I Have received yours, and find that you think that imperfect represen­tations of our Affairs, are the occa­sion that so many in your parts, who wish well to the present Government, sus­pect that it is too tottering, and unsteady; but with great grief of mind I must assure you, that the Thinking Men about this Town, have as melancholly a prospect, of those Affairs: For since we see so lit­tle is done for so great Taxes, we don't only deplore the successes against us in Flanders, but expect great uneasiness at home; and we fear the King is not fallen into right hands, and right measures to support his Throne, You know me too tender of the Honour of the present Esta­blishment, to imagine I will expose the failures of it. But since you so earnestly entreat me to offer at some Remedies, if I think our Circumstances require them, I shall not deny to satisfie so good a Friend, in so just a Request, I think our Case calls for schemes from every hand. I fear some Men about the King have false Notions concerning Government it self; and that is an Errour in the first Concoction. I will not write too pointedly; but without ac­cusing any body, am willing as far as the brevity of a Letter will permit, to demon­strate, that a Limited is preferable to a Despotick Monarchy. I believe it more suitable to the ends and design of Govern­ment, more conducive to the safety and glory of the Prince, as well as better cal­culated for the peace and happiness of the subject. I need not use any other Arguments to prove this Assertion, than Quotations out of History; where we shall find, that violent Convulsions, sudden and bloody Revolutions, deplorable and deso­lating Civil Wars, do more frequently attend the Despotick, than any other form of Government. The desire of Li­berty is born with Mankind, and the love of it so deeply ingrafted in our Hearts, that in all Ages, and Nations of the Uni­verse, it hath given plain and evident dis­coveries, how impossible it is to destroy it. The more vigorous the Efforts of Despotick Monarchs and Governments have been to efface it, the more frequent and bloody sacrifices have been offered by the People, for its Establishment; and more and stranger Instances can be given of what is here asserted under a Despo­tick, than under any other Form of Go­vernment. The frequent Rebellions, and repeated Murders, committed upon the Persons of the Roman Emperors, after that Government became Absolute: The de­posing and massacring of so many of the Gothish Kings in Spain and Italy; the innu­merable Insurrections & bloody Revenges upon the Persons of their Kings, practis­ed by the Subjects of those Despotick Mo­narchs in Asia and Affrick, in all Ages, and at this day in the Empires of Turkey, and Persia, Mogul, Fez, Morocco, and Mus­covy, are plain and evident Proofs, of what is alledged, and may give a just distaste to every wise and prudent Prince [Page 2]of a Government, which is always un­der the cruel Circumstances, either of devouring their Subjects, or of being pulled in pieces by them. Whoever will look into the Records of those Countries which I have mentioned, will draw in his own mind too ugly and too ghastly an Image of Absolute Power, to be in love with such an hideous Monster. I am not willing to tax any man with so unnatural a Lust, but in Policy as well as Religion, Princes and their Ministers should avoid all appearance of Evil; they should not give the People the least um­brage to suspect so Fatal a Project is hatching against their Liberties: Our Government has more than ordinary need to ward off all occasions of Jealousie: For however unwilling some are to own Election to be King William's Title, I hope no body dares affirm we were Con­quered; and I am sure he has not the Crown by the Jus Divinum, right of Lineship; and if his Title is Election, I am as sure an elective Government has as much need of the Peoples Love to continue it, as it had at first need of their Affections to make it: And there­fore without all question, a man cannot express his Love to this Government more effectually, than by pointing out what are the true and genuine Methods to conserve the esteem of all the honest and well-affected Subjects. And two things present themselves to my thoughts, which I humbly recommend to the Considerati­on of the present Parliament, His Maje­sty, and all the People of England.

The First is Annual Parliaments. I suppose no body has forgot that at the beginning of the Revolution, in the Act which was made for declaring the Rights of the Subject, after the Grievances reck­oned up, it says, that for redress of all Grievances, & for the amending, strength­ening and preserving of the Law, Parlia­ments ought to be held frequently, which must mean frequent Parliaments; and not frequent Sessions of the same Parliament; or our Constitution is but little amended by that Act. Our Ancestors understood the necessity and wisdom of having frequent Parliaments, Alfred as you may see in the Mirrour of Justice, Chap. 1. Sect. 3. Ordained, That the Parliament should meet every year twice, or oftner if need were. There are many Statutes in Ed­ward the Thirds time, that a Parliament shall be held once a year, and oftner if need be. That Act is no less than three times reiterated in his Reign. Acts of the same import are made in Richard the Seconds; and these Acts were made when Prorogations, and long Continuances of the same Parliaments were not in Use. Henry Sixths Reign was the first in which Prorogations began at all to be made for any time, and they were but very little used till Henry the Eighths time. But the usual way formerly was to call a Parliament, at least once a year, and as soon as their business was done, to dis­solve them. They adjourn'd themselves for some short time, but the King did not prorogue at pleasure. That this was the constant practise I appeal to the Parli­ament Rolls; but I don't so much dote up­on Antiquity, as to desire to revive that practice, unless I can prove it reasona­ble and advantagious. I think it is very much so in the present juncture. It can­not be unknown to King William, how much he has been Libelled, because so many of his Officers are in the House. Those that wish him ill, have hit the Blot: But it has disgraced him with those that wish him well. It is fit the King should choose whomsoever he thinks [Page 3]fit to serve him in his Imployments; but it will be matter of scandal if the People think their representatives are bought off, Whether by Places or Pensions. But if they are chosen Annually, it will not easi­ly be believed that an unfair Bargain can be struck with them. Our Taxes will be less heavy whilst we think our Represen­tative Assessors pay their Proportion. How just the Clamours and Suspicions of Man­kind are, I don't determine, but I know they are great, and by every body, and every where believed, and that by this course they would be avoided; if the Accu­sations are well grounded, if Votes are pur­chased by Places, or most of the Members are more than Ten times Re imbursed their own shares of the publick payments; then indeed the safety, and very being of the Constitution is struck at, our Funda­mentals are debauched, Our House of Commons is become a Parliament of Paris, to do as the Court would have them: And nothing but what they direct; Scotch Lords of the Articles are, as it were, by a Court-Cabal introduced; and Member­ship instead of being a Deputation from the People, is become a Preferment for life under the King. But whatever the Malicious say, I am not willing to believe these things. But I am willing that it should be made apparent for the future in every Parliament, that sits, That there is no likely-hood that it is Debauched, and that will be made apparent by Annual Parliaments. But to lay aside the peculi­arity of our present case; let me treat of it under a General Consideration. And I will endeavour to shew the Expediency of Annual Parliaments; and that I shall en­deavour to make good by the nature of Parliaments, and of their Delegations, by which it appears that the Members are Delegated by their Electors, to supply their places, in Advising, Treating, Con­sulting, and Determining upon the Great and Important Affairs of the Nation, which appear and are upon the Stage, in that juncture wherein the Parliament is sum­moned. When such a Parliament is con­tinued long [...] answers the present Occasion for [...] were summoned, great Inconveniencies [...], and unlike­ly to follow. A man may be [...] repre­sent me in one juncture, whom I might very reasonably judge unfit to do [...] in a­nother. A man may be qualified, to Advise, Consult, and Determine about the Im­provement of Trade, and the Manufactures of the Nation; and yet may be unfit to offer Advice in the great Affairs of Peace and War. A man may have know­ledge enough to act in such matters, who may want integrity, faithfully to repre­sent, and procure redress for Grievances, which will be springing up in any Go­vernment. When Parliaments are An­nually chosen, we can choose our Repre­sentatives, with an Eye to the present Circumstances of Affairs, and the present Exigencies of the Nation: But when the same Parliaments are continued upon us, we are put upon the unreasonable Task of Prophetically choosing men fit to repre­sent Us amidst the unforeseen & unexpect­ed Accidents, and Affairs which may sall in, so long as the Prince and his Ministers thinks sit to continue the Parliament then summoned. Besides, when the business of the Nation has been, as it were Monopo­lized for many years, then whensoever we have the Opportunity of Electing a new Parliament, we are put [...] on the same necessity of choosing a Kna [...] Skil [...]n the Rules of the House and Parliamentary Laws, as we are sometimes in private mat­ters of chosing [...] that is expert in Pleadings, and the methods of the com­mon [Page 4]Law, though we are not satisfied of his moral honesty; whereas if every body had their turn, in a little time, all the principal Free-holders would be instruct­ed, and directed in the interest of their Country.

Again, delegation imports in its own na­ture a power in the person, or persons, who delegate, to revoke it at his or their plea­sure, and can be continued no longer, than during the time, and particular oc­casions, for which it is granted; and is understood to be no longer in being, than the Constituents think fit to conti­nue it. And delegates are always upon their good behaviour. When Parliaments are not Annually chosen, but continued during the Princes pleasure, longer than the present exigency for which they are called, the nature of a delegation, and the undoubted priviledges of those that chuse them, are quite altered and over­turned; and the delegation is perpetua­ted, though it should appear that the delegates are unfit for it, or unfaithful under it. From delegates whom we our selves have impowered, they become ab­solute Masters; or if delegates still, they are transformed from being the peoples delegates and representatives, into the Princes delegates and creatures. By eve­ry repeated prorogation the peoples Com­mission is cancell'd, and their new Being is derived from the Prince his will and pleasure, and measured out, and continued, according to their humble complyance with what is demanded from them.

Again Annual Parliaments are best suit­ed to a limited Monarchy, (which I hope all English-men think the best) Annual Parliaments contribute most to the Ease Safety, and Glory of the Prince, as well as to the Security and Happiness of the Subject: By Annual Parliaments a Considence is begotten betwixt the Prince and the People; the Prince can scarce demand that, which the people will refuse, when the people have a con­fidence in him, and nothing contributes so much towards that confidence as Annual Parliaments. I again say they remove all the Jealousies which people retain of hav­ing their Representatives debauched, which will be suspected when Parliaments are continued, they are a Curb upon De­signing Ministers, who for selfish and fi­nister ends may be for endeavouring to Embroyl the King and his people, and many times have proved very Uneasy and Ruinous to Princes. They remove Griev­ances before they get to such an height as to pinch the people so hard, as to occasion such loud and unmannerly Complaints, as have many times obliged Princes from a mistaken point of Honour to refuse their Redress, and so have engaged them in un­necessary disputes with the people, which have lessened the Figure, Glory and Po­wer of some of our Princes, both here at Home, and amongst their Neighbours, more than any other thing in the world. Whereas when a King of England does meet his people in Parliaments Annually chosen he may reasonably expect to find them fraughted with fresh desires to unite him closer with his people, to assure him of their confidence, and affection, and to give him earnest of it, which placeth him in the heighth of power, reputati­on, and glory. For a King of England encircled with a confiding Parliament, is then in his Emperial Lustre, more abso­lute than any Monarch of the East, then he infallibly becomes the Terror of his Foes, the stay and support of his Friends, & the joy, comfort, and darling of his People.

As to the People, the continuing of the same Parliament, is a more fatal, and [Page 5]likely to be a more [...] blow up all our Liberties, than either Quo Warranto's, Regulations, or any other Methods practised in the two last Reigns, of which we complained so loudly, and with so much Justice. A Prince may more certainly Bribe, than Quo Warranto or Regulate Parliaments. The Nation will be awakened at those irregular steps: But a King may seem to proceed accor­ding to Form, when he continues that Parliament which he has made his Pen­sioners. King Charles the Second was his Arts-Master in this point: He was no Enemy to a Long Parliament, whilst he had a Long List of many of their Names, of whom a certain Great Man can give a good account; but as long as our King employs him, I will not in­decently reap up his faults; though if he can be caught at the same Work now he ought to be exposed.

It will add Weight to what I have said, if we find it the practice of the greatest, wisest, and most renowned Na­tions, to make provision for the Fre­quency and Rotation of their Diets and Parliaments. And that the most Glori­ous and Victorious Princes in those Na­tions have met most frequently with their People in Parliament. I shall not instance from our own History; I suppose no En­glish Man ignorant how frequently our Edwards and Henries put a stop to the Course of their Victories, to meet their people in Parliament. Have not the peo­ple of Spain made most careful provisi­ons for the frequent meeting of their States, with securities and cautions pecu­liar to themselves, and much more exact than what other Nations can pretend to, and have not the greatest and most vi­ctorious of their Kings been the readyest to enlarge their Privileges, and most ex­ [...] [...] their [...] Charles's, were as careful of meeting their people in their Diets, as of subduing and conquering their Enemies: And it is ob­servable, that King Charles, who was most exact in meeting his people fre­quently, raised the Monarchy of Spain to its highest pitch of strength, and glory; and his Son Philip, who offered at a de­spotick power, and abhorr'd the meet­ing with his people, did first ecclypse the Glory of that Monarchy, and threw it into that decay and consumption, un­der which it laboureth to this day. Did not the French Nation upon their Con­quest of, and Settlement in Gaul, now France, establish the frequent meeting of their States? And the most Victorious of their Princes have been most exact in meeting of their people, oftener than Annually, as may be instanced in their Clovis, their Pepin, Charlemaign, and the successors of Hugh Capet for several Ages. And though Lewis the Eleventh, and most of his successors have endeavoured to sup­press the States, and rendered that Mo­narchy despotick, yet it hath furnished ground for so many Commotions, Tu­mults, Leagues and Rebellions, as have not only frequently put a stop to the course of their Victories, but unravelled all their successes; and the subjects have many times return'd with interest the en­croachment of their Princes upon their Liberties, and reduced that Monarchy to the last gasp; and the struggles of the people of France, and Parliament of Paris, during the minority of this pre­sent King, to recover their lost Liber­ties, joyned with many other instances which their History affords, do plainly demonstrate the tottering, and dange­rous condition of all despotick Govern­ments. [Page 6] [...] calamities was Germany expo­sed to; full of civil Wars and discords within, by the Competition of Princes for the Empire; harrass'd and depopu­lated from without, by the Hungarians, Slavonians, Vandals, and Danes, to all which no remedy could be found, but by the establishment of frequent and An­nuals Diets; by the Golden Bull in Charles the Fourth's time; wherein the absent Princes, Imperial Cities, and Hans Towns who send their deputies, take espe­cial care of changing the deputies every Diet, lest they should be bribed, and gain'd by the Imperial Ministers. By this wise provision for frequent Diets, peace was settled at home, competition of Ti­tles for the Imperial Dignity were extin­guished, Foreign Invasions repressed, and the whole Body preserved in health and vigour: In a word, their Annual Diets are an invincible Barrier against the in­undations of the Turks on the one side, and the encroachments of the French on the other. And it is that only which has preserved them from being swallowed up betwixt these two troublesome Neigh­bours. I do omit to instance from Hol­land, Switzerland and Poland, which have hitherto been preserved invincible, by the frequent Assemblies of their States; for since the two first are Republicks, and the last is an elective Monarchy, where the Election proceeds without a­ny regard to the Family of the deceased King, they may not be thought proper instances to be followed in an hereditary Monarchy, (as the True Sons of the Church will call ours) yet there are some Recipe's which are good in all Cases, at all Times, and under all Governments; of which kind I take Annual Parliaments to be one.

[...] what I have said, has any Weight with the present Parliament, we may hope shortly to have a New one; and then it will be of great usefulness to set down what are the great and indispen­sible Characters, or Qualifications of a Parliament - man; and they are these; Sense, Courage, and Integrity.

Sense has divers acceptations; but that sence that is required to capacitate a Man for serving usefully, within those walls, is not the Learning of Universi­ties, but the knowledge of England. A Sense of Liberty, of what is meant by our Rights, and properties A Sense of our Laws and Interest, of the Nature of our Government, Of our Trade, of our natural strength and welfare. It cannot be denyed but that the Comparing of the Histories of other Nations. The reading over the Systems of Policy, and the Lives of the Great and Exemplary Patriots of Liberty in all Countrys, mightily enlarge their understandings, and adorn the Great speakers in that As­sembly, but if a Man has not reduced all that to the use of this Island, he has not the sense requisite for this post. If his head is never so full of the Idaea's of Forreign Constitutions, if he is not wise as to our Home matters; If he has Travelled Never so far for Experience, If he is a Stranger to the Isle of Britain, he may make a Loquacious Polititian, a Florid Orator, a States-man in Specu­lation, but he will never make a Vene­rable Member of our Parliament. A man that understands but well our En­glish Manufactory, the natural products of our Country, the ballance of Mer­chandizing, what Importations, and Ex­portations are to be prohibited, or en­couraged, what are the Grievances the people complain of, which of them are [Page 7]reasonable to be redress'd, and what are the proper methods of doing it; he that knows how much we can give; what is fit to be given, and can examin How what we have given is layd out, is more fitly Qualified for our Senate-house, than if he could discourse of Go­vernment, better than all those learned men, who pretend so nicely to under­stand and distinguish the several sorts: If the Countries and Corporations have any thing particular, in relation to their Counties or Corporations to be repre­sented, they ought to choose one that understands the Nature of what they would have represented, or that is at least capable of being thoroughly instru­cted in that matter. But at the same time that they chuse one for their par­ticular purpose, they ought to consider that he Votes for the whole Common­wealth, and therefore they must not chuse any man that is addicted only to their Interest, but should always delibe­rate whether he is of publick and uni­versal spirit, as well as a proper Advo­cate for them. But this will come in more properly, when I speak concern­ing Integrity.

The next Qualification is Courage: Although the Word Parliament signifies to speak freely the mind, and tho' Li­berty of Speech is always granted to all Parliaments, yet Courage is necessary up­on many accounts; it is often necessary to withstand the Frowns of a Prince, it is necessary to bear a man above popu­lar Clamor, it is necessary when Peace and War is debated. There has scarce been any Reign wherein the Princes have not Hectored some of the Members: There is scarce any Sessions, but Arts are used to stir up the people against their own Interest; and if a Parliament House upon the noise of a War should be seized with a panick fear, the whole Nation would soon be dispirited, so that it is necessary to have Courage to pre­serve his own Integrity, and to uphold the hearts of those that he Represents.

Again, whoever would discharge the Office of a good Senator, must have Inte­grity that is proof against Gain, against Fear, and Sollicitation. If he can be af­frighted, or bribed, or over-ruled out of his own sense of things, he is not fit for that place. Preferments may be ad­ded to, but must not change the man: Threats must make him more watchful and resolute, and he must be sure to distinguish between insinuation and ar­gument. He must consider himself as a publick Man; he must not know his own interest, or the interest of the place from whence he comes, when the general good of England comes in competion, he must consider himself as well, and more the Representative of England, than of that County, or Town, for which he serves: But when he has considered the Natio­nal Interest, then in gratitude and duty he is to consider the Interest of the bo­dy of the Electors, more than his own private Advantage; he is to strip him­self of all Relation, and to be akin to the Common-wealth: His soul must soar up into the exalted height of an Heroi­cal Vertue, and he is to believe that it is a pleasurable and noble enjoyment e­ven to sacrifice himself and all private Considerations for his Country; he is to lay aside all private Capacities, and as it were to transmigrate into a publick Al­lyance and Affinity, Cum calculis suffra­giorum sumeret magnanimitatem Reipublicae, as Demosthenes used to advise the people of Athens in great Causes of Estate: He used to advise, that when they took in­to [Page 8]their hands the Balls, whereby to give their Voices (according to the manner then in practice at Athens) they should raise their thoughts, and lay aside those Considerations, which their private Vo­cations and Degrees might minister and represent unto them; and should take upon them cogitations and minds agree­able to the dignity of the State: And there is good Reason for this Advice; for certainly, if a man shall be only or chiefly sensible of those respects which his particular vocation or degree, or the State of the County or Town which sends him, shall suggest and infuse into him, and not enter into true and worthy Con­siderations of Estate, he shall never be able aright to give or take Counsel in Parlia­mentary Affairs, in the business of the Senate-house.

The Notion of integrity has been too much mistaken of late; the being of a particular Church, or party, has Christen­ed Men Honest, and in this last Parlia­ment pretending to be for King Willi­am has gained those that Epithet who never understood a King as the Father of his Country, who make his Political Capacity above the Laws of Men, if I may not say the Laws of God too. In­tegrity in the Monarchy of England im­plies more of a National, then slavish Spirit, more of Common Care, than Personal Adoration; And it is sad to think that any Knave can Redintegrate his Reputation, only by being a Willi­amite, without being Converted to an English-Man. Those cannot be thought (let them be as much Williamites as they will) to preserve the Integrity of a Par­liament-Man, who change or stifle their principles for a place; nor can those be thought fit Members for that House, who either for their pleasure, or private bu­siness, neglect coming up to Town, no more than those who have so many Of­fices, that they can scarce peep within those doors, or who are so lazy and loy­tering, that they come not till it is too late to hinder them, and so suffer the Nation to be circumvented by the Ar­tifices and Tricks of the Court, who al­ways set them on foot, when the House is empty. I would have my Country­men beware (if ever they chuse again) of these self-interested, and careless Men. They ought, now their all is at stake, to examine how their Members have be­haved themselves, and not sell themselves and posterity for a drunken bout. Let them choose no MAN that has not Sense, Courage and Integrity, or that will not receive their instructions. There are no Counties, and few Towns, wherein they don't understand the Interest of their Country enough to give general instru­ctions. Let me recommend those to them I have hinted at in this Paper. Advise and order them to learn the Art of Tack­ing, since we can hope for nothing with­out it. Let them give no Money with­out good Country Bills, Let them give it in many Parcels, and Tack something to each; order them to bring in Bills to regulate the Militia, to encourage the Use of Fire locks amongst the populace; to encrease our Navy, to reduce all our part of the War to that Navy; to settle such Salleries upon the Judges as may make [...]em impartial, to bring in a Bill for Capital Tryals; but it ought to be a better one than Sir William Whitlocks, one more clear and more expertly drawn: And a­bove all things order them to bring in a Bill to secure Annual Parliaments, and the Elections of Members for the future. Ad­vise them to Ransack all our own Re­cords, and to consult all the several Go­vernments [Page 9]upon that Head. Choose but once wise and honest brave men, and they will find expedients to avoid the disputes, and baffle the Arts which have rendered Elections precarious and illegal. They will find Methods to be too hard for Court-tricks, and Spend-thrift Com­petitors: Choose no Man that is not wil­ling to be instructed, you have a Right to instruct them: It was the Custom for­merly to instruct all the Members; and the nature of the deputation shews, that, that Custom was well grounded.

I come in the next place to consider of Estates as a Qualification, I allow they may be some additional security for Mens good behaviour in the Parliament House; but they are far from being an indispensible Qualification. There have been in all Countries Men that have been indefatigable in their Care, and untainted in their Love of the publick, who have had but very small share in it. I will on­ly name Cincinnatus, Attillius Regulus, and Paulus Aemilius, amongst the Ro­mans; and Aristides the just, amongst the Athenians. These noble Patriots faith­fully discharged many of the greatest and most honourable Employments of their respective Republicks, yet lived and dy­ed poor, nor had the incorruptible An­drew Marvell our Country-man a much more plentiful Fortune. Riches were so far from recommending Men to Magi­stracy amongst the Lacedemonians, that by the institutions of Licurgus, they were only allowed to use Gold and Silver for the Utensils of a baser Nature. There was formerly, nay there is a Law to this day, that the Electors should make an Allowance for the expences of Members; and it is likely that in the primitive use of Parliaments, greater respect was had to their abilities, their spirit, and their fidelity, than to their riches. But the manner of Choosing Parliament men is strangely changed; can it be thought un­likely, that those who spend their For­tunes to be chosen into the House, should re - imburse themselves when they are there? Can it be believed that he that pays for his entrance as much as if it were an Office, does not design an Of­fice to make himself whole again? Can it be thought such Men shall promote publick Vertues, who are advanced to this station by publick Vices; who are more beholding to their Cups, than their Merits for that Honour? Little do the Country that thus Prostrate the Nature of our Parliaments, for brimmers of Ale and Wine, think, that those draughts let them in, and give them too just a Ti­tle to slavery. It is a strange Alteration that our Fore - Fathers should Reward the Men whom they pitched upon for that business, and that now-a-days we spunge upon them. We drink till we have lost our senses, that we may distin­guish which of the Competitors has the greatest share of reasoning. This is an open and an avowed debauching of the Institution: It were well there were no more base Arts practised in this matter. But till bribing and drinking will not so soon recommend Men, as the Characters that I have named, till the Free-holders of the Counties, and the Inhabitants of Burroughs go once about this business with sobriety, and without little ends, and partial inclinations, we shall never come to a Reformation. England will be without security, for we cannot fall into a solid security, without a well - chosen Parliament. And we shall never choose a Parliament as we should do, till the Electors choose more from Judgment, than Affection; more from Confidence [Page 10]in their Worth, than for the Liberality of their Entertainments. Although the Romans allowed the Candidates for any other Office to cajole for Votes, yet it was entirely forbid to all Men that came into the Senate. Nor was drink­ing for Parties any more in use when they chose Senators at Athens, or Sparta, nay at the General Assembly of the Com­mon-wealths, and States of Greece (call­ed the Council of Amphictiones) if any Man had but desired to be chosen, he for that reason lost his Election. The Se­nate of Venice at this day, to prevent the possibility of a Sollicitation upon the part of the Candidates; and to remove all fears, and that no other Considera­tion than the merit of their Candidates may influence the Electors, has constitu­ted the Ballet; and though I don't hope to fee so nice a Reformation, yet I may wish that such scandalous bribing, drink­ing, and sollicitation, as is not any where to be found, either in antient, or modern policy, in the Choyce of those who are the Conservators of the peoples Liber­ties, may be banished likewise our Ele­ctions. Our Neighbours of Scotland might instruct us how to choose Members, who are so far from treating and carousing, that if it can be proved they sollicite a­ny one Man, it destroys their Election. Whilst such corruptions as are amongst us last, there can come no good; and we must degenerate into slaves. It is in vain to talk of amendment, or to dream of Englands security, till we choose our Parliaments aright; and till those that take least pains and spend no mony to be chosen, are sent thither. Therein does and will consist Englands security: I wish to God all Mankind may be sa­tisfied that it does so, if this Parliament should be dissolved; which it must be, if the people have the sense, honesty, and courage, to demand in a prudent manner to have it made a Law that we should have Annual Parliaments.

The abuses of Elections will be pre­vented by Annual Parliaments, and will by no other Method be prevented so cer­tainly. When the Parliaments are cho­sen Annually, no body will think it worth the trouble and expence of appearing and striving for so short-lived an Office and Authority, which will indeed rather be a burdensome Trust; so that those who have the best Reputation with them will be chosen by the people: Nor will men sacrisice their Credit with the people, either for Ambition or Avarice: If they are sure to be layd aside like Almanacks, at the next Annual Election; so that the Cure of this evil is a strong argument for what is proposed, and may serve to rouze my Country-men out of that su­pine stupidity and ignorance of their own good, into which they seem to be sunk, and which is both the cause and effect of Tyranny, and makes us with all our boasted Rationality worse than the Oxe or the Ass, than the Beasts of burthen; for so are Men that don't know and con­sider.

When I first set pen to paper, I in­tended to have treated upon a second Head of Discourse, which would have been by way of Prevention and Caution, against a project, which will either set the whole Nation by the ears, or entayl slavery upon us and our Posterity. The project upon which I intended to have descanted, is the general Excise; but I have wrote a long Letter already, and the Notion and Tendency of such an Excise deserves a whole Letter apart; when my Affairs give me leisure to ana­tomize it, you may expect to hear of [Page 11]me at length, I would refer you to such an Opportunity; but since I here men­tioned it, I fear you will think me to blame, if I don't a little, though with never so short touches, explain my self upon it; but I will only at present give you the Picture in Miniauture of that Excise which is already established; the Never-to-be-forgotten Marvell, of whom I just now made mention, is the hand that drew it. His Words are these:

What are my own Thoughts about a general Excise you may command, if you think it needful, in the mean time,