I Have seriously consider'd the Let­ter you were pleased to send me, and I find it made up of two Parts; A Complaint of me, and a Vindi­cation of your self: To both which I shall return as clear and distinct on An­swer, and in as few words, as the mat­ter will permit.

1. As to the Complaint of me, it runs quite through the Book, and even your Postscript is full of it.

The substance of it is, that in answer­ing Objections against the Trinity, in point of Reason, I produce several Passa­ges out of your Essay of Humane Vn­derstanding, as if they were intended [Page 4] by you to that Purpose; but you de­clare to the World, p. 150. that it was written by you without any Thought of the Controversie between the Trinitarians and Unitarians; and p. 224. That your Notions about Ideas have no Connexion with any Objections that are made by o­thers against the Doctrine of the Trinity, or against Mysteries. And therefore you complain of it, as an Injury done to you, in imputing that to you, which you have not done, p. 95. or at least in leaving it so doubtfull, that the Reader cannot di­stinguish who is meant, p. 96. and this you call my peculiar way of Writing in this part of my Treatise.

Now to give you and others satis­faction as to this matter, I shall first give an account of the Occasion of it, and then shew what Care I took to prevent Misunderstanding about it.

The Occasion was this, Being to an­swer the Objections in Point of Reason, (which had not been answered before) the first I mention'd, was, That it was above Reason, and therefore not to be be­lieved; in answer to this, I proposed two Things to be consider'd; 1. What we understand by Reason. 2. What Ground in Reason there is to reject any [Page 5] Doctrine above it, when it is proposed as a matter of Faith.

As to the former I observ'd that the Vnitarians in their late Pamphlets talk'd very much of clear and distinct Ideas and Perceptions, and that the Mysteries of Faith were repugnant to them, but ne­ver went about to state the Nature and Bounds of Reason in such a manner as those ought to have done who make it the Rule and Standard of what they are to believe. But I added, that a late Author in a Book, call'd Christianity not Mysterious, had taken upon him to clear this Matter, whom for that cause I was bound to consider; the de­sign of his Discourse related wholly to Matters of Faith, and not to Philoso­phical Speculations; so that there can be no Dispute about his Application of those he calls Principles of Reason and Certainty.

When the Mind makes use of interme­diate Ideas to discover the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas received into them, this Method of Knowledge, he saith, is properly called Reason or Demonstra­tion.

The Mind, as he goes on, receives Ideas two ways:

• [Page 6]1. By Intromission of the Senses.
• 2. By considering its own Operations.

And these simple and distinct Ideas, are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning.

And so all our Certainty is resolved into two things, either immediate Per­ception, which is self-Evidence, or the use of intermediate Ideas, which disco­vers the Certainty of any thing dubious; which is what he calls Reason.

Now this I said did suppose,

‘That we must have clear and di­stinct Ideas of what-ever we pretend to any Certainty of in our minds (by Reason) and that the only way to attain this Certainty is by comparing these Ideas together; which excludes all Certainty of Faith or Reason, where we cannot have such clear and distinct Ideas.’

From hence I proceeded to shew, that we could not have such clear and distinct Ideas, as were necessary in the present Debate, either by Sensation or Reflecti­on, and consequently we could not at­tain to any Certainty about it; for which, I instanced in the Nature of Sub­stance and Person, and the Distinction between them.

[Page 7]And by vertue of these Principles I said, ‘That I did not wonder, that the Gentlemen of this new way of Rea­soning had almost discarded Substance out of the Reasonable Part of the World.’ Which Expression you tell me you do not understand. But if you had pleased to have look'd back on the Words just before, a Person of your Sagacity could not have missed the Meaning I intended. ‘Which are, Now this is the case of Substance; it is not intromitted by the Senses, nor depends upon the Operations of the Mind, and cannot be within the compass of our Reason.’

But you say, P. 6. That if I mean that you deny or doubt that there is in the World any such thing as Substance, I shall acquit you of it, if I look into some Passages in your Book which you refer to. But this is not the point before us, whether you do own Substance or not? but whether by vertue of these Principles, you can come to any Certainty of Reason about it? And I say, the very places you produce do prove the contrary; which I shall therefore set down in your own Words, both as to Corporeal and Spiri­tual Substances.

[Page 8] P. 7. When we talk or think of any particular sort of Corporeal Substance, as Horse, Stone, &c. tho' the Idea we have of ei­ther of them be but the Complication or Collection of those several simple Ideas of sensible Qualities which we use to find uni­ted in the thing called Horse or Stone, yet because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone, or one in another, we suppose them existing in and supported by some common subject, which Support we denote by the name Substance, tho' it be certain we have no clear or distinct Idea of that thing we suppose a Support. The same happens concerning Operations of the Mind, viz. Thinking, Reasoning, &c. which we considering not to subsist of them­selves, nor apprehending how they can belong to Body or be produced by it, we are apt to think these the Actions of some other Substance, which we call Spirit, whereby yet it is evident, that having no other Notion or Idea of Matter, but some­thing wherein those many sensible Qualities, which affect our Senses do subsist, by sup­posing a Substance wherein Thinking, Knowing, Doubting, and a Power of Mov­ing, &c. do subsist, P. 8. we have as clear a Notion of the Nature or Substance of Spi­rit as we have of Body, the one being sup­posed [Page 9] to be (without knowing what it is) the Substratum to those simple Ideas we have from without, and the other suppo­sed (with a like Ignorance of what it is) to be the Substratum to those Operations which we experiment in our selves. You mention other places to the same pur­pose, but these are sufficient for mine. These and the like fashions of speaking, P. 9. you say intimate, that the Substance is supposed always something, &c. I grant that you say over and over, that Sub­stance is supposed; but that is not what I looked for, but something in the way of Certainty by Reason. Yes, you say, we cannot conceive how these sensible Qualities should subsist alone, and there­fore we suppose a Substance to support them. It is but supposing still, because we cannot conceive it otherwise. But what Certainty follows barely from our not being able to Conceive? Are there not multitudes of Things which we are not able to conceive, and yet it would not be allowed us to suppose what we think fit on that account? I could hard­ly conceive that Mr. L. would have brought such Evidence as this against himself; but I must suppose some un­known Substratum in this Case.

[Page 10]But you go on, That as long as there is any simple Idea, or sensible Quality left, according to my way of Arguing, Sub­stance cannot be discarded, because all simple Ideas, all sensible Qualities carry with them a supposition of a Substratum to exist in and of a Substance wherein they inhere. What is the meaning of carry­ing with them a supposition of a Substra­tum and a Substance? Have these simple Ideas the Notion of a Substance in them? No, but they carry it with them. How so? Do sensible Qualities carry a Corpo­real Substance along with them? Then a Corporeal Substance must be intromit­ted by the Senses together with them. No; but they carry the Supposition with them. And truly that is burden enough for them. But which way do they car­ry it? It seems it's only because we can­not conceive it otherwise. What is this Conceiving? It may be said that it is an Act of the Mind, not built on simple Ideas, but lies in comparing the Ideas of Accident and Substance together, and from thence finding that an Accident must carry Substance along with it? But this will not clear it; for the Ideas of Acci­dents are simple Ideas, and carry no­thing along with them; but the Impres­sion [Page 11] made by sensible Objects: and the Idea of Substance comes in by way of Supposition with the other, so that it is not the comparing two Ideas together, but the supposing one Idea from another, and that a very obscure and confused one too, as is confessed, viz. That it is some­thing which supports Accidents, and was found out for that substantial End. As appears from these remarkable words of yours.

They who first ran into the Notion of Accidents, Book 2. Ch. 13. Sect. 19. as a sort of real Beings that needed something to inhere in, were forc'd to find out the word Substance to support them. Had the poor Indian Philosopher, but thought of this word Substance, he needed not to have been at the trouble to find an Elephant to support it, and a Tor­toise to support his Elephant. The word Substance would have done it effectually. And it might have been taken for as good an Answer from an Indian Philosopher, that Substance without knowing what it is, is that which supports the Earth, as we take it for a sufficient Answer, and good Doctrine from our European Philosophers, that Substance without knowing what it is, is that which supports Accidents. What can be ridiculing the Notion of Sub­stance, [Page 12] and the European Philosophers for asserting it, P. 14. if this be not? I for­bear now your Repetition of it; because I see it doth not please you. Ch. 23. Sect. 2. But truly it was not to upbraid you with the bare Repetition as a fault in Writing (many of which I am too much sensible of my self, to blame it in others) but only to shew that it was not a sudden Fancy, but a deliberate, and (as you thought) a lucky Similitude.

P. 11.But you say, You would be glad to hear a clearer and more distinct Idea of Substance, but you can find no better in your own Thoughts, or in the Books of Logicians. Are not these Logicians a sort of Euro­pean Philosophers, who were despised so much before, for this very Notion of Substance? Even Burgersdicius and San­derson (whom you quote) were so, as well as many others of the dull Tribe of Logicians.

But I do not find fault with the De­finition of Substance brought by Logici­ans; for they do not say, that it was found out only to support Accidents, but they say, it first implies a Subsistence by it self; and then that it supports Acci­dents: But you say, The former implies no more than that Substance is a Thing or [Page 13] Being; or in short, something they know not what. Is there no difference between the bare Being of a Thing, and its Sub­sistence by it self? I had thought Acci­dents or Modes of Matter which make sensible Impressions on us, were Things or Beings; or else there could be no ef­fect of them, but you will not say they subsist of themselves, and are in no other thing as the proper subject of them, and you confess at last, that Substance doth imply that it is not supported it self as a Mode or Accident. So that our Eu­ropean Philosophers happen to be in the right at last.

Well! P. 12▪ but I would think it hard to be thought to discard every thing which I do not comprehend; for I own Mysteries. Why then should I charge others for dis­carding Substance, because they have but a confused Idea of it. This is the force of the Charge which I bring into as few words, as may be, but without the least Intention to abate the strength of it.

To which I answer, That I do not charge them with discarding the Notion of Substance, because they have but an imperfect Idea of it; but because upon those Principles there can be no certain Idea at all of it, whereas I assert it to be [Page 14] one of the most natural and certain Ideas in our Minds, because it is a Repug­nance to our first conception of Things that Modes or Accidents should subsist by themselves; and therefore I said the Rational Idea of Substance is one of the first Ideas in our Minds; and how­ever imperfect and obscure our Notion be, yet we are as certain that Substan­ces are and must be, as that there are any Beings in the World. Herein you tell me you agree with me, P. 22. and therefore you hope this is no Objection against the Trinity. I never thought it was, but to lay all Foundation of Certainty as to matters of Faith upon clear and distinct Ideas, which was the Opinion I op­posed, does certainly overthrow all My­steries of Faith, and excludes the No­tion of Substance out of Rational Dis­course, which at length you apprehend to have been my meaning.

P. 35.But, say you, if any assert, that we can have no Ideas but from Sensation or Reflection, you declare, that this is not your Opinion. I am very glad of it: And I will do you all the Right I can in this matter. But we must take your Mean­ing from your own words. And there are three Particulars you express it in.

[Page 15](1.) That your Meaning was, P. 25. to sig­nifie all those Complex Ideas of Modes, Relations, and specifick Substances, which the Mind forms out of simple Ideas. So that these Ideas are allowed by you al­though they come not by Sensation or Reflection. But is not the Notion of particular Substances a Complex Idea, because it is a Complication of simple I­deas, as will presently appear from your own words; but all simple Ideas come in by Sensation and Reflection. But you may say the Combination of them to make one Idea, is an Act of the Mind, and so this Idea is not from Sensation or Reflecti­on. It seems then, the Mind hath a Power to form one Complex Idea out of many simple ones, and this makes a true Idea of a particular Substance not coming in by Sensation or Reflection. But I am still to seek, how this comes to make an Idea of Substance; I understand it very well to be a Complex Idea of so many Ac­cidents put together; but I cannot un­derstand, how a Complex Idea of Acci­dents should make an Idea of Substance. And till you do this you are as far as ever from a true Idea of Substance, not­withstanding your Complex Ideas.

[Page 16](2.) You never said that the general Idea of Substance comes in by Sensation or Reflection. P. 38. And if there be any Ex­pressions that seem to assert it to be by a Complication of simple Ideas, (and not by Abstracting and Inlarging them) be­cause we accustom our selves to suppose a Substratum; P. 28, 29. it ought to be look'd on as a slip of the Pen, or a Negligence of Expression. In which Cases, I think no Man ought to be severe. But was there not too much occasion given for others to think, that the Idea of particular Substance was only a Complication of sim­ple Ideas; and because all simple Ideas do come in, you say, only by Sensation and Reflection, therefore all the Ideas of particular Substance (which is but a Complication of them) must either come in those ways, or else we can have no true Idea of particular Substance at all?

So that there are Two things, where­in you are very far from giving Satis­faction.

P. 32.1. That although you say, That the Idea of Substance in general is made by Abstraction; yet you add, That all the Ideas we have of particular distinct Sub­stances are nothing but several Combina­tions of simple Ideas. From whence it [Page 17] is plain, that according to your repeat­ed Assertions, we can have no Idea of particular and distinct Substances, but what is made up of a Complication of simple Ideas: and although there may be some abstracted Notion or general Idea of Substance, which is only an act of the Mind, yet there is no real Idea of any particular Substance, but what is a Complication of simple Ideas. And that a Man hath no other Idea of any Substance, Book 2. ch. 23. Sect. 6. let it be Gold or Horse, Iron, Man, Vitriol, Bread, but what he has barely of those sensible Qualities, which he supposes to inhere with a supposition of such a Substratum, as gives as it were a support to those Qualities or simple Ideas, which he has observed to exist united to­gether. These are your own words; and what can the meaning of them be, but that we neither have nor can have any Idea of a particular Substance, but only with respect to the simple Ideas which make it up; and these being sen­sible Qualities, there is no such thing as an Idea of Substance, but only a supposi­tion of a Substratum to support Acci­dents.

2. That although the Idea of Substance P. 32. be made doubtfull by attributing it only [Page 18] to our accustoming our selves to suppose some Substratum; yet the Being of Sub­stance is not. How is this possible? Is not the Being doubtfull if the Idea be; and all our Certainty come in by Ideas? No, P. 33. say you, the Being would not be sha­ken, if we had no Idea of Substance at all. What! not as to our Knowledge? But you say, there are many things in Nature of which we have no Ideas. And can we have any Certainty of Reason as to those things? For about that our debate is, viz. What Certainty we can have as to Substance, if we can have no Idea of it? So that the Being of Sub­stance on these Principles is far from be­ing safe and secure as to us, when we have so lame an account of the Idea of it.

But you have yet a farther distincti­on to bring off the Idea of Substance; for you say,

P▪ 40.(3.) That the Idea of Substance is a Relative Idea. For the mind can frame to it self Ideas of Relation, and percei­ving that Accidents cannot subsist of them­selves, but have a necessary Connexion with Inherence or being supported, which being a Relative Idea, it frames the Cor­relative of a Support, which is Substance. [Page 19] And now I think we have all that is said in Defence of the Idea of Substance; viz. That there is a Complex, Abstracted and Relative Idea of it; which is deri­ved from the simple Ideas got by Sensa­tion or Reflection. But this Relative Ab­stracted Idea is confessed to be an obscure, indistinct, vague Idea of Thing or Some­thing; and is all that is left to be the positive Idea, which hath the Relation of a Support or Substratum to Modes or Acci­dents: And that what Idea we have of particular and distinct Substances is no­thing but a Complication of simple Ideas with the supposition of a Substratum or Support.

These being the Concessions and Di­stinctions you make in this Matter, I must now return to the Occasion of this Debate, which was, whether the ground of our Certainty, as to the Nature of Substance can be resolved into the sim­ple Ideas we receive in by Sensation or Reflection. The question is not, Whether you doubt or deny any such Being as Sub­stance in the World? nor whether the Notion you have of it be clear and di­stinct? for you confess it is not; but the point in debate is, What Certainty we can have of the Nature of Substance [Page 20] from the simple Ideas we have by Sen­sation or Reflection? And here the que­stion is not, Whether the mind cannot form Complex and Abstracted general Ideas from those simple Ideas? But whe­ther those simple Ideas are the Foundati­on of our Knowledge and Certainty as to the Nature of Substance?

P. 18, 23, 24, 36, 37.For you affirm over and over (if I may have leave to say so) That the sim­ple Ideas we have by Sensation and Re­flection are the Foundation of all our Know­ledge. P. 8. And yet that the Ideas we have of particular distinct Substances are no­thing but several Combinations of simple Ideas of Accidents.

Which being supposed, I think it no hard matter to make it appear that we cannot come to any Certainty as to the Nature of Substance in this way of Ideas. For,

1. The simple Ideas afford no ground of Certainty any farther than as to them­selves. Outward Objects make an im­pression on our Senses; and all the Cer­tainty we have by them is that our Senses are so and so affected by them; but what that is in those Objects which produces those Effects in us, these sim­ple Ideas do not acquaint us. For the [Page 21] old or new Doctrine of Qualities may be true, notwithstanding any Effect of these simple Ideas upon us; for the same effects would be whether there be real Qualities in the Objects, or only a power to make such Impressions on us, which we fancy to be Qualities without us. And so for our inward Perceptions; we certainly know, that we have a Power of Thinking, Doubting, Considering, &c. these simple Ideas we are very cer­tain of; but whether these Perceptions come from a Material or Immaterial Substance, you say, cannot be certainly known by these simple Ideas: for you think Matter may be so refined and mo­dified as to produce them. Now it is a very strange thing to me, that Men of Understanding should make these simple Ideas the Foundation of all our Knowledge and Certainty; and yet, that we should be able to attain to no Cer­tainty at all by them, from whence they proceed. For if these Ideas were in­tended for the means of our attaining to any Certainty, this would be the first thing we should know by them. It is not distinguishing Primary and Seconda­ry Qualities will help us out here. For these sensible Qualities of Bodies, which [Page 22] arise from the first, viz. Bulk, Figure, Tex­ture and Motion of Parts, do not carry any evidence along with them that they are not Resemblances of something in the Objects as well as the Primary. It is very easie to affirm, That there is in Truth nothing in the Objects themselves, but only Powers to produce various Sensa­tions in us: but I intend not to dispute whether it be so or not; all that I ob­serve, is, that there have been Philoso­phers, both European and others, of a­nother opinion; and that these simple Ideas, which are said to be the only Foundation of our Knowledge, do not help us one jot in the Discovery. For it is confessed by your self, Essay, B. 2. ch. 8. Sect. 25. That Sensation discovers nothing of Bulk, Figure or Mo­tion of Parts in the Production of sensible Qualities, nor can Reason shew how Bodies by their Bulk, Figure and Motion should produce in the Mind the Ideas of Blew, Yel­low, &c. How then are these simple Ideas the Foundation of our Knowledge and Cer­tainty, when by them we can discover nothing of the true causes of those Im­pressions which are made upon us? And you own, Ch. 9. Sect. 8, 9, 10. That the Ideas of Sensation are often corrected by Iudgment, and that so insensibly, that we are apt to mistake [Page 23] one for the other; so that these simple Ideas are but a very slippery and un­certain Foundation for our Knowledge, unless Reason and Judgment be watch­full to prevent the Errors we are liable to in the Ideas of Sensation But if no more be meant by the simple Ideas that come in by Sensation or Reflection, and their being the Foundation of our Knowledge, but that our Notions of Things come in either from our Senses or the Exer­cise of our Minds: As there is nothing extraordinary in the Discovery, so I am far enough from opposing that, wherein I think all Mankind are agreed. But when new Terms are made use of by ill men to promote Scepticism and Infidelity, and to overthrow the Myste­ries of our Faith, we have then Reason to enquire into them, and to examine the Foundation and Tendency of them. And this was the true and only Reason of my looking into this way of Certainty by Ideas, because I found it applied to such Purposes.

(2.) The Idea of particular Substances being only the Complication of many sim­ple Ideas, can give no greater Founda­tion of Knowledge or Certainty than those simple Ideas of which it consists.

[Page 24]Which is so clear of it self, that I shall not go about to prove it. But that you make the Ideas of particular Substances to be no other, P. 7, 8, 10, 30. is plain from the several places before mention'd, pro­duced by your self in this Book. So that as to the Notion of particular Sub­stances, we can find no Foundation of Knowledge or Certainty at all from the Ideas. It cannot be denied, that you joyn the supposition of a Substratum with this Complication of simple Ideas; but we must take notice that you place the I­dea of particular and distinct Substances in that Complication, and only reserve the supposition of the Substratum, as a gene­ral confused unknown thing, which makes no part of the Idea, but is only kept at a dead lift to support Accidents. Your words are, When we talk or think of any particular sort of Corporeal Sub­stance, P. 6. as Horse, Stone, &c. tho' the I­dea we have of either of them be but the Complication or Collection of those several simple Ideas of sensible Qualities, we use to find united in the thing called Horse or Stone: then follows, Yet we suppose them existing in some common Subject, &c. So that the Idea was compleat before the supposition. P. 8. And again, Whatever be [Page 25] the secret Nature of Substance in general, all the Ideas we have of particular Sub­stances are nothing but several Combinati­ons of simple Ideas. Can any thing be plainer? Yet there follows, Co-existing in such, though unknown cause of their V­nion, as makes the whole subsist of it self. Here we have still an unknown Support, but made no part of the Idea it self. In another place, the Idea of Substance is said to be a Complication of many Ideas together, B 2. ch. 23. Sect. 1. because not imagining how these simple Ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom our selves to suppose some Sub­stratum which we call Substance. And this is said to be the Notion of pure Sub­stance in general, Sect. 2, 3, 4. and not of any parti­cular Substance, which consists in a Com­plication only of simple Ideas.

(3.) The Relative Idea of Substance arising from the necessary Support of Ac­cidents is a mere effect of Reason and Judgment, and no effect of any simple Ideas. For it arises from nothing sug­gested by the Ideas of Sensation or Re­flection, but it comes only from the Mind it self. Because, as I said before, it is a Repugnancy to our first Conce­ption of Things, that Modes or Acci­dents should subsist by themselves. But [Page 26] which of the simple Ideas is this built upon? You tell me, You say the same thing, and quote these Words of yours; And I say, P. 22. Because we cannot conceive how simple Ideas of sensible Qualities should subsist alone, or one in another, we sup­pose them existing in and supported by some common Subject. But you have not told me, how this is founded on the simple Ideas, which was your main point; You boast, you say, of my Agree­ment with you herein: I wish we might as well agree in all other things under Debate; but why did you not inform me, how you came to this, by your simple Ideas; and what steps and pro­gress you made in the Complication of your simple Ideas before you came to it. For truly, I should have found some difficulty in it, since you make the Idea of a particular Substance a Complication of many simple Ideas: for if it be so, how could a Complication of simple Ideas, which cannot subsist by themselves, make the Idea of a Substance which doth subsist by it self? This looks a little un­towardly in the way of Knowledge and Certainty. But there is no help for it, a Substratum must be supposed to support these unlucky Accidents. Let it be so [Page 27] then. How came we to know that these Accidents were such feeble things? What simple Ideas inform'd you of it? If none, then it is to be hoped there is some other way to attain Knowledge and Certainty in this matter. No; you tell me, there is no need of any other way, but this of Ideas. How so? Your words are these, P. 40. The general indetermi­ned Idea of Something, is by the Abstra­ction of the mind derived also from the simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection. But alas! We are not upon the general indetermined Idea of something; but up­on the particular Idea of distinct Substan­ces, which is granted not to be by Ab­straction, but by a Complication of simple Ideas. So that this is quite off from the matter. But as to your general ab­stracted Idea, I have something farther to say.

(4.) A general Abstracted Idea of Sub­stance is no real Substance, nor a true I­dea of one, if particular Substances be no­thing but a Complication of simple Ideas. For you say, P. 40. That the Mind by Abstra­ction from the positive simple Ideas got by Sensation or Reflection comes to the gene­ral Relative Idea of Substance. If then the general Idea be raised from the sim­ple [Page 28] Ideas, and those simple Ideas make that of particular and distinct Substances only by Complication, then the general Idea of Substance can be nothing but an Abstracted Complication of these simple Ideas, or else it is not by Abstraction from the simple Ideas. But I do not de­ny that there is a general Nature of Sub­stance, which is as real as a general Idea can be, and it is that, which makes any particular Substance be what it is in its own Nature without respect to Indivi­dual Modes and Properties. And al­though this general Substance doth not exist of it self, yet it doth really exist in the several Individuals that belong to its kind; and the several kinds of par­ticular Substances are really distinguish­ed from each other, not merely by sim­ple Ideas of sensible Qualities, but by their inward Frame and Constitution: as the Substance of a Man is from that of a Horse or a Tree. For it is ridiculous to imagine, that these really differ from each other only as Individuals of the same sort under the general Abstracted Idea of Substance. And if there be Substances of several kinds really different from each other, an account must be given, not only of the general Notion of a Sub­stratum [Page 29] for Accidents, but of the specifick Nature of different Substances, and where­in the difference of the unknown Support lies, as to the Modes and Accidents of their kinds, which I despair of ever see­ing done by the simple Ideas of Sensati­on and Reflection. And your self confess, That we have no Idea of Abstract Sub­stance; B. 2. Ch. 24. Sect. 16. and that by the Complex Idea of sensible Qualities, we are as far from the Idea of the Substance of Body, as if we knew nothing at all.

And now I freely leave the Reader to judge whether this be a tolerable Ac­count of the Idea of Substance by Sensa­tion or Reflection, and whether I deserve so much to be complained of, for ex­posing the unreasonableness of laying the Foundation of all our Certainty and Knowledge upon simple Ideas which we re­ceive by Sensation or Reflection.

But before I proceed further, it will be proper here to take notice how you justifie your Idea of Substance from the Etymology of the Word; P. 43. which, say you, is standing under or upholding. I told you very little weight is to be laid on a bare Grammatical Etymology, when the Word is otherwise used by the best Authors for the Essence of a thing; and [Page 30] I named Cicero and Quinctilian; and the Greek Word imports the same. But still you say, it is derived à substando; and you tell us your opinion, That if we knew the Original of Words, P. 44. we should be much helped to the Ideas they were first applied to and made to stand for. If you mean the true Ideas of them, I must beg leave to differ in my opinion, and my Reason is this, because Words were used before men came to form Philoso­phical Notions or Ideas of Things; and therefore they were forced to make use of Words applied in another Sense; or else to coin Words on purpose to express their own (as Cicero often doth, as Qua­lities, Evidence, Comprehension, &c.) So that if substare were used in another Sense before, it doth not follow, that it ought to be so, when we enquire into the true Ideas of Things. But one of the best Criticks of the Latin Tongue in our Age, hath told us, that substantia is so called, Voss. Ety­mol. in V. Sto. quia per se substat. And substare is used by Terence, not for stand­ing under, but for being stedfast, Metuo ut substet hospes. But as to your gene­ral Observation; I think there are very few Words used in the Philosophical Language of the Romans, but what were [Page 31] taken off from the original Sense they were applied to; as Persona was first taken for a Man in Masquerade, Genus for a Pedegree, Species for a Sight, from Specio, to see, Virtus for manly Courage, and distinguish'd from Probity. Sit vir­tus etiam non Probitate minor. Ovid. de Pont. l. 3. And so Anima was first ta­ken for the Breath in the Body, as well as Spiritus. Thence Varro saith, Their Ancestors, although they eat Leeks and Onions, yet were bene animati, had no ill Breath; and thence Animam agere and efflare, saith Cicero; and from Anima, he saith, came Animus, by which they understood the Mind; Hinc Animus ad intelligentiam tributus, saith Varro ▪ and many others of a like Nature. But I shall only add one more, and that is the Name of Idea, so very often used by your self and others of late. I wish we had been told the original use of it, and how it was first applied, that we might better judge of the true meaning of it now when so much Weight is laid up­on it. Thucyd. l. 6. p. 392. Ed. Ox. & l. 3. p. 184 I find in Thucydides, who was an accurate Writer, and understood the true Sense of Words, that an Idea is used by him for an Appearance and Shew without Reality, as when he saith, That [Page 32] the Athenians in dealing with the Sicili­ans, made use of the same Idea which they had done before. Where it can sig­nifie nothing but what he calls before a Pretence. But when the Philosophers came to use this Word, they applied it to another Sense; Plato made use of it to signifie the true Exemplars or Mo­dels of Things, according to which the several sorts of them were framed and distinguished. This Notion he had, as many others, from the Pythagoreans, but what they Mystically called Numbers he called Ideas. But Idea in its original Sense from the Etymology of it, is de­rived from Seeing, and so the natural Sense of it is something Visible; from thence it came to signifie the Impression made in us from our Senses; and thence it was carried to the general Notion of a thing, and from thence by Metaphysi­cal and abstracted Speculations to the Original Exemplars of particular Essen­ces, which were Simple and Vniform and not liable to those Changes which visible Objects are subject to. So Ci­cero tells us, Acad. l. 1.8. Plato formed his Notion of Idea, which he would by no means al­low to any Representation made by our Senses, which are dull, heavy, uncertain [Page 33] and imperfect either by the Minuteness, or Distance, or Mutability of the Objects; thence the Philosophers of his School de­nied any true grounds of Certainty to be laid in the Ideas we have by our Sen­ses, which can only afford ground for Probability (not as to the bare Objects) but as to the Notions we take from them. But all Knowledge and Certainty was placed in the acts of the Mind (Scienti­am nusquam esse censebant nisi in animi no­tionibus atque rationibus) i. e. in exami­ning and comparing, not the bare Ideas, but the Definitions of things; and from these, judging of the Truth and Cer­tainty of them. And if our Ideas of things be so few, so superficial, and so imperfect as you confess them to be; if we are so much to seek, as to the Con­nexion of Ideas, and the finding out proper intermediate Ideas, I am afraid this way of Certainty by Ideas will come to very little at last. And so this Agreement and Disagreement of Ideas will have the Fate of the Stoicks Criterion of Truth, which only multiplied Disputes, but ended none. Never any men talked more of Certainty than they; and they boasted of their Discoveries of the true grounds of it: and the question then [Page 34] was not about a Criterion of the bare Existence of things; (about which they allow'd the Judgment of the Senses to be sufficient, and the Ideas from them to be true;) Nor was it about a Crite­rion for the Actions of Life, for which they thought Probability or Opinion suf­ficient; but it was about finding out such a mark of truth in the Ideas of our Minds as could not agree to a Falshood, i. e. such an Impression or Signature, as Ci­cero expresses it, Cicer. in Lucul. c. 6. as appear'd in that which was, which could not be found in that which was not. And this was cal­led Visum, or a true Idea; his words are, Quale igitur visum? quod ex eo quod esset, sicut esset, impressum est, signatum, & effectum. C. 24. The Greeks called it a Com­prehensive Idea, which they compared to Light, which discovers it self as well as other Things. But when they came to be pinched with particular difficul­ties about the Natures of Things, they were never able to make out that infal­lible mark of Truth in their Idea; and yet this was a more likely way to have found it, than to place the grounds of Certainty in the comparing the Agree­ment and Disagreement of Ideas, unless it could be made out that we have a [Page 35] full stock of Ideas, and are able to di­scern and make out the Connexion of them with one another. For if we fail in ei­ther of these, the talking of Ideas and comparing those which we have will do us little service in finding out of Truth.

But I confess, the design in general is so good, that it's pity that it should lie open to so many Objections; and much more, that it should be abused to very bad purposes. But my joyning your words with another's Application, is that which hath given you so much Of­fence as to make you think it necessary to publish this Letter for your Vindica­tion.

2. I come therefore now to shew the Care I took to prevent being mis-under­stood; which will best appear by my own Words. ‘I must do that right to the Ingenious Author of the Essay of Humane Vnderstanding, (from whence these Notions are borrow'd to serve other purposes than he intend­ed them,) that he makes the case of Spiritual and Corporeal Substances to be alike.’ It was too plain, that the bold Writer against the Mysteries of our Faith took his Notions and Expressions [Page 36] from thence, and what could be said more for your Vindication, than that he turned them to other purposes than the Author intended them? And the true Reason why the Plural Number was so often used by me, was because he built upon those which he imagin'd had been your grounds, and my business was to shew that those Expressions of yours, which seemed most to counte­nance his method of Proceeding could not give any reasonable Satisfaction. But you say, P. 57. You do not place Certainty only in clear and distinct Ideas; but in the clear and visible Connection of any of our Ideas. And Certainty of Knowledge, you tell us, is to perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, as expressed in any Proposition. Whether this be a true account of the Certainty of Know­ledge or not, will be presently consi­der'd. But it is very possible he might mistake or misapply your Notions; but there is too much reason to believe, he thought them the same, and we have no reason to be sorry, that he hath gi­ven you this occasion for the explaining your Meaning, and for the Vindication of your self in the matters you appre­hend I had charged you with: And if [Page 37] your Answer doth not come fully up in all things to what I could wish, yet I am glad to find that in general you own the Mysteries of the Christian Faith, and the Scriptures to be the Foundation and Rule of it. For thus you conclude your Book, in the last Paragraph of the Post­script. The Holy Scripture is to me, P. 226. and always will be the constant Guide of my Assent, and I shall always hearken to it, as containing infallible Truth relating to things of the highest Concernment. And I wish I could say there were no Mysteries in it; I acknowledge there are to me, and I fear always will be. But where I want the Evidence of things, there yet is ground enough for me to believe, because God hath said it: And I shall presently con­demn and quit any Opinion of mine, as soon as I am shewn that it is contrary to any Revelation in the Holy Scripture.

Which Words seem to express so much of a Christian Spirit and Temper, that I cannot believe you intended to give any advantage to the Enemies of the Christian Faith; but whether there hath not been too just occasion for them to apply them in that manner is a thing very fit for you to consider. For in an age wherein the Mysteries of Faith are [Page 38] so much exposed by the Promoters of Scepticism and Infidelity, it is a thing of dangerous consequence to start such new methods of Certainty as are apt to leave mens minds more doubtfull than before; as will soon appear from your own Concessions. For if the ground of Certainty be resolved into the Agreement and Disagreement of the Ideas as expressed in any Proposition; is it not natural e­nough from hence to infer, that from whencesoever this Proposition comes, I must judge of it by the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas contained in it? You make a Distinction between the Certainty of Truth and the Certainty of Knowledge. The former you say, Book 4. Ch. 6. Sect. 3. Is when Words are so put together in Propositions as exactly to express the A­greement or Disagreement of the Ideas they stand for: and the latter, When we perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, as expressed in any Proposition. But our question about Certainty must relate to what we perceive, and the means we have to judge of the Truth and Falshood of Things as they are expressed to us; which you tell us, Is by the A­greement or Disagreement of the Ideas in the Proposition. And in another place, [Page 39] Where-ever we perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of any of our Ideas, Ch. 4. Sect. 18. there is certain Knowledge; and when-ever we are sure those Ideas agree with the Reali­ty of Things, there is certain real Know­ledge: and then conclude, I think I have shewn wherein it is that Certainty, real Certainty, consists, which, what-ever it was to others, was, I confess, to me here­tofore, one of those Desiderata which I found great want of. So that here is plainly a new Method of Certainty owned, and that placed in the Agree­ment and Disagreement of Ideas. But the Author already mention'd, professes to go upon the same grounds, and there­fore it was necessary for me to examine them.

He saith, Christiani­ty not Myst. p. 10. That the simple and distinct Ideas we receive by Sensation and Refle­ction are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning; and that our Know­ledge is in Effect nothing else but the Per­ception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas. P. 12. And that where our Per­ception is not immediate, our Certainty comes from the clear and visible Connexion of Ideas. P. 13. For he saith, That if the Con­nexion of all the intermediate Ideas be not indubitable, we can have no Certainty. [Page 40] Wherein now do his grounds of Cer­tainty differ from yours?

But he applies them to other Purposes. I grant he doth so, and that was it which I had said for your Vindication. But the question now is, whether your ge­neral expression had not given him too much occasion for it?

It is true, that Ch 3. he distinguishes the means of Information from the ground of Perswasion; and he reckons all Au­thority Divine as well as Human among the means of Information: and the ground of Perswasion he makes to be nothing but Evidence; and this Evidence, he saith, lies in our Ideas, Ch. 4. in the Agreement or Disagreement of them, p. 19. and he places Certainty in our clear Per­ceptions of this Agreement or Disagree­ment, which you call clear and visible Connexion of Ideas. And wherein then lies the difference as to the grounds of Certainty?

But his design is to overthrow the My­steries of Faith.

This is too true. But upon what grounds? Is it not upon this Principle, that our Certainty depends upon the clear Perception of the Agreement or Disagree­ment of Ideas in any Proposition. Now [Page 41] let the Proposition come to us either by Human or Divine Authority: If our Certainty depends upon this, we can be no more certain, than we have clear Perception of the Agreement or Disagree­ment of the Ideas contained in it; and so he thought he had reason to reject all Mysteries of Faith, which are contain­ed in Propositions, upon your grounds of Certainty.

But you say, you own the infalli­ble Truth of the Scriptures, and that where you want the Evidence of Things there is ground enough for you to be­lieve, because God hath said it. I do verily believe you, because I have a far greater Opinion of your Sincerity and Integrity than I see reason for, as to the other Person who pretends mightily to own the Authority of Scripture at the same time when he undermines it. For his Words are, The Authority of God or Divine Revelation is the Manifestation of Truth by Truth it self, to whom it is im­possible to lye, p. 16. But when he comes to state the point, how far we are to believe upon Divine Revelation, he hath these Words, Sect. 2. ch. 1. n. 10. The natural Result of what hath been said is, That to believe the Divinity [Page 42] of Scripture, or the Sense of any Passage thereof without rational Proofs, and an evident Consistency is a blameable Credu­lity, and a temerarian Opinion ordinarily grounded upon an ignorant and wilfull Dis­position. And in the next Chapter he saith, That Revelation is not a necessi­tating Motive, but a mean of Infor­mation. Not the bare Authority of him that speaks, but the clear Conception I form of what he says is the ground of my Perswasion. And again, Whoever re­veals any thing, his words must be intelli­gible, and the matter possible. This rule holds good, let God or Man be the Reveal­er. As for unintelligible Relations, we can no more believe them from the Reve­lation of God, than from that of Man. Sect. 2. ch. 2. n. 16. p. 42.

But what are all these things to you, who own, That where you want the E­vidence of things, the Authority of Re­velation is ground enough for you to believe. I do not impute them to you, but I must say, that he alledges no ground for his sayings but your ground of Cer­tainty: For in the same Page he saith, That the conceived Ideas of things are the only subjects of Believing, Denying, Ap­proving, and every other act of the under­standing. [Page 43] All the difference we see is, that he applies that to Propositions in Scripture, which you affirm'd of Propo­sitions in general, viz. that our Certain­ty depends upon the clear Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas contained in them. But I shall do you all the Right I can, as to this mat­ter, by shewing what Reason I had to say, that your Notions were turn'd to o­ther purposes than you intended them, and that I shall make appear from several passages in the same Book.

1. You own the great Defects of Humane Knowledge, B. 4. ch. 3. Sect. 23. notwithstanding the simple Ideas we have by Sensation or Reflection. And from these things,

• 1. The Paucity and Imperfection of our Ideas in general; because our Sensa­tion and Reflection goes so little a way in respect of the vast extent of the Uni­verse; and the infinite Power and Wis­dom of the Creator of it: So that what we see in the intellectual and sensible World, holds no proportion to what we see not: and whatever we can reach with our Eyes or our Thoughts of ei­ther of them, is but a point, almost no­thing in comparison of the rest.
• [Page 44]2. The want of Ideas which we are capable of, because although we have Ideas in general of Bulk,
  Sect. 24, &c.
  Figure and Mo­tion; yet we are to seek as to the par­ticulars of them in the greatest part of the Bodies of the Universe; although we daily see their Effects. And that because of the Distance and Remote­ness of some, and the Minuteness of o­thers, and therefore we cannot come to a scientifical Knowledge in Natural Things, much less to that of Spiritual Beings, of which we have only some few and superficial Ideas.
• Sect 28.
  3. Want of a discoverable Connexi­on between those Ideas we have. Be­cause the Mechanical Affections of Bo­dies have no Affinity at all with the Ideas they produce in us; there being no conceivable Connexion between any Impulse of any sort of Body, and any Perception of any Colour or Smell which we find in our Minds. And so the Operations of our Minds upon our Bodies are unconceiveable by us; And the Coherence and Continuity of Parts of Matter; and the original Rules and Communication of Motion, are such as we can discover no natural Connexion with any Ideas we have.
• [Page 45]4. Want of finding out such interme­diate Ideas,
  Sect. 30.
  which may shew us the A­greement or Disagreement they have one with another. And this for want of due Application of Mind in acqui­ring, examining and due comparing those Ideas; and by ill use of Words, which have so much perplexed and con­founded Mens understanding.

2. You own the many Failings in our Reason. Book 4. Ch. 17. Sect. 1. By which you understand two Faculties in our Minds, viz. Sa­gacity and Illation; the one finding out, and the other ordering the intermediate Ideas; so as to discover the Connexion between them. But Reason, you say, fails, Sect. 9. where our Ideas fail us, and be­cause of the Obscurity, Sect. 10. Confusion or Im­perfection of our Ideas, Sect. 11. both as to Mat­ter and our own Minds, and the Divine Operations; and for want of interme­diate Ideas; Sect. 12. and by proceeding upon false Principles and dubious Expressi­ons.

3. As to Propositions you own these things;

• 1. Those are according to Reason,
  B. 4. ch. 17. 1. Sect. 23.
  whose Truth we can discover, by exa­mining and tracing those Ideas we have by Sensation or Reflection; and by na­tural [Page 46] Deduction find to be true or pro­bable.
• 2. Those are above Reason, whose Truth or Probability we cannot by Rea­son derive from those Principles.
• 3. Those are contrary to Reason, which are inconsistent with, or irrecon­cileable to our clear and distinct Ideas.
• 4. As to Faith and Divine Revelati­on you own,
  • B. 4. ch. 18. Sect. 2.
    1. That Faith is the Assent to any pro­position, not thus made out by deducti­ons of Reason, but upon the Credit of the Proposer, as coming immediately from God which we call Revelation.
  • 2. That things above Reason and not contrary to it, are properly Matters of Faith, and to be assented to on the Au­thority of Divine Revelation.

Thus far I have endeavoured with all possible Brevity and Clearness to lay down your Sense about this matter. By which it is sufficiently proved that I had reason to say, that your Notions were carried beyond your Intention.

P. 59.But you still seem concerned that I quote your Words, although I declare, that they were used to other purposes than you intended them. I do confess to you, that the Reason of it was, that [Page 47] I found your Notions as to Certainty by Ideas was the main Foundation which the Author of Christianity not Mysterious went upon; and that he had nothing which look'd like Reason, if that Prin­ciple were removed; which made me so much endeavour to shew that it would not hold. And so I suppose the Reason of my mentioning your words so often is no longer a Riddle to you. P. 62.

I now proceed to other particulars of your Vindication.

Among other Arguments against this Principle of Certainty, I instanced in the Being of Spiritual Substances with­in our selves, from the Operations of our Minds, which we do perceive by Refle­ction, as Thinking, Doubting, Consider­ing, &c. This Argument I yielded to be very good; but that which I urged from thence was, that it could not be from those simple Ideas of the Operati­ons of the Mind; because you had af­firmed that it is impossible for us by the Contemplation of our Ideas to be certain without Revelation that a mate­rial Substance cannot think. This is a point, in my apprehension, of great consequence, and therefore I must more strictly examine what you say in an­swer to it.

[Page 48] P. 65.Which is, That thinking is inconsistent with the Idea of Self Subsistence, and therefore hath a necessary Connexion with a Support or Subject of Inhesion, i. e. If there be Thinking there must be some­thing that Thinks.

But the question is, Whether that something be a Material or Immaterial Substance? But this Thinking Substance is in your Sense a Spirit. The question I put is, Whether Matter can think or not? If not, then the Substance which thinks must be Immaterial; if it can think, then there can be no evidence from the Idea of Thinking to prove the Substance which thinks to be Imma­terial.

This I take to be plain Reasoning; which you must allow, because it is about the Agreement or Disagreement of two simple Ideas, viz. Matter and Think­ing.

P. 66.But you say, That the general Idea of Substance being the same every-where, the Modification of Thinking, or the Power of Thinking joyned to it makes it a Spirit, without considering what other Modificati­on it has, as whether it has the Modifi­cation of Solidity or not. As on the other side, Substance, which hath the Modifica­tion [Page 49] of Solidity, is Matter, whether it has the Modification of Thinking or not. And therefore if I mean by a Spiritual an Immaterial Substance, you grant that you have not proved nor upon your Principles can it be demonstratively proved, that there is an Immaterial Substance in us that thinks.

I have thus set down your own Words, that you may not complain I have done you Injury. Id. p. 74.82. But when you put in de­monstratively proved, I suppose you mean in the way of Certainty by Ideas; for concerning that our dispute is. And therefore when you add, That you ex­pect that I should conclude it demonstrable from Principles of Philosophy; you must give me leave to say, this is going off from the business before us; which is about your Principles of Certainty from Ideas; for it was only to that purpose, that I brought this argument to prove, that we cannot from our Ideas be cer­tain of one of the points of greatest im­portance, viz. that there is a Spiritual Substance within us; and yet the ope­rations of our Mind are made one of the Sources of those simple Ideas, which are made by you the Foundation of Knowledge and Certainty. So that the [Page 50] point before us is, whether this Asser­tion of yours, That the Power of Think­ing may belong to modified Matter, doth not overthrow your Certainty by I­deas?

No, say you, that which you are certain of by the Idea is only, That there is in us a Spiritual Substance, and that, you say, implies no more than a Thinking Substance, i. e. that by Think­ing you can prove you have a Power of Thinking, which I believe may be demonstratively proved.

But I pray Sir, consider how this question arose, it was from your distin­guishing Spiritual and Corporeal Sub­stances from each other; and saying that we have as clear a Notion of a Spirit as we have of a Body. Against this I urged, that if it be possible for Matter to think, which you assert, then from the Idea of Thinking, we cannot prove the Cer­tainty of a Spiritual Substance within us, where it is plain, that a Spiritual Substance is opposed to the Power of Mat­ter. It is not, whether Matter so modi­fied can think, but whether Matter can think; and let it be modified how it will, Matter is Matter still. But the Power of Thinking makes it a Spirit, say [Page 51] you. But doth it cease to be Matter or not? If not, then it is Matter still en­dued with a Power of Thinking; and so our Idea can be no other, than of a Ma­terial Thinking Substance. But you say further, That the Power of Thinking makes it a Spirit, without considering what other Modifications it has, whether it hath the Modification of Solidity or not. That is, ‘Although it be really a Material Substance, yet the Modifica­tion of Thinking makes it a Spiritual Substance; for we are to go no farther than that Modification of Thinking, and from thence we are to conclude it to be a Spiritual Substance.’ But we are now enquiring not into the bare Modi­fication of Thinking; but whether from thence we can prove an Immaterial Sub­stance within us, or which is all one, a Spiritual Substance as opposed to Cor­poreal, which is your own Distinction. And that I may not be thought to do you injury, I shall produce your own Words.

By the simple Ideas we have taken from our own minds— we are able to frame the complex Idea of a Spirit. B. 2. Ch. 23. Sect. 15. And thus by putting together the Ideas of Thinking, Perceiving, Liberty and Power of mov­ing [Page 52] themselves, we have as clear a Per­ception and Notion of Immaterial Sub­stances, as well as material. So that here we have two things clear.

• 1. That a Spirit and Immaterial Sub­stance are the same.
• 2. That from the Operations of our Minds, we have a clear Idea of an Im­material Substance within us.

Sect. 17.Again you say, That the primary I­deas we have of Body as contradistinguish­ed to Spirit, are the Cohesion of solid and consequently separable parts, and a Power of communicating Motion by Im­pulse. These you think are the Original Ideas proper and peculiar to Body. Here Body is contradistinguished to Spirit; and as it is so, the Cohesion of solid and sepa­rable Parts is made one of the original Ideas proper and peculiar to Body as di­stinguished from a Spiritual Substance: How then, I pray, can a Spiritual Sub­stance consist of solid and separable Parts? For whatever is solid, you grant to be consequently separable. This seems to me to confound the Ideas of Body and Spirit, which you had taken so much care to distinguish; and so must destroy all Certainty of a Spiritual Substance from your Ideas. For although the [Page 53] bare simple Idea of Thinking may be said to be distinct from that of a solid Body; yet it is impossible from that Idea so explained to prove a Spiritual Substance, as distinct from Body. Which was the thing I intended to prove.

But you go on to compare the Com­plex Idea of Spirit and Body in these Words; Sect. 22. Let us compare then our Com­plex Idea of Spirit, without our Complex Idea of Body. Our Idea of Bod [...] is an extended solid Substance, capable of com­municating Motion by Impulse; and our Idea of our Souls is of a Substance that thinks and has a Power of exciting Moti­on in Body by Will and Thought. These you think are our Complex Ideas of Soul and Body as contradistinguished. Here you do not speak of the bare Ideas of Think­ing and Solidity; but of the different Substances, and one is said to be a solid Substance and the other a Substance that thinks.

I shall add one passage more to the same purpose.

The Idea we have of Spirit compared with that we have of Body, Sect. 30. stands thus. The Substance of Spirit is unknown to us, and so is the Substance of Body equally un­known to us. Here we have again the [Page 54] Substance of Spirit and the Substance of Body distinguished from each other; and not the bare Modifications. So that I need no body to answer you but your self. But least such expressions should be thought a mere slip of the Pen; you are pleased again to assert the Notion of an Immaterial knowing Substance to imply no more of a Contradiction than an ex­tended divisible Body. Sect. 31.

And yet after all this you confess, That you have not proved an Immaterial Substance, P. 67. and that it cannot be proved upon your Principles.

What is the meaning of this? I can­not think you intended to lessen the Au­thority of your Book in so considerable a part of it: And I should much rather have thought the latter Passage a slip of your Pen, but that in your Letter you go about to defend it. Therefore I must attend your Motions in it.

P. 68.You say, That all the great ends of Religion and Morality are secured barely by the Immortality of the Soul without a necessary supposition that the Soul is Im­material.

I am of opinion, that the great ends of Religion and Morality are best secured by the Proofs of the Immortality of the [Page 55] Soul from its Nature and Properties; and which I think prove it Immaterial. I do not question whether God can give Immortality to a Material Substance; but I say it takes off very much from the evidence of Immortality, if it depend wholly upon God's giving that, which of its own Nature it is not capable of. For if the Soul be a material Substance it is really nothing but Life; or Matter put into Motion with such Organs and Parts as are necessary to hold them to­gether; and when Death comes, then this Material Substance so modified is lost. God may by his Power grant a new Life; but will any man say, God can preserve the Life of a Man when he is dead? This is a plain Absurdity, and I think no such thing tends to preserve Religion or Morality.

Mr. Hobbes speaks very consonantly to his own Principles (although not to those of Religion and Morality. Leviath. ch. 34.) For he saith, That the universe being the Ag­gregate of all Bodies, there is no real part of it that is not also a Body. And so he saith, That Substance and Body sig­nifie the same thing, and therefore Sub­stance Incorporeal are Words which de­stroy one another. But what then is a [Page 56] Spirit? That, he saith, in the proper signification of it in common Speech, is ei­ther a subtle, fluid, invisible Body, or a Ghost, or other Idol or Phantasm of the Imagination. But is there not an Im­mortal Soul in Man? The Promise of Im­mortality, saith he, is made to the Man and not to the Soul ▪ and Immortal Life doth not begin in Man till the Resur­rection. From whence it is plain, he look'd on the Soul as nothing but the Life; Leviath. ch. 38. and so he saith, That Soul and Life in Scripture do usually signifie the same thing. And in the Vindication of his Leviathan, Vindicat. of Leviath. p. 90, 91. he saith, That his Doctrine is, that the Soul is not a separated Sub­stance, but that the Man at his Resurre­ction shall be revived. And he answers that place, Fear not them which kill the Body, but cannot kill the Soul; thus▪ Man cannot kill a Soul, for the Man killed shall revive again. I think he might as well have said, That Man cannot kill the Bo­dy; for that shall be revived at the Re­surrection.

But what is all this to you? I hope nothing at all. But it shews, that those who have gone about to overthrow the Immortality of the Soul by Nature, have not been thought to secure the [Page 57] great ends of Religion and Morality.

And although we think the separate State of the Soul after Death is suffici­ently revealed in Scripture, yet it cre­ates a great difficulty in understanding it, if the Soul be nothing but Life, or a Material Substance, which must be dis­solved when Life is ended. For if the Soul be a Material Substance it must be made up as others are, of the Cohesion of solid and separate Parts, how minute and invisible soever they be. And what is it which should keep them together, when Life is gone? So that it is no easie mat­ter to give an account, how the Soul should be capable of Immortality, unless it be an Immaterial Substance; and then we know the Solution of the Texture of Bodies cannot reach the Soul being of a different Nature.

And this is no more than what the wisest and most intelligent Philoso­phers have asserted, merely from the consideration of the Nature and Pro­perties of the Soul: as you very well know; and I need not for your sake, run into such a Digression, (or as you call it step out of my way) any farther, then you give occasion for it in what follows. For you tell me, P. 69 You have great Autho­rities [Page 58] to justifie your using a Spiritual Substance without excluding Materiality from it. And for this you refer me to two great men indeed among the Ro­mans, Cicero and Virgil. I was surpri­zed at what you say out of Cicero, ha­ving been no stranger to his Writings about these matters, and I have consul­ted the place you refer to; where you say that he opposes Corpus to Ignis and Anima, i. e. Breath; and that the Foun­dation of his distinction of the Soul from the Body is, because it is so subtle as to be out of Sight. It is a very easie mat­ter to multiply Citations out of Cicero, where Spiritus and Anima are both taken for Breath; but any one who will but read the very beginning of his Tusculan Questions, may understand his meaning. For in the Entrance of that Dispute he takes Animus for the Soul, and neither A­nima nor Spiritus: and he tells us, there were two opinions about it at Death. Some held a Discessus Animi à Corpore, a departure of the Soul from the Body, others said, that the Soul never depar­ted, but was extinguished with Life: and the several opinions he sets down at large, Ch. 9, 10. and then Ch. 11. he summs up the different opinions; and [Page 59] saith he, If it be the Heart, or Blood, or Brain; because it is a Body, it will be extinguished with it: If it be Anima, the Vital Breath, it will be dissipated, if it be Fire, it will be extinguished. It is true, he distinguishes here the Vital Breath from the Body; and no one que­stions such a distinction of the Animal and Vital Spirits from the grosser parts of the Body; but all this proceeds upon the Supposition of those who held no­thing to survive after Death; but then he goes on to those who held the Souls, when they are gone out of their Bodies, to go to Heaven as their proper Habita­tion. And here he plainly supposes the Soul not to be a finer sort of Body, but of a different Nature from the Body which it leaves. Nam Corpus quidem, saith he, quasi vas est & receptaculum Animi, C. 22. and elsewhere he calls the Body the Prison of the Soul, C. 30. and saith, That every wise Man is glad to be dismissed out of the Bonds and Dark­ness of it: and his business in the Body is secernere Animum à Corpore, to draw off the Soul from the Body; which the Philosophers called Commentatio mortis, i. e. a Continual Exercise of Dying; there­fore, saith he, Disjungamus nos à Corpo­ribus, [Page 60] id est, consuescamus mori. Is it pos­sible now to think so great a Man look'd on the Soul but as a Modification of the Body, which must be at an end with Life? Instead of it, there are several things very remarkable in this very Book concerning the Immortality of Souls by Nature;

1. He extremely despises those who made the Soul a mere Mode of Matter which was extinguished with Life; and he saith, they were Plebeii Philosophi, Ch. 23. a mean sort of Philosophers, and in another place minuti Philosophi, De Senect. c. 23. who held there was no Sense after Death. But he represents Cato there, as weary of the Noise and Filth of this World, and longing to go to far better Company. O praeclarum diem, cum ad illud Divinum Animorum Concili­um Coetum (que) proficiscar, at (que) ex hâc turbâ & colluvione discedam! Did these men look on the Souls of Men, as mere Mo­difications of Matter?

2. He urges the general Consent of Nations for the Permanency of Souls af­ter Death. c. 16. and he affirms Nature it self de Immortalitate Animorum tacitè judicare, c. 14. And I do not think the general Consent of Mankind in this [Page 61] Matter, so uncertain, or so slight an ar­gument, as some have made it; even since the late Discoveries: as I think it were no hard Matter to prove; but I shall not here go out of my way to do it.

3. The most ancient Philosophers of Greece held the same opinion as he shews from Pherecydes, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, &c. c. 16, 17, &c. and they went upon far better Reasons than the other, as he proves at large, c. 21, 22, 23.

4. That the Bodies and Souls of Men have a different Frame and Original. Our Bodies, he saith, c. 19. are made of Terrestrial Principles; but the Souls, he saith, are of a divine Original; and if we could give an account how they were made, we should likewise how they were dissolved, c. 14. as we may of the Parts and Contexture of Bodies; but saith he, Animorum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest, nihil est enim in animis mixtum atque concretum, aut quod ex terra natum atque fictum esse videatur, c. 27. So that here he plainly makes a Difference between our Bodily Substance, and that of our Souls, which have no bodily Texture and Composition; because there is no material Substance, which [Page 62] can reach to the wonderfull Faculties and Operations of the Soul; and there­fore he concludes in these words, Sin­gularis est igitur quaedam natura atque vis animi sejuncta ab his usitatis notisque natu­ris. What can express the Soul to be of a different Substance from the Body, if these words do it not? And presently adds, That the Mind is of a divine and Spiritual Nature and above Material Composition as God himself is.

I hope this may give you satisfaction as to Cicero, how far he was from ma­king the Soul a Material Substance. And the only place you produce out of him, c. 22. proves nothing but that the Soul is Invisible, as you may see by look­ing upon it again.

As to Virgil, you quote that Expres­sion, Dum Spiritus hos regit artus; where it is taken for the Vital Spirit; which sense I know no body questions; and so Tully expresses life, quae Corpore & Spiritu continetur, and opposes it to a Life of Immortal Fame, which he there speaks of, Pro Marcello, c. 9. but the only matter in debate is, Whether they excluded any other Notion of Spirit, which was not done, as I have made it appear concerning Cicero, and so I shall of Virgil too.

[Page 63]For soon after, Aeneid 4.385. he hath these Words,

Which shews that Virgil did believe the Soul to be more than a mere Vital Spirit, and that it subsisted and acted in a separate State: And it is observed by Servius, that Virgil uses Spiritus, Mens and Animus for the same. In Aeneid 6.726.

And he proves, that Virgil asserted the Immortality of Souls, and answers the arguments against it; and as far as he could understand, he saith, that our Bodies are from the Elements and our Souls from God; and the Poets intention was, Vt Animos immortales diceret. So that neither Cicero nor Virgil do you any kindness in this matter, being both Assertors of the Souls Immortality by [Page 64] Nature. P. 71. If these will not do you bring me to Scripture, and say, that Solomon himself speaks after the same manner about Man and Beast, as the one dieth, so di­eth the other, yea, they have all one Spi­rit, Eccles. 3.19. I will not dispute about the proper Sense of the Hebrew Word, but I must about Solomon's Sense. For although he makes Life and Death common to Man and Beast; yet he saith, v. 21. The Spirit of a Man goeth upward, and the Spirit of a Beast goeth down to the Earth. But you say, If the Notion of a Spirit excludes Materiality then the Spirit of a Beast must be Imma­terial, as well as that of a Man. I an­swer, that although the bare Word doth not prove it, yet the design of Solomon's Discourse doth, and so the going upward of the Spirit of a Man must be under­stood in a very different Sense, from the going downward of the Spirit of a Beast. For he saith concerning Man, That the Spirit shall return to God that gave it, c. 12.7. To what pur­pose? To be dissipated in the common Air? or to be lost in the vast Confusion of Matter? no, but he concludes his Book thus; v. 14. For God shall bring every Work into Iudgment with every se­cret [Page 65] thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil. If these be Solomon's Words, as no doubt they were, and he were a Man of Sense, and laid his sayings together, as no doubt he did; these last Words must interpret the foregoing, and his other say­ings be made Consonant to this. Yes, you may say, This relates to the general Iudgment, and not to the Soul's Subsistence after Death. But Solomon speaks of the Spirit of a Man going upward at Death, and returning to God that gave it: What Sense is there in this, if it be a Mate­rial Substance which vanishes and is dis­solved then? And if the Soul be not of it self a free, thinking Substance, I do not see what Foundation there is in Na­ture for a Day of Judgment. For where there is nothing but Matter, there is no Freedom of acting; where there is no Liberty, there is no Choice; where there is no Choice, there is no room for Re­wards and Punishments, and consequent­ly no Day of Iudgment. But Solomon po­sitively concludes, there will be a Judg­ment to come as to good and evil Acti­ons in another World, and therefore he must be understood in those Expressi­ons, to mean a Free and Thinking, and consequently an Immaterial Spirit in us.

[Page 66] P. 72.But you urge farther, That our Savi­our himself opposes Spirit to Flesh and Bones, Luk. 24.39. i. e. to such a gross Compages as could be seen and felt. The question then was, whether it were the real Body of Christ or only an Appea­rance of it; and how could this be re­solved better than our Saviour doth? Handle me and see, for a Spirit hath not Flesh and Bones as you see me have. But he calls this a Spirit. What follows? Therefore a Spirit is only an Appearance? I do not think that is your meaning. And no body questions but the name of Spirits is sometimes given to Appariti­ons. But this is far from our case, which is, whether that real Spiritual Substance we find in our selves be Mate­rial or not? Doth a Spiritual Substance imply Matter in its Idea or not? You cannot say it doth: Then it may be Immaterial: But how come we to know things but by their distinct Ideas? Is the Idea of Matter and Spirit distinct or not? If not, to what purpose do we talk of Knowledge by Ideas when we cannot so much as know Body and Spi­rit from each other by them?

Is it then any Absurdity to call a Spiritual Substance Immaterial? P. 73. No, [Page 67] you say, You would not be thought to af­firm, that Spirit never does signifie a pure­ly Immaterial Substance; for in that Sense the Scripture attributes the Notion of Spirit to God, and you have proved from your Principles, that there is a Spiritual Immaterial Substance. And this you think proves an Immaterial Substance in your way of Ideas. But of that after­wards. We are yet upon the proving an Immaterial Substance in our selves from the Ideas we have by Sensation and Reflection. Now, I say, still this is im­possible if the Spiritual Substance in us may be material. And at last you grant, That what I say is true, P. 74. that it cannot upon these Principles be demonstrated. Then, say I, Your grounds of Certainty from Ideas are plainly given up. P. 75. But you say, it may be proved probable to the highest Degree. But that is not the point; for it is not Probability, but Certainty, that we are promised in this way of Ideas; and that the Foundation of our Knowledge and real Certainty lies in them; and is it dwindled into a Pro­bability at last? The only reason I had to engage in this matter was a bold As­sertion, that the Ideas we have by Sensa­tion or Reflection are the sole Matter and [Page 68] Foundation of all our Reasoning: and that our Certainty lies in perceiving the Agree­ment or Disagreement of Ideas as expressed in any Proposition; which last are your own Words. How can we then be certain where we have no Ideas from Sensation or Reflection to proceed by? As in the present case. I have a Mind to be re­solved whether the Soul in Man be an Immaterial Substance or not; and we are to judge of the Truth of it by our Ideas. I ask then, What Idea you have of the Soul by Reflection? You answer, That it is a Thinking Substance. But doth this prove it Immaterial? You an­swer, That you cannot be certain, but that it is very probable. Is not this gi­ving up the Cause of Certainty? But you say, P. 81. You never offer'd it as a way of Certainty where we cannot reach Certainty. But did you not offer to put us into the way of Certainty? What is that, but to attain Certainty in such things, where we could not otherwise do it? And what a strange way is this, if it fails us in some of the first Foundations of the real Knowledge of our selves? But you say, If I dislike your way, you desire me to shew you a better way of Certainty as to these points.

[Page 69]I am sensible that you design herein, P. 81. to draw me out of my way to do you a kindness; but I will so far gratifie you at this time; and to oblige you the more, I will make use of no other Prin­ciples or Ideas, than such as I meet with in your Book; and from thence I do not despair of proving, that we may be certain that a material Substance cannot think.

And the method I shall proceed in, shall be to prove it, by such ways and steps as you have directed me to, al­though you might not think to find them so laid together.

1. From your general Principles as to Knowledge and Certainty. You say, That all our Knowledge consists in the view the Mind hath of its own Ideas; Book 4. Ch. 2. Sect. 1. which is the utmost Light and greatest Certainty, we with our Faculties and in our way of Knowledge are capable of. Here you resolve our Knowledge and Certainty into the view of the Ideas in our Minds; therefore by those Ideas we may come to know the Certainty of things; not in the Frame and inward Essence of them, as you often tell us; but by the Powers and Properties which belong to them. Whatever, say you, be the se­cret [Page 70] and abstract Nature of Substance in general, Book 2. ch. 23. Sect. 6.14. all the Ideas we have of particu­lar distinct Substances, are nothing but several Combinations of simple Ideas And you take pains to prove, Sect. 7. That Powers make a great part of our complex Ideas of Substances: and their secondary Qualities are those which in most of them serve prin­cipally to distinguish Substances one from another; Sect. 8. which secondary Qualities, as has been shewn are nothing but bare Pow­ers. So that our Knowledge cannot reach the inward Substance of things; and all our Certainty of Knowledge as to them, and their Distinction from each other, must depend on those Pow­ers and Properties which are known to us.

One would think sometimes, that you would allow Mankind no more Know­ledge than suits with the Conveniencies of Life; Sect. 12. but this would overthrow the great design of your Book, which is to put us into a way of real Certainty by the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas; Book 4. Ch. 4. Sect. 18. and where ever we perceive the Agree­ment or Disagreement of any of our Ideas, there is certain Knowledge. So that here you own we may come to a Certainty of Knowledge (which is beyond mere [Page 71] Probability) and that by perceiving the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas.

2. If we can find the Disagreement of any two Ideas upon your own Princi­ples, we must do those of Body and Spirit. For the Idea of Matter in gene­ral, you say, B. 3. ch. 10. Sect. 15. That in Truth it contains nothing but the Idea of a solid Substance, which is every-where the same, every­where uniform. And that Body stands for a solid extended figured Substance. So that Solidity, Extension and Figure are the inseparable Properties of Bodies. And in another place you have these Words, B 2. ch. 23. Sect. 17. The primary Ideas we have pe­culiar to Bodies as contradistinguished to Spirit, are the Cohesion of solid and con­sequently separable Parts, and a Power of communicating Motion by Impulse. These you think are the original Ideas proper and peculiar to Body, for Figure is but the consequence of finite Extension. Here we have the Idea of Body laid down by your self as contradistinguished to Spi­rit. Therefore by your own confession we may perceive the Disagreement of these two Ideas of Body and Spirit, and consequently may certainly know their Distinction from each other by their in­separable Properties. But if it be pos­sible [Page 72] for Matter to think, then these I­deas must be confounded: Yet you di­stinguish the Ideas of a Material and Immaterial Substance in these Words, B. 2. ch. 23. Sect. 15. Putting together the Ideas of Thinking and Willing, and the Power of Motion or Rest added to Substance, we have the I­dea of a Spirit, and putting together the Ideas of solid coherent Parts, a Power of being moved, joyned with Substance, we have the Idea of Matter. The one is as clear and distinct an Idea as the other; the Idea of Thinking and Moving a Body be­ing as clear and distinct Ideas, as the I­deas of Extension, Solidity and being moved. Can any thing now be plainer than the Disagreement of these two I­deas, by the several Properties which belong to them? But if after all this Matter may Think, what becomes of these clear and distinct Ideas? And yet you have th [...]se Words, Thus by putting together the Ideas of Thinking. Percei­ving, Liberty and Power of moving them­selves and other things, we have as clear a Perception and Notion of Immaterial Substances as we have of Material. Here it is plain, that you make Thinking and Perceiving to be part of the Complex Idea of an Immaterial Substance. How [Page 73] is this possible, if a Material Substance be capable of Thinking as well as an Immaterial? either therefore you must renounce your own Doctrine of Cer­tainty by Ideas, or you must conclude, that Matter cannot think.

3. But I urge this yet further from your Notion of Liberty and Necessity. B. 2 ch. 21. Sect. 8. Liberty, you say, is the Idea of a Power in any Agent to do or forbear any Action, according to the Determination or Thought of the Mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other. So that Liberty cannot be, where there is no Thought, no Volition, no Wish. Sect. 13. And again, Agents that have no Thought, no Volition at all are necessary Agents. But you make a Power of Thinking and Liberty to be parts of the Complex Idea of an Immaterial Substance, in the Words before cited. But what Liberty can you conceive in mere Matter? For you grant, That Bodies can operate upon one another only by Impulse and Motion; B. 2. ch. 8. Sect. 11. that the Prima­ry Qualities of Bodies which are insepara­ble from it, Sect 10. are Extension, Solidity, Fi­gure and Mobility from any Body. Now how can the Idea of Liberty agree with these simple Ideas of Body? To be mo­ved only by Impulse from another Body; [Page 74] and from the free Determination of our own Thoughts; are two Ideas as disa­greeing with each other, as we can well imagine. But if Matter may Think, it may have Liberty too, because you join these together; but if it be unca­pable of Liberty which goes along with Thinking, how can you imagine it should be capable of Thinking?

I argue, from your Notion of Perso­nal Indentity, which you place in self Consciousness. B. 2. ch. 27. Sect 9. For you tell us, That a Person is a thinking intelligent Being that has Reason and Reflection; and can consider it self, as it self, the same think­ing thing in different times and places; which it does only by that Consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and seems to you essential to it. From whence it follows, that if there can be no Self-con­sciousness in Matter, then it cannot think, because it wants that which you say is Essential to it. It being impossible, for any one to perceive, but he must perceive, that he doth perceive. But what is there like Self-consciousness in Matter? Or how is it possible to apprehend that meer Body should perceive that it doth per­ceive? For Bodies, you say, operate on­ly by Impulse and Motion; i. e. one Bo­dy [Page 75] upon another. But how can a Body operate upon it self without Motion? Those you call the Secondary Qualities of Bodies, are only you say, the effect of the Powers in some Bodies upon others endued with Sense and Perception. So that the effects of these Powers in Bo­dies, or of the Primary Qualities of Bulk, Site, Figure, Motion, &c. is not upon themselves but upon other Bodies, ei­ther by changing those Primary Quali­ties in them by different Site, Figure, Motion, &c. or producing those Effects in us, or which we call Sensible Qualities. But either of these ways there is no pos­sibility for Matter to operate upon it self in a way of Self-consciousness. If then every intelligent thinking Being have this so inseparably belonging to it, that you say, It is impossible, for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he doth perceive; and it be impossible from the Idea of Matter to make out that a meer Body can perceive that it doth perceive, I think it is more than probable in the way of Ideas that Matter cannot think.

5. I argue, from the power of Ab­stracting which you make proper to a thinking Substance. B. 2. ch. 11. Sect. 9. This is done, say you, by considering Ideas in the Mind as [Page 76] separate from the Circumstances of Time and Place. And this power of ab­stracting, you add, Sect. 10. puts a perfect di­stinction between Man and Brutes; and is an Excellency which the Faculties of Brutes do by no means attain to.

Letter, p. 27.You tell me, That you did not say the chief Excellency of Mankind lies chiefly, or any ways, in this that Brutes cannot abstract; for Brutes not being able to do any thing, cannot be any Excellency of Mankind. But I hope it is the Excel­lency of Mankind, that they are able to do what the Brutes cannot: And you say, This puts a perfect distinction between Man and Brutes; and I had thought in comparing Man and Brutes that which put a perfect Distinction was the chief Ex­cellency with respect to them. But let that be as it will; the thing I insist up­on is, the power of Abstracting follow­ing that of Thinking so closely that you utterly deny it to Brutes; but if it may be in the power of Matter to think, how comes it to be so impossible for such Organized Bodies as the Brutes have to inlarge their Ideas by Abstraction? Pom­ponatius thinks to avoid the Argument from Abstraction to prove the Souls Ima­teriality, De Immort. Animae. c. 9. by saying, That in the most [Page 77] abstract Speculation the Mind rests up­on Particulars; Vniversale in singulari speculatur. But this doth not reach the force of the Argument; which is not, whether the Mind hath not an Eye to Particulars, when it forms Universal No­tions; but whether the power of form­ing such Abstract Ideas from Particulars do not argue a Power which meer Mat­ter can never attain to: And all that Philosopher hath said, doth not amount to the least Proof of it.

6. Lastly, I argue from the Reason you give, why God must be an Immate­rial Substance. Let. p. 139. For these are the words in your Letter. And the Idea of an E­ternal, actual, knowing Being is perceiv­ed to have a Connection with the Idea of Immateriality, by the Intervention of the Idea of Matter, and of its actual Divisi­on, Divisibility and Want of Perception, &c. Here the want of Perception is own­ed to be so essential to Matter, that God is therefore concluded to be Immaterial; and this is drawn from the Idea and Es­sential Properties of Matter, and if it be so Essential to it, that from thence you concluded God must be an Immaterial Substance, I think the same Reason will hold, as to any thinking Substance. Because [Page 78] the Argument is not drawn from any thing peculiar to the Divine Perfections, but from the general Idea of Matter.

P. 73.But after all, you tell me, That God being Omnipotent, may give to a System of very subtil matter, Sense and Motion. Your words before were, a Power to perceive or think; and about that, all our debate runs; P. 66. and here again you say, That the Power of Thinking joined to Matter, makes it a Spiritual Substance. But as to your Argument from God s Omnipotency, I answer, That this comes to the same Debate we had with the Papists about the Possibility of Transub­stantiation. For, they never imagin'd, that a Body could be present after the manner of a Spirit in an ordinary way, but that by God's Omnipotent Power it might be made so: but our Answer to them was, That God doth not change the Essential Properties of things while the things themselves remain in their own Nature: And that it was as re­pugnant for a Body to be after the man­ner of a Spirit, as for a Body and Spirit to be the same. The same we say in this Case. We do not set bounds to God's Omnipotency: For he may if he please, change a Body into an Immate­rial [Page 79] Substance; but we say, that while he continues the Essential Properties of Things, it is as impossible for Matter to think, as for a Body by Transubstan­tiation to be present after the manner of a Spirit; and we are as certain of one as we are of the other. These things I thought necessary on this occasion to be cleared, because I look on a mistake herein to be of dangerous Consequence as to the great Ends of Religion and Mo­rality: which, you think, may be secured although the Soul be allowed to be a Mate­rial Substance; but I am of a very dif­ferent Opinion: For if God doth not change the Essential Properties of things, their Nature remaining: then either it is impossible for a Material Substance to think, or it must be asserted, that a Pow­er of thinking is within the Essential Properties of Matter; and so thinking will be such a Mode of Matter, as Spi­noza hath made it: and I am certain you do not think, he hath promoted the great Ends of Religion and Mora­lity.

I shall now proceed to consider the Arguments for proving a Supream Imma­terial Substance, which you freely al­low to be so. And my Design, as I [Page 80] said, was to shew, that the certainty of it is not placed upon any clear and di­stinct Ideas, but upon the force of Rea­son distinct from it.

P. 87.To this you answer, That Knowledge and Certainty in your Opinion, lies in the Preception of the Agreement or Disagree­ment of Ideas, such as they are, and not always in having perfectly clear and di­stinct Ideas. But those who offer at clear and distinct Ideas, bid much fairer for Certainty than you do; and speak more agreeably to your original grounds of Certainty. P. 88. For your Relative Idea, which you here run to again is no cer­tainty at all from the Idea, but from the plain Evidence of Reason, that Acci­dents cannot support themselves.

I pass over all which I think I have sufficiently answered already; as when you spend so many Pages about my using the Plural Number when your words are only mentioned, &c. But I shall pass over nothing which may seem to an indiffe­rent Reader to require any farther Con­sideration.

P. 101.Whether you took this way of Ideas from the Modern Philosopher mention­ed by you, is not at all material; but I intended no Reflection upon you in it [Page 81] (for that you mean by my commending you as a Scholar of so great a Master) I never meant to take from you the Ho­nour of your own Inventions; P. 103. and I do believe you when you say, That you wrote from your own Thoughts, and the Ideas you had there. But many things may seem New to one that con­verses only with his own Thoughts, which really are not so; as he may find when he looks into the Thoughts of o­ther Men which appear in their Books. And therefore, although I have a just Esteem for the Invention of such who can spin Volumes barely out of their own Thoughts; yet I am apt to think they would oblige the World more, if after they have thought so much themselves, they would examine what thoughts o­thers have had before them concerning the same things, that so, those may not be thought their own Inventions, which are common to themselves and others. If a man should try all the Magnetical Experiments himself, and publish them as his own Thoughts, he might take him­self to be the Inventor of them; but he that examines and compares them with what Gilbert and others have done before him, will not diminish the Praise of his [Page 82] Diligence, but may wish he had compa­red his Thoughts with other Mens, by which the World would receive greater Advantage, altho' he lost the Honour of being an Original.

P. 106. The Matter of Certainty, you say, one cannot imploy too many Thoughts about, viz. as to the finding the true Grounds of it, or wherein it is placed. This I was led to consider, by our Vnitarians placing it in clear and distinct Ideas; and therefore rejecting the Mysteries of Faith, because they could not have clear and distinct Ideas of them. And one wrote purpose­ly to shew that we were not to believe any Mysteries in the Gospel, because all our Certainty depended upon the Preception of the Agreement or Disagreement of those simple Ideas which we have by Sensation or Reflection. Now if these Principles of Certainty hold good as to all Propo­sitions we can have no Certainty of Faith, where we cannot perceive the Connexion of the Ideas contained in them. I own that you say, That Faith is an Assent to any Proposition not made out by any Deductions of Reason, but upon the Credit of the Proposer. But this doth not clear the matter; for, is Faith an Vnreasonable Act? Is it not an Assent [Page 83] to a Proposition? Then, if all certainty in Acts of Reason be derived from the perceiving the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas contained in it, either there can be no Certainty of the Reasonable Act of Faith, or the Grounds of Certain­ty must be laid some other way. But you say, Where you want Evidence of things there is yet Ground enough for you to believe because God hath said it. Which doth not yet remove the Difficulty, from the true Ground of Certainty; for say they, Revelation is but a means of Information; and God discovers by that such Propositions, which we could not have found out without Revelation; but where­ever Propositions are offered to our Vn­derstandings, we must judge of them by our Perception of the Agreement and Dis­agreement of the Ideas contained in them. And Faith doth not overthrow Nature: If therefore the Nature of Certainty lies herein we cannot be certain without it.

Is it not enough for you to disown the Consequence, but to shew that it doth not follow from your Principles of Certainty: But of this I have spoken al­ready, and I love not Repetitions. I only take notice, that you Assert and hold to the same. P. 107. I stick to my own plain way of Certainty by Ideas. And so do [Page 84] those who reject the Mysteries of Faith, because not agreeable to their Ideas, and think they proceed upon your Grounds.

But you say, That according to my Rules you know not where to place Cer­tainty; Ib. for in the Account I give of Des Cartes, I have these words concerning him. ‘The first thing he found any Certainty in, was his own Existence, which he founded upon the Perception of the Acts of his Mind. From hence he proceeded to enquire how he came by this Certainty, and he resolved it into this, that he had a clear and distinct Preception of it. And from hence he formed his general Rule, that what he had a clear and distinct Perception of was true. Which in Reason ought to go on farther, than where there is the like Degree of Evidence; for the Cer­tainty was not grounded on the clear­ness of the Perception, but on the plainness of the Evidence. Which is of that nature that the very doubting of it proves it, since it is impossible that any thing should doubt or questi­on its own being that had it not. So that here it is not the clearness of the Idea, but an immediate Act of Percep­tion, which is the true ground of Cer­tainty. And this cannot extend to [Page 85] things without our selves, of which we can have no other Perception, than what is caused by the Impression of outward Objects. But whether we are to judge according to those Im­pressions doth not depend on the Ideas themselves, but upon the Exercise of our Judgment and Reason about them, which put the difference between true and false, and adequate and inadequate Ideas, so that our Certainty is not from the Ideas themselves, but from the Evidence of Reason, that those I­deas are true and just, and consequent­ly, that we may build our Certainty upon them.’

These I acknowledge to be my words; and yet I see no Reason why I may not stick to them. P. 107. But you say, That I have placed the Grounds of Certainty of our own Existence, sometimes in the plainness of Evidence, in opposition to the clearness of Perception; sometimes in the immedi­ate act of Perception in opposition to the clearness of the Idea; and the certainty of other things without us in the Evi­dence of Reason, that these Ideas are true and just in opposition to the Ideas them­selves; so that such is your Dulness you cannot by these Rules tell, where to place Certainty.

[Page 86]But all these Mists will easily be scat­tered, if you set your self a little to con­sider the Design of my Discourse; which was not, to lay down Rules of Cer­tainty, but to shew that the Grounds of Certainty from clear and distinct Ideas were not well laid at first by Des Cartes himself. Because he deduced his Rule as to Certainty of other things, from the Evidence he had as to his own Existence, which he had both from immediate Per­ception and uncontroulable Evidence, when even the Doubting of it necessa­rily proved it. But the main Question was, whether this would reach to other things without us: Yes said he, the Rule will hold, where-ever there are clear and distinct Ideas. But I say the Cer­tainty doth not depend upon the Idea but upon inward Perception and the E­vidence founded upon it; and we have not the same as to External Objects: For we have no inward Perception of them, nor any Evidence that results from our own Beings; therefore the Rule of Certainty is carried beyond the true Ground of it. I do not oppose in the former Case the plainness of the E­vidence to the clearness of the Perception; but I suppose them both as to our own [Page 87] Existence. I say indeed after, that it is not the clearness of the Idea, but an im­mediate act of Perception which is the true Ground of Certainty as to our own Existence; but there I take Idea as Des Cartes did, for the clear and distinct Perception of our Minds, which might reach to other Objects as well as our selves; and such an Idea I deny is the Ground of Certainty as to our own Be­ings, which is founded on an immediate Act of Perception. And when they prove this as to such outward Objects, which we have the Ideas of, they may then carry the Rule so far; but I say the Case is vastly different, as to a clear Perception we have from our own Acts, and that which we have as the Impres­sions from outward Objects; in the for­mer Case we have such an Evidence, as it is impossible to doubt of, but the ve­ry doubting must prove it: Is it the same as to the Ideas of External Ob­jects? And as to these I do not deny, but we may come to a Certainty: but I say, it is not from the Ideas, which may be true or false, adequate or inade­quate, and whether we may be certain of them or not, depends upon the Ex­ercise of our Reason and Judgment a­bout [Page 88] them. So that I found the Cer­tainty of Ideas upon Reason, and not Reason upon the Certainty of Ideas.

And so I come more closely to consi­der the Argument from the Idea as to the Proof of a Supream Immaterial Sub­stance.

If our Certainty did arise from clear and distinct Ideas then it must hold, where we have a clear and distinct Idea, as it is confessed we have concerning God. But this Argument from the I­dea will not be allowed in this Case; it is denied by others plainly; but I do not say, that it is denied by you, but that it is made a doubtfull thing. Which comes to the same, in the point of Cer­tainty: and so the force of my Argu­ment doth by no means fail. P. 110

P. 113.But you say, That you intended by your words not to deny that the Idea of a most perfect Being doth prove a God, but to blame those who take it for the only proof, and endeavour to invalidate all others. For the Belief of a God being the Foun­dation of all Religion and genuine Mora­lity you thought no Arguments that are made use of to work the Perswasion of a God into mens Minds should be invalida­ted, which you grant is of very ill Conse­quence. P. 114.

[Page 89]Here you must give me leave to ask you, what you think of the universal Consent of Mankind, as to the Being of God? Hath not this been made use of, as an Argument not only by Chri­stians, but by the wisest and greatest Men among the Heathens? And what then would you think of one who should go about to invalidate this Argu­ment? And that by proving, that it hath been discover'd in these latter Ages by Navigation, that there are whole Nations at the Bay of Soldania, in Bra­sil, in the Caribbe Islands, and Para­quaria, among whom there was found no Notion of a God, And even the Au­thor of the Essay of Human Vnderstand­ing hath done this. B. 1. Ch. 4 Sect 8.

This cannot be thought a mere slip of the Pen. For men do not quote Authors so punctually then. But if it would not be thought stepping too much out of my way, I think I could prove that these Instances are very ill chosen, because ei­ther they were taken from such as were not sufficiently acquainted with the People and Language of the Country; or that their Testimony is contradicted by those who have been longer among them and understood them better; or [Page 90] lastly that the account given of them makes them not fit to be a standard for the Sense of Mankind, being a People so strangely bereft of common Sense, that they can hardly be reckoned a­mong Mankind, as appears by the best accounts both of the Cafres of Soldania, and the Caiguae of Paraquaria.

But this would be too much a Di­gression in this place. I return therefore to the argument for proving the Exi­stence of God; and you may plead for your self that your design was only to prove, That there is no Innate Idea of a God. But doth not this however take off from the force of an Argument some have used to perswade Men that there is a God? I meddle not with Innate Ideas; but have not some Persons of Note, in these Matters, used the Argument from the Mark and Character of God imprinted on the Minds of Men to prove his Being? And have you not set your self to dis­prove it? Ch. 4. Sect. 12.

But I leave this, and come to the argument from the Idea of God, con­cerning which you say, P. 119. That though the Complex Idea for which the Word God (whether containing in it the Idea of neces­sary Existence or no, for the case is the [Page 91] same) will not prove the real Existence of a Being answering that Idea, any more than any other Idea in any ones mind will prove the real Existence of any real Being answering that Idea, yet you conceive it does not hence follow, but that there may be other Ideas by which the Being of God may be proved.

And afterwards you offer to shew that your Proof of a Deity is all grounded on Ideas, P. 123. P. 125. P. 121. i. e. from the Ideas of our selves, as we are thinking Beings. But you con­fess, that you think, that the argument from the Idea will not hold, but how­ever you will not give up the argument from Ideas. Against which I urged your own argument, That from the Consideration of what we find in our selves and in our Constitutions, our Reason leads us to the Knowledge of this certain and evi­dent Truth, that there is an eternal, most powerfull, and most knowing Being. All which, I said, I did readily yield; but we see plainly, the Certainty is not placed in the Idea, but in good and sound Reason from the Consideration of our selves and our Constitutions. To which you reply, P. 120 That you never thought the Consideration of our selves and our Constitutions excluded the Consideration [Page 92] of the Idea of Being or of Thinking, two of the Ideas that make a part of the Com­plex Idea a Man hath of himself. But is the Reason you speak of, which leads us from thence to the Knowledge of an eternal, most powerfull, and most knowing Being, con [...]ained in the Com­plex Idea of a Man or not? A Complex Idea is made up of simple Ideas, all simple Ideas come in by Sensation or Reflection; and upon comparing these simple Ideas our Certainty you say is sounded. What simple Ideas then are there in Man, upon which you ground the Certainty of this Proposition, That there is a God? I grant you, that there is a Certainty grounded upon our Beings and the Frame of our Natures; but this I still say, is a Certainty of Reason and not of Ideas

P. 128.You say, You do not well understand what I mean by being not placed in the Idea; for you see no such Opposition, but that Ideas and sound Reason may stand to­gether ▪ i. e. in Reason rightly managing those Ideas so as to produce Evidence by them. But what need all this great noise about Ideas and Certainty, true and real Certainty by Ideas: if after all, it comes only to this, that our Ideas [Page 93] only represent to us such things, from whence we bring arguments to prove the Truth of things? But the World hath been strangely amuzed with Ideas of late, and we have been told, that strange things might be done by the help of Ideas, and yet these Ideas at last come to be only common Notions of things, which we must make use of in our Reasoning. P. 127. You say, in that Cha­pter about the Existence of God, you thought it most proper to express your self in the most usual and familiar way, by common Words and Expressions. I would you had done so quite through your Book; for then you had never given that Occasion to the Enemies of our Faith to take up your new way of Ideas, as an effectual Battery (as they ima­gin'd) against the Mysteries of the Chri­stian Faith. But you might have en­joy'd the satisfaction of your Ideas long enough, before I had taken notice of them, unless I had found them employ'd in doing Mischief.

But at last you tell me, P. 132. That whether I will call it placing the Certainty in the Idea, or placing the Certainty in Reason; or if I will say, it is not the Idea that gives us the Argument, but the Argument, [Page 94] it is indifferent to you. And if you mean no more by your Certainty from Ideas, but a Certainty from Reason, I am not such an unreasonable Man to disagree with you.

The next Argument for the Existence of God stands thus, as I have summ'd it up.

We find in our selves Perception and Knowledge. So that there is some Knowing, Intelligent Being in the World. And there must have been a Knowing Being from Eternity, or an Unknowing; for something must have been from Eternity: but if an Unknow­ing, then it is impossible there ever should have been any Knowledge, it being as impossible for a thing without Knowledge to produce it, as that a Tri­angle should make three Angles bigger than two right ones.

To which I added, that allowing the Argument to be good, yet it is not taken from the Idea, but from Principles of true Reason, as that no Man can doubt his own Perception; that every thing (we see) must have a Cause; that this Cause must either have Knowledge or not; if it have, the point is gain'd; if it hath not, nothing can produce no­thing, [Page 95] and consequently a not knowing Being cannot produce a Knowing.

In your Answer to this, I must first take notice of your Exception to that Expression, Allowing the Argument to be Good; P. 145. which you say, seems to imply that I thought the Argument not to be Good, which was very far from my meaning. For I had said before, That you brought very good Arguments to prove the Existence of a God in that Chapter: and afterwards, That I was far from weak­ning the force of your Arguments. And so I hope that Exception is removed.

You except not, P. 136. you say, against my Arguments or Principles of Reason: but you think still, P. 137. this is an Argument taken from Ideas: if you will think so, I can­not help it. But you endeavour to shew, That the very Principles you allow are founded upon Ideas: As that a man can­not doubt of his own Perception; This, you say, is by perceiving the necessary Agreement of the two Ideas of Perception and Self-Consciousness. But I rather think, it is from that Self-Evidence which attends the immediate Percepti­on of our own Acts, which is so great, Cum enim duo sint ge­nera rerum quae sciuntur, unum earum quae per sen­sus corporis percipit ani­mus, alterum earum quae per scipsum▪ multa illi Philosophi garrierunt con­tra corporis sensus; ani­mi autem quasdam fir­missimas per seipsum per­ceptiones rerum verarum, quale est illud, Scio me vivere, nequaquam in dubium vocare potu­erunt. De Trin. l. 15. c. 12. that as S. Augu­stin observes, the Academicks [Page 96] had nothing to say against that kind of Certainty, but only against that which a­rose from things convey'd by our Senses to our Mind.

The next Principle that every thing must have a Cause, must be understood of the Matter treated of, i. e. the things we see and perceive in the World. You say, It is a true Principle that every thing that hath a Beginning must have a Cause, because by contemplating our Ideas we find that the Idea of Beginning is connected with the Idea of some Operation; and that with the Idea of something operating which we call a Cause, and so the Beginning to be, is perceived to agree with the Idea of a Cause, as is expressed in the Proposition. Is not here a great ado to make a thing plain by Ideas, which was plainer with­out them? For is not any Man who understands the meaning of plain Words satisfied that nothing can produce it self? or, That what is not cannot make it self to be? And so the evidence doth not depend on the Agreement of the Ideas of Beginning, and Operation, and [Page 97] Cause; but upon the Repugnancy of the contrary Supposition. As in that Principle, That it is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time: If you say, that this depends upon the Disagreement of the Ideas of Not-Being and Being, it will be to little purpose for me to say any more about it.

But there is one thing which deserves to be consider'd; P. 139. which is the Connexi­on between the Idea of an Eternal, Actu­al, Knowing Being with the Idea of Im­materiality. This was the thing I look'd for. And by what means now doth this Connexion between these two Ide­as appear? By the help of an Intermediate Idea. What is that? Even the Idea of Matter. How so? The Idea of Matter you tell us, implies its Actual Division, Divisibility, and want of Perception, &c. which are the Arguments you use in this Proof. Are they so indeed? And will not the same Ideas prove our Souls to be Immaterial? If want of Perception be in the very Idea of Matter, how can Matter be made capable of Perceiving? But I find you do not always attend to the Agreement or Disagreement of your own Ideas. But of this before.

[Page 98]I proceed to the last Argument I pro­duced to shew, that your Proofs of the Existence of God doth not depend upon Ideas. And the Substance of it I thus put together. If we suppose nothing to be first, Matter can never begin to be; is bare Matter without Motion be Eter­nal, Motion can never begin to be; if Matter and Motion be supposed Eternal, Thought can never begin to be. For if Matter could produce Thought, then Thought must be in the Power of Mat­ter; and if it be in Matter as such, it must be the inseparable Property of all Matter, which is contrary to the Sense and Experience of Mankind. If only some Parts of Matter have a Power of Thinking, how comes so great a diffe­rence in the Properties of the same Mat­ter? What Disposition of Matter is re­quir'd to Thinking? And from whence comes it? Of which no account can be given in Reason. This I took to be the Force of your Argument, which I said, I was far from designing to weaken: Only I observed that the Certainty of it is not placed upon clear and distinct I­deas, but upon Reason distinct from it; which was the Thing I intended to prove.

[Page 99]But you say, P. 142 You do not see but the same proof may be placed upon clear and distinct Ideas, and upon Reason too. I hope this matter is made a little clearer to you; having so fully shew'd to you before, that in the way of Ideas you can come to no Certainty about any Substance, but by Reason as it is di­stinct from the Ideas; i. e. as to Mate­rial Substances that your Certainty is resolved into this Principle of Reason, that Accidents cannot subsist without a Substratum.

As to Spiritual Substance in us, that depends on two things,

• 1. That Thinking is only a Mode, and must suppose a Substance.
• 2. That Matter cannot think, and therefore it must be an Immaterial Sub­stance; which I have proved from your own Principles.

As to a Supreme Immaterial Substance, the evidence depends upon this Reason, that Matter and Motion cannot produce Thought; and therefore an Eternal Thinking Being must be Immaterial. And that Matter and Motion cannot produce Thought, is proved by this Reason, that either it must be an inse­parable Property of Matter; or some [Page 100] account in Reason must be given why some part of Matter should think and not others. And doth not all this pro­ceed upon Reason as distinct from I­deas?

And when I said, That the Certainty of it, i. e. the Argument is not placed on clear and distinct Ideas, but upon the force of Reason distinct from it, I meant the Certainty from ideas, although it were not so clearly expressed as it might have been; but here I observe you call for the Plural Number, which you are so offended with in other Parts of your Letter.

The next thing I undertook to shew was, that we can have no clear and di­stinct Idea of Nature and Person from Sensation or Reflection. Here you spend many Pages to shew that this doth not concern you. Let it be so. But it concerns the Matter I was upon; which was to shew that we must have Ideas of these things which we cannot come to by Sensation or Reflection.

My words are, I grant that by Sen­sation or Reflection we come to know the Powers and Properties of Things. But our Reason is satisfied, that there must be something beyond these, be­cause [Page 101] it is impossible that they should subsist by themselves. So that the Na­ture of things properly belongs to our Reason, and not to mere Ideas. Still you are at it, P. 157. That you can find no Oppo­sition between Ideas and Reason: but Ide­as are the Objects of the Vnderstanding, and Vnderstanding is one of the Faculties imploy'd about them. No doubt of it. But you might easily see that by Rea­son, I understood, Principles of Reason, allow'd by Mankind. Which I think are very different from Ideas. But I perceive Reason in this Sense is a thing you have no Idea of, or one as obscure as that of Substance. But if you set a­side these common Principles of Reason, your Ideas will signifie very little; and will like Accidents want a Substratum to support them.

But your Notion of Nature and Per­son deserves to be more throughly con­sider'd. Therefore to proceed more clearly in a debate of this Consequence with respect to the Doctrine of the Tri­nity (what-ever you pretend to the con­trary) I shall first set down your Noti­ons of Nature and Person from your own Words, and then enter upon the Examination of them.

[Page 102] P. 165.As to Nature, you tell me in short it is this, That it is a Collection of several Ideas combined into one Complex Abstract Idea. Which when they are found united in any Individual Existing, though joyn­ed in that Existence with several other Ideas, that Individual is truly said to have the Nature of a Man, or the Nature of Man to be in him: for as much as all these simple Ideas are found united in him, which answer the Complex Abstract Idea to which the specifick name Man is given by any one; which Abstract Specifick Idea keeps the same, when he applies the Specifick Name standing for it, to distinct Individuals, i. e. no body changes his Idea of a Man, when he says, Peter is a Man, from that Idea which he makes the Name Man to stand for, when he makes John a Man.

P. 216.As to Person in the way of Ideas, you tell us, That the Word Person in it self signifies nothing, and so no Idea belonging to it, nothing can be said to be the true Idea of it; but when any Language appro­priates it to any Idea, then that is the true Idea of a Person and so of Nature. These are therefore the signs of two Ideas they are put to stand for; P. 217. and by enume­ration all the simple Ideas that are contain­ed [Page 103] in the Complex Idea that each of them is made to stand for; we shall immediate­ly see the whole difference that is between them.

After which, you conclude, That you must content your self with this con­demned way of Ideas, and despair of ever attaining any Knowledge by any other than that, or farther than that will lead you to it.

But this must not hinder me from enquiring a little more strictly into these Notions of Nature and Person, for if these hold, I do not see how it is possible to defend the Doctrine of the Trinity. For if these terms really signi­fie nothing in themselves, but are only Abstract and Complex Ideas, which the common use of Language hath appropriated to be the signs of two Ideas; then it is plain, that they are only Notions of the Mind, as all Abstracted and Complex Ideas are; and so one Nature and three Persons can be no more.

We must therefore examine what your Notion is, of Abstracted and Com­plex Ideas, and how it can be applied to Nature and Person: and whether they are only signs of such Ideas as People have agreed to signifie by them.

[Page 104]To explain this, I must give an ac­count, as well as I can, from your self, how these Abstracted and Complex Ideas come to be formed in our Minds, and what is implied in them. [...] 2. ch. 1. Sect. 5. The Vnder­standing, you say, seems to you not to have the least glimmering of any Ideas which it hath not by Sensation or Refle­ction. These and their several Modes and the Compositions made out of them, we shall find contain our whole stock of Ideas; and that we have nothing in our Minds which did not come in one of these two ways. Ch. 2. Sect. 1. Sect. 2. From hence you consider the several sorts of Ideas, some Simple and some Complex. The simple Ideas are the Materials of all our Knowledge; and when the Vnderstanding is once stored with these simple Ideas, it has the Power to repeat, compare and unite them, even to an al­most infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new Complex Ideas: But no un­derstanding can make one new simple Idea, not taken in by the ways before mention'd, nor can it destroy those that are there. After you have given an account of the simple Ideas both ways, you come to the Faculty of Discerning in our Minds, and there you reckon up, Ch. 11. Distinguishing Ideas, Comparing, Compounding and Ab­stracting.

[Page 105]The Reason of Abstraction, Sect. 9 you say, is to have one general Name for many Par­ticulars, or else Names would be endless. Which Abstraction is performed by sepa­rating the Ideas of particular Objects from the Circumstances of real Existence, as Time, Place, &c. Complex Ideas are those simple Ideas which the Mind unites as one Idea. Ch. 12. Sect. 1. But still it is confin'd to those simple Ideas which it received by Sensation or Reflection, which are the ul­timate Materials of all its Compositions.

Of these you reckon, Modes, Sect. 3. Substan­ces and Relations.

The Ideas of Substances are such Com­binations of simple Ideas, Sect. 6 as are taken to represent particular things subsisting by themselves. And these are of two sorts, one of single Substances as they exist sepa­rately, as of a Man, &c. the other of se­veral of these put together as an Army of Men.

In your Chapter of Complex Ideas of Substances ▪ Ch [...]. Sect. 3. you affirm the Ideas of par­ticular Substances to be made by a Combi­nation of simple Ideas: and again, that it is by such Combination of simple Ideas as co-exist in some unknown cause of their Vnion. Sect. 6, 14

[Page 106] Sect. 33. That the Complex Ideas we have of God and separate Spirits are made up of the simple Ideas we have by Reflection; by inlarging the Ideas we find in our selves.

B 3. ch. 3. Sect. 2.In your 3d Book you consider gene­ral Terms. And the Reason of them, you say is because it is beyond the power of Human Capacity to frame and retain distinct Ideas of all Particulars. And these are made by way of Abstraction from Circumstances of Time and Place. After which you tell us, Sect. 6. That General Natures are nothing but Abstract Ideas; and the whole Mystery of Genera and Spe­cies, Sect. 9. which make such a noise in the Schools, is nothing else but Abstract Ideas with Names annexed to them. From whence, Sect. 11. you say, it is plain, that Gene­ral and Vniversal, belong not to the real Existence of Things, but are the Inven­tions and Creatures of the Vnderstanding; made by it for its own use and concern only Signs whether Words or Ideas. Sect. 12. And the Abstract Idea and the Essence of the Spe­cies or Genus of the same thing: Sect. 14. and eve­ry distinct, abstract Idea is a distinct Es­sence.

But then you distinguish the Real and Nominal Essence. Sect. 15. The former is the Real, [Page 107] Internal Constitution of particular things; and the Nominal is the Abstract Idea. But there is so near a Connexion between them that the Name cannot be attributed to any particular Being, Sect. 16. but what has this Es­sence, whereby it answers that Abstract Idea, whereof that Name is the Sign.

These things you repeat and inlarge upon in several other places, but this I think is the substance of what you say upon this matter: For I would not wil­lingly mistake or mis-represent your Meaning.

The Question now between us comes to this, Whether the common Nature or Essence of Things lies only in an Ab­stract Idea, or a General Name, and the Real Essence consists only in particular Beings from which that Name is ab­stracted?

The Question is not, Whether in forming the Notion of Common Nature, the Mind doth not abstract from the Circumstances of particular Beings? But it is whether there be not an Ante­cedent Foundation in the Nature of things upon which we form this Ab­stract Idea? For it there be, then it can­not be called an universal Name only: or a meer sign of an Idea, which we have [Page 108] formed from putting many simple I­deas together, which Name belongs to all of such a sort, as have those simple Ideas united together. I know not how it comes to pass, that a Man spinning Books out of his own Thoughts should hit so luckily upon the Thoughts of another Man: I do not mean now, about clear and distinct Ideas, but about this Point of universal Names. Leviath. ch. 4. For Mr. Hobbs in his Chapter of Speech, tell us, That Names were to serve for Marks or Notes of Remembrance, and therefore were cal­led Signs. Of these Names, some are pro­per and singular to one thing, as Peter, John, this Man, this Tree; some are com­mon to many things, as Man, Horse, Tree, in respect of all which it is called an Vniver­sal, there being nothing in the World V­niversal but Names; for the things nam'd, are every one of them individual and sin­gular.

One universal Name is imposed on ma­ny things, for their similitude in some Quality or other Accident; and whereas a proper Name bringeth to mind one thing only Vniversals recall any one of those many.

And of Vniversals some are of more, or less Extent, the larger comprehending [Page 109] the less large, and some of equal ex­tent, &c.

This is enough to let you see that these Notions are not so peculiar but that another Person, from his own Thoughts too, had said much the same things.

But whoever said or thought them first, we must examine how reasonable these Thoughts are.

I know no Body that thinks now-a­days, that Vniversals exist any where by themselves; but I do think, that there is a difference to be made between that and making them meer Names, or signs of Ideas.

I. And the Reasons I go upon are these. In the first place, we are agreed, that there is a supream immaterial most perfect Being; whose Essential At­tributes do not depend upon our Arbi­trary Ideas; nor any Names or Signs of Honour we give him, nor upon the meer Inlarging the Ideas of our own Per­fections; or such as we account to be so in our selves: for we attribute those to God which we are not capable of, as Eternity or Necessary Existence, Immu­tability, &c. Herein, we take up no Complex Ideas from several Individuals; [Page 110] but we form a true Idea of a Divine Es­sence, from such Attributes as are Essen­tial to an infinitely perfect Being, which being Infinite is thereby, Incomprehen­sible by us. And so you own, that the great God of whom and from whom are all things is incomprehensibly Infinite. B. 2. ch. 17. Sect. 1. And that God is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow Capacities.

II. In the next place, we look on this Supream Being, as the wise Creator of all things, who hath ordered the seve­ral Sorts and Ranks of Beings in the World according to his own Eternal Wisdom; and hath given them all such Properties as himself thought fit, where­by they are really and essentially di­stinguished from one another; as ap­pears by Mankind, and Brutes, and Plants. And no man that ever imploys his own Thoughts can think, that these are distinguished from each other, only by an Act of our Minds.

III. Among these it is evident, that there are some things, wherein they a­gree; and some wherein they differ. They all agree in being real, created Be­ings, and having a sort of Life belong­ing [Page 111] to them. But they differ, that some have Sense, which others have not; and some have Reason and Understand­ing which others want. And all this, is so plain and evident, that one might question, whether those had Under­standing or not, who could think the difference of these from each others was not in their Natures, but only depend­ed on the several Names that we call them by.

IV. Among the Individuals of the same kind, there is an Agreement in the same Essential Properties; as all Men in being Rational Creatures; and there is a Real Difference from each other in the several Accidents that belong to them; as to Time, Place, Qualities, Relati­ons, &c. And no Man in his Senses can call this in question. For his most plain and simple Ideas will inform him of it.

V. The Question now is, Whether that wherein they do all agree, be a meer Vniversal Name and Abstract Idea or not.

It is certain, that what God created is no meer Name or Idea: It is certain, [Page 112] that God created not only Individuals but the several Kinds, with the Diffe­rences, which they have from each o­ther; it is certain, that these Differences do not lie in meer Names or Ideas: How comes it then not to be certain that there is a Real Common Essence or Nature in the Individuals of the same kind?

But it comes not to us in the way of I­deas. If it be so, the way of Ideas and Reason are two different ways; and I shall never forsake one for the other, unless I could see better Reason for it; and even then I should not; but adhere to Reason still.

But how doth it appear by Reason, that Nature is any thing else but a Col­lection of several Ideas combined into one Complex Abstract Idea.

That will be done by considering,

• 1. What these Ideas are, which are so collected into a Complex Idea; which is called Nature.
• 2. What that Essence is which is im­plied in this Idea; whether it be a Real or only a Nominal Essence.

1. What these Ideas are, of which this Complex Idea of Nature consists; and they are said to be, the simple Ideas of particular Substances united together, [Page 113] without the Circumstances of Time and Place. But those simple Ideas may be considered two ways.

• 1. With respect to the Qualities of things, and these Ideas are said to be true and adequate; but they go no far­ther than the Qualities; which reaches only to that Sense of Nature, as it is ta­ken for Properties.
• 2. With respect to the Subject of them, which is the Nature or Substance that supports them, and of this you confess we have only imperfect and inadequate Ideas.

As they are true and adequate; and so they are not the true Representations of Things without us, but of the Effects of such Powers in them as produce Impres­sions in us; which are those you call Secondary Qualities. P. 169 And in that Sense I take your words. And of these I said, that we can understand nothing really by them but the Effects they have up­on us; i. e. the Powers and not the I­deas. The Ideas are the Impressions on our Minds; and by these we can un­derstand nothing but the Effects which the Powers in outward Objects have up­on us, and consequently not the Nature of them. This I take to be plain Sense.

[Page 114]To this you Answer Two things;

• P. 170.
  1. That we certainly know to distin­guish things by Ideas, supposing them no­thing but Effects produced in us by these Powers, as if they were Representations.
• P. 171.
  2. That we have certainly as much pleasure and delight by those Ideas, one way as the other.

Granting all this to be true, what is it to the Complex Idea of Nature, which arises from these simple Ideas? Nature is a Collection of several Ideas combined into one Complex Abstract Idea. But the simple Ideas acquaint us not with the Nature of the Objects, but only with the Powers which are in them; by the help of Bulk, Size, Figure and Motion; which you call the Primary Qualities. B. 2. ch. 8. Sect. 10, 15, 17, 23. Now these, you say, are really in the things themselves; whether the Senses perceive them or not; and the Ideas of these are the true Resemblances of what exists in the Objects; i. e. that by the Impressions we find in our selves, we are certain that there are Bodies of a deter­minate Bulk, Size, Figure and Motion. And this is all, we can by these simple Ideas come to, as the Nature of Corpo­real Substances. But suppose one should ask how we can understand, the Nature [Page 115] of these Operations of the Primary Qua­lities in producing the Secondary; we are soon answered, Sect. 25. that there is no con­ceivable Connexion between them and that Reason cannot shew how Bodies by their Bulk, Figure and Motion should produce in the Mind, the Ideas of Blue, Yellow, &c. And so we are extremely helped by these simple Ideas in understanding the Na­ture of any particular Substance. For the sensible Qualities in us are only the Effects of certain Powers in the Ob­jects, caused by their Bulk, Size, Fi­gure and Motion; but if we ask how they are produced, we are plainly told, that our Reason by these simple Ideas can reach to no knowledge of it. And so we are left in as much Ignorance, as ever as to the Manner how Things with­out us produce Ideas in us.

But say you, P. 174. By these simple Ideas, we can as certainly distinguish the Beings wherein those Powers are, and receive as certain Advantages from them, as if those simple Ideas were Resemblances.

As to Advantages from them, that is quite out of our Enquiry; which is con­cerning the Idea of Nature? as it is a Complexion of simple Ideas; and all that it amounts to is, that by these simple I­deas, [Page 116] we understand the Distinct Powers in several Bodies to produce Impressions in our Minds; and by the secondary Qua­lities we find in our selves, we are cer­tain of the primary Qualities in Bodies, from their different Bulk, Size, Figure and Motion. But still we have nothing but an Idea of Qualities, which goes no farther than the Essential Properties; but the Idea of Nature goes farther and implies that Being wherein those Qualities are; and that I said, which is the subject of Powers and Properties is the Nature or Substance of it; which in this respect is the same. Have we any Adequate Idea of this?

To this you say:

P. 176.2. That all Ideas of Substances, which are referr'd to Real Essences are in that respect Inadequate. This is what your self own to be your Sense; and is as much as I desire. For, I pray consider what a fine Abstract Complex Idea you have given us of Nature. Our Ade­quate Ideas go no farther than Quali­ties, and if we enquire into the Real Essence, or Substance that supports them, we are told that they are Inadequate; and consequently we can have no true Notion or Idea at all of it.

[Page 117]But you say farther, P. 178. that you do not affirm, That Abstract Ideas are only ge­neral Names. For you assert a Real Es­sence in things; the internal unknown Constitution is the Real Essence; and the Abstract Idea is the Nominal Essence.

The former you tell me, P. 181. you do rea­dily own; viz. That Essence which is in particular Substances; but the Question before us is, Whether that which is in more Individuals than one, be a Real or only a Nominal Essence.

2. And this is that, which we are next to Examine. To clear this, I put the Instance of the Sun, where an Es­sence was said by you to be in one Indi­vidual; and yet more Suns might agree in it. In this one Sun there is a Real Essence, and not a meer Nominal and Abstracted Essence: upon which I asked, If there were more Suns, would not each of them, have the Real Essence of the Sun? For what is it makes the second Sun, to be a true Sun, but having the same Real Essence with the first? If it were but a Nominal Essence, then the Second would have nothing but the Name.

Here I must examine your Answer, as far as I can understand it: For here in­deed you may complain of the want of [Page 118] clear and distinct Ideas; but I will do what I can to explain that which I con­ceive to be your Sense.

P. 190.You say, This doth not at all concern the Real, but the Nominal Essence.

How is this possible? Is there not the Real Essence of the Sun in that Individu­al, we call the Sun? But I put the Case, that there were a Multiplication of Indi­viduals; and there were more Suns: would not each of these have the Real Essence of the Sun? If it were only a Nominal Essence, the rest would have only the Name.

P. 191.But you say, you did not mean the real Essence of the Sun was in that Indivi­dual. How could you mean otherwise, when you acknowledge the Real Essence to be in particular Substances? And is not the Sun a particular Substance? But the Idea of it being a Complex and Ab­stracted Idea, could not be the Real Es­sence. I answer, That the Essence of the Sun being communicated to another is a Real Essence; or else, the Second is but the Name and nothing else.

You tell me, That you say expressly, that our distinguishing Substances into Species by Names, is not at all founded on their Real Essences. And I think it [Page 119] is clear to any one that understands things, and not meer Ideas; that another true Sun must have the Real Essence of a Sun.

You ask, What I mean by a true Sun. I answer, That which hath the Essence of a Sun; and that the Name cannot be truly applied to that which hath it not. Yes, say you, it may to any thing, which hath united in it that Combination of sensible Qualities, by which any thing else that is called Sun is distinguished from other Substances, i. e. by the Nomi­nal Essence. So that now the Abstract Complex Idea is owned to be nothing but a Combination of Qualities in one Idea.

But I must still ask, what becomes of this Combination of Qualities in the second Sun, if there be not a Real Es­sence to support them? You grant it when the second Sun comes to exist. And if it does not exist, how can it be the Second Sun?

Should it be true, P. 193. say you, that the Real Essence of the Sun were in any of the fixed Stars, yet it could not be called by us the Sun, whilst it answers not our Complex Idea, or Nominal Essence of a Sun. If the Real Essence of a Sun be in a fixed Star, it is really a Sun, whether [Page 120] you call it so or not; as a Laplander is as really a Man whatever you call him, if he hath the Essence of a Man. And it is strange to me to find any Man dispute such evident things.

And so I come to the Instance of the Individuals among Men. I said, that there must be a Real Essence in every In­dividual of the same kind. Peter, Iames and Iohn are all true and real Men; not by attributing a general Name to them; but because the true and real Essence of a Man is in every one of them.

P. 195.But you say, I first suppose them to be Men: no otherwise than as they are Individuals of the same kind.

Your Weweena, Cuchepy and Coushe­da I have nothing to say to, they may be Drills for any thing I know; but Peter, Iames and Iohn are Men of our own Country, and we know them to be several Individuals of the Race of Mankind: And what is it makes them Men, but that the true and real Essence of a Man is in every one of them? Yes, say you, P. 197. if making be taken for the Effi­cient Cause. Whoever dreamt of a Spe­cifick Essence being the Efficient Cause? But I said, that it was the true and real Essence of a Man, which made every [Page 121] Individual a true and real Man; of which I said we are as certain, as that we are Men. P. 198. That, say you, is only by our Senses finding those Properties, which an­swer the Abstract, Complex Idea, which is in our Minds of the Specifick Idea to which we have annexed the Specifick Name Man. I leave to you the Honour of this Scholastick Language, which is al­ways most proper when there is no­thing under it. I love to speak plain Sense if I can, and so as to be under­stood by every one that is acquainted with these Matters: but these Specifick Names and Abstract and Complex Ideas, I think tend to confound Mens Appre­hensions; who can never think other­wise, but that every Man is said to be a true real Man; not for any Specifick Name, but because his Properties shew him to be endued with the true real Es­sence of a Man. I said, that the gene­ral Idea is not made from the simple I­deas, but by meer Act of the Mind ab­stracting from Circumstances, but from Reason and Consideration of things.

You Reply, P. 199. That you thought Reason and Consideration had been meer Acts of the Mind, when any thing was done by them. I hope the Ideas you have of [Page 122] the Acts of your own Mind, are clear­er than those you have of other Mens. For it is plain, I opposed your General and Abstract Idea by a meer Act of the Mind, to a Rational Inference from the Nature and Properties of things. For I added; for, when I see so many Indivi­duals, that have the same Powers and Properties, we thence inferr, there must be something common to all, which makes them of one kind; and if the difference of Kinds be real, that which makes them of one kind and not of another, must not be a Nominal but a Real Essence. Is there now no diffe­rence between these Two Acts of the Mind, viz. Abstraction and Ratiocina­tion.

P. 201.And you grant, that the Inference is true. But you say, it doth not follow, that the general or specifick Idea is not made by the meer Act of the Mind. Where do I deny that Abstraction is made by an Act of the Mind? But that is not the Question; but whether the Notion of Essence in Individuals of the same kind, be a meer Act of the Mind by Abstracti­on, or have a real Foundation in the Na­ture of Things? i. e. whether it be a Real or a Nominal Essence.

[Page 123]But you say, P. 20 [...]. There may be Objections to the Name of Nominal Essence. My Ob­jection is not to the Name, but to the Thing you understand by it, viz. that there is nothing beyond Individuals but Names, which utterly overthrows the Difference of Nature and Person. For if there be nothing really, but an indi­viduated Essence, then it must follow, that there can be no difference of Hy­postases in the same Nature: For Nature individuated must take in the Hyposta­sis; and Nature being taken as common is affirmed by you to be nothing but an Abstract and Complex Idea, and a mere Nominal Essence.

You say, P. 203. That we cannot know the differences of things by their real Essences. And what then? Do I ever deny, that the difference of kinds is to be under­stood from the different Properties? But we are not upon our Knowledge of the difference of Species, but upon the Real and Nominal Essence.

And I shew'd that the real Essence doth not depend upon Complex Ideas; because if men mistake never so much in the Combination of Ideas, yet the same Essence remains; as I instanced in the Essence of a Man, a Horse and a Tree.

[Page 124] P. 210.True, you say, Our Thoughts or Ide­as cannot alter the real Constitutions of things that exist; but the Change of Ide­as can and does alter the signification of their Names, and thereby alter the kinds, which by these Names we rank and sort them into.

But this doth by no means reach the point, which is not concerning our sorting of Things, which is by Names, but God's sorting them, when he made them of different kinds. For so I said, that the Essences remain always the same, because they do not depend on the Ideas of Men, but on the Will of the Creator, who hath made several sorts of Beings.

P. 212.All the Answer you give is this, That the real Constitution or Essence of particular things existing, do not depend on the Ideas of Men, but on the Will of the Creator, but their being ranked into sorts, under such and such Names, does depend and wholly depend upon the Ideas of Men.

But my Argument did not proceed upon particular things existing, but up­on the several kinds of God's making, and is it possible for you to think that the kinds are not of his making, but that [Page 125] Men only by their Ideas make the several sorts? If so, I have very little hopes to remove you from your Ideas; but I am bound to do what in me lies to hinder such Notions from overthrowing the Mysteries of our Faith.

And it is a great satisfaction to me to find, that these Notions of Ideas, as far as they tend that way, have so very lit­tle Foundation in Reason, or rather are so manifestly repugnant to them.

Before I conclude my self, I must take notice of your Conclusion, viz. That you must content your self with this con­demned way of Ideas, and despair of ever attaining any knowledge by any other than that, or farther than that will lead me to it. Which is in effect to say, that you see no way to avoid Scepticism but this: but my great Prejudice against it is, that it leads to Scepticism, or at least, that I could find no way to attain to Cer­tainty in it upon your own grounds.

For (1.) you say, Book 4. Ch. 1. Sect. 1. That Knowledge to you seems to be nothing, but the Percepti­on of the Connexion and Agreement or Dis­agreement, and Repugnancy of any of our Ideas. In this alone it consists. Whence it unavoidably follows, that where we [Page 126] can have no Ideas, we can have no Knowledge.

But you go about to prove, That there are many more Beings in the World, Ch. 3. Sect. 23. of which we have no Ideas, than those of which we have any; and that one holds no Proportion to the other. So that we are excluded from any Possibility of attaining to knowledge, as to the far greatest part of the Universe for want of Ideas; and yet you say, That he that will consider the infinite Power, Wisdom and Goodness of the Creator of all things, will find Reason to think it was not all laid out upon so inconsiderable, mean and im­potent a Creature, as he will find man to be, who in all Probability is one of the lowest of all intellectual Beings. And not long after, Sect. 27. you say, That the Intellectu­al World is a greater Certainly and more beautifull World, than the Material.

But whence comes this Certainty, where there can be no Ideas? Is a gene­ral Reason sufficient without particular Ideas? Then why not in other cases as well?

2. Suppose we have no Ideas of the Intellectual World, yet surely we may have as to the visible World: No, you [Page 127] say, Sect. 24 That although we have Ideas of Bulk, Figure and Motion in general; yet not knowing what is the particular Bulk, Fi­gure, and Motion of the greatest part of the Bodies of the Vniverse, we are igno­rant of the several Powers, Efficacies and Ways of Operation, whereby the Effects we daily see are produced. These are hid from us in some things by being too remote, in others by being two minute.

So that you confess, Sect. 26. We can attain to no Science, Sect. 27. either as to Bodies or Spi­rits. And what a narrow compass must our Knowledge then be confined to? You confess, Sect. 25. We have no Ideas of the Mechanical Assertions of the minute Par­ticles of Bodies; and this hinders our cer­tain Knowledge of universal Truths con­cerning natural Bodies; and our Reason carries us herein very little beyond par­ticular matter of Fact. Certainty and Demonstration we must not in these things pretend to. So that all Certainty is gi­ven up in the way of Knowledge, both as to the visible and invisible World, or at least, the greatest part of them.

3. But still it is to be hoped, that where we have Ideas, we may come to a Certainty in discerning the Connexion [Page 128] between them. Sect. 28. No, you say, Another Cause of our Ignorance is, the want of a discoverable Connexion between those Ide­as we have. What! are we at a loss here too, and yet all our Certainty de­pend no the perceiving the Agreement and Disagreement of Ideas? Yes, you confess, That the Mechanical Affections of Bodies having no Affinity at all with the Ideas they produce in us, we can have no distinct Knowledge of such Operations beyond Experience. And the Operations of our Minds on our Bodies is as unconcei­vable.

4. But by the help of Intermediate Ideas, may we not come to find out the certain Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, so there be due Application of the Mind to it? B. 4. ch. 2. Sect. 2. Yes, say you, This may be done, and this is that we call Reasoning, and those intervening Ideas are called Proofs: and where the Agreement or Disagreement is clearly and plainly per­ceived, it is called Demonstration. But how if this way of Demonstration be made impossible? What benefit can we have of it in the way of Certainty: Each step, Sect. 7. you tell us, That Reason makes in demonstrative Knowledge must have in­tuitive [Page 129] Evidence; for else, you say, that Intermediate Idea would need a Proof. And for want of this, Men often embrace Falshoods for Demonstrations. But if there be no way of coming to De­monstration but this, I doubt we must be content without it.

5. You give no reasonable Satisfacti­on in the way of Ideas, as to the plain­est Evidence of Sense concerning the Ex­istence of external Objects. For there is no Intuition of the Mind, nor Demonstrati­on in this Case; and all the evidence in your way must be from the Ideas in our Minds, which are supposed to arise from external Objects; but the questi­on is, how from these Ideas within our selves, we can prove the certain Exi­stence of Objects without our selves. Because men may have such Ideas in their Minds by the power of Imagination, when there are no Objects to produce them? You say, Ch. 2. Sect. 14▪ A man is invincibly conscious to himself of a different Perception, in seeing the Sun in the Day, and remembring it in the Night, and tasting of Wormwood and smelling of a Rose, and thinking of it afterwards. But this doth not clear the main difficulty, which is, how from [Page 130] the Idea of the Tast of Wormwood or Smell of a Rose I can prove the actual Being of such things without me, since you grant, that there is no conceivable Connexion in Reason, between the Powers in the Objects and the Ideas in us: and if there be not, how can we be certain in the way of Ideas? I do not speak, as to Pain or Pleasure, but as to the Evi­dence from the Ideas in our selves. For the most that you say is, That a Man may perceive a very manifest difference between dreaming of being in a Fire, and being actually in it, because of the Pleasure or Pain that follows the Appli­cation of certain Objects; which Certainty is as great as our Happiness or Misery, be­yond which we have no Concernment to know or to be. But the present difficul­ty is not merely about the difference between sleeping and waking; and I grant you, that a Man's being sensible of Fire touching him, will effectually convince him that he is not in a Dream: but the point before us is, when we are sensi­ble we are awake, what it is in the way of Ideas, which can satisfie us of the real Existence of external Objects. For you confess, [...] Sect. 1. That the having the Idea of [Page 131] any thing in our Mind, no more proves the Existence of that thing, than the Pi­cture of that Man evidences his being in the World, or the Visions of a Dream make a true History. How then can we come to any Certainty in the way of I­deas? The Account you give is this, Sect. 2. that the actual receiving Ideas from with­out, makes us know that something doth ex­ist at that time without us, which causes that Idea within us. Which is in other terms to remove the Certainty from the Idea to the mere Act of Sensation: but all our Dispute hath been not about the Certainty either of Sense or Reason; (which I freely yield to) but about a particular way of Certainty by the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas; and of this I shew that you give no sa­tisfactory Account, as to the Existence of the plainest Objects of Sense. For you say, The Certainty lies in perceiving the Connexion between Ideas; and here you grant, That Reason cannot perceive the Connexion between the Objects and the Ideas, how then should we possibly attain any Certainty in the way of Ide­as? So that your self gives up the way of Certainty by Ideas.

[Page 132]I might easily pursue this matter far­ther; but I think this is sufficient to let you see, you have no such cause to be so well contented with this condemned way of Ideas, as you are pleased to call it.

And now to conclude, I am very far from being an Enemy to any free En­quiries into the Nature and Reasons of Things, and would be glad to find any real Discoveries that way. And I can easily bear the putting of Philosophical Notions into a modern and fashionable Dress.

Let Men express their Minds by Ide­as if they please; and take Pleasure in sorting and comparing and connecting of them; I am not forward to condemn them; for every Age must have its new Modes, and it is very well if Truth and Reason be received in any Garb. I was therefore far enough from condemn­ing your way of Ideas, till I found it made the only ground of Certainty, and made use of to overthrow the Mysteries of our Faith, as I told you in the begin­ning. This was it which made me look more narrowly into it at first, and now to give you this Trouble of an Answer to your Letter.

[Page 133]I hope that in the managing this De­bate, I have not either transgressed the Rules of Civility, or mistaken your Meaning, both which I have endea­vourd to avoid. And I return you thanks for the Civilities you have ex­pressed to me through your Letter; and I do assure you, that it is out of no Dis-respect, or the least ill will to you, that I have again consider'd this Mat­ter, but because I am farther convin­ced, that as you have stated your No­tion of Ideas, it may be of dangerous consequence as to that Article of Chri­stian Faith, which I endeavour'd to de­fend.

I am no Lover of Controversies, how­ever I have been often engaged in them; but I have that satisfaction in my mind, that my design was to pro­mote that, which upon my best Enqui­ries, I thought to be Truth; and by such means as were most sutable to the pursuit of it, without any Bitterness a­gainst those I opposed. But of all Truth, I am convinced, that it is fittest for me to employ the Remainder of my Days in what concerns the Vindication of our Holy Religion contained in the Scriptures, [Page 134] which gives us the only sure Grounds to hope for a Blessed Immortality. And in the Defence and Practice of that, I hope, by the Grace of God both to live and die.