A Common-wealth is a certain Soveraign Government of many Families, with those things that are common among them.

All Common-wealths are either

• Monarchies,
• Aristocraties,
• Democraties.

A Monarchie is that State where the Soveraignty [Page 2] resteth in the person of one only Prince.

An Aristocratie, is where some small part of the people have in the [...] as a body corporate, the Soveraignty and supream power of the whole State.

A Democrati [...], is where all the people have Power and Authority Soveraign.

So doth it appear, that the place and person where the Soveraigntie resteth, doth cause the State to be either a Monarchie, an Aristocratie, or Popular Government.

SOveraigntie is an absolute and perpetu­al power in every publike State and he is properly and only a Soveraign, that ac­knowledgeth no Superior or Equal, nor holdeth of any other Prince, person or power, but God and his own sword.

The First mark of Soveraigntie is absolute Power and Authority to command all Sub­jects in general, and every of them in par­ticular, without consent of any other person [Page 3] or persons, either greater or inferior to himself.

The Second mark of Majesty is Authority to make War, and conclude Peace at his pleasure.

The Third is Power to bestow all Honors and cheif Offices at his pleasure.

The Fourth marke of Soveraigntie is Ap­pellation.

The Fifth mark and last, is power to par­don all Subjects by rigor of Law or other­wise condemned in Life, Lands, Goods, or Honors.

These Powers are not to be imparted to any Officer, Deputy or other Magistrate, but in the Princes absence, and for some urgent occasion.

Monarchies are of three sorts

• Signioril,
• Royal,
• Tyrannical.

The Diver [...]tie of Monarchies doth no [...] proceed from the Nature of the State, but the diverse proceedings of those Princes that governe; for great difference there may be between the nature of the Common wealth and the Government thereof. That Prince that giveth the Magistracies, Honors and Offices without respect of Nobility, Riches or Vertue, may be said to governe popular­ly. And that Monarchy may be said to b [...] [Page 4] governed Aristocratically, when the Mo­narch imparteth the principal Honors and Offices to the Noble and Rich men only.

The same difference there is to be found in States Aristocratical and Popular: for the one and the other may be both Signio­ril, or Tyrannical.

A Monarch Signioril is he who by force of Arms and just War, is made owner of mens bodies and goods, and governeth them as a Master of a Familie governeth base Ser­vants and Slaves.

A Monarch Royal, is he whose Subjects are obedient unto his Laws, and the Mo­narch himself obeyeth the Lawes of God and Nature, suffering every Subject to en­joy liberty natural, with property in Lands and Goods, governing as a Father gover­neth his Children.

A Monarch Tyrannical, is he who with­out regard to the Law of God or Nature, commandeth Free-men as Slaves, and useth their Lands and Goods as his own.

ALL people subject to Princes, are go­verned as Free-men by their Prince and certain other particular Lords of Lands and Liberties; who not by the Princes Com­mission but by antient Lawes or Custom have Inheritance and Tenements; or else they are by one Prince and his Ministers commanded, which Ministers have not by Law, or Ordinance, any Authority or Inte­rest of themselves, but being like to the people (base men and slaves) they command only by Commission in the Prin­ces name; and the Authority of those Mini­sters doth cease at the Princes pleasure, so that the people doe not acknowledg any superior but the Prince [...] nor owe any ser­vice to other mean Lords: So as all the people stand without propertie in Lands or Goods; for example, the Empire of Turky and the West Indies.

The Provinces of this Monarchie are al­lotted to sundrie Magistrates or Ministers, [Page 6] and they altered and removed at the Prin­ces pleasure; but it is otherwise in a Monar­chie Royal, because the Monarch is there accompanied with many mean Lords [...] And albeit those mean Lords are Subjects unto the Prince, yet have they particular Te­nants who may not without just cause be dispossessed by the Prince; and those people having had dependency of their Lords and their Ancestors, do ever beare unto them a certain naturall love and dutifull respect: who so therefore compareth these Princi­palities, shall perceive, that to Conquer a State Signioril there is great difficultie; but being conquered, it may easily be maintained for the difficultie to conquer such a State, proceedeth from the lack of mean Lords to call in and assist the Prince that doth in­vade: who therefore desireth to subdue a Nation thus governed, must of force assault, all the people, and rather trust in his own strength then the aide of the Country. But if he can prevaile, then one only feare re­maineth, which is the Princes posteritie, which necessarily must be extinguished, be­cause the Princes race only hath interest both in the People and Soldiers. But to en­ter a Monarchy Royal, is an enterprise of no great difficulty, when he that doth enter, hath the friendship and aide of some [Page 7] mean Lords to take his part, and prepar the place where he is to arrive.

MOnarchies Royal, are for the most part antient and hereditary, and consequently easie to be governed. For it is sufficient for the Prince to maintain the old Laws, [...]and on occasion temporize with those accidents that happen [...] such a State cannot be taken from the Prince without excessive force; and if it be, it shall be soon recovered. Example, England and France.

But if a Monarchie newly conquered, be annexed unto an old, and not properly an­tient, then is it with much more difficulty maintained.

First, for that men naturally inclined to variation are easily induced [...]o take arms against him that newly governeth.

Secondly, every new Prince is forced to exact aswell upon those Subjects that joy­ned with him as those that did resist him, and therefore shall offend both. Example, Ireland annexed to the Crown of England: Sicilia and Naples to Spain [...].

[Page 8] The means to maintain such a Monarchie; is [...]

First to extinguish the race of him that was anciently Prince.

Secondly, to continue all Lawes and Customes in the former force; for so shall the Subject find nothing altered but the Prince, and therefore will soon rest conten­ted: and the rather if that new Monar­chie and the antient dominion of the Prince be of one Language: But if the people be of a contrary Language and humor, then to hold it, there needeth great industrie and fortune: in that case the best way is that the Prince should inhabit there, as well to incounter all inconveniences proceeding from the Subject, as to preserve the people from oppression of his own Ministers. Ano­ther way is to send thither certain Colonies, and plant them in fit places, or else to settle some garisons both of horse and foot; but Colonies are less chargeable to the Prince: As for the people inhabitant (who must necessarily remove, they being a small number and dispossessed) they cannot have power to offend: for in that case, this Rule or Maxime shall be found true, that men must be either kindly intreated [...] or with all extremity oppressed; because of light in­juries they may be revenged, but of utter oppre [...]ion they cannot.

[Page 9] A Third way to hold a conquered domi­nion, is, to cherish and defend the neigh­bors of little power, and oppress or keep un­der those that are most potent; and above all to take order that no forraign Prince or power doe enter; for it is ever to be looked for, that so many of the nation as are dis­contented, either for ambition or feare, will be ever readie to bring in strangers; and to conclude this matter of Principalitie annexed, I say it behoveth every Prince possessed of such a State, never to increase the power of any potent neighbor, never to oppress those that are of small power, ne­ver, to permit any forraign potentate to en­ter, but ever to plant Colonies and Gari­sons, or else to make that dominion his cheif habitation.

TYrannical Princes are not advanced by favor, neither doe they trust unto Fortune, but by degrees of Warr, or else by some other indirect meanes do aspire unto greatness; and therein do maintain themselves by all wayes either honest or dis­honest, [Page 10] without respect of Justice, Con­science or Law either of Nations or Na­ture: A Prince by such impious means as­pired, and desiring to hold that he hath gained, will take order that the Cruelties he committeth may be done roundly, sud­denly, and as it were at an instant; For if they be exe [...]nted at leasure and by piece­meale, then will the Princes fears continue long, and the terror in Subjects take deeper impression, whose nature is such that either they must be bound by benefits, or by cru­elty made sure from offending; Example, Dionysius and Agathocles.

SOme other Princes there are that from private Estate have aspired to Soveraign­ty not by unnatural or impious proceedings as the former, but by vertue and fortune, and being aspired have found no great difficulty to be maintained; for such a Prince having no other dominion, is forced to settle him­self where he is become a Prince; But here [Page 11] is to be noted that albeit such a man be ver­tuous, yet wanting fortune, his vertue pro­veth to small purpose, and fortune without vertue doth seldome work any great effect. Howsoever it be, a Prince being aspired, both by the aide of the one and of the o­ther, shall notwithstanding find some diffi­culty to hold what he hath gotten: because he is forced to introduce new Lawes and new Orders of government differing from the old, aswell for his own security, as con­firmation of the Government: for avoiding of which dangers he is to consider whether he be of himself able to compell his Subjects to obey, or must pray in aide of others; If he can doe the first, he needeth not doubt; but being driven to the other, his greatness cannot long continue [...] for albeit a matter of no difficultie it is to perswade a people, yet to make them constant, is a work well neer impossible. Example, Thes [...]us, Cyrus, Ro­mulus. The Second sort of new Princes are such as be aspired by favor or corrupti­on, or by the vertue or greatness of fortune or friends: A Prince by any or all these means advanced, and desirous to hold his Estate [...] must indeavor by his own vertue to maintain himself without depending upon any other: which may be done by this means; First; to assure all enemies from offending. [Page 12] Secondly, to win the love and friendship of so many neighbours as possibly he may. Thirdly to compass all designes ten­ding to his honor or profit, and bring them to pas [...] either by fraud or force: Fourthly, to make himself honoured and fol­lowed of Captains and Soldiers. Fifthly, to oppress all those that would or can offend. Sixthly to be obsequious & liberal to frinds, magnanimous & terrible to Foes. Seventhly, to c [...]sse all old and unfaithfull bands and entertain new. Eighthly, to hold such Amitie with Kings and Princes, as they ought reaso­nablie to favor him [...] or else they would offend; easily they cannot [...] Example, Gio­vannie, Torrigiani, Caesar Borgi [...].

The Third and last meanes whereby pri­vate persons doe aspire to Principalities, is not force and violence [...] but meer good-will and favor of men. The cause or occasion thereof, is only vertue, or fortune, or at least a certain fortunate craft and wittiness; because he aspireth either by favor of the People, or by favor of the Nobilitie; for these contrary humors are in all Common wealths to be found. And the reason thereof is, that the great men do ever endeavor to oppress the people, and the people do labor not to be oppressed by them. Of these divers appetites one of these three [Page 13] ef [...]ects doe proceed, viz. Principalitie, [...]i­berty, or Licencious life. Principality may come either by love of the multitude, or of the great men: for when any of these facti­ons do find it self oppressed, then do they soon consent to make one a Prince, hoping by his vertue and valor to be defended. Example, Francesco Sforz [...], Alessandro de Medici.

A Prince in this [...]ort aspired, to main­tain his Estate, must first consider well by which of these factions aforesaid he is ad­vanced: for if by favor of great men he be aspired, then must he meet with many difficulties; for having about him divers per­sons of great qualitie, and such as were but lately his equals, hardly shall he command them in such sort as it behoveth; But if the Prince be advanced by the people [...] few or none shall hardly disobey him. So it ap­peareth that a Prince made by the multi­tude is much more secure then he whom the Nobilitie preferreth: for common people doe not desire to enjoy more then their own, and to be defended from oppressi­on; but great men doe studie not only to hold their own, but also to command and insult upon inferiors.

Note that all Monarchies are P [...]incipa­lities,

[Page 14] But all Principalities are not Monar­chies.

A Senate or Council is a certain lawful assembly of Counsellors to give ad­vice to him or them that have in the comon Weale Power Soveraign.

A Counsellor is called in the Latine Se­nator; which word signifieth in effect an old man: The Grecians and Romans also most commonly composed the [...] Councils of ancient and expert persons; for if they or the greater part of them had bin young men, then might the Council have more properly bin called a Juvenate then a Se­nate.

The chief and most necessary note requi­red in a Counsellor is to have no depen­dance of any other Prince or Common­weale; either Oath, Homage, Natural ob­ligation, Pention, or reward: In this point the Venetians have bin ever most precise, and for that reason, doe not admit any Car­dinal or other Clergieman to be either of or [Page 15] at their Councils, therefore when the Veneti­an Sena [...]e is assembled, the Usher being ready to shut the dore cryeth aloud, Fuora Preti, Depart Priest.] Note also that in every state of what quality soever, a secret or Cabinet­Council is mainly necessary.

AN Officer is a person publick, that hath charge ordinary and limited by Law.

A Commissioner is also a person publick [...] but his charge is extraordinary and limited by Commission.

Officers are of two [...]orts, and so be Com­missioners; the one hath power to com­mand, and are called Magistrates; the other hath authority to execute: so the one and the other are persons publick: yet are not all publick persons either Officers or Com­missioners.

[Page 18] Commissioners are ordained to govern in Provinces [...] in Warr, in Justice, in dispo­sing the Treasure, or some other Function concerning the State; but all Commissions do spring and proceed from the Soveraign, Magistrates, and Commissioners. And here is to be noted that every Commission ceaseth if he that granted the Commission doth dye, or revoke it, or if the Commissi­oners during his Commission shall aspire to Office and Authority equall to his that made it.

A Magistrate is an Officer having power to command in the State; and albeit that every Magistrate be an Officer, yet e­very Officer is not a Magistrate, but they only that have power to command.

Also in making of Officers and Magi­strates in every Commonweale, three things are specially to be observed (viz) who doth make them, what men they are that should be made, and the forme and manner how they are made.

The first appertaineth to him or them in [Page 19] whom the Soveraigntie resteth; the second also belongeth to Majestie; yet therein the Laws are commonly followed, especially in Aristocracies and States popular; In the one the Magistrates are chosen out of the most wealthy or most noble: In the other, elected out of the whole multitude.

The forme and manner of choosing Magi­strates in Aristocracies and States Popular, is either by election, by lot, or by both, and their Office is to compel those that doe not obey what Soveraigntie commandeth: for all force of Commandment lyeth in compulsion.

Commandment likewise is of two sorts: the one may be called Soveraign and ab­solute, above Lawes, above Magistrates, and above people. In Monarchies such command is proper to the Prince only; in Aristocracies it resteth in the Nobility: and in Democracies the people have that power.

The second Commandments are Sub­ject both to Soveraignty and Law.

Here is to be noted that every Magistrate may recall his own Commandement, and forbid what he did Command, yet cannot revoke that which he hath Judged.

Com­missions deter­mine in presence of him that granted them. Also in presence of the Soveraign, all Au­thority of Magistrates ceaseth; and in pre­sence of great Magistrates the inferior have [Page 20] no power; and Magistrates equall cannot doe any thing but by consent, if his Col­leagues or fellow-Magistrates be present.

THe First concern matter Intrinsick.

The Second touch matter Extrinsick.

• The Administration of Justice.
• The Mannaging of the Treasure.
• The disposing of things appertaining to War.

• The skill how to deale with neighbours.
• The diligence to vent their designes [...]
• The way how to win so much confidence with some of them, as to be made partaker of whatsoever they mean to enterprise.

THis first point of matter extrinsick is of such quality as being well handled procureth great good, but otherwise becometh [Page 25] dangerous; for the proceeding must be diverse according to the diversitie of the ends which the Prince or Governor in­tendeth; for if he desire to continue peace with his Neighbors, one way is to be taken; but otherwise [...]e is to work that seeketh oc­casion to break, and to become an Enemy to one or more of his Neighbors. If he do desire to live peaceably with all, then he is to observe these Rules (viz.)

First, to hold and continue firmly all contracts and capitulations

Secondly, to shew himself resolved nei­ther to offer nor take the least touch of wrong or injury.

Thirdly, with all care and favor to fur­ther Commerce and reciproke traffick for the profit of the Subject, and increase of the Princes Revenue.

Fourthly, covertly to win so great confi­dence with Neighbors, as in all actions of unkindness among them he may be made Umpire.

Fifthly, to become so well bele [...]ved with them as he may remove such diffidences as grow to his own disadvantage.

Sixthly, not to deny protection or aid to them that are the weakest, and cheifly such as do and will endure his fortune.

Lastly, in Favouring, Aiding, and Protecting [Page 26] (unless necessity shall otherwise s [...] require) to do it moderately, so as they who are to be aided, become not Jealous, and consequently seek Adherency elswhere, which ofttimes hath opened way to other Neighbors that desire a like [...]ccasion.

EVery good and lawful principality is either elective or successive: Of them, election seemeth the more ancient; but suc­cession in divers respects the better; Minore discrimine sumitur Princeps quam qu [...]eritur. Tac.

The chief and only endeavor of every good Prince, ought to be the commodity and security of the Subjects; as contrarywise the Tyrant seeketh his own private profit with the oppression of his people. Civium non servitus sed tutela tradita est. Sal.

To the perfection of every good Prince, two things are necessarily required [Page 29] (viz) Prudence and Vertue; the one to direct his doings, the other to go­verne his life [...] Rex eris [...] [...]i recte feceris. Hor.

The second care which appertaineth to a good Prince, is to make his Subjects like unto himself; for thereby he is not only ho­nored, but they also the better governed; Facile imperium in bonos. Plaut.

Subjects are made good by two meanes (viz) by constraint of law, and the Princes example; for in all estates, the people do imitate those conditions whereunto they see the Prince enclined; Quiquid faciunt principes, pr [...]ecipere videantur. Quintil.

All vertues be required in a Prince, but justice and clemencie are most necessary; for justice is a habit of doing things Justly, as well to himself as others, and giving to every one so much as to him appertaineth; This is that vertue that preserveth concord among men, and whereof they be called good: [...]us & [...]equitas vincula civitatum: Cic.

The au­thor of the Epi­stle Dedi­catory to the Dut­chesse of Suffolk, prefixt to Mr. Latimer sermons, [...]aith that Lawyer [...] cove [...] ­ousness hath al­most de­voured England. It is the quality of this vertue also to proceed equally and temperately; it inform­eth the Prince not to surcharge the Subjects with infinite laws; for thereof proceedeth the impoverishment of the Subjects and the inriching of Lawyers, a kind [...]f men which [Page 30] in ages more antient, did seem of no ne­cessity: Sine causidicis satis [...]oelices olim fuer [...] futur [...]eque sunt urbes. Sal.

The next vertue required in Princes is Clemency, being an inclination of the mind to lenity and compassion, yet tempe­red with severity and judgment; this qua­lity is fit for all great personages, but chiefly Princes, because their occasion to use it is most; by it also the love of men is gained; Qui vult regnare, languida regnet manu. Sen.

After Clemency, Fidelity is expected in all good Princes, which is a certain perform­ance and observation of word and promise; this vertue seemeth to accompany Justice, or is as it were the same, and therefore most fit for Princes: Sanctissimum generis huma­ni [...]onum. Liv.

As Fidelity followeth Justice, so doth Modesty accompany Clemency; Modesty is a temperature of reason, whereby the mind of man is so governed [...] as neither in action or opinion he over-deemeth of him­self, or any thing that is his; a qualitie not common in fortunate folk; and most rare in Princes. Super [...]ia commune nobilitatis malum. Sal.

This vertue doth also moderate all exter­nal demonstration of Insolence, Pride, and [Page 31] Arrogance, and therefore necessary to be [...]nown of Princes, and all others whom [...]avor or Fortune have advanced: Impone [...]oelicitati t [...]e fr [...]enos, facilius illam reges. Curt.

But as Princes are to observe the bounds of Modesty, so may they not forget the [...]he Majesty appertaining to their supream [...]onor, being a certain reverend greatness due to princely vertue and royal State; A grace and gravity no lesse beseeming a [...]rince then vertue it self; for neither over­much familiarity, nor too great austeritie [...]ought to be used by Princes: Facilitas [...]ntoritatem, severitas amorem minuit. Tac.

To these vertues we may apply Libera­lity, which doth not only adorn, but high­ly advance the honor due to Princes; there­ [...]y also the good will of men is gained; for nothing is more fitting a Princes nature then Bounty, the same being accompanied with judgment, and performed according to the laws of liberality; Perdere multi sci [...]nt, do­nare nesciunt. Tac.

It seemeth also that Prudence is not only fit, but also among other vertues necessary in a Prince; for the daily use thereof is in all humane actions required, and chiefly in matters of State and Government. Prudentia [Page 32] imperantis propria et unica virtus. Arist.

The success of all wordly proceeding [...] doth shew that prudence hath compassed the prosperous event of humane actions, more then force of arms or other power [...] Mens una sapiens plurium vincit manus. Eurip.

Prudence is either natural, or received from others; for who so can counsel him­self what is fit to be done, needeth not the advice of others; But they that want such perfection, and are nevertheless capable, and are willing to know what others informe, ought to be accompted wise enough: Lau­datissimus est qui cuncta vid [...]bit, sed laudan­dus est is qui paret rectè monenti. He­siod.

ALbeit the excellent spirit of some Prin­ces be such as doth justly deserve the highest [...]ommendation; yet for that eve­ry course of life needeth the aid of men, and [Page 33] the mind of one cannot comprehend the infinite care a pertaining to publick affairs; it behooveth Princes to be assisted: Magna negocia, adjutoribus egent. Tac.

These assistants may be properly divided into Counsellors and Ministers; the one to advise, the other to execute: without Counsel, no Kingdom, no State, no private house can stand; for, experience hath proved that Common weals have prospered so long as good counsell did governe, but when favor, fear, or voluptuosness entred, those nations became disordered; and in the end subject to slavery: Quiddam sacrum profecto est consultatio. Plato.

Counsellors are men specially selected to give advice to Princes or Commonwealths, as well in peace as in war: the chief qualities required in such men, are Fidelity and Knowledg; which two concurring do make them both good and wise, and consequen [...]y fit for Counsel; Prudentis proprium m [...]nus rectè con [...]ulere. Arist.

The election of Counsellors is and ought to be chiefly among men of long experience, and grave years; for as youth is fittest for action in respect of corporal strength; so elder folk having felt the force of every fortune, and observed the course of worldly proceedings do seem most meet for consultation: [Page 34] Consilia senum, facta juvenum. Pla [...].

Albeit we say that the excellency of wis­dom should be in Counsellors; yet do we not require so quick and fiery a conceipt as is more apt for innovation then orderly go­vernment. Hebet [...]ores quàm acutiores meli­ùs Remp. a [...]ministrant. Thucyd.

To Fidelity and Experience we wish that our Councellors should be endued with Piety, Liberty, Constancy, Modesty, and Silence; for as the aid and assistance of God is that which governeth all good counsels, so liberty of speech and magnanimus utter­ing of what is good and fit, is necessary in Counsellors. Likewise to be constant and not to varie in opinion, either for feare or favor, is very commendable: Also as mo­desty in giving Counsel escheweth all offences, and gaineth good will; so secrecy is the best and most secure meanes to govern all publick affairs: Res magnae sustineri non possunt ab [...]o qui tacere nequit. Curt.

The first obstacle to good Counsel is [...]er­tinacy or Opiniativeness, a condition far un­fit for Counsellors; yet some men are so far in love with their own Opiniastre conceipts as that they cannot patiently endure oppositi­on. Secondly, Discord must from Counsel­lors be removed, because private offence [Page 35] many times impeacheth publick proceed­ings. Thirdly affection is an enemy to counsel, the same being commonly accom­panied with anger, wherewith nothing can be rightly or considerately done. Lastly Avarice seemeth a vice worthy to be ab­horred of all Counsellors because it driveth away both Fidelity and Honesty, the princi­pall pillars of all good counsell: Pessimum veri affectus et judicii venenum [...] utilitas. Tac.

To good Counsell other impediments there are, which square not with wisdom; for all crafty and hazarding Counsells do seem in the beginning likely to succeed; but afterwards and chiefly in the end do prove hard and of evil event. It therefore seemeth behovefull to be wary in resolving, and bold in executing: Animus vereri qui scit, scit tutò aggredi. Pub.

An other let to good consultation is im­moderate desire, which every wise man must endeavor to restrain. Cupiditate pauca rectè fiunt, circumspectione plurima: Thucyd.

Thirdly haste, is an Enemy to good de­liberation; for whoso greedily desireth any thing, proceedeth rashly; and rash proceed­ing endeth ever in repentance. Scelera impetu, bona consilia morâ vales [...]unt. Tac.

TO governe, is a certain skill how to command and continue Subjects in due obedience, so as offend they ought not, or if they will they cannot; wherein two speci­all things are to be considered (viz) the nature of Men, and the nature of the State [...] but first the condition of the vulgar must be well conceived; Noscenda natura vulgi, et quibus modis temperanter hab [...]atur. Tac.

The disposition of divers men is, some are apt to anger, some are hardy, some fearful; it therefore behooveth the Prince to accom­modate his government to the humor of [Page 39] people whom he governeth: Principis est virtus maxima nosse suos. Mart.

Likewise the nature of Commonweals is mutable and subject to change, and Kings are not only accompanied with fortune [...] but also followed with hate, which breedeth a continuall diffidence, chiefly towards those that are nearest to Majesty: Suspectus sem­per invisusq [...]e dominantibus quisquis prox­imus destinatur. Tac.

Moreover the vulgar sort is generally va­riable [...] rash, hardy, and void of judgment; ex opinione multa, ex veritate pauca judicat. Cic.

To confirm a Government, force and armes are of greatest necessity; by force I mean the guards and armes which Princes use for their defence or ornament; Miles in foro, Miles in curia principem comitari debet. Tac.

To this may be added fortification and strong buildings, in these days much used by new Princes, and others also to whom people yield, not willing obedience. In an­cient times Princes planted Colonies as well to suppress rebellion in conquered Coun­tries, as to front suspected neighbors: Colo­niae vera sedes servitutis. Tac.

The government of Princes is also greatly increased by a vertue, which I call a commendable [Page 40] affection in Subjects, proceedi [...]g of love and authority: These effects do grow from [...]he Princes own merit, but their being liveth in the mind of the People; this love is gained by lenity, liberality, and mercy; yet is every of them to be tempered: Nec aut reverentiam terrore, aut amorem hu­militate captabis. Plin.

Affection is also no way sooner won then by liberality, the same being used with Judgment and Moderation. Bellorum sociis, periculorum c [...]n [...]ortibus, sive de te ben [...] ac for­titer—meritis. Sen.

By [...]ndulgence likewise and Princely affa­bility the love of men is gained; for the multitude desire no more then necessary food, and liberty to use ordinary recreation [...] Vulgo, sicut pueris, omne ludicrum in pretio est. Sen.

AUthority is a certain reverent impressi­on in the minds of Subjects and others touching the Princes vertue and government; [Page 41] it resteth chiefly in admiration and [...]ear [...] Ingenita quibusdam gentibus ergareges [...]uos veneratio. Curt.

Authority consisteth in three things; (viz) the form of Government, the strength of the Kingdom [...] and the condition of the Prince; for in them all reputation and [...]ecurity resteth: Majest as imperii, salut [...]s [...]utela. Curt.

Whoso desireth to governe well, it be­hoveth him to use severity, constancy, and restraint; for over much lenity introduceth contempt, and certain hope of impunity; the condition of men being such as canno [...] be restrained by shame, yet it is to be com­manded by fear: Salutaris s [...]veritas vincit inanem speciem clementiae. Cic.

Yet ought severity to be used with great respect and sparingly, because over great terror breedeth desperation: Poena ad pau­cos, metus ad omnes perveniat. Cic.

To governe constantly is nothing else but to continue the old and antient laws in force without change or innovation unles exceed­ing great commodity or urgent necessity shall so require: for where extream pun­ishments are used, reformation is always needfull; Nocet interdum priscus rigor & nimia severitas. Tac.

Also to restrain Authority is a matter of [Page 40] great necessity [...]nd worthy a wise Prince [...] else he maketh others partakers of the ho­nor and power to himself only due, the same being also dangerous: Periculosum privati hominis nomen supra (immó & j uxta) principes extolli. Tac.

It seemeth also perilous that great Autho­rity given to private men should be long [...] for thereby oftentimes they are made in [...]o­lent and apt to innovation: Libertatis sive principatus magna imperia diuturna sse n [...] sinas. Liv.

Authority is also reinforced and enlarg­ed by power, without which no Prince can either take from others or defend his own: Parum tuta sine viribus majestas. Liv.

Power and Stength is attained by these [...]ive ways, Mony, Armes, Counsell, Friends and Fortune; but of these the first and most' forcible is mony: Nihil tam munitum quod non exp [...]gnari pecuni [...] possit. Cic.

Next to mony armes are of most use, as well to defend as to offend; to keep, as [Page 41] to conquer; for oftentimes occasion is to be offered as well to take from others, as to hold what is our own: Sua retinere privatae est domus, de alie [...]is certare Regia laus est. Tac.

Also of great and necessary use is Coun­sell, to devise how Arms ought to be em­ployed or enforced: Arma concilio tempe­ran [...]a. Tac.

Likewise Friends and Confederates do greatly increase the vertue of power, the same being such as have both wit and abi­lity to aid: In caducum parietem ne inclina: Adri.

The last, yet not the least part of power, consisteth in Fortune; whereof daily ex­perience may be seen; for the success of all humane actions seem rather to proceed from fortune then vertue. Omni ratione potentior fortuna. Curt.

To these particularities concerning power, we may add the qualities of the Prince, which greatly grace his authority; these are partly internal [...] and partly ex­ternal; by the one I mean the vertues of the mind, by the other a certain seemly beha­vior and comly gesture of the body; of the first kind I do suppose piety and provi­dence to be the chief, for piety maketh a Princk venerable, and like unto God; Oportet [Page 44] principem res divinas videri curare seri [...] & ant [...] omnia. Arist.

Providence is a forecast and likely con­jecture of things to come, supposed to be in those Princes that in their actions pro­ceed slowly and circumspectly; it seemeth also a course of Princely discretion to be retired and not ordinarily to converse with many: Autoritatem absentiâ tueare. Suet.

COnspiracy is commonly addressed to the Princes person; Treasons are ad­dressed again [...]t his Government, Authority, Country, Subjects, or places of strength. These Mischiefs are easily feared, but hard­ly eschewed [...] for albeit open Enemies are o­penly encountred, yet Fraud and Subtilty are secret foes, and consequently not to be avoided: Occulta pericula n [...]que praevidere n q [...]e vitare in promptu [...]st. Salust.

The danger of conspiracy preceedeth of divers causes, as Avarice, Infidelity of Subjects, Ambition in Servants, and coruption [Page 45] in Soldiers, therefore with great difficulty to be avoided: Vitae tuae dominus est, quisquis suam contempsit. Sen.

Notwithstanding it seemeth that either by Inquisition, Punishment, Innocency, or Destiny, the evill affection of men may be oftentimes discovered: 1. For whoso will curiously inquire and consider the actions and ordinary speeches of men (I mean those that be persons of honor and reputation) may oftentimes vent the Myne that lurketh in the minds. Quoniam raro nisi male lo­qunti male faciunt. Lips.

2. Punishment is likewise a thing so ter­rible that the consideration thereof with the hope of reward doth often discover those dangerous intentions: Cruciaiu aut praemio cuncta pervia sunt. Tac.

But as it is wisdom in Princes to give ear to informers, so are they not always to be believed; for Hope, Envy, Hate, or some other passion oftentimes draws them to speak untruly. Quis innocens esse potest si ac­cusare sufficit? Tac.

3. The third and likeliest defence a­gainst conspiracy is the Princes own In­nocency; for never having injured any man, it cannot be thought there liveth any Subject so lewde as will endeavor to hurt [Page 45] him. Fidelissima custodia principis ipsius in­ [...]ocentia. Pli [...].

4. The last and best bulwark to with­stand the force of this mischief we call destiny; which preceeding from the Fountain of divine providence, may be truly called the will of God; in whose only power it resteth to protect and de­fend good Pri [...]ces. Ille erit à latere tuo, & custodiet pedem tuum n [...] capiaris. Salo.

Treasons are most commonly enter­prized by covetous persons, who pre­ferring private profit before fame or fi­delity, do not fear to enter into any im­pious action: To this humor ambitious men, dissentious, and all such as be desi­rous of Innovation, are inclined: Pul­cra loquentes iidem in pectore prava stru­e [...]tes. Hom.

To these Offenders no punishment as e­qual to their impious merit, can be de­vised, being persons odious as well to friend as foes: Proditores etiam in quos ante­po [...]unt, invisi s [...]t. Tac.

HAving briefly touched the Vertues and Means whereby Princes are maintained [...]n Authority and Honor, let something be said of the causes from whence their ruine doth proceed; the cheif whereof seemeth to be Hate and Contempt: Hate cometh of Feare, which the more Common it is, the more Dangerous [...] Nulla vis imperii tanta est, quae prement [...] met [...] possit esse di [...]turna [...] Cic.

The causes of Feare are Punishments Im­positions and Rigor; and therefore it be­hooveth a Prince not only to shun them, but to eschew those actions whereby he may reasonably incur their suspition. Sentias enim homines ut metuant a [...]t oderint, [...]non mi­nus opinio [...]e & fama, quam certa aliqua rati­one moveri. Cic.

Yet Punishment [...] Imposition, and Censure are in all States necessary, although they shew and seem terrible, and consequently breed a certain desperation in Subiects, un­less they be discreetly and modestly used; [Page 48] for extreme and frequent punishments taste of cruelty; great and many Imposts [...]avour of Covetousness; censure of manners when it exceedeth the quality of offences, doth seem Rigor in these matters; therefore it be­hooveth the Prince to be moderate and cau­telous, chiefly in Capital Punishment, which must be confined within the bounds of Justice. Sit apud principem parsimonia etiam vilissimi sanguinis. Sen.

But if for securitie sake the Prince be forced to punish, let the same be done with shew of great sorrow and lothness: Tan­quam invitus & magnocum tormento ad casti­gandum veniat. S [...]n.

Let all punishments also be slowly execu­ted [...] for they that are hastily punished do seem to have bin willingly condemned; neither ought any Capital [...] Punishment to be inflicted but only that which is profitable to the Commonweale, and for example sake. Non [...]am ut ipsi pereant, quam ut alios pereundo deterreant. Sen.

In punishing also a special respect must be had, that no shew of content or pleasure be taken therein. Formarabiei est sanguine & vulneribus gaudere. Sen.

Also in punishing equality must be obser­ved, and the nature of the punishment ac­cording to the Custom. Nec eisdem de causis [Page 49] alii plectantur, alii ne appellentur quidem [...] Cic.

But in punishing publick offences wherei [...] a multitude have part, the execution ought to be otherwise, and as it were at an instant, which may haply seem terrible, but in effect is not. Frequens vindicta paucorum odium reprimit, omnium irritat. Sen.

Another meanes to satisfie a people offen­ded is to punish the Ministers of cruelty, and with their blood to wash away the common hatred. Piaculares publici odii victimae. Plin. By this King David did appease the Gi­beonites.

The next cause of discontent cometh of Impositions under which word is compre­hended all levies of mony, a matter no­thing pleasing to people, as that which they esteem equall to their own lives. Pecunia anima & sanguis est mortalibus. Plaut.

First, to remove hate conceived of this cause, there is nothing better then publick expostulation of necessity: for what Com­monwealth or Kingdom can be without Tributes? Nulla quies gentium sine armis, nec arma sine stipendiis, nec stipendia sine Tri­butis haberi queunt, Tac.

The second remedy against Hate for im­positions is to make moderate Levies and rare. For as Tiberius the Emperor was wont [Page 50] to say, a Sheep should be fleeced not flead. Qui nimis emungit, elicit sanguin [...]m. Tac.

Thirdly, also to eschew the offence of People it behoveth the Prince to have a vigilant eye on Informers, Promoters, and such fiscal Ministers, whose cruelty and covetous pro­ceedings do oftentimes occasion great hate; but this mischief may be, though hardly, en­countred, either by choosing honest Officers, or (proving otherwise) not only to re­maine them but to use them as spunges, Ex­primendi post qu [...]m biberint. Suet.

In all impositions or Taxations, no cru­elty or force ought to be used, the second cause to kindle hate: and to meet with that mischief, nothing is better then to proceed moderately, and without extremity. Ne Boves ipsos, mox agros, postremò corpora ser­vitio aut poenae tradant, Tac.

The fourth remedy is the Princes own parsimony, not giving so largely to private persons as thereby to be forced to take from the multitude. Magnae opes no [...] tam multa capiendo, quam haud multa perdendo, quaerunt [...]r. Maecaenas [...]

The last help against hate is in taxation to proceed equally, indifferently, and without favor or respect; and that the Assessors of Taxes may be elected of the meaner sort of people. Populus maximam fidem rerum suarum hab [...]t. Tac.

[Page 51] Touching Censure, which we numbred amongst the causes whereof hate is con­ceived, much needeth not to be spoken, be­cause the same is discontinued [...] or rather ut­terly forgotten; yet doth it seem a thing ne­cessary, being a certain observation and controlement of such evill manners, and disorders as were not by Law Corrigible; these Officers were of the Romans called Magistri pudoris & mod [...]stiae. Livi.

To the Function of Censures these two things are anciently subject Manners, and Excess; Under Manners I comprehend Wan­tonness, Drunkenness, Dicing, Brawling, Perjury, and all such Lewdness as Modesty condemneth. These disorders were anci­ently punished by the discretion of [...]ensors in all Ages and Sexes, to the end that Idle­ness might be generally avoided. Vniversa plebs habeat neg [...]tia sua, quibus àmal [...] pub­lico detineatur. Salust

Excess includeth Riotousness, expence of Money, Prodigal housekeeping, Banqueting, and Superfluitie in Apparrel, which things are the mothers of many mischeifs. It also seemeth in some sort perillous to the Prince that the Subject should exceed either in Co­vetize or Consuming. Nemo nimis excedat, sive amicorum copiâ, sine opum. Arist.

The punishment inflicted upon these sorts [Page 52] of offenders, were either Ignom [...]ny, or Pecu­niarie punishments, Censoris judicium d [...]m­nato nihil affert nis [...] ruborem. Tac.

The first and chiefest meanes to remove these inconveniences, is the Princes own ex­ample, whose life being well censured, easily reduceth others to order. [...]ita principis cen­sura perpetu [...]. Plin.

Secondly, Those disorders may be taken away without danger, if the Censures doe proceed by degrees and leasurely; for the nature of man may not suddenly be altered [...] Vitia quaedam tol [...]it facilius princeps, si eorum sit p [...] ti [...]n [...]. Sen.

These are the cheifest rules whereby to eschew hate; but impossible it is for any Prince or Minister utterly to avoid it; for being himself good, he incurreth the offence of all bad folk: if he be evil, good men will hate him; this danger therefore Wise and Vertuous Princes have little regarded: because hate may be gained as well by good as evil doing. Odia qui nimium timet, reg­nare nescit. Sen.

One other means to remove this error, is, to reward the good and well deserving Subjects; for no man can think him cruell that for love to Vertue useth Austeritie: which wil appear when he bestoweth boun­tif [...]lly on the good. Praemio & [...]oena Res­publica continetur Solon.

[Page 53] The other Vice which indangereth the State of Princes, we call Contempt, being a certain base and vile conceipt, which ente­reth into the Subjects, strangers or servants, of the Prince and his Proceedings; for the Authority of a King may be resembled to the powers of mans mind, whereunto the hands, the feet, the eyes, do by consent obey. Vires imperii in consensu obedientium sunt Livi.

The causes of Contempt do proceed chiefly from the form of Government, For­tune, or the Princes manners; the form of Government becometh contemptible, when the Prince desiring to be thought merciful, ruleth rather pittifully then justly: which manner of proceeding taketh away all reve­rence in the people, and in liew thereof en­tereth liberty, or at least a certain boldness to offend; Facultas faciendi quod cuilibet visum, non p [...]test comprimere ingenitam si [...] ­gulis hominibus pravitatem. Tac.

Also to be Mutable, Irresolute, light and Inconsiderate in bestowing the Honors and Offices of State, maketh the Prince con­temptible; Qui praesentibus fruitur, nec in longi [...]s consultat [...] Arist.

But if contempt be caused by Fortune, or as may be said more reasonably, by destiny, and that those fri [...]nds do fail who ought in [Page 54] duty to defend the Prince and his Autho­rity, then is there small hope to eschew contempt. Fato obnoxia virtus. Pl [...]ut.

The Princes manners do breed contempt, when he yeildeth his affections to sensuality and sloth, or if he incur the suspition of Simplicity, Cowardise, or any such Vice, un­worthy the Dignity he beareth [...] Common people do sometimes also disesteem the Prince for external and light causes, as de­formity of person, sickness or such like. Mos vulgi est, fortuita & externa ad culpam trahe­ [...]e. Tac.

ALbeit roundness and plain dealing be most worthy praise, chiefly in private persons; yet because all men in their actions do not so proceed it behooveth Wise Men and Princes above others at oc­casions to semble and dissemble; for as in all actions a Prince ought to be slow and advised; so in consent and beleiving haste and facility is most dangerous; and though credulity be rather an error then a fault; [Page 55] yet for Princes it is both unfit and perilous. Wherefore it importeth them to be defended with this caution, Nihil credendo, atque om­nia cav [...]ndo. Ci [...].

Notwithstanding he must not shew him­self diffident or distrustful utterly; but as I wish he should not over-slightly believe all men, so ought he not for small causes distrust every man. Multi faller [...] d [...]cuerunt, dum timent falli. Sen.

Dissimulation is as it were begotten by diffidence, a quality in Princes of so great necessity as moved the Emperor Tiberi [...] to say, Nescit regnare, qui nescit dissim [...] ­lare.

The necessity of dissimulation is chiefly to be u [...]ed with strangers and enemies: it also sheweth a certain di [...]cretion in Magistrates sometimes to disguise with friends when no offence doth thereof follow. Do [...]i non sunt d [...]li, nisi ast [...] colas. Plaut.

This kind of craf [...] albeit in every mans conceipt not praisable, is nevertheless tole­rable, and for Princes and Magistrates (the same being [...]sed to good ends) very ne­cessary. But those cunnings which are con­trary to vertue, ought not of honest men to be used: neither dare I commend Adulation and Corruption; though they be often used in Court and are of some learned writers [Page 56] allowed. Decipere pro moribus temporum, prudentia est. Plin.

By great subtiltie and frauds contrary to Vertue and Piety, I mean Perjury and In­justice, which though all men in words de­test, yet in deeds are used of many, perswa­ding themselves by Cavillations and Sophi­stications to excuse the impiety o [...] their false Oathes: as it is written of Lysander, Pueros [...]lis, viros juramentis circumvenire solebat. Plut.

THe Art Military is of all other quali­ties most necessary for Princes; for without it they cannot be defended; force of men only sufficeth not, unless the same be governed by Council, and Martial Wisdom. Duo sunt quibus resp [...] servatur; in hostes forti­tudo, & domi concordia. Tac.

Military knowledge concerneth Warr, and every Warr is either Forreign or Do­mestical. Touching Forriegn it must be considered [Page 57] when it must be begun, how to con­tinue it, and when to be ended; to begin War, a Prince is, to take heed that the cause be just, and the enterprise advisedly entred into. Sunt enim & belli sicut pacis jura, j [...]st [...]que ea non minus ac fortiter gerere debes. Liv.

The Laws of Arms are in all Common­weales to be duly observed: for to enter fight rashly and without respect to reason, were beastly; also to kill or slay would work no better effect, then that all Nati­ons should without mercy murder one ano­ther; Barbaro rity coe [...]em coede, & sangui­nem sangnine expiare. Sal [...]

No Warr therefore is to be made but such as is just. And in every just War these three things are to be looked into (viz) that the Author be of Authority, that the cause be good, and the end just; for in all States, the Prince, or they in whom the So­veraignty resteth, are the just Author [...] of Warr: others have no such Authority. Si quis privatim si [...]e public [...] s [...]ito, pacem bel­lumve feceri [...], capitale esto. Plat [...].

Warrs are of two sorts: Defensive and Offensive [...] the one to resist, the other to in­vade [...] against defence nothing can be said, because it is natural and necessary. Est non modo justum sedetiam nec [...]ssarium cum vi vis illata defendi [...]ur. Cic.

[Page 58] Defensive Warr is of two sorts, either to defend thine own, or thy friends; for it is reason that every one should keep securely that which to him appertaineth: and there­with also by Arms to defend the liberty of Country, Parents, and Friends. Nullum bellum à civitate suscipitur nisi aut pro fid [...] aut pro salute. C [...]c.

The like reason leadeth us to assist and protect friends: for the common obligation of humane society doth so require. Qui enim non obsistit si potest, injuriae, tam est in viti [...], quam si parentes aut patriam, aut socios deserat. Cic.

Invasion is also just and allowable, but not ever; for who so hath bin robbed, or spoiled of his Lands, or Goods, may law­fully seek repossession by force: yet so [...] as before any force be used, he first civilly seek restitution, wherein if Justice be denied, then is the use of Arms necessary: [...]ustum bellum quib [...]s necessarium; & pia arm [...] quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes. Liv.

Likewise invasion is lawfull against Bar­barians, whose Religion and Impiety ought to be abhorred, chiefly if they be potent and apt to offend; for the cause of such Warr is compulsion and suppression of evil. Cui lioenti [...] iniquitatis eripitur, utiliter vincitur. August.

[Page 59] Finally, To conclude this matter of in­ [...]asion, I say, That no revenge, no desire of [...]onor or Empire, are any lawful causes of [...]ar; but the intent thereof ought to be [...]irected onely to def [...]nce and security: For [...]ise men do take arms to win Peace, and [...]n hope of rest they endure travel. Ita bil­ [...]um suscipiatur u [...] nihil aliud quam pax [...]uaesita vid [...]atur. Cic.

Having said somewhat against unjust [...]ar, let us speak of temerity and unad­ [...]ised War, an enterprise worthy discom­ [...]endation. Omnes bellum sumunt facil [...], [...]gerrimè de [...]inunt: n [...]c in ejusdem pot [...]state in­ [...]tium & finis est. Sal.

A wise Prince therefore ought neither to undertake any unlawful invasion nor with­out sober and mature deliberation enter [...]nto any War, as he that is unwilling to offend, yet of courage e [...]ough to defend. Nec pr [...]voces bellum, nec timeas. Plin.

To make War, three things are required. Money, Men, and Arms; and to maintain a War, Provision and Council are needful: Therefore a wise Prince before he begins a War, doth carefully consider what forces and charge thereunto belongeth. Diu [...]p­parandum est bellum, ut vincas melius. Pub.

Above all other Provisions, car [...] must be [Page 60] had, that Bread be not wanting; for with­out it, neither victory nor life can be looked for. Qui frumentum necessariumque com­meatum non praepar [...]t, vincitur sine ferro [...] Vegetius.

Lastly, it behoveth a Prince always to have Arms in readiness, I mean, Harness, Horses, Weapons, Artillery, Engines, Powder, and every other thing necessary either for service on Horse or Foot: We may adde hereunto Ships, and Shipping of all sorts, with every furniture of offence or defence; for these preparations make a Prince formidable, because no man dare do or attempt injury to that King or people where preparation is ever ready to revenge. Qui de [...]iderat pacem, praeparat bellum [...] Ca [...].

By men we mean a multitude of Subjects armed, trained to defend or offend: These are of two sorts, Captains and Soldiers; and Soldiers are either Footmen or Horse­men [...] the one of great use in the Cham­pion, the other in Mountainous places; al­so for defence or assault of Towns or Grounds fortified most necessary, and con­sequently meet for service in all places, which moved Tacitus to say, Omne in pedite robur, Tac.

For sudden service, Horses do seem most [Page 61] [...]eet, and the execution of any enterprise [...]s by them most speedily performed: Ne­ [...]ertheless the actions of [...]ootmen do seem more certainly executed, chiefly if they be well armed, and skilfully led; for so ex­ [...]erience hath of late time proved; be [...]ides, [...]hat they are of less expence and of greater [...]umber. In universum aestimanti plus in [...]edite robur [...] Tac.

Having thus proved, that both Horse and [...]oot be necessary; let us remember, that [...]nless they be serviceable [...] great numbers [...]re to small purpose. Manibus opus est bello, [...]on multis nominibus, Livi.

To make Soldiers serviceable, consisteth [...]n good choice and good Discipline; the one at this day little regarded. Emunt mili­ [...]em, non legunt, Livi.

Soldiers ought to be elected out of the most honest and able number of Bodies; and every Company composed of men known one to the other; for thereby they are made the more confident: But hereof is small heed taken; for commonly they are Purgamenta urbium suarum, Curt.

Touching Discipline, it seemeth that thereof the external Form, and not the certain Substance, is observed: For as in former ages, Soldiers endeavoured to be ver­tuous and modest, so now they rather study [Page 62] to excel in Riot, then in Martial knowledge. Ex [...]ercitus lingua quam manu promptior [...] praedator est sociis, & ipse praeda hostium [...] Sal.

For as much as Soldiers are made good by election and choice, it seemeth that the foundation and ground of service con­sisteth in the discretion and judgment o [...] those that have authority to make Election; yet will we adde, that they must be chosen of natural Subjects [...] for strangers are cove­tous, and consequently corruptible; they are also mutinous and cowardly: Thei [...] custom likewise is to rob, burn, and spoyl both friends and foes, and to consume the Princes treasure. Ossa vides regum vacui [...] ex [...]ucta medullis [...] Juven.

But the Native Soldier is faithful and obedient [...] resolute in fight, loving to his Countrey, and loyal to his Prince. Gent [...] quae sub regibus s [...]nt, pro Deo col [...]nt. Curt [...]

Native Soldiers are of two sorts, (viz.) They that be in continual pay, and they that are trained ready to serve, but do not­withstanding attend their own private af­fairs, until they be called: The first are for all Princes necessary. In pace decus, in bello prae [...]idiu [...]. Tac.

Of this sort no great number ought to be, as well to [...]schew disorder, as also to [Page 63] save expences. The second kinde of foot Soldiers are to be levied in Villages, as peo­ple more patient of pains, and fit for the Wars; yet so judiciously disposed as the Citizens. Odio praesentium & non cupidine mutationis. Tac.

Touching the number of these extraor­dinary Soldiers, that must be referred to dis­cretion: Bellum parare, simul & aerario parcere.

To conclude, I say these numbers of or­dinary and extraordinary foot ought to be according to the number of the people, not inserting any Gentlemen; for service on hors-back is to them onely proper. Alas rusticis non tribu [...]; in nobilitatem & in di­vites haec à pauperibus onera inclines. Livi.

The most certain notes whereby to con­ceive the disposition of men fit to become Soldiers, are these five. The Country where they are born, their age, proportion of body, their quality of minde, and their fa­culty. Touching

First, The Countrey, it is a thing appa­rently proved, that Mouutainous Regions, or barren places, and Northern habitations do breed wits well disposed to the War. Locorum asperitas hominum quoque ingenia durat. Curt.

Secondly, The Age most apt for the War, [Page 64] was anciently observed to be about eigh­teen years, and so the Romans used. Facilius est ad virtutem instruere novos milites, quàm revocare pr [...]eteritos. Veget.

Thirdly [...] The stature of a Soldier ought to be observed: Marius liked best the longest Bodies; Pyrrhus preferred large and well proportioned men; but Vegetius in his choice, rather esteems strength then stature: [...]t [...]lius est fo [...]tes milites [...]sse quàm grande [...]. Veget.

Fourthly, The Minde or Spirit of a Sol­dier ought to be enosidered; for that Minde which is quick, nimble, bold, and con [...]ident, seemeth apt for War: He is also of good hope [...] that loveth honor more then ease or profit: In brief, Is qui nihil metuit nisi tur­p [...]m [...]amam. Sal.

Lastly, it is to be marked in what art or faculty a man hath been bred: for it may be presumed that Fishers, Fowlers, Cooks, and others trained up in effeminate arts are unfit for Martial endeavor: And as these men were in respect of their trade thought unme [...]t so in old time, slaves and master­less men were repulsed from arms, as per­sons in [...]amous. Sed nunc tales sociantur armis quales Domini haber [...] [...]astidiunt. Veget.

How Soldiers ought to be chosen, these few words we have spoken, may su [...]fice. Let [Page 65] us therefore say somewhat of Discipline. Choice findeth out Soldiers, but Discipline doth make and continue them fit for ser­vice. Paucos viros fortes natura procreat, b [...]na institutione plures redda [...] indu [...]ria: Veget.

Discipline is a certain severe confirmation Disci­pline. of Soldiers in their Valor and Vertue, and is performed by four means, Exercise, Or­der, Compulsion, and Example. The two first appertain to Valor, the third to Ver­tue, the last to both: But of Exercise, first, I say, That a Soldier being chosen, ought to be informed in Arms, and used in Exer­cise and Action; the word exerciti [...]m im­por [...]eth nothing else. Exercit [...] dic [...]tur quod melius fit exercitando. Varro

Order consisteth in dividing, disposing, and placing of men aptly at all occasions to be commanded, as the Leaders shall di­rect. This matter requireth a large dis­course, and therefore I refer it to skilful Captains and Writers, as Polybius, Vegetius, De la Nonne, and others.

Compulsion and Correction, is that which bridleth and governeth the manners of Soldiers: For no order can be observed amongst them, unless they be continent, modest, and abstinent; for continency is cheifly to be shewed in their diet, and moderate [Page 66] desires. Degenerat à robore ac virtute miles assuetudine voluptatum. Tac [...]

The Modesty of a Soldier is perceived by his Words, Apparel, and Actions: For to be a vaunter, or vain-glorious boaster, is far unfit in him that professeth Honor or Arms, seeing true Vertue is silent [...] Viri mi­litiae nati, [...]actis magni [...] ad verborum linguae­que ce [...]tamina, rudes. Tac.

The Apparel of a Soldier sheweth mo­desty, if therein he do not exceed; for al­beit it fitteth well the Profession of Arms, to be well armed and decently apparelled; yet all superfluity savoreth of ignorance or vanity. Horriaum militem esse decet, non cae [...]atum auro argentoque sed ferro. Livi.

Abstinence is also fit for all Soldiers; for thereby guided, they refrain from violence, and insolency; by that rule also they are informed to govern themselves civilly in the Country where they serve, and likewise in [...]heir Lodgings: Never taking any thing from the owner, nor committing any out­rage. Vivant cum provincialibus [...]ure civili [...] ne [...] insolescat animus quise sensit armatum.

The last mark of Discipline we called Example, under which word is Compre­hended reward and punishment: For men are rewarded when [...]oever they receive for any excellent or singular Service, Honor or [Page 67] Riches. And for Evil, they have their due when they taste the punishment thereunto belonging. Necessarium est acrius ille dimi­cet, quem ad opes & dignitates ordo militiae & imperatoris judicium c [...]nsuevit evehere. Veget.

Likewise as Gold and Glory belongeth to good and well deserving Soldiers; so punishment is due to those that be vitious and cowardly [...] for nothing holdeth Soldi­ers in obedience so much as the severity of discipline. Milites impe [...]atorem potius quam hostem metuere debent [...] Veg.

OF Soldiers let this little suffice [...] we will now speak of what quality Cheiftants and leaders ought to be [...] for upon them de­pendeth the welfare of whole Armies. Mi­litaris turba sine duce, corpus sine sp [...]itu. Curte.

A [...]heif or General in Warr, is either of his own Authority cheif, or a general that commandeth in the name of another. Of the [Page 68] first sort are Emperors, Kings, and Princes; of the other, be their Deputies, Lievtenants, Collonels, and indeed all generall Comman­ders in the War: Now whether it be more expedient that the Prince should command in person or by deputy, divers wise men have diversly thought, therefore it may be be thus distinguished; if the War do then only concern some particular part or Pro­vince, then may the same be performed by a Lievtenant; but if the whole Fortune of a Prince do thereupon depend, then is he to command in his own person and not other­wise. Dubiis bellorum ex [...]mplis summae r [...] ­rum & imperi [...] seipsum reservat. Tac.

It therefore importeth the Prince some­times by his own presence, sometimes by his deputation to performe that Office: but however occasion shall require, it ever behoveth that one only commander ought to be; (for plurality of Cheiftaines doth rarely or never worke any good effect) yet with this caution that he be of experience, and wise. In b [...]lica praefectura major asp [...]ctus habendus peritiae quam virtutis a [...]t morum [...] Arist.

The quali [...]ies required in a Cheiftaine are these, Skill, Vertue, Providence, Autho­rity, and Fortune By skill we meane he should be of great knowledge, and long experience [Page 69] or to make a sufficient Captai [...]e; the information of others, or his own reading is not enough. Qui [...]orit quis ordo agminis, quae cura exploa ndi, quantus ur­gendo trahendove bello modus [...] Cic [...]

Military vertue is a certain vigor or force both of body and minde to exercise Soldiers aswell in fained war as to fight with the Enemy; and summarily a Captain ought to be Laboriosus in negotio, fortis in periculo, industrius in agendo, celeri [...] in con­ficiendo. Cic.

Next to vertue we placed providence as necessary in great Captains; for being of such wisdome they will not hazard nor commit more to fortune then necessity shal inforce; yet true it is [...] fools and vulger [...] folks that commend or discommend actions ac­cording to succeess, were wont to say: Cunctatio servilis, statim exequi, Regium est. But advised and provident Captains do think; Temeritas praeterquam quod stulta, est etiam infelix. Livi. Albeit providence be the best mean of good speed; yet some Captains of that quality and in skill excelling, have bin in their actions unlucky; when others of less sufficiency have marvellously prevailed; we may therefore reasonably say with, Cic. Quod olim Max­mo, Marcello, Scipi [...]ni, Mari [...] & ceteris m gnis [Page 70] Imperatoribus non solum propter virt [...]t [...]m, sed etiam propter fortunam saepius imperia mandata, at (que) excercitus esse commissos. Cic.

Lastly, we wished authority to be in Cheiftains; for it greatly importeth what opinion or conceipt the Enemy hath of such a Governor, and likewise how much his friends and confederates do esteem him: but the cheif and only means to maintain Au­thority, is Austerity and Terror. Dux Au­thoritatem maximam [...]veritate sumat, omnes culpas militares legibus vindicet, nulli erran­tium credatur ignoscere [...] V [...]get.

Also experience hath proved that such Cheiftains as were affable and kind to their Soldiers, were much loved, yet did they in­cur a contempt: but on the otherside those that commanded severely and terribly, although they gained no good will [...] yet were they ever obeyed: Dux facilis inutilis. App.

AFter men found and framed fit for the Warr, to small or no purpose shall they [...]erve, unless they be imployed by wis­dom or good Council. Mon minus est Im­perator is consili [...] quam vi perficere. Tac.

Council in War is of two sorts; direct Council and indirect; the f [...]rst sheweth a plain and orderly course for [...]roceeding, as to lay hold on occasion: for as in all other human actions occasion is of great force; Occasio in bello solet amplius juvare quam virtus. Veget.

As occasions presented are means of good success; so fame worketh great effects in the Wars; therefore it behooveth a Cap­tain to be constant, and not apt to beleive the vain rumors and reports of men. Mal [...] imperatur, cum regit vulgus duces suos. Sen.

Confidence is also to be eschewed; for no man is sooner surprised, then he who [...]eareth le [...]t: also contempt of th [...] Enemy [Page 72] hath bin occasion of great discomfitures, therefore as a Captain ought not to fear, so should he not contemn his Enemy. Ni­mia [...]ducia semper obnoxia. Aemyl.

As security, and overmuch estimation of our own vertue or valor is hurtfull: so doth it import every good Captain to be well in­formed not only of his own forces, but also of what strength the Enemy is; likewise it behooveth him to know the situation of the Country and the quality of the people, with every other circumstance. Moreover, the Generals honor and capacity ought to be known with the condition and nature of the Enemy. Impetus acres c [...]nctatione lan­guescunt, aut in perfidiam mutantur. Tac.

Tem [...]ty in War is also dangerous; for wise Captains were wont not to enterprise any thing without deliberation and good opportunity, unless they were thereunto by necessity inforced. In rebus asperis & tenuispe, fortissima qua (que) consilia tutissima sunt. Livi.

Some wise men not superstitiously but discreetly do think prodigious signes from Heaven or on Earth are not to be neglected, neither are dreams in time of War to be contemned. Nam amat benignitas numini [...], seu quod merent [...]r homine [...], seu quod tangitur [Page 73] [...]orum affectione, his quoque rationibus pro­dere quae impendent. Aemi.

A wise Captain will also wait oportuni­ties and spy out fit times when the Enemy is wearied, or pretending fear, draw him into danger; which advantages with many other, are gained chiefly by observing of time; Quia si in occasionis momento, cuj [...]s praetervolat o [...]p [...]rtunitas [...] cunctat [...]s paulum [...]eris, nequicquam mox omissam querare [...] Livi.

Next the observation of Time, the Place is to be well considered, whether it be for thine advantage or thine enemies. Amplius prodest locus [...]aepè quàm virtus. Veget [...]

Thirdly, It importeth much, that men be well ordered, trained, and prepared for the fight; for the want of Art is cause of many disadventures, and many times a small supply of choice Soldiers on horsback or foot, doth seem to the enemy very terri­ble: Likewise a sudden shout or conceit hath amazed a whole Army. Milites v [...]nis & inanibus, magis quam justis formidinis causis moventur. Curt.

Fourthly, It were to good purpose, that in ordering of men for fight, Soldiers of one Cou [...]try or Nations, should be ranged together, and above all to foresee, that the least loss of Blood be among the Natural [Page 74] Subjects, and so handle the Matter, that the cheif slaughter light upon strangers and Mercenaries. Ingens victoriae dec [...]s, citra domesticum sanguinem [...]ellanti. Tac.

The Generals own courage and lively dis­position to fight, will greatly animate the multitude of Soldiers; as a contrary counte­nance or appearance of Fear, will exceeding­ly maze and dant. Necesse estad [...]ugam p [...]rati sint, qui ducem suum sentiunt desperare. Veget.

It were also for thy great advantage [...] that the forces should be ordered for the fight, before the enemy be prepared.

First, For that thou maist the better per­form, what thou thinkest fit to be done.

Secondly, That thereby thine own forces will thereof receive great courage, being readiest to assail the enemy, and to begin the fight. Plus animi est inferenti periculum, quam propulsanti. Livi.

After Victory it is not the best policy to execute the enemies with extteam cruelty, but proceed moderately; for it shall suffice the Victory is thine. [...]lausis ex d [...]speratione crescit audacia, & cum spei nihil est, sumit arma f [...]rmid [...]. Veget.

Lastly, I would advise that the General should be wary in his Actions, and in every enterprise to frustrate the Soldiers from spoils and pil [...]age. Saepe obstitit vincentibus [Page 75] [...]ravum inter ipsos certamen, omisso hoste spolia consectandi. Tac.

Of direct Councils, let that we have said suffice. We will now speak of Councils in­direct, commonly called by the Greek word, Stratagems or Subtile practices: Which manner of proceeding, hath been in times past of divers grave Writers condemned. Vir nemo mentis altae clanculum velit occi­dere hostem. Eurip.

Notwithstanding the opinion of this, and divers other Writers worthy credit, it seem­eth reasonable, and in piety allowable: that Stratagems and Subtilt [...]es may be used in the War, yet with such Caution as the same may stand with Fidelity and Honor: For Fraud being used contrary to Contracts and Agreements made with the enemy, is meer Treachery: As to poyson him or her, a murtherer to kill him, were plain Impiety. Faederatum injustè fallere impium. Livi.

Also out of the War covertly to kill a particular enemy by secret Assault or Pra­ctice, is not warrantable, either by Faith or Honor; yet to use all craft, cunning, and subtilty in open War, is both allowable and praisable; and so is thought by Christian Writers. Cum justum bellum suscipitur, ut apertè pugnet quis aut ex insidiis, nihil ad justitiam interest. Aug.

[Page 76] The same is also approved by divers Authors of good credit. Confice [...]ive dolo seu stricto cominus euse. The same is also affirmed by Xenophon, Reipsa nihil utilius in bello dolis.

Thus having briefly touched what Coun­sels are required in War, let us consider how Victory is to be used; for the end of every good War is Peace: To the enjoying whereof, three things are required, Wari­ness, Mercy, and Modesty; because over­great confidence may happily impeach the end of good Success. Res se [...]und [...] neglig [...]n­ [...]iam creant. Livi.

I also wish the Victory to be handled mercifully, because all Conquests are in their own nature cruel enough. And the Ire of insolent Soldiers, forces the conquer­ed to become desperate. Gravissime mor­sus irrita [...]ae necessitatis. Curt.

To proceed Modestly, is also an honor­able quality in him that conquereth: For in prosperous Fortunes, men do hardly re­frain covetous and proud doings; yea, some good and great Captains have in like cases forgotten what did best become them. In rebus secundis etiam [...]gregii D [...]ces insole­sc [...]nt. Tac.

After Victory followeth Peace: For if War did ever continue, no State or Government [Page 77] could stand: Therefore how great, or how long soever the War be, the end must be Peace; the name whereof is not onely sweet, but also comfortable, Pax una tri­umphis innumeris potior.

Peace is not only good and profitable to him that is victorious, but also to those that are victored. Pacem reduci velle victori, ex­pedit, victo necesse est. Tac.

Nevertheless until good and honorable Peace be offered, Arms may not be laid a­side: Wherein I wish Tullies advice to be followed. Bellum gerendum est; [...]i bellum omitt [...]mus, pace n [...]nquam fr [...]emur. Livi.

In Treaty of Peace, two things must be considered: First, That the conditions be honorable [...] To condiscend to any base con­ditions, is unto a Princely minde not onely great indignity, but also intolerable. Cum dignitate potius cadendum, quam cum igno­minia serviendum Plut.

It also importeth, the Peace should be simple, true, and unseigned; for all feigned and dissembling Amity is to be doubted. Pace suspecta tutius est bellum. Mithrid.

The fittest season to speak of Peace, is either when the War beginneth, or during the time that the enemies be of equal force; for if the war continueth, it must behove the weaker to yield to necessity: Not unlike [Page 78] the Shipmaster, who to save himsel [...] doth cast the greatest part of his loading in­to the Sea: Necessiiati pare, quam ne dii quidem superant. Livi.

Finally, Having generously defended thy self, and performed all things required in a magnanimous Captain, and finding never­theless thy force insufficient, it cannot be dishonorable to accept Peace. Wherefore laying aside Hatred and Hope, which are but weak supporters, thou maist recommend thee and thine to the approved discretion of an honorable enemy. Victores secundae res in miserationem ex ir [...] vertunt. Livi.

Now for as much as every Peace pro­miseth rest and quiet, as well to the victo­rious as to the victored; we may adde thereunto, that the Prince victorious re­ceiveth thereby Honor [...] Profit, and Security. For although his happiness may occasion Hope o [...] greater success yet in respect of Fortunes mutability, it shall be good and glorious to lis [...]en to peace. Decorum principi est cum victoriam propè i [...] manibus habeat, p [...]cem no [...] ab [...]ere [...] ut sciant omnes te & sus­cipere ju [...]è bellum & finire. Livi.

It seemeth also the more Honorable; for who so is victorious, doth give Peace and not take it: He also sheweth himself dis­creet by using a moderation in Victory, [Page 79] and no extremity in spoiling, which our wise and godly Writers have commended [...] Pacem contemnentes, & gloriam appetentes, [...]acem perdunt & gloriam. Bern.

Peace is also profitable for the victorious, because continual War breedeth weariness, and of violent proceeding desperation and peril cometh. Maximi & mortiferi morsu [...] esse solent morientium bestiarum. Sen.

Likewise Peace is more assured then any victory. Hope of the one is in thine own power; the other in the hand of God: Adde thereunto the force of Fortune, which hath great power in all humane actions. In rebus secundis nihil in quenquam superbè a [...] violenter consulere decet, nec praesenti cre­dere Fortunae, cum quià v [...]sper ferat, incer­tus sis. Sen.

Also conditions of Peace ought to be reasonable and freely bestowed: For no people can live contented under such a Law as forceth them to loath the State where­in they are. Misera pax bello benè mutatur. Sen.

THE greatest and most greivous cala­mity that can come to any State is Ci­vil War; for therein Subjects take arms a­gainst their Prince or among themselves, whereof followeth a misery more lamenta­ble then can be described. Non at as, non dignitas quenquam protegit, quo minus [...]l [...] ­pra caedibus, & caedes st [...]pris misceantur. Tac.

The first cause of Civ [...]l War proceedeth of destiny for God in his own divine provi­dence foreseeth many years before, that great and mighty Empires shall be ruined.

The second cause is, excesse, riot, and dissolute life; for nothing breedeth Civil Fury so soon as over great happiness; also pompous Apparell [...] banquetting and prodi­gall spending consumeth riches, and plenty is turned into poverty; for by these means [...]re men brought into desperation. Rapa­cissimo [...]uique ac perditissim [...], non agri aut [Page 81] faenus sed sola instrumenta vitiorum mane­bunt. Tac.

Now to consider how destiny might be eschewed, were in vain: For such a remedy no wit or wisdom can devise; being the de­cree of God, no doubt it is inevitable. Ita fato placuit, nullius rei eodem semper loc [...] stare fortunam. Sen.

There is nothing exempt from the peril of mutation; the earth, Heavens, and whole World is thereunto subject. Certi [...] eunt cuncta temporibus; nasci debent, crescere, extingui. Sen.

Touching the second causes of Civil War some remedies may be used, because it pre­ceedeth of Faction, Sedition or Tyranny. I call Faction a certain association of divers persons combined to the offence of others. It proceedeth often of private or publick displeasure, and more often of ambition. Nemo eorum qui in Rep. versantur, quo [...] vincat, sed a quibus vincatur, aspicit. Sen.

1. Factions are of two sorts; for either they consist of many or of few persons: both be dangerous, but the former more apt to take arms; and that party which proveth weakest, prayeth arms of forrain forces.

2. The other faction wherein are fewer partakers, be commonly great personages [Page 82] or men of more importance than ordinary people; and that proveth most perillous and bloody. N [...]bilium factiones trah [...]nt adse, & in partes, universum etiam populum [...] Arist.

Albeit some wise men have held opinion that factions are necessary, yet cannot that conceipt be reasonably maintained, unless it be upon confines and in such places where conspiracy is feared, which Cato in hisprivate Family used. Semper contentiunculas aliquas aut dissensum inter servos callidè serebat, s [...] ­pectam habens nimiam c [...]ncordiam [...]rum, m [...] ­tuensque. Plut.

Factions amongst the Nobility, are som­times suppressed by forbidding colors, or unknown badges to be worn; also to inhibit names or watch-words of mutinies is ne­cessary, which was Mecae [...]as counsel to Augustus; and Aristotle thinketh it fit that Laws should be made against the Factions of Noblemen. Nobilium contentiones & part [...]s etiam legibus oportet prohibere conari. Arist.

Another cause of civil war, we call sedi­tion, which is a suddain commotion or as­sembly of common people against their Prince or his Magistrates: the Original of which disorders may proceed of divers cau­ses, but chiefly of oppression. Imminentium periculorum remedium, ipsa peric [...]la arbitra­ri. Arist.

[Page 83] Again, Fear may be the occasion of Se­dition, as well in him that hath done injury, as in him that looketh to be injured, and is desirous to prevent it before it cometh. It may proceed also of over-great mildness in Government. Non [...]iseriis sed licentia, tan­tum concitum turbarum, las [...]ivire magis ple­bem quàm saevire. Livi.

Sedition many times ariseth of Poverty, or of the Artificers, whose Arts are grown out of use, and consequently no means whereof they can live. Semper in civitat [...], quibus opes nullae sunt, bonis invident, veter [...] odere, n [...]va expetunt, odio rerum suarum m [...] ­tari omnia student. Sab.

Lastly, Sedition cometh of Tyranny, In­solency, or Mutinous disposition of certain Captains, Cavaliers, or Ringleaders of the people for albeit the multitude is apt to innovation, yet doth it stand firm, until some first mover taketh the matter in hand. Multitudo omnis, sicut mare, per se immo­bilis. Livi.

Of these Movers some are Ambitious, who wanting other means to aspire, hope by practice of Sedition, to compass their designs; or else they are Unthrifts, who having consumed their own, seek by vio­lence to possess themselves of other mens: Or else they are vain and light persons, that [Page 84] without cause or reason, attempt innovati­on, themselves know not for what. Non tam praemiis periculor [...]m, quàm ipsis pericu­lis laeti, pro certis & olim partis, nova, am­bigua, ancipitia malunt.

Thus having told the causes of Sedition, I wish the remedies were prepared. Omne malum nascens facilè opprimitur, invetera­tum fit plerumque robustius. Cic.

The first way to suppress Sedition, is Elo­quence and excellent perswasion, which oftentimes worketh great effects among the multitude; chiefly when it proceedeth from some reverend and grave person, for his wisdom and integrity of life honored: For the Prince himself is not to take this office in hand, unless necessity so inforce: Integra autoritas principis majoribus remediis servetur. Tac.

If perswasion cannot prevail, then force must compel: But before such violent pro­ceedings, use art and cunning either to ap­pease the people, or at least to disunite them; and rather if the Prince do offer fair and [...]romise plausibly: Verba apud populum plurimum valent. Tac.

It is lawful also in such cases for Princes to use subtilty; and the same not prevailing, to wash away the stain thereof with Cle­mency: For when Arms are laid down, and [Page 85] every one yielded, general punishment were needless. Omnium culpa fuit, paucorum sit poena. Tac.

The last cause of Sedition we named Ty­ranny, which is a certain violent Govern­ment, exceeding the Laws of God and na­ture. The difference between Kings and Tyrants is this; the one imployeth arms in defence of Peace, the other useth them to terrifie those of whom his cruelty hath de­served hate: Auferre, trucidare, raper [...], falsis nominibus imperium, atque ubi solitudi­nem fecerint, pacem appellant. Tac.

The quality of Tyrants is to esteem Pro­mooters more then good Ministers, because those men are the scourge of infinite others. They are also Protectors of impious per­sons, and stand in daily doubt of Noble and Vertuous Men. Nobilitas, opes, amissi g [...]sti­que honores, pro crimine: Et ob virtutes cer­tissimum exitium. Tac.

Tyrants do also endeavor to suppress the knowledge of Letters and civil life, to the end all good arts should be exiled, and Bar­barism introduced. Pellunt sapientiae pro­f [...]ssores, & omnes [...]onas artes in exiliu [...] a­g [...]nt. Tac.

These and such like, be the conditions of Tyrants, who for the most part are de­posed and slain; for as Kings live long and [Page 86] deliver their Dominions to their Children [...] and Posterity; so Tyrants being feared and hated of all men, cannot continue in their estate.

The Remedies of these Mischiefs which proceed from the violence of such a Prince, are Persecution or Patience. Many gene­rous spirits have used the first; perswading themselves rather to die, then endure the sight of a Tyrant. Also the Grecians did think it a service acceptable to murther the person of such an impious Prince. Graeci [...]omines deorum honores tribuebant iis qui Tyrannos necaverunt. Cic.

Nevertheless, in Christian consideration the other course is to be taken: Let pati­ence therefore incounter this mischief; for seeing all Kings, as well the bad as the good be sent by God, they must be indured. Res est gravis occidere regalem stirpem. Homer.

Persecution is not onely perilous, but for the most part infortunate: For thereof pre­sent revenge is taken by that Prince that succeedeth. Facinoris [...]jus ultor est, quis­ [...]uis successerit. Tac.

The murder of Tyrants is also followed [Page 87] with many inconveniences worse then civil War it self. Principes boni, votis expetendi, qualescunque tolerandi. Tac.

For as Fire, Floods, and other inevitable Plagues are necessarily to be suffered: So evil Princes in their covetousness and cruel­ty ought to be patiently indured, because their office is to command, and subjects must obey. Indigna, digna habenda sunt, Rex quae facit. Sen.

And as it is the use of vulgar people to finde faults in the long raign of Princes; so the ambition of great Subjects is desirous of novelty. Praesens imperium subditis semper grave. Thucyd.

To conclude, we say that the best remedy against Tyranny, is Patience: For so long as men are, so long will Vices be. Regum ingenia toleranda, neque usui crebrae mutati­ones. Tac.

TO the perfections of Men, three things are necessarily required; Nature, Nur­ture, and Use: The first giveth capacity, aptness, and understanding; which are graces from above. Nurture, is learning, knowledge, art, or order. Use, is practice, experience, and orde [...]ly observation; where­of may be conceived, that Nature alone suf­ficeth not; nor can Nurture work any good effect, where natural aptness wanteth; and they can frame no perfection, unless expe­rience be also conjoyned. Nemo nascitur sapiens, sed fit. Sen.

Ambassadors, Negotiants, and generally all other Ministers of mean fortune, in con­versation with Princes and Superiors, must use great respect, shewing themselves rather ceremonious then presumptious, and ac­knowledge their obligation great, for the [Page 89] [...]avor and grace, they find in those which might command them.

It is no wisdom ever to commend or dis­commend the actions of men by their suc­cess; for oftentimes some enterprises at­tempted by good Counsel, end unfortunate­ly; and others unadvisedly taken in hand, have happy success. Who so then com­mendeth inconsiderate Counsels for their fortunate event, thereby encourageth men to jar and discomfort the wiser sort to speak what they know, and by experience have proved.

In Actions publick and every other mat­ter of great moment, the beginning is well to be considered: For afterwards it lieth not in our power, without dishonor to a­bandon what was begun.

The time doth not always serve, nor is apt occasion always offered to enterprise what we would; yet who so doth expect every opportunity, shall either attempt no­thing at all, or if he do, the same for the most part turneth to his own disadvant­age.

When any resolution is taken, either with over-great haste, or too much affection, sel­dom it receiveth good success: For he that doth the one, hath no leisure to consider; the other transporteth the minde so as it [Page 90] cannot conceive more then that which pre­sently presseth.

To these we adde others, I mean some of them that have leisure, and are void of af­fection, yet for want of natural capacity, or for continual negligence in their doings, never bring any thing well to pass.

Who so desireth to be beloved in a Com­monwealth, must rest content with that which men do give, and the Laws allow him to take: So shall he neither incu [...] dan­ger nor envy; for indeed, that which is taken or extorted from others, and not that which is given, doth make men hated.

Arms [...] Laws, and Religion, may not in any well governed State be dis-joyned; for every one of them in particular maintain­eth them all united.

In actions of War, courage and conduct are of great necessity; yet all good Go­vernment consisteth in using the Vertues Moral; and in handling the matter of Mar­tial Policy, it is fit to imitate the proceed­ings of antient and approved Captains.

Among Mortal Men, there is nothing more common then to believe the estate of one man to be better then an other; for hereof it cometh, that every one endeavor­eth rather to take from others with travel, then to enjoy his own with rest.

[Page 91] The state of Pri [...]ces is good [...] being well used; so is the fortune of private men, if therewith they be contented. The rich­man liveth happily, so long as he useth his riches temperately; and the poor man that patiently endureth his wants, is rich e­nough.

Whensoever a man is so dangerously distressed, as either proceeding or standing, he liveth in like peril, then doth it behove him in any wise, to resolve upon action. The reason is, that so long as nothing is done, the same accidents that caused his dangers, do still remain in their former force; but if he endeavor to enterprise somewhat, either he may meet with means to make him se­cure, or at the hardest, shew himself of so great courage and wit, as he dare and can attempt a way to do it.

It seemeth a thing of great difficulty, or rather impossible for any Prince or Magi­strate to eschue the evil speech and bad re­port of men; for if they be good and ver­tuous, then they incur the backbiting of leud persons; if evil, then will all good men exclaim against them.

All Commonwealths ought to desire peace, yet it is necessary ever to be pre­pared for the war; because peace disarmed, is weak, and without reputation: Therefore [Page 92] the Poets feign, that Palla [...] the God­dess of Wisdom did always appear armed.

Every Prince (well advised) ought to govern his Subjects and Servants in such sort, that by his affability and vertue they may be induced rather to serve voluntarily, then for pay or hope of preferment. For otherwise doing, whensoever the Prince shall want means to pay, the Subjects like­wise will fail of good will to serve. But he that faithfully loveth, doth neither in pro­sperity become arrogant, nor in contrary Fortune retire, or complain of the small fa­vor he findeth: For (till death) love and life remain at the Princes Commandment.

Where poor men finde Justice, evil men are punished, Measures and Weights be just, Youth well nurtured, and old folk free from avarice, there is the Commonwealth good and perfect.

In War between Neighbors, neutrality is commendable; for by that means we eschue many troubles and great expences, so long as the forces of either side be so equal in strength, as we need not to fear the victory of any: For so long their discord is our security, and o [...]tentimes offereth us means to increase our own state and repu­tation.

The cheif reasons to move War, are, th [...] [Page 93] Justice of the Cause, the Facillity of Suc­cess, and the Profit of the victory.

In all Humane actions it behoveth to a [...] ­commodate the Council of Men unto pre­sent necessity, and never to expose security to manifest peril, nor hope of that which without great difficulty or impossibility can­not be obtained.

It is the nature of men having escaped one extream, which by force they were constrained long to endure, to run head­long into the other extream, forgetting that Vertue doth always consist in the mean.

The multitude is inclined to innovation, and easily induced by false perswasion, and consequently easily transported by seditious leaders.

Men are naturally disposed to fear those things which threaten danger and terror [...] yet unless these perils by some new accident be daily revived, that fear by little and little vanisheth, and Security recovereth the place.

Whoso findeth himself contemned, or not respected, becometh discontent; which humor in generous mindes, breedeth often­times adventerous imaginations, whereof audacious attempts have followed, cheifly in persons of authority and reputation; for he that hopeth no good, feareth no evil: Yet true it is, that dangerous enterprises, the [Page 94] the more they be thought upon, the less hope they give of good success, for which reason conspiracies not suddainly executed are for the most part revealed or abando­ned.

All people do naturally imitate the man­ners of their Prince, and observing his pro­ceedings resolve to hate or love him: But if they happen once to ha [...]e the Prince, then his doings, good or evil, are afterwards not good; but if at the beginning he gained th [...] love of the people, then every bad action is reputed a vertue: as though he could not be induced to do amiss without good cause or reason.

Greatly are Princes deceived if in the election of Ministers they more respect their own particular affection, then the suffici­ency of the person elected.

A Prince having conquered any new Dominion, is thereby rather incombred then strengthned, unless the same be after well governed; and seldom is it seen that a prin­cipality by ill means gotten, hath bin long injoyed.

As to the perfection of the whole body soundness of head only sufficeth not, unless the other members also do their office; even so it is not enough that a Prince be faultless, but it behooveth also that the Magistrates [Page 95] and Ministers should perform their duty.

Great Princes rarely resist their appetites [...] as for the most part private men can: for they being alwaies honored and obeyed, do seldom with patience indure the want of any thing reasonable, as being perswaded that what they desire is just, and that their Commandment hath power to remove all difficulties.

All men are naturally good when no re­spect Tam be­né quam malé fac­ta pre­munt. Mart. of profit or pleasure draws them to be­come evill. But this worlds corruption, and our frailty is such, as easily and often for our particular interest we incline to the worst; which was the cause that wise Law­makers found out reward and punishment: the one to incite men to good, the other to fear them from being evill.

A Tyrant indeavoreth to maintain his Estate by three means. First, he practiseth to hold all Subjects in extream awe, and to be basely minded, to the end they should want courage to take arms against him. Secondly, he kindleth diffidence and dis­cord among the great men; thereby to re­move occasion of conspiracy and combina­tion. Lastly, he holdeth them disarmed and idle, so as they ne [...]ther know nor can attempt any thing against him

To govern, is nothing else but to hold [Page 96] Subjects in love and obedience: for in re­spect of the end, they ought not, and in re­gard of the other they cannot attempt any thing contrary to the governors will and their duty.

The Laws and Ordinances of a Common­weale made at the beginning thereof when men were good, do often prove unprofitable when they are become evill; and therefore new Laws are made according to the acci­dents which happen.

The discontent or disorder of people is ever occasioned by the inequality of their goods, because the poorer sort would be made equall to the rich: but the offence that grows among great men is the desire of honor; for they being equal, do indeavor to aspire to equall authority.

A Prince that desireth by means of his Ambassador to deceive an other Prince, must first abuse his own Ambassador, to the end he should do and speak with more ear­nestness, being indeed perswaded that the intent and meaning of his Master is simple which happily would not, were he privy that his Princes meaning were to dissemble. This course is also commonly holden by those that by imployment of a third person would perswade any thing fained or false.

For the performance of conditions in [Page 97] treaty of Peace or League of Amity, the Promises, Vowes, and Oathes of Princes are of great effect; yet because fidelity in a man is not ever certain, and time doth daily offer occasions of variation, there is no assurance so secure and good as to stand so prepared as the Enemy may want able means how to offend.

To resolve in matters doubtfull, ot answer requests which we are not willing to grant, the least offensive way is not to use direct denial, but by delaies prolong the time and so in place of effect, afford good expectati­on.

The old Proverbe [...]aith: Magistratus virum ostendit: which is no less true then ancient: for men in such fortune are occa­sioned not only to make proof of their suffi­ciency, but also to discover their affections; and the more their greatness is, the less re­spect they have to contain those passions which are natural.

Albeit great troubles and continual ad­versity seem insupportable; yet is there no­thing more dangerous, then ouermuch pros­perity; and being pressed by new appetites, they disturb their own security.

In speaking of occurrents doubtfull, it is alwaies wisdom to fain Ignorance, or at least alledge that we beleive then not: for [Page 98] most commonly they are utterly untrue, or far other then vulgarly is believed.

The Actions of men are commonly liked or disallowed according to the bad or good success: attributing that to Council which sometimes is due to fortune.

The multitude of men were wont to be more pleased with suddain then slow reso­lutions; and many times accompt those en­terprises generous, which are rashly and in­consideratly attempted.

Great difference there is between Sub­jects desperate, and others which are only discontented: for the one desire nothing bue present alteration, which they indeavor with all hazard: the other wish for innova­tion, inciting any motion or practice [...] be­cause their intent is to attend time, and that occasion may present it self.

A benefit bestowed on him who think­eth himself greatly injured, doth not suffice to raze the same out of his memory, cheifly if the benefit be given at such time as no meer motion but necessity may seem the oc­casion thereof.

That Peace ought to be desired which re­moveth suspition, which assureth us from perill, which bringeth quiet certain, and acquitteth us of expences: But when it worketh contrary effects, it may be called [Page 99] a dangerous war covered with the name of deceitfull trust, not unlike a perilous poyson ministred in lieu of a wholsom Medicine.

The effect of things, and not externall show or seeming, ought to be regarded; yet it is incredible what great grace is gain­ed by courteous speech and affability: the reason whereof is as I suppose that every man beleiveth he doth merit more then in­deed he is worthy, and consequently hol­deth himself injured when soever he findeth men not to afford him like estimation.

Men ought in any wise, to refrain to doe or say any thing which may offend, for which respect it were great folly either in presence or absence to utter displeasing speech unless necessity inforceth.

The matters whereof Councellors are cheifly to consider, be five. The Princes re­venue, Peace and Warr, Defence, Traffick, and what Laws are to be made.

In giving Council divers things are to be observed; but amongst them are two of most importance. First, it behooveth, that he who is Counselled should be wise; for seeing Council is nothing else but a certain considerate discourse of things to be done or not done, if he who is to take Council be not of discretion, then will he refuse all good advice offered, and rather [...]ncline to [Page 100] that which his own fancie affecteth because the want of Judgement draweth him to take pleasure in vain things; and as one incapable of what is good and true, will follow that which is evil and false: so on the other side if he that giveth Council be not faithfull, then will he a Thousand waies disguise and dissemble the truth, and con­sequently miscarry the mind of him that is Counselled: yea in the end utterly abuse him.

The affairs and proceedings of the world are so variable and accompanied with so many chances and changes, as impossible it seemeth to judge what is best: therefore experience enformeth, that the conjectures of the most wise prove vain and uncertain. I therefore mislike the Judgment of those men, that will let slip opportunity of pre­sent good (though it be small) for feare of a future evill, notwithstanding it be greater, unless the evill be very near at hand, or cer­tain. For if that doe not follow which is feared, then wilt thou repent to have omit­ted that which was desired.

Whensoever a general opinion is con­ceived of the singular vertue and knowledge of any [...]man, although he be indeed igno­rant and far unworthy that accompt, yet it is hard to remove such a settled conceipt: [Page 101] the reason is, that men having at the first given credit to common report, do make thereof so deep an impression as afterwards without great difficulty cannot be removed.

The Bodies of Men, Munition, and Mony may justly be called the sinews of War, yet of them the two first are more necessary, for Men and Arms have means to find Mony and Meate: but Mony and Meate cannot so easily find Soldiers and swords.

One wise Generall having but a Thou­sand men, is more to be feared and esteemed then twenty Commanders of equall Autho­rity: for they being commonly of divers humors, or judging diversly, do never, or very rarely what is to be done, and conse­quently lose much time before any resolu­tion can be taken.

A Prince of mean force ought not in any wise to adventure his Estate upon one daies fight: for if he be victorious he gaineth no­thing but glory: but if he lose, he is utter­ly ruined.

The most part of men are delighted with Histories, for the variety of accidents there­in contained: yet are there few that will imitate what they read, and finde done by others; being perswaded that imitation is not only hard but impossible, as though the Heavens and Men were changed in their [Page 102] Motion or Order, and Power, which they anciently had.

The Nature of men is such as will not en­devor any thing good, unless they be for­ced thereunto: for where liberty abound­eth, there confusion and disorder follow. It is therefore supposed that Hunger and Poverty make men industrious: but good Lawes inforce them to be honest; for if men were of themselves good, then Laws were needless.

There are two kinds of Adulation: The First proceedeth from a subtil malice: The Second cometh by an ordinary use of conversation; the one tendeth to profit and deceiving; the other hath no further de­sign then a respect or fear to offend. Where­unto the most honest are in some sort bound. Whoso bindeth himself to flattery, doth thereby bewray his intent, either to gain, or not to lose that he hath. For the person flattered is alwaies superior to him that doth flatter, or at least one as may in some sort stand him in stead. It may therefore be inferred that only men of base and mise­rable condition, and such as cannot help or hurt, be free from flatterers. And contra­riwise magnanimous and fortunate folke, proud men and such as content themselves with their present estate, are seldom found to be flatterers.

[Page 103] Every wise Prince doth presuppose that times of trouble may come, and that all such occasions he shal be forced to use the service of men diversly qualified. His study there­fore is in the mean time so to entertain them as when those storms arise he may rest as­sured to command them; for whosoever perswades himself by present benefits to gain the good will of men, when perills are at hand, shall be deceived.

In ancient times Princes and Governors were wont when peace and security were most like to continue, to find or fain occa­sions to draw their Subjects to fear, to the end that doubt might move them to be more carefull of their own weldoing; for well they knew it a general defect in men to be reachless, and never willing to use industry; unless by necessity they were constrain­ed.

All Histories do shew, and wise Polititi­ans do hold it necessary, that for the well governing of every Commonweal it be­hooveth to presuppose that all men are evil, and will declare themselves so to be when occasion is offered; for albeit some inconve­nience doth lie hid for a time, it proceedeth from a covert occasion, which for want of experience was not found untill time the Mother of Truth discover it.

[Page 104] Neutrality is always a thing dangerous and disallowable, because it oftendeth all parties: He that is strong looketh to be as­sisted in his greatness; and he that is weak not being defended, holdeth himself offend­ed: the one is not assured from Foes, and the other holdeth no friends.

Albeit neutrality procure present quiet and security, during the troubles of others; yet after the samefalleth out a disadvantage, because it entertaineth a certain falseness, and so in short space will be perceived; not unlike those men that borrow upon usury; for albeit they enjoy a certain time, without trouble or charge, yet the same being spent, and the day of payment come, they then feel the great danger which their short plea­sure hath purchased.

Whoso examineth all humane actions shall find that in eschewing one inconvenience, wepresently incur another. As for exam­ple, if we endeavor to make our dominions mighty, it behooveth to have the same fully r [...]plenished with people, and well armed, and so being, they are not easily governed. On the other side, if our Country be not well peopled, or disarmed, then it is easily holden in obedience; yet therwith so weake that it can neither increase the bounds ther­of, nor defend it selfe. It is therfore necessary [Page 105] in all our deliberations to consider what in­convenience is least, and choose that, as the best: for to find all perfect, void and secure of suspect or imperfection, is im­possible.

A Prince being instantly required to take part with other Princes, the one being in arms against the other, if he deny both in­cureth suspicion of both, and may be thought to have secret intelligences with one or both of them; so as either of them shall accompt him an enemy, and consequently he that proves victorious will be revenged; and the other holding him suspected will not ac­knowledg his Friendship.

It is the use of men to presume much upon their own merit, and seeing the success of some others to be such as without cause or desert are aspired to dignity thereby uncou­raged they promised to themselves the like: Nevertheless being entred into the course of their design, and finding many crosses and impeachments, they do not a little repent their over-weening and presumption, but also many times utterly abandon their rash and unadvised enterprize; neither can I think th [...]t the vertue or sufficiencie of any man without the favor of the heavens can advance him; for as the Poet saith, Ne [...] velle juvat, potiúsue nocet, si fata repug­nant

[Page 106] Whoso serveth a Prince far from his pre­sence, shall with great difficulty content him. For if he commit any error, it shall be aggravated: besides that the instructions sent unto him cannot be particularly con­ceived, because the State of worldly things doth daily alter. Also to serve alooffe, is a thing full of danger and far from reward: which inconvenience may for the most part be avoided by him that attendeth near to his Princes person.

Let no man that cometh to serve in Court, assure himself by his wisdom to be advanced or eschew all encounters. Neither is he to bear himself so careless as to commit all to fortune, but be perswaded that this wordly life is like to a voyage by Sea; wherein albeit Art with the favor of the wind may do much, yet can we not assure our selves to arrive safe in the Haven appointed; for daily experience doth shew, that some strange ships in the calmest weather, are drowned or impeached by the way, when others much weaker and disarmed passe se­curely.

Among men worthy of commendations, those have merited best that first planted true Religion: next they that framed King­doms and Commonwealths; the third place is due to such as have augmented or en­larged [Page 107] their dominions; lastly learned men deserve fame and memory: and as every of these are worthy of fame and honor; so ought they to be accompted infamous that introduce Atheism, or the subversion of kingdoms, or are become enemies to Learn­ing and Vertue.

Whosoever taketh in hand to governe a Multitude either by way of liberty, or principality, and cannot assure himse [...]f of those persons that are Enemies to that En­terprise, doth frame a State of short per­severance: yet true it is that such Princes be infortunate [...] as for their own security are inforced to hold a course extraordinary, and have the multitude their enemy; for he that hath few foes may with small disho­nor be assured; but he that is generally ha­ted can by no means live assured; and the more cruelty he useth, the weaker his prin­cipality proveth.

In commending another man great mo­deration is to be used; for as contumely of­fendeth him against whom it is used; so great praise, besides that it is uttered with danger to his judgment that speaketh it, the same doth oftentimes offend him that hear­eth it. For self love which commonly possesseth men, causes the good or evil we hear, to be measured with our own. And [Page 108] consequently every man that is touched with like deserts and defects, doth grow [...] offended that his commendation is not set forth, and feareth lest his imperfection should be discovered.

It is often, or rather ever seen, that the force of Leagues not used in their first heat, becomes cold; because Suspition soon enter­eth, which in short space will destroy what­soever was concluded, and may not with­out long time be rejoyned.

The power of Ambition which possess­eth the mindes of men, is such, as rarely or never suffereth them to rest: The reason thereof is, That nature hath framed in them a certain disposition to desire all things, but not to obtain them; so as our desires being greater then our power, thereof followeth discontent and evil satisfaction. Hereof also proceedeth the variation of Fortune; for some men desiring to get, and others fearing to lose that they have gotten, do occasion one man to injure another, and consequently Publick Wars do follow; by means whereof, one Countrey is ruined, and an other inlarged.

Princes of great power, and cheifly those that are Inhabitants of the North, having many Children, were wont to be much in­clined to the Wars, as well to win unto [Page 109] themselves honor, as also to get possessions for their Sons; which manner of proceed­ings did oftentimes remove such disturbance as the plurality of Brethren bringeth. These and other reasons induced Princes to at­tempt War against those Kingdoms, which in their opinion seemed easily conquered, or whereunto they can pretend litle; for by colour thereof they may the rather justifie their proceedings.

When a Prince deferreth to answer an Ambassador, it proceedeth from some of these respects; either because he will take time to resolve himself of somewhat where­of he doubteth, or that he intendeth covert­ly to deny that which is demanded, or that he esteemeth not the Prince that doth de­mand, or that he disdaineth the person by whom the demand is made, or else that he intendeth to hear from his own Ministers to be better resolved: Wherefore a discreet Negotiator ought in such cases to consider which of these reasons move the Prince where he is employed, to entertain him with delays, and make his dispatch according­ly.

The sufficiency of good Counsellors con­sisteth in four things.

First, They ought to be wise and skilful how to handle their affairs, directing all [Page 110] doings to publick commodity.

Secondly, To be just in their proceedings, giving to every one that which to him ap­pertaineth.

Thirdly, To be stout, and void both of partial respects and fear.

And lastly, To be temperate and mo­derate in their desires.

Whoso desireth to govern well and se­curely, it behoveth him to have a vigilant eye to the proceedings of great Princes, and to consider seriously of their designs: For it is a matter of small difficulty to live in peace with him who desireth our amity, and provideth for others that endeavor to offend us.

The intelligences that Princes study to at­tain, are procured by divers means: Some are brought by report, some vented by conversation and sounding, some by means of espials; but the most sure and credible accurrents, are those which come from Am­bassadors, cheifly those that either for the greatness of their Prince, or their own Vertue, be of most reputation. For those men conversing daily with great personages, and pondering diligently their Manners, Words, Wisdom, and the order of each mans proceedings, yea, of the Prince him­self, may with commodity attain unto mat­ters [Page 111] of importance sooner then they that are Writers of rumors, or that take upon them to conjecture of things to come.

Whensoever a people is induced to com­mit so great an error, as to give reputation to one onely man, to the end he should op­press all those great men whom they hate, they thereby give him opportunity to be­come their Prince; and so being assisted with their favor and aid [...] he may likewise extinguish all the rest of the Nobility; and they being extirpated [...] he will also endea­vor to tyrannize over the people, by wh [...]se help he aspired.

So many as are not consenting to the Ty­ranny, rest enemies to the person of the Tyrant, who can by no means gain the love of all. For impossible it is, that the riches of any Tyrant should be so great, and the Honors he can give so many as may satisfie all. Hereof it cometh, that those Tyrants that are favored of the people, and disfavor­ed of the Nobles [...] are most secure; because their Tyranny is supported with a greater strength (having the mul [...]itude their friends) then is the Tyrant whom the humor of the Nobles onely hath advanced.

A dangerous thing it is in all Common­wealths by continual punishing, to hold the mindes of Subjects in suspition; for [Page 112] men ever fearing their ruine, will (without respect) determine to save themselves, and as men desperate, attempt innovation. All capital executions ought therefore to be exe­cuted suddenly, and as it were at one instant [...] so to assure the mindes of men from further molestation [...]

The intent of every wise Prince that maketh War, either by election or ambiti­on, is to gain and hold what is gotten: Al­so to use the matter so as thereby he may inrich himself, and not impoverish his own people or Countrey.

He that inlargeth his Dominions, doth not always increase his power; but he that increaseth in force as well as in Dominion, shall thereby grow great; otherwise he gaineth no more then is shortly to be lost, and consequently he ruineth himself: For who spends more in the War, then he gains by Victory, loseth both labor and Cost.

Every Prince and Commonwealth must above all things take heed, that no necessity how great soever, do perswade him to bring into his Dominion any Auxiliary Sol­diers; because the hardest conditions the enemy can offer, are more easie then is such a resolution.

A Prince sheweth his ruine at hand, whensoever he beginneth to break the Laws [Page 113] and Customs, which are antient, and have been long time obeyed by the people of his Dominion.

That Prince which careth to keep himself secure from conspiracy, ought rather to fear those to whom he hath done over-great favors, then them whom he hath much in­jured: For these want opportunities, the other do not; and both their desires are as one; because the Appetite of commanding [...] is always as much or more then the desire of revenge.

Whensoever a Prince discovers a conspi­racy, he must well consider the quality thereof, measuring the force of the Con­spirators with his own; and finding them many and mighty, the knowledge thereof is to be dissembled, until the Princes power be prepared to oppose them; otherwise he hazardeth his own security.

It hath been by long experience found better to send one General to an Army, though he be of mean sufficiency, then to give the same Authority to two or more excellent personages with equal Commis­sion.

He that coveteth to be over-much loved, often times becomes contemptible; and he that endeavoreth to be over-much feared, is ever hated: And to hold the mean between [Page 114] them, cannot be exactly done, be­cause nature will not so permit.

Whoso aspireth to any dignity, must re­solve himself to endure the envy of men, and never to be moved for any offence con­ceived against him, though they that be offended, be his dear Friends: Neither shall he for the first affront or encounter, relin­quish his hope; for he that constantly maketh head against the assault of Fortune, shall after with facility arive where he de­signed.

In giving Council to a Prince or Com­monwealth, and therewith desiring to eschue danger and offence, no other mean is to be taken then that the Counsellor shall without passion or perswasion pronounce his opinion, and never to affirm any thing as a resolution, but with modesty to defend that he speaketh; so as the Prince which follows his advice, may seem to do it vo­luntarily, and not forced by the importuni­ty of him that gave the Council.

A discreet Captain being in the Field against the enemy, of whose vertue he hath had no proof, ought first by light skirmishes to feel of what vertue he is [...] and not to en­terprise any general adventure, to the end that Terror or Fame should not daunt nor discourage his own Soldiers.

[Page 115] Albeit Fraud be in all actions detested, yet is the same in Martial enterprises com­mendable and glorious: For that Captain who compasseth his designs by wit or stra­tagem, is no less commended then he that vanquisheth the Enemy by violence and Force.

In times of extremity, when resolution must be taken for the having or utter losse of the State, then no regard is to be had of Justice or Injustice, Mercy or Cruelty, Honor or Ignominy, but rather setting aside all respects, that course is to be follow which defended the lives and liberties of men.

Whoso desireth to know what will be hereafter let him think of that is past; for the World hath ever bin in in a circular re­volution: Whatsoever is now, was here­tofore and things past or present are no o­ther then such as shall be again: redit orbis in orbem.

A Prince that desireth to obtain any thing at the hand of another, must if it be possi­ble urge a suddain answer, and lay before him that is moved, a necessity to resove presently, giving him to understand that denial or delaies may breed a perilous and suddain indignation.

There is nothing more difficult, doubtful and dangerous then to attempt Innovation: [Page 116] for he that taketh in hand an enterprize of such quality, maketh all those his Enemies which lived well under the old order, and findeth them cold defenders that affect his novelties, which coldness proceedeth chief­ly of incredulity; for men are not easily induced to beleeve a new thing till experience hath proved it to be good.

There is no art nor other knowledg so seemly and necessary for a Prince as the Art Military with the ordinances and disci­pline thereof: for that is the only skill re­quired in him that commandeth, and such a vertue as doth not only maintain them that are born Princes, but often advanceth pri­vate men to that dignity.

The deep impressions which old injuries make in the minds of great men cannot with new benefits be razed out; it is also to be remembred that injuries be done all together: For they offend the lesse, and wil be forgotten the sooner; but benefits should by little and little be bestowed, [...]o shal the memory of them long continue.

A small pleasure or displeasure presently done, doth move more then a great good turn bestowed in times past; for the taste of things present doth make a deeper impressi­on in the minds of men, then doth the memory [Page 117] of things past, or expectation of things to come.

It is a matter of small difficulty to sound the discont ntment of other men. For every one doth willingly tell the well and ill de­serving of friends, and likewise how much or how little foes can do, if we have pati­ence to hear, which patience is the begin­ning of all good speed; but he that delighteth to speak much, and hear little, shall ever in­form others more then he himself can learn.

Among other dangers which a Prince in­curreth by being disarmed, the greatest is, that thereby he becometh contemptible; for no comparison there is between men armed and them that are disarmed: and no reason there is that he that is armed should yield obedience to him that is disarmed, neither is it like that a Prince disarmed can be secure from his own Subjects armed.

A Prince ignorant of Martial knowledg, among other misfortunes cannot be esteem­ed or trusted of his own Soldiers; it be­hooveth him therefore as well in time of peace as war to exercise arms, which may be done by two meanes; the one by action of body, the other by contemplation of mind. The body may be exercised in hunt­ing, hawking, and such like pastimes; [Page 118] thereby to be made apt to endure travel: his mind likewise may be informed by read­ing of Histories, and the consideration of actions performed by excellent Captains, observing the occasion of their victories or losses to the end he may imitate the one [...] and eschew the other.

He that doth not as other men do, but endeavoureth that which ought to be done, shall thereby rather incur peril then preser­vation for whoso laboreth to be sincerely perfect and good, shall necessarily perish, living among men that are generally e­vil.

A Prince that useth liberality to his pre­judice, ought not to regard the infamy of Miserable, because his parsimony will in time enable him to be liberal, and so may declare himself to be, having by parsimony increased his power, and therefore without imposing upon the people, may defend him­self from all such as will make war; so shall he use liberality to all them from whom he taketh nothing, who are infinite; and use mi­serliness to those only to whom he giveth, who are but few.

There is nothing that consumeth it self like to liberality; for if it be long used, it taketh away the meanes to continue it, and consequently doth make men poor and [Page 119] basely minded: or else to eschew poverty they shall be forced to extortion and be­come odious.

It is better to incur the name of cove­tous (which is a scandal without hate) then with desire to be accounted libe­ral, deserve the infamie of oppression (an ignominy accompanied with hatred.)

A Prince ought to be slow in believing, and advised in proceeding; he should also beware not to make himself over much fear­ed, but in all his actions shew great wisdom tempered with curtesie; so shall not over much confidence induce him to be careless, nor over much diffidence render him intole­rable.

Whoso observeth, shall see that men of­fended, less respect him whom they love, then him whom they fear. For love is main­tained by a certain reciproque obligation, which because men are evill, useth to be by every occasion of profit broken. But fear is continued by a certain dread of punish­ment which never faileth.

A Prince that holdeth in the fi [...]ld an Army wherein are great numbers of Soldi­ers, ought not to care though he be accompt­ed cruell: For without such an opinion con­ceived, he cannot keep his forces united, nor apt to attempt any enterprize.

[Page 120] Men for the most, do use rather to judg; by their eyes, then by their hands, for every one may see, but few can certainly know. Every one seeth what thou seemest to be, but few can understand what thou art in­deed; and these few dare not oppose them­selves to the opinion of many which have the Majesty of Estate to defend them. Also in the actions of all men, and chiefly Prin­ces, from whom is no appellation, the end is ever observed. Machiavel.

A Prince being forced to use the condition of beasts, must among them make choice of the Fox and the Lyon; for the Lyon can­not take heed of snares, and the Fox is ea­sily overcome by the Wolves, it behooveth him therefore to be a Fox to discover the snares, and a Lyon to terrify the Wolves.

A Prince newly advanced cannot observe those rules which are the cause that men be accompted good; he being many times con­strained for defence of his state to proceed contrary to promise, contrary to charity, and all vertue; and consequently it behoo­veth him to have a mind apt to alteration, as the wind and variation of fortune shall direct; yet ought he not to abandon the good, if so he can, but be ready to use what is evil if so he shall be inforced.

[Page 121] Every Prince ought to have two ears, the one Intrinsick in respect of Subjects, the other Extrinsick in respect of forraine Po­tentates, from whom [...]he may be defended with good Arms, and good Friends: Also matters Intrinsick wi l ever stand well so long as all things abroad rest firm.

A Prince that is favored of the multitude, need not to doubt conspiracy; but contrari­wise where the people is generally discon­tented, and hateth the Prince, then may he reasonably doubt every thing, and every person; for no man is so poor, that want­eth a weapon wherewith to offend,

W [...]en any occasion is presented to have that thou desirest, fail not to lay hold there­of: For these worldly things do vary, and that so suddenly, as hard it is to assure our selves of any thing, unless the same be al­ready in hand: On the other side if any trouble threaten thee, defer it so long as thou maist; for time may occ [...]sion some ac­cident to remove all dangers.

The Prince that doubtech the fidelity of his Subjects, must of force build Fortresses; but he that feareth forreign force more then his own people, were better to leave them unbuilt. Howsoever it be, that Prince that desireth generally to be respected and e­steemed, must perform some notable enterprise, [Page 122] and give testimony of great Vertue and Valor.

A Prince shall do well at all times to be counselled so as no man do presume to give counsel but when the Prince doth ask it. It is al [...]o to be noted, that he who is not of himself wise, cannot be well counselled of others, unless happily he yield to some wise men the Government of his whole Affairs. For good counsels from whomsoever they proceed, shall be thought to come from the Prince, and not the wisdom of the Prince to proceed from the counsel of others.

He that taketh delight to be employed in Publick Affairs, must by all means endea­vor to continue in such Services: For oft one business dependeth on another, where­unto the Florentine Proverb may be applied, Di cosa, nasae cosa & il tempole governa.

Some men have not onely desired, but also compassed honor and profit; yet be­ing in possession of both, were not there­with so satisfyed as they hoped to be; which being believed, would happily extinguish the immeasurable ambition wherewith many men are poss essed.

By experience I have learned that great folly it is to account that ours which we have not, or spend presently in hope of future gain. Therefore Merchants during the adventure [Page 213] of their goods, do not increase domesticall expences [...] but fearing the worst assure what is in hand.

For such men as have gained unto them­selves reputation and are accounted ver­tuous, to maintain that conceipt and eschew envy, there is nothing better then a life reti­red from daily conversation, & chiefly of the multitude. Fugiat sapiens commercia vulgi [...]

The end that moveth a Prince to make war, is to enrich himself, and impoverish the enemy: neit her is victory desired for other purpose then thereby to become the more mighty, and make the enemy weak; con­sequently wheresoever thy victory doth im­poverish thee, or thy gain therein doth weaken thee, it followeth that either thou passe or undergoe that mark whereunto the intention of war was directed. And that Prince is by victory enriched, that can op­press the enemies power and become Master of his goods and possessions. And that Prince is by victory impoverished when the enemy notwithstanding he be victored can still maintain himself, and the spoyls and possessions are not taken to the use of the Prince victorious, but imparted unto his Soldiers. For then may he be thought in his own loosing infortunate, and in victory unhappy; for if he be vanquished, then [Page 122] [...] [Page 213] [...] [Page 124] must he indure the offence by foes; and be­ing victorious shall be forced to abide the wrong offered by Friends: which as they be less reasonable, so are they also less sup­portable; because he is still by impositions forced to burthen the Subjects, whereof m [...]y be inferred, that the Prince having in him any generosity cannot justly rejoyce at that victory which causeth the Subjects to la­ment.

Who so desireth to obtain any thing, hopeth to compass his desire, either by in­treaty, presents, or threatning; for so shall he to whom the request is made, be moved either with compassion, profit, or fear: Nevertheless with covetous and cruel men, and such as are in their opinion mighty, none of these can prevail. And consequent­ly in vain do they labor, that go about by suit to stir them to pity, by gifts to gain them, or by threats to fear them.

Who so is perswaded that any Common­weal can continue disunited, doth greatly deceive himself: True it is, that some di­visions do maintain the Estate, but other do indamage the same They which do harm, are such as with Sects and Pertakings be accompanied; they which help without Sects and Pertakings be maintained. A wise Governor therefore, albeit he cannot so [Page 125] exactly foresee but some enemies will arise in the State, yet may he take order that no Factions may thereby grow. It is therefore to be noted, that the Citizens of every E­state, may aspire to Reputation, either by private or publick means. Reputation by publick means, is gained chiefly in the War, either by obtaining victory in some Battel, or surprising of some City; or else by per­forming some Ambassage d [...]ligently, pro­sperously: but private Reputation is gotten by doing favor to this or that man and pro­tecting them from Magistrates, giving them money, advancing them unworthily to Honor and Office; and by great Feasts, en­tertaining the multitude; of which man­ner of proceeding, Se [...]s, Factions, and Par­takings do grow: And as Reputation thus gained is dangerous, so the other without Faction is profitable; because the same is founded on Common welfare, and no pri­vate profit: And albeit among Citizens of this sort, will oft arise great hate, yet want­ing followers for their particular profit, the State shall not be indangered, but rather strengthned; for every man endea­voring to deserve well, will hold him­self within the bounds of Civil life, and by Vertuous Merits labor to be advan­ced.

[Page 126] To perswade or disswade particular per­sons, is a ma [...]ter of no difficulty: for if words suffice not, yet Authority will pre­vaile: but hard and perillous it is to re­move a false opinion conceived by a whole multitude, for therein faire speech and no compulsion must be used.

The best means which wise Captains can use to make their Soldiers resolute, is to take from them all hope, which resolution may also be increased with the love of our Country and confidence in the Captain: for confidence groweth by the valor of men, and Discipline in former Victories, and trust reposed in the leader. The love of our Country is naturall, but the aff [...]ction we bear to the Captain proceedeth rather from his vertue, then the benefits he hath be [...]owed [...] Necessity also may do much, and chiefly that where no choise is left, but either overcome by armes, or dye in desperation.

There is nothing of so great force to hold an Armie united, as the reputation of the Captain, which proceedeth only from his vertue; for neither Dignity nor Autho­rity without Valor can work that effect.

The first care that a Captain must have, is to hold his Soldiers well punished and paied; for where payment faileth, punish­ment ought not to be inflicted: and consequently [Page 127] no reason it is to punish him for robbery, whom want of pay enforceth to shift; but where the Soldier is payed, and not punished (offending) then will he without respect become insolent towards his Captain [...] whereof insue Mutinies, Discord, and utter Ruine

It is a custom very honorable not to promise more then thou wilt assuredly per­forme: yet true it is that whosoever is de­nied (though justly) doth rest illcontented; for men indeed are not governed by reason: otherwise it is for him that promiseth: and so good promises shall stand in stead of performance; besides that, he may find ex­cuse enough, because the most part of men are so simple, that faire words alone have power to abuse them, cheifly when they proceed from a person of Reputation and Authority. The best way therefore is not to promise precisely, but entertain the Suitors with answers general, and full of good hope: yet not such as shall directly and absolutely bind.

The greatest and most material displea­sures that use to arise between the Nobility and People, are caused by the diversity of humors, the one laboring to command, the other endevoring not to obey; so as all troubles and disorders in every Commonweale [Page 128] do thereof receive nutriment.

The City which is maintained rather by Factions then Lawes, so soon as one Faction is become strong and without opposition, the same of necessity must be divided in it self: for those particular causes which were at the first taken, are not of force enough to maintain it.

It is the nature of men not to indure any discom [...]odity, unless necessity do thereunto enforce them: which may apparently be perceived by their habitations; for as the feare of Warr draweth them to places of strength (for their defence) so that perill being past, they do for the most part remove themselves to inhabit Countries of more commodity and profit.

It may seem strange, and no even measure (yet approved by experience) that where many of [...]end few are punished. Also petty errors are severely corrected [...] but great and grievous crimes be rewarded. In like man­ner, where many receive wrong, few seek revenge. For injuries universal, are with more patience then particular offences en­dured.

All or the greatest part of men that have aspired to riches or power, have attained thereunto either by force or fraud: and without they have by craft or cruelty gained, [Page 129] to cover the foulness of their fact, they call purchase as a name more honest. How­soever he that for want of will or wit useth not those means, must rest in servitude and poverty. The reason thereof is that as nature hath laid before men the chief of all fortunes, so she disposes them rather to Ra­pine then honest Industrie, and more sub­ject to bad then good endeavors: hereof it cometh, that one man eateth an other, and he that is weakest must alwaies goe to the worst.

Where necessity forceth, boldness is re­puted Wisdom, and in great enterprises perill is not to be made accompt of. For those attempts that begin with danger, al­waies end with honor, or reward; also from one perill there is no way to escape, but by entring into another.

A wise man ought not to desire to inhabit that County where men have more Autho­rity then Lawes. For indeed that Country deserves to be desired where every one may securely enjoy his own; not that, where with facility it may be taken away; and that friends for feare to lose their own, are inforced to forsake them.

Some Magistrates either by over great zeale or ignorance take a course of Rigor, which being for the present favored, they [Page 130] are ever the more imployed, as men meet to extirpate inconveniences.

But thereby the Subjects are often drawn into desperation, and consequently have recourse unto armes, as their uttermost re­fuge. In this case a wise Prince for appea­sing the people is forced to disallow his Ministers, and sometimes also to inflict pub­lick punishment.

A Prince naturally suspicious, and having about him persons inclined to envie, is easily induced to mistrust those men that have ser­ved him with most sufficiency: which dan­ger they cannot eschew, because they who are worthiest commendation are often­times envied by such persons as have access unto the Prince.

Who so cannot endure both envy and hate, must re [...]rain to enterprise great mat­ters: for great honors being desired of many, it behooveth him that aspireth unto them, to be for his dignity envied, and for his Authority hated; which Authority albeit the same be well used, yet they who hate or envie (perswading themselves it might be better handled) indeavor to oppress that power, as fearing it will be worse.

Among other things which worketh the inconveniences of Commonweales, Ambition [Page 131] and Desperation are cheif; of both, Desperation is worst: for Ambition may attend occasion; Desperation will not, as that cannot endure delaies. Historians de­siring to write the actions of men, ought to set down the simple truth, and not say any thing for love or hatred: also to chuse such an opportunity for writing as it may be lawful to think what they will, and write what they think, which is a rare happiness of the time.

In commending or disallowing the actions of men it is a course very requisite to con­sider the beginning, the proceeding, and end: so shall we see the reasons and cau­ses of things, and not their bare events only, which for the most part are governed by fortune.

It is a matter of much necessity, that e­very man, and chiefly a Prince should in his first actions, give some testimony of Vertue; for falling at first into obloquie, doe he well or ill, all is ill taken.

The Custome of the Common people is to judge rather by their eyes then by their eares: which is the cause they allow more of external shew then inward vertue: and true it is, where excellency of mind, and beauty of body concur, the commendation due to such a person is far the greater. [Page 132] Gratior est pulchro veniens è corpore virtus.

A Prince or great personage that con­stantly endureth adversity deserveth great praise: yet greater commendation is due to him that beareth himself modestly in his happiness. For miseries are oft born with patience, but felicity corrupteth.

To be descended of Princes or great Par­sonages, is a matter of meer fortune, and so to be esteemed: but adoption proceedeth from the Judgment of men; therefore seem­eth incorrupt and seldom abused.

It hath been long observed, and is a rule which rarely faileth, that he shall be ever suspected of the Prince in possession, whom men acco [...]pt worthy to be a Prince in re­version.

It hath been a use very ancient to give credit to Astrologers, and other such per­sons who by their star-learning or blind di­vination, take upon them to tell of things to come. The reason thereof is that the most part of men beleive that soonest which they least understand; And if they see the event of a prediction though it hapneth by meer chance to fall out according to that was premised, thereupon they settle so firme an impression, as albeit many o­ther faile, yet the good conceipt of their cunning cannot be removed.

[Page 133] Liberality is a vertue which gaineth love, but much are they deceived whom riot in lieu thereof abuseth. To cast away and con­sume is soon learned, but to give in good order few have the skill.

In time of suddain mutiny, conspiracy, and offence of people, the wisest resolution is not to oppose force to prevent fury, but rather give space for the bad to amend, and the good to consent: for treasons prevaile on the sudden, but good Council gathers forces by leasure.

Mature deliberation ought ever to be used, but when armes are to determine, speedy execution is the best: because no delay in that enterprise is fit which cannot be com­mended before it be ended.

Who so is pleased to observe the pro­ceedings of men in Authority, shall observe that some of them hold a plain course with­out respect: others projecting for time to come do forecast how to hold their pre­sent good fortune or at least to escape dan­ger: for they mistrusting present prosperity and fearing a change, prepare beforehand some private friends to oppose against pub­lick hatred: whereof may be inferred, that no care is taken of innocency, but every one studieth how to pass without punishment.

[Page 134] In Captains and all Military Comman­ders, three things are required, Vertue, Discipline, and Authority; but in private Soldiers obedience and courage only suffi­ceth; for by due obeying, and no curious scanning the leaders direc [...]ions are maintain­ed; and the Army in danger is alwaies most valiant, which before the danger is most quiet. Let the Soldier therefore be well armed and valiantly minded. To advise and dsrect must be the Captains care.

It is a matter of no great moment, yet alwaies worthy the noting, that any exte­rior behavior, or garment presenting pride or greatness, chiefly in persons lately ad­vanced, though no man be thereby interess­ed or injured, doth move in others a certain offence: for the nature of man is such, as beholdeth the new prosperity of others with an envious eye, and wisheth a mode­ration of fortune nowhere so much as in those we have known in equall degree with our selves

In all enterprises of Warr, (if present necessity doth not otherwise require) lei­sure and deliberation ought to be used; for often it sufficeth in lieu of Wisdom, [...]o take the advantage of other mens folly.

All men that are to consider of great acti­ons, ought to be informed whether that [Page 135] which is undertaken be profitable for the Commonweale, honorable to themselves, and easy to be effected: or at least not greatly difficult. Also he that perswadeth [...] is to be examined whether besides bare words and Counsel, he will joyn his own perill; and if fortune favour the attempt, to whom the principal glory shall re­dound.

The perils which accompanie private enterprises, are far unlike to those which he doth enter that aspireth to principality. For in private attempts a man may pause or proceed as he will; But to him that as­pires to Empire there remains no middle course, but either by Victory to triumph [...] as a Prince; or being vanquished to endure death as a Traytor.

Let no man in his prosperity, give much credit to common applause or service assu­red by any of whom in meaner fortune he hath had no experience: for the base people are learned in no lesson [...] only with­out difference of truth or falshood to flatter men in Authority, and with shouts and words of great rejoycing make shew of great affection.

As overmuch haste is dangerous, so too great delay oftentimes proveth disadvanta­gious: for albeit consultation ought to [Page 136] foregoe action, yet to dispute long and in the end reject the advice of either side, or take a middle course (whith in cases of doubt and danger is worst) was ever ac­compted great discretion.

There is no course more comely, nor any resolution so well beseeming a wise man, having made proof of his own vertue (and finding in age no fortune due to such effect) as to retire himself from the Court and com­pany; for so shall he shun the inconvenien­ces of contempt and the discommodity of travell (Jucunda senectuti otia) yet true it is that whoso hath lived a Prince or gover­ned as a publick person, cannot expect secu­rity in a private estate.

Whensoever danger draweth near, and terror is at hand, all men look about, but none willingly adventure: For in such cases every man will give Council, but few will take par [...] of the peril.

In Commonwealths where Sects or Par­tialities he, the Leader of any side is able to kindle Civil War; yet is he unable to moderate the Victory: For to stir up dis­sentions and troubles, the worst man most commonly bears the stroke; but peace and quietness are not established but by men of rare gifts and excellent vertue.

It may seem strange and contrary both to [Page 137] courtesie and Christian profession, that men are far more mindful of injuries done unto them, then of benefits received by them. The reason thereof is, that Thank­fulness is accompted a burden, but Revenge is sweet, and reckoned a great gain.

Of reconciled foes, and such as know that our harms were caused by their means, we oft-times expect favor, as perswaded that new friendship will repair the loss of old displeasure: But the matter doth seldom so fall out; for the quality of mans nature is ever to hate those whom he hath hurt, and love them whom he hath made behold­ing. Quos laeserunt oderunt. Tac.

To common persons and such as are igno­rant in matters of State, every Taxation and Imposition seemeth heavy or superflu­ous; yet the wiser sort know, that the end of all publick endeavour is to confirm people in Peace, and Peace cannot be maintained without arms; nor Arms without Pay, nor Pay without Impositions.

As fortunate folk are envied, so are the poor contemned; which rule reacheth also to Princes: The one lives in Plenty with War, the other in Poverty with Peace. For seldom is it seen, that those people are as­saulted where nothing is to be gained, and whose base Beings afford no other spoils then blood and beggery.

[Page 138] Wisemen have observed that in matter of State, and the managing thereof, three things are especially to be looked unto: The first is, Occasion; the second, the [...]n­tentions of other Men; the third, our own Affection. For there is nothing that slippeth away so soon as Occasion; no­thing so difficult as to judge what an other man intendeth; nor any thing more no­cent then our own immoderate desires.

It hath been ever a course observed by wise Princes, but much more by Aristocra­ties and Popular States, against Force and Fury of the multitude, to defend themselves with Silver and Gold.

How much more it importeth all Princes to lead a vertuous life, and give daily exam­ple of Piety and Justice, appears apparantly in the proceedings of the Roman Bishops; who by the well-doing of some few of them at the first, became greatly honored; but afterwards they became contemptible: For the Reverence which men did bear to the [...]anctity of their lives [...]ailing, it was impos­sible of so contrary Manners and Examples to look for like effects.

The success of the War cheifly dependeth on the Reputation of the Prince, which de­clining, the vertue also of the Soldiers fail­eth: Likewise the fidelity of the people [Page 139] decayeth, and their money to maintain the War, ceaseth; contrariwise, the courage of the enemy is increased, they that stood doubtful become resolved, and every diffi­culty augmenteth.

The Authority which Princes give, is chiefly in respect of Wisdom and Valor: Yet true it is, that for the most part, they accompt them the wisest men that can best accommodate themselves to their humor.

The greatest distress and difficulty which can come to any Army, doth proceed of these causes: Want of money, scarcity of victuals, hatred of people, discord of Cap­tains, disobedience of Soldiers, and their flying to the enemy, either of necessity or freewil.

A Prince or great Magistrate having long maintained the reputation of Wisdom and Vertue, must take heed that no rash or dangerous resolution do taint the Honor­able Fame of his former life: For to be t [...]ans­ported with anger against his own profit, is lightness; and to esteem small dangers more then great, is want of judgment.

A Prince or Person of great estate, must be wary not to inure the conceit of double­dealing: For little sincerity and trust is looked in his actions, of whom there is an opinion of craft and falshood conceived.

[Page 140] Experience hath always proved, that whatsoever the most part of men desire, rarely cometh to pass: The reason hereof is, that the effects of Humane actions com­monly depend on the will of a few; and their intentions ever differing from the greater number [...] the end and success cannot be other then as pleaseth the few that are to direct them.

There is nothing more dangerous then to enterprise a War, or other actions of im­portance upon popular perswasion; for such expectations are vain, and such de­signs fallible: Also the Fury of the multi­tude is great, when danger is little or far off; but perils growing great and near, their courageth quaileth [...] as they whose Passions have no rule or measure.

It is strange to see how apt men are to doubt displeasure threatned by enemies, cheifly when they draw near; for the peo­ple do naturally over-much fear dangers at hand, and esteem less then is fit of things present: Also to make small accompt of those that are far from them, because divers remedies may be hoped as well by time, as other accidents.

The offensive words or answers of indig­nation, proceeding from great Princes, ought never to admit displeasure into the [Page 141] mindes of them against whom they are spoken: For having by Speech uttered a great part of Choler, the edge of their Deeds becomes the calmer, and more easily ap­peased: Such is the condition of noble and generous Spirits.

To judge right of other mens merit, seems of great difficulty; for time and tryal is thereto required; also it is not easie to answer the expectation of men, but oft­times inconsiderate, and not measured in due proportion.

It is a part of great discretion to divide the seasons of Affairs and Vacations: For as it fitteth well a Prince or Person of Dig­nity in times of Audience and Judgment, to be grave, heedful, and austere: So those Offices performed, all shew of authority and sad looks ought to be set apart; for by that means, neither courteous behavior shall detract from the Reverence due to his place, nor severity diminish the love which to his Behavior appertaineth.

Magistrates must look into all things, but not exact all things to rigor. Light faults may be pardoned, but great offences severely corrected; yet not always proceeding to pu­nishing, but oft contented with repentance. To be bitter in rebuking is also fit for a Magistrate, shewing himself sowre to the [Page 142] bad, and sweet to the good; framing both Countenance and Condition according to the merit of men; and be perswaded that it is more honest to offend, then to hate.

Soldiers must be encouraged in all For­tunes to stand resolved, and not to be dant­ed with any passed misadventure; ever at­tending a time and opportunity of revenge; which commonly cometh to passwhere mens mindes are united: For common danger must be repelled with union and concord.

Among other reasons wherewith Soldi­ers are encouraged, Necessity and Distress doth oft inforce them: For as men of ver­tue perform the actions of Arms for Honor, so the coward must do them for his security.

All Enterprises attempted by Arms, are honorable; but those that are done in Countreys remote, are more praisable: For the less they be in knowledge, the greater is the glory to atchieve them.

To be truly and faithfully loved, is a thing greatly to be desired; for Terror and Fear are weak works of Affection: For they be­ing taken away, he that ceaseth to fear, will soon begin to hate; and as they that by force are kept under, obey with ill will; so they that govern without Line justly, rule against Right.

Some men either deserving to be accompted [Page 143] of excellent wisdom, or singular in that skill whereof they make pro [...]ession, do or­dinarily love the proceedings of others, taking that advantage of their ill success; yet sure it is, that Disaster and unhappy E­vent of some Actions, proceed not of dis­order, nor Humane imperfection, but from a certain fatal Fury, which neither Council nor Constancy of Men can withstand.

It is a matter of much difficulty, or ra­ther impossible for any Prince to maintain the Law, Civil or Military without severity: For where men hope to be easily pardoned, there are they apt to offend. Contrarily where mens actions are precisely fitted, there do they live in over great aw, and Hatred doth always accompany such Seve­rity. The best course therefore is to punish offences severely, and reward vertuous Me­rits liberally; so shall Fear be converted to reverend respect, and none have cause to complain: For as it lies in each mans power to shun offending, so is it in their power also to deserve well, and merit reward.

Whosoever after mature deliberation, hath resolved what course to hold in the Action he hath in hand, must not after re­pent or fear any difficulty: For such thoughts would break the vigor of the Minde, and impeach the proceedings of that which was [Page 144] resolved. And albeit some differences do happily arise, yet must he believe that every other course would have been accompanied with the same or greater impediments.

Yong men for the warmness of their Blood, and for not having before-time been deceived by Fortune, more willingly enter­prise Actions rather honorable then severe. But old men as well for that their heat is cooled, as also for having attempted many things in vain, make choice of Enterprises severe rather then those that are followed with Fame and Glory.

The greatness of one Prince is nothing else but the ruine and distress of another: Likewise his strength is the weakness and oppression of others.

Some Conquests are of such quality, as albeit a victorious Captain merit triumphal Honor; yet a modest refusal becomes his greater glory.

The Dignity of Magistrates is not assured without Arms; for when Obedience fail­eth, no other means is left to continue a people united.

As willing Obedience in Subjects is the Princes strength, so is the same their own security: For as by the Princes Authority the people are governed, so by their consent he is maintained.

[Page 145] Three things men covet with immoderate desire, Lands, Riches, and Honors; but as seldom they compass their full content, so are they for the most part to endure a de­stiny far other then they wished.

Strange it is, yet by experience proved true, that in time of danger, Fortune or (rather Destiny) so much amazeth the judg­ment of wise men, as seldom they conceive what resolution is best to be taken.

No great Free-City can long continue quiet, unless the same be used to foreign assaults: For wanting foes without, some inward enmity will arise, not unlike to strange bodies of men, which being secure from external injury, are nevertheless by their own poise oppressed.

As every Pilot of ordinary skill knoweth in calm and quiet Seas to direct the course of his Ship; so every Governor of capacity doth understand how the affairs of State are in peaceable times to be handled: But when Tempests are, and Subjects bent to Sedition; the one requires an excellent Sailer, the other the aid of some excellent Wisdom.

It oft happens, that publick Duty is op­posite to private Friendship; so as we are either forced to omit the Offices due to our Countrey, or draw our dearest friends into danger: In which case we are to prefer [Page 146] publick respect, before particular Obliga­tion.

The nature of base people is such, as either they obey slavishly, or command in­solently: For liberty being the mark where­at they aim, is by them of that quality, neither moderately desired, nor discreet­ly continued; and always there are some seditious Leaders to be found, who of dis­order are inclined to kindle the ire and of­fence of ignorant people. Dux rebu [...] motis, facile invenitur. Salust.

Experience hath oft proved, that Men in best Fortune, and such as esteem themselves most secure, even then fall soonest into dis­adventure, because those dangers unfeared be as it were contemned, and not re­garded.

To enter needless dangers, was ever ac­counted Madness, yet in times of extream peril and apparent distress, bold and hazard­ous attempts are greatest security.

The divers Adventures which happen to men, may well inform that much better it is, cheifly in Arms, to be governed by Rea­son then by Fortune.

A certain Peace is ever accounted better security then Victory hoped or expected. Melior tutiorqu [...] [...]rta pax quàm sperata victoria. Livi.

[Page 147] If to our Prosperity God were pleased to add the Grace of Wisdom, we should thereby judge not onely of what is past, but also of all that can succeed hereafter.

Rarely or never can we consider truly of worldly proceedings, unless first we have felt the deceits of Fortune. Discord or Dissention in any State or City, offers op­portunity to such men as are ambitious to work their will: For the humor of Sects and Partialities is such as the weaker Facti­on doth ever chuse rather to call for aid of strangers, then yield to the Dominion of an adverse party.

Ancient Customs may not violently and suddenly be taken away. Fortune which altereth all things, will by little and little wear them out of use.

To be oft in fight, and converse much with men, breedeth a kinde of Satiety: there­fore it behoveth persons of great estate and Authority to be retired [...] le [...]t over-much familiarity should detract from the reve­rence due to honorable Estate.

The natures of men not content to live according to their Fortune and Birth, are of all others most prone to Envy; because they hate the vertue and welfare of all such as are in estimation above them.

Great heed is to be taken, that no Citizen [Page 148] or Subject, be suffered to aspire to such greatness, as cannot be forced to obey the Laws; and no order there is of more ne­cessity, then that every man of what quality soever, may be without respect accused and judged.

For conservation of particular Greatness and Dignity, there is nothing more noble and glorious, then to have felt the force of every Fortune.

It is the quality of wise men onely, to know how to use Prosperity, and never to trust too much to the favors of present Happiness. A man well advised in his Pros­perity, beareth not himself towards others either proud or violent; nor must he be­lieve in his own present felicity, for the Day knows not what the Night bringeth: He onely is to be reputed a man, whose minde cannot be puft up by prosperity, nor deject­ed by any adverse Fortune.

Men of Cholerick humor are easily moved with insolent Speeches, but wise men laugh them to scorn.

The way whereby a Prince eschues the hate of Subjects, is, hot to take from them their Lands or Goods; yet albeit the blood of some few be tainted, unless the same be accompanied with Confiscation (which a Prince is rarely forced to use) it seldom causeth him to become odious.

[Page 149] A Rule most certain it is, that he who commands any thing unpleasing, must by severe means cause it to be observed; and who desireth to be obeyed, must know how to command: And he onely knows how to command, that doth compare his own force with those that are to obey; wherein find­ing a proportion, then he may boldly pro­ceed, otherwise forbear.

In Actions of difficulty great courage is to be used, and who so compasseth any thing by violence, cannot maintain it by mildness, nor command by affability: He therefore that is of nature soft, should do best to re­frain all extraordinary commands, and in matters ordinary imploy the vertue of his milde spirit; because ordinary punishments are not imputed to the Prince or his Magi­strates, but to the Laws and Ordinances of State.

When Necessity presseth, desperation is deemed Wisdom, and generous mindes do not accompt of danger, because those at­tempts which begin with peril, do for the most part end with glory.

He that endeavors to be good among many that are evil, or will uphold that which those labor to pull down, of Force worketh his own undoing. All Common­wealth [...] alter from order to disorder, from [Page 150] disorder to order again; for Nature having made all worldly things variable, so soon as they have attained their utmost perfection and height, they must descend; so from good they fall back to evil, and from evil they return to good. War begets quiet, quiet idleness, idleness disorder, disorder ruine; likewise ruine order, order vertue, vertue glory and good fortune.

Wise men have observed, that Arms were before Learning, and Captains before Philo­sophers; for good and well regulated Ar­mies having gained victory, established rest and security, whereof the Study of Letters and Liberal Sciences ensued.

That Country deserveth to be loved of all men, which loves all men indifferently, and not that Countrey which respecting the best part, advanceth a few: No man there­fore is to be blamed, if for such cause he desire rather to abandon then embrace his Countrey.

Commonwealths are Bodies mixt, yet have they of Bodies simple some resem­blance: And as in these, many infirmities grow, which without violent Medicines can­not be cured; so in the other many mis­chiefs arise, which a good and godly Pati­ent should offend to leave uncured, though therein be use both force and fire.

[Page 151] Those Wars be most just which are most necessary; and those Arms are most merci­ful where no hope of help remains but in them onely.

In Actions which promise either publick glory, or private honor, men may be rea­sonably perswaded to adventure life and living, because great hope there is to die with Reputation, or live to recover that Peace which War hath consumed: But where men are no less oppressed by inso­lency of Commanders, then by insolency of Foes, there is the calamity doubled, and of two evils the danger of War seemeth least; for that hath end, the other is infinite.

Who so perswades himself to be no less esteemed in evil then good Fortune, is de­ceived: For promises made, during distress, are rarely performed, unless the same neces­sity continue.

The intent of every Prince, or other State that makes War, is to inrich himself, and impoverish the enemy: Neither is Victory for other occasions sought, nor the possessions of the enemy to other end desir'd, then to make themselves mighty, and their enemy weak. It follows then, that so oft as the victory impoverishes them, or the gains weaken them, either they pass or come short of that mark whereat the War was aimed.

[Page 152] Ancient and wel-governed Common­wealths were wont by their Conquests to fill the Treasuries with Gold and Silver, to give reward to Soldiers, to spare the people from Tributes, to make Triumphs and Publick Feasts: But in later times the Wars have used, first, to consume the Treasure, and after impoverish the people without assu­ring them from their enemies.

A Prince or State that leaves promises unperformed, by reason of unexpected im­pediments, and for no ill intent, ought not to be blamed: Neither are such accidents any just cause or colour why friends should abandon their confederates.

Where Magistrates govern justly, Sub­jects obey dutifully; where private persons grow rich, and Princes enlarge their Em­pire; there is the Commonwealth blessed, and the people fortunate.

ALL Cities and Towns of State are b [...]ilded either by people dwelling in or about the place where they are builded, or else they are made by strangers: Of the first are Athens and Venice, of the other Alexandria and Florence.

The fortune of every City builded, and vertue of the builder, appeareth by choice of the place, and quality of Laws: for as fertile places occasion men to be slothfull, unless by good laws they be forced to labor, so barrenness compells them to industry; which reason induceth wise men to plant habitations in either: Examples of the first are Ferrara and Rome, of the second Ragus [...] and Genoa.

All Laws whereby Commonwealths are governed were either made by some one excellent [Page 154] man, and at an instant; or else they were ordained at sundry times according to such accidents as befel. Example, the laws of Sparta made at the beginning Lycurgu [...], the laws of Rome at sundry times.

The government of every City in time becomes corrupt; Principality changeth in­to Tyranny: the Optimacy is made the go­vernment of the people; and the Popular estate turns to licentious disorder; which instability or alteration moved some Law­makers to take order that in the government of their City there should be a mixture of all three, and was the cause that t [...]e policy of Sparta continued [...]00 years, when the popular State of Athens endured not one hundred. Example, the laws of Sparta made by Lycurgus, and the Laws of Athens by S [...]lon.

Whoso taketh in hand to frame any State or government, ought to presuppose that all men are evil, and at occasions will shew themselves so to be. Example, the envy of the people of Rome to the Nobles, and their In­solency towards them appeared not so long as the Kings governd; but the Tarquins being banished, opportunity was thereby of­ferd that the malice of the one and the o­ther became discovered.

The divers honors of the Nobility and [Page 155] people, the one desiring to command, the other not to obey, are the cause of conti­nual troubles, unless some third mean there be of more authority then either, to bridle the force of both. Example, The Kings in Rom [...] expulsed, forthwith arose much mutiny, and could not be supprest till the Tribum Plebis were created; whose authority wrought the same effect which the Kings had done.

Some States endeavor to enlarge their dominions, and some others labour only to maintain that estate they antiently pos­sest. Example of the first was the City of Rome, of the second Sparta.

All States desiring to live at liberty, think fit that every man should be permitted to accuse any Citizen that offendeth, which manner of proceeding works two excellent effects: First that the people should not dare for fear of accusing to attempt ought against the State; or if they do, they shall be presently and without respect punished. Secondly by liberty of accusing, every man hath meanes to utter the offence wherewith he can charge others, which he could not; un­less it were lawfull to take such an ordinary course, and consequently be driven to ways extraordinary, particular revenge, or cal­lingin forreign forces. Example, Coriolanus [Page 156] and Appius, Claudius at Rome, Lucannone at Chinsi, Francisco Valeri in Florence.

A accusations are in every State necessa­ry, so slanders are dangerous, and worthy of punishment; the difference betwixt ac­cusations and slanders, is, that the one is publickly performed before Magistrates, with good proofs and Witnesses to maintain the truth of the accusation; but slanders are as well publickly performed as dispersed in secret and places of repair without Wit­ness and Justification, so as every man may be slandered, but few are orderly accused. Example, Appius Claudius accused by L. Virginius; Furius Camillus, slandered by Manlius Capitoliuus.

The only meanes to suppress Slander is, to give authority to some persons of repute to compel every slanderer to become an ac­cuser; and if the accusation prove true, then to reward the accuser, or at least not to punish him. Example Manlius the slan­derer of Camillus for his untrue information punished.

A rule most certain and assured it is, that every Kingdom and State at the first well framed, or after well informed, doth take the perfection thereof from the wisdom of some excellent man, who ought not to be blind though in a matter of great moment [Page 157] he happily useth some extraordinary vio­lenc or proceedings; for he that employeth force to mend and not to mar, deserves com­mendation. Example, Romulus, Lycurgus, Cleomenes.

There lives no man so simple or wise, so wicked or well disposed, but prefers those persons that are praisable, before those that are blamable: notwithstanding for that well near all men are beguiled in discerning what indeed is good, deeming that honorable which in truth is otherwise; they suffer themselves either willingly or ignorantly to be carried into a course which merrits ra­ther infamy then commendation. Example, every man wisheth himself Timoleon or A­gesilaus, rather then Dionysius or Phalaris; rather a Titus or Trajan, then Caligula or Vitellius.

Who reads Histories treating of great Actions shall perceive that good Princes indeed are more secure and better defen­ded by the love of the People, and Fidelity of Counsellers, then were they that enter­tained many Legions and Men of War. Example, of all those Emperors which raigned after C [...]esar untill Maximi [...]us the greatest number were for their vices taken and slain, only Galba and Pertinax excep­ted who were good Emperors.

[Page 158] A Prince of great knowledge both in Armes and Wisdom so firmly setleth the foundation of Government, as albeit his successor be of the less vertue; yet may he be maintained even by the memory of his predecessor: but if it happen that the third Prince prove not more like the first then the second, then all that is past goeth to ruine. Example, The Martial Valor of Romulus was the cause that Numa might governe safely in peace: which Tullus could not have done, had he bin unlike to Romu­lus; nor should Bajazet Emperor of Turky have enjoyed the state of his Father Maho­met and left the same to his posterity, if Selim his son had not been more like to his Grandfather then to Bajazet his Father.

The succession of two excellent Princes, cheifly if they be of long life, works won­drous effects: the like is seen in Optimacies or Popular States, where the Governors successively elected be men of great vertue and understanding. Example, The first ap­peared in Philip of Macedon, and Alex­ander his Son, rhe second in the Consuls of Rome.

In every State where Soldiers are not, the fault thereof proceeds from the Gover­nors. Wise Princes were therefore wont even in times of Peace to cause warlick exercises [Page 159] to be used; for without them the most warlick nations become not only ig­norant in Martial knowledge, but also effe­minate. Example, Pelopida [...] & Epa [...]i [...]ondas in Thebes, and King Tullus in Rome as well in peaceable as troublesome times used ex­ercise of Armes.

No Prince or State well advised, hazards his whole estate upon the valor of some few persons, nor ought to strength of straight places where the Enemy is to pass. Exam­ple, Tully King of Rome, & Metius King of Alba, condiscended that three of their No­bility for either side chosen should enter Combate, and that Nation which were victorious should command the other. Francis the French King going to recover Lombardy, was by the Switzers attended into two or three places in the Mountains, hoping there to repulse him, but the King taking another way, passed securely and prevaild.

Every State well governed doth reward men of good merit, and punish all offenders; and if any person of good desert shall wil­fully be a delinquent, the same man ought notwithstanding his former service, be pu­nisht. Example, The same Horatio that in Combat gained the victory against the Albani, having insolently slain his own [Page 160] sister, was notwithstanding his egregiou [...] Act and the fresh memory thereof, called into triall of his life, and with great diffi­culty obtained pardon: and Manlius who had with great glory saved the Capitol, for moving sedition in Rome, was after from the same cast down headlong.

Every wise man having performed any great service to his Prince or Country, ought to be content with such recompence as it shall please the Prince or Country to bestow: measuring the same according to the Power of the giver, and not the merit of him that receiveth. Example, Horatius Cocles for having lost his hand in defence of the bridge of Rome, and Mutius Scaevola suffering his hand to be burnt for his attempt to kill King Porsenna, were re­warded with a small portion of Land; and Manlius that defended the Capitoh from the Galleys, had no greater reward then a little measure of meale.

Ingratitnde is a vice so natural and Common, as not only private persons, but Princes and States also either through co­vetousnes or suspition are therewith infect­ed. Example, Vespasian proclamed Empe­ror, was chiefly aided by Antonius Pri­mus, and by his helpe prevailed against Vi­tellius; in reward of which service Vespasian [Page 161] removed him from the command of his Ar­my and gave that honor to Mutianus. Con­salvo Ferranoe having taken the Kingdom of Naples from the French, was first re­mov'd from his Command of the Castles and Soldiers, and in the end brought into Spain where in disgrace he ended his life Collati­nus Tarquinius who with the aide of Bru [...]us suppressed the Tarquins of Rome, and with him Pub [...]Valerius were banisht for no other cause but for being of the name of Tarquin, theother because he built a house upon mount Coelio.

All Errors that great Captains commit, are either wilfull or ignorant, towards the one and the other of which offenders to use greater lenity then the quality of their offen­ces deserves, seemeth necessary: for men of honor suffer nought by the infamy which evill service doth bring. It is also to be considered that a great Captain being cum­bred with many cares, cannot proceed in his actions couragiously if he stand in daily doubt to be punisht for every error that hapneth. Example, Sergius and Vi [...]gi [...]ius were before Veio, the one part of the Army on the one side of the City, the other not far from the place. Sergius being assaul­ted by the Falisci was not aided by Virgini­us, neither would he require his help, such [Page 162] was the envy the one bare to the other; and [...]onsequently their offence is wilful and worthy of capital punishment. Likewise when Varro by his ignorance, received an overthrow by Hannibal at Cann [...], he was nevertheless pardoned and honorably wel­comed home by the whole Senate.

Whensoever an inconvenience ariseth within or without the State, it seems a re­solution more sure to dissemble the knowing thereof, then to seek by sudden violence to suppress it. Example, Cosmo de Medices having gained extraordinary reputation in Florence, the Citizens imagined, that to suffer the same to increase, was dangerous, and therefore they banished him: Which ex­tream proceeding, so offended the friends of Cosm [...], being the stronger, as they forced the Citizens to revoke him, and make him Prince of that City. The like hapned in Rome, where Caesar for his vertue, much admired and followed, became afterwards to be feared [...] and they that feared, not con­sidering their force to be inferior to the power of Caesar [...] endeavoring to oppress him, were the occasion of his greater glory.

In every Republick, an excessive Autho­rity given to one or two persons for long time, proveth dangerous, cheifly when the [Page] same is not restrained. Example, The Dicta­torship given to Caesar for life, was an oc­casion to oppress the Liberties of the R [...] ­mans. The same effect was before that time like to follow the Decemvirat [...], by suffering Appius Claudiu [...] to prolong the time of his Dignity.

The Ambition of Men is such, as rarely they will obey when formerly they have commanded; neither do they willingly ac­cept of mean Office, having before sate in higher place: Yet the Citizens of well­governed States, did not refuse as well to obey as command. Example, The victory the Romans obtained against the Veienti, Q. Fabius was slain, having the year before been Consul: Nevertheless he then served in meaner place under C. Manilius, and M. Fabius his own Brother then Con­sul.

There is nothing more strange, yet by experience proved true, That men in ad­verse Fortune be much grieved, and in pro­sperity also discontented; which is the reason, that not being forced to fight for necessity, they will nevertheless contend for Ambition; and that humor doth as well possess those that live aloft, as others whom Fortune holdeth down. Example, The people of Rome having by the Authority of the Tribunes [Page 164] obtained to make themselves secure from oppression of the Nobility, forthwith required, That the Honor and Office of State might be also imparted unto them. The like Ambition moved them to have their part of Lands by force of Lex Agragia, which was at last the overthrow of the Ro­man liberty.

It seemeth that people displeased with some Innovations hapned in the State, do sometime without just Reasons complain of those that govern: Not unlike to a sick man who deemeth that the Physician, not the Fever, is the cause of his grief. Example, The people of Rome were perswaded that the Ambition of Consuls was the cause of continual War, therefore required that no more Consuls should be [...] yet were they con­tent that certain Tribunes should command with like Authority, so was nothing altered in the Government but the Governors title, which alone did content them.

Nothing can corrupt and alter the nature of man so much, or so soon as the immo­derate desire of Honor [...] in so much as men of honest mindes and vertuous inclinations are sometimes by Ambition, drawn to abuse that goodness whereunto they are inclined. Example, Appius Claudius having lived long an enemy to the Multitude, hoping by [Page 165] their aid to continue his Authority of the Decemviri in Rome, became their Friend, and disfavored the factions of great men. Likewise Q. Fabius a man of singular ver­tue, being also called to that dignity by Appius self, adulterated his nature and be­came like unto him.

Seldom or never is any people discontent­ed without just cause; yet if happily they be asked whereof their offence proceedeth, many times for want of some fit man to pronounce their grief, they [...]and silent. Example, The Romans at the death of Vir­ginia, were gathered together armed upon Mount Sacr [...] and being asked by the Senate, for what cause they so did? no answer was made; until Virginio Father of the Virgin had procured, that twenty of the Tribunes might be made to be as head of the p [...]ople, and confer with the Senate.

A great Folly or rather meer Madness it seemeth to desire any thing, and tell before­hand that the end and purpose of the de­sire is evil; for thereby he sheweth reason why it ought not to be granted. Example, The Romans required of the Senate that Appius and the rest of the Decemviri should be delivered into their hands, being deter­mined to burn them all alive.

The first part of their request seemed [Page 166] reasonable, but the end thereof unreason­able.

A course very dangerous it is in all States, by continual accusing and punishing, to hold the Subject in doubt and daily fear: For he that stands always looking for some trouble, becometh careless and apt to at­tempt innovation. Example, The Dec [...]mviri being opprest, the Tribunes authorised in their place, endeavored daily to call in question the most part of the Dec [...]mviri, and many other Citizens also, whereof great inconveniences arose, and much dan­ger would have ensued, had not a Decree propounded by M. Duillius been made, that for one year no Roman Citizen should be accused.

Strange it is to see how men in seeking their own security, lay the injuries which they fear u [...]on other men; as though it were necessary, either to offend or be of­fended. Example, The Romans among them­selves, united and strong, always endeavored to offend the Nobles; and the Nobles like­wise being perswaded they were strong, labored to oppress the people: Which hu­mors were the cause of continual trou­bles.

To make estimation and choice of men fit to govern, the best course is to consider [Page 167] in particular; otherwise it might be ima­gined [...] that among the Multitude or meaner people, they being the greatest number, might be found some persons of more per­fection. Example, The people of Rome de­siring that the Consulship might be given among them as men of most merit, did by all means endeavor to obtain that honor; but being come to election, and every mans vertue particularly considered, there could not be among the Multitude onel [...] one found fit for so great a place; and there­fore the people themselves consented, that the dignity should still remain as it was.

To perswade a Multitude to any enter­prise, is easie, if that which is perswaded, doth promise either profit or honor; yet oft under that external apparence li [...]s hid loss or disadvantage [...] Example, The Romans perswading themselves that the slow pro­ceeding of F [...]bius Maximus in the War, was both chargable and cowardly, required [...] That the General of the Horse might direct the War; which course had ruined Rome, if the wisdom of Fabius had not been. Likewise when Hannibal had divers years raigned in Ital [...], one M. Centenius Penula, a man of base birth, yet a Soldier o [...] some repute, undertook that if he with such Volunti [...]rs [Page 168] as would follow him, might have au­thority to fight, he would within few days deliver Hannibal either alive or dead: Which offer was by the Senate accounted rash, yet for fear to offend the people, granted; and Penula with his Soldiers was cut in pieces.

To appease a Mutiny or Tumult in any Camp or City, there is no means more speedy or successful, then if some person of great quality and respect, present himself to the people, and by his wisdom lay before them the damage of their Discords, per­swading them to Peace and Patience. Ex­ample, The faction of the [...]rateschi and Ar­ratiati in Florence; the one ready to assault the other. Francisco Soderini Bishop of V [...]terra in his Episcopal Habit, went be­tween the parties and appeased them: Also Count Egremont by the Authority of his wisdom and presence, supprest a great mu­tiny in Antwerp between the Martinists and Papists.

A people corrupted, do rarely or never observe any Order or Ordinance, unless by force of some Princes power they be there­to inforced; but where the Multitude is in­corrupt and religious, all things are done justly, and without compulsion. Example, Camillus at the victory against the Urienti, [Page 169] vowed that the tenth part of the pillage should be offered to Apollo; but the Senate supposing that the people would not consent to so great a Contribution, studied to dis­pence with that vow, and to please Apollo and the people also by some other means: Whereat the people shewed themselves openly offended, and willingly gave no less then the sum formerly decreed. When the Free-Cities of Germany are occasioned to make money for any Publick Service, the Magistrates impose One or two in the hun­dred on every City, which done, every one is sworn to lay down so much as in his own Conscience he is able; and he with his own hand, no other witness being present, cast­eth the money into a Coffer prepared for the purpose; which he would not, if his own Conscience did not inforce him.

When any extraordinary occasion hap­pens to a City or Province, some prodigi­ous voice is heard, or some marvellous sights are seen. Before T. Gracchus General of the Roman Army was betraid by Flavi­us Lucanus, the Aruspices discovered two Serpents eating the Entrails of the Beasts sacrified; which done, they vanished: which vision as they divined, prognosticated the Generals death: Likewise F. Savana­r [...]la foretold the coming of King Charls [Page 170] the Eight into Italy: And M. Sedigitus when the Galls first came towards Rome, informed the Senate he heard a voice much londer then any mans, crying aloud, Galli veniunt.

The multitude of base people is naturally audacious and apt to innovation; yet un­less they be directed by some persons of Re­putation and Wisdom, rarely do they joyn in any action of great import. Example, The Romans when their City was taken and sackt by the Galls, went to Veio with deter­mination to dwell there: The Senate in­formed thereof, commanded that upon great pain, every Citizen should return to Rome, whereat the people at first mocked; but when every man particularly within himself considered his own peril, all in general determined to obey the Magi­strates.

In the employment of Men for Service, neither Age nor Fortune ought so much to be regarded as Vertue; for yong men ha­ving made tryal of their valor, soon become aged, and thereby either unapt or unable to serve: Therefore well-governed Com­monwealths, preferred Military Vertue be­fore any other respect [...]. Example, Valerius G [...]rvinus with others made Consul the Three and twentieth year of his age, [Page 171] and Pompey triumphed in his youth.

No wise or well advised Prince or other State will undertake without excessive For­ces to invade the Dominions of any other Prince, unless he assure himself of some Friends there to be a Mean, and as it were a Gate to prepare his passage. Example, The Romans by aid of the Sagu [...]tines en­tred Spain, the Aetoli called them into Greece, the H [...]diai into France: Likewise the Palaeologi incited the Turk to come into Thrace; and Ludovicus Sforza occasioned Charls the French King to come into Italy.

A Republick desirous to extend the bounds thereof, must endeavor to be fully furnished with Inhabitants, which may be done both by Love and Force: Love is gained by suffering strangers to inhabit the City securely; and Force compels people to come thither, when other Cities and Towns near at hand be demolished or de­faced: And impossible it is without this order of proceeding, to enlarge any City or make the same of greater power. Ex­ample, The Romans to enlarge their City demolished Alba, and many other Towns, and therewith also entertained all strangers courteously: So as Rome grew to such great­ness [...] that the City onely could arm Six [Page 172] hundred and forty thousand men; but Sparta or Athens could never exceed Twen­ty thousand, for that Lycurgus had inhibit­ed the access of strangers.

A Commonwealth that consumes more Treasure in the War, then it profits in Victory, seems to have rather hindred then honored or inriched the State. A wise Captain therefore in his actions, ought as well to profit the Republick, as to gain to himself glory. Example, the Consuls of Rome did seldom desire Triumph, unless they returned from the War loaden with Gold, Silver, and other rich spoils fit to be deliver­ed into the Common Treasury.

All Foreign Wars with Princes or other States taken in hand, be either for Ambiti­on or Desire of glory, or else for necessity. Examples, the Romans for their Ambition conquered many Nations, with intent onely to have the obedience of the people; yet did they suffer them to hold possession of their Houses, and sometimes they were per­mitted to live onely with their old Laws. Likewise Alexander the Great endeavored to suppress many Princes for his glory, but did not dispossess the people, nor kill them.

Otherwise it is where a whole Nation [...] inforced by Famine or Fury of War, abandon [Page 173] their own dwellings, and are forced to inhabit elswhere. Example, The G [...]ths and other people of the North invaded the Ro­man Empire, and many other Provinces, whereof their alteration of names did en­sue; as Illyria now called Slavonia, England formerly named Britain.

A common conceit and saying it is [...] That Money makes the War strong, and is the force and sinews thereof; as though he who hath most Treasure, be also most migh­ty; but experience hath apparently shewed the contrary. Example, After the death of Alexander, King of Macedon, a mul [...]itude of Galls went into Greece, and being there arived, sent certain Ambassadors to the King, who supposing to make them afraid of his power, shewed them his treasure, which wrought a contrary effect; for the Galls before desirous of Peace, resolved then to continue the War, in hope to win that mighty mass of Money [...] Likewise Da­rius should have vanquished Alexander, and the Greeks might have conquered the Romans, if the richer Prince might ever by his Money have prevailed.

Every League made with a Prince or Re­publick remote, is weak and rather aideth us with Fame then Effect, and consequently deceiveth all those that in such Amity repose [Page 174] Confidence. Example, The Florentines be­ing assaulted by the King of Naples and the Pope, prayed aid of the French King, who being far distant, could not in time succor them; and the Cedicini desiring aid of the Capuani against the Samnits, a peo­ple of no force, were deceived.

A Prince whose people is well armed and trained, shall do better to attend his enemy at home, then by invasion to assault his Countrey: But such Princes whose Subjects are disarmed, had need to hold the enemy aloof. Example, The Romans, and in this age the Swisses, being well armed, may at­tend the War at home; but the Carthagi­nians and Italians being not so well furnish­ed, did ever use to seek the enemy.

The Plurality of Commanders in equal Authority, is for the most part occasion of slow proceeding in the War. Example, There was at one time in Rome created four Tribuni Militares with authority of Con­suls, viz. T. Quintu [...] after his Consulship, Cajus Furius, M. Posthumus, and A. Cor­nelius Cassus, amongst whom arose so much diversity and contrariety of opinion, as nothing could be done till their authority ceased, and M. Ae [...]ylius made Dicta­tor.

A Victory obtained by any great Captain [Page 175] with the Authority of his Princes Commission, Counsel, and Directions, ought ever to be imputed rather to the wisdom of the Prince, then the valor of the Captain: Which made the Emperors of Rome to permit no Captains (how great so­ever his victories were) to Triumph, as be­fore that time the Consuls had done; and even in those days a modest refusal of Tri­umph was commended. Example, M. Ful­vius having gained a great victory against the Tuscans, was both by the consent of the Senate and people of Rome, admitted to Triumph; but the refusal of that Honor proved his greater glory.

All they that from private estate have aspired to Principality, either by Force or Fraud become thereunto, unless the same be given, or by inheritance descended: Yet it is rarely seen, that Force alone prevaileth, but Fraud without Force oft times sufficeth. Example, Agathocles by such means became Prince of Syracusa; John Galeazzo by abu­sing his Uncle Barnabas, gained the Domi­nion of Lombardy; and Cyrus circumven­ted Cyaxares his Mothers Brother, and by that craft aspired to greatness.

Sudden Resolutions are always danger­ous; and no less peril ensueth of slow and doubtful delays. Example, When Hieron [Page 176] Prince of Syracusa died, the War even then being in great heat between the Ro­mans and Carthaginians, they of Syracusa consulted, whether it were better to follow the Fortune of Rome or Carthage. In which doubt, they continued until Apollonides a chief Captain of Syracusa laid before them [...] that so long delay would make them hated both of Romans and Carthaginians. Like­wise the Florentin [...]s being by Lewis the Twelfth required to give his Army passage towards Naples, mused so long upon an­swer, that he became their enemy, and they forced to recover his favor full dearly.

To govern a State is nothing else but to take such order as the Subjects may not, or ought not offend; which may be done, either by removing from them all means to disobey, or by affording them so great fa­vors, as reasonably they ought not to change their Fortune; for the mean course proveth dangerous. Example, the Latins being by the valor of Camillus overcome, yeelded themselves to endure what punishment it pleased the Romans to inflict.

An ingenious and magnanimous answer being made unto wise Magistrates, doth oft obtain both Pardon and Grace. Example, When the Privernates had rebelled, and [Page 177] were by force constrained to return to the obedience of the Romans, they sent certain of the City unto Rome to desire pardon; who being brought before the Senate, one of the Senators asked the Privernates, what punishment themselves did think they had deserved: The same, quoth they, which men living in freedom, think they are wor­thy of. Whereto the Consul thus replied, Quid si p [...]enam remittimus? Qualem nos pacem vobiscum habituros speremus? The P [...]ivernates answered, Si bonam dederitis, & fidel [...]m & perpetuam: Si malam, haud diuturnam. Which answer was thought to proceed from generous men, and therefore they were not onely pardoned, but also honored and received into the number of the Roman Citizens.

All Castles, Fortresses, and Places of strength, be made for defence either against the enemy or Subject: In the first case they are not necessary, in the second dangerous. For thereby the Prince may at his pleasure take occasion to insult upon the Subject [...] when much more seemly he might settle his estate upon the love and good affection of Men. Example, The Castle of Millan made by Duke Francisco [...]orza, incited his Heirs to become insolent; and consequently they became odious; which was also the caus [...] [Page 178] that so soon as that City was assaulted, the enemy with facility did possess it.

That Prince or Potentate which builds his Severity rather upon the trust he hath in Fortresses, then the love of Men, shall be deceived: For no place is so strong, as can long defend it self, unless by the love and aid of Men it be in time of necessity succored. Example, Pope Julio having drawn the Ben­tivoli out of Bologna, built there a strong Castle; the Governor thereof robbed the people, and they therewith grieved, in a short time took the Castle from him. So after the revolt of Genoa, Lewis the Twelfth came to the recovery thereof, and builded there the strongest Fortification of Italy, as well for site as the circumstances inex­pugnable. Nevertheless the Citizens rebel­led, and within sixteen moneths the French were forced to yield the Castle and Govern­ment to Octavio Fragosa.

To build Forts upon places of strength, either for defence of our own, or to hold that which is taken from others, hath ever proved to small purpose. Example, The Romans having supprest the Rebellion of the Latins and Privernates; albeit they were people Warlike, and lovers of Liberty; yet to keep them Subject, built there no Castles, nor other places fortified: And the [Page 179] Lacedemonians did not onely forbear to fortifie the Towns they conquered, but also left their cheif City of Sparta un­walled.

The necessity or use of Fortification, is onely upon Frontires or such principal pla­ces where Princes make their Habitation; to the end the fury of sudden assaults may be staid, and time for succor entertained: Otherwise, example, the Castle of Millan being made to hold the State in obedience, could not so do either for the house of Sfor­zi or France. Guido Ʋbaldo, Duke of Velin, driven from his Dominion by Caesar Borgia, so soon as he recovered his Countrey, caused all the Forts to be demolished: For by ex­perience he found the love of Men was the surest defence, and that Fortifications pre­vailed no less against him then for him.

The causes of Division and Faction in every Commonweal proceed most common­ly of Idleness and Peace, and that which uniteth, is Fear and War. Example, The Vejenti and Elinsci having intelligence of great contention between the Nobility and People of Rome, thought that a fit oppor­tunity to oppress the one and the other: But the Romans informed of such an inten­tion, appeased all Domestick anger, and by the Valor of their Arms conducted by [Page 180] Gn. Manlius and M. Fabius defeated the Enemies Forces.

The means to usurpe an estate disjoynted is first before Arms be taken, to become as it were an Arbitrator or a friend indifferent; and after Arms be taken, then to send mo­derate aid to the weak side, as well to en­tertain the War between the Factions, as also to consume the strength both of the one, and the other, yet in no wise to em­ploy any great forces, for thereby either party may discover the intents to suppress them. Example, The City of Pistoia fallen into division, the Florentines took occasion sometimes to favor the one, and some times the other, that in the end both sides weary of the War, voluntarily yeilded to their devotion. Philippo Viscount, hoping sundry times by occasion of Faction to oppress the Fl [...]rentin [...], did often assault them with great forces, which was the cause that they became reunited; and consequently the Duke deceived of his expectation

A great Wisdom it is to refrain Oppro­briousand Injurious speech: for as neither the one nor the other can an [...] whit de­crease the Enemies force, so doth it move him to greater hate, and more desire to offend. Example, Gabides a General of the Persians having long besieged Amida, [Page 181] became weary, and preparing to abandon the enterprise, raised his Camp, which they of the City beholding, began to revile the Persians, and from the Walls reproved them of Cowardise; which undiscreet words so highly offended G [...]bides, as there­upon he resolved to continue the siege, and within few daies wun the City. Tiberi [...]s Grac [...]hus appointed Captain of certain bands of men, whom for want of other Soldiers the Romans entertained, proclamed in his Camp, that no man upon pain of death should contumeliously call any Soldier slave, either in earnest or jest. Nam fac [...] ­tiae asperae quando nimium ex vero traxere, acrem sui memoriam relinquunt. Likewise Alexander the great having conquered well near all the East, brought his forces before Tyre, they fearing Alexanders fury, offered upon honorable considerations to yeild him obedience, only requiring, that neither he nor any of his forces should enter the City, which motion after four Moneths Alexander accepted, and so signified by his Ambassador who arriving in Tyre was by the proud Citizens slain, whereat Alexan­der grew into Choler and being ready to forsake the siege, staid his forces, and in the end sacked the City and put the people to the sword.

[Page 182] A Prince or any other State being assaulted by an Enemy of far more puissance then him­self, ought not to refuse any honorahle com­positions, chiefly when they are offered [...] for no conditions can be so base, but shall in some sort turn to the advantage and ho­nor of him that accepts them. Example, Anno 1512. certain Florentines procured great forces of Spaniards to come thither, as well to reposess the Medici then banisht, as also to sack the City; promising that so soon as the Army of Spain did come into the Florentine dominion, the faction of Medici would be ready armed to receive them. But the Spaniards being come, found no forces at all to joyn with them; and there­fore wanting victual, offered composition. The Florentines finding the Enemy distressed grew insolent and refused peace, whereof followed the loss of Prato, and many other inconveniencies. The like happened to them of Tyre, as before.

The denial or delay of Justice desired in revenge of injuries either publick or pri­vately offered, is a thing very dangerous to every Prince or other State, for that the party injured doth oft by indirect meanes though with hazard of his country and him­self seek satisfaction: Example, the com­plaint which the Galli made against the Fabii [Page] who sent Ambassadors in favor of the Tossani, not being heard, nor any punishment inflicted upon them for fighting against the Law of Nations, was the cause that the Galli were offended with the States, whereof followed the sack of Rome; and the delay of Justice in Philip of Macedon, for not re­venging the incestuous oppression of Atta­lus to Pausanias, was the motive to murther that King.

Whoso endeavors the alteration of any State, must of necessity proceed with all severity, and leave some memorable exam­ple to those that shall impunge the Ordi­nance of Government newly settled. Ex­ample, when Junius Brutus had by his great valor banisht the Tarquins, and sworn the People that no King should ever raign in Rome: within short time after, many young Nobles, among whom was Brutus son, im­patient of the equality of the new govern­ment, conspired to recall the Tarquins; but Brutus thereof informed, caused his own son not only to be condemned to death, but was himself present at the execution.

As health and soundness of the hands, legs, and other outward members cannot continue life, unless the heart and vital spi­rits within be strong and firm; so fortifi­cations and Frontier-defences do not prevail, [Page 184] unless the whole Corps of the King­dom and People be well armed: Example, when the Emperor came into [...]tal [...], and had with some difficulty past the confines of the Venetians welnear without ressistance; his army marcht to Venice, and might doubtless have possest the City, had it not been de­fended with water. Likewise the English in their assault of France, excepting a few en­counters on the Frontires, found no puissant resistance within the Realm. And Anno 1513 they forced all that State, and the King himself to tremble, as oft before they had done; but contrariwise the Romans knowing that life lay in the heart, ever held the body of their State strongest: for the nearer the enemy approacht Rome, the better they found the Countrey armed and defend­ed.

The desire to command soveraignly is of so great force, as doth not only work in those that are in expectation of principa­lity, but also in them that have no title at all. Example, this appetite moved the wife of Ta [...] ­quinius Priscus contrary to all natural duty to incite her husband to murder her own Father Servius, and possesse his Kingdom, as b [...]ing perswaded it were much more hono­rable to be a Queen then to be the daughter of a King.

[Page 185] The violation of ancient Laws, Orders, and Customs, under which people have long time lived, is the chief an [...] only cause whereby Princes hazard their Estate and Royal Dignity. Example albeit the deflow­ring of Lucrece was the occasion, yet was it not the cause that moved the [...]omans to take arms against Tarquin; for he h [...]ving before that fact of Sex [...]us his Son, governed Ty­rannically, and taken from the Senate all Authority, was become odious both to the Senate, Nobility, and People, who finding themselves well governed, never seek or wish any other liberty or alteration.

A Prince that desires to live secure from conspiracy, hath cause rather to fear those on whom he hath bestowed over great riches and honors, then those whom he hath great­ly injured; because they want meanes to of­fend; the other have many opportunities to do it. Example, Perennius the Prime favo­rite of [...]ommodus the Emperor conspired his death [...] Plantianus did the like to S [...]verus, and S [...]janus to Tiberius; for being advanced to so great honors, riches, and Offices as nothing remained desirable but the Imperial title, they conspired against the persons of their Sove­raigns in hope of the dignity; but in the end they endured that punishment which to such disloyalty and ingratitude appertain­eth.

[Page 186] An Army which wants Experience, albeit the Captain be expert, is not greatly to be feared [...] neither ought an Army of well traind Soldiers to be much esteemed, whose Captain is ignorant. Example, Caesar going into Africa against Afranius and Petraeus whose army was full of old Soldiers, said he feared them little, Quia ibat ad exercitum sine duce. Contrariwise, when he went to P [...]arsalia to encounter Pompey, he said, Ibo ad duce [...] sine exercitu.

A Captain-General commanding an Army ought rather to governe with curtesie and mildness, then with over-much austerity and severity. Example, Q. and Appius Claudi­us being Consuls, were appointed to govern the War. To Q. was allotted one Army which served very dutifully; but Appius commanding the other with great cruelty, was by his Soldiers unwillingly obeyed. Nevertheless Tacitus seems of contrary opinion, saying, Plus poena quam obsequium val [...]t.

Therefore to reconcile these different Conceits, I say, that a General having power to command men, either they are confede­rates or Subjects: If confederates or vo­luntaries, he may not proceed to e [...]tream punishment; if Subjects, and his power ab­solute, they may be governed otherwise [...] [Page 187] yet with such respect, as the insolence of the General inforce not the Soldiers to hate him.

Honor may sometime be got as well by the loss as gaining of victory. Every man knoweth glory is due to the Victor, and we deny not the same priviledge to the vanquished, being able to make proof that the loss proceeded not from his default. Neither is it dishonorable to violate those promises whereto the necessity or disad­vantage of War inforceth. And forced promises which concern a whole State, are not binding, and rarely or never kept, nor is the Breaker thereby to receive disgrace. Example, Posthumus the Consul having made a dishonorable peace with the Sam­nits, was by them with his whole Army sent home disarmed. Being arived at Rome, the Consul informed the people they were not bound to perform the base conditions he was compelled to yield unto; albeit, he and those few that promised, were bound to perform them. The Senate thereupon con­cluded to send him prisoner to Samno, where he constantly protested the fault to be onely his own; wherefore the people by that peace incurred no dishonor at all: And For­tune so much favored Posthumus, as the Samnites were content presently to return [Page 188] him to Rome; where he became more glo­rious for losing the Victory, then was Pontius at Samno for having won the victory.

Wise men have long observed [...] that who so will know what shall be, must consider what is past; for all worldly things hold the same course they had at [...]irst. The reason is, that as long as men are possest with the same Pas­sions with former ages, consequently of these doings the same effects ensue. Example, The Almains and French have ever bin noted for their Avarice, Pride, Fury, and Infidelity, and so in divers ages, experience hath pro­ved even to this present: For perfidious dealing the French have given sufficient proof, not onely in ancient times, but also in the time of Charls the Eighth, who pro­mised to render to the Florentines the Forts of Pisa [...] but having divers tim [...] received money, held them notwithstanding in pos­session. The Florentines found the like in the Almains [...] for in the Wars of the Vis­conti, Dukes of Milan, they prayed aid of the Emperor, who promised them great forces; in consideration whereof [...] he was to receive of the Florentines One hundred thousand Crowns in hand, and as much more when his Army was arived in Italy, both which payments were performed; [Page 18] but as soon as the Emperor came to Verona, he devised cavillations of unkindness, whereupon he returned home.

A Prince desirous to obtain any thing of another, must if occasion so permit, urge his demand so earnestly and press for so sudden and present answer, as he who is prest may not have leisure to consider how to excuse himself in denial. Example▪ Pope Julio endeavored to drive out of Bologna all the Bentivoli in which action he thought the aid of the French necessary, and that the Venetians should stand neutral; and by di­vers messengers did sollicite them to that effect; but not receiving any resolute answer, he thought fit with those few forces he had to take his journey to Bol [...]gna, whereupon the Venetians advertised him they would re­main neutral, and the French King forth­with sent him forces as fearing the Popes indignation; likewise the Tuscans having formerly desired aid of the Samnites against the Romans, took Armes suddenly and obtained their request which the Samintes had before denied.

When a multitude offendeth, all may not be punisht, because they are too many: to punish part and leave the rest unpunisht, were injurie to the sufferers; and to those that escape, an encouragement to offend again; [Page 190] therefore to eschew all extremity, mean courses have bin anciently used. Ex­ample, When all the Wives of the Romans conspired to poyson their Husbands, a con­venient number of them were punisht, and the rest suffered to pass▪ Likewise at the conspiracy of the Bacchanals in the time of the Macedonian War, wherein many thous­ands Men and Women had part, every tenth person only was put to death by lot; although the offence were general, by which manner of punishing, he that suffered, complaind on his fortune; and he that esca­ped, was put in feare that offending a­gain, the same punishment might light upon himself, and therefore would no more offend.

A Battel or great action in Armes ought not to be enterprised without special Com­mission or Command from the Prince, o­therwise the General incurs great danger, Example▪ Papyrius the Dictator punisht the General of the horse in the Roman Ar­my, for having fought without his consent, although he had in battaile slain 20000 Enemies without loss of 200 of his own, and Caesar commended his Captain Silanus for having refrained to fight, though with great advantage he might. Also Count Egmont hazarded the favor of the King his [Page 191] Master for giving battel to Marshall de Thermes, albeit he were victorious: for upon the success of that action the loss or or safety of all the Low Countries depen­ded.

To govern without Council is not only dangerous in Aristocracies and Popular States, but unto independent Princes an oc­cas [...]on of utter ruine. Example, Hieron the first King of Sicile in all his proceedings used the advice of Counsels, and lived fifty years prosperously in Peace, but his grand­child succeding, refusing all Counsell lost his Kingdom, and was with all his Kinsfolk and Friends cruelly slain.

In all Monarchies the Senate or privy­Council is or ought to be composed of per­sons of great dignity, or men of approved wisdom and understanding. Example, In Polonia no man is Counsellor unless he be a Palatine, a Bishop, a C [...]st [...]llan, a Captain, or such a one as hath bin Ambassador▪ and in Turky the title of Counsellor is not given but only to the four Bassaes. the two Cad [...]lesquir [...]s, the twelve Beglerbegs, and Kings son, who in his Fathers absence, is as it were [...] a president of the Divano or Senate.

Many Princes Ancient and Modern have used to select out of their Council, two or [Page 192] three or four at most to whom only they did impart their affairs. Example, The Emperor Augustus had Maec [...]nas and A­grippa, Julius Caesar, Q [...]aedius and Cor. Balbus, whom he only trusted with his Cipher and secrets, being Counsellors of the Cabinet (as we now call them.)

The alteration of old Laws or introducti­on of new, are in all States very dangerous, notwithstanding any appearance of profit or publick utility, which moved wise Go­vernors to decree, that ancient Lawes once established might never be called in ques­tion. Example, The Athenians decreed that no Law should be propounded to the people without the consent of the Senate: the like use is observed in Venice where no Petition is prefered to the Senate but by advice of the Sages; and among the Locrians the Custom was that whosoever presented any new Law to be confirmed, should come with a halter about his Neck, and be there­with hanged if his request were rejected; also Lycurgus to prevent the alteration of his Lawes, did sweare the people of Sparta to observe them untill his return, and there­upon retired himself into voluntary exile, with intent never to returne.

When necessity or good reason moves Innovation or Abolition of Laws, a course [Page 19] more secure it is to do it rather by degrees then suddenly. Example, The Romans finding the Laws of the twelve Tables un­profitable, suffered them to be observed or neglected at discretion, but would not pub­lickly suppress them for fear of calling other Laws into contempt: so did they continue 700 years, and were then cassed by Ebutius the Tribune. But Agis King of Lacedemon desirous to revive the Laws of Lycurgus, long discontinued, enforced all men to bring in their evidence and writings to be cancelled, to the end a new partition of Lands and Goods might be made, which sud­dain and violent proceeding proved so fa­tal, that it moved a dangerous sedition, wherein he was deposed and with his Mo­ther and Friends put to death; which Ex­ample haply moved the Venetians not to at­tempt any thing against the Authority of Augustino Barberino their Duke: but after his death, and before the Election of Love­dono, the Signiory publisht new Ordinances detractive from the Ducal Anthority.

Whoso hath won to himself so great Love and Affection, as thereby to become master of the forces, and at his pleasure commands the Subjects apt for Armes, may also without right or title assure him­self of the whole Estate. Example, Hugh [Page 194] Capat a Subject to the Crown of France, being greatly honored by the Soldiers, found means thereby to prevent Charles Duke of Lorraine of the Crown, being right heire by descent from Charlemaine. And albeit the Families of the Paleologi, Ebrami and Turcani be of the blood Royall and Right Heires to the Turkish Empire, when the Ottaman Line shall faile; yet it is like that the cheif Bassa having the love of the Janisaries will usurpe the State, because the Paleologi and other Competitors be far from the Turks person, poor and without means to purchase the Soldiers favor.

A Commander General in Armes, ought upon paine of great punishment be en­joyned, not to imploy or retain any forces longer then the time of his Commission. Example, The Dictators of Rome were in this point so precise, as never any of them dared to transgress the time prefixed, till Caesar obtained that dignity should con­tinue in him for life: which was the cause of his usurpation of the State. Also the Thebans commanded, that if the General of their Army did hold his forces one day longer then the time prefixt, he should thereby incur danger of death: which Justice was executed upon Epaminondas and Pelopidas.

[Page] Banishment of great Lords, or Citizens of great Reputation, hath bin in divers pla­ces diversly used: for in the one, they were inforced only to absent themselves without further infliction; in the other, Banish­ment was accompanied with Confiscation, a course of great danger. Example, In Argos, Athens, Ephesus, and other Cities of Greece, the Citizens puissant in Friends, Vertue or Riches, were many times banisht for envy or feare, but never or very rarely forced to absent themselves longer then Ten years; and that without loss of goods, which was the cause that never any of them War­red against the Country: but Dion being banisht Syracusa by Dyonysius Junior, and Coriolanus from Rome, did make mighty Wars against their own Country. The like was done by the Medici in Florence.

Honorable and Magnanimous men were wont, not only to enterprise great Acts, but also to suffer patiently al injuries which Foes or Fortune could expose them to: as resol­ved, that no Calamity was so great as to make their minds abject, or to forget the dignity appertaing to persons vertuous: Example. After the defeat of the R [...]man Army upon the River A [...]ia, the Galli per­sued the Victory even to Romes Walls: whither being come, and finding the gates [Page 196] open, without any signe of resistance they entred the Streets, where all honorable Palaces were also unshut, which caused the Galli greatly to doubt. Nevertheless looking into the houses, they found in every of them a Senator set in a Chaire of State, and in his hand a Rod of Ivory; his person was also vested with Robes of dignity, which Majestick spectacle did marvelously amate the Galli not having before that time seen any such Reverend sight; and therefore did not only refrain to offer vio­lence, but highly admired the Roman Cou­rage, cheifly in that Fortune. Nevertheless at length a rude Gall hapned with his hand to touch the white beard of M. Papyrius, whereat he taking great disdain struk him with his Rod, in requitall whereof the Bar­barian slew Papyrius, and by that example all the other Senators and persons of dig­nity were also slain.

Albeit the knowledge and study of Letters be both commendable and necessary in all well regulated States; yet if under so honest pretence, idleness enter, such abuses must seasonably be foreseen and removed. Example, When Diogenes and Carneades two excellent Philosophers, were sent Am­bassadors from Athens to the Romans, ma­ny of the Nobility that before disposed [Page 197] themselves to Arms, allured with their Elo­quence and marvellous wisdom, began with great admiration to follow them: and in lieu of Armes, turned their endeavors to the studie of Letters, which the wise Cato discerning, procured the Senate to decree that (to eschew all inconveniences which so honest idleness might breed) no philoso­phers should from thenceforth be received into Rome.

The Honor due to Magistrates was an­ciently much regarded, and contrarywise all irreverent and undutifull behavior with great severity punisht. Example, The Cen­sors of Rome degraded a Citizen only for having yawned loud in their presence: and another called Vectius was slain in the field for not doing due reverence to a Tribune when he past by him It is also observed, that the son of Fab. Maximus when he was Censor, meeting his Father on horseback, and seeing the Serjeants affraid to speak to him to dismount, did himself command him so to do, which Command the Father cheer­fully and willingly obeyed, saying, Do­mestick power must give place to Publick Authority.

Tyrannous Princes having incurred the universal hate of people, found no meanes so meet to preserve them from Popular fury, [Page 198] as to execute or deliver into their hands their own cheef Minions and intimate Counsellors. Example, Tiberius delivered to the People his favorite Seianus: Nero, Tig [...]llinus. Henry King of Swede committed to their fury his best beloved servant George Preston; Caracaella caused all his flatterers to be slain that had perswaded him to kill his brother [...] The like was done by Caligula, whereby he escaped himself.

A Prince that rewards or pardons a per­son that kills another Prince, albeit by that means he is aspired to Soveraignty, shall thereby both incur great danger and hate, and encourage men therein to attempt the like against himself Therefore wise Princes have not only left such services quite unre­compenced, but also most severely punished them. Example. The Emperor Severus put all those to death that consented to the murder of Pertinax; and Alexander the great executed him that slew Darius, as ab­horring that Subject that would lay violent hands on his Prince, notwithstanding he were an enemy. Likewise Uitellius put to death all the Murderers and conspirators a­gainst Galba; and Domitian executed his Secretary Epaphroditus for the Murder of Nero, although he instantly desired his aid.

[Page 199] The vertuous and vitious examples of Princes incite Subjects to imitate the same Qualities; which rule never or very rarely fails. Example, Francis the First King of France, and other Princes in divers ages and places, had great esteem of Learned Men; and forthwith all the Princes, Nobles, Nobility, and Clergy, disposed themselves so earnestly to study, as before that time had not been seen so many and so great a number of Learned Men, as well in Tongues as Sciences. Contrariwise, Alexander the Great, otherwise a Prince of great vertue, by his immoderate use of drinking, did draw the greatest number of his Court and people also to delight in drunkenness. The like effect followed the excessive intempe­rance of Mithridates, King of Amasia.

The last and not the least considerable, is to observe how great effects Devotion and Contempt of Humane glory worketh in the mindes not onely of private persons, but of Kings and Princes also, who have oft a­bandoned worldly Profit, Honor, and Plea­sure, to embrace the contemplative retired life. Example, Rami [...]us King of Aragon, Verecundus King of Spain, Charlemain Son of Carolus Martellus, Matilda Queen of France, Amurath K. of Turbay, with many others. Imperio Maximus, exemplo Major.