THE Information you give me concerning the great Clamour that is made by some in the City against our Friend the Author of Christian Blessedness, for continuing the Charge of Schism at this time against the Separatists from the Church of England, I am the more ready to believe, be­cause I find he meets with a great deal of the like Treatment in the Country, as far as the Sphere of my Acquaintance or Intelligence rea­ches. I can hardly put my Head into any Company, but where I hear him either Passionately rail'd at by Popular uneducated Tongues, or gravely Condemn'd by those of more sober and improved Under­standings; [...] [Page] [...] [Page 1] [Page 2] who, though no Ene­mies to his Person, have yet but little Charity for his Cause. Nay, several who know nothing at all of the Book, and so cannot direct­ly and expresly condemn it, do yet shew how ready they would be upon occasion to do so, by de­claring their Judgments against the Proposition maintain'd in it.

For I find 'tis a thing generally taken for granted, that the Dissen­ters are now no longer under the guilt of Schism, however they might be charged with it before. For, say they, the Tables are now turn'd. They have now an Au­thentick Patent for their Separa­tion, and may divide from you by Authority. And therefore let your Indictment run never so high, and be otherwise never so well proved, their Liberty will be their immediate Discharge. For, Sir, [Page 3] you must know that the Tolera­tion is generally supposed to lay all in Common, to put the Church and the Conventicle upon a square, and to acquit those that Separate not only from the Penalty, but from the Fault of Non-conformity.

This Notion, I perceive, has found entertainment, not only in Vulgar Heads, (who seldom think distinctly about any thing, but confound all things, whose Dif­ference is not to be felt and hand­led,) but also among those of good Natural sense, and who have ta­ken a Turn or two of Scholastick Education, and understand some­thing of the Measures of Reason and Consequence. Particularly I find this Conceit passes very cur­rent among Ladies and Gentlemen, who, for want either of Leisure, or Ability, or Attention, seldom examine things to the bottom, [Page 4] but judge according to Outside and Appearance.

But this I do not so much won­der at, when I observe that Men of profess'd Study and considera­ble Learning are carried away with the same Fancy, which I find gets ground every day; and let me tell you, Sir, among some o­thers, besides those whose Interest is concern'd to have it true. I find some of these begin to talk very odly and untowardly in this matter, and not according to their usual Clearness, and accuracy of Judgment, which they still retain in their other Discourses. But as for the Interested Parties, they catch at this Popular Plea of the Toleration with all the greediness imaginable, and insist upon it mightily, (an Argument, by the way, that they distrust their other Defences,) and are become down­right [Page 5] impatient of the Charge of Schism, and think themselves not only highly Affronted, but greatly Wrong'd and Injured whenever they are tax'd with it, and as you know, Sir, are very angry with our Author for continuing the Charge. What? Charge us with Schism at this time of day, Now we are in Favour, Now the Go­vernment smiles upon us, Now we have the Law on our Side? &c.

How far they have the Law of their Side, will be better under­stood from what is to follow. In the mean time I with that some of those who are so incens'd against our Author, and so free in their Censures upon that part of his Book, would have took the Cou­rage to appear against him in pub­lick, which would have been a much fairer and more manly way than either to rail at him in Cor­ners, [Page 6] (which, by the way, are as little sought for by Charity as by Truth,) or to pester him with Scur­rilous and abusive Letters without Names. This argues their Fear to be as great as their Malice, and that they diffide either to their Cause, or to their Skill in mana­ging it. The truth is, they ought for their own Credit, as well as in Justice to the Author, either to have Suppress'd their Resentments, or to have Vented them in Pub­lick. Which if they had done, I dare undertake they should not have been disappointed of an Ad­versary.

But it seems they have thought fit to make use of another Method, which though not equally declara­tive of their Sense, yet with the help of a little Spelling and Colla­ting things together may serve to pick out enough of their Meaning. [Page 7] For as far as I can gather from what I observe, and from what I hear, the Sum of all that they say against our Author (bating impertinent Cavils and Foul-mouth'd Reflecti­ons) may be reduced to these three Heads:

• 1. The Falsness of his Charge.
• 2. The Uncharitableness of it.
• 3. The Unseasonableness of it.

Which Treble Censure is ground­ed upon one Common Argument, because, say they, the Dissenters are Now, by Vertue of their Tole­ration, upon Equal Terms with the Church.

But, Sir, in the First place, how can that be, when One is Esta­blish'd, and the Other only Tolera­ted? Is not Establishment more than Liberty? If by Liberty here were understood Allowance or War­rant [Page 8] to act (which is the highest Sense of the word that the Persons concern'd stand for) it would yet fall much short of Establishment, which does not only Allow or Per­mit, but Enjoyn and Require. Much more then if Liberty here be found (as I believe it will) to [...]ignifie only a Capacity of acting without Punishment. Liberty of Allowance is much short of Esta­blishment, much more Liberty of Impunity. And how then are the Church and the Dissenters upon Equal Terms?

Some therefore, who better un­derstand what they say, chuse to express themselves thus, That the Dissenters have as much Authority for their Liberty, as the Church has for her Establishment. Which implies not Absolute Equality, but only Equality of Proportion. Now this I readily admit. But what [Page 9] then? Therefore they are not guil­ty of Schism in Causelesly dividing from her Communion. I interpose the Term (Causelefly) not without reason. For if they say they have sufficient Cause for dividing from us, then they no longer stand to their Plea of Toleration, but put their Cause upon another Issue, which I think has been already suf­ficiently examin'd and exposed. But that which they stand for now by the nature of their Appeal, seems to be this, That they are not guilty of Schism, because of the Liberty they have by the To­leration, which must therefore be supposed to excuse them from Schism, though they Causelesly di­vide from us. For if they had just Cause for their Separation, then they would be excused from Schism without a Toleration, which then need not be pleaded. But this is the Plea that is now generally in­sisted [Page 10] upon for their discharge from Schism, which must therefore be understood with this Supposal, though they do Causelesly divide from the Communion of the Church. This therefore is the true and explicite State of their Plea.

The Dissenters have now as much Authority for their Liberty as the Church has for her Esta­blishment; And therefore they are not guilty of Schism in Causelesly Separating from her. Now this Consequence I utterly deny, and Affirm that such Separatists are as much guilty of Schism now, after the Toleration, as they were be­fore.

To make this Clear, we must, in the First place, distinguish between the Law it self, and the Sanction of the Law. By the Law it self here I [Page 11] understand the bare Simple Pro­position, wherein either the doing or the not doing such a thing is enacted. By the Sanction of the Law I understand those External Motives which are proposed and solemnly annex'd by the Law­giver to his Law as an ingagement to Obedience, that is, Rewards and Punishments. These Sanctions, though they are sometimes made a part of the Law, as when we say the Penal Part by way of Contra­distinction to the Preceptive; yet properly speaking, they are no part of the Law at all, but only Accessories or Appendixes pruden­tially added to it, as Expedients for the better inforcement of Obe­dience. The Law if self is wholly compleated in the Proposition, from which the Sanction is as much distinct as the Hedge is from the Inclosure, or the Ground which it incloses.

[Page 12] This Distinction naturally leads us into another, as being depen­dent upon it. For if the Sanction be a distinct thing from the Law, then we must also, 2dly, distin­guish between the Abolishing of the Sanction and the Abolishing of the Law, and between the Suspen­sion of the Sanction and the Suspen­sion of the Law, and much more yet between the Suspension of the Sanction and the Abolishment of the Law. If the Law and the Sancti­on were one and the same thing, yet the Suspension of the Sanction could not be an Abolishment of the Law, because Suspension is not Abolishment. Much less then can the Suspension of the Sanction be an Abolishment of the Law up­on the Supposition of their Dif­ference. These things therefore ought carefully to be distinguisht.

[Page 13] From the Distinctions premised, this Conclusion will necessarily a­rise, That the Directive or Precep­tive part of the Law may still re­main in force, though the Penal part (I speak according to Com­mon use) be removed, whether it be by Abolishment or by Suspen­sion. For since the Preceptive and the Penal part are supposed to be wholly distinct, 'tis impossible that a Change made in the One should at all affect the Other, unless you could suppose some Connexion or other to intercede between them. As for instance, the Soul and Bo­dy being supposed to be Substan­ces really distinct, 'tis impossible that a Change in the One should at all affect the Other, unless there were such a Law of Connexion be­tween them, that Certain Thoughts in the Soul should raise Certain Motions in the Body, and that [Page 14] Certain Motions in the Body should occasion Certain Thoughts in the Soul, which is what we call the Vital Union between Soul and Bo­dy. In like manner say I concern­ing the Preceptive and the Penal part of the Law, that upon Sup­position of their real distinction 'tis impossible that a Change in the One should at all affect the Other, unless there should happen to be such a declared Connexion be­tween them by the Will of the Legislative, that upon the Ceasing of the One, the Other also should Cease; or unless the Nature of the thing infer the Necessity of it. Neither of which may be pretend­ed in the present Case, as I shall have Occasion to shew in the Pro­cess of this Argument. At present I suppose it, and do therefore say that the Preceptive part of the Law may, and will still remain in force, though the Penal part (which [Page 15] is distinct from it) be remov'd.

Whence it will further follow, that the Preceptive part of the Law does at present actually re­main in full force. For all that a Toleration does or can do, is on­ly to remove the Penalty, where there is an Establisht National Church. It is not there a Liberty of Allowance, but only a Liberty of Impunity. I say where there is an Establisht National Church. For indeed where there is no Legal E­stablishment for the Publick Exer­cise of Religion, a Toleration would be a Liberty of Allowance, (I mean as far as the State or Ci­vil Law can give an Allowance in this matter;) but where there is such an Establishment, there it can only be a Liberty of Impuni­ty. There it only suspends or takes away for a time the Penal part, which will not excuse from [Page 16] transgressing against the Precep­tive, which, where-ever there is a National Establishment, still Lives, Breathes, Speaks, Commands, and Obliges too under Sin, though not under Civil Penalty.

Every one knows, that has ei­ther Read or Thought any thing about the Nature of Laws, that a Toleration is very much short of a Dispensation. But now a Dispen­sation does not Abolish the Precept of the Law, much less then may a Toleration be supposed able to do it. Indeed a Dispensation does some way affect the Preceptive part of the Law, and that is it whereby it exceeds a Toleration. It is indeed a present Suspension of it, not an absolute thorough Suspension, but a Suspension with relation to such a particular Per­son or Action, in respect of which, the present Course of the Law is [Page 17] interrupted. But now a Tolera­tion does not so much as affect the Preceptive part of the Law, it has no manner of effect upon it, much less can it Abolish it, or Null the the Obliging force of it. All there­fore that it can do is only to re­move the Penalty.

And this is the true Difference, and perhaps the Only one that can be assigned between a Dispensation and a Toleration. A Dispensation does, for the present, and to some intents and purposes, bind up or suspend the Preceptive part of the Law, and interrupts the Authori­tative and Obliging Power of it, and thereby makes it not only con­sistent with Impunity, but with In­nocency to act against it. For it makes the Law as no Law with re­spect to the Person or Persons dis­pens'd with, and for the time while they are dispens'd with. But now [Page 18] a Toleration does not pass any such Effect (indeed not any at all) upon the Preceptive part of the Law. It neither strikes it, nor is levell'd at it. All the Execution that it does, or is design'd to do, is upon the Penal part, which in­deed for the time is wholly re­mov'd by it. So that a Dispen­sation does as much exceed a To­leration, as an Abrogation does a Dispensation. In that a Dispen­sation does do no more than Sus­pend the Preceptive part, it falls short of an Abrogation, which Ab­solutely and Universally removes it. And in that it does so much, it exceeds a Toleration, which on­ly takes off the Penalty, without so much as touching either the Substance or the Vertue of the Law.

And though this be clear and plain enough by the Evidence of its own Light; yet, I confess, 'tis [Page 19] some satisfaction to me, and it may be more so to others who set a greater value upon Authorities than I do, to find so great and so well-approv'd a Judge of the Ab­stract and general Reason of Law as the Celebrated Suarez to be of the same Judgment with me in this matter. For, says he, in Lib. 6. cap. 11. p. 386. his Book De Legibus, speaking of the Effects of a Dispensation of a Humane Law, Dispensation plus est quam Permissio, & Permissio proprie sumpta & se­cundum Communem usum, non est Dispensatio. Aliquando enim permit­tere non aliud significat quam volun­tarie non impedire, quod non est Dis­pensare. Nam Deus permittit Pec­catum, in quo non Dispensat. Aliter vero permittere significat idem quod sinere impune operari malum, ut in Republica dicuntur aliqua peccata per­mitti; Et quando id fit ex decreto Legis, dicitur permissio esse Legis ef­fectus. [Page 20] Illa vero non relaxat Legem, quandoquidem non excusat Culpam, quam propria Dispensatio tollit. Et ideo neque illa dicetur Dispensatio. A Dispensation is more than a Per­mission or Toleration (for 'tis all one, both as to the import of the word, and Suarez's constant way of using it) and a Permission properly ta­ken, and according to Common use is not a Dispensation. For sometimes to permit signifies no other than voluntarily not to hinder, which is not to Dispense. For God does permit Sin in which he does not Dispense. Some­times again to permit signifies the same as to suffer the doing of an Evil with Impunity, as some Sins are said to be permitted in a Com­mon-wealth. And when this is done by vertue of a legal Decree, then such a Permission is said to be the Effect of the Law. But this does not relax the Law, in as much [Page 21] as it does not excuse the Fault, which a proper Dispensation takes away. And therefore neither may this be said to be a Dispensation.

Suarez here distinguishes of a twofold Sufferance or Toleration; the Suffering an Evil to be done, or the bare not hindering the do­ing of it, and the Suffering it to be done with Impunity. And both these he sets below a Dispensation. The former kind of Toleration is the least that can be imagin'd, and indeed is so little as to be consistent with the strictest Kind or State of Government that is. All Gover­nours do Tolerate at this rate, even God himself, who, as He says, does permit or not hinder the commit­ting of Sin. The latter kind of Toleration is a degree above the former, as adding to it the doing with Impunity. And this indeed is too much to consist with the [Page 22] Strictness of Government, and therefore is not used in every Kind or State of it. Neither God nor Man do always Tolerate after this manner. For indeed it is a Relaxa­tion of the Government, not as to the Legislative, but only as to the Executive part of it. But though it be so much greater than the for­mer sort of Toleration, yet it is al­so at the same time as much less than a Dispensation, in that a Dis­pensation does, in some respects, wholly suspend even the very Ob­ligation of the Law, which a To­leration does not so much as Re­lax, or any way Affect, but only Suspends the Penalty annex'd to the Transgression of it. So that though it be some Mitigation of the Government, and thereby ex­ceeds a bare simple Permission, yet it is no Abatement of the Law, and therein falls short of a Dispen­sation.

[Page 23] The short of this matter is, All Permission may be consider'd ei­ther as of Right, or of Fact. Per­mission of Right is the same with a Dispensation, which disarms the Law of its present Authority and Obligation, and makes it no Fault to do otherwise than is Command­ed. Permission of Fact is two­fold, either the bare suffering or not hindering the doing of an Evil, which may be call'd a Simple Per­mission. Or the suffering it to be done without Punishment, which is a Toleration. This Latter Per­mission, though it be greater than the immediately preceding, yet 'tis as much less than the First, as reaching no higher than the Sancti­on, whereas that puts a present restraint upon the very Power of the Law.

[Page 24] This I take to be a true and distinct Idea of a Toleration, both as it is in its own proper nature, and as it stands in relation to o­ther Changes that concern the Ad­ministration of the Law. From whose Authority and Obligation it does not in the least diminish, but only lays a restraint upon the Execution of it. It does not de­vest the Law of any part of her Sovereignty, but only Sheaths up her Sword of Discipline; it does not Silence her Voice, but only Stays her Hand. In short, there is no­thing more nor less in it, than a Suspension of the Penal part of the Law.

This is all that it can do, and perhaps more than it ought. For I be­lieve there ought to be no such thing as a Toleration, and that 'tis more than either the Church or the State [Page 25] can rightfully grant. For not to insist upon that Trust which seems to be repos'd in them, to defend and secure both Unity of Faith and Unity of Worship; if there ought to be a Toleration, then there ought to be no Establishment, (for to what purpose is an Establish­ment, whose Order must never be executed?) But 'tis a strange thing if Human Laws may not be al­low'd to oblige to the same thing to which the Divine Law is ac­knowledg'd to Oblige, that is, to Ecclesiastick Unity. Which because required by the Divine Law, ought also to be required by Human Laws, and consequently there ought to be no such thing as a Toleration. And besides, those that say there ought, seem to me to be guilty of a Contradictory, Self-inconsistent Proposal, and not rightly to understand what they would have. For if they will have [Page 26] Liberty of Conscience granted to any, then certainly the Supreme Authority of the Nation must be allow'd this Liberty. And then let us suppose (as well we may) that he thinks himself Obliged in Duty and Conscience to use the Power that is in his hands to sup­press all Religions but the true one, that is, all but that which he himself conceives to be true. And what then will become of the To­leration? Nor ought the Magi­strate to be blamed for so doing. For having once allow'd in gene­ral that every Man ought to have Liberty of Conscience, you ought not to think it hard that the Ma­gistrate assumes this Liberty of acting according to his Conscience, though by doing so he restrains and hinders yours, as he certainly will in case he make use of the same Liberty. So that Absolute and Universal Liberty of Consci­ence [Page 27] is a down-right, contradicto­ry, inconsistent Supposition; which one Consideration, by the way, is sufficient to overthrow all that a Late Author has pleaded in its behalf.

But I shall pursue this no fur­ther, as being only a Digression from my Present Concern. What I stand for now, is this, That a To­leration, when it is granted, im­plies no more than only a Remo­val of such Penalties as the Law would otherwise inflict upon those who Disobey it. That it does not either Abrogate, or Suspend, or Dispense with the Law, but on­ly bridles and reins up the Execu­tion of it. All which is to be un­derstood with the fore-mention'd Condition, where there is an Esta­blish'd National Church.

[Page 28] And this (notwithstanding the Toleration) is the present Case in England, where there is a Church Establisht by the Law of the Land, and invested with several Tempo­ral as well as Ecclesiastick Rights and Priviledges, where the Pub­lick Liturgy stands Authorized by several Acts of Parliament, where Articles of Religion and Constitu­tions and Canons Ecclesiastical are also Confirm'd by the same Autho­rity, where the Acts of Uniformity remain unrepeal'd as before, and where even the Dissenters them­selves are all required to pay Tithes to the Publick and Legally­appointed Ministry. Which is al­so a plain and certain Argument that they are required to attend upon it, and conform to it. For is it imaginable that the Laws should Oblige them to Contribute their part to the Support and Mainte­nance [Page 29] of that Worship, to which they do not enjoyn them to Con­form? This would be against the very Supposition of an Establish­ment, and would place the Church and the Conventicle up­on an equal ground indeed, that is, it would make neither of them Establisht, but both only Tolerated. But they confess the Church to be Establisht, and so indeed she is as much as ever; and therefore the only Change made by the Toleration is, that the Penal part of the Law is, for the present, laid aside. As for the Preceptive, that stands where it did, and Obliges under Sin, though not under Civil Penalty.

And if so, then those who now divide from this Church Establisht by Law, which Law does also re­quire their Communion with it, are true and proper Transgressors [Page 30] against the Law; and if they do it Causelesly, are also guilty of the Breach of Church-Unity, that is of Schism, notwithstanding any Pub­lick Order for the not inflicting the Punishment otherwise due to them for so transgressing. This cannot excuse them either from Disobedi­ence to the State, or from Schism in the Church, with whose Esta­blishment they are still Obliged to Conform as far as Lawfully they may, though not accountable to the Law for their Non-conformity. Thus the Jews were justly taxable with disobedience to their Law in the matter of Arbitrary Divorce, though for some Prudential Rea­sons tolerated in the Practice of it by Moses their Chief Magistrate. The Effect of which Toleration (as our Saviour himself expounds it) was not Innocency, but only Impunity.

[Page 31] Against what has been hitherto discours'd, I know but of one Ob­jection that a Man would not be Ashamed to Urge, or Impertinent to Answer, or that deserves the Expence of Ink and Paper. But there is another which I must first take in my way, because 'tis thrown upon me, and is very loud and im­portunate for Satisfaction, which must therefore, I think, be given it for quietness sake.

In the first place then it is plead­ed, that this is no Ordinary Tolera­tion. That it is not a bare Supine Neglect to animadvert, a kind of Drowise fit, or Nodding of the Go­vernment, no, nor a design'd and deliberate Connivance only, nor yet a Private act of Indulgence declared by the Will and in the Name of the Prince alone; But that 'tis an Indulgence granted and [Page 32] setled by an Act of the whole Le­gislative, by the joint Concurrence of King and Parliament, that 'tis a Toleration by Law, by the same Law upon which the Church it self is erected, and by which it stands. This is the Common Popular Ob­jection, and there is not a Woman, or a Shop-keeper, but what is Big with it.

Now I grant the Dissenters that they have a Toleration setled by Law, and that therefore this is no Ordinary Toleration, and I know they are not a little puffed up with it. And by the way, Sir, 'twould make even a very grave Man smile to see how those Men who have been hi­therto such Despisers and Vilifiers of a National Establishment, are now lifted up with the Conceit of a Na­tional Liberty. Of what advantage this may prove either to them­selves, or to the Nation, or to the [Page 33] general Interest of Religion, I leave to wiser Heads to Conjecture, and to Time to shew; but in the mean while I fancy this their Plea, from the Extraordinariness of the Tole­ration, will do 'em but little ser­vice. For 'tis the unhappiness of this Objection that it proceeds upon a wrong State of the Questi­on. The Question is not concern­ing either the Kind or the Degree of the Authority, but concerning the Nature and the Extent of the Grant; not by what they are Au­thorized, but to what, whether to act Allowedly and with Innocence, or only Unrestrainedly and with Impunity? And to what purpose then do they insist upon the Great­ness of the Authority?

If it be said, that this is no Mi­staking the State of the Question, but an Inferring the thing denied, viz. Liberty of Allowance, from [Page 34] the Greatness of that Authority whereby this Solemn Toleration is granted: I Answer, that then the Inference is grosly False and Illogi­cal. 'Tis certainly a very plea­sant way of Arguing, to infer the greater extent of the Grant from the Greatness of the Authority whereby it is made, as if a Lesser Grant might not be the Effect of a Greater Authority.

Suppose that instead of Moses, God himself had been the Author of the Toleration concerning Ar­bitrary Divorce among the Jews. This Toleration was indeed given by Moses without any Divine Com­mission for it, as far as appears. But suppose it had been given by God himself. It will be readily granted that such a Toleration as this would have been of much greater Authority than the other, indeed of the greatest in the World. [Page 35] But would it therefore have been to any higher Purpose or greater Effect? No, that does not follow. Moses his Toleration reacht as far as Impunity, and a Divine one would have reacht no further. It would not have produc'd any o­ther Effect, though perhaps it might have been a further Security and Establishment of the same. Though the Authority it self be Greater, yet the thing granted by that Au­thority may be the same that is otherwise granted by a Lesser; and if there be nothing else in the Business but only a greater Degree of Authority, it must and will be so. And thus 'tis in the Case be­fore us. Though a Toleration by Act of Parliament be of greater Authority than a Toleration by the sole Will and Pleasure of the Prince, yet it is not to a greater Effect. And though the Diffenters have now as much Authority for [Page 36] their Liberty, as the Church has for her Establishment, yet 'tis only for Liberty, that is, (as appears by what has been said) Impunity.

When therefore 'tis pleaded that this is no Ordinary Toleration, 'tis plain that there is a double mean­ing in the Proposition. It may be understood either as to the Authority of it, or as to the Effect of it. If as to the Authority, that indeed is true, but nothing at all to the purpose, as being beside the State of the Question. If as to the Ef­fect, that I affirm and have shewn to be false. The Effect of this To­leration reaches not an Inch fur­ther than that of a less Solemn One would have done; perhaps, con­sidering some particular Restricti­ons whereby it is qualify'd, not so far. But to be sure it cán extend no further, the greatest Effect of both being only Exemption from [Page 37] Punishment. So that you see this Objection is quite disarm'd, and indeed is too weak and empty to abide any longer Trial.

The truth is, I should not have kept it so long under Examination, were it not for the Popularity of it, and that great Noise that is made about it. 'Tis not its Mo­ment, but its Importunity that has procured it so full a Hearing. For indeed in it self it is weak and silly enough. Though yet I think it is the Best by much that is used, or that the Men I am dealing with have Invention enough to urge. But I will be so kind to them, for once, as to put a Better Objection into their hands; and if they think I do not propose it enough to their advantage, let them take it and manage it themselves.

[Page 38] You may please to remember, Sir, that a little further backward, speaking of the Distinction that is between the Sanction of the Law, and the Law it self; I said 'twas impossible that a Change in the One should at all affect the Other, unless there were a Connexion be­tween them, arising either from the declared Will of the Legislative, or from the Nature of the thing it self.

Now in this I may seem to have laid a Foundation for a very strong Objection. For it may be pleaded that there is such a Con­nexion, not from the Will of the Legislative declaring such a depen­dence between the Law and the Sanction, that upon the Ceasing of one, the other also shall Cease: This, I suppose, will not be pre­tended, nor do I see any room for such a Pretence. But from the [Page 39] very Nature of the thing it self so requiring.

For it may be said, that although the Sanction of the Law be, as we have shewn, a Distinct thing from the Law it self, that is, the Penal part from the Preceptive, yet it is Essential and Necessary to the Ob­ligation of it. And therefore that which removes the Sanction, does also by Consequence remove the Obligation of the Law; And con­sequently since a Toleration (as is acknowledg'd) removes the Sancti­on of the Law, it does also by Vertue of that remove the Obliga­tion of it, the Latter not being a­ble to stand without the Former, any more than the Body is to live without the Soul.

I confess if the Sanction of the Law were necessary to the Obliga­tion of it, then notwithstanding [Page 40] all the real Difference that is be­tween them, that which takes a­way the Sanction, would also un­hinge the Obligation, as that which takes away the Soul destroys also the Life of the Body; and conse­quently the Toleration, by taking away the Sanction, must of necessi­ty be allow'd to take away the Obligation too. In this there can be no great Difficulty, or Dispute. All the Question will be concern­ing the Leading Proposition, whe­ther the Sanction of the Law be necessary to the Life and Obliga­tion of it. Here will be the last Pinch of the Difficulty, as will be better discern'd, if we Analyze the Argument, by Casting it into a Lo­gical Form and Order; wherein it will appear thus:

If the Toleration takes away the Sanction of the Law, it also takes away the Obligation of it.

[Page 41] But according to you it takes a­way the Sanction of the Law;

Therefore it takes away the Obligation.

The Consequence is denied, and thus proved;

That which takes away the Sanc­tion, takes away the Obligation:

Therefore if the Toleration takes away the Sanction, it also takes a­way the Obligation.

The Antecedent is denied, and thus proved:

If the Sanction of the Law be Necessary to the Obligation of it, then that which takes away the Sanction, takes away the Obliga­tion.

[Page 42] But the Sanction is Necessary, &c.

Here the Consequence is granted, but the Minor is denied;

Which was the Head and Knot of the Objection, and whose Truth comes now to be Examin'd.

It is a Common Question among Moralists, Civilians, and Casuistical Divines, Vtrum Sanctio Paenalis sit de Essentia sive de Ratione Legis? Whether a Penal Sanction be of the Essence or Reason of the Law? By which, I suppose, they do not mean, as the terms seem to im­port, whether it be of the inward Form and Constitution of the Law, (for 'tis plain that it is not;) but whether it be a Necessary Conditi­on to the Obligation of it, the same thing that is now under Considera­tion.

[Page 43] I do not remember that Suarez takes any notice of this matter, which I cannot but wonder at in a Person that undertakes a just and adequate Account of the Nature of Laws, and who often descends to the discussion of Points of much lesser moment. Though what his Judgment was in the Case, may be sufficiently Collected from what he discourses Lib. 1. c. 20. p. 53. concerning the several ways whereby Laws may suffer a Change. Among which I do not find that he has any Mention of the Removal of the Penalty, which he could not have omitted, if he had thought that the Sanction of the Law was necessary to its Obli­gation. For then the Removal of it would have caus'd either an Ab­rogation or a Suspension in the Law, as is urg'd in the Objection. But the Question is not so over­lookt [Page 44] by Others; and they gene­rally answer in the Negative, that the Sanction is not Necessary to the Obligation of the Law. I say generally. For I know there are some few that say that it is Neces­sary, and that the Law is but a mere dead Letter, a Body without a Soul, if it have no Sanction. Nay there are some that advance one step higher, and say that the Sancti­on is not only necessary to the Ob­ligation of a Law, but that it de­rives its whole Obligation from the Sanction.

That the Latter of these Asser­tions is not true, is, I think, as cer­tain as I would desire any thing to be. For I consider, that if the Law derived its whole Obligation from the Sanction, then these grand Ab­surdities (not to mention any o­ther) would unavoidably follow.

[Page 45] First, That any Law would Ob­lige, let the Matter of it be never so wicked and unjust, or the Au­thority whereby 'tis made never so incompetent, provided it were arm'd with a sufficient Sanction. For the Sanction being supposed to be the only Fountain of Obliga­tion, that being present, and in such measure as is requisite, the Obligation must needs follow, as every Effect does upon the Being of its intire and adequate Cause.

Secondly, It would also follow, that no Law could oblige constant­ly, unless it were backt with the greatest Penalty that is absolutely possible. For since the Law is supposed to have all its Obligation from the Penalty, then where there is the greater Penalty, there will be the greater Obligation; and consequently if the Case should so [Page 46] happen, that a Man should threaten me if I do not transgress the Law, with a greater Punishment than the Law does in case I do, I am then discharged from the Obliga­tion of the Law, (as being under a greater Obligation) and may innocently transgress it, though it were the Law even of God him­self. Which at one blow would strike off the constant Obligation of the whole Jewish Law. For the Law of the Jews being ratify'd and confirm'd to them only by Tem­poral Penalties, and those not al­ways the greatest, even of the same Kind and Order; if a Jew should happen to be tempted to trans­gress the Law (as he easily might) by a greater Punishment than the Law would inflict upon him for transgressing it, upon this supposi­tion, that the Law receives its Ob­ligation from the Penalty, it would follow, that he would be released [Page 47] from the Obligation of his Law, which I think is Absurd enough. But to this I further add:

Thirdly, If the Law be to re­ceive its Obligation from the Sanc­tion, then we must suppose it there­fore to Oblige, because it makes it Reasonable or Eligible for a Man to do so or so that he may avoid such a Punishment, for that is all the engagement to action that the Sanction can be supposed to add. But if this be all, this is not to Ob­lige in Duty, but only in Point of Prudence, which indeed is not properly to Oblige at all, since o­therwise all rational Inducements would be Laws. Indeed the Pro­posal of a Penalty may be a good Ground of Perswasion why a Man should do so as the Law directs. But it can be no more, it cannot lay an Obligation upon the Con­science, or make it Sin to do o­therwise. [Page 48] It may move, deter­mine, and in some Cases secure the Choice, but it cannot Oblige the Will.

To say therefore that the Law Obliges by and from the Sanction, is in effect to say that it does not Oblige at all, since then it could Oblige only by way of Persuasion and rational Inducement, which indeed is not strictly and properly to Oblige. The truth is, upon this Supposition the most Excellent Law of the most Sacred Authority in the World would Oblige no other­wise than the Demand of a Thief upon the High-way. The Thief bids me Deliver, or he'll Pistol me. The Law bids me do thus, or I shall be Punish'd. I yield up my Money to the Thief, to avoid being Pistol'd; and I yield my Obedience to the Law, to avoid being Pu­nish'd. 'Tis possible here that the [Page 49] Motive of Action in both Cases may be the same, viz. the avoid­ing of Evil. But I hope no-body will be so Gross as to say, that the Obligation in both Cases is alike too; that the Law Obliges no o­therwise than the Command of a Thief when he comes to Rob me. And yet this must be said, if it be true, that the Law has its Obliga­tion from the Sanction; for then 'tis plain, that all its Obligation comes to this, That it makes it rea­sonable and eligible for me to do such an Action to avoid such an E­vil, and so does the Thief.

Fourthly, If the Law Obliges purely in Vertue of the Sanction, then 'twill follow, that the Law will Oblige no further, than the Sanction reaches; Consequently it will not Oblige the Supreme Ma­gistrate, who is acknowledged not to be subject to the Sanction of the [Page 50] Law. But this is more than the greatest Sticklers for Prerogative will allow, and indeed is against the general Sense of the greatest Masters of Law, whether Common or Civil, who generally yield the Supreme Magistrate to be under the Directive, though not under the Coercive Power of the Law. And if so, then the Preceptive does not Oblige by Vertue of the Coer­cive, since 'tis allow'd to Oblige where the Coercive does not reach.

Fifthly, This Hypothesis of the Law's receiving its Obligation from the Sanction, will, in the Conse­quence of it, make all Laws pure­ly Penal, that is, such as do not oblige Absolutely, to the Fact, but only Conditionally, either to the Fact or to the Penalty; and which therefore are equally satisfy'd ei­ther by doing what is Express'd, or by suffering what is Intail'd upon [Page 51] the Omission of it. For if the Law be supposed to Oblige by Vertue of the Penalty which it proposes, then its Obligation comes to this, That I must do such a thing, be­cause otherwise I must suffer such a Punishment; which is as much as to say, that if I do not such a thing, I must suffer such a Punishment; which will again at last be resolv'd into this, that either I must do so, or suffer so; which though it Ob­liges me Disjunctively, leaves me at full Liberty as to the Determina­tion of my Choice. Which expresses the true Form and Nature of a pure Penal Law. But I suppose it will not be said that all Laws are purely Penal. For then there would be no Sin but only where the Pe­nalty is declined or resisted; the Consequence of which again would be, that all the Sin that is in the World would only be against Hu­man Laws; and that there would [Page 52] be no such thing as Sinning against God, because the Divine Justice can neither be evaded nor resisted. Which is a Consequence that would make strange Alterations, and in­troduce as strange Confusions in the System of the Moral and In­tellectual World.

Sixthly and Lastly, If the Obli­gation of the Law proceeded from the Sanction, then 'twould follow, that I am therefore Obliged to do, because I must Suffer for not do­ing: But this is so far from being true, that the Reverse of it is so. For I must therefore Suffer for not doing, because I was Obliged to do. For I must Suffer, because I Sinn'd, otherwise my Suffering would be unjust. And I could not Sin if I were not under an Obligation; which being thus Pre-supposed and Antecedent to the Necessity of un­dergoing the Penalty, (which is [Page 53] what I call the Sanction,) cannot possibly be founded upon it, or proceed from it.

This last Argument proves not only that the Law does not derive its whole Obligation from the Sanc­tion, but also that no Part or De­gree of it is thence derived. For if the whole Obligation be (as is supposed) Antecedent to the Pe­nalty, then 'tis plain that no part of it is or can be derived from it. To which I further add, That the End of the Sanction is to move and engage Men to pay that Obedience to the Law which they owe. 'Tis indeed one of the forcible and vio­lent ways of recovering a Debt, a Debt which Men owe to the Law, and which, if they did not owe it, could not be justly exacted from them under a Penalty. Here then is Duty and Obligation supposed (in Order of Nature at least) as An­tecedent [Page 54] to the Sanction, and to which the Sanction is to serve as a Means to the End. And therefore 'tis most certain (if there be any thing so in the Measures of Reason­ing) that the Law does not derive its Obligation, nor any Part or Degree of it from the Sanction. And this I take to be Vertually at least contain'd in those well-known Words of the Apostle, Wherefore ye must needs Rom. 13. be Subject, not only for Wrath, but also for Conscience sake. There is, I know, some Dispute concerning the Meaning, and concerning the Ex­tent of the former Clause; but what­ever be meant by Subjection here, and how far soever it is to extend, this in the mean time is certain, that this Subjection, whatever it be, is by the Apostle press'd from a dou­ble Principle, Wrath and Conscience, which he plainly distinguishes one from another, as two different [Page 55] Grounds and Inducements to Sub­jection. Ye must needs be subject not only for Wrath, but also for Con­science; that is, not only to avoid Punishment, but also out of a Sense of Duty and Obligation. Which being here made not only a distinct, but a further degree of Argument for Subjection, 'tis plain that in the judgment of the Apostle the Obli­gation of the Law is not from the Sanction; because if so, he need on­ly have said, Ye must be subject for Wrath, which would have been suf­ficient as including the other. But whereas he makes a Contradistinc­tion between them, 'tis evident that he that is subject only for Wrath, is not subject for Conscience; and consequently that Obligation in Conscience does not proceed from Wrath, but from some other Prin­ciple.

[Page 56] If it be then demanded, Whence does the Law receive its Obligati­on? I answer first, that 'tis enough for my present purpose to have shewn that it does not receive it from the Sanction. But if a more positive Answer must be given, I say that the Law has its Obligation from the Authority of the Law­giver, who by vertue of his Autho­rity has a Right to be Obey'd, and to exact Obedience by Punishments in all his just Commands.

And this they will at length be driven to acknowledge, who de­rive the Obligation of the Law from the Sanction. For when they say that the Law obliges by and from the Sanction, they must be un­derstood to mean if their Sense be drawn out more at length, that the Law obliges me to do so, because it obliges me to suffer for not doing [Page 57] so: But pray how comes the Law to oblige me to the Latter, to suf­fer for not doing so? Is this by ver­tue of any other Sanction? But so we might run on to Infinity. It must be therefore by something else. And what should that be but the Authority of the Law-giver? And if this be thought sufficient to Au­thorize the Sanction, why should it not also Authorize the Law?

If it be further askt, whence has the Law-giver his Authority? I answer, If he be a Creature, he has it from God, whom I suppose to be the sole Fountain of all Power. But if the Law-giver be God, he has it Originally and Independent­ly in himself. But whether it be by the more Super-eminency of his Na­ture, as some say, or by the Bene­fit of Creation, as others, let them dispute that abound with more lei­sure than I do, and want better employment.

[Page 58] But though the Sanction does not give the Law its Obligation, or any part of it, may it not however be necessary to it? Yes, if made so by the Will of the Legislator (as I said before) Establishing such a Connexion between them, that up­on the Ceasing of the One, the O­ther also shall cease. But not in any wise from the Nature of the thing. For if it be of it self Necessary, it must either be as a Cause, or as a Condition. That it is not Necessary as a Cause, we have sufficiently proved already, by shewing that it has no part in effecting or produ­cing the Obligation of the Law. If therefore it be Necessary, it must be Necessary as a Condition. But that it is not, I will now briefly shew.

By a Condition I understand that, which though it has no Causal in­fluence [Page 59] upon the Effect, yet it so determines the Efficient Cause to act, as that without it it will not act. As for instance, the opening of a Window, though it be not the Cause of inlightning the Room, (for it does not Efficiently inlighten it,) yet 'tis the Condition of it, as being that without which the Sun will not inlighten it. Or to come some­what nearer home, the Promulga­tion of a Law, though it be not the Efficient Cause of its Obligation, yet it is the Condition of it, as being that without which the Law will not oblige. Now the Question is, Whether the Sanction of the Law be in this sense necessary to the Obligation of it?

To which I answer, By no means For since the Obligation of the Law is supposed to owe its Birth not to the Sanction of it, but to other Causes (which has been proved al­ready) [Page 60] there can be no manner of reason pretended why the Sanction would be a Condition necessary to the actual obliging of it, but only as it may be esteemed a Sign that such a Proposition is the Will of the Le­gislator. For the Law having its whole and full Authority within its self independently on the Sanction, needs only a publick Sign that 'tis indeed the Will of such a Power to make it actually Obliging. If therefore the Sanction be neces­sary, it must be necessary as a Sign. But that end being already suffi­ciently answer'd and satisfied by the Promulgation of the Law, it cannot pretend to any such necessity, and therefore to none at all. And ac­cordingly we see, that even a so­lemn Promulgation it self, when it ceases to be necessary as a Sign, ceases absolutely to be necessary, as appears in the Instance of the Law of Nature; which because it [Page 61] may be and is otherwise known, than by a solemn Publication of it, renders that Circumstance wholly unnecessary.

The sum is, if the Sanction be necessary, it is necessary as a Pub­lick Sign, that being the only thing supposed to be further wanting, where the Law is otherwise suffi­ciently Authentick. But it is not necessary on that Account, because of the Promulgation, which fully and directly serves to that End. And therefore it is not at all neces­sary.

But may not the Sanction be ne­cessary as a Sign, where the Law is not promulgated? To this I an­swer, First, That the Fate of the present Cause is not concern'd in the issue of this Question, our Laws being sufficiently promulgated. But suppose it were concern'd, it need [Page 62] fear no danger from it. For the Question proceeds upon a contra­dictory Supposition. It supposes the Law to be promulgated and not promulgated at the same time. For if the Sanction be necessary as a Sign, then it must make the first discovery of the Law, which till then must not be supposed to be known. And yet it must too, and that before the Sanction can pre­tend to be a Sign. For the Sanction cannot pretend to that Office till 'tis known; and it cannot be known till after the Law is known. For to know the Sanction, is to know that such a Penalty is by the Law annexed to such an Action, which presupposes the Law to be known. And how then can the Sanction be necessary as a Sign, where the Law is not promulgated? The very Supposition implies a Contradiction. Whence I further conclude, That 'tis impossible that [Page 63] a Sanction should ever be necessary as a Sign to the Obligation of the Law; which as it receiv'd not its Obligation from it, so it may and will oblige without it, since from what has been discours'd, it clearly appears that it is no way necessary to the Obligation of the Law, ei­ther as a Cause, or as a Condition.

I say, to the Obligation of it. For I do not deny but that a Sanc­tion is very necessary to the Inforce­ment, and better Success of the Law; and that therefore 'tis very expedient that all Laws should have their Sanctions; partly that by them the greatness of the Obliga­tion may be rated and estimated (it being the general Prudence of Law-givers to annex greater Penal­ties to more concerning and impor­tant Precepts) and partly that by them Men might be the more easily and securely contain'd within the [Page 64] Limits of their Duty; which with­out some Penal Restraint every little appearance of Interest would tempt them to transgress.

And yet even this is only an Ac­cidental Necessity, introduc'd by the badness of the World. For were Men as they shou'd be, Wise and Good (which till the Millen­nium I despair to see) they would discern and be satisfy'd of the Rea­son and Equity of the Law; and that alone would be a sufficient motive to Order and Obedience. But when they are either so stupid as not to see the good end of the Law, or so profligate as not to regard it, then comes in this Expe­dient of the Sanction, arming the Laws with Penalties whereby they may be inabled to revenge them­selves upon those unconsidering disingenuous Persons that do them violence.

[Page 65] And indeed, considering the great and general Bruitishness and Degeneracy of Men, how very alienated they are not only from the Life of God, but even from that of Natural Reason too, 'tis very fit it should always be thus; and that all Laws, as well as those of Mount Sinai, should have their Thundrings and Lightnings to awake and alarm the Passions of such Men, who having lost their Reasons, have now nothing else to be taken hold by. But this, I say, only proves a Sanction necessary to the better Inforcement, and not to the Obli­gation of the Law.

To which if any one shall yet think it necessary, I shall only fur­ther press him with one sensible Absurdity, which perhaps may sig­nifie more with some Apprehensi­ons, than an abstracter way of rea­soning. [Page 66] It is this, That upon this Supposition it would follow, that if God himself shou'd impose any Command upon a Creature, with­out annexing a Penalty in case of Disobedience, he would not be able with all his Authority and Divine Supremacy, to oblige that Creature. And will any Man, can any Man have the Impudence or Impiety to say so?

Suppose that when God gave that Command to Adam, concern­ing the not eating of the Tree of Knowledge, he had not added that other Clause (which was the Sanc­tion of the Law) In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die. Will any Man presume to say that Adam would not have been ob­liged by that Divine Command, but might have tasted of the for­bidden Fruit without Sin? He must have but very little reverence for [Page 67] the Majesty of God, and as little sense of the sacredness of his Au­thority who would adventure to say so. And yet thus he must say if it be true (what is contended for by some) that the Sanction is necessary to the Obligation of the Law. For whatever is necessary to the Law as such, is necessary to e­very Law, whether Human or Di­vine. He therefore that holds the necessity of the Sanction to the Ob­ligation of the Law, must say (if he will be consistent with himself) that the Command of the Great God would not have obliged A­dam in case there had not been a Penalty annex'd to it. If he does not say so, I should smile at his In­consistency; and if he does, I should tremble for his Impudence and Irre­verence.

But from a Supposition to de­scend to a Matter of Fact, what [Page 68] will such a one say to the Tenth Commandment, to which (as the Author of the Christian Blessedness has rightly observ'd) there was no Sanction annex'd. Will he say, that this Precept stood as a Cypher in the Decalogue, without passing any Obligation upon the Jews? This indeed wou'd make much to the honour of the Divine Wisdom; and represent God as a very nota­ble Law-giver, to Usher in a Law with so great Solemnity, and after­wards write it with his own fingers upon Tables of Stone, when it could signifie nothing but only the filling up of a Number. And yet this, as absurd as it is, he must say, that will make the Sanction necessa­ry to the Obligation of the Law. If this be true, then the Tenth Com­mandment did not oblige. But it seems the great Apostle was of ano­ther Judgment, when he Rom. 7. 7. said, I had not known Sin [Page 69] but by the Law: For I had not known Lust, except the Law had said, Thou shalt not Covet. It seems then that Lust was a Sin, and that by vertue of the Tenth Commandment, which is here alledged by the Apostle to prove it so, which therefore did oblige, since without Obligation, as well as where there is no Law, there can be no Transgression. If it be said, that although the Tenth Commandment had no Temporal Sanction or Civil Penal­ty annex'd to it, like the other Nine, yet it had an Eternal Sancti­on, namely the Rewards and Pu­nishments of a future Life, and that 'twas by vertue of that Sanction that it became Obligatory. I an­swer, that this could not be any Sanction to the Jews, to whom it was not plainly reveal'd, though, it be now to us Christians who have a full and express Revelation of it. A Sanction not Publish'd is no [Page 70] Sanction, as much as a Law not published is no Law; that is, to any real Effect or Purpose of Go­vernment. Indeed of the two, Publication seems more necessary to the Sanction than to the Law. For oftentimes the natural and in­ward Reasonableness of the thing may in a great measure supply the place of an Express Law, as it did for a long time before there was any Express Law given; but now Punishment is a more Arbitrary thing, and that depends more upon the Will of the Gover­nor; and therefore unless there be an Express Declaration of it, as there will be no certain ground of expecting it, so there will be little or no influence de­rived upon Men from it. Which makes it absolutely necessary that the Sanction should be expressly declared and published, otherwise it will neither have the Nature nor the Effect of a Sanction.

[Page 71] It may indeed be the secret in­tent and purpose of the Law-giver to inflict such a Punishment for such an Offence; and perhaps in some Cases this may be justly done without declaring before-hand that he will do so; and this may be said to be the Sanction of the Law­giver; but unless this be openly and plainly declared, it can be no Sanction of the Law, nor can it be a Sanction to those that are to be govern'd by it.

If God in his first solemn inter­course with Adam, after the Pre­cept given him, had reserv'd that other Clause to himself, In the day that thou eatest thou shalt die; or had communicated this his Will and Purpose to an Angel, or to any other Being, but not to Adam himself, could this have been said to have been in any respect a Sanction [Page 72] to Adam? No certainly, because not manifested to him whose con­cern it was. Nor for the same reason could the other be said to be a Sanction to the Jews.

It must therefore either be said that the Tenth Commandment did not oblige the Jews (which I think would be an intolerable Assertion, and withal expressly against the sense of the Apostle, declaring Lust to have been a Sin by virtue of that Commandment) or that it obliged them without any Sanc­tion, and consequently that the Sanction is not necessary to the Ob­ligation of the Law: Which is the thing that I plead for.

If it be said, that though the Sanction be not necessary to the Obligation of the Law in general, nor consequently to the Obligation of all Laws; yet it must be necessa­ry [Page 73] to the Obligation of Human Laws, because Human Laws do not oblige under Sin, and therefore must oblige only under Penalty, and that therefore such Laws without a Sanction will not oblige. I an­swer, first, That this Objection proves a great deal too much; for upon this Supposition the Law would not oblige to Action even with a Sanction, for it would not so oblige at all. But we suppose here the Law to have such an Ob­ligation, and say that the Sanction is not necessary to it, and conse­quently that the removal of the Sanction does not remove the Ob­ligation. Our present Argument therefore is not concerned in this Objection. We are here enquiring what Alteration the Toleration has made in the state of things, by removing the Sanction of the Law, whether it has thereby re­moved the Obligation too? We [Page 74] say it has not, but that if the Law had any Obligation before, it has so still, because the Sanction is not necessary to it. But whether it had or no, belongs not to our pre­sent Consideration (which is only concerning the Effects of the Tole­ration) but to the Absolute Merits of the Cause.

But however, since it happens to come in my way, this I say fur­ther, That it is not at all necessary that Human Laws should be pure­ly Penal, because they are Human, and consequently that 'tis not ne­cessary that all Human Laws should be so. For when-ever they are purely Penal, 'tis acknowledged that they oblige to Punishment, otherwise they would oblige to no­thing; which is the same as not to oblige at all, and consequently would be no Laws. But how come they to oblige to Punish­ment, [Page 75] but only by the Will and Intention of the Law-giver in­vested with competent Authority? And if by that he could oblige to Punishment, then by the same, had he so pleased, he might have ob­liged to Action. For this is a most unquestionable Rule, That he who can oblige to Punishment, can also, if he pleases, oblige to Ac­tion; nay much rather, it being a much greater thing to oblige to Suffer, than to oblige to Do.

Human Laws therefore are not necessarily to be supposed purely Penal as they are Human, nor consequently ought all Human Laws to be so esteem'd. 'Tis not from the different Authority of the Law, but from the different In­tention of the Law-giver, that any Law becomes purely Penal. 'Tis therefore by meer Accident that Human Laws are any of them [Page 76] purely Penal, and not from the Specifick Nature of the Laws themselves, which for any thing that is in their proper Natures may oblige in Conscience, as well as any other Laws. And that they do so oblige (unless where tis otherwise express'd or insi­nuated in the Form of the Law) is most certain, the Law of God requiring us to obey the Laws of Men, where they are not con­trary to the Law of God. But I need prosecute this no further, since the Excellent Bishop San­derson has given the World suffi­cient Satisfaction in this Point, in those judicious Discourses of his, de Legum Humanarum Obligatione in Conscientia.

If it be further urg'd (which I think is the last Reserve of this Objection) That the Removal of the Law does involve the Re­moval of the Sanction; and why [Page 77] then will it not hold as much the other way, that the removal of the Sanction should remove the Law? To this I answer, That there is a great Disparity in the Case: The Sanction is made pure­ly for the sake of the Law, whom it is to guard and defend, and so serves to it as the Means does to the End; and consequently if the Law be abolish'd or suspended, &c. the Sanction must needs fall in proportion with it. But now the Law is not made for the sake of the Sanction, but for the good of those who are to be govern'd by it. And therefore though the re­moval of the Law removes the Sanction, yet it does not therefore follow that the removal of the Sanction should in like manner carry with it the removal of the Law. To which, after all I might add, That 'tis impossible that the whole Sanction of Human Laws [Page 78] should ever be removed. For since the Law of God requires Obedience to the Laws of Men where-ever it may be lawfully paid, and threatens those with the Punishments of another Life, who are disobedient to publick Order and Government in this, though the Human Sanction should be taken away, yet the Divine Sanction would still remain; and as long as that does remain, the whole Sanction cannot be said to be removed. This I might say for a Reserve, and I do not see what Answer can be made to it; but I think my Cause is other­wise so well grounded, that I need not insist upon this Plea.

From the whole course of this Argument (which I believe has receiv'd no damage by the ma­nagement) it fully and clearly appears, that the Sanction of the [Page 79] Law is not only a thing really distinct from it, but also no way necessary to its Obligation; and therefore that the removing of the Sanction does not imply or involve the removal of the Law, and consequently that the Tole­ration by removing the Sanction does not remove, no nor so much as interrupt the Obligation of the Law, to which the Sanction has been shewn to be not at all necessary. Which I think breaks the Neck of the Objection, and he had need be a very skilful Artist that shall set it agen.

Well, but suppose (which you see is not the Case) that the Law which enjoyns Conformity to the Religion and Church establisht, were by the Toleration per­fectly remov'd, and the Preceptive part of it taken away as well as the Penal; yet neither upon this Supposition (which is indeed a very [Page 80] great Concession and Abatement) would a Toleration excuse those from Schism who would be guilty of it without it.

For Sir, these Men are to con­sider, if they have not already con­sider'd it, that we do not derive the Grounds of Obligation to Ec­clesiastick Communion only from the Authority of the Civil Law (though that must be allow'd to add a considerable weight to the Obligation) but also and chiefly from that of the Divine Law; which I conceive to be as Positive and as Express in requiring Unity and Con­formity of Worship, as in requiring any Religious Worship at all.

The necessity of this is by S. Paul press'd upon the Ephesians, from the Unity of that Ephes. 4. 3, 4, 5, 6. Body whereof they were Members, from the Unity of that [Page 81] Spirit which was to them the Com­mon Principle of Life and Action, from the Unity of that Hope to which they were call'd, from the Unity of that Lord to whose Ser­vice they were all devoted, from the Unity of that Faith which they all profess'd, from the Unity of that Baptism whereby they were grafted into the Church of Christ; and lastly, from the Unity of that God who was the Father of them all, who was above all, and in them all. Every one of which Heads of Argument might justly deserve the Consideration of a particular Di­scourse, but that I am willing to suppose my Reader so apprehen­sive, as not to want to have things laid out to him more at large.

Accordingly the Christian Church is always represented by Figures that express the greatest Unity, not only between that and Christ, [Page 82] but also between Fellow-Christians. This is said to be that One Body into which we are all Baptized by One Spirit, and which is said to be fitly joyn'd together and com­pacted. This is that Spiritual House built upon the Foundation of the Prophets and Apostles, Jesus Christ himself being the Chief Corner­stone, in whom all the Building, fitly framed together, grows into an Holy Temple in the Lord. 'Tis represented also as one Flock, un­der one Shepherd Jesus Christ, whose last and most Solemn Pray­er was for the Unity of the Church; which must therefore be supposed to be highly agreeable to the Mind and Will of God, o­therwise our Saviour would not have pray'd for it so earnestly and with such Solemnity. Though I question very much whether this Solemn Prayer of Christ will be fully heard and answer'd till the [Page 83] Glorious State of his Millennial Reign upon Earth. However, in the mean time 'tis most certain that 'tis the Great Duty of us all to endeavour after that State of Unity which our Saviour pray'd might be among his Disciples. Hence it is that Schism is Con­demn'd as a Work of the Flesh, and those that Separate are said to be Sensual, not having the Spirit; and Christians are admonish'd to mark and shun them that cause Divisions, and are withall Com­manded to mind or think one and the same thing, [...] to stand fast in one Spi­rit with one Mind, to walk by the same Rule, to be joyn'd together in the same Mind, and in the same Judgment, and with one Mind and Mouth to glorifie God the Father, with a World of Pre­cepts and Exhortations to the same purpose, which every one may [Page 84] find that does but open the Bible.

Now what can all this signifie? Nothing certainly less than this, That the Unity of the Church is so Sacred a thing, that it ought to be preserv'd by all Lawful means, and that no Separation ought to be made in it without absolute and evident Necessity. In one word; that where 'tis Lawful to Commu­nicate, there 'tis Sinful to Sepa­rate. Which is more expresly de­liver'd in that Apostolical Canon taken notice of by the Author of Christian Blessedness; If it be possi­ble, as much as lies in you, live peace­ably with all Men. This takes in the whole Latitude and Capacity of Society, the State as well as the Church; in both which, by vertue of this Precept, Peace and Unity is to be maintain'd as far as is Possi­ble, and therefore without questi­on on as far as is Lawful. And if the [Page 85] Peace of the State is to be pre­serv'd as far as is possible, then certainly much more the Peace of the Church.

Since then the Scripture is both so frequent and so express, I might say also so earnest and passio­nate in inculcating the Necessity of preserving the Unity of the Church, and in Condemning all unnecessa­ry disturbances of it; it is most certain that the Divine Law, with­out the Confirmation of the Civil, is a sufficient Obligation to Church-Unity, where-ever it may Lawfully be held. Every Christian Church that proposes Lawful terms of Communication has, by the Law of God (though the Civil Law be silent in the case) an undoubt­ed Right to the Conformity of all that are within the Pale of her Establishment, who cannot with-hold it from her without in­curring [Page 86] the Guilt of Schism, which, according to the general sense of the Christian World, is nothing else but an unnecessary Separation; and then is Separation unnecessa­ry, when Communion is lawful. The Argument in Form is,

Whoever separates unnecessari­ly, is guilty of Schism:

But whoever separates where he may lawfully Communicate, sepa­rates unnecessarily;

Therefore whoever separates where he may lawfully Communi­cate, is guilty of Schism.

The Minor Proposition is plain by its omn Light, since there can no Moral necessity be pretended for not doing what may Lawfully be done. And the Major Pro­position is clear by the Light of Scripture, which presses and in­joyns the Peace and Unity of the [Page 87] Church to the very utmost degree of strictness, even as far as is possi­ble. Whence the Conclusion ne­cessarily follows, That whoever separates where he may lawfully Communicate, is guilty of Schism.

This is so clear and evident, that the most moderately affected in Point of Church-Unity and Conformity could never shut their Eyes against the Light of it, though they endeavour'd to wink never so hard. Particularly Mr. Hales, a very Free, and for the most part, Judicious Writer, and one very remarkable for his Moderation, e­specially as to all Church-matters, and who writes of Schism with all the tenderness imaginable, hand­ling it as if he were feeling the Edge of a Razor: And yet after all his Endeavours to reduce it in­to as narrow a compass as he could, by making as few guilty of it as [Page 88] might be, he could find nothing to justifie Separation but only Sin­fulness of Communion. As may appear from several Passages that occur in his Tract of Schism. For, says he, Page 195. For the further opening the Nature of Schism, some­thing must be added by way of dif­ference to distinguish it from necessa­ry Separation; and that is, that the Causes upon which Division is at­tempted, proceed not from Passion, or Distemper, or Ambition, or Ava­rice, or such other Ends as Human Folly is apt to pursue, but from well­weigh'd and necessary Reasons; and that, when all other Means having been tried, nothing will serve to save us from guilt of Conscience, but open Se­paration. So that Schism, if we would define it, is nothing else but an unnecessary Separation of Christi­ans from that part of the visible Church of which they were once Mem­bers. Again, says he, Page 198. [Page 89] Unadvisedly and upon Fancy to break the Knot of Union between Man and Man, especially among Chri­stians, upon whom, above all other kind of men, the tye of Love and Communion does most especially rest, is a Crime hardly pardonable; and that nothing Absolves a man from the guilt of it, but true and unpre­tended Conscience. Again, says he, Page 209. What if those to whose care the execution of the Publick Service is committed do something unlawful, &c. yet for all this we may not separate, except we be constrain'd personally to bear a part our selves. The Priests under Eli had so ill demean'd themselves about the daily Sacrifice, that the Scriptures tell us, they made it stink; yet the People refused not to come to the Tabernacle, nor to bring their Sacrifice to the Priest. For in these Schisms which concern Fact, nothing can be a just Cause of refusal of Communion, but [Page 90] only to require the execution of some unlawful or suspected Act. Again, says he, Page 215. Why may I not go, if occasion require, to an Arian Church, so there be no Arianism ex­prest in their Liturgy? And again, Lastly, Page 227. speaking of Con­venticles, says he, It evidently ap­pears that all Meetings upon unneces­sary occasions of Separation are to be so stiled; so that, in this sense, a Conventicle is nothing else but a Congregation of Schismaticks.

From these and other like Pas­sages any one may be satisfy'd that Mr. Hales, with all his Mode­ration, could not but see, that where Separation is not necessary, there Communion is; and that to depart from the Communion of a visible Establisht Church, with whom you may lawfully Com­municate, is to be guilty of Schism. And so much seems to be granted [Page 91] even by the Author of the Let­ter of Toleration, who defines Schism to be an ill groun­ded Page 86. Separation in Ecclesi­astical Communion, made about things not necessary.

'Tis true indeed, by things not necessary, this Author means (as he afterwards explains himself) things not expresly contain'd in the Rule, making him a Schisma­tick that separates from a Church, because that Church does not re­quire what the Scripture does not. But this will come to one and the same thing. For why is he a Schismatick that makes a Se­paration from a Church for not requiring more than is expresly contain'd in Scripture, but only because he might Communicate with that Church notwithstand­ing this her frugality and reserved­ness, and consequently his Sepa­ration [Page 92] was unnecessary? This is the thing into which the Schism of such a Separatist must be at last resolv'd. And then for the same reason, why is not he as much a Schismatick that separates from a Church, that does require more than the Scripture expresly contains, provided it be not con­trary to the Rule of Scripture, since with this Church he may al­so lawfully Communicate, and therefore has no Necessity for his Separation? 'Tis the unnecessity of the Separation that in both Cases makes the Schism. So that this Notion of our Author, though at first sight it seems to offer some­what New, resolves it self, at long run, into the Old Common No­tion of Schism, which has all a­long obtain'd in the Christian World.

[Page 93] Where-ever therefore there is no necessity of separating, there the Church has a Right to Com­munion, which to with-hold from her is Schism, or else there is no such thing as Schism in the World. This Right the Church of Rome had before her falling into her gross Corruptions, and this Right the Church of England and all o­ther Churches have that are Re­form'd from them. And this Right every Lawfully Constituted Church has by vertue of the Di­vine Law, which is her Original Charta, and which of it self lays upon all Christians a sufficient Ob­ligation to Church-Unity, though there should be no Civil Authority to back and inforce it.

For indeed, unless it were so, how could there be such a thing as the Sign of Schism in the Apostles [Page 94] Times, and in the more Primitive Ages of the Church? There was then no Civil Law to Oblige Chri­stians to Church-Communion; so far from this, that the Edge and Point of the Civil Sword was turn'd directly against it. The State and the Church then not only moved in two Different, but in two Op­posite Spheres. And yet we find that in those early times the Sin of Schism was as much condemn'd, and Schismatical Persons as deeply branded as in any of the after Ages. Nay more indeed, because of the singularity and strangeness of the Crime. Punish'd indeed they could not so well be, for want of the Concurrence of the Civil Sword; which was not then in a Christian hand, but they were censured and condemn'd, and ac­cording to the Apostle's Admoni­tion, those were mark'd and avoided that caused Divisions.

[Page 95] And therefore though we should allow the Present Toleration to Silence the Civil Law, whereby Conformity is injoyn'd, (which yet from the Premises appears to be far otherwise,) yet since the Divine Law requiring all possible Unity, stands uncancell'd, (for sure the Toleration won't be pretended to reach that;) those that make Caufeless and unnecessary Divisi­ons, will still be guilty of Schism, notwithstanding the favour of the Toleration, which I am afraid will prove but an indifferent Plea for Separation at the Last day to those that have no better.

What then, you'll say, is the Effect of a Toleration? Or what can be supposed to be the just and reasonable intent of it? I answer; As to the Effect, it cannot release at all from any preceding Obliga­tion. [Page 96] It does not release so much as from the Obligation of the Ci­vil Law, whose Penalty it only suspends, much less does it release from Obligation to the Divine Law, with which it has nothing to do, and upon which it has no manner of Effect. It does not therefore discharge any from Ob­ligation to Conformity, who would not be discharged without it. All indeed are actually eased by it; that's an universal and in­different Effect, but none are dis­charged or unobliged.

Then as to the Intent of it, all that it can be reasonably intended for is to ease those few from Penal­ties, (for I doubt they are not many,) who are so unhappy as really and sincerely to be persua­ded in their Consciences that 'tis not Lawful for them to joyn in Communion with the Church of [Page 97] England. Though the Toleration does actually Ease all indifferent­ly, yet 'tis for the Ease of such only that a Toleration can be just­ly or reasonably intended, whose Condition indeed would be as pi­tiable, as I am afraid it is rare.

But even here the Toleration has no other Effect than barely to Ease them. If they are withall re­leas'd from any Obligation, 'tis not by Vertue of the Toleration, but by Reason of something else, namely their unhappy Judgment and Persuasion in thinking our Communion unlawful; which how­ever in it self false and erroneous, must be allow'd to bind in Consci­ence while 'tis their Misfortune to be under it. This is the thing that releases from Obligation, when­ever there is any Releasement; The Toleration only Eases them from suffering the Penalty of Non­conformity. [Page 98] And 'tis for their Ease only that it can be reasona­bly intended.

But as for those who are satis­fy'd of the Lawfulness of Commu­nicating with the Establisht Church, (who I fear make the greatest part of those that separate from it,) they are still obliged under pain of Sin, though not of Civil Cha­stisement, to Communicate with it. And if they do not, 'tis not a Toleration, or Act of Indulgence, though granted by the highest Power upon Earth, that can ex­cuse them from the Sin of Schism, at least before God. Nor do such Men deserve the favour of a Tole­ration.

And now, Sir, from the Mea­sures laid down, it plainly appears, that if the Separatists from the Church of England were guilty of [Page 99] Schism before the Toleration, (which, whether they were or no, depends upon other Grounds, and is not now to be disputed over a­gain,) they are as much guilty of it now, there being no Change made by the Toleration as to the Preceptive, but only as to the Pe­nal part of the Law. Which may suffice to clear the Author of Chri­stian Blessedness of the first Impu­tation laid against him, that of a false Charge.

The two others will be more ea­sily, and more briefly dispatch'd.

The next thing therefore for which our Author is blamed is the Uncharitableness of his Charge. This indeed is a heavy Censure, and ought to be well-grounded, or else it will recoil upon those that make it. But I think there has been that said upon the for­mer [Page 100] Objection, that will scarce al­low any room for this.

For if the Author's Charge was uncharitable, it must be either be­cause of the Matter of it, or be­cause of the End and Design of it. Not certainly upon the account of its Matter, because that appears to be true; for the proof of which, I appeal to the Reason and Argu­ment of the preceding Discourse. And if they fix the Uncharitable­ness of it upon its End and Design, they themselves will bring their own Charity in question by judg­ing so severely of the Intentions of the Author, which they cannot be supposed to be privy to.

For how can they pretend to know the Author's Thoughts and Designs? Did he ever Communi­cate his Intentions to them? Or will they Judge by Inspiration, and [Page 101] pretend to the Gift of Divining and Conjecturing, as well as of Praying by the Spirit?

I that am intimately acquainted with the Author, and know more of his Principles and Sentiments, Thoughts and Intentions, than any of those that take the Liberty of Censuring and Condemning them, do verily believe that in his con­tinuing the Charge of Schism up­on the Separatists, he intended nothing against Charity, but ra­ther the greatest Charity and Good-will.

I know 'tis his most deliberate and well-assured Sense, that if e­ver there was or can be such a Sin as Schism in the Church of Christ, they of the Present Sepa­ration are truly and deeply guilty of it. And since it came fairly in his way, he thought himself obli­ged [Page 102] in Charity to reprehend them from it, not knowing what good effect a Candid and Rational Ad­monition might have upon those (for he had Charity enough to hope there might be some such) who were not quite over-run with the Humour of Opposition, nor arm'd Cap-a-pee with Prejudice. And being withal in the mean time assured of the Duty of Fra­ternal Correption; and how much that concerns every Christian (as being the Duty even of Lev. 19. 17. a Jew) in any-wise to re­buke his Brother, and not to suffer Sin to lie upon him.

And if I may have leave to di­vert a little from the Defence of my Friend to my own Justification, I think I may safely say that I am now in Prosecution of the very same Charitable Design. For though I acknowledge my self to have had [Page 103] some regard to the Reputation of my Friend, which I think has suf­fer'd without Cause; and which to Assert and Vindicate, I take to be a very Innocent Design; yet I can say (as far as I know the in­ward Springs of my own Actions) that the Principal End and aim of this Undertaking was to further that great and dear Interest of Christianity, for which our depart­ing Saviour so earnestly and so solemnly pray'd to his Father, the Interest of Ecclesiastick Unity. To further this, I say, is my main De­sign, both by awakening the Con­sciences of those who by the Fa­vour of the Government striking in with their own Natural humour of Contradiction, may be tempt­ed against the inward Sense and Light of their Minds to transgress against the great Christian Obliga­tion to Publick Order and Unity of Worship, and by undeceiving [Page 104] and disabusing others, who by the Impunity of the present Toleration may be so far imposed upon as to fancy themselves releas'd from any such Obligation. Both which, I think, are very Good, very Cha­ritable, and very Christian De­signs.

But to return: I think, Sir, there appears now to be as little reason for taxing our Author with Un­charity as with Error. For his own part, I believe he is Conscious to himself of neither. But if he is Guilty, I dare say he would be glad to be Convinc'd, that so he might Rectifie the One, and Repent of the Other. For the present he thinks there is so little occasion for either, that if he had not only Charg'd our Separatists with Schism, but with the most unjust and un­reasonable Schism that ever was made in the Christian Church, he [Page 105] thinks it would have been no Slan­der. And he has Commission'd me to say that he is ready against any Opposer to make it good.

But though the Author's Charge was neither False, nor Uncharita­ble, yet was it not something Un­seasonable? So indeed some say, who say neither of the other. Nor is this an inconsiderable Exception, if true. For as every thing is Beau­tiful in its Season, so is Season the Beauty of every thing, and there is nothing Beautiful out of it. Acti­ons Materially good, and wherein we mean well, are oftentimes ut­terly spoil'd merely by being Mis­timed. But why, I pray, was this Charge so unseasonable? What, because the Separation was grown very wide, and by reason of the relaxation of the Government growing still every day wider; because some were invited to it [Page 106] (as they are to other Sins) by Impunity, and others began to make that a Plea for its Lawful­ness; because it began to set up for one of the Court-fashions, and was growing to be not only a Priviledge of the Saint, but the Accomplishment of the Gentle­man; because some used their Li­berty as a Cloak for their Malici­ousness, and almost all as an Op­portunity to serve the Interest of their Cause; because, lastly, that Church and State which were so lately rescued from the Jaws of Popery, were now in as Critical a Point of Danger from the In­croachments of the Separation; was it therefore out of season to Charge the Separatists with Schism? Now I always thought that the most proper Season to admonish Men of their faults was when they were most Rife and Epidemical, and when they had most Tempta­tions [Page 107] and Opportunities of com­mitting them; and when the Com­mission of them would threaten the greatest Danger and Mis­chief.

This has been generally thought the most proper Season of Admo­nition by all wise Men in all other Matters, and why not in this? 'Tis the necessity of Admonition that at any time makes it seasona­ble; and then there is most need of it, when the Manners and Ways of Men are most disorderly and ir­regular. The more corrupt there­fore and degenerate the Age, the more seasonable is the Reproof, And indeed, if the general preva­lency and fashionableness of Vice be enough to make Admonition unseasonable, 'tis now high time, considering the Moral state of the World, that not only all Writing, but all Preaching too were laid [Page 108] aside. But this I suppose is a con­sequence which those that blame our Author's Charge as unseasona­ble will not admit; whence it fol­lows (whatever in partiality to their own concern they may be in­duced to say) that even by their own measure it was not really un­seasonable.

But 'tis further said, that this was a Treatment altogether unex­pected and unlook'd for. They expected now as much favour from the Pulpit and the Press, as they found from the Government; and that there should now be no other Discourses about them, but such as were Healing, Complying, and tending to Moderation, and not to have the old business of Schism re­viv'd again. This was as much contrary to Expectation, as to In­clination and Humour; and was it not enough to vex any body to [Page 109] be so disappointed? That it was enough, the Event shews; but whe­ther it ought to be, may admit more question. But I'll tell you a Story.

While Thcodora poffess'd the Em­pire of Constantinople with her Son, who was Causin's Holy Court, part 3. pag. 435. yet in minority, one named Methodius, an excellent Painter, an Italian by Na­tion, and Religious by Profession, went to the Court of the Bulgarian King, named Bogoris, where he was entertain'd with much favour. This Prince way yet a Pagan, and though tryal had been made to Convert him to the Faith, it suc­ceeded not, because his Mind was so set upon Pleasures, that Reason could find but little access. He was excessively pleas'd with Hunt­ing; and as some delight in Pic­tures to behold what they love, [Page 110] so he appointed Methodius to paint him a piece of Hunting in a Palace which he had newly built. The Painter, seeing he had a fair Oc­casion to take his opportunity for the Conversion of this Infidel, in­stead of Painting an Hunting piece for him, made an exquisite Table of the Day of Judgment. Wherein he represented that great Solem­nity with all its Circumstances of Terror.

In the end, the day assign'd be­ing come, he drew aside the Cur­tain, and shew'd his Work. 'Tis said, the King at first stood some while pensive, not being able to wonder enough at the strange Sight. Then turning towards Methodius, What is this? said he. The Re­ligious Man took Occasion there­upon to tell him of the Judgments of God, of Punishments and Re­wards in the other Life; where­with [Page 111] he was so moved, that in a short time he yielded himself to God by a happy Conversion. Now whether this Device of the Painter was unseasonable or no, or whether the advantage of the Design and of the Event would excuse the Dis­appointment, I leave to the Reader to judge.

And thus, Sir, having fully clear'd my Friend from the treble Indict­ment laid in against him, by shewing his Charge of Schism to have been neither false, nor uncharitable, nor unseasonable, I shall now, for a Con­clusion of all, address my self to the Dissenters in a word or two, concerning their Behaviour under the present Toleration. Not what it is, or has been (for that is well enough known) but what it ought to be.

[Page 112] Some, it may be, who are not all over Argument-Proof, moved with the Reason of the fore-going Considerations, may be ready to ask of me, What would you then have us to do, or how shall we behave our selves under the pre­sent state of Things? It seems in­deed to be as you say, That the Relaxation of the Government makes no Change in the Obliga­tions to Conformity; but if we should lay down the Separation, and come over to the Church, what are we the better for the Toleration? And is it reasonable that there should be a Toleration, and we not the better for it? What, was the Toleration granted, not to be enjoyed? Is it like the Tree of Paradice, good for Food, and pleasant to the Eye, and with­all planted within our reach, and yet not to be medled with? Shall [Page 113] we be so unkind to our selves, as not to embrace an opportunity of Ease and Liberty? Or so ungrate­ful to the Government, as not to make use of that Privilege of In­dulgence which the kindness of our Superiors has vouchsafed us? What would you have us do?

I answer in one word, Do now as you ought to do before. For since the Toleration (as has been proved) makes not any the least Alteration in those Obligations to Church-Unity that are derived either from the Law of the State, or from the Law of God, but all things as to that stand now in the same posture as they did, 'tis plain that your Behaviour also ought to be the very same now that it ought to have been before the Tolera­tion. If the Points of the Com­pass stand now as they did then, without any Declension or Variation, [Page 114] 'tis plain that you ought to steer the same Course now, as you ought then. If you ask what that is? I answer,

First, Lay aside as much as pos­sibly you can all manner of Pre­judice that may arise either from Natural Temper and Complexion, or from Education, or from long Custom to a contrary way; or from blind Regard to the Autho­rity of some Men, for whom, per­haps, you have had a more early than just Veneration; or from Hu­mour, or from Passion, or from Interest, or from whatever else may bride and corrupt the genuine native Sense of our Minds. For unless the Scale hang even, 'tis to no purpose to weigh any thing in it.

Secondly, When you have thus truly devested your selves of all Prejudice, and reduced your Judg­ments [Page 115] to an even poise, then ap­ply your selves seriously and deli­berately, impartially and sincere­ly, soberly and in the fear of God to consider and examin the State and Constitution of our Church, and the Terms of her Commu­nion, whether they are lawful or no. But be sure you do not this by advising only with Books of your own way, or by consulting on­ly with Guides of your own Party and Persuasion (for this would be to fall back into your old Pre­judice again) but by a free and in­different recourse to the Writers and Leaders of both Sides, by con­sidering and weighing what is of­fered by the learned and excellent Defenders of the Church, as well as what is said by the Advocates for the Separation, and by trying and judging all according to the infallible Rule of Scripture, and the Eternal Truth of God shi­ning [Page 116] forth in your own Souls. And if,

Thirdly, After your most impar­tial and sincere Endeavours rightly to inform your selves according to the best use of your Faculties and Opportunities, it be still your unhappiness verily to be persuaded in your Consciences, that the Com­munion of the Church of England is unlawful (which though I can­not deny to be absolutely possi­ble, seems yet as hard to me for a considerate Man really to believe, as to believe Transubstantiation) yet I say, if you should be invin­cibly determin'd to such a Persua­sion, in the Name of God abide where you are, and make use of the Toleration, and enjoy the Be­nefit of it with Peace and Satis­faction of Mind. I would not for a World persuade you to Communicate with the Church of [Page 117] England (as excellent as she is) a­gainst the real Sense and Persuasion of your Consciences. For the fol­lowing of which you can never be accountable, provided it be not your fault that you are of that Persuasion. But if,

Fourthly and Lastly, You are Convinced of the Lawfulness of holding Communion with the Church; (and to be free with you, I cannot but think that most of you are, if you would confess the truth;) then I pray consider seriously with your selves what to­lerable Account you will be able to render either to God or Man for continuing a Separation in that Church where even according to your own Judgment and Confessi­on you might lawfully Communi­cate. Or how you can be said to preserve the Unity of the Catholick [Page 118] Church, or that Communion of Saints which you profess to believe, if you separate from the Communion of a Visible, Establisht, National Church, of whose Lawfulness you are satisfy'd, and from whom therefore you need not separate. Consider whether this be not a Causeless dividing, dis-uniting, and dismembring of the Body of Christ, a high Violation of that Publick Order and Decency which he has required in his Church, and as great a Breach of the Christian Peace, as you can possibly be guilty of in the Peace of the State: In one word, consider whether this be not all that which both Scrip­ture and the best Antiquity repre­sent, and so severely condemn un­der that one Emphatical word, Schism.

[Page 119] And do not think to salve all at last, by taking Sanctuary in the Toleration. This, you see, stands Neuter, leaves the State of the Question as it found it; and does not at all interpose for your re­lief, but leaves you to stand or fall by the Absolute Merits of your Cause.

These therefore alone you ought to consider and enquire into, viz. Whether you can honestly and safely Communicate with us or no? And if you find you can, then 'tis most certain that you ought. The Law of God and the Law of Man (for the Toleration you see evacuates neither) do still oblige you to it; and if you do not, though the Government ex­cuses you from the Penalty, yet neither that nor any thing else [Page 120] will excuse you from the Sin of Schism. The short is, that which will justifie such a Separation as this, will justifie any, and then there will be no such thing as an Obligation to Church-Unity, and consequently no such thing as Schism in the World. And I desire never to reduce an Ad­versary to a greater Extremity than when he is forced to deny the very Being and Possibility of the Sin of Schism, that he may prove himself to be no Schisma­tick.

This, Sir, is all I think neces­sary to say upon this Occasion; and I think I have said nothing but what I have well thought and consider'd, and what is my real Judgment, and what will stand the Test, whether of Charity or of Truth. I have view'd and [Page 121] review'd what I have written; and I must needs declare, that I cannot discern the least flaw in the Argument of this Discourse, nor do I fear the Severity of the most Critical Eye or Hand. How­ever, if any one of the Learned among the Diffenting Party thinks the Argument of this Discourse may be Answer'd, and withall thinks himself sufficiently qualify'd for the Undertaking, (for I de­clare before-hand that I shall not think my self concern'd to take notice of every impertinent Scrib­ler,) I fairly and freely invite him to it; and withall do promise him, for his better encouragement, that he shall find me either Able to Defend what I have written, or Willing to Submit.

Farewell.

I Think it very proper and seasonable, in a word or two, to rectifie another very Popular Mistake, wherewith I find most Common Persons, and some others are imposed upon. It is concerning Mo­deration, whose Notion I per­ceive to be generally as much abused as that of Toleration, and to as ill a purpose.

[Page 123] Moderation, without que­stion if rightly understood, is a most excellent thing, as signifying,

I. In general, such a tem­per of Soul, and such a go­vernment of all a Man's Thoughts and Desires, Words and Actions, as may steer the course of Life in the middle way between the Extremes of Defect and Excess, so as to be always affected in Proportion to the Greatness or Goodness of the End, and to the Ne­cessity or Usefulness of the Means.

[Page 124] Or as signifying more par­ticularly with relation to the Body, such a due and well­proportion'd conduct of it, and regard to it, as becomes a Creature that is neither a meer Animal, nor a pure Spirit, but partakes of both Natures, and therefore ought not so to be addicted to the interest of the Body, as to neglect the Spiritual Life; nor yet so de­voted to the Life of the Spi­rit, as to forget he is in the Body. This way being as much too High, as the other is too Low, and the way of Man lying in the Middle.

[Page 125] Thus understood, without all doubt Moderation is a most excellent thing, and will have an universal and uncontested Approbation. And thus it is generally understood in all other Cases, but only when it relates to Church-Conformity. And then by Moderation is usually meant either an In­differency of doing what the Church prescribes, or a doing it by Halves, or a total Omis­sion of it.

And accordingly he is ac­counted a Moderate Man, who either is indifferently affected to the Constitutions [Page 126] of the Church, and is little concern'd whether he Con­forms to them or no, and ac­cordingly stands ready and di­sposed with or without rea­sonable Occasion to admit of Alterations, or who Conforms by halves, or who does not Conform at all.

All these in their several orders and degrees, go com­monly for Men of Modera­tion; and I believe many for the procurement of that spe­cious Title, are tempted to appear so disposed, designing nothing at all worse by it, than only the Reputation of Mode­rate Men.

[Page 127] But let such as run away with this Notion, take this Consideration along with them, if they are not in too much haste, That 'tis not all manner of Moderation that is justly to be commended, nor this of theirs in particular. For the right Estimation of which matter, I desire the following measures may be consider'd.

If the Object of our Mo­deration be not already either by Nature or Constitution fix'd and stated in a due measure, but is to receive its mea­sure from our Moderation, [Page 128] then Moderation, as it signifies an indifferency of Mind, may have both Place and Com­mendation. As suppose in the instance of Pleasure, which because an indeterminate Ob­ject, and of indefinite Lati­tude, capable either of Ex­cess or Defect, leaves room for the Exercise of Modera­tion in us, which is then a good and laudable thing.

But if the Object be al­ready either by Nature, or by positive Constitution fix'd and stated in a due measure, and is not to receive that measure from our Moderation, then our Moderation has neither [Page 129] Place nor Commendation: As in the Instance suppose of Vertue; which being already supposed to be in the Mean, leaves no room for Moderation in us, nor would Moderation then be a good or laudable thing. Nor was it ever thought a Commendation of the love of Vertue to say it was Moderate or Indifferent.

Now to apply this to the present Case. If the Order of the Church of England were not already constituted in a state and temper of Modera­tion, then indeed Moderation in Conformity might pretend to some Excellency and Com­mendation; [Page 130] but if it be al­ready in such a state and tem­per, then there is neither Room for it, nor Excellency in it. But rather on the contrary, to be moderately affected to Conformity, will then be as great a Commendation as to be a moderate Lover of Order and Reason, and all that's good. And they that like this Commendation, 'tis fit they should have it.

Before therefore Moderation in Conformity be made a commendable Character, and before Men of this Cha­racter be so much cry'd up [Page 131] and sought after as the fittest Persons to be employed both in State and in Church­concerns, it ought to be made appear, that the Constitution of the Church is in it self Im­moderate.

This indeed is slily and in­directly insinuated by all those that raise such Clamours a­bout Moderation. But they ought, if they would deal fairly, directly to prove it; and indeed wholly to insist upon it, and not impose upon the Prejudice and the Ignorance of the People by the specious and plausible [Page 132] Name of Moderation. For unless it be first proved, that the Church in her Consti­tution is Immoderate; 'tis plain, that Moderation on our parts has no room; and that all the Noise and Stir that is made about it, is but meer Sophistry with ill De­sign.

But now whether the Constitution of the Church be really Immoderate, I re­fer those that desire to be sa­tisfied to what has been from time to time written in her Defence and Justification, par­ticularly to an excellent Book [Page 133] very Honestly, and, as I think, very Learnedly written by Doctor Puller, call'd, The Moderation of the Church of England.