I know not by what fate or misfortune it comes to passe, whence the difficulty of perswading civill truth. that in the disquisition of a truth (though a simple uniforme thing) yet the contests about it, are usually infinite, and it is as difficult a thing to disincum­ber it feom errours, as it is a good field from weeds and brambles; which when the country man hath burnt to ashes, and thinks he hath quite destroyed, the next yeare to his astonishment he sees them return more numerous then before. Surely our unhappinesse in the E [...]a­dication [Page 2] of civill errours is, that we speake more to the affections then to the Iudgement, and therefore offer passion in stead of reason, or make one but the counterfeit of the other, or else not affecting one anothers persons, we fling headily into opposite paths or principles, in which not treading together at first, we cannot possibly meet together at last, and in this aberration we loose both truth and our selves.

Thus we finde it in these three severall answers to the first Treatise, in which (and the unhappilier, to give foundation to practicable errors) they at the very entry of the controversie mis­take principles, in jure publico, in the riginall of Magistracy and Government, in the nature of possession, prescription, right of extream necessity, of assertory & promissory Oaths, &c. things which were otherwaies stated and proved in that dis­course to which they have bin referred; I should not so disertly tell these tripartite answerers, that they do suponere quodlibet, ut Probetur quidlibet, were it not but that I see them so Majeste­rially peremptory to prescribe to others, and to necessitate us into action of the greatest prejudice that may be betwixt man & man; that I finde one of them give such a losse to his passion, that it carries him into direct Blasphemy, [...]irst Demur. advising that a Committee might treat with God, yea sentence the blessed Trinity. Lastly because all the world knows they give that obedience which to attaine publique desolation they will not allow toothers; where­fore as the subtilties of the vop [...]rs are so fine and delicate, that they passe upwards on every hand about us imperciptibly till at last we heare them over our heads formd into Thunder, Light­ning and Tempests, even so the fumes of these private mens Pas­sions passe so subtilly through their soft words, that if we who con­verse with them, be not maturely advisd of them, their insinua­tion will draw us into fire and flame, into blood and desolation, into the Calamities of a war, which perhaps may end as distant­ly from our and their now Covenant intentions as the two for­mer have already done.

The Question which was first asserted stands still un­shaken and almost untoucht, and in all th [...]se answers it is evidently granted, That we of the people may lawfully [Page 3] give obedience to an unlawfull power; Demur. p 6. case of Con. p. 3.7. [...] this onely is deni­ed, That it may be not with an acknowledgement of their authority and right, which is very uncasuistly and uncon­scientiously inserted here, because that is not the Peoples present case, but the Governours, these onely asserting that, contenting themselves with simple obedience from us.

The first Argument of the first Demurrer is formed a­gainst the incapacity of the persons governing, Pag. 2. and it runs thus:

Ob. That which is now termed a Parliament, is neither formal­ly, materially, nor effectually a Parliament, such as is requisite for this Kingdom, either according to the mind of God, or the neces­sities of the State. First, because the change which is made in it, is not made by those who first constituted it, unlesse it be by con­quest. The modern modell containes not the whole, nor the major part of the peoplee Secondly, the alteration is made by the Com­mons only, the Nobility as illustrior pars populi, appeared not in it.

Ans. Though this Argument (with the rest) relates more to the Commanders then to the obeyers, The end of Ma­gistracy, sub­sevient to the end of our be­ing. (of whom our controversie onely is) and that we of the People have a right to do lawfull things, though there were no Magi­strate lawfull or unlawful to oversee us, yet I shall not stop at these advantages, but oppose to the main of this Argu­ment, the main of our Creation and conservation. For we have nothing else to doe in the world, but to praise God and love our neighbour. The circumstance of the Magistrate is onely to be an encouragement of this, and to see that it be done with security: and if he doe this (whatever he be) we are beholding to him, and should praise God for him, and then why not obey him?

Though this were granted, That one Magistrate was unjustly ejected by another, and one government by another, yet that relates onely to those who co-operated in it whilst it was doing. How can such a supposed guilt in them, be in any part continued upon, and ascribed to [Page 4] us of the low ranke of the people? or now especially that we come into it after it is done, and after we are under the full possession of a present Power? People by the effects of it, sustaine punishment enough if they lose a good Magistracy, must they likewise be punisht because it is lost, though they were no con-cause of it?

The Authour of the Grand Case of Conscience, p. 10. infers Yes, and therefore makes our new commotions ne­cessary: because we can do nothing just in a State, where, (through the defect of a legal Magistracy) we can have no justice, yea though the things we do be in themselves just. For (quoth he) judgement is then onely just, when it is exercised by the higher Powers, the legall Magistracy of that Kingdome, where it is acted.

I answer, things are considerable, onely so far as they may reach the ends for which they are. All justice or just things re­late not essen­tially to the le­gall Magistrate. The end of every Magistrate is to see justice executed in case it be violated: Iusto enim non ponitur lex. The end of justice is to be a mea­sure of equity, that is, of equality. Justice or the proportion of equality is either comutative or distributive. But neither of these relate so essentially to the legall Magi­strate, that nothing may be done truly and conscienci­ously just, without he co-operate in it. As for commuta­tive equality, if Titius lend Sempronius ten bushels of such a quantity, which bushels have the publique mark upon them, and Sempronius pay him ten other every way of the same equality, Of commuta­tive justice Vid. p. 26.35. but that there wants the former mark, or that the said bushels have another mark, will you say Sempronius hath not intrinsically done Titius justice, or hath not justly satisfied him in his quantity? especially if in the mean time no more of that former marke can be had? As for distributive justice, we know that St. Paul ad­vised the Corinthians to avoyd the Iegall Magistracy and the judgement of the higher powers of that Countrey, 1 Cor. 6. of distributive justice. and rather to end things by arbitrement among them­selves, which had been an advice unjust, and to the scan­dall of Christianity, if things in themselves just might not [Page 5] be done but by the justice of the legall Magistrate. This therefore is but according to an old Axiome of justice, Provisio hominis tollit provisionem legis.

Thus much I have thought fit to answer in generall to this objection; This present Parliament is effectually a Parliament. but now more particularly I answer to its terms. And first, why is not this effectually a Parliament, seeing it is the Supream present power of the whole Na­tion, no part excluded? Vid p. 18. which in this controversie is the very term of the question. I hope he means no Criticisme by the word Parliament; if he doth, it signifies onely a publique speaking or consulting together for the Pub­lique. Moreover, the Authour would be (I am sure) much perplext, if I should aske him, how he knoweth so indubitably that this is not a Parliament or supreame Power requisite for this Kingdome, according to the mind of God? He must par­don us if we thinke formes no more then persons are to last here alwaies; or that the changes which have been, and still are to be of both, must never be done but accor­ding to the customary formalities of a quiet people, but rather according to the extreame necessity of a State. For if he aske me, what it is that forms in-organizd peo­ple into a Government, Necessity above formes of, Go­vernment. of what sort soever? I answer, Necessity. If, what makes or takes away a Law in a Go­vernment established? I answer, Necessity. If, what takes away a Government it selfe? I answer, according to him­selfe. page 2. that which first gave it being, viz. Necessity. Of which there are severall degrees; for in a peaceable State a word may take away that which in a disturbd State must be taken away by the Sword: after which it is but equall that he who gives the last blow, should in that quarrell give the last word, and leave us to a peremptory obedience, unlesse we would have no quarter in the world, or be like the old servati in bello, who were sold, confind to chains all their lives, or condemnd to dig perpetually in Mynes; All which it seems this Authour would have the conclusion of this argument, or else we are more be­holding to the charity of enemies, then to his. If we will [Page 6] not be perswaded by the States arguments, yet let us hear what Grotius, among others, determined long agoe, for all the world in this case. If a King have but part of a supream power (which consists in making and taking away Lawes, in laying universall Taxes) and the People or Senate have the other, the King may be forcibly opposed if he invade that part which is not his, because for so much he hath no right nor power. This is to hold, although such a King have the Militia alone; for that (in his hand) relates onely to forraigne warre, it being uncon­ceivable how they who share in supreame. Rights, can be exempt from a right of defending them. When war shall happen be­twixt such Fundamentall and Supreame parties, the King may loose all his share by the right of War. Lib. 1. c. 4. § 13. de Ju­bel. & pa.] Which Right of Warre betwixt those who divide a whole Kingdome, if it end clearly to the Redu­ction of one party, is not called so properly conquest as victory. The difference betwixt con­quest & victory This Authour uses the name of the first onely for the hatred every one bears to it, because it swallows the rights and persons of the whole; Whereas victory relates onely to a part of either, as beginning and ending in Civill Warres, where disputes of Right arise betwixt those of the same Jurisdiction and Country, and of the same Common Law.

But we have Arguments more Authentique then these, to shew that such changes may be according to the mind of God; and the Demurrer all his life will never prove the con­trary, Dan. 4.31, 32. Vid. p. 33. Gods power is an everlasting power, and his Kingdome is from heneracion to generation; All the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as nothing, and according to his will he worketh in the army of Heaven, and in the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, nor say unto him what dost thou? That is, God as Universall Lord, and King of Kings, governes both Angels, men, and Divels, and all must submit to him, because of his supreame irresistibility. Psalm. 75.7. God is the Iudge, he maketh low, and he maketh high. It must be confest that by him Princes raigne; but our Authour had [Page 7] rather perpetually imbroile our bodies and soules, then clearly say, by whom it is that Princes cease to reign. For then this Controversie would easily he reconc [...]l'd, and we as easily one to another.

Wee have shewn how the reason of Constituting, Object. and of changing Governments, is still one and the same, viz. Su­preame Necessity: But the Demurrer objects that our change hath not beene done by the same order of persons, who were in the old, viz. By major part of Lords, and ma­jor part of the Commons.

Although he is againe besides the state of the Que­stion, shewing onely how they who are the Supream Power of the Land, Answer. ought not to command us, rather then that we may not obey them in lawfull things; yet I shall here make another sort of reply, which will be very short to those who profess themselves Presbyterians, that is, originally Parliamentarians.

Kingdoms which are Supream in themselves, The State of Kingdoms as separated, and as mixt in themselves. and com­municate not in one anothers Lawes, are all of them Iu­re Gentium, in a state of War, unless they be mutually bound by Leagues to the contrary; which Leagues if they come to be broken, usually have the conditions of Invasion annexed, and the time and places nominated for beginning it; and because there is nothing any lon­ger due by Law, or League from the party injured, where now the Sword is onely to end the Controversie, there­fore what ever shall be acquired in this state of things from the party injuring, rightly changes all Titles in Iure publico, and in the right of governing what is ac­quired; but in one and the same Kingdome, where the Supremacie of Power and Right lies divided (as Grotius page 7. states it) there, Of the Ri [...]ht of War be­twixt Funda­mentall Par­ties. if they differ fundamentally, de­nying one anothers Rights and Powers, they are then immediately in the same state of War with those other separate Kingdoms; here onely is the difference, that these in their Concurrence and Constitution, making but one, have none of those ordinary Cautions, as Leagues [Page 8] have for their Right of invading one another by the way of war: a circumstance no more necessary betwixt them, then that in the marriage of two persons, a Lawyer should come after the Minister hath conjoyn'd them, and tell them in what cases they may again proceed to Di­vorce, and after their Divorce, what kinde of mar­riages they should make next. Even so war is suppos'd in that case, as well as Divorce in this; But because War begins there where Law ends, and reciprocally, and hath nothing but necessity for its equity, and that all the degrees of necessity cannot at first be foreseen, nor where security may at the end of all be presum'd off, therefore there neither is, nor ever was any fixt rule in any Coun­trey, what people should be bound to do at the end of a a VVar. I hope the Presbyterians neither of England, nor Scotland intend to deny what all the world knowes, that they concluded the King under the necessity of VVar, as well as others who conjoyned with them, and having stated his case there, they of the Kirke long agoe frank­ly declared, that he not satisfying for the blood of three Kingdoms, was not to touch the Scepter any more, but as Mr. Hinderson applyed in his Newcastle Conference the 4 th. of Hester 14. page 9. That if his Majesty reforme not according to their way, he and no lesse then his Fa­thes House were to perish: by which what could hee and they understand lesse, then change of Govern­ment? a thing, why now so horrid for the other party to think on, seeing they gave first intimation of it? They joyntly declared, that the King was not to judge any thing for himselfe, nor upon what tearms his readmit­tance to simple liberty could stand with their securi­ty; * for, his VVar when it ended (as they said who im­prisoned him) continued the same necessity upon them, which made them take Armes at the beginning. There­fore they themselves concluded, that nothing could be changed in the Kings concernment, according to the old forme and constitution of the Kingdom, which relates to a time of Peace, and not to a time of War.

[Page 9] But the Nobility whom he here stiles, illustrior pars populi, concurred not to this change; therefore it is formally and funda­mentally unlawfull.

In the first place, Of the House of Lords. I understand not, and I beleeve the Lords doe as little, what he meanes by putting them into such improper Latine. For they alwaies understand themselves to be rather of the two Comites Regis, then partem populi; and therefore as if they were an integrant part of the Kingdome, form'd to themselves a separated House, a Jurisdiction over the people, & lay as a Barre be­twixt the King and them; whether that power of their's had any congruity with the other supreame and Legisla­tive rights of the people or no, is not now the question, but rather this, Whether according to their mutuall engage­ments, their rights of a separated house were rightly lost to the House of Commons, or no?

This is by them affirmed, and the state of Venice as pro­found Platonists deny the other; for otherwise Noble men would be as difficulty reformed as Kings, and there­fore they rarely conferre illustrious Titles of Nobility on any but those who are in illustrious Offices, things separable from persons, by which meanes all Offices with them are questionable: But to return, that which according to themselves thus excluded the King, by the same Logicke excluded the Lords; and if they either directly or indi­rectly concurred to the ruine of the rest of the Kingdome, then the argument runs strong, that the House of Commons were bound to preserve it, and that the rest rightly owe their whole protection under God to them▪ But because I will suppose nothing here, the argument of matter of fact must judge one as well as the other.

Wherefore if any will aske whether there was not a Warre undertaken last yeare very eminently dangerous to the whole Parliament and their Party; the Army, and Country Committees, and that by the contrivance of the Royall Par­ty here, the Scots Nation in the North, Ormond in Ire­land, it will be past denying; Likewise whether the House of [Page 10] Lords in that extremity declared with the Commons that the Scots were Enemies to the Kingdome, or upon the first or second request gave their Concurrence for Counties to arme themselves for their defence; The [...]oyce of all parties must needs say no: So that, that House undertook to act a part as dangerous to the rest of the Par­liament, as they did, who were actually in Armes against their party every where. And how then should they expect to bestill necessary to them, and to their securities, who had put them into such apparent extremity and necessi­ties? As for the exclusion of some Members of the house of Commons, Of Secluded Members. I hope the sincere Presbyterians wonder not at that act, because the Kirk and State of Scotland was preserved by such an act last year, and by the con­courrence of the same meanes which did this here. Yea though they who from thence invaded our Nation, de­clared as much for the Covenant and Presbytery as the Kirke it selfe, save only that the Kirke had the good luck to speake the last word.

They who sit at top in the State are tanquam in nubibus, to the eyes of us of the People. Wee know not how they manage their Counsels, nor contrive their tran [...]actions, that is best determined by and amongst themselves. It is enough for us if they be of a number competent to act; and be persons who enter by vertue of free Election, and s [...]t in the legall place. For in a case where five are chosen to a businesses, and that any three of them are to be of the Qu [...]rum, though two of them be never so accidentally or violently detained, yet what the other three doe is to all intents and purposes valid, which is the present case. By this Gentlemans favour, The negative when preva­lent in equall partnarship. we have an Axiome of Law, which saith that in Partner-ship or Society (as the Civill Law calls it) when matter of extreme prejudice is agitated betwixt those who are of equall contribution either of Art or Mony, then Potior est conditio negantis: nothing ought in this case to be concluded against the nega­tives, though fewer in number, which was the Parliaments case when after the equall provocations [Page 11] of a Prince by Warre and imprisonment some of the same House thought he might have been securely readmitted into the Government again, and others thought it evi­dently dangerous. In this case the difference was as it were legall betwixt the Members, but not to be decided any way but by force, there being no other Tribunall to judge them, and their house might not judge of it, be­cause there they were parties and judges, a thing allowed no where; Whither the transactions of the legall num­ber of the house be invaled, when any members are forct away? and if otherwise, then the major part might legally vote the other out of the house at pleasure. But what was at last determined by any number above forty with the speaker in the legal place, seemes not out of form to us of the people; which was the case of the House of Lords when most of them & many of the Commons at the beginning of the first War, fled to the King under pretence of force from Westm. Yea when the five members were forc't from sitting, yet the rest of the House sat and acted without them, and voted a Committee, Ian. 5. To sit in London, and there to take into consideration the breach of Priviledges, the safety of the King and Kingdome, and preservation of Ireland, which was accordingly done by vertue of those Votes, made when Members were thus forct away. All our scruples therefore are concerning things to us practicably lawfull or unlawfull in themselves, Of the present consent of the Major part of the People.

As for the will of the Major part of the people, how will the Demurrer prove that they had not rather obey this present Power, then seeke to be rid of it by the hazards and calamities of another War.? They usually looke after nothing but their Rents, Markets, and rea­sonable subsistances, they are the luxurious and ambiti­ous part onely which pretends to new troubles. The peo­ples question thereof is not how the change was made, but an sit whether it be so changed or noe? For if according to its formality that be not rightly done; it concerneth not their consciences no more then the Thunder or light­ning over their heads doth, which are things totally out of their power, much lesse may they lawfully desolate Neighbours for them.

[Page 12] Ob. But he hath found one firme Axiome, That when part of any thing is cut off, the whole qua tale is destroyed quià dum cessat forma, cessat formatum; ergo the late force on the Parlia­ment hath made this no Parliament.

Answ.I wish he had taken the paines to give either a distincti­on or an instance in his Axiome, or have drawn up his inference into a Syllogisme; for I feare we shall finde wide impertinence in the first, and a grosse non sequitur, in the last as he hath ordered it. The question disputed here is not whither the denominated Parliament now sitting at Westminster be a Parliament according to the old forme and composure of Parliament or no, but whither tht Parliament now sitting at Westminster, be the supreame power of the Kingdome or no, and to be obeyed in lawfull things. His Ar­gument runs thus;

The surpeme power of the Kingdome consists in a Parliament of King, Lords and Commons.

But at Westminster there is not a Parliament consisting of King, Lords and Commons.

Ergo at Westminster, there is no true Parliament at all nam dum cessat forma, cessat formatum.

I thought he had been so good a Logician, as to have understood that the conclusion of his Syllogisme ought to have been contradictory to the question, from which it is as distant as if he would have concluded that two and three make five, which is very true, but how is it any thing to the purpose?

Whither the present power be the suprem?However I will doe him the favour to deny his Major—For we speake of powers which now are, and he himselfe hath all along condoled the e [...]ection of the King, and of house of Lords, as things which are not. Sed non entium nultae sunt affectiones; & so consequently they who are now nothing, make nothing now at Westminster, or any where else. But doth it follow however, that there can not be now any supream power at Westminster? at all If he had proved this, Whither it be a Parliament? he had proved something. But pe [...]aps the ve­ry word Parliament poses him, or else he would thereby [Page 13] impose on others. I must confesse words are dangerous, when they are not fully explained: and possibly the King mistook himselfe very much upon the very Alphabet and word of his Title, supposing he could not be named King, unlesse he were ab [...]olute, as he observed other Kings were; whereas by our constitution he was but one of three, who concurred to the making and abrogating a Law, and it belong'd to the Commons alone, to lay an uni­versall taxe; so that he was in most things rather Prince by office, then King by power, in tanto, non in toto. Even so the word Parliament, as it hath been popularly under­stood, signifies the assembly of severall houses, deliber­ating and concluding what was judged for the good of the publique.

But it is a contradiction to say a Parliament cannot at all be truly so called, unles so understood; we know there are eight Parliaments in France, which are not of such a constitution, though of the same Denomination. And if severall persons plenipotentiarily deputed to conclude for the publique good of the people, sit now at Westmin­ster, and that the other concurrent powers be civily dead; why may not we congruously enough still call them a Parliament? His axiome therefore serves onely against himselfe, and the true English of dum cessat form [...] cessat for­matum; is this, That seeing the old forme of this state, as it was in the supremacy of Kings Lords and Commons▪ hath in that relation ceased to be, and is civilly dead, not being able any longer to act any thing; and that a civill body as well a naturall, cannot live without a head one day; it followes then by this position, that the Regall Government is gone, and that we are in the state of a Re­publique; no other power now informing or actuating us, besides that which pretends to such a state; and where I pray you is that to be found now, but at Westmin­ster.

In the next place he offers a case, If the King, when hee came to accuse the five Members, Object. had detained all [Page 14] but forty and the Speaker; and had forc't them to Vote, that the whole Legislative power resided in himselfe; would we have deemed this a valid Vote? Especially seeing some Votes since this Session were adjudged Null, because the House was under a force. By which it seemes (quoth he) that with some new veritas non est perpetua; and Duo dum faciunt idem, non estidem.

Ans.To the first I answer positively, That such a Vote at­tained by the King, had beene no wayes duely valid.

The case of the Kings com­ming to the house of Com­mons not par­allel.But what is this to the purpose? For the question should have beene after the King had detained such a Vote, and had got us all into his full possession, whether we of the people might have obey'd him ever after in lawfull things.

Secondly, if he would have the people understand this case to be parallel, to the late exclusion of the Members, he prevaricates grosly againe; For he supposes the very forty in the House, with the King, to have been under a force; whereas in the Parliaments late case, none but those who were out of the House, were under restraint; the former were supposed to be forc't to a particular Vote, the latter were kept from Voting at all: Besides they who de facto Vo­ted in the House, have publiquely declared that they past their Votes, with all wonted freedome, and were rescued as it were from an overawing power, which concludes a­gainst his Argument abundantly. As in this Argument he hath done truth little service; so he hath (by his mistake) done Kingly Government lesse. For if Princes who have us in their full possession, may be obey'd in no lawful things, after they acquire an addition of some other powers un­lawfull; then he would dislove most of their Govern­ments, and have absolv'd us from Allegiance to King Charles long before this Parliament began; by which sort of arguing the Royallists I see will have no great prise this Gentleman.

But the Parliament hath already declared the Votes made under a force are null; This Vote I suppose he meanes past, [Page 15] after Boyes and apprentices of the Towne, The case of the apprentices entring and for­cing the house not parallel. had entred the House, and made the Speaker propound, and the Mem­bers Vote what they pleas'd. Here indeed there were forced Votes; But surely this proves not, that they who Voted, when the Members were last excluded, Voted in that manner. Besides the Parliament which knowes bet­ter then we of the people, what their owne disorders within their House are, are only fit to Vote, what Votes have beene forc't upon them, and they since that time have declared, they never transacted things with greater freedome and lesse overawing. From whence I easily see that his Axiomes will serve him nothing at all. For we ac­knowledge Veritatem esse perpetuam, The Parl. votes against force, still observed & are the same still. if we speake of naturall and Mathematicall truths, where there is no medium pro­portionis, to varie the thing; as, all number are even or odd; because there is no middle number, so all lines are either crooked or straight: But morall & civil things are alwaies in change, because humane actions are invested with such an infinity of circumstances and accidents; VVhy actions of Govern­ment must change. for which reason Duo dum faciunt idem non est idem; For no two men in the world can act the same thing in all the same cir­cumstances: Thus we heare that Omnis des [...]nitio in jure est periculosa; and summum jus aliquando sit summa miuria, which cannot be but in regard of those various accidents which perplex our actions, and make them like that famous flower the Marvell of Peru, which changes the colour of it's Leaves every day. His last axiome, That no man ought to take advantage of his owne wrongfull act or of ano­thers: is impertinent and no way beloning to us of the people. If he intends it to the present Governours, he had best to take heed againe, that he determine not against severall lines of our Kings: For the clearing of whose titles after usurpations, the Judges were ancienty sore put to it, How wrong hath been fit­ted for a title. [...] Bac. H. 7. to make this one Axiome for all. That the imposition of the Crowne takes away all de­fects, and stops in blood. And if this be true, then we and our forefathers for the most part, have live'd [...]nder no [Page 16] better Titles then Plenary possession, to which they submit­ted, either because they knew no better Titles, or could have none of better to command them, or because they were resolved they might lawfully submit in law­full things, which therefore as it now seemes, is not so much our present question as our present passion.

Two principall inconveniences hee findes in this pre­sent Government, and by the goodnesse of the fruit hee hopes hee may judge of the Tree. where I must againe ad­monish him, that the civill fruit of a Government is alike in all Governments, especially as to the Meum and Tuum of a people besides, if the tree and the fruits here were alike, then a good Axiome were spol'd; Malus homo potest esse bonus civis, & bonus magistratus, A man bad to him­selfe, may be a good Magistrate and a good Common­wealths man. His first inconvenience is,

Ob. That wee have now made the basis of the State, a quick-sand; and it stands like Nebuchadnezzars Image, upon a mixt footing, part iron, part clay.

I answer, that it stands not now on so mixt a footing as before; For the concurrence of King, Lords, and Com­mons, for the product of a supream act, was a mixture of things very heterogeneous, to enter into one and the same composition: By reason whereof, supremacy confin'd as it were on a Battable ground; and if we will believe Per­sidents, King sometimes gain'd upon the other two, some­times the Lords topt both, and now all is more united then ever in the sole sufferage of the people.

Object. Toleration is the next inconvenience, it being but e­quitable, That if wee thinke it lawfull to force people to submit to the Orders of the State, the same people be compel'd to adhere to an established confession of faith in Religion. For it is presum'd that Obedience is fully as due to God as to man.

I answer, the Christian Religion is not tolerated a­mongst us, it is enjoyn'd, as much as one man can passe it upon another; Of toleration. For, the finall penalty of neglecting it [Page 17] here is not to be required of us mutually in this life.

Secondly, The confessions of faith, which he would have men forc't too, are (as I conceive he meanes) but logicall deductions out of Scripture, Ergo not indubita­bly, true enough to be by force obtruded on mens faiths; It is not enough to say here, that they who compile them verily believe them true, and intend not to deceive, which is all that can be said. For then they doe no more but quote themselves, and we are taught that it is a Po­pish opinion to beleeve any company of men are infalli­ble, in what they purpose: wherefore the Magistrate can doe no more safely, then recommend not force, their notions and Logick on the people. But in a case of meum and tuum, or in a morall thing he may be more perempto­ry then in a divine, because those things are certainlyer knowne to us as men, then what is of divine revelation and inference.

He feares that by an obedience to an unlawfull power, Ob. he may assert its unlawfulnesse; and should our servants rise against us, and command us by threats to performe a lawfull Act, which is but transient we might yeild to avoid their force: But if they should affirme that the Government of the family were theirs by right, and that they intended to perpetuate it over us; we should thinke it a great sinne to betray that place and power wherein God hath naturally and morally placed us.

This indeed is a very fine subtilty to end in nothing: Ans. and I am sure what ever the basis of the State be, The magistrate in a state, not as a Father of a Family. the Basis of his Argument is put on a quick-sand. For if he intend truth thereby, he should have proved this maine thing; That the former Magistrate was our naturall parent, and that we all derive from him, as from a Genarcha, which being so evidently false, is as ill supposed. For in this confusion of Families in the world, in which the originall Families are lost; we owe no naturall duty to any, but to those from whose blood we derive.

Secondly, Though it were true, that the chiefe Magi­strate were our naturall Parent, yet it followes not, but [Page 18] there may be a case wherein he might be refrained from Government; the law supposes many, which is sufficient to oppose this Gentlemans single judgement; And if he be indeed a Presbyterian, he hath already concluded as much in the last Kings case, by concurring to invest his person with the accidents of Warre, in detayning him prisoner at Holmby, and Newcastle &c.

Thirdly, I understand not what he meanes by Gods placing a Magistrate morally over us. For God he is our Di­vine and supreame Magistrate; our Parent is our naturall and domestik Magistrate, and those who command the State wherein we are, are our civill publique subordinate Magistrates under God; and every particular man who is arrived to the maturity of reason, is, (if any such be) his owne morall or private Magistrate. For the principle of a humane or morall action, is a minde acting freely according to vertue, and those lawes which are written within us. But if by a morall Magistrate, he meanes such a one only, as is seated over us, and hath a care that we live conformably to vertue, and honesty in relation to others; then it followes, that whoever hath the capacity so to hold inspection over us, is a sufficient Magistrate; but that can onely be he under whose full possession we actually are. Moreover he is to know againe, that States cannot looke so strictly after vertue, as after publique quiet. For morall vertue is a private thing, and by rea­son of the free concurrence of the will, cannot be disco­vered certainely, but by those who are able to look with­in a man: VVhy states cannot looke so strictly after vertue, as after publique quiet But that which is ad alterum, and concernes rather wrong, then right, belongs to the Politicall Ma­gistrate, as a thing which cannot without confusion have redresse otherwayes. For the chiefe convenience of a State, is, that people might be kept from inconveni­ence, or incommoding one another; and that they may be conserv'd in a liberty to doe other good things ac­cording to Piety and honesty: So that he who doth things in themselves good, though under an unlawfull [Page 19] civill Magistrate, doth not by those acts assert any Ma­gistrates right; but his only who originally gave Law and Rules for those internall acts, and that is Gods right alone.

Lastly, whereas in this argument, he saith a Father of a family so abused should in his required submission, O [...]. sin, if he betrayed his place and power which God had naturally given him. I answer that there is a difference betwixt betray­ing a place so given, and loosing it by force (which in­deed is his first supposition) The one cannot be done without sin, because it is done voluntarily and totally by himselfe, but it is not our sin if we be forc't out of a place; to which we are compelled by a principle with­out us, and totally besides our power.

But there is a lawfuller power visible enough to religious eyes, Ob. though for the present in an Ecclipse, and suspended. It is not lawfull for a man to marry another woman whilst his owne wife is in a sound, or for a woman to marry another man, whilst her husband is in captivity or restraint, and willing to come to her if he might.

To this I answer; Ans. Of the Ecclips suspention and extinction of supream pow­ers. First, How knowes he certainely that the other power is onely in an ecclipse or suspen­ded? or if it be onely in an Ecclipse, doth it follow that we of the People might not doe lawfull Actions by the suppliment of other lights, whilst we cannot have that of the Sun? Must we all that while cease to be men for the absence of that which we cannot help? The Presybterian party would not have that understood so; when the King was in prison at Holmby. There be no more suns in the world but one, but there are many Magi­strates, and such who give better light one then the other, for which reason God first chose not Monarchy for the Jewes, certainly in an Ecclipse, the Sun is never out of his naturall Orbe, though his light and influence may be suspended and intercepted from us, but when a Prince is in a forraigne Country, and lives under the Lawes of another Magistracy, and that all Lawes and di stributi­ons [Page 20] of Justice and Magistracy in the Country he pretends to, are made without him and against him, will you according to the Lawes of Nature, Nations, or Policy, say he alone, and in that condition, is the supreame power or Authority of that Country, or rather that we of the People do nothing but sinne in his absence, though we do things in themselves lawfull? If you will aske how he came to be out of his Orbe or Country,? The union of people to a GoVernment not like a mar­riage. I am sure it was against the advice either of Presbyterian or Independent. It is easily granted, That a man may not mar­ry another woman, so soone as his wife falls into a swound. But you must againe be reminded that the nature of Mar­riage and of Government differ extreamly there, where you suppose them most to agree. For Marriage is not alwaies necessary to every particular man. But the pub­lique body of a people cannot be without Government one day, no more then a man can be without a Head, because a smalltime serves to the ruine of a man. Secondly, to take this or that woman to wife, is a thing of free choice; but it is not so alwaies with the Peo­ple in relation to Kings, who have many of them commit­ted great Rapes upon them, as I beleeve this Gentleman will acknowledge.

Obj. A Woman may not marry another Husband, whilst her first is in Captivity, and willing to come to her if he might.

Ans. A King of England, why not as a husband to the people of England. These cases of Marriage still makes a very bad paralell with our present case. For first, we have been taught by all parties in this Warre, that a King of England is not as a Husband to the People of England. For a Husband is he who alone makes and abrogates the Laws of his owne Family, as a right of his propriety, which a King of Eng­land could not doe alone in this state. Secondly, where was this Prince ever Crowned by which this Author meanes solemnly married to this state? where was the be­nedictio sacra, the anointing or the Oath of Contract ta­ken by him? I am sure the Covenant hath made no pro­vision for him.

[Page 21]To this purpose is that Argument in the grand case of Conscience, Ob. [viz.] The Apostle commands Wives to submit to their Husbands, surely quà Husbands, not quà men But sheuld a stranger come to anothers Wife and ca [...]l himselfe Husband (having before either imprisoned or slaine the right full Husband) and require submission, surely though shee might hee forced, yet it were a sinne to submit to him thus as a husband.

I answer, Answ. to submit in Adultery is a plaine sinne; but for a Woman to submit in lawfull things to the power of a stranger is no sinne, though he please to call himselfe her Husband, or exercise the Government of the Family. There is the same mistake of Husband here, as in the former, so that the Argument built thereupon, of it selfe fals to the ground. But if by this he meanes that in matter of supreame Command, we of the People may not obey any but the Husband or the King, Of taking away the Kings life. why then did the Presbyterian party for so many years oppose, and not totally submit to their now supposed Hus­band? Why did they Commissionate so many thousand Men, who by accidents of Warre had the power, though not the chance to kill him? Nay in the Par­liaments case it was alwaies conjoyntly argued by them, that it was he the Husband, that would have kil­led them the supposed Wife, for which reason the Kirke of Scotland long ago sent him a bill of Divorce, un­lesse he satisfied for the blood of three Kingdoms. Which of the two parties it was that at last killed him, belongs not much to the satisfaction of us the people, though here questioned because those parties as tot hat act differ'd no more (if he will further argue it) then dim n [...]tio and obtruncatio capitis doe, for they who after a long Warre, and by long imprisonment dispoyl'd him of that re­gall power (here so much argued for) did accord­ing to the terme of the civill Law, diminuere caput Regis, and they who in consequence of his civill Death, tooke away his naturall life, did obtrune are Caput Regis. If he had been kill'd in an action of Warre before, should the Soul­dier, [Page 22] or he who gave the Souldier commission have an­swered for his life? As for the submission of a Wife to a stranger as to her Husband, which is indeed a sin, I ear­nestly pray the Author seriously to consider, whether he can excuse us and all our forefathers from sin, ever since this Kingdome long agoe fell under the power of an u­surping king, if this his way of arguing be true?

As for the second Demurrer, I consider he hath gi­ven account to another very worthy Pen, which hath left little for my gleaning in such a field; however I shall see what hath escaped his hand, that the world may witnesse at last, that truth hath lovers, as well as errour and passion have Cham ions.

This Author and the grand case of Conscience begin with St. Paul Ro. 13. Ob. That wee must submit to higher powers, not that wee may lawfully submit, and that not for wrath onely, but for Conscience sake, which is of things necessary, not of things lawfull: Wherefore (say they) it is ill said that we may lawfully submit in lawfull things, obedience as a matter of Conscience being a thing necessary.

Ans. Of obedience for wrath, and for conscience sake. I grant it either in lawfull or necessary things, when obedience is required from those who actually have the whole Sepremacy of power in themselves. If I hold this lawfull, and he hold it necessary, we are not contra­ry; He onely makes what I allow more allowable. But the reason wherefore the Apostle requires obedience to such, Not onely for wrath (which is onely in regard of the power which they who are supreàme have to destroy us) but for Conscience sake is, Tyrants in ti­tles from whom. least by our re­sisting them we unnecessarily disturbe and draw cala­mity on others, and likewise in regard of their Au­thority from God, Tyrants even in title not arriving to the great Dominions of the Earth, without Gods secret order, God having clearly stated the Government of the world for ever in himselfe as his cheife Prerogative, he not being known or feared any way so much as by Do­minio n, [Page 23] which made St. Augus. in C. Dei. rightly say, Potestates omnes sunt a Deo, non omnes voluntates, so that the reason wherefore God permits sometimes such Princes to attaine to these powers, is the same wherefore he per­mits Devils in his Government of the world, a Nimrod, or a Pharaoh, a Caesar, or a Herod, an Antichrist or a Turke, who as bad, and as usurping as they are, and seeme to us in exercising so severe, though so secret a part of Gods Justice, yet fulfill severall prophecies, which shewes they come not to what they are, meerely by humane contri­vance by chance or accident.

The grand case of Conscience. P. 3. distinguisheth betwixt Authority or Power, and Rulers deputed to the exercise of that Authority. The first is by Gods positive Ordinance, the other bu [...] by his permission.

Here he grants enough as to our case, Of our lawfull submission to a Magistrate who rules by Gods permissive will which is of obe­dience, for if he can assure me that it is consonant to Gods permissive will that such persons be my Magistrates, I am well satisfied then, that Gods will is, I must be their Sub­ject, Gods free admission of one being the necessary ex­clusion of all the rest, so that subjection is not a thing now of my choice, but of my necessity.

But the Demurrer, P.3. would know what difference there is in popular obedience to lawfull powers, Ob. and unlawfull powers, if obedience be necessary to both.

I answer, Ans. Obedience ne­cessary to law­full and unlaw­full powers how different. If the powers here supposed by him agree e­qually in their supremacy, and absolutenesse, and dif­fer onely as one is got lawfully, the other unlawfully, then the difference of our obedience to either, is onely in the difference of things commanded, as they are ei­ther lawfull or unlawfull; neither can the Author (now arguing so much for a lawfull power) conscien­ciously tell us, that the lawfulnesse of the civill power commanding can make our obedience necessary to an unlawfull thing commanded; but rather that it makes that power then become to us in some manner unlaw­full, and worse to us of the People, then if we were un­der [Page 24] the absolute command of an unlawfull power which exacts nothing but lawfull things. The knot of this point lies here, Whither a civill circumstance (such as is the Magistrate either lawfull or unlawfull) can vitiate an Act of morall duty? I believe his distinction P.2. of a Government constituted or constituting, How we may have a right to take what ano­ther may not have aright to give. serves nothing for the discovery of a supreame lawfull power in it selfe. For I hold that whatever was once a sin may alwaies be called a sin, though with rooting or without rooting. Not but that God and we may make good use of other mens bad actions if they be such, for which reason poore beggers may in their extremities receive necessary Almes from those who came to their estates by wrong and oppression; the receipt whereof they do not justify the Title of such Estates, much lesse doe wee justifie the unlawfull Title of a supreame Magistrate, The difference betwixt privat Title and pub­lique. from whose care we re­ceive necessary protection. I say much lesse, because cases of Estates are juris privati and have Courts to judge of them, but the other is so much juris publici, that there is no mortall Court to judge of it, for which reason how will these Authors (what Governours soever they desire) evidently prove that they originally had lawfull Titles, or that they at first did not forcibly take the people to themselves, but that the people vo­luntarily resigned themselves to them which was not in Nimrods Case. Of possession. From whence this may be inferd to the satisfaction of the grand case of Conscience, p. 3. That, if he had that desired Governour, yet according to him­selfe he would not owne him long, because he were not sure to have in him a supreame power, such as the Apostle, Ro. 13. in his sence understands necessary for the Kingdome of England. But in our sence of plenary possession, which was the case of the Apostles time, we can easily see first, how our present power is the higher (the whole Kingdome now receiving all law protection and subordinate Magistracy, from them) and how they may be in lawfull things obeyed according to the [Page 25] same Apostle; and to the duty of our Creation and be­ing in this world.

The case of conscience p. 3. acknowledgeth that a Government may be altered; Object. but it must be done still by the higher powers, whom we ought equally to obey in submitting to an altered, as to a continued for me▪ But it is a sinne if a party forcibly lay the higher powers low, and exact obedience as to the legall au­thority.

I thought that he who in his sence understood the Co­venant in terminis Eternall, Answer. would not have allowed a change of Government here; no more then he might al­low the Scots (though upon never so much reason to themselves) to change their Doctrine or discipline; be­cause we swore during all our lives, to preserve that which was established among them, at the time of our swearing. But I now see we may well distinguish be­twixt the Covenant it selfe, and some Covenanters, the Covenant being as open for one change, as for the other.

Secondly, Of supream powers altering themselves by joynt concur­rence. If a Government though never so reason­ably reformed or altered, be never in any lawfull things to be obeyed, (termes which he did ill to leave out of his Argument) unlesse by the concurrence of all the higher powers; then farewell all the old consequences of Solis populi suprema lex, and the Presbyterians form [...]. Armes are unjustifiable. How corrupt and Tyrannicall are most of the Governments of the world, and yet how ma­ny of those supreame powers hath he observed to reforme themselves? or diminish any thing in themselves, to al­ter for the better? although the taking away of some­thing in a Government, may be as necessary, as continu­ing any old or new thing in it. Certainly these Authors have read but few of Ionases, who voluntarily renounce themselves to settle a Tempest.

Thirdly, How seperatly Our Alteration was made by the present su­preame power of the people: and the reason wherefore both Houses laid the exercise of Regall power aside for [Page 26] some yeares, made the Commons as they have agrued it, lay it aside for altogether. viz. Salus populi suprema lex; The laying of it aside for some yeares is argument enough to us of the people; that it might be laid aside for more yeares, and that one King might be laid aside as well as another. For to us it seemes effectually all one, Non esse & non operari, for a thing not to be at all, and in this world to doe nothing at all. If they sinned who did this, is that any thing to any but themselves? It is an Axiome of good Law Noxa sequitur caput. Thus whilst his Argu­ment should have been against our lawfull obedience, it is against their exacting it, as to the legall authority, which yet is grosly false; for they exact it not as to the old legall authority, but as to the present supreame power of the people, Non nomine Regis, sed nominepopuli: And yet in one good sence it may be still called the same legall Au­thority, because we have still under it the same lawes for our properties as before, and continued in life by them, as our lives themselves are.

Ob. Case of Cons. p. 3. it is objected that this principle of obey­ing those onely who are in plenary possession of all supreame power, is fit onely to destroy States: for then should none Governe any longer then their swords and strengths could beare them up.

Ans.I conceive (according to what is already proved) that nothing can befound, either more consonant to Christian charity, or to the preservation of States, then this our principle of obedience; besides he knowes no Kingdome in the world, Demur p. 8. where people doe not obey upon this same plenary possession; Allegiance alwayes relating to pro­tection. And if according to his consequence, Of non obedi­ence. we should suspend all obedience till we have infallibly found out that Per [...]on who derives a knowne and an undubitable right from him who was the first in compact (because according to these Authors intermediate intrusions, are violations of rights, and may not be obeyed even in things lawfull) then I pray you of what can we resolve lesse, then certainly to extirpate one another? which [Page 27] will come to passe ere we finde what we search for in such a blind scuffle; and for feare of doing a lawfull thing under the inspection of one, who is suppos'd to have done another thing unlawfully, must we resolve of do­ing all unlawfull things by warre our selves, and desert unnecessarily, the cares of Wife and Children, of Church and Neighbour? For non-obedience in a State is but a Chimaera, neutrality, a State without relation; there is no subsistence for it in any State, and unlesse you will al­low me to concurre with others, and under others in lawfull things, I must leave the world; my subsistence being onely in a conjunction with others here in this jurisdiction.

The two Demurrers p. 3. &p. 7. Ob. Except against this our pre­sent obedience, beeause the present powers is yet new: neither is there a totall cessation of all hopes of recovery.

Philosophers hold that the Definition of a man belongs to an infant, Ans. as well as to one of many yeares. Because after the Organization of the parts, What time makes a form'd Government. he is informed with the same principle of life and reason, as a growne man is; and having the same forme, is the same thing. Even so the present power hath possest all the parts of this Kingdome gives them life in the administration of publique justice and protection, which are the soule of a State, and the power which preceded this, what did it infuse more vitall then this? And now that that is taken away, if this other did not presently enter into its place; the Com­mon-wealth were dead, and each man were left in his naturals, to subsist of himselfe, and to cast how hee could in such a state of warre, defend himselfe from all the rest of the world, every man in this State having an equall right to every thing.

Wherefore let every man, especially, they who would informe consciences, take heed of affecting popular re­venge, vvhich must also reach themselves at last: for vvhen they have once frighted people from lawfull act­ions, vvhat can they th [...]n commit but the un'avvfull? [Page 28] Into what an unhappy transport are we fallen, that such a principle should be derived from our Church, the ve­ry Papists being ever ready to obey in things lawfull, though the State seemed to them unlawfull. These will judge better of the State now then of the Church, the one inviting and incouraging us to lawfull things, the other deterring us from them. But to return to the Ar­gument; I have already shewed, that new or old powers, never can signifie good or bad powers. The uncertaine hopes of recovering in the future, proves that the thing is certainly lost for the present, and it is our obedience at this time which this Q [...]estion relates to However the King of Portugals acquisition, or Usurpation was pre­sently acknowledged by our King and others, although the King of Spaine then had and still hath great hopes of recovering it, he being alwaies Hannibal ad portas, and never removing out of his own Dominion into another Forreigne Magistracy.

Obj. The first Demurrer p. 7. conc [...]ives our present condition like that of Israel, betwixt David and Absalom, at which time (quoth he) the people had grievously sinned, had they ren­drd obedience to Absaloms commands and substitutes, so long as David was living. Ans.

Our condition different from Israels betwixt David and Ab­salom.This is very true, but farre from the purpose. For Absalom was not a fundamentall legislative party in the state of Israel, as the House of Commons lately was, and so could not pretend such a right of Warre. Secondly David had his Army hard by in the same Kingdome with Absalom. We have none here but the Parliaments, all the Kings forces and adherents being dissipated. Thirdly the Israelites scruples are supposed during the time of Warre in Israel, our after the War is ended. But if he mean by this fallacious paralell, that the Israelites ought not to have opposed David at all in the way of Warre, then how will he salue the scruples of his own breast, who promo­ted the course of War as well as others against the King?

The Author of the grand case of Conscience is very in­genuous [Page 29] in his contest with his adversary to forme a Syllogisme with foure terms, and their be able to finde them out, and to answer the fallacy: so that whilst he wrastles thus stoutly with himself, he can have but a faire fall in his own shaddow, to prevent which I shall take the pains to part them both. His Syllogisme (as he imputes it to his Adversary) is p. 4.5.

If the people of the Roman Empire did submit to the power of Claudius and Nero, who by force were put upon them, then the people of England may lawfully submit to a change of Government though beleeved unlawfull.

But they did submit. Ergo those of England may.

Here he excepts against the equality of inference made betwixt those whose persons were without due Title forc't upon people, but still in the same Government; and those persons who without right of Title force themselves upon, us now in another Government,

But what if the Syllogisme be indeed and vertually onely this?

If the people of the Roman Empire were required by the Apo­stle to continue obedience to Claudius and Nero, then the peo­ple of England may lawfully continue obedience to their present Governours.

But those might, Ergo these may.

His distinction of persons intruding wrongfully into the same Government, Obedience to false Gover­nours in the right or wrong Government varies not the sin of obedi­ence. and into a different Government according to his former position satisfies not conscience in either, because both are supposed unlawfull and differ only secundum m [...]jus & minus quae non var [...]ant speciem so that if obedience were not a sin in one, it is not a sin in the other. If he say, obedience to intruders into the same Government is not a sin, then he hath dispatcht all con­troversie concerning the exclusion of the Kings Line, and that the Parliamens fault as to him was that they rather changed the Government then the Governours, which he acknowledgeth more plainly P. 5. where speaking con­cerning the persons comming to power, he saith it is not [Page 30] materiall who puts them in, nor what men are put into powers ordained by God. Wherein Cae­sars case & the Parl. disagree But to come nearer to the point, he cannot say that of the usurping Caesars, which may be said of the Parliament. For these are the repre­senters of the people of England, and were lawfully a third part of the supreame power before the change of Government. Caesar had no part of supreame right, but what he rather usurped then acquired by any dicision of right, or fundamentall legislative controversie betwixt the Senate and him. To say as the Demurrer, p. 4. That Caesar had gotten the consent of the Senate, and added compact to his conquest, is absurd, unlesse he meanes he had gotten the Senate so into his power, that he had them in a condition of Quarter; Wherein Ce­sars case & the Parl. agree, as to justifie our obedience. in which case as the Law saith principum rogamina sunt mandata, without doubt if the peoples submission to Caesar were lawfull upon his changing a Republique into a monarchy, after the Senate had for bad the approach of his Army, and that he had expelled many members from the Senate, why may not a lawfuller obedience be given to those of a Senate it self, who have changed Monarchy into a Republique? These two changes are so farre alike, that they frustrate this Authors distinction of persons intruding unlawfully into the same, and into a different Government.

Obj. He followes his objection still, p. 5. arguing that though peo­ple did de facto, obey such false possessors, and Vsurpers, yet that proves not the lawfulnesse of our obedience, nam a facto ad jus non valet consequentia; their submission should have been proued legall.

Ans.If he hath a quarrell to us for our peaceablenesse, yet why should he quarrell with St. Paul?

He bad the Romans submit in the same kinde; and unlesse we had Prophets on purpose to tell Governours, as well as us of the People, who must alwaies succeed ac­cording to the minde of God, then the state of the world, the nature of politick justic [...] of society and Religion is such that we may & ought to submit in obedience to those who plenarily possesse, protect and command us lawfull [Page 31] things. Surely he did not consider his Axiome well, For a facto ad jus valet consequentia, from fact wee inferre many civill rights, as custome and prescripti­on, &c.

Neither is it necessary to prove their submission legall, is it be prov'd absolutely necessary and equitable.

And yet we conceive another case (besides that be­fore mentioned) wherein this submission to a new power may be call'd legall. In what sen [...] the present submission [...] legall. For the end of all law and Government is to preserve our persons and estates; and they who are in supremacy of power, have power to preserve or destroy both if they please; and therefore have as great a power over our lawes, which are lesse, then our lives. So soone as one supreame power is expelled by another, law, life, and estate fall all into the hands of the succeeding power; and what it doth not actually take away, stands in effect as deriving from it; and if that supreame power make a sanction for our obedience to it (as alwaies is immediately done) then we may say our submission is legall, or else the su­preame power cannot make a law.

To that argument where we assert, that the Authority which excluds all other Authorities must be obey'd, or else all authority falls to the ground; The grand case of Cons. answers obliquely still, That notwithstaning, such authority can never illegally get the legall p [...]wer; nor can it exclude others from their authority. In which answer he plainely contradicts himself, p. 7. For Caesars power was (ac­cording to himselfe) legall, and yet got by a Circum­stance very illegall; the Senate being empty, and inti­midated, and not so much in their own, as in his power.

This argument is so farre from concerning us, Of the [...] evidence of [...] ri [...]ts, to as to satisfie con [...] ­e [...]ce for acti­ons of w [...]r u [...] on them. that it is directed onely against those Princes who ab origin, drive from illegall acquisitions. Of which he will doe well to speake largelyer, when he can assure my consci­ence by infallible evidence of right, that I may safely sweare or destroy men upon it, that there was ever such [Page 32] a man in England as William the Conquerour, or any other ancient King, from whom Titles are said to be de­rived, either legally or illegally: This is a proposition, which I beleeve he in the midst of his peremptorines was not aware off, no more then I now doubt in whose hands the present possession of the Kingdom; is for which reason they assert their Authority, and it is his part to shew how infallibly it appeares to be anothers by indu­bitable right ab origine. But because it is argued that in the disquisition of a right Title, none are so blind as the people (who among other burthens have the impositi­on of other mens judgements cast upon them) therefore an usurped Title to them is true enough to exact obe­dience.

Ob.Hence the grand case of Cons. answers, p. 10. That then by the rule of contraries it followes, That when titles are visibly unlawfull, people are disengaged from obedience to them.

To this I reply, that this answer is nothing but a meere repetition of the question, Ans. and hath no medium of proofe annexed to it; the very question being this con­clusion, viz. Whether obedience be lawfull to Titles visibly unlawfull?

Secondly, It hath been shown, that non-obedience and subsistence in a state are incompatible; every man in a state stands in a Relation, and must either command or obey; and owes something to him, by whose care he [...] sleepes quietly in his Bed.

Thirdly, If by disengagement from obeying a law­full Title, he meanes that we may choose whither we will obey or no, then though disengag'd, wee ma [...] obey.

These answers helpe us halfe way over the next di­ficulty.

Object. Demn. p. 5. We may not any way affirme the right of the Vsurper, or de­ny interpretatively the just title of the Heire, without the guilt of treachery, lying and falsenesse, if not of vow-breaking, In suf­fering a Theife to take my purse, I cannot helpe it; If I must [Page 33] part with that or my life, I chuse to loose my Purse; not for feare least I breake the fifth or eight Commandement, but least I breake the sixt, in being guilty of selfe murther; yet rather then say he hath authority to take it, I must loose my life. In point of protection among theeves, I may desire some to preserve mee from others, yet may I not say their robbery is just, or joyne or ply with them in robbing others.

To say no more of the certaine evidence, Ans. Obedience some times as­serts not a Ti­tle but power. and of the indubitablenesse of ancient originall Titles (which is here the maine of the Argument) I answer that simple obedience to an establisht Vsurper, doth not alwaies in­terpretatively affirme his right, or deny anothers, but af­firmes rather the irresistibility of the possessors present power. God is the supream magistrate of al the world, and by reason of his Omnipotent presence every where, we cannot exclude him from the cognizance of, or right to any of our Actions; but our earthly Magistrates may fall into such circumstances, that they may have neither per­sonall or virtuall presence with us, and therefore may be said to be civilly dead, according to the former Axiome, Idem est non esse & non operari, to doe nothing and be no­thing is to us the same thing, motion being the chiefe evidence of life.

In his case of the Thiefe, I desire any man to consider whether (as he hath put it) he hath not clearely bro­ken one Commandement, besides those which he hath named, viz. the third, because it is an untruth to say the Parliament requires not obedience from any of us, unlesse we all acknowledge the lawfulnesse of their au­thority, which is the second false supposition here.

When Officers gather Taxes for the State, they have no commission to demand our Declarations of the States authority first, but onely to receive the money Taxed, which this Author knowes is a truth knowne to every one. They who obey a wrong authority r [...]bbe not the ri [...]h [...]. As for the peoples conjoyning and complying wi [...]h the State to Robbe another, by obeying to the prejudice of another; he must meane it in a Robbery either of [Page 34] power, or of Riches. For power, the people aime not at it, their condition alwaies is l [...]rge who ever sits at top. And for getting by the warre, I hope the Presbyte­rian party which had the authorizing of Taxes, as well as others, knowes as well as the people themselves, that this is a grosse prevarication. Last of all there is differ­ence betwixt willing compliance, and necessary subjecti­ion, which is the peoples case.

Obj. He objects againe p. 6. If obedience be necessary then a title once wrong'd can never be lawfully righted, it will be sinne to helpe the weaker party, or to rescue our selves from perpetuall slavery.

Ans.Here he is started suddainly into two other questions. First, how a Title may be recovered? and secondly, How we of the people may rescue our selves from the slavery of any Titles? These two relate to the future, which is of Gods secret disposing; our question is of the present only.

Of the recove­ry of dubious Rights, and the benefit which people get by most warres.But I pray you what doe people get when warres for recoveries of dubious rights are long and calamitous? What are the people of France or the people of Spaine better for the long and hereditary anger of their two Kings? Or what was the world better for Alexanders Conquering it? The Houses which are burnt, and the millions of bodies left dead in the field, are the peo­ples; and Princes scorning to derive from them, still trample them to dung. We talke of some Titles wrong­ed, as if their rights were so certaine, and so necessary to live under, as God almighties is, who yet disposes of the changes which are made here among his chiefe Officers, and not we; Who is it then that can right wronged Ti­tles, but he alone who makes all Titles right?

To that case where it is argued, that if the Masters mate had throwne him over-board, and by power would suffer no other to guide the Ship but himselfe, Obj. if the mariners will not obey him commanding aright for the safe guiding of the Ship, the Ship must needs perish and themselves with it; It is answered by the Grand Case of Cons. p. 9 That the case should not have [Page 35] been of a Mate as a partner (which is false) but of a party of the Seamen, who coming to shore should bring the other obeying party to punishment, especially for acknowledging the Vsurping Stearesmans right, which is still falsely suppos'd in our case.

Here I desire this Casuist to pull off his maske and speake plainly, Answer. The case of the Master of th [...] Ship thrown over board. whether he doth not plead for his owne punishment, as one who at the beginning of our warre principally incouraged us not to be guided by the then pretending Stearesman, whom they of his party said aside, and stear'd a while themselves; the Scots declaring that he was not fit to touch the helme againe, till hee had sa­tisfied, &c.

Besides, this is true, that they then required obedience from compounding Royalists, although to them they seemed an unlawfull power and Magistracy, as to the dispencing of publique and private justice.

Secondly, the reason wherefore these marriners might not acknowledge him the right master, (as he hath vari­ed the case) is rather because this is in an inferiour thing de jure privato, Master and Marriners being accountants to the Merchants who have a Court of Justice to judge the fact; but what Court is there in this world to call that power, which here is the supreamest to any ac­count?

Thirdly, he supposes the usurper and the complyers to be brought to account by the others, but not till they come to shore; whereas in our case we can do nothing but in the ship, that is in the common-wealth, when we leave that, we go into another world, our true patria where in­deed we doe not call one another, but are all called to­gether to an account by our supreame Magistrate, whose sentence we would faine prejudge here by a confusion of the ship in via.

The grand case of Conscience, p. 9. Adviseth that seeing we are so unsetled, Ob. we should use meanes for a settlement, though by its procurement wee were more unsetled: If a man be at the rivers brinke he would advise him to keepe out of the water, but [Page 36] if at once he leap into the middle of the river, he would per­swade him to come to the bank, although he wade through much water to come thither.

Answ.I see according to this horrid tenent, that if God (as the Scotch phrase hath it) comes not to the whole length of our desire, Whether we be actually in the unsettle­ment & deepes which he sup­poses? then there must be no peace betwixt man and man in this world. Mr. Ste. Marshall preacht late­ly, that God was to be thankt for some thing, that Church doores were yet open to those who had a zeale, and a will to congregate, that they were not under their enemies swords, nor compounding with them; Hee saw how they might be worse if God should through their peevishnesse let them see forraigne armies at their doores, who have both faces tongues, religions & affections diffe­rent from ours; and wil not care for firing our houses and Churches, or for giving us lawes againe in an unknown tongue, and perhaps Religion too. Can he think the No­tion of our Church government would be a charme to such swords and consciences? Or rather can he assure us of his prophecy here, that if we begin new troubles, we shall certainly have victory? For his argument sup­poses it must needs end so, and that by his perswasion we shall wade to the bank. If we were indeed in the midst of the water (that is in the midst of warre and confusion) then being engaged for life, we might endeavour to wade through, though the streame were running deepe with our own and Childrens innocent bloods, for after all Metaphors, that is the element which he means. Thus in no diseases but those which are supposeddeadly, may we use desperate remedies, such as may endanger the destruction of the whole body; When the whole body may be hazar­ded for a dispe­rate remedy & when not. But may a man in­danger his whole body, when it is not for the cure of himselfe but of another, and by the killing also of others besides himselfe, wife and children? I will not name what sort of subtilty this Gentleman hath used in this Argument, nor def [...]ne with what conscience here he seekes to satisfie anothers; For, lest we of the People [Page 37] should bogle at comming on the Stage to Act our late Tragedy over againe, hee would impose it on our be­leifes, that we are still in the middle act of it and that we ought to finish it. It is high time for him to consider whither if we run along with him in this we should not shut up compassion from our Brethren, 1 Joh. 3.17. and shut out a great part of our gratitude towards God; although I confesse some scars and haltings may remaine yet, after the warre it selfe is ended. Methinks he should finde every thing both in Nature and Christianity more favourable for our present Peace, then for our third Warre, espe­cially seeing all our former warres have ended very con­trary to the expectation of those who were hottest to be­gin them. But I consider that passion is the last hold out of which we are beaten, of which the fuller men are, the lesse do they (through a great judgement on their spi­rits) perceive into what deformities they doe trans­port them, it being the nature of all intoxications that their defects are better perceivd by any, then by those who are opprest by them.

BY these steps we are come at last ad sacras columnas, to those sacred Pillars on which the holy Covenant hangs almost in every Church, as a sanctum aeternitati a law sa­cred to eternity. The hands which hung it there, have not (they say) power to take it downe a­gaine. Who therefore may undertake to tell these persons, that they actually are or else may be freed from it, seeing they finde themselves obliged if they can, to tie all the world with them in the same sort of knot?

Here is certainly a zeal [...] worthy to be [...]ixt on that, [Page 39] which should obliege alwayes; and the world must con­fesse that there hath been no publique oath taken by any person anywhere; who have been more scrupulously attent not to double with their God in relation to his part in contract. But yet let not these consciences be scandalized if I say it was compild by none but mortall men, taken onely by such, and as a promissory oath cannot possibly be free from those exceptions, and acci­dents wherewith time changes the constitution of all those things, which it doth not absolutely destroy, wherfore upon a sober review of al I doubt not, but as many Oaths and Leagues are transient, we are still obliged to many things of the Covenant but not qua league or Covenant. so to shew that this according to its nature, and as it is originally a League or Covenant, that is, as it is a formall compact, relating to the publique and united corporation of severall Nati­ons and Magistracies (by which each people were united together, and without which neither people were re­spectively to act any thing separately within and against themselves) I say I doubt not but to shew that such a Covenant, uppon what hath interven'd is expir'd to us the People of England, and that without any default of ours; And though our Magistrate would give it a new life and obligation; yet to many principall things it can obliege no longer; and for the next we are to consider that though something of our first end in reformation streame through the Covenant; yet its spring head ri­ses higher then it; which end we are in all formes to pursue still, & are now left ty'd to so much of the Covenant onely as we were oblieged to for all our dayes withall our mights and soules, before we took it at all. Lastly, if it were granted, that the Covenant is not expired, yet I shall here shew, that our submission to this present go­vernment is no way inconsistent with it.

In which few words, though I have stated the maine of its difficulties, yet ere I apply my selfe to answer objections, I shall briefly premise what I have observed others have omitted, it being hard to finde how we may be unti'd [Page] [...] [Page] [...] [Page 40] from a thing, till we have found how the knot at first was made.

Of promissory [...]nd assertory Oathes.Whatsoever we can say, affirme or deny, is either as­sertory or promissory The first relates to the time past or present ( is if I affirme Titius to be, or have been at Rome) and therefore upon the very saying or swearing, the whole truth and obligation is fulfilled, and past with the time which accompanied it. VVhither a promissory Oath, which alwaies involves a Ta­cite condition, be lawfull. The other relates to the time present, as it is then sincerely said or sworne; and to the future for the sincere fulfilling them, which yet is dubious, conditionall, and not in our powers; As when Titius promiseth Sempronius 100.l. when his ship returnes.

Ob. For this reason some say all promissory Oathes ase absoutely unlawfull, because Oathes must be true and certaine; but all future effects of things are uncertaine.

Ans.I answer, that for so much as concerns the forme of my Oath here, it is true and certaine, that my minde and words went truly together in the act of swearing, and that I will make my deed and words goe truly together, when the sup­pos'd condition betwixt us (and which, as we mutually consent to, is in neither of our powers at present) shall ab­solutely come to passe. This was the case of Abrams ser­vant, when he swore to take a wife for Isaac; a future (in severall circumstances) very uncertaine, Gen. 24.2.34. both in respect of what might happen to the servant, to Isaac and to the Virgin we know what hapne'd to Iob's Children and Family through the accident of warre, and the ma­lice of the Devill; and how Ioseph was shuffled away by his owne friends and kindred.

It is not enough to say, such suppos'd tacite conditions cannot be in Oathes; Of tacite con­ditions in Oathes concer­ning things possible. For first, If such conditions be in promises, and that I may lawfully make a promise to a­nother, then I may lawfully sweare a promissory Oath to him, which we see cannot be separated from such con­ditions as are not, cannot, and need not be exprest be­twixt us at the beginning. For (to take away the sup­position of fraud betwixt us) we both agree in this that [Page 41] we cannot foresee with what circumstances our futures may be perplext. Therefore it is sufficient that we swore things not necessary, but possible; such as might happen or not happen, because depending on things which depend not totally on us, nor on our will, but rather mixtly on the wills of others, and on that which to us is change or fortune, For which reason he is not forsworne, who ef­fects not alwaies what he by Oath promiseth, no more then he sinnes, who alwaies effects not his simple pro­mise.

Secondly, This tacite condition in a promissory Oath, and in things naturally and morally possible, is proved by the very nature and definition of the Oath. For it is onely an attestation, and imprecation of God in such manner, that if the promiser faile, he would have him to whom he promist, under­stand, that be puts himselfe under Gods severe wrath.

From hence it is to be noted, The obligation of a pact, or promise with an Oath, or without an Oath, is all one that the bare promise obliged as strictly before he swore, as after he swore; and of the reason is, because he was obliged by nothing, but by that which was in Pact. The investing it with an Oath, or with Gods punishment, relates onely to the Penalty: so that a promissory Oath signifies no more, then such a penalty upon such a promise: But a penalty (as we know) in law and equity relates onely to that which is un­lawfull, such as is the violation of a Pact.

The addition of never so many penalties, to a thing in it selfe unlawfull, can never fasten any obligation on me to doe it; Nor can severall Penalties to an obligati­on in it selfe lawfull, adde anything to the first Ius or right of it, but onely to my future feare, least I doe in­justice.

The Capitall question therefore in these cases will be. What the nature of the things are to which we obliged our selves at first? For according as they stand or fall, our relations or obligations, to them stand or fall whi­ther we will or no.

Thirdly, We finde such tacite conditions, conceal'd, [Page 42] and suppos'd in the Oathes of Solomon to Bathsheb [...]; 1 K [...]ngs 2 20. 21.22. 1 Sam. 25.22 Jo. [...].10. Gen. 24.2.3.4 of David, concerning Nabals house; of God concerning the destruction of Ninevah, and of Abrams servant concerning Isaacs wife, &c.

By a reflection on all this, viz. That seeing there may be a promise, and consequently a promissory Oath; and that the nature and obligation of a promise, and of such an Oath, is one and the same, we have gain'd a great point, That the Covenant (which is a promissory Oath) is not in its owne nature of an eternall obligation, but is involved in tacite conditions and accidents of the world, which may justly incumber us from effecting it, or from being fur­ther obliged to it, as well as other promises may, which yet are made bonâfide at the beginning. The difficulty onely is to see, whither de facto that hath interven'd, which hath now taken away the formall and originall obli­gation, which we of the people had to it at first, by autho­rity of our Magistrate; and so taken away, as we may be secure and out of feare of the penalty, which we then sub­mitted to in it.

I shall not here make use of what others have labori­ously argued; Argu. That the matter of the Covenant is such, as we cannot be obliged to, but let it be as good or as bad as men please to suppose; The Covenant a politicall or State Oath. I say in the first place, that all the good or bad, was form'd into a Politicall Oath, authorized upon two Kingdomes, by the sanction of two publique Magistracies; who as collaterals obliged them­selves to cooperate faithfully together, and obliged those of their distinct Nations, to cooperate respectively and subordinately with them, for attaining a former end in such a way of Reformation, as is therein exprest; but by such meanes, as they in their publique and re­spective capacities, not we in our particulars should judge most consonate to equity and true to religion. For which reason we happily are pointed at there, The subordi­nate conditi­ons of this Oath. onely in our private places and callings.

Here therefore there is a relation of severall things [Page 43] concurrent, viz. Of two Magistracies united as a meanes for the easier reaching the end of those respective refor­mations, which they were obliged to make before they entred in league, and of two people, who by the union of their respective Magistracies, passe (for so much as is there­in exprest) into an union one with another, and are to have their private capacities and endeavours managed by them, and never against them by any virtue of this league. Besides it is a considerable circumstance in the Magistrates managing the whole, that states or civill constitutions by reason of the diseases of ambition and avarice, are naturally as much subject to future changes, as any other things are; and without the supposition of tacite conditions, we may as little sweare to preserve the State of a publique body, as we may sweare to preserve the State of our own particular bodies, or as a parent may to preserve his Childe, which when it shall be taken away by diseases, or by justice, he may be sorry for the losse, but may not justly complaine of it. And indeed so it is come to passe without any default in us of the en­glish People, or of our publique Magistrate (under whom we were to act in these private places and callings) that neither of us can be said to have laid the Covenant aside, although we could not keepe it from expiring; because the failing was in that which was never suppos'd to be in our powers viz. in many conditionall things which camecr osse, and in the breach of fidelity in another col­laterall and concurring power.

If you please to object here as an aggravation, Ob. and an incite­ment for us of the Covenanted people to rise kill and slay, that the Covenant is buried not as a thing really expired and dead, but that the people out of interest must be told so, onely because the former Magistracy is really laid aside and changed, which if people should throughly consider, would quickly make them finde matter enough in the Covenant to take armes.

I shall not in the way of answer to this repeate any thing concerning the cause, Ans. the meanes, and the concur­rences [Page 44] to this our present change; every Covenanter both of England and Scotland, knowing well that there was no change of Government here, O [...] change of [...]nment, [...] the [...] cause, or as an effect of [...]hers for­ [...] breach of Covenant can [...]her way authorize us to [...] against this Government. till the Covenant was Na­tionally broke (and so many here were insnared, both Royalists and Parliamentarians) by the Scots, who thought to have us'd it for a change of Government, and as a stratagem to give law in another judicatory: Neither shal I argue in this place, how compatible any change may be with a Covenant so conditionall, in which Kings as Parties are totally excluded from judging either for themselves or for others, which point shall be further ar­gued at last; But I shall content my selfe to take what is here granted in the objection, viz. That the Government is really changed; The consequence then to us of the peo­ple will be, that seeing by the fourth Article of the Co­venant, we may not without apparent breach of it, act the sence of the Covenant, but as we receive it from our respective and supream judicatory of England onely, and that the said Government which it relates to, is confest to be gone, have you not then clearely confest that the obligation to act any thing publiquely by Covenant is likewise gone? according to an old Axiome, Sublato relat [...] tollitur correlatum.

If this present Government which we are chang'd to, The Covenant obliges us not against the [...]i [...]th Com­mandement. and which now protects us, should thinke fit by the way of Covenant to give a new life, to that remaining part of it, which may be observed, yet you will not allow any obedience to them, though in things never so law­full; Neither will that fourth Article allow me to obey any forreigner, nor those without whose consent the Covenant was made, and consequently without whom it is to be interpreted, as the late Proceedings of the Scots at the Hague plainely shew: So that after all this, if I in my private capacity be as you say still indispensibly ob­liged by it, Page 15. to begin or assist to publique troubles, do you not fall into a worser absurdity, and maintaine an Oath against the fifth Commandment, or against all Magistracy, [Page 45] which is an impossibility? Nothing ever cautiond in termes more expressely for our duty of making discoveries, The Covena [...] make [...] eac [...] man a Magistrate. of bringing to condigne punishment, of our supreame respective Iu­dicatories and the like then the Covenant did, which are things relating to none but our supream Magistracy, un­lesse you please plainly to assert another Absurdity, that every single man who hath taken it, is thereby absolvd from his Magistrate, and is made one himselfe to judge of the other, and thereby authorizd not by way of Tolera­tion to professe but to establish what Religion he would, to punish at his own tribunall whom he would, and to reforme the state as he would. For he to whom you will allow a capacity of making warre, hath also a Capacity of making Peace, and Lawes for the security of his Peace.

Thus we see how the Government is changed, and the formall obligation of the Covenant at an end; But what if I should grant you by the way of supposition, that in case both the Covenant and the former Govern­ment were standing together in as full force as you de­sire, and as it was when the Scots first delivered the King up to the Parliament of England? I would then know of you whither if our Parliament had then for reasons best known to themselves (and of which wee can never judge competently) declared us of the People, free from any further obligation of the Covenant, might we justly have thought our solemne League at an end, and that we ought to act nothing publiquely any longer by it?

If you will say we should have been still obliged to act upon it, then I aske you againe under whom? For I have proved it must be alwaies under a Magistrate, and you have all along proved that it must onely be under our lawfull Magistrate, how lawfull soever the thing be in it self which is commanded, you would not allow the King to be the person to be obeyed, whom you thought fit to keepe in an imprisonment. The Parliament (according to our supposition) would not be any longer obliged to it, or be obeyed in it, and the Scots acknowledge them­selves in the 4 Article to be the supreame judicatory [Page 46] onely of Scotland, and I cannot act publiquely by a pri­vate Capacity or Magistracy. Ergo in such a case, the Covenant how good soever, had not obliged any longer, nor is it in it selfe eternall.

Obj. You will not deny perhaps but one man may free another from an Oath when it is for the worldly profit of him who pleases to release it, as every man may throw away any thing of his owne right; but you will not allow it in Sacred things where God is a Party.

Ans.I answer, that though no Parent can dispence his wife or childe from the feare of God and the duties they owe to him, Num 30. How a superi­our may free an inferiour from [...]n Oath even in that which belongs to God. yet he allowed him to break the childs vow for giving him a sacrifice, and both to be guiltles; and then why may not we be now absolved, if our publique Pa­rent judges it not fit that wee should be any longer tide formally to a conditionall Oath; though it have relati­on to some sacred things?

You will say no, because the Parent did not as a party solemn­ly concurre to the Childs vow, and having never consented he might the better dissent; but our publique Parent did concurre at a party to our Oath. The Parliament and People tooke the Co­venant joyntly together, and it is said that if the Father heare the vowes, and contradicts them not in the same day, then he confirms them, and cannot break them without iniquity,

To this I reply, First, that v.16. it is said the Childe is free after the dissent of the Parent, and that the Parent is charged with whatsoever was amisse in him, which is excuse enough for us of the people. Secondly, the differ­ence is great in a maine point of the paralell; because after the concurrence of the Father to the childs vow for sacrificing something to God, that might be compleated in the Temple without his further helping it on; but we cannot doe any thing in our case without the coopera­tion of our publique Parent all along, neither can he do any thing without the concurrences of many other pos­sible, but uncertaine conditions, and if he in effect finde those conditions have come contrary to his publique en­deavours, [Page 47] what may we doe? will it be enough for us to rest in having attempted the utmost of our private endeavours with him? or will you authorize every man upon private judgement or interpretation to begin a warre in his own sence.

A League or Pact authorized betwixt private Neigh­bours over a whole Nation or over part of it, The difference btewixt this our league and those of Prin­ce [...] for authorizing war is not as a League betwixt Prince and Prince: because these have conditions exprest how and when to begin warre upon one another in case their Leagues be broken. But there is no such thing exprest in terminis in that Covenant which we have made one with another, and which we made sub­ordinately to our Magistrate: so that if we or the Magi­strate faile, we are equally left to Gods justice solely and to the forfeiture of our own penalties due to him, and every one is to answer for his owne deficiency in his own Station: And being left to our selves againe, we are left to act onely so much of our Oath or of the ancient end of it, as we were bound to before we swore: which is a great deale; because we were bound by precept before wee were by promise all the dayes of our lives to do our utmost for the glory of God, and the good of our neighbour.

Secondly, The obligation of the Cove­nant, how lesse then the obligation of a [...]ra Princes or States who by the supremacy of their powers, are able to make Lawes for their separated Kingdomes; when they unite their supream Powers, they are able to make a common Law for all their Kingdoms together, which is called a League or Compact; But a law when it comes to be broken (which is a publique thing, and therefore of every mans interest) may be vin­dicated publiquely by Warre, and by those who have a posse regni. But I cannot say the same may be done for the Covenant, for quo jure can it be done?

The Scots indeed by one way of arguing make it grea­ter then a Law, and by another make it lesse; which is when they one while affirme it unalterable and unrefor­mable as a divine text, and another while confesse it was not made by the joynt concurrence of all those who with [Page 46] [...] [Page 47] [...] [Page 48] them are essentiall to the making a publique Law. I con­ceive we may safely say it is of a Constitution inferriou [...] to that of a Law, and therefore its obligation is lesse, though its penalty be greater to the failers in it. It was made use of, only as a convenient instrument or meanes, for the better attaining some lawes as its end. A Law it was not because it was not made by all the then Legisla­tive powers of the Kingdome. For the Kings concurrence in England if not in Scotland, was then held requisite for passing a Law and he ever dissented from this Covenant. Halfe the inferiour sort of the People have not any In­terest in it, War how an unjust penalty for the meere breach of Co­venant. nor have taken it: And not having any obli­gation to it, how I pray you can they justly be drawne in­to the Penalty due to it? as they must all be, if a Warre (which is effectually a Penall thing) be begun though by a part of the Nation; for the nature of Warre is such, that it puts a whole Kingdome into imminent danger of desolation, though but begun in a part, and by a party of it.

Thus far I have endeavoured to shew the true fast and loose of all promissory Oaths, and how their obligati­ons cease according to the nature of the things which they are affixed to.

Object. The Author of the grand case of Conscience p, 1. Objects, That if inconvenience may break a promise or disengage an Oath, then many may be cheated, and David was much mistaken, Psal. 15.4. Who saith he shall dwell in Gods Tabernacle, who sweareth to his own hinderance and changeth not.

Ans.I answer, David speaks here of an Oath violated by a change onely in the Promiser, Of the obliga­tion of such a promise as may be fulfill'd sole­ly by the pro­miser. who by his Oath hath past a right to another: and therefore can no longer dis­pose of it againe; the party to whom he swore may dis­pose of it as he pleaseth and may dispense him of it; be­cause no man hath a right to make another man keepe his owne, longer then he please himselfe. It is a duty to pay a debt, but not to receive it. Finally, this is nothing to those cases where the change is not in us, but in other [Page 49] persons, and in things which relate principally and con­joyntly to the fulfilling of the Oath or Promise. For if I promise Titius a sword at such a time, and he then chance to be mad, (an accident not exprest betwixt us at first) am I bound to put it into his hands in this change be­cause I was the first promiser?

Wheras it is said, that the obligation of somethings end, because they can be no longer kept, Ob. as that of the Kings person &c. He ans. p. 11. That if men shall by violence put an end to the thing, that thereby the obligation may end too, that is a breach of Covenant. A woman promiseth to be faithful to her husband so long as he lives; but if she, to marry another, kills him, she breaks her promise.

I grant it easily that they who use violence to break lawfull contracts, Answ. sin grievously; which is a thing now confest in every Church of Scotland; but what is that to those who use no violence to breake them at all; nor can helpe it when it is done although many be undone by it? Of the obliga­tion for pre­serving the Kings person by covenant. One thing I most earnestly desire to learne in this questi­on propounded (I guesse) concerning the Kings Death; which was a consequence of the others breach and tamper­ings. If by the Covenant we were indispensably obliged to preserve his Person, How came it to passe, that we were obliged by the same Couenant to wage warre against him? I have heard of a distinction betwixt his power and his person, but never of any be­twixt his person and himselfe. So that if the Covenant could have dispenced any souldier of England or Scotland to kill his person by an accident of Warre (as his life was oft in danger before he came to the Scaffold) his Death had beene violent, and the obligation to preserve him had ended, and yet according to this argument the Covenant had not been broken. Why then should these men thinke the world so dull as not to understand plainly enough, that the Covenant provided for his Death more wayes then one? True it is, that the Covenant held out a faint and a conditionall preservation of him, and after all no man can sincerely stretch it further: From whence if we will let him judge this one controversie, he hath left it [Page 50] recorded to posterity, in his suppos'd book Chap. 9. In vaine is my person excepted by a parenthesis of words, when so many hands are armed against me with swords: Moreover in His Chap. of the Covenant, he feared it provided for him in a Logick too loose and circumstantiall. From all which what did he conclude, but that he would not allow of a Covenant-argument for his life?

I know the answer here is obvious, that bullets were not shot directly against him (as few are against any in a Towne or in a Battell) and that if he would have withdrawne his person, he should have beene out of dan­ger; but then I pray you what advantage had he in this by Covenant, more then any common souldier of either side? who when they retire, are equally out of danger, Nay he had lesse advantage, For by preserving him, they meant keeping him after he was rescued from others, How the words of preservation in Covenant, provided more for the Kings suffering, then the words of punishment provided for Delinquents sufferings. and by keeping him they meant not him primarily, but something else, to which all consideration of him was to give way. As for others which were to be brought to punish­ment, they had some of them leave to go beyond the Seas, others to enjoy liberties at home; and of all the excepted persons, there was never any of them who was here deprived of life, but as our troubles and warres increast, their number (which was strange) lessen'd even to six or seven at last, and most of those out of the Kingdome. I know they have distinctions wherefore so much might be remitted to those, and not to the King, although he had on his behalfe the word pre­servation in the Covenant; but these distinctions are but their strong justifications for that which is the bottome of this argument, if all Covenanters durst speake plain­ly alike.

Ob. He objects. p. 11. That if according to Covenant we should preserve the priviledges of Parliament, against a Malignant party that would have taken away but five Members; why not against an Heriticall party which took away above two hundred?

Ans.I answer, That when the five Membere were in dan­ger, [Page 51] there was a Session of neere all the Lords, and of all the Commons to authorize the People to bring others before them to condigne punishment: How [...] that the excluding member, ought to be brought by [...] before the excluded. But where is there now any Session of a supream power in this Land, before whom we ought to bring the present Parliament? under what formall supream Magistracy can we now co­operate or receive publique orders, but from them? who have commanded no such thing against themselves. Lastly the Covenant makes not us private men Magistrates, nei­ther doth it authorize us to a war disertly, as to a penalty.

Certainly he doth not meane that the remaining Mem­bers make no house, because there are more now kept out, then are admitted into it. For would not such an Argument clearly determine, that the house of Lords was never a house, since the Major part followed the King, under pretence, that they durst not sit any longer at Westminster? Or else if the [...]itting of so many Members as are enough for a legall vote be illegall, after others are forc [...]t away; How shall we justifie that Session with a new speaker, when the rest were forc't to the Armies pro­tection from the Citizens servants and apprentices, who forc't them, and Indangerd their lives in the House? Or how shall we justifie the house of Commons for sitting, when the five Members durst not appear? Though force should not be used without a desperate occasion be given (in which case the preservation of the substance, is al­waies above the consideration of a formality as hath bin argued by the Parliament ever since their first warres yet they know few or many sitters in the House, is not a thing of our examination, if they be above forty.

The second Demurrer p. 6. Ob. Objects that we have sworne by no terrour to withdraw our selves from this blessed union, Ans. but to continuein it all our lives against all opposition. The Coveant relates onely to a time of u [...]nion, with and under the magistrate.

If there were nothing else in the world yet these words sufficiently prove that we are now absolutely absolved from the Covenant; for first, they relate to a State and time of Vnion, in which we were according to the united [Page 52] strengths of two Nations, two Magistracies, and of the re­spective Magistracies and People here enabled, yea com­manded to make great opposition against those who then were actually united in armes against the Parliament. But now that we are supposed by these Authors to be dis-uni­ted as our enemies are, and that the Magistracy is changed, our state of subordination somewhat varyed; How the league of nationall u­nion came to be ended that the Links of our former chaine are broken; and that the Commons act alone without a King, as the Lords & Commons acted before without one, and that the Scotish Na­tion by their invasion, and their attempting to divide the King from us, and us one from another, by their decla­ration made preparatorily for division, thereby to favour invasion afterward, have in the face of all the world broken whatever was of Nationall union and Peace, yea and all that which was of confidence betwixt our selves at home, and (which was yet more horrid) in incou­raging one principall Army in Ireland to fall off from the advantages it had against the bloody Rebells, to turne their swords against the Parliament it selfe, only out of a by end of ambition, yea now (that the war being ended) we are to enter into an Vnion of cohabitation or in coope­ration (as they have done in Scotland it selfe) with those who during their united hostilities occasiond our Nati­onall Union, are we I say after all this, in the selfe same Union which they at first hoped might have been conti­nued to them & us for all our lives? That Union suppos'd the warre which then was, with the rest, of the circum­stances, and if we wish the same effect or Union now, do we not thereby wish the same cause or warre againe a­mongst us? as we were to oppose armes to armes, so uni­on to union, and certainly that Union of the Parliaments of both Kingdoms was at an end, ever since the Scotch Army here received their money, and returned, home, leaving the Delinquents of both Nations dis-united and clearly reduced to receive condigne punishment, (as the Covenant calls it) at the respective judicatories of both [Page 53] Kingdoms; and if it ended not then, yet it could not bee consistent with their Declaration and divisions presently after; and if not then, yet I am sure it could not be con­sistent with their Nationall invasion, and tampering to divide all in England and Ireland, the effect whereof hath been a change of Government here, and hath made them totally distinct forrainers to us.

The Demurrers premisses in this Argument by a new logick, Of bringing those who would divide us to condigne punishment. relate onely to a State of publique Vnion, and his conclusion relates only to a State of publique dis-union, of the consequences whereof the Covenant saith nothing at all in any Article; It enjoyn [...]s the bringing of De­linquents to condigne punishment, and those private per­sons likewise among our selves, who should helpe on, ei­ther divisions amongst us, or the invasion of either Na­tion first. But whether should they be brought to pun­ishment? The Covenant answers, Either before the re­spective judicatories of each Kingdome (who onely have power to judge of what is Condigne) or before no body.

It speakes likewise how we should unitedly venture our lives against the Enemy which then was: The meaning of our utmost endeavours, and of all the dayes of our lives in the Co­venant. it doth not, or at least ought not to sweare us to get the better of them for ever, nor that we should in a rout or dis-uni­on end our lives against all opposition, and without quarter. If the termes of our utmost endeavours, and all the dayes of our lives, are to be understood litterally, and that we must not survive any violation of the Coevnant, then why do these Gentlemen, (who conclude themselves in the State of the Covenant thus understood) thinke of li­ving till to morow? The termes of forever, or for all the dayes of our lives are not in our contracts to be understood na­turally, but morally; For we finde it plainly in the Ju­dicial law, that after a Jew had taken a servant, and bor'd a hole through his eare he was (as the Text saith) to serve him for ever, although one of them might poss [...]bly have dyed the next day, and both of them after a while might [Page 54] have beene made captives to others. The law calls the league of Marriage individua vitae consue [...]udo, a c [...]habita [...]i­on for all the dayes of our lives. For so it should be ex voto contrahenti [...]m, in the sincere desires of the contractors; Yet we know, one ordinarily dyes before the other, and that many conditions may happen to legitimate their divorce afterwards, though the contract was never so religiously made in the presence of almighty God at first.

The Scots in their late proceedings with their King at the Hague pag. the 6. interpret the words of utmost endeavour, as morally as we doe here? For the Commissioners of the Kirk said, they us'd their utmost endeavours to save the Kings life according to Covenant; but how? They answer, that it was in Papers, messages, Declarations, Testimonies, and Protestations onely; they name not warre, or bloodshed, for they pro­tested against that way last yeare, as contrary to Cove­nant, when the Parliament of Scotland invaded us; and I hope for the reputation of the religion they professe, they have not altered their publique commentary of that sacred Text contradictorily so soone.

To conclude, Either wee are still in the Vnion of the end of the Govenant, or we are not: If we be in it, then these breake the Covenant, by seeking to dis-unite us: If we be not in it, where then is the Article for our pri­vate forming a warre upon it? and under whom, if not under our English supreame iudicatory? The Covenant how more then broke by the Scots hostility. and if they call us not out to revenge that which was more then a bare falling off from the Covenant last yeare amongst ourselves, (when the Scots exercis'd such high hostilities, and were the first shatterers of all our frame (which o­therwise might by Gods blessing have cemented againe) how durst these private trumpets sound the alarum, and open the wounds of the Nations once more? Though the respective iudicatory of that Kingdome now cannot make that which was once done, undone; Yet by the present punishment of the Kirke, it is acknowledged that [Page 55] they hold the Covenant to have been more then nation­ally broken, in regard of the harme and damage which was done to us after it was broken. For there is a great deale of difference betwixt ceasing to helpe according to a league, and acting hostily contrary to it, especially when no such penalty is in such a league exprest betwixt the parties.

But you will object, Obj. that if the Covenant were so broken in one or two points by them, yet it doth not follow, that the whole Co­venant is broken thereby, and dead in every part.

I have answered before that we are no longer obliged to any thing in it by the way of League and Co­venant; The reason here is, Ans. whither the na­tionall break­ing of one part of the Cove­nant put an end to the whole. because here in leagues everything is to be observed con [...]unctively, otherwise all is broken; which is so true and cleare, that if we looke upon Gods league and Covenant with Israel, we shall finde the same thing pronounc't there. God said, If yee keepe my Commandements, I will be your God, and will maintaine you in your plenty, and in your Land: Yet he said, that if they broke any one Commandement in their part of Covenant, they were guilty of all, and that all should be at an end betwixt them: just as St. Iohn in the conclusion of his Revelation saith, Who ever shall diminish but one word of that Booke defaceth the whole, and looseth the whole benefit which he might expect thereby in the holy City, by vertue of the second Covenant.

It is asserted, Ob. that there is no clause in any Oath or Cove­nant, which in a common sence forbids obedience to a present Go­vernment: To this the grand case of Conscience answers, That the Covenant engages to another Government, therefore it forbids obedience to this, and Oathes ought to bee their owne in­terpreters.

Here he at first begs the question, whether the Cove­nant can now engage us or no? Ans. seeing it hath beene pro­ved, that that which is now nothing, cannot now en­gage us to any thing; and conseqently our submitting to, and acting under the present Government, cannot [Page 56] be contrary to Covenant; because things which are con­trary one to the other, must have actuall being together at the same time. But the very being of this Govern­ment, supposes the nullity of the Covenant, whose death (as it was other where contrived before) gave life to that mutation here afterwards.

The Covenant (of all oathes) interprets itselfe least, espe­cially in the positive Go­vernment, which it would establish, and in Religion.Secondly, Though the Covenant were still valid and in force, yet when we were sworne to it first, it found us actually out of that Government here pointed at, viz. Of King Lords and Commons. For that is the supreame Government of a Country, which makes a supreame law there: But at that time the supreamest humane law, which (according to these gentlemens opinions) was ever made in England or Scotland, or perhaps in all the world, was made without the King in those Kingdomes, and against his dissent. For which reason the Covenant engages not so positively for King or Kingly Govern­ment, as for the Vnion of the Covenanters in any forme and against any opposition; Though the Covenant were in Force, yet a change of Go­vernment might be con­sistent with it. Whereupon the Presbyte­rians when it was (as most conceiv'd) in their power, to restablish King or Kingly Gove [...]nment, they omitted both for many dayes of their lives, without question; because they conceiv'd it not a Government absolutely necessary by Covenant. When D. Hamilton entred Eng­land so hostilely for that end, and as he thought by ver­tue of Covenant, yet he was excommunicated for it by the Oracles of the Covenant.

Lastly, The reigne of the Covenant since the first day of its birth and obligation, was never yet a R [...]gall reigne, no not for one day anywhere; so that the change which is, is not determinatly contrary to that principle, out of which (according to the circumstances of security) any Go­vernment may be moulded for any place. For which rea­son if I should grant you that the Covenant were not ex­pir'd, and had not beene so palpably broken, as it was betwixt the Nations; yet Scotland (if they had pleas'd) might have beene Govern'd by a King, and England by [Page 57] a free State, & yet both consonantly enough to Covenant and without any contrariety, because the circumstan­ces of securitie in one might have been different from the circumstances of security in the other; which though different, might as well have been mutually maintained as their discipline differing from ours might have beene preserv'd by us. From all which it appears, that that Oath is Cloudy in the positive or set Government which we ought to have, and so cannot be justly called it's owne interpreter, besides a reformation according to the word of God; and the example of the best reformed Church­es, supposes such a latitude of Logick as would (if all sides should be heard) give us as much exercise as all our wa [...]res have.

And certainly the Covenant is alike undefin'd in Reli­gion and in civill Government. How the Cove­nant necessari­ly points at some change of Government. For we swore to bring the Church Discipline in the three Kingdoms, to as neer a similitude as the constitution of the places would bear, not into the very same; and as for the civill Government, it was to receive its forme in the security of that, just as water doth receive not onely the figure of the Pot or Glasse into which it is put, but its conservation from be­ing totally lost and spilt. But how then will you free your selfe from this contradiction in asserting that the civill State is unalterable by Covenant, when that of the Church which formes the other is so much alterable? and seeing that of the State receives from this, not only its form and being, but what ever else you alone please to at­tribute to your security in it? From whence I conclude a­gain, that a change of Government is consistent with Co­venant, & that a submission to it in lawful things is much more, and consequently it ingages not to any one deter­minate Government, and so is not against this of ours.

I beleeve it hath been a frequent observation of many, who have calmely converst with our Divines and others zealous for Presbytery, That they have found them little satisfied with that sort of Presbytery, which [Page 58] our Parliament modelled for us of this Nation; as ha­ving little affinity with the Couenant. My beliefe is, that they in that discernd not the consequence of their own dissatisfaction. Scotch Presby­tery fit for any Government but the kingly. For if their consciences regulated by Covenant, can admit no civill Government, but the Kingly (which they so much argue for here) and if the Covenant and a Scotch Presbytery (whose right they hold to be Divine) be essentially linkt together, Then we and they may all of us learne, not onely from direct inferences, but from the declar'd experience of the Sonne, the Father, the Grandfather, and great Grand­Mother, that is of the three last Scotch Kings and one Queene. That if the Scotch Presbitery come out of the Covenant then Kingly government cannot derive from it, because they are jurisdictions incompatible and in­consistant in the same place, and if one can conserve it, then may we say as much of the other. How much Ma­ry Queene of Scotland experienced of this, The judgement [...] experience of Mary Queen of Scotland. let the world judge by that which she wrote both with inke in her Let­ters, and with her blood on the Scaffold. For how came she to be Beheaded in England, but by Mr. Knox (and the Kirkes having done little better than) put her into the hands of those who could not keepe her long alive with security to themselves? Of King Iames. King Iames hath writ and argued largely concerning his dangers & sufferings under it, & it is yet remembred in what Dialect they of the Pres­bytery were wont to Preach and Pray against him to his face, and he not know how to remedy it, or by what right to top theirs. When he came into England he profest his deliverance from that subjection not of small satis­faction to his minde, and therefore at this di [...]tance he con­trived how to extinguish or check that [...]ate there, & after some progresse in that worke he himselfe dyed peaceably in a milder Country, Of King Charles Vid. Scotch Declaration, 27 July 1649. p. 14. But K. Charles with that Crown in­herited the consequences of that undertaking, for his first troubles began in the controversie of that Presbytery; and what a preservation he thought the Covenant (from [Page 95] which it seemes their Presbytery is so inseparable) might be to him and what his fate was and who helpt it on, nay who diverted him from agreement here, all the world knowes and in his writings likewise he hath showne to the world that he himselfe was not ignorant of it; This only is the wonder, that in the midst of this their specious zeale for Kingly Government, Of the Prince. the Covenant should be so silent concerning Royall Posterity, or for their suc­cession, in case the Scots or English Souldiers had kill'd the King casually before he had given them the satisfacti­on which they required, the consideration of all this, with some other lately offer'd to the young Prince at the Hague, by the Scotch Commissioners, and the satisfaction which they in their late Declaration require from him, as they did from his Father, have questionlesse made him scruple, so long at his adventure into that Country, though so much invited. For they told him p. 14.15. That for longer then these eight yeares, Vid. Decla. p. 8.10. yea ever since that Queene Mary, their fundamentall priviledge hath beene to assemble in Parliament; and to conclude there of themselves, either without King or Kings Commissioners; and that if his Majesty refuse those their reasonable desires, they shall be constrained in so great an extremity, to doe what is incumbent on them, to pre­serve Religion, Scotch pro­ceed, at the Hague with the Prince, p. 14.15 and the Kingdom from ruine. Here they plain­ly acknowledge, and assume that supreame power and right, which shall be proved here more evidently to­wards the conclusion.

But because I intend truth here in the simplicity of my Heart, and no way to swell this Argument, either with passion in my selfe, or with scandall to any man else therfore I shall sincerely unfold what hath long been a mistery to my selfe, and for confirmation of what I have asserted here so positively, I shall give the reader the expresse word of our great English Covenant-champion, and of Master Hinderson especially the Scotch Champi­on, betwixt whose fingers the Covenant it selfe was moulded.

[Page 60] O [...]t [...]ind cafe of Oonscience, p. 14, saith, But they who are now for the right of the Son, and continuance of the Govern­ment, are as much against the vices in and about him, as about the Father. And should he doe as his Father hath done, they who are now for the performance of this Oath and Covenant, would as truly joyne against him as against the Father.

Who can call this Regall Language? which yet will be lookt on as the English Presbyterian-alarum, though but by one man. Hee had done well in speaking of the performance of Covenant by us all if he had offered a Catalogue of all that which would fulfill the Covenant in all its termes without any further interpretation; But that which is supposed eternall for time is likewise infinite as to the matter which it may relate to by the ap­plication of humane Logick.

The supream power in Scot­land in whom.Mr. Hinderson in his Newcastle conference, with the King p.24.25. saith, That the reforming power is in Kings and Princes, Quibus deficientibus, it comes to the inferiour Ma­gistrates, Quibus deficientibus, it descends to the gr [...]sse of the people, but yet supposing still (as he saith) that they be all of them rightly, inform'd. For which reason though he conceal'd it from the King, yet he meant, that the reformation of any of those three powers, according to the Covenant must be judged & reformed afterwards, by some other bo­dy of men here not named. For I conceive that he who is ultimatly to judge of the Reformation and of its pub­lique obligation, judgeth likewise of the reformers them­selves though never so high or never so low; and to this strange opinion he would faine intitle two English E­piscopall Champions Bilson and Iewell.

Here I must confesse I was at a stand, concerning the nature and interest of the Covenant, and was sorry to see that I was no plainlyer told whether it would carry me (laden with so great a curse) nor where it would set me downe. At last I found in the same Author. 32.33. Speaking of the subordination of powers, under which people were finally to obey, That he would not wil­lingly [Page 61] tell his Majesty, whether the Church was subor­dinate to the civill power, either to King or to Parlia­ment, or to both: For (quoth he) I utterly desol [...]ima such a headship as the Kings of England have claimed, or such a supremacy as the Houses of Parliament crave, with appeales from Ecclesiastiall Iudicature to themselves.

No man may thinke but Mr. Henderson meant this for the jurisdiction of England, How the Scots state the su­premacy of England in Scotland. as well as of Scotland, for hee spake of Houses of Parliament which were plurall in England onely; and though it may seeme strange at the first view, to heare one say, that the Scotch Nation state the supremacy of England in their Country, or that they endeavour a direct change of Government, here, (which they have indirectly attempted for a long while.) let every man judge not by our subtilties, but by the Kirkes Declaration, 27 July, 1649, p. 11.12. Their words are, That their King after his Oath of Coronation in Scotland, shall assure them under his hand and seale, to in­joyne the solmne League and Covenant, establish and practise the Prerbyteriall Government, Directory, Confession and Catechisme, as they are approved by the severall Assemblies of their Kirke and Parliament, in ALL HIS DOMINIONS, and that he shall never endeavour any change thereof.

No man will say but States like judges ought to act, How the Scotch Presbyterians & ours oppose one another. ex bono & aequo conjunctively. So that though these things which here they would impose upon us perpetually, were never so good, yet they being unequitably deriv'd upon us from their supreame judicatory (in whose possession we are not so fully now, as they were last yeare in ours) we ought to abominate their designe, as much as they might the like obtrusion of their Presbitery from hence, without power there to rectifie it ever after. For these Presbiterians with us grant▪ That good and lawfull things may not be practiz'd under a power unlawfull, as they say the Scots would be here.

However here I at last found who was my supream right Magistrate in the Kirk [...] sence, but then I conceiv'd I was in [Page 62] a great snare, because I saw the jus publicum of a Kingdome totally though secretly changed. I saw all things of direct re­ligion, and whatsoever related collaterally to its securi­ty, lodged there, and by the Kirke prejudged from the judgement of all other authorities in Scotland especially. But because religion and its security draws in all hu­mane concernments, and that two supreame collaterall powers cannot stand in one and the same place, in the same time, for the same person, but for contrary actions, therefore I knew not whither of the two supreame pow­ers the Ecclesiasticall or the Civill I should in this case throw away, Two suprema­cies in the same place, how in­ [...]sistent. for they could not in this contest by the judgement of any be both obeyed together; and I stood in a miserable case betwixt a Jaylour and a Devill the Kirke giving me to the Devill if I obeyed the Civill power and the Civill power giving me to the Jaylour if I obey'd the Kirke, which was (to speake the truth) the State of the whole Kingdome of Scotland last yeare, betwixt the the Kirkes excommunication, and the Parliaments Or­der which authoriz'd Duke Hamiltons expedition, in Vindication of the Covenant here: In which difference we have no reason but to like the effect, however we may dislike such a cause here.

Wherefore to answer this [...]scruple, I positively say, That in whatsoever is of Pact betwixt man and man, or of policy in the Covenant, I ought solely to follow the civill Magistrate, and the Church here ought to follow the Magistrate likewise, as a case relating to the dis­quits to the warres, and to the recovering the peace of earthly Kingdomes: If otherwise, then the civil jurisdicti­on ought clearely to be managed by the Ecclesiastique; which is stated so no where (that I know of) but in Ro­magna and Dutchy of Ferrara and the other places be­longing to the Pope. This I speak not as desirous to detract any thing from the sacred function of the Ministery as it containes it selfe in its own function, no man being able rationally to object any thing wherefore some might [Page 63] not ex Officio, be deputed to excite others to vertue and san­ctity of life. But yet who can say they are not subject to the infirmities of ambition, avarice, and severe passions as well as other men? or have not our Antagonists (whe­ther they would or no) observ'd them in these cases of worldly rights and interests, to have as oppositly, yet as peremtorily differ'd one from another, as people of any family ever did? The Devill not being able to get the Text on his side, by his wiles oft got the commentary, so that we are to be excus'd, if we hold many things in Church-men, to be but as an Apohrypha at best, which yet for esteem sake is alloted a place before anything else, next after the genuine Text,

Having thus openly stated the scruples of my own and of many more consciences, and to take off maskes not from the faces, but from the consciences of these three, and the multitude of other Scotch Casnists, who have talkt so speciously for our Covenant, Vindication of an Heirs just Title, our submitting to it, and joyning with others immediately, Whether atrue Title doth (ac­cording to Co­venant) autho­rize obedience least right suffer wrong one day; I cannot (I say) but aske the same men plainly; What dif­ference in effect they find [...], betwixt the Titles and right of the Prince of Wales, and of the n [...]w King of Scotland, notwith­standing all their obligation of Covenant, to submit to him as such?

It is not enough by Covenant to preserve an aery Title onely to a Prince, and by the same Covenant, to suspend all the rest of his solid power, and right? certain [...]ly his Royall commands (notwithstanding all this talke) are no more obey'd in Scotland now, then the Episco­pall commands of our Countryman, the Bishop of C [...]al­cedon are now obey'd in Turkey. The King of [...] Scotlands pre­sent case, & the actual change of Government there by their interpretation of the covenant

But what hinders him from exercising any Kingly right in Scotland as yet? The Covenant which is not yet sa­tisfied. How is it then, that some of our Presbyterians say, that the same Covenant indispensably opens the doore to him here? If the [...]ing aske the Scots why they put the Law of the Covenant so to his obedience, [...] the [Page 64] first thing which determines all his other rights after­wards? They can onely say, that they swore it in his Fathers raigne, and it is now eternall. Though I censure nothing here, yet I cannot but conclude-hence; That they of themselves, as well as our Parliament, have made a Law above all other Lawes, (and more then a reformable Magna Charta) For the Government of the Kingdome which may be exercised according to it, without Kings, and against Kings.

Against Kings.The first thing which was ever offer'd to him from the Kingdome of Scotland, was an authority by far trans­cending his own, viz. that of excommunication. For (as their late proceedings with him at the Hagu [...] shew) hee was by that subtilty tryed whether he would refuse first to acknowledge Iames Graham (alias Montrosse) or that great power of the Churches, Page 18. by which he might be awed to greater things afterwards. To backe this likewise the Commissioners of the Synode said (p. 22) that they negoti­ated with him in a capacity altogether, Page 22. distinct from the Commissioners of Parliament, as being persons commis­sioned by the Kirke, which is commisioned with a Iusdivinum Our Bishops certainly never undertook such a jurisdiction & supremacy, and unlesse these had witnessed so much of themselves to all the world, no one would believe that in such a poore Country, and so much forme of Religion, there could be such high passions of am­bition.

Besides if it be a true rule, That he who is the maker, ought to be the interpreter of a Law, then let all the world observe one thing, That the Kirk having made the Covenant (as the principle of all supream rights both of State and Religion) then they alone ought to give the interpretation of it from time to time; as they de facto did not onely last yeare, contrary to the interpretation of their owne Parliament, but also for many yeares to­gether have peremptorily prest it upon ours: So that it makes a fundamentall change of Government there, though differently from what our Parliament hath made [Page 65] here, the jus publicum both of Religion and security of State with them, lying in the Covenant, and that lying in the brests of Churchmen, chosen by one another: and our's lying in the power of Laymen, chosen by the People, and judging by the Common Lawes of equity and necessity, and of the word of God.

It were in vaine to say the Kirke onely recommends their interpretation to the State. The interpre­tation of the Kirke is not recommendatory to the State For last yeare they did it with a Penalty upon the Parliament, their whole Army, and the body of the people which obey'd them; if it be a penal­ty to bee given to the Devill, and to bee put into a State of eternall death. Wherefore they there are, (or else none are any where) the true judges of right, who make themselves judges of wrong and of punishment.

To conclude how practicable soever the Covenant was at first, The conclusion or how erroneously soever we may now conceive it to be extinct, or to be a principle fitted to justify a change of Kingly Government, which was actually made first of all by it and their Presbytery in Scot­land; yet it being originally but a Politicall or condition all Oath, relating to our former Unions when Warre w [...], and to our co­operation under our respective Magistrates only, not in a way contrary to the fifth Commandment; and that all the Magistra­cy which we enjoy, and by whom we are now fully possest, if they have not laid it aside, yet call us not out to act the remaining part of it; and that it interprets not it selfe: so that each private man is not made by it his owne Magistrate; and that there is no penal Article in it obliging us private men to pursue a publique Warre upon the Magistrates, or any other mens bare neglect or misinterpreting it to themselves; who therefore can contrary to all this, peremptorily warrant us now, yea necessitate us to begin, or assist to the desolation of warre and bloodshed upon it? espe­cially seeing it is made very dubious at least whither we be now tyed to it at all or no: Further more how good so ever it was at first, yea though that other Nation had not given it it's mortall wound, when they attempted to give us ours, both in England and in Ireland, (which was the cause of this effect of change of Go­vernment here) yet if when it was in force, it should any other way have received a bad tincture of passion or ambitious policy among [Page 66] our selves, why might it not by our Magistrates order, have been as well carried out of our Churches as the brazen Serpent was out of the Temple, after it was unhappily perverted to its wrong end? If otherwise, and that it must at all hazards be indirect­ly made a snare to peaceable consciences even after it is extinct (as hath been proved) I shall desire any pious spirit to judge, whither it doth not in such a case deserve much of Campanellas censure which he gave upon the Spanyards India Treasury, that it was gotten in blood, sailes home in a sea of blood, and never rests till it be all laid out in blood.

The Reader may be pleased to take notice that though these replyes for the most part touch but on simple obedience to a Government sup­posed unlawfull, but commanding lawfull things, yet they virtually ex­tend to our acting under such a Government. It is to be presumed that our adversaries not contesting profestly what hath been publiquely argued in that point, do conceive the difficulties of acting under invol­ved in those of our submission to such a power. The distinction of Active and Passive obedience, is but a nicety, and if one be not a sin, the other is not. They are in a manner the same thing, derive from the same Principle, and differ but gradually, just as the morning and the noone light do, which derive both from the same planet. For he who takes paines to furnish in a [...]axe, and he who tooke paines to execute the office of a Judge or of a Justice of peace in honest things by vertue of Commissi­ons and Orders from the same supreame (but illegall) Magistracy, doe both of them what they doe, by vertue of the same originall submission which is a passive obedience. If this be otherwise, then (according to these authors opinion) we and all our forefathers have sinned, in obeying those actively or passively, who by unjust usurpati­on have come betwixt us and them, who derive from the first who were in compact, unlesse the Lapse of time can justifie the viciousnesse of an action (which is impossible) or that we may lawfully obey those who plenarily possesse and protect us, and command us lawfull things.