S r. John Nisbet of Dirleton, Lord Advocat, One of the Senators of the Colledge of Iustice, And one of his Ma ties. most Hon ble. Privy Council etc.
‘DISC [...]E IUSTITIAM’

SOME Doubts & Questions, IN THE LAW; Especially of SCOTLAND.

AS ALSO, SOME DECISIONS OF THE LORDS OF COUNCIL and SESSION:

COLLECTED & OBSERVED By Sir JOHN NISBET of Dirleton, Advocate to King CHARLES II.

To which is Added, An INDEX, For finding the Principal Matters in the said Decisions.

[printer's or publisher's device]

EDINBƲRGH, Printed by GEORGE MOSMAN, and are to be sold at his Shop in the Parliament-Closs, Anno Dom. M.DC.XCVIII.

ADVERTISEMENT, TO THE READER.

THE Deceast Sir JOHN NISBET of Dirleton, His Abilities in the LAWS, and generally in all Learning, pro­cured him the Employment of Kings Advocate, And one of the Lords of Session, and other Honour­able Places deservedly conferred upon him, in the time of His late Majesty King CHARLES the Second.

His long Practice and profound Knowledge, in Our Laws, gave the Rise to the following Doubts and Questions; Which, if he had Lived, he would have Answered and Clear­ed; as he has done many of them, to the great satisfaction of our Ablest [Page] Lawyers, and great improvement of our Law.

The Decisions are, What his Lei­sure, from publick Office, could al­low him to Observe, and were ever thought so Succinct and Judicious, that most Lawyers were at Pains, to cause Copy them from the com­mon Manuscripts, though neither full nor Correct; which now in the Printing is carefully helped.

THE Lords of His Majesties Privy Council, Do hereby Grant to George Mosman, Stationer Burges of Edinburgh, his Heirs or Assigneys, The sole Priviledge of Printing and Selling a Book, Entituled, Some Doubts and Questions of the Law, Especially of Scotland; As also, The Decisions of the Lords of Session, Observed by Sir John Nisbet of Dirleton, Advocate to His Majesty King CHARLES the Second: Together with, An Index to the saids Decisions: And discharges all other Persons whatsomever, to Re-print, Vend, Sell, or Import, any of the saids Books, for the space of nineteen Years, after the day and date hereof, under the Pain and Penalty of the Confiscation of the said, Books, to the said George Mosman, for his own use and behoof, and of the Sum of an hundred Pounds Scots, to be payed by the Re-printers, Sellers, or Importers of the said Book to the said George Mosman.

Extracted by Me GILB. ELIOT Cls. Sti. Cons.
LIST OF THE Several …

LIST OF THE Several Heads of the following Doubts and Questions.

A.
  • ADjudications. page 1
  • Advocation by the Ju­stices. 2.
  • Alimenta. 3.
  • Altarage. Ib.
  • Annexation to a Barony in another Shire. Ib.
  • Annualrent. Ib.
  • Annualrent for Damnage. 4
  • Right of Annualrent. Ib.
  • Relicts Annuity. 5.
  • Annus Ʋtilis. Ib.
  • Appellatio. Ib.
  • Appellatio a Camera Imperiali. Ib.
  • De Appellatione a Praefecto Praetorio, & aliorum Judicum sententiis. 6.
  • Appellatio a Vicario. Ib.
  • Approbatio. Ib.
  • Arrestment. 7.
  • Arrestment of Conditional Debts. 8.
  • Arrestment Loused. Ib.
  • Per Aversionem. Ib.
B.
  • Back-bonds to the Exchequer. Ib.
  • Bairns Part. 9.
  • Bond Heritable. Ib.
  • Bond Moveable. 10.
  • Bonds of Provision to Children. Ib.
  • Bond of Relief. Ib.
  • Baron Courts. 11.
  • Bastard. Ib.
  • Bishops. 12.
  • Bishops Debts. Ib.
  • Bodomaria page.
  • Burghs Liferent Escheat, Ib.
C.
  • Camera Imperialis. Ib.
  • Captions. Ib.
  • Casualities of Superiority. 13.
  • Causa cum qua Res transit. Ib.
  • Cautioner and Relief. Ib.
  • Chaplainrie. Ib.
  • Charge to enter Heir. 14.
  • Chattels Real. Ib.
  • Children and Creditors. Ib.
  • Childrens provisions. Ib.
  • Civitas Ib.
  • Clauses in Contracts of Mar­riage. 15.
  • Coals. 16.
  • Collation. Ib.
  • Commission not to Expire morte Mandatoris. 17.
  • Commissioners to the Parliament. Ib.
  • Commontes. Ib.
  • Common Appendant. 18.
  • Communio. Ib.
  • Compensation. Ib.
  • Composition for Entry. 19.
  • Compriser. Ib.
  • Comprising. Ib.
  • Infeftments upon Comprysing. 23.
  • Conditio. Ib.
  • Confession by Criminals. 24.
  • Confirmation. Ib.
  • Confiscation. 26.
  • Confusione tollitur obligatio. Ib.
  • Conjunct-Fiar. 27.
  • [Page]Conquest. 27.
  • Consensus. 28.
  • Consensus Domini. Ib.
  • Consent. Ib.
  • Anent Consistories; Whereby the Usefulness and Necessity of these Courts is evinced, and Doubts and Prejudices, against them, are cleared. 29.
  • Consolidation. 35.
  • Decreets contra Consortes. 36.
  • Corporations. 37.
  • Creditors of the Defunct. Ib.
  • Persons convict of Capital Crimes. Ib.
  • Curator. Ib.
  • Curatores ad Lites. Ib.
D.
  • Damnum. cum quis utitur Jure suo. 38.
  • Death-Bed. Ib.
  • Debitor and Creditor. 39.
  • Nomina Debitorum. Ib.
  • Strangers Debts. Ib.
  • Debitum Annuum. 40.
  • Debitum in Diem. Ib.
  • Decimae. Ib.
  • Decreets of the Lords of Session. Ib.
  • Deeds both inter Vivos, & Mortis Causa. Ib.
  • Dependence. 41.
  • Destination of Succession. Ib.
  • Desuetudo. Ib.
  • Dies coeptus. Ib.
  • Dilapidation. Ib.
  • Dishablitation. 42.
  • Power to Dispone, notwithstand­ing the giving away the Right of Fee. Ib.
  • Dispositio collata in arbitrium alterius. Ib.
  • Disposition. 43.
  • Actio ad Distractum. 43.
  • Division of the Duties of Lands, betwixt Buyer and Seller. Ib.
  • Donatio inter Virum & Ʋxorem. Ib.
  • Donatio mortis Causa. 44.
  • Donatio non acceptata. Ib.
  • Donators upon Recognition and Forefaulture. 45.
  • Duels and Hame-sucken. Ib.
E.
  • Emancipatio. Ib.
  • Contractus Emptionis, a Pretio inci­piens, aut Mensura. Ib.
  • What way the Buyer may be urg­ed to Enter. Ib.
  • Entry of Assigneys upon Resig­nation. 46.
  • Entry upon Resignation by a sin­gular successor. Ib.
  • Liferent Escheat. Ib.
  • Escheat single. 48.
  • Escheat without Backbond. Ib.
  • Delivered Evidents. 49.
  • Exception against the Cedent, if always competent against the Assigney? Ib.
  • Executor. Ib.
  • Executor Creditor. 52.
  • Executor Nominate. Ib.
  • Executory. Ib.
  • Extent. 54
  • Extinguishment of Rights. Ib.
F.
  • Faculty to alter. Ib.
  • Faculty to Dispone. Ib.
  • Jus Facultatis. Ib.
  • Personal Faculty. 55.
  • Quae Facultatis sint? Ib.
  • Quomodo intelligendum, Facultati non praescribi? Ib.
  • Faculty reserved to dispone. Ib.
  • [Page]Fee. 56.
  • De Feodo Pecuniae & Nominum. 57.
  • Feus. 67.
  • F uda Nobilia. Ib.
  • Fiar. Ib.
  • Fiars of Bonds. 68.
  • Fiars in Tailȝies. 69.
  • Fictio Juris. 70.
  • Fiscus. Ib.
  • Commissa Fisco. Ib.
  • Flumina. Ib.
  • Flumina Publica. Ib.
  • Forfaulture. 71
  • Forisfamiliation. 77
  • Funeral Charges. Ib,
G.
  • Gestio Haeredis. 78.
  • Gift. Ib.
  • Gift of Escheat with Backbond. 79.
  • Gifts of Forefaulture. Ib.
  • Gifts of Recognition. Ib.
  • Gift of Ward. 80.
  • If Gifts of Ward and Non-entry prejudge singular Successors? Ib.
  • Goods belonging to the Rebels at the Horn. Ib.
  • Grana crescentia. Ib.
  • Great Seal. 81.
H.
  • Heirs. Ib.
  • Behaving as Heirs. 82.
  • Heir of Conquest. Ib.
  • Discussion of Heirs. 83.
  • Heir and Executor. Ib.
  • Heirs Male. 84.
  • Obligements, in Contracts, in fa­vours of the Heirs of the Mar­riage. 85.
  • Heirs Portioners. 87.
  • Heirs of Provision and substitute. Ib.
  • Heirs of Tailȝie. Ib.
  • Quo casu, Heirs of Tailȝie may be considered as Creditors? 88.
  • Haereditas. 89.
  • Aditio haereditatis. Ib.
  • Haeres Contrahens. Ib.
  • Repudiatio Haereditatis. Ib.
  • Servus Haeres. Ib.
  • Ʋltimus Haeres. Ib.
  • Heirship Moveable. 90.
  • Money consigned for Redemption, whether Heritable or Moveable? Ib.
  • Sums Heritable or Moveable. Ib.
  • Homologation. Ib.
  • Horning. 91.
  • How far a Husband is lyable for his Wifes Debt? Ib.
  • De Hypothecis, Ʋulgo Wadsetts. 92.
  • Tacite Hypotheck. 94.
I.
  • Immobilia. Ib.
  • Immobilia per applicationem & aliis modis. 95.
  • Imposition upon the Pint of Ale. Ib. Impositions of Burdens upon Shires. 96.
  • Impositions voluntary upon Shir­es Ib.
  • Improbations. Ib.
  • Impugning the Authority of Par­liament. Ib.
  • Incendiarium. 97.
  • Incorporations. Ib.
  • Infeftment of Annualrent. Ib.
  • Base Infeftment. 98.
  • Infeftment in a Right, both of Pro­perty and Annualrent. Ib.
  • Infeftment for the use and beho of of another. 99.
  • Conditional Infeftments. Ib.
  • [Page]Publick Infeftments. Ib.
  • Inhibition. 100.
  • Inhibition upon Teinds 101.
  • Insinuatio. Ib.
  • Instance. 102.
  • Instantia. Ib.
  • Instrumentum Guarentigiatum. Ib.
  • Interdiction. Ib.
  • Inter decem Dies. Ib.
  • Intrometter. Ib.
  • Invecta & illata. 103.
  • Duobus Investitis per modum Confir­mationis, sed posterius acquirentis Jure prius confirmato, uter sit potior? Ib.
  • Investitura. 104.
  • Jura complexa. Ib.
  • Juramentum. Ib.
  • Jurisdictio. Ib.
  • Jurisdictio Camerae Imperialis. Ib.
  • Jus accrescendi. Ib.
  • Jus Mariti Ib.
  • Jus Mariti & Relictae. 106.
  • Jus Relictae. Ib.
  • Jus Superveniens. Ib.
  • Justice-General. 107.
K.
  • Nearest of Kin. Ib.
  • KING. 108.
  • King and Prince. Ib.
L.
  • Laudimium. Ib.
  • Lawburrows for Burghs. Ib.
  • In Lecto: Ib.
  • Legacies. 110.
  • Conditional Legacies. Ib.
  • Legal Reversion. 111
  • Legatars and Intrometters. Ib.
  • De Legatis. Ib.
  • Legatum rei alienae. Ib.
  • Legatum a Legatario acquisitum ante mortem Defuncti. 112
  • Res eadem duobus Legata. Ib.
  • Legitima Liberorum. Ib.
  • Legitimation per subsequens Matri­monium. 115.
  • Marriage and Legitimation. 116.
  • Leuteratio. Ib.
  • Libellarius Contractus. Ib.
  • Liberi. Ib.
  • Liferenter. Ib.
  • Executors of a Liferenter. 117.
  • Liferents. Ib.
  • Quando Dies cedit as to Liferenters? 118.
  • Vasallus Ligius. Ib.
  • Limitation of Fees Ib.
  • Litiscontestation. 119.
  • Quo casu Possessor in mala fide con­stituitur per Litiscontestationem, & quando non? Ib.
  • Locus Poenitentiae. Ib.
M.
  • Mare. 120.
  • Marriage. Ib.
  • Marriage Clandestine. 123.
  • Materna Maternis. Ib.
  • Matrimonium. 124.
  • Mensis. 125.
  • Mensura Taxative & Demonstrative. Ib.
  • Militia. Ib.
  • Miln. Ib.
  • Ministers Stipends in a Reddendo. Ib.
  • Minor. Ib.
  • Minor non tenetur Placitare. 126.
  • Reduction upon minority. Ib.
  • Decreet against Minors. Ib.
  • Mobilia. Ib.
  • Mobilium vilior possessio. Ib.
  • Modus habilis. 127.
  • [Page] Molendinum. Ib.
  • Molendina aquatica: Ib.
  • Molendina Bannaria. Ib.
  • Molendina navalia Immobilibus accen­sentur: Ib.
  • Molendina. [...] Ib.
  • Districtus Molendini. 128.
  • Quomodo qui sunt in districtu Molen­dini cogi queant? Ib.
  • An qui sunt in Districtu alibi molere possint? Ib.
  • An Extrui possit Molendinum quod noceat vicino? Ib.
  • An Molendinum possit Extrui sine li­centia Principis? Ib.
  • Restagnatio Molendini. Ib.
  • Ʋsus Molendinorum Juri Civili ig­notus. 129.
  • Ʋbi convenit, ut pro Familia molatur, quid Juris si aucta sit? Ib.
  • If a Mother and her friends may succeed? Ib.
  • Mutuum. Ib.
N.
  • Non-entry. 130.
  • Novo damus. Ib.
  • Nullitas ex verbis non licebit. 131.
  • Clausula ex unnc prout ex tunc. Ib.
  • Nundinae. Ib.
O.
  • Oath of Coronation. 132.
  • Qualified Oaths. Ib.
  • Correspective Obligements. 133.
  • Mutual Obligements in Con­tracts. Ib.
  • If Offices do Escheat by Horn­ing? Ib.
  • Omissa & male appretiata. Ib.
  • Operae. 134.
  • Order of Discussing. Ib.
P.
  • Pactis Privatorum non Derogatur Juri Communi. Ib.
  • Parliament. Ib.
  • Passing from a Right. 135.
  • Patents of Honour. Ib.
  • Pecunia Pupillaris. Ib.
  • Pensions granted by the King. 136.
  • Personalis Actus. Ib.
  • Pignora. Ib.
  • Plenishing; If a Wife be provided to a part of it? Ib.
  • Possessor. 137.
  • Poinding of the ground. Ib.
  • Prerogative. Ib.
  • Prescription. 139.
  • Prescription against the King. 140.
  • Presentation upon Forefaul­ture. 141.
  • Process against Strangers. 142.
  • Procuratories of Resignation. Ib.
  • Promise to Dispone, not in writ. Ib.
  • Protections. Ib.
  • Provisions in favours of Bairns. 143.
  • Provision in Bonds. Ib.
  • Provisions in Charters. Ib.
  • Provisions in Contracts. 144.
  • Provisions in favours of Daugh­ters. Ib.
  • Publica. Ib.
  • Pupils. 145.
Q.
  • Quartering. Ib.
  • Quorum. Ib.
R.
  • Ratihabitio. Ib.
  • Jus Ratium. 146.
  • Jura Realia in Re & in Rem. Ib.
  • Rebellion. Ib.
  • Whether the Rebels Goods ought [Page] to be Lyable to Creditors? Ib.
  • Recognition. 147.
  • Redemption Heretable or Move­able. 148.
  • Order of Redemption. Ib.
  • Reduction. Ib.
  • Reduction Ex capite Fraudis. 149.
  • Infeftment after Reduction. Ib.
  • Reduction Ex capite Metus. Ib.
  • Reduction upon Minority. Ib.
  • Reduction Ex capite Lecti. 150.
  • Re-entry after Redemption. Ib.
  • Regalia. Ib.
  • Regality. 151.
  • Writs registrate, that cannot be found in the Register. Ib.
  • Registratio. 152.
  • Regum Contractus. 154.
  • Relief of Cautioners. 155.
  • Relocation. Ib.
  • Reluitio seu Retractus. Ib.
  • Remissions. Ib.
  • Renounciation. Ib.
  • Renounciation by Daughters at their Marriage. 156.
  • Renunciatio Juri Publico. Ib.
  • Res Fiscales & res privatae Regis. Ib.
  • Re-seafin upon Reduction. Ib.
  • Reservation in favours of Relicts 157.
  • Resignation. Ib.
  • De Resignationibus. 158.
  • An Resignatio in Manibus Domini Superioris, alienantem penitus de­vestiat? Ib.
  • An ex Persona Resignatarii, & ejus vel obitu vel delicto, Custodia Haer­edis & alia emolumenta Domino directo obveniant? Ib.
  • An in Feudis, quae de Domino Rege tenentur, idem Jus sit, adeo ut per Resignationem Vasallus devestiatur? 159.
  • Si Alienatione facta, & ex ea Resig­natione; alia postea fiat, & ex ea etiam Resignatio in favorem alterius, isque primus Investitus fuerit: & post eum prius acquirens: Quaeritur uter Potior? 161.
  • An is qui in Dominium directum suc­cessit Titulo singulari, teneatur Ac­quirentem in vasallum recipere ex Resignatione in manibus Authoris? 164.
  • An Superior nedum Resignatarium e­jusque haeredes, sed Cessionarios in­vestire teneatur? 165.
  • De Resignationibus a Domino directo acceptatis, An devestiant Resignan­tes? 166.
  • Retention. 171.
  • Retours. Ib.
  • Retoured Duty. Ib.
  • Return of Lands to the Superior, upon a Provision. 172.
  • Return of Lands to the King, fail­ȝieing of Heirs Male. Ib.
  • Reversion. Ib.
  • Reversions of Comprysings against appearand Heirs. 173.
  • Reversion Personal. 174.
  • Legal Reversion competent to Idi­ots, &c. 175.
  • Rights made by Dyvours Ib.
  • Fraudulent Rights in prejudice of Creditors. 176.
  • Right a non habente potestatem. Ib.
  • Rights ad Tractum futuri Tempor­is. Ib.
  • Right in Trust. 177.
  • Ripae & Ripatica. Ib.
  • Quando Dies cedit in Grass Roums, when there is Question betwixt Fiars and Liferenters? Ib.
S.
  • [Page]Act Salvo. 179.
  • Seasin. Ib.
  • Registration of Seasins. Ib.
  • Special Services and Precepts of Clare constat. Ib.
  • Servitude and Extinguishment. thereof. Ib.
  • Lords of Session. 180.
  • Sheriffs. Ib.
  • Ships. Ib.
  • Solarium. 181.
  • Sponsalia. Ib.
  • Statuta. Ib.
  • Steelbow and Heirship. Ib.
  • Strangers.
  • Goods or Debts belonging to Stran­gers. Ib.
  • Subjects living Abroad. Ib.
  • Substitutes. 183.
  • Substitutio. Ib.
  • Substitution in Bonds. Ib.
  • Substitution in Legacies. 185.
  • Successio in Maternis. Ib.
  • Successio in Stirpes. 186.
  • De Successione in Feudo amisso, & quo Jure censenda, utrum Haereditatis an Conquestus? Ib.
  • Successor Titulo lucrativo. 191.
  • Singular Successors. 193.
  • Sums heretable and movable. Ib.
  • Sums moveable. 194.
  • Eldest Superior. Ib.
  • Superior mediate. Ib.
T.
  • Tack. Ib.
  • Back-Tack and Prorogations. 196.
  • Tack of Teinds. Ib.
  • Tailȝies. 197.
  • Tailȝie altered. 201.
  • Teinds. 202.
  • Teind of Fish. Ib.
  • Proving the Tenor. Ib.
  • Decreets for proving the Tenor. 203.
  • Terce. Ib.
  • Territorium. 205.
  • Testament. Ib.
  • Testament Execute. 206.
  • Testament and the Wifes part. Ib.
  • Testes. 208.
  • Third and Teind. Ib.
  • Titles of Honour. Ib.
  • Titular. 209.
  • Tocher. Ib.
  • Quaestiones de Tractatu Suedico, & Bonis prohibitis Vulgo Counterband. 210.
  • Posterity of Traitors. 214.
  • Transumpts. 215.
  • Trebellianica. Ib.
  • Trust. Ib.
  • Trustees in Infeftments. Ib.
  • A Trustee committing Treason. Ib.
  • Tutors. 216.
  • Tutor and administrator of Law. 217.
  • Tutor Ratione Rei. Ib.
  • Tutory. Ib.
V.
  • Re-entering of Vassals. 218.
  • Vectigalia & Pedagia. Ib.
  • Vinco Vincentem. Ib.
U.
  • Union. Ib.
  • Ʋniversalia Augmentum recipiunt. 219.
  • Quando Ʋniversitas delinquit? Ib.
W,
  • Wadsets. Ib.
  • Wadset Heretable or Move­able. [Page] 220.
  • Wadset proper. Ib.
  • Ward. 221.
  • Ward Lands. 222.
  • Taxt Ward. 223.
  • Warrandice. Ib.
  • Infeftment of Warrandice. 224.
  • Waste. Ib.
  • Witnesses Remitted. Ib.
  • Witnesses in case of Treason. Ib.
  • Women Witnesses. Ib.
  • Obligements to employ Sums of Money, for Provision of Wives. 225.
  • A Womans Jointure. Ib.
  • Woods. 226.
  • Wrack. Ib.
Z.
  • The case of the Admirality of Ork­nay, and Zetland, Represented in behalf of the King, in An­swer to the Duke of Lennox's Claime thereto. Ib.

ERRATA in the Doubts &c.

PAge 2. lin. 16, after posterior add first. p. 10. l. 21. given read got. p. 16. l. penult. dele or. p. 19. l. ult. place the comma after only. p. 23. l. 8. right r. burden. p. 25. l. 3. was r. is. Ibid. dele and. p. 26. l. 13. after Dispon­ner add a me & de me. p. 61. l. 22. r. in comperto. p. 82. l. 11. of Kin r. Heir of Tailȝie. p. 83. l. 12. after unles add, Tailȝied. p. 84, l. penult. Males ls. 1. Males are. p. 99. l. 19. after use add of. p. 102. l. 29. 1. Confirmatione. p. 114. l. 7. aditur r. auditur. ibid. l. 41. r. pertinebat. p. 122. l. 20. nor. r. but. p. 130. l. 7 Immediate r. mediate. p. 133. l. 10. against the Price r. against the Buyer. p. 170. l. 45. r. oblectari. p. 184. l. 11. null, r. Moveable. p. 195. l. [...]9. second r. first. p, 198. l. 8. dele male. p. 218. l. 14. after but add If,

SOME Doubts and Questions, IN THE LAW, Especially of SCOTLAND.

A.

Adjudications.

BY the Act of Parliament, upon Comprisings or Adjudications for a Sum of Money, The Superior may be forced to enter, or to pay the Debt, Quaeritur, If he may be urged to enter, upon Adjudications proceeding upon Dispositions, in prejudice of the Superior, by obtruding a Vassal; seing in that case he has not Retractum Feudalem?

A Vassal having made a Disposition, or granted a Bond for Disponing his Lands, will the Superiour be obliged to Infeft upon Adjudication? Ratio dubitandi. That the Superior, by the Act of Parliament, is obliged only to Infeft Comprysers, or Adjudgers being Lawful Creditors, and he has Retractum Feudalem paying the Creditor: And the Debitor has Retra­ctum Legalem, which is not in the case of Dispositions.

[Page 2]If Lands should be Adjudged from the Appearand Heir of Ward-lands, Whether will the Appearand Heirs Marriage be due, and affect the saids Lands in prejudice of the Adjudgers? Answer. Albeit that it appears, that Marriage should be of the nature of Ward, which is not Real as to singular Successors; the Superior having only Right to the Duties, which he may uplift; And ex stilo of a novo damus, Marriage is not reckoned amongst real Incumbrances; Yet in the case of Thornidikes, the Lords has found Marriage Real.

Whether, as Reversions that are comprysed need no Intimation, In Respect of the Series of Solemnities that is in Comprysings, By which they become so publick, that they are presumed to be known to the Per­son Lyable, If there be not Eadem Ratio in Adjudications, being now of the nature of ordinary Decreets?

If at least there be a difference betwixt Bonds and Reversions; So that, as to Bonds, when there is a Competition of Two Comprysers, The Posterior intimating should be preferred?

If Superiors, who are Subjects only, will be obliged to receive Adjudg­ers to be their Vassals, having Adjudged not for Debt, but upon Dis­positions? And if the King be in another Condition?

If, upon a Disposition, The Receiver should obtain Sentence for Dam­nage and Interest against the Disponer his Heir for Implement, If in that case, the Adjudger ought to be received? Ratio Dubitandi, That Pri­mordium inspiciendum est; and upon the matter there was not a Debt ab initio?

If a Reduction Ex capite Minoritatis, not being intented at the in­stance of the Minor, Jus Actionis may be Adjudged?

An Heretable Bond being Adjudged, Though there be no necessity of Intimation, because Adjudications and Comprysings are publick Rights upon Record. Quaeritur, If the Debitor, paying bona fide to the person, to whom he granted the Bond, will be in Tuto, the said Adjudi­cation not being intimate? Answer. It is thought, that he should be in Tuto, seing Intimations are required for Two Effects. Viz. Either to compleat the Right be Assignation, or to certiorate the Debitor that he make payment to no other person: And though an Adjudication be sufficient, as to the said first Effect, an Intimation is necessary as to the other, unless the Debitor be called in the Adjudication.

Advocation by the Justices.

IF the Justices may Advocate to themselves Criminal Processes, depending before Lords of Regality, or other Judges? It is thought, The Lords of Justiciary cannot Advocat: The taking or Advocating Processes, from a Competent Judicatory, upon Reasons of Advocation, being a Power and Prerogative belonging to his Majestie's Supreme Ju­dicatories of Session and Council. And Reasons of Advocation, either upon Suspicion, or some other Reason meerly Civil or of State, belong not to the Cognisance of the Justices, but to the Lords of Session and Council. If they were to Advocate, the Reasons of Advocation be­hooved to be first discust; and what could be the method, since all Pro­cesses [Page 3] before the Justices are so peremptory, That Caution must be found both by the Pursuer and Defender.

Alimenta.

COnstituto semel Alimento, quo nihil in jure magis favorabile, aut magis personale, de eo nec Alienatio nec Transactio rité celebratur; datur enim ut persona exhibeatur & utcunque vitam toleret; Mirum igitur Advocatos primi ordinis tanto conatu & boatu summa ope annisos, ut Judicibus persuade­rent aut imponerent, asserentes Alimentum, uxori constitutum juri Mariti obnoxium esse, vel saltem creditoribus Mariti esse integrum illud afficere; Quod enim ossibus haeret nec a persona cui competit avelli aut alienari potest, illud nec juris Ministerio, aut fictione transfertur; Quum igitur Alimentum adeo personale sit (ut superius diximus) ut alienari nequit, ita ut ab uxore nu­bendo in Maritum non possit transferri tacitâ & quasi alienatione: Sublato autem jure Mariti, jus Creditorum quod subit in consequentiam & ut accessorium cor­ruit, nec subsistit magis quam accidens sine subjecto. Broomhall contra Darsie, Julii 7. 1678.

Altarage.

SOme Lands being Founded, by a Burges of Dumfermling, to an Altar in the Church of Dumfermling, for Maintainance of a Chaplain at Saint Marys Altar there; And it being provided by the Foundation, that the Founder and his Heirs Male should Present the Chaplain; The said Lands being after Fewed, and since Disponed Quaritur, How shall the purchaser be Infeft? This case is not under the Act of Parliament anent Laick Patronages; The case there being of Patronages, whereof there is Infeftment holden of the King, whereas the Patronage in Question, is not by Infeftment, but provision as said is: It is thought, that the Chaplain is Superiour: And if there be none, a Chaplain should be presented. Caribber.

Quaeritur, The Patronage being to the Heirs Male of the Founder, and if they do not present within [...] Days, The Dean of Gild of that Town should present, Whether the Heir-Male may Dispone the Patro­nage? Ratio dubitandi. The Provision in the Foundation, is not in favours of Assigneys, and the Founder had confidence only in his Heirs; And such an Interest being Religious, and provided to a Family, with the said substitution, is not in commercio. Randifurd.

Annexation to a Barony in another Shire.

WHat is the effect and import of Annexation of Lands, lying within one Shire, to a Barony lying within another? Whether it be Annexation only, that one Seasin may be sufficient, for all the Lands, though in several Shires: Or that Inhibitions, and other Diligence should be used at the Mercat-cross, where the Barony lyeth?

Annualrent.

AN whole Barony of Land, being affected with an Annualrent, and being thereafter Disponed in several parcels to diverse persons; If one of the saids Purchasers should be distressed, for the whole Annualrent, [Page 4] May he have recourse against the others, for their proportional parts, they being in rem correi debendi?

A Person being Infeft in an Annualrent irredeemably, so that neither the Heretor may Redeem, nor the Annualtenter may require his Money, and the Annualrenter not being Creditor, but upon the matter Emptor annui reditus, Quaeritur, Whether such Annualrents will be lyable to subsequent Laws, restricting and lessening Annualrents? Ratio dubitan­di, These Laws do militate only in the case of Mutuum, which is not here; There being neither Sors, nor Ʋsura, nor Debitum, as to the principal Sum; And though such Annualrents be constitute with a respect to the Sum that was payed, and the Annualrents thereof current for the time, That does not alter the case; seing the property of Lands is only bought with the like consideration, And the Annualrents of Money might have been heightned, and the Annualrenter wants the benefite competent to him in the case of mutuum, viz. In the case of Money lent out for Annualrent, he might uplift the Sum, and employ it more profitably than for a small Annualrent.

An Annualrent being Disponed to be uplifted out of Lands and Teinds, and Infeftment following thereupon. Quaeritur, What will be the Effect of the said Right as to the Teind, seing the Ground cannot be Poinded for the same; these not being Fundus? Answer, The Right of the Teinds may be apprysed, and a personal Action will be competent a­gainst the Heritor of the Teinds, during his occupation.

An Annualrent being disponed, to be by Infeftment out of several Lands lying discontigué; Quaeritur, If the Disponer may unite the same, so that one Infeftment, taken at one of the Lands, may be sufficient for the others?

Annualrent for Damnage.

Quaer. IF the Defender should be lyable for Annualrent of the price, in so far as it is more, nor the Worth of the Lands? It is thought Not, because the Rate is not certain, and the Defender may get a Buyer at the same price; And that the Defender was in bona fide to contract with a Pupil so authorized, and if he have prejudice, he should have recourse against his Tutors Representatives; And Annualrent is not due for Damnage and Interest until it be declared. Tweeddale contra Dru­melziar, vide Reduction upon Minority litera M.

Right of Annualrent.

A Person having disponed Lands, with a Procuratory of Resignation and Infeftment to the Buyer of the Lands, and for security to him­self of a part of the Price for an Infeftment of Annualrent redeemable upon payment of the Sum, and with a Clause likeways that the Infeft­ment shall expire. Quaeritur, 1. If there be prejudice to the Buyer, that his Right should be so affected, being his Ground-right? Answer, It is thought there is none; Seing upon payment, if the Party desire, There may be a Renunciation, upon the back of both Charter and Seasin, rela­ting to another of the same Date, to the effect it may be registrate. 2. Quaeritur, If the said Right, being to be holden of the Superior, may [Page 5] be extinguished without Resignation? Answer. It, being only a redeem­able Right, after Redemption, in strictness of Form, cannot be resigned, because it is loused. And formerly, in Wadsets of Property, the Supe­rior, upon the Redemption, did grant Precepts; and a Right of Annu­alrent cannot be resigned for a new Infeftment given to the Heretors Superior, that being inconsistent with the Property in one Person; And therefore, a Decreet of Redemption, with the Clause foresaid Resolutive in case of Redemption, relating to both, doth sufficiently extinguish it. And if there should be a Resignation in the Superiors hands, it should not be in favorem, for the Reason foresaid, or ad Remanentiam; But to the effect the Annualrent might be renounced, and consolidate with the Property, with the Superiors consent.

Relicts Annuity.

WHen a Husband is obliged, and his Heirs, to pay an Annuity to his Wife in Liferent; If other Creditors be about to do Diligence and Comprise after his Death, Quaeritur If the Relict may not pursue the Heir to secure her, and for that effect to grant Infeftment of Annual­rent, and upon a Decreet Adjudge an Annualrent upon that Ground? Quando aliquid conceditur aut disponitur, conceduntur omnia sine quibus non potest explicari: And the Obligement for the Annuity will be otherways Void.

Annus Ʋtilis.

ANnus utilis Duplex est, 1. Ratione initii, ut initium sit utile, & post­modum Dies continui. 2. Ratione omnium dierum, ut actor habeat potestatem agendi, reus respondendi, & Dies sint judiciales. Thes. Besold. in Lit. I. 51. vid. Injuria.

Appellatio.

APpellatio non permittitur in foro Saxoniae, sed in ejus locum successit Leu­teratio, ad eum finem introducta, coram eodem Judice, ut gravamina errore forte litigantium, vel negligentia Judicis illata, brevi manu reparentur, sed hu­jus rei abusus perspicuus est. Vide Leuteratio, Besold. Thes. Litera. l. 53.

Appellatio a Camera Imperiali.

APud Germanos, cum sit ultimum Judicium Camera, ab ea non appellatur ne tamen sua potestate abutatur, constitutum est judicium Revisorium, ad quod ij qui per iniquitatem aut negligentiam Assessorum laesos se existimarent, provocare & Revisionem petere possent; per Commissarios Imperatoris, & Statuum Imperii, ad id deputatos, adversus sententiam sine dolo, non tamen sine errore, aut culpa latam. Fritschii Exercitat. juris publici, pars. 2. exercit. 1. n. 88. & sequen.

Revisio habet effectum Executionis suspensivum, 91. Ibid.

Judicium Camerale cum non a solo Imperatore, sed a Statibus suam accepe­rit authoritatem, tum Imperatoem, tum Status repraesentat, Ibid. n. 83.

Camerae Praesidem & Assessores initio constituebat Imperator, sed Ordinibus, [Page 6] consentientibus, id deinceps mutatum, ut Assessores ab Ordinibus praesentarentur Ibidem.

Imperator causas in Camera caeptas, avocare non potest; quia per modum Contractus in ordinationem Camerae consensit, & ideo ad ejus observantiam de jure tenetur, Ibid. n. 84.

De Appellatione a Praefecto Praetorio, & aliorum Judicum Sententiis.

LIcet ab iis ob eorum Excellentiam non liceat provocare, iis tamen qui Laesos se affirmant supplicandi Licentia permittitur, & remedium datur per Suppli­cationem ex gratia, non per viam Restitutionis ex Justitia, praesertim cum sen­tentia lata est contra Jus Litigatoris. Thes. Besoldi. p. 557. litera L.

Appellatio a Vicario.

AVicario ad eum cujus est Vicarius, non appellatur, cum utriusque idem sit Tribunal. L. Romana 3. de appellationibus sexto Decret. L. 1. & 2. Cod. De Officio ejus, cujus vice alter judicat. Sigismund: Scaccia de Appellationibus. q. 8. n. 61.

Approbatio.

1mo. Nulla Exceptio aut allegatio in foro magis trita aut frequentior est illâ de Approbatione; aut (ut loquimur) de Homologatione, quae illâ regulâ niti videtur, quod approbo non reprobo: Sed cum omnis de­finitio in jure sit periculosa, & ista ut omnis materia Brocardica variis substrin­gatur limitationibus; aut enim Approbatio juris alicujus, celebratur expressâ ra­tificatione & id agitur ut approbetur, & eo casu reprobare quod approbavit nulli li­cet, nec honestum est: aut aliud agitur, sed ex actu colligitur & infertur approbatio, & eo casu dispiciendum quid actum, & actus agentium ultra eorum mentem & intentionem haud operantur. v. g. Emi praedium, ratus illud ad vendito­rem pertinere ut optimum maximum, nec Servituti aut Reversioni (ut loqui­mur) seu Retractui obnoxium; emersit adversarius Sempronius asserens servi­tutem aut jus praedii Reluendi sibi competere; ejus vel potentiam veritus, vel alia ratione impulsus, cum eo transegi, isto jure vel mihi cesso vel acceptilato, sed Titius idem jus servitutis aut Retractus ab eodem authore adeptus, sed po­tius quia anterius: Si ex eo contra me ageret, mihi contra jus Retractus aut servi­tutis excipienti haud obtrudi posset me jus homologasse & approbasse; eo quod cessionem, aut acceptilationem ejus stipulatus fui, ea enim transactione id tan­tum agebatur, ut litis ansâ praecisâ, conditio mea melior non deterior foret; & ut mihi consulam acquirendo jus, si quod erat penes Sempronium, non vero ut jus aliquod a me alienem.

2do. Eadem ratione, si juris mei ignarus praedium meum conduxi, aut post locationem Dominium ejus nactus, & domini forte haeres sum; in possessorio, lo­catore de mercede agente, de jure meo exceptio haud admittenda est, nemo enim sibi causam possessionis mutare potest: nec minus possessione reddita jus meum in­tegrum & illibatum superest, nec in petitorio, aut declaratorio obest conductio, aut exceptio, Quod approbo non reprobo; conducendo siquidem praedium quod ignarus meum esse, alienum rebar & locantis, id mihi erat propositi, ut jus in eo consequar, non ut jus in alium transferam: & consensui, sine quo nec est, nec esse potest alienatio, nil magis contrarium quam error.

Arrestment.

IF Arrestment be Pignus Praetorium, and doth so affect, that in whatso­ever hands the thing arrested cometh, it will be lyable thereto? Or if it be only a Diligence, and upon the matter of the nature of Inhibition in mobilibus, so that the Debitor dying, or the subject that is arrested being Poinded or Comprysed, the Arrestment will be ineffectual?

If the Goods in the Hands of the Debitor, upon Arrestment, may ha­bili modo be craved to be forthcoming? Or if habilis modus of all Goods (but Money) be to Poind or Apprise: the Propriety of Corpora being on­ly transmitted per Traditionem?

If Arrestment upon a registrate Bond may be loused being before the Term of Payment?

Whether, where there is nothing due by a Person in whose hands Ar­restment is made the time of the Arrestment, the same will affect a su­pervenient Debt?

If Arrestment die with the Debitor, or doth affect after his Decease?

If a Bond for lousing Arrestment be void through the Debitors De­cease?

If at least an Arrestment upon a Decreet, be of an other nature than that upon a Dependence, being in effect Pignus Praetorium, and Execution pro tanto; or if it should be at the most, like a Denounciation, whereup­on Comprising has not followed in the Defuncts time, which therefore is void?

Albeit an Arrestment doth not import a Right of Hypotheck, and that notwithstanding, an other Creditor may poind. Quaeritur, If at least, it should have that Effect, That the Person in whose hands the Arrest­ment is made, cannot pay the Debitor in prejudice of the Arrester: and that as he cannot pay the Debitor, so after his decease he cannot pay his Heir nor Executor, being eadem Persona?

Executors being in Competition upon Arrestment to make forth­coming, Whether they should come in all pari passu, notwithstanding some be before, and some after; as in the Case of Comprisings being both at one time, though the Denounciation be at several times?

Quaeritur, If an Arrestment doth affect Debts due by the Person in whose hands the Arrestment is made contracted after the Arrestment? Ratio Dubitandi, Inhibition doth affect Lands acquired thereafter; and Arrestment, as to such things as are the Subject of Arrestment, is of the nature of Inhibitions, and there is eadem ratio as to the Interest of the Creditor.

Arrestment being made of a Sum, due by a moveable Bond, bearing Annualrent, and of all profits due to the Debitor by the said Bond. Quae­ritur, Whether the said Arrestment should be effectual, not only for the Annualrents already run, but these that should accrue thereafter? The same Question may be as to duties of Lands. Ratio Dubitandi, Quod non est, aut nullum est, nullum sortitur effectum. And Arrestment of what is not yet extant, is accidens sine subjecto. It is thought, That there is a dif­ference betwixt a Debt, that is not neither in sp [...], nor obligatione; and condi­tional Debts, which though the Condition be not existing, may be arrest­ed; and the Condition existing, the Arrestment will be effectual: and a [Page 8] fortiori, Annualrents, and Mails, and Duties, may be affected by Arrest­ment, seing, from the date of the Obligation, dies cedit, though non venit.

If a Debitor be in Possession of a Coal, or of a Miln in his own hand, what course can be taken by a Creditor, at whose Instance there is a Dependence, to secure the Profits, in case he prevail?

What is the Reason of Difference betwixt Arrestment and Inhibition, as to that Point, seing Arrestment affects only what belongs to the Debitor for the time? Answer, The Arrestment relates to Goods and Debts, the time of the Arrestment; and Inhibition is simply, that the Debitor should not dispone his Lands and Estate; and Arrestments are a Diligence a­gainst the Party who is Debitor, or has any Goods in his Hands belong­ing to the Arresters Debitor himself.

Arrestment of Conditional Debts.

IF a Creditor should arrest a Sum due to his Debitor upon a Wadset, in case of Redemption; What will the Import be of such an Arrest­ment? Answer. If redemption follow, and after the Order another Cre­ditor arrest; It is thought, That the Arrestment before will be preferable; as in the case of the Arrestment of a conditional Debt, which will be drawn back, Existente conditione, vide Wadset Quaest: 1 ma. Litera W.

Arrestment Loused.

QƲaeritur, If upon a Dependence, or Bond unregistrate, there be Ar­restment laid on, and the same be loused; and thereafter, the Goods arrested be poinded, The Cautioner for lousing the Arrestment will be lyable? Ratio Dubitandi is, That the Goods were not fraudfully put a­way by the Debitor. Quaeritur, If after the Arrestment, the Debitor con­tract Debts, and the Goods be poinded for the said Debt, contracted after the lousing the Arrestment, Quid Juris, Will the Cautioner be lyable?

Per Aversionem.

AVersione emere, aut locare dicimur, cum universaliter & uno pretio ven­dimus aut locamus: Duobus enim modis locatio fit, vel per Aversionem vel ut in pedes, vel mensuras, merces praestetur. Thes. Bes. verbo Busch­stauff. 127.

B.

Back-bonds to the Exchequer.

THE Exchequer having granted Gifts: v. g. of Recognition, or others, but upon Back-bonds in favours of Creditors, and of the Wife and Children; So that they have reserved no Interest to the King, but to themselves only to regulate and arbitrate the dispenceing the Benefite of the Back-bond, in favours of Creditors and the Wife and Children; May they proceed, and apply that Benefite, in favours of such [Page 9] as apply to them, without calling the other Parties? It is thought, That the Lords of Exchequer are to be considered as Arbitri, and that their Ar­bitrium is regulatum, and should not be used, without citeing of all these, who have any Interest; that upon full hearing of all Parties, they may proceed.

Bairns Part.

IF a Son get a Portion in order to live upon it seorsum, and out of his Fathers Family. Quaeritur. If he can be thought a Bairn, and claim a Bairns-part, seing he has not granted a Discharge, nor accepted the same in Satisfaction. James Cheisly.

There being Three Heirs of diverse Marriages, and certain Provisions in favours of the Heirs of the Marriage, being made in the respective Contracts of Marriage. Quaeritur. If (there being no other Bairns in fa­milia) they will have their Bairns-part, notwithstanding they are Heirs? And if they have, Quaeritur. If they must confer their Provisions, if they be unequal? Answer. They will come in as Bairns. And as to the second Quaerie, It is thought, they should not confer; seing they have their Provisions, not simply as Heirs, but as Children, by the said Pro­sions.

Bond Heretable.

IF a Bond bearing an Entail of a Sum. Viz. To the Creditor and the Heirs of his Body, which Failȝieing to a Brother, or Heir of a Brother, who would not succeed either him or his Children; be Hero­table, in Respect of the Entail, though Executors be not excluded, nei­ther doth it bear a Clause of Infeftment?

A Band being granted to a Husband, and his Wife the longest Liver of them Two, and the Heirs of the Marriage, which Failȝieing, to the Husbands Heirs and Assigneys whatsomever. Quaeritur. Whether the said Bond belongs to the Heirs or Executors of the Husband. Ratio Dubitandi, It is granted since the Act of Parliament 1641. And the Act of Parliament 1661. and the Act of Parliament 1641, are positive, that all Bands for Sums of Money bearing Annualrent are Moveable, Ex­cept in the two cases therein exprest, viz. Of an obligement to Infeft, Or of a Clause Excluding Executors. And on the other part, the said Acts seem only to intend Bonds containing payment of Annualrent for profit, which upon that account before the said Act were Heretable after the Term: Whereas the Bond in Question is not only Heretable upon the ac­count foresaid of payment of Annualrent; But because the same is ex­presly Tailȝied, and provided in favours of Heirs, and in the first place of Heirs of Provision of the Marriage: And the Sum is of purpose Here­tably fixed for a Liferent to the Wife and a right of succession to the Bairns of the Marriage, so that the Husband cannot Test of it; And it cannot fall under Executory ab intestato, in prejudice of the said Tailȝie: And is of the same Nature, as if a Bond were taken to a Man and his Heirs Male, which would not be Moveable, seing it implyes the Clause excluding Executors.

When a Bond is taken to the Creditor, and Failȝieing of him by De­cease [Page 10] to another person, bearing only Annualrent and no Hererable Clause, Quaeritur; If the Creditor to whom it is granted may Dispose of it by Testament? Ratio Dubitandi, it seems not to be Heretable by the Act of Parliament: On the other part the said Substitution imports the E­xecutors to be excluded, and a Testator cannot dispose by Testament of what ab intestato could not fall to Executors: And though the Creditor be Fiar and may dispose of the said Sum, yet he cannot do it on Death-bed; the same being an Heretable Sum.

If at least after the Death of the Creditor the said Sum be Heretable in the Person of the Substitute? Ratio Dubitandi, The same is Moveable by Act of Parliament; And the Substitute having now right to it, he is in the same case as if the Bond were granted to him: Ex adverso, the same being semel Heretable is semper Heretable, untill it be made Move­able by a Charge.

If a Bond containing such a Substitution should be made Moveable by a Charge, would it notwithstanding belong to the Substitute?

If an Heretable Bond may be comprysed; And if the Legal expire will the Creditor have right to the sumes contained therein, though far ex­ceeding his Debt?

Bond Moveable.

A Party having given a Bond to the end that thereupon a Comprysing may be deduced against the Granter, For settleing the Estate of his Father in his Person; And having granted a Back-bond to pay the per­son granter of the Bond a Sum of Money, with Provision That if he de­nude of the Comprysing he shall be free of payment of the Money. Quae­ritur, If the Sume be Moveable; So that the Relict of the Creditor may crave a part thereof Jure Relictae, in respect the Sum is in Obligatione: And to denude of the Right of the Comprysing is in Facultate Solvendi. Mr. Archibald Nisbet contra Dalgarno.

Bonds of Provision to Children.

A Father having granted Bonds of Provision to Children with a Clause That they should be valid though not delivered, Quaeritur, The same being granted in Leige poustie, If they should prejudge the Relict or Fisk? Ratio Dubitandi, The Granter is Master of them, and may Can­cel and destroy them. Answer. Si absit Dolus and the Defunct did in­tend nothing but to provide his Children, they should be considered as a Debt.

Bond of Relief.

IF a Person obliged Conjunctly with another upon a Bond to be reliev­ed may not after Registration of the Principal Bond charge for Re­lief: And for that effect to pay the Sum and poind for the same? Forbes contra Ʋdnic,

Baron Courts.

QƲaeritur If the Superior may pursue before his Baron Court for Non-entry, or Ward, or Marriage? Ratio Dubitandi, That the said Casualities are fructus of the Superiority; And seing the Baron may pur­sue his Tennents for the Fruits of Property, There is the same Reason, that he should pursue for the Fruits of his Superiority: And the Vassals have no prejudice, but rather Advantage, that they are not taken from their own Houses to answer before another Court, and to be at the Charges both of Attendance and Process, which are greater there: And if the Baillie do wrong, it may be repaired by a Reduction.

Bastard.

IF a Bastard has disponed his Estate in Leige Poustie, and Infeftment has not followed dureing his Life, Will the King or his Donator be lyable to fulfil the Disposition?

If a Bastard's Relict and Bairns, will have their Legitime, though he cannot make a Testament? Answer. Affirmativé.

If having Children, he may make a Testament, and name a stranger an Executor; seing the King has not prejudice: And his Children cannot complain, having their Legitime? Cogitandum.

If at least he may leave Legacies: And his Children Executors nomi­nate, at the least nearest of Kin, and Executors ab intestato will be lyable to the same?

If a Bastard has Testamenti factionem passivam, and may be named Ex­ecutor, or Heir of Provision? Answer. Affirmative.

If a Bastard may have an Heir of Tailȝie and Provision? Cogitandum.

If a Bastard, by a Deed inter vivos has disponed his Estate in Lands by a delivered Write: and dyeth before the Right be perfected, Quaeri­tur, What way the same shall be perfected? or what Action is compe­tent to the Person in whose Favours it is made, and against whom? An­swer, It is thought, that the King being to succeed to the Bastard, his Of­ficers may be pursued, and the Director of the Chancery, if the Lands hold of the King (and if they hold of another Superior, the said Supe­rior) To hear and see the samen adjudged, and Precepts directed.

Quid Juris, If the Deed be not a simple Disposition, but a Right to the Disponer in Liferent, and another Person in Fee; with the ordinary Clauses and Power to alter? Answer, There may be more Question in this case, being upon the matter Donatio mortis causâ.

Quae Ratio, That a Bastard cannot make a Testament, whether or not ob maculam natalium: Or that by reason thereof they were as Dedititij in Law, swa that during Life they were liberi, but dyed servi and nulli, without power to dispose of any thing? Answer, That the said Incapa­city was ratione natalium: Seing these who have no other Heirs (so that the King is to succeed as ultimus Haeres) have not Testamenti factionem.

If a Father who is a Bastard will succeed to his Children? Answer, It is thought, he will.

Bishops.

IF Precepts granted by Bishops may be execute after their Death? If a Bishop being upon the point to be Translated, may accept a Renunciation of a Tack not expired, and grant a new Tack for moe years, in prejudice of his Successor? Or if he may set a Tack?

Bishops Debts.

SEing Bishops are an Incorporation and do not represent their Prede­cessor's Person, but only the Incorporation: and therefore are not lyable to his Debts; Quaeritur, If at least he be lyable to the Debts of the Bishoprick, As v. g. If there be an Annualrent payable out of the same to a pious Use, and the preceeding Bishop has not paid the same: Will his Successors be lyable personally, at least will their Rents be affected by a real Action of Poinding the Ground, or like to the same?

Quid Juris As to the Taxation; if a Bishop would be lyable for these bygones that were due by his Predecessor: reserving Relief against his Heirs and Executors?

Bodomaria.

BOdomaria est Foenus Nauticum, quo sub spe majoris lucri pecunia datur Navis Patrono, hoc pacto ut salvâ nave tantum cum faenore reddatur, relicto interea Hypothecae loco navigii fundo, quo perdito & capitale interit. Besold. Thesaurus, Bodom.

Burgh's Liferent Escheat.

WHat Execution can be against Burghs for their Debt? If they may be charged with Horning, and if thereupon any Liferent Escheat may follow?

C.

Camera Imperialis.

CAmerae sententiae, an ab iis appelletur; an Imperator eas avocare possit? de earum revisione, vide A. & ibi Appellat.

Captions.

IF Captions may be Execute after Sun-set, seing Poinding cannot be then executed? It appears there is difference betwixt Poinding and Caption, by reason other Persons that may have interest in the Goods may be concerned in the Poinding, which is not in Captions: And the [Page 13] Kings Rebels may be taken at anytime, and there is no time so fit to take and surprise them as the night. Rothemay against Forbes. Before, the Coun­cil found that Captions should not be execute in the night.

Casualities of Superiority.

IN General It is thought that all Casualities, which are Fructus Dominit directi, are to be considered as fructus pendentes of Lands, which per­tain to the singular Successor; unless they be Collecti: and they are never thought to be Collecti, unless they be at least claimed and pursued for.

Causa cum qua Res transit.

REs transit cum sua causa, hoc est cum omni cominedo, & onere. Jus. Fluv. p. 775. n. 55.

In conditionali dominio interest, an sub conditione ad nos pertineat, an verò. à nobis abscedat; priori casu quamvis Dominium in Aere stare non putest, tamen quoad nos est in pendenti & in spe tantum: altero, est actu nostrum sed existen­te conditione resolvitur: Nam meum est quod certâ lege meum est, Jus Fluviat. p. 790. n. 145. & deinceps.

Cautioner and Relief.

IF a Cautioner be Denounced for his Cautionry, will the Principal be lyable to relieve him of the loss of his Escheat? Ratio Dubitandi, The Principal is obliged to relieve him of what he should pay for him, but not of the prejudice he should sustain for his Contumacy and Rebellion, through his not payment.

Chaplainrie.

LAnds being holden of a Chaplain, a Bishop being Patron, if there be not a Chaplain and the Bishop delay or refuse to present, what course shall be taken by the Vassals Heir, or singular Successor to get In­feftment? If the Bishop may not be pursued, and the Director of the Chancery, to hear and see him decerned to present a Chaplain, and to exhibite to one of the Clerks of Session the Presentation to be registrat, to the effect it may be known and patent to the Leidges, and that within [...] days after he be charged: And in case of disobedience, ve­rified by a Horning against him upon the Decreet; The Director of the Chancery to direct Precepts for infefting of the Vassal.

Seing by Act of Parliament anent the Superiority of Chaplainries, and such like, The Patron to the Chaplain is appointed to be Superior to the Chaplains Vassals. Quaeritur, If Chaplains hold of the Bishops, the Bi­shop will be Superior? Answer, It is thought, not; seing the said Act of Parliament is only in favours of Laick Patrons, and was made when the Bishops were suppressed.

Charge to enter Heir.

AN appearand Heir being charged to enter Heir in General, and renouncing, Quaeritur, If there may be a Comprising or Adjudi­cation against him, unless he be charged to enter Heir in Special? Ra­tio Dubitandi, That frustra should he be charged to enter Heir having al­ready renounced: Yet it is thought he ought to be charged, seing a spe­cial Charge to enter Heir, is Instar and in place of a Special Service, and Infeftment thereupon: and the Heir may repent that he renounced, and may be better advised, when he is charged to enter Heir in Special.

Chattels Real.

LIferents, Non-entries, Ward, and such like Casualities, that are successive when they are gifted, they become real Chattels, and will fall to the Executors of the Donator, as is thought; Quaeritur, If when they are not gifted they should be considered also as Chattels, so as to be­long to the Executors of the Superior, and not to his Heirs and Successors of the Land? Cogitandum.

Children and Creditors.

IF a Father grant Bonds to his Children, and thereafter contract Debt, so that he is not in a condition to satisfie both his Creditors and Children, Whether the granting of Bonds for Onerous Causes will import a Revo­cation of the Childrens Provision: At least will the posterior Creditors be priviledged and preferable to the Children?

Childrens Provisions.

A Father having disponed to his Son of the first Marriage, the Fee of his Estate; with power to burden it with 40000 merks for pro­vision of his remanent Children allanerly. Quaeritur, If he being then married upon a Woman of that age, that he could not have Children by her, should thereafter marry; May he provide any part of that Sum to the Children he had thereafter of the last Marriage? Or if the remanent Children, in whose favours the Faculty is reserved, can only be understood of the remanent Children of the first Marriage, he having then five be­sides the Heir, Mr. Alexander Gibson contra his Brother.

Civitas.

CIvitates & Municipia intelliguntur nomine Reipublicae: & eis competit beneficium Legis. leg. 3. cod. de Jure Reipub. Sc. Rempublicam ut pu­pillam extra ordinem juvari. Frischius Tom. 2. exercit. juris publici, ex­ercit. 2. n. 17. & sequen.

Praescriptio non currit minori sed Civitati, Ibid. 35.

Propter tenuitatem civitas novum vectigal imponit, Ibid. 37.

Gaudet Praescriptione centum annorum.

Ex solo pacto sine traditione, quibusdam casibus habet in rem actionem Ibid.

Ʋsus-fructus ei relictus durat centum annis Ibid.

Clauses in Contracts of Marriage.

THe Contract of Marriage betwixt Alexander Sandilands, and Agnes Sandilands his Wife Daughter to Robert Sandilands Dean of Gild, beareth that provision, Viz. That the said Robert and his foresaids are o­bliged to the said Agnes and her Spouse that at Robert his Decease the said Agnes his Daughter shall be esteemed a Bairn of the House and Family; And shall succeed to her Part and Portion Natural equally with the rema­nent of Robert's Bairns to all Sums, Plenishing Goods and Gear; and others that should pertain to the said Robert the time of his Decease.

The said Alexander is obliged and his foresaids, that whatever Benefite shall fall to the said Agnes, or her to succeed to by her Fathers Decease, or by vertue of the said Obligement, to provide the same after he should get it, to himself and her in Conjunct-fee and Liferent, and to the Bairns be­twixt them, which Failȝieing his Heirs and Assigneys, 9 January 1657. Registrate 1 March 1671.

The said Alexander is obliged to provide the Conquest to himself in Liferent; and their Bairns in Fee.

The Contract of Marriage betwixt John Hamilton Writer and Rachel Sandilands the other Daughter of the said Robert, Bears, That they accept the Tocher in satisfaction of all other Sums, Executory, Debts, Goods, and Gear, and others whatsomever which was provided to the said Rachel, or which may fall or pertain to her, or may be claimed by her by Decease of the said Robert, or her Mother Mause Weir: All which she and her Husband Assignes to the said Robert, his Heirs, Executors, or Assigneys to be Disponed at their pleasure.

By the Clause of Conquest the said John is obliged to provide the same to himself in Liferent, and the Bairns in Fee: And to that effect to insert the Bairns Names in the Writes.

The said Rachel, if her Husband Decease before her, is to have (if there be no Children) the half; and (if there be) the third of the plenishing of the House the time of his Decease, which is to be made free of Debts by his Heirs and Executors.

Quaeritur, If the Obligement to succeed to all that should pertain to the Father should be understood, only as to a Bairns Part, and should not be extended to the Deads-part?

If what should fall to Agnes after her Fathers Decease, should belong to the Bairns of the Marriage, though the Marriage be disolved through the Husbands Decease before the Father Robert his Decease?

If Rachel the other Daughter notwithstanding her Renounciation, will come in as one of the nearest of Kin, at least as to Deads Part, Viz. Deads third and the half of a Bairns Part.

By Contract of Marriage, the Husband is obliged in the first place to provide 30000 Merks, to his Wife in Liferent, and the Heirs of the Mar­riage presently: And to the other Bairns 18000 Merks after his Decease. Quaeritur, The Heir being served, will there be a Confusion as to his Debt and Provision? 2do. If he may have Action against the Executors for it, as Heir and Creditor? 3tio. If he succeed to his Father in Land-Estate, though the Money was not employed, will not the Obligement [Page 16] be satisfied, pro tanto? 4to. Will the Bairns come in pari passu or must the Heir be satisfied in the first place out of the Moveable Estate?

Coals.

A Woman being Infeft in Lands in Liferent; cum Carbonibus & Car­bonariis. Quaeritur, If she may win Coal where there was none before in order to Selling? Ratio Dubitandi. That usus fructus est jus utendi salva rei substantia, and the Coal usu consumitur; And being digged non renascitur: It is thought therefore, that where there was no Coal be­fore, The Liferenter cannot break Ground in order to Selling.

Quaeritur, If the Liferenters at least may Win Coal, where there was no going Coal before in order to their own use and for their Fire, Re­founding any Damnage that may be by breaking of the Ground. Cogi­tandum.

Where there is a Coal going, Quaeritur, If the Liferenter may continue to Work and Sell? Answer. It is thought for the Reason foresaid the Liferenter cannot Sell, but may claim by the said Clause to have as much Coal as may serve for the Liferenters use only, unless it be expresly pro­vided that the Liferenter may Win and Sell as the Fiar might have done.

If the Liferent be not constitute so clearly in the Terms foresaid, and it be only provided that the Liferenter shall Liferent the going Coal, Quaeritur, If the Liferenter may have the same benefite of the Coal as the Fiar might have had, both for the Liferenters use and for Selling, pro­viding that the Liferenter use the same as bonus Vir, and in the same man­ner as was in use formerly, and do not any thing of purpose to the preju­dice of the Fiar: putting in too many Colliers or otherwise?

As there is quasi Ʋsus-fructus of Money, if it ought to be so of Coal, and what is Win should be valued, and the price should be valued to the Liferenter in Liferent and in Fee to the Heretor? To consider if this case has occurred elsewhere in the case of Sylvae caeduae.

Collation

BY Contract of Marrriage, the Husband is obliged to provide the Heirs of the Marriage therein specified; But there is a Clause sub­joined, That if there be only Daughters, and they be moe than one; The Eldest only should succeed, and the other Daughters should resign their parts in her favours, reserving to the Father to provide them which he did not: There being beside some Heretable Estate, Quaeritur, If the Eldest will not only have the Land, but her share of the other Estate as Heir Portioner? Ratio Dubitandi. That Law and Nature favours and intends Equality, betwixt Children; Especially where the interest and preservation of Families is not to be considered, and upon that account there is no Prerogative of Primogeniture and [...] which is only com­petent Liberis Masculis, Daughters being finis & caput familiae: And by the Contract the Eldest Daughter is not obliged to Marry one of the Name or who should take the Name. 2do. The Heir cannot be Executor un­less he confer, or upon the foresaid consideration, and there appears to be Eadem Ratio in this case, Whitelaw.

[Page 17]If an Heir, to the Effect he may share in the Executry offering to con­fer the Moveable Heirship, ought not also to confer Lands, and other Heretable Estate? For the Executory may be very considerable, and it were hard that upon Collation of the Moveable Heirship possibly of small value, he should both retain the Heretable Estate how great soever, and share in the Executory though very great.

If there be Three Daughters, and the Eldest at her Marriage get a part of the Lands. Quaeritur, If she will share as Heir Portioner with the other Sisters, unless she confer; as in England.

Commission not to Expire morte Mandatoris.

IF a Commission may be granted by a Person to Freinds for Selling Lands and to endure irrevocable, not only during his own Lifetime; but after his Decease to bind his Heirs untill it be Execute? Ratio Dubi­tandi, Mandatum expirat morte: And on the other part, there may be a necessity to Sell, and his Heirs may be Minors: Or upon some other con­siderations it may be fit that there should be such a Power given; And as he may bind himself by granting such a Commission, he may bind his Heirs being eaedem Personae.

Commissioners to the Parliament.

QƲaeritur, If there be any case wherein Commissioners to the Parlia­ment ought to consult the Shires whom they Represent? Answer. It is thought, that albeit by their Election they have Commission cum Li­bera potestate, It is to be understood that they may superstruere; But cannot evert or alter Fundamentals and the constitution of the Government either of Church or State: And if any thing of that nature be intended, it ought not to be done by Representatives, unless they have special Autho­rity to that purpose.

Commonties.

THe Servitude of Pasture being either in common Muires, as Glads­muire or such like; Or in Commonties belonging to Heretors and Superiors, and their Vassals by Rights from them; Or in Lands belonging to others and not to their Superiors. Quaeritur. If an Infeftment cum com­muni Pastura will be a Ground of Prescription, in all the foresaid cases, un­less it be special as to the Subject, and the Lands to be Pastured upon? Answer. As to common Muires, if the Lands adjoining be Dis­poned, cum communi Pastura, by the King, it is to be presumed that before they be Disponed, the Kings Tennents of the Lands Disponed were in use to Pasture in the said Muire: And therefore the Clause cum communi Pa­stura is to be understood with the Pasture formerly belonging to the King; And in that case, possession though not for the space of Fourty Years by vertue of that Right is sufficient. 2do. There is the same reason as to Lands Disponed by Superiours having a Commonty within their own Property. v. g. in Dirletoun, unless there be some speciality. v. g. as in David Forrest his Precept of Clare constat, there is Nine Acres given with­out mention of Pasture in the Commonty of Dirletoun, and there is a Te­nement [Page 18] and three Acres and an half cum communi Pastura in Communia de Dirletoun; So that the Right being granted unico contextu, the Right of the said Acre cum communi Pastura Excludes the same as to the other Nine Acres. 3tio. As to a Commonty within the Property of other Superiours, the Clause cum communi Pastura in the Tenendas will not be a ground of Prescription, unless there be a Right or Constitution by the Heretor, within whose Property the said Commonty is.

Common Appendant.

QƲaritur, There being a Servitude of Pasturage or Commonty due to me out of Neighbouring Lands (which the English call Common Appendant) will the Servitude extinguish if I purchase the saids Lands, seing res sua nemini servit? Answer. It is thought that it is Suspended but not extinct: So that if the Purchaser sell the Lands affected with the Ser­vitude it will revive, unless it be provided otherwise: And Servitudes of that nature are Real, and pertinents Praediorum non Personarum.

Communio.

COmmunis Possessio, quâ vel ad pasculandum, vel ad alios fructus partici­pandos vicini utuntur, non caret Litigiis; Divitibus proportionem Geometricam, pauperibus Arithmeticam affectantibus: Sed possessio Geometri­ca servari debet & Praedialis, ita ut qui majores habet possessiones magis uta­tur pascuis, qui minores minus. Jus Fluviat. p. 561. n. 25.

Compensation.

IF there may be Compensation on a Bond prescribed, For that reason, Viz. That quae sunt temporalia ad agendum they are perpetua ad exci­piendum; And the ground of Prescription as to Personal Actions be­ing Negligentia petentis, cannot be pretended in this case, the Defender being satisfied in his own hands.

When in Processes for Sums of Money, Compensation is proponed, and the Pursuer Replyes upon Recompensation, and the Defender again Du­plyes upon Recompensation. Quaeritur, what course shall be taken by the Judge upon their several Recompensations? Answer, If it appear that the Pursuer or Charger is addebted in as much to the Defender, as the De­fender to him, all the Compensations being considered, the Defender ought to be assoiled; and the Parties hinc inde should be decerned to give up and discharge the Grounds of the Compensation: And if all the Com­pensations being sustained, the Defender be found debitor to the Pursu­er, a Decreet should be given for what is due: And if the Pursuer be found debitor to the Defender, the Defender ought to be assoiled, and the Pursuer decerned to pay what he is owing.

An Assigney to a Debt for an Onerous Cause, having pursued for the same, Quaeritur, If it be alledged that, the time of the Assignation, the Cedent was the Defenders debitor, and that he hath present Action for li­quidating his Debt; Whether ought Compensation to be sustained upon [Page 19] the said Ground, and a time granted to liquidate? It is thought, That the Cedent not being Inhibite, nor any Diligence done against him, the Sum assigned was in Commercio, and might be disposed of by him; there being then no ground of Compensation, which is de liquido in liquidum; and otherwise non tollit obligationem. vide Retention, in Litera R.

Composition for Entry.

IF the Superiority be disponed or comprised after Resignation, Quaeri­tur, Whether what is payable for receiving of the Vassal should belong to the former Superior: Or to his Successor by whom he is to be receiv­ed, being pretium of his Entry.

Compriser.

IF after expiring of a Comprising, the Compriser may pursue for the Evidents, being incidents to the Right.

Comprising.

IF a Bond for an Onerous Cause, being granted by a Person not Inhi­bited, and publick Infeftment thereupon, be preferable to a Compri­ser who had comprised before, but was Infeft after the Bond?

If a Compriser of Ward-Lands die before the expiring of the Legal, Will the Marriage of his Heir fall?

If it fall, Will the Debitor, if he redeem, be lyable to refound the Avail?

Comprisings of Heretable Bonds, though they be upon the matter Le­gal Assignations, so that the first Compriser will be preferred to the second intimating, in respect of the previous publick Solemnity in deduceing Comprisings: Yet Intimation is necessar to put the Debitors in the Bonds comprised in mala fide.

If there be a necessity of a Declarator of expiring a Legal, as there is of a Conventional? Seing in many Cases there may be much Equity for purging the expiring; as if the Sum be all paid but a very little part, and the Lands exceed much the Debt.

If the Compriser come to be Debitor in a Sum equivalent, Will the Compriseing expire?

The first Compriseing being reduced at the instance of a posterior Com­priser ex capite Inhibitionis, Will the first Compriser have Right to the Legal of the second?

Though the Debitor be Inhibited, May he not assign the Legal?

If Compriseing whereupon Infeftment is not to follow, and which formerly needed not to be allowed ought to be Recorded, conform to the Act of Parliament 1661. Act.?

There being a Compriseing against a Principal and two Cautioners of their respective Lands; and the Right of the said Compriseing being ac­quired by a Person who had bought one of the Cautioners Lands, If that Person should dispone the Right of the other Lands with the Comprise­ing, Sums, and Grounds thereof, as to the said other Lands, only before [Page 20] the expireing of the Legal. Quaeritur, 1. If he hath not reserved expresly the Compriseing and Sums thereof as to his own Lands, but has only disponed in the Terms foresaid: Will the Compriseing extinguish as to his own Lands, seing it could not subsist without the Grounds, and these are dis­poned? Answer, It is thought, It will not extinguish, in respect the Compriseing is not simply disponed, but only as to the other Lands, and the same not being disponed as to his own Lands, eo ipso it is retained to­gether with the Grounds; and it was Actum that the Disponer, by ac­quiring the Compriseing, should be thereby secured as to his own Lands: And having disponed the same as to the said other Lands, Law presum­eth that he has retained it as to his own Lands in the first place, and that it should be effectual as to the other Lands in the second place: And A­cta agentium are to be understood to operate according to their Intention.

Quaeritur 2do. If the Compriser of that Legal should Redeem, who should have right to the Sums; whether the Disponer, or these to whom he has disponed, as to the other Lands, at least to a part of the same? Answer, If the Disponers Interest as to the Security of his Lands amounts to, or exceeds the Sums, he will have Right thereto entirely, seing he is to be secured in the first place.

If a Com [...]riser Infeft in Lands doth consent only to a Right made by the Debitor of a part of the Lands comprised, will that Consent secure the Buyer against the singular Successors of the Compriser, having Right from him by Compriseing or Disposition and Infeftment thereupon: Se­ing they may pretend that a Consent doth not denude habili modo.

A Creditor comprised the Principal Debitors Lands, and some time thereafter the Cautioners Estate; and after the Compriseing against the Principal was expired (But yet the Compriseing against the Cautioners was running) he disposed of some of the Principals Lands. Quaeritur, If the Cautioner may plead that the Compriseing against him is extinct, In swa far as the Creditor has an irredeemable Right to the Principal's E­state, Exceeding his Debt: and is satisfied at least may be satisfied with his Intromission and disposing of the same?

A Compryser, after expiring of his Comprysing of his Debitors Estate exceeding the value of his Debt, Intrometting with or disposing of a part of the same. Quaeritur, If he may Compryse any other Estate belonging to the Debitor: Upon pretence that he is not satisfied: Or if the Expir­ing of the Comprysing and the making use thereof thereafter, putteth him in the same condition as if the Lands had been Disponed to him irredeem­ably, and datae and accepted in solutionem: So that both Principal and Cautioner, against whom a Comprysing is yet running, may pretend that the Debt is satisfied; At the least that the Creditor should denude himself of that Comprysing cum omni causa? Lamertoun contra Mr. John Fairholme.

A Compryser of Lands holden Ward being Infeft. Quaeritur. If these Lands will ward by the Decease of the Compryser; And if the Marriage of the Appearand Heir will fall? Ratio Dubitandi, A Compryser is but an interim Vassal for security of his Debt: And upon that Consideration such a Right in England is considered as a Chattel.

If the Comprysing be redeemed will the Debitor be Lyable to refound the Damnage sustained by the Ward and Marriage?

[Page 21] Quaeritur, If the Ward of the Comprysers Heir, will determine and ex­pire upon the Redemption?

Quid Juris in that case of proper Wadsets, if the Debitor after Redem­ption will be Lyable to Refound the foresaid Damnage? The difference being that a Comprysing is an involuntar Right, and the Wadset Volun­tar, so that the Creditor seemeth to take his hazard.

If Lands be Comprysed from a Person who has no Right thereto for the time but acquires thereafter a Right, whether the said jus superveniens will accresce?

If there be a difference betwixt a Compryser and a Buyer from an in­terposed Person, who has acquired a fraudulent Right, Viz. That a Buyer acquires a Right for an Onerous Cause, and it is just and the Inter­est of Commerce that he should not be prejudged, whereas a Compry­ser does only Diligence upon his own hazard, and the Right Transit cum sua causa & labe?

A Right being acquired bonâ fide, from a Person not Inhibited, after Comprysing, and being Infeft before the Compryser. Quaeritur, Whe­ther he or the Compryser will be preferable? Answer. The Lords found in the case of Sir Patrick Nisbet and Hamilton, That the Compryser should be preferred: Which appears to be hard, seing, a Comprysing is only jus ad rem and a Legal Disposition; And the first compleat Right by In­feftment seems to be preferable, and a Comprysing does not import vi­tium Litigiosi seing the Debitors Right is without Question: And the Question is whether the Compryser or the Receiver of the Disposition should have Right to that which is unquestionable in it self?

The Debitor or these who have Right to the Legal, Redeeming from the Appearand Heir of the Compryser, whether doth the Redemption sist the course of the Ward and Marriage if the Heir be not Fourteen Years of Age? Answer. Affirmative. quia resoluto jure principali resolvun­tur consequentia.

Will not the Debitor be lyable not only to pay the Debt but to refound the prejudice the Creditors Heir sustains upon occasion of the falling of the Casuality of Ward and Marriage by the Decease of the Debitor? Answer. Affirmative, and the Creditor and his Heirs should be Indemnes: It being the Debitors fault that they are forced to Compryse, and that the Comprysing is not Redeemed.

Whether a Discharge does extinguish a Comprysing, the Creditor grant­ing to be satisfied; In the same manner that Intromission within the Years of the Legal doth extinguish the same? Answer. If there be no Infeftment a Discharge is sufficient: But if there be Infeftment, there must be at least a Renounciation Registrate in the Register of Reversions.

A Comprysing being Redeemed, whether doth the Debitors Right and Infeftment revive, or must there be a new Seasin, and what way shall the Debitor be Reseased? Answer. There must be a new Seasin; and the same way is to be taken as in the case of a Regress: Seing the Compryser as he has a Legal Reversion, so there is a Legal Regress.

Quaeritur. If a Comprysing as to all effects be equivalent to a Resigna­tion? Ratio Dubitandi, That a Comprysing is not only a Legal Disposition but the Compryser may be immediatly Infeft upon the same, as upon a Resignation, though the Debitor decease.

If a Compryser get a Right to the Legal of his own Comprysing be­fore [Page 22] it expire by another Apprysing; And so Deinceps if there be more Comprysings whereof the first Appryser obtains Right within the Re­spective Legals. Quaeritur. when the same doe expire? Cogitandum.

If a Royal Burgh, or others having Power to receive Vassals upon Re­signation, has Power likewise to receive upon Comprysings: And if in that case any Composition be due to them?

If the Lands be Comprysed how shall the Duties be divided? Answer. If any part of the Lands be sowen before the Comprysing, the Encrease will belong to the Compryser: And if the Lands be set, the time of the Comprysing is to be considered; For if the Comprysing be before White­sunday the Compryser will have Right to the whole Duties; And if it be before Martinmass, he will have Right to the half: And if after Martin­mass to no part thereof.

The Superior being charged with Horning to receive a Compryser, and being Denounced, will he be Lyable for Damnage and Interest: if either he Infeft a second Compryser, or a Precept be direct out of the Chancery for Infefting him?

If upon the Redemption of a Comprysing, the Superiors will be obliged to Infeft the Redeemer Gratis?

Quid Juris, If the Redeemer be another Creditor?

Quaeritur, If Comprysings be equivalent to Dispositions and Resigna­tion following upon the same, so that the first Compryser is preferable to others even before Infeftment? Answer. That Comprysings are only Legal Dispositions, and do not denude the Debitor without Infeftment, whereas Resignation being made in the Superiours hands and accepted doth denude.

What is the reason then that after Comprysing, it is found that the De­bitor not inhibited cannot Dispone in prejudice of the Compryser? An­swer. That the Law, and the Judge who is Lex animata, having in sub­sidium Disponed to the Creditor the Debitors Lands; the same is so affe­cted by the Legal Diligence, that the Debitor is denuded as to that effect that he can do no voluntar deed to prejudge the Creditor; Without preju­dice nevertheless of more exact and compleat Diligence of other Creditors, who obtaining Infeftment will be preferred to the first Compryser: as in the case of Moveables after Arrestment, the Debitor cannot dispone the same, and yet may be Evicted by another Creditor by way of Poinding.

If a Superiour be content to take a Right to a Comprysing of Lands holden of him, not being willing to enter the Compryser. Quaeritur, If he may claim a Years Duty when the Lands are Redeemed? Answer. Negative: And he is in the same case as if he had Comprysed himself, so that as he cannot in that case neither in the other can he claim any Compositi­on; in respect the samen is granted only that the Superior should not be prejudged by obtruding a Vassal, upon him against his will.

If by the First Act of Parliament anent Comprysings, a Composition was due to the King? Answer. It is thought, not: There being a diffe­rence betwixt the King and other Superiours; in respect the King is Pater Patriae and all the Leidges being his Subjects, it cannot be said that he has any prejudice by the change of his Vassal, and long after the said Act of Parliament Signatures were not past upon Comprysings, but Compry­sings lay at the Signet and were the warrand of Charters under the Great Seal.

[Page 23]To try when that Custom was changed, and what warrand was for changeing the same.

A Person having Comprysed Lands and having granted Bond that he being satified of the Sums due to himself, and of the Sums due to another person, and that other person being relieved of his Cautionry for the De­bitor, The Compryser should denude himself in favours of the Debitor: And the said Compryser having thereafter Disponed the Right of the Comprysing, but with the Right of the said Backbond expresly provided in the Disposition and the Procuratory of Resignation therein. Quaeritur, If there be no mention in the Seasin that the Right is with the said Bur­den, whether the Compryser will be still Lyable by the said Backbond to the Persons in whose favours it is conceived? And 2do. If the said Back­bond will militate against a singular Successour acquiring a Right from the Assigney to the Comprysing. Answer. It is thought both the Com­pryser and the person having Right from him with the Burden of the Backbond will be Lyable. 2do. A singular Successor will not be Lyable unless the said Provision, that the Right should be with the burden of the Backbond, be in Traditione and in the Seasin.

Quaeritur, What way shall the Appearand Heir have the Right of the Lands Comprysed where the Comprysing is extinguished by Intromissi­on, If it be not by a Service as Heir to his Father? Answer. He may give in a Bill to the Lords or intent Action against the Superiour on that ground, That the Lands are in effect redeemed and satisfied by Intro­mission; And that the Superiour and the Creditor being conveened, it ought to be declared that the Lands are Redeemed, and the Creditor ought to renounce, and the Superior be decerned to Infeft.

When a Person is denuded by Infeftment, and yet the Infeftment and Disposition whereupon it proceeds is Reduceible upon the Act of Parlia­ment as being in Fraudem Creditoris. Quaeritur, What course the Creditor shall take, and whether he should first reduce before he Compryse? Ratio Dubitandi. That if he compryse the Debitor being divested as said is, there is nothing in his person to be comprised. Answer. It is thought it is fit­ter to Reduce and then to Compryse; Because after the Creditor has been at the Charges of Comprysing, it may be there may be difficulty in the Reduction: And yet upon other Considerations, it may be fitter first to Comprise; in Respect the Lands may be Comprysed both for the Debt of the Disponer and the Debt of the Person to whom the Right is given.

Infeftments upon Comprysing.

WHen there is a Clause in a Charter upon Comprysing, That if the Comprysing expire another Infeftment should be taken within Year and Day, otherways the Infeftment to be void. Quaeritur, What is the effect of that Provision, if it may be purged? 2do. If another Com­pryser may object the said Nullity?

Conditio.

COnditio est adjectio, quâ id quod dari, aut fieri volumus, confertur in aliquem casum & suspendit obligationem.

[Page 24]Conditione impossibili adjecta, Contractus est nullius momenti, & contrahen­tes Ludere videntur, secus in sponsalibus & ultimis voluntatibus in quibus fa­vore Matrimonii & ultimae voluntatis, tales conditiones habentur pro non scrip­tis. Christen. de Sponsalibus quaest. 14.

Confession by Criminals,

IF a Confession be emitted and signed before the Judge in the Criminal-Court may the Pannal Retract and not adhere to it before the Assyse, so that the Inquest cannot proceed on it as an evidence and clear Proba­tion?

Minors having confessed hainous Crimes, may they desire to be repon­ed upon pretence of their Age, though they do not pretend and clear that their Confession was upon Error or Mistake?

Confirmation.

A Feu of Church-Lands being neither confirmed by the Pope nor King, If the Confirmation by the King of Rights granted there­after by the Feuer to be holden of the King; will supply the want of Confirmation of the Original Charter?

When a Person is Infeft to be holden of the Superior and deceaseth, and both the Disponer and Superior that was for the time are deceased, yet the Superiority is conveyed to a singular Successor, Quaeritur, If after long time the singular Successor in the Right of the Superiority may confirm the said Infeftment: So that the Heir of the Person Infeft, though not confirmed in his own time, may be Infeft as Heir to him by a publick Infeftment? Ratio Dubitandi, It cannot be said that his Father was In­feft by a publick Infeftment: To consider therefore whether the Party infeft being infeft to be holden of the Superior, may be said to be truely infeft holden of the Superior; But that the Infeftment was not a compleat Right, until the Superiors Consent and Confirmation was had, whereby it did convalesce, as if it had been from the beginning: Or if there be no mid impediment? And there is a Difference betwixt Vitiosum ab initio, & Incompletum; illud nunquam confirmatur, istud accedente comple­mento convalescit.

Whether or not Confirmation may be granted after the Death of the Disponer? Vide Craig.

If a Disposition be granted to be holden of the Superior containing a Precept of Seasin, and if it be confirmed by the Superior, but before Sea­sin follow thereupon the Superior is denuded of his Right in favours of his singular Successor, Quaeritur, If thereafter Seasin may be taken on the said Precept? Ratio Dubitandi, That Res devenit in alium casum, and the former Vassal not being denuded, he remains still Vassal to the succeed­ing Superior; So that by no deed without his consent, a new Vassal can be obtruded to him.

Quaeritur, If Infeftments being to be holden of a Superior, may be con­firmed after the death of the Person infeft? Ratio Dubitandi, Craig seemeth not to be clear, upon that Ground that the Superior and Vassal should both consent; So that the consent of the Vassal in taking the Infeftment and the Superiors in confirming the same be conjoined, which cannot be, [Page 25] the death of either interveening: It is thought nevertheless, that such Rights may be confirmed after the Death of the Receiver, though their Consents cannot be conjoined, which was only done, and when the con­sent of Persons is required ad integrandam Personam; as in the case of Pu­pils and Minors, it ought to be given before their decease, & in ipso acta; But where the consent and confirmation of Persons is ad integrandum & constituendum Jus, which is constitute and perfected per gradus & partes, The consent and confirmation may be at any time re integrâ, and where there is no medium impedimentum: as Exempli Causà, If there be a Com­priseing against the Disponer, the Disposition cannot be confirmed.

Item sometimes there must be Confirmation neither ad integrandam Personam, nor Constitutionem Juris, but for confirming the Right consti­tute; as the Popes Confirmation in the Right of Church-Lands, or the Patron's Confirmation; which are necessary in regard of their Interests, Et ne quid Detrimenti Ecclesia capiat: which may be at any time.

If a Right be confirmed after the Death of the Receiver of the Right, and after the Disponers Heir is Infeft upon the Retour, Quaeritur, If the Heir of the Person who receives the Right, may be served Heir to his Predecessor as having dyed last vest and seased, notwithstanding that the Right was null the time of his decease; and that there is medium impedi­mentum in the Retour, by the Infeftment of the Disponers Heir? An­swer, It is thought he may be served Heir, and the said Infeftment is not an impediment; the Heirs of the Disponer being eadem persona and in effect his Author: And the said Infeftment is in effect to the use and be­hoof of the Receiver of the Right and his Heirs: And the Heir of the Disponer is in no other case than the Disponer himself, whose Infeftment is to the use of the Buyer until his Right be confirmed, and then ceases.

If the King should confirm the Charter à me granted by Castlemaines to Cesnock. Quaeritur, If in that case the Vassals will be in any hazard? Answer, It is thought, not; seing it cannot be said that they were at any time Vassals to Cesnock: And though fictione Juris the Confirmation be drawn back as if Cesnock had been infeft immediatly after his Right: yet it cannot be drawn back where there is medium impedimentum; the Vassals having acquired a Right before, and having never been Cesnock's Vassals but only to Castlemains before the Forefeiture.

If an Heretor of Land dispone his Land to be holden of the Superior, and the Superior confirm the Disposition with all that shall follow upon it; But before Seasin be taken upon the Precept, the Disponer dies. Quae­ritur, What way the Purchaser shall be Infeft? Answer, The Disponers Heir is to be Infeft, and to grant a Precept relating to the former Disposi­tion and Confirmation: Or if he will not, or think not fit to be Heir; the Lands may be adjudged from him as charged to enter Heir.

Quaeritur, In the case foresaid, if the Superior, after he has confirmed the Disposition, die before Seasin thereupon; Whether a singular Successor in the Right of Superiority may question the said Infeftment? Ratio Du­bitandi, That there is medium impedimentum, viz. The Superior is chan­ged; and the former Vassal being his Vassal the time of his Right, there­after another Person cannot be his Vassal without his consent: Et è con­tra, the former Superior having done all that he could do to perfect the said Right; and nothing resting to compleat it but the deed of the Dis­poner [Page 26] or his Heir by giving Infeftment, the former Superior was denud­ed as to his Interest: So that his Successor cannot question the said Right, being perfected by the Infeftment.

If at least the Successor of the Superiority may be urged to renew the Confirmation? Ratio Dubitandi, The singular Successor in the Superio­rity, may be urged to grant Infeftment upon Resignation in the hands of his Predecessor, Cogitandum. But it appears there is a difference, seing by Resignation the Property is in the Superiors hands, whereas by the Con­firmation, it is not: and the Vassal is not denuded before Infeftment up­on the Charter confirmed, whereas he is denuded by Resignation, and by Comprising which in Law is equivalent to a Resignation accepted, seing the Superior cannot refuse to give Infeftment upon Compriseings.

If the Disponer be denuded of the Superiority, what course is to be ta­ken against his singular Successor for renewing the Procuratory? Answer, Seing in the case in question, the Buyer was infeft according to the Tenor of the said Disposition, It is to be considered if the King may notwith­standing confirm the said base Right.

Confiscation.

IF a Person being at the Horn dwell within a Regality, and have Goods or Debts within another Regality, Will these also belong to the Lord of Regality where he dwelleth, upon that pretence that se­quuntur personam?

Confusione tollitur obligatio.

BY Contract of Marriage, the Husband is obliged to employ 30000 merks to himself and his Wife in Conjunctfie, and the Heirs of the Marriage; and has obliged also his Heirs and Executors to employ at his decease 15000 merks to his Bairns besides the Heir, Quaeritur, If the Heretable Estate be short of 30000 merks, May the Heir pursue the Executor ad Supplementum? Ratio Dubitandi, he is served Heir and ea­dem Persona with the Defunct, & confusione tollitur obligatio: It is thought he may, and that Maxim militateth, when the Heir succeedeth in uni­versum Jus & Patrimonium: But in this case the Heir having right only to the immoveable Estate, there is no confusion of that Obligement which is prestable out of the Executory, to which the Heir has no right: as in the case of moveable Debts due by the Defunct to his Heir either of Line or Tailȝie, there is is no confusion for the reason foresaid.

Item Quaeritur, If there be not so much in the Executory as may satisfy the Provision foresaid in favours of the Bairns, if they may have recourse against the Heir for their Provisions? Ratio Dubitandi, The Heir by the Contract was to be provided presently, and the Bairns at or after the Father's decease, and by and attour the Sum provided to the Heir: so that the Heir should have his Provision as Praecipuum and before the Bairns: Answer, It is thought, That the Heir being provided under the name of Heir, which is Nomen Repraesentationis, as he is lyable to other Creditors, so he is lyable to the Bairns, being provided under the noti­on of Bairns, who do not represent.

[Page 27]If the said Provisions had been in a second Contract of Marriage, the Son of the first Marriage being Heir of Line, would be lyable to the Son of the second Marriage though served Heir, and there would be no confusion for the Reason foresaid.

Conjunct-Fiar.

QƲaeritur, If a Lady Conjunct-Fiar or Liferenter of a Barony may re­ceive Vassals singular Successors upon Resignation or Confirmation or give Novo damus.

Conquest.

A Father being obliged to provide to the Heirs of the first Marriage the Conquest, and having acquired a Room during the first Marriage, and disponed the same to the Son of the third Marriage, Quae­ritur, If the Heir of the first Marriage may reduce that Right, as given without an onerous Cause in his prejudice, being a Creditor by that Clause of his Mothers Contract of Marriage? Ratio Dubitandû, It is pretend­ed not to be free Conquest, the Father having contracted Debt thereaf­ter above the Sum of that Room: Whereunto it was Answered, That the said Room was Conquest, the price being then paid; and the Debt contracted thereafter.

A Merchant being obliged to provide the Conquest during the Mar­riage to himself and Wife, and the Bairns of the Marriage, Quaeritur 1. Whether Conquest being Ʋniversitas, will fall under the Executory of the Bairns, though the subject, and what will fall under the Con­quest be moveable?

2do. The Conquest being provided so, that the Right should be taken to the Husband and Wife and Bairns of the Marriage, whilk Failȝieing the half to the Husbands Heirs and the half to the Wifes Heirs: Whether the Husband be Fiar and the Bairns only Heirs of provision, though the subject be Moveable?

Though the Husband be Fiar, if he can Dispone the Conquest with­out an Onerous Cause: or provide the same to other Heirs, in prejudice of Bairns being Creditors by such Provisions?

The Husband being obliged in these terms to provide the Conquest, viz. Lands Heretages and Annualrents and other things; And to take the Rights in manner foresaid. Quaeritur, If the General other things be comprehensive of Moveables, there being no mention of Sums of Money or Moveables? And it seems that Conquest is to be understood pro­perly of Heretable Interests, of which only, and not of Moveables, Rights are taken: And other things may be understood of things Homo­geneous, and of the same nature that the things expressed in particular are of; ( Viz. Heretable) as Reversions, Tacks, &c.

If at least Bonds bearing Annualrent though Moveable, will fall under the conquest; Seing Rights are in use to be taken thereof: And by the Law they belonged to Heirs before the statute? This and the Four pre­ceeding Questions are in the case of Andrew Bruce, and his Conquest dur­ing the first Marriage.

[Page 28]The ordinary Clause of conquest in favours of Wives being of Lands, Heretages, Annualrents. Quaeritur, If Bonds being Heretable because Executors are Excluded will fall under the same? Answer. It is thought, not; Because the Subject is only Lands, Heretages and Annualrents, whereupon there is or may be Infeftment: And Heretages comprehends only Lands, Teinds, and such Rights as are real by Infeftment or other­wise, or whereupon Infeftment may follow.

Consensus.

USƲ receptum est, ut in terrarum aut nominum & jurium alienationi­bus & Cessionibus, praeter contrahentes alii interveniant pro interesse & consensum accomodent & subscribant contractibus & instrumentis: Sed quis­nam Consensûs effectus esse debeat ambigitur; quibusdam videtur, consentien­tes, contractus quibus consenserant haud reprobare nedum ut rescindantur agere posse, juxta tritam juris regulam quod approbo non reprobo. Alii opinan­tur cum nihil juris disponant ant tribuant, consensum haud extendi ultra id quod actum aut cogitatum, viz. Ʋt si quod jus eo tempore quo consensum adhibu­erant suberat, aut juris umbra, ejus ratione aut praetextu Litem aut quaestionem intentare nequeant; Salvâ tamen libertate commercii, & jura si quae sunt penes alios quam contrahentes, potiora acquirendi; aut in ea succedendi: Iis ex inter­vallo & post facto adeptis consensum haud obesse.

Cogitandum an ea sit commoda distinctio, consentientes si in alia jura postea succedant iis uti posse; quae enim consentientibus tunc temporis haud competebant sed postea nec opinantibus forte jus detulit, ea antequam penes eos forent consensu ase abdicasse nec verisimile nec credere par est: Qui autem juri in alium transferen­do consensit, si ejusdem rei jus & melius penes alium esse compererit & sponte & operâ suâ acquirat, ex eo adversus eos qui ipso consentiente jus alterum quaesi­erant agere haud audiendus: Nec enim juri nec bonis moribus consentaneum est, quod approbavit, aliquid moliri aut quaerere quo illud posset reprobare aut rescin­dere Broomhall contra Lady Darsie.

Consensus Domini.

COnsensus assumit naturam actus super quo interponitur: Sicut stipulatio, quae est stricti juris interposita contractui bonae fidaei. Bes. Thes. liter. L. p. 552.

Dominus consentiendo, non praesumitur juri suo velle praejudicare; sed solum obstaculum, quod scilicet jus vasalli sine Domini Consensu alienari non poterat, removisse: Et remissio juris sui non praesumitur, nisi verbis apertis de eâ con­stet. Ibidem P. sequen.

Regula, quod Domini consensus juri ipsius nihil officiat, procedit tantum in illis juribus; quae Domino consentienti competentia, separatam habent rationem a negotio cui consensus accedit, non autem in his quae ad robur & firmitatem actus pertinent. Idem. p. 554.

Consent.

QƲaeritur, If an Appearand Heir consent to a Disposition, made in Lecto, after the Decease of the Granter, may another Heir quarrel [Page 29] the Deed upon pretence that the Consenter was not served Heir at any time? Ratio Dubitandi: The Consent of the Appearand Heir the time of the granting the Right, doth so validate the Right, that all Heirs are precluded from questioning it: And there appears to be the same reason when the Consent is supervenient.

If the Consent will import Behaving?

A Person being Infeft in an Annualrent to be holden of the Disponer; and in possession by payment of the Annualrent, Consents to a Disposition of the Lands. Quaeritur, If that Consent will prejudge a singular Succes­sor; The Disposition being neither Registrate in the Register of Reversi­ons, nor the Seasin upon the Disposition relating to the Consent?

If the Consent of a Person having Right by Disposition whereupon Re­signation has followed, will prejudge a singular Successor?

In what cases Consent to a Right will prejudge singular Successors? Answer. It is thought that where there is no Infeftment and the Consenters Right may be transmitted by Assignation or Discharged, such a Consent may prejudge singular Successors: And will amount to an Assignation or Discharge.

If a Consent of a Party having only Right to a Reversion, will prejudge a singular Successor unless it were Registrate?

Anent Consistories; Whereby the Ʋsefulness and Ne­cessity of these Courts is evinced, and Doubts and Prejudices against them, are Cleared.

THE Question, whether a Judicatory be useful and necessary, and therefore to be Instituted, If it be not; and continued if it be al­ready erected; or unuseful and therefore to be suppressed; Cannot be de­fined well à priori, but from the nature of the Subject, and Causes which are agitate in the Judicatory: And if the Subject be necessary and favour­able, Notwithstanding any extrinsical Abuses (which may creep in to the best Judicatories) it may plead for a Reformation, but not a total Sup­pression.

All Causes are of necessity to be decided, and Justice is always favour­able, But in some Causes (as the Law speaks) praedominatur favor & pub­licum interesse, and such, and only such are the Subject of the Jurisdiction of the Commissarys, as Causae Matrimoniales & Testamentariae, which are in themselves favourable; and the Causes of Orphans and Widows, of mi­serable Persons, of Persons slandered and defamed, of Ministers and their Readers for their Stipends, in which the Condition of Parties pleadeth for favour, not in the point of Decision (which should be impartial, and ab­stract from all respects) but in the way of Procedure, that it be both ex­act and summar; that those Parties be neither dwanged by a long and ex­pensive attendance, nor wronged by a precipitant handling of their Bu­siness: which Qualities seeming incompatible in a Judicial Procedure, con­cur only when a particular Judicatory, is allotted for such Causes: and neither the throng of their Business can justle them out, neither the Judge can have a pretext for shifting them.

The Gravity and Difficulty of Matrimonial and Testamentary Causes is [Page 30] so notour, and the favourable Elogies of Law anent these Persons, recom­mending thereby a Circumspect, and as it were a Religious Handling of them, are so obvious and frequent, that they need not be repeated; and it is certain that there is no Subject debated either in the Law it self, or in the large Volumns of the Doctors, with greater Prolixity and Subtility, than the Causes of Marriages and Testaments. (A)

It is to be observed from Law and History, that from these Reasons, Ma­trimonial Causes, and publicatio & insinuatio Testamentorum (which is with us the Confirmation of Testaments) were neither entrusted to the lowest sort of Judges, neither to Judges of great Employment about the deci­sion of other Civil Actions, to be decided in a tumultuary Way, and pro­miscuously with other Causes, but by a considerate Choice of Judges, sin­gled out, for these Causes: It was provided that neither the meanness of the Judge, nor the greatness, nor multitude of his other Employments, should prejudge Causes of so great Gravity and Importance. (B)

Though the favourable Nature of Consistorial Causes, and the necessi­ty of a several and peculiar Judicatory for them, be evident for the Rea­sons and difficulty foresaid, and from the Patern of Antiquity; It will ap­pear more clearly from representing the Inconvenients that will follow, if Consistories be supprest, and by answering the Objections against these Courts.

The Inconvenients are these 1. Omnis mutatio etiam in melius est pe­riculosa; Especially of a Fundamental Law and Policie, which hath ever been alse ancient as any monument of Law and Policy in this Country (C) 2. Unless there be a Judicatory appointed for these Causes, it cannot be conceaved how Defuncts Wills shall be observed, how Minors, Orphans, Widows, Legators and Creditors shall be secured. 3. Whereas it may be conceived (and as we hear is urged by some men, who know not the [Page 31] nature of Testaments, nor use of Consistories) that a General Register may be keeped of Testaments, as of Sasines, and Hornings, without ne­cessity of Confirmation: The keeping of such a Register cannot supply the want of Consistories, if they should be supprest; Because albeit a Re­gister could be keeped of Testament Testamentars given up by the De­funct and presented to be registrate by Executors; The Registration of them cannot be urged, if the Executors be unwilling, or the nearest of Kin, who is possibly Interessed by the nomination of Executors, and leav­ing of Legacies, to keep up the Testament, except there be a Judicatory for Confirmation of Testaments; and Edicts served, and Intromittors charged to give up Inventar; Neither can any time be limited for registra­tion of Testaments: And the Certification of Nullity, in case of not Re­gistrations within the time appointed, should be Injustice; because Te­staments are not the Deeds of Parties concerned, viz. Executors and Le­gators, but the Wills of Defuncts, which may be unknown to those who have most Interest: and therefore the not Registration of them cannot be imputed to them, as of Sasines and Hornings which are the Deeds of the Parties themselves, and cannot be unknown to them. 4. When Defuncts have not made Testaments, it cannot be conceaved (if there be not a Judicatory for Confirmation of Testaments) how the nearest of Kin should be decerned and confirmed Executors Dative, how Licences should be given, quando dubia est haereditas, and apparently damnosa, and when haereditas est caduca; and neither an Executor is nominate, nor the nearest of Kin craveth to be confirmed; how the Defuncts Goods should be pre­served to Minors and Creditors, if the Procurator-Fiscal be not decerned, and either become comptable, or a surrogation of Parties interessed: And when Testaments have been already confirmed, how shall Testaments, ad omissa & male appretiata & non executa be expede? How shall Executors Creditors be decerned? How shall the intricate Questions be decerned, and Disputs incident in the Confirmation of Testaments be decided, anent the Nullity and Falshood of Testaments, the competition of the nearest of Kin, with the Executor Nominate, of the Executor ad omissa, with the Executor confirmed? Of the Executor ad non executa, with the Execu­tor of the Defunct? Executors anent the Praelation of Creditors, and o­thers of that nature?

The Confirmation of Testaments, and the decision of Causes Matrimo­nial and Testamentary, cannot be devolved upon the Lords of Session, without great prejudice, 1. Because the Lords are already overburden­ed with great Business, and weighty Causes of Heretages, and great Im­portance; and therefore have been forced to discharge themselves of Acti­ons possessory of Molestation, Jam. 6. Parl. 11. Cap. 42. 1587. Ratifying a former Act of of the saids Lords, whereby these Actions are remitted to other Judges; because the multitude of Affairs before the Lords empeaches greatly the ordinary Course of Justice: And it is not possible to the Lords to try the Verity so well, (which are the Words of the Act, and Motive of making of it.) 2. The Lords have not time to hear Parties, and urge earnestly calling and dispatch of the Businesses of greatest Conse­quence; far less can they have time to urge Parties to confirm Testaments, and to enquire, and take course anent Defuncts Goods, ne dissipentur to the prejudice of Creditors and Minors; which should be done, and is incum­bent [Page 32] to the Commissaries ex officio, albeit Parties urge not. 3. The Lords Procedure by reason of multitude of Business before them, is not peremptor; and Parties after long and expensive attendance, having pre­pared their Business for hearing, cannot be assured to have them called and expede, whereas Process before the Commissars are peremptor; and Sum­mons bear not continuations which is necessarly required in favourable Causes, concerning Minors and poor People who cannot attend; But espe­cially in Edicts and Testaments, which cannot bide delay, least Minors Goods should perish: And are so priviledged that in Vacant and feriat times, they may be, and are ordinarly expede, without necessity of a li­cence. All Questions and Causes, and probation of Adultery on Impotency, the Disputs whether frigiditas sit naturâ vel Arte, utrum ante matrimonium aut superveniens; Ʋtrum maleficium sit solubile an insolubile, and others of that Nature, cannot be agitate verecundé, in so publick and eminent a Judicatory, primâ instantiâ.

These Causes much less can be remitted to Sheriffs, and other inferiour Judges. 1. By reason of the Gravity and Intricacy of them (D.) 2. The Sheriffs have either their Offices Heretable and Patrimonial, or cho­sen yearly by his Majesty; The first cannot have their Right of Jurisdi­ctions enlarged to Causes of such gravity, without a new Grant and Right from his Majesty; and here how little favourable Heretable Offices are, It is constant from Law and Reason, by the Act 44. Ja. 2. Parl. 11. It is Ordained that no Office should be given in Fee, and Heretage; (Skeen de verb. Sign. in Verbo Sheriffs) Because in Jurisdiction persona eligitur, and both Heretable and other Sheriffs are known to be Gentlemen who under­stand not the Law, nor the way of Process, and are forced to delegate pedaneos Judices; and to depute their Friends and Servants, who have no knowledge of the Law, and being changed yearly, have no time to learn the least formality of Process; (E) 3. Sheriffs, who in Con­science, and according to our Acts of Parliament, are lyable to answer for their Deputs, may think it hard that Causes of such weight and Difficul­ty, which cannot be decided but by such as understand the Civil and Ca­non Law, should be remitted upon their perrils to be Judged by Deputs. 4. The Sheriffs Jurisdiction both Civil and Criminal, is so large, (as is represented by the learned Skeen, de Verb. Sign. in Verbo Sheriffs.) that it cannot be extended, without great Prejudices, to Causes and Actions of a different nature; Because Removings, Molestations, Ejections, Servi­ces, and other Actions competent to be judged by the Sheriffs, are for the most part real and possessory, and may be easily decided by the customa­ry Law of the Country, and Acts of Parliament; Whereas Testamentary and other Consistorial Causes, are in apicibus Juris; and cannot be de­cided, but by the Civil and Canon Law, not authoritative, but according to the equity of the said Law, which must be known to those who are Judges in these Causes.

[Page 33]The prejudices and common Objections against Commissariots are these. 1mo. That they are Episcopal Courts. 2do. That Official Courts are supprest in England. 3tio. Exorbitancy of Quots, and other abuses are great in these Courts.

That the first may be cleared, It is to be considered that Jura Episcopalia are of two sorts. 1mo. Such as are usurped by Bishops as intrinsically in­herent in the pretended Office of Bishops. 2do. Such as extrinsically be­long to them by the Grant of Princes or otherways; These of the former sort (as their usurped Jurisdiction over their Bretheren) are extinct with the Office. The last sort is not to be supprest, if they be useful and necessary: Thus the temporal Jurisdiction of Bishops was Reserved to Baillies of Regalities, conform to the Infeftment to be holden of His Majesty: Thus Episcopal Patronages are not extinct, but are to be disposed upon as the Estates shall think expedient, & sic de caeteris. That the Jurisdiction of Commissaries as it is now established is of this kind. (F) It appears 1mo. Because it is clear from the Civil and Canon Law; That consistorial Causes non pertinebant ad Episcopalem Audientiam in the times of the great­est Grandeur, and in the most Superstitious Times; And that Church-men were prohibite to medle with them, as Absurd, and most incompetent to be Judged by them, as is evinced by Citations supra at the Letter (B.) But these Causes were assumed by these Judicatories in the Latter Times, upon pretext that they were pious and favourable, and by the Connivance of Princes (G) 2do. The Jurisdiction of Commissaries as it is now established, was erected by Q. Mary in time of greatest purity and Re­formation, and a Commission granted by her to the Commissaries of Edinburgh. An. 1563. And is warranted by diverse Acts of Par. Viz. Ja. 6. P. 1. C. 28. 1567. (The which Year, the Lords of Session made certain Instructions for the Commissaries of Edinburgh, and other inferiour Com­missaries) By another Act of his 7 Par. 1581. which is the 26 in the Cata­logue of the Unprinted Acts, and containeth a Commission for confirmation of Testaments and placeing of Commissaries. By an Act of his 12. Parl. 1592 the 25. of his Unprinted Acts, Entituled a Ratification of the Commisa­riot of Edinburgh. By the Act. 179. of his 13. Par. 1593. Ordaining Letters of Horning to be direct upon Decreets of Provosts and Baillies of Burrows as is granted upon Commissaries Precepts. 3tio. It is most evident from the 6 Act of his 20 Par. 1609. That the Jurisdiction of Commissaries is a Temporal Jurisdiction, acknowledged by the Act to flow from His Majesty, as well as any other ordinar Jurisdiction, which His Majesty might have granted to any Subject as well as Bishops; And which is grant­ed [Page 34] by the said Act to the Lords of Session, as His Majesties great Con­sistory for Reduction of Commissaries Decreets; And which before he granted to the Earl of Argyle, whose Heretable Right of the Commissari­ot of Argyle, is reserved by the said Act.

There is a great difference betwixt the Official Courts of England, and the Commissariots as they are Established in this Country, Because Commis­sariots being considered either Objectivé, In regard of the Object and Causes Consistorial; Or formaliter ratione modi quo versantur circa Ob­jectum, in regard of the way of procedure in these Courts, Commissariots are Civil and Temporal Judicatories in both respects, in respect of Con­firmation of Testaments and Testamentary Causes, and Matrimonial, de impotentia Maleficio & de Natalibus. Bastards and others of that nature are incompetent to be Judged in Sessions, Presbytries and Assemblies (which are the true Ecclesiastical Courts) and therefore is acknowledged to be meerly Civil, because Summonds are direct by the Commissaries under the Signet of Office, bearing His Majesties Name and Armes, the Certi­fication is Civil, Witnesses are Summoned under Civil and pecunial pains, and Letters are directed for compelling them to compear under the pain of Horning: The Execution of Sentences is Civil, by poinding or com­prising for Liquidate Sums; Or by a Charge to fulfil what is in facto, upon the Commissars Precept; Or by a Charge of Horning upon the Let­ters; And by intenting Action of deforcement before the Commissaries or the Lords of Session. But the Officials Jurisdiction was Episcopale, Ec­clesiastical in both the former Respects, and was continued as it had been in the Popish Church; The Bishops usurping the Jurisdiction that belonged to Sessions Presbytries and Assemblies; and delegating to their Officials their Jurisdiction, both Objective, in Causes competent to be judged in Church Ju­dicatories; And Formaliter in the way of procedure competent only to the Church. By the Canon of the English Church they were Judges in causa non modo instantiarum sed Correctionis & disciplinae, they had a Superinten­dance over Ministers, to advert that they should do their Duty in their Charges; Ministers and Church-men were accusable before them, and being contumacious and not appearing might be Suspended and Ex­communicate; They were Judges whether Crimen be notorium & publi­cum or not; And upon pretext that it was not publick and Scandalous, po­terant mutare poenitentiam in mulctam pecuniariam; They usurped Sacrile­giously the power of the Church and Ecclesiastick Censures, and by the fulminating at random Excommunications for small matters, as small Debts, Viccarrage Teinds, the Official and his Officers Fees, and for Non-compearance in their Courts: And by their easy Absolution upon small satisfaction and for Money, made Excommunication con­temptible (H) For these and other Abuses intrinsical to the Judica­tory it self, These Courts have been long ago cryed down on these grounds by diverse Learned and well affected Men, and lately supprest: But the instance of their ruine cannot with reason be adduced to subvert Consistories, they being altogether different and absolutely Civil in their Institution, object and way of Process, and no more Ecclesiastical than the Church Regalities, which had an Extrinsical dependance on Bishops in the way of holding.

[Page 35]It is already cleared, That if any Abuses be in these Courts they are not essential resulting upon the nature and Constitution of the Judicatory, but accidental, which may be Reformed, without the subversion of so old and so useful a Judicatory. 2do. If Commissaries either be not qualified or corrupt, It is wished they may be tryed, and removed, and a solid course taken for obviating the like Abuses thereafter, that places be not venal, but proposed and disposed as rewards of Vertue to able and deserving Men 3tio. The Exorbitancy of Fees and Quotts may be Regulated, by taking course anent the presentation to settled places, that honest and ingenious Men be presented, that a Competency of settled and constant Fees be alot­ted to encourage honest and able Men to pretend to these places, and to enable themselves for them, and that they may live creditably and ho­nestly in them, and Quotts may be abridged, and it may be provided that small Testaments may be free of Quot; And the Quots of great Testa­ments may be limited, not to exceed a certain Sum, which the Estates shall think reasonable to be the highest Quot: The Quot Silver which shall be thought fit to be taken may be employed (the Commissaries being satisfied of their Fees) to pious uses.

Consolidation.

A Person having Right by Assignation to a comprysing of Lands hol­den of himself, whether eo ipso that he has the foresaid Right, will the Property consolidate with the Superiority? Seing a Comprysing is e­quivalent to a Disposition and Resignation thereupon: And the Superior having Right by an Assignation to a Disposition whereupon there is Resig­nation, and to the said Resignation; It seems that in that case there is Con­solidation: In respect the Superior upon such an Assignation in favours of a Stranger will be obliged to Infeft him: And because he cannot Infeft him­self, the Law doth introduce Consolidation. Ratio Dubitandi is, That Con­solidation is upon the matter a Seasin of the Property; And a Seasin being facti, cannot be without some deed of the Person, in whose favours the Consolidation is to be made, Declaring that he accepts a Right to the effect foresaid. If it be not fit in such cases, that the Superior should before a Notar and Witnesses Declare, that seing he has both a Right to the Proper­ty and Superiority in his Person, It is his will and intention that the Pro­perty should be consolidate with the Superiority; And that an Instrument upon his Declaration foresaid should be equivalent as if the Compryser had been Infeft and had resigned ad Remanentiam: And if such an Instrument should not be Registrate as an Instrument of Resignation ad Remanentiam?

When a Person Infeft in the Property of Lands, acquires and is Infeft in the Superiority. Quaeritur, If eo ipso there be a Consolidation of both Rights? Item if the Superior succeed as Heir to the Right of the Property Quaeritur, If in that case there be a Consolidation, so that Dominium di­rectum trahit ad se utile? Seing the Superior could not Infeft himself, and by his purchasing of the Property he enters to the Right thereof, and so the Property is consolidate fictione juris, in the same manner as if he had been Infeft.

If vice versâ, The Proprietar acquire the Superiority, If eo casu there be a Consolidation of both Rights? Answer. It is thought, not: And that Dominium utile cannot draw to it directum, without Infeftment by the Su­perior of the Dominium directum.

[Page 36]If a Person being Infeft by his Father upon a Right granted to him and his Heirs whatsomever to be holden of the Disponer; be thereafter In­feft as Heir to his Father in the Superiority of the said Lands, which be­longed to his Father and his Heirs Male. Quaeritur. Whether there will be a Confusion and Consolidation of the Property and Superiority? It is Answered. During his Lifetime there will be a kind of Consolidation, see­ing he cannot be Superiour to himself: But it will cease by his Death, so that the Superiority will belong to his Heirs Male, and the Property to his Heirs whatsomever.

If he intends that there should be a Consolidation, what course is to be taken to that purpose? Answer. If, as in the case foresaid, he was Infeft first in the Property and then in the Superiority, he must dispone the Pro­perty to a Confident; And the Confident being Infeft must resign ad Re­manentiam, to the effect the Property may be consolidate with the Superio­rity to him and his Heirs Male and their Successors.

If a Superior should succeed in the right of the Property. Quaeritur. If there be a confusion of both Rights in his Person? Answer. It is thought, though they may appear to be a Consolidation dureing his Lifetime, they are nevertheless distinct; Seing the right of the Superiority may be to Heirs Male, and the Property to Heirs whatsomever: And the said Heirs may succeed Respectivè.

If the said Superiour, being Infeft in the Right of the Superiority, succeed thereafter in the Right of the Property, what way shall he be Infeft there­in, seing he cannot Infeft himself? Answer. It is thought that it is not inconsistent, that the Superior may give Precept to give Seasin to an Actor­ney in his name and for his use.

If the said Superior intend that the Property should be consolidate with the Superiority, what way shall it be done? Answer. He may direct the said Precept in these Terms for Infefting him: And seing he has both Rights in his Person and intends that the Property should be consolidate with the Superiority; The Precept may be in these Terms, to give Seasin to the effect the Property may be consolidate with the Superiority; To be hol­den both of his Superior in all time coming, in the same manner as if they had never been severed.

If a Precept may not be obtained in subsidium out of the Chancery, for Infefting the said Person in the property to be holden of himself, seing he cannot Infeft himself? Answer. It is thought that a course may be taken upon a Bill to the Lords, ordaining the Director to the Chancery to di­rect a Precept upon the reason foresaid.

Decreets contra Consortes.

A Decreet of Reduction Ex capite interdictionis being obtained in foro; and the Wife being Liferentrix craving to be reponed, because Com­petent and omitted could not be alledged against her being sub potestate Mariti. Quaeritur. If she prevail, may the Husband crave the benefite of her Decreet? Ratio Dubitandi. Upon pretence that it is found that the Decreet against him was unjust upon the matter: And it cannot be just as to her and unjust as to him.

This Question may occur in many cases; As that of two Heirs portio­ners, [Page 37] one being Major and another Minor: And after the Decreet against both, The Minor being Reponed and prevailing. And of a Decreet a­gainst a principal, having proponed a Defence of payment and having succumbed in probation: And thereafter the Cautioner being pursued, and upon probation of the same Defence, being Assoilied.

Corporations.

QƲid juris as to Crafts and other Incorporations, and as to Bishops and other single Incorporations, if in any case they may oblige them­selves and their successors?

Creditors of the Defunct.

IF the Creditors of the Defunct being Minors will be preferred to the Creditors of the Heir, though they do not Diligence within three Years?

Persons convict of Capital Crimes.

A Person being convict of a Capital Crime, and the Escheat of his Move­ables therethrough falling to the King, and he being keeped in prison many Years without a Remission, and dying in that condition. Quaeritur, Whether the Rents of his Lands in the interim not uplifted, will belong to the King and his Donator, or to the Heir? Ratio Dubitandi, His Escheat is only of what he had the time of the Sentence; after which he became civiliter mortuus; and being nullus in Law, he had nothing to loss; And the King by his Indulgence could not prejudge his Heir, unless he had granted him a Remission restoring him against the Sentence.

Quaeritur, quid Juris, If after he is convict, he should commit Treason, whether he might be Forefaulted in prejudice of his Heir?

Curator.

A Female Minor being Married, Quaeritur, If the Office of her Cura­tory doth expire?

Curatores ad Lites.

JƲre Saxonico, Faeminae sunt in perpetua Tutela, sed isti Curatores non habent Administrationem, & ideo Rationes non tenentur reddere; adhibentur enim tantum pro consilio & assistentia, & ad integrandam personam, maxime in Ju­dicialibus.

Ex consilio suo, quod fideliter impertiuntur, etiamsi non responderit eventus, conveniri nequeunt, quia nemo ex consilio obligatur: An idem dicendum in Cu­ratoribus ad Lites? Thes. Bes. in litera K. 47. verbo Kriegerischer. per. totam pag. 474. & sequent.

D.

Damnum, cum quis utitur Jure suo.

DAmnum est conjunctum cum injuria: Et non dicitur Damnum quod Evenit cum quis jure suo utitur.

Si vero quis ita utatur Jure suo, ut vicino potius noceat quam sibi prosit, il­licitum est, & prohiberi potest: Quia magis Jure suo abuti quam uti videtur.

Si in meo aliquid faciam ad aemulationem & injuriam alterius, hoc est, non in meam utilitatem sed animo nocendi; alteri de Dolo Teneor.

Secus si injuriâ faciam, non animo nocendi vicino sed ut mihi prosit.

Si enim in meo praedio puteum aperiam, quo aperto, venae putei vel fontis vicini mei praecidantur, non teneor ex hujusmodi facto etiamsi promisissem de Da­mno infecto, quia jure meo & licite feci. Textus sunt expressi, Leg. 1. §. 12. & Leg. 21. ff. de aqua pluvia arcenda, Jus Fluviat. p. 67. n. 13.

Death-Bed.

IF a Creditor may on Death-Bed make an Heretable Sum Moveable by a Charge of Horning?

A Person holding Lands Ward, when he was on Death-Bed did resign his Estate in favours of his eldest Son, with the Burden of Provisions in favours of his other Children; which course was taken of purpose, to pre­vent the falling of the Ward and Marriage, his Son being then Minor. Quaeritur. If his Son may question these Provisions as being in Lecto, upon pretence that though on Death-Bed he might Dispone in favours of his Heir, yet he could not prejudge him? Answer. It is thought that the said Right being made suo modo, and he having accepted the same and bruik­ed by vertue thereof, after Majority he cannot question the said Modus and Qualification.

A Person having provided his Estate both Heretable and Moveable to his Relict in Liferent, and to his Daughter in Fee, and Failȝieing of her by Decease to be divided betwixt his Relict and his Brother, being his next Heir after his Daughter and her Heirs. And the Brother having accepted of a share of the Moveable Estate after the Decease of the Daughter. Quaeritur. If he might question the said Right as to the Heretable Estate as being made on Death-Bed? Ratio Dubitandi. Ʋtile per inutile non vi­tiatur, and the Defunct might on Death-Bed dispose on his Moveables; And the accepting of the Right as to these does not hinder the Heir to question the same as to the Heretage; Whereof he had no power then to dispose.

A Husband having Disponed Lands by way of Gift to his Wife, and having thereafter revocked the said Gift tacite by a Disposition made on Death-Bed in favours of another person. Quaeritur. If the Heir may question the said Disposition upon Death-Bed? Ratio Dubitandi, The Heir is not prejudged, in respect the Lands would not have belonged to him [Page 39] but to the Wife: And the Revocation is qualified and only in favours of the Person to whom it is made on Death-Bed, and to no other effect.

Debitor and Creditor.

IF for a Sum of Money, Land be Wodsett, so that the granter of the Wadset is not Debitor, There being no Clause of Requisition or Oblige­ment for repayment, Quaeritur, If there be only a Reversion, Whether will the granter of the Wadset have the benefite of the Act Debitor and Creditor; so that the haver of the Wadset may be restricted to the Annual­rent of the Sum contained in the Reversion? Grubet contra Moir.

After a Comprising was deduced, an Infeftment of Annualrent was granted by the Debitor: And thereafter another Compriser having com­prised, who pretended that his Compriseing should be drawn back to the first, being within Year and Day, and therefore should be preferred to the Right of Annualrent: And that the Debitor being denuded by the first Compriseing, had only a Reversion; and that an Infeftment of An­nualrent is not habilis modus, to give a right of Reversion; and that it was not, nor could be cled with Possession; The second Compriseing being before the term of payment: The Lords brought in the Annualrenter with all the Comprisers, as if he had comprised the same day he was in­feft. Colstoun contra Nicolas a Creditor of Dunglass. Gibson Clerk. Col­stoun's Bond was 16 February 1669; Seasin 24 May 1669, Nicolas Com­priseing 1669.

If the first Compriseing and Infeftment should be considered as being to the behoof, not only of the Adjudger Infeft, but of the others, by the Act of Parliament, in the same manner as if the Infeftment had been so granted expresly by the Superior? Quaeritur, Quid Juris? Ratio Du­bitandi, That even in that case the Adjudger Infeft is only Vassal, so that by him only the Superior has his Casualities. Bancrief.

Nomina Debitorum.

IF Nomina, which are not Res, But Entia Rationis, have Situm, when the Debitor is in Scotland animo remanendi, and the Debt is contracted with him, as resideing there? Ratio Dubitandi, They are thought and called a Personal Interest, and therefore should sequi Personam. Contrà, They are, Res in Obligatione & potentia. 2. If the Creditor be forefaul­ted in France, being a French-man, they do not forefault to that King, Quia subditus amittit only quae sunt civitatis. 3. They are lyable in Scot­land to extraordinary Taxations. 4. The Debitor is quasi servus, & ser­vi habent situm. To consider Quid Juris elsewhere, as to Banks & montes Pietatis.

Strangers Debts.

IF a Stranger contract with a Scots-man abroad, that he should pay him presently upon the Place, and the Debitor nevertheless come away without satisfaction. Quid Juris as to that Debt, whether it be constru­ed Nomen Anglicum?

[Page 40] Quid Juris as to English-debts, contracted betwixt English-men in En­gland, if the Debitor withdraweth to Scotland? Answer, It is thought, that though actor sequitur forum rei, and the Law of Scotland has place in such Cases, quoad Ordinatoria, yet the English over-rule such Cases quoad Decisoria: And a Testament proven in England is sufficient.

Debitum Annuum.

A Brother having given a Liferent-tack to his Brother of a yearly Du­ty of Victual out of his Lands, to be payed yearly during all the days of his lifetime at Martimass; and the Tacks-man having deceased before that Term, will he have any part of that years Duty in which he deceaseth? And if there be a difference betwixt Debitum annuum & Le­gatum annuum, cujus dies cedit anni initio? Mr. William Turnbul Minister of Mokerston, contra Turnbul of Minto.

Debitum in Diem.

WHat course should be taken when the Debt is in Diem, and the Term of Payment not come; and the Debitors Estate comprised, and the Comprising for other Debts like to expire before the Creditor in Diem, can have a Decreet and Execution thereupon? Sir Robert Sin­clair's Daughter.

Decimae.

AƲ Commencement Les dismes n'estoyent le domaine des gens d'eglise: et les dons des dismes que les Princes et Seigneurs ont fait aux Moines (qui lors n'estoient du nombre des Clercs) ont esté faites de leur biens propres?

Plusieurs payoient les dismes par devotion sans contrainte, de ces payments fut faite coustume qui causa obligation qui Engendra action pour contraindre a payer les dismes. Grimand. de dismes lib. 1. cap. 4.

La contrainte de payer dismes primierement, N'eut fondement certain sur l'authorité du Magistrat Civil, car il ne se trouve aucune constitution pour payement des dismes dans les Loix Imperiales, Ibidem.

Charlemagne fut le premier qui les commanda payer Ibid.

Decreets of the Lords of Session.

WHether the Sentences of the Lords of Session should be conside­red as Laws, and if notwithstanding thereof, these who are of another Opinion may in cases occurring thereafter, vote according to their own Opinion?

Deeds both inter Vivos & Mortis Causa.

IF it appear by a Paper in legitima potestate, That the Defunct intended to settle his Estate, both Heretable and Moveable, Whether will the same be valide as to both, so that both a Testament and Deed inter vivos may be consistent in one Paper? Ratio Dubitandi, If at the same time [Page 41] there had been a Paper apart, in the same Terms, it had been a valid Right as to the Heretable Estate, being Delivered: And it appears that it were against Reason that it should be invalid because it is in a Paper containing a Testament, seing utile per inutile non vitiatur. Captain Ross.

Dependence.

INhibitions and Arrestments may be upon Dependence of an Action: Quaeritur, If when two Citations are necessar, the Summons with the first Citation thereupon, will import a Dependence before the second Citation?

Destination of Succession.

A Bond being granted to a Sister by her Brother for Provision, and to the Heirs of her Body, whilk failȝieing to return to him and his Heirs: Whether may she assign it without an Onerous Cause? Jean Drummond contra Riccarton her Brother.

Whether the said Bond be moveable, and will fall under Executory?

Humbie, By Contract of Marriage betwixt him and Wariestoun's Daugh­ter, being bound to resign for an Infeftment to himself, and the Heirs Male of the Marriage; Which failȝieing his Heirs Male whatsomever, Quaeritur, If there be no Heirs Male of the Marriage, will his other Heirs Male have action of Implement; The said Obligement being on­ly in Favours of the Marriage?

If as to other Heirs (That being only a Destination) he may alter it at any time, etiam in Lecto, in favours of the Heir whatsomever of the Marriage? Quod in Favorem introductum est, in odium non retorquetur.

If a Bond were granted by a Person in the same Terms, and were lying by him, might he alter or destroy it in lecto?

Desuetudo.

LEx non dicitur sublata per non usum, sed per contrarium usum. Baldus ad Tit. ff. de Legibus & Cod. quae sit longa consuetudo, Heiring: de Mo­lendinis, Quaest. 37. N. 38.

Dies coeptus.

IN Favorabilibus Dies coeptus habetur pro completo: v. g. Pubes dicitur annum decimumquartum complevisse, cum diem ejus ultimum attigit.

Dilapidation.

THE Act of Parliament 1585 against Dilapidations, provides, That Bishops to be provided thereafter, should find Caution to leave their Benefice as it was at their Entry: and if the Person so provided should do otherways, the Tacks and other Deeds should be void. Qua­ritur, If they should find Tacks set at their entry, Whether they may set [Page 42] new Tacks after the expireing thereof; the Benefite being in the same case by the new Tacks as at their Entry? Cogitandum.

Dishabilitation.

QƲaeritur, If by our Law the Posterity of Traitors may be disabled, and what may be the import of the Dishabilitation? and whether etiam Ante-nati may be disabled?

Power to Dispone, notwithstanding the giving away the Right of Fee.

WHen Lands are disponed, reserving a Power to the Disponer to dispone the same in hail or in part, as if he were Fiar, Quae­ritur, If he be thereafter forefaulted, will the King have the same faculty by the Forfeiture? Answer, The said Faculty being Perso­nal to the Disponer, upon personal Considerations, such Reservations be­ing in Rights granted by Parents to their Children, to be Tyes upon them that they be dutyful; and because Parents may come to be in that condition that they may need, and it is just that they have recourse to their own Estate: Seing the said Considerations do not militate as to the Fisk, the said Faculty cannot be pretended to be transmitted.

Quid Juris, In the Case of a Compriser, whether the said Faculty can be comprised? Answer, That the Debitor having the Faculty foresaid ought to dispone for satisfaction of a just Debt; And if he be so unjust as not to satisfy the Debt, the Law may, and doth dispone: and in Law the Compriseing being a Legal Disposition, is equivalent as if the Disposition had been made by himself.

Dispositio collata in arbitrium alterius.

A Person not being satisfied that his nearest Kinsmen should succed him, having a great Estate, and they but mean, and who, he conceived could not represent him creditfully; and not being fully resolved who should represent him, lest he should be prevented with death, did there­fore dispone his Estate in Lands, to such two Persons most worthy of his Name; or upon Mortifications, or such Pious Uses, as Ten of his Friends named in the Disposition, being a Deed inter vivos, should think fit. Quae­ritur, If the Friends should accordingly name two Persons, would the Right be valid? Ratio Dubitandi, 1. Mandatum expirat morte mandan­tis: And if he could not dispone himself on Death-bed, much less could he impower another Person to dispone after his Decease. 2. Paria sunt indebito tempore fieri & in tempus indebitum conferri. 3. A Deed cannot be said to be a perfect Deed inter vivos, unless it were consummate in sub­stantialibus, and the Person Cui, is de substantia. 4. No Power can be given by a Person, who has no Right himself but as Procurator or Com­missioner, and such Powers do expire with the Granter. 5. There can no Right validly be given incertae personae, or ex alieno arbitrio in futuro. 6. The Defunct could not give Power to the said Friends, to dispose of [Page 43] his Personal Estate after his Decease, and à pari or majori, he could not give such a Power as to his Heretable Estate. Mr. John Bayne of Pit­cairly.

Disposition.

IF a Person get a Right and Disposition omnium Bonorum; Whether will he be lyable to the Debt of the Disponer?

Actio ad Distractum.

EX Contractu non agitur ad Distractum, sed ad implementum: & Contra­ctus & Transactio non aliter annullantur ex defectu Implementi, quam si praecesserit monitio ad implendum, & deinceps culpa implere Debentis. Hering. de Molend. Quaest. 11. N. 132. & 133.

Division of the Duties of Lands, betwixt Buyer and Seller.

BY the ordinary Custom when Lands are sold, If it be a Whitsundays Bargain, the whole years Duty is assigned: If it be a Martimass-Bargain, only the half year. Quaeritur, If they be not assigned, Quid Ju­ris as to the said Duties? Answer, It is thought, the Buyer will be in the Case, as we have said of a Compryser: But the Question will be if the Bargain be made after Martimass, and before Candlemass the ordinar Term of Payment of Victual? And then it is thought, that the Buyer should be in the same case, as if the Bargain had been made precisely at Marti­mass, if the price be then payed, or in condition to be payed, with the Annualrent from Martimass: Seing the Disponer is in no worse case than if the Bargain had been made precisely at Martimass.

Donatio inter Virum & Ʋxorem.

A Woman being induced to consent to a Right granted by her Husband of her Conjunct Fee Lands, and making Faith not to question it. Quaeritur. If she may so far revock a Donation as to her Husband, that she may crave the equivalent?

Donatio inter Virum & Ʋxorem being ipso jure Null, But so that morte confirmatur. Quaeritur. If a posterior Creditor of the Husbands should Comprise Lands given to the Wife, during the Marriage before the Hus­bands Death, will his Death confirm the deed in prejudice of the Creditor; The Comprysing being medium impedimentum?

If at least the Legal will belong to the Wife, The Husband not Re­vocking?

If the Husband decease without Revocking. Quaeritur. If the Wife will have Action against the Heir upon that ground, that the Debt is pay'd out of her Estate by the Comprysing on the Husbands posterior Bond?

Lands being Disponed by a Husband to his Wife, and thereafter he [Page 44] having Disponed the same to another person in Lecto aegritudinis. Quaeri­tur. If his Heir may question the Right in Lecto? Ratio Dubitandi, It is not made in his prejudice but of his Wife: And the Revocation is only in favours of the Receiver of the Disposition.

A Debitor having contracted Debt after he had made a Right of Land or any other Donation in favours of his Wife. Quaeritur. If eo ipso he has Revocked Tacité the said Donation? Ratio Dubitandi. The Donatio inter virum & uxorem is Null, and morte tantum confirmatur; And before it became valid the said impediment interveened: And since the Debitor might have Revocked the said Gift and might have satisfied the Creditor that way; his Silence and not Revocking is upon the matter frau­dulent, and in prejudice of the Creditor. It is thought, That it is to be considered, if the Debitor or his Heir have no other Estate, out of which the Creditor may be satisfied; In that case the Creditor may have recourse against the Lands Disponed to the Wife.

If in the case foresaid the Wife may have recourse against the Heir for the Lands given to her so evicted? Ratio Dubitandi. That if the con­tracting the Debt after such Donations import Revocation, it ought to be only in favours of the Creditor and not of the Heir, who ought to be in no better case, and the Wife's Action against the Heir may be upon that ground, That out of the Estate belonging to her (unquestionably as to the Heir) the Debt whereto the Heir is Lyable is satisfied.

A Woman having made a Disposition to a third person to the behoof of her Husband, and having ratified and made Faith before a Judge. Quae­ritur. If she may question the said Deed as being Donatio inter Virum & Ʋxorem notwithstanding her Oath? Answer. It is thought she may: And that Deeds that in Law are invalid cannot be sustained upon pretence of an Oath which ought not to be Vinculum iniquitatis; otherwise eâdem faci­litate that a Wife is induced to give, she may be induced to Swear, and the Law should be Elusory: And such Oaths ought to be understood only, that they are not compelled, and that they shall not question such Deeds upon that head; But not in relation to any other Ground whereby they may be questioned; As v. g. Minority, and that the Wife has Curators not consenting: And that the Husband (if she has no other) is Cura­tor and cannot Authorise her to any Deed in rem suam: And the Act of Parliament anent the Oaths of Wives is in favours of Strangers and not of Husbands.

Donatio mortis Causa.

THere being a Donation inter virum & uxorem. Quaeritur, The Do­nator Deceasing and the Donant Surviving and not Revocking, whether will the Gift be Valid? Ratio Dubitandi. Such Donations aequi­parantur Legatis being always Revocable: And Legatars Deceasing before the Testator their Legacies are void.

Donatio non acceptata.

IF a Donation be made but not accepted. Quaeritur, If a Creditor may Compryse the same and accept? Vide Legacy quest. 4.

Donators upon Recognition and Forefaulture.

AFter Lands holden of the King had fallen under Recognition, they fell also under Forefaulture, and after the Decease of the Forefaulted person a Gift of the said Lands was given upon the Recognition, and there­after another Gift was given upon the Forefaulture; It not being known by the King or his Officers, the time of the first Gift, that the person Fore­faulted had committed Treason; Quaeritur, Which of the Donators should be preferred? Ratio Dubitandi, That Recognition is but a Casuality; And after the Vassal was Forefaulted the property was thereby devolved to the King ipso jure; And all Casualities seem to be Extinct, and consolidate with the Right of property: And the Right upon Recognition does not belong to the Superior ipso jure before Declarator. M cghie of Larg.

Duels and Hame-sucken.

IF Hame-sucken or Fighting Duels be Capital though no person be killed?

Qui in Duello occubuerunt, in Locis religiosis sepeliri non possunt, Perez. Lib. 2. Tit. 1.

E.

Emancipatio.

IF by our Law, Children after twenty five years may Emancipate them­selves, and live by themselves, and leave their Father and his Family? Cogitandum. And the custom of other Nations is to be considered.

Whether if they go out of the Family without the Fathers consent they may claim a Bairns part?

Contractus Emptionis a Pretio incipiens aut Mensura.

CƲm emitur fundus tot jugerum, an si plura reperiantur jugera Emptori cedant, an venditori? Respondetur. Cúm pretium formatur a Mensura, & ab ea Contractus incipit, & in singula jugera certum pretium promittitur, quod superest ad venditorem redit, quod deest ab eo suppletur.

Sin Contractus incipit a specie, licet demonstrative aliqua mentio de modo agri fiat; ut si vendo fundum centum jugera continentem, si plura repe­riantur, cedunt Emptori, nec ad augendum pretium tenetur: falsa enim fuit Demonstratio, quae non nocet. Thes. Bes. in litera K. 9. verbo Kauf­fen. p. 453.

What way the Buyer may be urged to Enter.

IF the Buyer lye out what will be the remedy for the Superior? Answer. He may pursue to hear and see him decerned to Enter, and to [Page 46] pay Composition: And without prejudice of that Decerniture, if he con­tinue to ly out, To hear and see it found that the Lands are in Non-entry; And that the Superior as to Casualities, shall be in the same case as if he were Entered.

Entry of Assigneys upon Resignation.

IF the Alienation and Resignation be Assigned, Quaeritur, If the Su­perior may be compelled to enter the Assigney, seing both are in fa­vours of Heirs and Assigneys? Answer. Negativé, Unless a Composi­tion be payed both for the Buyer and for the Assigney: Seing the Superior is not obliged to Enter any but the Buyer and his Heirs: And though the Right be to Assigneys it is to be understood such as the Superior should be satisfied with: And the Superior is not to be in a worse case than if the Buyer had been Infeft and had Disponed: And there is in this case Fictio brevis manus.

Entry upon Resignation by a singular successor.

WHat way a singular Successor in the Right of Superiority, may be urged to Infeft upon Resignation in his Authors time; Seing he does not represent him as Heir; And is not bound to the Buyer by Con­tract or quasi? Answer. There is obligatio in rem, as in the case of Servi­tudes and Annualrents; And he may be pursued summarly to hear and see him decerned to Enter the Buyer: And to that purpose to give him a Charter of the Tenor Exhibited: And upon a Bill the Director to the Chancery may be ordered to give out a Precept in subsidium.

Liferent Escheat.

A Vassal having granted a subaltern Right being Year and Day at the Horn, Forfaulteth only his own Right of Liferent without prejudice to the Sub-vassal: Whereupon it may be Quaeried, If a Vassal has Dis­poned his Right but so that the Party Acquirer is not Infeft, will notwith­standing the Disponers Liferent fall? Answer. Affirmativé. And the Ratio Dubitandi is of no weight. Viz. 1. A Tacksman though the duty be not proportionable will not be prejudged. 2. If the Receiver of the Disposition be Rebel per annum, and the Lands hold of the King, The King will get eodem tempore Two Liferents of the same Lands. Viz. One by the Rebellion of the Disponer, and the other by the Rebellion of the Re­ceiver. For as to the first, a Tacksman has a Real Right and Interest which militates against a singular Successor. And as to the second, there is no Inconvenient that the Superior should have the Liferent of his Vassal; And if the King be Superior that he should also as King have the Liferent of his Subject; And any benefite may accrue to him by the Disposition and Warrandice thereof during his Lifetime.

If a Person Infeft in Liferent be denuded by an Assignation of the Life­rent, which is only habilis modus (in respect Liferents constitute by Infeft­ment are personal, and cannot be transmitted by Resignation) Quaeritur If the Liferenter be Year and Day Rebel after the Assignation, will the Su­perior have Right to the Duties?

[Page 47]A Lady Tercer, or Tennent by Courtesy, their Lands holding of an­other Superior than the King, and they not being Vassals to him; Whe­ther will their Liferent fall to the King, being year and day at the Horn?

A Person being denounced in April, and continuing year and day at the Horn, Quaeritur, quando dies cedit, of the Liferent falling to the Supe­rior of the Lands set to Tennents? And whether or not the Superior will be in the case of a Liferenter surviving the Fiar; So that he will have right in the case foresaid, to the full Duty of that year that the Liferent falls, per lapsum anni & diei?

Quid Juris, Where the Rebel laboureth himself, will he not be lyable to the Superior for the Duty of that Year, as if he were a Tennent?

If these Obligements that are ordinary in Dispositions to be holden of the Granter and Superior, That while the Buyer holds of the Granter, his Heirs and Successors shall be entered gratis, and shall not be lyable to Non-en­try nor Liferent Escheat, which are gifted to them now as then, Will bind singular Successors? And what way they may be made real, if there be any Question? Answer, It is thought, that they may be inserted both in the Charter and Sasine.

It may be contended, that these being upon the matter Servitudes up­on the Superiority, may be constitute as other Servitudes without Write; specially seing it is intended they should hold either of the ways; and that the Right in the Person of the Disponer to be holden of the Superior, is in effect to the Buyers behoof, until they be confirmed: And Reversions were Real, even before the Act of Parliament anent the Registration of the same, Cogitandum. If at least Comprisers will be lyable to such Ob­ligements? Seing they comprise only such a Right as their Debitor had: and they are in use to comprise all Contracts and Dispositions, and there­fore ought to be lyable in rem to all Obligements upon the Debitor and his Successors, relating to the Lands comprised.

To consider, If there be not a Difference betwixt Obligements as to Life­rent Escheat and others; these as to Liferent Escheat being contrary to Law, and such as give occasionem peccandi; and if such an Obligement be not sustained, to whom will the Liferent belong? Whether to the medi­ate Superior, seing the immediate has renounced? or to the King as ab­latus ab indigno?

If a Liferent Escheat be gifted to the Rebel himself, being yet at the Horn, Whether will it fall under his single Escheat, or Liferent to the King?

If the Liferent be gifted by the Superior to the Vassal himself being re­laxed; and if thereafter he be Year and Day at the Horn. whether or not his Liferent will of new fall to the Superior? Ratio Dubitandi, he can­not have two Liferents of one Person.

If there be a Difference betwixt the Casualities of Ward and Non-en­try, and a Liferent Escheat, which has also tractum temporis; in respect the Liferent Escheat falleth ex delicto, and but once, and is Jus collecti­vum of all Years falling under Liferent: Whereas Ward and Non-entry are of the Nature of Annua Legata, and are in effect annuae cessiones, which are only Effectual during the Cedents Right? Vid. Title, If Gifts of Ward and Non-entry prejudge singular Successors, in Lit. G.

[Page 48]If a Person being at the Horn should suspend and relax, and thereaf­ter the Letters being found orderly proceeded, should be Denounced, Quaeritur, If the time of the former Rebellion would be continued with the last as to the Question of the Liferent, as if the Rebel had not been relaxed?

When Reversions, or Minuts bearing Obligements to dispone in favours of the Rebel, do fall under Liferent Escheat, Quaeritur, What benefit or Right will the Donator have? Answer, It is to be considered, what be­nefite the Rebell would have: and the Liferent thereof will belong to the Donator.

If an Heretor be year and day at the Horn, and there being a Subal­tern right holden of him for a small Feu-duty, the Superior would get his Liferent only as to that Feu-duty, there being no more his.

Quaeritur, If there be a Liferenter holding of the Superior, and she hav­ing assigned her Liferent during her lifetime, Whether or not the Supe­rior will have right to her full Liferent, without respect to the Assignati­on? Et quae Ratio differentiae? Answer, The subaltern Right was a real and valid Right, constitute habili modo, which could not be prejudged by any Deed of the Heretor: Whereas the Assignation made by the Life­renter is only personal, as a Disposition made by the Heretor, which de­pends upon the real Right; and eo resoluto, falleth.

Escheat single.

IF an appearand Heir have right to a moveable Heirship, and the same or nearest of Kin have right to be Executor, but neither the one is served, nor the other confirmed, and both be at the Horn: Whether will their Interest foresaid fall under Escheat, as in the case of Forefeiture; Seing Escheats are Forefeiture as to Moveables?

If a Tack being for many nineteen Years, should be assigned; Will the same fall under the single Escheat of the Assigney, seing there is no Liferent as to him, and the Liferenters may all die in his lifetime?

Will not the Assigney have right for the lifetimes of the Heirs, though they be not served Heirs?

The Tack being for three lifetimes, and certain nineteen years after, Quid Juris, Where the Tacksman has no Heirs, so that there is place to a Gift of Bastardy or ultimus Haeres?

A Tack of Teinds being granted to the Tacksman and his Heirs and Assigneys, for three Liferents, and three nineteen Years; and being there­after assigned, Quaeritur, If the Assigney be at the Horn, Whether it will fall under his single Escheat? Answer, It is thought it will: seing it is not a Liferent Right as to the Assigney, and the whole Liferents may be determined during the Assigneys lifetime: and a Tack for three nineteen Years doth fall under single Escheat.

Quaritur, If a Tack exceeding the Life of Men, v. g. for eight nine­teen Years, falls under single Escheat?

Escheat without Backbond.

IF the King may regrant Escheats, without a Back-bond, and declare that it is his pleasure so to do? Answer, It is thought that the King [Page 49] in no worse case than other Superiors, who do always give Escheats of their Vassals Liferent, (and if they be Lords of Regality their single Es­cheat) without Back-bond.

Delivered Evidents.

A Person having a Bond of fifty thousand Merks, did assign the same to the Debitor; But so that the Debitor by the Assignation and accep­ting thereof, was obliged to pay the said whole Sum (reserving the Ce­dents Liferent) to the persons therein mentioned amongst them, Quaeri­tur, The Assignation being never delivered to the Assigney, and recove­red after the Cedents decease, viis & modis, Whether it will be a bind­ing Writ? Answer, The Case will not be without question. Ratio Du­bitandi, That Deeds and Writs that are single and monopleura do not bind, unless they become the Parties Evident by Delivery: and on the other part, Contracts subscribed by two Parties retained in the hands of one, are valid though not delivered to the other: and the said Assignation is not a simple Deed, but bears reciprocal Obligements which are as bind­ing as if they were subscribed by both. 2. The said Assignation, though it appears to be actus inter vivos, yet upon the matter is donatio mortis cau­sa, and the Defuncts will as to her whole Estate, and to whom it should belong after her decease: and such Writes, being of the nature of Wills and Legacies, may be retained and are valid though not delivered. Lady Margaret Kennedy.

Exception against the Cedent, if always competent against the Assigney?

QƲaeritur in general, If all personal Obligements, and Exceptions com­petent against the Cedent, be competent against the Assigney? And what reason there is, that Discharging Compensation, and the Suspen­ding of Payment for a time, and such like; should be competent against the Assigney: and not such as are founded upon correspective Writs, which import Retention, or Suspending of Implement against the Ce­dent?

Executor.

IF the Executor ad omissa be countable to the nearest of Kin, who are not accessory to the Fraud of Omission?

If the Creditors and nearest of Kin have such an interest in the Goods confirmed, that they are preferable to the Executors own Creditors? or if after Confirmation there be a Confusion, as in the case of an Heir?

When there is only one Child, who is both Heir and Executor; Whether there will be only a Bipartite Division, betwixt the Defunct and Relict? Lady Craigleith.

If an Executor Creditor be lyable to Execute the Testament fully, or on­ly so far as may satisfy himself?

If the Defuncts Estate be so settled in the Person of the Executor by Con­firmation, that there is a confusion of it with his own; so that his Credi­tors [Page 50] may affect, and evict it being in Money or in Goods; and doing pri­or diligence, will be preferred to the Defuncts Creditors? Ratio Dubi­tandi, The Executor is haeres in mobilibus: On the other part, he has on­ly an Office, and the Administration is committed to him by the Com­missars, and he findeth Caution to make forthcoming; and if he die be­fore the Testament be Execute, another will be confirmed ad non executa, and upon the matter he is Curator Bonis.

A Child being confirmed Executor to the Grandfather upon the Mothers side, and dying without Issue and either Brothers or Sisters: Will the Fa­ther have right to the Executory as Executor to the Child? 2. What if the Child decease before the Testament be execute? 3. Can the Father be Executor ad non executa to the Grandfather? Mr. Andrew Marjori-banks Daughter.

Executors nominate (though Strangers, and not Universal Legators) before King James his Act of Parliament, had right to the whole Executo­ry; and since to the Third; Quaeritur, If they decease before Confirma­tion, Will they notwithstanding have right as Legators?

If they be Confirmed, and die immediatly before the Testament be ex­ecute, Whether the Executor-Stranger will have right to the Third?

The Office of Tutrix ceaseth by her Marriage, but not that of Execu­trix, Quaeritur, Quae Ratio Discriminis? Answer, She being in Tutela her­self, cannot be Tutrix to another. 2. An Executor has not nudum Offi­cium, but is Heir in mobilibus: and for that Reason, a Woman may be Executrix, though incapable munerum virilium.

Testaments appear to be Executed by Sentences: Seing after Sen­tence the Executor may Assign.

Albeit quod est Cessibile may be Comprysed, or affected with the Ce­dents Debt: Yet if after Sentence, the Debts and Goods be extant, The Creditors Legators and nearest of Kin will be preferable to the Creditors of the Executor: Because though they may seem to be secured by Cau­tion, yet the same is that the Inventar shall be made forthcoming, and tutius est incumbere &c. And the Executor is Haeres fideicommissarius or Cu­rator bonis, and if he Sell or Assign praesumitur That he doth so that he might satisfy Creditors, Legators and nearest of Kin; but where the same is evicted for his own Debt, it is upon the matter Unjustice and Malver­sation.

Seing the Interest and Right of an Executor is jus anomalum & Par­ticipium, being partly considered in Law and constructed to be haereditas in mobilibus; and partly Officium to execute the Defuncts Will if he Dye Tested, and the Will of the Law if he Dye Intested; And therefore if a Woman be Executrix, albeit she be only Dative, if she marry she is not in the case of a Tutrix and Curatrix: Albeit it may be thought that an Exe­cutor Dative is Curator datus bonis, and she ceases to be Tutrix and Curatrix if she Marry, because these are only nuda officia; But she continues still to be Executrix: And yet if an Executor Dye before Execution his nearest of Kin will not succeed to him in that Interest as Executor to him; So that he may be confirmed Executor to him in the Goods confirmed, but there must be a Testament and Executor ad non Executa, not to him but to the for­mer Defunct: Whereupon diverse Questions arise, And first, if an Exe­cutor nominate die after the Confirmation but before Execution, will he [Page 51] have by the Act of Parliament the third of all the Goods of the Deads part, or only in so far as the Testament is Execute? Ratio Dubitandi, Before the Act of Parliament the Executor had the third entirely, viz. The De­functs part without respect to the Execution, But only the confirmation being in place of addition: And by the Act of Parliament he is restricted to a third of that. And on the other part, since that Act of Parliament, It is presumed, according to that Law, The Defunct intended only the third of his part to be given to the Executor, in respect of the Trouble and pains he is at to Execute, and recover bona Defuncti, and therefore he should only have a proportion of what is Execute.

If the Executor nominate Decease before he confirm, will he have any part of the Deads part? Which will be cleared by an Answer to the former.

When the Procurator Fiscal is confirmed after an Edict served, Whe­ther will the nearest of Kin being Majors the time of the Confirmation, and not owning their Interest, be excluded; So that they can have no Action against the Procurator Fiscal or Bishop for the Goods contained in the Inventar?

Quid Juris as to the nearest of Kin for the time; And if he be Repon­ed whether will he have action of Compt and Reckoning, or must he re­duce the Confirmation so far as that he may be confirmed; The Procura­tor Fiscal being satisfied of all Charges? Ratio Dubitandi, That the nearest of Kin is not nomen juris to succeed, or to have any thing belong­ing to the Defunct unless he represent him, which he cannot unless he be confirmed Executor.

Quid juris, In the case of an Executor Creditor after he is satisfied, will the nearest of Kin be excluded? And if not, what is the habilis mo­dus to get a right setled in his Person? Ratio Dubitandi, In suffering the Creditor to be confirmed, it seems that he has disclaimed his Interest, and not without injury to the Memory of the Defunct: And the Creditor be­ing once confirmed, the nearest of Kin cannot be confirmed: And having Forefaulted his Interest, it may seem, quod indigno aufertur, est Fisci; & quod nullius est, est in bonis Regis.

Quaeritur. When Testaments are Execute, so that there is no place to a non Executa? And if as to Goods whereof the Executor is presently in possession it be not fully Execute? And as to nomina and Debts it be not Execute by Sentence, though they be not uplifted; Seing after Sentence the Executor may Assign? And in that case, may not the Executors Exe­cutor confirm the same as belonging to the Defunct?

Though after Sentence the Debt be in bonis of the Executor, and con­founded with his own Estate: If there should be a Competition betwixt the Executors own Creditors, and the Creditors of the Defunct or his Re­lict and Bairns; Would not the Creditors and the Relict and Bairns of the Defunct be preferred to the Creditors of the Executor, upon that Ground that they are not simply the Executors Goods but in Trust; and is a fidei-commissum for the use of the Defuncts Creditors and his Relict and Bairns: So that both the Executors Creditors and Fisk ought to be excluded upon any such Competition?

If the nearest of Kin will not be Executor: Quaeritur, What remedy will be competent to the Creditors, not of the Defunct but of the Execu­tor; [Page 52] Seing there is an Act of Parliament, in case of an Heirs not entering: But not in the case of an Executor in behalf of Creditors?

If the Commissars should confirm the Creditor of an Executor nominate and the Executor decease, will the next nearest of Kin have Action against the Executor Dative to be Comptable? And whether that Executor will have the priviledge of an Executor Creditor? And if he may be pur­sued at the instance of other Creditors who are not Creditors to the De­funct?

An Executor being nearest of Kin and confirmed, but immediatly dy­ing, Quid juris, will his nearest of Kin be confirmed Executors ad non Executa, if there be another nearer to the first Defunct?

To consider the Civil Law as to Haeres cum beneficio Inventarij: If an Executor be not Haeres in mobilibus cum beneficio Inventarij?

Executor Creditor.

A Creditor being confirmed Executor and dying before the Testament be Executed; Will not his nearest of Kin be confirmed ad non Executa and exclude all other Creditors, in respect of the Diligence of his Predecessor, and that Confirmation did affect the Goods for their sa­tisfaction?

Three Creditors being confirmed for their Respective Debts, and one of them deceasing before Sentence. Quaeritur. Will the Office and bene­fite belong to the Survivers entirely? Ratio Dubitandi. A Testament Creditor is a Diligence, and there is no other way of Diligence to affect the Moveable Estate of a person deceased, and it is equivalent to diligence against Debitors on Life, affecting their Moveables. And on the other part, Executory being an Office the Law preferreth the Creditor, If the nearest of Kin do not own it; But cum sua causa, and so that the nature of the thing is not altered: And therefore the Executor dying, the Office and Diligence doth evanish.

Quid juris in the case of an Executor Creditor: If after he is satisfied the nearest of Kin will have an Action for the superplus?

If a Testament be Execute by a Sentence against the Debitors, though payment be not made? Vide Hope.

Executor Nominate.

IF an Executor Nominate be Lyable as a Tutor; not only for what is confirmed but what he might have confirmed and intrometted with? Tweeddale contra D. of Monmouth.

Executory.

WHether Ʋniversitas bonorum, That is an illiquid Right; Though the Subject may consist of Moveables as a single Escheat, Con­quest, Society as to a Trade or Shipping; Will fall under Executry?

If Casualities of Ward, Liferent Escheat, Non-entry, Marriage, will fall under the same? Or to the Superiors Heir?

There being a Bargain of Lands, in nudis finibus contractûs vel Disposi­tionis, [Page 53] will the Price belong to the Heir who must perfect the Bargain? Answer. It is thought not; Seing the Price is a Moveable Sum: And it appears that the Defunct having sold the Lands had use for it, and did intend to uplift it.

Whether a Gift of single Escheat will fall under Executry or belong to the Heir? Ratio Dubitandi, That the Escheat is jus Ʋniversitatis, And nothing is in use to be confirmed but either particular Moveables or Debts, and plenishing estimate in cumulo,

Item, Whether a Gift of Liferent Escheat (which as to the Donator is a Moveable Interest) will fall under Executry? Ratio Dubitandi As in the former: And likewise that during the Liferenters Lifetime it can­not be construed, what it will amount to: And it has Tractum futuri temporis.

The same Question may be as to a Tack Assigned.

Whether the Heir who has Right to a going Coal, will have Right to Buckets, Chains, and other Instruments as being accessoria and destination addicted to the Coal, as the Colliers: Or if they will fall under Executry?

A Person being about the building of an House; And the samen being begun and certain Materials (as Stone, Lime, Slats and others) being prepared o that use: Whether will they belong to the Heir (for the rea­son foresaid) or fall under Executry?

A Daughter having accepted her Tocher and Provision by Contract of Marriage; in satisfaction of what might fall to her either by her Father or Mo­thers Decease, The Contract of Marriage being after her Mothers Decease. Quaeritur, If another Sister will have the Mothers part entire without re­spect to her Sisters Interest; being renounced as said is? Ratio Dubitandi, That the Father who is Lyable for his Wifes Third, is in Effect Discharg­ed as to his other Daughters part of the samen: And on the other part, the Mothers part belonging to her Children, non jure Legitima as Bairns, but as Executors and representing her: If any of them Decease before Confirmation, or be unwilling to confirm, their Renounciation will be ineffectual as by a person not having Right.

Quaeritur. If the the Sister who is not Excluded should confirm: If the Sister who is Excluded (as said is) may at least have Action against her for her part of the Mothers part: To the effect that the Discharge in favours of her Father may be effectual? It is Answered, That unless she be confirmed her self, she can have no part of that which belonged to her Mother: And albeit by the Act of Parliament anent Executors Nominate, the nearest of Kin has Action for the superplus of the Deads part exceeding the third; That is only in the case therein mentioned, the said Act giving Condictio­nem ex lege in that case only: Whereas that Act doth not militate in other cases where there is no legitime, but only an Interest to represent; which cannot be effectual sine Aditione: Confirmation being in effect Aditio in mobilibus.

Quaeritur, If a moveable Escheat will belong to the Executor, seing Moveables belong to the Executor; and moveable Sums, and other move­ables fall under the same? Answer, It is thought that Escheat being Jus Ʋniversitatis, should belong to the Heir: Seing not only mobilia do fall under the same, but also such Rights and Interests as cannot belong to an Executor, as Tacks if they be not Liferent Tacks: And it is the stile of [Page 54] Gifts, that the Escheat should be holden of his Majesty; which does not quadrate, and is not proper to be said of such things as belong to the Executor.

Extent.

IF the Inquest be warranded to Extend, unless there were former Re­tours upon a Commission to Extend?

Extinguishment of Rights.

IF the Heretor of Praedium Dominans acquire the Right of Praedium ser­viens, Whether doth the Right of Servitude extinguish; quia res sua nemini servit; So that if he sell the Dominans, the Servitude doth not revive?

If the Heretor of Land acquire a Right of Annualrent out of the same; Whether or not is the said Right of Annualrent extinguished or suspen­ded only; So that it may revive if the Right of Property be taken a­way by Reduction?

F.

Faculty to alter,

LAnds being disponed with power to alter, without these Words, Etiam in Lecto; If that Faculty may be used in Lecto?

A Person having reserved a Power to alter in Lecto; May he then use that Power, in favours of any other Person than his Heir; seing he is not in legitima Potestate as to the disponing an Hereta­ble Interest: and on the other Part, the Heir has no prejudice?

Faculty to Dispone.

BY a Write granted by the Earl of Callender, to his Lady, he gives her power to dispose of the half of his Estate, Quaeritur, The said Power being Personal, without mention of her Heirs, and she not having used the said Faculty; If the said Power be Transmissible? Found by the Lords That the Earl of Dumfermling as Heir to his Mother, had right thereto: and he having assigned the same to his Son, he recovered thereupon the half of the Estate, To see the Decreet.

Jus Facultatis.

ATtendendum, an quis aliquid faciat jure facultatis an jure servitutis; Fa­cultas enim non minus aliis quam nobis patet: quia usus qui alii magis ex occasione quam jure conting it, Servitus non est, nec in eo temporis Diutur­nitas [Page 55] quidquam prodest, nisi accesserit prohibitio praescribentis, & patientia ejus contra quem praescribitur Jus Fluviat. p. 756. N. 71. & sequent.

Personal Faculty.

A Person giving a qualified Right, reserving Liferent and a Power to dispone: Quaeritur, If that Faculty may be comprised as a Personal Reversion?

Quae Facultatis sint?

ALiqua Dicuntur esse facultatis, quorum Libertas a Jure publico permissa est, quae non pariunt jus deducibile in Judicium: hoc casu nec nos contra alios praescribimus, nec alii contra nos; Exemplum est in Leg. viam. 2da. de via publica. Aliud Exemplum est in facultate privata, quae nullam antecedentem habet causam obligandi; ut si Rusticus sua sponte, nulla praecedente causa, per multos annos, Domino, certis temporibus, capones attulit; ex hoc actu merae fa­cultatis nulla oritur Domino actio.

Quomodo intelligendum, Facultati non praescribi.

ALiqua dicuntur esse Facultatis ad acquirendum novum Jus, vel novam a­ctionem; vel etiam ad eam Conservandam: atque ita pariunt Jus dedu­cibile in judicium. Et hoc jus licet sit in libera potestate acquirere volentis, non tamen est in potestate illius contra quem acquiritur, vel conservatur, ut recusa­re posset. Sic adire haereditatem est merae facultatis, & tamen tollitur & prae­scribitur spatio 30 annorum; ergo & juri offerendi, & reluendi praescribitur. Hering. de Molend. quaest. 21. N. 17. & sequen.

Jus publicum tribuit cuivis de Populo, ut uni ex multis, nec privative ad alium, etsi ad singulos inde aliquid commodi perveniat: Inde illud quod dice­re solent, Facultati non Praescribi, Dicitur de his quae à natura, aut publico Jure tribuuntur; itaque quocunque tempore, nemo praescribit ut qua ierit in publico nullus alius commeet, etsi nunquam ea commearit.

Ea quae de tali facultate dicta sunt, non recte Traducuntur ad ea quae pro­prii & privati cujusque Juris sunt; id enim Jus est quod ad privatum quem­que pertinet privativé, ita ut non ad alium: Omni siquidem Juri aut facul­tati quae competit privato cuiquam privativé, potest praescribi. Idem Ib­id. N. 20.

Faculty reserved to dispone.

IT being ordinary that a power is reserved by these who Dispone Lands, especially to their Friends, to Redeem or Dispone or Burden at any time dureing their Lifetimes. Quaeritur, Whether Lifetimes should be understood civily, during their Liege Poustie?

Item, Quaeritur. If the Receiver of the Disposition be Dead and the Lands in Non-entry, whether the Disponer may notwithstanding Dis­pone and resign by vertue of the said Power? Ratio Dubitandi, The said Faculty is upon the matter a Heretable Commission and Procuratory, [Page 56] which cannot be Execute post mortem mandantis: and there is no person that has the Right Established in his person so that it may be resigned.

Item. If the Lands be in Non-entry and Ward, will the Resignation by vertue of the said Faculty determine and put an end to the foresaid Casualities in prejudice of the Superior? Ratio Dubitandi. The De­funct by whose Decease they accrue was the Superiors Vassal: And though the Disponer has the same power, yet he should have used it debi­to tempore, while the Vassal was on Life, and before the pursuer had jus quaesitum: On the other part, the said power is of the nature of a Regress, so that quocunque tempore (as in the case of regress) Re-entry may be desired by vertue of the said Faculty.

A Charter being to be granted to a person conform to the said power; That Clause, Quaequidem pertinuerunt, what way it is to be conceaved; and if mention should not be made of the person who is Infeft for the pre­sent, though he be not the person to whom the Right was Disponed with the said Power; But either an Heir or singular Successor?

If the Faculty to Dispone be not upon the matter a Reversion, materially and as to the effect of the same; so that the person having the same, may Dispone albeit he has not jus in re; And albeit the Heretor be either Dead or Forfaulted; As an order may be used against an Appearand Heir, or against the King or his Donator, in the case of Forfaulture or ultimus Haeres?

A Person who had the Faculty foresaid, having by vertue thereof Dis­poned, but deceasing before Resignation, Quaeritur, What way the Disposition shall be made effectual, seing the Faculty was personal to himself?

Fee.

WHen by a Contract of Marriage a Sum is to be provided to a Hus­band and Wife in Liferent, and to the Bairns in Fee; Which Failȝieing to the Father and his Heirs. Quaeritur. Before there be Chil­dren where is the Fee? And if it be not fit to take it to the Father to the use and behoof of the Children, which Failȝieing to himself and his Heirs?

When it is intended that by Contract of Marriage the Parents should be only Liferenters, and that certain Sums should be provided to the Chil­dren, so that they do not represent them, Quaeritur, What way the Fee can be provided to the Children that are not in being? Answer, The Fa­ther may be infeft in Liferent for himself, and in Fee for the use and be­hoof of his Eldest Son and his Heirs: Which Fee is to be to the Father and his Heirs, to the use foresaid: And they are to be obliged upon the Existence of a Son, to denude in Favours of him and his Heirs.

By Contract of Marriage betwixt Knockdaw, Sir John Kennedy, and Gilbert Kennedy of Girvanmayns, The said Sir John having married the said Gilbert's Daughter; The said Gilbert's Lands and Estate are dispon­ed to the said Sir John and his said Spouse, and the Heirs betwixt them; which failȝieing, to such of the said Gilbert's other Daughters, as he should at any time appoint; which failȝieing, to the said Sir John's Heirs and Assigneys whatsomever: and now the said Sir John being deceased, and having a Son of the Marriage, Quaeritur, Whether the Fee did belong [Page 57] to him, so that his Son may be served Heir to him in the Estate? It is Answered, That in the case of the Duke and Dutchess of Monmouth, The Conception of the Tailȝie not being unlike, it was thought the Dutchess was Fiar; albeit the Limitation of the Heirs did ultimatly resolve in the Dukes Heirs; upon that ground that there is a difference betwixt the case where the Lands are provided and Disponed to the Husband and the Wife, and the Heirs of Marriage; which Failȝieing either to the Hus­bands Heirs, or Wifes Heirs: And in the case foresaid where after the Heirs of the Marriage there are diverse substitutions, in favours of the Wife's other Heirs; and after all in favours of the Husbands Heirs. In the first, if the Wife's Heirs be only substitute Failȝieing Heirs of the Marriage, the Husband is understood to be Fiar; Because as it is the essence of a Fee to have power to Dispone, and if the Fiar do not Dispone to transmit to the Fiars Heirs, and to be represented by them: And in dubio cujus haeredibus maxime prospicitur, That person is thought to be Fiar. But in the second case, there being diverse degrees of Substitutions and all in favours of the Wife and her Heirs, before her Husbands Heirs, The Wife is thought to be Fiar: And upon the Failȝeure of all her Re­lations, the Husbands Heirs in the last place are Heirs of provision to her; And yet in the said case of Girvanmains, It is thought that the Husband is Fiar, there being these specialities in that case. 1mo. The said Estate is Disponed to the Husband, and his Spouse the longest Liver as said is and their Heirs of the Marriage; and there is no Liferent settled on the Husband, whereas there is a Liferent of a part of the Lands given to his Wife in satisfaction of what might fall to her either of her Fathers Estate, or of her Husbands. 2do. There is a provision that if there should be no Children of the Marriage to succeed to that Estate, the Husband should be obliged in that case, he and his Heirs to denude themselves upon payment of a certain Sum of Money; and he could not denude himself unless he were Fiar: So that it was intended that the Husband should be Fiar, but with the foresaid Provision to denude in the case foresaid, and to be restricted to a Tocher: For which and other Reasons arising upon the Contract, The Antecedentia and Consequentia being considered, It is thought that the Son should be Heir to his Father as Fiar.

A Bond being granted to a Man and his Wife, and their Heirs. Quae­ritur, What Right the Wife will have to the Sum? Ratio Dubitandi, that there being no mention that the Sum should be due to the longest Liver, and the Heirs of the longest Liver, but to them both and their Heirs, It appears that the Heirs should be understood the Husbands Heirs as Personae digniores. Answer. It is thought that seing there is an joint Right to the Husband and the Wife, and it is the custome of Persons of their Quali­ty being mean Country Persons, that the longest liver should enjoy all: The Wife indubie should enjoy the haill in Liferent and should have the Fee of the half.

De Feodo Pecuniae & Nominum.

‘PEcuniae & Nominum nec proprie Ususfructus nec Feodum est; usus­fructus enim definitur jus utendi fruendi salvâ, rerum substantia: pecunia autem sive in specie, sive in nominibus est res fluxa: Et si in [Page 58] specie sit facile diffluit & usu consumitur: Nomina autem etsi initio idonea; debitoribus decoquentibus, inania sunt. Quemadmodum vero ob utilita­tem receptum est, ut pecuniae sit quasi usus fructus ita est quasi feodum: istud enim proprie loquendo est tantum in rebus soli & stabilibus & feu­dis tantum; non vero allodialibus (ita dictis quod nullo laudato & recognito alio dominio, ad proprietarium pertinent pleno & integro jure nec libato & diviso in Dominium directum & utile: Licet autem apud alias Gentes praedia quaedam allodialia sint, nobis omnia sunt feudalia.) Et Feodum qui­dem in feudis de proprietate & dominio dicitur, prout distinguitur ab usu fructu & aliis quae circa feuda versantur juribus: Per Metaphoram tamen Feodum transfertur ad pecunias & nomina ita ut is in Feodo esse dicatur cui jus summum & proprietatis competit: plaerumque vero evenit sive seculi vitio (in nova commenta prurientis) sive Notariorum Incuria aut imperitia ut Chirographorum stylus a primaeva simplicitate deflectat, sic haud raro nec immerito dubitatur penes quos sit pecuniae & Nominum Feodum.’

Quaestio Prima.

‘SI igitur Sempronius Pater, Pecuniam crediderit & Chirographo sti­pulatus sit eam & usuras sibi solvi si superstes sit; Eo autem per obitum deficiente Titio filio suo & Titii haeredibus & quibus dederit, seu assignatis: Ita tamen ut Sempronio liceat de pecunia & Nomine dis­ponere Titio & haeredibus ejus inconsultis nec consentientibus: Quaeri­tur, In ista facti specie ad quem nominis istius Feodum pertineat? Et videri possit Feodum ad Titium filium pertinere cum nulla sit mentio Sempronij haeredum: Et Feodi ea sit natura ut ad haeredem transeat, qui in jure eadem persona censetur: Dicendum tamen Sempronium in Feodo esse; penes Titium vero & ejus haeredes spem & jus successionis: Nam quae Feodi & proprietatis vel essentialia vel naturalia sunt (ut sciꝪ.) Dominus de re sua disponere possit & ut ea ad haeredes transeat) ea Sem­pronio competunt; potestas enim disponendi etiam non expressa in­esset; & Titius Sempronio substitutus in jus ejus succedit & pro haerede ha­betur (provisionis saltem ut loquimur) idque ex eo elucescit quod si ac­cessisset etiam hypotheca & sasina, terris pro Pecunia in hypothecam da­tis, i [...]sdem conceptis verbis Sempronio sciꝪ.) & eo deficiente Titio filio & ejus haeredibus & assignatis; Titius eo casu extra omnem quaestionis aleam haeres foret: ubi autem eadem sunt verba & eadem ratio, idem jus est & esse debet.’

Quaest. 2da.

‘IN ista facti specie supra memorata, Quaeritur etiam an Sempronius de isto nomine disponere possit, nedum inter vivos sed Testamento aut codicillis eo legato; cum debitum Chirographarium & mobile sit?’

Respondendum videtur, Sempronium eo ipso quod tam haeredibus quam executoribus praeteritis, Titium elegit & substítuit sibi, instar haeredis provisionis, & interciso ordinario succedendi ordine quasi Tallia; Titium in ea re haeredem esse voluit: Voluisse etiam nomen esse haereditarium, [Page 59] de quo moribus nostris nisi inter vivos non licet disponere; nec de ea re est Testamenti factio: Nec ad haeredem institutum in mobilibus seu exe­cutorem nominatum pertinet, quod ab intestato ad Executorem dativ­um non pertineret.’

Quaest. 3tia.

‘IN ista etiam specie, Quaeritur, Si Chirographum in actorum codi­cem seu Regestum (sive ut loquimur Registrum) referatur, vel a Sempronio, vel eo mortuo a Titio, ut instar sententiae habeatur & ex eo sit executio parata: An eo casu Titio executio competat; ita ut Literis Exe­cutorialibus & Cornuationis (ut loquimur) impetratis, debitori man­dari possit ut Titio solvat sub poena Rebellionis: Et comminatione ni pareat, eum Exlegem & Rebellem denunciatum iri?’

Respondetur. Titio actionem quidem competere adversus debitorem, non executionem summariam, cum non sit Creditor primarius & ab initio, sed jure successionis ut substitutus & haeres talliae aut provisionis: Haeredi siquidem ex Chirographo nunquam executio summaria compe­tit, nisi a decessore in acta relatum & post ejus obitum in haeredem tran­slatum sit; vel haerede agente per viam actionis ut in acta referatur, de ea re sententia sequatur.’

‘Quaestio ista, utpote de formula, haud magni momenti esse videtur; eventu tamen fieri potest ut sit maximi: Processus enim cornuationis ex longa & catenata serie diligentiae conflatus, magno temporis & operae & sumptuum dispendio ad ultimam forte metam deductus inanis corrueret; si constiterit Titium haud rite processisse, cum ei summaria executio haud competeret; adeo multum est bene coepisse: Sublato enim funda­mento superstructa corruunt, & paria sunt in jure non fieri & non rite fieri.

Quest. 4ta.

‘IN specie supradicta Respondimus nomen in persona Sempronii pri­marii creditoris haereditarium: Superest tamen adhuc scrupulus & quaestio an in persona Titii substituti sit etiam haereditarium, an vero ut mobile ad executores Titii pertineat? Sed’

Respondetur, Nomen etiam quoad Titium haereditarium esse: absur­dum enim foret, partim haereditarium partim mobile esse: & cum ab initio haereditarium sit non desinit esse haereditarium; nisi creditor vel substitutus facto aliquo declaret naturam nominis innovatam velle; li­teris forte impetratis & debitore jusso solvere sub poena Rebellionis.’

Quest. 5ta.

‘IN illa facti specie superius memorata, cum essent quinque rei deben­di in solidum, uno ex iis defuncto, Sempronius creditor de eadem pecuniae summa sibi dari curaverat ab haerede ejus syngrapham seu oblga­tionem corroborationis; sic dictam quod priore obligatione salva ad eam ut accessoria et auxiliaris accedat eamque corroboret: eaque obli­gatione stipulatus fuerat pecuniam sibi solvi, ipsoque per obitum defi­ciente [Page 60] non Titio ejusque haeredibus in principali obligatione substitutis, sed Gaio ejusque haeredibus: Quaerebatur igitur utrum post mortem Sempronii, pecunia ad haeredes Titii praemortui ex prima substitutio­ne; an vero pertineat ad Gaium ex seounda?’

Respondendum, Videtur eam ad Gaium ejusque haeredes pertinere: Sempronius enim facultate usus quam sibi reservaverat, & quae etiam non expressa penes eum ut dominum & feudatarium fuisset, novissima substitutione priorem sustulerat: & licet notarii imperitia aut oscitan­tia haud cautum sit pecuniam solvendam tam ex principali quam acces­soria syngrapha Gaio & ejus haeredibus; id tamen jus supplet & sub­intelligit: posteriora siquidem derogant prioribus; nec possibile est ut idem jus sit in solidum penes plures & diversos creditores: ad haec in ijs quae sunt facultatis & arbitrii, voluntas posterior operatur & praevalet utcunque expressa; & magis valet quod agitur quam quod concipi­tur.’

Quest. 6ta.

‘HAud dissimili ratione, si debitum sit haereditarium (hypotheca­rium sciꝪ.) addito pacto de terrarum hypotheca; postea vero creditor nova syngrapha in corroborationem accepta stipuletur pecuniam sibi et executoribus solvendam; statim nomen haereditarium esse desinit: Licet enim posterior syngrapha sit in corroborationem et absque praejudicio prioris, ita ut ex utraque syngrapha pecunia debeatur et exigi possit; mutantur tamen nominis qualitates et accidentia extrin­sica; ex principali siquidem obligatione haereditarium; ex accessoria mo­bile est: nec interest debitoris quos sibi velit creditor haeredes aut execu­tores aut substitutos; adeo ea de re voluntas creditoris ambulatoria est & novissima derogat praecedentibus.’

Quest. 7ma.

‘CUm in specie cujus saepius mentio facta est, Gaius substitutus sit Sempronio in syngrapha, in corroborationem data ab haerede tan­tum unius ex pluribus correis debendi: quomodo agere poterit ad­versus reliquos debitores nec ex principali nec accessoria obligatione Gaio obligatos?’

Resp. Actione utili in factum Gaium adversus omnes correos expe­riri posse (eam Angli vocant Action upon the case) narrata facti specie superius exposita: nec minus ut expeditior sit adversus debitores actio potest etiam agere adversus haeredes Titij substituti in prima obligati­one, ut eam sibi cedant.’

Quest. 8va.

‘CUm pecunia creditur, & Chirographo Sempronio creditori Titius ejusque haeredes & executores substituti sunt; diximus nomen istud haereditarium esse: verum sententiae isti refragari videtur consti­tutio novella, Caroli secundi Act 32, Parl. 1. 1661, Ea siquidem statu­tum [Page 61] est, omnia nomina ad executores pertinere, nec haereditaria esse nisi in casibus ibi exceptis; qui (ut vulgo dicitur) formant regulam in non exceptis: ij autem sunt tres viz. Si obligatione haeredibus tantum con­sultum sit & disertis verbis arceantur executores: si accedat hypotheca & investitura, quae est Ius reale & haereditarium, nec ad executores pertinet cum sint haeredes tantum in mobilibus: & si pactum sit de creditore inve­stiendo ex quo investitura & sasina sequi potest. Idem Ordines prius sta­tuerant tempore Turbarum & funesti inter Regem & populum dissidii An­no. 1641. Act 57: quod adhuc extat in Codice apocrypho actorum istius temporis: Nec injuste quidem, si materiam spectes, sed frustra & irritum defectu potestatis legislativae quae penes solum Regem est: Is enim solus sancit, unus sancit pro authoritate, sed praevio Ordinum consilio & con­sensu: sed,’

Resp. Utrobique, tam Regia constitutione, quam illo ordinum statu­endi conatu, agi tantum de ea nominum specie quae vulgaris & frequen­tior est; Cum sciꝪ. Ita in creditum itur ut pecunia debeatur, & red­denda sit creditori ejusque haeredibus & executoribus; quo casu sanci­tur ea ad executores pertinere: in aliis vero casibus, ubi singularis ali­qua ratio obest suadetque nomen nec creditorem voluisse nec posse ad executores pertinere; Lex ista locum non habet: Et cum varii casus nec de regula nec legis sint, nec de iis cogitatum, eos omnes excipere nec necesse vix possibile erit: in compertum autem est Sempronium creditorem cum Titium ejusque haeredes sibi substituerit, Executores exclusos voluisse: Et in genere, ubicunque pecunia (ut ita dicam) talliatur; & interciso ordinario succedendi ordine, haeredibus Talliae, aut provisionis prospicitur nomen haereditarium est; e. g. Si quis Chiro­graphum acceperit sibi & haeredibus forte inter ipsum & uxorem pro­creatis, quibus deficientibus haeredibus de corpore suo, quibus etiam deficientibus aliis provisionis haeredibus; nemo ut opinor arbitrabitur nomen illud, quo consulto tot haeredibus consulitur haud haereditarium esse: licet in Chirographo nec de executoribus submovendis nec de investitura aut sasina danda caveatur.’

Quaest. 9na.

‘QUod superius dictum est substitutum Sempronio ei in Jus nominis succedere & haeredem provisionis esse. Sed de ea re ambigitur, & Quaeritur an Sempronio haeres esse possit, qui eo defuncto e vestigio a­gere potest adversus debitores ex obligatione etiam sine alia aditione; licet ex inquisitione quindecemvirali (ut moris est) haud compertum & declaratum sit, eum Sempronio in ea re haeredem esse: accedit quod haeres succedit in universum Jus substitutus vero in isto nomine in rem unam & singularem & forte exilem? Tenendum tamen est substitutum haeredem esse Sempronio saltem provisionis: quandocunque enim do­minium & feodum alicujus rei sive fundi sive nominis est penes aliquem tempore obitus, ea ad alium transmitti & transire nequit nisi haeres sit: nec alio Titulo aut Jure succedit substitutus ubi nomen est Chirographa­rium tantum; quam ubi est etiam Hypothecarium: certum autem est ubi debitum Hypothecarium est, sasina secuta, substitutum titulo haere­dis, [Page 62] nec aliter posse, succedere: imo substituto praemoriente, Sempronio substituti haeres Jus nominis haud nanciscitur nisi Sempronio haeres sit; Et ex Inquisitione constiterit & declaratum sit eum esse haeredem.’

Quaest. 10.

‘MOribus nostris haeres nullum Jus consequitur nisi haereditatem ade­at, sive ea sit in praediis sive in aliis rebus haereditariis. In ter­ris autem duo sunt modi adeundi, ut sciꝪ. a Superiore seu domino di­recto, vassallo defuncto, haeres agnoscatur & ejus jussu & seu praecepto (quod Clare Constat dicitur) ut haeres investiatur: vel ex inquisitione Judicis ad quem ea res pertinet constet, & ab eo renunciatum sit eum esse haeredem, & Sasina secuta sit: In aliis vero rebus unicus adeun­di modus ex inquisitione sciꝪ. Cum igitur in casu superiori, substitutus nulla praevia Inquisitione secundum obitum Sempronii, statim & recte adversus debitorem agat, haud immerito dubitatur an Sempronio haeres sit? sed,’

Respondetur, isto casu aditionem haud deesse imo necessariam esse; cum enim haereditas aut opulenta aut damnosa sit; ut invito non datur bene­ficium ita damnum & injuria non debet inferri; nec ullo jure nisi civili apud Romanos haeres necessarius est, & apud eos unico tantum casu: sub­stitutus autem ipso facto adit & haeres est, si debitum ut suum petat & ex Chirographo agat: Ideo autem solenni ex institutione adeundi modo haud opus est, cum ex Chirographoeum Sempronio succedere clare con­stat, neo in claris ulterius inquirere necesse sit.’

Quaest. 11ma.

‘UBi debitum hypothecarium est & sasina vestitum: substitutus post obitum creditoris nec recte agit nec aliquid Juris consequitur, nisi haereditatem adeat & a domino directe & sponte agnitus & sasitus sit, vel ex inquisitione Jussu & mandato Regis investitus: Quaeritur igitur quae sit ratio discriminis, cum Chirographarius substitutus statim mortuo cre­ditore & jus habeat & debitum condicere possit; hypothecarius vero non nisi adita haereditate nec minus manifestum sit ex obligatione substitutum succedere!’

Resp. Rationem differentiae in promptu esse; In Chirographario si­quidem debito cum Jus personale tantum sit, & ex Chirographo evidens sit substitutum succedere; ut substitutus adeat nulla alia formula opus est sed ex Chirographo agendo; vel alio quovis actu Jure suo agnito adiisse censetur: Sin debitum Hypothecarium sit, cum penes credito­rem duplex sit Jus, reale sciꝪ. per Sasinam, & personale ex Chirogra­pho; quod reali (utpote potiori & nobiliori) semper accedit; neutrum transit ad substitutum nisi adierit & sasitus sit, Sasina a domino volen­te & sponte data, vel ex Inquisitione & Jussu & Mandato Regis. Cum igitur ut Chirographarius succedat, unica voluntas substituti ejusque factum requiratur; In Hypothecario vero tam voluntas & factum sub­stituti adire volentis quam domini directi eum in vasallum recipientis: Ideo Chirographarius Jus suum petendo, vel alio actu Jus suum agnos­cens, [Page 63] confestim succedit; nec aliud agendum superest: In hypotheca­rio vero, si dominus directus forte difficilior, substitutum recipere re­nuit vel cunctatur; Inquisitio necessaria est, ut ex ea rite facta domino Regi innotescat substitutum, creditori haeredem esse; quo comperto, superior praeceptis Regis ex Cancellaria sua morem gerens substitutum recipit Sasina data: Si vero ter monitus (ut moris est) haud obtem­perat, in subsidium ex praecepto Regis per Vicecomitem Sasina da­tur.’

Quaest. 12ma.

‘IN specie saepius repetita, cum Chirographo vel simplice vel hypothe­cario Pecunia debetur Sempronio; & eo deficiente per obitum, Titio ejusque haeredibus; si Titius praemoriatur Sempronio superstite, & postea mortuo; Titii haeredes in ea re haeredes erunt Sempronio; nominis enim feodum penes Titium nunquam fuerat: Ambigitur, an qui Sempronio haeres esse vult, etiam Titio haeres esse debeat actu & aditione; & ut pra­ctici loquuntur deservitione? An vero satis sit eum esse haeredem Titio habitu, & qui ei proximior & actu haeres esse queat si velit? De ista Quaestione licet magni momenti, & in praxi & quotidiano usu saepi­us recursante, nulla (quod sciam) decisio est; adeo ut mihi inte­grum sit dicere quod sentiam, salvo eorum Judicio, penes quos vel legis vel sententiae ferendae authoritas erit. Cum igitur pro utraque parte haud desint rationes, nec cae leves; in isto conflictu hae animum fluctuantem impulere ut pedibus in illam sen­tentiam eam; requiri sciꝪ. ut qui Sempronio haeres esse vult etiam Titio haeres sit habitu & proximior; nec necesse esse ut ei Haeres sit actu & adeat: In omnibus dispositionibus mens & voluntas disponentium attenditur, in iis autem dominatur quae Voluntates dicuntur institutio­nibus sciꝪ. & substitutionibus haeredum; quae nedum in Testamentis sed inter vivos fiunt, sapiunt tamen naturam Testamenti vel donationis mortis causa. Cum autem quis haeredes Talliae aut provisionis (ut loqui­mur) instituit, id unice vult satagitque ut in rebus suis haeredes instituat: non vero ut aliis & in aliorum rebus vel instituat vel substituat haeredes. Et substitutio pupillaris qua pupillo, & exemplaris (ad pupillaris exem­plum) qua furioso haeres datur, singularia sunt Iuris antiqui & municipa­lis Romanorum, nec alibi usurpata: Quando igitur Sempronius vel alius quilibet, Titium ejusque haeredes sibi haeredes aut Talliae aut provisionis substituit, ratio haud habetur civilis adeundi actus, sed Juris adeundi & sanguinis, ut qui ut alterius haeres ad successionem vocatur, eatenus alteri uni forte ex liberis aut cognato suo ea necessitudine junctus sit, ut alteri haeres esse possit si velit & e re sua sit; si enim adeunti vel exigua spes lu­celli affulgeat, quod aditurus sit haud dubitandum; sin alterius haeredit­as damnosa sit, nec instituentis nec haereditatis ejus interest ut ei necesse sit alienam adire; quae nedum inanis sed etiam damnosa suam exinani­ret quantum libet pinguem & opimam: Ut de vaccis proditum est per somnium a Pharaone visis adhuc deformibus & strigosis, etiam pinguibus & nitidis devoratis: Nec aliquid a ratione vel Jure magis alienum est, quam ut quod in favorem introductum est in odium & perniciem retor­queatur. Adhaec in materia haereditaria, tam in Jure quam praxi & usu [Page 64] & stylo, apud nos vocabulum haeres non pro eo qui adiit haereditatem sed pro adituro vel cuiadeundi jus est saepius accipitur; haereditas siquidem est jus successionis; & de adeunda (secundum doctores) magis proprie quam de adita dicitur: ubi enim adita est & successum, desinit esse haereditas & jus succedendi: hinc est quod ubi per Breve de morte ante­cessoris mandatur Judici idoneo ut inquiri faciat, quis defuncto sit legiti­mus haeres, intelligitur haeres habitu & cui Jus sit succedendi; non vero haeres actu & qui adiit; de quo cum jam adierit supervacanea esset tam inquisitio quam aditio.’

‘Id in ista specie facti luce clarius est, si quis enim liberis orbus, fratres habeat; & inter eos, qui sibi haeres futurus esset, virum prodigum & & obaeratum; & consulto eo praeterito substituit ejus haeredes: ut reor, nemo opinabitur eum voluisse ut sui haeredes prodigo & decoctori actu haeredes sint: Et quod una via solicite curaverat ne fieret fratre praeterito, fortunarum suarum naufragium & jacturam voluisse fieri alia via fratris haeredibus institutis, si haeredes nedum habitu sed actu esse debeant: Imo aliquando, cum quis alterius haeredes sibi adsciscit & substituit, eve­nire potest ut instituenti haeredes sint, alteri vero vix habitu haeredes esse possunt; si necessitudo & jus sanguinis haud desit obsit vero civilis aliqua ratio; ut v. g. fratris haeredibus institutis, si praemoriatur instituens fratre adhuc superstite, qui ei haeres fuisset si eo quo instituens diem obiit tempore decessisset; instituenti haeres erit, nec fratris mors operienda erit, & tamen ei haeres nec habitu esse potest qui instituenti succedit; Ea ra­tione obstante quod adhuc superstes haeredem habere nequit, vel si fra­tris haereditas integra & ex asse adita sit, adeo ut amplius haeredem habere nequeat, facultate adeundi per aditionem absumpta; quia si frater cu­jus haeredes vocantur praemortuus sit sine liberis & perduellionis damna­tus, instituente postea defuncto; si alius sit frater qui perduelli haeres foret si ad pacem & fidem Domini Regis decessisset, & instituenti haeres erit licet neutro casu fratri nec habitu nec actu haeres esse posset; obstan­te sciꝪ. non naturali ratione & sanguinis defectu, sed Jure & ratione civili, ob eas quas supra memoravimus causas.’

‘Quae pro altera parte afferuntur, viz. quod ei quorundam sive opi­nio sive error (& magis communis) suffragetur; & vulgo dicitur error communis jus faciat, hisce presertim rationibus subnixus, viz.) cum quis vocatur sub modo aut qualitate ut alteri haeres sit qualitatem nedum adesse sed praeambulam antecedere oportere, nec instituenti haeredem esse posse nisi prius alteri cujus haeredes vocati sunt haeres sit: cumque Haeres nomen Juris sit non personae, alterius haeredem non admittendum esse, nisi ex Inquisitione alteri haeredem esse compertum sit; ex In­quisitione autem alterius haeredem renunciari moribus nostris nihil aliud esse, quam alterius haereditatem cernere, & actu adire. Istae inquam rationes facile diluuntur; nam cum patribus errasse utcum­que excusat, errore autem ratione evicto & agnito, nemo adhuc erran­dum esse sentiet: Et communis error quando est in facto, & circa con­ditionem aut qualitatem personae, ut quondam. Barbarii Philippi; qui cum servus esset praetor Romanus fuit; in isto & similibus casibus, vel si forte praelatus vel notarius haud legitimus pro legitimo tamen tentus & reputatus sit, hactenus communis error Jus facit ut quae ab iis gesta [Page 65] sunt haud corruant, publica utilitate postulante; ne publicus & commu­nis error Reipublicae noceat: Error autem in Jure non excusat nedum Jus facit; & qualitas sub qua vocatur haeres alterius, haud deest si hae­res sit habitu & proximus, ut superius demonstratum est. Denique qui Brevi Regis impetrato postulat ut judex inquiri faciat an haeres sit instituenti, ejusque tantum haereditatem adit, licet alteri haeres sangui­nis & habitu & esse & per inquisitores renunciari debeat.’

Quaest. 13.

‘AN eo ipso quod Sempronii haereditatem adiret Titii haeres; etiam Titii haereditatem adiisse videatur, cum Titii haeredes Sempronio substituti sint; adeo ut provisionis haeres Sempronio esse nequeat nisi haeres Titii sit quaerendum est? parum quidem interesse videtur utrum Titio haeres esse ex inquisitione, & postea Sempronio ex alia inquisitione etiam haeres esse comperiatur; an vero ex una & eadem Inquisitione tam Titio quam Sempronio eum haeredem esse declaretur. Caeterum voluntas & propositum (nedum maleficia sed &) Civiles actus distinguit; cum itaque Titii haeres Brevi ex Cancellaria impetrato inquiri postulat an sit Titio haeres, sine dubio Titii haereditatem adit; Id enim unice agit & vult, ut Titio actu haeres sit: Verum ubi Brevi impetrato de morte ante­cessoris inquirendum curat quis Sempronio haeres sit, & clameo seu peti­tione exhibita petit ut declaretur se haeredem esse Sempronio cum haeres proximus Titii sit, eo casu nec adit nec ei propositum est ullam nisi Sempronii haereditatem adeundi: An vero Titii sit haeres inquiritur tantum obiter & tanquam de qualitate praeambula; sine qua Sempronio provisionis haeres esse non potest; non vero ut Titii haereditatem adeat, & ei haeres actu sit: sufficit enim ut superius disseruimus ut Titio haeres sit sanguinis & habitu: adeo in Jure iidem actus ex animo & fine diverso plerumque diversos habent & sortiuntur effectus.’

Quaest. 14.

‘NIhil quidem a Religione Judicantis magis alienum est quam [...] ea divino & omni Jure vetita aegre tamen vita­tur; & quod de Marte & Venere & de Vulcani vinculis occultis sed te­nacibus in fabulis est, verum est de Affectibus animum impedientibus, ne Verum & Justum cernere possit: imo ubi Lex & regula haud deest, interdum instar Lesbiae, colore aliquo eò torquetur, quò affectus impellit: ubi autem Lex aut regula deest, sibi homines Lex sunt ut ait Apostolus, sensu multum diverso: & Judicantis pro lege affectui gratificandi arbi­trium sibi permissum arbitrantur. Curandum itaque quantum fieri po­test, ne arbitrio, Legibus & Justitiae inviso, locus sit. Licet autem sit homonomia in ipso nomine Haeredis, & materia anceps & arbitraria; u­trum haeres de eo qui est actu haeres, an de eo qui habitu & sanguinis hae­res est tantum, intelligendum sit: Arbitrium tamen videtur istis regu­lis substringi & coerceri posse.’

1mo. ‘Ubicunque alterius haeres ad alterius haereditatem vocatur satis [Page 66] est eum alteri haeredem esse habitu; utque ei facultas & jus sit adeundi si velit & prosit, non vero necessitas si nolit aut noceat.’

2do. ‘Tum materia subjecta tum id quod agitur multum inspicitur: In materia igitur non successoria, ubi mentio fit haeredis, nec agitur ut succedat sed ad alium finem & effectum, intelligendus est semper haeres habitu non actu; e. g. In tabulis nuptialibus seu Contractu quem ma­trimonialem dicimus, synalagma est & mutua ultro citroque obligatio; sponso enim de dote; sponsae de doario cavetur; & liberis de successio­ne: quia vero obligatio sine actione & executione inanis esset, nec uxor nec liberi sub potestate & ferula mariti futuri, contra eum agere queunt; ideo clausula executiva introducta est, qua cavetur; ut actio & executio com­petat Necessariis quibusdam & eorum haeredibus, ad ea persequenda quae uxori & liberis ex eo contractu debentur aut praestanda sunt: Eo casu si aliquis ex haeredibus egerit, ex ea clausula qua sibi non consulitur sed ob sanguinis & necessitudinis vinculum in aliorum rem officium & sollici­tudo injungitur; nemo rationis compos nedum Jurisprudens opinabitur, eum summovendum nisi actu haeres esse velit; & haereditati damnosae se implicare non obstante Juris regula officium nemini debere esse damnosum. Haud aliter sentiendum eo casu quo decimae (ut plerum­que fieri solebat) ad longum tempus locantur, conductori ejusque haere­dibus & assignatis; ita ut locatio durante vita conductoris, & secundum eum trium haeredum successive duratura & aequaeva sit. Haeredes enim, cum quaeritur quamdiu locatio duratura sit, intelliguntur qui sanguinis & & habitu haeredes sunt, licet non actu; si enim (ut saepe evenit) locatio­nis Jus cessum fuerit nec ad haeredem pertineat, haud credendum tres haeredes, Jure alienato, in aliorum rem alienanti haeredes fore actu, & adituros: Cumque locatio sit conductori haeredibus & assignatis, durante tot haeredum vita, non agitur ut penes haeredes Jus istud semper futurum sit, sed ut sive sit penes haeredes sive singulares successores, ut ejus dura­tio, cum ex natura locationis perpetua esse nequeat, definiatur ex vita trium haeredum.’

‘Sic in judiciis declaratoriis Juris, Nonintroitus forte aut aliis ejusmo­di & Rescissoriis, quia non sunt actiones rei persecutoriae, nec iis aliquid dari vel fieri petitur sed agentis jus tantum asseritur & declaratur; ne­cesse tamen est ut omnes quorum interest conveniantur; defunctis iis quorum interesse poterat haeredes eorum necessario citandi sunt; nec ne­cesse tamen est ut sint haeredes, actu & vel adeant vel repudiant.’

3tio. ‘Ubicunque haeredibus sanguinis consulitur, cavetur tamen ne actu haeredes sint; ne adeundo litibus aut debitis haereditariè subjaceant: Aequivocum haeredis nomen de eo qui proximus & habitu haeres sit intel­ligendum est, exemplum fuit insigne in ea cujus superius meminimus facti specie, cum sciꝪ. Frater adhuc liberis orbus, fratre parum frugi aut prodigo; ideo eo praeterito fratris haeredes resignatione facta sibi si non agnascantur liberi haeredes substituit; veritus ne si frater succederet etiam sua profunderet.’

‘Illud quoque addi potest, quod instrumentis sponsalitiis cum vir ad secunda vota convolat, saepius haeredibus prospicitur; ut a sponso terrae & praedia dentur vel acquirantur, aut ut certa pecuniae summa colloce­tur sub usuris; & terrarum aut ex iis annui reditus hypotheca; sed ea [Page 67] lege ut penes Conjuges ususfructus tantum sit, haeredes vero ex conju­gio feodum & proprietas; ut superiore ita isto casu liquet id agi, ne hae­redes patri succedant cum ex priore matrimonio liberos forte habeat ei haeredes in universum futuros: liberi vero ex secundo matrimonio in Terrarum aut annui reditus feudum ex pacto ipsis concessum succedere nequeant, cum penes patrem haud futurum sit: Ea igitur interpretatio fieri debet ut id quod agitur & actus valeat, & evitetur absurdum; maximum autem foret si quod una via prohibetur aut cavetur alia eve­niat: & dum Charybdis evitatur, incurratur Scylla non minus exitiosa.’

Quaest. 15.

‘SUperius Respondimus Titium ejusque haeredes, Sempronio in Chiro­grapho substitutos, ei haeredes esse provisionis: Quaerendum an Sempronii Creditoribus teneantur? & quidem dicendum est eos teneri & obnoxios esse; nam omnis haereditas etiam particularis, & in Chiro­grapho praedio aut alia re particulari, eatenus est successio in universum Jus; secundum haereditatis definitionem: ut nedum commoda sed incommoda & onera ad eum pertineant & redundent, sed quatenus de­bitis subjaceat & oneribus: quaestio difficilior nec levis momenti est, & alio forte loco ubi de haeredibus Talliae & provisionis & aliis particularibus haeredibus agetur, magis opportune ventilabitur.’

Feus.

IF a Feuer may Refute as in the case of other holdings? The difference being, that Feuda are Beneficia, & invito Beneficium nec datur nec reti­netur: Whereas Feus are Emphyteuses and upon the matter perpetual Locations; and as in Locationibus either ad tempus how long so ever, the Conductor cannot renounce, so their appears to be eadem Ratio in Feus.

Whether there be Non-entry in Feus, and the Liferent Escheat of the Feuer doth belong to the Superior, seing they are not proprie Feuda? And yet it is thought sapiunt naturam Feudi.

If there be Non-entry: Whether before Declarator, the Superior will have right to the retoured Duty, which is the Feu-duty, besides the Feu-duty due to himself: And after Declarator to the full profits?

Feuda Nobilia.

FEuda nobilia sine Nobilitate dari possunt: Adeo ut aliquis ab Imperatore investiri posset in Ducatu aut Comitatu, nec tamen Dux aut Comes sit. Thes. Besold. in litera I. 18. verbo. Innhabern. des. p. 428.

Fiar.

1. WHen Lands are Disponed to a person, without mention either of Heirs or that he is Fiar or Liferenter; or that they are Di­sponed Heretably. Quaeritur, If he be Fiar?

[Page 68]2. In Conjunct Fee where there are no degrees of Substitution, whe­ther is the Husband or Wife Fiar?

3. When Lands are given in Conjunct-Fee to the Husband and Wife, and their Heirs; who is Fiar?

4. If the Husband be Fiar, whether at least the Heirs betwixt him and her, are to be understood his Heirs: or his Heirs whatsoever?

5. If Lands be Disponed to two Brothers by their Father, and their Heirs; if they be both Fiars ex semisse?

6. If when Lands are Disponed by a Father to two Brothers and the Heirs of their Body; if one die without Heirs of his Body, whether it be substitutio reciproca?

7. When Lands are Disponed to Husband and Wife and their Heirs of the Marriage; and these failȝieing the half to the Husbands Heirs, and the other half to the Wifes: Quaeritur, Whether the Husband be so Fiar, that the Wifes Heirs, failȝieing Heirs of the Marriage, will be Heirs of Provision as to the half?

8. When it is intended that the Wife should be a Joynt-fiar: If the Right should not be to the Husband and her; and after their Decease the half to his Heirs and the other half to her Heirs?

9. When a right is given to Two Persons and to the longest Liver of them Two, and the Heirs of the longest Liver, who is Fiar? And if the Fee be in pendenti?

10. When the Fee is provided by Contract of Marriage to Bairns; and accordingly a Right is granted in the foresaid terms, there being no Bairns for the time: Quaeritur, When a Child is born whether the Fee be immediatly in its person?

11. If it be in solidum in its person and thereafter others be born Quae­ritur, Quid juris, and if concursu faciunt partes?

12. In Conjunct-fees where there is no substitution, the Heirs deter­mine the Fee.

13. Where there are degrees of substitution, The person whose Heirs succeed first is Fiar; And all the Substitutes thereafter are Heirs of Provi­sion to the Fiar by progress.

14. When a Band is taken to a person and his Heirs; if his Grand­child by a Daughter decease having no issue, whether the Child being Heir, his Father will succeed to him; albeit his Father cannot be Heir to the Grand-father, and haeres haeredis should be haeres instituentis?

Fiars of Bonds

A Bond being in these terms, To a man and his Wife and the Heirs of the Marriage; which failȝieing to the longest Liver of them two and the Heirs of the surviver, Quaeritur, who is the Fiar?

A Bond being granted to a Husband and his Wife and the longest liver of them two in Conjunctfee; and to one of their Sones expresly named and the Heirs of his Body: whilks failȝieing to the Heirs to be procreat betwixt the Husband and the Wife; whilk failȝieing to the Wifes Heirs and Assigneys, Quaeritur, Whether the Fee of the said Sum pertaineth to the Husband, or to the foresaid Son, or to the Wife? Ratio Dubitandi, That the Right of [Page 69] Succession terminates upon the Wife and her Heirs, which seems to import that she is Fiar. 2do. As to the Son the said Sum being provided to his Heirs in the first place It seemeth that the Fee should pertain to him: Seing the Heirs of his Body are to succeed in the first place, and the Fee of Money (as it is said of the Ʋsufructus of Money, That it is quasi Ʋsu­fructus) is quasi feodum & Proprietas: and properly that is said to be Pro­perty which belongeth to a person and descendeth to his Heirs: And yet it is thought that the Fee of the said Sum doth belong to the Husband, in respect the Money being his own was lent by him in behalf of himself and the foresaid persons: and albeit when a Bond is conceived simply to a Husband and his Wife in Conjunctfee and to her Heirs and assigneys, she is Fiar; for the reason foresaid, that it is to belong to her and her Heirs only. Nevertheless when there is diverse degrees of Substitution of Heirs of diverse persones and of a Wife in the last place, the person whose Heirs are provided for in the first place ought to be understood to be Fiar: and these in secundis tabulis and in a more remote degree, to be only Heirs of Provision Failȝieing the former: and if the Son had survived or his Heirs, It is absurd that they should be Heirs to their Mother and not to their Fa­ther; And that the Mother being Fiar should have power to Dispone of the Sum in prejudice of her Husbands Children. And albeit the said Sons Heirs be first named yet it is thought that he is not Fiar, seing he is to be Heir of Provision to his Father: as if an Infeftment were granted to his Father and Wife in Conjunct-fee; and failȝieing of them be decease, to a certain person their Son and the Heirs of his Body: The Son in that case would be Heir of Provision.

A Bond being granted to a Man and his Wife and longest Liver of them Two and their Heirs: And the Wife having survived, Quaeritur. If she will be Fiar of the said Bond?

A Person having Infeft his Creditors for security of Debts, and while they be payed respectively. Quaeritur, Quatenus They are Fiars whe­ther in solidum, or ex parte: And qua parte? Respondetur, They are Fiars proportionally, and ex parte effeiring to their Debt.

Fiars in Tailȝies.

BY a Contract of Marriage; Lands being given in Tocher and the Right thereof so conceived that they were Disponed to the Husband and the Gentlewoman in Conjunct-fee and Liferent, and to the Heirs of the Marriage: Whilk Failȝieing to the Heirs of the Husband his Body in any other Marriage: Whilk Failȝieing to the Womans Heirs and Assigneys whatsomever. Quaeritur, who is Fiar? Answer. That though where there is but one degree of Substitution, ( viz. Failȝieing the Heirs of the Marriage the Womans Heirs) The Woman is Fiar; Because res pertinet ad eos quo­rum haeredibus providetur: But where there are diverse Degrees of Sub­stitution (as in this case) the Husband (cujus haeredibus maxime prospicitur) It is thought should be Fiar; Seing not only the Heirs of the Marriage got­ten by him, But in the next degree his Heirs of any other Marriage are substitute: and in ultimis tabulis, The Wifes Heirs, and as Heirs of Pro­vision to the Husband: and the Husband having given a Jointure, it is [Page 70] thought to be in Lieu of the Tocher, and to belong to him as Fiar and not as simple Liferenter.

A Bond for a Sum of Money being granted to a Man and his Wife and longest Liver of them Two, and to their Heirs and Assigneys secluding Executors: And the Wife having survived the Husband, and a Bairn being likewise on Life of their Marriage: Quaeritur, Whether the Relict will be Fiar?

If a Bond be granted to Two Brothers in the terms foresaid, and one of them deceasing having left Children, and the other surviving having also Children: Quaeritur, who is Fiar?

Fictio Juris.

QƲaeritur, A Debitor being disseas'd what way can the Compriser be Infeft? Answer. The Decreet of Reduction putteth the Debi­tor quoad the Creditor in the same case as if he had not been denuded Fi­ctione Juris.

Fiscus.

IN Dubiis ubi non est plena Probatio fisco non favendum. Besol. Thesaur. liter. L. p. 556. vide Auctores ibi citatos.

Commissa Fisco.

MErces committuntur Fisco ex causa fraudati vectigalis ipso Jure; ita ut statim desinant esse ejus qui deliquit: itatamen ut ob contradictionem par­tis requiratur sententia declarativa. De Jure fluminum. 206.

Flumina.

FLumina a Rivis distinguuntur magnitudine, vel aestimatione circumcolentium Hering. de molendin. Quaest. 15. n. 4.

Flumina Publica.

FLumen publicum est illud quod perenne est. Th. Scipman. de Jure Fluminum seu. jus Fluviaticum p. 3. n. 20.

Flumina publica sunt in potestate & patrimonio Principis, & de Regalibus sunt, idem P. 5. n. 52.

Publica sunt superiorem non recognoscentis, & Majestate fulgentis, Ibid n. 7. & quorum usus omnibus Expositus est.

Flumina publica sunt, quae sunt perennia & de Regalibus, plerumque navi­gabilia, & quae navigabile aliud faciunt, & ad principem pertinent: Ʋsu ve­ro patent singulorum commodis & utilitati, non etiam commercio seu Juri emen­di, acquirendi, alienandi. Quaest. eadem. Num. 10.

Flumina Censitorum vice funguntur, & ex privato in publicum addicunt, & ex publico in privatum, dum uni adimunt & alteri addunt, Jus fluviat. p. 5. 24. &c.

Forfaulture.

A Subvassal being Forfaulted, Whether His Majesties Donator will have Right to the Estate free of Servitudes, and Rights not consent­ed to by the immediat Superior? Caldwells Relict contra Dalȝiel.

When the Lands fall in His Majesties Hands by Forefaulture, or other­ways by the suppressing of Benefices, or any other occasion; if there be Vassals holding of the same; May he Dispone the saids Lands and Supe­riorities? Ratio Dubitandi; That a Superior cannot interpose. Answer. There is a difference betwixt Vassals holding Originally of His Maje­sty, and these who hold ab initio of other Superiors: As to the first they cannot be prejudged so as to be put to hold of any other than His Ma­jesty, and to be more remote from the Fountain: The others are not pre­judged, seing they are put in the condition they were in formerly: and as the former Superior might have Disponed the Superiority, and resigned; so His Majesty cannot be denyed the same Power: and His Majesties Disposition is Fictione Juris equivalent to a Resignation, seing there is no other Superior in whose hands the King can resign.

If a Subvassal, to a Vassal holding of the King, be Forefaulted for Trea­son; will subaltern Rights granted by him fall under Forefaulture? Se­ing it is pretended that such Forefaultures belong to the King not as Supe­rior but Jure Coronae and as Prince; & noxa caput sequitur: and the King has no prejudice having a Vassal. Yet I think that these Rights should fall, Quia resoluto Jure Dantis resolvitur Jus accipientis: And if the Subvassal should Forefault his Lands by Recognition, his Vassals Right would Forefault: And it is against reason, That Treason being Crimen gravius, The Forefaulture and poena should be Levior: And Trea­son is Crimen feudale and against the King as Superior paramount: and as the betraying of a mediate Superior will import Forefaulture, not only of the Subvassal but of his Vassals; there is the same or greater reason, that Treason against the King should have the same effect: and the reason that the Forefaulture of the Subvassal should belong to the King is, because the Crime is committed against him as highest Superior.

If the Kings immediat Vassal should confirm the Inferior Rights, if there be any alteration of the case? Seing the King is in place of the Vas­sal, because the Crime is committed against the King as Superior, and he should be in no better case: and the Vassal if he were to have the bene­fite of the Forefaulture, could not Question the said Rights.

If a person Infeft in Liferent be Forefaulted for Treason, will the Liferent expire though he survive? Seing he is nullus, and after Treason doth neither transmitt cedendo nor delinquendo.

A Person being Infeft in Trust and to the use and behoof of another; Quaeritur, If he commit Treason will he Forefault the Right of the Lands to His Majesty? Seing albeit his Right be to the use and behoof of ano­ther yet he is Vassal; and as the French say he is homme vivant & confis­quant; and there is no reason the Superior should be defrauded; and the granter of the Right is to be blamed that he trusted such a person.

By the English Law, though a person Dispone for Onerous Causes, he is not Lyable to warrand unless he be expresly bound; otherways the [Page 72] acquirer is presumed to take his hazard: But with us no Warrandice, is absolute Warrandice.

Quaeritur, If a Donator to a Forefaulture has Action for Exhibition and delivery of the Evidents?

The Vassal of a Subject, having granted a subaltern Right to be holden base, and the same not being confirmed by the mediate Superior: Quae­ritur, Whether the Subvassals Right foresaid, will fall under the Fore­faulture of his immediat Superior being Forefaulted? Answer. It is thought that it will fall under the Forefaulture, in respect that if the per­son Forefaulted had committed a Crime against his Immediate Superior whereupon the Lands would have recognosced or Forefaulted to him, The Subvassal his Property would have fallen under the Forefaulture; and there is eadem if not major Ratio in the case of Treason, The King being Superior Paramount, and the Crime against him being also a Crime against the mediate Superior; there being no greater wrong than to be a Traitor to the Superiour. Caldwell and Glanderstoun.

Quaeritur, Quid Juris, If the mediate Superiour had confirmed the Subvassals Right?

Quid Juris in the case of Forefalture for Treason? And if there be a difference in the case of Forefaulture in Parliament and before the Ju­stices?

Lands being Comprysed and a signature being past upon the Comprysing, but no Infeftment being taken thereupon: Quaeritur, If the Debitor commit Treason in the interim, whether the same will fall under Forefaulture? Answer. It is thought that it will not, seing the Debitor was fully denuded; there being no vestige of Right in his per­son; seing he is divested by the Comprysing as if he had resigned, and the Superiour had accepted the Resignation.

Quaeritur, Quid Juris, If there were only a Comprysing without a Signature? And the Question may be more general; Viz. If in all cases the Heretor be so denuded that he cannot prejudge the Compryser, by any Deed whereupon Recognition or other Forefaulture may follow, in favours of the Superiour: otherways a Malicious Debitor may, of pur­pose, do such a Deed to prejudge his Creditor.

To consider if there be a difference betwixt a Disposition and Resig­nation accepted by the Superiour: And a Comprysing; whereupon no­thing has followed?

Item. If the presenting of a Signature on a Comprysing to the Exche­quer, be equivalent to a Resignation in the Superiours hands and ac­cepting?

Item. Whether a Charge to other Superiours to enter the Compryser be equivalent to a Resignation?

If after a Person is Forefaulted, an Estate should fall to him, as appearand Heir to any person, he being yet on Life; whether would the same pertain to the King or to the next Heir, as if he were Deceased? Seing he is nullus being Forefaulted, and is not in a Capacity to be Ap­pearand Heir.

If a Forfaulted person have Children that are ante nati; Whether or not will they be prejudged by their Fathers Forfaulture: as to any Capacity or Estate belonging to him? Whether will they succeed to their Grandfather [Page 73] or any relation upon the Fathers side; Seing their Blood is corrupted and they cannot represent their Father being nullus as said is?

A person having Married an Heretrix, and being thereafter Forfault­ed, Quaeritur, If the Blood of the Children be so tainted and corrupted That they cannot succeed to their Mother? 2do. If the Mother should not dispone in her oun Lifetime; Whether her Estate will fall to the King by the incapacity of the Children, being her appeirand Heirs?

An Heretrix being Wife to a forfaulted person, If als long as he liveth the King will have right to the Mails and Duties Jure Mariti? 2do If she may dispose of her Estate without his Consent seing he is nullus in Law: And yet is her Husband, the Marriage not being dissolved with the Fore­faulture?

A Father having Disponed his Estate to his Son, with Reversion and power either to Redeem or Dispone; Quaeritur, If the personal faculty may, notwithstanding, be comprysed during the Fathers Life; and may be used even after the Death of the Father? There is the same Question as to Forefaulture.

A Woman being Heretrix of Lands in Scotland; and the same being Tailȝied to the Heirs of her Body, whilk Failȝieing to certain other Heirs: with the ordinary Clauses irritant that she and they should not have pow­er to prejudge the Tailȝie; Quaeritur. If her Husband being Forefaulted, the Blood be so corrupted that her Children cannot succeed, and if their Interest of Succession will fall to the King?

If a Tack set for an Onerous Cause and for payment of Debt; will pre­judge the Donator to the Forefaulture?

The Creditor having an Action of Reduction competent to him for Reduceing an Infeftment as being in defraud of him; if thereafter the Debitor should be Forefaulted, and the Creditor reduce the said Right; what way shall he be Infeft; seing he cannot Compryse or Adjudge; the Debitor being Forefaulted?

There being a Minute of Contract anent the selling of Lands, and the Buyer being thereafter Forefaulted; Quaeritur, If the King or his Dona­tors will have Right to the said Minute in the same manner as the Buyer? or if the Seller can raise a Declarator to be free of the Minute? Seing al­beit where there is a clear Right and Interest belonging to a person Fore­faulted, the same will pertain to the King; yet when a Bargain is only in fieri, and there are diverse obligements upon the part of the Fore­faulted person, the Seller ought not to be in worse case, and in place of a Subject have so powerful an Adversary. The Earl of Tarras, and the Heirs of Walter Riddel.

The Laird of Cesnock having acquired from Castlemaines the Barony of Castlemaines, but not being Infeft but base before the Forefaulture, Quae­ritur, If by his Forfaulture, these who had Rights holden of Castlemaines not confirmed by the King will be in any hazard? Answer. It Is thought not: Seing any Right Cesnock had to the saids Lands, was not as the Kings Vassal: In which case the subaltern Rights would have fallen; and Castlemaines remaining the Kings Vassal, Cesnock had only the Right of property holden of Castlemaines: And as to Castlemaines Right holden of the King, Cesnock had only Jus ad rem by the Contract or Disposition; so that thereby the King by the Forefaulture may come to Castlemaines [Page 74] Right, and force him to denude himself of the same; but it cannot be said that the said Estate came in the Kings hand by the Forefaulture of a Vassal.

Sempronia having Right to certain Lands which are parcels of a Barony Feued to her Authors by the Earles of Argyle who held the same Feu of the Arch-Bishops of St. Andrews; who did confirm the subaltern Rights grant­ed by the saids Earles: Quaeritur, Whether the saids Lands belonging to the said Sempronia do fall under the Forefaulture of the Earl of Argyle, notwithstanding the confirmation granted by the Bishops: In respect the saids Rights are not confirmed by the King?

In Answer to the said Querie, It is thought, that the saids Lands do not fall under the Earles Forefaulture, for these Reasons.

1mo. The Earle of Argyle did Forefault only what did belong to him­self, Nam noxa caput sequitur; and the saids Lands did not belong to him in Property, but only in Superiority: And there is a difference betwixt the said case, and the case of Lands holden immediatly of the King himself; which by the Forefaulture of his Vassal are Forefaulted; and does return to the King as he did give them pure and free, and without the burden of any other Right granted by the person Forefault, but such as the King did consent to and confirmed: Whereas in the case in Question, The said Earl did not hold the foresaids Lands immediatly of the King but of the Arch-Bishop, who stands still His Majesties Vassal: And as his own Right is not prejudged by the said Forefaulture, so the Right of the sub-Vassal consented to and confirmed by him, is not prejudged by the said Forefaulture.

2do. Lands holden of the Bishop waird, or which would fall in his hands upon Recognition or otherways by the deed of the Earl of Argyle, being Disponed by the Earl to be holden of himself; will not recognosce by the Earles Deed in Disponing the Superiority or otherways, if the Bi­shop had confirmed the Subvassals Right; And there is the same reason in the case of Forefaulture, in respect by the common Law when Lands do fall and are confiscat, they fall to the immediate Superiour: And by our custom in the case of Treason the King has that Priviledge, that the Lands which are Forefaultare Confiscat and Forefaulted to him; because the Crime is committed against him. And therefore the Lands holden of o­ther Superiours do Forefault to the King, no otherways than they would belong to other Superiours, if the Forefaulture did belong to them; In which case the confirmation of the Subaltern Rights by the immediate Su­periour of the person Forefaulted, would save the Subaltern Rights that they could not fall under Forefaulture.

3tio. By the Law and Custom of the Kingdom it is lawful Subinfeodare; and albeit it may be pretended that if the Bishop had not confirmed the Fews granted by the Earl of Argyle they would have fallen by his Forefaul­ture though lawful ab initio, seing res devenit ad aliam causam & resoluto Jure dantis resolvitur jus accipientis: Yet in the case of confirmation by the Bishop, there is a great difference; seing the Subaltern Right doth not only depend upon Argyl's Right so that it falleth with it; but has another Foundation whereupon it does subsist; Viz. The Bishop's own Right and the confirmation granted by the Bishop; and specially in this case, seing it appears by the confirmation that the same is granted not to gratify the Sub­vassal, [Page 75] and to prevent prejudice to him by the Forefaulture of Argyle if it should fall out, but in order to the Bishop's own Interest and Advantage; In respect by the confirmation there is reserved to the Bishop, beside the Feu-duty payable to Argyle, a Feu-duty to himself and his Successors; with a Clause irritant if it be not payed: And fictione brevis manus, the Feuar is in the same case as if the Bishop ab initio by one Charter had Dis­poned the saids Lands to the Earl of Argyle in Superiority, and to the Feuar in property for payment to the Earl of Argyle of the Feu-duty men­tioned in Charter, and to the Bishop the said other Deuty: In which case Argyl's Forefaulture could not prejudge the Feuar of the Right of Pro­perty granted by the Bishop himself, nor the Bishop of the said Additional Duty.

4to. By the Acts of Parliament K. Ja. 2d. and K. J. 4. anent the set­ting of Feues and by custom ever since, The setting of Fews was so speedful and necessar in order to the policy of the Kingdom; That Vas­sals are not only allowed but invited to set their Lands in Feu; which in effect is a general confirmation of all Fews; so that the Fewers should not be in hazard either by the Waird or Non-entry or by any Deed or delict of their Superiour; but should be lyable only to pay their Feu-duties to these who should have Right upon occasion of the same: and the said Barony being of a large and vast bounds, albeit it was Fewed to the Earl of Argyle; yet for the labouring and bringing it in, it was necessary to set it in parcells to other Fewers holden of him: and the Fews in Question are granted before the Year 1606.

A Subvassal holding of a person Forefaulted, and his Right not being confirmed either by the Forefaulted persons immediat Superiour, or by the King, Quaeritur, If his Right will fall under the Forefaulture? Ratio Dubitandi; Licebat infeodare, & noxa caput sequitur: and yet is thought it will fall under the Forefaulture; Because resoluto jure dantis &c. And though it be lawful to grant Sub-altern Rights yet it is alwayes cum sua causa.

A Superiour being Forfaulted, and his Vassals Right not being con­firmed, and so falling: Quaeritur, If His Majesty should confirm the Vas­sals Right, if that will be habilis modus to secure against a poster or Do­nator? Ratio Dubitandi; The Vassals Right being altogether extinct by the Forefaulture, there is nothing to be the subject of a confirmation, which cannot be of non entis; and the Vassal should have obtained a Gift upon the Forefaulture. And contra, The Vassals Right not being null of it self, but such as could not prejudge the King when Lands return to him by the Forefaulture of the Superiour, because he did not consent to the same; his consent thereto at any time may convalidate the Right before Jus be quaesitum to a Donator.

If, after Forefaulture His Majesty having granted a Remission, the per­son Forefaulted is redintegrated to his Estate, as if the Forefaulture had not been: or if he should take a new Right upon the Forefaulture?

When a Forefaulted person has Right to succeed to any other person as Heir; so that not only his own Estate but what would belong to him if he had entered Heir, would fall to the King by his Forefaulture; Quae­ritur, will the King be Lyable to the Debts of the Defunct; seing he does not succeed to the Traitor's own Estate and Patrimony, but in haereditatem [Page 76] quae est nomen universitatis, both as to the Debita and Bona: and there is no reason that the Defuncts Creditors should be prejudged, unless they had been in culpa either themselves or their Debitor.

His Majesty having presented, upon Forefaulture, a Vassal; If that Superiour should be thereafter Forefaulted; Quaeritur, If the Feu not being confirmed, will fall under his Forefaulture? Ratio Dubitandi: The Feuer is in the same condition with other Subvassals; so that if he do not apply for confirmation he is lyable to the same hazard. And yet on the other part it may be thought, that the reason why Confirmation is neces­sary is, because when Lands return to the King they return as they were given free of all Rights and Burdens, but such as the King did consent to; which doth cease in this case; seing the King is not only Consenter to the Subvassals Right but is Author by the presentation.

A Person having committed Treason, and thereafter his Kinsman to whom he might have succeeded, being Deceased, Quaeritur, If that De­functs Estate will fall to the King, or go to the next Heir? Ratio Dubi­tandi: That there seems to be a difference, betwixt the case in the fifth Question of the Title Heirs, when a person being Appearand Heir, and having haereditas delata before he commit Treason, the same should fall to the King; seing he was Haeres habitu, and had jus radicatum in his Person before his Treason, and therefore Forefaults the same to the King. Whereas in this said other case, when the Succession fell, the Traitor could not have any Right in his Person being nullus and incapable of Succession: So that it cannot be said that he is Legitimus and propinqui­or haeres.

A Person holding Lands Ward of the King did give an Infeftment to be holden of himself Blensh, and the same being confirmed by the King, the granter was thereafter Forefaulted, so that the Subvassal did come to hold of the King: Quaeritur, Whether he will hold as he did formerly, or Ward as his immediat Superior did?

A Person being Appearand Heir both in Land and Heretable Sums, but not being served Heir; And being Forefaulted after the Decease of his Predecessor: Quaeritur. If he doth Forefault not only the Lands but the said other Heretable Estate? Answer. It is thought there is a difference betwixt Lands, and any other Heretable Estate; seing the Appearand Heir is obliged to enter to his Lands to the Effect the Superiour may have a Vassal Lyable to Service or other Duties; so that his not entering is delictum, vel quasi; and the Lands are in Non-entry: And he is in the same case in Relation to the Superiour, as if he were entered: Whereas, as to any other Heretable Estate, he needeth not owne or claim the same but if he pleases; and he cannot have Right unless the same be settled upon him by a Service: and consequently cannot Forefault that which is not his. Vide supra, in the Question concerning Cesnocks Forefaulture.

A Band being granted to an Englishman, but bearing Registration in Scotland; and being granted by a Scotsman: If the Person Creditor be guilty of Treason, whether it will fall under Forefaulture in England, or Scotland?

Cum essent Sempronio duo filii, Primogenitus patre adhuc vivo perduellionis damnatus fuerat; postea patre mortuo, utroque filio superstite (nam perduellis fuga se subduxerat) de haereditate patris ambigitur an ad primogenitum & ex [Page 77] ejus persona ad Fiscum pertineret? Nam Jure civili quod indigno aufertur fisco quaeritur: & Jure nostro haeres apparens, Majestatis damnatus, nedum sua sed bona haereditaria & praedia quae sua forent, si adita esset haereditast, amittit & ad fiscum transfert.

Sed distinguendum, Et multum interest, an filius, praemortuo patre, crimen postea admiserit; an vero (ut in casu praedicto) ante patris obitum Majestatis reus & damnatus sit: priori casu cum primogeniti persona adhuc integra sit, con­festim a morte patris dies cedit & haereditas ei delata est; adeo ut qui etiam pa­tre superstite haeres fuerat in spe, Jam incipit haeres esse habitu & spe certa & radicata, cum libuerit actu & aditione haeres futurus: si igitur postea maxi­mam capitis diminutionem patiatur, haereditas ipsi delata & jus succedendi infis­cum transit: altero vero casu, filio ante mortem patris damnato, haereditas pa­tris morte nec delata est nec deferri potuit, utpote poena servo, & qui in jure nul­lus, nec personam habeat in qua successionis jus radices agere queat: his conse­quens est, fratrem juniorem patri haeredem fore; quia absurdum esset patrem a crimine alienum, & forte tam suis quam familiae meritis commendatum, ex de­licto filii nihil amittere dum viveret (noxa enim caput sequitur) morientem autem tum bona tum familiam & memoriam perdere: nec perduellis aut fisci melior debet esse conditio, quod damnatus poenae se substraxerit: & extra quae­stionis aleam est, secundogenitum patri haeredem futurum primogenito patri prae­mortuo.

2da. In ista specie facti suboritur quaestio, viz. si venia data restituatur pri­mogenitus, an frater desinit esse haeres? Et quidem distinguendum est, 1mo. An cum restituitur, haereditas integra & ex asse adita sit, fratre ex inquisitione haerede renunciato, & in omnibus quae patris fuerant praediis investito (cum enim terrae in haereditate sunt, ante investituram haud censetur esse aditio) isto casu restitutio quae est ex gratia nemini nocet nisi concedenti; nec adimit jus fra­tri quaesitum: & quod rite constitutum & quaesitum est haud corruit etsi casus evenerit a quo incipere non poterat.

2do. Sin restituatur primogenitus, haereditate nondum ullatenus adita; eo casu quia res adhuc est integra & sublato obice per restitutionem, qui oberat ne haeres esse possit; incipit haeres esse habitu & aditione actu haeres erit.

3tio. Haereditate partim adita partim non, fra re in quibusdam terris in­vestito in quibusdam haud sasito; novissimo isto casu frater in iis quidem terris in quibus investitus est haereditatem retinebit; in reliquis primogenitus haeres erit: tantum adeo discrimen est inter jus inchoatum & id quod penitus consum­matum & quaesitum est: Multa enim cadunt inter calicem supremaque labra.

Forisfamiliation.

QƲaeritur, If the granting of a Provision to a Child importeth Forisfa­miliation; so that the Child cannot claim a Bairns part? Or if it be to be considered what the subject of the Provision is? Viz. Whether it be Heretable or Moveable: Seing in the first case it seems that the Pro­vision being out of a different Subject should not exclude from a share of Moveables? David Scot Son to Walter Earl of Buccleugh.

Funeral Charges.

IF Funeral Expences should be deduced as a Debt off the whole, or only off the Deads part?

[Page 78]If the Funeral Charges for Burying the Husband, should affect the whole Moveable Estate, or the Deads part? Answer. It should affect the Deads part; seing it is not a Debt contracted during the Communion: And the Deads part cannot be used or employed better than to Bury him.

If the Funeral Charges should be deduced in Relation to the Quot, so that the Quot should be only of the Deads part free of the said Debt? Answer. It is thought, it should not be deduced, for the reason contained in the preceeding Querie.

G.

Gestio Haeredis.

IF an Appearand Heir medle by entering to the possession of Lands, whereof the Defunct was in possession; but his Title is found there­after to be void: Will his medleing import Behaviour & aditio­nem passive.

Gift.

THE late King having granted to a certain person the Gift of an Office at His Majesties presentation; There is a Gift of the said Office granted to another person by one having Right by a late Gift to present to the said Office; notwithstanding that the person who had the for­mer Gift ad vitam or culpam is yet Living and is not deprived: And it is now desired, that His Majestie should not only ratify the said late Gift, but that of his certain knowledge, proper motive, and by vertue of his pre­rogative he should give a new Gift of the said Office; Revocking and annulling the former Gift granted by the late King to the present incum­bent; and giving power to the person to be presented by the New Gift, to enter presently to the Exercise and benefite of the said Office, by him­self and his Deputes: And ordaining the present Incumbent to deliver up the Registers; and recommending to the Lords of Session to con­struct His Majesties Gift with the greatest latitude that their Nobile Offi­cium can allow: And containing a promise to ratify in Parliament.

Quaeritur. Whether a Gift of the Tenor foresaid be according to Law? It is Answered, That the samen is altogether against Law and Form, for these Reasons.

1mo. By the common Law there can be no valid Gift of an Office or place, unless the same be Vacant, and the manner of Vacation exprest in the Gift; seing the Office belonging to another who has Right to and in possession thereof, the same is not in the hands and power of these who has Right to present, so that they may give the same. 2do. If it be pretended, that it may be taken periculo petentis, and that the Incumbent may be thereafter deprived or may decease; and that the Gift may be effectual in either of the said cases: Such a pretence is both against Com­mon [Page 79] Law and our Practique; seing it imports votum captandae mortis: And, by an express Act of Parliament, Gifts of Escheat should not be given before they fall by Horning: and there is the same Reason as to all other Gifts. 3tio. That a former Gift granted, by the late King, who undoubt­edly had Right to give the same, should be Revocked and Annulled without a previous citation of the person concerned; and without so much as a hint of any reasons why his Right should be taken from him; is a Streach not only against Law and Form but against Humanity and Justice which is defined Jus suum cuique tribuere, & neminem laedere. 4to. That, what cannot be done in Law and Justice, should be desired to be done by vertue of His Majesties Prerogative, is an Injury to so just a Prince; And it is of a dangerous preparative that His Majesties Prerogative should be pretended for Favours to private persons, that are Unjust and Illegal. 5to. Whereas it is desired, that it should be recommended to the Lords of Session, to construe His Majesties Gift, if it should be granted, and if there should be any Question upon the same; with the greatest Latitude that their Nobile Officium may allow; The said Desire and Stile is Illegal, and without any precedent; and should not be a precedent hereafter: seing there ought to be no prelimitation upon the Lords of Session: And it is their Duty, and may be expected from them, that they will con­strue His Majesties Grants according to Law and Justice: And their Nobile Officium; being as the Highest Judicatory, to do Justice according to Law, they have no Latitude to recede from the same.

Gift of Escheat with Backbond.

IF a Backbond do so affect the Gift of Escheat, that the Donator cannot Assign the same?

Gifts of Forefaulture.

LAnds being Disponed by His Majesty, as being in his hand upon Fore­faulture, conform to a certain Decreet of Forefaulture mentioned in the Right, with the Clause cum omni Jure; and the King having, the time of the granting the Disposition, Right to the Land as being in his hands for committing another Deed of Treason after the former; whereupon there was not a Decreet the time of the Disposition: Quaeritur. If the said former Decreet be taken away, whether the Donator will have right to the Lands upon the Supervenient Deeds, and new Decreet of Fore­faulture following thereupon? Ratio Dubitandi, The said Right is upon a special Ground, & causa limitata limitatum producit effectum: And the Clause [...]um omni Jure is only Clausula executiva; and is only to be un­derstood of Inferior Rights to Mails and Duties, by reason of Ward, Non-entry or otherwayes; and not of the right of Property upon other Grounds. Swinton.

Gifts of Recognition.

A Gift of Recognition bearing Lands holden of the King Ward, to have been Disponed; but not specifying the same; or special as to [Page 80] the Lands but not as to the persons in whose favours the Disposition is made: if it will be valid?

Gift of Ward.

THE Superior having gotten a Gift of his own Ward, either to him­self or to another for his behoof, gratis; Quaeritur, If the Sub­vassals may claim the benefite of the said Gift, and to be free of the said Ward? Ratio Dubitandi. That in effect the said Gift is a Discharge of the Ward; which being Discharged to the Superior is Discharged to the Subvassal, whose Property falls in Ward only consequentially: and on the other part, as the Superior and Donator to the Ward, may take ad­vantage of the same both against the Vassal and Subvassals; the Vassal ought not to be in a worse case than another Donator.

If Gifts of Ward and Non-entry prejudge singular Successors.

THere are some Casualities which are Fruits of Superiority, and have Tractum temporis as Ward and Non-entry &c. And these being Gifted will be effectual, during the whole time of their endurance; as to the Granter and his Heirs: But there may be question as to singular Successors; Whether the Donator will have right to the Ward and Non-entry, for Years after the Giver is denuded? Ratio Dubitandi; That resoluto Jure dantis resolvitur jus accipientis; and such Gifts are of the na­ture of Assignations to Mails and Duties, which are not effectual but dur­ing the Right of the Cedents: And the Ward and Non-entry do belong to the Superior by reason he wants a Vassal to serve him; and the singu­lar Successor having that prejudice, he ought after his Right to have the benefite of the Casualities. Vide Liferent-Escheat. Quaest. 7. in Lit. E.

Goods belonging to the Rebels at the Horn.

A Creditor having affected the Moveables of the Defunct, by confirming himself Executor Creditor; and having got possession of the same whereby he is satisfied of his Debt: Quaeritur, If the same may be evicted from him by a Donator to the Defuncts Escheat? Answer. It is thought, they cannot be evicted: Seing, in favorem commercii, Goods be­longing to Rebels may either be Disponed and given by themselves in pay­ment of their Debt, or poinded or otherways affected, before Declarator and Diligence, done by the Donator to affect the same.

Grana crescentia.

WHat is the reason for the astriction of Grana crescentia? Answer. Feuers are in effect Coloni and perpetual Tacksmen; And they ought not to be in better case than Tennants, whose Grana crescentia were upon the matter thirled, the Food and Expences of Labouring being [Page 81] deduced, it is thought the Tennent will have no more than will enter­tain him.

Great Seal.

A Gift of the Estate belonging to Bastards or Forefaulted persons where­upon there was no Infeftment, being granted under the Great Seal, Quaeritur, will it be valid? Ratio Dubitandi, The ordinary way of pas­sing such Gifts is under the Privy Seal.

H.

Heirs.

A Child being served Heir to his Mother, and thereafter the Childs Father being served Heir to the Child; Quaeritur, if he can be said to be Heir of Line to his own Wife, and ought to be dis­cust before other Heirs?

A Woman being Married to a Bastard, and having a Child, Quaeritur, as the Child will succeed to the Mother, whether the Child having no o­ther Heirs, his Father being a Bastard; (so that he cannot have any Cognati upon the Fathers side) will his Mother be Heir to him? Ratio Dubitandi, That by the Common Law the Mother does succeed; and as the Child does succeed Ratione Cognationis and Relation to his Mother, it seems that for the same reason she should succeed to him, the Relation being mutual.

Quaeritur, If a Son of a former Marriage having Right to succeed by Substitution, in the case where the Father provided Lands to the Son of a second Marriage, and the Heirs of his Body: Whilks Failȝieing to the Fathers other Heirs and Assigneys, for implement of his Contract of Mar­riage: There being no other Children of the second Marriage, must he be Heir to his Father; the substitution being (as said is) in favours of the Fathers Heirs? Ratio Dubitandi, That in many cases the word Heir to another person than the person De cujus successione agitur, is to be under­stood haeres habitu vel potentiâ, & non actu; As if upon considerations a Bro­ther should pass by his Brother of purpose, and Failȝieing his own Heirs should substitute the Heirs of his Brothers Body: But in this case it would seem by the Obligement of the said Contract of Marriage and the said right, he has intended that he should be represented himself, Failȝieing the Heirs of his Marriage. Vide the tenth and eleventh Questions in the Title, Successor titulo Lucrativo, Litera S.

If that should be the Construction; Quaeritur, Quid Juris, If the Son of the second Marriage should decease, the Father living: Seing the Son of a former Marriage cannot be served Heir to his Father? Cogi­tandum.

[Page 82]Lands being entailed to diverse persons substitute and the Heirs of their Bodies, whilk Failȝieing to the other Heirs of Tailȝie successivé, Quaeri­tur, If one of the said Heirs of Tailȝie be Forefaulted before the Death of the person in Fee leaving descendents of his own Body, whether will the next Heir of Tailȝie succeed? Ratio Dubitandi; Because the next Heir who would succeed, Failȝieing the Forefaulted person and the Heirs of his Body, cannot be said to be proximus; seing the Children of the Traitor are nearer: And though they be nulli and mortui civiliter they are not naturaliter nulli: So that they being incapable; and the others not having jus sanguinis; it may appear quod nullius est pertinet ad Regem. It is thought, that the nearest of Kin should exclude the Fisk; Seing qui sunt nulli, they are not to be considered as to any effect; and especially in that which is odious and exclusive: And it is hard, that the Estate should be Forefaulted by the Crime of a person who had never Right to it.

Behaving as Heirs.

QƲae Ratio, That the owning a Title of Honour, and sitting in Parlia­ment doth not import Behaving as Heir; and yet the owning and in­trometting with a Sword, or Armour, or any thing else will import Gestionem? Answer. That Creditors being to be satisfied out of the Goods and Estate belonging to a Defunct Debitor; If the Appearand Heir doth meddle with any part of the samen, Eo ipso adit passive, quia miscet se rei, which should be Lyable to the Executors Execution: But a Title of Ho­nour is not such an Interest, as could be any way Lyable to the Creditor, and the Appearand Heir in owning the same non libat haereditatem.

Quaeritur, If a Ratification by any Appearand Heir of a Right grant­ed by the person he was to succeed to, being yet on Life; will import Gestionem? Ratio Dubitandi; That he could not be Heir nor Gerere dur­ing the Defuncts Lifetime: And on the other part, the ratification is granted because he is Appearand Heir, and might question the Right: And as one may be Lyable passive by accepting a Right in the Defuncts time, whereby he is Successor titulo lucrativo; so he may Behave by a Deed in the Defuncts time.

Heir of Conquest.

THere being three Brothers, and the middle Brother having an Estate and deceasing after the decease of his Elder Brother, who had di­verse Sons; and the Younger Brother being on Life, Quaeritur, Who will succeed to the middle Brother as Heir of Conquest? Ratio Dubitandi; 1mo. The Younger Brother being Heir of Line; and who would be Tu­tor to the Children of the middle Brother, if he had any; it may be doubted if there should be a representation in conquest; the Heir of Conquest not being properly Heir? 2do. Conquest ascending gradatim, whether would the Youngest or Eldest Son of the Elder Brother succeed as Heir of Con­quest, being both collateral to the Defunct?

Discussion of Heirs.

A Person, having provided his Estate to his Daughter, with power to Dispone and Redeem, is obliged that if he should make use of that power in prejudice of his Daughter, he and his Heirs Male and Suc­cessors, in that Estate and Dignity, should be obliged to pay a certain great Sum of Money at the first term after his Decease: Quaeritur, whe­ther his other Heirs or Executors, and not only the Heir Male, will be Lyable to pay the said Sum, at the least in subsidium, The Heir Male being first discust? Lauderdale and Lady Yester.

Quaeritur, Quo ordine, A Successor Titulo Lucrativo should be Discust? Answer. It is thought, that he should be discust before the Heir of Tailȝie, being in effect a general Heir: Unless Lands be Disponed to an Appear­and Heir of Tailȝie, in which case he should be considered as an Heir of Tailȝie.

When the order of Discussion is Renounced; If the Heirs of Tailȝie or Provision may have recourse for their relief against the Heir general; who by Law is first Lyable to the Debts: Albeit as to Creditors that order be Renounced?

Heir and Executor.

GIfts of Ward, Marriage, Non-entry, Do these belong to the Heir or Executor? Answer. They are in rem, and some has tractum, and therefore belong to the Heir.

A Person being obliged by a Bond to Dispone Lands for a certain price, and the Creditor having charged upon the said Bond, and being content to pay the price, and in the interim the Debitor deceasing; Quaeritur, If the Creditor obtain a Decreet for implement against the Heir, whether the party bound to Dispone, his Heirs or Executors will have Right to the Price? Answer. It is thought, that the Heir will have Right; seing there is no Sum due to the party bound; but if he Dispone, which is only in obli­gatione, the said Sum becometh due upon his Disposition; and is not due to any but to a Person who is to Dispone; and the Heir only can Dispone.

If by Contract one of the Parties has Disponed and is obliged to In­feft in Lands; and the other is obliged to pay a Sum of Money as the Price. Quaeritur, If the Seller decease before the Disposition be fulfilled, whether the Sellers Heirs or Executors will have right to the Price? Ratio Dubitandi, The Heir only can fulfil, and therefore ought to have the Price; and on the other part, the Heir is Lyable to fulfil by the Disponers Obligement: But the Disponer having taken the Obligement to pay the price in favours of himself his Heirs and Executors, the Sum by the Act of Parliament should pertain to the Executors; And it appears that the Disponer, in place of his Lands, intended to have a personal and Moveable Estate.

What is the Reason of Difference betwixt the last and former case? An­swer! In the last, there is a Moveable Obligement for payment of Mo­ney: And in the other there is no Obligement upon the Creditor, but upon the Debitor to Dispone; But so that if the Disposition be made, a Sum is to be payed, which cannot be payed but to the Disponer's Heir [Page 84] after his decease, who only can Dispone, the Debitors Executors can have no right to the same; and it was in the Creditors option either to charge for implement or not, so that the Money was not in Obligatione but in Conditione or modo, If implement should be craved.

When an Order of Redemption is used, and the Money consigned, and thereafter the person against whom the order is used deceases; Quaeritur, Whether the same will belong to his Heirs or Executors? Answer. It is thought, it should belong to the Heir, for the reason foresaid in the last Querie; Specially seing an order of Redemption may he used against an Appearand Heir: And if that Appearand Heir should after Consignation decease, the Money could not belong to any representing him, who had no Right; and therefore it can belong to no other, but to the Heir, who should be thereafter Heir, and Infeft and should Renounce: And there­fore it is thought, that the Money being the Redeemers Money, and upon his hazard untill Declarator, it is never Money of the person against whom the order is used until Declarator; and then being his in specie is moveable, and belongs to his Executors.

If a Wadset be granted to a Man, and his Wife, and the longest liver of them two, and the Heirs of the Marriage &c. And an order of Re­demption be used and declared against the Husband; and thereafter he decease: Whether in that case, the Money consigned will be heretable, and ought to be given up to be employed for the Wife in Liferent, and the Heirs in Fee? Answer Affirmative.

A Bond being ab initio heretable by Obligement to Infeft, and Infeft­ment thereupon; And thereafter there being a Bond of Corroboration granted for the same Sum, but not heretable; bearing to the Creditor only his Heirs and Executors: Quaeritur, Whether the Sum be Heretable or Moveable? Ratio Dubitandi, The same is due, both by an Heretable and Moveable Bond; and the Moveable Bond being Posterior seems to be a Novation of the former, & posteriora derogant prioribus. Et contra, the said Sum is due still upon Infeftment, and the subsequent Bond is only in accessorio; So that jus principale & primordiale is more to be considered, as to the question concerning the nature and quality of the Right.

Heirs Male.

A Father, his Eldest Son being Dumb, of purpose to exclude him, as being unable to manage, Doth by a Bond of Tailȝie settle his Estate upon another Son, and the Heirs Male of his Body; Whilk Fail­ȝieing to his other Heirs Male; with a Provision, That his said other Son and his foresaids should be obliged to entertain the Elder Brother: And if the said dumb person should at any time have the Faculty of his speaking, he should succeed, and the said Bond should be void: Quaeritur, If the Brother who has got the Estate decease before the Elder, without Heirs of his Body; If the Elder Brother would succeed to him, as Heir Male? Answer. It is so evident, that it was intended, that the Elder Brother should not succeed, except in the case foresaid, if he should have the said Faculty of his speaking, And the said Tailȝie being made of purpose to seclude him: It is thought, that he cannot succeed by vertue thereof; And his Heirs Males is to be understood his other Heirs Male, by the Dumb Person, who is excluded.

Obligements, in Contracts, in favours of the Heirs of the Marriage.

A Person being obliged by his Contract of Marriage, with a second Wife to resign certain Lands, for an Infeftment to himself, and the Heirs Male of the Marriage; and to employ also 60000 lib. for the Heirs of the Marriage; And his Eldest and only Son of the first Mar­riage being bound by a Bond granted thereafter, for implement of the said Contract of Marriage, in the same manner, as if he had been obliged by the Contract; And the Father having accordingly resigned, and taken Infeftment; and the Son of the second Marriage being Infeft as Heir of Provision, in the Lands provided as said is in favours of the Heirs of the said Marriage: Quaeritur, If the Son of the first Marriage, being after the said Contract Infeft in the Fee of the Fathers other Estate, will be Ly­able to relieve the Heir of the second Marriage, of the Debts contracted after the said Fee, as Successor Titulo Lucrativo; or being bound for his Father as said is: Upon that pretence, that his Father ought to perform the Obligements of the said Contract cum effectu; and to free the Heir of the second Marriage of his Debts? It is thought, that the Contract being once fulfilled by taking the Infeftment foresaid, and by employing of the said Sum; both the Father and his Cautioner, the Eldest Son, were im­mediatly Liberate, the said Obligement being satisfied; The import of the same being, that the Son of the second Marriage should succeed as Heir in the saids Lands, but not that he should be free of his Debt: Or that being free, the Father could not Dispone the Lands for an Onerous Cause. But if the Father had Disponed the Lands, provided by the Con­tract, without an Onerous Cause, after the Elder Son his Fee; or had resigned of purpose, to defraud the Heir of the second Marriage; the Father would be Lyable de Dolo, and the said Deeds reduceible: But the Eldest Son, being once Liberate, by implement, would not be Lyable. Tweeddale contra Drumelȝior.

There being Heirs General, and Heirs Male, and of Provision; and Heirs of a second Marriage, being provided by their Mothers Contract of Marriage to certain Provisions, whereunto they have Right as Heirs of Provision: Quaeritur, quo ordine will the Heirs of the second Marriage be lyable to Debts and Discussion? Answer. It is thought, that they being Heirs upon an Obligement & quasi creditores, it would appear that they should be Lyable in the last place in subsidium, all others being discust.

In Contracts of Marriage, The Husband being for the most part oblig­ed to provide and resign his Estate, for Infeftment to himself and the Heirs Male of the Marriage; which Failȝieing to his Heirs Male of any other Marriage; which Failȝieing, the Heirs Female of his own Body, the Eldest succeeding without Division: Quaeritur, If the Husband should resign and take such a Right upon Resignation; but thereafter should resign in favours of other Heirs: Whether the Heirs of the Mar­riage may question the said alteration, and what way? Ratio Dubitandi, That an Heir is eadem persona, and cannot question the Deed of the Person whom he represents. Answer, He is not simply Heir, but Heir of the [Page 86] Marriage: And as to Obligements in his favours he is Creditor. 2do. It is thought, he may pursue a Reduction of the foresaid Deed, as being in prejudice of him as Creditor: or he may pursue the Heir of Provision by the posterior Right, for implement of the said Obligement.

Quaeritur, When by such Provisions, there are other Heirs substitute to the Heirs of the Marriage: Whether the Husband may alter the Desti­nations as to the said other Heirs? And if he do, if they may question the Deed? Answer. It is thought, that the Heirs of the Marriage are only in Obligatione: And the other Heirs in destinatione mariti, which he may alter.

A Person being obliged by Contract of Marriage to resign certain Lands in favours of himself and his Wife in Liferent, and the Heirs Male of the Marriage; whilk Failȝieing, his Heirs whatsomever: And like­wayes being obliged, that what he should get by his Wife, by any Le­gacy, or Right. or Assignation in her favours, to secure and employ the same to himself, and her in Liferent, and to the Heirs of the Marriage; which Failȝieing to his Heirs whatsomever: And he having accordingly resign­ed, and taken Infeftment, to him and her, and the Heirs foresaid: And a Sum of Money having fallen to her, and being uplifted and Discharged, both by him and his Wife, before Inhibition; and thereafter there be­ing Inhibition upon the said Contract at the instance of certain Friends, at whose instance Execution is appointed to follow: These Questions do arise. 1mo. If notwithstanding the said Inhibition, he may Dispone the Lands? Answer. He may Dispone the same, being Fiar: And the import of the said Obligement is, that the Right of Succession, as to the said Lands, should be secured to the Heirs of the Marriage, in case the Father should decease in the Fee of the same; so that he cannot provide them to other Heirs: But it is not intended thereby, that the Father should not have the Right competent to all Fiars: Viz. That they may dispose of the same, if their condition requires.

Quaeritur, If he may at least Dispone the same without an Onerous Cause? Answer. It is thought not, seing all Obligements should be un­derstood, ut actus valeant & operentur: And though the Father be Fiar, his Fee is by the said Obligement so restricted in favours of the Heirs of the Marriage, that he cannot, fraudulently, and to evacuate the said Obligement, Dispone without an Onerous Cause.

If the Inhibition will be effectual as to the Sum e. g. of 10000 lib. neveremployed? Answer. It will be effectual as to the Wife: But as to the Heirs of the Marriage, there may be question. Ratio Dubitandi, That there being an Obligement, it ought to be once fulfilled by employ­ment to him and his Wife, and to the Heirs of the Marriage: And on the other part, seing notwithstanding the Inhibition he might have dis­posed of the said Sum, if it had been employed; there is eadem Ratio, if it be not employed; Seing his Condition may be such, that he cannot em­ploy the same.

If it be not to be considered, what truely his Condition is? And if it be such that he cannot employ the said Sum without Ruine; That he should not be obliged to employ it Dicis Causa to be thereafter uplifted? And if a Process may be intented against his Children, to hear and see it Found and Declared, that he should have power to Dispone notwith­standing [Page 87] of the said Inhibition and Obligement foresaid, both as to Lands and Money? Seing if the Money were employed, he could, and might dispose of the same being Fiar: And he is not in that Condition to raise the said Sum, and employ it. Watson of Damhead.

Heirs Portioners.

WHen Women succeed as Heirs whatsomever ( v. g. Three Daugh­ters) they succeed as Heirs Portioners, without any priviledge of Primogeniture. Quaeritur, if the Three Daughters succeeding be deceas­ed, leaving each of them Sons and Daughters: Will the Eldest Son of any of them exclude the rest of the Children, and be Sole Heir Portioner to the Grandfather? Ratio Dubitandi, As Primogeniture is introduced for the preservation of Families, which does not militate in successione Foeminea, Women being finis & caput Familiae; There ought to be no respect to the same in the second Degree, & nepotibus, as there is not in primo gradu in filiabus: There being utrinque eadem Ratio.

Where there is a plurality of Heirs Portioners, and some of them be­come Lapsi: may the Debt be recovered in solidum, from these who are Responsal? Cogitandum.

If a Barony descend to Heirs Portioners, will all have Right of a Barony?

If any Superiorities belong to the Barony, will the Eldest only be Su­perior?

Heirs of Provision and substitute.

WHatever belongeth to a Defunct in Fee and Property (whether Land or any other Interest) the time of his decease, cannot be transmitted but to Representatives; or these who are instar haeredum, and bonorum possessores, as in the case of Lands provided to Bairns of the Mar­riage, the Bairns are in effect Heirs of Provision: And if Sumes be pro­vided by way of Substitution to another person, after the decease of the Creditor; the Substitute will be Lyable to the Creditors Debt, other Heirs being discussed.

Heirs of Provision being oftimes Strangers, and in re certa: Quaeritur, will they only be Lyable secundum vires?

If a Right of Lands be given to a person without mention of his Heirs; And Failȝieing of him by decease, to another and the Heirs of his Body: Quaeritur, Will not the said person who is so substitute be Heir of Tailȝie? And if it be so in Lands, why not so in Bonds granted to persons and Fail­ȝieing of them by decease to other Substitutes?

Heirs of Tailȝie.

QƲaeritur, If there be no Heretable Estate belonging to an Heir of Line, out of which the Executor may be relieved of heretable Debts: Will the Heir of Tailȝie be obliged to relieve the Executor of such Debts? Ra­tio Dubitandi; Heirs of Tailȝie are not properly Heirs, but Bonorum pos­sessores; and Lyable to Debts only in subsidium: whereas the Heirs of [Page 88] Line and Executors are properly Heirs: and the Heir of Line, if the Exe­cutry be great and more considerable than the Heretable Estate, may Con­fer: which is not competent to the Heir of Tailȝie or Provision.

The same Question may be betwixt an ultimus haeres and the Executor nominate of a Bastard Legitimate.

Haereditas being successio in universum Jus; Quaeritur, Why is an Heir of Tailȝie called Hoeres, who succeeds only in rem particularem, as Fundus? Answer. He succeeds in omne Jus talliatum, & non singulari Titulo; But as representing the Defunct in ea re: et non interest Whether there be any thing in haereditate quando haeres succedit eo jure; et majus et minus non variant speciem.

If after a person has succeeded as Heir of Tailȝie to a certain Barony, the same be evicted; whether will he be Lyable to the Defuncts Debts? Ratio Dubitandi; semel haeres semper haeres, & sibi imputet that adit damnos­am haereditatem: On the other part, the Heir having succeeded, and hav­ing contracted quasi aditione with Creditors; intuitu, that the said Land was to be his; the said quasi Contractus should be considered as ob causam da­tam & non secutam.

Heirs of Provision and Tailȝie, who are to succeed only in rem singula­rem, albeit Titulo universali: Quaeritur, If they will be Lyable to the De­functs whole Debt, though far exceeding the value of the Succession: Or if they should be considered as haeredes cum beneficio Inventarii; and should be Lyable only secundum vires: There being no necessity of an In­ventar, the subject of their Succession being only as said is res singulares? Answer. It is thought, that if one be served general Heir Male, without Relation to a singular Subject (as to certain Lands) he would be Lyable in solidum: But if he be served only special Heir in certain Lands, he should be Lyable only secundum vires.

There being a Right made in favours of a Person as Heir of Provision of a great Estate; and in favours of another as likewayes Heir of Provision of an inconsiderable parcel; Quaeritur, If the person succeeding almost to all the Estate will be considered as Heir of Tailȝie, and will be Lyable to relieve the other as Heir of Provision?

When there are two Heirs of Tailȝie in diverse Lands, of which the Rent is not equal, but the one much disproportionable and less than the other; Quaeritur, If they will be Lyable to the Debts equally, or propor­tionally?

Quo casu, Heirs of Tailȝie may be considered, as Creditors.

ONe having Tailȝied his Estate by a Disposition to One and the Heirs of his Body, whilk Failȝieing to other Substitutes; and by a Contract betwixt him and the Person to whom he Disponed his Estate, he having taken the said person obliged to do no Deed in prejudice of the Tailȝie, but to preserve it inviolable: Quaeritur, If he the Disponer should make a Dis­position notwithstanding; may the Heirs of Tailȝie pursue Reduction of the same, as being made in Defraud of them, being Creditors by the said Contract?

[Page 89]If after the said Contract is Registrate, the Heirs of Tailȝie have Jus quaesitum: So that the Contracters cannot Discharge, or prejudge the same?

Haereditas.

OMnis haereditas quandocunque aditur, cum tempore mortis defuncti continua­tur, Perez. Lib. 2. inst. tit. 14.

Haereditas jacens sustinet Personam Defuncti. Ibidem.

Si Haeres instituatur sub impossibili conditione; instituitur pure; & conditio habetur pro non adjecta. Perez. ibidem.

Idem, Si institutio fiat ad tempus: habetur enim tempus pro non adjecto, & utile per inutile non vitiatur, Ibidem.

Aditio haereditatis.

ADitur haereditas, vel verbo, vel facto; verbo declarat (scilicet voluntate) se velle haeredem esse: Facto vero Gerendo pro haerede, & immiscendo, Dummodo sciat delatam ad se haereditatem: Regula enim est, Omnia quae animi destinatione agenda sunt, non nisi vera & certa scientia perfici possunt. Perez. Lib. 2. tit. 19.

Aditio haereditatis non requirit hodie solennia verba, ut olim Cretio. Ibidem.

Haeres Contrahens.

HAEres videtur contrahere cum Creditoribus & iis satisfacere debet.

Repudiatio Haereditatis.

QƲi repudiavit haereditatem, non amplius ad eam admittitur: qui tamen a Creditore rite interpellatus est ut haereditatem adeat, & repudiat; non prohibetur eam adire quoad alios Creditores.

Qui haeres institutus est sub conditione, ut non adire, ita non potest repudiare ante eventum conditionis: Regula enim est, Quod quis si habere velit habere non potest, repudiare nequit.

Servus Haeres.

INstituto servo haerede; eo ipso datur libertas sine qua haeres esse non potest, Perez. lib. 2. inst. tit. 14.

Ʋltimus Haeres.

IF a Donator by a Gift of Ʋltimus Haeres will be Lyable to the Defuncts Debt personally Effeirand to the Estate? And if he be not, what course shall be taken to affect it?

If such Universal Successors be Lyable in solidum, (If they be found to be Lyable Personally) unless they give up an Inventar? And what shall be the method of giving up an Inventar?

Heirship Moveable.

IF a Son that is Forisfamiliat, and has a Family, will get a Moveable Heirship by his Father? Ratio Dubitandi, He is sufficiently instruct­ed, and aocomodated as Pater Familias: And e Contra, the other Chil­dren, though Forisfamiliat will be Executors, and Exclude him; and in that case there is no Reason, that all should be Executry, and the Heir Excluded.

Whether a Coach and Cart will fall under Heirship with the Horses belonging thereto the time of the Defuncts Decease? And whether not only the Plough, but Oxen or Horses that goes in the same, will belong to the Heir?

An Heretrix being Married, Quaeritur, If she may have a Moveable Heirship? Ratio Dubitandi, That she is in Familia Mariti, and has none of her own? Lady Levin.

Quaeritur, If a Jewel may fall under Heirship; upon pretence, that it is the Jewel of the Family? Ratio Dubitandi, Jewels are only Jocalia; and Heirship is properly Instrumenta fundi, or Domus: And in England are called Heir-looms.

In Saxonia & finitimis regionibus peculiares quaedam species sunt in quibus proximus agnatus succedit; quas Heergevvettam, vel res expeditorias vocant.

Inter reliquas res, ad eum pertinet equus optimus cum ephippio viri mortui, gladius, optima armatura, &c. Besold. Thesaur. litera H. 33. Heergev­vettam.

Money consigned for Redemption whether Heretable or Moveable?

MOney being consigned upon an order of Redemption, Quaeritur, If after Decreet of Declarator the same be heretable or moveable? Ratio Dubitandi, That it belongs to the Creditor, and is moveable, and as it were in Cash; which of its own nature is moveable: And on the other part, Surrogatum sapit naturam surrogati, and as the Relict would have a Terce, so the Heir, who only can Renounce, ought to have right.

Sums Heretable or Moveable.

A Sum being due by Contract, wherby the Buyer of Lands is obliged to pay the price; But so, that it is provided that it should be retained for payment of annualrent, until an infeftment of warrandice upon the Lands be purged: Quaeritur, whether the said sum be Heretable or move­able?

Homologation

Sir William Ker having got a Right under the great Seal to debateable Lands upon the borders, wherein Ker of Cherrytrees pretended a Right and Interest and Property by a prior Gift; and Bennet of Grubet an interest [Page 91] of Commonty: The said Sir William Ker and Cherrytrees did by a minut oblige themselves to communicat their Rights, so that Sir William Ker should dispone to Cherrytrees his Right as to the part of the saids Lands Cherrytrees was in possession of; and that Cherrytrees and his Successors should be obliged not to question Sir William Ker his Right: Thereafter Cherrytrees offered to assigne the said minut to Grubet: Quaeritur, whether or not the accepting of the said assignation would import an homologation of Sir William Kers Right, and a passing from Grubets Right: And if Grubet by the Obligement forsaid, would be obliged not to question Sir William Kers Right as to Grubets part of the said Commontie? Answer, That actus agentium non operantur ultra eorum intentionem; and Grubet did not intend to prejudge himself, but to better his Right and to be free of a plea; and he could not question Sir William Kers Right upon that which he was to have from Cherrytrees; But could not be barred to question the same upon his oun Right which he had not from Cherrytrees.

A Tailȝie bearing a clause irritant, That the course of Succession should not be altered, and that the Contraveener should Lose the Right; And the Heir of Tailȝie in minority having resigned in favours of other Heirs that were not contained in the Tailȝie, and being infeft upon the said resigna­tion; Quaeritur, if the said Heir after majority continues to possess and to administer, and has granted Commission for doing other deeds concern­ing the Management of the Estate intra quadriennium utile, but before inten­ting of reduction Ex capite Minoritatis: Will he be thought so to homologat the said alteration, that he cannot question the same, and cannot be reponed against the committing of the said clause irritant? Answer. It is thought that the possession will not import homologation, seing it may be ascribed to the former Right which cannot be said to be altogether extinct by the said other Right; the same being null at Least annullandum and reduce­ible. Vide Tailȝie altered in Litera T.

Horning

IF a person charged may be Denounced year and day after the charge without a new intimation?

If a Pupil may be charged and Denounced, and taken with Caption? It is thought not, seing he can neither Velle nor Nolle, nor obey nor disobey.

There is not Eadem Ratio as to Minors.

If it may be objected against a Judge that he is at the horn, seing Parties may be debarred from pleading as not having Personam; And there is the same Reason to debar Judges a Judicando?

How far a Husband is lyable for his Wifes Debt?

SEing the Husband by his Marriage has Right Jure Mariti to all move­able Estate belonging to the Wife; and acquires the same per Ʋni­versitatem, as if she had made an Assignation and Right in his Favours. Quaeritur, Whether he will be lyable to all her Debts, at least Moveable; quia penes quem commoda penes eundem incommoda? At least if he will be lyable peculio-tenus, in quantum locupletior factus est?

[Page 92]If there be any difference betwixt a Husbands getting a Tocher, and when there is no Tocher but Jus Mariti? Seing in the first case, he is a Creditor by Contract singulari Titulo: And in the other, he has right Titulo Ʋniversali omnium bonorum, which are understood Debitis de­ductis.

If a Husband may be lyable for his Wifes Debt, the Marriage being dissolved?

Item, If after the Marriage is dissolved, any Debt come to his know­ledge, that did belong to his Wife during the Marriage: Whether he might pursue for the same?

How far the Husband will be concerned in his Wifes Debts, Activé or Passivé?

De Hypothecis, vulgo Wadsetts.

‘LIcet tam instrumento alienationis quam Charta a Domino directo concessa terrae ipsae alienentur, Jus proprietatis nonnunquam haud transit; sed inferius, Hypothecae forte ceu impignorationis: Cum enim juxta regulam plus cautionis sit in re quam persona, aliquando praedia a de­bitore alienantur in majorem cautionem & securitatem ut loquimur. Hy­potheca autem terrarum alia apud nos impropria dicitur, alia propria, nec minus ista, haec magis propriè est impignoralis. Pignus siquidem & hypotheca proprie datur, ut Creditori caveatur, non vero ut utatur nisi die solutionis adveriente, debitor in mora aut non solvendo sit: impropria vero Invadiatio ea dicitur, cum creditor praedii jus & investituram nan­ciscitur ut sibi tam de sorte quam usuris cautum sit, sed ea Lege ut prae­dii possessio penes debitorem remaneat, non jure proprietatis qua pror­sus exuitur, sed conductionis: id fit pacto in Instrumento alienationis in­serto, quo Creditor qui per alienationem Dominus et vasallus est, praedium ut suum relocat debitori, stipulatus annuam mercedem quae solennes et licitas pecuniae usuras haud excedit; addito etiam pacto de reversione seu retractu, seu redimendo, quando aut debitor aut creditor voluerit; aut prout convenit inter contrahentes: Hypotheca quae propria dicitur ea est, quando sciꝪ. praedium non tantum in Cautionem sed [...] alie­natur; & tam terrae quam pecunia quasifunctionem recipiunt; ita ut pecu­niae usus quaecunque sit ad Debitorem; praedii vero usus & possessio etiam naturalis ad Creditorem pertineat; sed sub modo & pacto de retroven­dendo: Ex his varia nec levia emergunt Dubia.’

‘Inter ea est illud, si ex delicto Creditoris qui ex Investitura vasallus est, feudum ad Dominum Superiorem redierit; terris forte (si praedium militare sit) ultra modum licitum & semissem alienatis, aut alio delicto feudali, vel ex crimine laesae majestatis: An Dominus illud habeat ut opti­mum maximum, & quale ab initio charta originali ab eo aut ejus Decesso­ribus aut Authoribus profectum fuerat: vel tantum ut Hypothecatum aut Impignoratum, & Retractui & Juri reluendi obnoxium.’

‘Plerisque (ut arbitror) videtur Creditorem mulctandum jure suo tantum, salvo debitori ejus culpae haud affini jure suo & Retractu, cui Do­minus Superior consenserat pacto isto de redimendo in ipsa charta inser­to: & pro hac sententia stare videntur trita illa Juris Axiomata; Noxam [Page 93] caput sequi, Nec ullum facto suo sive ex facto sive ex delicto, plus juris in ali­um transferre posse quam ipse habet.

‘Verumtamen acriore & fixo obtuitu penetrantibus & ut par est omni­bus rationum momentis ultra citraque scrutinatis, Jurisconsultis adversa ut opinor placebit sententia, earum (quae sequuntur) rationum suffra­gio subnixa, siquidem illud quod agitur magis inspici quam quod con­cipitur, & actus agentium ultra eorum intentionem haud operantur: quicquid autem inter Debitorem & Creditorem agatur, id inter Domi­num & Creditorem vasallum agitur, ut ex alienatione prioris vasalli isti is sufficiatur & ei vasallus sit, eodem nec alio modo aut jure quam pri­or, Dominio directo & ejus fructibus & compendiis salvis & illibatis: in­terea haud autem exiguum est, ut, ex Recognitione ob alienationem aut quovis delicto Feudali, Feudum domino commissum, ad Dominum re­maneat quale ab initio fuerat, aut rediturum fuisset, si prior vasallus deliquisset: Nec praesumendum Dominum, pro laudemio quod in Hypo­thecis si non minus haud majus esse solet eo, quod pro alienatione sim­plice dependitur, Dominium suum ejusque fructus velle carpere aut im­minuere.’

‘Accedit, quod pacta ista inter Debitorem & Creditorem, quoad Dominum sunt extrinsica; nec ejus jus aut Dominium directum sed vasalli & Domi­nium utile afficiunt: Quamdiu igitur Creditoris Jus & Dominium utile adhuc durat, pactis istis subjacet; eo autem sublato & amisso, pacta ista, quae ei inhaerent & accessoria sunt, cum principali evanescunt.’

‘Adhaec; feudo ex delicto Creditoris qui vasallus est Domino commisso aut ob Perduellionem amisso; vel praedium ad Dominum pertinebit, quale fuerat ante Hypothecam, aut jus tantum Hypothecae: Dici autem nequit Hypothecam Domino committi, ea enim est cautio in rem pro pecunia, & inanis & accidens esset sine subjecto, si Domini esset sine pecunia, quae, ut nunquam ejus fuit, ita demum redire nequit.’

‘Nec obstat illud, Neminem plus juris in alium transferre quam ipse habet; multis enim casibus Jus quod vasalli fuerat, sed facto suo imminutum, & vel servitutibus, vel Juri Retractus ab eo concesso obnoxium, plenius ad Dominum redeat, feudo ex delicto commisso.’

‘Nec magis officit, quod Dominus pactis istis videtur consensisse; ea enim non inter Dominum & Debitorem & Creditorem inita sunt, sed a contra­hentibus ipsis apposita & chartae inserta ne personalia videantur; & ut affi­ciant vasalli jus ad quoscunque ejus successores perveniat; non vero ut imminuant aut laedant jus Domini directi; id ex ipso pacto de reversione ejusque verbis elucescit; eo enim cavetur praedium per Debitorem ejus­que haeredes & assignatos redimi & relui posse, sed a Creditore ejusque haeredibus & assignatis in jus creditoris succedentibus; Dominio autem utili ex delicto caduco & extincto nillum jus superest creditori, in quod ejus haeredes aut assignati succedant; quodque ab iis redimi & retrahi possit; nec Dominus, vasallo ob delictum dominio utili privato, in id creditori succedit: Jus enim suum ex delicto amittit quidem, non au­tem transmittit nec amissum transferre potest: utque unaquaeque res ad naturam suam facile redit; ita plena proprietas, quae ante concessio­nem vasallo aut iis a quibus causam habet domini fuerat, eorum jure ex­tincto ad dominum redit & reviviscit.’

‘Porro, si ex delicto Creditoris, qui solus in feudo & vasallus est, non [Page 94] committatur feudum ipsum quale a domino profectum fuerat; sequitur illud tum incommodum tum absurdum, Latifundia sciꝪ. & Baronias quae pro modicis pecuniarum summis in cautionem & Hypothecam impro­priam dari solent, spreto domino impune alienari posse; debitore penes quem est jus reversionis illud cedente; ex ejus enim facto & alienatione nihil domino obvenit aut committitur, in quem nihil commisit aut de­liquit jure suo usus, cum in feudo & sasina haud sit nec ulla inter eum & dominum necessitudo & obligatio interveniat, quae alienationem im­pediat.’

‘Ex supra dictis conficitur, in Hypothecis, vasalli jus quoad Debitorem pactis de retrovendendo & relocando substrictum & obnoxium esse; quo­ad vero superiorem liberum & solutum: & creditorem eodem quo alii vasalli jure censeri: nec queri potest debitor, cum creditoris fidem & conditionem suo periculo elegerit; & si locuples sit adversus eum pro damno resarciendo agere possit.’

‘Si haec sententia durior videatur, facile erit ejus rigorem emollire pacto de retrahendo, ita ut diserte caveatur praedium, nedum a creditore e­jusve successoribus, sed & a Domino si ad eum pervenerit ex delicto creditoris, retrahendum; pecunia credita ei persoluta: sic domino sci­enti & volenti nec fraus nec injuria fiet.’

Tacite Hypotheck.

QƲaeritur, If a Tacite Hypotheck being not only of Fructus, but Instru­menta Fundi, Quid Juris in Grass-Rooms, where there is nothing payed but Silver?

What is the effect of a Tacite Hypotheck? And if a Tennent should sell his Corn in a Mercat, may not the Master pursue Actione Hypo­thecariâ against the Buyers, who should know the condition of these with whom they Deal?

The Heretor of Lands or Master having a Tacite Hypotheck for a Years Duty: Quaeritur, If the said Hypotheck be alse well for the Stocking upon the ground, as of the grouth and Encrease?

Quaeritur, If the Rests of diverse Years amount only to a Years Duty; whether the Master will have any Hypotheck as to an Years Duty so made up? Or if it be understood only of the Rests of the immediatly pre­ceeding Year?

I.

Immobilia.

QƲAE res inter Immobilia computentur? Thes. Bes. litera L. p. 597. ad finem.

Poenae & mulctae non exactae immobilibus accensentur Ibid. Item servi ascriptitii, Ibidem.

[Page 95]Munitiones cum castro consideratae tormenta & arma bellica, si testator res pretiosas in Familia servari jussit. Ibidem p. 597.

Immobilia per applicationem & aliis modis.

IMmobilibus accrescunt & accedunt mobilia variis modis; quod enim applica­tione perpetua corporibus alterius naturae affixum infossum aut inaedificatum est, Immobile fit; nam mobile Immobili cohaerens Immobile censetur, Hering. de mol. quaest. 8. N. 18. & 19.

Per immutationem res mobiles sortiuntur naturam Immobilium, ex quinque causis. 1. Facto hominis, ut Affixione, Infossione, Adjectione. 2. Legis potestate & fictione, ut cum colonus ascriptitius aut mancipium rusticum glebae serviens pro re Immobili censetur. 3. Attributione seu destinatione, ut lig­num ad aedificium destinatum inter Immobilia computatur. 4. Subrogatione ut, quibusdam casibus, pecunia. 5. Subjecto v. g. quando Jura nomina & actiones ad Immobilia competentes aut mobilia pro talibus habentur. Hering: de. molend. Ibidem. n. 20. & sequen.

Imposition upon the Pint of Ale.

QƲaeritur, If the Gift of the Town of Edinburgh and other Burghs, of Two Pennies upon the Pint of Ale, or Two Merks upon the Boll of Malt, may be questioned by any concerned, upon that ground, that be­ing a burden upon the People it could not be laid upon them, without con­sent of Parliament? Answer. It is thought, it may be questioned. 1. For the reason foresaid, being the fundamental of the Liberty of the People. 2. The whole Countrey is concerned, and has prejudice thereby, In re­spect that they who dwell within the Lothians, will suffer as to the price of their Bear; which will be less in consideration of the said burden of Two Merks upon each Boll, and consequently the whole Countrey will be prejudged; The price of the Bear in Lothian being the standart almost of the whole Countrey, Edinburgh being Communis Patria; And the Drink upon that occasion being both worse and dearer: And the Shires of Lo­thian having concurred they came, in end, to a condescendence, that the Town should be obliged never to desire the like: And it is thought, that the Gift, both in passing at the Exchequer, and ratification thereof in Par­liament, was so qualified. 4. A Bond was given by the Town to that purpose to the Colledge of Justice, and also to the Shires, and both were trusted to one of the Commissioners for the Shires to be keeped; and, it's informed, was given back by him viis & modis, 5. The pretence of Debts, and alteration of the way of living of the Magistrates is frivolous, Seing the Town ought not to Contract Debts, the Magistrates being only in effect Curatores; And the King could not lay a Burden upon the Coun­trey for payment of his own Debts; and the Debt of the Town is no less than it was formerly before the first Gift: and the Magistrates should not live upon what is given to the Town. 6. As to the pretence of his Maje­sties Prerogative; it is against Law, and the common stile of the Chance­ry, which should not be altered; and His Majesty doth make use of his Prerogative to remitt the rigour of Law, but not to give Illegal Grants, rei alienae, to prejudge and Burden others: And therefore such Grants are ever understood Salvo Jure, and to be periculo petentis. 7. The dis­pensing [Page 96] with the former Bond is of dangerous consequence; His Majesties Prerogative being never against Justice; and for taking away the Bonds and Rights granted to the People, without their own consent: otherways there should be no security for Liberty and Property.

Impositions of Burdens upon Shires.

SEing Shires are not Incorporations, Quaeritur, If upon any Pretext whatsomever, The Major part may lay any Burden upon the Shire, or any part of it without their Consent?

Impositions voluntary upon Shires.

WHen any Charges for Banner, Trumpet, or Coat &c. for the Heretors, are to be payed, Quaeritur, Whether the same are to be pay­ed viritim & per capita; or proportionally according to the Valuation? Answer. They are Personal and not Patrimonial: and are to be payed with respect to the persons, and not their Estates.

Improbations.

IF Pursuers of Improbations should consign? Of late some are of Opini­on, That Consignation is to be made only when Improbation is pro­poned by way of Exception: But the Act of Parliament anent Caution in Improbations, in place of which Consignation is come, is clear as to all Improbations by way of Action or Exception.

It appears, there should be a difference betwixt a general Improbation, at the instance of Heretors and Buyers, which is a Tentative used to try the condition of the Lands if they be affected with any latent pretences: And the case of special Improbations, and Improbations of certain Writes; and that in this case there should be Consignation; but not in the other: unless upon Production, a particular Right be taken to be Improven.

When in Improbation Writes are produced, and certification craved contra non producta; and it is alledged that the Defender has produced sufficiently to exclude the Pursuer: Quaeritur, If notwithstanding certi­fication should be granted? Answer. By the late Practique the Lords are in use to hear the parties debate upon the Right: which is thought hard, seing if the Defender be confident of the Right he has no prejudice by granting the Certification, and having gotten long termes he ought to produce all Writes called for: Seing Improbation est processus tentati­vus, and in order to try the Defenders pretence, and not to debate a Right.

Impugning the Authority of Parliament.

BY an express Act of Parliament, The Impugning the Authority of the Parliament consisting of three Estates, is Treason. Quaeritur, If the misconstrueing, or Impugning the proceedings of the Parliament, if they amount to Treason? Answer. There is a difference betwixt Im­pugning Authority, and Proceedings of Judicatories; seing Judges may have an unquestionable Authority, and yet their proceeding may be que­stioned: [Page 97] And Papists, and Hereticks cannot controvert the Authority of Parliament, and yet may be dissatisfied with and misconstrue the proceed­ings of the same: Which practice, though Criminal, doth not amount to Treason. Traquair. Item, The Earl of Argyle.

Incendiarium.

INcendiarii. vide in Thes. Bes. Lit. M. 72. p. 647.

Incorporations.

JF a Colledge or Corporation, being in Law a Body, may Forefault the Rights of the Corporation, and in what case? Ratio Dubitandi, Ma­gistrates are only Curators, loco Curatorum; and the University never Dieth; and Bishops, and such other sole Corporations, though they com­mit Barratry, do not Forefault in prejudice of their Successors.

When a Town or Incorporation, that has Power to Contract Debts, do grant Bond obliging the Magistrates and their Successors, and bearing Horning and other Executorials, Quaeritur, If succeeding Magistrates may be charged with Horning? And if they be denounced, will the Escheat of their own Moveables fall, or only of Moveables belonging to the Town? Ratio Dubitandi, Officium nulli debet esse damnosum; and they are not bound themselves personally, but only they and their Successors in officio in behalf of the Corporation: And on the other part, if they should not be Lyable, the Execution would be elusory: and though it is not just that they should pay such Debts out of their own Estate, yet they are lyable to pay the same out of the Estate of the Corporation: and if they cannot raise so much for the time, out of that Estate; they should Suspend, and make it appear, that they are neither in mora nor in culpa.

Quid Juris, As to Comprysing or Adjudication as to such Bonds? Whether it should be only of the Publick Estate, or of the present Magi­strates likewise? Specially after the Letters are found orderly proceeded, upon a Suspension discust against them.

After the Magistrates are denounced and Year and Day at the Horn, Quid Juris, as to the Liferent Escheat, whether will that of the Town fall? and how long their Liferent shall be thought to endure? Or if the Life­rent of the Magistrates, and each of them will fall?

If the succeeding Magistrates may be charged summarly, and if they be Denounced will their own Escheat fall?

Infeftment of Annualrent.

LAnds being affected with two annualrents to diverse persons, and being comprised for the bygones of the first; Quaeritur, If after the expire­ing of the Comprysing, the Compryser (the Lands being sufficient to pay both annualrents) will be Lyable to the second Annualrenter? Seing the Lands were affected therewith the time of the Comprysing: And though [Page 98] the first annualrent was prior, the Debitor did no prejudice to give the second; the Lands (as said is) being able to pay both.

If the second Annualrenter may redeem?

Base Infeftment.

LAnd, holding Feu, being disponed to be holden either of the Dispon­er or of the King; And the Disponer being obliged to infeft by two Infeftments, the one to be holden of himself Blensh; and the other of the Superiour as the Disponer held: Quaeritur, If the Buyer think fit to hold of the Disponer and does not make use of the Procuratory; Whether during the time that he continues to hold of the Disponer will he be lyable to releive him of the Feu-duty?

Infeftment in a Right, both of Property and Annualrent.

A Sum of Money being lent, and thereafter (for further security) the Debitor having granted a Disposition, whereby he is obliged to infeft the Creditor in an annualrent out of certain Lands; And like­wayes to infeft him in the property of the Lands (being extended to a twenty pound-land) for security both of the principal Sum and annual­rent; So that he might have Recourse both to the Lands and Possession of the same; until he be satisfied, both of the principal Sum and bygone Annualrents: And that by two Infeftments under reversion: and that he may have recourse to either Right as he should think fit: and though he should make use of either, that he should not be precluded, but make use of the other alse oft as he thinks fit: which Right is granted by a Charter and Seasin following upon the same. Quaeritur, There being a Non-entry of the Creditor; whether before Declarator, the Retour-Duty of the Lands, or the Annualrent of the Sum (being one hundred pounds sterling Yearly) will fall and belong to the Superior? Seing the Annual­rent valet seipsum. It is Answered. That it is thought, the Right being instar Hermaphroditi, and neither properly a Right of Annualrent nor Pro­perty, and yet both, It is thought, that in Law (as a Hermaphrodite is repute to be sexus praevalentis) so in this case Jus proprietatis trahit ad se Jus inferius: And it being the Design of the Creditor, to secure both the principal Sum and Annualrent, and that the Debitor should continue in possession (and in Wadsets improper, where the Debitor is to possess ei­ther upon a Back-tack, or otherways, the Annualrent is not Debitum fundi) It is therefore intended that there should be a Right of Property; But so that the Annualrent should be secured in manner foresaid: As if in a Right of Wadset with a Back-tack, it should be also provided, that the Back-tack Duty should be Debitum fundi, and that it should be lawful to the Creditor to poind the Ground for the same, as if it were secured by an Infeftment of Annualrent.

Infeftment for the use and behoof of another.

IF a Right be granted to the use and behoof of another, will the Right Forefault by the Treason of the Vassal, in prejudice of him to whose use it is? de quo vid. Wadset Heretable or Moveable, Let. Ʋ q. 4.

And farder if the Vassal be Year and Day at the Horn, whether will his Liferent fall in prejudice of the Ʋsuarius? And if the Ʋsuarius be Year and Day at the Horn, whether will his Liferent fall to the Superior or not? Ratio Dubitandi. That Ʋsuarius is not Vassal, and yet has real Interest out of the Lands holden of the Superior.

Conditional Infeftments.

A Mother, being debarred from her Joynture many Years, upon occasi­on of Incumberances, and upon that Ground being Creditrix to her Son for a considerable Sum of Money; and likewayes out, of respect to her Son, having taken a Right to a Comprysing for certain great Sums, Did Assign to her Son (being the only Son of her Marriage with his Fa­ther) both the saids Interests, to himself and the Heirs of his Body, whill [...] Failȝieing to herself and her Heirs; with a provision that he should not have Power to alter the said Destination; and if he should alter the same, the Assignation should be void: But the Son, having made no use the said Comprysing, and there being no Infeftment thereupon, is Infeft in the Estate as Heir to his Father, Quaeritur, What way his Mother and her Heirs may be secured, so that the said provision may be effectual to them, in case the condition exist by the Failȝieure of the Heirs of his Body? An­swer. It is thought, that the Son should give her a Bond, making mention of the Mothers favour to him, and of the said Substitution and provision, and that it is just it should be made effectual to her in the case foresaid, if it should fall out; and that by the Assignation her Right is Liquidate in the case foresaid, to 40000 Merks, to be payed to her and her foresaids: Therefore, without prejudice of the said Assignation and Provision, he should be obliged and his other Heirs succeeding to him in his Estate, Failȝieing Heirs of his Body, to pay to her and her Heirs the Sum fore­said at the first Term of Whitesunday or Martinmass after the existence of the said Condition, and the Failȝie of the Heirs of his Body: And for her better security he is to be obliged to Infeft her, and her foresaids in an Annualrent effeirand to the said Sum out of his Estate, beginning the first Terms payment, at the Term of Whitesunday or Martinmass after the Failȝie of Heirs of his Body in case they faill; with this provision, that in respect the said Infeftment is not to be effectual, but in the case foresaid, it shall not be prejudged nor questioned upon pretence of any length or lapse of time or Prescription: And that the same shall not Commence or begin to run, until the said Right become effectual in the case foresaid.

Publick Infeftments.

IF an Annualrent to be holden of the Disponer, be confirmed by the King: Quaeritur, If that Confirmation will make it publick?

[Page 100]If an Annualrent be Disponed out of diverse Lands, to be holden of the Granter; and a Decreet of poinding of the Ground be got as to some of the Lands, will it make the Right publick as to others?

Inhibition.

INhibitions upon Bonds or Contracts, if they import only, that nothing should be done in prejudice of the same and execution thereupon? So that the person having reduced upon the Inhibition, cannot make use of the same to sustain any Right, but such as Depends upon the Ground of the Inhibition?

Both the person Inhibited, and the person receiver of a Right being out of the Countrey the time of the Inhibition: Quaeritur, If the Right be Lyable to Reduction? Ratio Dubitandi, Both the Inhibited and the par­ty Receiver should be certiorated, and put in mala fide: And as the Per­son Inhibited is not certiorate, if he be out of the Countrey, if the Inhibi­tion be not Execute at the Peer and Shoar of Leith, so there is eadem Ratio as to the Lieges.

An order being used upon a Conventional Reversion or Legal, against [...] Person Inhibited: Will the Inhibition affect the Renounciation granted by him; seing he may be forced to give it, and it has Dependence upon a Right before the Inhibition?

If an Inhibition being Execute against the Debitor only, and being in cursu only as to the Inhibiting the Leiges, where the Lands lye being at a great distance; and Intimation in the mean time to the party who is about to bargain with the Debitor; will put the said party in mala fide; So that there may be a Ground of Reduction, Ex capite Inhibitionis a­gainst the party Inhibited; and that the said Right is fraudfully made and accepted, without a necessary cause, in defraud of the Creditor, and after intimation of his Diligence?

A whole Barony of Land being affected with an Inhibition, and being thereafter Disponed in several parcels to diverse persons: If one of the saids purchasers should be distressed by a Reduction ex capite Inhibitionis may he have recourse against the others for their proportional parts, for his Relief they being in rem correï debendi? Vide Annualrent Quaest. 1ma.

If after an Inhibition is Registrate, and Fourty Dayes are past; if the Creditor getting notice that his Debitor has Lands within other Shires, may inhibite the Leiges there, and Registrate within Fourty Dayes? And if in that case the Debitor must be himself again certiorate?

By a Minute, an Estate much incumbered being Disponed; and the price being agreed upon at a certain rate per Chalder or 100 Merks, But so that the Incumberances should be purged by the price pro tanto, and any Ease by the Creditors should redound to the Seller; and the whole incumberances being purged, the Buyer should Compt for the superplus of the Free-Mo­ney, and should pay beside 20000 Merks, after all is purged: Quaeritur, Whether the Benefite of the said Contract can be affected with an Inhibiti­on, or with Arrestment, at the instance of Creditors of the Disponer? Ratio Dubitandi; The said Benefite is not Liquid.

If Inhibition does affect Lands acquired after Inhibition? Answer Af­firmative, The Debitor not being Discharged to Dispone the Lands he has presently, but simply his Lands and Estate.

[Page 101]If at least it affecteth such Lands as are acquired, within the Shire where the Inhibition has been used?

Quaeritur, If Inhibition doth affect Bonds though Moveable by the Act of Parliament, so that the Creditor cannot Assign the same?

Quaeritur, If Inhibition doth affect Bonds, so that the Creditor cannot thereafter Assign the same? Ratio Dubitandi, That it is thought, they affect only real Estates and Interests; and there is no mention of Bonds and Debts which are Personal; and they come not under the General of Goods and Gear, which are real things: Whereas Debts are Nomina, and Entia Juris & Rationis.

If Inhibitions affect Lands acquired thereafter? The Ratio Dubitandi is, No Diligence can affect non Ens, and what did not belong to the De­bitor: And if Inhibition will not affect Lands when it is not Execute at the Mercat Cross where they lye, much less can it affect Lands that has not Situm as to the Debitor, and does not pertain to him: and the narra­tive of the Inhibition is, that the Debitor intends to defraud his Creditor, by putting away his Lands, which does not militate, as to Lands which he has not then.

A Bond being granted after Inhibition, and thereupon the Debitor be­ing denounced, and his Escheat Gifted, Quaeritur, If the Horning and Gift may be Reduced ex capite Inhibitionis? Ratio Dubitandi, That the Ground being taken away the Superstructure falls, so that the Bond being reduced the Horning doth fall. Contra, The King is not concerned upon what Ground the Rebel is at the Horn, if the Horning be valid and for­mal; and the Inhibition doth import only, that the Debitor should not give any voluntar Right, whereupon his Estate (which is the subject of Execution for Debt) may be taken away: but not if he should commit Crimes, either of Treason, or should be Rebel, or do deeds wherupon Recognition may follow; That the King or other Superiors should be prejudged of their Right and Casualities of Forefaulture, Liferent-Escheat, &c. George Marshal contra

Inhibition upon Teinds.

IF Inhibition upon Teinds interrupteth prescription, without a citation; specialy where the possessor is in possession by a Right?

If Inhibition puts a party bruiking by a Right, in mala fide; so as, be­fore his right be reduced, to be lyable for bygones after the Inhibition? Tweeddale.

If to the effect foresaid he be in mala fide, because being Commissioner for the Earl of Lauderdale; he prevailed upon the same Grounds against Oxenford.

Insinuatio.

DOnationes, quae excedunt summam quingentorum solidorum sive aureorum, insinuandae sunt; ut effusae donationes coerceantur, & ne fraus struatur Creditoribus falsis donationibus. Insinuatio est publicatio donationis apud acta, vel ejus quod agitur apud Judicem in scripturam redactio. Perez. Inst. Lib. 2. tit. 7.

Instance.

BY the common Law of the Romans, and by the custome of France, Instantia perit after three Years, as to all effects of it, v. g. Interrup­tion of Prescription: But without prejudice of the Action, if it be not prescribed, so that a new Action may be intented.

Instantia.

INstantia perempta omnia acta perire dicuntur, quod intelligendum de ordina­toriis non de decisoriis: & Instantia perempta vitium Litigiosi non atten­ditur. Thes. Bes. in Liter. I. 22. verbo Instank.

Instrumentum Guarentigiatum.

INstrumentum quod Doctores vocant Guarentigiatum (seu confessatum habet Executionem paratam, & vim sententiae. Besold. Thes. verbo Guarenti­giatum Instrumentum. p. 338. Sect. ultima.

Interdiction.

IF Interdictions be null, because the Executions do not bear Oyesses? Park Gordon.

If a Person having no real Estate, but personal Bonds, may he not be interdicted if there be cause? at the least that he cannot give away his Estate without an Onerous Cause? Ratio Dubitandi, Interdictions, are thought only to affect Immoveables. Mr. John Bruce Minister.

If a Husband can be interdicted to his own Wife, being in ejus potestate & cura?

If an Interdicter can consent to a Deed in his own Favours?

If Interdiction be loused, will Debts contracted in the interim be va­lid? Ratio Dubitandi, That by the lousing it is acknowledged that he is not prodigus: And seing no Act of Prodigality or Facility before or after can be instructed, ex extremis praesumitur medium, and that he was not prodigal in that interim.

If the Heir of a Person Interdicted will be lyable to a Personal Executi­on, or real against his Moveables?

Inter decem Dies.

DIctio (Intra) includit sua extrema, & excludit ea quae sunt extra: & si Terminus assignetur ad aliquid faciendum Intra decem Dies, qualibet die dictorum decem dierum actus fieri potest. Thes. Bes. Lit. I. 16. verbo Inner.

Intrometter.

THere being a difference between an Executor confirmed after Intro­mission, and a Donator to the Defuncts Escheat though declared: [Page 103] viz. That the Executor is lyable to the Creditors, but not the Donator. Quae Ratio, that the Escheat declared should free the Intrometter?

If the Declarator be after intenting of the Cause, will the Intrometter be free?

Invecta & illata.

IF a Person astricted as to Invecta & illata tholing Fire and Water, should buy unground Malt, and after he had brought it within the bounds astricted has sold it; will he be Lyable for astricted Multures?

Duobus Investitis per modum Confirmationis, sed posterius acquirentis Jure prius confirmato, uter sit potior?

CƲm praedia alienantur de superiore tenenda, id fit vel per modum Resigna­tionis vel Confirmationis: si igitur Alienatio fiat de Domino superiore te­nenda, per modum Confirmationis, & ex ea sasina secuta sit: postea vero alie­natio terrae eodem modo tenendae alteri fiat, & ex ea nedum sasina sed Confirma­tio accesserit, ac denique prioris acquirentis Jus sed posterius, confirmatum fu­rit: Quaeritur, Ex iis acquirentibus uter potior sit? Et quidem dubitationis si ulla, ea subesse videtur ratio, quod per Resignationem alienans penitus devesti­tur: sasina autem cum sit in re, plus posse & tribuere videtur quam resignatio quae ad rem tantum est: verum explorati Juris est posterius acquirentem potiorem esse, cum prior nactus sit jus perfectum & omnibus numeris & partibus absolutum, idque a potestatem habentibus; alienans siquidem nec alienatione nec sasina priori data Dominus esse desiit, & penes quem est Dominium penes eum remanet potestas alienandi per quam Dominium definitur: sicut autem alienatio alienanti Domini­um haud adimit cum sit jus personale, nec in re tantummodo sed ad rem conse­quendam, ita nec sasina ex ea dissasitur, cum sit prorsus nulla & irrita utpote praedii de Domino directo tenendi: nam sasina praedii de aliquo tenendi inanis & sasina haud censetur, nisi is de quo tenendum est praedium vel per se vel per bali­vum suum eam dederit; vel per alienantem dandae vel prius datae confimatione sua consensum & autoritatem accomodaverit.

Ex istis elucescit quanti momenti sit habilis agendi modus: ut enim apud Phy­sicos tria rerum naturalium dicuntur esse principia, Materia Forma & Privatio; totidem etiam apud Jurisconsultos rerum agendarum statuuntur principia, Pote­stas scilicet Voluntas & Modus: sine potestate velle vel conari dementia est: sine vo­luntate potestas iners, nec in actum sese exserit: si adsit utraque tam potestas quam voluntas etiam enixa, desit autem modus habilis & ad actum explicandum idoneus, actus nullus & inefficax est; Forma enim & Modus (ut vulgo dicitur) dat esse rei: Et haud fieri, & haud rite & debito modo fieri, paria sunt: Cum igitur ac­quirens omisso modo acquirendi per resignationem, quâ resignatione factâ, tam alienanti quam alteri, tum alienandi tum acquirendi potestas praeriperetur, istum per confirmationem maluerit; in eum quadrat (quod multis aliis casibus locum habet) illud Brocardicum, Quod potuit noluit, quod voluit facere nequivit.

Investitura.

INvestitura est vel propria vel abusiva, per illam possessio vacua in accipien­tem transit; per hanc haud transit, nec enim in possessionis substantia sed in signo & praeambulo quodam consistit. Jus fluviat. p. 737. n. 77.

Jura complexa.

JƲra complexa as Escheats single, Societies for certain Years, do these fall under Executry? Ratio Dubitandi, The subjects are mobilia: Contra, they are not liquid and cannot be valued, so that there can be no appretia­tio or male appretiata.

Juramentum.

JƲramentum sortitur naturam, & conditiones contractus cui adjicitur, & intelligitur rebus in eodem statu permanentibus. Thes. Besold. verbo E­hegelubd. p. 207.

Jurisdictio.

MOribus Jurisdictio non datur Jure Magistratus sed in agris consistit, ab iis inseparabilis sicut servitus in gleba, & sigillum in cera: & est super territorium prout nebula super paludem, per potentiam activam.

Proinde si territorium dividatur, minime Jurisdictio separatur, sed una cum partibus dimembratur. Thes. Besold. Litera L. p. 547.

Jurisdictio Camerae Imperialis.

AN Caesaris morte, Jurisdictio Camerae Imperialis expiret, vel sit in Suspen­so? Besold. Thes. verbo Camergericht. 136.

Jus accrescendi.

WHen a Sum of Money is payable to a Widow in Liferent, and to the Children of her late Marriage in Fee: Quaeritur, If any of the Children should decease, Whether their part will accresce to the Sur­vivers? or if they must be Executors or Heirs to the Child deceased? Ratio Dubitandi, That the Fee is not given to individuals nominatim, but to Bairns & Liberis; and before it be declared that they have Right as Liberi and so the Fee established in their person, they are deceased; and there­fore locus est Juri accrescendi: as in the case of Heirs Portioners before they be served Heirs, if some of them decease, their Right will accresce to the Survivers.

Jus Mariti.

MArriage being dissolved within Year and Day, by our Custom the Husband has neither Tocher nor any other Benefite by the Law [Page 105] as Courtesy: Neither the Wife, if she survive, will have Jointure or Terce, if there be no Children. Quaeritur, if the Husband has not Jus Mariti as to Moveables, whether Extant or consumed? Ratio Dubitandi. These other Provisions are presumed to be in respect of a Marriage durable and standing, at least for the said space; whereas the Right foresaid is founded upon the Relation of Maritus; & ipso momento that he was Married he was Husband: But it seemeth, that seing the Wife would not have Jus Re­lictae by the Death of her Husband, he should not have Jus Mariti; ne So­cietas iniqua & Leonina sit: But as to bona consumpta, it seemeth that fecit sua, being bona fide Possessor.

If a Husband lying at the Horn, and being thereafter relaxed, will lose only the Mails and Duties of his Wifes Lands resting before and be­coming due during Rebellion? Or if his Jus Mariti and Right to these Mails and Duties, during the Marriage, will fall entirely; seing he might Assign his Jus Mariti, and his Right not being during Life he is in the case of an Assigney to a Liferent, which falleth under the Assigneys single Escheat?

If a Provision in a Contract of Marriage with a Widow (having given a Tocher) that her Husband shall not have Jus Mariti to a certain Sum, nor to any other Sum except the Tocher (specially she having diverse Children of her first Marriage) be not valid? Lady Red-house.

A Bond being conceived in favours of a Woman conditionally, who thereafter Marrieth, and dieth before the condition exist: Quaeritur, If the Husband will have Right Jure Mariti? Answer, he will; per Legem quae Legata. ff. de Reg. Juris.

Quid Juris, As to conditional Legacies, if the condition exist after the Husbands Death, if they will belong to her self? Vide the said Rule and the reason of the Difference.

If his Jus Mariti may be Comprysed? And if it may, whether the said Right will fall under the single Escheat of the Compryser?

If a Husband be Forefaulted; Quaritur, If his Jus Mariti falleth un­der the Forefaulture? Ratio Dubitandi. The Husband has Jus Mariti, upon pretence and in order to Administration; and the Law presumeth that he will Administrate as he ought: and the Relation and Jus Mariti haeret ossibus and is personal.

There being a Provision in a Contract of Marriage; that the Woman should be excluded from any Interest in Terce or third of any other part of Moveables; so that the Terce is no Communion as to her; Quaeritur, If notwithstanding there will be Communion as to the Husband, so that he will have Jus Mariti, as to any Moveable Estate belonging to his Wife?

A Woman having Right to an heretable sum, if Diligence and charges be used for payment, Quaeritur, If ipso Jure it becomes moveable, so that the Husband has therafter Right Jure mariti? Answer, It is thought that, as to the Decision of this question, much will depend upon circumstances; and if diligence be used in order only to secure the Sum, and that the De­bitor be suspect, the Sum will be still heretable: specially if adjudication follow in favours of the wife and her Heirs.

Quaeritur, If a Provision in a Contract of Marriage, that the wife should retain a Right of sums belonging to her, and that she may dispose of the same without consent of her Husband, be valid and to be sustained? Answer [Page 106] Affirmative, seing such pactions are not contra bonos mores or jus gentium; But on the contrare, are conform to the Roman Law: and when any ad­vantage is introduced in favours of a Husband, or any Person jure positivo or municipali, they may renounce the same. Mr. Iohn Arthur.

Quaeritur, If the Husband be Lyable to the Wifes debts & quatenus? An­swer. It is thought, he should be Lyable; quia penes quem Emolumentum, penes eum onus; But it is thought he should be Lyable only quatenus Locupletior, and according to his intromission and as a Tutor, the Wife being in Tutela mariti: and though he has Right jure mariti & Communionis, to that which belongs to his Wife, that should be understood Debitis Deductis.

If, after the Marriage is dissolved, it be found that there was a Debt be­longing to the Wife during the Marriage, Quaeritur, If the same will belong to the Husband surviving, Jure Mariti? Answer, It is thought, The Law gives what belongs to the Wife, to the Husband as Admini­strator; And the Law presumes that he Administers behoovefully: But if a moveable Debt was not known the time of the Marriage, and is yet due, there may be some Question; and yet it is thought, that it should fall under the Communion.

If the Wife be provided in satisfaction of Terce or Third; Quaeritur, In that Case, If such a Bond will fall under Communion, or if it will belong to the Husband Jure Mariti? Cogitandum.

Jus Mariti & Relictae.

IF the loss ariseing by the act of Parliament anent Ʋnlawful Ordinations and Marriages, be understood to be a Privation; so that such Rights cease as if they were not Married; amittuntur, non commutantur: and the wife and Husband have Right to their own estate, free of jus mariti & relictae, as if they were not Married? Lady Aitoun.

Jus Relictae.

A Woman, by contract of Marriage being provided to a Liferent of all that should be Conquest, whether Lands, Sums, or Goods, Quaeri­tur, If she will have Right to the half or third of the moveables jure relictae? or if eo ipso that she is provided to, and accepteth a Liferent, it appeareth that she renounceth her Communion? Whereas on the other part, that provi­sion being in her favours, and she not being excluded; it seemeth she and her Executors should not be excluded by it.

If the Husband may, by Donations in Liege poustie, prejudge the wife and bairns of their part? Answer the nature of the Gifts is to be considered, if they be so immodicae & inofficiosae, as it may be presumed, they are given of purpose to frustrate them.

Jus Superveniens.

IF a Person having no Right to Lands should dispone the same, so that the acquirer should be infeft upon his Resignation; and there after the dis­poner should acquire the same, and being infeft upon the resignation of the Heretor, should dispone and resigne in favours of another for onerous [Page 107] causes so that he should be infeft: Quaeritur, which of these, who acquired these Lands, from the same author will, be preferred?

That Brocard Jus Superveniens &c. will it hold in the case, where the Right is supervenient not to the disponer, but to his heirs? or where the Heir to the Disponer had Right himself the time of the disposition?

Quaeritur, quo casu Jus Superveniens accrescit? And if it should be un­derstood of the Right only of moveables, and such things as may be trans­mitted without infeftment? And not of Lands and others, which cannot habili modo be conveyed, much less accresce, without Infeftment?

Justice-General.

IF the Justice-General may be Judge to Ryots, or any Crime or Delict, whereof the pain is not defined by Law, but left arbitrary?

K.

Nearest of Kin.

THE Interest of the nearest of Kin is, that they may be confirmed Executors, and if they die before confirmation they do not trans­mitt: and yet if the Testament be confirmed by any person, na­scitur actio against the executor, who is Lyable to the nearest of kin which they transmitt.

There being three persons who are nearest of kin to a Defunct, and the edict is moved and served at the instance of the Procurator-fiscal, and two confirmed only: whether will the third have action against the other two as nearest of kin for a part? Ratio Dubitandi. That these who are executors of Law cannot have Right de facto; unless they confirm; that being modus adeundi in mobilibus: and the nearest of kin by the act of Parliament has on­ly an action in the case where he cannot adire, there being executors nominate and confirmed who have Right to the office and a third part, so that the nearest of kin may pursue for the rest.

When the nearest of kin have action against the Executor Nominate, if some of them decease before confirmation, whether will they transmitt the forsaid action? Ratio Dubitandi, it is not Officium but Jus legitimum, which may be transmitted, as the relicts part and bairns part, without re­spect to the confirmation: and on the other part, it may seem, that seing they did not intent action before their decease, they do not transmitt; and in such cases the intenting of action is instar aditionis, and there is no re­presentation in moveables.

There being two Daughters, of which one, being Married, by her Con­tract of Marriage accepts her Tocher, in satisfaction of what she could Pre­tend to by the decease of her Father and Mother, Quaeritur, the Father having survived the Mother, whether will the other Sister have entirely her Mothers part as nearest of kin to her? Ratio Dubitandi, The other had renounced: And on the other, part the Mothers part did entirely belong [Page 108] to her self and to her nearest of kin: and the said sister that renounced is alse near to her Mother as the other? Vide Renunciation, Litera R.

KING.

IF the King take burden, in a Discharge granted by a Minor, that he shall ratify at perfect age, Quaeritur, whether the Kings successors will be ly­able representing their predecessors? Ratio dubitandi, The King succeeds not as Heir but Jure Coronae: as in the case of single incorporations, V: G: Bishops, who are said to be successors, and are not Lyable to the debts of their predecessors, or in the case of feuda ex pacto & providentia? Cogitan­dum. Earl of Tweeddale and Duke and Dutchess of Monmouth.

If the King be in the case of other Minors? So that a revocation is not suf­ficient, unless a reduction be intented Debito tempore, intra quadriennium utile?

King and Prince.

IF the King and Prince be to be considered as incorporate, so that these who succeed are in the case of successors of Church-men, and do not succeed by Inheritance, but by succession?

L.

Laudimium.

‘LAudimium debetur Usufructuario, non Proprietario. Thes Bes­oldi verbo Handlohm. P. 359. versus finem.

‘Licet Dominus directus, post alienationem ab Emphyteuto factam, novum possessorem investiat, nulla facta mentione Laudimij aut ab eo censum recipiat, tamen suo juri non censetur renunciare, sed Laudimij integram exactionem habet, nisi expresse donaverit, Ibid. p. 360. sect. 2.’

‘Laudimium nondum exactum connumeratur inter fructus pendentes: & si Emphyteusis pertinet ad parochum, illud non exactum, ad haeredes haud transmittitur; sed cedit ei qui in beneficio succedit. ibidem.

Lawburrows for Burghs.

IF a Burgh be Lyable to find Lawburrows for their Burgesses? The Lord Thesaurer-Deput.

In Lecto.

IF in Lecto, a Person, having children, may marrie their Mother, in order to their Legitimation, in prejudice of his Heirs?

If after a criminal and capital sentence, a person condemned be in Legi­tima [Page 109] potestate? Seing he cannot be said to be in Lecto, and the Sentence doth not affect immobilia.

If a man on death-bed be accessory to Treason, whether will his Estate forefault in prejudice of his Heir? It seemeth, that though in Lecto Lands cannot be sold or annailȝied any way in prejudice of the Heir, that being only the case of the old Law of deeds in Lecto: Yet consequentially a man on death-bed may do many deeds in prejudice of the Heir, and a Traitor on death-bed may be taken out and punished.

If a Band being heretable, may be made moveable of purpose in Lecto? Executors of Colonell Mathison. George Hadden.

If an infeftment be given, of Lands holden Ward, upon the resignation of the Father in Lecto; and a reversion apart to the Father to redeem upon a Rose-noble; Quaeritur, if the Ward and Marriage be cut off? Answer. if the Lands hold of a Subject, Sibi imputet that he did not enquire and know the condition of the Disponer: But if they hold of the King, there may be some question; Seing the Kings Grants may be questioned upon Obreption or Subreption, and the negligence of his Officers should not prejudge him: and it appears the course forsaid, was taken of purpose to defraud the King of his casualities, being in spe proxima; and the disponer having Provided for himself that he should be master of his Estate by the Reversion forsaid: It is thought there is a Decision in the said case, in favours of the King which should be tryed.

A person on death-bed having made a Disposition in favours of a Credi­tor, but to the Prejudice of his other Creditors (The Defuncts whole estate being disponed in favours of the Creditor forsaid) Quaeritur, If the De­funct could on death-bed prejudge his other creditors, and preferr one to all his other Creditors? Seeing persons being on death-bed are not in Liege Ponstie as to any deeds But the making of Testaments; and not as to deeds inter vivos; and if the Defunct in his Testament had made such a Conveyance in favours of a Creditor it could not have been sustained; and any deed done on death-bed is upon the matter but a Legacy or codicill: and a dying person should not be allowed to do any fraudulent deed; and it is a fraud where, there are many creditors, to give one the whole estate: and a person in Lecto cannot Prejudge his Heir; and a fortiori ought not to prejudge his creditors, who would be preferable to Heirs: and as in the case of comprysings within year and day all creditors should come in pari passu; So Dispositions on Death-bed ought to be to the behoof of all other creditors? Cogitandum.

A Defunct having on death-bed made a Disposition relating to a former and in corroboration of it did nominate two of his Name to succeed; Quae­ritur what will be the import and effect of it? Answer. It being on Death-bed it cannot have the effect of a Disposition unquestionable; but only of a declaration of the defuncts will, which ought to Determine (at least to have weight with) the friends.

If a person stricken with a Palsie, So that he cannot go abroad, but other­wise having sound Judgement and Memory; if after a considerable time he decease in that condition, will he be thought to be in Lecto after the contra­cting the Palsie? Ratio Dubitandi, That persons Paralytick cannot be said to have morbus sonticus; and diverse, after they have been so, have been able to do affairs and have had Children; and therefore it is thought, [Page 110] that it is to be considered if there be a Complication of any other disease, of which it may be thought that he dyed; and from the time of the contra­cting that sickness he is to be esteemed to be in Lecto.

What is the reason that a third party acquiring a Right made in Lecto, though bona fide will be lyable to reduction?

Legacies.

Quaeritur, If an universal Legacy, which upon the matter is a Testament and ultima Voluntas de universitate Bonorum, may be proven by the oath of the nearest of Kin? Answer. It is thought it may be so Proven; Seing Scriptura is not de forma Legati; and a Legacy not exceeding an hundred pounds may be proven by witnesses; and a Legacy exceeding that value is not probable by witnesses, not because That Scriptum is de essentia, but ob fluxam fidem testium: and therefore whatever value it be of, it may be pro­ven by the oath of the nearest of Kin.

If a Person being named Executor and universal Legatar shall be fore­faulted before he be confirmed, will his interest forefault to the King? Ratio Dubitandi. albeit a Legacy will forefault, yet in this case the Legacy being universal, and being subjoyned to the Nomination, is of the nature of Insti­tution; which, being an office, does not forefault.

If a Legatar should commit Treason before the Testators decease, will his Legacy be void, as in the case of his decease? Answer, The Legatar not being capax tempore mortis Testatoris, having committed Treason, the Le­gacy is void.

If a Legatar doe not own the Legacy may a creditor affect the same? and if there be a difference betwixt the Legacy and a Donation? vide Donatio non acceptata. in Litera D.

Conditional Legacies.

A Legacy being Left to an appearand heir, with that provision, that the Legatar should not question the Defuncts will, having disponed his estate both heretable and moveable to another, both by Disposition and testament: and a clause irritant being adjected to the Legacy, That the le­gatar should both not impugn, and should ratify the Defuncts deed; and should dispone and convey any Right he had, in favours of the said other party; and if he failȝied or contraveened in either, that he should lose his le­gacy: Quaeritur, If the appearand heir should pursue an Exhibition ad Deliberandum, and being required should not be free to ratify and dispone presently; whether the clause irritant be committed? It is answered, That the said legacy is not left in these terms, that if upon Deliberation having a time granted for that purpose; he should think it his interest rather to accept the legacy than to own his Right of succession, he should have the said legacy: But the samen is left, in case he should cheerfully acquiesce to the Defuncts will, which he is obliged to do presently; being obliged to dispone Sine die: & ubi Dies non adjicitur praesenti die debetur.

Legal Reversion.

IF a Minor have a Right to a legal reversion, as singular successor to the Debitor, Quaeritur, If he will be in the same case as a Minor that is heir to the Debitor, so that he may redeem at any time before he be of the age of twentie five years? Or if there be a difference, upon that account that the Heir or his predecessor has Right ab initio; whereas the singular successor Incidit in jus; and the reversion being Limited by the Law in favours of the Creditor, it ought not to prorogate by the deed of the debitor Hamilton of Wishaw.

Legatars and Intrometters.

IF Legatars may pursue Intrometters, and if the Defenders will be heard to debate whether there be free Gear?

De Legatis.

‘LEgata sunt Testamentorum appendices, & legatarij quo dammodo haeredes. Perez Lib. 2. Tit. xx.

Legatum Rei alienae.

QƲaritur If a person on Death-bed should name his appearand heir Ex­ecutor; and should leave in Legacy to another an Heretable interest, or should otherwise dispone Lands; whether or not the Heir confirming the Testament may question the same as to the Legacy foresaid? But in this case the question will be, how far Res aliena (or such as is aliena as to the power of disposing the same in Lecto) may be Left? and Testaments being favorable, and the Intention of Testators being most to be considered, whether or not the Executor should redeem that which is Left in Legacy being Heretable, and be lyable in estimation and to the value thereof if it be res aliena? Or should satisfy the Legacy if it be res sua but Heretable, at least so far as the Executrie will extend. v de Death-b d. Quaest. 2 & 3. Literá. D.

Res aliena si Legetur, non debetur nisi sciverit Testator rem alienam esse; non enim praesumitur Legare voluisse si scivisset rem alienam esse. Perez. Lib. 2. Tit. xx.

Incumbit autem Legatario probare Testatorem scivisse rem esse alienam, nisi con­junctis personis Legata fuerit: pro quibus praesumitur ex affectu eum Legaturum fuisse etiamsi alienam, Perez. ibid.

Ʋbi Legaturres haredis valet Legatum, nec refert sciverit Testator, an non haeredis esse; facile enim praestetur nec redemptione opus est. Perez. ibidem.

Dominium rei suae legatae transit in Legatarium statim a morte Defuncti. Ibi­dem.

Legatum a Legatario acquisitum, ante mortem Defuncti.

SI Legatarius, vivo testatore, rem Legatum consequutus est Titulo oneroso emptionis vel alio, haeres tenetur solvere pretium quod dederat Legatarius; nec enim censetur habere rem cui pretium abest; sin vero Legatarius eum adeptus est titulo Lucrativo, aliter dicendum est, nihilque ab haerede petere potest; nihil enim ei abest & duae causae Lucrativae in unum hominem, & unam rem, concurrere non possunt. Ibidem. si ex duobus testamentis.

Res eadem duobus Legata.

CƲm eadem res pluribus Legatur conjunctim, singulis debetur in solidum sed concursu fiunt partes; & ideo si unus defecerit, vel sprevit Legatum vel decessit vivo testatore Collegatarijs accrescit. Perez. Lib. 2. Tit. xx.

Legitima Liberorum.

‘MOribus nostris Primogenitus est Haeres ex asse; & in universum Jus immobilium; Terrarum scilicet & aliorum quae immobilibus accensentur: nec minus ex mobilibus libat & praecipit mobilia haeredita­ria, vulgo Moveable Heirship: Et apud Anglos Heirloom, optione per­missa optimum quodque eligendi tam ex supellectile quam ex instrumen­tis rusticis, & militaribus Armis, Equis, aliisque ejusmodi; ut tam Domi quam Ruri ad colendum, & si opus fuerit ad militiam & profectio­nes tum in bello tum in pace utcunque sit instructus: reliqua autem mo­bilia sive res sive nomina, Marito & uxori & Viri liberis, etiam ex diver­sis Matrimoniis (si adhuc in Familia) communia sunt, deductis debitis, si Pater-familias obaeratus aut Debitor sit; nec enim aliter bona intelli­guntur nisi aere alieno subducto: Ea communio licet sit inter conjuges & liberos habitu & spe; haud cedit tamen nec actu vim suam exerit, nisi Matrimonio dissoluto per alterius conjugis obitum. Matrimonio duran­te, rerum communium non solum Administratio sed Dominium est pe­nes Maritum, & potestas disponendi haud aliter quam de suis: nec ut communio ista cedat, opperiendum est ut conjux emoriatur & penitus fato defunctus sit, sed confestim ut mori incipit potestas illa Legitima (vulgo Liege poustie) desinit, & communio effectum sortiri incipit. Mori ve­ro incipit, imo civiliter, pro mortuo habetur, postquam morbus invasit Lethalis & sonticus, qui cuique rei agendae impedimento sit; adeo ut nec domo proreptare possit, nec negotiis (uti solitus erat) superesse, eundo ad Templum aut Forum & loca publica ubi plerumque salus animae & negotia procurantur: quamdiu enim animus Ergastulo corporis coer­cetur & ejus Ministerio & organis necessario utitur, vix fieri potest ut corpori aegro mens sana sit: Accedit, Quod ubi Cadaver ibi aquilae, & moribundis adsunt & advolant plerumque (amici ut videri volunt sed) corvi & haeredipetae, ut captent & eblandiantur aliquid; nec id difficile est: aegri siquidem tam corpore quam animo infirmo, & assiduis eorum (quorum opera tunc opus habent) officiis & Blanditiis impares & obnoxii, [Page 113] facile dant & jactant quae propediem sua haud futura sunt: ex eo tempore igitur quo aeger sese domi abdidit, nec amplius in propatulo, Foro aut Ec­clesia sui copiam facit, licet ex morbo non decumbat lento sortasse eoque magis periculoso, dicitur esse in Lecto aegritudinis & in extremis agere: & alienatione Terrarum, aut rei alicujus haereditariae ei prorsus interdici­tur: Et si secus faxit aut alienarit, haeredi actionis rescissoriae remedio facile succurritur: Sic non sine summa ratione prospectum est haeredibus, ne quid in eorum fraudem fieret a parentibus aut decessoribus in extremis, cum sui parum compotes sunt: idque non semel cautum Jure veteri, quod Libris Majestatis aliisque Libris Juris continetur; iis Elogium illud, quod Libri Juris nostri sint, haud negarunt Principes nostri; nec immerito, quod dictum velim pace viri Consultissimi Cragii iis paulo iniquioris: Quemadmodum enim Virgilius aurum ex stercore colligit Ennii; Juris Studiosis ex Libris istis (& non tam stercore quam Juris nostri veteris sive ruderibus sive Rudimentis) licet multa colligere aurea & scitu nec in­amoena nec inutilia.’

‘Sed moribus nostris & usu Fori (cum eadem subsit ratio) idem Jus intro­ductum est in favorem Viduae & Liberorum; & ut plerumque ubi Jus deficit Senatus supremus supplet instar Praetorum, ita ex aequitate accommodavit remedium utile ne Legitimis suis fraudentur, nec liceat Patri familias in Lecto aegritudinis, conjugis aut Liberorum, mobilium partes & Legitimas imminuere, nedum abalienando penitus eripere: quin etiam in Matre­familias praemoriente, ex communione ejus Legitima cedit statim eâ in Lecto aegritudinis constitutâ; nec ex eo tempore Marito, quam vis Domino & in Legitima potestate permittitur aliquid facere in fraudem uxoris, aut eorum qui in Jus ejus succedunt: multum autem interest, uter viran uxor praemoriatur; viro enim superstite cum Liberis, ex obitu uxoris cedit communio, & Legitima tantum uxori ejusque proximis & successoribus, iis mobilium triente ceu quatuor unciis & partibus decisis: quae supersunt Bes, viz. Ceu octo unciae & partes adhuc communia sunt Patri & Liberis. Sed ut superius dixi habitu tantum & spe; fieri enim potest & saepe evenit, ut Communio inanis sit, Liberis Patri praemorientibus, vel Patrimonio acciso, vel aliquo casu defecto: ubi autem viro contingit in fata conce­dere uxore & liberis relictis, communio cedit ad omnes effectus tam uxo­ri quam liberis; adeo ut ex mobilibus triens uxori, alter triens accedat li­beris, tertius Patri-familias relinquitur, de eo, nec ultra testari potest si voluerit: si intestatus decesserit, suum trientem liberis relinquit adinstar haereditatis, adeundum Jure quasi haereditario, sed haerede submoto & ex­cluso: Liberi enim trientem Patris haud vindicant ut suum & Legiti­mam, sed in eum succedunt, quasi haeredes in mobilibus modo solenni: & haeredi legibus satis superque consultum est, cum solus haeres sit ex asse in immobilibus, reliquis liberis praeteritis & exclusis: Sin haeres e re suâ esse duxerit, haereditate omissâ, inter liberos admitti & ex Patrimo­nio paterno sive haereditate & terris, sive mobilibus, aequo cum caeteris nec ampliori Jure aut parte, Potiri; id ei facile permittitur; unicuique enim licet renunciare Juri pro se introducto: nec minus haeres haereditatem adit, & in Terris (si quae sunt) investiendus est, ut rerum haereditaria­rum Jus adeptus, Fratribus habili modo eas conferre & impertire possit. sic collatione facta, defuncti Patrimonium, quod ad haeredem vel ad liberos ut liberos, aut Executores, aut proximos cognatos pertineret, ab [Page 114] intestato ultra citraque inter haeredem & liberos communicatur. Testa­mento autem facto si ex liberis aliquis vel Executor vel Legatarius sit, quod ex Testamento consequitur haud tenetur conferre; nec enim id habet ut legitimam & ex dispositione Juris vel ut unus ex liberis, sed Testa­toris voluntate & ut quilibet; verum cum penes haeredem sit optio, ma­turè & re integra debet eligere; si enim haereditatem adeat purè nec te­status se velle conferre, vix postea aditur nec ad collationem admittitur, elegit enim nec eligenti licet variare.’

‘His altius positis & praemissis, uti par erat in materia usu quidem & moribus satis obvia, sed (quod sciam) in libris non satis enucleata, ex iis eliciendum, Quid Juris sit in ista specie facti.’

‘Diem obiit Sempronius sed intestatus, Maevia uxore superstite cum tri­bus liberis Caio, Titio, & Publio; Viduae triens mobilium Jure relictae (ut loquimur,) Titio & Publio alter triens cesserat ut Legitima & liberis, tertius etiam triens iis obtigit sed ut executoribus & quasi haeredibus mo­bilium ab intestato; adierant etiam dati a Judicibus ad quos pertinet Te­stamentorum probatio & Executorum datio; sed Caius promogenitus cui delata erat haereditas decessit haereditate haud aditâ, eo forte peregre pro­fecto aut aliter impedito; ejus morte ea ad Titium secundogenitum de­venit & adita est: Contra Titium agebat Publius frater condictione ex causa ut restitueret quae ex mobilibus, vel ut Executor, vel unus ex li beris nactus fuerat; cum res ad alium casum devenerat & eum a quo non potuisset incipere; quod ea habuerit causam & unicam fuisse quod hae­res non fuerat sed unus ex liberis, & cum eo effectum evanuisse; eum nunc haeredem & integrâ & opimâ haereditate locupletatum, eâ debere esse contentum; nec sine injuria aut invidia ex mobilibus aliquid libare aut retinere posse: & in Libro isto cujus mentio superius facta vetus re­peritur Decisio. 1553. Julii, quâ contra haeredem Judicatum in causa Alexandri Law contra Robertum Law.

‘Sed cum ista ex libris Curiae & Regestis Decisio haud promatur, sed ex compilatoris nescio cujus libro & notis, salvâ rerum Judicatarum Au­thoritate quae apud me magna est, integrum mihi esse reor ut in contrari­am sententiam pronior sim, iis adductus argumentis: Cessit siquidem Legitima liberorum ejusque semis ad Titium pertinens confestim a morte Patris; Theoph. lib. 2. Titul. de Legatis. §. 20. Theoph. eo­dem libro Instit: ti­tulo. 19. de haeredum qualitate & differentia §. 5. cedere autem tum Legitima tum Legatum dicitur cum actio pro iis competit; & ii, quibus Jus cessit, si decesserint antequam res ab eo sibi debitas consequantur, Jus tamen & actionem ad haeredes transmittunt. Ea autem est definitio Juris con­summati & perfecte quaesiti: Jus igitur, Titio ita quaesitum & in eo quasi fixum, quomodo avelli & ei eripi queat haud video: alia quidem est ra­tio defuncti (ut loquuntur) partis ceu trientis, ejus semis ad Titium perti­bat ut unum ex proximis cognatis & executoribus; is a morte Sempronii statim Titio delatus est: haud cessit tamen ex eo tempore sed tunc de­mum cum Titius adiit, & Patri Executor datus est: Jura enim haeredi­taria, vel quasi, quae pertinent ad aliquem ut haeredem & successorem in alterius Jus universum, non cedunt nec quaeruntur nisi haereditate adita; in mobilibus autem Executoris datio & confirmatio est instar aditionis: utcunque enim suppositum sit Titium Executorem datum a judice, de­functi triens cessit Executoribus & istius semis Titio, Jus adeo firmum & ad haeredes transiturum, si Titius Caio praemortuus fuisset, morte Caii [Page 115] intercidere & irritum fieri, a Jure & Ratione videtur alienum. Ad haec mortuo Patre-familias, cum de patrimonio quaeritur, an integrum & ex asse ad eum pertinuerit coelibem forte & orbum, an vero commune fuerit uxori & liberis; Et quota uxoris & liberorum pars sit, utrum se­mis an triens; Et liberorum Legitima an ex asse unius sit; An si plures sint liberi in quot uncias & partes dividenda sit: Tempus mortis Patris-familias inspicit Lex, de futuro haud solicita, nec quae tunc sunt quotae augeri aut minui possunt; quamvis Patrimonium rerum quae in eo sunt interitu & fructuum & foetuum accessione augeri potest & minui. Po­sito igitur Patrem-Familias decessisse testatum, relictis viduâ & liberis; viduam autem & liberos haud diu superstites fuisse morbo aut alio casu ex­tinctos; tamen Executor Patris-familias haud assem sed trientem tan­tum consequitur; licet tempore aditionis ceu confirmationis, nec liberi nec vidua extiterint; extiterant enim tempore obitus Testatoris & tunc partes fecerant; eae autem semel quaesitae eorum morte haud evanes­cunt, sed ad cognatos proximos & Executores transeunt. Posito etiam Patrem-familias mortuum, superstite uxore & unico tantum filio praeter haeredem, nec alios reliquisse liberos, filium autem secundo genitum im­puberem postea obiisse; fratre superstite; eo casu ex patris mobilibus hae­res trientem consequitur sed ut Executor fratris & ejus Legitimam; nec vidua aut Patris Executor audiendi si pro trientibus semisses petant, causa­ti rem ad alium casum devenisse, nec haeredem ex mobilibus aliquam partem carpere posse. Si Objiciatur in isto casu haeredem ex mobilibus nullam partem nancisci immediate & Jure suo, sed mediate & morte fra­tris, & ut ejus Executorem; In specie autem facti de qua agitur Titium tum haeredem fuisse tum unum ex liberis, & suo Jure haereditatem patris adiisse, nec minus ut unum ex liberis, Legitimae liberorum semissem adeptum; Jura ista [...] nec penes unum consistere aut retineri posse. Istud facile diluitur; tempus enim mortis Sempronii Patris-famili­as intuendum; eo autem tempore Titius erat unus ex liberis, nec haeres erat aut esse poterat, Caio primogenito superstite; ei haereditas morte patris delata, ad Titium haud immediate sed ex fratris morte pervenit; Titio quasi per surrogationem & [...] in locum primogeniti sub­eunte: Cum igitur Titius, eo quo Pater obiit momento, inter liberos fu­erit, & ipso Jure Legitimam nactus est, nec injuria retinet quod Jure ha­buit: Si Caius patris adiisset haereditatem ei Titius haeres foret, nec minus sic patris haereditate potitus legitimam retineret: Quod autem Caius haud adierit, Titio nec imputandum nec officit: Patrimoniorum siquidem conditio, & Jura viduae & liberorum, legibus constituuntur; nec aequum est ea ex arbitrio haeredis pendere aut ambulare. Porro hae­reditatis delatio & Facultas adeundi, aliis casibus nedum hoc, haud pa­rum operatur; haerede enim perduelli & Majestatis reo, haereditas etiam non adita amittitur & Fisco quaeritur.’

Legitimation per subsequens Matrimonium.

A Person after his first Marriage, of which he had Children, having Married again, and having diverse Children by the Woman Mar­ried to him in that second Marriage, elder nor the first Children, which are thereby legitimate: Quaeritur, Whether the Eldest Son with the se­cond [Page 116] Wife, will be preferred to the Son of the first Marriage, as to the Right of Succession? Ratio Dubitandi, The first Marriage was Contract­ed Spe, and in contemplation that the Children of that Marriage would succeed, and the Eldest Son by his Birth had Jus primogeniturae, as the first Lawful Son, which could not thereafter be taken from him: & e con­tra, the Son of the second Marrriage, the time of the Fathers Death, which is to be considered as to the question of the Succession, is his Eldest Law­ful Son. Cogitandum.

If a Person may Marry on Death-bed, in order to the Legitimation of Natural Children, in prejudice of his Agnats, who would otherwayes succeed?

Marriage and Legitimation.

THere being a Declarator intented, to hear and see it found that the Children were Lawful; in respect there was a promise and Copula, Quaeritur, If the pursuit, being after the Fathers Decease, in order to the Succession to the Good-sire, the promise may be proven prout de Jure, as it might have been before? My Lord Neutoun told me, that after the Fa­thers decease it is found not probable by Witnesses. Laird of Lauder.

Lenteratio.

LEuteratio. vide Appellatio in Litera A.

Libellarius Contractus.

LIbellus, sive Libellaria, est contractus, quo interveniente scripturâ res immo­bilis venditur, certo pretio, certa insuper pensione in singulos annos; ea lege plerumque addita ut stato & condicto tempore renovetur; denuo numerato pretio certo vel arbitrario. Hering de molendin. q. 29. n. 4.

Est Italis usurpatus, & dicitur a scriptura & Libello, seu brevi charta. Ibidem. n. 6.

Liberi.

INdefinito Liberorum nomine, censetur actum de natis tempore Contractus, non de nascituris. Hering de molendin. quaest. 20. n. 19.

Liferenter.

IF a Liferenter of Lands Stock and Teind having Set the Lands to Ten­nants for a Duty for the Stock and drawing the Teind, and having deceased before Martinmass after drawing the Teind: Quaeritur, will she be Lyable to the Heir for the half of the Teind? Ratio Dubitandi. For the Heir; That she dying before Martinmass, he ought to have the half of that Years Duty: And for the Liferenter, that she had Right to the Teind after it was separate and collected, so that she might have dis­posed of it; and having gotten it, it cannot be taken from her; and that [Page 117] the Legal terms are to be considered in the case of Debt, when dies cedit; but in this case nihil debetur, but she has Right to the Fruites Teinds, and Quota of them in the same manner as the Tennant, and as if she had la­boured. Vide Third and Teind. Letter T. Vide Titular. litera T. q. 2. vide Milns. Litera M.

Where Grass Roums are set for payment of a Silver Duty (by the Ten­nent entering at Whitsunday) the half at Martinmass, and the other half at Whitesunday thereafter; Quaeritur, If the Liferenter decease after Martin­mass, whether the Martinmass Duty will belong to her Executor? Ratio Dubitandi, That the Duty payable by the Tennant, entering as said is, and going away at the next Whitesunday is payable in respect of the Cropt, and proventus of the next Year, either of Corns or foetura animalium; and it is without question that a Tennant paying a Silver Duty for a Corn-Roum, albeit he pay at Martinmass after his entry, yet it is payed for the next years Cropt; so that the Liferenter can pretend to no part thereof, deceasing the time foresaid: and on the other part, it appears that there may be a difference as to Grass Roums, seing the half of the Duty seems to be payed for the profite of the Grass, from Whitesunday to Martinmass, which falls within the Liferenters Right.

Quaeritur, Quid Juris, As to Salt-pans and Milns if the Liferenter have the same in her own hand, whether her Right is presently determined by her Death?

The same being set to Tennants from Candlesmass to Candlesmass: If the Liferenter deceased after Lambmass and Martinmass, will her Execu­tors have any part of the Duty after Lambmass?

When Rentals are set in these terms, That beside the Rental Duty there should be every five Years a considerable Sum payed, as in Contractu Libellario; Quaeritur, If the Liferenter will have Right to that Sum, if it fall to be payed during the Liferent?

When the whole Estate of a Nobleman is Disponed reserving his Life­rent, or of a Baron; will the Liferenter have Vote in Parliament, and Voice in the Election of Commissioners for Shires?

A Lady being Infeft upon her Contract of Marriage in Lands for her Liferent; Quaeritur, If Tacks set thereafter by her Husband will bind her? Vide Terce quaest: ultima.

Executors of a Liferenter.

IF a Woman deceaseth after Whitesunday before her Husband, will her Executors have Right to a part of the years Farms?

Liferents.

DIes as to Liferents (when the question is betwixt the Executor of the Fiar and Liferenter) cedit at Whitesunday and Martinmass as the Legal Terms.

Quaeritur, If a Bond be, to a Man and his Wife the longest liver, payable at Lambmass and Candlemass; and the Husband deceasing after Candlemass will the Husbands Relict have Right to a half year at White­sunday?

[Page 118]If a Father be Infeft in Liferent in Lands, and be content to renounce his Liferent in favours of his Son? Quaeritur, If it be habilis modus to extin­guish his Liferent? Ratio Dubitandi, He is the Superiors Vassal during his Life, and cannot cease to be Vassal without the Superiors consent, at least sine refutatione.

When a Vassal is Year and Day at the Horn, if he has granted a Right to be holden of himself, what will be the Import of his Liferent?

If a Liferenter do Dispone his Liferent of Lands; or if the same be Comprysed from him, and thereafter he be Year and Day at the Horn: Quaeritur, If the Superior will have Right to the Liferent, as if the said Right had not been granted? Answer. It is thought, he can have no other Right, than such as the Liferenter had, and affected with the said Right.

If the Liferenter be Forefaulted, will not the King have the Right of the said Liferent without the burden of the said Rights? And if it be so, Quae Ratio Discriminis? Answer, The King will have Right to the said Liferent entire; and the reason of the Disparity is, that Treason is Cri­men feudale, and when the Vassal Fiar or Liferenter doth Forefault, the Right cometh to the King Pure, and without any Burden but such as he has consented to; Whereas Horning is not Delictum feudale but commune: and the Liferent doth not belong to the Superior Jure feudali, but Statuto, so that he ought not to be in better case than the Rebel.

Quando Dies cedit as to Liferenters.

WHen Rent of Lands is Victual, the Heretor dying before White­sunday the Liferenter has Right to the whole Year; if after White­sunday but before Martinmass, The Relict has Right to the half; but if after Martinmass to no part, because Whitesunday and Martinmass are Ter­mini Legales as to the question, Quando dies cedit. Quaeritur, therefore, whether when Rent is all in Highland Roums & agris pascuis, the custom being in some places that the Tennants entering at Whitesunday, payes the half of the Rent at Martinmass next; and the other half at Whitesunday thereafter, Quid Juris as to the Relict, the Husband dying after White­sunday or after Martinmass?

The same Question is, If, in the Lowlands in Corn-Roums, the Ten­nant and Master agree, that the Duty should be payed in Money by the Tennant entering at Whitesunday, the half at Martinmass, and the other half at Whitesunday?

Vasallus Ligius.

NEmo potest esse simul duorum Vasallus Ligius. Thes. Bes. litera L. p. 597. ad finem.

Limitation of Fees.

LAnds being Disponed to a person, and the Heirs Male descending of him; which Failȝieing to the granter and his Heirs, Quaeritur, If his foresaids faill; what way will the Granter being Superior and his Heirs [Page 119] attain to the Right, whether as Heir of Provision to the Vassal? or per vi. am Consolidationis, and by a Declarator that he has Right by the return foresaid; and that the Property is consolidate with the Superiority?

Whether he will be Lyable to the Vassals Debts? Ratio Dubitandi, The Vassal was Fiar and might Contract Debt, and whoever succeedeth to him ought to be Lyable thereto.

If the Right be granted to a Person, and the Heirs of his Body, with­out any further Provision or mention of return, whether will the King have Right as ultimus haeres, or the Superior? Answer. The Fee not be­ing simple but limited; It is thought, that the Superior should have Right seing the Fee is limited. And the King cannot succeed but by way of Re­presentation and as haeres ultimus, and there can be no Transmission beyond the Limitation. But if the Lands be given to a Man and his Heirs what­somever, the Fee is simple; and the Granter having simply and absolutely given away the same, he can pretend no Right to the same; and the King cometh under the generality of Heirs whatsomever, being ultimus haeres.

Litiscontestation.

IF Removings, Spuilȝies, and Ejections, which are interdicta possessoria Litiscontestatione perpetuentur for fourty years, or only three?

The same Question may be for Servants Fees, House-Mails, and such other Actions which prescribe in three years.

Quo casu Possessor in mala fide constituitur per Litiscontestationem & quando non?

LItiscontestatio possessorem malae fidei constituit, adeo ut ab eo Tempore; ad restitutionem fructuum teneatur: hoc tamen verum est in iis, qui per Li­tiscontestationem vere in mala fide constituuntur, veluti si res feudalis Emphyteu­tica petatur, aut vindicetur, ob feloniam commissam: aut quia tempus locationis transactum est veraque sit causa vindicationis, quam etiam possessor nec minus obstinate contendit.

Secus est, si ego rem emo ab eo cujus esse putabam, tu vero dicis eam ad te per­tinere, & nihil adducis praeter petitionem & nunciationem, tunc quia bonam fidem habeo, Litiscontestatio me non vera sed ficta efficit malae fidei possessorem; & a fructibus merito excusor, donec sententia feratur. Thes. Besold. in litera K. 48. verb. Kriegsbevvestigung. Sect. pen. p. 478.

Locus Poenitentiae.

AFter Articles of agreement are subscribed, of which one is, that they shall be extended in a Contract: Quaeritur, If there be Locus poeni­tentiae? Ratio Dubitandi, Because antequam totum negotium in mundum sit redactum licet poenitere L. 17. Cod. de fide Instrumentorum.

An agreement being to be perfected in Writ, whereby one of the Par­ties was to be obliged to pay a Sum of Money; there was a Letter Written thereafter by that person, desireing that the Write may be drawn, and [Page 120] bearing that he should perform conform to the said agreement, Quaeritur; If he be bound by the said Letter, so that there is no Locus poenitentiae? Answer. It is thought, that the bargain being to be perfected in Writ, and until then there being locus poenitentiae, The Letter promising performance doth imply a condition. Viz. If the Write be perfected and subscribed: seing upon the drawing of Writes there may arise Questions which may hinder the perfecting of the same, & multa cadunt inrer calicem &c.

M.

Mare.

MAre dicitur esse de districtu illius Civitatis. seu loci, qui confinit cum Ma­ri: & habentes Jurisdictonem in territorio cohaerenti Mari, dicuntur habere Jurisdictionem in Mari intra centum milliaria. Jus Fluviat. p. 152. & 496. n. 23.

Marriage.

IF the Superior Infeft the Appearand Heir being unmarried, doth he pass from the Marriage?

If Marriage be due, if the Appearand Heir be either senex or valetu­dinary? And either unfit or unwilling to Marry?

It seemeth Celibate is not Delictum, so that the Casuality thereby should arise to the Superior; but only the Marrying without the Superiors con­sent inferreth contempt, and consequently Delictum & poenam?

If the Appearand Heir be Married in his Fathers time and have Chil­dren, and thereafter Marry after his Fathers decease, will a Marriage fall to the Superior?

If the Marriage of the Appearand Heir of Ward-Lands should be mo­dified, with respect to the value of the Ward Lands, without consideration of his Debts? It appears that the Superior should not be in worse case by the Deed of his Vassal: and yet he may be in better, for if the Heir have beside a personal or other Estate, the Marriage will be modified to be such, as the Tocher to a Person of that Estate may be thought in probability to amount to.

If a Person holding of the King, and other Superiors Respective; of the King blensh, but of them Ward; may resign in the Kings hands to be holden Ward in aemulationem, and of purpose to prejudge the other Supe­riors? Saltcoats.

If Parties be Married publickly. Quaeritur, If it be not our that they are impotent, as if it may be proven that before the Marriage the Man was Castratus; is it competent to the Heir or any other person concerned in the point of Interest (but the party prejudged) to question or dissolve the Marriage as null or dirimendum, upon that or any other Ground?

If a Marriage be unlawful; and either of the Parties be in bona fide, [Page 121] which doth legitimate the Children. Quaeritur, If these Children will succeed with other Children of lawful Marriages, at least to their Pa­rents?

If they will succeed to their other Kinsmen? or if the Legitimation will only import that they are not Spurij, and that they have Testamenti facti­onem?

If a marriage after Inhibition, may be reduced upon that ground?

What are the Legitima Remedia to compell parties to consummate mar­riage upon Contracts? Whether they may not only be decerned by the Commissars, but by the Church, under the pain of Ecclesiastick censure?

Where some Lands hold of the King Taxt-ward, and others hold of him Simple ward, Quaeritur, will he get both the simple Marriage and the taxt? Sir Iohn Cuninghame saith, it was decided in the case of Innernytie, for both.

Marriage being dissolved within year and Day, whether the Gifts, and Jocalia given hinc inde may be repeated? Item, whether the gifts given by friends will fall under communion? So that the Maxim, that Marriage being dissolved within year and day is in the same condition as to all in­tents as if it had not been, Is only to be understood of Dos & Donatio propter nuptias.

If an old Woman super annos, and past the age of Marriage being about Threescore years, shall succeed in the Right of ward-Lands, whether Mar­riage will be due? Iohn Bonars Heir

Quid Juris if a widow either man or woman, inter annos nubiles shall succeed to Ward-lands? Barclay of Pearstoun.

If a Person have only two acres, or a mean interest in Ward-lands, but a very great interest otherwise, Whether will his Marriage be considered with respect to his whole Estate?

Seing the Marriage of appeirand Heirs belongs to the eldest Superiour, Quaeritur, who shall be thought the eldest Superiour, whether the eldest as to the Lands, or as to the Vassal; and if it be to be considered, which of the Lands, was first given in Tennandry?

Quid Juris when a Marriage is fallen, but not declared nor gifted?

A Marriage being contracted betwixt a woman Pubes, and one that is impubes, Quaeritur, If it be a Marriage, at least as to her, so that she can­not marry with another in the interim that he is not pubes? Ratio Dubitandi. That a Contract being mutual cannot Claudicate.

A Father, by his daughters Contract of Marriage, having disponed to her and the second Son of the Marriage, and the other Heirs therein menti­oned his Estate, under Reversion and certain other Conditions; and in spe­cial if he should ordain a certain Sum should be payed by these who should succeed to the Estate, to his Daughter and her forsaids: and the said con­tract bearing also a Tocher of five Thousand pounds to be payed presently to the Husband: Quaeritur, If the Marriage be dissolved within year and day without Children, whether the Contract will be ineffectual as to all intents, as being causa data & non secuta cum effectu? Or whether it be as to the Right of the person of the Daughter, either as to the Estate or as to the said Sum ipso facto void, at least reduceable? And whether she may repeat the Tocher from the Husbands Heirs? Lady Yesters contract of Marriage, being dissolved within year and day.

[Page 122]A person being Heir to his Father in a great Estate holden blensh; And having a small piece of Land holding ward, which he may succeed to as Heir to his Father. Quaeritur, If notwithstanding he is Heir general and Heir in special in the Lands holden blensh, he needs not Enter to the saids ward Lands, in order to be free of a Marriage, which would be conside­red with respect to the whole Estate? Ratio Dubitandi. That being Heir as said is otherwise, he cannot refuse to be Heir of the said Lands. Answer. It is thought, that if he was charged to enter Heir in special at the instance of a creditor in special, he could not renounce: But the superior cannot urge him to Enter, but will have only the benefite of a Nonentry: Seing the said other Lands, and any interest he had as general Heir are distincta patri­monia from ward Lands, and he may owne the one without the other.

If the superior may affect and evict the said ward Lands by adjudication, for the Marriage of the appearand Heir, considered with respect to his other Estate, in prejudice not only of the appearand Heir, but of any who should thereafter be appearand Heirs? Ratio Dubitandi, That the Marriage being but a Casuality may exceed more than the double of the value of the Lands, which is absurd. Cogitandum.

If the appearand Heir will notwithstanding be lyable to the Marriage, albeit he doth not enter nor renounce to be Heir, as to these Lands? Ratio Dubitandi. That Refutatio of vassals is not admitted, unless they satisfy the casualities already fallen. Answer. It is thought, he may renounce and be free of the casualities personally; without prejudice to the superior to affect the Ground: and the case is different from that of vassals infeft, Seing they having accepted the Right they cannot offer to renounce, unless they pay what was formerly due to the superior, being fructus Dominij; whereunto not only the Ground but they are lyable personally, by reason of their Right and possession, and it cannot be said that the appearand Heir, has either. Mortounhall.

There being diverse Adjudications of Land holding ward within year and day, but Infeftment only upon one; and that adjudication whereupon Infeftment is, being before the debitors decease, and therefore stopping the Ward; and the rest after but within year and day of the first Infeftment, Quaeritur, If the first be satisfied by intromission, may the superior claim the Ward of the appearand Heir of the Debitor being Minor, in respect the act of Parliament Debitor and Creditor doth relate only to the interest and and competition of creditors, and doth not prejudge superiors of their Right and casualities; and the adjudger Infeft is only vassal; and the other ad­judgers are not vassals; and by them the superior can have no casuality either of Liferent, Ward, or Marriage? Cogitandum. L. Bancreiff.

When diverse Lands are holden of the King, some in simple Ward and others Taxt as to the Ward and Marriage, Quaeritur, when the Marriage falls, whether the King will have both the simple Marriage and the taxt Marriage? Answer. That since at one time there can be but one Marriage, there can be but one Casuality for the same: and as the King would have but one Marriage, albeit there be diverse Lands holden ward of him simple-Ward; So in the case foresaid, where there are some taxt, he cannot have two Marriages; and the taxt being only aestimatio, where there can be no Marriage there can be no Taxt due: The same question may be of Lands holden simple and Taxt-Ward of a Subject.

[Page 123]A person being charged with Precepts out of the Chancery to Enter a person presented upon forefaulture, and in respect of his Contumacy the person presented being Infeft upon a Precept out of the Chancery and there­after deceasing. Quaeritur, the Lands holding Ward, whether the Marri­age of the appearand Heir will belong to the King or to the Superior? Ra­tio Dubitandi. That the Superior not having owned the defunct to be his vassal, he cannot claim the Marriage of his Heir: and on the other Part The King is not Superior, and grants only Infeftment in Subsidium: and doth what the Superior without reason refused to do: and there is a great difference betwixt the case foresaid, and that, when the Superior not being Infeft himself is therefore charged to Enter, with certification to Lose the Superiority during his Life; Because in the first case, there is no contempt of the Superior, but a wrong done to the person who would enter being a stranger to the Superior not being formerly his vassal: and in the other case there is both a wrong to his own vassal, and a contempt of his own Su­perior that he is in non-entry; and the more aggravated, that being charg­ed to enter he continues in non-entry; and the act of Parliament therefore provides that he should Lose the Superiority.

It is informed by Iames Hay, That the Lords have lately found, That when Lands are holden some simple-Ward and some taxt, both the single and taxt Marriage will be due: The President being of another opinion.

If a Superior Infeft his Vassal being Minor, before the Marriage fall by his attaining to the age of fourteen years, may he claim the Marriage after it falleth?

If he Infeft him after the Marriage has fallen, whether doth he pass from the Marriage?

Marriage Clandestine.

BY the act of Parliament anent unlawful Ordinations, these who are so Mar­ried amitting jus mariti & relictae, Quaeritur, If the Husband Loseth his Curiality or the woman her Terce? Or only Jus mariti as to the Com­munion of moveables; Acts Specially penal being stricti juris, and there being, beside, other pains?

If Clandestinae Nuptiae without consent of Parents, though they bind the parties so that they cannot Marry with any other, yet will be null as to Parents and friends, that the Children cannot succeed to them against their will?

Materna Maternis.

IF in no case that Maxime Materna Maternis has place with us? And in special (in that viz.) if a Person succeed to his Mother and decease without Heirs upon the Fathers side, will the Fisk exclude the Mothers friends, the Estate being profectitious and descended from her?

In Allodialibus there is no succession of the Mother or her friends active; but in feudis foemineis, if a Son should succeed to his Mother, and should thereafter Die; Quaeritur, whether his Heirs upon the Fathers side would [Page 124] succeed to such Lands, or his Mothers Heirs? Ratio Dubitandi That the said Lands are given ab initio, primo investito and his Heirs, which must be understood haeredes Sanguinis: and the son having succeeded to his Mo­ther, his Heirs upon the Fathers side cannot be thought to be Heirs either to her or her predecessors: and therefore in that case it is to be thought, that the Rule should have place Materna maternis: and there is the like reason in Patents of Honour being quasi feuda; and being granted by the King to the receiver of the Patent and his Heirs.

A Person, as said is, being infeft in Lands as Heir to his Mother, and die­ing without issue: whether will his nearest Kinsman upon the Fathers side or Mothers side succeed to him in the said Lands? Ratio Dubitandi, That by our custom the Fathers friends are alwayes preferable; and that Rule Paterna Paternis & Materna Maternis has no place: and yet it is thought that in mobilibus, when a person has Right to the same as Executor to his Mother they go to the nearest of Kin upon the Fathers side; Because there is no affectio as to mobilia, and there is no Limitation or Destination of Heirs as to these; But as to Lands, when the Right is taken to a man and his Heirs, and a woman succeeds to the said Lands, and thereafter her son as Heir to her, if the son die without issue, his Mothers Heirs ought to succeed: Seing by the Infeftment no person can succeed but he that is Heir of blood to the person first infeft, either immediately or mediately.

Quid Juris, as to Bands for Sums of money? Answer. It appears, that there is eadem Ratio, Seing there is in bands Limitatio haeredum.

Matrimonium

‘SOla nuptialis benedictio & solennis & publicus in Ecclesia benedicendi ritus, vera est Matrimonii apud Christianos executio; ex quo tem­pore jura Matrimonii vigorem suum obtinent, Licet concubitus non fuerit secutus. Christenius de jure Matrimon. Disser. 1. quaest. 1.’

‘Si post sponsalia pura, concubitus accesserit, & sponsa conceperit, spon­sus vero ante confirmationem diem obierit; de jure, partus non est Le­gitimus, quia non est ex justis nuptiis. Idem-eadem disser. Quaest. 2.’

‘Isto casu licet interdum Sponsalia habeantur pro Matrimonio, illud locum habet solummodo, quoad vinculum mutuae promissionis, ne illud temere solvatur, non quoad reliquos Matrimonii effectus. Idem. eadem. diss.

‘Jure Civili, Divino, & Canonico, non aliter Legitimum est Matrimo­nium quam si Parentes consentiant; nec minus Matris quam Patris con­sensus requiritur, praesertim mortuo Patre.’

‘Non interest, utrum consensus sit expressus an tacitus; paria enim sunt consentire & non contradicere. Idem de sponsalibus. Diss. 1. quaest. 3. p. 17. & 18.’

‘Parentibus non permittitur Matrimonium impedire, si id fiat injuria; & cum causa sit cognoscenda, Statutis quarundam Civitatum, cautum est parentes isto casu ad Judices Ecclesiasticos seu Commissarios causarum Ecclesiasticarum esse citandos; & si Liberi sint minores viginti quinque annis, non tenentur parentes rationes sui Dissensus proferre; sin Liberi an­num vigesimum quintum expleverint, Parentum oppositio non aliter lo­cum habet, quam si justas Dissensus causas proferant. Ibid. P. 19.’

[Page 125]"Si Titiae ea conditione Legetur, si arbitratu Seij nupserit, habetur pro non adjecta, & debetur Legatum licet conditioni non pareatur. Christen: de spons. quaest. 17.

‘Si ad sponsalia clandestina, quae consensu Parentum carent, concubi­tus accesserit, non confirmatur Matrimonium, si parentibus justae causae sint dissensus: haec sententia curijs Holland: placuit. idem quaest. 20.’

Mensis.

‘SI Mensis simpliciter proferatur, intelligitur de mense solari & Duode­cima parte anni, vel triginta Diebus. Thes. Bes. in Litera M. 68. verbo Monat. p. 664.’

Mensura Taxative & Demonstrative.

‘INterest utrum Mensura in venditionibus Taxative, an vero Demon­strative adjiciatur: illud fit cum ab ipsa mensura contractus initi­um sumit, hoc cum a corpore. Jus fluviat, P. 810. n. 58.’

Militia.

THE Gentlemen that went out in a Troup in the late Expedition, having been at Charges for a Banner, Trumpet, and Coat, &c. Quaeritur, If the said Charges may be laid upon the whole Shire? An­swer Negative, Seing the Militia-Horse did not go out; and it was mu­nus Personale upon the Heretors within age to go out.

Miln.

A Defunct being in Possession of a Miln being a Horse-miln; whether will the said horse and other instrumenta mobilia that are in the Miln, belong to the Heir?

Quid Juris as to Milns when they are either sett to Tennants or possessed by Liferenters quoad the duties of the year wherein the Liferenter dyes? vide Liferenter Litera L. and the like cases of Third and Teynà and Titular. Li­tera T.

Ministers Stipends in a Reddendo.

IN Infeftments of Erection, the Reddendo is ordinarly a blensh Dutie, and beside to Pay to the Minister the stipend therein mentioned Quaeritur, whether the stipend be Debitum fundi? Ratio Dubitandi, That what is due upon the Reddendo not relating to Lands, but to Teinds which are not fundus & subjectum permanens, But a Benefit ariseing out of the Lands; such a Reddendo non afficit fundum; no more than Teinds and a valued dutie.

Minor.

WIll the Heir of a Minor be restored upon that ground, That the Lands being Entailed he resigned in favours of the Heirs what­somever? There being no Lesion to the Minor.

Minor non tenetur Placitare.

MInor non tenetur placitare holds not, ubi agitur de Dolo, culpa vel obliga­tione Defuncti, as in Recognitions, Forefaultures, &c. Cranburn contra Lady Carnegy. Humby contra his Neice.

Reduction upon minority.

LAnds being disponed to a Minor, and after his prefect age the Bargain being questioned as being to his prejudice, in so farr as the same was for Eighteen years purchass and a half, & the same might have been bought at Seventeen according to the rate of the times. Quaeritur, If such Lesion not being Enorm (and modica) be relevant? Ratio Dubitandi, The de­fender contracted bona fide with a Tutor the pupills Father, and Licet Con­trahentibus se invicem decipere, and non constat notourly, That that was the rate; and some of the witnesses declare the contrare; and the de­fender will get a Buyer at the same rate. Tweeddale contra Drumelzior. vide Annualrent for Damnage, Litera A.

Decreet against Minors.

IF a Decreet against Minores indefensos, no Curators being called in spe­cial but in general at the mercat Cross if they have any for their interest, be null? Ratio Dubitandi, Gesta cum adultis non habentibus Curatores are not void: and on the other part, by the common Law Datur Curator ad Litem, & Minor non habet personam standi in Judicio; & lata Contra Minores indefensos sententia, non Tenet. L. 45. § 2. ff. de re judicata. vide Perez. Institut. Lib. 1. de Curatoribus. § Danturne invitis.

Mobilia.

IF Mobilia has Situm, when they are here animo & destinatione Domini; so that when they belong v. g. to Englishmen they are to be thought Res Scoticae and to be affected with the Laws of Scotland; and he cannot dispose of them by a nuncupative Will. And e Contra, If he should change their situm, and transport them to stay in England?

Mobilium vilior possessio.

MObilium vilior & abjectior est possessio & facilius acquiritur & amittitur, quam immobilium; in ea non cadit tanta affectio: non est Locus in ijs re­dhibitioni Gentilitiae sive juri [...]. Hering. de molend. quaest 8. n. 58. & sequent.

Mobilia sequuntur conditionem personae sive Domini, adeo ut ejus ossibus adaere­ant active & passive: Immobilia autem co-haerent Territorio.

Modus habilis.

IF a person haveing Right to Lands (wherein another is infeft and in Pos­session, so that he has the benefit of a possessory Judgment) should dispone his Right, which is preferable in favours of the said party who is infeft and in Possession as said is; and thereafter another person upon a posterior dispo­sition should compleat his Right by Infeftment: whether or not will the said prior Right at least Extend to and import a discharge of the action of redu­ction, and militate against the singular successor?

If a Reduction being intented, the pursuer judicially Declare that he passes Simpliciter from the said action, will that barr a singular successor; Seing the said Declaration is upon record, whereas in the case above mentio­ned the disposition is a Latent deed, which cannot prejudge a singular suc­cessor?

If at least if it were Registrate in the register of seasins, it would prejudge; being none of the Writs appointed to be registrat therein?

Molendinum.

NOn licet molendinum exstruere in flumine publico, sine Principis consensu. Frits: Jus fluviatile p. 10. n. 128.

Molendina aquatica.

MOlendina igitur aquatica sunt de Regalibus. Idem p. 13. n. 175.

Molendina Bannaria.

MOlendina bannaria sunt, ad quae integrae Communitates vel Pagi praecise ire coguntur. Jus Fluviat. 1225 versus finem.

Quae appellatio inde videtur sumere originem, quia Bannire apud veteres Germanos idem significat quod Sancire, Jubere, Edicere. Hering. de Molend. q. 11. n. 2, & 3.

Molendina navalia Immobilibus accensentur.

‘MOlendina navalia pro immobilibus habenda sunt. Hering de Molen­dinis q. 8. n. 26. quia aedificans ea intentione & destinatione ea extruit, ut semper & perpetuo non pro motu sed pro molitura in ipso flu­mine manerent; nec [...] & molendinum aquaticum perpetuae morae causa ad ripam exaedificatum, plus praestare potest quam Molendi­num navale; nec in illo quidquam nominari potest quod huic non insit, rotae molares & caetera omnia. idem q. 8. 26. & sequen. Ea destinatio & attributio ad molendum, molendinum immobile reddit.’

Molendina [...]

‘MOlendina [...] alata, seu vento agitata, immobilibus accen­sentur: Idem eadem. quaest. n. 40.’

Districtus Molendini.

‘VEnditâ moletrinâ, licet non fiat mentio districtus, id est, jus cogen­di subditos molitoris ad molendum, venit tamen; quia simplex rei alienatio pertinentias rei continet. Jus Fluviat. p. 1229. n. 31.’

Quomodo qui sunt in districtu Molendini cogi queant?

‘ETiamsi is qui emit Molendinum, non posset Jurisdictionaliter coge­re Rusticos inhabitantes in districtu Molendini; potest tamen eos cogere per actionem, per manus injectionem in frumenta & fruges Mo­lendas. Hering. de Molendin. q. 11. n. 145.’

An qui sunt in Districtu alibi molere possint?

‘SUbditi in aliis Molendinis molere possunt si Dominus Molendini non procuret eorum grana in mola sua bannaria contundi intra spa­tium viginti quatuor horarum. Idem quaest. 11. 139. & alii ibi ab eo laudati.

An Extrui possit Molendinum quod noceat vicino?

‘SUperioris Molendini Dominus prohibere non potest, ne in inferiori loco alius Molendinum exstruat, tametsi ex eo futurum sit ut superio­ris reditus diminuatur; quia ex eo quod quis suo Jure facit, teneri non potest, licet alteri per consequentiam noceatur: distinguendum est, qua ratione superiori vicino noceatur, nam si ob id solum quod minus fre­quens sit Superioris Molendini commercium prohibendus non est, cum suam posset quisque conditionem Meliorem facere, etiam cum al­terius detrimento, dummodo citra injuriam: Si vero ob id quod cur­sus aquae impediatur, & ex restagnatione fiat ut superius Molendinum perinde exerceri nequeat, prohiberi potest: nam sic debet quis rem suam meliorem facere, ne vicini Deteriorem reddat. Heringius, de Molendinis. q. 14. n. 30.’

An Molendinum possit Extrui sine licentia Principis?

‘IN flumine publico navigabili aut tale faciente, non nisi ex principis licentia: sed in alio non navigabili, attamen publico, sola Gentium authoritate Molendinum extrui potest. Idem quaest. 15. n. 39.’

Restagnatio Molendini.

‘SI duo in eodem flumine Molendina possederint, quoad Restagnatio­nem pacta & consuetudo primum servantur; his deficientibus, qui prior aedificavit primas habet partes. Idem quaest. 20. n. 10.’

Ʋsus Molendinorum Juri Civili ignotus.

‘QUae de Molendinis nunc obtinent & in usu sunt, Juri civili ignota sunt maxima ex parte; nam post Imperii translationem ex Oriente in Occidentem tempore Caroli Magni, etiam Juris mutatio succes­sit; & usus Molendinorum alio loco esse coepit quam apud Romanos: adeo ut Molendina exstruendi facultas hodie non amplius sit communis, sed privata ut plurimum; siquidem Principibus, Comitibus, & Baronibus ab Imperatore; a Principibus rursus viris nobilibus & aliis cum Territo­rio & feudis Jure Clientelae tribuitur; ita ut jus Molendinorum pro bene­ficio Regali aut principali aestimetur. Heringius de Molendinis. Quaest. 7. n. 4. & sequent. p. 124.’

Ʋbi convenit, ut pro Familia molatur, quid Juris si aucta sit?

‘SI in concessione feudi aut Emphyteuseos aut simplicis Conductionis, pactum adjiciatur quod debeat accipiens molere frumentum pro tra­dente, ipsiusque tota Familia; eaque si aucta fuerit pro omnibus molere debet gratis, aut eodem quod convenerat pretio: potest enim evenire ut Familia minuatur & sic molitor est in lucro: Cum igitur penes eum eo casu foret Lucrum, debet damnum sentire: Idem obtinet in Furno, & concessione Lignorum pro familia. Hering. de molen. quaest. 20. n. 15. & sequen.

If a Mother and her Friends may succeed?

IF in no case Cognati on the Mothers side can succeed? Answer. It is thought that they ought to succeed; seing the Son succeedeth to his Mother and her Friends; and Jus successionis should be reciprocal, being founded upon Proximity of Blood, which is the same to the Mother and to the Son: But in this our Custome is lame, and opus est vel constitutione vel Decisione.

Mutuum.

MƲtuum & Commodatum and such other Contracts which are said Re­contrahi, and not nudo consensu; Quaeritur, If they may not be said to be Contracted, when a Write is Subscribed thereupon, obligeing persons to lend Money or Commodare? Answer. Such Contracts cannot be said to be Mutuum or Commodatum nisi res intervenerit: And yet da­tur ex iis actio praescriptis verbis, or in factum.

N.

Non-entry.

IF the Superior of Lands holden feu, will have, during Non-entry, both the Feu-duty as his own, and the Non-entry Duty as Casuality and Fruit of his Superiority?

The Superior being in Non-entry. Quaeritur. Though the Non-entry were declared, whether the Liferent Escheat of the Subvassal would be­long to the immediate Superior? Ratio Dubitandi, It is not a feudale Delictum and commissum; but ex lege, which is in favours of the imme­diate Superior.

If the Superior suffer the Appearand Heir to be in Non-entry and to possess without a Process for Nonentry; If he may have a real Action of poinding the Ground against a singular successor?

If the full Duties will be due to the Superior upon account of Non-en­try following the Ward, albeit the Superior was not in possession during the Ward?

Quaeritur, When Lands are Disponed by a Baron to be holden of him­self; If before Declarator of Non-entry the full Duties be due, when the Lands are Disponed without any mention of Retour or Extent? Answer. If the Lands be Disponed to be holden from the Disponer of the King, a proportion only of the Retour Duty is due; Because the King and the Dis­poner having condescended that the old Barony should be extended, That part which is Disponed to be holden of the King censetur eodem Jure with the rest of the Barony; But when the Baron Dispones a part to be holden of himself without any mention of Extent, the full Duties may be claimed, at least the proportion of the valued Duty.

Novo-damus.

THE King having granted a Charter with a Novo-damus, Quaeritur, If he should have succeeded to a person having a better Right either upon Forefaulture or Recognition, or as next Heir; will the Novo­damus barr him? Or if the Novo-damus should be understood to be re­stricted to any Right or pretence or claim the King may have to the Lands by the Right of the Resignant, as falling in his hands by Forefaulture of him or his Authors, or otherwayes from their Right, and the committing of the same, either for ever or for a time?

Quid Juris as to other Superiors having succeeded to persons having a better Right?

Quid Juris, If other Superiors have received any Vassal upon Resigna­tion or otherwayes; if they may question their Vassals Right upon ano­ther unquestionably better, falling to them as succeeding to any other person?

[Page 131]Lands having fallen to the King by Forefaulture, the person Fore­faulted having but a Right of Superiority, the Property belonging to Vas­sals: Quaeritur, If upon Resignation of the Subvassal in the Kings hands as immediate Superior by the Forefaulture; a Charter with a Novo-damus will put him in that Condition, as if he had from the begin­ning holden of the King; so that the King cannot interpose another Superior by Disponing the Superiority that did belong to the Traitor? Ratio Du­bitandi, That the Novo-damus is equivalent to an Original Grant: And yet is thought, That the Novo-damus is only an accessory Right, and in effect Clausula executiva; whereby the King gives the Property, that belonged to the Resigner with all Right he could pretend thereto; But not the In­terest and Superiority that belonged to the Traitor, unless it were expres­ly Disponed: & actus agentium non operantur ultra eorum intentionem. Dun­can of Lunaie.

The King having granted to my Lord Kincardine, and thereafter to the Chancellor a Gift of the Wards and Non-entries that had fallen or should fall during the time therein mentioned Respective; and thereafter having given diverse Infeftments with a Novo-damus. Quaeritur, If the foresaid Donators could be prejudged by the saids Novo-damus? Answer. It is thought that the saids Novo-damus are of the nature of Gifts or Discharges of such Casualities, which the King might grant before Intimation made to the persons of the said Gifts.

Nullitas ex verbis non licebit.

VErba non licet vel non licebit, annullant actum; important siquidem ne­cessitatem praecisam; negant potentiam, resistant actui & aliter factum in­validant. Thes. Bes. in Litera K. 31. verbo Kan. Sect. ultima. p. 469.

Clausula ex nunc prout ex tunc.

VErba Ex nunc prout ex tunc, sunt retro activa & important canonem la­tae sententiae; operanturque actum completum etiamsi verbum futuri tem­poris sit adjectum; adeo ut unum tempus insit alteri, extremum in primo, & primum in postremo. Heringius de Molendinis quaest. 1. n. 45.

Nundinae.

NƲndinarum solennium Jus, ad majora Regalia pertinet.

Nunquam Caesar consuevit alicui dare Nundinarum privilegium, nisi prius adjacentibus & vicinis Civitatibus quarum interesse potest, auditis.

Nundinarum favor magnus est, quia earum tempore res aut personae alicu­jus arrestari non debent; Secus in Mercatis.

Quemadmodum tempore Nundinarum in loco illarum arrestare aliquem non li­cet; ita etiam nec in illo sine quo Mercatores ad Nundinas venire non possunt, Thes. Besold. in Litera M. 43. p. 631.

O.

Oath of Coronation.

IF what is required and promised, by the King the time of his Corona­tion, be understood to be Conditiones Regni, so that the same not being fulfilled the People is free? Answer. These are not Conditiones either Suspensivae or Resolutivae, but modus regnandi: And albeit Modus ought to be fulfilled, and subjects who are under a Coercive Power may be urged to observe the same; yet a Prince who is subject to no higher Power relin­quitur Religioni Juramenti, & Deum solum habet ultorem.

These Similies may be urged to this purpose, viz. A Father is oblig­ed not to provoke or wrong his Children, and that is Modus implyed in the Relation of a Father; and yet if he do otherwayes the Relation is not taken away: And when Parties are Married, there is Stipulation hinc inde of mutual Duty, not only as to Chastity, but as to other Duties, and yet though they fail in the same, being only Modus vinculi conjugalis, the Mar­riage is not dissolved except in the case of Adultery: That Duty of mutual Chastity being inter essentialia, and the other Duties inter naturalia con­jugii.

Qualified Oaths.

WHether qualified Oaths may be received before Inferior Judges? Answer. It is thought not: The question whether the qualities should be construed qualities or Exceptions, being of that difficulty, that they are not to be decided by Inferior Judges.

The Lords are not in use to receive qualified Oaths unless they be given in to be seen by the other Party, and upon debate be found Relevant; so that the person who is to give his Oath may be admitted to Swear in the terms of the same, as being properly Qualities and not Exceptions. Quae­ritur, What Qualities ought to be sustained? And seing it is the common opinion that intrinsick qualities may be received; Quaeritur, What Qua­lities are to be thought Intrinsick? Answer, These are Intrinsick that are inherent in the Act and Matter in question v. g. If it be referred to the Defenders Oath that he promised to pay the Pursuer a Sum of Mo­ney, he may declare in what Terms he promised, pure, in diem, or sub Conditione.

If it be referred to a Parties Oath that he is Lyable for a House-mail (having taken and dwelt therein) after three Years. Quaeritur, If he may declare with that Quality that he payed the same? Ratio Dubitandi. That it is Extrinsick, and not a Quality but an Exception: On the other part, quomodo unumquodque ligatur, solvitur; and the Debt not being proven but by his Oath, he may prove payment the same way. 2do. There is a pre­sumption in Law, which is the Ground of so momentary a Prescription, That such Debts are not so long owing; And therefore it ought to be pro­ven [Page 133] by the Defenders Oath they are owing. 3tio. It is the common practice, that Parties that are not bound by Write think they are in tuto to pay without Writ.

If he declare not positive that he payed, but that he Assigned a bond or Debt in satisfaction. Quaeritur, If that Quality should be received? An­swer. It is thought, that it is not intrinsick.

Correspective Obligements.

QƲid Juris, If there be correspective Writs of one Date, but not in one Body, as v. g. a Disposition of Lands and a Bond of the same date for payment of the price: If the Exception competent against the price ( viz. The Disponer cannot be lyable unless the price be payed) will mili­tate against the singular Successor? Ratio Dubitandi, The Disponer sequi­tur fidem: And the Obligement to pay the price is not in corpore juris; so that the Assigney is in bona fide to take a Right thereto: & Contra, Person­al Exceptions competent against the Cedent are competent against the Assigney, in Obligations personal hinc inde.

It is informed, that there is a Decision, That such Exceptions are not competent against Assigneys.

Mutual Obligements in Contracts.

IF there be a mutual Contract anent the selling of Lands and payment of the price; & the Buyers creditor comprise the minute in so far as it is in his favours; whether he will have action for implement unless he pay the price? Answer. He will not: Seing the final cause of the Disposition is the Price.

If Offices do Escheat by Horning?

IF the Keeper of a Register, or Writer to a Seal be at the Horn Quaeritur, if his Office will fall under his Escheat? Ratio Dubitandi, That no­thing is Escheatable but that which may be transmitted and is applicable to another; whereas an Office is a personal Function, and industria personae eligitur, which is so personal that it cannot be conveyed by his Escheat to another.

If at least the Rebell doth forefault his interest, if he be year and Day at the Horn? And Quid Juris as to Judges, who have places from the King, and as to Commissars, and Ministers, that are presented by other Patrons, whether by their Rebellion they be so disenabled, that they cannot enjoy their Places, and their Patrons can present others?

Whether at least Relaxation will repone the Rebell, and take away the Inability?

Omissa & male appretiata.

A Person being named Executor and universal Legatar. Quaeritur, If a Testament ad omissa & male appretiata be confirmed, will the prin­cipal [Page 134] Executor Loss both the Office and the Benefit of the Legacy, as to what is omitted and male Appretiat? Answer. It is thought, he will Loss both, in respect of his Fraud and Perjury, in the same manner as the nearest of kin confirming, will in the like case, loss not only the Office but the Benefite competent to him, as nearest of Kin, as to that which is omitted, or male Appretiate.

Operae.

IN Materia Operarum Consuetudo & praescriptio multum consideratur. Jus Flu­viatile p. 121. n. 3.

Order of Discussing.

WHen a Defunct doth oblige him and his Heirs, renuncing the order of Discussing, Quaeritur, will the Heir of Line be lyable to Re­leive the Heirs of Tailȝie and Provision, as to such Debts for which by the Law he should have been first Discust?

P.

Pactis Privatorum non Derogatur Juri Communi.

THat Law That Pactis privatorum non derogatur juri Communi what way it is to be understood? And if it be only as to Solemnities, or Formalities provided by Law, and not when the Law pro­vides any benefit in favours of a person, as a Communion in favours of a Husband and Wife; or Courtesy or Terce, or such like?

The Prince, and under him the Judge, and in special [...] (sed quis custodiet ipsum Custodem) the Lords of Session, have not a Legislative Power: And when there occurres a Case not formerly decyded, and the best governed Nations do not agree anent the Point in question; some being for the Affirmative, some for the Negative; and upon pro­bable Reasons on both sydes, sustinendum Judicium: Or, if the Question be of an Exception from a general Rule; the Rule is to be stuck to, until there be a Law to the contrare; as in that case, whether Minors should be debarred from the Remedie of Restitution, by their Oath; conform to the Novel sacramenta puberum: Which in effect is to make a new Law.

Parliament.

IF Reductions may be pursued summarly before the Parliament in prima instantia? It is thought, that although when my Lord Lauderdale was [Page 135] Commissioner, that was done, in the Case of the Lord Forrester against Ge­neral Ruthven's Relict; and at the instance of the Lord Dundie against Pit­taro; And there is now a Complaint at the instance of Edzel against The Earl of Crawfurd for reducing the said Earl his Title: yet such Processes would not be sustained before the Parliament, If it were represented, That by Di­verse ancient Laws, and for great Reasons it is provided, that all Com­plaints in civilibus should be first pursued before the Judge Ordinary.

Passing from a Right.

IF a Tacksman of Teinds having a Tack yet to run, take another Tack of the saids Teinds: Will he be thought to pass from the former? Lau­derdale contra Tweeddale.

Patents of Honour.

PAtents of Honour being granted to a Person, and his Heirs Male of his Body; Quaeritur; 1mo Whether the appearand Heir may sit in Parlia­ment and not be Lyable as Behaving? It is thought, (whatever may be pretended as to Custom) in strict Law he should be lyable; seing in Ge­neral, the owning an Heretable Interest is aditio passive, and gestio pro haerede. 2do. Quaeritur If a Patent and Title thereby, may be resigned as feudum for a new Patent to the Resigner and other Heirs than in the former? Co­gitandum. If it may be resigned, Quaeritur, If the Resigner must be first served Heir? Cogitandum.

If a Nobleman having a Patent to him and the Heirs Male of his Body, should thereafter resign his Title and obtain a new Patent to him and his Heirs Male of his Body, which failȝiening to his eldest Heir Female with­out Division: And the Heirs Male should faill; may a Nobleman who in the interim has got his Title betwixt the first and second Patent; claim place before the Heirs Female, as having Right by the second Patent, being be­fore theirs: Or if the Heirs Female will have place as representing their Predecessor, who had Place by the first Patent, seing the second is but a Continueing of the first in favours of him who got it, with an alteration on­ly as to his Representatives: And they who had posterior Patents were not concerned who should represent him; and it was uncertain whether the first Heirs should faill; so that they might have any prejudice by the change Roxburgh contra Lothian.

Pecunia Pupillaris.

IF a Tutor uplift the Maills and Duties of Lands, a quo Tempore will he be lyable to stock the same, so that the Pupils Means be not unprofitable? Or if this be not Casus arbitrarius, according to the variety of Circumstances? Balhousy and the Tutor of Dumb Iames Hay.

If a Tutor be not lyable for Annualrents, and when should they be stocked?

Pensions granted by the King.

QƲaeritur, Seing Pensions granted by private Persons are binding, and are a Ground of Action; Whether Payment of Pensions granted by his Majesty may be denyed? And if not, What Remedy is competent?

Personalis Actus.

‘ACtus, in quo est apposita dictio Ipsi, in contractibus non stat restri­ctive, sed tantum demonstrative; ideoque non impedit transmis­sionem; & Contractus non obstante dictione ipsi ad haeredes transeunt, quia quilibet praesumitur suo haeredi ut sibi prospicere; quae praesumptio non tollitur ex dictione sibi, quia est violenta & procedit ex visceribus na­turalibus, contrariam probationem non admittentibus.’

‘Si in alia Dispositione sit simplex concessio, Dictio sibi non restringit: & adjectio personae in concessione de sua natura ad haeredes transitoria non facit quod concessio sit personalis, & non transitoria.’

‘Secus est in concessione non transitoria, puta ubi electa est industria personae: vel in actu personae cohaerente. Thes. Besoldi, in litera I. 10. verbo Ihme. p. 425.’

Pignora.

‘SErvi Aratores & Boves Aratorii, & Instrumenta rustica pignori haud capiuntur, l. 7. Cod. quae res pignori obligari, &c.’

‘In obligatione generali rerum quas quis habuit aut habiturus est, non continentur quae verisimile est quemquam specialiter obligaturum non fuisse, ut supellex quam quis habet in usu quotidiano & necessario, vel quae ad affectionem ejus pertinet.’

‘Invecta in praedium urbanum tacite oppignorantur; secus in praediis rusticis quia sufficit in iis fructus teneri, Heringius de molendinis q. 28 n 12 ad 18 inclusive.

‘Studiosorum supellex libraria sub tacita illa oppignoratione non venit. Ibidem.

‘Ea tantum invecta censentur obligata, quae illata sunt ut perpetuo ibi sint; ideo nomina & instrumenta obligationum & merces illatae ut venderentur haud veniunt. Ibidem 20.’

‘Creditor jure civili poterat pignus alienare, etiamsi pactum non inter­venerit; praevia tamen denunciatione ut debita solvat; & licet pignus ali­enare, cessante debitore in solutionem per biennium post denunciationem. Perez. Lib. 2. Tit. 8.’

Plenishing; If a Wife be provided to a part of it?

BY Contract of Marriage, a Wife is provided, in satisfaction of Terce, Third or other part of Movables, except the half of the Plenishing of the House the time of the Husbands Decease, Whereto it is provided she shall have Right. Quaeritur, If there be no Free Gear, will the Heir be [Page 137] obliged to free the half of the Plenishing? Ratio Dubitandi. The Contract bears she should have Right; and she is in the same case as if her Hus­band had disponed for an Onerous Cause the Plenishing he should have the time of his Decease: And on the other part, it seems this Provision should be understood Conditionaliter, if there be free Goods: And the Clause being an Exception from a Renunciation, both the Renunciation and Exception from it, ought to be of the Regula, and of that which would belong to her, if she were not excluded, which could only be the free Gear.

If the clauses do not bear besides the Heirship, Quaeritur. If she will have Right to the plenishing, without Deduction of the Heirship? Eadem Ra­tio Dubitandi.

Possessor.

PRocessum ligitiosae possessionis, Hispani Interim, Galli Recredentiam, Belgi Provisionale remedium, alii processum informativum appellare solent, Budaeus litem vindiciariam. Thes. Bes. in Litera I. 29. verbo inte­rim mittel.

Possessor bonae fidei fructus consumptos suos facit absolute, extantes vero Domi­nocedunt.

Possessor vero malae fidei, nec consumptos nec extantes suos facit, sed Dominus extantes vindicat; consumptos vero condicit condictione sine causa. Perez. lib. 2, Tit. 5.

Poinding of the Ground.

A Lord of Erection having Disponed Teinds, and the Reddendo bearing a Sum to be payed for a proportional relief of the blensh duty payable by the Lord of Erection; and certain Bolls of Victual to be payed also for his relief to the Minister: Quaeritur, Will the Minister have action for poinding the ground? 2do. What will the Superiors poinding the Ground import?

A Decreet of Poinding the Ground being got against the Heretor for the time and the Tennants: Quaeritur, If after the Death of the Heretor the Lands may be comprysed for the Bygones from the Appearand Heir, without a Decreet of transferring, or a new Decreet: Answer. It is thought, there is no need of any other Decreet; the Decreet being Really founded; which may be recovered against an Appearand Heir, and put in Execution by Comprysing, or poinding against him.

Prerogative

IF the Question betwixt Roxburgh, and Lothian, should be determined with respect to his Majesties Prerogative being the Fountain of Honour? It is thought, that His Majesties Concessions, whatever the Subject be, should be judged Jure communi; And that Jus quaesitum, whether as to Ho­nour and precedency or any thing else, cannot be taken away upon any such pretence. The Prerogative is instar littoris which is defined quo fluctus Hybernus exaestuat: So that as the Sea does not go beyond the Shoar when [Page 138] the Sea is most full; so the Prerogative and Plenitudo Potestatis does never go beyond Law, which is a great Littus and Boundary of just Power.

The Royal Prerogative is acknowledged and asserted by diverse Laws and Acts of Parliament of this Kingdom; But how far the Ex­tent of the same may reach, is a point of State and Policy of the highest nature and importance, and not to be defined by the Opinions of Lawyers, but by the Highest and Legislative Authority.

The Royal Prerogative is not only asserted in the general by the Laws of the Kingdom; but diverse and great Powers Rights and Priviledges be­longing thereto, are in special declared by diverse Acts of Parliament; both in Relation to the Government, and in Relation to His Majesties In­terest, and Questions, and Causes, betwixt Him and His Subjects; As the Power of Calling and Dissolving Parliaments; The Choising and Appointing Officers of State, and Commissioners and Judges; To make War and Peace; And that there can be no Meetings to Treat or determine in Mat­ters of State without His Majesties Authority and Warrand: And that upon no pretence there can be any Rising in Arms without His Warrand; And His Right to Custums; And Power to grant Remissions for the High­est Crimes: And that the Negligence of His Officers cannot prejudge Him. And albeit by the Common Law the Eldest Superior is preferable, yet when Lands are holden of diverse Superiors Ward, the Marriage of the Vassal, which otherwayes would belong to the Eldest Superior, doth pertain to the King, tho as to the Vassal his latest Superior: And by custom, albeit the going to a Miln, for never so long a time, being facultatis, doth not import Servitude without a special Astriction, yet the repairing to His Majesties Milns, by the space of Fourty Years, doth induce a Servitude, without any other constitution: As to which and other points of the Pre­rogative, explained by Law and Custom, Lawyers may and ought to give their Opinions in Law.

But as to Lawyers and Juris-consults, it is said, Turpe est sine lege loqui, & ubi leges silent they cannot but be silent: And the Laws of Scotland, which ought to warrand the Resolutions and the Opinions of Lawyers, in Questions concerning the State and Government, are only the Statutory Law and Acts of Parliament, and the common Law and custom and un­denyable practique of the Kingdom.

As to the Civil Law of the Romans; it was only the Municipal Law of that People; And by reason of the great Equity of it, in Questions de Jure privato, tho it has not the force of Law with us; yet it is of great Authority and use in cases not determined either by statute or custom; But, as to Questions of State and Government, the Civil Law is of no use with us; in respect the Laws of all Nations, concerning their State and Government, are only Municipal; and the Constitution of the Respective States doth varie both from that of the Romans; and for the most part each from ano­ther: So that any Questions, concerning the same, cannot be solidely or warrantably Answered, upon Principles or Reasons brought from any Law, but the constitution of the Government and Laws and Customs of the Nation and Kingdom concerned.

It is conceaved, That when the Opinion of Lawyers is asked, Res should be integra, and they should be at liberty to give their Opinion freely and [Page 139] without prejudice, which they cannot doe after His Majesty has any way predetermined them, by declaring his own Royal Will and Pleasure.

As to that Question, What can be said, in Law, in defence of these who have acted contrary to Law, in Obedience to His Majesty, or upon his Royal Dispensation; if they should be questioned in the time of Succeeding Kings?

It is Answered, That, upon the Grounds foresaid, nothing can be said positively to secure them, from Question, either by our Law or Custom; The said case being not mentioned nor determined by either: But it is to be thought and presumed, that His Majesties Prerogative being asserted by the Laws foresaid, and His Majesties owning that power to Command and Dispense as a part of His Prerogative, and they conceiving that it was not their duty to dispute His Majesties Power; Succeeding Princes will not think it their interest, to be severe against any person, for exceeding in Obedience to their Royal Predecessors.

Prescription.

IF a Feu-Charter of Kirklands, not confirmed by the King or Pope, with Seasins thereupon, may be a Title to warrand Prescription?

Temporary Prescriptions, as in case of House-Mails, Servants Fies, Eje­ctions, &c. If they run against Minors?

The Vassal retouring his Lands to be in Non-entry Fourscore Years, Quaeritur, If he may object Prescription quoad the retoured Non-entry Du­ties? Seing after the Years of prescription, he confesseth the same to be due: & Temporalia ad agendum sunt Perpetua ad excipiendum?

If His Majesties annexed Property does prescrive?

If Prescription run, against these who were Forefaulted by the Usur­per, Qui non valebant agere: Found for the Negative, Lauderdale contra Tweeddale; That Lauderdale his Father and Good-Sire non valebant agere, Because upon his Fathers Resignation Queen Ann was Infeft in Liferent, and might have excluded them during her Lifetime: and though he might have intented a Declarator; yet that being such an Action, as could not bring him to possession, he was not obliged to intent it: This Reason ap­pears not to be without some Question, seing if there were a Liferenter and Fiar, and the Fiar should not prevail with the Liferenter to join in an Action for interrupting prescription, the Fiar should be without remedy if he would not interrupt by Declarator: and if a Declarator do interrupt, it cannot be said that non valebat agere. 2do. A Declarator would have brought the Lord Thirlestoun to Civil possession, at least so far as it would have been declared, that the Queens possession was his, and by vertue of the Right thereof he was Fiar: And if the Queen would not owne the possession to have been by that Right, she should have been forced to re­move: So that by that Action they might have attained natural possession.

Before the Act of Parliament 1621. anent Comprysings, the Legal ran against Minors; which argues, that the Temporary Prescriptions of Spuil­ȝies, for House-Mails, Removings &c. run against Minors.

If there be a difference betwixt the time of prescription in England and Scotland? Whether is prescription inter decisoria?

Item, If Prelates, provided before the Act of Parliament 1585. (against [Page 140] Dilapidations) may notwithstanding thereof set Tacks without hazard? Seing the Act seems to militate only as to persons provided thereafter.

If a Feu-set contrary to the said Act against Dilapidations, may be a ground of Prescription? Ratio Dubitandi, That by the said Act, the Pa­trimony of the Prelates is extra Commercium, and is of the nature of the an­nexed property & quod non est alienabile non est praescriptibile. Vide, Di­lapidation in litera D.

If in all cases when an Obligement or Interest and Right is in the De­fenders Right, whereby he bruiks, may he alledge Prescription, as he cannot do in the case of Reversion, there being Eadem Ratio?

What is the Reason, that Reversions Registrate do not prescribe? Seing Bonds Registrate do notwithstanding prescrive.

If a Faculty granted to a Person as v. g. to the Disponer of Lands, and a power to Dispone the samen, or to Redeem upon a penny, doth pre­scrive being granted apart?

If, Prescription being alledged against a Bond, it be Relevant to reply and to offer to prove by the Excipients Oath, that to his knowledge the the Debt is due, and true, and not satisfied?

If a Reversion be granted only for five Years, Quaeritur, If in that case it prescribes against Minors? Vide de Retractibus Gentilitiis, if they pre­scribe against Minors?

If a Minor acquire Right to a Comprysing near expired, singulari titulo, will the Reversion be prorogate? and if there be a difference betwixt a Mi­nor succeeding as Heir, or otherways Singulari Titulo?

Prescription against the King.

THE Act of Parliament 1617. Militateth against the King, as to real Actions; when the Defender has prescribed a Right by possession founded upon the Rights therein mentioned; as appears by the express words and the ground of that Prescrption, being not so much odium & negligentia non petentis as favor possidentis, which is the same as to the King as to another: But in that part of the Act anent, the prescription of Per­sonal Actions, there is no mention of the King, and he cannot be said to be negligent; and it is declared by Act of Parliament, that the negligence of his Officers shall not prejudge him. Quaeritur therefore, if Prescription in that case be competent against the King?

‘Verba semper & quandocunque designant temporis infinitatem: & si in pacto de retrovendendo adjiciatur haec clausula, ut quandocunque vendi­tor & ejus haeredes velint pretium offerre, Praedium recipere possint, non ob­stante triginta annorum praescriptione, Jus redimendi semper & in perpe­tuum competit; nisi possiderit Emptor pro suo; vel contradixerit Relui­tioni: ab eo enim tempore incipit praescriptio: In Contractibus enim nullum verbum debet esse otiosum, verba autem quandocunque &c. es­sent otiosa si non operarentur. Thes. Bes. litera I. verbo 5. Je und allwegen p. 423. & 424.’

‘Princeps potest privato privilegium concedere, ut ipse solus in aliqua parte maris aut fluminis publici piscari possit; aliosque ne id faciant pro­hibere: Loca publica, & quae Jure Gentium communia sunt, praescribi [Page 141] possunt tanto tempore cujus initii memoria non existat: praescriptio enim immemorialis vim habet privilegii seu Tituli, & potius praesumpta concessio quam praescriptio dicitur; & praesumptio ex ea exsurgens est Juris & de Jure, nec admittit probationem in contrarium. Jus Flaviati­le. p. 260. n. 261.’

"Praescriptio impium praesidium Novel. 9.

‘Respublica & municipium non restituitur adversus praescriptiones temporales; quae Jure veteri, respuebant restitutionem. vide Frisch. Tom. 2. Exercitat. 2. n. 58. & sequent.

‘Jure Novel: praescribitur contra Rempublicam & Civitatem, Tri­ginta vel quadraginta ann. ibidem. n. 63.’

‘Praescriptio Conventionalis a Defuncto coepta currit contra Rempubli­cam quae ei successit, Ibidem. n. 65.’

‘In Praescriptione, Jure Civili bona fides requiritur ab initio, nec desinet usucapiens acquirere licet mala fides superveniat: Jure autem Canonico bona fides requiritur toto tempore.’

‘Requiritur etiam Titulus, id est, justa causa possessionis & habilis ad transferendum Dominium.’

‘Res furtivae & vi possessae Jure Civili usucapi nequeunt. Perez. Instit. Tit. 10.’

‘Nihil enim operatur bona fides aut Titulus propter vitium, nisi vitio purgato, nempe re furtivâ reversâ in potestatem Domini.’

‘Servus Fugitivus non usucapitur, quia fugiendo sui furtum facere di­citur.’

‘Si quis mala fide, absente forte Domino vel negligente aut eo decedente sine successore, fundum alienum possederit & vendiderit Emptori bonae fidei, non obstat usucapioni vitium quasi rei furtivae; non enim fundi locive furtum committitur, aut rerum immobilium facilis est inter­versio.’

‘Res Fisci usucapi non possunt, quia Juris publici sunt: bona autem va­cantia usucapiuntur quae haeredem non habent, si antequam a Fisco occu­pentur ab alio possideantur; quia nondum Fisco denunciata, non sunt Fisci, sed manent in Commercio.’

Presentation upon Forefaulture.

QƲaeritur, If a Composition be due to the Superior for receiving a Vas­sal, presented by the King upon a Forefaulture? It is thought, That it is not due; seing he is obliged to receive him; and the Lands belong­ing to the King by the Forefaulture, he does a Favour to the Superior by presenting one in his place.

The King having presented a Vassal to the immediate Superior, some years after the Forefaulture of the former Vassal, Quaeritur, Whether the Person presented will have Right to the Duties become due since the Forefaulture, or if the same will belong to the Superior? Cogitandum. But it seems, that the King having no Right to the Lands, which he can­not hold of a Subject, but having only Right to present a Vassal in the interim, the Duties should belong to the Superior, seing the Property be­longs to no Person; And the Superiority draws unto it the Right of Pro­perty [Page 142] and the Superior not having a Vassal ought to have the duties of the Lands: Otherwise if the King should not present for many years he should want the Fruits and Benefit of his Superiority: And it is not his fault that he wants a Vassal, seing hardly he could force the King to pre­sent. The Lord Tarras.

Process against Strangers.

IF a French Man or Hollander v. g. should retire out of France or Holland hither, and should be Pursued in this Kingdom at the instance of these who have contracted with him in the Place where he was, Quaeritur, If Process should be Sustained against him here? And if it should, accord­ing to what Law should he be Judged? Seeing our Judges are not pre­sumed nor obliged to know any other Law but our own and the civil Law. Answer. They ought to have Process according to the Law of the Place where they Contracted, which may be known upon a Commission.

Seing Mobilia and Immobilia habent situm viz. illa fixum, ista vagum, Quid juris as to nomina Debitorum, utrum sequuntur personam Debitoris an Credi­toris? So that a Debt due by a Scotsman to a Stranger should be consider­ed as a Scots interest & res Scotica; and a Testament concerning the same should be confirmed in Scotland.

Quid Juris as to annualrents, when the Laws of the Place where the Creditor lives and our Laws do vary?

Quid Juris, When the Debitor being a Scotsman and having granted Bond in Scotland, has retired elsewhere, both as to the effect of confirma­tion and Annualrent whether Lawful or no Lawful? And if the Annual­rent should be ever considered with respect to the Place, where the Debitor was Incola the time of the contracting?

Procuratories of Resignation.

IF Procuratories of Resignation, granted by Magistrates, Expire by the de­cease of the granters?

Promise to Dispone, not in writ.

IF any Person or their Heirs may be pursued, for implement of a promise to dispone Lands and Heretages; it being referred to the Oath of the Per­son that made the Promise (or of his Heir if he be deceased) that such a Promise was made? Answer. That it is thought, that as when upon a Treaty and Agreement Writs are drawn, Parties may Resile, before Writs be subscribed; There is eadem, if not major Ratio in Promises, which can­not be perfected but in Write, Et nihil actum creditur, dum quid supersit a­gendum, nisi accedit Juramentum, Vide Emphyteosis, and what the Lawyers say in such Cases, where Write is necessary.

Protections.

IF Persons cited to appear before the Justice or Council, or imprisoned by order of the Justice or Council, may be taken or arrested upon Caption or otherwise, for a Civil Debt, though they have not Protections?

Provision in favours of Bairns.

IT was provided by Contract of Marriage, that the Conquest should be employed upon Rights to the Husband and Wife in Conjunct Fee, and to the Bairns of the Marriage in Fee, Quaeritur, If the Husband, having acquired a considerable Estate, may he advantage his Heir or any other of the Children, and give a greater Proportion to them than the rest? Or will the Conquest belong to all equally? Ratio Dubitandi, It were hard that the Father should not have power to divide his Estate amongst his Children, and in Consideration of it to oblige them to be dutyful. On the other part, the provision being in favours of the Children which is nomen collectivum & universale, indefinitum aequipollet universali. 2do. If that Power were allowed to a Father, it may be abused; and intending to marry again, he may deal with one of his Children, and giving more nor his Proportion, he may by transaction settle all the Conquest on him; and take a great part of it back from him in prejudice of the other Children. 3tio. By that Provision there is a Legitime settled upon the Children; and as the Father cannot prejudge them of that which is given them by Law, but the Bairns-part must divide equally, so he cannot prejudge them of that Bairns-part provided by Contract; unless by the same, the Father had that arbi­trium and Power given to him, as sometimes it is.

Provision in Bonds.

A Bond of provision being granted by a Brother to a Sister, for a Sum to be payed to her at the next Term after the Bond, without mention of Heirs or Assigneys, but with a Provision, that if she should decease unmar­ried it should return to the Granter and his Heirs; Quaeritur, If, she having assigned the Bond, the Assigneys will have Right, albeit she deceased un­married? And what the import of the said provision is, whether a Sub­stitution, or a Quality of the Fee and a fidei commissum, that she should not assign but with the burden of it? Ancrum younger contra Mangertoun.

Provisions in Charters.

IF Lands be disponed to be holden of the Disponer, with a Provision that if the Vassal be year and day at the Horn, his Liferent shall not pertain to the Disponer; but (now as then, and then as now) shall be given and belong to himself. Quaeritur, Quid Juris? Ratio Dubitandi, Dolus futurus non potest remitti; and being pactum contra legem made to fright from Dis­obedience and Rebellion, the Rebell ought not to have the advantage of it: Nor the Superior, because remisit; & quod aufertur indigno, cedit Fisco.

If such Pactions will bind singular Successors in the Superiority? Ratio Dubitandi, That they can be in no better case, than their Author; and these Pactions are in rem Active & Passive: And the Superiority being on­ly by the Disposition and Infeftment thereupon, it is qualified with the said Provision, and cannot be transmitted otherwise than as it is Jus affectum & limitatum.

Provisions in Contracts.

A Father being obliged by Contract of Marriage, to employ a Sum to himself and his Wife in Liferent only, and his Bairns of that Marri­age in Fee; which failȝiening to his Heirs and Assigneys: If Infeftment should be taken in these Terms, whether is the Father Fiar, so as the Bairns could not succeed but as Heirs of Provision to him. Mr Andrew Marjorie-banks Contract of Marriage.

If the Fee were secured to the Children, By and Infeftment to a Trustee to the behoof of the Children; if it be the Fee of all his Estate, and being a merchant, and thereafter People contracting with him as a Person of a visible Estate, would the Creditors be prejudged by such Provisions in a Contract, not publick by Infeftment upon it, or Inhibition? The same case.

Provisions in favours of Daughters.

BY Contract of Marriage it is provided, that in respect the Estate was Entailed, The Daughters should be provided, If there be one, to 50000 Merks; if two to 60000: whereof to the eldest 37000 Merks and to the other the remainder; to be payed at their age of sixteen years or their Marriage. Quaeritur, The Father having survived, and there being two Daughters of the Marriage at their Mothers Decease, of which the Elder died not long after; long before the age foresaid. 1mo. Will the younger sur­viving get 50000 Merks, being now the only Daughter of the Marriage? 2do If at least she will have the portion of the elder being 37000 Merks? 3tio. If her Sisters Portion will accresce to her as nearest of Kin? 4to. If the said Provisions be conditional, viz. If they Marry or attain to sixteen Years? 5to. If such Provisions be personal? at least so far, as if after the Term they be not assigned and the Daughters die, they will not transmit, there being no mention of Heirs? 6to. The said Sums not being due up­on account of Creditum, but of Provision for a Livelyhood, that they may be married, or at least have a Competency to live upon; Quando Dies ce­dit? Whether after dissolution of the Marriage, or when they attain to the Age foresaid? Scot younger of Ancrum.

Publica.

COnfirmatio munerum publicorum hodie a Principe successore petitur; sed si de­negaretur injuria fieret a Principe. Jus Fluviat.

Publicum seu publica utilitas varijs modis dicitur, viz. 1mo. Cum in univer­sum & particulariter Commodum affertur, quod in Sacris, Sacerdotibus, & Ma­gistratibus, consistit. 2. quae in universum conducit, non autem singulis; ut quoties de locupletando fisco agitur. 3. Quae privata proprie, licet ex ea con­sequatur publica utilitas; ut cum dicimus, Tutelam esse munus publicum, & Testamenti factionem esse juris publici. Hering. de molend. Quest. 15. n. 14.

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Pupils.

IF in Law Pupils who have neither Velle nor Nolle, may be Charg­ed and Denounced?

Q

Quartering.

IF there may be Quartering for Impositions laid on by the Major part of the Shire, though there were ground for the same? Answer, Negative, Seing Quartering is Remedium Extraordinarium & Mili­tare, and cannot be used but where there is a Law to warrand the same: But in such Cases, if there be any thing done behoovefully for the Shire, They who are refractory may be pursued actione negotiorum gesto­rum, before the Sheriff or other Judicatories, and upon Decreets the or­dinar Execution may follow.

Quorum.

IN the case of Mr. John Bayne of Pitcairly mentioned in the Title. Dis­positio collata in arbitrium alterius in litera D. The Friends being so nam­ed that the major part should have power to determine; There being Three of Ten. viz. The Chancellor, Sir John Nisbet, and Tarbat, sine qui­bus non, and in case of any of their decease, Sir William Bruce. Quaeritur, If all the three sine quibus non must consent? Or if it be necessar only that there should be a Quorum of the Meeting? Ratio Dubitandi, His name­ing Three sine quibus non, appears to be upon that account, because two might not agree. 2do. It were hard, if all the Friends should agree but one of the sine quibus non, It should be in his power to evacuate the Defuncts Will and Design. 3tio. When a Commission is given to Three Persons to be Judges or Arbitrators, they must all be present, and yet if two agree though the third dissent, their sentence will be valid.

If any one of the Quorum, sine quibus non, should settle with the Heirs, of design to question the Defuncts Deed. Quaeritur, If he (as having Fore­faulted his Trust) should be in the same case as if he were Dead?

R.

Ratihabitio.

RAtihabitio retrotrahitur ad initium, & Mandato comparatur.

Jus Ratium.

JƲs Grutiae vel Ratium (Flotrecht) jus, viz. Traducendi ligna super flu­mine ad Regalia spectat. Jus Fluviat. p. 97. n. 11.

Jura Realia in Re & in Rem.

JƲra Realia vel sunt in Re ipsa vel in Rem tantum: Jura autem ad rem in­terdum sunt in rem, personalia tantum sed ad rem consequendam, ut Dispo­sitiones, Contractus, & Reversiones ubi non sunt Registratae.

Jura in Re & Terris sunt ea quae per Sasinam competunt (nulla enim Sasina nulla Terra) scilicet jus Dominii (vel directi vel utilis) vulgo superioritatis & proprietatis, Jus ususfructus & conjunctae infeodationis, Jus Hypothecae seu im­pignorationis vulgo Wadsets, Viduarum Triens seu Tertia, Curialitas Scotiae in­dulta Maritis conjugibus, si Ʋxor in Terris successor aut Haeres & prolem enixa fuerìt, licet haud vitalis statim moriatur: ea enim Jura Viduis tam marito quam conjugi competunt, ex sasinis & in terris in quibus alteruter obiit vestitus & sasitus; ut ex Brevipatet.

Jura autem Reversionis & Regressus moribus nostris Realia sunt & in Rem; ut adversus non tantum haeredes sed singulares successores efficacia sint; idque hand sua natura, cum re ipsa sint tantum personalia pacta de retrovendendo; sed mori­bus nostris ubi rite Registrata sunt, etiam adversus emptores, aut alios singulares successores, rata & valida habentur; cum insinuata iis innotèscant aut sciri possunt.

Nec minus servitutes praediorum, & conductiones seu assedationes, Jura Realia & in Rem sunt sine sasina, si ante venditionem possessio accedat.

Rebellion.

A Bond being Assigned by a Rebel and the Assignation not intimate before the Rebellion. Quaeritur, Whether the Assigney, or the Do­nator will be preferred? Ratio Dubitandi, That the Assignation denudes the Cedent, and the Intimation is not necessary but to exclude another Assigney: And the Rebel by his Rebellion does not transmit but amitts and Forefaults any Right that he has, which being in nullius bonis is Domi­ni Regis; whereas it cannot be said that the Bond was in nullius bonis after the Assignation, seing it is then in bonis Cessionarii.

Whether the Rebels Goods ought to be Lyable to Creditors?

SEing Bona are understood Debitis deductis, and by the custom of all Nations when they are confiscate Transeunt cum sua causa, and with the burden of Debts, what can be thought the reason that it is otherwayes with us? Answer, It is thought, that seing Lands when they are Fore­faulted either to the King, or to the Superior, they return in the same man­ner & ut optima maxima as they were given, that condition being implyed [Page 147] in all Rights of Lands that the Vassal should be faithful and Loyal. It has been thought (but upon mistake) That Moveables and other personal Estate should be confiscate in the same manner, without respect to Debts, whereas there is Dispar Ratio; Lands, as said is, being given by the Supe­rior with that quality, whereas personal Interests are simply allodial, and ought to be forth-coming to Creditors; who, though they have not a Right to the same, yet have that Interest, that they are the Subject of Execution: and it appears to be unjust, and to obstruct Trade, if it should be otherways.

Recognition.

LAnds being Wadset for a Sum, far below the value of the half, with a Back-tack. Quaeritur, if there be ground for Recognition, if the Land hold Ward? Ratio Dubitandi, The whole Lands are Wadset.

If Infeftments of Warrandice be Ground of Recognition?

A Vassal holding Ward, giveth a Charter to his Subvassal or his singu­lar successor upon Resignation, with a Novo damus, Quaeritur, If the Novodamus will import a Recognition?

A Gift of Recognition being given of certain Lands, whereupon the Donator is Infeft; and therafter another Gift being given of the same in favours of of another person, who is also Infeft after the former Donator, but preveens by obtaining a Declarator upon his Gift; the former not be­ing declared: Quaeritur, Which of the Donators will be preferred? Ra­tio Dubitandi, That the first Infeftment seems to be preferable, the Supe­rior being thereby denuded: And on the other part, when Casualities and Escheats are Disponed, which fall ex delicto (as the case of Escheats by Horning) There is no consummate Right before Declarator.

Whether an Appearand Heir if he Dispone, and Infeftment follow, the Lands will recognosce? Ratio Dubitandi, Quod nullum est, nullum sorti­tur effectum: And not being Infeft he cannot give any effectual Right.

Minors Disponing Ward Lands, Quaeritur, If they may be Reponed against Recognition? Ratio Dubitandi, They ought not to Reponed against Delicta, after they are puberes & Doli capaces: And such Deeds importing Recognition, are Crimina & Delicta feudalia.

A Person being Infeft in Ward Lands, with a Faculty and Power to the Disponer to Redeem and Dispone upon payment of a penny, Quaeritur, If the Disponer make use of that Power and do Dispone, and if an Infeft­ment without consent of the Superior be taken, whether there be Locus Recognitioni? Ratio Dubitandi, That he is not Vassal; and the Superior has not consented that he should have, and use that Power.

Lands holden Ward being Wadset for a Sum far beneath the value of the Lands with a Back-Tack, Quaeritur, If there be place for Recognition, seing it is intended only, that the Creditor should be secured, and the Back-Tack Duty is within the half of the Rent? Answer. It is thought, not­withstanding, that there is ground for Recognition; seing the whole pro­perty is Disponed, and the Vassal has only a Superiority, and is a Tennant only of the Property? And beside, the Superior has that prejudice, that if his Vassal be Year and Day at the Horn, the Liferent of the Property will not belong to him, but only the Liferent of what is payable to his Vassal by [Page 148] the Wadsetter by the Reddendo of the Wadset Right: and the Liferent of the Back-Tack will fall to the King, and the Vassal may thereafter Discharge both the Back-Tack and the Reversion, so that the Subvassal would have Right to the hail property without the Superiors Consent.

Redemption Heretable or Moveable.

QƲaeritur, If Lands being Redeemable and an order used, will the Sum consigned belong to the Heir or Executor? Ratio Dubitandi, Sur­rogatum sapit naturam surrogati, and the Defunct intended that the said Sum should be Heretable being fixed upon Land, and the Debitor had no power to alter the Defuncts Intention, as to the condition of any part of his Estate. It is otherwayes, when the same is consigned, in Obedience to a premonition at the instance of a Creditor. Vide. Executry quaest. 2da. in litera E.

If a Declarator of Redemption doth denude the Wadsetter, so that the Superior without any further Deed, either of Renounciation or Resignati­on, may Infeft the Granter of the Wadset?

If the Superior has receaved the Wadsetter, and has given him a Char­ter bearing the Lands to be Redeemable, will he be obliged upon Re­demption to Re-enter the Granter without a Regress? Ratio Dubitandi, That the Granting of the Charter with that Quality seems to import a Re­gress. Answer. It is thought, that it does not import a Regress; it being a Provision betwixt the Parties, and to be understood Civiliter, that the Su­perior should not be obliged to Re-enter the Debitor being once denuded, but upon such Terms as he shall think fit, otherwayes there should be no use for Letters of Regress.

Order of Redemption.

AN Order of Redemption being used, may the User pass from the same, the other Party being unwilling?

An Order of Redemption being begun, by Premonition at a certain time to receive the Money contained in the Reversion, and before the term the person premonishing being deceased, Quaeritur, If his Heir being served before the terme, may prosecute and compleat the order by Con­signation? Ratio Dubitandi, Premonition may seem to be personal. And e contra, the Heir is Eadem Persona, so that the premonished is not concerned, whether he receive the Money from the Person himself or his Representatives.

Reduction.

WHen a Right is reduced Ex capite Minoris Aetatis, or Circumven­tion, or upon any other Ground, so that the Infeftment where­by the Disponer was disseased is taken away; Quaeritur, If the Disponer must be re-seased? Ratio Dubitandi, Fictione Juris By the Reduction he is reponed as if he had not been disseased: And on the other part, Dis­sasina being facti, quod factum est fieri infectum non potest: And when Wad­sets [Page 149] are Redeemed, albeit the Right be loused and extinct by a Decreet equivalent to a Reduction, yet the Redeemer must be reseased.

After Redemption, What way should the Redeemer be reseased? Whe­ther upon the Resignation of the Party infeft upon the Wadset; Or what other Way? Answer, Wadsets were of old granted upon Reversions not contained in the Body of the Right; and then the Disponer was in use to get a Regress, whereupon the Superior did re-enter him; but now the Reversion being in the Body of the Right, the Disponer is in the same case as if he had a Regress, and should be infeft in the same manner: The Wadsetter being denuded by the Decreet, he has no Right in his Person to resign: and therefore it is thought, that the same course should be taken, both in the case of Redemption and Reductions, as formerly, when Re­gresses were in use.

Reduction Ex capite Fraudis.

IF a Reduction be pursued of the Right as Fraudulent, may not the Defender alledge, that the Disponer had Bona, either Movables or others equivalent to the Debt, which may satisfy the same; and offer to sa­tisfy the Pursuer upon an Assignation of the Debt due to him; to the effect he may have Recourse against the said other Estate of his Author? Answer. It is thought, the saids Defences would be relevant, and Assignations could not be denyed.

Infeftment after Reduction.

A Person having disponed Lands and resigned, and being so divested by Charter and Seasine, If he should thereafter reduce the said Right; Quaeritur, what way he shall be reseased, Seing the Right was not Jus Nullum sed Annullandum: and the Seasine and Resignation that di­vests is Factum quod non potest fieri infectum?

Reduction Ex capite Metus.

QƲaeritur, If Rights being made dolo vel metu, and upon these Heads or Ex capite Lecti being reduceible; and such Actions being in rem, a singular Successor acquireing a Right from the person lyable to such acti­ons will he be in the same case as Persons acquireing from Confidents? Ratio Dubitandi, Acts of Parliament are stricti Juris, and cannot be ex­tended.

Reduction upon Minority.

IF Interlocutors in Jure against Minors may be reduced ex capite Minoris aetatis and Laesion? Answer Negative, Seing Minors cannot be restored, but where either there is captio by the deed of another to their prejudice; or by their own deed, through their Facility; or where there is an omission of Defences: But where Defences are not omitted, and being proponed and advised are repelled as not relevant, The Interlocutor, which is a Deed of the Judge, cannot be reduced but upon iniquity.

Reduction Ex capite Lecti.

A Father having acquired a Right to his Eldest Son of certain Lands, reserving his own Liferent, and a Power to dispone etiam in articulo mortis: And thereafter having on Deathbed made use of the said Faculty, and disponed the said Lands to a second Son, Quaeritur, If the said Right may be questioned by Reduction Ex capite lecti, as being made in prejudice of the Heir? Ratio Dubitandi, That the said Disponer could not do any Deed then, in prejudice of his Heir; And on the other part, that the eldest Son, having accepted the said Right with the said Provision, cannot question the same. 2do. The Heir is not in this case to be considered as Heir, but as quilibet, Seing he is not in the case of an Heir succeding in a Right as Heir, seing the Right was not in the Person of his Father; and he himself was Fiar with the quality forsaid. 3tio The Law of the Majesty is only in the case of Rights granted to a Person and his Heirs simply; and the reason of the Law is express, that the Defunct, when he was in health having had no thought to dispose of his Heretage, when he grants Rights on Deathbed of the same, is presumed to have been imposed upon, or that the said Rights on Deathbed were Elicite, or granted by him in Delirio & fervore passionis in­stantis: Whereas the said Faculty, being reserved in the Right, argues the Fathers intention ab initio if he should think fit even then etiam in articulo, being sedati animi: Nevertheless the said Right was reduced. Davison con­tra Davison. November 1687.

Re-entry after Redemption.

IF Wadset Lands be holden of the Superior, and the Reversion be con­tained in the Charter; If the said Reversion be not equivalent to a Re­gress in respect of the Superiors consent to the same? And what way the Vassal may be entered upon the Redemption, especially if the Creditor be dead; and his appearand Heir will not grant a Renunciation, and cannot resigne? Answer. The Superior may be urged to grant a Charter, making mention of the Wadset, Redemption, and Declarator, and by Law that he is lyable to re-enter, the Vassal having redeemed.

Regalia.

MAjora Regalia cohaerere dicuntur Imperatoris ossibus, ut ab eo avelli ne­queant.

Imperator alios sibi assumere potest in partem Solicitudinis, non vero in pleni­tudinem Potestatis, quae omnem respuit Divisionem; & quasi Sanctum Sancto­rum est, in quod nemo admittitur nisi Princeps. Bes. Thes. in Litera K. 3. ver­bo Kayserliche, P. 450.

Integra Territoria, seu Provinciae, Ducatus, Principatus, Comitatus &c. cum Jurisdictione territoriali in feudum Statibus Imperii, Ducibus, Principibus, & Comitibus, & Civitatibus Imperialibus conceduntur: cujusmodi feuda Imperii immediata, omnia regalia Jura & Emolumenta eo spectantia continent. Frit: Jus Fluviat. P. 106. n 3.

[Page 151]Regalia non sunt Res, sed Jura Regi aut alii Superiorem non recognoscenti, in signum supremae potestatis, necnon in praemium immensi laboris, quem pro Im­perio & Regimine sustinent, ad Rempublicam tuendam competentia. Heringius de Molendinis. q. 9. n 47. & sequen.

Regality.

IF Rights of Regality imply and import a Right to Escheats upon Horn­ing, albeit they be not express thereanent? Ratio Dubitandi, It is the common Opinion, that they are imported: Ex adverso, Gifts of Escheat upon Rebellion are inter maxima regalia, and Rights of the same are stricti Juris. 2do. All Letters of Horning bear, That the Rebels Goods should be escheat and brought in for His Majesties use. 3tio. Regali­ties being Priviledges of Jurisdiction, and Exemption from the ordinary Courts of Shires and Justices, carry only such Escheats as are incident to Jurisdiction, as Mulcts and Fines of persons unlawed, or sentenced in Courts of Regality. 4to. Declarator of Escheats cannot be pursued be­fore Regality-Courts but only before the Session. 5to. In other Cases of Escheats, upon account of Crimes or Delicta, as for Theft, Slaughter, the Crime is not against the King directly, but consequentially, as concer­ned in the Loss of a Subject: But Rebellion on Horning is directly against the King. It will be fitt to see the Right of an Ancient Regality.

Suppose that the Lord of Regality has Right to the Escheat upon Horn­ing, will he have Right only to such Movables, as are within his oun Ter­ritory, Or to all the Rebel his Movables, even such as are within the Re­galities of others?

If a Right of Regality may be granted, not only for Lands holden of the King, but for such as hold of other Superiors? Ratio Dubitandi. That the King being the Fountain of all Jurisdiction, in whatsomever Lands or Bounds, whether they hold immediatly of himself or not, may delegate and give thar Jurisdiction to whom he pleases, whether the Lands hold of himself or not: And on the other part, the said Jurisdiction being annex­ed to the Lands and given intuitu of the same, it is hard that a Vassal should be above his Superior; and his Superior being it may be Baron, a Right of a Barony-Jurisdiction cannot be given in eadem Baronia; and farr less of a higher Jurisdiction: And no Right can be given to a Vassal in relation to his Lands, but such as would pertain to his Superior, if the the Lands come in his hands by Non-entry or otherwise: And the Right of Regality, which did never pertain to the Superior himself, cannot come in his hands by Non-entry or otherwise.

Writs registrate, that cannot be found in the Register.

IF it be Evident that a Writ was put in the Register, and yet cannot be found, neither Principal nor Booked, What Remedy?

Registratio.

‘APud nos Instrumenta aut Literae Registrari dicuntur, cum referuntur in Regestum sive Librum publicorum, vel actorum vel monumen­torum. Registratio autem celebratur duobus modis, & ad diversos fines & effectus.’

‘Ubi enim Instrumentum sive simples & [...], obligatio scilicet aut Chirographum aut Dispositio; aut [...], contractus scilicet inter duos aut plures, in librum actorum refertur; & plaerumque fit ut vim & instar sententiae obtineat, & executionem paratam, virtute clau­lae Executivae & Registrationis (ut vocant) in omnibus fere instrumen­tis solennibus, istis aut similibus verbis. viz. Et pro majori securitate & nos (ii scilicet qui obligantur) volumus & consentimus ut praesens In­strumentum inseratur & Registretur in Libris Supremae aut inferioris Cu­riae competentis, ut ita nanciscatur vim sententiae Dictorum Judicum, ut Literae Denunciationis & Cornuationis (ut practici loquuntur) conti­nentes spatium sex dierum & alia necessaria (ut par est) pro ea exse­quenda Dirigantur: & constituimus [...] aut eorum quemlibet Procuratores nostros ad effectum praedictum.’

‘Sic sine lite & processu, ad ultimam processus metam & exitum deve­nitur, sententiam scilicet & Executionem omnimodam; fictione enim brevis manus omnia ad processum & sententiam requisita quodammodo insunt: vice enim Citationis (quae supervacua est ubi partes praesto sunt & consentiunt) procurator etiam Rei intervenit, dicis causa, & consentit; Judex etiam secundum Instrumenta exhibita per procurato­rem, eoque postulante ut juxta Clausulam praedictam, ad effectum prae­dictum, in Regestum referantur, decernit: actuarius etiam & Clericus Curiae decretum seu Extractum expedit.’

‘Illud autem tribus partibus constat. 1mo Enim praemittitur decretum eâque sequitur formâ, Edinburgi [...] die Mensis [...] 16 [...] Co­ram Dominis Concilii & Sessionis comparuit, T. W. Advocatus procu­rator pro D. P. W. Obligato in Chirographo infra scripto, & exhibuit dictum Chirographum, petiitque illud inseri & Registrari in Libris Concilii & Sessionis ut vim sententiae dictorum Dominorum obtineret ei interponendam; qua literae Cornuationis & aliae necessariae desuper di­rigantur modo inibi specificato; quam postulationem dicti Domini Ratio­ni consonam Judicarunt, ideoque ordinavere & ordinant Dictum Chiro­graphum inseri & Registrari in libris dictae curiae, & decrevere illud ob­tinere vim sententiae ipsorum, & Literas Cornuationis & alias necessarias inde dirigi modo infra-scripto. 2do. Subjungitur Tenor ipsius Chiro­graphi. 3tio. Sequitur Clausula ista viz. Extractum de libro actorum per me. viz. Vel Dominum Rotulorum Clericum Registri, vel ejus De­putatum Clericum, qui subscribit nomen suum.’

‘Instrumento autem Registrato, autographum seu originale a Clerico retinetur in publica custodia; Exemplari (ut superius diximus) Extracto & Creditori dato, ex quo executio sequitur tam realis quam in perso­nam: nec absimile est illud Extractum Instrumento Guarentigiato, cujus saepe mentio habetur tam apud Jurisconsultos quam Practicos; ex eo enim, non minus quam ex sententia solenni, Executio parata est.’

[Page 153] ‘Caeterum omnis definitio in Jure periculosa est, & Juris remedia etiam optima interdum remedio indigere videntur; nec Registrationis saluber­rimo instituto suum deesse videtur incommodum: Instrumenta enim cum in publica custodia sint, Incuria Clericorum, aut servorum fraude facile intercidunt aut subtrahuntur; ea autem perdita esse subo­dorati debitores aut eorum haeredes, actione Falsi (eam Improbationem dicimus) intentata, saepe liberantur; nulla Judicis sed summa actoris & reapse injustitia. In causa enim Falsi agitur, ut exhibeatur Instrumentum de quo quaestio est; ea, in libello, comminatione (seu ut practici lo­quuntur Certificatione) nisi exhibeatur irritum fore, nec ullam ejus Ra­tionem aut fidem habendam esse in Judicio vel extra Judicium. In ista autem causa Falsi, haud satisfacit Exhibitio exemplaris rite Extracti; nec immerito & sine ratione; Instrumentum enim ipsum multa fortasse suffice­ret argumenta, tam ad veritatem astruendam quam ad falsitatem argu­endam, ex comparatione Literarum, & Subscriptionibus Testium & Partium; & alia plurima quae Extracto tantum exhibito desiderantur.’

‘Hac Ratione impulsi nec provisis incommodis pluribus & graviori­bus (ut omnis mutatio etiam in melius est periculosa) Angli Judices tempore nuperae Usurpationis (si fas est praedones & perduelles Judices vocare) in res novas semper prurientes (annitentibus maxime Scotis qui eis assidere ut Collegae haud erubuerunt) statuto sancierunt, Instru­mentum ipsum exhibendum quidem, ut in acta referatur, Creditori red­dendum ut penes eum remaneret.’

‘Registratio enim cum sit actus voluntariae Jurisdictionis quolibet tem­pore etiam feriarum explicatur, non tantum extra Judicium, sed nec ullo alio fundamento nititur nisi consensu partium, & clausula Registratio­nis in Instrumento ipso inserta; Instrumento autem penes Creditorem remanente nec in custodia publica asservato sententia esset inanis sine ullo probationis adminiculo quod in actis sit. Adhaec, eadem & majora sequerentur incommoda; saepe enim non tantum ejus penes quem Instru­mentum est, sed aliorum interest ut servetur, praediis forte haeredibus Taliae & Provisionis ita dispositis ut multi sint gradus Substitutionum: eo, & multis aliis casibus tutius esset & aequius, Instrumentum illud in publica custodia esse, ut sic omnibus quorum interest consultum sit, quam Instrumento penes unum retento, ejus negligentia vel dolo reli­quorum Jus periclitari.’

‘Praeterea, Creditore penes quem Instrumentum est, decoquente, & cum Debitore suo colludente (ut id genus hominis fallax est) facile esset illudere Creditoribus suis, qui Instrumentum istud per adjudicationem sibi addici obtinuerunt, Instrumento, in causa Falsi consulto intentata, haud exhibito.’

‘Mihi autem in isto Recessu & unice satagenti quomodo prodesse ut­cunque possim, videtur; omnibus quorum interest consultum fore, & in­commodis & commentis quae ultro citroque adduci possunt obviam iri, si tempore confictionis Instrumenti ejus Copia aut exemplum describa­tur, ab eo qui Instrumentum ipsum scripserat, & ei subjiciatur brevicu­lum seu brevis nota ab eodem scriptore scripta, iisdem partibus & Testi­bus Subscribentibus, & ejusdem Datae; eo qui sequitur aut simili tenore.’

‘Nos vero (obligati scilicet in Instrumento) agnoscimus Copiam supra­scriptam, verum esse & integrum exemplar Instrumenti seu Contractus [Page 154] inter nos confecti ejusdem datae & tenoris; & volumus & consentimus ut virtute clausulae Registrationis in dicto Contractu insertae, nec non vir­tute praesentium ut praedictum Instrumentum coram curia exhibitum in Libris Curiae Registretur, habiturum vim ad effectum suprascrip­tum: nec non volumus & consentimus, quod extractum praefati Instru­menti in omnibus causis etiam Falsi & Improbationis exhibitum, una cum isto Breviculo, sufficiens erit & efficax ad omnes effectus, haud secus quam si Instrumentum ipsum exhiberetur aut productum, satisfaceret.’

‘Registrantur Instrumenta non tantum Executionis sed custodiae causa, & ad futuram rei Memoriam; ut plaerumque fit in Acceptilationibus & Apochis, quando concedens ad nihil faciendum obligatur, adeo ut Exe­cutione haud opus sit; ne tamen intercidant, consentit ut ad futuram rei memoriam; in libris actorum inserantur & asserventur.’

‘Registrantur etiam Instrumenta nec Executionis nec custodiae sed In­sinuationis ergo; idque summa ratione & necessitate nedum utilitate; unusquisque enim scire debet conditionem ejus cum quo contrahit juxta regulam Juris.’

‘Id autem scitu difficile est, isto tempore Candoris & Bonorum Morum effoeto, Fraudis autem feraci; saepe enim eveniebat ut comparatis praediis ut optimis maximis, nec cirta justum & maximum pretium, emerge­rent qui sibi Jus in iis vindicarent, vel Dominii vel Retractus seu Rever­sionis; sic iis vel evictis vel modica pecuniula redemptis Emptor delu­sus tam Terris quam pretio carebat, actione adversus venditorem plae­rumque inopem prorsus inani. Scire igitur expedit conditionem rei de qua contrahitur, an sit penes Disponentem & penitus sua, nec aliena sit vel Jure Dominii, nec Hypothecae nexu aut annui reditus aut alio one­re gravata; aut Retractui aut Reversioni obnoxia: Nec minus cognitu necessaria est conditio vendentis aut alterius contrahentis, licet enim Do­minus sit & Dominium sit potestas de re sua Disponendi, Juxta regulam Juris, quilibet est Rei suae Arbiter, subjungitur tamen in ista Regula Nisi Lex obstet; Lex autem obstat Dominis ne de rebus & Terris suis libere disponant, Legum vinculis forte praepeditis, Inhibitione scilicet, quando in rem & ad instantiam Creditorum inhibiti sunt: aut in rem suam & suorum haeredum iis bonorum suorum Administratione inter­dictum est: aut quando Rebelles Denunciati sunt & Exleges: De quibus impedimentis alibi & suis locis disseruimus.’

‘Ut autem incommodis ex ignorantia tam conditionis rei quam perso­nae obviam eatur, utque conditio utriusque innotescat, plurimis Constitu­tionibus & Legibus enixe cautum est.’

If a Disposition may be Registrate, the Disponer being on Life but the receaver being Deceast? Ratio Dubitandi, Registration is to the effect it should have the force of a Decreet, and there can be no Decreet in favours a Dead Person.

Regum Contractus.

‘COntractus Principis habet vim Legis, quoad observantiam; immo po­tentior est Lege intensive; quia ligat successorem, quod Lex non fa­cit: secus vero extensive, quia Lex ligat omnes Contractus.’

‘Regius etiam ex lege successor, factum Principis antecedentis princi­pali [Page 155] nomine peractum, ejus licet non sit haeres, ratum ut habeat conveniens est: alioqui publica fides, & dignitas principalis collaberetur, Thes. Besold. p. 549.’

‘Reges absoluti non litigant depossessionati, Le Roy plaide saisi, Thes. Bes. p. 560.’

Relief of Cautioners.

IF Cautioners finding the principal to be in a worse condition, may pur­sue for Relief before Distress? At least to be secured out of his Estate?

Relocation.

A Tack being set and the Setter being deceased. Quaeritur, If after his decease, and no person being Heir to him, the Tacksman may be said to bruik per tacitam Relocationem; seing there is none that can be said to be Relocans?

Reluitio seu Retractus.

INter Juris Interpretes celebris est Contraversia de Jure reluendi, seu Retra­ctus, quod apud nos Reversio dicitur, an ei praescribi possit? qui affirmati­vam tuentur; regulam; qui negativam, exceptionem, Sententiae suae fundamen­tum adducunt; Regula est, Omnes actiones, omnia Jura etiam maxime longae­va, longissimo tempore, id est lapsu quadraginta annorum praescribi & extin­gui. Exceptio est, Ea quae sunt merae facultatis haud praescribi. Apud nos lis ista sopita est; Constitutione enim Regis, Jacobi Sexti Act. Parl. 12. 1617. Ca­vetur omnia Jura Contractus & inter alia Reversiones & Retractus, & ex iis actiones, 40. annis praescribi; Exceptis Reversionibus quae sunt in corpore Juris, & investitura excipientis; & iis etiam quae insinuatae & in Archiva publica & regestum relatae sunt: quibus casibus (cum nulla subsit suspicio falsitatis, ut ait Lex ista) actiones ex iis statuitur esse perpetuas. Sed cum Contractus, Chirogra­pha seu obligationes, praescribantur, licet insinuatione publica & in archivis sint, qui fit ut ubi eadem & par est ratio dispar Jus sit?

Remissions:

IF the Exchequer, when Remissions are not given by the King, may grant Remissions sine causae cognitione, upon a Letter of Slains?

If Remission can be given for Murder? Answer. The Kings Power is not limited: but in Justice, Remissions cannot be given, but in the cases that by the Divine Law, and Law of Nations, the benefite of the Sanctu­ary may be competent: Whereas by Act of Parliament, there is no San­ctuary for fore-thought Felony.

Renounciation.

QƲaeritur, If the Father or his Executor may urge the Daughter who has renounced, to confirm her self Executrix to her Mother, to the [Page 156] effect her Renounciation may be effectual? Vide of nearest Kin. Quaest. 4ta. litera K.

Renounciation by Daughters at their Marriage.

IF a Man have a Son and Two Daughters; and both the Daughters Re­nounce all Executry, Debts, Goods, and Gear whatsomever, either provided to them, or which may fall or pertain to them by the Decease of their Father or Mother, Quaeritur, If the Son will be both Heir and Executor?

If a Person charged to enter Heir and renounceing, may notwithstanding be served Heir? Answer. He may be served: and no other person or Creditor can oppose, upon pretence of the Renounciation, seing Charges to enter Heir are Personal Diligences as to the Chargers only: and Re­nounciations in obedience thereto do militate only in favours of the Char­gers.

If the Charger may oppose? Answer. If he has any prejudice or Inter­est he may oppose; but it is thought he can have none, seing notwith­standing of the Service, what is done upon the Charge, or Renunciation will be effectual; and the Renounciation is actus involuntarius for Obedience: and with us there is not Locus successorio Edicto: And it were hard if Hae­reditas should be Opulenta that the Heir could not Enter.

Renunciatio Juri Publico.

REnunciare potest Debitor immunitati Nundinarum; quia licet favorem pu­blicum habeant nundinae, principaliter tamen de privatorum commodo agi­tur: & regula communis est, Quoties privato favori Lex aliquid intro­ducit principaliter, licet secundario publicam causam annexam habeat, Renun­ciari huic favori posse. Thes. Bes. Litera M. 43. P. 631.

Res Fiscales & res privatae Regis.

REgalia & res Fiscales, & res privatae Regis, magno intervallo inter se di­stant; [...]ae enim sunt privati Patrimonii, quae Principi ratione personae & non ratione dignitatis obveniunt; At quae Rex ex suis provinciis & ditionibus, ut Rex vel Princeps percipit, ea ad ipsius Patrimonium Fiscale pertinent, nec ad haeredes transeunt licet in rebus privatis succedant, nisi etiam in principatu succedant. Hering. de molend. quaest. 9. n. 71.

Re-seasin upon Reduction.

A Right being granted to be holden of the Superior; and after Infeft­ment, being reduced Ex capite Doli vel Metus. Quaeritur, Whether the former Right revives, Or if there must be a new one, what way is it to be taken? It is Answered. That it is thought, that the Seasin being ta­ken away, and being Facti which cannot be infectum, there must be a new Seasin; and the Superior is to be dealt with to give a precept, making [Page 157] mention of the former Seafin and Decreet of Reduction; and that he is willing to receive again the Disponer.

If the Disponer be deceased Quomodo shall his Heir be infeft? Answer. Being served Heir he may apply to the Superior, for a Precept mentioning as said is, and that he his Heir.

If the Lands be holden of the King, what course should be taken? An­swer. upon application to the Lords by Bill, they may grant warrand to the Directors of the Chancery, to give precept of the nature foresaid.

If the Superior may be forced to receive his former Vassal in the case foresaid? And if he should, will Composition be due? Answer. It is thought, that he ought to receive him but upon composition; seeing having once entered his Vassal, he is not obliged to Re-enter, but upon Compo­sition.

Reservation in favours of Relicts.

BY Contract of Marriage, a Lady having accepted a Liferent-provision, in Satisfaction of all she could claim, either of Terce or Moveables, excepting and reserving the third of the plenishing of the House, Quaeritur, whether by the said reservation she has a Right settled in her person to the third of the Plenishing, free of debt and moveable Heirship? Or if the said Third be only understood of free gear, the debt being payed, and Heir­ship deduced? Item if the said Third be lyable to a Bairns part, if all the Executry be exhausted but the said Third?

Resignation.

IF a Superior, who is a singular Successor, may infeft upon a Resignation in his Authors hands, as upon a Comprysing the time of his Authors Right?

IF a Superior has given a Charter upon Resignation whereupon there is no infeftment, Quaeritur, If he be denuded of the Superiority, will the singular Successor therein, be obliged to renew the Right, and to grant precepts to that effect, and by what action he may be urged?

Quaeritur, If after Resignation, the Disponer and the Person in whose favours the resignation is made, may agree and recede from their bargain without consent of the Superior, upon pretence that the Resignation is in favorem; and every Person may renounce Juri pro se introducto? It is thought, They cannot & res non est integra, there being a quasi contractus betwixt the Superior and them.

If after Resignation accepted, the Superior be denuded, whether his Successor will be obliged to infeft him? And what way he may be urged? It is thought, That Succedit in rem cum sua causa, and upon a Bill to the Lords there may be a warrand to direct precepts, as upon a Retour.

If an Instrument of Resignation in favorem, will prejudge a singular Suc­cessor, seeing it is not Registrate?

De Resignationibus.

Quaestio Prima. An Resignatio, in Manibus Domini Superioris, alie­nantem penitus devestiat?

‘ALienato praedio, & ex mandato in Instrumento Alienationis inserto, Resignatione subsecuta, & a Domino directo admissa, Quaeritur, An ea Alienantem ita devestiat, ut nullum Juris vestigium penes eum supersit, nec eo mortuo aut delinquente, custodia haeredis minoris, aut Maritagium, vel alia emolumenta Domino directo obveniant?’

Respondere visum est, Alienantem penitus devestitum & Dominio utili exutum; nec ex ejus obitu vel delicto, obventiones (quae sunt Dominii directi fructus) deberi Domino directo: omnia siquidem, quae Vasalli ut devestiantur facere solent aut debent, rite peracta sunt: nec obest quod unius interitus est alterius ortus, nec Jus proprietatis & Dominii directi a Domino discedit, nisi alii acquiratur; dici autem nequit Emp­torem aut eum cui Alienatio facta est, Dominum aut Vasallum esse, an­tequam a Domino directo investitus & sasitus sit; Jus siquidem nedum ad rem, per alienationem quaesitum est ei in cujus favorem Resignatio facta est, sed tantum non in re; & inchoatum eatenus, ut feudum sit penes Dominum directum, quasi per fideicommissum, & in rem ejus cui alienatio facta est, ita ut eum ejusque haeredes investire teneatur: & in Jure quod prope est, multis casibus idem censetur.

Quaestio Secunda. An ex Persona Resignatarii, & ejus vel obitu vel delicto, Custodia Haeredis & alia emolumenta Do­mino directo obveniant?

‘SI post Resignationem a Domino directo admissam, nihil commodi ei obvenit vel ex obitu vel delicto alienantis, quia Vasallus esse desiit, Quaerendum? An saltem ex obitu vel delicto ejus cui Alienatio sacta est, custodia & Maritagium haeredis, ususfructus ex Rebellione per Annum & Diem, aliaeque obventiones ordinariae & solennes ei cedant quae de­bentur cum Vasallus vel moritu [...] vel deliquit: nec Vasallus dici potest, quia nunquam sasitus fuit; Juxta tritum illud, nulla Sasina nulla Terra: Verius tamen & Juri consentaneum videtur, eo tempore quo per Resig­nationem, Terrae sunt in manibus Domini superioris, Jus & Dominium directum haud sterile & effoetum esse: & ejus fructus ei haud negari de­bere, isto colore vel captione, quod alienans devestitus Vasallus esse de­siit, Emptor autem nondum Vasallus est: nam si Domino nec renuente nec cunctante, per eum non stet quo minus Emptor investiatur, Emptore [Page 159] praemortuo vel negligente, vel fato vel ejus negligentiae imputandum quod Vasallus non fuerit & investitus: ubicunque enim de Domini commodo agitur, pro investito habetur qui a Domino parato investitu­ram haud petiit, nec ejus mors vel mora Domino obest: hac ratione haeres Vasalli haereditate haud agnita, si ad pubertatem pervenerit, ejus Maritagium Domino debetur; & ex ejus delicto, vel ususfructus vel praedium ipsum ad Dominum pértinet, etsi nunquam ei Vasallus fuerit: id quidem interest inter haeredem ejus qui Vasallus & in feudo investitus obiit, & haeredem Resignatarii; quod in illum, feudum quod decessoris fuerat renovatur & transmittitur; in isto vero feudum incipit; nec est Haeres Emptori, in feudo quod ejus nunquam fuerat: Verum illud faci­le diluitur, quemadmodum enim in Jure qui in utero est, ad varios effectus fictione Juris pro jam nato habetur; haud secus ubi feudum constituitur & eo nascendo maturuit, ut ab alienante abdicatum & in manibus & pe­nes superiorem sit; sed ea lege & fiducia, ut acquirenti novum infeofa­mentum concedatur, pro enato habetur; nedum quoad superiorum & compendia & emolumenta ad eos pertinentia; sed ad quosdam alios ef­fectus; Haeres enim Resignatarii qui morte praereptus decessit sine sa­sina; etsi primo investitus sit ex alienatione, succedit tamen in Jus acqui­rentis & non suo sed Jure haeredis; & fictione brevis manus feudum nan­ciscitur ut haereditarium: Haud secus quam si Acquirenti investito, ipse (eo mortuo) ut haeres investitus fuisset; ideo feudum in ejus persona haud novum & Conquestus, sed haereditas censetur: Et si decesserit orbus & sine liberis ad Agnatos ex latere descendit. Adhaec, licet feuda plerumque Acquirenti sint libera, ut de iis pro arbitrio suo Disponere possit haeredibus: quaedam vero sunt fideicommissaria & vinculata, ut nec alienari nec aere alieno gravari possunt; Feudum tamen haud ut liberum consequitur, qui parente praemortuo primus ex Alienatione investitur; sed si Conditionatum sit, conditionibus parere debet; & nisi paruerit feudo mulctandus ex lege Commissoria seu Clausula irritante; adeo in Jure spes proxima & radicata multum attenditur & operatur: & acquirenti nedum spes sed ex Resignatione Jus, adeo radicatum fuit, ut Resignata­rio & ejus haeredibus, & Jus ab eo habentibus auferri vel avelli nequeat: & Domino necesse sit feudum iis per Investituram tradere qui primi erant per Resignationem: dumque Vasallus ex Charta & praecepto sasinam & traditionem operitur, interim umbra quaedam traditionis prae­cedit, fundo Domino sursum reddito per fustis & baculi traditionem, in favorem acquirentis, & statim per idem symbolum rursum reddito Re­signatario aut ejus procuratori.’

Quaestio Tertia. An in Feudis, quae de Domino Rege tenentur, idem Jus sit, adeo ut per Resignationem Vasallus devestiatur?

‘AN in omnibus Feudis, sive ea de Rege sive de aliis superioribus te­neantur, idem Jus sit, operae pretium est quaerere? Et quidem ubi [Page 160] eadem ratio idem Jus est, & a contrario ubi dispar ratio diversum Jus. Id autem nec parum est discriminis inter Dominum Regem & alios su­periores; quippe hi rerum suarum providi & satagentes, sua Jura & com­moda scire & debent & praesumuntur, si nesciant aut negligant suo pe­riculo & dispendio est: Rex vero in id unice intentus ut Regno bene sit nec quid detrimenti capiat, Eaque Reipublicae mole obruitur ut rebus suis & privatis superesse nequeat: Quin & Quaestor & Proquaestor aliique quibus sacri Patrimonii procuratio demandata est, viri Illustres & impigri in omnibus fere Curiis Regis assidui & impliciti; tot negotiis distinentur, ut nedum supra vix omnibus pares esse queant: Hinc Obreptio & Subreptio, vitia in largitionibus principum saepe sed frustra vetita: hinc etiam negligentia, haud ex socordia quae in viros amplissi­mos & diligentes non cadit, sed reipsa, ut quibusdam casibus dolus, etiam sine dolo & reipsa esse dicitur: Ideo Constitutione Regis Jacobi Sexti: Parliamen. 16. Cap, 14. necesse fuit cavere, Ne Officiariorum & Mini­strorum Regis negligentia Regibus noceat: consultum igitur videtur esse, nec rimam relinquendam qua irrepant, nedum portam aperien­dam qua erumpant fraudes; id autem futurum, si statuatur ex Resignatio­ne in manibus Regis (aut eorum quibus id munus commisit ut Resigna­tiones recipiant) Vasallum penitus devestitum esse; nam Resignatio ista fit nulla indagine aut inquisitione praevia, quaenam sit Resignantis aut Feudi conditio; an is aeger vel moribundus, & forte nothus aut Bastar­dus; an vero Feudum Jure aliquo affectum sit, aut obventione ante Resignationem debita & cedente, aut Regi caducum & commissum ex delicto; sic haud difficile erit Regem fraudare imo Iudificare, E. G. Resignatione feudi militaris facta a Vasallo, cui haeres sit infans aut im­pubes, in favorem Emptoris simulati, si praemoriatur alienans, causabi­tur Emptor eum devestitum, nec haeredis impuberis vel Custodiam vel Maritagium obvenisse: Sin Resignatarius morte praereptus sit, alienans dicit se haud devestitum, nec de Alienatione aut Resignatione constare; notarius siquidem qui Resignationibus faciendis adhibetur plaerumque obscurus, & ejus opera utentibus addictior est: Contractus autem vel dis­positio ex qua Resignatio fit, penes contrahentes remanet, & cum sine ea Resignatio inanis sit, ea celata vel deleta facile erit rem eo redigere, ac si nec Alienatio nec Resignatio celebrata fuisset; & prout ex te eorum vide­bitur, & magis commodum, Colludentium arbitrium erit utrum alienans an vero acquirens eorumque haeredes Regi Vasalli forent; Ut est in Apologo de homine fallaci & dolo ancipiti numen ipsum fallere auso, & periculum facere an omnia sciret & vera responderet; cum enim sub vestis lacinia passerem haberet, sciscitatus est, an avicula quam habe­ret viva an mortua esset, certus, si Oraculum vivam diceret, eam necare illiso cerebro; sin mortuam, promere vivam: Responsum penes eum esse utrum vivam an mortuam malit: sed mille sunt nocendi & fraudandi artes, quas referre nec tutum est saeculo isto in fraudes nimis prono, cum vel memorare docere sit: verum re penitus inspecta videtur Responden­dum, idem Jus esse in omnibus feudis, nullo inter Regem & alios supe­riores discrimine, nisi quoad accidentalia quaedam & extrinseca, de qui­bus non curat Lex; Eadem autem est utrobique ratio; ea scilicet, post­quam Vasallus devestitus est Alienatione, & ex ea Resignatione facta & admissa; ex ejus vel delicto vel obitu, nihil vel commodi Domino directo, [Page 161] vel incommodi acquirenti posse evenire; Rex enim licet supremus, et ut Angli loquuntur Superior paramount, in Feudis sive dandis sive renovan­dis Jure haud Praerogativo sed communi utitur: Et cum sit fons Juris­dictionis, quod Juris in alio statuit, eo uti haud gravatur: Nec obstant quae attigimus Incommoda; nec Incommodum Argumentum, nedum Jus solvit; ea hominum sorte, ut nihil humani incommodi expers & vacuum sit: Imo inter regulas Juris ea est, Omnem Definitionem in Jure periculosam, adeo ut vix fieri possit quin aliquo incommodo subver­tatur: Ex adverso, haud desunt incommoda multa & gravia; in isto igitur conflictu, ut praesumptiones leviores & debiles fortioribus cedunt, ita incommoda aliis & gravioribus diluuntur: Si igitur aliter statuatur, quae populo & acquirentibus timenda sunt incommoda magis p aegra­vant; Rex siquidem de lucro captando, hi vero agunt de damno vi­tando; Rex de obventione & lucello casuali, & directi Dominii fructi­bus jactura levi & facili resarcienda; aliis subinde renascentibus.’

Quaestio Quarta. Si Alienatione facta, & ex ea Resignatione; alia po­stea fiat, & ex ea etiam Resignatio in favorem alterius, isque primus Investitus fuerit: & post eum prius acquirens: Quaeritur uter Potior?

‘ALienatione facta & ex ea Resignatione, si postea alius Emptor vel aliter acquirens, ex posteriore Resignatione prior investitus fu­erit, & post eum prior acquirens fuerit etiam investitus ex priore Resignatione, haud immerito Quaeritur, Uter potior Jure, & prae­ferendus sit?’

‘De ea ratione, apud authores nostros, nihil certi aut expediti Juris re­peritur: Quibusdam quidem, qui prius investitus est, licet ex posteriore Resignatione, potior videtur; eâ ratione subnixis, quod ubi jus per va­rios gradus perficitur, aut ex pluribus partibus integratur, is praeferendus sit, qui per reliquos gradus in summum prior innititur, & ex omnibus par­tibus Jus integrum & completum nanciscitur; nec enim in Certamine Equestri qui statim a carceribus perincitatis, impetu alios praetervolat, Bra­beum consequitur, sed qui totum emensus curriculum primus ad metam decurrit.’

‘Verius tamen est, & consequens iis quae superius disseruimus, primum Resignatarium licet posterius sasitum, jure potiorem esse; & posterius acquirentis jus nullum & irritum esse; utpote a non habentibus potes­tatem profectum. Summus quidem est Diligentiae favor, & vigilantibus jura subveniunt: Ac quod de Julii Caesaris foelici & omnia vincente in­dustria exemplari, proditum est isto versu,’

[Page 162]Nil actum credens, dum quid superesset agendum.

‘ID in jure assequendo, & ubi de eo diligentiâ certatur locum habet: Sed in ista specie, tantum abest ut secundus Resignatarius prior jus con­summatum adeptus sit, ut nec ullum habeat vel habere potuerit, vel ab alienante vel a domino directo: alienans siquidem dominio utili per ali­enationem & Resignationem in rem primi acquirentis, penitus exutus, nullum habuit quod in secundum transferret; Juxta illud etiam pueris notum & inter ludentes tritum, Qui nihil habet, nihil dabit, & juris pru­dentiae principium & regulam, Nemo potest transferre in alium plus juris quam ipse habet.

‘Nec magis ex alterutra Resignatione, in favorem vel prioris vel secundi Resignatarii, penes dominum directum jus aliquod erat, quod in secun­dum transferret; cum enim prima Resignatio in rem & favorem tantum primi acquirentis fuerat, & limitata causa producat tantum limitatum effectum; ex ea Resignatione, nec secundo Resignatario nec alii nisi pri­ori praedium dari potuit: Ex secunda vero Resignatione, cum sit prorsus cassa & inanis facta, scilicet ab alienante prius devestito, & qui nullum jus haberet quod resignaret; ex ea nullum jus erat penes Dominum dire­ctum quod transferret in secundum.’

‘Hinc est quod Resignatione facta, haud dubii Juris est vasallum sub­feudum & praedium de se tenendum alii non posse disponere; Cum igitur jus inferius & ut loquimur Bassum dare nequeat, an adhuc penes eum erit Jus & potestus per novam alienationem & Resignationem, praedium alteri concedendi, ut jus majus & nobilius & de domino Superiore tenendum consequatur? Obstante juris regulâ, Cui non licet quod minus est ei quod majus est non licere.

‘Cum praedia acquiruntur per Resignationem, eorum dominium non sta­tim & instar Boleti emergit, sed per varios gradus constituitur & elabo­atur: iivero sunt, ut proprietarius & qui utile dominium habet alienet, ut deinde vel ipse vel (quod plerumqe fit) ejus procurator, jus suum & do­minium in manus domini directi resignet; adhibito notario & Instrumen­to Resignationis in favorem acquirentis confecto; utque Superior prae­dium non jam Vasalli, sed cujus jus penes ipsum est, disponat Cartâ suâ, addito mandato de Resignatario investiendo, vulgo Praecepto Sasinae; & demum ex eo, acquirens investiatur: per priores istos gradus devestitur alienans, sed in gratiam & in rem acquirentis; per posteriores investitur acquirens; Quemadmodum autem, ubi Scala adeo angusta est, ut per gra­dus singulis tantum ascensus sit, prioribus gradibus per aliquem vel occu­patis vel sublatis, in superiores inniti nullus nec speratur nec conatur; Haud secus in feuda acquirendo, ex ista graduum serie, prioribus, quibus alie­nans dominio & jure suo nudatus est, sed in primi acquirentis gratiam, per eum occupatis; alteri posterius acquirenti, in ulteriores gradus penetran­di, nec spes nec Locus relinquitur: exinde de jure acquirendo & diligen­tia, frustra certamen esset, praedio per priorem Resignationem Resigna­tario adeo affecto & addicto, ut alterius esse nequeat.’

‘Ad haec cum duplex sit Resignatio praediorum, vel ad Remanentiam, vel in Favorem; utriusque quoad Resignantem idem & par est effectus, ut deve­stiatur scilicet; & quod ejus fuerat dominium utile, ejus esse desinat, & penes [Page 163] Superiorem & in ejus manibus collocetur: utroque casu dominium utile cum directo e vestigio coalescit & consolidatur; sed eo discrimine, quod ubi Resignatio fit ad Remanentiam & in rem ipsius Domini, Consolidatio id operatur, ut tam utile quam directum dominium penes Dominum sit, sed ut suum nec divellendum; ubi vero Resignatio fit in favorem, do­minium utile ita transit, ut interea cum directo conjunctum, penes do­minum Superiorem sit; sed ea lege & modo ut Resignatarium investiat: nisi enim Dominus esset, & etiam utile haberet dominium, nec id Carta sua dare posset: quod & ex ipsa Cartarum ex Resignatione stylo manifes­tum est; nam iis Dominus directus terras disponit, non ut amplius ali­enantis, sed quarum Jus ad alienantem pertinuerat, & per Resignationem translatum & collocatum est in manus suas, sed ligatas ea lege pro novo scilicet Infeofamento acquirenti dando. Ex his sequitur, vasallum per Re­signationem sive ea fit ad Remanentiam sive in favorem, pariter deves­titum; & post alterutram, in ejus fraudem, nec honeste nec utiliter ali­enare posse.’

‘Accedit quod haud pridem in mores nostros irrepsit, & iste apud alias Gentes frequentior, ut Investitura detur in usum & rem alterius quam In­vestiti: si igitur alienatio fiat domino directo sed in rem & usum alterius, & ex ea Resignatio facta sit ad Remanentiam, Isto casu haud ambigen­dum, alienantem frustra alienare in fraudem usuarii, in cujus rem & usum praedium domino directo alienatum & sursum redditum fuerat. Nec magis dubitandum est, & ea Resignatione quae fit in favorem, Alienanti ademptam omnem alienandi potestatem; nam utraque Resignatio fit in manus Superioris sed in rem alterius, & ista quae fit in favorem pariter transfert praedium in domini manus, quodammodo ad Remanentiam, & apud eum remansurum; donec ex lege fiduciae, quae in Resignationibus contrahitur, Resignatarius investiatur.’

‘Demum, Resignatio adeo solennis & in rem, & Dominii ab alienante translativa est, atque in ea tot actus interveniunt tam alienantis qui Re­signat, quam Domini directi qui Resignationem admittit, & jus penes se translatum Resignatario reddit, tradito symbolo in Fidem & Arrham In­vestiturae subsequuturae; intervenientibus etiam Notario & Testibus; ut Resignante mortuo, defunctis etiam tum domino directo tum Resigna­tario, Resignatio tamen ejusque vis & effectus haud intercidat & eva­nescat; nam & iis casibus, Investitura a Domini directi successoribus, Resignatario aut ejus haeredibus, vel ab eo causam habentibus, dari de­bet. Ea Argumenta sunt, Per Resignationem Dominium utile ab Alie­nante discedere, ita ut in Superiorem transferatur, & cum Dominio di­recto cui interea unitum est, transeat; nedum ad Domini haeredes, sed ad Successores quoslibet singulares. Ex istis omnibus, quae ut de re & quaestione tanti momenti prolixius disceptata sunt, manifestum est alie­nanti per Resignationem dissasito, nullam vel juris umbram vel vestigi­um superesse; & Alienationem & ex ea Resignationem si quam posterius fecerit, & Investituram etiam priorem eâ, quae ex priore Resignatione se­cuta est, inutilem & nullam esse; ut a non habentibus potestatem: sal­tem annullandam actione Rescissoria, quae nobis Reductio dicitur.’

Quaestio Quinta. An is qui in Dominium directum successit Titulo singulari, teneatur Acquirentem in vasallum reci­pere ex Resignatione in manibus Authoris.

‘EX eo quod superius dictum est, Dominium scilicet utile, ex Resigna­tione in manus Superioris sursum redditum, cum Dominio directo, ad successorem in eo etiam singularem transire; ea suboritur Quaestio, An Successor singularis teneatur acquirenti, vel ejus haeredibus, domini­um utile a directo sejunctum reddere? & si renuat, quod Juris remedi­um iis competat? Nulla siquidem inter dominum directum, qui ex Resignatione terras, quoad dominium utile, in manus suas recepit, in­tercessit necessitudo cum Successore; qua eum representet, ut haeres aut alio titulo universali; aut ex Fiducia, quae in Resignatione intervenit, fi­dem ejus liberare teneatur: Nec magis negotium ei fuit cum Resigna­tario; vel ullus, quo obligetur, vel contractus, vel quasi contractus.’

‘Sed praeter Personales, sunt aliae etiam Obligationes in rem, quibus res ipsa subjacet, & qui eam nanciscitur sese subjecit: Sic qui adipisci­tur praedium servituti obnoxium, licet ejus dum acquireret nulla menti­o aut exceptio fuerit, patientiam tamen, & quae ex servitute debentur praestare tenetur: Idem de Annuis Reditibus & pactis de Retrovenden­do & Retractibus ceu Reversionibus & Lege Commissoria dicendum; res enim semper transit cum sua causa & onere; nec alio aut pinguiore Ju­re Successor utitur, quam eo quod decessor aut Author habuerat: Ea autem est causa dominii directi, ut quandocunque Dominium utile per Resignationem cum eo conjunctum est, qui eam receperit vel ejus Suc­cessor etiam singularis, gravatus sit Resignatario & ejus Successoribus Dominium utile restituere.’

‘Si id facere cunctetur vel renuat Dominus directus, in promptu reme­dium est, ut sciꝪ coram Senatu ceu Collegio Judicum in Causis Civi­libus Supremo, actio summaria intentetur; & exhibito Instrumento Re­signationis, & novissima Carta & Investitura Auctoribus concessa, pe­tatur juxta eam novam fieri Resignatario vel ejus haeredi, Sententiâ la­tâ: Si Dominus directus haud pareat, sed adeo contumax sit, ut Re­bellis & Exlex denuncietur Banno publico, & Cornu pro Tuba inflato, ut moris est, quod ideo Cornuatio apud nos dicitur; Demum jussu & mandato Senatus, Cancellarii Director praeceptum Sasinae diriget pro Resignatario, vel ejus haerede investiendo, Ita ut de Domino directo te­neant, nec vasallus Jure suo fraudetur, nec dominus suo etiam culpâ sua decidet; Mulctandus tamen ob pervicaciam & Rebellionem, bonis omnibus mobilibus tam rebus quam nominibus Regi caducis; quod Eschetam vocamus.’

‘Ista sunt intelligenda de praediis quae de Subditis tenentur: Rex e­nim & Quaestores Regii, quique alii ei a Rationibus sunt, id quod ju­stum est haud gravate facere praesumuntur.’

Quaestio Sexta. An Superior nedum Resignatarium ejusque haeredes, sed Cessionarios investire teneatur?

‘QUaestionem praecedentem de Resignatario ejusque haeredibus reci­piendis, excipit ista de Assignatis, sic Cessionarii (sed parum Latine) apud nos dicuntur: omnia autem Jura, moribus nostris, cedi possunt, de quibus Investitura haud sequutura vel nec dum secuta est; Si igitur alienatis praediis, & ex alienatione Resignatione secuta, acquirens ea & jus suum per Alienationem & Resignationem sibi quaesitum, per Cessionem in alium transtulerit, Quaeritur, An Dominus directus Ces­sionarium recipere teneatur? Et quidem extra quaestionis aleam, vide­tur recipiendum esse; Alienatio etenim tam acquirenti quam haeredibus & assignatis ejus facta est; nec minus in eorum favorem Resignatio a Do­mino Superiore admissa est. Tenendum tamen est Cessionarios recipere Dominum directum haud teneri; Feudum siquidem Beneficium dicitur, & Beneficium nec invito nec ab invito datur & exprimitur; Interque Feudi sive essentialia sive naturalia illud est, ut Domino inconsulto nedum invito dari nequeant: Nam Feuda, initio & jure primaevo, dabantur a Dominis viris militaribus & sibi devotis, ob Fidem & Virtutem Belli­cam, tam ipsorum compertam, quam posterorum praesumptam, juxta illud Poetae, Fortes creantur fortibus, & bonis. &c. Licet autem saeculo dege­neri, Feuda etiam degeneraverint, ut instar patrimonialium sint, & Feu­da in ipsis Feudis desideres; Tamen fere ubique illud retinet, ut pro Vasallo & veteri Clienti, novus & extraneus non possit obtrudi; Etiam isto tempore quo bellum, ut ait Ennius, Magis cauponatur quam belligeratur, & mercenario milite conducitur & dolo magis quam virtute geritur. In Gallia, & aliis haud multis Regionibus, ubi favore Commercii (qui sum­mus est) concessum est Feuda alienare, id fit eo temperamento; ut pro recognoscendo & laudando Domino, Compositio, ut loquimur, & Laudimia Domino directo pendi debeant, certa parte pretii in id decisa, & Legi­bus definitâ. Caeterum apud nos, Feuda de Domino tenenda, nisi Do­minus consenserit, frustra (interdum haud impune) alienantur; Si mi­litaria sint, & Custodia, & Maritagium haeredis, ad Dominum pertinent: nec adhuc parum refert qualem Dominus sibi asciscat Vasallum. Aliarum enim rerum, juxta Juris Regulam, Duo non possunt esse Domini in solidum, in Feudis vero duo sunt Domini & perpetui, fed Dominio diverso & dis­pari; ita ut penes Superiorem, Directum; penes Vasallum sit Ʋtile; & u­trique ex eodem Fundo fructus sint & proventus, Ʋtili quidem Naturales, Directo vero Civiles & Obventiones; Ex ista, ut fere omni communione, plerumque nascitur quaestionum & litium seges, de Warda, Maritagio, Non-introitu & aliis Obventionibus, quae cedunt Domino directo: ut igitur litibus & rixis obviam eatur, & de dominii sui fructibus mature & officiose (ut par est) satisfiat, si mutandus sit Vasallus Domino di­recto cavendum est, ne pro viro probo & bonae indolis, morosum & dys­colum; & pro devoto & cliente, potentiorem & tantum non adversari­um [Page 166] nanciscatur. Iis de causis nec injuriâ, Domino ita consultum est, ne invitus Vasallum novum & incommodum habeat.’

‘Nec obstant quae superius dicta sunt, Dominum sciꝪ. Resignatione in ejus manus factâ in Favorem & in Gratiam acquirentis & ejus haeredum & assignatorum, eo ipso consentire, ut acquirentis tam haeredes quam assignatos in Vasallum recipiat; verba enim ista tam in Alienationis quam in Resignationis Instrumentis, intelligenda sunt civiliter & secundum subjectam materiam, sciꝪ. ut Resignatione factâ Resignatarium & Hae­redes ejus investiat (Haeres enim in Jure censetur eadem persona cum defuncto) Cessionarium vero si sibi visum fuerit: Imo si Resignatari­us investitus sit Charta ipsi & Haeredibus & Assignatis concessa, Feudo mulctatur, si militare sit, & Vasallum in Feudo vel de se vel Domino te­nendo, sine Domini consensu, investiret.’

‘Cum duae sint Alienationes, altera Resignatario, altera Cessionario, una autem Investitura: Si Dominus assignatum ex Cessione investire paratus sit, supervacuum est quaerere, an unum aut duplex Laudimium Domino solvendum sit; cum Domino integrum & penes eum arbitrium sit vel haud admittere, vel quibus convenerit conditionibus & Laudi­miis eum recipere; Et si Dominus per compendium, Cessionarium brevi manu recipere velit, Charta & ex ea Sasina ei tradita; haud inviden­da videntur Domino Laudimia, quae consequeretur si longiore & opero­so circuitu nec modicis sumptibus, Charta & Sasina Resignatario tradi­ta, & Resignatione in gratiam Cessionarii, & ex ea repetita iterum Charta & Sasina, assignati Investitura absolvenda esset.’

De Resignationibus a Domino directo acceptatis, An devestiant Resignantes?

‘SUpposito in facti specie, Vasallum Feudi militaris illud vendidisse; & Resignatione facta per procuratorem ex Mandato, inter alias clau­sulas solennes in literis seu Instrumento venditionis inserto, & per Do­minum directum seu Superiorem recepta, coram notario & testibus, ut moris est, & de ea Instrumento confecto; sed postea diem obiisse relicto Haerede impubere, Emptore nondum investito, Quaeritur, An Custo­dia & Maritagium Haeredis venditoris, Domino directo obveniant & debeantur? Haud inficias eo utriusque partis Patronis haud deesse argu­menta; nec ea quidem levia: sed omnibus ultro citroque perpensis, Negativa verior, et Juri et Aequitati magis videtur esse consentanea: Eo ta­men temperamento et cautelâ, si omnia bona fide acta sint, et dolus ab­sit, et omnis machinatio fraudulenta; venditore forte in extremis et morbo sontico laborante, et venditione properata, ut fraus et fucus fiat Do­mino inscio, et commento isto fraudato istis et aliis Dominii sui fructibus, morte Vasalli imminente, propediem obventuris; Si forte venditore et Emptore amicis et colludentibus, et Domino (ut fere Magnates sunt) haud satis attento, consulto differtur & sustinetur Investitura, ejusque petitio, ut ancipiti dolo frustretur Dominus; Causantibus, si praemoriatur venditor, eum penitus devestitum; si Emptor, eum nondum investi­tum nec Vasallum fuisse.’

‘Ubi igitur praedium venditum, & Resignatio in Domini volentis & ac­ceptantis [Page 167] manum facta est, nec ulla fraus, aut fraudis suspicio subest, ven­ditor Dominio utili exutus & penitus devestitus est, adeo ut ad eum de­vestiendum, omnia ab eo acta sint; ita ut nihil supersit agendum: Nec ul­lum penes eum sit Jus vel Juris umbra; nisi pacto inter eum & Domi­num convenerit, ut a Resignatione recedatur; quod plerumque fit, cum supervenit alius Emptor, & Resignatione facta in ejus gratiam, novo Emptori gratificatur Dominus, Charta & Investitura ei concessa: quod plerumque sed parum honeste fit, non obstante priore venditione & Re­signatione: quo casu posterior Emptor sed primo Investitus, & Jus ple­num & perfectum consecutus, praefertur priori Emptori etiam investito sed posterius: Prior enim tempore, quoad Jus completum, potior est Jure.’

‘Cum igitur venditor quoad Dominum & Emptorem sit devestitus, et quoad seipsum active; nec enim, ita devestitus praedio divendito, ex eo ali­quid commodi aut emolumenti potest consequi, aut ulterius aliquid agere ut devestiatur; Sequitur eum desiisse esse Vasallum, et devestitum esse Pas­sive ut ita loquar: Nec ex praedio, quod amplius haud est suum, aliquid incommodi aut periculi, ipsi aut haeredibus metuendum; Juxta regulam, Penes quem Commoda, penes eundem Incommoda. Et e contra.’

‘2. Argum. Secundo, Si venditoris filius Investituram petat, et, Do­mino (ut par est) renuente, Breve impetrarit e Cancellaria, et coram In­quisitoribus patrem obiisse ultimo vestitum et sasitum, et se ei Haeredem esse in eo praedio asserat, Et sententia seu veredicto quindecim-virali de­clarari petat; ei obstabit exceptio, feudum a patre abdicatum in Domi­ni manibus esse, et ejus fidei commissum, ut Emptorem in eo investiat, idque facere debere & paratum esse.’

‘3. Argum. Tertio, [...] &c. uno dato absurdo multa sequun­tur: Dato igitur Vasallum venditione & Resignatione haud deve­stitum esse; Hydrae instar, multa pullulabunt non tam incommoda quam absurda, a Ratione et Aequitate aliena. Si enim repraesentato pretio et Feu­do abdicato, et omnibus peractis quae faceredebuerat aut poterat venditor, ut Jus suum in Emptorem transferret, Vasallus adhuc est; tunc ex ejus aut Haeredis delictis feudalibus et Criminibus si Majestatis sint, Domino Regi; sin etiam sint in Dominum immediatum, Domino ipsi feudum ipsum committetur, aut feudi ususfructus: Si Venditor, aut ejus Haeres, Exlex, & per Annum & Diem rebellis fuerit; Si venditor Resignatione facta sta­tim morte praereptus fit, antequam Emptor investitus sit, sed pretio prae­cepto, aut cum Emptori debitor fuerat, fundo in solutum vendito, nec ulla vel venditoris vel Emptoris aut Domini culpa vel mora intervene­rit; Creditores tamen venditoris praedium, per licitationem aut Adjudi­cationem sibi addictum & in solutionem datum consequentur; Emptore & Creditoribus ejus (si qui sunt) frustra quaerentibus sibi legum praetextu delusis, tam pretio quam praedio carendum; eo colore quod praedium tum venditum, tum a venditore resignatum, adhuc tamen penes eum & ejus ossibus haeserit, ejusque Creditoribus & eorum diligentiae obnoxium.’

‘4. Argum. Si, mortuo venditore, Emptor a Domino directo petat Investituram feudi, per Resignationem in Domini manibus existentis, sed in favorem & rem Emptoris, & quasi Domini fidei commissi, ut eum investiat; & de Resignatione constet, cum Dominus Instrumento sub­scripserit, aut juramento delato confessus vel habitus sit pro confesso, Re­signationem [Page 168] factam & admissam, Dominum ut Vasallum investiat cogi posse, explorati Juris est: Emptore autem investito, qua fronte vendica­bit Dominus Custodiam praedii & filii venditoris, ejusque Maritagium, Non-introitum, aut alias obventiones ex obitu venditoris, cum Vasallum habeat Emptorem, & ei investituram dederit praedii ut optimi maximi, & quale ad venditorem pertinebat tempore Resignationis. Adhaec, Jura ista Wardae, Relevii, Maritagii, & alia ejusmodi, ideo introducta sunt, ut Vasalli haerede minore & per aetatem officio & servitiis militaribus im­pari; Dominus feudum ob servitia concessum, ea causa cessante, ad tempus quasi condiceret & rehaberet, donec haeres ad Legitimam aetatem perve­nerit: & cum uxores apud viros saepe uxorios plurimum possent, Do­mini multum interest, ex qua familia uxorem ducat, ne forte Domino iniquior aut inimica sit: Eae autem rationes cessant Emptore investito, viro ad servitia militaria parato & idoneo: nec refert quam uxorem du­cat filius venditoris, qui nec est, nec futurus est Domini Vasallus.’

‘Omissis aliis quae pro ista sententia cumulari possent argumentis: quae pro adversa sunt (quam possum paucis) perstringam & diluam. Pri­mum & in Jure fere unicum est; si venditor adhuc Vasallus nec deve­stitus est, ex ejus morte Custodiam, si infra aetatem Legitimam est, & ejus Maritagium ad Dominum pertinere, consequens est: antecedens au­tem verum esse, & venditorem haud esse dissasitum ita arguitur; penes devestitum nullum residet Jus vel Juris vestigium, quod alienare, aut in alium transferre queat; nemo siquidem plus Juris in alium transferre potest, quam ipse habet; venditorem vero, venditione celebrata & Re­signatione secuta, non solum de facto alienare, sed in secundum Empto­rem, Jus etiam nec inutile aut inane transferre posse, ex eo liquet; Quod secundus Emptor (ut superius attigimus) ex Resignatione in ejus gra­tiam, licet posteriore, prior tamen investitus, potior erit primo etiam investito, sed posterius: Et ab eo si possideat, praedium vendicabit & evincet.’

‘Accedit Cragii nostri, Juris communis & Patrii consultissimi, seu opinio seu Authoritas; ubi enim quaestionem istam (& satis prolixe) di­sceptavit; in eam sententiam non tantum propendere, sed pedibus iisse videtur, Vasallum, Resignatione tam ab eo facta quam a Domino accepta­ta, haud devestiri.’

‘Adhaec, quemadmodum Natura, materiam formâ quae inerat, nunquam privat aut exuit, nisi nova accedat; haud secus, Jura nulli Jus adimunt nisi alteri quaeratur.’

‘Sed Responsio in promptu est; primo enim, illud quod supponitur pro fundamento, Viz. Secundum Emptorem primo investitum, priori posterius investito potiorem esse, haud indubitatum aut extra quaestionis aleam est. Et Cragius nullibi quam in ista disceptatione magis perplexus aut minus sibi constans: Fatetur tamen, de eo fundamento moribus nostris variatum: Et Cragio, David Mcgilleus Regius Advocatus, vir laudatissimus, ab eo ibi & alibi cum maximi honoris praefatione laudatus, opponitur: & ejus non tantum sententia sed Senatus-consultum & authoritas rei judicatae, cujus ibi mentio fit; qua, Mcgilleo patrocinante; secundi Emptoris Investitu­ram licet priorem, primo Emptore agente actione Rescissoria, nullam & irritam esse Judicatum est; quia Alienatio facta fuerat a venditore devesti­to & non habente potestatem.’

[Page 169] Hopaeus etiam Juris nostri peritissimus; sed (ut plerisque videbatur) nimiae & captiosae subtilitatis, atomum & punctum distinguere videtur: Ait enim, si Vasallus ex Alienatione & Resignatione devestitus, dederit sub­feudum de se tenendum, id irritum fore, utpote concessum a non haben­te potestatem; sin autem dederit feudum de Domino tenendum, & Dominus secundum Emptorem primo investierit, Alienationem & Investi­turam valere; & investitum priori Emptori praeferendum. Quomodo autem penes venditorem Jus & potestas sit dandi Jus nobilius, & feudum de Do­mino tenendum; eidem autem desit potestas dandi Jus inferius & feu­dum de se tenendum, intellectu nedum explicatu difficile est; Et Oedi­po eget. Sed dato nunc moribus nostris in favorem diligentiae, secundo Emptori, qui praedium bona fide comparavit & sibi vigilavit, Jura subvenire; & diligentia praevertentem, & Jus consummatum ade­ptum, priori Emptori praeferendum; non sequetur tamen venditorem quoad Dominum adhuc Vasallum esse, nec devestitum quoad alios effe­ctus, & eos praesertim, ut Dominus, venditore vivo aut mortuo, ex ejus persona aut morte nihil commodi aut obventionis petere aut consequi pos­set; cum feudum non tantum alienarit, sed a sese penitus abdicarit, Domino consentiente, & feudum, per bacilli traditionem, solennis in Resignationibus symboli, recipiente; sed ut Emptori traderet; & Do­minus confestim & unico contextu, per dicti symboli traditionem, Em­ptori feudum reddere & Investituram concedere, si superstes sit; sin fato functus, ejus haeredi, Juris remediis compelli possit.’

‘2dum. Argumentum est, ab Incommodis, iisque haud paucis quae con­trariae sententiae assertores urgent. 1mo. exaggerant; eo temporis interstitio inter Resignationem venditoris & Emptoris, Investituram (quod, Em­ptore negligente aut moriente, incertum dictu, quam diuturnum futu­rum sit) Dominium directum interea sterile & effoetum fore; feudi Cu­stodiam, Maritagium, & alios Dominii istius fructus & emolumenta, si ex persona venditoris haud obveniant, quia vasallus esse desiit; ex perso­na Emptoris haud speranda; nec enim unquam fuit, nec certum est an futurus sit Vasallus; siquidem multa cadunt inter calicem supremaque labra: Porro, cum nec Alienationis instrumentum nec Resignationis pe­nes Dominum sit, sed illud penes Emptorem, istud penes Tabelliones, homines isto seculo lubricae & suspectae fidei; in suspenso & incertum fo­re, utrum Dominus sit venditori an Emptori; & colludentibus facile esse utrum velint, & prout e re sua et sibi commodum fuerit, Domino Vasallum obtrudere, celatis Instrumentis aut deletis.’

‘Ad istud Argumentum, haud respondebo, quod vulgo dicitur, Incom­modum non solvere Argumentum nedum Jus: sed ostendam, casu sup­posito, quae supra memorata sunt, non sequi incommoda: necenim ve­rum est Dominium directum interea inutile & infoecundum fore; nam Alienatione & Resignatione facta, quae non tam Jus est quam via ad Jus, licet Emptor Jus in Re & Completum ante investituram haud nancisca­tur; ex Alienatione tamen Jus habet ad Rem; & ex Resignatione rece­pta a Domino directo Jus in Re inchoatum; sed adeo efficax, tam quoad Dominum quam Resignatarium, ut si venditor dolo malo alii vendiderit, & Dominus directus dolo affinis fuerit, secundum Emptorem investiendo, neutri impune sit; sed Actio detur primo Emptori contra venditorem ex Empto: Et si inops sit, & contra eum actio inanis futura; datur adver­sus [Page 170] Dominum ex Stellionatu & dolo, pro damno & interesse: Imo cum Resignatarius recipiendae investiturae in spe proxima sit, & spes radicata in Jure multum operetur, si nulla Domini mora aut cunctatio sit, habetur pro investito, quoad Domini commoda & obventiones: quando enim stat per eum, cujus interest, aliquid fieri ne id fiat, habetur pro facto & impleto: Si igitur Resignatarius moras nectet nec Investituram petat, Terrae erunt in Non-introitu, Et eo du­rante Dominus fructus consequetur; Et si moriatur, Custodia & Mari­tagium haeredis, & ex haeredis rebellione ususfructus, si per annum in ea perstiterit, & aliae id genus obventiones, ad Dominum directum perti­nebunt: haud secus quam si defunctus fuisset investitus. Et quemad­modum mortuo Vasallo, ejus haeres etiamsi haereditatem non adierit, imo repudiarit, pro investito habetur, eatenus ut Dominii fructus & emo­lumenta obveniant, v. g. Non-introitus, Maritagium, & ex delictis Eschetae, seu caduca, & privatio vel feudi vel ususfructus; nec enim ejus mora aut culpa non petendo Investituram Domino obesse debet: Non absimili ratione; Resignatarius, ubi de Domini commodo agitur, pro Va­sallo censetur; si per eum stet quo minus sit Vassallus. Quod de Incerti­tudine objicitur, facile diluitur; si enim Terrae non tenentur de Domino Rege sed de alio Domino, sibi Dominus cavere debet & suo periculo si secus faxit, sibique imputatur; nec fere evenit aut contingere potest, ut Do­minus aliquid detrimenti capiat; Vasallus enim Domino invito haud obtruditur; & ante Resignationem cum Domino transigitur de Laudi­miis, & si quae alia ab Emptore praestanda sunt Domino, ut ab omni pericu­lo & incommodo securus sit. Non diffiteor longe aliam rationem esse Do­mini Regis; Cum enim Pater Patriae sit, nec sit e dignitate sua causari aliquem e subditis sibi iniquum aut infensum; nullo delectu aut discrimi­ne Resignationes recipit, per eos quibus eam Provinciam demandavit. Adhaec, Principes de rebus publicis solliciti, privatis superesse nequeunt; & viris clarissimis, qui a Rationibus sunt (utcunque impigris & sedulis) haud mirum est si aliquando imponatur; sed fraus deprehensa punitur: & lege consultissima statutum, Regis Ministrorum Incuriam & Negli­gentiam Regi haud officere: nec difficile adhibere remedia quibus fraudi­bus & incommodis obviam eatur, & inter alia illud esset haud spernendum, si Resignatione facta Instrumentum Resignationis statim conficeretur, subscribentibus etiam tam Resignante quam Resignatario, & apud Ca­meram Rationum deponatur; alioqui Resignatio habeatur pro infecta; sic enim constabit Resignationem celebratam, & incommoda supra­dicta cessabunt. Interea, quae pro Negativa disseruimus, intelligi velim, si compertum sit Resignationem factam, nec fraudem subesse, eo casu; quia omne Jus a Rege ut Juris fonte profluit; & si scriptum sit, sanxit; si moribus introductum permisit, & quasi tacito consensu firmavit; quod in alios statuerit Jure uti debet.’

‘Cum Deus nobis haec otia fecerit aut fieri permiserit, statueram ea ut­cunque oblectare id genus exercitationibus; & comperto quaestionem in foro ventilari, videbar mihi operae pretium facturus, si, in casu arduo, exitus dubii & ancipitis, & quicunque demum futurus sit magni momen­ti, quid Juris sit dispicerem; & quid meae esset opinionis dicerem; id feci eo animi candore; ut nec in Regem studio, quod mihi semper ma­ximum fuerat, nec alio affectu transversum rapi, mihi permiserim; li­cet [Page 171] in causa simili etiam res mea ageretur, nec socero nec vitrico nec aliis ultimus haeres fui; nec assentatione aut aliis artibus ab aliquo opes e­blanditus aut adeptus sum nec munus: antequam enim ad munera, eo­dem quo nunc mihi ereptum est impetu, & ab iisdem raptus sum tantum non invitus, & eorum quae mihi acciderunt praesagus: Deo largiente, & industriae Laboriosae & innoxiae, & alienis haud inhianti, favente, fui & adhuc sum Superior & Dominus directus haud unius Vasalli: sed cum ista animo agitarem, immo persoripsissem, haud animo praejudicandi ne­dum sugillandi amplissimi Senatus sententiam, incertus quaenam futura esset; sed ne animus negotiis assuetus, immo ab ineunte aetate innutritus, nunc ignobili otio & desidia torpesceret: tandem mihi nunciatum est Se­natum pro Affirmativa judicasse, secundum actorem Regis Donatarium.’

Retention.

QƲaeritur, In the Cases of Compensation (mentioned in the Questions second and third anent Compensation in the Letter C.) If at least the Defender may pretend, that he should not be in worse case, than if the As­signation were not made; and therefore ought to have Retention until his Debt be liquidate? It is Answered, That there is no ground for Retenti­on, but the Defender ought to have done Diligence to affect the Debt due to him; which he might have done by Inhibition upon the Depen­dence, or by assigning his Action, to the effect Arrestment might have been made in his hands of the Debt due by him.

Cum refundere oportet ímpensas & meliorationes, Jus Retentionis competit; quia interest magis per Exceptionem retinere, quam per actionem repetere. Jus Fluviat. p. 779. n. 78.

Retours.

IF the Sheriff-Clerk, and Sheriff of the Shire, to which the Lands are unite, may not give Seasin, and will be lyable to answer in capiendo Securitatem, for what is contained in the Retour, as to both Lands?

Retoured Duty.

AN Annualrent of One Hundred Pound Sterling being given out of a Barony, for a Sum of Money lent to the Baron upon that Surety, to be holden of the Superior, Quaeritur If the Barony, being of a conside­rable Rent, suppose Nine Thousand Merks per annum; and the new extent of the haill Barony being but Twenty Pounds, if the Annualrent should be in Non-entry, whether the Non-entry should be the full Annualrent, upon that pretence that valet seipsum? Or if it should be only a propor­tion of the retoured Duty, viz. The fifth part? Answer. It is thought, that it should be only a proportion of the retoured Duty; And valet se­ipsum is only understood, when there is no other retoured Duty; And in this case, it appears there is no other retoured Duty, In so far as the whole Barony and Rent being retoured, the Annualrent being the fifth [Page 172] part is consequently retoured: And it were absurd, that for the Non-entry of an Annualrent, there should be more due than for the whole Ba­rony; Specially seing the Superior wants not a Vassal of the Barony to serve him for the whole Barony; and the Annualrenter is not properly a Vassal obliged to serve, being infeft only for surety of his Money.

Return of Lands to the Superior, upon a Provision.

IF there should be any Difference betwixt Ʋltimus Haeres, and the King succeeding upon a Provision of Return, Failȝieing Heirs male? Ratio Dubitandi, An ultimus Haeres and the Donatar is lyable to Debts; but in the other Case, it is doubtful: Because it is a Maxim, that when e­ver Lands are returned to the Superior, either ad Remanentiam, or ad Tempus, as in the Case of Forefaulture, or Recognition, or Ward, or Non-entry, they return pura & ut profecta sunt: and specially in Ward-lands, and where it appears that the Superior elegit familiam, and has given Lands with an express Provision of Return; it may seem reasonable, that seing he has none to serve him in the Family, he may have the Lands back in the same condition he did give them.

Return of Lands to the King, failȝiening of Heirs Male.

THE King having disponed Lands without an Onerous Cause to a Relation or Servant, and his Heirs male; which Failȝieing to re­turn, if the Masculine Line fail, Quaeritur, Will the King have Right without the Burden of Debts? 2do. If the Lands be comprised, (although the King should be free of Personal Debts) Will the Compriseing, though expired be void, Quia resoluto Jure dantis, resolvitur Jus acci­pientis?

Reversion.

A Reversion being granted, failȝiening Heirs of the Granters Body; may the Granter dispone as absolute Fiar? Will his Wife have a Life­rent by the Contract of Marriage? Will she have a Terce? So that the Effect of Reversion will be only against his other Heirs than those of his Body, if the Lands be not disponed or burdened by the Fiar? Lamberton contra the Relict of Plenderguest.

What is the Import of that Clause in Wadsets subjoined to Reversions, That it should not be lawful to redeem, but by payment not only of the Sum given upon the Wadset, but of all other Sums due by the Granter his Heirs and Successors to the Receiver and his foresaids; if it be effectual not only against the Heirs, and those who represent the Granter, but a­gainst singular Successors? Rationes Dubitandi, 1mo. The said Clause is neither a Reversion nor Eik to a Reversion, which ought to be special, [Page 173] and eontain certain Sums, or liquid Obligements. 2do. Destructive of Com­merce, seing it cannot be constant, whether the Person having Right to the Reversion, be such as may be dealt with; seing it doth not appear by the Register, whether he be owing to the Creditor any other Sums by that upon the Wadset. 3tio. If the Reversion should go per mille manus, Will Sums due by all these who had Right thereto to the Haver of the Wadset or his foresaids, be real; So as to affect the Reversion. 4to. may the Creditor take voluntar Assignations to debts due by his Debitor, and so prefer such of the Creditors as he pleaseth, and burden the Reversion, so that the Debitor cannot redeem. 5to. If other Creditors compryse from the Debitor, before the haver of the wadset be creditor in other Sumes to the Granter, will he be prejudged by the Comprysing as medium impedimentum?

What is the Import of an Eik to Reversion? If the Creditor will have a real interest to affect the Duties, as if it were an Eik to the Back-tack? Ratio Dubitandi, The said Sum is due upon the Wadset, and eo ipso that it is eiked to the Reversion, it is eiked to the Tack; and plus valet quod agitur, &c. And on the other part, Reversions are stricti Juris, and import no more than quod sonant, viz. That it should not be lawful to Redeem, but upon payment of the Sum contained in the Eik.

Premonition being used (upon a Reversion) to the Wadsetter for re­ceiving his Money, Quaeritur, If there be Locus Poenitentiae, so that it may be past from? Ratio Dubitandi, Licet Renunciare Juri pro se intro­ducto. On the other Part, it may be pretended, That Jus is quaesitum to the Wadsetter; so that if it be his interest to have his Money, he may up­on the Premonition call for it. The Question will be greater, if there be an Infeftment of Annualrent with a Reversion to the Granter, without an Obligement to pay the Principal Sum upon Requisition; seing the Per­son who has Right to the Annualrent, may be concerned to have the Prin­cipal Sum; which he cannot have, if the Heretor do pass from his Premonition.

If a Comprysing of Lands disponed to the Wife, will Import Jus re­vocandi competent to the Husband, so that the Deed in favours of the Wife cannot be said morte confirmari, in respect of the said medium impe­dimentum? Item, Whether at least the Wife will have Right to the Legal?

Reversions of Comprysings against appearand Heirs.

IF Comprysings or Adjudications against Appearand Heirs do not ex­pire before they be twenty five Years? Ratio Dubitandi, That the Act of Parliament is in favours of Minors having Right, and the Appearand Heir has no Right: and in Adjudications they renounce to be Heir: and there is no Reason that the Creditor should be prejudged, upon Pre­tence of favour to a Person who has no Right.

If the Appearand Heir be reponed before he be twenty five Years, the Creditor who would adjudge the Reversion competent to him, will con­sequently be restored?

Reversion Personal.

QƲaeritur, If a Reversion that is Personal (excluding Heirs and Assig­neys) may be comprysed? Ratio Dubitandi, A Compryser is up­on the matter, and in construction of Law a Legal Assigney: And on the contrare, Voluntar Assignations are only excluded, but not Compry­sing: And there is not par ratio, because it is in arbitrio of the Person who has Right of Reversion personal to himself, either to Redeem, or not: but a Debitor having Right to a Reversion, ought to satisfy his Debt; And if he will not make use of his Right of Reversion to that purpose, The Law gives a Remedy by Comprising.

If the Compryser of such a Reversion may redeem after the Death of the Person to whom it granted? Ratio Dubitandi, The Heretor whose Lands are affected with the Reversion, ought not to be in worse Case, at least as to the Time and Endurance of the reversion: and the Compriser sibi imputet, That he does not make use of his Right in time: and he has advantage enough in Law, that the Reversion being Personal may be Comprysed.

If a Reversion, that is Personal, Doth fall under Forefaulture? Ratio Dubitandi, That the Fisk is not so favourable as the Creditor and Compry­ser: And yet it is to be considered, that whatever is competent to the Traitor doth forefault to the Fisk: And otherways, it would be an Incou­ragement to commit Treason, if such Reversions and Faculties being on­ly competent to Parents and Relations, they cannot forefault; so that their Children may bruik the Estate, notwithstanding of their Treason.

When a Person has right to Redeem personally to himself, after the use­ing of the Order he may assign; But Quaeritur, If having proceeded to his Order by premonition, he decease before compleating of the same, in that case he may assign, and the Assigney may prosecute the Order? Ra­tio Dubitandi, He has declared his Will to redeem: And yet on the o­ther part, Actus inceptus non habetur pro completo: sed Cogitandum.

Quid Juris, In such a Case, In Retractu Gentilitio? And if in any Case, in actibus arbitrariis facultatis, aliqualis Declaratio arbitrii, be suf­ficient?

A Reversion being to a Person; and the Heirs male of his Body allaner­ly, excluding Assigneys and other Heirs; Quaeritur if it falls under the Forefaulture of the person to whom the Reversion is granted as said is? Ratio Dubitandi. That all others are excluded, both Heirs of Line and Assigneyes: And on the other part, the Reversion is not meerly personal, but Jus Haereditarium transmissibile to the Heirs foresaid of his Body? Co­gitandum.

Quae Ratio, That a Reversion granted to a person only, and not to Heirs and Assigneyes; or a power to dispone reserved in the Right gran­ted with the same, may be comprysed, and yet does not fall under Fore­faulture? Answer. Nothing fals under Forefaulture that is personal on­ly, and which is neither cessible nor transmissibile ad haeredes: Whereas a Reversion that is meerly Personal, though it cannot be conveyed by a vo­luntar Right and Assignation, may be comprised: Seing by the Compri­sing, [Page 175] the Person who has the Reversion his debt is satisfyed; and he ought to have made use of the said Faculty and Right to that Purpose: And seing he is in dolo, that he does not make use of it, the Law doth justly provide that it may be comprised, and used to that end; which both in Law and Conscience he should have used for himself: Et interest Reipublicae ut quis re sua bene utatur.

Legal Reversion competent to Idiots, &c.

QƲaeritur, If a Fatuous Person or Idiot, having Right to a Legal Re­version has the Benefit competent to a Minor, to redeem after his recovery? Answer, It is thought, not: seing by our Law and Custom, Minors before the Act of Parliament 1621. had not that benefit: And by the said Act of Parliament, it is given only to Minors, Et Exceptio firmat Regulam, &c. And neither can Statutes be extended, nor is there eadem Ratio, seing the time of Minority is defined; Whereas a Fatuous Person may live a very long time; and it is hard that the Creditor should be in incerto all that time, as to his Right and Dominium, whether it be sim­ple or redeemable. Earl of Kincardin.

If Actions upon Contracts do prescribe against Fatuous Persons? An­swer, They do not prescribe; quia non valent agere: and there is a Diffe­rence betwixt Prescription of Actions, and of Legal and other limited Reversions, which are only given for a certain time: Because Jus Limi­tatum, to a certain time producit limitatum effectum, viz. A limited Action during the said time: And it being just, and the Compriser or Here­tors Interest, That the Reversion should be only limited, and for the said time, ne Dominium sit in incerto, as said is, he cannot be in worse case by Reason of the condition of the Party who has Right to the Re­version, being Minor or Fatuous: and in effect by a Reversion, the Com­priser or Heretors Right, is Jus resolubile sub conditione potestativa; and in such cases it cannot be pretended, that the party could not satisfy the con­dition, being Minor & Fatuus.

Rights made by Dyvours.

QƲaeritur, Whereas by the Act of Parliament anent Dyvours, Rights granted without an Onerous Cause, in prejudice of Creditors, are reduceible; without Prejudice always of those who have acquired Rights from the Confident Person bona fide: If the said Salvo should be extend­ed to Comprysers? Ratio Dubitandi, That it appears hard that Credi­tors should be prejudged, and be in worse case by the Fraud of their De­bitor, and their action (being competent to them and nata immediatly after the fraudful Alienation) should be taken away from them without their own Deed: and yet the said Salvo being only in favours of Pur­chasers, and favore Commercii, and of these who bona fide contract with Persons that are not inhibited, neither they nor their Authors should be excluded; and Comprysers cannot plead the favour of Commerce, seing they have not any Commerce nor Contract with a Confident Person, but against their will use Execution against what they conceive doth belong [Page 176] to him, which they do upon their own hazard, and therefore ought not to be in better case than their Debitor, and cannot have his Right but as he had it, Et cum sua causa.

Fraudulent Rights in prejudice of Creditors.

A Debitor after expired Apprysings, Dispones his Estate so incum­bered, by a Contract bearing an obligement that the Disponer should cause the Comprisers Dispone their Right: or that it should be lawful to the Buyer to acquire them: And after all should be purged, the Buyer being obliged to pay the Sum thereinmentioned, and accor­dingly having payed the same to the Seller, Quaeritur, If such a Trans­action, though it cannot be questioned upon that head that it is without a just price, yet may be questioned upon the Act of Parliament, as being without a necessary cause; and of purpose to defraud Creditors, who had not preferable Rights?

If a Person be in that condition, that his Debt will exceed the value of his Estate; and because his condition is not known, and being a person of Credit he is not inhibited; any confident friend knowing his condi­tion, if he should acquire a Right to his Estate in hail or in part, for a price equivalent, of purpose that he may have a Livelyhood, Quaeritur, if such a Right may be quarelled as fraudulent? Ratio Dubitandi, That it is for an Onerous cause: And on the other part, The Cause was not just nor necessary: and it is presumed that the said course was taken in defraud of the Creditors.

Right a non habente potestatem.

THE King having Disponed Lands, having fallen in his hands by Forefaulture; and the Infeftment being past under the Great Seal; the person to whom it was granted did decease before Seasin; and there­after another Donator procured a Right under the Great Seal; and was Infeft thereupon, Quaeritur, If the second Gift may be questioned as being a non habente potestatem; in respect the King was fully denuded in favours of the first Donator, and nothing could be done more to denude him by himself: and the taking of Seasin is not the Act of the King, but of the Party: And it could not be imputed to the Donator, that he did not take Seasin, being surprised by Death: And double Rights are forbidden by the Law?

Rights ad Tractum futuri Temporis.

WHen a Tack or Annuity for certain years, belongs to a person; It does not belong to his Executors; because it has Tractum futu­ri Temporis; But if he have Right to it by the Escheat of another person, it will belong to his Executors. To consider what is the reason of the dif­ference.

Right in Trust.

HIs Majesty having upon the Forefaulture of the Earl of Argyle given a part of the Estate to My Lord Lorn with the Title of Earl; beside what he was Infeft in before: And having given of Provision for the rest of the Children alse many Lands as would extend to the Rents alloted to them: and having given out of the Estate a Liferent to the Lady Argyle; and the rest of the Estate to the Creditors: and having appointed the Lords of Session Commissioners, for hearing the Creditors claims, and de­termining the same; and upon their competition for preference. There is also a Right of the Estate settled upon Three Trustees to the longest li­ver of them Three, without mention of Heirs and Assigneys, being Three Clerks, one of the Session, one of the Council, and one of the Ex­chequer, to the uses foresaid; and that the said Estate may be conveyed, and alloted, as His Majesty had Ordered: Quaeritur, If a Signature to the effect foresaid be habilis modus? Answer. It is thought, not; Seing there being no mention of Heirs, the said Right granted to the Trustees, if they should all Die, will evanish; albeit it be granted to them in Fee: And therefore it is thought, that the proper way were, That a Commission only should be granted to the Trustees, to Dispone to such persons, as the Commissioners should appoint: And as to Lands holden of the King, Charters should be granted making mention of the Forefaulture, and Commission and Disposition made by vertue thereof, and ratifying the same; and conform thereto giving and Disponing the Lands therein­contained.

Ripae & Ripatica.

USus Riparum est publicus, & cuilibet licet naves ad eas appellere; Ripae enim hanc servitutem debent flumini, cujus usus sine usu riparum nullus est: & servitus ista a natura imposita videtur, ut usu fluminis concesso & ea concessa in­telligantur sine quibus eo uti non possumus. Jus Fluviaticum p. 28. n. 362.

Ripatica penduntur pro trajectione, quae navi fit ab una Ripa in aliam: & sunt omnia Emolumenta & reditus quae Princeps capit in Ripis fluminum, ve­ctigalia scilicet & potestas cogendi ad muniendas Ripas. Idem p. 30. n. 375.

Quando Dies cedit in Grass Roums, when there is Question betwixt Fiars and Liferenters?

IT being the Custom of the Country in some places, That Lands con­sisting of Grass-Roums, are Yearly set from Whitesunday to Whitesunday thereafter, for payment of a Silver Duty at Martinmass after they are set; Quaeritur Therefore, If the Fiar survive the Whitesunday, but dieth be­fore the Martinmass, if he will have any part of the Martinmass Duty? Or if it will belong entirely to the Relict, Liferenter, or next Fiar? An­swer. It is thought, That he nor his Executors would have no part of that Duty, being payed for the said Year, betwixt Whitesunday and the next ensueing Whitesunday: Seing he deceased (as said is) before Dies either cessit, or venit. Monmouth.

[Page 178]In some places Grass-Roums are set from Whitesunday to Whitesunday, but the Term of Payment is Candlemass, and Lambmass. Quaeritur, If the Fiar decease after Martinmass after it is set, but before the first Term of Payment; if he will have any part of that Years Duty? Answer. It is thought, he will have the half; and what ever be the Term of Payment, Dies cedit at Martinmass, for the half Year preceeding.

Seing for the Duty of Corn-lands, though payable betwixt Yule and Candlemass, yet Dies cedit at Whitesunday and Martinmass as in the Que­stion foresaid; Quaeritur, What is the reason of so great difference be­twixt these and Grass-Roums? Answer. That the Duty being payed for the Cropt, the Terms of Whitesunday and Martinmass are respected; so that the Fiar surviving Whitesunday, his Executors have Right to the half of the Year; upon that consideration (as appears) because the Lands are then fully laboured, and Sowen; and whoever survives Martinmass has Right to that Terms Duty, because the Cropt is then fully collected: But as to Grass-Roums set, (as said is) at Whitesunday to Whitesunday there­after; the Grass only is to be considered, which upon the matter is the Cropt of these Roums; and the reason why the Duty of the whole Year is payed at Martinmass, appears to be, that before Martinmass the Grass-profites are collected by selling of their Wool and Beasts, at or before that time.

Quaeritur, If the Fiar decease after Martinmass and has not uplifted the Duty, will the same divide betwixt him and the Liferenter? And if he has uplifted the same, if his Executors would be Lyable to refound the half to the Liferenter? Answer, Cogitandum. For if it be not uplifted it appears reasonable that the Liferenter should have the half, and if it be uplifted, it appears hard that the Fiar having uplifted the same Jure suo & bona fide, should be Lyable to render any part of the same; specially seing the Liferenter may have the same advantage if she should decease after Martinmass.

If Corn Roums should be set in the same Terms, That the Duty should be payed at Martinmass after they are set, Quid Juris? Seing the said payment will be before the next Cropt, and the Fiar may die before both the Terms of the next Year, for which the Duty is due? Answer. It is thought, that the Fiar cannot set the said Lands in manner foresaid, in prejudice of the Liferenter: And if the Tennent take the same that way, it is upon his own hazard: And the Liferenter would force him to pay the Duty, after the ordinary Terms of the Country.

Quaeritur, If a Tennent have a Liferent-Tack, and he Die after White­sunday, If the Tack will not continue for that Year? Seing the time of Removing of Goods necessary for labouring is past before his decease, and Roums being set from Whitesunday to Whitesunday, annus coeptus, as to La­bouring, habetur pro completo. Vide Annuum Legatum.

Quaeritur, If there be not the same reason as to Liferenters, in Labour­ing or possessing the Land with their own Goods, seing their Executors cannot remove the Goods after that time, and the Year of the Liferent is begun?

S.

Act Salvo.

QƲaeritur, If Ratifications in Parliament, with the Clause, That they should not be Lyable to the general Salvo, Will prejudge a third Petson having undoubted Right, and having been secured by a general Law, viz. The Act Salvo Jure: The Ratification being only a private Act, and the persons concerned not being called?

Seasin.

A Posterior Seasin, but first Registrate, whether will it be preferred to the prior Seasin, Registrate thereafter though debito tempore?

Registration of Seasins.

IF a Seasin of Reversion granted by a Bishop will militate against the Successor, albeit it be not Registrate in the Register of Seasins? Ratio Dubitandi, The Bishop doth not succeed as Heir: And yet he cannot be said to be a singular successor, and Bishops they are Corpora singula.

Special Services and Precepts of Clare constat.

A Person being served Heir-male or Provision in special in certain Lands, and deceasing before he be Infeft: Quaeritur, If his general Heirs will be lyable to the Debt of that person to whom he was served Special Heir?

The same Question may be moved upon a Precept of Clare constat, whereupon Infeftment has not followed; seing in neither of the said cases there is Aditio Haereditatis before Infeftment; whereas in general Services there is Aditio as to any Estate, whereupon there is no Infeftment?

Servitude and Extinguishment thereof.

IF a Person who has Right to a Servitude out of other Lands, should ac­quire also Praedium Serviens; Quaeritur, If eo ipso that he has Right, both to Praedium Dominans & Serviens, the Servitude doth extinguish; Quia res sua nemini servit? and if he should thereafter Dispone Praedium Servi­ens, whether the said Servitude not being reserved; either he or his singu­lar successor in the Right of the other Lands can claim the same? Or if he should Dispone praedium Dominans without mention of the Servitude, but with all Liberties and pertinents; whether will that Servitude revive, as being only Sopita for the time, while both Lands belonged to one person, [Page 180] but not extinct by any Discharge, or deed freeing the Lands of the same?

If a person has constitute by Writ a Servitude, and thereafter Dispone his Lands without excepting of the same. Quaeritur, If it will militate against a singular Successor? Answer. Such Jura Haereditaria which are in rem, non Transferuntur nudis pactis sed traditione; and by possession, which is instar traditionis: But if the Servitude be Discontinua as v. g. the leading of Sea-ware, which is not done but at a certain time of the Year, Quaeritur, what shall be done to perfect the Constitution? It is thought, it may be published by making Intimation thereof to the Tennents, and at the Paroch Church, and upon the ground: and the Granter, if need be, may be Inhibited.

Si alicui Jus hauriendi & adeundi conoessum est, utrumque habet: Si tan­tum hauriendi, inest aditus: Si tantum adeundi ad fontem, inest & haustus: aliquo enim concesso, omne illud, sine quo hoc Jure uti nequimus, concessum in­telligitur. Jus Fluviat. p. 89. initio.

Aut vicini aquam hauserunt, Jure familiaritatis aut Jure acquisito; hoc casu cogi nequeunt, ut in fonte mutationem admittant; illo possunt. Idem. p. 90. n. 40.

Lords of Session.

IF the Lords of Session have power to Judge Appellatione remota, seing they have the same power, which the Lords of Session had formerly? It is thought, that they have the same power Extensive as to the subject of their Jurisdiction; but not Intensive, as to the quality foresaid, if it be not exprest; being ex reservatis quae non transeunt nisi exprimantur: Seing Adaequatio, by the clause with the same power, is to be understood as to the ordinar power belonging to Judicatories and Incorporations qua talia; and not as to any Extraordinary Power and Priviledge: As if a Burgh should be Erected with the same priviledges belonging to any Burgh within the Kingdom, they will not have Right to be Sheriffs within themselves; by reason other Burghs have that Right, non qua Burga; but by a special priviledge: And some Lords of Regality do pretend to the Escheats of the Persons within their Regality upon Horning, and yet a Right of Regality by the general clause, will not cary the same.

If the Lords of Session be to be considered as Judges only, or Magi­strates, & Praetores habentes Imperium in some cases?

Sheriffs.

IF Precepts of Sheriffs may be put in Execution, by their Officers, after their Death?

Ships.

IF, a Ship being abroad, Traditio Instrumentorum (to a Buyer, viz.) of the vendition, be sufficient?

If a Ship be poindable, & quomodo?

Solarium.

SOlarium est vectigal, quod a superficiario penditur pro Jure superficiei in so­lo. Jus Fluviat. p. 70. n. 15.

Sponsalia.

IF, after a solemn Contract of Marriage, one of the Parties Marry other­ways; will that Marriage be lawful, even though after Banns upon the said Contract of Marriage? Answer. Contracts of Marriage and Sponsalia inducunt Jus ad rem, as in other personal Contracts, and Dispo­sitions anent Lands; but not in re sine Traditione; which in Marriage, is only when sequitur Benedictio in facie Ecclesiae, or Concubitus.

If Sponsalia be consummate and purified per Copulam, and a pursuit being intented for Solemnizing the Marriage, and Declaring the Issue lawful, the Defender die in the interim; may the pursuit be transferred in favours of the Wife and Children, ad hunc effectum at least, that she may have Jus Relictae, and they be Heirs and Executors to their Father? Eadem est quaestio, as to promise and copula.

‘Rejecta distinctione Canonistarum in Sponsalia de praesenti & de fu­turo, prout illi ista accipiunt: quaelibet Sponsalia, quibuscunque verbis contracta, nihil aliud sunt quam Conventiones de Matrimonio in futurum contrahendo. Christenius de Jure Matrimonii. Dissert. 1. §. 3.’

‘A modo tamen contrahendi, usu hodierno dividi possunt Sponsalia, in pura sine adjectione alicujus conditionis, & Conditionalia quae honesta conditione apposita contrahuntur, ut ducam si Pater consenserit; illa de praesenti; ista de futuro haud male appellantur. Ibidem.

‘Qui Sponsalia contrahunt, nuptias celebrare compelluntur, legitimis coercitionibus: & Contractus Sponsalitius, trinundino promulgatur in Ecclesia, aut pro Curia. Ibidem sent. 6.’

‘Concubitu purificantur Sponsalia sub conditione, & statim fit conjugi­um; quia censentur sponsi a conditione recedere: nec obest protestatio se non recedere, utpote contraria facto. Christen. de Sponsal. quaest. 9.’

Statuta.

‘STatuta, Ratione Bonorum sui Territorii, obligant etiam non subje­ctos; ipsas enim res afficiunt, sive a Cive possideantur sive ab Ad­vena. Thes. Bes. lit. S. 110. ante finem. addit. p. 902.’

Steelbow and Heirship.

WHether a Roum being set in Tack for certain Years with Steelbow-Goods, as Oxen &c. will the Steelbow Goods belong to the Heir who has Right to the Tack? Or to the Executor? Ratio Dubitandi, Both the Lands and the Goods are set in the Tack as Fundus Instructus, and the Duty is payable in contemplation of both: so whoever has Right to the Tack, has Right to both, the Tack being Jus individuum. 2. [Page 182] The Goods are like nativi & ascriptitii & addicti glebae. 3. What is to ly fixed for diverse years cannot be reckoned inter mobilia. 4. It were hard to think, that a Relict and Bairns should have their Legitim out of Goods that are not in the possession of the Defunct, nor would be for di­verse years. And it would seem, That eadem est Ratio as to the setter of the Tack, and his Heirs and Executors.

Pecora dantur in socidam, cum animalium casus in Pastorem transfertur; qua conventione pecora ferrea effici & appellari solent; quod fit in multis pro­vinciis Germaniae; ubi cum fundo certus numerus ovium & vaccarum in feu­dum dari solet; ita ut Vasallus feudo sinito eundem numerum supplere & restitue­re teneatur. Besold. Thes. in verbo Eisern Biehe. lit. E. p. 224.

Strangers, See Process against Strangers, lit. P.

ALL Nations are Municipia, and the World a great Civitas: They have that Relation and necessitude, that [...] sunt, and owe Justice to all persons of whatsoever Nation, according to the Law of the place, where they Contract, with respect to that place; sibi enim legem dixerunt: If Justice be refused, datur remedium pig norationis seu Repressaliarum.

Goods or Debts belonging to Strangers.

IF Mobilia or Nomina belonging to Strangers (v. g. in England) should be confirmed here? Or if it be sufficient they should be confirmed in England? Ratio Dubitandi, sequuntur personam: On the other part, they are a Scotish Subject or Interest.

Subjects living Abroad.

A Native Living Abroad and being Popish, and going to the Mass where he liveth, Quaeritur, Whether he Forfaulteth his Estate in Scotland?

Item, If he Intercommune there with persons Forefaulted in Scotland; whether he be Lyable, as having contraveened the Law of Scotland; so that if he have any Estate in Scotland it may be affected?

If a Prince may command a Subject living Abroad under his Enemy to retire and come home? And if he disobey, may he be proceeded against, and be divested of any Fortune and Liberty competent to him as a Native?

‘Quoties Rex, Princeps, vel alius, in alterius Regis vel Principis Ter­ritorio bona habet & possidet, ratione quorum, Juramentum fidelitatis praestare solitus est; per hoc non efficitur, ratione suae personae, seu per­sonali obligatione, subditus aut subjectus; nec quoad personam sortitur forum nisi secundum quid; ita ut pro tali possessione bonorum conveniri possit, coram Judice loci, in cujus Territorio bona sunt. Thes. Bes. in litera H. 70. Huldigung. p. 402.’

Substitutes.

A Bond for a Sum of Money being granted to Sempronius; and Fail­ȝieing of him by decease to Titius, and Titius his Heirs and Assig­neys, Quaeritur, who is Fiar? Answer. The first person: Titius being only substitute, Failȝieing of him by decease; and Successor in spe.

Quaeritur, If Sempronius may dispose of the said Sum by Testament as he may inter vivos? Ratio Dubitandi. That Titius is substitute by a deed inter vivos. Answer. It is thought, he may: Seing such Deeds are upon the matter Donationes mortis causa; in which voluntas est ambulatoria.

Quaeritur, If the said Substitute will be lyable as Heir of Tailȝie? It is thought, he should be lyable; Seing if there were an Infeftment in the terms foresaid, the Substitute could not succeed but as Heir of Provision.

If a Bond bearing the Substitution foresaid be registrate, Quaeritur If the Substitute (being named as said is) may charge thereupon? Answer. It is thought, not; because the Bond being registrate, is a Decreet as to the first Person: but the Substitute having only right, instar haeredis by Suc­cession; he cannot charge no more than an Heir of Provision.

Substitutio.

SƲbstitutio est Designatio secundi, vel ulterioris haeredis.

Substitutio vulgaris est ea quae fit in casu vulgari, haereditatis non adi­tae nec acquisitae. Perez. Institut. lib. 2. tit. 15.

Substitutio Pupillaris est, qua Parentes Liberis suis in potestate sua & im­puberibus substituunt, in casu mortis ante Pupillarem aetatem, & acquisitae hae­reditatis.

Constitutione Divi Marci & Veri, substituens in alterutrum casum dunta­xat vel Vulgaris vel Pupillaris substitutionis, in utrumque substituisse intel­ligitur; alterum sciꝪ. expresse, alterum tacite. Perez. Ibidem.

Quaeritur, De substitutionibus in Taliis nostris, istis verbis, viz. Cum Terrae disponuntur Titio & haeredibus suis de corpore suo prognatis; qui­bus deficientibus haeredibus masculis &c. utrum sunt pupillares an vulgares? Responsio. Eas utramque Substitutionem continere: Deficientibus enim Hae­redibus institutis in primo gradu, quolibet casu, sive non adierint, sive haeredi­tatem adierint & defecerint, ad substitutos haereditas pertinet.

Substitution in Bonds.

A Bond being granted to the Creditor, and failȝiening of him by decease to another person, Quaeritur, If the Person substitute will be lyable to the Creditors Debt, at the least pro tanto; Seing the Sum was in bonis, and his Debt ought to be satisfied out of his Estate?

If such Bonds may be altered by the Creditor, not by uplifting which he may do being Fiar, but also by changing the Bonds, and taking the same to himself and any other person, or to his Heir? Seing the Bonds seem to be a perfect Donation in favours of the Substitute: and on the o­ther part they may be thought mortis causa.

[Page 184]If the Creditor may dispose of such Sums by Testament?

A Bond being granted by diverse Persons to my Lord Dundonald, and failȝiening of him by Decease to his Son the Lord Cochran his Heirs and Executors: and after the decease of Sir John Nicolson one of the Debitors, he having taken a Bond of Corroboration from his Brother Sir William to himself; and failȝiening of him by decease to his Grand-child then Lord Co­chran (his Father being deceased:) Quaeritur, Seing the first Bond stands as to the rest of the Debitors; Whether the Lord Cochran his Fathers Ex­ecutors, will have Right to the same? And what course shall be taken to get the Right of the former Bond settled in Cochran's Person?

Quaeritur, If the former Bond being null; and in the Bond of Corro­boration there be an Obligement to Infeft; if the nature of the Sum as to the former Quality of Moveable, be altered?

A Bond being granted to Robert Selkirk Merchant in Edinburgh, and Katherine Inglis his Spouse, the longest liver of them two in Conjunctfie; and failȝiening of them both by decease to Robert Selkirk their lawful Son, and to the Bairns lawfully to be procreat of his Body; which failȝiening, to the other Heirs lawfully procreate, or to be procreate betwixt the said Robert and his said Spouse: Which all failȝiening to the said Katherine In­glis her own nearest and lawful Heirs, Executors or Assigneys: with this Provision, That it shall be leisum and lawful to the said Robert Selkirk Elder at any time dureing his lifetime, vel in articulo mortis, by himself alone, to uplift, discharge, or otherways assign and dispone the Sums in the said Bond, in haill or in part, to any Person or Persons, he shall think expedient, and to make and grant all Writes, Rights, and Securities re­quisite thereanent, in due and competent Form, without the Consents and Subscriptions of the said Katherine Inglis his Spouse and Robert Selkirk his Son or his foresaids, had or obtained thereto in any sort.

The abovementioned Robert Selkirk the Husband, and Robert Selkirk his Son being both deceased, without Heirs either of the Body of the said Robert Selkirk Younger, or of the Marriage betwixt the said Robert El­der, and the said Katherine Inglis; so that the said Katharine has Right to the said Bond: Quaeritur, Whether the same will pertain to her in her own Right as Fiar, or as substitute in the last place, and representing the Fiar? And who is Fiar by the said Bond, Whether the said Robert Elder his Son, or the said Katharine, who pretends to be Fiar, because the Right of Succession terminats upon her and her Heirs?

It is Answered, That albeit when a Bond is conceived simply to two Persons in Conjunctifie, and the Heirs of one of them; the Person to whose Heirs the Sum is provided is understood to be Fiar; yet when there are diverse degrees of substitution of the Heirs of diverse Persons; the Person whose Heirs are first substitute is Fiar; and both his own Heirs substitute in the first place, and the other Heirs of any other Person substitute after them, will be Heirs of Provision to him: As when a Bond is taken to a Husband and his Wife, the longest liver of them in Conjunctfie, and to the Husbands Heirs; whilk failȝiening, to the Wife her self and her Heirs; tho the Right of Succession as to the said Bond does terminate upon the Wife and her Heirs, yet the Husband will be Fiar, both as dignior; and because the Right of the Sum will pertain to his Heirs in the first place: and to the Wife and her Heirs only upon their failȝieur, and as Heirs of Provision to [Page 185] them: And Therefore, In the present case, the Money being lent by the Husband, and being provided after his decease to his Son Robert, and the Heirs of his Body, whilk failȝiening, the Heirs of the Marriage betwixt the Husband and the Wife; and to the Wifes Heirs, only in the last place: It is thought, That her Husband is Fiar, and that the Wife and her Heirs will only have Right as Heirs of Provision unto him: And if Robert should have had Children, or if there had been other Children to the said Robert Elder by the said Katharine, it were absurd that they should have had the Right of the said Sum, which was lent by the Husband, not as Heirs to him, being their Grand-father or Father, but as Heirs to the said Katha­rine, being their Mother or Grand-mother; or that the said Katherine sur­viving her Husband should have power as Fiar of disposeing the said Sum; or to have given it to a second Husband, in prejudice of the said Robert her Son, or the Heirs of his Body, and the Heirs, if there had been any thereafter, procreate of her Husband and her, tho descended of both.

If it be found by the Lords, that either the said Robert Selkirk Elder, or his Son Robert was Fiar; the said Katharine must be served Heir of Pro­vision to the Fiar.

Substitution in Legacies.

A Legacy being left to a Person, and failȝiening of him by decease to another. Quaeritur, What the Import of that Substitution is? An­swered, It is thought, That it is Substitutio Vulgaris; and that the Effect of it is, That if the Legatar die before the Testator, so that the Right do not take effect in his Person, it should belong to the Substitute: But that is not fideicommissaria; So that the Legatar dieing after the Testator, it would belong to his Executors, and not to the Substitutes.

Successio in Maternis.

A Grand Father upon the Mothers side, having the time of his decease two Daughters, and Children of a third Daughter, Quaeritur, If the two Daughters will only succeed, and exclude the Children of the third? Ratio Dubitandi, That Representation is in order to the standing of Fami­lies, and in the case of Primo-geniture; whereas in Successione materna the Interest of Families is not considered; seing the Grand Children by their Mother has not somuch as caput in Familia: And for the same reason, mo­bilia, because they are not the Foundation of Families, admitt no Repre­sentation. Answer. It is thought, by our custom, The Children of the deceist Daughter will succeed with their Materterae: Et non potest reddi ratio omni­um quae a majoribus constituta sunt.

If the Children of the deceast Daughter do succeed, Quaeritur, If the deceased Daughter has left Sons and Daughters, whether the eldest Son of the said Children will succeed to their Grand Father? Or if all the Chil­dren will be Heirs Portioners as to their Mothers part? Seeing for the same reason, that their Mother and Aunts are Heirs portioners viz. That they are finis Familiae; a fortiori they who are not in Familia at all ought to be Heirs portioners. Answer. It is thought, that the eldest Son of the deceast [Page 186] Daughter will succeed as Heir portioner with his Aunts; and the Law doth favour not only Families as to preservation after they are constitute, but likewise as to their Constitution: And the eldest Son, albeit he be not in Familia materna, may constitute and be a head of a Family of his oun.

Successio in Stirpes.

‘SI duo Conjuges ita testentur, post utriusque obitum utriusque haere­des ex aequo successuros & haeredes fore; tunc non in capita sed stir­pes succedunt, & in duas aequales portiones haereditas dividenda est; quia quilibet suos haeredes aeque dilexisse creditur; & illis ex aequo prospicere. Thes. Bes. verbo. Gleich. 62. P. 323. & 324. sect. ult.

De Successione in Feudo amisso, & quo Jure censenda, utrum Haereditatis an Conquestus.

QƲaeritur De Feudo amisso & reverso, quo Jure censendum sit, u­trum Haereditatis an Conquestus; & de omnibus commissi speciebus competit, sive ob Alienationem, sive Disclamationem, sive Pur­presturam vel Baratriam, aut qualemcunque Feloniam, aliudve deli­ctum, feudum apertum dicatur; Sed quia Recognitio frequentissimus apud nos feudi ex commisso vindicandi modus increbuit, de ea & praxi nostra maxime solenni, & textui accommodatiori, quaestionem agitabimus: Decisionem ad reliqua commissa indistincte porrigendam praefati. Quae­ritur igitur, cum Superior feudum per Recognitionem sibi asseruit, u­trum feudum Recognitum post obitum ipsius, ut conquestus ascendat?’ An vero ut haereditas cum feudo dominanti descendat; posito feudum do­minans haereditarium esse?

Quaestio haec in se difficilis, & gravissimas consequentias secum trahens, haud aequali tamen difficultate in omnibus Recognitionis speciebus labo­rat: Quod ut patefiat, sciendum duas apud nos invaluisse Recognitio­nis species, ex causarum diversitate diversas; unam ob defectum Vasal­li, alteram ob delictum: Ex posteriori causa, feudum ob delictum & admissum Vasalli dicitur proprie committi: Ex priori, Vasalli prosa­pia, quam in prima feudi concessione dominus ad feudi successionem as­civerat, extincta, feudum dicitur finiri; & cum stemmate in quo rese­derat exspirare: si enim ab initio, contessum est alicui & haeredibus mas­culis ex ipsius corpore progenitis, vel descendentibus masculis; Vasallo mortuo, nec ullo ex descendentibus masculis superstite, dominus feu­dum ab haeredibus talliae, vel per foeminas descendentibus, revocat; & hanc feudi revocatïonem Balfurius Recognitionem vocat, & ejus praxin prodidit in Tract. de Recognitionibus, datam 18. Decemb. 1506. Regio Advo­cato agente contra Joannem & Margaritam Auchtrans haeredes, alterum tal­liae, alteram lineae: Et hoc Genus Recognitionis etiam in feudis Francis locum habet: feudo hac ex causa revocato, etsi dubitari potest, utrum in persona domini ád quem revertitur, Haereditatis an Conquestus natu­ram induat; certum est eodem jure quo feudum dominans censeri, ean­dem naturam & qualitatem sortiri respectu successionis; & omni alio re­spectu, [Page 187] qui ex distractione & divisione propriorum seu haereditatis & con­questuum, secundum nostram consuetudinem posset emergere. Quin etiam, hoc casu non solum Dominium directum dominium utile attrahit, sed possessio civilis possessionem naturalem advocat; adeo ut Dominus dire­ctus possessionem naturalem nactus, non dicatur novam adeptus, sed vete­rem continuare possessionem, astipulantibus omnium doctorum suffra­giis, in L. clam possidere. ff. de acquirenda vel amittenda possessione: Et haec feudi extincti redintegratio adeo Aequitate & Ratione subnititur, ut fi­at in eodem qualitatum statu quibus feudum dominans afficitur, tam quoad usumfructum, ff. de usufructu: quam hypothecam L. si fundus in principio ff. de pignor. Et servitutes ex fundo dominante debitas: idque optimo Jure, quia accessio per modum unionis coiens, eandem pror­sus rem constituit, & res cui unitur omnes suas Qualitates ei impertitur. L. 26. sf. de pacto dotal. Atque haec decisio, firmissimo & irrefragabili Argumento nititur; quod dominio utili, quod per infeodationem a di­recto discesserat, extincto, & per modum merae privationis annihilato, nihil domino cedit, aut acquiritur; sed proprietas, quae abscedente u­sufructu & dominio utili eatenus fuerat inutilis, eo perempto pura & de­faecata emergit: ideoque dominium utile non redit; sed in persona pro­prietarii quasi recidivum reviviscit, & dominus nil nanciscitur, sed quod ante habebat, sed gravatum jure reali in alium devoluto, eo jure evanes­cente illibatum, & quasi purificatum incipit obtinere; sicut cum fini­tur Emphyteusis vel ususfructus, vel cum res revertitur ad mulierem soluto matrimonio L. in rebus. C. de Jure dot. Cum igitur nulla hic sit. Accessio nec Transmissio, sed mera privatio & extinctio, nulla potest esse acquisitio. Argumenta, quae hanc sententiam enervare videntur, quia in alteram Recognitionis speciem opportunius & fortius stringi possunt, solvere supersedeo, donec eam absolvero.’

‘Secunda Species, quae, proprie & [...] Recognitionis no­mine usu nostro indigitatur, procedit, cum Vasallus feudum militare, vel saltem ejus partem medietate majorem, quomodocunque, vel sim­pliciter vel sub pacto de retrovendendo seu reversione vendit, domino inscio & inconsulto; vel saltem ita gravat annuis reditibus, aliisve oneri­bus, ut major pars fructuum quotannis erogetur, & exhauriatur; quo ca­su feudum amittitur & ad dominum revertitur, ait Textus, & mores no­stri suffragantur: sed quo jure, utrum haereditatis an conquestus am­bigitur, & adhuc sub judice lis est: Certe majori difficultate, & fortio­ribus argumentis hic, quam in superiori specie conflictandum est; ibi enim feudo naturaliter finito & extincto sine facto Vasalli, nec ulla extrin­seca causa interveniente, nulla erit transmissio juris extincti & elapsi, sed virtute directi dominii utilis attractivi, naturalis consolidatio. Sed in hac specie feudum in se perpetuum de se non finitur, sed per accidens, ideo­que nova videtur acquisitio in paenam ingratitudinis, & sic veluti ex causa lucrativa juxta L. apud Celsum. §. auctor. ff. de dol. mal. & met. except. Secundo, Feudum recognitum haereditas videri non potest, cum non tam per virtualem praedecessorum successionem transmittatur, quam per emergentem delicti Vafalli occasionem, jure obventionis lucrativae quae omitti potest, patrono accedere videatur. Adhaec, cum subfeuda in eodem supposito cum feudo dominanti consluentia, non necessario cum eo coalescant; nec in consequentiam Consolidationis & unsonis, eadem [Page 188] jura qualitatesque participant; quicquid enim nonnulli sentiant, ex qui­busdam legibus male intellectis, confusionem & consolidationem astru­entes, L. Ʋranius ff. de fidejuss. L. Papinianus ff. de servitut. urban. praed. clarioribus legibus refelluntur; quibus cuilibet rerum suarum moderatio & arbitrium permittitur, L. in re mandat. C. mandat. L. nemo exteris C. de Judaeis: & receptae & triviali praxi frustra oppedunt; Constat enim subseuda a domino superiori empta, in eodem supposito coire non tamen uniri; sed in casu divisionis ab antiqua haereditate dirempta ad haeredes conquestus transire; idque apud nos observatur, & in Gallia ubi Jus Consuetudinarium dominatur expresse sancitum est. Tertium & ulti­mum Argumentum, quod maxime officere videtur ne feuda recognita haereditas judicentur, ducitur ab incommodo; si enim feuda recognita, feudo dominanti virtute consolidationis ut haereditas accedunt, sequi­tur feudi dominantis annexatione & incorporatione domanio & coronae D. Regis facta, & subfeudo aperto & commisso, subfeudo, inquam, quod ante incorporationem elocatum fuerat, (post enim, non licet, ne secu­ta dissolutione, proprietatem semel annexam alio modo quam in Em­phyteusin dare, Constit. 234. Jacob. sext.) feudum illud domanio ac­crescere & inalienabile esse, sicut reliquum domanium & patrimonium fiscale & publicum, non tam principis quam Majestatis & coronae; nec nisi praevia dissolutione posse a Rege disponi, quod absurdum: nec e­nim serenissimis nostris Regibus denegari debet libertas, quam feudi­starum Coryphaei Andreas Isernia & Mathaeus de asslictis, omnibus prin­cipibus attribuunt in L. Imperial. § praeterea ducatus tit. 55. de prohib. feud. alien. Et Galli domanii & Appannagiorum ex Lege fundamentali inalienabilium acerrimi assertores, regibus suis non invident: his non obstantibus, in alteram partem non solum propendeo, sed pedibus eun­dum censeo; eamque moribus nostris, juri feudali & civili magis con­sentaneam, nec tot tantisque incommodis laborantem, argumentis a­struere, & contraria diluere, conabor.’

‘Primo igitur, feuda recognita moribus nostris inter Propria seu Haere­ditaria numeranda ex eo patet, quod Jure haereditario & antiquo a prae­decessoribus transmisso vindicata; quodque non per modum transmis­sionis sed extinctionis & negationis ad Dominum devoluta sint: quam­vis enim, ut in priori specie, feudum non expirarit, & per se extinctum sit; quia tamen accedente Vasalli culpa, feudum vel ipso Jure vel prae­via sententia corruit; ideo merito dicitur extingui & irritari, ut Emphy­teusis in se perpetua, ob desidiem & Cessationem Emphyteutae biennalem annihilatur & extinguitur Jure cannonico & Civili; & Jure nostro scrip­to, constitutione 246. Jacobi Sexti; Ubi amissio & irritatio Emphyteu­se [...]s vel feudi ex Jure aequipollere dicuntur; irritatio autem & transmissio ex diametro adversantur, illa enim penitus annihilat & extinguit; haec Jus ab uno avocat & in alium transfert; cum igitur nil supersit, quod transmitti vel acquiri posset, necesse est Jus Dominicum se exserat; & nullo obice objecto, Dominio utili, quod habebat vasallus, extincto, Do­minium utile vi quadam alliciat; vel virtualiter proprietati & Dominio directo insitum & quasi sopitum resuscitet: & sic nulla somniari potest acquisitio nec Dominii directi quod Dominus ante habebat; nec utilis quod interit: & Dominium utile quod Dominus incipit habere non de novo transmissum accedit, sed antiquum per infeodationem supressum, [Page 189] ea resoluta, enititur & sese exserit; atque hoc moribus nostris ita fieri, argumento est, quod cum feudum redit ad Dominum, non cum onere quod in transmissione fit, revertitur, sed immune & liberum sicut ante primam infeodationem: adeo ut non solum alienationes & investiturae quae initio validae, utpote citra medietatem factae constiterant, recognitio­ne subsecuta corruant, sed etiam Subinfeodationes & Emphyteuses quam­vis ab initio recte constitutae, ex post facto subvertantur, & recognitioni subjaceant: secus quam in Gallia ubi feuda Domino aperta oneribus a vasallo impositis obnoxia sunt, Teste Molinaeo.

‘Atque hanc sententiam juri feudali maxime esse consentaneam, fa­cile liquebit, perpensa natura feudi: Feudum nonnulli definiunt do­minium utile; sed meliores Jurisconsulti, explosa Dominii distinctione quae non Juris sed Magistrorum est, nullum utile Dominium admittunt; sed feudum usumfructum & Jus utendi fruendi esse volunt Cujac. lib. 1. de Feudis. Duar. lib. 1. annivers. disp. Egumarius Baro, lib. 4. de Bene­ficiis. Joannes Borcholt. in disp. De Jure Emphyteutico. Et textu feudali ex­presso nituntur, qui definit Feudum Beneficii usumfructum, lib. 3. tit. 1. de feud. & primo quidem precarium, vel annuum, vel ad summum vita­lem, lib. 1. tit. 1. postea, usu gliscente perennem, lib. 3. initio. Sequi­tur igitur ex Jure feudali, feudum, ut omnem usumfructum, semel amissum & peremptum, non posse acquiri vel transmitti; sed cum pro­prietate consolidari; vel concinnius loquendo, dicendum usumfructum causalem, quem dominus habet ex causa rei & jure Dominii. L Si cum argentum. § penult. de exceptionibus rei judicatae: & quasi Dominii partem L. 4. ff de Ʋsufructu; & qui usufructu formali (ut loquuntur Doctores) impediebatur quo minus se exsereret; eo repagulo per sententiam de­claratoriam & privativam, secundum Dominum latam, substracto, emi­care quasi & emergere. Secundo, cum quis rem ob causam aliquam da­tam causa non secuta, recuperat condictione causa dati ex Jure Civili, connotat rem eo modo receptam cum omni causa & omnibus fructibus redire, quasi nunquam data fuerit. L. qui se debere. § Fandus ff. de con­ductione causa data causa non secuta: Et consequenter, si quis fundum hae­reditarium dotis nomine dederit, & nuptiis non secutis postea condixe­rit; post condictionem, haereditarium esse nemo est qui diffitea­tur? pari ratione, si feudum hae editarium aliquis in feudum dede­rit, & fidelitate quam stipulatus fuerat in perpetuum, vel nunquam se­cuta vel temerata; postea recuperarit condictione causa dati quae adver­sus vasallum infidelem Jure feudali intentatur, tit. 20. lib. 1. defeudis non dicitur de novo acquisiisse sed cum pristino Jure & causa recuperasse, quod si in persona primi concedentis feudum apertum non cen­setur conquestus, nulla est ratio diversitatis in persona haeredis, aut ali­cujus descendentis.’

Tertio loco, Decisionem hanc a Jure Civili & ratione non alienam esse, abunde demonstrant trita illa Axiomata & Brocordica, Neminem sibi ser­vire aut in se agere posse, L. siquis aedes. ff. de servit. praed. urban: Omnem obligationem per confusionem extingui & exinaniri, L. Ʋranius. ff. de fidejussor. & Maximae Philosophicae, ex relatis uno sublato tolli alterum; & idem agens & patiens in rerum natura concipi non posse: & conse­quenter eundem Dominum & vasallum esse absurdum videri; & proin­de feuda necessario consolidari: praeterea, quamvis omnium doctorum calculo, Jus feudale Jure civili posterius, eoque plerisque in locis exo­lescente [Page 190] quasi posthumum sit, certum tamen est in Jure civili nonnullas quasi umbras & feudorum simulachra reperiri; a quibus ad feuda non inepte ducitur consequentia; & ut omittam praedia stipendiaria nec mancipi, de quibus mentio fit in § per traditionem Ʋ. instit. de rerum divisione; & militias, in L. omni modo. C. de inofficioso Testamento; clientelas, de quibus passim toto Jure: & Jus [...] seu Libellari­um, cujus meminit, Just. novella septima. Jus Emphyteuticum omnium judicio Juri feudali maxime affine est, & hoc ad ejus exemplum, & ideam conditum videtur, Dominio utili seu usufructu in perpetuum e­locato, & conditione servitii & [...] seu praestationum pro melio­ratione & canone Emphyteutico subjecta; & in casu inofficiosae aliena­tionis vel contumacis cessationis feudi privatione irrogata: Unde fre­quentissima ultro citroque argumentatio fit, & quod in uno statuitur, ad alterum a doctoribus producitur, nisi expresse contrarium statuatur: Con­cludendum igitur, feuda aperta extingui & consolidari, sicut Emphyteuses de quibus nunquam dubitatum est a Juris interpretibus; praefertim cum verba Juris omnia negativa & privativa sint, nullamque transmissionem aut ex parte Domini acquisitionem importent, L. 2. C. de Jure Emphyt.

‘Atque his argumentis, feuda commissa feudi Principalis Jure censeri e­vincitur iis, incommoda quae contrariam sententiam gravant, quasi in sub­sidiis subtexere non erit alienum: inter multa alia haec eminent, 1. quod posita subfeuda recognita conquestus esse, sequitur pendente fundi Do­minantis usufructu, aperta usufructuario acquiri; ut omnes rei fructilis obventiones; idque non solum quoad usumfructum sed etiam quoad pro­prietatem, per L. usufructu legat. § 1. ff. de usufructu. 2. indidem se­quitur, feudo dominante sub pacto de retrovendendo seu reversione alienato, & postea ex lege pacti redempto, subfeuda medio tempore re­cognita fiant, reliqua commoda & fructus emptori non eripi; sed utcun­que ampla & opima latifundia cum pretio refuso penes eum remanere. denique venditorem fundi dominantis, quamvis ipsum cum omnibus viribus & pertinentiis alienet, subfeudum ante alienationem commissum, Domino seu Emptore invito, posse recognoscere; nec Jus commissi, ut Re­vium, & alia ante venditionem cessa & venditori adquisita, ad Empto­rem pertinere: Quae consequentiae quam cum ratione & praxi nostra congruant, judicandum relinquo.’

‘Hactenus sententiam, quae tam in Jure quam praxi nostra potior videtur, utcunque probavimus; supersunt argumenta, quae supra in contrarium proposuimus, quorum solutionem, licet ex praedictis facile eliciatur, pau­cis persequemur. primum & secundum facile concidunt, sicut enim non refert, quomodo aut qua occasione usufructus finiatur, sive per se, morte usufructuarii naturali vel civili; maxima & media capitis diminutioni­bus, an per accidens, cessione & proprietatis consolidatione Inst. de usu­fructu: Sed quomodocunque finitus ad proprietatem revertitur: ita feudum, Jure Vasalli quomodocunque extincto, sive naturaliter ut in priori recognitionis specie; sive ex commisso; ad Dominum redit, & primaevam suam naturam recuperat; nec obstat posterior pars secundi argumenti, quae consolidationem fundorum dominantis & subalterni in casu concursus in eodem supposito non necessariam esse concludit; quia vera est tantum in casu transmissionis quae fit jure extraneo & heteroge­neo, ex titulo emptionis, legati, vel successionis si Dominus haeres sit vasalli, quo casu feudum transmittitur cum onere a vasallo imposito; cum enim [Page 191] feudum sit jus transmissibile, quin Dominus haeredibus suis qui forte a successione feudi dominantis tallia aut alia provisione arcentur, consulere potest feudo acquisito, & citra consolidationem ad ipsos transmittendo, dubium non est: atque haec in feudo & Emphyteusi qui sunt usufructus perpetui recepta sunt, contra Juris Dispositionem de temporali usufructu qui nec cedi nec transmitti potest, L. si usuructus. ff. de Jure dotium, & Inst. de usufructu: quae tamen illaesa & illabefacta manet in casu extin­ctionis & commissionis, qui necessario consolidattonem & in pristinum statum sine onere redintegrationem implicat. Ad postremum respon­detur, cum Subfeudorum consolidatio luculenter demonstrata sit; & sub­feuda Domanio seu proprietati annexa consolidata, ipsius naturam & qua­litates & inalienabilitatem assumere; & doctorum, qui contrarium te­nent, authoritatem, quia ratione non fulcitur, authenticam non esse: Et haec est Juris civilis dispositio, juxta L. inter socerum, ff. de pacto do­tali: sed praxis, quae plerumque a Jure recedit, & hic & in Gallia, adversa­tur; & Rex subfeuda etiam domanio annexo subalternata, alienare po­test, nec requiritur dissolutio: Ratio praxeos hujus [...] haec obtendi­tur, quod cum annexatio sit stricti Juris & odiosa, utpote quae absolutam, & ut leges ipsae loquuntur, legibus solutam Principalis potestatis plenitu­tudinem coarctat, nullam extensionem patitur; ideoque ea tantum, quae expresse annexa sunt, Domanii annexi Jure censentur; non antem ob­ventiones & quantumvis haereditariae accessiones. In Gallia certe luculen­ta Caroli novi constitutio definit, nil Domanio annexo comprehendi, nisi quod expresse & diserte consecratum & coronae incorporatum est, vel saltem per decem annos ab iis quia rationibus Regiis sunt Domanio annexo accensitum est; dispar tamen ratio est in Gallia & apud nos; ibi enim feuda a genuina feudorum puritate disciverunt, & tantum non Alaudiorum & Patrimonalium Jure censentur, & proinde ad Dominum cum onere commissa revertuntur: apud nos vero tantum abest ut stricta illa feudalitatis tyrannis, quae rei suae dispositionem annihilet, emolliatur, ut contra intendatur; adeo ut vasallus, Domino inconsulto ne finium re­gundorum experiri posset, nedum de feudo transigere, quod tamen Jure feudali licet, tit. 23. lib. 4. de feudis. Et feudum rescissum proditur, ob deteriorationem & sylvarum stragem; cujus praxin refert doctiss. Cragius inter Davidem Boner de Rossye & Joannem Chrichton de Ennernythie. Concludo feuda subalterna ab antiqui seu haereditarii feudi Domino re­cognita, haereditati non conquestibus accenseri, & feudo Dominanti consolidari.’

Succesor Titulo lucrativo.

IF the Heir of a Successor titulo lucrativo, be lyable as himself, to the whole Debt contracted before, though exceeding the value of the Estate dis­poned? Ratio Dubitandi, The Title of Successor is a penal and passive title, and paena non transit in Haeredem. 2 do. The Heir of an Intrometter was found only lyable in quantum the intrometter was Locupletior, in the case of in Lauder: And on the other part, a Successor Titulo praedicto, is haeres per praeceptionem, & haeres quasi contrahit: So that he is not lyable ex Delicto, but ex quasi Contractu. 2 do. The Intrometter is lyable ex culpa; For a Stranger may be Intrometter, & culpa est immiscere se rei ad se non pertinenti.

[Page 192]If a Defunct should Resign Lands formerly tailȝied, and infeft his only Daughter in Fee: Will she be lyable as Successor titulo Lucrativo? Vide Intrometter, Quaestiones. 1 & 2. in Litera I.

If he should infeft in Fee his Appearand Heir of Tailȝie, having a Daughter who succeedeth to him in his other Estate: Will the Heir male be lyable as Successor titulo Lucrativo?

Quaeritur. If an Heir male being to succeed by a Right of Tailȝie, getting a Right of a part of the said Lands; will be Successor titulo Lucrativo? Ra­tio Dubitandi, The Heir male is not proprie haeres, being only a collateral; and there being an Heir of Line.

If an appeirand Heir get a Right only of a Liferent of Lands, where­unto he was to succeed: will he be Lyable as Successor titulo Lucrativo?

A person being Lyable to Creditors, and then having put his Appear­and Heir in Fee of his Estate; and thereafter being forefaulted: Quaeritur. If after his decease his Appearand Heir will be lyable titulo Lucrativo? Ratio Dubitandi, A Person forefaulted is nullus, and cannot be represented.

A Tutor or Factor having accepted the office and Administration; and thereafter having put his Son in the Fee of his Estate, before he can be charged with any Malversation; Quaeritur, If his Son will be lyable ti­tulo Lucrativo, for any malversation after his Fee? Answer, It is thought he will be lyable; seeing the accepting the office and obligement ex quasi Contractu, is before the Fee.

A Father having given his Daughter an Estate in Land (or otherwise) in Tocher to her Husband, and reserving his oun Liferent, would she be thought to be Successor Titulo Lucrativo, if she be his Appearand Heir? Ratio Dubitandi, It is given to the Husband and not titulo Lucrativo; In respect the Husband has Right by a Contract, and in contemplation of Onera Matrimonii and the Ioynture he gives his Wife.

If at least the Tocher in so far as it is immodica, may be questioned and retrenched in favours of Creditors?

A Merchant in Edinburgh having married a third wife, and by Con­tract of Marriage being obliged to employ Twenty two thousand merks upon a Right of Lands, or Annualrent, to himself and his Spouse in Life­rent and conjunct Fee, and to the Heirs of the Marrage; which Failȝieing to his Heirs and assigneys: And thereafter having Disponed certain Lands for implement of the said Contract, to the eldest Son he had then of the said Marriage, which Failȝieing to his oun Heirs and Assigneys. Quaeritur, If the eldest Son and his forsaids will be lyable to all precedent Debts as Successor titulo lucrativo? Ratio Dubitandi. That he was only a Son of a third Marriage, and his Father had Sones of a former Marriage. Answer. It is thought, he will, notwithstanding, represent his Father; In respect the said Right is for implement of the said Contract, as said is; and if the said Sum had been employed, conforme to the Contract, he would have represented his Father: And by the said Right he represents him per praeceptionem: And that he would be lyable suo ordine as Heir of the Marriage, the Heir of Line being discust.

Quaeritur, In the case foresaid, if the said Son of the third Marriage will be lyable to Debts contracted after his Right by his Father? Seeing his Father is obliged, that he should succeed him in the Right of the sa d Sum: And the Creditors ought not to be in worse case, than if the said Sum had [Page 193] been employed, and Successores titulo lucrativo are not lyable to posterior Debts, when the Right granted to them is mera Donatio: So that their Father was not obliged that they should succeed: And the Father was a Merchant, and continued his Trade thereafter, and became Bankrupt. vide Heirs. Quest. 3. in Litera H.

If a Gentleman, by his Son's Contract of Marriage dispone his Estate to him, will he be lyable to all the Debts, or only effeirand to the value of the Right?

An Uncle having Disponed to his Nephew his Lands or others, being for the time his appearand Heir; and having Died without Children, Quae­ritur, whether he be lyable as Successor Titulo Lucrativo? Ratio Dubitandi, he was only presumptive Heir: And the Uncle might have had Children if he had married again: And upon the reason forsaid, if the Lands had holden ward they would have recognized.

An Appearand Heir being Infeft in Liferent in Lands to which he might have succeeded, Quaeritur, whether he will be Successor Titulo lucra­tivo, specially if the Liferent be settled upon him, and the Fee upon his eldest Son?

Singular Successors.

QƲaeritur, If the Act of Parliament anent Registration of Seasins, as to singular Successors, should only be understood such as have acquir­ed Right from the common Author; and not Comprysers and such as suc­ceed upon account of Forefaulture?

Sums heretable and movable.

Lands being Disponed by a Contract; and the Buyer being obliged to pay the Price, Quaeritur, whether the Seller's Heirs or Executors will have Right to the said Price? Ratio Dubitandi, The Price cometh in Place of the Lands, and the Heir will be obliged to denude himself of the Right of the Lands; the Disponer's obligement being only prestable by his Heirs: So that it seems the Heirs should have Right to the Price. On the other part, the quality of heretable or movable depends upon the arbi­trium and Destination of the Creditor himself; and it appears that the Dis­poner, having sold his Lands for a Price, he intended in lieu of an heretable Estate, to have only a movable Estate in Money; not to ly in the Buyers hands, but to be employed as the Disponer should think fit, either for Trade­ing or otherwise; So that the said sum should belong to his Executors.

Quaeritur, If Sums consigned for Redemption of Land, be of that same nature? Ratio Dubitandi, It appears there is a difference upon that con­sideration, that a Person who has a Redeemable Right does not desire his Money, and the Reversion is in Rem; so that the Sums due thereupon ap­pear to be heretable untill they be uplifted, & surrogatum sapit naturam surrogati.

Sums movable.

A Sum being due upon a Wadset, with the ordinary clause, that by the premonition, and charge that should follow, the Infeftment should not be loused untill payment. Quaeritur, If after Execution used the Sum becometh movable? Ratio Dubitandi, It is yet due upon Infeftment, and it cannot be conceived that the Executors or Donator should have Right to the Infeftment, being only in favours of the Heirs.

Eldest superior.

WHen Lands are holden Ward of diverse Superiors, The eldest Supe­rior and antiquior, is preferrable, as to Mariage. Quaeritur, the for­said quality of antiquior, whether it is to be considered in relation to the Vassal, so that the superior that he did first hold of is to be thought antiquor? Or if it be to be considered in relation to the feudum it self; so that the feu­dum that was first constitute by a grant from the King to the Vassals au­thors, should be thought antiquius?

Quid Juris, If a Person be infeft as Heir to his Mother or her Father to be holden Ward; and thereafter be infeft as Heir to his Father, the Lands also holding Ward; whether of the Superiors will have Right to the Mar­riage?

A Person being infeft in Lands holding Ward; and thereafter being infeft upon a Comprysing in Lands holding of the King, Quaeritur, If the Mar­riage through his decease will fall to the King, or the other Superior during the legal? Ratio Dubitandi, a Right by comprysing is only for security and Redeemable.

Superior mediat.

THe immediate Superior being found to have amitted his Superiority during Life, because being charged he did not enter, Quaeritur, If the mediat may infeft upon Resignation, being only Superior in that part and in subsidium, that the Vassal should not have prejudice by his imme­diate Superiors nonentry; but not ad alios effectus, which may prejudge the immediate Superior; and in special that, by obtruding to him a sin­gular Successor to be his Vassal? That same question may be in the case of Ladies Liferenters, and Conjunctfiars of Superiorities.

T.

Tack.

A Tack being sett in April of certain Lands and Houses, whereof some were possest for the time by the Tacksman by a verbal tack [Page 195] or Tolerance; others sett to Tennants: and the Tack bearing the Entry to be after separation from the ground in anno 1652. in which it was set, Quaeritur, A Compryser being publictly infeft befor separation, if the Tack will not militate against a singular Successor, the Entry being in­debito tempore after the Setter was denuded? Answer. It appears that the Entry, as to the commencement of the Tack, was presently the time of the date; Seing as to the Houses and some of the Lands the Tacksman was in natural possession: and as to the grass of the Lands sett to a tennant, the Entry though not exprest was at Whitesunday following; and the entry mentioned in the Tack seemeth to be meant of the Tacks­mans Entry to Labour; & Interpretatio facienda ut actus valeat.

If at least the Tack should be invalid as to the Lands which were set to tennants as being not publick by possession? Answer. It is thought, that a Tack being Jus indivisibile, possessio partis maketh it publick in Totum: And it cannot be ex parte publick and ex parte, non.

A Tack being set to a Tacks-woman during life, and after to her Heirs, until payment of certain Sums, for Ten shillings yearly, Quaeritur, Will the Tack be void as without Ish? Answer, It appears, that the Tack be­ing set for security of Payment of the Money, the Ish is not altogether un­certain; Certum est enim quod fieri potest c [...]rtum, per relationem ad aliud; and the Rent being One Thousand Pounds, it may be considered in what time that Rent may satisfy the Sum mentioned in the Tack: and upon the matter, there is a Reversion to the setter and his Successors, and they may determine the Ish of the Tack by payment of the Debt: Lady Braid and her Son assigned the Tack, whereof a Reduction was raised by Gor­gymiln, having bought the Lands.

Neither Servitudes nor Tacks do affect Lands in prejudice of singular Successors, unless they be real by Possession, Quaeritur, If such Rights may be registrate in the Register of Reversions, albeit the Act of Parlia­ment doth not mention the same? And if they be registrate, if they will be real as Reversions?

Locatio & conductio albeit they are not in Law inter Contractus qui re fiunt, and by our Custom they are not effectual unless they be Re, and cled with possession; before which they are personal as to the Contracters and their Heirs; but after that, they become real Rights, and bind singu­lar Successors, Quaeritur therefore, if a Tack of Lands be set to a Per­son to enter at Whitsunday thereafter? And thereafter another Tack be set to another Person before that Term, so that neither can have Possession? What way the second Tacksman may perfect his Right, so that he may be preferred? Answer, It is thought, he may make intimation of his Right to the present Tennent, and require him to remove at the Term, and pro­test for remeed of Law.

Quaeritur. Why Tacks without Possession do not prejudge singular Suc­cessors; and yet Tacks do prejudge beneficed Persons? Answer. Benefi­ced Persons are not singular Successors; which properly are such as do acquire and purchase: Whereas Prelats or Beneficed Persons are Suc­cessores Titulo Ʋniversali; and are considered as singular Incorporations, whose Deeds do bind their Successors.

When any Person is infeft in Teinds, Quaeritur, If he may set Tacks longer than during his Right, in prejudice of the Buyers, or other singu­lar Successors?

[Page 196]A Tack being set to a Person for fifteen Years, without mention of his Heirs or Executors, Quaeritur, Whether it be meerly personal? Or at least the Heir (if the Tacksman decease before expireing of the Tack) should have Right during the time foresaid? Answer, It is thought, that Tacks should be stricti Juris; and there being no mention of Heirs, the said limitation of time imports only, that the Tacksman should have right if he should live all the said time, and not after: And in Tacks industria & conditio Personae is to be considered, if the Tennent be a substantious and vertuous Person; whereas Heirs may be Infants, and not succeed in the Conditions foresaid.

If a Tack be set by a Church-man to a Feuer and his Heirs succeeding to him in the right of the Feu; if the Teinds of the feued Lands may be assigned, there being no mention of Assigneys? 2. If it may be Com­prysed? 3. If it cannot be assigned, Will the Tack fall by the Assig­nation? Tack of the Teinds of Paikie.

Back-Tacks and Prorogations.

WHat is the Reason that in Wadsets, Back-tacks are valid without a definite Ish, viz. During not Redemption?

Item, In Prorogations, Tacks of Teinds to begin after the Ish of the former, though the Titular be denuded in the interim? Answer, In Wad­sets the Back-tack is in corpore Juris and the Wadset is with the burden thereof; the Wadset and Backtack being correspective Rights: So that who succeeds in the Right of the Wadset, can have it no other­wise than cum causa: As to Prorogations, they are granted in rem, and by the authority of the Judge.

Tack of Teinds.

A Tack of Teinds being set to a Person and his Heirs and Assigneys, for his Lifetime, and four nineteen Years after, Quaeritur, If he be year and day at the Horn, will the same fall under his Liferent Escheat; only as to His Liferent, or entirely?

If after his decease it would fall under the Liferent or under the single Escheat of his Heir?

If it be for many nineteen years, exceeding the longest Life of any man; Will it fall notwithstanding under a single Escheat, seing there is not a formal Liferent constitute?

If a Tack for many nineteen years should be assigned; will the same fall under the single escheat of the assigney; seing there is no liferent as to him, and the liferenters may all die in his lifetime?

Will not the Assigney have Right for the lifetimes of the Heirs, though they be not served Heirs?

The Tack being for three Lifetimes, and certain nineteen Years after; Quid Juris, Where the Tacksman has no Heirs, so that there is place to a Gift of Bastardy or ultimus haeres?

Tacks of Lands being real by the Act of Parliament in favours of Ten­nents; Quaeritur, Quid Juris, As to Tacks of Teinds?

Tailȝies.

WHen a person, having acquired Lands, provides the same to his Heirs Male, Quaeritur, Whether the Maxime viz. Haereditas de­scendit & Conquestus ascendit has place in Tailȝies?

If a Tutor, Intrometting with the Duties of Lands Entailed to the Heirs Male, may not employ the same upon security to the Pupil and his Heirs Male; upon pretence that it should be presumed, that it was in the Pa­rents intention, as appears by the Entail? Answer. It is affirmed, that it was so decided in the case of the Heirs of Cockburns-path, which we have not seen: But it is thought, that a Tailȝie being Institutio Haeredis; as a Tutor could not make a Testament for his Pupil, nor name an Heir and Executor for his Pupil, so he could not make a Tailȝie either in Land or Money.

There being a Tailȝie in these terms, that it should not be lawful to break the same; and the Fee having descended to a Woman, by vertue thereof; who did notwithstanding resign the Fee in favours of the Hus­band and the Heirs of the Marriage, which Failȝieing to the other Heirs of the former Tailȝie; and thereafter the said Heir of Tailȝie having ob­tained a Decreet of Reduction of the said Right Ex capite Minoritatis, for eviteing the hazard of the Clause irritant in the first Tailȝie; albeit the Right granted to her Husband was ratified in Parliament, with the clause that the Ratification should not be Lyable to the Act Salvo Jure: Quae­ritur, If the Husband be Forefaulted and his Posterity disabled, if the Heirs of Tailȝie having Right to succeed after the Wife and her Chil­dren, may be prejudged by that Forefaulture? Answer. It is thought, not; Seing the Husband was not in the Fee, the time of the Forefaulture, the same being taken away by a Reduction.

If the Woman should thereafter Marry, and have Children the time of her decease but disabled. Quaeritur, If the Children of the Husband, who would otherways succeed, if the Father were not Forefaulted; will Forefault the Right of the said Estate to the King, and will be in the case of a person that is Forefaulted, and has Right of Succession to the Estate as Appearand Heir? Cogitandum.

Seing there may be Quaestion, Quaeritur, what course shall be taken to prevent it? Answer, It is thought, that a Gift may be procured from the King, making mention of the Forefaulture and Dishabilitation; and notwithstanding, that His Majesty is not willing that the persons who are to succeed, Failȝieing the Wife of the Forefaulted person, and the Heirs of her Body, should be prejudged; having been Faithful and Active in opposing the late Rebellion: Therefore, He doth ratify the said Tailȝie in so far as concerns them, and the Right of Succession; Declaring that it shall not be prejudged by the Forefaulture and Inability: And for their farther security, in case after the Decease of the Wife, the Children of the Forefaulted Person be surviving, and that any Right to the said Estate shall belong and accrue to His Majesty by their Inability, then and in that case, now as then, and then as now, he is to dipone to the Heirs of Tailȝie succeeding after the Wife, and her Children, the said Estate, and any Right belonging to His Majesty, as being, or which shall then be in his hands by the Forefaulture and Inabilty foresaid.

[Page 198] Quaeritur, If a Bond granted to a Man and his Wife, and longest liver of them two in Conjunct-Fee, and to one of their Sons expresly named and the Heirs of his Body, which Failȝieing to the Heirs to be procreat be­twixt the Husband and his Wife; which Failȝieing to the Wife her Heirs and Assigneys; be Heretable or Moveable; Seing there is neither Infeft­ment thereupon nor obligement to Infeft? Answer. It is Heretable in re­spect of the Tailȝie foresaid; there being no Tailȝie of Moveables or Moveable Sums: And the provision in favours of Heirs Male, with the Substitution foresaid, is equivalent as if Executors were expresly ex­cluded.

When a Person has settled his Estate upon a Friend, by a Disposition to him and certain Heirs of Tailȝie therein mentioned; and thereafter for se­curity of the Tailȝie has taken a Bond from the person, in whose favours the Tailȝie was made, that he should do no deed to disinherit the other Heirs of Tailȝie; and to keep the Tailȝie inviolable; Quaeritur, If the said person shall, without any Onerous Cause, Dispone the Lands or grant Bonds for great Sums equivalent to the value of the Estate, if the said Deeds may be questioned by the next Heir of Tailȝie? Ratio Du­bitandi. The doer of the said Deeds was Fiar; and the Heir of Tailȝie cannot come to the Estate, but as Heir to him, and is lyable to his Deeds. Answer. It is thought, in the said case, there is a Fideicommissum in fa­vours of the Heirs of Tailȝie: and though the Estate might be Disponed for Onerous Causes, the Disponer being Fiar; yet he ought not to have violate the said Fideicommissum by fraudulent and gratuitous Deeds. 2do. Besides the said Fideicommissum, there is a supervenient obligement, where­by the Heir of Tailȝie is Creditor; and therefore may question any deed without an Onerous Cause in defraud of the said obligement: and an Heir, in whose favours there is obligements qua Heirs, may Question any Deeds done by the person whom he represents, contrare to the said obligement; As, V. G. when Deeds are done on Death-bed, or contrare to a Tailȝie bearing Resolutive clauses, though for Onerous Causes; and much more in such a case, where a Bond is granted to the End foresaid, which ought to be effectual; and could operate nothing if the Heir could not question the same. Earl of Calendar.

A Person having provided his Estate, failȝiening Heirs of his own Body, in favours of a Relation, and the Heirs of his Body, &c. and having by the Write bearing the said Tailȝie, and a Procuratory of Resignation, provided that he should be Lyable to satisfy all Bonds, Obligements, and Deeds done, or to be done by him at any time during Life; Quaeritur, If these should be understood civiliter, dureing his Liege poustie, or of his natural Life? Answer. That it is thought, that it should be understood during his natural life; Seing the Entail being a free gift, any provi­siones thereincontained in favours of the granter ought to be construed favourably: and the word Lifetime is properly to be understood of na­tural life.

If it be provided, that the said person should marry a Gentlewo­man named in the Writ, Quaeritur, if such a provision be lawful, Seing it appears to be contrary to the Liberty that ought to be in Mar­riage? Answer. The Right being sub modo, he ought to fulfil the same: and there is no restraint as to his Liberty; Seing if he think fitt, he may choose to accept the Right with that quality, or not.

[Page 199]If the said Entail being made in Leige poustie, and resignation there­upon, the Granter may thereafter upon Death-bed, by a paper apart, oblige his said Heir of Tailȝie to marry as said is, or to fulfil any other provision? Answer. It is thought, that seing he is not so stated in the Right of Succession, that the Granter cannot prejudge him, who has still voluntas ambulatoria, and may evacuat the said Right being Master of it; and having it in his own hands and power; as he may cancel it, so he may qualify it as he thinks fit; & qui potest plus potest minus.

A person having, by an Infeftment holden of the King under the Great Seal, taken the Right of his Lands to himself, which failȝiening to such a person as he should name by Writ, and his Heirs; which failȝiening to certain other Heirs, did thereafter Dispone his Estate, failȝiening Heirs of his own Body; to the person thereinmentioned and the Heirs Male of his Body; which failȝiening to certain other Heirs of Tailȝie; bearing a Procuratory of Resignation, and reserving the Resigners Liferent, where­upon Infeftment followed; Quaeritur, If thereafter the Disponer should have Children of his own Body, what way should they be Infeft? Cogi­tandum.

If it should be thought, that the first Infeftment should stand in favours of the Disponers Heirs, the said last Disposition with what has followed thereupon being conditional, and the condition not having existed; Quaeritur, If the Heir of the Disponers Body should thereafter decease, whether the said Right by Disposition shall revive, at least that the per­son foresaid in whose favours the Disposition is made, may be served Heir to the Disponers Heir of his Body, by vertue of the said first Infeftment, and the said Nomination and Disposition? Sir Robert Hepburn.

If the King grant a Charter, with the ordinary Clauses irritant for pre­serving of Families; and with that in special to be added, that it should not be lawful to any that should succeed to prejudge their Successors De­linquendo, even by committing of Treason; and if they be guilty of such Crimes, that the Estate shall be Forfault as to themselves, but not as to other Successors; whether such a Clause will secure against Forefaulture? Ratio Dubitandi. That it would be an encouragement to Disloyalty. 2do. It is against the common Law, & pactis privatorum non derogatur Juri communi. 3tio. By the late Act of Parliament anent Tailȝies, it is provided, that the King should not be prejudged as to Fines nor Confisca­tions, nor Superiors of their Casualities: On the other part it is thought, there should be a difference betwixt these who by their vertue and pur­chase have founded a Family; and these who succeeded in the Right of Estates acquired by Loyal and Virtuous Persons: In the first case, it is just that the person who has purchast and Entailed his Estate with such Clauses, if he commit Treason, should Forefault for himself and all his Successors: In the other case, it is hard that a person descended of an ancient and loyal Family, should Fotefault an Estate not acquired by himself in prejudice of the Family; and that the personal delinquence of one should weigh down the Merits of many Predecessors; A Family being like a Ship, out of which the Jonas that has raised the Storm should be cast, and not the Ship and whole Family perish: And upon the consideration foresaid, it has been provided for the standing of Families, even by Divine Law, that it should not be in the power of one to Ruine the Family, but the Succes­sors [Page 200] Right should revive by the Jubile: And by the Feudal Law in the begining, Feuda were not Haereditaria, so as that the Heirs and Successors should be Forefaulted by the deed of their Predecessors: And when Feuda came to be Haereditaria, there were some that were ex pacto & provi­dentia; so that the Succession was settled in such a manner, that it could not be cut off by the deed or Forefaulture of any of the Descendents, but as to their own interest; And there are yet Entails elsewhere, and in Eng­land of the nature foresaid, as V. G. of the Lord Grayes Estate; which was the occasion, that not only the Family, but himself was preserved; It being thought fitter, that his Liferent should be confiscat dureing his Life, than by his Death his Estate should go presently to his Brother. And as to that pretence, that Disloyalty would be thereby encouraged, it is of no moment; seing qui suae vitae est prodigus will be prodigus as to all other in­terests: And albeit by the common Law, where there is no provision to the contrary, Estates are Forefaulted as to all intents; yet provisio ho­minis tollit provisionem legis; and there is no Law nor Statute, with us, disabling the King to give Rights with such provisions, as are consistent with, and suitable to the Divine Law, and even the Civil Law ( Fidei­commissa being in effect Entails) and the Laws of other Nations, and of his other Kingdoms: and the Brocard, pactis privatorum &c. doth militate most, when the certain form and modus habilis is prescribed by Law for conveyances or Testaments, which ought to be precisely kept and observ­ed without Derogation: In other cases Provisio hominis, as said is, tollit legem: As, by our Law, a Relict has a Terce of Lands, and a third of Moveables: and Marriage being dissolved within Year and Day the Tocher ought to return: and in case ward Lands, or the major part be Disponed they are recognised: and if a Feu-duty be not payed in the space of two Years, the Feu may be reduced; and yet as to these and ma­ny other cases derogatur Juri communi pactis privatorum. And as to the Act of Parliament concerning Tailȝies, it doth militate only in the case of Tailȝies with the ordinary Clauses irritant, anent the contracting of Debts, or doing other Deeds; so that albeit by the said Clauses irritant, the Debts or Deeds of the Contraveener are void, as to Tailȝied Estates, yet Con­fiscations and Fines in favours of the King doe affect the Estate: and it is not provided, by the said Act of Parliament, that it should not be lawful for the King, upon the considerations foresaid, to grant a Right Entailed with the said Clause, that the Estate should not be forefault in prejudice of the Entail: and it cannot be said, that the concession of a Prince qualify­ing his own Grant with such Provisions as he think fit, is Pactum privato­rum: and seing, other Superiors may so qualify the Infeftments and Rights granted by them to their Vassals, that the Vassal should not forefault his Lands, for Feudal Crimes; for selling the Lands holden Ward with­out the Superiors consent; or for being behind in payment of Feu-duties; it is against Law and Reason to deny that power to the King, to qualifie the Vassalls Right; so that, when Lands otherways would Forfault, they should not Forfault in prejudice of the Family and Successors.

The Lands of Artloch being by Alexander Keith of Artloch Heretor thereof, Tailȝied to himself, and the Heirs Male of his Body, which fail­ȝieing to the Heirs Female of his Body without division; which Failȝie­ing to his Sister, &c. And having secured the Tailȝie by Provision, that [Page 201] it should not be in the power of any of the Heirs to alter the samen, with Clauses irritant and resolutive; whereby the controveening of the Terms of the Tailȝie are declared to be a ground of amitting the Estate; and de­volving thereof upon the next Member of the Tailȝie; All which Clauses are insert in the Bond of Tailȝie, Charter, and Instrument of Seasin fol­lowing thereupon.

Anna Keith, being the only Heir of the Marriage, and so Heretrix of the Lands; she by Contract of Marriage with John Forbes of Assure is obliged to resign and provide the saids Lands of Artloch to him and her in Conjunct-Fee and Liferent, and to the Heirs-Male to be procreat be­twixt them; which failȝiening to the Heirs-Male of her Body; which failȝiening to the Eldest Heir Female to be procreat betwixt them; which failȝiening to the Eldest Heir Female of her Body; which failȝiening to him and the Heirs Male of his Body; which failȝiening to the Eldest Heir Fe­male of his Body: Which failȝiening to him and his Heirs and Assigneys whatsomever.

1. Quaeritur, Who is Fiar by the Conception of the Tailȝie, whether the Wife, because she having been formerly Fiar, the Tailȝie was made upon her Resignation, and so the Heirs of the Marriage must in dubio be Heirs to her? Or whether the Husband, by the Pre­rogative of the Sex, and by the last termination of the Tailȝie, which re­solves on his Heirs (ut supra) will be Fiar? Or if the foresaid destination, whereby the Wifes Heirs-Male or Female are preferred to the Husbands in all the Branches of the Substitutions, will alter the case?

2. To whom the Heir of the Marriage could be served, whether to the Husband, or to the Wife?

3. Hoc supposito, that the Husband be Fiar; whether or not the fore­said Contract, whereby she puts the Husband and Heirs of the Marriage in Fee, will be interpret in Law prejudical to the former Tailȝie as a wronging thereof; Altho the Husband was expresly obliged to assume the Name and Arms of the Family, which compleats the design of all such Tailȝies? And whether the Contract being in Minority will be reduce­ible upon that ground?

4. Altho it might be reduceible, as debording from the first Tailȝie by making him and his Heirs absolute Fiar; yet if it may not stand in so far as concerns the Husband and the Heirs of his Body; and be only reduce­ible, in swa far as it alters, and debords from the other Branches of the Tailȝie?

Tailȝie altered.

A Minor having, contrare to the Clause irritant contained in his Fa­thers Tailȝie, altered the Succession, and being Infeft upon the Re­signation: If the said last Right should be reduced, (Vide Homologation Quaest. 2da. in litera H.) Quaeritur, What way shall the Contraveener re­turn to the former Right? And whether by the Decreet reductive, the former Right will revive, as if the posterior had never been? Or if the said person upon a Bill to the Lords must have a warrand to the Director of the Chancery for a New Seasin? Seing by the Resignation and Seasin following thereupon, there was de facto a Disscasin, & quod factum est in­fectum fieri nequit? Countess of Buccleugh.

Teinds.

A Person having Right both to Lands and Teinds, disponeth the Lands without mention or exception of Teinds; Quaeritur If the Teinds be disponed? Ratio Dubitandi, That the Right of Teinds is an inferior interest; and upon the matter a Servitude and burden upon the Lands; and is extinguished confusione & consolidatione, as soon as it is in the Person of the Heretor; as in the case of Servitudes, Right of Annualrents, &c. Ennerpeffer and Bonshuw.

A Person having acquired by Infeftment, a Right to the Teinds of his own Lands, Quaeritur, If the Teinds be confounded with the Right of the Stock; that the Lands being thereafter disponed or comprysed, without mention of Teinds; The Buyer or compryser will have Right to the same; as in the case of a Right of Annualrent?

Quaeritur, If a Person having a Right to Lands cum decimis inclusis, whether in that case the Buyer or compryser, without mention of the Teinds, will have Right to the same?

Seing the Brieve bears only a warrand to Enquire, de Quibus terris & annuis Reditibus the Defunct died vestitus, without mention of Teinds, Quaeritur, What way a Person being only Infeft in Teinds, his Heir may be served special Heir to him in the same?

When Teinds are in Non-entry, Quaeritur, If the Superior will have Right to the haill profits before Declarator? Seing Teinds are not re­toured, and there is neither an old nor new Extent of the same.

Teind of Fish.

BOats for taking of fish, lying upon the shoar in one parish; and going thence and returning thither for taking and unloading; but belonging to Persons dwelling in another neighbouring Parish, Quaeritur. If the Teind of the fish should belong to the Minister of the Parish where they are taken, or where the Owners and fishers dwell?

Proving the Tenor.

IF a Comprysing may be made up by proving the Tenor? Answer, It is thought, not? In respect, By the act of Parliament, the Tenor of Letters of Horning and Executions cannot be proven; and there is Ea­dem Ratio as to comprysings: And a comprysing is not of the nature of Scri­pta & Instrumenta quae possunt refici, being both of the nature of Executions and of a Decreet of the Messenger as Sheriff in that part: And neither Ex­ecutions of Messengers, nor Decreets can be made up by proving the Te­nor: And it is not enough that Witnesses may remember, and be positive that there was a Comprysing; seing they cannot remember, at least ought not to be trusted, whether the comprysing be formal; which being Juris, they can neither be Judges nor Witnesses thereto.

Quaeritur, If a Decreet for proving the Tenor can satisfy the Producti­on in an Improbation? Answer, It is thought, it should not; no more than [Page 203] a Transumpt: seing otherways the indirect manner may be cut off, which ariseth upon the comparing of hand Write, and other Circumstances from the Principal; which is not competent, when Extracts only of such Writs are produced: And the Style, that such Decreets should make alse great faith, as if the Writs were produced, is to be understood Civiliter, viz. Except in causa falsi.

If Sentences or Acts of Court being lost, the Tenor may be proven?

If Executions of Summons of Interruption being lost, may be made up by proving the Tenor, after the decease of the Messenger? It is thought that they cannot; Seing by the act of Parliament, the Tenor of Letters of Horning and Executions cannot be proven: And there is Eadem Ratio as to other executions made by Messengers; which appears to be that, viz That they are Servi publici; and by the Law only trusted and authorized as to such acts, and their relation of the same.

If the Tenor of Bonds may be proven? Answer, There is a difference betwixt Bonds and other Writs; in respect Bonds are granted, to the effect they may be satisfyed, and retired upon satisfaction; and Debitors think themselves secure, when they retire and destroy their Bonds: And there­fore when a Bond cannot be produced; Instrumentum penes Debitorem, or which cannot be shown, Praesumitur Liberatum; unless there be a clear Evidence that they could not be satisfyed; as that the term of Payment was not come, or such like; and Casus amissionis be positively libelled and proven, as incendii, rapinae, or the like,

If a Comprysing may be made up by proving the Tenor? Answer, It is thought not, for the Reasons foresaid, Viz. That it is both an Exe­cution and Sentence; and the Tenor is so long when it is of so many Ba­ronies, and it contains so many Essential Formalities, and Acts of Execu­tion; and the Witnesses to many several Executions, that no person can declare that the Tenor libelled is exactly the true Tenor: and Compry­sings are of that nature, that they may be satisfied; and are deduced to the end they may be satisfied. Lauderdale.

Decreets for proving the Tenor.

THE Tenor of a Writ being made up, Quaeritur If it will satisfy the Production in an Improbation, The Granter or his Representa­tives being called to the making up of the Tenor and Compearing? Ra­tio Dubitandi, That as to a Third Party who has interest to question the Writ being a Creditor, and having Comprised before the Decreet for proving, and there being a prior comprysing upon the said bond; there is Eadem Ratio as in Extracts; Seing the means of Improbation in the in­direct way is taken away. vide Transumpts, Quaest. 1. hujus Literae.

Terce.

A Person having disponed Lands bona fide, but being prevented by death before the Buyer was Infeft, Quaeritur, Whether the Relict will have right to a Terce? Ratio Dubitandi. The Relict has a Terce of all Lands wherein her Husband died infeft, and is not lyable to personal Creditors: [Page 204] On the other Part, it seemeth against Reason, That the Husband having bona fide disponed, and the Heir being lyable for the Implement, the Relict should be in better case than the Heir, who has no part: and that the Relict should have only Right to a Terce of Lands undisponed: and that there is a difference betwixt a Disposition, and other Personal Debts; seing a Disposition is Jus ad Rem, which cannot be said of other Oblige­ments: And these Words, That she should have Terce of all wherein the Husband died infeft, ought to be understood Civiliter, Viz. undisponed.

Quaeritur (If Lands be redeemable) Will the Relict Tercer have any part of the Money whereupon the Lands are redeemed, specially when the Husband died infeft upon a Compriseing? Ratio Dubitandi, The Law gives unto Relicts only a Terce of Lands, and not of Sums of Mo­ney: and there is a difference betwixt a Tercer, and a Liferenter who is provided to a Liferent of Lands under Wadset

A Person being obliged for a most onerous cause to dispone his Lands and deceasing before Infeftment or Resignation. Quaeritur, If his Relict will have a Terce, notwithstanding of the Disposition? Ratio Dubitandi, That it is hard, the Relict should be in better case than the Fiar and Heir from whom the Lands may be evicted by a pursuit for implement: And though the Husband died Infeft his Right was resolubile, and such as might have been evicted from him. 2do. A Reversion is but pactum de re­trovendendo, and in this case there is a full Vendition; and yet an order may be used upon a Reversion, which will either prevent the Terce or extinguish it.

Quaeritur, If a Reversion, though not Registrate, will militate against the Relict, to prevent her Terce or to Redeem? Ratio Dubitandi, She is not to be considered as a singular Successor, but as having a Right by virtue of, and as depending upon her Husbands Right, yet standing in his Person; whereas he is denuded in favours of a singular Successor.

It is Indubii Juris, That the Husbands Debts, that are only personal, do not prejudge a Relict of her Terce: But, Quaeritur, whether a Comprys­ing before her Husbands decease will militate against her? And if as to this point, there be a Difference betwixt a comprysing whereupon the Supe­rior is charged, and whereupon there is no charge?

Quaeritur If a Disposition, whereupon there is Resignation, will pre­judge a Terce?

Lands being Wadset for a certain Sum, Quaeritur, If the Relict of the Creditor, will have a Terce both of the Lands; and in case of Redem­ption of the Sum of money?

If a Wadset be to a Husband only; and after his Decease to his Wife: And an order be used and declared; Quaeritur, If she will get a Terce of the money? And in that case, whether the Executors will not only have Right to the two parts but to the third part of the Sums consigned, with the burden of the Relicts Liferent? Cogitandum.

A Lady by her Contract of Marriage being provided to a Liferent; and infeft base in satisfaction of her Terce, and what else she may pretend, Quaeritur, If the Superior questioning her Right as base, she may have re­course to a Terce, as renounced in behalf of the Husband and not of the Superior; and the Renunciation being causa data intuitu of her Liferent, he cannot debar her from the same; and take any advantage by the said Renunciation. The Lady Ballencreiff.

[Page 205] Quid Juris as to a Tercer being Liferenter of a third part? Answer. The difference betwixt the Liferent and Terce is, That the Liferenters Right is anterior and certain, but the Terce is posterior and uncertain: So that the Fiar may sell the Lands; in which case there would be no Terce. vide Liferenter. qu: vltima.

Territorium.

TErritorium est universitas agrorum Jurisdictione munita, Jus Fluviat. p 42. num: 513.

Testament.

IF a Testament may be Holograph?

If a Movable debt be due to an English Man who is deceast, must it be confirmed in Scotland; & è Contra?

If a Nuncupative Testament in England, will have Right to a Debt due in Scotland? Ratio Dubitandi, it is valid in England; & mobilia non habent situm, & sequuntur personam: on the other part, corpora mobilia & nomina though they have not situm, as Lands; yet they have it so far, as being res Scoticae, they cannot be transmitted, but according to the Law of Scot­land; Law being rerum Domina.

Quid Juris, if it be offered to be proven by the oath of the nearest of kin, that the Defunct did, before him, and other witnesses above exception, Name the pursuer his Executor and universal Legatar; will a nuncupative Testament so proven be sustained? Answer, It is thought, it will not; Seeing nuncupative Testaments are not in our Law admitted: And it is de forma, that they should be in Scriptis.

Quaeritur, If a Testament may be sustained by way of Instrument? Answer. an Instrument under a Notars hand, being but the assertion of a Notar, is not considered as Scriptum, which requires the Subscription of the party himself; or in subsidium by Notars before Witnesses de ejus man­dato.

Quaeritur, If one Notar subscribing for the Testator, be sufficient in Testaments? Answer. Affirmative; in respect of the great favour of last wills; and oftentimes there is not copia Notariorum.

Ministers by Act of Parliament cannot be Notars, but in the case of Testaments; Quaeritur, If eo ipso that they are Ministers they may be No­tars in Testaments? Or if they must be admitted Notars? Answer. Cogitandum.

Quae Ratio, That a Testament made in France or Holland according to the custom there, which is different from ours; should be sustained in Scotland, as to any Scots interest falling under the same?

If a Minor having Curators may dispose of his Estate by Testament, without the Curators consent?

A Minor of thirteen Years, or there about; having made a Testament, and named the person, with whom he was boarded and bred in Family, his Executor and universal Legatar; without the knowledge or consent of any of his Friends; Quaeritur, whether the said Testament may be [Page 206] questioned upon Circumvention; without qualifying any other circum­stance, but that it is Dolus in re ipsa to elicite from a person of that Age a Right to all his Moveable Estate in defraud of his friends? Answer. It is Casus arbitrarius; and much will depend upon circumstances, if the Defunct had no Relation to the Executor; and if the Executor did suggest that the Defunct should make a Testament; and employed the Writer, and did inform the Writer, what the Tenor should be, and such like.

A Testament being made by a Sickly Child being Pubes but in confinio and a little time more; in favours of his Nurse, in whose house he had stayed for diverse Years, and lay sick for the time, whereby she was named Exe­cutrix and universal Legatrix; may be reduced as inofficiosum & dolosum; that being dolus reipsa and machinatio fraudulenta to prejudge five of his Brethren and Sisters, who were in a poor Condition; in respect the Child had but lately passed Tutory and chosen Curators; and the said Testament was elicited from him without the knowledge of his Curators and other Friends, and the Writer and Witnesses were employed by the said Nurse; And the friends apprehending that she might take advantage, dealt with her, that the Child might be suffered to stay in another place; and she was not only satisfied for the time he had been with her, but they offered a Sum of Money to her, that he might be at freedom: And it is so inci­dent to Minors to be influenced, that when they are to chuse Curators, the Council upon application will sequestrat them.

Testament Execute.

IT appears that the Testament is Executed as to Debitors, by sen­tence against them; seing after sentence an Executor may Assign: And therefore if the Executor die the Debt may be confirmed, and pursued for, by his Executors.

Testament and the Wifes part.

A Wifes Testament being confirmed; and her Husband as best knowing having given up the Inventar, both of Goods and Debts due to and by him; and amongst the Goods, having given up the Wifes Jewels, and among the Debts due by him having given up Debts either simply Heretable, being upon an Infeftment, or Heretable quoad relictam, upon Bonds whereof the Term of payment is past; and so the debita being found to exceed bona, Quaeritur, What in Law the Commis­sars should do in such a case? Answer. The Wifes Jewels and Abulȝie­ments ought to be considered as praecipua, and not in Communion; and which ought not to be affected with the Debt: and it ought to be conside­red if any of the Debts be Moveable quo ad Relictam, and these only ought to affect the Wifes part; so that what is free of the Inventar of the Husbands Goods will divide, if there were no Bairns in familia; and al­beit there be Bairns but foris familiat, the half of the Husbands free Move­able Estate would be the Wises part; and ought to be confirmed as be­longing to her, with her whole Jewels and Abulȝiements. Lauderdale.

When the Husband survives the Wife, and her Testament is confirm­ed; [Page 207] whether Moveable Heirship will be deduced, as when the Husbands Testament is confirmed? Ratio Dubitandi, There can be no Heirship, the Husband living: and on the other part, the Wifes Executry ought not to be in better case nor her self, if she had survived: and there can be no Bairns part, until the Husbands decease actu, albeit habitu: and there is eadem ratio as to Heirship.

Nihil magis deberi hominibus quam ut ultimae voluntatis sit liber stilus; & licitum, quod non redit, arbitrium; Leg. 1. Cod. de sacros Eccles.

In Testamento Jure civili olim septem Testes requirebantur: Jure autem Canonico duo sufficiunt.

Si unus ex testibus fuit servus; ex benignitate, & ut voluntates ultimae exitum habeant, Testamentum haud corruit, si eo tempore habitus fuit liber.

De rebus suis testari erat tanti momenti, atque ut fraudibus obviam iretur, ideo Jure veteri non nisi publice testamentum fieri permissum; & vel callatis Co­mitiis, quod semel in anno fiebat; vel si Testator erat mil [...]s in procinctu, cum parati essent cum hoste confligere. Perez. lib. 2. tit. 10.

Legatarii aut fideicommissarii in re singulari & certa, possunt esse testes in Testamento; quia negotium censetur principaliter agi inter Testatorem & haere­dem. Ibid.

Testamentum nuncupativum maxime in usu esse; & si in scripturam a nota­rio redigatur, esse tamen nuncupativum; quia scriptura ad memoriam non ad solennitatem adhibetur. Ibidem.

Filius-familias Testamentum condere non potest, quia in aliena potestate est: nec Testamentum ab eo conditum valet, si postea Pater-familias fuerit; quia prin­cipium inspicitur; & quod initio vitiosum est tracto temporis non convalescit. Idem. Institut. lib. 2. tit. 12.

Testamento novissimo rumpitur anterius, licet ex eo haeres non adeat, quia adi­tio non pertinet ad perfectionem Testamenti, sed ad ejus exitum tantum & ef­fectum. Idem. lib. 2. tit. 17.

Si posteriore Testamento haeres institutus sit tantum ex parte, prius tamen rumpitur; & universitas haereditatis ad eum pertinet Jure accrescendi, ne quis decedat partim testatus partim intestatus; perinde enim est, ac si partis mentio haud facta sit.

Irritum fit Testamentum, si capitis dimunitionem Testator passus sit, non so­lum maximam & mediam, sed etiam minimam, Arrogatus forte: si vero tem­pore mortis sui Juris fuerit, convalescit Testamentum beneficio Praetoris; data secundum tabulas bonorum possessione haeredi scripto: sufficit enim fuisse sui Ju­ris & Civem Romanum, tempore facti Testamenti & mortis. Ibid.

Si quis coeperit Testamentum facere nondum autem perfecerit morte praeventus, non infirmatur prius Testamentum; quia unumquodque eodem modo dissolvitur quo colligatum est. Ibid.

Quid si quis ista verba scripserit (addita etiam subscriptione) viz. se nolle Testamentum quod fecerit valere; Quaeritur, an irritum fiat?

Testamentum Rescissum per Quaerelam inofficiosi olim penitus corruebat; Ju­re vero novissimo tantum quoad institutionem; quia tantum peccatum est in li­beris, non autem in legatis aut fideicommissis, quibus nulla injuria illata est. Perez. lib. 2. tit. 18.

Qui agnovit Testamentum quocunque modo, v. g. acceptando legatum suo nomine; caret Quaerela: secus si Tutorio nomine aut alieno.

Testes.

THE Question being of the Jurisdiction of a Town; If the Bur­gesses may be Witnesses? Hattoun contra Dundie.

Post didicita Testimonia alii Testes regulariter non recipiuntur; & si reci­piantur, purgatur suspicio subornationis Juramento ejus qui vult alios produ­cere; & ne claudicarent judicia, Idem conceditur adversario. Fritsch. Ex­ercit: 2da. Juris public. n. 86.

Third and Teind.

WHen Lands are set for Third and Teind, so that the Master is not to be payed by the Hand of the Tennent, or by the product of the Corns when they are Reaped and Threshen; but has an Interest in the Corns and Bodies of the same, as the Tennent himself: Whether will his Executors have Right to the Third and Teind entirely, the Defunct dying before separation; eodem modo, as if the Tennent who is Partiarius as to two parts, should die before separation? Ratio Dubitandi. That there is no Merces or duty payable by the Tennent: he sowes the ground for his own use, and for the use of the Master.

If the Wife should decease after separation, whether in that case her Executor will have Right entirely to the Third and Teind; seing they are fructus percepti & in Bonis Mariti?

Vide. Liferenter, Quaest. prima, in litera L. which Question may be proposed as to Third and Teind.

Titles of Honour.

IF there be Feudum Comitatus aut Reguli, and the same descend to Heirs Portioners; Quid Juris as to the Title?

When an Estate in Lands and Baronies, is erected in Comitatum, with the Title, whereupon Infeftment follows; Quaeritur, If the Estate be Disponed or evicted by expired Comprysings, Quid Juris as to the Title; seing it is not given by Patent, but by Infeftment as haereditamentum and accessory to the Lands?

A Patent of Honour being granted to a Person and his Heirs, Quaeri­tur, if any of his Heirs may surrender the said Honour in the Kings Hands for a new Right to himself, and other Heirs than is in the former Patent, albeit he was not served Heir himself? Ratio Dubitandi. He may sit in Parliament though he be not Heir: On the other part, though he be tole­rate to sit in Parliament being Heir of Blood, and no person being concern­ed to object; yet he cannot dispose of such an Interest, unless he be serv­ed; seing Titles and Patents of Honour, are not ex pacto & providentia & Gentilia; but are Jura haereditaria, belonging to these that first get them and their Heirs; and may be Forefaulted.

A Title of Honour and Jus Civitatis being granted to the Receivers and their Heirs, Quaeritur, If their Heirs owning and making use of the same, and not medleing or intending to medle with bona Defuncti, will be Ly­able [Page 209] as behaveing? Ratio Dubitandi. That such Interests and Capa­cities, are not in bonis nor commercio, and are res inaestimabiles; and where persons are allowed beneficium Inventarii they cannot come under Inven­tar and be valued; and therefore there needs no other Aditio, but that they should owne the same; and Creditors are not prejudged, seing they are not the subject of Execution and Diligence: and yet they may be Forefault; these who have them for the time, being quasi Heirs of Pro­vision.

When Lands are Erected in Comitatum, with the Dignity and Vote in Parliament, Quaeritur, If the whole Lands be Evicted or Disponed, what becometh of the Dignity annexed to the same? Ratio Dubitandi. That Baronia is nomen dignitatis, which is ever annexed to Lands; and that Comitatus, albeit a higher Dignity is of the same nature: and therefore as a Barony being sold, the Disponer does not retain the priviledges of a Baron; so it ought to be in the case of Comitatus; the Title being annexed to the Lands and given in consideration of the same, and of the Estate suf­ficient to sustain the Title: and that there is a difference betwixt a Title of Honour given by way of Patent, and that which is annexed to Lands. Cogitandum.

Titular.

IF the Titular be in possession of Teinds, and die before Michaelmass; Quid Juris?

Tocher.

IF either a Father or a Stranger be obliged to pay a Tocher, and Mar­riage do not follow, or be dissolved within Year and Day, Quaeritur To whom will the Tocher pertain? Ratio Dubitandi. All such Oblige­ments are Conditional, and causa data: On the other part, it may be pre­tended, that there is Fictio brevis manus, and the same case as if the Toch­er were given to the Woman, to the effect that she may give it to the per­son whom she is to Marry: so that though Causa ceaseth as to him, it doth not cease as to the Woman, which ordinarly is Affection and Relati­on to her, and that she may be Dotata.

A Father having granted a Bond to his Daughter; and thereafter hav­ing by a Contract of Marriage with her Husband, given him a Tocher, without mention that it is in Satisfaction of that, or any other Provision; If notwithstanding it will be thought to be in Satisfaction? Ratio Dubi­tandi, That either the Father cogitavit, and remembred that he granted such a Bond, or did not remember; and if he did not remember, that which was not thought upon cannot be said to be intended to have been satisfied and taken away: and if he did remember, and yet did not pro­vide, that the Tocher should be in satisfaction, it cannot be thought, that he intended that it should be so. Lady Yester.

Quaestiones de Tractatu Suedico, & Bonis prohi­bitis, Vulgo Counterband.

‘UBi exarsit bellum inter Reges Principes aut populos qui superiorem haud agnoscunt, quae occasione belli (ut plerumque fit) exori­untur controversiae & quaestiones de navibus, rebus, aut hominibus in bello captis; Jure patrio, statutis aut moribus ejus gentis, cui actor aut capiens subditus est, haud judicandae aut dirimendae sunt; Reus enim, qui est extraneus, eas leges nec noscere praesumitur nec agnoscere tenetur; cum legibus & moribus (qui eodem Jure censentur) nulla sit nisi in sub­ditos authoritas.’

‘2. Juris quidem gentium, in disceptationibus frequens est mentio; verum in libris nihil aut parum certi de eo proditum est; praeter gene­ralia & remota quaedam principia; cum nullum sit Systema aut liber, nec esse possit, in quem omnes gentes consenserint; ut pro Jure gen­tium authentico, habendus sit.’

‘3. Inter omnes convenit, ubi duo Principes aut Populi bello com­mittuntur; aliis Regibus, aut populis, qui isti bello haud implicantur & subditis suis, haud interdici aut minui libertatem commercii, cum istis Regibus aut populis inter quos bellum est; eo tamen tempera­mento & moderamine, ut neutri ex Adversariis, vel prosit, vel obsit & noceat, in ordine ad bellum; quod plerumque fit vel opem ferendo, vel advehendo bona prohibita & vetita, vulgo Counterband dicta.’

‘4. Vocabulum istud Counterband innuit praeviam prohibitionem: Bona igitur Contraband sunt, quae contra Bannum seu Edictum adve­huntur; & prohibita sunt vel Jure gentium, communi & notorio, vel speci­ali Banno; seu declaratione ejus principis qui bellum gerit,’

‘5. Jure gentium & belli, extra aleam est, ea bona esse Contraband, quae per se & immediate ad bellum spectant, & eo destinata sunt, ut in bello vel offendant vel defendant; nec ullius aut exigui sunt in pace usus; ut Arma, cujuscunque demum generis sint.’

‘6 Quae autem usus sunt ancipitis, tum in bello tum extra bellum, ut pecunia, commeatus & ejusmodi; Ita demum Contraband & vetita esse censentur, si hostis ad incitas & angustias redactus, & conditio ejus ad­vehenti comperta sit, saltem eam scire potuerit; ut si oppidum sit obsessum; eo enim casu hostis est, qui hosti necessaria subministrat.’

‘7 Illa igitur bona, quae communis (ut ita dicam) aut promiscui usus sunt, Jure gentium non sunt bona Contraband simpliciter, sed in casu praedicto tantum; sed nonnunquam, commeatus & bona praedicta, Contra­band & vetita fiunt, etiam extra praedictum casum, & ab initio belli; si gerentes bellum, publica significatione ad alios populos edita (quod in bello solenne est) denunciaverint, se ejusmodi bona ad hostes advecta, pro vetitis & Contraband bonis, habituros.’

‘8 Verum eo casu distinguendum est, an cum populo aut principe, cujus subditi ejusmodi bona advehunt, Tractatus aut conventio inter­cesserit, de commercio etiam tempore belli: An vero nihil de commercio convenerit.’

‘9 Priori casu, cum tractatus ejusmodi sint contractus inter principes [Page 211] celebrati, religiose observandi sunt; & secundum eos judicandum, eti­amsi princeps qui bellum gerit, denunciavirit commeatus & ejusmodi bona pro Contraband bonis habenda: Nec enim inconsulto aut Invito Rege aut principe, cum quo tractatus intercessit, ab eo recedere potest.’

‘10. Consequens est, licet ex stilo diplomatum seu Commissionum, quibus Magistri & Navarchi navium privatarum (vulgo Capers) mu­niti sunt; Commeatus & bona ejusmodi (moribus nostris) Contraband sint; Si tamen in nave Suedica depraehendantur ejusmodi bona libera, nec vetita aut Contraband judicanda: expresso enim articulo Tracta­tus inter Regem nostrum & Regem Sueciae, commeatus & ejusmodi bona ut libera, impune ad hostes advehuntur.’

‘11. Quod attinet ad subditos Principis aut Populi, cum quo Tra­ctatus aut Foedus de commercio non intervenit; Si bellum gerens, edi­cto solenni (ut moris est) significaverit se ea bona pro vetitis habiturum; & non obstante dicto Banno & edicto, subditi principis cum quo tracta­tus haud intercessit, ea bona advehant; pro vetitis habenda sunt & Ju­dicanda: Nec conqueri possunt, cum sint moniti & Inhibiti.’

‘12. Si vero in Edicto, seu declaratione (ut loquimur) nulla mentio fiat de commeatu, aut ejusmodi bonis; libera censenda sunt; etiam ijs cum quibus tractatus aut foedus haud intercessit: Licet ex stilo nostro (ut dictum est) sint prohibita. Nec enim stilus nec mores nostri, ex­teris, quibus penitus ignoti sunt, obtrudi possunt: & cum nulla praeces­serit denunciatio aut edictum publicum, ea bona prohibens; quod non prohibitum est permissum censetur: Et ex Jure belli & gentium, ad quod in ejusmodi casibus recurrendum est, libera esse Judicandum est.’

‘13. Ex tractatu Suedico, variae oriuntur quaestiones quas perstrin­gere haud gravabimur. &’

‘14. Quaeritur, Si in nave Suedica, depraehendantur bona vetita aut bona hostium, an in commissum cadant & confiscentur, tum bona ista prohibita; tum bona, si quae sint in nave, libera; & navis ipsa?’

‘15. Nullus est, quantum memini, in isto tractatu articulus, ex quo ad quaestionem istam responsio elici possit; Videtur tamen bona prohi­bita tantum confiscanda, salvis nave & bonis liberis; ea ratione, Quia ultimo tractatu inter Regem nostrum & Ordines provinciarum foederata­rum cautum est; istiusmodi casu eveniente bona Contraband confis­canda; Naves autem Batavorum & alia bona libera dimittenda; Et alio articulo ejus tractatus cautum est, Regem Sueciae & suos subditos, in eo Tractatu includi; In eo enim conciliando & promovendo, impigre operam navaverat.’

‘16. Nec obstat, quod tractatu isto nunc per bellum dissoluto, Ar­ticuli isti quoad omnes inanes videantur, & sublato principali corruit ac­cessorium; Cum enim tractatus isti sint contractus inter Regem nostrum & Regem Sueciae & Batavos; qui (quicquid fecerint Batavi) quoad nos & Suecos illibati manent; nec subditis Regis Suecia, Batavorum culpa aut perfidia fraudi esse debet.’

‘17. Nec obstat, quod praeter tractatum istum pacis inter Regem nostrum & Ordines praedictos, eodem tempore articuli quidam com­mercii seorsum editi sunt; & inter eos, articulus de bonis vetitis & eorum confiscatione; & licet convenerit inter partes, Suecos tractatu pacis com­praehendi, [Page 212] de ijs tamen in articulo commercii nulla facta est mentio, Res­pondetur enim articulos istos commercii eodem tempore additos, partem tractatus istius censendos esse.’

‘18. Quaeritur, Cum tractatu Suedico cautum sit Naves Suedicas li­teris Salvi-conductus muniendas, forma solenni in dicto tractatu praescri­pta; An eo ipso quod literas salvi-conductus non exhibeant, capi & confiscari possint?’

‘19. Quaestio ista nupero bello excitata & saepe agitata, nec tamen est decisa; nec desunt pro utraque parte argumenta: Cum enim isto tracta­tu libertas commercii ultro citroque sit permissa, tempore belli, sed sub modo, viz. ut fraudibus obviam eatur; si modus non observetur, liber­tas ista tollitur: ac cum ijs agendum, ac si libertas commercii cum hosti­bus penitus esset interdicta: Accedit, quod in tractatibus ejusmodi, om­nes articuli cum effectu intelligendi sint & ut aliquid operentur; nec ul­lus effectus erit articuli istius de salvis-conductibus, & de formula eorum tanto studio & industria concinnata, si naves ijs destitutae ad hostes li­bere & impune commeare possint.’

‘20. Ex altera parte arguitur, isto tractatu haud caveri naves vel bo­na, periculo confiscationis subjacere, si literae salvi-conductus vel desint, vel a formula ista recedant; pacta enim Commissoria esse stricti Juris, nec praesumi aut implicari nisi exprimantur; Nec articulum Inanem aut sine effectu futurum, eum enim effectum habere, viz. ubi navis munita est literis salvi-conductus dimittendam esse, nec ulterius inquirendum: Si vero literis istis munita non sit, in eam inquiri posse, an Bona vetita vel hostium in ea sint; quod non sine gravi molestia & incommodo plerum­que fit: Et si vel hostes, vel hostium bona, vel bona vetita in ea deprae­hendantur, tum demum abduci & addici posse.’

‘21. De quaestione ista, haud semel in foro ventilata, donec publicum per sententiam innotescat judicium; meum sustineo.’

‘22. Si aliae adsint praesumptiones & adminicula, Veluti, si contractus nauticus (vulgo Charter-party) desideretur; si aliqui ex ministris nauticis, Proreta (vulgo Boatswain) & alii Batavi sint; si gentem suam, ubi primum navis obviam facta est, dissimularunt; & se Bremenses esse mentiti, sed postea religione Juramenti coacti, sese Batavos esse confessi sunt; Quod in facti specie evenisse compertum habeo; eo casu, si navis, literis salvi-conductus non sit munita, haud leve argumentum est navem & bona haud esse libera: Et adminicula ista, & similia cum eo concurrentia, in praesumptionem gravissimam & aggregatam, & uti ita dicam praegnantem assurgere videntur, nisi Rei luculentis probationi­bus & documentis ostenderint navem & bona libera esse, Nec ad hostes pertinere.’

‘23. Quoniam mentionem de Batavis, & hostium subditis fecimus, quaestio ista suboritur; Cum declaratione belli a Serenissimo nostro Rege edita, novissimo bello inter eum & Ordines praedictos, denunciatum sit; si in aliqua nave subditi hostium depraehendantur, tam bona quam na­vem confiscanda; nec tractatu Suedico ita cautum sit; In eo enim de Navarcho tantum cavetur, & permittitur cujuscunque sit gentis, etiam hostilis, modo sit Incola & civis regni Sueciae: Si igitur, praeter navarch­um, nautae duo vel tres sint Batavi; quid eo casu censendum, An na­vis & bona addicenda sunt?’

[Page 213]24. ‘Ex praedictis liquet, si vel bona vel subditi hostium in nave li­bera deprehendantur; bona vetita & hostilia, & subditos hostium de­tineri posse; navem autem & bona libera dimittenda.’

25. ‘Verum difficilior est quaestio, viz. Cum tractatu Suedico tum subditi tum Inhabitantes & Incolae Regni Sueciae includantur, & fruan­tur libertate Commercii etiam cum hostibus Regis nostri; Si Batavus Inhabitans aut incola sit Regni Sueciae, & vel ipse vel ipsius bona in nave Suedica deprehendantur, an Jure detineri possit, & bonis suis excidat?’

26. ‘Cum Batavus, eo quod Incola est Regni Sueciae pro tempore Ju­ra Originis haud amittat, nec Batavus esse desinat. Qui Origine hosti­um est subditus pro hoste videtur habendus; Et si extra Regnum & di­tionem ubi Incola est, in alto mari vel alibi deprehendatur, ut hostium subditus tractandus; praesertim si ipse vel sua bona ad hostes & cives suos, & terram ubi subditus est, advehantur.’

27. ‘Haec sententia istis rationibus videtur subnixa; una a tractatu Suedico, quo cavetur adeo sollicite de Navarcho licet sit hostium subditus, in favorem Suecorum & eorum Commercii, ut scilicet Navarchum adscis­cere & praeficere possint etiam hostium subditum, quia magis idoneus & suis civibus forte peritior est: Quod igitur, in uno articulo, nec sine cau­tela, ut Navarchus sit civis & Incola, permittitur, in alio casu prohiberi videtur, a contrario sensu: & quorsum tanta de Navarcho sollicitudo, si hostium subditus eo quod Incola & civis sit Regni Suetiae pro tempore, li­bertate commercii cum civibus suis, licet Regi nostro hostibus, frui possit.’

28. ‘Alia Argumenta sunt a gravissimo Incommodo: Quid enim si perduellis & subditus Regis nostri, Majestatis Reus & damnatus, in Suecia larem figat, & incola sit? An libertate commercii frui debeat, nec Regi aut subditis suis in mari deprehendere & ad supplicium abducere licebit?’

29. ‘Quid si Batavus in Regno Sueciae civium suorum Institor sit? An tam sibi quam constituentibus Regis nostri hostibus, ejus nomen & privilegium praetexentibus, quod incola sit Regni Sueciae, libere & impu­ne, etiam cum hostibus negotiari licebit? An eo praetextu Batavis ad Regis nostri ditionem & Regna aditus & occasio commorandi & explo­randi, summo Regis & Regni discrimine, permittetur?’

30, ‘Verum in quaestionibus de tractatibus & contractibus inter Re­ges & populos, amicitia & foedere junctos, quarum occasione periculum est ne bello committantur; tutius est Regem ipsum consulere, & inqui­rere quid ejusmodi casu in Regno Angliae obtineat; ubi quaestiones istae frequentiores sunt; ne eodem bello ejusdem Regis tribunalia inter se dissideant.’

31. ‘Quia in quaestionibus maritimis, de navibus & bonis bello cap­tis, Magister, nautae & vectores plerumque examinantur etiam Jurati: Quaeritur, An eorum dictis standum sit? Et si quae sint contra reos prae­sumptiones, an eorum Juramento & Testimonio diluantur? Et vide­tur Respondendum, cum Juramentum sit finis omnis controversiae, si vel ut partes vel ut testes considerentur, secundum eorum testimonia Judi­candum, nisi vacillantia & suspecta sint, aut vitio aliquo laborent.’

32. ‘Non pigebit attexere, Tractatibus praedictis non sine ratione cau­tum; cum naves privatae bellicae, non tam belligerandi quam caupo­nandi [Page 214] animo (ut Ennius dixit) instructae sint, nec tam ut hostem carpant quam sibi consulant, & sui compendii causa; ideo cautionem prae­standam certam summam continentem in articulis expressam, ne foederati aut eorum subditi quid detrimenti capiant; eam cautionem exigi debere, & quidem idoneam & summam istam continentem; nec sufficere cautionem indefinitam nulla summa expressa.’

33. ‘Tractatu inter Regem nostrum & Ordines praedictos, quo Re­gem Sueciae & ejus subditos includi dictum est, Cavetur lites & causas istas expedite terminandas; & si pro Reis sententia absolutoria lata sit, ab ea haud provocandum: Si vero secundum actorem Judicatum sit, Reis Provocationis remedium indulgendum, haud ad Judicem Ordina­rium, verum ad Concilium Regis, aut ab eo delegatos: & Appellationis causam inter semestre tempus peragendam & finiendam.’

34. ‘Quod iniqua & impar sit Rei & Actoris conditio; & huic denege­tur, illi autem competat appellationis remedium; Id ea ratione videtur introductum, quod actori domi, & in suo foro de lucro certanti & agenti, haud metuendum sit, ne gratia aut potentia adversarii opprimatur: Quod autem provocetur non ad Judicem ordinarium sed ad Concilium aut dele­gatos; exteris & mercatoribus consultum est, ne longo sufflamine litium, & formularum, quae in ordinariis Judiciis solennes sunt, Anfractibus at­triti haereant.’

35. ‘Quod ea, quae adeo pie consulta sunt, in usu haud sunt recepta; & ii quorum interest tantopere sibi defuerint, iis non utendo remediis, mirum videtur: Nec minus mirandum, consuetudinem a Jure & Ratio­ne alienam tolerari; Ea autem est, quod cum exteris, quorum naves deprehensae sunt, patronorum & peritiorum copia haud deneganda sit, cujus consilio sese defendant, adeoque Admiralitatis curia, penes quam de iis causis jurisdictio est, Lethae aut Edinburgi teneri debeat; Nonnulli tamen a Thalassiarcha, ut praetendunt delegati, in regionibus procul dissi­tis, in causis istis plerumque arduis & gravissimis, per se & substitutos suos judicant; a quorum sententia, aliquando ad supremam, quae Lethae habetur curiam provocatur. Et ab istius curiae sententia appellationis, rursus ad supremum Senatum & Dominos Sessionis (ut loquuntur) ap­pellatur: Sic evenit, ut tot Judiciorum & curiarum meandros, vix detur eluctari: Nec id sine magno tum temporis tum sumptuum dispendio.’

Posterity of Traitors.

IF, by our Law, the Posterity of Traitors be disabled ipso Jure, both Ante­nati & Post-nati, as to any Estate pertaining to themselves, which is not profectitious from the Father after Treason? Ratio Dubitandi. The Doom of Forefaulture, beareth only forefaulture of Life, Lands, and Goods; without mention of the posterity; & noxa caput sequitur: and Lex Julia Maje­statis is but the municipal Law of the Romans, and is not authorised by any Act of Parliament or custom of ours. To Consider the Act of Parliament K. Ja. 5. and the Act of Dis-habilitation of the Posterity of the Earl of Bothwel, and Rehabilitation of John Stewart.

Transumpts.

IF Transumpts under the Clerk Registers hand do Satisfy in Improba­tions? Ratio Dubitandi, as in the case of the Question, Decreets for proving the Tenor in hac Litera T.

If Transumpts of Seasins out of the books of Touns and Burghs upon process to that effect, as use is, will satisfy the production? Answer. They will satisfy; seeing the Prothocalls are Extant in the Touns Regis­ter: Cogitandum as to the Transumpts of other seasins.

Trebellianica.

AN Executor nominate, after Confirmation deceasing before the Testa­ment be execute; Quaeritur, will he have Right to the Third and Trebellianica?

Trust.

WHether a bond in these terms, viz. bearing an obligment to denude and declaring the Trust, be equivalent to an Assignation?

Trustees in Infeftments.

A Right being granted to one, his Heirs and Assigneys, for the use and behoof of another person and his Heirs, Quaeritur, whether the ca­sualities of Ward, Marriage &c. do fall by the decease, and with respect to the person infeft, or to the person to whose behoof the Right is granted?

May the person, to whose use the same is granted, compell the Vassal to denude in his favours, without the Superiors consent?

Though the Superior may pretend, that when the Right is to the be­hoof of an Incorporation, that he has prejudice: yet if it be to the behoof of a single person, can he refuse to enter him, if the Vassal be content to denude in his favours? Ratio Dubitandi. Though Ʋsuarius has an In­terest, yet he is not Vassal; and the Superior cannot be urged to receive a new Vassal: And on the other part, the Right being in Trust and pre­carious, to the behoof of the other; ex natura inest, that he may revock and urge the Vassal to denude, and a Regress is implyed, the Superior having granted the Right of the nature foresaid.

A Trustee committing Treason.

A Person having committed Treason, and having in his person for the time a Right to a bond by Assignation, but in trust to the use of an other, and upon a back-bond declaring the Trust: Quaeritur, Whether or not the Sum due by bond will belong to the King, and his Donator? Ratio Dubitandi, The Right of the Sum is in the person of the Traitor; and by the Back-Bond he is only debitor, and obliged to denude: And [Page 216] he to whose use it is intrusted has not Jus in re but ad rem; and a personal action against the Trustee, whereunto the King is not lyable.

Tutors.

TƲtela being munus publicum, at least authoritate though not utilitate; If by our custom a Tutor may be urged to accept the office? Answer. Negative; and yet he may be urged Causative, as v. g. If a legacy be left to a Tutor nominate, he must either accept the office or want the legacy.

If a Tutor of Law, after the year, compear to oppose the giving of a Da­tive; will he be heard to purge after Jus Devolutum?

As a Father has power to name Tutors; is he so Tutor of Law, that without any authority of the Judge or Service, he may Administrate and grant Discharges?

A Tutor nominate by a Codicill, ought he not to be confirmed; and the Nomination ly in the Commissars Register?

If where there is more Tutors, payment may be made securely to one?

Quid Juris as to Tutors, if they may be charged? and where there are Letters of Horning granted against them for their interest, upon the debt of the pupil, If their Escheat and Liferent will thereupon fall?

In what case Tutors may be charged, or pupils themselves? It is Thought, That Cogitandum est, Whether there be a difference betwixt the case of a Tutor, when there is a Decreet against the pupil and against him for payment, and he has not alledged nor made appear that he has nothing of the Pupils Estate in his hands, & officium non debet esse damno­sum: And when the Tutor is only charged for his interest: Seing in the first case there is a decreet against him; and in the other, not: Or if he ought to Suspend as being Debitor ex quasi contractu; eo ipso that he is Tutor, and is lyable either to the debt, or ought to show that he cannot pay it.

Quaeritur, If a Woman may be Tutor dative, or Curator? It is thought, that (though the Testators will, be most to be followed in Testaments) she cannot be Tutor dative; because it is virile officium: And a Wo­man, though she will be Heir failȝiening Children, & penes quem emolu­mentum penes eundem onus: yet she cannot be served Tutor of Law: And the Law not trusting her, she should not be Dative: And though the Exchequer gives such Tutories, it seemes to be an Errour and abuse.

If Breives for serving Tutors of Law should be direct to any others, but the Sheriffs? Or to other Judges, where the Defunct had his Do­micile and his Estate? Seing Infants and Pupils have no Domicile: and Services are oftentimes of purpose before the Baillies of the Canon­gate; and in other places, where neither the Pupils parents did dwell, nor had they any interest or estate.

Diverse Tutors being named conjunctly, Quaeritur, if any of them de­cease, will the Nomination be void? Answer, It is thought, that Tutors and Executors have the Office singuli in solidum; So that any of them de­ceasing, the survivers continue Jure non decrescendi. Montrose.

A Mid-brother having left Children, Quaeritur, Whether will his Elder Brother or Younger be Tutor to them? Ratio Dubitandi, That [Page 217] the younger Brother will not succeed, & penes quem onus, penes eundem emo­lumentum: Et e contra, if the mid-Brothers Children should succeed to their Father, the younger Brother will be Heir to them, though not to their Fa­ther.

Tutor and administrator of Law.

QƲaeritur, If Debitors may pay the Father as Tutor of Law, sine inquisitione, and without some authority of the Judge competent? Seing there may be prejudice to the Pupil, if the Father be prodigus, or otherwise unfit.

Tutor Ratione Rei.

QƲaeritur, Whether a Person, Disponing his Estate to a Pupil or Minor, may appoint Tutors and Curators for administration of it during Mi­nority? Answer, he may appoint Tutors or Curators to administrate: But the Question remaineth, whether he may appoint a Tutor, not only rei suae but Personae; and to any other Estate belonging to the Pupil.

Quaeritur, The Father being deceased, may the Grand-Father name Tutors to his Grand-Children?

There being no place to a Dative till after year and day, Quaeritur, If the nearest Agnat may oppose the giving a Dative? Or if Jus be fully devolutum to the King, as in other cases Juris devoluti?

Tutory.

FIve Persons being named Tutors, whereof two to be sine quibus non, viz. The Defuncts Relict, and another; and the Relict being Mar­ried, and the other sine quo non deceasing: Quaeritur, Whether the Tutory falleth? And if it be void, whether the nearest of kin of age may be Tu­tor in Law? Or if there should be place to a Tutor Dative? And if in that case the surviving Tutors should be preferred to all others? Ratio Dubitandi, 1mo. Though the defunct did express his respect to the sine qui­bus non; so that during their being Tutors they should be sine quibus non; he did also express his confidence in the other Tutors above all others, by name­ing them Tutors; so that, for the reason soresaid, it may appear, That they should continue Tutors; at the least that for avoiding of question, they should be preferred to be Datives. 2do. The next nearest of Kin should not be Tutors, seing the Defunct did not trust them. The case of my Lord Montrose; his Father having named his Mother and the Earles of Perth and Haddington, Drumelzior and Sir Willaim Bruce, to be his Tutors.

V.

Re-entering of Vassals.

WHen a Right holden of the Superior is reduced, whether the Superior be obliged to Re-enter without a Composition?

Vectigalia & Pedagia.

VEctigalia & Pedagia sunt quasi stipendia Principum, pro protectione & repa­ratione itinerum & pontium instituta. Jus Fluviat. Tom. 2. Consil. 8. p. 140. n. 23.

Licet per vadum quis transire possit, solvitur tamen pedagium de flumini­bus; &c. 24.

Vinco Vincentem.

QƲaeritur, In what case the Brocard holdeth, Si vinco vincentem, vinco te? Answer. ubi est eadem Ratio; as, v.g. If there be three comprysings, and the last compryser be first infeft; and thereafter the first; and the second in the last place; But there is an Inhibition at the instance of the second before the Debt of the third Compryser: The second will be pre­ferable to the third, who will be preferable to the first; and yet the first will be preferred to the second.

As in the case of Adjudication and Infeftment thereupon, the adjudger may exclude the Superiors Ward falling by the Debitor, Quaeritur, If he may exclude and be preferable to the Liferent, having the first Infeftment; Quia si vinco vincentem, vinco te? Answer. he is not preferable to the Life­rent: and the Brocard doth only militate ubi est eadem Ratio vincendi; and the adjudger vincit the Superior, because he is infeft holden of him: so that there can be no Ward: but cannot upon that ground vincere the Liferenter, because she is also infeft, and has a prior Infeftment though base yet pub­lick; and which therefore doth exclude the adjudgers Infeftment being posterior; though it would not exclude the Superior as to his casuality, because base and not confirmed by him. Ballencrief. vide Debitor and Cre­ditor, Quaest. 3. Litera D.

U.

Union.

THere being an Union in a Charter, of Lands in diverse Shires; so that one Seasin may be taken for all: Quaeritur, If the Heir may be served in the Shire where Seasin is to be taken, as to all the Lands? [Page 219] In respect the Lands in other Shires are fictione juris, and by reason of the Union, thought to be there: Or if there must be a Service by a Commission, or two Services in the several Shires?

If notwithstanding of the Union, Seasin may be taken of both the Lands, seing the Charter bears that una sasina erit sufficiens, and not that it shall be necessary? And if the Seasin may be quarrelled, as not being at the places where Seasin is to be taken?

Item if the Taking two Seasins upon the Retour, will import a renunce­ing of the Union; so that a seasin cannot be taken thereafter at the place of the Union, upon Resignation or otherwise?

Ʋniversalia augmentum recipiunt.

TOtum est, vel Ʋniversale, vel Integrale: Ʋniversale ut haereditas, Dos, &c. augmentum & Diminutionem recipit, & futurum includit; Ita gre­ge legato, quae postea accedunt ad Legatarium pertinent: Jus Fluviat p. 768, n. 12. & sequent.

Quando Ʋniversitas delinquit?

UNiversitas dicitur delinquere, quando secundum consuetudinem loci per prae­conem vel sonum campanae, fuerit convocata, & in Concilio generali sponte convenerit & deliquerit.

Si Decuriones consenserint tantum, non Ʋniversitas sed particulares deliquis­se dicuntur; quia aliud est Ʋniversitas, aliud singuli: & in generali potestate Decurionibus data, non includitur potest as delinquendi. Fritschii Tom. 2. exer­cit. 3. Juris publ. n. 73.

Licet ista solennitas contra civitatem sit probanda, tamen haud requiritur in delictis tractum successivum habentibus; v. g. si non punitd elinquentes, quia ibi praesumitur ratificatio, quae in paenalibus mandato quoque comparatur; & con­sensus ipsius satis facto declaratur. ibid. n. 75.

Quomodo puniatur Ʋniversitas, vide ibid. n. 78. & sequent.

Punitur aliquando Banno, sumpto de authoribus supplicio; ut paena ad pau­cos, metus ad omnes perveniat. ibid. n. 80.

W.

Wadsets. Vide De Hypothecis.

WHAT way shall a Creditor be secured as to a Wadset, or Money due thereupon? Answer. He may compryse the Wad­set-Right; and if he cannot compryse, the term of payment of the Creditors Debt not being come, he may arrest the Sum due upon the Wadset, to be forthcoming in case of redemption. vide Arrestment of Conditional Debt in litera A.

[Page 220]If Another Creditor compryse the Wadset, will he be preferred to the Arrester befor the Order, though anterior? Answer. he will be preferred being in the Right the time of the Redemption; And the Money being only due to these who have Right to the Land, and must renounce and retrovendere.

The Wadsetter deceasing after an Order, and the Money being consigned Quaeritur, Whether will it belong to his Heir or Executor? Ratio Dubi­tandi. Money of it self is Moveable: And on the other part, surrogatum sa­pit naturam surrogati; and it is due to be given ratione rei and a renuncia­tion to be given by the Heir.

Quid Juris in the case of a Contract, whereby Lands are sold and a price payable; if the Buyer charge for implement and consign the price, and the Disponer decease; whether will it belong to his Heirs or Exe­cutors?

After Redemption of a Wadset, or comprysing, the Wadsetter or com­pryser dying; whether is it necessary that their Heirs be infeft and re-renounce, or if a renunciation will be sufficient; the Wadset or comprysing being loused and extinguished by Redemption?

Wadset Heretable or Moveable.

WHen there is a provision in a Wadset-Right, that requisition should not louse the infeftment: Quaeritur, If after requisition the Sum be Heretable or Moveable? Ratio Dubitandi. The Creditor declares his resolution to have the Sum: And on the other part, a Sum due upon a real Right appears to be Heretable. It is thought, that until it be actually uplifted, it should be Heretable: sed Cogitandum.

If the Wadsetter be year and Day at the Horn; and thereafter the Wad­set be redeemed, Quaeritur, If the Superior will have the Wadsetters Life­rent of the Sum due upon the wadset.

If before Redemption, the Wadsetter Dispone the Lands, suppose they hold Ward, will they recognise simply, or only as to the Wadsetters interest? Ratio Dubitandi, The Wadset is, upon the matter, but a Hypotheck; and he can forefault no more than he has: And on the other part, whatever paction be betwixt the Creditor and Debitor; yet as to the Superior, the Wadsetter is properly and formally his Vassal; so that ex ejus persona he has all the fruits and casualities of Superiority.

If a Wadsetter holding of the King commit Treason, Whether or not he forefaults the Lands or only his interest of Wadset? Ratio Du­bitandi, As in the former Querie: and that the King should have homi­nem vivum & mortalem confiscantem; and all the casualities belonging to his Superiority, or to His Majesty as King, ex morte vel delicto Ʋasalli: and albeit the Right be redeemable, yet that is to be understood alse long as the Right is in the person of the Wadsetter; but not after it is Extinct by Forefaulture.

Wadset Proper.

IF a Wadsetter of Ward-Lands die before Redemption, will the Mar­riage of his Heir fall? And if it fall, will the Debitor, if he redeem, be lyable to refound the avail.

[Page 221]In Proper Wadsets a great part of the Sum being paid; will the Wad­setter be comptable for the duties effeirand thereto?

Ward.

A Compryser of Lands holden Ward being infeft, Quaeritur, If these Lands will Ward by the decease of the compryser, and if the Mar­riage of his appearand Heir will fall? Ratio Dubitandi, a compryser is but an interim Vassal, for suretie of his Debt: And upon that consideration such a Right in England is considered as a Chattel, and not Inheritance. vide Comprysing. quaest: 14. litera. C.

If the comprysing be Redeemed, will the Debitor be lyable to refound the damnage sustained by the Ward and Marriage?

Quaeritur, If the Ward of the comprysers Heir will determine and ex­pire upon the Redemption?

Quid Juris in the case of proper Wadsets; if the Debitor after Redem­ption, will be lyable to refound the foresaid Damnage? The difference being, that a comprysing is an involuntar Right, and the Wadset voluntar; so that the Creditor seemeth to take his hazard.

A Creditor being infeft in Ward Lands, upon a Wadset bearing back­tack; will they Ward upon his decease, and the Minority of his Heir?

If they Ward, will the Debitor have the benefit of the backtack, during the Ward? The Superior having in effect consented thereto.

We have seen a Charter granted to the Earl of Home, viz. To George Earl of Home and Mareon Halyburton, of the Earldome of Home, and other Lands thereinmentioned; some of them holding Ward; Which Charter is granted to them in Liferent and to their Son Alexander in Fee; dated in Anno 1538. which bears, that though the said Alexander be infeft in Fee, yet if the time of the Liferenters decease he be Minor, his Ward and Marriage shall fall to the King.

Item, It bears a reservation of Terce to the said Mareon, notwithstanding of the said Fee.

If the Ward of a person who is Appearand Heir, as to a Wadset Right, do not determine by a Redemption of the Wadset? And the same Que­stion may be, as to the Liferent of the person infeft upon the Wadset? Answer. It is thought, that it will determine; his Right being Jus resolu­bile: And though the Ward be considered as fructus Dominii directi; and being gifted, it may seem that the Donator cannot be prejudged, yet that is to be understood when the Vassal has an absolute Right; but not when the Right is qualified and resolubile.

If the Appearand Heir of VVard Lands being pubes and Doli capax com­mit Treason, will his VVard be determined? vide Marriage. questiones 17. & 18. in litera. M.

Lands holding VVard being full the time of the Vassals decease, by an Infeftment upon a Comprysing; but the Comprysing being thereafter re­deemed by the Debitors general Heir being Minor; Quaeritur, If the Supe­rior will have the VVard? Answer. It is thought, not; seeing the Heir does not succed to the Lands as Heir to his Father, who was not Vassal; but as general Heir has Right to the Reversion, whereupon he has Re­deemed: and Modus & Forma is much to be considered.

[Page 222]If the Comprysing does extinguish, being satisfied by Intromission, Quae­ritur, If the Heir being Minor, there will be a Ward in that case? Answer. It is thought, not; Seing the Comprysing does extinguish not ab initio, but ex post facto; and the Heir cannot be said to be the Appearand Heir of a Vassal; the Lands being full, as said is the time of his Fathers decease: And albeit there is not a formal and ordinar legal reversion, no Money being to be paid, yet there is upon the matter Jus Retrahendi to the Ap­pearand Heir. vide Comprysing. Quaest. 37. litera C.

Ward Lands.

QƲaeritur, A Superior of Ward Lands having confirmed a base Infeft­ment, whether will the Subvassal be Lyable to the Ward, or Non-entry falling by the decease of the Vassal? Ratio Dubitandi. Hope giveth only that reason in the case of Lands holden of the King, that Confirmati­ons bear a Salvo of all Rights, Duties, and Services.

By the Act of Parliament [...] The Superior during the Non-entry and Ward, had Right only to the Feu-duty due to the Vassal by the Sub­vassal; Quaeritur, If the Superior be in the same case by the confirmation, as he was by the said Act of Parliament; notwithstanding the Act of Par­liament 1606, in favours of Subjects Superiors of Ward Lands.

If the Appearand Heir of a Vassal of Ward Lands renounce to be Heir, will his Marriage notwithstanding fall either single or double? Ratio Dubitandi, he was never Vassal; and caelibatus is not delictum.

If Marriage be real and affects in prejudice of singular Successors? Ra­tio Dubitandi, Hope is for the Affirmative, and alledgeth Decisions. To consider Haltons case: On the other part, in Novodamuses, amongst in­cumberances that affect, there is no mention of Marriage. 2do. The Mar­riage respecteth not the Lands but the person, and his other Estate as to the value. 3tio. It may appear to be a personal Prestation, whereto the person and his Right dureing his and his Heirs time is Lyable, but doth not affect a singular Successor, as in the case of Ward.

A Vassal of Lands holden Ward of the King did Feu the same before the Year 1633. when it was lawful to Feu Lands holden Ward of the King; and when the said Feu was granted, the Disponer did grant a general Dis­charge of the Feu-duty except dureing the Ward; and for securing the Feuer having bought the saids Lands as optima maxima, at alse high a price as if the Lands had holden otherwayes, that he and his Successors should not be Lyable to the Feu-duty during the Ward; the Disponer was obliged to Infeft the Feuer in an Annualrent out of other Lands equi­valent to the Feu-duty; suspending always the effect of the said Right, ex­cept during the Ward. Quaeritur. 1mo. If the said general Discharge, with an obligement to grant particular Discharges when required, will militate against singular Successors, being in rem? Answer. Cogitandum: But it is thought, that it will not; unless the same were by way of Provi­sion in the Charter and Seasin.

When Ward Lands were Feued which did hold of the King before the Year 1633. The Feuer during the Ward was only Lyable to the Feu-duty by the old Act of Parliament, allowing the Feuing of such Lands; [Page 223] but there is no mention of the Marriage in the said Act of Parliament; Quaeritur therefore, Whether the Marriage of the Disponer and his Suc­cessors will affect such Feues? It is Answered, That it is thought, not; se­ing the setting of Feus being allowed; it appears, that Feuers should be on­ly Lyable to the Feu-duty.

The Feuer having ever possest since the granting of the said Right (mentioned in the Querie abovewritten except one) but not being In­feft upon the said obligement to Infeft in an Annualrent, for relief of the Feu-duty: Quaeritur, If the Feuer should pursue upon the said obligement, if it may be obtruded that it is prescribed? Ratio Dubitandi, That the said obligement is a part of the Feuers Right; and the Feuer has been in possession by vertue of his Right all the time: and if the Feuer had not been Infeft upon the Feu-Charter, and had been in possession by the space of Fourty Years; and after the expireing of the same should pursue the Disponer and his Representatives, to grant a new Charter with a Precept to Infeft; it could not be pretended that the said Right was prescribed.

If Lands holden Ward of the King be Feued after the Year 1633. and the King should question the said Feu as null, being contrar to the Act of Parliament: Quaeritur, If Prescription may be alledged and obtruded against the King? Ratio Dubitandi, That the Right is null ab initio, and cannot be a warrand and ground of Prescription; Et quod nullum est, nul­lum sortitur Juris effectum.

A Vassal of Ward Lands holden of the King, having Feued the same conform to the Act of Parliament warranting such Feus: Quaritur, If the Vassal be Forefault, whether such Feus will fall under the Forefaul­ture; if they be not confirmed? Or if the Act of Parliament, warranting such Feus, be equivalent to a confirmation? Answer. It is thought, the King for himself and his Successors, by the said Act, did consent to all Feus that are to be granted by vertue thereof: So that the same is equiva­lent to a Confirmation. Marques of Huntlie.

Taxt Ward.

A Gift being granted of Wards simple or Taxt, falling within a certain time, Quaeritur, if the Donator will have Right to the Taxt Ward for Terms thereafter. Answer. He will have Right to the same; if the Taxt Ward has fallen within the said time, as the whole time of the Ward; seing Ward is to be considered as Jus integrum; and Dies cedit when ever it falls, albeit non venit.

Warrandice.

A Bond being Assigned with absolute Warrandice: Quaeritur, What is the import of the said Warrandice? And if the Cedent should be Lyable, if the Debitor be, or should become Insolvent? Answer. It will import only that the Debt is true, and due by a valide Bond; but not that the Cedent should be obliged to warrand the condition of the Debitor; the Law being express to that purpose, that he should warrand [Page 224] deberi, but not Debitorem locupletum esse: As was found in the case of Mr. Robert Barclay.

Quid Juris, If the Warrandice be in these Terms; that the Debitor is Locuples, and he be truely so for the time, but he becomes Insolvent? Cogitandum.

Infeftment of Warrandice.

IF an Infeftment of Warrandice, being only base, will be construed to be publick by Possession; by reason of the Possession of the Principal Lands Dunglas.

Waste.

WAste being committed by a Liferenter or Wadsetter; and the Here­tor deceasing or disponing the Lands; whether will the Action for the same be competent to the Heir of the Heretor, or to his Executors, or Singular Successors? Answer. It is thought, it will belong to the Heir, or Singular Successor, being Actio in Rem: And so it is by the English Law.

Witnesses Remitted.

THE necessary Qualification of a Witness being Honesty and Inte­grity, which though presumed in all Persons, yet cannot be thought to have been in these, who by sentence on their own Confession, are evidently Criminosi, and guilty of the highest Crimes: It would seem that a Remission may Free as to punishment, and may Repone as to all other capacities, and as to the Kings own Interest; But not as to that, which in behalf of the People, requires Integrity: And the King by a Re­mission may free a Pain, but not a Guilt, and cannot repone to Innocency.

Witnesses in case of Treason.

THE Law of the Majesty, and the Statutes of King William Chap. 11th. Of these who are Infamous; and the Statutes of Robert the 1st. Cap. 34. of these who are repelled from Testimony, are clear, that Socii Criminis cannot be Witnesses, and convicti & redempti cannot be Witnesses: Quae­ritur therefore, if a Person convict of Treason and Remitted, that he may be Witness against others, can be Witness? Especially, that Law bearing That conducti prece vel pretio cannot be Witnesses; and there can be no greater pretium than a Mans Life, Skin for Skin &c.

VVomen VVitnesses.

QƲaeritur, If Women Witnesses may be admitted in the case of Di­vorce, to prove Adultery? Answer. This Question is under debate, [Page 225] upon Advocation from the Commissars of Edinburgh having admitted the same: And that they should not be admitted. 1mo. That by our Law, Cap. 34. Stat. 2d. Ro. 1st. Women are not Habile Witnesses: And by the Custom (except in casu puerperii to prove the Birth of Children, to give the Husband the benefite of Courtesie) and by the Canon Law De­cretal: De verborum significatione Cap. 10. And on the other part, it is urged, by the Civil Law, they may be Witnesses except in Testaments; and by the Canon Law, they may be Witnesses in causa Matrimoniali, and by our custom in Criminibus occultis & domesticis; and in atrocioribus, as Murder, Treason, and Falsehood: And in Answer, It is urged, that where the Civil Law is altered by the Canon, that is to be followed; and that Wo­men cannot prove Marriage, and ought not to prove the Dissolution; and in causa Matrimonii Witnesses should be above all exception. Cap. 1. de Con­sanguinitate: And if any of the Canonists were of another Opinion, it was because the effect of Divorce was separatio mensae & Thori, non vinculi; and in Treason and such Crimes much is indulged, ad vindictam publicam, but not ad vindictam privatam, when such pursuites are only for private interest: And it is not presumed, that the Kings Advocat will corrupt Witnesses: and in whatever case either by the Canon Law or ours, Women are ad­mitted, It is only ubi constat de corpore delicti, which is not in Adultery, where there is not a Child: and in whatever case (even when the publick is concerned) VVomen are never admitted; but to adminiculate; And Quando concurrit unus testis habilis, supplet inhabilitatem alterius: And there being Fourty or Fifty Processes of Adultery within this Hundred Years, VVomen VVitnesses were never received: and they are not admitted in causa scandali before the Commissars, to prove injuria verborum, much less in Crimine Adulterii.

Obligements to employ Sums of Money, for Provision of VVives.

IF a Person be obliged by Contract of Marriage to employ a Sum of Mo­ney to himself and his Wife the longest liver in Liferent, and to his Heirs Quaeritur, If the said obligement be not performed, what course the Relict may take to affect thereupon his Estate having no Heirs, Creditors being in competition of Diligence? And if she may not pursue his Appearand Heir as lawfully charged, making mention of the Obligement, and that the Heir will not perform the same, and that loco facti succedit interesse; and therefore to hear and see him decerned to pay and make forthcom­ing to her the said Sum, that it may be employed conform to the said Obligement; and to hear and see it found and declared, that the same Execution shall follow upon the Decreet by Adjudication or otherwayes, as is competent to other Creditors?

If a Relict will be preferable to other Creditors?

A VVomans Jointure.

A Man getting a Tocher, and giving a Joynture in order to his VVifes Aliment; and she having a Joint Right with him: If he become [Page 226] Bankrupt will it be altogether ineffectual dureing Life? Ratio Dubitandi. It is Alimentary, and she is a most favourable Creditor, and otherwayes it should be Societas Leonina.

VVoods.

WHen a Liferenter is Infeft cum Nemoribus: Quaeritur, Quid Juris, VVhen the VVood falleth to be cut dureing the Liferent?

VVrack.

IF Ships or Barges belonging to this Kingdom, do make Ship-wrack with­in the same: Quaeritur, VVhether the Representatives of the owners may claim the Goods and not the King? Or any Infeft cum Wrack? Ra­tio Dubitandi, That by the Act of Parliament, Ja. 6. Par. 9. Cap. 124. Ships belonging to these Nations, where that Law has not place, are to be in another case than the Ships belonging to the Nations where the Law anent Ship-wrack has place: and it seems reasonable, that the King's own Subjects and their Ships should be in alse good case, as the Ships of any Nation whatsoever; and that their Ships and Goods should not be lost upon pretence of VVrack; unlese there were a positive Law to that pur­pose: and the foresaid Act implyes, that it is Triste Lucrum, and not to be owned but Lege Talionis.

Z.

The case of the Admirality of Orknay and Zetland, Represented in behalf of the King, in Answer to the Duke of Lennox's Claime thereto.

BY a Charter under the Great Seal in anno 1603. His Majesties Grandfather did give and grant to Lodovick Duke of Lennox the Office of Admirality, in these terms, Totum & integrum Officium Admiralitatis nostri Regni, cum omnibus privilegiis honoribus & Commoditati­bus eidem spectantibus.

The said Charter is not only of the said Office, But of the Dukedome of Lennox, and of the Lands therinmentiond belonging to the same: And as to the said Lands and Dukedome, the said Charter is upon the Dukes Resignation, the same having formerly pertained to him; But as to the said Office of Admirality, the same is not given upon the Dukes Re­signation, but is casten in in the Novodamus; whereas the Clauses of Novo­damus do not usually contain, as to the Subject Disponed, more nor did formerly belong to the Resigner; seing de novo dare & renovare doth sup­pose a former and preexistent Right. There are indeed Ratifications in Parliament of Lodovick Duke of Lennox his Right of the Office of the Ad­mirality; But it is to be considered, that by ancient Laws and Acts of Par­liament, it is Statute that heretable Offices should not be given, or Dis­poned in Fee or Heretage; and if they should de facto be disponed, they should be given with great deliberation, and deliverance of the Parliament, s appears by the Acts 43 and 44 King James 6th. his 11th. Parliament.

[Page 227]Ratifications do ordinarly pass in Parliament, of course without voting, the very last hour of the Parliament when it is to dissolve; and how little weight should be laid upon the same, it appears by the Ratification pro­duced for his Grace the Duke of Lennox dated 23 of October 1612, which doth ratifie the Infeftment Granted to the said Lodovick Duke of Len­nox of the Offices of Great Admiral of Scotland, and of all the Isles and bounds thereof, with the Offices of Lieutenendrie upon the seas, and Col­lonellship, and Justice General, and Office of Judicatorie Criminal and Civil, with all the Priviledges, Dignities, and Casualities of the same set down in the said Infeftment; albeit no such Infeftment, for any thing known, is or can be produced: and the foresaid Infeftment in the year 1603 Granted to the Duke of Lennox is only simple, of the Office of Ad­miralitie Regni nostri without any mention of the Isles, or of the Office of Lieutenendrie upon the Seas or Collonellship, and Justice General, and of the Office Judicatorie Criminal and Civil; And the said Act of Parlia­ment is blank as to the date of the Infeftment which is ratified; whereas if there had been any such Infeftment of the Tenor and Extent foresaid, it would have then been produced the tyme of the said ratification; And if it had been then produced, the ratification would have expressed the date of the same.

It Appears by certain other papers now produced by the Duke for clearing his interest, That the claim of that Honourable Familie was on­ly of the Office of Admiralitie of the Kingdom, without any mention of the Isles, and much less of Orknay and Zetland; in so far as his Majesties Fathers letter 16 June 1628, of which the extract is produced, doth bear, That he had been pleased to sign a signature, In favours of the Duke of Lennox of the Heretable Office of Admiralitie of this his Kingdom: And in the Act of Parliament produced of the date 28 June 1633, Mention is made, that the deceased James Duke Lennox stood Infeft as Heir to the said Lodovick Duke of Lennox, in the Office of Admiralitie of this Kingdom, without the least mention of Orknay and Zetland.

It appears by the Writs produced for the Duke, That until the Earl of Mortouns Grand-Father obtained a gift and Right of Orknay and Zetland from his Majesties Father; The Duke of Lennox's Right, as to the ad­miralitie of Orknay and Zetland, was ever questioned and controverted by his Majesties Officers; In so far, that upon the last of March 1628, The King did set a Tack of the Earldome of Orknay and Zetland To Archibal [...] Lord Naper, Containing a Right likwayes of the Admiralitie within the Bounds of Orknay and Zetland: And the Earl of Linlithgow having appeared in behalf of the Deceased James Duke Lennox, The said Lord Naper Declaired, that he should be ruled as to the said Right of Admirality according as his Majestie should declare his will thereanent; whereas if the Dukes Right had been clear and unquestionable, neither a Tack would have been set of the Admiralitie of Orknay and Zetland, neither woul [...] there have been any Reference made to his Majestie; But upon the Ear [...] of Linlithgowes appearing, and representation of the Dukes Right, th [...] Clause of the said Tack as to the Admiralitie of Orknay and Zetland, would have been Delet.

As to Possession; the Earles of Mortoun have been in Possession of the Admiralitie of Orknay, upon a Gift and Right from his Majesty, ever since th [...] Earle of Mortouns Grand-Father obtained the Right of Orknay.

[Page 228]There is produced for the Duke, The double of a Gift granted to the Earl of Linlithgow of the Admiralitie of the whole Kingdom of Scotland and Isles thereof, and of the Lieutenendrie, Justiciarie and General of the Sea; with consent of the Deceast James Duke of Lennox and of his Curatorsf the said Earl being a Confident Person and Relation of the said Noble Familie, And without prejudice of the Dukes Right: But it is to be Con­sidered, that the said Paper is only a Double and not Authentick, And the said Right is only Granted dureing the Minoritie of the said Duke of Len­nox, and is given upon a Supposition and Narrative of the Dukes Right; Whereas no Right has been, or for any thing that can be seen, can be showen; That the Dukes of Lennox have Right expresely of the Admirality of the Isles, and of the offices of Lieutenendrie and Justiciarie.

As to the Priviledges and Casualities belonging to the Admiralitie of Orknay and Zetland; it is represented, that the Priviledges and Casualities of the Admiralitie are not specified nor defyned in any Charter or Record, for any thing that does appear: the Charter foresaid granted to Lodovick Duke of Lennox in Anno. 1603, bearing only (as said is) Cum Privilegijs & commoditatibus eisdem Spectantibus: And the Charter granted to Adam Hep­burn Earl of Bothwell in the Year 1511 (which is the most ancient Record of Admiralitie that we have seen) bearing only the said Office of Admiral Totius Regni, to be given to the said Adam, Cum omnibus Libertatibus profi­cuis & eschetis ejusdem; without mention of the Isles of Orknay or Zetland, or specifieing the Liberties and Casualities belonging to the Admirality.

It Appears by an Act of Parliament Intituled concerning certain abuses of the Admirals proceedings, being 156. Act of King James 6th. his 12. Parliament; that upon pretence of an Infeftment granted to Francis Earl of Bothwell of the Admiralitie of Scotland, containing greater Specialities and diverse Clauses which were not in the former Infeftments of Admirality, The People being oppressed did Complain, and by the said Act it is Sta­tute, that the Admiral and his Successors should exerce no Jurisdiction nor exact no Dutie nor Casualitie, But that which was in use to be exerci­sed and taken by the Admiral for the tyme, before the Death of King James 5th: And therefore it is humblie conceived, that whosoever shall be found to have Right to the Admiralitie of Orknay and Zetland, It is fit that the Priviledges and Casualites of the same, be so defyned and cleared, that the Fishing, Trade, and Trafficque be not interrupted nor disturbed; And that his Maiesty be not prejudged of his Rents of Orknay.

It is humblie represented to his Majesties Consideration, The Records being for the most part lost, which might have cleared his Majesties Interest; and the Right of Admiralitie being Granted to the Dukes of Lennox in manner foresaid; and neither the Dukes Right nor the Right of Admiralitie granted to the preceeding Admirals being special as to the Isles of Orknay and Zetland; and the said Isles of Orknay being the Kings Propertie, and feued only to the Earles of Orknay, and now Annexed to the Crown; and the said Isles being so remote and of so vast an extent, and formerlie pos­sessed by the King of Denmark; and upon Transactions with the said King which are not very ancient, being reunited to this Kingdom; Whether or not the Right of Admiralitie granted to the Dukes of Lennox ought to be extended to the said Isles of Orknay and Zetland?

FINIS.
THE DECISIONS OF THE …

THE DECISIONS OF THE LORDS OF COUNCIL and SESSION, IN Most Cases of Importance, Debated, and brought before them; from December 1665, to June 1677.

OBSERVED By Sir JOHN NISBET of Dirleton, Advocate to King CHARLES II.

To which is Added, An INDEX, For finding the principal Matters in the said Decisions; As also, A List of the Pursuers and Defenders Names.

[printer's or publisher's device]

EDINBƲRGH, Printed by GEORGE MOSMAN, and are to be Sold at his Shop in the Parliament-Closs. Anno Dom. M.DC.XCVIII.

DECISIONS OF THE LORDS OF COUNCIL and SESSION, In some Weighty and Important Affairs before them. Beginning the 7. of December 1665, and ending the 29. of June 1677.

Decision 1st. Veatch contra Duncan, 7. December 1665.

THE Clause cum molendinis & multuris, importeth freedom from astriction, though it be only in the Tenendas. Me refe­rente.

D. 2. Burnet contra Leys, 12. Decemb. 1665.

THe said Mr Robert Burnet Son to Alexander Burnet of Leys being pro­vided by his Grand-Father Sir Thomas Burnet of Leys (his Father having deceased before) To the Sum of 10000. Merks, to be payed after his age of 25. Years; with Annualrent after that time conform to a bond; pursued his Nephew Leys for the Annualrent of that Sum; at least for an Aliment until he should attain to that age: Upon that ground, That he could not starve; and that his Grand-Father, whom the Defender repre­sents as Heir having provided him, as said is, to the foresaid Sum to be payed at the time foresaid, did acknowledge that he was obliged to pro­vide [Page 4] him being his Grand-Child: and that until the time his provision should be payable, he and his Heirs were lyable to his Entertainment being Debitum Naturale.

The Lords this day did Demurre: And the case being of consequence as to the preparative, thought fit it should be further thought upon.

D. 3. Ferguson contra More. Eodem die.

IN the case Ferguson contra More, the Lords Found That Compensation should not be granted against an Assigney upon a Debt of the cedent As­signed to the Suspender; unless intimation had been made to the Cedent, before the Chargers intimation of the Assignation made to him by the Ce­dent.

D. 4. Inter Eosdem, eod. die.

IN the same case, two Persons being obliged Conjunctly and severaly as principal Debitors, to pay a Tocher, without a clause of relief pro rara, It was found that de Jure inest.

D. 5. Pringle contra Cranston. eod. die.

IN the case Pringle of Greenknow contra Cranstoun, Found that a subvas­sal being infeft by a Baron cum Curiis & Bloodwitis, may hold Courts and unlaw for Blood.

D. 6. Eleis contra Keith and Wiseheart, 15. Decemb. 1665.

IN the case betwixt Mr John Eleis and Mr Alexander Keith and Wise­heart, It was Found That Elizabeth Keith Spouse to Mr William Wiseheart Minister at Leith, having by Bond, granted by her Husband and her, obliged her self to pay to the said Mr. John, the Sum of 6000. merks: and for his further suretie to infeft him in certain Lands pertaining to her; which bond contained a procuratory of resignation: The said bond though null as to the obligement to pay the said Sum, was valide as to the Right of the Lands: And that the said Elizabeth, having thereafter disponed the said Lands in defraud and prejudice of the said Mr John, was lyable to the said Mr John, and upon that ground, The Lords found the said Mr John as Creditor to the said Elizabeth, might question any fraudulent Rights made by her to his prejudice.

D. 7. Grants and Row contra Visc. of Stormont, eod. die.

DAvid Viscount of Stormont having obtained a Decreet of Reduction against [...] Grants, of their Right of certain Lands, for not production. [...] Grants and [...] Row, did reduce the said De­creet against [...] now Viscont of Stormont, upon production of the Rights called for in the first Decreet: And in this Reduction, The Lords did suffer and admit the said Viscount to insist in the said first Reduction, he pro­duceing the said David Viscount of Stormont his Right and instructing that he represents him; Though the said first Process was not transferred in [Page 5] the Person of the said Viscount active; and against the Pursuers of this Re­duction passive; and the summonds of Reduction, whereupon the first De­creet, proceeded was not produced: Which The Lords allowed to be sup­plyed by production of the Decreet, and a paper containing such reasons of Reduction, as Stormont thought fit to give in: And that in respect it was the fault of the Defenders in the first Reduction, that the Writs were not then produced: And they and these having Right from them being re­poned, it was just that Stormont and his Heirs should be likewise reponed.

D. 8. M cLeod contra Young. 19. Decemb. 1665.

WAlter Young, Harie Hope and [...] having Written to the Lord McDonald, that they had commissionated [...] Donaldson to buy Cows for their use; and that for such as should be bought from him they obliged themselves to pay all such Bills as should be drawn upon them: and the said Donaldson having drawn a Bill upon the saids Persons and any of them: Found, that in respect they were partners and socii as to the bargain, and the Lord McDonald had upon their letter trusted and sold the Cows to the said Donaldson, they ought to be lyable in solidum conjunctly and se­veraly.

D. 9. Dickson contra Sandilands. 21. Decemb. 1665.

IN the case betwixt [...] Dickson of Killoch and Sandilands his Mother and her present Husband: It was Found, that a Husband being obliged by Contract of Marriage, to provide the liferent of such Lands as he should acquire during the Marriage, to his Wife in liferent; and to the Heirs of the Marriage: and his Heir being pursued for implement, and for resig­ning certain Lands acquired by the Husband for a liferent to the Relict; The Relict her liferent and Right should be with the burden of a Sum of Money borrowed by the Husband, for making the said purchass; as to the Annualrent of the said Debt during the Relicts Lifetime.

The Lords considered, that though, in order to other ends and effects, and in special to determine the Succession in favours of an Heir of con­quest, whatever Lands are acquired by any person titulo singulari are esteemed Conquest: yet in Contracts of Marriage such obligements anent conquest, are to be understood of what is acquired by the Husband with his own means and Moneys; seing what is acquired otherwayes (the Price or a part of it being borrowed, and the Husband being Debitor for the same) upon the matter, and in effect, is not conquest and a free accession to the Husbands Estate; in so far as the Price is a burden upon the Husbands Estate: and as the Husband, if he had been charged himself, might have satisfied the obligement by giving an Infeftment with the foresaid burden, so the Heir may do the same.

D. 10. Lepar contra Burnet. 23. Decemb. 1665.

IN the case betwixt Lepar and Dam Rachel Burnet and the Laird of Pres­toun her present Husband; these questions were agitated and decided.

1. If a Husband get, in Tocher with his Wife being an Heretrix, [Page 6] more than an ordinary and competent Tocher, which he might have gotten with another; The Husband and his Heirs will be lyable, after the Mar­riage is dissolved by the Wifes decease, in quantum lucratus est, for the Wifes Debt: And the lucrum will be considered, to be the benefit he has got­ten above an ordinary Tocher.

2. The Lords inclined to think, That though a decreet of registration was obtained against the Wife and her Husband for his interest; The Hus­band will not be lyable, the Marriage and his interest ceasing: And that an ordinary Tocher being ad sustinenda onera, is not lucrum.

3. Heirs portioners are lyable for their own part; reserving action in case any of them become irresponsal: and if the Creditor having done dili­gence cannot recover their parts, he may have recourse against the rest.

4. It was moved (but not decided) whether the others being non sol­vent, The responsal Heir should be lyable for their proportion in solidum? Or only for What he has gotten of the defuncts Estate?

D. 11. Bryand contra Grhame. 3. January 1666.

IN the case betwixt Mr Andrew Bryand and George Grhame, The said George being constitute assigney to a Bond granted by the said Bryaend to Thomas Iack: And having charged thereupon, The Suspender offered to improve the Bond; and urged the charger to bide by the same, which he was content to doe in these terms. Viz. That he did abide by the said Bond as truely assigned and delivered to him by the cedent: And that the cedent would compear and abide by the same as a true Bond. The Suspender an­swered, that the cedent was lapsus, and had come out of Prison upon a Bonorum; and therefore he ought to find Caution to compear all the dyets of the Process. The Lords found, that the cedent should abide by the said Bond; with certification, that if he should not appear when the Lords should think fit, for clearing the question anent the falsehood of the Bond by his oath or Examination; the Bond should be declared to be void; and to make no faith both as to cedent and assigney.

D. 12. Falconer contra E. of Kinghorn. 4. January 1666.

THe Laird of Drum as Principal, and the Earl of Kinghorn and others as Cautioners, being Debitors to Robert Falconar by a Bond granted in anno 1640; And the said Robert having pursued this Earle of Kinghorn (as representing his Father) upon the said Bond: It was alledged, the Bond was null as to the Earl of Kinghorn, in respect there was no wit­ness designed to his subscription: And it being Replyed, that two of the name of Lyon were subscribing witnesses; and tho they were neither designed witness to Kinghorn his subscription, but subscribed witness in­definite; and albeit they were not otherwise designed, as they ought to be conform to the Act of Parliament by their Dwelling or otherwise; yet they were truely witnesses; and the pursuer may and doth now de­sign them: and this Defender had no prejudice, one of the witnesses be­ing yet on life: So that if he thought fit to improve, the means and direct manner of Improbation was yet competent.

The Lords allowed the Pursuer to design, which they would not have done, if both the witnesses had been deceased.

D. 13. Lady Bute contra Sheriff of Bute. 5. January 1666.

THe Lady Bute Dam Grissel Campbel being Contracted and Pro­claimed with Mr. James Grahame; in the interim before her Mar­riage, was induced (and as she pretended forced) to grant a Disposition, and Discharge of a part of her Joynture in favours of her Son the Sherrif of Bute; he having, after the first Proclamation of their Bannes, stopped any further proceding until he extorted the said deeds.

The Lords (in a Reduction of the saids deeds at the instance of the Lady and her Husband) found, that post Sponsalia and Banna, she was not sui juris; and could doe no deed in prejudice either of her Husband or her self without his consent: And that she was in the same condition, as if she were Marryed. And therefore the Lords found the reasons relevant, for reduceing the saids Rights, both as to her Husband and her self.

It was alledged, that the Husband had consented, in so far as after the saids deeds were done, he knew the same; and yet proceeded to Marry: The Lords repelled the Alledgance.

D. 14. Oliphant contra Drummond. 6. January 1666.

IN a special Declarator, at the instance of Sir James Drummond of Machany having Right by Assignation, to the Escheat of the Lord Rollo, and his Brother Sir John Rollo of Bannockburn; from Walter Stuart Donatar to the same: Sir Laurence Oliphant and Gavin Drummond, Who were also Dona­tors to the Escheat and liferent of the said Rebells, and had recovered a ge­neral Declarator; and had intented a special; having compeared and de­sireing preference, alledging that the pursuers gift was null and simulate; in respect by the Act of Parliament 1592. cap. 149. Praesumptio juris & de jure, is introduced: And it is statute, that it shall be a relevant exception against any pretending Title by Assignation or Gift of Escheat of the Rebel, to alledge, that the Rebel his Wife and Bairns remained in possession; and it was subsumed, that the Pursuer and his Cedent had suffered the Rebel to continue in possession, since the date of the Gift in Anno 1658.

The Lords found, that the Rebels having been in possession a consider­able time by the space of five years or thereabout; the Gift, by the Act of Parliament, is presumed to be simulate.

2. That though the Donatar Walter Stuart was a Creditor, it doth not alter the case; Seing he might be (and Law presumeth he was) satis­fied; and Gifts being ordinarly affected with Back-bonds, it was his fault that he was not satisfied: And that he should not by his negligence and collusion prejudge other Creditors, who would have Right after he had been satisfied.

3. That the Pursuer having assigned his Right, the assigney is in no better case, & utitur jure Authoris.

4. That the reply, that the Lands were comprysed, is not relevant; un­less it were alledged, that the Pursuer or his Cedent had done diligence to attain possession, but was excluded by the compryser. Jo. Hay Clerk.

D. 15. Brown contra Veatch and Scot. 9. January 1666.

IN the case Broun contra Veatch and Scot, It was found, after contentious debate in Praesentia, At the Barr, and betwixt the Lords; That an [Page 8] Infeftment of Warrandice base, to be holden of the granter, should be pre­ferable to a publick Infeftment of property granted thereafter holden of the Superior, and cled wih possession diverse years: And that the possession of the Principal Lands should be interpreted the possession of the War­randice Lands. Some of the Lords were of another Iudgment upon these grounds. 1. By the Act of Parliament Ja. 5. par. 7. cap 150. (Entituled provision and pains of them committand fraud in alienation and otherwise) a publick Infeftment is preferable to a base not cled with possession though anterior: And both the verba and Ratio Legis, do militate in favours of the Heretor by a publick Infeftment; The intention and end of the Law being to obviat fraud and prejudice by latent Infeftments: And it being all one, as to the interest and prejudice of the party who acquireth Lands, whether the privat and latent Infeftment be a Right of property or War­randice, Seing an Infeftment of Warrandice, when the principal Lands are evicted, becometh an Infeftment of Property.

2. The Act of Parliament foresaid of K. Ja. 5th. is not taken away by the Act of Parliament K. James 6. Par. 17. anent Registration of Seasins; in respect, an Infeftment of property being base, though Registrate and Anterior, will be null in prejudice of a party, who has acquired a Right by a posterior publick Infeftment: And both the saids Acts of Parliament, be­ing remedia quae tendunt ad eundem finem, though the hazard be not so great as to the prejudice by latent and private Infeftments, since the Act of Par­liament anent Registration of Seasins: The said Act of Parliament 1617. doth not derogate to the Act of Parliament, K. Ja. 5.

3. As to that pretence, That the possession of the principal Lands is the possession of the Warrandice fictione Juris, It was Answered, That there is no such fictio warranted by any Law: and so it is Fictio, but not Juris.

2do. It is a Fictio contra Jus, & cui Jus resistit; in respect the Heretor by the publick Infeftment of property being in possession, no other person can be said to be in possession, seing there cannot be two Domini in solidum, nor two Possessores by distinct Rights, having no subordination or dependance one upon another, as Liferenter and Fiar, Superior and Vassal, Master and Tennent; or such like.

4. It is clear, that the possession of the principal Lands cannot be thought the possession of the Warrandice; Seing if after Fourty Years the principal Lands should be evicted; and a pursuit for Warrandice and recourse should be in ented upon the Right of Warrandice, though Pre­scription cannot be obtruded, yet if there be any defect in the Infeftment of Warrandice, as v. g. The Disposition is subscribed by one Notar, or such like; The same may be alledged: Whereas, if that Infeftment were cled with Fourty Years Possession, the Right would be prescribed, and could not be questioned upon any Ground whatsoever, but Falsehood.

In this Process, It was Questioned whether the Heretor, who had the publick Infeftment, having been in Possession above Seven Years, should have the benefite of a possessory Judgement, until a Declarator and a De­creet in petitorio.

Some of the Lords thought, that in the case of Warrandice, the Heretor should not have the benefite of a Possessory Judgement against the Pursuer upon an Infeftment of Warrandice; quia non valebat agere: But the que­stion was not decided.

D. 16. Cranston contra Wilkison, 14 July 1666.

BEtwixt Cranston and Wilkison, It was Found (Newbyth Reporter) That a Person being conveened as representing his Father, who was alledged to be vitious Intrometter to the Pursuers Debitor; the Title being passive and penal could not be a Ground of Action against the Defender to make him Lyable to the whole Debt; But only in so far as should be proven the Defunct did Intromet, and was Locupletior: quia actio poenalis non transit inhaeredem: And the Defunct if he had been pursued in his own Life, might have purged the said Title.

D. 17. Burnet contra Johnston 17. July 1666.

JOhnston of Frosterhil having Disponed his Lands with absolute War­randice in favours of Gordon of Birsemoir; Reserving his own and his Wifes Liferent: and thereafter having Disponed the same Lands in favours of Mr. William Johnston; who did obtain the first Infeftment: And being charged at the instance of Alexander Burnet, having Rght by Assignation to the Disposition in favours of Birsemoir; The Letters were found orderly proceeded; notwithstanding the Suspender alledged the Charger had no interest dureing the Suspenders Life; Seing he never did nor could possess; by reason of the Reservation foresaid. And the Lords found a difference, when Warrandice is craved upon a deed of the Party obliged, and upon any other ground: And that as to his deed he may be charged to purge it, without necessity to alledge a Distress.

D. 18. Wedderburn contra Scrimzeour, 18. July. 1666.

A Father having left a Legacy, thinking his Wife was with Child; in these terms, That if his Wife should have a Male Child the Le­gatar should have the Sum of 4000 Merks: And that if she should have a Daughter, the Legatar should have the Sum of 5000 Merks.

The Lords Found, That though she had no Child, the Legacy should be effectual ex praesumpta voluntate Testatoris; seing it cannot be thought, but that he rather intended a Legacy for him, if he had no Child; Than in the case she should bring forth a Child: Et in conditionibus primum locum obtinet voluntas Defuncti, eaque regit conditiones. L. 19. ff. de conditio­nibus. Newbyth Reporter.

D. 19. Steill contra Hay. Eeod. die.

A Tennent being Ejected, Ejection was sustained at the Masters in­stance; though the Tennent did not concur: But it was not su­stained quoad omnes effectus, viz. As to violent profits, Juramentum in li­tem; but only that the Master should be in the same condition he was be­fore the Ejection; and should have the same manner of possession as if the Land were not void; and to uplift the duties; and to put in and remove Tennents. And for the Bygone ordinary Duties, in the same Process, it was Found, that the pursuer, though he was not Infeft, but only Ap­pearand Heir to the Pursuer who was Infeft, might pursue the said Action, to recover his Possession, having been in possession before.

D. 20. Hedderwick contra Wauch. Eod. die.

THE Commissioners for the Borders, upon the Verdict of the Inquest that the Pannel was guilty of Receipt of Theft, having ordained the Pannel to pay 100 lib. Sterl. within a short time; and if he should faill to be sent to Barbadoes and loss his Escheat. The Lords Found, That by that Verdict, there did arise to his Majesty, the Casuality of his Escheat: Whereof there being Jus quaesitum; The King and his Donator could not be prejudged by a Doom which is contrary to Law: And that in such cases of Capital Crimes, the Law having determined the pain, and espe­cially the loss of the Escheat; no Judge (even the Justice General) could moderate or lessen the samen.

D. 21. Bisset contra Broun. 19 July. 1666.

IT was Found nemine contradicente; That a Stranger residing in Holland, animo morandi or elsewhere: Though by the Law of the place, his nearest of Kin, without confirmation, has Right to all Goods or Debts be­longing to him: Yet if the Debt or Goods be due by Scots-men, or be in Scotland, they cannot pursue for the same, unless the Right thereof be setled upon them, according to the Law of Scotland, by confirmation if they be Moveables: Or by a Service if they be Heretable. Hay Clerk.

D. 22. Thomson contra McKitrick. Eod. die.

FOund, that a Comprysing may be deduced upon an Heretable Bond, whereupon Infeftment had followed, the same being payable without requisition; albeit a Charge of Horning do not preceed; seing there may be poinding upon such a Bond: And there is Eadem Ratio as to Compry­sings; and the Denounciation is a sufficient Intimation, that the Com­pryser intendeth to have his Money. Hay Clerk.

In the same Cause, The Lords having sustained a Seasin of burgage Lands, whereto the Sheriff-clerk was Notar, there being no Town Clerk for the time, by reason in the time of the English Usurpation, The Magi­strates and Clerk refused the Tender. The Lords Found, That the said Seasin being within Burgh, though not under the hand of the Clerk, was not null upon that Ground that it was not Registrate; Because though the reason of the Act of Parliament for Registration of Seasins, and the exception of Seasins within Burgh, be, that Seasins within Burgh are in use to be Registrate by the Clerks in the Towns Books; yet the said reason is not exprest in the Act of Parliament: and the Act of Parliament excepting Burgal Seasins, the Party was in bona fide to think that there was no ne­cessit of Registration.

D. 23. Eleis contra Wiseheart Eod. die.

A Wife being obliged with her Husband to pay a Sum of Money, and to Infeft a Creditor in her Land: Though the Bond was not sustain­ed as to the personal obligement to pay, yet it was found valid as to the obligement to Infeft, and the Procuratorie of Resignation contained in the [Page 11] Bond: And the Wife notwithstanding, having Disponed her Land, she was found Lyable for the Sums as Damnage and Interest.

This Decision seemeth hard, In respect albeit a Woman may Dispone her Land with consent of her Husband; yet she cannot bind to pay a Sum of Money; And in the case foresaid, non agebatur that she should Dispone her Lands; But that she should be Lyable to the Creditor, and for surety he should be secured in her Land, And the principal obligation being void, the accessory of surety could not subsist.

D. 24. Eodem Die.

IT was debated but not decided, whether the Tenor of a Comprysing may be proven; there is an Act of Parliament. Ja. 6. Parl. 6. That the Te­nor of Letters of Horning should not be proven; and there is Eadem if not more Ratio as to Comprysings, the Solemnities being greater and more: And if a Comprysing, which is in effect the Execution of a Messenger, may be made up by a probation of the Tenor; a paritate rationis, Poind­ings, and Interruptions of Prescription by Citations, and Executions, and Intimations of Assignations, may be made up by Witnesses; and Ar­restments and Decreets.

D. 25. Minister of Moram contra Bairfoot. Eodem die.

THE Minister of Moram having pursued a Reduction of a Tack, set by his predecessor; upon that Ground that it was above three years, without consent of the Earl of Buccleugh Patron for the time: The Tack was sustained, in respect Francis Stuart had consented, in whose Favours Buccleugh, by a Decreet Arbitral, was obliged to denude himself of the Patronage.

This Decision seemeth to be hard; seing Buccleugh was full Patron, and was not denuded by the said Decreet: And the Right of the Patronage might either have been Comprysed from him, or Disponed by him ef­fectually, notwithstanding of the said Decreet, which did not settle the Right of the Patronage in the said Francis his person; but was only the Ground of a personal Action against Buccleugh, for denuding him of the Right of the Patronage: And as Francis could not present, so he could not consent as Patron to Tacks: Upon these considerations diverse of the Lords were of the contrair Opinion.

D. 26. McKenȝe contra Fairholme 24. July. 1666.

IN the case of Mckenȝie against Mr. John Fairholme: Sir George Mcken­zie, having by way of Reduction questioned a Bond granted by his Father, and himself as Cautioner, as null ipso facto: Upon that Ground that he was Minor when he Signed the Bond: And his Father being Admini­strator of the Law, and in effect Curator to him, had not Authorized him as Cautioner; and could not be author in Rem suam, the Pursuer becom­ing Cautioner in Rem, and at the desire and in behalf of his Father.

The Lords did not this day decide the Question; some being of Opini­on, That a Father, though if his Children be Impuberes and Pupils, be the [Page 12] Tutor and Administrator of Law, ye he is not Curator to his Children being Puberes: Seing a Son if he should desire other Curators to be given him, his desire could not be refused: Et habenti Curatorem Curator non datur. Vide infra 26. July 1666. And 7. Decemb. 1666.

D. 27. Petrie contra Richart. eod. die.

RIchart of Auchnacant having a Wadset of 12000. Merks from Buchan of Portlethem; did thereafter enter in a second Contract with Buchans Son and Heir who had Right to the reversion; and diverse years Back-tack-duties being accumulated and made a Principal Sum, it was agreed that there should be no Redemption but by payment of the Sum contained in the said second Contract, made up as said is of the Sum contained in the said second Contract, and the Back-tack-duties; and by payment of the An­nualrents so accumulated: Mr Petrie Provest of Aberdeen having acquired the Right of reversion, and having used an Order of Redemption, and there­upon having intented Declarator, it was alledged, that he should have con­signed the Sum contained in the said second Contract, which he could not misken, by reason as he not only knew of the said second Contract before he acquired the said Right, but acted in relation to the said Contract and in effect homologate the same: In so far as, 1. By the said second Contract he and certain other persons being named and appointed to de­termine the question, betwixt Richart and Buchan, what should be paid to Buchan for the charges he had been at in prosecuting his Right against Richart, The said Petrie had accepted a submission relating to the said second Contract, whereupon a Decreet arbitral did follow, ordaining 300 merks to be paid to Buchan for his charges. 2. By the second Contract, Buchan was obliged to cause Petrie (being his friend) to give bond that he shovld engage for Buchan's performance of the said second Contract: and accordingly Buchan being charged to fulfill that head of the said Con­tract, had procured a Bond from the said Petrie and produced it in Judgment the time of the discussing of the suspension. 3. Petrie had assigned the 300. Merks of charges modified by himself; and the instrument of intimation of the Assignation mentioned the said Sum to have been modified by the Decreet arbitral; proceeding upon the said Contract: From these Acts it was urged, that knowing and having homologate the said Contract in manner foresaid, he was in pessima fide to take a Right in prejudice of the Defenders, and to pretend to be in better case than his Author.

The Lords notwithstanding Found that the said second Contract not being Registrat in the Register of Reversions, he was not obliged to take notice of it; and might redeem by payment of the Sums contained in the first Con­tract. It was acknowledged by some of these who were for the decision, that these Acts imported an Homologation, But the second Contract though by our Law valid, was not favourable, and was against the com­mon Law; in so far as the accumulating Annualrents to be a principal Sum, is usura usurarum [...]. I have often urged that favour is not nomen juris, and Law ought to be uniform, and not Lesbia Regula plyable and variable upon pretences of favourable or not favourable: Sed nunquam credita Teucris Cassandra.

D. 28. Harper contra Hamilton. 25. July 1666.

IN the case Mr John Harper contra Hamilton his Vassal; It was decided, that after the intenting a general Declarator of Non-entry, the Vassal should be lyable not only for the retoured dutie, but for the ordinary mails and duties of the Land: Though some were of the opinion, that before Sentence the Vassal should only be lyable for the retoured dutie.

D. 29. Wilkie contra eod. die.

SIr John VVilkie of Foulden having intented a Reduction of a voluntar Interdiction made by him to some of his friends.

The Lords appointed some of their number to conferr with him: and, upon their Report that he was rational and intelligent; and, for any thing appeared by his discourse and deportment, Rei suae providus; The Lords Reduced in absence; there being no compearance or opposition for the Interdicters.

D. 30. The Lyon contra 26 July 1666.

BY the Act of Parliament Ja. 6. Parl. 11. cap 46. It is ordained, that Officers of Arms should find suretie to the Lyon, for observation of their Injunctions, under the pain of 500. Merks, with the damnage and interest of the party greived by the malversation, negligence, or informa­lity of the Officer.

In a process betwixt the Lyon and [...] It was controverted, whether the Cautioner might be pursued before the Lyon for payment of the Debt, as damnage and interest, by reason of the malversation of the Officer of Arms in a poynding. It was alledged, that the Lyon was a criminal Judge, and most competent as to the Question, whether the Messenger had com­mitted iniquity, and malversed in his Office, and whether he should be deprived; and he and his Cautioner had incurred and should be lyable to the pain aforesaid: But as to the civil action against the Cautioner, there might be a good ground of action against the Cautioner, upon the act of caution before the competent Judge; But the Lyon, being Judex pedaneus, was not Judge of actions of that nature and consequence, In respect they may be of great difficulty and importance: For if the Cautioner should be pursued for payment of the Debt, being supposed to be 1000 merks, upon pretence of the malversation of the Officer, and that he had not done his dutie in poynding and comprysing; It were hard and dangerous, that the Lyon and his Bretheren should be Judges in a matter of that consequence: And it will not follow, that because the Messenger had not done his dutie in a Caption or comprysing, that his Cautioner should be lyable for the Debt as damnage and interest; Seing the Caption and Comprysing might have been ineffectual, and the Creditor could not thereby have gotten payment: And it appears by the said Act of Parliament, that the Lyon is only Judge to the penal Conclusion of deprivation of the Officer, and payment of the pain.

[Page 14] The Lords notwithstanding Found the Lyon Judge competent to the action against the Cautioner, for damnage and interest; Me inter minimos recla­mante. Gibson Clerk. Newbyth Reporter.

D. 31. M cKenzie contra Fairholm. eod. die.

THe Lords Found in the case before mentioned, (24. July Mckenȝie contra Fairholme) That a Father is loco Curatoris to his Son being in familia; and that a bond granted by the Son without his consent is null ipso jure; as if it had been granted by a Minor having Curators without their consent.

D. 32. Wedderburn contra Scrimzeour. ead. die.

IN the case Scrimzeour and VVedderburn of Kingennie (mentioned before 18. July.) A legacy being to be effectualin that case only, If the Tes­tators Wife should not be brought to bed of a Man Child; It was Found, that a Male Child should be understood a living Child: and that Homo Mortuus and a dead Child is nullus in Law: And that the legacy should be effectual, though she had been brought to bed of a Male Child, but dead.

D. 33. Menzeis contra Burnets. eod. die.

IN the case Menȝies contra Burnets, It was Found, that a Relict being provid­ed to a Liferent of all the Goods belonging to her Husband; ought to sell and make Money of the Horse, Oxen, and such Goods as may pe­rish; to the effect she may Liferent the Money and make the Sum forth­coming after her decease; but cum temperamento, That a competent time should be allowed to that effect: And if the Goods should perish in the mean time, she should not be lyable for the same. In that same case it was Found, that a Relict should not have both a Liferent and Third; but should have her choice or option of either. Some of us were of the opinion, that seing it appeared by the Contract, that the Goods were not to be in Com­munion, but that she was to have a Liferent of the same, she had not a choice to have a Third or Liferent. Hay Clerk. Lord Lie Reporter.

D. 34. contra Blantire. 27 July 1666.

[...] Having intented a Reduction of an Interdiction, upon that reason, that Blantyre was rei suae providus; And that the Pursuer had lent him the Money due to him, when he was in England, and in necessity; and being a stranger and a Creditor, he ought not to be prejudged by such a voluntar Interdiction; being upon a Bond granted by the Debitor without a previous Sentence, finding Blantyre to be prodigus, or such a person as should be interdicted.

The Lords Thought The Case of that Consequence, that they would not decide upon a Report, but Ordained it to be debated in praesentia. Lord Castlehill Reporter.

D. 35. contra eod. die.

IT was decided, That an Executor Creditor was lyable to do diligence as other Executors; and tho there was a difference betwixt him and other Executors, upon that account that he was confirmed in order to his own interest, and to the effect he might be payed of his Debt, and had prefe­rence before other Creditors; yet as to the Duty and Office of ane Execu­tor there was no Difference: And having accepted the Office which was Voluntatis, it became Necessitatis, and he was obliged to Execute it. Reidie Reporter.

D. 36. L. Borthwick contra Ker. eod. die.

AN Inhibition being raised upon the dependence of a pursuit for maills and duties, for three years preceeding the Summonds and in time coming during the defenders possession: It was Thought, that the inhibition relateing only to the Summonds as to the three years preceeding, without mention of the subsequent years; could not be a ground of Reduction Ex capite Inhibitionis; in respect the defender in that pursuite was assoiled as to the years before the Summonds, as being bona fide Possessor: And albeit the Summonds was not only for these years, but for the time to come as said is; and the Defender was decerned to pay maills and duties for certain years after the Summonds, yet the Leidges were not obliged to take notice of the Summonds, but as it was related in the Inhibition.

The Lords were of this opinion: But the case was not decided, the Pursuer having desired up his process that he might be better advised. Ad­vocat, Oliphant. and Sir Robert Sinclair.

D. 37. E. Newburgh contra Stuart. eod. die.

SIr William Stuart being Creditor to the Earl of Newburgh, in a great Sum, upon an Infeftment in the said Earls Lands: after his Majesties Restauration, he was induced (tho there was no Question as to the Debt) to make a Reference and Submission to the Laird of Cochran and Sir John Fletcher; upon no other account, but that he apprehended that Newburgh might trouble him and cause him be fined; which was the ordinary and Ignoble practice of Noblemen at that time against their Creditors: These Arbiters did take from the said Sir William a discharge of the Debt and re­nunciation of his Right, and from Newburgh a blank bond as to the Sum; and the said Debt then amounting to 40000 merks, they did give to the Earl of Newburgh the Renunciation; and to Sir William, Newburgh's sim­ple bond filled up with 6500. Merks only: Newburgh pretending that Sir Alexander Durhame (then Lord Lyon) was owing him Money, did by way of letter give a precept to the Lord Lyon in these terms, That he desired him to pay that Sum to the bearer upon sight, and that he should retire his bond: This letter being presented to the Lyon, he in a scorn­ful and jeering way subjoyned to the letter, My Lord, I am your Humble Servant: the Earl of Newburgh, not satisfied to have payed Sir William in manner foresaid as to 3400. Merks, did intent a pursuit against Sir William, That he might be free of the Residue and get back his Bond of [Page 16] 6500. Merks, upon that pretence that the said Sir William had got from him a Bill of Exchange, which had been accepted by the deceast Sir Alex­ander Durham; at the least in case of not accepting, he should have pro­tested and intimated to Newburgh, that it was not accepted nor satisfied, that he might have recourse against the said Sir Alexander in his own time, whereof he is now prejudged.

Upon a Debate in praesentia, It was Found, that the said letter was not a Bill of Exchange but a precept; and that the receiving of such precepts upon Chamberlanes and others, being for the Creditors further suretie, do not oblige them to the formalities of presenting, protesting, and intimat­ing: which are in use in the matter of Exchange and Trade betwixt Mer­chant and Merchant. Advocats Lockhart, VVallace. contra VVedderburn and Chalmers.

D. 38. Crawfurd contra the Town of Edinburgh. last of July 1666.

A Donator, by a Gift of Ʋltimus Haeres, having Pursued for a movable Debt due to the Defunct; The pursuit was not Sustained, because the Gift was not declared.

D. 39. Gray contra Gordon. eod. die.

A Bond being granted to Sir Robert Farquhar, and bearing the term of payment to be diverse years after the date of the same; and Annualrent to be payed in the interim, termly and yearly: Was found to be Heretable quoad Fiscum, Though Sir Robert Farquhar had deceast before the term of payment of Annualrent; And the assigney was preferred to a Donatar.

D. 40. Halyburton contra Halyburton. eod. die.

A Son having intented a Reduction of a disposition made by his Father, for provision of the rest of the Children, In lecto aegritudinis.

The Lords found the Defence relevant, that the Pursuer had consented; in so far as the Son had Subscribed as Witness, and knew and heard the disposition; so that he was not ignorant of the tenor of it: And it was re­membred by the Lords when they were voting, that they had found the alledgance relevant, That a Son and appearand Heir that Subscribed as Witness to his Fathers deed in lecto, without that addition, that he heard it read; in the case of Stuart of Escog: It being to be presumed, that the ap­pearand Heir being of age, would not be Witness to such deeds, unless he inquired and knew what they were.

D. 41. Cuming contra Johnston. 7. Novemb. 1666.

SOme Lands in Dumbar being disponed by one Adamson in favours of Johnstoun; with a provision contained in the disposition and Infeftment, that a Sum of Money should be payed by the receiver of the disposition, to him or any he should name: And in case it should not be payed the Right should be void: And the saids Lands being thereafter apprysed, It was found, against the compryser, that the said clause and provision was real: And that the person named, and having Right to the [Page 17] Sum and benefit of the said clause, Though before declarator he could not pursue a removing, yet he has good interest to pursue for the mails and duties for payment of the said Sum; and being in possessorio, to retain the mails and duties for payment of the said Sum pro tanto: And that the said provision, and such like, are effectual against singular Successors. It was urged by some, That all, that could be done upon that Clause, was, that a Reduction of the Right might be pursued thereupon; But it was an­swered, that it being actum, that the Lands should be burdened with that Sum, and if nothing more had been exprest, but that it is provided that the said Sum should be payed; the said provision being real, would have fur­nished the said action and exception, for payment of the said Sum out of the maills and duties: And therefore, the subjoyning the resolutive clause, being ad majorem Cautelam, could not be prejudicial nor retorted in preju­dice of the disponer nor his Assigney. This Question was hinted at but not decided in the said Debate, viz. If the Declarator should be pursued, upon the said clause for annulling the Right, if it should operate in favours of the Assigney, the Lands not being disponed to him in case of contraveening; being to appertain to the disponer and his Heirs, in case the Right should be rescinded. Its thought, that the provision being assigned, the whole be­nefit and consequence of the same are disponed: and consequently the as­signey, in the case foresaid of annulling the Right, may pursue the Heirs of the Disponer and receiver of the Right, and his Successor to denude them­selves of the Right of the saids Lands. Newbyth Reporter.

D. 42. Hay contra Magistrates of Elgin. eod. die.

IN the case Colin Hay against the Magistrats of Elgin; Improbation being proponed against the Executions of Messenger, bearing that he had intimated to the Magistrats, that he had arrested a prisoner at the in­stance of the said Colin: And the Magistrats and Witnesses compearing and urging to be examined, It was alledged for Colin, that they should not be examined; Because the Messenger who was also cited was not pre­sent; and that if he were present he might condescend upon circumstances, and remember the Witnesses that they had been Witnesses; it being o­therewise incident to them to have forgotten, though they had been truely Witnesses to the Execution. It was answered for the Magistrats, that they had cited both Witnesses and Messenger; that they had done all that was incumbent to them; and his not appearance, ought neither to prejudge them nor the Witnesses: And that having come in obedience to the ci­tation, they should not be troubled to come here again, their Residence being at such a distance.

The Lords indulged so far to Colin, as to delay the Examination of the Witnesses until further diligence should be done to bring here the Mes­senger, Me Refragante: but ordained Colin to pay the expences: And if it had been desired, that if the Witnesses should die, they should be holden as improving; The Lords would have granted the desire.

D. 43. Carse contra Carse. 8. Novemb. 1666.

DOctor Carse having taken a Right of Annualrent out of Sir David Cun­inghams Lands, in the name and persons of Mark Carse of Cockpen [Page 18] and Adam Watt Writer; and a comprysing thereafter deduced in their name to the behoof of the Doctor, for some arrears of the said Annualrent, not only out of the Lands out of which the Annualrent was due, holding blench or feu; but of other Lands holding Ward. Charles Carse Son and Heir to the said Doctor, pursued the said Mark Carse and the Heir of Adam Watt, to denude themselves of the Right of the saids Lands, conform to a Backbond granted by the said Mark Carse, and the said Adam Watt, de­claring the trust: In that trust it was alledged for the Defenders, that they were content to denude themselves, they being releeved of all hazard they might incur upon occasion of the said Trust, and having that Right in their Person; and to that purpose did offer a Disposition, bearing a provision that the Right should be burdened with the relief of Wards, Marriages, and Mi­nisters Stipends, Cess, and other such hazards. It was Answered, that the said Disposition ought not to be clogged with such a provision, which would fright Buyers from purchasing the saids Lands; and the pursuer was ne­cessitat, and had presently an occasion to sell the saids Lands: And as to the incumberances, and hazards, which the Defenders should condescend upon they should be purged: But as to the Marriage of Adam Watts Heir (which was condescended upon) there could be no hazard upon that ac­count, In respect the comprysing at the instance of Mark Carse and Adam Watt was the fourth comprysing, which did only import a Right of re­version; The first comprysing, whereupon Infeftment had followed, carry­ing the Right of property: It was Duplyed, that if it should appear that the former apprysings are either null or informal or satisfied, the fourth Appry­sing would carry the Right of property, and consequently the Marriage.

The Lords Found, that the Pursuer should accept the Disposition with the burden of the said relief: Or in his option should secure the Defenders by a Bond with a Cautioner, to releive them.

D. 44. Bowie contra Hamilton. 10. Novemb. 1666.

HAmilton of Silvertounhill having Disponed to James Bowie certain Lands, whereto he had Right by Comprysing; and the said James being removed at the instance of a Wadsetter; and having Pursued upon the Warrandice contained in the Disposition; It was alledged by Silver­tounhill, that though the Disposition did bear absolute Warrandice; yet by a Margine subcribed, it was restricted to warrand only the formality of the Comprysing, and the truth of the Debt, and the Executions. It was Answered, that the Warrandice being absolute in the Body of the Disposition, was indeed qualified by the Margine, that it should only be extended to the Warrandice of the Lands, in so far as concerns the Apprys­ing and Sums thereinmentioned (which are the words of the Margine) and that the said Warrandice imports that the Disponer should not warrand simply, but as to the Sums contained in the Comprysing; so that in case of eviction Silvertounhill should only refound the same; and the Pursuer was content to restrict the Warrandice to the Sums payed by him: It was urged, that there being Three kinds of Warrandice viz. Either absolute; or only that the Comprysing was formal, and the Debt just; or a re­stricted Warrandice to refound the price in case of eviction; the Last was Medium inter extrema, and most equitable; and in obscuris magis aequa inter­pretatio, [Page 19] est contra Disponentem facienda, qui potuit Legem apertius dicere: And if it had been intended, that he should warrand only the formality, and validity of the Comprysing, and reality of the Debt, it had been so exprest.

Yet The Lords, by plurality of Voices, Found, that the Warrandice should be interpret, to warrand only the validity of the Comprysing, and the reality of the Debt: That being the most ordinary in Rights of Comprysing. Sinclar, alteri Harper.

D. 45. Cheine contra Christie. 15. Novemb. 1666.

GEorge Cheine Pursued Adjudication against David Christie of a Right of Annualrent, which pretained to James Christie the said Davids Bro­ther the Pursuer's Debitor. James Cheislie Writer compeared and alledged he had Right to the Lands (craved to be adjudged) by an expired Com­prysing of the property of the same against the said David Christie, who had Right to the saids Lands; and that the said James his Right of An­nualrent was null, being base, and never cled with Possession.

The Lords Found, that the alledgance was not competent hoc loco against the Adjudication; and that the said debate would only be competent after the Adjudication, when he should pursue a poynding of the ground. The Lords Found the contrare before, in an Adjudication Pursued by Sornbeg contra the Lord Forrester, which practique was obtruded and not respect­ed; Because the Lord Forresters Right in that Case was clear; And this the Lords thought hard, Forrester being content to dispute his Right, that a Right to his Lands should be established in the Person of another to trouble him. But it were fit our Practiques were uniform: And it appears hard, that a Creditor who is a stranger, and has not the papers in his hands, and is not in a Capacity to pursue for them before he get a Title by Adjudica­tion, should be forced to Dispute his Debitors Right. Newbyth Reporter.

D. 46. Abercrombie contra eod. die.

FOund, that a Pursuit upon an Assignation after the Summonds execute; should not be Sustained, though the Cedent concurred; the Pursuit not being at his instance. Newbyth Reporter.

D. 47. Kennedy contra Hamilton. eod. die.

THe Lords Found a Comprysing upon a charge to enter Heir, null; Be­cause the person, at whose instance the charge was, had no Right to the Debt the time of the Charge; the Assignation, whereby he had Right, being acquired thereafter; so that the Charge was Inanis, and without ground. Me referente.

D. 48. Binning contra Farquhar. Eod. die.

A Disposition being made by a Father in favours of a Son; And there­after the same Lands being Disponed by the Son in favours of his Brother in Law: The said Rights were questioned by a Creditor, as be­ing fraudulent; being Disponed by the Sons Contract of Marriage; which though Onerous, as to Provisions in favours of the Wife, is not so as to the [Page 20] Son, whom the Father could not advance, or provide in prejudice of the Creditors: But it was alledged, that the Disposition made by the Son, was for an Onerous Cause; and by the Act of Parliament, though a Right should be found fraudulent, yet a third party acquiring bona fide, by the Act of Parliament is secured; and his Right cannot be questioned, unless he be particeps fraudis, or acquire the same without an Onerous Cause, which by the Act of Parliament, is only probable Scripto vel Juramento.

Yet the Lords enclined to reduce the Right granted by the Son, unless it were offered to be proven, that it was for an Onerous Cause; in respect of several presumptions alledged and informed by the Pursuer: And be­fore Answer, as to the Relevancy ordained both Parties to condescend upon their presumptions hinc inde; of Fraud or the Cause Onerous for the granting of the said Right, and to prove the condescendence. I have ever thought, that the practice of the Lords to ordain Parties to prove before Answer, as it is late, is accompanied with many inconveniencies; seing by such Acts, which are not of Litiscontestation, Processes are still keeped loose; and after that irregular way of probation, the debate of Relevaney is again resumed; to the great vexation, both of Parties, and Lords: and after the Lords Interloquitor of Relevancy, there may be again Litis­contestation; So that upon the matter there are two Litiscontestations in one Cause. Newbyth Reporter.

It being again debated, What the Certification should be in such Acts. viz. Whether the Alledgance should be holden as not proponed; or that the Lords should advise: Which in effect is no certification.

The Lords were not clear to detetmine; which is a great Informality, and a pressing reason against that anomolous way.

D. 49. Reid contra Tailzifer. 16. Novem. 1666.

IN the case, William Reid contra Tailzifer and Salmond. It was Found, That a Testament is to be thought execute, so that, thereafter, there is no place to a non Executa, when a Decreet is recovered against the De­bitors; though the Executor decease before he get payment: Because the Right of the Debt is fully established in his person by the Decreet; and he having done diligence, it ought not to be imputed to him, that the Debitor is in mora as to the payment of the Debt: And there being Jus quaesitum by a Decreet, and Execution having followed thereupon by Horning; after which Annualrent, though not due ex pacto, yet becom­eth due ex lege; or by Comprysing at the instance of the Executor, and Infeftment thereupon; It were absurd, that all these Rights should eva­nish; which would necessarly follow, if there were place to a non Executa: Seing the Decreets and Rights foresaid following thereupon, could not be transferred or settled in the person of the Executor ad non Executa; who doth represent the Defunct only, and not the Executor, at whose instance the Decreet is obtained and Execute.

D. 50. Purves contra Blackwood. Eod. die.

ADam Purves having pursued Reduction and Improbation of a Com­prysing, and the Grounds and Warrands thereof, against Blackwood.

[Page 21] The Lords, In respect the Comprysing was deduced Twenty four Years before, did refuse to grant Certification, against the Letters ad Executi­ons; and against one of the Bonds being Registrate when the principal Bonds were given in to the Clerk Register to ly in publica custodia; In respect of the Troubles of the Time, and the loss and disorder of the Registers; and that the Extract was produced, and the Defender was content to abide at the Truth thereof. Hay Clerk, And Newbyth Re­porter.

D. 51. Govan contra Paip. 24. Novem. 1666.

IN the case, Govan contra Paip, The Lords Found, That an Assigna­tion not being intimated in the Cedents time (and consequently the Debt being in bonis Defuncti) ought to be confirmed: But the Lords in consideration that the Debt was small, Found Process at the Assigneys in­stance, he finding Caution for the Quot effeirand thereto.

D. 52. contra Miln. Eod. die.

An Order being used for Redeeming a Wadset; the Executor Credi­tor of the Wadsetter pursued the person in whose hands the Con­signation was made for payment of the Sum Consigned; And in the Pro­cess the user of the Order was called, and Decreet was obtained; but be­fore it was Extracted he deceast; and there was debate upon the Oath of the Consignator. The Lords Found, That the user of the Order being a person having interest and called ab initio, nothing could be done until the Process was transferred against some person representing him.

In the same Process, it was argued amongst the Lords, whether a Sum being consigned upon an Order of Redemption, the user of the Order may pass from it, and lift the Sum without consent of the Wadsetter? And it was remembered by some of the Lords, That upon an Instrument of Con­signation Process was sustained at the instance of the Wadsetter against the Depositar, in whose hands the Sum due upon the Wadset was con­signed, for making the Sum forthcoming. But in this case nothing was done.

It appeareth, that after Consignation, Jus is Quaesitum to the Wadsetter; so that the Sum, being consigned and sequestrate to his behoof, cannot be uplifted without his consent.

D. 53. Lesly contra Bain. 6. Decem. 1666.

IN a pursuit to make forthcoming, after serious deliberation and debate amongst the Lords as in a case daily occurring, and wherein the Decisi­on would be a preparative and practique,

It was Found, That a pursuit to make forthcoming a Sum of Money due to a Debitor, is in effect Execution; and equivalent to a poinding: Seing Money being in nominibus, and not in specie, could not otherwayes be affected and poinded; and therefore could not follow, but upon a De­creet, and not upon a Bond not Registrate. 2. It was Found, that an Arrestment is but an Inchoat and incompleat Diligence: and notwith­standing thereof the Sum Arrested remaineth in bonis of the Debitor: Se­ing [Page 22] notwithstanding thereof, Goods belonging to a Debitor may be poinded: As also Arrestment being a Negative Diligence, whereby a Sum Arrested is secured, so that the Debitor cannot uplift; and the per­son, in whose hands the Arrestment is made, cannot pay or give away the same, in prejudice of the Arrester; and as in immobilibus, Inhibition doth not establish a Right in the person of the Creditor; unless he deduce a Com­prysing; but doth affect the same, so that the Debitor cannot prejudge the Creditor, and his Diligence if he Compryse: There is Eadem Ratio in Arrestments in mobilibus. Upon these Grounds it was Found, That the Debitor deceasing, the Sums Arrested being in ejus bonis, ought to be confirmed; and that the Creditor could not have Action against the person in whose hands the Arrestment was made; and the Appearand Heir of the Debitor called for his interest; but should confirm himself Executor Creditor.

D. 54. Monteith contra E. Calender and Gloret. 7. Decem. 1666.

THE Laird of Parkley Hamilton as principal, and Hamilton of Kin­glassie and certain others his Friends as Cautioners, being Debitors in Two Bonds; Kinglassie, in consideration that Parkley had Disponed to him a Right of Wadset which he had to the Lands of Touch, by a Con­tract did oblige himself to satisfy and pay the Sums contained in the saids Bonds; and to procure Discharges from the Creditors to Parkley and his Cautioners: And nevertheless having payed the said Sums, he did not take Discharges but Assignations to the saids Bonds, which he filled up in the name of Sir Mungo Stirling of Gloret his own Creditor; who did thereupon Arrest a Sum due by the Earl of Callender to Parkley: Thereafter Captain Monteith having Right to Callendars Debt by Assignation from Parkley, obtained a Decreet against the Earl; which being Suspended upon double poinding, It was alledged for Gloret, that he ought to be pre­ferred, in respect of his Assignation and Arrestment; whereunto it was Answered, that Kinglassie being obliged (as said is) to pay the saids Sums had payed them; and whereas he should have taken Discharges, he had taken an Assignation Blank in the Assigneys Name, and had filled up Glo­rets Name in the same; So that Assignation being procured by him, and lying by him, and he being Master of it, it was in effect his; and he was in the same case, as if the Assignation had been granted to himself, and he had made a Translation to Gloret; in which the Exception upon the oblige­ment foresaid to relieve Parkley; as it would have been competent against Kinglassie, would have secluded also Gloret his Assigney by Translation: In this Process Gloret his Oath being taken; and he having declared, that the Assignation was procured by Kinglassie; and by him delivered to Glo­ret, and that he payed nothing to the Cedent, but that the Assignation was given to him by Kinglassie, that he might be satisfied of certain Sums due to him be Kinglassie, which he was to Discharge if he recovered payment, by vertue of the said Assignation.

The Lords upon a Debate in praesentia, preferred Monteith; and found the Exception, which was competent against Kinglassie, if the Assignation had been to him and transferred by him to Gloret, is competent against Gloret; and that he is in the same case, as if he had Right by Translation from Kinglassie. This is most just, and founded upon Law and Equity, [Page 23] seing otherwayes Fraud cannot be obviate; And, in Law plus valet quod agitur, quam quod simulate concipitur aut exprimitur: And, Fictione brevis manus, Though it appear that it is but one Act, viz. The Assignation made to Gloret; yet in construction of Law, there is two Acts, viz. The granting the Assignation blank to Kinglassie, which in the interim before it was delivered to Gloret was his evident; and an Assignation immediat­ly made to himself, and thereafter the filling up Glorets Name, and the delivery of the Assignation to him, which upon the matter is a Translation. Spotswood for Monteith. Lockheart, Cuninghame, Maxwell, and Weir for Gloret.

D. 55. Mckenȝie contra Fairholm. Eod. die.

SIR George Mckenȝie having intented Declarator and Reduction of a Bond Subscribed by him as Cautioner for his Father; Ex eo capite; that it was null ipso jure; in respect he was Minor for the time, and his Fa­ther was loco Curatoris to him, and had not Authorized him, at least could not be Author to him in rem suam: It was alledged, that he had not in­tented Reduction within the quadriennium utile: And as to the Declara­tor of Nullity, the reason was not Relevant, In regard Bonds granted by Minors, having Curators, without their consent are Null; they being in­terdicted eo ipso that they do choise Curators, that they do nothing with­out them; But Bonds granted or other Deeds done by Minors wanting Curators, are not Null in Law; but the Minors lesed by the same may crave to be Reponed Debito tempore by way of Reduction: And that the Father, though he be Tutor in Law for the Children being Pupils, he is not Curator being puberes and of that Age that they may choise their their own Curators.

The Lords notwithstanding Found the Reason relevant; and declared the Bond Null as to the Pursuer: Quibusdam refragantibus, inter quos Ego; upon these Grounds, that there is a great difference betwixt Tutors and Cu­rators, Pupills, and Puberes, the Father haveing by the Law power to name Tutors, and consequently being Tutor of Law himself, and having that Authority which may be derived, and given by him to others; whereas he has no power to name Curators to his Children, when they are of that Age that they may choise themselves: And though he should name Curators in a Testament, his Nomination could not bind his Chil­dren. And 2. If Children being Puberes should choise any other persons to be their Curators, they would exclude and be preferred in that Office to the Father; Whereas habenti Curatorem Curator non datur. 3. If a Child should have an Estate aliunde, and the Father (his Son being pubes) should cessare and be negligent in the Administration of his Estate, there could be no Action against him for his omission; which might be compe­tent against him and his Heirs if he were Curator. Gibson Clerk, Sin­clair for Fairholme, the Defender; Wedderburn and Lockheart for the Pur­suer.

D. 56. Ʋrquhart contra Frazer. Eod. die.

A Wadset being granted by Sir Thomas Ʋrquhart Elder and Younger of the Lands of Brae to Sir James Frazer, for 24000 Merks; and the [Page 24] Granters of the Wadset, being obliged to warrand the Rental (besides Cu­stumes) to be Twenty Chalders of Ross bear; and to furnish Tennents, and to cause them pay the said Duty; and for each Boll undelivered Ten Merks: Sir Alexander Ʋrquhart of Cromarty, Donatar to the Escheat of the said Sir Thomas Elder and Younger, pursues the Heir and Executor of the Wadsetter, for the superplus of the Rent of the said Lands, exceeding the Rent of the foresaid Sum for diverse Years; In respect the Contract was usurary: It was alledged, by the Act of Parliament 247. Anno 1597. The Creditor cannot pursue for the superplus of the Annualrent but by way of Reduction of the usurary Bond, or Contract, with Concourse of his Maje­sties Advocate. It was Replyed, That Rei persecutoriâ he had interest to pursue for what was indebite payed.

The Lords Found, That the Process could not be sustained, without con­course of His Majesties Advocate; The Act of Parliament being express, that the Creditor cannot repeat the excrescence above the Annualrent; unless he concurr with the Advocate to reduce: which appeareth to be provided, of purpose to oblige the Creditor to inform and concurr with the Advocate, for reduceing so unlawful pactions.

D. 57. Ʋrquhart contra Cheyne. Decemb. 8. 1666.

SIR Thomas Ʋrquhart of Cromarty having disponed to Mr. William Lumisden a Tenement of Land and Salmond-fishing, for Surety of 4000. Merks borrowed from Lumisden; the abovementioned Sir Alex­ander Ʋrquhart having Right by Comprysing to the saids Lands and Fish­ing, and reversion of the said Wadset; pursued a Compt and Reckoning against Walter Cheyne having Right to the said Wadset, and to hear and see it Found, that the Sum due upon the Wadset was satisfied and payed by the said Walter and his Authors Intromissions: It was alledged, that the Wadset being a proper Wadset without a Back-tack, the Defender was not Lyable to Compt; and tho he were, he was not Lyable to Compt but since the date of the Right, and for his own Intromission. It was Reply­ed that it was a Right granted for security, and that by the Contract of Wad­set and the Eik to the Reversion thereafter, the Right was redeemable upon payment of the principal and Annualrents that should be unsatisfied; whereas in proper Wadsets, there is an Antichresis, and the Rents of the Land belongs to the Wadsetter in lieu of the Annualrents, whereto the Debitor is not Lyable.

The Lords Found, That though the Right was not clear and express, that the Wadsetter should have Right for surety, and until he be satisfied by In­tromission or otherwayes; yet the Reversion being in the Terms foresaid, it was Actum, and intended that the said Wadset should not be a proper Wad­set, but only for surety as said is.

D. 58. E. Cassils contra Whitefoord. Eod. die.

THe Lands of Damertoun being a part of the Barony of Cassils and formerly holden Ward by the Lairds of Blairquhan Kennedies, of the Earl of Cassils; and now being in Ward through the Minority of the present Heritor, who had Succeeded in the Right of the saids Lands being acquired from the Laird of Blairquhan. The Tennents of the saids Lands [Page 25] Pursued a multiple poynding against the E. of Cassils and Whitefoord now of Blarquhan, and the Heretor of Dalmertoun; all pretending Right to the multures of the saids Lands. The E. of Cassils alledged, that dur­ing the Ward they should bring their Corns to his Miln of the Barrony of Cassils, there being no Milns upon the Lands of Dalmertoun. The Laird of Blarquhan alledged, that he was infeft in the Lands of Blarquhan and in the Miln of Dalhovan, upon a Right granted by Kennedy of Blarquhan cum astrictis multuris & usitatis; at such a time as Blarquhan had Right to Blarquhan and Dalhovan and to the Lands of Damertoun: And that before the said Right granted by Kennedy of Blarquhan to John Whitefoord of Ballach Author to this Laird of Blarquhan, the Tennants of Damertoun were in use to come to the said Miln, and to pay the like multure and service as the Ten­nants of Blarquhan did; and since the Right, have been in use to come con­stantly to the said Miln. It was Answered for Cassils, that unless there were an express Constitution of Thirlage, the said Lands of Dalmertoun (being a distinct Tenement from the Lands of Blarquhan, which hold of the King) cannot be alledged to be astricted to the said Miln of Blarquhan: And if it had been intended that the Lands of Dalmertoun should have been astricted, It would have been exprest: And when the same did belong to Kennedy of Blarquhan, it cannot be said that it was astricted to his own Miln with the foresaid Servitude, quia res sua nemini servit; and he having Dis­poned his Miln, it cannot be presumed that he would have Burdened his own Lands with a Servitude: And though it were clear Kennedy had as­tricted the saids Lands of Dalmertoun, yet he could not Constitute a Ser­vitude without the Superiors consent in his prejudice, when the Lands should Ward in his hands. It was replyed by Whiteford of Blairquhan, that the Superior had consented to the Thirlage, in so far as John Gilmor and one Bonar, having Comprysed the saids Lands of Dalmertoun from Kennedy of Blarquhan, and having Assigned their said Comprysing to John VVhitefoord; the said VVhitefoord by Contract did Assign the same to Kilkeren, with a Reservation of the multures thereof to the Miln of Dalhovan: And the said E. had granted a Charter to Kilkeren upon the foresaid Right.

The Lords thought, That these Words Cum multuris usitatis, do relate only to the quantity of the multures as to such Lands, as can be shown to be astricted: But before Answer to the Debate upon the said Charter and Reservation, They ordained the Charter and Contract containing the Re­servation to be produced, That they might consider, Whether it be in the Charter, and how it is conceived; and what it should operate if it were only in the Contract.

The Lords enclyned to think that a clear Reservation, though there were not a preceeding Thirlage, should import a Constitution, as to these who accept or consent to such a Reservation.

D. 59. Leslie contra Leslie. eod. die.

PAtrick Leslie of Balquhoyn pursued a general Declarator of the Single and Liferent Escheat of John Leslie of Balquhoyn, against James Leslie and his Spouse as nearest of Kin to the said John. It was Alledged, that the Horning was prescribed, the Declarator being raised fourty years after the Horning. It was Replyed, That though Prescription should run against the King (which was denyed) yet in this case it could not; The [Page 26] King being Minor the time of the Prescription diverse years, and the Go­vernment being interrupted; So that there was not Tempus utile during the Usurpation: And the King is not in use to dispose of Escheats, until application be made to his Majesty: And by the Act of Parliament, it is provided, that the negligence of his Officers should not prejudge him.

The Lords Found, That the Horning did not prescribe, in respect of the Kings Minority, and Interruption foresaid.

It may be asked, If that reply of his Majestie's Minority and Inter­ruption, were not competent? And if the Escheat were gifted by a Lord of Regality, or a Superior, Quid Juris? And it seemeth, that a Horning being poena, and once execute, it doth not prescribe; Seing the Rebel, if he should survive fourty years, his Liferent would fall to the Superior; and there is no reason that he should Lucrari, and be in better case ex culpa, and by the continuance of his Rebellion for so long a time.

D. 60. Hume contra Creditors of Kello. 12. Decemb. 1666.

IN a Process betwixt Hary Hume, and the Donator of the Forefaulture of John Hume of Kello, and certain others his Creditors; It was Found, That a Comprising being deduced before January 1652, and being the first effectual Comprysing, ought to be preferred to the posterior Compry­sings; so that they should not come in together pari passu: In respect tho they were within year and day of the compleating, and the making effectual the first Comprysing by Infeftment or Diligence, yet they were not within year and day of the deduceing the said Comprysing: and the said Comprysing being before the year 1652. doth not fall under the compass of the Act of Parliament concerning Debitor and Creditor; which bringeth in pari passu Comprysings led since January 1652; and being Cor­rectoria Juris Communis, ought not to be extended.

D. 61. Thomson contra Stevenson. eod. die.

IN a Reduction of a Right and Disposition of certain Houses; being pursued ex capite minoris aetatis; It was alledged that the Disposition did bear 500 merks, to be payed, and the Defender was content to quite the right being payed of the Sum.

It was Found, That the Alledgance was not relevant, unless he should offer to prove it really payed, and profitably employed for the use of the Minor.

In this Process the Lords would not sustain the Reason per se, unless Lesion were joyned and libelled, viz. That the Lands were disponed sine Decreto Judicis.

D. 62. Shaw contra 13. Decemb. 1666.

SHaw being confirmed Executor to his Brother a Factor at London; and diverse Decreets being recovered against him, at the instance of the Defuncts Creditors; He desired a Suspension upon that Reason, That he had done Diligence to recover the Defuncts Debts and Goods; and that he could not satisfie the Decreets obtained against him, until he [Page 27] should recover the Defuncts Estate: and that he was content it should be divided amongst the Defuncts Creditors, according to their Diligen­ces; and therefore craved a Suspension without Caution; being content to make Faith that he could not get a Cautioner.

The Lords past a Suspension as to personal Execution only.

D. 63. Hamilton contra Brown. 15. Decemb. 1666.

HAmilton of Grange being pursued as representing his Father, upon the Title of Behaving and Gerens pro Haerede, for payment of a Debt of his Fathers: It was alledged, that this Condescendence, viz. That he had behaved as Heir, in sua far as he had granted Dispositions of Land belonging to his Father. And 2ly. That he had consented as appearand Heir to some Right of Lands apprysed from his Father, Is not relevant; unless it were said and alledged, that he had done these Deeds before the expyring of the Comprysing; seing he could have no Right after the expyring of the same; and neither could be Heir, nor Gerens pro Haerede as to such Lands: And as to his consent, it was not sufficient unless he had disponed.

The Lords inclined to be of this Judgement, That his consent being as appearand Heir, should import Behaviour; and that though the Com­prysings were expyred, he might have an interest to question the same, as not formal or Null, or satisfied by Intromission, or by some other Ground: and that by his consent he was denuded of that Interest; and therefore such Dispositions should import Behaving: Yet in respect the Writes which were to be used to prove the Passive Title were not produced, and much may depend upon the wording and conception of the same. The Lords thought fit to ordain before Answer, the Writes to be produced, and assigned a Term to that effect: But declared, that their Act should be Litiscontestation quoad hoc, That the Pursuer, after the Term is run upon the said Act, should not get others, as if there were not Litisconte­station, Lockhart for Grange, and Birnie for the Pursuer.

D. 64. Hartshaw contra Hartwoodburn. eod. die.

SCot of Hartshaw pursued a Declarator of Property within the Bounds libelled, and that he had been in Possession by pasturing, and doing other Deeds of Property, and debaring the Defender Hartwoodburn and his Predecessor: In this Process there was an Act of Litiscontestation; whereof a Reduction was intented, upon that Ground, that the Defen­der was absent, and was Minor and indefensus, wanting Tutors and Cu­rators for the time, his Tutor being dead: and that he had a defence Minor non tenetur placitare.

The Lords Found, If the Summonds had concluded the possessorie of Molestation: And if that had been lybelled, that the Pursuer, the time of the intenting the Pursuit, was in Possession; would have repelled the Defence (that non Tenetur) against the molestation: But because a De­clarator of Right was only lybelled, they reponed the Minor; And Found that non tenetur placitare. Longformacus for Hartwoodburn, and Sir George McKenȝe for Hartshaw.

D. 65. L. Colvil contra Feuars of Culross. eod. die.

THe Lotd Colvil being Baillie of the Regality of Culross, and lyable to uplift the Taxation of that Abbacy; And having charged cer­tain of the Vassals to pay their Taxation; They suspended upon that Rea­son, That a fifth Part more than the Taxation was stented upon them, on pretence, and in consideration of Charges.

The Lords Found, That they could not be stented to more than the Taxation; tho the Sheriff and Baillies of Regality be lyable to uplift the Taxation.

Yet it seems hard, that they should be at the Charges of raising of Let­ters, and Registration of Hornings, and such like: And albeit the Vas­sals, who are content to pay their Proportion, should not be lyable to more; yet it may appear, that it is reason, that when the Sheriffs or Bail­lies give in what they have uplifted, their Charges should be allowed.

D. 66. Hay contra Littlejohn. 16. Deeemb. 1666.

LIttlejohn having comprised the Liferent Right of a Tenement in Leith; the said Tenement became ruinous; and by the fall of a part of it, did crush a part of the next house adjoining to it, belonging to [...] Hay of Knockondie. In a Pursuit Knockondie against Littlejohn, for Dam­nage and Interest.

The Lords sustained Process; The Pursuer proving that the House was manifestly ruinous; without necessity to lybel or reply that the Pursuer had required the Defender to repair his House: It being sufficient that the case of the House was such as did really require and call for Repara­tion, in order to his own Interest, and for preventing his Neighbours: So that it being his Fault, that he did not repair the same, he was lyable to refound the Pursuers Damnage: And albeit by the Act of Parliament, Liferenters may be urged to find Caution to keep their Liferent Lands Sarta tecta, and in the condition they found them at their Entry: And by the Civil Law, Neighbours may be urged to find Caution Damni in­fecti: the said Remedies are not privative, in case any Prejudice be done before they be taken.

D. 67. Allan contra Campbel. eod. die.

EDinample Campbel being pursued as representing his Father, upon the Title of behaving as Heir: It was alledged, that he intrometted with the Duties of the Lands condescended upon, by a Right to two Compry­sings against his Father: It was replyed, The Comprysings were not expired the time of his Fathers Decease, so that in effect he was He­retor.

The Lords Found, That Gestio being magis animi quam facti; The Defenders Intromission by vertue of a Title, did not infer Behaving.

D. 68. Menȝies contra Burnet. Decem. 18. 1666.

A Relict being provided to the Liferent of the conquest dureing the Mar­riage, and pursueing for the same; It was alledged, that the Money [Page 29] in question, which the pursuer pretended to be conquest dureing the Marriage, did belong to the Defunct before the Marriage; and that the Bond was renewed after it: The Question was, what way the said Al­ledgance, tending to take from the Pursuer the benefite introduced in her favours by Write, and by her Contract of Marriage, could be proven? Yet the Lords enclined to find it probable by the Debitor, and the Wit­nesses in the Bond; But before Answer, They Ordained the Defender to use such Probation as he thought fit, for proving the Alledgance; Re­serving to themselves to determine what it should import.

D. 69. contra 18. Decem. 1666.

IN a Process against an Heir of Provision: It was Alledged, that the Heir of Line ought to be first discust: It was Replyed that the Heir of Line was conveened and Renounced: And it being duplyed, That the Estate belonging to the Heir of Line, and whereto he should have Right if he were served Heir, ought to be discussed.

The Lords Found, No Process against the Heir of Provision, until the Heir of Line was discussed; and that the Renounciation of the Heir of Line was not sufficient; but that the Creditor behooved to proceed to Ad­judication contra haereditatem Jacentem, belonging to the Heir of Line.

D. 70. Deacon of the Weavers contra the Magistrates of Edinburgh. 1. June. 1667.

THE Deacon of the Weavers being imprisoned by the Magistrates of Edinburgh, because he had disobeyed their Order, anent the putting in their Hand a Box for the Poor of the Journey-men; until some Questi­ons betwixt the Masters of the Trade and the Journey-men of the same should be decided; did crave by a Bill to be enlarged, upon that reason, that the Craft had intented a Reduction of the Contract betwixt their Pre­decessors and their Journey-Men, concerning the keeping and having a Box for the Poor of the Journey-men: And that until the Decision of the Process, the Box ought to be keeped by their Deacon.

The Lords Ordained the Complainer to be enlarged, by Consigning the Box in the Clerks Hands. Upon occasion of the said Process, it was agi­tated amongst the Lords, Whether there could be a Contract and Trans­action betwixt the Craft and Journey-men, who are not an Incorporati­on, and cannot oblige their Successors? Seing there can be no Successors but of a Person or Incorporation: But the Lords, without giving Inter­loquitor upon that point, Ordained the Reduction to be heard summarly. Gibson Clerk. Mckenȝie alter Lockheart.

D. 71. Young contra Young. 4. June. 1667.

IN the case Young contra Young; It was agitated, Whether a Hus­band be Lyable for his Wifes Debt before the Marriage, being proven no otherways but by her Oath dureing the Marriage: If the Husband declare he does not distrust her, and believeth she hath declared Truth.

The Lords did not decide the point; but some were of the opinion, That if the Husband Declare upon Oath, that he believeth she did De­clare [Page 30] Truth, he will be Lyable; in respect that by the Law, the Hus­band is Lyable for the Wifes Debt being Legally proven: And the Question is only, whether the Wife may declare in prejudice of her Hus­band; which she cannot do, because otherwayes it may be in the power of an untoward Wife to undoe her Husband: which inconveniency ceaseth when the Husband declareth, he hath no reason to distrust the Wife, and that he believeth she hath told Truth: The great Question will be, Whether the Husband may be urged to give such an Oath of Credulity? Seing whatever a Husband thought, yet having an Imperi­ous Woman, he should be forced to comply with her, and to declare that he believeth her, otherwayes he would have a miserable Life. Scot Clerk.

D. 72. Thomson contra Stevenson. Eod. die.

IN the case Thomson contra Stevenson, The Lords Found, that the Ex­tract out of the Kirk-Session Books, is not a sufficient Probation of Age to infer Reduction Ex capite minoritatis: But the case being difficilis probationis after a considerable time; They Found, that aliqualis probatio ought to be received, with the Adminicle foresaid. Norvel. alt. Wallace, Hamilton Clerk.

D. 73. Zinzian contra Kinloch. Eod. die.

ZInzian having poinded; pursued a Spuilȝie against Kinloch, having meddled with some of the poinded Goods: The time of the advise­ing the Cause, the Defender offered to improve the Poinding in data. The Lords Repelled the Defence in hoc statu, Reserving Action: In respect the Poinding was produced ab initio; notwithstanding it was alledged, that the Defence was noviter veniens ad notitiam; which the Lords did not respect; because the Poinding being produced ab initio (as said is) The Defender should have tryed and might have had the same Informa­tion, which he has now of the same: In the same Process, though the prices of the Goods Spuilȝied were not proven, because it is to be presum­ed that the prices contained in Poindings are not too high; And the Lords having considered the poinding, Found the prices low. Haystoun Clerk.

D. 74. Mitchel contra Mitchel. 12. June. 1667.

THE Lords upon a Bill ordained Witnesses to be received before Litis­contestation; and their Depositions to ly in Retentis; Because they were in Town for the present; and were to go to Zetland and senes valetudinarii and peregre profecturi: And upon such like considerations, others may be received Witnesses in hoc statu. Scot Clerk.

D. 75. Lumisden contra Summers. Eod. die.

IN a Declarator of Escheat, it was alledged, that the Goods Lybelled were Disponed to the Defender: It was Answered, that the Disposi­tion was stante Rebellione: It was Replyed, That in Fortification of [Page 31] the Disposition, it was offered to be proven, that the Disposition was made for the price of Corn, and Straw, and other Goods disponed to the Re­bel; and whereby His Majesty, and his Donator had benefite; in respect the same was employed for the Entertainment of the Beasts, and Sowing the Ground, whereof the Encrease fell under Escheat.

The Lords Repelled the Defence: And Found that the Rebel being Ly­able only personally, for the price of the Goods alledged Disponed; and the property of the Goods in Question being his; the same belonged to the King: And the King and his Donator was not obliged to debate upon what account and occasion the Rebel was Debitor to the Defender: Or what use he made of the Goods Disponed to him by the Excipient, And is in no worse case than a Creditor poinding, or Arresting; or any other per­son acquiring Right to the property of Goods; who would be preferred notwithstanding such pretences; there being no such Hypotheck that can be pretended by the Law of Scotland. Diverse instances were adduced by me to this purpose; not only in behalf of the King, but of other Superiors and Heretors, as V. G. If a Superior should pursue Declarator of a Liferent, and it should be alledged that after Rebellion the Rebel had Disponed a part of his Lands; And that it should be offered to be pro­ven, that the Money for which the Disposition was given, was lent, for acquiring the Right of the Lands; So that thereby the Superior had bene­fite thereby: Or if the Master were pursueing by vertue of the legal and tacite Hypotheck competent to him, and it should be alledged that the Tennant was Debitor to another, for the price of Corns furnished for Sowing the Ground; In which cases the Superior and Master could not be frustrate upon any such pretences. Birnie, alter Thoirs & Frazer, Hamil­ton Clerk.

D. 76. Dalrymple contra Eod. die.

A Reduction of a Testament being pursued, Ex eo capite, that the De­funct was fatuus & incompos mentis: And the Relevancy being que­stioned; because no Act or Circumstance, or qualification was Libelled, in­ferring the Defunct to be in that condition.

The Lords Ordained the Pursuer to condescend. Wallace alt. Hog.

D. 77. Harroway contra Haitly. 14. June. 1667.

JAnet Harroway pursued the Heirs of Alexander Haitly her Husband, to hear and see the Tenor of her Contract of Marriage with her said Husband proven, being lost, as was pretended, the time of the Troubles: It was alledged, that no Adminicle in Write was Lybelled or produced; And whereas it was Lybelled, that John Nicol was employed as Writer for drawing of the Contract, the double of it was insert and extant in his Servants Stile-Book; The said Stile-Book being neither a Write under the Defuncts hand, nor a Minute nor a Record Extant in any Register, could not be sustained as any Adminicle.

The Lords, Albeit it was offered to be proven by the persons alledged to be Writer and Witnesses to the Contract; that it was subscribed, and of the Tenor Lybelled, and other probabilities were urged; Yet they did not sustain the Summonds without an Adminicle, upon that considerati­on [Page 32] in special, that our Law, ob Lubricam fidem of ordinary Witnesses, against whom there is possible no legal exception, deferring so little to their Testimony, That Transactions, Agreements, or Promises above the va­lue of 100 pounds cannot be proven by Witnesses; If such pursuites should be sustained, without Adminicles of Writ; Contracts of greatest impor­tance might be made up, and proven by Witnesses; It was remem­bred by some of the Lords, that in the Process, Corsar contra Durie, The Lords were so tender, that upon a contentious debate, a Seasin was found not to be an Adminicle.

D. 78. Antrobus contra Anderson. Eod. die.

GEorge Antrobus English-man, pursues William Anderson Provost of Glas­gow for 234 lib. 13. shillings Sterling, due by John Herbertson, some­times Baillie of Glasgow; upon that ground, that being charged to take the Debitor upon Letters of Caption, he had refused to concur with the Messenger: It was alledged, that the Defender was not in sight of the Re­bel; and though it be pretended, that it was shown to the Defender, that the Rebel was in the same House, in another Room for the time, yet the Defender being chief Magistrate and Provost of the Town, he was not obliged to go himself to seek the Rebel; and it was sufficient he was wil­ling to send his Officers; and did send them to that effect: Especially it being considered, that the Provost was charged about Nine of the Clock under Night; and the Army having come that same Night to Glasgow, he was the very time that the Messenger charged, with the Quarter-Ma­ster, and other Officers, about the business of quartering the Forces: All which amounteth to a Relevant Defence to free the Defender of an odi­ous pursuit; the pursuer having no prejudice; in respect the Rebel was, and is notourly Bankrupt, and was imprisoned a few dayes after, and con­tinued a long time Prisoner in Glasgow.

The Lords Found the Alledgance Relevant.

The Lords are in use to sustain such Actions in subsidium against Magi­strates for payment of the Debt, when they suffer the Debitor to escape out of Prison; But when a Magistrate is charged with Letters of Caption, bearing no Certification, but Horning, it appears hard to me, that the Law having defined and prescribed the pain and certification, that the Lords should sustain any other penal Action without the warrant of an Act of Parlia­ment; And that the Magistrates for a Culpa or neglect, should be Lyable to the whole Debt, which may be a great Sum. If the Action be considered, not as a penal Action, but for Damnage and Interest, it should be only sustained, in so far as the Creditor is prejudged; so that the Debt being either recoverable, and the Debitor in alse good case as before, or being Bankrupt the time of the Charge, the Magistrates may be de­nounced upon the Caption, or censured for their Contempt, but ought not to be Lyable for the Debt in solidum. Scot Clerk.

D. 79. Davidson contra the Town of Inverness. Eod. die.

THere being a Decreet of the Dean of Gild of Innerness against an Un­freeman, Unlawing him in Three Hundred Pounds, for Trading: [Page 33] and a Suspension and Reduction being raised of the same, upon that reason. viz. That the Suspender dwelt without the Towns Jurisdiction: And that by the Acts of Parliament, Unfree-Traders may be charged to desist, and to find Caution to that effect; But the Town or Dean of Gild cannot proceed to process or unlaw them; there being no such Act of Par­liament to warrand it; but only to Charge (as said is) and to confiscate the Goods.

D. 80. Forbes contra Blair. Eod. die.

DOctor Forbes and his Spouse, having recovered a Decreet against David Edgar; The said David did grant a Disposition in favours of his Mother; whereof the Doctor and his Spouse did intent Improbation and Reduction; and after long dependence, Certification was granted and Extracted; But the Defender having given in a Bill, craved to be Re­poned, pretending that the Certification was granted in Winter, when the Defender being an Aged Woman, and attending one of her Children being Distracted, could not come in the time of a Storm; and within five or six dayes after the Certification was granted, she came and produced the Disposition;

The Lords before Answer, whether they would repone against the Cer­tification, Ordained them to dispute upon the Reasons of Reduction. viz. That the Disposition was inter conjunctas personas, without an Onerous Cause; and that the Condescendence was not relevant, viz. That the Disponer had granted Bond for Aliment and Entertainment of him and the other Children to his Mother, and for her Terce; In respect the said Pretences were only patched up to colour the said fraudulent Disposition: And that the said Disponer, pendente lite and after Sentence, could not in prejudice of the Pursuer give a Bond, to be the ground of the said Dispo­sition; But if there were any ground of the said pretended Debts, the De­fender should have recovered Decreet for the same: and though the Debt were without question, the common Debitor, contrare to the Act of Par­liament, could not make a voluntar Disposition, in prejudice of the Pur­suers Diligence; to gratify and prefer another Creditor. It was Answer­ed, That by the Act of Parliament, the Reason, ( viz. That the Right was granted without an Onerous Cause) is only probable Scripto vel Ju­ramento: and that the Disponer not being inhibited, the Defender might lawfully sibi vigilare, and take a Right for a just Debt: And by the Act of Parliament, the Diligence, that disableth a Debitor to give, and a Cre­ditor to take a voluntar Right, is not a Dependence or a Decreet, but In­hibitions and Hornings, which are so publick, that the Leidges may and ought to take notice of them.

The Lords were tender to repone against the Certification: and yet they thought not good to take away the Disposition upon the Certification; seing the Write was produced, and not suspected nor questioned to be false; and the Defender did excuse and purge her negligence (as said is:) and the Disposition being in her favours, who was sub potestate Ma­riti, and should be defended by him, having her self in Law neither velle nor nolle, his negligence should not undo her: And therefore the Lords having considered also the Difficulties in the Debate, upon the Rea­son, they reduced the Disposition in manner aftermentioned, by reser­ving [Page 34] to the Defender to pursue for the said pretended Debts: and de­clared, that if she recovered Decreet, (the Pursuer always being called, that there be no collusion) the Defender shall come in pari passu with the Pursuer: and that the Disposition shall stand to that effect only: Both the Parties acquiesced to the Decision.

D. 81. Cheap contra Philp. eod. die.

MR. Cheap pursued a Reduction of a Disposition made by [...] Philp, in favours of Mr. John Philp, upon these Reasons; That it was subscribed by two Notars, and their Subscriptions did not bear de Mandato; and because one of the Notars was known to be of so great Age, that he had not been for a long time employed as a Notar, and that he had only subscribed his Name; The rest of the Solemn Words used by Notars when they subscribe in subsidium, being writen by the other Notar; Therefore another Notar had been also used, besides the two Notars; And that no respect ought to be given to his Subscription, by reason it was ex Intervallo, and not uno contextu. 2. That the Dispo­sition was in lecto.

The Lords, When the case was reported, debated upon the first Reason, and in special upon these Points. 1. Whether in Subscriptions in sub­sidium by Notars, it be essential it should be exprest, That they subscrib­ed ex mandato; and if that solemnity may be supplied, by offering to prove that the Notars were Rogati: It was urged, that Minuts and Abbrevi­ations of Seasins might be extended and transumed, though none of the ordinary Solemnities be exprest, and therefore such Defects and Omissi­ons may be supplyed: It was Answered, That in Abbreviations, Omnia praesumuntur solenniter acta; But when an Instrument is compleat, or any other Write, if it want the Ordinary Solemnities, they cannot be supply­ed; & solennitas non praesumitur; And being only probable by the Write it self, it cannot be made up by Witnesses. 2. It was debated, Whether a Father or Grand-father could be Notar, in a Write or Right in favors of the Son or Grand-child.

The Lords did demurr upon these Points, and thought fit, that be­fore Answer as to these, the Reason founded on Lecto should be dis­cussed.

D. 82. Watt contra Halyburton. eod. die.

JAmes Halyburton being infeft upon a Comprysing, in some Acres in Dirleton, did grant a Disposition of the same to Adam Watt, where­by he was obliged to infeft him by two Infeftments; whereupon the said Adam Watt his Son, having Right by Assignation from his Father, pursued William Halyburton as Heir to the Disponer, for implement and obtaining himself infeft, and thereafter to infeft the Pursuer: It was Answered, That the Disposition was in the hands of Adam Watt by the space of twenty years, and that he had made no use thereof: and that the Defenders Father had done all that he could, for denuding himself of the said Right, the said Disposition bearing a procuratory of Resignation: and that the Lands holding Ward, if the Defender should enter, his Ward [Page 35] and Marriage would fall; so that unless the Pursuer would warrand him as to that hazard, he cannot be obliged to infeft himself.

The Lords decerned, reserving Action to the Defender for Damnage and Interest as accords.

D. 83. Key contra Fleming. 15. June 1667.

GEorge Fleming, having an Infeftment of Annualrent out of the Lands of Cambo, and thereafter having comprysed for his Principal Sum: It was Found, in a double Poinding and Competition betwixt the said George and Gilbert Key another Creditor of Cambo, that the said Gilbert should be preferred; in respect of the said Gilbert his Infeftment in an Annual­rent: That Decreet being suspended, Fleming craved to be preferred, in respect his Right of Annualrent was before Key's Right: It was Answer­ed, That this Infeftment was extinct and taken away by the Comprysing; and that he could not now have recourse to it, after a Decreet of Prefe­rence in foro contradictorio: It was Replyed, That Decreets of double poinding preclude as to bygones; but as to the future, all are qualified, for any thing that was then seen.

The Lords were clear, that notwithstanding of the Comprysing, he might have recourse to his former Right: But the great Question was, Whether Decreets of Poinding the Ground, against a Party compearing, did include him, so that he could not be heard against Competent and Omitted? which the Lords did not decide; but recommended to the Reporter to settle the Parties. Gibson Clerk.

D. 84. Home contra the Countess of Murray. 18. June. 1667.

JAmes Home of Beaprie having Assigned to the Countess of Murray the Gift of Escheat of Sir John Kininmouth, and certain Debts due by the said Sir John; The Lady, by her Bond, granted that she had got the said Right, and obliged her self either to make payment to the said James of the foresaid Sums, or to Repone him to his own place: The Lady being pursued upon the said Bond, alledged that it was null, being granted by her during her Marriage without her Husbands consent: It was Answered, that the desire of the Summonds was alternative; either to pay or Repone the Pursuer; Et deceptis non decipientibus succuritur. The Lords having de­bated amongst themselves upon the reason of the Law annulling Deeds, stante Matrimonio done by Wives; and some argued, that Women Married are not in the condition of Pupils who have not judicium, nor Minors who have not Judicium firmum; and that they are Lyable Ex delicto vel quasi, and ex dolo. The Lords, before Answer to the Debate, whether her Asser­tion in the Bond, viz. That she had received the Writs mentioned in the same, should be Obligatory, at least so far as to Repone the Pursuer; They Ordained her to be Examined anent the cause of granting the Bond. Gib­son Clerk.

D. 85. Johnstoun contra Cuninghame. 19. June. 1667.

A Bond being granted to a Husband and his Wife, and the Heirs of the Marriage; which failȝiening their Heirs; was Found to pertain [Page 36] to the Husband after the Death of the Wife in solidum: And that these words (their Heirs) ought to be understood Civiliter of the Heirs of the Husband, as being persona dignior.

D. 86. Watson of Dunnykier contra his Vassals. 21. June. 1667

THE said Watson having Feued certain Crofts; with a servitude in his Muir of Path-head to Winn Divots and Clay, for Building and Repairing the Houses Built, and to be Built by the Vassals; pursued De­clarator that it should be lawful to him to improve the Muir, leaving alse much as would be sufficient for the use foresaid: It was Alledged, that the Servitude did affect the haill Muir; and that their Right flowing from himself could not be restrained; & sibi imputet who did grant it in the Terms of the said Latitude.

The Lords considering that it was intended that the said Servitude should only be for the end foresaid, and it would be a prejudice both to the publick interest which is concerned, that the Country should be impro­ven, and waste unprofitable Grounds Laboured; and to the pursuer also; without the least advantage to the Defenders: They therefore Ordained alse much Ground to be set apart, as might more nor sufficiently serve for the use foresaid; and allowed the pursuer to labour and improve the rest, without prejudice to the Defenders to make use even of the rest dureing the time it continueth in the present condition and not laboured; And it case it should happen upon any occasion, that what should be set apart for the Feuers use foresaid, should prove short and not sufficient for that use, they reserved Liberty to them, to have recourse to the residue; and granted visitation to the effect foresaid. In praesentia, Lockheart and Cheap alter Mckenȝie.

D. 87. Hay of Stravan contra Oliphant. 22. June. 1667.

IT was Found, That a Miln-dam could not be drawn from one side of a Burn to another, without a Servitude or consent of the Heretor having Lands on the other side; and that the Heretor is not obliged to debate, whe­ther he had prejudice or not; The Lands on the other side being hisand the Burn medio-tenus. 2. It was also Found, that he might lawfully demolish the Dam; unless it were alledged, that the Miln had gone the space of Fourty eight Hours; So that it might have come to his knowledge that it was a going Miln. Haystoun Clerk.

D. 88. L. Blantyre contra Walkinshaw. 2. July. 1667.

IN a Reduction the Lord Blantyre contra Walkingshaw, Ex capite minorita­tis; It was Found that the granting of a Bond though with consent of Curators, being persons above all exceptions, was Lesion; and that it was not sufficient to alledge that the Money was actually delivered to the Cu­rators; or to the Minor in their presence; unless it were also alledged that it were converted to his use.

This seemeth hard, for the borrowing of Money by the Minor whose Affairs may require the same, was not Lesion; but the misemploying of it, which is the fault of the Curators.

D. 89. contra Eod. die.

AN Assignation being made to Mails and Duties of a Tenement of Land, for the Year in which it was granted, and in time coming without Limitation: The Lords Found, That the Heir of the Cedent ought to have a formal and valid Disposition of the Land, wherupon the Assigney may be Infeft; Seing otherwayes he could not be secure as to a perpetual Right to Maills and Duties against a Singular Successor: Et con­cesso Jure conceduntur omnia sine quibus explicari non potest.

D. 90. Mebrae contra Melaine. 8. July. 1667.

IN the Process Mcbrae contra Melaine, being for removing a Tutor su­spect; upon many Grounds, and in special, that the Tutors Father had been Tutor to the Pupils Father and had not compted; and that the Tutor and his near Relations had Questions and Actions of great impor­tance with and against the Pupil.

The Lords inclined, That another Friend should be joined to the Tu­tor; But no Answer was given by the Lords to the Dispute: only the pursuers Procurators got a time to condescend upon a person fit to be joined.

D. 91. Crie contra E. Finlator. 9. July. 1667.

A Creditor having obtained a Decreet in subsidium, for payment of his Debts, against the Magistrates of Dundee; and having Assigned the Bond wherupon the Debt was due to the Magistrates, they pursued the Cautioners in the Bond; who alledged, that the Debt and Bond being sa­tisfied by the principal or Town of Dundee, who was Lyable loco Rei ex delicto, the Cautioners were liberate.

The Lords did demurr and delay to give Answer. Vide infra 24. Ja­nuary. 1668.

D. 92. Grange Hamilton contra Smith. Eod. die.

THe Lords Found, That as the payment of Annualrents, so the pay­ment of Feu-duties may be proven prout de Jure. Hay Clerk.

D. 93. Watson contra Law. 15. July. 1667.

IN the Process Watson contra Law, It was Found, That Kirklands being Disponed with absolute Warrandice; The Disponers are obliged to warrand from the Designation of a Gleib: Though it was alledged, that ex natura rei, and not ex defectu Juris, The said Gleib was evicted.

Thereafter it was Found in the same Cause; That the Designation be­ing as to Cows, and Horse grass; and upon a Law supervenient after the Disposition: viz. An Act in the late Parliament; The Disponer ought not to warrand from a Supervient Law.

D. 94. contra Eod. die.

EXhibition being pursued by an Appearand Heir, to the end he may advise, not only as to the Writes in favours of the Defunct, but such as were granted by him.

The Lords superceeded to give Answer as to the last Member, until they should consider the Act of Sederunt: It being alledged, by some of the Lords, That by an Act of Sederunt it was ordained, that no person should be forced to exhibite Writes granted by Defuncts, in favours of himself or his Authors, Except Writes granted by Parents; Or Husbands in favours of Wives and Children.

D. 95. Hamilton contra Symenton. 16. July 1667.

IT was Found, That the Mother, being Liferenter of all that could belong to the Daughter as Fiar and Heir to her Father, was obliged to enter­tain her; and de facto having entertained her, could crave nothing for her aliment, though the time she was entertained, she was only appear­and Heir, and thereafter was about to renounce to be Heir. Hamilton Clerk.

D. 96. Elleis contra Keith. eod. die.

THE Lords, upon debate and deliberation, Found, That a Person addebted in payment of a Sum upon a Wadset, may pay his Debt, and take a Renunciation, tho the Creditor granter be inhibited; and that Inhibitions do not affect Renunciations.

The Reasons that moved these that were for the Decision, are. 1. That Inhibitions do hinder the Liedges to purchass from Persons inhibited, but not to borrow Money from them; and as they may lawfully pay the Sums they borrow, so they may take Discharges and Renunciations. 2. When a Person does grant a Renunciation of a Wadset, he doth not grant a Voluntar Right, but only a Discharge upon the matter, which in Law he might be forced to give, upon an Order of Redemption. 3. A Person inhibite might take Payment and grant Discharge of an heretable Bond, even before Sums due upon such Bonds became arrestable. 4. If In­hibitions should affect Renunciations of Wadsets, then they could not be granted without consent of the Creditor who had inhibited, even after an order of Redemption. 5. The Inhibition, where it mentioneth and prohibiteth Renunciations, is to be understood of Voluntar Renuncia­tions, which the Party inhibite is not obliged to grant; As v. g. An He­retor having a Base Right irredeemable, should after Inhibition renounce the same. 6. If a Wadset had been granted before the Inhibition, the Creditor may renounce, because in Law, and by the Contract he is o­bliged upon payment to renounce, so that it is not a voluntar Deed; And there is eadem Ratio in Wadsets after Inhibition; seing the Right is gran­ted with that condition that upon payment the Creditor should renounce; And as I may grant a Right to a Person inhibited, so I may grant it with that Quality, that he should be obliged to re-dispone, in which case he may lawfully dispone back again, notwithstanding of the Inhibition.

D. 97. Ker contra Ker. eod. die.

THe Lords Found, That an Executor, notwithstanding of the Oath gi­ven upon the Inventar, the time of the Confirmation, may be urged to declare upon Oath, whether since the Confirmation, it is come to his Knowledge, That some Goods and Debts were omitted, which he did not know the time of the Confirmation, and whether he has gotten grea­ter Pryces than are contained in the Inventar. Gibson Clerk.

D. 98. Sir James Keith contra Lundie. eod. die.

A Decreet being obtained against Sir James, as charged to enter Heir of Tailȝie to his Brother Alexander, in foro, for payment of a Debt due to Lundy; Two Exceptions being proponed and admitted, and the Term circumduced; he craved to be reponed against the said Decreet, Alledgeing that the Procurator, who pretended to compear for him in the Decreet, had no Warrand, and was sick for the time.

The Lords inclined to repone him as to personal, but not as to real Ex­ecution: and desired the Reporter to deal with the Party to consent. Ha­milton Clerk.

D. 99. Hermiston contra L. Sinclair. 17. July 1667.

HErmiston being bound to pay to the Lord Sinclair his Brother, out of the first and readiest of the Rents of the Estate of Sinclair, a certain Annuity.

The Lords Found, That he ought to pay the said Annuity entire; tho he pretended he was not obliged simply, but out of the Rents; and that the said Rents, in respect of the real burdens upon the Estate, and the low Rates of Victual, would not extend to satisfie the same: Seing he was obliged to pay out of the first and readiest.

D. 100. Lady Burgie contra Strachan. eod. die.

A Base Infeftment given by a Husband to a Wife, was sustained after the Husbands decease, as publick and cled with Possession, albeit the Husband was not in Possession the time of granting the Right: In respect, either he, or others by redeemable Rights and Tacks given by him, came in Possession thereafter.

D. 101. Fyffe contra Daw in Perth. 6. Novemb. 1667.

A Burgess in Perth, having put his Son with a Neighbour to be his Prentice, and the Boy having diverted from his Service, the Father was pursued for Damnage and Interest sustained by the Master, who did referr to the Fathers Oath his absence and diverting: In which Pro­cess, the Father having declared with a Quality, That the Master had beaten and put away his Son.

The Lords Found, The Quality being super facto alieno, did resolve in an Exception, which he should have proponed, and cannot be pro­ven [Page 40] by his own Oath: And yet though the Process was a Suspension, wherein there had been Litiscontestation, as said is; The Lords, did give a Term to prove the said Quality. Procurators Fyffe alter Chambers.

D. 102. Duke and Dutchess of Monmouth contra Scot of Clarkingtoun. 12. Novemb. 1667.

REquisition being made by the Duke of Monmouth and his Lady, to Sir Laurence Scot of Clarkingtoun, for a Sum of Money; But the Notar having deceased before his Instrument of Requisition was exten­ded▪ and there being only a Minut of the same unsubscribed, the said Duke and Dutchess pursued Clerkingtoun for extending and making up the Instrument; and craved that Clerkingtoun and the Witnesses might be examined to that purpose: and that upon Probation, that the Re­quisition had been made conform to the said Minut, an Instrument un­der the Clerk Registers hand should be equivalent to an Instrument.

The Lords Refused the said Desire, in respect the said Minute was neither subscribed by the Notar, nor in his protocal. Lockheart alter Spotswood.

And that Requisition and such Actus Legitimi cannot be proven but by Instruments perfected as to all necessary Solemnities, at least the Minutes of the same under the Notars hand. And tho the Debitors or Party con­cerned may know such Deeds were done de facto; they may be ignorant and are not obliged to declare, whether they were Legally done or not.

D. 103. Allanus Henderson contra 14. Nov. 1667.

‘QUia facti species (quae sequitur) dubia & perplexa, & de ea discep­tatio in apicibus Juris est, eam & argumenta ultro citroque ad­ducta ex Jure Civili, Juris istius Idiomate, Latine visum est subjicere. Sequitur species facti.’

Ninianus Henderson nauta & incola villae, quae vulgo nuncupatur Sa­linae Praestonianae, peregre profecturus; nec immemor periculorum, qui­bus nautae & navigantes obnoxii sunt; de rebus suis & patrimonio (quod exile satis erat) in praediis urbanis, & quibusdam tenementis in villa ista sitis, disponere statuit: quod fecit Chirographo seu Instrumen­to, sed adeo informi & Styli ancipitis & dubii, ut acerrimae Disputatio­ni ansam praebuerit, utrum Testamenti & Donationis mortis causa, an inter vivos Jure censeri debeat: Ejus Clausulas & tenorem brevi­ter perstringam: Cum esset coelebs, nec liberos, nec fratres haberet, sed sororem unicam, eam praeteriit nulla de ea mentione facta: & praefatus de profectione sua & de morte; quod haud Ignarus esset ea nihil esse cer­tius; nec minus hora & tempore quo esset obeunda nihil esse incertius: Ideo amore & gratia ductus, quo prosequitur Allanum Henderson Nimani Patrui sui filium, nominat (ipsa verba) & constituit dictum Allanum haeredes Executores & Assignatos suos, ejus haeredes & Successores & Do­natarios in rem suam irrevocabiliter; In & ad sua Tenementa domos et terras arabiles jacentes in villa dicta; & ad omnes alias terras haeredi­tates & bona quae in posterum ad sese pertinere contigerint; cum ple­na potestate dicto Allano suisque praedictis, si ipsum mori nec in patriam [Page 41] redire contigerit, intrare & confirmationem obtinere a Domino directo & superiore, in & ad dictas terras & Tenementa, iisque frui & possidere; Transferendo in dictum Allanum ejusque praedictos, omne jus suum tam proprietatis quam possessionis; & excludendo agnatos & necessarios suos, & proximos cognatos quoscunque; cum cessione omnium Instrumento­rum & Evidentiarum dicta Tenementa & Terras concernentium: Reser­vando tamen (ipsissima verba, quae notanda) sibi ipsi tantummodo, post suum in patriam reditum, revocare, rescindere, irritare, & annullare praesentes literas tanquam nunquam fuissent; & dictis Terris aliisque uti & pro arbitrio & libitu suo de iis disponere: cum Clausula Registrationis. Ninianus ex profectione Redux in patriam, diem obiit. Ex eo Instrumento egit ad implementum praedictus Allanus, ad­versus sororem & haeredem dicti Niniani; Excipiebat Soror, & pro ea Advocati arguebant, eam non teneri sed absolvendam his argumentis; Testamentis, Legatis, & mortis causa Donationibus, res mobiles tantum dis­ponuntur, nec eae omnes sed quae Executoribus Relictae & liberis cedunt; libata & subducta ea parte mobilium, quae Jure haereditatis haeredi, mori­bus nostris, relinquitur: Nec satis esse aliquem tum velle tum posse de rebus suis disponere, nisi accedat modus habilis; forma enim in civilibus & concessionibus dat esse rei: cum igitur tenore Instrumenti perpenso; in comperto sit, Testamentum, saltem ei affinem donationem mortis causa esse; sequitur eo Testamento de praediis suis frustra nec modo habi­li disposuisse, & donationem inanem & inefficacem esse: Quod autem Instrumentum & Donatio in eo contenta, Testamenti & Donationis mortis causa Jure censeri debeat, facile evinci, tum ex praefatione & ver­bis narrativis; tum ex clausula dispositiva, nec non & ex clausula & ver­bis Executionis: Ex praefatione liquet, donationem concessam non tan­tum contemplatione verum etiam commemoratione mortis, & verbis in Testamentis & ejusmodi donationibus Testamentariis solennibus; nec non ex ipsis concessionis verbis constare, donatorem voluisse testari vel mortis causa donare; nominat siquidem dictum Allanum ejusque prae­dictos, suos haeredes & successores; nominare autem & constituere hae­redes & Successores sunt verba penitus Testamentaria; Et in Donatio­nibus inter vivos nec apta nec usurpata: Accedit, quod cum definitio Do­nationis mortis causa sit, Cum aliquis vult se magis quam Donatarium, eumque potius quam haeredem rem suam habere; eam disponentis vo­luntatem fuisse certum est ex clausula executiva, & potestate dictis bonis & terris fruendi post mortem suam; aliis cognatis & proximiori­bus submotis & exclusis: Cum Donatio aliqua conceditur metu & in­tuitu periculi imminentis, eo cessante, & donante incolumi & superstite, cessat & evanescit donatio; Donatio autem, de qua agitur, facta est metu periculi ex navigatione periculosa, imo sub conditione si Disponentem mori contigerit; cum igitur in patriam redierit, nec conditio exstiterit, consequens est Donationem inanem & irritam esse. Dato Donationem inter vivos, & puram esse ab omni conditione suspensiva; extra omnem Quaestionis aleam est, eam factam sub conditione Resolutiva; Siqui­dem potestate concessa ex donatione, Terris aliisque donatis fruendi & possidendi, si Donantem sine reditu in patriam mori contigerit; a con­trario sensu sequitur, sin in patriam incolumis redeat, rebus donatis nec frai nec possidere licere; sed donationem nullam, existente conditione sub qua resolvitur Donatio ista: Et si supponatur inter vivos nec sub con­ditione [Page 42] suspensa nec resoluta; sine dubio a Donatore revocari potuit; & Revocata est post reditum; & probaturos recipiebant Rei, Instru­mentum donationis penes donantem repertum fuisse: Instrumentum autem penes Debitorem aut concedentem repertum, censetur liberatum aut revocatum.’

‘Quod nunc sit penes actorem, non sequi, ei rursus a donante traditum, & iterata Traditione donationem Reviviscere; nisi doceatur quando & quommodo ad eum pervenerit; fieri enim potest ut tempore mortis penes donantem fuerit, & actoris dolo substractum.’

‘Pro Actore Replicabatur, Instrumentum dispositionis & donationis, inter vivos Jure censendum; & actionem ex eo efficacem esse; mentem donantis fuisse donationem concedere irrevocabilem si peregre mori contigisset; sin rediisset revocabilem; hoc casu potestatem revocan­di retinuisse, sed ea haud usum; nec enim Instrumentum aut scriptum exstare quo Testatus sit donationem revocari: menti exprimendae verba haud defuisse satis apta, & dispositioni inter vivos idonea; donasse sc: irrevocabiliter & Jus suum omne tam possessionis quam proprietatis trans­tulisse, cum potestate fruendi & possidendi: & cessio evidentiarum, & Registrationis clausula sunt naturae penitus Heterogeneae & a Testamen­tis alienae. Si Donator revocatione facta peregre decessisset revocatio­nem Actori minime obfuturam; Si Actor superstite donatore mortuus fuisset donationem haud inanem, sed haeredibus Actoris efficacem fore: Ea argumenta concludere donationem, Testamenti naturam haud sa­pere; cum in Testamentis ambulatoria sit voluntas & praemoriente do­natario aut legatario evanescunt Legata & Donationes: haud diffiteri donationem istam quibusdam clausulis, donationi mortis causa affinem videri: Sed quod de Hermophrodito Jure cautum est, haud inepte & hic accomodari, & quod praevalet inspiciendum.’

‘Ad argumenta pro Reo Respondebatur: Ad primum, haud incongruum esse mentis & valetudinis compotem, & in legitima potestate constitutum, uno & eodem Instrumento, de rebus suis tam mobilibus quam immo­bilibus disponere posse; si quis enim peregre profecturus Testamentum condat, & Executores instituat, et eodem Testamento de terris suis disponat per verba formalia & idonea, addito mandato de Resignatio­ne facienda, & Sasinae praecepto: Sasinâ & Resignatione secuta, eo ca­su, si dicas nec Testamentum nec Dispositionem valere, absurdum erit quae seorsim licitae sunt rerum suarum donationes, illicitas fieri, quod simul uno Instrumento celebratae sunt: Si dicas Testamentum tan­tum valere, ratio reddi non potest, cur Testamentum & mobilium do­natio magis valeat, quam Dispositio & rerum immobilium Donatio, cum in hac non minus concurrant potestas & voluntas, & modus & conceptio, idonea & solennis: Superest igitur utrumque valere. Praeterea respon­detur, falsum esse quod asseritur, donationibus mortis causa de terris & rebus immobilibus disponere haud licere; cum nihil frequentius sit contractibus & donationibus, quibus, proximioribus exclusis, haeredes alii (& ut loqui solemus) Taliae & Provisionis instituuntur.’

‘Accedit, quod Donator Actorem Donatarium constituerit; & verbum istud proprium sit donationis inter vivos; nec officit quod etiam hae­redem & successorem nominarit, cum utile per inutile non vitietur. Ad Secundum Respondetur; Dato, Donationem esse mortis causa, non se­quitur [Page 43] invalidam esse; superius enim dictum est in contractibus & ob­ligationibus de successione Talliata, de rebus immobilibus & praediis nos quotidie disponere: eas autem donationes esse mortis causa, patet ex praedicta Definitione mortis causa donationis; & quod omnes de suc­cessione contractus, mortis contemplatione & plerumque non sine mor­tis commemoratione fiant, & effectum post mortem sortiantur, & in iis ambulatoria sit voluntas, nisi accedat pactum de non revocando. Ad Tertium Respondetur, falsam esse Propositionem; nec enim cessante causâ impulsiva cessat effectus; nec qui periculo imminente mortalita­tis admonitus, Testamentum condidit; si periculum effugerit aut elu­ctatus fuerit, eo minus in voluntate eadem perseverasse censebitur; & testatus discedit nisi revocasse constiterit. Ad Quartum Respondetur, Dispositionem reditu eveniente, haud nullam aut irritam esse, sed revo­cabilem, id ex eo demonstrari; Quod sibi soli & tantummodo reserva­rit, si domum rediret, potestatem revocandi; si enim inanis & caduca fieret Donatio, in casu reditus, quorsum ista potestas & sibi soli reser­vata, revocandi donationem, quoad omnes, ipso conditionis eventu ex­tinctam & revocatam. Ad Quintum & Sextum Respondetur, & Ne­gatur, instrumentum post Donatoris reditum penes eum esse; & penitus supervacuum disceptare an penes eum fuerit, cum nunc penes actorem sit, & sibi a donatore traditum, nec necesse est docere quo­modo & quando ad se pervenerit.’

Senatus Interlocutus est, Donationem istam Testamenti naturam haud sapere, sed validam & efficacem esse: Sed si constiterit & probatum fu­erit, penes donantem instrumentum post ejus reditum fuisse, tuno revocatum & irritum esse.’

‘An autem, eo quod penes actorem nunc sit, a revocatione discessum sit & reviviscat Donatio, interloqui sustinuit: & ulterius inquirendum censuit quando & quomodo ad actorem pervenerit.’

D. 124. Whitehead contra Straiton. 14. Novemb. 1667.

RObert Whitehead of Park pursued John Straiton Tacksman of the Park of Holy-rood-house, for the price of a Horse put in the said Park, to be pastured for 4. shil. per night; which after search cannot be found:

It was Alledged, That by a Placad affixed upon the Gate of the Park, It was intimated, that the Keeper of the Park would not be answerable for any Horses put therein, although they should be stolen, or break their Neck, or any other Mischief or Hazard should overtake them. It was Replyed, That by the Law Nautae, Caupones, &c. the Keeper ex conducto is ly­able; unless it were alledged, That it had been expresly agreed, that he should not be lyable; or at the least, that it was known to the Pursuer, that such a Placad was affixed, when he put in his Horse.

The Lords, Before answer, ordained the Reporter to enquire, and hear the parties upon the terms of the Agreement, when the horse was put in: whether it was told or known to the pursuer, that the keeper would not be answerable. Castlehill Reporter.

D. 105. Gardiner contra Colvil. 16. Novemb. 1667.

IN an action Gardiner contra Colvil; the pursuer being ejected during her Husbands absence out of the countrey, and when it was supposed he was dead.

The Lords sustained the pursuite; Though the time of the adviseing the probation, It was offered to be proven that he was living: and did de­clare, that albeit the Husband were at the Barr, they would give the Wife the benefite of Juramentum in litem, in respect of the wrong done by the Defender, and the particulars and quantities could not otherwise be proven. Actor Longformacus alter Wallace. Castlehill Reporter.

D. 106. Trotters contra Lundy. 20. Novemb. 1667.

THE Children of George Trotter in Fogorig being confirmed Execu­tors to their Sister Isobel Trotter, pursued James Lundie Cautioner in a Bond for James Trotter of the East-end of Fogo, for the Sum there­inconteined: It was Alledged, that the said James being Heir to his Grand-father Alexander Trotter in the East-end of Fogo, and the said George Son to the said Alexander and Executor to him, they did transact together that the Movables belonging to the said George as Executor should remain with the Heir; and the said James and the Defender as Cautioner did for the cause foresaid grant the said Bond blank in the Creditors name where­in the said George filled up the name of John Trotter in Chester his Brother; and procured from him an Assignation for the said Isobel his Daughter; And that thereafter upon a Submission betwixt the said George and Alexander Trotter Son to the said James granter and principal Debitor in the said Bond, The Arbiters ordained the said George to give back to the said Alexander the said Bond, and Assignation, with a Discharge thereof; and therefore the said Isobel being in familia paterna, and the said Bond and Assignation being taken and procured as said is, by the said George the Father in favours of the Daughter who hath no visible Estate or means to acquire any such Right, he was still master of the same: And it being ordained to be Discharged (as said is) the said Debt is Extinct. It was Answered, that the Bond being filled up and Re­gistrat in the name of the said John Trotter, and the samen being Assigned, and the Assignation in favours of the said Isobel intimat; and after her decease, her Executors having confirmed the said Debt; all before the said Submission; her Father could not by the Submission or any other deed of his, Evacuat the said Right Established in the person of the said Isobel and her Executors: And as to the Practique betwixt Monimusk and Pit­tarro, whereupon the Defenders alledge; it doth not quadrate to the Bond in question, it being never delivered but depositat in the Uncles hand, Mo­ther Brother to the Child; and in the same case It was Found, That the Fa­ther could not retract a reall Right made in favours of his Child and Heir: And here there is Eadem Ratio.

The Lords Found, That the Father being Master of a Bond or Right, whereupon nothing followed, being granted by himself; may throw it in the fire, and may consequently Discharge it: But the said Right being made publick, and compleated by the delivery, and which is equivalent, by [Page 45] some publick deed, by Infeftment if it be Heretable; or by Assignation intimated, or confirmed Testament, if it be Movable; he could not there­after Retreat or prejudge the same: And repelled the Defence in Respect of the Answer. Hackertoun Lord Reporter. Mr Thomas Hay Clerk.

D. 107. Pollock contra Pollock. eod. die.

JOhn Pollock having granted a Bond of 5000 Merks to James his second Son of the first Mariage; The said James intented and pursued for pay­ment both Robert eldest Son of the same Marriage, Heir of Line, and John eldest Son of the second Marriage, and Heir of Provision, as charged to En­ter Heir respective: It was alledeged for the Heir of the first marriage, that he offered to renunce: And for the Heir of Provision, that the Heir of Line ought to be first discussed by adjudication; and condescended upon mov­able Heirship, which might be adjudged: It was Answered for the Heir of Line, that his Father, having provided him, had taken from him a Renunciation of all that could belong to him as Heir, So that he could have no Right to the movable Heirship, which, in respect of his Re­nunciation, would be considered as other movables and fall under Exe­cutrie: It was Replyed for the Heir of provision, that by the Renuncia­tion, the Heir of Line had renunced his kindness, to the effect his Father might have power to dispose of the Heirship; but his Father not having disposed thereof, the Right returned to the Heir of Line again, the Re­nounciation being in favours of him and his Heirs; as in Renounciations of that nature as to Lands, if the Father does not dispose of the same, they will notwithstanding belong to the Heir. Some of the Lords thought, there should be a difference betwixt Lands and Movable Heirship; In respect the Right of Lands, whereof the Father died infeft, cannot be Set­led in the person of any other but the Heir, who therefore ought to have Right notwithstanding of the Renunciation: But the Movables which should fall under Heirship by the Renunciation of the Heir, cease to be Heirship; and may be confirmed as other Movables: Others Thought, that the Effect of such Renunciations should be the same as to Movables and Lands; the Fathers intention being one and the same for both; and therefore, as the Right in the construction of the Law returneth to the Heir of the Father, who doth not otherwise dispose of his Lands; there is the same reason as to movable Heirships: And as to the pretence foresaid, it is of no weight, seing if it were the Intention of the Father, that by such Re­nunciations the Son should be denuded, without Return, though the Fa­ther should not dispose of his Lands; the Son may be pursued and forced to denude himself, that his Renunciation may be effectual, in favours of the nearest of Kin.

The Lords before answer ordained the Renunciation to be produced, that they might consider the Tenor of it.

D. 108. Tacksmen of the Custumes contra Greenhead. Eod. die.

THe Custums of the Borders being set in Subtack to Greenhead and others, by the Tacksmen of the haill custumes of the Kingdom: Greenhead is pursued as representing his Father one of the Subtacksmen, for [Page 46] the dutie the year 1650. It was alledged, That the Subtack was altogether unprofitable, upon the occasion of the English Invasion; so that Beasts and other Goods were not imported, nor Exported that year, as they had been in use formerly: It was Answered, that albeit in praediis Rusticis, in case of Sterilitie, Vastation, and such other Calamities that cannot be avoided, There may be abatement craved & Remissio Canonis; yet in this case the Subject being conductio rei periculosae & Jactus Retis, the Subtacksmen ought to have no abatement, and are in the same case as Tacksmen of Sal­mond fishing, who will be lyable for the duty, albeit no profit arise to them.

The Lords Found, That Subtacksmen should have abatement: But the Question being most, Quatenus, and concerning the proportion; because, though the Subtacksmen had undoubtedly loss, yet it was not Total; there being some Commerce betwixt the Kingdoms for that year, some Moneths. It was Found in end, upon hearing of Parties, that the half of the Dutie should be abated. Actores Lockhart & Cuninghame Alteri Sinclair. Mr Tho­mas Hay Clerk:

The Law is very clear ff Locati; and the Doctors upon that Title; not only in praediis but in conductione vectigalium, and the like; in case of an insuperable Calamity, remittitur Canon & merces; but they are not so clear as to the Quatenus and proportion of the abatement, when the detriment is not Total: But it is just, the abatement should be proportionable to the loss: And accordingly The Lords decided.

D. 109. Justice Clerk contra Lambertoun 23. Nov. 1667.

IN the case, the Justice Clerk contra Lambertoun, the probation anent the value and worth of the Woods pertaining to the Justice Clerk, and cutt and intrometted with by Lambertoun, being advised; It was considered and represented by some of the Lords, that had been Commissionated to ex­amine the Witnesses adduced by both parties, being allowed to have a joynt probation, that the probation was dubious; the Witnesses for the Pursuer declaring too highly, and the Witnesses for the Defender too low as appeared: And that the Subject of the Question not being de re which is the proper Object of Sense, but de rei valore qui cadit sub Judicium & In­tellectum; The Testimonies of the Witnesses are not de rei veritate but de credulitate & opinione; and therefore are not numeranda sed ponderanda, ac­cording to the circumstances both of their oun quality and the quality of the Declaration, whether they have declared verisimilia, and whether animose and such like; and whether they have given a probable reason of their knowledge: That in this case, the Witnesses that have deponed most to the advantage of the Pursuer are his own Tennants; and one of them a Smith & his Officer: that they give the reason of their Knowledge, that they dwelt in the bounds, which is not sufficient, unless they had been periti and Con­versant about the matter of Woods, and the Buying and the Selling and the valuing of the same: That some Witnesses for the Defender had given their Judgment upon oath as strongly and pregnantly as they, though they be not so many: So that the probation at best is but dubious, and in dubiis minimum sequendum; at the least the Lords have a latitude to found their Judgment upon the Testimonies of both cum temperamento, and without adhering percisely to either.

[Page 47] The Lords Found nevertheless by plurality, That they should have respect to what had been proven by the most part: And accordingly De­cerned.

D. 110. Rankin contra Skelmorlie and Dunlop. eod. die.

IN a double poinding at the instance of the Lord Melvil; there being a Competition betwixt two Creditors of Antonia Broun Daughter and Heir to Sir John Broun:

The Lords preferred Skelmorly the first Arrester, Though Rankin had obtained a Decreet to make forthcoming, and had compleated his Di­ligence; and alledged, that an Arrestment is but an inchoate Diligence, and doth not hinder any other Creditor to compleat, and do more exact di­ligence by poinding, or by a Decreet to make forthcoming, which in Debts, and in nominibus are equivalent. The reason of the Decision was, that Skelmorly had not only Arrested but had intented a pursuite before the Lords to make forthcoming before Rankin; But Processes before the Lords being more tedious, and the Pursuer not Master of Calling, Ran­kin had taken advantage by obtaining a Decreet before the Sheriff, in the interim.

D. 111. Hay contra Drummond. 26. Novem. 1667.

IN a Reduction Hay of Haystoun contra Drummond and Hepburn; A Seasin being called for; The Defenders having alledged, that the same being Registrate, and they condescending upon the Registration, the pur­suer should Extract it himself.

The Lords did debate amongst themselves, whether the Defender should be obliged to Extract and produce the Seasin: Some were of the opinion, that there is a difference betwixt Decreets and Registrate Bonds and such like; and betwixt Seasins and Charters, which being the Defenders own Evidents and the principals not being in the Registers, they are presumed to have them; and if they have them not, ought to Extract them: Others thought, that seing Extracts do satisfie the Production in Reductions; If the Defen­ders have neither Principals nor Extracts, and be content to make Faith thereupon, it were hard they should be at the Charge to Extract them, in or­der to a Process against themselves. The Lords did nothing upon the Debate.

The Lords did resolve, and caused intimate to the Advocates, That hereafter they would only give two Terms in Reductions, and three Terms in Improbations.

D. 112. Dalȝiel contra eod. die.

THE Minister of Prestonhaugh, Mr. John Dalȝiel, pursued for the Teinds of Lanton, upon his presentation to the said Kirk and Teinds Parsonage and Viccarage: It was Alledged, no process, unless he were presented to be Prebendar, seing the said Kirk is a Member of the Colle­giate Kirk of Dumbar; and cannot be made appear to be dissolved, and E­rected in a several Rectory.

The Lords Found, That being presented to be Minister at the said Kirk, and to the Teinds, which are the patrimony of the Prebendar; it is equiva­lent, [Page 48] as if he were presented Prebendar: As when there is a presentation to a Kirk, which is a Parsonage, and to the Teinds, the Minister will have Right, though he be not presented to be Rector or Parson.

D. 113. E. of Lauderdale contra Vassals of Musselburgh. 5. Decem. 1667.

IN a Reduction and Improbation at the instance of the Earl of Lauder­dale, against the Vassals of Musselburgh, and in special Major Biggar and others Heretors, and possessors of the Lands of Hill.

The Lords Found, That the Major having produced a more eminent progress, and which he alledged would exclude the pursuer; no Certi­fication could be granted contra non producta; The Defender not being obliged to show any other Writes, untill these which are produced be discussed. The Lords Found also, That the Defenders are not obliged to declare, that they will use no other Writes than these which are produced: The only difficulty being, that the reason of Reduction could not be dis­puted, until the Production be closed; and if the Writes produced should be improven or reduced, the Pursuer would be put to a new process of Improbation; or return and crave Certification after Dispute in Causa, which is incongruous in Form.

The Lords were of Opinion, that in the same Process the Pursuer after the discussing of the Writs produced, might thereafter crave Certification contra non producta.

D. 114. Fountain contra Maxuel. eod. die.

ALbeit the Lords are tender in Exhibition of Writs; unless it be pro­ven, that the Defenders had the same the time of the intenting of the Cause; or had fraudfully put the samen away before; which is difficilis pro­bationis; Yet in an Exhibition at the instance of [...] Fountain against Maxuel of Nethergate, they decerned to exhibite, albeit it was not proven that the Defenders had the Writes, at, or since the intenting of the Cause: In respect it was proven, the Defender had medled with the Writs being in a Charter Chest; and had offered to Transact concerning the same; and so was presumed to have put them away fraudulently: There being a great difference betwixt a transient having of Writes, and a down right medleing and Intromission; which, being proven, though it be before the intenting of the Exhibition, doth oblige the Intrometter to be answerable for the same.

D. 115. Collector of the Taxation contra the Parson of Old­hamstocks. 6. Decem. 1667.

IN the Case, The Collector of the Taxation contra the Parson of Old­hamstocks; a Question was moved, whether the Successor in the bene­fice be Lyable for the Taxation due by his Predecessors, his Patrimony consisting most of Teinds: But was not decided at this time.

D. 116. Mr. Rodger Hog contra The Countess of Home. 11. Decemb. 1667.

AN Inhibition being served upon an Obligement to warrand; A Re­duction was thereupon sustained, though it was alledged there was neither Decreet of Eviction, nor Liquidation of distress; the pursuit being only a Declarator, and the Decreet being only effectual after Evi­ction and Liquidation; which accordingly was declared by the Lords.

D. 117. Inter Eosdem. eod. die.

BEtwixt the same Parties: It was alledged, that the Defenders Right was ratified by a Creditor, who had a Comprysing expired; so that the pursuer had no interest to question the Defenders Right: It was An­swered, That the pursuer desired only such Right as was after the Inhi­bition to be reduced, without prejudice of any other, which he could not nor was obliged to debate hoc loco.

The Lords, notwithstanding Found the Alledgance Relevant.

D. 118. Hamilton contra Lord Belhaven. 13. Decem. 1667.

RObert Hamilton Clerk, pursued the Lord and Lady Belhaven to hear and see it declared, that a Minute betwixt him and them concerning the Tenor and Articles Lybelled, is null; the clause irritant therein mentioned being committed.

The Lords refused to sustain the pursuit; unless the Minute were pro­duced: Albeit it was alledged there could be no prejudice, in respect a Minute of another Tenor could not be prejudged: and a Minute of that Tenor Lybelled, should be declared void upon the reason Lybelled.

D. 119. Rioch contra Eod. die.

AFter Litiscontestation upon an Exception of payment; the Defender, who was pursued as Lawfully charged to enter Heir, Desired to be admitted to renunce; which was refused; because by the proponing the Defence, Gesserat se pro haerede: And Litiscontestation is a judicial Contract.

D. 120. Rannolph Davidson contra Richardson Eod. die.

A Ship being declared pryse, Because the Loadning of Salt belonged to a Frenchman; the Skipper and Steersman having declared upon oath that the Loadning was taken in at the Rotchel upon the account of the said Person. The adjudication was quarrelled by a Reduction, upon diverse reasons; and in special these, that the Deposition of the Skipper and Steers­man were forced and extorted from them; and that it was offered to be proven and that it did appear by diverse Letters, Certificats, and Docu­ments produced, that the Loadning did belong to the Owners of the Ship who were Citizens of Dantzick and Hamburg, and were not the Kings Enemies.

The Lords in this Process Found, that the Owners may be heard to reduce the Sentence upon reasons omitted by the Skipper. 2. It being debated a­mongst [Page 50] the Lords whether the Skippers Declaration should so prejudge and conclude the Owners, that they should not be heard thereafter to prove that the Loadning belonged to them: Some thought it hard, that the Skip­pers fraud or mistake should prejudge the Owners: But because in the case, there was no ground to persume that the Skipper and Steersman did intend to prejudge or wrong the Owners; and the Writs and Certificats produced were all after the Seizure; and the Letters, which were of an­terior dates might have been made up, and were all from Persons concern­ed; and there were Documents found in the Ship that could clear that the Loadning did belong to the Owners.

The Lords Sustained the Sentence, unless the Pursuer would qualifie Foroe and Violence, and that the Depositions were Extorted. Hay Clerk.

D. 121. Homes contra Paterson 17. Dec. 1667.

IT was Found, that the Attester of the sufficiencie of a Cautioner, being pursued for the Debt, the Cautioner being distrest and discust and not Solvent; and the Attester having alledged that he offered to prove that the Cautioner was then the time he became Cautioner, habitus & reputatus Responsal & idoneus as to the Debt: The alledgance is relevant, and the Attester no further lyable.

D. 122. Sir Thamas Nicolson contra the Laird of Philorth. 18. Dec. 1667.

PHilorth elder, being pursued as representing his Grand-Father for pay­ment of a Debt due upon Bond granted by the Earl Marischal and his Grand-Father as Cautioner: It was Alledged, that the Bond being Dated above fourty years ago was perscribed: It was Replyed, that interruption had been made by payment of the Annualrents by the principal Debitor: It was Answered it was prescryved as to the Cautioner, there being no in­terruption by any Document or pursuit against him, or payment by him.

The Lords repelled the Defence in respect of the Reply: and Found that the ground of prescription as to personal actions being odium and ne­gligentia non petentis, that it doth not militate in this case, the Creditor haveing gotten Annualrent; so that he cannot be said to be negligent. Lockhart, alter Cuninghame.

D. 123. Gilespie contra Auchinleck. Eod. die.

MAry Williamson Lady Cumblidge, having Right not only of Liferent but also to the Fee of the said Estate by Comprysing; and being a­bout to Marry with Patrick Gilespie her second Husband: for settling and preventing Questions betwixt her Children and her Husband, she did Dispone the Fee of the Lands to her eldest Son with the burden of 5000. Merks to be payed to her second Son at his age of Twentie one years; and to Entertain him in the Interim: And at the same time her eldest Son did grant and sett a Tack to the said Patrick, for a year after his Mothers de­cease if he should survive her, of her Liferent Lands reserved in the Dis­position, mentioning their purpose of Marriage, And that he was to stock the saids Lands, and that his Wife might die before him; upon which [Page 51] considerations the said Tack is sett: At the same time, the said Mary did privatly dispone her Liferent in favours of her second Son John Auchinleck, who intented a pursuit against her and her said Husband for the Maills and Duties of the Lands for diverse years: It was Alledged; that the said Right being a privat latent Right, the Defender ought to be free of by­gones as being bona fide Possessor, by virtue of his Wife's Infeftment, and his Jus mariti: It was Answered, That he and his Wife are Eadem per­sona, and she being his author, cannot pretend that they possessed bona fide in prejudice of a Right made by her self.

The Lords Found the alledgances relevant.

It was further alledged, that the Disposition made to the Pursuer was most fraudfully granted in prejudice of the Defender after Treatie of the Marriage, and the said publick Transactions in order thereto; Which were Equivalent to, and to in lieu of a Contract of Marriage; the Wife having no other thing besides to dispose of besides her Liferent, to which the Husband has Right Jure mariti; so that a Contract was not necessary as to that: And that the said Right was retained by the Mother, and not delivered until she was Married; at which time she could not prejudge her Husband, and that the Defender had a Reduction depending upon the reasons foresaid.

The Lords Found the alledgance relevant: And found that an Assigna­tion not intimat and not being made for an onerous Cause, could not pre­judge the Husband, having by his Marriage a publick Right Equivalent to an Assignation, and therefore assoiled.

It was not considered whether the Right was delivered or not, being found latent as said is.

D. 124. Wilson contra the Magistrates of Queensferry 2. January. 1668.

ARchibald Wilson being charged to accept the Office of a Baillie of the Town of Queensferry, Suspended upon the Act of Parliament, Jam. 3. Parl. 5. Chap. 29. whereby it is statute, that Magistrates within Burghs should not be continued longer than a Year; and subsumed that he had served the preceeding two Years.

This case being Reported, The Lords Found, the Reason Relevant.

And albeit the Act of Parliament be not in observance, specially in Edin­burgh, The present Provost having been in that place diverse years, yet the Ambition and unwarrantable practice of those who violate the said Act, and others made to that purpose; ought not to prejudge others who are most sober, and claim the benefite of the same,

D. 125. contra 3. January. 1668.

A Wife provided to an Annualrent in Victual out of certain Lands by her Contract of Marriage, did renounce the same; and thereafter was Infeft in an Annualrent out of other Lands: And upon the said last Infeftment a Process being intented for poinding of the Ground: It was Alledged, that the Seasin was null being alledged to be given by a Hus­band propriis manibus, and the Assertion of a Notar without any precept or warrand in Writ: It was Answered, That the Marriage with the Re­licts [Page 52] Renounciation of her former Right, and her Contract of Marriage, being all produced, are sufficient Adminicles to sustain the same.

The Lords enclined to favour the Relict, yet they found it of a dange­rous consequence, that a real Right should depend upon the Assertion of Notars and witnesses: And the Question not being whether the Husband might or ought to have given his Wife the said Right, in recompence of of her former; But whether de facto he did the same, Seing the foresaid Writes having no relation to the Seasin, either as given or to be given, could not be Adminicles to warrand or sustain the same: And therefore before Answer, it was thought fit to enquire, if there had been any Decision in the like case; as was informed.

D. 126. Sir John Home contra The Feuars of Coldinghame. 7. January. 1668.

IN a Process at the instance of Sir John Home of Rentoun Justice Clerk contra The Feuars of Coldingham: The Defenders offered to improve the Executions: It was Answered, They could not be heard, unless they would propone the said Alledgance peremptorie; but that the same should be reserved by way of Action.

The Lords for avoiding the multiplying of Processes, obliged them to propone the exception of Improbation peremptorie: But the same being prior natura, and competent to be proponed before any other in meritis causae; And yet being now proponed peremptorie in form of Process, be­ing the last of Exceptions:

The Lords admitted the Defenders to propone their other Exceptions, and reserved that to the last place.

D. 127. Eodem die.

THE Lords upon debate amongst themselves, Thought that the Abbay being His Majesties House, should not Exempt or protect any person against His Majesties Laws, and the Execution of Letters of Caption, and therefore Recommended to the Keeper of the Abbay, to put him out and not to shelter him there.

D. 128. Forbes contra Innes. 8. January 1668.

IN the Case, Forbes contra Innes and Dalgarno; The Lords Found, That a Wife having no Right for the time to Lands Disponed by her Hus­band; and having at the desire of the Buyer consented and sold her Right; if she thereafter acquire from another person a Right to the saids Lands, is not by her consent concluded, but may pursue and evict the Lands upon her Right; Her consent operating only, that upon any Right from her Hus­band, or then in her person, she cannot question the Right whereto she hath consented; And the Brocara that Jus superveniens accrescit, being to be understood of Jus superveniens Authori; whereas a Consenter is not Au­thor. Lockheart alteri Wedderburn & Thoirs.

D. 129. Laird of Glencorse contra his Brethren and Sisters. 9. January 1668.

ALexander Bothwel of Glencorse, having Disponed his Lands to his El­dest Son by Contract of Marriage betwixt his Son and his Wife, with absolute warrandice; And by the Contract the Tocher being payable to the Father, he did notwithstanding deliver Bonds of Provision to his o­ther Children, which were of a date before the Contract, but not deliver­ed diverse years after his Sons Marriage: The Eldest Son pursued a Re­duction of the said Bonds, in so far as they may affect his Estate, or be the ground of a pursuit against him, as Successor Titulo lucrativo post con­tractum debitum: The Reasons of Reduction were, that the Bonds were not delivered the time of the Right granted to the Son; and that he could not thereafter do any Deed in his prejudice, and consequently, could not deliver the said Bonds, the delivery and not the granting being that which doth animate, and make the same effectual: It was Answered, That the Father being Tutor of Law to his Children, he having [...]he Bonds for their use, is equivalent as if the Children had them, or that they had been delivered to them: And whatever may be as to a Singular Successor, they ought to be effectual against his Eldest Son, who is universal succes­sor. It was Answered, That Contracts of Marriage, being not only in fa­vours of the Son, but in the behalf of the Wife and Children, and with the Friends, are most solemn and favourable Transactions; Et bona fides is in them exuberant; so that upon no pretence, no Deed ought to be done by any of the Contracters in fraudem; And that the Father, if he had intended to have burdened the said Lands, should have burdened the Fee expresly with the same; that Provisions granted by Parents to their Children before they be delivered may be revocked; and that the Father by granting the Disposition in favours of his Son, had revocked the Bonds in question, in so far as they may trouble him.

The Lords, in respect it was proven, That the Bonds were not deliver­ed till after the Contract, Found they could not be effectual against the Son, and Reduced. Sinclair and Wallace, alteri Wedderburn & Lockheart.

D. 130. Earl of Kinghorn contra The Laird of Ʋdney. 14 January. 1668.

THE Earl of Kinghorn did Wadset to the deceast Laird of Ʋdney the Barony of Balhaves, and the Sum due upon the Wadset being pay­ed to Ʋdney, he did by his Letter to the said Earl promise a Renounciati­on of the said Wadset to be granted by him: The Earl of Kinghorn as Heir to his Father having pursued the now Laird of Ʋdney as represent­ing his Father upon the passive Titles, and especially upon that, as Suc­cessor Titulo Lucrativo; in so far as he was Infeft in the Lands condescen­ded upon acquired by his Father to himself in Liferent, and to the Defen­der in Fee; with power to the Father or his Assigney to redeem the same upon payment of three Pounds; And to Set, Wadset and dis­pone without his consent. It was Alledged, the Sons Right was prior to the said Letter, and that the Father did not make use of the said power: It [Page 54] was Replyed, That the Wadset was prior to the Defenders Right; yet this Right being qualified (as said is) the Father might have contracted Debts, and granted obligements after the said Right; and the Defender would be lyable to the same; seeing the Lands and the Fathers interest in the same being upon the matter a Fee and power to redeem and dispone, might have been comprysed for his Debt contracted after the said Right.

There being two questions in the case viz. Whether the Defender be lyable as Successor Titulo lucrativo, If it should be found that the Wadset was Anterior? 2ly. If the obligement shall be found to be after the Defen­ders Right, whether he would be notwithstanding Successor Titulo lucrati­vo, in respect of the quality and condition foresaid of the said Right.

The Lords repelled the alledgance, and Found, the Defender would be lyable as Sucessor, the pursuer proving that the Wadset was Anterior: As to the second question, the Lords thought it not necessar to decide, being of very great consequence, and deserving hearing In praesentia, seing it was notour that the Wadset was before the Defenders Right: Yet we inclined for the most part to think, that when such Rights are granted or Purchased by Parents to their appearand Heirs, they should be lyable to all the Debts due and contracted thereafter; at least secundum vires & in quan­tum Lucrantur: And beside the abovementioned reasons, these may be urged 1. the Father having by such a reservation, not only a reversion but in effect a Right of propertie, In so far as he has power to Dispone and wadset as if he were Fiar; if he should discharge the said Reservation his Discharge would inferr against his Son the passive title of Successor titulo lucrativo; having gotten thereby an absolute and irredeemable Right which he had not before; And therfore he not useing the power com­petent to him by the said Reservation, being equivalent as if he had dis­charged the same, ought to operate the same effect. 2. Such a Right is in effect Praeceptio Haereditatis cum of effectu only the time of the Fathers decease, seeing before that time it is in his power to Evacuat the same; and therefore the time of the Fathers decease is to be considercd so as the Son cannot be said to have Right or to Succeed effectualy before that time, and so ought likewise to be lyable to the Debts contracted at any time before his Fathers decease.

D. 131. Balmedie contra the Baillies of Abernethie. 15. Jan. 1668.

A Decreet at the Procurator Fiscal's Instance of the Regality of Aberneth­ie before the Baillie of the Regality, against the Weavers in the Town of Abernethie, for contraveening the Act of Parliament 1661 Anent the breadth and bleetching of Linnen Cloath; was suspended upon that reason, that the Bailies within the Town of Abernethie, were only Judges compe­tent to the Inhabitants within the Burgh.

The Lords Found, that the Town being only a Burgh of Regality had ju­risdiction within the same: And the Baillies jurisdiction is Cumulative and not Privative; unless they had it expresly by their Infeftment Privative, and that in such cases Locus est Praeventioni.

D. 132. Parkman contra Allan. Eod. die

IN the late War betwixt his Majestie and Holland and Denmark, a Swed­ish Ship being taken by a Scots Caper and adjudged Pryze: A Re­duction of the Admirals Decreet was pursued, upon diverse reasons; and in special this, That by the Treatie betwixt his Majestie and the Crown of Swed­en, the Subjects of Sweden may traffique with their Alleys, though Enemies to h s Majestie with freedom; and carry in their Ships Counterband Goods, Except such as are contained in an Article of the said Treaty, being for the most part Armes, and Instrument a Bellica; and that the Goods in question which they had carried in their Ships to Holland, viz. Tarr and stock fish were not of that nature. 2. That when the said Ship was taken, there was none of the saids Goods aboard; and that it could not be declared Pryze upon pretence That immediatly before they had carried the said Goods to Holland; seing it is not unlawful not a breach of Treatie betwixt his Ma­jestie and Sweden, that the Subjects of Sweden should continue the same inter­course and freedom of Trade they had formerly with their friends, though now the Kings Enemies: and if they carrie counterband Goods, the only hazard is that if they be deprehended carrying the same, They may be con­fiscat; conform to the Treatie with Sweden, bearing si Deprehendantur; which is Consonant to the custom of all Nations, and of the Admirality of England. It was Alledged, that the Ship in Question should not have the benefit of the Treatie, having Served the Danes the Kings Enemies, and being fraugh­ted and loaded with Tarr from Noraway upon the account of Danish Merchants, and with stock Fish which they had carried to Amsterdam: That it was expresly provided by the Treatie with Sweden, that they should not carry bona hostium; and that tho the Danes were not the Kings Enemies, yet Tarr and Stock-fish are Counterband, Tarr being a Material so useful and necessary for a Naval Warr; and that by the Treatie, Comme­atus is counterband and Stock-fish falleth under the notion of Commeatus: and that by the Commission given by the Admiral to the Capers, they are empowered expresly to seize on Ships, not only while they have counter­band Goods caryeing to his Majesties Enemies, but upon the return having sold and disponed upon the same. It was Replyed, 1. That by the Law of Nations (which is clear from Grotius de Jure Belli) Goods that are usus pro­miscui both in Warr and Peace are not vetita and counterband; and two Na­tions being engaged in Warr with others that are at friendship with both are allowed libertie of Trade with either as to such Goods: And that Tarr is of that same nature, and Commeatus, except in the case of portus clausus, or Ci­vitas obsessa, and from which deditio may be expected if not supplied. 2. His Majesties Declaration of Warr with Holland, bears, that Ships carrying coun­terband to Holland, if they be mett with carrying the same, may be seized; and that his Majesties Declaration, Emitted of purpose in relation to other Nations, should be considered as lex Belli, and not a privat and unwarant­able style of a commission given periculo petentis.

In this, many Points being debated, It was Found by the Lords, that Tarr is Counterband. 2. As to that Point, whether a Ship having carried counterband Goods to Enemies, may be seized upon in her return home-ward, having sold and vented the same to the Enemies and not deprehen­ded carrying the same; They thought fit to know his Majesties pleasure, [Page 56] and the custom of England; and a Letter was writen to my Lord Se­cretary to that purpose. 3. The Ship in question, having carried coun­terband Goods to Holland, and having thereafter made a Voyage to France; and there having taking a new Loading of Salt upon the account of the Owners; and being taken upon her comeing from France, If it should be found that she might have been seized upon pretence that they had carried the said Goods to Holland; It was Debated whether the Return should be understood of the immediat Voyage from Holland to France; or until they should return to Sweden? And as to this part, the Lords thought good to take advice of Merchants: In praesentia, Lockhart & Wedderburn, alt. Wal­lace. vide, feb. 4. 1668.

D. 133. Mckitrick contra [...] Eod. die.

THE Prescriptions of Reversions and Expiring of Legals, and the taking advantage of the same are so odious; That the Lords inclined to find, that necessary Depursments upon reparation of Houses should not be al­lowed to a Compryser; in a Declarator to hear and see it found, that he was satisfied by intrommission; reserving action to him for the same: But before answer, they ordained the Reporter to consider the Depursments; and to Report whether they were absolutely necessary. This is hard in the point of Law; intromission being to be understood civiliter & cum effectu of that which is free, all charges deduced. Hay Clerk.

D. 134. Trotter contra Trotter Eod. die.

THE Lords Found, that a Wadsetter having comprised for his principal Sum; may, in competition with another Compryser, pass from his Com­prysing, and return to his former Right of Wadset. Gibson Clerk.

D. 135. Anderson dean of Guild of St. Andrews contra James Tarbat. 16. January. 1668.

WIlliam Tarbat having granted Bond for 300 pounds to his Son James and other Children; the said Bond was Reduced at the instance of a Creditor, Because it was subscribed only by one Notar, being a matter of importance: Though it was alledged, that it resolved in three several Bonds; and it was Equivalent as if the three Bonds had been granted for 100 pounds respective. For the Lords considered, that the Bond being one and individual; the importance, as to the interest of the debitor, is the same whether it be granted to one or to diverse Persons.

D. 136. Binnie contra Binnie. 17. January 1668.

MArgaret Binnie being induced to grant a Bond obliging her to resign some Tenements of Land in favours of herself and the Heirs of her Body; which Failȝieing, in favours of her Brother Alexander Binnie; and to do no deed in prejudice of his Succession; She did thereafter Marry and Dispone to her Husband the said Tenements. In a pursuit at the in­stance of her Brother against her and her Husband for his Interest, upon the said Bond and for implement thereof,

[Page 57] The Lords Found, that she with consent of her Husband ought to Re­sign. Some of the Lords thought, that the import of such obligments is only, that the Granter should not alter such Tailȝies in favours of other Heirs: And that they are not restrained to sell or Dispone for onerous Causes if they should have occasion; otherwise they should cease to be Fiars: The very Essence of Fee and Propertie consisting in a liberty to Dispone. It may be questioned, how far the Husband may be lyable to his Wifes oblig­ments before the Marriage? For there being a Communion betwixt them only as to mobilia, it may appear that he should only be lyable to Movable and Personal Debts: Seing penes quem Emolumentum, penes eundem Onus; but this point was not Debated.

D. 137. Straquhan contra Morison. Eod. die.

A pursuit for Spuilȝie being restricted to wrongous Intromission: It was Alledged, that the Defenders are only lyable for their intromission re­spective; in so far as it should be proven that each of them had intromitted at least pro virili and conjunctly: It was Replyed, that the Defenders being conveened Ex delicto, they are lyable in solidum as Correi; being all ac­cessorie to the wrong: And the pursuit, as it is Restricted, is not for Intro­mission simply, but wrongous Intromission: And though the Pursuer, by restricting the Pursuit, as said is, has precluded himself as to violent profits and juramentum in litem, and other consequences of spuilȝie; he has not prejudged himself as to that benefit, that all who are accessory to the wrong should be lyable in solidum, which the Law has introduced upon just ground; seing it is impossible, in such cases, where diverse Persons do intromett, to distinguish and prove their intromissions.

The Lords Found, the Defenders lyable Conjunctly. Wedderburn, Sinclair & Straquhan. Alteri Lockhart & Thoirs.

D. 138. Pollock contra Pollock. Eod. die.

THe Lords having considered the Renunciation mentioned above. 20 of Novem. 1667; Found, that it being in favours of the second Marriage and in Effect an Assignation, could not accresce to the Granter.

D. 139. Birnie contra [...] Eod. die.

MR Andrew Birnie having granted a Bond blank in the Creditors name to his Good-brother Short; the Creditors name being thereafter filled up, Mr Andrew Birnie suspended upon double poynding against him and another Creditor of Shorts, who had thereafter arrested.

The Lords preferred the Person whose name was filled up; In respect he had shown Mr. Andrew the Bond before the arrestment, and desired him to satisfie the same, though he had not made intimation by way of Instru­ment. This Decision seemeth to justle with that of the 9. November 1665. Jamison contra Tealzifer.

D. 140. [...] and the Laird of Innes her Husband, [...] contra [...] 21. Jan. 1668

THE Laird of Rosyth having provided his Daughter of the first Mar­riage [Page 58] with the Laird of Innes, to 10000. Pounds, at her age of Twen­tie years; and there being no obligement for Annualrent

The Lords, in a Process at her instance for her aliment, modified 600. Merks yearly: Some were of opinion that the said sum being payable at the foresaid Term, the Annualrent of the same should not have been modi­fied for the time thereafter, and that she should be in no worse case than if it had been payed.

D. 141. Shaw contra [...] Eod. die.

THE Lords Found, That a Wife being provided in Lecto by her Hus­band, her provision should be restricted and Sustained as to a Terce; she being no otherwise provided before.

D. 142. Home contra Tailzifer Eod. die.

AN Exception of Improbation being proponed against a Writ; and thereafter, Tailzifer of Harycleugh being desired to abide at it, he declared, that he had gotten it as a true Evident, and condescended upon the way he had gotten it; and it being alledged, that he ought to be po­sitive, Whether he would abide at it, or not?

The Lords declared, That after probation they would consider how far his using and abiding at the said Write should import against him; and if he be in bona fide to use the same.

D. 143. Dowglas contra Lady Wamphray. 22. Janu. 1668.

THE Lady Wamphray being provided in an Annualrent out of Lands without respect to a Sors or Stock, and being infeft: It was Found, that she ought to be lyable to Taxations and publick burdens, being onera patrimonialia, though the said Annualrent was payable to her alswel infeft as not infeft.

D. 144. Justice contra Stirling 23. Janu. 1668.

IN the Case, Justice and his Tutors, contra Stirling and Cockburne her Husband: a Bond being granted to a Husband and his Wife the long­est liver, and the Heirs betwixt them; which Failȝieng to the Heirs of the longest liver: And the wife having survived, there being only one Child of the Marriage;

The Lords Found, that the Fee of the said Bond belonged to the Hus­band as dignior persona: And that the Child had Right thereto as Heir to him; and that the Heirs of the Wife could have no Right after the Childs decease as Heirs of provision to the Child: And that the Wife had not the Right of Fee, which she pretended to be in suspence, until it should be determined by the death of either who should be the last liver.

D. 145. The Town of Glasglow contra [...] Eod. die.

THE Town of Glasgow having a Right from the Bishop to the parson­age Teynds; pursued a Spuilȝie: It was Alledged, for some of the De­fenders, [Page 59] that they possessed by Subtacks from Blantyre Tacksman: It was Answered, that Certification was granted against the principal Tack, and that the Subtacks were void in consequence: It was Replyed, that the Defenders were not called to the Improbation; and that they being in possession, the Collusion or negligence of their Author cannot prejudge them.

The Lords, upon a debate amongst themselves, Thought, that Sub-vas­salls being in possession ought to be called in an Improbation against the Vas­sal their Author; because they could not be miskenned being Heretable possessors: But as to the Tennants bruiking Lands by tacks, or Heretors bruiking by Subtacks their own Teynds; They thought, that it could not so well be known that they had Right; and so were not parties necessary to be called: And therefore, before Answer, they ordained to condescend upon the manner and quality of their possession, and whether it was such as the Bishop could not but know. Sinclair & Lockhart. alter Cuninghame.

D. 146. Simpson contra Adamson. 24. January. 1668.

UPon Report it was Debated among the Lords, whether a Decreet of poinding the Ground should interrupt prescription of an An­nualrent right, being only against the Tennants, the Heretor not called: Some were of the opinion, that the Decreet being null, nullum sortitur effectum: Others thought, that Prescriptions being odious, talis qualis and any Act of Interruption was sufficient: And as Prescription may be inter­rupted by any Deed of Molestation of Tennants, being a natural Inter­ruption, so it may be interrupted civilly by a pursuit against the Ten­nents.

The Lords did not decide the Question, but thought fit to advise further.

D. 147. Town of Dundee contra E. of Finlater. eod. die.

THE Town of Dundee being pursued in subsidium for payment of a Debt due by a Rebel, whom they had suffered to escape out of Prison; after Decreet satisfied the Creditor, and took Assignation to the Debt and Bond; whereupon they pursued the Earl of Finlater one of the Cautio­ners: It was Alledged, That the Town ex delicto had come in the place of the principal Debitor; and payment made by them did liberate the Cau­tioners, as if payment had been made by the Principal: It was Replyed, That the Town was only Lyable to the Creditor, who might pass from his Decreet against the Town; and as he might have Assigned the Debt to any other person, The Town as quilibet might have a Right from him.

The Lords Found, That the Town is not in the case of Cautioners, or Expromissores ex pacto, but of Correi, being lyable in Law ex delicto for, and in place of the Principal. Vide 9. July 1667.

D. 148. [...] contra [...] 25. January 1668.

THE Lords upon debate amongst themselves, in the case concerning Viccarage; Thought that Yards, for which Viccarage was in use to be payed, being turned into Infield Land and Laboured, The Vicar has no Right to the Teinds of Corns growing thereupon, but the same belongs [Page 60] to the Parson: But they did not decide this point, being only debated in­cidenter.

D. 149. Keith contra Grahame. eod. die.

IN the case of Keith of Craigie, contra Grahame of Creichie, The Lords, upon probation in mutual Declarators anent a Moss, Found, That the Barony of Craigie having pertained to Straiton of Lauristoun; and thereafter a part of the same being Disponed to Keith and his predecessors; and another part to the Authors and Predecessors of Grahame of Creichie, extending the saids Two Parts to the whole Barony; That both the saids Parties had Interest and Right to the Moss in Question, as to Community and Pasture, and casting Peats and Turff: But as to the property of the Moss, they Thought that it should belong to that parcel which was last disponed by the Common Author; seing he disponed the other part only cum moris & maresus in the Tenendas and Executive Clause; no mention of the Moss being in the dispositive part: So that the property of the Moss remained with himself annexed to the other parcel.

D. 150. Lady Traquair contra E. of Winton. 1 Feb. 1668.

THE Earl of Winton, having Right by Assignation to a Bond grant­ed by the Lord Sempil, did grant a Translation in favours of the Lady Traquair, and the Lady Jean another of his Daughters, bearing war­randice from his own Deed; and thereafter uplifted the Debt. The said Ladies pursued the Earl of Winton, as representing his Grandfather for payment of the Sum; because the Earl his Grandfather had uplifted it: The Defender alledged, that the Translation being a Donation of the Fa­thers in favours of his Children, whereof he was Master, was revocable; and that he had revocked the same, in so far as he had uplifted the said Sum: It was Answered, That the said Translation was out of his hands, having delivered the same to the Pursuers Mother for their use, and that he was obliged to warrand the same.

The Lords thought, that the Translation being in the Lady Winton's hands being in Law Eadem persona with the Earl, it was equivalent as if it had been in his own hands; and that he might destroy or revock the same: But the Parties being of quality and of near Relation, they did not decide this case; but recommended to some of their number to endeavour an ac­commodation.

D. 151. [...] contra Scot and Muirhead her Husband. eod. die.

MR. Hary Scot's Daughter and her Husband Mr. John Muirhead for his Interest, being pursued as representing the said Mr. Hary for a Debt due by him; The pursuer insisted on the Title of behaving as Heir by Intromission with his, Moveable Heirship: It was Alledged, That he could not have an Heirship, being neither Prelate, Baron, nor Burgess: It was Answered, That he had acquired the Land condescended upon to himself in Liferent, and to his Daughter in Fee; which was equivalent as if she had succeeded to him in the said Lands.

[Page 61] The Lords Assoilied from that Title; In respect he had no Right in his Person, in which she could have succeeded: Some were of the opinion, That if the Right had born the ordinary Clauses, and a Power to dispone and Wadset, notwitstanding the Fee in the person of the Daughter, that in Law he ought to be considered and looked upon as a Baron; being in effect, and upon the matter a Fiar. Hay. Clerk.

D. 152. Paplay contra The Magistrates of Edinburgh. eod. die.

JOhn Paplay pursued The Magistrates of Edinburgh for payment of a Sum of Money; Because his Debitor Hendry Henderson had escaped out of their prison: It was Alledged, After six years silence such a pursuit could not be sustained against the Town; and that these who were Magistrates for the time ought to be pursued and discussed in the first place.

The Lords sustained the Process, and Found, that the Incorporation be­ing persona quae non moritur; The present Magistrates may be pursued for payment of the Debt out of the Patrimony of the Town; without citeing these Magistrates for the time when the Debitor escaped; Reserving Acti­on against the Delinquent, who suffered the Rebel to escape.

D. 153. Parkman contra Allan. 4. Feb. 1668.

THE Lords Found, that in the case mentioned 15. January. 1668. until the Ship should return to Sweden, it should be esteemed a Voyage, quoad the Effect and point in question.

D. 154. Ker contra Ker. 5. February. 1668.

RObert Ker of Graden having Infeft his second Son Robert Ker in an An­nualrent out of his Lands of Graden and others; upon a Contract betwixt them, whereby Graden for the Sum of 6000 Merks addebted by him to his Son. viz. 3000 Merks of borrowed Money, and 3000 Merks for his Portion (accumulatory, and extending together as said is) was obliged to Infeft the said Robert in 360 Merks, as the Annualrent of the said Sum of 6000 Merks; beginning the first Terms payment of the half of the said Annualrent being for borrowed Money, at the first Term after the Con­tract: And of the other half being for his Patrimony, after his Fathers decease: The said Robert the Son pursued a poinding of the Ground for by­gones, and in Time coming, the Terms of payment being past: Henry Ker the Pursuers Eldest Brother, compeared and alledged, his Ground could not be poinded, and that he was Infeft therein by a publick Infeftment; at least that his Infeftment was publick by possession; and that the Pur­suers Infeftment is base. It was Replyed. 1. That the said Hary his In­feftment of the Lands was posterior to the Pursuers Infeftment, and grant­ed not only by a Father to a Son a conjunct person; who by the fore­said Right praecepit haereditatem; and though he cannot be pursued upon the passive Title of Titulus Lucrativus dureing his Fathers Lifetime; yet his Mouth is stoped, so that he cannot question any Deed of his Father pre­ceeding his Right; and that he is in the same case, as if his Infeftment had been given with the burden of prior Rights. It was further urged by the Pursuer, That the Defender condescending upon his Entry and Initium [Page 62] possessionis, he offered to prove that his Right was cled with possession be­fore that time. It was Duplyed, That his Infeftment could not be cled with possession, but as to the Annualrent of the 3000 Merks of borrowed Money; so that it is base as to the other 3000 Merks of his portion. It was Triplyed, that the Infeftment was of an entire Annualrent of 360 Merks, as appears by the Contract and Seasin: And that the Right being of an Annualrent, though payment of the half of the same be Suspended, the Right being a joint and indivisible Right could not be ex parte private, and ex parte publick.

The Lords Found, That the Infeftment of Annualrent, if it should be proven to be cloathed with possession as to the half, is publick in solidum; and admitted the Reply of possession: But as to the second Reply, viz. That the Defender was haeres per praeceptionem, and could not question any prior Right granted by his Father. The Lords Found it of difficulty and consequence; and reserved the Debate and Decision, until the end of the Process. Hamilton Clerk. Mr. Thomas Lermont. alter Sinclair.

D. 155. Mr. George Johnston contra Sir Charles Erskine. February 6. 1668.

THE Lands of Knockhil being a part of the Lands of Hodam, did belong to Richard Irvine, and were comprysed from Robert Irvin Great Grand-child to the said Richard as charged to enter Heir to the said Richard, at the instance of Mr. John Alexander Minister at Hodam: But no Infeftment nor Diligence against the Superior having followed upon the said Comprysing, dureing the said Robert his Life; The Lord Lyon Sir Charles Erskine comprysed from Mr. James Alexander Son to the said Mr. John, the Right of his Comprysing, and obtained Infeftment upon the said Comprysing in August 1666. The said Robert's Two Si­sters and his Sisters Children, obtained themselves Infeft as Heirs to the said Richard their Grandsire and Fore-grandsire in June 1666. And upon a Right from them, and their Resignation, Mr. John Johnston being In­feft in October 1666. pursued for Maills and Dueties: The Lord Lyon compeared and alledged, that he and the Tennents ought to be Assoilȝied in this possessory Judgement, Because he and his Authors had been in possessi­on by vertue of the Comprysing at the instance of Mr. John Alexander, by the space of seven years, whereupon Infeftment has followed. It was An­swered, That the Alledgance is not Relevant, unless he had said that he was in possession seven years by vertue of a real Right, which cannot be said, the Infeftment being late and of the date foresaid. It was further Alledged by the Lord Lyon, that he ought to be preferred, because he was Infeft upon the said Comprysing at Mr. John Alexander's instance against the said Robert, as charged to enter Heir to the said Richard; and his Infeftment was anterior to the said Mr. George's Infeftment upon the Resignation foresaid of the said Robert's Sister and Nephews retoured and Infeft as Heirs to the said Richard. It was Replyed, That no Infeftment or Diligence having followed upon the said Comprysing against Robert in his Lifetime; his Sisters and Nephews might have served themselves Heirs to the said Richard who was last Infeft; and de facto was Infeft as Heir to the said Richard, before any Infeftment upon Alexander's Comprysing; [Page 63] so that his Authors Infeftment being prior to the Lord Lyon's Infeftment, the Pursuer ought to be preferred: and as Robert if he had been served spe­cial Heir to his Grandsire, if he had not been infeft, the next Heir might have been Infeft as Heir to Richard; and an Infeftment upon a Right from them would have been preferable to a Comprysing against Robert; so in this case Mr. George ought to be preferred; the special charge against Ro­bert being only equivalent to a special Service; and no Infeftment having followed in the person of the said Robert or the Compryser. It was Duply­ed, That by the Act of Parliament Ja. 5. Ch. 106. Par. 7. It is declared that Execution against the Appearand Heir being charged to enter Heir should be equivalent as if he were entered; which is the Certification in the special Charge; and upon a Comprysing, if Robert had been Infeft, Infeftment being taken quocunque tempore even after his decease, before any other person had been Infeft upon a Comprysing or Right from a next Heir; The Comprysing against Robert would have been preferable.

The Lords Found, That the benefite of a possessory Judgement is only competent by vertue of a real Right; and that a Compryser cannot claim the same, without an Infeftment or Charge against the Superior; and repelled the first Alledgance.

The Lords Found The second Alledgance Relevant, and preferred the Comprysing in respect of the Infeftment thereupon, before the Infeftment upon the Right from the Heirs of the said Richard.

D. 156. Halyburtoun contra Scott 17. Decemb. 1671

A Provision granted by a Father to a Daughter for love and favour, being quarrelled by a Creditor upon the Act of Parliament 1621. It was Answered, that the Father the time of the granting of the said Right had an opulent Estate beside, out of which the Creditor might have been satisfied: and the Lords before Answer, having ordained that a tryal should be taken of the Defuncts Estate, and Witnesses being adduced to that purpose: It was Found, that the Defence was not proven. It appears that the Defence was not relevant; and that a Creditor is not holden to Debate whether his Debitor had a competent Estate to satisfie his Debt ali­unde; and that Debitors can grant noe Right without an onerous cause, until the Debt be satisfied. Haystoun Clerk.

D. 157. Paton contra Stirling of Ardoch. 20. Dec. 1671.

SIR Henrie Stirling of Ardoch did grant a Back-bond in savours of [...] Paton his Sisters Son; whereby he obliged himself, that being satis­fied of the Debts due to him, he should denude himself of the Right of the Lands of Panholls which pertained to the said Patons Father: Where­upon a pursuite being intented against Ardoch's Sone, as Heir and Executor to his Father: It was Alledged, that the Bond was granted in Lecto; and could not prejudge the Heir; and that he had a Reduction depending upon that reason: And as Executor he could not be lyable, the Bond being anent the Right of Lands, and in effect a reversion which is not prestable by Executors: It was Answered, that the said Bond tho on death­bed may and ought to affect the Executry; seing in Lecto the Defunct might doe any deed to burden his Executry: And his obligements at [Page 64] that time are effectual as to his Executry: And Loco facti imprestabilis suc­cedit interesse, which is prestable by Executors: And if he had in leige poustie granted a Disposition of Lands, and thereafter having Infeft ane other in the same; he had become incapable to fulfil the obligements thereof, both his Heir and Executor would be lyable for damnage and interest; and there is the same reason in this case, the Defunct as to burdening and dis­poseing of his Executry, being in the same condition as if he were in leige poustie. The Lords before Answer thought fit to try, if the Right was in trust, and if there had been a former Back-bond, which the Pursuers Step-Mother had destroyed as was informed, and certain other circumstances. Gibson Clerk.

D. 158. Lord Maxwel contra Tennents of Duncow. 16. Feb. 1672

FOund that the Defence upon the Acts [...] against these, who, during the dependence of Process, invade or wound the adverse partie, who by the said Acts tyne the cause and forfault their inter­est in question; being in effect penance and founded upon delinquency, may be proven even before the Lords prout de Jure, as to Order and Rati­habition: which was alleadged could not be proven by Witnesses to im­port the loss of Heretage.

D. 159. Commissaries of Edinburgh contra the Commissaries of Breichen 17. Feb. 1672.

THere being a competition betwixt the Commissars of Edinburgh and the Commissars of Breichen, to which of them the confirmation of the Earl of Panmures Testament should belong: the said Earl having taken a House and stayed a whole Session in Edinburgh with his Lady Children and Familie, in order to the breeding of his Children and other occasiones; and having died there:

The Lords preferred the Commissars of Breichen, being Commissars of the place where the said Earl had his principal dwelling and his interest and Estate.

D. 160. Lady Milnetoun contra Sir John Whytfurd. 20. Feb. 1672.

IN the Process at the instance of the Lady Milnetoun against Sir John Whytfurd; the said Sir John, after the Process had depended long and all endeavours to delay and prevent a Decision, having insisted upon a Repro­bator, upon that head, that the Ladyes Wittnesses were corrupted: It was Alledged and urged by many arguments, that a reprobator upon the ground foresaid after sentence in foro contradictorio, which is the great security of the People, could not be proven but scripto vel Juramento: And according­ly the Lords Found that it was only probable that way; and yet this day the Lords having again ordained the cause to be Debated, as to the point foresaid anent the probation of corruption after sentence obtained; they retracted their former Interloquitor; and Found, that Reprobators upon the head foresaid are receiveable; and probable prout de Jure, after Sentence.

[Page 65]These arguments were urged both at the Barr, and in the Debate among the Lords, viz. That Sentences in foro are the great Security of the People; and if these should be convelled, upon pretence of such personal exceptions against Witnesses, there should not be a period of Pleas and Process.

2. Upon the consideration foresaid many exceptiones, which are ad­mitted before sentence even after Litiscontestation, are not recieved after sentence; v. g. exceptiones noviter venientes ad notitiam; and ex instrumen­tis noviter repertis.

3. Prescription being the great security of the People, ne dominia sint in­certa, should be weakened; if after Decreets in foro founded upon 40. years purchase; the same should be convelled upon probation by Wit­nesses; that the Witnesses upon whose Testimonie the Decreets proceed­ed were corrupted.

4. There should be progressus in infinitum if the Testimonies of Witnes­ses should after sentence be reprobated by other Witnesses: and after sen­tence in the Reprobator, the Testimonie of the reprobatorie Witnesses should be reprobated by others; & sic in infinitum.

5. Reprobatores were only in use, when the Designation of Witnesses, before they declare, from their duelling and vocation and other circum­stances was questioned as false; which being obvious and easie to be knowen, It is not to be presumed that the reprobatorie Witnesses will declare falsely, anent such points which may be easily tryed: But the Corruption of Wit­nesses being ane occult and unwarrantable practice, it is not to be pre­sumed that witnesses were present and conscious: and the reprobatorie Witnesses may be suborned and declare falsely impune.

6. Our Law is Jealous of Probation by Witnesses, they being for the most part viles personae and yet habiles: and Writes cannot be taken away by such probation; and Sentences in foro are scriptura publica & solennis.

7. By our practique dicta testium cannot be questioned post sententiam, tho by the comon Law and the Law of other Nations they may: and there is less reason to admit personal exceptions contra testes to be proven by Wit­nesses:

8. As to the Incommodum, That a Door should be opened to Corrup­tion, if the Testimonies of Witnesses after Sentence, should not be question­able upon that head; It is easily Answered: Seing Witnesses may be pur­sued Criminallie and severely Punished, if they may be discovered to have been Corruped or false. Actores Cuninghame & Lermonth alteri Mckenȝie & Harper.

D. 161. Mr. James Reid contra the Lady Dundie. Feb. 21. 1672.

AN Infeftment granted to the Lady Dundie by her Husband, in re­compence of a former provision she had by her Contract of Mariage and which she had renounced; was questioned by a Creditor who also was Infeft: upon that ground, that the Ladyes Right was base: and tho Rights granted to Wives upon their Contract of Marriage, or after Marriage when they have no provision, or in recompence of former provisiones; are sus­tained albeit base; because the Husbands possession is the Wifes possession; yet the Right in question ought not to be sustained upon that ground; In respect the Husband was not in natural possession; the Lands being lyfe­rented [Page 66] by his Mother; and by the Act of Parliament, the possession where­upon base Rights are sustained is only to be understood of natural pos­session: The Lords preferred the Lady, and repelled the said Defence; upon these considerations, that Infeftments given to Wives in the cases above­mentioned are construed to be publick and are not persumed to be frau­dulent: And Wives are not in the condition of other Creditors who may perfect and make their Rights publict; whereas Wives can do nothing themselves; and it is to be presumed that Wives are provided by their Husbands: So that these who are to acquire Rights from them ought to enquire if their Wives be Infeft; specially seing, since the Act of Parli­ament 1617 anent registration of seasings, they may easily know the same. Cuninghame &c. and for the Lady, Lockhart and Lermonth.

D. 162. Lord Hattoun contra Paterson. 22. Feb. 1672.

THE Lords of Exchequer having given the Escheat of the Laird of Craigie Carnagie, to Andrew Paterson: and the Gift being assigned to the Laird of Aytoun by the said Andrew; a decreet was there­upon obtained against the Representatives of the Earl of Dundie, for his in­tromission with the Goods belonging to the Rebel, whereupon Adjudication or Comprysing followed of the said Earls Estate in Argyle, which was Disponed by the said Laird of Aytoun to the Earl of Argyle: Thereafter my Lord Hattoun Thesaurer-depute having gotten a second Gift; pursued the the said Andrew Paterson before the Exchequer upon that ground, That by Acts of Exchequer it was ordained that no Gifts of Escheat should pass without Back-bonds, and the Clerks are Discharged to give out the same otherwayes; and nevertheless viis & modis, the said Andrew had surrep­titiously gotten out the said Gift; and ought to give a Bond that being sa­tisfied of what he can pretend to be due to him by the Rebel, and of the Expences in passing the Gift; he should denude himself in favours of the second Donator: And that it should be declared that the said Gift should be affected with the said Bond, as if it had been given ab initio: And ac­cordingly the Exchequer did decern and declared: Whereupon the Thesau­rer deput pursued a Reduction of the said Apprysing against Aytoun and the Earl of Argyl, upon that reason viz. That the said Gift, which is the ground thereof, is restricted and qualified, and that the said Andrew Pater­son is fully satisfied of what is due to him.

It was Alledged for the Defenders, that the Gift was pure and simple with­out any Back-bond; and therefor the Assigney finding it was such, and there being no Back-bond upon record, was in bona fide to take a Right to the same: And the said Decreet of Exchequer being supervenient, and res inter alios acta, could not be obtruded against a singular Successor, but the Pursuer may have action against the Cedent: The Lords Repelled the Alledgnce, and Found that the Decreet and Back-bond do qualifie the Gift both as to the Donator and to his Assigney.

The said Decision appears very hard upon the grounds abovementioned, and because Back-bonds are only personal obligements upon the Granters and do not qualifie Rights, being extra Corpus Juris: And his Majestie, in granting Gifts of Escheat single or Liferent, is in no other case than other Su­periors; as Lords of Regality having Right to single Escheats, whose Gifts cannot be qualified in prejudice of a singular Successor; but by pro­visions [Page 67] contained in the Body of the Right: and the import of Back-bonds is only, that the Granters being satisfied should be comptable for the super­plus; but there is not thereby any tye upon them not to dispose upon the same, being comptable for the pryce or value of that which they dispone. Colingtoun Reporter: Having heard the cause at the side Barr.

D. 163. Blair contra Blair. 23. Feb. 1672.

WItnesses being examined before Answer ex Officio: It was desired that seing ex facto oritur Jus, and the Lords being unclear to decide in Jure before the point of fact were cleared by probation; and the point of Law and ground of their Decision is to arise out of the probation; and therefore they may see and debate upon the same: which was refused; seing publicatio Testimoniorum by our Law is allowed in no case but in Improbati­ons ex quaestione falsi. Mckenȝie alteri Lockhart &c.

D. 164. Neilson contra Elizabeth Arthur. Eod. die.

ELizabeth Arthur being charged upon a Bond granted by her self; sus­pended upon that reason, that she was cled with a Husband the time of the granting thereof: It was Answered, she had a peculium and Estate set­led upon her by her Father in these Terms, that her Husband should have no interest therein; but that it should be manadged by advice of the Freinds named by him for the behoofe of her and her Children: And that the Sum charged for was borrowed and employed for her use.

The Lords Found the Letters orderly proceeded.

D. 165. Lady Lugton contra Hepburn and Creichton. 13. June. 1672.

A Decreet being recovered before the Commissars of Edinburgh, at the instance of the Lady Lugtoun, against her Grandchild [...] Hepburne Daughter to the deceast Laird of Aderstoun; Modifying 400. Merks Yearly, for Aliment of the said [...] Hepburne, by the space of 13. Years since her Birth: The Lords in a Reduction and Sus­pension of the said Decreet, modified the Sum thereincontained being 3500 Merks to the Tenth part of the Sum of 30000 Merks; which was mentioned in the said Decreet, and considered by the Commissars as the Estate belonging to the said Hepburne: So that in respect and upon suppo­sition of the same, they modified the said Aliment: And by reason the said Estate was intricate and litigious, and possibly could not be recover­ed: The Lords ordained the Pursuer to Assign the Tenth part of the said Estate; not exceeding 3000 Merks; which was done upon that considera­tion, that the Aliment was modified in respect of the said interest: And if ex eventu it should be Found, that it could not be recovered, and that she had no Estate; it were unjust, that she should be Lyable personally; her Grand-mother being obliged, at least presumed to entertain her ex pietate materna, if she had no Estate of her own. Monro Clerk.

D. 166. Grott contra Sutherland. 14. June. 1672.

TWo Owners of a Ship being obliged by a Contract to Transport Goods to a certain part: The Lords sustained Action against one of them in solidum, for implement of the Obligements in the Contract being facti which is indivisible; and they being socii & exercitores, so that the Fraught might have been payed to one of them; and eadem ratione any one of them is Lyable, and may be pursued in solidum. Gibson Clerk.

D. 167. [...] contra [...] eod. die.

THE Lords Found, That a Declarator of Right, which ought to be upon 21 Dayes, being priviledged by a Bill which is periculo petentis, should not be sustained being execute upon a shorter time: And Ordained that the Writers to the Signet should nor insert in Bills and Summonds a priviledge dispenceing with the Law, and the solennes induciae thereby in­troduced in favours of Defenders, under the paine of 100 Merks for the first fault; and deprivation for the second; except in cases which by the Law are priviledged and named: The President, Advocate, and others of their number, to meet and consider what these should be.

D. 168. Henderson contra Henderson. 20. June. 1672.

A Bond being produced to satisfy the production in an Improbation: The Lords without further probation did Improve and Decern quoad the Defender; in respect he refused to abide by the Truth of the same. Gibson Clerk.

D. 169. Gray of Haystoun contra Forbes and Lindsay. eod. die.

WIlliam Gray of Haystoun having granted Bond to Lindsay; and the said Lindsay having Assigned the same to his Daughter; The said William Gray Suspended upon a double poinding, against the said Assigney and a Creditor who had arrested: It was Alledged for the Creditor, that the Assignation was made by a Father to a Daughter, to defraud Creditors: It was Answered, That the Father by Contract of Marriage was obliged, in case there should be no Heirs Male betwixt him and the Assigneys Mo­ther, to pay to the Heir or Bairn Female at her age of 14. years. 4000. Merks; and until then to entertain her: And that the Assigney being the sole Bairn of the Marriage, her Father had given the Assignation foresaid for implement of the said obligement.

The Lords, hav ng considered that the provision by the Contract of Mar­riage in favours of the Daughters is only in case there should be no Heirs Male of the Marriage, and that the Father should have other Heirs Male of his Body; so that the Daughter should not succeed to the Estate; and that both the Father and Mother are yet living, and of that age that it was not to be expected that the Father would have other Heirs Male of his Body by an other Marriage; and his Daughter was his Appearand Heir whatsomever: Therefore they Found, that the case of the provision in fa­vours of the Heirs Female did not exist, and preferred the Creditor. Lock-heart and Bannerman for Lindsay. Bernie &c. for Forbes. Gibson Cl.

D. 170. Fergusson contra [...] 21. June. 1672.

THE Lords Found, That a Partie being within the Countrie, the time of the citation upon the first Summonds, and some time thereafter; and goeing out of the Countrie before the second Summonds, could not be cited at the Pear and Shoar of Leith upon the second Summonds; without a war­rand in the said Summonds to that effect.

D. 171. The Laird of Hermiestoun contra Cockburn. Eod. die.

THE Lords Found, That in the case, and in all time coming, where Wit­nesses are adduced before Answer, they will only allow one Term: so that upon any Diligence, they will admit no Witnesses, but those who are cited by the first Diligence. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk.

D. 172. Ramsay contra Carstairs. eod. die.

A Father, in his Contract of Marriage, being obliged to provide the Heir Female of the Marriage, and to pay to her 20000 lib. at her age of 15 years: and until then to entertain her: there being only one Child and Daughter of the Marriage, she and her Husband pursued the Father and his Curators, he being furious, to pay the said Sum. It was Answered, That the said Provision being only payable to the Heir Fe­male, the Pursuer neither had nor could pursue upon that Quality and In­terest dureing the Father's Life; specially seing both he and his Wife the Pursuers Mother, were living, and of that age, that they may have Heirs Male of the Marriage, or other Daughters: And if they should have Male Children, the Case and Condition of the Provision would deficere, and not exist; and if they should have moe Daughters, the Pursuer could not have Right to the whole Sum acclaimed It was Replyed, That the Fa­ther was in effect civiliter mortuus; and the Pursuers would find Caution to refound, in either of the said Cases.

The Lords Found the Defence relevant, and that such Provisions being settled upon Heirs Female, by reason, and in case of exclusion of the Heirs Female of the Marriage, when Lands are entailed to Heirs Male, and there are no Heirs Male of the Marriage; The Term of Payment could not be understood to be during the Marriage. Strathurd Reporter. Gibson Clerk.

D. 173. William Sandilands contra The Earle of Hadington. Eod. die.

THomas the first Earl of Hadington having Disponed certain Lands, with absolute warrandice, in anno 1610: The now Earl of Hadington was pursued as representing his Great Grand-father, to warrand the said Lands from Astriction to the Miln whereunto they were astricted, before the Earl of Hadington Disponed the same: It was Al­ledged, That the Warrandice doth not extend to the case of Servitudes, such as Common Pasturage, Thirlage, and such like, which are not la­tent; and may, and are presumed to be known by Purchassers, who [Page 70] ought, and do ordinarly enquire and inform themselves concerning the condition and burdens of the Lands they intend to purchase: spe­cially in the case in question, the multure being not exorbitant: It was Replyed, That in Law where praedia, either rustica, or urbana, ut opti­ma maxima, are Disponed, they are Disponed as Libera: And that the Lands in question are so Disponed, it is evident, in respect the Warran­dice is absolute, and they are Disponed cum molendinis & multuris. It was Duplyed, That the Romans were in use to Dispone either simply, or cum ista adjectione, praedia ut optima maxima, the import whereof was, servi­tutem non deberi: But where Lands are Disponed simply, it is construed and presumed in Law, that they are Disponed talia, and such as they are; And with such accessories, either as to burden or advantage as tacite veni­unt; albeit these be not exprest; as Servitudes either Active or Passive: and as to the Warrandice, it is of the ordinary Stile without mention of Servitudes; and it appears from the stile and conception of the ordinary clause of Warrandice, and the speciality thereinmentioned, viz. Wards, Non-entries, Inhibitions, Apprysings, &c. That such Incumberances are only intended, whereby the Right or Possession of Lands, or the Mails and Duties, or any part of them are evicted: Whereas in the case of A­striction the Heretor doth enjoy his Lands and Duties of the same entire; and seing his Corns must be grinded, it is not a material prejudice, that they should be grinded rather at one Miln than an other: and it appears by the Disposition, that it was not actum and treated, that the said Lands should be Disponed ut optima maxima; the Warrandice being in the ordinary terms without mention of Servitudes: And the Clause cum molendinis is only in the Charter and Tenendas, and is ex stilo, and imports only freedom of Thirlage as to the Disponer.

The Lords upon the foresaid Debate, And that the said Miln was a Miln of the Barony of Torphichen, whereof the Lands astricted are a part; and that the same were astricted before the Earl of Hadington acquired the same; they Found the Defence Relevant and Assoilȝied.

D. 174. Creditors of Tarsappie contra Kilfanes. 23. July. 1673.

THE Lords upon Debate among themselves, were of the opinion, that a confident person having got a Disposition from a Debitor; may at the Debitors desire satisfy such Creditors as he thought fit, there being no Diligence done by other Creditors: And as the Debitor might have done so himself, so the Trustee may do: And that it is provided so by the Act of Parliament. 1621.

They Found that the Trustee, if he got any Ease by composition, should apply the benefite thereof, for satisfaction of the other Creditors.

Item. That he cannot make voluntar payment in prejudice of a Cre­ditor who has done Diligence. Gibson Clerk.

D. 175. Kilbirny contra Cuninghame. 24. July. 1673.

IN an Adjudication upon the late Act of Parliament: The Lords modi­fied the price to be 18. years purchase, as to the certain and constant Rent; and 9. years as to casual Rent of Coal. Gibson Clerk.

D. 176. Murray contra The Tutor of Stormount. 25. July. 1673.

BY a Contract of Wadset, the Wadsetter being lyable to compt for the excrescence of the Duties more than should satisfie the Annualrent; The Lords, in a Process for Maills and Duties, Found the Exception Re­levant, that the Pursuer was satisfied of the Sum upon the Wadset, by his Intromission, without Declarator.

D. 177. Ker contra Ruthven. eod. die.

THE Lords Found, That the Estate of the Earl of Bramford being settled upon the Lord Forresters Son by Act of Parliament, he could not have it but cum sua causa, and the burden of his Debts.

Item, They Found, That the Earl, having entertained his Grand-child the Pursuer, was to be presumed to have done it ex pietate avita; the Earl being a generous person, and having an opulent Estate; and his Grand-child having nothing for the time, but the Debt in question, whereof the Annualrent was provided and belonged to his Brother. Monro Clerk.

D. 178. Creditors of Hugh Sinclair contra Annandale. 26. July. 1673.

THE Lords Found, That a Compryser upon Debts anterior to the De­bitor's Rebellion, being Infeft before Year and Day, is preferable to the Donator of the Liferent Escheat. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk.

D. 179. Mr. John Bayn contra Caivie. eod. die.

THE Lords Found, That a Tack being questioned as antedated to ob­viate an Inhibition, was suspect being rased in the Date; So that the same seemed to be vitiate, and an other year superinduced: And therefore was not a valide and probative Writ in prejudice of the Inhibition: un­less it could be adminiculate by some Adminicle before the Inhibition. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk.

D. 180. 2. June 1674.

THE Kings Majesty, having by two Letters to the Lords of Sessi­on, presented Mr. David Balfour of Forret, and Mr. Thomas Mur­ray both Advocates, to be Lords of the Session: It was moved by one of the Lords, that seing by the Law and Acts of Parliament, these who are to be admitted to be Lords of Session, should be tryed; Therefore the Tryal should be such as is intended by the Law; the very Notion of Tryal importing, at least a serious, if not a strict and exact way of Tryal.

This was moved, because the way of Tryal had become of late so per­functorious, and dicis causa, that it was ridiculous, and in effect a Mock-Tryal: Some of the Lords being appointed to examine these who were named by the King, and after they had asked some trivial Questions, hav­ing [Page 72] made Report, That they found them qualified; albeit it was not on­ly known to the Examinators, but to all the Lords, and notour to the World, that they were altogether Ignorant both of Law and Practique; and did acknowledge it themselves, not dareing to expose themselves to sit in the Outer house as Ordinaries; they prevailing with others of the Lords to go out and officiate for them as Curats.

1. It was urged, that the Estates had considered the Interest of the King­dom; all Estates being concerned in that Judicatory, that the Lords should be Persons of great Abilitie and Integrity, seing their Lands and Fortunes and greatest Interests, are the Subject of their Jurisdiction and Decisions: and therefore it was provided by diverse Statutes and Acts of Parlia­ment, they should be qualified Persons, and found upon Tryal to be such.

2. His Majesties Letter required, that the Persons now named, should be examined effectually.

3. By diverse Acts of Sederunt, and in special one upon the Kings Letter, for the time, the way of Tryal is prescribed, which is most exact.

4. The Oath of Admission, that the Lords should be faithful, has and ought to have Influence upon all their Actions, as Lords of the Session, that they should be done faithfully; and the Tryal of Lords for the Reasons foresaid, being an important Act of Duty, ought to be done faithfully and sincerely, and cannot be done otherways without breach of Oath.

5. To pretend to obey the Law, and the Kings Letter (which re­quireth an effectual Tryal) in a way which is superficiary, and evi­dently ineffectual; it is a Cheat, and Circumventio Legis; which in others is hateful; but in Judges, who are Antistites Juris, is abominable, and in­consistent with the Honour and Integrity that should be expected from the Judicatory.

6. If there were no Tryal at all, the Lords would be passive, if Per­sons not qualified should be named; but being enjoyned to try effectual­ly, if they receive them without an effectual tryal, they are not free of blame; and are accomptable to God, and his Majesty, and to the Par­liament.

To all these Reasons, It was Answered, That at this time the way of Try­al that had been for a long time, should be continued at this time; and that the Motion was upon some design.

The Mover did purge himself upon Oath, that he had no Design, but to do duty; and did attest the President, that before this occasion they had spoken often to that purpose: and did represent, that this is the fit time to put the Law and Statutes in execution; The Persons named being Advocats, and Persons presumed to be able to undergo the Tryal; so that it cannot be thought that there is any thing of Design against their Persons: That it cannot be denyed, but the late way is abusive; and antiquitas erroris, or abusus, cannot be thought and pleaded to be custom: That in the Year 1629. the Lords by an Act of Sederunt, had renew­ed and ratified all the former Statutes anent the Tryal and Admission of the Lords; and ordained them to be observed; That since that time the Troubles interveened and continued long, so that Prescription cannot be [Page 73] pretended for an abuse which had occasioned so great prejudice and clamour.

It was Carryed, That the Examination should be as it has been of late: and upon the Report of Gosford and Craigie, (appointed to examine them) they were admitted: Gosford was of Opinion that there should be another way of Tryal.

D. 181. Bogie contra The Executors of the Lady Oxenford. 4. June 1674.

THE Executors of the Lady Oxenford, being pursued at the instance of a Legatar, did in the Compt before the Auditor, give in an Ar­ticle of Discharge, viz. That the Expences of a Process at the Executors instance should be allowed: It was Answered, That if the Executor had not pursued that Process, there was as much free Gear as would have sa­tisfied the Legacie, and the Executor had not prevailed: and if they had prevailed, the benefit would only have accresced to the Executor, and not to the Legatars: and therefore penes quem emolumentum, &c. and seing they would have had no benefite, they should have no loss by the event of that Process.

The Lords Found, That the Executors, having prosecuted a Process in­tented by the Defunct, did their duty; and officium should not be da­mnosum: and therefore the Charges of that Process should not be upon their own accompt, but should be defrayed out of the Executry: but so, that where Executors have no benefit by the Confirmation, but are either sim­ple Executors, or universal Legators, as to the superplus, particular Lega­cies being payed, if there be as much Executrie as will satisfie such Ex­pences, and the Legacies; the Legacies ought to be payed intirely, be­fore the Executors have any benefit; but if the Executrie will not amount to satisfy the Charges, and particular Legacies, the Charges are to be satisfy­ed, and the Legacies to be abated proportionally, and the Executor is to have no benefit: but if he be a particular Legatar, he is to be considered with the rest of the Legatars, and to share with them proportionally. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk. Concluded cause.

D. 182. Helen Mure contra John Law. 6. June 1674.

A Relict being pursued, as Executor to her Husband, for a Debt: alledged, she was only Executor Creditor for payment of 2400. merks, provided to her by Contract of Marriage: It was Answered, That the Debt was satisfied, at least compensed; in sua far as she was obliged by the same Contract to give to the Defunct Goods and Gear, to the va­lue of 2400. merks, which she declared she had in penny and penny worth, and was worth the same; (which are the Words) and obliged her self to put him in Possession thereof.

The Lords Found, That the Husband having lived only 9. years after the Marriage; because of the presumption that he had been silent all the time, and had not craved nor declared the said Sum to be resting; It was therefore to be thought, that he had gotten the Goods, and that the Obligement was satisfied: and yet they thought, that there being so [Page 74] much confidence betwixt Husband and Wife, it were hard to put her to a full Probation: They therefore Ordained her to give her Oath of Calumny, that she had satisfyed the Obligement; and to adduce some Probation and Adminicles to prove aliqualiter. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk. Concluded Cause. Mr. Rodger Hog alteri.

In the same cause, it being further alledged, that the Huband had payed for his Wife as much Debt as would exhaust that which she had brought with her; and so that she had not payed it effectually.

The Lords Found, That if she had put him in Possession of the Goods conform to the Obligement; and that they were her own, at least that she had a Right or coloured Title thereto, that she was neither lyable to warrand, either as to the eviction of the Goods, or from any Debts; seing the Husband taketh his hazard, and in Law is lyable to the pay­ment of the same.

Some of the Lords thought, That albeit the Husband be lyable to the Creditors of the Wife, whether she perform her part of the Contract of Marriage or not, or whether he got any thing with her effectually or not; yet it were very fit to consider the quality of the Debts of the Wife, al­ledged payed by the Husband; for if they were such as the Wife could not but know, when she contracted Goods of the value foresaid, and yet she did conceal them; it were a Fraud and Cheat to oblige her self to be worth and give to her Husband, Goods extending to 2400. merks, when she knew she was not worth a Groat, her Debts being so great as to e­vict the same.

They considered, that in this case she did not dispone any Goods in par­ticular, but was obliged to a generalitie, viz. That she was worth Goods of that value; and she cannot be said to be worth in Goods the said Sum, her Debt being equivalent: Seing Bona are understood debitis deductis.

D. 183. Act of Sederunt. eod. die.

THE Lords thought fit to make an Act of Sede [...]unt, and to intimate it to the Advocats; to the purpose following, viz. That when an Alledgance is not admitted, but a joint Probation is allowed before An­swer; if there be any other Alledgance found relevant, and admitted to either, Litiscontestation should be understood to be made as to that Al­ledgance. 2. And likeways as to that effect, that the Parties are con­cluded, and cannot be heard thereafter to propone any other Alledgance. 3. The Terms being run as to Alledgance not discust, they are con­cluded as to the Probation of it, as if the relevancy had been discust by a formal Act of Litiscontestation, whereas it is remitted to be considered after Probation, seing often ex facto oritur Jus; and upon consideration of the circumstances after Probation, the Lords have more clearness to determine Relevancy.

D. [...] 184. contra Hepburn. 7. June 1674.

THE Apothecary Patrick Hepburn his Son, being pursued as Succes­sor Titulo Lucrativo, for a debt of his Fathers, upon that Ground, that tho the Right of Lands granted to him by his Father, was before the [Page 75] Debt; yet it was revocable, and under Reversion to the Father, upon a Rose noble, when he contracted the Debt lybelled.

The Lords assoilȝied from the Passive Title foresaid; but reserved Re­duction. It appears that the case was not without difficulty; and that albeit future Creditors in some case may reduce Anterior Rights ex capite fraudis; yet this is difficult and unusual: and therefore it had been fitt to determine that Point, viz. Whether an appearand Heir, getting a Right revocable, and of the nature foresaid, should be lyable at the least in quantum; seing if the Father had discharged the reversion, he would have been Successor, in respect of the Discharge after the Debt; and the Son was a Child, and the Father reserved and retained Possession, and upon the Matter the Father's not redeeming was a Discharge of the Re­version. Actor. [...] alteri Hog. Concluded Cause.

D. 185. Cuningham contra Lees. 9. June 1674.

THE Relict of James Deans, alledging that her Husband had vio­lently torn her Contract of Marriage; pursued his Heir to hear and see the Tenor of it proven, and offered to prove casum amissionis, as said is.

The Lords, albeit there was no Adminicle in write, sustained the Sum­monds; in respect there is a praesumptio Juris, that there are Contracts of Marriage betwixt Persons of any consideration, so that the Marriage was an Adminicle: and the effect being meerly Civil and not Penal, they had no respect to that Alledgance, that the Process was after the Husbands decease, and some 7 or 8 years after the deed.

D. 186. Paton contra Stirling. eod. die.

SIR Hary Stirling of Ardoch, on Death-bed, did by a Write acknow­ledge, that the Right he had acquired from Doctor Paton of certain Lands, was under Trust, and for surety of Sums, which he had payed for the Doctor; whereupon Doctor Paton's Son intented a pursuit a­gainst Ardoch's Heir to declare the Trust, and for Compt and Reckoning: And before Answer, The Lords having ordained Witnesses to be Exa­mined for clearing the Trust; They Found, That by the Probation the Trust did not appear, and that the said Declaration in Lecto could not prejudge his Heir, unless there had been some further evidence, that the Declaration was emitted by the Doctor of his own accord, and upon con­viction and for Exonering his Conscience; which did not appear by the Probation. Lockheart and Falconer. alteri Long formacus and Cuninghame. Gibson Clerk. Concluded Cause.

D. 187. Lady Spencerfield contra Hamilton. 10. June 1674.

IN the case of the Lady Spencerfield contra Robert Hamilton of Kilbrak­mount, The Lords Found, that the Alledgeance, viz. That the Defen­der could not be Lyable as Intrometter, because there was a Gift given of the Defuncts Escheat being Rebel, is not Relevant; unless the Gift were [Page 76] either declared, or were to the Defender himself, or that he had Right from the Donator: For in the first case, he is in condition parallel with an Intrometter, in the case of an Executor confirmed; and cannot be said to be intrometter with the Goods of a Defunct, and bona vacantia, the Right of the same being in a living person per aditionem, and by con­firmation; and a third person Intrometting where there is no Declara­tor, who has not the Gift himself, nor a Right from the Donator, is not in a better case than an Executor decerned: And in the case of a Donator Intrometting, or the intromission of any other having Right from him, there is the pretence and colour of a Right in the person of the Intromet­ter, which is sufficient to purge vitious Intromission.

They Found in the same case, that a person entering to the possession of the Defuncts House, by warrand of the Lords: Their possession of the Goods in the House doth not infer Intromission, unless they make use of such Goods as usu consumuntur, or dispose of such Goods, as are not of that nature; as Beds, Tables, and such like. Robert Hamilton Clerk.

D. 188. Freeholders of Linlithgow contra The Commissioners to the Parliament. 12. June 1674.

IN a Suspension at the instance of the Freeholders of Linlithgow-shire, against their Commissioners to the Parliament. The Lords Found, that if the Prorogationes and Recesses of Parliament be for a considerable time, so that the Commissioners do or may go home, the Commissioners should not have their Fies, or Charges dureing the same. 2. That if the pro­rogation be for a short time, and the Commissioners having their Resi­dence at a little distance, in Edinburgh, or Linlithgow shire, do or may go home; they ought not to have Fees dureing that time. 3. If there be Articles sitting, dureing that time, and they do not go home, tho they be not upon the Articles; they should have their Fees: Because they are concerned to know, and inform themselves, what is in Agitation in the Articles. Newbyth Reporter. Monro Clerk.

D. 189. Bailly Boid contra Store. November 7. 1674.

THE Lords sustained a Discharge granted by a Master to his Tennent upon payment of his Duty, tho it was neither Holograph, nor Subscribed before Witnesses; but pretended to be subscribed by the Granter: Which the Lords did in respect of the Custom; and that Ma­sters and Tennents are in use to give and take Discharges without Witnesses. And that in the case of Writes, Letters, and Bills betwixt Merchants, the Lords are in use to sustain them, tho they want Witnesses; and there is the same, if not more reason in the case of Tennents; by reason of the great and exuberant confidence betwixt them and their Masters. Some of the Lords thought it hard to recede from the Law, there being no limi­tation or exception in behalf of Tennents; & ubi Lex non distinguit nec nos: And that there is a great disparity betwixt Merchants and Tennents, Compts, Letters, and Bills of Exchange, and other Writs of that nature; being secret Transactions betwixt Merchants and their cor­respondents; whereunto Witnesses and other persons, neither are in use [Page 77] to be, nor is fit they should be privy: Whereas Discharges by Masters to Tennents are in use to be, and there is no inconveniency that they should be subscribed before Witnesses; and there is no difficulty to get Witnesses to them; and if they want Witnesses, and be not Holograph, Masters may be prejudged; It being easy to imitate and forge a single subscription, and there being no means of improbation of the same.

D. 190. The Town of Innerness contra Forbes of Colloden, and Robertson of Inches and others. eod. die.

THis case having been Agitated, not without some heat, amongst the Lords themselves; I thought fit to give an account thereof, at great­er length, than I have used in other Cases and Decisions.

The Town of Inverness having Charged the said [...] Robertson of Inches, and Colloden and other Feuars, who hold the Forrest of Drakies, and other Lands and Milns, and Fishings of the said Burgh; for payment of their proportions of a Stent imposed upon them, for the use of the Town. And they having Suspended, upon that reason, that the said Stent was unequal as to their proportions, and that the Town had not an Arbitrary Power to impose Stents upon their Neighbours, and Feuars, unless there were an unavoidable, at least a pressing necessity and occasion relateing to the good and interest of the Burgh; and in that case, the Neighbours and Feuars were to be Lyable only in subsidium; In so far as the Patrimo­ny of the Town and Common Good should be short, and not extend to defray the same.

The Lords (Sir John Gilmour being President for the time) did by their Decreet of Suspension, Find the Letters orderly proceeded: But with­all, did regulate the way of stenting to be according to the method and Rules set down by the Lords as to the future, which are contained in the said Decreet, and acquiesced to by the Suspenders; the Decreet bearing to be of consent; and containing only a Protestation, that the Suspenders should not be Lyable to any Stent, for maintaining and prosecuting Pleas against themselves.

Thereafter, the Feuars being charged upon another Stent, did Suspend upon that reason only, that the Regulation and Method appointed by the Lords had not been observed: and did intent a Declarator, that they should not be Lyable to Stents, but such as should be imposed, in the way and according to the method foresaid.

Tho there was no other reason in the said Suspension, nor conclusion in the said Declarator, but as is immediatly related; yet, another reason was thereafter insisted upon, both in the Suspension and Declarator; and they did plead, that they were exempted, and ought not to be Lyable to any Stent upon any account or method whatsomever; by reason, that their Lands, and in special the Forrest of Drakies, were Feued to them for a Reddendo and Feu-duty contained in their Infeftments pro omni alio onere.

The Case not being fully debated at the Bar, Some of the Lords con­ceiving, that the Lands of Drakies were not a part of the Original and Ancient Patrimony of the Town, but that the same had been acquired by the Town; and thereafter had been Feued out by them in the Terms foresaid for payment of a Feu-duty pro omni alio onere; they were of the [Page 78] opinion, that they could not be Lyable to a Servitude, unless the same had been constitute, either by their Infeftments or otherwayes; But special­ly in this case, they being free by their Infeftment, and express Clause therein, of all burden or Servitude, but their Feu-duty: And that they could be in no other case, than if the Town of Edinburgh should Feu any of the Lands lately acquired by them, for payment of a Duty pro omni alio onere: And yet the plurality of the Lords were of the opinion, that if the Town could prove and make appear, that they have been in use, by the space of 40 years or above, to Stent their Feuars for defraying their Af­fairs, and Burdens, and Works of the Town, that they ought to be Ly­able, notwithstanding of the said Clause pro omni alio onere. And accor­dingly before Answer a Term is Assigned, for proving the Towns Posses­sion.

In the interim, The most Eminent of the Advocates, and in special such as were for the Town; being discharged pleading, upon occasion of the Appeals; this case came in Agitation the last Session; and some of the Lords, even these that were of the opinion formerly that the Feuars should not be Lyable to be stented, upon the ground and mistake foresaid that the said Lands of Drakes was not a part of the Ancient Patrimony of the Town; they were convinced, upon the production of the Towns Evidents, that the said Lands were a part of the Ancient Patrimony of the Town, being Incorporate and contained in their Infeftments with the Burgh it self, bearing one individual holding and Reddendo: And therefore con­ceiving, that est Judicis supplere quae desunt Advocatis in Jure, and which arises upon production of the Papers; they did argue, that the Feuars ought to be Lyable for these Reasons.

1: That there is a difference betwixt the Original Patrimony of the Town, which is profectitious, and flowes from the Bounty of Princes, and is given to Burghs Royal, for sustaining and defraying their necessa­ry burdens and occasions; and betwixt that, which is adventitious, and acquired by Burghs themselves, by their own Moyen and Means.

As to the first, The same being given eo intuitu, and to the end, that it should be a Stock for doing and defraying the Common Affairs and bur­dens, and Charges of the Town, it cannot be given away, nor Feued, but cum sua causa; and so that they should be Lyable to Stents and Impo­sitions upon occasions requireing the same: Whereas the other is acquired by Towns as quilibet, and the Feuars ought to be considered as quilibet, and as in the case of other Feuars.

2. Upon the consideration foresaid, it is statute by diverse Acts of Par­liament, and in special by the 36. Act. K. Ja. 4. Parl. 3. And the 181. Act. K. Ja. 6. Parl. 13. That the Common Good of Burrows should be observed and keeped to the common profite of the Town: And the said Act of K. Ja. 4th. bears, That Lands, Fishings, Milns, and others belonging to the Burrows, should not be set but for 3. Years allenarly; and if any be set otherways that they be of none avail: And as this is Law, so it is just, otherwayes, those who have Tenements within Burgh, and who upon occasions are Lyable to be Stented, should be unjustly and heavily prejudged, if the Lands and Fishings which, being in the Towns hands, would be lyable in the first place to such Burdens, may be given away; so that the whole burden should be rolled over upon them.

[Page 79]3. The foresaid pretence, That the Feuars were Lyable only to the Feu-duty pro omni alio onere; was Answered, viz. That omne aliud onus was to be understood, of any other ordinar duty payable to the Town as Superiors; but does not exempt the Feuars from these munera extraordina­ria Patrimonialia, for the necessar use and preservation of the Town: As in the case of Lands disponed to be holden of the Disponer, for payment of a Blensh or other Duty pro omni alio onere, The Clause foresaid will not exempt the Vasal from Taxations, and the Superiors relief of the same against his Vasal:

4. It appears by a Ratification of Queen Mary, produced for the Town, That the Town of Innerness had made diverse Acts concerning the setting the Lands, Milns, and Fishings, which are ratified by the said Queen; And which, if they were observed, would oblige the Feuars to be lyable to to be Stented.

The saids Lords, Who were of the said opinion, thought, That upon the Grounds and Production foresaid, the Feuars of Drakies ought to be lyable without any farther probation, to Stents imposed for the use and interest of the Town; the same being imposed necessarly and equally according to the method abovementioned: And yet the Town having adduced proba­tion by production of the Records out of their Books and Witnesses; they considered and thought, that the possession of the Town, by imposing their Stents by the space of 40. years, was proven: In respect, it appeared by the Extracts out of their Books, That from the year 1624. until 1664. they have been in use to impose Stents in case of Exigency, for the private use and concerns of the Town; Notwithstanding of what was alledged at the Bar, against the said probation, and in special, that the Books them­selves ought to be produced; whereas there was nothing produced but Extracts of Acts, and that the probation, that the Town has been in use to Stent for repairing their Bridge, did not quadrate to the case and point in question; seing it was to be proven that Stents were imposed for the private use and concerns of the Town, and the Bridge and repairing of the same is of publick concern and interest, relating not only to the good of the Town, but of the whole Shire: And the Record, anent Stent in relation to the Bridge being out of the way, and not considered as a pro­bation; It was not proven, that the Town had been in Possession 40. Years.

Nevertheless, The plurality of the Lords did Find the Alledgeance foresaid of Possession, by the time foresaid, not proven; upon that ground that the Bridge was not to be considered as the proper concern of the Town: And did suspend and declare in favours of Inches and other Feu­ars: Diverse of the saids Lords dissenting upon the Grounds foresaid; and that it appears to them, that the Feuars, upon the account of their Lands, were Lyable to be Stented, being the ancient and proper Burgal Pa­trimony of the Town: And albeit a continued tract of Possession by the space of 40. years, which hardly is to be expected in servitutibus, or im­positions that are discontinue, could not be made out, as they conceive it was; yet the Feuars having homologate and consented, and submitted to the said Impositions without repineing, until after the Year 1664. That they did not so much question the Town's Right to impose upon them the said Stents, as the exorbitancy, and frequency, and inequality of the same [Page 80] as to their proportions; they could not be heard now to plead and pretend exemption from the said Stents.

The Lords having Found as said is, That the Lands of Drakies were not lyable to the said Stents: The said [...] Roberson of Inches in be­half of himself and some other Feuars, having only appeared in the debate, and Forbes of Colloden, who thought himself concluded by the above-written Decreet of Suspension, and has consented to the same; did not­withstanding desire, that he might have the benefite of the said Interloqui­tor, and that the parcel of Land, which he had in the Forrest of Drakies, might also be declared free of Stents; seing there was eadem ratio, and so there ought to be idem Jus, as to him and the said other Feuars.

It was Answered for the Town of Innerness, That he could not be heard, in respect of the said Decreet of Suspension in foro, and of his ex­press consent therein contained. Whereunto it being Replyed, that the consent was only as to the individual Stent thereinquestioned, and did not conclude him as to other Stents; and that notwithstanding thereof, it be­ing now Found, that the Forrest of Drakies, whereof his was a part, was free; the immunity foresaid could not be denyed to him. It was Answered, and the said dissenting Lords were of the opinion, that a Decreet in foro did bind him whatever others could pretend: And it was evident by the said Decreet, that it was then the Lords meaning (Sir John Gilmour a person of great Parts and Integrity being then President) that all the said Lands of the Forrest of Drakies should be lyable in all time coming; and his consent is most positive and express to the Regulation of Stenting as to the future: And the said Consent being premitted to the whole decer­niture of the said Decreet, doth influence and affect all the Articles and Heads of the same, unless it had been limited and special as to an or moe, and not all: And it was so far from being limited to the Stent then in question, that there is a Protestation subjoined to the decerniture in these Terms, That Colloden and the Suspenders doe protest, that they should not be lyable to such Stents as should be imposed, for maintaining the Plea against themselves; And exceptio & protestatio firmat Regulam & Sen­tentiam in non exceptis, & iis, contra quae non emissa est protestatio.

The Lords notwithstanding Found, That Colloden should be free of Stents, as to such Parcels as he had of the Lands of Drakies.

Thereafter the Town of Innerness did alledge, that the Suspenders ought to be lyable as to the Milns and Fishings, that they held in Feu of the Town, seing they are undoubtedly the ancient Patrimony of the Town: and they offer them to prove, that they have been in use, past memory, to stent the same with the Burgal Lands when occasion required, not only for Taxations, imposed by Parliament, but for the private use of the Town.

It was Answered, That the said Alledgance was not now competent; seing the Debate, whereupon the Interloquitor proceeded, was concern­ing the Suspenders Feues, which they hold of the Town, which compre­hend both Lands, Milns, and Fishings: and there is no reason of diffe­rence, why the Milns and Fishings should be in an other case than the Lands.

It was Answered for the Town, That in all the Debate, there had been no mention of Milns and Fishings; and they were content to make Faith, that they did not understand the Debate to be concerning the Milns and [Page 81] Fishings, but only the Lands of Drakies; And if they had thought that they had been concerned to prove their Possession as to the Milns and Fishings there was that speciality that they might have proven more clearly their Possession, as to the Milns and Fishings, than as to the Lands: and now they are able to prove the same.

Some of the Lords thought, That the Question being of that Impor­tance to an Incorporation, and they wanting the Assistance of their most able Advocats, upon the occasion abovementioned; and the exception being undoubtedly relevant to inferr their Right, and the conclusion of their Declarator, as to the Milns and Fishings, that they should be lyable to be stented if it were proven; It were hard, that their Right should be taken from them upon a quirck, and pretence of Omission, being upon a mistake, as said is. In end, the Plurality of the Lords did Declare, by their Interloquitor, That if in November the Town should be able to make appear by ancient Records, that they had been in Possession of stenting the Milns and Fishings, with the Tenements of the Town, when Impo­sitions and Stents were laid on by the Town only (and not by the Par­liament) for their private use, that the same should be lyable as other Burgal Lands.

D. 191. Hamilton contra the Earl of Kinghorn. 11. November 1674.

JAmes Mauld of Melgum, having assigned to James Hamilton two Bonds, and he having intimate his Assignation to the E. of Kinghorn gran­ter of the same, did thereafter write to the said Earl, shewing him that he had use for the Sums contained in the said Bonds; and that he desi­red a course might be taken to pay the same: And in Answer to his Let­ter, the said Earl did Write and subscribe a Postscript upon a Letter wri­ten to him by the said James Mauld, to that purpose, that the said James Mauld had assured him, that he had made the Assignation foresaid upon assurance that my Lord should not be troubled to pay the said Debt, and that he was about to take a course to that effect: but that notwithstan­ding, if he must be his Debitor, he should take a course to pay the An­nualrent; but as for the Principal Sum, it was not foreseen by him, that he should be put to pay it at that time, and he desired forbearance. And thereafter being charged, the said Earl suspended upon that reason, that the said Bonds were granted by him to Melgum for the price of Lands Dis­poned by him to the Earl; and by a Back-bond of the date of the said Bands, Melgum was obliged to Warrand the Rental of the said Lands for two years: and quatenus the Tennents should be short in payment of their duties, the time forsaid, he should pay wherin they should be wanting, and that the Earl might retain in the first end of the foresaid Sums: And that the said Earl had got a Decreet against the Tennents of the said Lands, for payment of the Sums therein contained; and therefor that he had ground of retention and compensation upon the foresaid Bond granted by Melgum effeirand to the Sums restand by the said Tennents. Where­unto It was Answered, that tho Compensation competent against the Ce­dent is competent against the Assigney, yet where there is not only an Assignation which is the deed of the Cedent; but a delegation, and [Page 82] the Debitor doth accept and consent and becomes Debitor, as in this case, as appears be the foresaid Letter written to the charger; compensation is not receivable. It was Replyed for the Suspender, that the Letter is not positive that the Suspender should become Debitor, but only in these terms if he must be Debitor to the charger; and that upon the matter he is not Debitor to him, in so far as he has a ground of compensation. Whereunto It was Answered, That these Words, If he should be Debitor are to be understood only, in Relation to the Complement and Assurance contained in Melgum's Letter, viz. If he should not take course himself with the said Debt; and that the Letter is positive, that the Earl should pay the Annualrent, and also the Principal Sum, which he could not do presently: and if the Earl had intended to compense, he should have told the Charger, that he had a Ground of Compensation, in which the Char­ger would have had recourse against the Cedent, and would not have re­lyed upon the Suspenders Letter.

The Lords Found the Letters orderly proceeded, in respect of the said Answer and Letter.

D. 192. Gordon contra Pitsligo. 12. Novemb. 1674.

MR. Thomas Gordon and his Father pursued the Lord Pitsligo, upon a Promise to enter them to certain Lands, which they had acqui­red, holden of him.

It was Alledged, That if there was any such Promise, it was to be per­formed in write, by a Charter to be granted by the Defender; and there is locus Poenitentiae until the Charter be subscribed. It was Answered, That the Promise was referred to the Defenders Oath: and albeit there is lo­cus poenitentiae in Synalagmis, and Contracts; yet where there is a positive Promise to give or do any thing, the same being verified, ought to be fulfilled; and there is no locus poenitentiae upon pretence that it should be fulfilled in Write.

The Lords repelled the Alledgance, in respect of the Answer foresaid. Monro Clerk. Newbyth Reporter.

D. 193. Paton contra Ardoch. eod. die.

WIlliam Paton Son to the deceast Dr. Paton, pursued

Stirling, and Sir Harie Stirling of Ardoch, as representing his Father, for Implement of a Write, granted by his Father on Death-bed; where­by he was obliged to denude himself of the Lands of Panholls, being sa­tisfyed of such Sums of Money as should be found to be due to him by the said William and his Father, after Compt and Reckoning.

It was Alledged for the Defender, That his Father had acquired a Right to the said Lands, from the said Dr. Paton, being his Brother in Law, hav­ing maryed the said Sir Henrie's Sister, upon a Back-bond, containing a Reversion in favours of the said William, the said Sir Harie's Nevoy: and that thereafter the said William being Major, had discharged the Rever­sion; so that the Defunct, and now his Heir has an irredeemable Right to the said Lands: and that the same pretended Deed on Death-bed, could not take away the same.

It was Replyed, That the Defunct on Death-bed did, and might exoner his Conscience, by a Declaration, that the Discharge of the Reversion was [Page 83] on Trust: And there were other Adminicles and Presumptions concur­ring, to evince that it was a Trust; viz. The near Relation of the Par­ties; the Defunct being the Pursuers Uncle, and that the Bonds granted by the Doctor, either to the Defunct himself, or to other Persons from whom Ardoch had Right, were not retired; which would have been, if the Right in Ardoch's Person had not been on Trust: It being against Reason, that Ardoch should have both Right to the Lands, and to the Debts, for which the said Right was granted. It was Duplyed, That the Defender being an Infant, neither doth, nor is obliged to know what was betwixt his Father and the Pursuer, unless there were a Write to clear the same; and his irredeemable Right by the Discharge of the Reversion, cannot be taken away by Presumptions: and that a Write on Death-bed, upon what pretence soever, cannot prejudge the Heir: And it cannot be thought, but that if a Trust had been intended, the Pursu­er would have taken a Back-bond as he had done formerly; and the De­fenders Father might have given a Discharge of the said Bonds as to per­sonal Execution.

The Lords Found, That the Trust was not proven: and that the De­claration on Death-bed could not prejudge the Heir. Thereafter it was urged for the Pursuer, That at least he should have Action against the Defenders as Executors, for affecting the moveable Estate belonging to the Defunct, and in Implement of the said Write, at least in subsidium, as to Damnage and Interest.

Upon a Debate amongst the Lords themselves, It was urged, That the said Writ, being in effect a Reversion, was only prestable by the Heir, who only could denude himself of the Right of the said Lands: And persons on Death-bed, ipso momento that they become Sick, they lose their legitima potestas, either as to prejudging their Heirs, or their Bairns and Relicts: And they cannot dispose of their Deads Part, but by a Nomi­nation, or Legacy, and a Reversion could not be given, by way of Legacy.

The Lords Found, That the said Write could not affect the Executry. Gibson Clerk.

D. 194. The Executors of the late Bishop of Edinburgh contra the present Bishop. eod. die.

THE Executors of the late Bishop of Edinburgh, Pursued the Commis­sars and Procurator Fiscal, and the now Bishop of Edinburgh for the Quots of Testaments, that were either confirmed, or had fallen by the de­cease of Defunct persons; and were confirmable before the said late Bishops Death, and fell under his Executry: And also for the Quots of all Testa­ments confirmed, or confirmable for the half year, after the said Bishops decease, and falling under the Ann.

The Lords Found, That the Quots of Testaments, that were not con­firmed, did neither fall under the Bishops Executry, nor the Ann; But only the Quots of such Testaments as were confirmed, either in the Bi­shops Lifetime, or during the Ann: Upon these Grounds, which were de­bated at the Bar, but more at length among the Lords themselves; viz. 1. The Quots of Testaments do not belong to Bishops, as having a share [Page 84] and interest in the Moveable Estates of Defunct Persons after their de­cease; which are only divided betwixt their Executors, and Bairns, and Relict; but the said Quots, are in effect Sentence, or Confirmation Sil­ver, which is given to the Bishops upon that account and consideration, That by their Sentence or Confirmation (which is instar Sententiae being actus voluntariae jurisdictionis) The Defuncts Estate is secured to be forth­coming to all persons concerned, both Creditors, Relict, Bairns and others: And therefore, until that be done, there is no Quot, nor confir­mation-silver due. 2. The Lords of Session had, by Act of Parliament, as a part of their Sallary, Sentence-Silver, viz. Twelve pennies of the pound, until the same was taken from them by Act of Parliament their Sallary being enlarged, and settled upon them otherwayes: And, if during the time, the said Lords had their Sentence Silver, any of them had deceased before Sentence, tho the Process had been commenced and advanced beyond Litiscontestation; it cannot be said, that the Executors, of a Lord deceasing before the Sentence, could claim any part of the Sen­tence Money, where the Sentence is pronounced after his decease. 3. By the 28. Act of his Majesties Parl. 1661. the Quots of Testaments are dis­charged; and yet the Bishops being restored to the Right of Quots, the same will be due for any Testament confirmed thereafter, notwithstand­ing of the said Act of Parliament; whereas, if Quots were due from the time they became confirmable, they could not be claimed, tho confirmed, since the Bishops were restored as said is, to their Quots, as being discharg­ed by the said Act of Parliament.

The Lords did also Find, That the Bishops Relict and nearest of Kin had Right to an Ann, even before the late Act of Parliament (being the 13. Act of the 3. Session of His Majesties second Parliament, concerning the Ann, due to the Executors of Bishops and Ministers) In respect by a Letter of His Majesties Grand-father in anno 1613. and Act of the Bishops thereupon, an Ann was Found to be due to the nearest of Kin of Bishops: But in regard by the said Letter and Custom, before the said late Act of Parliament, the Ann in relation to Bishops, was, if the Bishop deceased before Michaelmass, after the Moneth of [...] his Executors had the half of that year, as belonging to the Bishops Incumbent Jure proprio; and the half of the next year as Ann; the half of the Rent of his Benefice for the half year preceeding Michaelmass, the other half being due to him as Incumbent, and fallen under his Executry: Whereas by the late Act, the said Ann is so ordered, that the Bishop or Minister surviveing White-sunday, the half of that year does belong to him and his Executors upon account of his Incumbency; and the other half for the Ann: And the In­cumbent surviving Michaelmass, he is to have the whole Year as Incum­bent, and the half of the next year is to be Ann: Therefore the Lords Found, That the late Bishop having deceased before Michaelmass, and be­fore the said late Act of Parliament, the Ann should be as it was for­merly.

In the same Process, It was debated among the Lords more fully than at the Bar, whether the Quots of Testaments should fall under the Ann? And it was urged by some, that the Quots of Testaments are but casual Obventions; and that they are due as said is, upon the account foresaid. viz. That Testaments are confirmed by the Bishop, or his Officials, and [Page 85] ratione operae, and as Sentence-Silver; so that they cannot be due, but to the present Incumbent, who does a duty; and that Compositions for entering of Vasals and Liferent Escheats and Non-entrys, and such like casualities do not fall under Ann. Whereunto It was Answered, That by the Kings Letter, by the Act of Parliament, and by the Canon Law, the half of the Rent of the Benefice, Stipend, and Living fall under the Ann; and the Quots of Testaments are a considerable part of the Bishops Rent, especially in Edinburgh; and undoubtedly is a part of his Living and Bene­fice: And the Rent of Milns which is casual, and depends, where there is no astriction, upon the arbitrary will of Parties to come, or not to come to the same, and is likewayes due ratione operae; doth fall under Ann: As also the Rent of Fishings, and such like which are casual: And there is a great difference betwixt Quots, which is an ordinary yearly Rent, and cannot fail so, but there will be still Testaments confirmed; and the casualities of Superiority as Liferents &c. which are so uncertain; as that it cannot be said, they are the Bishops Living: And the Argument, that Quots are due ratione operae, and by reason of actual confirmation, which cannot be due by the Executors or Relict, is of no weight; seing the other constant Rent of Stipends and Benefices is due ratione operae, and because the Bishop or Minister serveth, which is not prestable by Executors or Relicts.

The Lords, notwithstanding, enclined to Find, That the Quots do not fall under the Ann: but upon the motion of some of their Number, that the Interloquitor, being to be a preparative, should be further considered, they thought fit not to proceed to the Voting. Gibson Clerk. Forret Reporter.

D. 195. Craig contra Edger. 20. Novemb. 1674.

THE Lords Found, That a Bond bearing Annualrent, being Assign­ed by a Woman, to her former Husband by her Contract of Marri­age; and the Assignation not being intimate, a Retrocession did settle again the Right of the said Bond in the Person of the Wife; Quia unum­quodque dissolvitur, eo modo quo contrahitur: And the said Bond being thereafter assigned in favours of the second Husband, he and his Execu­tors had Right to the same; and that it was not in bonis of the first Hus­band, though the Retrocession was not intimate until after his decease. Lord Glendoick Reporter. Mr. John Hay Clerk.

D. 196. Thoirs contra Tolquhon. eod. die.

MR. David Thoirs, in an Improbation at his Instance, against Tol­quhon, of a Bond, did crave Certification, because the Principal was not produced, but an Extract out of the Commissars Books of Aber­deen.

The Lords, upon a Report, having debated amongst themselves, what was fit to be done in the said Case, seing it appeared that the said Pur­suite was intented, not of design to question the Bond, upon evident and probable Grounds of Falsehood, but only to have it produced; and it ap­peared by many Presumptions, that the Bond was a true Deed, and ne­ver questioned by the granter ex capite falsi, tho he had suspended upon [Page 86] other Reasons; And there had been much diligence by Decreets, Horn­ing and Comprysing upon the same; and yet the Bond being of an anci­ent Date, beyond 40 years, there was no person living that could prove the Tenor thereof, and declare that they knew the same to be a true Deed: And on the other part, the Lords could not refuse to grant Certification, seing an Extract does not satisfy in an Improbation, where the Principal was not produced.

It was moved by some of the Lords, That if the Pursuite was not in­tented within the years of Prescription, that it should not be sustained; seing albeit causa falsi doth not prescrive, where the Paper or Subject craved to be improven is produced; and the Pursuer offers to improve and make it appear that the same is false; yet when the Improbation is only to try the condition of the Defenders Right, and in order to a Cer­tification, if the Principal cannot be exhibit, it is not properly causa falsi: And the effect of the Certification is only that the Write for not production should be holden as false praesumptive, and fictione Juris: And upon the matter it is but a Reduction for not Production.

The said Point being of great Concernment, and the Debate being up­on a Bill, and the Process not produced, that it might appear whether it was intented within the 40 years or not, it was not decided.

D. 197. Cranston contra Brown. 21. Novemb. 1674.

A Testator having left by Testament a Sum of Money, due upon an Heretable Surety; and having named his Sister as Executor and universal Legator, she was pursued for payment of the said Legacy; at the least, that being likeways Heir, she should denude her self of the Right of the said Sum.

It was Alledged for her, That the Subject being Heretable, the Defunct could not bequeath the same in Testament.

It was Replyed, That when res aliena is left in Legacy, the Executor in Law tenetur luere, and ought to redeem the same, or pay the value; and multo magis in this case, the Testator having in effect left res sua, though upon the matter res aliena as to the power of disposing of the same on Death-bed, or by Testament: And therefore the Executrix, if she be Heir, (as she is in this Case) ought to give the same: and if she were not Heir, ought to redeem the same, as said is.

The Lords, upon the debate amongst themselves, considered, that in Law, legatum rei alienae is effectual if the Testator sciebat rem alienam; whereas si nesciebat, it is to be persumed he would not have left that which was not his own; and tho the Testator upon mistake was ignorant that it was res aliena, yet if the Legator was of so near Relation that it was pro­bable he should have left the legacie, at least the value, if he had knowen it was res aliena, the Legacy was effectual: And that in the case in que­stion, the Legator was the Defuncts Nevoy by his Brother, and the Sum that was left was his own, tho Heretable as said is; and the Testator ei­ther knew that he could not dispose of the same being Heretable, and was presumed and obliged to know the Law; and if he was ignorant in point of Law, ignorantia Juris nocet: and therefore the Lords inclined to sustain the Legacy. But one of their Number having desired, that the Decision [Page 87] [...] [Page 84] [...] [Page 85] [...] [Page 86] [...] [Page 87] might be delayed while the next day, that he might have his thoughts upon the Case, the same was delayed. Strathurd Reporter. Mr. John Hay Clerk.

D. 198. Pilton contra the Creditors of the Lord Sinclair. 30. November 1674.

THE deceast Lord Sinclair, having maryed his Daughter with John Sinclair younger of Hermiston, did dispone to him his Estate, with the Burden of his own proper Debts, mentioned in the Right; and took a Bond for an Annuity of 8000 merks, first in the name of John Watt, and thereafter the said Bond being given back, he did take another Bond, for the said Annuity during his Lifetime, in the Name of George Cockburn of Pilton: Whereupon the said George did diligence by Com­prysing and otherways, against the said John Sinclair of Herdmanston; and did also take the said John Sinclair's Liferent Escheat. And upon the Grounds foresaid, and a Suspension of double Poinding against him, diverse Creditors of the Lord Sinclair did question Pilton's Interest up­on the foresaid Bond, as being fraudulent, and a contrivance to frustrate Creditors, and to secure so considerable an Interest for the use of the De­bitor, contrare to the Act of Parliament, 1621.

The Lords, notwithstanding, preferred the said George Cockburn, as having Right to the Duties of Herdmanston's Estate, by vertue of the said Gift of Escheat; reserving to the Creditors their Declarator of Trust, or Reduction upon the said Act of Parliament: And accordingly the whole Estate of Herdmanston being set in Tack thereafter, the Tack-duty is pay­able to Pilton, and the other Creditors in order, conform to the said De­creet.

The Tacks-men being charged at the instance of Pilton, Did Suspend upon double poinding, pretending they were troubled by other Creditors of the Lord Sinclair: And the said Creditors compearing, did alledge, that they ought to be preferred to Pilton, in respect his interest ab initio by the said Bond for the Annuity foresaid of 8000 Merks, was a fraudulent contrivance, in prejudice of the Lord Sinclair's Creditors; that the fore­said Annuity might be secured to him in the Person of Pilton his Friend and Relation; and thereupon might live plentifully, his Creditors being defrauded, and suffering in the mean time: And that the Gift of Escheat of Herdmanstons's Liferent, being granted intuitu, and upon account of the said interest; laborat eodem vitio, and was in effect to the behoof of the Lord Sinclair.

It was Answered for Pilton, That tho the said Bond was granted to him, without an Onerous Cause; yet intuitu of the same, and thinking that he was thereby secured, he had bona fide alimented my Lord Sinclair, and had payed to himself, and had engaged to others for him, to pay diverse Sums of Money, before any interruption made by the Creditors; So that before any Diligence done by them, his Right became Onerous, and the Gift of Escheat of Herdmanston's Estate was taken by him, to secure himself as to his relief: And that the King and Exchequer did, and might give the said Gift to him upon the consideration foresaid; and thereupon, in the former Decreet of multiple poinding, he was preferred to all other Credi­tors: [Page 88] And that his Majesty had also gifted the Liferent Escheat of the said Lord Sinclair, to Mr. George Gibson, upon a Back-bond, that thereby he and the other Creditors thereinmentioned being satisfied, the super­plus and benefite of the said Escheat should be applyed for the Aliment of the said Lord Sinclair: And therefore, tho Pilton should not have Right as he had to the said Tack-duty, the foresaid Annuity and Gift of Escheat of Herdmanston's Liferent would accrue to Mr. George Gibson Donator, to the uses foresaid; and fall under his Gift.

It was Answered for the Creditors, That they were content the Lords should modify an Aliment for the Lord Sinclair: And that Pilton's inte­rest should be sustained effeirand thereto; the Superplus being applyed, as it ought to be, for their satisfaction.

The Lords, for the most part enclined to Find, that George Cockburn's Right to the said Annuity was Onerous, In sua far as he could instruct, that he had payed to, or for the use of my Lord Sinclair, any Sums of Money before the Creditors Diligence.

Yet some were of the opinion, That the Laird of Hermanston having Married my Lord Sinclair's Daughter, and having given the said Bond for the Annuity, dureing my Lord Sinclair's Lifetime, was a down-right contrivance, contrare to the Act of Parliament 1621. to the end that the Right to the said Annuity, which if it had been taken in the per­son of my Lord Sinclair himself would have been lyable to his Creditors, might be so conveyed in the person of another, that it should not be lyable to the said Lord Sinclair's Debts; and being ab initio fraudulent, it conti­nued still: And Pilton's applying any part of the same, for the use of my Lord Sinclair, was so far from purgeing the Fraud, that by the Act of Par­liament, it was a clear evidence and probation of the same.

And yet they thought, That Pilton having out of respect to his Friend lent his name inconsideratly, he might thereafter for his security take, and the Exchequer might give Herdmanston's Liferent Escheat, upon the account foresaid; and the same cannot be thought to be to the behoof of my Lord Sinclair, unless it had been either procured by my Lord Sinclair, or granted expresly for his use: And as to my Lord Sinclair's own Liferent, His Majesty and Exchequer might qualify the Gift as they they thought fit; and His Majesty might have been concern­ed upon many considerations, that my Lord Sinclair should not want an Aliment; and might either have detained his Liferent in his own hands, in order to his Aliment, or given the same sub modo, and with the Burden thereof: And the said Gift was given as to the Superplus fore­said, for the Lord Sinclair's Aliment, not to be modifyed by any other, but by the Exchequer, and at their sight and direction, as the said Gift bears.

Upon the Grounds foresaid the Lords did prefer Pilton conform to the former Decreet. Sir David Falconer and others for the Creditors alteri Dalrymple.

D. 199. Auchintoul contra Innes. 10. Decem. 1674.

THE Lords Found, That a person being pursued as representing his Fa­ther or other Predecessors, and denying the passive Titles, the same ought to be proven; and that the Defender, by proponing a Defence in [Page 89] Jure, as in the case in question, that Annuities were discharged by the late Proclamation, does not confess the passive Titles: But if he should propone a defence founded upon a Right in the person of his Predecessor, it would conclude him; so that he could not pretend that the passive Titles should be proven. Newbyth Reporter. Vide 20. January 1675. Carfrae contra Talzifer.

D. 200. Stuart contra M cDuff. 11. Decem. 1674.

IN a pursuit for payment of a Sum of Money, It being Alledged, That the Pursuer had intrometted with Moveables and Goods, to the value of the Debt Lybelled pertaining to the Defenders Father, for whose Debt he was pursued; and that it was to be presumed, that he had got the saids Goods in satisfaction of the same Debt, unless he should alledge and prove an other Cause.

The Lords Found, That if the Defence should be proponed in these Terms, that the Pursuer had got the saids Goods in satisfaction, and that they were data in solutum; the Defence ought to be positive, and that the delivery of the Goods was probable by Witnesses; but the quality foresaid could not be proven otherwayes, but by the Pursuers Oath: But if the Exception was proponed, so as to infer compensation, viz. That the Pursuer had Intrometted with the saids Goods to the value of the Debt; that it ought to be verifyed instanter by Write or Oath. Castlehil Reporter. Hamilton Clerk.

D. 201. Home and Elphingston contra Murray of Stenhop. eod. die.

IN a Competition betwixt an Assigney and an Arrester; It was Alledged, That the Assigney should be preferred, because the Assignation was anterior to the Arrestment; and tho it was not intimate, yet the equiva­lent was done, in sua far as, the Debitor being desired to make payment to the Assigney, and shewing his Assignation, did promise to pay the same, which upon the Matter, was like a Bond of Corroboration, which certainly would prefer the Assigney, notwithstanding he had not intimate his Assignation.

The Lords Found, That if the said Promise were verifyed by Writ, it should exclude the Arrester; but that it could not be proven by the De­bitors Oath, in prejudice of the Arrester: And even as to the Debitor, the said promise could not bind him, being made in contemplation of a Right supposed to be in the person of the Assigney; Which being Found, not to be a valid Right, there were no reason that the Debitor should pay twice.

And whereas it was pretended, That if the Debitor had not accepted the Debt, and promised payment, the Assigney would have done Dili­gence, so that he would have been preferable to the Arrester; The Lords thought, that sibi imputet that he had not perfited his Right, as was Found before in the case of Pitfoddels contra Donaldson. Forret Reporter, Gibson Clerk.

D. 202. Moubray contra Arbuthnet. 12. Decem. 1674.

IN a Process for the single avail of a Marriage; The Lords modifyed 9000 Merks, the Rent of the Lands being proven to be 3000 Merks: and it was thought, that the avail of the Marriage should be in all cases of that nature, 3. Years Rent.

D. 203. Lord Balmerinoch contra The Tennents of North­berwick. 13. Decemb. 1674.

THE deceast Sir William Dick having charged the Lord Balmerinoch for payment of a great Sum of Money due by a Bond, granted by his Father, and diverse other Noblemen, who were Actors in the late times; and did borrow the said Sums for the use of the publick (as they called it) and the said Lord Balmerinoch having Suspended upon diverse Reasons, and also upon a Reason of Compensation Founded upon a Bond granted by the said Sir William to Sir John Smith; whereupon the said Sir John had a Right to the Lands of Northberwick; and had Assigned and Disponed the said Debt and Right in favours of the Lord Balmerinoch, by a Disposition and Assignation Blank in the name of the Assigney; and no Decreet being Extracted upon the said Process; and the Act of Parliament anent publick Debts, that no Execution should be for the same, having interveened;

The Lord Balmerinoch having filled up the said Assignation, in the name of James Gilmour, did intent in his Name, a Process for Mails and Duties, against the Tennents of Northberwick.

The Creditors of the said Sir William Dick pretending Right to the said Lands by diverse Infeftments, did compear in the said Process, and al­ledged, that the said Right, whereupon the pursuite was Founded, was extinct and satisfied, In sua far as, the said Lord Balmerinoch had Found­ed a Reason of Compensation upon the same, against Sir William Dick, which was sustained; and whereupon there was a Minut of a Decreet Suspending the Letters against Sir William Dick for the Debt above­mentioned: And that the said Assignation granted by Sir John Smith had been given up to Sir William Dick, or his Son Sir Andrew, as their Evi­dent; for Exonering the said Sir William of the Debt compensed upon.

It was Answered, That there was no Decreet in that Process of Suspen­sion, against Sir William Dick: And as to the said pretended Minute it was not produced: And whereas it was desired, that William Dounie, who was Clerk for the time, should be examined upon Oath concerning the said Minut; and the giving up the said Assignation to Sir William Dick or his Sons; It was urged, that the Minutes and Acts of Process could not be made up by Witnesses, Et non creditur Clerico nisi quatenus constat ex Actis. And 2. That there neither was, nor could be a Decreet in the said Process, In respect, the said Suspension was upon other rea­sons that were Relevant; and compensation being in effect satisfaction, and the last exception, the said Reasons ought to have been first discust. viz. That there were diverse Arrestments at the instance of Creditors, which should have been purged; and that Sir William had Assigned the Debt whereupon he had charged, and the Assignation was intimate; So [Page 91] that the Suspender could not be in tuto to pay; unless the consent of the Assigney were obtained, and that the said Sir William was at the Horn and his Escheat gifted, and that the Donator did not concur nor consent. 3. Tho' there could have been a Decreet, and the Arrestments had been purged, and the Assigney and Donator consented; yet the samen not be­ing Extracted, the Suspender might pass from his Reason of compensati­on, seing res was integra before Extracting; and the Suspender may eike and verify any other reason that is emergent: And there had arisen a most relevant Reason and Defence to him upon the said Act of Parliament anent publick Debts; of which he ought to have, and may plead the be­nefite, in regard Acts of Litiscontestation and Decreets are Judicial Trans­actions and Contracts: and as in other Contracts there is locus poenitentiae before they be perfited in Write, so in Acts and Decreets, before they be Extracted, Parties are not concluded: as verb. g. even after Litisconte­station before the same be Extracted, a Defence may be proponed; and in Declarators concerning Clauses irritant, tho Parties will not be admitted to purge after Sentence, yet before Extracting they will be heard: And even by the Common Law, albeit ubi res transit in rem Judicatam, sententia non retractatur ex Instrumentis noviter repertis; yet before Extracting of the same, if Writes be Found which will elide the Pursuers Lybel, they will be received.

It was Answered for the Creditors, That in this case res was not inte­gra, because the Suspender had so far acquiesced, that in effect he had payed the Debt, Compensation being equivalent; And if before extra­cting, he had made actual payment, there would have been no necessi­ty of extracting the same; and in this case not only there was solutio ipso Jure, in respect of the said Compensation sustained; but de facto the Lord Balmerinoch had payed 3 or 4000 merks in satisfaction of the Debt char­ged for; the Compensation being so far short: and the Creditors had in­tented exhibition of a Discharge granted by Sir William Dick to the said Lord Balmerinoch, of the foresaid Sum of 4000 merks; and a Declara­tor, that in respect of the said Compensation, the said Right granted by the said Sir John Smith was extinct.

The Lords, at the desire of the saids Creditors, having examined di­verse persons anent the said Minut, and the giving up of the said Assigna­tion, and anent the having of the said Discharge, granted by Sir William Dick to Balmerinoch, the Creditors at length did pass from their Compear­ance. And now the Cause being again advised, the Lords did adhere to their former Interloquitor in Anno 1664. And did Find, That before ex­tracting, Balmerinoch might pass from his Reason of Compensation: and decerned in the said Process at Balmerinoch's instance, against the Ten­nents of Northberwick; Reserving to the Creditors their Action of Exhibiti­on and Declarator as accords.

D. 204. Kinloch contra Rate. 15. Decemb. 1674.

THE deceast Mr. Robert Kinloch Portioner of Luthrie, having gran­ted, after he was married, a Liferent Right to his Wife, by Infeft­ment in some of his Lands; in satisfaction of any further Provision: did thereafter give her an additional Jointure and Infeftment in other Lands; after which he did give a Right of Annualrent, forth of the Additional Lands, to his Daughter Janet Kinloch.

[Page 92]The Daughter and her Husband Mr. John Dickson, did intent a Poin­ding of the Ground, upon the said Right of Annualrent; in which Pro­cess Jean Rate Relict of the said Mr. Robert compeared, and defended upon her foresaid Rights, being anterior to the said Infeftment of An­nualrent.

It was Replyed for the Pursuer, That as to the first Right for Provision of the Wife, she did not make question, but that being in Satisfaction of any other Provision, as said is; the additional Right granted there­after was for Love and Favour, and Donatio inter virum & uxorem; and revocked tacitely by the Pursuers Infeftment of Annualrent.

The Lords Found accordingly, That the said posterior Right was re­vocked by the Right of Annualrent pro tanto; without prejudice to the Relict of the Superplus if any be, the Annualrent being satisfied. New­byth Reporter. Gibson Clerk.

D. 205. George Drummond contra Menȝies of Rotwell. 16. December 1674.

IN the Process at the instance of George Drummond for payment of a Sum due by Alexander Menȝies of Rotwel, as intrometter with the Debitors Goods: It was Found (as in diverse Cases before) That the pretence, that the Defunct was Rebel, and his Escheat gifted; doth not purge vitious Intromission; unless it be alledged, that the Defuncts Es­cheat was gifted and declared before intention of the cause; or that the Defender did intromet, either by vertue of a Gift to himself, or by War­rand and Right from the Donator for the Defenders Intromission, tho the Gift was not declared before the intention of the Cause; In respect if there was a Gift declared before the intention of the Cause, the Defender is in the same case, as if there were an Executor confirmed, before the intenting of the Cause; and if he had either the Gift himself, or a Right from the Donator before he did intromet, his Possession ab initio, being by vertue of a Title, tho not perfected, cannot be said to be vitious; and quivis Titulus etiam coloratus, purges the vitiousness of the intromis­sion. Strathurd Reporter. Gibson Clerk.

D. 206. Kelhead contra Irving and Borthwick. eod. die.

JOhn Irving Merchant in Drumfries, having furnished Mournings, Win­ding-sheet and others necessary for the Funerals of the deceast Earl of Queensberry; did take a Bond for the Sum of 1424 merks from the Coun­tess Dowager, Relict of the said Earl; which, tho it did bear only that Narrative, that the Lady was addebted to the said John, without relati­on to the Cause foresaid, yet it appeared it was for that Cause; In swa far as, the said Countess, being confirmed Executrix to her Husband, had obtained an Exoneration; and the foresaid Debt, contracted for the Fune­rals, was one of the Articles of the same.

The said Countess having deceased, the Earl of Queensberry her Son was confirmed Executor to her; and a Decreet being obtained against him at the instance of the said John Irving, for the foresaid Debt, he suspended upon multiple Poinding against the said John Irving, and the Laird of Kelhead, and James Borthwick, and certain other Creditors.

The said Laird of Kelhead alleadged, that he ought to be preferred as [Page 93] to the Goods confirmed by the said Earl, as Executor to the said Coun­tess, because the said Countess was his Debitor in the Sum of 5000 merks; and to the effect he might be satisfied of the said Debt, had disponed to him her Moveables if he should not be satisfied in her own Lifetime; and that he had done Diligence upon the Disposition of the said Moveables by arrestment, and by taking Possession after the Ladies decease; and thereby had right to the Moveables confirmed by the Earl, and thereup­on ought to be preferred.

Whereunto It was Answered, That the said Disposition did not give Right to Kelhead, unless Tradition had followed upon the same in the La­dies lifetime: and the Lady had not only retained Possession, but by the Conception and Nature of the Right, Kelhead could not have Possessi­on, seing he was to have Right to the Moveables after the Ladies decease, if he were not satisfied dureing her lifetime; so that he was in the case on­ly of other Personal Creditors, and must come in according to his Dili­gence: and Irving and Borthwick were not only prior in Diligence, hav­ing obtained Decreets, but were priviledged and preferable before all o­ther Creditors, in respect the said Irving's Debt was of the Nature fore­said, for the defraying of the Funerals, and James Borthwick's Debt was for Drugs.

It was Duplyed for Kelhead, as to Irving, that any Priviledge he preten­ded to, did cease; In sua far as the Debt was innovat, and was not a Debt upon the Executry of the Earl of Queensberry, but became a Debt of the Countess her self, who had given Bond (as said is) without any Relati­on to the Cause foresaid: And as to James Borthwick, there being two Debts due to him, one by Bond, and the other by an Accompt, the Bond did bear borrowed Money and Annualrent, and was not a priviledged Debt.

The Lords Found, That Kelhead had no Right to the Moveables, by the Disposition foresaid, and was only a Personal Creditor: whereupon They Found also, that Debts of the nature foresaid, upon the account of Funerals, and of Drugs furnished the time of the Defuncts sickness, are priviledged; so that the Creditors, tho they be not Creditores Hypotheca­rii, are Privilegiati, and preferable to other Personal Creditors.

They Found also, That Irving's Debt was still Priviledged, notwith­standing that the Countess had given Bond for the same; seing it did not bear borrowed Money, but only that she was addebted; and it appears by the Testament and Exoneration, that she was addebted upon no other ac­count, but for the Cause foresaid.

They also did Find, That the foresaids Debts being Priviledged, as to the Countess, they are Priviledged also as to her Executor: and that James Borthwick should come in with the said Irving, as to his Accompt; but not as to his Bond: and as to it, was to come in with the rest of the Credi­tors. Craigie Reporter. Gibson Clerk.

D. 207. Captain Gordon and Ludquharne contra 17. December 1674.

CAptain Gordon a Privateer, having taken a Ship, named the Wine-Grape, and brought the same to Leith; It was found a free Ship, [Page 94] and not a Prize, by a Decreet absolvitor of the Admiral; in respect it appeared by the Pass, and other Documents, and the Declaration of the Company and Skipper, that it was a Sweddish Ship: And albeit the Skip­per was a Hollander, yet he was received Burgess of Stockholme, and since the War he had transported his Domicile there: This Decreet being questioned by a Reduction before the Lords, upon that Reason, that the Admiral had committed Iniquity in giving the said Absolvitor, in regard the said ship was not a free ship; And it did appear from the Declarations of the Skipper and Company, that the Skipper was a Hol­lander; and a Partner of an eight part of the said ship: And after a long Debate, The Lords granted a Commission to the magistrates of Stockholme in Sweden, to examine such witnesses as either Party should desire, for clearing the point of Fact; and to examine the Sweds that were alledged to have interest in the said Ship and Loadning; and the Skippers wife who was then at Stockholme: And diverse persons and Witnesses being examined upon the said Commission, at the Instance of the Skipper and Defenders in the Reduction; and a Report being return­ed and advised: The Lords, in July last, did Find, That the said Report was a sufficient presumptive Probation, that the Skipper had fixed his Do­micile at Stockholme, and that the Ship and Goods were free and did not belong to the Kings Enemies; The Swedes by the Treaty betwixt Sweden and our King being allowed to make use of Hollanders to be Naucleri and Skippers, dummodo sint Cives & Incolae: and therefore decerned; super­seeding the extracting of the Decreet until September: and if the Pursuers should shew, that they had done Diligence upon the said Commission, the Lords declared they would grant a new Commission.

And thereafter an Agent Matthew Colvil, having gone to Stockholme, in behalf of, and for the Pursuer the Privateer; and having urged, that some Witnesses should be examined by the Magistrates there, upon the Points contained in the former Commission; upon that consideration, that no person was present for the Privateer, when the Witnesses were exami­ned at the instance of the Defenders; and it was not the Pursuers fault, that he was not there himself or his Procurator, seing the said Mr. Colvil going there, and pursueing the said Commission, had made Ship-wrack by the way, and was forced to return back.

The saids Magistrates did refuse to proceed upon the said Commission to examine the said Witnesses, that had been formerly examined, or others pretending that the Commission was execute, and that they had examined both Parties and Witnesses upon the same: and did write a Letter to the Lords, shewing the Reasons whereupon they had refused.

This Session, the Cause being called in praesentia; the Pursuers did ob­ject against the said Report, whereupon the foresaid Interloquitor had proceeded; and in special, that the Depositions of the Witnesses exami­ned at Stockholm were not transmitted; and that they were not so much as named in the Report: and that the Owners had refused to declare up­on that Interrogator, viz. whether their Name was only borrowed for the use of the Kings Enemies, to colour and continue their Trade; pre­tending that they had given their Oaths already to that purpose, upon their obtaining of the Pass: and it was desired for the Pursuers that the Lords would proceed, without respect to the Report and Interloquitor fore­said; [Page 95] and advise and give their Sentence, whether, upon what was be­fore them, the Reason of Reduction was proven.

Upon Debate among the Lords, It was urged, that they had given a Decreet already, but the Extracting was superseeded (as said is) conditio­nally, in order to the granting a new Commission: And the most that the Pursuer could desire in reason, was, that a New Commission should be granted: And all that was before the Lords being formerly advised, and a Decreet given thereupon, and the same standing, there was nothing now to be advised; but the Decreet ought to be Extracted, or at the most a new Commission should be given to the Pursuer.

The Lords notwithstanding, without respect to the said former Decreet, did proceed to advise and Vote, whether there was alse much proven, as to condemn the said Ship.

It was urged by some of the Lords, That tho res were integra, and there were no Decreet; there is no Ground to adjudge the said Ship upon the pretences foresaid, seing the Skippers Oath being a Party had been taken upon the same; and he had declared upon Oath, that he had changed his domicile, and his Residence was at Stockholme; and his Oath being taken, they needed no other Probation, specially seing his Oath is admi­niculate with the Depositions of his Wife, and others taken upon the Com­mission foresaid at Stockholme; being positive, that he had Transported his Domicile there; and no other Probation was adduced to the contrary.

It was farder urged, That the Skipper being a Burgess, and being for the time in Sueden with his Wife and his Child; The Suedish Owners were in bona fide to think, that he was such a person, as by the Treaty they might make use of as Skipper: And what ever could be pretended against him for his own interest, ought not to militate against them.

It was also urged, That His Majesty had written a Letter in favours of the Strangers, recommending them to the Lords Favour and Justice; and it would be thought a strange Return, that the Lords should con­demn both the said Ship, and the Admirals Decreet absolvitor, and their own former Decreet.

It was nevertheless Voted and Found by plurality, that the Ship ought to be adjudged upon the said pretences, that the Kings Enemie had the interest foresaid, both as Skipper and as Owner: diverse of the Lords dis­senting.

D. 208. 23. Decemb. 1674. inter easdem.

THE Sueds having given in a Bill, desireing that seing they offered to prove positive, that the Skipper had changed his Domicile, they might have a Commission to what Judges the Lords pleased, for proving the said Alledgance; Some of the Lords were of Opinion, That the Al­ledgance being unquestionably Relevant was yet competent, In respect the Lords had by their Interloquitor Found, that they had already proven presumptively, that the Ship in question did not belong to the Kings Ene­mies; and alse long as that Interloquitor stood, they needed not prove any farther; the onus probandi of the contrair lying upon the Caper: And the said Interloquitor being since reversed and taken away (as said is) It was neither needful nor competent until now, to offer to prove positive the said Alledgance.

[Page 96]The Lords notwithstanding, Found by plurality, and by one Vote only, that the Alledgance was not now competent; the President being of a contrair opinion; but being carryed by one Vote before it came to him, he could not Vote.

Je me suis estendu trop sur cet Arrest, a cause que les plus habiles & sca­vans des Senateurs opinoyent pour les Estrangers, & Maistre du Navire: & aucuns des ceux qui estoyent de l' autre coste, estoyent parens ou aliez de Luth­quharne, qui estoyt Partie; & gagnoit par l' Arrest 2000 Livres Sterl: ou environ: & l' emportoit par une voix seulement.

D. 209. Pitmedden contra Seatones. eod. die.

IT was Found in the case Sir Alexander Seaton of Pitmedden, contra Seaton of Blair, That Pitmeddens Brother, tho he was Appearand Heir to a Baron, he could not have a Moveable Heirship; because he was not actu­al Baro. Some were of opinion, that as to that Advantage and priviledge of having a Moveable Heirship, it was sufficient that the Defunct was of that quality, that he was one of these Estates; seing a person once Baro, tho he be denuded is semper Baro as to the effect and interest foresaid: And a Prelate, tho for Age he should become unable to serve, and dimit, yet is still a Prelate as to that effect: And the Appearand Heir of a Baron, who has Right and in potentia proxima to be a Baron, and is Peer to Barons, and may be upon the Assize of Noblemen and Barons; if he should be prevented with Death before he be Infeft, it were hard to deny him the priviledge foresaid, that his Heir should have his Movable Heirship: And if his Heir would have the benefite as to a Moveable Heirship, his Intromission with the same ought to import a Behaviour. Lord Forret Reporter.

D. 210. Mr. David Thoirs contra Tolquhon. 2. Jan. 1675.

MR. David Thoirs, having acquired from John Forbes the Lands of Craigfintry, did pursue an improbation against the Laird of Tol­quhon of a Bond and Comprysing deduced thereupon of the said Lands against John Forbes of Gask, the said John Mr. David Thoirs's Authors Great Grandfather: And Certification being granted, and being urged that it should be Extracted; It was Alledged, that it could not be Extract­ed, but ought to be stopt; because the said Bond, whereupon the Com­prysing was deduced, and whereunto, and to the Comprysing thereupon, Tolquhon has Right by progress, was granted to the deceast Mr. William Forbes Advocate, and Registrate in the Commissar Books of Aberdeen in Anno 1632; And the Extract was now produced; which after so long time, and the time of Troubles, the Registers being all in such disorder, ought to satisfy the production; being not only adminiculate, but also ho­mologate in manner aftermentioned, by Patrick Forbes Grand-child and Successor to the Granter, and the said John Forbes the said Patrick's Son; In sua far as the said Bond was granted to the said Mr. William Forbes a person above all exception; and all possible Diligence, both real and per­sonal had been used thereupon by Horning, Comprysing, and Caption: and that the Granter had Suspended the said Bond upon diverse Reasons, [Page 97] and did never question the truth of the same; and Disponed his Estate to Patrick Forbes his Appearand Heir, with the burden of his Debts; and it cannot be thought, but that he understood the Debt in question, to have been comprehended under the general of Debts, having been so much di­stressed for the same: And that the said Patrick did homologate the truth of the said Bond; In sua far as by a Minute of Contract betwixt him and Tolquhon, he had taken a Right from Tolquhon to the said Bond and Com­prysing; and was obliged to pay for the same the Sum thereinmentioned: And the said Patrick having Disponed to his Eldest Son William his Estate, the said John was served Heir to the said William his Brother; and had ho­mologat also the said Bond by Contract betwixt him and Tolquhon, whereby he dispones the Lands Comprysed of new again to Tolquhone, and ratifies the said Apprysing and Grounds thereof: Which Contract, albeit when the said John was Minor, was made with consent of his Friends and Lawyers most deliberately; the said Mr. David Thoirs being one of his Lawyers; And therefore, tho it might be questioned upon Minority, as to any pre­judice or disadvantage the Minor may pretend to have by the same, yet it will stand as an Homologation of the said Bond as to the truth of the same; unless it were offered to be improven, by a positive qualification of Falsehood.

The Lords having considered the Inconvenients on either side, if certi­fications for not production of principals should be loosed, being the great surety of the People: And on the other part, if they should be Snares, and Parties should pursue maliciously Improbation, having viis & modis got the principal Writes out of the Register, or known they had miscar­ryed: They Found, In respect that Mr. David Thoirs having taken a Right, after the matter was litigious by a Charge and Suspension of the Mi­nute, betwixt Tolquhone and the said John Forbes the Great Grand-child; so that the said Mr. David was in the same case, as if the said John were Pur­suer, and was content to state himself in that case; And in respect of the Specialities of this Cause, and Adminicles and Homologations foresaid, that therefore the said Extract ought to satisfy the Production, and the Certification ought not to be Extracted.

D. 211. Pittarro contra E. Northesk. 5. January 1675.

THE Earl of Northesk having taken an Assignation to a Bond, granted by the deceast Laird of Craige and Earl of Dundee to Margaret Car­nagie, and her Children for 1000 Merks, and having Comprysed there­upon Craigs Estate; he did after the Comprysing give a Bond to the said Margaret Carnagie and her Children, that in case he should recover pay­ment, he should make payment to them of the foresaid Sum: Sir David Carnagie of Pittarro, being Debitor to the said Earl in the Sum of 2000 Merks, Suspended upon that Reason, that the said Margaret and her Children had Assigned to him the said Back-bond granted by Northesk; and that the said Earl had Disponed the Right of the said Apprysing to the Lord Hattoun; And therefore became Lyable to pay the said Sum to the Sus­penders Cedent, and the Suspender may and does compense upon the said Bond pro tanto.

It was Answered by the Charger, That the Comprysing did neither be­long to the Suspenders Cedent, nor was to their behoof; the said Bond [Page 98] granted by the Laird of Craig being Assigned ab initio, without any Back-bond: And the Comprysing being deduced before Northesk granted the said Bond: And by the said Back-bond he was obliged only to pay the said Sum in case he should get payment, and he was so far from getting pay­ment of the said Sum, that having comprysed not only upon the said Bond granted to Margaret Carnagie, but for other Debts exceeding far the said Debt due to her; yet got payment of neither.

It was Replyed by the Suspender, That he was not concerned to Dis­pute, whether he got payment or not; but the Charger having Disponed the Comprysing as to the said Sum, without the consent of the said [...] Carnagie and her Children; and without the Burden of the said Back-bond, it was equivalent as if he had got payment; it being all one upon the matter as to the interest of [...] Carnagie, whether Northesk had got payment of the said Sum, or had disponed the Comprysing in sua far as concerns the same.

The Lords, In Respect of the conception of the Bond granted by Northesk, Found, That either he should procure a Retrocession of the said Bond and Comprysing thereupon pro tanto; or that he should pay the Damnage and Interest sustained by the Suspenders Cedent, through Northesks granting of the Right of the said Bond and Comprysing to Hattoun: And in that case, that the Damnage and Interest should be presently liquidate; and being liquidate should be a ground of compen­sation. Glendoich Reporter. Monro Clerk.

D. 212. Eod die.

IT was debated this day among the Lords, whether a Bond being grant­ed by a principal and two Cautioners bound conjunctly and severally; and the Cautioners not bound to relieve one another; if one of the Cau­tioners should take Assignation to the Bond and should pursue the other, the said other Cautioner will have a defence upon that Ground, That al­beit they be not oblidged to relieve one another pro rata, yet that the said obligement inest, in sua far as, they are bound conjunctly and severally: Most of the Lords enclined to find, that the pursuer ought to relieve the Cocautioner pro rata, and had not action but for his own part. But some of the Lords were of another opinion; that there being no obligement upon any of the Cocautioners to relieve one another; one of the Cautioners paying entirely and getting an Assignation, in effect emit nomen: And tho both the Cautioners be oblidged conjunctly and severally in relation to the Credi­tor, yet there is no Transaction or obligement betwixt the Cautioners them­selves; every one having actio mandati as to the principal for their relief, which inest, tho the principal were not bound to relieve them expresly: but ought to be considered as quilibet, and Strangers one to another.

But because the Lords were divided, and it was alledged on either hand, the case was formerly decided; the Decision was delayed this day; Vide infra 28. January 1675.

D. 213. Laird of Hempsfield contra Bannantine. eod. die.

THE Laird of Hempsfield with certain Cautioners for him, having grant­ed a Bond of 6000 Merks to the deceast James Bannantine and his Wife, the longest liver of them two; and after their decease to John Ban­natine [Page 99] their Son; whereupon Inhibition was execute against the principal and Cautioners: And the said John Bannantine did pursue a Reduction and Improbation against these who had acquired Rights, after the Inhi­bition.

It was Alledged, That the Pursuer had no interest, because the said Bond was Blank in the name of the substitute, and the pursuer could not be understood to be the Bairn to whom the Sum is to be payable after the decease of his Father and Mother, seing he was not born the time of the granting of the Bond: And as to the Inhibition it was not at the in­stance of the Pursuer, but of his Father and Mother.

It was Answered, That the Bond was opponed, bearing the Pursuers Name; and tho the Bond had been Blank, and the Pursuer not born when it was granted, the Father might have filled up any of his Bairns Names as he thought fit: And as to the Inhibition, it was at the instance of the Father James Bannantine who was Fiar; and did accresce to the Pur­suer, being substitute in the Fee after his decease.

The Lords Repelled the Alledgance.

It was thereafter Alledged, That the Pursuer was satisfied of the Debt, in sua far as either the Debitor or Cautioners had payed the same, at least a part thereof, and did satisfy pro tanto; or some other persons, having ac­quired their Lands after the Inhibition, had given Money to the Pursuer or his Father, to pass from the Inhibition as to them, which ought to be allowed as payment pro tanto.

It was Answered, That the Alledgance is not Relevant, unless it were in these Terms, that the Pursuer or his Father had accepted what was pay­ed by the saids persons in satisfaction of the Debt pro tanto; otherwayes, that there is no solutio, but only a Transaction betwixt the persons fore­said, and the Pursuer, to free themselves from Trouble and of a Plea; and what was given, was not in satisfaction of the Debt in whole or in part, but upon the account foresaid: And seing the Creditor having in­hibite; so that his Inhibition did affect diverse Lands, or having diverse persons bound to him as Cautioners, might warrantably pass from his In­hibition as to some of the Lands, and discharge such of the Cautioners as he thought fit; he might also take a consideration for doing the favour foresaid.

The Lords thought, That if it should be allowed to Creditors to make such Transactions; and what they should get upon account of the same should not be allowed in payment, they might get more nor the double of their Debt; at least more than Principal and Annualrent; and that it would be the occasion of usury. They Found the Defence Relevant, that what should be proven to be given eo nomine should be imputed in satisfaction. Gibson Clerk.

D. 214. Innes contra Innes. 7. January. 1675.

BY a Contract of Marriage a Sum being provided to the Husband and his Wife, and to the Heirs Male of the Marriage; whilks Failȝie­ing to the Fathers Heirs Male whatsomever: An Inhibition upon the said Contract, at the instance of the Eldest Son of the Marriage, and Reduction thereupon was not sustained; because the Father was living, and the Son neither was, nor could be Heir to him, In respect the Father [Page 100] was living: And tho he were dead the Son could have no Right, unless he were Heir, in which case he would be obliged to warrand. Glen­doich Reporter.

D. 215. Laird of Luss contra E. of Nithsdale. eod. die.

A Bond being alledged to be granted by the Earl of Nithsdale, in anno 1621, to one Colquhone and his Wife, for 6000 Merks: And a pur­suit being intented thereupon; It was Alledged, That the Bond was most suspicious, being so Ancient and nothing done thereupon; and in re­spect of other great presumptions, viz. the quality and condition of the said Adam when the said Bond was granted, being designed the Earl's Servant: And that it was improbable, he could have so much Money to lend his Master, or that he and his Heirs should have so long wanted the same: And that it appears, that the Bond has been Blank ab initio, the Creditors Name being filled up with another Ink: And the said Adam being designed to have been the Writer of the Bond; and yet where it bears that he is Writer, it does not bear the said Adam, which it would have born if his name had been filled up from the beginning: And it ap­pears, that the Earl being known to be a person negligent, and being at London for the time, and having to do with Money, might have given the Bond to the said Adam his Servant for raising of Money, and that he forgot to call for it.

The Lords Found, That the said Bond could not be taken away upon the presumptions foresaid; unless it were either prescrived, or the De­fenders would offer to improve it. Gibson Clerk.

D. 216. M cintoish contra Frazer. 9. January. 1675.

M cIntoish pursued Frazer of Streichen, for payment of a Sum due upon Bond; In which Pursuite two Defences being proponed, viz. Pre­scription and Payment; and a Reply made to the first, viz. Interruption by a pursuit; and Litiscontestation being made upon the Defence of pay­ment and the said Reply; It was Alledged, when the Cause was to be ad­vised contra producta, viz. That the Summonds and Execution thereupon produced, for proving Interruption, did not prove the same; In respect the Summonds were never called, nor any Document taken in Judgment thereupon. And as to the Discharge produced, It was Alledged, That it was granted by the persons thereinmentioned as Curators to the Pursuer, and was not subscribed by the Pursuer himself as it ought to have been; there being a great difference betwixt Tutors and Curators; In respect Tutors must act for the Minor, and are Authors as to all deeds done by them; but Curators do only concurr and ought to advise and consent to the deeds of their Minor, which otherwayes are not valid.

The Lords did Find the Discharge did not prove; and it could not be obtruded to the Pursuer who had not subscribed the same; and did also Find that the Summonds and Execution did sufficiently interrupt. Con­cluded cause. Actor Falconer alteri Seaton. Monro Clerk.

D. 217. Town of Edinburgh contra Earl of Loudoune. eod. die.

THE Lady Yester having Mortified a certain Sum of Money for the Poor in certain Paroches in the South; and having employed to the End foresaid the foresaid Sum upon Bond or Contract, granted by the Town of Edinburgh: The Ministers of the said Paroches did pursue the Town of Edinburgh, to hear and see the Tenor of the said Write to be proven; and that being done, that they should be decerned to pay: And did sufficiently prove the Tenor of the same.

In the Process against the Town, There was a Defence proponed, viz. That my Lord Loudoune, who had Interest in the said Mortification, had got payment of the said Sum from the Town of Edinburgh, which they of­fered to prove by his Oath.

The Lords having Ordained his Oath to be taken before Answer; And he being Summonded to that effect, he was holden as confest: And having thereafter upon a Bill, Desired to be Reponed to give his Oath, and being Reponed, he was holden as confest the second time: And in respect that the said Defence was not proven by his Oath, The Lords proceeded and decerned against the Town.

The Town of Edinburgh having intented Process against the Earl of Loudoune, for refounding the said Sum; upon that medium, that the same was formerly payed to him; and that he had confessed, at least was holden as Confest, which is equivalent as to the payment of the said Sum.

It was Alledged, That his being holden as Confest, in the Process foresaid did operate only that the Defence referred to his Oath was not proven, but could not be a Ground of pursuite against himself, unless it were proven by his Oath, that the said Sum was payed to him; and he desired to be Re­poned to his Oath; It was Answered, That he being twice holden as Con­fest, there was no reason to Repone him, and his being holden as Con­fest doth operate in Law alsemuch, as if he had confessed the said Sum; Seing through his Contumacy the Pursuers are prejudged: And he cannot pretend, that he was not a Party in that Process, seing he was holden as Confest, and in the same Process craved to be Reponed, and was Repon­ed as said is: And tho he had not been called ab initio in that Process, yet being called incidenter for proving of an Alledgance; by the certification foresaid he became Partie therein: And as when an incident Diligence is raised against a haver of Writes, for proving of an Alledgance; and the having thereof is referred to the Oath of the Defender in the incident; if he be holden as confest, tho the Alledgance be not proven, the Pursuer of the Incident will have Execution against him as Haver; and for the Dam­nage and Interest sustained through his Contumacy; so it ought to be in this case.

The Lords, Tho the Earl of Loudoun's presumptive Confession (being holden as confest as said is) be a convinceing evidence, that the said Money was payed to him; yet they had that respect to him both as to his quality and integrity, that they would have Reponed him, if he had compeared himself; or had written to the Lords, that he desired to be Reponed; and did intimate alse much to his Procurators: and to that effect did give some time, but no Return being made, they proceeded, and sustained the [Page 102] pursuite at the instance of the Town of Edinburgh, upon the medium fore­said. Monro Clerk.

D. 218. Letter by the Lords of Session to the King. 12. January. 1675.

MY Lord Lauderdale His Majesties Secretary, having writen to the President, concerning the abovementioned Process betwixt Cap­tain Gordon and the Suedes, anent the Ship called the Wine Grape, That the Suedish Envoy had made Application to his Majesty, and had repre­sented, That the Decreet against the Strangers, was caryed but by two Votes; and had given in a List to his Majesty, of those that were for, and against the said Decreet, with diverse Reasons against the same. It was thought fit, that a Letter should be drawen to His Majesty, contain­ing the Grounds, whereupon the said Decreet proceeded; which being done by those who were appointed by the Lords; some of the Lords did object against the same, That they did mention the Lords indefinitly to have given the said Decreet; Whereas His Majesty was informed of the contrary, and the Information was true; and therefore it was desired it should bear, That, upon the Votes of the major part, which is usual in all Cases, the Decreet was pronounced: Specially, seing the said Letter did containe the Grounds of, and did assert the Justice of the said Decreet: So that these, who had voted against the same, could not belye themselves, and put under their hand the contrarie of what they had voted. And albeit in all Judicatories, even in Parliament, what is done by the plurality doth overrule and conclude the Dissenters, so as to submitt to the same: Yet they are not obliged to maintain or assert the Justice of a Sentence and Act, that they had been against in their Judgment and vote.

It was, notwithstanding, carryed by plurality, That without the amendement foresaid the Letter should be subscribed by all the Lords; the President having promised to write to my Lord Lauderdale, what was truly res gesta, when the said Decreet was given: And upon that assureance, some of the Lords declared when they subscribed, that they subscribed not their oun sense, but the sense of the Court: And though they were concluded, as said is, yet they were not convinced.

D. 219. Glendyning contra the Earl of Nithsdale. 13. January. 1675.

WIlliam Glendining having pursued the now Earl of Nithsdale as Heir to Robert the late Earl of Nithsdale his Father, for fulfil­ling a Minute betwixt the said Robert Earl of Nithsdale and William Glendinning of Lagan, from whom the Pursuer had Right: and for pay­ment of the half of the duty of the Lands of Douphingstoun, conform to the said Minut: and Litiscontestation was made in the cause: and for proving the rent of the saids Lands of Douphinstoun, It was craved, that the De­positions of witnesses, that had been adduced in the like process, intent­ed against the said Earl, as representing his Father for implement of the said Minute, should be received in this Process: But the Lords having considered, that the said Earl did not represent his Father active, [Page 103] but was pursued only upon the passive Titles; and that this process against the now Earl, is not against him as representing the last Earl; neither was it alledged that he represents him; Therfor they Found; that the said Depositions could not be repeated in this process; Seing res was inter alios acta; and acta in uno judicio non probant in alio, nisi inter easdem personas; or these who represent him.

D. 220. Edmiston contra Mr. John Preston. eod. die.

WAuchope of Edmiston and his Lady, as Executors to the deceast James Raith of Edmiston, pursued Mr. John Preston lately of Haltrie Ad­vocate, for payment of the Tack duty for a Seam of Coal, belonging to Edmiston, and set to him for certain Years.

It was alledged for the Defender, That he ought not to be lyable for the Years in question; because, having entered to the Possession of the said Coal, and having payed the Duty for the time he possessed; he was forced to cease from working, in respect the said Coal came to be in that condition, that it could not be wrought, partly by reason of the defect of Roof, so that the Coalȝiers neither would nor could work with­out hazard; and partly by reason of bad Air It was Replyed, That the Defender having accepted a Tack of a Subject, lyable to such hazards, eo ipso he had taken his hazard; and was in the case, as if he had acquired a Right to jactus retis.

It was Duplyed, That alea and jactus retis, and spes in venditione, may be, and is understood to be sold; but in Locatione, spes and alea is not thought to be set, unless it appear by the Contract, that the Conductor should take the hazard; seing it is de natura of Contracts of Location, that fruitio is understood to be given and set; and that merces should be pay­ed ex fructibus. And where the Conductor cannot frui, upon occasion of an insuperable impediment, which does not arise, either from his dole, or culpa, or negligence, as in this case; remittitur merces: as is clear, not only when the thing that is set is a subject, not lyable to so much hazard, but when it is contingent, as when Gabells or Custums are set, or Fish­ings, or Milns, or Coals, if there fall out such an impediment, as doth interrupt the fruition and perceptionem fructuum, as if there be Pest and War in the case of Custums; or if Herring should not be got at all; or if upon occasion of inundation, Milns should be unprofitable; or Coal­heughs should be drowned or burnt.

The Lords, before Answer, Thought fit, that there should be conjunct Probation allowed to both Parties, anent the condition of the Coal; and the Defenders desisting and ceasing from working thereof, and the Oc­casion of his desisting: and if the impediment was insuperable. Craigy Reporter.

D. 221. eod. die.

APPlication being made to the Lords by a Bill given in by a Widow, Desireing, that she may be allowed to intromet with the Cropt and Goods pertaining to the Defunct, without hazard of vitious Intromission:

The Lords thought, That such Warrands being Voluntariae Jurisdictionis, and the Commissaries being entrusted, for securing the Estate of Defunct persons to the nearest of Kin, and Creditors, and other persons having inter­est; [Page 104] did Remit the Petitioner to the Commissars of the place. Sir David Falconer Younger was for the Petitioner and subscribed the Bill.

D. 222. Meldrum contra Tolquhone. 20. January 1675.

IN a Declarator of Escheat at the instance of Meldrum contra Tolquhone: It was Alledged, That the Horning was Null, because the Party was Charged only upon six days, albeit he dwelt benorth the Water of Dee: And by the Act of Parliament 1600. cap. 25. All Charges of Horning against persons dwell and benorth Dee, should be upon 15. dayes at the least: And by the 138 Act Parl. 12. K. Ja. 6. It is statute, that in case any Denounciations of Hornings should be at the Mercat Cross of Edin­burgh, upon Charges, upon unlawful and impossible Conditions; the same, and Horning thereupon should be Null: And that there was a Decision in Duries Book in Anno 1625, that Hornings even upon Bonds against per­sons benorth Dee were Null.

It was Answered, That the Act of Parliament in Anno 1600, was only in the case of Hornings upon Citations or Charges to find Law borrowes, or for compearing before the Council, as appears by the narrative of the said Act which doth interpret and regulate the dispositive Words of the Act.

And that the Act of Parliament in Anno 1592. doth not militate in the case of Hornings upon a Clause of Registration, seing after that Act until the said Act 1606, such Clauses that Hornings should be upon 6 dayes, were not thought, and de facto are not impossible.

And as to the practique, It was Answered, that there was a late practi­que in Anno 1664, upon a Debate in the Innerhouse, in the case of Phi­lorth contra Frazer; Whereby it was Found, That the Act of Parliament 1600. is to be understood, in the case foresaid, where Hornings are upon Charges of the nature foresaid, for appearing before the Council, and such like; but not in the case in question and others of that nature, where Hornings are upon Bonds, and Clauses of Registration therein contained, which do bind, and cannot be questioned by those who do oblidge them­selves.

The Lords considered, that the narrative of the said Act doth clear the meaning of the dispositive words; and there needed not to be a Law and remedy as to Hornings upon Clauses of Registration, seing Parties could not help themselves as to Charges to compear before the Council, and others of that nature without a Law: But they were Arbiters, and could make a Law to themselves, as to Clauses contained in Contracts or Writes, if they thought them grievous or impossible: And that there appeared to be a singularitie in the case mentioned by Durie, seing the Charge was given in Orkney upon 6 dayes, which could not well be satisfied: And therefore the Lords, for the reasons foresaid, did sustain the Horning. Actor Hog and Thoirs: alteri Falconer and Forbes. In prae­sentia.

D. 223. Carfrae contra Telzifer. eod. die.

A Person being pursued as representing a Debitor, upon that passive Title, that he had behaved himself as Heir to the Defunct; In sua far as being conveened at the instance of another Party, he had proponed [Page 105] a peremptor Defence: The Lords Found, That the proponing of a De­fence upon payment or such like, was not such a Deed as could infer the Passive Title of Behaving; unless it were adminicled with Intromission or otherwayes. Nevoy Reporter. Hamiltoun Clerk. Vide 10 December 1674.

D. 224. Chalmers contra Ferquharson and Gordon. 22. January 1675.

THE Lords Found, That a Person being Pursued as Intrometter; and having Alledged, that before the intention of the cause she had ob­tained a Gift of her Husbands Escheat, the said Defence is Relevant: And that after Intromission, there being a Donator confirmed before intention of the Cause, or the Intrometter obtaining a Gift tho not declared, there being no necessity to declare the same against her self; that the same doth purge even Intromission before the Gift. Some of the Lords were of ano­ther opinion, upon that Ground, that ipso momento that the parties intromet, there is a Passive Title introduced against them; which doth not arise upon the intention of the Cause, but upon their own Act of behaving; and Jus being semel quaesitum to Creditors cannot be taken from them, except in the case of an Executor confirmed before the intention of the Cause; against whom the Creditor may have Action: And that there is a diffe­rence betwixt a Donator having declared, and an Executor having con­firmed; In respect the Executor is lyable to Creditors but not a Donator; and an Appearand Heir having become lyable by intrometting with Moveable Heirship, and behaving as Heir, his Intromission is not purged by a supervenient Gift; seing his immixing is Aditio facto; and there is eadem ratio as to Intrometters, who are Executors a tort (as the English Lawyers speak) and wrongously: And in effect, by their Intromission adeunt passive, and are lyable to Creditors. Strathurd Reporter.

D. 225. Jean Maxuel contra Mr. William Maxuel. eod. die.

MR. William Maxuel Advocate, being pursued at the instance of Jean Maxuel natural Daughter to Sprinkel, for 5000 Merks Alledg­ed due to her by Bond, granted by the said Mr. William, which she did refer to his Oath; did give in a qualified Oath, Declaring that he had granted a Bond to the Pursuer at the desire of her said Father, but the same was never delivered; and was so far from being effectual, that by the express order of Sprinkel, he was not to deliver the same to the Pursuer without his warrand; and that he had given him order to destroy the said Bond, in consideration that he was not satisfied with the Pursuers carri­age; and that he had left her a Legacy, which the Defender had payed. This quality was thought to be so intrinsick, that his Declaration could not be divided, so as to prove the granting of the Bond, and not the Quality; Specially seing the said Quality was adminiculate with Letters, which the said Mr. William did produce, which were written by Sprinkel to the same purpose: Yet by plurality, It was Found, that his Oath proved the Lybel; and Decreet was given against him. Thereafter the said Mr. William obtained a Suspension upon that Reason, that the Decreet was [Page 106] Extracted by favour of the Clerks, not without precipitation; after that he had applyed to the Lords, and desired that the case might be reconsi­dered: And that the Lords had Ordained the Decreet to be brought back; and because the party refused, they past a Suspension.

The case being debated in praesentia; The Decreet in foro was obtruded, and that it was just upon the matter; seing as to not delivery, It appear­ed by his Oath, that he was trusted to the behoof of the Pursuer, and was in effect a Depositar, so that he could not cancel the said Bond without consent of the Pursuer: To which It was Answered, That the Decreet was Extracted as said is, and that immediatly upon the pronounceing of the same, he had applyed to the Lords to the effect foresaid; And it can­not be said, that he had any Trust from the Pursuer, but only from her Father: And tho he could be thought to be a Depositar; the manner and quality and terms of the Depositation, could not be proven otherwayes, but Scripto or Juramento.

The Lords notwithstanding, Thought they were concerned to adhere to the Decreet being in foro; least their Decreets should be obnoxious to that prejudice that even when they are in foro, they may be questioned and altered; Some of the Lords were of the opinion, that the great considera­tion the Lords should have, is to do Justice, and that the party having omitted nothing upon his part, neither before nor after pronounceing of the same; and upon the matter the reason of Suspension as to the point of Ju­stice and Law being unanswerably Relevant, It was hard that a Party should be grieved upon a pretence of form; there being a singularity in this case upon which the Honour of the Lords may be salved, viz. That the said Decreet was Extracted with too much precipitation.

D. 226. Joynt Petition of the Advocates, 26. January 1675.

A Joint Petition was presented by the Advocates that had withdrawen; whereby they did not expresly desire, that they should be readmitted, but did hold forth that they were free of, and hated the very thought of Sedition, and that the Lords who did best know the Reasons of their withdrawing would vindicate them to His Majesty; and that they were willing to serve with that freedom which their predecessors had formerly, and which they conceived was no more than was necessary for these of their station, in order to the interest of the People, that they acknowledge and were willing to submit to the just Power of the Lords, as their predeces­sors had enjoyed the same, and desired that the Petition should be trans­mitted to His Majesty as satisfactory. Some of the Lords thought, that the Petition was altogether dissatisfactory, and should be thrown over the Barr, being as to the manner, in a joint and Factious way; And as to the matter, no ways satisfactory, insinuating a qualification of the Lords Power, and their Submission; and that the Lords pretended to a Power which their Predecessors had not, and that was not just.

Others of the Lords were of the opinion, That whatever mistakes there might be as to the manner, It was hard upon that account to reject it: and that if the time was not so pressing (that which was appointed for Addresses being to Elapse the very next day) it might have been helped as to the manner, by giving Intimation to the Advocates, that it would not satisfy; But there being no time for that, and the certification being so high and [Page 107] heavy, viz. utter and perpetual incapacity; it might be justly said, as it is Reported, a Judge in England had said in the case of a person accused of Theft, whom he enclined to favour by reason of the meanness of the va­lue of the thing that was stollen, being a Watch of Brass only, and the matter of the Watch being beneath that value which the Law of England requires for punishing Theives Capitally; And it being Alledged, that the Fashion with the Matter did exceed the value foresaid, It is said, that he Answered, That he would take no Mans Life for the Fashion, and it were hard, for the Fashion and modus, and the way of Address to take from so many persons their Livelyhood, and from the Countrey their Service, that was so necessary to them. And that the Advocates fault being a Joint-withdrawing, they might conceive that the expiation of the same should be by a joint Address; And yet the Petition was not joint as to all the Advocates concerned, many having given in and being to give in se­veral Petitions: And as to the matter it was Represented, that though the Petition is general, yet the generals therein contained do imply the particulars that would be satisfactory, seing the Lords did not pretend to any power, but that which was just, and no violation was intended of their Liberties, neither was any innovation introduced or obtruded upon them or their carriage in their station. Upon all which, It was thought, that the Petition should be transmitted simply, to the effect it might import Interruption of the Prescription and Certification; any Acts of Interruption even quales quales being sufficient: And the more short that the Prescription be, and the higher the Certification and prejudice of Prescription, as in this case; the Interruption being the more favourable.

The Lords notwithstanding, Found, that the Petition not being satis­factory, could not be transmitted to any effect. And yet did declare, that albeit the Proclamation was conceived in these terms, viz. That if the Advocates should not give satisfaction betwixt and the 28. day; if they should apply upon the 28. day, their Application should be thought to be within the time contained in the Act: And that in stile of Law, these words, betwixt and a certain Term, does not exclude the day of the Term.

They declared also, That the Petition being dissatisfactory upon that account amongst others, viz. That they did not offer satisfaction, nor desire to be readmitted, That Petitions being given in severally, and bear­ing that they desired to Re-enter, and were willing to give satisfaction conform to the Kings Letter and Proclamation, should be received and transmitted as satisfactory.

D. 227. Eod. die.

UPon a Bill, the Lords Found, That Parties having a joint and equal Interest in Lands and Tenements; both, as to the Right it self, be­ing disponed to them jointly, and as to the respective Proportion and Parts of the said Tenements; the principal Writes should be keeped by such as offered Caution to the other Portioners; and that Transumpts should be given to the other Persons concerned upon the Common Charges of them all.

D. 228. 27. January 1675.

IN the case abovementioned, 5. January instant, concerning Con-cautioners obliged conjunctly and severally for the Principal, without a clause of mutual Relief: The Lords Found, That one of the Cautioners having payed and taken Assignation, the others had a good Defence against him for his own part, notwithstanding of the Reasons there abovementioned; and that it was urged, that the Co-cautioner could not be forced to relieve the Defen­der if he had payed the whole; seing he had neither actio mandati, there being none given by either of the Cautioners to others; nor was obliged to relieve the other Cautioners by an express Clause, which is ever in­sert, when mutual relief is intended: And that this is clear Law, it ap­pears from the Title of the Civil Law de Fidejussoribus ff. lib. 46. Tit. 1. leg. 39. Et leg. 36. ibid. Et. Leg. 11. Cod. eod. Tit.

The Lords Decided, as said is, In respect of a Practique produced be­twixt [...] in anno [...] relating to a former Practique in anno [...]

D. 229. The Minister of Tulliallane contra Colvill of Larg and Kincardne. 28. January 1675.

IT was Found by the Lords Commissioners for Teinds, That the Here­tors of Lands, having Right cum decimis inclusis were not lyable to the Augmentations of Ministers Stipends; and that no Locality could be gi­ven out of their Teinds, the saids Infeftments being before the Year 1587. And that the Feu-duty payable to Church-men for Stock and Teind in Victual, was not lyable thereto; because the Teinds not being separate from the Stock, and the Heretors having Right to the Lands free of Teinds, in effect there were not decimae: And by the Acts of Parliament, and the Kings Decreet Arbitral, Teinds are lyable to Ministers Feu-du­ties, in consideration that the Lords of Erection and Titulars, had Right thereto from the King since the Act of Annexation: And that the King, who might have questioned their Rights, was pleased by the said Acts of Parliament, and Decreet Arbitral, to affect them with the burden of Ministers Stipends; whereas such Rights cum decimis, were granted by Church-men, and did not flow from the King, but from them, at such time as by the Law then standing, they might have granted the same.

D. 230. Doctor Hay contra Jamieson and Alexander. eod. die.

GEorge Steuart Advocate, having comprised from [...] Con, the Lands of Artrochie and others; did dispone the said Lands and his Right of Compriseing to [...] Neilson: and thereafter the said Neilson failing in payment of the price, the said George Steuart did Comprise back from the said Neilson the said Lands: and Andrew Alex­ander did also comprise from the said Neilson the said Lands, and his Right foresaid.

Doctor Hay, Having also comprised from [...] Con the foresaid Lands, pursued an Improbation of the said first Comprysing, at [Page 109] George Steuart's Instance; and having called thereto the said George Steu­art and Neilson, and Marjorie Jamison, who pretended Right to the said Lands; he did obtain a Certification against two Bonds, which were the Ground of the said Comprising; upon Compearance, and a long Dependance, and long Terms assigned for produceing the said Bonds: And thereafter the Doctor pursued a Removing from the said Lands, a­gainst the said Andrew Alexander and others: And it was Alledged for the said Alexander, That he had Right to the said Lands, and was in Possession upon a Right from George Steuart, who had Right thereto, (as said is) by a Comprising against [...] Con the common De­bitor: Whereunto It was Answered, That the Defenders could not found a Defence upon George Steuart's Comprising, Because the saids Bonds, being the Grounds thereof, were false and improven: To which It was Duplyed, That the Certification against the said Bonds, was only granted against George Steuart; and that the said Andrew Alexander was not called, and that now there is produced the foresaids Bonds; And that the Extracts of the same out of the Register of the Commissariot of Aberdene had been formerly produced; but the Principals, which were in publica custodia, as the warrands of the same, could not be then found by reason of the disorder of that and many other Registers, upon occa­sion of the late Troubles; and the same being now found aught to be received and sustained as the Grounds of the said Comprysing; Seing they are not improven and found false by a Decreet of Improbation upon tryal of the Falsehood; But a Certification is only given against the same for not production; which at the most doth amount only to a pre­sumptive Falsehood, which is now taken away (as said is) by produ­ction of the saids Bonds: seing praesumptio cedit veritati.

It was Answered for the Pursuer, That all Persons, whom he was obli­ged to take Notice of, and to call to the Improbation of the first Appry­sing, were called; viz. The said George Steuart, at whose Instance the said Comprising was deduced; and who had also Comprised from Neilson the Right thereof, as said is; and Neilson himself: and that he needed not call the said Alexander, who had only a subaltern Right, and was not infeft: and albeit he had comprised from Neilson, yet by that Comprising he had not such an interest as the Pursuer was obliged to know; in sua far as, the Right of the Lands in question, was settled in the Person of the said George Steuart, by the Comprising against Neilson: after which Neilson had only a Reversion: and the said Neilson was called himself, as said is: And the said Alexander's Right by his Comprising against Neil­son, being only a Right of the Legal of George Steuart's Comprising a­gainst Neilson, the Pursuer was not holden to take notice of the said Right: and the said Reversion is not only now expired, but was expired the time of the obtaining of the said Certification, no Order being used thereupon: And albeit the said Andrew Alexander was not called, yet he did compear in the said Improbation; and albeit he pretends, that his right was re­served, the said pretence is of no weight; seing it was reserved only as accords: And Certifications being the great Security of the People, and specially where the same are obtained upon compearance, and after di­verse termes are assigned; and after Certification granted, the samen stopt for a long time, upon expectation that the Writes may be got, as in this [Page 110] Case; the samen cannot be canvelled and loosed, praetextu Instrumentorum noviter repertorum.

The Lords, For the Reason foresaid, thought hard to loose the said Certi­fication; but specially in this case, seing the said Alexander will have and take the advantage of Stuarts expired Comprysing; and exclude the Doctor who was a true and real Creditor, to whose prejudice the said George Stuart and the other Defenders had patched up, not only the said Comprysing for small Sums, but other Rights; which the Donator had been forced, af­ter he had Comprysed, to question by a Reduction, and had prevailed af­ter a long dependence, and after they had possest the Lands for a long time: And on the other hand, the said principal Bonds being now produced; they thought it hard, that the Doctor should take advantage of the same, to exclude the Defenders altogether; and therefore they pro­posed to the Doctor, that he should grant a Reversion to the said Alexander, upon payment of what was justly due to him, within the space of two Years: And the Doctor acquiesceing, they decerned in the Removing with the quality foresaid, Lord Glendoick Reporter. Gibson Clerk. Actor Chalmers alteri Thoirs. Vide 17. February 1676. inter eosdem.

D. 231. contra Maxuel. 29. January. 1675.

A Bill of Exchange being drawn upon three Merchants, without men­tioning that it was drawn upon them, either severally or con­junctly; and one of the persons upon whom it was drawn, being pursued for the whole Sum in the said Bill, being accepted by them all simply, without mentioning that they had accepted the same only for their own Parts; It was Alledged, That they were only lyable for their own Parts, being correi debendi; which is understood in Law, that they should not be lyable in solidum, unless it were so exprest, especially seing the Pursuer cannot say, that they were either Partners, or that each of them had pro­vision extending to the whole Sum.

The Lords, having thought fit to try the custom of Merchants, and to take the opinion thereupon of certain Merchants in Edinburgh; and the Report being positive, that it was the custom of Merchants, both in the place where the Bill was drawn and here, that there should be Action in solidum upon such Bills, when they are drawn and accepted simply in manner foresaid; Found the Defenders lyable in solidum.

D. 232. McKintoish contra McKenȝe. 29. January. 1675

A Decreet, against a person holden as Confest before the Lords of Sessi­on about 20 Years agoe, was questioned as null; upon that pre­tence, that it did not bear, that the Party, against whom it was given, was personally apprehended, but only that he was lawfully cited.

The Lords Found, That after so long time, the said Decreet could not be declared null and void, upon pretence of an intrinsick Nullity; In re­gard the said Decreet did bear, that the Defender was lawfully cited to give his Oath; and he could not be thought to be lawfully cited, unless he had been personally apprehended; and praesumitur pro sententia, and that omnia are solenniter acta; unless it were made appear by production of the Execution, that the Defender was not personally apprehended: [Page 111] And therefore the said Reason of Nullity was Repelled; Reserving Action of Reduction as Accords. Monro Clerk.

D. 233. Scrimzeor contra Kingheny. 2. February. 1675.

MAjor Scrimzeour having named in his Testament in Anno 1650. Sir John Carnagie, and the Tutor of Purie Fodringhame and Alexander Wedderburne of Kinghenie to be Tutors to his two Daugh­ters: Margaret Scrimzeour one of the said Daughters pursued the said Alexander Wedderburne for Compt and Reckoning and Payment; and an Auditor being appointed, and that Question being started before him, viz. Whether the Tutor should be Lyable for Negligence, from the time that he accepted; or before, after he knew that he was named Tutor: And upon the Auditors Report, It was Found by the Lords, that he should be lyable only from the time of his accepting; and yet the Pursuer having desired and got a Hearing in the Innerhouse, It was again urged for her, that the Tutor should be lyable, after he knew that he was named, and did cease to do that Diligence that was incumbent to him; and di­verse Citations were adduced from the Civil Law, and the Titles of the ff. & Cod. De Tutela & Tutoribus; And De Administratione & periculo Tu­torum; which ought to militate in this case, especially in respect the said Defender was not only named Tutor, but was a Legator; a considerable Sum being left to him by the said Testament, which Law presumes was left to him in contemplation of the burden of Tutory put upon him; so that having accepted the said Legacy, and having confirmed himself Executor Legator, he could not decline the Office, not to be Lyable as Tutor or ut Protutor. And it was farder urged, that as Executor Lega­tor, he was lyable to do Diligence: To which It was Answered, That the former Interloquitor was opponed being just, and upon Relevant Grounds of Law, in respect the Civil Law is not received by us altogether in the case of Tutors; the Office of Tutorie by the Civil Civil Law being munus publicum & necessarium, which no person can decline, unless he have and alledge a just Ground of Excuse, within the time limited by that Law; whereas by our Law and Custom, when any person or persons are named Tutors, they are at liberty to accept the said Office or not; so that a person named Tutor until he accept, neither is, nor is obliged to do the Duty of a Tutor: And albeit by the Civil Law, a Legacy being left to a Tutor, is presumed to be left eo intuitu and upon condition, that he should accept to be Tutor, yet by the Civil Law, if the person named Tutor do not actually get the said Legacy, nisi consecutus sit, which are the words of the said Law, he is not obliged to accept the said Office; and it is not, nor can it be said, that the Defender got the said Legacy before he did ac­cept: And as to that other Ground, that the Defender being Executor Legator was obliged to do Diligence; It was Answered, That by late Decisions, an Executor Creditor is only lyable to intromet, in order to his own satisfaction; and an Executor qua Legator is in the same case as an Executor Creditor; seing a Legacy is a Debt payable out of the Executry; and the Legator has no interest to confirm, but to the effect he may be payed of the same.

The Lords Found, That a Tutor is lyable only from the time that he did accept: and that the leaving to him, and his accepting of a Legacy did not [Page 112] alter the Case; unless before his accepting of the said Office, he not on­ly had owned, but got the said Legacy: And this Pursuit being only actio Tutelae, and for Compt and Reckoning against the Defender as Tu­tor, they did not determine the said Question, How far an Executor Le­gator should be lyable? but reserved the same, until the Defender should be pursued as Executor.

The Lords, in the Debate amongst themselves, some of them did urge these Arguments; That a Tutor being lyable only ratione Officii, he can­not be lyable before he accept the said Office; it being inconsistent with Law, that he should be lyable to the Duty of an Office before he have it, which would be Filius ante Patrem. 2. In Law, a Tutorie is quasi Contractus; and as in all Contracts, it is required that there should be the mutual Deeds of both Parties contracters; and the Nomination (which is the Deed of the Defunct) did not bind the Tutor, until he bind himself by accepting, which is his own Deed. 3. That a Tutor, having a Le­gacy, should be obliged to accept it, is only provided by the Civil Law; which is the Municipal Law of the Romans; and is not of force with us, until it become our Law, either by a Statute, or Custom authorizing the same; and even by the Civil Law, praesumitur only that the Legacie left to the Tutor is upon the account foresaid, but that Presumption is only in the case, where it cannot be thought, that the Defunct would have left the Legacie upon another account, viz. of Relation or any other Consi­deration; Whereas, in this case, it cannot be thought, that the said Legacy was left to the Defender, upon the account that he was Tutor, in respect he being the last named of the three Tutors, there were no Legacy left to them; and he was Nephew to the Defunct, who had a great kindness for him: and the said Legacy was not left to him simply, but in case his Wife, whom he thought to be with Child, should not be brought to bed of a Son. 4. The Defender could not accept the said Office of Tutor Testamentar, Because he and the other two Tutors were named conjun­ctly, and the other two living, he could not be Tutor alone. Actor Dal­rymple, alteri Falconer. Monro Clerk.

D. 234. 3. February 1675.

A Removing being pursued from some Lands of the Estate of Collarnie; the Lady Collarnie compeared, and alledged, that the Tennent could not be removed without her consent, seing the had right to a Terce by the Law, and was not excluded by her Contract of Marriage, tho she was provided thereby to a Jointure, but not in satisfaction of her Terce, or what else she could pretend: Whereunto It was Answered, That she was not served nor kenned to a Terce; and until then, she had no interest to compear to stop the Removing.

The Lords Repelled the Defence, and Found she had no Interest: Re­serving her Right of Terce, when she should be served and kend, as ac­cords. Craigie Reporter.

D. 235. Oliphant of Provostmains contra [...] eod. die.

A Bill was given in, desiring, that a Comprising being deduced, and the Messenger having deceased in the interim, before he subscri­ed [Page 113] the same; Therefore an other Messenger who was his Collegue might be allowed and Warranted to subscribe the said Comprising.

The Lords considered, That the Messenger that was on life, tho he had been employed to execute the Letters of the Comprising, by denounceing and citeing, yet he did not sit and was Collegue to the deceast Messenger and was Judge with him, the day and time of the deduceing of the said Comprising: and that a Comprising being Processus Executivus, consist­ing of the Executions, and of the Process and Sentence of Comprising, upon the day that the Debitor was cited thereto; tho diverse Messengers may act severally as to Citation and Denunciation, yet none of them could be looked upon as the Judge and the Pronouncer of the Sentence, who ought to subscribe the same, but the Messenger that did actually sit as Judge, and upon the verdict of the Inquest, did Decern and Ad­judge.

D. 236. Cranston contra Mr. Mark Ker of Moriston. 4. February, 1675.

UPon a Bill, it was desired, that Witnesses should be examined in re­lation to a Process, that their Depositions should lye in retentis: But The Lords Found, That tho Summons were raised, that the samen not being execute, there was not a Dependence: and that it was a streatch great enough, to receive Witnesses before Litiscontestation in a depend­ing Process, which the Lords are sometimes in use to do: but that Wit­nesses should be received upon a Bill, without the Foundation of a Pro­cess, it is inconsistent with Form.

It is to be Regrated, That of late, the time of the English, that Abuse having creept in, that there are so many Bills given in, and sometimes past through inadvertencie in a hurrie; the said custom should be yet re­tained; so that Bills do justle out Process and the hearing of Causes; E­specially it being considered, that they are oft times offered in the very time, when after pleading in other Causes, Parties and Advocates are re­moving; which is the Occasion that oft times most of the Lords are not advertent when the same are offered: And it is a Practice not suteable to the gravity of the Court, and not without a dangerous Consequence; seing Bills may be anent Matters of great importance, which ought to be offered to the Lords in a decent way, and should be considered by them deliberatly.

D. 237. [...] contra [...] eod. die.

THE Ship called the Wine-Grape, mentioned in the Case abovere­lated Num. 207; Being Found by a Decreet of the Admiral not to be a Prize: and thereafter the said Decreet being reduced upon a con­tentious Debate in foro: A Bill of Suspension was given in, making mention, that the Lords having thought fit, during the dependence, the Value of the Ship being liquidate, the Price thereof should be sequestrate in the Complainers hands, upon a Bond to pay the Sum therein contained to the Caper and his Owners, if they should prevail in the Reduction fore­said: And that he was charged to pay the said Sum, the Process being now at a period by the said Decreet Reductive, at the instance of an [Page 114] Assigney: And that he could not pay the same until an Arrestment made in his Hands, at the instance of the Swedes the former Owners of the said Ship, should be purged; which Arrestment was upon the Dependence of a Reduction, intented at the Strangers instance, for reduceing of the said Decreet Reductive: It was debated upon the Bill, and amongst the Lords, that the said Decreet being in foro contradictorio, was of that nature, that it could not be reduced: and it were of a dangerous Con­sequence, that after Decreets in foro, the People should not be secure, but upon pretence of the dependance of Reductions of the same, that which was found to belong to them by such Decreets, should be again lyable to Ar­restment and to questioning: And upon the other hand, It was considered and alledged, That there being Arrestment and Warrand for the same upon the dependance, the Debitor was not concerned to dispute what the Issue of the same may be, but there being de facto an Arrestment, the same ought to be purged; which could not be in forme, but either by lousing the Arrest­ment, or by refusing the Bill upon the reason of Arrestment; the Defend­er in this Reduction finding Caution to make forthcoming, if the Pursu­er should prevail.

The Lords, notwithstanding Found, That in respect the matter was al­ready decided by a Decreet in foro, that the Bill should be refused, not­withstanding of the said Arrestment upon the dependance foresaid; which was hard as to the Debitor, who could not be formally secured, but in manner foresaid: And likeways hard as to the Strangers, seing by the said Deliverance, the Lords did in effect predetermine the Reduction now de­pending; and upon the matter did Find, That the Pursuer could not have Interest to pursue, before the Pursuer was heard in the said Reducti­on.

D. 238. Vanse Jaylor of the Tolbooth of Edinburgh, 5. February 1675.

MR. Vanse Jaylor of the Tolbooth of Edinburgh, did give in a Bill, complaining that the Jaylor of the Canongate was in use to enlarge Prisoners being put in for debt, upon the Warrand and consent of the Creditor at whose instance they were imprisoned; whereas the Complain­er did not enlarge any such Prisoners, without Warrand of the Lords Letters: and therefore desired, that either he should be allowed to have the same liberty, or that it should be denyed to other Jaylors.

The Lords did consider what was fit to be done in all such like Cases; and in end, the plurality did resolve, that where the Sums were small, not exceeding 200. merks, the Jaylor might enlarge Prisoners for debt, without any other Warrand but the consent of the Parties, at whose in­stance they were imprisoned; which they did upon that consideration, that Poor People, if they should be forced to suspend and relax, with a Warrand to put them out, would be sometime put to more Charges, than the Debt doth amount to. Five of the Lords did dissent, being of the Opinion, That the Prison being His Majesties Prison, no person could be put in upon Letters of Caption, unless the same were under the Signet; and no person put in by Warrand of the said Letters, could be enlarged without Letters to that effect; nam unumquodque dissolvitur, eo modo quo contrahitur: And the Prisoner being put in for his Rebellion, could not [Page 115] be enlarged, unless he were relaxed: And if Parties did suffer themselves to be taken and incarcerat for small Sums, it was their own fault, and more unexcusable the less the Sum be; and majus & minus non variant speciem: And it being acknowledged by the Law, they being Prisoners for greater Sums, they could not be enlarged, without a Warrand to put them to liberty; and the Law making no distinction of greater and less Sums, the Lords had not a Legislative Power to alter or qualifie the same, without an Act of Parliament.

D. 239. Burnet contra Lutgrue. eod. die.

A Commission being directed for taking the Oath of a Stranger residing in Holland; the Report was questioned upon that pretence, that the Strangers Deposition was not subscribed, albeit the Commission did bear, that he should subscribe the same: and yet it was sustained, because of the Custom of Holland, that the Judges only subscribe, and the same was sub­scribed by them; And it was adminiculate with a Letter from him, bear­ing, that he had declared before the Commissioners, and that he would adhere to what he had declared. Gibson Clerk.

D. 240. Marion Binnie contra Gilbert Scot, eod. die.

THE deceast William Scot of Bonington having three Sons, William the eldest, and Robert, and Gilbert: The said William by his Con­tract of Marriage, had the Lands and Estate of Bonington disponed to him by his Father Mr. James Scot; but was not infeft therein: and after his decease his Brother Robert having succeeded to him, did renew a Bond granted by the said William, in favours of Robert Riddel; and having re­tired the said William's Bond, did grant a new Bond for the Sum there­in contained: And the said Robert having also deceased, before he was in­feft in the Estate, or served Heir to the said William; and the said Gilbert the third Son having succeeded: a Pursute was intented, at the instance of the Relict and Executrix of the Creditor, against the said Gilbert, as re­presenting the said William and Robert his Brothers; at least to hear and see it found and declared, that the said Bond granted by Robert, was gran­ted by him in contemplation and lieu of the said William's Debt and Bond; and that it ought to affect any Estate that did belong to the said William; and in special the benefite of the said Contract of Marriage, and dispo­sition therein made in favours of the said William.

It was Alledged for the Defender, That he did not Represent Robert nor William, upon any Passive Titles; and tho he should represent William, neither he nor the Estate would be Lyable to the said Debt, In respect the samen was extinct, and innovate by a new Bond granted by the said Robert; whom neither he did nor would Represent: And the said Bond being granted only by Robert, could not affect any thing belonging to William; and he was not concerned to debate upon what account the said Bond was given by Robert.

The Lords did encline to sustain the Declarator, upon that head, that the said Innovation was only to the effect, the Creditor might be the bet­ter secured and satisfied; the said Robert being Appearand Heir for the [Page 116] time; and who if he had lived would have perfited his Right, and obtain­ed himself served Heir to William; but being prevented by Death, so that the said Bond was altogether ineffectual, the Pursuer had condictionem causa data causa non secuta, to be Reponed against the said Innovation: and the Defender was in dolo pessimo to question the same, seing nemo debet locupletari cum aliena jactura; And he ought not to have William's Estate without payment of his Debt: And some of the Lords did urge and in­stance the case aftermentioned, viz. If the Younger of two Brothers, the Elder having gone Abroad, and thought to be dead, should obtain him­self served as Heir to his Father; and the Creditors of the Father conceiv­ing that he had Right should renew their Bonds, and give back these that they had from the Father, and thereafter the Elder Brother should return and should be served Heir to his Father, whether in that case the Creditors might have Action against the Elder Brother and Estate, notwithstanding of the said Innovation?

But because the case was New, and not without Difficulty, The Lords before Answer thought fit to try, what way it could be made appear that the said Bond was in lieu of a Bond granted by William. Newbyth Re­porter. Gibson Clerk.

D. 241. Broun contra Ogilvie. eod. die.

A Person being pursued for an Annuity of Money, did claim the bene­fite of Retention conform to the late Act of Parliament: But the Lords Found, that albeit Retention was granted for relief of Debitors of their Taxation, and that the Debitor was alike concerned as to the end foresaid, whether he payed the Annualrent as the usura and profite of a principal Sum, or as Annuity due upon a personal Bond; yet the Act of Parliament, mentioned only Annualrents: And being, as all Acts of Par­liament, stricti Juris, specially such as are correctoriae Juris communis; it could not be extended beyond the Letter of the Law. Nevoy Reporter. Gibson Clerk.

D. 242. Collonel Fulertoun contra The Laird of Boyne. eod. die.

THE deceast Laird of Towie having named his Relict now Lady Boyne Tutrix to his Daughter; and in case of her Marriage Collonel Fulertoun: The said Collonel pursued the Laird of Boyne for delivery of the said Pupil: It was Alledged, That her Mother and her Husband would entertain the Pupil gratis. It was Answered, That Boyne being her Step Father, and having no other Relation, but that of Vitricus, which in Law is not favoured; his offer to entertain is not Relevant against the Tutor, who has the Trust both of the Pupils person and Estate: And it is to be presumed, that the offer of the Step-Father is upon a design upon the Pupill her Person and Fortune; and that the case had been determined in terminis 4. July 1649. Langshaw contra Mure.

The Lords Repelled the Defence, and Ordained the Pupil to be de­livered to the Tutor. Strathurd Reporter. Gibson Clerk.

D. 243. [...] contra [...] eod. die.

THE Lords Found, That a Warrand could not be given to cite at the Mercat cross with certification pro confesso; seing no person could be holden as confest who is not personally apprehended. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk.

D. 244. Duke of Monmouth contra Earl of Tweeddale. eod. die.

THere being a Transaction betwixt the Duke and Dutchess of Monmouth, and the Earl of Tweeddale, whereupon a Discharge was granted by the said Duke and Dutchess to the said Earl, with consent of their Cu­rators, which was also superscribed by his Majesty taking burden for the Duke and Dutchess; with an obligement, that they should ratify after Majority: The said Duke and his Lady pursued a Reduction of the said Discharge, upon a reason of Minority and Lesion; It was Alledged, That all Parties haveing Interest were not called, viz. The Officers of State for His Majesties Interest; seing His Majesty was so much concerned, that if any thing were evicted from the Defender, His Majesty would be Lyable for the same.

The Lords Repelled the Defence: Without prejudice to His Majesties Advocat to appear for his interest, if he thought fit. Stathurd Reporter. Gibson Clerk.

D. 245. Irving contra Caruther. 6. February 1675.

THE Summonds being referred to the Defenders Oath, who having declared that as to what was referred to his Oath he could not re­member nor be positive; It was debated amongst the Lords, whether the Oath did prove or not: Or if the Defender should be holden as Confest, In respect he was to declare de facto proprio & recenti; and in such a case the pretence of non memini is neither excuseable nor relevant: And so it was Found by the Lords, tho some were of the Opinion, that a person compear­ing and declareing upon Oath, that to his knowledge he did not remem­ber, could not holden as confest, seing he cannot be said to be contuma­cious; and to want Memory is not a fault: And after a party has declar­ed, it is only to be considered, whether the Oath proves or not. Mr. John Hay Clerk.

D. 246. Burnet contra McClellane. eod die.

A Father being pursued, as Behaving himself as Heir to his Son, and Litiscontestation being made, and Witnesses adduced; the time of the Adviseing, It was Alledged, That the Father could not represent his Son as behaving, because the Defunct had a Brother who was produced, and at the Barr: Whereto It was Answered, That in hoc statu the Defence was not receivable; and it could not be said to be noviter veniens, seing the Father could not be ignorant that he had another Son.

The Lords, in respect of the State of the Process, would not receive the Defence, tho verified instanter, unless the Son would suscipere judici­um, and be content that the Process should proceed as against him: which [Page 118] appears to be hard; seing that which was to be proven, was not only that the Defender intrometted, but that he was appearand Heir; and in casu notorio, no probation was to be respected to the contrary: and tho the Fa­ther could not but know that he had a Son, yet he might be ignorant that his Son would be preferred to himself, as to the Succession of his own Son: and in damno vitando, ignorantia Juris is excusable. Mr. J. Hay Clerk.

D. 247. [...] contra Captain Martine and others. 9. February. 1675.

A Ship being taken by a Caper, and being found by a Decreet of the Admiral to be a Prize: Thereafter, upon a Decreet of the Lords, reductive of that of the Admiral, being found to be a free Ship, the Stran­ger did urge payment against the Captain and the Owners of the value; And It was Alledged, That the Decreet of the Lords, Ordaining Restitu­tion, was against them as correi debendi, and not in solidum, and that they are only lyable for their own parts: Whereunto It was Answered, That though it was found, That the Captain had probable Reasons for bring­ing up the said Ship, yet upon the matter, the Stranger was wronged by the taking of his Ship; and in casu delicti, by spuilȝie or wrongous in­tromission, or otherways, Decreets against the Persons therein contained are construed to be in solidum: and the Stranger cannot know, what the respective Interests and Parts of the Owners are; and ought not distra­hi, and to be put to Process against every one of them, for declaring of their Parts.

The Lords Found, That they were lyable in solidum; Reserving their Debate and Relief amongst themselves, as to their several Interests and Proportions. Lord Forret Reporter. Gibson Clerk.

D. 248. Burd contra Reid. eod. die.

THE Lords having formerly Found, That the Cedents of Personal Bonds, are lyable only to warrand debitorem esse, but not esse lo­cupletem; It was pretended, That there being a Question concerning War­randice of a Right of Annualrent out of Land, the same should be war­randed no other way: But The Lords Found, That the Warrandice of Lands, or of such real Rights, upon or out of Land, are absolute, unless they be expresly limited and qualified by their Right. Hamilton Clerk.

D. 249. Vetch contra the Creditors of James Ker and Peter Pallat. eod. die.

SIR Robert Stewart in Ireland and his Son, being Debitors by Bond in the Sum of 800. lib. starl. to the deceast James Sanderson; which Bond being conceived in the Form of English Bonds, did not bear Annual­rent: The said James did assign the said Bond in Favours of Ronald Graham in trust, and to his own behoof, upon a Back-bond; and there­after did assign the said Back-bond in favours of James Ker and Robert Broun Merchants; as to two Parts to the said Ker, and the third part to Broun.

Sir George Maxuel of Pollock being Trustee, and acting in name of the [Page 119] said Stewarts, did grant a Bond to the said Ker and Broun, making men­tion of the said Bond granted by the Stewarts, and of the Assignation made by the said James Sanderson to the said Broun and Ker; and that after Compt and Reckoning, there was only resting of the said Sum 300. lib. sterl. which the said Sir George, in name of the said Stewarts, is obliged to pay within three Moneths after that Stewarts Bond should be delivered to him, with an Assignation or Discharge.

The said James Ker being deceased, his Executors did intent Action a­gainst the said Sir George Maxuel, for his part of the said Sum, viz. 200. lib.

In this Process, William Vetoh did compear for his Interest, and did al­ledge, that the Sum in question due by Sir George Maxuel, did belong to him, having fallen under the Rebellion of the said James Sanderson, and the Gift of his Escheat, first Gifted to David Rodger, fra whom the said William had right, and thereafter to the said William himself: and tho the said Bond, granted by Sir George Maxuel, was granted to the said Ker and Broun, yet it was granted for the same Sums, that were due by the said Stewarts to the said Sanderson, as appears by the Bond granted by the said Sir George Maxuel; so that the foresaid Sum due to Sanderson, and the Bond for the same, having (as said is) fallen and belonged to the King, it does still belong to him and his Donator; Notwithstanding the said new Bond granted by Sir George Maxuel in place of the same, seing Surrogatum sapit naturam, &c. It was Answered, That the said Sanderson being Debitor to Ker and Broun; as he might have payed his Debt after the Rebellion, or the Creditors might have gotten satisfaction by poind­ing or Arrestment before the Rebels Escheat, so he might have assigned the Debt due to him for their satisfaction. Whereunto It was Answered, for the said William Vetch, That the Rebel cannot make assignation stante rebellione, the Act of Parliament in anno 1592. K. Jam. 6. Parl. 12. cap. 145. Entituled, Anent the Escheats of Rebels, Bearing expresly, That no Assignation shall be valid being made by a Rebel at the Horn, in defraud of the Creditor; if he be at the Horn for the same cause: And therefore the said Assignation made by Sanderson when he was at the Horn, in pre­judice of Rodger, Vetch his Cedent, at whose instance he was at the Horn for the same Debt, is void: and what may be in the Case of actual pay­ment, or of Poinding, or legal Diligence, needs not be debated in this case; seing the Rebel did neither make payment, nor was the said Debt due by the Stewarts, affected with Legal Diligence, but a voluntar Assig­nation was made by the Rebel, which being Null, for the Reason fore­said, and the Pursuers Right to the Sum in question, being founded up­on the same, the Pursuer can have no Right to the foresaid Sum; and the said Vetch having undoubted Right (as said is) ought to be pre­ferred.

The Lords by their Interloquitor 10 Decenber last, did find that an Assignation made by a Rebel to his Creditor, albeit for a Debt preceeding the Rebellion, and that the Assignation was granted before the Gift of the Rebels Escheat, cannot prejudge the King or his Donator: But that payment made by the Rebel, or any other in his name, upon his Precept or Assignation, being before the Donators Gift, is sufficient to liberate the Creditor from Repetition.

[Page 120] It was further Alledged for the Pursuer, that the said Bond granted and due by the Stuarts was extinct and innovat; In fua far as the said Sir George Maxuel had granted the said other Bond to the said Ker and Broun for the same Sum, which was equivalent to payment.

Whereunto It was Answered, That the said Bond granted by Sir George Maxuel was in effect but a Bond of Corroboration, whereby the said Sir George became expromissor, and upon the matter Surety for the said Sum; So that the former Bond was not innovat nor extinct, being neither Discharged nor Retired; but being only to be Discharged or Assigned upon payment made by Sir George, which implyes that it could not be innovat nor extinct, seing it could not be Assigned if it had been extinct.

The Lords before Answer to that Point, viz. If the said Transaction was equivalent to Payment, declared they would take Sir George Maxuel's Oath ex officio, at what time the said Bond granted by the Stuarts were delivered up to him, and by whom; and if any Discharges were granted to him of the said Bond.

Sir George Maxuel having declared upon Oath, That he had recovered the said Bond from Ronald Grahame, and that he had not taken a Dis­charge of the said Bond either from him or from the said Ker and Broun.

This Day the Debate was again resumed at the Barr, and amongst the Lords; and these Arguments were urged by His Majesties Advocat. viz. That by the Rebellion Jus quaeritur Domino Regi, and that confiscation ex delicto is upon the matter a Legal Assignation, and equivalent to an Assignation intimate: And if there were two Assignations, and the Debi­tor being out of the Country, the first Assignation had been intimate at the Mercat Cross, and Pear and Shoar of Leith, and the Debitor having return­ed, the second Assigney had intimate his by way of Instrument, and thereup­on the Debitor had bona fide made payment to him, the first Assigney notwithstanding would be preferable: And tho the Debitor would be free in respect of Payment bona fide, yet the first Assigney might repeat the Debt from the second as indebite payed to him who had no Right; so that the King and his Donator having Right to Stuarts Debt, tho the Sum in question had been payed to Ker and Broun (as it is not) a paritate rationis the Donator might repeat the same as indebite payed to them; seing by the said Interloquitor, It is Found, That an Assignation made by a Rebel, albeit before the Gift, cannot prejudge the King or his Donator, for the reason foresaid; It follows necessarly, that the Assigney by vertue of such an Assignation has no Right to the Sum Assigned, and consequent­ly, if the Debitor pay the said Sum bona fide, tho he may be liberate, yet the said payment cannot prejudge the King, or his Donator, but they may repeat the Sum belonging to them: And if it be not payed, but a Bond is renewed for the same, as in this case, the Donator ought to be preferred.

The Assignation being null, as said is, There can be no Innovation or Deed done by the Assigney who has no Right, in prejudice of the King or his Donator; seing a Debt cannot be innovat but by a person having Right to the same.

The Law does so far favour Legal Diligence done by the Creditors of Rebels, that there are some Decisions in their favours preferring their Di­ligence [Page 121] done before the Gift be declared; but voluntar Deeds done by Re­bels in prejudice of His Majesty, who has Jus quaesitum, and of the Cre­ditor who has denounced, are altogether reprobate; And the Law being clear, and there being no Decision to the contrary in favours of Creditors in the case of payment upon such Assignations as are void in Law; the Donator ought to be preferred; Otherways a Door should be open to prejudge His Majesty of His Casuality, and Creditors of their Diligence, seing the Rebel may assign, and upon such voluntary Assignations pay­ment may be made: And there should need no Application to the Ex­chequer for Gifts of Escheats, if they may be so easily evacuate by such practices:

It appears by Sir George Maxuel's Oath, and by his Bond, that the said Debt was not extinct; seing Sir George did act in the Affair as a Trustee and doer for the Stuarts; and their Bonds were neither Discharged, nor given back by the Assigneys, who had Right to the same; but were re­covered by the said Sir George by his own means from Ronald Grahame.

The Lords did adhere to their former Interloquitor, and did Find that Creditors getting payment from Rebels, either by poinding or by As­signation before Declarator at the Donators instance, doth secure the Creditor against the Donator; And did also Find, that in this case the first Bonds were extinct; and that the same being delivered to Sir George Maxuel, before Declarator at the instance of the second Donator, that the Assigney is preferable. Sir David Falconer for Veatch alteri Dalrymple, Char­ [...]ris, &c. Gibson Clerk.

This Decision appears to be hard, seing Declaratoria non tribuit Jus, but Declarat Jus quod est: And the Horning being declared upon the first Gift, there needed not a Declarator upon the second. Vide infra 12. February, and 10. Novem. 1675. inter eosdem.

D. 250. Douglass contra Jackson and Grahame. 11. February. 1675.

THE Lords Found, that a poinding is not lawful, unless it be begun before the setting of the Sun; and what is to be done at that time, be all done and compleat before the Day light be gone.

D. 251. Lady Torwoodhead contra The Tennents. eod. die.

THE Lady Torwoodhead having gotten Aliment modified to her by the Lords of Council of 600 Merks yearly; and for surety of the same having gotten the Gift of her Husbands Liferent Escheat, did pursue the Tennents for Mails and Duties.

It was Alledged for Florence Garner. That he had Right to the Lands Lybelled, and Mails and Duties of the same by Comprysings and Infeft­ments thereupon expired.

It was Answered, That the Mails and Duties of the Lands exceed the Annualrents of the Sums contained in the Comprysing; and by the Act of Parliament 1661. for ordering the payment of Debts betwixt Creditor and Debitor, where the Lands Comprysed exceed the Annualrents of the Sums contained in the Comprysing; The Comprysers are restricted to the possession of such of the Lands dureing the Legal as the Lords of Session should think just: And that the expireing of the said Florence his [Page 122] Comprysings was interrupted by an Order used by Edward Ruthven Son to the Lord Forrester.

It was Answered for Gairner, That the Lord Forrester had no Right to the Reversion of Torwoodhead's Lands; so that no Order used by him, as to these Lands, could be valid to interrupt the said Comprysing: And the said Order neither was nor could be declared.

The Lords, In respect the Lord Forrester being principal and his Brother Torwoodhead Cautioner, both their Lands were Comprysed for the same Debt, and that the Principal may satisfy the Debt, and extinguish the Com­prysing as to both his own and the Cautioners Lands, They Found that the said Order did interrupt the Comprysing as to both.

This appears to be hard. 1. Because the said Act of Parliament indul­ges the favour foresaid to the Debitors themselves, upon the Conditions thereinmentioned, viz. That they should ratify the Comprysers possession and deliver the Evidents; and the same cannot be extended to Donators. 2. A Comprysing cannot be interrupted, but either by Payment and actual satisfaction, or by using and declareing an Order of Redemption: Until which be done, the Comprysing cannot be thought to be unexpired. Craigie Reporter.

D. 252. Kinnier contra [...] 12. February. 1675.

THE Lords upon a Bill given in by [...] Kinnier who had obtained a Bonorum, and a Testificat of diverse persons of Credit that he had become insolvent upon occasion of loss and ill Debtors, and was otherwayes vertuous; They dispenced with that part of the Decreet anent the wearing of the Habit.

D. 253. Presbytrie of Duns. eod. die.

THE Presbytrie of Duns having by Bill desired, That Letters of Horn­ing may be direct against certain persons who had been cited as Witnesses; and did not appear before them.

The Lords did demurr, In respect Letters of Horning ought not to be direct, but either by consent of Parties, or by Warrand of Acts of Parlia­ment; As appears by Acts of Parliament, ordaining Horning to be direct upon Sheriffs and Commissars Decreets, and Decreets within Burgh, and Admirals Decreets.

D. 254. Cruickshanks contra Watt. eod. die.

THE Lords Found, That a Disposition being made after Inhibition, but before the Registration of the same, may be reduced ex capite In­hibitionis; seing the Execution of the Inhibition doth put the Leidges in mala fide: And after the same is compleat, and thereby the Debitor and the Leidges are inhibite to give and take Rights, the Inhibition ipso mo­mento thereafter, is valide and perfect; but resolvitur sub conditione, if it be not Registrate in due time. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk.

D. 255. Veatch contra The Creditors of James Ker, and Peter Pallat. eod. die.

IN the case abovementioned Veatch contra The Creditors of James Ker and Peter Pallat; It was farther Alledged for the said William Veatch, that he ought to be preferred, because by the Act of Parliament 1621. As­signations or other Rights granted by Bankrupts in favours of any of their Creditors, who had not done Diligence, and in prejudice of a Creditor who had done Diligence by Horning or otherwayes, are void: And the Creditor who is partially preferred and gratified, if he recover payment he is Lyable to Refound: And by the Act of Parliament in Anno. 1592. anent the Escheats of Rebels, Cap. 145. Assignations made stante Rebellio­ne in prejudice of the Creditor, at whose instance the Cedent is at the Horn, are Null; and that the said Assignation made by Sanderson in fa­vours of Ker and Broun, was made by him after he was at the Horn at the instance of David Rodger, Veatches Cedent: And the said Assigna­tion being Null for the Reason foresaid, all that has followed thereupon is void.

It was Answered, That the said Act of Parliament is only to be under­stood, in the Case when any voluntar Payment or Right is made in de­fraud of the lawful and more timely Diligence of another Creditor, hav­ing served Inhibition, or used a Horning, Arrestment, Comprising, or other Lawful Mean to affect the Dyvors Land or Estate; and that Horning is not such a Diligence as does affect, being only personal Execution against the Debitor; and that the said Debt of Stuarts was many years contracted by the Rebel after the said Horning; and that the said Stewarts residing in Ireland, and their Bond being conceived after the stile of English Bonds, did not fall under Sanderson the Creditors Escheat.

Whereunto It was Answered, That by the said Act of Parliament, Bank­rupts, after they are at the Horn, cannot make any voluntar Right or Payment to gratify or prefer other Creditors; so that there is no necessi­ty to debate whether Horning doth affect or not; And yet the truth is, Horning is such a Diligence as doth affect, seing thereby all the Escheat­able Goods are affected, and do belong to the King, and to the Creditor at whose instance the Horning is, who is preferable to the King, and has an interest in the said Goods; and that what ever belongs to a Rebel, whether the time of the Rebellion, or at any time how long soever thereaf­ter during the Rebellion, the same accrues to the King, and consequently to the Creditor in the Horning; and that nomina debitorum and Debts non habent situm, but are personal Interests, and sequuntur personam Creditoris; and if they be moveable, do fall under his Escheat, which is a Legal As­signation, as said is.

The Lords enclined to prefer Veatch. But because some of the Lords in voting were non liquet, the Business was delayed. Vide supra 9. Febr. 1675. inter eosdem. And Vide infra 10. Novemb. 1675.

D. 256. Parishioners of Banchrie contra Their Minister. 16. February 1675.

IN the Case of the Parishioners of Banchrie against their Minister: The Lords Found, That the Act of Parliament, 3. Sess. of his Majesties 1st. Parl. cap. 20. Ordaining that ilk Minister should have Grass for one Horse and two Kine, over and above their Gleb, Did import, That Ministers should have the said Grass, or 20. lib. conform to the said Act, albeit their Glebs which they had formerly, did extend to four Aikers, and much more than would be Grass, if the same were left lee to that purpose, for a Horse and two Kine. Some of the Lords were of a contrary Opinion, seing, by the Act of Parl. K. Jam. 6. Parl. 18 cap. Where there is no arable Land, 16. Soums Grass is to be designed for the four Aikers which the Law appoints to be designed for Glebes: and upon the Ground fore­said, Ministers having 16 Soums Grass, may pretend to have alse much more Grass designed to them as will keep a Horse and two Kine, or 20. lib. Hattoun Reporter. Hamilton Clerk.

D. 257. Binning contra Brotherstanes. eod. die.

ALexander Binning by Contract of Marriage with Margaret Trotter, was obliged to resign a Tenement of Land in Favours of himself and his Wife in Liferent, and the Heirs of the Marriage in Fie; and accord­ingly Resignation being made, Infeftment was taken to him and his Wife, and their Heirs foresaid.

Thereafter the said Margaret having deceased, there being only one Daughter of the said Marriage Margaret Binning; the said Alexander married a second Wife, and did oblige himself to provide the Heirs of that Marriage to 10000 merks: And thereafter did induce the said Mar­garet his Daughter of the first Marriage, after her Minority, to give a Bond, obliging her to resign the abovementioned Tenement to which she was to succeed as Heir of Provision, to her Father, in favours of her self and the Heirs of her own Body, which failȝiening, in favous of Alex­ander Binning her Brother of the second Marriage and his Heirs whatsom­ever; and to do no Deed to prejudge him anent the Succession.

The said Margaret Binning being thereafter Infeft as Heir of Provision to her said Father in the said Tenement, did by Contract of Marriage with William Brotherstanes oblige her self to Resign the said Tenement in fa­vours of her self and the said William, and the Heirs of the Marriage; whilks Failȝieing his Heirs whatsomever; and upon the said Resignation, she and her Husband were Infeft.

Thereafter the said Alexander Binning her Brother did obtain a Decreet against the said Margaret and her Husband for implement of the said Bond; and for granting a Procuratory of Resignation for resigning of the said Tenement, conform to the said Bond; in favours of the said Mar­garet her self and the Heirs of her Body, whilks Failȝieing in favours of the said Alexander: And in obedience to the said Decreet the said Marga­ret and her Husband did resign the said Tenement: and Infeftment was taken to the said Margaret and the Heirs of her Body, whilks Failȝieing to the said Alexander: After the said Margaret her decease the said Alexander [Page 125] did obtain Decreet against the Tennents of the said Tenement for Maills and Duties, which being Suspended by the said William Brotherstanes and turned in a Lybel; It was Alledged for him, that he ought to be preferred being Infeft long before the Pursuer, and 7. years in possession: Where­unto It was Replyed, That the Defender was denuded of any Right that he had by the Infeftment foresaid in favours of the said Margaret and her Heirs of Provision foresaid; and that the Pursuer had thereby Right as Heir of Provision to her.

To which It was Duplyed, That being incarcerat upon the said Decreet against him and his Wife (for Implement) he had resigned for Obedi­ence as Husband, and Authorizing his Wife; but did not intend, nor could not be decerned to denude himself of his own Right, which he had for so Onerous a Cause by his Contract of Marriage.

The Lords, having considered the Procuratory of Resignation granted by the Defenders Wife and himself, did Find that he had granted the same, not only for Obedience, and for his Interest as Husband, but for his own Interest, and as taking burden for his Wife; and so did denude himself of any Right that he had, in favours of his Wife, and the Pursuer as Heir of Provision: And therefore preferred the said Alexander.

Upon the Debate, It was agitate amongst the Lords, whether such Clauses in Tailȝies, viz. That no deeds should be done in prejudice of the Heirs of Tailȝie and Provision and their Succession, do import that the Gran­ter of such Obligements should not have power to dispose of the Land that is Tailȝied, and have that liberty which is inherent to Dominium? Or if it should import only, that they cannot break the Tailȝie, or provide the Lands in Tailȝie to other Heirs.

The President was of Opinion that the Fiar could not dispone nor do any other Deed: And that the said Clause was not restricted to the alter­ing or breaking of the Tailȝie. But this point was not decided.

D. 258. Ratraw contra [...] 16. February 1675.

AN Appearand Heir having, upon an Exhibition pursued by him to the effect he might advise whether he would be Heir, obtained the Writes to be exhibited in the Clerks Hands; did thereafter upon a Bill desire the samen to be delivered, pretending that he had use for the Writes for serving himself Heir; and no other person could have any In­terest for keeping them but himself.

The Lords granted the desire of the Bill: Albeit some of the Lords thought, that the Writes could not be delivered to him, unless he were Heir, but only such as he should have use of for his Service upon a Ticket to the Clerk to redeliver the same, if he should not be served Heir within a certain time: And that the Creditors had Interest, seing the Appear­and Heir, if he should resolve not to be Heir, might embazle and put the Writes out of the way, in prejudice of Comprysers.

D. 259. Hay contra Gray. 4. June. 1675.

A Merchant, having given a Commission to a Skipper to carry a parcel of Salmond to Bourdeaux, and upon the Sale of the same there, to bring home Wines and Prunes; pursued the said Skipper for the said Sal­mond [Page 126] and profite thereof, and referred the Lybel to the Skippers Oath: And the Defender having qualified his Oath in these Terms, viz. That being upon his Voyage to France, he was forced to go in to Holland by Storm of Weather; So that he could not go to Bourdeaux; And that he was forced to sell the Salmond in Holland, and with the price of the same did buy a parcel of Cards and other Goods mentioned in his Oath, for the Pur­suers use; and having embarqued the same to be transported to Scotland, and in the interim War having arisen, the Ship and Goods were taken by the Dutch; and that he had done for the Pursuer as for himself, and as other Merchants had done for themselves; Which Oath being advised, It was debated amongst the Lords, whether the Defender should be Assoili­ed, in respect of the Oath and qualification foresaid? And It was Found, that albeit the Defender might be excused upon the account foresaid, for not going to Bourdeaux and fulfilling his Commission in terminis, yet as to the of the parcel of Cards with the product of the Salmond, and the embarqueing of the same for the Pursuers use, for which he had no order; he was to be considered as negotiorum gestor, and upon his own hazard; and could not prejudge the Pursuer by disposing of his Money; unless he were able to say, that gessit utiliter both consilio & eventu; specially seing he might have secured his Money in Factors hands, or transmitted the same by Bills of Exchange, without employing or far less hazarding the same without order. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk.

D. 260. 8. June 1675.

THE Lords yesterday did Order, that in regard of the great abuse in desiring and granting Advocations so frequently from Inferiour Courts, to the great prejudice of the People, and the retarding and delay­ing Justice; that therefore the Ordinary upon the Bills may refuse to pass Advocations, if he find cause; but that he ought to report all Advocations before they be past to the whole Lords.

D. 261. Kyle contra Gray. eod. die.

THIS Day the Lords Found, That Advocations for Sums of Money within 200 Merks, could not be past upon any reason of Iniquity. Castlehill Reporter.

Some of the Lords in the case foresaid were of Opinion, that Advocati­ons should not pass, tho the Process had been for a Sum above 200 Merks; Because Litiscontestation had been made in the Cause; and after Litiscon­testation there can be no Iniquity but by a Decreet; which ought to be Suspended without Advocation.

D. 262. Grant contra Grant. 10. June 1675.

IN the Improbation of a Bond; the Bond being produced, and the De­fender refusing to abide by the same, Certification was craved against the said Bond, because the Defender did not abide by the same: And the Lords were clear, that the Certification should be granted for not abiding by the said Bond, tho it was produced; but because the Witnesses in the Bond had been examined, and there being only two Witnesses to the [Page 127] same, they both declared that they were impuberes, the one of 8. and the other of 9. Years of Age, the time of the subscribing of the Bond; and the Subscription was not like the Subscription now used by them; and to their remembrance they were not Witnesses to the same; but were not positive that they were not Witnesses.

The Lords, in respect of their Declarations, and that the Defender himself, did in effect, at least presumptively, acknowledge the falsehood of the Bond; in sua far as he did not abide by the same; Had an Impres­sion that the Bond was false; and therefore they granted Certification for not abideing by the same: and did leave to the Pursuer, either to take out the Certification, or to insist in improving of the Bond, or for decla­ring the same Null, as wanting Witnesses, as he should think fit: Seing without question, tho the Witnesses did not fully improve it, yet in re­spect of their Age the time of their pretended subscribing the same, and by their Declaration, they did not astruct the Truth of the same; In which respect, the Bond ought to be constructed, and looked upon as wanting Witnesses, and so Null. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk.

D. 263. Scot contra Murray. 11. June. 1675.

A Suspension being raised of a Decreet; Arrestment was used at the in­stance of the Creditor, after the raising of the same; and upon that pretence, It was craved by the Suspender, That the same might be loosed; and upon the Report of the Bill, the Lords having debated, Whether the said Arrestment could be loosed, being upon a Decreet, though sus­pended?

The Lords Found, That tho a Suspension be raised of a Decreet, yet it does not cease to be a Decreet, until it be taken away by a Decreet in fa­vours of the Suspender; and that tho a Suspension sists execution, yet the Creditor may arrest; seing the Arrestment is no Execution, but a Dili­gence and Remedy to preserve the Debitors Estate; to the effect that af­ter discussing of the Suspension, the Creditor may have execution against the same: And therefore They Found the Arrestment could not be loosed. In this case, the Suspender had consigned the Principal Sum, but not the Annualrents; otherwayes if he had consigned all, the Lords would have loosed the Arrestment; seing the Consignation of the Money is sufficient Surety to the Creditor. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk.

D. 264. Auchenleck contra E. Monteith. 15. June 1675.

WIdow Auchenleck pursued the Earl of Monteith, for the price of certain Ware for his Ladies Cloaths, extending (conform to an Accompt) to the Sum of 177. lib. It was Alledged for the Earl, That the said Ware was furnished, after he had served Inhibition against his Lady that she should not contract Debt to his prejudice. Whereunto It was Answered, That the said Furnishing was necessary for the Ladies Cloaths, and albeit after Inhibition, she could not contract Debt to her Husbands prejudice, yet the Earl being obliged to furnish her Cloaths, and other Necessaries; he will be lyable for what is furnished to her necessarily.

The Lords, (upon the Report of the Debate foresaid) having conside­red the Inhibition, and that the execution of the same was not registrate; [Page 128] were of the Opinion, that the said Inhibition was Null: But because it was not questioned by the Defender, they Ordained that the Reporter should hear, what Answer the Defenders Procurators could make as to the said Nullity,

It was thought hard by some of the Lords, That a Merchant, after In­hibition at the Husbands Instance, furnishing bona fide to the Wife, should be frustrate upon the pretence of an Inhibition; unless either the said In­hibition had been intimate to the Merchant, or it were notourly known that the Wife was Inhibited; seing such Inhibitions are granted without any Ground either of Write, as Bond or Contract, or the dependance of a Process; but only upon a Bill and Desire of the Husband, sine causae cogni­tione: And it were hard, That Merchants, when Persons and Ladies of any Quality, come to their Shops for buying their Ware, should go to the Registers and try whether they be inhibite. but these Points were not de­cided.

D. 265. Katharine McMillan Lady Logy contra Meldrums. 16. June 1675.

A Disposition being granted by a Husband to his Wife of Moveables, and she in an Improbation of the same, being urged to abide there­at; and offering to abide at the same as a Write truly delivered to her by her Husband: The Lords Found, That she ought to abide at the same simpliciter, and tho such a Qualification may be allowed to Strangers and singular Successors, who may be in bona fide to take Assignations to Writs; Yet Wives and conjunct Persons and Relations, are in a different conditi­on, seing they are presumed not to be ignorant of the Deeds and Trans­actions of their Husbands and Relations. Newbyth Reporter. Monro Clerk.

D. 266. Thomson and Halyburton contra Ogilvie and Watson. eod. die.

DAvid Thomson having, by his Testament, nominate his Wife Execu­trix and Tutrix; and having left a Legacy to his Son of 5000. lib. and having ordained his Relict to employ the same upon Annualrent, in sua far as he ordained him to be educate upon the Annualrent of the same: In a Pursute for the said Legacy, and the Annualrent of the same, It was Alledged, That the Executrix could not be lyable for Annualrent: And It being Replyed, That she was also Tutrix, and Tutors are lyable after the first Term that they embrace the Office, for Annualrent of the Pupils Means; and that having confirmed the Testament, by the Nomination foresaid of her to be Tutrix, she hath accepted the Office of Tutorie: And the Point at Interloquitor being, whether by confirming of the Testament, she had accepted of the Office of Tutorie? Some of the Lords viz. [...] Were of the Opinion, That by Confirming of the Testament, she did not accept of the Office: But it was Found by the Lords, That having confirmed without Protestation that she did not accept of the Office, eo ipso she did accept of the same: And tho she had emitted such a Protestation, it could not be allowed, seing she was not only [Page 129] named Executrix, but had a Legacy left her; and she could not accept the Office of Executry and Legacy foresaid, and repudiate the Office of Tutory of her own Child.

The Lords (in the Case foresaid) Thought, That if the Relict were able to make appear, That having used all possible diligence, she had not recovered Payment of the Defuncts Means; she could not be lyable for An­nualrent, but from the time that she recovered the same. Castlenil Re­porter. Monro Clerk,

D. 267. Gray contra Cockburn. eod. die.

THE Lords Found, In the Case betwixt the Laird of Cockburn and Mr, William Gray Minister at Duns, That Cockburn, being lyable to pay certain Bolls of Victual betwixt Yule and Candlemass, might have payed the same upon Candlemass day: and that as he might have payed the same he might have made offer thereof: but that in all cases of that nature, Per­sons who are lyable, and do make such Offers, are not thereby liberate as to the greatest Pryces, unless the Partie be in mora to receive the Victu­al; either the time of the offer, or six days thereafter. Castlehil Reporter. Monro Clerk.

D. 268. Heckford contra Ker. 17 June 1675.

MR. Hugh Ker having granted Bond to [...] Heckfords, for the Sum of 1000. merks; and being obliged thereby to pay the said Sum with Annualrent at Martimass thereafter; and for the Creditors surety having wadset by the said Bond ten rudes of Land, to be possest for the annual­rent of the said Sum, so long as the samen should remaine unpayed: The Representatives of the said Mr. Hugh were pursued for 6 lib. as the inlake, whereof the Rent of the Land did come short of the Annualrent of the said Sum and for publict burdens: who did alleadge, that the said Right being a proper wadset, and the saids Lands being possest by the Cre­ditor, the Debitor was not lyable, neither for Annualrent nor Pub­lick Burdens.

The Lords Found, That the Bond being of the Nature foresaid, and containing a proper Wadset; so that if the Duties of the Lands had ex­ceeded the Annualrent, the superplus would have belonged to the Credi­tor entirely; and not been imputed in payment of the Principal; the Debitor was not lyable either for inlake or publick Burdens: And tho in the beginning of the Bond, the Debitor was obliged to pay Annualrent, yet the payment of the same was qualified, and to be understood accor­ding to the whole Tract of the Bond, viz. That the Duties should be al­lowed for payment of the Annualrent, and that the Creditor should pos­sess, and have the use and [...] of the Land and Rents thereof for his Annualrent; which is clearly a proper Wadset. Newbyth Re­porter. Mr. John Hay Clerk.

D. 269. Colledge of Aberdeen contra The Town of Aberdeen. eod. die.

DOctor Reid having by his Testament left his Books to the Colledge of Aberdeen, to be kept by a Bibliothecare; and having left for a Pa­trimony and Sallary to the Bibliothecare the Sum of 6000 Merks; and having named Mr. Robert Dounie his own Relation to be Bibliothecare; and in case of his refuseal, having appointed another to be chosen by the Colledge: And the Master of the Grammer School, Mr. Robert Paterson being pre­sented to the said Office by the Colldge, pursued a Declarator to hear and see it Found and Declared, that he has Right to the said Office and Sallary.

It was Alledged for the Town of Aberdeen; That no Title was produc­ed for the Pursuer but the Extract of Doctor Reid's Testament, bearing the said Mortification; which could not be respected, seing the said Ex­tract is out of the Books of the Commissars of Aberdeen; and his Testament could not be confirmed, but by the Commissars of Edinburgh, he hav­ing died out of the Country; and therefore the said Extract could not be considered, but as a Copy, and the principal ought to be produced; And it appears, that there was never any Principal, bearing the Masters of the Col­ledge to have the Election of the Bibliothecare; seing the Town of Aber­deen has been in use since the Mortification to present to the said Office; and by a Contract in anno 1632. betwixt the said Mr. Dounie and the Town, he is presented to the said Office by the Town; to which Doctor Dun the Principal of the Colledge was Witness, and the Executors no­minate likeways Witnesses.

The Lords Found, There was no necessity to produce the Principal, the Extract being a sufficient Title: and as to the pretended Nullity, it was not Juris; seing non constat, that Doctor Reid died out of the Coutry: And if there were any Ground upon the pretence foresaid, it were only of a Reduction.

It was Found also, That by the said Testament, the Nomination of the Bibliothecare did belong to the Colledge, and the possession of the Town without a Right cannot Found a Defence in petitorio: and the Deed and Contract with Dounie, and the Subscription of the Principal, and of the Executors of Doctor Reid as Witnesses, could not prejudge the Col­ledge.

The Lords having considered the Tenor of the Mortification, which gives Power to the Colledge to Name in case of Refusal of Dounie; Found nevertheless, that the said Interest to Name and choose a Bibliothe­care was not temporary and prima vice; Seing Wills of Defuncts were to be interpret benignly, Especially in favours of Colledges; and there can be no reason, why the Defunct should have appointed the said Election to be in manner foresaid for the first time, and not thereafter: And if the Colledge had not the Right foresaid, it should not belong to the Town, but the Defuncts Heir, who doth concur with the pursute. Newbyth Reporter Robert Hamilton Clerk.

D. 270. contra 18. June 1675.

IN an Adjudication, the Appearand Heir being called, and his Advo­cates having compeared and desired to see the Process; It was Alledged, That he had no Interest, having renounced, and that his compearing was only to retard the Pursuers Diligence, that other Creditors might come in. This point of form being reported, viz. Whether his Procurators should see: And if they, should see, whether in communi forma or not, or in the Clerks hands?

Some of the Lords were of the Opinion, That being a Person necessar to be called, and being called, his Procurators should see in communi forma, the Law making no distinction; and tho he had Renounced, yet he had Interest to see and object, whether the Pursuers Debt was the true Debt, or satisfied; and if it appeared that it was satisfied, he may, notwith­standing his Renounciation, enter if he thought fit: And the Renoun­ciation may be questioned as false.

The Lords nevertheless Found, That he should see only in the Clerks hands within 24. Hours; tho it was urged, that if the Party were in Town, that course might be taken; but the Party being at the distance of 100 Miles, or any other considerable distance, so that in so short a time the Procurator could not get Information, it were better that in such cases the Processes should be seen in communi forma: For if Parties had pre­judice, they would apply again by Bills, which would occasion greater trouble and delay. Redford Reporter.

D. 271. E. Weems contra Bruce. 22. June 1675.

A Bond being granted by the Earl of Weems to [...] Bruce and his Wife Gaw, and the longest liver of them two, and to the said Bruce his Heirs: and the said Gaw the Relict having intented a pur­sute for payment of the Sum due thereby, It was Alledged, it was prescriv­ed, there being more than 40. Years Elapsed since the granting. It was Answered, That the time of the Husbands Lifetime, the Bond did not prescrive against the Pursuer, being cled with a Husband, and so non va­lens agere.

The Lords, upon the Report made by my Lord Newbyth, Did ex tem­pore Find, That it did not prescrive during the Husbands time: Tho some of them were of the opinion, that the case was of importance as to the Con­sequence; and was to be further thought upon and debated, in respect it cannot be said, but there was a Person valens agere ever since the date of the Bond; the Husband dureing all this time being valens agere; and after his decease, the Wife: and the Husbands silence, being the Fiar, and the Person who had Right for the time, being joined with the Relict her si­lence; and both being joyned by the space of 40. years; all the reasons of Prescription concurred in the Case, viz. That Debitors should be secured after so long a time; and that there is praesumptio Juris, the Bonds may be made up, and nothing thereon done till all the witnesses were dead: And that maxim contra non valentem agere, &c. is to be understood in the case, where there is not a person having Right valens agere, by the space of 40 years: or in the Case of temporary and momentary Prescriptions, [Page 132] but not in Prescriptions longissimi temporis: Otherways, Prescription, being the great Salvo and Security of People, might be eluded, and a person acquir­ing a Right of Lands, possest by his Author peaceably, for the space of 40. Years without any Interruption, should not be secure; seing it may be pretended, That the Husband, having been silent fourty Years, with­out any Interruption; his Wife, who pretends Right to the Lands by Liferent or otherways, non valebat agere during the Marriage.

D. 272. Bruce contra Bruce. 23. June 1675.

DOctor Arnot having disponed, to one of his Nevoys, an Annualrent out of certain Lands belonging to him; and thereafter having dis­poned to another of his Nevoys, the elder Brother of the Annualrenter, the foresaid Lands: A poinding of the Ground was intented, at the In­stance of the Person who had Right to the Annualrent: And It was Alledged, That the Disposition of the Annualrent was never delivered by the Doctor, but was beside him the time of his decease, and was viis & modis gotten out of his Charter Chest, and given to the Pursuer: To which It was Answered, That the Pursuer had the Paper in his Hands, and it was presumed to be delivered: And 2do. Tho it should be supposed, that the said Right was amongst the Doctors Papers the time of his decease, yet the Doctor having made the said Right publick by an Infeftment, and Seasin thereupon to the Pursuer, which was Registrat; albeit he might have evacuate the said Right by destroying the Disposition, yet nevertheless having keeped the same by him undestroyed, it ought to be construed in Law, that being Uncle to the Pursuer, and having given the said Right upon the account of the said Relation, he kept the same by him to the Pur­suers behoove, unless it could be made appear, that the Doctor did any Deed to recal and evacuat the said Right.

The Lords repelled the Defence of not delivery, in respect of the An­swer. Hatton Reporter. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk.

D. 273. Dowglass of Kelhead contra Carlyle and others. eod. die.

KElhead pursued a Declarator of Non-entry, pretending that he was Su­perior of the Lands libelled: In which Process, It was Alledged, That he was not Superior of the said Lands, In respect the Right libelled, that he had from my Lord Queensberry, was to be holden of the Disponer: and Queensberry being Superior to the Defenders, could not interpose another betwixt him and them: And upon the proponing of the said Alledgance, the Pursuer was forced to reply, upon a Right to the Casualities granted by a Paper apart by my Lord Queensberry to the Pursuer, and thereupon Pro­cess was sustained: and decreet given for the retoured dutie before the intention of the Declarator; and the full Avail and Rent of the Land af­ter the intention of the Cause. Of which, Suspension being raised upon these Reasons. 1mo. That, after Decreet of Declarator was recovered, the Superior and his Donator has Right to the Lands during the Non-en­try; and may remove Tennents, or uplift the Duties from them; but be­fore Declarator, there could not be a Sentence for Poinding the Ground, for the full avail. 2do. Tho the Ground could be poinded for the full [Page 133] Avail, yet the Pursuer has no Right but to the Feu-duties, even after the intention of the Cause, before the Pursuer did Found upon and produce the Assignation foresaid, as his Right to the Casualities; seing there being a question whether my Lord Queensberry or the Pursuer had Right to the Superiority, and the Libel being only founded upon the Pursuers Right as Superior, the Defender was in bona fide, and could not enter nor be ly­able for the full avail, until the Question was cleared by production of the said Assignation: and therefore could not be lyable until the same was produced.

The Lords, As to the first Reason, Found, That after the intention of the Declarator of Non-entry, at the Instance of the Party having Right, the Defenders are lyable in the full avail; and that the real conclusion of poinding the Ground for the same may be sustained; seing the Ground may be poinded for a Rent liquidate, as it was in this Case: and when Lands are not retoured, the Pursuer, even before Declarator, may crave Right to the Rents. As to the Second, The Lords were all clear, that the Defender was not lyable for the full avail, but after production of the Title, whereupon the Pursute is sustained: But it being moved, that the Defenders having proponed the said Alledgance before the same was re­pelled, and decreet given out for the full avail, after intention of the Cause; some of the Lords were of the Opinion, that there was now no Remedy: Others thought, That there being a clear iniquity and prejudice to the Party, and the Lords being convinced of the same, they ought to do justice to the party: And the question being brought before them upon Suspension ex incontinenti; and not ex intervallo, the Sentence non transivit in rem judi­catam: Whereupon some heat having arisen among the Lords, while some did plead the Credit of the House, and the Security of the People, that the Decreets of the Lords in foro should be an ultimate and unquestionable Decision; and others Thought and did represent, that the Honour of the House, and Interest and Security of the People consists in this, that Ju­stice should be done, and no evident Iniquity should be, without Reme­dy; Especially where a Decreet has not taken effect, and become res ju­dicata, but is drawn in question immediatly by a Suspension. The Lords did demur, and decided not that Point. Castlehil Reporter. Gibson Clerk.

D. 274. Hamilton of Munkland contra [...] Maxuel. eod. die.

UPon the Report of Redford, betwixt Hamilton of Munkland, and [...] Maxuel, The Lords Found, That a Debt, due by a Person, who had disponed his Land upon the account that a Manse was built, and that he was resting his Proportion of the Charges, is not debi­tum Fundi. Hamilton Clerk.

D. 275. The Colledge of Aberdeen contra the Town of Aberdeen. 24. June 1675.

IN the Case abovementioned, of the Colledge against the Town of Aberdeen; The Lords, having heard again a Debate in praesentia, Did adhere to what they had Found formerly: and did Declare Jus eligen­di [Page 134] of a Bibliothecare to pertain to the Colledge. Vide 17. June 1675. inter eosdem.

D. 276. Earl of Lauderdale contra Lady and Lord Yester. 25. June 1675.

THE Duke of Lauderdale having settled upon the Lady Yester his Daughter, his Estate: and thereafter by Contract of Marriage be­twixt the said Lady and my Lord Yester, containing a Procuratory of Re­signation, whereupon Infeftment followed; the said Estate is disponed and resigned by her, with consent of her Father, and him for his Interest, in favours of the said Lady, and the Heirs of her Body of that Marriage; and these failȝiening, of any other Marriage: With Provisions contain­ed in the said Procuratory; And in special, that the said Lands should be redeemable by the Earl, upon a Rose-noble; and that upon an Order used, the said Right in Favors of the Lady and her foresaids should be void: and two other Provisions in Case of Redemption, viz. 1mo. That in Case the Duke of Lauderdale should think fit to redeem, that the Duke and his Heirs should be lyable, and obliged to pay, (likeas they bind themselves by the said Provision, to pay) to the Lady and her foresaids, besides the Tocher, 7000. lib. sterl. at the first Term after the Dukes decease. And 2do. That whereas by the said Contract, the Lady, if the Estate had not been redeemed, was obliged to pay all her Fathers Debts and Legacies, she should be free of the same, in case of Redemption: Which Provisions are contained in the Infeftments.

The Duke, having used an Order, and having intented thereupon a Declarator of Redemption; concluding that the Lands should be declared lawfully redeemed, and that his Daughter should be decerned to de­nude her self; and to grant a Procuratory for Resigning; since she was infeft by publick Infeftment.

It was Alledged, That as to that Conclusion, that she should renounce; there was no Warrand for the same; seing there was not a Reversion in these Terms, that she should grant the Lands orderly redeemed and re­nounce; in which Terms, Reversions, which are pacta de retrovendendo, are ordinarly conceived; but that the Reversion, whereupon the Order is used, is only a Provision contained in the said Contract of the Tenor fore­said; with a resolutive clause, in case of Redemption, which imports no Obligement upon the Lady, nor pactum de retrovendendo, but only Jus Retractus, and a Faculty and Power to the Father to Redeem; and in case of Redemption, the expiring and Nullity of the Right.

2. It was Alledged, That tho the Lady were to Renounce; her Re­nounciation ought to be qualified and burdened with the provisions con­tained in her Right; and in special, with the foresaid provision as to the secureing to her 7000. lib. Sterl. and the other Provision foresaid for se­curing her relief of the Debts.

It was Replyed, That as to the said first Alledgance; that inest in all Contracts bearing Reversions; whether in the formal Terms of a Re­version; or Provisions upon the matter importing a Reversion: and ex stylo all Decreets of Redemption do contain the said Decer­niture to Renounce: And the Duke being denuded in favours of his Daughter by publick Infeftment, the habilis modus to return again to his Right upon Redemption, is upon the Resignation.

[Page 135]As to the 2d. It was Answered, That the said Provisions are not in the Reversion; and amount only to a personal obligement upon the Duke and his Heirs; but not to be a real burden and incumberance upon the Right.

As to Debts, It was Answered, That there needs no other security for the Lady her relief of the same; seing she was to be lyable thereto in contemplation of the Right, if it should stand effectual in her Person: And its provided, in case of Redemption, she should be free thereof.

It was Duplyed as to the said provisions; That the same, being in the bo­dy of the Procuratory and Infeftment, are real; and they are insert unico contextu with the provision, that the Lands shall be redeemable; and doe qualifie the same: And that notwithstanding that it be provided, That in case of Redemption she should not be lyable to the Debts, yet she may be in hazard to be overtaken as Successor Titulo Lucrativo; In respect, by the said Right it is provided, that in case of Redemption the said 7000 lib. should be given to her and her foresaids, which being a provision intro­duced in her favours, and in effect in lieu of the Estate, and being so great, may fix upon her a Passive Title; as having gotten by her Father beside her Tocher so great a Sum; which is not payable to her Husband, but to her and her foresaids; and therefore could not Renounce, but with the burden of the said provision for her Relief.

The Lords Found, That she ought to Renounce: Reserving to her the foresaid provision, as Accords. Castlehill Reporter. Gibson Clerk.

D. 277. Tutor to the Laird of Aitons Daughter. eod. die.

THE Tutor to the Daughter of the deceast Laird of Ayton, having craved by a Bill, that he might be warranted by an Order of the Lords, to set the Pupils Lands for less Duties than were payed formerly; seing the former Duty could not be gotten.

The Lords, Tho they had granted the like desire in favours of other per­sons upon Bills, thought, upon better consideration, that it was fit to re­fuse the said Bill; seing upon such pretences Minors may be wronged by their Tutors Authority; and the Lords have only a Jurisdictio contentiosa in relation to Processes or questions depending betwixt Parties; but not a voluntar Jurisdiction, or power in relation to Administration of private Estates: And if the Tutors Deed in setting pupils Lands were warrantable, the Law would secure him: And therefore left him to do as he will be answerable. Redford Reporter.

D. 278. [...] contra [...] eod. die.

UPon a Report made to the Lords, concerning a Decreet of the Com­missars which was questioned upon Iniquity, because it being urged, that Caution should be Found in an Improbation, the Commissar did not Order the Party to find Caution.

It was Debated amongst the Lords, Whether Caution should be Found or Money should be consigned, alsewell in Actions as upon Ex­ceptions in Improbations? And some were of the Opinion, that Caution or Consignation should be in all questions of Improbation; Whether [Page 136] by way of Exception or Action, conform to the Act of Parliament, Q. Mary. 7. Parl. Cap. 62. And some of the Lords were of the Opinion, that the Law being clear to that purpose, Consignation should be wherever such Questions fall out either by way of Action or Exception: But the contrary was asserted by others, and they pretended Custom; but no­thing was instanced to verify the custom; and tho it were, it ought not to derogate to so clear a Law upon so good Grounds.

The Lords did not decide this point at this time.

D. 279. [...] contra [...] eod. die.

UPon a Report made to the Lords concerning an Advocation; upon that reason, that there was a Competition in the case upon double Rights: It was debated among the Lords, Whether the cause being un­doubtedly competent before the Inferior Judge, the pretence; that there was a competition of double Rights should be a Relevant Ground of Ad­vocation: And some of the Lords were of Opinion, that in the general to Advocate upon that Reason, it were hard; seing Inferior Judges their Jurisdiction as to Causes competent before them, is founded upon their Rights; so that they have alse good Right to the same as to any other pro­perty: And in Removings, and Actions for Maills and Duties, and others such real Actions, when a Defence is founded upon a Right, or when Parties compear for their Interest, and produce Rights, it may al­wayes be pretended, that the question is anent double Rights; so that the Jurisdiction of Inferior Judges may be altogether evacuated: And the Lords, who have scarce time to decide Causes that are proper before them, should be cumbered with Processes that may and ought to be determined by an Inferior Judge; contrar to the Acts of Parliament, and in special the 39 Act of Q. Mary her 6th. Parl. And the 8th. Act of His Majesties 1st. Parl. 3. Sess. Discharging the Advocation of Causes, whereunto Inferior Judg­es are expresly appointed Judges: But if it should be represented and appear, that there is intricacie in such Causes, wherein there may be que­stion of double Rights, the Lords in that case may Advocate: But upon the pretence of double Rights, as to which it may be there is no difficulty, there ought to be no Advocation. Yet it was urged by [...] that the Lords were in use to pass Advocations upon the reason foresaid; And albeit the pretence of custome not being verified, and tho verified be­ing against Law, ought not to be put in the ballance with express Laws founded upon good Reason and Common Law, yet the Bill was past. Redford Reporter.

D. 280. Gilchrist contra Murray. 26. June. 1675.

IN a Process for payment of a Sum due by the Defender, the Lybel be­ing referred to his Oath, and he having declared with a quality, viz. That as he was Debitor so he had made payment, partly in Money, and partly in Commodities and Ware.

The Lords, Upon Advising of the Oath, Found, That the same not be­ing special as to the quality of Payment, viz. How much was payed in Money, and how much in Goods, nor being special, as to the quan­tity [Page 137] of the several Goods; did not admit the same: but if it were made special, as to Money payed by him, it would be sustained pro tanto: And as to the delivery of Goods in satisfaction of the Debt; It resolved in an Exception, and ought to be proven. Hamilton Clerk.

D. 281. Livingston contra Garner. eod. die.

A Bond being granted for payment of a Sum, and thereupon the Gran­ter having suspended in his own time; and a Decreet of Suspensi­on being recovered in his favours: after his death, his Son being of the same Name, was Charged, Denounced, and taken with Caption for the same Debt.

The Lords upon a Bill, Did Find, That the Son ought to be free of the said Debt: and in regard of the Chargers trincating and fraudful Practice, they modified 40. lib. to be payed by him, the one half to the Partie, the other half to the Poors Box. Gibson Clerk.

D. 282. Langlands Supplicant. eod. die.

A Bankrupt having obtained a Bonorum, by a Bill desired the Lords to dispense with his wearing the Habit, in respect of an Attestation of two Persons, that he had become irresponsal, upon the account of Cauti­onrie, and other Occasions mentioned therein; which the Lords did: Al­beit some of their Number were of another Opinion, and did urge, that by the Act of Parliament, such Persons being infamous, and the Lords by an Act of Sederunt, having Ordained that they should wear the Habit, as is the Custom in all other Nations, that they may be known to be such Persons; the Lords neither could nor ought to dispence with express Laws and Statutes; and that no respect ought to be had to the Attestation, be­ing emitted by privat Persons having no Authority, and not cited nor sworn to that purpose: and the pretence contained in the Attestation was most irrelevant. Gibson Clerk.

D. 283. Birnie contra Montgomerie. 29. June 1675.

A Pursute for making up the Tenor of a Comprising was sustained, in respect the Adminicles were most pregnant: and in special the Ex­ecutiones were yet extant and entire. Monro Clerk. [...] It is thought, that much Cautione and tenderness should be used in Pro­cesses of the Nature forsaid, for proving the Tenor of Compriseings; se­ing Compriseings are to be considered, either as Decreets or as Executions; and in effect, they are both upon the matter; In respect the Messenger Decerns and Adjudges, and Dispones the Lands and others comprised; and therefore the same ought to be subscribed, both by the Messenger, who in subsidium doth that which the Partie ought to do, and doth dispone his Estate in satisfaction of his Debt; and by the Clerk of the Compriseing as a Decreet: and the Tenor of Decreets cannot be proven but by Ex­tracts; And a Comprysing being (as said is) Processus executivus, and ultimate execution; it ought not to be proven but per relationem Nuncij, and execution under the Messengers hands. And it were hard that exe­cutiones should be made up by witnesses, and probation of the Tenor; [Page 138] Seing there may be a nullity in the same if they were extant: And tho wit­nesses may remember they had seen executions, they can hardly remem­ber upon the precise tenor of all the words of the same: And if the tenor of the executions might be made up, there should be no security; Seing Prescription, which is the greatest Security of the People, may be eva­cuated, upon pretence that there was an interruption by the execution of a Summonds; but that the same being lost is made up by proving the Te­nor: and by an Act of Parliment K. Jam. 6. Par. 6. cap. 94. Its Ordained, That the Tenor of Letters of Horning, and Executions thereof, is not pro­bable by Witnesses: And there is parity, if not more Reason as to Com­prisings; whereby the greatest Estates may be taken away, by a Decreet for proving the Tenor.

D. 284. Hall contra Murray. 30. June 1675.

ARrestment being upon a Decreet; and the said Decreet being there­after turned in a Lybel; The Lords Found, That the Decreet ceas­ed to be a Sentence; and the Arrestment thereupon, is now of the nature of an Arrestment upon a Dependence, and may be loosed. Gibson Clerk.

D. 285. Dunmure contra Lutfoot. eod. die.

THE Lords in an Improbation Found, (as they had done formerly in diverse Cases) That an Extract out of the Books of an Inferior Court does not satisfie the Production: the question being of a Write registrate in the Books of the Canongate. Newbyth Reporter.

D. 286. Stewart contra Riddoch. eod. die.

JAmes Stewart of Aberlednoch, having obtained a Decreet Cognitions Causae, against John Riddoch, for implement of a Disposition, granted by David Riddoch his Grand-father: and thereupon having also obtained a Decreet of Adjudication, the same was stopt upon a Bill given in by [...] Camp­bel of Tarririck; pretending that he had a Right to a Contract of Mariage betwixt Alexander Riddoch and his wife, as assigney constitute by the said Mr. Alexander, in whose favours the Granter of the Disposition to Stewart was obliged by the said Contract to dispone to him the same Lands; And the Assignation granted by the said Alexander Riddoch, to the said Campbel being questioned as false.

The Lords thought fit to hear both Parties on their several Adjudicati­ons; reserving Improbation of the said Assignation: and with this Decla­ration, that if the said Assignation should be improven, the Decreet and Adjudication upon the same should fall.

Because there was a Competition in Diligence, The Lords did wave the Debates in the Improbation; being most as to that Point, who should abide by the said Assignation as true; seing the Assigney Campbel declared, that his Name was filled up in the same without his Knowledge: and was not concerned to abide by the same: and Mr. John Drummond of Megginsh compearing, as having a compleat Warrand, and Commission from the said Mr. Alexander Riddoch, who was in Barbadoes, to prosecute the said Acti­on, which had been intented in Campbel's Name, offered to abide by the said Assignation only as a Factor.

[Page 139]Some of the Lords thought, that a Write being questioned as false, there should be some person to abide by the same upon their hazard simply; and not with such qualities; seing the consequence and hazard of per­sons, that abide by Writes questioned upon falsehood, if the same should be improven, is the great bulwark and security of the people against falsehood, which doth encrease daily. But this point was not decided.

D. 287. Clerk contra Steuart. eod. die.

A Husband, by his Contract of Marriage, having got the Right of the Fie of a Tenement of Land settled upon him; his Wife having re­signed the same for Infeftment to him and her, and the Heirs of the Mar­riage; whilks failȝiening his Heirs. He and his Wife did thereafter enter in a Contract with another Sister of his Wifes, who had Right to the equal half of the said Tenement, as Heir portioner with her Sister; by which Contract there was a mutual Tailȝie with consent of the Husband; and the Right of Fie, that by the former Contract was settled upon her Husband, as said is, was disponed to the Wife; in sua far as both the Si­sters, with consent of their Husbands, were obliged to resign their Respe­ctive parts, in favours of their Husbands and themselves in Liferent; and the Heirs of the Marriage in Fie; whilks Failȝieing in favours of the Wifes Heirs: Which Contract was questioned by a Reduction at the instance of a Creditor of the Husbands; upon that reason, that the said Right of Fie granted by the said Contract betwixt the Husband and the Wife, and her Sister, was in defraud of the Husbands Creditors, and null by the Act of Parliament 1621. In sua far as the Husband had a Fie of the said Tenement, by the Contract of Marriage betwixt him and his Wife; which might have been affected with Execution at the instance of his Creditors; and the said Fie was given, by the said late Contract, to the Wife, so that the Husband had only a Liferent.

In this Process, It was Alledged. 1. That the Act of Parliament did mi­litate only in the case of Dyvors, and Dispositions granted by them. And 2. That the said Act of Parliament doth only rescind Alienations that are made without true just and necessary Causes; and that the said Contract betwixt the Husband and his Wife, and her Sister was made for a true and just Cause; and the Fie of the said Tenement, which the Debi­tor had, was given away in respect of the Obligements of the said Con­tract in favours of the Husband the Pursuers Debitor; which was as equal as to advantages for the Pursuers Debitor, as they were for the other par­ty; seing both the Sisters their parts of the Tenement were provid­ed in the same manner to the Respective Wives and their Husbands, and the Heirs of the Marriage; whilks failȝiening the Wifes Heirs; and that the Pursuers Debitor was a person opulent for the time, according to his qua­lity; and had sufficiency of Estate and Moveables otherwayes, that might have satisfied the Pursuers Debt the time of the said last Contract, and thereafter: So that the said Contract being valide ab initio, it could not be taken away upon pretence, that thereafter the Husband became insol­vent; seing it cannot be said, that the Husband did intend to defraud his Creditor, or that there were any fraud upon his part.

It was Replyed, That tho the case of Bankrupts and their fraudful pra­ctices mentioned in the said Act, being so frequent, did give occasion and [Page 140] Rise to the same; yet it appears evidently by the said Act, that it was intended, that Debitors should not be in a capacity to give away any part of their Estate, in prejudice of their Creditors, to any person; In sua far as the dispositive words of the Act are in these terms, that in all Causes at the instance of a true Creditor, the Lords will decern all Alienations and Rights made by the Debitor, to any conjunct person, without true just and necessary Causes, and without a just price really payed; the same be­ing done after Contracting of lawfull Debts from true Creditors; to be null without further Declarator: And the said Act does not bear, that all Rights made by Bankrupts should be Null, it being hard to give a Cha­racter and definition of a Bankrupt; So that diverse questions may arise anent the notion of Bankrupt; and what Debitors should be esteem­ed Bankrupt; and therefore for cutting off the same, the Act is conceiv­ed in the Terms foresaid; and annulls Dispositions made by Debitors without an Onerous Cause: And the Lords, by the Statute ratified by the said Act, do declare, that they intend to follow and practise the Laws Civil and Canon made against fraudful Alienations in prejudice of Credi­tors: And by the Civil Law, all Rights and Deeds made and done in prejudice of Creditors without an Onerous Cause, are null, and may be re­scinded actione Pauliana: And the Law doth presume, praesumptione Juris, that they are fraudulent, being prejudicial to Creditors ex eventu & re: who are not obliged to say, that they are fraudful consilio; which is in animo and hardly can be proven.

As that point, viz. That the said Contract was upon valuable conside­rations; It is Replyed, That the taking of the Fie from the Husband, and giving the same to the Wife; it's a Donation as to the Wife in prejudice of the Creditor; So that there is no Onerous Cause as to the Husband.

The Lords, Upon Debate at the Barr and amongst themselves, did Find, that Debitors might dispose of a part of their Estate by way of Gift, and without an Onerous Cause; if they retain alse much and more than would satisfy their Creditors: And therefore they Found the Defence Re­levant, that the Debitor had alse much Estate besides the Fie of the said Tenement, as would satisfy the Pursuers Debt. Actor Falconer alteri Steuart. Monro Clerk. Praesentia.

Some of the Lords were of the Opinion, That the case, being of so great consequence as to the preparative; it was fit to be thought upon: and urged these Reasons. 1. That the Words and Letter of the Law ap­pear to be clear, against Deeds done by Debitors without an Onerous Cause. 2. Tho our Law were not clear, yet in cases of that nature, when we have not a Municipal Law, nor custom to the contrary, we ought to follow, tho not the Authority, yet the Equity of the Civil Law, which is received every where, where there is no custom to the con­trary: Specially, seing it is declared by the said Statute mentioned in the Act of Parliament 1621, That the Lords are to follow the Civil and Ca­non Law made against Deeds and Alienations in prejudice of Creditors. 3. It is hard, to put Creditors to dispute the condition of their Debtors, the time of making Donations; and whether they had effects and sufficiency of Estate to satisfy their Debt, notwithstanding the said Deeds; which may be unknown to the Creditors: It being sufficient to say, that the Deed was without an Onerous Cause; and that the Debitor became inso­vent. 4. If a Debitor should become insolvent ex post facto, tho the time [Page 141] of the Donation, the residue of his Estate might have satisfied the Debt, It is more just and reasonable that a Donator, who has a Lucrative Title, should rather suffer ex eventu than a Creditor. [...] did argue to the contrair.

D. 288. Bonars Relict contra His Representatives. 2. July. 1675.

A Bill of Advocation being Reported of a pursuite at the instance of John Bonars Relict, against his Representatives, before the Town of Edinburgh, for payment of 10000 Merks, conform to a Bond granted by him: The Lords did Advocate, not so much in respect of the importance of the Cause, the Town being competent Judges; but because there was an Improbation depending before the Lords, upon the same pursuite of the said Bond: And contingentia causa non debet dividi; and doth Found the Lords Jurisdiction to Advocat to themselves all Questions concerning the said Debt.

D. 289. Earl of Dundonald contra Glenagies, and the Earl of Marr. eod. die.

A Tack of the Teinds of Kilmaranoch being set by the Abbot of Cam­buskenneth, to Sir James Erskine for his Lifetime; and for the Life­time of his Heir Male; and after the decease of the Heir Male, for the Lifetime of his Heir Male; and two 19 Years thereafter: The Earl of Dundonald, having Right by progress to the said Tack, pursued a Spulȝie of the Teinds.

It was Alledged, That the Tack is expired: And if the Earl of Dun­donald will condescend and prove that the said Sir James had an Heir Male surviving; the Defenders will offer to prove that two 19 years had expired since the decease of the last Heir Male.

The Lords Found, That the Pursuer should condescend upon an Heir Male, and prove that he survived the said Sir James: And if he should condescend and prove, that the Defender ought to prove (as said is) that the Tack was expired: And did Assign to the Pursuer and Defender to prove Respective.

D. 290. Mr. Henry Morison. 3. July. 1675.

UPon a Bill against Mr. Henry Morison; It was desired, that in re­spect he was an Advocate and Member of the House, he should summarly deliver certain Goods entrusted to him by the Complainer: And It was Alledged for him, That the Complainer ought to intent an Action in communi forma; And the Interest, that he had in the House as an Advocate should give him Right to any priviledge that belonged to an Advocate, but ought not to put him in a worse case than other Subjects, who could not be forced to defend upon such Bills: And the practice, that the Advocates should Answer summarly to Complaints against them, is only in relation to their Trust and Office, if they refuse to exhibite or deliver Writes entrusted to them: And the Trust mentioned in the Bill was only to him as quilibet, not as an Advocate.

D. 291. [...] contra [...] eod die.

A Discharge, alledged granted by a Minister to one of the Heretors of the Paroch of a part of his Stipend, was quarrelled as false; and did ap­pear to be vitiate; in a process at the instance of the Minister for his Sti­pend: And the user of the same being urged to abide by it, did offer to abide by it with a quality, viz. That the payment not being made by the Heretor himself, (but by his Tennent who took the said Discharge in the Heretors Name) he did abide by the same a Write truely delivered by the Tennent.

The Lords did not sustain the said quality; Unless the Heretor would produce the Tennent, and abide by the same as being truely subscribed and not vitiate; which the Tennent did.

D. 292. Key contra Her Creditors. eod. die.

THE Pursuer of a Bonorum, having given her Oath, that there was no fraudulent Deed done since the Disposition, whereby the Pursuer cesserat and Disponed omnia bona.

It was urged, That the Pursuer should declare also, that no fraudulent Deed had been done by her to defraud the Creditors, whether before or after the Disposition; which was refused by the Lords; in respect that the ordinary Oath given by such Pursuers did run in the Terms foresaid, that they had made no fraudulent Right since the subscribing of the Disposi­tion: Some of the Lords were of Opinion, that the Pursuer should have declared, that she had done no fraudulent Deed at any time; seing cessio bo­norum is an extraordinary remedy, indulged to persons who are become lap­si upon some extraordinary occasion, wlthout their own fault or fraud, and upon that account deserved favour; which was not to be given to fraudato­res who at any time had taken indirect wayes to prejudge their Creditors: And if the Pursuer, the very day before she subscribed the Cession and Dis­position, had made an anterior Right to prejudge her Creditors, it were most inconvenient and absurd, that her Oath should only be received in these Terms, that she had made no Disposition or fraudulent Deed since the granting of the Disposition in favours of the Creditors: And as to the pretence of custom and the conception of the Oath; it ought not to be re­spected; seing it cannot be said, that the Oath of Bankrupts, in the Terms that it is now urged, was desired and refused; and if there had been any defect in the conception of the Oath it ought to be helped.

D. 293. Bairdner contra Colȝier. eod. die.

IN a Process for abstracted Multures: The time of the advising of the Cause, these points were debated amongst the Lords, viz. Whether or not, the Right of a Miln, being Feued by the Abbot, in these Terms cum astrictis multuris, did import astriction of all the Grains growing; so that these that were astricted should be Lyable to bring all the Corns that grew upon the Lands to the Miln; and in case any such be sold the Here­tors and their Tennents should be Lyable for astricted Multures: And 2. There being Decreets recovered at the instance of the Feuar of the [Page 143] Miln, against the Feuars of the Lands, for abstracted Multures of grana crescentia, if the same should import Astriction as to all such Granes, tho neither the Right of the Feuar of the Miln, nor of the Heretors of the Lands be express of grana crescentia; but only of the Terms foresaid cum astrictis multuris.

Some were of the Opinion, as to the first point, That a Feu of a Miln in the Terms foresaid cum astrictis multuris, should import nothing else but that they that were within the sucken and astriction should be lyable, only to grind at the Miln all such Corns that they should have need and occasion to grind; Seing Thirlages are a most odious servitude and ought to be taken strictly: And Multures being Moliturae and due for grinding, they ought to be understood only in the case of Corns which the Feuers do bring to the Miln to grind; or which they have need and use to grind; and yet abstract and go to other Milns: Otherwayes there should be no difference betwixt the Astriction of grana crescentia, and an ordinary astriction. 2. The case in question was of a Miln Feued by the Abbot of Culross, and of Lands likewayes Feued by himself after the Feu of the Miln, and the time of the Feu of the Miln Lands being the Abbots own, either in mains­ing, or set to Tennents; It cannot be thought, that the Astriction was in other terms than such as Tennents are in use to be astricted to their Ma­sters Miln; and beside the Teind and Seed, and the Duty payable to the Master; which being payable to the Abbot the time of the Feu of the Miln was free of astriction; the Tennent having the residue of the Rent for entertaining of his Family, and for defraying the Charges of the La­bouring, and Servants Fies; and other necessar Expences which could not be defrayed otherwayes, but by selling some of the Corns growing: It cannot be conceived that the Abbot or any other Master would astrict his Tennents in these Terms, that they should be lyable for dry Multures, except it were exprest, and that the Astriction had been granorum crescen­tium. Yet the Lords did demurr as to this point, In respect it was vehe­mently urged by [...] that the Astrictions in the Terms foresaid ought to be understood of grana crescentia; otherwayes it should be in the power of these who are astricted, to sell all their Corns, and to buy Meal for their Family, and so to elude the Thirlage: Albeit It was Answered, That it was not to be presumed that Feuers or Tennents would do so; and if they did, they ought to be lyable for abstracted Multures effeirand to such quantities as were necessary, and they were in use to grind for their Fa­milies.

Another point was Agitated and debate amongst the Lords, viz. That the said Decreets could not be obtruded to the Defender; seing neither he nor his Author was called to the same, and res was inter alios acta: But the Lords did not decide these points, but recommended to some of their number to endeavour to settle the Parties.

D. 294. Oliphant contra [...] 7. July 1675.

[...] Oliphant desired an Advocation from the Town [...] Court, upon these Reasons, viz. 1. That the Lybel was to be proven by the Defenders Oath which he was to qualifie. And 2. That the Defender was to prove a Defence by the Pursuers Sons Oath, who [Page 144] was out of the Country; and the Town could not give a Commission for taking his Oath: Both which Reasons were thought not to be Relevant and the Advocation refused; In respect all Judges ought to receive Oaths with intrinsick qualities, and Commissions may be direct by any compe­tent Judge.

D. 295. Lord Halcartoun contra Robison. July 1675.

THE deceast Lord Halcartoun being oblidged, by Contract betwixt him and his deceast Father, to Infeft Mistress Margaret Falconer his Sister, in an Annualrent of the principal Sum of 1000 Merks out of the Lands of Halcartoun redeemable upon 1000 Merks: And to pay the prin­cipal Sum upon Requisition. Sir Patrick Falconer immediat Younger Brother and Heir of Line to the said Mrs. Margaret, Assigned the said Sum and Contract in favours of Robert Robertson; And the said Robert having in­tended Action against the now Lord Halcartoun as representing his Fa­ther, It was Alledged, That the said Sum being conquest in the person of the said Mistress Margaret, it did not belong to the Heir of Line, but to the immediat Elder Brother as Heir of Conquest.

The Lords, having heard the Cause in praesentia; and being resolved to decide the question, betwixt the Heir of Line and Heir of Conquest, as to Heretable Bonds, bearing such Obligements to Infeft; which had been often before in agitation, but never decided but the time of the English; Did Find, that the said Bond and Sum did belong to the Heir of Conquest, who would have succeeded, in case the Right had been perfected by an Infeftment.

Some of the Lords were of the Opinion, That Bonds of that Nature should belong to the Heirs of Line, for these Reasons. 1. That the Heir of Line is General Heir and Successor in universum Jus, tam active quam passive, and is lyable to the Onus Tutelae, and other Burdens; and penes quem onus, penes eundem emolumentum; unless the benefit of Succession be provided otherways, either Provisione hominis, in the Case of Tailȝies; or Legis, and there is no Law settling upon the Heir of Conquest, the Right of Suc­cession as to Heretable Bonds, whereupon no Infeftment has followed: And the Law of the Majesty, [...] is only in the Case of Terrae & Tenementa & Feuda, as appears by the very Words of the said Ancient Laws; and by Craig and Skeen de Verborum significa­tione, in verbo Conquestus, and verbo Breve de morte antecessoris. 2. As Bonds cannot be called Heretage, so they cannot be esteemed to be Con­quest; Heretage being properly Lands, wherein a Person succeeds as Heir to his Predecessor: and if the Heir of Conquest, who is now found to have Right to such Bonds, should decease, tho the samen would de­scend and belong to the Heir of Line, yet such Bonds cannot be called Heretage: And Minors qui non tenentur placitare de haereditate paterna, could not plead the same Priviledge in the case of Heretable Bonds.

3. Lands and Feuda can only be said to be Heretage, or to be Conquest, when Parties have a real Right to the same by Infeftment; but as to Bonds, they do not settle Jus in re, but at the most, a Jus ad rem.

4. Comprisings, Dispositions, and Reversions, being more of the na­ture of Conquest, especially Reversions, which are real Rights, and do militate, not only against the Granters, but singular Successors, do [Page 145] descend and pertain to the Heir of Line, and not to the Heir of Conquest.

D. 296. Veatch contra Pallat. 10. November 1675.

THE Lords, in the Case beforementioned ( February 9 and 12. 1675) Veatch against Pallat, having resumed the Debate; and it appearing u­pon Tryal, that the Common Debitor Sanderson, the time of the granting of the Assignation in anno 1662 in favours of Ker and Brown, was not only Rebell but was in effect Fallitus and Lapsus: They preferred Ʋeatch to Pallat.

D. 297. Gibson contra Rynold and Taylor. 16. Novem­ber 1675.

A Disposition being made by a Woman cloathed with a Husband, of her Liferent of a Tenement, redeemable upon the payment of a certain Sum within a short Term therein mentioned allanerlie: A Decreet of Declarator of the expireing of the Reversion was obtained; and thereafter a Decreet of Removing at the instance of the Person Infeft upon the said Disposition, against the said Woman and her Husband: Whereof a Reduction and Suspension being raised, upon that reason that the suspender was cloathed with a Husband the time of the expiring of the said Reversion, and of the said Decreets; so that non valebat agere nor use the Order of Redemption: and the Husbands Negligence in suffering the Reversion to elapse, and the said Decreets to be obtained, ought not to prejudge her; seing she was content yet to purge by payment of the Sum contained in the Reversion.

The Lords, upon Debate amongst themselves, had these Points in consideration, viz. 1mo. Whether or not a Redemption, being limited and temporary (as said is) in the Case foresaid; there may be yet place, after the elapsing of the Term, to purge: And some of the Lords were of the Opinion, that Reversions being stricti Juris, there can be no Redem­ption, neither in the case of Legal nor Conventional Reversions, after e­lapsing of the Term; nor place to purge: But this Point was not decided. 2. It was agitat, whether a Woman cled with a Husband, may be heard to purge, upon pretence that non valebat agere: as to which Point, some of the Lords did demurr, and it was not decided: The Letters being found orderly proceeded upon an other Ground, viz. In respect of the Decreet in foro contradictorio: But it is thought, that such Reversions should expire even against Women cloathed with Husbands, seing it can­not be said that they are in the case of Minors and non valentes agere, be­cause they are cloathed with a Husband; And by the contrary, having the assistance and advice of their Husbands, they are more able to go about their Affairs: And if their Husbands refuse to concur, they may apply to the Lords, and desire to be authorized by them. Strathurd Re­porter. Monro Clerk.

D. 298. Halyburton of Innerleith. 17. November. 1675.

THE Lords, upon a Bill presented by [...] Halyburton late of Innerleith Prisoner in Edinburgh for Debt, did permit, that until [Page 146] January next, he should in the Day-time go out with a Keeper; the ma­gistrates being lyable if he should escape: This was done upon pretence, that he intended to settle with his Creditors, which he could not do un­less he were allowed the Liberty foresaid: But some of the Lords were of the Opinion, that the Emprisonment of a Debitor, being the ultimate length of Execution; and not only custodiae causa, but in effect that taedio and foetore carceris, Debitors may be driven to take a course with their Creditors; That therefore the Lords had not power to give any Indul­gence or Permission, contrare to Law, and in prejudice of Creditors, without their consent.

D. 299. Mr. Vanse. 18. November 1675.

CAptain Martine being pursued before the Admiral, for wrongs done by him in taking free Ships and Goods, upon pretence that he was a Caper; and that the same belonged to the Kings Enemies: and having desired an Advocation, the Lords thought fit that he should find Caution: and because he refused, and pretended he was not able, did com­mit him: and thereafter he having escaped out of the Tolbooth of Edin­burgh in a disguise, and in Womens Cloaths; Mr. Vanse, Keeper of the Tolbooth, did give in a Bill, representing, That there being so great a number of Prisoners, upon account of Conventicles, and for Criminal Causes, and the said Captain being incarcerate, not for a Crime, but for not finding Caution, he was in bona fide not to look upon him as a Person that would escape: and there being so many Persons who had access to other Prisoners to furnish them Meat, and upon other Occasions, the said Captain his Escape, in manner foresaid, was such, as the most faithful and diligent Keepers might have been surprized and imposed upon: and there­fore did desire that his Carriage might be tryed by the Lords; and if they should find him innocent, that he may be cleared.

It was thought by some of us, That the Desire foresaid, resolving either in an Absolvitor, or a Declarator of his Innocency; The Lords could not give a Sentence as to either in Form; unless either there were a Pursute a­gainst Mr. Vanse, at the Instance of the Persons concerned; or a Declara­tor at his instance, against them being called: and any Sentence that the Lords should give, the Parties concerned not being called, will be no se­curity to the Petitioner: And whereas it was pretended, that this being an Incident, and a Dependance before the Lords, they may proceed upon it, as accessory to the said Dependence.

It was Thought, That the suffering the Prisoner to escape, tho it had a dependence upon the Process, yet could not be called an Incident, but a delictum, whereupon did arise a ground of Action against the Petitioner, both at the instance of the Town of Edinburgh, who were directly lyable to Creditors for the escape of Prisoners; and at the instance of the Parties concerned: and therefore their Interest and Action could not be prejud­ged in so summar a way upon a Petition; they not being called: Where­as such Actions, being both of importance as to the matter, and of diffi­culty and intricacy, do require not only citation of Parties, but all the or­dinary Solemnities of Process, both for introduceing and discussing the same. Vide infra Novemb. 23.

D. 300. Warden contra Berry. 20. November 1675.

THE Lords Found, That an Arrestment upon a Decreet, after it was suspended, may be loosed upon Caution. Done upon a Bill. Hamilton Clerk.

D. 301. Vanse contra Sandilands. 23. November 1675.

IN the Case abovementioned, concerning the Escape of Captain Mar­tine, and the Bill given in by Patrick Ʋanss; which was given up to [...] Sandilands Commissioner for the parties concerned, and to his Procurators to see and answer this day: It was Represented for Patrick Ʋanss, That Keepers of Prisons are in effect Depositarij; and that Prison­ers are entrusted and depositate to be keeped by them; And in Law Depo­sitarius tenetur only de dolo & lata culpa; and the Petitioner could be char­ged with neither: And the Prisoners Escape, in a disguise, is such, as might have surprised and imposed upon the most circumspect and diligent Keeper: And diverse Instances, from Lawyers and Story, were adduced of Escapes of that nature, of prisoners in disguise; and of the Impunity of Jaylors being free of Fraud, and any accession to the same: Whereunto It was Answered, That the Keepers of Prisons are not Depositarij, but pub­lick Servants and Officers; and in all cases of any Trust or Charge, when the same is not gratuitous and dantis causa, but likeways causa accipientis, and ubi intervenit merces, these who are trusted tenentur praestare culpam le­vissimam: And seing it cannot be said, that the Prisoner escaped vi majore, which could not be resisted; nor casu fortuito, which could not be foreseen or prevented, the Keeper, and his Servants, for whom he should answer, cannot be said to be free of culpa: And albeit quaevis causa excusat a poena, where there is no dolus, and the Instances adduced do militat only to that purpose; it cannot be instanced either at home or abroad, that Magistrats and custodes Carcerum under them, were found not to be lyable in subsidi­um, for damnage and interest for the escape of Prisoners: and yet the Lords enclined to free the Petitioner: and that it may appear to be done the more warrantably, they ordained him and his Servants to be examined concerning their Knowledge of the said Escape.

Some of the Lords were of the Opinion, That it was to no purpose to examine the Parties themselves; and tho they had Charity for the Petitio­ner, that he was not conscious or accessory to the said escape, yet that he and his Servants, for whom he should answer, could not be thought to be free of culpa and negligence; and that is was hard, for securing him from prejudice, to unsecure the People: and if such a preparative should be sustained, it would be of dangerous Consequence, and not only a prejudice, but a discouragment to the People, if after the extremity of Diligence and Trouble, Prisoners for Debt, or upon other accounts, should escape impune, upon such pretences: And it was remembred, that upon the Occasion of the Indulgence, and Favour to Keepers of Prisons in Edinburgh, there had been of late diverse Attempts and Escapes; and in this instant Year, one being taken for a High-way Robber, and imprisoned in Edinburgh, had escaped without any Censure or Punishment of the Servants of the House. Vide supra Novem­ber 18.

D. 302. Mr. James Eleis contra John Hall and others. 24. November 1675.

IN a Suspension of multiple poinding, at the instance of Mr. James Eleis of Stainhopmilns against John Hall and the other Creditors of Mistress Masterton and against the Creditors of James Masterton; It was Found, that Mistress Masterton the Relict, not being confirmed Executrix Creditrix to her Husband; her Husbands Creditors are preferable as to any Goods and Debts extant and undisposed of, which belonged to her Husband; In re­spect albeit the Right of the same was established in the person of the Exe­cutrix, yet they did pertain to her as Executrix, and as having a Trust and Office; And to the effect the Testament may be Execute; and what is confirmed should be made forthcoming to all Parties having Interest; and consequently to the Defuncts Creditors, and not her own: And the Executrix has not an absolute property in the Goods confirmed, but only qualified and for Administration, and to the effect foresaid.

2. It was Found, That a Servant, for his Fies, is not priviledged and preferable to other Creditors.

3. James Masterton having granted a Bond for payment of a considerable Sum, after his own and his Wifes decease, in case he should not have Children of his own Body; It was Alledged, That the said Bond, being without an Onerous Cause, and not being effectual until after his decease, as said is, and failȝiening of Heirs of his Body; was of the nature of dona­tio mortis causa, and could not affect the Relicts part: Whereunto It was Answered, that the said Bond being granted when he was in liege poustie, and had power as Dominus to dispose of his Goods, or to grant Bonds which might affect the same; The Relict could have no Legitime, but of the free Gear; the said Bond and other Debts being satisfied.

Some of the Lords were of the Opinion, that the Bond should affect the haill Goods: But others thought that it ought to affect only the De­functs part; seing there is a Commumon betwixt Husband and Wife; and albeit the Husband is said to be Dominus, and has full Administration of the same, so that he may dispose thereof, and grant Bonds for Onerous Causes; yet he cannot, in prejudice of the Communion and the Wifes In­terest foresaid, dissipate and give away the same by fraudulent Donati­ons, of purpose to prejudge either the Relict or the Children of their Le­gitime: But this point was thought fit to be heard and debated in prae­sentia.

D. 303. Forbes of Colloden contra Ross and others. 26. November 1675.

A Decreet, at the instance of Forbes of Colloden against Robert Ross and others, before the Commissar of Ross; being questioned upon that Ground, that the said Commissar had committed Iniquity in Repel­ling Relevant Declinatures; whereof one was upon the account of his Re­lation to the Pursuer, being the Commissars Uncle: And an other was upon account of the nature of the Action, Alledged not to be consistorial; and the subject of the Process, tho it had being proper otherwayes, yet [Page 149] being far above the Sum of 200 Merks, was such, as by the Regulation, the Commissar could not be Judge in: And likewayes in res [...]ect, that the Commissar did assume to himself a Power to modify a great Sum, extend­ing to above 6000. lib. for the Charges the Pursuer had been at in pro [...]e­cuting a Plea by warrand of the Defenders, and wherein he and they were concerned: And the said Modification was upon no other Probati­on but the Pursuers Oath; and that the modifying of so large a Sum did belong ex nobili officio to the Lords of Session privative.

Some of the Lords were of the Opinion, That the Commissar, notwith­standing of the Relation foresaid, could not be declined; seing there is no statute that Judges may be declined upon that account: And by the Act of Parliament 212. K. Ja. 6. His 14. Parl. Anent the Declining of the Lords of Session; There is no other Relation that can be a Ground of Decli­nator, but where the Judge is related to either of the Parties, as Father, Bro­ther, or Son: And yet others were of the Opinion, that a Nevoy, being of so near Relation, may and ought to be declined; In respect by the Com­mon Law, persons of that Relation are most suspect; and cannot be Judges: And by the said Law, a Judge may be declined upon any Ground that may decline a Witness; and there is more reason to decline Judges than Witnesses, seing there may be penury of Witnesses, and they may be so necessary, tho related to the Parties, that others cannot be Found: And the said Act of Parliament, as all Acts of Parliament, espe­cially such as are correctory Juris communis, ought to be taken strictly; and cannot militate, but in the case therinintended and exprest: And the said Act is upon special considerations, in Relation to the Lords of Ses­sion, and particularly, of the Eminent Integrity that is presumed, and ought to be in the Supreme Judicatory.

The Lords, without entering upon the Debate of the said other points, turned the Dcereet in a Lybel. Forret Reporter. Clerk.

D. 304. Anderson of Dowhill contra Lowes. 27. November. 1675.

William Gibson did Dispone to William Norvel his Son in Law and Eli­zabeth Gibson the Disponers Daughter, certain Aikers near Glasgow; which thereafter the said William Norvel did Dispone to Thomas Norvel his Brother: And by a Right from the said Thomas thereafter did pertain to Anderson of Dowhill.

But John Lowes, having thereafter Marryed the said William Norvels Relict Elisabeth Gibson; and having, upon an Assignation to a Debt of the said William Gibson, adjudged the said Williams Right from his Appearand Heir: And having pursued an Improbation and Reduction of Dowhills Right; and in special of the foresaid Disposition made by the said William Gibson to the said William Norvel; Dowhill was forced to pursue forprov­ing the Tenor of the said Disposition, which was out of the way; and which he pretended to have been in the Hands of the said Elizabeth Gib­son; and to have been abstracted by the said John Lowes her second Hus­band, intending to patch up the Right foresaid; And these Adminicles bein Lybelled, viz. That the said Elizabeth Gibson being pursued at the instance of the said Thomas Norvel before the Court of Glasgow, for Exhi­bition [Page 150] of that Disposition; the said Elizabeth, for obtaining a Suspension of the Decreet of Exhibition recovered against her, did consign in the hands of Henry Hope the said Disposition and other Writes; and that thereafter the said Thomas Norvel, upon the said Disposition, did obtain a Decreet cog­nitionis causa, before the Baillies of Glasgow; In which the said Disposi­tion is mentioned as produced: And thereafter the said Thomas did also obtain an Adjudication of the said Aikers, wherein also the same was pro­duced: And that there is an attested double of the said Disposition, which is written by James Galbraith Agent, and attested by two famous Notars.

The Lords admitted the Summonds to Probation; And diverse Wit­nesses being Examined, and in special the said James Galbraith, and these who were Servants to the Clerk of the Court of Glasgow, the time of the obtaining of the said Decreets Cognitionis causa, Adjudication, and others: After much debate, before advising, in praesentia, and amongst the Lords themselves; Some of the Lords were of Opinion, that pursuites, of the na­ture foresaid, being of so great importance, and tending to make up a Right to Lands which may be of great value; The Adminicles ought to be in Write and most pregnant; and that in this case, tho there might be ground of presumption, yet it cannot be said, that there are clear Admi­nicles in Write; In sua far as the attested double cannot be considered as an Authentick Write, and it wants a date: And as to the Decreet of Adjudication, tho it mention the production of the Letters of Disposition, yet it appears by the Depositions of the Witnesses, and it was granted at the Barr, that the principal Disposition was not produced, but only an attested Double, and needed not to be produced; the Decreet cognitionis causa being sufficient to instruct the Pursuers Title in the Adjudication: And as to the Decreet Cognitionis causa, that it is not a sufficient Adminicle, seing both it and the Decreet of Adjudication, bearing the Production in the same Terms, there might have been the same mistake in the De­creet Cognitionis causa, that is confest to have been in the Adjudication, viz. That the Attested double being only produced, yet the Production is made to bear the Disposition; and there being so short a time betwixt the Decreet Cognitionis causa which was the 13. February, and the Adju­dication which was on the 24. of the same Moneth, it is to be presumed that the attested double has been produced in both: And seing in such pursuits for proving of Tenors rei gestae veritas ought to be proven; yet it does not appear, by the Testimonies of any of the Witnesses, that they knew that there was a Disposition truely subscribed by the said William Gibson to the said William Norvel; and a pretended Disposition might have been produced the time of the obtaining of the said Decreets; and might be truely doubled; and yet be a false Write: And it were of a dange­rous consequence, upon such pretences and Adminicles, to make up an Authentick Write, to have the force of a principal Disposition as to all effects; especially it being considered, that even Extracts do not satisfy in Improbations, tho out of the Registers of the highest Judicatories; by reason that Parties concerned will be prejudged of the means and indi­rect Articles of Improbation, arising upon the sight and production of principal Writes, by compareing Hand-Writes and Subscriptions and others: And if Tenors, being made up, should be of more force than [Page 151] Extracts, there should be the same Inconvenient and hazard to the People; and a Door should be opened to contrivances, if after Papers are produced in Judgement, they should be destroyed of purpose, and the Tenors of the same should be thereafter made up by a Decreet, which should satisfy the Production in Improbations.

The Lords thought fit again to Re-examine the said James Galbraith, before they should proceed to Sentence: Vide 15. February 1676. inter eosdem.

D. 305. Blair contra Kinloch. 30. November 1675.

MR. George Blair, being called in an Adjudication at the instance of Kinloch of Gourdie, as Superior of the Lands craved to be Adjudg­ed; did alledge that they could not be Adjudged, because they did be­long to him by a Disposition and Resignation thereupon ad remanentiam: It was Answered, That Adjudications are now in place of Comprysings; and as such Debates were not competent against Comprysings the time of the deduceing of the same, so they ought not to be admitted against Ad­judications; seing Comprysers and Adjudgers do Adjudge or Comprise upon their own hazard: And if the Debitor has any Right or Interest, it ought to be Adjudged; and if he has none, there is no prejudice to any person.

The Lords Found, That there being no Competition of Creditors, and no hazard of retarding the Pursuers Diligence upon that account; the Defender being called might propone the said Defence; and ought not to be put to Trouble and Charges to appear in any other Process for Mails and Duties, or Removing; Especially seing he was content, that if the Pursuer had a Reduction, as he pretended, of his Right, that it should be discust presently; and tho he had no Reduction, that what he could say against his Right should be heard and discust by way of Reply. Forret Reporter.

D. 306. Mr. Vanss contra Sandilands. 1. December 1675.

IN the case abovementioned 18. and 23. of November. Vanss contra Sandi­lands. The Lords having Examined the Servants of the Tolbooth and Captain Martines Wife, Found that Mr. Vanss being free of any suspition of Fraud, or Knowledge and accession to the escape of Captain Martin; ought not to be Lyable to any hazard for the same.

D. 307. Barclay contra Arbuthnet. 3. December 1675.

COllonel Barclay, having produced in termino a Relaxation unregistrate, for proving a Defence, Founded upon the Relaxation. It was Alled­ged before the Lord of the Outer-house, that the Term ought to be cir­cumduced: Whereunto It was Answered, That it could not be circum­duced, since he had produced the said Paper, and Avisandum ought to be made, that the Lords might advise, whether it proves or not.

The Lords Found, That in such Cases, where possibly a blank Paper, or a Paper of an other nature than that which was to be produced, is produ­ced in termino; the Judge may and ought to circumduce the Term; where it is evident, that such Papers are produced, not to satisfy, but to [Page 152] delay and abuse the Judge: But in this case, seing it was found, That Collonel Barclay had produced sufficiently ad victoriam causae, so that there may be some ground of doubt and debate; The Lords Found, That it was competent only the time of the advising. Gosfoord Reporter.

D. 308. Lady Mouswel contra the Creditors of Mouswel. eod. die.

IN a Suspension of multiple Poinding against Agnes Rome Lady Mous­well and her Children, and Dowglas of Dornick, and the other Creditors of Mouswell; The said Lady desired to be preferred for an Annualrent of 1000. merks yearly, wherein she was infeft: It was Answered by the Cre­ditors, that she had Right only to an Annualrent of 800 merks yearly, hav­ing restricted her self to 800. merks, by a Contract and Agreement be­twixt her and her freinds of Mouswell: Whereto It was Replyed, That the Restriction was personal in favours of the Heir of Mouswell, and intui­tu of the Obligements contained in the said Contract; that the Friends should undertake the Sums mentioned in the said Contract respective which they had not done: And albeit It was Duplyed, that the Minute does bear a positive and absolute Restriction, and Renounciation of 200 merks, and that there is no Provision or Clause irritant in the Minute, that if the Obligements upon the other Contracters were not fulfilled that the Restri­ction should be void; Yet The Lords preferred her for the whole Annual­aent, Notwithstanding of the Restriction foresaid: Which appears to be hard, Seing some of the Creditors, who did compete with the Lady, were not Contracters and obliged by the said Contract; And the foresaid Restriction was not in favours of the Creditors who were obliged by the said Contract, but in favours of her Son the Heir; And the benefite there­of doth accrue to his Creditors who had comprysed; and does in effect redound to the advantage of the Heir and his Successors; Seing the Cre­ditors will be the more easily satisfied, the burden of the Ladies Liferent being restricted, as said is: and the other Creditors, who had not fulfilled their Obligements, may be pursued for implement of the same: And it is a great inconsequence, that because they had not fulfilled their part, that therefore the Ladies part, which was fulfilled and execute, should become void: and the pretence, that the Restriction foresaid was causa data non secuta is of no weight; seing the causa was the Obligement of the Credi­tors, which they might be compelled to fulfil. Hatton Reporter.

D. 309. Cuninghame contra Maxwel. eod. die.

A Bond being suspended upon a Reason of Compensation, viz. That the Suspender had debursed diverse Sums (conform to an Accompt) for the Charger: and the said Reason being referred to the Chargers Oath, and deferred back again to the Suspenders Oath; it was debated among the Lords, a quo tempore Compensation should be sustained; whether from the time of the debursements, or from the time the same was liquidat and cleared by the Suspenders Oath. And it was Found, That Compensation should be sustained from the time of the Debursements: seing the said Sums then grew to be due.

[Page 153]Debts being illiquid, either because not constitute by Wr [...]te or Decreet; or because they are not due in Money but in Victual, or such like; which must be liquidat, as to the Prices and Value, before there can be any exe­cution for the same; the Question may be of greater difficulty as to the last, seing compensatio is s [...]lutio, and ipso jure minuit; whereas a Debt in Mo­ney, cannot be said to be payable, and far less to be payed in Victual, un­less the Creditor be content to be satisfied that way.

D. 310. Dalling contra McKenȝe. 7 December 1675.

A Woman is understood to be praeposita negotiis domesticis; so, that for the Provision of her House, she may take from Fleshers and Baxters and others such Furnishing as is necessary: and her Declaration and Oath may be taken, and ought to be trusted as to the same: and the Husband is presumed not to know the particular Quantities: and these who do fur­nish, are not oblidged to enquire, whether her Husband has given her Money sufficient to provide his House, if she be a Person that is not inhi­bite: seing the Husband has a remedy, if he has any suspition that she may abuse and wrong him, and may inhibite her. Glendoick Reporter.

D. 311. Sheriff of Perth contra [...] eod die.

IT was Found, That the late Proclamation, remitting Fines due up­on the contraveening of Penal Statutes, ought to be extended to Ryots and Fines, upon the committing of the same before the said Proclamation; the Persons being thereafter Convict before the Sheriff. Glendoich Re­porter.

D. 312. Lord Arnistoun contra Patrick Murray of Deuchar. 8. December 1675.

WHen Lands are pretended to be thirled to a Mill, the Heretor has good interest to pursue an Improbation against the Heretor of the Mill, of all Rights and Writes, bearing express constitution of the said Servitude: But that General, viz. That the Defender should produce all Writes, which may import Thirlage, ought not to be sustained; in respect there may be Writes importing Thirlage consequentially, which the De­fender is not obliged to know, what the import of the same may be; and it were hard, that upon pretence of such an Interest, the Defender should make his Charter Chest patent to the Pursuer: and the Pursuer has a Re­medy, if he apprehend that the Defender may trouble him, upon pretence of Writes, which may import consequentially Thirlage, he may force him to produce the same, by intenting a negatory Action and Declara­tor of Freedom.

D. 313. [...] Laird of Wamfray. eod. die.

THE Act of Parliament against Protections. 3d. Sess. of His Majesties 1st. Parl. Cap. 3. giving Power to the Lords of Session, and Exche­quer, Privy Council, and Justice General, to grant Protections to per­sons summoned to appear before them; is only to be understood in that [Page 154] case, when they are obliged to appear personally to give their Oaths, or to be Witnesses; and cannot appear by Procurators: And such Protections ought not to be granted upon pretext, that Processes of Compt and Reckon­ing and others cannot be managed without their own presence: And this was Found upon a Bill given in by Johnstoun of Wamfray; whereby he de­sired a Protection.

And yet it is thought, that in some cases, where it is evident that there is a necessity of the Defenders presence to give Information in the point of Fact, especially in general Actions of Compt and Reckoning, Protections ought to be granted.

D. 314. Veitch contra Hamilton. 9. December. 1675.

A General Action of Compt and Reckoning, at the instance of Pupils and Minors Post tutelam & curatelam, against their Tutors and Curators, is not consistorial and competent to be pursued before the Commissars; where the import of the Action exceeds the Sum and value to which the Commissars may be Judges: And the pretence, that there are diverse Ar­ticles, and none of them doth exceed the said Sum is of no weight; seing the Reply of articulatus Libellus is only in the case, where the Debitor is pur­sued for diverse Sums, which in effect resolves in diverse Actions: Where­as actio tutelae is but one general Action and upon one Ground, viz. The Defender is Lyable as Tutor and Curator, whatever and how many so­ever the Articles of Intromission be: And upon the Ground foresaid, the pursuite before the Commissars was Advocate. Newbyth Reporter.

D. 315. The Creditors of James Mastertoun, and of his Relict Alice Thine. eod. die.

BY our Custom and the Custom of diverse other Nations, tho there be a Communion betwixt a Husband and a Wife as to Moveables; yet the Husband dureing the Marriage has not only Administration, but is Do­minus actu; and may dispose of the same, not only for Onerous Causes, but by way of Donation; and the Wife has only a Right and Interest habitu; which exit in actum after the Marriage is dissolved; as to all the Move­ables belonging to them, the time of the Dissolution.

And yet if the Husband dispose of his Moveables in fraudem, and of purpose to prejudge the Wife, and to evacuate her Legitime and part of the Moveables; as was Alledged in the case in question; the circumstan­ces being such as did evince the Husbands fraud and purpose to settle his Estate upon his near Relations after his Death; in prejudice of the Wifes Interest; such Donations will not be sustained.

The said James Mastertoun, having made a Disposition in favours of his his Wife, with the burden of his Debts, so that his Creditors should not be prejudged; but that the said Right should be affected with the said Debts; It was debated among the Lords, what the import should be of the said Clause; and if the Creditors of the Husband had thereby a real Interst in the Goods; or only a personal Action against the Receiver of the Disposition: And it was thought, that the Goods being extant and undisposed of; the Receiver of the Disposition with the said quality, was in the case of a Trustee or Executor: And the Creditors of the Husband [Page 155] competing, upon their Diligence, to affect the same with these of the Wife, would be preferable: But if they were disposed of by the Wife, tho the price be not employed for the use of the Creditors, tho they be extant the Husbands Creditors has no Interest in the same; seing the Wife was Domina and might sell the same; and Buyers finding her in possession, are not concerned to enquire what way she should employ the price. Vide infra 17. December 1675. Thomson contra Eleis.

D. 316. Scot contra Kennedy. 10. December. 1675.

A Father, or any other person disponing his means, may qualify his own Gift; and in special with that Provision, that if the persons be Pupils or Minors, the same should be Administrate by the persons named in the said Disposition; and yet these, in whose favours the Dispo­sition is made, may choose Curators, who will have the Administration of any other Estate belonging to them: But if they be Puberes their per­sons are free; and neither of the said Administrators can pretend to the keeping of them, quia curator datur rebus.

D. 317. McKneish contra Bryce and her Husband. eod. die.

A Woman being pursued upon a Bond; and having alledged, that it it was Null, because she was vestita viro: The Reply, that she promised payment after her Husbands decease, tho the Sum was only 100 lib. Scots, was Found not to be probable by Witnesses. Glendoich Reporter.

D. 318. [...] contra [...] 16. Decem. 1675.

THE Lords Found, That a Merchant being in use to furnish diverse Years; That a current accompt did not prescrive; Tho some were of Opinion, that the Act of Parliament bearing no distinction; the Ar­ticles of Accompt ought to prescrive from their Respective Dates; Seing otherways the Act of Parliament may be eluded, both in the case of Compts and other cases, which prescrive by the Act. Nevoy Reporter.

D. 319. Wilson contra Deans. 17. December. 1675.

IT was Found, That a Woman keeping a Shop, and Traffiqueing as a Merchant with the knowledge of her Husband, he is Lyable for Debts Contracted by her, upon the account of her Traffique, Actione institoria. Forret Reporter.

D. 320. Thomson contra Mr. James Eleis. eod. die.

THE Lords Found, In the case of a Right of Moveables, granted by a Husband to his Wife with the burden of his Debts, and a Provi­sion that they shall be affected with the same, That the property of the Goods is settled in the person of the Wife; so that she may dispose of the same: And these who acquire Right thereto are not concerned to en­quire, [Page 156] whether the price be converted to the use and satisfaction of the Creditors; who will have a personal Action against the Wife: So that she will in effect be in the case of an Executor and Trustee: But if the Goods so affected be extant, the Creditors of the Husband will be preferable to the Wifes proper Creditors; her Right being fiduciary (as said is) and to the use foresaid. Praesentia. Vide supra 9. December 1675. The Creditors of James Mastertoun.

D. 321. [...] contra [...] 21. Decem. 1675.

A Father having made a Disposition in favours of his Son, reserving his own Liferent, with power likewayes to dispose of what he had pro­vided; did appoint certain Persons as Curators, and to have Administra­tion of what he had provided, dureing not only the Pupillarity, but the Minority of his Son; and nevertheless his Son, having chosen Curators after his Pupillarity, there was a Competition betwixt the said Curators, and the Person appointed by the Father to Administrate.

The Lords Found, That the Son, as to his Person, was not in potestate of either of the said competing Curators; seing Curator non datur personae sed rebus: and as to any other Estate, belonging to the Minor, any other way than by the Provision of his Father, the same was to be governed by the advice of the Curator, named and chosen by himself.

But the Lords demurred as to that Question, viz. Whether the Father might affect the Right granted by himself, with the Quality and Provisi­on foresaid, that the Person named by him, should have administration of the Estate disponed by him: And some were of the Opinion, that there is a difference betwixt a Stranger and a Father; in respect Strangers are not obliged to give; and what they are pleased to give, they may affect and qualifie their Right thereof sub modo, and with what Provisions they think fit; whereas a Father has a Duty lying upon him in nature, to pro­vide his Children; and by the Law he may name Tutors to his Children; but after Pupillarity, he cannot put them under the power of Curators, without their own consent: and if this practice should be allowed, there should hereafter be no election of Curators: They did also consider, that the Right granted by the Father, was in effect donatio mortis causa, seing the Father retained possession, and a power to revock: And it seemed, that as the Father could not in Testament make Curators, so he could not do the same by a Legacy, or any such Donation mortis causa.

D. 322. Mr. of Rae contra Dumbyth. 8 February 1676.

IN a Spuilȝie, at the Instance of the Master of Rae against Dumbyth, It was Alledged, The Pursute was prescrived, because not intented with­in 3. Years; so that it could not be sustained to give the Pursuer Juramen­tum in litem and violent Profits. It was Replyed for the Pursuer, That long within the 3. Years, a pursute for Depredation had been intented, before the Justice; Which being of a Higher Nature, and including Vir­tually, and in consequence, the conclusion of Restitution and Profits, was a sufficient Interruption as to this pursute.

The Lords, notwithstanding Found, the pursute prescrived. Newbyth Reporter. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk.

D. 323. Riccarton Drummond contra [...] eod. die.

THE Lords Found, That a special Service in an Annualrent, doth give Right to Heretable Bonds, and all other Heretable Estate, whereup­on Infeftment did not follow; and includes a General Retour, as Homo doth include Animal. Newbyth Reporter. Hamilton Clerk.

D. 324. [...] contra [...] eod. die.

THE Lords Found, That when Creditors did compear in Adjudicati­ons, not being called; they ought to be admitted with that quality, that since the course of the Adjudger is stopt by their Compearance, the Adjudger shall be in the same case as to any Adjudication at their instance, as if both Adjudications were within year and day.

D. 325. Colledge of Aberdeen contra [...] eod. die.

THE Colledge of Aberdeen, having Right by Act of Parliament, to the Vacant Stipends within the Bounds thereinmentioned; pursues for a Vacant Stipend: the Bishop of Ross compeared and alledged, That the Kirk was his Mensal Kirk, so that there could be no Vacant Stipend.

The Lords Found, That the Colledge should have Right to any Stipend that belonged to the former Ministers, either modified to them, or of which they have been in Possession: and that it was consistent, that the Kirk should be Mensal, and yet the Minister should have a Stipend, and that the Pursuers should have Right thereto, being Vacant. Craigie Repor­ter.

D. 326. [...] contra [...] 9. February 1676.

IN a Suspension, a Reason of Compensation is lybelled, viz. That the Charger was debitor to the Suspender upon account of a Fraught; and it was offered to be proven by the Chargers Oath, that he was so Debitor; and by Witnesses what the Fraught extended to

The Lords Found the Letters orderly proceeded; and that Compen­sation was de liquido in liquidum, and not de liquidando by Witnesses.

D. 327. [...] contra [...] eod. die.

A Pursute was intented for a Sum of Money, which the Defender was obliged by his Promise to pay, in case he should be married; having gotten from the Pursuer in the mean time a Piece, which the Pur­suer was to loose, in case the Defender should not be married.

The Lords sustained the Pursute: Tho some of their Number were of the opinion, that sponsiones ludicrae, of the Nature foresaid, ought not to be allowed. Strathurd Reporter.

D. 328. Sir Patrick Nisbet contra Hamilton. eod. die.

AFter the Lands of a Debitor were denounced to be comprysed; a vo­luntar Right was granted by him, of an Annualrent out of the samen [Page 158] Lands, for an Onerous Cause; whereupon the Annualrenter was infeft by a publick Infeftment, before any Infeftment upon the Comprising: and there being upon the foresaid Rights a Competition betwixt the Com­priser and the Annualrenter: It was Alledged, That after the Lands were denounced, the Debitor could not give a voluntar Right of the same being litigious, and affected with the Denounciation: And on the other part, it was debated, that the Debitor, not being inhibite, might give a voluntar Right for an Onerous Cause, and the first consummate Right ought to be preferred.

The Lords, In respect it was pretended there were contrary Decisions, Thought fitt, not to give Answer, until these should be considered.

D. 329. Park contra Rysly. eod. die.

A Tennent having sold Nine Score of Sheep, and the samen being ca­ryed off the Roum where he was Tennent; the Master of the Ground, by Warrand of the Sheriff, as having therein the Right and Interest of a tacite Hypotheck, did seise upon the same.

The Lords Found, That neither the Master nor the Sheriff, without citing the Partie, could seise upon the said Goods, not being upon the Masters Ground; nor give Warrand to that purpose: And yet seing quaevis causa excusat a spolio, they restricted the Pursute to wrongous Intromission: and allowed to the Master his Defence for Retention of the Goods, until he should be payed of his Years Duty. Newbyth Reporter. Hamilton Clerk.

D. 330. [...] contra [...] eod. die.

THE Right of a Wadset being comprised, the Compriser did require for the Sum due upon the Wadset; and pursued the Representatives of the Debitor: It was Alledged, for the Defender, That he could not pay the Money, unless the Pursuer should put the Defender in Possession of the Lands: It was Answered, That the Pursuer not having possession him­self, and having loosed the Wadset by Requisition, he could not put the Defender in possession: and the Defender might have taken possession by his own Right: and it was enough that he was content to renounce the Wadset; especially seing neither the Pursuer nor his Author had done any Deed to put the Defenders in worse case as to Possession; and the Possession was apprehended and still continued by an Anterior Compryser: and the Pursuer had obtained a Declarator, finding the said Comprysing to be satisfy­ed and extinct, so that the Defenders might easily recover Possession.

The Lords notwithstanding Found the Alledgeance Relevant, and that the Pursuers should put the Defenders in possession.

D. 331. Grant contray Barclay. 10. February 1676.

IN a pursute upon a Passive Title of Behaving; It was Alledged, that before intention of the cause the Defender had gotten a Gift of the De­functs Escheat.

The Lords, Upon Debate amongst themselves, Found, that albeit the Gift was not declared, yet it purged the Defenders vitious Intromission; being before the intention of the Cause; and that the Defender, having the Goods in his hands, needed not a Declarator.

[Page 159]This seemed hard to some of the Lords, In respect by our Custom there being two wayes adeundi haereditatem, viz. either by a Service or by In­tromission was the Defuncts Goods that were in his possession: The Ap­pearand Heir, by medling with the Goods, gerit se pro haerede; And so by his Intromission having declared his intention alse fully as if he were served Heir; semel haeres cannot cease to be Heir; there being Jus quaesi­tum to the Creditors as to a Passive Title against him. 2. The pretence, that the Defender is in the same case, as if there were an Executor con­firmed before the intention of the Cause, is of no weight; Seing the De­fence upon the confirmation is sustained; because there is a person against whom the Creditors may have Action, which is not in the Case of a Do­nator. 3. A Donator has no Right without a general Declarator; And tho, when the Donator has the Goods in his hand, there needs not a special Declarator; yet, for declaring his Right, there must be a general one. 4. As to that pretence, that the Defender cannot be Lyable as Intrometter with the Defuncts Goods, because they belong to the Fisk and not to him; It is Answered, That the Goods being in the possession of the De­funct; the Appearand Heir thereafter medleing with the same eo ipso adit; and the Creditors ought not to be put to debate, being he is in Possession: And if a person should be served special Heir to the Defunct, tho the De­functs Right were reduced and the Haereditas could be inanis as to the benefite, yet the Heir would be still Lyable. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk.

D. 332. Mcquail contra Mcmillan. eod. die.

A Pursute being intented against the Wife as universal Intrometter to a Defunct, and her Husband pro interesse; and the Wife having deceased: It was Found, that the Husband should not Lyable, unless it were proven, that he had Intromission with the same Goods; upon the Intromission with which the former pursute was intented against his Wife.

This was not without difficulty: And upon debate amongst the Lords, tho it was not the present case, yet the Lords enclined to be of the Opi­n [...]on, that the Husband, having gotten a Tocher ad sustinenda onera Ma­trimonij; If the Wife had any other Estate, whereunto the Husband had Right Jure Mariti, he should Lyable in quantum locupletior. Nevoy Reporter. Robert Hamilton Clerk.

D. 333. Alexander Abernethie contra Arthur Forbes. eod. die.

THE Lord Saltoun having given a Bond of 20000 Merks to Alexan­der Abernathie, upon account of his Service, and of the Service done by his Brother James Abernathie: Thereafter the said Lord Sal­toun did grant a Bond, making mention that the Lands of Auchincleuch be­longed to him and his Authors, and that the said Alexander had been Instrumental to obtain a Reduction of the Rights of the Estate of Salton, to the behoof of the said Lord Salton; and therefore obligeing my Lord Saltoun to Infeft him in the said Lands.

The Lords Found, That the said Bond, being after the former and for the Causes foresaid, and having no Relation to the said former Bond of [Page 160] 20000 Merks, that it should be in satisfaction of the same; Could not be in­terpret to be in satisfaction thereof: And the Brockard Debitor non praesu­mitur donare does not militate in this Case; Seing the Lord Salton was in a capacity to give both the said Bonds, by way of Donation: and the question was not betwixt the said Alexander and the Creditor, but be­twixt another person to whom thereafter he had gratuitously Disponed his Estate. In praesentia.

D. 334. Gibson contra Fife. 12. February 1676.

A Woman having lent 100 Merks, upon a Blank Bond; and the same being lost: The Debitor was pursued for payment of the said Sum; and did confess that he had truly borrowed the Money, and granted the Bond Blank; and he was willing to pay the same, being secured against any pursute, at the instance of any person, who might have found the said Bond, and filled up his own name therein.

The Lords thought the case to be of great difficulty and import, as to the preparative; that practice of granting Blank Bonds having become too frequent: And resolved, in this case, to take all possible Tryal by the Debitors Oath, and otherwayes, of the date and Writers Name and the Witnesses in the said Bond: And thereafter to ordain the Debitor to pay upon surety, that the Pursuer should relieve him of any Bond that should be found of that date and Sum; and writen and Subscribed by the Writer and Witnesses that should be found to have been in the said Bond. Gibson Clerk.

D. 335. Anderson contra Lowes. 15. February 1676.

THE Lords, in the case abovementioned Anderson contra Lowes 27. November 1675. Found the Tenor of the Write thereinspecified proven by the Adminicles thereinmentioned. In praesentia.

D. 336. Marshal contra Forrest and her Husband. eod. die.

IN a pursute at the instance of a Minor against his Tutrix: The Pur­suer having referred to the Tutrix Oath, that she had intrometted with diverse particulars belonging to him: The Husband of the Tutrix Al­ledged, that she could not declare in his prejudice: It was Replyed, That the Pursuer having an Action and Jus quaesitum competent to him against his Tutrix, he could not be in worse case as to modum probandi, by the Tu­trix her superinduceing a Husband: And that the Intromission of a Re­lict, after her Husbands decease, being such as to Money, Bonds, and many other particulars, as could not be known to any person, but to her self; nor proven, but by her own Oath; It were hard, that the Minor should be prejudged of his Probation by her own Deed: And the Husband is not in the case where a Debt is only to be constitute by the Wifes Oath; seing the Ground of the Debt is constitute by Write, viz. By the Nomi­nation or Letter or Tutory: And when there is a pursute against any per­son, that Person cannot by an Assignation prejudge his Creditor of his Probation by Oath; and the Minor is more priviledged; seing by the [Page 161] Common Law Minors have a tacite hypotheck of their Tutors Estate; and by our Law they ought to be favoured, at least so far as it should not be in the power of the Tutrix to ruine them, by convoleing ad secundas nuptias ante redditas rationes.

The Lords thought the case considerable: And Ordained the Tutrix to declare; Reserving to themselves, to consider what her Declaration should import. Forret Reporter. Gibson Clerk.

D. 337. E. of Dumfermling contra the Earl of Callender. 16 February 1676.

THE Earl of Dumfermling, having Right by Assignation, to the Obligements contained in the Contract of Marriage, betwixt the deceast Earl of Callender and his Grand-mother; in swa far as the same is in favours of the said Lady: pursued the said Earl of Callender for Imple­ment of the said Obligements; and the Lord Almond, now Earl of Callen­der, as having gotten a Right to the said Earl of Callender's Estate, with the burden of his Debts: and the said Earl in the interim having deceas­ed, did insist against this Earl of Callender: For whom It was Alledged, That the Process ought to be transferred against some representing the said Earl of Callender, as Heir of Line, or otherways: And tho the Pursuers Procurators declared, they insisted only against Callender for a Declarator, that the Estate disponed to him should be affected with the foresaid Oblige­ment: It was urged for Callender, That the said Earl's Heirs ought to be called; Seing the Declarator, against him being a singular Successor, that his Lands should be affected, was only a subsidiarie Conclusion, and could not be sustained before the Debt was constitute: and the Debt could not be constitute, unless the pretended Debitor, or some representing him, were called.

The Lords notwithstanding Found Process; and that there were no ne­cessity of calling or transferring against the Heirs of the Debitor. Actor Sinclar, Bernie and others, alteri Lockheart. Monro Clerk. In Praesen­tia.

D. 338. Doctor Borthuick contra the Earl of Crawfurd. eod. die.

THE Earl of Crauford, having borrowed 8000 merks from the Mo­ther and Grand-mother, and two of their Children, for them­selves and in name and behalf of their said Children; he is obliged by his Bond to infeft the said Mother and Grand-mother in Liferent and the said Children in Fie in an Annualrent out of certain Lands; but by a mistake, the Precept of Seasin, contained in the Bond, is in favours only of the Mother and Grand-mother, and for infefting them as Fiars of the said An­nualrent, and accordingly they are infeft: And yet thereafter the said Mo­ther and Grand-mother acknowledging, that the said Infeftment was so taken upon mistake, did by a Disposition, bearing the Narrative foresaid, dispone the Fee in favours of the said Children: and there was a Pursute intented at their instance, against the said Earl of Craufurd, for poinding of the Ground, Wherein It was Alledged, That the Mother and Grand-mother, [Page 162] being only Lifrenters, could not resign the Fee, which they had not: and if the Pursuers made use of their Right from them, the Defenders ought to be assoilȝied; because the Mother and Grand-mother, by a Trans­action betwixt the said Earl of Crawfurd and them, had accepted the time of the Englishes, a parcel of Lands in satisfaction of the said Debt.

The Lords Found, notwithstanding of the said Alledgance, that the Pursuers ought to have process for poinding the Ground; In respect the Mother and Grand-mother had de facto the Fie in their person upon the said Precept and Seasin: And the same being given indebite, as said is, they might have been compelled to denude themselves thereof: and therefore might voluntarly, and accordingly did denude themselves thereof, and the said Transaction could not prejudge them, seing they derived their Right from the said Persons qualificate, in respect of their Interest and Error fore­said; and they might have been compelled to give the same: and the Earl of Crawfurd was not in bona fide to contract with them; Seing by the Bond granted by himself, they were only Fiars, and the other but Liferenters. Actor Lockhart and Beaton, alteri Cuningham and Suinton. Clerk in praesentia.

D. 339. Doctor Hay contra Alexander. 17. Febr. 1676.

DOctor Hay his Case, 28 January 1675. supra, resumed and taken to consideration this day; And tho some of the Lords considered, that it was hard to canvel Certifications in Pursutes of Improbation after a long Dependence, and diverse Terms given to produce, and delays of Extra­cting, after Circumduction of the said Terms; and that such Certifications are not only the great Surety of these who obtain the same, but of these who obtain Right from them, conceiving themselves to be secured with such Certifications: Yet the President, and others of the Lords enclined to repone Alexander against the Certification, the Writes being produced; tho it was urged, that beside the Security and Interest of People, as said is, it was to be considered, that in this Case, there were Advantages preten­ded to on both hands, viz. by Alexander of an expired Comprysing; and by the Doctor of the said Certification: and that Alexander and his Au­thors, by vertue of their Comprysing, had been many years in Possession; tho there was probability the Comprysing was satisfyed; and it seemed to be equitable that the Doctor should have a Decreet of Removing; and should give a Reversion to Alexander, limited to such a time as the Lords should find just, upon payment of what should be resting and unsatisfied by his and his Authors Intromission, if there there were any part of the Debt yet resting: But this Point was not decided, the Lords having re­commended to some of their Number, to endeavour an Accommodation betwixt the Parties.

D. 340. Abercrombie contra Acheson and Livington. eod. die.

A Taverner, after she had removed from her Masters Service, and was Marryed, was pursued to Compt and Reckon for Ale and Wine which the Pursuer offered to prove was layed in in his Cellars.

The Lords Found, That the Pursuer ought to Lybel and prove that the Debt was yet Resting: Seing it was to be presumed, that Ser­vants [Page 163] of that quality did Compt Weekly with their Masters; and the Pur­suer would not have suffered the Defender to go out from his Service be­fore she had Compted and made payment: And it appeared, that there had been former Decisions to that purpose. Lord Justice Clerk Reporter.

D. 341. Dundass contra Turnbul and other Creditors to Whitehead of Park. eod. die.

IN a Competition, betwixt an Infeftment of Annualrent and a posterior Infeftment upon a Comprysing; the Lords enclined to find, that the Infeftment of Annualrent was made publick by a pursute of poinding the Ground before the Infeftment upon the Comprysing: But, some of the Lords not being clear, the case was not decided. Gosford Reporter.

D. 342. Wauch contra Jamison. eod. die.

DOctor Bonar, being to go out of the Country did Dispone a Right of Lands and of an Annualrent to Mr. John Smith his near Relation; upon a Backbond granted by the said Mr. John, bearing that the said Right was granted partly in Trust, and partly for surety to the said Mr. John for Sums due for the time to him by Bonar; and of such Sums as Smith should advance to Bonar, or his Creditors: And that the said Right should be Redeemable by Bonar or his Sister, if she should survive him, by payment of the foresaid Sums.

Thereafter the Doctor did grant a Bond of 5000 Merks to the said Mr. John Smith, bearing no Relation as to the said surety: And bearing, as to the conception, a simple Moveable Bond to the said Mr. John his Heirs and Executors: And after the said Mr. John Smiths decease, there be­ing a Competition betwixt Doctor Jamison his Heir and the Executor, as to the said Sum of 5000. Merks: And the question being, whether it should be thought to be Heretable, in respect of the said surety; or Moveable, In respect of the conception of the said Bond.

The Lords did consider the case as of great moment, as to the conse­quence and Interest of the People; and upon debate at the Barr in praesen­tia and among themselves, they came to these Resolutions; viz. That it was consistent, that a Sum should be Moveable, and yet that it should be secured by an Heretable Suretie, as in the case of bygone Annualrents due upon Infeftments of Annualrent; and of bygone Feu-duties or Taxa­tions; the same being unquestionably Moveable ex sua natura; And yet there being a real surety for the same, and a real Action for poinding the Ground even competent to Executors: And likewayes in the case of Wadsets loosed by Requisition, and bearing a provision, that, notwith­standing of Requisition, the real Right should stand unprejudged until payment; in which case the Sum would be Movable, tho still secured by Infeftment. 2. That, as to these qualities of Moveable or Heretable, in relation to the Interest of Succession and Question betwixt Heirs and Exe­cutors, the design of the Creditor & animus, was to be considered princi­pally: And if Debts, either by the conception, were Heretable ab initio, or an Heretable surety taken thereafter for Moveable Debts, as a Wadset or Comprysing; It was to be presumed, that the Creditor intended to alter the quality of the Sums, and that they should belong to his Heirs: [Page 164] but if Creditors should take an Heretable surety, without any intention to alter the quality of the Debt, or that the same should ly as bonum stabi­le and fixt; the Debt continues still Moveable: As v. g. If a Creditor, having done exact Diligence, should take a Gift of Liferent Escheat, or Recognition, upon a Back-bond, that he should be satisfied in the first place of his Debt: Or if in a Suspension, a Disposition of the Debitors Estate should be consigned, because he cannot find Caution: Or in the case of Bonorums, a Disposition of an Heretable Estate should be made in favours of his Creditors: Or if a Debitor should Dispone his Estate in favours of a confident person with the burden of his Debts: In these and the like Cases, Because the Creditor does not intend, that his Money should ly as an Heretable Debt, but upon the contrary has done, and is about to doe all possible Diligence, for recovery of the same, the Debt continues still Movable, notwithstanding of the said accessory and extrinsick surety. 3. Bonds, being taken after a general Surety in the Terms foresaid, for Debts to be advanced, may be Moveable; notwithstanding of such Sure­ty, if it appear that the Creditor intended it should be such: As if such supervenient Bonds should be taken to Executors, Excluding Heirs: E­specially when such general Sureties, for Sums as are to be after­advanced, are not dispositive, but by way of Provision containing Back-bonds, and not of the Right it self, viz. That the Receiver of the Right should not be lyable to denude, until he get payment of the Sums that should be due to him at any time thereafter; In which case it appears, that he has not a positive Right, and Surety for the said Sum, but an In­terest and exception of Retention.

The Lords in end, In the foresaid Cause, Found that the said Bond of 5000 M. In sua far as it should be made appear, to be made up of the Sum mentioned in the Back-bond, that was due to Smith at that time, should belong to the Heir an as Heretable Sum; In respect, ab initio, the said Sure­ty was granted for the same: But, as to the residue of the said Sums, it should belong to the Executors as Moveable; Seing the Defunct had exprest his Intention that it should be such, by the taking the Bond, in the form and conception of a Moveable Bond. Cuninghame and Kincaid for Wauch, alteri Lockheart and Mckenȝie. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk. in praesentia.

D. 343. Ogilvie contra Buckie. 22. February. 1676.

IMprobation being proponed against a Discharge, after the same had been questioned as Null, because it wanted the Writers Name, at least he was not designed.

The Lords Found The said Write Null and not probative, unless the Pursuer should condescend upon a Writer Living; at least, if he were Dead, should produce Writes writen or subscribed by him, to the effect the Pursuers may thereupon have the means of indirect probation entier. Actor. Mckenȝie alter. Thoirs.

D. 344. Aerskine contra Rynolds. eod. die.

THE Lords sustained a Declarator, at the Instance of a Creditor, to hear and see it Found, That certain Sums provided by a Father to [Page 165] his Children, after the contracting of the Debt, should be lyable and sub­ject to Execution for their Debt: and that they should be lyable them­selves in quantum lucrati, tho there was not a Reduction intented of the said Rights upon the Act of Parliament 1621. which the Lords were mo­ved to do, not only because they thought, that the said Declarator is a Re­duction upon the matter, but the rather that the Summonds were offered to be proven by the Defenders own Oaths: and in effect, as to the most of the Sums, they were not a Subject of Reduction; seing the Debts were not all assigned to the Children; but the Bonds being blank in the Cre­ditors Name, the Father had filled them up in the Name of the Children: and as to such as were assigned, for the most part, they were renewed in the Name of the Children; the former Bonds being given back, with As­signations to the same. Newbyth Reporter.

D. 345. Hilton contra L. Chynes. 24. February 1676.

THE Lady Cheynes being infeft in an Annualrent, upon a Right gran­ted by her Husband: Her Seasin was questioned upon these Grounds: 1. That it was Null, in sua far as the Baillie and the Actorney in the Seasin were one Person, who could not both give and take the Seasin. And 2. The Provision was during Marriage, and after the Creditor that did compeat, his Debt; and tho it could be sustained, where there was no Contract of Marriage, for a competent Provision; yet it could not be sustained for the whole Annualrent, being exorbitant; her Husbands E­state and Debt being considered.

The Lords, In respect, it did appear evidently, that it was a mistake of the Notar, that the Seasin did bear the same Person to be both Baillie and Actorney, in the Clause of Tradition; And seing by the first part of the Seasin, it was clear, that there was a distinct Actorney, who did present the Seasin to the Baillie; Did therefore encline to sustain the Seasin: but before Answer to that Point, they ordained the Parties to be heard upon the said other Alledgance: and the Relict to condescend upon her Tocher and the Rent of the Estate: and the Creditor upon the Burdens. New­byth Reporter.

D. 346. Johnston contra Cullen. eod. die.

A Tack, being granted by a Husband to another Person, to the behoof of his Wife; to begin at the first Term after the Husbands decease; was not sustained against a singular Successor: because the said Tack was but a Personal Right, not being cled with Possession: and the entry was conferred in tempus indebitum, to begin after the Husband was denuded. Glendoick Reporter. Monro Clerk.

D. 347. Johnston contra Orchardtoun. eod. die.

IN a Pursute upon a Bond of Corroboration, It was Alledged, That the Principal Bond ought to be produced; which was repelled, in respect, the maxim non creditur referenti, nisi constet de relato, holds only in the Case, where there is only a naked Relation to a Write, and not when the Write that relates thereto doth proceed to an Obligement thereupon; [Page 166] and it is not only Relative but Dispositive. Glendoick Reporter. Robert Hamilton Clerk.

D. 348. Burnet contra Swan. eod. die.

A Seasin within Burgh being questioned, because it was not found in the Books, was sustained; In respect of the Act of Parliament, ex­cepting such Seasins from necessity of Registration; it being to be pre­sumed, that the Clerks do not faill to registrate the same, and if they do not book them, it ought to be imputed to them, and not to the Party. Sir David Falconer for the Seasin. Alteri Seaton. Hay Clerk. In prae­sentia.

D. 349. [...] contra [...] eod. die.

IN a Pursute against a Minor, It was Alledged, Quod non tenetur placi­tare, because Minor: Whereupon there did arise two Questions, viz. 1. Whether the said exception, being a Dilator, ought to be verified instanter: As to which, It was Found by the Lords, That Minority, be­ing in Fact, could not be verified instanter. 2. It being replyed, That the Defender was Major, which was offered to be proven; and a con­junct Probation being desired by the Defender; It was nevertheless Found by the Lords, That the alledgance of Minority being eleided by the said Reply of Majority, which only was admitted, the Pursuer ought to be allowed to prove his Reply, without Conjunct Probation to the contrary. Sir David Falconer Actor. alteri [...] Hamilton Clerk. In prae­sentia.

D. 350. Rig contra Rig. 6 June 1676.

THE Lords Found, as they had done formerly in another Case, that where a person of a near Relation stayes for any considerable time in Family with another, as in the Case in question a Brother with a Sist­er; and both are Majores and of that age that they may agree, if it be so intended by either, that the one should be considered and have a Fee and satisfaction as a Servant to his Sister, or that the Sister should have satis­faction for the Aliment and Entertainment of her Brother; if they make no such Transaction, that neither the Sister can claim Aliment, nor the Brother a Fee, upon pretence that he did serve, and did good Offices to his Sister; and that it ought to be thought and presumed, that he did the same upon ac­count of his Relation, for his Entertainment: and that she did entertain him in contemplation of the said Relation, and that he was useful. Hay Clerk.

D. 351. Pittarro contra the Tennents of Redmyre. 7. June 1676.

THE Abbot of Arbroth, by an Ancient Charter, having fewed the Miln of Conveth, in these Terms, cum pertinen cum multuris totius paro­chiae de Conveth: The Feuar of the said Miln in the Year 1597. did ob­tain a Decreet of the Lords of Session, against some of the Heretors of the said Parish, in foro as to some of the Defenders; but in absence as to o­thers, [Page 167] and in special as to the Heretor of Redmyre being called. And now [...] Carnegie Younger of Pittaro, having pursued, for abstra­cted Multures, the Heretors and Tennents of Redmyre; and having foun­ded both upon the said Charter of the Miln, and the said Decreet; It was Alledged, That the Defenders Right bears no Astriction: And as to the said Charter, it must be understood of the Multures belonging to the Abbot; and of the Lands pertaining to, or holden of him; and that the Lands of Redmyre do not hold of the Abbot, but of the Laird of Drum, who holds the same of the King: and that the Abbot could not astrict any Land but his own: and as to the said Decreet, that it was a latent Decreet, in ab­sence against the Defenders Author; and that notwithstanding thereof, the defender and his Authors, had been in Possession of Liberty, in swa far as, tho they came sometimes to the Pursuers Miln, being nearest and most convenient, and the Multure being alse easie as at any other Miln; yet the going to a Miln being facultatis, wherein Astriction cannot be shown, they had used and were in Possession of the said Liberty to go to other Milns.

It appeared, that the same Defence being proponed in the foresaid De­creet 1597. for these who were compearing, was Repelled; In respect the said Charter was so Ancient, and was so expresly of the Multures of the hail Parish; And after so long a time it was not necessar to debate the Ab­bots Power to astrict the said whole Parish: And the foresaid Charter does bear, that the Abbot did give to the Feuer the said Miln, in the same manner, and alse freely as one Ʋmfridus had the said Miln and Multures, by a Grant and Right from K. William: And it was presumable, that the said King, who might have thirled the said Lands holden of himself, did give the Miln and Multures.

The said Decreet likewayes 1597. did mention the Production of a Retour before the Sheriff; and the verdict of an Inquest concerning the said Multures,

The Lords having among themselves debated, and considered, that the said Decreet 1597, tho in absence was a valide Decreet; whereby the Defenders Author is decerned, in all time coming, his Tennents, Cot­tars and Successors to pay the Multure thereinmentioned: And that the said Decreet was a standing Decreet by the space of 40 years; and never questioned; there was no necessity to debate upon any other Grounds, than that the Pursuer had thereby a Right to the said Mul­tures; Seing the Defenders did not deny, that they were in use to come to the Miln, but pretend a Liberty and use to go likeways to other Milns: And it cannot be said, that he had the said Liberty, the contrare appear­ing by the said Decreet which never was questioned, and now cannot be questioned being prescrived, and yet the Lords Assoilȝied fra Bygones and Services, not contained in the said Decreet.

It being Alledged that the Farm should not be thirled: The Lords Found, That the growing Corns being Astricted by the said Decreet, there ought to be an exception, but of Teind and Seed: And that the Ten­nents were Lyable for such Corns as belonged to themselves; and the Master for his Farm. Actores Sinclair and Lermonth &c. for Pittarro al­teri for the Defender Lockheart and Falconer. Monro Clerk. In praesentia.

D. 352. Stenhouse contra The Heretors of Tweedmoor. eod. die.

THE Laird of Stenhouse, his Lands being designed for a Gleb; pur­sued some of the Heretors within the Parish for his relief, conform to the Act of Parliament: In which case, in respect the pursute was by the space of 8. or 9. years after the Designation; And the Heretors were in bona fide, and did possess their own Lands, and had made fructus suos;

The Lords Found, That the Defenders were not Lyable to pay the Annualrent for the Sum decerned from the time of the Designation; Se­ing usurae debentur only ex pacto vel mora. Albeit it may appear, That that Relief that is due ex lege is at least alse effectual, as if it were ex pacto: And the very Notion of Relief imports that the Party should be relieved of all Damnage sustained by him: And the Pursuer was prejudged, not on­ly by the want of the value of what he was to be Relieved of, but of the Interest of it. Gibson Clerk.

D. 353. Ramsay contra Zeaman. 7. June. 1676.

DOctor Zeaman, By Contract of Marriage, betwixt him and Margaret Ramsay, was obliged to employ 10000 lib. to himself, and her in Liferent, and the Heirs of the Marriage: And was also obliged to employ other 20000 lib. to himself, and to the Heirs of the Marriage; with a Provision, that he should have power to burden the said Heirs of the Marriage with an Additional Joynture to his Wife, and the provisions of his other Children; at any time etiam in articulo mortis: Which Joyn­ture and Provision is accepted by the said Margaret, in satisfaction of what else she could claim of Terce or Moveables. And thereafter the Doctor in his Testament, having named his Son and appearand Heir, to be his Exe­cutor and universal Legator; and having left in Legacy to his Wife the Annualrent of 3000 Merks by and attour her Joynture; and diverse Provi­sions to his other Children, and Legacies to other persons: His Relict and her present Husband pursued her own Son, as Executor to his Father, for payment of the said Legacy left to her: And it being Alledged, That the Inventar of the Testament would not extend to satisfy all the Legacies; and that there ought to be a Defalcation proportionably: It was Answered, That she was not to be considered as an ordinar Legator, but in effect was a Creditor; In respect of the said Provision and Power reserved to the Doctor, as said is: And that he had used the said power and faculty.

The Lords Found, That the said Addition being left to her in Legacy; she was in no better case than the other Legators; and had no preference before them out of the Executry.

Yet it is thought, That if there be not so much of the Executry as to sa­tisfy the Relict her Legacy; the Heir will be lyable for what she wants; Seing, by the said Provision, the Heirs of the Marriage are burdened with what he should add to her Joynture etiam in articulo mortis: And albeit nemo potest facere ne leges habeant locum in suo Testamento, and no person at [Page 169] any time can reserve a Power to burden his Heirs, at such a time as in Law he is not in legitima potestate; yet when any person gives any thing, or makes a Provision in favours of any other person, or of his Heirs of Provision; he may give and qualify the same sub modo, and with what burden he pleases; and therefore the Defender, being not only Executor, but the only Heir of the Marriage, will be Lyable by the said Provision to the said Addition and Provision in favours of his Wife and Children, albeit left in Lecto: And he cannot frustrate the same, upon pretence that he will not serve himself Heir of Provision, but Heir of Line; seing he is the same per­son, and is both Heir of Line, and Heir of Provision: And if need bees, the Relict and Children, as Creditors by the said Provision contained in the Contract of Marriage and in the Testament, may get Decrees against him as charged to enter Heir of Provision; and if he renounce may ad­judge the 30000 lib. provided to the Heirs of the Marriage. Actor Sinclair alteri McKenȝe and Zeaman. Gibson Clerk. In praesentia.

D. 354. Irving contra Forbes. 8. June. 1676.

IN the case, Irving contra Forbes: It was debated among the Lords, whether a person should be Lyable, as vitious Intrometter, notwith­standing that it was Replyed, that he was confirmed Executor: And Answered, That as to Superintromission, beyond what was confirmed, he was Lyable as Intrometter.

It was asserted by the President and some others, That it was the cu­stom and daily practique, That notwithstanding of Superintromission even before the Confirmation, the Executors ought not to be Lyable, but secundum vires; and that a Dative ad omissa may be taken; yet others were positive of the Opinion, that a Person, Intrometting with more nor is con­firmed, was Lyable as vitious Intrometter; Seing it could not be denyed, but he was Intrometter; and he could not plead, nor pretend to be Execu­tor, as to what was not confirmed; and if there were no Confirmation he would without question be lyable as Intrometter; and the Confirmati­on ought not to put him in better case; seing, notwithstanding of the same, as to Superintromission, he is not only Intrometter without warrand and so vitious, but is perjured; having made Faith, the time of the Con­firmation, that nothing was omitted; And it is hard that a custom, contrare to the Principles of Law, and to the Opinion of Hope and other Lawyers, should be obtruded; unless, upon a Debate in praesentia, there be a Decisi­on, which may be the Foundation of a Custom.

D. 355. Burnet contra Gib. 9. June. 1676.

THE Lords, in a Spuilȝie of Teinds, Pursued at the instance of Alex­ander Burnet contra William Gib, Found, That the Defender, or his Author having enclosed a peice of Marish Ground to be a Yard; and hav­ing made no other use of the same since, but for Carrets and Roots; he was not Lyable to the Bishop Titular, or his Tacksman of the Parsonage Teinds, for payment either of the value of the Parsonage Teind, or for the Viccarage Teind; which was found by plurality of one or two Voices.

[Page 170]These that were for the Decision did found their Opinion upon these Grounds, viz. 1. That the Heretor potest uti Jure suo; and that the Ti­tular has no tye, nor Servitude upon him; but he may either Labour, or not his own Ground; If he do it not in fraudem or aemulationem, of pur­pose to prejudge the Titular. 2. That the Defender, in order to his own Interest, having thought fit to enclose his Ground, and to make use of it for Carrets and Roots, for which, by the custom of the Country, Teind is not due, neither to Parson, nor Viccar; the Defender is not Lyable for Teind; Seing Viccarage Teind, and the payment of it is regulate, ac­cording to Custom.

It was urged by the Lords that were of an other Opinion, That the Ti­tular of the Teinds had an interesse partiarium as to Teinds; so that albeit the Heretor may uti Jure suo, it is to be understood, that he should use the same sine injuria, without prejudice of the Titular: And if, of purpose to prejudge the Titular, he should not Labour but suffer his Lands to ly waste, he will be Lyable to the Titular for the value of the Teind that was formerly payable, or might have been gotten; As was Found in the case of the Laird of Polwart against the Minister of Polwart. For, If he should inclose all or a considerable part of his Ground that was arable Land, and whereof the Teind was either payed to, or led by the Ti­tular, it were hard that it should be in his Power to prejudge the Parson to the advantage of the Viccar; But in that case the small Teinds would be considered, as great and parsonage Teinds, quia surrogatum sapit na­turam surrogati: And far less, it ought to be in the Power of an Heretor to prejudge altogether the Titular or the Minister, who is provided out of the Teinds, as in the case in question, by encloseing Ground former­ly arable, and making that use of it, that neither the Titular nor Parson can have any benefite of Teind; It being unjust, that the Titular should be prejudged, and that the Heretor should advantage himself; and by his own Deed should free himself of Teind: And albeit, by the cu­stom in some places, Teind is not payed for Carrets and Roots in Yards, the same being looked upon as inconsiderable; and the Bounds, where the same are Sowen or planted, being small parcels of Ground, for the private use of the Heretors own Family; yet when a considerable Tract of Ground is enclosed and parked, so that the Heretor has the same if not more profite than he has of his other Laboured Ground, by selling the Roots and Fruits of the same, as about Edinburgh, or other great Cities where great parcels of Corn-Land are taken in, and enclosed to the use fore­said; as by the Common Law Teind is payable, even for such Fruits and Profits; So by our Law, the Titular ought not to be prejudged: And the custom, that Teind is not payable, for Roots and such like, ought to be un­derstood of such as grow in Yeards about Houses, as said is, for the pro­per and domestick use of Heretor or Tennent; but not where a great par­cel of Ground is taken in, and destinate for profite and advantage, by Soweing, or Setting, and Selling Herbs and Roots.

D. 356. Nairn contra Scrymger. 13. June 1676.

IN a Suspension, at the instance of a Person who had bought Lands, up­on that Reason, that the Seller who charged for the Price was obliged by the Contract to give him a perfect Progress, and that the Progress ex­hibited [Page 171] to him was defective, In swa far as, the Lands did hold of the Bi­shop, and the Original Right was not produced, but only a Charter of Confirmation in Anno 1611; and the Charter confirmed was not produ­ced; and the Progress, since the Charter of Confirmation, was but late; and some of the Charters had no Seasin following upon the same; and some Seasins wanted the Warrand of Charters and Precepts: And albeit it was alledged, that the Charters would be found Registrate in the Bishops Register; that defect was not supplyed thereby; seing the Bishops Regi­ster was not Authentick; and ought to have no other respect than a Re­gister of any other Lord or Baron, of the Writes granted by them.

The Lords Found, That, tho much may be said upon the Progress fore­said, to defend against any Person that will pretend Right to the Lands; and to found Prescription upon them: A Buyer nevertheless was not Obliged to accept and acquiesce to the same as a sufficient Progress; seing the Buyar ought to have a Right; and Prescription with 40 Years Possession doth not amount to a Right, and there may be Replyes upon In­terruption: and at the best, Prescription is not a Right but exceptio tem­poris.

But the Lords did allow, to the Charger, a time for making out a better Progress: and Found, That the Suspender could not be forced to acqui­esce in absolute Warrandice, which was offered in Supplement of the Progress; In respect the same is only the Ground of a Personal Action, and may become ineffectual; if the Person, obliged to Warrand, should become insolvent. Actor Falconer. alteri Stewart, &c. Gibson Clerk. In prae­sentia.

D. 357. Cornelius Neilson contra [...] 14. June 1676.

COrnelius Neilson one of the present Baillies of Edinburgh, having had notice that a Privateer had a Ship taken by him lying at Stonehyve, fraughted with Dails and other Timber, Did bargain with him for a Parcel of Dails and Trees to the value of 200 lib. sterl; And the said person, with whom he had bargained, being found thereafter to be a Pi­rate, being execute and hanged at London as a Pirate; And the said Ship being found, with the Cargo of it, to be a free Ship belonging to His Majesties Allyes, and unjustly taken by a Pirate; Yet the said Cornelius had the Confidence to intent a Pursute against the Owners and their Factor, to hear and see it Found and Declared, that he had utiliter, in respect of their Interest, made the said Bargain; seing otherways the Pirate might and would have carried away the Ship and Cargo; or other­ways, not having men in Company enough to navigate both his own and the said Ship, he might or would have burnt and destroyed the same; and the Owners ought to be lyable to refound to him what he had given, for the said Parcel of Dails, and some Anchors and Cables: And in the dis­pute, the said Cornelius Procurators did not stand to hint and insinuate, that he was not without suspition and jealousie, that the said Person was a Pi­rate the time that he transacted with him; and that the said Transaction was made upon a principle of Generosity (as they called it) and Huma­anity, in behalf and for the Advantage of the Owners.

It was Alledged for the Defenders, That the Ship and Goods being theirs, they have rei vindicatio of the same, and may claim and recover the Ship [Page 172] and Goods, where ever they are; and that Pirats are of all Theives the greatest; and res furtiva non potest usucapi, and is extra commercium: And by the Law, even when Persons are in bona side, and do buy stollen Goods, and could not probably know whether they were stollen, yet the Owners may claim the same, and will not be lyable to refound the Price; but in this Case the Pursuer cannot in the least pretend, that he was in bona fide; seing by the Law of all Nations, when Goods or Ships are taken via facti, by Privateers or others, they cannot break Bulk, or dispose upon Ship or Cargo, or any part thereof, and if they do, Law looks upon them as Pi­rates; and these who do buy, or get any of such Goods from them as Re­ceptatores. And seing the Pursuer doth acknowledge that he had suspition that the seller was a Pirate, he was in pessima fide to have any dealing with him: And he cannot pretend he was negotiorum gestor, seing negoti­orum gestio is only in the case, where a Friend, in absence of the Party con­cerned, does him a good Office, eo animo, and upon no other account, but that his Friend should suffer no prejudice: and upon the matter negotio­rum gestor, so circumstantiate, contrahit, or quasi contrahit with the Person cujus negotium gerit, which cannot be said in this case; seing the Owners were altogether unknown to the Pursuer, not only as to their Person but as to their Nation: And the Pretences foresaid of Humanity and Generosity are not presumable, the Pursuer being a Merchant, and who is known to be under the Character of a person apt enough to take the Occasion of advantageous Bargains; and having bought the sa d Goods at an easy rate and great undervalue, and it being evident, that he did intend only his own interest, and not that of the Owners, in swa far as, he did not buy the haill Ship and Cargo per aversionem, but only the parcel foresaid; And it appears by a Commission produced, that he transacted so with the Pirate, that the Ship was consigned in the hands of the persons thereinmentioned, to the effect he might have alse many Dails and Timber at the low rate he had agreed for, as would extend to the said Sum of 200 lib. starl. and the superplus should be compted for, not to the Owners, but to the Pi­rate: And when the Ship was brought ashoar, he did not give notice to any Magistrates, that it should be seised upon to be forthcoming to these who should have Interest, there being ground of suspition, that the said person was a Pirate: And as to the Pretence and Citations adduced, that etiam malae fidei possessores have necessarias impensas allowed to them; That is only in the case of Expences upon ruinous Houses, which otherways would perish, being debursed by a Person that was in possession; and without which the House could not be preserved from ruine, and in other cases of the like nature: but not in the case of Thieves, Pirats and Reset­ters, who cannot pretend to have Repetition of the Price payed by them; the same not being impensae but pretium.

Tho some of the Lords were of Opinion, That there was no Founda­tion for the said Pursute; and that there was rather Ground to Censure the Pursuer as a Receptator; that such practices should have no Encourage­ment: Yet others being of Opinion, that the Pursuer was favourable, having preserved the said parcel; and a benefite arising to the Owners by his Transaction; The Lords Recommended to the Parties to settle: Actores Cuninghame, Dalrymple, & Falconer, alteri Lockheart and Mcken­ȝie. In praesentia.

D. 358. Doctor Frazer contra Hog. 16. June 1676.

IN anno 1593. Contractu Permutationis seu Excambii (ut loquimur) celebrato inter Georgium Comitem Mariscallum & Menonem Hog de Blaridryn; Quia dictus Menon dederat & disposuerat dicto Comiti quas­dam terras villae Piscatorum vulgo of the Fishertoun de Peterhead; Et villa de Peterhead erecta fuerat in Burgum Baroniae; adeo ut terris istis dicti Menonis commode Comes carere nequiret: Et quia dictus Menon habe­bat Jus ususfructus & Locationem ad longum tempus terrarum de Blairidryn, Ideo dictus Comes disposuerat dicto Menoni & suis haeredibus praedictas terras de Blairidryn; sed redimendas a dicto Comite & suis suc­cessoribus, solutione trium millium mercarum & locatione dictarum ter­rarum in Annos novemdecem post Redemptionem; pro merce­de sedecem librarum singulis Annis pro dictis terris pendi solita; ut in Contractu asseritur: Et pro implemento dicti Contractus, Charta a dicto Comite & filio ejas concessa in anno 1617. dictus Menon investitus & ejus haeredes, dictas terras possederant, donec Dominus Alexander Frazer Archiatreus Regius, acquisito Jure Reversionis seu Retractus in dicto con­tractu & Investitura contento, Jacobo Hog nepote dicti Menonis praemo­nito (ut moris est) ut dictam summam reciperet, & praedictas terras revenderet, Actione declaratoria dictas terras vendicabat Jure Retractus, rite ut asserebat redemptas.’

Excipiebat Reus Retractum seu Pactum de retrovendendo apud nos stricti Juris esse & specifice implendum; eo autem pacto cantum te [...]ras dictas redimendas non solum solutione dictae summae, sed adjectum eas esse relocandas in tempus praedictum; Locationem autem seu Assedationem nec oblatam nec depositam.’

Replicabat Actor Pactum illud de Relocatione injustum & usurarium & illicitum esse; terras siquidem ejus esse valoris ut merces Relocationis tantum non imaginaria sit; Colonum enim pro iis pendere aut pendere posse quotannis sexcentas minas: Et si Reo non solum dicta summa 3000 mina­rum, sed etiam locatio adeo diuturna & pro mercede adeo exili danda fo­ret; specie Locationis ipsam Proprietatem vel ejus Pretium consecutu­rum: Adhaec, Constitutione Jacobi 2 di. Parl. 6. cap. 19. Statutum esse, in Contractibus Hypothecariis, quibus terrae alienantur sub pacto de Re­trovendendo, & Relocando post Redemptionem; Conditiones & Ass [...]dationes istas haud servandas, terris redemptis, nisi convenerit de justa mercede & pensione, saltem haud multum citra justam Firmam, ut loquimur.’

Resp [...]ndebat Reus multum interesse inter Contractus Mutui & alios pu­ta V [...]na [...]ionis & Permutationis &c. Ubi enim pecunia foeneratur & cre­ditu [...], usurariae stipulationes illicitae sunt; & pacta alioquin licita repro­bantur, ut pacta Legis Commissoriae; ea ratione, quod debitori obaerato & i [...]opi Creditor nihil non exprimet; ea autem ratio in aliis Contracti­bus cessat; & in hoc casu; nec enim in eo mutuum, & consequenter nec usura nec pactum usurarium nec Debitor inops, sed Contractus Per­mutationis inter Rei avum, virum haud locupletem & Comitem praepo­tentem, cui terras suas ut sibi si non necessarias, saltem commodas fla­gitanti, nedum leges inquiores dare: Constitutionem autem praedictam Jacobi 2di. in Contractibus pignoratitiis locum habere, ubi terrae Credi­tori [Page 174] impignorantur, ut ex verbis Constitutionis liquet (when Lands are Wadset.) In casu praedicto nec Creditum nec Pignus esse; avum suum nec pecuniam Comiti dedisse, nec repetere posse; cum dicto contractui Clausula Requisitionis (ut loquimur) non insit; nec Reus prae­dictam summam petere possit; nec Comes teneatur persolvere: avum suum permutasse terras suas cum terris de Blairidryn, ea lege & satis ini­qua, ut Reo haud liceat terras avitas reluere; Cum penes Actorem extra­neum & singularem successorem facultas sit redimendi, si ea uti velit conditioni parendum; terras tempore Permutationis incultas & forte ste­riles fuisse, in Regione saltuosa & montana; si sua & parentum industria excultae & meliores sunt, id in suum detrimentum haud retroquendum.’

‘Quaestio ista, Domino de Castlehill referente, in domum interiorem introducta; & inter Dominos disceptata; Cum de ea sententiis varia­tum, visa est altiorem indaginem requirere; &, coram ipsis, Partibus & Patronis vocatis, audienda. Actores Lockheart &c. alteri Cuninghame.

D. 359. Mitchel contra Litlejohn. 20. June. 1676.

MR. Litlejohn Tailȝiour, by Contract of Marriage with his first Wife Clerk, was obliged to provide whatsoever Lands, Money or other Moveable Goods he should acquire during the Marriage, to himself and to the Heirs of the Marriage: And thereafter having Marryed a Second Wife [...] Mitchel, and having provided her to an Annualrent, he did grant a Right to her a little before his de­cease, when he was on Death-Bed as was Alledged, whereby he declared, that, in consideration, that his Wife had been very dutiful, and it was not reasonable, that, if the Marriage should dissolve before Year and Day, she should want altogether the benefite of her Joynture; therefore he wills, that tho he should decease before Year and Day, she should have a Right to the said Annualrent, as it is restricted by the said Write to less than she was provided to: And that the Contract of Marriage and Infeftment thereupon should be effectual pro tanto in the case foresaid; And is oblig­ed to pay the said Annuity.

This Deed being questioned upon these Grounds. 1. That he could not do any Deed in prejudice of his Heirs on Dead-bed. 2. That the Con­quest being provided (as said is) to Heirs of his first Marriage, both as to Lands and Moveables, he could not by the foresaid Deed, being a meer Donation, prejudge the Children of the first Marriage. Upon occasion of the said question, the Lords thought fit to consider, what the import of such Clauses of Conquest should be understood to be; the same being so frequent; And there being hinc inde Angustiae, and difficulties on both hands; seing, upon the one, it may appear hard, that a Husband should be restricted by such Clauses too much; and on the other hand, that such Clauses should be ineffectual, and in the power of the Husband to eva­cuate them; seing all obligements ought to be understood cum effectu & ut operentur: And in end it was Resolved, that the said Clause of Conquest, being conceived in the terms foresaid, in favours of the Heirs of the Mar­riage; the Husband doth not cease to be Fiar, so that for Onerous Causes, he may dispose of whatsoever he acquires; and the Heirs of the Mar­riage will be lyable to his Deeds and Obligements thereanent. 2. It was thought, That the Husband could do no Deed in fraudem of the said Clauses, and of purpose to frustrate the same. 3. Tho some of the Lords [Page 175] were of the Opinion, that the Husband could not dispose of the Conquest but for Onerous Causes, yet others thought, that he might dispose thereof, without fraud and for Rational Causes and Considerations; as in the case in question, upon the considerations abovementioned, in favours of a dutiful Wife; And it was so sound by the Major part; albeit others thought in­deed, that the Husband, notwithstanding of the foresaid Clauses, might provide a second Wife and his Children by her, out of the Conquest dure­ing the first Marriage; if he had no other Estate, and the Provisions be competent; But that in the case in question, the Deed foresaid was a Do­nation, which the Children of the first Marriage, being Creditors by the said Clause of Conquest, might question.

But the Lords Found, That if the said Deed was on Death-bed, the De­funct having not only granted an Heretable Right, but having obliged himself, his Heirs and Executors, to pay the said Sum, his Executry and Deads part would be lyable to the said Obligement; even as to Moveables acquired dureing the first Marriage; which may appear not to be without difficulty; seing, as to the Conquest, during the first Marriage, there could be no Deads-part; the same being provided to the Children of the first Marriage, as said is.

Tho the Heir of the Marriage may renounce to be General Heir, and may take a course to establish the Conquest, either in his own, or in the person of an Assigney to his behoof; and so not be lyable to the Defuncts Obligement, without an Onerous Cause. Yet it is to be considered, whe­ther, if they should be served Heirs of the Marriage, they would be lyable to the same; seing all Heirs represent the Defunct suo ordine, and are ea­dem per [...]ona? Or if they be lyable only to the Defuncts Deeds and Oblige­ments for Onerous Causes?

Item, If such Provisions be not in favours of the Heirs of the Marriage, but only of Bairns; Whether the Bairns will be lyable to the Defuncts Debts? And if all the Bairns will be lyable to the same as Heirs of Provi­sion?

It is thought, If Infeftment follow in favours of the Father and the Bairns of the Marriage, they must be Heirs of provision to him: and that all the Bairns (if it be not otherways provided) will be Heirs of Provi­sion.

But these Points did not fall under debate. Actores Cuningham, al­teri Dal [...]ymple. Hamilton Clerk. In praesentia.

D. 360. Galbraith contra Lesly. eod. die.

THE Lords Found, That a Bond being granted by two Persons con­junctly and severally, being Merchants; and for the price of Mer­chant Ware: the same could not be questioned upon that pretence, that one of them was Minor the time of the granting the same; It being offered to be pro [...]en, that he was then, and is since a Trafficquing Merchant. Monro Clerk. Sir David Falconer having reported the same, in Order to his Tryal, when he was to be admitted a Lord of the Session.

D. 361. Irving contra Irving. 22. June 1676.

ALexander Irving of Lenturk raised Suspension and Reduction against John Ross in Strathmore, and Francis Irving Brother to Drum, of a De­creet [Page 176] of Spuilȝie and wrongous Intromission; upon these Grounds, that the Witnesses had declared falsely; In swa far as, being adduced by the Pursuer before the Council, they had declared they knew nothing; and in the Process before the Lords, they declared fully and positively, as to all that was Libelled. And 2. They declared upon Quantities so ex­orbitant, that the same do amount to the twentieth Corn; Whereas in the Countrey, where the Cornes grew, they have scarce the third Corne.

The Lords Found, That the Decreet, being in foro, could not be que­stioned upon any Ground; and in special upon the Testimonies of the Witnesses as false; seing there should be no end nor period of Pleas; and there being no Protestation for Reprobatores. Some of the Lords were of Opinion, that as a Decreet founded upon a false Write may be questi­oned, so when the same is founded upon false Testimonies, and the false­hood is evident, and may be qualified sine altiore indagine, the same may be likeways questioned: And the Remedy of a Reduction of Decreets in foro, being denyed, only upon that pretence of Competent and Omit­ted, ought not to be denyed in such cases; seing the Ground foresaid, that the Testimonies were false, doth arise upon the Depositions of the Witnesses; and was neither known nor competent to the Defender, who is not allow­ed to see nor to question dicta testium: And a remedie, which in Law and Reason ought to be allowed, is not taken away, because it is not protest­ed for by a Party, who for the time did not know that there were any Ground for the same. Newbyth Reporter. Gibson Clerk.

D. 362. [...] contra Sheil. eod. die.

A Comprysing being deduced at the Instance of an Assigney, against the Representative of the Debitor as lawfully charged; and the Com­priser upon his Infeftment having intented a pursute for Mails and Duties;

It was Alledged, That the Cedent was debitor to the Defunct, so that the Debt due to the Defunct, did compense the Debt due by him; and the Ground of the Comprysing being satisfied, the Comprysing is extinguish­ed: Which case being Reported to the Lords, they had these Points in debate, and consideration amongst themselves. viz. 1. That Com­pensation is only of personal Debts, and of Sums of Money, de liquido in liquidum; but is not receivable in the case of Real Rights and Lands, and Pursutes upon the same; Seing in such processes there is no Debt craved, but the pursute is founded upon a Real Right: And some of the Lords be­ing enclined to think, that the Alledgance is not founded upon Compensa­tion, but upon Payment or the Equivalent, viz. That the Cedent habebat intus; and in effect, and upon the matter was satisfied, being Debitor in alse much as was due to him by the Defunct: And the Lords are in use to favour Debitors, whose Lands are Comprised; and, in order to extin­guish Comprisings, to sustain process for Compt and Reckoning; and de­claring the same to be extinct, not only by Intromission but by Compen­sation: Others were of the Opinion, that tho Compensation ipso jure minuit & tollit obligationem, where it is proponed; yet if the same be not propo­ned before the Decreet, whereupon the Comprysing proceeds; and when both Debts are in finibus of a personal Obligement; the Debt contained in the Comprysing cannot be said to have been payed before the Com­prysing; [Page 177] and after the Comprysing is deduced, it cannot be extinguished but either by Intromission within the Years of the Legal, or by Redemption. 2. Whatever may be pretended as to the Cedent, that he could not be in bona fide to compryse for a Debt due to him, having alse much in his hand as would satisfy the same, yet such pretences are not competent against the Third Person having bona fide comprysed; or having Jus quaesitum; As in the case of a Horning upon a Decreet, it could not be obtruded to the Donator, that the Debt was satisfied; The Obtainer of the Decreet being Debitor to the Defender: And if this should be sustained, expired Com­prysings and Infeftments thereupon, being now a most ordinary surety, may be easily subverted upon pretence, that the Cedent was Debitor, in Sums equivalent, to the person, against whom the Comprysing is deduced: And there is a great difference betwixt payment and satisfaction, either by actual payment of the Debt, or by Intromission with the Maills and Duties of the Lands comprysed, which is obvious and easie to be known; and betwixt the pretence of satisfaction by Compensation; seing payment is exceptio in rem, and extinguisheth Debts as to all effects; and Intromissi­on is so notour, that the Buyer may and ought to take notice of the same; whereas Compensation is but quasi solutio, and it has never effect, until it be proponed.

That point was also in consideration with the Lords, Whether Compen­sation can be proponed by any person, but such as has Right to the Debt? And as to this point, there were different Opinions, and some of the Lords were of the Judgement, that any person, having interest to de­fend against Comprysings and pursuites upon the same, might alledge they were satisfied in manner foresaid: But others were of the Opinion, that no person can pretend to compence, but he that could discharge the Debt, whereupon he would compence; and consequently must have Right to the same: And in the case in question, neither a confirmed Te­stament, containing the Debt due to the Defunct, nor any Right to the same was produced.

The Act of Parliament, K. Ja. 6th. Parl. 12. Cap. 141. Being so po­sitive, that Compensation is only de liquido in liquidum, before the giving of Decreets, and never after the giving thereof; Some of the Lords were of Opinion, that tho the Defender had Right to the Debt due to the De­funct, Compensation could not be received: But some of the Lords hav­ing desired, that the advising of these points, being so considerable, should be delayed till to morrow, they were not decided. Thesaurer Depute Reporter. Gibson Clerk.

D. 363. Lamingtoun contra Raploch. eod. die.

A Suspension being craved, Upon that reason, that the Charger had been Curator, and ante redditas rationes could not charge him with any Debt; It was Answered, That the Complainer being to be Marryed, he desired the Charger, and some others to be his Curators, to the effect they might authorize him to Contract; and the Charger had never in­trometted.

Some of the Lords were of Opinion, That if it could be verified by the Complainers Oath, that the Charger had no Intromission; and that [Page 178] these that Intrometted were Responsal; In which case by the Civil Law, there is no actio tutelae, but against these who intrometted; the others who had not Intrometted being only Lyable in subsidium, the said reason should not be sustained: But it being pretended, that, by our custom, all Tutors and Curators are Lyable, whether they intromet or not with­out out distinction; and that Pupils may take themselves to any of them: Tho it was not made appear, that the said point was ever debated or de­cided, yet the Lords Ordained the Complainer to give in a Charge against the Curator, and the Compt to be discust upon the Bill. Glendoich Re­porter.

D. 364. E. Dumfermling contra Callender. June 1676.

BY Minute of Contract betwixt the deceast Earl of Callender, and Dam Margaret Hay Countess of Dumfermling, he was obliged to Infeft the said Lady in the Lands and Barony of Livingstoun in Liferent and Con­junctfee; and whatsover other Lands and Sums of Money should be con­quest during the Marriage: He is obliged likewayes, to grant surety of the same, to her in Liferent, in the same manner as of the former Lands: And in case of no Issue of Children, the one half of the said Conquest to be disposed upon, as the Lady shall think fit: And the Earl of Dumfermling having intented a Pursute as Assigney by his Father, who was Heir to the said Lady his Mother, for implement of the said Minute; for declaring what Lands, Sums of Money and others were conquest by the said Earl, dureing the foresaid Marriage; and for Infefting the Pursu­er in the half of the said Conquest: It was Alledged, That the said Oblige­ment and Clause of the Minute as to the Conquest, are conditional. viz. In case of no Issue of Children; and that the said condition did not exist. viz. There being an Child procreate of the said Marriage.

The Lords upon Debate, in praesentia, and among themselves; did Find, that the said Condition did exist, In swa far as, tho there were Children of the Marriage, yet there was no Children or Issue the time of the Dissolu­tion of the Marriage, by the Decease of the Lady.

Albeit It was urged, That these Conditions, si liberi non extiterint, vel non sint procreati; and that Condition, si non sint liberi superstites, were dif­ferent in Law; and in the conception and import of the same: And in the first case, si non sint liberi, sine adjecto tempore decessus vel dissoluti Matri­monii, deficit ipso momento that there is a Child; And the Condition, being in the Terms foresaid, in case of no Issue, both in Law and in Propriety of Speech, cannot be otherwayes understood and Interprete: And in Claris non est locus conjecturae aut interpretationi, which is only, where words are Homonymous or Ambiguous: And where a Clause is, of it self, such as may be understood without addition; to make any, upon pretence of the intention of Parties, is not interpretari sed addere; & intentio in mente reten­ta nihil operatur: And that if there had been Children of the Marriage, who had Lived to that Age, that they had been Marryed, and had had Children, who had all died before the Dissolving of the Marriage, It could not be said, without absurdity, that there had been no Issue; And both in Law, and by our custom, when there is any Advantage given or provid­ed by the Law, or by Contract, in favours of the Husband in case of Issue, It is ever understood si liberi sint procrea [...]i, tho they do not survive; As in [Page 179] the case of a Courtesy of Scotland: And that Conditions ought to be taken strictly and according to the Letter; especially in this case, the Provisi­on foresaid, that the Lady, in case of no Issue, should have either a Fee, or the half of the Conquest; or a Faculty to dispose of the same.

It was farder Alledged, That the said Clause doth not import, that the Lady should have the Fee, or the half of the Conquest, but only a perso­nal Faculty and Power to dispose of the half of the Conquest; which she had not used: And nevertheless it was Found by plurality, that the said Provision imported a Fee; In respect the said Minute was a short paper, drawn by my Lord Callender himself, who was altogether igno­rant of the stile and conception of Writes; And, if it had been extended, as it was intended, it could not otherwayes be extended, but the Fee be­hooved to be provided to the Lady, as the half of the Conquest, And, that the half of the Conquest should be disposed of by the Lady, did im­port, that she should have a Fee and Dominium; the very nature and es­sence of Property consisting in potestate Disponendi.

Some of the Lords were of Opinion, that the said Clause did import only a personal Faculty: Upon these Considerations. 1. That the Right of Dominium, being the highest Right and Interest can be given, it can­not be thought to be given, but when the words are such, as are not applicable to any other interest; whereas the said words do qua­drate alse well, if not more, to a Personal Faculty, than to an Heretable Fee. 2. The said Clause is conceived per verba maxime personalia, viz. That the half of the Conquest should be disposed by her; and if she should think fit, which are verba arbitrii & facultatis. 3. In dubiis minimum is to be understood & solitum; & ut evitetur absurdum; And Respect is to be had to the quality of the Person; And albeit mean Persons, in their Con­tracts of Marriage, do sometimes provide, that the Longest liver may have all, It is not usual nor can be instanced, that ever, in a Contract of Persons of quality, a Fee was provided to a Wife; It being the great de­sign, of the Marriage of such Persons, to raise a Family to the Husband; and it being very ordinary, that a personal Faculty should be given to the Wife. 4. If the Contract had been extended, it might, and ought to have been extended in these Terms, That the Lady should Liferent the haill Conquest; and, in case of no Issue, she should have the Personal Faculty foresaid: And tho the Conquest had been provided to the Husband and her, and the Longest liver of them two, and the Heirs of the Marriage, whilks faiȝieing the one half to his Heirs, and the other to hers; her Hus­band would have been Fiar; and, in the case foresaid, her Heirs would have been Heirs of Provision to him, as to the half of the Conquest. Actores Sinclair, Bernie, &c. alteri Lockheart, &c.

D. 365. Doctor Wallace contra Symson. June 1676.

A Bill of Exchange being drawn by a Merchant in Edinburgh, upon his Correspondent at London, payable to a Merchant at Bristol; the person, to whom the said Bill was payable, was not in England for the time, but had gone to Ireland; but his Freind, having broken up the Letter direct to him, and having Found enclosed the said Bill of Exchange, did indorse the same to be payed to another person upon the place; who did [Page 180] accordingly present the said Bill to the Merchant, on whom it was drawn; who did accept the same conditionally, when it should be right indorsed: And thereafter, the person, to whom the said Bill was payable, having duely indorsed the same to be payed, as the Indorsation did bear; The Mercant, upon whom the said Bill was drawn, did in the interim break, before the Bill swa Indorsed was presented to him; There having interveened betwixt the date of the Bill, which was 2 d. January, and the Right Indorsement of the same, which was about the end of April, about 4. Moneths; So that the Question was, whether the Drawer of the said Bill should be Lyable to Refound the Sum thereincontained?

It was Alledged, That he could not be Lyable, In respect the said Bill was not returned to him protested, either for not Acceptance or for not Payment: And albeit in Law, and by the custom of Merchants, the Drawer be Lyable unless the Bill be payed; yet that is ever understood with a Proviso, that Diligence should be done, and Protests should be taken; unless the Person, upon whom the Bill had been drawen, had been evi­dently non solvent the time of drawing the said Bill; which could not be Alledged in this case, seing the Defender had drawen upon the same person after the said Bill, to the value of 2000 lib. sterling, which had been Answered: And had likewayes Answered Bills of his, of great va­lue; whereas if the Bill in Question had been returned Protested, he would have retained the Provision he had in his Hand, or done Diligence, to recover the value of the said Bill; or might have countermanded the said Bill, and given an other Bill payable to a person that was upon the place.

The Lords notwithstanding Found, That the Defender and Drawer of the said Bill should be Lyable: But some of the Lords were of another Judgement: And the Defender Repined, and gave in a Bill, desiring to be Heard.

D. 366. [...] contra [...] 4. July 676.

IN a Suspension against an Assigney, upon a Reason of Compensation, viz. That the Suspender had Right to the equivalent Sum due by the Cedent, by an Assignation prior to the Assignation granted by the Cedent to the Charger.

It was Answered, That the Assignation, granted to the Charger, was inti­mate, before the Intimation of the Assignation granted to the Suspender: Whereunto It was Replyed, That ipso momento, that the Suspender got the Assignation foresaid, being thereby Creditor to the Cedent, he had a Ground of Compensation against the Cedent, and consequently against the Charger as Assigney: And an Assignation, without Intimation, is a suf­ficient Right, and Ground of Compensation; unless there were an other Assigney to the same Sum, competing upon that Ground, that he had a better Right by an Assignation intimate.

The Lords notwithstanding did not allow Compensation, and Found the Letters orderly proceeded. Newbyth Reporter, Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk.

D. 367. Buchanan contra Logie. eod. die.

THE Lords Found, That a person out of the Country, being cited at the Mercat-Cross of Edinburgh, and Pear and Shoar of Leith, upon 60. Dayes warning, to be holden as confest; tho he was not cited perso­nally, and that the Decreet could not be questioned upon that Ground as Null: But if he were Living and desired to be reponed to his Oath, there might be Ground to Repone him. Newbyth Reporter. Mr. John Hay Clerk.

D. 368. Lesly contra Fletcher. 5. July 1676.

SIR John Fletcher being obliged, by Contract of Marriage, to provide Dam Marion Lesly his Wife of a second Marriage, to the Liferent of a Sum of 10000 lib. did thereafter Infeft her in the Lands of Gilchristoun, being of more value and of a greater Rent: Whereupon she having ob­tained a Decreet against the Tennents; The Lords Found her Right, being granted stante Matrimonio, and thereafter revocked, Null; In swa far as it exceeded the Provision in her Contract of Marriage: And sustained her Decreet only effeirand thereto; and ordained her to be Lyable for the superplus, until the said Sum of 10000 lib. should be employed for her Life­rent, conform to her Contract of Marriage. Forret Reporter. Mr. Tho­mas Hay Clerk.

D. 369. Cheisly contra Edgar of Wadderly. eod. die.

EDgar of Wadderly being Charged, upon an Indenture betwixt him and Samuel Chiesly Chirurgeon, for payment of the Sum thereincontain­ed, for his Brothers Prentice-fee, and Entertainment dureing his Prentice-ship: And having Suspended the said Bond, and intented a Reduction thereof upon Minority and Lesion; The Lords Found, That the Second Brother having no other Means nor Provision; his Eldest Brother, who was Heir to his Father, and had the Estate, ought to Entertain him, and to put him to a Calling: And did not sustain the Reason of Lesion. For­ret Reporter. Gibson Clerk.

D. 370. Pitrichie contra Geight. eod. die.

SIR Richard Maitland of Pitrichie having obtained a Gift of Recogni­tion of the Estate of Geight; There was thereafter a Minute, betwixt him and his Father, and the Laird of Geight; whereby it was agreed, that Pitrichie, who, and his Predecessors had an ancient Wadset of the Lands of Achincreive and others, being a part of the said Barony; should have the Reversion Discharged by Geight; and that Geight should give him a new Right of the said Wadset-Lands, irredeemable and holden of the King; and should pay to Pitrichie for the Charges in obtaining and declaring of the said Gift 4000 Merks: And that, on the other part, Pitrichie should Dispone to Geight the rest of the Estate, and the Right he had thereto by the said Recognition.

Thereafter Pitrichie, having intented Declarator, for Nullity of the said Minute; upon pretence that Geight did refuse and fail to perform his part; [Page 182] did obtain a Decreet, and did enter into a Bargain with the Earl of Aboyn, and did dispone to him a considerable part of the said Estate; that by his Power and Interest in the Countrey, he might be maintained, and be able to enjoy the rest: But, before the granting of the said Right to Aboyn, Geight had intented a Reduction of the said Decreet of Nullity; upon that Reason, That the said Decreet was given, In respect he had not the Writes at that time in hand to produce; and to instruct, that he was able to give a Right of the said Wadset-lands to be holden of the King; and that they were now found upon search of the Registers; So that he had not been in mora; and the not production of the said Writes ought not to be imputed to him, but to the Confusion of the Times; his Writes being scattered, and his Father having been long time a Sufferer and Prisoner, for serving the King.

The Lords Found, That the said Decreet, being in effect upon a Cer­tification for not Production, and Geight condescending, and offering to instruct, that he had not been negligent, and the occasion and manner that the said Writes were not in his Hand; and how he had recovered the same; he ought to be reponed against the same: And that, by the Reduction, be­fore the granting of the Right to Aboyn, it was res litigiosa, and Aboyn ought to be in no better case than Pitrichie.

D. 371. [...] contra [...] eod. die.

A Bond, granted by a Woman stante matrimonio, for payment of a Sum of Money, being ratified judicially; It was Found, That the Ratifi­cation did not bind her: being of a Deed null in Law, tho it was ju­dicial; being likewayes stante matrimonio.

D. 372. Blair of Kinfauns contra Mr. Thomas Fouler. 6. July. 1676.

IN the Case betwixt Sir William Blair of Kinfaunes and Mr. Thomas Fouler, It was Found, That an Action, at the instance of the Exe­cutors of a Minister, for building a Manss, and refounding the Expences of the same, is competent against the Heritors for the time and their Re­presentatives; but not against a singular Successor: and that it is not Debitum fundi. Newbyth Reporter. Gibson Clerk.

D. 373. Rynold contra Erskines. eod. die.

THE Lords Found, That, a Father having assigned certain Bonds for provision of his Children, the Creditors have not only an Acti­on of Reduction competent to them, but a personal Action to refound the Sums uplifted, upon the Bonds, if the Assignation should be found to be fraudulent: But did Reserve to the Defenders to debate, whether the same was fraudulent; The Defenders having Alledged, that the same were granted by their Father, having a plentiful Fortune for the time, so that he might lawfully provide his Children. Newbyth Re­porter.

D. 374. Crauford contra Gordon. eod. die.

IN the Case, Alexander Crauford contra Sir Lodovick Gordon, The Lords thought the point in question. viz. Whether or not, a Backbond be­ing granted by the Compryser, the time that he did receive an Assigna­tion, whereupon he Comprysed; or by a person having gotten a Dispo­sition, did affect the said Rights, not only as to the Granters of such Back-bonds, and their Representatives, but likewayes as to Singular Successors; And if the same should be Found to affect, if it did affect only while the said Right was personal, and before Infeftment, but not after?

The Lords thought the said point, to be of that importance as to the Consequence and Interest of the People, that it was recommended, that they should have their thoughts thereupon, to the effect that the same may be decided with great consideration; And accordingly, this day, the case being fully debated among themselves, It was carryed and found by plurality of Votes, That such Back-bonds do affect, even as to a Sin­gular Successor, tho extra corpus Juris; And albeit they be granted after the receiving of such Rights; And that they affect Comprysings, even after Infeftments has followed thereupon, during the Legal, but not af­ter. Diverse of the Lords did Argue and Vote against the said Decision, and in special, A. I. C. N. B. S. T, Upon these Grounds. 1. A Sin­gular Successor does not succeed, in universum Jus as an Heir, but only in Jus Singulare; And if the said Jus be simple and pure, without any quality in corpore Juris; any extrinsick quality or Deed may bind the Granter and his Heirs, but not the Singular Successor, who neither can, nor is obliged to know, and take notice of any quality that is not in the Right. 2. The quality of a Right is an Accident of the same, and Accidentis esse est inesse; So that, in Law, where the same is not in corpore Ju­ris, it doth not affect the Right as to Singular Successors. 3. Upon the Considerations foresaid, Reversions, and Bonds for Granting Reversions, do not militate against a Singular Successor, unless they be in corpore Juris, or Registrate; And tho there be an express Statute to that purpose, yet it doth not follow a contrario, where there is no Statute, Back-bonds should affect; seing the said Statute is made, conform to the Common Law, and is Declaratory as to Reversions; being then most in contempla­tion of the Parliament, but doth not derogate from the Common Law in other Cases. 4. Back-bonds are upon the matter Reversions and do oblige only to make a Retrocession in favours of the Cedent; and cannot operate more, than if a formal Retrocession were made in favours of the Cedent; which could not prejudge a Singular Successor, unless it were intimate. 5. It would be an irrepairable prejudice to the People, and to Singular Successors, who, finding a Right pure without any quality are in bona fide to think, that they may securely take a Right thereto; And yet should have no remedy, if, upon pretence of Back-bonds, and Deeds altogether extrinsick, their Right may be questioned. 6. As to the pretence of the prejudice to the People, viz. That they are in use to grant Assignations, in order to the deduceing of Comprysings thereupon; and may be frustrate, if the Back-bond should not affect the same, is of no weight; Seing they trust the Assigneys; And it is their own fault, if [Page 184] they Trust persons that doe not deserve Trust; And they have a Remedy by intimateing the Back-bonds, which, upon the matter are Translations; whereas a Singular Successor has none. 7. That such Back-bonds should affect Comprysings, not only before, but after Infeftment during the Legal; But thereafter should cease to qualify the same; It seems to be in­consistent with, and against the principles of Law. In praesentia.

D. 375. [...] contra [...] eod. die.

THE Lords Found, That a Bishop and Executors, had Right only to the Quots of such Testaments, as were confirmed in the Bishops time, in his own Right, as Bishop for the time: And the said Quots, be­ing in effect Sentence-Silver, dies cedit by the Confirmation; so that who­soever is Bishop then, has Right to the same.

They Found likewayes, That Quots being a part of the Bishops Patri­mony and Rent; The Quots, of all Testaments confirmed within the half Year, after the Bishops decease, did fall under the Ann, and belong to the Bishops Relict and Executors. Vide Carpzovium. lib. 1. Jurisp. Consistorialis de Salario defuncti Pastoris semestri.

D. 376. Spence contra Scot 7. July. 1676.

IN a pursute for payment of a Sum of Money, It was Alledged, That the Pursuers Cedent was Tutor to the Defender, and had not made his Accompt: Which Defence the Lords sustained against the Assigney; But it was their meaning, that the Pursuer should not be delayed; and and that a competent time should be given to the Defender to pursue and discuss his Tutor. Glendoich Reporter. Mr. John Hay Clerk.

D. 377. Johnstoun contra Rome. 8. July. 1676.

IN a pursute upon the passive Title of Successor Titulo Lucrativo; In swa far as the Defender had a Disposition from his Father, without an Onerous Cause: The Lords sustained the pursute, albeit it was Alledged by the Defender, he had made no use of the said Disposition, and was content to renounce the same; which the Lords Found he could not do, being delivered to him. A Concluded Cause Advised. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk.

D. 378. Finlaw contra Litle. 11. July 1676.

A Legacy being left in these Terms, viz. That it should be payed out of the Testatrix her Household Plenishing, and Debts due upon Compts: The Lords Found, That albeit the said plenishing, and Debts should not extend to satisfy the said Legacy, that it was not a limit­ed Legacy; but ought to be satisfied out of the other Executry; and that the saids words were only executiva, as to the order and way of Payment in the first place; and Interpretatio should be ut actus valeat; especially seing the Legator was the Defuncts Relation: And it is to be presumed, that the foresaid qualification was only as to the way of payment; In respect the Defunct did look upon her Plenishing and Debts foresaid, as [Page 185] sufficient to pay the same; And did not declare that the said Legacy should be only payed out of the same, and in case it should be short, that she should have no more: And it appeared to the Lords, that the Exe­cutors had given up a very inconsiderable Inventar of the plenishing, and far short of what a person of the Defuncts condition and profession, being a great Innkeeper, behoved to have in order to her Calling. Actores Dalrymple &c. alteri Hog. in praesentia.

D. 379. Bishop of Dumblain contra Kinloch of Gilmertoun. eod. die.

IN Anno 1620. His Majesties Grand-Father did Annex the Deanry of the Chappel Royal to the Bishoprick of Dumblain: And did mortify thereto an Annualrent of Ten Chalders of Victual out of the Lands of Markle and Traprane: By vertue of which Right the Bishops of Dum­blane, have eversince possest the said Annualrent, until 1638. that the Bishops were supprest: And thereafter, Mr. Alexander Henderson, and Mr. Robert Blair being provided thereto, as his Majesties Chaplaines, did continue in the possession of the same, till the Bishops were Restored in 1661. and since the Bishop of Dumblane was in possession of the same: But Francis Kinloch now Heretor, tho he had been in use of payment of 8. Chalders of Victual, as a part of the said Annuity, out of his Lands, since he acquired a Right to the same, being charged at the instance of the said Bishop, did Suspend upon that Reason, viz. That the said An­nualrent was Wadset by the Earl of Bothwel in the Year 1587. to Mr. Thomas Craig for 7000 Merks: And John Murray Earl of Annandale hav­ing acquired the Right of the said Annualrent; and having resigned the same in savours of K. Ja. to the effect it might be Mortified, as said is; The King, by the said Mortification, could give no other Right, than what flowed from the said persons his Authors, which was redeemable, as said is; and de facto the said Right was Redeemed; In sua far as, the Right of Reversion of the said Annualrent having come in the person of the Duke of Lennox, Donator to the Forefaulture of the Earl of Both­well, and from him to the Earl of Balcleugh, and from the late Earl of Bal­cleugh to Sir John Scot of Seatoun. Caetera desunt.

D. 380. Jaffray contra Murray. 8. November 1676.

A Party being pursued, upon the passive Titles; and in special upon that of Charged to enter Heir; and having offered to Renounce, It was Replyed that he could not, Seing Res was not integra; In Respect he had granted a Bond, Of purpose, that thereupon the Estate might be Adjudged; The Lords Found, That albeit he had not granted the Bond upon the designe foresaid, yet, the Estate being adjudged and incum­bered by his Deed, he ought to be Lyable to the Defuncts Creditors pro tanto, Or to purge. Gibson Clerk.

It is Thought, That if the Appeirand Heir should dolose grant a Bond, that the Defuncts Estate might be thereupon adjudged, ought to be Ly­able in solidum: But if he grant a Bond which is a lawful Deed, and thereupon his Creditor adjudge, which he could not hinder; It is hard to sustaine a passive Title against him; unless his creditor, having ad­judged, [Page 186] were satisfied by that course; In which case, seing the Defuncts creditors are prejudged, It is Reason he should be Lyable pro tanto.

D. 381. Steuart contra Hay. 9. November. 1676.

LAnds being bought after Interdiction: A Reduction of the said In­terdiction was pursued at the instance of the Buyer, upon these Rea­sons. 1. That Interdictions, by the Common Law, are only of prodigi; And Interdictors are in effect given Curatores to them: And, by our cu­stom, albeit Interdictions are granted sine causae Cognitione, upon Bonds granted by persons interdicted, upon that consideration and narrative, that they are persons facile, and not fit to manage their Estate; whereupon the Judge presumes, that they are such; and upon a Bill gives warrand to publish the same; yet the Interdiction in question ought not to be sustain­ed, seing it is not the ordinary stile of other Interdictions; and the Bond of Interdiction bears no narrative of Facility; but only that the Granter, for the standing of his Family, being very Ancient, did oblige himself not to Dispone his Estate without consent of the Persons thereinmentioned, and Letters of Publication were not raised thereupon, but Inhibition was only used.

2. That Interdictions are a Remedy, for secureing weak persons, and ought not to be a snare to others: And the Law favours, and helps these that are decepti, and not decipientes: And that the Pursuer was in effect circumveened, in swa far as, the said Interdiction was not Regi­strate till the Pursuer was in Terms of Bargaining; and they had searched the Registers, and had not found any such Interdiction; and the only In­terdictor on Life, was Witness to the Bargain, and got a part of the price; and the rest of the price was payed to Creditors anterior to the Interdicti­on; And the Pursuer, relying upon the Ingenuity of the Disponer, tho he might have secured himself by taking a Right to the said Debts, did extinguish the same, by taking Discharges and Renounciatons.

The Lords being divided in their Opinions, The case was not decided this day. [...] Hay Clerk. In praesentia.

D. 382. Inter eosdem. 10. November. 1676.

THE Lords sustained the Interdiction abovementioned, the Defen­ders offering to prove, that the Person Interdicted was not rei suae providus: And Found, That the person interdicted was thereby in the condition of Minors; And that he and his Heirs could not question any Disposition or other Deed done by him, upon the naked head of Interdicti­on, unless they alledge and qualify Lesion: And that the Pursuer of the Reduction may prove that the Bargain was profitably made, and that the pryce was in rem versum: And the Lords declared, they would not be nice as to Probation; but Reserved the consideration of it to themselves.

It was further Replyed, That the Interdiction is Null, being Execute by a person that was not a Messenger, being deprived; which was Repelled, In respect of the Answer, that it was offered to be proven, that notwithstand­ing of the Sentence of Deprivation, he was holden and tentus & reputa­tus to be a Messenger: Notwithstanding it was Triplyed, that the Pur­suer, [Page 187] in Fortification of the Sentence of Deprivation, and his own Deposi­tion; offered to prove, that it was the common Opinion of the Country, that the Executor was not a Messenger, then being deprived: Which was thought hard by some of the Lords; being of the Opinion, that at least habitus and tentus & opinio ought to have been allowed to both Parties to prove; Reserving to the Lords, to Consider the Probation, and to Judge, according to that which should be Found most pregnant.

D. 383. Paterson contra Johnstoun. eod. die.

IT was desired by a Bill, That a party, against whom Witnesses had been used, and who had declared, might be allowed to qualify the Inhabi­lity of the Witnesses; and that a Terme should be Assigned to that purpose: Whereupon it was Agitate among the Lords, If a Reprobator should be sustained by way of exception, whereupon there would be a new Litis­contestation: And it was urged by some of the Lords, that if the Inha­bility of the Witnesses should be qualified upon the ordinary Grounds, whereupon the Witnesses themselves are interrogate, viz. That they are not worth the Kings unlaw, and such like; That Reprobator ought not to be sustained; Especially the Party being heard, to object against the Witnesses: And yet the Lords sustained Reprobator, by way of excepti­on, and without Limitation; In respect, the Oath of the Witnesses con­cerning their own Hability is only an Oath of Calumny; and notwith­standing thereof, a Reprobator may be pursued, by way of Action: And the Objections, against the Witnesses, may come to the Parties know­ledge, after they have declared: And as there may be Two Litisconte­stations, if an exception of Falsehood, or any other, should arise upon the Production of the Writes; there is eadem ratio as to the Witnesses; seing the Objections against them could not be proponed before Litiscontesta­tion: And, if they be Relevant, they ought to be proven; And it is the interest of both Parties, that the Reprobator should be received by way of exception; ne lites protelentur: But the Lords Ordained a Condescendance, to be given in, in Write, of the Grounds of the Repro­bator; and to be given to the other party, that he might be heard to de­bate, upon the Relevancy of the same. Gibson Clerk.

D. 384. Inglis contra Boswell. 14. Novem. 1676.

A Father having granted Bonds of provision, in favours of his Chil­dren being in familia; and having thereafter contracted Debt; It was Found, That the Creditors, tho posterior, are preferable to the Children: And tho, in other cases, It is presumed That Bonds or Writes, being in the hands of these to whom the same are granted, were delivered ab initio; yet, in the case of Children, the Presumption lyes against them, that they are still in the hands of their Parents, so that they are masters of the same: And eo ipso, that thereafter they contract Debt, they revock the said Provisions, In swa far as they may prejudge their Cre­ditors; unless it be offered to be proven, that they were delivered, and were the Childrens Evidents, the time of the contracting the said posterior Debt. Newtoun Reporter. Mr. John Hay Clerk.

D. 385. Davidson contra Wauchop. 16. Novem. 1676.

JOHN Wauchop, one of the Macers before the Lords, having taken a Right, by Translation, to a Bond of 700 Merks, alledged gran­ted by the deceast James Davidson Jaylor in the Canongate to [...] Horseburgh: And a Reduction and Improbation being intented of the said Bond; The Lords did decern in the Improbation; and Found the said Bond to be false and forged; and remitted [...] Dumbar Forger to the Justice: Albeit the Writer and Witnesses, and the Debitor and Cre­ditor being all deceast, there were no means left for improving the said Bond directly: Which the Lords did, In respect of the indirect Articles aftermentioned, and the concurrence, in great number and preg­nancy, of the presumptions and evidences of falsehood, arising intrinsically upon the inspection of the Write, and the compareing of Papers and otherwayes, viz. 1. That the Debitor Davidson was a person most Re­sponsal; and the Creditor Horseburgh indigent; So that, the Bond being of date 1644. It could not be thought, that if it had been a true Bond, the Creditor, or his Relict, would, or could have wanted payment so long; nothing being done to recover payment until after 1669. That the said Bond, being Assigned to [...] Laurie, was transferred in favours of John Wauchop, after all the means of Improbation had failed by the decease of Writer and Witnesses. 2. The said [...] Laurie and John Wauchop being examined upon Oath, It appears by their Declaration, that the Assignation of the said Bond in favours of [...] Laurie was never delivered to him, but was still retained by [...] Dumbar, who had Marryed the Relict of the said Horseburgh; and pretended that the said Assignation was made by Horseburgh, in favours of his Wife, but left Blank; And that Lawries Name was filled up to the use, and in be­half of the said Dumbar and his Relict, for security of a small Debt due to the said Laurie. 3. That John Wauchop did give to Dumbar, for a Translation from Laurie, only 300 Merks, and did promise, in case he should recover the said Debt, to pay 200 Merks more; of which, 100 Merks was to be payed to the said Laurie; And it cannot be thought, that Dumbar would have given away so considerable a Sum, the Bond and An­nualrent of the said Sum extending to 100 lib. sterl. for 300 Merks presently, and 200 Merks upon the condition foresaid. 4. It appeared by the Bond and Assignation, that they were writen with one Hand, and the Wit­nesses Subscriptions appeared to be all writen with one Hand. 5. The Writer and Witnesses are obscure Persons, and not known; and the de­signation of them is so general, that they could not be well found; being designed Writers and Indwellers in Edinburgh, and no otherwayes. 6. It appeared, by comparing other Papers writen by Dumbar, both as to the Character, and the Spelling; that the said Papers, being writen by Dumbar, are the same Write, that the Bond and Assignation is of. 7. It appeared by some Papers subscribed by Davidson, produced by Wauchop to astruct and approve, that his Subscription to the said Papers is not like that of the Bond.

Diverse Papers were produced, being alledged to be Forged by Dum­bar; being Bonds granted by persons who were Dead; and whereof the [Page 189] Writer and Witness were likewayes Dead; which did labour of the same Grounds of Suspition and falsehood: And albeit they were not de­clared to be false, yet being questioned and a warrand being given by the Lords to apprehend Dumbar, he had escaped, and was Fugitive: And the said Dumbar is lookt upon, and is pessimae famae as a Falsary and a Forger.

The Lords were evil satisfied, That their Macer should have taken a Right to, and used such a Write; But as yet have not Censured him. In praesentia.

D. 386. Paterson contra Mckenȝie. 22. Novem. 1676.

THE Defender, in the Improbation of an Assignation, transferred in in his favours, being urged to abide by the same; and having offe­red to abide by the same, as given to him for an Onerous Cause; and as true for any thing he knew: It was Answered, That Certification ought to be granted, unless the Defender would abide by the same positively, as a true Deed: Seing, otherwayes, false Writes might be conveyed through many Hands, and the using of the same might escape impune; notwith­standing of the Act of Parliament, against the users of false Writes; if they should be allowed to qualify their abideing by the same, in man­ner foresaid; which is contrar, to the very Notion of abiding by; which imports a positive asserting the truth of the same. Upon which Debate the Lords Considered the great inconvenients on either hand, if a Right may be taken to false Writes and used impune; whereas before any person take Right to the same, they ought to inform themselves concerning the same, and the Condition and Quality of their Cedents. And on the other part, if commerce should be obstructed so far as a Right should not be taken without hazard to Papers, having no intrinsick nullity or defect, that of falsehood being altogether extrinsick, and which cannot be known.

The Lords, in respect the Cedent, who had made the Translation of the Write quarrelled, was Living, Ordained him to abide by the same simply: And suffered the person, who has now Right thereto, to abide at the same with the foresaid quality; But reserved to themselves, at the advising of the Cause, to consider what the said qualification may im­port in behalf of the User. Actor. Mckenȝie and others, alteri Falconer. Haystoun Clerk. In praesentia.

D. 387. Weir contra E. Bramford. 24. November 1676.

HIS Majesty and the Parliament having rescinded the Forefaulture of the late Earl of Bramford, who had been Forefaulted the time of the Troubles for his Loyalty; did so qualify the Act of Rescission and Restitution, that albeit he had Daughters, who by the Law would have been Heirs of Line; yet the Estate was settled by the Parliament, upon his Grand-child, Son to the Lord Forrester, who had Marryed one of the Daughters.

Mr. William Weir, having Right by Assignation to a Debt of 5000 Merks. due by the Earl of Bramford to Patrick Ker, one of the Grand-children of the said Earl; and a Decreet being obtained for the said Debt, against Edward Ruthven the Lord Forresters Son, as having succeeded in the [Page 190] said Estate, and being bonorum possessor, and having Right as said is, to said Estate, ought to be Lyable passive to the Burden.

The Lords, by the said Decreet, Declared, that the Estate should be Lyable; and thereupon Adjudication having followed against the said Edward, of a part of the Estate, and Infeftment upon the same; the said Edward did intent Reduction of the said Adjudication upon that Reason, That the said Decreet against Edward Ruthven, whereupon it proceeded, was Extracted wrongously, and not conform to the Minuts and Interlo­quitor; which were in these Terms, that the Estate should be Lyable to the Debt; but not that the said Edward should be decerned to pay; as the Decreet bears: And that there could be no Adjudication against the said Edward, who was not Heir to the said Earl: but there ought to have been a Decreet and Adjudication, against his Heirs of Line, being charged to enter Heir.

Upon Debate among the Lords, some were of the Opinion, and did Represent, that there could be no Adjudication against the Heirs of Line, nor Decereet Cognitionis causa; seing they could not be charged to enter Heir in special to that Estate, which, by the Act of Parliament did not belong to them; but was settled upon the said Edward, as said is; And that the said Decreet against Edward was Disconform to the Lords Inter­loquitor; Seing it was not intended, by the said Decreet, that the said Edward or any other Estate of his should be Lyable to the said Debt; It being expresly declared in the said Decreet, that he should be free of perso­nal Execution: And the said Decreet was, but in effect, a Decreet Cognitionis causa: And therefore behooved to bear the Decerniture fore­said, that he should be decerned to make payment, which was only dicis causa, to the effect Execution might follow by Adjudication: And, by the Summonds, whereupon the Decreet proceeded, it was only craved, that the Estate should be affected; And, by the Adjudication, Bramfords E­state was only affected, and the Adjudger was content to declare, that he should affect no other Estate.

Yet some of the Lords were of the Opinion, That the Decreet not be­ing in these Terms, that the Lords decerned Cognitionis causa, to the effect Execution might follow against Bramfords Estate; It was in Arbitrio Ju­dicis, to sustain the Decreet to be a Ground of Adjudication or not: And that Mr. William Weir, having been accessory to the Appeals, at the in­stance of Callender from the Lords of Session, deserved no favour: And it was carryed by plurality, that the Adjudication should be reduced. Newtoun Reporter. Mr. John Hay Clerk.

D. 388. Sheill Minister of Prestounkirk contra His Parishoners. 28. November 1676.

THE Lords Found, That Viccarage Teinds are ruled by Custom, and Local as to the Quota and Kinds, and manner of payment of such Teinds as are truely Viccarage: So far, that in a pursute for Viccarage Teinds; The Defenders Alledging, that some of them had been in use of paying only some certain Kinds by the space of 20. Years; The Lord Found the said Alledgance Relevant, to free them of other Kinds; Albeit they d d Reply, that the Pursuer was in possession of the Kinds in question within the Parish; some others of the Parish, having been in [Page 191] use to pay the same: And that Viccarage is nomen universitatis, ut Baronia, and possession of a part interrupts Prescription; and is, in Law, Possession of the whole. Newtoun Reporter.

D. 389. John Ker contra Jean Ker. eod. die.

IN a pursute at the instance of a Donator: It was Alledged, That the Debt pursued for, was Heretable quoad fiscum: And it being Replyed, That the Pursuer had Right thereto as Executor Creditor: The Lords Found Process upon that Title tho supervenient; The Testament be­ing confirmed after the intenting of the Cause.

In the same Cause, It was Found, That a Testament being confirmed, the nearest of Kin ipso momento has Jus quaesitum to that part of the Goods which belong to them, and do transmit the same to their Executors, and these who represent them; tho the Testament was not Execute, before the decease of the nearest of Kin: And that the said Interest and Action, being in effect a Legitima, and competent to them by the Law and Act of Parliament, is settled in their person and doth transmit; tho the same be not recovered in their own time.

D. 390. Scot contra Toish. eod. die.

AN Assignation, being made in Holland, according to the custom there, by way of Instrument, under the Hand of a Notar, a Tabellion hav­ing retained the Warrand in his Hands, Signed by the Parties, was su­stained, in respect of the custom and consuetudo loci. Justice-Clerk Re­porter.

D. 391. Drumellier contra E. Tweeddale. 30. Novem. 1676.

IT was objected against a Witness, That he was Testis Domesticus, be­ing Servant to the Defender; at least having been his Servant the time of the Citation: Whereunto It was Answered, That he was not presently his Servant; and tho he was his Servant the time of the Ci­tation, he might now be a habile Witness: The Reason, why Servants cannot be Witnesses in behalf of their Masters, ceasing in this Case, viz. That their Masters might have influence upon them; and that they may declare in their Favours, out of fear, to be put out of their Service: And as to the pretence, that it is presumed, that the Defender put the Witness out of his Service, of purpose, that he might used as a Witness; the same doth amount only to praesumptio hominis, which cedit veritati; And animus and design not being probable, but by the Oath of the Party, the Defender and the Witness were free to declare, that he was not removed out of the Defenders Service upon the design foresaid; And it was more strongly to be presumed, that neither the Defender, being a Person of Qua­lity, nor the Witness would perjure themselves.

It was farder urged, That the witness was to be used upon a pa­per that had been produced after the intention of the Cause, and for improving the Date of the same; And that he was removed out of the Defenders Service befor the production of the said paper; So that [Page 192] he could not have that prospect and design to use him as a witness, and that he was removed upon the account foresaid.

The Lords, before Answer, Ordained, that the Time of the produ­ction of the said paper might be tryed. Redford Reporter. Gibson Clerk.

D. 392. Grierson contra The Laird of Lagg. 1. December. 1676.

A Superior, having obtained the Gift of his own Ward, did pursue his Subvassal at the instance of a Donator, in Trust and to his be­hoof for Maills and Duties, dureing the Ward: And the Defender hav­ing Alledged, That the Pursute was to the behoof of the Superior himself; and that he or his Predecessor had Disponed to the Defender his Lands with absolute warrandice.

The Lords Found, That the Gift of Ward, being given to the Vassal, did accresce to the Subvassal, paying his proportion of the Composition: Albeit it was urged, that as the King might have given the said Gift to another, he might have given it to the Vassal himself; and he could not be in a worse case than another Donator: And that the Subvassal knowing the nature of the Right, that the Superior held Lands ward; was Lyable to all Casualities arising ex natura rei, to what Donator soever the same be given.

It was controverted amongst the Lords, What should be the Ground of the Decision in point of Law: And some were of the Opinion, that it was upon that Ground, that Jus superveniens accrescit; the Lands being disponed to the Subvassal ut optima maxima: But it was the Opinion of others, That Jus superveniens accrescit, when it is either of the Pro­perty, or of any Servitude, or of Casualities that had fallen before the Right granted to the Vassal; but not of Casualities arising thereafter ex natura rei: And therefore they thought, that the Right should be found to accresce to the Vassal, upon that Ground, that the Relation be­twixt a Superior, and his Vassal, and the mutual obligation & fides be­twixt them, is such and so exuberant, that the Superior should not take advantage of a Casuality fallen upon account of his own person, and by his Minority: And that a Right of Ward, granted to the Vassal himself, or to any other to his behoof, is upon the matter a Discharge of the Casuali­ty, both as to himself, and as to the Subvassal, that is concerned in con­sequence. Newtoun Reporter. Haystoun Clerk.

D. 393. Home contra Scot. eod die.

IN a Process for Mails and Duties; It was Alledged, That one of the Defenders was in possession by the space of 7. Years, by vertue of a Tack, and had the benefite of a possessory Judgement: And it being Replyed, That he ought to say, that he had a Tack from a person hav­ing Right: And neverthess, The Lords Found, That is was sufficient to Alledge, that he had a Tack, and by vertue thereof in so long posses­sion.

This Decision seemed, to some of the Lords, to be hard; in respect a Tennent is not properly in possession, but detinet to the behoof the Set­ter; [Page 193] So that he could be in no better case than his Master, who, notwith­standing of his possession, either in his own person, or in the person of his Tennent, cannot plead the benefite of a Possessory Judgement; unless he had, or should alledge upon, some Right; And if the Master were called as de facto he was in the said process, It were inconsistent, that his Tennent should have the benefite of a Possessory Judgement and not himself. In praesentia.

D. 394. Rutherford contra Weddel. 5. December. 1676.

THE Lords, In a Suspension at the instance of a Bankrupt, who was Prisoner; did allow him to come out without the habite; Because It was represented, that the Debt was for the most part not contracted by himself, but by his Father: Albeit some of the Lords were of the Opinion, that the Act of Sederunt bearing no distinction, and being made upon good consideration, and conform to the practice of all other Nations; That Bankrupts should be known by a habite to be persons, that deserved no Trust; and that others may be affrighted from contracting or under-going Debts, which they are not able to pay: And that the pretence fore­said was frivolous, it not being presumable, that a person would be Heir and become Lyable to Debts, that he had not Contracted, unless there were Effects and sufficiency of Estate, to pay the same: And if such pretences should be allowed; the Law would be altogether elusory. Gosford Re­porter. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk.

D. 395. The Town of Glasgow contra Greenock. 7. December 1676.

THE Town of Glasgow, having intented a Declarator against the Laird of Greenock, containing these Conclusions, viz. That it should not be lawful to Greenock, or his Burgh of Barony, to import any Goods from Abroad; which, by the late Regulation, and Act of Parlia­ment concerning the priviledges of Burghs Royal, being the 5. Act of the 3d. Session of his Majesties Second Parliament, belongeth to the Royal Burghs; and are to be imported by them privative; and in special Wine, Brandy; and Salt. 2. That if they should be found to contraveen the said Act of Parliament, that the unfree Goods deprehended should not only be Escheat; but their whole Goods; conform to former Laws and Acts of Parliament against unfree Men.

It was Alledged for the Defenders; That, at least, they ought to be in the same case as Strangers, and Unfree-men of Forreign Nations; who may import without limitation, making Offer to the Royal Burghs; and if they do not buy the same from them, being obliged to Sell them in whole sale, and at the price to be limited and appointed by the Burgh where Offer is made; and that the Burghs of Barony had been in use of importing as Strangers, the same being qualified as said is; And the said Custom was not contrary to Law, but conform to diverse Acts of Parliament, and in special the 100 Act of K. Ja. 5th. his [...] Parliament, bearing, that if any Free-man, or other Scots-man dwelling within this Realm, should bring home Wines, Salt, or Timber; That the Magistrates of [Page 194] Burghs, where the same is entered, should set a price upon the same; which imports that Unfree-men may import the same.

The Lords Found, That by the said late Act of Parliament; The matter of Trade is so regulated; That as the Burghs of Barony their priviledges to import Goods and Commodities, that they could not import before, are settled upon them; and on the other part, Royal Burghs are secured from the encroachment of Burghs of Barony; So that they cannot import, but the particulars allowed to them by the said Act: Therefore that, upon no pretence, the Burghs of Barony and Unfree-Men can import any other Goods; and that they are not to have the Liberty that Strangers have; Seing Strangers are allowed the Liberty of Trade and Commerce, being qualified as said is: And if the same were denyed, there would be no Trade betwixt our Merchants and them: Whereas the Liberty of Trade, and to import Forreign Commodities, is only lodged and settled upon Royal Burrows, upon good Considerations; and intuitu of the same they are Lyable to a 6th. part of Taxations, and other publick Burdens. 2. It was Found, That, albeit in the late Act of Parliament, there be not mention of Salt as one of the Commodities allowed to the Royal Burrows, and contained in the specification, that the same does only belong to the Royal Burrows; Seing they are founded as to all Commodities, not ex­presly allowed by the said Act to Burghs of Barony and Regality in Jure: And the Burghs of Barony are excluded, by the said Act, as to all others except these allowed to them expresly by the said Act; and come under that general, viz. Such as are necessary for Tillage or Building, or for the use of their Manufacture.

And whereas it was pretended by the Defenders, that Salt is necessary for the curing of their Fishes. The Lords Found, That Manufacture, in­tended by the Acts of Parliament, is only to be understood of Works e­rected by Companies or others for making of Cloath, or such like; about which many poor People are Employed and Entertained: And tho there be skill in cureing Herring, they are not a Manufacture, but a Native Commodity, without any alteration of the form, and only qualified by the cureing of the same: And that, upon that pretence, the Defenders ought not to be allowed to import Salt: But was Recommended to some of the Lords, being also upon the Council, to move that a course might be taken for Regulateing the price of Salt; that it be not Arbitrary to the Royal Burrowes, to sell the same at such Rates, as the Burghs of Barony cannot, without prejudice, buy the same; So that they may be forced to desist from making or exporting Herring.

The Lords Found, That the said Act having defined the pain to be the Escheat of the Goods deprehended; And not the Escheat of the Con­traveeners whole Goods: And that as to Goods not deprehended, the pain ought not to be greater: And that these who import unlawful Goods, contrare to the Act, tho they be not deprehended, may be pur­sued for the value of the same, and no farder.

Some of the Lords were of another Opinion, as to this Point, and thought, that seing the late Act of Parliament, doth mention only the case of unlawful Goods deprehended; and doth regulate the former Practice, as to the attaching and affecting of the same; and it is inconsistent, that both the Goods deprehended should be escheat, and likeways the Contraveen­ers [Page 195] other Goods should be escheat; That therefore the former Laws are still in vigour. Actor Lockheart, &c. alteri Cuningham. In praesentia.

D. 396. Marshal contra Holmes. 12 December 1676.

AN Advocation being produced, after the Judge had decerned, but before he had cleared and dictate the minute of the Decreet; which he did upon the Bench, immediatly after production of the Advoca­tion.

The Lords Found the Decreet Null, as being spreto mandato: But, in re­spect of the Circumstances, and that the Judge had decerned before, as said is, they turned it in a Lybel. Thesaurer-deput Reporter. Gibson Clerk.

D. 397. Durham contra Durham. eod. die.

SIR Alexander Durham having upon Death-bed, given Bond to the Lord Clermount, for 20000. merks; and at the same time, having ordained his Nevoy Mr. Francis Durham his appearand Heir, to pay to Adolphus, natural Son to the said Sir Alexander, 6000. merks; The said Mr. Francis did, after the Defuncts decease, grant Bond relative to the foresaid Bond, and to the order for Adolphus his Provision; whereby he ratified the foresaid Bond, and was obliged to pay the said Provision to Adolphus, upon this condition, that the Countess of Midleton should Warrand and Relieve the Estate of Largo, from all Inconvenients, and in special, such as might arise from his Uncles Intromission, with publick Accompts; and if the Estate should not be free, in manner foresaid, that the said Bond should be void.

The said Adolphus having pursued upon the foresaid Bond, It was Alledged, That it was Conditional, as said is; And the Defender did condescend, that the Estate was distressed for a Debt of 20000 Merks, for which a Decreet was recovered against his Heir.

The Lords Found notwithstanding, That the said Resolutive Condition was to be understood so, that the Bond should not be void altogether; but only proportionally effeirand to the distress. Newton Reporter. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk.

This Decision, tho it may appear equitable, appears to be hard in strictness of Law; the precise Terms of the Condition being considered.

D. 398. Colledge of Glasgow contra Parishoners of Jed­burgh. eod. die.

THE Lords Found, That a Presentation of an actual Minister before the Term, was not a compleat Right to the Stipend; unless there had been a Warrand for his Transportation. Thesaurer-deput Reporter, Gibson Clerk.

D. 399. Inglis contra Inglis. 13. December 1676.

MR. Cornelius Inglis, having granted a Bond to Mr. John Inglis, for a Sum due to himself, and for his Relief of Cautionries for the said Mr. Cornelius; whereby he was obliged, for his Surety, to infeft him in cer­tain Lands to be possessed by him, in case of not payment of the Annualrent [Page 196] due to himself, and the reporting Discharges from the Creditors to whom he was engaged: and whereupon the said Mr. John was infeft by a base Infeftment.

The said Mr. Cornelius, in respect his Son Mr. Patrick had undertaken to pay his Debts, did dispone to him his Lands; whereupon the said Mr. Patrick was infeft by a Publick Infeftment.

The said Lands being thereafter Comprised from the said Mr. Patrick; and there being a Competition betwixt the said Mr. John Inglis, and di­verse other Creditors of the said Mr. Cornelius and his Son Mr. Patrick, who had comprised the said Lands from the said Mr. Patrick: The Lords Found, That Mr. John Inglis was preferable to the said other Creditors; In respect, tho their Infeftments upon their Comprisings were publick and the said Mr. John his Infeftment was holden of the granter, yet the said Mr. John's Right was publick as to Mr. Patrick, in swa far as, the said Mr. Patrick had corroborate the same; and, before the said Comprisings, had made payment to the said Mr. John, of certain bygone Annualrents, in contemplation of his said Right; and had taken a Discharge from him, relating to the same; so that his Right, being Publick as to Mr. Patrick, was publick as to those who had Right from him; and Infeftments holden of the Granter, being valid Rights by the Common Law; and by Act of Parliament and Statute, invalid only as to others, who had gotten publick Infeftments, in respect of the presumption of Fraud and Simulation; the said Presumption cedit veritati, and in this case is taken away in manner foresaid.

The Lords Found, That notwithstanding that the Right was granted to Mr. Patrick, upon the Consideration foresaid, and for payment of the Debts thereinmentioned, that the Creditors mentioned in the same, had not a real Interest in the said Lands, but only a personal Action against the said Mr. Patrick; in respect the said Right was not granted to him for their use and behoof; neither was it expresly burdened with their Debts: and therefore the Lords did Find, That all the Creditors, both of the said Mr. Cornelius and Mr. Patrick, who had Comprised within Year and Day, should come in pari passu.

D. 400. Margaret Nevoy contra the Lord Balmerinoch. eod. die.

THE Lord Balmerinoch was pursued, as Representing and Behaving as Heir to the Lord Couper, at the Instance of Margaret Nevoy, and diverse other Creditors of the said Lord Couper; upon that Ground, that he had ratified a Disposition, made by the said Lord Couper, in favours of his Lady on Death-bed; and was obliged to comprise the saids Lands, and to give the said Lady a Right to the Comprysing, to be deduced, that should be preferable to other Creditors; And that by the Act of Sederunt in my Lord Nithsdales Case, appearand Heirs, granting Bonds to the effect their Predecessors Estate may be established in their Person or in the Per­son of some Confident to their behoof, are lyable as Behaving: and It was Alledged for the Defender, that Behaving is magis animi quam facti, and it is evident that the Defender did shune to be Heir; and did of purpose take the Course foresaid, that he should not represent the defunct.

[Page 197] The Lords Found, That the Condescendence was only relevant in these Terms, viz. That the Defender, or any Confident to his behoof, had comprised the said Estate for Balmerinoch's own Debt; and had possest by vertue of the Comprysing: Or that the Lord Balmerinoch had commu­nicate the Right of the said Comprysing to the Lady Couper; and that she had possest by vertue thereof; and could not defend her self with her own Right as being in Lecto, Or otherwayes defective.

It was the Opinion of some of the Lords, That it was sufficient and Relevant to say, that Balmerinoch had Comprysed for his own Debt; and was obliged to Communicate the said Comprysing; and had ratified the Lady Couper's Right: For these Reasons. 1. The Law considers quod agitur, and not quod simulate concipitur; And the Lord Balmerinoch, by tak­ing the course foresaid to compryse for his own Debt, intends upon the matter adire, and to carry away his Uncles Estate, to frustrate Creditors. 2. Tho it be pretended, that there is a difference betwixt Nithsdal's Case and this, In respect in that case, the Adjudication was upon Bonds grant­ed by himself, after his Fathers decease; And, in this, the Comprysing is for my Lord Balmerinoch's Debts, Contracted before my Lord Couper's Death; The said difference is not considerable, seing as to that case, there was a design to carry away the Defuncts Estate, by a Deed of the Appearand Heir, to the prejudice of Creditors; and there is the same in this. 3. Tho my Lord Balmerinoch had granted only a Ratification, without Communicating any Right; eo ipso he behaved as Heir; In respect he had ratified the Ladies Right, for any Right or Interest he had himself; and he had an Interest, as Appearand Heir, sufficient to establish a Right in the Person of the said Lady, and to prejudge Creditors; so that they could not question the same; Seing Rights on Death-bed, being consented to by the Appearand Heir when they are made, or ex post facto, become valid and unquestionable ex capite Lecti, as appears by the Law of the Majesty, concerning Rights on Death-bed.

D. 401. Earl of Argyle contra The Lord Mcdonald. 14. December 1676.

THE Earl of Argyle, having pursued the Lord Mcdonald, for Re­duction of a Feu holden of the Pursuer ob non solutum Canonem; It was Alledged, That the Defender had a disposition of the Superiority from Lochzeal before my Lord Argyl's Right, by a Disposition likewayes from him: And tho my Lord Argyle, having compleated his Right before the Pursuer by an Infeftment upon the same, will have Right to the Feu-duties after his Infeftment; yet the Defender had Right to the bygones by the foresaid Disposition made to him; which, being of the Lands and Superiority and made to the Vassal himself, was, upon the matter, an Assig­nation to the Feu-duties and a Discharge: And farder, That as to the Feu-duties after my Lord Argyl's Right, he was in bona fide, not to pay the same, having the foresaid Disposition as said is: And my Lord Argyle having done nothing upon his Right to make Interruption; And there­fore the Summonds ought not to be sustained upon Cessation and not pay­ment, before Intimation of the Pursuers Right to the Defender: Both which Alledgances the Lords Found Relevant.

[Page 198]In the same Case, The Lord Mcdonald having proponed an Alledgance, viz. That my Lord Argyle was obliged by Bond to warrand Lochzeal at the Hands of the Defender; and of any pursute competent upon the said Dis­position made to the Defender, & quem de evictione tenet Actio, agentem repellit Exceptio; And the same being Found Relevant, the Defender giving his Oath of Calumny thereupon; The Lords, In respect the Defender being in Town had refused, at least had not come to give his Oath of Calumny, had decerned: But the Lord Mcdonald having intented Reduction of that Decreet, upon offer to give his Oath of Calumny; upon pretence, that it was towards the end of the Session, when his Oath of Calumny was crav­ed; and that upon some occasions, he had been forced to go home, It was Alledged for the Earl of Argyle, that upon Mcdonalds Refusal to give his Oath of Calumny, it was, in construction of Law, a Calumnious Alledg­ance, and could not now be received; And the greatest favour could be shown to him, was, that he should be heard to verify the same instanter. The Lords did decern, superseding Extracting, until a day in January; that, in the mean time, the Defender might verify the said Alledgance; having taken his Oath of Calumny, that the Write was not in his own Hand. Actores Lockheart and Bernie. alteri Cuninghame and Thoirs. In praesentia.

D. 402. Litlejohn contra Mitchel. eod. die.

THE Lords Found, That Bonds granted on Death-bed, albeit they are Legacies, as to that effect, that they do affect only the Deads part, yet they are preferable to other Legacies left in the ordinary wayes of Legacies; and that the Defunct was in legitima potestate as to the affect­ing of his part, and granting of Bonds to that effect. Justice Clerk Re­porter. Gibson Clerk.

D. 403. [...] contra [...] eod. die.

THO in Improbations the user of Writes, questioned as false, ought to compear to abide by the same; yet a Commission was granted to take the Defenders Declaration that he did abide by, In respect he was a per­son of great Age.

D. 404. Wallace contra Murray. eod. die.

THERE being a pursute, at the instance of a Creditor against the Representatives of an Intrometter with the Debitors Goods, The Lords Found, That the Passive Title of Intrometter could not be sustained, after the Intrometters decease, to make him Lyable as universal Intro­metter: And yet sustained the same in quantum he was locupletatus; the Pursuer for the Defenders farder surety, confirming before the Extracting of the Sentence, a Testament as Executor Creditor to his Debitor. Thesau­rer Depute Reporter. Gibson Clerk.

D. 405. Grant of Rosollis contra L. Bamff. 19. Decem. 1676.

THE Lord Bamff, having acquired the Lands of Craigstoun from John Lyon, did give three Bonds to the said John Lyon Blank in the [Page 199] Creditors Name, containing each of them 5000 Merks; And, at the desire of the said John, did give a Letter with the said Bonds with a Blank direction, bearing that the said John Lyon, having Disponed to him the Lands of Craigstoun, for which he had become Debitor by certain Blank Bonds containing 5000 Merks; And therefore desireing that no person might scruple to take the said Bonds; For it should be no dissatisfaction to him, that they took them without acquainting him; but that it should be holden, as if they had received the Bonds in the beginning, and had their Names filled up therein at that time.

The said John Lyon did fill up the Name of John Grant of Rosollis in the said Bonds; and delivered the said Letter to him, putting a direction upon the same, for the said John Grant: Whereupon the Lord Bamff being charged did Suspend, upon that reason, that he ought to have Re­tention, because the said Bonds were granted for the price of the said Lands and in contemplation of a valid surety, free of all Incumberances; and the surety not being valid, In respect the Lands were affected with Hornings, Inhibitions, and Comprysings, equivalent to the Sums contained in the Bonds; he had in Law Condiction, as being ob causam non secutam.

There was also compearance for the Donator of the said John Lyons Escheat, who did produce his Gift and Decreet of general Declarator; and Alledged, that he ought to be preferred, because he had Right to the Sums due by the said Blank-bonds; In respect the Chargers Name was filled up in cursu Rebellionis: And the said Blanks, being ab initio the Rebells, while they were Blank, they fell under his Escheat; and he could not fill up, or deliver the same, in prejudice of the Fisk.

The Lords Found, That the pretence foresaid of Condictio causa data, tho competent against the said John Lyon himself, if the Bonds had been filled up in his own Name, would not be competent against the Charger, if his Name had been filled up ab initio; Because if the Suspender had been content to give Bond to him, It would have been delegatio, in which case the Exceptions competent against delegantem would not have been competent against the Person, in whose favours the Delegation was made: And that the Charger was upon the matter in the same case, seing the Suspender by his Letter was content, that the Bonds should be holden, as if they had been filled up ab initio.

The Lords also Found, That the said Bonds being Blank, tho they continued Blank, were the said John Lyons proper Bonds; and if he had deceased before the filling up of the same, they would have fallen under his Executry; and consequently, he being Rebel and his Escheat gifted and declared, they fell under his Escheat: And His Majesty, and the Donator could not be prejudged by any Deed of the Rebel, in filling up of the same.

It was also Found, That albeit the Lord Bamff, by his Letter, was bound up, that he could not question the said Bonds upon the pretence foresaid of Condictio, or any other that might have been competent against the said John Lyon; Yet, notwithstanding of the said Letter, the King might have given, and he might accept either a Gift of Lyons Escheat, or a Right from the Donator, and thereupon might claim Right to the said Sums. Thesaurer Depute Reporter. Mr. John Hay Clerk.

D. 406. Tennent, Young, and others, contra Sandy Procu­rator-Fiscal of the Regality of Ogilface. eod. die.

IN a Declarator of a Liferent-Escheat; It was Alledged, That there could be no Escheat upon the Horning Lybelled; Because it was upon Letters direct by the Secret Council, upon a Decreet of a Regali­ty Court; And by the Acts of Parliament, The Lords of Session are only warranted, to direct Letters of Horning summarly, upon the Decreets of Sheriffs, and Baillies of Regality, and other Inferior Judges.

The Lords Thought, That the Council could not direct Letters of Horning upon the said Decreet; Seing, before the Acts of Parliament, Letters of Horning could not be direct upon the Decreets of Inferiour Judges summarly, without a Decreet Conforme before the Lords of Session; And Statutes being Stricti Juris, the Council could not direct Let­ters, unless by the same Statute they had been warranted to that effect; and it appears, that the said Statute was founded upon good Reason and Consi­derations, tho they be not exprest, viz. That the Lords of Session are always sitting in the time of Session; and in vacance, there is some of their Num­ber appointed to receive and pass Bills of Suspension, if there be cause; whereas the Council sitteth but once a Week ordinarly in Session-time; and in Vacance but thrice. 2. The Lords do not pass Suspensions but upon good Reasons, and they are to consider the said Decreets, which is not pro­per for the Council. 3. As Suspensions are raised of the said Decreets, so oft times there is a necessity of raising Reductions; and the Lords of Council are not competent Judges to the Reduction of the said Decreets: But the Lords thought not fit, that there should be a question betwixt them and the Council, concerning their Priviledge; and therefore did forbear to give answer, until some accommodation should be endeavoured: And it was proposed by some, that the Decreet of the Regality Court, being for keeping of Conventicles; and that practice, concerning so much the Peace of the Countrey, that all Disturbance thereby might be prevented; and upon that account, it being recommended to the Council, by Act of Parlia­ment, that they should see the Laws against Conventicles put effectually in execution; The Council, as they might conveen the Contraveeners be­fore themselves, may commissionate the Inferiour Courts to proceed as their Delegats; and upon their Decreets given by them as their Delegats, that they may direct Letters of Horning. Thesaurer-depute Reporter.

D. 407. Ker contra Hunter. 20 December 1676.

A Personal Action was sustained, upon a Right of Annualrent, against the Tennents during their Possession, for the Mails and Duties effeir­and to the said Annualrent. Thesaurer-depute Reporter. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk.

D. 408. Carnegie of Balmachie contra Durham of Anachie. eod. die.

THE Lords Found, That albeit by the common Law, Annualrent be due for Tocher; yet, by Our Custom, it is not payable, unless it be so [Page 201] provided by the Bond or Contract for the same: but in the case in questi­on, They Found the Defender lyable to pay Annualrent, in respect the De­bitor had been in use of payment, at the least, had promised to pay Annu­alrent for certain years bygone: and Annualrent once payed, implyes a tacite Paction to continue the payment of the same. Thesaurer-depute Re­porter. [...] Clerk.

D. 409. Veitch contra Pallat. eod. die.

THE Lords Found, That a Rebel, contracting Debt after Rebellion, can­not assign in satisfaction of the same, any debt due to him: and tho the Assigney should transact with the Debitor of the Debt assigned, before a Gift and Declarator; the Donator will be preferable. Lockheart and Hog for Veitch, alteri Cuningham and Seaton. Gibson Clerk. In praesen­tia.

D. 410. Inter eosdem. eod. die.

AND in the same Case, It was Found, That a Bond granted after Hor­ning, tho it did bear that the same was for Wines; yet being the Re­bels assertion, could not prejudge the King: but it being alledged, and offered to be proven, that the said Wines were truely furnished before the Rebellion: The Lords Found the Alledgance relevant to be proven, only by the Rebels Compt Books, and by Books of Entry; and not simply by Witnesses, without such Adminicles in Write.

D. 411. Pallat contra Veitch. eod. die.

THE Lords likeways Found, That the Presumption introduced by the Act of Parliament, that Gifts of Escheat are simulate, in respect that the Rebel is suffered to possess; is only in that case, where the Rebel has a Visible and Considerable Estate of Lands or Tacks, and is in possession of the same: but when the Rebells Estate is either not considerable, con­sisting only of an Aiker or two, (which was the case in question) or in nominibus, and not known to the Donator, so that the Donator had rea­son not to trouble himself, and to look after either that which was incon­siderable, or which was not known to him; there is no ground to pre­sume that the Gift is simulate.

D. 412. Tait contra Walker. 22. December 1676.

THE Children of a second Marriage, having pursued the Son of the first, for Implement of their Mothers Contract of Marriage, and the Provisions therein contained in their favours: It was Alledged, That they were Debitors themselves, in swa far as, they were Executors named and confirmed to their Father: And It being Replyed, That the Testa­ment was given up by the Mother, they being Infants for the time, and she was not their Tutrix, and so could not bind them.

The Lords Found, That there was Difficulty in the case, in respect the Pursuers were now past 40 years, and they had never questioned or de­sired to be reponed against the said Confirmation: And on the other part, It was hard, that a Deed of their Mother, having no Authority to do the [Page 202] same as Tutor or Curator should bind them; and there was no necessity to be reponed against the same, it not being their Deed, and being ipso Jure void: and therefore before Answer, the Lords thought sit to try, if the Pursuers had meddled with any part of the Executry, or had done any Deed that could import Homologation of the said Testament. Newbyth Reporter.

D. 413. [...] contra [...] eod. die.

IT was questioned amongst the Lords, whether an Inhibition could be sustained, albeit the Execution did not bear a Copy to have been affixt at the Mercat-cross; And it was Resolved as to the future, it should be declared, that Executions of Inhibitions should be null, unless Copies were affixt; In respect there can be no Executions without giving of Co­pies, either personally, or at their dwelling house: And when the Leidges are inhibite at the Mercat-cross in general, so that a Copy cannot be given to every person, it ought to be left at the Mercat-cross in subsidi­um: But, because it was informed, that many Executions did not bear Copies to be left at the Mercat-cross, The Lords did forbear to give An­swer as to the Inhibition in question, until the stile and custom should be tryed.

D. 414. Dick of Grange contra Sir Andrew Dick. 22. December. 1676.

SIR Andrew Dick having obtained, upon a Petition to His Majesty, a Warrand to the Exchequer, to pay to his Wife and Children 130 lib. sterl. Yearly: The said Annuity being Arrested at the instance of [...] Dick of Grange; It was Alledged, in a Process to make forthcoming, that, being Alimentary, it could not be Arrested: Whereun­to it was Replyed, that the said Sum was not Alimentary, so that it could not be affected with Sir Andrew his Debts; In respect, whatsomever be­longeth to a Debitor, either on his own Right or Jure Mariti is Lyable to his Debts; and it is not in the Power of a Debitor to make any thing belong unto him Alimentary, but there must be an express constitution to that effect; which is only in that case, where the King or any other person doth give any thing, and doth qualify their own Gift with that express provision, that it should be only for the Aliment of the person gratified, that it should not be affected with any Debt or Execu­tion for the same; whereas His Majesties Grant was only in the Terms foresaid, and was procured from His Majesty, not upon any special con­sideration or respect to Sir Andrew's Lady, but upon a Representation made by Sir Andrew, that he had a former Wadset from the Earl of Mor­toun of his Estate in Orknay, and the same being taken from him by a Re­duction at the instance of His Majestie of the Earl of Mortoun's Right of Orkney; he and his Family would be in a sad condition: And therefore the said Annuity being granted by His Majesty in lieu and intuitu of the said former Right, surrogatum sapit naturam surrogati.

It was farder Replyed, That albeit the said Annuity were Alimentary, the Pursuers Debt ought to affect the same, being likewayes Alimentary, In respect it was for Money furnished for the Aliment and Entertainment [Page 203] of the said Sir Andrew and his Lady, & privilegiatus non utitur privilegio contra privilegiatum.

The Lords Found, That the said Annuity was Alimentary and could not be Arrested, and the Aliment being de die in diem, the Debt due to the Pursuer could not affect the same, unless it had been for Aliment, while the Annuity in question was in cursu. Forret Reporter. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk.

D. 415. E. Argyle contra The Laird of M [...]naughtoun. 3. January 1677.

IN a pursute at the instance of the Earl of Argyle, against the Laird of M [...]nauchtoun, who held some Lands of him Ward, for the single avail of his Marriage; It was Alledged for the Defender. 1. That the De­fender had Marryed the time of the Usurpation, at which time the Casuali­ties of Ward and Marriage were taken away by an Act and Proclamati­on of the Usurpers, whereby the Defender was secured and was in bona fide to Marry without requireing the Superiors Consent. 2. De facto the Superior had consented to his Marriage, In swa far as the Defender having given notice to him by a Letter, the Marquess of Argyle being then at London, that he was to Marry with a Gentle-Woman, who is now his Wife, the Marquess did return a Letter (which was produced) showing that he could not but approve his matching with the said Gentle-Woman being the Laird of Ardkindles Daughter; and if they should proceed to the Marriage, that he wished them well.

Whereunto, It was Replyed, That the Usurpers by their Act could not prejudge the Pursuer, or any other Superior, but that they might claim the Obventions and Casualities, that did fall unto them, by the na­ture of their Vassals Right; as it was found in the case of Sir George Kina [...]rd and the Master of Gray, that Lands holden in Ward being Disponed in the time of the Usurpation, without the Superiors consent, did recognise notwithstanding of the said Act: And as to the said Consent, It was Replyed, that the said Letter was but a Civil Complement, without any mention of the Marquess his Interest as Superior, and without an ex­press Licence to Marry, and Discharging any Interest, or pretence that he had to the Defenders Marriage.

Upon Debate at the Bar and among the Lords, Some were of the Opi­nion, that there being no Contempt that could be alledged of the Superi­or; and the Vassal having so much reason to think, that he needed not his Consent, In respect the said Act was a Law de facto, and for the time; the whole Country being forced to submit to the Usurpers, and to ac­quiesce to their Orders; That Communis error facit Jus, and quaevis causa excusat as to Casualities arising upon feudal Delinquency or Contempt: And the Superiors Interest, that was intended of the Law, was not that he should have a Sum of Money, but that his Vassal should not Marry with­out his Consent, and match with Families either disaffected, or in which the Superior could not have confidence; and the avail of Marriage is pe­nal in case the Vassal should either Marry without the Superiors consent, or should refuse to Marry a person profered by the Superior to be his Wife.

[Page 204]Upon the foresaid Considerations, they were of Opinion, that the De­fence was relevant; and that there was a great difference betwixt the case of Recognition and Marriage, in regard the reason of the Decision in the case foresaid, was, that the Vassal did upon the matter contemn the Su­perior, after the Kings Restitution, seing he did not apply for a Confirma­tion; Whereas the Vassal, being once married, it were to no purpose to desire the Superiors Consent.

On the other part, some of the Lords argued, that the single Avail is not penal, but only the double; seing the Vassal, attaining to the age of marriage, if he should die unmaryed, yet the single avail would be due: Whereunto It was Answered, That poena is in Law, when a Person is ly­able to pay a Sum, either for doing or not doing a Deed; and as the Vassal is lyable to the double Avail, for refuseing the Person offered by the Superior, so he is lyable to the single for not marrying, and tho matrimonia are libera, so that a Person may marry or not as he pleases, yet causative many things are allowed, which cannot be directly: And it being the design of the Feu­dal Law, and Superiors, in giving out their Lands, to have still Vassals to serve them and their Family, the appearand Heir is obliged by the nature of his Holding to marry, or in poenam to pay the avail: and if the Vas­sal should desire his Superior to offer him a Person that he might marry, or to consent that he should marry, such a Person as he thought fit for him; and the Superior should refuse both, it were hard, that notwithstanding the Vassal should be lyable to pay the Avail of his marriage.

The Lords nevertheless Found, That the single Avail of Marriage is not penal. Actores Lockheart and Hamilton, alteri Cuningham. Mr. John Hay Clerk. In praesentia. Vide infra 23. January 1677. inter eosdem.

D. 416. Mitchelson contra Mitchelson. 4. January. 1677.

A Younger Brother, being served, before the Baillies of Kirkcaldie, Heir of Line to the immediate elder Brother: Thereafter the eldest Bro­ther did desire to be served Heir of Conquest to the same Person; and the Baillies not being clear to proceed, in respect of the former Service, unless it had been reduced: The Lords Thought, That, upon their Refusal, the Elder Brother may Advocate for Iniquity; and that the Brieves may be served before the Macers: and that the Eldest Brother being wronged by the foresaid Service, to which he was not called, so that it was res in­ter alios acta, he ought not to be prejudged thereby, nor put to the trou­ble and Charges of a Reduction. Gibson Clerk.

D. 417. Earl of Glencairn contra Brisbains. 5. January 1677.

FRancis Freeland of that Ilk, having disponed to John Mcknair and Robert Hamilton irredeemably: and they thereafter having dispon­ed the same, with consent of the said Francis, to John Brisbain: And the said John having granted a Reversion to the said Francis his Heirs of his own Body allanerly; for payment of the Sum of 8000 merks, and what farder Sums should be debursed for improving the Lands, building or re­pairing the Houses, with Annualrent frae the Debursements, upon the said John Freeland his own Declaration; and that after the first Term af­ter [Page 205] the said Francis his decease: The Earl of Glencairn, Creditor to the said Francis Freeland, alledging that the said Reversion was granted by Fraud and Contryvance, and in prejudice of him and Lawful Creditors; and that the said Reversion was granted in manner foresaid, not in favours of his Debitor but his Heirs for eludeing their Execution; Pursued a Reduction of the said Disposition made in favours of Ha­milton and Mcnaire; and a Declarator that Brisbaines Right should fall in consequence; and that it should be lawful to him to comprise the said Reversion, and to use an Order as if it had been granted to the said Francis Freeland himself.

The Lords Thought, That if the Price were not adequate (which was to be tryed) the Conclusions foresaid should be sustained. Thesaurer-de­pute Reporter. Gibson Clerk.

D. 418. Creditors of Mouswel contra The Lady and Children. 6. January. 1677.

JAmes Douglas of Mouswel, by Contract of Marriage, betwixt his Eld­est Son James Douglas, and [...] Lawrie, did dispone to his Son the Fee of his Estate, reserving his own Liferent; and with a Provi­sion, to be contained in the Infeftment, That it should be lawful to him to take on and burden the Estate with the Sum of 18000 merks, for the Pro­vision of his other Children, and for doing his other Affairs: And ac­cordingly the said James did provide, to eight Children, 9000. merks out of the said Estate, by a Bond granted within a year after the said Marri­age, and Infeftment thereupon.

Both the Father and the Son the Fiar being deceased; and the Son hav­ing left only one Son of the Marriage an Infant; there followed a Contract [...]etwixt Agnes Rome Grandmother to the Child, and Janet Lawrie the Mother, and certain Friends of the Family, whereby it was agreed, that the Grandmother should quite 200 merks of her Liferent yearly, and the Mother 400 merks of her Liferent; and that the Grandmother should Con­firm her Husbands Testament for payment of his Debts; and for the su­perplus of the Debt, the Friends should undertake the same; and upon payment, having taken Right thereto, should superceed personal Execu­tion, until the Child were major; the Annualrents being in the mean time payed by the Grandmother, as Tutrix to her Grandchild. The Grandchild having deceased, while he was yet Infant; both the Creditors and the Friends, and the Relict, did take a course to affect the Estate by Comprysings; and upon their Infeftments and Rights, having pursued the Tennents, so that they were forced to raise a multiple Poinding; It was Alledged for the Creditors, That the Grandmother her Liferent ought to be restricted, conform to the said Contract, whereby she had dischar­ged the said 200. merks yearly: Whereunto It being Answered, That res devenerat in alium casum; and that the said Restriction was in favours of her Grandchild, and for the standing of the Family, and in contempla­tion of the Undertaking, and Obligement foresaid of the Friends, which they had not done, and cessante causa cessat effectus: and, the Estate being altogether ruined, she ought to be in her own place.

[Page 206]And albeit it was thereto Replyed by the Creditors, That, whatever might be pretended to be the impulsive Cause, yet the said Restriction being once granted doth continue, notwithstanding of the pretence fore­said; seing there is no resolutive Clause or Provision, that the Case above­mentioned falling out, the Grand-mother should be in her own place; but on the contrare it appears by the Contract, that the Death of the Child was then under her consideration, In respect, it is provided ex­presly, that if the Child should die the Restriction of the Mothers Life-rent should cease, and she should be in her own place; and so, the Provi­sion foresaid being only in favours of the Mother, and not of the Grand-mother, Exceptio firmat Regulam in non exceptis: It being considered like­ways, there was not the same reason for the Grand-mother, In respect by the decease of the Child, the Mothers Interest in the Estate did altogether cease, whereas the Heir, who did succeed to the Child, was the Grand-mothers own Son: And as to the pretence, that the Friends had not ful­filled their part of the Contract, It was Answered, that the Contract being in effect in favours of the Family, both the Relict and the Creditors were thereby obliged, and might yet be urged to fulfil their obligements: And tho they should both fail, the Family could not be prejudged; and that the Freinds, accordingly as they were obliged, they had taken course with the Debts: and tho it was pretended that they had not done it debito tempore, the said pretence was of no moment, seing no time is limited by the Con­tract.

Nevertheless the Lords Reponed the Relict against the said Restriction.

In the same Cause, There being a Competition betwixt some of the Creditors, whose Debts were Contracted by the Grand-father Agnes Rom's Husband before his Sons Contract of Marriage; and betwixt the Children, who were Infeft, as said is, upon the Bond of Provision, granted by their Father, conform to the faculty foresaid.

It was Alledged for the Creditors, That they ought to be preferred, In respect, that upon Bonds of Corroboration granted by the Son the Fiar, they had Comprysed and were Infeft by publick Infeftments; at least had charged the Superior; So that their Right being publick, and for a true Debt anterior to the Childrens Provision, they were preferable to the Children, their Infeftment being base.

The Lords Found, That the Children should be preferred, In respect the Comprysings were against the Son; and the Comprysers could be in no better Case than the Son himself, whose Right was affected with the said faculty in favours of the Children: So that neither he, nor any having Right from him, could question the Right granted by ver­tue of, and conform to the said Faculty.

This Decision, being by plurality, seemed hard to some of the Lords; who did consider, that the foresaid Faculty was not only in behalf of the Children, but of supervenient Creditors, if the Father had thereafter Contracted any Debt, and if the Father had given surety to the said Su­pervenient Creditors by base Infeftments, and if his Anterior Creditors before the said Contract had comprysed and had been Infeft, they would have been preferred to the said posterior Creditors having only base Rights, and multo magis to the Children.

[Page 207]They considered also, That the Estate being, by the said Contract, Dis­poned simply to the Son, with a Reservation only of the Fathers Liferent and the said Faculty; and the Son not being obliged to pay the Fathers Debts by the said Contract, if there had been 18000 Merks of Debt ante­rior to the Contract, Anterior Creditors might have pursued the Son for the same, not only because he was Appearand Heir and Successor Titulo Lucrativo, but because he was obliged by the Contract, at least his Estate burdened for the said Sum; And the Anterior Creditors might either have taken that course, or might have Comprysed the Interest compe­tent to the Father by the said Faculty: And seing the Son might have been forced in manner foresaid to satisfy the said Creditors, he might have granted Bonds of Corroboration, whereupon they might have Comprysed; and having comprysed, and having gotten publick Rights, they are preferable to the base Right of the Children.

In the same Cause, The Creditors did alledge, that they ought to be preferred to the Children, because their Provision was after their Debt, and was without an Onerous Cause; And nevertheless the Lords Found the Defence for the Children Relevant, viz. That their Father, the time of the granting of the said Bon [...], for their Provision, had a sufficient Estate, besides, out of which the Creditors might have been satisfied.

This Decision, being also by the Major part, seemed hard to others, who thought that a Debitor could do no Deed in prejudice of his Credi­tors, without an Onerous Cause: And tho the Father might be looked upon, the time of the granting of Provisions to Children as in a good con­dition, and therefore the Creditors to be secure and needed not do Di­ligence, yet if thereafter he should become insolvent, the loss ought to be upon the Children, and not the Creditors: And that it being a princi­ple, That a Debitor can do nothing in prejudice of his Creditor, without an Onerous Cause, It is certainly both Fraud and prejudice, that he should not pay his Debt, but should give away, to his Children, that part of his Estate which the Creditors might have affected: And Inhibiti­ons being only in these terms, That the Party Inhibite should do no Deed in defraud of the Creditor; It might be pretended, by the same Reason in Reductions ex capite Inhibitionis, that the Party Inhibite did nothing in defraud or prejudice of the Pursuer, In respect, the time of the grant­ing the Bond or Right craved to be reduced, he had Effects and sufficien­cy of Estate beside. Lockheart &c. for Queensberry and other Creditors. Cuninghame, Anderson and Mckenȝie for the Children and Relict. Gibson Clerk. In praesentia.

D. 419. Stewart of Castlemilk contra Sir John Whitefoord. 10. January 1677.

SIR Archibald Stewart of Castlemilk, having pursued a Reduction of a Disposition of the Lands of Coats, made by James Stewart of Minto, in favours of Sir John Whitefoord; ex capite metus: In swa far as, the said Sir John Whitefoord had taken the said James and kept him in privato car­cere for some time; and thereafter, having a Caption against him, had de­tained him Prisoner: and had caused transport and convey him in that condition, from diverse places in the night Season; and by his Servants had threatned him with long Imprisonment; and in end had prevailed [Page 208] with him to dispone to him the saids Lands, being eight Chalders Victu­al of Rent, and where there was a Coal of 100. lib. sterl. of Rent; upon an Obligement only to pay him an yearly Annuity of 400. merks: In which process, the said Sir John, and Duke Hamilton, who had thereaf­ter acquired the said Lands from the said Sir John, did compear, and pro­pone the Defences following. 1. That the foresaid Qualifications of Force were not Relevant to import metus, qui potest cadere in Constan­tem virum, being neither mortis nor Cruciatus; nor so circumstantiate, as is required of the Law, for founding the said Action. And 2 That albeit metus were relevantly qualified, the foresaid Deed cannot be questioned upon pretence of the same, unless the said James Stew­art had been lesed or damnified by the same; Seing it appears by the Title, quod metus causa, &c. A Reduction and Restitution upon that head is not competent, ubi non est damnum, & nihil abest; as is clear by diverse Texts, in the case of a Creditor useing force to get what is unquestiona­bly due to him; and in this case the said James had no prejudice, in re­spect he was obliged by an antecedent Minute to dispon the said Lands: so that the said Disposition was but for implement of the said Minute, which the said Sir John did give back to be cancelled by Minto, when he got the said Disposition. And 3. It was offered to be proven, that, after the said James was at liberty, the said Disposition was granted by him.

The Lords Found, That the Libel and Qualifications of metus and Force were relevant; and yet, in respect the Defenders were so positive as to their Alledgance, that the Disponer was at liberty when he granted the said Right; they allowed a conjunct Probation concerning the said Qualificati­ons of Force, and the condition the Disponer was in for the time, and the way of granting the said Right; whether he was under Restraint and the Impression of Fear, or in Freedom? Or whether the samen was granted by him freely and voluntarly?

As to the said other Defence, that there was no damnum, the Lords re­pelled the same; and would not allow that point of Fact to be tryed, whe­ther or not there were a former Minute, for Implement of which the said Right was granted? And whether it was given back for, and the time of the granting of the said Disposition?

Some of the Lords were of the Opinion, That the Qualifications libelled, were not relevant to import such a force and metus, as could be the ground of a Reduction of the said Right; ex eo capite; tho they were convinced that the practice foresaid is most unwarrantable and dolosa; and that there­upon the Right may be questioned as to Sir John himself, but not as to a singular Successor: and that there is a difference betwixt a Reduction ex capite metus, which is competent against singular Successors; and a Reduction ex capite doli, which is not competent against a singular Suc­cessor, who bona fide has acquired a Right, for an Onerous Cause.

But diverse of the Lords were of Opinion, that the Defence foresaid, that there was no damnum, was most relevant, for these Reasons; viz. All Restitutions upon what mediums soever, whether metus or dolus, or lubricum aetatis, are against damnum and prejudice; for frustra should Re­stitution be craved, if there be no damnum. 2. It is evident by di­verse Laws, and the Title foresaid, quod metus, &c. That ex edicto quod metus causa, &c. non datur actio si nihil absit; & succurritur only captis & [Page 209] laesis. 3. By the Civil Law, there were diverse Remedies competent to these who had been forced to do any deed; viz. A Civil action ex Edi­cto Praetoris, and a Criminal Action ex lege Julia; and a Penal Remedy ex decreto Divi Marci, That a Creditor by force, extorting what is truely due, amittit Jus Crediti: And our Reductions ex capite metus are but Civil Actions, as that ex Edicto: And the said other Remedies being pe­nal, by the Municipal Law of the Romans, cannot be introduced by the Lords of Session being Civil Judges, without an Act of Parliament. 4. All Restitutions should Repone both Parties in integrum; and it were un­just, that if it were constant, and the Lords were convinced upon their own certain knowledge, that there had been an antecedent Minute, and that the same had been cancelled upon the granting of the said Dispositi­on, that Minto should be restored, and not the said Sir John; that now res non est integra, seing the antecedent Minute is not Extant; and tho it were Extant, it would be ineffectual, In respect Minto has Disponed the foresaid Lands to this Pursuer who is Infeft; and, having the first Infeft­ment would be preferable, whether the Minute were Extant or not. 5. As to the pretence that was so much urged, that it would be of dan­gerous consequence, that such Deeds extorted by force should be sustain­ed upon the pretext of non damnum; and that it would tend to encourage such practices, the same is of no weight; seing the Deed, being just upon the matter, may and ought to be sustained, and yet the way of procureing the same may be severely punished. 6. As to the difficulty of Probation, there being no Adminicles in Write, that there were such a Minute, It is not considerable; Seing multa permittuntur causative, which cannot be done directly; and that tho the Result of Probation by Witnesses, may be the making up or taking away of Writes, which cannot be done direct­ly, but by Write; yet when that which is to be proven is in Fact, it may be proven by Witnesses; as in the same case, that the Disposition in que­stion was Extorted, it may be proven by Witnesses, to take away the said Disposition: And if a person should be forced to grant a Disposi­tion of Lands of 20. Chalders of Victual of Rent, and in Exchange should get a Disposition at the same time of other Lands of the half value, it were a good Defence and probable by Witnesses, that the Pursuer did get, the time of the granting the Disposition of Lands, worth 20 Chal­der Victual, a Disposition of less value; and Contingentia causae and of a Transaction and circumstances of the same, ought not to be divided; but may and ought to be entirely proven by Witnesses, alse well for the Defender as the Pursuer. Actor Lockheart and Sinclair. alteri Cuningham and Mckenȝie. Mr. John Hay Clerk. In praesentia.

D. 420. Commissar of St. Andrews contra Watson. 11. January 1677.

THE Lords sustained a pursute at the instance of the Master of the Ground, against these who had bought, from his Tennent, his Corns and other Goods, wherein the Pursuer had a Tacite Hypoth [...]k. Glen­doich Reporter. Mr. John Hay Clerk.

D. 421. Viscount of Oxenford contra Mr. John Cockburn. eod. die.

MR. John Cockburne, having gone Abroad with the Viscount of Oxenford; and after his Return, having gotten several Bonds from the said Viscount of considerable Sums, and also a Pension of 1000 Merks: And having charged upon the same, the Viscount Suspended upon that Reason, that the said Mr. John, dureing their being Abroad, had received great Sums of Money remitted to him upon the Viscounts account, for which he had not Compted; and that, after Compt and Reckoning, he will be found Debitor to the Viscount in more than the Sums charged for: And it being Alledged by the said Mr. John, that he is only comptable for his Intromission, and that his Actual Intromission ought to be Instructed by Write or by his Oath; and the Declarations, of Merchants and Factors Abroad, cannot be Probation to bind upon him so great Intromissions.

The Lords considered the condition of the Viscount for the time, that he could not Intromet himself; and that the said Mr. John had such Influ­ence upon him, that having been his Governour at Schools, and upon the desire of his Friends being put from him by an Act of Council, He, notwithstanding, without and contrare to the Advice of his Friends, car­ryed him Abroad; and since his return had gotten from him the Bonds foresaid: And therefore thought fit to try the Business to the bottom; And to ordain the said Mr. John to give in his Compts of what was receiv­ed and debursed, when the Viscount was Abroad; and the Factors and other Witnesses to be Examined, concerning his Intromission; and whether or not any Moneys, that were remitted for the Viscounts use, were received by the Viscount himself, or by the said Mr. John. Red­ford Reporter. Mr. John Hay Clerk.

D. 422. Laird of Bavilay contra Barbara Dalmahoy. eod. die.

A Horning, against a Person dwelling within the Shire of Edinburgh, upon Lands Annexed to the Barony of Renfrew, being denounced at Edinburgh, was sustained; In respect that the said Lands were Local­ly within the Shyre of Edinburgh: And the Rebel, In respect of his Re­sidence there, was Lyable to the Jurisdiction of the Sheriff, and to all Burdens, and had all Capacities competent to the Shire of Edinburgh, Mr. John Hay Clerk.

D. 423. Baillie contra Somervel. eod. die.

THERE being a Provision in a Contract of Marriage in these Terms, that 5000 Merks of the Tocher should return to the Father in Law, in case his Daughter should decease before her Husband, within the space of 6 Years after the Marriage, there being no Children betwixt them then on life; and in case the Father in Law should have Heirs Male within the space of six Years after the Marriage.

[Page 211]The Lords Found The said Provision copulative; and that the Tocher should not return, albeit the Father in Law had Heirs Male within the foresaid time; Seing the other Member of the said condition did not exist; In respect, albeit his Daughter deceased within the said time, yet she had a Child of the Marriage that survived. Gosford Reporter. Mr. John Hay Clerk.

D. 424. Jaffray contra Laird of Wamfray. 12. Jan. 1677.

A Sum, due be a Bond bearing an Obligement to Infeft and Requisiti­on; was Found to be Moveable after Requisition; and to fall un­der Escheat, notwithstanding the late Act of Parliament Ordaining Bonds bearing Annualrent to be Heretable; but remains still Heretable quoad fis­cum; In respect Bonds of the nature foresaid became Moveable by Re­quisition, even before the said Act of Parliament; And the Fisk, since by the foresaid Act of Parliament, is not put in better case, is not in worse. Glendoich Reporter. Mr. John Hay Clerk.

D. 425. Inter eosdem. eod. die.

IN the same case It was Found, That an Instrument of Requisition was Null, because it did not bear, that the Procuratory was produced: And an Instrument being produced extended under the Notars Hand, and being quarrelled upon the Ground foresaid, The Lords did not allow the Notar to give out an other Instrument, bearing the Procuratory to be produced; nor did admit probation by Witnesses, that the Procura­tory was produced; Seing such Solemnities are not presumed, and can­not be proven by Witnesses, but by valide and formal Instruments: And a Notar having given out an Instrument, that is defective, cannot there­after give an other to supply the defect; Otherways the question being be­twixt the Creditors, who had done lawful Diligence and a Donator, it should be in the power of a Notar to prefer and gratify either party, as he should be prevailed with, either to give out, or not to give another In­strument.

D. 426. Inglis contra Lawrie. eod. die.

SOme of the Lords were of the Opinion, that a Husband may give va­lidly, during Marriage, to his Wife, a Provision or Jointure, where there is no Contract of Marriage: But that the Wife could not give to the Husband, tho there were not a Contract of Marriage, and that she might revock any such Donation: which appears to be hard and unequal. Actor Colt, alteri Dalrymple. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk. But this Point was not decided.

D. 427. Fordel contra Caribber. 16. January 1677.

IN a Reduction, at the instance of the Laird of Fordel, against Monteeth of Caribber, of a Disposition granted by Monteeth of Randyfurd to Ca­ribber; upon that Reason, That the said Disposition was not delivered, but was lying by the Defunct in his Charter Chest, and blank in the Name and Date; and that the Defender intrometted with the same un­warrantably, and filled up his Name.

[Page 212] The Lords Ordained certain Persons, who were going to France, to be examined before Debate; reserving to themselves to consider what their Depositions should work.

Tho it may appear hard, that a Write should be taken away by Wit­nesses; yet the Reason being relevant, and in Fact, and resolving in dole and Fraud, it may be proven by Witnesses. Mr. John Hay Clerk.

D. 428. Stewart of Ardvorlich contra Riddoch. eod. die.

DAVID Riddoch, by Contract of Marriage betwixt his Son Alex­ander and Jonet Ballentyne, did dispone to the said Alexander his Estate: and thereafter did dispone the same to his second Son David Riddoch, for payment and with the burden of all his Debts: who did thereafter dispone the same to Stewart of Ardvorlich for a just price.

The said Stewart of Ardvorlich pursued a Reduction of the Disposition, contained in the said Alexander his Contract of Marriage; upon that Rea­son, That the said Contract of Marriage was not delivered to the said Al­exander, at the least there being but only one double subscribed, the same was given back to David Riddoch the Father; and was lying by him the time of his decease: And it was evident, that it was never intended, that any other use should be made of the said Contract, but only in order to get a Marriage to the said Alexander, as being provided to the said Estate; in swa far as the said Disposition, in favours of the said Alexander, was with­out the burden of the Disponers Debts, which were very great; and did not so much as reserve his Liferent: Whereunto It was Answered, That the Contract was a mutual Evident, subscribed by both Parties, and that Marriage had followed upon the same; and therefore it could not be ta­ken away, upon the pretence of not delivery.

The Lords Found, That tho the Contract had been beside the Father the time of his decease, it was not to be considered as instrumentum penes de­bitorem, being a mutual Evident: But thereafter It was Replyed, That the Pursuer offered to prove, that not only the said Contract was lying by the Disponer, the time of his decease, but an Assignation blank of the said Contract; which, being in the Disponers Hands, was in effect a retrocessi­on or Discharge of the Disposition, contained in the Contract: Which Re­ply the Lords found Relevant. In praesentia.

This Reply was Found also probable prout de jure.

D. 429. Cuningham contra Halyburton. eod. die.

THE Lords Found, That a Tacksman of Lands, within Burgh, may be removed, if he be behind in payment of his Duty; unless he find Caution as to the future; in the same manner as Tacksmen of Land in the Countrey. Forret Reporter. Gibson Clerk.

D. 430. [...] contra [...] eod. die.

THE Lords Found, That a Burgess of the Town, tho he be not Incola, if he trade, may be stented for payment of his Majesties Taxation.

D. 431. Earl of Glencairn contra Brisbain. eod. die.

THE Lords Found, In the Case abovementioned Glencairn contra Brisbaine, That the true Value of the Lands should be proven, to the effect it may be known whether the Price be adequate or not: And albeit the Lands had not been laboured by Tennents, being still in the Heretors hands, the Value might and ought to be proven, by the soweing and increase, and the quantity of the Land; and what Lands in that part, of the like quantity and quality, may be set for: And it was not enough, that now the Earl of Glencairn offered 2000 merks more, in respect the Lands might have been improven; or the said offer might be made upon Picque or Emulation. Hatton Reporter. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk.

In this Case the Lords allowed a conjunct Probation:

D. 432. Caribber contra Fordel. 17. January 1677.

THIS Day again in the Case abovementioned Caribber contra Fordel, The Lords did Find, upon a Bill given in by Caribber, That albeit Write cannot be taken away but by Write directly; and that a Disposition could not be taken away but by a Renounciation or some other Writt, where there is no question as to the Validity and Formality of the same; Yet it may be taken away by a Reduction Ex capite Metus & Doli, and minoris aetatis and Lesion: And that in such pursutes, the Reasons being in Fact, and Lybelled either upon Force or Circumvention and Fraud, are probable by witnesses; and that the Reduction at Fordels instance upon that Reason, viz. That the Disposition in question was found among the Defuncts papers, the time of his Decease, and was intrometted with and filled up by Ca­ribber, is ex eodem capite Doli. Mr. John Hay Clerk.

D. 433. [...] contra [...] eod. die.

AN Edict of Executrie, being Advocate from the Commissars; a Bill was given in, desiring that the Advocation might be summarily discust, seing both nearest of Kin, Creditors, and the Fisk were concerned, that the Testament should be confirmed and execute; which Desire, the Lords thought could not be granted, in respect of the Act of Regulation: but it was thought a great Escape and Inadvertency, that such Advocations should be past, seing the Lords could not confirm Testaments: and if any Partie should be prejudged by any Act of the Commissars, it may be re­duced, upon the head of Iniquity: And the Lords thought, it was fit that a new Edict should be raised; and if an Advocation should be sought, the Reason should be discust upon the Bill.

D. 434. Earl Argyle contra Mcnaughtoun. 23. Jan. 1677.

IN the Case abovementioned, Earl of Argyle contra Mcnaughtoun, It was Found, That Mcnaughtoun having acquainted the deceast Mar­quess of Argyle, that he was to Marry with his Lady; and that the Mar­quess having returned an Answer by his Letter of the Tenor abovemen­tioned; [Page 214] the said Letter imported his Consent to the Marriage; and that the Marquess having consented, he could not claim the Benefite of the Marriage. Vide supra 3. January 1677.

D. 435. Tailfer contra Sandilands. eod. die.

A Curator having in his Accompts given in an Article of Incident Charges upon occasion of the Minors Affairs, viz. That he had met with Agents and others in Taverns, in Relation to the Pupills Af­fairs; and had been at Charges in drinking with them, extending to a considerable Sum, during the whole time of his Charge: The Lords did not allow the same in the Terms foresaid; But Ordained him to con­descend upon the particulars: And if he kept a Book and Diary of his Debursements, so that he might warrantably declare, that he had truely debursed the particulars thereinmentioned; they enclined to modify the same to such a Sum, as they should find reasonable.

D. 436. Home of Ford contra Steuart. 24. January 1677.

A Wadset being granted in these Terms, That the Wadsetter should possess the Lands; and that the Granter should free the Wadsetter of Levies of Horse, and Feu-duties, and Ministers Stipends: It was Found that the Wadsetter is not Lyable to Compt and Reckon for the Duties and superplus of the same, exceeding the Annualrent; In respect, the Wadset was a proper Wadset; and the Wadsetter was not free of all Ha­zards of the Fruits, Tennents, War and Vastation. Redford Reporter. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk.

D. 437. Ronald Grahame contra Sarah Rome. eod. die.

JOhn Rome being obliged by his Contract of Marriage with his second Wife to provide 10000 Merks in favours of himself, and his Spouse in Conjunct-fee, and the Heirs of the Marriage; whilks Failȝieing to his own Heirs and Assigneys: And to provide also 5000 Merks in favours of the Remanent Bairns of the said Marriage:

The Lords Found, That the Father was Fiar of the said Sums; and that the Heir of the Marriage and Remanent Bairns had an Interest only to succeed to him as Heirs of Provision in the same: And that the Cre­ditors might affect the said Sums; and would be preferable to the Bairns; Notwithstanding their Debts were Contracted after the said Contract of Marriage, and Inhibition thereupon; seing the Inhibition could not take away his Fee: And the Import and Effect both of the said Obligements and Inhibition is only, that the Father should do no fraudulent Deed, without an Onerous Cause, in prejudice of the same. Gosford Reporter.

D. 438. Ardblair contra Wilson. eod. die.

A Bond being granted by James Bisset of Neitherbalcarne to the Laird of Ardblair for Love and Favour; to be payed after his decease: The Lords Found, That the said Bond, being granted without an Onerous Cause, to be payed in manner foresaid after the Granters decease; could [Page 215] not prejudge posterior Creditors, who were in bona fide to lend their Mo­ney, notwithstanding any such Latent Deeds and Bonds.

This Decision seems to be hard; Seing it was lawful both to the Gran­ter and Receiver of the said Bond, to grant and receive the same: And the said Donation, being lawful ab initio, could not become thereafter un­lawful by any Deed of the Granter: And Fraud cannot be pretended, but where Creditors or others, the time of the granting of such Bonds, were prejudged; unless it did appear by some speciality and circumstance in the case, that there had been a design to Cheat and Circumveen these who were to lend their Money, by granting and settleing upon the Rela­tions of the Debitor, his Estate; and thereafter to get in his Hands, his Creditors Means, whom he was not able to satisfy; which was Found in the Case of Maisson and Pollock, and was not Alledged in this Case. Nevoy Reporter. Mr. John Hay Clerk.

D. 439. Sinclair contra Home of Renton. eod. die.

A Bond of Corroboration being granted for a Sum due upon a Wadset; with power to use Execution without Requisition: The Lords Found, That the Creditor may summarly compryse upon the same with­out previous Requisition. Glendoich Reporter. Mr. John Hay Clerk.

D. 440. Nairn contra Stuart of Innernytie. eod. die.

A Presentation being granted by a Bishop to a Prebendary in favours of a person dureing his Lifetime; and after his decease to his Son: The Lords Found, in a multiple poinding and competition, betwixt the per­sons substitute in the said Presentation; and another Prebendar provided by the succeeding Bishop, by the decease of the first Prebendar; That the Substitution, contained in the Presentation foresaid, did expire by the de­cease of the Father, and that the Substitution was void; In respect, the Bishop could not, in prejudice of his Successor, grant a Presentation in the Terms foresaid, bearing a Tailȝie and Substitution. Castlehill Reporter. Mr. John Hay Clerk.

D. 441. Drumellier contra E. Tweeddale. eod. die.

IT being objected against Major Bunting, being led as a Witness for Drumellier against the Earl of Tweeddale; That he had given Partial Counsel, at least had concerned himself as a Party for Drumellier; In swa far as, he had been at Consultations with him, in Relation to the Pro­cess.

The Lords Found, That he could not be a Witness, tho he was a person of Integrity above exception; and that he was free to declare that, at the said Consultations, the point, whereupon he was to be used as a Witness, was not in consideration. Gibson Clerk.

D. 442. Grange Dick contra Oliphant. eod. die.

AN Assignation being granted for relief, and payment of certain Sums mentioned in the Assignation; for which the Assigney was Cautioner for the Cedent; the same was questioned upon that head, that it was never [Page 216] delivered, but was still in the Cedents Hands: The Lords Found, That the said Assignation was never delivered: And yet they Found, That it was an effectual Evident in favours of the Assigney, In respect the Cedent had made the same publick by a Horning thereupon. Sir George Lockheart &c. alteri Cuninghame &c. In praesentia.

D. 443. Ker contra Kers. 25 January. 1677.

A Disposition being questioned, as being made in lecto, at least deliver­ed then: It appeared by the Deposition of one of the Witnesses, used for proving the Lybel, that the said Write was subscribed diverse Years before the Disponer was on death-bed; and that the same was deli­vered before death-bed to the said Witness: and that the Defunct having called for it on death-bed, for drawing two other Dispositions, of the Lands contained therein; one in favours of the Pursuer the Disponers Heir; and the other in favours of a Son of the Disponer, who was Father to the Person in whose favours the Disposition in question was made: And upon debate amongst the Lords, what should be the import of the said Te­stimony, seing the Depositar did not declare in what Terms the same was given to him by the Disponer; whether to the behoof of the said Per­son, in whose favours it was made or not; or upon any other account, for keeping the same, so that the Disponer might call for and alter it: It was Found, 1. That the Disponer might have revocked the same; In respect it did not appear, that it was delivered to the behoof of the Person to whom it was made.

This Decision seems to be hard; in respect the Disposition was now in the Hands of the Receiver, so that it was to be presumed, that it was de­livered, either to him, or to the said other Person to his behoof: and the delivery ought to be construed, and presumed to have been, ut operetur: and the nature of the Act it self, imports that it should be to the behoof foresaid: It not being to be imagined, that if the Disponer had intend­ed to have retained the Power in his Hands, either to make the said Right effectual, or not; he would have given it out off his Hands.

2. The Lords Found, Upon the Testimony foresaid, That the Dispo­ner having revocked the said Disposition not simply, but to the effect fore­said, that the said two Dispositions should be granted; The Pursuer there­fore had not Right to the whole Lands, contained in the said first Dispo­sition; but that the same should divide, conform to the said two Disposi­tions. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk. In praesentia.

D. 444. Procurator-Fiscal of Glasgow contra Cowan. 26 January 1677.

THE Commissar of Glasgow, having sustained Process, at the In­stance of the Procurator-Fiscal, for the tryal of a falsehood of Exe­cutions, whereupon a Decreet had proceeded: and having upon Probati­on of the falsehood, decerned the user of the said Executions, to pay 300. lib. to the Procurator-Fiscal as a Fine: and the said Decreet being sus­pended; The Lords Found, That the Commissar was not competent Judge to the improbation of Executions, by way of Action; seing they cannot reduce their own Decreets; and Improbation is a Reduction ex capite falsi. Justice-Clerk Reporter. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk.

[Page 217]It is to be considered, that the most part of Decreets, befor Infe­rior Judges, are for Null-Defence, and upon false Executions: and it were hard, that there should be no Remedy but by Improbations before the Lords, which may depend long and are very chargeable; So that Decreets before Inferior Judges being for the most part for in­considerable Sums, the Remedy should be worse than the Mischief.

It appears indeed, that the Commissars have not power to Fyne; that being a Criminal Jurisdiction; and that they are not Judges to Impro­bation by the indirect manner; The Tryal of Falsehood, by circum­stances and presumptions, being Altioris Indaginis; and of that Diffi­culty, that it ought not to be left to an Inferiour Judge. Item, The Try­al of Falsehood, as to that effect that Falsaries may be punished, ought not to be by any Inferior Judge; But it seems to be just and necessary, that Parties, grieved by such Decreets, should be allowed to pursue the obtain­ers of the same, to hear and see them reponed against the said Decreets, upon that Ground that they were not cited to the same; to be proven by the Witnesses and Executer himself, declaring that they pursue to that effect allanerly: And it appears not to be inconsistent with Law and Form, that this course should be taken; seing the Judge does not reduce his own De­creet, ex capite iniquitatis; and it may be provided, that such Pursutes, tho they be upon the matter Improbations, are only to the effect foresaid; and that no other effect or consequence shall follow upon the same; and multa fiunt per indirectum, which cannot be directly: And if a Party, who is holden as confest, should raise a lybel before an Inferior Judge, that it may be Found that he was not Contumax, being out of the Countrey, or Sick, or detained by Storm, or some other insuperable Impediment; and that therefore he should be reponed; and the Decreet should be holden as a Lybel; such a Pursute would not be incompetent, tho in effect it would be a Reduction upon the matter.

D. 445. Donaldson contra Rinne. 27 January 1677.

IT was moved, whether or not a Decreet of an Inferior Judge, being questioned upon that Ground of Iniquity, that the Lybel was not pro­ven; and the Depositions of the Witnesses being produced by the Pursuer ab initio; The Lord of the Outer House may advise the Probation; Or if it ought to be advised by the whole Lords? It was Found, That the De­positions being produced (as said is) the Lord may give his own Inter­loquitor, as upon any other Write produced ab initio, to instruct the Ly­bel. Tho some of the Lords were of Opinion, that the Probation ought to be considered and advised by the haill Lords; And it was hard, that the Probation being found sufficient, by a competent Judge, it should be in the power of one single Lord to review the same, and find the contrare. Mr. John Hay Clerk.

D. 446. Murray Pupil contra [...] 31. January 1677.

A Pupil of 4. Years of Age, being pursued upon the Passive Title of a Charge to enter Heir; and the Friends conceiving that it were fit to [Page 218] Renounce: none of them being Curators, nor being willing to meddle, and to authorize the Pupil to renounce; The Lords Decerned, but super­ceeded Personal Execution, until the Pupil should be past Pupillarity. Castlehil Reporter.

D. 447. Master of Rae contra Sinclar of Dumbaith. 1. February 1677.

SInclar of Dumbaith, Sandside and others having in a Hostile manner in­vaded the Lord Raes Country: There was a Criminal pursute in­tented against them for the Crimes committed upon the occasion foresaid; but the said pursute being taken away by a Remission, there was there­after a Spuilȝie pursued at the instance of the Master of Rae, having Assig­nation from his Father; and by his Tennents whose Goods had been Rob­bed and taken: And it being Alledged against the said Pursute, that it was prescrived, The Lords sustained the Reply, that the Prescription was in­terrupted by the foresaid Process before the Justices: And again this Day a Summonds of Spuilȝie, which had been formerly intented, being produced; and it being Alledged, that by the said Summonds and Exe­cution upon the same, the Prescription was interrupted, The Lords Found, That the same did not interrupt; In regard it appeared, that the Names of the Defenders have been Blank in the saids Summonds, and since filled up with another Ink: And it appeared by the Executions, that the same were at the instance of Gray of Arbo and others mentioned in the Sum­monds, without specifying the said other Persons; and the Defenders had settled with, and satisfied Arbo; So that it appeared, that the Names of the said other persons had been filled up in the body of the Summonds, of purpose to be a Ground for the said Reply: But tho the Lords did not sustain the Process, as to the effect of giving the Pursuer Juramentum in li­tem; In regard the Goods Libelled, were Libelled to extend, as to the number of Good, and the Damnage sustained by the Pursuers Cedent, to vast Sums, exceeding the value of that whole Country; yet the Lords did adhere to their former Interloquitor, That they would consider, the time of the advising, the profits of the Goods as in a Spuilȝie.

It occurred to some of the Lords and was moved, whether Juramentum in litem, being given to the Party wronged; and upon that account, that the quantities and the Kinds of Goods, taken from him, could not be so well known to others and proven; if the same be a personal favour; Or if it may be extended to an Assigney? Newbyth Reporter.

D. 448. Holmes contra Marshall. 2. February 1677.

THE Lords Found, That a Woman, being provided by her Contract of Marriage, to a Liferent of the Conquest of Lands, or other Goods that should be acquired dureing the Marriage: And the question being of Moveables, and she having accepted a Third of the same, she could not return to crave a Liferent of the other two parts; tho it was Alledged by her, she had not accepted the same in satisfaction of what she could claim. 2. It was Found, That a Woman, being provided, as said is, to a Liferent of all the Moveables her Husband had the time he Mar­ryed [Page 219] her; and which he should acquire during the Marriage; It was in her Option, either to take her to her Liferent of the whole; or to claim the 3 d part in property; but, making Election, could not varie. Tho this was Found by plurality, yet some of the Lords were of Opinion, that by the Provision foresaid she has only a Liferent; and that she had not the said Election; Seing eo ipso that she is provided to a Liferent of all, it is in­tended and agreed, there should be no Communio bonorum; It being incon­sistent, that she should be both Proprietar and Liferentar usufructu formali, Newbyth Reporter. Gibson Clerk.

D. 449. [...] contra Tait. 6 February 1677.

THE Lords Found, That a Bond, being granted on Death-bed, with consent of his Appearand Heir for his Interest; bearing an oblige­ment to pay a Sum of Money; Is to be considered, not as a Legacy, but as a Bond inter vivos: Seing, by the Common Law, all persons are in le­gitima potestate as to the granting of Bonds; And our custom, whereby per­sons on Death-bed are not in in liege poustie, is qualified with an exception, viz. unless the Heir consent; in whose favours the same is introduced.

Castlehill Reporter.

D. 450. [...] contra [...] eod. die.

THE Lords Found, That Appearand Heirs may be pursued, as be­having before the year expire; seing eo ipso that miscent, adeunt passive: And as to that pretence, that they would be wronged if it should have appeared by the probation that they did not meddle; It is of no weight; Seing the Lords may modify Expences.

D. 451. [...] contra [...] 29. February. 1677.

AN Exhibition being pursued at the instance of an Heir of Conquest: And it being Alledged by the Heir of Line, that some of the Lands, whereof the Writes were craved to be exhibited, were in Holland; and that by the custom there, the Eldest Brother did not succeed as Heir of Conquest; but all the Brothers and Sisters equally; so that the Writes ought not to be delivered to the Pursuer, who had only an Interest as to the fifth part; whereas the Defender had four parts, having acquired three from his Brothers and Sisters, and having one himself; and he having the far greater interest in the Land and Writes, ought to have the keeping of the same, being Lyable to make them forthcoming to the Pursuer.

The Lords notwithstanding preferred the Elder Brother to the keeping of the Writes.

In that same Cause, It was Alledged, That, as to the Lands in Scotland, the Defuncts Right was only by a Comprysing, which was personal, and whereupon no Infeftment had followed; and which belonged to the Heir of Line, as Tacks and Reversions: The Lords, nevertheless, Found, that the Heir of Conquest has Right to the same, conform to a late De­cision.

D. 452. Purveyance contra Knight. 8 June 1677.

THE Lords Found, Upon the advising of a concluded Cause, after De­bate in praesentia, in the Case in question, That Liber Rationum, and a Compt-Book of a Merchant, containing an Article of Debt, due by him to the Pursuer, was a sufficient Probation: In respect the said Compt-Book was written with the Merchants own Hand; and he was known to be a person of great Honesty and Exactness: and the Article was so clear, that the time therein mentioned, he stated himself to be Debitor in the said Sum, all by gone Annualrents being payed; and in an other part and Article of the said Book, he did acknowledge, that he had borrowed the said Sum, and was special as to the time; and there was a great Confidence and near Relation betwixt him and the Creditor; and therefore the Lords decided as said is; in respect of the said Circumstances: but thought it hard, that Compt-Books in Scotland, where there is not that exactness that is else where, in keeping Books, should have that Faith that is given to them elsewhere. Mr. Robert Stewart Actor, alteri Cuningham. Mr. John Hay Clerk. In praesentia.

D. 453. Campbel contra Taite. eod. die.

THE Lybel being referred to the Defenders Oath; and he having declared upon a general Interrogator, that he was not owing the Sum acclaimed; It was urged, the time of the advising of the Oath, that the Defender should declare, whether or not he had gotten a parcel of Lint, and what way he had payed the price of the same. The Lords Found, That he should not be urged to declare upon that Interrogator; In respect it was not desired he should be interrogate upon the same when he did de­clare; and having denyed that he was any ways Debitor, he would be in­volved in Perjury, if upon a special Interrogator he should acknowledge that he was Debtor upon the account therein mentioned. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk. Stewart and Swinton Advocats.

D. 454. Patrick contra Anderson. eod. die.

AN Executor, having alledged that the Testament was Exhausted, and for probation, having produced the Defuncts Bond, with a Discharge from the Creditor after the Defuncts decease: and it being Found, That the same did not prove, unless there had been a Sentence produced: It was thereafter Alledged for the Executor, that seing he instructed the Debt, and that he had payed the same bona fide, the same ought to be allowed for his liberation; at least that the said Debt should come in pari passu with the Pursuers; unless they could object against the same, as not a true Debt; which was Repelled; in respect no Legal Diligence had been done for the said Debt.

Some of the Lords were of Opinion, that it should have been allowed to come in pari passu; In respect the Diligence, used by the Pursuer, in in­tenting a Pursute against the Executor, was only Personal, and did not affect the Goods; and the Executry being short, and the Goods being to be forthcoming to all Parties having Interest, any Creditor may compear [Page 221] for his interest, and crave to have a proportion of the same at any time before Sentence; Otherways a great Creditor, in alse much as may be equivalent to the Executrie, if he should pursue the Executor before the other Creditors, they may be all frustrate. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk.

D. 455. Blackwood contra Pinkill. 9. June 1677.

A Father having infeft his Grand-child in Fee of his Estate, and his Son Father to the Fiar, in Liferent; with a Provision, that the Liferent should be alimentary to him: The Lords, Upon a Debate among them­selves, concerning the said Qualification of the Liferent, were of the O­pinion, that the Son being provided before to some other Lands simplie, without the said Quality, the Creditors of the Son might, by their Dili­gence, affect the said alimentary Liferent; except so much of the same as the Lords should think fit to reserve for a competent Aliment to the Son: but there was not a Decision in the Case. Mr. John Hay Clerk. Con­cluded Cause.

D. 456. Captain Binnie contra Gibson. 20 June 1677.

THE Lords Found, That a Partie, being pursued as representing his predecessor; for payment of the Sum due by a Bond; might propone a Defence of Payment; notwithstanding that he had, before, pursued an Improbation of the said Bond: In respect the Bond being ancient and not granted by himself, he was in bona fide to pursue Im­probation of the same; and thereafter it appearing to be a true Bond, he may also alledge payment; giving his Oath of Calumny upon the De­fence.

D. 457. Pringle contra Pringle of Torsonce. 21. June 1677.

THE Laird of Torsonce having disponed his Estate to his Eldest Son for Love and Favour; with a Provision contained in the Dis­position, that it should be lawful to him to burden the saids Lands by Wadsets of the same; Or Annualrents forth thereof, for the Sum of 5000 Merks Redeemable by his Son: And having thereafter grant­ed a Bond to a Daughter of a second Marriage, of 1000. merks, who did pursue the Representatives of the Son, for the said Sum, It was Alledged for the Defender, That he could not be pursued Personally; but if there were any Ground of an Action, it would be only for a Declarator, that the Lands are lyable to the said Debt. 2. That there could be no Ground of Declarator, in respect the Disponer had not made use of the said Facul­ty, nor granted a Wadset for the said Sum; and that the Defunct had a personal Estate and Executry; And in swa far as, he had not, conform to the said faculty, secured the Pursuer out of the said Lands, he had de­clared his Intention, not to make use of the said faculty.

The Lords Found, That the Pursuer ought to discuss the Executry, and any other Estate belonging to the Disponer: and if the said Sum could not [Page 222] be recovered out of the personal Estate, that he might have recourse a­gainst the said Lands; which was Found by the Lords, upon these consi­derations, viz. That the Right made by the Father being for Love and Fa­vour, the said Reservation ought to be interprete benigne, and it was to be considered quid actum; the Fathers intention being to have a Power, to contract alse much Debt as might amount to the said Sum; And eo ipso that he did grant the said Bond, he did burden the said Lands virtually; and in his own time they might have been comprysed for the said Sum; and therfore may be now affected and comprysed. 2. The Fathers End being to have power to burden with the said Sum, the modus and way was insert ex stylo by the writer; that which is mentioned in the Disposition being the most ordinary, and therfore to be understood demonstrative but not taxative. 3. Tho some of the Lords were of Opinion, That the Pursuer may immediatly, as other Creditors, have recourse against the Estate; yet it seemed to be reasonable, that, in this case, the Reservation being in the Terms foresaid; and the Bond, where­upon the Security was founded, not relating to the same, the Executry should be first discust: Seing by the Common Law the Executry was ever first lyable; And tho, by the Lords Practice, Creditors may pursue ei­ther the Heir or Executor, yet there being such a speciality in this case, and the Defender not representing personally the Grandfather, as Heir, or otherways by Progress, his Representatives ought to be first discust, and the said Lands to be lyable only in subsidium. Actores Sir George Mckenȝie, Mr. Robert Stewart. Alteri Lockheart and Pringle. Gibson Clerk. In praesentia.

D. 458. Malloch contra The Relict of David Boid. 26. June 1677.

A Second Compryser having pursued a Declarator, that the prior Com­prysing was satisfied by Intromission; and the Defender having in the Compt and Reckoning given in an Article of Debursements for prosecuting and defending of Processes concerning his Right; The Lords Found, That, as to the extinguishing of the Comprysing upon the ac­count of Intromission, the Expences in deduceing the Comprysing and obtaining Infeftment were only to be allowed; but not any other extrin­sick Debursements: But the Comprysing being extinct and satisfied, if there were any superplus of Mails and Duties, for which the Compryser was to be comptable, he might retain, of the first end of the same, such as were profitably expended, not only in Relation to his own, but the Pursuers Right. Newbyth Reporter.

D. 459. [...] contra [...] eod. die.

THE Defender, in a Spulȝie, having Alledged that the Goods were his own; and that, having given them to the Pursuer to be grassed, he might have taken away his own Goods: It was Replyed, That the Pur­suer was not obliged to debate the Right and property of the said Goods; but in spolio, he needed Lybel no more, but that the Goods were upon his Ground and in his Possession; and taken away vi and in manner Lybel­ed: And spoliatus ante omnia restituendus.

[Page 223]The Lords debated among themselves, whether the Defence be Rele­vant; and did not decide the case: Some being of Opinion, that if it should evidently appear, that the Pursuer was not in Possession of the Goods as suos, but in behalf of the Defender; as if there were a Writt betwixt the Pursuer and Defender, bearing that the Goods were the De­fenders; and that the Pursuer contractu Locationis & Conductionis had tak­en the same in graseing; that the Defender could not be Lyable for Spuil­ȝie of his own Goods: But if it should appear, that there was any vio­lence in taking them away, he may be pursued for a Riot.

D. 460. Drumkilbo contra Mcmath and Oliphant. eod. die.

JAnet Mcmath Lady Grange being Creditrix to the Laird of Kilspindie; And having, upon an Arrestment in the hands of Drumkilbo, obtained a Decreet to make forthcoming; There was thereafter a Suspension of double poinding against the said Janet Mcmath, and Sir Laurence Oliphant of Gask, who pretended Right to the Sum due by Drum­kilbo, by an Assignation intimate before the Arrestment: And in the Competition foresaid, the said Sir Laurence was preferred. But there­after in an Improbation of the said Assignation, at the instance of the said Janet Mcmath, the said Sir Laurence having abiden by the same, It was Found, after a long and litigious dependence by the space of 50 Years, that the Assignation was false: And William Dick of Grange, the said Janet her Son, having thereafter intented a pursute against the said Sir Laurence, to hear and see it declared, that in respect the said Sir Laurence, by his com­pearance, and making use of the said false Assignation, had been prefer­ed; and had rendered the foresaid Diligence by Arrestment ineffectual; and had transacted and made benefite of the said false Assignation; That therefore, In swa far as he was Lucratus he should make the same forth­coming for payment of the Pursuers just Debt; Especially it being consi­dered, that he had Discharged one of the Cautioners in Drumkilbo his Bond: It was Answered, That he was in bona fide to acquire a Right to the said Assignation, neither knowing, nor being accessory to the Forgeing of the same; and he had made no benefite by uplifting from Drumkilbo any part of the said Debt; but by transferring his Right in favours of Mr. John Blair; which he had done bona fide: And as to the Discharging the Cautioner, it could not prejudge the Pursuer, seing the Discharge would fall in con­sequence of the Assignation.

The Lords Found, That, albeit he were not accessory to the Forgery, yet having used a false Write, and having litigiously so long maintained the same; and upon that occasion, the Pursuer be ng altogether frustrate; he ought to be Lyable in quantum lucratus, and what he had gotten more by the Transaction with Mr. George Blair then he had given for acquire­ing the said Right: And the Lords reserved Action to the Pursuer against the Cautioner: And in case the Cautioner should be Assoilȝied, without prejudice to have recourse against the said Sir Laurence as Ac­cords. Actores Lockheart, Monnypenny &c. alteri Cuninghame &c. Mr. Thomas Hay Clerk. In praesentia.

D. 461. [...] contra The Laird of Cramond. eod. die.

MR. Cornelius Inglis being Debitor to Mr. John Inglis of Cramond in the Sum of 3500. Merks; He did give to Cramond, for Security of the said Sum, and for relief of Cautionries for him, extending to towards 10000 M. a Bond for payment and relieving him of the said Sums; with an obligement to Infeft in the Lands thereinmentioned, for his Security and relief of the said Sums; and a precept of Sasine whereupon Infeftment fol­lowed: And thereafter, Mr. Patrick Inglis, the said Mr. Cornelius his Eldest Son, did grant a Bond to Cramond, relateing expresly to the said former Bond and Right of Relief, and in Corroboration thereof, and the Infeftment thereupon, containing an Obligement for Payment and releif of the said Sums.

Thereafter the said Mr. Patrick did obtain, from his Father, a Right and Infeftment of the said Lands, upon that narrative, that he had undertaken the payment of his Fathers Debts; and that he was engaged for him; and that the said Right was granted to him for his Relief; whereupon he ob­tained Possession; and, before any Diligence, at the instance of any of the other Creditors, he did pay some Annualrent to Cramond upon a Dis­charge, relateing to Cramonds Right and Infeftment foresaid.

Thereafter there being a Multiple poinding raised against Cramond, and some of the Creditors, who had deduced a Comprysing against the said Mr. Patrick of his Right; the Creditors Alledged, that they ought to be preferred, because Cramonds Right was only base, and the said Mr. Patrick's Right was cled with Possession, before any pretence of Possessi­on in the person of Cramond; and that they having Comprysed Mr. Pa­trick's Right are thereupon preferable to Cramond; Whereunto it was Answered, That Cramonds Right, being a Right of Relief, could not take Possession ex natura of the Right, until a distress; and because it was pro­vided by the Right it self, that Cramond should enter to the Possession in case of distress; and in case he should not be payed of his Annualrent; which he could not do before Declarator: And that the Lords had diverse times Found, that Infeftments of Warrandice, whereupon there could be no Possession before Eviction, should be preferred to posterior Infeft­ments; and that Infeftments of Annualrent, being anterior, should be su­stained in a Competition with posterior base Infeftments cled with Pos­session; Because the first Term of Payment of the Annualrent was not come, when the posterior Infeftment came to have Possession; and that the Com­petition was not betwixt Cramonds and the Comprysers Infeftment upon the Comprysing, but Mr. Patrick's own Infeftment; and that Cramonds In­feftment was cled with Possession before the Compysers Right and Interest, by payment of the Annualrent of the said Sum due to Cramond himself; as appeared by the Discharge accepted by Mr. Patrick relating to Cra­mond his Right and Infeftment foresaid: And that base Infeftments by the Common Law being valide; And by the Act of Parliament K. Ja. 5th. in anno 1540. It being provided, that for obviating Fraud by granting [Page 225] private and latent Infeftments, in prejudice of posterior Infeftments that are publick, being either holden of the Superior or by Possession; the said Act of Parliament cannot be extended to this Case; In Respect Cramonds Right cannot be said to have been fraudulent and private as to Mr. Patrick; In respect he did not only know the same, but did ra­tify and corroborate the said Right as said is, both before his own Right and after the same; and before the interest of Creditors, he did in effect ratify and homologate the same, by making payment conform thereto, as said is.

The Lords, In Respect the case was of moment, as to the Preparative, Ordained that it should be Debated amongst themselves: And upon the Debate, they decided these points. 1. That, the said Act of Parliament K. Ja. 5th. being general, and there being no Exceptions of Infeftments of Relief, the said Act is comprehensive of the same. 2. Tho the Act of Parliament, anent Registration of Seasings, does secure Singular Successors, yet the said Act of Parliament K. Ja. 5th. is not taken away, tho in in some cases, the Lords are apt to favour prior Infeftments, where there is no presumption of Fraud: And therefore, when there is any pretence of Possession, as in the case of Infeftments of Warrandice, they Found that fictione Juris the Possession of the principal Lands is the possession of the Warrandice. 3. That albeit Mr. Patrick could not question Cra­monds Right for the Reason foresaid, yet the Comprysers, being Singular Successors, may question the same.

The Lords therefore preferred the Creditors: And yet sustained Cra­monds Infeftment, In swa far as concerns the Sum foresaid due to him­self, and not as to Cautionries; In respect the said Discharge was only of the Annualrent of the Sum due to himself.

This Decision appears to be hard, upon these Considerations: First, Be­cause Cramonds Infeftment, tho base, as to the point of Right, by the Com­mon Law is preferable: And as to the said Statute, it introduces only a praesumptio Juris, that base Infeftments, not cled with Possession, are pre­sumptively fraudulent: And the Question, whether Cramonds Infeftment was fraudulent, was to be considered in relation to Mr. Patrick and his Infeftment, and not to his Successors: And the said presumption was taken away by Mr. Patrick his Deed foresaid, having corroborate, as said is, Cramonds Infeftment; which was verified by a Write Subscribed by Wit­nesses, and which was was Found to militate, even against the Creditors, and to cloath Cramonds Infeftment with Possession. 2. Cramonds Right be­ing Jus individuum, tho upon distinct Grounds, it could not be fraudu­lent and private ex parte, and ex parte publick. Actores Sir John Cunin­ghame, &c. alteri Lockheart. In praesentia.

D. 462. Mr. John Kincaid contra Gordon of Abergeldie. eod. die.

MR. John Kincaid having pursued Gordon of Abergeldie, as repre­senting his Father, by Behaving: His Defence was, That he had Right by an expired Comprysing, whereby his Father was denuded, [Page 226] so that he could not be Heir to him. But in the same Process, in respect a Reduction and Declarator was intented at the said Mr. Kincaid's in­stance, within ten Years after the appearand Heir had purchased a Right to the said Comprysing; The Lords, tho there were no Order used, did simul & semel sustain the said Processes: and appointed Compt and Reckon­ing, and Auditors.

FINIS.

ERRATA in the Decisions.

PAge 4. lin. 15. read rata. p. 9. l. p [...]nult. Pursuer 1 Person. p. 15. l. 29. Laird of r. Lord. p. 17. l. 17. after him add but. ibid. l 26. after of add [...]. p 33 l 7. after Goods, add The Reason was found relevant. p. 35. l 21. r. con­clude. p. 37. l. 5. have 1. give. p. 50 l. 9. after we add no. p. 51. l. 38. most r. more. p. 54. l. 9. after anterior add to the Sones Right. p. 58. l. 35. after Right add till. p. 65. l. 11. purchase 1. possession p. 73. l. ult. yet 1. so. p. 74. l. 37. after to add an. p. 75 l. 35. D ctor 1. Granter. p. 84. l. 22 after confirmable, add Quots of Testaments confirmed be­fore the Act restoring Quots to the Bishops. p. 85. l. 18. due r. done. p. [...]9. l. 18. after by. add Writt or. p. 105. l. 11. Donator r. Executor. p. 108. l. 27. [...]eu-duties r. Augmentations. p. 111. l. 43. after Creditor add confirmed before the Act of Sederunt. p. 17 [...]. l. antep. after flagitanti add [...]ecula [...]e non potuit.

INDEX OF THE Pursuers and Defenders NAMES Mentioned in the foregoing Decisions.

A.
  • ABercrombie contra Page 19.
  • Abercrombie contra Atcheson and Livington. Page 162.
  • Aberdeen Colledge contra the Town thereof. Page 130, 133.
  • Aberdeen Colledge contra Page 157.
  • Abernethie contra Forbes, Page 159.
  • Act of Sederunt anent proponing Alledgances. Page 74.
  • Act of Sederunt anent liberation of Prisoners. Page 114.
  • Act of Sederunt anent Advocations. Page 126.
  • Advocats their [...]int Petition. Page 106.
  • Aetskine contra Rynolds. Page 164.
  • Allan contra Campbel. Page 28.
  • Anderson contra Tarbet. Page 56.
  • Anderson contra Low [...]s. Page 149, 160.
  • Antrobus contra Anderson. Page 32.
  • Ardblair contra Wilson. Page 214.
  • Argyle (Earl) contra L Mcdonald. Page 197.
  • Argyle contra Menaughtan Page 203, 213.
  • Armstoun (Lord) contra Murray. Page 153.
  • Auchinleck contra E Menteath. Page 127.
  • Auchintoul contra Innes. Page 88
B.
  • BAillie contra Somervel. Page 210.
  • Bairdner contra Collier. Page 142.
  • Balmedie contra Baillies of Abernethie. Page 54.
  • Balmerinoch contra Tennents of Northbervick. Page 90.
  • Banchries Parochiners contra their Minister. Page 124.
  • Barclay contra Arbuthnet. Page 151.
  • Bavilay contra Dalmahoy. Page 210.
  • Bayne contra Carvie. Page 71.
  • Bernie contra Page 57.
  • Bernie contra Montgomerie. Page 137.
  • Binnie contra Binnie. Page 56.
  • Binnie contra S [...]ot. Page 115.
  • Binnie contra Brotherstones. Page 124.
  • Binnie contra Gibson. P. 221.
  • Binnie contra Farquhar. P. 19.
  • Bishop of Edinburgh his Executors contra the present Bishop. P. 83.
  • Bishop of Dumblain contra Kinloch. P. 185.
  • Bislet contra Broun. P. 10.
  • Blackwood contra Pinkill. P. 221.
  • Blair contra Blair. P. 67.
  • Blair contra Kinloch. P. 151.
  • Blair contra Fouler. P. 182.
  • Blantyre contra Walkingshaw. P. 6.
  • contra Blantyre. P. 14.
  • Bogie contra Executors of the Lady Oxford. P. 73.
  • Boid contra Storie. P. 76.
  • Bonars Relict contra his Representatives. P. 141.
  • Borthwick (Lord) contra Ker. P. 15.
  • Borthwick (Doctor) contra E. Craufurd. P. 161.
  • Bowie contra Hamilton. P. 18.
  • Broun contra Veatch and Scot. P. 7.
  • Broun contra Ogilvie. P. 116.
  • Bruce contra Bruce. P. 132.
  • Bryand contra Grhame. P. 6.
  • Bu [...]hanan contra Logie. P. 181.
  • Burd contra Reid. P. 118.
  • Burgie (Lady) contra Strachan. P. 39.
  • Burnet contra Leyes. P. 3.
  • Burnet contra Johnston. P. 9.
  • Burnet contra Lutgrue. P. 115.
  • Burnet contra McCleilan. P. 117.
  • Burnet contra Swan. P. 166.
  • Burnet contra Gib. P. 169.
  • Bute (Lady) contra Sheriff thereof. P. 7.
C.
  • CAmphel contra Tait, P. 220.
  • Carfrae contra Tailȝiefer, P. 104.
  • Carnegie contra Durham, P. 200.
  • Carse contra Carse, P. 17.
  • Cassils contra Whiteford, P. 24.
  • Chalmers contra Ferquharson and Gordon, P. 105.
  • Cheap contra Philp, P. 34.
  • [Page]Cheyne contra Chrystie, P. 19.
  • Cheislie contra Edgar, P. 181.
  • Clerk contra Stewart, P. 139
  • Colarnic (Lady) contra Tennents, P. 112.
  • Collector of the Taxations contra the Parson of Auldhamstocks, P. 49.
  • Colvil contra Feuars of Culross, P. 28.
  • Commissars of Edinburgh contra the Commissars of Briechen, P. 64.
  • Commissar of St. Andrews contra Watson, P. 209.
  • Craig contra Edgar, P. 85.
  • contra Laird of Cramond, P. 224.
  • Cranston contra Wilkieson, P. 9.
  • Cranston contra Ker, P. 113.
  • Cranston contra Broun, P. 86,
  • Craufurd contra Town of Edinburgh, P. 16.
  • Craufurd contra Gordon, P. 183.
  • Crie contra Findlater, P. 37.
  • Cruickshanks contra Watt, P. 122.
  • Cuming contra Johnston, P. 16.
  • Cuningham contra Lees, P. 75.
  • Cuningham contra Maxuel, P. 152.
  • Cuningham contra Halyburton, P. 212.
D.
  • DAlling contra Mckenȝie, P. 153.
  • Dalrymple contra P. 31.
  • Dalȝiel contra P. 47.
  • Davidson contra Town of Innerness, P. 32.
  • Davidson contra Richardson, P. 49.
  • Davidson contra Wauchop, P. 188.
  • Dick contra Dick, P. 202.
  • Dick contra Oliphant, P. 215.
  • Dickison contra Sandilands, P. 5.
  • Donaldson contra Rinnie, P. 217.
  • Douglas contra L. Wamphray, P. 258.
  • Douglas contra Jackson and Grahame, P. 121.
  • Douglass contra Carlyle, &c. P. 132.
  • Drumelȝier contra E. Tweeddale, P. 191, 215.
  • Drumkilbo contra Mcmath and Oliphant, P. 223.
  • Drummond contra Menȝies, P. 92.
  • Drummond Rickarton contra P. 157.
  • Dumfermling E. contra E. Callender, P. 161, 178.
  • Dundass contra Turnbul, and other Creditors of Whitehead of Park, P. 163.
  • Dundee Town contra E. Findlater, P. 59.
  • Dundonald E. contra Glenagies and the E. Marr, P. 141.
  • Dunmure contra Lutfutt, P. 138.
  • Dunse Presbytrie contra P. 122.
  • Durham contra Durham. P. 195.
E.
  • EDinburgh Town contra E. Loudoun, P. 101.
  • Edmondstoun contra Preston, P. 103.
  • Elies contra Keith and Wiseheart, P. 4, 38
  • Elies contra Wiseheart, P. 10.
  • Elies contra Hall and others. P. 148.
F.
  • FAlconer contra E. Kinghorn, P. 6.
  • Ferguson contra More, P. 4.
  • Ferguson contra P. 69.
  • Findlay contra Little, P. 184.
  • Fyffe contra Daw, P. 39.
  • Forbes contra Blair, P. 33.
  • Forbes contra Innes, P. 52.
  • Forbes contra Ross, &c. P. 148.
  • Fordel contra Caribber, P. 211, 213.
  • Fountain contra Maxuel, P. 48.
  • Fraler contra Hog, P. 173.
  • Fullerton contra Laird of Boyne. P. 116.
G.
  • GAlbraith contra Lesly, P. 175.
  • Gardner contra Colvil, P. 44.
  • Gibson contra Fiffe, P. 160.
  • Gibson contra Reynold & Tailȝeor. P. 145.
  • Gilchrist contra Murray. P. 136.
  • Gilespie contra Auchinleck P. 50.
  • Glasgow (Town) contra P. 58.
  • Glasgow (Town) contra Greenock. P. 193.
  • Galsgow (Colledge) contra Parochiners of Jedburgh. P. 195.
  • Glasgow (procurator Fiscal) contra Cowan. P. 216
  • Glencairn (Earl) contra Brisbaines. P. 204. 213.
  • Glencorse (Laird) contra his Brethren and Sisters. P. 53.
  • Glendoning contra E. Nithsdale. P. 102.
  • Gordon contra Pitsligo. P. 82.
  • Gordon and Ludquharne contra P. 93. & seq.
  • Govan contra Paip. P. 21.
  • Grahame contra Rome. P. 214.
  • Grants and Row contra Viscount of Stormount. P. 4.
  • Grant contra Grant P. 126.
  • Grant contra Barclay. P. 158.
  • Grant contra Lord Bamff. P. 198.
  • Gray contra Gordon. P. 16.
  • Gray contra Forbes and Lindsay. P. 68.
  • Gray contra Cockburn. P. 129.
  • Grierson contra Laird of Lag. P. 192.
  • Grott contra Sutherland. P. 68.
H.
  • HAll contra Murray: P. 138.
  • Halcartoun (Lord) contra Robison. P. 144.
  • Halyburton contra Halyburton. P. 16.
  • Halyburton contra Scott. P. 63.
  • Halyburton of Innerleiths Petition. P. 145.
  • Hamilton contra Broun. P. 27.
  • Hamilton contra Smith P. 37.
  • Hamilton contra Symenton. P. 38.
  • Hamilton contra Lord Beilhaven. P. 49.
  • Hamilton contra Earl of Kinghorne. P. 81.
  • Hamilton contra Maxuel. P. 133.
  • Harper contra Hamilton P. 13.
  • Harroway contra Haitly. P. 31.
  • Hartshaw contra Hartwoodburn. P. 27.
  • Hattoun (Lord) contra Baterson. P. 66.
  • Hay contra Litlejohn. P. 28.
  • Hay contra Magistrates of Elgine P. 17.
  • Hay contra Oliphant. P. 36.
  • Hay contra Drummond. P. 47.
  • Hay contra Jamison and Alexander. P. 108.
  • Hay contra Gray. P. 125.
  • Hay contra Alexander. P. 162.
  • Heckford contra Ker. P. 129.
  • Hedderwick contra Wauch. P. 10.
  • Hempsfield contra Bannatyne. P. 98.
  • Henderson contra Henderson. P. 68.
  • Henderson contra P. 40.
  • Hermistoun contra Lord Sinclar. P. 39.
  • Hermistoun contra Cockburn. P. 69.
  • contra Hepburne. P. 74.
  • Hilton contra Lady Cheynes P. 165.
  • [Page]Hog contra Countess of Home. P. 49.
  • Holmes contra Marshell. P. 218.
  • Home contra Creditors of Kello P. 26.
  • Home contra Countess of Murray. P. 35.
  • Homes contra Paterson. P. 50.
  • Home contra Fewars of Coldinghame. P. 52.
  • Home contra Tailzifer. P. 58.
  • Home and Elphingston contra Murray. P. 89.
  • Home contra Scot. P. 192.
  • Home contra Steuart. P. 214.
I.
  • JAffray contra Murray. P. 185.
  • Jaffray contra Laird Wamphray. P. 211.
  • Inglis contra Boswell. P. 187.
  • Inglis contra Inglis. P. 195.
  • Inglis contra Laurie. P. 211.
  • and Laird Innes contra. P. 57.
  • Innerness (Town) contra Forbes &c. P. 77.
  • Innes contra Innes. P. 99.
  • Johnstoun contra Cuninghame. P. 35.
  • Johnstoun contra Erskine. P. 62.
  • Johnstoun contra Cullen. P. 165.
  • Johnstoun contra Orchartoun. P. Ibid.
  • Johnstoun contra Rome. P. 184.
  • Johnstoun of Wamphry Supplicant. P. 153.
  • Irving contra Carruthers. P. 117.
  • Irving contra Forbes. P. 169.
  • Irving contra Irving. P. 175.
  • Justice contra Stirling. P. 58.
  • Justice Clerk contra Lamberton. P. 46.
K.
  • KEith contra Lundie. P. 39.
  • Keith contra Grahame. P. 60.
  • Kelhead contra Irving and Borthwick. P. 92.
  • Kennedy contra Hamilton. P. 19.
  • Ker contra Ker. P. 39. 61. 191. 216.
  • Ker contra Ruthven. P. 71.
  • Ker contra Hunter. P. 200.
  • Ker contra Fleyming. P. 35.
  • Key contra Creditors P. 142.
  • Kilburny contra Cuningham. P. 70.
  • Kincaid contra Gordon. P. 225.
  • Kinghorn (Earl) contra Laird Udney: P. 53.
  • Kings Majesties Letters to the Lords of Session. P. 71.
  • Kinloch contra Rait. P. 91.
  • Kinnier contra P. 122.
  • Kyle contra Gray. P. 126.
L:
  • LAmingtoun ontra Raploch. P. 177
  • Langlands Supplicant. P. 137.
  • Lauderdale (Earl) contra Vassals of Musselburgh. P. 48.
  • Lauderdale (Earl) contra Lady and Lord Yester. P. 134.
  • Lepar contra Burnet. P. 5.
  • Lesly contra Bayne. P. 21.
  • Lesly contra Lesly. P. 25.
  • Lesly contra Fletcher. P. 181.
  • Letter from the Lords of Session to the King. P. 102.
  • Linlithgowes Freeholders contra their Commissio­ners to Parliament. P. 76.
  • Litlejohn contra Mitchel. P. 198.
  • Livingston contra Garner. P. 137.
  • Lugtoun (Lady) contra Hepburne and Creichtoun. P. 67.
  • Lumsden contra Summers. P. 30.
  • Luss (Laird) contra Earl of Nithsdale. P. 100.
  • Lyon King at Arms contra P. 13.
M.
  • Mackbrae contra Mclaine. P. [...]7.
  • Mcintoish contra Frazer. P. 100.
  • Mcintoish contra Mckenȝie. P. 110.
  • Mckenȝie contra Fairholm. P. 11. 14. & 23.
  • Mck [...]ttrick contra P. 56.
  • Mcleod contra Young. P. 5 [...]
  • Mcmillan contra Meldrums. P. 128.
  • Mcne [...]sh contra Bryce and her Husband. P. 155.
  • Mcquaill contra Mcmillan. P. 15 [...].
  • Malloch contra the Relick of David Boid. P. 222.
  • Marshell contra Forrest and his Spouse. P. 160.
  • Marshel contra Holmes. P. 195.
  • contra Martine. P. 118.
  • Mastertouns Creditors and Relict. P. 154.
  • Maxuel contra Tennents of Duncow. P. 64.
  • Maxuel contra Maxuel. P. 105.
  • contra Maxuel. P. 100.
  • Meldrum contra Tolquhone. P. 104.
  • Menȝies contra Burnet. P. 14. 28.
  • contra Miln. P. 21.
  • Miltoun (Lady) contra Whiteford. P. 64.
  • Minister Moram contra Bairfoot. P. 11.
  • Mitchel contra Mitchel. P. 30.
  • Mitchel contra Litlejohn P. 174.
  • Mitchelson contra Mitchelson, P. 204.
  • Monmouth (Duke) and Dutchess contra Scot. P. 40.
  • Monmouth (Duke) contra Earl of Tweeddale. P. 117.
  • Monteith contra E. Callender and Gloret. P. 22.
  • Mr. Henry Morison, P. 141.
  • Moubray contra Arbuthnet, P. 90.
  • Mouswel La. contra the Creditors on the Estate, P. 152.
  • Mouswel its Creditors contra the Lady and her Children, P. 205.
  • Mure contra Law, P. 73.
  • contra Murehead and Scot, P. 60.
  • Murray contra Tutor of Stormont, P. 71.
  • Murray contra P. 217.
N.
  • NAirn contra Scrymgeor, P. 170.
  • Nairn contra Stewart, P. 215.
  • Neilson contra Arthur, P. 67.
  • Neilson contra P. 170.
  • Nevoy contra L. Balmerinoch, P. 196.
  • Newburgh (Earl) contta Stewart, P. 15.
  • Nicolson contra Laird of Philorth, P. 50.
  • Nisbet contra Hamilton, P. 157.
O.
  • OGilvie contra Buckie, P. 164.
  • Oliphant contra Drummond, P. 7.
  • Oliphant contra P. 112, 143.
  • Oxford Viscount contra Cockburn. P. 210.
P.
  • PAllat contra Veatch, P. 201.
  • Paplay contra Magistrats of Edinburgh, P. 61.
  • Park contra Rysly, P. 158.
  • Parkman contra Allan P. 55, 61.
  • Paterson contra Johnston, P. 187.
  • Paterson contra M cKenȝie, P. 189.
  • [Page]Paton contra Stirling of Ardoch, P. 63, 75, 82.
  • Patrick contra Anderson, P. 220.
  • Perths Sheriff contra P. 153.
  • Petrie contra Richart, P. 12.
  • Pilton contra Creditors of the Lord Sinclar, P. 87.
  • Pitmedden contra Seatons, P. 96.
  • Pitrichie (Lord) contra Laird Geight, P. 181.
  • Pittarro contra E. Northesk, P. 97.
  • Pittarro contra Tennents of Redmyre, P. 166.
  • Pollock contra Pollock, P. 45, 57.
  • Pringle contra Cranston, P. 4.
  • Pringle contra Pringle, P. 221.
  • Purves contra Blackwood, P. 20.
  • Purveyance contra Knight. P. 220,
R.
  • RAe (Master) contra Dumbyth. P. 156. 218.
  • Ramsay contra Carstairs. P. 69.
  • Ramsay contra Zeaman. P. 168.
  • Rankin contra Skelmorly. P. 47.
  • Rattraw contra P. 125.
  • Reid contra Tailzifer. P. 20
  • Reid contra Lady Lundy. P. 65
  • Reynolds contra Erskines. P. 182
  • Rig contra Rig. P. 166.
  • Rioch contra P. 49.
  • Rutherford contra Weddel. P. 193.
S.
  • SAndilands contra Earl of Hadington. P. 69.
  • Scott contra Murray. P. 127
  • Scott contra Kennedy. P. 155
  • Scott contra Toish P. 191
  • contra Scot P. 60
  • Scrimgeor contra Kingheny P. 111
  • Shaw contra P. 26. 58
  • contra Sheill P. 176
  • Sheill contra Parochiners. P. 190
  • Simpson contra Adamson P. 59
  • Sinclar (Hugh's) Creditors contra Annandale. P. 71
  • Sinclair contra Home P. 215
  • Spence contra Scot P. 184
  • Spencerfield (Lady) contra Hamilton P. 75
  • Steill contra Hay P. 9
  • Stenhouse (Laird) contra Heretors of Tweed­moor P. 168
  • Stewart contra Mcduff P. 89
  • Stewart contra Riddoch P. 138. 212
  • Stewart contra Hay P. 186
  • Stewart contra Whiteford. P. 207
  • Strachan contra Morison P. 57
T.
  • TAcksmen of the Customs contra Greenhead P. 45
  • Tailfer contra Sandilands P. 214
  • Tait contra Walker P. 201
  • contra Tait P. 219
  • Tarsappies Creditors contra Kilfaunes P. 70
  • Tennent, Young &c. contra Sandy P. 200
  • Thoirs contra Tolquhone P. 85. 96
  • Thomson contra Mckittrick P. 10
  • Thomson contra Stevenson P. 26. 30
  • Thomson and Halyburton contra Ogilvy and Watson P. 128
  • Thomson contra Eleis P. 155
  • Torwoodhead (Lady contra Tennents P. 121
  • Traquair (Lady) contra Earl of Wintoun P. 60
  • Trotters contra Lundy P. 44
  • Trotter contra Trotter P. 56
  • Tulliallans Minister contra Colvil and Kincardine P. 108
  • Tutor to the Laird of Aitons Daughter Supplicant P. 135
U.
  • URquhart contra Frazer P. 23
  • Urquhart contra Cheyne P. 24
V.
  • VA [...]se contra Sandilands, P. 147, 151.
  • Vanse his Petition, P. 146.
  • Veatch contra Duncan, P. 3.
  • Veatch contra Creditors of Ker and Pal­lat, P. 118, 123, 145, 201.
  • Veatch contra Hamilton, P. 154.
W.
  • WAllace contra Symson, P. 179.
  • Wallace contra Murray, P. 198.
  • Wamphray Laird, Supplicant P. 153.
  • Warden contra Berrie, P. 147.
  • Watt contra Halyburton, P. 34.
  • Watson of Dunykier contra his Vassals, P. 36.
  • Watson contra Law. P. 37.
  • Wauch contra Jamison, P. 163.
  • Weavers of Edinburgh contra Magistrats thereof P. 29.
  • Wedderburn contra Scrymgeor P. 9, 14.
  • Weir contra E. Bramford. P. 189.
  • Weymes contra Bruce, P. 131.
  • Whitehead contra Straiton, P. 43.
  • Wilkie contra P. 13.
  • Wilson contra Magistrates of Queensferry, P. 51.
  • Wilson contra Deans, P. 155.
Y.
  • YOung contra Young. P. 29.
Z.
  • ZInzian contra Kinloch P. 30

An Alphabetical INDEX FOR Finding the Principal Matters handled in my Lord DIRLETON 'S Collection of Decisions. Where it was thought fit, for better Orders sake, to prefix to them Numerical Figures, and the Letter d. Whi [...]h there and in the following INDEX denotes either Decision or Dispute.

A.
  • ABBEY should not protect against Captions. decision 127.
  • ABIDING by a Writt. d. 142. see d. 168. d. 262. d. 265. d. 286. d. 386. d. 403.
  • Abideing by a Bond, as truely assigned and delivered by the Cedent. d. 11.
  • Abideing by, in Improbations. d. 291.
  • ABSOLUTE Warrandice of Kirk­lands, extended to warrand from the designation of a Gleib; Tho it was Al­ledged, That ex natura rei, and not ex de­fectu Juris the Gleib was evicted; but not to extend to a Supervenient Law. d. 93.
  • ACTIO TƲTELAE. d. 314.
  • ACT before Answer. d. 183.
  • ADJUDICATION. d. 270. d. 305. d. 324. see. d. 45. d. 107.
  • Adjudication of the Earl of Bramfords E­state. d. 387.
  • ADVISEING of the Cause. see d. 73
  • If an ADVOCATE, upon a Bill sum­marly given in against him, be obliged to deliver up. v. g. Goods entrusted to him; or if he be only obliged to Answer summarly in Complaints against him, in Relation to his Office and Trust? d. 290.
  • Advocates, who had withdrawn, their Petition for Readmission. d. 226.
  • ADVOCATION. d. 261. d. 228. d. 294. d. 396.
  • Advocation of an Edict of Executry. d. 433.
  • Advocation upon a Competition of double Rights. d. 279.
  • All Advocations, before they be pass'd, to be Reported to the whole Lords. d. 260.
  • ALIENATIONS in prejudice of Creditors. d. 287.
  • ALIMENT. d. 165. d. 177. d. 414. d. 455.
  • Aliment and Fee. d. 350.
  • Aliment craved in the interim, untill a Pro­vision falls payable. d. 2.
  • ANN. see d. 194. d. 379.
  • ANNUALRENT. d. 408. see d. 45. d. 146. d. 154. d. 266. d. 407.
  • An Annualrenter Comprysing for the prin­cipal Sum, may pass from his Compry­sing, and recur to his Infef [...]ment of An­nualrent. d. 83.
  • ANNUITY. see d. 241.
  • Annuity payable out of the first and readi­est Rents, found to be entirely due, tho the Rents were exhausted with Debts. d. 99.
  • Annuity to a Wife out of Lands, lyable to Publick Burdens, d. 143.
  • APPEARAND HEIR. d. 119. see d. 63. d. 95. d. 270. d. 450.
  • Appearand Heir to a Baron, cannot have a Moveable Heirship, not being actu­ally Baro. d. 209.
  • ARBITRIƲM JƲDICIS not al­lowed [Page] to alter a punishment determined by Law. d. 20.
  • ARRESTMENT. see d. 201. d. 300.
  • Arrestment being on a Decreet, turned thereafter into a Lybel, may be loused. d. 284.
  • Arrestment cannot be loused upon pre­tence, that it was laid on after the De­creet was Suspended. d. 263.
  • First Arrestment, tho last Decreet of forth­coming (being sine mora) found prefe­rable. d. 110.
  • Arrestment upon a Dependence. d. 237.
  • ARTICƲLATƲS LIBELLƲS. see d. 314.
  • ASSIGNATION. see d. 123.
  • Assignation, after Summonds Execute, not sustained as a Title, albeit the Cedent concurred. d. 46.
  • Assignation Blank in the Creditors Name. d. 54.
  • Assignation by a Wife to her Husband by her Contract of Marriage. d. 195.
  • Assignation not intimate in the Cedents Lifetime. d. 51.
  • An Assignation to Maills an Duties in all time comeing, obliges the Cedent and his Heirs, to grant a Disposition, where­upon the Assigney may be Infeft. d. 89.
  • ASTRICTION. d. 293. d. 351. see d. 173.
  • ATTESTER of a Cautioner acquite, proving that the Cautioner was then Re­pute Responsal as to that Debt. d. 121
  • AVAIL of Marriage. see d. 415.
B.
  • BACKBONDS. d. 211. see d. 162.
  • Backbond to the Exchequer. see d. 198.
  • Backbonds by Comprysers.. d. 374.
  • BACKTACK. see d. 57.
  • BAILIF. see d. 131,
  • BANKRUPTS. d. 94. see d. 198. d. 249. d. 282. d. 287. d. 292.
  • BANNA. see d. 13.
  • BARON. d. 209.
  • BASE Infeftments. d. 461.
  • A Base Infeftment sustained to a Wife as publick, others being in possession by Re­deemable Rights from the Husband, tho he was not in possession himself. d. 100.
  • BEHAVING as Heir. d, 400. d. 450. d. 462.
  • BENEFICE. see d. 115.
  • BIDEING be. see Abideing be a Writ. Litera A.
  • BILLS of Exchange. d. 231. d. 365. see d. 236.
  • BISHOPS. see d. 194. d. 375.
  • BLANK Writs. d. 334. d. 403. see d. 54. d. 139.
  • BONAE fidei possessor. d. 123.
  • BOND blank in the Creditors Name. d. 139.
  • A BOND being granted by a Wife and her Husband with a Clause to Infeft; tho null as to the Obligement to pay the Sum yet valide as to the Right of her Lands. d. 6. d. 25.
  • A Bond granted by a Father to a Daughter is revockable, if it be not compleated by delivery, or by Infeftment, if it be Her­etable: Or by Assignation intimated, or confirmed Testament, if it be Move­able. d. 106.
  • Bond of provision. d. 140. see d. 384.
  • A Bond to a Husband and his Wife, and the longest liver, and the Heirs betwixt them, and to the Heirs of the longest Li­ver, Found to make the Husband Fiar. d. 144.
  • A Bond reduced, being Subscribed by one Notar in a matter of Importance. d. 135
  • A Bond whereof the Term of payment was long after the Date, and Annualrent to be payed in the interim, Found Heretable quoad fiscum. d. 39.
  • Bonds granted on Death bed. d. 402. d. 449.
  • Bonds of provision undelivered, tho prior in date but posterior in delivery, cannot affect the Fee interveening. d. 129.
  • BONORƲM. d. 282.
  • BOOKING of Seasins. see d. 384.
  • BOX of Journeymen. see d. 70.
  • BURGAL Lands. see d. 22, d. 190.
  • A Burges that is not Incola. see d. 430.
  • BURGHS of Barony. see d. 395.
  • BURGHS Royal. see d. 78. d. 124. d. 190.
  • [Page]If Burghs Royal cannot fine Unfreemen for Tradeing, but only Charge them to de­sist. d. 79,
C.
  • CAPER. see d. 247.
  • CAPTIONS. see d. 127.
  • CAƲSA data & non secuta. d, 308.
  • CAUTIONER. see d. 26. d. 31. d. 50. d. 55. d. 121. d. 122. d. 147. d. 213.
  • If Cautioners may take Assignation, and burden the Cocautioners with the whole Debt? d. 212. d. 228.
  • If Cautioners will be liberate, when Magi­straters are Lyable loco Rei ex delicto? d. 91.
  • CERTIFICATION in Improbations d. 210. d. 230.
  • Certification in an Improbation, of an Old Comprysing, not sustained. d. 50.
  • Certification pro confesso. see d. 243.
  • Certification in an Improbation being Ex­tracted, production of the Writt imme­diatly thereafter will not Repone against the same. d. 80.
  • Certification in an Improbation not grant­ed, where the Defender produced a more Eminent progress than the Pursuer, un­till that were discussed. d. 113.
  • In a CESSIO bonorum, The ordinar Oath runs in thir Terms, That the Bankrupt had made no fraudulent Right, since the subscribing of the Disposition. d. 292.
  • CHAMBERLANES. see d. 37.
  • CHARGES upon six days benorth Dee. d. 222.
  • CHILDRENS Provisions. d. 344. d. 373. see d. 418. d. 437.
  • CIRCUMDUCTION of the Term. d. 307.
  • Circumduction of a Decreet Reponed a­gainst as to Personal, but not as to Real Execution. d. 98.
  • CITATION. d. 243. see d. 232. d. 367.
  • Citation of Parties out of the Country. d. 170.
  • CLAUSE cum Curiis & Bloodwitis. see d. 5.
  • The Clause cum Molendinis & multuris Im­porteth freedom from Astriction. d. 1.
  • Clause de non alienando. d. 136.
  • Clause in favours of a Husband and Wife, and their Heirs, makes the Husband Fiar, as persona dignior. d. 85.
  • Clauses of Conquest. d. 359.
  • Clauses of Conquest, how to be under­stood in Contracts of Marriage? d. 9.
  • COALS. see d. 220.
  • Coals constant and casual Rent, how modi­fied? d. 175.
  • COLLECTORS Fee. see. d. 65.
  • COLLEGIAT Church. see d. 112.
  • COMMISSARY-Court. see d. 314.
  • Commissaries. see D. 221.
  • COMMISSION. see d. 207. d. 208.
  • Commission, for taking of a Strangers Oath in Holland, sustained, tho not subscrib­ed by the Party, being Subscribed by the Judges there. d. 239.
  • COMMISSIONERS. see d. 188.
  • COMMUNION betwixt Husband and Wife. d. 136. see d. 302. d. 315.
  • COMMUNITY and Pasture, and casting Peats and Truff. d. 149.
  • COMPENSATION. d. 191. d. 326. d. 366. see d. 200. d. 211.
  • Compensation a quo tempore to be sustained? d. 309.
  • Compensation against a Comprysing. d. 362
  • Compensation when granted against an Assigney upon a Debt of the Cedent? d. 3.
  • COMPETITION betwixt Assig­neys and Arresters. d. 201.
  • Competition betwixt Donator and Credi­tor, d. 249.
  • Competition betwixt a Compryser and an Annualrenter. d. 328.
  • Competition betwixt Creditors and Chil­dren. d. 384.
  • Competition of double Rights. see d. 279.
  • Competition of posterior Creditors, with Creditors by Bonds, without an Onerous Cause. d. 438.
  • Competition of Heirs and discussing. d. 69.
  • COMPOSITION. see d. 174.
  • COMPRYSING. d. 235. d. 251. d. 439. d. 458. see d. 24. d. 44. d. 63. d. 83. [Page] d. 133. d. 211. d. 230. d. 203. d. 385. d. 362. d. 374.
  • Comprysing of a Wadset, d. 330.
  • Comprysing upon a Charge to enter Heir Null; the person, at whose instance the charge was, having no Right to the Debt the time of the Charge, but acquired thereafter. d. 47.
  • Comprysing upon a Heretable Bond, with­out Requisition sustained. d. 22.
  • Comprysing does not extinguish a Wadset. d. 134.
  • Comprysings before the Year 1652. not re­gulat by the Act Debitor and Creditor. d. 60
  • A Compryser upon Debts, anterior to the Debitors Rebellion, being Infeft before Year and Day, is preferable to the Dona­tor of the Liferent Escheat. d. 178.
  • COMPT-Books of Merchants. d. 452.
  • CONDITION. see d. 18. d. 32.
  • Condition Resolutive. see d. 397.
  • Conditions copulative. d. 423.
  • Conditions in Contracts of Marriage, si non sint liberi, &c. d. 364.
  • CONDƲCTIO Rei dubiae. see d. 108.
  • Couductores Vectigalium. Ibidem.
  • CONFESSION presumptive of a per­son holden as confessed. d. 217.
  • CONFIDENT persons getting Dis­positions from Debitors, may at the Debi­tors desire satisfie such Creditors, as they shall think fit. d. 174.
  • CONFIRMATION necessary in Scotland of goods there, belonging to Strangers elsewhere. d. 21.
  • CONJUNCT probation of the value of Lands. d. 431.
  • CONQUEST. see d. 9. d. 359.
  • Conquest found probable by the Debitor, and Witnesses in the Bond. d. 68.
  • CONSIGNATION in Improbations d. 278.
  • CONSƲETƲDO Loci. d. 390.
  • CONTINGENTIA Causae non debet dividi. see d. 288.
  • A CONTRACT Subsequent to a Wadset, (whereby the Back-tack due­ties, are accumulated and made a princi­al Sum, and that there should be no Re­demption, till these were Satisfied) not regarded, in respect the said Contract was not Registrate, in the Register of Reversions. d. 27.
  • Contracts of Marriage. see d. 9. d. 123. d. 161. d. 169. d. 172. d. 185. d. 195. d. 364.
  • CORREI debendi. see d. 231.
  • COUNTERBAND Goods. d. 132. d. 153.
  • CREDITORS on the account of Fu­nerals and Druggs. d. 206.
  • When Creditors do appear in Adjudicat­ions not called, they ought to be admit­ted with that quality, that the Adjud­ger shall be in the same case, as to any Adjudication at their Instance, as if both Adjudgers were within Year and Day. d. 324.
  • CURATOR. d. 363. d. 435. see d. 88. d. 316.
  • Curator non datur personae, sed rebus, so that the Minors. person is not in potestate. d. 321.
  • Curators Subscriveing only to Writs and not the Minors. d. 216.
D.
  • DAMNAGE by Ruinous Houses su­stained; without necessity to say, that the Defender was required to repaire his House. d. 66.
  • DATE. see d. 179.
  • DEATH-BED. Vide in Lecto. Litera L.
  • DEBITOR non praesumitur donare how to be interpret? d. 333.
  • DEBITƲM Fundi. d. 274. d. 372.
  • DECIMAE inclusae not Lyable to the Augmentation of Ministers Stipends. d. 229.
  • DEEDS in Lecto. see in Lecto Lit. L.
  • DECLARATOR of, Redemption. d. 276.
  • A Declarator, that Childrens Provisions, being granted after Contracting of the Debt, should be Lyable to the Creditors and their Diligence, sustained without Reduction. d. 344.
  • Declarator general of Non-entry being in­tented, the hail Duties are due. d. 28.
  • Declarator of the Nullity of a Minute. d. 118.
  • [Page]DECLINATOR of Judges. d. 303.
  • DECREET see d. 98. d. 203.
  • A Decreet against a person holden as con­fest craved to be declared Null. d. 232
  • Decreets in foro. d. 361. see d. 225. d. 370.
  • Decreets of Inferior Judges. see d. 445.
  • DEFENCE after Litiscontestation. d. 246.
  • In DELICTS by Spuilȝie and wrong­ous Intromission Decreets against persons are construed to be in solidum. d. 247.
  • DELIVERY of Writts. d. 150. d. 272. d. 442. see d. 106. d. 129.
  • Dementia. See d. 76.
  • DENOUNCIATION of Lands. see d. 328.
  • DEPENDENCE. see d. 36.
  • DEPOSITIONS of Witnesses in one Process craved to be repeated in another. d. 219.
  • Depositions of Witnesses to ly in Retentis. d. 236.
  • DESIGNATION of Lands for a Gleib, and relief thereof, conform to the Act of Parliament from the rest of the Heritors, but Annualrent found not due from the time of the Designation. d. 352.
  • DISCHARGES granted by a Master to Tennents without Witnesses. d. 189.
  • A DISPONER may qualify his Right, and in special if the person be a Pupil; that such as are named in the Disposition, should Administrate. d. 316.
  • A Disposition made after Inhibition, but before the Registration of the same, may be reduced ex capite Inhibitionis. d. 254.
  • DISCUSSING of Heirs. see d. 69.
  • DONATIO inter virum & Ʋxorem. d. 204. d. 426. d. 362.
  • DONATOR. see d. 14. d. 249. d. 389. d. 411.
  • A Donator of ultimus Haeres: d. 38.
  • The Donator, a quo tempore has he Right to the full Rents? d. 273.
E
  • EDICT of Executry. d. 433.
  • EJECTION sustained at the Ma­sters instance, tho the Tennent did not concurr, but not quoad omnes effectus. d. 19.
  • Ejection sustained at the Wifes instance, where the Husband is absent. d. 105.
  • ERROR and mistake. d. 338.
  • ESCAPE of Prisoners. d. 299. d. 301. d. 306.
  • ESCHEAT. see d. 14. d. 59. d. 75. d. 162. d. 205. d. 331. d. 409. d. 411.
  • Escheat passes cum sua causa. d. 177.
  • EXAMINATION of Witnesses in an Improbation. d. 42.
  • EXCEPTIO Falsi proponed peremptorie d. 126.
  • Exceptions quo casu they affirm the Lybel. see d. 199. d. 223.
  • EXCHANGE. see d. 231.
  • EXECUTOR. d. 62. d. 182. d. 454 d. 412. see d. 181. d. 187. d. 205. d. 224.
  • An Executor has not an absolute property in the Goods confirmed, but only quali­fied and for Administration. d. 302.
  • Executor Creditor. see d. 389.
  • Executor Creditor Lyable to doe Diligence. d. 35.
  • Executors giving Oath upon the Inventar. d. 97.
  • EXERCITORES navis Lyable in solidum. d. 166.
  • EXHIBITION sustained of Writts intrometted with by the Defender, al­beit not proven, that he had them at or since the intenting of the Cause, he hav­ing medled with them in the Charter­chest, whereby fraud is presumed. d. 114.
  • Exhibition ad deliberandum. d. 49. d. 258.
  • EXPENCES. see d. 281. d. 458.
  • Expences of Executors upon pursueing of Processes doe affect Legators. d. 181.
  • Anent EXTRACTING of Decreets; and when res est integra as to the pro­poning of New Defences. d. 203.
F.
  • FACULTY reserved in a Dispositi­on to burden with a Sum. d. 457.
  • Faculty reserved out of the Right of Fee, to burden the same with a Sum of Mo­ney. d. 418.
  • [Page] Causa FALSI. see d. 196. d. 385.
  • FEES of Commissioners to the Parlia­ment. d. 188.
  • FEUARS. see d. 190.
  • FEU-DUTY. see d. 92. d. 229.
  • FIAR. see d, 95, d, 136, d, 144, d, 213 d, 350, d, 418.
  • FINES. see d, 311.
  • FRAUDULENT Rights. d. 48. d. 156.
  • Fraudulent Rights contrare to the Act of Parliament 1621. d. 198.
  • FUNERALS. see d. 206.
  • FORTHCOMING. see d. 110.
  • Forthcoming, in effect Execution, and e­quivalent to a poinding. d. 53.
G.
  • GESTIO pro haerede. d. 151. see d. 119.
  • Gestio pro haerede, by Intromission with Rents not sustained, where there is a Title. d. 67.
  • Gestio pro Haerede elided by the Behavers having got a Gift of the Defuncts E­scheat ante motam litem. d. 331.
  • Gestio pro Haerede inferred by the Appear­and Heirs consent to expired Compry­sings. d. 63.
  • GIFT of Ward, in favours of the Vassal himself, accresces to the Subvassal. d. 392
  • Gifts of Escheat. d, 409, see d, 187, d, 224. d, 249.
  • Gifts of Escheat and Backbonds d, 162
  • Gifts of Escheat when presumed simulate. d, 411.
  • GLEIB. see d, 93. d, 352.
  • GOODS Disponed stante rebellione fall under Escheat. d. 75.
  • GOVERNOURS going Abroad with Youngmen, their case as to their Intro­mission. d. 421.
  • GRANA crescentia. see d, 293.
  • GRASS due to Ministers. d, 256.
H.
  • HABIT of Bankrupts. d. 282.
  • HEIR. see d, 69, d, 85, d, 169, d, 172, d. 214, d, 353, d, 400, d, 416 d, 450.
  • Heir of Line. see d, 107, d, 295.
  • If an Heir of Provision may be pursued where the Heir of Line has renounced, but not yet discussed by Adjudication. d, 107.
  • Heirs of Conquest see d, 295.
  • Heirship Movable see d, 151, d, 209.
  • HERITABLE. see d. 39.
  • Heritable Bonds decided to belong, not to the Heirs of Line, but of Conquest. d. 295.
  • HOMOLOGATION. see d. 27.
  • HORNING. d, 253, d. 422. see d. 59, d, 222. d. 406.
  • HUSBAND. see d, 85, d, 100, d, 105 d, 125, d, 144. d. 182, d, 315, d, 319. d, 336.
  • Husband and Wife; and how far her Oath will oblige him? d. 71.
  • A Husband conveened for his Wifes Debt. d. 332.
  • A Husband taking burden for his Wife. d. 257.
  • A Husband Lyable for the Wifes Debt in quantum lucratus; But an ordinary Tocher being ad sustinenda Onera Matri­monii is not Lucrum. d. 10.
  • HYPOTHEQUE. see d. 420.
I
  • IACTƲS Retis. see d. 220
  • IMPENSAE necessariae not allowed to a Compryser, in a Declarator that he was satisfied by Intromission. d. 133.
  • IMPROBATION. d. 168. d. 196. d. d. 230. d. 339. d. 262. d. 286. d. 385. d. 386. d. 456. see d. 42. d. 50. d. 80. d. 113. d. 145. d. 163. d. 210. d. 265, d. 278. d. 291. d. 403.
  • In an Improbation; an Extract out of the Books of an Inferior Court, does not sa­tisfie the production. d. 285.
  • Improbation of Executions before Inferi­or Judges. d. 444.
  • Improbation of poinding will not elide Spuilȝe, being proponed at advising of the Cause. d. 73.
  • INCORPORATION, see d. 152.
  • INFEFTMENT. see d. 100. d. 160. d. 399.
  • [Page]INFEFTMENT of Annualrent. see d. 83.
  • Infeftment of Annualrent and personal act­ion thereupon. d. 407.
  • Infeftment of Annualrent made publick, by a poinding of the Ground. d. 341.
  • Infeftment of Warrandice base, to be hol­den of the Granter, preferable to a pub­lick Infeftment of property granted there­after holden of the Superior, and cled with possession diverse Years; and the possession of the principal Lands is in­terpreted the possession of the Warrand­ice Lands. d. 15.
  • INFERIOR Judges. see d. 279. d. 294. d. 406. d. 444.
  • INHIBITION, d. 213. d. 254. d. 413.
  • Inhibition against a Wise. d. 264.
  • Inhibition at the Instance of the Heir of a Marriage. d. 214.
  • Inhibition upon a Dependence. d. 36.
  • Inhibition upon an obligement to War­rand. d. 116. d. 117.
  • Inhibitions do not affect Renounciations; so that the Debitor in a Wadset may pay his Debt and take a Renounciation, tho the Creditor Granter be inhibited d. 96.
  • INNOVATION. d. 240.
  • INSTITORIA Actio. see d. 319.
  • INSTRUMENT of Requisition must be perfected, and cannot be supplyed by an unsubscribed minute after the Notars decease. d. 102.
  • INSTRƲMENT Bellica see d. 132.
  • Instrumenta quae in quibusdam sapiunt natur­am Testamenti, & in alijs naturam actus inter vivos, cui Juri ascribenda sunt? d. 103.
  • Instrumentum penes debitorem repertum. see d. 428,
  • INTERDICTION. d. 381. d. 382. see d. 29. d. 34.
  • INTERRUPTION. d. 216.
  • INTROMISSION. d. 221. d. 224. see d. 67. d. 133. d. 137. d. 187. d. 199. d. 223. d. 205. d. 404.
  • INVENTAR. see d. 97.
  • IOURNEY-MENS keeping of a Box. d. 70.
  • JUDGES. see Declinator.
  • JƲRAMENTƲM in Litem. see d. 322. d. 447.
  • JURISDICTION. see d. 279.
  • Jurisdiction of a Bailif of Regality. d. 131.
  • JƲS Mariti. see d. 123.
  • Jus praesentationis. see d. 112.
  • Jus Relictae. d. 315.
  • Jus superveniens. d. 128.
  • Jus tacitae Hypothecae how far competent to the Master of the Ground? d. 329.
K.
  • KEEPING of Writs. d. 451.
  • Keeping of Writs of Lands, where there is a joint interest, allowed to him who offers Caution to the other portion­ers. d. 227.
  • KINGS Decreet arbitrall. see d. 229.
  • KIRK. see d. 112.
  • Kirk-Lands. see d. 93.
L.
  • In LECTO d. 443. see d. 40. d. 157. d. 186. d. 193. d. 353. d, 402. d. 449.
  • A LEGACIE, left upon condition, sub­sists, tho the Condition did not exist, when there is praesumptio voluntatis Testa­toris. d. 18. d. 32.
  • LEGATORS. d. 378. see d. 181. d. 402.
  • LEGATƲM of a Heretable Sum. d. 197.
  • LETTERS of Horning upon the de­creets of Inferior Judges. d. 406.
  • LIFERENT. see d. 9. d. 33.
  • Liferent Escheat. see d. 198.
  • A LIFERENTER of the whole must entertain the Fiar, tho only ap­pearand Heir, the time of the entertain­ment. d. 95.
  • LITISCONTESTATION. see d. 74. d. 119. d. 246.
  • LOCƲS poenitentiae. d. 192.
  • LOOSEING of Arrestment. d. 300.
  • LORD of the Outter house adviseing probation. d. 445.
  • Lords of Session. see d. 180. see, Trial.
  • Lords of Session their Letter to the King. d. 218.
  • The LYON sustained Judge Compe­tent [Page] in an Action against a Messengers Cautioner for damnage and interest. d. 30.
M.
  • MAGISTRATS of Burghs. see d. 91.
  • Magistrates of Burghs are not obliged to officiate longer than one year. d. 124.
  • Magistrats takeing Assignation to a debt, for which they were lyable subsidiarie, do come in place of the principal, and the Cautioner is liberate. d. 147.
  • Magistrats lyable for the Negligence of their predecessors; an Incorporation being persona quae non moritur. d. 152.
  • MANDATƲM excedens how far Ly­able. d. 259.
  • MARRIAGE. d. 415. see d. 202. d. 327.
  • MASTER of the Ground. see d. 329.
  • MENSAL Kirk. see d. 325.
  • MERCES. see d. 220.
  • MERCHANTS. see d. 452.
  • A Merchant's current accompt does not prescribe. d. 318.
  • MESSENGER. see d. 235.
  • METƲS. see d. 419.
  • A MILN-DAMN cannot be drawn from one side of a Burn to another, with­out consent of the Heritor having Lands on the other side, or a Servitude. d. 87.
  • MINISTER. see d. 25. d. 112. d. 229. d. 256.
  • Ministers Stipend. d. 398.
  • MINOR. see d. 61. d. 72. d. 88. d. 216. d. 321.
  • Minor non tenetur placitare competent a­gainst Declarators of Right, but not when the Minor is pursued in a Mole­station, where a pursuer is in possession. d. 64.
  • A Minor Cautioner for his Father in a Bond, Null. d. 26. d. 31. d. 55.
  • MINORITY excluded, It being of­fered to be proven, that the Minor was then a Traffiqueing Merchant. d. 360.
  • Minority and Lesion. d. 369.
  • MODIFICATION of Expences. d. 281.
  • Clause cum MOLENDINIS & Mul­turis. see d. 1.
  • MOLESTATION. see d. 64.
  • MOOR. see d. 86.
  • MORTIFICATION. d. 379.
  • Mortification for a Library Keeper to the Colledge of Aberdeen. d. 269. d. 27.
  • MOVEABLE Bond. d. 424.
  • Moveable Heirship. see d. 209.
  • Moveable Sums. see d. 342.
  • Moveables Disponed to a Wife with the burden of the Debts, and that they shall be affected with the same, yet the Pro­perty thereof is settled in the person of the Wife. d. 320.
  • MUIR. see Moor.
  • MULTURES. see d. 58. d. 293.
N.
  • NAƲTAE, Caupones &c. If it takes place in the case of a Horse stollen out of the Park, it being told the Pur­suer, that the Keeper would not be An­swerable? d. 104.
  • NEAREST of Kin. see d. 389.
  • NEGOTIORƲM Gestor. d. 357.
  • NON Creditur Referenti nisi constet de Re­lato, how to be understood? d. 347.
  • NON ENTRY. see d. 28. d. 273.
  • NON Memini. d. 245.
  • NOTAR. see d. 102. d. 135.
  • NOTARS Subscription in subsidium wanting the solemnity de mandato, if Null? d. 81.
  • NOVATION. see d. 240.
O.
  • OATH. d. 453. see d. 97. d. 101. d. 225. d. 239. d. 245. d. 280.
  • Oath of a Tutrix after she was cloathed with a Husband. d. 336.
  • OBJECTION aga nst a Right of An­nualrent, not competent to hinder a De­creet of Adjudication thereupon, but re­served to the poinding of the Ground. d. 45.
  • OFFER of Victual payable betwixt Zuil and Candlemass. d. 267.
  • ORDER of Redemption. see d. 251.
P.
  • [Page]PARLIAMENT. see d. 188.
  • A PARTY holden as confest being out of the Country upon a citation at the Mercat Cross of Edinburgh. d. 367.
  • PARTIES having Interest not called. d. 244.
  • If Parties may be Reponed against a De­creet in foro. d. 370.
  • PARTNERS and socii Lyable in soli­dum conjunctly and severally. d. 8.
  • The PASSIVE Title of Intrometter, not sustained after the Intrometters de­cease to make Lyable as Universal Intro­metter but in quantum locupletatus. d. 404.
  • The Passive Titles are not acknowledged by a Defence in Jure; Otherways, if the Defence be founded upon a Right in the person of the Predecessor. d. 199. d. 223.
  • PASTURE see d. 149.
  • PATRON. see d. 25.
  • PAƲLIANA actio. see d. 287.
  • PAYMENT of Feu-duties probable pro­ut de Jure. d. 92.
  • PERSONAL Faculty. see d. 364.
  • PIRATS see d. 357.
  • Locus POENITENTIAE. see d. 192.
  • POINDING. see d. 73.
  • Poinding of the Ground. see d. 338. d. 341. d. 146.
  • Poinding to be begun before setting of the Sun, and compleated before Day-Light be gone. d. 250.
  • POSSESSION. see d. 161.
  • Possession of a part validates an Infeftment of Annualrent in solidum. d. 154.
  • POSSESSORY Judgement. d. 393.
  • A Possessory Judgement only competent by vertue of a Real Right. d. 155.
  • PREBEND. see d. 112. d. 440.
  • Receiving PRECEPTS upon Cham­berlands (for the Creditors farther secu­rity) do not oblige them to the forma­lities of protesting, presenting &c. d. 37.
  • PRESCRIPTION. d. 196. d. 271 d. 318. d. 322.
  • Prescription, as to a Cautioner, elided by payment of Annualrent by the principal d. 112.
  • Prescription of Annualrent, if stopt by a Decreet of poinding the Ground against the Tennents, the Heretor not being called? d. 146.
  • Prescription of Horning, as to Escheat, in­terrupted by the Kings Minority, and the late Usurpation. d. 59.
  • PRESENTATION to a prebendary with a Substitution. d. 440.
  • PRESUMPTIONS for taking away of a Bond. d. 215.
  • PRISONERS, see d. 299.
  • Prisoners for small Debts, viz. not exceed­ing 200 Merks, may be enlarged with the Parties consent, without Relaxation. d. 238.
  • If Prisoners for a Debt may be allowed by permission from the Lords to go out in the Day time with a Keeper? d. 298.
  • PRIVILEDGED Debts. see d. 206
  • PRIZE. d. 207. d. 208. see d. 132. d. 247.
  • In a Prize, Found, that the Owners may be heard to Reduce the Sentence upon Rea­sons omitted by the Skipper. d. 120.
  • PROBATION. d. 410.
  • Probation by Witnesses. d. 427. d. 428. d. 432. see d. 419.
  • Probation prout de Jure. d. 158. d. 160.
  • PROCLAMATION remitting Fines, due upon the contraveening of penal Statutes. d. 311.
  • PRODUCTION in an Improbation see d. 285.
  • PROGRESS of Writts. d. 356.
  • PROMISE see d. 192.
  • Promise not probable by Witnesses. d. 317
  • PROPER Wadsets. d. 268.
  • PROTECTIONS are understood to be allowed, only in the case when per­sons are obliged to appear personally to be Witnesses; or to give their Oaths be­fore the Session, Exchequer, &c. and cannot appear by procurators. d. 313.
  • PROVING the Tenor of a Comprising d. 283.
  • Proving the Tenor not sustained, without a sufficient Adminicle in Writt. d. 77.
  • PROVESTS of Burghs Royal not Ly­able subsidiarie, albeit, being charged, they go not personally to apprehend [Page] Rebels, having sent their Officers. d. 78.
  • PROVISION in a Contract of Mar­riage in favours of Heirs Female, d. 169 d. 172.
  • Provision to a Wife in Lecto restricted to a Terce. d. 141.
  • Provisions of Children. d. 373. d. 437. see d. 344. d. 418.
  • PƲBLICATIO Testimoniorum allow­ed in no case, but Improbations ex quaesti­one falsi. d. 163.
  • Publick Burdens. see d. 143.
  • Publick Infeftments. d. 399.
  • PUPIL. see d. 90. d. 242. d. 316.
  • A Pupil charged to enter Heir. d. 446.
Q.
  • QUALIFIED Oath. d. 225. d. 280 d. 294.
  • A QUALITY in an Oath super facto a­lieno resolves in an Exception, and must be proven. d. 101.
  • QUOTS of Testaments. see d. 375.
  • Quots of Testaments not confirmed in the Bishops Lifetime fall not under the Bi­shops Executry or Ann. d. 194.
R.
  • RATIFICATION of a Bond granted by a Wife stante Matrimonio does not bind her, being of a Deed Null in Law. d. 371.
  • REAL RIGHT. see d. 155.
  • REAL Clause. see d. 41.
  • REBEL see d. 411.
  • A Rebel being allowed by the Donator to continue in possession for five years, or thereabout, The Gift of Escheat presum­ed simulate. d. 14.
  • REDEEMABLE Rights. see d. 100
  • REDEMPTION. see d. 251. d. 276. d. 358.
  • REDUCTION. see d. 7. d. 72. d. 237.
  • Reduction and Production therein. d. 111
  • Reduction at the instance of a Creditor of a Reversion, granted not to the Debitor himself, but to his Heirs allenarly. d. 417.
  • Reduction ex capite metus. d. 419.
  • Reduction ex capite Minoritatis. d. 61.
  • Reduction ex capite Minoritatis sustained of a Bond granted with consent of Cura­tors, albeit the Money was delivered to them, seing it was not converted to the Minors use. d. 88.
  • Reduction ob non solutum Canonem. d. 401.
  • Reduction of an Interdiction. d. 34.
  • Reduction of an Interdiction, the person being rei suae providus. d. 29.
  • Reduction, of an usurary Bond or Contract, must be with concourse of the Kings Advocate. d. 56.
  • In a Reduction of a Testament ex capite dementiae, the pursuer ordained to con­descend on qualifications inferring it. d. 76.
  • REGALITY. see d. 131.
  • REGISTRATION of Sasines of Bur­gal Lands. see d. 22.
  • RELICT. d. 448.
  • A Relict not kenned to her Terce, cannot stop a Removing. d. 234.
  • A Relict provided to a Liferent of all Goods belonging to her Husband, ought to sell such Goods as may perish, and make the Sum arising therefrom forthcoming af­ter her decease. d. 32.
  • A Relicts Liferent burdened with a Sum of Money, borrowed by the Husband for making the purchase of the said Right, viz. as to the Annualrents of the said Debt dureing the Relicts Lifetime. d. 9.
  • RELIEF. see d. 82. d. 212. d. 228.
  • Relief de Jure inest, where persons are obliged conjunctly and severally as prin­cipal Debitors. d. 4.
  • REMOVEING. see d. 234.
  • RENOUNCIATION not allowed from one, who had granted Bond, that the Estate might be adjudged. d. 380.
  • Renounciations. see d. 96. d. 119. d. 270 d. 276.
  • RENTS. see d. 99.
  • REPLY of Majority Found probable by the Pursuer only, and a Conjunct Pro­bation denyed. d. 349.
  • [Page]REPROBATORS. d. 383.
  • Reprobators, upon probation of Corruption probable prout de Jure after Sentence. d. 160.
  • REQUISITION. d. 425. see d. 22 d. 102.
  • RES inter alios acta. see d. 219.
  • Res Litigiosa. see d. 370.
  • RESERVATION of a power to bur­den Heirs etiam in Lecto. d. 353.
  • RESOLUTIVE Condition. d. 397.
  • RESTRAINT. see d. 299.
  • RETENTION. d. 241.
  • In RETENTIS. see d. 74.
  • REVERSION. see d. 27. d. 276. d. 417.
  • If Reversions, limited to a time, do prescrive against Wives cled with Husband? d. 297.
  • ROYAL Burghs and Burghs of Baro­ny their Liberties. d. 395.
  • RUINOUS Houses. see d. 66.
S.
  • SASINE. see d. 22. d. 345.
  • Sasine by a Husband to his Wife pro­priis manibus. d. 125.
  • A Sasine within Burgh not booked. d. 348.
  • SERVICE of Heirs. d. 416. see d. 323.
  • SERVITUDE see d. 87. d. 312.
  • A Servitude, of a Divot in a Moor, found not to hinder an Heritor to Labour and improve the same, there being so much thereof set apart as would satisfy the end of the Servitude. d. 86.
  • SESSION-Books do not prove the Age of a Party, to infer Reduction ex capite Minoritatis. d. 72.
  • SINGLE avail of Marriage. d. 202.
  • SOCII. see d. 8.
  • SOLENNES Induciae. see d. 167.
  • In SOLƲTƲM data. d. 200.
  • A SONE subscribing as Witness to the Fathers Provision, of the rest of the Chil­dren on Death-bed, hinders Reduction ex capite lecti. d. 40.
  • A SPECIAL service in an Annualrent does give Right to Heretable Bonds, and all other Heretable Estate whereupon In­feftment did not follow. d. 323.
  • Post SPONSALIA & Banna, a Woman not sui Juris, and can do no deed in pre­judice of her self, or of her future Hus­band, without his consent. d. 13.
  • If SPONSIONES ludicrae, anent Mar­rying, ought to be allowed? d. 327.
  • SPULZIE. d. 447. d. 459. see d. 322.
  • Spulȝie being restricted to wrongous Intro­mission, the Defenders are not lyable in solidum but conjunctly. d. 137.
  • STENTS imposed by Burghs upon their Feuers. d. 190.
  • STIPENDS. see d. 229. d. 325. d. 398.
  • STRANGERS. see d. 21. d. 239.
  • SUBSCRIPTION in subsidium. see d. 81.
  • SUBSIDIARY Action against the user of false Writs. d, 460.
  • SUBSTITUTION. see d. 213.
  • A SUBVASSAL, being Infeft by a Baron cum curi [...]s & Bloodwitis, may hold Courts and unlaw for Blood. d. 5.
  • Subvassals, being in possession, ought to be called in an Improbation against the Vassal their Author. d. 145.
  • If a SUCCESSOR in a Benefice be Lyable for his Predecessors Taxation? d. 115.
  • Successor Titulo Lucrativo. d. 130. d. 184 d. 377.
  • A SUM, expresly provided by a Clause in a Disposition and Infeftment, to be payed by the Receiver of the Disposition, otherwayes his Right to be void, such a Clause found Real. d. 41.
  • Sums may be Moveable, tho secured by Heretable Rights. d. 342.
  • SUPERVENIENT Title. d. 389.
  • SUSPECT Tutor. see d. 90.
T.
  • TACITE Hypotheque. d. 420
  • TACK. see d. 145.
  • Tack of Teinds. d. 289.
  • A Tack, not cled with possession and con­ferred in tempus indebitum. d. 346.
  • A Tack razed in the date. d. 179.
  • A Tack, set by a Minister for more than [Page] three years without consent of the Pa­tron, how sustained? d. 25.
  • Tacks after Redemption. d, 358.
  • Tacks; and in what case remittitur Merces? d, 220.
  • TACKSMEN of Lands within Burgh. d, 429.
  • TAILZIES. d, 257, d, 266.
  • TAVERNERS are presumed to Compt Weekly with their Masters. d, 340.
  • TAXATION. see d, 115, d, 241.
  • Taxation not augmented upon the account of the Collectors Charges. d, 65.
  • TEINDS. d, 148, d, 355. see d, 289, d, 388.
  • Teinds belong to the Minister Jure Re­praesentationis, albeit the Kirk be a Mem­ber of a Collegiate Church, and the Mi­nister not prebend. d, 112.
  • TENENDAS. see d, 149.
  • TENNENTS. see d, 189.
  • TENOR and prouing therof. see d, 77, d, 185, d, 304.
  • If the Tenor of Comprysings may be pro­uen? d, 24.
  • TENTƲS & reputatus. see d, 381, d, 382.
  • TERCE, d, 141, d, 234.
  • TESTAMENT. see d, 76, d, 103, d, 375, d, 159, d, 194, d, 197.
  • Testament sufficiently executed by a De­creet, tho no payment be made there­upon. d, 49.
  • TESTIMONIES of Witnesses. see d, 361.
  • TESTIS Domesticus. d, 390.
  • In Testium conflictu major pars praevalet. d, 109.
  • THIRLAGE. d, 312, see d, 293 d, 351.
  • Thirlage constitute by reservation of Mul­tures, as to these who consent to the re­servation, albeit no preceeding Thirlage. d, 58.
  • TRANSFERRENE. d, 52, d, 337.
  • Transferring in a Reduction. d, 7.
  • TRIAL at the Admission of the Lords of Session. d, 180.
  • TRUST. see d, 186, d, 193.
  • TRUSTEES. see d, 174.
  • Trustees when they denude are to be re­lieved of all hazard, upon account of the Trust. d, 43.
  • TƲTELAE Actio. see d. 314.
  • TUTOR and Pupil. d. 242. d. 376. see d. 336.
  • A Tutor being pursued to remove as su­spect, there being Debts betwixt him and the Pupil, another friend appointed by the Lords to be joined to him. d. 90.
  • A Tutor craving by a Bill, that he might set his Pupils Lands for lesser Duties, refused. d. 277.
  • Tutors Lyable only for the time they ac­cept and not after they knew they were named. d. 233.
V.
  • VACANT Stipends. d. 325.
  • Non VALENS agere. see d. 297.
  • VASSAL. see d. 145.
  • VASTATION by War, Found to give Conductores Vectigalium a proportional abatement; albeit it be Conductio rei du­biae. d. 108.
  • VICCARAGE. d. 388. see d. 148.
  • VICTUAL. see d. 267.
  • VITIOUS Intromission. d. 187. d. 205. d. 354.
U.
  • ULTIMUS Haeres. see d. 38.
  • UNFREEMEN. see d. 79.
  • USURARY Bond. see d. 56.
W.
  • WADSET. d. 436. see d. 27. d. 96. d. 134. d. 268. d. 330. d. 439.
  • A Wadset bearing only for security, and until the Wadsetter should be satisfied by Intromission, Found to be an impro­per Wadset, tho without a Backtack. d. 57,
  • WADSETTERS must count for the excrescence of the duties. d. 176.
  • WAIRD Lands being disponed by a [Page] Father, with obligement for two In­feftments; The Son must compleat the said Right by Entreing and Infeft­ing the Partie, Reserving to him Acti­on for Relief of his Ward and Marri­age as accords. d. 82.
  • WARRANDICE. see. d, 15. d. 93.
  • WARRANDICE from Astriction. d: 173.
  • The WARRANDICE of a Dispositi­on of a Comprising, found in dubio to warrand the Validity of the Compryse­ing and the Reality of the Debt; but not to refound the pryce in case of Eviction. d. 44.
  • WARRANDICE of Lands is abso­lute, unless expressly limited: But Warrandice in Assignations of Bonds is only debitorem esse, but non esse locu­pletem. d. 248.
  • WEARING the Habite. d. 252.
  • WIFE. see. d. 6. d, 10. d. 71. d. 85. d. 100. d. 105. d. 125, d. 141. d. 143. d. 144. d. 182. d. 204. d. 257. d. 264. d. 297. d. 315. d. 332. d. 353. d. 371.
  • A Wife consenting to a Disposition of Lands made by her Husband; is not hindred to evict the same, she acquireing there­after a Right from another Person. d. 128.
  • A Wife haveing a peculium settled upon her exclusive of her Husbands Intrest therein, found lyable for a Bond gran­ted by her. d. 164.
  • The Wife is praeposita negotiis domesticis for Provision of the House. d, 310,
  • A Wife Trafiqueing as a Merchand, the Husband is lyable for Debts Contracted by her on the account of that Trafique, actione Institoria. d. 319.
  • A WIFES obligement stante matrimonio. d. 84.
  • Wives and conjunct persons ought to abide by Writs Simpliciter. d. 265.
  • Wives Infeftments upon their Contracts of Marriage sustained albeit Base, in re­spect of the Husbands possession. d. 161.
  • WITNESSES. d. 441. see d. 42. d. 109. d. 219. d. 236. d. 317. d. 383. d. 419. d. 427. d. 428. d. 432.
  • Witnesses before Answer. d. 171.
  • Witnesses depositions how received before Litiscontestation to ly in Retentis? d. 74.
  • Witnesses in a Bond not being designed, It's allowed to the person to designe them; one of the Witnesses being yet on lyfe. d. 12.
  • WRITERS name may be condescend­ed upon after the Writer and Witnesses are Dead: And in what case and Terms? d. 343.
  • Writers to the Signet discharged to alter the solennes Jnduciae in Bills and Sum­monds, except in such as are priviledged by the Law. d. 167.
FINIS.

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