Preliminary First.

1. THE Author of the Essay concerning Human Understanding, having sin­cerely levelled the aim of his En­deavours at the attainment of Truth in Philosophy, which can only be had by clear­ing the way to Science; hence, this being the sole End we have, both of us, prefixt to our selves, the best Method (in common) which I can take in my Reflexions on that Learned Trea­tise is, to keep my Eye still directed to that end, and to take my measures from the Order and Rapport which our respective Positions, or Dis­courses, may be conceived to bear to that best Design.

[Page 2] 2. This premis'd, my first Preliminary Reflex­ion shall be upon his making use, throughout his whole Work, of The using the word [Idea] in dispa­rate Senses, ob­structs the way to Science. the word (IDEAS) as the Chief, or rather only Materials, of which, according to him, we are to frame immediately all our Know­ledges. Which being so, it follows that, if the sense of that word be not it self Clear, but Equi­vocal; and if, as taken in one Sense, it be mani­festly nothing at all to Science, nor can be any Material of it; and, as taken in the other, it may and must conduce to it, nay, be the Sole ime­diate Ground and Origin of all Science; I cannot but think, that the promiscuous usage of that Word in such Disparate Senses, (it being of so general Concern, and running through that whole Book) must necessarily encumber and per­plex in a high Measure the way to Scientifical knowledge.

3. One of his Secondary Designes was (as he expresses himself in his Epistle to the Reader) to remove the Rubbish Philosophical Words generally used, not to be laid a side without great Ne­cessity. in order to the building up Science, and to beat down the Vanity and Ignorance of those who have re­duced Philosophy, which is nothing but the Knowledge of Things, to insignificant School-Terms. This is certainly a very necessary and a very laudable Design; it being evident to all in­genuous Lovers of Truth, that never was there more need of a Reformation, than there has been of Philosophy in these last Centuries; to second him in which I have not failed on my part to contribute my endeavours. Yet, notwithstanding [Page 3] I do not think we ought, without great and ne­cessary occasion, alter those words which have been accepted and used by the Learned World (such as it was) hitherto: Especially such words as are proper and Univocal, such I take the word [Notion] to be; much less to sub­stitute another, which I must Much less chang'd for others less proper. think is less proper, and withall highly Equivocal, or Ambiguous, I mean the word (IDEA.) I know this inge­nuous Author apologizes for his frequent using it; and I am apt to think he did this out of Ci­vility towards our Modern Philosophers, who have brought it into fashion: For, he gives no reason why he did not rather constantly use the word (Notion;) which, importing a part of Cogni­tion, does most certainly better suit with a Treatise about Human Understanding.

4. As for the Sense in which he takes the word (IDEA) he professes that he uses it to express whatever is meant by Mr. L's Acception of the word [Idea] very Ambiguous. Phantasm, Notion, Species, or what­ever it is that the mind can be em­ploy'd about in thinking. Which manifests that he uses that word very Equivocally: For a Phantasm, and a Notion, differ as widely, as Body and Spirit; the one being a Corporeal, the other a Spiritual Resemblance; or rather, the one being a Resem­blance, or a kind of Image, or Picture; the other the thing Resembled, as will be seen hereafter. Again, 'tis agreed to by all the World, that Brutes have Phantasms, but they can have no Notions; for these are the Elements, or Materialls, whose agreeable Connexion furnishes our Mind with Science; of which Beasts, which have no [Page 4] Mind, are incapable; and therefore it were both unnatural, and to no purpose, to put Notions (which are the Primary Affections of the Mind) in those meer Animals. I am more at a loss to find, that, in the last page but one in his Epistle to the Reader, he seems to contradistinguish Notions to Ideas; which how it consists with the indifferency he grants the word (Idea) here to signify Notions, I cannot at all comprehend.

5. I must confess, it is generally a fruitless contest to dispute about a Word, which is nothing but a Sound, or The Ambiguity of it not clear'd by him. a Character, were but the deter­minate Meaning of it told us by the user of it: Let it be A, or B, or what he pleases, provided the distinct Sense of it be clearly manifested by the Writer, or Speaker, it were, in that case, Logomachy, and impertinent Cavil, to except against it. But, when the Author's own Explication of it does, (contrary to the Nature of Explications) declare it is used ambiguously, it laies a force on me to remark it; lest it may lead the Reader, (as it infallibly must) into great Errors, unless it's double Sense be warily distin­guisht in the ensuing discourse; which I have not observed to be done any where by this other­wise accurate Author.

6. From this undistinguish'd Ambiguity of the word (Idea) it follows naturally, that even his own excellent Judgment, and consequently, his Reader's, must necessarily sometimes deviate; and, tho' his general intention was only to pur­sue the Knowledge of Things, yet he must needs be sometimes mis [...]ed at unawares to entertain Fancies for Real Knowledges; as will occasional­ly [Page 5] be shown hereafter. For the present I cannot omit one particular, it being of such main im­portance.

7. The Author believes all sorts of Animals to have, in some degree, Perception. Now Perception (as I conceive) The putting Brutes to have Know­ledge, associates them with Man­kind. signifies Knowledge; for, under what sort of material Action to rank it, I confess my self at a loss: But, let it be only the first step and degree towards Knowledge, and the in-let of all the Materials of it, still he says, the dulness of the faculties of some Brutes, makes them remote from that Knowledge which is to be found in some Men: So that it seems in other Men there may possibly be no more Knowledge (at least in some things) than in Brutes; nor does he any more than probably conjecture, that Beasts have not the power of comparing, which may be observed in M [...]n, belonging to general Ideas, and useful to abstract Reasonings. Now, this so jumbles together Spiri­tual Natures with those which are meerly Corpo­real, that, if this be so, we shall be at some loss to know our own Kind, to define what Man is, or to distinguish our selves from our younger Bro­thers in knowledge, Brutes, or our Souls from theirs: For, if by Ideas there be meant Notions, (as his Expressions leave it indifferent) and that a Man's knowledge consists in having these Ideas in him, and Brutes have also such Ideas; and, that, moreover, they may possibly have also, in some sort, a power to compare those Notions, and both Method to Science, B. 2. Less 1. §. 12. judging and discoursing most evidently con­sist in comparing our Notions, I see no Operations [Page 6] peculiar to a Man, but what Brutes may perform in a lower degree; and since Degrees do not vary the Species (for otherwise dull Men would be of another Species from those who have more wit) we could, consequently, never know what Man­kind meant; or who is a Man, who not, unless in outward appearance; nor, lastly, how our Souls, or Minds, do differ from their Fancies, or Imagi­nations. Again, M. L. affirms, B. 2. Ch. 11. §. 11. that it seems as evident to him that Beasts do rea­son, as that they have Sense; than which, certain­ly, nothing in the world can be more evident, or undeniable. Now, if this be so, all those who hold that (a Rational Animal) is a proper and a­dequate Definition of (Man) ought to hold Brutes to be Men. Mr. L. will say, that Brutes can only reason in Particulars, having no General Ideas, because they cannot Abstract; nor do we see they make use of any General Signes to ex­press Universal Ideas: Indeed, they have no such Signes as Words, to notify they have any such Ideas; but, if we may conclude from their Out­ward Actions (on which only Mr. L. seems to ground his good Opinion of them that they have Reason,) we may as well gather from the same ground that they have General Ideas too. For example, when a Horse sees a Man a far off, he can only have an Idea that it is something; for the Object cannot, at that distance, imprint a more particular Idea of it self, but that most General one, and therefore 'tis evident the Horse must either have a General Idea of it, or none at all; whereas yet he must have some Idea of it, because he sees it, though confusedly. Coming nearer, the Object imprints a more distinct Idea of a Man; [Page 7] yet not so distinct, as to represent this Man in par­ticular. At length coming very near, the same Object is apt to imprint an Idea of this particular Man; which shews plainly, that all those Ideas the Object gave him before were General ones: To proceed, we may observe, that while it ap­pear'd only to be something, which was a very ab­stract Idea, the Horse carry'd it abstractedly too, and remain'd unconcern'd. When it appear'd to be a Man, it began to be a little concern'd, ha­ving to do with such kind of things as us'd to do it either Good or Harm; and therefore it stares at it (a common carriage in sheep especi­ally) as if it study'd, or consider'd, what to make of it, in order to its own Interest, or Self-preser­vation. But, when the Object imprints an Idea of this particular Man, who either us'd to bring him Provender, or come to catch him to make him work, he either comes towards him, or runs away; which different behaviour of theirs (if outward Actions were, in this case, worth buil­ding on) is as good a sign that Brutes have Gene­ral Ideas, as we can expect from dumb Animals. Besides, when a Cat, or Dog is hungry, and hunts about for Meat, how can Mr. L. imagin they long only for one particular sort of Meat, and not any sort of Meat in common that is agreeable to their nature? I am sure their indifferency to any such Food (in case they know at all) gives us as good ground to think they have a General Idea of such a sort, kind, or species of Food, as it does for any Knowledge they have of particulars. Hence is shown, that Mr. L's Criterion, or distin­ctive Mark to know them from Men, (viz. the having General Idea's) quite failing, we ought to [Page 8] esteem Horses, and other Cattle, to be Four-foot­ed Men, or else Men must be two-legg'd Beasts. Moreover, since he grants here §. 5. they can compare those Ideas they have, tho' imperfect­ly, and but in some circumstances; and all Judging, and Discoursing must, by his Doctrine, consist in the comparing Ideas; he must think there are some of them who are very judicious Gentlemen, and use natural Logick, and, tho' not very ar­tificially, make Syllogisms too. In a word, if we have no pecular Faculties Intrinsecal to our Na­ture, nor any Primary Operation belonging to it, and it only, to distinguish us from Brutes but Extrinsecal shape only, all Beasts might be Men, and Men Beasts: And then we ought in duty to consider how to correct our Carriage towards our dear Brethren in Nature, Brutes; which will bring in the Turkish Charity to Dogs, and twenty other Fooleries: And, 'tis an excellent Argument to prove the Identity of our Natures, that Mr. L. brings of some Gentlemen he was acquainted with, who deny'd themselves to be Men; and I wonder he would civilly give them the Lye, by passing upon them the Complement that they were notwithstanding very Rational Men; for, were it possible any Man could be a Beast, 'tis most certain these Men were such. But I won­der not all at such extravagant Conceits; for as Reason, grounded on our Natural Notions of the Thing, is reduced, if pursued home, to First and Self-evident Principles; so Fancy, if follow'd close, advances at length to pure Folly, and ends finally in perfect Madness.

[Page 9] 8. As for us Men, we can certainly affirm, that we do truly perceive, or know, be­cause we know certainly, by ex­perience, The first considera­tion pre-requir'd, ere we ought to think that Brutes know. or rather by Reflexion, that we do know; but we do not thus know that Brutes know; and whoever thinks he can ga­ther it by Reason, ought, I conceive, er'e he goes about it, to study exactly two previous points. First, he ought to consider very attentively, how, or upon what Grounds he can imagin Particles of Matter, tho' never so subtil and artificially laid together, can be capable of Perception, or Knowledge, or how this Suits with the Nature of meer Body. We can only gather this from Local Motions proceeding from Brutes, with some kind of Regularity: Now an exact Watch (in proportion to its few parts) does, by vertue of a Spring within, which is part of its self, afford the same argument to one that is not aware of its contrivance. For, it shews us, and regularly too, the Minutes, Quarters, Half-hours, Hours, Days of the Month, and tells us the time aloud by Striking the Bell: Nay, a Repeating-Clock does, without Missing, or Mistake, answer the Question (as it were) which by pulling the String you ask it; and, tho' you are never so importune in repeating your question often, yet it still answers truth, with more steady exactness than Banks his Horse could, by seeing the Motion of his Masters Eye. Yet, if any Man had drawn thence a Conclusion that those Engins had perciev'd, or known, we are satisfied that he had been perfectly mistaken. An Italian here had an Engine which would both a wake one at the hour he designed to rise, and [Page 10] also strike fire, and light his Candle for him; which I believe is more than the most docil Brute could ever be taught to perform. The Case had been still more difficult, had this Watch, or En­gine, which seemed self moving, been put into all these Motions by Subtil and Indiscernable Agents; as Iron is by the Effluuiums of a Load­stone, or as Memnons Musical Statue was by the Rayes of the Sun; for in that Case the Vulgar, discerning no Material Cause that set it on work, would presently have had recourse to some Know­ing power in the Engine; in the same manner as when they hear noises in a House, and can­not find out what caused them, they imediately conclude 'tis a Spright. Whence results this plain Rule, that er'e we can with reason conclude, or think any thing, except our selves, has Perception, or Knowledge, by our seeing it perform any Outward Action, we ought first to be certain that we can com­prehend all the Operations of Bodies, and all the several Combinations and Contrivances of them; and that we see that those Actions are impossible to be performed by Bodily parts, laid together by an infi­nitely wise Artificer; before we fall to imagin that any meerly Animal Body is more than a Natural En­gin; or that it does any more perceive, think, or know, than does a Watch or Clock.

9. The Second thing necessary to be done er'e we ought to think Brutes have any knowledge, is, to consider The Second consider­ation prerequir'd. exactly the incredible variety of the several Organical parts, found in the bodies of Animals; which, with the peculiar Uses of each, and the Contexture of them with the other parts, do swell so many Books of Anatomy al­ready, without any hopes or prospect of reaching [Page 11] them all: And, besides, it is necessary also to weigh attentively the Chymical parts (if I may be allowed to call them so) of an Animal, consisting of Blood, the Humours in it, and especially the Spirits; which last are apt to be moved, upon every oc­casion, by the least touch of all the Bodies about it, nay, by the most minute particles of them, lodged in the brain and excited there a fresh; and are withall apt to be carried thence in convenient Vehicles throughout the whole, to set on motion those parts which are more solid: When he has done this, let him Consider all these diverse-natu­red parts laid together by the All-wise Contriver of Nature, in order to the Animal's pursuing what's Agreeable to its nature, and avoiding what's Disagreeable to it: When, I say, all these particulars are well weigh'd, and duely reflect­ed on, I believe we shall be at a loss to pitch upon any outward Notion with such wise Contextures, and the Complexion of such innumerable Mate­rial Causes may not naturally produce.

10. To give some ease to our fancy, startled at the Strangeness of many Actions we see done by Brutes, let us re­flect That our selves both asleep and awake, do, with­out Knowledge, perform as strange Operations as Brutes do. on what happens to Men, walking in their Sleep, when the passages to our Knowing Power are intercepted; and our wonder­ment will to a great degree, cease. How regularly do the Phantasms at that time, move our Brutal part, the Body: Many Authen­tick Examples of which I could recount worthy our highest admiration; they being such as, were we awake, and had our rational fears about us, we neither durst attempt, nor could possibly per­form, without extream hazard. But, not to in­sist [Page 12] on these, let us reflect on our selves, even when perfectly awake, and we shall discover that, however we are set on work by Motives, or Reasons, yet we know not at all how the out­ward parts of our Body (only which we experi­ence in Brutes, and ground the conceit of their having Knowledge upon them) do perform any of their Operations. What Man living, though supposed the wisest (much less the Generality) knows how, or by what passages he is to send A­nimal Spirits into the Muscles (whence all our Motion proceeds) or into what Muscles, or what quantity of them is requisit to do such an Outward Action? What Feats of Activity does a Rope-dancer show us? How many ways does he distort, wind, turn, poize, stretch, and ply the parts of his Body? To do which, the Ani­mal Spirits are to be sent now into this, now in­to that Muscle, to move this or this or that Limb, or Joint; sometimes great quantity of them to make a vehement, or quick Motion; sometimes fewer, to move them more moderately; some­times none at all into any of them, when he has a mind to surcease all Motion, and sit still. Yet he knows, no more than a Brute, or a Stone does, how he is to do any of this, nor can give the least account how it is done. All this is transa­cted by the wise Contrivance of the Body; which is so framed as to be subservient to the Design the Man, as he is Knowing and Rational, had projected. And the same is done in Brutes, when either actual Impressions are made upon them from the Objects; or those former Impressions are again excited in the Brain; which done, all the frisking motions of Pursuance and Avoidance which they perform, do follow by a Course of [Page 13] Natural or Material Causes; and, withal, accor­ding to those measures and degrees as are propor­tioned to the Efficacy of the first impellent Cause, the Object in their Imagination; the Agreeable­ness or Disagreeableness of which, to the Nature of the Animal is that which sets all the Engine on work at first.

11. Nor can the Objection bear any force that some Actions of Brutes resemble Reason, even though it seems more The Resemblance of Reason in some Actions of Brutes, no Argument of their Knowledge then is found in Men; since we experience that a Watch, which is the work of an Artificer, per­forms the Operations proper to it, and tells us the time of the day with more exact­ness, than the best Reason we have can do with­out such helps. So that the Watches acting ac­cording to reason, demonstrates indeed there was Reason in the Framer of it, but argues none at all in the Engine it self: Wherefore, however the Actions of some Brutes may bear a show of Rea­son, this can only argue that they are the work­manship of a Rational, or Wise Maker; but, not that themselves acted knowingly, or rationally, while they did these Actions: For my self, I must declare, that I have as much admired the wisdom shewn in the Action of a young Vine, exerting and twisting its little Fingers about other things near it, to support it self as it grew up, as (all the forementioned Circumstances weighed and abated) at any Operation of a Brute; and I doubt not but a Campanella (who maintained that every thing in Nature had perception) or some such other man of fancy, would discourse, and descant on it thus: "The poor week limber [Page 14] Vine knew, and was well aware, that, not be­ing able to support it self, it would, when it increast in length, fall down flat on the ground, and so be exposed to be trampled under foot, and hurt; and, therefore, did very prudently cling about other Vegetables, or Poles near it, to sustain it self, and avoid that inconveni­ence." And, I dare affirm that we lose the best part of our Natural Contemplation, by putting Brutes to have Knowledge; for, what wonder is there that such things as have a knowing Power in them should know, or, who admires it in a Man? Whereas, it justly raises our mind to high Admiration and Adoration of the Divine Artifi­cer, to see things which are made of meer Mat­ter, act with as much Wisdom and Prudence for their own preservation, as the wisest Knower can by his best Wit, of which he is so proud, and sometimes with much more. No doubt but the growth and operations of dull Vegetables, do administer to devout Reflecters occasions of very high Contemplation; and shall the Opera­tions of sensitive Beings, which are incomparably more excellent, and more admirable, as being the Top and Master-piece of this Material World, af­ford little, or none at all? Now, if their Nature be to have Knowledge in them, and it be a thing common to all Creatures, and expected that GOD should give to every thing what is its Nature, there is little or no particular ground for our wonderment. GOD has given Brutes a Knowing Power, and that Power makes them know, and there's an end of our Admiration, and conse­quently of our Contemplation, and of that de­vout Admiration, to which our Astonishment at [Page 15] the several Actions of those Natural Automata would otherwise raise us.

12. I beg pardon for this long digression; I thought fit to dilate thus largely on this point; both because it Brutes have Phan­tasms, but no No­tions or Mean­ings. is a very concerning and useful Preliminary; as also to manifest how the using the word (Idea) hand over head (as we may say) and taking it Equivocally and indifferently for Phantasms and Notions, leads this Great Man (as it must needs have done every Man) into great mistakes. For Phantasms Beasts may indeed have, they being no more but Effluuiums emitted from other Bodies, and received by the portalls of the Senses into the Brain; where the Animal Spirits stand readily waiting to move the Brute, according as those Tinctures are agreeable, or disagreeable, to the Compound: but Notions, or (which is the same) Meanings, or Apprehensions, they cannot have; for these being made by Direct Impressions upon our Spiritual part, the Mind, (only which can mean, or apprehend) to judge they have any such, would conclude they had a Spiritual, and con­sequently an Immortal part in them, which I am sure we shall both of us deny. Besides, had they Meanings, or were capable of any, they would be capable of the Meanings of our Words; at least those amongst them which are most Docil, and could Speak, would not fail, if well taught, and educated, to know much of our Language, and Answer, in some few occasions, Pertinently; which none of them ever did designedly, and, if they hap to do so by accident, none thinks they meant as they spoke, but all mankind laughs at the odd [Page 16] Chance, as at a pleasant Jest. Those that teach them might point at the things when they pro­nounce their Names, as Nurses do to little Infants; and why might not Beasts learn them, as well as Children; at least learn as much in many years, as they do in two, or three? Indeed, some Words and Sounds, which are very often used to come into their Brain, accompanied with some pleasing or harmful Phantasm, do, by vertue of that con­comitant Phantasm, affect them, and make them act; not from their knowing what these words, or interjections mean, but by vertue of the Phan­tasms, or Effluviums, that came along with them, and moves them; or, because they being lodged together in the Brain, that Word or Sound, or some other Vehement Motion of ours, excites again the same Phantasm which puts them upon acting. Nor can we draw any parallel from some wild and Savage Men, seeming as rude as Brutes; the Question is of their Nature, not of their Circumstances. Could it be well proved that those Brutish Savages, tho' instructed afterwards, could never be brought to perfom any actions more rationally than Brutes do, nor could ever be taught any Language to a tolerable degree, so as to answer at all Pertinently or In­telligently, the difficulty would be greater? But this I never heard, or read, asserted by any. Or, conld it be well attested, that Brutes could fancy, or make choise of a Female for being more beau­tiful, or were taken with the Harmony of Musick, or did comport themselves accordingly, I must confess I should much wonder. I remember that about the year 1663. visiting my Noble Friend Sir Kenelm Digby, he told me he was much sur­prized, [Page 17] and uneasy at a Relation made him by a Gentleman, whom he could not suspect guilty of that Vanity, as to tell an untruth to make his Story admired; which was, that he saw Apes dance the Ropes at Southwark Fair (which was then held) and that they framed their Gestures and Motions exactly according to the Musick. For (says he) this, if true, shows they know Proportion, which argues Reason, and will oblige us to seek for new Principles. At his earnest intreaty I went to examine the business, and found it thus. A fellow stood below on the ground with a String (which was put about the Ape's Neck) in one hand, and a Switch in the o­ther; who, understanding the Musick, made a little twitch with the String, or a menace with the Switch, when he would have the Ape retire, or advance, to keep time with the Fiddles: Nay, far were those Mock-men, the poor Apes, from being guilty of any thing that Resembled Reason, that, when they made them dance with a lighted Wax-candle in their hand, neither their Tutor's Instructions, nor their own Docility could teach them to hold the lighted end of the Candle up­wards, though they often felt the inconvenience: for, the melted Wax scalded their Legs, and made them, in the middle of their dance, steal now and then a little Scratch where it burnt them▪ which they did with such a Serious and Inno­cent grace, that it gave much divertisement to the Spectators. This Story I relate the more willingly, to warn others not to give easy credit to particular Men's Narrations, whether Tra­vellers, or others; much less to suspect their own Principles upon such Sleight Advertisements. I [Page 18] returned to my Friend, and eased him of his Quandary; for which he was very thankful; and blamed himself much for giving credit to a Tale, to the prejudice of Evident Reason.

13. To proceed, and pursue my Theme more closely, I would be glad to know, at least in Common, what kind Ideas, if not Spiri­tual Notions, Inexplicable. of things, in this Author's opi­nion, those [Ideas] are. Are they Corporeal, or are they Spiritual, or under what Head shall we rank them? If Corporeal, they cannot be in the Mind; as Accidents, or Modes of it; the Mind being of a Spiritual nature. If they be Spiritual, Brutes, which have not a Spi­ritual Nature, can have no Ideas. Perhaps it will be answer'd they are not things, but certain Modes of things: But this satisfies not; for Modes are Affections of the Thing, or certain Manners how it is; wherefore they must be sutable to the Nature of the Thing of which they are Modes; for a Thing cannot be such as it cannot bee: And so the question returns, what that Thing is of which those Ideas are the Modes: Is it Corpo­real, or is it Spiritual? If it be Spiritual, then again Brutes can have no Ideas, because they have no Spiritual Natures in them, and so they can have no Spiritual Modes: If Corporeal, then our Mind, which is Spiritual, can have no Ideas in it; Corporeal Ideas being improper Modes for a Spiritual Nature. I do chiefly insist upon this Objection, to shew more manifestly that the Word Idea, should have been Distinguish'd at first, and Counterposed to Phantasm, and not confounded with it: Besides, my Genius leads me when I discourse about any thing, even tho' I oppose it, to know distinctly what that thing is, least I [Page 19] oppose I know not what; and I must declare that I can make no conception of the word Idea by what our Moderns, and particularly this Learned Author, has given me concerning it. For, he abstracts from affording his Reader a distinct and clear view of it; without which his Book, which runs wholly upon that Word, cannot be perfectly intelligible; nor, oftentimes, his main Discourses inferr any determinate Conclusions.

14. It may perhaps be replied, That every Man experiences he has those Ideas; as also that he comes to know, by Experience that we have Ideas, gives no distinct Account what they are. having them in his Mind; and therefore it is a folly to enquire so scrupulously about such things as are, in some sort, Self-known; and that it is enough to say they are Resemblan­ces of things, made in us by the Object without us. To which I reply, that we indeed experi­ence the An est of something in our Mind (and, by the way, of something of another nature in our Fancy too) by which we know things; but, whether it ought to be called an [Idea] or suits with the proper meaning of this word; or, after it is called so, the Quid est of that [Idea] or what it is (at least as to the Common Notion or Genus of it) or what to make of it by the light yet given me by this Author, or any other I have had the good fortune to see, I must profess I am not able to discern. All the knowledge I have of it from him, besides that given above which confounds me, is this, That he calls it frequently a Resemblance, N [...]r to say, they are Resemblances. Portraiture, Image, Appearanc, and such like; which still leave [Page 20] me more dissatisfied than ever: For, who can have the first knowledge of a thing by a Picture, or Resemblance of it? Let any Man see the pi­cture of a Tree, or an Apple, who had never seen those things themselves, nor ever should see them any other ways; and what knowledge could it give him, but only of things of a far different nature from a Tree, or Apple, viz. a Cloth, Board, or Paper, thus figured and colour'd? Or, how can any Man know that such things are, or have any being in nature, by a bare similitude of them. I may see the picture of such a shap'd Man, but whether that Man is, or ever was, the picture cannot inform me; so that it might be some Fan­cy of the Painter, for ought I know by the Picture. Indeed, had I known such things for­merly, then a Resemblance of them might, in that case, revive, and call into my mind the know­ledge of them; but, how it should beget the first knowledge of them, as our late Philosophers put those Resemblances to do, is altogether impossible and inexplicable.

15. Again, since Mr. L. affirms that we know nothing, either by Direct or Re­flex Knowledges, but by having To have Ideas of our own Ideas, inexplicable. Ideas of it; it must follow, that when by a Reflex Act I know my first Idea got by a direct Impression, I must have an Idea of that Direct Idea, and another Idea when I know that Reflex one, of it; and still ano­ther of that; and so still on, all the time while I go on reflecting upon my former Knowled­ges. Now, what sense can we make of an Idea of an Idea, or what means a Similitude of a Si­militude, or an Image of an Image? Each succeed­ing [Page 21] Knowledge must be different from the for­mer, because it has still a different Object to re­present, and that Object cannot be known with­out its proper Idea; and, it is not only the immediately preceeding Act which must be thus different, but the immediately-preceding Idea too, which is the Object of each succeeding Act; And, in what shall we conceive the difference of those successive Ideas to consist? It may perhaps be said, that plain reason tells us it must be so, though we know not the particular manner how it is done. I answer, The same Reason tells us far more plainly, that it looks very untowardly, and aukwardly, it should be so; or that there should be a Resemblance of a Resemblance: And my advancing this Objection does oblige me to show, in due place, how both our Direct and Reflex Knowledges may be performed after a Connatural manner, without straining either good Sense, or the Nature of Things. Were it a Material Resemblance, it might, by rebounding from one place to another, cause a Resemblance of its self; but here 'tis quite otherwise; for the first (Idea) it coming by a Direct Impression from the Corporeal Object without me, must resemble It; and the Idea of that Idea (or else of my First Direct Act) which is the Object of my First Reflex Act, must be a Similitude of an Idea that came from the Object in Nature, and is like it; and the second Reflex Idea must resemble an Idea, which was like an Idea that represented a thing of a quite different, or of a Corporeal Nature; and so endwayes; which would put all our Reflex Ideas into Confusion, as involving still others in them.

[Page 22] 16. 'Tis yet as great a difficulty, if not grea­ter, how the Soul should have a power in its self (as Mr. L. con­ceives) No Operation in­ternal or external begins from the Soul alone. to reflect upon its own Actions, that is, to form Ideas of its former Ideas; it being (as I verily judge) metaphysically demonstrable, that an indivisible Nature cannot work upon it self, or pro­duce in its self a new Act, or a new Idea by its own single power; or, by it self, move the Body at pleasure, as we seem to experience in those motions we call Voluntary; or so much as have any succession of Acts, but by means of the Body; only which (and not the Soul) is Quantitative, and, consequently, of it self, capable of succession. The farther explicating and elucidating which Points, are reserved to their proper places.

17. Many other Arguments against these Ideas, will, I believe, occurr hereafter, which I at present omit, because Mr. L. not only, nor directly op­pos'd by this Dis­course. I would not fore-stall. But, e're I leave this point, I must do the right to this ingenuous Author to d [...]clare, that it was besides his intention in his Treatise to discourse particularly about the na­ture of his Ideas, and therefore I cannot be said properly to confute, or over-throw, what he never went about to advance, or establish: Though I cannot but judge, that it had been far more sa­tisfactory to his acute Readers, and most highly important to Sci­ence, To ground all Know­ledge on Ideas not distinguish'd from Phantasms, makes Science impossible. to have done so; and most necessary for his Book, since with­out distinguishing his Ideas from Phantasms, and letting us know distinctly what [Page 23] his Ideas are, his whole Essay is unintelligible, and all his Discourses built on the ambiguous word [Idea] are inconclusive. And, had his penetrating Wit set it self to that study, I doubt not but it would have exceedingly conduced both to clear his own thoughts, and to have enlightned others. I desire then it may be understood, that it is not in order to him only I have enlarged on this point, but to meet with the mistakes of others also, who do customarily use the word [Idea,] and yet, as I have good reason to fear, do not perfectly understand their own meanings. Lastly, I thought it fit to dilate first on this point, that I might pre­pare the way to my next Discourse, to which it naturally leads.

PRELIMINARY Second.

1. BUT, if the word [IDEA] be Equivo­cal and Improper to be used in Philosophy, as being un­fit That the Elements or Materials of our Knowledges are pro­perly to be called [NOTIONS.] to signify the first Conceptions of our Mind, (which are, as Mr. L. says well, the Materials of Sci­ence) and consequently, are apt to make us entertain Erroneous Fancies for Real Knowledges; it will be be ask'd what other word we can invent which is Univocal, Proper, and not liable to signify a Superficial Resemblance, nor dangerous to seduce us by taking Fantastical Ap­pearances for the true Knowledge of the Things; but is, of its own Nature, fit to express distinctly those Solid Materials, by the Composition of which the Structure of Science is to be raised? I reply, the word [Notions] is such, and answers all these Intentions; and therefore this is the only word to be made use of by Philosophers, who serious­ly and sincerely pursue the Knowledge of Things, and not their own witty Conceits, or Imaginati­ons. 'Tis Univocal and Unambiguous, because Men of Art, or Philosophers, who are the best [Page 25] Reflecters on the Operations of our Mind, and have the truest Right to express those Thoughts their Art has given them, have constantly used it hitherto to signify our simple Apprehensions, or the first Operation of our Understanding; and never to signify Material Resemblances, or Phan­tasms: Whence also it claims to be Proper. And, indeed, it has title to be such even from its very Origin and Derivation: For, none can doubt, or ever question'd, but that the Compound word [Cog­nition] does properly signify True [Knowledge,] and therefore the Simple word [Notion] must most properly signify those simple Parts, Elements, or Materials; the orderly putting together of which in a Knowing Power does compound, or make (Cognition,) Whereas the particular Sense or Meaning of the word [Idea] which denotes a Resemblance, or Similitude, does not, in its immediate and proper Sense, in the least inti­mate any Order to Knowledge at all; nor any Material, Part, or peculiar Object of it. Nor, lastly, does the word [Notion] signify a bare Si­militude, or Resemblance, which can be, and usu­ally is, in the Fancy; but (as will be seen short­ly) the very thing it self existing in our Mind; which is most undoubtedly a Solid Material, or Firm Ground to build the Knowledge of Things, or Science upon it.

2. I hope I shall have candid Readers, and there­fore I am not apprehensive that any will be so captious as to ob­ject, The word [Notion] and [Cognition] are taken here Objectively. that I do here use an Equi­vocal word, as well as others, by taking [Cognition] which signifies an Act of Knowledge, for the Object of that Act. [Page 26] 'Tis a Fate, to which all words are obnoxious, to have some Ambiguity, or double sense one way or other. Thus we call in our common Speech a Parchment by which we hold our Estates [A Writing,] and a Sentence of Seneca, his, [Saying]; and so take those words for the thing Written, or Said; tho' they may also signifiy the Acts of writ­ing, or saying. But, this is not such an Equivo­calness as breaks squares between me and the Ideists, or that on which my Exception proceeds. The Univocalness which I assert to the word [Cog­nition] and [Notion] is such a one as is taken from their Radix, [Nosco] which, notwithstanding little Gramatical variations, does still import some Knowledge, or an Order to it; and the genuin signification of those words, thus varied or de­clined, is still kept within that same Line. Quite otherwise than is found in the word [IDEA] which is Indeterminate to those vastly different Lines of Corporeal and Spiritual, (which makes it highly Equivocal;) besides that it has no Rapport at all to the Line of Knowledge from its Radix, or Original Sense. To clear then the meaning of the word [Notion,] as 'tis used here from this Sleight, and (in our case) Unconcerning Am­biguity, I declare, that, there being two Con­siderations in Knowledge, viz. the Act of my Knowing Power, and the Object of that Act, which, as a kind of Form, actuates and determins the Indifferency of my Power, and thence specifies my Act; I do not here take the word [Notion] for my Act of Simply Apprehending; but for that Object in my mind which informs my Understand­ing Power, and about which that Power is Em­ployed; in which Objective meaning I perceive [Page 27] Mr. Locke does also generally take the word [IDEA.]

3. Since I have formerly blamed the Ambiguous explication of the word [IDEA,] 'tis but just it should be required What Notions are. of me to give a more Deter­minate and Distinct one of the word [Notion,] which I shall do in blunt Terms thus; [A Notion is the very thing it self existing in my understanding.] I expect at the first hearing such a monstrous Position, which seems to the Antiperipateticks something above Paradox, and as Mysterious as a Supernatural Point of Revealed Faith, it will be entertained by some of them with a kind of A­mazement, by others with a Smile. On the other side, I am so little concerned how any re­ceive it, that I must resolutely declare that, unless this Thesis be as True as it is Strange, it is impossi­ble any Man living should know any thing at all. By which the Reader will see that the Credits of the Aristotelians, and their Adversaries, as to their being held Solid Philosophers, does entirely lie at Stake upon the decision of this main point. Which therefore must crave the Attention, and Soberest Consideration of those persons, who take themselves to be concerned in the affair of Science, or in the Search after Truth.

4. Er'e I address my self to prove my Position, I must bespeak my Reader's Con­sideration, that, in a Question of Fancy is to have no hand in dis­coursing about Spiritual Con­ceptions. this Nature, which depends up­on our Reflexion on what is, or is not in our Spiritual part, the the Soul, he must lay aside his pleasing Phantasms, and all the Imagery, which [Page 28] with such a fine Raree-show uses to entertain and delight his Fancy. The point is of a higher Nature than to managed by such Familiar Appearances. The Ideas of Figure, Colour, nay, of Quantity it self must sit out as Bunglers, when such a Game is to be played, in which they have no Skill. This Contest must be carried on by Means as Spi­ritual, as is the Subject of it; that is, by exact Reason, or severe Connexion of Terms. And, to think to draw Intrinsecal Arguments; or to frame pertinent Answers to them, from what we find in Material Imaginations, when the Question belongs to that part of Metaphysicks which treats of Spiritual Natures, and their Operations, is as absurd, as 'tis to contend that the Knowledge of a Man is Great, or Little, because his Body is Bigg, or Dwarfish; or to fancy that Science is to be measured by Yards, or Inches. And, tho' I cannot fear any such Rational kind of attacque as Close Connexion of Terms, for the Negative, yet I grant my self obliged to produce no less than Clearest Evidence for the Affirmative; provided we rate Evidence, not from what seems easiest to Fancy, but from the said Connexion of Terms; only which can establish our Judgments.

5. I am to note first, that, as the Moderns grant we know nothing without having [Ideas] of them within The Question about Notions Stated. our minds; so I willingly acknow­ledge, that we cannot know any thing that is without us, but by having in our understanding Notions of those things. Now, say I, those Notions must be the very things them­selves (as far as they are known) in our Soul; which they deny, as incredible and Monstrous. [Page 29] I note, secondly, that in my Thesis, I take the word [Thing] in the largest Signification, as it comprehends not only Substances, which only are properly Things; but also all the Modes, or Accidents of Substance, which are improperly such. These Notes premised, I come to my Proof:

6. First Argument. When I simply apprehend the Thing, or any Mode or Ac­cident of it, this Operation of my A Notion is the Thing it self in our Under­standing; Proof 1. Because Knowing is an Immanent Act. Understanding is within my Mind, and compleated there; therefore the Thing Appre­hended, which is the Object of that Operation, must be there likewife: For, otherwise, this Operation of my Mind, it being Immanent, and not Transient, or passing out of my Mind to the Thing without me, cannot be employed about that Thing, con­trary to the Supposition. Nor could the Thing be truly said to be Apprehended, unless this Ope­ration, called my Apprehension, had the Thing for its Object; and this within my Understanding, it being an Internal Operation. But, that which is within me when I know it, is the Notion of it: Therefore the Notion of it (taken, as is declar'd above, objectively) is the Thing it self in my Un­derstanding.

7. Second Argument. I know the very Thing; therefore the very Thing is in my Act of Knowledge: But my Act Proof 2. Because the Thing Known must be in our Knowing Power. of Knowledge is in my Under­standing; therefore the Thing which is in my Knowledge, is also in my Understanding.

[Page 30] 8. Tho' I will not allow it to be any way an an Answer to these Arguments, to alledge, that 'tis sufficient that Proof 3. Because a Resemblance is not the Object of Knowledge, nor sufficient to cause it. the [Idea] or Resemblance of the Thing be in my Mind, because it does not in the least shock the Connexion of its Terms, or shew them Incoherent; but is a mere shuffling Pretence, thrown in to avoid their Force: Yet I shall condescend to shew it impertinent, and I argue against it thus.

9. Third Argument. That only is Known, which I have in my Knowledge, or in my Understanding; for, to know Otherwise, Ideas only could be said to be known. what I have not in my Know­ledge, is a Contradiction: There­fore, if I have only the Idea, and not the Thing, in my Knowledge or Understanding, I can only know the Idea, and not the Thing; and, by Con­sequence, I know nothing without me, or no­thing in Nature. Again,

10. Fourth Argument. Philosophy is the Know­ledge of Things: But if I have nothing but the Ideas of Things Proof 4. Because, otherwise, all Phi­losophy would be destroy'd. in my Mind, I can have Know­ledge of nothing but of those Ideas. Wherefore, either those Ideas are the Things themselves, as I put Notions to be, and then I have gain'd my Point; or else they are not the Things, and then we do not know the Things at all; and so adieu to the Knowledge of Things, or to Philosophy.

[Page 31] 11. I expect not any direct Answer to these Reasons, yet I doubt not but Wit and Fancy will furnish a prejudi­ced Proof 5. Because Similitudes can­not possibly give us the First Know­ledge of Things. Person with Evasions; and the next will, possibly, be this, that we know the Things that are without us, by means of the Ideas or Resemblances of them which are within us. To overthrow which Pretence, I argue thus:

12. Fifth Argument. We cannot have the First Knowledge of any thing by a Pi­cture, or Resemblance, as was As was prov'd for­merly. shewn, Preliminary 1. §. 14. Where­fore, Notions, or Simple Appre­hensions being the First Notifications of the Things to our Mind, we cannot know the Thing by their means, as is pretended, were they not more than Resemblances; that is, were they not the very Thing.

To overthrow this Pretence utterly, and with­all, to uphold and fortifie this last Argument, I advance this:

13. Sixth Argument. We cannot possibly know at all the Things themselves by the Ideas, unless we know cer­tainly Proof 6. Because, ere we can know the Idea resem­bles the Thing right, both of them must be in the Mind, to be there Compar'd. those Ideas are Right Resem­blances of them. But we can ne­ver know (by the Principles of the Ideists) that their Ideas are Right Resemblances of the Things; therefore we cannot possibly know at all the Things by their Ideas. The Mi­nor is proved thus; We cannot know any Idea to be a Right Resemblance of a Thing, (nor, in­deed, that any thing whatever resembles another [Page 32] rightly,) unless they be both of them in our Com­paring Power; that is, in our Understanding or Reason, and there view'd and compar'd together, that we may see whether the one does rightly re­semble the other, or no. But, this necessitates that the Thing it self, as well as the Idea, must be in the Understanding, which is directly contrary to their Principles; therefore by the Principles of the Ideists, we cannot possibly know that their Ideas are Right Resemblances of the Thing. Now, if the Thing it self be in the Understanding, there needs no Idea of it; for to be there, or to be in a knowing Power, is to be known. Again,

14. Seventh Argument. No Relation can be known without Knowing both the Correlates: Therefore no Proof 7. Because both the Corre­lates must be in the Understanding. Idea, which being a Resemblance of the Thing must necessarily be re­lated to it, can be known without knowing also the Thing to which 'tis related as that which is resembled by it. Therefore the Thing resembled must be known, not only besides the Idea, but by other means than by it; which can be no way but by the thing it self existing, in the understanding. Which Argument is enforced by this Consideration, Proof 8. Because the Prototype, must be first known. that when the One of the two things that are Related, or Alike, is the Prototype, the other taken from it, or (as it were) drawn by it; the Prototype must be first known ere we can judge that the other is like it. But the Prototype in our Case is the Thing without us, therefore the Thing without us must first be in our mind er'e we can judge of the other's resembling it.

[Page 33] 15. Ninth Argument. Notions are the Mean­ings, or (to speak more properly) what is meant by the words we Proof 9. Because Notions are what's meant by Words. use: But what's meant by the words is the Thing it self; there­fore the Thing it self is in the Meaning; and consequently in the Mind; only which can mean.

16. It may be perhaps replied, that the Ideas are only meant by the Words; be­cause when we speak, we intend Proof 10th. Be­cause when the thing it self is in­tended to be made known, the Thing it self is the first meaning, or what is first meant by the words. to signify our Thoughts. I an­swer, that, however it may be pretended that what is meant im­mediately by the words, is our Thoughts, when our own Thoughts or Judgments about any matter, are the things desir'd to be known; yet, when the Things are the Objects enquired after, as, when a Master teaches a Scholler Natural Phi­losophy, or any other Truth, the Intention of the Speakers does primarily aym and mean to signify the Things or Truths themselves; and not our Thoughts concerning them; and, therefore, the Things themselves are in the Intention and Mind, or are the Meanings of the Speakers, or Discoursers. And this passes generally in all other occasions, except only when the Knowledge of our Interi­our Thoughts is ultimately aymed at. Thus, when a Gentleman bids his Servant fetch him a Pint of Wine; he does not mean to bid him fetch the Idea of Wine in his own head, but the Wine it self which is in the Cellar; and the same holds in all our Commerce and Conversation about things without us.

[Page 34] 17. Eleventh Argument. Our Words are ad placi­tum, and have no Natural Conne­xion with the Things they signifie, Proof 11. Because the Ideas cannot be fore-known to our Agreement what VVords are to signifie, but the Things only. but are order'd to express them by the Agreement of Mankind: There­fore what's signified by them, must be fore-known to that Agree­ment. But the Ideas, or Resem­blances we have, cannot be fore­known to this Agreement, since they could not be at all known, (being in the Mind,) but by the Words; which, not being yet agreed on, can make known, or signifie nothing. Therefore the Things which we had naturally Fore-knowledge of, and not the Ideas, are that which is signified by Words. On the other side, since 'tis no less cer­tain that the Words do signifie what's in the Mind of the Speaker, or his Notions, they must signifie the Thing in the Mind; and, consequently, also the very Things which are without us, and which were known to us before the Agreement about the Words, were in our Mind, when we went about to name them: And, were not this so, Words could signifie nothing, which is a Contradiction.

Corollary I. Hence that great Contest in the Schools, whether our Words do immediately signifie our Concep­tions, Hence the Que­stion, VVhether the Things, or our Notions, are im­mediately signi­fied by VVords, is Frivolous. or the Things in re, (as they phrase it,) is put past all Dispute. For, if the Objective Part of our Conceptions, which are our Notions of the Thing, be the self-same with the Thing in re, neither the one, nor the other, is immediately sig­nified; [Page 35] because there is no one, and other, but the same. And if the Question be put of the Thing as in re, and as in the Understanding; 'tis answer'd, This Question takes in those several Manners of Existing, which enters not into the Objective No­tion, nor prejudices the Identity of the Thing un­der either State; and so the Question is again fri­volous.

18. Twelfth Argument. The same is evinced from the Verification of our Words; as, when I say [The Glass is in the Proof 12. From the Verification of Propositions. Window,] the Word [the Glass] must mean the very Substance of that Glass existent without us, and not the Idea of that Glass; for it would be False to say, the Idea of the Glass is in the Window. Therefore the very Glass it self which is in the Window, must be also in my Mind.

19. Thirteenth Argument. But, because Resem­blances and Likenesses please them so well, we will try what Proofs Proof 13. Because what's perfectly like, is the same. may be drawn from those very Words which themselves do most affect. They hold, the Idea, or Likeness of the Thing is in the Mind. Let us consider then the Likeness of a Man in the Understanding; or ra­ther, because we both agree that we have no Com­pleat Ideas or Notions of any Suppositum, let us take one of Mr. Locke's Simple Ideas, v. g. Exten­sion. I ask, Is the Idea of Extension, as to its Re­presentation, in all Respects like that Mode as it is in the Thing; or is it not? If not, then we can never know that Mode (at least, not clearly and fully) by that Idea; which yet we must do, ere [Page 36] we can discourse of it as a Simple Idea. And, if it is perfectly, or in all respects, like it; then 'tis in no Respect unlike it; and, by Consequence, in no Re­spect Different from it, (for that Difference would be an Unlikeness;) and, if it be in no respect Different, it follows, out of the very Terms, that it is the ve­ry same, in the Mind, and out of the Mind, which is so much boggled at in our Notions: So that, at unawares, the Explicaters of Ideas by Resemblan­ces, must be forced to come over to our Position, even while they would avoid it.

20. Fourteenth Argument. To make this yet Clear­er, and to set it above all possible Confute, let us take the Word, Proof 14. This last Reason main­tain'd by the In­stance of the No­tion of Existence [Existence,] or Actual Being. They know what that Word means, and consequently, they they have an Idea of it in their Understanding; for 'tis this which they say Words signifie. This Idea then must either be in all re­spects like to Existence, or in some respects; that is, in part only: Not in part; for Existence has no imaginable Parts in it, nor any divers Respects or Considerations; no, not even those Parts made by the nicest Metaphysical Abstraction of our Mind, called Act and Power; but 'tis One, most Simple, Indivisible, and most Absolute Act; and thence 'tis called by the Schools an Actuality, as if it were the very Nature of Act it self, without the least Alloy of the more imperfect Notion of Potentia­lity, or Power. Wherefore the Idea of Existence must either be in all respects Like Existence, or not at all Like it; if not at all Like it, then, ha­ving no Idea or Resemblance of it, we can never know what the Word Existence means: If it be in [Page 37] all respects Like it, then, by our former Discourse, 'tis in no respect Unlike it; and therefore, in no re­spect Different from it; and therefore 'tis the very same with it.

21. Fifteenth Argument. It may, perhaps, look like an Amusement, or Surprize, to pretend the Thing is the same, Proof 15. The same Reason ab [...]tted by the Natural Say­ings of Mankind. when 'tis perfectly like; for I do not expect that every Reader will speculate so deep, as to see that all Likeness is Unity of Form as far as the Likeness reaches. Wherefore, to put them out of this Mis-conceit, we will endeavour to convince them that this Position is not a Trick of Art, but plain honest Nature: It has been still my usual Method to shew, that the highest Speculations I advance, are abetted by the natural Notions, Sentiments, and Sayings of Mankind; nor will I decline to bring my present Position to be tried by the same Test. Let us take then two Quantities, (Yards for Example;) in case we find them perfectly Alike under the Notion or Respect of Quantity, we make account we can in true Speech say they are the same Quantity. Or, take two Pieces of Cloth, of such a Colour; and, if they be exactly alike in that respect, unprejudiced Nature obliges us to say they are of the same Colour; and the same holds in all Substances and Modes whatever. Since then the Ideists must grant that their Ideas are perfectly like that which they know by them, (as they must be, as far as the Thing is known by them, because the Thing is known only by their Resembling, or being like it,) it follows from the Consent of Mankind, that those Ideas must, consequently, be the same with the Things out of the Mind which [Page 38] are known by them; which is what we put our Notions to be. Wherefore, the Notion we have of the Thing, must be the self-same with the Thing known.

22. It may be replied, that the Notion of a Thing (a Stone, for Example) has a Spiritual Manner of Being The Difference in the Manner of Existing preju­dices not the Iden­tity of the Notion and the Thing. in the Mind; whereas the Thing, or Stone, out of the Mind has a Corporeal Manner of Being, and therefore 'tis in some respect Dif­ferent from the Thing; and, con­sequently, not perfectly the same with it; and so can only be barely like it, or resemble it. I an­swer, 'Tis granted that it is Unlike it, and so Dif­ferent from it, and therefore not the same with it, as to the Manner of Existing; but I deny that ei­ther its Existing, or Manner of Existing do enter into the Notion, (except in the Notion of God, to whom Existence is Essential,) or do at all be­long to it, or the Thing either; but that the No­tion is the Thing, precisely according to what is Common to it both in the Understanding, and out of it, abstractedly from both those Manners of Existing. To explicate which, we may consider, 1. That no created Thing, nor consequently, Mode or Accident of it, has, of its own Nature, any Title to be at all, (much less to be after such or such a Manner;) for then Being would be Es­sential to them, and not the Gift of their Crea­tor; whose Prerogative of Self-being, or Essen­tial Being, is Incommunicable to his Creatures. 2. Hence the Things, and consequently their Modes, do perfectly abstract from being, and not being, much more from all Manners of being. [Page 39] 3. This appears evidently by those Words which signifie them, the Meaning of which Words is the same with our Notions. For Example, Take Ga­briel, Peter, Bucephalus, an Oak, a Stone, a Yard, Whiteness, or what other Thing, or Mode of Thing we please; 'tis evident that the Sense of them (which is the same with our Notion of them) does not at all include, hint, or intimate Existence, or Non-Existence. Wherefore, 'tis set above all farther Dispute, and (as far as I can fore-see) beyond all imaginable Objection, that our Notion of the Thing is the self-same with the Thing in Nature which is conceived by us. Q. E. D.

23. Now, if our Soul, when it knows any Thing has the very nature of that Thing in it, and therefore is The Eminency of the the spiritual Na­ture of the Soul, gives her a Power to be all Things intellectually. intellectually that thing (for to be such a thing is nothing but to have the Nature of such a thing in it) it follows that, considering her precisely as knowing a Stone, a Tree, Fire, &c. she is that Stone, Tree and Fire intellectually, Whence we may discover how Rational, and how Necessary and Important a Truth that saying of Aristotle is, that Anima in­telligendo fit omnia. In a word, 'tis due to the Nature of our Soul, as it is Spiritual, and to the Eminency of her Essence, to comprehend after her manner the whole Inferiour Nature of Bodies, (and much more) or to be an Intellectual World, as soon as she is her self, and depur'd from her dull Material Compart, as is shown in my B. 3. L. 4. §. 14. Method. Nor can this making the Soul to know so much (nay, much more) be deemed an Extravagant [Page 40] Conceit, or too high a Privilege for her, by any well instructed Christian, who reflects, (as is also clearly Demonstrable in Metaphysicks) that she is made for, or is capable of a Knowledge infinitely higher, viz. the beatifying Sight of GOD; in comparison of which the Knowing the whole Universality of Creatures is but a meer Trifle.

24. I much fear that such Readers, who are not raised above Fancy, and have not well reflected how all Truths, Shown that Things may have two different Man­ners of Existing. and all our Judgments and Dis­courses that are rightly made, do consist in the Connexion of Terms, will look upon all Efforts of Close Reason, as Chi­merical, and think them to be only a kind of Chiquaning, and little Tricks of Logick. Where­fore, to comfort the uneasy Fancies of such weak Speculaters, I desire them to consider how all things were in the Divine Understanding before they were Created, and are still there; and how their Ideas, that is, their Essences, had there ano­ther, (and that a more incomparable manner of being) then they had in themselves afterwards. From which Divine Archetypes they were copied into Nature, and thence transcribed, by Impressi­ons on our Senses, into Human Understandings. This Reflexion will (I hope) let them see how it is not impossible, but Consonant to Reason, that the self-same thing may have both a Natural, and an Intellectual manner of Existing. I note by the way, that, whereas I have insisted so much on the Impropriety and Novelty of the word [Idea,] our Modern Ideists will alledge that Pla­to did make use of that word before them, and that they do but eccho him, while they use it af­ter [Page 41] him. But, I believe they will find upon Ex­amination, that Plato meant by that word the Essences, or Natures of Things; and, in likelihood, those very Essences in the Divine Understanding; however some thought he misapplied it to Uni­versal Ideas, or Essences, subsisting alone, and not in the Individuals. Now, did our Moderns take it in the same Sense he did, that is, for Essences, and not for Resemblances only, I should not ex­cept against them as to that particular; but, to use his word, and affix another Sense to it, is, as I con­ceive, to abuse it.

25. Corollary II. From this whole discourse, and the many several Arguments in it, it appears evidently, that No Solid Philoso­phy can be built on Ideas. unless the word [Idea] be taken as we take the word [Notion,] that is, unless Ideas, or Notions, or whatever else we please to call them, be the very things in our understanding, and not meer Resemblances of them, they can never reach or engage the Thing it self, or give us Knowledge of it; that is, they can never make us know any thing; any more than a Picture can make us know a Man we never saw, nor ever shall or can see but by means of that Picture; that is, not at all. And therefore, as I cannot but judge what I here advance to be True, and withall most necessary to be told, so I am obliged, without asking leave of any, to do that Right to Truth as to declare that those many Schems of Doctrine, woven upon such Ideas as their Groundwork, tho' they be never so Ingenious and coherent within themselves, and may be of some use in Logick to distinguish our Notions, are both meer­ly Superficial, and perfectly useless in Philosophy, [Page 42] which is the Knowledge of Things; and can only serve to please the Daedalean Fancies of the in­genious Contrivers and witty Descanters upon them; but can never bring us to the Solid Know­ledge of any one Thing in Nature, nor verify any one Predication, or Judgment we make; nor en­able us in our Speculative, or even Common, Dis­courses about any Thing, to speak one word of good Sense. Not that I think that Mr. Locke does still take the word [Idea] in that unac­countable meaning; but, that the acuteness of his Natural Genius does generally carry him (per­haps unreflectingly) to mean by that word the same I mean by Notion; tho', to say the truth, he totally abstracts from meddling designedly with this abstruse point.

26. Corollary III. Hence also we may gain some light what Knowledge is. For, it has been demonstrated that our 1. VVhat Know­ledge is. Notions, on which all our Know­ledges are grounded, and of which they are Compounded, are the very Na­tures of the thing known; and, consequently, that our Soul, considered precisely as knowing those Natures, or having them in her, as in their Subject, is, as such, those very Things which are constituted by those Natures. Wherefore, our knowing that those things are, or are such or such (which is Com­pleat Knowledge) is the having those things and their Predicates of Existent, or of their being affected with such or such Accidents, so in the Judging Power as they are in the things without; that is, the things within her must be as the things in Nature are. Wherefore, when the Soul knows any thing in Nature she must be that thing as it [Page 43] is Another thing distinct from her; So that in a word, To know is Esse aliud ut aliud; To be an­other thing, as it is another. For Example; To know the Bell is in the Steeple, she must not only have the Bell existent in the Steeple within her, but also that the Bell in the Steeple is without her; or is in her as another thing, which is neither her, nor any Thing or Mode belonging to her. To expli­cate which hard point we may reflect, that all the Essential Notions of a Thing (were it possible to comprehend them all) of a Body for example, are Intrinsecal to it; as also all those Modes or Acci­dents of it, the Complexion of which does constitute the Essence of that Body; and even taking them singly, as meer Accidents, they depend for their being on that Body as on their Substance; But it is not so with the Natures of those Bodies, or their Modes or Accidents, as they are in the Soul. For, they are no Determinations or Modes suitable or belonging to her Nature as 'tis Spiritual, nor de­pend Solely on her as on their Subject for their Exi­stence, as all Modes in their Natural Subjects do. Whence follows, that when she knows them, they are purely in her as Extrinsecall to her, or as other Things; and as having their genuin Existence elsewhere, or out of the Mind. And, in this consists the Excellency of a Spiritual Nature, (from which we may demonstrate her Immateri­ality, and, by Consequence, her Immortality) that by reason of the Superlative Nobleness of her Essence she can comprehend the whole Nature of Bodies (tho' she may know other higher Natures also) all its Accidents, its Existence without us, and whatever can belong to it; and yet so as to stand a-loof from it, and preserve her Distance [Page 44] and Height above it; and is withall through the Amplitude of her Nature, able to engraft on her infinitely capacious Stock of Being all other things; and give them, besides their own, (if they be in­feriour Natures or Bodies) a far Nobler Exi­stence in her self. This Definition of Knowing will, I doubt not, look like Gibberish to short-sighted Speculaters, who have not reflected steadily on the Souls Spiritual Operations, and on what Manner things are in the Mind: But, if each step to it be (as I cannot doubt but it is) demonstrable, the Evidence of the Premisses, and the Necessity of the Consequence ought to obtain of every Learned Man not be startled at the Strangeness of the Con­clusion, because Fancy is dissatisfyed. That Infe­riour Faculty is to be curb'd and kept within its own narrow Sphere; and forbid to meddle with Spiritual Subjects which are beyond its reach and Skill; and are only manageable by Reason ground­ing it self on such Notions as are above Matter. And, if it appears by this Rigorous Test that our Notions are the very things as distinct from us, all the rest of it will follow of Course by a Natural and Necessary Consequence.

PRELIMINARY Third.

1. BUT how can the Things be in our Under­standing? since the [Thing,] in its first and proper significa­tion, An Objection a­gainst the Possibi­lity of the whole Thing being in one mind, cleared. being an Individual Sub­stance, is the subject of Innumera­ble Modes, or Accidents, which we can never reach, or compre­hend; and therefore it can never be known by us compleatly, as Mr. Locke has very elaborately demonstrated at large; and, as my self have also proved in my B. 1. L. 2. § 7. Method. This be­ing so clear and confess'd a Truth, it seems to follow hence against us both, that neither the Ideists have any Idea of it Resembling it fully, nor we any Notion of it, which is truly and entirely the same with it intellectu­ally; and so neither of us can, properly speak­ing, pretend to know any Thing as we ought.

2. To clear this important Difficulty, on which the whole Affair of Science, and the Confutation of Scepticism, Some Notes pre­mis'd to clear this Objection. seems mainly to depend, it is to be noted.

3. First, That the Notion of the Individuum, Thing or Suppositum, can never, for the Reason now given, be Di­stinct Our Knowledge is such as our No­tions are. and Compleat, but Confused and Imperfect. For, let us take [Page 46] any Individual thing, v. g. a Stone, we shall find that it has in it what answers to the Notion of a Thing, (or what has Being) as also of Extended, Dense, Hard, Opacous, Dinted, &c. it is Divisi­ble into innumerable Particles; its peculiar Mix­ture consists of many diverse-natured Parts, with such an Order or Position amongst them, &c. of all which our Senses, with their best Assistances, can not afford us clear Knowledge; nor, consequent­ly, imprint any Clear Notion of that whole Thing in our Mind.

4. Secondly, That, since to know a Thing, is to have the Notion of it in our Mind, our Knowledge must be such We can have such a Notion of a Thing (or Es­sence) as distin­guishes it from all other things. as the Notion is: If the Notion be Clear, Intire and Distinct, our Knowledge too is such; and, if the Notion be Obscure, Partial and Confused, our Knowledge must be Obscure, Partial, and Confused like­wise.

5. Thirdly, We can have such a Notion of eve­ry Individual thing, if it be not (as the smallest Atoms are) too Confused Notions suffice for a Re­mote Ground of Science. little to be perceptible by our Sense, as (tho' it be Confused as to it self) may serve to distin­guish it from all other Things, and to make us know it Exists separately from all others, and in­dependently on them; Moreover, that it is the Suppositum, or Subject, which has its own Nature or Essence in it, and also all the Modes or Accidents belonging to it. Thus, when we see a Bag of Sand, or Wheat, poured out, our Senses acquaint our Mind, pre-imbued by some common Notions, [Page 47] that each Grain can exist separate; and has, su­stains, or gives Being to its own Accidents, with­out the Assistance of any of its Fellow-Grains.

6. Fourthly, This Confused Knowledge of the Thing, in gross, is sufficient for such a Degree of Science of it, as Only Distinct or Abstracted No­tions are the Im­mediate Ground of Distinct Know­ledge or Science. we can have in this State. For tho' we cannot have a distinct Knowledge of it all, taken in the Lump, and therefore do not pre­tend to have Science of it thus considered, nor of each Considerability in it ta­ken by Detail; yet, we know that Confusedly it contains in it self what answers to all the many di­stinct Conceptions we make of it, which are the Ground of all the Science we have; they being all stored up and amassed in the Thing, and apt to be drawn or parcell'd out thence by our Abstractive Considerations of it.

7. Lastly, That our Distinct Knowledge (or Science) is built on our Distinct Notions of the Thing fram'd in Science thus groun­ded, is truly cal­led, The Know­ledge of the Thing. our Minds by Impressions on the Senses, which are many, and the Manners of their affecting us also manifold. Hence our Soul, in this State, can have no Distinct or Clear Knowledge of the Thing, but by piece-meal, or by Distinct, Different, Partial, Inadequate, or (as they are ge­nerally and properly called) Abstract Notions; as Mr. Locke has frequently and judiciously exem­plify'd in the several Conceptions or Notions we have of Gold; which we may consider, as yel­low, heavy, solid, malleable, dissolvable in aqua Regia, &c. Whence, tho' it be, perhaps, impos­sible [Page 48] for us to reach all the Considerabilities that may be found in it, which ground our Different Notions; yet each Notion we have of it, being Distinct from all the rest, and being truly the Thing, as far as 'tis thus Consider'd; hence we can have Science of the Thing, tho' confusedly of the whole, yet Distinctly of it in part, by such a No­tion, as far as it is conceived by that Notion; notwithstanding our Ignorance of other Consi­derations of it; those Abstract Notions being in our Mind, (unless they hap to be Subordinate, as General and Particular ones are,) perfectly Di­stinct from, and Exclusive of one another. Thus we can have Abstract Notions of Length, Breadth and Thickness in Bodies; or (which is the same) we can conceive Bodies precisely as they are Long, Broad and Thick; and Mathematicians can frame many Sciences of Bodies, as thus conceived; and discourse Orderly and Clearly of each of those distinct Notions, that is, of the Thing, as precise­ly such; without meddling with Rarity, Density, Solidity, Fluidity, Heat, Cold, Moisture, Dryness, or any other Physical Consideration found in the same Body: Tho' each of these last also may, for the same Reason, (viz. their Clear Distinction from all the rest,) be discours'd of with equally Clear Evidence; and ground as many several Subordi­nate Sciences in Physick, as the other did in Ma­thematicks.

8. By what's said, it appears, that all Science, or all Philosophy, being ground­ed on these Abstract or Distinct Abstracted Ideas, tho' Exclusive of one another, do in­clude or conno­cate the Thing. Notions of the Thing, it can be tru­ly said to be the Knowledge of Things; and that unless this be so, [Page 49] there can be no Philosophy. This Position Mr. Locke has ingenuously asserted: Whether he holds to it exactly, or no, will be seen shortly. Tho', in case he should be found to deviate from it, 'tis not peculiar to him, but a far more Common Er­rour in our Modern School-Philosophers; and, I fear, in all the Ideists: For these Gentlemen, as soon as they have got such Ideas into their Heads, and express'd them by Abstract Words, as Ratio­nality, Extension, Roundness, Length, &c. they, finding this Abstract Conception in their Minds, and experiencing that they can discourse about it Scientifically, do presently begin to imagine that those Ideas have got rid of the Thing, and hover in the Air (as it were) a-loof from it, as a little sort of shining Entities; and thence have of them­selves a Title to be a Competent Ground-work to build Science on. They Character them to be Re­semblances, which is a Conceit easie to Fancy; and so they set themselves to contemplate them, and employ their Wits to descant on them. They dis­course of them, and them only; for they do not endeavour to shew clearly how those Ideas do en­gage the solid Nature of the Thing. Whence it must needs happen, that in case those Ideas chance to be meer Material Resemblances, or Phantasms, the Knowledge built on them is purely Superficial and Imaginary; nor can have any more TRUTH in it, than a Looking-glass, which represents to us a well-proportioned Edifice; or a Dream, which (as it sometimes lights) is composed of Fancies pretty well Coherent with one another. Lastly, which is worst of all, they make Truth, which can have no Foundation, but in the Things which Creative Wisdom or Essential Truth has [Page 50] made and establish'd, to consist in the meer Agree­ment of those Ideas. Whereas they ought to make it consist in this, that those Abstracted Con­ceptions, or Notions of ours, are the Thing it self thus partially consider'd; and also, that our Judg­ments or Discourses of them, and all Truths what­ever, do wholly consist in this, that those Partial Conceptions of ours are found to be Identify'd in the Thing we Judge or Discourse of. 'Tis the Thing we divide, (as it were,) or take in pieces by those Abstract or Partial Notions of it; and, therefore, 'tis the Parts (as it were) of the same Thing we put together again, and Identify when we compound Propositions or Judgments.

9. In a word, They make the Abstractedness of those Ideas to be Exclusive of the Subject or Thing; whereas I This Point farther explicated, and enforced. make it only Exclusive of other Notions, but to Include and signi­fie the Thing or Subject, according to some Con­sideration, or (as it were) Part of it; in the same manner (to use a grosser Example) as the Hand or Foot signifie the Man or Thing to which they belong, according to his Power of Handling, or Walking. Hence I hold, that Whiteness, Breadth or Hardness in the Wall, do signifie and import the Wall it self, precisely quatenus, or as it is White, Broad and Hard. Whence I affirm, that all Science, which consists of those Abstract and Mutually-distinct Notions, as of its Materials, is truly a Solid (tho' inadequate) Knowledge of those very Things; and not of Notions, or Ideas, aparted from them really, or as Distinct kinds of Beings Existing sepa­rately from it: Which if they were, we should be never a Jot the wiser for knowing all the Ideas [Page 51] in the World, nor ever arrive at true Philosophy, it being the Knowledge of Things, and not of Resem­blances: Especially, since (as was demonstrated in my former Section) those Resemblances can never give us Knowledge of the Things themselves.

We may draw farther Arguments to prove our Position, that all our most Abstract Notions do in­clude or connotate the Thing or Subject, from all our Abstract Notions or Ideas, whether they be Essential, or Accidental. To begin with the for­mer.

10. Arg. 1. 'Tis impossible to conceive Huma­nity, for Example, without conno­tating Homo its Suppositum; there­fore Prov'd, because Ab­stract Notions, if Essential, do evi­dently include the Thing. that Abstract Idea, [Humani­ty,] must signifie the Thing, or [Homo,] according to what's his Essential Constitutive. The Ante­cedent is prov'd. The Notion or Idea of the De­finition is the very Notion or Idea of the Thing defined; but the Definition of Humanity, viz. the Compleat Essence of a Man, includes Man in its No­tion; therefore [Humanity,] which is the Thing defined, does also include the Thing, or [Man,] in its Notion. Wherefore [Humanity,] tho' ex­press'd abstractedly, because 'tis but one Part, as it were, of the Entire Suppositum, (though it be the principal part of it,) does signifie the Thing, or Man, according to his Compleat Essential Form or Constitutive. The same Argument may be made of any other Essential Idea. Let us examine next the Ideas or Notions of the Modes or Acci­dents of Things, and try whether they exclude the Thing, or include it.

[Page 52] 11. Arg. 2. The Idea or Notion of [Modes,] is, that they are the Manners how a Thing is; and of [Accidents,] Prov'd, because all Modes do the same. that they are those which do ad­vene to the Thing, or (if I may be permitted to strain a Word, to express properly and fully my meaning) Accidents are Unessential Conceptions of the Thing. Wherefore, the Idea of both of them do include the Thing in their Expli­cations, and consequently in their Notions, and not exclude it. Or thus, There can be no Modes of a Nothing; therefore the Notion or Idea of a Mode involves essentially the Thing of which it is a Mode, and to which, as such, it relates. Wherefore, the Material Part of it is the Thing, the Formal Part [as thus modify'd] or [as existing thus] or (which is the same) as thus conceiv'd.

12. Arg. 3. This is confirm'd, because Modes are justly conceiv'd to have no Being of their own, but to Exist As having no Being of their own. by the Existence of their Subject: But, when we have a Notion of any Mode in Na­ture, we conceive it as some way or other Exist­ing; therefore their Notion must connotate the Subject or Thing by whose Existence only they do Exist.

13. It would not be hard to multiply Argu­ments to prove this nice Point, fetch'd both from Metaphysicks, This makes or shews Philosophy to be the Knowledge of Things. and also from Logick, and the Ve­rification of all Propositions, did I conceive it to be needful. But, I see plainly, that all the Arguments in my former Preliminary do conspire with their united Force, to make good this Fundamental Position. For, if [Page 53] this Truth be once firmly establish'd, that our No­tions are the Things themselves, as far as they are conceiv'd by us, it must follow, that all our Science being built on those Notions, has for its Solid Ba­sis the very Thing it self, and not any other Things or Nothings, distinct from the Thing known; such as are their pretty Spiritual Looking-Glasses, those Unaccountable, Inexplicable, Unnecessary, and Useless Things, called Ideas. And, I hope I may rest confident that those Proofs of mine will abide the Shock of the most Strenous Opposition; since, unless that Grand Leading Truth be Certain, 'tis demonstrable that no Man living can know any thing at all. For, 'tis confess'd, that nothing can be known, but by the Means of those Ideas or Repre­sentations of it: And those Arguments evince, that unless the Thing it self be in our Mind first, those Ideas, or Resemblances cannot possibly give us any Notice, or Knowledge of it.

14. Note First. On this Occasion we may re­flect on the Sagacity of that great Speculater and Observer of Na­ture, Hence Aristotle expresses the Modes or Accidents, by Concrete Words Aristotle; and may gather, at the same time, his true Senti­ments in this Particular; that, when he came to range all our Natural Notions into his Ten Common Heads, he did not express the Modes or Accidents by Abstract Words, but Con­crete ones; lest his Scholars should hap to think they were certain Kinds of Entities Distinct from the Subject: whereas they were Nothing but the Subject or Substance it self, considered as thus af­fected, or thus modify'd: For, he does not call them [...], Quantitas, Qualitas, as we do; but [...], Quantum, Quale; nor [Page 54] [...], Relatic, but [...], Relata; or more simply, [...], Ad aliquid: Which last is abet­ted by our Common Language; as, when we ask, [What is he to me?] the Answer is, [Your Friend,] your Father, &c. Where the Words [to me,] ex­press formally what we call Relation; and the Words [is he,] both signifie that the Relation is a Mode or Accident intrinsecal to the Subject, how­ever it be Consider'd in order to another; and with­all, that it has no Being, but that of the Thing or Subject signify'd by the Pronoun [He:] Which amounts to this, that what we call in an Abstract Word [Relation,] is nothing in reality, but the Thing Considered thus, or in order to another Indi­viduum, which we call to be thus Modified, or con­ceived to be according to such a manner Related. The same is observable in the rest, [...], Agere, Pati, Habere, [...], quando, ubi, which have the Force of Concretes; for 'tis only the Subject that can be conceived or said to Act, Suffer, be in such a Place or Time, or have such a kind of Habiliment: Whereas, were it not for that reason, he could have express'd them in Abstract Terms, (perhaps more handsom­ly;) as, [...], Tempus, Lecus, Actio, Habitus, had it not been his Intention to avoid Abstract Terms, lest the manner of Expression should represent it as a kind of Thing, Distinct really from the Subject, and so lead Men to take a Fancy for a Reality, as it happens in the Mis-acception of the Word [Space,] which breeds the Conceit of Vacuum. And, he was less sollicitous to do this in the first Predicament, call'd by him [...], because there was no Danger Men should take the Essence of the Thing to be a distinct Thing from [Page 55] the Thing it self, as there might be in the others▪ So that this ought to be embrac'd and establish'd, as a most certain and most Fundamental Maxim by all who pretend to true Philosophy, that What­ever Conception of ours has not the Thing, or Res, (ei­ther consider'd in part, or in whole,) in its Notion, has no Reality in it, and is a meer Fancy.

Note Second, Hence we may gather the proper manner of Signifying, found in Abstract and Concrete Words, as The Point elucida­ted by Abstract and Concrete Words. such, viz. that the Concrete Word (Album for Example) signifies di­rectly the Subject, and indirectly the Form or Mode conceived to be in it: And the Abstract Word Albedo signifies directly the Form or Mode, and indirectly the Subject; which indirect manner of signifying is properly called Connotating.

15. This uncommon Doctrine might, perhaps, sink better into the Reader's Con­sideration, if it were illustrated Hence Space with­out Body, or Va­cuum, is a Con­tradiction. by an Instance. We will take then Mr. Locke's Position of an In­finite Imaginary Space, or Vacuum. To make good which Tenent, he imagins that Vacuum signifies a Space without Body: Which, to my Judgment, is as much as to say, it signifies a Contradiction, or Chimera. For, I positively deny we can have any Notion of Space, without including Body, however we may have a Fancy of it: And I as positively affirm, that Space can signifie nothing but Body, according to such a Mode called Space, or Quantity. For (to wave my former Proofs) I ask him whence he had first the Notion or Idea of Space? He is too acute to hold Innate Ideas: It was Acquir'd then, or wrought in him; And by [Page 56] what, but by the Thing, that is, by the Body? It was the Body then which he saw; it was the Body thus modify'd, that imprinted it self thus on his Senses, and caused such a manner of Idea in his Mind. Wherefore, to conceit that we can have an Idea of Space without Body, whereas he never had an Impression or Idea of Space, but what was in Body, and a Mode of it; and so Identify'd with it, is to relinquish our Solid Natural Conceptions, and run to Fancies; to abandon the Firm Ground of all our Knowledge, the Thing, and to pursue instead of it an Aiery Nothing; (for Modes or Man­ners, without the Thing of which they are Modes, signifie a meer Nothing, and can be Nothing else;) or, (which is the same) 'tis to discard our well-grounded Notions, and to entertain in their Room meer Phantastick Resemblances. The Notion of Space then being an Impression of and from the Thing, is the Thing or the Body conceived according to that abstracted Respect or Mode, called Space? Wherefore, to put Space beyond all Bodies, or where there is no Body, is a plain Trucking our Natural Notions, for Appearances that are Ground­less, and coined by our Imagination. Perhaps he will say, we can clearly Abstract the Idea of Space from that of Body; which is so far true, that our Precise and Formal Notion of the Body, as it is pre­cisely a Thing, or Capable of Existing, is not the No­tion of Space, which is a Mode of the Thing. But, why must it therefore be Nothing of Body, when 'tis evidently one kind of Conception or Considera­tion of it; that is, when 'tis nothing but Body, as grounding the Notion of Space? In a word, Since Space is not of it self A Thing, or Res, it must and can only be Modus Rei; and therefore, to Fancy [Page 57] an Idea of it, which excludes Body, is to make it a Mode of Nothing, and consequently no Mode; which is to destroy the Notion of Space, while he goes about to refine it. This for the present, till we come to reflect farther upon that Tenet in its proper Place.

PRELIMINARY Fourth.

1. THE former Grounds being laid, shewing what Knowledge is, and in what it consists; the next thing The State of the Question. that comes to be consider'd is, to shew, in particular, the Man­ner how we come to know at first; or, by what Connatural Steps, the Things, or (which is the same) our Notions of them, which are the Ma­terials of Knowledge, are introduced into our Minds. And, let it be noted, that it is not my In­tention here to shew, what compleat Knowledges, or Judgments, are in our Soul before others in Pri­ority of Nature; which I have already done in my Method, Book 2. Lesson 4. What I aim at here is, to acquaint the Reader very particularly with my Thoughts how our Mind comes first to be im­bu'd [Page 58] with both Direct and Reflex Notions, which are the Elements or Materials, of which our Com­pleat Knowledges or Judgments are compounded.

2. The Difficulty of conceiving how Corporeal Things that are without us, could get into our Soul which is Spiri­tual, Aristotle neglects to shew particu­larly how Know­ledge was made. and affect it, was so puz­zling to the Greatest Philosophers hitherto, that it has made them rack their best Wits to invent some congruous Way how this could be performed. Aristotle, who ought to have done this, since he advanced that Position above-mentioned which required it should be done, gives us no particular Account of it; but being resolved, it seems, to follow the sullen Principle he had taken up, viz. Acroases ita esse edendas ut non sint editae, left it to Posterity to find it out. Which affected Humour of his, whether it proceeded from Envy of Knowledge to the World (an unpardonable Fault in a Pro­fessor of Knowledge) or from Vanity, or out of Policy to bring more Scholars to his walking School, has certainly brought much Disparage­ment to his Doctrine, hindred its Currency, and help'd forward by the Schools, (who undertook to explicate him, and did it untowardly) has pe­ster'd the World with diverse Schemes of Philoso­phy, either newly invented or furbish'd up afresh. Whether he did explain after what manner we come to know, to his Scholars, I know not; only it may seem wonderful, if he had done it, that none of them should have deliver'd it down to us. But, letting Aristotle alone with his Faults, which blemish'd his other great Vertues, and come to the other Philosophers since his time.

[Page 59] 3. These Learned Men saw clearly, that all Corporeal Agents work by Local Motion, and that no Operation Later Philosophers were at a great puzzle about it. of theirs could be transacted without such Motion, at least ac­companying all their Actions, they being all of them Successive or Quantitative; and they could not conceive how Local Motion should be recei­ved or wrought in a Soul, whose Nature, (it be­ing Spiritual) is incapable of it. For, it must (as the very Notion of it imports) be made first in one part of the Subject, afterwards in another; which can with no Sense be apply'd to the Soul, which (it being Indivisible) has no Parts at all. They were not so well skill'd in Metaphysicks, as to reflect, that it was very congruous to Reason to affirm, That the Notion or Nature of Things (speaking of Created Beings) did abstract from all Existence; and therefore, that the same thing might have different manners of Existing, and be in our Soul Spiritually, tho' out of it Corporeally: And, those few who did apprehend the thing might thus exist in the Soul when in it, were still at a Nonplus how it could get into it. Perhaps the Difficulty of explaining this, might be one Rea­son, why Cartesius, not knowing how to give an Account of this, thought fit rather to study, how he might avoid giving any Account at all of it, and thence recurr'd to the Position of Innate Ideas. At least, this is the best Excuse I can make in his behalf, for embracing a Tenet so totally prae­ternatural; in case (as his Words give us just occasion to think) it were really his Doctrine.

[Page 60] 4. The Schoolmen, whose way it is, when they are at a Plunge how to find out a Reason for any difficult How the Schools explicated this Point. Point, to create some Entity which God and Nature never made, and then to alledge 'twas that Entity which did the business; invented their Species Intentiona­les; which, if they were not the same with our Notions, or the Things in our Knowledge, were meer Resemblances coined by Fancy, as our Mo­dern Ideas generally are. But this raised a new Difficulty, instead of laying the old one: For, besides that those Species were such unaccounta­ble things, that none knew what to make of them, or under what Head to rank them, they could do the Question no Service at all: For, if they were Corporeal, they could only affect the Soul by way of Local Motion; of which, being Spiritual, she is not capable. And, if they were Spiritual, it will be ask'd, How they came to be such, being caused by a Corporeal Agent; as also, how, being sent from a Body, they could get into the Soul, or by what Vehicle? Being thus at a Loss, they invented another Entity, called Intelle­ctus Agens; whose Office it was to depure the Phantasms from their Dross of Materiality, that they might become fit, thus refined, to be re­ceiv'd in the Soul. But this still multiply'd more Difficulties, and solv'd none. For, First, What other Reason had they from Nature to put such a Power in the Soul? Or what other thing was it good for, but to purifie the Species? If it had no other Office, nor served for any thing but to do this Job, 'tis manifest 'twas invented gratis, to get rid of the Difficulty that stunn'd them, and taken [Page 61] up for an Asylum Ignorantiae, when they were hard put to it, and wanted something else to say. Secondly, Were those Phantasms, before they were Spiritualiz'd, in the Soul, or Intellectus, or out of it? If in it, the old Question returns, How got they thither? If out of it, How could the Soul's Acts of Understanding, which are Immanent Acts, become Transitive, and affect a Thing which is without her? Thirdly, Since the Understanding, or this Intellectus Agens, can only work by Know­ledge, how could it have this Power to alter the Natures of things, or turn them from Corporeal into Spiritual, when as yet it had no Knowledge at all in it, as before those Species were refined and fitted to be received in it, it had none? Last­ly, Are those Species they put, when purify'd, per­fectly like the Thing, or imperfectly? If perfectly like, then they are the same with it, as our No­tions are; and so, the Thing it self is in the Soul, and then those Species of theirs are to no purpose; for the Thing being there in Person (as it were,) there can need no Proxy of Species to stand for it; nor can it bear any Sense to call the Thing a Spe­cies of it self. If they be imperfectly like the Thing, they are no more but Resemblances of it; and then, 'tis already abundantly demonstrated, that the Thing can never be known by them: So that they could make nothing cohere how our first Ru­diments or Materials of Knowledge could get into the Soul, or how the Thing could come to be known by them.

5. The Ideists, on this Occasion; have taken two ways, and both of them very short ones; which is to skip over How the Ideists behav'd themselves as to this Point. all those Difficulties at one Leap. [Page 62] The Cartesians tell us in one Word, That God gave the Soul her Ideas (or, as some of them say, some of them) at the same time he gave her her Being; and that, by having those Ideas in her, she comes to know; and, so, by making this quick work, the Question is at an End. This is soon said, but not so easily proved. Some Rubs I have put in the way of this Pretence, to hinder its Currency, in the Preface to my Method, and in the Book it self, as Occasion presented; and shall add many more, in case their Opposition shall invite me to it. But; what needs any more, since Mr. Locke has already Confuted that Position beyond possibility of any Rational Reply? Other Ideists there are, who think it their best Play to abstract totally from that hard Question; and, find­ing, by Experience, that they have Ideas and Re­semblances in their Head when they know, they content themselves with That, without proceed­ing to examin distinctly what they are, or how they bring us to the Knowledge of the Things in Nature. These Men do certainly act more pru­dently than the former; for, 'tis much more wise and safe, in order to the Common Good of Learn­ing, to wave an obscure Point totally; than, by advancing false Positions, in a matter of univer­sal Concern in Philosophy, to affirm what cannot be maintain'd. Tho' I must declare, that I cannot see but that such a Fundamental Point, which in­fluences the whole Body of Science, ought not to be pretermitted. For which reason I have thought fit to lay the Grounds for it in the two first Les­sons of my Method, reserving a more particular Account of it till further Occasion should be pre­sented; which seems to offer it self at present.

[Page 63] 6. Yet I do not judge this Opportunity so pres­sing or proper, as to oblige me to treat such a large Point fully, or How far the Au­thor engages to clear this Diffi­culty. to set my self to demonstrate and smooth every Step I take in this untrodden and rugged way. This of right belongs to that part of Metaphysicks that treats of the Nature of the Soul; and, particu­larly, as it is the Form of such an Animal Body; which may not improperly be called Physicks; or Animasticks. Besides, it were too great a Bold­ness to pretend to pursue such an abstruse Point quite thorough with Evident Demonstration. Yet I think I may promise my Readers, that the Posi­tions I shall lay down orderly to clear it, will have that Coherence amongst themselves, and be so Agreeable to the Natures of Things, and to the Maxims of divers other Sciences; that it will be hard, in just Reason, to find any considerable Flaw in it. I take my Rise from the remotest Principles that can concern that Point, and these are my Thoughts.

7. It belongs to the Divine Wisdom to carry on the Ordinary Course of his World by Causes and Effects; and, The First Cause car­ries on the Course of Second Causes by Immediate Dispositions. on the Matter's side, by Disposi­tions to further Productions. Thus Wood is heated by Degrees, e're it becomes Fire, and breaks out into a Flame; and, in the Generation of every thing in Nature, there are are many Previous Al­terations of the Matter, ere it acquires Another Form, or becomes Another Thing.

[Page 64] 8. Wherefore it belongs also to the same Wis­dom and Goodness of God, as he is the First Cause, that if, in the And therefore he assists Nature, if Dispos'd, when it cannot reach. Ordinary Course of the World, the Subject be dispos'd for some­thing that cannot be compassed by the Power of Second Causes, to step in to Nature's Assistance, and help her immediately by his own Hand. Thus, when the Individuality is compleat­ed, that is, when the Potentiality of the Matter is Ultimately Determin'd and Particulariz'd by Se­cond Causes, so that it is become distinct from all other Entities, or apt to be This, and so fitted for Existence; which Existence, Second Causes cannot give: God, whose Generous Bounty stands ever ready to bestow unenviously on his Creatures all the Good they are capable of, does give them Existence immediately by himself.

9. Therefore, if there can be such a Disposi­tion in the Brain of an Embryo, that (grown riper) it is apt, as Therefore, if the Matter can be Dispos'd for a Rational Soul, GOD will give it. far as is on the Matters side, to act Comparatively, which is the Disposition for Rationality: And that this cannot be done, but by having a Form in it of a Superior or Spiritual Nature, which Second Causes cannot produce; it is certain, God will, by himself, as­sist it, by infusing such a Form.

10. There can be such a Disposition in the Brain of an Embryo to work Compara­tively, that is, to Judge and Dis­course; There can be such a Disposition in Matter. since we experience that we do this actually now, in part, by the means of the Brain, or something that's near it, or belongs to it.

[Page 65] 11. Wherefore, since this cannot be done with­out having those Materials in us, of which, Compounded or Com­pared, Therefore, some Ma­terial Part, by which immediate­ly the Soul has Notions from the Object. we are to Judge and Dis­course, which we call Simple Ap­prehensions, or Notions; it follows that there must be such a Dispo­sition in some Bodily Part, as to convey into the Soul such Notions.

12. Wherefore, since Bodies, in their whole Quantity, or Bulk, cannot be con­vey'd by the Senses into the Brain, Therefore Effluvi­ums are sent from Bodies, to that Part. the Author of Nature has order'd that all Bodies, upon the least Motion of Natural Causes, In­ternal or External, (which is never wanting) should send out Effluviums, or most minute and imperceptible Particles; which may pass through the Pores of those Peruious Organs, called the Senses; and so, be carried to the Brain.

13. This Natural Compound, called [Man,] is truly One Thing, and not aggre­gated of more Things Actually Therefore Man is truly One Thing, which is Corpo­reo-Spiritual. Distinct; since the Form, called the Soul, did (tho' not so Naturally, yet) as necessarily follow out of the Disposition of the Matter, (taking it as Se­conded, and its Exigency and Deficiency supply'd by the First Cause,) as the Form of Fire, or of any other Body in Nature, does out of the Dispo­sitions properly Previous to that Form: And, therefore, does as truly (by Informing that Mat­ter) Make or constitute the Man One Thing, as any other Corporeal Form does any Body in Na­ture.

[Page 66] 14. Therefore there must be some Chief Corpo­real Part in Man, which is im­mediately united with the Soul, as Therefore some Chief Part in him which is primarily Cor­poreo-Spiritual, or has both those Natures in it. the Matter with its Form, and, therefore, is Primarily Corporeo-Spiritual, and includes both Na­tures. Whence, when that Part is affected, after its peculiar Nature, Corporeally; the Soul is affected after its Nature, that is, Spiritually, or Knowingly; which Part Cartesius thinks is the [...], or Glandula Pinealis.

15. Therefore the Manner how, and the Rea­son why those Corporeal Efflu­viums do come to affect the Soul, Which is affected according to both those Natures, be­cause of their I­dentification in that Part. and cause in her Spiritual Notions of the Thing, is because of the immediate Identification of the Matter and Form, in that part; whence follows, that the one can­not be affected, but the other must be affected too after its Different manner, proper to its Distinct Nature. In the same manner (abating the Diver­sity peculiar to each of those Natures) as, when the Matter of Wood is wrought upon, the Form of it, or the Complexion of Accidents, (making up one Thing with it,) does also suffer Change. Whence, by the way, is seen the Reason of that received Maxim, that Actiones & Passiones sunt sup­positorum: So that 'tis the whole Thing which acts or suffers, tho' according to this or that Part of it; and hence it is that the Whole Thing is conceiv'd, tho' by an Inadequate Notion we conceive but but one Part of it (as it were) distinctly.

[Page 67] 16. This Part immediately inform'd by the Soul as 'tis Spiritual, (which we will call the Seat of Knowledge,) must, The Peculiar Tem­per of that Part consists in Indif­ferency. whatever it is, be of a Temper the most Indifferent to all Bodies, and to their several Modes as can be conceived; and (as far as Matter can bear) Abstract from them all; both that it may be con­naturally more sensible of the Different Effluviums by which their several Natures are to be under­stood; as also more fit to beget in the Soul Uni­versal Notions, such as are those of Ens, or Being; by which all the Negotiation of our Interiour Acts of Judging and Discoursing is managed. Tho' I am apt to judge that those General Notions are also caus'd when the Impression is Confused or In­distinct, as those of Ens or Being are; and the same is to be said of the Rest in proportion. Thus, when we see a Thing a-far off, and have but a Confused View of it, it only appears to us to be something, we know not, particularly what, or A Thing; without making us know in the least, what Kind of Thing or Body it is. Afterwards, coming nearer, we discern it moves it self; whence we gain the Notion of a Living Thing: Then, ap­proaching still nearer, we, by a more distinct Im­pression, know 'tis a Horse. And, lastly, when it is within convenient Distance to give us a per­fectly Distinct View of it, we know 'tis such a Particular Horse of our own.

17. That Part, called the Seat of Knowledge, must, moreover, be the most Sen­sible, and the most Tender that can That Part very Tender and Sen­sible, yet not Te­nacious. be imagin'd, that (as was said) the least Effluviums may affect it: [Page 68] And yet it must not be of a Glutinous Nature, so as to entangle them, and make them stick there; but that, reverberated thence, they may light in some near adjacent place, to serve, by their re­newed Impulses afterwards, for the Use of Memory, and to excite again former Knowledges; as also, (as will be shewn,) to cause Reflex Acts. That it must not be in the least Glutinous, appears hence evidently, that, did the Effluviums stick there, we should, whether we would or no, perpetually contemplate or think of those Objects; which would also hinder our Perception of others, by mingling the former Effluviums with those which supervene.

18. The orderly disposure of the world, by Gradual steps arising from less perfect Natures to those which That part the most Noble of all Ma­terial Nature. are more Noble, and more Per­fect, does evince that this Part call'd the Seat of Knowledge, is the most Supremely Noble production of Material things, and nearest ally'd (as it were) to Spiri­tual Nature that can be imagin'd; so that all the best Perfections that are to be found in Corpo­real things, are center'd in it. Whence, tho' it is too rude to affirm with a certain learned Physi­cian, that the [...], is a baser part of Man's Body than the Intestinum Rectum; yet I cannot approve of Cartesius his Conceit, that it is a Glan­dule; which is one of the Ignoblest parts we have; but judge it has a peculiar Temperature of its own; not only specifically distinct from other parts, but that they are scarce in any degree to be parallell'd to it.

[Page 69] 19. Whether amongst its other Special Quali­ties it partakes of the Nature of those Bodies which in the dark Perhaps 'tis Re­flexive of Light, or Lucid. do reflect Light; and that the Glossy and Lively Appearances and Resemblances, which we call Fancies, or Phantasms, do spring thence, I leave to others to determin. I think it is the Interest of those who make the Septum Lucidum to be the Seat of Knowledge, to embrace that Opi­nion.

20. Those Effluviums sent out from Bodies, have the very Natures of those Bo­dies in them, or rather are them­selves The Effluviums have in them the Naturee of the Bo­dies whence they are sent. Lesser Bodies of the Self-same Nature, (as the smallest im­perceptible parts of Bread and Flesh, are truly Bread and Flesh) which are cut off by Natural Agents from the great Lump; and, therefore, by Application of themselves, they imprint the very Body it self, or a Body of that Nature, on that material part which is the Seat of Knowledge. Whence the Soul be­ing, at the same time, affected after her manner (or Knowingly) as that part was affected, she has also the very Nature of that Body (as far as the Sense exhibits it) put in her by that conform­able Impression, when she has a Notion of it.

21. Therefore those Effluviums striking the Seat of Knowledge, and immediately (as has been said) falling off from They affect that Part, as Things Distinct from the Man. it, do affect it as a Thing distinct from the M [...]n. For they are not there as belonging at all to the In­trinsecal Constitution of the Body, but as meer [Page 70] strangers to it: Whence the Soul has the Nature of that Body in her (and consequently is that Body) as 'tis another Thing from her, which illu­strates the Explication of knowing given formerly; and that 'tis to be another thing as it is another.

22. The Reason why those Effluviums, contain­ing the Essence or Nature of the Bodies whence they flow, do not Why they imprint Abstract Noti­ons. breed a Notion in the Soul of their whole Essences is, because they are convey'd to that part by many different Conduits the Senses; which being diverse, and each of them (according to their circumstances) apt to be affected diversely, do therefore receive and imprint them after a different Manner. For exam­ple, those which, by the smart motion of the Ayr, do come in thro' the Drum of the Ear; and consequently by the Auditory Nerve which is joined to it, and immediately conveys them to the Seat of Knowledge; do affect it with a kind of Vibration, or (as we may say) Soundingly. Those which come in by the Eye, affect it Luminously, or as accompany'd with Light, and so of all the rest; whence are caused in our Soul all our Distinct, or Abstracted Notions of the Thing, or (which is the same) of the Nature of the Thing, in part, or according to such a Consideration of it; on which, because of the Distinctness, and consequently Clearness of those impressions, all the Science we have of the Thing is grounded.

23. There is, moreover on the Soul's side, which is the Subject The Peculiar Na­ture of our Soul, renders those No­tions perfectly distinct and In­divisible. that receives those Impressions, another thing highly conducing to make our Notions yet more [Page 71] Clear and perfectly Distinct, which deserves our best Reflexion. 'Tis this, that, the Nature of our Soul being Indivisible, it gives an Indivisi­bility to all those Notions, or Natures in her; which, as they existed without her, and were con­vey'd into her by Effluviums, being Corporeal, were Divisible, and therefore something Indistinct and Confus'd: This appears clearly in most of the Objects about which the Soul is conversant, perhaps, in all; viz. in Figures, Points, Lines, Superficies, Instants, Measures, Comparisons, Pre­dications, Respects, Negations, Denominations, Relations, &c. For example, There is not, per­haps, in all Nature any Body Perfectly, or Ma­thematically, Flat, Sphaerical or Triangular; or just a yard, nor any Duration mark't out to be just an Hour; but, by reason that Bodies are affected with quantity, which is perpetually vari­able by a world of Agents of diverse Figures assaulting it; as also because of the Divisibility of Quantity in infinitum, it is warpt from those Exact Figures, or deviates from those Just Mea­sures: Whereas, on the contrary, those things, as they exist in the Soul, are adjusted and Stinted even to an Indivisible; so that the very least imaginable Consideration, added or detracted, quite alters the Notion to another Species, Now, nothing can be so concisely Distinct from another, or more impossible to be Confounded with it, than what is so comprized within its own Bounds, as to be This and no other, or so much and no more, even to an Indivisible. Whence 'tis demonstrable that the Thing, as in our Soul, or as standing under our Notion, or Conception, is a most Proper Ground for that Distinct and Clear Knowledge [Page 68] [...] [Page 69] [...] [Page 70] [...] [Page 71] [...] [Page 72] called Science. This is evidently seen throughout the whole Body of the Mathematicks; and the same will be found by Reflexion in all other Sciences whatever.

I note here on the by, that this Power or Fa­culty of the Soul, which is so proper and so na­tural to her, of Reducing all things in her from the Indistinctness found in them, as they stand in Nature, or from Divisibility to Indivisibility, does ground most evident Demonstrations of her Im­materiality, and consequently, of her Immortality, were it pursu'd home.. But this is not my busi­ness at present.

24. That Part, called the Seat of Knowledge, can be affected with many co­herent Impressions at once, which Whence Complex Notions come. cause in the Soul Complex, or Compounded Notions. This is too evident to need any Dilating on it, I call those Impressions coherent, which are caused by Effluviums making singly different Impressions ei­ther from the same Thing, or the same sort of Thing. But, it is on this occasion to be well noted, that, lest our Knowledges or Discourses be lost in a Croud, or run astray in a pathless Wood of Notions disorderly aggregated, the Art of Logick is absolutely necessary, to range and di­stinguish our Notions into Common Heads, and to descend from those General Heads all along by Intrinsecal Differences Method to Sci­ence, Book 1. Less. 3. § 2.; that is, to divide them by more and less of the Common Notion, so to keep them still within that Line or Head; without which they must needs interfere and breed Confusion. This Method of Distin­guishing [Page 73] and keeping distinct our Notions, is as ne­cessary for Scientifical Discourses, as 'tis for an Army to be Marshalled in Rank or File; without which 'tis but a Medly or Confused Multitude. Whence, those who slight this Methodizing their Notions, must necessarily, in rigorous Reason, talk Ramblingly; tho' perhaps ingeniously, ac­cording to such a sort of Wit as Men use when they would maintain Paradoxes; or, as Erasmus us'd to praise Folly.

25. It being demonstrable in Metaphysicks, that whatever is only in Power to have a new Act, cannot of it The Soul cannot A­lone produce any New Act in her self, self produce that Act in it self, unless it be wrought upon first by some other Agent which is in Act; and much less can such a Power do this, as is of an Indivisible or Spiritual Nature, in regard it has no Parts, one whereof being in Act it self, may produce an Act in the rest; as it happens in the Wheels of a Watch, or in our Bodies, when one part of them moves another: It follows hence, that our Soul can produce no new Act, either of Memory, or of Reflexion upon her own former Acts, nor of Thinking or Willing, &c. without being first affected by some Object without her, or anew by some Part or Particle within the Man; which, being in Act it self, may cause those new Acts of Knowledge in her.

26. The Effluviums, which, by affecting the Seat of Knowledge, gave her to know at first, are the properest But by the Phan­tasms exciting her anew. Agents to produce connaturally these new Acts of Reflexion or Memory; in case it can be found that they are duely qualify'd for such an Efficiency.

[Page 74] 27. Those Effluviums (as was prov'd above) not sticking on that part which is the Seat of Knowledge, do conse­quently How Reminis­cence is made. fall off from it, and are lodged near it; whence 'tis con­sonant, that That Part also having its Effluviums when thus sollicited by the Impulse of those A­tomes sent from without; and therefore (all Na­tural Action causing Reaction;) when they rebound thence, they carry away some minute Particles of the said Part. Wherefore these Outward Efflu­viums, thus imbu'd, and qualify'd with some tang of the Seat of Knowledge, when they come to be Excited again by some Exteriour or Interiour Causes, must affect it afterwards accordingly; and thence they become duely qualify'd to cause a Notion of it as Fore-known, which we call, to re­flect upon it, or remember it. By which we see how Reflexion and Reminiscence are caused by the new Impulse of those former Atoms to the Seat of Knowledge, tinctur'd with some Particles of that Part it self. For which Reason, the oftner this is done, the Memory of it is more Easie and Lively. Whence is seen, that there is no need of multiplying succeeding Ideas, to know the pre­ceding ones, when we have Acts of Reflexion; a new Impression of the Effluviums or Phantasms, thus qualify'd, repeating still the same former No­tion with the Connotate of Foreknown.

28. Memory and Remembrance are inexplicable, without putting those first-im­printed Atoms to reside still in Memory and Re­miniscence, in­explicable, unless Phantasms re­main in the Brain the Brain, and to be excited there anew. For, were this put to be perform'd by a meer Motion upon [Page 75] the Nerve (as most of our Modern Philo­sophers think,) the Object being gone, that Motion would quickly cease. Nor could the same Motion be connaturally reviv'd but by the same Object, which is seldom at hand to make it again as oft as we have occasion to re­member, as Experience shows us. Much less could the Remembrance of Sounds or Tunes, in Man or Birds, be possibly explicated, unless those repell'd Atoms, lying in Order, and striking afresh the Auditory Organ, did repeat the same Impression they had formerly. For, to put Millions of Mo­tions to continue perpetually playing in the Fancy, and (as they needs must) interfering with one an­other, would destroy all Harmony, and breed a strange jarring Confusion.

Note, that Reminiscence is oft-times made in us by using our Reason, gathering or recollecting former Notions The manner how Reminiscence is made in Brutes by others that orderly succeeded them; in the same manner as we investigate Causes from their Effects: Where­as in Brutes it is performed meerly by a new Ap­pulse of the former Atoms to that part in which the Imagination consists; which being the most supreme in the Animal, has a Power to Agitate the Animal Spirits, and move the Body agreeably to those Impressions; as is found also in Man.

29. The same Excitation of those particles thus imbu'd, causes also Reflex Know­ledge of our former Operations. How Reflexion is connaturally made. And indeed Reflexion on our past thoughts is the same as Remembrance of them; for we can neither Reflect on a Thing with­out Remembring it, nor Remember it without Re­flecting [Page 76] on it. But this Reflexion, for the reason lately given, must proceed from some Object or Cause Extraneous to the Soul; that is from Efflu­viums in the Memory thus reexcited. For it is to be noted that as Divines (or rather Christian Faith) tell us, that Christ having two distinct Na­tures in the same Suppositum, all his Operations proper to him as such, were therefore Theanthro­picae, or such as were agreeable and belonging to both the Divine and Humane Natures: So Man, consisting of both a Corporeal and Spiritual Na­ture, and thence being a Corporeo-Spiritual Thing, all his Operations, for the same Reason, must be Corporeo-Spiritual. Whence he has no Act purely Spiritual, or uncompounded with the Co-opera­tion of that Corporeal Part, which receives those Effluviums (call'd by us Fancy) or without it's Concurrence. Which gives us farther Light, to see how our Soul cannot reflect on her own Operations, but the Fancy must go along; and, by what's said, it will be easie to conclude from which of those parts the Operation must begin anew, viz. from that part from which it did be­gin at first. Hence came that Saying of the Schools, That the Soul has Notions, or knows, Speculando Phantasmata: which are pretty Fanciful Words; and, tho' they may perhaps have a good Meaning, yet 'tis very unphilosophically express'd: For it makes the Soul to speculate, which (if it have any Sense at all) signifies to know the Phantasms or Ideas in the Imagination, when as yet she has no Knowledge in her at all. All her Notions, which are the first Elements of Knowledge, be­ing caus'd in her by those Effluviums, previously to her Knowing either them, or any thing else.

[Page 77] 13. From what's said above, 'tis seen that those Direct Notions, which are thus naturally imprinted, are Direct Notions, common to all Mankind, and their Words Pro­per; Reflex ones Improper, and their Words Me­taphorical. Common to all Mankind in the main, (however they may in each Man differ in some Degree) and consequently, the Words we agree on to express those Natural Noti­ons are, for the same reason, Proper Words; whereas those Notions made by meer Reflexion, as are those of Spiritual Natures, are therefore Improper, as having no proper Phan­tasms to imprint them connaturally on the Mind: whence also the Words that express them, are such as are taken or Translated from Natural Objects; and therefore they are Improper or Metaphorical.

31. From this exact Distinctness of our Notions, even to an Indivisible, or from this, that one of them is not ano­ther, Whence we come to have Negative Notions. our Mind has an Appen­dage of a Negation tack'd to eve­ry Notion, so that it becomes very familiar to her: whence she can have a Negative Notion of every thing she conceives, while the considers it as limited, or reaching thus far, and no farther; or being This, and no other. Of which Nature are all the Modes of Ens, they being limited Con­ceptions of it; no Notion being perfectly Positive but that of Ens or Being.

32. Hence the Soul can have also the Notions of Indivisibility, Immortality, Im­mensity, and innumerable such But Negative No­tions, as they are Negative, do not abstract from the Subject. like. But, it is very specially to be remark'd, that we can have no Notions of those Negatives as [Page 78] taken abstractedly from the Thing or Subject; for, otherwise, Non Entities (formally as such) might be the Object of the Understanding; which is impos­sible; for [Nothing] formally as such (I add, nor Va­cuum) can have no Effluviums sent from it to the Brain, nor consequently any Intelligibility; nor can any possible Notion be fram'd of it. Wherefore Baldness signifies the Head, quatenus having no Hair on it; Blindness, the Eye, quatenus having no Sight; Immensity, the Thing, quatenus not ca­pable to be measured, &c. Hence

33. The Notion we have of [Nothing] or Non Ens, is only that of Ens in it's whole Latitude, with a Negati­on How we come to have a Notion of [Nothing.] annexed to it; in the same manner as in particular Entities, [Incorporeal] signifies [non Corpus] or as [Indivi­sible] signifies [Non-Quantum] &c.

24. Hence it is that we come to conceive, and sometimes express Non Ens as an Ens; as Grammarians do when Hence great Care is to be had, lest we take Non-Entities, or No­things, for Things. they define a Noun to be the Name of a Thing, and yet make Nihil (which signifies Nothing) a Noun Subjective, and put Adjectives to it. Whence Philosophers must take very great Care, lest, seduced by our manner of Conceiving Non-Ens as a Thing, they come to fancy, or judge it to be formally something; as do the Asserters of Vacuum, and too many others in like Occasions. For then (I beg their Pardon for my Plainness) their Discourses upon it can be no wiser than are those Ingenious Verses, made to shew how rare a Thing Nothing is; nor, indeed, so wise: For those Poets did this [Page 79] Ludicrously, to shew their Wit; but these do it Se­riously, and make account, that, in doing so, they shew their Skill and Wisdom; which I must think is meer Folly.

35. The Notions of Genus, Species, Subject, Pre­dicate, and generally of all Terms of Art which are not Fantastick, Logical Notions are Real ones. but wisely conducing to clear and range our Notions in Order, to gain Science, are Nothing but several Abstract No­tions of the Thing, precisely considered according to some Manner of Being it has in our Understand­ing. For Animal and Homo are evidently Abstract or Inadequate Notions of Peter, taking him as he exists in Nature: But, when we call Animal a Ge­nus, or, Homo a Species; or, when, in this Propo­sition, [Petrus est Homo,] we say Petrus is the Sub­ject, and Homo the Predicate, we speak of them precisely, as they exist in the Understanding; For, in Nature, or out of the Understanding, there can be no Universals, but only Individuals, none else being determin'd to be This or That Ens, or ca­pable of Existing: Nor can Propositions be any where, but in the Mind. Whereas, in the Understanding, the Notion of [Animal] is really larger, and that of [Homo] narrower; which Ar­tists call Genus and Species. And, in the foresaid Proposition, Petrus and Homo, which are its Parts, are as truly in our Mind the Subject and Predicate, as that Proposition it self is there; or as the Thing, as existing in Nature, is White or Black.

36. This then is the Test to try all the Specula­tions made by Logicians, and other Reflecters or Artists, viz. The Test to try Ar­tificial Notions. to examin whether they suit with, [Page 80] and are built on the Natures of the Things them­selves, as they exist in our Mind; that they conduce to order our Notions so, as may clear the Way to Science; and that they be not meerly Impertinent and shallow grounded Fancies, as they too fre­quently are; particularly, the See Method to Science, B. 1. L. 7. §. 13, 14. Entia Rationis, which make such a Noise in the Schools.

Corollary II. Whence, upon the main, is clearly discovered, how all true Philoso­phy is nothing but the Knowledge Hence all Philoso­phy is Real Knowledge. of Things; either as they have their Being in Nature, which is done by Direct Acts; or else in the Understanding only, which are known by Reflex ones.

37. Besides those Impressions which cause our Direct and Reflex Acts, there are others which breed meer Whim­sies How our Soul comes to have Phanta­stick Notions, or (as we call them) Fancies. coin'd by the Fancy, and are purely Chimerical. For our Fan­cy having Innumerable Effluviums, or Atomes in it, of many Sorts, which are oft-times agitated disorderly; hence it comes, that it conjoins and imprints Incoherent Phantasms on the Seat of Knowledge, and so makes Apprehensions of them in our Minds; such as are those of a Golden Earth, a Hircoceruus, an Elephant supporting the World, a Chimera, and such like. This most commonly happens in Dreams, conceited Prophesies, and Enthusiastick Revelations; especially those caused by the Spleen. Nor is groundless Speculation, exempt from this Enormity. Generally this happens when our [Page 81] Thoughts are Unattentive to the Things in Na­ture, whose Direct Impressions keep our Fancy Orderly, and Firm. Now, there is little Harm in our apprehending those extravagant Connexions; the Danger is, lest Speculaters, seduced by Ima­gination, do come to Judge that the Things are so in Nature as they fancy them; which must necessarily fill their Minds with Caprichio's, and Frantick Conceits. The Ways to avoid these Inconveniences, How to avoid be­ing deluded by them. are, First, To attend heedfully to the Direct Impressions from the Things without us; and to examine whether the Connexion of those Fancies be agreeable to their Natures, or no. Secondly, To make Right and Strong Judgments concerning those common Notions we had from Nature, which keep our Thoughts and Discourses Steady and Solid; espe­cially, to keep an Attentive Consideration, that, as all these Notions came from the Thing, so they are still the Thing, conceiv'd according to somewhat that is in it; and to take care we do not make them forget their Original, nor disown the Thing, from whence only, as be­ing Modes meerly depending on it, they had any kind of Being at all; nor, consequently, In­telligibility. Thirdly, To observe the Methodical Rules and Maxims of True Logick, which teach us how to distinguish our Notions exactly, and to keep them distinct, lest we blunder in our Dis­courses; and which do withall shew us what are the Ways how to frame true Connexions, or right Judgments and Discourses. But, the last and best Means to keep us from being mis-led by Fancy, or following its Vagaries, is, the Study [Page 82] of Metaphysicks; which, being built on the Highest, Steadiest and Clearest Principles, ab­stract from all Fancy, and will scarce ever per­mit those who who are well vers'd in it, to fall into Errour. And, let it be observ'd, that nothing in the World more perverts all true Science, than does the admitting those disor­der'd Fancies because, being cleanly express'd, they have sometimes a Lively Appearance, for Solid Truths; nay, laying them often for Grounds, and Self-evident Principles. This, this, I say, is the main Source of all Hypothetical Philosophy, and of all Erroneous Schemes of Doctrine, not grounded on the Natures of the Things; which, therefore, must needs be, at best, Shallow, and Superficial; and, if pursu'd home to their Prin­ciples, plain Nonsence, the usual and proper Effect of Ungovern'd Fancy.

38. Of those Things that do not come in by our Senses, as Bodies do, but are of a different or opposite Na­ture; How we may dis­course evidently of those Natures, of which we have no Proper No­tions. of which therefore we can have no Notion but by joining a Negation to the Notion of Body, (such as are Indivisible, Incorporeal, Immaterial, Immor­tal, and, in general, all Spiritual Things, and their proper Modes,) we can have no proper Effluviums, or Phantasms, as is evident. Where­fore also, the Notions we have of them, and, consequently, the Words by which we express them, are all Improper, or Metaphorical; which, if not reflected on, will breed Innumerable Er­rours. The best Notion we can frame of them, is that of Thing, with a Negation of Body, [Page 83] and of all the Modes of Body joined to it; which does not so much tell us what it is, as what it is not; or rather, it gives us a Blind, but Cer­tain Knowledge of what kind of Nature it must be, because it tells us of what kind of Nature it cannot be; the Differences which constitute that Nature, and its Opposite, being contradicto­ry, which forces it to be either of the One or of the other. Yet this hinders not, but we may discourse consequently, or Scientifically, of those Things that connotate the Negation of Body, full as well as of the Bodies themselves: For, as we can conclude evidently from the Notion of Bo­dy, that it is Divisible, Changeable, Placeable, Moveable, thus or thus Qualify'd, &c. so we may conclude, with Equal Evidence, from the Notion of a Thing which is not a Body, that it is not Divisible, not Extended, not Moveable, not Placeable, not affected with any Physical Quali­ties, &c.

39. Lastly, As for the Notion we have of God, however the An Est of such a Supreme Being be ma­ny We can have no Proper Notion of GOD's Es­sence. ways Evident and Demonstra­ble; yet the Notion of the Quid est of such a Being is the most Obscure that can be imagin'd. For, First, Since he must have Innumerable Perfections in his Na­ture, and the Notion we have of every ordi­nary Suppositum in Nature is therefore Confu­sed, and Obscure, because it grounds many No­tions which we cannot clearly conceive at once, or have a Distinct Apprehension of them; it follows, that much less can the Divine Nature be clearly conceived by us in this State, which [Page 84] comprehends all the best Perfections found in the whole Universality of Creatures, and infi­nitely more. Secondly, 'Tis yet harder to frame a Notion of a Being, in which those Innume­rable Perfections are not found Single, but are all of them center'd in one most Simple, and most Uncompounded Formality; which contains in it self eminently all the Excellencies that can possibly be conceived in Creatures, and Millions of times greater, and more. Thirdly, As we can have no Notion of a Created Spiritual Nature, but by a Negation of what's Proper to Body; so we can have no Notion of the Divine Na­ture, but by Denying of him all that belongs pro­perly to the Natures of such a Body and Spirit both; and by acknowledging them infinitely short of resembling, or even shadowing him. Lastly, We have no Notion, or Expression, that can sute with him; no, not even the most Metaphysical ones. Ens includes Potentiality to Existence; and, all Potentiality signifying Imperfection, must be ut­terly denied of him. Existence seems to come nearer; yet, because it signifies a Formality supervening to Ens, as 'tis Existent; and so is, as it were, a kind of Compart, it cannot be Proper for his infinitely- Simple Being. And even Self-existence signifies a kind of Form or Mode of the Subject that Self-exists. So that we have no kind of Notion or Expression, that can per­fectly agree to God's Infinite Essence; but we are forc'd to content our selves to make use of sometimes one Attribute, sometimes another, that signifies some Perfection, with [Infinite] an­nex'd to it, which is not found in Creatures, or which is denied of them, or is Incommuni­cable [Page 85] to them. Whence comes that Maxim of the Mysticks, that God is better known by Ne­gations, or by affirming he is none of those Po­sitive Perfections we find in Creatures, than by applying any of our Positive Notions to him. And this is all we can do in this State, till Grace raising us up to Glory, we come to know his Divine Essence, as it is in its Self; (or, as we phrase it, See him Face to Face;) in contemplating which, consists our Eternal Happiness.

40. Thus much of our Notions, which we call the First Operations of our Understanding, and how they The Author speaks not here of Com­paring Notions, or of Judg­ments. are caused in our Soul. How our Judging and Discoursing (which are the other two) are made in it, is shewn at large in the Second and Third Books of my Method to Science.

41. If any Learned Man is dis-satisfied with this Discourse, or has a mind to oppose it, I think I have Right to require of him two Things: The Author's A­pology for this Discourse; and what can be the only way to go about to confute it. First, That he would not ob­ject his own Fancies or Dis-like of it, or think that this is suf­ficient to invalidate it; but, that he would go to work like a Man of Reason, and shew that This or That part of it does contradict Such and Such a Principle in Logick, Physicks, or Metaphysicks. This is the only Solid Way of Objecting, all other being but Empty Talk, and Idle Cavil. Next, I think I have Right to demand, (since [Page 86] it is fundamentally necessary to Philosophy that this Point be clear'd,) that he would set him­self to frame some Orderly and Coherent Dis­course of his own, built upon Evident Princi­ples, how, or by what particular Means, the first Knowledge of the Things without us, comes into our Soul. In doing which, he will oblige the World very highly, and my self very particu­larly: And, unless he does this, he will be con­vinced to find fault with what himself cannot mend: Which will manifest that he either wants true Knowledge, or (which is a far greater De­fect) Ingenuity.

PRELIMINARY Fifth.

1. THE main Hindrance of Science, viz. The Mistake of Fancies for Realities, or of meer Similitudes The Design of the Author here. for Notions, being provided a­gainst; the other Grand Impe­diment to true Knowledge, which is the taking Words, us'd in Philosophy, in an Ambiguous or wrong Sense, is to be our next Care. The In­conveniences which arise hence, and the ways how to detect and avoid Equi­vocation, are in my Book 1. Less. 11. Method dis­cours'd of in common; and I have here in my Second Preliminary clear'd also in common the Signification of all Abstract Words, and shewn, that they mean the thing it self, qua­tenus such or such; or, according to such or such a Consideration of it as is express'd by that Word. My present Business, to which my Cir­cumstances oblige me, is to clear, in particular, the Notion or Meaning of those most Important Words, which being made use of by Learned Men, and taken by them often-times in different Senses, do so distract them in their Sentiments; [Page 88] and, by drawing their Intellectual Eye, now to one side, now to the other, make them so frequent­ly miss the Mark while they aim at true Science. Not that my Intention in this Preliminary is, to pursue the Mistakes of others, but only to settle the True and Genuine Sense of such Words, to be applied afterwards to the Mis-accepters of them, as occasion requires; tho' I may hint now and then some Abuses of them, that so I may the bet­ter clear their proper Signification.

2. I begin with [Existence] express'd by the Word [is] which is the Notion of the Thing, precisely consider'd The Meaning of the word [Exi­stence.] as it is Actually Being. This is the most simple of all our Noti­ons, or rather indeed the Method. 1. B. 1. L. 2. § 14. only Simple Notion we have, all the rest being but Respects to it. For, it has no kind of Composition in it, not even that Metaphysical one, of grounding divers Concep­tions or Considerations of it, as all others have. Whence all Notions being, by their Abstraction, Distinct and Clear; this most Abstracted Notion is so perfectly clear and self-evident, that, as it can­not need, so it cannot admit any Explication. They who go about to explain it, show themselves Bung­lers, while they strive to approve themselves Artists. For, by telling us, that 'tis Esse contra Causas, they put [Esse,] which is the Notion defin'd, in the Definition; which is most absurd, and against all Art and Common Sense: Nay, they make it more obscure than it was before, by adding [Extra Cau­sas] to it, which are less clear than it self was. By the Word [Causes,] I suppose, they mean Natu­ral ones; and so, tho' it gives no Clearness to the [Page 89] Signification of the Word [Esse,] yet it may at least consist with good Sense; and may mean, that the Thing was, before, or while it was not yet produced, within the Power of those Causes, or in the State of Potentiality; and that Existence is that Formality, or most formal Conception, by which the Thing is put out of that imperfect State, of having only A Power to be, and is redu­ced to the perfecter State of Actuality, or Actual Being.

3. As it is impossible to misconceive this self­evident Notion, so 'tis equally im­possible to mistake the meaning The Extreme Dan­ger of Misconceiv­ing it. of the word [Existence] which properly expresses that Notion; for, if they take the word [is] to have any meaning, relating any way to the Line of [Ens,] or any Signification at all that is, of its Nature, purely Potential, they quite destroy it's No­tion: And, if they take it, in any Sense, for an Actuality not belonging to the Line of Ens, they must necessarily take it to mean [is not,] there being no Third or other such Notion to take it for; in the same manner, as if one takes not Ens to mean A Thing, he must take it to mean No­thing. Now, tho' the Goodness of Humane Na­ture, which abhors Contradiction, reclaims ve­hemently against such an unnatural Depravation of Common Sense, as to take [is,] while thus ex­press'd, for [is not;] yet, taking the meaning of the Word [Existence] as it is disguised by another Word, which is, by consequence, Equivalent to it; those Deserters of Humane Nature, the Scep­ticks, do take occasion from the altering the Ex­pression, to misapprehend even what is Self-evi­dent. [Page 90] For 'tis the same Sense, (when we speak affirmatively) to say a thing is True or Certain, as to say it is; since nothing can be True or Certain that is not; and, therefore, when these Men talk of Moral and Probable Truth, and Probable or Mo­ral Certainty, which mincing Expressions mean [possible not to be so] they in effect say, that [what is, may, whilst it is, possibly not be;] Which man­ners of Expression, tho' they may seem to some but a meer Unconcerning School-Speculation; and Unreflecting Men may think it deserves no other Note, but that of being Ridiculous; yet, I judge my self obliged to declare, that it is more­over most enormously Mischievous; and that it quite perverts and destroys (by a very immedi­ate Consequence) the Nature and Notion of all Certainty and Truth whatsoever, and of Being too; and quite overthrows all possibility of Knowing any thing at all. Had they said [I think it true or certain] none would blame them; rather 'tis a Credit for such Men even to think heartily there is any Truth or Certainty at all in Philoso­phy; but to joyn (as they do) Moral or Proba­ble, to Truth and Certainty, as a kind of Mode affect­ing them, is to clap these most unconsociable Things, Light and Darkness, into one Dusky Com­pound, to abet Nonsense, and palliate Ignorance.

4. The Notion immediately next in order to Existence, as that which has the very least Potentiality that can be The meaning of [Ens] or [Thing.] in the Line of Being, is that of Ens, or Thing. Wherefore the meaning of that word can be no other but that of [Capable to be] for, no Created Thing has Actu­al Being, or Existence, in its Essential-Notion, but [Page 91] of its own Nature may be or not be; as, besides what's proved in my B. 3. L. 7. Method, is seen in the very Notion of Creature; which signifies That which has its Being from Another; which, therefore, can, of its self, be only Capable of Being. That the No­tion of Ens is distinct from that of Existence is demonstrated Ibid. else­where, and is farther evident hence, that the Notion of what has Existence must be different from what's had by it, or from Exi­stence it self. All Mankind has this Notion of Thing in them; for they experience that every Thing can exist, by seeing it does so; and they know also they are not of themselves, whether they hold a first Being, or no; because they do gene­rally see that Causes produced them. Wherefore all that can be said, or thought of the word [Ens] is, that it signifies the Thing precisely, as 'tis Ca­pable of Being.

5. Whence follows, that the Abstract Terms, [Entity] or [Essence] do proper­ly signify [A Capacity of Being,] The Meaning of [Entity] or [Es­sence.] which is the Abstract Term of [Capable of Being.] Tho' Entity is often us'd as a Concrete for the Thing it self. Moreover, Essence is the Total Form of Ens its Suppositum, or Subject, which adequately and in­tirely constitutes it such; as Humanitas is the To­tal Form of Homo. I call it the Total Form, to distinguish it from the Partial Form of Body; which, with the Matter, its compart, do com­pound the entire Notion, or Total Form of Cor­poreity.

[Page 92] 6. To understand which more clearly we are to Note that the Notion and Sig­nification of the word [Matter] The Meaning of [Matter] and [Form;] or of [Power] and [Act.] signifies the Thing, or Body pre­cisely, as it is a Power to be a Thing; and Form signifies the same Thing, according to that in it which determins it to be a Thing Actually. We are to reflect too, that Power and Act, considered in the Line of Being, are the same as Matter and Form; only the Former words are purely Meta­physical, because they express the parts of Ens as Ens; in regard no other conceptions in the Line of Being can possibly be framed of a Body, but as it is Determinable, or Determinative, which are the very Notions of Power and Act; whereas Matter and Form, tho' in Bodies they signify the same as the former, seem rather to incline to the parts of such an Ens, or Body, Physically con­sider'd.

7. To show literally what's meant by this say­ing, that Matter and Form con­stitute the compleat Ens, or make What's meant lite­rally by the com­mon saying, that Matter and Form compound Body. the Subject capable of Existing, I discourse thus. Nothing as 'tis Indeterminate or Common to more can be ultimately Capable to be: v. g, neither a Man in Common, nor a Horse in Common, can possibly exist, but This Man, or This Horse: Whatever therefore does determin the Potentiality, or Indifferency of the Subject as it is Matter, or, which is the same, a Power to be of such or such a Nature, (which is what we call to have such a Form in it) does make it This or That, and, consequently, disposes it for Existence. [Page 93] Wherefore since the particular Complexion of the se­veral Modes and Accidents do determin the Power or Matter, so as to make it Distinct from all o­thers, it does by Consequence determin it to be This, and, so, makes it Capable of Existing; that is, an Ens or Thing. I enlarge not upon this Point, because I have treated it so amply in the Appendix to my Method to Science.

8. Hence is seen what is, or can, with good Sense, be meant by that Meta­physical, or Entitative part called The Literal Mean­ing of Substan­tial or Essential Forms. by the Schools, the Substantial or Essential Form; which they say, does, with the Matter, make up that compound Ens, call'd Body; and that, in Literal Truth, it can be nothing else but that Complexion of the Modes, or Accidents, which conspire to make that peculiar or primige­nial Constitution of every Body, at the first In­stant of its being thus ultimately Determin'd to be This. For, this Original Temperature of the Mixt or Animal, being once settled by the Steady Concurrence of its Causes; whatever Particles or Effluviums, or how many soever, which are Agreeable to it, do afterwards accrue to it, are so digested into, or assimilated, to its Nature, that they conserve, nourish and di­late, and not destroy it. Whereas, if they be of an opposit Nature, they alter it from its own tempe­rature, and in time quite destroy and corrupt it. To explicate which more fully, let us consider how the Causes in Nature, which are many times of a Different, sometimes of a Contrary Temper to the Compound, do work upon a Body; and how they make (as they needs must) preternatural Dis­positions [Page 94] in it; till, when those Disagreeable Al­terations arrive to such a pitch, as quite to per­vert the former Complexion of Accidents, which we call its Form; a new Form, or new Complexion succeeds, determining the Matter to be Another Thing; till it self also, wrought upon in the same Manner, comes to be Corrupted, and so makes way for a New Off-spring. To which, in the very Instant it is ultimately Determined to be This, the First Being, whose overflowing Goodness stands ever ready to give his Creatures all that they are Disposed or Capable to have, does, with a steady Emanation of Being, give his Peculiar Ef­fect, Existence.

Corollary. The Reason why our Moderns do so oppose Substantial or Essential Forms, are reduced to two Heads: The Reason why some Moderns op­pose Substan­tial or Essential Forms. First, Because they conceited the Form was a kind of Distinct Thing, or at least a part of a Thing Super­vening to the Marter, its Com­part, and Compounding the Ens, after that gross manner as Two Things in Nature do Compound a Third: Whereas, in reality, they are nothing but divers Notions or Considerations of the Thing, formally, as it is a Thing. Wherefore, to say, a Body is Compounded of Matter and Form, is no more, in Literal Truth, than to say that there can be no more Considerations of a Body, taken for­mally, as it is a Thing; or taking it in the Line of Ens precisely, but of a Power to become such a Thing; and of the Act or Form, Determining that Power: However the Thing may have in it what grounds the Notions of many Modes or Ac­cidents; [Page 95] which are also the Thing materially, tho' not Formally according to the Notion of Ens. Nor let any object, that this is to maintain that Things are compounded of Notions, as some may mis-un­derstand us; for, let it be remember'd (as is de­monstrated above,) that the Notion is the very Thing, as it is in our Understanding, according, or as far as it is conceiv'd by us; that is, 'tis the ve­ry Thing, partially Consider'd. The other Reason which the Moderns had for this Mis-conceit, was, because the Schools generally explain'd themselves very ill, by making a new Entity of every diffe­rent Conception; not comprehending well the Difference between Metaphysical Composition and Divisibility, and The Meaning of Me­taphysical Com­position and Di­visibility. Physical, or rather Artificial ones; such as Apothecaries use when they put many Ingredients into a Pill; or Carpenters, when of Many divers Mate­rials they compound a House; which is the ap­plying, outwardly or inwardly, more Things (pro­perly so called) together: Whereas Metaphysi­cal Divisibility is never reduced to Act, but by our Understanding framing Distinct or Abstract Notions of one and the same Thing. And Me­taphysical Composition is no more, but that there is found in the Thing (though Physically and Enti­tatively one, and uncompounded) what grounds those distinct Notions; which being but divers Respects or Considerations, it follows, that the Thing in Nature may, without any Contradiction, (or Possibly,) be Chang'd according to One of them, and not according to Another.

[Page 96] 9. Hence, Lastly, is clearly seen what is the Principle of Individuation, about which there have been such warm What is the Prin­ciple of Indivi­duation. Disputes, viz. That 'tis nothing but that Comploxion of Modes or Accidents, which make up the peculiar Constitu­tion of a Body at the first Instant of its being such an Ens or This, as is explicated at large, § 8. by which 'tis, consequently, fitted for such a particu­lar Operation in Nature.

10. Ens or Thing has many other Names, tho' all of them less proper. As, First, [Substance,] which, coming from The Meaning of the word [Sub­stance.] The word Improper. the Verb [Substare,] respects on­ly its Modes and Accidents, and not what concerns its self, or its own Order or Capacity to Existence. Wherefore, 'tis very Improper; and, unless the common U­sage of it make some Amends for the Impropriety of the Expression, certainly it is most highly Un­fit. Aristotle calls it [...], which coming from [...], keeps it within the Line of Being. As I remem­ber Boetius was the first who render'd [...] by Sub­stantia. The Schools either us'd it in Imita­tion of him, or else they took it up when they were to treat of the Ten Predicaments; and, Na­ture instructing them that the last Nine had no Order to Being in their Signification; and so, as taken in their peculiar Notions, could not exist alone, without needing a kind of Support (as it were:) hence they call'd this Support, by a Name suitable enough to their Thoughts, Substance; and the others, that had not Being in their Notion, and so had no Title to Being by their own Merits, or to uphold themselves in being, Accidents; of [Page 97] the Impropriety of which Word more hereafter. I wish there were no worse in it; and that, they did not fancy all those abstract Notions, which are only the Thing in part, to have in them the Notion of Things too, or to be so many In­tire Things; tho' they were Feebler and the other Stronger. However it were, they went to work Illogically: For, they should have considered, that all of them (taking them as they were Di­stinct from the Notion of Thing) could be no­thing but several Conceptions of ours, or (which is the same) the Thing as diversly considered; and then they might have easily reflected, that we could not (in general) have more Conceptions than those of Res and Modus Rei; that is, of the Thing, and of the several Manners how a Thing is; which would have clear'd this Truth to them, that the Manner or the How a Thing is, is nothing without the Thing, as is deduced formerly. How­ever, the Word [Substantia] with a sound Expli­cation, may pass, since Use will have it so; and will do little Harm, so it be but rightly under­stood to mean what we properly call Ens, Res, or Thing.

11. On this Occasion, 'tis my Opinion, that both Mr. Locke and my self should not be too severe against the Mo­dern That the words [Supporting] and [Inhering] taken metapho­rically, may be allow'd, and ought not to be Ridicul'd. School-men, for using the Words [Substantia] and [Inhae­rentia;] or, as he ingeniously ri­dicules it, [Sticking-on and under­propping.] The manner how the Thing and its Modes do relate to one Another; being only found in our Mind, and according to the Being they have there (for out of [Page 98] it there is no Distinction at all of the Thing from its Modes) is Spiritual; and so, can no other way be express'd, but metaphorically; and our selves do and must, in such a case, frequently use such Metaphors to express our Conceptions; which a Critick might banter sufficiently, by taking them Literally. Indeed, if those School-men did understand them in that crude Literal Sense, (as I fear many of them did) from which Appre­hension, I believe, his Zeal against them pro­ceeded, they deserve to be the Sport and Laugh­ter of all Men of Sense; for I know nothing else they are good for. Now the Truth is, there is a kind of Natural Order in our Notions, tho' ta­ken from the same Thing; so that we have the Notion of Res or Thing antecedently (in Priori­ty of Nature) to Modus Rei, or the Accidents; and we conceive the Mode or Manner to presup­pose the Notion of the Thing, and to have no Be­ing but as it is in it and affects it. Whence, be­ing conceiv'd to be in it, and to have no Being by any other means, we may, by a Metaphor not much strain'd, say it does, as it were, Inhere in it; and that the Thing supports its Modes in their Be­ing. Nor will it do us any Harm loqui cum vul­go, to speak as vulgar Philosophers use; provi­ded we do Sentire cum doctis, or make wiser Judg­ments of the Literal Sense of those Words, than they perhaps ever meant.

12. The word [Suppositum] is another Name of Ens or Thing, in a manner, (tho' not altogether) the same The meaning of Suppositum or Hypostasis. with Substance. For [Substance] is, I conceive, meant for the Es­sential Notion of the Thing, as it is contradistin­guisht [Page 99] from Accidental, or Unessential ones; and Suppositum does, over and above, relate also to the very Nature of the Thing, (or to the Com­plexion of Accidents which constitutes its Essence) and not only to the Modes, as each of them sing­ly is a meer Accident, and had Being by it or in it. Whence the Notion of Suppositum is the most Confused of any other; and signifies that which has all the Forms in it Whatever, whether they be Essential ones or Accidental; and not only those Modes (or Accidents) which naturally be­long'd to it at first as Properties, (or inseparable Accidents) but those also which accru'd to it since, and are meerly Accidental to it.

13. Hence there can be no difficulty in the meaning of the word [Supposita­lity] which is the Abstract of the The Meaning of [Suppositality.] Suppositum: For, it signifies ma­nifestly the Thing according to the precise Notion of the Suppositum, or of what has all the aforesaid Forms in it: How agreeable this discourse is to Christian Language and Prin­ciples, will easily appear to Solid Divines.

14. The word [Individuum] which is another name of Ens, us'd by the Learn­ed, and, as is seen in those usual The Meaning of the word [Individu­um. words [the same Individual thing,] is got into our vulgar Language, is a Logical Expression; distinguishing the Notion of a Particular, (only which is properly a Thing) from the Generical and Specifical Notions; in re­gard both these latter do bear a Division of their Notions into more Inferiour ones; and so, that each of the Inferior ones contains the whole Su­periour Natures in it which the others do signify; [Page 100] as the whole Definiton, Notion or Nature of an [Animal] or of [a Sensitive Living Thing] is found in Man, and also in Brutes; and the whole Definition or Notion of Man, is found in Socrates and Plato. But, the particular Natures of Socrates and Plato (which are signify'd by those words) and their Definitions, could they bear any, cannot be divided into more which have the particular Na­tures of Socrates and Plato in them: And, there­fore they are called Individuums; that is, such as cannot be divided into more, which have the Na­tures signified by those words in them, as could the Generical and Specifical Notions of Animal and Homo; whence Individuums are the Lowest and Narrowest Notion that can possibly be in the Line of Ens.

15. The Individuum, is call'd by the Latin Schools [Substantia prima] and the Superiour Notions in the The Meaning of [Substantia Pri­ma] and [Sub­stantiaSecunda] Line of Ens. [Substantiae Secundae] which signifies that only Indivi­duums are in propriety of Speech Entia or Capable of Existing; For, since, (as was shown above) nothing that is Common or Undeter­mined can exist, none of the others can have any Actual being at all but in the Individuum, as a kind of Metaphysical Part of its Intire Notion; and a Part (in what Sense soever that word be taken) can not possibly be but in the whole. If this then be their meaning, as I believe it is, nothing can be more true and Solid. Only I must note that it is less properly and less Logically exprest; and that Aristotle speaks more exactly when he calls the Former [...], or primò Substantia, and the latter [...], or Secundò Substantia; [Page 101] which words denote, that the former is Ens in its Primary and Proper signification of that word, and the latter only Analogically, that is in a Secon­dary and improper Sense; which prima and Se­cunda Substantia do not express: For, both these may be properly Entia still, for any thing those words tell us, tho' one of them may have an Or­der of Priority to the other as Prima and Secunda; in some such Sense as we call God the Primum Ens, considering him in order to Creatures.

16. From Words used by Philosophers which belong to the Line of Ens, we come to those which are made The VVord [Acci­dents] is impro­per. use of to express the Modes or Manners how a Thing is; which, in a generall Appellation, the Schools have call'd Accidents. This Word is, certainly, very im­proper: For, who can think that Quantity or (as they will needs call it) Extension, is Accidental to Body, or (as some may take that Equivocal Word) that 'tis but by Chance, or by Accident, that Bo­dies have any Bigness in them at all? The best Sense I can give it, in pursuance to my own Grounds, is this, that [Accidental,] which is the Denominative from [Accident,] may mean such Notions as are Not Essential; or (which is the same) they may mean the Thing consider'd as to that in it which has no ways any Order to Being, nor expresses any such Order by the Word which signifies its Notion. And, were this Sense uni­versally accepted, and attributed to the Word [Accidents,] it would be a True and Solid one: For, 'tis evident, that none of the Words that sig­nifie any of those Accidents, does in the least im­port in its Signification either Being, or any Re­spect [Page 102] or Order to it, as does Ens, and all those Words which do formally and properly express it, or belong to it. Whence the Notions signify'd by such Words, are not Essential ones, or relating properly and precisely to the Essence; but Modish, (as we may term it,) or expressing some Manner [How] the Thing is; which is a quite different Notion from that of Ens, or Thing, or of what formally is found in that Line. I do believe that divers of the Wisest, and most Learned School-men did take the Word [Accidents] in this Sense, tho' the Propriety of that Word, fetch'd from its Radix, did not invite, much less oblige them to do so. I doubt also, that the Usage of that Word in that warrantable Sense I have now assign'd, was not so Common, and universally Current, even among the School-men, as to force it to bear that Sense; as appears by their thinking that Acci­dents were certain kinds of little Adventitious En­tities; much less among the Modern Ideists; who (through their Shortness in Logick and Metaphy­sicks) do make Quantity, or Extension, the Essen­tial Form of Body; which is, to put Bigness in the Line of Being; or, to make Bigness and Being, or the Mode and the Thing, to be in the same Line of Notions, and Intrinsecal to one another: Where­as, a Thing must first be conceiv'd to be, e'er it can be after such a Mode, or Manner.

17. For the Reason lately given, I cannot but judge, that the Word [Mode,] or (as some call it) [Modification,] The Word [Mode] more proper. is far more proper than the Word [Accidents,] to signifie those last Nine Common Heads of our Natural Notions, Which Impartiality of mine, on this, and other [Page 103] Occasions, giving some Advantage to the Carte­sians, and other Moderns, over other Philosophers, who call themselves Aristotelians, will, I hope, obtain their good Opinion of me, that I do sin­cerely follow my best Reason, and not Pique or Prejudice, while I oppose them in other Things: And I am sure, 'tis my own Reason I ought to follow, till clearer Reasons of theirs shew mine to be none; which I have no Reason to fear; for, I hope, it will appear to every Acute and Ingenuous Examiner, that no Writer ever distinguish'd his Notions more Exactly and Clearly, or Connected them more Closely and Immediately.

18. The Primary Mode of all those Things we converse with, or Bodies, is call'd Quantity. This Word is very The VVord [Quan­tity] is very Pro­per. Proper, and fully Significant; for, all the Bodies in Nature have some Quantity or Bigness in them, more or less: Nay, even the least Atome, or Effluvium, that can be conceiv'd, has Bigness in it, as well as the greatest Body, nay, as the whole World; tho' not so much, or so great a Degree of it. Where­fore, this Word [Quantity] is Comprehensive; and so, fit to signifie the Commonest Affection of Body: But, this is not enough; 'tis withal, very Simple, or Uncompounded: Moreover, the Word it self has, on its side, no kind of Equivocalness, taking it as it is applied to Body in Common; which Re­quisites are not found in any other Word used by us, to express that Mode. Only we are to note, that Bigness, or Bulk, is only proper to Body, as it has in it all the three Dimensions; whereas, Quantity reaches to how Long, or how Broad, as well as how Thick: And therefore Quantity is ab­solutely [Page 104] the properest Word to express this Prima­ry Mode: However, it is much neglected by our Moderns, who are grown strangely fond of Ex­tension.

19. The Word [Extension] is very improper to signifie it: For, Extension proper­ly denotes the Action of Extend­ing; The VVord [Exten­sion] very im­proper. to which is directly opposit, in our usual Speech, that Action, call'd Contraction. Or, if it be taken for the being Extended, still its proper Signification must be a Passion caus'd by the Action of Extending; which cannot sute with that Simple and Primary Mode we call Quantity; which is Naturally Antecedent to, and Independent of those Subsequent Modes cal­led Action, and Passion. Again, All Intrinsecal Modes are conceiv'd to be certain kinds of Forms affecting Body, as their Subject; and Forms are very ill express'd by a Substantive deriv'd from a Verb; and by such an one especially, as must ne­cessarily (at least) Connotate Action or Passion, if it does not rather directly, or most properly signi­fie them. Moreover, let them take Extension, Stretching out, or Exporrection how they will, still Common Sense teaches us, that we may take Con­traction or Straitning in the same manner as they do it: Whence follows, that if Extension means or implies Impenetrability of Parts, Contraction must mean Penetrability of Parts▪ Which Notion none of us will admit to have any Ground in Nature, tho' the Maxim tells us, that [Contraries are em­ploy'd about the same Subject.] Now, the Word [Quantity] is not entangled with any of these In­conveniences, but freed from them all, as will ap­pear to any Sober Reflecter. And, on this Occa­sion, [Page 105] I beg Leve of our Ideists, to tell them, that it is not safe, nor prudent, to leave off an Old and us'd Word, till they are sure they have found An­other which is better, or more proper. Cartesius made choice of [Extension] wittily, that he might thus more cleaverly bring all Physicks to Mathe­maticks; and others (perhaps, ut est Natura ho­minis, fond of a Novelty) follow'd him unadvi­sedly; tho' they were not guilty of any such De­sign of their own, or aware of his. And I am sorry Mr. L. affects only the Improper Word [Ex­tension,] and quite neglects that more Proper Word [Quantity.]

20. Many other Names, at least Attributes, are given to Quantity; such as are Divisibility, Impenetrability, Space, The Meaning of Di­visibility, Im­penetrability, Space, and Mea­surability. and Measurability; the former of which signifies it in Order to Na­tural Action and Passion, and re­spects properly the Parts into which it may be divided; or, which is the same, its Potential Parts; in which, perhaps, the Nature of Quantity would be found to Consist, were I here to treat of the Nature of those Modes, and not only of the Names us'd in Philosophy. Impenetra­bility properly signifies such an Order or (as it were) Situation of those Parts, as that one of them is without, and not within another; which grounds that Secondary Notion, which some do impro­perly call Extension; and Extension or Quantity, if of any considerable largeness in respect of the Body it contains, is call'd Space; which differs from the Notion of Place in this, that Place (if properly such) is just as much Quantity as con­tains the Thing placed, and has a respect to some [Page 106] determinate and known Points: Whereas Space has not in its Notion to be adjusted to the Body that is in it, not restrain'd to any set Distance. So that Space is Place at large, and Place is Space restrain'd. Measurability grounds the Reckoning or Compu­ting how many of such a Standard of Quantity as we had design'd in our Thoughts, would, if re­peated, equal the whole of which we intend to take a Survey.

21. Now, Quantity being the most Common of all Corporeal Modes, and which Antecedes and grounds all the A Short Explica­tion, what Quan­tity, Quality, and Relation are. others, it cannot, for that very Reason, be properly defin'd; so that (as Mr. Locke acutely ob­serv'd) we know such things be­fore we are ask'd, better than we do after; for the Asking puzzles our Natural Thoughts, which were Clear enough before of themselves; and Re­flexion, which, when there is occasion, is wise, and enlightens us, does but serve to blunder us when there is no need or occasion for it. Not­withstanding, I have, in my Method, endeavour'd to give it some kind of Explication, by differencing it from all other Intrinsecal Modes, (which are its Genus, as it were, or rather, a Transcendent No­tion to all such Accidents,) in this, that it tells How the Thing is, according to some Common Con­sideration, in which All Things we converse with do agree. By which 'tis distinguish'd from Quali­ty, which acquaints us How a Thing is as to what respects its own peculiar Nature; and from Rela­tion, which expresses how one Individuum respects another Individuum. But this (as was said) is out of my present Business in this Preliminary, which [Page 107] is only to shew what Names are Proper, or Impro­per; and not to treat of the particular Nature of each Mode, of which I have, in their due places, sufficiently discours'd in my Method.

22. These, as far as occurrs to my Memory, are the Chiefest Words used by Philosophers, whose Proper or VVhat [Transcen­dents] are. Improper Acception has most In­fluence upon the Advancement or Hindrance of Science. Notwithstanding, there are others far more Equivocal than any of the rest, called Transcendents, or Words Applicable to all, or many of the Common Heads of our Natu­ral Notions; which are hardest of all to explicate, as wanting any Common Genus, or any thing like it, to explicate them by. I intended once to di­late upon them in this Preliminary, as being a Subject very worthy of our Reflexion, and yet scarce treated on by any as they deserve: But, seeing, upon Review, how Prolix I have been al­ready in my Preliminaries, I am forced to content my self with Noting them in short; leaving it to others to enlarge upon them. They are these, distributed into their several Ranks.

23. First, Ens, taken, in its whole Latitude, for the Thing, and its Modes. Second­ly, The Properties of Ens, taken in The Five Sorts of Transcendents. that large Signification; such as are Unum, Verum, Bonum, and their Opposites, Non-Unum, or Divisum, Falsum, and Malum. For, the Notions of all the Modes being improperly Entia, have, by Consequence, only improper Essences, or Entities of their own; and, consequently, Properties of those Improper Essences. Thirdly, Idem, Diversum, and, in gene­ral, [Page 108] Relatum; taking this last Word in the largest Sense, for all kinds of Respects whatsoever. In which Signification, all Things, or properly cal­led Entia, do relate to Existence; and all their Modes or Accidents do respect them diversly, as certain Manners how they are. Of which Nature also are the aforesaid Common Words, [Mode,] and [Accident,] which are Transcendents in re­spect of the Nine last Predicaments. Fourthly, Com­pletum, Incompletum, Partial and Total, Generical and Specifical, Superior and Inferior, Simple and Compound, and such like. Most of which kind of Transcendents seem rather to respect the Manner of Being which Things have in our Understanding, than the Manner of Being they have out of it. Of the last Sort are, Which, What, That which, Some­thing, Somewhat, &c. which are the most Confused Words imaginable, and signifie any Notion, but that of meer Nothing. By these we make a Bastard or Illegitimate Definition of Ens; and say, that a Thing is [That which is capable of Existing, &c.] I call it an Illegitimate or Improper Definition, be­cause the Notion of the Genus (which is one part of a proper one) has a Determinate Sense: Where­as [That which,] which, for want of a better, sup­plies the place of the Genus, has none. For,

'Tis to be noted, that in all Transcendents, (un­less▪ perhaps, some of those of the Fifth Sort, which have a kind of blind, Confused Sense,) the Name only is Common or Applicable to more, and not the Notion; for, having no one Notion that is Common to all those Common Heads, they have none till it be Determin'd; since no Notion can exist in the Mind, unless it be This, or That, or one, any more than a Thing can exist in Nature, unless [Page 109] it be determin'd to be such a Particular or Indivi­dual Thing. Much less has any of them proper Differences, dividing them by more and less of the Common Notion, as every Notion that is truly Common to more, may, and must have.

23. Whence extreme Care must be taken, how Students in Philosophy do use these Transcendent Words; and Great Care to be had, that Tran­scendent VVords be not held Uni­vocal. that they do distinguish their Sense most exactly, when they have Occasion to make use of them. For, they having an Indifferency to many Senses, and those as vastly disparate as the Common Heads themselves are; that is, (as the Schools properly phrase it) Senses differing toto Genere, (I may add, Generalissimo) it must follow, that every time they do use them confused­ly, or with a Conceit that they are Univocal, their Discourse must needs straggle widely, now one way, now another, and thence confound all our Commonest Notions, which, of all others, ought to be kept Distinct; the want of doing which, hinders all Coherence or Connexion of Terms, in which only Science consists, and breeds innumerable, and most Enormous Errours. It would be tedious, I doubt, to my Readers, tho' perhaps not hard for me, to show what Prodigi­ous Inconveniences do arise from the Mis-accep­tions of one of those many Different Senses such Words may bear, for Another, I will only bring one Instance; hoping that by this, as by a Sea­mark, my Readers may avoid the Shoals and Rocks of Errors in other like Occasions.

[Page 110] 25. The Word [Compounded] may either mean the Composition of Matter with its Essential Form; or, that of the VVhat great Er­rors spring thence shown in the Uni­vocal Acception of the Transcendent word [Com­pounded.] Essence with its Suppositum, which is conceived to have the Essence in it: or, of the Superiour No­tions of Ens with the Individuum; All which are Compositions be­longing to the Line of Ens. Coming next to the Modes or Accidents, the whole Ens or Suppositum may be considered as Compounded with its Pri­mary Mode called Quantity; or with some Qua­lity, or Relation. Or, with some Action or Passion, Time, Place, Situation, or Habit. Whence ac­crues to the Subject the Denominations of Agent, Patient, Living, or being at such a time, or in such a Place, Sitting, Armed, &c. All which Nine last Compositions are Modifying or Accidental ones, and not Essential, or such as concern directly and precisely the Notion of Thing or Being, as did those of the first sort. Now come Cartesius and his Fol­lowers, who, loath to say the Body and Soul are two Suppositums; and, wanting Skill in Metaphy­sicks to comprehend what the Union of Entitative Parts is, or how made, (which are Points too hard for Mathematicians, and of which de la Forge, tho' he talks prettily, can make nothing at all) they would have the Soul and Body compound One Thing, because they Act together, or assist one an­other mutually to produce some sorts of Acti­ons. Whereas Action being only a Mode, and so presupposing the Res, or Thing, which it modi­fies, can only determin and denominate its Subject to be Acting; and therefore Joint-acting can only constitute and denominate the Soul and Body Co-Acters; [Page 111] which is a vastly disparate Notion from the Constituting and Denominating them One Thing, as common Sense informs us. We will put an Instance: My Hand and my Pen do both of them concur to the Action of Writing, and so compound one Joint-Acter; nay, they depend mu­tually on one another as to the producing this Action: For the Hand cannot write without the Pen, nor the Pen without the Hand: Besides, they are in some sort fitted to one another, in order to perform this Action; for, the Fingers are so fram'd, as to hold and guide the Pen very com­modiously; and the Pen (taking in its Handle and the Nib-end too) is fitted very commodi­ously to be held and guided by my Hand, so as to draw the Letters such as they ought to be. Last­ly, which is much more, and a Parallel very agree­able to the Co-action of Soul and Body, they both of them do modifie each other's Action. For, the best Scrivener writes but scurvily with a Bad Pen, and the Best Pen writes but scurvily in an unskilful Hand. And yet the Hand and the Pen are not one Jot the nearer being one Thing, notwithstand­ing their Concurrence to this Joint-Action; tho' it be qualify'd with Mutuality, Fitness of the Co-Agents, and the Modification which the Action receives from both of them jointly, and each of them severally. Besides, they put the Cart be­fore the Horse, while they pretend that the Act­ing as one Thing is to make them one-Thing. For since the Res is, in Priority of Nature and Rea­son, before Modus rei; and Being before Acting; and that nothing can Act otherwise than it is; 'tis Evident from plainest Principles, and even from the very Terms, that they must first Be one Thing, [Page 112] e'er they can Act as one Thing, or Be such a Com­pound, before they can Act as such a Compound. And so, the Point sticks where it was, viz. How the Soul and Body come to be thus Compounded into one Ens; of which I have given some Ac­count, Preliminary 4. § 8, 9, 10, 13.

26. On this Occasion I cannot but Reflect, that the Cartesians were very Unadvi­sed to meddle with such a Point, The Cartesians un­advis'd, in going ultra Crepidam as puts them quite past their Ma­thematicks; as likewise, that tho' they have fram'd a Logick or Method suitable to explicate their Mathematical Philosophy, yet they are but very bad Distinguishers of our Natural Notions into Common Heads, which is one Prin­cipal Part of true Logick; as appears by their ram­bling so irregularly from one to the other, as has been shewn elsewhere, in their making Extension or Quantity, which is a Mode, the Form which is Essential to their First Matter; and here, in put­ting Composition according to the Notion of Action, to be Composition according to the No­tion of Ens. And whoever impartially Examins the Distribution of their Notions into Heads, will find it not to be such as Reason naturally forced, (as ours is,) but such as Design voluntarily and in­geniously invented.