[...]
[...]

THE Christian Life.

PART II.

Wherein the FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF Christian Duty Are assigned, explained, and proved.

VOLUME I.

BY JOHN SCOTT Rector of St. Peters Poor, London.

LONDON, Printed for Robert Horn at the South Entrance of the Royal Exchange, and Walter Kettilby at the Bishops-head in in St. Paul's Church-Yard. 1685.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE AND Right Reverend Father in God HENRY Lord Bishop of London, And one of his Majesties most Honourable Privy Council, &c.

My Lord,

I Here present to your Lordship the first Vo­lume of a second Part of that Treatise of Christian Life, which I published some years since, and which under the Protection of your Venerable Name hath found good acceptance [Page] with the World; and to make an ingenuous confession to your Lord­ship, my design in this second Dedication is not purely to ren­der you the due Respects of a Presbyter to his Diocesan; nor to tender those just Acknowledg­ments I ow to your Lordship for the happiness I have enjoy'd, with the rest of your Clergy, under the auspicious Influence of your se­rene and watchful Govern­ment; no nor yet to express the grateful sense I have, and shall always retain, of the personal Obligations you have laid upon me; no, my Lord, though these were all of them sufficient Induce­ments, yet I confess that together [Page] with these I had a certain Poli­tick end in my eye. For I thank God I can truly say my main De­sign in composing this Treatise was to benefit the World; but reflecting upon the manifold de­fects it abounds with after all the pains I had bestowed upon it, I found that, to palliate its internal blemishes, it was but needful to grace it with some external Or­nament, and could think of none so proper for my purpose as this of affixing your Lordships Name to it; a Name that carries with it power enough to recommend any thing to the World that is but pi­ous, and honest, and well-de­signed, and all that, I am sure, [Page] this is, how defective soever it be in other respects; which toge­ther with the experience I have had of the great candor and be­nignity of your Lordships tem­per, gives me encouragement to hope that you will not only accept but approve it; and then I am sure your Lordships approbati­on will give it credit and au­thority enough with the World to enable it to effect those good and honest ends for which it was sincerely intended by

Your Lordships Most humble, Most obliged and Faithful Servant John Scott.

THE PREFACE TO THE READER.

WHEN I wrote the Trea­tise of Christian Life, of which this and another Volume, now in the Press, is a second Part, I had no design of engaging any further in that Argument; but now I find by experience that Writing is like Build­ing, wherein the undertaker, to sup­ply some defect, or serve some conve­nience which at first he foresaw not, is usually forced to exceed his first Model and proposal, and many times to dou­ble the charge and expence of it. For after that Treatise began to be a little known in the World, I was advi­sed from several hands that there [Page] was one thing wanting in it, which is the common defect of most practi­cal Treatises, and that was, an Ex­plication and Proof of those main Principles of Religion in which the Obligation of our Christian Duty is founded, which they thought might be sufficiently done within a very narrow compass, though herein I find that either they were very much mistaken, or that I have very much exceeded the necessary limits of my Argument, which I am not yet con­vinced of, but that I must submit to the judgment of the World. I con­fess the prospect of doing it in that narrow compass they talk'd of was a great inducement with me to under­take it, and perhaps had I foreseen at first what a large field of discourse it would oblige me to traverse, I should never have entered on it, but when once I was in, I could not handsomly retreat.

[Page]AND indeed considering with what prodigious rudeness and inso­lence the very foundations of Religion are struck at in this dissolute Age, he who would now treat of them to any purpose will find himself obliged not only to give a distinct and clear explication of them, but also to assert the truth of them with convincing evidence, and to answer and expose those Atheistical Cavils that are level­led against them; which later would have been much less necessary in an Age of a more serious and Religious Genius. And upon this account I have been forced upon a much larger and more laborious proof of the seve­ral Principles of Religion than I first intended. Not that I have any great hope of reclaiming those who are professed Atheists to the acknowledg­ment of the truth; for when men are seduced by lust, as I verily believe most Atheists are, there is little reason [Page] to expect they will be reduced by reason. But that which I chiefly aimed at is to confirm and establish those that are wavering, and to Antidote all against this spreading contagion of Irreligion and Atheism, which in a fatal Chain draws after it not only the ruine of mens Souls hereafter, but also the utter subversion of all Hu­mane Society here; And it is this hath constrained me to enlarge this Second Part into two Volumes, which at first view I promised my self to finish in one.

IN this first Volume I have treated only of those Principles which are common to natural Religion and Chri­stianity together; as an Introduction to which I have in the first Chapter explained and demonstrated the natural distinction of Humane Actions into good and evil, by some eternal Rea­sons for or against them; and having shewn at large that God hath made [Page] this distinction sufficiently clear and evident to all men to enable them to conduct themselves to their own happiness, and that those actions of men which fall under this natural distinction are the principal subject matter of the commands and prohibi­tions of Religion, I proceed in the second Chapter briefly to explain the nature of Religion in General, and of natural and Christian Religion in particular; from the nature of both which I have deduced those funda­mental Principles from whence the Obligations of Religion are derived; the five first of which being common to natural Religion with Christianity I have handled in this first Volume in so many distinct Chapters.

AND then as for the last, viz. the acknowledgment of Jesus Christ our Mediator, which contains under it all those Religious Principles that are peculiar to Christianity, though I have [Page] endeavoured to treat of it with all the brevity that is consistent with a clear and satisfactory account of the whole Argument, yet it is run out into a second Volume, which is now in the Press, and, I hope, within a few Weeks will be ready to follow this. And per­haps when the Reader considers the copiousness of the Argument it han­dles, he will rather blame me for being too brief than too tedious; for in treating of those Doctrines which have been handled at large in other English Treatises of the Christian Faith, and especially in that incompa­rable one of our most learned Bishop of Chester on the Creed (a Book which next to the Bible I thankfully ac­knowledg my self more beholden to for my instruction in the Doctrines of Religion than to any one I ever read) I have contracted my self into as narrow a compass as the barely [Page] necessary explication of them would permit me; but where that renowned Pen hath insisted more Cursorily (as for instance on the particular Offices of our blessed Mediator) I have most enlarged my self, though even there I have for brevity sake pretermitted some things I intended less immediate and necessary appertaining to the Ar­gument.

UPON the whole I can truly say, that to the best of my understand­ing, I have herein delivered nothing but what is agreeable to the Do­ctrine of the Primitive Church, which as the most faithful Comment on the holy Writings of our Saviour and his Apostles I have all along carefully consulted in doubtful and difficult ca­ses; and this is the reason why it hath stuck so long in hand, the pains I have taken in consulting the ancient Monuments of Christianity about it being, as I may truly say, at least [Page] double to that of composing it; and in following the Primitive Doctrine, I have followed the Doctrine of the Church of England, which in its Faith, Government, and Discipline, I believe in my conscience, is the most Primi­tive Church in the World.

As for the Method I have chosen, which is to deduce all the Doctrines of Christianity from one general Head, viz. the Doctrine of the Me­diator, it is the most convenient I could think of for my purpose, which was to represent at once to the Readers view all the parts of our holy Re­ligion in their natural connexion with and dependence on one another, that so he might be the better able to judge of the beautiful contexture and admirable contrivance of the whole, and that by seeing how re­gularly all the parts of it proceed out of one common Principle, and con­spire in one common end, he may be [Page] the better satisfied that Christianity is so far from being a heap of incohe­rencies, as some have injuriously repre­sented it, that considering it merely as an Hypothesis, abstracted from all that external evidence that accompa­nies it, the very Art and contrivance of it, the proportion, symetry, and corre­spondence of its parts, their subserviency to each other, and the concurrence and tendency of them all together to the common ends of Religion, are such as do apparently exceed all humane Invention, and argue it to be the pro­duct of a divine mind. For as he who would form a true Idea of the beauty of a Picture, must not contemplate the parts of it separately, but survey them all together, and consider them in their proportions and correspondencies with each other, so he who would frame a right Notion of Religion must not look upon it as it lies scattered and divi­ded into single parts and propositions, [Page] but consider them in contexture, and as they are connected all together in­to one body or hypothesis. For it is in their apt Junctures, their mutual de­pendencies and admirable coherencies with one another that the beauty and harmony of the whole consists. And therefore to do right to Christianity, and enable the Reader to contemplate it with the greatest advantage, I have endeavoured to represent to him the whole in a view, and to give him a prospect of all the parts of it together, in an harmonious union and connexi­on with each other. For I verily be­lieve that the mean opinion which some witty men have entertained of Christianity, proceeds in a great mea­sure from their broken and imperfect apprehensions of it; they understand it piecemeal, and take it asunder into single propositions, which they consi­der separately and apart by themselves, without ever putting them together [Page] into one regular System, and present­ing them to their thoughts in that or­derly connexion wherein the holy Ora­cles have delivered them to us. For I can scarce imagine how any man of sense should contemplate Christianity all together, and throughly consider the harmonious coherence of all its parts, and the wonderful contrivance of the whole, without being captivated with the beauty and elegancy of it.

AND now I have nothing further to add concerning this Treatise but only to intreat the Reader not to be too severe in the perusal of it. For though as for the Doctrine of it, I see no reason at all to Apologize for it, be­cause I am fully persuaded of the truth of it, yet being forced, as I was, to compose it by snatches, and in the more quiet intervals of a busie and uneasie life, I very much suspect the exactness both of the Stile and Method of it; and therefore all the favour I [Page] desire is this, that where I have impro­perly or obscurely express'd my self I may be construed in the most favoura­ble sense, and that wherever I may seem to be confused or immethodical it may be attributed to those frequent interruptions which the disorders of my body have given to my thoughts. And these are requests so very just and rea­sonable, that I am confident none will be so peevish as to deny me, but they who read Books only to carp and find fault, and without any design to Edifie their own understandings. But I hope the Reader will consider that the Ar­gument here treated of is of too great moment to him to be so wretchedly trifled with, and that therefore he will not be either so disingenuous to me, or uncharitable to himself, as to peruse with such a spiteful design that which I sincerely intended for his good, and which he, I am sure, if he pleases, may be the better for for ever.

THE CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

HUmane Actions of three sorts, page 1. Ne­cessary and sinful Actions are either such as are good or evil in themselves, which are those we call Moral Actions, or such as are commanded and forbid by positive Law, p. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. The Nature of Moral Good ex­plained, Sect. 1. p. 8, 9, 10, 11. That there is such a thing as Moral Good in humane Acti­ons, proved in five Propositions, p. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27. The various ways by which God hath discovered to us what is Morally Good in six particulars, Sect. 2. p. 28, to p. 53. Acti­ons Morally Good are the principal parts of Re­ligion, Sect. 3. p. 53, 54, 55. This demon­strated by six Arguments from Scripture, p. 55, to p. 71. Four Reasons why God principally requires what is Morally Good, p. 71, to p. 91.

CHAP. II.

OF the nature of Religion in General, and of natural Religion what it is, p. 92, 93, 94, 95, 96. And of Revealed Religion, p. 97, 98, [Page] 99, 100. A definition of natural and revea­led Religion, considered as they are now in con­junction, p. 101, 102. From the nature of Re­ligion thus defined the Principles of all Religi­ous Obligations are deduced, p. 202. Which are reduced to five Heads, p. 102, 103.

CHAP. III.

OF the necessity of believing the existence of God in order to our being truly Religious, p. 104, 105. Atheism resolved into the corruption of mens Wills and Imaginations, Sect. 1. p. 106, 107, 108, 109. The particular causes of it reduced to nine Heads, and of the folly and unreasonableness of them, p. 109, to p. 157. Of the great folly and madness of Atheism in its self, p. 157, 158. This shewn at large in six particulars, p. 158, to p. 196.

CHAP. IV.

THat to the founding the Obligations of Religi­on it is necessary we should acknowledge the divine Providence, p. 196, 197, 198, 199. What are the particular Acts of Providence which we are to acknowledg, shewn in five Particulars, p. 200, to 244. The Divine Pro­vidence proved, first à Priori by Arguments drawn from the nature of God which are re­duced to four Heads, p. 245, to 256. secondly, à Posteriori by Arguments drawn from sensi­ble effects of God in the World, of which six instances are given, p. 256, to p. 310. The [Page] most considerable Objections against a Divine Providence reduced to five Heads, and particu­larly answered, p. 310, to p. 354.

CHAP. V.

THe necessity of acknowledging divine Rewards and Punishments to oblige us to be truly Re­ligious, p. 355, 356, 357, 358. How far it is necessary we should believe them, shewn in four particulars, p. 358, to 369. Of the Universal acknowledgment of future Rewards and Pu­nishments, p. 370, 371, 372, 373. The reality of these future Rewards and Punishments pro­ved by six Arguments, p. 373, to 399. By what means our belief of future Rewards and Punishments is to be acquired and confirmed, shewn in four particulars, p. 399, to 410. Of the force and power of this belief to oblige us to be truly Religious, p. 410, to 417.

CHAP. VI.

THe necessity of Right Notions of God to oblige us to be truly Religious, p. 417, 418. In what respects they are necessary to oblige us to be truly Religious, shewn in four particulars, p. 419, to p. 444. Of the way of forming right Notions of God in general, p. 445, to 449. Si [...] general Rules laid down for the framing right Notions of God, p. 449, to 484. Of the common causes of mens misapprehensions of God, in si [...] particular instances, p. 485, to 513.

OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE. PART II.

CHAP. I. Concerning the Being, and Nature of Moral Goodness.

ALL Humane Actions are either Ne­cessary, or Sinfull, or Indifferent. The Necessary are such as are com­manded, the Sinful such as are forbidden by God, the Indifferent such as are neither commanded nor forbidden, but left en­tirely free to our Choice and Discretion. Again, the necessary and the sinful actions are either such as are necessary and sinfull in themselves, and are commanded and for­bidden upon the account of some Good and Evil that is inseparable to their Natures; or such as are indifferent in their own Na­tures, as to any good or evil inherent in them, but are made necessary or sinful by [Page 2] some positive Command or Prohibition su­perinduced upon them. Of the first sort are those which we call Moral Actions; as being the subject matter of the Moral Law, which commands, and forbids nothing but what is essentially and immutably good and evil: and whilst there was no other Law but this, every Action which did not ob­lige by some eternal Reason, or which is the same, by some inseparable good or evil, was left free and indifferent. But in pro­cess of time God superadded to this Moral Law a great many Positive ones, whereby he obliged men to do, and forbear sundry of those indifferent things, which were left to their liberty by the Law of Nature. For such we call the Rites and Ceremonies of the Mosaick Law; all which were indiffe­rent before they were imposed, and as soon as ever the Imposition was taken off from them, did immediately return to their Primitive Indifferency; so that by the abo­lition of their Ceremonial Law, the Jews were restored to all the Liberties of the Moral; excepting only the matter of the two Sacraments, and of maintaining a vi­sible Communion with the Church, which are determined by positive Laws of Chri­stianity. And of this later sort of necessa­ry and sinful Actions, are, not only all [Page 3] those indifferent ones which God himself has commanded and forbidden immediately, but also all those which he commands and forbids by his Vice-roys and Representatives, in this World. For whatsoever he hath not commanded or forbidden by his own immediate Dictate and Authority, he hath Authorized his Vicegerents to command or forbid, as they shall judge it most expe­dient for the Publick. So that when they command what God hath not forbidden, or forbid what he hath not commanded, their will is God's, who commands us by their Mouths and stamps their Injuncti­ons with his own Authority.

And of this distinction between actions that are morally and positively Necessary, the Scripture frequently takes notice, and particularly, Mich. vi.6.7, 8. Wherewith­all shall I come before the Lord and bow my self before the high God? shall I come before him with Burnt-Offerings, with Calves of a year old, &c. No, these are not the things that will render me acceptable in his eyes, and procure me a welcome Admission in­to his Presence; and yet it is certain that these things were then required and com­manded, and therefore were positively ne­cessary; but that they were not necessary in themselves upon the account of any in­trinsick [Page 4] Goodness that was in them, is evi­dent from what follows, He hath shewed thee O man what is good; as much as if he should have said, the things above na­med are in their own nature indifferent, having neither good nor evil in themselves; and are made necessary meerly by positive Command, upon which account they are insufficient to recommend you to God: but there are other things that carry an intrin­sick Beauty and Goodness in their Nature by which they strictly oblige you to imbrace and practise them, and do thereupon recom­mend you by their own native Charms, to the Love and Favour of God; and what these good things are he hath sufficiently shewn or discovered to you, viz. To do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with your God, which are the main and principal Duties that he requires of you. Which plainly implies that there are some Actions which are morally, that is, in their own Natures, eternally good, and therefore eternally necessary, and some that are necessary only because for some present Reason God Wills and Com­mands them. For no account can be given why he should be more pleased with Justice and Mercy and Humility, than with Sacrifice, unless we suppose the former to [Page 5] be good, and therefore necessary upon im­mutable Reasons, and upon that account to be immutably pleasing to him; and the latter to be necessary only upon mutable reasons which therefore were to lose their Necessity as soon as those reasons did alter or cease. For had Sacrifices been good in their own Natures, their goodness had been as unalterable as their Nature; whereas, on the contrary we find, that whereas their Nature neither is nor can be altered, yet their Goodness or Necessity is. For as before God adopted them into the Rubrick of Re­ligion by his own positive Institution they were indifferent things; so after this Insti­tution was repealed by a contrary Com­mand, they became unlawful. So that it is now as necessary that we should not Offer them in the Worship of God, as it was be­fore that we should. And the same may be said of all the other Rites of the Mosaick Law: which being in their own Nature In­different, could no otherewise be convert­ed either into Necessary or Sinful, but by God's express Command or Prohibition. Whereas Justice and Mercy, &c. are good in themselves abstractly considered from all Will and Command; and are not good meerly because they are Commanded, but are commanded because they are good; be­cause [Page 6] they carry with them such unaltera­ble Reasons as do in themselves render the practice of them eternally necessary. For tho there be very good reason why men should not offer material Sacrifices, not­withstanding they were once injoyned; yet it can never be reasonable for them to be unjust or cruel or proud, because the contra­ry vertues carry such fixed and immutable Reasons with them as will bind and oblige us to eternity; insomuch that tho we had a Dispensation to be proud under the Broad-Seal of Heaven, yet 'twould still be very absurd and unreasonable to be so. And as things that are only positively necessary or sinful, derive all their necessity and sinful­ness from God's direct or express Com­mand and Prohibition; so they cannot be commanded or forbidden by Consequence. For if the Matter of them be antecedently Lawful or Indifferent, it must necessarily remain so till it is directly commanded or forbidden; there being no other Reason to bound and limit it, but only the Will of the Law-giver in whose disposal it is: and therefore till he directly signifies his Will either for or against it, it must remain as it is, i. e. Free and Indifferent. But you will say▪ Suppose God hath commanded such an indifferent thing for such a Reason, [Page 7] doth it not thence follow that he thereby commands every other indifferent thing that hath the same reason for it? I answer, No; for if the Reason why he commands it be necessary and eternal, it is not a thing indifferent, but morally necessary, and so is every thing else that hath the same Reason for it; and consequently the reason of the Law, tho it be applyed but to one thing, extends to every thing of the same Nature; because in all moral Cases the Reason of the Law is the Law. But if the thing com­manded be in it self indifferent, the Rea­son why it is commanded cannot be neces­sary; and therefore tho there be the same Reason why another thing of the same Na­ture should be commanded, yet it doth not necessarily oblige unless it be command­ed actually; because in such Cases it is not the Reason but the Authority of the Law that obliges: and therefore where there is only the Reason and not the Law, it lays no obligation on the Conscience.

From the whole therefore it is evident what is the difference between things that are positively and morally Necessary and Sinful; which I thought very necessary to explain at large for the giving a fuller light to the ensuing Discourse; in which I shall endeavor to shew,

[Page 8] First, THAT there is such an intrinsick Goodness in some Humane Actions as ren­ders them for ever necessary and obliging to us.

Secondly, THAT God hath sufficiently discovered to us what those Humane Acti­ons are which carry with them this perpe­tual obligation.

Thirdly, THAT these Actions which carry with them this perpetual obligation are the main and principal parts of Religion.

SECT. I. That there is such an Intrinsick Good in some Humane Actions as render them for ever Necessary and obli­ging to us.

GOOD is twofold, Absolute, or Respe­ctive, or the Good of the End and the Good of the Means. The good of the End is that which is the Perfection and Happiness of any Being; the good of the Means is that which tends and conduces thereunto. As for Instance, the absolute Good of a Brute Animal consists in [Page 9] the Perfection and Satisfaction of its Sense, or in having perfect Feeling and Sen­sation of such things as are most grateful to its Appetite and Senses. Its respective Good is the Means by which its Senses are perfe­cted or rendred lively and vigorous, and by which it's provided for with such things as are grateful and pleasing to them. For there being in every animate nature a Principle whereby it's necessarily inclined to pro­mote its own Preservation and Well-being, that which hath in it a fitness to promote this End is called Good, as on the contrary that which is apt to hinder it Evil. Now Man being not only a sensitive but a ratio­nal Creature, hath a twofold Good be­longing to his Nature, the first Sensitive which is the same with that of brute Ani­mals, consisting in the Perfection and Sa­tisfaction of his bodily Senses and Appe­tites, and in those means which conduce thereunto; and this for distinction sake is called his Natural Good: the second Ratio­nal, which consists in the Perfection and Sa­tisfaction of his Rational Faculties, and in those means which tend thereunto; and this is stiled his Moral Good, though in re­ality 'tis as much Natural as the former. For Man being naturally as well Rational as Sensitive, that which promotes his Ra­tional [Page 10] Perfection and Happiness, is no less naturally good for him than that which promotes his Sensitive: Nay his Rational Nature being the much more noble and ex­cellent part of him, that which naturally promotes the Perfection and Happiness of it, is in it self a much greater good to his Nature and ought to be preferred by him before any of those Natural goods, which conduce only to the happiness of his sensi­tive Nature; and he who indulges his sensi­tive Part in any Pleasure which his Rational disallows, doth thereby create a torment to himself, and raise a Devil in his own mind. For tho Reason and Religion doth allow that the Sensitive nature should be gratified in all its natural Appetites and Desires, yet neither allow that it should be pampered and indulged in any such Excsses as are pre­judicial either to it self or to that Rational Nature whereunto it is joyned; and he who indulges his Sense in any such Exces­ses, renders himself obnoxious to his own. Reason, and to gratifie the Brute in him displeases the Man, and sets his two Na­tures at variance. So that there is nothing can be naturally good for us, that is any way inconsistent with what is morally so, i. e. with what conduces to the Perfection and Happiness of our rational Nature; and [Page 11] tho this Natural and Moral Good are no way inconsistent with one another, yet it is the Moral that is the Supreme Good of a Man, because it is the good of his most excellent Nature. Having thus premised what I mean by Good in general, and par­ticularly by Moral Good, I proceed to shew that in some Humane actions there is such an intrinsick moral Good as renders 'em for ever obliging to us. And this I shall endeavour in these following Propo­sitions.

First, THAT the Happiness of Humane Nature is founded in its Perfection.

Secondly, THAT the Perfection of Hu­mane Nature consists in acting suitably to the most perfect Reason.

Thirdly, THAT the most perfect Rea­son is that wherein all reasonable Beings do consent and agree.

Fourthly, THAT there are certain Rules of Moral Good, wherein all Reaso­nable Beings are agreed.

Fifthly, THAT to act suitably to those Rules hath been always found by univer­sal experience conducible to the Happiness of Humane Nature, and the contrary mis­chievous thereunto.

I. THAT the Happiness of Humane Nature is founded in its Perfection. For [Page 12] the Perfection of Beings consists in their be­ing compleatly disposed and adapted for the End whereunto they are designed. Now the End of all Beings that have Life and Sense, is that sort of Happiness that is sutable to their Natures; for 'tis thither that they all of them naturally tend, and therein that their Faculties do all concenter. When therefore their Faculties or Powers of A­ction are compleatly disposed to enjoy the proper Happiness of their Natures, then are they perfect in their Kind. Thus for instance, the End of Brutes which have only Bodily Sense, is Sensitive and corpo­real Happiness; and thererefore then is the Brute Creature perfect in its kind, when it hath not only all the Parts and Senses that are necessary to procure and en­joy its Happiness, but hath them also per­fectly sitted, tempered, and qualified to pur­sue and relish it. And supposing that all the pleasure or happiness of a Beast consisted in the Taste and Smell of its Pasture, it could never be compleatly happy so long as the Organs of its Smell or Taste were imperfect. So that the perfection of eve­ry Sensible Nature consists in being perfe­ly disposed to enjoy its Natural Happiness. And accordingly herein consists the Perfe­ction of Humane Nature, in being perfe­ctly [Page 13] fitted and disposed to enjoy and relish Humane Happiness. For this being its proper End, it is impossible it should ever be perfect in its Kind till 'tis compleatly contempered and adapted thereunto. So that our Happiness must necessarily be founded in our Perfection, which is no­thing else but the perfect Disposition of our Natures to relish and enjoy those Goods wherein the Happiness of our Nature con­sists; and till our Nature is perfectly dis­posed to enjoy them, all the good things of Heaven and Earth will be insufficient to render us perfectly happy.

II. THAT the Perfection of Humane Nature consists in acting sutably to the most Perfect Reason. For Reason being the top and Crown of Humane Nature, hath a natural Right to Command and Dispose of its Motions; to be the Eye of its Will, and the Guide of its Affections, and the Law of all its Powers of Action. And indeed, for what other use serves the Reason of a Man, but to prescribe Rules to his unrea­sonable Affections, to light and direct them to their proper Objects, and as they are moving towards them to moderate their Excesses and to quicken their Defects and to lead them on to true Happiness in an even Course through all the wild Mazes [Page 14] of popular Mistakes? And unless it be thus imployed, the man is Reasonable in vain, and his light like a Candle inclosed in a Dark-Lanthorn burns out in wast and spends it self in an useless and unprofitable blaze. And whilst to please our Appetites and Passions we run counter to the advice of our Reason, we forsake the rule of our Natures and act like Beasts and not like Men; in which course of Action if we per­sist, we must necessarily degenerate from our selves, and sink by degrees into the most sordid Brutality. For when once our Appetites have gotten the Command of our Reason, and not only dethroned but inslaved it, the very Order of our Nature is transposed and we are become our own Reverse and Antipodes. If therefore we would arrive at our own Perfection it must be by following our Reason, and submit­ting all our Affections and Appetites to its Government. For what else can be the Perfection of a Rational Nature, but to be perfectly Rational; and what is it to be perfectly Rational, but to have our Minds throughly instructed with the Principles of Right Reason, and our Will and Affections intirely regulated by them? For herein consists the Supream Perfection not only of Men, but of Angels, yea and of God [Page 15] Himself, the Crown and Glory of whose Nature it is, that he always knows, and chuses and acts what is fittest and best and most reasonable. And when once our Under­standing is so far inlightned as that it al­ways dictates right Reason to us; and our Will and Affections are so far subdued as that they always freely and chearfully comply with it, we have arrived to the very top of our Nature, and are Commenced perfect Men in Christ Jesus.

III. THAT the most perfect Reason is that wherein all Reasonable Beings do consent and agree. For if there be any such matter as True and False, Reasonable, and Vnreasonable in the Nature of things, and if there be any such thing as Vnderstanding among Beings, whereby they are capable of distinguishing between the one and the other; either that must be True and Reaso­nable which all Understandings do consent and agree in, or all the Understandings that are in the World must be under a fatal Cheat and Delusion. Which later be­ing supposed inevitably destroys all Know­ledge and Certainty, and lays a foundation for the wildest Scepticism. For supposing all Understandings to be deceived and impo­sed on, it is impossible for us to be certain of any thing, and for all we know, a Part [Page 16] may be bigger than the Whole, two and two may make twenty, and both parts of a Contradiction may be true. Nay we can never be certain whether we are not Dreaming when we think we are Awake, and whether we are not Awake when we think we are Dreaming. Either therefore we must renounce all Certainty whatsoever, and fluctuate in eternal Scepticism, or al­low that to be True and Reasonable which all Understandings do unanimously vote so.

IV. THAT there are certain Rules of Moral Goodness concerning the immu­table Reason whereof all Understandings are agreed. For such are all those which prescribe the Dueness of Worship and Vene­ration to God, of Obedience and Loyalty to our Parents and Superiours, of Temperance and Fortitude to our selves, and of Justice and Charity to one another; to the Good­ness and Reasonableness of which Rules, all Understandings do as unanimously con­sent, as to the truth of any Proposition in the Mathematicks. Now of all the orders of Reasonable Beings, that which we most converse with and with whose Consent and Agreement in any matters we are best ac­quainted, is that of Men; and therefore if among Men we can discover such an Uni­versal [Page 17] Agreement concerning the Goodness of these Rules as will warrant us to con­clude all other Rational Beings to be con­senting with them, this will be a suffici­ent Demonstration of the Truth of the Proposition. These two things therefore I shall endeavour to make out, 1. That the Reason of Men is Vniversally consent­ing in this matter, viz. That there is an immutable Goodness in these Rules of Mo­rality. 2. That this Universal Consent of Mens Reason in this matter is a sufficient Demonstration that all other reasonable Beings are consenting with them.

First, THEREFORE there is nothing more evident than that Men are Universally agreed in this matter, that to Worship God, to Honour their Parents and Superiours, to be temperate in their Passions and Appetites, and just and charitable towards one an­other, are things in their own nature im­mutably good; that this is not an Opini­on peculiar to such an Age, or to such a Nation, or to such a Sect of Religion, but the Vniversal Judgment of all Mankind of whatsoever Age, Nation, or Religion. For 'tis upon this judgment that all that Conscience is founded which approves of or condemns mens actions; which Con­science is nothing else but a Sense or Feel­ing [Page 18] of Moral Good and Evil; and is every whit as natural to Mens minds, as the Sense of pleasant or painful touches to their Bodies. Since therefore general Effects must spring from general Causes, it neces­sarily follows that the Pain and Pleasure which Mens minds generally feel upon the Commission of bad and good Actions, must be resolved into some general Cause; and what else can that be, but the ge­neral Consent of their Reason concerning the immutable Evil of the one and Good of the other? I know 'tis pretended by some of our Modern Navigators that there are a sort of People in the World who have not the least sense of Good and Evil, and do own neither God nor Religion nor Morality. But considering the short Con­verse and imperfect Intercourse which these our new Discoverers have had with those Barbarous Countries, it is fairly suppose­able that the Inhabitants may have Noti­ons both Religious and Moral, of which Strangers who understand not their Lan­guage and Customs, and Manners, can make little or no Discovery. But sup­pose that what they report were true; yet by their own confession these wretched Barbarians are in all other things so ex­treamly Brutish, that they discover no [Page 19] other token of their Humanity but their Shape. For they live altogether regard­less of themselves; of the Conveniences of their Lives, and of the Dignity of their Na­tures; without making any Reflections on their own minds, or any Observations from their own experience. Since therefore all Knowledge is acquired by Attention, it is not at all impossible for Creatures so utter­ly supine and negligent to be ignorant of the most common Notions. But for any man to question the truth of this general Rule, because there are a few Exceptions from it, is every whit as absurd as if he should question whether Men are general­ly two-legg'd Animals, because there have been some Monsters with three. And what if among men there are some Mon­sters in respect of their Minds, as well as others in respect of their Bodies? This is no more a prejudice to the standing Laws of Humane Nature, than Prodigies are to the Regularity of the constant course of Vniversal Nature. Specimen naturae cujus­libet, saith Tully, à natura optima sumendum est, i. e. The true sample of every Nature is to be taken from the best Natures of the kind. Since therefore the men of all Na­tions and Ages and Religions who have in any measure attended to the Nature of [Page 20] things, and made but any tolerable use of their Reasons, are, and always have been universally agreed that there is an immuta­ble Good in Vertue, and Evil in Vice; it is no Argument at all that this is not the gene­ral Sense of Mankind, supposing it true which is very questionable, that there are some few such inhumane Barbarians in the World as make no distinction at all be­tween 'em. But then

Secondly, THIS Universal Consent of Mens Reason in this matter, is a sufficient Demonstration that all other Reasonable Beings are consenting with them. For it shews that God himself is of this mind; and if He be, we may be sure that all other Reasonable Beings are. For if we believe that God made us, we must be­lieve that he made us for some End; and if he made us for any End, he must esteem those Actions good which promote it, and those evil which obstruct and hinder it. And what other End can an infinitely hap­py and blessed Being have in making o­ther Beings; but only to do 'em good and according to their several Capacities to make them partakers of his own Happi­ness? And if this be the end for which God made us, to be sure those Actions must be good in his esteem that are be­neficial, and those evil that are hurtful [Page 21] and mischievous to our Nature. And therefore since he hath implanted in us not only a natural Desire of Happiness; but also a rational Faculty to discern what Actions make for our Happiness and what not, we may be sure that whatsoever this Faculty doth Vniversally determine to be good or evil for us, is good or evil in the Judgment of God. 'Tis true when the Rea­son that is in one man judges contrary to the Reason that is in another, there must be a Disagreement on one side or the other from the Reason and Judgment of God; but when all mens Reason is agreed that this is good and that evil, it is plain that this is is the Judgment of the Rational Faculty which naturally makes such a Di­stinction of things. For there is no man that uses his Reason can possibly think that Truth and Falshood, Justice and Injustice, Mercy and Cruelty are equally good in themselves; his Rational Faculty being so framed as that at the first glance and re­flection, it naturally distinguishes 'em into Good and Evil. When therefore God hath created us with such a Faculty as natural­ly makes such a Judgment of Good and Evil, that Judgment must be Gods as well as the Faculty which made it. That there­fore which is the unanimous Judgment of [Page 22] all Men, must be the Natural Language of the Rational Faculty; and that which is the natural Language of the Rational Fa­culty must be the Language of the God of Nature. For he who created me with such a Faculty as naturally judges this Good and that Evil, must either have the same Judgment himself, or create in me a Con­tradiction to his own Judgment; and that Judgment which he hath created in me, he must be supposed to create in all other Be­ings that are capable of Judging; other­wise he would be the author of Contradi­ctory Judgments. For, should one Ratio­nal Faculty naturally judge this, and ano­ther the contrary, they must necessarily be so framed as to contradict each other, and consequently he who framed both must be the Author of the Contradiction. So that this universal Consent of Men con­cerning the Good and Evil of Humane Actions is a plain Evidence that God and all other Rational Beings are consenting with 'em.

V. AND Lastly, that Mens acting con­formably to these Rules of Moral Good­ness, in which they are thus universally consenting, hath by long and constant Ex­perience been found most conducive to Mens Welfare and Happiness. For the [Page 23] Proof whereof I shall need urge no other Argument than this, that the great Design of all Humane Laws and Constituti­ons hath been to secure and inforce these Rules of Morality; which is a plain Argu­ment that Men have always found by Ex­perience that they are naturally good and productive of their Happiness and Well­fare. For how can it be thought that af­ter men have had so many thousand years Trial of Piety and Justice and Mercy and Temperance, they should still be so solici­tous to fence and guard 'em with Laws, had they not found 'em highly advanta­gious, and their Contraries as mischievous to Mankind. For do but suppose that the Contraries to all Vertue were for Experi­ment-sake imposed for some time upon Mankind, and it were made as Penal by the Laws of Nations to be Pious, and Just, Merciful, and Temperate as it is now to be the contrary; is it imaginable that that which we now call Vice should in process of time acquire the same Universal Repu­tation that Virtue hath always had among men? Or at least, is it probable that af­ter some thousand years Trial and Experi­ence of such a Law, Men should still be as much concerned to guard and inforce it, as they are and always have been to se­cure [Page 24] the Laws of Piety and Virtue? No, it is most certain they would not. For the very injoyning of Impiety, Injustice, and Cru­elty would be in effect to injoyn men to render themselves most wretched and mi­serable; to surrender up all the Supports of their Hope, the Peace of their Consciences and the Tranquillity of their Minds; to live in everlasting Broils and Discords, and turn Robbers and Cut-throats to one another, and utterly deprive themselves of all the Comforts and Securities of Humane Socie­ty. So that there is no doubt but after a few Years Experience of the mischievous Consequents of such a Law, the whole World would groan under it as an insup­portable Tyranny, and even the most Vi­cious would soon grow quite weary of it, and heartily wish that it were for ever Repealed, and the good old Laws of Piety and Virtue restored and inforc'd up­on Mankind. And if so, it is plain that Virtue and Vice are distinguished by their Natures into good and evil; and that the Obligations we lie under to practise the one, and abstain from the other, are not founded in any Arbitrary Constitution, but in the essential Goodness and Malignity that inseparably adheres to them.

[Page 25]AND if we consult the Experience of particular Men, we shall always find, that whereas Impiety and Injustice, Fraud, and Malice do naturally torment mens Minds with Anguish and Confusion, haunt their Breasts with fearful Thoughts and dire Ex­pectations, harrass their Souls with per­petual Malecontentedness, and intricate their whole Lives with everlasting Shifts and Intrigues; Piety and Justice, Truth and Benevolence do as naturally sooth and ravish their Minds, fill 'em with blessed Hopes and▪ chearful Reflections; compose their Passions, strengthen and invigorate their Hearts, and render the whole Course of their Lives plain and direct, even and easie. And hereby Vertue doth sensibly recommend it self to our Natures in all its Capacities, as being suted to the Satisfa­ction of all its reasonable Desires, and so by consequence designed to make up the compleatest and most intire Enjoyment. All which is as plain and obvious to the Rea­son of Mankind as any Matter of Fact that is before us. So that 'tis not only the Reason, but also the Experi­ence of Mankind that universally a­grees and consents in this great Truth, that there is such a Good in Virtuous and such an Evil in Vicious Actions, as doth [Page 26] eternally and inseparably cleave to their Na­tures.

AND therefore since our Nature is to continue the same for ever; the same Ver­tues and Vices which are now the Perfecti­on and Depravation, and consequently the Happiness and Misery of it, will be so for ever. From whence it necessarily follows, that our eternal Happiness and Misery is founded in the Course of our own Actions. So that as in the Course of a virtuous Life we are growing up into a State of fixed and everlasting Vertue, wherein we shall be everlastingly Perfect and Happy; so on the contrary, in a course of vicious Actions we are sinking into a state of everlasting Viciousness, wherein we shall be everlastingly wretched and misera­ble. For since Virtue is good for and Vice evil to us in its own Nature, it necessarily follows that according as we remain Vir­tuous or Vicious for ever, our Condition must be good or evil for ever. And this being so, of what unspeakable Conse­quence are the Actions of Men, that thus draw after 'em a Chain of Joys or Woes as long as Eternity? And how careful ought we to be, to what course of Life we deter­mine our selves, considering that our eter­nal Fate depends upon what we are now [Page 27] doing; that every Moral Action we per­form is a step Heaven or Hell wards; that in every bad or good Choice we make, we are planting our Tophet or our Para­dise; and that in the Consequents of our present Actions we shall rue or rejoyce to eternal Ages? O would to God men would at last be so wise as to consider these things before it be too late, and not live at Random, as they do, without any Regard to the certain and unavoidable Fate of their own Actions! For doubtless would they but throughly weigh the Nature and Event of things, and look before they leap into Action, they would see infinitely more Charm and Terror in that Good and Evil which inseparably adheres to virtu­ous and vicious Actions, than in all the Temptations in the World. Wherefore in the name of God let us look about us, and for once resolve to act like Beings that must for ever feel the bad or good effects of our own Doings. Which if we do, we shall not only live well and happily here, but to all Eternity experience the blessed Consequents of it.

SECT. II. That God hath sufficiently discovered to us what those Humane Actions are, which are Morally Good, and upon that account perpetually obliging.

THE Truth of which will evidently appear by considering the Particu­lars, what it is that God hath done in or­der to the making this great Discovery to us; the most considerable of which are re­ducible to these six Heads,

First, HE hath implanted in us a natu­ral Desire of Happiness.

Secondly, HE hath given us Reason to discern what Actions they are that make for our Happiness, and what not.

Thirdly, HE hath so contrived our Na­tures as that we are thrust on by our own Instincts and Passions, to those Actions which make for our Happiness.

Fourthly, HE hath taken care to excite and oblige us to those Actions by annexing natural Rewards to them and en­tailing natural Punishments on their Con­traries.

Fifthly, To strengthen and inforce this Obligation, he hath frequently superadded to these natural Rewards and Punishments supernatural Blessings and Judgments.

[Page 29] Sixthly, THAT to enforce all this he hath made sundry supernatural Revelations wherein he hath plainly told us what those things are that carry with 'em this intrin­sick Good and Necessity,

I. GOD hath taken care to discover to us what is Morally Good by implanting in us a natural Desire of Happiness; which is so inseparable to Humane nature, that 'tis impossible for us to forbear desiring what is good for us, or at least what appears so. For tho through our own Ignorance and In­consideration we many times mistake Evil for Good, and Misery for Happiness, yet such is the Frame of our Nature, that we cannot desire Evil as Evil, or Misery as Mi­sery; but whensoever we imbrace a real Evil, 'tis either under the Notion of a less Evil, or of a real and substantial Good. Now by this unquenchable Thirst and Desire of Happiness which God hath implanted in our Natures, we are continually importu­ned and excited to search out and enquire by what Ways and Means we may arrive to be happy. So that as Hunger and Thirst and the sense of bodily Pain and Pleasure forceth men upon the invention of Trades and civil Occupations to supply their Necessities and Conveniences: So this vehement Hunger and Thirst after Happiness, which God hath created in our [Page 30] Bosoms, doth almost necessitate and constrain us to pry into the Nature of our Actions; that so we may discover what Trade and Course of life it is that tends most direct­ly to our own Felicity. And by thus im­portuning us by our own self▪love to en­quire into the Nature of our Actions and into their natural tendencies to our Weal or Woe, he hath not only expressed his good will towards us by taking Security of our selves for our own Welfare, and obliging us to be happy by the most tender and vigorous Passion in our Natures, but hath also taken an effectual Course to dis­cover to us the Good and Evil of our own Actions; Considering,

II. THAT he hath given us Reason to discern what Actions they are that make for our Happiness and what not. 'Tis true, had he only implanted in our Breasts a blind Desire of Happiness, without any Eye of Reason in our Heads to guide and direct our Actions towards it, we must have wandered in the dark for ever, till we had pined away our wretched Beings with a hungry and unsatisfied De­sire. But by giving us a quick-sighted Fa­culty of Reason to guide and conduct this our blind Desire, he hath taken sufficient care not only to excite our Enquiry after the Way to Happiness, but also to inable [Page 31] us to find it. For the natural tendencies of our Actions to our Happiness or Mise­ry are so very obvious and visible, that we can scarce open our Eyes and look abroad without observing them. For how can any man who makes any observations up­on things, be so stupid as not to discern the vast Difference there is between Truth and Falshood, Justice and Injustice, as to their natural tendency to the Good and Hurt, Happiness and Misery of Man­kind? 'Tis true, if men will neglect using their Reason, they may be ignorant of the plainest Propositions; but if they be, 'tis their inexcusable Folly. But if men will be so true to their own Interest, as calmly to reflect upon their Actions, their Sense cannot more readily distinguish between Honey and Gall, than their Reason will beween Virtue and Vice; the fundamental Reasons of which are so legible in all the Appearances of Nature, so necessary to the Being and Preservation of Mankind, and their equity is so apparent, and their Con­venience so obvious, that a man can hardly reflect upon any thing either within or without him, without being convinced of their Force and Obligation. So that for a man that hath the use of his Reason not to observe the Difference of his Actions, as [Page 32] to their intrinsick Good and Evil, and ne­cessary Tendency to his Happiness and Misery, would be as gross and unexcusable a Stupidity, as if he should pass through the World without ever taking notice that two and two make four. God therefore by giving us a Reasonable Faculty to dis­cern the nature of things, upon which the Differences of Good and Evil are so plainly and legibly imprinted, hath hereby taken sufficient Care to shew us the difference of our own Actions. For, to inspire us with a Faculty of Reasoning, by which we can form true Notions of things from sin­gle Experiments and infer one truth from another, and immediately to inspire this Faculty with Divine Truth, are only two different Modes of Divine Revelation; and God did as really reveal himself to us when he gave us Reason to understand his Will, as when he sent to us his Messen­gers from Heaven to make known his mind and Will to us. For God hath so framed our Understandings, as that whensoever we impartially reason about things, we are forced to distinguish between Good and Evil, and cannot persuade our selves without doing infinite Violence to our own Faculties, that to Blaspheme God or to Re­verence him, to lie or speak Truth, to [Page 33] honour our Parents or to scorn and despise them are things of an indifferent Nature; but as soon as ever we open the Eye of our Reason we discern such an essential Diffe­rence between them, as forces us to con­demn the one and approve the other. And accordingly as for the great strokes of Ini­quity, we find they have as much the U­niversal Judgment of our Reason against them as any false Conclusion in the Ma­thematicks; whilst the Goodness of their contrary Vertues is as universally acknow­ledged by us as the Truth of any first Prin­ciple in Philosophy. Since therefore God hath so framed our Understanding as that it cannot calmly reflect upon our Actions without distinguishing between the good and bad, he hath hereby sufficiently reveal­ed to us what that good is that immutably binds and obliges us.

III. GOD hath so contrived our Natures as that we are thrust on by our own In­stincts and Passions to those Actions which are morally Good and do make for our Happiness. For we are framed and con­stituted with such Passions and Affections as do naturally point and direct us unto vertuous Actions; and tho by the Con­stitution of our Natures, our Passions are subjected to our Reason, and all our Ver­tue [Page 34] consists in being reasonably affected, yet in the very Nature of our Passions there is a certain Tendency and Direction to Vertue, antecedent to all our Reasoning and Discourse. Which Theages the Pytha­gorean stiles a [...], a certain natural Impetus or Enthusiasme by which with­out any previous Discourse or Delibe­ration we are forcibly carried on towards vertuous Actions. For some Affections there are in our Nature, which do in the general plainly signifie to us that there is such a thing as Moral Good and Evil in Humane Actions; and others that do as plainly point out what those Actions are wherein this moral good and evil is sub­jected. Of the first sort are the Affections of Love and Hatred, Complacency and Horror, Glory and Shame, Repentance and Self-satisfaction; which plainly de­clare that there are answerable Objects in the Nature of Things and Actions; that there is a Good to be beloved and an Evil to be hated; a Deformity to be abhorred and a Beauty to be delighted in; an Ex­cellency to be gloried in and a Filthiness to be ashamed of; a Well-doing to be satisfied [...] an Ill doing to be repented of. For [...] the [...]e were no such real Distinctions in [Page 35] the Nature of Things and Actions, all these Affections in us would be utterly vain and impertinent. And as these Affe­ctions of our Nature do signifie in the ge­neral that there is a moral Good and Evil in our Actions, so there are others which do particularly point out what Actions are morally Good and what Evil. Thus for Instance, the Passions of Veneration and Disdain do plainly direct us to Honour God and our Superiors, and to be con­stant in good Courses out of a generous Scorn of all Temptations to the contrary. Thus Commiseration and Envy direct us to Charity and Justice, to lament and assist those who are undeservedly unfortunate, and to be displeased with the Advancement of base and undeserving People; and con­sequently to be just and equal in our Distri­butions, and to proportion them to mens Merit and Desert. For by this Passion of Envy Nature teaches us that there is such a thing as just and unjust, equal and unequal, and that the former is to be embraced and the latter to be shunned. And to name no more, thus Sorrow and Joy doth by a silent Language disswade us from injuring and perswade us to benefit one another. For so by the mournful Voice, the deject­ed Eyes and Countenance, the Sighs and [Page 36] Groans and Tears of the sorrowful and op­prest, (all which are the powerful Rheto­rick of Nature) we are importuned not only to forbear heaping any further Injuries upon them, but also to commiserate their Griefs, and by our timely Aids to succour and relieve them. As on the contrary the florid and chearful Looks, the pleasant and grateful Air which we behold in those that rejoyce, are so many Charms and Attra­ctives by which Nature allures us to mu­tual Vrbanity and Sweetness of Behaviour, and a continual Study to please and gra­tifie one another. By these and many o­ther Instances I might give, it is evident that tho by our own ill Government we too often deprave our Affections and cor­rupt them into Vices, yet their natural Drift and tendency lies towards Vertue. Thus by their own natural Light which they carry before us, they direct our steps to the Way we are to walk in, and point out all those Tracts of eternal Goodness that lead to our Happiness. For since these Affections are in us antecedently to all our Deliberations and Choices, it is evident they were placed there by the Author of our Natures; and therefore since 'tis He who hath inclined them to all that they naturally incline to, He doth in Effect di­rect [Page 37] and guide us by their Inclinations. So that their natural Tendencies and Di­rections are the Voice of God in our Natures, which murmurs and whispers to us that na­tural Law which our Reason indeed doth more plainly and articulately promulge. And from this natural Tendency of our Affecti­ons to Good proceeds that pleasant and pain­ful Sense of good and bad Actions which we experience in our selves before ever we can discourse. For thus before we are capable of reasoning our selves into any Pleasure or Displeasure, our Nature is rejoyced in a kind or just Action either in our selves or o­thers, and we are sensibly pleased when we have pleasured those that oblige us, and as sensibly grieved when we are con­scious of having grieved and offended them. We love to see those fare well who we imagine have deserved well; and when any unjust Violence is offered them, our Nature shrinks at and abhors it. We pity and compassionate the miserable when we know not why; and are ready to offer at their Relief when we can give no Reason for it; which shews that these things pro­ceed not either from our Education or de­liberate Choice, but from the Nature of our Affections which have a Sympathy with Vertue, and an Antipathy to Vice im­planted [Page 38] in their very Constitution. And hence it is that in the Beginnings of Sin our Nature is commonly so shy of an evil A­ction; that it approaches it with such a modest Coyness, and goes blushing to it like a bashful Virgin to an Adulterers Bed; that it passes into it with such Regret and Reluctancy, and looks back upon it with such Shame and Confusion; which in our tender years, when as yet we are not arri­ved to the Exercise of our Understandings, cannot be supposed to proceed from Rea­son and Conscience, and therefore must be from the natural Sense of our Affections, which by these and such like Indications do signifie that they are violated and of­fended. Now this natural Sense of Good and Evil which springs from the Frame and Nature of our Affections, was doubtless intended by God to be the [...] guide of Humane Nature; that so when as yet 'tis not capable of following Reason and Conscience, it might be di­rected to what is Good and be preserved from wicked Habits and Prejudices by its own Sense and Feeling, till such time as it's capable of the Conduct of Reason; that so when this leading Faculty under­takes the Charge of it, it may find it [...] to its [...] and [Page 39] be able to manage it with more Ease and Facility. And thus by the natural Drift and Tendency of our Affections God hath plain­ly revealed to us what is good and what not.

IV. GOD hath also entailed upon our Actions natural Rewards and Punishments, and thereby plainly declared which are good and which evil. For it is easily de­monstrable by an Induction of Particulars, that every Vertue hath some natural Effi­cacy in it to advance both our publick Good and our private Interest. That Tem­perance and Charity, Righteousness and Fi­delity, Gratitude and Humility are not only convenient, but absolutely necessary to our Joy and Comfort, our Peace and Quietness, our Safety and Contentment; to the Health of our Body and the Satis­faction of our Mind, and the Security and Happiness of our Society with one another. Whereas on the contrary, Vice naturally teems with mischievous Effects, and is ever productive of Horror in the Conscience, Anguish in the mind, Discord in the Affe­ctions, Diseases in the Body, and Confusi­ons and Disturbances in Humane Society. Since therefore the Divine Wisdom and Contrivance hath thus inseparably coupled good Effects to good Actions and evil ones to evil, it hath hereby very plainly and [Page 40] sensibly declared to us what it would have us do and what not. For seeing it hath so constituted things as that in the Course of Nature such Proportions of Happiness do necessarily result to us from such Actions, and such Proportions of Misery from their Contraries, what can be more evident than that its Design was hereby to encourage us to the one and affright us from the o­ther? So that by these natural Rewards and Punishments which in the Course of things God hath chained to our Actions, he hath as expresly prescribed us what to do and what not, as he could have done if he had spoken to us in an audible voice from the Battlements of Heaven. For since the whole Train of Natural Effects is to be resolved into the Providence of God, and since his Providence hath so or­dered and contrived things as that in the ordinary Course of them good Effects do spring out of good Actions and evil out of evil ones, what else could he intend by it but to allure us to the one, and terrifie us from the other? For it is by Rewards and Punishments that all Lawgivers declare their Will and Pleasure concerning those Actions which they command and sorbid; and therefore since God in his Providen­tial Government of the World hath [Page 41] thought good to link natural Rewards to such Actions, and natural Punishments to such, these are to be lookt upon as the great Sanctions of the Law of Nature, whereby he commands what pleases and prohibits what displeases him. For when God had no otherwise revealed himself to the World than only by the establsht Course and Nature of things, that was the great Bible by which alone Mankind was in­structed in their Duty; and there being no revealed Threats or Promises annexed to good and bad Actions, Gods Will and Pleasure concerning them was visible only in the good and bad Consequents which they drew after them; which are so plain and obvious to the Observation of Man­kind, that 'twould be the most inexcusable Inadvertency not to take Notice of them. So that the moral Good and Evil of all A­ctions, finally resolves into the natural Good and Evil that is appendant to them; and therefore are our Actions morally good because they are naturally beneficial to us, and therefore morally evil because they are naturally prejudicial and hurtful; and those which in their own nature are nei­ther good nor evil, are indifferent in them­selves, and left altogether undetermined by the Law of Nature, which commands [Page 42] and forbids nothing but under the Sancti­on of those natural Rewards and Punish­ments which in the Course of things are made necessary to Humane Actions.

V. TO these natural Rewards and Pu­nishments which God hath entailed upon good and bad Actions, he hath thought good many times to superadd supernatural Blessings and Judgments. For tho he had before sufficiently expressed his Will con­cerning Humane Actions in the great Bi­ble of Nature, and by their natural Effects had plainly enough distinguished the good from the bad; yet considering what heedless and inobservant Creatures we are, and how apt to overlook the or­dinary Consequents of our Actions, he hath not altogether abandoned us to the easie Instructions of Nature, but out of his superabundant Care to shew us what is Good and lead us to our Duty and Hap­piness, he hath from time to time second­ed the natural Rewards and Punishments of our Actions with supernatural Favours and Judgments; that so by these he might awake our drowsie Attention, and revive in us the languishing sense of our Duty. Of which we have infinite Instances in the several Ages of the World; there be­ing scarce any History either Sacred or [Page 43] Prosane that abounds not with them. Se­veral of which both Blessings and Judg­ments do as plainly evince themselves to be intended by God for Rewards and Pu­nishments, as if they had been attended with a Voice from Heaven proclaiming the Reasons for which they were sent. For how many famous Instances have of we mi­raculous Deliverances of Righteous Persons, who by an Invisible Hand have been res­cued from the greatest Dangers, when in all outward appearance their Condition was hopeless and desperate; and of won­derful Blessings that have hapned to them not only without, but contrary to all secon­dary Causes; of some that have been so eminently rewarded in kind, as that the Goods which they received were most vi­sible Significations of the Goods which they did; of others who have received the Blessings which they have asked, whilst they were praying for them, and obtained them with such distinguishing Circumstan­ces as plainly signified them to be the An­swers and Returns of their devout Addres­ses to Heaven? And so on the contrary, how many notable Examples are there of such miraculous Judgments inflicted upon unrighteous Persons, as have either exceed­ed the Power of secondary Causes or been [Page 44] caused by them contrary to their natural ten­dencies; of men that have been punished in the very Act of their Sin, and sometimes in the very Part by which they have of­fended; that have had the evil of their Sin retaliated upon them in a correspon­dent Evil of Suffering, and been struck with those very Judgments which they have imprecated on themselves in the Justi­fication of a known Falshood? All which supernatural Judgments and Blessings of God are only his Comments on the Text of Nature, by which he farther explains to us the Meaning of those natural Re­wards and Punishments which Vertue and Vice draw after them, and shews us what clear Indications they are of his Almighty Pleasure and Displeasure. For when he rewards men supernaturally it is for those Actions that carry a natural Reward with them, and when he punishes them super­naturally it is for such Actions as do carry a natural Punishment with them; so that his supernatural Rewards and Punishments do speak the same Sense and Language with his natural, only they speak plainer and louder to rouse and awake those stupid Souls that are deaf to and regardless of the soft and still voice of natural Rewards and Punishments. Thus when the old [Page 45] World by not attending to the natural Consequents of their own Actions had al­most extinguished their Sense of Good and Evil, God by a supernatural Deluge in which he drowned the wicked and preser­ved the righteous, consigned to all future Generations a standing Monument of his Hatred of Sin and Love of Righteousness; that so by the Remembrance of it he might keep Mens heedless Minds more attentive to the natural Rewards and Punishments of their Actions. And when the Remem­brance of this was almost worn out, and with it mens natural Sense of good and evil, God by raining down Fire and Brim­stone upon Sodom and Gomorra, and rescu­ing the Righteous Lot from that dire Con­flagration, alarmed the World with a new Declaration of the wide Distinction he makes between Vertue and Vice. And lastly, when the Vertue of these great Ex­amples was almost spent, God raised up the People of Israel, and by the miraculous Blessings he bestowed on them when they did well, and the stupendous Judgments he inflicted when they did wickedly, exposed them to all the Nations round about for a standing Demonstration of the vast Difference he makes between Good and Evil. For so the Psalmist tells us, [Page 46] Psalm 98. verse 2. compared with Psalm 102. verse 15. The Lord hath made known his Salvation, his Righteousness hath he openly shewed in the sight of the Heathen; that the Heathen might fear the Name of the Lord, and all the Kings of the Earth his Glory. Thus by frequent Examples of supernatural Rewards and Punishments God hath been always instructing the de­generate World in the essential Differences between Good and Evil.

VI. AND lastly, To inforce all this God hath made sundry supernatural Revelati­ons, wherein he hath plainly instructed us what Actions are good and what evil. That he hath made sundry Revelations to the World is evident in Fact, because there are sundry Revelations extant, which by those many miraculous Effects of the Di­vine Power that attended the Ministration of them, have been sufficiently demonstra­ted to be of a divine Original. And such are those contained in the five Books of Moses, and the Prophets, which have been all most amply confirmed, both by the Mira­cles which were wrought by their inspired Authors, and the exact Accomplishment of the several Predictions contained in them. And such is also the last and best Revelati­on contained in the New Testament; which [Page 47] both by the Types and Predictions of the Law and Prophets, and the infinite Mira­cles wrought by Jesus and his Followers, together with its own inherent Wisdom and Goodness, hath been so effectually proved a divine Revelation, that nothing but Ignorance or inveterate Prejudice can cause any man to disbelieve or suspect it.

NOW if you consult these several Reve­lations, you will find that the main Drift and Design of them is to detect and expose what is morally evil, and explain and re­commend to us what is morally good. For thus the several Revelations made to A­braham and his Children, were only so many Repetitions of that Covenant of Righ­teousness which God had struck with them, to encourage them to persevere in Well-doing. Thus the Law of Moses consisted partly of Ceremonial Rites, which were either intended for Divine Hieroglyphics to instruct that dull and stupid People in the Principles of inward Purity and Good­ness, or else for Types and Figures of the holy Mysteries of the Gospel: and partly of Precepts of Morality, together with some few of Policy, suited to the Genius of that People; and partly of such Pro­mises and Threats as were judged most apt to oblige them to the Practice of Piety. [Page 48] And as for the Prophets, the substance of their Revelations was either Reprehensions of Sin together with severe Denunciations against it; or Invitations to Vertue and Piety together with gracious Promises to encourage them to practise it; or Predicti­ons of the Messias and of that everlasting Righteousness which was to be introduced by him. And then as for the Gospel, all the Duty of it consists either in Instances, or Means and Instruments of Moral Good­ness; and all the Doctrins of it are nothing but powerful Arguments to oblige us to the Practice of those Duties. Thus the great Intendment of all Gods Reve­lations is to explain and enforce the Du­ties of Morality; to discover the Nature, and lead us on to the Practice of them by the most powerful Obligations. And in this most perfect Map of the Road to Hap­piness, all the Tracts of Piety and Vertue are so plainly described and delineated to us, that no man can possibly miss his Way, that sincerely inquires after it. For tho in matters of Opinion men may be inno­cently mislead and deceived, yet there is no Article either of Doctine or Duty upon which our Happiness necessarily depends, wherein it is possible for an honest and di­ligent Mind to be mistaken. And thus you [Page 49] see by how many excellent Ways God hath discovered to us which of our Actions are good and which evil. So that if after all this we proceed in any sinful and immo­ral Courses, we are utterly inexcusable. For if after God hath thus plainly made known his Will to us, we still persist to contradict it in our Practice, we do there­by in effect declare that we regard not the Almighty, and that we will do what we list, let him will what he pleases. And what an unpardonable Insolence is it for us who depend upon his Breath, and hang upon his Providence every moment, to treat him as if he had nothing to do with us, and were the merest Cypher and most insignificant ▪ Being in the World? For though 'tis true he hath not made so full a Discovery of his Will to some as to o­thers, yet he hath so sufficiently discove­red it to all, that none can pretend to the Excuse either of invincible or unaffected Ig­norance. For as for the Heathen, though they have no Revelation of Gods Will without them, yet they have the Bible of Conscience within them, and the large and legible Bible of Nature that lies continu­ally open before them, in which they may easily read the principal Differences be­tween Good and Evil, and all the great [Page 50] Principles of Morality. And if notwith­standing this they will be so regardless of God as not to attend to and comply with those natural Discoveries of his Will, what Pretence can be made for them why they should not perish for ever in their Obsti­nacy? For as the Apostle tells us, though they had not the Law, that is, the revealed Law, yet they did, or at least might have done, by nature the things contained in the Law; and therefore as many of them, saith he, as sinned without this revealed Law, shall perish without the Law, that is, by the Sentence of the Law of Nature, Rom. 2.12, 14. And then as for the Jews, be­sides those natural Indications of Gods Will which they had in common with the Hea­then, they had sundry supernatural ones; they had sundry great and notorious Ex­amples of Gods rewarding good men, and punishing bad; and besides they had the Law of Moses, the Moral part of which was but a new Edition of the Law of Na­ture; as for the Ceremonial Part of it, it was though an obscure, yet an intelligible Representation of all those sublime Motives to Piety and Vertue, which the Gospel more plainly proposes. So that would the Jews but have heedfully attended either to the spiritual Sense of their Law, or to [Page 51] the Sermons of their Prophets which very much cleared and explained it, they could not have been ignorant either of any ma­terial Part of their Duty, or of any conside­rable Motive by which it is pressed and in­forced. And if notwithstanding, they would be so regardless of God, as to take no no­tice of his Judgments and Mercies; so rude to his Authority as not to mind either his Law within or his Law without them, upon what reasonable Pretence can they excuse themselves? But then as for us Christians we have not only all those natural Discoveries of our Duty which the Heathen had, and all those Supernatural ones which the Jews had, but a great deal more. For in our Revelation the Laws and Motives of Vertue are set before us in a much clearer Light, and are neither wrapt up in Mystical Senses, nor overcast with typical Representations, but laid before us in the most plain and easie Propositions. For that which was the Mystical Sense of the Jewish Law, is the literal Sense of the Christian; in which all those Precepts and Promises and Threats which were delive­red to the Jews in dark Riddles, obscure and typical Adumbrations, are brought forth to us from behind the Curtain, and pro­posed in plain and popular Articles. So [Page 52] that if we still continue in our sinful Cour­ses, we are of all men the most inexcusable. The Heathen may plead against the Jews, that their Law of Nature was not so clear in its Precepts, nor yet so cogent in its Mo­tives as the Law of Moses; the Jews may plead against us Christians, that their Law of Moses was neither so express in its Precepts, nor yet so intelligible in its best and most powerful Motives as our Gospel; but as for us Christians, we have nothing to plead, but by our own Obstinacy a­gainst the clearest Discoveries of our Duty do stand condemned to everlasting Silence. So that when it shall appear at the dread Tribunal of God, that we have persisted in our wickedness notwithstanding all these Advantages, we must expect to be reproach­ed by all the Reasonable World, to be ex­ploded and hiss'd at, not only by Saints and Angels, but by the Jews and the Gentiles, and the Devils themselves, who will all con­spire with our own Consciences to second our woful Doom with the Loud Acclama­tion of Just and Righteous art thou O Lord in all thy Ways. Wherefore as we would not perish for ever without Pity and Excuse, let us make hast to forsake all ungodliness and worldly Lusts, and to live soberly, and righteously, and godly in this present World.

SECT. III. That those Actions which carry with them this perpetual Obligation are the main and principal Parts of Religion.

THE truth of which is most evident from the abovenamed Text, Mic. 6.8. and what doth the Lord require of thee but to do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God? Which Interrogation tho it implies not an absolute Negation, viz. that the Lord required nothing else of them (for under the Law he required Sacrifices and sundry other positive Du­ties, as under the Gospel he requires Sa­craments and Reading and Hearing his ho­ly Word, &c. which are positive Duties as well as those legal Institutions of Moses;) yet it plainly implies a comparative Nega­tion, viz. that the Lord requires nothing else so principally and affectionately, so for the sake of the things themselves and upon the account of their own inherent Beauty and Goodness, as he doth these Moral Duties here specified. He did indeed require the Jews to offer Sacrifice to him and to perform those other Ceremonial Rites specified in the [Page 54] Law of Moses; and for them wilfully to have neglected those Duties would have been such an avowed Defiance to his Au­thority as would have rendred them justly obnoxious to all the Judgments threat­ned in their Law; but yet he did much more earnestly require them to be just and merciful and humble, and manifested him­self to be far better pleased with one Act of Moral Goodness than with a thousand Sacrifices. And thus he requires of us Christians that we should communicate with him and with one another in our E­vangelical Sacraments, and dutifully con­form to all those sacred Institutions and Solemnities of Religion which are contain­ed in the Gospel; and if we wilfully neg­lect them we justly incur all that everla­sting Vengeance which is there denounced; but yet our sincere compliance with the immutable Obligations of Piety and Ver­tue, is a thousandfold more acceptable to God than our strictest Observation of these his positive Institutions. So that the Que­stion in the Text what doth the Lord re­quire of thee plainly implies this Propositi­on, that tho God doth exact of us cer­tain Duties which are not moral, i. e. have no intrinsick necessity in them, yet it is the Moral Duties, such as Justice and [Page 55] Mercy and Humility which he principally requires at our hand. Thus concerning Sa­crifice, God plainly tells us, I will have Mercy and not Sacrifice, i. e. I will have Mercy rather than Sacrifice, Hos. 6.6. And the Wise man assures us that to do Justice is more acceptable to the Lord than Sacrifice, Prov. 21.3. And to the same purpose our Saviour himself pronounceth, even before that Ceremonial Worship was Abolished, that to love the Lord with all our heart, with all our understanding, with all our Soul, and with all our strength, and to love our neighbour as our selves is more than all burnt-Offerings and Sacrifices, Mark 12.33. But for the clearer Demonstrati­on of this great and necessary Truth, I shall endeavour, First, to prove the Truth of it by some Scripture Arguments, Se­condly, to assign the Reasons of it. As for the Proof of it, the following Particu­lars will be abundantly sufficient,

First, THAT the Scripture plainly de­clares that the great Design of all the Doctri­nals of Religion hath always been to move and perswade men to the practice of Mo­ral Goodness.

Secondly, THAT the main Drift and Scope of all the positive Duties of Religion hath been always to improve and perfect men in Moral Goodness.

[Page 56] Thirdly, THAT God expresses in Scri­pture a great Contempt of all the positive Duties of Religion when ever they are se­parated from Moral Goodness.

Fourthly, THAT where ever we find the Whole of Religion summ'd up in a few Par­ticulars, they are always such as are Instan­ces of Moral Goodness.

Fifthly, THAT wherever such Persons as have been most dear and acceptable to God are described in Scripture, their Cha­racter always consists of some Instances or other of Moral Goodness.

Sixthly, THAT the Scripture plainly declares that at the great Account between God and our Souls, the main Inquisition will be concerning our Moral Good or Evil.

I. THE Scripture expresly declares that the great Design of the Doctrins of Religion is to move and perswade men to Moral Goodness. For so the Apostle speaking of the Grace of God, i. e. the Gospel, assures us that its great Design is to teach men to deny all ungodliness and Worldly Lusts, and to live soberly, righteously, and Godly in this present World. Tit. 2.12. And if we consider the Doctrines in Particular, we shall find that they all conspire in this great Design. For so the Doctrine of eternal life is proposed by God to perswade us to [Page 57] cleanse our selves from all filthiness of flesh and spirit, and to perfect holiness in the fear of God, 2. Cor. 7.1. So also the Do­ctrine of our future Punishment is levell'd against all unrighteousness and ungodliness of men, Rom. 1.18. And as for those Doctrines which concern the Transacti­ons of our Saviour, they are all proposed to us as Arguments to perswade us to Pie­ty and Vertue. For 'twas for this cause that Christ was manifested, to destroy the works of the Devil, 1 John 3.8. 'twas for this purpose that he bore our sins in his own body on the tree, that we being dead to sin should live to Righteousness, 1 Pet. 2.24. 'twas for this end that he rose from the dead, that thereby he might prevail with us to walk in newness of life, Rom. 6.4. and 'tis for this end that he intercedes for us at the right hand of God, that thereby he might encourage us to come to God by him, Heb. 7.2. and in a word, for this cause he hath told us he will come to Judgment, to re­ward every man according to his works, that thereby he might stir us up to Sobrie­ty and Vigilance and to all holy conversa­tion and Godliness, Mat. 24.42. compa­red with 2 Pet. 3. verse 11. Thus you see all the Doctrines of Religion are only so many Topics of divine Perswasion, whereby God addresses himself to our [Page 58] Hope and Fear and every other Affection in us that is capable of Perswasion, to ex­cite us to comply with the eternal Obliga­tions of Morality; and there is no one Article in all our Religion, that is matter of mere Speculation, or that entertains our Minds with dry and empty Notions that have no Influence on our Wills and Affe­ctions. For since the Design of Religion in General, is to bind and fasten our Souls to God, we may be sure that there is no Part of it but what doth in some measure contribute hereunto. Since therefore 'tis moral Goodness that God chiefly recom­mends to us by the Perswasions of Religi­on, we may be sure that what his Argu­ments do chiefly perswade us to, that his Commands do chiefly oblige us to.

II. FROM Scripture it is also evident that the main Drift and Scope of all the positive Duties of Religion is to improve and perfect men in moral Goodness. We find the Jewish Religion exceedingly a­bounded with positive Precepts; for such were all those sacred Rites and Solemnities of which the Bark and Outside of that Re­ligion consisted; of all which 'tis true what the Psalmist saith of Sacrifices in particular, thou desirest not Sacrifices, thou delightest not in burnt Offerings, Psal. [Page 59] 51.16. that is, thou takest no delight in them upon the score of any internal Good­ness that is in them, but desirest them merely as they are instituted means and In­struments of Moral Goodness. For so ma­ny of the Rites of the Mosaic Law were instituted in opposition to the Magical, Vnclean and Idolatrous Rites of the Eastern Heathen. As particularly, that Prohibi­tion of sowing their Fields with mingled Seed, Lev. 19.19. in Opposition to that Magical Rite which the Heathens used as a Charm for Fructification. So also that Command of sprinkling the Blood of their Sacrifices upon the Ground like Water and covering it with Dust, in Opposition to that Idolatrous Rite of gathering the Blood into a Trench or Vessel, and then sitting round it in a Circle, whilst they imagined their gods to be licking it up. And to name no more of this kind, the Prohibi­tion of seething a Kid in his Mothers Milk, Exod. 23.19. was in Opposition to a Custom of the Ancient Heathen, who at the Ingathering of their Fruits were wont to take a Kid and seeth it in the milk of its Dam, and then in a Magical Procession to sprinkle all their Trees and Fields and Gar­dens with it, thereby to render them more fruitful the following Year. Besides all [Page 60] which you may find a World of other In­stances in Maimonides More-Nevoch. lib. 3. who tells us, that the Knowledg of the Opinions and Customs of these Eastern Heathens was porta magna ad reddendas praeceptorum causas, the great Rationale of the Mosaic Precepts; and that multarum legum rationes & causae mihi innotuerint ex cognitione fidei, rituum & Cultus Zabio­rum; i. e. that by being acquainted with the opinions and customs of those Eastern Heathens he understood the grounds and rea­sons of many of the Laws of Moses, More-Nevoch. lib. 3. cap. 29. So that tho these Precepts were not Moral, yet were they set up as so many Fences by God, to keep his People from stragling into those Hea­then Immoralities.

AGAIN, there are other Rites of their Religion, which were instituted to shadow out the Holy Mysteries of the Gospel; the great Design of which Mysteries was to invite and perswade men to comply with the eternal Laws of Morality. Thus their Laws of Sacrifice were instituted to repre­sent to them the great Transactions of their future Messias; his Incarnation and immaculate Life, his Death and Resurre­ction, Ascension and Intercession at the right hand of God. So also their Festival Laws, [Page 61] and particularly their Laws of Jubilee, were made to shadow out the Doctrines of our Redemption and eternal Life; and their powring out Water in their Sacrifices, and their Ritual Purgations from uncleanness, were intended for obscure Intimations of the Effusion of the holy Spirit, and the Doctrine of Remission of Sins; all which Doctrines carry with them the most preg­nant Invitations to Piety and Vertue.

Lastly. THERE are other Rites of that Law which were appointed to instruct them in Moral Duties. For God finding them not only a perverse but a dull and sottish People, as those generally are that have been born and bred in Slavery, ap­prehended that the most effectual way to instruct them would be by Signs and ma­terial Representations, even as Parents do their Children by Pictures. And accor­dingly in Isaiah 28.10. he tells us that he gave them line upon line, and precept upon precept, here a little and there a little, with a stammering tongue; i. e. he look'd upon them as Children, and so condescended to their Weakness, and spake to them in their own Dialect. And this way of instructing them by outward and visible Signs, being much in use in the Eastern Countries, and more especially in Egypt, whose manners [Page 62] they were infinitely fond of, was of all o­thers the most probable and taking. And accordingly a great part of the Jewish Rites consisted of Hieroglyphics, or visible Signs, by which their minds were instructed in the Precepts of Morality. Thus by Circumci­sion God signified to them the necessity of mortifying their unchast Desires; by their Legal Washings he intimated to them their Obligation to cleanse themselves from all Impurities of Flesh and Spirit; yea this, as St. Barnabas in his Epistle tells us, was the Intent of all that Difference of Meats in the Jewish Law, which pronounced Swines flesh unclean, to instruct them not to live like Hogs, that wallow in the Mire while they are full, and whine and clamor when they are empty; which forbid them to feed on Eagles and other Birds of Prey, to in­struct them to live by honest Industry, and not by Rapine; which prohibits Fish with­out Scales, that generally live in the Mud, to teach the evil of Sensuality and earth­ly-mindedness, &c. From all which it is evi­dent that Moral Goodness was the con­stant Mark at which all the positive Pre­cepts of their Law were levelled.

AND then as for the Christian Religi­on, all the positive Precepts it contains are directed to the same End. It requires us [Page 63] to believe in Jesus Christ, and in his Me­diation to draw near unto God; the Design of which Faith it expresly tells us is to Sanctifie our natures, Acts 26.18. and to purifie our hearts, Acts 15.9. It enjoyns us to be Baptized into the name of Jesus; and for what purpose? but to oblige us thereby to die to sin and to walk in newness of life, Rom. 6.4. It requires us to com­memorate our Saviour's Passion in a Sacra­mental Communion of his Body and Blood; and to what End? but only to excite us to Love and Thankfulness to God, and Cha­rity towards one another, 1 Cor. 5.7, 8. In a word, it requires us to live in Vnity with the Church, and not to separate our selves from her sacred Assemblies; and for what other reason? but that we might be­come an holy Temple, and an habitation of God, by being compacted together into an uniform and regular Society, Eph. 2.21, 22. Since therefore all the Precepts both of the Old and New Testament which are purely positive, do bear a Respect to Moral Goodness, and were imposed by God in subserviency thereunto, it is evident that that is the principal Mark which he designs and aims at.

III. ANOTHER Evidence from Scri­pture that Moral Goodness is the principal [Page 64] Matter of our Duty, is the great Contempt which God expresses of the positive Duties of Religion when ever they are separated from moral Goodness. For thus concern­ing the Positives of the Jewish Religion, we are told that the Sacrifice of the wicked is an Abomination to the Lord. Prov. 15.8. And concerning the Whole of their positive Religion, the Prophet thus pronounces in the Name of God, to what purpose is the multitude of your Sacrifices to me saith the Lord? I am full of the burnt-Offerings of Rams, and of the fat of fed Beasts, i. e, so full as that I loath them; and I delight not in the Blood of Bullocks, or of Lambs, or of He-Goats. When ye come to appear before me, who hath required these things at your hands, to tread my Courts? bring no more vain Oblations, Incense is Abomination to me; the new Moons and Sabbaths, the cal­ling of Ass [...]emblies I cannot away with; it is Iniquity, even the Solemn meetings. Your new Moons and your appointed Feasts my Soul hateth, they are a trouble to me, I am weary to bear them. And when you spread forth your hands, I will hide mine eyes, yea, when ye make many Prayers I will not hear. And what I beseech you is the reason that God should thus dislike his own Instituti­ons? why he plainly tells you, your hands [Page 65] are full of blood, your Cruelty and Oppres­sion doth prophane your Worship, and turn it all into Impiety, Isai. 1.11. to the 16th. For so Isai. 66.3. he plainly tells them, he that killeth an Ox, is as if he slew a Man; he that Sacrificeth a Lamb, as if he cut off a Dogs neck; he that offer­eth an Oblation, as if he offered Swines blood; he that burneth Incense, as if he blessed an Idol; and why so? why they have chosen their own ways, i. e. of Impiety and Wickedness, and their Soul delighteth in their Abominations. Nor doth God ex­press a less Contempt of the Positives of Christianity, when separated from Moral Goodness. For thus St. James tells us even of our Faith or Belief in Jesus, that without Works it is dead; that is a sens­less, squalid thing that hath neither Life nor Beauty in it, James 2.17. And S. Pe­ter compares Baptism to the washing of a Swine when it is separated from Purity of Life and Manners, 2 Pet. 2.22. And our receiving the Lords Supper without Cha­rity and Devotion is by St. Paul stiled coming together to Condemnation, 1 Cor. 11.34. All which is a plain Demonstration that moral Goodness is the principal mat­ter that God insists on; since 'twas this that sanctified the Sacrifices of the Jews, [Page 66] and crowned all their Ceremonial Obser­vances with the divine Acceptation, and without this all their other Services were noisom and offensive to him; and it is this that perfumes our Faith and our Sacra­ments, our Prayers and Religious Assem­blies, and renders them a grateful and sweet smelling savor in the Nostrils of God, and without this they are all a hateful stench and Annoyance to him. Doubtless there­fore the principal Matter of Duty which God requires of us, is that which he e­steems the Grace and Fragrancy of all our other Duties.

IV. ANOTHER Evidence from Scri­pture that moral Goodness is the princi­pal matter that God requires of us, is, that where ever we find the Whole of Re­ligion summed up in a few Particulars, they are always such as are Parts and In­stances of moral Goodness. Thus in the above cited Mic. 6. what doth the Lord require of thee? but to do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God. Thus also the Prophet Isaiah giving an ac­count to his People what they were to do in order to their Reconciliation with God, thus directs them, wash ye, make ye clean, put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes, cease to do evil, learn to do well, [Page 67] seek judgment, relieve the oppressed, judg the Fatherless, plead for the Widow; come now, and let us reason together saith the Lord, Isai, 1.16.17, 18. So also our blessed Sa­viour sums up the Whole Duty of Man into two Particulars, and what are they? why thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy mind; this is the first and great Com­mandment. And the second is like unto it, thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thy self; on these two Commandments hang the Law and the Prophets, Mat. 22.37, 38, 39, 40. Thus St. James, True Religion and unde­filed before God and the Father is this, to visit the Fatherless and Widows in their Af­fliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the Word, James 1.27. And elsewhere the Apostle sums up the whole Law in­to one leading Head of Morality, and that is Love, for love, saith he, is the fulfilling of the Law, Rom. 13.10. So this Observati­on generally holds true, that in all those Summaries of Duty mentioned in the holy Scripture, only such Duties are taken No­tice of as are Parts and Instances of Mora­lity. Which is a plain Demonstration that 'tis this which God principally re­quires, since 'tis this which he most takes notice of; and it may be reasonably sup­posed [Page 68] that in those Summaries of our Du­ty wherein but a few Parts are enumera­ted, they are such as are the Chief and principal; it being contrary to all Rules of Language to express the Whole of any thing, by the meanest and most inconside­rable Parts of it.

V. ANOTHER Evidence from Scri­pture that Moral Goodness is the principal Matter of Duty that God requires of us, is, that wheresoever such Persons as have been most dear and acceptable to God are described, their Character is always made up of Instances of Morality. Thus the Description of Job is, that he was a man perfect and upright and one that feared God and eschewed evil, Job 1.1. And in the 15th. Psalm the Description which David gives of the man who should abide in the Tabernacle of the Lord, is this, that he walketh uprightly, and worketh righteous­ness, and speaketh the truth in his heart; that he backbiteth not with his tongue, nor doth evil to his neighbour, nor taketh up a reproach against his Neighbour, &c. he that doth these things, saith he, shall never be moved. And the greatest Character that is given of Moses the Darling and Favorite of God, is, that he was very meek above all the men that were upon the face of the [Page 69] Earth, Numb. 12.3. Thus also the Cha­racter of Cornelius by which he was so in­deared to God, is, that he was a just and de­vout man, one that feared God with all his house, who gave much Alms to the people and prayed to God always, Acts 10.2. And in a word, the general Character of those whom God accepts, is, in every Nation he who doth righteousness is accepted of God, Acts 10.35. Thus moral Goodness is the great Stamp and Impress that renders men cur­rent in the Esteem of God; whereas on the contrary, the common Brand by which Hypocrites and false Pretenders to Reli­gion are stigmatized, is their being zealous for the Positives, and cold and indifferent as to the Morals of Religion. For so our Saviour Characters the Pharisees; woe un­to you Scribes, and Pharisees, Hypocrites; for ye pay tyth of Mint, Annis, and Cummin ▪ which yet was a positive Duty, and have omitted the weightier matters of the Law, Judgment, Mercy, and Faithfulness; these ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone. Ye blind Guides, ye strain at a Gnat and swallow a Camel, Math. 23.23.24. plainly implying the Morals of Religion to be as much greater than the Positives in weight and moment, as a Ca­mel is than a Gnat in bulk. Since there­fore [Page 70] Moral Goodness is always mentioned as the great Character of Gods Favourites, and the Neglect of it out of a pretended zeal to the positive Duties of Religion is always recorded as a Mark of the most odious Hypocrites; this is a sufficient Ar­gument how high a Value God sets upon the Moralities of Religion.

VI. and Lastly, ANOTHER Evidence from Scripture that moral Goodness is the principal Part of Religion, is, that at the great Account between God and us, his main Inquisition will be concerning such Actions as are morally good or evil, For so Rom. 2.6. we are told that God will render to every man according to his deeds; to them who by patient continuance in well doing, seek for honour and glory and immortality, eternal life. But to them who are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrigh­teousness, tribulation and wrath, indigna­tion and anguish. And accordingly Enoch as he is quoted by St. Jude verses 14.15. declares this to be the Occasion of the Lords coming with thousands of his Saints, viz. to execute Judgment upon all, and to convince all that are ungodly among them, of all their ungodly deeds which they have un­godly committed, and of all their hard speeches which ungodly sinners have spoken [Page 71] against him; all which are matters of Fact against the eternal Rules of Morality. And our Saviour himself in that Popular Scheme and Description he gives of the Proceed­ings of the Day of Judgment, plainly de­clares that one of the principal Matters, he will then inquire into, will be our Neglect or Observance of that great moral Duty of Charity towards the poor and needy, Mat. 25.32, 46. Which is a plain Evidence that our obeying or disobeying the eternal Laws of Morality, is that by which we do most please or displease God; since 'tis upon this that he will most insist in his final Ar­bitration of our eternal Fate. For since his last Judgment is only the final Execution of his Laws, we may be sure that what­soever it is that he will principally insist on in his Judgment, that is the principal mat­ter of his Laws. And now having suffici­ently proved the Truth of the Proposition, I proceed to the Reasons of it; upon what Accounts it is that God hath made moral Goodness the main and principal Part of our Religion. The chief Reasons of which are these four.

First, BECAUSE 'tis by moral Good­ness that we do most honor him.

Secondly, BECAUSE 'tis by this that we do most imitate him.

[Page 72] Thirdly, BECAUSE 'tis by this that we advance to our own Happiness.

Fourthly, WHEN all our positive Du­ty is ceast, this is to be the eternal Work and Business of our Nature.

I. GOD hath made moral Goodness the principal Part of our Religion, because 'tis by this that we do him the greatest Honour. It is an excellent saying of Hie­rocles [...], i. e. the best honour we can do to a self▪sufficient be­ing is to receive the good things he holds forth unto us; and therefore 'tis not by gi­ving to God that you honour him, but by rendring your selves worthy to receive of him; for, saith he, [...], i. e. whosoever gives ho­nour to God as to one that wants, doth not consider that he thereby sets himself above God. For by his own self-sufficiency he is infinitely removed above all Capa­city of Want, and so can never need any additional Contributions of Glory and Hap­piness from his Creatures. For Glory be­ing nothing else but the Resplendency of Perfection, which always reflects its own [Page 73] Beams upon it self, where ever there is infinite perfection (as to be sure there is in the Nature of God) there must an in­finite Glory proceed from it; and therefore being infinitely glorious in himself, it is impossible that any thing we do should add any further Glory to him. So that if we would truly honour and glorify him, it must not be by giving to, but by receiving from him. Now the best thing we can receive from God, is Himself; and Him­self we do receive in our strict compliance with the eternal Laws of Goodness. Which Laws being transcribed from the Nature of God, from his own eternal Righteous­ness and Goodness, we do by obeying them, derive Gods Nature into ours. So that while we write after the Copie of his Laws, we write out the Perfections of his Being; and his Laws being the Seal upon which he hath ingraven his Nature, we do in o­beying them take Impression from him and stamp his blessed Nature on our own. For all those virtuous Dispositions of mind which we acquire by the Practice of Vir­tue, are so many genuine Signatures of God, taken from the Seal of his Law, and Participations of his Nature. For so Holiness which consists in a Conformity of Soul with the eternal Laws of Goodness, is in Scri­pture [Page 74] called the Signature or impression of the Spirit of God, whereby we are sealed unto the day of Redemption, Eph. 4.30. and such as do righteousness, are said to be born of God, 1 John 2.29. which implies their deriving from him who is their divine Parent, a divine and Godlike Nature, even as Children do their humane Nature from their humane Parents. So that by the Pra­ctice of moral Goodness we receive from God the best thing he can bestow, viz. a di­vine and Godlike Nature; and consequent­ly by so doing, we render him the highest Honour and Glory. For since we can no otherwise honour him but by receiving from him, we doubtless do him the great­est honour when we receive Himself, by partaking of the Perfections of his Nature, which are the greatest Gift he can communi­cate to us. Herein, saith our Saviour, is my Father Glorified, that ye bear much fruit, John 15.8. [...], saith the afore­named Philosopher, i. e. he only knows how to honour God who presenrs himself a Sacrifice to him, carves his own Soul in­to a divine Image, and composes his Mind into a Temple for the Entertainment of God, and the Reception of the divine Light and Glory. 'Tis then therefore that [Page 75] we best honour God, when by the Practice of true Godliness we conform our Wills and Affections to him; and derive into our selves his Nature and Perfections; and should you erect to him a Temple more magnificent than Solomons, and load its Al­tars with Hecatombs of Sacrifices, and make it perpetually ring with Psalms and resounding Choirs of Halelujahs, it would not be comparably so great an Honour to him, as to convert your own Souls into living Temples, and make them the Ha­bitations of his Glory and Perfecti­ons. For he values no Sacrifice like that of an obedient Will, delights in no Choir like that of pure and heavenly Affections, nor hath he in all his Creation an Ensign of Honour so truly worthy of him, as that of a divine and God-like Soul; a Soul that reflects his Image, and shines back his own Glory upon him. Wherefore since 'tis by the Practice of moral Good­ness that we receive God, and copie his Nature into our own, it is no wonder he should make it the principal Part of our Duty. For how can it be otherwise ex­pected but that he should exact that chiefly of us, which most conduces to his own glo­ry. Since then nothing we can do can con­duce to his Glory but only our receiving [Page 76] Benefits from him, and since no Benefit we receive from him can so much conduce to it as our receiving Himself, and since we can no otherwise receive himself but by practising that Goodness which is the Per­fection of his Nature, we must hereby doubtless render him the greatest Honour and Glory.

II. GOD hath made moral Goodness the principal Part of our Duty, because 'tis by this that we do most truely imitate him. For so you find in Scripture, that wherever God is proposed to us for a Pat­tern of Action it is by some Act or other of Morality that we are required to transcribe and imitate him. So 1 Pet. 1.16. be ye holy, for I am holy; and Luke 6.36. be ye merciful as your Father is merciful; and Mat. 5.48. be you perfect as your Father in Heaven is perfect. And indeed 'tis only in Moral Goodness that God can be the Pattern of our Imitation; as for those Per­fections of his which for Distinction-sake we call natural, viz. his Omniscience, and Omnipresence, Omnipotence and Eter­nity, they are all beyond the Sphere of our Imitation, and therefore were never proposed to us as the Copies of our Action. But as for his moral Perfections, viz. his Goodness, and Righteousness, and Purity, [Page 77] and Mercy, they are the Fundamental Rules and Standards of all moral Action. For the Nature of God, as it is infinitely good and righteous, is the eternal Fountain whence all the Laws of Morality are de­rived; and all those moral Precepts by which he governs his rational Creation, are only so many Exemplifications of the mo­ral Perfections of his own Nature. For the Holiness of God, which comprehends all his moral Perfections, consists in that essential Rectitude of Nature, whereby he always chooses and acts conformably to the Dictates of his own infallible Reason; and 'tis to this Rectitude of choosing and acting that all his moral Laws do oblige us. For moral Laws are only the Dictates of right Reason, prescribing us what to do and what to avoid; so that in our Comply­ance with them, we follow the Rule of Gods own Will and Actions, and there­by imitate the eternal Rectitude of his Nature. For tho in those different States and Relations of God and Creature, right Reason cannot be supposed to oblige him and us to all the same particular Choi­ces and Actions, yet it obliges us both to act reasonably in our respective States and Relations; it obliges God to act reasonably and as it becomes the State and Relation [Page 78] of a God and Creator; and it obliges us to act reasonably and as it becomes the State and Relation of men and Creatures. And as for God, He is invariably inclined to do all that right Reason obliges him to, by the essential Rectitude of his own Nature; and herein consists all his moral Perfection, which is nothing else but the immutable Inclination of his Nature to do whatever is just and good and reasonable. So that while we live according to the Dictates of Reason, or, which is the same thing, the eternal Laws of Morality, we trace and imitate the moral Perfections of God; and in our Place and Station, live at the same Rate and by the same Rule, that He doth in his. We do what God himself would do, if he were in our Place, and what the Son of God did do when he was in our Nature; and there is no other Dif­ference between his Life and ours, but what necessarily arises out of our different States and Relations. Since therefore Moral Goodness is an Imitation of God, 'tis no wonder that he so much prefers it before all other matter of Duty. For he must needs be supposed to love that above all things, which is the true Copie and I­mage of those Perfections of his Nature, for the sake of which he loves Himself [Page 79] above all. For he loves himself not mere­ly because he is Himself, but because he is in all respects morally Good, and his Will and Power are perfectly compliant with the infallible Dictates of his own Reason; and hence arises his infinite Complacency in himself, that there is nothing in him but what his own Reason perfectly ap­proves, no Inclination in his Will or Na­ture but what is exactly agreeable to the fairest Ideas of his own Mind. And since it is for his own Goodness-sake that he loves himself as he doth, we may be sure that there is nothing without him can be so dear to him, as that in us which is the Image of his Goodness. Every like, we say, loves its like, and the righteous Lord, saith the Psalmist, loveth Righteousness, Psal. 11.7. i. e. being righteous himself, he loves Righ­teousness in others by an invincible sympa­thy of Nature. His greatest Heaven and Delight is in his own most righteous Na­ture, and next to that in righteous Souls that imitate and resemble him. [...]; God hath not a more grateful Habitation upon Earth than in a pure and vertuous Mind; [...] saith Apollo that Mimick of God, by his Pythian Oracle. i. e. I rejoyce as [Page 80] much in pious Souls as in my own Heaven. Which is much what the same with that gracious Declaration that God himself makes by the Prophet Isaiah 57.15. thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity, whose Name is Holy, I dwell in the high and holy place; with him also that is of a contrite and humble Spirit, to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of the contrite ones. Since therefore moral Duties are all but so many Copies and Exemplifications of Gods Nature, this is a sufficient Reason why he should pre­fer them before all the Positives of Reli­gion.

III. GOD principally requires moral Goodness, because 'tis by the Practice of this that we advance to our own natural Happiness. For the natural Happiness of reasonable Creatures, consists in being entirely governed by right Reason; i. e. in having our Minds perfectly informed what it is that right Reason requires of us, and our Wills and Affections reduced to an entire Conformity thereunto. And this is the Perfection of moral Goodness, which consists in behaving our selves to­wards God and our selves and all the World as right Reason advises, or as it becomes rational Creatures placed in our Circum­stances [Page 81] and Relations. And when by pra­ctising all that true Piety and Vertue which moral Goodness implies, we are perfectly accomplished in our Behaviour towards God, our selves, and all the World, so as to render to each without any Reserve or Reluctancy what is fit and due in the Judg­ment of right Reason, we are arrived to the most happy State that a reasonable Na­ture can aspire to. 'Tis true, in this Life we cannot be perfectly happy; and that not only because we live in wretched Bo­dies that are continually liable to Pain and Sickness, but also because we are imperfect our selves, and have none to converse with but imperfect Creatures. But were we once stript of these natural and moral Im­perfections, wheresoever we lived we should necessarily be happy. Were I to live all alone, without this painful Body, I should necessarily be in a great measure happy while I followed right Reason, tho I lived in the darkest Nook of the Creati­on. For there I should still contemplate God, and while I did so, my mind would be always ravish'd with his Beauty and Perfections; there I should most ardently love him, and while I did so, I should sympathise and share with him in his Hap­piness; there I should still adore and praise [Page 82] him, and while I did so, I should feel my self continually drawn up to him, and wrapt into a real Injoyment of him; there I should be imitating his Perfections▪ and while I did so, I should enjoy an unspeak­able Self-satisfaction, perceiving how every Moment I grew a more Divine and Godlike Creature; there I should intirely resign up my self to his heavenly Will and Disposal, and while I did so, I should be perpetu­ally exulting under a joyous Assurance of his Love and Favour; in a word, there I should firmly depend upon his Truth and Goodness, and while I did so, I should be always triumphing in a sure and certain Hope of a happy Being for ever. Thus were I shut up all alone in an unbodied State, and had none but God to converse with, by behaving my self towards him as right Reason directs me I should always, enjoy him, and in that Injoyment should be always Happy. And if while I thus behaved my self towards God, I took care at the same time to demean my self towards my self with that exact Prudence and Temperance and Fortitude and Humi­lity which right Reason requires, I should hereby create another Heaven within me; a Heaven of calm Thoughts, quiet and uni­form Desires, serene and placid Affections, [Page 83] which would be so many everflowing Springs of Pleasure, Tranquillity and Con­tentment within me. But if while I thus enjoyed God and my self, by behaving my self as right Reason directs, I might be admitted to live and converse among per­fect Spirits, and to demean my self to­wards them with that exact Charity and Justice and Peaceableness and Modesty which right Reason requires, the Wit of man could not conceive a true Pleasure beyond what I should now enjoy. For now I should be possest of every thing my utmost Wishes could propose; of a good God, a Godlike, joyful and contented Soul, a peaceable, kind and righteous Neighbourhood; and so all above, within, and without me would be a pure and perfect Heaven. And indeed when I have thrown off this Body, and am stript into a naked Ghost, the only or at least the greatest goods my Nature will be capable of enjoying, are God, my self, and blessed Spirits; and these are no otherwise injoyable, but only by Acts of Piety and Vertue, without which there is no good thing beyond the Grave that a Soul can tast or relish. So that if, when I go to seek my Fortune in the World of Spirits, God should thus bespeak me, ‘O man, now thou art leaving all these Injoyments [Page 84] of Sence, consult with thy self what will do thee good, and thou shalt have what­soever thou wilt ask to carry with thee into that spiritual State;’ I am sure the utmost I should crave would be this, ‘Lord give me a heart inflamed with Love, and winged with Duty to thee, that thereby I may but enjoy thee; give me a sober and a temperate mind, that thereby I may but enjoy my self; give me a kind, a peaceable, and a righteous Temper, that thereby I may but enjoy the sweet Socie­ty of blessed Spirits; O give me but these blessed things, and thou hast crowned all my wishes, and to Eternity I will never crave any other Favour for my self but only this, that I may continue a pious and a vertuous Soul for ever; for while I continue so, I am sure I shall enjoy all spiritual Good, and be as happy as Hea­ven can make me.’ So that the main Happiness you see of Humane Nature consists in the Perfection of moral Good­ness; and it being so, it is no wonder that the good God who above all things desires the Happiness of his Creatures, should above all things exact of us the Duties of Morality. He knows that our supreme Beatitude is founded in our Piety and Ver­tue, and that out of our free and constant, [Page 85] sprightly and vivacious Exercise of these a­rises all our Heaven both here and hereafter; and knowing this, that tender Love which he bears us, that mighty Concern which he hath for our Welfare makes him thus ur­gent and importunate with us. For he re­gards our Duty no farther than it tends to our Good, and values each Act of our Obe­dience by what it contributes to our Hap­piness; and 'tis therefore that he prefers moral Duties above positive, because they are more essential to our eternal Welfare.

IV. and Lastly, GOD principally re­quires of us moral Goodness, because when all positive Duty is ceast, this is to be the eternal Work and Exercise of our Natures. For Moral Good is from everlasting to ever­lasting, its Birth was elder than the World, and its Life and Duration runs parallel with Eternity; before ever the Mountains were brought forth 'twas founded in the Nature of God, and as an inseparable Beam of his all-comprehending Reason it shines from one end of the World to the other. For as soon as ever there was a rational Creature in being, the obligations of Mo­rality laid hold on him, before ever any positive Duty was imposed; and as long as ever there remains a rational Creature, the Obligations of Morality will abide on [Page 86] him, when all positive Duty is expired. For moral Obligations are not founded like positive ones upon mutable Circumstances, but upon firm and everlasting Reasons; upon Reasons that to all Eternity will car­ry with them the same force and necessity. For as long as we are the Creatures of an infinitely perfect Creator, 'twill be as much our Duty as 'tis now, to love and adore him; as long as we are reasonable Creatures, 'twill be as much our Duty as 'tis now, to submit our Will and Affections to our Reason, and as long as we are related to other reasonable Creatures, 'twill be as much our Duty as 'tis now, to be kind and just and peaceable in all our Intercourses with them. So that these are such Duties as no Will can di­spense with, no Reasons abrogate ▪ no Cir­cumstances disanul or make void; but as long as God is what he is, and we are what we are, they must and will oblige us. So that what the Psalmist saith of God, may be truly applied to moral Goodness, the Hea­vens shall perish, but thou shalt remain, they all shall wax old as doth a garment, and be folded up and Changed, but thou art the same yesterday▪ to day, and for ever, and thy years shall have no end. But as long since the positive Parts of the Jewish Reli­gion were cancell'd and repealed, the Vail [Page 87] of the Temple rent in twain, the Temple it self buried in Ruins and all its Altars thrown down and their Sacrifices abolished, whilst the moral Parts of that Religion still stand firm as the everlasting Moun­tains about Jerusalem; so the time will come whem the positive Parts of Christia­nity it self must cease, when Faith must be swallowed up in Vis [...]on, and Sacraments be made void by Perfection, and all the sta­ted times and outward Solemnities of our Worship expire into an everlasting Sab­bath; but then when all this Scene of things is quite vanished away, Piety and Virtue will still keep the Stage, and be the everlasting Exercise of our glorified Natures. For as I shewed before, all posi­tive Duty is instituted in subserviency to moral, and like a Scaffold to a House is only erected for the Convenience of Building up this everlasting Structure of Morality; and when this is once finished, must be all taken down again as an unnecessary Incum­brance that now only hides and obscures the Beauty of that Heavenly Building that was raised on it, and shall abide without it for ever, to entertain our Faculties through all the future Ages of our Being, and to be the everlasting Mansion of our Natures. Wherefore since positive Duties must all [Page 88] cease and expire, and only moral Goodness is to be our Business for ever, 'tis no won­der that God, who is so good a Master, takes so much Care in ths short Apprenti­ship of our Life to train us up in that which is to be our Trade for ever. He knows it is upon Piety and Vertue that we must live to Eternity, and maintain our selves in all our Glory and Happiness; and that if when we come into the invisible World we have not this blessed Trade to subsist by, we are undone for ever; and therefore out of a tender Regard to our Welfare, he makes it his principal Care to train us up in this everlasting Business of our Natures.

WHAT then remains but that above all things we take care to apply our selves to the Practice of moral Goodness: to con­template and love and adore and imitate God; to depend upon him and resign up our selves to his Disposal and Govern­ment▪ to be sober and temperate in our Affections and Appetites, and just and Charitable and modest and peaceable to­wards one another. These are the great things which God requires at our hands, and without these all our Religion is a fulsome Cheat. 'Tis true the positive Parts of Religion are our Duty as well as these, [Page 89] and God by his Sovereign Authority ex­acts them at our hands; and unless when Jesus Christ hath been sufficiently propo­sed to us we do sincerely believe in him, unless we strike Covenant with him by Baptism, and frequently renew that Co­venant in the Lords Supper; unless we di­ligently attend on the Publick Assemblies of his Worship, and use an honest Care to avoid Schism and to persist in Vnity with his true Catholick Church, there is no Pretence of Morality will bear us out when we appear before his dread Tribunal. But then we are to consider that the pro­per Use of all these positive Duties is to improve and perfect us in moral Goodness; and unless we use them to this Effect we shall render them altogether void and insignificant. Wherefore as we would not lose all the Fruits of our positive Duties, let us take care to extend them to their utmost Design, to improve our Sacrifice to Obedience, our Sacra­ments to Gratitude and Love, our Hearing to Practice, our Praying to De­votion, and our Fasting to Humility and Repentance. For if we rest in these Duties and go no farther, thinking by such short Payments to Compound with God for all those Debts we owe to the eternal Laws [Page 90] of Morality, we miserably cheat and befool our own Souls, which notwithstanding all this Exactness about the Positives of Re­ligion are by their own immoral Affecti­ons still enslaved to the Devil; to whom it is much one what our outward Form of Religion is, whether it be Christian or Heathen or Mahometan, provided it doth not operate on our minds or give any Check to the Current of our depraved Natures. For whether we bow to God or to an Idol, is all one to the Devil, so long as our souls remain Profane and indevout; whether we Communicate in the holy Sacrament of Christ's Death, or in the impure Rights of Venus and Priapus, is indifferent to him so long as our Hearts continue putrid and corrupt, steaming with unchast Desires and Affections; whether we Celebrate the Christian Festivals or the bloody Satur­nals or Barbarous Bacchanalia is no great matter to him, provided our Minds be but canker'd with Wrath and Malice and Cru­elty and Revenge. These are the Sinews of his Goverment, and the Bands of our Allegiance to his Throne; and whilst they are preserved, he knows his Kingdom is safe, and so long he doth not much regard what our outward Religion is. Nay there is nothing can be a higher Gratification to [Page 91] his Ambition, than to behold Himself ser­ved in Christs own Livery and Worship'd in a Form of Godliness; by which he hath the Pleasure of dividing Empires with God, and ravishing the better share from him; of beholding his hated Creator mockt with the Shell and Outside of a Worshiper, whilst himself is treated with the Kernol and Inside. For whilst we continue wicked under an outward Form of Religion, we do in Effect Sacrifice our Beast to God, and our selves to the Devil; who above all things loves those unnatural Commixtures of Hearer and Slanderer, Worshiper and Deceiver, Communicant and Drunkard, Sa­crificer and Oppressor; by which we only exalt and sublimate Impiety, which never looks so Glorious as when 'tis Gilded with Fasts and long Prayers. Wherefore as you will answer it at your eternal Peril, do not Cheat and abuse your selves with the Name and Shadow of Religion; lest when you have superstructed your Hopes of Happi­ness on a rotten Foundation, it should fi­nally miscarry and sink underneath you into everlasting Wretchedness and Despair.

CHAP. II. Concerning Religion; What it is, and what things are Necessary for the founding and securing its Obliga­tions.

HAVING in the foregoing Chapter briefly discoursed concerning the Nature of Moral Goodness, and shewn that it is the principal Part of Religion, it will be requisite in the next place to explain what Religion is, that so from thence we may collect what things are necessary to the founding and securing its Obligations, which will be the Subject of the ensuing Chap­ters.

RELIGION in the General respects God as the Object and Centre of all its Acts and Offices. For upon Supposition that there is such a Being as a God, and that there are such Beings as reasonable Crea­tures, or capable Subjects of Religion, it will necessarily follow that there must be some Religion or other to tie and oblige these Creatures to that God. For by God we mean a Being that hath all possible Per­fection [Page 93] in him, and is the supreme Cause and Fountain of all other Being and Per­fection; and such a Being we must needs acknowledge doth not only deserve the worthiest Acts of Religion that reasonable Creatures, who alone are capable of un­derstanding his Worth, can render to him, but hath also an unalienable Right to ex­act and require them; and that not only upon the Account of his own essential Desert (for whatever he deserves he hath a right to demand) but also upon Account of the Right he hath to reasonable Crea­tures, who owe their Beings to him and all their Capacities of serving him, and so cannot dispose of themselves without manifest Injury to him contra­ry to his Will and Orders. By reasona­ble Creatures we mean Beings that are de­rived from God and are indowed by him with a Capacity of understanding him and themselves; and such Creatures must ne­cessarily stand obliged to render him such Acts as are sutable to and due Acknow­ledgments of the Perfections of his Nature and their own Dependence upon him; and this Obligation is that which we call Reli­gion. Which word according to Lactanti­us lib. 4. Divin. Institut. c. 28. is derived a religando, from binding or obliging us to [Page 94] God. So that true Religion in the general is the Obligation of Reasonable Creatures to render such Acts of Worship to God as are sutable to the Excellency of his Nature and their Dependence upon him. Which Defi­nition includes both the Doctrines and Du­tuies of Religion. For the Doctrines are the Reasons by which it obliges us to the Duties; and as there is no Duty in Reli­gion but what derives its Tie and Obliga­tion from some Doctrine contained in it, so there is no Doctrine in Religion but what ties and obliges us to some Duty that is enjoyned in it. When therefore I call Reli­gion an Obligation, I include in that term all those Doctrines of it concerning God, his Nature, and his transactions with his Creatures, which are the reasons by which we stand obliged to render all acts of Wor­ship to him. But for the better under­standing of the nature of true Religion, it is necessary we should distinguish it into natural and revealed. By natural Religi­on I mean the Obligation which natural Rea­son lays upon us to render to God all that Worship and Obedience which upon the consi­deration of his Nature and our dependence upon him it discovers to be due to him. For God having planted in us a rational Faculty, by the due exercise of which we are na­turally [Page 95] lead into the belief of his Being, the sense of his Perfections and the ac­knowledgment of his Providence, he ex­pects we should follow it as the Guide and Directory of our lives and actions; and whatsoever this Faculty doth naturally and in its due exercise dictate to us, is as much the voice of God as any revelation. For whatever it naturally dictates, it must dictate by his direction who is the Author of its Nature, and who having framed it to speak such a sense and pronounce such a judgment of things, hath thereby put his word into its mouth and doth himself speak through it as through a standing Oracle which he hath erected in our breasts on purpose to convey and deliver his own Mind and Will to us. So that whatsoever natural Reason rightly exercised teaches us concern­ing God and our Duty towards him, is true Religion, and doth as effectually bind and oblige us to him as if it had been immedi­ately revealed by him. It teaches us that God is infinitely wise and just and powerful and good; that he is the Fountain of our Beings, the disposer of our Affairs, and the Arbitrator of our Fate both here and hereafter; and by these Doctrines it obli­ges us to admire and adore him, to fear and love him, to trust and obey him. And this [Page 96] is natural Religion, which consists of such Doctrines as natural Reason teaches us con­cerning God and his Nature and Providence, and of such Duties as it infers from those Doctrines and inforces by them; and all the Doctrines of this Religion upon which it founds its Duties, being eternal verities, as they must necessarily be being all de­duced from the immutable Natures of God and things, all the Duties of it must be morally, that is eternally good and reasona­ble, because those Doctrines are the eter­nal Reasons upon which they are founded and by which they oblige. So that what­soever is a Duty of natural Religion must oblige for ever, because it obliges by an eternal Reason, and so can never be dispen­sed with or abrogated 'till the Natures of things are cancell'd and reversed, and eter­nal Truths are converted into Lies.

IN short therefore, natural Religion hath only natural Reason for its rule and measure; which from the Nature of God and things deduces all those eternal Reasons by which it distinguishes our Actions into honest and dishonest, decorous and filthy, good and evil, necessary and sinful. For it doth not make them good or evil by judging them so, but if it judgeth truly, it judges of them as it finds them; and unless it finds [Page 97] them good or evil in themselves upon some eternal Reason for or against them, its judgment is false and erroneous. So that the objective goodness or evil that is in the actions themselves is the measure of our Natural Reason, but our natural Reason judging truly concerning them is the mea­sure of our choice or refusal of them; for be our action never so good or evil in it self, unless we have some eternal reason for or against it, we cannot judge it so; and unless we judge it so, we cannot reasona­ble choose or refuse it; but as soon as ever we have judged and pronounced it good or evil upon an eternal reason, we stand obliged by that Judgment to do or forbear it. So that right Reason pronouncing such actions good and such evil, is the Law of Nature, and those eternal Reasons upon which it so pronounces them are the Creed of Nature, both which together make na­tural Religion. And by this Religion was the World Governed, at least the greatest part of it., for some thousands of Years; till by long and sad Experience it was found too weak to correct the errors of mens Minds, and restrain the wild extra­vagancies of their Wills and Affections; and then God out of his great pity to lost and degenerate Mankind, vouchsafed to us [Page 98] the glorious Light of revealed Religion, which in the largest acceptation of it in­cludes all natural Religion, as well the cre­denda as agenda, the Doctrines as the Duties of it; both which are contained in that Re­velation of his Will which God hath made to the World, to which it hath superadded sun­dry Doctrines and Duties of supernatural Religion.

BUT strictly speaking, revealed Religi­on as it is distinguished from natural, con­sists of such Doctrines and Duties as are knowable and discoverable only by Reve­lation; as are not to be deduced and infer­red by reasoning and Discourse from any necessary or natural Principles, but wholly depend upon the counsel and good Will of God. And where things depend intirely upon Gods Will, and their Being or not Being lies wholly in his free disposal, it is impossible that our natural Reason should ever arrive at the knowledge of them with­out some Revelation of his Will concern­ing them. For in such matters as these where the Will of God is absolutely free, Reason without Revelation hath neither necessary nor probable Causes and Principles to argue from, and therefore can make neither cer­tain Conclusions nor so much as probable guesses concerning them, but must neces­sarily [Page 99] remain altogether in the dark till such time as God hath revealed to it which way his Will is determined; and of such matters as these consists all revealed Religi­on strictly so called. For tho God hath made sundry Revelations of his Will, yet the subject matter of them was for the Main always the same, viz. the Doctrine of the Mediation of Jesus Christ, and the Duties that are subsequent thereunto, which from that Promise which God made to Adam upon his Fall, the seed of the Woman shall break the Serpents head, to the last promul­gation of the Gospel, hath been the great Theme of all divine Revelation. For what else was that Revelation which God made to Abraham, in thy Seed shall all the Nati­ons of the Earth be blessed, but only the dawning of the Gospel? which is nothing but glad tidings of the Mediator. What was the Law of Moses but only the same Gospel shining through a Cloud of Types and symbolical Representations; and what are all the succeeding Prophesies of the Old Testament but only the same Gospel still shining clearer and clearer till at last it broke forth in its Meridian brightness? And were this a proper place, I think I could easily demonstrate that from Adam to Moses, from Moses to the Prophets, from [Page 100] the Prophets to Jesus Christ, the main Scope and Design of all Divine Revelation, hath been the gradual Discovery of this great Mystery of the Mediation. So that re­vealed Religion was for the matter of it always the same, tho it was not always revealed with the same Perspicuity, but clear'd up by degrees from an obscure Twi­light to a perfect Day. Wherefore Chri­stianity which in strictness is nothing but the Doctrine of the Mediation together with its appendant Duties, ought not to be lookt on as a new Religion of 1600. years Date, for in reality 'tis as ancient as the Fall, and was then Preached to Adam in that dark and Mysterious Promise; af­ter which it was a little more clearly re­peated, tho very obscurely still, in God's Covenant with Abraham; and again, af­ter that it was much more amply revealed in the Types and Figures of the Law of Moses, which yet like painted Glass in a Window did under their Pompous Shew still darken and obscure the holy Mysteries within them, which were nothing but the Doctrines and Laws of the Christian Reli­gion. So that Judaism was only Christiani­ty vail'd, and Christianity is only Judaism revealed.

[Page 101]THUS The Religion of the Mediator, you see, was the principal Subject of all divine Revelation; and this without Reve­lation natural Reason could never have discovered, because the whole of it depen­ded upon the free will of God. For whe­ther he would admit of any Mediator or no; whether he would admit his own Son to be our Mediator or no; whether he would deposit such inestimable Blessings for us or no in the hands of our Mediator, was intirely left to his free Determination; and there was no necessary cause either within or without him, no nor any probable one neither, that humane Reason could ever have discovered, that could incline or determine him one way or t'other. So that till such time as he revealed his Will to us, we were left utterly in the dark as to this matter, and had no manner of Prin­ciples to argue from, or so much as to guess by. This therefore is strictly the reveal­ed Religion as it stands in opposition to the natural. But since together with re­vealed Religion God hath put forth a se­cond Edition of natural, which was almost lost and grown out of Print through the wretched Negligence and Stupidity of Mankind; and since he hath not only re­vealed them together but also incorporated [Page 102] them into one; Religion as it is now fra­med and constituted by this happy Con­junction of natural with revealed, may be thus defined, It is the Obligation of Ratio­nal Creatures to render such acts of Worship to God through Jesus Christ as he himself hath instituted, and as are in their own Natures sutable to his Excellencies and their dependence upon him. Where by acts of Worship I do not mean such only as are immediately directed to and terminated up­on God, as all those are which are contain­ed in the first Table of the Decalogue; but all those acts in general which God hath commanded, which being performed upon a Religious account, that is, out of Ho­mage and Obedience to Gods Will and Au­thority, are as truly and properly acts of Worship to him as Prayer or Praise or Ad­juration.

AND now having given this short ac­count of the nature of Religion, it will from hence be easie to collect what Principles are necessary to the founding and securing its Obligations; for

First, GOD being the great Object of all Religion, it must be absolutely ne­cessary in order to our being truly Religi­ous that we believe that God is.

[Page 103] Secondly, RELIGION being an Obliga­tion of us to God; that this Obligation may take effect upon us, it is necessary we should believe that he concerns himself a­bout us, and consequently that he Governs the World by his Providence.

Thirdly, RELIGION obliging us to render all due acts of Worship to him, to inforce this Obligation upon us, it is ne­cessary we should believe that he will cer­tainly reward us if we render those acts to him, and as certainly punish us if we do not.

Fourthly, THESE acts of Worship which Religion obliges us to, being such as are suitable to the Excellency of Gods Na­ture, to enable us to fulfil this Obligation it is necessary we should have right Appre­hensions of the Nature of God.

Fifthly, RELIGION obliging us to render all these Acts of Worship to God in and through Jesus Christ, to our per­forming this it is necessary we should be­lieve in his Mediation.

THESE are the great Principles in which all the Obligations of Religion are founded; and therefore in order to the through fixing those Obligations upon mens Minds, it will be necessary before we pro­ceed to the particular Duties which Religi­on obliges us to, to discourse of these Princi­ples distinctly.

CHAP. III. Of the necessity of believing that God is, in order to Mens being truly Religious.

HE that cometh unto God, saith the A­postle, must believe that God is, Heb. 11.6. where by coming to God is meant worshiping him, that is, expressing our Veneration of, and Affection to him, by outward and visible Signs and Actions; and unless our outward Actions in Religion proceed from an inward Veneration of, and Affection to him, they are not Worship but Mockery; but how is it possible a man should inwardly venerate God, when he believes there is no such Being in the World? For how real soever any thing may be in it self, if we believe it is not, it is to us as if it were not; and therefore tho God doth so necessarily exist, as that he cannot but be, the very Notion of him implying an infinite Distance from not being; yet while we believe he is not, our Thoughts can be no more concern'd about him, than about purchasing an Inheritance in Vtopia. So that this Proposition that God is, is the prime Fundamental of all Religion, and if [Page 105] this be removed, Religion must sink, and all its Sacred Obligations fly in sunder. But this is so self-evident that it would be ve­ry impertinent to insist upon the Proof of it. All that I shall do therefore in pursu­ance of this Argument shall be to endea­vour to establish the Belief of this funda­mental Truth upon which all Religion de­pends; and that First, by inquiring into, and removing the Causes of mens Infidelity in this matter; Secondly, by representing the Folly and Vnreasonableness of it. For as for the Proofs and Evidences of Gods Being, I shall reserve them till I come to discourse of his Providence, where I think there is enough said to satisfie any Man that is not desperately hardned against all Conviction.

SECT. I. Of the Causes of Atheism; shewing the great Absurdity and Unreason­ableness of them.

CONSIDERING how loudly the Voice of Nature, the Consent of Nations, and the beautiful Structure and Contrivance of things do proclaim the Be­ing of God, one would think it impossible there should be any such Monster as an Atheist among reasonable Beings; and in­deed it hath been warmly disputed among the Learned whether there be any such or no? A Question, which these later Ages have determined in the Affirmative, by an Induction of too many woful Instances. But doubtless had men impartially attend­ed to the Dictates of Reason, and not de­livered themselves up to the Infatuations of their Lusts, and the inveterate Prejudice of a corrupt Imagination, it would have been impossible for so many gross Absurdi­ties as Atheism implies, to have entred in­to their minds; but when once mens Wills and Affections have espoused a Proposition, [Page 107] they will make one shift or other, be it never so absurd, to impose it on their Vn­derstandings; and considering how many Causes there are leading men to Atheism who are predisposed thereunto, I cannot think an Atheist to be so great a Wonder. For so long as mens Vnderstandings are led by their Wills, and their Wills are byassed with inclinations to Impiety, they can hardly forbear wishing there were no God; and then from wishing there were none to believing there is none, will be a very short and easie Transition. Since therefore their Atheism proceeds not so much from the Defect of their Reason as from the fault of their Wills, perhaps the most effectual way to cure it, is rather to detect and remove those faulty Causes in their Wills, than to attempt upon their Reason with the Proofs and Demonstrations of a Deity. And accordingly you see that when God had once erected this good­ly Theatre of Beings, and imprinted on it so many glorious Characters of his own Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness, tho from time to time he hath wrought innu­merable Miracles, to reduce men from Su­perstition, Idolatry and Wickedness, yet he never wrought one to reduce them from Atheism. And indeed to what purpose [Page 108] should he? it being highly improbable that they who will not be convinc'd of the Being of God by this standing Miracle, the World, in which there are so many ample Demonstrations of his Being, should be convinc'd of it by any other Miracles; for other Miracles are only the Disorders and Interruptions of Nature; and certainly the regular Course and standing Order of Na­ture, is a much more glorious Evidence of Gods Wisdom and Power, than the most miraculous Interruptions and Disorders of it. And therefore if men will be Atheists notwithstanding God hath imprinted so many Proofs of his Being on this visible Creation, 'tis plain it is not their Reason but their Wills that make them so; and if so, to what purpose is it to urge their Reason with the Arguments of Gods Being? since if they will not listen to those that are round about them, and are every where to be found in this great Volume of Nature, it is highly improbable that e­ven Miracles themselves, which are Gods peculiar Arguments (and are there­fore called the Demonstrations of his Spirit) should ever be able to perswade them. Wherefore to put a stop to this Pestilential Disease, which in these later Ages hath been so fatally propagated a­mong [Page 109] all Degrees and Orders of men, I conceive the most proper way is to disco­ver and remove those faults in their Wills which have such a malevolent Influence on their Vnderstandings; and the princi­pal ones may be reduced to these nine Heads,

  • 1. A perverse Opposition of Will to the Will and Nature of God.
  • 2. Superstitious Misapprehensions con­cerning God.
  • 3. Precipitant Rashness in prescribing to, and prejudging the Divine Provi­dence.
  • 4. Vain Affectation of Singularity in Opinion.
  • 5. Custom of Drolling on, and Ridicu­ling the most serious things.
  • 6. Taking up our Religion, or Opini­ons in Religion, without Examination.
  • 7. Measuring the Truth or Falshood of Religion by the Practice of such as make high Pretences to it.
  • 8. Placing Religion in the little Opini­ons that constitute the Sects and Parties we are engaged in.
  • 9. Profane and careless Neglect of Pub­lick Worship.

[Page 110]I. ONE great cause of Atheism is the perverse Opposition of mens Wills to the Will and Nature of God. For the natu­ral Notion which men have of God is, that he is a most pure and holy Being, in­finitely removed by the Perfections of his Nature from all Inclinations that are con­trary to the Dictates of right Reason. And accordingly in all those Declarations which he hath made of his Will, they find him expressing an high Detestation of all Immora­lity and Wickedness, and commanding them to abstain from it under the most dreadful Penalties, which they know he hath both Right and Power to inflict when he pleases. Notwithstanding which, pre­suming on his Goodness and a future Repen­tance, they suffer themselves to be tempt­ed and seduced into wickedness; the plea­sure of which tolls them on from one Wickedness to another, till their Wills are captivated by Custom to inveterate Habits of Sinning. So that now their Sense of God, and of his Almighty Displeasure be­ing no longer able to master the stubborn­ness of their Wills, only serves to fret and disturb them, to raise Terrors and Anxieties in their Consciences, and there­withal to imbitter the Pleasure of their Sin. For so long as this Sense remains alive in [Page 111] their Bosoms, they can never hope to sin quietly for it; and it being so, they have no other Remedy but either to part with that or their Sins. For while thy retain their Sins, the Belief of a God will grow an intolerable Vexation to them, unless by sophisticating their Belief with false Noti­ons of Religion they can temper it into an amicable Compliance with their Lusts. And this is usually the Artifice of the dul­ler sort of People whose Understandings are more easily imposed on, viz. to inter­mingle with their Belief of a God such Notions of Religion as may render it fa­vourable and propitious to their Lusts. And hence I doubt not sprang most of those wicked Doctrines which from time to time have been foisted into Chri­stianity, from the Desire which men have to accommodate the Difference between their Consciences and their wicked Wills, and reconcile their natural sense of God to their Sins. But alas these Artifices are all so thin and transparent, that 'tis a hard matter for men of Wit to impose them on their Understandings; and tho they have an equal Good-will to these wicked Do­ctrines with the duller sort of sinners, yet their Reason is too sharp-sighted to be Chouc'd and deceived by them. And there­fore [Page 112] usually they go another way to work, and being sensible that they can never en­joy their sins in quiet, while they are aw­ed with the Sense and Belief of a Deity, and yet obstinately resolved that they will enjoy them, they have no other Expedient but to muster up all their Wit and Reason to dispute the belief of a God out of their Minds; and being stifly resolved to persist in their Wickedness, they are obliged by their own Interest to wish there were no God to observe and punish them. And then facilè credunt quod volunt, they easily believe what they would have, and the slenderest probability will sway their Un­derstanding to vote on the side of their Interest and Affections. So that when men are resolved to be wicked, Atheism is their Interest and Refuge, to which they are many times forced to fly in their own Defence, to avoid the Clamors and Per­secutions of their Consciences. Had these men lived in those Good Pagan days where­in they might have rioted with Devotion, Sacrificed to the gods in drunken Bowls, and Worshipt in the Arms of a Strumpet, no men would have been more Religious than they; and could they now but Com­pound the matter so as that God should let them alone to enjoy their Lusts, there is no [Page 113] doubt but they would be well enough content to let him alone to enjoy his Be­ing. But because their sense of him frets and galls them, they first grow impatient under it, and then set their Wits at Work to raise objections against it, and either to laugh or dispute it out of their Minds. And accordingly Plato makes mention of a sort of Atheists [...]; who in consequence of their Opinion that all things are void of Gods, have plunged themselves into intemperance of Pleasures and Pains being otherwise persons of great Memories and quick Understandings, De Leg. Lib. 10. But alas, how unreasonable is it in a matter of such vast importance for men to be­lieve by their Interest and Affections! 'tis true could men put out the Sun with wink­ing, or extinguish the Nature of things by an obstinate disbelief of them, it would be very justifiable for those men to believe there is no God whose Interest it is that there should be none. But alas, the Na­tures of things are unalterable and will be what they are whatsoever our Opinion is a­bout them. If there be a God, there will be one, whether we think fit to believe it [Page 114] or no; and tho when the Interest of our Lusts requires it, we may possibly dispute our selves out of the Belief of his Being, yet he is not to be disputed out of his Be­ing. We may indeed secure our selves from the Dread of his Vengeance by dispu­ting our selves into a disbelief of him, but we can never secure our selves by it from the danger of his Vengeance. And what a sensless thing is it for a man to shut his eyes against an unavoidable danger, mere­ly for fear of being frightned by it; and when he might shun Gods Vengeance by dreading it, instead thereof to shun the dread of it? What is this but to set his Reason at work to rock his Conscience a­sleep, that so he may destroy himself without fear or Disturbance.

II. ANOTHER great cause of Athe­ism is superstitious Misapprehensions con­cerning God; which tho they are Lodg­ed in the Mind, yet are most commonly exhaled from the Affections, that like im­pure Bogs do generally breath up all those Meteors that darken and disturb the Region above. And indeed most of our ill apprehen­sions of God are transcribed and copied from our own Affections; which be they never so irregular, our own self-love will be apt to celebrate for Perfections. And then what­soever [Page 115] we esteem a Perfection in our selves, we naturally attribute to God, who is the Source and Standard of all Perfection; and those Affections of our own Nature which we most injuriously attribute to God, we love or hate in him according as we love or hate them in other men. Thus the fond and indulgent, who are apt to doat upon others without reason, and to hug even their Vices and Deformities, are prone to attribute their own temper to God, and to look upon him as a Being that is infinitely indulgent to those whom without any reason he hath chosen for his Favourites. And because he who is fond of others, loves others should be fond of him, to be sure he will love his fond God too, and be far more devoutly affected towards this Idol of his own temper, than to the true God himself cloathed in all the native Glory of his own Attributes. But on the contrary, those who are stern and peevish and implacable can by no means indure their own temper in others; and therefore 'tis no wonder if they hate it in God to whom they are wont injuriouslly to attribute it. For how is it possible for them to affect a Divinity whom they have pictured in their own Minds with such a stern and terrible Aspect, with an Imperious [Page 116] Self-will that bears down all things before it by irresistible Might without any Re­spect to Right or Wrong, with bloody hands and a Vengeful heart, and a testy, peevish and unaccountable Nature that loves and hates without any reason, and is pleased or displeased as the [...]oy takes it. And ha­ving thus set up such a grim Idol of God in their Minds as they can by no means affect, they secretly wish there were no such Being, which is the brink of Atheism. Thus their ghastly Apprehensions of God meeting with the surly and churlish tem­per within them, instead of moulding them into Devotion to him, commonly inrage and canker them with Malice against him; and accordingly Plutarch well observes [...], i. e, the Atheist thinks there is no God and he who hath dreadful Appre­hensions of him wishes there were none; and he who wishes there were none is but one remove from believing there is none. Thus you see in what a direct Line Vice leads to Superstition, and Superstition to Atheism. For Pride and Wrath, Malice and Revenge are naturally apt to ingender in mens Minds horrid and frightful Ap­prehensions of God; which working on those sour and rugged Passions that begot [Page 117] them are as apt to exasperate and inrage them against him; and then their Reason immediately takes part with their Passion, and to gratifie its wish that there were no God, sets it self industriously to argue him out of his Being. But alas, what an un­reasonable procedure is this, for men to pin their faults upon God, and dress him in their own Deformities, and when they have thus disguised him by putting upon him their own frightful tempers, as the old Persecutors did the Christians by wrapping them in Lions Skins, to set on their Wit and Reason to worry him out of his Being; what is this but to make a God as the Hea­thens did their Mercuries, and then fling stones at him; to transform him into a Monstrous Idol and then dislike him, and then dash him in pieces? But be not de­ceived, God will be what he is, a most per­fect, glorious, and amiable Being, how in­glorious soever he may appear to you through the false Medium of your own Diabolical temper, which like Crimson-co­loured Glass will represent the fairest Ob­jects to you bloody and terrible; But for you to hate God for no other reason but because your own hateful Passions do re­flect to you such an inglorious Idea of him, and then to deny him because you [Page 118] hate him, is equally impious and unreasonable.

III. ANOTHER great cause of Athe­ism is Rashness and Precipitancy in prescri­bing to and pre-judging the divine Provi­dence; and this also most commonly arises from some great Irregularity in mens Wills and Affections. For generally the rash Judg­ments which men make of the divine Pro­vidence, are grounded on those unequal Di­stributions it makes of the good things of this World in prospering the Bad and affli­cting the Good, upon which we are too of­ten ready to Charge it with being an un­equal Arbitrator of mens Fates. The oc­casion of which is our immoderate Estima­tion of the Goods and Evils of this World. We so inhance the Goods of it in our Opi­nion, as to think them great enough to be the Crowns and Rewards of Virtue; and have such horrible Apprehensions of of the Evils of it, as to imagine them great enough to be the Plagues and Punishments of the most obstinate and notorious Offen­ders. Whereas by the whole Course of his Providence it appears that God hath a different esteem of them both; that he thinks the best things of this World to be bad enough to be thrown away upon the most despicable persons; and therefore to express his Scorn of these admired Vani­ties, [Page 119] he many times scatters them with a careless hand, as not thinking it worth the while to be so exact in the Distribution of them, as to put them in Gold Scales and weigh them out to Mankind by Grains and Scruples. And as for the worst things of this World he thinks them not so bad but that they may be indured without a­ny considerable Damage to the Sufferer; and therefore many times suffers them to befall his own Favourites, as not thinking it of Moment enough to interpose his Pro­vidence to shield them against their impo­tent Impressions. And upon this difference of Judgment men too often ground an in­veterate Quarrel against God, and because they doat upon this World, and thing the Goods of it good enough to be the Portion of good Men, and the Evils of it bad enough to be the Punishment of bad, they are an­gry with God for not being of their Opini­on, and are ready to arraign his Providence, and to conclude that this World is govern'd by a blind Chance that drops her Favours at random, as the full plumed Hawk mews her loose Feathers and never cares who stoops to take them up. And this Ovid ingeniously acknowledges of himself.

Dum rapiunt mala fata bonos, ignoscite fasso,
Sollicitor nullos esse putare Deos; i. e.
[Page 120]While I behold ill Fates attend good men, I am tempted to think there are no gods.
Marmoreo Licinus tumulo jacet, at Cato parvo,
Pompeius nullo, quis putet esse Deos?
The wicked Licinus lies in a Marble Tomb, but Cato in a small one, and Pompey in none, who would think there were gods?

So also there are others, who beholding themselves in the flattering Mirror of their own self-conceit, are so taken with the Re­flections of their own Merit and Excellen­cy, as that they cannot see how 'tis possi­ble but that if there be a God he must love and reward them; and therefore if instead of so doing, God either deprives them of those worldly Goods which they doat on, or frustrates them of those carnal Hopes for whose Accomplishment they have ear­nestly supplicated, they presently begin to murmur against him, and thence proceed to arraign the Justice of his Providence, and thence to deny both that and his Being. For thus it comes to pass, saith Simplicius, that such who have no grounded Belief of a Deity, when they observe the Miseries of good Men, and the Prosperities of bad, are without any Regard to the common Notions of a God, ready to cry out with [Page 121] with him in the Tragedian [...], i. e. I dare affirm there are no Gods, because the wicked prosper that hurt me. Thus from their fond Affection to these worldly Goods, men frequently take occasion to quarrel with Gods Providence, for not appropria­ting them to be the Rewards of Virtue; and being once engaged in a Quarrel a­gainst his Providence, their next attempt is to dispute him out of his Being.

But what an unreasonable way of con­cluding is this? I value this to be best and that to be worst, and therefore God ought to be of my Opinion, and to pro­ceed accordingly in his Providence over the World; for there is nothing can be better or worse within the Prospect of an infinite Wisdom than what I apprehend to be best and worst for Mankind; and there­fore if he will do good to the Good, it must be in the Method that I shall pre­scribe him, that is to say, he must crown them with Rose-buds▪ and cloath them in Purple, and feed them with the fat of the Land; and if he punish the Wicked he must give me leave to give aim to his Ar­rows, and to direct him how, and what, and when, and where to shoot, and so long [Page 122] I am contented to allow him a Being in the World; but if he will presume to cross my Opinion of things, and steer his Acti­ons by the unerring Compass of his own in­finite Wisdom; if he will rather choose to do good to the Good by chastening than by prospering them, and to avenge himself upon the Wicked by fattening them with Prosperity for Slaughter, I shall look upon it as such an Affront to my judgment as will admit of no meaner Expiation than the stripping him out of his Providence and Being. And what can be more ridicu­lous than for men to deny the Being of God, because his Providence sometimes crosses their foolish Opinion of things, and doth not Govern it self by the crooked Rules which they are pleased to prescribe it.

IV. ANOTHER great cause of Athe­ism is vain Affectation of Singularity in O­pinion; a Vice that hath been always in­cident to men of Speculation, who valuing themselves upon the stock of their Know­ledg and deep Insight into the Nature of things, have always affected to start new Notions and advance contrary Hypotheses to the received Opinions of Mankind, that so they may be vogued for men of singular Knowledg, and seem to [Page 123] have taller Understandings than the rest of their Brethren, And this I doubt not hath been one great cause of speculative Atheism; for there is no Principle in Na­ture which hath been more universally re­ceived among Men than the Belief of a Deity; which doubtless is the main Rea­son why men who affect Singularity have been so prone to quarrel at it. It doth not comport with their Design of being thought wiser than the rest of the World, to sub­mit their Understandings to common Noti­ons and universal Doctrins; because should they think as other Men do, they might probably be thought no wiser. Perhaps had the Belief of a Deity been lately start­ed, and only received by some singular Sect of Vertuosoes, these men might have beeen as forward to entertain it as they are now to reject it; but because it is an Old-fashion Doctrine, in which all Ages and Nations have concurred, they think it would be a discredit to their Understand­ing to wear it, and therefore they set their Wits at work to invent Atheistical Hypo­theses to solve the Phaenomena of Nature without a Deity. And he that doth but impartially consider the haughty Genius of those Philosophers that laid the Foun­dations of Speculative Atheism, may easily [Page 124] perceive that the great Motive of their In­fidelity was nothing but a proud Affecta­tion of thinking counter to Mankind. And indeed could I but embrace the Doctrine of the Transmigration of Souls, I should be tempted to believe by the likeness of their Humors that it was one and the same Soul that pass'd through Democritus into Protagoras, through Protagoras into Epi­curus and through Epicurus into Mr. Hobbs; And since they so exactly agreed in their Pride and haughty Ostentation of Know­ledg, it is justly supposable that this was the main cause of their Agreement in Athe­ism; which being a Singular Doctrine and directly contradictory to the common No­tions of Mankind, was upon that account more adapted to the humor of these arro­gant Philosophers, And accordingly Pla­to describes the Atheists of his Age to be a conceited and scornful sort of People, and declares the cause of their Atheism to be [...], a certain pernicious sort of igno­rance that put on a semblance of the great­est Wisdom; and afterwards he calls Athe­theism [...], that which in the Eyes of some conceited people seemed to be the wisest of all Doctrines, de Leg. Lib. 10. [Page 125] And because these Atheistical Philosophers, who were some of them great Masters of Wit and Learning, had the good luck to be remarqued and gazed on like so many Anticks for their Singularity, they have always found Disciples and Followers a­mong the people of little Sense and a great deal of Vanity, who being ambitious of the Reputation of Wits and Philosophers, but having neither Brains nor Industry e­nough to merit it, are fain to shelter their Ignorance in Atheism, and there to face it out with laughter and boldness; and be­cause by laughing at God and Religion they deride the common Faith of Man­kind, they fancy themselves singularly witty, and expect that others should fancy them so too; whereas in reality these little People are but meer Pretenders to specu­lative Atheism. For before they can be more, they must comprehend the whole System of the Atheistical Philosophy, and be able to describe all those supposed Laws of Motion, by which Matter without the Conduct of a Superior Wisdom and Power did originally range it self into this beau­tiful World, and to shew at least the possi­bility of all the strange Appearances in Na­ture, without supposing a God; which is such a task as their feeble Understandings durst [Page 126] never attempt; for the utmost they can pretend to is a few Terms of the Atheisti­cal Philosophy, which they have learned by rote, and do cant and smatter with as much Skill and Understanding as Parrots do the Lessons that are taught them. And tho the brisk young Gentlemen will some­times boldly affirm, and if you dare take them up will lay a Wager on it too, that Reason is nothing but a Train of Imagina­tions; that Choice is nothing but the last stroke of outward Object on the Fancy; and that there is nothing in Nature but Mat­ter and Motion; yet should you be so rude as to ask them what they mean by these Phrases, you would uncase their Igno­rance and utterly undoe them. So that such as these are only the Hawkers and Re­tailers of Atheism, that noise and cry it a­bout; but have neither Wit not Industry enough to understand it, but do take it up with the same implicit Faith as the Papists do their Religion. Thus as the Ambition of being accounted wiser than others, cau­ses men to affect Singularity in their Opi­nions, so the Affectation of Singularity in Opinion doth very often transport men in­to Atheism.

NOW tho I would by no means plead for Mens enslaving their Understandings to [Page 127] vulgar Opinions, so as to put a stop to all Advancements of Knowledge, and hinder the World from ever growing wiser; yet doubtless for men to quarrel at Opinions for no other reason but because they are vulgarly received, is not only a rude Af­front to the Reason of Mankind; but also an effectual way to involve our selves in an endless Labyrinth of mistakes. For while I affect to be singular in my Opinion, I deprive my self of the Assistance of o­ther mens Understandings, and in my tra­vel for Knowledge chuse rather to go alone by my self through untrodden by-ways, than to keep the Road and follow the Tract of those that have gone before me. So that unless I am wiser than all the World, which is very unlikely, it is a thousand to one but I bewilder and loose my self; for how wise and sagacious soever I may be, it is certain that many Heads are wiser than one; and therefore when all heads concur in the same judgment, it is probable at least that that judgment is true; he therefore who rejects an Opinion because all or most do embrace it, affects to think coun­ter to the strongest Evidence, and to be­lieve against the greatest Probability. 'Tis true in many things the generality of men have been mistaken, which is a sufficient [Page 128] reason why we should not pin our Faith upon the Sleeve of Vulgar Opinions, but impartially examine before we confidently embrace them; but yet there is a Reve­rence due to the Judgment of Mankind, and the Laws of Modesty require us not to be confident against it without very great reason; but to affect to run counter to it, especially in such a matter of moment as the Belief or Disbelief of a Deity, is not only the highest Arrogance but the most extra­vagant Madness. For it is at least proba­ble that there is a God, because all Man­kind do believe one, and if there be one, it is of infinite Moment that we should believe it, and act accordingly; and there­fore for men to turn Atheists out of mere Singularity, is not only to believe there is no God, because it is probable there is, but to play and dally with ones own Fate, and run the hazard of being eternally miserbale out of a wanton Affectation of contradicting the Judgment of Mankind.

V. ANOTHER great Cause of Athe­ism is custom of drolling on and ridiculing the most serious things; a humour which hath strangely prevailed in this pleasant and jocular Age, wherein the wild rovings of mens Fancies into odd Similitudes▪ start­ling Metaphors, humorous Expressions, and [Page 129] sportive Representations of things are grown more acceptable in almost all Con­versations, than the most solid Reason and Discourse, and 'tis generally lookt up­on as a far more genteel and fashionable Quality for a man to be witty than Wise. Now though I do not deny but that Wit in it self is a very useful and valuable In­dowment, and serves to many excellent purposes; as namely to pollish and adorn the most serious Truths, and represent them to mens Minds in the most comely and affecting Dresses; to expose what is apparently base and ridiculous, and lash it with the Satyrs it makes against it self; to quicken and give life to a solid Argu­Ment, and render it more piercing and convictive; and in a word, to indear our Society, and give a relish and picquancy to our Conversation, and to recreate our Minds after we have been tired out or cloyed with severer Occupations; though Wit, I say, be a very useful Quality as to all these good purposes, yet unless a wise Man hath the keeping it, that knows when and where and how to apply it, it is like Wild-fire that flies at rovers, runs his­sing about, and blows up every thing that comes in its way without any respect or discrimination. And indeed the more [Page 130] grave and serious any thing is, the more prone it will be to expose and ridicule it. For the life of Wit consists in the surpri­singness of its Conceits and Expressions, in making such smart or uncouth Represen­tations of things as are most apt to raise a pleasing Wonder and Amazement in those that hear us. Now there is nothing more surprising in its own nature, than to see or hear a serious thing sportfully represented, and drest up in an antick and ridiculous Disguise; the very exposing it in a Garb and Figure so unexpected because so very unlike and unsutable to it self, is apt of its own Nature to surprise and amuse the Spectators or Hearers; which surprise, if he be a vain person, will tickle him into Laughter, but if he be serious, will affect him with Detestation and Horror to see a serious thing so contemptibly treated. But the greatest part of Men being of vain and trifling Spirits, that are whisled up and down in little levities of Fancy, there is nothing commonly doth more gratefully surprise them and provoke their Laughter, than ridiculous Representations of serious Arguments; and hence it comes to pass that 'tis grown a great Instance of wit a­mong the generality of men to sport and play with serious things, to burlesque the [Page 131] sense of them, and apply them to ridicu­culous purposes; whereas in reality this mistaken sort of Wit is nothing but dull and impudent Buffoonery, and a very little Wit joyned with a great deal of Sauciness will enable a Man to make sport with the most serious Arguments. For 'tis but cloathing them in rude and porterly Expres­sions, or misconstruing them to a profane or ludicrous sense, or debauching the Phrases by which they are expressed to a silly or a wicked meaning, and it shall be presently cried up for an excellent Jest, and the Au­thor of it dubb'd a Wit Laureat. This therefore being so easie a way for dull peo­ple to advance themselves to the Reputa­tion of Wits, hath of late years especially been mightily frequented by the impotent Well-wishers to Wit and Ingenuity; and because Religion hath been always esteem­ed the most serious thing in the World, therefore they fix upon that as the com­mon Theme of their Raillery, considering that the more serious it is, the more it will surprise men to hear it burlesqued and drol­led on. So that if they do but speak slight­ly and irreverently of God, or never so clownishly ridicule a Mystery of Religion, or cloath an obscene Thought in a Text of Scripture, their Sauciness will supply the [Page 132] defect of their Wit, and men will laugh not so much at the Picquancy of their Con­ceit, as at the Boldness and Presumption of it; and because their Discourse hath the luck to be laughed at, they think them­selves celebrated for the Oracles of Wit, and are thereby emboldened to proceed in this their impious Buffoonery, till at last they have drolled themselves into a Contempt of God, and from thence into downright Atheism. For tho a Jest be no Argument nor yet a loud laughter a Demonstration, yet if you inspect the generality of our little Pretenders to Atheism, you will find this is the main Foundation that their Ir­religion depends on; for their gift consists not in arguing and demonstrating, but in such a Sett of fine Phrases and terse Oaths; and all the Stock of Learning they pretend to is a few shavings of Wit gathered out of Plays and Romances, and these they pin upon Religion, as you have seen unhappy Boys do Rags at mens Backs, to expose it to Scorn and Derision; and having ac­customed themselves to treat it with such rude and porterly Contempt and Disinge­nuity, it grows by degrees cheap and vile in their Eyes, and at last is rejected by them as a ridiculous Imposture; and if now when they are urged with Evidences of [Page 133] Religion, they have but Wit enough to answer Reason with Drollery, and to retort a Jest to a Demonstration, how gloriously do they imagine they have acquitted, them­selves, and with what triumphant Shrugs do they celebrate their Victory over the little man in black.

NOW tho for men to deride what they do not understand, savours neither of Learn­ing nor good Manners, and is equally un­becoming a Gentleman and a Scholar; and tho for a man to venture to be damned for deriding of God and Religion, is such a Triumph of Wit as argues the utter Defe [...] of his Reason, yet so long as there are vain men enough to be tickled with this profane sort of Drollery, to be sure there will ne­ver want Fools enough to venture on it. For when a Fop will needs aspire to the Reputation of a Wit, he hath no other way but to dress up Religion in a Fools-Coat, and expose it for a Spectacle of De­rision, and then how dull soever the Con­ceit be, the stupendous Presumption of it will suprise and amuse the Company, and men will admire him just as they do Rope­dancers for daring to perform what a wise Man would tremble to attempt; and being thus emboldened by the Admiration and Laughter of his Company, which the vain [Page 134] Creature mistakes for a Proof and Evi­dence of his Wit, he grows more pert and confident, and so fools and fleers on till he hath toyed and laughed himself out of all sense of Religion.

BUT alass! what a desperate piece of Folly is this, for men thus to sport and dally with the Almighty, whose Venge­ance they can neither withstand nor indure; to point and make Mouths at him to his Face, and set him up as the Finger-butt of their Scorn and Derision! For certainly if there be Sins that can raise a Cry loud enough to reach Heaven, this, as a great Author of our own hath expressed it, will be so far from whispering there, that 'twill give an Alarm to the Vengeance of Heaven, whose Inflictions like Stones tumbling from the tops of Towers, will by so much the more fatally crush those they light on, by how much the longer they are falling upon them. And therefore for Men thus to dal­ly with their own Fate, to venture to be damn'd that they may be thought to be witty, and expose themselves to endless wailing and Wo only to raise a present fit of Laughter, is doubtless a far more despe­rate Attempt than 'twould be to play at the mouths of Canons while they are spitting Fire, or to lay hold on a Thun­derbolt [Page 135] as it comes roaring down from the Clouds.

BUT suppose there were neither Evil nor Danger in this impious Practice, yet for men to conclude there is no God because they have the Confidence to scorn and de­spise him, is altogether as ridiculous as their despising him is impious. For there is no­thing in Nature so real or serious but may be drolled and Rallied on; if a man will set his Wits at work he may break Jests upon Pain, and entertain his Company with Comical Representations of the Groans and Agonies of dying; but it would be a Jest indeed should be droll himself into a Belief that there are no such things as Pain or Death; but alas, things are not to be altered by laughing at them, and how mer­ry soever we may make our selves with the Belief and Nation of a Deity, we shall one day find in earnest that he is not to be jested out of his Being.

VI. ANOTHER cause of Atheism is taking up Religion or Opinions in Religi­on without Examination. The generali­ty of men do embrace their Religion as a part of their Fate, as the Temper of their Clime, or the Entail of their Ancestors; and the reason why they are Christians is, because Christianity had the luck to be­speak [Page 136] them first, and by its timely Inter­posure to prepossess and forestall them. So that in all probability had Mahometism plied them first, they would have had as much Faith for the Alchoran as they have now for the Bible. Now when Men thus take up their Religion they know not why, their minds must needs be left naked and defenceless to all the Temptations of A­theism. For when a Man can render no [...]eason for his Religion, his Faith hath no­thing but blind Prejudice to support it; and 'tis with his Will that he believes and not with his Vnderstanding; so that he may chuse whether he will believe or no, because he hath no Evidence to determine his Vnderstanding. And how unstable and insecure must his Faith needs be, when it hath no other Foundation but a fickle and inconstant Will; when it lies at the mercy of his Humour and Inclinations, and it is in his power to determine his Assent to that side of the Question which is most for his Interest? For now his Faith being determined by his Will, and his Will by his Interest, whenever he thinks it his In­terest that there should be no God, to be sure he will be ready enough to believe that there is none; and consequently as soon as he grows wicked enough to need [Page 137] Atheism for a Refuge from his Conscience, he will betake himself thither in his own defence▪ and endeavour by an obstinate Disbelief of Gods Being, to shelter him­self from the Dread of his Power. Thus when mens belief is not grounded upon Reason and Evidence, but stands tottering on the fickle Foundation of their Wills, it is liable to be blown down by every Blast of Temptation. And hence I doubt not in a great measure proceeds the Irreligion of the Age we live in; for if you surveigh the present Sticklers for Atheism, you will find they chiefly consist of the hair-brain'd and uncatechised Youths of the Town▪ who never troubled themselves to under­stand the first Principles of Religion, nor to consider the Dependence and Connexion of its Doctrines, and know nothing at all either of the admirable Contexture of the Parts of it, or of the Reason and Evidence of the Whole. For alas, their Study hath been employed another way, viz. in court­ly Forms of Speech and Punctilioes of Acti­on, in fashionable Garbs and Oaths and artificial Luxuries, in conning of fine Jests and Modes of Address, and retailing Frag­ments of Wit from Plays and Romances; but as for the severer and more useful Stu­dies they bequeath them to the dull men of Sense and Reason.

[Page 138]SUCH as these for the most part are the Sages that droll upon Religion and make jests upon the Scripture; and what wonder is it that such as these turn Infidels, who were never able to render any Reason of their Faith? For how weak soever the Arguments of Infidelity are, it is a hard case if it cannot baffle that Faith which hath no Reason on its side to guard and defend it; especially when they are second­ed with a mans Lusts and Inclinations, as to be sure the Arguments of Infidelity will always be. For when a man hath no Rea­son for his Faith, but a great many Lusts against it, the slenderest shews of Probabi­lity will suffice to make him an Infidel. But what an horrible Neglect is it for Men that have Reason to distinguish between Truth and Falshood, to take no care to en­quire into the Truth and Evidence of their Religion in which their greatest Interest is involved; but to wink hard and believe at a venture they know not why nor what? what is this but to cast Lots for their Souls, and throw Cross or Pile for their eternal Salvation? They resolve, they say, to ad­here to the Religion of their Ancestors, but whether that be true or false they never inquire; so that if it be true, they may thank their Stars for it, but if it be false, [Page 139] they have the worse Luck. Thus they wholly commit themselves to the Con­duct of Chance to be conducted to Hea­ven or Hell, as it happens; and as if those distant Fates were indifferent to them, they concern not themselves to inquire whether the way they are in be the Broad or the Narrow, the Right or the Wrong, but e'en leave the Event to determine it. And can any thing in the World be more wild or extravagant, than for men who are so so­licitous about their smaller concerns, who will not purchase an Acre of Land without examining the Deeds and Evidences by which the Right to it is Con­veyed, thus to take up their Religion up­on Trust, and stake their everlasting Fate upon such a desperate venture? But then for men to take occasion to despise and re­ject Religion from their own sottish Neg­lect to inquire into the Truth of it, is such an height of Extravagance as no Bedlam can parallel; it would be as reasonable for a man to put out his Eyes, and then resolve not to believe there is a Sun in the Firma­ment because he doth not see it, or to stop up his Ears, and then peremptorily deny the Be­ing of Sounds because he do's not hear 'em; for for men thus to graft Infidelity upon Ignorance, is only to heap one Extravagance on another; if they understand not the [Page 104] Evidence of Religion the more Shame it is for them, but methinks it might very well become them to be modest and teach­able till they do; and in the mean while to take care to inform themselves better; but thus immediately to leap out of Igno­rance into Atheism, is first to play the Fool, and then run stark mad upon it.

VII. ANOTHER cause of Atheism is mens measuring the Truth or Falshood of Religion by the Practice of such as make the loudest Pretence to it. When a man is unwilling to undergo the trouble of sa­tisfying his own Reason of the Truth of his Religion, his usual Method is to inquire what other men think of it, who by the zealous Profession which they make may be supposed to understand it better than himself; but because mens Thoughts are secret and invisible, and do not always cor­respond with their Words and Profes­sions; therefore to satisfie himself what other men think of Religion, he concludes the safest way is to judge by what they do, and not by what they profess; and so far in­deed he is in the right. For to be sure mens Actions are a much more certain In­dex of their Thoughts than their Words; and therefore when he sees those who profess Religion act as if they did not believe it, [Page 141] and observes how their Words do run atilt at their Practice, and how broadly their Lives give the lie to their Professions, he presently concludes that whatever they pretend they are Infidels in their Hearts; and being once persuaded that those whom he thinks do best understand Religion do not believe it, he thence immediately con­cludes that they find no reason to believe it, and do only put on the Profession of it as an Angelical Vizor, being minded to play the Devils in it with more Credit and Security. And by this Popular way of reasoning they conclude Religion to be nothing but a Politick Device and Engine which wise men have contrived to beguile and manage the simple; and that whatso­ever is pretended for it, it is a mere jugling-box which Knaves play tricks with to de­lude and cozen Fools. And of this way of mens reasoning themselves into Atheism the Age we live in is full of wofull Instan­ces; for now adays to scorn and despise Religion is no longer the Prerogative of Wits and Vertuosoes, but the Infection is spread and propagated into Shops and Stalls, and the Rabble are become Professors of A­theism. Now whence should this proceed? alas, it is not to be supposed that such per­sons as these should ever be able to Philo­sophise [Page 142] themselves into Infidelity, and turn Atheists either upon Aristotle's or Epi­curus's Hypotheses; no, no, their Argu­ment lies nearer home, and more open to their Capacities; they have seen a world of vile tricks played in our Religious Car­nivals and Masquerades; some making their Religion a Sanctuary for their Trea­sons and Rebellions; others gilding over their Faction and Sedition with a specious Pretence of zeal for Gods glory: some pro­secuting their own Revenge and Ambition under the Ensigns of pure Worship, and true Protestant Religion; others commu­ting for their Excesses of Riot with a cla­morous zeal for Decency and Order, and others picking Pockets with one hand while they have been lifting up the other to Hea­ven in Devotion; the sight of which hath tempted the rude and unthinking Vulgar to look upon Religion as a mere Castle in the Air, that hath no Foundation▪ but in the Invention of Knaves▪ and in the Faith of Fools.

NOW tho there is no doubt to be made but that these vile Hypocrites who have laid this Stumbling-block in mens way, shall one day dearly answer for the ruin of those whom it hath occasioned to fall, and for thus exposing the Credit and Re­putation [Page 143] of Religion to the misprisions of those that do not understand it; yet it is a most inexcusable piece of folly for men thus to infer Atheistical Conclusions from the ill Example of Hypocritical Professors. For in the first place, to conclude a Man an Infidel because his Actions run counter to the Faith he pretends to, is very rash and fallacious. For do we not see Men very of­ten act against their Consciences, and fly in the face of their own Convictions? why may we not then as fairly suppose those wicked Actions we argue from to be the effects of an obstinate Will as of an Infidel Judgment; but suppose it were true that those men were all Infidels that do thus act against their Faith, doth it therefore follow that you must turn Infidels too? if it be so unsafe and so unworthy of a man to carry his Brains in other Mens Heads, what a shame is it to carry them in other Mens Heels, and to suffer his Faith to be lead by the Tract of their Examples through all the wild Mazes of Irreligion and Atheism?

BUT you will say, by these Mens Ex­amples you plainly see what a Mystery of Iniquity there is in religious Pretences; and what then? must Religion be a Cheat be­cause bad Men play tricks with it, and [Page 144] make it a Cloak for their Knavery? if so, then the best things in the World are lia­ble to Suspicion; because there is nothing so good but what is capable of being pro­stituted to very ill purposes. I confess when we see so many Cheats acted under the Masque of Religion, we have just rea­son to call it to a more severe Examination, and to inquire more narrowly into the Proofs and Evidences upon which it is founded; but presently to reject Religion because Knaves and Hypocrites make bold to disguise themselves in it, is every whit as absurd and ridiculous as if a man should deny that there is any such Virtue as Cha­stity in the World, because there are com­mon Prostitutes that pretend to it.

VIII. ANOTHER cause of Atheism is Divisions and Schisms formed out of little Opinions in Religion. For it is natural to men to place a great part of their Religion in those Opinions, for whose sake they divide and separate from each other; so that if hereafter they happen to be dissa­tisfied with those Opinions of which they are excessively fond at the present, they will be under a great Temptation to sus­pect Religion it self, as if that were as ill grounded as those little Opinions which they laid so great a stress on, and so after [Page 145] they have run through several Sets of Opi­nions, and in fine have discovered them to be all Delusions, they are ready to con­clude Religion it self to be nothing but a System of Lies and Impostures. For as weak Heads when they perceive the Bat­tlements shake are apt to suspect the Foun­dations, so weak Understandings will be prone to suspect even the Fundamentals of of Religion, when once they perceive those darling Notions totter which they have confidently presumed to superstruct thereupon.

AND upon this account I make no doubt but that the Irreligion of this Age is very much to be attributed to the Sects and Divisions of it. For how many woful Examples have we of Persons who had once a great Zeal for and Satisfaction in Religi­on, that upon their causeless Separation from the Churches Communion, have run from Sect to Sect, and from one extrava­gant Opinion to another, till at last being convinced of the Cheats and Impostures of them all, they have totally discarded Re­ligion it self, and made their last Resort into Atheism. And as separating into Par­ties upon little Differences in Religion ex­poses the Separatists themselves to great Temptations to Atheism, so it doth those [Page 146] also who are Indifferent on both sides, and stand ingaged on neither part of the Sepa­ration. For whilst these men behold the State of Religion thus miserably broken and divided, and the Professors of it crum­bled into so many Sects and Parties, and each Party spitting Fire and Damnation at its Adversary; so that if all say true, or indeed any two of them in five hundred Sects which there are in the World, (and for all I know there may be five thousand) it is five hundred to one but that every one is damn'd, because every one damns all but it self, and it self is damn'd by four hun­dred and ninty nine; so that 'tis a mighty Chance if in so great a Volly of Anathe­maes which every one hath levelled at it, any one escape: When, I say, unengaged persons that are not able to distinguish be­tween the disputable Opinions that consti­tute these Sects, and the Necessaries and Essentials of Religion, shall reflect upon this tumult and confusion of Faiths, they will be apt to conclude without farther In­quiry, that Religion it self is nothing but an infinite Maze of disputable Opinions, where­in Men wander about in the dark and justle and rancounter one another without any certain Clew on either side to guide and direct their Inquiries; under which [Page 147] Misapprehension they will either damn all Religion for a Cheat, or hover about in eternal uncertainty, not knowing where in so great a Confusion of Religions to fix and settle their Faith. And hereunto I doubt not is to be attributed a great part of the Irreligion of this Age. For while some Men by running themselves out of Breath in pursuit of those Ignes fatui or New Lights, that have broken and divided our Com­munion, have at length quite tired out their Zeal and religious Pretences, and so are at length lain down in the Mire of Ir­religion and open Profaneness; others by looking on and beholding the wild Divi­sions which these new Lights have made, have been tempted to run away from Reli­gion it self, as if that were only a Laby­rinth of uncertain Opinions contrived on purpose to distract and bewilder mens Brains.

NOW tho the Authors of these Divi­sions, whosoever they are, are doubtless highly accountable to God for all that Ir­religion which attends them, yet for Men from hence to draw Atheistical Conclusi­ons is much more imputable to the per­verseness of their Wills than to the Weak­ness of their Vnderstandings.

[Page 148]FOR in the first place, What if you have discovered some Opinions ln Religi­on to be false and erroneous, of the Truth of which you were once very confident; doth it therefore follow that there is no­thing certain in Religion? If so, you may as well conclude that there is nothing cer­tain in the Mathematicks neither, since some men have been as confident of the Truth of false Axioms in Geometry as ever you could be of false Propositions in Reli­gion. That you were once over-confident in a disputable Matter was your own Fault and Folly, but must it therefore follow that Religion is a Cheat be­cause you have been rash and incon­siderate? and what tho you once laid the great stress of your Religion upon an Opinion which you now discern is errone­ous, must Religion needs suffer for your Mistake, and be branded for an Imposture because you took that for Religion which was not? For there are a thousand Propo­sitions about Religion, which have been Zealously disputed for and against, which have torn men into Sects, and been the Religion of the separate Communions they have formed and denominated, that yet are very remote Superstructures on the true Foundations of Religion, and may be true [Page 149] or false, believed or disbelieved without any damage to Religion. And therefore before you suspect the Truth of Religion it self upon your discovering the Falshood of any particular Opinion, you ought in all Reason to consider whether that Opinion be so essential to Religion as that it cannot subsist without it; for if it be not, 'tis the most unreasonable thing in the World, to infer a suspicion of the Truth of Religion from the Falshood of Propositions that have little or no Dependence on it, and to re­ject the Gold and the precious Stones for the sake of the Wood, and Hay, and Stubble that have been superstructed upon them. And then

2. What can be more absurd than for Men to reject Religion because Mens Opinions about it have been so divided? For if you survey the several Divisions of Chri­stians, you will find they generally concur in all the necessary and essential Doctrines of Religion, and that the Opinions where­in they divide, are for the most part such unnecessary Speculations, as that it is al­most indifferent to Religion whether they be true or false; And with what Reason can we suspect the Truth of necessary Do­ctrines wherein all are agreed, because there are Disagreements in unnecessary ones? [Page 150] Because there are some Propositions in the Mathematicks, about which the Opinions of the Mathematicians are divided, shall we therefore suspect the Truth of all those wherein they are agreed? For if their Dis­agreement be an Argument of the Falshood of the former, why should not their A­greement be as good an Argument of the Truth of the later? But how much soever Mens Opinions about Religion may be divided, all that can be thence inferred is, that some Men are mistaken; and while some Men judge of Religion by their Pas­sions and Interests, and others by the Pre­judices of their Education, it is impossible it should be otherwise. But for men in the midst of such apparent causes of Dif­ference, to resolve to be of no Religion till all are agreed in one, is just as wise, and as rational as if they should determine not to go to Dinner till all the Clocks in Town strike Eleven together.

IX. And Lastly, ANOTHER great cause of Atheism is the profane and care­less Neglect of Gods Publick Worship. For Men of Secular lives whose Minds are al­ways engaged in this eternal hurry of worldly Affairs, are too prone to forget God, and all their Concerns in Religion and another World; and even their con­versing [Page 151] so much with these sensitive things which are always before them, and are continually crouding in upon their Thoughts, doth naturally indispose them to exercise their Faculties about divine and spiritual Objects, and render their Minds [...] unfit and unable to as­cend to the Contemplation of God. And therefore God hath appointed the stated Times of Publick Worship, on purpose to withdraw Men from their secular Pur­suits, that so they be at leisure to retire into themselves, to recollect their scattered Thoughts, and awake their Minds to a sense of Piety and Religion; which can by no way so effectually be performed as by the Solemnities of Publick Worship, where­in our remembrance of God is not only re­freshed, and our Piety to him excited and directed by the publick Instructions, but our natural Sense of Religion is also actua­ted and intended by the mutual Concur­rence and Example of each others Devo­tion. Thus after our Religion hath been slackned by our worldly Cares and De­lights, it is duely wound up again by the Returns of our Publick Worship, and so the sense of God is still kept alive in our Minds. When Men therefore turn their Backs upon the Publick Worship, and de­vote [Page 152] the holy Seasons of it to their secular Business or Pleasures, it is not to be won­dered at that their sense of a divine Power, which they seldom or never think of, should by degrees decay and wear off, and that that being extinguished they should sink into Irreligion and Atheism. For when once Men have worn out their Sense of a Deity, and as the Consequence of that are broke loose from all the Ties and Obli­gations of Conscience, they can have no other Principle but Atheism to warrant their Actions; and when once they have abandoned all Sense and Remembrance of God, so that he is not in all their Thoughts, they are in a fair forwardness to Infidelity. For tho as yet they do not actually dis­believe his Existence, so neither do they actually believe it; for how should they actually believe that which they have no Sense or Thought of; so that in this insen­sible State their Faith is concerned neither one way nor t' other, nor are they at all solicitous whether there be a God or no. Thus from their profane Neglect of Gods Worship Men naturally slide into an habi­tual Senslessness and Incogitancy of him, and from thence to not believing; and from thence to disbelieving him is an easie and almost necessary Transition.

[Page 153]OF the Truth of which the Age we live in will furnish us with too many sor­rowful Instances. For as this Nation which hath been always remarqued for a grave, serious and religious Genius, was never so generally tainted with Atheism as now; so neither was it ever chargeable with such a general Neglect of the Publick Worship of God, which for several Ages after the Reformation, was duly frequented, and devoutly celebrated, till by the Prevalence of our restless Sects and Factions, the Dis­cipline of the Church was gradually weak­ned, and at last totally destroyed; in the happy Days before which the Families of each Parish went hand in hand together to the House of God, and with one Heart and Voice celebrated his Praise and Wor­ship; and to absent ones self ordinarily from the Publick Assemblies, was hardly consistent with the Reputation of being a Christian. By which means their natural Sense and Dread of the divine Powers, be­ing continually awakened and revived, they were not only secured by it from all A­theistical Impressions, but also animated and excited to a pious and sober Conver­sation. But the spirit of Schism prevail­ing against the Power and Discipline of the Church, till it had uttterly disabled it [Page 154] from restraining the Wantonness of that crooked and perverse Generation; some in­corporated themselves into separate Com­munions, and others under Pretence of so doing withdrew from the Publick Assem­blies to the common Resorts of Idleness, Drunkenness and Debauchery; and whilst the Masters took the Liberty of Conscience to go to Conventicles, the Servants pre­tending to be of a different Perswasion assumed the Liberty of Will to go to Ta­verns and Ale-houses; insomuch that it grew a common Observation, that there have been more young People debauched on the Lords Day than all the Week after, whilst under pretence of joyning with a different Communion, they have taken occasion to withdraw themselves from the Inspection of their Parents and Masters. And till once our Schisms and Divisions are cured, it will be impossible to prevent this ill Practice, unless we will be so unjust as to deny that Liberty of Conscience to our Servants which with so much Clamour and Confidence we demand of our Gover­nors. And thus by degrees Profaneness hath insinuated it self under the Covert of Schism, and Liberty of Conscience became a common Sanctuary for the licentious Neglect and Contempt of Gods Worship, [Page 155] till at last it grew so common and fashionable, that it almost ceast to be scandalous. Yea, so far at length hath this impious Humour prevailed, that to go to Church and be de­vout is among too many Men grown a Note of Disgrace, and the Character of a Priest-ridden fool; and a Man is hardly lookt upon as fit for genteel Conversation, that knows any other use of a Holy-day, but only to be at leisure to lie abed, or to Game or Drink and Debauch; by which Neglect and Contempt of the Worship of God, that natural Sense of him, which should have been quickned and cherished by it, hath been gradually worn out of Mens Minds; the Consequence of which is, all that Atheism and Infidelity that overspreads this present Age. For when once Men have renounced the Worship of God, and in Consequence are abandoned of their natural Sense of his Majesty, they are upon the brink of Atheism, into which their own vile Lusts, whose Interest it is that there should be no God, will easily precipitate them. But alas, how ridiculous as well as impious is it for Men to take oc­casion from their own Neglect of Gods Worship, to renounce the Belief of his Be­ing; what is this but to tail one folly to another, and to second Extravagance with [Page 156] Madness? It would make one amazed to think that ever reasonable Beings should be so besotted, as to live in a World over which an Almighty Being presides, who sees all their Actions, and in whose Hands all events are which concen them, and even the everlasting Fate of their Souls; and yet take no more notice of him, pay no more Respect or Veneration to him, than if he were the merest trifle or most insignificant Cypher in the whole Creation. But sure when Men have been guilty of such a black and horrid Impiety▪ one would think their wisest Course for the time to come should be to repent of it, and to endeavour to compensate for their past Profaneness by the strictness and Sincerity of their future Devotion; but for Men to proceed from neglecting Gods Worship to denying his Be­ing, is to do worse because they have done ill, and thereby to inflame the Provocation, as if they were resolved to render their Condition desperate, because they have been so fool-hardy as to render it dange­rous.

AND thus I have given a short Ac­count of the common Causes of Atheism, which you see are all derived from Mens Wills and not from their Reason. For this I do most firmly believe, that the Argu­ments [Page 157] of Gods Existence are so plain and convincing, that no Man ever was or can be an Atheist without some inexcusable fault in his Will.

SECT. II. Of the inexcusable Folly and Unreaso­nableness of Atheism.

THE next thing I proposed was to endeavour to confirm and establish this great Principle of Religion, viz. the Belief of a God, by representing the great folly and unreasonableness of Atheism. In discoursing which I shall meddle no more than needs must with the Proofs and Ar­guments of a Deity, because as I have shew­ed before, 'tis not for want of Arguments that Men turn Atheists, but for want of Consideration and an honest Will; and that the Byass that carries them towards Infi­delity is not in their Vnderstandings, but in their Wills and Affections; that 'tis only their Partiality to their Lusts, that in­clines them to Atheism; and that the Rea­son why they are so ready to believe that there is no God, is, because they wish in their Hearts that there were none. To [Page 158] establish the Belief of a God therefore, I shall endeavour to represent the folly and unreasonableness of Mens being partial on the side of Atheism, supposing it were disputable whether there be a God or no; and this will evidently appear in the fol­lowing Particulars.

  • 1. The Atheist concludes against the Dignity of Humane Nature, and renders it not only mean but ridiculous.
  • 2. He concludes against the very Being and Well-being of Humane Society.
  • 3. He concludes against that which is the main Support and Comfort of Humane Life.
  • 4. He concludes for that side of the Question which is infinitely the most unsafe and hazardous.
  • 5. He concludes for the unsafest side of the Question upon the highest uncertain­ties.
  • 6. He plainly contradicts himself in his Conclusion.

I. THE Atheist concludes against the Dignity of Humane Nature, and thereby renders it not only mean but ridiculous. For the chief Worth and Dignity of Hu­mane Nature consists in its Relation to God, without whom its noblest and most ex­cellent Faculties are in a great measure use­less [Page 159] and insignificant; for if there be no God, the objects of our Five Senses are the sole Entertainment of our Understanding and Will, and we have no other use of these mighty Faculties, (which if there were any such thing as an infinite Truth and Goodness are naturally capable of en­joying them) but only to consult and choose the Gratifications of our Sense, and the Pleasures of this perishing Body. For ex­cepting God there is no such thing in Na­ture as a spiritual enjoyment, no Good to be found, but what is prepared to entertain the boundless Liquorishness of our carnal Appetites; and had we none but such as these to consult for, our Reason which is the Crown and Glory of our Natures, would have nothing else to do but to Cater for our Flesh, and we should have an Understand­ing and Will to no other purpose, but to enable us to play the Brutes with more Skill and Sagacity. And indeed setting God aside we are so far from having the advan­tage of Brutes by being rational, that we are rather so much the more wretched and despicable than they. For as for the Hap­piness of this Life which wholly consists of sensual Good, the Senses and Appetites we have in Common with the Beasts that perish are sufficient for the enjoyment of [Page 160] it; and with these we might relish it as well without our Reason as with it; we might Eat and Drink and Sleep, and en­joy all the Pleasures of a Brute with as much Gust and Savour as we do now with our Reason. For if we were Brutes we should do as Brutes do; we should weary our selves no longer with vain pursuits, nor vex our selves with fruitless Expecta­tions, nor torment our selves with the fears of a Disappointment, but e'en take our Pleasures when our Appetites craved 'em, and they freely offered themselves to our Injoyment. And tho our Reason doth sometimes cook the Injoyments of our Sense, and give them a higher Relish and and Luxury, yet this advantage is very much out-weighed by the many Regrets, and Remorses, and stinging Reflections it intermingles with our Pleasures; So that had we only the Faculties of Brutes, I am verily perswaded we should more sincerely enjoy the Happiness of the brutal Nature; but to be sure we should bear our Miseries with much more Ease and Chearfulness. For supposing there is no God, our Reason can afford us no solid support under any Calamity; the main Arguments of Com­fort, as I shall shew by and by, being de­rived from the Consideration of God and [Page 161] his Providence; which being taken away, I doubt not but we should bear our mise­ries without our Reason much better than with it. For then we should neither be ter­rified at the approach of them, nor tor­mented with Despair under them; then we should neither multiply them with false Opinions, nor inrage them with bitter Re­flections on the Causes of them; but whenever they happened, bear them as Beasts do, without any other Pain or Un­easiness than what they necessarily impres­sed on our Senses, which would render them a thousand times more tolerable to us, than all our Arguments can do, supposing we have no God nor Providence to argue from.

So that were that true which the Athe­ist concludes for, viz. that there is no God, it would follow that Reason in a Man serves to no other purpose, but to render him more wretched and despicable. If there be a God indeed, our rational Facul­ties are of excellent Use; as having an Ob­ject commensurate to their widest Capaci­ties, and every way fit and worthy to em­ploy and exercise them; an infinite Truth for our Vnderstanding to dive into, and an infinite Good for our Wills and Affections to pursue and embrace. But if there be nothing to be enjoyed by us but what is [Page 162] Carnal and Sensual, our Reason is so far from being our Ornament and Perfection, that it is the Plague and Disgrace of our Natures.

FOR for any Nature to have more Fa­culties than what are necessary to its Hap­piness, is monstrous; and therefore had we nothing to enjoy but the Happiness of Brutes, 'twould be a Deformity to our Na­tures to have the Faculties of Angels; be­cause these Faculties would be in vain, there being no adequate Object in the Na­ture of Things to employ and entertain them. So that were the Doctrine of the Atheist true, it would cashier our Reason for a vain and useless Faculty; a thing that serves our Nature to little other purpose, but only to vex and disquiet it. And what Man that hath any Regard or Reverence for himself, would ever be fond of a Belief that thus sinks and depreciates him, and lays the Glory of his Nature in the Dust? For if it be true that there is no God, it is as true that Man is a most despicable Creature, that his Reason upon which he so much values himself is a frivolous and imperti­nent Faculty; a Faculty that can serve him to no higher purpose than only to be a Cook and a Taylor to his Body, to study Sauces and Fashions for it; and that while it serves him in this, disserves him in a [Page 163] thousand other Instances, in mingling his Pleasures with Gall and Wormwood, with Fears and Impatiences, Anxieties and Re­morses, and in aggravating and putting Stings into his Griefs and Calamities. So that when all is done, the only thing that makes it worth the while for a Man to be reasonable, is, that there is a Being of infi­finite Perfection to be known, and loved, and imitated and adored by him; and to deny the Existence of this blessed Being, is infinitely to undervalue our selves, and to eclipse the Glory and Dignity of our Natures. So that by being partial to Atheism we are partial to our own Shame and Dis­grace, and industriously consult the Re­proach and Infamy of Humane Nature; for the Devil himself cannot affix a blacker Scandal on our Reason than what is impli­ed in this Assertion, that there is no God.

AND as it lays the greatest Reproach up­on our Nature, so it also renders us the most Ridiculous of all Beings. For there are certain Affections interwoven with Humane Na­ture, which if there be no God are shame­fully ridiculous; such as the Dread of in­visible Powers, the Sense of Good and Evil, and the anxious Expectation of a Judg­ment to come; all which are so deeply in­laid in our Beings, as that with all our [Page 164] Arts and Reasoning we cannat totally erase them. And even the Atheists themselves who have tried all possible ways of extin­guishing them, have found by Experience that the utmost they can do is, to damp and stupifie them at present; but that in despight of them they will revive and awake again when Death or Danger ap­proaches them. Now how ridiculous are these Affections in Humane Nature, if there be no such Being as a God? For up­on this Supposal we have Passions that have no Objects in the Nature of things, that have nothing in the World to move and affect them, but wild Chimeraes, flying Dragons, and Castles in the Air; and whereas all other Beings have real Objects in Nature corresponding to their several Instincts and Affections (for so the Hare hath a natural dread of a Dog, the Sheep of a Wolf, the Mice of a Cat, the Toad of a Spider, all the Objects of which dread have a real Existence) Poor silly Man, supposing there is no God, naturally trem­bles at an invisible Nothing, and is horri­bly afraid of the Shadow of an Imagina­tion. So that if the Atheists Opinion were true, the Ape that looks pale at the sight of a Snail, and flies as if he feared lest that slow Creature should overtake and devour [Page 165] him, would be a great deal less ridiculous than timorous Man, whose Nature is thus hagg'd with frightful Imaginations of in­visible Powers and a Judgment to come.

AND what Man that hath any Reve­rence for the Humane Nature within him, would ever suffer himself to be bribed for an Opinion that doth not only undervalue but deride and Ridicule it. Should you hear your self branded with a contemptible Character, or ranked among Apes or any such ridiculous Animals, you would doubt­less be so far from courting the Author of it, that you would resent it as a great Af­front, and think your selves obliged in honour to return the Provocation; and yet for the sake of a few base Lusts, which are the Shame and Scandal of your Na­tures, you espouse the Cause of Atheism, tho it derides and affronts you to your Face, and stains the Glory of your Na­tures with the most contemptible and ridi­culous Character in the World.

II. THE Atheist concludes against the very Being and Well-being of Humane So­ciety. For the Soul that penetrates through all Humane Society, and compacts and unites it in a regular Body, is Religion, or the Sense and Acknowledgment of a Divine Pow­er, without which all the Parts of the [Page 166] Corporation of Mankind, like the Mem­bers of a dead Body, must necessarily dis­band and flye abroad into Atoms. For a form'd Society which is an united Multi­tude consists in the Harmony and Consent of its Members mutually united by Laws and Agreements, and disposed into a Re­gular Subordination to one another, nei­ther of which can any Humane Society long continue without the Belief and Ac­knowledgment of a God.

FOR without this in the first place, 'tis impossible that the Parts of any Society should continue united by Laws and A­greements. For 'tis from the Belief of a God, that all the Obligations of Consci­ence are derived; so that take that away and these must dissolve; and when the Obligations of Conscience are dissolved, there is nothing but Mens temporal Inte­rests can oblige them to conform to those Laws and mutual Agreements, by which they are united to one another. And if it be their Interest only that obliges them to be just and faithful to their mutual Agree­ments, they will be equally obliged to be unjust and unfaithful, when ever it is their Interest to be so. So that this Principle which only obliges them to be honest while it is for their Advantage, will as effectually oblige [Page 167] them to be Knaves when ever the Case is altered; and things being reduced to this Issue, there remains no Foundation of Trust and mutual Confidence among Men. For what can any Mans Promise signifie, if he be under no Obligation but Interest? To be sure if it be for his Interest he will do what he says without any Promise; but if it be not, what Promise can oblige him? You will say it is his Interest to keep his Word, be­cause otherwise he will forfeit his Reputa­tion for the future? But pray what Repu­tation can a Man have to forfeit, that owns no other Law or Obligation but his Interest? or who will ever presume upon that Mans Word and Engagement, whose avowed Principle it is to be honest no lon­ger than he can gain by it? Thus Atheism you see, resolves all our Obligations into our worldly Interest, which is so fickle and mutable a Principle, so dependent upon Chance and the Inconstancies of Fortune, that there is no hold to be taken of those that are governed by it. For that which is their Interest to Day may be their Disad­vantage to Morrow, and if it should so happen, they must steer a contrary Course, or else act contrary to their leading Princi­ple. So that for Men to trust each other upon this fickle Principle, is all one as to [Page 168] relie upon the Constancy of a Weather­cock, which every contrary Wind turns to a contrary Position. And things being once reduced to this Issue, that Men can place no Trust or Confidence in one another, their Society will soon become their great­est Plague and Vexation. For every Man will be forced to stand upon his Guard against every Man, and keep himself re­served and retired within himself; till at last out of mutual Distrust and Jealousie of one another, they are forced to with­draw their Society, and to live apart in se­parate Dens for fear of being intrapt and devoured by each other.

AND as Atheism cuts in sunder those Ligaments of mutual Trust and Agreement, by which the Parts of Humane Society are united; so it also dissolves that Regu­lar Subordination that is between them. Plutarch observes in his Treatise against Colot, [...], i. e. It seems to me more possible for a City to stand without Ground, than for a Commonwealth to subsist and continue without the Belief of a God; which is [...] only firm Foundation whereup­ [...] [...] and Society depends. For [Page 169] if there be no God, what should oblige any to own any Superiour, or pay any Sub­mission? And if his Interest be his only Ob­ligation to his Superiours, when ever he can mend his Fortune by Rebelling against them, that very same Interest which at present restrains him from it, will with equal force invite him to it; nor will it sig­nifie any thing that we are obliged to the contrary by Oaths of Fidelity and Allegi­ance; for if it be our Interest to be faithful to the Government, our own Prudence and Discretion will oblige us to it without such Oaths as well as with them; but if it be not our Interest, and this be the only Principle that obliges us, no Oath or En­gagement can hold us. So that in this State of things all the Security that Governors can have of their Subjects, is, that they will not Rebel when they are not able; but as soon as they think it safe, to be sure they will think it lawful; which being once admitted will undermine the very Foundations of Government, and utterly dissolve that regular Subordination by which Humane Society is supported. Whereas admitting that the Laws of our Prince are bound upon us by the Autho­rity of a Sovereign Lord, who can render us eternally happy or miserable, we are [Page 170] obliged to obey him by all that we can hope or fear, and have all the Engagements to Loyalty that the Reflections on a happy or miserable Eternity can lay upon us. What a prodigious piece of Folly is it therefore for Men to embrace Atheism as their Inte­rest, which doth thus directly tend to de­prive us of all the Comforts of Society, by involving us in eternal Confusions and Dis­orders? For if once we take away mutual Trust and Government from the World, both which have a necessary Dependence on the Belief of a God, we break all the Harmo­ny of Humane Society, and convert it into a Commonwealth of Canibals. And what Man in his Wits would ever be found of an Opinion that proclaims open War with Mankind, and is pregnant with Conse­quents so fatal and destructive to the World? Can we think it more advantage­ous to us that Atheism should be true, than that Humane Society should be up­held and perpetuated? or are the Pleasures we reap from the Lusts which incline us to Atheism, comparably so valuable as the Benefits which acrue to us from being for­med and united into regular Corporations? If not, how apparently do we engage a­gainst our own Interest, when we espouse the Cause of Irreligion?

[Page 171]III. THE Atheist concludes against that which is the main Support and Com­fort of Humane Life. For while we are in this World, our best and securest Con­dition is exposed to a world of sad and uncomfortable Accidents, which we have neither the Wisdom to foresee, nor the Power to prevent; So far are we from be­ing self-sufficient as to our worldly Hap­piness, that there are a thousand Causes upon which we depend for it, that are not in our Power to dispose of; and in such a State of uncertainty wherein we are con­tinally bandyed to and fro, and made the Game of inconstant Fortune, what Quiet or Security can we enjoy within our selves without believing that there is a God at the Helm, that steddily over-rules all events that concern us, and steers and directs them by the invariable Compass of his own infinite Wisdom and Goodness. For consi­dering how poor and indigent our Nature is, how we are fain to seek abroad and to go a begging from Door to Door for our Happiness; how we depend upon Chance, and are secure of nothing we possess, or desire, or hope for; how prone we are to be alarmed with the Prospect of a sad Fu­turity, and to magnifie distant Evils in our own Aprehensions; how apt we are to ag­gravate [Page 172] our Miseries by our Impatience and Despair, and to pall our Enjoyments by expecting more from them than their Natures will afford; considering these things, I say, which way can we turn our selves without a God? or where can we re­pose our restless Thoughts but in his Pro­vidence? Verily, could I be tempted to believe that there is no God, I should look upon Humane Nature in its present Cir­cumstances as the most forlorn and aban­doned part of the Creation, and wish that I had had the Luck to be of any other Spe­cies than that of a Rational Animal. For in the State I am I find my self liable to a thousand Dangers against which I have no Sanctuary, and under which I have no Sup­port, if there be no God to govern the World; and having such a dismal Prospect of things before me, and a busie Mind within me that will be continually working on and aggravating the Evils of it, what can I do with my self, or how can I enjoy my self without a God to relie on? Upon the supposal that he is, and that he go­verns the World I can easily relieve my self under the most dismal Apprehensions; I can fairly conclude and safely depend on it, that if I take care by my submission to Gods Will to make him my Friend, he [Page 173] will either prevent the Evils I apprehend, or support me under them, or convert them to my good, either of which is sufficient to set my Heart at ease, and instate me in a quiet Enjoyment of my self. But now by giving up the Belief of a God, I throw away all these Considerations, and leave my self utterly destitute and supportless. For what solid ground of Support can I have when I have no manner of Security either that the Evils I dread shall be pre­vented, or that I shall have a Proportio­nable Strength to bear them, or that I shall ever reap any good or advantage from them; without which Considerations every Evil that threatens or befals me is pure unmin­gled Misery, against which there is no Fence or Cordial in Reason or Philosophy. For suppose I should argue with the anci­ent Moralists, that every ill Accident that befalls me is fatal, as being the Effect of some necessary Cause that is without my Power or Disposal, and therefore 'tis un­reasonable for me to grieve at it; this will be so far from any way mollifying the An­guish of my Mind, that 'twill rather in­rage and inflame it. For that my Calami­ty is fatal, so that it is not in my Power to avoid or remove it, is rather an Aggra­vation than a Diminution of it. Or sup­pose [Page 174] I should reason as the same Moralists otherwhiles do, Why should I grieve at the Evils that befal me, when alas! my Grief will be so far from lessening them that 'twill rather encrease and multiply them, contribute new Venome to their Stings, and render them more pungent and dolorous; What a faint Cordial would it be to my oppressed Mind, to consider that my Grief will but augment my Load? It is some Ease to a dejected Soul to vent its Griefs in Moans and Lamentations, which while she seeks to smother in a sullen silence like imprisoned Wind will breed a Collick in her Bowels; and is it not a sad thing that I must deny my self the only Solace of a miserable Man, for fear of augmenting my Misery? Again, suppose I should reason thus with the same Authors, that Af­flictions are indifferent things, and in themselves neither good nor evil, but in­differently improvable into Mischiefs or Benefits; this I confess were a good Ar­gument supposing that the Affliction came from a good God, who can extract Good out of all our Evils, and render the rank­est Poyson Medicinal; but otherwise you will find 'tis but a cold Comfort to call your Misery by another Name; For if there be no God to temper our Evils, and [Page 175] to ordain and direct them to wise and good Ends, we shall find in the issue they will prove themselves Evils to us by what soft Name soever we may call them. Again, and to name no more, Suppose I should reason thus, as these Masters of Morality do, that to bear Afflictions with an un­concerned Mind is brave, and manly, and generous; that it is an Argument of a great and Heroick Mind, that hath raised it self above the reach of Misfortunes; I readily confess so it is, supposing a Man hath good reason thus to bear his Afflicti­ons, which is the Question in debate; for then it is the Triumph of Reason over Passion, and an illustrious Instance of a well fortified Mind; but if we have no reason for it, all these glorious Words, Generous, Brave, &c. are nothing but empty Flash and mere Rodomontado. For for a Man to be unconcerned with Evils without reason, is so far from being generous and brave, that 'tis an Argument of his brutal Stupi­dity and Fool-hardiness. But yet supposing that there is no God, these are the main Ar­guments we have to support our selves under any Calamity. But alas, such real Griefs of ours are not to be redress'd with pretty Sayings and grave Sentences, which tho they may look takingly at a Distance, [Page 176] will when we come to apply and experi­ence them force us to pronounce as Job did of his Friends, miserable Comforters are ye all, and Physicians of no value. So that were we left destitute of God and a Providence, and of all those blessed Sup­ports we derive from thence, we were of all Creatures the most miserable. For in this state of things we are compassed about with Miseries and Misfortunes, and which without God is our greatest Misfortune, we have a thing called Reason within our Breast, which is very ingenious in giving Stings to our Miseries, and vexing us with cutting Reflections on them, but is not able to qualifie one Grief, or minister one dram of solid Comfort to us.

BUT when we lift up our Eyes to God, there are such vast and innumerable Com­forts flowing down to us from the Consi­deration of his Nature and Providence, as are sufficient not only to allay our Sorrows, but to convert them into Joys and Tri­umphs. For in him we behold not only an infinite Wisdom that always knows what is best for us, but also an infinite Goodness that always wills what it knows to be so, and an infinite Power that always does what it wills; and whilst we see and con­sider this, there is nothing in the World [Page 177] can happen amiss to us; Welcome Pain, welcome Pleasure, welcome Loss, welcome Gain, welcome Disgrace, welcome Honour; for if we have but God our Friend, we may securely depend upon it, that what­ever befalls us is best for us.

WHO but a Mad-man therefore would ever espouse the Cause of Atheism, or make it his Interest to exclude God out of the World? Indeed were he an envious, ma­licious, or tyrannical Being, that repined at the Happiness of his Creatures, and watch­ed all Opportunities to plague or destroy them, 'twere but reasonable we should endeavour to quit our Minds of the Belief of him; but to imagine it our Interest to believe there is no such Being in the World as a Good God, that out of the immense Benignity of his Nature espouses our Inte­rest, and takes care of our Happiness; that understands our Wants, and compassio­nates our Sufferings, and is able and wil­ling to support and relieve us; that re­quires nothing of us but what is for our good, and will infinitely reward us for doing that which is best for our selves; that connives at our Follies, and pities our Infirmities, and upon our unfeigned Re­pentance is ready to be reconciled to us, even when we wilfully and presumptuously [Page 178] provoke him; to Imagine it, I say, our In­terest to shake off the Belief of such a bles­sed Being as this, is the utmost height of Folly and Madness. For 'twere doubtless a thousand times more tolerable for Men that the Sun should be pulled down from the Firmament, and all the Lights of Heaven extinguished, than that the Belief of a God should be banished from the World, the absence of which would over­spread Mankind with such a dismal Night of Horror and Despair and Blackness of Darkness, as would render all wise and considering Men aweary of their Beings, and cause them to wish a thousand times over, as for the utmost Good they could devise for themselves, O that there were such a Being as a God at the Helm of the World, that so the Affairs of it might be steered by an infinite Power, that is always direct­ed by an infinite Wisdom, and always by­assed and inclined by an infinite Goodness! What then can be more brutish or irratio­nal, than for the sake of a few base Lusts that are the Scandal of our Nature, the Bane of our Society, the Vexation of our Lives, and the Disturbance of all our Happiness, to banish the Belief of a God from our Minds which is the Foundation of our Hope, and the only support we can rationally depend on.

[Page 179]IV. THE Atheist concludes for that side of the Question which is infinitely the most unsafe and hazardous. He who believes there is a God and acts according­ly, runs a very small and inconsiderable Ven­ture if in the issue of things he should chance to be mistaken; he only ventures the dissatisfying a few extravagant Lusts, the crossing some irregular Inclinations of his Nature, which if he had gratified would have vexed and tormented him, and entan­gled his Life with a thousand ill Circum­stances; he only ventures some Prayers and some Tears, some Watchings and Srug­lings and Contentions with himself, and per­haps some Reproaches and Persecutions for Righteousness sake, in Exchange for which he hath commonly a healthful and a prospe­rous, an even, safe and contented Life, a quiet and a Triumphant Conscience, and a joyous Expectation of a blissful Eternity to come, which do outweigh all the Incommodities he ventures, all the Pains he undergoes, and all the Pleasures of which he debars himself; and if in the Conclusion when he resigns up his Breath, it appears that there is neither God nor Heaven nor Hell, his Condition will be altogether as good as the Atheists, with whom he will sleep quietly in the same Dust under the same everlasting Insensibility.

[Page 180]BUT on the contrary, the Atheist by believing that there is no God and acting ac­cordingly, runs the most desperate Hazard in the World. For besides that he throws a­way the main Support and Comfort of his Life, and lays himself open to all Contin­gencies, and resigns up the Satisfaction of a good Conscience together with the Hopes of a blessed Futurity, and all the innume­rable Joys it abounds with; besides all which, I say, he ventures to be eternally wretched and miserable in the World to come, and exposes himself naked and de­fenceless to the unquenchable Wrath of an everliving God; in Exchange for all which he hath no other present Compensation, but the Pleasures of a riotous and tumul­tuary Life, which do always die away in the Enjoyment, and are generally dasht and sophisticated with a thousand very sad and uncomfortable Circumstances. And then if when he concludes this present Scene of Life, he should find himself mistaken in his Atheistical Confidence, and be unexpe­ctedly summoned to the Tribunal of that God, whose Being and Authority he hath so peremptorily denied and affronted, and from thence be transmitted into a dismal Eternity, there to languish out an everla­sting Existence in remediless Woes and un­pitied [Page 181] Lamentations; how would it asto­nish and confound him to find his confident Infidelity baffled by such a woful Experi­ment, when instead of being asleep in a state of Silence and Insensibility, which was the thing he depended on, he shall find himself wasted to a strange Shoar, and there landed among Devils and miserable Spirits, in a state of endless, easless and re­mediless Calamity! How blank and forlorn will the Fool look to find himself thus fa­tally mistaken? and yet for all he knows this may be the Result and Issue of things. So that 'tis a very small Hazard you see that good Men run, compared with that of the Atheist; for should they be mista­ken, their Condition will be as good as his at the winding up of the Bottom; but if they should not, it will be infinitely bet­ter.

IT is storied of a certain Hermite, who being retired from the World, led a very severe and mortified Life, that being one day met by two Cardinals, who were ri­ding by with a very Pompous Equipage, was thus acosted by them, Father, why should you thus mortifie and macerate your self by retiring from the Glories and Plea­sures of this Life? Suppose now that after all your Religious Severities, there should be [Page 182] neither a God nor a future World to reward you, would it not be egregious Folly in you thus to throw away present Enjoy­ments for future Nothings? To which the good Man presently returned this An­swer; But Sirs, suppose there should be a God and a future World to punish you, would it not be egregious Folly in you, to run such a desperate Venture as you do of being everlastingly miserable, for the sake of a few momentary Honours and Advance­ments? Upon which, as the Story saith, the Cardinals being convinced, went away very pensive. And herein doubtless the honest Hermite was very much in the right. For were it a Moot-point whether there be a God or no, one would think in a matter of such unspeakable Moment, and where the Hazard on each side is so infi­nitely unequal, there is no Man in his Wits but would choose the safest side, and make that his Rule and Principle to live by. In this therefore the Atheist is justly chargeable with the most desperate Folly, that whereas at least he might be safe, if not eternally Happy, by believing that there is a God and acting accordingly, he rather chooses to venture being eternally Miserable, by believing there is none and acting as if there were none. In short, this [Page 183] is the plain state of the Case, if I be­lieve that God is and act consonantly, I shall be safe if he be not, and eternally happy if he be; whereas if I believe that he is not, I ame sure to be miserable for ever if he be, and am only safe from being mi­serable for ever if he be not; and this be­ing the Case, I leave any Man to judge which of the two is in Prudence more eli­gible, the peradventure of being happy for ever or of being miserable for ever, supposing both to be equally probable. But

V. The Atheist concludes for the unsa­fest side of the Question upon the greatest Vncertainties in the World. One would think before a Man assented to a Conclusi­on, the Consequence of which, if he should be mistaken, will be for ever fatal to him, he should be so wise at least as to look be­fore he leap, and satisfie himself of the Grounds he concludes on, and not to give up his Assent upon every doubtful and un­certain Appearance. Now that part of the Question which the Atheist Assents to, is of such mighty Consequence as that should it prove false he is lost for ever; and there­fore one would think it concerned him to be very sure of his hand, and take care that his Assent be founded upon very strong and [Page 184] undeniable Evidence, instead of which he assents at a venture, and grounds his Belief upon the most sandy Foundations. For

1. He concludes for a pure Negative.

2. He concludes for it upon a bare Possibility.

3. He concludes for it against the best Evidence that the Contrary will admit.

I. HE concludes for a pure Negative. All Men are agreed that 'tis a very hard thing to prove a Negative; but to prove a pure Negative is impossible, unless the Ex­istence of the thing which it denies implies an express Contradiction. 'Tis true, where a thing visibly exists so that we can perceive as well how it doth not exist as how it doth, we may with as good Evidence de­ny as affirm; but as for pure Negatives which deny the very Existence of such things as may possibly exist, it is impossible to be certain of them without an infinite Understanding. For before we can be sure that what is not in our Understanding is not in Nature, we must be sure that what­soever is in Nature, is in our Understand­ing, otherwise a thousand things may be tho we do not understand them. As for Instance, Unless I were sure that I had the perfect Map or Geography of such a Coun­try in my Head, it is impossible I should [Page 185] be sure that there is no such Town, or City, or Region belonging thereunto; and so un­less I were sure that the Cosmography or V­niversal Map of Nature were perfectly deli­neated on my Vnderstanding, I cannot po­sitively affirm that such or such a Being doth not actually exist. So that as a great Divine of our own hath well observed up­on this very Argument, after all that can be said against a thing this will still be true, that many things possibly are which we know not of, and that many things more may be than are. For unless our Under­standing were extended to the whole Com­pass of Nature, there may be, for all we know, ten thousand things in Nature which are not in our Vnderstanding. So that con­cerning pure Negatives we can never be certain, unless the things which they de­ny be absolutely impossible, and imply, in the very Notion of their Existence, a plain Contradiction; which cannot be said of the Existence of God. For by God we mean nothing but a Being endowed with all pos­sible Perfections; and to say that it is im­possible that there should be any such Being as is endowed with all the Perfections that 'tis possible for a Being to be indowed with, is to assert Possibilities impossible, which is a Contradiction in Terms. Since therefore [Page 186] this Negative that there is no God, denies that which is possible in its Nature, and which implies not the least Shadow of Con­tradiction, it is impossible, supposing it were true, for any finite Understanding to be certain of it. What Man in his Wits then would ever presume to deny the Being of God, and to Stake his everlasting Fate on it, when he knows beforehand that he cannot be sure that his Denial is true, and that if it prove false he is lost for ever! A­las! what is this but to throw Dice for our Souls, and to venture our Salvation on a wild Vncertainty?

II. THE Atheist concludes for a pure Negative upon a bare Possibility. One would think in a Matter of such infinite Moment, Men should at least be so wise as not to conclude without strong Probabili­ties, where they can find no Certainty to relie on; but so desperately fool-hardy is the Atheist as to suspend his Faith, and with that his Salvation, upon the bare Pos­sibility that there may be no God. For when he is urged with those Arguments of Gods Being, that are drawn from the beautiful Contrivance of the World, he hath no other way to evade them, but by endea­vouring to demonstrate how by the neces­sary Laws of Matter and Motion, things [Page 187] might possibly be shuffled together as they are without the Agency and Direction of a God; and yet even in this Attempt so ma­ny inextricable Difficulties present them­selves as have puzled and confounded the acu­test Wits that were ever engaged in it; and while with all their Art and Contrivance they have been framing their Hypothesis of the Existence of this World without a God, they have been forced not only to beg some Principles, but also to assert others that upon Examination have been found repugnant to the Nature of things; and when all is done, if both were true, yet are they altogether insufficient to solve a thousand Phainomena in Nature. So that the utmost that the most learned and in­quisitive Atheist could ever pretend to, was to advance Atheism to a Grand perhaps, and by endeavouring to demonstrate how things might possibly be as they are without a God, to prove that 'tis possible there is none; and yet when all is done, their most ingenious Endeavours are only a Demonstra­tion that the most acute and witty Men may be mistaken. For what a hopeless kind of Task is it to shew how that may be the Effect of a blind Chance or Necessity, which hath all the Characters of a wise Design and Contrivance fairly imprinted on it? [Page 188] How is it possible for an undesigning Chance to fit Means to Ends, or Ends to Natures, or so to proportion Parts to one another as to make a comely Symmetry in the whole, and this in ten thousand Instances and not fail in one? How often, as the above named Author from Tully discourses, might a Man after he hath shaken together a Sett of Letters in a Bag, fling them out upon the Ground, before they would fall into an exact Poem, or make a good Discourse in Prose? And may not a little Book be as easily made by Chance as the great Volume of the World, in which there is such an inexhaustible Treasure of rich Sense and Contrivance? Or how long might a Man be in sprinkling Colours upon a Can­vas with a careless Hand, before they would happen to fall into the exact Picture of a Man? And is a Man easier made by Chance than his Picture? Why may we not as well conceive the most regular Build­ing in the World to be framed by a casual Concourse of Stone and Iron and Timber, as that these blind and rambling Parts of Matter should chance to place themselves so orderly in the World, and to observe such an exact Harmony and Decorum as if they kept Time with the Musical Laws of some almighty Mind, that composed [Page 189] their Measures and regulated their Motions up and down in the Universe?

BUT granting the Atheist what he so eagerly tho unsuccessfully contends for, that it is possible all this might happen by mere Chance, and consequently that there may be no God in the World, would any Man in his Wits found his Faith upon a mere Pos­sibility, when 'twill be as much as his Soul is worth if he should happen to be mista­ken? It is possible that should he throw himself from the Top of a high Steeple, the Air between may be so condensed as to bear him up and preserve him from being dasht in pieces by his Fall; but would you not think the Man slark mad that should venture his Neck upon that Possibility? And yet it is a far more desperate Venture that the Atheist makes, by thus hazarding his Soul to everlasting Destruction, upon a bare possibility that there may be no God to destroy him.

III. THE Atheist concludes against the best evidence that the Contrary will admit. For that there is a God we have as full E­vidence as the Matter could bear if there were one, and to require more is absurd and unreasonable. For let us at present sup­pose, but for Argument-sake, that there were such an infinite Spirit in the World; [Page 190] a Spirit that were as wise, and as good, and as powerful as he whom we call God is sup­posed to be; supposing, I say, there were such a Spirit actually existing, we could not have greater Evidence of it than we have already that he actually exists. For we could not see him with our Eyes, because we suppose him to be a Spirit, we could not demonstrate his Existence à priori or from any Cause, because being the first Cause he must be un caused or Self-Origi­nated. It remains therefore that the only Demonstration we could give of his Being, is that which we call à posteriori or from such sensible Effects as can only be ascribed to the Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness of such a Being; and of such Effects as these we have infinite Instances before us. For in sum, we have all this visible World about us, whose changeable Nature de­monstrates it to be the Effect of some supe­rior Cause, and whose unspeakable Vast­ness, Beauty, and Contrivance argues it to be the Effect of some most wise, and good and powerful Cause. For as to the first, whatsoever is changeable cannot self-exist, but must necessarily proceed from some su­perior Cause; because whatsoever Self-exists is necessarily, and whatsoever is necessarily is always the same; that which is without [Page 191] any Cause cannot but be, and that which is thus or thus without any Cause, cannot but be so or so for ever; and conse­quently if the World were of it self without any Cause, it would not only be necessarily, but also be such as it is necessa­rily and unchangeably; but contrariwise we plainly perceive that it runs a perpetual Course of Change and Alteration, that its Parts are continually altering their Figure, and shifting their Places with one another, whereas if this Part were of it self neces­sarily, as it must be if the Whole be so, it would necessarily be where it is and what it is eternally.

AND since the Mutability of this World argues it to be the Effect of some superior Cause, I would fain know whether con­sidering the Vastness, and Beauty, and Contrivance of it, it be not most reasona­ble to attribute it to such an all-good, all-wise, and Almighty Cause as we suppose God to be. For what less than an infinite Power can bear a due Proportion to such a vast and immense World? Should you en­ter into a vast and magnificent Palace, and find no Creature in it, but a company of Mice or Weasels, could you possibly be­lieve that these impotent Vermin built it? And yet the building of the most Royal [Page 192] Palace doth not so much exceed the Power of these weak Animals, as the building of this World doth the Power of any Cause but a God. But then if we consider the infinite Number of Beings in the World that are capable of Happiness, and the vast Provisions that are made to entertain them according to their several Capacities, we cannot but thence conclude that the Power which made them was acted by an infinite Goodness. Lastly, if we consider the rare and admirable Contrivance of the se­veral Parts of the World; how perfect each one is in its Kind, how exactly fitted to each other, and what a lovely Symmetry and Proportion they all make in the whole, how can we otherwise imagine but that that Power and Goodness which caused it was di­rected by an infinite Wisdom? So that the World is such an Effect as openly pro­claims its Cause to be a God; and if this E­vidence of Gods Existence will not con­vince Men, they are impregnably fortified against all Conviction; and if God should carry them into those infinite Spaces that are beyond the Limits of this World, and there command a New One into Being, while they stood looking on, and saw it springing out of nothing, they might with as good reason conclude that World to be [Page 193] nothing but a fortuitous Concourse of in­sensible Parts of Matter, as they now do that this is so. So that in fine, he that denies God after all these Demonstrations which he hath given of himself, is out of the reach of Argument, and if he pursue his own Principles, can never be convin­ced by any possible Reasons. And what a desperate Folly is it for Men to embrace a Belief, which should they be mistaken draws after it everlasting Ruin, when they have all the Reasons to the contrary that the Matter is capable of? What is this but to shut their Eyes, and cast themselves blind­fold on their own Destruction, and to re­solve to wink hard and believe against all possible Reasons, that so they may ruin themselves without any Interruption?

VI. and Lastly, THE Atheist plainly contradicts himself in his own Conclusion. For by denying that God is, he necessari­ly denies the Possibility of his Being. For if he be not, it is impossible he should ever be; because Eternity of Being is included in the Notion of him. For when we speak of God, we mean by him a Being that is before all Causes, and the Cause of all Causes, and that therefore oweth not his Being to any prior Cause, but doth ne­cessarily, independently, and eternally exist. [Page 194] So that if he be not now, he cannot be at all, because he must begin to be, which is contradictory to the very essential Notion and Idea of him. For if he should ever begin to be, he cannot be Eternal, and if he be not Eternal he cannot be God. So that to say God is not, is by necessary Consequence to say he cannot be at all; and yet by a God we mean at the same time a Being that is endowed with all the possible Perfections that a Being is capable of. Wherefore as by saying that God is not, we do by Consequence assert that it is im­possible he should ever be, so by asserting that it is impossible he should ever be, we do in effect assert this gross Contradiction; that it is impossible such a Being should ever be as includes all the Perfections that are possible to a Being. Thus in the same Breath we pronounce that God can and cannot be, that 'tis possible he is, and yet impossible he should ever be. For by saying that he is a Being endowed with all the possible Perfections of Being, we expresly affirm that it is possible he may be; but by saying that there is no such Being actu­ally existing, we do as expresly assert that it is impossible he should ever be. He there­fore who asserts that God is not, doth by necessary Consequence assert this express [Page 195] Contradiction, that it is impossible there should ever be a Being as perfect as it is pos­sible. And when if there be a God, Mens eternal Fate depends but upon believing that he is and acting accordingly, what a monstrous Folly is it for Men to contradict themselves to deny him; what is this but to stake their Souls upon it, that the very first Principle of reasoning is false, and put their Fate upon this desperate Issue, that unless both Parts of a Contradiction prove true, they must inevitably perish for ever?

And now having shewn you from what malignant Causes Atheism springs, and how desperately foolish and unreasonable it is in it self, let us all endeavour by the serious Consideration of what hath been said, to fortifie our Minds against it. And since this Proposition that God is, is the prime Foundation of all Religion, it con­cerns us all to use our utmost Diligence to establish our Minds in the firm and sted­fast Belief of it; and this we cannot fail to do, if we heartily endeavour it. For the Arguments of Gods Being do shine all round about us with such a clear and convincing Light, that we need do no more than just open our Eyes to it, and dispel those mischievous Causes from our Wills, that hide and obscure it from our Vnder­standings. [Page 196] And when once we have throughly setled the Belief of Gods Be­ing in our Minds, it will mightily influence all our Powers of Action; it will invite our Hope, and alarm our Fear, and Address to every Passion in us that is capable of Per­swasion, and be an everliving Spring of Religion within us; for God is an Object so infinitely Great in himself, and of such infinite Moment and Concernment to us, that 'tis next to impossible we should firmly believe that he is, without being vigorously impress'd with religious Affections upon the Consideration of his Being.

CHAP. IV. Of the Necessity of acknowledging the divine Providence to oblige us to be truly Religious.

THE main Influence which the Belief of a God hath upon the Minds of Men, proceeds immediately from the Be­lief of his Providence, without which we [Page 197] are no way concerned or Interested in him. For a God without a Providence is a solita­ry kind of Being that lives alone from the World, altogether retired within himself, and never looks abroad or any ways inter­meddles with any thing without; and what have we to do with a Being that hath no­thing to do with us or our Affairs, but lives apart from us in some unaccessible Re­tirement, where neither we can go to him nor he come to us? So that it is by his Providence that all Correspondence and In­tercourse between God and his Creatures is maintained; which being taken away, he is as nothing to us, and we are as nothing to him. For what doth it signifie to us that there is a certain excellent Being, cal­led God, sitting on the Top of the Heavens with his Arms folded in his Bosom, and who doth nothing there but enjoy himself in a quiet Contemplation of his own Per­fections, without regarding any thing without him, or doing either good or hurt to the World? Such a God is nothing but a great Cypher in the World, that only makes a glorious Flourish, but is as insig­nificant as no God at all. For to what pur­pose should we pray to a God that is not at leisure to hear us, or hope in a God that is not concerned to help us? What should [Page 198] move us to love a God that bestows no Good, or to fear a God that inflicts no Evil, or to obey a God that hath no Regard of our Actions? Why should we thank him if we receive nothing from him? For what should we praise him if he be no ways be­neficial to the World? And wherein should we imitate him if he sits still and does no­thing, and exercises neither Wisdom, nor Goodness, nor Justice, nor Mercy towards any thing without him? All which Perfe­ctions of the Deity without a Providence are utterly void and useless. For his Pro­vidence is the great Sphere of Activity wherein he exercises and displays his Per­fections, wherein his Power executes the Contrivances of his Wisdom, and his Wis­dom contrives the Methods of his Good­ness; so that without his Providence all his Perfections will signifie nothing. For what doth that Wisdom signifie that contrives nothing? Or that Power which doth no­thing? Or that Goodness that is good for nothing? Or that Justice which distributes nothing? And yet just such Cyphers are all the Perfections of God suppose there is no Providence wherein to employ and exercise them. And if once we vacate and extin­guish these Perfections of God which are the Graces which render him so Sublime [Page 199] and Adorable, what Reason can move us to adore and Worship him? For why should we concern our selves with a God who concerns himself with no Body, and that either hath neither Power, nor Wisdom, nor Goodness, or which to us is the same, makes no use of them? So that the denial of Gods Providence, you see, directly cuts in sunder all the Ties of Religion, by rendering him an insignificant Being to the World.

IN the Prosecution of this Argument I shall shew, First, What of the divine Pro­vidence it is that is necessary to be believed in order to our being truly Religious. Secondly, What Evidence there is to cre­ate in us this Belief. Thirdly, The Insuf­ficiency and Vnreasonableness of the com­mon Pretences to Infidelity in this matter.

SECT. I. What it is we are to believe of the divine Providence.

IN General, it is not sufficient that we be­lieve this or that Part or Branch of it, but we must acknowledge the Whole; every Part whereof the Whole consists being pregnant with very powerful Obligations to Religi­on. Now the Whole of Providence consists in Gods continual Conservation, Possession, [Page 200] Inspection, and Disposal of all things, and Government of the rational World. So that the Whole of it includes these five Parts or Branches,

  • 1. Gods continual Conservation of all things.
  • 2. His continual Possession of all things.
  • 3. His continual Inspection of all things.
  • 4. His continual Ordering and Disposal of all things.
  • 5. His continual Government of the ra­tional World. All which, as I shall shew, are highly necessary to be believed in order to our being truly Religious.

I. To oblige us to be truly religious, it is necessary we should believe that God continually upholds and conserves all things. That he alone is the great Atlas on whose almighty Shoulders the whole Frame of things depends. For tho the works of Hu­mane Art do often stand many Ages after the Workmans Hand is withdrawn from them, yet the reason is because there is Something between them and Nothing, viz, the pre-existing Matter of which they are formed; whereas the Works of God being all produced out of Nothing, have nothing between them, but that creative Power which produced them. And therefore as Mans Works would necessarily perish were [Page 201] that pre-existing Matter taken away, which stands between them and Nothing, so Gods Works would necessarily resolve into nothing, should that creative Power be withdrawn which stands between them and nothing. In short pre-existing Matter is the Basis of our Works, and creative Power of Gods; and therefore as our Works must cease to be were their pre-existing Matter withdrawn, so Gods Works must cease to be were his creative Power withdrawn. So that 'tis the same almighty Power which raised the World out of Nothing that keeps it from sinking into nothing; and that it is this Moment is as much the Effect of divine Power, as that it was that Moment when it was first created. For the World was no more able to give it self the second Moment of Being than it was the first, nor the third than the second, and so on through all the past and future Moments of its Be­ing. For one Moment of Being is as much as another, and therefore to give a second requires the same Power as to give a first; and if so, then each succeeding Moment of the Worlds Duration and Continuance, must be derived from the Cause of the first Moment of its Being. So that the Crea­tion and Conservation of the World, is only the same Act continuing and flowing on [Page 202] (like a Line from a Mathematical Point) from the first Instant of its Being to the last Period of its Duration. And so the Scripture represents it; thus Nehemiah 9.6. Thou, even thou art Lord alone, thou hast made Heaven, the Heaven of Heavens with all their Hosts, the Earth and all things that are therein, and thou preservest them all; and Acts 17.25, 28. he giveth to all life and breath and all things, in him we live, and move, and have our being; and Heb. 1.3. he is said to uphold all things by the word of his Power.

WHICH is a Truth of that vast Impor­tance to Religion, that it is hardly concei­vable how it can subsist without it. For while we look on our selves as Beings that are independent from God, that do live, and breath, and subsist of our selves, with­out any new Supplies of Being from him, why should we serve and worship him? What reason have we to trust in a Being from whom we expect no Support? Or to render Homage to a Being on whom we have no Dependence? So that by disbelie­ving this Part of the divine Providence, we do in effect cut off all Intercourse between God and our selves, and lay an Imbargo on Religion. For if we depend not on him, what have we to do with him? And if we [Page 203] owe not our Lives and Beings to his Power, what right hath he to exact our Obedience? But while we look upon our selves as Be­ings that hang upon him, and derive every Breath and Moment of our Beings from him, so that should he withdraw from us that almighty Arm that susteins us, and leave us to subsist of our selves, we must presently drop into nothing, how can we forbear without infinite Stupidity and In­gratitude to devote our selves and all our Powers and Faculties to his Service? For what a stupid Wretch should I be should I not study to please him upon whom I know my Life and Being depends, and who merely by withdrawing his Hand from underneath me can let me sink into nothing when he pleases; and what an un­grateful Wretch should I be should I refuse to honour, worship and obey him, from whom I draw every Breath I breath and derive new life and Being every Moment?

II. IT is also necessary we should be­lieve that God possesses all things; that he hath not given away this World from him­self, and cast it out of his own Disposal as a common Scramble among Men; but that he hath reserved to himself an absolute, unalienable and independent Propriety in all that we enjoy and possess. For all things [Page 204] owe their Being to him as he is the Creator and Vpholder of them; and therefore whatsoever is must necessarily be his, be­cause it is by his Power and Providence. And if we who act by the Power of God and can do nothing without him, may claim a Right to the Effects of our Inven­tion and Industry, how much more may God who contrived and produced all things by his own independent Wisdom and Pow­er? For our Wisdom and Power being Gods, he hath a Sovereign Right to all the Effects of them; but his Wisdom and Power are absolutely his own without De­pendence on any superior Cause; and therefore whatsoever are the Effects of them must necessarily be his by a most ab­solute and independent Propriety. And ac­cordingly he is stiled the possessor of Hea­ven and Earth, Gen. 14.19. and Moses tells his People, behold the Heaven and the Heaven of Heavens is the Lords, the Earth also and all that is therein, Deut. 10.14. and the Earth saith the Psalmist is the Lords and the fulness thereof, the World and they that dwell therein; for he hath founded it upon the Sea and prepared it up­on the Floods, Psal. 24.1. and 50.12. and the Heavens saith he again are thine, the Earth also is thine; as for the World and [Page 205] the fulness thereof thou hast founded them, Psal. 89.11.

GOD therefore being the Supreme Pro­prietor of the World, there is nothing can be justly ours but by his Will and Grant; and nothing can be ours by his Will, but what is honestly and justly ours. So that for us to seise upon any Part of the World by Fraud, or Violence, or Oppression, is to trespass upon God and invade his Proper­ty, and to tear his World from him against his Will. Thus whatsoever we possess by Wrong, we possess as Robbers and Invaders of God, and whatsoever we enjoy by Right, we enjoy as Tenants to the great Landlord of the World; and without owning and ac­knowledging this we cannot be truly Reli­gious. For if the World be not his, why should we pray to him for what we want of it, or praise him for what we enjoy? Why should we patiently submit to his Disposal when he deprives us of what we have? Or thankfully acknowledg his Good­ness when he supplies us with what we need? Why should we employ our Possessi­ons in his Service, or think our selves obli­ged to return him any Part of them in pi­ous or charitable Works? In a word, why should we be contented with a small share, and abide by that unequal Division of things [Page 206] that is made in the World, and not en­deavour to increase our own poor Heap by pilfering from other Mens that are ten times bigger than ours? Whence are these Obligations but from this Supposal, that God is the supreme Proprietor and Posses­sor of all things; which being denied there remains no solid Foundation of Reason for any of these great and necessary Duties of Religion.

III. To oblige us to be truly religious it is also necessary we should believe that God is present with and inspects all things; that his divine Substance is diffused through and circumfused about all things, so as to penetrate them within as an universal Soul, and contain them without as an universal Place. For so the Jewish Doctors are wont to call God Hamakom, that is to say, the Place or Continent of all things; because all things are incompassed by him, and do live and move within his infinite Bosom. For so in Scripture the divine Substance is described, as spreading it self through and a round the World, even to the utmost possi­bility of Extension. Whither saith the Psalmist, shall I go from thy Spirit, or whi­ther shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up into Heaven thou art there, if I make my bed in Hell, behold thou art there; [Page 207] if I take the Wings of the Morning, and dwell in the uttermost Parts of the Sea, even there shall thy Hand lead me and thy right Hand shall hold me, Psal. 139.7, 8, 9, 10. And Behold, saith Solomon, the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain thee, 1 Kings 8.27. yea do not I fill Heaven and Earth? saith the Lord himself, Jer. 23.24.

NOW tho Gods Omnipresence be strict­ly an Attribute of his Essence, and not a part of his Providence, yet 'tis such an At­tribute as includes his universal Providence, and without supposing of which an univer­sal Providence can hardly be conceived. For if he co-exists and be present with all things, he must be supposed to operate up­on them; because where ever he is, his infinite Wisdom and Power and Goodness are; which in their own Nature are such active Perfections as cannot be present where such a world of things are to be done, and sit still and do nothing. For how can we conceive that infinite Wisdom should be present where a world of things are to be ordered, and yet order nothing? That infinite Power should be present where a world of things are to be done, and yet do nothing? Or that infinite Good­ness should be present where a world of good is to be done, and do no good at all? [Page 208] Such an idle, restive Presence as this, is utterly inconsistent with such active Per­fections. So that the Omnipresence of an infinite Power and Wisdom, and Goodness necessarily supposes an universal Provi­dence, and without such an Omnipresence an universal Providence can hardly be conceived. For how can God be present by any Power, or Virtue or Efficacy of his Nature, in any Place from whence the real Substance of his Divinity is excluded? How can he operate by his own immedi­ate Efficiency where he is not? Or extend his divine Power, and Wisdom, and Good­ness over all things, except his divine Sub­stance in which these Attributes are, be co-extended with them. Every Agent must be where it acts, because it acts from its Being, and it is as possible for that which is not to operate, as for that which is to operate where it is not; and hence Socra­tes being asked how it was possible for one God to order all the Affairs of the World? returns this Answer, [...], i. e. God is so great and vast a Being, as that he hears and sees all things together, and is present every where, and takes care of all things at the same time. [Page 209] Thus Gods Omnipresence, you see, doth so include his universal Providence that with it 'tis necessary and without it inconcei­vable.

AND then from his Presence with all things, necessarily follows his Inspection of all things; because where ever he is, his infinite Knowledg is, which is inseparable from his Being; and were ever his infinite Knowledge is, it must necessarily have a through Prospect of all things round about him, so that nothing can be concealed from its Inspection. For so the Scripture assures us that the Eyes of the Lord run to and fro throughout the whole Earth, 2 Chron. 16.9. and that the Eyes of the Lord are in eve­ry place beholding the evil and good, Prov. 15.3. and in a word, that all things are open and naked to the Eyes of him with whom we have to do, Heb. 4.13.

BOTH which are Truths of vast Im­portance to Religion. For while Men look upon God as a Being that dwells at a great Distance from them, they will be ready enough to conclude Procul à Jove procul à Fulmine, that being far off from him, they are out of his reach, and beyond the Dan­ger of his Thunderbolts; and that he is too far removed from them either to succour them when they want his Aid, or to punish [Page 210] them when they deserve his Displeasure; which must needs extinguish both their Hope and Fear, which are the Master-Springs of their Religion. And tho we should believe him to be present with us, yet unless we also believe that he hath a full Inspection into all our Actions and Af­fairs, we shall have no Regard to him. For if he sees not into our Affairs, how can he succour and relieve us? And if he cannot relieve us, to what end should we hope in him, depend upon him, or pray to him? And unless he hath a perfect Insight into all our Actions, how should he reward or punish us; and if he cannot reward us what should encourage, if he cannot punish us, what should terrifie us to our Duty to him? But if we look upon him as a Being that is always with us, and where ever we are surrounds us wirh his boundless Pre­sence▪ that includes and penetrates every part of our Substance, sees into our inmost Thoughts and Purposes, and ransacks eve­ry Corner of our Souls with his allseeing Eye, and hath a through and perfect Pro­spect of all our Affairs and Concerns, we cannot without infinite Force to our Rea­son forbear fearing and reverencing, ser­ving and adoring him.

[Page 211]IV. To fasten the Obligations of Re­ligion upon us it is also necessary that we believe that God continually orders and disposes of all things; that he is the Spring of all the Motions of this great Machine of the World, that sets every Wheel and Cause agoing, and by his all-commanding Influence maintains, directs and over-rules their Motions; and that there is nothing happens in the World, whether by Na­ture, or Chance, or Design, but by his Or­dination and Disposal; that even those na­tural Causes which are necessarily determi­ned to such particular Courses and Effects, are influenced and conducted by him, and that whensoever they stray from their Courses, suspend or precipitate their Mo­tions, or move counter to their natural Tendencies, it is by his Order and Directi­on; that 'tis he who drives and guides the heavenly Bodies, impresses the Degrees and chalks out the Paths of their Motions, and by his own Almighty Hand turns round those stupendous Wheels in a perpetual Revolution. For so the Scripture tells us that he makes his Sun to shine upon the good and bad, Mat. 5.45. that it is at his Beck and Command that those vast Bodies of Light exhale the Vapours of the Earth and Sea, and dissolve them down again in Hail, [Page 212] and Rain and Snow. For so we are told that 'tis he who covers the Heavens with Clouds, and prepares the Rain for the Earth; that sends forth his Commandment unto the Earth, and giveth Snow like Wool, and scattereth the hoar Frost like Ashes, and casteth forth his Ice like Morsels, and send­eth forth his Word and melteth them, and causes the Wind to blow and the Waters flow, Psalm 147.8, 15, 16, 17, 18. that the Fire, and Hail, and Snow, and Vapours, and stormy Winds do fulfil his Word, Psalm 148.8. And in a word, that 'tis by his Order and Influence that the Earth sends up its Sap into the Seeds and Roots of Herbs, and Corn and Plants, and causes them to spring and grow, and that all Animals do propa­gate their Kind, and still replenish the Store-houses of Nature; for so we are told that he cloaths the Grass of the Field, and arrays the Lillies in all their glory, Mat. 2.28, 29, 30. and that he causes the Grass to grow for the Cattel, and Herb for the use of Man, that he may bring forth Food out of the Earth, Psal. 104.14.

AND then as for fortuitous and casual Events, which depend upon Accidental and irregular Causes, as a Mans being hit with an Arrow let fly at random, or brain­ed with a Stone falling from the Top of an [Page 213] House, we must believe that they are all ordered, directed, and over-ruled by God; so as that to him there is nothing casual or contingent; and tho there are many things happen of which there was no Necessity in their immediate Causes, yet do they as ne­cessarily depend upon the Will and Power of the first Cause of all, as the Rising and Setting of the Sun, and Ebbing and Flow­ing of the Sea. So that how fortuitous so­ever these things may be in respect of the Design and natural Tendency of second Cau­ses, yet none of them ever happen besides the Purpose and Intention of God, who fore­sees and designs them before they come to pass, and directs and levels them to his own most wise and holy Ends and Purpo­ses. For so the Arrow which the Soldier let fly at Random was levelled by God at Ahabs Breast, so that his Death was Chance in respect of the Soldier who shot the Ar­row, but Design in God who directed it; and accordingly, Prov. 16.33. we are told that the Lot is cast into the Lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord. And so in the Case of Chance-Medley when a Man accidentally kills another without any Design or Intention, tho it be mere Accident in him, 'tis Council and Design in God, who, as the Scripture expresses it, delivers the [Page 214] Man he slays into his Hand, Exod. 21.13.

And then Lastly, As for those Events which happen by the Design of free and rational Agents, it is necessary we should believe that they are all over-ruled by God too; that whatever befalls us in this World whether it be by the good or ill Design of Men or Angels, is for good, and just, and holy Ends, either permitted or determined by the sovereign Disposer of all Events; so that without his wise Permission or De­termination, neither Angels, nor Men, nor Devils can do us either good or hurt; that every good thing we receive from them, only passes to us through their Hands from God, and that they are only the Chan­nels and Conveyances of the overflowing Streams of his infinite Bounty; and that when ever we suffer any ill from them, they are but the Rods in Gods Hand where­with he chastens and corrects us; that he hath the over-ruling Disposal of all the Ills which they inflict upon us, and can render their Stings a Sovereign Balm, and their ranckest Poyson Medicinal to us; so that their Malice being in Gods Disposal, can effect nothing but what he will have it; and if it doth us hurt 'tis his Executioner, but if he pleases it shall do us good, and like [Page 215] Leaches applied by a skilfull Physician, shall draw away our Disease while it is sucking our Blood. For so God made the Malice of Joseph's Brethren the means of his Ad­vancement in Egypt; and by the Covetous­ness of Judas and Cruelty of the Jews ad­vanced the holy Jesus to his own right Hand, and executed his Purpose to redeem Mankind. Thus God over-rules the A­ctions of Men, and when he pleases directs them quite contrary to their Intentions; for the way of Man, saith the Prophet, is not in himself, it is not in Man that walketh to direct his steps, Jer. 10.23. It is the Man that walks and acts, but it is God alone that leads his Way, and directs his Actions to what End he pleases.

ALL which it is necessary we should be­lieve in order to our being truly religious. For while we look upon God as a Foreiner to the World, that hath altogether reti­red himself from the Affairs of it, and a­bandoned it to the Disposal of blind Chance or Necessity, he must stand for a Cypher in our Esteem, and signifie no more to us than the Emperor of the World in the Moon, who for all we know may be a glorious and puissant Prince, but is so far removed from us and our Affairs, that he can do us neither good nor hurt. And if God inter­meddle [Page 216] not with those Goods and Evils which happen here below, what doth he signifie to us who live apart from him in another World, from which he is wholly retired and withdrawn? But if we firmly believe that there is nothing befalls us, whether it be in the Course of Nature or by Chance, or Design, but by his Order and Direction, we must lay aside our Reason and Humanity, if for every Good we want or do receive, we do not apply our selves to him with humble, and submissive, thank­full and ingenuous Minds; and if under e­very Evil that we feel or fear, we do not resign up our Wills and lift up our Eyes to him, as to the sole Arbitrator of our Fate. For where should we pay our Thanks, or whence should we expect our Supplies and Deliverances, but to him who is the Foun­tain of all Good, and from him who is the supreme Moderator of all Events? Who is there in Heaven or Earth whom we are so much concerned to please, and so much obliged to acknowledge and submit to, so much engaged to trust to and rely on, as him who hath all our Fortunes in his Hands, and the absolute Disposal of every thing in which we are or may or can be any way interested or concerned? So that the Belief of Gods over-ruling Providence hath [Page 217] every Link of our Duty fastened to it in a strong and rational Concatenation, and if it be loosened from this Principle, the whole Chain must necessarily fall in sun­der.

V. and Lastly, To oblige us to be truly religious it is also necessary we should be­lieve that God is the Supreme Governor of the rational World; which is a distinct Branch of Providence from the former. For all things whatsoever are subject to Gods Order and Disposal, but in strictness of Speech 'tis only rational Beings that are subject to his Government. For Govern­ment supposes Laws, and Laws Rewards and Punishments, of which rational Beings alone are capable, they alone having the power to deliberate, and upon Deliberati­on to choose what is good and refuse what is Evil, without which no Being can de­serve either to be rewarded or punished. So that the Government of God in strictness of Speech, respects only the rational World consisting of Angels and Men.

As for the Government of Angels 'tis impossible we should understand any more of it than what God hath revealed; be­cause tho they converse with us and our Affairs, yet we do not converse with them; our Spiritual Nature by which we are near [Page 218] allied to them being shut up in Matter, which like a Wall of Partition divides us from them, and hinders us from looking over into their World, and from seeing their Nature and Operations, and survey­ing their Polity and Government. Indeed so far as we understand their Natures, we may easily understand the Laws by which God Governs them; because we know Gods Laws are always adapted to the Na­tures of things; and consequently since we know that they are rational Creatures, we may conclude from thence, that what­soever is fit and decorous for rational Crea­tures, as such, they stand obliged to by the Law of their Natures. But since there are particular Powers and Properties in their Natures which we understand not, 'tis im­possible we should understand all the par­ticular Laws by which they are Governed. Only thus much in general we know, that the whole Order of Angelical Beings were from the first Moment of their Creation subjected to Laws fitted to their Nature; by which natural Laws they stood obliged to obey their Creator in all his positive Commands and Institutions; and that these Laws whatsoever they were both na­tural and positive were established in Re­wards and Punishments, by which if they [Page 219] continued obedient they were to continue for ever in their most blissful Ranks and Stations; but if they rebelled were imme­diately to be banished thence into everla­sting Wretchedness and Misery; that a certain Order of these Angelical Beings, ex­cited either by their Pride, or Envy, or sensual Affection, did under their Head or Chieftain revolt from God by transgressing some natural or positive Law, for which they were expelled the high Territories of Happiness, and driven into these lower Parts of the World, where under the Prince of their Rebellion they have ever since waged War against God and Man; that in this state of War they are under the Re­straint of Gods almighty Power, who sets Bounds to their Power and Malice which it cannot pass, and determins it to what Ends and Purposes he pleases; employing it sometimes to try and chasten good Men, sometimes to execute his Wrath upon the Children of Disobedience, and sometimes again letting it loose, merely to display his own almighty Power in its Defeat and O­verthrow; in which State they are reser­ved as Prisoners at large to the Judgment of the great Day, whereby together with wicked men they shall be sentenced and con­fined to everlasting Flames and Darkness; [Page 220] that the good Angels in reward of their constant Obedience are continued and fixed in a most blissful Condition, in which they enjoy the constant Smiles of God, and the unspeakable Pleasure of being entirely resign­ed to his Will, who upon all Occasions sends them to and fro the World, as the great Messengers and Ministers of his Providence, to Minister to the Recovery of recoverable Sinners, and to pour out the Vials of his Wrath upon the obstinate and unreclaima­ble; to assist, protect and comfort good Men while they live, and when they depart from hence to conduct their Spirits through the aery Territories of the wicked Angels into those blissful Mansions that are prepa­red to receive them till the Resurrection; at which time their Part will be to summon and gather both the good and bad before the Tribunal of Christ, to receive their fi­nal Sentence to everlasting Weal or Wo.

THIS is the main of what we know concerning Gods Government of Angels; the sincere Belief of which will be of vast Advantage to us in the whole Course of our Religion. For since there is such a mighty Colony of evil Angels roving about the World, watching all Opportunities to lay Snares in our Way, and to tempt us into their Revolt and Ruin; and since their De­sign [Page 221] in tempting us now, is only to get us into their Power, that so they may torment us hereafter, how much doth it concern us to guard and defend our selves against their evil Motions and Suggestions, left by complying with them we give them oppor­tunity to train us on from one degree of Wickedness to another, till they have made us provoke the Almighty to cut us off, and abandon us for ever to their Rage and Fu­ry; and since they are all of them under his Restraint, and can proceed no farther in their mischievous Designs against us, than he lets loose his Chain to them, how should this encourage us manfully to strug­gle and contend against them; since if we do, we may depend upon it, that God in whose Power they are, will either command them off, or at least not permit them to over-power us with Temptation. And since by Gods Permission there are great Flocks of good Angels always hovering about us, to guard us against those malignant ones, and to prompt us to good, as they prompt us to evil, and with their holy Inspirations to countermine their impure Suggestions, how much doth it import us to cherish and reverence every pious Thought and Motion, since for all we know it may be the Whis­per of some Angel of God, who by these [Page 222] and such like holy Injections is now strugling with the Powers of Darkness, to rescue our Souls out of their hands. And since these blessed and benevolent Spirits do by Gods Appointment pitch their Tents about good Men while they live; and con­voy them safely to the Seat of the Blessed when they die, how should this encourage bad Men to be good, and good Men to persevere in Well-doing; since they place and continue themselves under the blessed Patronage of Angels, to be conducted safe­ly by them through this perillous Sea to the calm Regions of eternal Light? Thus the Belief of Gods Government of Angels, so far as he hath thought good to reveal it to us, very much conduces to a hole Life.

BUT that which more nearly concerns us, and hath a more immediate Influence on our Practice, is his Government of Men; the Belief of which is indispensably necessa­ry to render us truly religious. Now con­cerning this Government of God over Men, there are seven things necessary to be be­lieved.

  • 1. That the great End of Gods Go­vernment is the Welfare of Mankind.
  • 2. That in order to this End, God hath given us Laws for the Regulation and Go­vernment of our Actions.
  • [Page 223]3. That to secure our Obedience to these Laws he hath derived his Authority upon all lawful Sovereignties to Govern us according to them.
  • 4. That he is ready to contribute to us all necessary Assistance, to enable us to ob­serve these Laws.
  • 5. That the Assistance he contributes to us is such as supposes us free Agents, and concurs with and maintains our natural Freedom.
  • 6. That he takes particular Cognisance of the good and ill Use which we make of our natural Freedom.
  • 7. That he will certainly reward or pu­nish us accordingly.

I. To oblige us to be truly religious it is necessary we should believe that the great End of Gods Governing us is our Welfare and Happiness. That being infi­nitely raised above all Want and Indigence, he doth not assume the Government of us to advance himself, or to gratifie any bound­less Ambition of his own, which is a Vice that springs out of Poverty and Indigence, and therefore can have neither Root nor Room in a Nature so infinitely happy as his; but that all his Design in reigning over us is to do us good and to consummate our Happiness; to restore and rectifie our dis­ordered [Page 224] Nature, and to advance and raise it to the utmost Perfection, and Bliss and Glory it is capable of; to protect and de­fend us against present Evils, and support us under them, and convert them into In­struments of good, and to rescue us from that worst of Evils, Sin, and from all those endless Miseries it is pregnant with. This we ought to believe is the great Scope of all his Acts of Government, and even of the direct Punishments he inflicts; which are always intended either to reclaim the Of­fenders themselves, or to warn others by the sad Example of their suffering not to follow the ill Example of their Sin. And that this is the great End of his Govern­ment he himself hath expresly declared. So Psal. 145.9. we are assured that the Lord is good to all, and that his tender Mercies are over all his Works; and Verse 13.14. that in the Exercise of his everlasting Kingdom, he upholdeth all that fall, and raiseth up all that are bowed down; and tho in the Admini­stration of his Government, he hath decreed to cut off all such obstinate Rebels as will not be reduced by the Methods of his Love, yet he hath declared that he is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to Repentance, 2 Pet. 3.9. and that he would have all men to [Page 225] be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the Truth, 1 Tim. 2.4. And unless we believe him to be a benevolent Governor, that aims at the Good of his Subjects, we shall look upon his Government as a cruel Tyranny, erected for no other End but to squeeze and oppress us, to inthrall our Li­berty, and rob us of the Rights of our Nature, and to chain us down to an end­less and easless Toil and Wretchedness; and whilst we thus look upon it, it is im­possible we should ever submit to it with that generous Freedom and Chearfulness that true Religion requires. But if we firmly believe that the great Design of it is to promote our Welfare both here and here­after, we have all the reason in the World to covet to be Governed by God, and to receive his Yoke as a mighty Grace and Favour.

II. To oblige us to be truly religious it is also necessary we should believe that God hath given us Laws for the Regulation and Government of our Actions. For with­out Laws to direct Men what to do and what to avoid, there can be no such thing as Government, the proper business of which is to regulate Mens Actions, and without a Rule there can be no Regulation; so that divine Rules or Laws are necessa­rily included in the divine Rule or Govern­ment; [Page 226] and as God cannot be supposed to give Laws without Governing, so neither can he be supposed to Govern without gi­ving Laws; so that unless we believe that God governs us by Laws, we are utterly destitute both of all Reason why and of all Direction wherein to obey him, and have neither Motive to inforce nor Measure to regulate our Obedience. And as it is ne­cessary we should believe that he hath gi­ven us Laws, so it is also necessary we should believe that those Laws are for our good; that he neither imposed them on us pro im­perio, as arbitrary Tests and Trials of our Obedience, nor exacts them of us to serve himself and advance his own Interest and Greatness, but that the great Design of them is to do us good, and to direct our Acti­ons to our own Interest; to render our Lives placid and easie, and to perfect and glorifie our Natures. For while we look upon the Matter of Gods Law either as indifferent in it self, and imposed upon us by him for no other End but to shew his absolute Sovereinty over us, or as bene­ficial only to him and imposed upon us merely to promote his Interest, it is impos­sible we should ever comply with it with a free and chearful Mind. We may haply obey him out of Fear and Dread, because [Page 227] he is too mighty for us, and not to be con­tended with without infinite Peril and Disadvantage; but 'tis impossible we should obey those Laws with a resigned and chear­ful Will, from which we only fear ill but expect no benefit. Wherefore to oblige us to render a free and unforced Submissi­on to Gods Laws, it is absolutely necessary we should believe that the great Design of them is the good of those they are imposed on; and so the Psalmist assures us that the Statutes of the Lord are perfect, converting the Soul and making wise the simple; right, rejoycing the Heart; pure, enlightning the Eyes, true and righteous altogether, more to be desired than Gold, yea than much fine Gold, sweeter also than the Honey and the Honey-comb, and that in keeping them there is great Reward, Psalm 19.7, 8, 9, 10, 11. and that the Law of Gods Mouth was better to him, that is, for the good it did him than thousands of Gold and Silver, Psalm 119.72.

AND this if we firmly believe it will in­finitely encourage our Obedience. For when I am sure that God commands me nothing but what my own Health and Ease and Happiness requires, and that every Law of his is both a necessary and a Soverein Pre­scription against the Diseases of my Nature, and that he could not have prescribed me [Page 228] less than he hath without being defective in his Care of my Recovery and Happiness, with what Prudence or Modesty can I grudg to obey him? How can I think much to serve him, when I serve my self by it to the best Purpose in the World? Or why should I so much as wish that he had not imposed this or that Law on me, when I know he imposed it to no other End but to oblige me to be happy, and that he cannot Di­spense with any Duty he requires of me without giving me leave to be miserable. When therefore Gods Authority doth thus strike in with our Interest, and walk hand in hand with it through every Duty it im­poses, by refusing to obey him we fight against our selves, and renounce his Authority and our own Happiness together.

III. To oblige us to be truly religious it is also necessary we should believe that to secure our Obedience to these Laws, God hath derived his own Authority upon all lawful soverein Powers, to govern us ac­cording to them. That to promote our Happiness which is the End of his Govern­ment, and to secure our Obedience to his Laws, which are the Means to that End, he hath established a visible Authority up­on Earth to represent his own invisible Majesty, and in his Name to exact our O­bedience [Page 229] to his Laws, so far as it is liable to their Cognisance; and that the Persons vested with this Authority are exalted by it above all Controll or Resistance, and in their several Dominions placed next to and immediately under God, by whose Com­mission alone they act, and to whose Tribu­nal alone they are accountable; so that by resisting them, we do as much resist God, whose Deputy Governors they are, as a Neo­politan doth the King of Spain by levying Arms against his Vice-roy of Naples; and by refusing to obey their just and lawful Commands we demur to Gods Authority, who in every just thing they impose or re­quire, speaks to us by their Mouths, and Commands us by their Laws. For so the Scripture tells us not only that they are or­dained of God, and that to resist them is to re­sist the Ordinance of God; not only that they are the Ministers of God, and that there­fore for Conscience sake, or in Reverence to Gods Authority which they bear, they are to be obeyed, Rom. 13.1, 2, 3, 4, 5. but that they judge for God and not for Men, 2 Chron. 19.6. and that therefore their Judgment is Gods, Deut. 1.17.

THE Disbelief of which excludes Gods Government out of the World, and conse­quently dissolves all our Obligations of Du­ty [Page 230] and Allegiance to him. For how can he be supreme Governor of the World, if all other Governments are not immediately under him? And how can they be immedi­ately under him if they are not immediate­ly authorized by him? And by what other Right can any Person or Persons pre­tend to govern in Gods Kingdom under him, but by Commission from him? For every supreme Authority is the Head and Fountain of all other Authorities, so far as it extends; and if it be not so, it cannot be supreme. And therefore unless all Autho­rity be derived from God, he can have no such thing as a supreme Authority in the World. And this I doubt not is very well understood by our Atheistical Politicians, who in pursuance of their Denial of God, derive all Authority from the People; be­ing truly aware that if the Authority of the Governors can be derived from the Peo­ple, it will necessarily follow that both must be independent upon God, and that to derive Authority to govern from any other Head but God, is to deny him to be the supreme Governor of the World, which is the thing they would be at. If it be said, that God hath given Authority to the People to authorise their Governors, and so he is still Head of all Authority tho it be derived [Page 231] from him immediately through the People; I answer, That this doth very little mend the matter. For if God hath given Au­thority to the People to authorise their Governors, he hath in Effect given the Reins out of his own Hands, and left the People to govern the World. For I would fain know, do Governors govern by Gods Authority or the Peoples? If by the Peoples, 'tis the People that govern by them and not God; if by Gods, 'tis God that go­verns by them and not the People. In short, If they govern by the Peoples Au­thority, they are, as Governors at least, in­dependent from God, and accountable only to the Tribunal of the People; if by Gods Au­thority, they are Independent from the Peo­ple and accountable only to the Tribunal of God. So that whether he authorises them im­mediately or by the People it is all one, the Question being not so much how they are authorised, as by what Authority they go­vern; if it be by Gods, to God alone they are accountable if by the People, Gods Authority is quite excluded from having any hand in the Government of the World. In short, If the Choice of the People makes their Governor without Gods authorising him, he is the Peoples Vice-roy and not Gods; but if it be God that authorises him, he is Gods Vice-roy [Page 232] and not the Peoples. So that their choice even in Elective Governments can signifie no more than the bare presenting of a Person to God to be authorised his Vicegerent by him: who, if their Choice be just and lawful, is sup­posed to consent to and approve it, and there­by to authorise the Person so presented. For sovereign Authority in the Abstract is ordain­ed and instituted by God; but abstract Au­thority cannot govern unless some Person be vested with it; and to vest him with it, he must not only be applied to the Autho­rity, but the Authority must also be appli­ed to him; but where the People have the Right of Election, they only apply the Per­son to the Authority, but 'tis Gods Consent and Approbation that applies the Authori­ty to the Person, who thereupon commen­ces Supreme under God, and hath no su­perior Tribunal but Gods to account to.

AND thus according to the Prophet Daniel, the most High rules in the Kingdoms of Men; Because as Lord of all the Lords, and King of all the Kings of the Earth, he rules and governs by their Ministry, and they rule and govern by his Authority. So that to secure and maintain the Obligations which Gods Government of the World de­volves upon us, it is necessary we should believe that all rightful Sovereigns are his [Page 233] Vicegerents, and do rule by his Com­mission and Authority, and that the Sword which they bear is Gods, who hath delive­red it into their Hands, to protect his faith­ful Subjects, and to execute his Wrath, and avenge his Authority upon Evil-doers. So that we cannot rebel against them, nor wilfully disobey their just Commands, with­out giving a Defiance to God himself, and rejecting the Yoke of his Government. Whilst therefore we behave our selves Fa­ctiously and Seditiously towards those whom God hath set over us, we live as Out-laws in the Kingdom of God, without any re­spect to that visible Authority by which he governs the World; and whilst we do so, all our Pretences to Religion are impudent lies and Impostures.

IV. IN order to our being truly Religi­ous it is also necessary we should believe that God is ready to contribute to us all that Assistance which is necessary to enable us to observe his Laws. That whereas in this corrupt State of our Nature, we are so indisposed to all good by our carnal Affecti­ons and vicious Habits, as that without some foreign Aid it is morally certain we shall never be reduced to a through Compli­ance with our Duty, God is always ready not only to second but to prevent our En­deavours, [Page 234] to inspire good Thoughts into our Minds, and by them to kindle devout Affections in our Wills, and by them to excite us to a constant Course of pious and virtuous Endeavours; and that when he hath proceeded thus far with us, he doth not presently abandon us to our selves, and leave us to contend and struggle in vain with insuperable Difficulties, but all along co­operates with us, aids and assists our Facul­ties, and with his holy Inspirations cherishes our languishing Endeavours, till they have wrought their way through all the Diffi­culties of Religion into a permanent State of Piety and Virtue. So that unless we either turn a deaf Ear to those good Thoughts he suggests to us, and refuse to listen to their Perswasions, or quench those holy Affections which they kindle in us with earthly Cares and Pleasures, or by wil­ful sinning harden our Hearts against all the Impressions of his Grace, we shall not fail of being frequently and powerfully exci­red by him to Piety and Virtue; and when he thus excites us, if we do not wilfully slacken our Endeavours, and basely surren­der back our selves to our Lusts, in despight of all our Resolutions and his Perswasions to the contrary, we shall be so effectually and constantly assisted by him, as that it [Page 235] will be impossible for us to fail of Success. For thus the Scripture assures us that he gives Grace to the humble, 1 Pet. 5.5. and thereby works in them to will and to do, Phil. 2.13. and that to this End he gives his holy Spirit to every one that asks, Luke 11.13. The Belief of which is absolutely ne­cessary to oblige us to submit to Religi­on. For tho we are naturally free to Good as well as Evil, yet through the vicious Habits we have generally contracted either through youthful Levity and Inconsiderati­on, or ill Education and Example, our Li­berty to good is so streightned and confined, that whenever we attempt to exercise it, we find a prevailing Byass on our Natures, that carries us the contrary way, bearing before it all our good Resolutions, and ti­ring out our short-breath'd Endeavours, so that the good we would, we do not, and the evil we would not, we do. And therefore unless we can depend upon God for Assistance against the Violence and Outrage of our bad Inclinations, after we have once strugled with them in vain, and thereby made a woful Experiment of our own Impotence, we shall out of mere Despair of prevailing against them, give over attempting it and ut­terly abandon our selves to their Tyranny.

BUT if we firmly believe that God who [Page 236] knows our Weakness and our Enemies strength, will in Proportion to both rea­dily assist us, whensoever we heartily in­voke his Aid, and in Concurrence therewith exert our own Endeavour, we have all the Encouragement in the World to undertake our Duty maugre all the Difficulties that at­tend it. For being assured that God will concur with our Endeavours, we may de­pend upon it, that not only our own Endea­vours are in our Power, but Gods Assistance too, and that the Corruptions of our Na­ture do not so much over-match our En­deavours as Gods Assistance over-matches those Corruptions. So that if we hearti­ly exert our Endeavour, we are sure we cannot fail of Success; because we know that God will assist our Endeavour, and that with his Assistance we cannot but be victorious. Since therefore the Grace of God is as much under the Command of our Will as our own Principles of Action, it is as much in our Power to do that which we cannot do without Gods Grace, as to do that which we can. And therefore if Gods Grace be sufficient to supply the Defect of our natural Power, and enable us to conquer the Difficulties of our Duty, we are sure there is nothing in it can be too hard for us; because now we can do not [Page 237] only all that we can do by our selves, but also all that we can do by the Grace of God.

V. To oblige us to be truly Religious it is also necessary we should believe that the Assistance which God affords us, is such as supposes us free Agents, and concurs with and maintains our natural Freedom. That it doth not necessarily determine us to good, but leaves it to our own free Choice to determine our selves which way we please; that as he acts upon necessary A­gents by a necessary Influx and Causality which they cannot resist, and determines those things to act by his Will, which have no Will of their own to determine them, so he acts upon free Agents by a free and unconstraining Influence, i. e. by suggesting Arguments to their Minds, to incline and perswade them, but leaves it to their own Liberty to consider those Argu­ments or not, and to comply with those Perswasions or reject them; and that tho as he hath sometimes suspended the Powers of necessary Agents and interrupted the na­tural Course of their Motion, as when he forbad the Sun to move, and the Fire to burn, so he hath at other times restrained the natural Liberty of free Agents, and determined them by an over-ruling Neces­sity, yet both the one and the other are [Page 238] extraordinary and miraculous: but that in the ordinary Course of his Government, he doth as well leave free Agents to that natural Freedom with which he first created them, as necessary ones to those Necessities which he first impressed upon their Natures. For his Providence is succedaneous to his Creation, and did at first begin where that ended, and doth still proceed as it began, ordering and governing all things according to the several Frames and Models in which he first cast and created them. Nor can he order and govern them otherwise with­out unraveling his own Creation, and ma­king things to be otherwise than he first made them. For how can he ordinarily necessitate those Agents whom he first made free without changing their Natures from free to necessary, and making them a diffe­rent kind of Being than he made them? So that tho in the Course of his Government God doth powerfully importune and per­swade us, yet he lays no Necessity on our Wills, but leaves us free to choose or refuse; and as the Temptations of Sin incline us one way, so the Grace of God inclines us a­nother, but both leave us to our own Li­berty to go which way we please. And this the Scripture plainly asserts, where it makes mention of Mens resisting the Holy [Page 239] Ghost, Acts 7.51. and grieving and quench­ing the Spirit of God, Eph. 4.30. 1 Thes. 5.19. and refusing to hear when God calls, and to regard when he stretches forth his Hand, and of their setting his Counsel at naught and rejecting his Reproofs, Prov. 1.24, 25. and in a word, where it makes mention of some Mens baffling and defeat­ing that very Grace which would have conquered and perswaded others, Mat. 11.21. Which plainly imply that all that As­sistance to do our Duty, that God ordinari­ly vouchsafes us in the Course of his Go­vernment, is such as no way determins or necessitates us.

THE Belief of which is highly necessa­ry to engage us in the Service of Religion. For while Men imagine that their Duty is such as they cannot heartily comply with, without being compelled to it by an irresi­stible Grace, and that no Assistance of God can be sufficient to this End, but that which suspends their Liberty to Evil, and fatally determins them to Good, what should move them to exert their own En­deavour? Why should they watch and pray and strive, and contend against a corrupt Nature? For if God will make them good irresistibly, their Endeavour is needless; but if he will not, it is Labour in vain. To [Page 240] what End should they ply the Oar to stem the Tide of a degenerate Nature, since with­out an irresistible Gale from Heaven they shall never succeed, and with it they shall whether they ply or no? So that while Men live in Expectance of an irresistible Grace to make them good, they quit themselves of all their Obligations to a pious and virtuous En­deavour; but so long as they believe that Gods Grace is such as supposes and leaves them free, such as they may defeat or prosper by the good or ill use of their Liberty, they can­not but discern themselves infinitely obli­ged to co-operate with it, to listen and con­sent to its blessed Motions and Perswasions, and constantly to endeavour to comply with them in their Actions, or at least not to resist them, and harden and fortifie themselves against them, by acting counter to and fly­ing in the face of their own Convictions. For since the Grace of God doth not determin us to good, but leaves us to our own Free­dom, we can never expect to be determined to good without our free Concurrence; which if we refuse we shall certainly perish in our Sin, and have not only the Blood of our own Souls to answer for, but all that Grace too which we have baffled and defeated.

VI. To oblige us to be truly Religious it is necessary that we should believe that [Page 241] God takes particular Cognisance of the good and ill Use we make of our natural Freedom; that he doth not merely gaze upon our Actions as an indifferent and un­concerned Spectator, but beholds them with the highest Concern and Regard, with infi­nite Complacency or Detestation, and trea­sures them up in his all-comprehending Mind, to be produced for or against us in the day of fearful Reckonings and Accounts; that he doth not inspect our Actions with a passant and cursory View, as things of little or no Moment, but lays them up in ever­lasting Remembrance, so that every good or ill thing we do stands upon Record in the Mind of God in order to our final Ac­quittal or Condemnation. For so the Scri­pture tells us, not only that Gods Eyes are upon the Ways of Man, and that he seeth all his goings, Job 34.21. and that his Eyes run to and fro throughout the Earth, and are in every Place beholding the good and Evil, 2 Chron. 16.9. and Prov. 15.3. but that he sees good Actions tho done in secret, and will reward them openly, Matth. 6.6. and that he will bring every work into Judgment with every secret thing whether it be good or evil, Eccles. 12.14.

THE Belief of which is absolutely ne­cessary to found the Obligations of Religion. [Page 242] For if we suppose either that God sees not our Actions, or looks upon them with an indifferent Eye, without taking any Notice or Cognisance of them, there is no religious Consideration can oblige us. For upon this Supposal, our Actions must all be indifferent to him; and if they are in­different to him, what reason have we to make any difference between them? 'Tis true, good Actions are in themselves bene­ficial and evil ones prejudicial to us, and therefore for our own Interest-sake we ought to choose the one and refuse the other; but this abstracted from all Respects to God, is only a Prudential and not a religious Ob­ligation; but why should we do any good or avoid any evil upon Gods account, if Good and Evil are alike to him? But if we firmly believe that God not only sees whatsoever we do, but takes particu­lar Notice of all our good and evil Actions, and out of an high Complacency in the one and Abhorrence of the other treasures up both in everlasting Remembrance, we can­not but discern our selves obliged by all the Reason in the World ▪ to choose what is good, and eschew what is evil. For what an infinite Encouragement is it to do good, to consider that while we are doing it Gods Eye is upon us, regarding us with high [Page 243] Applause and Approbation, and entering it with all its acceptable Circumstances into the eternal Record of his own Mind, from whence it shall be produced in the last Day, and proclaimed before Men and Angels to our everlasting Honour and Glory? So that when our Memory is lost upon Earth, and all that we did is swallowed up in the deep Abyss of Oblivion, all our Pieties and Vir­tues shall be famed in the Records of Hea­ven, and have everlasting Memorials in the Mind of God. As on the contrary, what an infinite Discouragement is it from sinning, to consider that the Eye of that God to whom Vengeance belongs, is intent upon us, following us through all our Re­treats and Concealments, and Recording eve­ry ill Deed with all its foul Aggravations in the eternal Volumes of his own Remem­brance, which he will one Day most certain­ly open and read out before all the World to our everlasting Shame and Confusion? So that when the pleasure of our Sin is gone, and all that rendred it tempting or desirable for ever vanisht and forgotten, the Shame and Infamy of it shall stand upon Record, and be transmitted down to eternal A­ges.

VII. and Lastly, To oblige us to be truly religious it is also necessary we should [Page 244] believe that God will reward and punish us according to our doings; that he is nei­ther an idle nor an impotent Spectator of our Actions, that merely pleases and vexes himself with the Contemplation of them; but that all the Notice he takes of them is in order to his rewarding and punishing them, which he will one day most certain­ly do to our everlasting Joy or Confusion. But because this Argument will be the Sub­ject of the ensuing Chapter, I shall insist no farther on it here.

SECT. II. Of the Proofs and Evidences which there are to create in us a Belief of the divine Providence.

HAVING in the foregoing Section gi­ven an account of those Parts or Branches of the Divine Providence, which are necessary to be believed in order to the founding the Obligations of Religion; I shall proceed in the next place, to shew what Evidences there are to create this Belief in us; and because this is the great Fun­damental of all Religion, upon the Belief of which it all immediately depends, I shall endeavour to demonstrate the Truth of it,

  • [Page 245]1. A priori, by Arguments drawn from God himself.
  • 2. A posteriori, by Arguments drawn from sensible Effects of God in the World.

I. I shall endeavour to assert the Truth of a divine Providence by Arguments drawn from God himself. For supposing that there is a God, that is to say, an infinitely wise, and good and powerful Cause of all things, (which I doubt not to make ap­pear when I come to discourse of the sen­sible Effects of God in the World) it will from thence necessarily follow that he up­holds, disposes and governs all things by an over-ruling Providence; For

  • 1. If there be such a God, he must ne­cessarily be and exist of himself, without any dependence upon any superior Cause.
  • 2. He must necessarily be the Cause of all other things that are and do exist.
  • 3. He must necessarily be present with all things.
  • 4. Where ever he is, so active are his Per­fections that he cannot but operate whereso­ever he finds Objects to work upon. From all which I shall make appear it will ne­cessarily follow, that he continually ex­ercises an over-ruling Providence over the World.

I. IF there be a God he must necessa­lily [Page 246] exist or be of himself without Depen­dence on any superiour Cause. For when we speak of God, we mean by him a Be­ing that is as perfect as it is possible, that hath nothing before him, nothing superior to him, nothing greater than himself; which cannot be meant of any derived Be­ing; because all Effects are after their Cau­ses, and in some respect inferiour to them, as deriving their Beings, and all their Ex­cellencies and Perfections from them. But to say of God that he is after or any way inferiour to any Cause, is a palpable Contradiction to the very Notion of him; 'tis to say that there is something before the eternal Something, superior to the Supreme Something, more perfect than infinite Perfection. So that either there can be no such Being as a God in the World, or he must be of himself or from his own Essence, in which there must be such an in­finite Fulness of Being, as that from all Eternity past to all Eternity to come it is infinitely removed from not Being, and so by a Necessity of Nature must from ever have been and for ever be. And such a Being we must admit of whether we will admit of a God or no; for either we must allow that this World, or at least the Mat­ter of it exists of it self by its own never▪ [Page 247] failing Fulness of Being, without ever needing any Cause to produce it, (which as I shall shew you by and by is impossible) or that all things in it derive their Being from some first Cause who having no Cause in being before him must necessarily be un­caused and unproduced; and if God ex­ists of himself, as he must do supposing he is, he must be superiour to all things; for that which is of it self cannot but be, and that which cannot but be can have no Power above it, because if it hath, that Power might have either hindered or extinguished its Be­ing, and so it might not have been.

So that Gods Self-existence necessarily supposes him exalted above all Power and Superiority, and consequently to be the supreme and sovereign Power over all things; but to suppose him to be supreme and So­vereign without exercising Rule and Domi­on, is ridiculous; for without the Exercise of Dominion supreme Power is but a use­less and insignificant Cypher-flourish with a glorious Name, Rule and Dominion being the only proper Sphere for supreme Power, as such, to move and act in. So that un­less God rules and governs, he is supreme to no Purpose, and his sovereign Power is useless and in vain; for if he exert his so­vereign Power at all, it must be in Rule [Page 248] and Dominion, which is its only natural Province; but if he doth not, his Sove­reignty is only a Majestick Sloth that sits sleeping in an awful Throne with its Hands in its Bosom, without ever doing any thing that is Sovereign; and of what Use is that sovereign Power that never exercises any act of Sovereignty? Since therefore Gods Self-Existence necessarily supposes his sove­reign Power over all things, we must either grant that he continually exercises this Power in ruling and governing the World, or assert that it is utterly useless and in vain, which as I shall shew by and by is as absurd as it is blasphemous.

II. If there be a God he must necessarily be the Cause of all other things that are and do exist. For whatsoever might not have been, or may not be, must be derived from something which cannot but be. If it might not have been how came it to be? Not from it self to be sure, for then it must always have necessarily been; and therefore it must finally be resolved into some other Cause which is of it self, and so cannot but always have been and always be. Now that this World is not of it self, but from some other Cause that is of it self is evi­dent; because whatsoever is of it self, must necessarily have all the Being, and all [Page 249] the Perfection of Being that is possible. For that which is of it self is necessarily of it self, and it is not only true that it cannot but be, but also that it cannot but be of it self; for if it might not have been of it self, it might not have been at all, because it self or its own Essence is the only Ground or Reason of its Being; and therefore if that Reason might have failed it might ne­ver have been at all. Now that which necessarily is of it self, hath neither actual nor possible Cause of Being; for if it hath an actual Cause, it is not of it self; if any possible one, it is not necessarily of it self; and if it hath no possible Cause of Be­ing, it is all that its possible to be, that is, it is so compleat and perfect, that no possible Being or Perfection of Being can be added to it.

BESIDES, that which is of it self in­cludes Necessity of Being in its Essence, and that which includes Necessity of Being, must always actually be what it is, and have nothing potential in its Nature; and that which hath nothing potential must have all possible Being and Perfection. For if there be any possible Perfection of Being which it hath not, it must be in possibility of being what it is not; and if so, it is not necessarily what it is. So that if the World be of it self, it must include in the Nature [Page 250] of it a Necessity of Being; and if so, it must always actually be, that is, be always out of all Possibility either of not being or of being what it is not; and if it be out of all Possibility of not Being, it must have all Possible Being; if out of all Possibility of be­ing what it is not, it must have all possible Perfection of Being, that is, all possible Power and Knowledge and Wisdom and Goodness, which do all as necessarily result from Self-Being as any essential Property from any Es­sence. Since therefore this material World hath none of these possible Perfections of Be­ing in it, it is impossible it should be of it self, and if it be not of it self, it must have a Cause of Being that is distinct from and before it self; and what can this Cause be but God; since that which caused the World must be before all Causes, and that which is before all Causes must be uncaused and of it self, and that which is of it self must have all possible Perfection, and consequently be God.

SINCE therefore the World was made by God, it will from hence necessarily fol­low that it is ruled and governed by him. For if he made the World, to be sure he made it for some End, it being unconceiv­able that infinite Wisdom should frame a World that is capable of the most noble and excellent Ends, without designing it to [Page 251] any End at all; and if he designed it for any End, to be sure he is concerned that that End whatever it be should be accom­plished; and if he be, his own Concern­ment will lead him to the Exercise of a Providence, which is nothing else but a constant and steady Guidance of those Be­ings which he hath made, to those com­mon and particular Ends for which he made them. For if he made them for any End, to be sure whatever it was, he did not let it drop out of his Mind and Thoughts as soon as he had made them, but still carries it along in his Eye and Intention; and if he still intends that End, there is no doubt but he still prosecutes it, which he cannot do without a Providence; for how can he drive things on to the Ends for whice he made them, if he be withdrawn from the World, and hath wholly seque­stred himself from all the Affairs of it?

III. IF there be a God, he must necessa­rily be present with all things; because be­ing of himself without any Cause, he must be without any Bounds or Limits of Being. For it is altogether unconceivable how any thing that is of it self should be restrained or limited by it self. For tho we must al­low something to be of it self whether we will admit of a God or no, yet we cannot [Page 252] suppose that which is of it self to be the Cause of it self, without a Contradiction; because every Cause must be before its Ef­fect; and therefore to suppose that which is of it self, to be the Cause of it self, is to suppose it to be before it self, that is, to be when it is not, or to be and not be together, which is impossible. When therefore we say that something is of it self, our meaning can be no other that this, that it hath such an immense Pleni­tude of Being in it self, as that it neither needed nor required any Cause to produce it; and how can that which is of it self without being the Cause of it self, be any way restrained or limited by it self? For that which limits Beings, is only the Will or Power of their Causes, which either would not or could not bestow any further Being or Perfection upon them; and there­fore only such things as are caused are li­mited, because they being produced out of nothing, are only so far and no farther brought into Being, as their Cause was willing or able to bring them. That there­fore which exists of it self without any Cause of Being, must exist of it self with­out any Limits of Being; because it was neither limited by it self nor by any other Cause; and that which hath nothing to [Page 253] limit it, must necessarily be immense and boundless. God therefore being this Self-existing Being, must necessarily be of an unlimited Essence; an Essence which no possible Space can either circumscribe or de­fine, but must necessarily be diffused all through, circumfused all about, and present with all things.

AND if he be present with all things, how is it imaginable he should sit still a­mong them, and exercise no Providence o­ver them? For since he is a living Being, he must be vitally present wheresoever he is, and that he should be vitally and yet unactively present among a World of Beings, that he should live in this wide Vniversity of things, and in every Part of it, and yet take no more Notice of, have no more In­fluence upon it than if he were a dead and sensless Idol, is altogether inconceivable; and we may as well imagine a Sun in the Universe without Heat or Light, as a li­ving God surrounding and penetrating all things, without ever exerting his active Powers, or shedding forth his vital Influ­ence upon them. For where ever life is it will operate; and therefore since God who is all Life and Activity is every where, he must operate every where, and if he ope­rate every where, that Operation is an V­niversal Providence.

[Page 254]IV. and Lastly. IF there be a God, he must be endowed with all those active Perfections of Power and Wisdom, Justice and Goodness; all which must be present wheresoever he is. For as for Power, it is nothing else but the Spring or Fountain of Causality; and therefore since God is the first Cause, he must necessarily be the Spring of the Power of all Causes; and that from which all Power is derived must it self be all-powerful; otherwise it would de­rive more Power than it hath, and be the Cause of that whereof it hath no Causality, which is a Contradiction. And then as for Wisdom and Goodness, they are inseparable to perfect Power; which how forcible so­ever it be, cannot be perfect except it be conducted by Wisdom and Goodness; for without these, Power is only an irresistible Whirlwind that sweeps and hurries all things before it without any End, or Method, or Order. And what a lame, blind and de­fective Power must that be that can neither design nor contrive, neither propose to it self beneficial Ends, nor yet choose suitable Means to effect them? and in a word, that can neither intend well nor prosecute wise­ly? If therefore the Power of God be per­fect, as it cannot but be, being the Origi­nal of all Power, it must necessarily be [Page 255] conjoyn'd with perfect Wisdom and Good­ness; with perfect Goodness to level its Intentions at good and beneficial Ends; with perfect Wisdom to order and direct its Prosecutions.

SINCE therefore perfect Power, and Wisdom and Goodness are essential to God, they must be coextended with his Essence, which as I shewed before is extended to all things. And how can we conceive such active Perfections as these to be present with all things without ever acting upon them? For the very End and Perfection of all these At­tributes consists in their Exercise; for so the End of Power is Action, the End of Wis­dom is ordering and contriving, and the End of Goodness is doing good. How then can we suppose that an infinite Power whose End is Action, should be present where a World of things are to be done, and do nothing? that infinite Wisdom whose End is ordering and contriving, should be pre­sent where a World of things are to be or­dered, and order nothing? or that infinite Goodness whose End is doing good, should be present where a World of good is to be done, and do none at all? What is this but to transform the divine Perfections into senesless Idols, that have Eyes, but see not, hands, but act not; that have boundless, [Page 256] boundless, but useless and unactive Powers; that have glorious Names, but in reality stand but for so many Cyphers in the World? And thus I have endeavoured to demon­strate a Providence by Arguments drawn from God himself; but because there may be something in them too subtile and Me­taphysical for common Apprehensions to reach, I have but briefly insisted on them. I proceed therefore in the second place to another sort of Arguments, which are more easie and obvious, viz. such as are drawn from sensible Effects, of which I shall give these six Instances.

  • 1. The constant Direction of things to the same good Ends, which have no Design in themselves.
  • 2. The watchful Providence of things which have no Fore-sight in themselves.
  • 3. The mutual Agreement and Corre­spondency of things which have no Vnder­standing of themselves or of one another.
  • 4. The Continuation of things in the same comely Order, which have no Govern­ment of themselves.
  • 5. Miraculous Events.
  • 6. Predictions of future and remote Con­tingencies.

I. ONE sensible Instance of a divine Providence is the constant Direction of [Page 257] things to the same good Ends which have no Design in themselves. When we see things void of all Sense and Reason as constantly directed to good Ends, as they could be if they had Sense and Reason, we may be sure that there is a Reason without them that framed them for those Ends, and di­rects them to them; it being unconceiva­ble how Chance or blind Necessity that have no Design, or Art, or Contrivance in them, should constantly operate as regularly as Reason it self. Now if we survey this vast Universality of things, we may easily ob­serve, at least of the generality of them, that they are framed for and directed to some Wise and excellent End; and though through our own short-sightedness or want of Enquiry we do not see the Vse and Ten­dency of them all, yet this is no Argument at all that they are vain and superfluous. For as we now see the Use of a world of things which past Generations under­stood not, so there is no doubt but future Generations will understand the Use of a World more than we; and therefore since the Vsefulness of the Generality of things is now so apparent and visible, we ought in all Reason to conclude, that our not dis­cerning the Vsefulness of them all, pro­ceeds not from their Defect but from our own Ignorance▪

[Page 258]LET us therefore briefly survey this beautiful Scene of things that is before us. The Sun and Earth, for Instance, are things that are utterly void of Vnderstanding, and therefore can have no Design or Con­trivance in them; how then came they to place and continue themselves at such a commodious Distance from one another? Whereas in such a vast and immense Space they might have found ten thousand Mil­lions of other Places and Distances to fix in? The Earth might have found room enough to place it self either much nearer to or much remoter from the Sun than it is; but if it had done so, it must have either been everlastingly parched or ever­lastingly frozen and benighted, and either way converted into an useless, barren and inhabitable Desert; whereas where it now is, it stands at the most convenient Di­stance from the Sun, to be warmed and cherished by his enlivening Fires, and nei­ther to be roasted by being too near them, nor frozen by being too far from them; but to receive from them such a temperate heat, as is sufficient to excite its seminal Virtues, and to draw up its Juices into them, and thereby to ripen its natural Fruits, and in a word, to comfort and re­fresh its Inhabitants, and to render it to [Page 259] them a pleasant, a healthful, and a fruitful Paradise. Since therefore of ten thousand Millions of Places wherein it might have fixed in that Immensity of Space that sur­rounds it, it hath fixed upon and doth still continue in the best without any Design or Wisdom of its own, it is plain that there is an over-ruling Wisdom without it that chose its place and fixes and determins it there­unto. Again, How came the Sun (for whether it be the Earth that moves about the Sun, or the Sun about the Earth is all one to our Enquiry) how came this Sun, I say, which hath no Reason to govern it self by, to be determined to such a useful Course of Motion? what makes this vast and mighty Body move round the Earth in twenty four hours, in finishing which spacious Circle of Motion it must fly far swifter than a Bullet from a Canons Mouth; and yet through so many Ages each twen­ty four hours it hath constantly performed it, without being so much as one Minute faster or slower; whereby it makes those just and regular Returns of Day and Night to both the Hemispheres, so that neither the one nor the other is either too much heated by his Presence, or too long benight­ed by his Absence, because as soon as the one hath been sufficiently warmed and che­rished [Page 260] with his Rays, he immediately re­tires from it into the other, and by so do­ing he gives the active Animals leave to rest, the over-heated Air to cool, and the Gasping Earth to repair its fainting Vertues, which a continued Heat would soon exhaust and extinguish. Thus by returning Day and Night to both Parts of the Earth once in twenty four Hours, he preserves both their Heat and Moisture upon which all Genera­tion depends, in a due and regular Temper, so that neither their radical Moisture is consumed by the parching Droughts of the Day, nor their vital Heat extinguished by the cool Moistures of the Night, but the one still allays and tempers the other by their quick and alternate Revolutions. How then came the Sun that understands no uti­lity and designs no End, to be determined to this Course of Motion, which above all others is so admirably useful and advanta­geous to this World we live in? Again, What is the Reason that since he thus equally moves round the Earth, he doth not always move in the same Circle, but runs out every Day into a different Circle almost a whole Degree farther northward or southward, and this so constantly and so pre­cisely that in six thousand succeeding Revo­lutions, he hath never varied so much as [Page 261] one Minute from his Course either one way or the other, and by these his stated Ex-currencies towards the North and South he makes the Seasons of the Year, gives a Summer and a Winter, a Spring and a Fall to all Parts of the Earth, without which the Earth would long ere this have been utterly useless, and all its Fruits and for want of them its Animals too would have for ever perished? For some Parts of it would have been scorched with everlasting Heat, other bound up with everlasting Frost; here it would have been all a Sandy, there all an Icy Desert, and so both Vegetation and Generation would every where have utterly ceast either for want of Moisture or for want of Heat. How came the Sun then which hath nei­thr Sense nor Reason of his own to guide him, to be directed into such a commodious Course of annual Motion, whenas in that vast Space he moves in, he might as well have run ten thousand other Courses of Motion? He might have moved all the Year round the Earths Equator; but if he had done so, all the middle Tracts of Earth both Northward and Southward would soon have been scorched up with his continual Presence, and all the remoter Parts both ways would quickly have died [Page 262] with Cold through his perpetual Absence: or he might have run his annual Course on one side only of the Earths Equator, and made his circular Excursions to or beyond the Pole; but if he had done so, he must have left a great Part of the opposite Hemisphere exposed to everlasting Night and Cold, whereas in the annual Course of Motion he now performs, he sheds forth his Light, and Heat, and Influence over all the World, and by turns gives every Part its yearly Seasons; which is a plain Evidence that all his Motions are conducted by a wise and over-ruling Mind, which among so many Courses of Motion that lie before him in the boundless Space he moves in, hath de­termined him to that which for Perpetui­ty is much the best and most commodious.

AND the same is to be said of the Mo­tions of the Moon, which Nature hath de­signed for a vicarious Light to the Sun, to supply his Absence and perform his Office in this lower World. For what makes this senseless and irrational Planet, that moves without any Intention of its own, wander by turns Northward and Southward some Degrees beyond the Sun? And what makes it move Northward when the Sun is Southward, and again South-ward when the Sun is North-ward, whereas in that im­mense [Page 263] Space wherein it swims, it hath room enough to run a thousand other Courses of Motion, none of which could have been so advantageous to us as this? For by moving North-ward when the Sun is South-ward and so è contra, it moderates the Cold and Darkness of the winter Nights, and by passing beyond the Tropicks which are the Boundaries of the Sun, it in some measure supplies his Absence, by enlightning those long and tedious Nights in which the Regi­ons towards the Poles are buried; which is a plain Instance of the singular Care of Providence, that no Parts of the Earth should be left altogether destitute of the necessary Comforts of the heavenly Light and Warmth.

Again, How came the Air which hath no Design in it self to place it self so com­modiously as it hath done between the Earth and the Heavens? Why is there not a wide vacuity between? Or if some Body must needs intervene, why was it not Fire or Water as well as Air, which of all other Bodies is the most commodious? For had it been a void Space, there could have been no Intercourse between Heaven and Earth; or had it been filled with Fire or Water, it would have consumed or drowned the Earth and all things belonging to it; [Page 264] but as for the Air which is a thin, soft, fluid and transparent Body, it is of all o­thers the most proper Vehicle of the Ce­lestial Influences. For what other Body is there that through such a stupendous Di­stance could have conveyed down to us the Light and Heat of the Sun, with such an ineffable Swiftness; or what other Ele­ment could have been so proper for Ani­mals to move and breath in? Since there­fore this Space between the Earth and Hea­vens might have been supplied with other Bodies, but with none so fit as Air, which yet is no way conscious of its own Fitness, and so cannot be supposed to choose this Space for it self, it is a plain Evidence that there was a wise Mind without it that chose this Habitation for it.

AND now we are come down to this terrestrial Globe which consists of Earth and Water, let us briefly consider the ad­mirable Use of both, and of all things ap­pertaining to them. How came the sense­less Water to bore Holes and Channels in the Banks of the Ocean through long Tracts of Earth, and against its own Na­ture to climb up to the tops of Mountains, that so it may be able not only to run down again with Ease, but also to carry it self to such Heights afterwards, as the Necessi­ties of Men and Beasts require, and to [Page 265] unite into large Rivers that run into all the inland Parts of the Earth, watering both them and their thirsty Animals all along as they go, till at last they return into the Ocean again? How comes this dull and senseless Element that can consult neither its own Convenience nor that of other Be­ings, to be salt where it is convenient for it self to be salt, viz. in the Ocean, by which it is preserved from Putrefaction; and fresh where it is convenient for other Beings that it should be fresh, viz. in the Fountains and Rivers, that so it may be fit to fructify the Earth, and be a wholesom Drink for its Animals? How come so many Rivers and Fountains which do all arise from the salt Waters of the Sea, to be stript of their salt Particles, by oosing through the Pores of the Earth, and thereby to be rendred both fruitful to the Ground and wholsom for Men and Beasts? How comes it to pass that so many Clouds as are drawn up out of the salt Ocean, should in their Ascent so far shake off their Salt as to descend back again upon the Earth in sweet and fresh Showers? And how come those Vapours of which the Clouds consist, and which are much thicker and heavier than the Air, to be drawn aloft as they are by the Rays of the Sun, which have neither Pumps nor Buckets to exhale them? And when [Page 266] they are aloft in the Air, how come they to gather into thick Clouds, and not rather to disperse themselves about in that vast Expansum, or to return back again to the Earth in thin Vapors as they arose; and while they hang in the Air, what is it that susteins their Weight, and when they fall, how comes it to pass that they ordinarily fall in soft and gentle Showers that water the Roots of the Grass and Corn without any Prejudice to their Stalks and Blades, and not rather in Mists or Streams, which ei­ther would be insufficient to moisten the Earth, or lay wast its Corn and Fruit with the Violence of their Fall? All which are illustrious Instances of a wise and powerful Providence, that directs and orders this senseless Element, and causes it ordinarily to move and act as if it had Wisdom in it self and did therewithal industriously con­sult the publick good of the World; but this Argument you may find handled more at large in a late excellent Treatise de Deo.

AND now we are arrived to the Earth whereon we live and move and have our Beings, which tho it self be of a broken and irregular Figure, and seems to be ra­ther the mighty Ruins of some more beau­tiful Structure, than an original Effect of the divine Art and Contrivance, yet con­tains [Page 267] in it the most amazing Instances of an alwise and alpowerful Providence. For how came this dull and stupid Lump to be impregnated with such an infinite Variety of seminal Vertues, all which do proceed as orderly and artificially in the Formation of their Plants and Fruits, as if they were every one endued with a most wise and in­telligent Mind? For since the Plants do all derive their Nourishment from the in­ward Parts of the Earth, it is necessary that some Parts of them should be buried under Ground, that so they may come at their Food; and that these Parts should be fitted with spongy strings to fasten them to the Earth, and to suck in those Juices of it whereon they feed; and accordingly the seminal Vertue of every Plant first forms it self a Root under Ground, which runs out more or less from the Centre of it into greater or smaller Strings proporti­onable to the Magnitude of the Plant it bears, that so how great soever it be it may by these Strings be so fastned to the Earth, as that the Wind to which its upper Parts are exposed, may not be able to tear them up; then this seminal Form whatsoever it be, digests these Strings into a porous and spongy Substance fit to suck in the Juices of the Earth on every side, and bores little [Page 268] Holes or strait Fibres through them from one end to the other, that so by these Con­duit-pipes they may all convey the Juices they imbibed into the Centre of the Root; and having thus formed its Root, and by these Strings or nervous Filaments suppli­ed it with plenty of Juice, by strange my­sterious Art it concocts the liquid Matter in­to a hard and solid Substance, through which it also bores an infinite number of strait Fibres from the very Centre of the Root, to convey up with it those Juices that are lodged there, with the thicker Parts of which it nourishes and increases its more solid Substance, thrusting forth the thinner towards the Surface, and the thinnest at the Extremities of its Branches; the former of which it digests into a Bark wherewithal it cloaths the tender Body of its Plant, to defend it against the Violences of Heat and Cold; the latter into Leaves, and therewithal adorns its Branches, and shelters its Fruit from the scorching of the the Sun, and the excessive Moisture of the Rain; and by thus distributing the still-ri­sing Juices, it still encreases its Plant till such time as it arrives to its full growth and Maturity; so that from the utmost Strings of the Root, to the Centre of it, from the Centre of the Root to the highest [Page 269] Branches of it, from the Branches to the Leaves and Fruit of it, these porous Fibres run on, by which every part how distant soever from the Root, sucks up its Juices and digests them into its own Substance; for even the Leaves and Fruit are hung upon the Branches by little, soft and Spongy Stalks, through which there run innume­rable Fibres that convey the Juice from the Branches, and by stupendous Art di­stribute it by their Pores through all the whole Body of the Leaves and Fruit. Vide Lessius de Prov. But then by what particular Art the seminal Vertues of each particular kind doth so constantly and regularly concoct and elabo­rate the Juices of the Earth into their own specifick Smells and Tasts, and Figure and Colours, is a Mystery that confounds and puzles all our Philosophy. Now whence I beseech you proceeds this curious, inimi­table Art which we with all our Reason can neither transcribe nor comprehend? Not from the things themselves sure; for how can they have Art that have no Reason? And therefore of Necessity it must pro­ceed from some alwise, superintending Mind, that either immediatly contrives and frames them, or else impresses their seminal Vertues with its own alwise and [Page 270] powerful Art whereby they contrive and frame themselves.

AND if in the Composure of every Plant there are such visible Footsteps of a divine Art, how much more of every A­nimal, whose Parts for infinite Variety, delicate Smalness, exquisite Shape, Position and Temper, do as far excell the other, as the Offices for which they are designed? For tho the plastick Soul that forms the Animal, hath not the least Ray of Art or Reason of its own, yet in the Formation of it, it proceeds with as much curious and incomparable Art as if it were endowed with the most perfect Reason. For first it Spins out the thicker Parts of the semi­nal Matter into little Threds or Fibres, part of which it hollows into Pipes, and part into Spunges, some whereof are more thin, and some more solid; all which with wondrous Art it cuts and prunes in divers places, fitting their Ends to one an­other, and in divers Manners knitting them together into a well-proportioned Stru­cture of Bones and Members; then of the thinner Parts of the seminal Matter it forms the Intrails, viz. the Liver and Heart and Brains, drawing out from each certain Fibres to be framed into Veins, and Arteries and Nerves, for which End it [Page 271] bores and hollows them through, extends and stretches them out at length, and di­vides them into innumerable Branches, which it spreads through all the Intrails, and thereby maintains a mutual Communi­cation between them, and derives the Nou­rishment and animal and vital Spirits through all the Body; and having thus spun the several Parts out of the seminal Matter, and curiously woven them toge­ther, it concocts the remainder of the Matter which is still supplied with new Nourish­ment into the Substance of those several Parts, and this in such precise and regular Proportions, as to form every one of them, tho infinitely various from one another, in­to its own proper Figure, and Measure, and Proportion; so that within seven days af­ter the Conception, the whole Body is en­tirely framed, and distinguished into all its proper Parts and Members, which though they are so vastly great in their Number, so strangely different in their Size and Fi­gure, so infinitely various in their Motions and Tendencies, do all contribute one way or other to the Beauty and Benefit of the Whole; some to propagate the Kind, others to preserve the Individual, others to di­stinguish what is necessary, convenient and pleasant from what is dangerous, offensive [Page 272] or destructive to its Nature; some to pur­sue what is good, others to shun what is evil, others to enjoy those goods, and others to defend it against those evils that threaten or invade it; so that of all these infinitely numerous and diverse Parts, not one can be wanting or defective without some conside­rable Damage to the Whole. How then is it conceivable that such an infinite num­ber of different Animals, which are all so perfect in their Kind, so amazingly curious in their Composition, as that we with all our Reason can discern nothing in them that is either superfluous or defective, nothing in their Figure that is irregular, nothing in their Position that is misplaced, nothing in their Motion that is exorbitant; should all of them be framed by their several Plastick Souls, which are utterly blind and irra­tional, without the Conduct and Direction of an all-wise and all-powerful Providence? Should you behold a confused Heap of Earth, and Stone, and Iron and Timber without any visible Artificer near it, fall a pollishing its own Parts, fitting them to one another and disposing them into Order according to the Rules of Architecture, and at length frame them all together into the Form of a most beautiful Palace, would you not conclude that some skilfull Mind [Page 273] were invisibly present there, and did work upon this senseless Heap, and dispose its Parts into this comely Order? And yet in the Composure of any one Animal there is infinitely more Art than in the most beautiful structure in the World. How then can we imagine that the blind, artless Matter of which it is composed, could ever have framed it self into this admirable Form and Contexture, had not some great Mind been invisibly present at the Compo­sition of it, or at least imprinted on its artless Mattter, some powerful Signature of its own wise Art to direct, and order and contrive it.

I might from hence have proceeded to the formation of Man, the Masterpiece of all this lower Creation, in whose Frame and structure there are such Miracles of Art as do outreach both the Imitation and Wonder of the most raised and comprehen­sive Minds. For who can sufficiently ad­mire the skilful Contexture of his Corporeal Parts, which though almost infinite in Number and Variety, do not only com­pose a Body of a most amiable Symmetry and Proportion, but are also as exactly framed, and tempered and adapted to per­form the Offices of Life and Motion, and Sense and Reason, as Art or Wit can fancy [Page 274] or imagine them? But then how much more admirable is the Soul which inhabits and animates this Body; for of whatsoever Sub­stance this thing we call our Soul is, it is evidently framed for great and noble Opera­tions, to disclose the Mysteries of Nature, and to dive into its deep Philosophy, to penetrate into the Causes of things, and with its nimble and sagacious Thoughts to survey this ample Theatre of Beings; to recollect things past, and to foretel things to come, to invent the most useful Arts and comprehensive Sciences, to dictate good Laws, and project wise Policies for the Government of Humane Societies, and in a word, to understand the right Reasons of things, and to regulate its Will and Affections by them: And is it possible we should imagine a Being thus exquisitely framed to be the Product of a blind and artless Matter, to be nothing but a lucky Jum­ble of senseless and irrational Atoms? For suppose it were nothing but elaborated Mat­ter, yet certainly it requires infinite Art and Skill to contrive and fashion it into all those curious Springs, and Wheels and Mechanick Knacks that are necessary to render it not only a living and feeling, but also a wise and rational Matter. For how is it conceivable that a little Drop of [Page 275] Water without the Assistance of any Mind or Providence, should form it self not only into all the Parts and Lineaments of a Humane Body, but also into a Humane Mind, a Mind of vast Desires and infinite Capacities of Knowledg, that can form Ideas within it self of every thing that is round about it, and from them can frame innumerable Propositions, and deduce them into Arts and Sciences: and in a word, that can move it self and the Body it lives in, by its own internal Springs, and form it self into so many various and contrary Affections by the mysterious Force and Energy of its own Reason and Discourse? If you beheld a dead Pencil move without any visible Hand, and dip it self into va­rious Colours, and draw but an exact Pi­cture of a Man, you would doubtless con­clude either that some invisible Limbner had infused into it the Art of Limbning, or did immediately manage and direct it. But should you find this Picture when it is drawn and finished, not only live and move, but reason and discourse, and exert all sorts of Animal and Humane Operations, could you imagine that ever the blind, irrational Pencil formed it of it self without being managed or directed by some superiour Mind or Providence?

[Page 276]AND thus I have given some brief In­stances of the constant Direction of all sorts of things, how stupid and irrational soever, to some wise and good End, which is a plain Evidence of an universal Provi­dence over the World, that in a constant and uniform Series directs things to their proper Ends that have no Aim or Design of their own, and so are utterly uncapable to guide and direct themselves.

II. ANOTHER sensible Evidence of a divine Providence is, the sagacious Provi­dence of things that have no Foresight in themselves. For among irrational Beings that can neither apprehend for what Ends they act, nor by what Means they may best effect them, how strange is it to con­sider with what Insight and Providence they many of them act in storing up Pro­visions for themselves against a time of Ex­tremity, in framing their own Beds and Nests, and defending themselves and their Young against approaching Dangers; in educating their Young, and propagating their Kind through all succeeding Genera­tions, insomuch that if they were every one endued with Reason of their own to foresee their own Dangers, and forecast their own Conveniency and Safety, they would not act with more Skill and Sagacity than [Page 277] they do. For thus the Plants that have neither Sense nor Reason to discern the Periods of their own Growth and Decay, when they have almost spent themselves, and are ready to wither and die, run up into Seed, as if they foresaw their own ap­proaching Fate, and did thereupon bethink themselves of propagating their Kind before it be too late, and leaving a numerous Po­sterity behind them. And therefore since they have neither Thought nor Forecast in themselves, 'tis evident that there is a Pro­vidence that thinks and forecasts for them.

Thus also those Plants that shoot up on high, but are too weak to support them­selves, such as the Hop and Vine and Ivy, run out into little strings or tendrils with which they lay hold upon some body that is stronger than themselves, as if they were conscious of their own weakness, and so to prop up themselves did designedly twist about those stronger bodies that are best able to support them. And therefore since they neither know their own weakness, nor yet the strength of the Trees or Wall they depend on, it is evident that there is a wise Providence that knows both, and guides and directs them to their safety.

[Page 278]And as there is a visible Providence over Plants, so there is also over brute and irrational Animals, and especially over the smallest and most contemptible, who by reason of their natural weakness and impo­tence are less able to provide for them­selves. For thus the Spider is a Creature as void of Reason as the Plant of Sense, and yet with what wondrous Art doth he spin his Web out of a viscous matter within his own Bowels? He extends the threads of it cross to one another, leaving equal Angles in the middle, fastning the extreme to the opposite threads, and then least through the weakness of the slender threads of which it is composed the Fly he hunts should happen to break through, he weaves several under-nets one within ano­ther, and with a wondrous Art fastens them all together, that so if one should fail, the other might hold; and when he hath thus fix'd and spread his subtile and strange-contrived Snares, he lies in wait in a little Den without, made by him on purpose to conceal himself; from whence, as soon as the Fly is entangled, he swiftly runs and seises it, and having killed it carries it away and lays it up in a safe Repository against a time of Famine. In all which performance this irrational Insect proceeds [Page 279] as providently and wisely as if in a long deduction he had inferr'd one thing from a­nother and acted upon the most rational deliberation; and therefore since he is void of reason himself, and doth not determine himself by any natural Logic of his own, he must proceed by the reason and dire­ction of some wise Mind without him, that hath the guidance and disposal of his mo­tion. For he begins not to exercise his Art after he is arriv'd to a riper age, but is born with his Trade about him, and spins and weavs fpom his very Infancy; nor is there any diversity in his Manufacture, as there useth to be in those of rational Artifi­cers, but 'tis always woven in the same manner, and figure, and fashion, which is a plain evidence that he effects it not by any art or reason of his own but by mere natural instinct, which is nothing but the impression of the art and reason of the Au­thor of Nature, which impression knows not what it doth, nor upon what reasons it proceeds, but only answers to the Reason of God as the signature doth to the Seal that imprest it, and like an Eccho articulates and resounds his Voice without understand­ing what it means. And as the sensless Ec­cho when it reverberates words that car­ry Sense and Reason in them, supposes the [Page 280] original Voice to proceed from some in­telligent Mind; so these irrational Instincts of Nature which express so much art and reason in their operations, do necessarily imply that there is some wise Mind or Pro­vidence to which they owe their original and continuance.

FOR thus to instance farther, with what a strange and wonderful Art do the Bees frame their Combs, which they divide on each side into a world of little six-corner'd cells, and then prop them up with middle walls of pillars which they raise from the floor into an arch, by which as they are ren­dred more strong, so the Bees have an en­trance through to repair them whenever they decay; and having thus artificially built their houses, with what industry do they wander to and fro to gather the sweet dews of Heaven, whereon they live, from the herbs and flowers of the field, and with what care do they trea­sure them up in those little cells against winter, when they can neither go forth by reason of the cold to seek their sustenance abroad, nor yet find it if they could; and when they have fill'd their cells with their winter provision, they providently draw over the mouth of them a thin skin or membrane to preserve the grateful liquor [Page 281] lest it should drop out and be lost; and in a word, in what a regular order do they live, they rest and labour all together, and in the discharge of several offices conspire to the same work; some press the flowers with their feet, others with their mouths or down of their bodies gather up the moistures which these press out and carry them home to their cells; some bring home the materials of which these cells are compos'd, others disburthen them of it, others build with it, and others plane and polish the building. Thus all hands are at work first to build the house they are to dwell in, and to divide it into its se­veral apartments, and then to store them all with provision against the ensuing time of scarcity. Now therefore (not to men­tion their wondrous polity and government of which so many curious observations have been made) how is it possible they should do all these things with so much regularity and exact order, without being guided by some art and reason? But yet 'tis certain 'tis not by any reason of their own; they do not at all consider when they build, how needful houses are for them­selves and their Winter provisions, nor how convenient that waxy matter which they gather is to build those houses, nor [Page 282] what necessity there is of dividing them into distinct cells and apartments; they un­derstand not the nature of those sweet dews which they gather, whether they are food or poison, and when they gather more than they have present need of they know not why they do it, they reason not with them­selves that Winter is approaching, where­in neither these dews will fall upon which they live, nor themselves be able to go forth and gather them, and that therefore it behoves them to store themselves be­forehand against the ensuing famine; and when that they have laid up their store and are binding it in with the membrane they draw over it, they do not consider that 'tis a fluid matter that will be apt to run out and be lost; and yet all these things they perform with as much regularity and art, as if they had throughly weigh'd and considered and perfectly understood the rea­sons of them; which is a plain evidence that they are acted by a reason that is not their own, and what other reason can this be than that of the divine mind which go­verns and disposeth all things? And the same may be said of Ants, and Moles and Palmer-worms and innumerable other ani­mals, which though they have no reason of their own, are yet in many instances as [Page 283] evidently conducted by reason as any ra­tional beings whatever.

For with what admirable art do the ir­rational Birds form their nests a little af­ter their coupling; they begin to build though they neither consider that they are breeding, nor yet do foresee when they shall lay; by which it's plain that there is a Providence which considers and foresees for them; and though they understand not what materials are fittest to build their nests nor in what order to frame and dis­pose them, yet there is a very wise under­standing that directs them both to choose and contrive the materials, and this with greater art than we with all our reason can do. For as for the outward surface of the nests which comes not near their bodies, they frame it with sticks and thorns which with inimitable art they twist and inter­weave into a round and uniform hollowness, which they commonly dawb round with mud to render it more compact and warm; when this is done though they understand not their own specific frame and constitu­tion, yet they proceed as if they did, and suit their nests to the strength or weakness of their natures; for those of them that are of a hardier make content themselves with this inward plaistering, and when 'tis dry­ed [Page 284] proceed to lay and hatch their eggs on it, without troubling themselves to line it with any softer materials, as if they knew beforehand that the constitution of their young would be such as would not need any softness or delicacy; whereas those that are of a tenderer frame take care to cloath the hard plaistering with straw or hay or moss, upon which those that are tenderest of all make another layer of hair or down or feathers, as if they perfectly under­stood what degree of softness and warmth would be necessary for the preservation and nourishment of their tender off spring. Since therefore it's certain that they know none of all these things, and yet they act as if they did, they must necessarily be supposed to act by the direction of some wise Mind that perfectly knows them all. And then again considering with what pa­tience and diligence the female sits upon her eggs when she hath laid them, as if she understood the plilosophy of her own warmth, how necessary it is to form and animate and hatch them, and with what care and industry the male brings her in provision whilst she is sitting, that so she may not be forc'd by the necessities of Na­ture to neglect her eggs and leave them too long expos'd to the cold air which in [Page 285] a short time would destroy the tender principles of life within them; and in a word, with what care and industry they both conspire to cherish and feed their young when they are hatch'd, till such time as they are cloath'd and fledg'd and can fly abroad to seek provision for themselves; considering, I say, how in all these things they proceed as if they perfectly under­stood the reasons and necessities of their own actions, it's plain that they must be guided either by a reason in their own or in some other mind that hath the command and con­duct of their motions. Now that it is not by a reason of their own is evident, be­cause whatsoever they do, they necessarily do, and cannot possibly do otherwise, for they never vary in their operations, never try any new experiments, but always pro­ceed in the same road and repeat the same things in the same method, which is a plain sign that they cannot do otherwise, and consequently that they act not from reason but necessity; and therefore since they are made and impelled to act as they do, and yet do act so rationally and wisely, that which impels them must be a rational mind either acting upon them immediately, or by a fix'd and permanent impression of its art and reason on their motions. For [Page 286] as Aristotle hath long since observ'd [...], they do these things neither by any art nor council nor deliberation of their own. They are not masters of the wisdom by which they act, but are meerly passive to the im­pressions of that wisdom, that are made upon them. For so men we see for their own profit and others pleasure can teach Dogs and others animals to dance the measures of tunes and other artificial motions, the rules and ends of which they understand not; for when they perform these moti­ons, they neither think of their masters profit nor the spectatour's pleasure, which is the end and design of them, nor under­stand the proportions of musick which is the rule of them, so that the reason of their mo­tions is only in their teachers mind, who by frequent use doth by degrees imprint the practice of his art upon their fancies; and if a man can so imprint his art upon these artless creatures, as to make them practice it without understanding either the grounds or reasons of it, how much more may an allwise and Almighty mind. And there­fore since de facto we behold a world of curious art among brute animals, that far exceeds all the little feats we can teach them, why may we not as reasonably be­lieve, [Page 287] that any one of these dancing ani­mals learnt all his artificial motions, the reasons of which he understands not, with­out any arts-master to teach him, as that Ants and Bees acquir'd all the art and Providence they practice, without either discovering the reasons of it by any un­derstanding of their own, or being ever in­structed in it by any other provident mind; for art and providence cannot be supposed without reason, and therefore since the rea­son of their art is not in themselves, it must necessarily be in some mind without them that hath the conduct and direction of all their motions.

III. ANOTHER sensible evidence of a di­vine Providence is the mutual agreement and correspondency of things that have no under­standing of themselves or of one another. For if we look abroad into the World we cannot but observe an admirable harmony among things which yet have no kind of knowledg of one another, and therefore can­not be supposed to have framed and adap­ted themselves to one another, nor yet to be so fram'd and adapted, but by the Art and contrivance of some very wise and intelligent Mind. For how can any cause fit any two things to one another without ha­ving some Idea in his mind of the natures [Page 288] of them both? If therefore in the nature of things we can discover a world of mu­tual suitabilities, of this to that and of one thing to another, it will be a sufficient ar­gument that they all procced from some wise Cause that had an universal Idea of their natures in his mind, and saw how such a thing would suit such a thing, before ever he actually adapted them one to ano­ther.

NOW not to insist any further upon the admirable fitness of the Sun and Earth, the Water and Earth, the Air and Heaven and Earth one to another, which I have largely discoursed already, how exactly is every animal fitted for its element, and e­very element for its animals? Thus the Birds for instance, are fitted with wings to fly aloft in the air, and the air is fitted to bear them up, and to yield to the vi­bration of their wings: the Fishes are fit­ted to swim in the water, having finns which serve instead of oars to cut through and divide the streams, and the waters are fitted for the fish to swim in, being a soft and fluid substance that is easily cut and divided; and as for the earth and those earthy animals that inhabit it, there is an admirable congruity between them; for they being all fram'd to walk or creep must [Page 289] have an hard and solid matter to move on, and the earth being an hard and solid matter requires such animals as can walk or creep on it; and as every element is fit­ted for the motion of its animals, and e­very animal to move in its element; so e­very element hath a food that is proper to the appetites of its animals, and, every a­nimal an appetite that is proper to the food of its element. So that as every ani­mal is fitted within with all those facul­ties and organs that are requisite to its procuring and enjoying what is good for it, and its shunning and repelling what is hurt­ful, so it is also furnish'd without with all that is necessary or convenient for its sup­port and satisfaction. Thus every faculty within hath an object without prepar'd for it, that is exactly correspondent therewith, without which, as hath been excellently observ'd, the faculty would become vain and useless, yea and sometimes harmful and destructive, as reciprocally the object would import little or nothing if such a faculty were not provided for and suited to it. For thus the Eye would be per­fectly useless if it were not for the light, and the light would be much less conside­rable if it were not for the Eye; for if all light were extinguish'd, all those curious [Page 290] colours into which the light is refracted would be utterly insignificant; and if all those colours were extinguished, the Eye would be utterly depriv'd of one of its most pleasant entertainments. And what use would there be of all that infinite va­riety of melodious sounds, fragrant odours, and delicious savours which this frame of nature affords, were there no hearing, smel­ling or tasting faculties? and what would these faculties signifie were there no such sounds or odours or savours? So that these objects and faculties are all as perfectly fit­ted one to another as it was possible for art to fit them: nothing could be better sitted for seeing than the eye, nothing bet­ter fram'd to render things visible than the light, and light can be refracted into no colour so grateful unto the eye as green, which is the great colour of Nature; and the same may be said of the ear and sounds, the smell and odours, the tast and savours; and if the eye were made to see and the ear to hear, as there is no doubt but they were, be­ing so exquisitely fram'd for that purpose; to be sure light was made for seeing and sounds for hearing, and so for all the rest; and how is it possible that so many things should be made so exactly harmonious and agreeable with one another without the powerful [Page 291] art and direction of some very skilful mind, that knew before-hand that this thing would perfectly fit that, and consequent­ly had a perfect Idea of them both? When therefore we behold such exact correspon­dencies between the motive faculties of Ani­mals and the elements they move in, be­tween the fruits and products of those E­lements and the faculties of tast, digestion, and nutrition in those animals that inhabit them, and in a word between all sensible objects without and sensitive objects with­in, how is it possible we should be so sense­less as not to trace out an all-directing wisdom by footsteps that are so exprest and remarkable? For suppose you heard a musical Instrument move its own strings into an exquisite harmony and run long di­visions of curious and well-proportion'd notes, without the impulse of any visible Artist, would you not conclude either that some invisible hand did immediately touch and play upon its strings, or that they were mov'd by some internal spring and contrivance of a musical mind? how then can we attend to the admirable har­monies of Nature, to the natural references and due proportions and exact correspon­dencies of all its innumerable parts to one another without believing that there is [Page 292] some great harmonical mind which tun'd it at first and still plays upon it by the im­mediate touch and impulse of its own invi­sible hand.

AND as all things are thus fitted and a­dapted together, so are they also most re­gularly subordinated to one another ac­cording to their rank and worth; the sens­less elements with all their fruit and pro­duct being subject to the use of animals to whom they afford a vast variety of all conveniencies and necessaries answerable to their desires and needs; so that of all those vast numbers of sensitive Beings there is no one kind or individual, no not so much as a fly, or worm, or insect but what is plentifully supplied out of these common store-houses of Nature. And as the elements are subjected to the use of animals, so both are subject to the use of Man, who is as much superiour to the brute animals, as they are to the sensless elements. To him therefore, as it is most fit and congruous, all things here below pay tribute; the Earth ingenders within its bowels quarrie's of stone and mines of coal and mettals to serve his necessary uses and conveniences, and spreads its surface with a vast variety of herbs and flowers and fruitful trees to supply him with food and with Physick, [Page 293] and treat him with pleasure and delight; to entertain his eye with beautiful colours, his smell with fragrant odours and his palate with delicious savours; the Waters serve to quench his thirst, to dress his food, to fructifie his fields and gardens, to cleanse his body and habitation and to maintain and facilitate his entercourse and traffick with all parts of the World; the Air fans him with refreshing gales, supplies him with breath and with vital and animal spirits; the Fire warms and cherisheth him, concocts his meat and drink into fit and wholesom nourishment, and serves him in his most ne­cessary Arts and manual operations. And as all the four elements do one way or other conspire to our use and benefit, so do all the animals too that inhabit them, though as yet there are sundry of them whose use we have not discovered, but as for the ge­nerality of them they are innumerable ways adapted to our use; some to furnish our Table with food and delicacies, others to prevent or to remove our Diseases with their medicinal Vertues; some to cloath and some to adorn our Bodies, others to as­sist us in and others to ease us of our la­bours, and others to entertain us with chearful sports and recreations. Thus all things here below have as plain a reference [Page 294] to the use of Man who is the noblest part of them, as if some wise and powerful Mind had contriv'd them on purpose to serve and benefit him; as on the contrary Man hath so plain a reference to them considering his needs and his sensitive and rational faculties, as if the same wise Mind had fram'd him on purpose to use and enjoy them.

AND is it possible that after all this we should be so stupid as not to discern those bright beams of wisdom which shine through so many perspicuous correspondencies? For it's certain that either they must be design'd by Wisdom, or happen by Chance; and is it possible that a blind Chance which can do nothing regularly and is the Parent only of monstrous and deform'd births, should thus exquisitely fit and adapt things to one a­nother in such a long and orderly series; that Chance which never yet compos'd a tune or wrote a line of coherent sense should ever be the Author of this great frame of things, in which there is more of harmony than in all the musical compo­sures, and more of sense and Philosophy than in all the studied Volumes in the World? And if it cannot be the effect of Chance it must be the product of Wisdom and Providence.

[Page 295]IV. ANOTHER sensible evidence of a di­vine Providence is the continuation of things in the same comely order which have no government of themselves. That things are put into a most useful, wise and artificial order hath been sufficiently demonstrated under the foregoing particulars; now I would fain know what was it reduced them to and still continues them in this order; did the blind parts of the matter whereof these things are composed, once upon a time as they were wandring through the field of infinite space becken to one another, and by common consent assemble themselves into a General Council, and there advise to­gether how they should rank and marshal themselves into a World, and when upon grave and mature advice they had agreed upon, and describ'd and chalk'd out the laws of their motion did they break-up Coun­cil, and set forth in their several lines to the execution of their Canons and Decrees, till by their oblique, parallel and counter-motions, they at last interwove themselves into all those beautiful contextures we be­hold? He who can imagine this to be either probable or possible, must himself be as dull and stupid as those sensless parts of matter are, of which he dreams. Well then, since these things could not be effected by any [Page 296] Council or contrivance in the matter it self, was it by mere chance that these blind parts of matter floating in an immense space, did after several justlings and ran­counters jumble themselves into this beau­tiful frame of things? alas, this is a con­ceit, if possible, more ridiculous than the for­mer; for how is it possible to imagine that Chance should ever make a Man? in the contexture of whose parts there are such wonders of Art as do as far exceed the most curious Engines and Machines that e­ver humane Art invented, as the most glo­rious and magnificent Palace doth a Castle of Cards. And if Chance cannot so much as draw the picture of a Man, which is but a rude imitation of his outside, how much less can it shape Temper and con­nect all those hidden and subtil springs of life and motion, sense and imagination, me­mory and passion within him? Well then, since it was neither from any wisdom in the matter of them, nor from any casual mo­tion of that matter that this orderly series of things did proceed, was it from a blind necessity? but pray what made this neces­sity? how came the matter of these things that might have mov'd otherwise having an infinite space about it, and no principle within i [...] to encline it one way more than [Page 297] another, to determine it self to this series of motion? if you say it was by Chance, I have shew'd it is impossible; and if you say it was from Eternity, that is all one. For as an excellent Author of our own hath observ'd, Whether it were now, or yesterday, or from Eternity infers no dif­ference as to our purpose; not the circum­stance of the time, but the quality of the Cause being only here considerable; the same cause being alike apt or unapt yester­day as to day, always as sometimes, from all Eternity as from any set-time to produce such effects. So that 'tis as possible for matter fortuitously moved without any Art or Council to compose a World now, and to frame it into Animals and Men a [...] it was from Eternity; that is, 'tis from all E­ternity, and now equally impossible; and if it were by the Council of some in­telligent Mind that it was fram'd into this world of Beings and orderly series of things, then it is doubtless by the same Mind that its order and harmony is still con­tinued and preserved. For it is altogether as impossible for matter of it self unguid­ed by Wisdom and Art to pursue any con­stant course, as to fall into any regular form, it being as we see all torn and bro­ken into little parts innumerably many, [Page 298] and infinitely diverse in their size, and fi­gures, and motions, and thence onely fit in their several courses to cross and con­found each other. How then is it possible without vast Wisdom and answerable Power so to manage this wild and disordered swarm of Atomes as to determine them to their proper bounds, continue them in their regular ranks and files and preserve them in the same tenure of action, so as that in all those new productions of the individuals of every kind of Plants and Animals which are every day compounded out of them, they should none of them ever extrava­gate in their motions so as to disturb and hinder one another, and finally disorder and interrupt the natural course of Gene­ration? When therefore we consider how this great Machine of the World (as the above-cited Author expresseth it) whose parts are infinite for number and variety, hath stood six thousand years together al­ways one and the same, unimpair'd in its beauty, unworn in its parts, unwearied and undisturbed in its motions; through what an infinite series of generations and corrup­tions all its plants and animals have past, and yet how after they have been corrup­ted over and over, and their whole frames have been broke in pieces, and all their [Page 299] parts divided and dispers'd, they have still been generated anew, and rallied into the same specifick natures, which, though they still consist of numberless parts are con­stantly drawn up into the same postures and figures and positions, and with strange regularity digested into the same handsom order, as if they all kept time with the mu­sical Laws of some Almighty Mind, as the stones of Thebes did with Amphion's Lute, and thereby continually danc'd into their natural figures; When, I say, we consi­der these strange and wondrous things, what tolerable account can we give of the per­formance of them without an over-ruling Providence? For how is it imaginable that in a six thousand years course of Ge­nerations and Corruptions these blind and undesigning parts of matter, which by rea­son of their infinite diversity are so natu­rally apt to thwart and disturb one ano­ther, should maintain such regular courses of motion as still to concenter in the same forms, so as that through all this vast tract of time not so much as one kind of plants or animals should miscarry; how, I say, could this have been, had they not all a­long been conducted by a steady and uner­ring Providence?

[Page 300]V. ANOTHER Sensible evidence of a Divine Providence is the miraculous events that have hapned in the World. By Mi­raculous Events, I mean such as either for their matter or manner of production do exceed the Power of natural Causes, or at least are produc'd by them out of their e­stablish'd course and order. Such as divi­ding the Sea, stopping the Sun, raising the Dead, curing the sick, and blind, and lame, with a touch or word; of all which we have notorious instances both in the Old and New Testament, and these attested with as full and convincing Evidence as ever any matters of Fact were that are recorded in History. For as for the Miracles of the Old Testament, besides that they were sundry of them perform'd in the publick view of Na­tions, and were recorded in those very Ages wherein they were wrought, and so could have been easily disproved by ten thousand living Witnesses had they not been true; besides that they were attested by the most antient Heathen Poets and Histo­rians in their Mythologies and Histories, who to be sure would never have yielded the glory of such wondrous Effects to a Nation whom they hated and despised, had they not been forced to it by undeniable Evidence; In a word, besides that they [Page 301] were confirm'd by the succeeding Prophets of that Nation, who both by the Miracles they wrought, and by the exact accomplish­ment of their Predictions have sufficiently evidenc'd themselves to be supernaturally inspired; Besides all which, I say, the Miracles of the Old Testament are abun­dantly attested by the New, the credit whereof is ratified and confirm'd by a world of new Miracles wrought by our Saviour himself, and particularly by his Resurrecti­on from the dead, which are not only in part confessed by the Jews themselves, his most mortal Enemies, and by the Heathen Writers who were implacable Persecutors of his Religion, but also by his own Di­sciples and Apostles, who, as I shall shew hereafter, were Eye-witnesses of these Mi­racles, and did not only attest them with their Mouths, but also sealed their testi­mony with their blood, and confirm'd it before all the World with infinite other Miracles which they wrought in his Name, and which they continued to work for se­veral Ages together, as is evident not only from the wondrous success of their Ministry, which without being attested with such miraculous Effects could never have pro­pagated in so short a time such an hated Religion over all the World, but also from [Page 302] the confident Appeals which the Christian Writers frequently make to their heathen Enemies, in which they Subpoena them in as daily Spectators of their wondrous Works, and for the truth of them challenge their own Eyes and Ears. So then that there have been such miraculous Effects can no more be doubted than that there have been such Men as Pompey the Great or Julius Caesar, the former being attest­ed, all things considered, with much more Evidence than the latter.

AND if this attestation be true, there must be a Providence; for how is it pos­sible that blind Nature which neither de­liberates nor chooses, should of it self ever vary or interrupt its course without rush­ing into utter confusion and disorder? How should any part of it, when 'tis once mo­ved either faster or slower than ordinary, so restrain, or quicken its own motion as to reduce it self back again to its establish'd Course? For if it once move faster, it must have some degree of motion super-added to it, and till that is withdrawn it must move faster for ever: if it move slower, it must have some degree of motion withdrawn from it, and 'till that be resto­red it must move slower for ever: how then is it possible that Nature or any part [Page 303] of it which moves by a blind necessity, should of its own accord either hasten and then slacken, or slacken and then hasten the course of its motion, as it must do in the production of miraculous Effects, without being influenc'd by an Almighty Provi­dence? We have several miraculous In­stances of the diverting natural Causes from their course and stopping them in it; such as causing the Waters to divide and stand still, and the Sun to move backward. Now how is it conceivable that any na­tural Cause that hath no will of its own to move and determine it, should either stop its own motion and then move again, or divert from its course and then return again, if it were not under the command of some will without it, that guides and di­sposeth it according to its own Council? But besides these Scripture Miracles, there are sundry miraculous Instances of the re­warding good Men and punishing bad pub­lickly recorded in the Histories of all Ages; some of vindicating the Innocence, others of restoring the lives, others of relieving the necessities of good Men; some of de­tecting the Crimes of bad Men, others of striking them dead in their impious facts, others of punishing them in kind, and o­thers of inflicting on them those very [Page 304] Plagues which they have imprecated on themselves to give credit to a falshood; of some or other of which there is scarce any Age of the World which hath not been furnished with sundry notorious instances; so that unless we will give the Lye to all humane testimony, and condemn the Re­cords of all Ages for publick Cheats and Impostures, we cannot deny but that there have been sundry Miracles in the World, and if of all these Miracles that have been so strongly attested there be but any one true and real, that one is a sufficient argu­ment of an over-ruling Providence. For if ever any thing hath been effected that is either above the Power or contrary to the established Course of natural Causes, it must be brought to pass by the Power of God, and if God doth sometimes visibly exert his own immediate efficacy on this World, that is a plain evidence that he always governs it; for whenever he thus exerts it, it is for some reason to be sure, and for what other reason should he thus strip his Arm and visibly exert his Power upon or before us, but either to awaken our at­tention or to confirm our faith, or alarm our fear, or encourage our hope; and if e­ver he had any such design upon us, it must be in order to his governing us; for [Page 305] to what other purpose can an Almighty Being be supposed to address himself to our Hope and Fear, and Faith and At­tention, but to subdue and reduce us under his Rule and Government.

VI. And lastly, Another visible evidence of a divine Providence is Predictions of future aad remote contingencies. That there have been such things hath been uni­versally acknowledged by Heathens as well as Jews and Christians. As for the Hea­then, Tully gives numerous instances of it in his two Books of Divination; In the first of which he sets down this as the great Principle of Prediction: Esse Deos & eorum providentiâ mundum administrari eosdemque consulere rebus humanis, nec solum universis verum etiam singulis, i. e. That there are Gods, and that by their Provi­dence the World is governed, that they take care of humane Affairs, and this not only in general, but in particular. And of these Predictions he tells us there was one Chry­sippus who wrote a large Book, in which he gives innumerable instances of them, all con­firmed by very good Authority. Besides which there were their Oracles and their Sybilline Writings, among which if there had not been a great many true Predicti­ons, it is not to be imagined that ever the [Page 306] wiser and more inquisitive part of Men should be so far imposed on as they were to pay such a mighty respect and ve­neration to them, and that not only for a little while, but for several Ages together. But as for their Oracles, there are sundry of them recorded in ancient Historians together with their punctual accomplish­ments; and Tully in particular tells us of one of Apollo his Oracles which foretold a thousand years before that Sypselus the Tyrant should reign at Corinth. And Varro makes mention of one Vectius Va­lens an Augur in the time of Romulus, who when Rome was building foretold by the flying of twelve Vultures that the City should continue a thousand two hundred years, which accordingly hapned. But as for the reality of Predictions we need seek no farther than the Holy Scriptures, in which you have sundry Prophesies of things which hapned a long time after, as particularly of the deliverance of the Jews from those two Captivities, the one in Aegypt, the other in Babylon; the for­mer of which was foretold four hundred years, and the latter above seventy years before it came to pass, and yet both of them accomplished punctually to a day, as you may see in Gen. 15.13. com­pared [Page 307] with Exod. 12.41. and Jer. 25.12. compared with 2 Chron. 36.21, 22. which latter ▪ Prophesie is not only recorded in Scripture, but mentioned by Eupolemus an heathen Historian cited by Eusebius, Prepar. pag. 454. Thus also you have Esay his Prophesie of Cyrus whose name and atchievements he most exactly fore­tells long before he was born, Esay 44.45. And then for Daniel's Prophesies of the grand Revolutions of the Empires of the World, they do so punctually describe what hapned long after, that Porphyry himself, though a mortal Enemy to Christianity, is forced to confess the exact agreement of his Prophesies with the succeeding Events, vid. St. Chrysost. cont. Jud. Tom. 6. p. 326. and hath no other way to evade the force of them but by affirming without any co­lour of Reason or Authority that they were written afterwards in or near the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, though it is evident that the LXX Interpreters who translated the Old Testament a hundred years before, translated this Prophesie of Daniel with it. And Josephus expresly tells us, that Jaddus the High Priest shewed this very Prophesie to Alexander the Great, who lived long before Antiochus, Joseph▪ An­tiqu. l. 11. But to name no more, there [Page 398] are the Prophesies of the Messias, of the place and most particular circumstances of his Nativity, and Ministry, and Life, and Death, and Resurrection, and Ascension, all which were so punctually accomplished in our Blessed Saviour, that did not the Jews, in whose hands they have been al­ways preserved, own and acknowledge them, one would be apt to suspect that they were forged on purpose by some Christian to countenance our Saviours pretence of be­ing the true Messias.

AND if there be any such thing as Pro­phesie, if but any one of all these In­stances be real (and that none of them should, would be very strange) this one will be a sufficient evidence of a Divine Pro­vidence; for to foresee things at a distance, and before their Causes are in being, so as to describe before hand the precise Time, and Place, and Manner of their existence, or to foresee things casual and contingent, that wholly depend upon the free choice and determination of voluntary Agents, requires a mind of infinite comprehension, that sees through all the whole Series of Causes, and hath a perfect prospect not only of those things that actually exist, but also of all that are future and possible. For how is it possible to foresee a remote futu­rity [Page 309] in all its particular Circumstances, whose immediate Cause is either unborn, or free and undetermined, without having a perfect inspection not only into the natures, and inclinations, and tendencies of things, but also into all their particular Conjuncti­ons and Conspiracies; and that Mind which sees into all these, must needs be all-seeing and have nothing concealed from it, that is either present, or future, or possible. So that if there be any such thing as Prediction of remote and contingent futurities, it must necessarily proceed from an all-seeing Mind; and if there be an all-seeing Mind that oversees the whole World, and accu­rately inspects all that is past, or present, or to come in it, is it imaginable that such a Mind should sit looking on as an idle Spectator and act no part it self in such a vast and busie Scene of thihgs? For that it thus exactly inspects and takes notice of the World, is a plain Argument that it is greatly concerned for it; and that it should be greatly concerned for it, and yet do no­thing about it, nor exercise any Providence over it, is altogether inconceivable. And thus I have shewn, with all the plain­ness I could, what Evidences there are to create in us a belief of a Divine Provi­dence, which I persuade my self are such, [Page 310] as duly considered, cannot but prevail with Minds that are not steel'd against all con­victions, and utterly abandoned both of their Reason and Modesty.

SECT. III. The Objections against Providence considered and answered.

I Now proceed to the third and last thing proposed to be treated of in this Chapter; and that is to shew the Insuffi­ciency and Vnreasonableness of the common Pretences to Infidelity in this matter; and here not to insist upon all the little and shameful Cavils which have been made against Providence, which are so very in­considerable that 'twould be too great a Credit to them to be seriously confuted; I shall insist upon those only which are the common, and do carry the fairest shew of Reason with them, and they are these five:

  • 1. That the Exercise of a Providence doth not comport with the Majesty of God.
  • [Page 311]2. That it doth not consist with the Ease and Happiness of God.
  • 3. That it is not reconcilable with the manifold Evils which we behold in the World.
  • 4. That if there were such a Providence, it could not admit of the unequal Divisions of Goods and Evils which are made in this World.
  • 5. That it is not to be reconciled with the wretched State and Condition to which we behold the greatest part of Mankind abandoned.

I. IT is objected against the Being of Providence, that it doth not comport with the Majesty of God to take notice of, or concern himself about the little Affairs of this World. Which is such an Objection as carries its own Answer with it; for I would fain know which is most sutable to Majesty, to sit still or to act, to wrap up it self in everlasting Sloth and Idleness, or to display it self in a vigorous Activity? And if it be greater and more Majestick, as doubtless it is, for any Being to employ and exercise its Powers, than to let them lie asleep and make no use of them, I would fain know in what higher Sphere can God exercise his Powers than in governing the World. For to govern well is the best [Page 312] and greatest thing that we can frame an Idea of; 'tis to do the greatest good, to dispense the noblest Virtues, and to shed forth the amplest Sphere of Benefits. And therefore since the World is such a vast Dominion, doubtless the most glorious Employment that the largest Mind can undertake, is to rule and govern it; and there is nothing can be greater and more Godlike, than to sit at the Helm of this floating Universe, and steer its Motions to their Ends with a steady and unerring Hand. What therefore can God do more worthy of himself than to govern the World well and wisely? Or wherein can he better display the Glory of his own Perfections, than in keeping this mighty Engine in such an admirable Order, so as that though its Parts are infinite in Number and Variety, and in their several Lines of Motion do frequenly cross and intersect each other, yet do they neither clash nor interfere, disturb nor confound one another, but in their different Functions mutually assist each other, and all conspire in a com­mon Good, composing out of their infi­nite Discords a most elegant Harmony, in which mighty Performance there is scope enough for an infinite Power to exert its utmost Activity, for an infinite Wisdom [Page 313] to employ its utmost skill, and for an in­finite Goodness to put forth its utmost Bene­ficence.

So that to undertake this Province of governing the World, is so far from being beneath the Majesty of God, that it would be an unpardonable Arrogance for any but a God to undertake it; and if Contrivance be the End of Wisdom, Action of Power, Beneficence of Goodness, as doubtless they are; where can the infinite Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness of God find a more ample Sphere for Action, Contrivance, and Beneficence than in the Govern­ment of the World? And if it be the pro­per Exercise of Majesty to govern, what can better comport with the greatest Ma­jesty than to display it self in the Govern­ment of the largest Dominion, which is that of the World?

BUT then considering that God himself is the Father of all this great Family of Beings, how can it be beneath his Majesty to take care of his own Off-spring? Why should it be below him to provide for any thing which was not below him to create? If there be any thing in this World so contemptible as not to deserve his Regard, why did he create it? If there be not, why should he disdain to govern it? [Page 314] And if every thing in this World hath some End for the sake of which God thought it worthy to be one of the Objects of his Creation, why should he not as well think the constant Direction of it to that End, to be an Object worthy of his Providence?

II. IT is further objected against the Be­ing of Gods Providence, that it is inconsi­stent with his Quiet and Happiness. For to attend to such an infinite number of things as the Government of the World in­cludes, cannot but distract his Thoughts, and thereby disturb him in the Injoyment of himself. All which is a gross mistake, arising from no other cause but our mea­suring God by our selves; because we find our own Minds so narrow, and our own Powers so limited, as that we cannot without Distraction attend to many things at once, therefore we conclude that this mighty Business of governing the World must needs be very uneasie to God. Where­as if we considered God as a Being that is infinitely perfect, whose Almighty Power implies an Ability to do whatsoever is possible, and whose infinite Knowledge in­cludes an universal Prospect of all things past, present, and to come, this would easily convince us of the Vanity and Falshood of [Page 315] this Objection; for it is by reason of Im­perfection that Beings operate with Labour and Difficulty; it is because their Powers are weak and not able to conquer without strugling the Resistances of the Objects upon which they operate; but against perfect and infinite Powers there are no Objects can make such Resistance as to put them upon strugling and Labour; so that to an omnisci­ent and omnipotent Mind there can be no­thing difficult to be known or effected; and it is altogether as easie to it to know all things that are knowable, and do all things that are possible, as to know or do any one thing whatsoever; because whatsoever it doth it doth perfectly. How then can the Government of the World be difficult or uneasie to God, whose Knowledg and Power are perfect and infinite; and consequently can inspect and govern all the Beings in the World with as much Facility as if they had only one Being to take care of; and if one Man can with Ease manage one Business which he perfectly understands, why may not God manage all who understands all better than we understand any one; and suppose the things of the World were in­finite, yet since Gods Knowledg and Power are infinite too, there is the very same Pro­portion of Infinite to Infinite as of One to One.

[Page 316]FOR it is to be considered that the na­tural Tendency of infinite Power is to Acti­on, of infinite Wisdom to Contrivance, of infinite Goodness to Beneficence; and how can we imagine that it should be any Di­sturbance to God to follow the Inclination of his own Perfections? And therefore since it is equally easie to his infinite Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness to exert them­selves in a larger Sphere of Action, Con­trivance and Beneficence as in a narrower, why should it more disturb him to govern a whole World, than one single Being? It would doubtless be rather a disturbance to him to act nothing, to contrive nothing, and to do no good; because this would be to cross the Inclination of his own Perfecti­ons; but since it is as easie to him to exer­cise those Perfections about many things as about few; to exercise them about a world of things must rather be a Delight than a Disturbance to him, because the more he exercises them, the more he complies with their natural Tendencies and Incli­nations.

AND what though this World be a great and cumbersome Mass of things; it can be no Labour to God to move and actuate it, who as an universal soul is diffu­sed through it, and vitally present with every [Page 317] part of it; for he moves it not as Bodies move Bodies by thrusting and pressure, but as Souls move Bodies by Thought and Will; and as our Soul doth move its Body, and determine the Motion of its Members merely by thinking and willing, without any material Pressure, without any Ma­chines or Engines, even so God, who is the great Soul of the World, doth actuate eve­ry Part, and regulate every Motion of it without any laborious heavings or thrust­ings, merely by the all-commanding In­fluence of his own Almighty Thought and Will. And if it be no Labour to our Soul to think and will, and therewithal to move our Body, why should we think it any Labour to God by the same Operations to move the World? For suppose our Soul were clothed with a Body as large as the whole Vniverse, and were but vitally pre­sent with every Part of it, it would doubtless move it all with as much Ease, and command it every way with as much Freedom as it doth the Body wherein it now resides; how then can it be difficult to a perfect Mind which penetrates all through, and coexists with every Part of this material World, to move and actuate the Whole, and mode­rate all the Motions of it according to its own Will and Pleasure?

[Page 318]III. IT is farther objected against a Pro­vidence, that it is not consistent with the ma­nifold Evils, both moral and natural, which we behold in this World. If there were a just and gracious Providence over-ruling the World, how can it be imagined that it should ever permit so many Irregulari­ties as we every day behold in Mens Lives and Manners, or suffer so many Calamities and Miseries to befall its Subjects? Both which as I shall shew you are very fairly consistent with a just and righteous Provi­dence.

FOR as for the first, to wit, the moral Evils or Irregularities of Mens Manners, the Permission of them in the World is no more inconsistent with the Goodness of Gods Providence, than his making of free Agents was with the Goodness of his na­ture. For his Permission of sin is no more than his permitting free Agents to act freely, and according to that Liberty to Good and Evil wherewith he framed and created them; and why may he not as well permit them to act freely as create them to act freely? But to be essentially determined to good, so as not to have any natural Liberty to Evil, seems inconsistent with the State of a Creature; for there is no Will can be naturally and essentially [Page 319] determined to good, which is not con­ducted by an infallible Mind; for whilst the Mind which is the Guide may possibly err, the Will which is guided by it must be liable to go astray. Since therefore no Will can be essentially good but that which is guided by an infallible Mind, and since no Mind can be essentially infallible but one that is omniscient, it necessarily follows that to be free to Good and Evil is as natural to all reasonable Creatures, as to be finite in Knowledge and Vnder­standing; and accordingly our Saviour declares that to be naturally and essentially good is the incommunicable Prerogative of the divine Nature, Luke 18.19. and if so, then either God must have made us free to Good and Evil, or not have made us at all, and there must have been no such Orders of Being as Men and Angels, which are the Crown and Glory of all the Creation; and is it not much better that there should be such Beings, than that there should be no such thing as Liberty to Good and Evil? And if it were not inconsistent with the Divine Goodness to create free Agents, why should it be inconsistent with it to permit them to act freely? 'Tis true indeed we are natu­rally more free to Evil than the Angels, and some Angels perhaps were more free to it [Page 320] than others; but what then? Was God obliged in Goodness to make all Kinds of Beings equally perfect? If so, there must have been but one Kind of Beings in the whole Universe, and consequently there must have been infinite Kinds of Beings that are capable of Happiness for ever un­made, or for ever unprovided for. Where­fore since the Goodness of God was so infinitely fruitful as to communicate it self in different Degrees of Perfection to all Possibilities of Being, that so there might be no Kind wanting to compleat the Universe, it was requisite that there should be a mean Degree of Perfection be­tween Angels and Brutes; otherwise there would have been a Gap and Chasme in the World, not only a possible Kind of Being wanting, but a Kind which by partaking both of Reason and Sense, of Spirit and of Matter, is the [...], as Simplicius expresses it, i. e. the vital Joynt that clasps the upper and lower World together; and if it were no way unsutable to the Goodness of God to create the two Extremes, viz. Angels and Brutes, why should it be thought unsutable to make a middle Nature between them?

IT is true, by partaking of both Na­tures we are not only free to Evil in [Page 321] common with Angels, but also liable to strong­er Temptations to it than they; because we are placed in a tempting Body among a great many brutish Passions and Appetites, and that Body is placed in a tempting World among a great many sensitive Goods and Evils, that are continually importuning those Appetites to mutiny against Reason, and to carry us away captive into Folly and Wickedness; but to place us in this state is so far from being inconsistent with the Good­ness of God, that it is exactly pursuant to the Design of a most wise and gracious Providence. For since we are placed by the Condition of our Natures in a lower Rank of Being and Perfection than Angels, we have no more reason to complain of that, than Ants or Flies have that they are not Men. But in this imperfect state the highest good that Providence could design us was to put us into a state of Trial and Probation, wherein by the good use of our Liberty we might by degrees fit our selves for and at length arrive to a better and more raised Condition, and by an orderly Progression from this rude and imperfect state, might in the different Periods of our Lives grow up into higher and more excellent Capacities, and at length ripen into Perfection. Now in order to our Trial [Page 322] it was tequisite we should be placed among Difficulties, without which no Proof can be made of our Virtues, of our Patience, and Temperance, and Chastity and Equanimity, Meekness and Sobriety; all which are proper to us as Beings made up of Angel and Brute; from the latter of which Natures all those brutal Appetites arise in us, in the good or bad Govern­ment whereof consists the Nature of Hu­mane Virtue and Vice. So that this pre­sent state of our Life is intended by God for a Field of Combat between our Sense and our Reason, our brutal and angelical Nature, and that the Victory of our Rea­son might through the Difficulty of it be rendered more glorious and rewardable, God hath furnished its Antagonist with the Weapons of worldly Temptation to assault and oppose it, to try its strength and Mettle, and to exercise both its active and passive Virtues; intending when it hath conque­red, to translate us hence as a Reward of our Victory into a free and disintangled state, where we shall be vexed and inticed no more with the Importunities of sensual Lust and Affection, but to all Eternity en­joy the Serenity and Pleasure of a pure, an­gelical Nature. And what is there in all this that is any way unsutable, yea, that is [Page 323] not every way answerable to the Goodness of Providence? 'Tis true, instead of con­quering, we may, if we please, yield our selves captive to Folly and Wickedness; but what then? Is Providence to be blamed for leaving Mens Hands at Liberty, because some have been so desperate as to cut their own Throats? 'Tis sufficient that he hath proposed to us Reward enough to encourage us to contend, and contributed to us Assi­stance enough to enable us to conquer, and having done all that becomes a wise and good Governour to prevent our Sin and Ruine, who is to be blamed for it but our selves? God leaves us at Liberty indeed among Temptations to Evil; and this the very State and Composition of our Natures requires; but all he designs by it, is to exercise our Virtues, and thereby to im­prove and train us up to a state of higher Perfection, and to furnish us with glorious Opportunities of fighting for and winning Crowns and Rewards; and this is so far from any way reflecting on the Goodness of his Providence, that it is an illustrious In­stance of it; and yet 'tis only thus far that he is concerned in the Being of sin in the World; all the rest is owing to our own mad and desperate abuse of our natural Liber­ty, to our wilful Opposition to his gracious [Page 324] Intentions, and obstinate Resistance to his powerful Arts and Methods of preventing our Sin and Ruine. What then can be more unreasonable than for us to object against the Goodness of Gods Providence that which is purely the Effect of our own Madness and Folly?

AND if the Evil of Sin be no way incon­sistent with the Goodness of Providence, much less is the Evil of Misery, since the Generality of those Evils which we suffer in this World are either the natural Effects, or the just Punishments, or the necessary Antidotes and Preventives of our sin. And therefore when you come into a great School of wild and unruly Boys, you may as well argue that there is no Master of it, because there are Rods and Ferulaes in it, as that there is no Providence over this sinful World, because there are Miseries and Afflictions in it; for upon the Being of Sin in the World, the Being of Misery is so far from being an Argument against Providence, that 'tis rather a Demonstra­tion of it; because a [...] sinful World can no more be governed without Misery, than an unruly School without Correction.

IV. ANOTHER Objection that is made against Providence is that unequal division of Goods and Evils that is made [Page 325] in this World. If there were a just Provi­dence that over-ruled the World, one would think it should make a more visible Di­stinction between good and bad Men in the Distribution of its Rewards and Punish­ments; whereas in the ordinary Course of things we see all things happen alike to all, and many times it fares worst with the best, and best with the worst of Men. Now be­cause this is the greatest and most universal Objection that was ever urged against the Providence of God, I shall in answer to it endeavour to shew, 1. That it is for the most part false and groundless, 2. That so far as it is true, it is no Argument at all against a Providence.

First, I say this Objection, that there is no Difference made among Men as to the Goods and Evils of this World, is in a great Measure false and groundless. For I make no doubt but in the ordinary Course of things good Men are more prosperous even in this World than bad; as for times of Persecution, they are a just Exception from the general rule of Providence; be­cause therein God to serve his own Glory, and the great Ends of Religion, exchangeth with good Men spiritual for temporal, and heavenly for earthly Enjoyments, which is such an Exchange as no man will account a [Page 326] Robbery that understands the just value of those different Commodities.

'TIS true, it hath been an usual Com­plaint in all Times and Ages, that it fares best with the worst, and worst with the best; and through the commonness of it, it is now grown into a Maxim. But it is to be con­sidered that Men always pity the miserable and envy the prosperous, and that these Passions do naturally bribe their Judg­ments to think worse of the one, and bet­ter of the other than either deserve; for those whom we pity we are inclined to love, and those whom we love we are in­clined to think well of; as on the contrary, those whom we envy we are inclined to hate, and those whom we hate we are inclined to think ill of; and then because God doth not reward and punish Men according to the Sentence that our blind Pity or Envy passes on them, we are ready to quarrel with his Providence. And besides, there are a world of close Hypocrites, that under a mighty shew and Ostentation of Piety do secretly indulge themselves in sundry wast­ful and ruinous Vices, which many times reduce them to Poverty and Misery, and these we commonly rank among the good it fares ill with; as on the contrary there are abundance of good Men, that in the Course [Page 327] of a reserved, modest and unaffected Piety, whieh makes but very little shew in the Eye of the World, are blest and prospered, and these we as commonly rank among the bad that fare well. Since therefore we are such incompetent Judges of good and bad Men, we should be very careful how we object against the Providence of God such Maxims as are only founded on our own fallacious Observations. But could we strip our selves of Pity and Envy, and penetrate in­to the insides of Men, I doubt not but we should soon be satisfied that good Men have much the Advantage of bad, even as to the Happiness and Prosperity of this World; for though perhaps there are ma­ny more bad Men prospered than good, be­cause there are far more bad than good Men in the World, yet in Proportion to their Numbers I doubt the prosperous good would far exceed the prosperous bad, though there should be but thirty of the one to forty of the other; and supposing that in Propor­tion there were more bad Men than good advanced to worldly Greatness, (which yet is very doubtful, considering how prone we are to judge ill of great Men, and to reckon more of them into the Number of the bad than we ought, through Envy and Misunderstanding the Reasons of their Acti­ons) [Page 382] yet it is to be considered that the true state of worldly Happiness and Prosperity consists not in a great but in a moderate Fortune, and that the good things of this World are no where so freely and entirely enjoyed, as in the middle Region between Poverty and Riches; for as Poverty is at­tended with Famine and Cold and Anguish, so Greatness is attended with Hurry and Tumult, impaled with Cares, and impri­soned with Pomp and tedious Ceremony; so that the truly unfortunate are the Ne­cessitous and the Great, while the middle State without partaking of the evils of either, includes all that is truly desirable in both Extremes; all that Poverty wants, and all that Greatness enjoys; and in this hap­py state I dare boldly affirm there are pro­portionably far more good Men than bad; For it is a very rare thing for a good Man that is honest and industrious, and depends upon God for a Blessing, to be reduced to extreme Necessity; so very rare, that David in all his life time could not produce one Instance of it, Psal. 37.25. for miserable Poverty is usually the Consequence either of Idleness, or Luxury, or Faction, or Kna­very; all which are inconsistent with true Goodness; and a good Man in any Condi­tion on this side pinching Necessity, is [Page 329] ordinarily even in this Life far more happy than the most gay and prosperous Sinner, whose outward Glory and Greatness is usu­ally nothing but the gaudy Cover of a Tra­gical Inside, of a Mind that is tortured with Pride and Envy, with boundless Hopes, insatiable Desires, and horrible Reflecti­ons, that dash and embitter all his En­joyments, while the good Man under his mean and simple Outside, carries a great and happy Soul, a contented Mind, a chearful Heart, and a calm Conscience, which mightily sweeten all his Enjoyments, and make his homely Morsel outrelish the most studied Luxuries. Let us therefore but judg impartially of Men, and but truly state what is the most happy Condi­tion of humane Life, and proportion the number of the good to the bad, and bal­lance the Insides of the one with the Out­sides of the other, and I doubt not but we shall be easily convinced that even in this Life the good ordinarily fare much better than the bad; for in true Compu­tation Necessity and Greatness are the only unfortunate States of humane Life, and in these there are far more bad Men than good; but between these two all Conditions are in a manner indifferent as to the Happiness of Men; and in this happy Mean there [Page 330] are far more good Men than bad; and then the Minds of good Men having infinitely the advantage of the Minds of bad, as to the rendering their outward Condition happy, it is impossible but that ordinarily and generally they must be the more happy and prosperous.

Secondly, So far as this Maxim, that all things happen alike to all, is true, it is no Argument at all against a Providence; and that upon these following Accounts. 1. Be­cause many of the Goods and Evils of this World happen to us not as Rewards and Punishments, but in the necessary Course of secondary Causes. 2. Because the Goods and Evils of this World are in themselves so mean and inconsiderable that it would be beneath the Wisdom of Providence to be very exact and curious in the Distribution of 'em. 3. Because this Life is properly the state of our Trial and Probation, and not of our Reward and Punishment. 4. Be­cause the Goods and Evils that befall us here are not so truly to be estimated by themselves as by their Effects and Conse­quents. 5. This promiscuous Distribution of things, so far as it is, is very requisite to assure us of a Judgment to come. 6. Be­cause the exact Adjustment of things is re­served for a future Judgment.

[Page 331]I. THE hapning of all things alike to all is no Argument against Providence; be­cause many of the Goods and Evils of this World happen to us not as Rewards and Punishments, but in the necessary Course of second Causes. For in this Life good and bad Men are so mingled toge­ther, rhat in Cases of common Calamity what happens to the one must happen to the other without a miraculous interposal of Providence. Thus while God leaves second Causes to their natural Course, how is it possible that War, or Plague, or Fa­mine should distinguish between the good and bad that are incorporated together in the same Societies; and so long as free Agents are left to act freely, wicked Parents will frequently spoil their Constitutions by the repeated Excesses of their Riot and Wan­tonness; and while they do so, their Dis­eases, without a Miracle, will descend upon their righteous as well as unrighteous Po­sterity; and wicked Neighbours, whilst it lies in their way, or serves their Interest, will wrong and oppress the just and unjust without any distinction. But you will say, why then doth not Providence interpose between second Causes and good Men, and miraculously protect them from their mischievous Effects? To which in short I [Page 332] answer, that in some extraordinary cases God hath interposed, of which there are innumerable Instances both in sacred and profane History; but to expect that he should ordinarily and constantly do this, is very unreasonable, because it cannot be done without giving a perpetual Distur­bance to the Course of Nature, which be­ing in the whole most orderly and regular, full of admirable Beauty and Contrivance, ought not to be disturbed and inverted upon ordinary Occasions. For if the esta­blished Course of things be wise and regu­lar in the whole, why should we expect that God should be perpetually tampering with it, and interrrupting and varying it by his immediate Interposals, as if he were dissatisfied with his own Contrivance, and upon every Revisal of this great Volume of the World, did still discover new Erra­taes in it to be corrected and amended. The Evils therefore which good Men suffer are not ordinarily so momentous as to ob­lige a wise and good God to interrupt the Couse of Nature to prevent them; and it is much better that some violences should be offered to good Men, than that a constant violence should be offered to the Nature of things; and since God can carry on his good Designs to good Men in a still and [Page 333] silent Path, and cause all their adverse Accidents to unwind of themselves, and at last to clear up into a blessed Close, is it not much better he should do it this way, than by offering perpetual Violence and Di­sturbance to Nature?

II. THE happening of all things alike to all is no Argument against a Providence, because the Goods and Evils of this World are so mean and inconsiderable, that it would be beneath the Wisdom of Provi­dence to be very exact and curious in the distribution of them. It is no part of wisdom to be nice and curious about Trifles. 'Twas ridiculous enough in Caligula to im­ploy a mighty Army only to gather a great heap of Cockle shels; but when he had ga­thered them, it would have been much more ridiculous to have taken a great deal of care to divide them amongst his Soldiers in exact Proportions to each ones Merit and Desert. Now though we look upon the Goods and Evils of this World as things of vast and mighty Moment, yet God who sees them with far better Eyes than we, knows very well that they are but Trifles in comparison with those end­less Goods or Evils we must enjoy or suffer in another World, and that it is a very inconsiderable thing whether we fare well [Page 334] or ill this moment, who immediately af­ter must fare well or ill for ever; and therefore he looks on it, as he justly may, as a thing beneath his infinite Wisdom to be very exact and curious in dividing to us these momentary Trifles in just Proportions to our particular Deserts; and did we not strangely magnifie them, by looking on them through the false Opticks of our own fantastick Hopes and Fears, we should be so far from objecting against Gods Provi­dence these unequal Distributions of them, that were they more exact and equal we should rather object against his Wisdom, as thinking it a very mean Employment for a Deity to be very nice and curious in proportioning such momentary Enjoyments and Sufferings to the Merit or Demerit of immortal Creatures. So that consider­ing of what little moment the present Goods and Evils are which good Men suffer and bad Men enjoy, they ought rather to be lookt on as an Argument of Gods Wisdom than as an Objection against his Providence; for he understands the just value of things, and knows that the best of these worldly Goods are bad enough to be thrown away upon the worst of Men, and so expresses his just scorn of these ad­mired Vanities, by scattering them abroad [Page 335] with a careless Hand; for why should he partake of the Errours of vulgar Opinion, and express himself so very regardful of these Trifles as to put them in gold Scales and weigh them out to Mankind by Grains and Scruples.

III. THAT all things here do happen a­like to all is no Argument against Provi­dence, because this Life is properly the state of our Trial and Probation, and not of our Reward and Punishment. The di­vine Providence hath placed us here as Candidates and Probationers for those e­verlasting Preferments it designs us here­after, that so by training and exercising us in all those excellent Virtues that are pro­per to our Natures, it may improve us from one degree of Perfection to another, 'till at last it hath accomplished us for the heavenly State; in order to which Design it is necessary that there should be an un­equal Distribution of things, whereby good Men may sometimes suffer and bad Men prosper; otherwise there would be no occa­sion for any of our passive Virtues, nor any tryal of our active. For Affliction is the Theatre of Patience and Fortitude, and Resignation to God, and without it there would be no room in the Lives of good Men for the Exercise of these virtues, which [Page 336] for want of Objects to act on, would rust and wax languid. Again, Difficulty is the Touchstone of our Love and Faith and Ingenuity; but should Providence be al­ways crowning the Righteous, and drag­ging Offenders to Execution, such a Pro­cedure would determin our Liberty, and leave us no room for the Exercise of our Faith and Ingenuity; for then the Rewards and Punishments of Providence would be so sensibly and continually present with us, and so urgently press upon our Hopes and Fears, that it would be impossible for us not to believe in God, and next to impos­sible not to obey him; and being thus forced to believe and obey, what Excellency would there be in our Piety and Virtue? What Charity is it for a Miser to lend his Money upon Assurance of twenty per cent? Or what Loyalty for a Traitor to discover his Conspirators within sight of a Wrack? And just as little Virtue would there be in any of our good Works, were there an exact Equality in the Distributions of Pro­dence. For then we should never do a good Work but upon the certain Prospect of an immediate Reward, nor repent of a bad one but upon the irresistible Dread of some immediate Punishment. But in this inequality of things wherein the good of­ten [Page 337] suffer and the wicked prosper, we are left in a free and unconstrain'd Condition, and whether we are virtuous or vitious, devout or profane, it is out of Choice and not of Necessity. So that now to believe and obey the sacred Dictates of Religion is generous and ingenuous, and our Faith and Obedience is our virtue and Ex­cellency, because we believe and obey without Force and against Temptations and Difficulties.

AND as this unequal State of things is of absolute Necessity to try and exercise our Virtues, so it is also very assistant thereunto. For that Providence doth ge­nerally and not universally bless and pro­sper good Men, is a great support to a wise and rational Belief. For as a late ex­cellent Author hath well observed, if things were constantly managed one way without any variation, we might be apt to con­clude that the World was under the rigid Laws of a fatal Necessity; if on the other side there were no Rule observed, no Foot­steps of Method in the Dispensations of Pro­vidence, we might be tempted to believe that Chance rules the World; but when we observe that in the management of things there is an Intermixture of these two, viz. that there is a general Rule, and that there [Page 338] are particular Exceptions from it, we have just reason to conclude that all is under a free Almighty Agent, that rules the World according to the Determinations of his own Will. As this way of Providence, viz. to interweave into good Mens Fortunes Adversity with Prosperity, is in this respect very advantageous to their Faith, so is it also to the whole State of their Virtue; for as on the one hand a continued train of prosperous Events would be apt to bloat and elevate their Minds, so on the other a continued series of Adversity would be apt to sink and depress their Spirits, whilst this middle way of Interchange in their Condition balances them on both sides, and keeps them in an even, steddy and well-poized Temper. Since therefore this Life is the state of our Trial, it is evi­dent that an exact Equality of things would be a much stronger Objection a­gainst the Wisdom of Providence, than all these present Inequalities are against the Justice of it. For Hardships and Difficul­ties are necessary to a state of Trial, and were good Men always blest and bad Men always punished, this Life instead of being a Probation to either would be the Hea­ven of the one and the Hell of the other; and since some Afflictions are necessary to [Page 339] try good Men, and some Prosperities to try bad, it would be a strange oversight of Providence, when it designs the Trial of both, to fix them in such a Condition, wherein no through Experment can be made of either. So that for us to object against Providence for making such unequal Distributions in a state wherein it designs our Trial, is in effect to object against Wisdom for acting most sutably to its own Designs.

IV. THAT all things here do happen alike to all is no Argument against Providence, because the Goods and Evils that befal us here, are not so truly to be estimated by themselves as by their Effects and Conse­quents. For the divine Providence, which runs through all things, hath disposed and connected them into such a Series and Order, that there is no single Event or Accident but what is purely miraculous, but de­pends upon the whole System, and hath innumerable Causes antecedent to it, and innumerable Consequents attending it; and what these Consequents will be, whether good or bad, is beyond our Skill to prog­nosticate; so that though the Event be ne­ver so good or bad singly and apart by it self, yet in Conjunction with all those Consequents that will most certainly at­tend [Page 340] it, the best Event for all we know may prove most mischievous, and the worst most beneficial to us. So that for us bold­ly to pronounce concerning the Good or Evil of Events, before we see the Train of Consequents that follow them, is very rash and inconsiderate. As for instance, you see a good Man oppressed with Sorrows and Afflictions, and a bad Man crowned with Pleasures and Prosperities; and consider­ing these things apart by themselves, you conclude that the one fares very ill and the other very well; but did you at the same time see the Consequents of the ones Adversity and the others Prosperity, it is probable you would conclude the quite contrary, viz. that the good Mans Adver­sity was a Blessing, and the bad Mans Pro­sperity a Curse. For I dare boldly affirm that good Men generally reap more substan­tial Benefit from their Afflictions than bad Men do from their Prosperities; the one smarts indeed at present; but what fol­lows? perhaps his Mind is cured by it of some Disease that is ten times worse to him than his outward Affliction; of Ava­rice or Impatience, of Envy or Discontent, of Pride or vanity of Spirit; his Riches are lessened, but his Virtues are improved by it; his Body is impaired but his Mind is [Page 341] grown sound and haile by it, and what he hath lost in Health or Wealth, or Pleasure or Honour, he hath gained with vast ad­vantage in Wisdom and Goodness, in Tran­quillity of Mind and Self-enjoyment. And methinks no Man, who believes he hath a Soul, should grudg to suffer any tolerable Affliction for the bettering his Mind, his Will and his Conscience. On the other hand the bad Man triumphs and rejoyces at present; but what follows? his Prospe­rity either shrivles him into Miserable­ness, or melts him into Luxury; the for­mer of which impoverishes, and the latter diseases him; for if the former be the Ef­fect of his Prosperity, it increases his Needs, because before he needed only what he had not, but now he needs both what he hath not and what he hath; his covetous Desires treating him as the Faulkner doth his Hawk, still luring him off from what he hath seized to fly at new Game, and never permitting him to prey upon his own Quarry. and if the latter be the Ef­fect of his Prosperity, that is, if it melts him into Luxury, it thereby wasts his Health to be sure, and commonly his E­state too; and so whereas it found him poor and well, it leaves him poor and dis­eased, and only took him up from the Plow [Page 342] and sets him down at the Hospital. In general, while he is possessed of it, it only bloats and swells him, makes him proud and insolent, griping and oppressive, pampers and inrages his Lust, stretches out his De­sires into an insatiable Bulimy, sticks his Mind full of Cares and his Conscience of Guilts, and by all these woful Effects it inflames his Reckoning with God, and treasures up Wrath for him against the day of Wrath; so that comparing the Conse­quents of the good Mans Adversity with those of the bad Mans Prosperity, it is evi­dent that the former fares well even in his worst Condition, and the latter ill in his best. It's well for me, saith good David, that I was afflicted, for before I was afflict­ed I went astray, but now I have kept thy Commandments, Psalm 119.67. But on the contrary, when the Wicked spring as the Grass, saith the same Author, and when all the workers of Iniquity do flourish, it is that they shall be destroyed for ever, Psalm 92.7. If then in the Consequents of things good Men are blessed in their Affli­ctions, and bad Men plagued in their Pro­sperities, as it is apparent they generally are, these unequal Distributions are so far from being an Argument against Provi­dence, that they are a glorious Instance of [Page 343] it. For wherein could the divine Provi­dence better express its Justice and Wisdom together, than by benefiting the good and punishing the bad by such cross and im­probable Methods?

V. THAT all things here do happen a­like to all, is no Argument against Provi­dence, because it is very requisite it should often do so, to assure us of a Judgment to come. For were the Affairs of this World managed with that exact Equality as that the good did never suffer nor the bad e­scape unpunished, we should be deprived of one of the best moral Arguments of a future Judgment. For as on the one hand should Providence never reward the good nor punish the bad in this Life, but con­found them together without any Distin­ction, it might tempt us to despair of any just Retributions from it in the Life to come; so on the other hand were the Goods and Evils of this Life weighed out to Men in exact Proportions to their Merit and Demerit without any Inequality, we might be tempted to think that there is no need of, and consequently no ground to expect any Judgment to come. For what occasion would there be for any future Judgment if all things were already exactly balanced and adjusted; and therefore as to confirm [Page 344] us in the Belief of the Justice of Providence, it was requisite the same plain Instances should be given of its Distinguishing the good from the bad by present Rewards and Punishments; so to confirm us in the Ex­pectation of a Judgment to come, it was no less requisite that there should be some In equality in the present Management and Distribution of things, and that the Goods and Evils of this World should not be ad­ministred with that exact Regularity as to prevent the necessity of a day of Judg­ment; but that there should be undecided Cases enough remaining for a future Tri­bunal to adjust and determine. So that as in the present management of things there is Equality enough to induce us to believe a just Providence; so there is also Inequality enough to induce us to expect a future Judgment; God having wisely pro­vided in his present Administration of things, to give us Instances enough of his just Procedure towards the good and bad, and yet to leave us Instances enough of unrewarded Virtue and prosperous Wicked­ness, to assure us that he intends an after Reckoning. For how can we reflect upon these repeated Examples of just Reward and Punishment, which in every Age al­most God sets before us, and not believe [Page 345] that he governs the World? And how can we reflect upon those manifold Evils which some good Men suffer, and Goods which some bad Men enjoy, without believing that he hath appointed a Day wherein he will adjust these Inequalities and vindicate the Cause of oppressed Virtue, and crush triumphant Wickedness into everlasting Confusion?

VI. And lastly, That all things here do happen alike to all, is no Argument against Providence, because the exact Adjustment of things is reserved for a future Judgment. I confess were God to make no other Di­stribution to the just and unjust, but what is made in this Life, the Inequality of it would be a strong Objection against his Providence; but then considering that all this cloudy Scene of things will shortly close up in a righteous Judgment, wherein for the Evils which the good have suffered they shall be awarded an eternal Happiness, and for the Goods which the bad have enjoyed they shall be doomed to everlasting Wretchedness, this is sufficient to vindicate the Justice of Providence were these pre­sent Inequalities a thousand times greater than they are. For suppose that after a short Melancholy Dream good Men were to live happily, and after as short a pleasant [Page 346] one bad Men were to live wretchedly but for a thousand years in this World; we might as well object against Providence this unequal Distribution of the melancholy Dream to the good, and the pleasant one to the bad, notwithstanding the succeed­ing thousand years of their Happiness and Misery, as we do the sufferings of the Righteous and Prosperities of the Wicked, which bear far less Proportion to that Eternity of Happiness and Misery that is to succeed them, than the Sorrow or Plea­sure of a Moments Dream doth to a thousand years real Calamity or Blessed­ness.

FOR the Providence of God from the first to the last is all but one continued Plot, like that of a well-contrived Comedy, which at first is very obscure and intricate; so that by what is past or present there is no guessing at the Conclusion; for all through the intermediate Acts Virtue and Honour fight their way through Difficul­ties and Disappointments, and sometimes the Hero acts a sad, and sometimes the Villain a prosperous Part, at which the unskilful Spectator grieves, and is ready to damn the Poet for distributing such un­equal Fates; but then in the fifth and last Act all the cross Accidents clear up, and [Page 347] issue in a fair Conclusion; and in the close of all, the Hero is crowned, and the Villain hissed off the Stage. Let us there­fore have but the patience to stay 'till Providence hath finished its whole Plot, and closed up all its mighty Scenes in the general Judgment of the World, and then we shall see all these Inequalities set right, and the Fates of good and bad Men de­termined by a most just Award. But for us to quarrel at Providence now, who are yet got no farther, it may be, than to the middle of the great Drama, and to find fault with its Procedure for crossing the good and prospering the bad, is rudely to overturn the Stage before the Entrance into the fifth Act, and to hiss off the Al­mighty Poet for not compleating his Design before he is arrived to the Conclusion. And thus I have endeavoured to answer more at large this Objection against Provi­dence, because it hath been more insisted on than any other, and hath more gene­rally stumbled Mens Belief of divine Provi­dence.

V. And lastly, It is farther objected that the Being of a just and good Providence, is not to be reconciled with that wretched State and Condition to which we behold the greatest part of Mankind abandoned [Page 348] For if there were a good Providence that over-ruled the Affairs of this World, how is it imaginable that ever so great a part of Mankind as the Infidel World includes, should be left so utterly destitute as they are of the Knowledg of God, and of the Means of attaining their everlasting Happi­ness? To which I shall briefly answer these three things:

I. THAT the Infidel World is not per­haps left so utterly destitute as we are apt to imagine; for they have the Law of Nature to direct them, by which alone they must be tried, and stand or fall at the Day of Judgment; which as to the main strokes of their Duty, is so plain and in­telligible, that no sincere Inquirer can be ig­norant of it; and if when they may un­derstand it they will not, or if when they do understand it, they wilfully transgress and violate it, the Divine Providence hath been sufficiently good to them to leave them for ever inexcusable. For so far as their Ignorance is invincible it is not their Sin, nor shall they ever be accountable for it, or for any sinful Omission or Commission thence proceeding, and if they only an­swer for not understanding their Duty when they might, or for not performing it so far as they understood it, they can have [Page 349] no reason to complain that they are hardly dealt with. But then,

II. As they have not those vast Advan­tages that we have of becoming good, and growing up into the state of Perfection and Happiness, so proportionably less Degrees of Good will be accepted of those that do well, and less Degrees of Punishment ex­acted of those that do ill; for that Maxim of our Saviour, Luke 12.48. To whom­soever much is given, of him much shall be required, necessarily implies the contrary, viz. that to whomsoever less is given of him less shall be required; and if so, it is certain that so much as their means of be­ing good are less than ours, so much the less good God will accept of them than of us; and as God will accept less good of the best Infidels, so he will exact less Punish­ment of the worst; for so our Saviour him­self hath assured us, that it will be more tolerable for Tire and Sidon, and Sodom and Gomorrah in the last Day, than for those who persist in their Vnbelief and Disobedience in despight of the Proposals of the Gospel. If then in Proportion to their present Disadvantages less good will be accepted of those who make any Im­provement, and less Punishment exacted of them who make none, neither the one [Page 350] sort nor the other hath any reason to com­plain; and though their Condition were worse than it is, yet under these Circum­stances it would be fairly consistent with the Goodness of the Divine Providence. But then,

III. And lastly, Though their Condi­tion were a great deal worse than it is, yet it would be very unreasonable for us to object it against the Goodness of the divine Providence, unless we better understood than we do, how God will dispose of them in the other World. Indeed if Mens Fate consisted in what they suffer and enjoy in this Life, we might better judg of Provi­dence by what is before us; but since our main state is beyond the Grave, what­ever befals us here is very inconsiderable, compared with what we must suffer or enjoy hereafter; and as for the present Dis­advantages which the heathen World lies under, they are but very short and momen­tary, and if Providence pleases, it can abundantly compensate them in the World to come; and therefore since yet we know not what it will do, as having no Revela­tion in the Case, it becomes us to suspend our Judgment 'till the Event hath deter­mined it.

[Page 351]THIS we know, that Providence hath ways enough, and time enough too be­tween this and the Day of Judgment, to supply these Destitute Souls with all those spiritual Advantages in the other Life, which for Reasons best known to it self it hath hitherto withheld from them; it may if it pleases extend their Trial and Proba­tion beyond this Life, and discover in the other Life the Light of the Gospel, to so many of them at least as have here made any tolerable Improvements under the Light of Nature, and if they make good use of it, reward them accordingly. For though we Christians have no reason to expect any farther Trial after this Life is expired, because we have passed the ut­most Trial already, yet who knows but God may make a farther Trial of those in the other Life, upon whom the great Ex­periment of the Gospel was yet never made; and therefore since Providence can yet be infinitely good to them notwith­standing their wretched Condition at pre­sent, and since for all we know it will be so, we ought not to object against it its present Disregard of them, till we see the final Issue of things; for that their present Condition is so bad is no ground for us to argue against Providence, unless we were [Page 352] sure it would never be better; because for all we know it may yet be rendered good enough not only to justifie, but to glorifie the Goodness of Gods Providence towards them.

AND now to conclude this great Ar­gument. Since we see how necessary the Belief of Providence is to our being truly religious, and what unanswerable Evidence there is of the Truth and Reality of it, what remains but that we heartily endea­vour by a calm, fixt, and impartial Con­sideration of these things, throughly to instruct our selves in the Nature, and firm­ly to establish our selves in the Belief of it; For our Religion must necessarily ebb or flow according as it is influenced more or less by our Vnderstanding and Belief of the divine Providence, which are the great Principles that move and govern it. For every Branch of the Divine Providence is an inexhaustible Fountain of religious Rhetorick and Persuasion, and in this sin­gle Proposition, that God upholds and go­verns the World, there are a thousand times more Inducements to Piety and Virtue, than in all other Topicks in the World. But how pregnant soever it is with Argu­ments, and how powerful soever its Argu­ments are, 'tis impossible it should prevail [Page 353] upon any reasonable Mind that understands not the Force; and believes not the Truth of it; for all the possible Access which out­ward Objects have to our Minds, is through our Knowledg and Belief of them, without which the most momentous Pro­posals are no more capable of affecting us than one of Tully's Orations is of calming the North wind; but he who firmly be­lieves the Truth, and understands the full Emphasis of a Divine Providence, must necessarily be affected by it, if he be but within the Reach and Power of Persuasion; and unless his Will be impregnably fortified against all the Force of Argument and Reason, he will find himself so besieged with Motives on every side persuading him to submit to the Obligations of Religion, that it will be almost impossible for him to defend himself against their powerful Importunities. For what Man in his Wits can sit unconcerned under the lively Belief that he is in the hands of a most just and gracious, alwise, and Almighty Providence, that is conscious to his inmost Thoughts and Purposes, and beholds all his Actions with infinite Complacency or Abhorrence; that hath the disposal of his Life and his Soul, and of all the Goods he can hope for, and all the Evils he can fear, and will [Page 354] certainly reward him a thousand-fold if he doth well, and if he doth ill as certainly pursue him with a dire Revenge? This Belief carries with it such constraining Terrors and Allurements as cannot but affect all reasonable Minds, and finally prevail with their Hopes and Fears against all contrary Temptations. Wherefore if ever we would fix the Obligations of Religion upon our Minds, it concerns us above all things to be throughly instructed in the Nature, and confirmed in the Belief of the divine Providence.

CHAP. V. Of the necessity of believing divine Rewards and Punishments in order to our being truly Religious.

HUMANE Nature is framed to move upon the Hinges of Hope and Fear, and to be elicited and drawn forth in Acti­on either by the Proposal of some attaina­ble Good or Prospect of some avoidable Evil, the former of which begets Hope in us, and that Pursuit; the latter Fear, and that Flight and Avoidance; and according­ly we find all Laws address to the Hopes and Fears of Men with Proposals of Re­ward and Punishment, as to the Master-Springs and Principles of their Action, by which they are moved to do or forbear according as they are required and en­joyned. And indeed to give Laws to Men without inforcing them with Rewards and Punishments, would be to leave it indifferent whether they obeyed them or no, which is inconsistent with the Nature of Laws; for Laws necessarily imply an [Page 356] Obligation to Obedience; but what Obli­gation could we have to obey them, did they leave it indifferent as to any Good or Evil accrewing from it, whether we obeyed them or no; for if it will be as well for us one way as t'other, what matter is it which way we determine our selves? And this holds good in nothing more than in the Matter of our Obedience to the Laws of Religion, to which our cor­rupt Nature is above all things backward and averse; all that spiritual Exercise which those Laws require being quite against the Grain of our Earthy and sensu­al Inclinations; so that were we not drawn to it by the Hope of Good, and driven by the Fear of Evil, to be sure our own bad natures would keep us at an eternal Di­stance from it; but unless we believe God to be a Rewarder of those that obey, and a Punisher of those that despise him, we have no ground to hope for any Good, or to dread any Evil at his hands.

For unless we believe that he will Crown those that serve him with some Mark of his Favour, how can we think he is plea­sed with them; there being no other way for him to express his being Pleased, but by Crowning 'em with some signal Reward; and if he be not Pleased with [Page 357] those that serve him, to be sure he is not Displeased with those that Neglect him; and if he be not Displeased with 'em, what Reason have we to apprehend that he will Punish 'em? Thus the unbelief of Gods being a Rewarder of those that obey him draws after it an unbelief of his being a Punisher of those that Despise him, and so on the contrary. For unless we be­lieve him to be so much concerned for his Service as to punish those that neglect it, we have no reason to think he is so much concerned for it as to reward those that embrace it. So that the belief and unbe­lief of Gods being a Rewarder and a Pu­nisher do by necessary consequence mutu­ally imply each other; and unless we be­lieve Both there is no reason we should be­lieve Either. And when our nature is so averse, as it is, to his Service, what should induce us to serve him when we expect no Good from him, or hinder us from slighting him when we fear no Evil? And what is there can bring us home to God when we are carried away from him with an impetuous Tide of corrupt Inclinations, and have neither Hope nor Fear to Bound or Restrain it? So that considering the Aversation of our Nature to Gods service, it is morally impossible [Page 358] we should ever be heartily reconciled to it without being Drawn with the Hope of Reward, and Driven with the Fear of Pu­nishment.

In the Prosecution of this Argument I shall indeavour to shew,

First, How far it's necessary that our Belief of divine Rewards and Punishments should extend.

Secondly, What Evidence there is to induce us to believe them.

Thirdly, By what Means this is to be Begotten and Confirmed.

SECT. I. How far it is necessary that our belief of divine Rewards and Punish­ments should extend.

FOR to induce us to submit to the Obligations of Religion, it is by no means sufficient that we believe in the gene­ral that God will Reward us if we do well, and Punish us if we do wickedly. For this we may firmly believe, and yet at the same time prefer the Pleasures of sin as [Page 359] much greater Goods than the Rewards of Vertue, and Dread the Difficulties of Ver­tue as much greater Evils than the Pu­nishments of sin; wherefore to Render our Belief of divine Rewards and Pu­nishments an Effectual Principle of Reli­gion these four things are necessary.

First, That we should believe that God is so far a Rewarder of those that serve him, and so far a Punisher of those that neglect him, as to make a Plain and sensi­ble Distinction between them.

Secondly, Considering how Promiscu­ously the Goods and Evils of this World are distributed among Good and Bad men, it's necessary we should believe, That there is a Future state of Rewards and Pu­nishments.

Thirdly, It is necessary we should be­lieve those Future Rewards and Punish­ments to be such as do Infinitely Transcend any Good we can Reap by our sins, and any Evil we can Incur by doing our Duty.

Fourthly, It is necessary we should be­lieve that there is no other way for us to Avoid those Punishments but by forsaking our sins, or to Acquire those Rewards but by submitting to our Duty.

[Page 360]I. IT is necessary we should believe that God is so far a Rewarder of those that serve, and so far a Punisher of those that Neglect him, as to make a plain and sen­sible distinction between them. For unless we believe that God makes some Distin­ction between those serve and those that neglect him, we shall Confound Good and Evil in our own Apprehensions, and look upon all humane actions as In­different, and thereby dissolve all the Ties and Obligations of Religion. For things are in Themselves, as they are in the Judgment and Esteem of God, who cannot be mistaken in Estimating their Na­tures; and therefore unless there be some Distinction between Men and Men, and Actions and Actions in the Esteem of God, rhey must be all Alike and Indifferent in their Own natures. And if all Actions are Indifferent in themselves, we are free from all the Ties and Obligations of Religion, and 'tis left Indifferent to us whether we will Worship God or Blaspheme him. So that unless we believe that God makes some Distinction between the Good and bad, Religion can have no force at all upon our minds.

But now there is no other way for God [Page 361] to Distinguish between Men and Men, but by Rewarding and Punishing them; be­cause if he make any Distinction in his Affections between us, we may be sure his Love will incline him to Reward, and his Hatred to Punish us; and since 'tis as Easie to him to follow his Inclination as not, since he can Reward where he Loves, and Punish where he Hates without any Di­sturbance to his own Happiness, what should hinder him from doing it, suppo­sing that he really loves or hates, or makes any Distinction in his Affections between those that serve and those that neglect him? So that unless he Reward the one and Pu­nish the other, he can make no Visible Distinction in his Affections between them. If he be Contrarily affected to Good and Bad men, his Affections will infallibly ap­pear in his Actions; but if he use them Alike, it is plain they are Alike to him. So that unless we believe that God distin­guishes between Good and Bad men by Rewarding and Punishing them, we must look upon Both as Indifferent to him, and believe that he concerns himself neither with the one nor the other; and if we think it is Indifferent to God whether we are Good or Bad, to be sure it will not be Indifferent to us, whose natures are so [Page 362] Biassed with Bad Inclinations, which ha­ving neither Hope nor Fear to Restrain them, will Run towards Bad Objects with­out Rub or Interruption. And what like­lihood is there that we who are so Prone and Inclinable to evil, should concern our selves in the service of God, whilst we look upon it as a thing Indifferent to him whether we serve him or no?

Wherefore to the subduing our minds to the Obligations of Religion, it is ne­cessary we should believe that God is so far a Rewarder of Good, and Punisher of Bad Men, as to make a sensible Distinction between them, and demonstrate that he is differently affected towards them. For to what end should we serve a God that takes no notice of us, that regards not what we do, but sits above in the Hea­vens as an unconcerned spectator of our Actions; why should we cross our own inclinations, and forsake our beloved lusts, for his sake, when it is altogether Indifferent to him what we do, or whither we go, or what becomes of us?

II. Considering how Promiscuously the Goods and Evils of this life are distributed among Good and Bad Men, it is necessary that we should believe there is a Future state of Rewards and Punishments. For [Page 363] though sometimes in this life God rewards Good men, and punishes Bad with such signal and Remarkable Goods and Evils as are sufficient Indications of the vast Di­stinction he makes between them, yet this is Extraordinary and besides the Con­stant and Regular Course of his Providence, which for wise and excellent ends and pur­poses doth ordinarily scatter Good and Evil among men with an open and undistin­guishing hand; insomuch that as the Wise man observes, Eccles. 9.1, 2, 3. No man knoweth either Love or Hatred by all that is before him; all things come alike to all, there is one event to the Righteous and to the Wicked, and as is the Good so is the sin­ner, and he that sweareth as he that fea­reth an Oath; this is an evil among all things that are done under the Sun that there is one Event to all. Since therefore Gods love of Good men and Hatred of Bad appears not by any thing before us, we must either conclude that they are both Indifferent to him, which would be to Rase the very Foundations of Religion, or that there is a Future state of Rewards and Punishments wherein there will be no more such Promiscuous Distributions, no more such Cross-coupling of Prosperity with Vice, and Misery with Virtue, but all [Page 364] things will be Adjusted sutably to mens Deserts and Qualifications, and those that are Good Advanced to immortal Glo­ry and Honour, and those that are Bad Deprest into eternal Shame and Confusion. For the Difference which God makes be­tween them in the present course of his Providence is too small and indiscernable to induce us to believe that he makes any Difference between them in his Esteem and Affection; and therefore either we must believe that there is another state wherein he makes a far wider difference between them, or conclude that they are both In­different to him, and that he hath no more Regard to the one than the other, or that he hath no Regard at all to Either, which as I shewed before, utterly dissolves the Obli­gations of Religion.

III. IT is necessary we should believe those Future Rewards and Punish­ments to be such as do Infinitely Tran­scend any Good we can reap in our sinful neglect of God and any Evil we can incur by our submission to him. 'Tis true, were our natures equally inclined to submit to or neglect him, we should need no more Good and Evil to move us one way than t'other; but the same Proportion of Goods and Evils which tempts us now to [Page 365] Forsake and Abandon him, would equally tempt us to serve and obey him: but a­las, this is far from our case; for in sub­mitting to God we move counter to our selves, we cross the Grain of our Degene­rate Nature, and run away from our dea­rest Inclinations; whereas in forsaking him, we Row with the Tide, and are dri­ven on with an impetuous current of sinful Lusts and Affections; and the case being thus, the temptations on the one side must be incomparably greater, if ever they pre­vail with us, than they need be on the other. For Men are easily tempted to act in compliance with their own Inclinations; and the smallest Goods or Evils that can be proposed to 'em from without, will rea­dily induce 'em to do what they have a mind to; but to prevail with a Man to do that which he is extreamly averse to, to act against Nature, and live in defiance with his own Inclinations, requires a mighty force of outward temptation; and it must be a very great Good that he will not lose, a very formidable Evil that he will not incur, rather than enter into any course of action that is irksom and ungrateful to his na­ture. So that unless we believe the Goods and Evils of the other World to be incom­parably greater than all the pleasures of [Page 366] Sin, and all the sufferings of Piety and Virtue, there will not be force enough in our Faith to persuade us; because those fu­ture Goods and Evils move against Nature, and persuade us to a course of life we are extreamly averse to, whereas these present ones join hands with our Inclinations, and find a ready concurrence in our wills and affections; and a very small temptation will prevail against a great one, when it hath Nature, that Bosom Orator, to solicite and plead for it. Wherefore unless we be­lieve the Rewards and Punishments of the future state to be such as infinitely out­weigh those present Goods and Evils that tempt us to sin, they will never be able to prevail against 'em; because they must not only out-tempt them, but, which is the much harder task of the two, they must out-tempt the Reluctances of our Degenerate na­ture; and yet for future Goods and Evils to out-tempt present ones is not so easie a matter neither; especially if those future ones are invisible and out of the Ken of our sense, which is the case here. For Fu­turity lessens all Objects to the Mind, even as distance doth to the Eye, and makes things appear to us much smaller than they are in their own natures; So that the futurity of the Rewards and Punishments [Page 367] of the other life are a mighty disadvantage to 'em when they stand in competition with present Goods and Evils; because the later appear to us in their full Proportion, and Magnitude, with all their tempting circumstances about 'em, whereas the for­mer exhibit to us a dim and confused Landskip of things afar off, of things which we never saw nor felt, and which by rea­son of their distance imprint very dark I­dea's on our minds. And as their Futurity lessens their appearance, and renders it con­fused and indistinct, so their Invisibility weakens their force and influence on our minds, which no Objects can so nearly af­fect as those that strike upon our Senses. So that unless by an immense magnitude they compensate for being future and in­sensible, it is impossible they should pre­vail with such minds as ours against pre­sent and sensible Goods and Evils. Where­fore to render our belief of a future State effectual to reduce us to God and our Du­ty, it's absolutely necessary we should be­lieve the Rewards and Punishments of it to be infinitely greater than all the Goods and Evils that can tempt us to Sin; and that not only because our natures are extream­ly averse to that which these Rewards and Punishments tempt us to, but because [Page 368] the Goods and Evils which tempt us the contrary way have the prevailing Advan­tages of being present and sensible.

IV. And lastly, IT is necessary we should believe that there is no other way for us to acquire these Rewards or avoid these Punishments, but by submitting to the Ob­ligations of Religion. For to be throughly convinced and persuaded of the immense Rewards and Punishments of the other life, is by no means sufficient to reduce us un­to God, so long as we do but Dream of any possible way to obtain those Rewards and avoid those Punishments without sub­mitting to Him, to which above all ima­ginable ways our corrupt nature hath the greatest Antipathy. So that though we were never so much convinc'd of the ab­solute necessity of escaping Hell and pur­chasing Heaven, yet if at the same time we have a prospect of any other way or means of effecting it, to be sure we shall shun this this most ungrateful one of for­saking our Sins and returning to God. And if listing our selves into Godly Par­ties, or putting on a demure and sancti­fied countenance, if being moped, dejected or unsociable, if whining or fasting, or long prayers, or an affected Gurb, or rigid ob­servance of holy Times; if consuming [Page 369] our lives in a barefooted Pilgrimage, or wearing a hair Shirt, or whipping our Bo­dies, or spending our Estates in Masses and Indulgencies; if being made free of a holy Confraternity, or visiting Altars and Shrines, or numbering Prayers, like Faggots by a Tally of Beads; if these or any of these will but secure us of Heaven and from going to Hell, we shall think 'em a thou­sand times more tolerable and easie than to submit our wills to God in all the instances of true Piety and Vertue; in the doing of which we must strangle the corrupt incli­nations of our nature, tear our beloved Lusts from our hearts, rack off our earthy affections from their Lees, and refine and spiritualize 'em into a divine Zeal, and Love and Devotion, than which there is no­thing in the World more irksom to a de­generate nature. So that 'till we are re­duc'd to an utter despair of reaping the Rewards and escaping the Punishments of the other Life by any other means than this of submitting our selves to the Obligations of Religion, our faith will be altogether ineffectual.

SECT. II. What Evidence there is to induce us to believe these future Rewards and Punishments.

THAT there are future Rewards and Punishments is a Doctrine universal­ly assented to by all Ages, and Nations, and Religions, and there is scarce any first Principle in Phisosophy, in which Man­kind are more generally agreed. Thus a­mong the Heathen Poets, Divines and Phi­losophers, there is an unanimous acknow­ledgment of these future States, although their descriptions of 'em are generally no­thing but the dreams of an extravagant fancy. For so as Josephus observes, speak­ing of the Essenes Doctrine concerning the future State of the blessed [...], &c. i. e. they teach, as all the Greek Nations also do, that for good Souls there are blessed Seats prepared beyond the Ocean in a Region that is always free from Rain and Snow, and excessive heats, being perpetually fanned with gentle breeses from the Ocean; which [Page 371] description he hath translated almost ver­batim out of the 4th. Book of Homers Vlyssea, where he brings in Proteus thus bespeaking Menelaus, [...], &c. i. e. The Gods shall send thee to the Fields of Elysium which lie on the utmost parts of the Earth where thou shalt live secure and happy, there being neither Rain, nor Snow, nor Winter, but the blessed Inhabitants are perpetually re­fresh'd with the gentle breathing of cool Zephyrs from the Ocean. Plato tells us of an antient Law concerning Men, [...], i. e. which was always and is still in force among the Gods, that those who lived just and holy lives should after their death go into the Isles of the blessed, where they should enjoy all manner of happiness without the least intermixture of misery; but that those who lived here unjustly and ungodly should be sent into that Prison of just pu­nishment, which is called Hell, Plat. Gorg. p. 312. Thus also Tully Tuscul. lib. 1. per­manere animos arbitramur consensu natio­num [Page 372] omnium, i. e. We believe, as all Nations do, that the Souls of Men do survive their Bodies; and to name no more, Seneca E­pist. 117. tells us, Cum de animarum ae­ternitate disserimus, non leve momentum a­pud nos habet consensus omnium aut Timen­tium Inferos, aut Colentium, i. e. when we discourse of the Eternity of Souls, the gene­ral consent of all Men either fearing or worshipping the Hellish powers is of very great moment. And indeed this belief of the future states being so generally imprint­ed on Mens minds is a very probable ar­gument of the reality of them, it being hardly conceivable, how the Reason of all mankind should have so unanimously con­sented in it, had it not been extreamly a­greeable to the make and frame of our minds, and we cannot suppose any false proposition to be agreeable to the frame of our mind, without reflecting dishonou­rably upon the truth of him that framed it. And indeed this notion of a future state is such as hath been generally imbraced by those Persons who are least capable of deducing it by a Logical dependence of one thing upon another, and therefore since it hath no dependency in their minds on any other antecedent notion, how could it have been so generally entertain'd, did not the com­mon [Page 373] dictate of Nature or Reason acting a­like in all Men, move 'em to conspire in it, though they knew not one anothers minds. For it hath been believed with a kind of repugnancy to sense, which disco­vers all things round about it to be mor­tal, and which upon that account would have been too apt to have seduced ruder minds into a disbelief of any other state; had not some more powerful impression on their Souls forcibly urg'd 'em to believe it.

BUT because this Argument drawn from universal consent is liable to some little exception, I shall not insist upon it, but indeavour to prove the reality of this future state of Rewards and Punishments from these Topicks:

First, From the Wisdom of God's Go­vernment.

Secondly, From the Justice of his Pro­vidence.

Thirdly, From the natural capacity of our Souls to survive our Bodies, and to enjoy future Rewards, and suffer future Punishments.

Fourthly, From the natural expectance we have of future Rewards, and dread of future Punishments.

[Page 374]Fifthly, From the excellent frame and structure of humane Nature.

Sixthly, From the Testimony of the Christian Religion.

I. FROM the Wisdom of God's Go­vernment. That Mankind is under the Government of God, is evident from that Law which he hath imprinted on our na­ture, by which our actions are distin­guish'd into Good and Evil, Virtuous and Vitious; of which sufficient proof hath been given, Ch. 1. and since God hath given a Law to our natures, there is no doubt to be made but he hath taken sufficient care to inforce the observance of it by Re­wards and Punishments, otherwise his Go­vernment over us would be very insecure and precarious. For that Law giver doth only Petition his Subjects to obey, who doth not promise such rewards and denounce such penalties as are sufficient to oblige 'em thereunto.

BUT now there is no Reward can be suf­cient to oblige us to obey, which doth not abundantly compensate any loss or evil we may sustain by our obedience; no punish­ment sufficient to deter us from disobeying that doth not far surmount all the Bene­fits and Pleasures which we can hope to reap from our Disobedience; but unless [Page 375] there be a future state, the Law of Na­ture can propose no such Rewards and Pu­nishments to us. For if we have nothing to dread or hope for beyond the Grave, our present interest is all our concern, and in rea­son we ought to judg things to be Good or Evil according as they promote or obstruct our temporal happiness. Now though it is certain that in the general there is a natural good accrewing to us from all vertuous actions; as on the contrary a na­tural evil from all vitious ones; and it is ordinarily more conducive to our temporal Interest to obey than to disobey the Law of our natures; yet there are a world of instances wherein Vice may be more ad­vantageous to us than Vertue, abstracting from the Rewards and Punishments of a­nother life. It is ordinarily better for me to be an honest Man than a Knave; it is more for my Reputation and usually for my Profit too; and it is more for the pub­lick good in which my own is involved; but yet in several circumstances it may be better for me with respect only to this World to be a Knave than an honest Man. For whensoever I can cheat so secretly and securely as not to fall under the publique lash nor impair my reputation, and I can gain more by the Cheat than I shall lose [Page 376] in the damage of the Publique, it will be doubtless more advantageous for me as to my worldly interest to cheat than to be ho­nest; and how often such fair opportunities of cozenage do occur, no Man can be insen­sible that hath but the least insight into the affairs of this World. So that if there were no future Rewards and Punishments, this great Law of Righteousness would not have force enough universally to oblige us; because there are a world of instances wherein we might gain more good and es­chew more evil by doing unrighteously, than all its present Rewards and Punishments do amount to. And the same may be said of all other laws of Nature, which with­out the great motives of future happiness and misery can no longer induce Men to obey 'em than it is for their temporal in­terest to do so. For suppose I can secret­ly stab or poison a Man whom I hate or dread, or from whose death I may reap any considerable advantage, what should restrain me from it? If you say the Law of Nature, pray what Reward doth the Law of Nature propose that is sufficient to compensate for the disatisfaction of my Re­venge, or for the danger I run in suffering my Enemy to live; or what punishment doth the Law of Nature denounce that [Page 377] can ballance the advantage of a thousand or perhaps ten thousand pounds a year that may accrew to me by his death?

IF you say the Law of Nature proposes to me the reward of a quiet and satisfied Mind, and denounces the punishment of a guilty and amazed Conscience; I easily an­swer, that this peace and horror which is consequent to the forbearance or commission of sin, arises from the hope and dread of future Rewards and Punishments; which being taken away, to sin or not sin will be indifferent as to any peace or horror that can follow upon it; and when this restraint is taken off, what consideration will there be left that is sufficient to with­hold me from the bloody fact, when ever I have an opportunity to act it securely, and am furiously spurred on to it by my own Re­venge and Covetousness? So that if there be no Rewards and Punishments in another life to inforce the commands of the Law of Nature, it's certain that there are no such annex'd to it in this as are universally suffi­cient to oblige us to observe 'em. For as for the Goods and Evils of this life, they are ordinarily distributed among Men with so little respect and discrimination, as not only to occasion but to justifie that famous observation of the Wise Man, that all [Page 378] things happen alike to all. Either therefore there are other Goods to be hoped for, and other Evils to be feared, or there are a world of cases wherein God hath not suf­ficiently provided to secure our obedience to the Law of our Nature; and to ima­gine that God should give a Law to his Creatures, and take no care to secure the Authority of it, is a most sensless Blasphemy of the Wisdom of his Government; for this would be to expose his own Authority to contempt, and to cast his Laws at the feet of his Creatures to be spurned and trampled on by 'em at their pleasure.

IF it be Objected, that all that this Argument proves, is, that to secure our obedience to the Law of Nature, it's neces­sary we should believe that there are fu­ture Rewards and Punishments; but that it doth not hence follow that 'tis necessary that there should be future Rewards and Punishments; because whether there be any such things or no, our belief of 'em will be sufficient to secure the Authority of the Law; I answer, That if our be­lief of future Rewards and Punishments be necessary, one of these two things must inevitably follow; either that the Objects of our Belief are real, which is the thing I am proving, or that to countenance the [Page 379] Authority of his Laws, it's necessary for God to impose upon our faith, and deceive us into the belief of a falshood. For if to inforce God's Law, it's necessary we should believe that there are future Rewards and Punishments, either there must be such things really existing, or God must inforce his Law with our belief of a falshood; and to imagin, that when God might have created for us a future state of Reward and Punishment, if he had so pleased, and go­verned us by the hopes and fears of it, he hath rather chosen to govern us by Tricks and Lyes, and to wheedle us into obedi­ence by a cheat and delusion, is a Blasphe­my no less sensless than horrid. Since there­fore to secure the Authority of that Law by which the humane Nature is to be go­verned, it is necessary that it should be in­forc'd with the motives of everlasting Re­ward and Punishment, one of these three things necessarily follows; either that God hath not sufficiently inforc'd his Law, which is a soul imputation on his Wisdom, or that he is fain to inforce it with a Lye, which is an impious reflection on his Truth, or that there are everlasting Rewards and Punishments.

[Page 380]II. FROM the Justice of the divine Providence. For if there be a divine Pro­vidence presiding over the World (as, that there is, hath been already sufficiently pro­ved) Justice and Equity, which is the most glorious perfection of an Over-ruling power, must necessarily be included in the notion of it. For without Justice, over-ruling power is nothing but an impotent Tyranny, whch to attribute to God is far more dishonourable and incongruous to the nature of his perfections, than to strip him of all Providence, as Epicurus did, and shut him up in the heavens in a state of everlasting Sloth and Luxury. For not to Govern, is only to do Nothing; but to Govern without Justice, is to do Mis­chief; and 'tis a much less Derogation from the Perfection of any Being, to suppose it to be Idle than to suppose it to be Mischie­vous. So that allowing that God, who is the most perfect of all Beings, governs the World, it would not be only Blasphemous, but Nonsense to imagine that he governs it unjustly. Now the proper justice of Govern­ment consists in the Equality of its Distri­butions; for since there is such a thing as immutable Good and Evil in the actions of free and reasonable Agents, it is naturally fit and due that those who do good should [Page 381] receive good, and those who do evil, evil, from their hands who have the Government of actions; and this proportionably to the good and evil of their doings. So that Gods Governing the World justly, consists in Di­stributing good to those that do good, and evil to those that do evil, or in other words in Proportioning Rewards and Pu­nishments to men according to the Good and Evil he finds in their actions; and un­less we suppose him to do this, it is non-sense to imagine that he Governs the World.

BUT if all his Distributions are confi­ned to this life, and there is neither Re­ward nor Punishment to be expected from him in another, there are infinite instances of his Providence wherein it will be impos­sible to defend his equality and justice. For if there be no other Scene of good and evil, reward and punishment, but only this life, all the afflicted good and prosperous bad men that ever were in the World, of which there infinite instances, are so many reproachful. Monuments of the woful ine­quality of the divine Government. For how many Millions of brave Souls have there been, who have thought nothing too dear for God and his service, and have sacrificed their lusts, their lives, and their [Page 382] fortunes to him, and yet upon this suppo­sal have reaped no other recompence for so doing but only a miserable life, and a wofull death, and an obscure dishonourable grave? As, on the contrary, how many Millions of Millions of wicked men that have lived in open defiance to all that is sacred, and just, and good, blasphemed God, affronted his authority, and trampled upon all the Laws of his Government, and yet, sup­posing there is no other life, have under­gone no other punishment for so doing but to live prosperously, and die quietly, and lie inshrined in a Marble Monument? Now how can we otherwise Apologize for the justice of Providence when it thus cross-couples Prosperity with Vice, and Adver­sity with Vertue, but only by supposing this present life to be only the state of our Trial and Probation, which will quick­ly determine in our everlasting Recom­pence or Punishment, according as we be­have and acquit our selves in it; upon which supposal the justice of Providence may be fairly accounted for, were the pre­sent distributions of it a thousand times more unequal than they are? For then we need not wonder that good and bad men are at present so unequally treated, since now they are only upon their Proof [Page 383] and Trial, which, as I have shewn before, requires such a treatment, but their Re­ward and Punishment is reserved for another state, wherein all these seeming inequali­ties shall be fairly adjusted, and Vertue shall be crowned with everlasting Glory and Pleasure, and Vice damn'd to eternal hor­ror and confusion. But if the Goods and Evils of this present life, are all the reward and punishment that good and bad Men are to expect, where is the Justice of the divine Government, that many times op­presses its Friends, and advances its E­nemies, and in the conclusion extin­guishes their Beings together, and there­with all possibility of making any future retribution of good to the one, or evil to the other? And therefore if it be true, that the Judge of all the World will do righteously, that first or last he will cer­tainly distribute his Rewards and Pu­nishments to his Subjects accord to the Merit and Demerit of their actions, it must be as true, that for the main he hath reserved the doing it to a future state; since it cannot be denied but that at pre­sent he very often doth the quite contrary; and if it be but as evident that there is such a future state as it is that God governs [Page 384] the World justly, I think 'tis as fair an as­surance of it as any modest Man can re­quire.

III. FROM the natural capacity of our Souls to survive our Bodies, and enjoy fu­ture Rewards and suffer future Punish­ments, it also follows that there is a fu­ture state of Reward and Punishment. For we find in our Souls a certain innate force and power, whereby they determine themselves which way they please in their motions and operations; whereby they are exempt from the necessitating influence of any thing that is forein to 'em; and this innate liberty or power of self-determina­tion is necessarily supposed in the manage­ment of all humane Affairs; in Commerce and Treaties, in Government and Laws and Administrations of Justice, in Councils, Admonitions, reproofs and persuasions: in all which applications are made to our Souls as to free and self-determining Agents, that have the absolute disposal of their own motions, and can direct 'em which way they please; and indeed were not our Souls left to their own free disposal, but con­cluded by the Laws of a fatal necessity, as we see all material Agents are, such appli­cations to 'em as these, would be very ab­surd and ridiculous, and we may as rea­sonably [Page 385] hope to tame Wolves and Tygers by reading Ethicks to 'em, or to still the North-wind by sending Ambassadours to him to propose Articles of Peace, as to pre­vail upon Mens minds by moral addresses and persuasions; because if they are not masters of their own choices, whatsoever the rigid Laws of necessity determine 'em to, they must necessarily choose in despight of all persuasions to the contrary.

NOW by this self-determining Power our Souls do evidently manifest themselves to be immaterial substances, and conse­quently not liable to Death and Corrup­tion. For if they were matter they would be moved like matter, i. e. by the pres­sure or thrusting of other matter upon 'em; and it would be no more in their power to move any other way than that which some other matter presses and impels 'em, than it is for a stone not to move upwards when 'tis impel'd by the force which your Arm impresses on it, and not to move down again when that force is spent, and 'tis prest back by its own weight and gravity. Whereas we feel in our Soul an innate power to determine it self which way it pleases, and even to move quite contrary to all forein impressions. For when 'tis prest on by outward Object to such and [Page 386] such thoughts and purposes with all ima­ginable vigour, it often stems the impetu­ous Tide, and thinks and purposes the quite contrary. How then can that be mat­ter which is not determined in its motions by matter, but when it pleases can either move counter to all material impressions, or of two material impressions can move counter to the strongest.

THAT our Souls therefore are imma­terial, is just as evident as that they have liberty of will; and that they have liberty of will, needs no other proof than the common sense and feeling of mankind; and whatso­ever essence feels this freedom within it self, whereby it is absolved from the rigid Laws of matter, may with all the reason in the World conclude it self immaterial; and if our Souls are immaterial substances, to be sure they can naturally subsist and live without these Bodies, and must neces­sarily do so unless God destroys 'em, as having no contrary qualities or divisible parts, no principles of death or corruption in 'em; and since God hath made our Soul of an immaterial and immortal nature, we have all the reason in the World to con­clude that he will not unravel his own workmanship, but permit it to survive its Body, and enjoy or indure that happy [Page 387] ot miserable Fate which it self hath chosen and made.

IV. FROM the natural expectance we have of future Rewards and dread of fu­ture Punishments, it is also evident that there is a state of future Rewards and Punishments. Thus after the commission of any flagitious wickedness there natural­ly arise ill-abodings in Mens minds of a dire after-reckoning; and though the Com­mission be secret and conceal'd from all hu­mane cognizance, so that there is no rea­son to dread the corrections of publique Justice for it, yet when ever the Man re­flects on it, it fills his mind with horrible presages of a woful Futurity; as, on the contrary, when ever a Man doth any great good or conquers any violent temptation to evil, it lifts up his Soul into a blessed expectation, and swells his hope with the promise of a future Reward; and though the good he hath done, or the evil he hath avoided, gives him no kind of prospect of any present advantage, yet his mind is soothed and ravished with the contemplation of it, which naturally suggests to him the joyous hopes of a recompence to come. For, whence should this hope and dread spring up in Mens minds upon the Commis­sion of good and bad actions, but from some [Page 388] common impression upon humane nature, in­timating to us a future state of Reward and Punishment? If you say, 'tis from those religious Principles which we im­bibe in our Education; I would fain know how came this Principle concerning the future state to be so universally imbibed, if there were not something in it that is very agreeable with the reason of all mankind? For, whatever is the matter, wee see 'tis very easily embraced, but very difficultly parted with; Mens Minds do catch at it with a strange kind of greediness, but when once they have swallowed it, it never comes up again without straining and violence; and what should be the rea­son of this, if there were not something in it that is very agreeable with the natu­ral tast and rellish of our understandings? We know there have been great Wits and Philosophers that have taken as much pains to rase the belief of a future state out of Mens minds as ever any others did to imprint it there; and yet though their Doctrine hath been always highly be­friended by Mens wicked lusts and affe­ctions, to which the belief of a future state is the most terrible and vexatious thing in the World, yet with all their Wit and So­phistry they have never been able to root [Page 389] it out of Mens minds. If then our hopes and fears of another World be merely ow­ing to our Teaching and Education, why should not teaching erase as well as im­print 'em; especially when it is so power­fully seconded with all the Bosom Rheto­rick of Mens vitious inclinations? Where­as on the contrary, those who have most industriously attempted to extinguish their sense of another World, have generally been very unsuccessful, and though in the Riot of their sinful delights, they many times charm and stupifie it for the present, yet no sooner do they retire into them­selves and coolly reflect upon their own minds, but it presently awakes again, and haunts and pursues 'em; and though they use all imaginable ways to divert their minds from the thoughts of another world, and, to avoid these Bosom Accusers and Tormentors, run for Sanctuary to all things without 'em, to Sports and Recreations, to Wine and Women, to Care and Business, yet still they pursue 'em, and ever and a­non break in upon 'em, and scare and ter­rifie 'em; and because their minds are so haunted with these importunate terrours of the World to come, they are affraid to look inwards, but are fain to live abroad in their own defence, as not daring to trust [Page 390] themselves alone with themselves; all which are plain Presages of a future Judgment and Vengeance that awaits wicked Souls after this life. For if this dread of future Punish­ment be natural to us (as its sticking so close­ly and universally to humane Nature plainly argues it is) it must be imprest on us by the great Author of Nature; and for him to impress a Passion on us which hath no real Object, would be to impose a Cheat upon our Natures and abuse our minds with a false Alarm. So that either we must suppose that God hath implanted in our Natures a [...]ead of that which is not, which is a dishonourable reflection on his Truth and Veracity; or that there is real­ly a future Punishment answerable to that dread.

AND as the dread of future Punish­ment is natural to us when we do ill, so the desire and expectance of future Reward is no less natural to us when we do well. For I dare boldly say there never was any vertuous Man, of whatsoever Nation or Reli­gion, or sect of Philosophers, whose mind hath not been winged with earnest hopes and desires of a future happiness, and there is none that ever yet either denied or despair'd of it, but only such as have first debauched the very Principles of their Na­ture. [Page 391] For such it's evident were the Sadduces and Epicureans, sects of Men that had drown­ed all that was humane in 'em in sensuality and voluptuousness and are branded upon Record for their shameful Indulgence to their own brutish Genius; and such are no Standards of humane Nature, but ought ra­ther to be look'd upon as Monsters of Men. And therefore as we do not judg of the na­tural Figures and proportions of humane Bo­dies by monstrous and mishapen births, so neither ought we to judg of what is na­tural or unnatural to Men by those brutes in humane shape, who, by submitting their Reason to their passions and Appetites, have disfigur'd their Natures and distorted it in­to an unnatural Position; But if we would know what is humane and natural to us, we must take our measures from those who live most conformably to the Laws of a Rational Nature; and these are they whom we call Pious and Virtuous, who are there­fore to be look'd upon as the true Stan­dards of humane Nature, by whom we may best judg of what is natural and un­natural to us; and if we judg by these, we shall most certainly find that Virtue, and the hopes of Immortality are so nearly al­lied, that like Hippocrates Twins they live and die together. For though while [Page 392] Men live a brutish and sensual Life, their future hopes are usually drowned in their present Enjoyments; yet when once they recover out of this unnatural state, and be­gin to live like reasonable beings, imme­diately they feel great desires and expecta­tions of a future happiness springing up in their minds, and so arising higher and higher proportionably as they advance in virtue and goodness; which is a plain evidence that these hopes and desires are natural to us and interwoven with the frame and constitution of our Souls. But now how can it consist with the goodness of God to implant such desires and hopes in our Natures, and then withhold from 'em that which is the only Object that can sute and satisfie 'em? For as a great Divine of our own hath well observed, Other Beings, we see, have no natural desire in vain, the good God having so ordered things that there are Objects in Nature apportioned to all their natural Appetites; but if there be no future state of happiness reserved for good Men, We are by a natural Principle most strongly inclined to that which we can never attain to; as if God had purpose­ly framed us with such inclinations, that so we might be perpetually tormented be­tween those two Passions Desire and De­spair, [Page 393] an earnest propension after a future Happiness, and an utter incapacity of en­joying it; as if Nature it self whereby all other things are disposed to their perfe­ction did serve only in Man to make him miserable, and, which is more considerable, as if Virtue which is the perfection of Na­ture, did only serve to contribute to our infelicity, by raising in us such desires and expectations as without a future Happi­ness must be for ever disappointed. But if this Desire and Expectation be natural to us, as it evidently is, it must be im­planted there by the God of Nature, with whose truth and goodness it can never con­sist to inspire us with such Desires and Hopes as he knows have no Object in the nature of things, and so can never be ful­filled and accomplish'd.

V. FROM the excellent frame and con­stitution of humane Nature, it's also evi­dent that there is a future state of Reward and Punishment. For whoever shall im­partially consider the frame of our Natures, will easily discern that we are made for much greater purposes than to enjoy this World, and that our faculties are as much too big for these sensitive fruitions as the Channel of the Ocean is for the streams of a little River. For the highest happiness we can [Page 394] frame an Idea of, is the enjoyment of God by contemplation and love and imitation of his Perfections, as I have proved at large, Part. 1. c. 3. which doth as far ex­cel all Worldly happiness, as the Enjoy­ments of a Prince do the pleasures of a Fly; and yet it is evident that our minds are framed with a natural capacity of en­joying this supream Beatitude, i. e. of con­templating, and loving and imitating God. For as for the Being and Existence of God, all things round about us preach and pro­claim it, and which way soever we turn our Eyes we behold the footsteps of his Power and Wisdom; and being endowed with a reasoning faculty, we can easily as­cend to the infinite Perfections of his Na­ture by those borrowed Perfections we be­hold in his Creatures, which are so many lively Comments and Paraphrases upon him, and so far forth as they are Perfe­fections, must necessarily meet and concen­ter in him; and then such is the frame of our natures, that from the contemplation of the Beauty and Perfection of any Being, we naturally proceed to admire and love it; so that unless our wills be violently prejudiced against the Perfections of God, our contemplation must necessarily kindle our love of 'em; and then those Perfecti­ons [Page 395] which we love and admire in another, we are naturally ambitious to transcribe in­to our selves; so that being once inflamed with the love of God, that will be con­tinually prompting us to imitate him, and that will by degrees mould us into a fair and glorious resemblance of him. Thus God hath implanted in the very frame of our Nature a most forward capacity of enjoying himself, which in the perfection of it infinitely transcends all that can be ima­gined in a terrestrial Paradise. And yet though we have faculties that we are sure are naturally capable of enjoying him to Perfection; of contemplating him without weariness, of loving him without aversion, of imitating him without difficulty or in­terruption; in this present state of things it is morally impossible we should ever a­rise to it. For our faculties are clog'd with so many sinful prejudices, interrupted with so many bodily necessities, diverted with so many secular occasions, that it cannot be reasonably expected even from the best Men in the World, that they should in this life approach the Perfection of the happiness of divine Enjoyment; especially if there were no other life but this, for then it would be folly so much as to attempt it. For what Man in his Wits would e­ver [Page 396] think it worth the while to spend a considerable part of his life in waging War with himself, mortifying his Affections, crossing and starving out his dearest incli­nations (which yet he must do ere he can arrive to any comfortable degree of divine Enjoyment) if there were no other recom­pence to be expected at last, but to live a few days longer in a Rapturous Muse, and then lie down in everlasting darkness and in­sensibility. Were he not a thousand times better please and gratifie himself at pre­sent, content his craving desires with the goods that are before him, and take his fill of those sensual delights that readily offer themselves to his Enjoyment, than run away from 'em in a long and wearisom quest of spiritual joys, which for all he knows he may never arrive to, or if he doth, is sure within a few moments to be deprived of for ever. So that if there be no other state but this, it's plain we are made naturally capable of the highest happiness to no purpose; we are naturally capable of en­joying God, and yet such are our circum­stances in this present state, that if there be no other, it is not to be expected we should ever arrive to any high de­gree of Enjoyment, and if it were, all things consider'd 'twould be an egregious [Page 397] piece of folly to attempt it; Now how can it consist either with the divine Wisdom or Goodness to create in us such vast ca­pacities of spiritual happiness, and then place us in such circumstances wherein 'twould be both imprudent and in vain for us to pursue any other happiness but what is carnal and sensual? No wise Man would build a House unless he meant it should be inhabited; and can we imagine that the All-wise God would ever have created in us such vast and boundless ca­pacities of happiness, merely to stand empty and be for ever uninhabited; that he who always proposes to himself the most noble and worthy ends of his Actions, would e­ver have form'd in us such superfluous ca­pacities, or built such spacious Rooms in our Nature when he never intended to make any use of 'em?

AND then considering the Goodness as well as Wisdom of God, what likelihood is there that he should create such ample capacities in our Nature and furnish it with such excellent faculties, for no other end but to enjoy the trifling goods of this life; that he who hath created goods for all other creatures that are every way a­dequate to their natural capacities, should make us capable to partake of the felici­ties [Page 398] of Angels, and then stake us down to the pleasures of Swine? Especially considering that by making us capable of a higher hap­piness and sensible of our own capacity, he hath almost necessitated us to expect and de­sire it; and what is this, if he doth not intend it for us, but to create in us an appetite mere­ly to vex and tantalize it; as if it were a recreation to him to sit above in the Hea­vens and behold the work of his own hands spending it self in weary struglings towards him, and vex'd all the while it continues in Being with an impotent de­sire of that which it shall never enjoy, and which by giving it a capacity to enjoy he hath encouraged it to desire and expect.

VI. And lastly, FROM the Testimony of the Christian Religion it is also evident that there is a future state of Reward and Punishment; which in most express terms assures us of another life beyond this, wherein we shall be for ever happy or mi­serable according to what we have done in the flesh; So that we have as full evi­dence of the reality of future Rewards and Punishments as we have of the truth of Christianity, and as full evidence of the truth of Christianity as all the miraculous works of our Saviour can give, and as full evidence of the [Page 399] truth of his Miracles as the most credi­ble Testimony of eye witnesses can give, who not only confirmed their Testimony by other Miracles of their own, but at the last sealed it with their bloud, which is the highest security that mortal men can give of their fidelity; but though this Argu­ment be of all others the most convincing and satisfactory, yet I shall insist no farther on it in this place, because I shall have oc­casion to prosecute it at large in the seventh Chapter.

SECT. III. By what means this belief of divine Rewards and Punishments is to be be­gotten and confirmed in us.

THOUGH the evidences of future Rewards and Punishments be such as are sufficient to convince any reasonable mind, yet it is evident that in this degene­rate state of our natures there is a strong repugnancy to the lively belief of them, insomuch that the bare proposal of evi­dence is not sufficient effectually to persuade us; wherefore before we dismiss this Ar­gument, [Page 400] it will be neeessary to add to what hath been said such means and directions, as, together with the evidences, are pro­per to dispose our minds to the effectual be­lief of the future state; and these I shall reduce to these four particulars,

I. IF we would effectually believe the future state of Rewards and Punishments, we must fix and inure our minds to serious thoughts and considerations. For whilst our minds are taken up with fancies and levities, with wild or ludicrous or in­coherent Ideas, or entertained with the cares or pleasures of this life, they will not be at leisure to turn their thoughts to­wards another World. For to think close of another World requires a very serious and thoughtful mind; because the other World doth not press upon our Senses as this World doth, which wheresoever we turn our selves is continually thrusting its Objects into our minds through our Eyes and Ears, and whispering to our thoughts through the Organs of our Sen­ses which are the most immediate Entries and Inlets to our Mind. So that the other World being quite out of sight, and this always in view, it is as difficult for us to keep the one out of our Minds as to let the other in. For before we can set our [Page 401] selves to think closely of the other World, we must shut our Eyes and Ears to the Objects of this; otherwise they will ob­trude themselves upon us, and draw away our thoughts and meditations; we must gather in our thoughts from the Objects of Sense that are round about us, take leave of this World, and retire into our own minds, and shut up our selves within our selves, that none of these sensitive things may come at us, and that we may be wholly at leisure to entertain our selves with the invisible things of another World. And this we shall never be able to do so long as our Minds are vain, and roving, and desultory, and possess'd with wild ima­ginations or restless cares or extravagant mirth and Jollities; for these things will put our thoughts upon so many vagaries, and render them so loose, and wild, and incoherent, that they will never be able to hang long enough together to form any serious conceptions. So that when we would fix them upon the other World we shall scarce be able to gather them in from those outward Objects among which they are squandered; or if we do, we shall ne­ver keep them long enough together to form any serious apprehensions of it; but as soon as they have taken a cursory view of [Page 402] it, they will be flying abroad again, and roving into vanity and impertinence. So that while our Minds are light and vain, they cannot think enough of another World seriously to apprehend and believe it; the Rewards and Punishments of that invisible state are things too serious for our wild thoughts to dwell on; and 'till our minds are grown more fixt and steady, till they are more withdrawn from sensitive Objects, and more accustomed to retired thinking, they will be too volatile and fu­gitive seriously to apprehend, and heartily to believe a future state. If therefore we would attain to a firm belief of it, we must indeavour to reclaim our wild thoughts by accustoming our selves to serious think­ing; and when by sad and serious medita­tions we have rendred our minds more fixt and retired, we must

II. Indeavour to remove those vicious prejudices which indispose us to the belief of future Rewards and Punishments. For while men live in opposition to God, and have therefore reason to apprehend his displeasure, this will strongly prejudice our minds against the belief of a future state; because this belief must necessarily gall and disturb us, and render our vicious cour­ses extremely troublesom and uneasie. For [Page 403] when a Man is resolved to lead an ill course of life, and at the same time believes it will conclude in eternal wretch­edness, his faith will be a perpetual plague to his Mind, like Belteshazzars Mene Tekel it will scare and alarm him in his sin­ful Carouses, and imbitter the gust of them with many a sad thought and dire re­flection; and 'till he either shakes hands with his Creed, or his ill Resolution, it will be impossible for him ever to be quiet. Whilst therefore he resolves to continue his ill courses, it is his interest to believe there is no other World but this; he is obliged to it in his own defence, and as he hopes to en­joy himself, and sin without disturbance; and then his interest having bribed his af­fection, his affection will be sure so to biass his reason, that it will be a difficult matter for him to convince and persuade himself. For if there be future Rewards, he knows he hath no interest in them; if future Pu­nishments, he is conscious he must feel and indure them; and to believe that there are such goods as he shall never be the better for, and such evils as he shall be infinitely the worse for, must needs be extremely re­pugnant to his inclinations. For that which men would not have, they are averse to believe; and that which they [Page 404] are averse to believe they are not easily convinced of, because their aversion will cast such a mist before their minds as that they will hardly be able to discern a fair Probability in a clear Demonstration. Where­fore if ever you would arrive at a firm belief of the future Rewards and Punish­ments, you must indeavour to dispel from your minds those prejudices against it with which your own ill courses are apt to inspire you, by resolving with your selves to lay aside your sinful affections and interests while you are examining the evi­dences of another World, and not to suffer them to intermingle with your reason­ings; concluding that in a matter of such infinite moment 'tis the greatest madness in the world to think as you wish and believe as you affect; that 'tis not your unbelief will either extinguish the joys of Heaven, or quench the flames of Hell, and that since the nature of things will not bend to your wishes, and be as you would have them, it is your true interest to believe that they are what they are, especially in a matter of such infinite concern to you; that if Heaven and Hell are not dreams but realities, you will most certainly find them so whatever you think of them, and that therefore it concerns you as much as [Page 405] an eternity of happiness or misery amounts to, to believe that they are real if they are so, lest out of a vain confidence that there are no such things, you forfeit Heaven and incur Hell fire. With such thoughts as these you must often encounter those pre­judices which sin raises in your minds; and when once you have conquer'd them, and reduced your minds to an impartial desire of being rightly informed in this mat­ter, and in order to that, to give an equal hearing to the reasons on both sides, you are fairly prepared for the belief of another World, which cannot fail to obtain upon your understandings, if

III. YOU duly examine those motives of credibility upon which those future Rewards and Punishments are proposed. For though Faith be the gift of God, yet it is a gift which he confers upon us as he doth all his other blessings, in the use of due and proper means; and as it is the blessing of the Lord that makes rich, but not without the concurrence of the diligent hand, so 'tis the grace of God that gives us faith, but not with­out our application to the natural means. Now the natural means of faith is a due con­sideration of the evidence upon which the matter to be believed is founded and [Page 406] proposed. For though the matter be ne­ver so evident in it self, yet it is not evi­dent to us 'till we have duly considered it; and if we believe without evidence, we believe with our wills, and not with our understandings; whereas in reality be­lieving is properly an act of the under­standing, whereby it assents to a thing as true, which it cannot do without some proof and evidence that it is so; and there­fore when we assent to things as true with our wills without our understandings, or, which is the same thing, without proof and evidence, we cannot so properly be said to believe, as not to disbelieve them. For there are a world of things which men do neither deny nor affirm, believe nor dis­believe, that is, about which they never concern their thoughts, nor trouble their heads one way or t'other. And thus it is here; there are many who pretend to believe another World, but if you ask them why, they can give no reason, nor did they ever enquire whether there be any to be given; so that it is plain whatever they imagine, they do not believe it; for to believe without understanding, is as perfect nonsense as to understand without evidence, or believe without faith. So that that which they call faith, is only not disbelieving; [Page 407] whether there be another World or no, they never troubled their heads to enquire, and so having no evidence pro or con, their un­derstanding doth neither affirm nor deny, believe nor disbelieve, but negligently leaves the matter in suspence and uncer­tainty.

The natural means of faith therefore, you see, is a due enquiry into the evidence of the truth and reality of the things we believe; and therefore if we would indeed believe that there is a future World of Re­wards and Punishments, we must seriously consider the reasons and evidences that prove and assert it, and urge them close to our understandings, 'till they have forced and extorted from them a rational and well-grounded assent; which if we do, laying aside all partiality and prejudice, there is no doubt but they will be found weighty enough to turn the Scale against all Objections to the contrary; especially if

IV. And lastly, You add to all these means fervent and hearty Prayer. For Prayer in it self is a very proper and useful means to beget and confirm in us the belief of the other World, because it is an abstraction of the mind from those sensitive and material objects which stand [Page 408] like hills and mountains between us and the invisible World, and intercept our Pro­spect of it. For whenever our mind is engaged in a serious and hearty prayer, it dispels all earthly things before it, and scatters them out of sight, and having no Mists or Clouds in its way, nothing but a fair and clear heaven above it, thither it directs its Eyes, and Thoughts, and Desires without any lett or interruption. Now the very withdrawing our minds from sensible things to converse with spiritual and invi­sible ones, doth, as I shewed before, migh­tily dispose us to the belief of another World. When therefore by frequent and hearty prayer our minds have been ac­customed to retire from the objects of sense, and to fix their thoughts and contem­plations upon God, they will be able to turn themselves with more ease and rea­diness to the invisible things of another World, which the more familiar they are to us, the better able we shall be to appre­hend and believe them.

But then, by our fervent and hearty prayers we shall also obtain the assistance of God, without the concurrence of whose grace we can do no good thing, and much less effectually believe the Rewards and Punishments of another life, which is the [Page 409] root and principle of all true Piety and Virtue. For to the forming a firm belief of this Doctrine in our minds, there is required a very severe and impartial con­sideration of the Proofs and Evidences up­on which it is founded; and considering how vain and roving our thoughts are, how apt to fly off from any serious argu­ment, and especially from this of another World, which is so offensive to our vicious appetites and affections, what likelihood is there that we should ever fix our mind to such a through examination of the Proofs of another World as is necessary to beget in us a lively belief of it, unless God, who alone can command our thoughts, co-operates with us, and animates our faint indeavours with his grace and assistance; unless he by sugge­sting the evidences of the future state to us, and by urging and repeating them, imprints them on our minds with all their natural force and efficacy; in a word, un­less by following our flying thoughts with these his holy inspirations, and impor­tuning them with, and almost forcing them upon them, he at last prevails with them to stay and look back and consider and seri­ously to ponder the weight and force of them, it is very improbable they should ever abide long enough upon our minds [Page 410] to settle into a firm and efficacious belief. Let us therefore earnestly implore the aid and assistance of God, and beseech him fre­quently to inspire our minds with the Ar­guments of a future life, and to urge, and repeat and set them home upon our thoughts, 'till by a due consideration of them we have extracted all their force and evidence, and digested it into a lively and active belief; and if to the use of all the abovenamed means you do but add this of Prayer and Supplication, you may de­pend upon it, that he who hath promised to open unto all that knock, and to be found of all that seek him, will never deny you any grace or assistance that is necessa­ry to produce in you this fundamental Principle of Religion, viz, an effectual be­lief of the Rewards and Punishments of an­other world.

To conclude this Argument therefore, since this belief is so absolutely necessary to subject our minds to the obligations of Re­ligion, let us endeavour as much as in us lies, to found it in our reason, by convincing our minds of the truth and force of those evidences upon which it is proposed. For while we believe upon trust and we know not why, our faith must needs be very weak and infirm, and like a Tree without [Page 411] root in the midst of a storm, be unable to outstand any blast of temptation. For the temptations of sin are such goods and evils as are evident to our senses, which do most certainly assure us that there are such things in the World as pleasure and profit, reproach and persecution; and therefore unless when we are tempted, our faith can confront the evidence of Sense with the e­vidence of Reason, and produce good proof of those future Goods and Evils which it puts in the ballance against these present temptations, it will hardly be able to with­stand 'em. For what likelihood is there that the things which we believe without proof and evidence, should have compara­bly that force and influence upon us, as the things which we know, and feel and ex­perience? So that when we come to op­pose a Heaven and a Hell of whose reali­ty and existence we have no evidence, to pleasures or profits, reproaches or persecu­tions, which strike immediately on our senses, it is easie to prognosticate which will be most prevalent.

BUT if our belief of the future Re­wards and Punishments be founded on such evidence as satisfies our reason, what temp­tation in the World is there that can pre­vail against it; what good is there that can [Page 412] outbid Heaven, or what evil that can vie terrours with Hell? For we see by ex­perience that the Objects of our faith, when it is grounded upon satisfactory e­vidence, do as much influence our minds as the Objects of sense; they who never saw the Indies unless it were in a Map, and so can only believe that there are such Countries, are yet as much affected with the rich Merchandize they abound with as those who have been there, and as ready to venture their Estates and Persons thi­ther, through the danger of the Sea, in hope of a prosperous return. If therefore we believe that there is such a state as Heaven, with as full satisfaction of mind as we do that there is such a place as the Indies, doubtless our Faith would affect us as much as our Eyes, and we should be as forward to go to Heaven and venture through all dangers and difficulties thither, as if we had been there already and had seen with our own Eyes all the Glories and Delights it flows and abounds with. So that the evidence of our Faith, if it be clear and satisfactory, will as much affect our minds as the evidence of our sense; and Heaven and Hell will as vigorously in­fluence our hope and fear, if with a full satisfaction of mind we believe 'em, as if [Page 413] we had seen and felt 'em. Conceive then that you had spent but one hour in Hea­ven, surveying with your own Eyes the glories of that Place, the Triumphs and Exultations of its blessed Inhabitants, and the rapturous Joys and delights wherewith it entertains 'em; conceive that after this you had been sent for another hour into Hell, and had there been spectators of the horrors and agonies of the damned, of their torture, and rage, and dire convulsions of Soul, caused by a desperate and remediless misery; in a word, conceive that after all, you had been dismiss'd into this World a­gain, to choose your own fate and determine your selves to that happy or this miserable portion for ever; think now what your mind and resolution would be; whether you would not be willing to lose any thing rather than Heaven, or to endure any thing rather than Hell; whether any good or evil sin can tempt you withal, would be able to out-tempt the Rewards and Pu­nishments of Eternity. Doubtless no; the remembrance you would have of the infi­nite Joys and intolerable Miseries you saw in that other World, would prove an invincible Antidote against all tempta­tion. Now what your sense of the other World would be if you had seen it, that [Page 414] will your belief of it be, when 'tis found­ed upon clear and satisfactory evidence; 'twill be an infallible Counter-charm a­gainst the most bewitching temptations; 'twill render the greatest goods dreadful to us that becken us to Hell, and the greatest evils desireable that drive us towards Hea­ven. For Faith, saith the Apostle, is the sub­stance of things hoped for and the evidence of things not seen, Heb. 11.1. that is, it ren­ders its invisible Objects as real and evi­dent to us, as our sense doth visible ones; and when Heaven and Hell are become as evident to our faith as sensible things are to our senses, what good or evil is there in all the World that can out-tempt 'em? For what good is there so good as Heaven, or what evil so bad as Hell? So that if our belief of the future Rewards and Punish­ments be but founded on such evidence as gives a full satisfaction to our minds, 'twill draw our Souls to God like an invincible Loadstone, in despight of all the opposi­tions of temptations from without, and of all the counter-strivings of a corrupt na­ture from within; and there is nothing in the World will be able to withstand it; no good or evil that sin can promise or threaten that will have the power to re­sist its Almighty persuasions, but 'twill [Page 415] force its own way through all oppositions, and like an overflowing Torrent bear down all our carnal considerations before it.

WHEREFORE if ever we mean to dis­ingage our selves from the slavery of sin, and entirely to devote our selves to God and his Service, let us in the use of the above-na­med Means endeavour to establish our minds in a firm and well-grounded belief of the other World; that so our faith being built upon a sure foundation of Reason, may be able to outstand all the waves of temptation, and to chase all those goods and evils before it that stand in the way of our return to God; and when by our faith we have so far overcome the World as to submit and resign our selves to God in despight of all its temptations, we shall find our belief of the other World every day grow and improve upon our hands, 'till at last it commences into a certain assu­rance. For 'tis not so much mens reason as their lusts that do object against the rea­lity of the future World; they are loth to believe it, because it disturbs 'em in their sinful enjoyments, and so their will em­ploys their reason to argue against it; and when once their wills are engaged in the controversie, a very slender probability will weigh more on that side than a clear De­monstration [Page 416] on the other. When there­fore our wills are taken off by a free resig­nation of 'em to God, all that sinful pre­judice which renders us now so averse to believe, will vanish from our minds; and then we shall see things as they are, and the arguments of another World will ap­pear to our minds with such a convincing evidence, as will quickly dispel all our doubts and uncertainties, and render our Faith equivalent to a clear Vision. So that we shall pass through all the temptations of the World with the same constancy and resolution of Soul, as if we walked in open view of Heaven and Hell, and these migh­ty Objects which do so infinitely transcend all the Goods and Evils which sin can tempt us withal, will have as victorious an influence on our lives as if they were present and did strike immediately on our senses. And then how is it possible that any temptation whatsoever should be able to cope with or prevail against 'em? For he who is fully persuaded of the reality of Heaven and Hell, must be utterly a­bandoned of all his reason, if he sin for any Goods sake that is less than Heaven, or for any Evils sake that is less than Hell. When therefore we are drawn to God by such invincible hopes and fears as [Page 417] the firm belief of the other World will sug­gest to us, how is it possible that any tem­ptation of sin should either dissuade us from coming to him, or persuade us to forsake him? Wherefore it concerns us to take all possible care to ground our faith well and improve and strengthen it, that so in de­spight of all temptations it may influence our wills and govern our practice, and safely conduct us through all the snares of this Life, and at length bring us home to everlasting Happiness.

CHAP. VI. Of the necessity of having right Appre­hensions of God, in order to our being truly Religious.

IT is a Noble and Celebrated passage of Epictetus, Ch. 38. [...], i. e. Know that the main founda­tion of Piety is this, to have right appre­hensions of the nature of God, and to be sen­sible [Page 418] that he is, and that he governs the World well and justly; and accordingly the Psalmist speaking of God, tells us, They that know thy name will put their trust in thee, Psalm 9.10. i. e. They who have made a true discovery of thy Nature, and by observing as I have done the glorious effects of thy Wisdom, and Power and Justice and Goodness, have formed in their minds right and genuine apprehensions concern­ing thee, will make no scruple to place their whole trust and confidence in thee; which is equally true of all other acts of Piety and Religion. For the true know­ledg of God will as much influence our minds to love and adore him, to praise him and submit to him, as to put our trust in him; and hence St. Paul ascribes all the impiety and wickedness of the Gentiles to their not liking to retain God in their knowledg, i. e. to their wicked aversion to the true and genuin Notions of God, Rom. 1.28.

IN the prosecution of this Argument I shall endeavour these three things:

First, To shew in what respects right apprehensions of God are necessary to our being truly Religious.

[Page 419]Secondly, To lay down some Rules for the forming of right apprehensions of God in our minds.

Thirdly, To assign and remove the com­mon causes of our misapprehensions con­cerning him.

SECT. I. In what respects right Apprehensions of God are necessary to our being truly Religious.

IN general, whatsoever is requisite to ren­der Men truly religious must be derived from true apprehensions of God, who is the great Object of Religion. For Religion being the rule of divine Service must it self be regulated by the divine Nature, and without a right understanding of the na­ture of God, it is impossible we should regulate our religion by it. Now to the right conduct and due regulation of our Religion, it is requisite, first, that we should be rightly informed what services are plea­sing to God; secondly, that we proceed upon a true Principle in serving him; [Page 420] thirdly, that we direct our Services to a right end; fourthly, that we be furnished with sufficient motives to engage us to serve him; the want of either of which will prove an irreparable flaw in the very foun­dation of our Religion, and render the whole not only infirm but defective in its very constitution. And in all these respects right Apprehensions of God are indispensa­bly necessary.

First, They are necessary to inform us what Services are pleasing to God.

Secondly, They are necessary to inspire us with the true Principle upon which we must serve him.

Thirdly, They are necessary to direct us to the true end for whieh we must serve him.

Fourthly, They are necessary to furnish us with proper motives and encouragements to engage us to serve him.

I. A right apprehension of God is ne­cessary to instruct us what services are pleasing to God. For to be sure nothing can be pleasing to him but what is agreeable to the perfections of his Nature, which are the Originals from whence the eternal Laws of Religion are transcribed; unless there­fore we know what his perfections are, how is it possible we should know what [Page 421] services are agreeable to 'em? If you would serve a Prince gratefully and acceptably, you must inform your self beforehand what his nature and disposition is, that so you may accommodate your self thereunto, and compose your actions and behaviour accordingly; that you may furnish him with fresh pleasures if he be soft and vo­luptuous, or blow him up with flatteries, if he be proud and vainglorious; that if he be covetous and tyrannical, you may spunge and oppress his people and drein their wealth into his Coffers; if just and benefi­cent, you may assist and forward him in righting the injuries, correcting the miscar­riages, and alleviating the burthens of his Subjects. And thus if you would serve the great King of the World in such ways as are pleasing and acceptable to him, you must study his Nature, and endeavour to enform your selves which way his infi­nite perfections do incline him, that so you may know how to comport your selves towards him and to render him such Ser­vices as are agreeable to his Nature. For there is no rule in the World but onely that of his Nature, by which you can cer­tainly conclude what will please him; and though he hath told you by express Re­velation what services he expects and what [Page 422] will please him, yet without recurring to the rule of his Nature, you can never be secure either that what he told you is true, or that what he told you was pleasing to him then, is still pleasing to him now. For how can you be secure either that he told you truly what Services were pleasing to him, but only from the truth and veraci­ty of his Nature, or that the Services which were pleasing to him then, are pleas­ing to him now, but from the stability and unchangeableness of his Nature. So that in our enquiries after what is pleasing to God, we cannot depend upon his Word without consulting his Nature, which is not only the Security but also the Test of his Word. For it's certain that that cannot be God's Word which contradicts his Nature, and what plausible pretence soever any Doctrine may make to divine Revelation, if it teach or command any thing that is apparently repugnant to the divine Perfections, we ought for that rea­son to conclude it an Imposture; it being much more possible that the most plausible pretence to Revelation should be false, than that God should reveal any Doctrine that is repugnant to his Nature. So that in all our Enquiries what is pleasing to God, our last appeal must be to his Nature, which [Page 423] is the great Standard of Good and Evil, by which we are to measure what is pleasing and displeasing to him.

WHILST therefore we are ignorant of God's Nature, or possessed with wrong and false apprehensions of it, we must ne­cessarily wander in the dark, and neither know what to do nor how to behave our selves towards him. For how can we i­magine what will please or displease a dark and unknown Nature, whose bent and in­clinations we are utterly unacquainted with; but if we are under false apprehensions of his Nature, they must necessarily mislead us in our behaviour towards him, and put us upon false ways of serving and pleasing him. Thus if we apprehend him to be a froward and testy Being, that is apt to be pleased and displeased with Trifles, in conformity to our apprehension of his Na­ture, we shall offer him a trifling Service, a Service made up of Pageantry and Com­plement, of pompous shew and ceremonious respects and empty formalities; For such a trifling Worship is in it self most proper for such a humorous Divinity. So if we appre­hend him to be of an imperious and tyran­nical nature, that governs himself and the World by a blind and obstinate Will, with­out any regard to the eternal reasons of [Page 424] things, we shall worship him as the In­dians do their arbitrary Devils, i. e. follow him with houlings and lamentations, with trembling hearts and frighted looks, and dismal tones, and by flattering him with praises and fauning upon him with slavish submissions and addresses endeavour to collogue with Heaven, and ingratiate our selves with its dreadful Majesty; for what can be more agreeable to such a tyrannical Divinity than such a forc'd and slavish Worship? In a word, if we apprehend him to be a fond and indulgent Being, that is governed by a foolish pity and blind commiseration, we shall not fail to render him a sutable Worship, i. e. to retire and grow melancholly, to whine and bemoan our selves; to deject our looks and disfigure our countenances, and teaze our Souls in­to fits of fruitless compunction, that so by the soft Rhetorick of a well-acted sor­row we may pierce his bowels and melt him into pity and compassion towards us; for what can be more prevalent with such a soft and indulgent Deity, than such a mournful and passionate Religion? Thus whilst we have wrongful apprehensions of God, they must necessarily mislead us into false ways of Worship, because we can no otherwise worship him than by rendering [Page 425] him such Services as are sutable to the ap­prehensions we have of his Nature; and therefore while we think any otherwise of his Nature than it is, we must necessarily think such Services sutable to it as are not.

BUT if we truly understand what God is, we cannot but apprehend what Wor­ship is sutable to him, by that Eternal congruity and proportion that there is be­tween things and things; which is as ob­vious to mens minds, as sounds and co­lours to their ears and eyes. If God be a Being endowed with such and such Per­fections, every Mans mind will tell him that between such an Object and such acti­ons and affections there is a natural con­gruity, and therefore so and so he ought to be treated and address'd to, with such and such actions and affections to be ser­ved and worship'd. So that if we appre­hend God truly as he is, circled with all his natural glories and perfections, our ap­prehensions will produce in us such affe­ctions, and our affections such deportment and behaviour towards him as are sutable to the perfections of his Nature, and we shall worship him with such Services as will both please and become him; with ad­miring thoughts and dutiful wills and God­like [Page 426] affections; with an ingenuous fear, a humble confidence and an obedient love; with chearful Praises and profound Adora­tions, with sober, wise and rational Devo­tions; such as will wing and employ our best affections and most noble faculties; For 'tis such a Worship only that can sute such Perfections and please such a Nature as Gods.

II. A right apprehension of God is also necessary to inspire us with the best Prin­ciple of serving him. For it's certain that there is no Principle in humane Nature that will so effectually engage us to the service of God, or render our service so acceptable to him, as that of Love; which will tune our wills into such an Harmony with Gods, that we shall no longer chuse and refuse according to our particular likings and dislikings, but what is most pleasing or displeasing to him will be so to us; and our wills being thus united and subjected to his, our obedience will extend to all his Commands, and admit no other bounds but his Will and Pleasure. Where­as if we do not obey him out of love, we shall indeavour to contract our obedi­ence into as narrow a compass as may be, because we shall render it to him with a grudging mind, and consequently with a [Page 427] narrow and stingy hand; for we shall serve him no farther than we are driven by fear and the restless importunities of a clamorous conscience, and so consequently fall infi­nitely short of our duty, and take up in a partial and hypocritical obedience. For while we do not love him, it is impossible we should obey him with a ready will, which is the proper seat of his Empire; and while we obey him with a stubborn and rebellious will, we are only his slaves, but the Devils subjects. 'Till therefore we do obey him, at least in some measure, from a Principle of love, it is impossible our obedience should be either universal or sincere.

But to the inspiring our Souls with this Principle, there is nothing more necessary than right apprehensions of God, who in himself is doubtless the most amiable of beings, as having all those Perfections in infinite degrees that can beget or deserve a rational affection. So that we cannot think him to be any way otherwise than he is, without thinking him less lovely, and detracting more or less from the infinite beauty of his Nature; For since he cannot be more lovely than he is in himself, every false apprehension of him must needs represent him less lovely. [Page 428] But since of all his Perfections that of his Goodness is the most powerful motive and ingagement of Love, there is nothing more necessary to kindle our love to him than right apprehensions thereof. For being infi­nitely good, as he is, in his own Nature, it is impossible we should conceive him to be better than he is; and therefore every false notion we entertain of his goodness must ne­cessarily detract from it, and so much as we detract from his goodness, so much we de­tract from the principal reason and motive of our loving him. And therefore in order to the ingaging of our love to him, it con­cerns us above all things not to entertain any Opinion of him that reflects a dispa­ragement on his goodness. For too many such Opinions there are that have been imbibed among Christians as the funda­mental Principles of their Orthodoxy; namely such as these, that Gods Sovereign Will is the sole rule of his actions, and that he doth things not because they are just and reasonable, but that they are just and reasonable because he doth 'em; as if he were merely an Omnipotent, blind Will that acts without Reason, and did run through the World like an irresistible Whirlwind, hurrying all things before him without any consideration of right or [Page 429] wrong; That his Decrees of Governing and disposing his creatures are wholly founded in his absolute and irresistible Will, that determins of the everlasting fate of Souls without any reason, or foresight, or condi­tion; that by this his unaccountable Will he hath impaled the far greater part of 'em within an absolute Decree of Reproba­tion, for no other end but that Nimrod-like he might have game enough to sport and breath his vengeance for ever; and that having nailed 'em to this woful cross by this his dire Decree, he bids 'em save themselves and come down, as those cruel Mockers did our Saviour, and because they do not obey, torments and cruciates 'em for ever, though he knows they are not able to do it of themselves, and hath purposed never to enable 'em to do it. Which Opinions do represent God in such a for­midable dress, circled with such a stern and gastly Majesty, as is more apt to inspire us with horror than love. For though by per­suading our selves that we are of the small number of his elected Favourites, we may work our minds into some degree of love to him; yet when we consider how severely he hath treated the rest of our fellow Crea­tures, without any other reason but his own Will, this will intermingle such a [Page 430] grimness with his smiles, such a terrour with those Charms for which we love him, as must necessarily damp the fervours of our love, and ever and anon freez it into horror and astonishment, and so fear will be at least the predominant Principle of our Obedience; and while it is so, our Re­ligion must needs languish under great im­perfections and infirmities. For while our fear and dread of God is the governing Principle of our Religion, we shall but do penance in all our addresses to him, and every act of our Obedience will be a kind of Martyrdom, so that we shall never be able to entertain any chearful converse or friendly Society with him, and yet serve him we must, for fear our neglect of him should rouse his Vengeance against us; and between this necessity of coming to him, and this fearfulness of approaching him, what can there be begotten but a forced and constrain'd Devotion, which because we do not love we would willingly leave, did not our dread and horror of him drag us to his Altars. And as we shall serve him with a forc'd Obedience, so we shall obey him with a sordid and nigardly affection; and while we grudg him our Obedience, we shall be most backward to obey him in those instances of Duty that are of great­est [Page 431] moment and most pleasing to him, and most forward in those that are of least concern and most pleasing to our selves. Thus while our minds are ridden with sour and rigid apprehensions of God, they will inspire us with a slavish dread of him, and that will restrain and contract our Obedience to him. Thus Maximus Ty­rius excellently represents the case, [...], i. e. the truly religious Man is the friend of God, but the superstitious is his flatterer, and the former is happy but the latter miserable; for the one being encouraged by his own Vertue, approaches God without any slavish fear and dread, but the other being debased with the sense of his own wickedness approaches him with trembling and despair, dreading him as a cruel Tyrant, Dissert. 4.

IF therefore we would render him a chearful, free, and universal Obedience, we must endeavour to represent him fairly to our own minds, and to think of him as he is, and as he hath represented himself in [Page 432] the holy Scriptures, i. e. as a bountiful be­nefactor to all his Creation, and an uni­versal lover of the Souls of men; that would have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth, and doth heartily and readily contribute to our eter­nal welfare; that leaves no art of love, no method of kindness unattempted to rescue us from eternal perdition, and when we have utterly baffled and defeated them all, doth most unwillingly abandon us to the woful fate we have chosen and prepared for our selves; that in punishing even the most incorrigible sinners doth not at all design to wreak and gratifie his own revenge, but to do good to the World, and warn others by their sufferings not to imitate their sins; And in a word, that importunately in­vites us back when we are gone astray, and upon our return graciously receives us, and when he hath received us is infinitely industrious to prepare us for happiness, and when he hath prepared us abundant­ly rewards us, and when he hath rewarded us everlastingly triumphs in our Glory and beatitude; these and such like thoughts are truly worthy of God, and befitting the infinite goodness of his Na­ture, and as such do earnestly recommend him to our affections, as the most amiable [Page 433] and indearing object in the World; and when by such recommendation they have captivated our affections, and kindled our hearts into an unfained love of him, they have inspired us with such a vigorous Prin­ciple of action, as will both animate and innoble our Religion, and render it truly worthy of God and our selves; For then we shall serve him with a free and dutiful will, a liberal affection, and a chearful heart, and consequently render him a full, and generous, and willing obedience. For so holy David tells us, Psal. 119.32. I will run the ways of thy Commandments when thou shalt enlarge my heart, i. e. when thou shalt open and widen my heart with the love of thee (for so St. Paul expounds the Phrase, 2 Cor. 6.11.) I shall most readily and chearfully obey thee.

III. A right apprehension of God is also necessary to direct us to the end for which we are to serve him; without which it is impossible we should serve him acceptably. For as a good intention doth not justifie a bad action, so neither doth a good action a bad intention, and unless both are good, neither are acceptable. If I do an action that is materially good with respect to a bad end, I unhallow and vitiate it, and ren­der it formally evil. If I fast for strife, [Page 434] or give Alms for vain-glory, or pray to give a colour to my Rapines and Oppressions; my very Devotion is a cheat, my Mortifi­cation a lie, and my Charity an imposture. So that in order to our serving of God acceptably, it's necessary we should direct those services we render him to their right and proper end; and what that is we can­not well understand unless we have a right apprehension of his nature; for to be sure God hath proposed that to us for the end of our Worship, which is most agreeable to his own perfection, and therefore unless we have a right Notion of his perfections, how can we rightly apprehend what end is most agreeable to them? As for instance, the right end of our serving him, is that we may glorifie him for ever in an everlasting participation of his perfection and happiness; and this we can be no otherwise certain of, than by a true survey and inspection of his nature, which will instruct us that being infinitely perfect as he is, he must be infinitely happy within himself, and so can design no self-end without himself, and consequently that the end for which he requires our service is not any advan­tage he expects to reap from it, or further addition to his own happiness, he being from all Eternity past as compleatly happy [Page 435] as he can be to all Eternity to come; and therefore what other end can he be suppo­sed to aim at than our good and happi­ness? It is true indeed, he designs to glo­rifie himself in our happiness; but how? Not to render himself himself more glori­ous by it than he is in himself, for that is impossible; but to display and shew forth his own essential glory to all that are capa­ble of admiring and imitating him, that thereby he might invite them to transcribe that goodness of his into their natures, of which his glory is the shine and lustre, and thereby to glorifie them selves; and what can more effectually display the glory of a Being who is infinitely wise and power­ful and good, than to contrive and effect the happiness of his Creatures, and especially of his rational Creatures, who of all others have the most ample capacity of happi­ness? Doubtless, the highest glory of an infinite power, that is conducted by an in­finite wisdom and goodness, is to contrive and execute the most effectual methods of doing the greatest good; and what greater good can such a power effect, than the eternal happiness of reasonable Creatures? So that Gods glory and our happiness are so inseparably conjoyned, that we cannot aim right at either, but we must hit both [Page 436] and whether we say that his end is his own glory or our happiness, it is the same thing; for his glory is our happiness, and our happiness is his glory, and when he hath perfected our Nature, and advanced it to the highest happiness it is capable of, it will shine back upon him, even as all other glorious effects do on their causes, and reflect everlasting honour on that infi­nite Power and Wisdom and Goodness from whence it was derived. Thus right ap­prehensions of the nature of God will na­turally lead us to the great end which he proposes in all his transactions with us, and thereby direct us what end we are to propose in our transactions with him. For that which is Gods end ought to be ours, and therefore since his end is his own Glo­ry, or, which is the same thing, our everlasting Happiness, it ought to be ours also.

But now while we misapprehend the na­ture of God we shall be apt to set up false and indirect ends of serving him; as for instance, whilst we look upon him as a selfish being, that centers wholly in him­self, and separates his interest from the interest of his Creatures, doing every thing meerly for his own sake, we shall think our selves obliged in all our addresses [Page 437] to him to set aside our own interest and hap­piness, and to aim singly and separately at his honour and glory; and yet this is the great Fundamental of the whole Scheme of some mens Divinity, viz. That God aims wholly at himself, and regards the good of his Creatures no farther than it serves his own interest; that he made this World out of mere ostentation, to boast and magnifie his own power and greatness; and gives Laws to his Creatures, and ex­acts their obedience for no other reason but because 'tis for his honour to be served and worshipped; that he created Hell only to shew the power of his wrath, and prepare an everlasting Triumph for his vengeance; and erected Heaven for a Theater to shew himself on, that so having filled it with a vast Corona of Angelical and Saintly specta­tors, he might display the glory of his Ma­jesty before them, and thereby provoke them to extol and praise and commend him for ever. And while we thus conceive of God, how can we hope that he will ever be pleased with us unless we aim at the same end that he doth, i. e. unless laying aside all regard to our selves and our own happi­ness both here and hereafter, we intirely direct all our worship and service to his glory and interest; which being impossible [Page 438] for us to do, whilst we have so much self-love and so much indigence together, will either render our Religion wholly unpracti­cable, or perplex us with eternal doubts of its truth and sincerity.

And supposing we could direct all our Religion to this end, this instead of ren­dering it more acceptable to God would only render it more unworthy of him; for then we should serve him under the notion of his Benefactors rather than of his Pen­sioners, with a design to enrich him rather than to be enriched by him: And what an unbeseeming presumption is it for such in­digent Creatures as we, to entertain the least thought of contributing to God, or making any addition to his infinite store? He is above all want, being infinitely sa­tisfied from the inexhaustible fountain of his own perfections; and for us to imagine that he needs our Services, and requires them to serve his own interest, is to blas­pheme his Alsufficiency, and suppose him a poor and indigent being, that for want of a perfect satisfaction within himself, is forced to rome abroad and raise taxes upon his Creatures to enrich and supply himself. For if we serve him for any end at all, it must be either to do him good or our selves; if it be to do him good, we reproach [Page 439] and dishonour him by supposing that he hath need of us and our services, which can do him no good unless he hath some need of them. So that whatsoever some high-slown Enthusiasts may pretend, that it is sordid and mercenary to serve God for our own good, I am sure to serve him for his good is prophane and blasphemous; and therefore either we must serve him for no good, or serve him for our own; and since he is so infinitely sufficient to himself, that nothing we can do can benefit and advan­tage him, to what better purpose can we worship and serve him, than to receive be­nefit and advantage from him; which in­stead of being base and mercenary, is a purpose most becoming both God and our selves? For to serve him with an intent not to give to, but to receive from him, is to acknowledg his fulness and our own want, his Alsufficiency and our own Po­verty; whereas by serving him to the contrary purpose, we do in effect set up our selves above him, it being much grea­ter to give than it is to receive; and to make that the end of our worshipping God, which doth in effect suppose him to be our inferiour, is to make our selves Gods instead of Votaries. What the true end therefore is of our serving God, may [Page 440] be easily inferred from a right apprehension of his nature. For do but consider him as a Being that is above all want, that is infinitely satisfied in his own perfections, and an unbounded Ocean of happiness to himself, and then what other end can you propose in serving him, but to derive per­fection and happiness from him, in the ac­complishment of which he and you will be Glorified together?

IV. And lastly, A right apprehension of God is also necessary to furnish us with proper motives and incouragements to serve him. It is the nature of all reasona­ble Beings to be drawn forth into action by Motives and Arguments; and the most powerful Arguments to move us Godward, are drawn from the na­ture of God, from his Majesty and Holi­ness, his Truth and Justice, his Mercy and Goodness; none of which can have their just and full influence upon us, unless we have a right and genuine apprehension of them. The consideration of his Majesty is naturally apt to strike our minds into an awful reverence of his Authority; but if we look upon it under the notion of a mere Arbitrary greatness, that Governs not it self by Counsel and Reason, but by a blind, and absolute, and unaccountable [Page 441] Will, that always chuses and refuses pro imperio, without any regard to the eternal reasons of things, we may be astonish'd and confounded at it, but we can never truly reverence it. The consideration of his Holiness is naturally apt to deter us from approaching him with vicious and impure affections; but if we place his holiness in a mere formal affectation of external de­cency, respect, and reverence, and not in the immutable conformity of his Will with the eternal Rules of Righteousness, it may move us to be very ceremonious and respect­ful to him, as to the Place, and Garb, and Posture of our Worship, but it will never prevail with us to cleanse and rectifie our hearts and affections. Again, the conside­ration of his Justice is naturally apt to re­strain us from affronting his Authority by perverse and wilful violations of his Laws; but while we look upon it as a stern and implacable Attribute, which nothing will appease and satisfie but bloud and revenge, it may overwhelm us with horrour and despair, but 'twill never persuade us to reform and amend. Once more, the con­sideration of his Mercy is naturally apt when we are gone astray to invite us to return, with the hopeful prospect it gives us of pardon and reconciliation; but while [Page 442] we look upon it under the notion of a blind pity, or effeminate easiness and ten­derness of Nature, that will admit of no severity how wholsom soever or necessary to the ends of Government, instead of moving us to repentance, it will animate us in our rebellion. In fine, the conside­ration of his Goodness is naturally apt to work upon our Ingenuity, and to draw us Godwards with the cords of a man, and the bonds of love; but while we mistake it for a blind Partiality, that chuses its Fa­vourites without reason, and rewards them without respect to their Qualifications, instead of captivating our love, 'twill pro­voke our disdain, and excite in us a secret contempt and aversation.

Thus though the nature of God be in it self a most fruitful Topick of Mo­tives and Arguments to ingage us to serve and obey him, yet by the false repre­sentations that are sometimes made of it, it may be perverted into an inducement to wickedness, and made a plausible pre­tence to encourage and justifie us in our re­bellions against him. Whilst we look upon God as he is in himself, shining with his own unstained and immaculate Glories, there is nothing more apt to in­fluence all the springs of motion within us; [Page 443] to enflame our love, encourage our hope, and alarm our fear, and by these to set the Wheels of our Obedience agoing. For there is nothing in humane nature that is capable of being moved and affected by Reason, which hath not an answerable rea­son in the nature of God to move and affect it. And as in him there are all the rea­sons that can affect us, so there is all the force and efficacy of those reasons, every thing in him being perfect and infinite; in him there is an infinite beauty to attract our love, an infinite good to inflame our desire, an infinite kindness to affect our in­genuity, an infinite Justice armed with an infinite power to awaken our fear, an in­finite mercy to invite our hope, and an in­finite truth to confirm and support it. So that 'tis beyond the power of all humane imagination to frame or fancy an Object that is so every way fitted to affect hu­mane nature, and influence all its Princi­ples of action, as God in himself is. Whilst therefore we apprehend him truly, and as he is in himself, the consideration of him must needs be of wonderful force to oblige us to serve and obey him, and there is not one of all those glorious per­fections in which his Nature is arrayed, but will suggest to us some powerful [Page 444] persuasive to Piety and Vertue, and either by our hope or our fear, our love or our gratitude, incline our hearts to keep his Commandments. So that if we are ig­norant of his perfections, or do entertain false Notions concerning them, we shall either want those Motives to Piety which they naturally suggest, or draw Argu­ments from them to encourage and justifie us in our rebellions against him. And thus you see in all these instances how indispensably necessary right Notions of God are to ingage us to serve and obey him.

SECT. II. Rules for the forming right Apprehen­sions of God.

DIonysius the Areopagite, and from him all the Schoolmen, assign three ways by which we are to frame our ap­prehensions of the Nature of God, viz. Viam Causalitatis, viam Eminentiae, & viam Remotionis, i. e. the way of Causality, the way of Eminency, and the way of Remo­tion. The first consists in arguing from those perfections which God hath caused and pro­duced in his Creatures to the perfections of his Nature. For whatsoever degrees of perfection there are in the Creature, they must either be uncreated, which is a con­tradiction, or flow from the Creator as from the immense Ocean of all perfection; but 'tis impossible they should flow from him, unless they were first in him. So that when we behold such and such perfections in the Creature, we may from them most certainly infer that the same are all in God, who is the cause and fountain of them; and though the divine Nature abounds with innumerable vertues and [Page 446] perfections, yet 'tis impossible for us by our own natural light to discover any other of them than those of which he himself hath imprinted some specimens up­on created Beings; these being the only Scales by which our understanding can ascend to the reach and view of the divine perfections. But because all created per­fections are not only short in their degrees, but also intermingled with defects in their very kind and nature; therefore in attri­buting them to God we ought carefully to abstract from them whatever is defective whether it be in kind or in degree. For God is the cause of perfection only, but not of defect, which so far forth as it is natural to created Beings hath no cause at all, but is merely a negation or non-entity. For every created thing was a negation or non-entity before ever it had a positive being, and it had only so much of its primitive negati­on taken away from it, as it had positive being conferred on it; and therefore so far forth as it is, its being is to be attributed to that soveraign cause that produced it, but so far forth as it is not, its not being is to be attributed to that Original Non-entity out of which it was produced. For that which was once nothing would still have been nothing had it not been for the cause [Page 447] that gave being to it; and therefore that it is so far nothing still, i. e. limited and defective, is only to be attributed to its own primitive nothingness. As for in­stance, if I give a poor man an hundred pounds; that he is worth so much money is wholly owing to me, but that he is not worth a hundred more is owing only to his own poverty; and just so, that I have such and such perfections of being is wholly owing to God who produced me out of nothing, but that I have such and such defects of being is only owing to that Non-entity out of which he produced me; and there­fore since our perfections are derived from God, but not our defects, 'tis altogether as unreasonable to attribute the latter to to him, as it is reasonable to attribute the former.

Now the defects of created perfection which we are to remove and abstract from God in our conceptions of him, are of two sorts: First of the thing; Secondly, of the mode of thing. The defect of the thing is when the thing it self is such as that it wholly ex­cludes something much better and more perfect; thus matter for instance is defective in the thing, because it excludes spiritual and immaterial substance, which is much more excellent than it self. The defect of the [Page 448] mode of the thing is when the thing is so excellent in it self as that it excludes no­thing better, but yet is deficient in degrees of perfection. As for instance, Wisdom and Goodness, Reason and Vnderstanding are things so excellent in themselves as that they exclude nothing that is more excellent, but yet as residing in created Beings want a great many possible degrees of perfection. Now both these defects being natural are uncaused, and so cannot proceed from the Author of Nature, and not proceeding from him, they cannot be supposed to be in him, and therefore in our conceptions of him ought not to be attributed to him. In respect therefore of these twofold defects in created perfections, it is necessary we should conceive of God in the way of Remotion and Eminence as well as of Causality; otherwise we shall injuriously attribute to him the Defects of his Creatures, of which he is not the cause, as well as their perfections of which he is. If therefore we would do God right in our thoughts and conceptions of him, we must in the first place remove from him all defect in the thing, that is, all matter and material perfections; because they are defective in their very kind and nature, as excluding such substance and perfections [Page 449] as are incomparably more excellent than themselves; and this is to conceive of him in the way of Remotion, which consists in removing all kind of matter and material affections from our thoughts and apprehen­sions of God. And then in the second place we must abstract from him all defect in the mode of the thing, i. e, all the defect of degrees in those spiritual perfections of the Creature which we attribute to him, and raise and exalt them in our own minds to their utmost height and eminence; and this is to conceive of him in the way of Eminency, which consists in ascribing to God the short and limited perfections of his Creatures abstracted from all defect and limitation. These three ways there­fore are all indispensably necessary to lead us to a true discovery of the Nature of God; as will yet farther appear by the following Rules I shall lay down for the forming a right Notion and Apprehension of him.

First, If we would think aright of God, we must attribute all possible perfection to him.

Secondly, in forming our Notions of his Perfections we must take our rise from the Perfections we behold in his Creatures.

[Page 450]Thirdly, In ascribing to him the per­fections of his Creatures we must abstract from them every thing that is defective and imperfect.

Fourthly, In arguing from the perfecti­ons of the Creature to the perfections of God, we must distinguish between the state and relations of God and Creature.

Fifthly, Though in arguing from the perfections of the Creature to the per­fections of God we are not to subject him to the Rules of a Creature, yet we are always to suppose his Will and his Power to be in perfect subjection to the per­fections of his Nature.

Sixthly, In conceiving of his Perfecti­ons we must always suppose them to be exactly harmonious and consistent with each other.

I. To the forming a right apprehension of God it is necessary that we ascribe to him all possible perfection. For he being the first and supreme cause from whence all the perfections of Being are derived, must necessarily include all perfection in him­self, and be all those perfections which he hath communicated to others; for how can he give that which he hath not? It is true indeed, free causes may give less to their effects than they have in themselves, but [Page 451] it is impossible they should give more; though they may withhold from their effects any perfection or degree of perfecti­on which they have, they cannot derive to them any which they have not. What­soever therefore is a perfection of Be­ing, must necessarily be essential to that supreme cause from whence all Being is derived; otherwise there would be more in his effects than there is in himself, and consequently more than he could give or be the cause of, which is a contra­diction.

AND as all those perfections that are in created Beings must necessarily exist in the nature of God, so must all those too that are possible in themselves. For every per­fection that is possible in it self must be possible to him who is the cause of all things; but no perfection can be possible to him that is not actually in him, for no cause can produce that perfection in ano­ther which it hath not in it self, and there­fore if there be any perfection that is not in him 'tis impossible it should ever be pro­duced by him, and that which is impossi­ble to God must be impossible in its own nature, that which is not an object of om­nipotent power is not an object of any power, and that which is not an Object [Page 452] of any power is in it self impossible. Since therefore every perfection that is possible in it self must be possible to God, and since no perfection that is not in him can be possible to him, it necessarily follows that all the perfections that are possible in them­selves are actually existing in the Nature of God.

II. IN forming our Notions of Gods per­fections we must take our rise from those perfections which we behold in his Crea­tures. For our understanding being too short-sighted to penetrate immediately into the substance and essence of things, hath no other way to know and apprehend them, but either by their causes, or by their effects; but now God being the first and supreme fountain of all causes cannot be known by his cause, because he hath none, and therefore is knowable only by his effects, that is, by the works of his Creation that lie before us, and are within the prospect of our understandings; in the which all that is excellent and good is an illustrious Comment and Paraphrase up­on God.

NOW the effects of God are all reducible to these four generals, Substance or Essence, Life, Sense and Reason; all which are in man, who is the Epitome of the World, [Page 453] and a compleat Model of all the Works of God; and therefore not only all these, but all the proper excellencies and per­fections of these must be supposed to be in God, from whom they are deri­ved.

THE first effect of God is substance. Now the proper perfections of substance are Amplitude and Fulness of Being. By the Amplitude of substance I mean its greatness or largeness as to the diffusion or extent of it, in opposition to littleness, or, which is the same thing, to being de­fined to, or circumscribed within a small and inconsiderable space; by the Fulness of substance, I mean its having more of Essence or Being, by which it is more re­moved from not being, in opposition to things that have but little being in them, that are of so fleeting and transitory a na­ture as that they are next to nothing. Wherefore in conceiving of God we must ascribe to him these perfections of substance even to their utmost possibility, that is, we must conceive him to be a Being of infinite Amplitude, that is neither defined nor cir­cumscribed within any certain space, but coexists with, and penetrates and passes through all things; and by thus conceiving of him we attribute to him Immensity, [Page 452] [...] [Page 453] [...] [Page 454] which consists in being unconfined by any bounds of space in the out-spreading of himself to all places that we can see or imagine, and infinitely beyond them. And then in conceiving of him we must also ascribe to him infinite Fulness of Being, by which he is so infinitely removed from not being, as that he cannot but be; and by thus conceiving of him we attribute to him necessary existence, which consists in being out of all Possibility of not being.

BUT then secondly, another of those works of God from which we are to take our rise in conceiving of his Perfections, is Life. For he is the cause and fountain of all that life that is in the world, and there­fore must not only have life in himself, but the utmost perfection of it also that is possible. Now the Perfections of life are Activity and Duration; by Activity I mean a vigorous power and ability to act, in op­position to weakness and impotence, which must needs be a great perfection of life, which is the spring and principle of Acti­on; by Duration I mean a long continu­ance of life in opposition to that which is short and momentary; for the more lasting the life is, the more perfect it is, and the more there is of it. Wherefore in conceiving [Page 455] of God we must ascribe to him the utmost perfection of life that is possible; that is, we must conceive him to be infinitely active and powerful, that doth what he pleases in Heaven and on Earth, and can effect whatsoever is possible in it self, and not repugnant to the other perfections of his Nature; and in thus conceiving of him we attribute Omnipotence to him, which consists in an ability to do every thing that doth not imply a contradiction either to the nature of the things themselves, or to the nature and perfections of the doer; and then in conceiving of him we must also ascribe to him an infinite duration of life, that is, a life that is not bounded either by a beginning or an end, but is from e­verlasting to everlasting, and coexists and runs Parallel with all Duration past, and present, and to come; and by thus conceiving of him we attribute Eternity to him, which consists in a boundless du­ration of life without any term of beginning or end.

BUT then thirdly, another of these effects of God from which we are to take our rise in conceiving of the Perfections of God, is Sense; by which I do not un­derstand carnal or material sense only, which consists in perceiving the strokes [Page 456] and impressions of material Objects on our sensories, but sense in the general, whether it be of material or spiritual Be­ings. For that spiritual Beings have as exquisite a sense of spiritual Objects, as corporal of corporeal ones there is no doubt to be made; because otherwise we must suppose them insensible both of plea­sure and pain. Now the perfection of sense is Quickness and Sagacity of Percepti­on, whether it be of painful or of plea­sant, grateful or ungrateful Objects; and this is to be found not only in Beasts and Men, but also in separated spirits, in An­gels, and in God himself. For though none of these have any corporeal sense to feel and perceive the impressions of corporeal Objects, yet that both Angels and sepa­rated Spirits have a spiritual sense of spiri­tual impressions, by which they are sub­jected to pain and pleasure, cannot be de­nied; and though God by the infinite per­fection of his Nature is exempt from all sense of pain, yet it cannot be supposed that he who is the fountain from whence all sense is derived should himself be insen­sible; and if he be not, we ought to sup­pose him as sensible of all that is truly pleasant and good as it is possible to be; and where there is an infinite good, as there [Page 457] is in the nature of God, it is possible to be infinitely sensible of it; and in thus conceiving, we attribute to him infinite Happiness. For what else is an infinite sense of good but infinite pleasure and hap­piness; and this is the happiness of God, that he is infinitely perfect in himself, and infinitely sensible of his own perfecti­ons and therein infinitely pleased and delighted.

FOURTHLY and lastly, Another of those Works of God from whence we are to take our rise in conceiving of his per­fections, is Reason. For all that light of reason which shineth in humane and An­gelical minds being rayed forth, and de­rived from him, he must be supposed not only to have reason in himself, but to have it in its utmost possible perfection. Now the perfection of reason consists in Know­ledg and Wisdom in the Vnderstanding, and Rectitude or Righteousness in the Will. By Knowledg I mean considering and under­standing things absolutely as they are in their own Natures, in their Powers and Properties, Differences and Circumstances; by Wisdom I understand a through consi­deration of things as they are related to one another under the Notion of means and ends, and of their fitness or unfitness [Page 458] to the ends and purposes they are design­ed for. Wherefore in conceiving of God we must ascribe to him all possible Know­ledg and Wisdom, that is, a perfect com­prehension of all things that either are, or have been, or shall be, or can be; in short, a knowledg infinitely extensive, as com­prehending all knowable Objects, and infi­nitely intensive, as seeing every single Ob­ject in all its relations, dependances, and circumstances with a most perfect and in­fallible view; and in thus conceiving of him we attribute to him Omniscience and infinite Wisdom. By Rectitude or Righte­ousness in the Will, which is the other per­fection of Reason, I mean a conformity of the Will, and consequently of the affecti­ons and actions, to all that right reason dictates and prescribes; For the proper office of reason is to conduct the Will, and and to give bounds and measures to our principles of action; and in following right reason, and chusing and refusing by its eter­nal prescriptions, consists the Rectitude of the Will, and in that all Moral perfection. In conceiving of God therefore we must attribute to him all those moral perfections which consist in the intire compliance of his Will with the Dictates of his infallible Reason, in chusing every thing which right [Page 459] reason approves, and refusing every thing which it disallows, and this with the most perfect freedom and exactness; and in thus conceiving of him we attribute to him infinite Goodness, infinite Justice, and infinite Truth. For as for the first, viz, infinite Goodness, which consists in the in­variable inclination of his Will to do good to, and procure the happiness of his Crea­tures, by which he is infinitely removed from Envy and Malice, right reason dictates to him that being infinitely happy in him­self, the best and most becoming thing he can do is to propagate his own likeness and resemblance by doing good to, and procuring the happiness of others; and that Envy and Malice, which are the pro­perties of poor and indigent Beings, are infinitely unbeseeming him who is a self-sufficient nature; and accordingly his Will which always follows his Reason is infi­nitely propense to the one, and averse to the other. And as for the second, which is infinite Justice, which consists in dealing with his Creatures according to their se­veral deserts, by which he is infinitely re­moved from all partiality and injustice, right reason dictates to him, that since there is an immutable good and evil in the actions of free and reasonable Agents, it is [Page 460] fit that those who do good should receive good from him, who is the supreme Judge and Moderator, and those who do evil, evil, in proportion to the good and evil of their doings; and that to reward evil actions, and to punish good ones, or to reward those that are less good beyond those that are more, or punish those that are more evil beneath those that are less, is to go cross to the natures and reasons of things; and by these Dictates of Reason his Will is invariably regulated in all its transacti­ons with his Creatures. Lastly, as for infinite Truth, which consists in a perfect agreement of his declarations with his in­tentions, especially in matters of Promise, whereby he is infinitely removed from all deceit and falshood, right reason dictates to him, that to speak truth is the only natural end of speaking, that to promise is to give a right, and to intend to perform strict justice; that on the contrary lying perverts the use of Speech, and betrays a baseness and meanness of spirit, that to de­ceive is to injure, and to falsifie promise is to commit a Robbery; and accordingly his Will which is ever guided by his rea­son, imbraces truth, and rejects falshood with infinite abhorrence.

[Page 461]AND thus from the various perfections of Gods Works which are before us, we may fairly argue to all the perfections of God himself. For whatsoever perfection he hath given, he must have, and whatso­ever perfection he hath he must have so far as it is possible; for if it be possible, it must be within his power, and if it be within his power to be sure 'tis included in his nature; otherwise he must chuse to be less perfect when it is in his power to be more. And by thus taking our rise to God from the perfections of the Crea­ture, we discover him to be an immense self-existing substance, that is omnipotent, eternal, infinitely knowing and wise, just and good, faithful and happy. But to render our discovery yet more com­pleat

III. IT is necessary that in ascribing to him the perfections of the Creature we abstract from them every thing that is de­fective and imperfect. For to be sure there is nothing can be defective or imperfect in the Cause and Author of all perfection. So that whereas all other Beings have some de­fect or other intermingled with their perfe­ctions, and do either want some kind of perfe­ction, or some degree of those kinds where­with they are adorned, God hath all kinds [Page 462] and all degrees of all kinds of perfection; and so we must conceive of him, if we would do him right when we attribute to him the above-named perfections. As for instance, when we attribute to him the perfections of substance, we must abstract from them the defect of Corporeity or ma­terial extension, which compared with spirituality is a mighty defect and imper­fection of substance both as to its Ampli­tude and Fulness of Essence. For no Cor­poreal substance can be at the same time in the same place where another corporeal substance is; because it consists of such parts as cannot penetrate each other; so that every body must be limited in pre­sence, because it cannot be where another body is; whereas a Spirit being pene­trable it self, can penetrate or pass through all things, and consequently be present at the same time, and in the same place where not only other bodies are, but other Spi­rits too. So that by attributing body or matter to God, we must necessarily con­fine and limit the Amplitude of his sub­stance, which if it be bodily must necessa­rily be excluded from all those places where other bodily substances are, and consequently have but a finite and limited presence, which utterly destroys the [Page 463] infinite Amplitude or Omnipresence of his substance. And then bodily substances being all compounded of divisible parts, and consequently liable to be divided and corrupted, cannot have that fulness of Being in them which Spirits have, which are simple and uncompounded sub­stances, and consequently void of all prin­ciples of corruption; so that by attribu­ting body or matter to God, we substract from the infinite fulness of his Being, and instead of ascribing to him necessary ex­istence, which puts him beyond all possibi­lity of not being, degrade him into a divi­sible and corruptible nature. Wherefore in attributing to God the perfections of substance, we must abstract from them all matter and material affections, and conceive of him as a most pure and simple spirit.

AGAIN, when we attribute to him the perfections of life, viz. Power or Acti­vity and Duration, we must wholly ab­stract from them all those imperfections with which they are commixt in the Crea­ture. As for instance, activity in the Creature is attended with labour and pains; the not abstracting of which from the Activity of God made Epicurus suppose him to be a restive Being, that withdrew [Page 464] himself from action for fear of disturbing his own happiness by it; whereas labour and pains are the imperfections of activity, and so ought not to be admitted into our conception of God's, which being infinite, there is nothing can be difficult or uneasie to him. For it is because of imperfection that labour and trouble do attend any Be­ings in their operations; could they do what they do perfectly, it would be no la­bour at all to them. God therefore ha­ving an infinite power to effect what he pleases, whatsoever he doth he doth it most perfectly, and consequently without any toil or labour; and since all things were derived from him, and are depen­dent upon him, they must all be perfectly subject to his power; and where there is perfect subjection there can be no resistance, and where there is no resistance there can be no labour. And then as for Duration, which is the other perfection of life, in the Creature it is attended with depen­dence. For there is no life but depends upon God, to be shortened or prolonged ac­cording to his pleasure; the lives of all Beings are maintained and supplied by his all-enlivening power and influence, which if he withdraw from them but one mo­ment, they presently expire; so that the [Page 465] duration of all created life is dependent and precarious, and even those Beings that shall live for ever have no other tenure of life but Gods Will and pleasure, who with the breath of his Nostrils can blow them out when he pleases. But the duration of Gods life is altogether independent; for he sub­sists of himself, from that infinite fulness of Being that is in him, and hath done so from all Eternity past when there was no other cause but himself in being, and therefore can do so to all Eternity to come without the support or assistance of any other cause. So that he is not at all be­holding for his duration to the good will and pleasure of any other Being, but de­rives from an inexhaustible spring of life within himself, whence he also derives life to all other Beings.

AGAIN, when we attribute to him the perfection of sense, viz. quickness and exquisiteness of perception, we must whol­ly abstract from it all that imperfection with which it is attended in the Creatures; for in them it is attended with sundry affections which argue imperfection in their nature and happiness; such as Fear, Sorrow, Repentance, Desperation, and the like; all which argue a defect of Power or Wisdom, and proceed from a quick sense of evil [Page 466] past, or present, or to come, which is in­consistent with perfect happiness. When therefore we attribute to God this perfe­ction of sense, we must abstract from it all those affections which proceed from the sense of evil or pain. For he is so infinite­ly perfect both in nature and happiness, that no evil can approach him to vex or disturb him, or make any painful impressi­ons on his nature; and being so, it is im­possible that in propriety of speech he should either fear, or grieve, or repent, or despair. All these affections indeed are in Scripture attributed to him, but then it is in an improper and Metaphorical sense; not as if he did at any time feel these passions within himself, but because he demeans himself towards us as if he did; not as if the affections themselves had any place in his nature, but because the natu­ral effects of them appear in his actions and behaviour. And though there is no doubt but he resents all those evils which good men suffer, and bad men commit, yet it is not from any painful impression that they make upon his nature; for he nei­ther feels the miseries he pities and re­lieves, nor is vext at the sins he detests and abhors, but all the resentment he hath both of the evil of our sufferings and sins is [Page 467] perfectly calm to himself, and devoid of all passion and disturbance. 'Tis true, his Will being perfectly reasonable must be differently affected towards different Ob­jects, and contrarily affected towards con­trary Objects, because they propose to it different and contrary Reasons; and there­fore as it must be affected with complacen­cy towards good Objects, so it must be affected with abhorrence towards bad; but this abhorrence arises not either from any sense of hurt they do him, or fear of hurt they can do him, his Nature being wholly impassible, but from the repugnancy they bear to his own infallible reason; and his abhorrence being wholly founded in his Reason, and not in any sense or feeling he hath of the evils he detests, must upon this account be stript of all grief and vexa­tion. Wherefore in attributing to God the perfection of sense, we must take care to abstract from it all those affections which spring out of the imperfection either of our nature, or our happiness.

BUT then in the last place, when we attribute to him the perfections of Rea­son, viz. Knowledge and Rectitude of Will, we must also abstract from them all those imperfections with which they are at tended in the Creatures; As for instance, [Page 468] Knowledge in the Creature is attended with reasoning and discoursing, that is, inferring one thing from another, arguing Conse­quents from Principles, and Effects from Causes, which is a great imperfection of Knowledge, and a plain indication that it is narrow and confined in it self, and not to be improved without labour and study. For that we are fain to infer one thing out of another is an evident token that we know but in part, because in this way our knowledge must be suc­cessive, and we must know one thing be­fore we can know another; we must know the Principles before we can know the Consequents, and the Causes before the Effects; else how can we deduce the one from the other? And this deducing or in­ferring requires a great deal of study and labour. Wherefore in attributing Know­ledg to God we must abstract from it this imperfection of reasoning and discourse; for his Knowledg being infinite or uncon­fined by the utmost extention and duration of things, doth at one Intuition or simple view behold all things past, and present, and to come, yea, whensoever, whereso­ever, or howsoever possible; and behold­ing as he doth all Consequents in their Prin­ciples, all Effects in their Causes, he doth [Page 469] not know one thing after another, but comprehends them all together in his infinite mind, without any succession or improvement. So that from all Eternity past he knew as much as he doth now, and as much as he will do to all Eternity to come; for his Knowledg was always infi­nite, and what is infinite admits not either of more or less. And then for that other perfection of reason which consists in Recti­tude of Will, in the Creature it is acquired, even as that Knowledg and Wisdom is by which it is measured and regulated. For Rectitude of Will consisting in chusing and refusing as right Reason directs, must needs be acquired in the Creature, because that Right Reason is so, by which it chuses and refuses; so that there is the same defect and imperfection in the Rectitude of our Wills as there is in our Reason and Know­ledg, that is, that it is not altogether, but acquired by degrees, and so it may be is in­finitely successive and improvable. Where­fore in attributing to God Rectitude of Will, which, as I shewed before, consists in Goodness, and Justice, and Truth, we are wholly to abstract from it this imper­fection of being acquired. For it is essen­tial to his Will to follow the Dictates of his Understanding and Reason, and essential [Page 470] to his Understanding to dictate to his Will all the parts and degrees of Goodness, Ju­stice, and Truth; so that the rectitude of his Will is infinite both as to the extent and degrees of it, there being no good, no degree of good that an infinite reason can propose, but what his Will doth most readily imbrace, and perfectly comply with; so that the Recti­tude of his Will is such as could not be ac­quired part after part, degree after degree, because it is essentially infinite; and from e­verlasting he was as good, and as just, and as faithful as now, and to everlasting he cannot be better, or juster, or faithfuller than he is, because what is essentially infinite admits no improvement either of parts or degrees. And thus you see how in all these respects it is absolutely necessary to the framing a right Apprehension of God, that in ascribing to him the perfections of the Creature, we abstract all those defects and imperfections with which they are intermixt.

IV. IT is necessary that in arguing from the perfections of the Creature to the perfections of God, we distinguish be­tween the state and relations of God and Creature. For there are many things which are perfections in the Creature con­sidering their state which would be imper­fections in God considering his; and so on [Page 471] the contrary. As for instance, to be dependent and humble, resigned and submis­sive; to be grateful and devout are per­fections in the Creature, because there is a Being infinitely above them in all de­grees of all sorts of perfection, in Know­ledg and Wisdom, in Power and Goodness, in Justice and Truth; a Being to whom they owe themselves, and all the good things they possess, and upon whom they depend for all that they are, or enjoy, or hope for; and therefore it infinitely be­comes them to abase themselves before him, to trust to, and depend on him, and resign themselves to him; to supplicate him for all they want, and thank him for all they enjoy; but for God to be humble, who is infinitely perfect above all, for God to depend, who is the upholder of all, for him to submit who is Lord over all, or to be devout and grateful, who is the supreme Fountain and Proprietor of all, would be to sneak and condescend far beneath the infinite dignity of his Nature. As on the contrary, to love himself above all, to set up his Will above all other Wills, and to expect and require that they should do ho­mage to it; to exact Adoration and Worship from all, and to appropriate it to himself from all other Beings, are excellencies and [Page 472] perfections in God, because he is infinitely amiable above all other Beings, and there­fore ought in reason to love himself above all, infinitely exalted above all other Beings, and therefore ought in rea­son to expect that all other Beings should be subject to him; in a word, because he, and he alone is God, and hath all divine perfections appropriate to himself, and therefore ought in reason to expect that all capable Beings should acknowledg his Divi­nity by sutable actions, and restrain their acknowledgment of it wholly to himself; but for a Creature, that is infinitely less lovely than God, and infinitely inferiour to him, to love it self, and set up its own Will above him, and invade his Throne and Divinity, and arrogate to it self his Honour and Worship, is not only unrea­sonable, but impious. In this case there­fore we must carefully distinguish between the states of God and Creature, and not attribute to him those perfections of the Creature which are proper to it, under the notion of Creature, because in so do­ing we shall infinitely degrade him; but whatsoever is in it self a perfection, pre­cisely considered from all respects to the state and relations of a Creature, that we ought to ascribe to God in its utmost ex­tent and degree.

[Page 473]AND yet even here it will in many cases be necessary for us to keep this di­stinction of God and Creature in our minds; for though whatsoever is absolutely and in it self a perfection in the Creature is also a perfection in God, yet considering the state of God, that may be an exercise of absolute perfection in him which would be imperfection in a Creature. As for in­stance, Wisdom, and Goodness, and Justice are absolute perfections in a Creature, and therefore ought to be attributed to God, but it doth not thence follow that that is no exercise of these per­fections in God which is not so in Crea­tures. It is an act of Wisdom in a Crea­ture to pursue his ends by the most proba­ble means, but it doth not therefore fol­low that it is an act of folly in God to effect his ends by contrary means, because he being not only all wise, but all-powerful, which no Creature is, can make the most contrary means as subservient to his ends as the most probable, and therefore some­times to display the greatness of his Power, and to excite our attention and reverence he chuses to operate by contrary means, and when he doth so he chuseth most wise­ly. Again, it is an act of Goodness in us to succour the unfortunate, and rescue [Page 474] oppressed innocence from undeserved cala­mities; and not to do so, when we can with ease, and without any prejudice to our selves, is a high degree of malice and ill nature. But it doth not therefore fol­low that it is an act of malice in God to permit innocence to suffer, when with ease, and without the least damage to him­self he can relieve it, because being infi­nitely wise and powerful, which no Crea­ture is, he can infallibly bring good out of evil, and advance us to happiness by suffe­ring; and therefore sometimes he permits the innocent to suffer evil, thereby to pro­cure them some great and lasting good; and when he doth so it is an act of great Goodness in him. Once more, it is Justice in the Creature not to kill or hurt the Innocent, not to deprive them of any good they are rightfully possess'd of, and to act contrary is great injustice, because we have no right to another mans Life, or Limbs, or Goods, unless he forfeits them to us by some unjust attempt to deprive us of ours; but it doth not therefore follow, that it would be unjust in God to do so, who be­ing the supreme Proprietor of our Lives, and Limbs, and Goods, which no Creature is of any other Creatures, can justly re­sume them when he pleases, be we never [Page 475] so innocent, because they are his own; what­ever he gave us he can take away from us, without any injury, because he rather lent it than gave it us, reserving the absolute propriety in himself; and his right being supreme, absolute, and independent, and ours but subordinate and conditional, what­soever we can justly do he can justly do, and abundantly more; so that though we may argue this or that is just in the Crea­ture, therefore it is just in God, yet we cannot argue è contra, this or that is just in God, therefore it is just in the Creature, because his right in all things is infinitely Paramount to our right in any thing; and therefore though he cannot without our own fault and forfeiture reduce us to a worse state than that of not being wherein he found us, because to do so would be equi­valent to the taking away from us more than he gave us, and consequently more than he hath a right to, yet Gods right being infinitely more absolute and exten­sive than ours, he can justly take away from us infinitely more than we can justly take away from one another. And therefore to correct the iniquities of wicked Nations and Parents, God some­times lays his hand upon good Kings, [Page 476] and innocent Children, and either deprives them of their comforts, and pursues them with constant infelicities, or puts an un­timely period to their lives; and when he doth so, he hath an absolute right to do it, which no other Being can pretend to. Wherefore in attributing to God the per­fections of the Creature we are carefully to distinguish between the state of God and Creatures, and neither to ascribe to him any of those perfections which belong to a Creature, as a Creature, nor to bound the exercise of those absolute perfections we ascribe to him by the Rules and Limita­tions of the Creature.

V. ALTHOUGH in arguing from the perfections of the Creature to the perfe­ctions of God we are not to subject him to the Rules of a Creature, yet we ought always to suppose his Will and Power to be intirely subject to the Moral perfecti­ons of his own nature. For God who is infinitely exalted above all other Beings can be subject to no other Law but that of his own Essential Wisdom, and Justice, and Goodness; and since every thing hath a right to exercise its own faculties so far forth as it is just and lawful, God who is subject to no other Law but only that of his own perfections hath an essential right [Page 477] to will and do whatever that Law allows and approves of. Now the perfections of God which give Law to his Will and Power, are those which, for distinction sake, we call Moral, because their Office is the same in him with that of moral Ver­tues in the Creature, viz. to conduct and regulate his Will and Powers of action; and these Moral perfections are his Wis­dom, and Goodness, Justice, and Truth, which being all essential to him are as much a Law to his Will and Power, as Moral Laws are to ours; And to suppose his Will and Power not to be perfectly subject to them, is to suppose him a very defective and imperfect Being, a lawless Will and Power being the greatest defect in Nature. Wherefore to secure our minds against all injurious apprehensions of God, this is a most necessary Rule, that we con­ceive him to be such a Being as can neither Will nor Act any thing but what his own Essential Wisdom, and Goodness, and Ju­stice do approve; that in all his Decrees, Purposes, Choices, and Actions consults his Moral perfections, and perfectly regulates himself by them, and doth neither chuse nor refuse, elect nor reprobate, save nor damn without their full consent and appro­bation. For to affirm that he is not [Page 478] obliged to regulate himself by Wisdom, and Justice and Goodness, or that he can do other­wise, is to attribute to him a Power to Will and Act foolishly, maliciously, and unjustly, which indeed is not so properly Power as Impotence; and to suppose that he can thus Will and Act, is to deny that he is infinitely Wise, and Just, and Good, which utterly ex­cludes all possibility of being otherwise in any respect or degree. For to be infinitely Wise and Just is to be infinitely removed from folly and injustice, which nothing can be that hath the least degree of possibility to act unwise­ly or unjustly. Wherefore in conceiving of God it is always to be supposed that his Will and Power are so immutably subject to the Moral perfections of his Nature, as that it is impossible for him to Will or Act against them. For all that liberty of Will that is determinable to good or evil, just or unjust, is a flaw and imperfection in the reasonable nature, because it speaks the Will to be defective in that which is the ut­most possibility of Goodness and Justice, i. e. in being immutably determined there­unto; and therefore to attribute such a liberty to God, is to scandalize his Na­ture, and reproach it with imperfection. For all that Power which is not con­ducted by Justice and Goodness is only [Page 479] power to do mischief, to Tyrannize over other Beings, and to sport and play with their miseries; which is so far from being a perfection of Power that it proceeds from the most wretched weakness and impotence. So that by attributing such a power to God, we foully asperse and blaspheme him, and instead of a God imagine a worse Devil, and more qualified to do mischief than any that are now in Hell, who though they are powerful enough to do mischief, are none of them Omnipotently mischievous; it is to imagine a God without a Deity, that is, without that Essential Rectitude of Will wherein all his Moral perfections do con­sist, which are the Crown and Glory of his Nature. For to be good and just are the brightest Rays of the Deity, the Rays that illustrate and glorifie all his other perfecti­ons, and without which infinite Knowledg and infinite Power would be nothing but infinite Craft and Mischief; so that to ima­gine that he hath any Will or Power that is not Essentially subject to his Moral per­fections, is to deface the very beauty of his Nature, and represent him the most hor­rid thing in the World. Wherefore in conceiving of God we ought to fix this as the main and fundamental Rule of our thoughts, that he hath no Will to Chuse, [Page 480] or Power to Act but what are in perfect subjection to infinite Wisdom, and Justice, and Goodness; and this will secure our minds from all those rigid and sour ap­prehensions of him which by reflecting on his Moral perfections do him the greatest dishonour, and represent him the most dis­advantageously to mankind.

VI. AND lastly, It is also necessary that in conceiving of the perfections of God we always suppose them exactly har­monious and consistent with each other. For all perfections of Being, so far forth as they are perfections, are consistent with each other, and like strait lines drawn from the same Center run Parallel toge­ther without any crossing or interfering. For there is nothing contrary to perfection but imperfection, and there is no disagree­ment but what arises from contrariety. When therefore we conceive of the per­fections of God, we must so conceive of them, as that there may be no manner of inconsistency or disagreement between them, otherwise we must admit into our con­ceptions of them something or other that is defective or imperfect. As for instance, in God there is infinite Wisdom, and infi­nite Justice, infinite Goodness, and infinite Mercy, wherefore if we would conceive [Page 481] aright of these his glorious perfections we must take care not to admit any Notion of any one of them that renders it repug­nant to any other, but so to conceive of them altogether as that they may mutually accord and agree with each other. For while we apprehend his Goodness to be such as that it will not accord with his Wisdom, we must either suppose his Wis­dom to be Craft, or his Goodness to be Folly; and whilst we apprehend his Mer­cy to be such as that it will not agree with his Justice, we must either suppose his Justice to be Cruelty, or his Mercy to be blind Pity and Fondness; and it is certain that that goodness cannot be a perfection which exceeds the measures of Wisdom, nor that Mercy neither which transgresses the bounds of Justice, and so on the contrary. For if either Gods goodness excludes his wisdom, or his wisdom his goodness; if either his Mercy swallow up his Justice, or his Justice his Mercy, there is an appa­rent repugnance and contrariety between them, and where there is a contrariety there must be imperfection in one or t'other, or both.

WHEREFORE if we would appre­hend them altogether, as they truly are in God, that is, under the notion of perfecti­ons, [Page 482] we must so conceive of them as that in all respects they may be perfectly consistent and harmonious; as that his Wis­dom may not clash with his Goodness, nor his Goodness with his Wisdom; as that his Mercy may not justle with his Justice, nor his Justice with his Mercy; that is, we must conceive him to be as wise as he can be with infinite goodness, as good as he can be with infinite wisdom, as just as he can be with infinite mercy, and as merci­ful as he can be with infinite justice, which is to be wise, and good, and just, and merci­ful, so far as it is a perfection to be so. For to be wise beyond what is good, is Craft, to be good beyond what is wise, is Dotage, to be just beyond what is merciful, is Ri­gour, to be merciful beyond what is just, is Easiness, that is, they are all imperfection, so far as they are beyond what is perfect. Wherefore we ought to be very careful not to represent these his Moral perfecti­ons as running a tilt at one another, but to conceive of them all together as one in­tire perfection, which though like the Center of a Circle it hath many Lines drawn from it round about, and so is look­ed upon sometimes as the term of this Line, and sometimes of that, yet is but one common and undivided term to them [Page 483] all; or, to speak more plainly, though it exerts it self in different ways and actions, and operates diversly according to the diversities of its Objects, and accordingly admits of divers Names, such as Wisdom, Goodness, Justice, and Mercy, yet is in it self but one simple and indivisible princi­ple of action, all whose operations how diverse soever are such as perfectly accord with each other, whose acts of Wisdom are all infinitely good, whose acts of good­ness are all infinitely wise, whose acts of justice are infinitely merciful, and whose acts of mercy are infinitely just; so that in this, as well as in their extension and degrees they are all most perfect, viz. that they always operate with mutual consent, and in perfect harmony. And while we thus conceive of the divine perfections, our minds will be mightily secured against all those false apprehensions of God which lead to superstition and presumption; for we shall so apprehend his wisdom and justice as not to be superstitiously afraid, and so apprehend his goodness and mercy as not to be presumptuously secure; and as on the one hand his Justice will protect his Mercy from being abused by our wanton security, so on the other hand his good­ness will protect his wisdom from being [Page 484] misrepresented by our anxious suspition. For while we consider his mercy thus tem­pered with his justice, and his wisdom with his goodness, we can neither ex­pect impunity from the one if we continue wicked, nor yet suspect any ill design against us in the other if we return from our evil ways, and persevere in well doing.

SECT. III. Of the causes of our mis-apprehensions of God.

I Now proceed to the last thing I pro­posed, which was to assign and remove the causes of mens misapprehensions of God; many of which are so secret and obscure, so peculiar to the frame and temper of mens brains, so interwoven with the infinite varieties of humane Con­stitutions, that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to trace them, so as to make an exact enumeration of them all; and there­fore I shall only assign the most common and visible causes by which the generality of men are mislead in their Apprehensions [Page 465] of the divine Nature, whinh are reducible to these six Heads:

First, Ignorance of what is the true per­fection of our own Nature.

Secondly, Framing our Notions of God according to the model of our own humour and temper.

Thirdly. Obstinate partiality to our own sinful lusts and affections.

Fourthly, Measuring Gods Nature by particular Providences.

Fifthly, Taking up our Notions of God from obscure and particular passages, and not from the plain and general current of Scripture.

Sixthly, Indevotion.

I. ONE great cause of our misappre­hensions of God is Ignorance of what is the true perfection of our own Natures. For, as I shewed before, in conceiving of the perfections of God we must take our rise from those perfections we behold in his Creatures, and particularly in our own Natures, wherein there is a composition of all created perfections; so that while we are ignorant of what is the true per­fection of our own Natures, our thoughts can have no rule or aim whereby to judg of God's. That he hath all those perfecti­ons in himself which he hath derived to [Page 486] us, is the Fundamental Maxim upon which we are to erect our Notions of him; and therefore unless we know what those per­fections are which he hath derived to us, and wherein they consist, our mind hath no footing or foundation whereon to raise any certain Idea of him. For since we have no other way to conceive of his per­fections but by our own, how is it possible that while we are ignorant of our own we should ever conceive aright of his? This therefore is one great reason why men do so grosly misconceive of God, be­cause they have no true Notion of their own perfection, by which they are to form their conceptions of his.

FOR whereas the true perfection of hu­mane nature consists In Moral goodness, or an universal compliance of its Will, Affections, and Actions with those ever­lasting Laws of righteousness which right reason prescribes, how many are there that look upon this as a very mean and carnal accomplishment, and place all their perfection in things of a quite different nature, viz. in the Ebbs and Flows of their sensitive passion, and the extraordinary Fermentations of their bloud and spirits, that is to say, in unaccountable dejections and exaltations of mind, in vehement [Page 487] impressions of fancy and Mechanical move­ments of affection, in Raptures and Ec­stacies and Hypocondriacal incomes and manifestations, that have nothing of sub­stantial Vertue or Piety in them, nor com­monly any other effect but to cause men to renounce that Righteousness which they never had, and rely upon that which they have no Title to, and to sooth and tickle their fancies, and blow them up into glorious opinions of themselves, and Tri­umphant assurances of their being the Dar­lings and Favourites of God, whilst poor Moral men, that make conscience of regu­lating their affections and actions by the eternal Laws of Righteousness are look'd upon by them with a scornful compassion, and placed in the lowermost form of sinners, at the greatest distance from the Kingdom of God. Now when men take such false measures of their own perfection, how is it possible they should conceive aright of the perfections of God, which they have no other way to conceive of but only by arguing from their own? Wherefore in or­der to the forming our Ideas of Gods perfections, it is necessary we should first fix the true Notion of our own; which is no hard matter for us to do. For our Na­ture being reasonable, to be sure its [Page 488] perfection must consist in willing, affe­cting and acting reasonably, or which is the same thing, in Governing it self in all its relations and circumstances by those im­mutable Laws of goodness which right rea­son prescribes, and which are exemplified to us in the holy Scripture; and when we have fixt in our minds this Notion of our own perfection, it will naturally conduct our thoughts to God's, and let us see that his perfection consists not in a lawless and boundless Will, that decrees without fore­sight, resolves without reason, and Wills because it will, and then executes its own blind and unaccountable purposes by dint of irresistible power without any regard to right or wrong. For if we rightly un­derstand our own perfection, we cannot but discern that such a Will as this is one of the most monstrous deformities in na­ture, because it is the most Diametrically opposite to the true Idea of our own Per­fection, which while we attentively fix our eyes on, we cannot but infer from it that the true perfection of God consists in the unvariable determination of his Will by the all-comprehending reason of his Mind, or in chusing and refusing, decree­ing and executing upon such reasons as best becomes a God to will and act on, i. e. upon [Page 489] such as are infinitely wise, and good, and just, and merciful. For if to Will and Act upon such reasons as these be the perfection of our nature, we cannot but conclude that it is the perfection of Gods too; but if we are ignorant of our own perfection, we must necessarily think of God at Rovers, without any certain aim or rule to square and direct our apprehensions.

II. ANOTHER cause of our misappre­hension of God, is our framing our Noti­ons of him according to the Model of our own particular humour and temper. For self-love being the most vehement affection of Humane Nature, and that upon which all its other affections are founded, there is no one Vice to which we are more universally obnoxious than that of ex­cessive fondness and partiality to our selves, which makes us too often dote up­on the deformities, and even Idolize the Vices of our own temper. So that whe­ther our nature be stern, sour, and imperi­ous, or fond, easie and indulgent, we are apt to admire it as a great perfection merely because it is Ours, without mea­suring it by those eternal reasons which are the Rules of Good and Evil, Perfection and Imperfection; and then whatever we look [Page 494] upon as a perfection in our selves we na­turally attribute to God, who is the cause and fountain of all perfection. And hence it comes to pass that mens minds have been always tinctured with such false and repugnant opinions of God, because they frame their judgments of him not so much by their reason as by their temper and hu­mour; and so their different humours be­ing not only unreasonable in themselves, but repugnant and contrary to one another, produce in them not only false and un­reasonable, but contrary and repugnant opi­nions of God. Thus for instance, the Epicureans who were a soft and voluptuous Sect, intirely addicted to ease and plea­sure, fancied God to be such a one as them­selves, a Being that was wholly sequestred from action, and confined to an Extra-mundane Paradise, where he lived in per­fect ease, and was entertained with infi­nite Luxuries, without ever concerning his thoughts with any thing abroad; for this they thought was the top of all per­fection, and therefore thus they would have chosen to live had they been Gods themselves. Thus the Stoicks, who were a sort of very morose and inflexible peo­ple, copied their Notions of God from their own complexion, supposing him to be an [Page 495] inflexible Being that was utterly incapable of being moved and affected by the rea­sons of things, but was wholly governed by a stern and inexorable Fate. And ac­cordingly the Scythians and Thracians, the Gaules and Carthaginians, who were a people of a bloudy and Barbarous nature, Pictured their Gods from their own tem­per, imagining them to be of a bloud-thirsty nature, that delighted to feed their hungry Nostrils with the Nidorous reeks and steams of humane gore. Whereas, on the contrary, the Platonists, who were gene­rally of a very soft and amorous nature, took their measure of God thereby, and so framed an Idea of him that was as soft and amorous as their own complexion, com­posed altogether of loves, and smiles, and indearments, without the least intermix­ture of vengeance and severity, how just soever in it self, or necessary to the well-government of the World. Thus as the Ethiopians pictured their Gods black be­cause they were black themselves, so ge­nerally men have been always prone to represent God in the colour of their own complexions; which is the cause that they many times represent him so utterly un­like to himself, because out of an unrea­sonable partiality to themselves they first [Page 492] mistake the deformities of their own na­tures for perfections, and then Deifie them them into Divine Attributes. Thou thoughtest, saith God, that I was altogether such a one as thy self, Psal. 50.21. that is, thou didst frame thy conceptions of me according to the Pattern of thy own ill-nature, and so thoughtest basely and un­worthily of me. And hence I doubt not spring most of those misapprehensions of God which have been received among Christians. For how is it possible for any man that is not of a fierce and cruel nature himself, to believe it consistent with the nature of God to snatch poor Infants from their Mothers Womb, that never actually offended him, and hurl them into the flames of Hell? And considering the stern and inflexible temper of the famous Au­thor of the Horrible Decree, though other­wise a rare and admirable person, there is too much reason to suspect that he tran­scribed his own nature into his Doctrine, and modelled his Divinity by his Temper. And so on the contrary, who but a man of excessive fondness and partiality, that loves beyond all reason, and invincibly doats upon the deformities of his own dar­lings, could ever imagine it consistent with the wisdom and holiness of God to chuse [Page 493] his favourites without reason, and, when he hath chosen them, not only to overlook all their faults, but to hide them from his own eyes with the Mantle of anothers Righteousness, that so how ill soever they behave themselves, he may never see cause to be displeased with them? From these and other instances it is evident that one great cause of our misapprehensions of God, is our measuring his nature by our own. For first, our partiality to our selves makes us magnifie our own faults into perfections, and then whatsoever we reckon a perfection in our selves we natu­rally attribute to God, and so many times it comes to pass that our Notions of God are nothing but the Images of our selves, which Narcissus-like we fall in love with for no other reason but because they reflect our own sweet likeness. As therefore we would not wrong God in our own thoughts, we must take care not to attribute to him any thing of our own, but what is a per­fection in the judgment of the most impar­tial reason; and because our self-love is apt to bribe our own reason into a favou­rable opinion of whatever is our own, we ought to admit nothing of our own into our Notion of God but what is voted a perfection by the common reason of Mankind.

[Page 491]III. ANOTHER cause of our misap­prehensions of God is our obstinate par­tiality to our own sinful lusts and affecti­ons. For while men are vehemently ad­dicted to any sinful courses, the true No­tion of God must needs sit very uneasily on their minds, because it will be always quarrelling with them, suggesting argu­ments against them, and alarming them with dreadful thoughts and dire abodeings of a vengeance to come. For there is no true conception of Gods nature but what is pregnant with some powerful argument against disobedience to his Will; so that while we obstinately persist in disobedi­ence to him, our reason cannot truly con­ceive of him without waging War against our Lusts, and while a man is thus at va­riance with himself, and one end of his Soul is at War with the other, so that he cannot gratifie his affection without af­fronting his reason, nor comply with his reason without doing violence to his affe­ction, he can never be at ease within, till either he hath forced his affection to sub­mit to his reason, or his reason to submit to his affection; but while a mans reason hath the true Notion of God and his per­fections before it, 'twill be impossible for him to reconcile it to his sinful affections, [Page 490] against which, whenever he coolly reflects, it must necessarily dictate bitter Invectives and denounce horrible Sentences. So that if he be obstinately resolved to side with his sinful affections, he must either be con­tent patiently to endure the clamour and fury of his own reason, which is one of the most uneasie Penances in the World, or endeavour to corrupt and sophisticate his Notions of God with such opinions as countenance his Lusts. And this, consi­dering the mighty influence which mens affections have on their reason, is no hard matter to do; for the least shew of proba­bility, backt with a strong affection for an opinion, is of greater force with corrupt minds than the clearest demonstration against it. So that if the Opinion be but serviceable to the interest of a mans lust, that will engage his affection on its side, and then the opinion having once retained those powerful Orators in its cause, it is secure of a very favourable trial at the Tri­bunal of reason, where in all probability only one side of the Question will be weighed, and Judgment will be given up­on hearing the Arguments for it, without admitting any evidence against it.

[Page 496]THUS when men are hunted and pursued through their wicked cour­ses by the true Notions of God, it is expedient for them if they resolve to go on to take sanctuary in false ones, where their Conscience and Will, their reason and affections may dwell quietly together, and they may be as wicked as they please without any disturbance. And abundance of such false Notions there are prepared to their hands, which mens wicked minds have invented in the defence of their lusts. For thus some, to ease their Consciences, have persuaded themselves, that God is so wholly taken up with his own happiness as that he is not at leisure to concern him­self about humane actions, and under this persuasion they sin on with full security that he will never punish them. Others on the contrary, to reconcile their lusts, persuade themselves that God is won­derfully concerned about small things; about trifling opinions and indifferent actions, and the Rites, and Modes, and Appendages of his Worship, and under this persuasion they hope to attone him for all the immoralities of their lives by the forms and outsides of Religion, by uncom­manded severities and affected singularities, by contending for Opinions,, and stickling [Page 497] for Parties, and being pragmatically zea­lous about the borders and fringes of Re­ligion. Others there are that to quiet their anxious minds persuade themselves that God, in Christ at least, is all Mercy and Goodness, without the least allay of Righ­teous Severity, or vindictive Justice; and being thus persuaded, they sin on securely, and under the Wing of his Mercy affront his Authority, without any disturbance. Others again, that to stifle the sense of their own guilt persuade themselves that God hath irrevocably determined the ever­lasting Fate of men without any respect to their doings, and that those whom he will save he will save irresistibly without any concurrence of theirs, whereas those whom he will not save he hath utterly abandoned to a dire necessity of perishing for ever; from whence they conclude, that if they are of the number of those that shall be saved, it is needless for them to endeavour after it, and if in the List of those that shall perish, it is in vain for them to endeavour to prevent it; and that therefore their wisest course is to sin on, and expect the Event. All which are only the Artifices of wickedness to reconcile mens Consciences to their Lusts, and com­promise the quarrel between God and [Page 498] their wicked lives, that so they may sin on for the future without check or re­morse.

WHEREFORE if we would form a right Notion of God in our minds, and preserve it pure and unsophisticated, we must above all things beware not to let our Lusts intermingle with our Reasonings about him, or to bribe us to assent to any opinion concerning him. For this is an eternal Maxim, that there is nothing can be true of the most holy God, that gives the least countenance or protection to sin; and therefore when ever it makes for the interest of our Lusts to believe any opinion of him, for that reason we ought to re­ject it; for nothing can be true of God that is not perfectly consistent with his infinite Holiness, and nothing can be con­sistent with his infinite holiness that is any way serviceable to the interest of sin; so that while we suffer our sinful interests to dictate to us our opinions of God, we make falshood our Oracle, and the very foundation of our Faith is a Lie.

IV. ANOTHER great cause of our misapprehensins of God is our measuring his Nature by particular Providences. The tree is known by its fruit is the common Rule [Page 499] by which men judg of God as well as of one another, and it is most certain that every free Agent is as it doth, that the ordinary course of its Actions is an infalli­ble Index of the inward dispositions and inclinations of its mind; but as for the actions of God, they are not to be judged of singly and apart from one another, be­cause they have all one general drift and tendency, and so are mutually dependent upon one another, and closely linked toge­ther even from the first to the second, and so on to the last in one continued Chain and Series; so that of all those innume­rable actions whereof his general Provi­dence consists there is no one loose or inde­pendent Link, but every one is connected unto all the rest, and all the rest to every one throughout that mighty Chain. Where­fore unless we had an intire Prospect of the whole Series of Gods actions, and of the mutual respects and relations which they bear to one another, it is impossible for us, without a divine Revelation, to make any certain judgment of Particu­lars. For though this or that particular action or providence of God, considered separately from all the rest, may have a very pernicious and malevolent Aspect, yet it is to be considered that no action of God [Page 500] is what it would be if it were apart by it self, but what it is in conjunction with all the rest of his actions, and that that which by it self might prove very pernicious, may by being contempered with others of a different nature become exceeding be­neficial to the World. For so in the Hea­vens there are sundry Stars of a very malignant aspect apart by themselves, which yet in conjunction with other Stars of a different temper do many times derive a most benign influence upon us. And if men can give no certain judgment of any single Act or Scene of Gods Providence without comprehending at once the whole Drama, how is it possible they should take true measures of his Nature by any particular event that befalls them? For for all they know those very Events which singly considered are most noxious to the World, may be most beneficial as they are intermingled and contempered with other Providences; so that while they measure God by single Events they will many times deduce sour and rigid opini­ons of him from those very Providences which are the highest instances of his be­nignity and goodness. Thus, for instance, should Joseph have framed his judgment of Gods Nature by his being thrown into [Page 501] the Pit, sold into Aegypt, and there cast into Prison for his integrity and innocence, what could he have thought of him but that he was a very envious and malicious Being, that took delight in afflicting inno­cence, and sported himself with the mise­ries of his Creatures? And yet consider­ing what followed upon these sad Provi­dences, and how these were all of them but so many steps to his advancement, it is plain, that had he thought thus, he had thought very injuriously; those very Pro­vidences from which he must have in­ferred Gods malice to him, being in con­junction with what followed most illu­strious instances of his Goodness towards him.

AND yet how commonly do we see men pass judgment on Gods Nature from such particular Providences? They see a world of deplorable Accidents, such as Famines, Butcheries, Plagues, and Devastations, in which themselves are many times invol­ved, from whence they are ready to con­clude, that certainly God would never inflict or suffer these things if he were not of a very froward, cruel, and implacable nature; whereas did they but see these sad accidents as they lie interwoven with all the rest of his Providences, they would [Page 502] doubtless see infinite reason to conclude the quite contrary. Sometimes again they behold Wickedness prosper in this World, and Vertue and Innocence depressed and trampled on, from whence they are ready to conclude, either that that which we call Vice and Vertue are things indiffe­rent to God, or that he is unjust in the di­stribution of Rewards and Punishments; whereas had they an intire comprehension of the whole train and series of his Pro­vidence, they would soon be convinced that even in these cross distributions he doth most equally and most effectually pu­nish the Wicked, and reward the Good, by rendring the ones Prosperity his Bane, and the others Adversity his Restorative. Some­times again they are denied those blessings and deliverances which they have a long while sought with most importunate cries and supplications, from whence they are ready to conclude that God is of a stern and inexorable nature, not to be moved or prevailed with by prayers and intreaties; whereas could they but see through the whole drift of his Providence, they would easily be satisfied that the goods they pray for are many times preg­nant with evils, and the evils they depre­cate with goods which are much greater [Page 503] than themselves, and that that is the rea­son why God was deaf to their intreaties, because he could not grant them what they asked without doing them some great unkindness, and that therefore these denials are so far from arguing him stern and in­exorable, that, on the contrary, they are signal instances of his tender mercy and compassion towards us. If therefore we would conceive aright of God, we must not take our measures of his Nature by particular Providences, which many times import quite contrary to what they seem and appear, but having formed our Noti­ons of his Nature out of those perfections we behold in his Creatures, by them we are to measure all his particular Provi­dences, which though they are sometimes very dark and obscure, and seemingly repug­nant to our common Notions of him, yet because we see not the ends and reasons of them, we ought to conclude them good, because they proceed from a good God.

V. ANOTHER main cause of our mis­apprehensions of God, is the taking up our Notions of him from dark, and obscure, and single passages, and not from the plain and general current of Scripture. There is no doubt but that whatsoever God hath [Page 304] revealed of himself in Scripture, is true, because truth and veracity, being a great perfection in it self, must needs be in­cluded in his nature which is the Center of all perfection; but yet since there are some things in Scripture hard to be under­stood in themselves, and other things diffi­cult to us, who are not throughly acquain­ted with the Customs and Controversies they refer to, or with the Phrase and Language of the Age they were written in, it is im­possible for us many times to comprehend its meaning by the mere clink and sound of its words, without expounding its obscure passages by its plain ones, and its particular propositions by its general cur­rent; and to found any Doctrine or Opi­nion upon obscure and particular Phrases, that seemingly contradicts the plain and general drift, and then to expound the plain into the seeming sense of the obscure, and the general current into the seeming sense of the particular Phrase, is a most egregious prevarication on the holy Scri­pture. And yet this unreasonable practice hath occasioned many false apprehensions of God in mens minds. For there is no­thing more evident than that all along through the general current of Scripture God is represented to us as a most bene­volent [Page 505] Being, that knows no bounds of good-will, but stretches out his arms unto all his Creation, and receives his whole Off-spring, excepting only those Prodigals that run away from him, with free and impartial imbraces; as one that would have all men to be saved, and to come to the know­ledge of the truth, and readily contributes to them all those aids and assistances that are necessary to the effecting of these blessed ends; that reprobates none from his kindness and favour but only such as despise and reject it, and never aban­dons any to wretchedness and misery till they have first baffled and defeated all his arts of saving them. Such is the represen­tation of God which the plain and general scope of Scripture gives us; so that had men kept themselves to this rule of ex­pounding obscure Texts by plain ones, and particular Phrases by the general scope, when they seemingly clash one with ano­ther, they had done right to God, and secured their own minds against sundry ve­ry wrongful apprehensions of him. For that God hath destined the greatest part of mankind to endless calamity, without any respect to their doings; that he hath two Wills, viz. a secret and a revealed one; that his revealed Will is that he would [Page 506] have all men to be saved, and his secret one, that he would have the greatest part of them perish; that he hath imposed a Law upon men which without his irresi­stible grace they cannot obey, and notwith­standing he hath decreed to withhold this grace from the greatest part of them, is resolved to persecute all that do not obey it with everlasting flames of vengeance; These, I say, are all of them such opinions as reflect very dishonourably upon God, and have no other foundation but a few, particular Phrases and obscure passages in Scripture, not only abundance of plain Texts, but the general drift and scope of it being of a quite contrary sense. So that had but this necessary Rule been observed, of interpreting dark passages by plain, and particular ones by the general scope, such dishonourable opinions of God could never have found shelter under Scripture Autho­rity. For I would fain know whether those Texts which declare God to be an universal lover of the Souls of men, be not far more numerous and plain, than those which seemingly restrain his affection to a small select number, and reprobate all the rest of mankind; and if it be so, as I think no modest man can deny, how can this Doctrine de deduced from Scripture [Page 507] without forcing the far greater num­ber of Texts to subscribe to the smal­ler, and the plainer to the obscurer, which is contrary to the most necessary Rules of Interpretation, and which, if pursued, will open a wide door to the grossest and most fulsome errours in Religion, Wherefore to secure our minds from false apprehensions of God, it is necessary that in consulting the Scripture concerning him, we should follow the plain and general drift of it, and not entertain any opinion of him upon the credit of a few, or of obscure Texts, which more or plainer ones seemingly contradict. For it is certain, that that opinion is either false, or of little moment, that hath but one or two Texts to countenance it, and that very dubious, which hath none but obscure Texts to relie on; but when there are more and much plainer against it than for it, it must be false, or there is no relying upon Scripture, the sense whereof, as to all particular opi­nions, must be supposed to be that which the most and plainest Texts do counte­nance. So that he who imbraces any opinion that hath more and plainer Texts against it than for it, imbraces it for its own sake, and not for the Scriptures.

[Page 508]VI. AND lastly, Another cause of our misapprehensions of God is the great dis­similitude and contrariety of our natures to his. For when men have nothing of God in them, nothing of those amiable graces which are the glory and lustre of his nature, it is impossible they should have any experience of him, any inward taste or relish of his perfections; so that they can only know him by the hearing of the Ear, by Books, and dry discourse and rea­soning, which compared with experimen­tal knowledge is very uncertain and de­fective. For between the notional and the experimental knowledg of God, there is the same difference as between the knowledge of a Geographer and a Travel­ler; the one hath only a faint and rude figure of foreign Countries in his head, copied from the Globe or Geographical des­criptions; whereas the other having tra­velled through them, and beheld their Situations, and Cities, and Rivers, and conversed with their People, and tasted their Fruits, retains a clear and lively Idea of them, of the exactness whereof he hath as firm a certainty as of the truth of his own senses. Thus he who knows God only by Books and Discourse, can have but a faint and imperfect Idea of him; he may believe [Page 509] him to be infinite in all kinds and degrees of perfection, in Goodness, and Mercy, and Justice, and Truth, and be able to demon­strate it upon dry principles of reason; but having no experience of these perfections in himself, no sense or relish of their beau­ty and excellency, his apprehensions of them are but slight and obscure, like a deaf mans notions of sounds, or a blind mans of colours, which for want of the evidence of sense cannot be so clear, and certain, and distinct as theirs are who see and hear. Whereas he who partakes of the perfecti­ons of God, and is in any degree pure as he is pure, and holy as he is holy, hath as it were travelled into his very Nature, and seen all his perfections by the light of an infallible experience; he knows what God is, not so much by reasoning and discourse, as by a quick and lively sense of the divine perfections, which he hath copied and transcribed into his own temper, and which, like the beams of the Sun, light up his thoughts to that Fountain of light from whence they were derived. And he who hath Gods Picture in his own breast, and can see his perfections in the Graces and Vertues of his own mind, knows him by his Sense as well as by his Reason; he sees and feels God in the Godlike temper of his [Page 510] own Soul, the Graces whereof are so many living Images of God, and sensible Com­ments on his nature, which render the mans Notions of him not only as clear and distinct, but also as certain and indubitable as any demonstration in Geometry. For there is no evidence will give us so full a certainty of things as that of our own senses; it was by sensible evidence that our Saviour demonstrated himself to be the Messias, and confuted the Infidelity of his Apostle St. Thomas; and it is certain that our bodily senses are not more infallible than is the purified sense of our minds. When therefore we are transformed into the likeness of God, and made partakers of his Nature, we shall have a vital sense and feeling of his perfections within us, by which the true Notions of him will be more confirmed and ascertained to us than by all the reasons and demonstrations in the World. For now we shall behold the beau­ties of Gods Nature in the God-like dispo­sitions of our own, and beholding his Face in the Glass of our natures, whensoever we reflect on it, his perfections will be as intimate and familiar to us as the Graces of our own minds; which will not only awaken our thoughts into frequent medi­tations of him, but also heighten and [Page 511] improve our Meditations into the most glorious Ideas of him. For, when all is done, there is no man can think so well of God as he who hath a Godlike nature, be­cause the resemblance he bears to him will not only frequently raise up his thoughts to God, but also shape them into a conformity with his nature; whereas whilst we are un­like to God, we are not only devoid of all that evidence of his perfections which the purified sense of our nature would give us, and consequently our Notions of him, for want of that evidence, will be only super­ficial and uncertain, but through our par­tiality to our own ungodlike dispositions we shall be apt to entertain such Notions of him as are as unlike him as our selves. For either out of fondness to our selves we shall look upon our ill dispositions as perfections, and so attribute them to God, or out of fondness to those ill dispositions we shall be tempted to admit such opini­ons of God as will license and indulge them.

WHEREFORE if we would secure our minds against all false apprehensions of God, we must above all things endea­vour to purifie our hearts from those evil dispositions which render us unlike him; from sensuality and injustice, from pride [Page 512] and discontent, from envy, hatred, and all uncharitableness, which are the great cor­rupters of our minds, the bosom Hereticks that seduce and pervert us, and, as much as in us lies, to conform our selves to the nature of God, by practising the contrary Vertues; and when once by imitating the perfections of his nature we have trans­cribed them into our own, we shall see and feel him in our selves, and our Sense of him will conduct our Reason, our Expe­rience of him wil correct our Knowledg, and our Vision of him consummate our Faith; and we shall be more enlightened in our knowledg of him by beholding his face in the sanctity of our own minds, than by a thousand Volumes of curious Specu­lations.

And now, having seen what the true causes of all our misapprehensions of God are, let us from henceforth beware of them, and, so far as in us lies, labour to avoid them; and considering of what vast ad­vantage to our Religion right and true Notions of God are, let us diligently apply our selves to the above-named Rules for the regulating our apprehensions concern­ing him; that so having throughly purged our thoughts of all erroneous opinions, we may see God truly as he is, arrayed in all [Page 513] the genuine perfections of his nature. And then we shall find our lives and affections under the Influence of the most powerful reasons in the World. For every thing of God is full of persuasion, all his perfections have a constraining Rhetorick in them that by a kind of Moral violence conquers all that attend to it, and seises and capti­vates their Wills in despight of all the reluctances of their natures. So that when once our minds are throughly instructed with the true Notions of God, we shall not need to seek abroad for Motives and Arguments, for we shall have a Fountain of divine Oratory within our own Bosoms, from whence our Wills and Affections will be continually watered with the most fruitful inducements to Piety and Vertue; insomuch that which way soever we turn our selves we shall see our selves surround­ed with such invincible reasons to trust in God and to fear him, to admire and love him, to obey and worship him, as will ani­mate our faculties, wing and inspire our drooping indeavours, and carry us on with unspeakable Chearfulness and Alacrity through all the weary stages of Religion; and we shall no longer look upon Religion as the burthen and oppression of our nature, but readily embrace it as our Ornament [Page 514] and Crown, our Glory and Happiness, as being fully convinced that in serving of God we serve not only the greatest, but the best Master in the World.

FINIS.

This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Text Creation Partnership. This Phase I text is available for reuse, according to the terms of Creative Commons 0 1.0 Universal. The text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission.