CHAP. I.
That Governments have their Revolutions and fatall Periods.

THe best of Preachers, Ecclesiastes cap. 1. SOLOMON, ta­king the World for his Text, found no other Application could be made of it then this, That All under the Sun is vanity; and this he proveth (as did the wisest of Philosophers) by the perpetuall rotation of all things in a circle, from Continua est rebus generatio & corruptio. Arist. de gen. & corr. lib. 12. cap 10. Generation to Corruption. Inest rebus cunctis quidam velut orbis, 3 Annal. &c. There is (saith Tacitus) as it were a wheeling of all things, Certis eunt cuncta Tempo­ribus. Nasci debent, cresce­re, & extin­gui. Senec. con­sol. ad Hel. and a Revolution of Manners as well as Times. Nor are the huge Bodies of Common-wealths exempted from the same Fate with Plants, Brutes, Men, and other petty Individuals; and this by a certain destiny, or decree of nature, who in all her Productions, makes the second moment of their perfection, the first toward their dissolution. —Numina rebus Crescen­di posucre mo­dum. Lucan. This was observed to our purpose in the present case, by the Master of Roman Eloquence, Idipsum à Platone, Cic. de divin. Num [...]ri fata­les, vel perio­di. Plat. Philosophiâ (que) didici, naturales esse conversiones Rerumpub. ut eae tum à Principibus teneantur, tum à populo, tum à singulis. I have learned (saith he) out of Plato's Philosophy, that Commonweals [Page 2] are altered by Turnes into the severall Formes of Government, Aristocracy, Democracy, and Monarchy. Nor can any reason be given For it, besides those rapid Hurricanoes of fatall necessity, which blow upon our Affaires from all points of the Com­passe,

The English of all is, That as men are borne into the world with soules; De Fato vide Lips. polit. l. 1. c. 4. & l. 6. c. 2. & in uotis ad lib. 1. polit. cap. 4. so Cities have a Fate or Genius given them, at the first founding of their Walls; and this Fate is so sure and inevi­table, that no reason or wit of man can conquer it, but it directs all things to the appointed end. Now that you may understand what Fate is, Minucius Felix calls it, Quod de unoquo (que), nostrum fatus est Deus, [...]lapmar. 124. that which God hath spoken or determined con­cerning every man. Vide Richter ax [...]om. pol. à pag. 1. usque ad 50. It is (saith Seneca) that Providence which pulls downe one Kingdome or Government, and sets up another; nor is this done leisurely, and by degrees, but it hurles the powers of the world on a sudden, Sence 2. Nat. quae [...]. from the highest pinnacle of glory, to no­thing. Hence it is, saith the same Author, (almost in the lan­guage of Scripture) that a Kingdom is translated from one family to another, Epist. 92. the Causes whereof are lockt up in the Cabinet of the Deity, though Holy Writ hath left the main cause of such Chan­ges upon record, viz. the wickednesse and injustice of Rulers. It is the weight of Sinne, which causeth those fatall Circumvo­lutions in the vast frame of the world; all things being as changeable as the Moon, and in a perpetuall Flux, and Reflux, like the Tides that follow her Motion; so that what hath been is that which shall be, and there is no new thing under the Sun.

It was the weight of Sin which sunk the old world in a De­luge, and hath been the occasion (no doubt) of all succeeding [Page 3] alterations, Besold. 309. by permission of Divine Providence, who leaves the men of the world to the fulfilling of their lusts, that he may ac­complish his own Fatalities or Degrees by an execution of ven­geance. Hence it comes to passe, that the best established and mightiest Governments of the world have been but temporary; witnesse the foure great Monarchies, the Assyrian, the Persian, the Grecian, and the Roman; and the time or age of a Govern­ment hath by some been reputed Peucerus de divinat. gen. fol. m. 30. & Gregor. Rich­ter, ax [...]om po­lit. 1 & Occo­nom. 5. [...]cum [...]multis aliis. Herod. for the most part 500. years. As for example, the Assyrian Empire lasted 520. years, till it was ruined by the Medos and Persians.

The Athenian, Isocr. Symm. from their first King Cecrops to Codrus the last, continued 490. years, and then it was translated to a populan Government.

The Lacedemonian Common-wealth flourished much about the same number of yeares, Idem? from the time of their Founder Ly [...]urgus, to the dayes of Alexander the Great, under whom it fell.

The Roman was governed by Consuls about 500. Numerus quin­gentesimus est fatalis. Ultra quingentos an­nos non durant Regna, ut estē ­dunt historiae omnium Tem­porum. Peucer. in lect. Chron. years too, from the expulsion of their Kings, till it was reduced again into a Monarchy by Augustus.

After Augustus it stood in this Form, about 500. years more, under Emperors, till Valentinian, the last Emperor of the West, was slain at Rome, at which time the Empire was rent in pieces. The Vandals, under the conduct of Gensericus, possessed Them­selves first of France, then of Spain, at length of Africk, and in Italy of Rome it self. Ann. 70. & 1569. The Scots and English shook off the impe­riall yoke in Britain. The Burgundians and Franks seized part of France. Illud est aban­tiquissimâ me­moriâ prodi­tum; Civitates omnes Anno quingentesimo converti, aut everti. Bodin. l. 4. de Repub. c. 2. The Gothes another part of it, and part of Italy, the Country of Aquitain, with the seats of the ancient Cantabrians and Celliberians in Spain, whilst the Lombards laid hold on Gallia Cisalpina. By which means, the Emperors had no certain power in the West, after the time of Valentinian; so that re­linquishing Rome, the old Imperiall City, they erected an Ex­archate at Ravenna, which was soon destroyed likewise by the Lombards.

Now, East periodus fatalis regno­rum & Rerumpublicarum, plerum (que) congruat, ad Annos quingentos; tamen multa regna circa medium b [...]sas [...]Periodi defecerunt: Strigel. u Reg. 1 [...]. Peucer. de Devin. p. 20. though 500. years be reputed the usuall period of Go­vernments; [Page 4] yet some have not atteined above half the number: As the Persian Monarchy, which from Cyrus the first to Darius the last, florished no longer then about 230. years.

The Grecian having completed 250. after many struglings and bloudy bickerings betwixt the Competitors, was divided into the severall Kindomes of Macedonia, Syria, Pontus and Egypt.

The Hoc est, anno ab V. C. 244. Kingly government of the Romans was abolished, near the one hundred and fiftieth year after its Institution.

The Lombards domineered in Italy 240. years, till they were subdued by Charlemain, and their last King Desiderius banished with his wife and children.

But this is not all; I can tell you of many Royall Families and famous Governments, V. P. Greg. that have had their fatall peri­ods in a very short revolution of time, Lib. 21. de repub. cap. 5. & Greg. not exceeding 100. years. Richt. in Axi­om. pol. As, in the one hundreth year after the Empire of Au­gustus, the Roman government came into the hands of Princes that were strangers, Annus 100. est fatalis princi­pibus Familiis. as Nerva, Trajan, Adrian, by nation Spa­niards.

In the yeer of our Lord, Matthias Chri­stianus in spe­cul. 171. vide Mich. in Axio. Occ. 23. 280. Artaxerxes erected a new King­dom of the Persians out of the ruines of the Parthians.

In the year 300. the Roman Empire was committed to the tutelage of Princes Christian, as Constantius and Constantine the Great.

Anno Domini 400. The Empire hath been usu­ally translated from Family to Family, at the end of the one hundreth year. divers new Kingdoms were raised out of the Ashes of the Empire, inflamed by Divisions, viz. in Italy, France, Spain, Africk, Asla and England.

Anno 500. the Western part of the Roman Empire was ex­tinct, untill the time of Charlemain, and swallowed up at Con­stantinople in the Grecian. Ibid.

I could reckon up many more of these short-liv'd Govern­ments. Centesimas pe­riodos fatales esse regnis, & regiis Stirpi­bus, ostendunt historiarum monumenta. But this may suffice to shew, that (sooner or later) they all have their fatall Periods; their Crownes are laid in the dust, and their Glories buried in the Grave of Oblivion. No wonder then, if our English Monarchy, having arrived to almost 600. years since the Conquest, should now (according to the com­mon Fate of all other Governments) resigne up her Interest to some other Power, Peu. in orat. de miraculosa [...]. Family, or Form. The late Commotions [Page 5] and Contests betwixt King and Parliament, were as so many sharp Fits and feaverish distempers (which by a kind of Anti­peristasis are ever most violent in old age) upon the approach­ing Instants of dissolution. The Corruption of the old Form hath proved the generation of another, which is already setled in a way visible and most substantiall before all the world; so that 'tis not to be doubted but (in despight of Irriti sun [...] conatus huma­ni. Vide Rich­ter. 684. opposition) it will have a reason of continuance (as others have had) according to the proportion of time allotted by Divine Providence. And this I am the more apt to believe, in regard of its confirmation by a continued Series of many signal Victories and Successes, to the envie of all opposers, and amazement of the world: Besides, I suppose it cannot be exemplified in History, that ever Kings were suddenly re-admitted, after they had been once expelled out of a Nation. If any one case of this kind may be produced, there are a hundred to the contrary: So that if it be conside­red likewise, how the Worm works in many parts of Europe, to cast off the Regall yoke (especially in France, Scotland, Ire­land, and other places) it must needs be as much madnesse to strive against the stream for the upholding of a power cast down by the Almighty, as it were for the old Sons of Earth to heap up Mountains against heaven. And when all is done, Nulla vis bu­mana vel vir­tus, incruisse unquam potuit, ut quod prae­scripsit fatalis ordo, non fiat. we shall find it but labour in vain; that we have but fortified Castles in the aire against fatall Necessity, to maintain a phant'sie of pre­tended Loyalty; the consequence whereof will be, that at length in coole Blood we may have leisure to consider, how foolishly we have hazarded our lives and fortunes, and sacrificed the lives of others, Ammian. lib. 23. with the common good and peace of the Nation, for the satisfying of an opinionated humor.

CAP. II.
That the Power of the Sword is, and ever hath been the Founda­tion of all Titles to Government.

TO cleare this, we need do no more but take a review of those Governments mentioned in the former Chapter, in their Rise and Revolutions. The World, after the Flood, in time grew more populous; & more exceeding vitious, being inclined to rapine, ambition, &c. so that the Pater familiar way of Go­vernment being insufficient to correct those grand enormities, there was need of some one more potent then the rest, that might restraine them by force. Vide Peterium supra Genesin. Upon which Ground it was, that Nimrod, first of all men, complotted a new and arbitrary way of Government, backing it with Power by a party of his owne, that those Crimes which could not be cured by Perswa­sion, might be cut off by Compulsion; and that by a power sea­ted in his own Sword and Will, he might oppose the wilfulnesse of others: But he, afterwards abusing this power, by stretching his own will too far over other men's wills, to the prejudice of their wel-being, and oppression of the Church, became the first Tyrant in the world; Gen cap. 10. and therefore was called a mighty hunter, as having used his power to no other end, but to lay the Foundations of Idolatry, and Tyranny.

Thus you see the power of the Sword to be the original of the first Monarchy, and indeed the first Politicall Form of Govern­ment that ever was; for the maintenance whereof he fortified himself in the lofty Tower of Babel, the beginning of the Baby­lonian or Assyrian Government, which last name it took under Ninus, and from him continued in a Succession of 36. Kings, down to Sardanapalus; who was overcome in Battel by a con­spiracy of his Capta [...]ns; among whom Arbaces the Governor of Media being chief, Vide Justinum, & alios. reigned in his stead, & by his Sword trans­lated the Title into his own Family, from the Assyrians to the Medes; with whom it continued in a Succession of 9. Princes, till the Sword made King Astyages give a Surrender to Cyrus the Persian, the last of whose Successors, Darius, yeelded it up [Page 7] upon the same Termes to Alexander the Great, who erected the grand Monarchy of the Gr [...]cians. Veluti, è spe­cula quadam, libertati om­nium insidia­tus, dum con­tentiones ci­vitatum alit, auxilium infe­rioribus feren­do, victos pa­riter, victo­résque subire regiam scrvi­tutem coegit. King Philip, the Father of this Alexander, was confined at first within the narrow compasse of Macedonia, too narrow for his ambition; and therefore by fomenting quarrels betwixt the Thebans, Phocians, Lacedemonians and Athenians, he found means to undermine them one after another, and by his Sword made way for a Title, through those petty Common-weals, to the Monarchy of Greece; which being improved the same way by his Son to the Domi­nion of the whole World, was lost again to the Romans by King Perseus, the last of the Macedonians; all whose Glories, with those of his Predecessors, served in the end only to aggra­vate his misfortunes, Just. l. 8. and magnifie the triumphs of a Roman Consul. But the Title to that of Macedonia and the other Pro­vinces had been lost from the Family of Alexander above 150. years before, it being immediately upon his death bandied by the great men of his Army, and his Mother, Wives, and Chil­dren slain by Cassander; who, with Antigonus, Seleucus, and Ptolomie, having by Conquest rid their hands of all other Com­petitors, shared the Empire between themselves, Cassander reigning in Macedonia, Antigonus in Asia, Seleucus in Syria, and Ptolomie in Egypt; all whose Successors successively resigned their Titles (as did Perseus the last Successor of Cassander) to the Sword of the Romans.

If we look to the Originall of the Romans, we find Romulus and his Successors, founding a Kingdom upon the ruins of their Kindred, Friends and Neighbors. Next, the Kingly Title gained by the Sword and Subtilty, was the same way derived to divers of the 7 Kings, and at length extinguish'd in Tarquin by the Sword of the Senate; wherewith they drave, and kept him out of his Dominions, and made a Title to those also of other Nations, so far, that in the end they entituled themselves Lords of the whole Earth, and so continued, till Caesar wresting the sword out of their hands, became Master both of it and them: Most of the Successors of Caesar likewise made way by the sword to the Imperiall Chaire; as Augustus by the ruine of Lepidus and Conquest of Anthony; Claudius, Nero, and most of the rest, by policy, murther, and the Favor of the Soldiery. [Page 8] At length the Sword divided the Empire into East and West, and in the same manner likewise each of them suffered many titular subdivisions, till new Titles were raised in the West, by the Sword of the Gothes and Vandals; in the East, by the Turks and Saracens.

If this be not obvious enough out of profane Histories, take a view of those in Holy Writ, where you shall find the sword the onely disposer, and dispenser of Titles to Common-weals and Kingdomes. We find Jacob on his death-bed, bequeathing one Portion to Joseph, above the rest of his brethren; and that was a Parcell which he took out of the hand of the Amorite with his Sword, Gen. 48. v. 22. and with his Bow; unto which Parcell the Scripture mentions not any Title that Jacob had, but by his Sword. And as for the Title which his posterity had unto the Land of Ca­naan, though it were allotted them by divine promise and dispensation; yet (as to the eye of the world) they were to lay claime and take possession by the Power of the Sword, and so accordingly they received commission to ratifie their Title, by a Conquest of the Canaanites; after which, Jure gentium, it became for ever unquestionable.

In the History of the Kings of Israel, we read, that most of their Titles have been founded upon powerfull usurpation: such was that of Ieroboam; who though the Kingdome were designed to him by a Declaration from heaven in the mouth of the Prophet, erred notwithstanding in his over-speedy inva­ding the Soveraignty by force; and that Act of his is branded with the black Character of Rebellion. Yet being thus gotten into the Throne, God would not suffer him to be disturbed, saying, 1 Kings 12. 24 the Thing was from him; that is, by his permission; And so he that was a Traytor in rebellion, being once invested by a meer permissive Act of Providence, came to have a positive Right, to the prejudice of him that was his Soveraigne, and to the exercise of Jurisdiction over those, that had been of late his Fellow-Subjects.

After Jeroboam reigned his Son Nadab, who was conquered and slaine in Battell at Gibbethon, 1 Kings 15. 27 by Baasha, who with his Sword setled the Crown upon his owne head, which was worn afterward by his Sonne Elab, till he likewise was slain, and the [Page 9] Crown by force of Arms usurped by Zimri; Cap. 16. from whom also it was snatched in the same manner by Omri; who died peace­ably, and left the Succession to his son Ahab, without the least scruple all this while on the Peoples part, in point of submis­sion and obedience to these usurped Powers. Adde to these Usurpations that of Nebuchadnezzar over the holy City, which he took by force of Armes, and carried away many of the Jewes, 2 Chron. [...]. 36. with their King Jehoiakim into Captivity to Babylon; an Action as full of Injustice and Cruelty as most that we read of: yet Nebuchadnezzar being once in possession by Conquest, his Title became right and good; as may appear by the Report given concerning Zedekiah the Successor of Jehoiakim, of whom it is said, Ver. 13. that he rebelled against Nebuchadnezzar; which im­plies an investiture of right in Nebuchadnezzar by the Sword, or els that Resistance of Zedekiah could not be called Re­bellion.

To come a little nearer, and give you a sight of this Truth in Moderne practises, it will be very convenient a little to examine the Rights and Titles of present Princes to their seve­rall Principalities within Christendome; whom if we trace up to their Originalls, we shall find▪ to have no other dependance then upon the sword. What pretence had Ferdinand the Spa­niard to seize upon the Kingdome of Navarre, but onely to satisfie the spleen of Pope Julius 2d. Vide Anto. and his owne Ambition against the French? Nebrissensem de bello Na­varriensi. for which cause to make his way the easier, he set upon John Albret unawares, and forced him with his Queen and Children quite out of his Dominions; which he afterward held in possession, and brought the people under his Allegance.

In the same manner, Philip the second, with an Army under the Command of the Duke of Alva, set upon Don Antonio King of Portugall, and after he had subdued the Kingdome, laid claime to the Crown as his owne by Right; which he and his Successors held, till that now of late, in the Reigne of Philip the fourth it was recovered againe by the Sword of Don John of Braganz [...]. Fair Titles to the Succession were pretended on both sides; but if either have the better this way, it must be Don John, as being descended from Edward, a third Sonne, [Page 10] whereas the Spaniard descends from Elizabeth, the youngest Daughter, of Emanuel King of Portugall. Yet it seems pos­session hath hitherto been held the best Title, and the Portugalls having of late outed the Spaniard, made bold to stop his mouth with this Answer: Vide Autorem Lusitaniae li­beratae. That his Predecessor Philip 2 ^d. had no Right to the Crowne, it being contrary to their fundamentall Lawes, that any Foreiner should succeed in the Kingdome: And that it was lawfull for a Kingdome oppressed by Armes, by Armes againe to recover its ancient liberty: which is enough to shew, that the Spaniard neither had, nor hath any Title, beside his Sword, to lay claim to the Kingdom of Portugall.

That Arragon was fairly annexed to the Crown of Castile, by the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, cannot be denied; yet it is notorious to all the world, that the Spaniard hath since this union, usurped much more in Arragon by Force, then his Predecessors injoyed before by Right, and dealt no otherwise with that Kingdome, then if it were his by Conquest, exercising an absolute Tyranny therein, as well as other his Dominions. To this end he abolished the ancient and most excellent Con­stitution of that eminent Office, Covaruv. pr. Quae [...]t. 1. called, the Justice of Arragon; whereto some one person was chosen by the Vote of the People, who in most Cases had a Power to controll the King. This was so great an Eye-sore to Philip the second, that (as Petrus Mat­thaeus saith) he number'd these among the most glorious of his Actions, That he had lessened the power of the Arragonians, deprived them of their greatest Priviledges, and demolished that grand Office, called, the Justice, the Bulwark of their Li­berty: So that what Title the Spaniard now hath to tyrannize in Arragon, is founded onely upon force and usurpation. If we turne our eyes likewise upon his other Dominions, in Ame­rica, and those here in Europe, as Sicily, Naples, Milain, Flan­ders, &c. his Title stands in all upon the same Termes, viz. a possession by the power of the sword.

And this is just as much Right as his Kinsman the Emperour had to lay claim to the Kingdome of Bohemia, and afterward to seize upon the Palatinate; Ut pat [...] ex au­rea Bullá C [...] ­roli IV. c. 17. Bohemia being an Elective King­dome that had power of themselves to choose whom they plea­sed for King, and so made choice of the Prince Elector Frede­rick, [Page 11] whom the Emperor made bold to drive out of that and his own Countrey by Force of Arms, See Instrumen­tum Pacis. because he accepted of the Election; And not onely so, but after Frederick was dead, prosecuted the warre, Feuda Germa­nica, praecipuè dignitatum il­lustrium, ex provisione Le­gis fundamen­talis, & con­suctudine per­petuae observan­tia, ita ad Liberos & Agnatos pertinent, ut nec crimine lasae Majestatis confiscari, nec bollo justo, in praejudicium Liberorum amitti possi [...]t. Ut aiunt J. C. Germani. to the prejudice of his Heire, the present Pr. Elector, whom he hath constrained to quit his dignity of the first Electorship, and resigne it, with the best part of his Domini­ons, upon hard Termes, to the Duke of Bavaria; so that what Title the Emperour hath to Bohemia, and the Duke to the rest, is derived rather from the Sword of Mars, than the Scepter of Iove by right of Succession.

This Act of violence against the Prince Elector gave an Alarm to the other Protestant Princes of Germany, to defend their Estates by Armes from the Incroachments of the Emperour; and therefore to avoid the inconveniences of emulation be­tween themselves, they made choice of the Swede to be their Chief; who, moved partly by the Common Interest of Re­ligion, but especially for severall injuries done him by the Em­perour, (as may be read in that King's Manifesto) undertook the warre, and with his Sword hath carved out a Title to many fair Countries and Priviledges within the Empire. See Instru­ment. Pacis.

What Title have the Swisses, the Hollanders, Geneva, &c. to their Liberty, Plenum Regnum est in Florentino Ducatu; quale plerumqne subsequitur Armis oppres­sam Liberta­tem. Besold. in Synopsi. c. 4. but the sword? On the other side, what Title have the Medices to domineer over the free States of Florence, and Siena, to the utter ruine of their Liberties, but only force? whereby Cosmus introducing an absolute Tyranny, under the name of Duke made himselfe more than a King, and (in emu­lation of the Muscovite) glorified his Successors with the Stile of Great Dukes of Tuscany.

How the Pope's Temporal power (which was once so small) in Italy, came to be thus considerable, is easily known, if we take an Accompt of the Actions of Alexander the sixth, who, of all the Popes that ever were, Nic. Mach. de Principe. c. 11. shewed what a Pope was able to doe with Money and Armes, and having a mind to make his Sonne Caesar Borgia, a Prince in Italy, he taught him how to make use of the French Forces to build himselfe a Fortune in Romania, [Page 12] upon the ruine of the Barons of that Country. And though the Pope's intent thereby was not to inlarge the Church-Dominions, but to make his Son great; yet after his Sons death, it turned to the Churches advantage, the succeeding Pope seizing upon all, as Heire of Borgia's Usurpations, founded upon blood and treachery. After this Pope succeeded Iulius, who finding the Church thus made great, the Barons of [...]ome quite extinct, and their Parties worn out by Alexanders persecutions, found also the way open for heaping up moneyes, never practised before Alexanders time; wherewith acquiring Forces, he endeavou­red to make himselfe Master also of Bolonia, to extinguish the Venetians, and chase the French out of Italy; in most of which Designes he gained happy successe. And thus you see, how his Holinesse himselfe came by a Title to his Temporall possessions; yet as among the Iewes, none but the high Priest might enter the Sanctum Sanctorum, so the Roman high Priest, that none might presume to enter upon his Territories, hath ever since gilded these magna latrocinia, these great Robberies, with the faire Title of Saint Peters Patrimony; so that having intailed it on himselfe first by the sword of Peter, it hath been the easier ever since by vertue of the Keyes, to lock the right Owners out of possession.

Out of Italy let us passe into France, and there we finde Charles the seventh, who, when his Title to the Crowne was adjudged in Parliament lesse valid, than that of the Queen of England, appealed to his Ad mucro­nem gladii sui appellavit. Gi­rard. l. 21. Pas­quier. 5. c. 7. sword, as the only Protector and Pa­tron of Titles. Of this Truth the Realme of France is a most sad example at this day, where the Tyranny of their Kings is founded and preserved by force, not only upon the shoulders of the Peasant, but on the destruction of their ancient Princes, and the majesty of Parliament; which retaines not so much as a shadow of their old Liberty. What is become of the Dut­chies of Normandy, Britany, Aquitaine, Burgundy, &c.? what Title had the French Kings to those Countries, til. they worm'd and worried out the right Owners by Force of Armes? What Claim had they to this absolute Domination over Parliaments, but Tyrannicall usurpation? yet Lewis the Jactitare so­ [...]ebat, suâ po­tissimùm operâ effectum fuis­se, ut Regnum Gallicanum quasi ex Tutelâ, ad plenam Pubertatem fuerit redactum. Besold. in Synops. c. 4. eleventh gloried in [Page 13] the Action, Lehmann. 2. cap. 4. as if the Fleurs de Lys never flourished so well, as when they were watered with the blood and tears of the People. For, according to the antient Constitution, that King­dome retained a mixture of Aristocratical power; so that the then supreme Court of Parliament at Paris had a principall share in the Government, and nothing was imposed on the People, but by the Consent of their Deputies: But now, having been mined out of their Authority by the powerfull Incroach­ments of their Kings, and being overawed by armed Powers held continually in pay for the purpose, their Authority is de­funct, and their common Interest in the Affairs of the Publique translated into a private Councell d' Estat, which depends upon the meer will of the King: And so the Parliament of Paris, which was once the Supreme Councel, Senatus Parisi­ensis in Judi­cum curiam transmutatus. Besold. having surrendred its Title to the Sword of the King, serves now onely for a petty Court of Judicature, and a meer Mock-show of Majesty—Thus we see the French King's Title to what he holds at home; and if we look abroad, he hath but the same Right to what he got in Catalonia and Flanders: And yet we must needs say, it is as good every jot as that of the Spaniard, See Malvezzi, in the Events of the Spanish Monarchy. whose best Plea is, that his Theeveries there have been of a longer Prescription: And upon the same Termes, of late years, They have both laine at Catch for the Dutchy of Savoy, and severall parcells of Germany.

Here likewise I might sift the Title of the Family of Oldenburgh (the stock of the late King) to the Crown of Denmark, and of Denmark it self to the Dutchy of Holstein, but to bring this dis­course to a Period, I shall draw nearer home, and make it as clearly appear likewise; that the Power of the Sword ever hath been the Foundation of all Titles to Government in England, both before, and since the Norman Conquest. First, the Sword of Caesar triumphed over the Liberties of the poor Britaines, Caesar in Com­ment. and gave the Romans here a Title to their Dominion. After­wards, their Liberty returning again, when the Roman Empire fell to pieces, a new Title was setled by the Sword of our Pro­genitors the Saxons, See the English Chron. who submitted for a Time, upon the same Terms also, to the Danes, till the Saxons, impatient of the yoke, out-acted (by way of Precedent) the Parisian Massacre, or Si­cilian Vespers, and made use of their Knives, instead of their [Page 14] Swords, to recover their own Title against the Danish Tyranny. Now, if in these nationall revolutions of Government, I should examine those also of the Regall Families, we cannot from any examples produce more pregnant Instances, concerning the Transitions of Title from Family to Family, meerly upon the accompt of the Sword: But I wave those, and will take a view of our own Affairs at a lesse remote distance, and see whether William the Conquerour translated the Government, upon any better Terms into the hands of the Normans.

And upon examination it appears, he had no better Title to England, then the rest before mentioned had at first to their severall Countries, or than his Predecessor Rollo had to Nor­mandy it self. Histor. Nor­man. For, about 120. years before, it hapned that this Rollo issued in the head of a barbarous Rout, out of Denmark and Norway; first, into the Dutchies of Frize and Henault; afterward he seated himself by force in the possession of Rohan; in a short time of all Normandy, and missed but a little of the Conquest of Paris.

From him, this William was the sixth Duke of Normandy; who, though a Bastard, legitimated his Title, by the successe of severall Battels, against six or seven of his Competitors, more clear in Bloud than himself; by which means having secured his Claim at home, he became the more confident to tempt his Fortune with a design upon England. As for any Right to the Crown, he had none, save a frivolous Testamentary Title, pre­tending that it was bequeathed to him by the last Will of his Kinsman, K. Edward the Confessor, upon which pretence he betook himself to Armes, and with a Collection of Forces out of Normandy, France, Flanders, and other Countries, landing in Sussex, he gave Battel at Hastings, and established himself a Title by Conquest upon the destruction of King Harold, and of the Norman. ille Spurius, Guil­ [...]lmus. dictus, Anglicanum Regnum vi oc­cupavit; Le­ges (que) tulit, nullas accepit. Laws and Liberties of the Nation, as may be seen in all our Chronicles.

After him, his Sonnes, the two succeding Kings, William Rufus, and Henry the first, made good their succession by the Sword, against Robert, their elder Brother, as did King Stephen a stranger against Maud the Empresse, Besoldus in Synopsi. l. 1. c. 4. the right Heire of that Henry. Next to Stephen succeeded Henry the second, the Son [Page 15] of Maud, who, as Heir of his Predecessors way of Usurpation, Quarter'd the Armes of England with the Lordship of Ireland, by the Sword; as his Successor Edward the first, by the same means, cemented the Principality of Wales to the Kingdome of Eng­land, with the Blood of Leoline and his Brother David, the last of the Welch Princes. See the Chro­nicles. Next, Edward the second was forced by Armes to surrender his Right to his Sonne Edward the third, whose Grand-child Richard the second was in like manner by force of Armes deprived by Henry of Lancaster, whose Sonne Henry the fifth made good not onely that Title, but craved out a new one with his Sword to the Crown of France, in defiance of the Salick Constitution; and left it so confirmed unto his Sonne Henry the sixth, that he was Crowned King of France at Paris, and so continued, till (Fortune turning) his Title was Cancell'd there by the Sword of the French, as it was likewise in England by that of Edward the fourth; whose Sonne Edward the fifth left the Crown in the bloody hands of Richard the third, from whence it was wrested by Henry the seventh. This Henry (from whom the late King derived his Claime) came in with an Army, and (as one hath well observed) by meer Power was made King in the Army, and by the Army; so that in the very Field where he got the Victory, the Crown was set upon his Head, and there he gave Knighthood to many of his Commanders. Upon this Foundation of Military Power, he got himself afterwards so­lemnly Crowned at Westminster. And soon after, upon Autho­rity thus gotten, he called a Parliament, and in that Parliament was the Crown entailed upon him and his Heirs. Thus both his Crown and his Parliament were founded upon Power: As for any just Title, he could have none; for, he descended from a Bastard of John of Gaunt, which (though legitimated for common Inheritan­ces, yet) expresly was excluded from Succession to the Crown. And for his Wives Title, that came in after his Kingship, and his Par­liament, which had setled the Crown before upon him and his Heirs. And he was so far from exercising authority in her Right, that her Name is not used in any Laws, as Queen Mary's was, both before and after her Marriage with the Spanish King.

Now, having made it evident out of the Histories of all Times, our own, and other Nations, that the Power of the Sword ever [Page 16] hath been the Foundation of Titles to Government, it is as clear likewise out of the same Histories, that the People never presumed to spurne at those Powers, but (for publique Peace and quiet) paid a patient submission to them, under their va­rious Revolutions. But it were vain to raise more dust out of the Cobwebs of Antiquity in so limpid a Case, confirmed by the Practises of all Nations: Look nearer our own Times into the warres of Germany, and those betwixt the French and Spa­nish of late Time in Catalonia and Flanders; one while you might have seen the same Town uuder the Power of the Em­perour, another while under the Swede; th [...]s year under the French, the next under the Spaniard, and upon every new alte­ration, without scruple, paying a new Allegiance and Submission, and never so much as blamed for it by the Divines of their own, or any other Nation. Moreover, none can deny, but that as Henry the seventh, and the rest before mentioned, came into this Kingdome by meer Power, without Title of inheritance; so the whole Body of this Nation (as one observes) swore Fe­alty and Allegiance to them, and obeyed them whilst they ru­led; yea, doth yeeld subjection to those Laws until this very day. And the learned in the Laws do continually plead, judge, justifie, and condemn, according to those Laws; So that herein the very voice of the Nation, with one consent, seems to speak aloud: That those whose Title is supposed unlawfull, and founded meerly upon Force, yet being possessed of Authority, may lawfully be obeyed. Nor may they onely, but they must, else by the Judgement of Civilians, such as refuse may be punished as seditious and Trayterous; Vide Grotium, de jure B [...]lli, l. 3. c. [...]5. Bello ut alia acquiri pessunt, ita & jue Imperantis, &c. the Victors being ever allowed (Jure gentium) to use all means for securing what they have gotten, and to exercise a right of Dominion over the Conquer'd Party. Whosoever therefore shall refuse Submission to an esta­blished Government, upon pretence of Conscience, in regard of former Allegiances. Oaths and Covenants; or upon su [...]positi­on that it is by the Sword unlawfully erected, deserves none but the Character of peevish, and a man obstinate against the Rea­son and Custome of the whole world. Let his pretence be what it will, Resistance, in the eye of the Law of Nations, is Treason; and if he will needs perish in the Flames of his own phren'tick [Page 17] Zeal, he can at the best be reckoned but the Mad-mans Saint, and the Fool's Martyr.

CHAP. III.
That Non-submission to Government justly deprives Men of the benefit of its Protection.

IF at any time it seem good to the wise disposer of States and Kingdoms (who puts down one, and sets up another) to permit the expulsion of such as were formerly in possession, and admit others in their places, it cannot in reason be expected, that those which refuse obedience to their Authority shall receive the Benefit of Protection; and that for severall considera­tions.

First, because Protection implyes a Return of obedience and Friendship, from the persons protected, to those that protect them; otherwise they put themselves into the condition of Enemies, and by the Law of Nations, which indulges a liberty unto all that are in power to provide for their own security, they may be handled as Publique Enemies, and Out-lawes; wherefore in this Case, so little of protection is due to them, that they may be punished as Traitors, by some shamefull Exe­cution. And it appears out of Grotius, De Iure Belli. lib. 3. cap. 20. in case of Non-sub­mission, to new Lords after a Victory, the Throats of every Re [...]user are wholly at their mercy; and all this, De Jure.

Secondly▪ there being a necessity of some Government at all times, for the maintenance of Civill conversation, and to avoid Confusion, therefore such as will not submit, because they can­not have such a Governour as themselves like, are in some sense meer Anarchists, and destroy the two main ends of all Civill Communion: 3 Polit. cap. 4. 1 Polit. c. 2. & l. 2. c. 4. & 6. The first whereof Aristotle sets down to be Publique Safety, in relation whereunto each Member of the Commonwealth is concerned to have a care of the whole: The second is Publique Equity, for the Administration of Justice, [Page 18] encouragement of Vertue, and punishment of Vice, without which it's impossible to enjoy Peace or Happinesse. Where this humour reignes, there those two can never be secured, nor any politicall [...]taxi [...], good Order, or Tranquillity maintained, which is the very Soul of Government; forasmuch as (say the Civilians) the essence of a Common-weal consists, A [...]ist. 1. Polit. cap. 5. Bellarm de Laicis, c. 5. Ratione Impe­randi & parendi; in Imperii & Subjectionis rectâ ordinatione, in a due course of Commanding and Obeying, Rule and Subjection: From whence (say they) we may conclude. Molina. de Jure & Just. Tract. 2. dist. 26. Regere & Subjici; that Rule and Su [...]bjection are founded upon the Law both of God and Nature, and they must needs be Transgressors against both, that upon any pretence whatsoever shall refuse to obey those Powers that are set over them, and open a Gap to Con­fusion, ipsa Tyrannide deteriorem, of far worse consequence than any Tyrannicall usurpation.

Thirdly, private and particular persons have no Right to question how those came by their Power that are in Authority over Them; for, if that were once admitted, there would be no end of disputes in the world touching Titles. It is ground enough for the submission of particular Persons in things of politicall equity, that those which have gotten the Power are irresi­stable, and able to force it if they refuse: Judicium sibi privatus sume­re non debet, sed possessio­enem sequi. lib. 1. c. 4. For, as touching this Case (saith the most excellent Grotius) Private persons ought not to take upon them to meddle with these Controversies in point of Title, but rather to follow them that are in possession. For, all Power is from God; and, our Saviour told Pilate, the Power that he had was given him from above, though all the world knows that Pilate was but a Deputy-governour, and (in a civill accep­tation) received his Power from Caesar, who was an Usurper. To this accords that of Bodinus 1. Respectu pri­ma [...]ausa [...]m­uia Imperia legitima esse concedo; sed si quaeras de cau­sis intermediis, &c. de repub. cap. 6. who saith, that all Governments are lawfull in respect of the first Cause, viz. God; but on the othor side, if we regard secondary Causes, all Go­vernments have had their Beginning and Foundation upon Force and Violence. Now, since all commanding Powers hold their Supremacy from God, and that by the Law of Nations, They have a Right to exercise their Power over those whom they hold in possession; Rom. 13. Therefore by the Law of God (which damnes resistance against those Powers) and by the same Law of [Page 19] Nations, they which refuse submission to those Powers, (be They just or unjust by way of Acquisition) may be justly depri­ved of their Possessions and Protection.

To those Testimonies before Cited, Tract. de Ma­jest cap. 1. let me adde one more, to conclude out of Bocerus: Contra Rempublicam quamcun (que), supe­riorem non rccognoscentem, si quis aliquid moliatur; is, ut Crimi­nis Majestatis reus puniatur: Non quidem ex l [...]ge Julia; sed Jure gentibus communi, quod cujuslibet Imperantis tuctur Majestatem. If any man attempt ought against any Common-wealth whatsoever, that acknowledges no Superiour, he may be punished as guilty of Treason: And this, by the Custome and Law of Nations, which provides for the Authority and safety of all that are in Power. De Regalibus, c. 3. num. 307. Now (saith the same Author) If any person will not acknowledge, nor submit to those that rule the Common-wealth, it is to be presumed that he hath some designe in hand to their Prejudice, and he may be punished accordingly; which punishment (the Crime being Treason) amounts to losse of Life, as well as Possession and Protection.

CHAP. IV.
That a Government erected by a prevailing part of the People is as valid de Jure, us if it had the ratifying consent of the whole.

SInce after the miserable Confusions of a Civill War, there is in the end a necessity of some Settlement, it cannot in Reason be imagined (when the Controversie is decided by the Sword) that the Conquerours should, as to the manner of settle­ment, submit to the will of the Conquered Party, though more in number than Themselves; nor are they obliged to settle the Government again, according to the former Lawes and Con­stitutions, but may, in this case, use such means as Necessitas summa reducitres ad merum Ius naturae. nature in­structs them in, and erect such a Form as they thewselves con­ceive most convenient for their own Preservation. Grotius de Ju­re belli. l. 2 c. 6 Grotius inter Pr [...]legomena de Jure Belli: To this truth we have the Testimony of the most Learned Grotius, which I wil set down at large. In bello Civili, scripta quidem Jura, id est civilia, non valent; at valent non scripta, id est, quae natura dictat, [Page 20] aut gentium consensus constituit. In a Civil war, (saith he) written Laws, that is, the established Laws of a Nation, are of no Force, but those only which are not written, that is, which are agree­able to the dictates of Nature, or the Law and custom of Nati­ons. And then that only is Law (saith he) which shall be declared by the prevailing Party. Grotius ibid. Jus dicitur esse id quod validiori placu­it, ut intelligamus fine suo carere Jus, nisi vires ministras habeat. That onely which it pleaseth the stronger Party to enact is said to be Law, since it cannot accomplish the outward end of a Law, Nic. Mach. de Principe, c. 6. except it be attended by Force to constrain obedience. Hence came it (saith the Florentine Secretary.) that all the Pro­phets that were arm'd, prevailed; but those that were unarm'd were too weak. And therefore it behaves all Legislators to be so provided, that if the People will not be ruled, they may compell them by Force. Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus, would never have been able long to continue the Authority of their Laws, had they been without Arms at Command. And Solon himself, the great Athenian Law-giver, See Grotius ib. declares, he could never have esta­blished his Laws at Athens, had he not had Power to second Them; and that all those great matters which he effected in founding a Common-wealth, he did,

by coupling Law and Force, making Authority and Power walk hand in hand together.

Moreover, as to the late Contest betwixt King and Parlia­ment, Grotius speaks very home to justifie the Parliaments late Proceedings in positive Terms: Grot. lib. 1. c. 4. Si Rex partem habeat summi Imperii, partem alteram populus aut Senatus, Regi in partem non suam involanti, vis justa opponi poterit, quia eatenus Imperium non habet: Quod ubi fit, potest Rex etiam suam Imperii partem belli Jure amittere; that is in English, if the Authority be divided betwixt a King and his People in Parliament, so that the King hath one part, the People another; the King offering to incroach upon that part which is none of his, may lawfully be opposed by force of Arms, because he exceeds the bounds of his Autho­rity. And not only so, but he may lose his own part likewise, by the Iure Belli. Law of Arms. From whence I plainly infer; that if a King [Page 21] may thus, Eventus belli, velut aequus judex unde Ius stabat, victori­am dedit, Li­vius 21. by Right of war, lose his share and Interest in Autho­rity and Power, being conquered; then on the other side, by Right of war, the whole must needs reside in that part of the People which prevailed over him, there being no middle Power to make any claim: And so the consequence is clear likewise. That the whole Right of Kingly Authority being by military decision resolved into the prevailing Party, what Government so ever it pleases them next to erect, is as valid de Jure, as if it had the Consent of the whole body of the People.

These Premises thus laid upon a sure Ground, shew the weak­nesse of his, who wrote that so much magnified Pamphlet, en­tituled, [An Exercitation concerning Ʋsurped Powers, &c.] For the Designe of that gilded Structure, raised upon the sandy Foundation of a false Hypothesis, is, obliquely to charge the pre­sent Powers in England as Ʋsurpers, though he have laid the Scene in America. To this purpose, he spends his first Chapter; where telling what Ʋsurpation is, he defines it an Intrusion into the Seat of Authority, without any lawfull Right, Title, or calling; and insinuates it to the prejudice of the present Governers, as if they were guilty of this Intrusion, without right or Title. In ap­plying this, he first alledgeth, that the Right and Title to Go­vernment is in a King, Lords, and Commons, co-ordinate in pow­er, not in the Commons alone. This indeed was true, til the King (as I shewed before) lost his Title by Right of war, and until the Lords likewise lost theirs, by compliance with the Enemies and Invaders of the Nation; for which cause they Themselves also, by Right of War, forfeited all their Interests and Priviledges, as Enemies; and so the whose Authority devolved naturally into the hands of the Commons.

But here the Exercitator objects also, that the present Go­verners have usurped over the majority of the House of Com­mons, in that they were thrust out of the House by Force. But (for Answer) since by the equity of all Laws, Accessaries are punishable as well as those that are principall in the Crime, therefore by the same Right of war, the secluded Members also, in adhering to the conquered Party; even after the Victory, and favouring the Invaders, were justly deprived of their Interest, and the supreme Si qui jure suo uti non possunt, coru [...] jus accrescit praesentibus: Grotius de Iu­re Belli, l, [...]., c. 5. Authority descended lawfully to those Mem­bers, [Page 22] that had the courage to assert their Freedoms, secure their own Interest, themselves and their Adherents, from future In­conveniencies, and take the Forfeiture of those Prerogatives and Priviledges of the King Lords, and secluded Commons, as Heirs apparent, by the Law of Arms, and Custom of Nations, to an Investiture in the whole Supremacy.

One Objection more he hath; how that a Calling from the People, being necessary and essentiall, to a humanely constituted Magistracy, our present Governors ought to have such a Call; but not having it, they are therefore concluded guilty of Ʋ ­surpation. This is the summ of the Objection, though not Syllogi­stically deciphered. To which I answer: 1. That if only a Call from the People constitute a lawfull Magistracy, then there hath very rarely ever been any lawfull Magistracy in the world, nor among us long before and since the Conquest. The proofe of this may be confirmed by a Review of those Instances set down before in the second Chapter; where it is evident, that all the world over, most Princes came into the Seat of Authority not only without a Call, but absolutely against the wills of the People, and so, many of them exercise the Soveraignty to this very day: And particularly, here in England, most of our own Kings reigned without any Call, but made way by their Swords; there being of those 25 Princes that have King'd it among us, not above half a dozen that came to the Crowne in an orderly Succession, either by lineall or collaterall Title: And not any one of those halfe dozen but laid claime to it, by vertue of their Predecessors Usurpations, without any Call from the People; onely in the Investiture they had their consent, be­cause out of a love of publike Peace, none would, or out of Feare, none durst offer to question their Titles. Now, if the former part of this Objection were true, that a Call were the only Essentiall, constituting a lawfull Government, then it would follow, that as all the world, so we and our Ancestors have lived and paid obedience for the most part, under an un­lawfull Magistracie; which sure no sober man will affirm. But if any will be so mad as to say it, I only propound to him this sober Quaere, Why we may not now as lawfully submit to the present Magistracy, in case it were unlawfull, as our Ancestors [Page 23] did heretofore to theirs, for the publike Peace of the Nation?

2. As to the Assumptive part part of this Objection, which insi­nuates, that our present Governors have no Call or Consent of the People, I answer, That if by the consent be meant the Consent of the Body of the People, or of the major part of their Representatives, this may hold requisite in a State not divided by Civill War, but at Peace within it self; where it is most consonant to reason, that in case there be occasion to elect a supreme Magistrate, or Magistrates, the election should be carried by the greater number of Voices, in such manner as Voices are usually given in that State; But now in a Civil War the case is altered, when the controversie touching Government is decided by the Sword: For, ipso facto the Sword creates a Title for him, or those that bear it, Majestatem realem durare constat, quam­diu, vel vi ma­j [...]re, vel omni­um quorum in­terest consensu­non mutatur. and installs them with a new Majesty of Empire, abolishing the old; Because, as the Civilians say, The ancient Majesty of a State or Common-weal continues no longer, if it be changed either by a greater power, or by consent of the People; where (you see) force and power is put in equall Balance with popular consent, in relation to change of Government. And as if it were the best pedegree of supremacy, they define the Su­preme Authority to be that which holds claim from God and the Sword; Besold. de Ma­jest. cap. 1. Di­citur verò summa, qui [...] non alium nisi Deum & gla­dium recognos­cit; at (que) ideò suae Origini [...] quasi Author existit, &c. and therefore is also as it were the Author of it's owne Originall, without dependance on any other; so that (say they) every Common-wealth, be it never so small, which acknowledgeth no Superior but God and the Sword, hath a Right of Majesty, or poli­ticall Supremacy. Camman. disput. de Iuribus Majest. 1. Thes. 70. 75. &c. To this accords that of Grotius before-recited; That as in War all other things fall to the Conquerors, by way of Acquisition; so likewise a Right to govern the People, and even that Right also which the people themselves have to Government; Arnisaeus de Majest. c. 1. so that what Government soever it pleases them to erect, Bello ut alia acquiripossunt, it a & Jus im­perantis in Po­pulum, & Ju [...] quod in Impe­rio habet ipse Populus Grot. de Jure belli. l. 3. c. 15. the People having lost their Right of Election to them, must be as valid de Iure, as if it had the Peoples Consent. But as in this case, there is no need of their expresse positive consent to justifie a new Goverument; so a tacit or implied consent is sufficient; which Consent (as one saith well) is the very dictate of Nature or common Reason, because it is better to have some Iustice than none at all; and there is a necessity of some coercive power or govern­ment, [Page 24] left all be left to Disorder, Violence, and Confusion, which none (even of the conquered Party) can be so unnaturall as to desire; and therefore (saith Lib. de legib. 3. cap. 10. Suarez) They do tacitly consent, that Justice be administred by the Conquerors, because it is a lesse evill to be governed, by them, than altogether to want due coaction and direction.

Object. Now, ere I conclude this Chapter, I must needs wipe away one Objection very frequent in the mouthes of many: That this transmission of Title by Right of war holds good, when Nation is ingaged against Nation; but in one single Nation within its self it cannot; because (say they) it seems unreasonable that a Nation should challenge a Conquest over it self.

Answ. To this I answer,that warlick Acquisitions hold as good in civill Divisions within the same Nation, as in war betwixt Na­tion and Nation: For, where a Nation is ingaged in a Civill war, and divided into parties, the eye of the Law of Nations looks not on them as one Nation, In Tract at. de Legatis. but as two, according to that of Grotius: In Regno diviso, gens una, pro tempore, quasi duae gentes habentur: In a divided State, one Nation, during the time of its Nationall Divisions, is esteemed as two Nations; so that what preeminence Nation may gaine over Nation by right of forein war, the same may be obtained likewise by one part of a Nation against the other, by Right of civill war: And what the forein Conqueror may doe in changing the Government, a­bolishing old Laws, and establishing new, the same may be done also by the Civill Victor for his own security.

Thus by all the Premises it is undeniably evident, in a way of application; That the present prevailing Party in England have a Right and just Title to be our Governours; and that this new Go­vernment erected by them, to the subversion of the old, is as valid de Jure, as if it had the ratifying Consent of the whole Body of the People; Nor can they in any sence, be counted Usurpers, as is most irrationally intimated by the slight Exercitator.

CHAP. V.
That the Oath of Allegiance, and Covenant, are no justifiable grounds to raise a new War, in, or against the Common-wealth of England.

HAving in the former Chapters cleared the Right and e­quity of the present Government, in point of Title, from the slanderous Character of Ʋsurpation, I shall in the next place descend to examine the vain Phansees of such as refuse a Submission thereto, upon pretence of Conscience, in regard of former Obligations. These people are represented unto us un­der the ordinary Notions of Royalists and Presbyterians; the the former pleading the Oath of Allegiance; the later, the solemn League and Covenant, as a Ground for their Refusall.

As for the Oath of Allegiance; In a word, Allegiance is but a politicall Tie, for politick ends, grounded upon politicall Con­siderations, and therefore being politically determined, when those Considerations are altered by new Circumstances, (be it in relation to Caesar, or the Senate) the old Allegeance is extinct, and must give place to a new. The same description may serve likewise for the Covenant; For, even that part of it which re­lates most to Religion, will be found wrap't up altogether in matters of Discipline and Church-politie, to serve politick ends and Interests, if the Actions of our English and Scot [...]ch Pres­byters, may be admitted as a Comment upon the Text, I grant, both those Oaths are Religious Acts, as they are solemnized with the Invocation of God, as a Witnesse; but as all Actions are qualified from their principall End; so the maine end of those Oaths being Obedience to the Prince in order to the good of the Publique, they are of a politicall Nature; and when such an alteration of Affairs shall happen as extinguishes his Title, I conceive we are not obliged, in this Case, to pay him that Sub­mission which by Oath we promised, but ought rather to swear a new one, to those that succeed him in the Government.

For, in promissory State-Oaths (as these two are) it is granted by all, that there lurk severall tacit Conditions, inseparable from [Page 26] the nature of all Oaths and Engagements; and which are as it were the life and soul of the Obligation: These tacit Conditi­ons, or (as Dr. Sanderson calls them) Suppositions, are set downe by divers Authors, Sanders. de Ju­ra. Praelect. 2. sect. 1. which I shall orderly apply to the matter in Question: One tacit Condition annexed to every Oath, is, That the words of it be duly interpreted, Idem. in sect. 8. in a fair and equitable constructi­on, not wresting it out of hatred or affection to any Party. This Con­dition hath been but ill observed by the Scots, and others, in re­lation to their Covenant, who will not admit any construction, but what may serve to advance their own owne Designes, and heap hatred upon others: witness their pleading for it in an ab­solute sence, or their own sence, when as the principall parts of it are limited by expresse Conditions; viz. that part which concerns the maintenance of the King, and the Priviledges of Parliament, is circumscribed with this Clause [In (or no other­wise than in order to) the preservation of Religion and Liberty] And the other which relates to Religion, is as to manner of Reformation, qualified with another Clause, [viz. According to the word of God,] so that the old statu quo of King and Par­liament was sworn to in a sence but secondary, and subordinate, to shew that the usuall Priviledges of both might be quitted, if they proved inconsistent with Religion and Liberty; as also that any Reformation might be exploded, to make way for one more consonant to the word. And certainly, if the present Pres­byterian Whips [...]ers knew any other way more probable to ad­vance their Kirk Dominion, than by making a pretended Plea for Prerogative, a Stalking-horse to the Design, I believe both King and Lords, had been left long since to God's blessing and the warne Sun (as they say) in despair of any Comfort from the Kirk's Benediction. It seems now to me likewise, That they added this Clause [according to the word] not out of any love to a reall Reforming, but onely that they might have a Plea for the pulling down of Episcopacy, to introduce another Form more suitable to their own ambitious ends, since that Form that they contend for is as little consonant to the word as the other, because they take little thence besides the bare name of Pres­byterie, to patch up a Reformation. These things the world must needs believe of them, till they lay aside their Self-designings, [Page 27] and admit of an equitable interpretation of the Covenant in the limitations expressed, or according to that Sanders. ibid neve sensum aliquem jura­mento à nobis praestito, aut ejus alicui parti assinga­mus proprit commodi aut utilitatis cau­sâ, quem non quivis vir alius pius & prudens (qui est liberi­oris Iudicii, utpote cujà nihil interest) ex ipsis verbis facilè eliccret. Latitudo pruden­tialis, the prudential latitude, spoken of by Dr. Sanderson, which ought to be considered in all Oaths, when the Sence and mea­ning of them is in question. For, as we ought by all means to beware, that we give not our selves too great a liberty of In­terpretation, to the end that we may shake off the obligation of an Oath; so none ought to fasten such a sence upon an Oath, or any part of it, for their own profit or commodity, which any other pious and prudent man (indifferent and un-interested in the businesse) would not collect and conclude out of the words of the Oath.

Moreover, if we did grant the Scots their own Interpreta­tion; yet it can be of small Consequence to their ends, since the Covenant it self is extinct, by reason of the Breach first made by themselves: Let Grotius determin this truth, who lib. 2. cap. 15. saith, Si pars una Foedus violaverit, poterit altera à Foedere disce­dere: nam Capita Foederis singula conditionis vim habent. If one Party break a Covenant, the other is no longer bound to it: For, each particular head of a Covenant, carries with it the force of a Condition; which Condition in relation to the Covenanters is, that either of them observe it with Fidelity to each other. But the Scots have been so far from observing, that the whole Na­tion have been involved in the Breach of it, by dividing the King from the People, the People from each other, and at length by a perfidious Nationall Invasion: so that except they can shew us some new Foundation whereon that Breach is re­paired, the Covenant must needs be defunct in point of obliga­tion. For, Grotius ubi suprà. (aith the same Author) Foedus tacitè renovatum intelligi non debet: Non enim facilè praesumitur nova obligatio, nisi ex actibus qui nullam aliam interpretationem recipiunt. A Covenant being once at an end, cannot be supposed to be re­newed ta [...]itly: For, a new Obligation is not easily to be pre­sumed, but by such Acts as declare it, and admit no other Con­struction. Therefore, till the Scots and their Partisans can pro­duce evidences of a renovation of the Covenant, by positive Acts of State, they must of necessity grant, that all Covenant-obligations and Relations are expired, between the two Nati­ons of England and Scotland.

[Page 28] A second tacit Condition latent in Oaths promissory, is expres­sed in these words, out of the Divinity of the Stoicks, by Seneca: Tun [...] fidem fallam, Seneca l. 4. De Beneficiis, c. 36. & constantiae crimen audiam, si cum omnia cadem sint, quae erant promittente me, non praestitero Promissum: Alioqui, quicquid mutatur libertatem facit de integro consulendi; & fidem meam liberat. Then (saith he) let me be accused of falshood and Inconstancy, if when all things remain the same as they were at the time that I promi [...]ed, I shall not then per­form my Promise: Otherwise, any alteration whatsoever leaves me wholly at liberty, and freeth me from my Enagement. And a little after (saith he) Omnia de­bent esse cadem quae suerint cum promitte­res, ut promit­tentis sidem teneas. Affairs ought to be in the same condi­tion they were, when thou didst promise, to bind thee to the perfor­mance. And in his 39 Chapter he becomes more particular, and saith, In all promises do lurk these tacit Conditions or Exceptions, Si potero, if I am able, Si debeo, if I ought, Si haec ita erunt, if Things continue as now they are. If you require the performance of my Promise, Si aliquid intervenit no­vi, quid mira­ris cum condi­tio promitten­tis mutata sit, mutatum esse Consilium? bring Affairs into the same posture that they were in when I made it: But if any new alterations happen, why dost thou wonder, my condition being otherwise than it was when I promised, that I am changed in my intentions? Render things the same, and I am still the same.

And that this holds good in Christian Divinity, as well as Stoical, appears out of the afore-mentioned Doctor, whose Do­ctrine is equivalent, Sanders Prae­lect. 2, sect. 10. and his Terms convertible with those of Seneca, declaring that all Promises have these tacit Conditions, Suppositions, or Exceptions; Si Deus permiser it; if God permit, which answers to Seneca's Si potero; Quoad licet, as far as law­fully I may, which answers to his Si debeo; Rebus sic stantibus, as long as things thus stand, which answers to his Si haec itaerunt; According to which severall Suppositions in order, I shall exa­mine both the Oaths of Allegiance and Covenant, and prove their Non-obligation.

First, [...]. S [...] Deus [...]ermiscrit. No man that enters into an Otah or Covenant, can be so stupid, as to promise the performance of any thing, without this tacit Reservation within his own Soul, that he will do it if God permit, considering we can do nothing without him, who exerciseth his Wisdom and Soveraignty in the disposition of all human Affaires, according to that of the Apostle James, [Page 29] who bid us say, James 4. If the Lord will, we will do this or that. If so, then having sworn in the Oaths before-mentioned, to continue true and faithfull to the King, and his Heirs, &c. it cannot be meant otherwise, then with this Clause, If God please to permit their continuance in the Government: But we plainly see God is not pleased to permit their continuance, since all men will con­fesse, that (at least) by a permissive Act of Providence, another Form of Government is erected quite contrary to the Old. Therefore if we consider the Oath of Allegiance and Covenant, according to this first Supposition, they are now of no force and obligation; but it may serve to satisfie a private mans Conscience, if in times past he have done his utmost to perform the duties required by those Oaths, during the former establish­ment. The Reason is (saith the same Quia cum omnia divina Providenti [...] & voluntati subsint, nec sit in cujusvis hominis pote­state omnes suturos Casus praestare; qui fecit quod in se fuit ut adimpleret quod promiserat, Juramenti fidem exolvit. Rei Impossi­bilis nulla est obligatio. Sanders. Ibid. Doctor) Because seeing all things are subjected to Divine Providence and Pleasure, and that it is not in the power of any man to regulate all accidents which happen in the future; therefore he that hath used his whole endea­vour to perform what he promised, hath paid his Allegiance, and ful­filled the intent of his Oath; the Obligation ceasing when things cannot possibly be effected (as the Doctor saith) ex Impossibili­tate Facti. Praelect. 2. Sect. 12.

Quoadlicet As concerning the Dr's Quoadlicet, the second tacit Con­dition or Excption, it is to be presumed no man swears to any thing, but with this Reservation, as far as lawfully he may. If so, then in case it so happen, that we cannot lawfully act in pro­secution of those things which we have sworn to, our obliga­tion ceaseth ex Impossibilitate Juris; as in the former, by an Impossibility of Power in us to effect what we were obliged unto, so in this, by an Impossibility of Right in us to act in order there­unto: For, saith he, that is said to be impossible by an Impossi­bility of Right, which a man hath no lawful power to endeavour. But as to the restauration of Kingly Government, now that another is established (by as good a Title (I have proved) as ever the Kingly was) I would fain know what right or lawfull Power, any private man hath, and which way he can ground it [Page 30] upon the Oath of Allegiance and Covenant, to indeavour the destruction of the New Form of Government, and a restitution of the Old. For, private persons have no right to question those that are in Power, Grot. de Jure Belli l. 1. c. 4. and are no competent Judges in Controversies of that nature, nor ought they to meddle with them, but (as Grotius saith) rather to follow Possession. Yea, put case they were unlaw­fully possest, Ibid. Ʋsurpers, Invaders, and Tyrants, yet the same Au­thor saith, Privato vi dejicere summi Imperii Invasorem non licet, It is not lawfull for any private Person to indeavour the thrust­ing them out by Force.

Nor is this founded only upon humane Reason, but also up­on Scripture. That place in the 13. to the Romanes [There is no power but of God, The Powers that be are ordained of God] is suf­ficient to convince every private conscience of the necessity of Submission; that is, to submit to them so far, as not to presume to dispute how they came by their Power; and this course is most agreeable to the sense of all Expositors, the practice of all Times, and the voice even of naturall reason, since the opening of a gap to question Supreme Powers, and touch the tender eye of their Authority, would let out all into Confusion; Tumult following Tumult, like Billow upon Billow, till the world were over-whelm'd with a Sea of Miseries and Distra­ctions.

Object. But some may object;If there be such a necessity of sub­mission to Supreme Powers without questioning them, how then can this Parliament be justified in having questioned the King, at their first sitting, for divers of his Actions? Answ. I answer, there is a difference betwixt Supreme Power, and the Exercise of it. The controversie was not at first concerning his Right of Govern­ment, but the abuse of it by way of male-administration; in de­fence of which abuses he took Arms, and so by the Law of Arms losing his Right, (as is proved before) the Power descended to those that are now in possession, whose Right we ought no more to question, than at first we did his; their power deriving as naturall a pedegree from Heaven as his did, and being as le­gally confirmed by the Law of Arms and Nations, as ever that was which he held from his Predecessors. Now, in that the 13. to the Romans commands a submission and obedience in general [Page 31] Termes, it is not meant to all Powers in the arbitrary exercise of their Power in time of Peace, but to all Supreme Powers in point of Title, be it setled upon them by Potestates a­pud Ammia­num aliósque dicuntur, penes quos sunt Jurae militaria. Ar­nold. Clapmar. de Jure Impe­rii. l. 1. c. 10. Right of War, Inhe­ritance, or any other way. And to support this exposition, give me leave here to introduce two of the main Pillars of Reforma­tion Bucer, and Calvin, men famous in their generations; whose Testimonies may serve once for all, touching that so much con­troverted Chapter to the Romans. The Apostle (saith Calvin upon the place) seemes here to go about to take away the frivo­lous cu [...]iosity of men, Videtur Apo­stolus voluisse tollere srivo­lam hominum curiositatem, &c. Calv. in Rom. c. 13. who use often to inquire by what Right those which have Command did get their Authority; But it ought to suf­fice us, that they are in preeminence; For, they did not get up to this height by their owne strength, but are set over us by the hand of God. And saith Bucer also, on the same place, When a Question is made whom we should obey, it must not be regarded what he is that exerciseth the Power, Quum quaeri­tur cui paren­dum, non est spectandum qualis sit qu [...] potestatem ex­ercet, nec [...]que Jure, vel in­juriâ, quis po­testatem inva­serit. Bucer. in Rom. 13. or by what Right or wrong he hath in­vaded the Power, or in what Form he dispence it, but onely if he have Power. For, if any man doth excell in power, it is now out of doubt, that he hath received that power from God; wherefore, without all exception thou must yeild thy self up to him, and hearti­ly obey him.

Seeing now all Supreme Powers are of God, and that the Apostle commands subjection to them, but damns Resistance, it is clear then, as to our case here in England, that we owe Sub­mission to the present Governors; and that no private man hath any warrant out of the Word to satisfie his Conscience in the lawfulnesse of such Actions, as tend to disturb or thrust them out of possession; therefore according to this second Supposition of the Doctor, no Oath being of Force to bind the Conscience, further then a man may lawfully Act, it followes, evidently (the case thus standing) that the Old Allegiance is can­cell'd, and we bound to admit a New; and that both it, and the Covenant have now no influence at all over us, but are utterly void, and of none effect.

Rebus sic Stantibus▪ The third tacit condition or Supposition implied in all Oaths is (saith the Doctor) Rebus sic Stantibus, as long as things con­tinue thus; it being to be presumed, that when I swear to per­forme any thing, I do it with this tacit Reservation, if I be not [Page 32] hindred by an alteration of Affairs: But if such an alteration happen, that neither the same persons nor things are in being which I swore to maintaine my Oath is at an end, and the obli­gation ceaseth; which now is our very Case here in England, the Government being changed, and new Governors set over us. For this the learned Grotius hath one instance very perti­nent to our purpose. Non tenebi­tur, si cesset qualitas sub quâ alicui ju­ravit; ut si Magistratus desinat esse Magistratus. An Oath (saith he) binds a man no longer, if the quality or condition of the person to whom he swore, be altered: As for example, if he that was a Magistrate cease to be a Ma­gistrate. In evidence whereof, the same Author alledgeth a saying of Caesar's to the Souldiers of Domitius, when Domitius was a Prisoner. They were unwilling to serve Caesar, because of the military Oath they had taken for the other: But to take away this scruple, Grot. lib. 2. saith Caesar to them, Sacramento quidem vos tenère quî potuit, cap. 13. de Jure belli. quum projectis fascibus & deposito Imperio, pri­vatus & captus ipse in alienam venisset potestatem? How can he hold you bound by Oath any longer, being outed of his Authority and Command, remaining a private man, and a prisoner under the power of another? Alas, Sacramen­tum capitis di­munitione sub­latum. your Oath ended together with his Au­thority.

Thus also, according to this third Supposition of the Doctor's, it is plainly to be inferred; that since Affairs of State stand not now in England, Ibid. as they were when we took the Oath of Allegi­ance, or the Covenant, but a new Government is erected; therefore our obligation to the former is totally extinguished. And if the obligation be extinct (as I have proved in the several particulars before-mentioned) then the consequence is as plain; that neither of those Oaths can be a ground sufficient to justifie any Royalist or Presbyterian, in denying a submission to the present Govern­ment, or to raise a new war within the Nation.

CHAP. I.
Concerning the Royall Party.

THE Royallists are of two Sorts. First, such as adhere to the Prince out of necessity; Secondly, such as adhere to him out [Page 42] of humor. The former are Those, who being hopelesse of a Re­turn, or of the recovery of their Fortunes, by way of Recon­cilement, are constrained to run any hazard abroad with the head of their Party, and turne every stone to over-turn the pre­sent Powers here in England, that they may set up Themselves. The latter Sort of Royallists, are such, as though they served heretofore under the Royall Standard, yet, through the Favour of the Parliament, have re-gained possession of their Estates: And therefore being re-invested with their Fortunes, They are loth as yet to attend the Prince in person, though they follow him with their wishes, and would be glad to imbrace any De­signe underhand, or perhaps (when time serves) appear here again in the Field, to make way for his Advancement. These may (not improperly) be called humorous Royallists, because they have only an obstinate and vain-glorious humor for the ground of their behaviour, without any respect of Advantage to Themselves, but are ridden by the other to carry on the high­Royall designe of Particular persons, and run a new hazard of their own. To restore the single Family of a Prince, suppressed by the Almighty, they seeme willing to Venture the destruction of all their own Families; and to serve the ends of certain Persons about him, men whose Fortunes are desperate, they are apt to foole themselves into the losse of their owne; as they must needs doe, if the Prince mis-carry in his Enterprize, whereas if he should carry it with Successe, They will be then but where they were, They can be but Masters of what they have already. The high Ranters and Fugitives are they that will be look't on at Court; Those Bell-weathers of Royalty will bear away the Bell of Preferment, whilst the poore Countrey-Royallists (both Gentry and Yeomen) shall be glad to drudge and plow, to pay those yet unknown Taxations, which must needs be collected, to satis­fie the forlorn Brethren of the Sword, the many yonger Brothers, and Strangers, which will come in with the Grandees, in hope to purchase a Fortune by squeezing the Publique.

All which being considered, it is awonder to see, how They feed Themselves with Phant'sies, who pretend in this Nation to the restitution of Royality; how their eyes are dazled with that Sun which seems to rise upon their Party, supposing the golden [Page 43] Ag [...] must needs return again with him, and that he will climb up to the Meridian, in spight of all opposition! But to give them a Cooler for these Conceits, I shall more particularly, according to the Method before propounded, shew first the Improbability of Successe in the new Royall Designes; and then, the grand Inconveniences that would follow such a Successe, that all mistaken Persons may see, how far they wander (to the hazard of themselves) out of that way, which leads to the future happinesse of this Nation.

As to the Improbability of the Prince's Successe in his Designe, First, he is like to have but a slender Supply of forein Aids: For, the Affairs of Christendom are at this time so disposed, that some Princes want leisure; others ability to assist Him: And divers there are which refrain, for particular Reasons of State. The Spaniard hath other Fish to frie, keeping a serious eie upon France, and lying at Catch against Portugal. Besides, there are severall Reasons (not fit here to mention) which may dispose him rather to imbrace the Amity of this Common-wealth, as it is now established; and whereof there is some hope (were there no other ground) in that he hath given our Agent a friendly reception.

So likewise hath the King of Portugall too another Agent; and how far he is from neglecting our Friendship, may appear by his Demeanour toward our Fleet, in the Port of Lisbon, where he hath given them the like Freedom and entertainment as he doth to Rupert, carrying himselfe indifferently between both, though he seem a little to incline somewhat more toward Rupert; not out of any good will, but only in regard of his Pre­engagement to that Party.

The King of France hath his hands full enough at home, so that he hath little list or leisure to mind Affairs abroad; being jealous not only of the Spaniard, but even of his owne Subjects, by reason of their regret at the insupporrtable Taxes, the Dis­contents and Bandyings of his Parliaments in the severall Pro­vinces, and the Partisans of the Imprisoned Princes; all which seem to threaten (if not the Monarchy it Self, yet) the Family of the Monarch.

Denmark hath hitherto given but a coole Acknowledgment [Page 36] of so neare an alliance, having been (at the best) but a Retiring­place for Montrose, seconding this with some other slight super­ficiall courtesies; one of the best of which was (to rid their hands of their Guest) by lending him a few Bottoms, first, to seek his better Fortune in Swethland, and then to waft him and his For­lorn hope toward their long homes, into Scotland.

Some such triviall Supplies likewise may be expected from the Swede, with a few Complements from the Emperour and German Princes, their jealousies of each other not permitting them to spare their Forces: For, whosoever considers the De­layes and Shifts made by the Emperour and his party, in perfor­ming the Articles of Peace; and on the other side, the resolution of the Swede and that Party to have them fully performed (to­gether with those heart-burnings among them, which break out often into Flames in every Corner) may easily imagine the peace of Germany is not long-liv'd, and therefore that neither of those Princes will part with many of their Soldiery.

The Hollanders esteem it a safe way to conform themselves ever to the Prevailing Party in England, having Reason, above all others, to prize the Friendship and Amity of the English Nation. And though some common Courtesies are expressed there to the Prince by way of entertainment; yet these are done rather to comply with the desires of the Prince of Orange, than out of any inclination or affection to the Royall Party; whereas the Sence of the States Provinciall (and in them the meaning of the whole People) is, to preserve a strict Correspon­dence with the Common-wealth of England. Nor do they relish those close Combinations between the Prince of Orange and his Brother; fearing so great an Alliance may dispose Orange to aspire, and establish a greater Interest of his own than is meet for a Member of a Republique, if Monarchy come to its height again in England; which they ought by no means to desire, but rather that England should continue as it is; not onely for the former Reason, but also, for that such a Neighbourhood would be concerned in Reason, to admit Them into a nearer Friendship and Complication of Interests, than ever they can hope from a Monarchy.—

These things being considered, the Prince hath small hope of [Page 37] Successe, in regard of any considerable Supplies from Forein Princes.

Secondly, Put case he can, by the help of the many fugitive English, the Scots, and Supplies drain'd out of the Dregs of severall Countries, make shift to patch up an Army, or two, to trie his Fortune, yet 'tis ten to one but They ruine his Designe. For, first, the introducing of Forrainers will soone alienate the Affections of the English, as experience hath proved in all times. Secondly, Auxiliatores conducti ex diversis locis, nec disciplinâ inter se, nec affectione consentiunt. Petr. Greg. Tolos. lib. 11. de Repub. cap. 3. pag. 656. Mercenary Auxiliaries that are col­lected out of severall Nations, seldome agree either in disciplin, or Affection. The reason of this is given by the same Author: For (saith he) since the Customes of Nations are diverse, therefore men of severall Countries, differing both in habit and manners, can­not long continue together, without discovering an Antipathy or Con­trariety in their natures, even to the ruine of that Party with whom they are ingaged.

To passe by the Testimonies of many other States men, we have two very pertinent ones afforded us out of our own Affaires: witnes that emulation discovered between the Scots and English in the Hamiltonian Invasion; and also of late, between the English and Irish under Ormond in Ireland, whereupon the English chose rather to joyn with the Parliament-Party, than continue any longer ingaged with the Irish. Lastly, Those Forrain Mercenaries will, upon the least misfortune of War, desert the Prince, and take up Arms under the Parliament. For (as saith Patritius) The Mercenarii militis sides ex fortuna pendet: quá inclivant [...] ad hostes, ipsi e­tiam spem at (que) animum cò incli­ [...]nt. Francisc. Patrit. lib. 9. de Reg. Tit. 15. Faith of Mercenaries depends upon Fortune, and if she turn to the Adverse Party, thither They follow, and incline their hopes and affections. Yea, so little trust is to be given to these Mercenaries, that notwithstanding their Condition be good, yet (saith another) Solent plus lu­crum quàm cau­sam scqui bellan­di: Et it â facilè ab bostibus, vel majore stipendio, vel donis, cor­rumpi possunt. Pet. Greg. To­los. ubi supra. They are easily corrupted with Money, and with rewards and promises of better Pay, bought over to any other Party; respecting gaine much more than the Cause of their Engagement. Judge then, how the Prince is like to thrive with his Forrain Auxiliaries, if he shall have any, either in En­gland or Scotland; for, the Reason of these Things holds good in one Nation, as well as another.

Thirdly, since it appeares how small Successe he is like to have [Page 46] by the Aides of other Princes, let us see whether he have any better hopes by Forrain Aid out of Scotland or Ireland, to make a Conquest of England. As for Ireland, he hath but poore ex­pectations thence, since the Lord Lieuten [...]nt hath swept away those Adversaries with the Besome of Vengeance, and made way by a continued chain of miraculous Successes, to Shackle that Rebellious Nation; and doubts not ere long, to bind their Princes with Chaines, and their Nobles with links of Iron, since every month brings in fresh Laurels of Victory, to their Terror and amazement. But Ireland being given for lost, let us see next, whether the Royallists are like to receive any more comfort from Scotland: Its an old saying, Nullum bonum ex Aquilone, No good comes out of the North; and of all others, Royallists should be the least apt to beleeve any benefit to come out of that Nation, from whence proceeded the Ruine and Destruction of the late King, and all their Party; nor can they hope much bet­ter of them in time to come. For, first, They adhere to the Prince, not out of any love to his Interest, but onely in hope to settle their own upon his Shoulders; and therefore if they can make a better Bargain elsewhere, they wil cast him off, or (if he be in their power) sell him off (as they did his Father) upon the first occasion. What else can he expect from a Party, whose In­terest was first founded upon the ruine of his Great Grand-mo­ther, continued and augmented to the perpetuall vexation of his Grand father, and at length prosecuted to the destruction of his Father? Secondly, it is impossible to reconcile the two Parties, Royall and Presbyterian, even as impossible (King James was wont to say) as to reconcile God and the Devill. Thirdly, if They cannot be reconciled or stand together, then whatsoever Agreemens may be made, it will be but from the Teeth outward; nor can there be an union betwixt them upon any designe, but in the prosecution thereof they will mind the ad­vancement of their severall Interests, which must make them jealous of each other, divided and partiall in their Counsels, and cause the inward rancor to break out, to the prejudice and utter ruine of the whole Engagement. Fourthly, let the Scots invade us again upon the Royall, or what score else they please, They will never be endured (especially in the Northern Parts) [Page 47] having heretofore by their perfidious and Tyrannical behaviour, fixed an odious Impression upon the Spirits of the People, and quickned the old Antipathy betwixt the two Nations: So that, if the Prince come in with them, or by them, he will fare never the better (but much worse) for their Sakes, or their Com­pany. Lastly, they come (if they dare come) a most nasty, lowzie, beaten Generation, against one of the most generous, best accomplished, and most Victorious Armies in Christendome; an Army that must needs be dishonoured by such an Enemy, from whom neither Credit nor Advantage is to be gotten; yet it is meet they should be chastized, since the Almighty, out of love to the future Peace of our Nation, seemes to decree, that Belial and Dagon, Montrose, and the Kirk, with her Worthies should be sent after Hamilton. This indeed, would be a fair step to Reformation, by letting out the Corruption of that Country, which sticks like a Scab, upon the faire Body of this Fortunate Island.

Now, in the last place, to conclude this particular touching the Improbability of the Prince's Successe, since he hath little ground to hope for any by the assistance of other Nations, let us examine what hope he hath from our own. Severall Reasons may be given to the contrary; As first, the People's hatred of Foreiners, and their feare of that Plague, universall Free-quarter, with their aversnesse to War, having tasted some time of the Sweets of Peace; And though they are sensible of some necessary Burthens, yet considering another War will increase new ones, more exor­bitant, every man would be content with things as they are; for, the Common people (as the Poet saith)

will be satisfied with Bread and Quietnesse, rather than hazard their Ease and Security, to serve the Ambition of others.

Secondly, They will be the lesse apt to engage in any new Insurrections and Parties, since the last thrived so ill, to the Prejudice and shame of all the Undertakers: Examples make Men wise; and though many of them escaped without punish­ment, in regard this See the new Acts of Trea­son, and the Act for esta­blishing an High Court of Justice. Government was not then declared; yet [Page 40] now that it is established, and Laws are made to defend it against all that offend in time to come, men will beware (I suppose) how they meddle, since they can expect nothing lesse after ano­ther War, than the punishment of Traitors.

Thirdly, Put case the Counties were resolv'd upon New Insur­rections, yet what can be done by unweildy Bodies of raw Men, taken from the Streets, the Plow, or the Harrow; rude, and un­acquainted with Military Disciplin, against a well-disciplin'd Army of Old Soldiers? Consider what became of those vast numbers in Kent, Essex, &c. with what ease they were dispersed, and how soon they vanished into nothing!

Fourthly, It is not like, that the Gentry, men of Estates, will stir in any considerable number, to hazard their Possessions, be­ing yet scarce warm in them, after a Purchase made upon dear rates of Composition; But if any are so mad as to venture on new Designes, they might do well to consider how hard a matter it is to carry them on without discovery, seeing the State hath a Party and Friends, in all Countries and Corporations. Besides, if They could carry it so close, as to bring any petty designe into Action, yet they cannot but be snap't, and nip't in the Bud, the Militia being so well setled, and a Party ready in Armes in every County—Now, all these parcells of dis­course being well weighed together, I leave every mans Intellect to make the Conclusion; what slender probability of Successe there is, by the assistance of Foreiners or Natives in the present Royall Designe against England.

Having thus, in the former part of this Chapter, shewn the Improbability of Successe in the new Royall enterprrize, which were enough to wean Wise men from engaging upon that Score, I shall (according to the Method propounded) in the next place state those Grand Inconveniences, which would unavoidably follow to the prejudice of the whole Nation, in case the Roy­allists should proceed with Successe, to the ruine of this Govern­ment: The very consideration whereof should (me thinks) be sufficient to startle all understanding men, from wishing well to that Party.

First, since there can be no Medium of Reconcilement betwixt our present Governours and the Son of the late King, it is [Page 49] granted by all, that if ever he come into possession, it must be by Conquest, and the Power of the Sword: If so, then he will be as absolute as was William the Conqueror, and we all must be in the same slavish Condition, as our Fore-fathers were, under the Tyranny of that Norman Bastard. That Government which heretofore was called Monarchicall will then be exactly Tyranny­call, Cic. ad Art. 7. Epist. 5. according to that saying of prudent Cicero in one of his Epistles; Ex victoriâ cùm multa mala, tum certè Tyrannis existit. As many other mischiefs, so certainly, a Tyranny ever followes a Conquest. And therefore it was that when He was af­terwards King, by the name of Henry. 2. Henry, the Son of Maud the Empresse, contended for the Crown by Arms against King Stephen, and was like to prevaile, the Estates of the Realm wrought an Accommodation betwixt them, See Daniel. in the life of King Stephen. upon this Ground, because they conceived it dangerous for them, and the whole State, to have a young Prince get the Mastery by his Sword: For, Princes ever improve such kinds of Victory to an Advantage over the People, and Successe makes them cruell; withnesse the savage Proceedings of Edward the Second, Daniel. in Edw. the Second. against his Lords, after he had overthrown them in Battell, in the Northern Parts; execu­ting their Persons, and confiscating their Estates, as Traitors, so that he is noted in our Chronicles, to be the first of all our Kings, after the Conquest, who to prosecute his Revenge gave a Pre­cedent of Butchering the Bodies of the English by Behead­ing and Quartering. This may be enough to shew, that to bring any Prince into possession by the Sword, is to instate him in a Tyranny.

Secondly, Though the Prince of himself should not be inclined to Tyranny, yet his followers having a Power over him, will soone perswade him to it. Besold. in Cap. Nam Legitimum Regnum convertitur in Tyrannidem, aut Dominatum, de morble re­rumpub. p. 3. 12. cum Aulo-politicis (qui plerún (que) odio prosequuntur libertatem) facilè aurem prabet Princeps. For (saith one) a well-regulated Government is soon changed into a Tyrannycall domination, when a Prince gives ear to Court-politi­cians, who (for the most part) are enemies to Liberty. And as to our present case Machiavel speaks very aptly; Mach. de Re­pub. l. 1. c. 16. that a Nation which hath cast off the yoke of Tyranny or Kingship, (for in his language they are both the same thing) and newly obtained their Liberty, must look to have all those for Enemies, that were Familiars and [Page 50] Retainers to the King or Tyrant, who having lost their Preferments, will never rest, but seek all occasions to re-establish themselves upon the ruines of Liberty, and to aspire again unto a Tyranny; that ex­ercising an arbitrary Power, they may take the more sharp Revenge, against all those that dare but pretend unto Liberty.

Thirdly, seeing that (as things thus stand) to have a King again invested by the power of his own Sword, were all one as to have a Tyrant erected, with an Arbitrary Power, to doe what he list, it will not be amisse to take a view of the effects and Con­sequences of Tyranny, As first, a Leges oppri­mit Timor. Sen. Herc. Fur. trampling of all Lawes under Foot. Secondly, using all sorts of Ans [...]rre, trucidare, ra­pere. T [...]. in Agric. Cruelties and Rapine. Hence it is, that Cato called a King Plutarch in vitâ Catonis. Carnivorum Animal, a Ravenous Creature; and by Homer in the first of his Iliads, a King is called [...], a Devourer of the People, so that no mans Life or Estate is in safety, if they have a mind to bereave them of either; and for this purpose, Tacitus saith, they alwayes D [...]latores per praemia cli­ciu [...]. Tacit. Annal. 4. keep false Accusations and Witnesses in Lavender. Thirdly, no Boni quàm mali suspectiores su [...], semperque allena virtus formidolosa est. Salust. Nec minus periculum ex unagnâ famâ, quam ex malâ. Tacit. Agric. good man can live safe by them, nor any man that is e­minent for Valour or Vertue; according to that of the Trage­dian Seneca.

Who acting the Part of a Tyrant, saith, It is a madnesse to preserve great Persons, when they once grow burdensome to their Prince and Country. Thus Tarquin taught his Son Lucius to secure his Ty­ranny, by striking off the Heads of those Poppies in his Garden, which grew higher than thir Fellowes; whereupon, his ingeni­ous son gave the world to understand, as well as himselfe, what his Fathers meaning was, when afterward he destroyed all the principall men among the Gabians, by Force, Treachery, and false Accusations. No matter whether things be justly done, or not; for, a Tyrants Maxims are such as this, out of Lu­cian,

[Page 51] That Prince's Scepter is not worth a Rush, who stands upon Ju­stice and honesty. Caesar hath left it upon Record of himselfe, as Th [...]cydides hath of Euphemus, and Euripidei of E [...]eocles: Regni causâ jus violandum esse. That all Lawes may be violated, to make way to a Domination: That Regni causa secleratum esse. a man may be wicked to obtain, or maintain, an absolute Soveraignty; That a Prince Principi nihil est injust [...] quod fructuos [...]m. ought to account nothing unjust which is profitable. To which may be added one more out of Ubi honesta tantùm domi­nanti licent, pre­cariò regnatur. Seneca, That where a Prince hath no power to doe ought but what is just, he reignes but by Courtesie. These are the usuall Rules by which Tyrants steer their Courses; and therefore it concernes all men to forbeare their assistance, to any that endevour to re-settle a King by the power of the Sword, lest he seat himselfe as a Conqueror, and so slip into an absolute Tyranny. For,

It is seldom, that Kings forbear an arbitrary Power, if they can by any means usurp it, over the People: and though there may sometimes happen a good King that will not make use of it to their Prejudice; yet even then the People are not safe, Quamvis bo­nus at (que) clemens fit, qui plus po­test tamen quia malo esse licet, formidatur. Sa­lust. ad Caes. because (saith Salust) it is in his power to be wicked if he please.

Fourthly, If he come in by the Sword, there will be no Act of Oblivion passed before hand; and if he gaine possession, it is a Question then, whether he will grant any afterward; or if (for fashion sake) he doe grant one, how farre it shall extend, and whether it may not be eluded, to make way for revenge against particular Persons, who (perhaps) little dream of an Inquisition for past Offences, as being of the moderate Sort of Offenders a­gainst the regall Person and Prerogative. All these Quaeres are well worthy every mans Consideration, since revenge is esteemed inter Areana Imperii one of the speciall mysteries in the Cabinet-Counsells of Royalty: For, with them, as Tacitus saith, Ʋltio in Questu habetur, Revenge is counted great gaine, and prized as the prime Jeweli of a Crowne. It is so D [...]lc [...] malum vindicta. sweet a Morsell, that even the best of Kings could not refraine it; as may be seen in the practices of David and Solomon. 2 Sam. 19. 18. We read how David par­doned Shimei for a time; and he seemed so earnest in the doing it, that one would have thought, the Offence should never have been remembred; Also, how he forbore to revenge himself upon Joab all his owne daies; yet being to die, he gives charge to his Son Solomon, not to let them escape unpunished, but that he [Page 52] should bring their hoar heads unto the grave with blood, 1 Kings 2. which af­terward (upon slight occasions) were executed accordingly. So Solomon himself likewise, though he forgave his Competitor and Brother Adonijah, Ibid. and bad him go to his house in peace; yet he lay at catch still for some new occasion to be revenged: And therefore for a petty passion of love toward the Shunamite Lady, in demanding her to be his Wife, poor Adonijah was laid to sleep with his Fathers. Daniel. In our owne Chronicles we find also, how that when Henry the third had in the end gained the better by his Sword, over the Earl of Leicester and the People, he me­ditated nothing but revenge against all that had opposed him, razing the Castles of his Barons, confiscating their Estates, and taking forfeiture of the Charters of many Corporations; espe­cially of the Londoners whom he spightfully vexed ever after in body and purse, upon every opportunity. So likewise Richard the second, because the Londoners were not willing to back him in his Irregularities, but had appeared crosse to his Designs, watched every way to be revenged on them; Ibidem. and upon a slight occasion of a Tumult in the City (which neverthelesse the Mayor soon suppressed) he deprived them of the best part of their Priviledges, and put them to the expence of no lesse than Twenty thousand pounds; a fine considerable summe in those daies of Antiquity, to be added to that invaluable losse of their Liberties, for so poor a matter as a petty Tumult about a Quarrel with a Bishop's Ser­vant. But when Kings have been dis-obliged by any City or per­sons (by hook or by crook, sooner or later) they shall feel their displeasure: And therefore Machiavel adviseth never to trust them; Mach. de Prin. For, whosoever (saith he) thinks by new Courtesies to take out of their minds the remembrance of old Injuries, is extremely de­ceived.

Fifthly, If Kings are thus revengfull, then what may we expect but the fatall Consequences of that humor? It is an old Saying;

His Reigne will be very bloody, that comes from banishment to a Kingdome; whereof they shall be first sensible that have op­posed his Interest; and such are all those in this Nation that have appear'd for the Parliament, against the Encroachments of [Page 53] the Prerogative. Nor let them flatter themselves, that they shall scape better than others, because they never opposed this Princes person; It will be ground sufficient for his hatred, that They bandied against his Father, and the Prerogative, to which he is heire. Nor is it likely he will forget the observation made by one of his Chaplains, in a Sermon before him at the Hague; how that the Presbyterians held his Father by the haire, Dr. Crighton. and the Independents out off his head; Nor is it to be supposed that we should have many Parliaments hereafter; For, besides the Pro­vocations given by Parliament, it is against the nature of King's to love Monarchae nois amant Ordinum Conventus cre­briores. Besold. de Simulachris Reri [...]npub. Parliaments or Assemblies of their People; and it was left as a Legacie by King James to his Family, in his Basilicon Doron; That his Successors should neglect Parliaments as much as might be: So that consider how this Prince is engaged, not only by the Interest of the Crowne, his particular personall Interest of Revenge, but also by the Praecepts of his Grand-father, and the common Inclination of all Monarchs, and we may easily imagin what will become of Parliaments, and Parliament-Patriots, if ever he get possession.

Sixthly, Whereas many now adhere to him in their hearts, in hope they shall be eased of Excise and Taxes, &c. if he be re­stored, they are exceedingly mistaken. I remember a Passage out of the Stories of France; Du Serres. that the Duke of Orleans having, upon a difference betwixt him and the King, laid a Tax upon some of the Provinces, by their owne consent, to maintein his Army; afterward, allured with fair promises, they inclined the Duke to accord with the King, hoping to be eased of the Imposition; but they fell short of their desires; for, that which they had vo­luntarily imposed upon Themselves, was setled upon Them per­force by the King, when he once had them in possession: And so that Tax, which was called the Gabel, continues upon them to this very day, as a Token of their folly. Now, let not us flatter our selves here in England, that we shall fare any better (in point of Excise, or other payments) upon the Prince's restitution. If now we have Burthens, we must then look to have Furrows, made upon our backs: If now we are (through necessity) put to endure a few whips, we shall then (of set purpose) be chasti­sed with Scorpions. It is not an Excise, or an Army that we [Page 54] shall scape, but be visited with whole Legions of forein Despera­does, which must be fed with greater Payments than ever, and (God knowes) when we shall be rid of them, if the Prince settle upon their shoulders. Consider, how many hungry Scots gape after this gude Land, who, with those of other Nations, must be Satisfied out of the Purses of our own, whilst those that are their Leaders will be gratified, with this, that, and the other Mans Lands and possessions. And that this Insinuation is no Fiction, but well grounded upon Precedents out of our owne Histories, in the Practices of our Kings, may appear by the Proceedings of the Conquerer; who being forced to extraordinary Courses to satisfie his forein Soldiery, made bold so frequently with the E­states of his Subjects, that the great Lords of the Kingdom, fea­ring it would come to their Turns at last to part with their Pos­sesions, by way of prevention, sled out of the Land, some into Scotland, some into Denmarke, and other Parts, to trie if by aide from abroad, they might recover Themselves and their Fortunes a­gain at home: But by this means they hapned to lose all so much the sooner; for, miscarrying in the Designe, their Estates were possess'd, and their Offices supplied by the Norman Favo­rites. Thus also, King Stephen, himself being a Foreiner. and re­lying most upon forein Arms to preserve him in possession, was constrained to take the same Course, for the satisfaction of his forein Auxiliaries, which consisted most of Flemings and Picards, whom he especially trusted in his greatest Actions, neglecting and oppressing the English. Thus did Henry the third also in his wars with the Barons; against whom bringing in Foreiners, He, for reward, invested them with others Lands and Honors, and laid heavy Impositions besides upon the whole Kingdom, to make Them Satisfaction. And in those variations of Fortune between the two Houses of Yorke and Lancaster, as often as either of Them had occasion to make use of forein Arms to assert their Titles, the Estates of the Adverse Party, and the Purses of the People, were sure to goe to wrack for the Pay of the Soldiery. From hence then it appears, that if the Prince put himselfe in possession by Arms, we shall be so far that way from any ease of our burthens, that they will be doubled, and trebled, yea, and ten­folded upon us.

[Page 55] Lastly, The Prince's Confederation with the Scots, and our English Presbyters, (were there no other Reason) might be e­nough to terrifie any ingeniously minded People from giving their assistance, be they Royalists, or not: For, if the Kirke be able to bind the Prince to hard Conditions, and prove (like the Sons of Zeruiah) too strong for him, so that his Interest bow to theirs, then in stead of a Regall (which is more tolerable) we must all stoop to the intolerable yoke of a Presbyterian Tyranny, that will prove a plague upon the Consciences, Bodies, and Purses of this free Nation. The Scots by this means will effect their Designe upon us, by stretching their Covenant-union to an equality of In­terest with us in our owne Affairs: And the English-Grandees of that Party will seat themselves again in the House, and exclude all others, or else a New Parliament shall be called of Persons of their owne Faction; so that if they should carry the day, all the Comfort we shall have by casting off the present Governers, will be only that we shall have these furious Jockies for our Riders: Things (perhaps) shall be in the old Statu quo, as they were when the late King was at Holdenby, whose Son must then lay his Scepter at the Foot-stole of the Kirke, or else they will restore him by leisure (as they did his Father) into the exercise of Roy­alty: By which means we should be brought again, as far as ever we were, from a condition of Settlement, and the Common-wealth reduced to Ashes by endlesse Cumbustions. On the other Side, put case the Prince have the better end of the Staffe of the Presbyters, (they relying upon his Courtesie, as well as the rest of the People) then, in case he carry the day, They, and All, are at his mercy, and no Bar will be in the way to hinder him from an Ascent unto an unlimited Power: So that you plainly see, this present Combination of Royallists and Presbyters (which soever of them be most prevalent) must of necessity put the Nation in hazard between Scylla and Charybdis, that we cannot chuse but fall into one of the pernicious Gulphs, either of Presbyterian, or Monarchicall Tyranny.

All these Particulars being seriously considered; how Impro­bable it is in the first place that the Prince should goe on with Successe in his Designe; and then, what miserable Inconveniences must needs follow such a Successe (in case he prevaile) not only [Page 56] to the Prejudice of any one Party, but of All, I may undeniably conclude, that all mistaken Royallists, as well as others, who live now under the Protection of the present Government, are con­cerned out of necessity, and in respect to their owne well-being and benefit, to wish well thereunto, rather than prosecute the private Interest, of a single Family, and of a few Fugitives its De­pendants, to the hazard of their owne Families, with the Peace and happinesse of their native Country.

CHAP. II.
Concerning the Scots.

I Am sorry I must waste Paper upon this Nation; but seeing They make Themselves Considerable by being troublesome, it will not be amisse to sound the Depth of their present Design; which that I may the better doe, give me leave to trace them in their Encroachments, from the first to the last, upon the English Nation. Not to mention those of elder date, let us begin with King James who being a native Scot, out of love to his Country­men (or rather to himselfe, that he might keep them quiet, by stopping their mouths with the sweet morsels of England) was pleased to admit many of them into his Court, then into his Councell, and to be partakers of Honours and Offices, equall to the best of our English. His Son, the late King. knowing danger might come of discontent out of the Northern Corner, followed the same Course that his Father tooke, to oblige Them; holding them in Pension, giving accesse to all Beggars, with such faire Entertainment, that most of Them staid here, and none returned empty. This heaping of Favors upon Some, stirred up the Appe­tites and Emulation of others; who seeing themselves neglected, and not like to share in any of these Enjoyments by the Favor of the King, bethought them of an other way, to make Themselves as considerable as the rest of their Country-men, and gain an In­terest with the English. Seeing they could not thrive with the Court, They would trie what They could doe without it.

Hereupon, being men of Power in their owne Country, They [Page 57] became most Zealous Assertors of the Presbyterian Discipline against the Episcopall, by which means they gained the Friendship of all the Religious Party in England, then persecuted by the Bishops, who were at Court the only Favourites: Hereupon, these Leaders of the Scotish Presbyterians, beginning to grow active and forward in establishing their own Form at home, and also to propagate it abroad by encouraging their Friends, gave such an Alarm to the Bishops, that they (to crosse the Designe) fell foule upon all of the Opinion here in England; and not onely so, but pressed the King to establish an Episcopall Ʋniformity in both Kingdoms, even in Scotland as well as England. The forcing of this upon the Scots was a Cause of the Commotions in that Kingdom; whereupon a war ensued betwixt the King and Them through the instigation of the Bishops; which was soon ended, to the Advantage of the Scots in Money and Credit, and to the dis­honor of the King and the Episcopall Party.

This happy Successe wrought a very reverend opinion of them, in the hearts of the well-affected Party in England, who stood for the purity of Religion, and a liberty of Conscience, against Episcopall power and Innovations; as also for the Lawes and Liberties of the Nation, invaded by the Prerogative. And for redresse of these things the King was necessitated to call a Parliament; who not obtaining such Reliefe of Grievances as they expected by reason of a Corrupt Councell of Bishops and others about the King, which alienated him from his great Councell the Parliament, and after­ward caused Him to breake out into a warre against Them, were constrained likewise to take Armes, in defence of our Liberties. Hereupon, recourse was had to the Scots for their assistance; who, having the same Enemies at Court, and being equally involved in the same common Danger, it was supposed they were concer­ned in Reason to joyn with the Parliament, without any Dispute or Scruple. But They, considering now was the Time to make their Markets (if ever) and their owne interest as much English as might be, came not off so roundly as was hoped, but fell to bartering like Hucksters, and no Bargaine would be (forsooth) without a Covenant. They would not joyn, except They might be (in a manner) all one with us, and this Ʋnion must be sealed with that solemn League and Covenant. What their meaning was [Page 58] therein, we shall know by and by, by taking a view of their Acti­ons ever since, which are the most sure Interpreters: Yet even at that time, See the grand Case of Consci­ence concern­ing the En­gagement, sta­ted, &c. some men had their eyes in their heads, and many Ob­jections were made at divers Expressions in the Covenant, and many Desires for explanation of some Articles more fully. But the Scots standing stiffe upon their owne Terms, and no Conjunction like to be obtained without the Covenant, and the necessity of the Parliaments Affairs admitting no delay, we were glad to take it as it was offered, without further question or Demurrer.

It was no sooner taken here at London, but immediately every one began to make his Advantage (through the multitude and ambiguity of Expressions) and by it to promote his severall In­terest; as if it had been made to engage unto a particular Party, not to unite two Nations in a common Interest. But above all the Scots, having had the honor of this Invention, conceived themselves much injured by any, that denyed them the Preroga­tive of making an Interpretation; and in matter of Religion, urged their owne Discipline as the only Patern to Reform the Church by; and their Plea had been fair enough out of the Covenant, could they have proved it to be [according to the word of God;] which Clause was most luckily inserted. Not­withstanding all the Reasons to the Contrary, the Scotish Module was still pressed: The Scot was willing to ride, and having (as he thought) the English-man fast bridled with a Covenant, he began to switch and spur. The Throne of the Kirke was the Stalking-horse to catch geese; and if that could have been setled, then there had been no denying Them whatsoever they would ask; They would have seated themselves surely in this fat Soile; There would have been no removing them out of our Councels, where­of the necessity of our Affaires had made them Members and Partakers. For, had the Kirk-Interest been once confirmed a­mong us, then by vertue of that Authority which they use to con­troll the Civill power, the Parliament must have been subser­vient to all their ends. And since it would have concerned the English Clergy (to make their Party strong, and maintein Cor­respondencies for their owne preservation) to have gratified their Scotish Founders in all their Desires, the Scots might easily have translated the Covenant-union to as good as an absolute [Page 59] Nationall union, by gaining a Joynt-Interest with us in our Affairs for ever, and consequently, in all the Profits, great Offices, Coun­cels and Concernments of this Nation.

Now, whether this were their Designe or not in the Covenant ab origine, I shall not determine; but let it be judged by their in­solent behaviour here among us, after they were admitted to our Counsells: and therefore in the next place I shall examine their Proceedings, which most evidently represent them in their Inten­tions. —It sufficed them not; after they were come in, that they had an equall Power with us in publique Affairs, in the Committee of both Kingdoms at Derby-house (which was wil­lingly allowed them for a time, so far as concerned the Com­mon cause of both Nations, in prosecuting the war) but driving a Powerfull Party in both Houses, They tooke upon them to meddle with matters relating to the future Peace and Settlement of this Nation, distinct from their owne, and to provide for an equall Interest with us therein. The first most notable Evidence of this (though there had been many before) was discovered at the Ʋxbridge-Treaty, where Propositions of both Houses for Peace being presented to the King, it was found the Scots had so far Provided for Themselves by their Party in the Houses, That in time to come, the ordering of the English Militia, the Power of making War and Peace, and all other Prerogatives of Govern­ment, were to be administred by a proportionable number of Scots, as well as English: A thing so ridiculous, and an Encroach­ment so palpable, that the King Himself, in one of His Answers, took notice of it, and said, He was not so much an Enemy to the English Nation, as to signe those Propositions; or somewhat (I am sure) to this Purpose.

A second evidence or discovery of their Encroachments was made, upon their delivering in divers Papers to the Parliament, at severall times, wherein they disputed their Claim, and ventu­red their Logick upon the Letter of the Covenant, to prove an Interest in disposall of matters meerly relating to our welfare; which they re-inforced afterwards with new Recruits of Argu­ment, when the King came into their Army.

But not knowing well how to maintaine their Arguments, They were contented for that time, to quit Them and their [Page 60] King too, upon such Terms, as are notorious to all the world; who being at length reduced under the Power of the Parliament and Army, Propositions of Peace were sent to him at Hampton-Court, wherein no such Provision being made for the Scotish In­terest, as was in those at Ʋxbridge, their Commissioners here protested against them▪ accused the Parliament of Breach of Co­venant, and complained highly in one of their Declarations that they should be so neglected. This may serve as a third evidence of their Covenant-designe of Encroachment; whereto may be added one more, when the King was at Carisbrooke Castle, whither the Commissioners of Parliament were no sooner arived with Propositions againe, but the Scots Commissioners were at hand, and for the same reason protested furiously against Them. By which insolent demeanors and expressions, from time to time, and crying up the Covenant for their defence, it is clear enough what their Intentions were when they urged it upon us, and that notwithstanding all the specious Pretences of brotherly Love, their Designe in it hitherto hath beene, onely to scrue themselves into an equall Interest with us in this Nation.

Having smelt out their Project thus farre, give me leave to trace them on to the end, as briefly as may be. The Royall Party being totally suppressed, and so no further occasion to make use of the Scotish Army, the Parliament, with some diffi­culty, made shift to send them home into their own Kingdome: But being defeated of their Aims and expectations, they could not so rest; having failed of their ends by pretending for Par­liament, they resolved next to try what they could do upon the Kings Score, and so the Grandees turn'd the Tables, in hope of an After-game, by closing with Hamilton upon the Royall Ac­compt; not doubting but if they gained the day this way, to re­compence their Travels with much more Advantage. The Cove­nant, like a nose of wax, apt to be turned any way, served this en­terprize every jot as well as the former, though the Designe were different from what it was, the great ones not caring much what became of the Kirk Interest, since they had agreed for the security of their owne; which must needs have been very con­siderable, if they could have redeemed the King, and restored him into the condition of an absolute Monarch. Therefore the [Page 61] Kirk seeing themselves left thus in the Lurch, thundered out their Curses amaine upon that Hypocriticall Engagement, as destru­ctive to the Covenant.

But the Grandees being at a losse in this likewise upon Hamil­ton's Defeat, and followed home to their owne dores by the brave English Army, were glad to cry Peccavi to the Kirk, and also to our English Commanders, whom they dismissed with many promises of fair Carriage for the future. Within a while after, a new dore of hope being opened to them by the supposed Succession of the late Kings Son, They to ingratiate with him, proclaime him their King; and here the Grandees and the Kirk joyning hands againe, become friends, and offer their Service for his restitution, upon Terms of the Covenant; which is their Plea now at this very day: So that the Covenant, which was pretended to be framed at first, for the preservation of this Par­liament and the Liberties of the People, against the usurpations of regall Power, is; now that the Scots can serve their designe no longer that way, become the Ground of their present Combi­nation with the Prince, and their Presbyterian Brethren in Eng­land, for the destruction of our Liberties; being resolved this way, since they have failed in all the rest, to trie whether they can accomplish their profane Projects through the Covenant, by insinuating themselves into places of Honour, Profit, and Power, that they may domineere in the possessions, as their Pharisaicall Priests would over the Consciences of the English.

Thus having made way, in discovering what the designe of the Scots ever hath beene, and is at this Instant, under the faire Co­vert of the Covenant, certainly, no man that is master of an English spirit, but will abhorre the Hypocriticall pretences and Encroachments of that perfideous Nation. And therefore now that all men may beware how they be drawne into an Engage­ment with them, I shall (according to my way) manifest first, the Improbability of their Successe, and then the Inconveniences which must necessarily follow, in case their designe be successeful­ly effected.

First, As to the Improbability of Successe, consider by way of Comparison, the great difference between the English and Scotish Soldiery. Ours are heightned with extraordinary Pay, [Page 62] bravely accomplished, strong Horse, well disciplin'd, veterane Soldiers, better Spirited by reason of a more generous educa­tion; and to all these add the advantage of being Englishmen, and the Reputation of having been so long victorious; let these considerations be laid in the balance against the Scots; fresh men (for the main) newly raised, a People of farre lesse generous Soules, poor in Body, Pay, and other Accommodations, save what they have purchased by proguing here in England. Judge then in reason what these are able to doe against so brave an Ar­my that contemns and scorns Them, as having beaten them with a handfull (in comparison of their numbers) home to their owne dores; an Army, that to all worldly Advantages, hath hitherto had a speciall Protection from Heaven, God having Sealed them for his owne by many miraculous victories and Successes, to the wonder of the whole world.

Secondly, consider that our English Army are all of a Nation, Natives, and unanimous especially upon the appearance of any Invaders; whereas the Scotish will be made up of divers Facti­ons, Royalists and Presbyterians, that com in pursuance of diffe­rent ends; which (for the time that they continue together) must needs be a cause of many Confusions and partialities of Counsells, to the prejudice of their Enterprises and Proceed­ings; a spring of perpetuall Emulations, that will soone untwist the Confederacy; so that in short time they must fall asunder like a Rope of Sand, and the private Soldiery be disposed to enter­taine thoughts of some new Engagement, to the ruine of the first.

Thirdly, We shall not only be provided for them here, if they dare be so unworthy as to invade us; but 'tis like this Common-wealth may find work for them at home, and (to cure their madnesse) divert the humour with Phlebotomie, by way of Revulsion.

Fourthly, It is like they will be farre from running much ha­zard to gain Successe unto the Designe. For, if they provr a little unfortunate, the humour will alter; one good beating will make them understand, there is another way of Interest and Thriving, than under the wings of Royalty. It may chance to make them remember (because they cannot forget) how long [Page 63] they have lived without a King in Scotland, while the Grandees and the Kirk did all; and that the English have dealt more in­genuously to have no King, than a Presbyterian Mock-King. One Rout (with this consideration) puts them presently into the humour of a Republique, as well as England. And then they will have no more work to doe, but to raise the Market, and get Chap men for their King to put him off handsomly, that they may pay their Army, and goe home again like Scots.

Lastly, the Scots having no just Ground of a Warre against England, can hardly be prosperous in the Attempt. The Cove­nant can be none, being extinct, as I have proved in the former part of this Treatise; besides I shall adde one Reason more: It cannot in common sense be supposed to have been intended as an eternall obligation, binding both Nations for ever, or to bind the English Nation with an implicite Faith, to whatsoever the Scots should expound to be righteous and necessary, to be done here for ever by way of Government. But it appeares intended onely for a certain time, for the prosecution of cer­taine Ends which were common to both Nations as Affaires then stood; and therefore being of a transient nature, because those Ends (by the alteration of Time, and other Circum­stances) are found either not possible or inconvenient, the obligation expires of it self. This being the state of the Cove­nant, neither the Scots, nor any other Party can found a Warre upon it in Reason or Justice. If so, then having no other Ground for a Warre▪ but Covetuousnesse, Emulation and Am­bition, which (as I shewed in the Preamble of this Chapter) have been cloaked under the Covenant, in all their Ingagements, the hand of Heaven will assuredly be against them for their un­christian Practices, as may appeare by these examples follow­ing.

First, Strig. in Chron. part. 2. p. 186. The Athenians, carried on with Covetousnesse, Emulation, and a desire to possesse themselves of the Riches, of the Lacede­monians, were the Author of the Peloponesian Warre; the con­sequence whereof was, that it ended with the subversion of their City walls, P [...]ucer. in lect. and the miserable slavery of their People. The same end likewise had the Carthaginians, Chron. d. 18. for moving an ambitious War against the Romans by the Instigation of Hannibal; Iul. An. 73. as also [Page 64] had the Thebans for their unjust invading the Macedonians.

It is observable likewise how that Semiramis. Babilonian Queen and Vira­go (as Diodorus Siculus tels us) being gre [...]dy after the Wealth of the Indians, Diod. Sic. rerii antiq. l. 2. c. 5. invaded them by an unjust Warre, in hope to make a Conquest▪ Bella injusta in­felices Su [...]c [...]ssus, tri [...]es, & Tra­gi [...]os exitus semper habent. but th [...] Issue was, that she was forced to flie home again most sh [...]m [...]fnlly for the safety of her life. Thus Xerxes, invading Greece with a world of Men, and Ships, was in the end glad of a poor Fishing-boat to get home out of Europe, to a worse destiny in Asia; Strig. [...]. Reg. 14. p. 187. being slaine immediately after his Return, by his Uncle A [...]ta [...]an [...]s. Upon the like occasion, Cyrus lost his Army, and his life; and to quench his B [...]oud-thirsty humour, his Head was cut off, and cast into a Hogs head fill'd with Bloud, by the Scythian Queen. Thus likewise, Mark Anthony, not con­tent with half the Empire of the World, invading his Partner Octavius for the whole, lost all, & being taken alive at mercy, laid violent hands on himself to prevent the Fury of the Conquerour. Thus Crassus another Roman, Philip. Chron. being of the Scotch Religion, a sacred hunger after Gold, Tom. 1. Epist. per Pe [...]c. edit. pag. 248. invaded the Parthians without cause, against the advice of the Senate; in which expedition he lost his Army and Life, and the Parthians considering what he came for, poured Molten Gold into his Mouth, in Triumph and Mockery.

To these Examples out of profane History, let me adde a few out of the Sacred. You may read 2 Kings 15. how Sena­cherib, the King of Assyria, mad an impious invasive War against Hezekiah King of Judah; the consequence whereof was the Confusion of his Army, and Revenge followed him to his own home so close at the heels, that it was executed upon him by his owne Sons, while he was at his superstitious devotion, in the midst of his Idols. Nor have wicked Princes onely beene punish­ed for invading the good, but you may read also that the good have had ill Successe in invading the bad. 2 Chron. 35. Thus good Josiah, a most religious Prince, warring without cause against Pharaoh Nicho King of Aegypt, received his deaths wound at Megiddo, and after his death, the same King Pharaoh, to right himself of the Injury done him by Josiah waged Warre, and by Gods per­mission subduing the Land, made the whole Nation Tributary, and took King Jehoahaz, the Sonne of Josiah, and carryed him Prisoner into Aegypt.

[Page 65] Also, another good King of Judah, by name, Amaziah, pro­voking Jehoash, 2 Kings 14. a wicked King of Israel, without cause, to Battel, was utterly Routed, the City of Hierusalem taken, the Walls demolished, the Temple spoiled, and Amaziah himself carried away Prisoner, to shew how much the Lord of Hosts, and God of Battell, it displeased with unjust Wars, that he will not pro­sper them, though made by his own People against the wicked that are his Enemies.

But there is one example more, which (me thinks) is very pertinent to our purpose; 2 Sam. Chap. 2, 3, & 4. and that is of Ishbosheth, the Son of King Saul, who laying claim to the Kingdome after his Father, by prerogative of Succession, made War against David, who was chosen King by Gods owne appointment: But to shew that Hereditary Succession is no Plea to justifie a Warre against the Powers that are ordained by him, he placed marks of displeasure against all that took part with Ishbosheth, so that in the end Ish­bosheth had his Head strook off by some Commanders of his own Party, and brought to David. Now, I leave this unto those that list, to make the Application: And withall, they may doe well to consider how the Spaniard prospered in 88. in his In­vasion against England; how ill he hath thrived ever in his At­tempts against the Hollander: And as for the Scots, I suppose, that as it concerns them to consider the sad example of the late Hamiltonian Invasion; so they and their Adherents may learn from all these together, That God will never prosper them, if they proceed in their unrighteous Combination.

Having shewn the Improbability of the Scots successe, I shall in the next place discover the great Inconveniences and ha­zards that our Nation must needs undergoe, in case it should happen.

First, It being evident, that their designe in urging the Cove­nant upon us, hath been to insinuate themselves into an equall Interest with us in our own Nation, it is to be supposed, that having hitherto been defeated of their long-expected Prey, they come now to prosecute it with the greater appetite: And it is to be presumed they will not serve the King with the Covenant, at an easier rate than they intended it should have cost the Par­liament.

[Page 66] Secondly, It is to be feared, this so much desired Interest of theirs may (if opportunities fall out right for their Turns) be driven on farther by the Sword, than yet we are aware of. A Nationall Ʋnion hath been whisper'd often among them hereto­fore; and there's no doubt but they will bid high for it, if ever they have occasion; And then it must needs be a very fine world, when we are confounded with a Miscelany of Scotish and Eng­lish; when Scots shall be Competitors with us in point of Pri­viledge, vie wealth with us in our own Possessions, Honours, and Dignities; and either impose new Lawes upon us, or alter the Old, as may make most for their Advantage.

Thirdly, That these things may be, is probable enough, since their King having no other rewards to give them, it is impossible he should satisfie the Grandees and Leaders any other way, than by promising large accessions of Interest, with other mens Ho­nours and Possessions; even those men's (perhaps) that are the Moderate Sort of Transgressors; For, in such Cases it is usuall to stretch all Offences upon the Wrack, to supply the necessities of the Conquerour; and then if this happen, 'tis like a Scotch Covenanters stomack, will allow no distinction, betwixt Presbyter and Independent, but may digest the estate of an English Cove­nanter without so much as a Scruple of Regret, or Com­passion.

Lastly, it is a very great wonder, since the present Stage-play of the Covenant, and the Actors are brought on this side the Curtain, and we know what they are through all their disguise, and what they aime at, That yet many of our English should be so stupid, as to be led away with their Cheates and Pretences for a King and Reformation: Also, since it is evident, that their chief Leaders and Sticklers gape onely after Profit and Prefer­ment, and (according to the Custome of all Forreiners in Arms) will make no difference between Friend and Foe, so they may sa­tisfie their covetous and ambitious Ends; since the whole People likewise must of necessity be harased with innumerable Taxes, to pay the rabble of their Souldiery; certainly, no true English heart can be so degenerous, as to forward or countenance them, in their invading this Nation.

Now, for a Conclusion to the whole; that these Particulars [Page 67] may appeare more solid then mere Insinuations, give me leave to confirme them by many Authentick examples; it being an ordinary Case in the world, That Ab istis exer­citibus, quos de­fendendi sui causâ attraxe­runt, evertuntur. Commonwealths and King­domes have been oppressed often by those Foreiners, that came or were invited in as Friends, to give their assistance. Here be­fore I proceed, let me call to minde a Story of the Hedghog, in the Fable; Peucer. Auxili­atores, ut solet fieri, postea siunt domini. Strigel. 2. Paralip. 28. who being almost dead with Cold, chanced to light upon a Foxes Kennel; where asking for entertainment, the Fox more compassionate than wise grants his Request. But the Hedghog, as soone as he recovered warmth, began to bristle and prick the Fox, who complaining of his unworthy carriage, the Hedghog made Answer, that if he found him troublesome, he might leave him, and seek a new Lodging. I shall make no ap­plication, but leave those that would entertaine the Scots as their Friends, to consider whether they should finde more Courtesie from them, if They had power here then the Fox did from the Hedghog, or than other Nations have had from the friendly Pre­tences of Forain Auxiliaries.

Concerning this, Justin. there are severall Precedents. Tht Mac [...] ­donians being invited by the Thebans, to assist them against the Phocians, made a shift not onely to seat themselves among the Thebans, but under the conduct of King Philip, made way to the Conquest of all Greece: Xenoph. lib. 7. So the Persians comming as Friends to aid one party in a civill division in Caria, suppressed both, and deprived that Common-wealth of its liberty. And the Cartha­ginians, in the first Punick Warre, received more prejudice from the Cel [...]ae, their Confederates and Brethren in Covenant, than from the Romans their Enemies.

The Goths and Vandals being invited by the Emperour Theo­dosius, Pezel. part 4. pag. 613. for his assistance, deprived him of Italy and Spain. After­ward, the Longbeards or Lombards being called in by Narses against the Goths, seated themselves for above 200 years in that part of Italy, which from them was called Lombardy.

A Quarrel hapning between the two Saracen Sultans of Per­sia and Babylon, Circa Annum Christi▪ 870. the Persian called in the Turks, under the Con­duct of their Captain Tangrolipix out of Scythia, Chytraeus in Apoc. cap. 9. who seated Themselves first in a part of his Dominions.

In the Chronicles of Judah, 2 Chron. 28. we read how King Ahaz invited [Page 68] Tilglath-pilneser King of Assyria to his Assistance, against the Edomites; who comming as a Friend, did him exceeding pre­judice, and laid a Designe then for the Conquest of Hierusalem, which was afterwa [...]d effected. Josephus tels us likewise, how that Pompey being called to assist Hircanus, in the recovery of the Kingdome of Judaea, Josephus de bello Jud. lib. 1. c. 12. out of the Hands of his yonger bro­ther Aristobulus, took occasion hereby to reduce it under the Roman obedience.

In the time of the Emperour Fredrick the 3. the Princes of Italy being in contention, the Pope called in the Spaniard and se­verall other Princes, to compose the Quarrel; In Chron. Phil. lib. 5. which being done, a new one arose betwixt the Auxiliary Princes for the Lordship of Italy; but the Spaniard drave away the rest, and made bold to keep possession for himselfe. Thus likewise, the Spaniards be­ing invited into Sicily and Naples, to free them from the French, did indeed expell the French, but possessed both Kingdomes themselves. On the other side; a Controversie arising between Lewis and John Sforza for the Dutchie of Milain, John called in the Spaniards to his Party, and Lewis the French: But the French driving out John and the Spaniards, made themselves at that time Masters of the Duke-dome, and carried their Friend Lewis away Prisoner into France.

Thus in old time our Ancestors the Saxons, Sam. Daniel. being called in by Vortigern the British King, to assist him against the Invasions of the Picts and Scots, turned their Arms against the Britans, and driving them into Wales, transmitted the possession of this Island to us, Joh. Bodinus lib. 5. cap. 5. their Posterity. So the Scots likewise (as Bodin saith) be­ing called in to the assistance of the Picts against the Britains, possest themselves of the best part of that Kingdome, which they hold at this day.

And now I would faine know of the Admirers of the Scotish Nation, that if The Scots come in hither with their King upon their Shoulders, and their fine Flourishes of pretended Friend­ship, what assurance they can have, that they shall not serve us the same sauce, as their Ancestors did the Picts, and as ours did the Britans, or as others did other Nations, whom they op­pressed under as glorious Pretences, in case They should get the power in their hands: Especially since of late time, They [Page 69] have made so many pelpable Discoveries of Encroachment up­on the English Nation.

Seeing therefore that their Covenant-Cause appears a Cause for intrenchment upon our Nationall Interest, rather than for Religion or Monarchy▪ I may reasonably conclude, that it concerns all Parties whatsoever (if not for the Improbability of their Successe, and the Miseries that would follow it, yet) out of a de­testation of their Designe, to abhor Them in their Invasion.

CHAP. III.
Concerning the English Presbyterians.

WHence it was, and for what ends, Presbytery was first brought into this Nation, is not here to be disputed: But if we grant the Intentions of its first Fautors to be pure in the Fountain; yet it appears polluted in the Streams, by the Cor­ruption of their Successors: For, as the primitive Pretences of it were high and glorious, in the innocence of its Cradle; so being grown up to a full Stature, it hath (after the manner of all other things that participate of worldly mixtures) in time contracted so many adulterations of worldly Interest, that it hath lost the Beauty which it once appeared to have, and serves every Sophi­ster, as a Cloake, to cover his ambitious Designe.

But since it is arived, notwithstanding, to such a hight in the opi­nions of many, as to be cried up for the only patern of Govern­ment under the Gospel, this is to be imputed to the blind Zeal of those that are led, and the deceitfulnesse of the Leaders, rather than to the Intention of its learned Founder, Mr. Calvin. For, it doth not appear that ever he stretch't his Module so far, as the necessity and universality of a Divine Right, but seems only to have hewn part of the Building out of the rock of the Scri­ptures, and peeced up the residue by politique and prudentiall Rules, such as he conceived might sound nearest the Text, and serve most conveniently to cement the dis-joynted Members of the then broken and tumultuous Common-wealth of Geneva, into an entire and well-compacted Body.

[Page 70] It was no sooner lick't into Form there; but (as it is the Fate of all things new) it began to be much extoll'd and admired; and the Fame thereof spreading in England, as well as other Parts, wrought in many of our Country-men an Itching desire to goe thither, and instruct Themselves in the Nature and Cu­stoms of the Government; where, of Spectators they soon be­came Proselytes, and returning home with new Affections, looked with an eye of disdain upon the Bishops; as if Themselves had in­deen found out the Patern in the Mount, because (forsooth) the words, Presbytery, Elder, Deacon, and Assembly, &c. sound more Go­spel like than Diocesse, Church-Warden, Arch-deacon, and high-Com­mission, &c. With these Terms, Maxima pars vulgi capitur Amba [...]gibus. the ordinary Sort of Religious persons, not able to see through this Shell of words, into the Kernell or Substance of the businesse, were easily led to a belief of high matters; whereas this new Forme, like the Trojan Horse, brought an Army of mischiefs in the belly of it; which were ne­ver so fully discovered, as till this Parliament. For, immediatly af­ter that the Episcopall Form was abolished here, as corrupt and Antichristian, the chief Sticklers of the Presbyterian Clergy began to shew their Teeth; and sitting in an Assembly Cheek by Jo [...]e with the Parliament, intermedled with their Affairs, labored to twist their Church discipline with the Interest of State, claimed in their open Pleas, Discourses, and their Confession of Faith, a Power in themselves distinct from the Civill, and demanded the Voting of this in both Houses, as Jure Divino, that so the Parlia­ment might for ever cut the throat of their own Authority, and Magistracy.

These, and many other Pranks they played, in hope to erect their intended Domination: And though (being often requi­red) they were as little able as the Bishops to shew their Pedegree from the Apostles, or to derive the lineaments of their form from the Body of the Scripture; yet they pressed it on stil, and wanted not their Party in Parliament, with the assistance of the Scots, (whose Interest it was) to second them. And here it might be wondred, that so many knowing men, and of able Parts, should prove so degenerous, as to prostitute Themselves, and the Ma­jesty of the Nation, to serve the ambitious ends of a few Priests; but that they had their Ends in it too, and were willing to fol­low [Page 71] the Example of the Scotish Grandees, by gratifying the new Clergy in the form of a Nationall Church, with Accruments of worldly pomp and Power, the better to support their Owne in the State.

For this Cause it was, that They stooped so unworthily to the Designe of the Scots and the Clergy; and being all of them combined in Interest, they were in a manner necessitated, to countenance and comply with each other in their mutuall En­croachments, to the dishonour of our Nation, the debasing of Parliaments, and the extreme hazard of the Libery of our Soules and Bodies. All which being considered, you may see, how ex­ceedingly we are obliged to our present Governers, that they strove so mightily against the stream to prevent Them all in their severall Designings; and what necessity lay upon them to ex­pell that corrupt Interest out of Parliament, and to follow the Counsell of the Poet, in cutting Immedicabile vulnus Ense re­cidendum est. Ovid. off a rotten Part for the Preser­vation of the whole, by the Power of the Sword. By reason of this necessary and magnanimous Act, it is, that they have made Themselves so many Enemies to the Presbyterian Party: For, the Scots, being defeated of their English Interest, the Secluded Members of their Hopes and Priviledges, and the Clergie of their Kirk-domination, incline all immediately to face about to the Prince, and to hedge in him and his Interest with their owne, as well as they can, in hope of private Revenge and a Recovery, without any regard at all to the good and peace of the Publique. Then Gentlemen, if they prevaile, ye will be but in the old posture again, As You WERE; yea, and far worse than you were, since all those Church-usurpations which were then but in designe, must needs be confirm'd by a new alteration.

For this Cause it is, there are so many Presbyterian Juglings in private, such Murmurings abroad, and so many Mutinies in the Pulpit; such wel-acted Lamentations for the glory of the Kirke, and the losse of their Diana, that every Prayer is a Stratagem, most Sermons meer Plots against the State, and upon their Hea­rers. Thus the Nature of their Designe being discovered, give me leave in the next place to manifest the Vanity of their Hopes, that if men will not forbeare for shame of its hypocrisie, they may yet, in consideration of the many sad Consequents which may follow.

CHAP. IV.
Concerning the Levellers.

WHat these People aime at, and how they would settle, is as hard for me to determine, as in what point of the Compasse the wind will [...]it next, since they are every jot as giddy and rapid in their Motions. Yea, the very Settlement which they pretend to, would, were their Desires granted, put the Common-wealth into an utter Impossibility of Setling, as I shall prove by and by, when I come to Particulars.

In the mean time, that you may know what They are, and how they came to be distinguished by this Title, give me leave to trace Them from their Originall, and manifest how they were divided in Affection from the Parliament; which appears to be occasioned only by a meer misinterpretation or mistake of some Passages in divers Declarations of the Parliament and Army touching the Liberties of the People; wherein they professed, That the compleat Settlement of the Liberties and Peace of the Nation is that blessing of God, than which, of all worldly things, nothing is more dear and precious in their Thoughts. From this, and the like Ex­pressions, a certain Sort of men, of busie parts, and that have a mind to seem Sombody, immediatly tooke upon them to frame such Comments, and Chimaera's of Liberty, as might fit their own Ends and Phantsies; And in time, disseminated such strange Prin­ciples of pretended Freedome, among the common Sort of Sol­diery and People; that it became evident to all the world, they sought not Liberty but Licentiousnesse.

And the first time that they began to appear considerable in view, was in the year 1647, when that memorable contest hapned betwixt the Army, and the corrupt Party then prevalent, in both Houses and the City: At which time, though they did good Ser­vice in helping to reduce the one, and purge the other; yet no sooner had the Parliament recovered it Self into a State of In­nocence and Freedom, and begun to act in such a way, as they conceived necessary to establish the liberties of the Nation, but these men made bold to carp at their Proceedings, and crie out [Page 78] against them and the superior Officers of the Army, as perfidi­ous, and betrayers of the publique Interest; because Themselves (a hot headed Rabble, and the meanest of the People) might not have it setled after their own humor.

From whence it appears, the first Cause of the Difference be­tween the Parliament and Them, was their bold and impudent behaviour, in presuming to direct their wisdome what to doe, and taking upon them, Dictator-like, to define what is Liberty, and what not, and how it ought to be established; as if Them­selves alone were infallible, and the only Champions of Ʋniver­sall Freedom, and the Parliament such, as either regarded it not, or sought it's destruction. And, notwithstanding that they have manifested their great wisdom, courage, and care ever since, in carrying on the work of Freedom to this height, wherein we now see it, to the absolute confutation of these mens Calumnies; yet their restlesse Spirits proceed still in the same violent Course, having of late, in a presumptuous manner, presented a mutinous scandalous Remonstrance, which (neverthelesse) they call an humble Petition, to the Parliment; wherein they take advan­tage, by the present Necessities of the Common-wealth, to slander Them in their Proceedings, as Oppressors of that Liberty which they so Zealously mainteine; and for the necessary Defence whereof, they are constrained to continue divers payments upon the People at present, to purchase [...]ase in the future.

Having thus discovered the vanity of their Quarrell, in the next place give me leave to shew what their Designe is: And this They professe, in that Pamphlet, called the Agreement of the People, See the Agree­ment of the People. (set forth May 1. 1649.) to be a Popular Form, or a Go­vernment by the People, as the only Preservative of Peace and Li­berty; wherein it is required, That the Supreme Authority of England, and the Territories therewith incorporate, may reside hence­forward in a Representative of the People consisting of 400 persons, and no more; whereto all of 21 yeares and upwards, are allowed a Right to chuse, and be chosen Members, except Servants and Vaga­bonds. And because all persons have an equality of Right to chuse and be chosen, without respect of Birth, quality, or wealth, all Orders of men being Levell'd in this Particular, therefore the Promoters of this way, are not improperly called Levellers; so [Page 79] that this Term of Levelling is equivalent with Aristotle's [...], 6. Polit. cap. 2. which is translated aequalitas Juris, the Equality of Right be­fore-mentioned; And the same Author saith, this Plea for Equa­lity of Right in Government, at length introduceth a Claim for Equality of Estates, and the making of such Lawes as the Indeque fre­quentantur A­grariae Leges▪ quae prohibent, ne quis nimis dives efficiatur. Besold, in Sy­nops. de De­mocr. Agra­rian Lawes enacted by the popular Boutefeus in Rome, whereby it was made criminall for any man to grow Richer than ordinary. But of this, more anon.

Now therefore, since it appears, how injurious their Calum­nies are, and how perilous their designe is, to the Parliament and Common-wealth, I suppose it were time lost to stand to prove the Improbability of their Successe, seeing all Persons of Credit and Fortune, are concerned, to abhorre and detest this Wild Project: And though the four Champions made proclama­tion in the head of their Agreement; See the Pre­amble of the Agreement. That according to the nature of Truth, it hath made its own way into the understanding, and taken root in the hearts and Affections of most Men; yet you must know these men they speak of, are only the rude multitude, who un­derstand no more of the businesse, than that it may prove a hope­full way, to mend their own out of other men's Fortunes, and satisfie their naturall Appetites of Covetousnesse and Revenge, upon the Honourable and Wealthy. In consideration whereof, I come next to give you a more exact and lively Draught, of the manifold miserable Inconveniences of that Government, (or rather, Confusion) so earnestly contended for by the Levelling Party.

First, Such a Democratick, or Popular Forme, that puts the whole multitude into an equall exercise of the Supreme Au­thority, under pretence of maintaining Liberty, is, in the Judg­ment of all States-men, the greatest enemy of Liberty; For, the multitude is so Brutish, that (as the Emperour Claudius said) they are Plebs ut prona in miser [...]cordiā, ita immodica in saevit [...]am. ever in the extreames of kindnesse or Cruelty; being void of Reason, and hurried on with an unbridled violence in all their Actions, trampling down all respects of things Sacred and Civill, to make way for that their Liberty, which Clap­marius calls Clap. de Ar­cau. dom. pop. a most dissolute licentiousnesse, or a licence to doe even what they list; according to that of the Lyrick,

[Page 80] when Liberty becomes the greatest Vice, and degenerates in­to Violence. Such a Liberty as this is recorded by Tacitus, to have been among the Parthians, an uncertaine loose kind of People, Incerti nimi­rum, solati (que) & magis sine domi­nio, quàm in Li­bertate. living rather without government, than in Liberty; or as Salust speaks of the Abrogines, 2. An­nal. Genus ho­minum agreste, sine legibus, sine Imperio, liberii, atque sol [...]tum. Salust. a rude sort of men, without Lawes, without Government, free, and dissolute. And Livy Quoniā ea de­mum Libertas Romae est, non Senatii, non Ma­gistratus, non Leges, non mo­res majorum non Instituta patrii, non Disciplinam vereri Militiae. Liv. l. 5. tells you, how things were come to that passe in the popular State of Rome, that no regard was had either to the Senate, or Ma­gistracy, or Military Discipline, or to the Lawes and Customs of their Ancestors. When affaires are in this condition, then (as Aristotle saith) Mera [...] est extrema tyrannis, meer Democracy (or liberty) is extreme Tyranny; and (as Besoldus) Plebs perniciosissimus fit Tyrannus, the People becomes a most pernicious Tyrant. Hence it is, saith Quicciardin, Histor. lib. 2. very pertinently to our purpose, That many times, when a People have got loose from the yoke of a Tyranny or Kingly Government, out of a desire of Liberty, they proceed from one Extreme to an­other, & sese, nisi retineantur, in effraenatam licentiam praecipi­tant; quae quidem & ipsa, Jure Tyrannis, potest appellari, and except they be restrained, run headlong to Licentiousnesse; which also may be rightly called a Tyranny. To which accords that of Peuce­rus, who most excellently describes the Effects of it in these words: Tales longè sunt crudeliores, et longè plus no­cent quàm soli Tyranny, &c. The study of popular Air, applause, and humor, is a mad­nesse no whit inferior to Tyranny it Self. Those which seek after it, as Leaders of the People, become far more cruell and mischievous than single Tyrants can be: For, single Tyrants are the lesse able to doe mischief, because, they are constrained to stand in fear of others; but the furious Multitude fearing no colours, are hurried on like a Torrent, and beare downe all the Bankes of opposition. So that (as Clapmarius saith) reckon up those flagitious Enormities of Kingly Government together▪ Clapm. de Flag. as breach of Faith, violation of things Sacred, depriving men of their Possessions, Dom. cap. 19. with all the Acts of Injustice and cruelty, and they abound much more in a meer Popular State (or Le­velling popularity) than any other. And therefore, ( Omnium prope Judicio vapulat; eò quòd imbi li­ [...]o [...]tia pro liber­tate habeatur. Bodin con­cludes) since it is the high Road to Licentiousnesse and Tyranny, it is justly condemned by all wise men of the world. Bodin. 6. cap. 4.

Secondly, Petr. Gregor. 5. de Repub. cap. 3. Nor is is only a meer Tyranny in it Self; but so far destructive of a Free State (especially a Free State newly ere­cted) [Page 81] that it soon causes a change of it into the form of a regall Tyrannie; according to that Maxim of Politicians, Facilis est transitus à regimine Democratico ad Monarchicum, The passage is quick and easie from a meere Popularity to Monarchy; And that, because of those Discontents, Emulations, and Tumults, which arise continually among them, and whereby their Leaders so tire them out, that in a little time, they Componi non possunt, nisi Im­perio ad unum devoluso. willingly yeeld them­selves under the yoke of any one Person, who seems willing and able to deliver and ease them by a settlement. Thus Rome, that stately Mistresse of the World, Clap. de Arc. who disdained to stoop under Victorious Caesar, Imp. l. 2. c. 14. falling afterward into Popular Divisions, and Discords, more fierce than ever, soon grew weary, and willing to bow her neck under Eam Republi­cam discordiis civilibus fessam, nomine principis, sub Imperiū ac­cepit. Tacit. Augustus. Plutarch compares those po­pular tumults to the pangs of a Woman in travell, calling them [...] Reipub: the Pains of a Common-wealth, that Tumultus po­pulares parturi­u [...] Regnum. must needs bring forth into the world some great Kingdom or Tyranny. Now the Person invested after this manner, is usually some one of their Leaders; Ann. 1. who by soothing and carrying them on upon high and glorious pretences of Liberty, gaines so much confidence and Power among them, that in the end he bereaves them of liberty to disturb him, or themselves any further. Thus, and by such Arts as these, Julius Caesar first erected the Imperiall Tyranny at Rome, as Pisistratus likewise made himself absolute at Athens, and Dionysius the Tyrant at Syracusa; who pretending Themselves great Patrons of Liberty, stirred the people up against the Se­nate and Counsellers of State, as Enemies to that Liberty, whereof they were ineed the onely Keepers. And it is not to their Lea­ders alone, that they expose the publique Liberty, but oftentimes to those out of whose hands it was first recovered: Thus, Aga­thocles the Tyrant of Sicily, Periander, and severall others, have by this means, after they had been expelled, regained a possessi­on: And therefore it cannot be improper here, to return the Language of our Levellers in their late Petition, home to them­selves; that since They, and divers others dis-affected persons▪ are so unwilling to imbrace the Common-wealth, in its present state and true condition of Liberty, They are to be reckoned the only Causers of those Taxes and other Inconveniences now lying up­on us, whereas if they would unite (as they ought) our Burthens [Page 82] would be inconsiderable, because the Royall and forein Confede­rates would have the lesse Confidence to assail us, and force these Necessities upon us, were we once free from those Divisions, distractions, and dis-satisfactions, which Presbyters and Levellers occasion here among us.

Thirdly—It cannot but be sad to consider, what Tumults and Combustions must needs happen every year, by reason of those prodigious multitudes, that are admitted to make choice of the Persons to be intrusted in the Representative: And though there be one Clause in the Agreement, which seems to provide against Riots at every chusing of the Members, yet it is impossible to devise any meanes to prevent those Inconveniences which will arise in a self-opinionated Multitude upon such an occasion, S [...]inditur incer­tum studia in cōtraria vulgus. wherein they all conceive themselves to have an equall Interest and power, and touching which it can hardly be expected any Conclusion can be made, till from Arguments they proceed to Cuffs, and so in the end, the Club carry the Election.

Fourthly, It hath ever been the Custom in these meer Popular Forms, Contzen. 1. po­lit. cap. 20. for the most part to make choice of the lowest of the People, such whose Persons are held in Admiration by the rest of their Fellowes, and like to satisfie them in all their phren'tick humours; a lively sad example whereof we have in the popular State of Athens, where they chose such Persons to participate of the supreme Authority, Greg. Tolos. l. 4. de Repub. cap. 3. as would countenance them, and share with them, in slaying or condemning the richer Sort, and then seizing upon their Possessions, plundring their Houses, and many more such fine effects of Levelling Liberty. Hence it is, they shift and change their Governers so often, Plebs Rectores meliores vocat eos, qui magis [...]i indulgeat. Idē. rejecting, at every new Election, such as they have found averse to their licentious waies, as Enemies of Liberty, under pretence of putting Better in their places; that is, such as indulge them in these and the like Courses.

Fifthly, by this meanes, unlearned, ignorant Persons, neither of Learning nor Fortune, being put in Authority, the Common-wealth cannot remain safe either in peace or war; for, though covetousnesse and private necessity, they will exercise rapin and Injustice in time of Peace, and by reason of their Ignorance in the Affaries of Government, the State must needs run a hazard in time of War, or any other publique extremity. Here, let me call [Page 83] to mind a passage of the Romans, mentioned by Aquinas Aquin. de Re­gim. Princ. l. 4. cap. 15.; a­mong whom it hapned, that two Persons being chosen by the Consuls, for the Government of Spaine, they were after the Election found fault with, the one being very Poore, the other accused of being Covetous: And when it had been long deba­ted, which of Them should be intrusted, at length Scipio, to end the controversie, stood up, and concluded neither, because Per­sons so qualified must needs be corrupt in their Government, and ever sucking the Body Politick, like Leeches, wheresoever they can lay hold: yet such Persons as these, poor, and unexpert in Affairs, if they are Busie-bodies, and have a nimble Faculty of prating, are usually adored by the Vulgar, as the onely States­men.

Sixthly, It is ordinary with the grand Demagogues, or Leaders of the People, to make Sale of Elections, and all Offices of Ju­dicature, Honour and Authority: and upon these Terms they many times admit the better Sort into Places of power, and turn them out again at pleasure: So that ( [...]. as Plato and Plu­tarch say) meer Popularity is no Government, but is as it were a Market, wherein all Offices of Government are exposed to sale; and He ordinarily gains the best bargain of Authority, that hath the longest Purse, and most powerfull Tongue, to perswade the Ex Favore, & pretio, populus distribuebat Magistratus. Clerks of the Market; Plato. whereby it is to be supposed on the other side, that the Purchasers will see Themselves no Losers; it be­ing a matter of Course, that such as buy Authority should sell Justice.

Seventhly, Polyb. 6. histor. à pr. paratu. 1. disc. The Plea of our Levellers for yearly Representatives, with this Caution, That no man shall be chosen a Member of two Representatives together, and that in the Intervalls we may be governed by a Committee of their own Members, without a standing Councell of State, is very irrationall. For, what under­standing can a Succession of mean and new elected Persons have of the publique Affairs, so as to manage them with Skill and Advantage, in so short a Time, seeing it is use and experience that fits a man for the carriage of Grand Concernments of State. We find in the Roman State (when it was most Popular) that the Multitude were never so mad as to cast off, though they took upon them now and then to controll, the Senate, which [Page 84] was their standing Councell; and without which no Common-wealth can continue of any long standing: And thherefore it is that rather than such a Councell of State should be wanting, Summa-Rerū sit penes paucos, qui antecellunt reliquos virtute & Sapientiâ. Ari­stotle adviseth us to intrust them with Affaires altogether, they having all those Advantages of Observation, Custom, and Ex­perience which cannot be expected from a tumultuary Succes­sion, of raw and unexpert Statists. Polit. 1. As for example, we read, in what a flourishing condition the Common-wealth of Athens continued, as long as Affairs were ordered by that Famous Councell, Thucy [...]ides l. 2. pag. 63. the Areopagites; and no sooner did the power come into the hands of the People, but afterwards all turned to con­fusion. It were much to be wonder'd, that the State of Rome stood so long in a Popular Form, but that we know it was also underpropp'd by the Wisdome and Authority of the Senate, and had many eminent Pillars to support it; as Menenius Agrippa, Furius Camillus, Papirius Cursor, Fabius Maximus, Ca [...]o Censor, Marcus Scaurus, and Pompey, upon whose Vertues its subsi­stence depended, and not upon those Tumultuary Sots, the Many. Thus likewise, the popular State of the Bodinus 6. [...] Repub. cap. 4 Thebans sub­sisted a while, by the singular Wisdome and Valour of Pelopidas and Epaminondas; who were no sooner gone, but the Popularity sunk of it self, and came to nothing. How much safer then must it needs be for the People of this Nation, to leave the Succession of Representatives, and the Form of a Councell in the fu [...]ure, with the time and manner of their Constitution, and Rules for Election, to be ordered by the wisdome and discretion of Par­liament, than after the humour of some obscure p [...]rsons, whose Knowledge and Interest in the Publique matters, is no whit comparable to theirs, and therefore not to be valued in compe­tition with them, for the ordering of such Affaires, as so highly concern the Good and Peace of the Publique.

Eighthly, this Pop [...]lar Form is the only enemy of true genero­sity and vertue: For, how much the more excellent any man hath approved hims [...]lfe, either in Conduct or Councell, so much the more he is suspected, hated and calumniated, by the ungrate­full multitude. Lez Repetunda­rum. In the popular state of Rome They had Lex Re­petundarum, a Law whereby the multitude were inabled to call all publique Magistrates and Officers to Accompt; a course [Page 85] seeming plausible enough in it selfe: But hence proceeded those Liberae Accusationes, whereby the People having liberty to ac­cuse Magistrates, Libera accusati­ones, & Calumniationes. proceeded to Calumniations, and continually vexed with false and unreasonall Charges, even those who had been most faithfull, and done very famous Services for the Com­mon-wealth; just as our Levellers now exclaim against the Par­liament, and would (if they might) rage against them about publique Accompts, as appeares by their old Agreement, and their late Petition; the consequence whereof would be, that in the end they should be Ostracised, and receive an Ostracismus used at Athens as Petalismus else-where; when the Peo­ple banished any eminent man, the Sen­tence was writ­ten either upon the Shell of a Fish, or an Olive leafe. OYSTER­SHELL, or an OLLIVE-LEAF, in recompence of all their Labours.

Thus, the most famous Captain Alcibiades, having done ma­ny Services for the Athenian Populacy, was, only for a petty mis­fortune (and no other Cause) in mannaging the Warre of Sicily, called h [...]me, and banished both from his Command and Coun­try. At length, being sent for home again, he made them Victo­rious over their Enemies the Lacedemonians; yet notwithstanding so great merits, he was, upon another Turn of popular Air for a misfortune in Asia, A [...]. 3. polit. c. 13. sent the second time into banishment by those Levellers.

So likew [...]se, Phil. Came­ra [...]. Cent. 2. oper. Succis. cap. 51. another famous Athenian Captain, Themistocles, received no other reward than Banishment, for all his merito­rious Archievements. And Miltiades, who erected the Grecian Trophies in Persia, and asserted the Liberties of Greece against all their Enemies, was used farre worse, being kept a Prisoner all his life, and after his death, they not onely neglected to give him Buriall, but (to stretch their ingratitude yet further) con­demned his Sonne Cimon to perpetuall Imprisonment. In like manner, they used Phocion, the most deserving of all the Athenian Commanders, but with much more cruelty; for, they murther'd him with their own hands, and afterward denyed him Buriall: Whereupon, Bodinus relating the Story out of Plutarch, makes this observation; That when the Multitude begin to insult against the most deserving Men, they run beyond all Shame and Reason.

Nor was it thus only in Greece, but we finde the same humour also among the Roman Levellers whereof that illustrious Family of the Scipio's was a sad Example. For, Scipio Major, he that [Page 86] for his Famous exploits against Carthage, was Sirnamed Afri­canus, having rescued Rome from the Brink of Destruction, and freed her from the fear of that pernicious Rivall, was, at his return home, so afflicted and vexed with injurious Calumnies of the unthankfull Rabble, that for quitnesse sake he spent his dayes in a voluntary exile, and at his death, commanded such an Ingrata pa­tria n [...] ossa qui­dem mea habes. Epitaph to be fixed upon his Monument, as might testifie to After-times the great ingratitude of his Peeple. They accused his Brother also, Sirnamed Asiaticus, of defrauding the Com­mon-wealth, and kept him a Prisoner. In the same manner, they calumniated likewise the most meritorious Scipio Nasica; so that to decline the popular Fury, he departed with the good will and consent of the Senate, as employed by them upon an Embassy to Pergamus, from whence he never returned. By this it appears then, that all generous Spirits are concerued in reason, to abhor the Levelling way of Government.

Ninthly, Ubi Imperium plebis est, ibi Patricios ac no­biles, multis magnisque Inju­riis, affici necesse est. Arist. 3. pol. cap. 7. Aristotle saith, where this Levelling popular Form is erected, there is a necessity that all persons who are become eminent or potent, either by fortune, or vertue, should receive many high and heinous injuries from the Vulgar. And Tacitus gives the reason why it was thus in the Roman State; Because (saith he) the Common Rabble have a kind of inveterate hereditary hatred against the more noble, and worthy persons, especially such as are Councellours of State; Inveratissimum fuit in Rep. Ro­mana odium plebis adversus Patricios. Tac. as appears by their frequent calumniating the Senators, punishing them sometimes with Banishment, as they did Furius, and many others, and often with unreasonable Fines, as they did Liv. li. 4. & 5. C. Sempronius, Q. Pomponius, and Virginius, &c. And all this, for the most part without any cause, but meerly to exercise their Spleen, which takes the same course of enmity likewise a­gainst all that are Wealthy, be they High or Low. For, it is rec­koned Clapm. de Arcan. l. 2. c. 13 inter Arcana, a prime mysterie of Popular Government, to use all private tricks and waies of Milking and Gelding the Purses of the Rich. Nor is that alone sufficient, but they fly out ever and anon into violence, and from Plandering they proceed to [...]lat Levelling of Estates, as is evident by those Licinian and Agrarian Lawes made by the Populacy of Rome, whereby it was provided, that no man should grow too rich, nor be Master of above fifty Acres of Land. And touching this, there is an inso­lent [Page 87] Passage recorded by Livy, how that when the Senate seemed unwilling to permit the Division of certain Lands among the common sort, the Tribunes, or Ringleaders of the People, asked the Senators, Auderen [...]ne po­stulare, ut cùm bina Jugera agri plebi divideren­tur, isis plus quàm quinqua­ginta jugera ha­bere liceret? how they durst possesse more than fifty Acres apeice, yet find fault with a division made of two apeece to the People! And the same Author tells us, so many Quarrells and Tumults arose about division of Lands, that the Senate knew not which way to prevent them, till they disburdened the Common-wealth, by sending forth Colonies, and satisfying them with Lands, in the remote Parts of Italy, Liv. l. 10. and other Places.

Lastly, from Levelling they proceed to introduce an absolute Community. And though neither the Athenian nor Roman Le­vellers, ever arived to this high pitch of madnesse; yet we see there is a new Faction started up out of ours, known by the name of Diggers; who, upon this ground, That God is our common-Father, the Earth our Common-Mother, and that the Originall of Propriety was mens pride and Covetousnesse, have framed a new plea for a Returne of all men ad Tuguria, that like the old Parthians, Scythian Nomades, and other wild Barbarians, we might renounce Towns and Cities, live at Rovers, and enjoy all in common.

Now for a conclusion, all these Considerations being put to­gether, you may easily spell what Leveller is, what the meaning is of those Zealous Pretenders to Liberty and Freedome, and what their Pretence may come to, it being the ready Road to all licentiousnesse, mischief, mere Anarchy and Confusion; which whosoever followes, may stay long enough, ere he see the per­formance of those glorious promises, set forth in their late Pe­tition, wherein the People are made to believe fine things; but I leave them to judge, whether this be the way, [to sit down se­curely under their own Vines, under the glorious administration of Justice and Righteousnesse.]

CHAP. V.
A discourse of the excellency of a Free-State, above a Kingly Government.

HAving in the former Chapters Stated the Designes, and given an Accompt of those grand Inconveniences, which of necessity will ensue a Successe of the opposite Parties, this next discourse must needs be very pertinent, by way of conclusion, to manifest the excellency of the present Government, which They all endeavour to destroy. And though there needed no other Ar­gument to prove it, and recommend it to the world, than this; That it is the only Bank, which preserves us from the Inunda­tions of If this Go­vernment be de­stroyed, we must expect a Regall, or a Presbyteri­an, or a popular Tyrannie. Tyranny on the one side, and Confusion on the other; yet it wants not (of it selfe) those many Advantages, above all other Forms, which render it most convenient to promote the Peace, wealth, and honour of the English Nation.

Yet it is a wonder to see, how lightly men prize this invalua­ble Jewell of Liberty, which hath cost the Common-wealth so much Blood and Treasure, trampling the precious Pearl under their Feet, like Swine; so that the Parliament meet now with as many difficulties to preserve, as ever they had to purchase it. But for this, there are two speciall Reasons, which may be col­lected out of the Mach. de Rep. l. 1. c. 16, 17, & 18. Florentine's subtile discourses upon Livy; who compares such as have been educated under a Monarchy or Tyranny, to those Beasts which have been caged or coop't up alll their lives in a Den, where they seem to live in as much plea­sure, as other Beasts that are abroad; and if they be let loose, yet they will returne in againe, because they know not how to value or use their Liberty: So strong an Impression is made likewise, by education and Custome from the Cradle, even upon men that are endued with reasonable Souls, that they chuse to live in those Places and Customes of government, under which they have been bred, rather than submit to better, which might make more for their Content and Advantage. Hence it is, that those poore Slaves under the Turk, Persian, Tartar, Muscovite, Russian, French, and Spaniard, with other Eastern, Northern, and Western Tyrants, are so enamoured of their Chains, that [Page 89] they admire their own condition above all others, and (like the Indians) adore the Devill which torments them, because they are ignorant of a better Deity to protect Them.

But besides education and custom, under another Form, there is a second Reason why men are so degenerous in Spirit, as to vassa­lize Themselves, and neglect the maintenance of their Liberty; and that is, a generall Corruption and Depravation of manners, by luxurious Courses, when a Nation is even swallowed up with Riot and Luxury; so that being Slaves to their owne Lusts, they become the more easily inslaved unto the Lusts of another. The Truth of this may be observed in the variation of the Roman State; which in its primitive innocence, was so sensible of Li­berty, that when Brutus and Colatinus had once expell'd the Tar­quins, the People all most readily joyned with then as one man, in defence of their Freedom; Florus. yea, they were so zealous of it for a long time, that no Relations or Considerations whatsoever of former merits, could availe with them to spare those that attempted ought against it: For, when the Sons of Brutus were found guilty of a conspiracy, to bring back the Tarquinian Fa­mily, They condemned them to death, and their own Father was as forward as any, to bring them to Execution: So the famous Manlius likewise, to whom Rome owed both her selfe and Liberty, being by him preserved against the Galls, in the greatest extremity, was notwithstanding, upon a discovery of his after-Intent to surprize their Liberty, thrown headlong down the Tarpeian Rock, within view of the Capitoll which he had so nobly defended. By which Actions you may perceive, that when Rome was in its pure estate, vertue begat a desire of Liberty, and this desire begat in them an extraordinary Courage and Resolution to defend it; which three walked a long time hand in hand together, and were the Causes, that the first Found­ders of their Freedome had so little difficulty, in maintaining themselves, against those Invasions which hapned afterward, by the Tarquins and their Royall Confederates. But in processe of Time, when the Romans had lost that ancient vertue, which pur­chased their Liberty, and an Empire over the world; being softned in their manners, and conquered by their vices whose Dominions they had conquered, they soon bowed under the [Page 42] yoke of Imperiall Tyranny; And though there appeared after­ward some sparks of ancient courage and love of liberty among Them, when They took off Caesar himselfe, Caligula, Nero, and in the end rid Themselves quite of that Tyrannicall Stock of the Caesars yet (I say) because those Sparks were kindled only in a few of the more noble Soules, and the generallity cor­rupt and degenerate from their old vertue, therefore such he­roick minds as endevoured, could by no means engage Them to assert their Liberty.

It is observable also in all times, the Northern and more manly People, that have no Acquaintance with luxurious Diets and Apparrell, nor care much to obtain Them, nor to taste of those melting Enchantments of more wanton Nations, are endued with a greater courage and Sence of Liberty; whereas those People that inhabit the delicate parts of the world (as in Asia, and other Countries, where civility hath degenerated into effe­minacy) They ever have lived, and do (for the most part) con­tinue in miserable Slavery, at the will of imperious Tyrants: And if at any time there have happen'd worthy Resolutions in ver­tuous Spirits, to recover their Freedom, They have (for the most part) failed in the Enterprise, by reason of the Corruption of their Party, which causeth men at length to decline the common Cause, through pusillanimity, Faction, Treachery, or Apostacie; being more superstitiously inclinable to adore the greatnesse of a Tyrant, Mach. l. 1. c. 17 de Repub. than really affectionate to the worth of Liberty. For this Cause it was, that in elder time, the People of Naples, Mi­lain and Florence, lost their Freedoms, as soon as they had gotten it; and of late also the Neapolitans failed in their Attempt, be­ing a soft effeminate people, easily bribed and courted out of their Designe, with Spanish Gold and Complement; whereas the Swisses, Hollanders, and divers other hardy People, stuck close to their Leaders, and by their constancy, Industry, and Zeal of Li­berty, accomplished the work.

By which parcell of discourse we may collect, whence it is, that our present Governers meet with so many difficulties and oppo­sitions from their owne Country men here in England, viz: by reason of our former education under a Monarchy, with the ge­nerall debaucheries of all sorts of People, which render them [Page 43] Admirers of the Pomp of Tyranny, and Enemies to that Freedom which hath been so dearly purchased. They are Lovers of Vanity more than of Themselves or their Country, humorous, and led with an admiration of old Customs to their owne hazard, rather than they will steer a new and reasonable Course of farre more Convenience and Commodity; so that if the Common-wealth had not a Party of its owne throughout the Nation, men of valour and vertue, free from those Corruptions of Excesse and Riot, and sensible of Liberty, it were then in reason to be expe­cted, they could not long maintain their Station: But being supported by Counsellers, grave, serious, abstemious, and vigilant, and by a Soldiery, whose valiant Commanders are severe and strict in Discipline, both Morall and Military, when I consider this, with the many other Advantages which their Enemies have not, their Foundation seems to me impregnable, and prompts me to this Omen; That being every way qualified like Eis fuit domi Industria, foris justum Imperiū, animus in consu­lendo lib [...]r; ne (que) libidini, neque delicto obnoxius. Salustius; de Catone in suâ Concione ad Ro­manos Consules. those Ro­man Spirits of old, they will be Courted and confirm'd by the Roman Fortune.

For shame or feare then (if not for love) let men forbear an opposition, and consider what an honor it is to be in the List of that Party, which have ennobled Themselves by their owne ver­tue and the love of Liberty; For, as Cato saith in Plutarch, even the greatest Kings or Tyrants are much ihferior to those that are eminent in Free-States and Common-weales; nor were those mighty Monarchs of old worthy to be compared with Epami­nondas, Pericles, Themistocles, Marcus Curius, Amilcar, Barca, &c. and other excellent Captains in Free-States, which purchased Themselves a Fame in defence of their Liberties. And though now the very name of Liberty is grown odious or ridiculous a­mong us, it having been a Stranger a long time in these parts; yet in ancient time, Nations were wont to reckon themselves so much the more noble, if they were free from the yoke of Regall Tyranny; which was the cause why there were then so many Free-States in all parts of the world. In our Country here, before the time that Caesar's Tyranny tooke place, there was no such thing as Monarchy: Caesar. Cōment. lib. 5. For, the same Caesar tells us, how the Bri­tains were divided into so many severall States; relates how Cassevellanus was, by the Common Councell of the Nation, [Page 92] elect in this their publique danger, to have the principall ad­ministration of the State, with the businesse of Warre: and af­terward how the severall Cities sent their Hostages unto him. Whereby we perceive it was of old no Monarchy, but like to the Gaules, with whom it was then one also in Religion, divided into provincall Regiments; Sam. Daniel. of the State of Britain. withont any entire rule or Com­bination; onely in case of common perill, by Invasion, &c. they were wont to chuse a Commander in Chief, much like the Dicta­tor chosen by the Romans upon the like occasion. And now we see all the Western world (lately discovered) to be, and generally all other Countries are, in puris naturalibus, in their first and most innocent condition, setled in the same Form, before they come to be inslaved, either by some predominant power from abroad, or some one among Themselves more potent and am­bitious than h [...]s Neighbors. And such was the State heretofore, not on [...]ly of our Nation, but of Gaule, Spaine, Germany, and all the West parts of Europe, before the Romans did by strength and cun­ning unlock their Liberties. And such as were then termed Kings, were but as their Generalls in War, without any other great Ju­ris [...]iction.

If we reflect likewise upon the ancient State of Italy, we find no other Forms of Government but those of Free-states and Common-weals; Mach. lib. 2. Cap. 2. as the Tuscans, Romans, Samnits, and many others; nor is there mention made of any Kings in Italy besides those of the Romans, and Porsenna. Concerning the ruine of whose Family, though Histories are silent; yet we reade, that Tuscany (whereof Porsenna was King) became afterwards a Free-State, and continued so Zealous of Liberty ever after, and such haters of Monarchy; that they denyed the Veians their assistance against the Romans, for no other reason, but because those Veians had made choice of a King to protect them in their necessity; saying, that they scorn'd to joyne with those men who had subjected themselves to the Government of a single Person.

Nor is it onely a mere gallantry of Spirit which invites men to the love of Freedome; but experience tells us it is the most commodious and profitable way of Government, conducing to the enlargement of a Nation every way in Wealth and Domini­on. [Page 93] Incredibile est memoratu; quan­tùm adepta li­bertate, in bre­ [...]i Romana Ci­vitas creverit. Salust. It is incredible to be told (saith Salust.) how exceedingly the Roman Common-wealth increased in a short time, after they had obtained their Liberty. And Guicciardin affirmes, that Deo summo­perè placent; eò quòd in iis, magis quàm in alio g [...]n [...]re Re­rumpublicarum, commune bonum conservetur, Jus suum cuique ae­qualiter distri­buatur, Civium animi vehemen­tius ad virtu­tem, &c. Fr. Guicciard. lib. 10. Hist. Free States are most pleasing to God; because that in them more regard is had to the common good, more care for impartiall distribution of Ju­stice to every man, and the minds of men are more inflamed with the love of Glory and Vertue, and become much more zealous in the love of Religion, than in any other Form of Government whatsoever. It is wonderfull to consider how mightily the Athenians were augmented both in Wealth and Power, in the space of one hundred years, after they had freed themselves from the Ty­ranny of Pisistratus; but the Romans arrived to such a height as was beyond all imagination▪ after the expulsion of their Kings. Nor doe these things happen without speciall reason, forasmuch as it is usuall in Free States to be more tender of the Publique, in all their Decrees, than of Particulars, whereas the case is other­wise in a Monarchy; because in this Forme the Princes pleasure usually weighs down all Considerations of the Common Good. And hence it is, that a Nation hath no sooner lost its Liberty, and stoopt under the yoke of an Ʋsurper, but it immediately loseth its former Lustre; the Body fills with ill humours, and may swell in Title, but cannot thrive either in Dominion or Riches, according to that proportion which it formerly enjoyed; be­cause all new Acquisitions are appropriated as the Princes Pe­culiar, and in no wise conduce to the ease and benefit of the Publique.

—It is observable likewise in the course of Hereditary Monar­chies; that though a Nation may have some respit and recruit now and then, by the Vertue and Valour of a Prince, yet this is ve­ry rare; and when it doth happen, it usually lasts no longer than his life, because his Successor (for the most part) proves more Weake, or Vicious, than himself was vertuous. For, as Dantes the Italian Poet saith,

Vertue is not transmitted from Father to Sonne, as the Sap of a Tree is from the Root to the Branches. Vertue is lost in the [Page 46] descent, Lib de Repub. 2. cap. 11. and comes not by Traduction: Therefore (Machiavel saith) Not he that placeth a vertuous Government in his owne Hands or Family, and Governs well during his naturall life, but he that establisheth a lasting Form for the Peoples constant Se­curity, is most to be commended. It is recorded in Tam obstinatè Jus suum urs [...] ­rum, ut Turci­cae perfidiae se [...]ommittere ma­lucrint, quàm Sceptris haeredi­tariis cum potiri. Besold. de Suc­cessione regia, [...]ap. 5. History, that the Hereditary course of Government was so odious to the Hun­garians, that when Ferdinand the first, King of the Romans, laid claim to that Crown, as Heir in his Wives Right, They chose ra­ther to make a League with the Turk, than subject their State to the Inconveniences of an Hereditary Succession.

The German Poet Gunther (who reduced much of Policy into Poetry) in these Verses commends the fashion of his own Coun­try, that since they had accepted the Regall or Imperiall Form of Government, they were accustomed to trust their own Judg­ments in making choice of their Emperour, rather than receive him blindly from the hand of Chance or Fortune: Nor doe I find any that think a Monarchy tolerable otherwise than upon Terms of Election, except it be Lipsius, and such partiall Pen-men as Himself, who were held in pension or relation by Hereditary Tyrants. For, besides that common Reason disswades men from taking Governers at Adventure, without respect of wisdome or vertue; so if we take a view of the miserable events of it in all Histories, it must needs deterre men from the love of such a Suc­cession: And therefore the Argument usually brought in de­fence of it, that it is the only way to prevent the Inconveniences of an Interregnum where the Heire is uncertaine, is of no validity; since it hath caused ten thousand times more bloody Disputes between Pretenders in point of Title, than ever happened in those Inter-regnall Controversies, whith have risen betwixt Com­petitors by way of Election; witness the tedious fatall Bickerings which happened in France and other Nations among Princes of the Blood, and here in England, between the two Houses of Yorke and Lancaster. It is observed also, out of the antient Roman Hi­story, [Page 47] that all those Emperors which ruled by right of Inheritance, Mach. de Rcpub▪ cap. x. proved most of them no better than savage Beasts, and all of Them wicked, except Titus; but such as were advanced by E­lection approved Themselves noble and vertuous, as you may see in those five that succeeded Nerva to Marcus: And no sooner did the Empire return again into a Course of Inheritance, but it ran to a losse, and at length to the ruine of its glory and great­nesse.

But, to wave this digression touching Hereditary and elective Monarchies, I affirm, that neither of Them are to be compared with a Free-state, nor to be admitted, unlesse it be the latter by way of Election; and then only in case of extreme necessity, as the Roman Common-wealth was wont now and then to create their temporary Dictators, Dictator was a King pro Tem­pore. into whose single Hands they trans­mitted the whole Power of ordering Affairs, in time of urgent and imminent danger, to avoid the Inconvenience of delay which might be occasioned through the variety of Opinions, and multi­plicity of Counsels: Howsoever elective Kings are found fault with, because They usually practise such Sleights, that in a short time, the Government which They received for their own Lives, becomes entailed upon their Families.

It is to be considered also, That the Kingly are not much lesse destructive, than the Levelling popular Tyrannies to gallant and worthy men.

Nor is it the worse sort of Kings or Tyrants only, that hate brave and deserving Persons; but even the most moderate, and those that seem to be the best▪ conditioned become jealous and distast­full, supposing the Fame and gallantry of their Subjects, detracts from their own estimation: And therefore They usually con­sult which way to dishonor or destroy Them; by which means men are terrified from the Love of glory and vertue. Orat. id. Epist. Philippi. De­mosthenes tells us, Philip the Macedonian was so full of vain-glory, that he would arrogate the worthy Deeds of his Friends, and other men, to himself, and make them seeme to be his owne: And he ever hated those Commanders and Governors which were victorious and successfull, more than such as were either carelesse or unfortunate. [Page 96] His Son Alexander was of the same humour too: For, when Curtius. l. 6. suae existimans quicquid cessisset alienae. Antipater had gained a victory, which he intended himself to have had the honor of, he could not forbear to utter his Indignation, reckon­ing himself injured by the merits of his Subject and Servant. And at another time, he caused Parmenio to be put to death, for no other cause, but because he hated him, being suspitious of his ex­traordinary merits. Thus the Emperour Vespasian likewise be­haved himself toward the Generall Antonius, by whose means Rome was secured from him against Vitellius, and the Imperiall Diadem placed on his head, which was no sooner done, but Vespasian, in stead of a Reward, casheered him of his Command, and all other Imployment whatsoever; so that sinking under the Burthen of his owne despaire, and the others Ingratitude, he lived not long after. In like manner, Alphonsus Albuquerquius, after he had brought most part of the East Indies under the obe­dience of his Master the King of Portugall, was sent for home; and outed of his Command, died for meer grief and sorrow. Nor did Consaluus the great or Ferdinando Cortese, fare any bet­ter for all their Services: Sepulveda. Comma ad Arist. polit. 3. c. 9. Consaluus, after he had driven the French out of the Kingdom of Naples, and subdued it to Fer­dinand of Arragon, was by him, at his coming to Naples put out of his Command, and carried into Spaine in little better condi­tion than a Prisoner, where his heart broke for griefe imme­diately. How miserable then is the condition of the most gene­rous Spirits under Tyrannous Royalty, wherein Princes count themselves dis-obliged by the bravest Actions of their Subjects! And Tacitus tells of one of the Caesars upon the like occasion, Desirui per haec fortunam suam Caesar, impa­rem (que) tan o me­rito rebatur. That he conceived it prejudiciall to his own honor and Fortune, and supposed himselfe insufficient to recompence extraordinary merits. For, good Turns seem then only acceptable to Princes, when they may be easily requited; Nam beneficia us (que) eò laeta sunt, dam videntur posse exolui: otherwise, they return Hatred in stead of Thanks. Cominaeus also reports it from Lewis of France his own mouth; That he much more loved those whom himselfe had obliged by bounty and courtesie, than such as had obliged him by their deserts.

Yea, Ubi multùm an­te [...], pro gratiá o [...]i [...]i red­ditur. Tacit. so dangerous a Thing is Vertue in Prince's Courts, that it is as much as a man's life is worth to be commended for it. And to this purpose we have a story in Polybius lib. 6. how that one Apelles being Enemy to Aratus, Annal. 4. a Favorite of King Philip the [Page 97] Macedonian, took occasion to extoll him most highly to the King, as a Person admired by all for his many rare and incom­parable Vertues, knowing this was the way to bring him out of the King's Favor; which was (saith one) a new way of revenge, and it took effect to the destruction of Aratus: For, after a while, he became so much disrelished, that the King gave him a Dose in convenient Season, which rid him away by a lingring Sicknesse. And Aratus so well understood how the Case was with him, that when his Friend Cephalon came to visit him in his Chamber, [...] and asked how it came to passe that he spit blood? O Ce­phalon (said he) these are the rewards of Kingly Friendship and Ac­quaintance. Our own Histories, and our Neighbours of France, might furnish us with Instances enough of the same nature; but at home here look no further than Harry the 8 th. and we find him ever and anon be-dabled with the Blood of the most deser­ving Persons, Plutarch. in Atato. as well as most of his Predecessors. What persecu­tion hath hapned since, is notorious to all of the meanest Rea­ding and observation; so that seeing it appears there is as little Security for the bravest Spirits, in a Regal, as in a popular Tyranny, certainly, all Persons of generous Thoughts and Resolutions are much more concerned to dislike it, and apply Themselves to the love of a Free-State; it being concluded by Aristotle the best of Governments, and is by experience known to be most conducing to the Advancement of a Nation every way in Honor, Profit, and Dominion; having ever produced many more excellent Heroes, than any other Form, upon the Stage of Action; as is evident in the Grecian, Roman, and modern Stories.

But one great Argument of exception (I perceive among some) against this Government is; because men are permitted the Freedom of their Souls and Consciences in the profession of Religion. This they conceive inconsistent with the publique Peace; that no State can be of continuance with such a Tole­ration; and that it is not agreeable to the Word of God. To the latter part of this Assertion, I answer, That prudent Tole­ration of opinions in matter of Religion could never be pro­ved yet, by any of our Episcoparians and Presbyterians, in all their VVritings, to be repugnant to the VVord; being as farre to [Page 98] seek this way, as they are to convince us of the sacred ne­cessity of a Nationall Ʋniformity. Severall Instances there are to shew, how this Common-wealth hath punished those wild Pretenders, that professe manifest Libertinism and Blasphemy; many of whom at this day are in Custody: And as long as these Ill Weeds are rooted out of the Garden of the Church, the wholesome tender Plants will thrive in Beauty and Vertue, under their severall measures, and dispensations.

And that variety of Opinions can be no way destructive of Publique Peace (as is pretended) is evident by the Customs of other Nations, both Heathen and Christian. The Joh. Leo. l. 8. Egyptians have now among them no lesse than four severall Sects, dif­fering in Doctrine and Discipline, and all derived from the Superstition of Mahomet. Yet their great Pontifes and Priests, live in amity together, void of hatred and strife; and the common People also behave themselves accordingly, without brauling or enmity. And it is usuall for the more learned sort of Them, to Dispute with each other, and defend the Opinions of their Party, which they are allowed to do with all Liberty, so long as they flie not out into language against any of the four Doctors, who were the first Patrons of those Opinions. Where­in if any chance to Offend, they are punished by Fine and Im­prisonment.

Lipsius tells us, Lips. l. adver­sus Dialogist. that in the Isle of Japan, there are no lesse than nine Religions, every man being at liberty to professe which he please: So that in the same House you might see the Husband of one Religion, the Wife of another, the Son of a third; and yet no heart-burning nor difference among them, to the distur­bance of the Family. The Turk (we see) also allows an equal Li­berty to Christians and Jews, yet his Empire hath long continued firme and Peaceable, notwithstanding the variety of Opinions tolerated among those of his own Sect, and others. The case is the same likewise in severall Christian dominions; as Poland, Transylvania, Hungary, and even in the Protestant Dominions in Germany. Yet the experiment is brought nearer home to us by our neighbours the States of Holland, who by a prudent to­leration of severall Professions, have established themselves in [Page 99] such a measure of Peace, Plently, and Liberty, as is not to be equalled by any of the Nations round about them. And the Reasons why those Nations continue in Peace, notwith­standing their difference in Religious Opinions, are confes­sed by the same Lipsius (a great Roman Catholick) to be these: First, because the Prince, and he that is the High Priest, among them, carry themselves with the same Aspect upon all, giving no Countenance to one more than another. Secondly, be­cause they severely punish such as offer to disturb their Neigh­bours about any matter relating to Religion. Thirdly, because they suffer not that Religion to be evill spoken of, which is publiquely professed by the Prince or State: whereby it is implyed, that a Toleration of different opinions in Religion, can be no prejudice to the Peace of a Nation, so long as these Rules are observed; but rather a grand Preservative of publique Quiet; whereas persecutions for matter of Religi­on have ever been all the world over the great Incentives of Sedition. And since it is of unavoidable necessity, that (while the world stands) there will be divisions of Opinion, cer­tainly such a course must needs be most rationall, which shall provide waies of remedy against such Inconveniences as may follow them, rather than Inventions of Torture and Tor­ment to thwart and stifle Them; because the understandings of men can no more be compelled than their Wills, to ap­prove what they like not. So that from hence it appears plainly, the great pretenders of Nationall Ʋniformity in Re­ligion, those high imperious Ʋniformity-mongers, that would have men take measure of all Opinions by their own, are the greatest disturbers of States and Kingdomes; and seem of the same straine with the Tyrant Mezentius, who, if his Guests were too long for his Bed, cut them shorter, and if they hapned to be too short, he had Engines of Torture to stretch them longer; being resolved to fit them all to his own measure and humour.

Severall other Objections there are against this new Govern­ment, in the mouths of many People; but they are founded upon outward Sence, more than inward Reason; they raise Ar­guments [Page 100] from those Things which are the effects of present necessity, and not of the nature of the Government it self, whereas if men would unanimously joyn in an establishment, no such necessity would be: But as now, so alwaies all alte­rations of Government (though for the better) have been declaimed against by the more ignorant sort of People, sup­posing those Burthens will remain for ever, which Governors are constrained to lay upon Them for present subsistence and security: yet it hath been ever observed likewise, that the more willing and forward People have been to settle in Peace under a new Government, the sooner they have been eased of all their Grievances and Pressures; according to that saying of Curt. apud Alex: lib. 8. Cur­tius, Obsequio mitigantur Imperia. And therefore in this case, Omnes intel­ligant, si salvi esse velint, necessitati esse parendum. Cicero adviseth all men that would be safe, to submit unto necessity.

Whence is it that Taxes continue, but from absolute ne­cessity? and this necessity is much augmented by the peevish humours of People; Cic. de offic. lib. 2. who remaining unsetled, give cause of Jealousie to the State, and of hope to their Enemies; so that they are forced to keep up an Army for security. When things stand thus, Tac. Hist. 4. Dissolutionem Imperii do­cent, si fructus sustinetur, diminuantur. Tacitus affirms there can be neither Peace nor Security without Armies, nor Armies without Pay, nor Pay without Taxes. And therefore (saith he) they aim at a de­struction of the Government, that would take away those Profits whereby the Common-wealth is supported; From whence (by the way) may be collected, what the meaning of our Levellers is, in demanding a present Release of all Taxes and Payments. And whereas great Complaint is made against the imprisoning men in unlawfull waies, and trying them by extraordinary Courts and Commissions of Justice, know that of Tacitus takes place ever upon extraordinary occasions: Tac. Annal. [...]4. Magna exempla semper habent aliquid ex iniquo, quod tamen adversus singulos utilitate publicâ rependitur. Great examples are not tyed strict­ly to the Rule; and though some particulars suffer by swer­ving from it; yet recompence is made in that Profit, which redounds to the good and safety of the Publique: For, it cannot in Reason be presumed, that such ordinary Proceedings [Page 101] as are used in times of Peace, can be sufficient to secure a Com­mon-wealth, during the necessities of Warre, at which time Inter Arme silent Leges. Laws use to be silent, and those Courses are judged most just and equitable, and have ever been allowed so by all States and States-men, which are dictated by common reason and prudence, for their necessary preservation, To this accords that of Queen Dido in Virgil, Aeneid. 2.

Therefore if men will not submit and settle, but keep the State by their obstinacy, under the necessities of warre, they must (if they plot or attempt any thing against them) expect such proceedings and consequences as attend the Sword when it is drawne: But would they close cordially in affection, and be resolved once to settle, in opposition to all Invaders, and Intruders, and let the Common-wealth have leave to take breath a little, in the possession of a firme peace, then they would soon find the Rivulets of a Free-State, much more pleasing than the troubled Ocean of Kingly Tyranny; begetting Fertility and verdure (as they run along) in all the Me­dowes, and reviving those Pastures which Royalty was wont to drown and swallow. Had they but once tasted the sweets of Peace and Liberty both together, they would soon be of the opinion of See Axiom. polit. Rich. p. 152. Herodotus and Demosthenes, that there is no diffe­rence between King and Tyrant, and become as zealous as the antient Romans were in defence of their Freedom. And though this discourse may sound like that concerning the Joyes of Heaven in the ears of ordinary people, as of Blessings afarre off; yet since it is in your power to hasten them, why stand ye off, and delay? ye may (if you please) by an unanimous obedience, quickly open the Fountains of future happinesse, that Justice may run downe as a mighty streame, [Page 102] in the Channell of the Lawes and righteousnesse and Peace im­brace each other.