Pythago­reans brought in Numbers, Porph vit. Pythag. [...], for a more decent Way of Instruction, following the Practice of Geometricians, who make use of Figures to represent things to the Mind; and therefore their Doctrine of Numbers was the Philosophy of Principles, or the general Grounds of Certainty; but this was so abstruse and so little understood, that it soon lost its Re­putation, as Porphyry observes, or was mixed with Plantonism; and there­fore Photinus joins the Pythagorean and Platonick Principles together. But Aristotle was a great Enemy to these abstracted Speculations, and therefore set himself so much on all occasions against Ideas and Numbers, especially in his Metaphysicks. Metaphys. l. 7. c. 15, 16. l. 12▪ c. 4, 5. But instead there­of, he endeavour'd to bring down Certainty to material Things, and to real Beings. In order to this, he saw it necessary to avoid Confusion, by explaining doubtfull Terms, and by ranking things under several Heads, which he called Categories; wherein all things are reduced to Substance, and Accidents belonging to them; to [Page 116] which he joins some general Discour­ses about the right Apprehension of things simply consider'd. But it is ob­servable, that in all the Categories from Archytas the Pythagorean downwards, (who first placed them in that Or­der,) Substance was first ranked, as the most proper Idea of the Mind, and all Accidents or Modes were consi­der'd with respect to that. And the French Cartesians in their Logick, place Substance as the first Object of their I­deas: and do not leave us a relative Idea, to be supposed only, because Accidents cannot subsist without a Subject. Then follows the Way of understanding the Truth and Falshood of Propositions; after which, he pur­sues the Way of Reasoning, or infer­ring one thing from another, which he calls Syllogizing, wherein he pro­fesses to go upon this common Princi­ple of Reason, That what things do a­gree in a third must agree among them­selves. But being not content with the ordinary Dialectical Way, which proceeded upon the Concessions of the Party, he attempted to bring in true Demonstration. To which he [Page 117] supposes general Axioms necessary, and Definitions, and Postulata: and he distinguishes between a necessary Con­clusion, and a Demonstration; for the former may arise from the manner of reasoning; but a Demonstration sup­poses a necessary Cause, and that the Propositions are such as that the Con­clusion necessarily follows from them. So that Demonstration according to him must be of an inseparable Pro­perty, and by the most immediate and necessary Cause. How far Aristotle's Notion of Demonstration can be appli­ed to Physical matters is not my bu­siness to enquire; it being only to shew what his Method of Certainty was.

But besides Aristotle, the Stoicks took upon them to lay down the true Method of Certainty; and they went another Way to work about it, viz. (1.) By finding out the Criterion of Truth and Falshood. (2.) By exami­ning the Consequences and Deducti­ons of Reason.

As to things which had some De­gree of Evidence to Sense or Reason, they made the Criterion necessary, [Page 118] but for those which had not, but must be proved, the Examination of that Proof was necessary in order to Cer­tainty.

The Criterion was agreed to be [...], the Measure where­by we are to judge of things. But as in the Use of Balances for Weight, there must be one to hold them, and the Balances themselves, and the Position of them; and as in the judg­ing of a Line, whether straight or crooked, there must be the Artificer, the Rule and the Application of it; so in judging of Truth and Falshood, there must be the Faculty of Under­standing as the Artificer, Sense and Reason as the Rule; and the inward Ideas of the Mind, which answer'd to the Position of the Balances, or the Application of the Rule. Now that which they placed their Notion of Certainty in, was that inward and com­prehensive Idea, which was called by them [...]. If it were a weak Assent, they called it Opinion; for they made the Assent vo­luntary, notwithstanding the Criteri­on; but if it were a firm and immove­able [Page 119] Assent, that they called Knowledge and Certainty.

But besides these comprehensive Ide­as they did allow of common Notions, Arrian. l. 1. c. 22. l. 3. c 26. Simplic. in E­pict. c. 33. which they called [...], or Anti­cipations: of which Arrian speaks; and Simplicius saith, they are those where­in all are agreed, and are planted in us by right Reason, and confirmed by Time and Observation.

As to the other Part, they took great pains about the true significati­on of Words, the rank and order of Things, the nature and kind of Pro­positions, and the difference of Signs, whereof some were Monitory, and o­thers Demonstrative. And the proving a thing uncertain, by something gran­ted to be certain, was that which they called Demonstration. According to the Principles of the Eleatick School, the most simple and natural Way of reason­ing was supposed to be by drawing Con­sequences upon Suppositions, and the Way the Stoicks took to judge of reasoning, was by judging what approached near­est to the first Principles of reasoning; such as that every thing we talk about either must be or not be; and in such [Page 120] disjunct Propositions, one Part or o­ther must be taken, and then a Train of Consequences follows.

And Plutarch, no friend to the Sto­icks, thinks this faculty of drawing Consequences, lays the best Foundati­on for Demonstration. For the Princi­ple of it, Plut. de Ei Delph. Sim­plic. in Epict. c. 58. he saith, is the [...], the connex Way of reasoning; that is as Simplicius explains it, when two things are so joyned together as antecedent and consequent, that by Position of the An­tecedent, the Consequent follows, and by taking away the Consequent, the Ante­cedent is removed. Thus I have, in as few Words, as I could, laid together those old Methods of Certainty, which have obtained greatest Reputation in the World.

But your Way of Certainty by Ideas is so wholly New, that here we have no general Principles; no Criterion, no Antecedents and Consequents; no Syl­logistical Methods of Demonstration; and yet we are told of a better Way of Certainty to be attained, meerly by the help of Ideas. But how comes there to be such a Way of Certainty by Ideas, and yet the Ideas themselves [Page 121] are so uncertain and obscure? I confess, that the more I look into it, the far­ther it appears to be from a Way of Certainty to me. Essay, B. 4. ch. 12. Sect. 14. For in your Chap­ter of the Improvement of Knowledge, you have these Words; for it being evident that our Knowledge cannot ex­ceed our Ideas, where they are imper­fect, confused or obscure, we cannot ex­pect to have certain, perfect, or clear Knowledge. And yet how often do you confess, that our Ideas are imper­fect, confused, and obscure? How then is it possible to attain to any Certain­ty by them? And notwithstanding these plain Words, you assert it over and over in your second Letter, as appears in the Beginning, that you do not place Certainty in clear and distinct Ideas, (as I observed in the Begin­ning.) How can these things consist? Can Certainty be had with imperfect and obscure Ideas, and yet no Certain­ty be had by them? I cannot blame you for finding fault with common Principles of Reason, if both Parts of a Contradiction may be true: But I forbear. However I cannot but join other Words of yours to shew how re­solved [Page 122] you were to be inconsistent with your self: Book 4. ch. 2. Sect. 15. But obscure and confu­sed Ideas can never produce any clear or distinct Knowledge; because as far as any Ideas are confused or obscure, so far the Mind can never perceive clearly, whether thy agree or disagree.

And yet in the same Place, you say, that our Knowledge consisting in the Per­ception of the Agreement or Disagree­ment of any two Ideas, its clearness or obscurity consists in the Clearness or Ob­scurity of that Perception, and not in the Clearness or Obscurity of the Ideas themselves. How is it possible for us to have a clear Perception of the Agree­ment of Ideas, if the Ideas themselves be not clear and distinct?

If the Mind can never perceive clearly, the Agreement or Disagreement of obscure and confused Ideas, how can its Knowledge lie in the Perception of that which is not to be perceived?

This is a thing which I cannot make consistent.

But besides, I have another Charge upon your Way of Certainty, viz. that you have no Criterion to distin­guish false and doubtfull Ideas from [Page 123] true and certain; how then can any Man be secure that he is not imposed upon in this Way of Ideas?

The Academicks went too far in the Way to Scepticism, but they differ'd from the Scepticks in two Things. 1. They asserted, that there was no absolute Certainty to be had, which the Scepticks would not. 2. They held a far greater Probability in some things than others, and that Men were bound to follow the greatest Probability in what concern'd their own Welfare: but the Scepticks said, that they would do as others did, or follow Inclination, and the Laws of their Country, but they held no Opi­nion in their Minds, as they said.

The Academicks went much upon Ideas, or Representations of things to their Minds, but they did not pro­ceed upon every Idea, but they exa­min'd and weighed all the Circum­stances belonging to it, before they allow'd it to prevail upon them to give an Assent as to a greater Proba­bility. Carneades, one of the subtilest of them, Sext. Empiric. advers. Ma­them. l. 7. as appears by Sextus Empiri­cus, distinguished a three-fold Idea.

[Page 124]1. [...] a probable Idea; which the Academicks called [...]. For, said he, neither that which appears false of it self; nor that which is true, but doth not ap­pear so, can perswade a Man's Mind. And of those things which do ap­pear to be true, some have a very slender Appearance, others have a mighty strong one, and therein he placed his Criterion.

2. [...], an undi­stracted Idea; i. e. when no Circum­stances disturb or shake the first Im­pression, so as to make us question the Truth of it; which Sextus Empi­ricus calls [...], a Con­currence of Ideas and none disagree­ing, and yet he would not allow this to be a Ground of certainty but only of Probability.

3. [...], a well exa­min'd Idea, by the best Reason a Man hath and the greatest Application of Mind. And this was the Foundation of the highest Probability a Man's Mind could reach to. Now to ap­ply this to your Case; You tell us of a Way of Certainty by Ideas, and ne­ver [Page 125] offer any such Method for Exa­mining them, as the Academicks re­quired for their Probability. As for instance, Your first Idea which you go upon, Essay, B. 2. ch. 4. is that of Solidity, which, you say, of all others seems the most intimately connected with and essential to Body: And therefore must be of great Moment. Sect. 5. Solidity, you say, consists in Repletion and Resistence; and by this Idea of Solidity the Extension of Body, you say, is distinguished from that of Space; so that of pure Space and Solidity you have clear and di­stinct Ideas. Now here in the Way of Certainty I have two Questions to ask. 1. How this Idea comes to be clear and distinct to you, when others who go in the same Way of Ideas have quite another Idea of it, and think they have as plain and di­stinct an Idea that the Extension of Space and Body are the Same? Now, what Criterion is there to come to a­ny Certainty in this Matter? I see none so much as offer'd, but only that they seem to you to be clear and distinct, but to others the contrary. So that here we are at a loss as to a­ny [Page 126] Certainty in the Way of Ideas. And the blind Man who fansied the I­dea of Scarlet to be like the sound of a Trumpet, could hardly be convinced of his Error in the Way of Ideas. This you mention to shew the diffe­rent Ideas men may fall into; which I think is enough to shew that they have no Way to Certainty in them­selves, if it be possible for Men, even for Philosophical and Rational Men, to fall into such contrary Ideas about the same thing; and both sides think their Ideas clear and distinct. 2. But I have another Question to propose; viz. Whether by this Idea of Solidity we may come to know what it is? This is a very reasonable Question in the Way of Certainty, which is to lead us to the certain knowledge of Things. I pray therefore tell me from your Idea, what it is, and where­in it consists? The Question you sup­pose might be very well asked; and you give a most satisfactory Answer to it. Sect. 6. If any ask me what this Solidity is, I send him to his Senses to inform him. I had thought by the Design of your Book you would have sent him to his [Page 127] Ideas for Certainty; and are we sent back again from our Ideas to our Senses? What do these Ideas signifie then? But you say farther; That if this be not a sufficient Explication of Solidity, you promise to tell him what it is, when he tells you, what Thinking is, or explains to you what Extension and Motion are. Are we not now in the true Way of Certainty; when such things as these are given over, of which we have the clearest Evidence by Sensation and Reflection? For here you make it as impossible to come to certain, clear and distinct Notions of these things, as to discourse into a blind Man the Ideas of Light and Colours. Is not this a rare way of Certain­ty?

Thus I have shewed that you have no Security against false and uncer­tain Ideas, no Criterion to judge them by; no Light into the Nature of Things by them, as will farther appear by what you say of the Ideas of sensible Qualities. To discover, Book II. ch. 8. Sect. 7. say you, the Nature of our Ideas the bet­ter, and to discourse of them intelligi­bly, it will be convenient to distinguish [Page 128] them, as they are Ideas or Perceptions in our Minds; and as they are Modifi­cations of Matter in the Bodies that cause such Perceptions in us: that so we may not think (as perhaps is usually done) that they are exactly the Images and Resemblances of something inhe­rent in the Subject: most of those of Sensation being in the Mind no more the likeness of something existing with­out us, than the Names that stand for them are the likeness of our Ideas, which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite in us. Now here again our I­deas deceive us, in the Way of Cer­tainty. We desire to know some­thing of the Nature of those Objects of which we have the Ideas in our Minds, because these we are told, will bring us to a Certainty of Know­ledge. Of what? Of what we feel? No certainly, but of that which causes these inward Perceptions. Can we then by these Ideas know the Na­ture of things without us? No, you say we cannot; for most of those of Sensation are no more the likeness of something without us, than Names are for things which they stand for. So that [Page 129] these Ideas are really nothing but Names, if they be not Representati­ons of Things; and if they be not, how can we understand Things by them; and if we cannot, what Cer­tainty is attainable by them?

But I will do you no wrong; and therefore I must consider what you say about Demonstration: For it can­not be denied that you own the thing, although you deny it to be ex proe­cognitis & proeconcessis, B. IV. ch 2. Sect. 8. and say, it is a mistake that they are supposed to be the Foundations of all our Knowledge and Reasonings. We must therefore Examine your Way of Demonstration without Principles.

Certainty, Sect. 12. you say, depends so whol­ly on Intuition, that in Demonstrative Knowledge, this Intuition is necessary in all the Connexion of the Intermediate Ideas, without which we cannot attain Knowledge or Certainty. By Intuition you mean Self-Evidence. For you say, in this the Mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the Truth as the Eye doth Light only by being directed towards it. For hence you must suppose Self Evidence [Page 130] to be in the Ideas of your Mind; and that every Intermediate Idea which you take to demonstrate any thing by, must have a Self-Evident Connexion with the other Idea: which is such a way of Demonstration, as the old Philosophers never thought of. For upon this Ground every De­monstration carries its own Light with it; and can no more be questi­oned, than whether two and two make four; and I would be glad to see any Demonstration (not about Fi­gures and Numbers) of this kind, which I think is not to be expected in the Way of Ideas. But because in this lies the chief Point as to a Way of Certainty by Ideas, I shall more carefully examine the Grounds you proceed upon, and shew them to be very Insufficient for the purpose you intend them.

Your principal Ground is from Mathematical Demonstrations, and your Examples are brought from them. But his is quite a different Case from yours. For you grant, that those I­deas on which Mathematical Demon­strations proceed, are wholly in the [Page 131] Mind, and do not relate to the Exi­stence of Things; but our Debate goes upon a Certainty of the Knowledge of Things as really existing; so that, al­though we should grant all that you say, about the Intuition of Ideas in Mathematical Demonstrations, yet it comes not at all to your Business, unless you can prove that we have as clear and distinct Ideas of Beings, as we have of Numbers and Figures. And yet herein you are not consistent with your self; for you design to prove Demonstrations without General Prin­ciples; and yet every one knows, that General Principles are supposed in Ma­thematicks, and that Person would be thought Ridiculous, who should go a­bout to prove, that General Principles are of little, or of dangerous use in Mathematical Demonstrations. And so in Morality, which you place among the Sciences capable of Demonstration; you confess, B. IV. ch. 3. Sect. 18. That the Way of Demon­stration therein is from Principles, as those of the Mathematicks, by necessa­ry Consequences. This is a very in­telligible Way of Demonstration: But how then comes it to pass, that in the [Page 132] Way of Certainty by Ideas as to other Points of Knowledge, Ch. 7. Sect. 10. you deny gene­ral Maxims to be the Foundation we are to proceed upon? And the Method you lay down, Sect. 9. is this, that Ideas of particular things are first in the mind, which are first received and distin­guished, and so Knowledge got by them; but general Ideas are Fictions and Con­trivances of the Mind, Sect. 10. which carry Dif­ficulty with them; but that it is true of our particular distinct Ideas, that they are all known by their Native evidence, are wholly independent, receive no Light, nor are capable of Proof one from an­other; much less the more particular from the more general, or the more sim­ple from the more compounded, the more simple and less Abstract being the most familiar, and the easier and earlier ap­prehended. But which ever be the clearest Ideas, the Evidence and Cer­tainty of all such Propositions is in this, that a Man sees the same Idea to be the same Idea, and infallibly perceives two different Ideas to be two different Ideas. For when a Man has in his Vnderstand­ing the Ideas of One and of Two, the Idea of Yellow and of Blue, he cannot [Page 133] but certainly know, that this Idea of One is the Idea of One, and not the Idea of Two; and that the Idea of Yellow is the Idea of Yellow, and not of Blue. For a Man cannot confound the Ideas in his Mind, which he has distinct; that would be to have them confused and di­stinct at the same time, which is a Con­tradiction: and to have none distinct is to have no use of our Faculties, to have no knowledge at all. And therefore, what Idea soever is affirmed of it self; or whatsoever two entire distinct Ideas are denied one of another, the Mind cannot but assent to such a Proposition, as infallibly true, assoon as it under­stands the Terms without Hesitation, or need of Proof, or regarding those made in more general Terms, and called Max­ims. These are your own Words, which I have set down at large, that you may not complain that I misrepresent your Sense. And if I understand the force of them, you take off the Way of Demonstration from general Princi­ples and Consequences deduced from them, and place it in the Self-evidence of Ideas.

[Page 134]But that it is impossible to come to a Demonstration about real Beings, in this Way of Intuition of Ideas, I shall now make appear from your self, which will farther discover the Inconsistency of your Notion of Ideas.

And the Reasons I go upon are these;

• 1. That you confess, that some of the most obvious Ideas are far from being Self-evident.
• 2. That there may be contradicto­ry Opinions about some Ideas, which you account most clear and distinct.
• 3. That granting the Ideas to be true, there is no Self-evidence of the Connexion of them, which is necessary to make a Demonstration.

1. That some of the most obvious Ideas, are far from being Self-evident by your own Confession. Among these you cannot deny those of Mat­ter and Motion, of Time and Duration, and of Light, to be very considerable. But I shall prove from your self, that we can have no Intuition of these things, which are so obvious to us; and consequently can have no Self-evident Ideas of them.

[Page 135]As to the Idea of Matter: That you tell us, Book 3. ch. 10. Sect. 15. consists in a solid Substance every where the same; and a Body is a solid extended figured Substance.

Now there are two things concer­ning Matter, which I would be glad to come to a certain Knowledge of. And those are,

1. The Manner of Cohesion of the Parts of Matter, concerning which you have these Words. Book 2. ch. 23. Sect. 24. For since no Body is no farther, nor otherwise exten­ded, than by the Vnion and Cohesion of its solid Parts, we shall very ill compre­hend the Extension of Body, without un­derstanding, wherein consists the Vnion and Cohesion of its Parts, which seems to me as incomprehensible as the Manner of Thinking, and how it is performed. I would have any one intelligibly explain to me, Sect. 25. how the Parts of Gold or Brass (that but now in fusion were as loose from one another, as the Particles of Water, or the Sands of an Hour-glass) come in a few Moments to be so united, and adhere so strongly one to another, that the utmost force of Men's Arms cannot separate them. A considering Man will I suppose be here at a loss, to [Page 136] satisfie his own or another Man's Vnder­standing. And can you then imagine that we have Intuition into the Idea of Matter? Or that it is possible to come to a Demonstration about it by the help of any intervening Idea? The Idea of Solidity, or firm Cohesi­on of Parts cannot be said to come from the Idea of Matter it self, for then there could be no such thing as fluid Matter. Whence then comes the distinction between these Ideas of solid and fluid Matter? That there is such a Cohesion of the solid Parts of Matter is evident: now what other Ideas do you compare and connect with this to make it evident, how this Solidity and Matter came to have this Agreement with each other?

Is it by the Density or Compacted­ness of the Matter in a little Compass? But that is as hard to give an account of; viz. how some Parts of Matter come to take up so much less Room, and to stick closer than others. Is it by bare Rest of the Parts? But how comes the Resistance of solid Bodies to come only from Rest? Is it from the Pressure of the Ambient Air? No you [Page 137] say, Book 2. ch. 23. Sect. 24. that in Truth the Pressure of an ambient Fluid how great soever, can be no intelligible Cause of the Cohesion of the solid Parts of Matter. So that we are not to look for any thing like a Demonstration of the Cohesion of the Parts of Matter.

2. And as little are we to expect it, as to the Divisibility of it; which was the other thing I hoped to find de­monstrated in the Way of Ideas. For you tell us, Ch. 23. Sect. 31. that the Notion of Body is cumbred with some Difficulties which are very hard, and perhaps impossible to be explained, or understood by us. And among these you particularly instance in the Divisibility of Matter; which you say, whether we grant or deny it to be in infinitum, it involves us in Consequences, impossible to be explica­ted or made consistent. Consequences that carry greater Difficulty, and more apparent Absurdity than any thing can follow from the Notion of an immaterial knowing Substance. So that I think it is vain to expect a Demonstration in the Way of Ideas as to this Matter.

The next is that of Motion. Con­cerning which you tell us, that the [Page 138] Definition of the Schools is exquisite Iar­gon: Book 3. ch. 4. Sect. 8. Sect. 9. That of the Atomists is but put­ting one Synonymous Word for another; viz. that Motion is a Passage from one Place to another: for Passage may as well be defined a Motion from one Place to another. And the Cartesian Definiti­on, that it is the successive Application of the Parts of the Superficies of one Body to those of another, will not prove a much better Definition of Motion when well examin'd. And what is there so evident as Motion? So that if our I­deas fail us in so plain a Case, what help can we hope from them in things more abstruse and remote from our Senses?

As to Time and Duration, you say, that the Answer of a great Man (to one who asked what Time was, Book 2. ch. 14. Sect. 2. Si non rogas, intelligo, which amounts to this, the more I set my self to consider it, the less I understand it) might perhaps per­swade one, that Time, which reveals all other things, is it self not to be discover'd. This shews, that there is no Self-evi­dent Idea of Time. But here you of­fer to furnish us with as clear and di­stinct Ideas, as of many other which [Page 139] are thought much less obscure. How­ever, then it is plain, that we have not the Knowledge by Intuition, but by rational Deduction. For you proceed from the Idea of Succession, Sect. 32. to that of Duration; by observing a Distance in the Parts of Succession; and then from observing Periodical Motions, we get Ideas of the Measures of Duration, as Minutes, Hours, Days, Years, &c. From hence we proceed to imagine Duration not yet come; and such to which we can al­ways add; from which comes the Idea of Eternity: and by considering any Part of Duration with Periodical Measures, we come to the Idea of what we call Time in general. So that the Idea of Time in general is so far from being known by Intuition, that many Steps are to be taken in order to it; and some such as one would hardly have thought of. As how the Idea of Succession should arise from a Train of Ideas in our Minds: Sect. 4. You say it is, because we have no Perception of Duration, but by con­sidering the Train of Ideas, that take their Turns in our Vnderstandings.

What think you of those People that fail'd not in reckoning the Suc­cession [Page 140] of Time right for many Years to­gether by Knots, and Notches on Sticks, and Figures, without ever so much as thinking of Ideas, or any thing like them? But besides, such Arbitrary Measures of Time, what need any Recourse to Ideas, when the Returns of Days and Months and Years by the Planetary Motions, are so easie and so universal? If a Man hath no Per­ception of Duration when he sleeps, yet the Time runs on, and Nights have as much their share in Successi­on as Days have. And although, you say, it seems very clear to you, that Men derive their Ideas of Duration from their Reflection on the Train of the Ideas they observe to succeed one an­other, yet I think the contrary so clear, that Men may have a clear I­dea of Succession without it, that I ra­ther wonder how you came to think of this Way. But it is sufficient to my purpose, that you could never know this Idea of Time by Self-evi­dence.

The last I shall mention is Light, and one would think, if any Idea be Self-evident, it should be that. But [Page 141] let us see what you say about it; you explode the Peripatetick Definition of it as unintelligible; Book 3. ch. 4. Sect. 10. and the Cartesian you allow to be but little better. For when they make it to be a Number of little Globules striking briskly on the bottom of the Eye, you say, to a Man that understands it not before, these Words would make the Idea of Light no more known to him, than if one should tell him, that Light was nothing but a Company of little Tennis-balls, which Fairies all day long strook with Rackets against some Men's Foreheads while they pass by others. And is this a Self-evi­dent Idea of Light? Thus we have seen what Account your self have gi­ven of these Self-evident Ideas, which are the ground Work of Demonstra­tion.

2. But suppose an Idea happen to be thought by some to be clear and distinct, and others should think the contrary to be so, what hopes of De­monstration by clear and distinct Ideas then? As suppose a Man entertain Des Cartes his Idea of Space, as the same with Body, or extended Matter, which he affirms to be clear and distinct; the [Page 142] Consequence from hence is, as your self confess, Book 4. ch. 7. Sect. 12. that he may from thence demonstrate that there can be no Vacu­um: but again, let us suppose another to have a clear and distinct Idea of Space from Body, this Man, you say, may demonstrate as easily that there may be a Vacuum, or Space without a Body, as Des Cartes demonstrated the Contrary. Say you so? What! De­monstrations on both sides, and in the Way of Ideas too? This is extraordi­nary indeed. But if we may be al­low'd the Use of common Principles, we may be sure, that both Parts of a Contradiction cannot be true, and therefore there must be a fundamen­tal Mistake some where. You say, it is in wrong Application of that general Maxim, What is, is. But there is no fault in the Principle, which is the true meaning of the other; that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, which undoubtedly holds true; but it is in supposing the Rea­lity of the thing to be according to what you call a clear and distinct Idea. So that the general Principles of Rea­son stand firm and good; but your [Page 143] Self-evidence of clear and distinct Ideas is such a Principle, we see, as serves for Demonstrations of both Parts of a Contradiction.

3. But granting the Ideas to be true, yet when their Connexion is not Self-evident, then an intermediate Idea must complete the Demonstration. But how doth it appear that this middle Idea is Self-evidently connected with them? Book 4. ch. 2. Sect. 7. For you say, if that interme­diate Idea be not known by Intuition, that must need a Proof; and so there can be no Demonstration. Which I am very apt to believe in this Way of I­deas; unless these Ideas get more light by being put between two others. This will best appear by a remarkable In­stance already mention'd, viz. in the Ideas of Space and Body; the Que­stion supposed is, whether they be the same or not; some we see affirm it, and others deny it. So that here we must use an intermediate Idea, and that is of Motion, and we are to consider whether this hath a Self-evident Connexion, with the o­ther Ideas? The Motion of Bodies, you say, Essay, B. 2. ch. 13. Sect. 22. that are in our view and neighbour­hood, [Page 144] seems to you plainly to evince a Vacuum. But how? Is it by Intuiti­on or Self-evidence? No, you do not pretend to it. But by Reason: Be­cause there must be a void Space equal to the Bulk of that Body, which moves within the Bounds of such a Superficies. And if there be a Space without Body there must be a Vacuum. But Gassendus attempted to prove Motion impossi­ble, if there were no Vacuum: For every Body must go into the Place of another, and so in insinitum; which he said was ridiculous and impossi­ble.

The Cartesians answer'd, that the Mo­tion was Circular. Gassendus urged, that still it was impossible: For suppose A the first Body, and X the last; A can­not move, unless X can be moved: but X cannot move, because the Place is filled with A.

The Cartesians say, this proves no­thing, because in the same instant, that X goes into the Places of A, that gives way. Joh. Bapt. Mo­rini Dissert. de Atomis & vacuo, p. 14. Ioh. Bapt. Morinus (Pro­fessor of the Mathematicks at Paris, at the same time with Gassendus) an­swers to Gassendus his Argument, that [Page 145] the Separation of two Bodies and Suc­cession are at the same time; and so there can be no Vacuum.

Bernier defends Gassendus his Argu­ment, Bernier Favil­la Ridiculi Muris, p. 99. and saith, that no Motion can be­gin without a Vacuum; but other Phi­losophers and Mathematicians as stifly deny it. And is it possible to imagine, that there should be a Self-evident Connexion of Ideas in this Case?

But what hath Reason now to do in this Way of Intuition? Yes, say you, Reason is to discover the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas. Sect. 2. But this is no­thing but an imploying the Faculty of Reason in such a manner: And so in the Beginning of your Chapter of Reason, Ch. 17. Sect. [...] you tell us, that it is sometimes taken for true and clear Principles, and sometimes for clear and fair Deductions from those Principles; but you take it for a saculty in Man. But why, in a Chapter of Reason, are the other two Senses neglected? We might have ex­pected here full Satisfaction as to the Principles of Reason as distinct from the faculty, but you wholly avoid it; Sect. 2. and only shew how it is used in find­ing out the certain Connexion of Ideas [Page 146] in Demonstration; and the probable Connexion in other things. So that the Difference lies between us, as to this Matter of Reason, in these two things.

• (1.) You affirm, that general Prin­ciples and Maxims of Reason are of lit­tle, or no Vse; I say that they are of very great use, and the only proper Foundations of Certainty.
• (2.) You say, that Demonstration is by Way of Intuition of Ideas, and that Reason is only the faculty imploy'd in discovering and comparing Ideas with themselves, or with others intervening; and that this is the only Way of Certainty.

I affirm, and have proved, that there can be no Demonstration by Intuition of Ideas; but that all the Certainty we can attain to, is from general Princi­ples of Reason, and necessary Deducti­ons made from them.

But before I conclude this Dis­course, I must observe that you prove that Demonstration must be by Intui­tion, in an extraordinary Manner, from the sense of the Word. For you say, it is called Demonstration, Essay, B. 4. ch. 2. Sect. 3. it being shewn to the Vnderstanding, and the Mind made see, that it is so. I have told [Page 147] you formerly, how very uncertain a Way of Arguing it is, which is taken from the Original signification of Words; and if it would hold in this Case, it would be most proper for Ocular Demonstrations, or by the Fin­ger. But in the Philosophical sense of the Word, Demonstration was never taken for Intuition, or the knowing of a thing by its Self-evidence. But you assert the Necessity of intuitive Know­ledge, Sect. 7, 8. in every Step of a Demonstration. Whereas, Aristot. Me­taph. l. 4. c. 4. Aristotle saith, things that are Self-evident cannot be demonstra­ted; and that it is Weakness and Folly not to know what things are capable of Demonstration, and what not.

It seems there were some Philoso­phers, who would have first Princi­ples demonstrated; This, saith Aristo­tle cannot be done without running in infinitum, which is absurd. Whence it is plain, that Demonstration was sup­posed to lie in some antecedent Proof; and where any thing was Self-evident it was absurd to look for it: So that the Way of Intuition and Demonstrati­on, were thought inconsistent. For what a Man sees by its own Light, he [Page 148] needs no Proof of. But you say, that in a Demonstration the intervenient Ideas are called Proofs; Sect. 3. and where by the help of these the Agreement or Disagreement is plainly perceived, that is Demonstra­tion: Sect. 7. And that in every step there is an intuitive Knowledge of the Agreement or Disagreement it seeks with the next in­termediate Idea, which it uses as a Proof; for, if it were not so, that would need a Proof. So that according to your Method of Demonstration, that which is used as a Proof must need no Proof, but must be known by imme­diate Intuition. Of which kind of De­monstration, I would fain see any one instance in the Knowledge of Things, and not in abstracted and mathemati­cal Demonstrations. For it may be, it hath been the occasion of some great Mistakes in the Philosophy of this Age, that ingenious and mathe­matical Men have labour'd so much to accommodate the Principles of that Science to the Nature of material Things; of which we have a remark­able Instance in the System of Des Cartes. And supposing we could come to a Certainty about the Nature and [Page 149] Tendency of Bodies here within our Reach, (I mean with respect to the Earth) I do not know, how far the greatest Mathematician can proceed in making Demonstrations as to the Nature and Tendency of those Bodies which are so much out of our Reach, as the Heavenly Bodies are, both in themselves and with respect to one another. For, if the Phaenomena de­pend upon a force given them by the Great and Wise Creator, how can we know in what Manner or Degree that force is given to Bodies at such a wonderfull Distance from us, as the fixed Stars are? For, if God can al­ter the Laws of Motion in another System, as it is not denied; how can we be Mathematically certain, that the Laws of Motion in Bodies, so much above us, are the very same that we find them here? I do not by any means take off from the laudable Endeavours of those who have gone about to reduce natural Speculations to mathematical Certainty: but I mention it to shew, that it is a very easie way for thinking Men to deceive themselves, in talking so much of [Page 150] demonstrative Certainty about natural Things, when all their Instances are brought from Mathematical Demonstra­tions. Aristotle, Arist. de Part. Anim. l. 1. c. 1. whom I cannot de­spise so much as some do (I do not say for want of reading him) hath a Discourse on purpose in the Beginning of his Books of Animals, in what way na­tural Things are to be handled; and he saith, there are two ways. 1. By way of Science. 2. By way of Instruction, which must be suitable to the Nature of the things. So that in natural History he saith, there must be certain bounds set for Enquiry, without proceeding to strict Demonstration. And, saith he, the Man­ner of Demonstration as to natural Things, is different from what it is in specula­tive or mathematical Things. In an­other Place he laments the want of Experiments as to natural History, (al­though he made far more than any be­fore him, and was better able to do it by the plentifull Assistance of Philip and Alexander, while he lived at Court) and he looks on that as the best way of satisfying our Reason about such things; [...] Gen. A­ [...] l. 3. c. 10. and our Reasons, saith he, are then good, when they agree with the Phaenomena.

[Page 151]And he was so far from thinking he had made Demonstrations in Phy­sicks, that in one Place he saith, De Meteor. l. 1. c. 7. that in things not evident to Sense, he thought it sufficient to shew the Possibility of it; and therefore he ought not to be run down for his Modesty; however his physical Notions fall far short of De­monstrations.

In his Morals, Moral. Magn. l. 1. c. 1. he saith, all Princi­ples must be suitable to the Nature of the Science; for it would be absurd for a Man to go about to prove the three Angles of a Triangle, equal to two right Angles; and take this for his Principle, That the Soul is immortal. For the Proof must be proper and connected with it. And from hence he excludes Pla­to's Idea, from being a Principle in Morals.

In his Eudemia, Eudem. l 1. c. 6. the Way of Procee­ding in Morals, he saith, is by Reasons, Testimonies, and Examples; and he looks on it as great want of Iudgment for Men not to consider what Reasons are proper for every Science. So that ac­cording to him, Morality is not unca­pable of Demonstration; so it be up­on Moral Principles: For that he lays [Page 152] down in the Beginning of his Ethicks, and afterwards that the same Exactness is not to be required in all sorts of Rea­soning: Ethic ad Ni­com l. 1. c. 1, 7. l. 2. c. 2. but that it ought to be suitable to the Matter it is about. [...].

If therefore the Principles in Mora­lity be clear and proper, and the De­ductions be plain and natural, I do not see, but that it is as capable of Demonstration as any other Science; if Men were as willing to be convinced in Morals, as they are in Mathematicks. And therein I fully agree with you: But the Way of Demonstration by Ideas will not do, either there or any where else. I mean by this intuitive Know­ledge in every Step of the Demonstrati­on: when the intervening Ideas are far from being capable of this intuitive Certainty.

And as to your Argument from the Notation of the Word, it is certain, that after the Philosophical Use of it, it signified no more among some Phi­losophers, than the Conclusion of an Ar­gument; whereby we are brought from something we did perceive, to somethiug we did not.

[Page 153]Not by Way of Intuition, but by a Deduction of Reason. Itaque Ar­gumenti Con­clusio quae est Graecè [...] ità de­finitur; Ratio quae ex rebus perceptis ad id quod non per­cipiebatur adducit. Cicero in Lucullo, c. 8. [...], Plato in Phaedro. V. Dialect. Ciceron. Adam Bu [...]sii, l. 6. c. 10. And Plato makes use of the Word Demonstration in his Phoedrus, for such a Reason which wise Men would believe, and others would not. But there could be no intuitive Certainty in such a Demonstration.

I have been longer a clearing this Matter than I thought I should have been; but it is the main Point as to Certainty by Ideas, and what remains will admit of an easier Dispatch. I now return to the Difference between Nature and Person; and I shall only single out what is material and perti­nent; and now leave the interlocu­tory Gentlemen to maintain their Conversation by themselves.

I had said in my Vindication,

Which to my understanding is plain and clear Reason. And if so, then here we have an Identity of Na­ture, and a Distinction of Persons in the same Nature.

But to this you object these three Things:

• P. 127.
  (1.) That you cannot put together one and the same, and distinct; and con­sequently there is no Foundation for the Distinction of Nature and Person.
• P. 131, 132.134.138, &c.
  (2.) That what I say about common Nature, and particular Subsistence and Individuals, is wholly unintelligible to you and your Friends.
• P. 154.
  (3.) That to speak truly and precise­ly of this Matter, as in reality it is, there is no such thing as one common Na­ture in several Individuals; for all that is Truth in them is particular, and can be nothing but particular. But the [Page 155] meaning is, that every particular indi­vidual Man or Horse, &c. has such a Nature or Constitution as agrees, and is conformable to that Idea which that ge­neral Name stands for.

This is the Substance of what I can gather out of your Discourse in several Pages, but as to the general Reflections I pass them over, having no other Design, but to set Truth in as good a Light as I can. And if I have the Misfortune not to be under­stood, I cannot help it; I wish it were in my Power to help other Men's Ca­pacities as well as to help my own.

But you say, P. 144. the Notionists and Ide­ists, (as they are called) seem to have their apprehensive Faculties very differently turned? I do not think, that there is any different Turn in their Fa­culties; but there may be a very wrong Turn in the Method of Reason­ing in those, who go in this Way of Ideas, from what there is in those who pursue the general Principles of Reason, and from thence draw parti­cular Conclusions.

If any Man takes it for granted, that your Way of Ideas is the only Way to [Page 156] Certainty (and he must take it for granted, if he will believe it) then I cannot see how he can apprehend one and the same common Nature in dif­ferent Persons or Individuals, because all his Ideas are taken from Particu­lars; and therefore a common Nature is no more but one common Name; and every Individual is consider'd as rank­ed under those Names. But herein lies the fundamental Mistake, that you presume that we are not to judge of things by the general Principles of Rea­son, but by particular Ideas. For if Men set aside this new Way of Judg­ing only by these Ideas; things would appear in another Light to them: But I find it is to very little purpose to argue with such Men, who are re­solved to stick to this Way of Ideas; For they can apprehend nothing but just in their own Way. And let us say what we will, it is jargon, and unintelligible to them; although very rational Men have said the same things that we do, and have been thought by the rest of Mankind to have spoken intelligibly. But now it seems nothing is intelligible, but what [Page 157] suits with this new Way of Ideas, how­ever repugnant it be to the common Principles of Reason; which must be the Standard to Mankind, whatever becomes of this Way of Ideas.

And therefore in this Debate, I shall proceed upon these Principles of Rea­son, which have been receiv'd among Mankind; and from them I hope to make it appear, that the Difference of Nature and Person is not imaginary and fictitious, but grounded upon the real Nature of things.

The Principles of Reason, which I go upon are these;

• 1. That Nothing hath no Proper­ties.
• 2. That all Properties being only Modes or Accidents must have a real Subject to subsist in.
• 3. That Properties essentially diffe­rent, must subsist in different Essen­ces.
• 4. That where there is an Agree­ment in essential Properties and a Dif­ference in Individual, there must be both an Identity and Diversity in se­veral Respects.

[Page 158]Now upon these Principles I build my Assertion, that there is one real and common Nature or Essence in Mankind, and a Difference of Persons in the several Individuals. For, that there are such essential Properties in Mankind which are not in Brutes, I suppose you will not deny. Now these essential Properties must subsist somewhere; For Nothing can have no Properties, and these Properties cannot subsist (where Individuals are multiplied) in any one Individual: For that is to exclude all the rest from the essential Properties which belong to them; and if they have them in common, there must be some com­mon Subject wherein they subsist, and that can be nothing but the common Essence of Mankind. For the Essence of Brutes or Plants have them not; and therefore these Essences must be really different from one another.

But because Individuals of the same kind, have something to distinguish, as well as to unite them, therefore there must be a different Subsistence in every Individual: and so one and the same, and yet distinct, may very [Page 159] easily and intelligibly consist toge­ther.

But you say, P. 131. I have not told you what Nature is; I think my Discourse sufficiently shew'd it, if you had a mind to understand it; for you could not but see that I meant the Subject of the essential Properties, whether you call it Nature, Substance, or Essence. Your Objection about Nature and Sub­stance being of equal Extent, I hope, I have sufficiently removed in the foregoing Discourse.

You tell me, P. 132. that it is more than you know, that the Nature of a Man is equal in Peter, James and John. I am sorry for it. For I thought you had Ideas of particular Substances. But they may be Drills or Horses for any thing you know. I am again sorry, that you know particular Men no better; but that for ought you know, they may be Drills or Horses.

But you know a Horse that was called Peter, P. 133. and you do not know but the Ma­ster of the same Team might call other of his Horses, James and John. Sup­pose all this. And could you not in the Way of Ideas distinguish them from [Page 160] those of your Acquaintance who had the same Names? I confess, this tempts me to think that Ideists (as you call them) have a particular Turn of their understandings about these Matters. For I cannot but think, that those who were not very rational Men, might understand the Difference be­tween Men and Horses; without be­ing told, that although Horses might be called by their Names; yet that these were real Men, and their Consti­tution and Nature was conformable to that Idea, which the general Name Man stands for. But this is no more than to say, that he that has the Nature of a Man is a Man, or what has the Nature of a Drill is a Drill; and what has the Nature of a Horse is a Horse; whether it be called Peter, or not called Peter. If this were really the Discourse of your Friends in private Conversation, you have been very obliging to them to publish it to the World: For Man­kind are not so stupid, as not to know a Man from a Horse or a Drill, but only by the Specifick Name of Man. You may have a Horse called Peter if you please, and another Iames, and [Page 161] a third Iohn; but for all that, there is no one that hath the Understanding of a Man, but will be able without your Specifick Names to tell the Difference of your Horse Peter from your Man Peter; and call them by what Names you please the Difference will not depend up­on them, but upon the Essential Proper­ties which belong to them; and so it will be owned by all that have not this New turn of their Vnderstandings. But I plainly see, that a new Notion when it hath got deep into a Man's Head doth give a strange Turn to his Understand­ing; so that he cannot see that, which every one else can, that hath not the same Tincture upon his Mind. And I remember an Observation of yours, B. II. ch 11. Sect. 13. How dangerous it is to a Man's Reason to fix his Fancy long upon one sort of Thoughts. These Ideas are a very odd sort of Specta­cles to our Understandings, if they make them see and understand less, than People of very, ordinary Capacities do. For even the Man who had the Horse with the Name Peter, and might have others by the Names of James and John, would not a little wonder at a grave Philosopher that should seriously say to [Page 162] him; You see, Friend, that your Horses have the Names of Men, how do you know but that they are Men? Know, saith the Country-man, I hope you are wiser than to ask me such a Question? Or what do you take me for, if I can­not tell the Difference of Men from Horses whatever Names they have. Do not tell me of your Specifick Names, and Conformity to your Ideas, I know well enough the Difference between my Horse Peter and my Man Peter with­out such Gibberish. My Man Peter and I can sit and chop Logick together, about our Country Affairs, and he can Write and Read, and he is a very sharp Fellow at a Bargain; but my Horse Pe­ter can do none of these things, and I never could find any thing like Reason in him, and do you think I do not know the Difference between a Man and a Beast? I pursue this no farther lest the Country-man should be too rude to the Gentlemen, with whom you had this Learned Conversation, about the Difference of Men, and Horses, and Drills.

But you or your Friend, or both, p. 114. are very hard set again about a Common Na­ture [Page 163] with a particular Subsistence proper to each Person. For such is your Misfortune, you say, p. 121. that for your Life you cannot find it out. This is a hard Case; be­fore, for your Life you could not under­stand Nature and Substance to be the same; and now again, for your Life you can­not find out this. Where lies the mon­strous Difficulty of it? You say, You repeated, and this twenty times to your self; and your weak Vnderstanding always Rejolts. At what? My Words are, ‘Nature may be considered, as it is in distinct Individuals, as the Nature of Man is equally in Peter, Iames and Iohn. And this is the common Na­ture with a particular Subsistence pro­per to each of them.’

You say, p. 135. That the Nature of Man in Peter is the Nature of a Man, if Peter be supposed to be a Man, but if it be the Name of a Horse, your Knowledge vanishes. Cannot you, for your Life, know the Difference between a Man and a Horse, by their Essential Properties, whatever their Names be? If so, there is a greater turn of Mens Vnderstandings, than I imagined. But again say you, Let it be impossible to give that Name to [Page 164] a Horse (who ever said or thought so?) yet you cannot understand these Words, the common Nature of a Man is in Peter; for whatsoever is in Peter exists in Peter; and whatever exists in Peter is particu­lar; but the common Nature of Man is the general Nature of Man, or else you understand not what is meant by Common Nature; and it confounds your Vnder­standing to make a General a Particular.

To this I answer, That the Common Nature of Man may be taken two ways. In the way of Ideas, and in the way of Reason. In your way of Ideas it is not at all to be wondered at, that you cannot understand such a Common Nature, as I spake of, which subsists in several Per­sons, because you say, You can have no Ideas of Real Substances but such as are Particular; all others are only Abstract Ideas, and made only by the Act of the Mind. But I say, That in the Way of Reason you may come to a better un­derstanding of this Matter. Which is by considering the Nature of Beings, and the Causes of the Differences a­mongst the several kinds of them. I had told you before, Answ to Lett. l. p. 110. in my Answer to your first Letter, that we are to consider [Page 165] Beings as God hath ordered them in their several Sorts and Ranks, and that he hath distinguished them by Essential Properties from each other, as appears by Mankind, and Brutes, and Plants: And that although the Individuals of the several kinds agree in Essential Pro­perties, yet there is a real Difference between them in several Accidents that belong to them, as to Time, Place, Qualities, Relations, &c. Now that wherein they agree is the Common Na­ture; and that wherein they differ, is the Particular Subsistence. And if this be so hard to be understood, why was it not answered here in the proper place for it? is not that a Real Nature that is the Subject of Real Properties? Is not that Nature really in all those who have the same Essential Properties? And therefore the Common Nature of Man must exist in Peter, because he is a Man, and so in Iames and Iohn: and yet every one of these is so distinguished from the other, that we may justly say he hath a Particular Subsistence with that Common Nature. And this is no making a General a Particular; but distinguish­ing one from the other, which is a Di­stinction [Page 166] so easie and necessary, that I cannot but wonder at those who say, that for their Lives they cannot find it out.

I had said, ‘For the Nature of Man as in Peter, is distinct from that same Nature, as it is in Iames and Iohn, other­wise they would be but One Person as well as One Nature.’ And what Reply is made to this? p. 137. You cannot un­derstand what this is a Proof of. It is plain that I meant it of a Particular Sub­sistence; and if you cannot for your Life understand such easie things, how can I for my Life help it? Read the Words over again which are before them, and join them together. ‘And this is the Common Nature with a Particular Sub­sistence proper to each of them; for the Nature of Man as in Peter is distinct from that same Nature as it is in Iames and Iohn.’ But I am really ashamed to be put to explain such things; I hope Ideas do not give another Turn to Common Sense. p. 138. But you say, That otherwise they could not be three Persons, is to prove it by a Proposition unintelli­gible to you, because you do not yet ap­prehend what a Person is. Of that in its [Page 167] proper place. These Words of mine follow, ‘And this Distinction of Per­sons in them, is discerned both by our Senses as to their different Acci­dents, and by our Reason because they have a separate Existence, not coming into it at once and in the same manner.’ And is this unintelligible too? p. 140. You say, It will hold as well for three Physical Atoms, which are three distinct Individuals, and have three di­stinct Natures in them, as certainly as three distinct Men. But are three Atoms as much three Persons as three Men? But you cannot discern the distinction by our Senses as to their Accidents, nor by your Reason as to separate Existence, because God might create them at once. Therefore we can­not distinguish three Humane Persons that way? In this Reasoning in the Way of Ideas? Or in any Way?

Suppose we put the Common Nature of an Animal for the Common Nature of Man. p. 141. What follows? Therefore three Animals are three distinct Persons, as well as three Men? I thought there was some cause for your Disliking the Com­mon Principles and Methods of Reasoning. I am forced to give but short touches at [Page 168] such things, which I cannot answer more largely, without being thought to make Marks of Distinction.

‘Come we now therefore to the Second Sense of Nature, as it is taken abstract­ly without Respect to Individual Per­sons; and then I said, it makes an entire Notion of it self. For how­ever the same Nature may be in dif­ferent Individuals, yet the Nature in it self remains one and the same; which appears from this evident Rea­son, that otherwise every Individual must make a different kind.’

Is this to be understood any better? No. An entire Notion of it self is an Expression never met with before. p. 144. An entire Idea of it self had been very plain and easie; but this is not to talk with Men in their own Dialect. But if we put it so, the Difficulty remains. What Difficulty? It then makes no more an en­tire Notion than the Nature of Peter. Is it not the same Nature considered as common to all Individuals, distinct from that Nature as in Peter? I wish among all the Ways of inlarging Knowledge, you could think of some new Way of conveying Notions into Mens Minds, [Page 169] for I find your Way of Ideas will ne­ver do it. For you cannot be brought one step beyond the first Cast of Ideas. And you will not allow, that which I give for an Evident Reason, p. 146. to prove any thing towards clear Apprehensions of one Common Nature. But if Nature be one and the same in different Individu­als, then there must be one Common Nature, which makes an entire Notion of it self: If it be not one and the same, then every Individual must make a Distinct Kind? Can any thing be more evident? But you give one common Answer; p. 147. I understand not any thing that is meant in this whole Paragraph, as to the right Apprehension of one Common Nature. And so I am very well content to leave it to the Reader's Understanding.

And now I come at last to the Idea of a Person. And here I am glad to find something you do understand: Which is great News. p. 149. This, say you, I understand very well, that supposing Peter, James and John to be all three Men, and Man being a Name for one Kind of Animals, they are all of the same Kind. Do you mean that they have the same common Essence, [Page 170] or have only the same common Name? If you mean the former, there must be a common Nature; if only the latter, that cannot make them of the same Kind. For Kind signifies nothing but a meer Name without it. If it be asked you, whether Men and Drills be of the same Kind or not? Could you give no other Answer, but that the Specifick Name Man stands for one sort, and the Specifick Name Drill for the other; and therefore they are not of the same Kind? Are those Names arbitrary, or are they foun­ded on real and distinct Properties? If they be arbitrary, they have no other Difference, but what a Dictionary gives them. If they are founded on real and distinct Properties, then there must be a real Difference of Kinds founded in Na­ture; which is as much as I desire. But to go on. You understand too very well, that Peter is not James, and James is not John, but that there is a Difference in these Individuals. You understand also, that they may be distinguished from each other by our Senses, as to different Fea­tures and Distance of Place, &c. But what follows, you say, You do not understand, viz. that supposing there were no such ex­ternal [Page 171] Difference, yet there is a Difference between them as Individuals of the same Nature. For all that this comes to, as far as you can understand, is that the Ground of the Distinction between several Individuals in the same common Nature is that they are several Individuals in the same common Nature. P. 152. You understand, it seems, that they are several Individuals, that Peter is not James, and James is not John; and the Question is, what this Distinction is founded upon? Whether upon our observing the Difference of Features, Distance of Place, &c. or on some antecedent Ground? I affirm, that there is a Ground of the Distinction of Individuals antecedent to such accidental Differences as are liable to our Observa­tion by our Senses.

And the Ground I go upon is this, that the true Reason of Identity in Man is the vital Union of Soul and Body: And since every Man hath a different Soul united to different Particles of Mat­ter, there must be a real Distinction be­tween them, without any respect to what is accidental to them. For, if Pe­ter have a Soul and Body different from Iames, and Iames from Iohn, they must [Page 172] have different Principles of Individuati­on, without any respect to Features or Place, &c.

P. 149.You say, You cannot suppose a Contra­diction, viz. that there is no difference of Place between them. But that is not the Point, whether when we consider them with respect to Place, there can be such a thing as Identity of Place to two dif­ferent Bodies? But whether we cannot consider two several Individuals of Man­kind without particular Regard to Place? Which I say, we may, and for this Rea­son; because Relation to Place, is an external Difference, but the real Di­stinction of Individuals doth not relate to any Accident of the Body; be­cause the Individual consists of the Union of Soul and Body; and you can­not judge of the Existence of the Soul by the Place of the Body. You say, that when we see any thing to be in any place in any instant of Time, Essay, B. 2. ch. 27. Sect. 1. we are sure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another which at that Time exists in another Place, how like and un­distinguishing soever it may be in all other Respects. And in this consists Identity. But I think the Identity of Man depends [Page 173] neither upon the Notion of Place for his Body; nor upon the Soul consider'd by it self, but upon both these, as actually united and making one Person. Which to me seems so clear and intelligible, that I can imagine no Objection a­gainst it. I am certain, you produce none.

My next Words are, ‘And here lies the true Idea of a Person, which arises from that Manner of Subsistence, which is in one Individual, and is not com­municable to another.’

In your Answer to this, I pass over the trifling Exceptions, P. 155. about the Dissyl­lable Person, and the true Idea and Sig­nification of the articulate Sound; and a­bout here and herein, &c. being resolved to keep to what appears material. And the only thing of that kind is, P. 156. that ac­cording to my Sense of Person, it will as well agree to Bucephalus as to Alexan­der; and the Difference will be as great, between Bucephalus and Podargus, as between Alexander and Hector, all being several Individuals in the same common Nature: but for your Part you cannot un­derstand that Bucephalus and Podargus are Persons in the true signification of the [Page 174] Word Person in the English Tongue. And whoever desired you should? For I ex­presly say, that a Person is a compleat in­telligent Substance, with a peculiar Man­ner of Subsistence. And again, For a Per­son relates to something which doth distinguish it from another intelligent Substance in the same Nature. So that it is impossible to apply my Notion of Person to any irrational Creatures, al­though they be Bucephalus and Podar­gus: And I think a Man must strain hard to make such Objections, so di­rectly against that Idea of a Person which I set down. And it is very easie to un­derstand the Difference between a Di­stinction of Individuals as such, and of intelligent Individuals, and that Manner of Subsistence in them, which makes them distinct Persons.

P. 159.But you say, that I affirm, that an in­dividual intelligent Substance is rather supposed to the making of a Person, than the proper Definition of it; and yet after­wards I make it to be the Definition of a Person, that it is a compleat intelligent Substance.

To this I answer, That in the former Place I give an Account of the Reason [Page 175] of Personality, which I say lies in the Manner of Subsistence, and not in the intelligent individual Substance; which is rather supposed to the making of a Person: For that which critically distin­guishes the Person is the Reason of Per­sonality; but when we come to give a common Definition of it, there is no such Necessity of insisting upon the Rea­son of the Difference, but upon the com­mon Acception of it Person. And upon that Account I call it a complete intelli­gent Substance, because, although the Soul be so in it self; yet we take Person with Relation to Soul and Body united toge­ther. And so the Identity of Person must take in both, not only here, but at the Resurrection.

And thus I have gone through all that I could find, that seem'd material in the Dialogue between you and your Friends as to this Subject, and I assure you, I have omitted nothing which I apprehended had any Appearance of Difficulty in it. And I find not the least Reason to be unsatisfied in the Account I had given of the Difference of Nature and Person: but I still think that it doth tend very much to the right Apprehen­sion [Page 176] of the Doctrine of the Trinity; as I hope doth farther appear by the fore­going Discourse.

And now to come to a Conclusion of this whole Debate. (For I intend not to draw this Saw any longer: having done as much as I think sitting for my self to do.)

I saw no Necessity of writing again for my own Vindication as to your first Charge, which I was contended to leave to the Reader's Judgment. But in the Conclusion of my former Answer, I had said, ‘That as you had stated your Notion of Ideas, it may be of dange­rous Consequence to that Article of the Christian Faith, which I endea­vour'd to defend. P. 57.’ This you call a new Charge against your Book; and you com­plain, that I do not specifie the Particu­lars, 59. wherein I apprehend it may be of such dangerous Consequence; and you blame me for this saying, 84. without shewing that it is so: 85. and that all the Reason I give is, that it is made use of by ill Men to do mischief: 57. that when I say, it may be, it shews only an Inclination to accuse, 84 and proves nothing: 85. that Danger may be ap­prehended where no Danger is; that if [Page 177] any thing must be laid aside, because it may be ill used, you do not know what will be innocent enough to be kept: and lastly, that the Imputation of a Tendency to Scep­ticism, 17 [...]. and to the overthrowing any Arti­cle of the Christian Faith are no small Charge; 171. and that you cannot see any Ar­gument I have brought, that your Notion of Ideas tends to Scepticism. These things laid together, made me think it necessary to do that which I was unwil­ling [...] do, till you had driven me to it; which was to shew, the Reasons I had, why I look'd on your Notion of Ideas, and of Certainty by them, as inconsi­stent with it self, and with some impor­tant Articles of the Christian Faith.

What I have now done, I thought it my Duty to do, not with respect to my self, but to some of the Mysteries of our Faith; which I do not charge you with opposing, but with laying such Founda­tions as do tend to the Overthrow of them; of which we have had too much Experience already; and may have more, if your Way of Certainty by Ideas should obtain. Which I cannot think it will among such as are capable, and willing, to judge impartially. I have [Page 178] now done with this Matter: And as some may think it the first Part of Wisdom not to begin in such Disputes (and I am of their Mind if they did not touch the Christian Faith) so they cannot but judge it the next (as I do) to know when to make an End.