CHAP. I.

MAster Baxter in his Preface to his Book (called by him The true and onely way of Con­cord of all Christian Churches) reflecting upon a Letter of mine, Written and Printed near 20 years before, saith; There are so many Mistakes in matter of fact in it, that although he had made an Answer to it, yet he cast it aside for Peace sake; believing, that the opening of the aforesaid so many mistakes would not easily be born: the rather, because (as he [Page 42] says in the words immediately foregoing) he knew he had greatly incurr'd both our displeasures already, (to wit, the Bishop of Ely's and mine) for what he had said and done against our Way; and that (as to my particular) the aforesaid Letter of mine was a proof of it.

Again, in the same Preface to the same Book, he saith, You, (meaning the Bishop of Ely and Me, to whom he addresseth that Preface) have (above all men I know) effectually helped to bring us (meaning himself, and the rest of his Party) under.

These are Mr. Baxter's complements when he speaks to me, and therefore, I am not to expect more Civility from him, when he speaks of me, as he doth in divers of his Books which I have seen, and perhaps, in many more of them which I have not seen; (for I hope all men are not bound to reade all Mr. Baxter writes:) But in those I have seen, when he speaks of me, it is neither Ho­noris, nor Charitatis gratiâ; but to reproach me either directly and in express terms, (or covert­ly and by the bye) as, when in his Preface to the second part of his Plea for Nonconformists, he saith, It was Bishop Morley 's gross mistaking charge that made him write one whole Tract, or Trea­tise, namely, That of things sinfull per Accidens or by accident.

Again, in the former part of the aforesaid Plea for Nonconformists, he saith, Bishop Morley advised him to reade Bilson and Hooker, in whom (saith he) I found more than he approv'd, for resisting and re­straining of Kings.

Again, in another of his printed Papers; (I mean that Paper which he would have taken for a Recanta­tion [Page 43] of some of those Political Aphorisms, I had laid to his charge) though he do not name me, yet he points directly at me, as if I had accused him for asserting, That all humane powers are limited by God; which to deny (as he there insinuates I do Vid. his Letter to Mr. Hinkley, and his last answer to Dr. Stil­lingfleet. and elsewhere plainly tells me I do) is to defy Deity and Humanity: and consequently makes me a defyer of them both.

Lastly, with the same ingenuity and candour, he aims at me more obscurely, and more obliquely indeed, but yet more spitefully and more mischie­vously; when in the close of his Animadversions upon the Dean of St. Paul's Sermon, he speaks of somebody that removed somebody from a great Man's service, who might have kept him from Apo­statizing, if he had been suffered to continue with him; meaning my supposed removing Mr. Jones the Authour of Elymas the Sorcerer; from being one of the Duke of York's Chaplains.

These are the things that Mr. Baxter doth either directly and expresly, or implicitely and obliquely charge me withall: And perhaps there be many more in other of his voluminous Writings which I have not seen, nor heard of yet; and all of them as true perhaps as any of those I have here named, that is, not true at all, as I hope I shall make it appear to any indifferent and impartial Reader, that will take the pains to compare his several Allegations with my several Answers to them.

CHAP. II.

FIrst then, whereas Mr. Baxter chargeth me with having made many Mistakes in a Letter I writ and printed many years ago, to justifie my silencing of him, when I was Bishop of Worcester; it is to be observed,

1. That this is a charge in general terms onely, without specifying any one of those many mistakes in He names no one mistake. particular.

And 2 ^dly that he names no body, no not so much as any one of his own Party, that now doth, or ever Himself the only Accuser. did for 20 years together, lay any such thing to my Charge besides himself; so that whether there be many or any, or if any mistakes, they being mistakes in matter of Fact (as he saith they are) there is no Constat, no other evidence, but Mr. Baxter's bare Affirmation onely, whereunto my bare Negative ought in Law, Equity, and Reason to be esteemed a sufficient Answer. Unless, though according to the Apostolical Canon, an accusation against a Pres­byter ought not to be received by a Bishop (for so was Timothy) without two or three witnesses; yet An Accusati­on against a Presbyter not to be received without wit­nesses. an accusation of a Bishop by a Presbyter, without any witnesses at all, ought to be believed, and that in matter of Fact too, which cannot be otherwise [Page 45] proved but by Witnesses; or unless, as S. Hierom saith of himself and St. Austin, that Quamvis Episco­pus sit major Presbytero, tamen Augustinus est minor Hieronymo; Though a Bishop be greater than a Presbyter, yet Austin is less than Hierom: So Mr. Baxter will say (as I doubt not but he thinks) that though the authority of a Bishop be greater than a Presbyter's, yet such a Presbyter as Mr. Baxter ought to be credited before such a Bishop as Bishop Morley.

Be it so; but yet neither Bishop nor Presbyter, No one to be believed in his own Case. nor any body else, is to be believed in his own Case, or upon his accusing of a third person upon his own word, or upon his own affirmation onely; especial­ly when the accusation is general, without any in­stance thereof in particular. As if, when one man speaking of another, saith, he is a Liar, a Thief, or a Perjured person, he were to be believed, and the man he speaks of were to be thought to be such a one as he saith he is, without so much as naming, and much less proving any one particular either Lie or Theft or Perjury that he is guilty of.

What is this, but to make a Pope of a Presbyter? for the Pope claims no more than that his Ipse dixit, his bare saying of a thing, should be proof enough to oblige men to believe what he affirms to be true, no nor so much neither as to matter of fact; The Non-Con­formists Tea­chers as In­fallible as the Pope. though some of the Pope's shameless Sycophants have of late offered to maintain that he is as Infallible in matter of Fact, as he is in matter of Faith; and I verily believe him to be so. And I believe likewise that many of the Nonconformists have the same opinion of their Teachers, which the most Bigott-Papists have of their Pope, as to their [Page 46] Veracity at least, if not to their Infallibility also. So I mean as undoubtingly to believe whatsoever they teach them in matters of Faith, or tell them in matters of Fact. But whether it be because they are taught to believe so, or because their having such mens persons in admiration makes them believe so, I will not, I cannot determine: I hope it is the latter rather than the former, though I am afraid, some of their Teachers are well enough pleased they should so esteem and believe of them. Howsoever, or whatsoever may be the cause of it, We are sure enough, by undeniable experience, that it is so.

And truly Mr. Baxter doth very much presume upon his own very great, or upon my very little Credit in the World, if he thinks that whatsoever he is pleased to say of me, without any proof or in­stance of it will for his own bare saying of it onely, be believed by any, but those of his own party; and by those of his own party, I mean not all the Non­conformists, but the Baxterian Nonconformists Baxterian Nonconfor­mists. onely, if there be any such besides himself.

But Mr. Baxter may perhaps say in his own be­half, that although in his aforesaid Preface to his M. Baxter 's Answer to the Bishop's Let­ter inquired after. Book of Concord, he gives no particular instance of any of the many mistakes he chargeth me with, yet in his Answer to that Letter of mine, wherein he says, those many mistakes are in general, there were not Instances onely, but also Proofs of all and every one of those many mistakes in particular. Well, But Where is that Answer of his to that Let­ter of mine? Why, Mr. Baxter after he had writ it laid it aside; for so Mr. Baxter himself (which Not likely that it was laid aside. ought to be taken for proof enough) saith. But [Page 47] Why did he lay it aside? Sure he did not mean to lay it aside when he writ it: It was therefore for some very extraordinary reason, if he did so; For never any man had a greater [...], natural tender­ness and affection for all the Issues of his own brain, His writings; numerous, than Mr. Baxter seems to have; Which Issues of his are so numerous, as if he had begun to write assoon as he could speak, and to print assoon as he could write; and they do so croud to come into the world, that one seems to take hold of the heels of another, as Jacob did of Esau's, strugling which should get out first, and from this striving, while they were yet in the womb of his brain, comes their so often And contra­dictious. crossing, and contradicting of one another, after he is delivered of them.

This fondness of his towards his own concepti­ons and the delight he takes in the multiply­ing and publishing of them makes me think, that His own reasons why he laid it aside. either there was never any such Answer at all made by him, or if indeed there were any such Answer, there were some other reasons, besides what are al­ledged by him, that made him forbear the Printing of it; for whereas he saith, It was for peace, or for peace sake that he laid it aside, or forbore printing it; because having already (that is, before my publishing of the aforesaid Letter) greatly in­curr'd the Bishop of Ely 's displeasure and mine by what he had said and done against our Way, he believed the opening of so many mistakes in matter of fact (as were in that Letter) would not easily be born; and for that reason, he laid aside that Answer of his to that Letter of mine.

I cannot believe that this was the onely, or indeed any reason at all of his so doing; I mean it was nei­ther [Page 48] his love of peace in general, nor his fear of gi­ving me any farther provocation in particular, that made him suppress that pretended Answer.

For first, if he were of so peaceable a disposition Not probable for peace-sake. or so great a lover of Peace as he would seem to be, he would not have spent so much of his time in writing so many Volumes to keep up and increase Schism and Separation in the Church, together with Faction and Sedition in the State as he hath done.

Which might be made to appear yet farther from the manner, as well as the matter of his writing, Mr. Baxter Magisterial in his writing. which is so Magisterial, and with that contempt, undervaluing and vilifying of those he writes against, or that write against him, and sometimes with such exasperating and provoking language as very ill be­comes him that pretends to be a Peace maker.

And perhaps in such a style was that Answer of his written (if he writ any answer at all) to the afore­said What likely might be the reason of his laying it a­side. Letter of mine; and then perhaps too, some wiser Friend of his might advise him to forbear printing of it, at least at that time, namely, at the King's first coming in, against one that came in a little be­fore him, and was sent by him, and had been, all the while the King was abroad, in Exile with him, and for him, and had newly received some more than ordinary marks of his Majestie's favour from him. These, or the like considerations to these, being suggested to him, might peradventure at that time prevail with him, rather wholly to suppress, or at least to defer the printing of that Answer of his (if there were any such answer) than thereby so unseasonably to provoke me more, whose displea­sure, he saith, he had greatly incurr'd by what he had said and done against the Bishop of Ely 's way [Page 49] and mine; as if the Bishop of Ely and I had a Way of our own, wherein no body walked but our selves.

I would therefore fain know what he calls the Bishop of Ely's way and mine, and for his speaking and acting against which, he had so greatly incurr'd that Bishop's and my displeasure: Is it a new or a newly found out Way, or a way of our own de­vising as Mr. Baxter's way is of his? a way that Mr. Baxter 's Way a New way of his own. never any walked in before, nor none but himself doth walk in yet, nor will (I believe) ever walk in hereafter. For it is neither Episcopal, nor Presbyte­rian, nor wholly Independent, nor any of any other denomination either ancient or modern, that I ever heard of; but partly of all, and partly of none of them. But Ours, I mean, the Way, which the Bishop of Ely and I do walk in, is no By-path, not The Bishop's Way the old Church of England­way. a Way of Sufferance or Toleration onely, such as Mr. Baxter and all the Nonconformists plead for: but the Good old way, the King's, the Church of England's way, nay, the Catholick Churches High-way; the Way wherein all the Primitive Fathers, Saints and Martyrs, and all the Orthodox Christians in all Ages, (untill the last before this of ours) have gone before us. I mean the Government of the Church by Bishops, teaching all and nothing else, but what was taught by Christ and his Apostles in point of Doctrine; and commanding nothing which God has forbidden, nor forbidding any thing which God has commanded, in the outward Administration of God's publick Worship and Service: but making use of that liberty and power that God hath left to his Church in order to Decency and Uniformity and Edificati­on, and consequently in order to that Unity and Concord, which Mr. Baxter doth so much pretend to [Page 50] desire and plead for. This, and no other but this, is the Way of the Church of England, and this, and no o­ther but this is the Way, which the Bishop of Ely and I do walk in, and would have all men else, that are born within the pale of our Church, to walk in also. And therefore, as we cannot chuse but be sorry for those that are led or kept out of this way, both for their Nonconfor­mist Teachers draw and keep people out of the way. own and the Churches sake, so we cannot chuse but be displeased too with those that not onely re­fuse to walk in it themselves, but endeavour and doe what they can to draw others from it, and to keep those that are gone out of it, from returning again into it, by making and preaching and print­ing Pleas and Apologies for Nonconformists, which can have no other end (consequentially at least, if not intentionally) but to confirm them in their Non­conformity. And surely, he that would not forbear Mr. Baxter 's Pleas for them justly taxed. to doe this, and to doe it over and over again, being so prejudicial and destructive to the peace of the Church and State (as We have experimentally found it to be) He (I say) that would not forbear to doe this for the publick peace sake, nor for fear of offen­ding the King and the Parliament, the makers of those Laws against those things and persons, he so loudly and so boldly pleads for, did not in all proba­bility for peace sake (and much less for fear of dis­pleasing Bishop Morley) forbear to publish what he had written in answer to that Letter of the Bishop's which would have been much less provoking, by specifying though not proving some of those many mistakes he now chargeth him with, without naming any of them, and consequently, as much as in him lies, imposing upon his Readers, especially such as are ill-affected to Bishops, an implicit belief, that [Page 51] there are indeed many, very many mistakes in the Bishop's Letter; and perhaps gross ones too, and such as Mr. Baxter could have named, and proved also; but being a man of so peaceable, so patient, and so meek a disposition as he is, he did for peace sake, and because he would not provoke the Bishop to be more displeased with him than he was already, for­bear to doe so; Credat Judoeus, non Ego, Believe it who list for me, as he faith.

And therefore he must give me leave to think, upon better considerations, that he never writ any Most likely that he writ no Answer. Answer at all to my Letter; So that all the Reply I need to make to this general unattested and unpro­ved Charge of Mr. Baxter, is to oppose my bare Negative to his bare Affirmative; for Affirmantis est probare, He who affirms a thing ought to prove it; which untill he hath done, it is to be supposed, (forthe reasons before by me alledged) he cannot doe; And consequently that the Charge itself is a mere Calumny.

Which that it may be made more evidently to ap­pear, The reason of reprinting the Bishop's Let­ter with Mr. Baxter 's A­phorisms. I have caused the self same Letter (wherein he saith there are so many mistakes) without any the least addition, subtraction or alteration, to be re­printed and publish'd, to the end, that such as will vouchsafe to reade it without prejudice, may judge betwixt us, whether there be indeed so many, or any such mistakes in matter of Fact in it, as Mr. Baxter saith there are; as likewise, whether I did well or ill in restraining him from preaching in my Diocese; which that all men may the better judge of, I have reprinted likewise those Political Apho­risms of his which were at first annexed to that Letter, not as accusing him for holding them now, [Page 52] but as remembring him of his holding them then, which though it was not the cause (as the Letter tells him) of my Silencing him at first, yet, that together with what he had asserted at the Conference in the Savoy was the cause (as the Letter tells him also) why I continued, and resolved to continue that restraint and Suspension, untill he should make a publick Recantation, as well of what he had affirm­ed in the aforesaid Conference, (namely, The unlaw­fulness of lawfull Commands by lawfull Authority, if by accident they might be the cause or occasion of sin) as likewise of those not onely false and erroneous, but dangerous, seditious and rebellious Maxims of his; which howsoever he may have since repented and recanted, I am sure he had not recanted them then, at least not publickly, or so as I or the World could take notice of it. They therefore that reade the Letter with the Aphorisms annexed to it, and reprinted with it, are to consider them rebus sic stantibus, I mean as things were then when they were first printed. And if Mr. Baxter himself would consider them so too, he must needs confess (if at least he will stand to what he hath written Mr. Baxter justly silenced upon his own grounds. since, even in this very Book, of which he would have me give him my opinion) he must needs con­fess (I say) that he was justly Silenced, or restrain­ed from Preaching, as being then one of Those, who he himself saith are Vid The True and one­ly way of Concord, cir­ca finem. intolerabiles, that is, such, as ought not to be suffered to Preach, as being disturbers of the publick peace, [...], as St. Paul calls them, that is, Seducers of the people, [...], overturning or turning upside down whole Houses or Families, [...], whose mouths (St. Paul saith in the same place) ought to be [Page 53] stopped. And if those mens mouths ought to be stopped, that by Seditious Preaching disturb Fami­lies, how much more ought they to be silenced, that by Printing and Publishing seditious and rebellious Books and Maxims, doe what they can, not onely to disturb, but overthrow whole Churches and King­domes?

But Mr. Baxter will say he doth not own any of those Maxims now: I do not say he does, but I do say he did own them, at least he had not disown'd them then, when I silenced him; and consequently when he was one of those whom he himself calls intolerabiles, or such as ought not to be permitted to Preach, which is enough to justifie what I said or did then. But whether he hath since made or pub­lished any declaration, whereby he hath clearly and fully disown'd all those Seditious Maxims of his, We shall see hereafter.

CHAP. III.

ANd now I should proceed to the consideration of some particulars, which Mr. Baxter is pleased to charge me with in his aforesaid Preface to his afore­said Book of Concord; having I suppose said enough, if not more than enough, already to his general Charge without witness or proof, relating to my [Page 54] aforesaid Letter, had not Mr. Baxter himself sent me by my friend Mr. Isaac Walton, another Book of his called The second part of the Nonconformists Plea for Mr. Baxter 's bundle of ex­torted and distorted Treatises. peace, which he calls an extorted and distorted Trea­tise, or rather a bundle of Treatises bound up toge­ther. And distorted enough indeed it is, but how or by whom it was extorted from him I know not; he seems by the many Books he hath written, to be so ready a Writer, that he needed not to have any thing he writes to be extorted from him. For indeed he is rather one of those, quibus difficile est non scri­bere, who are as hardly to be restrained from Wri­ting, as others are from Preaching. But in this bun­dle of Treatises, whether extorted or not extorted, there is one wherein I am particularly concerned, He calls it, The judgment of Nonconformists of things sinfull by accident; and in his Preface to that whole bundle of Treatises, he saith, This Treatise in par­ticular was written purposely to answer the gross mistaking charge of Bishop Morley.

And truly if he had not said so, or if that Treatise had been Printed by it self, I should neither by the The Bishop's pretended mistake not mentioned in the Treatise written to answer it. Title of it, nor by the Book it self have suspected it to have been purposely written against me, or a­gainst any mistake of mine: For neither in the Title nor in the Book it self do I find Bishop Morley so much as once named, or any way so characterized by any thing I have said or done, as to conclude my self to be understood by it. Nay, I verily believe, that if I should grant all and every one of the sixty four Propositions asserted in that Treatise to be true, yet nevertheless whatsoever I have laid to Mr. Bax­ter's charge in that Letter of mine, would be true also; so that I cannot chuse but wonder that he [Page 55] should say, as he does in the aforesaid Preface, That this particular Treatise of scandal or evil by accident was purposely written to answer the gross mistaking charge of Bishop Morley: whereas the Title page to that Treatise saith no such thing, neither is that wherein he saith the Bishop is so grosly mistaken to be found either in terminis terminantibus or oequipol­lentibus (either in downright terms, or in words that imply as much) in the whole Treatise.

If it be replyed, that as the general Preface to the whole bundle of Treatises called The second Part of the Nonconformists Plea tells me, that I am the man that am guilty of so gross a mistake; so that the Title page to that particular Treatise, We are now speaking of, (though not explicitly and formally, yet implicitly, and intelligibly enough) tells me That gross mistake, what it is. what it was wherein I was so grosly mistaken, namely, in misreporting the Nonconformists judgment of things sinfull by accident.

I rejoyn (first) that unless Mr. Baxter thinks that every body is obliged to reade all that he Writes, he No man bound to reade all Mr. Baxter writes. could not rationally presume, that a man of my age, and one that had so little time left to spare from his more pressing and more important concerns, was likely to enquire after every Book that came out in Print, and to see whether he was concerned in it or no; and it seems Mr. Baxter thought so, and there­fore sent me by Mr. Walton that Book, in the Preface whereunto he saith he did purposely write that Treatise in answer to the gross mistaking charge of Bishop Morley; which I had never seen nor heard of before, nor perhaps should ever have seen or heard of it at all, if Mr. Baxter himself had not sent it to me; and which if he had sent me sooner, I would [Page 56] not have said as I have done in the foregoing Chap­ter, that he had not given so much as any one In­stance of the many mistakes he saith there were in my printed Letter, as indeed he did not where he speaks of them to me; nay, he saith he had laid aside an Answer he had written to that Letter for peace sake, that he might not by opening or publishing so many mistakes of mine, give me any farther cause of being displeased with him. And yet two years Mr. Baxter 's ingenuity. before (mark the ingenuity of the man) he had published a whole Book, consisting of sixty four Pro­positions besides Quoeries, purposely intended then, (though he doth not say so in plain terms, till two years after) for an Answer to Bishop Morley 's gross mistaking charge; though neither then nor since, neither there nor any where else hath he yet told us what that gross mistaking charge is, but leaves it to be guessed at or collected out of the Title page to that Treatise, which he saith he purposely writ for an Answer to it; where­in whether he hath dealt justly and candidly either with me or with his readers, I am now to consider and examine, after I have premised out of what I have already said two or three short preliminary Ob­servations.

Whereof the first is this; That it was not, Three Obser­vations from what hath been said. nor could not be for peace sake, nor because he would not give me any farther provocation, (as in his Preface to his Book of Concord he pretends it was) that he laid aside the Answer he saith he had made to my printed Letter; for then, he would not without any farther provocation on my part, have afterwards printed a whole Book on purpose to con­vince me of one of the many mistakes in that Letter, or rather to expose me to the World, for having been guilty of so gross a mistake as he calls it.

[Page 57] A second observation is this, That naming but one of those many mistakes he saith there were in that Letter of mine, he doth implicitly confess that he could name no more; because by aggrava­ting that as much as he can, he declares he would not have forborn to specifie the rest, if there had been any more to be specified.

And consequently (which I would have to be observed in the third place) That if this which he calls a gross mistake, be no mistake at all of mine, but a very great Mistake, or rather a very great Calumny of his, as I doubt not but I shall prove it is, Mr. Baxter had no reason to charge that Letter of mine with so many mistakes, nor I any reason to thank him for concealing of them.

CHAP. IV.

NOw whether that which Mr. Baxter calls a gross mistaking charge be indeed such a charge He doth not set down the charge in plain terms, but leaves it to be guessed. as he would have it to be believed it is, he should in the first place have in plain and express terms set down that charge of mine, as I have set it down my self in that Letter, wherein he saith that gross mista­king charge is.

For in all debates betwixt rational and ingenuous men (whether in point of opinion, or in matter of fact) the [...] or thing in question, ought to be clearly stated, and agreed on, betwixt the dif­fering [Page 58] Parties, before they can proceed to the pro­ving, or disproving of any thing that is in difference betwixt them: But this (as I said before) Mr. Bax­ter hath not done, but onely affirmed that such a gross mistaking charge there is of Bishop Morley's, and that he hath written and published such a Trea­tise in answer to it, leaving his Readers (as I said before) to guess at what that Charge is, or rather what he would have it thought to be; and that is (as may be collected from the Title page to that Treatise which he calls an Answer to that charge) the Bishop's misreporting the judgment of Nonconfor­mists The Title page is the Trea­tise, wherein he pretends to answer it. of things sinfull by Accident, to make men believe that the Nonconformists Asserted, That whatsoever may be the occasion of sin to any, must be taken away; or that nothing may be imposed, which men may take scandal at, or by Accident turn to sin. And he adds, That to save mens Souls from the guilt of believing this misreport, the Treatise following, (saith the Title page) was published; as likewise to help those to repentance, who have polluted their Souls with falshood and uncharitableness by believing and second­ing such reports.

This I say is the Title page prefixed to the afore­said Treatise, and a very notable one it is. Never Written in as dreadfull a style, as any Pope's Bull. any Pope's Bull came forth with a more dreadfull bellowing against all that shall say, write, preach, print or report, or that shall believe any thing that is said, written, printed, preached or reported by any body else, concerning any of the Nonconformists, though never so truly, or never so well attested, if any Nonconformist, especially such a one as Mr. Baxter, one of the [...], one of those who seem to be Pillars, shall please to disown [Page 59] it; For in that case (saith Mr. Baxter) not onely the reporting any such thing is a gross mistake, but the believing such a report doth so pollute mens Souls with falshood and uncharitableness, that they cannot be saved from the guilt thereof, unless that ensuing Treatise of his do help them to repent of it. So dange­rous a thing, it seems it is, not onely to report, but to give credit to any thing that is reported to the pre­judice either of the doctrine or practice of any of the Godly party; as if they could not err in either, which is in effect to assume unto themselves a more than Popish Infallibility, which is the worst of the Popish errours, as being the ground and foundation of all other heresies or errours that are held by them. And yet they that would be thought the most zea­lous Our zealous Antipapists take up many of the Popish principles. Antipapists do really, though not professedly, sympathize with the Papists in this which is the Root, and in several of the most pernicious Bran­ches, and false doctrines, growing out of this Root, as appears speculatively by Mr. Baxter's Politick Aphorisms, and practically by what was acted by the Nonconformists, before, and in, and after the late Rebellion against the best of Kings by the worst of Subjects; I mean during the Ʋsurpation of the Sovereignty, first by both Houses, and then by one of the Houses of Parliament, and afterwards by Cromwell, and his Son, and lastly by the Rump or the fag-end or worst part of but one of the two Houses.

Again, as they sympathize with the Papists in They have the same arts of keeping their Proselytes. some of the worst of their doctrines and practices, to draw more to them, so they imitate them also in making use of the same arts and artifices for keeping of those whom they have made their Pro­selytes [Page 60] from revolting from them: For as the Ro­mish Confessours do terrifie and fright their Converts, by forbidding them upon the penalty of being guilty of mortal sin, to hear or reade, and much more to give any credit to any thing that is written or spo­ken to confute or disparage any of their doctrines or practices; so I know not what other ends Mr. Baxter could have in prefixing so terrifying and terrible a Title to so petty a Treatise, but to fright Mr. B 's end in this Title. those that have been seduced by him, from making use of their own reason to bring them into the right way again, by hearkening to, or believing of any thing that is or can be said or written by any of us to his prejudice, or to the prejudice of any thing that hath been asserted by him, by telling them be­forehand, that it is no less than a damnable sin, to believe that he, or the Nonconformists, asserted any such thing, as Bishop Morley by a gross mistake im­putes to him, and the rest of the Nonconformists, and therefore that he writ the following Treatise on purpose partly to save mens Souls from the guilt of believing, and partly, to help them to repentance, that have polluted their souls by believing that gross mistake or misreport of the aforesaid Bishop. Whereunto he adds in another place, that it was the fear he should die with the guilt of silence upon him, if he had not published the aforesaid Treatise in order to the afore­said ends, that made him write it and publish it; as if the salvation of so many mens souls had depended upon it, which if Mr. Baxter himself did believe to If it be so as he says, he was highly to blame for not publishing this Treatise sooner. be true, then wo be to all those that died in the be­lief of the truth of Bishop Morley's charge before the publishing of this Treatise, and wo to Mr. Baxter himself for publishing this Treatise no sooner. For [Page 61] the first Edition of this his admirable both [...] and [...], of this his severeign both Antidote to prevent, and Restorative to recover those Souls that were otherwise in danger to be lost for ever, for believing, or for not repenting their belief of Bishop Morley's charge, was not published untill the year 76, which was 14 years at least after Bishop Morley's charge was printed. And how did Mr. Baxter know, but that many hundred Souls during that long interval might be infected with that so dangerous a sin of believing the truth of that Charge, and die in that belief without repentance, merely for want of being helped to it by this so effi­cacious or none-such a remedy, as is prescribed by him in this Treatise?

Again how could Mr. Baxter himself tell but that Ʋpon his own account as well as others. he might have died in less than 14 years, (which is double the age of a man in Law) especially consider­ing the dying condition he so often tells us he is in, and was in many years before? And then I would fain know, how his deferring so long to publish this so sovereign an Antidote and Remedy against so malignant, and Soulkilling a disease, could consist either with the charity he owes to other mens Souls, or the care of his own? For if it be true that when he did publish it, it was (as he tells us it was) For fear of dying with the guilt of silence upon him; why should not the same cause have produced the same effect sooner? Truly Mr. Baxter had little care of his own as well as of other mens Souls in the mean time, if he himself believes what he would have other men to believe, namely, that the believing of Bishop Morley's mistaking Charge is of so very dangerous a consequence to those that die without [Page 62] repentance for their believing of it. And therefore I verily believe that this was but an hyperbolical His design to draw an odi­um upon the Bishop from all the Non­conformists. strain of Mr. Baxter's Rhetorick, to enhance the grossness of Bishop Morley's mistaking Charge, and to make his Readers more averse from believing of it; and withall, to make the Bishop himself the more odious to all the Nonconformists, by insinua­ting, that what the Bishop had affirmed to be the assertion of Mr. Baxter, he had affirmed to be the judgment of all the Nonconformists. For why else doth he entitle the Treatise, which he saith was purposely written to Answer that gross mistaking Charge of Bishop Morley, why doth he intitle it I say, The judgment of the Nonconformists? as if what I had laid to his charge, I had laid to the charge of all the Nonconformists; or as if what I had said he had maintained in the Conference at the Savoy concerning things sinfull per Accidens, I had said, all the Nonconformists had maintained it also; which I never said, nor never thought they did.

CHAP. V.

FOr indeed I know not what the judgment of Nonconformists (if by Nonconformists he mean all the Nonconformists) is in this or in any other particular, except it be in being Dissenters from the Government and discipline of our Church, as it is by Law established; no nor what is the judgment of all the Nonconformists of any one species or kind of them, (whether Presbyterians or Independents or Anabaptists or Antinomians or any other of any one denomination) as to this particular. And therefore I could not, I am sure I did not, say this or that was the judgment, or that this or that was asserted by the Nonconformists; unless Mr. Baxter will say, that He and all the Nonconformists are and must be always of the same mind and judg­ment, and consequently, that what I said was assert­ed by him, I must needs mean it to be asserted by them all also. As if he were to all the Nonconfor­mists what the Pope is to all the Papists, virtu­ally Mr. B. makes himself the Head of the Nonconfor­mists and their Advo­cate; their whole Church; and therefore as all Pa­pists professing to believe as the Church believes, must needs believe as the Pope believes; so all Non­conformists, because they agree with him in Non­conformity, must therefore needs be of his mind in all things else also; because he takes upon him to [Page 64] be their head, or at least to be their mouth or Ad­vocate General for all of them; as appears by the Title he gives to those two Books of his, which he calls The first and second part of the Nonconformists Plea for Peace; as if they all spake by his mouth, or had all of them made him their Proxy to speak for them: which if they have done, why doth he not shew us his Commission for it? which as he hath not done yet, so I am confident he will never be able to doe, no not from all, or from the most of any one Without their Commission or approbation. party of the Nonconformists. Which I am the bolder to affirm, because having sometimes occasionally made use of his Authority in point of opinion, and of his Example in point of practice, for the convincing of some both Presbyterians and Independents, who by their practice seemed to be of another judgment in diverse things, than he was, I found that what he said or did signified little or nothing unto them: Nay, they told me in plain terms, that I was very much mistaken, if I thought that Mr. Baxter's either judgment or practice was of so great weight with them, as for that reason onely, to make them alter their own either judgment or practice in any thing whatsoever: So that it doth not follow, that because Bishop Morley in that printed Letter of his saith that this or that was Mr. Baxter's Assertion, therefore he said, or must be understood as if he had said, it was the assertion of all or indeed of any o­ther of the Nonconformists but of Mr. Baxter himself onely. Of any other I say; for I did not so much His two As­sistants at the Savoy confe­rence dis­charged from that Asserti­on. as charge both or either of those two Nonconformists, that were Mr. Baxter's Assistants at that Conference with asserting what he asserted. Nay, I do in that Letter of mine discharge them both from concurring [Page 65] with him in that Assertion, which I lay unto his charge, though he saith, he concurr'd with them in it. I charge him with it, because (as I tell him in my printed Letter) he did often affirm and declare it to be his; and I discharge them from it, because neither of them did affirm or declare it to be theirs, but rather seem'd to dislike it, and to dissent from him in it.

But why then (will he say) do I say Crimine ab u­no disce omnes, From ones ill carriage you may know the rest; which seems to imply that what I charge upon him I charge upon his whole party, as I do indeed, but not in that same place, nor speaking of the same mater, but for their censuring and con­demning all other Protestant Churches in the World The Noncon­formists con­demn all Pro­testant Chur­ches. as well as ours, as Mr. Baxter did expresly at the Conference aforesaid, because They as well as We re­fuse to give the Communion to those that will not receive it so, as by publick order it is to be received. And it was upon account of this proud, peevish and censorious humour (of which I take all the Non­conformists, and amongst them the Presbyterians espe­cially, to be more or less guilty) that I then (taking Mr. Baxter to be a Presbyterian) said Crimine ab uno disce omnes; that is, By one man's ill temper you may know the whole party.

But then as by Omnes All of them, I did not mean all the Nonconformists, so I did not mean all the Pres­byterians neither, but those of England and Scot­land All the Pres­byterians a­broad agree with us in the main point a­gainst our Presbyteri­ans. onely; all foreign Presbyterians, that allow of and practice Calvin's Scheme of Discipline and Go­vernment of the Church, agreeing with us against our Presbyterians in the main difference betwixt us and them; namely that as it is in the power of a Na­tional [Page 66] Church, to appoint and prescribe to those of her own Communion the usage of such indifferent things, as she shall think to be most for order, de­cency and edification in the publick service and worship of God; so it is in her power also, to ob­lige all of her Communion, to the use and observa­tion of all such indifferent things after they are pre­scribed and enjoyned (as long as they continue to be so) under the penalty of Excommunication, or of being excluded out of the Society or Commu­nion of that Church, if they do not comply, and much more if they preach or write against any such orders or ordinances, as are made by publick Au­thority, or by the Representatives of the whole Society: and most of all, if they deny theChurches power to ordain and enjoyn any such orders or or­dinances; of all which Crimes, or degrees of the same crime, no other Presbyterians are guilty (for ought I know) but those of England and Scotland onely; or if perhaps some be, they are excluded from Communion with the National Church where­in they live as well as Nonconformists are with us here in England; so that in Holland it self (where it is said any man may chuse his own Religion, or be of what Religion he will) no man that will not subscribe to the Synod of Dort in Rituals as well as Doctrinals is, or can be admitted to be a member, and much less a Preacher in that Church: no nor to the exercise of any Office Civil, or Ecclesiastical in their Church or State. It is true, they suffer men of all Religions to live amongst them, Luthe­rans Why all Reli­gions tolera­ted in Hol­land, and how. as well as Calvinists, Arminians as well as An­tiarminians, nay Papists as well as Protestants, and Jews as well as Christians, but not as members of [Page 67] their Church who are Calvinists, and Calvinists onely. The rest indeed beforenamed are some of them conniv'd at, and some of them permitted to have their Meetings and preaching after their own way, but it is at their own charge, and severely punishable if they preach or print any thing to the reproach or scandal of the Religion allowed of and established by the State.

We wish no more, will our Sectaries perhaps say, Let us have but so much liberty as this upon the same terms, and We will thank God and you for it. But what security will you or any of you give us, that when you have that liberty, you will not all of you joyn together to destroy our Religion, though you know not what to set up instead of it? We see you have done so once already, and attempt­ed it often both before and since, and why may not you do so again? For the Laws were against you then, as much as they are now, and so was the Such Tolera­tion not prac­ticable with­out the charge of a standing Army. King too. And therefore granting such a Tolerati­on of several Sects of Religion, or ways of Belief and Worship, as there are in Holland; it is not pos­sible (humanely speaking) to secure the pub­lick peace either of Church or State, but by keeping up a standing Army of thirty or forty thousand men always in pay (even in times of peace) with a powerfull Fleet at Sea, as the Hollanders do to secure themselves from Insurrections at home, as well as Invasions from abroad. Now whether the People of England will be content to be at such a Charge, and to live under such a Government, those that would have such a Liberty of Conscience, or Toleration of Religion as there is in Holland, let them [Page 68] enquire of the peoples Representatives, and Petition them to that purpose at their next meeting.

In the mean time all their Pleas for Peace are but sowing the seeds of War, or like Cadmus sowing the serpents teeth, which presently grew up to so many armed men, and presently fell a cutting one anothers throats; which though it will not be the first work the Sectaries will doe, yet it will come to that at last.

For preventing whereof, considering the nature of man, and the animosity, and the irreconcileableness of differences in Religion, there is no other way to secure the publick Peace either in Church or State, no nor the several Sectaries themselves, from out­raging and destroying one another, but either the suppressing of them all, by execution of the Laws that are or may be made against them, or by over­awing of them all by such a standing force, as may be always ready and able to keep them from joyning together against the Government, or to dissipate them if they should joyn.

But if the safety of the Government might be pre­served and secured by either of the two aforesaid The necessity the Hollan­ders lie under of keeping up a standing force at Land and Sea. Ways, why did not the States of the Ʋnited Pro­vinces (may some men say) make use of the former, rather than the latter of these Expedients, in order to that end? I answer, because they were always after their revolt from Spain in danger of Invasion from abroad, as well as of differences and divisions among themselves at home; and therefore, there was and always will be a necessity of their having and keeping up such a force both at Land and Sea, for their own defence against their potent and con­fining Enemies, as could not possibly be supported [Page 69] and maintained, but by so vast an Income of Re­venue as was not to be expected from so small a Ter­ritory as theirs is, though never so industriously husbanded, or thriftily managed, without the help of many more hands, than their own to work and fight for them; and of many more mouths than their own, to consume what the Commodities of their own growth and their trading with other Na­tions brings in to them; together with the product of that Consumption by the Excise that is laid upon Their Excise and other Taxes. all things that are eat, or drunk, or worn, or bought or sold amongst them: And hence it is, and from other Taxes and Impositions (which are grea­ter than any that by the Turks are imposed up­on the Christians) which all that live amongst them are subject to, that they are able to maintain such Armies and Navies as they do and must do for their defence against any sudden and powerfull Invasion of them by their enemies that lie round about them; and this makes them not onely to suf­fer as many as will, but to invite and incourage as many as they can, to come and live there, by let­ting them to be of what Religion they please a­mongst themselves (so they contribute to the publick Charges as well as they who are of the Religion of the Countrey) because the more mouths they have to eat and drink, the more hands they are able to keep in pay, to oppose any Invasion from without, and withall to suppress and prevent any Commotion or Insurrection from within also. So that there the Toleration of so many Sects and Sectaries as are a­mongst them, is not onely not dangerous, but in a Political sense very usefull and advantageous to that Government, by helping them to keep up and pay [Page 70] their Army, which otherwise they must have kept up wholly at their own Charges; by which Army, the Sectaries that help to keep it up are themselves kept under.

But here with us (thanks be to God) there is no need of having or keeping up a Standing Army, to We under no such necessity. defend us against Invasions from abroad; being na­turally fortified and intrenched within so wide and deep a ditch as cannot be passed on a sudden to sur­prize us, nor at all with such a Force as may very much indanger us, but We shall hear of it time enough to provide against it, by joyning all of us (I mean all the whole Nation) together to oppose it, as certainly all of us, (unless we be mad, or worse than mad) shall do upon such an occasion, when our lives, our Wives and all that We have are at stake. And therefore (I say) We need not always be at the Charge of keeping up an Army, against any fo­reign Enemy, having the Sea for our Wall, and our Ships for our Bulwarks, nor for the preventing of any Insurrection or Rebellion at home neither, if the good Laws which are already made be put in execution, especially those that are made to secure Provided the Laws be put in execution. the established Government both in Church and State; I mean those Laws that are made against all Recusants or Nonconformists, by what name soever they are specified or distinguished: But if instead of putting those Laws in execution, there shall be such a Toleration granted here, as there is in Holland, there will be a necessity of raising and keeping up such a standing Army here, as there is there, though not to defend us against our Enemies abroad, yet to keep peace and prevent a Civil War at home, which will infallibly be the product of such a Toleration, [Page 71] if there be not always a Standing Army to prevent it; and truly if there must be such an Army, it is but reason, that they for the keeping down of whom it is raised and kept up, should be at all the charge of raising and keeping up of it.

CHAP. VI.

BUt to return from this long (though I hope not altogether impertinent or unseasonable) Di­gression, to what I was before speaking of; I say Mr. Baxter unjustly chargeth me with charging all, or any of the Nonconformists, but himself onely with that which he calls the gross mistaking charge of Bishop Morley.

And therefore if all, or any of the Nonconformists▪ think themselves injured to have this Assertion said or thought to be theirs, they may be pleased to take notice whom they are to thank or to blame for it; it is Mr. Baxter, and not Bishop Morley that imputes it to them. And if the believing of Mr. Baxter's holding and maintaining such an assertion be of so dangerous a consequence, that it puts a man into a state of damnation that doth believe it; then Wo be to me, and to all that were then there, (I mean at the Conference in the Savoy) whether Conformists or Nonconformists; for all of them as well as I, heard him assert it, and therefore they cannot chuse but believe (whether they will or no) that it was his [Page 72] Assertion, because they heard him assert it, and that not once or twice onely but often; nay Wo especial­ly, Wo be to Mr. Baxter himself, who knows it was his Assertion; and therefore though he may, and I believe doth repent his asserting of it, yet he cannot disbelieve that he did assert it, though he were never so willing or desirous to do so; for Nescit vox missa reverti, A word once spoke is not to be recalled: and he cannot chuse but remember what he cannot forget, having been then, and since, so often put in mind of it: So that Mr. Baxter has pronounced a dreadfull sentence against himself, if the believing that he asserted what I charge him with, be not indeed a gross mistake (as he calls it) which whether it be or no is now to be considered.

CHAP. VII.

IN order whereunto We are first to consider, what the Assertion was that I charge Mr. Baxter with­all, He in his Title page to the Treatise (which he saith was purposely written to answer that Charge) saith it was this (viz.) ‘Whatsoever may be the Occasion of sin to any, must be taken away; or that Nothing may be imposed which Men may take scan­dal at, or by Accident turn to sin.’ But the truth is that neither the one nor the other of these Asserti­ons, was that with which I charged Mr. Baxter, [Page 73] either in my Sermon at Kidderminster, or in my printed Letter; but that Assertion which I charged him with, both in my aforesaid Sermon, and in my aforesaid Letter, was this, and no other but this. viz. ‘That the enjoyning things lawfull by lawfull Authority, if they may by Accident be the Occasion of Sin, is sinfull:’ From whence, (if it were true) it would follow, that nothing may be imposed, that may be Accident be the occasion of Sin, nor con­sequently the Common Prayer Book, which was then the thing in question; but then it would follow like­wise, that nothing at all could be impos'd (as I then told Mr. Baxter, and since repeated in my aforesaid Letter) by any Civil, any more than by any Ecclesiastical, nor by any Divine, more than by any Humane Authority; because there is nothing which either man or God himself hath commanded, but considering the pravity of humane nature, it may by Accident, be the occasion of Sin. Now that this Assertion, which draws along with it all these Consequences, was that very Assertion, with which I charge Mr. Baxter in my Letter, and did charge him with in my Sermon, appears partly by the Letter it self, which I have reprinted, and part­ly by a Passage in a book Mr. Baxter had printed before, which was the occasion of my Writing and printing that Letter, and therefore I have reprinted that provoking passage of his also; both which I must desire the Reader of these Papers to peruse before­hand, that he may be the better able to judge whe­ther what I have said already, touching what was the Assertion I charged him with, as likewise, what I shall say to prove he did assert it, be true or no; and consequently whether I in charging him with [Page 74] it was grosly mistaken, or he, in denying he as­serted it, be not worse than grosly mistaken. For surely he cannot chuse but know and remember whether he asserted it or no. But Affirmantis est probare, (as I said before) It lies upon him who affirms a thing, to prove it; and therefore seeing he denies it, I must prove it.

CHAP. VIII.

AND to that end, it is to be considered what kind of thing it is, which is in question be­twixt us; it is not matter of dispute, either Specu­lative, or Practical; (as that was, which was in question betwixt our Disputants and him and his Assistants, at the Savoy-Conference) but a mere matter of fact; namely, whether he did then and there assert, what I in my printed Letter do af­firm The thing charged upon Mr B. mat­ter of Fact, and prov'd by Testimony. he did then and there assert, or no: which being (as I said before) mere matter of fact, is not to be proved or disproved by Metaphysical no­tions or Logical distinctions, but by the Testimony, pro or con, of Witnesses, that were then and there present, and such, as against whom there lies no exception; such, I am sure, I have produced to prove my Affirmative, as appears by their Sub­scriptions to my printed and reprinted Letter. [Page 75] And this Testimony of theirs, to prove my Affirma­tive, was by me produc'd and published, presently af­ter Mr. Baxter had complained in print to those whom he calls his Parishioners of Kidderminster, (though they were never so legally) that what I had said of him in a Sermon to them, was not true, but onely made use of by me, to defame him, that so he might seem to be justly prohibited by me to preach the Gospel.

Presently (I say) after this his printed com­plaint The Bishop's Letter when and why printed. of me, I printed that Letter of mine, part­ly to vindicate and confirm the truth of what I had said, or rather meant of him (for I did not name him) and partly to justify my self for silen­cing of him, which was not for what he had said at the Conference in the Savoy, or for what I said in my Sermon he had said there, but upon another account; namely, for preaching in my Diocese be­fore he had obtained or asked any leave to doe so, as is fully declared and proved by the aforesaid Let­ter; which though it was written and published for both of the aforesaid ends, yet that Attestati­on subscribed and annexed to it, as it was at first printed, so it is now reprinted again, not to justi­fie my silencing of Mr. Baxter, or to prove that what he had said at the Conference, was the cause of his being silenced by me, but onely to attest the truth of what I had said in my Sermon first, and afterwards in my printed Letter, Mr. Baxter had said or asserted in the aforesaid Conference; The Attestati­on why an­nexed to it. which affirmation of mine and attestation of theirs (if it had not been true, and generally taken and acknowledged to be so) why in all this time (it being twenty years since that Letter of mine with [Page 76] that Attestation of theirs was first printed) why I say in all that time, hath none, no not so much as one of all the Nonconformists that were present at the Conference, ever as yet appeared, either to deny No notice ta­ken of it for twenty years. the one, or to disprove the other, except Mr. Bax­ter himself onely? Nor he himself neither, till the very last year, that is, not till his Second part of the Nonconformist's plea for Peace was printed. For in the Preface of that Book it is, that Master Baxter first tells the World and me of the gross mistaking charge of Bishop Morley, meaning (as I suppose) my charging of him, and consequent­ly (as he thinks, or rather would have it to be thought) all the Nonconformists with this Asserti­on, That a Command of a thing lawfull in it self, by lawfull Authority, if it may by Accident be the occasion of Sin, is unlawfull; and consequently that no such thing ought to be imposed; or if there be any such imposition, it ought to be taken away.

The first of which three Assertions, I acknow­ledge to be that which I charge Mr. Baxter with; but not all, or any other of the Nonconformists, besides Mr. Baxter himself. The two last are not The Conse­quences of Mr. B 's As­sertion. charged upon him by me, but are his own Collec­tions from that I charge him with, as being indeed the necessary Consequences of it. For if the command of a lawfull thing by lawfull Authority be unlawfull, if it may by accident be the occasion of Sin, then indeed it will necessarily follow first, that there ought to be no such Command or Imposition; and secondly too, that if there be any such Command or Imposition, it ought to be taken away. For Ʋno absurdo dato, mille sequuntur; that is, If you grant one absurdity, a thousand will follow at the [Page 77] heels of it: and from this Topick he may conclude against the lawfulness of any Command whatsoe­ver, as I said before, and as I then told him. Where­upon (as it is in my Letter) when I first charged him with the horrible consequences of this Asserti­on of his, he denyed the Assertion it self; I mean, he denied that he had asserted it, untill the very words of it, which he had written a little before with his own hand, were produc'd and read before His Assertion written with his own hand. all the Company; then indeed he added another rea­son, why the Command of a lawfull thing by lawfull Authority, might be unlawfull, namely if it were commanded under an unjust penalty; Whereunto he afterward added another, or a 3d reason also, name­ly, if the Evil per Accidens were such as was foreseen, and ought to have been prevented or provided a­gainst by the Commander. But neither of these two last or additional reasons did make him quit or forego his first: For it was that, and onely that which he stuck to at last, when his other two rea­sons were by our Disputants wrested from him, or made useless to him; as may appear to any ratio­nal man, that will but cast an eye upon their Ar­guments and his Answers to them, as they are an­nex'd to my Letter at the end of it, where he shall find that our Disputants, being to prove, that what our Church commands to be done in the publick The first Ar­gument at the Savoy Confe­rence. service of God by those of her Communion, was lawfull for her to command; Their first Argument was this, (viz.)

• That Command (supposing it to be the Command of a lawfull Superiour) which commands an Act in it self lawfull, and no other act or circumstance un­lawfull, is not sinfull.
• [Page 78] But such were all the Commands or Injunctions of our Church in the book of Common-Prayer.
• Er­go, &c.

I Subjoyn the Minor to the Major of this Syllogism, because by Mr. Baxter's not denying of the Minor, which every one believed and expected he would have denied, he seems to grant that to be true; and consequently that there is nothing in that Book injoyned or commanded by our Church, but what is lawfull in it self; otherwise no doubt he would have denied the Minor, rather than the Major; Mr. B 's rea­son for denying the Major. but (as I said before) he denied the Major, first be­cause that may be a Sin per accidens, which is not so in it self, and therefore the command thereof may be unlawfull, though that Accident be not in the Command: This (I say) was the first reason he gave for his denying of the Major, as he himself con­fesseth in his printed Address to those of Kiddermin­ster. Afterwards indeed, upon my urging him with those horrid consequences of such an Assertion, he added another reason for his denying the Major, or for his denying the lawfulness of the command of a lawfull thing by a lawfull Superiour, namely, if it were commanded under an unjust penalty; for the invalidating or nullifying rather of which second reason, our Disputants second Syllogism was this, The 2d. Syllo­gism.

• That Command which commandeth an act in it self lawfull, and no other act whereby any unjust penalty is enjoyned, &c. is a lawfull command.
• But that which the Church commands is in it self lawfull, and is not commanded under an unjust penalty,
• Ergo &c.

And here again, one would have thought Mr. Baxter would have denied the Minor, but he did not; and [Page 79] therefore as his not denying the Minor of the first Syllogism, was in effect a Confession, that our Church commands nothing in that Book but what is lawfull in it self, so his not denying of the Minor of the se­cond Syllogism, is in effect, a confession also, that the Church injoyns nothing in that Book under an unjust penalty: for still the Proposition he denies is the Major in this Syllogism, as well as in the for­mer, without taking any exception to the Minor in either of them.

But why did he deny the Major of this Syllo­gism? Mr B. denies the Major a­gain, and his peevish rea­son for his so doing. or what reason or reasons did he give for it? Why the very self same, and no other than he gave for his denial of the former; namely, because the first Act commanded may per Accidens be unlaw­full, and be commanded under an unjust penalty; which in plain terms, is all one as if he had said, The Command of a thing lawfull in it self is sinfull, be­cause a thing lawfull in it self may by Accident be­come sinfull (which is the very Assertion I charge him withall) or because a thing commanded under no unjust penalty, may be commanded under an unjust penalty; Whereas our Major Proposition, which he denied, asserts the lawfulness of such a Command onely, as is commanded under no un­just Penalty.

Yet because there was one starting hole more, Another start­ing hole of his. which Mr. Baxter might think to get out at; namely that though the thing commanded were lawfull in it self, and though it were commanded under no un­just Penalty, yet if by Accident it might be the oc­casion of such an evil as the Commander ought to provide against, the commanding of it must needs be sinfull and unlawfull; to stop up this gap, or [Page 80] starting hole (I say) our Disputants added a third Syllogism to the former, of which the Major Propo­sition was this,

• That Command which commandeth an Act in it self lawfull, and no other Act whereby any unjust
  The 3d. Syl­logism.
  penalty is injoyned, nor any circumstance whence di­rectly, or per Accidens any Sin is consequent, which the Commander ought to provide against, hath in it all things requisite to the lawfulness of it, and par­ticularly cannot be guilty of commanding an Act per Accidens unlawfull, nor of commanding an Act under an unjust penalty:
• But such are all the things commanded by our Church in the aforesaid Book.
• Ergo—&c.

And here again Mr. Baxter without excepting a­gainst Mr. B. in ef­fect grants the Premisses and denies the Conclu­sion. the Minor Proposition, denied the Major, without giving any other reason for it, but what he had given before; which was in effect to grant both the Premisses, and deny the Conclusion: for the Major is so self-evident a Proposition, that We thought he that could have the confidence to deny it, was not a man any longer to be disputed with.

Now that these were our Arguments, and that these were his Answers, written, and given in with The Attesta­tion made by Dr. Gunning and Dr. Pear­son never so much as que­stioned. his own hand, appears by the attestation of Dr. Gun­ning now Bishop of Ely, and Dr. Pearson now Bishop of Chester, and then both of them the Primarii Pro­fessores Theologiae (the King's and the Lady Marga­ret's Professours of Divinity) in the University of Cambridge, and two of the three Disputantsfor the Common-Prayer-Book against Mr. Baxter and his Assistants; which Attestation of theirs being printed and published twenty years ago, and never since contradicted, or so much as questioned by any of [Page 81] the contrary party, no not so much as by Mr. Bax­ter himself, to this day, I hope there needs no other proof of the truth of it. And if that Attestation be true, then it is evident, that Mr. Baxter did affirm and maintain as well as he could, from first to last, in the Conference, That the command of a thing law­full in it self, by lawfull Authority, was unlawfull, if by The Assertion charged home upon-Mr. B. Accident it might be the occasion of Sin; though it were not commanded under an unjust penalty, and though that evil, whereof it might be the occasion by Acci­dent, were not such as the Commander was obliged to provide against; For all this he thatdenies the aforesaid Major Proposition of the last ofthe aforesaid three Syl­logisms, as Mr. Baxter did, must needs grant, and con­sequently must he needs grant and assert also, (if he will not contradict himself) That any command of a­nything though never so lawfull in it self, by what Au­thority soever it is commanded, is unlawfull, if it may be the occasion of Sin though per Accidens onely; and though that Accidental Sin or evil be such, as the Commander either did not, or could not foresee, or was not obliged to provide against it: For all this is consequentially and necessarily affirmed and asserted by him that denies the aforesaid Major Pro­position for no other reason, but because the Com­mand may by Accident be the Occasion of Sin. But if Mr. Baxter shall say he gave another reason for his denial of the aforesaid Proposition, namely, that such a Command, though never so lawfull in it self, might become unlawfull, if it were commanded under an unjust penalty; I confess he did, but most illogically and irrationally; because one of the con­ditions of the Command which the Proposition af­firms, and Mr. Baxter denies to be lawfull, is, that [Page 82] it must not be commanded under an unjust penalty, and the reason why Mr. Baxter denies it to be law­full, is, because it is or at least it may be command­ed under an unjust Penalty: which is all one as if he had said that which is not so, is so, because it may be so.

This reason therefore being so expressly excluded as it is from being any reason at all why the Propo­sition which Mr. Baxter denied should be, or could be denied with any shew or colour of reason, there was nothing left him to resort to or rely on as his last refuge, but his first reason; namely, because such a command, though it was not commanded under an unjust penalty, yet it might be the occasion of Sin per Accidens, and therefore unlawfull to be com­manded; which being given for a reason for his de­nying of the aforesaid Proposition of the last Syllo­gism, he could not mean it of such an evil per Acci­dens as that the commander ought to provide against, because it was another of the Conditions expressly required by the Proposition it self, to make a Com­mand lawfull, that as it should not command any thing evil in it self, so it should not command any thing neither though never so good in it self, that might by accident be the occasion of such an evil, as the Commander ought to prevent or provide a­gainst; so that the occasion of evil in that sense per Accidens, could not be the reason why Mr. Baxter denied the Proposition; and therefore by evil per Accidens in relation to this Proposition and his de­nial of it, he must needs mean such an evil per Ac­cidens, as was neither commanded under an unjust penalty, nor such as the Commander was obliged to hinder or prevent. Whence it follows that [Page 83] Bishop Morley's charging him with asserting, That the command of that which is lawfull in it self is un­lawfull, The Bishop's charge a­gainst Mr. B. no gross mi­stake. if it may by Accident be the occasion of Sin, was not, as Mr. Baxter saith it was, a gross mistake, or any mistake at all, though he had not asserted it in terminis, or in express terms, as he did often when he gave it for the first of his reasons why he denied the Major Proposition of the first of the aforesaid Syllogisms.

CHAP. IX.

FRom hence it follows likewise that all those In­stances (which Mr. Baxter assigns and alledges in his Narrative to his friends at Kidderminster, to free himself from the Assertion I charge him with, and which his denial of the aforesaid Proposition doth necessarily and manifestly convince him of) are all of them frivolous and impertinent, and not so onely but fraudulent, and scandalous, and injurious also; I mean those instances which he gives of such evils per Accidens, as make the Commands of things good and lawfull in themselves to become evil and unlawfull.

As, saith he, ‘ To command out a Navy to Sea, is not Mr. B 's In­stance of com­manding out a Navy to Sea. unlawfull in it self, but if it were foreseen they would fall into the enémies hands, or were like to perish [Page 84] by any Accident, and the necessity of sending them were small or none, it were a Sin to send them. Again (saith Mr. Baxter) it is not unlawfull of it self to sell poison, or to give a knife to another, or Of selling poy­son. to bid another to doe it, but if it were foreseen (he must mean by him that sells the poyson, or gives the knife) that they will be used to poyson or kill the buyer (he might have added, or any body else) it is unlawfull. He goes on and saith, It is not of it self unlawfull to light a Candle, or set fire on straw, but if it may be (he should have said if it be) Of lighting a candle. foreknown (to him) that by another's negligence or wilfulness it is like to set fire to the City, or give fire to a train of Gun-powder that is under the Par­liament House when the King and Parliament are there, I crave the Bishop's pardon (saith he) for believing it were Sinfull to doe or command it.’ You All granted have it, Mr. Baxter, you have the Bishop's pardon not onely for believing as you say you do in this last, but in all the former particulars which you in­stance in also: And I do assure you the Bishop be­lieves them all as much as you do, and so I am confident do all the Episcopal Party in England; for they are all of them notoriously and unquestio­nably true; and are undoubtedly sufficient to prove the Command of a thing lawfull in it self to be un­lawfull, if the Commander foresees it will be by Acci­dent the cause or occasion of such an evil or mischief as he ought to prevent.

But what is this to the proving the Command of a thing lawfull in it self to be unlawfull, if it may be by Nothing to the purpose. Accident the cause or occasion of some such evil as the Commander doth not foresee, or is not bound to pre­vent? For such a Command it must be, that Mr. [Page 85] Baxter by his denial of the aforesaid Proposition is obliged to prove to be unlawfull; and therefore the more of such Instances as these he doth or may al­ledge, the more he seems to prevaricate in his own Mr. B 's pre­varication. cause, and to argue against himself; just as I have heard a Pleader at the Barr did in Westminster Hall, when the Judge interrupting him, said to him, You, such a one, if you love your Client or his cause, speak no more; for you are all this while speaking against him, though you think you speak for him: The like may I say of Mr. Baxter, and of his Instances, because they do not onely not disprove, but prove and confirm the truth of my Charge against him. For if it be the Commander's foreseeing, and being obliged to prevent such an evil or mischief as his Command will be (though but per Accidens) the occasion of, that makes his command to be unlawfull; then if the Commander do not foresee it, or be not obliged to prevent it, the Command is not unlaw­full; as Mr. Baxter by his denying of the aforesaid The charge against him stands good. Proposition must needs conclude it was; so that all his aforesaid Instances are (as I said before) frivolous and impertinent, as to the disproving of my Charge against him, or to the proving of it to be a gross mistaking Charge, as he saith it is.

CHAP. X.

ANd so is the other Instance of his likewise which makes the two reasons (which in his aforesaid Answer he did severally insist upon) to be but one, namely, ‘ Supposing (saith he) to kneel at the Sacrament to be never so lawfull in it self, if it be imposed by a His Instance of kneeling at the Sacra­ment as fri­volous; penalty incomparably beyond the proportion of the of­fence, that Penalty is an accident of the Command, and maketh it by Accident sinfull in the Commander.’ This instance I say of his, though he speaks of it as very pertinent and argumentative, yet is it as frivo­lous and impertinent as any of the former; I mean as to the discharging him from the Charge I charge him with, and which his denying of the aforesaid Proposition proves him to be guilty of. For sup­posing all that he supposeth in this Instance to be Supposing an unjustpenalty; never so true; namely, that the penalty for not re­ceiving the Sacrament is an accident to the com­mand of Kneeling, and supposing too, that penalty to be incomparably beyond the proportion of the offence, and consequently must needs make the com­mand it self to be Sinfull in the Commander of it under such a penalty; supposing all this (I say) to be true: what then? Doth this prove the Com­mand of a thing lawfull in it self and commanded under no unjust penalty to be sinfull in the Comman­der of it? For this it must prove, or it proves nothing [Page 87] at all, as to the discharging Mr. Baxter from what his denial of the aforesaid proposition proves against him. For doth not that proposition say [...] or in express words, that ‘ The command which it affirms to be a lawfull command, must, first, command an act in it self lawfull; and, secondly, no other Act whereby an unjust penalty is injoyned; nor, thirdly, any circumstance whence directly or per Accidens any Sin is consequent, which the Commander ought to provide against?’ And yet such a Command so quali­fied did Mr. Baxter then deny to be lawfull, as ap­pears by the aforesaid subscribed Attestation. And now, what he then denied to be lawfull, though it were not commanded under an unjust penalty, he would by this instance prove to be unlawfull, be­cause it is commanded, or rather because he sup­poseth it to be commanded under an unjust penalty. Quo te constringam Protea nodo? What tye can hold one, who so Proteus like shifts his shape? For whe­ther it be or be not commanded under an unjust pe­nalty, the command it seems must be alike unlaw­full, if Mr. Baxter and his Disciples list not to o­bey it, that is, if they themselves are not the Com­manders of it.

Again supposing, but not granting Mr. Baxter's supposed unjust penalty for not kneeling at the re­ceiving And supposing such an acci­dent as the commander ought to pro­vide again?. of the Sacrament to be an Accident to the command of kneeling; I ask him, whether it be such an accident as the Commander ought to pro­vide against, or no? If not, how can it be sinfull in the Commander to command it? or how can it make his commanding of it to be unlawfull? But if it be such an Accident as the Commander ought to provide against, (as indeed every unjust penalty is) [Page 88] then this instance of his is altogether as frivolous and impertinent as any of his former. For that command which we affirmed, and he denied to be lawfull, and consequently asserted to be unlawfull, was to be such a Command as commanded an Act lawfull in it self, and no other Act whence directly or per Ac­cidens any Sin is consequent, which the Comman­der ought to provide against: But this instance of his, is of such a Command, as is per accidens at least the cause or occasion of some such evil, or sin, as the Commander ought or is obliged to provide against. Whereas if he had meant to speak pertinently (in order to the discharging himself from my charge a­gainst him) he should have given us an Instance of the unlawfulness of a lawfull command by lawfull Authority, where no evil which the Commander ought to provide against, was any way consequent either directly or by Accident onely. But this he hath not done yet, nor I dare say ever will doe, or can doe, though the Metaphysical Limbeck of his brain sweat never so much for it.

CHAP. XI.

ANd thus having (as I suppose) made it appear that all Mr. Baxter's Instances are frivolous and impertinent as to the proving what I charge him with, to be a gross mistake, or indeed any mistake [Page 89] at all, I am now to make it appear also, that those before specified Instances of his, are not onely fri­volous and impertinent, but fraudulent, scandalous and injurious, and (I am afraid) malicious also, as to the intention and design of them.

And first, they are fraudulent, and fraudulent­ly The fraudu­lence of these Instances de­tected. alledged by Mr. Baxter, because by all and eve­ry of those Instances, he would make his Readers to believe that all that he had asserted at the Confe­rence in the Savoy was onely the unlawfulness of such commands as the Commander of them fore­saw would by accident at least be the cause or oc­casion of some such evil or mischief as the Com­mander ought or was obliged to hinder, or provide against; or of such Commands as were comman­ded under an unjust penalty. For as to make his Readers believe the former, he produceth the in­stances of commanding a Navy to Sea by him that foresees it would fall into the enemies hands; and the selling of Poyson by him that foresees it will be used to kill the buyer or some body else with it; and of setting Fire on Straw, foreknowing that by another's negligence or wilfulness it is likely to set fire on the City or the Parliament-House; as by these and the like instances (I say) he would make his Parishioners at Kidderminster and others of his Readers believe the former; namely, that when he asserted that the command of a thing lawfull in it self was unlawfull, if it might by accident be the cause or occasion of sin, he meant it onely of such commands where the evil or sin which by accident they would, or probably might be the cause of, was foreseen or ought to have been hindred by the Com­mander: So by the last of his instances; namely, [Page 90] supposing to kneel at the receiving of the Communi­on to be lawfull, yet the enjoining of it under an unjust penalty makes the Command it self to be unlawfull; he would make it to be believed that he did not deny the command of a lawfull thing by lawfull authority to be lawfull, unless it were injoined or commanded under an unjust pe­nalty, such as he supposeth the penalty for not recei­ving the Sacrament kneeling to be. So that adding Mr. B 's de­sign in them. this last instance to the former, and considering them one with another, or all of them together, his de­sign in alledging of them must needs be this, to make it to be believed that whereas Bishop Morley chargeth him with having affirmed the Command of a lawfull Act by lawfull Authority to be unlaw­full, if by accident it might be the cause of sin; all that he said or at least all that he meant was this, that such a Command was unlawfull, if the evil, it might by accident be the cause of, was foreseen and ought to have been prevented by him that com­manded it, or if it were commanded under an un­just penalty; and consequently that Bishop Mor­ley's charge of him was a gross mistake.

Whereunto Bishop Morley replies by referring His charge convincingly renew'd upon him. himself to Mr. Baxter's aforesaid answers to our Disputants aforesaid Propositions, especially to the third or last of them, which affirming such a com­mand of a thing lawfull in it self, under no unjust penalty, and neither directly, nor by accident, the cause of any such evil or mischief, as the Comman­der of it did foresee, and ought to prevent, was a lawfull command; Mr. Baxter by denying this proposition to be true, and consequently such a command to be lawfull, because it might be evil [Page 91] by accident, cannot be imagined to mean such an accident as the Commander did foresee, and ought to prevent, nor the enjoining what he comman­ded under an unjust penalty: both which kinds of accidents the proposition he denyed had in terminis excluded; and therefore he must needs mean such an accident as the Commander did not foresee, or was not obliged to prevent; and such a Command as had no unjust penalty annexed to it; and conse­quently some such accident as either the peevishness or perverseness, or some fault or other in those to whom such a command is given, and who ought and will not submit to it, is the cause of. That there­fore What he must mean by Acci­dent in his Assertion at the Savoy. which I did then, and do still charge Master Baxter withall, is, that he did then at the afore­said Conference assert the Command of a thing law­full in it self to be unlawfull, if by accident it might be the occasion of Sin; now that by acci­dent he did not, nor could not mean either the in­joyning of it under an unjust penalty, or any other accidental evil which the Commander was obliged to prevent or provide against, is evident, from his denying the Proposition to be true, which affir­med such and no other but such a command of a thing lawfull in it self to be lawfull, as was neither commanded under an unjust penalty, nor could by accident be the occasion of any either evil or mis­chief, which the Commander was answerable for or ought to prevent: From Mr. Baxter's denying of this Proposition (I say) and from his giving no other reason for his denying of it, but that such a command as the Proposition affirmed to be lawfull might by accident be unlawfull, it is undenyably evident he must needs mean such an accident or ac­cidental [Page 92] evil as the Commandee, not the Comman­der may be guilty of; and if no Command be law­full, that may be the occasion of such an evil, then (as Mr. Baxter truly tells his Kidderminster The conse­quence of his Assertion ur­ged. Friends) Bishop Morley did infer that no Command either of God or man could be lawfull, or (as he is pleased to word it) That neither God nor man can enjoyn any thing without Sin, if the sinfulness, it may by accident be the occasion of in those to whom the Command is given, be to be imputed either to the Command, or to the Commander, which I think is little less than blasphemy to affirm; and therefore Mr. Baxter had reason to disguise the Assertion I charge him with, by giving such in­stances His Instances onely disgui­ses of his As­sertion. of it as are nothing a kin to it; for all his aforesaid instances are instances of the unlawful­ness of such Commands as are or may be the cause or occasion of some such evil or mischief as the Commander foresees and is obliged to prevent, or of such as are commanded under an unjust penalty. Whereas if he would have dealt ingenuously and pertinently he should have given us one instance at least, if not more of the unlawfulness of such a Command, (as he asserted at the Conference to be unlawfull, namely of the unlawfulness of such a Command) as was neither commanded under an unjust penalty, nor was the occasion or cause of any such evil, mischief or sin, as the Comman­der did not foresee, or was not bound to prevent. For how does the unlawfulness of selling of Poyson by an Apothecary to one whom he knows or sus­pects will poyson himself or some body else with it, prove the unlawfulness of selling of poyson by him that doth not know or suspect any such use [Page 93] will be made of it, because it may fall out that some body or other may be poysoned with it? Or how doth the unlawfulness of commanding a Na­vy to Sea, when the Commander foresees it will fall into the Enemies hands, prove the unlawfulness of such a Command, because by such a chance as the Commander did not, nor could not foresee, it did fall into the Enemies hands? or lastly, how doth the unlawfulness of commanding to kneel at the receiving of the Sacrament, if it were comman­ded under an unjust penalty, as he supposeth, (but did not nor cannot prove it is) prove the unlaw­fulness of the same command if it be not comman­ded under an unjust penalty, as We and all other Protestant Churches in the World, as well as ours, say it is not? for proof whereof I refer the Reader to what I have said long ago in my printed Let­ter.

CHAP. XII.

AND now having shewed what in truth it was that I charged Mr. Baxter withall, and that I charged him with it truly; and consequently, that all his Instances to the contrary are frivolous, and impertinent, and fraudulent; I am now to make it appear that they are scandalously (if not mali­ciously) [Page 94] injurious also. For first, as nothing can be more fraudulent than for a man, when he is charged with an Assertion that is false, and in its consequences impious and blasphemous, to substi­tute The Injuri­ousness of th [...]se Instan­ces made ou [...]; a true one instead of it; and by giving many instances of the latter to indeavour to make it to be believed he is not guilty of the former; so, nothing can be more provoking and injurious than to charge another falsly with what himself may be charged truly: And does not Mr. Baxter doe so, by pro­ducing those aforesaid instances of his, which no man can reade that hath any opinion of Mr. Bax­ter's veracity and sincerity, but must needs con­clude Bishop Morley or those that disputed with Mr. Baxter had affirmed, That the Command of that which is lawfull in it self is a lawfull Command, As implying that the Bi­shop had as­serted the contrary: though it be commanded under never so unjust a pe­nalty; which is more than insinuated by the last of his instances before specified, namely the Com­mand of Kneeling when we receive the Sacrament, as likewise that I, or they, or some of us, had af­firmed the Command of a thing lawfull in it self, to be a lawfull Command, though the Commander did foresee it would be the cause of some great e­vil or mischief, which he was bound to prevent; and this is not onely insinuated, but necessarily im­plyed in all the rest of the instances produced by him, as in that of sending of a Navy to Sea, fore­seeing it will fall into the Enemie's hand; and that of selling of Poyson, knowing he that buyes it will poyson himself or some body else with it; concer­ning which and the like damnable actions he doth in effect plainly enough tell me, that I allow such things to be lawfull, when in his libellous Narrative [Page 95] to his Kidderminster Friends he tells them he must crave the Bishop's pardon for believing those or any of the like commands to be sinfull; as if the Bi­shop had asserted all or any of them to be lawfull; which if it can be proved the Bishop did, either Which the Bishop utter­ly disclaims. expresly or implicitly, formally or virtually, dogma­tically or consequentially, say there, or any where, any thing which can grammatically be construed or logically inferr'd to tend towards the asserting or ap­proving of any of the aforesaid instances, the Bi­shop himself doth hereby acknowledge himself to be utterly unworthy to be called a Bishop, or a Priest, or a Christian, or a Man, but rather a Devil incarnate, or an utter and professed Enemy to all Mankind. But if the Bishop did never affirm or say any such thing, nay if he and the Disputants of the Epis­copal party did not by that Proposition, which Mr. Baxter frequently and finally denied, assert the contradictory to this calumny, namely that what the Church injoined in the Common-Prayer-Book or publick service of God, and the Sectaries refused to obey, were therefore lawfull injunctions and commands, not onely because they were law­full in themselves, and commanded by lawfull Au­thority, but because they were not commanded un­der any unjust penalty, or might so much as by accident be the cause of any such evil or sin, as they by whom they were injoyn'd, ought to pro­vide against; if this (I say) be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth of what was then affirmed by Bishop Morley, or by the Dis­putants, or any other of the Episcopal party as re­ally it is; (and I defie Mr. Baxter, or any of his party to prove the contrary) what then doth Ma­ster [Page 96] Baxter deserve for indeavouring by his imper­tinently, Mr. B 's no­torious Ca­lumny. fallaciously and injuriously at least (if not maliciously) alledged Instances, to make so notori­ously-impious, unchristian and inhumane a Calum­ny to be believed, not onely of Bishop Morley, but of all the Episcopal party that were there present; for sure Bishop Morley did not differ from the rest of his party, nor the rest of his party from him in this, or any other particular at that Conference?

And to this very purpose it is in the 48th pro­position of the Book (which he saith was pur­posely written to answer Bishop Morley 's grossly mi­staken charge) that Mr. Baxter resumes his in­stance In his Book called The judgment of Nonconfor­mists of things sinfull by Ac­cident p. 65. of an Apothecary's selling Poyson to one who he knows will kill his Neighbour, or himself, or his Prince with it, as of a thing thought lawfull and justified by us; because (as he makes us speak) the selling of Poyson is lawfull per se, of it self, and unlawfull onely per accidens, by accident. Whereunto he adds in the same place, ‘ That he hopes that our Casuists (meaning the Casuists of Some other Instances of his calumni­ous dealing. the Conforming party) shall never see a Law made to command or tolerate all Apothecaries to sell Poyson to those that they know mean to use it to treason or murther;’ As if we had any such amongst us, I mean, of the Episcopal party, that not onely justifie the selling of Poyson by those that know it will be used for Murther or Treason, but would have a Law made to command or tolerate the doing of it. If there be any such Casuists a­mongst us, I will readily acknowledge they are as bad, if not worse than the worst of the Jesu­ites; but let Mr. Baxter name any, at least one such Casuist of ours, if he can, or if he cannot, if [Page 97] he have any thing of Ingenuity left in him, let him confess his fraudulent and injurious deal­ing with us and repent of it. For as for that passage which he quotes out of Ecclesiastical Polity Page. 23. to prove the Authour of that Book such a Casuist as he speaks of, it is so illogical and unconcluding, that none but one that cares not what he says, or that thinks his Ipse dixit, his own bare saying, is enough to conclude quidlibet ex quolibet, any thing from any thing, would have quoted it upon such an occasion.

In the mean time I do not, I cannot deny, but Some amongst us as bad Ca­suists as the Jesuits. there be some, nay many Casuists among us, (but they are not of us) as bad as any of the Jesuits, especially in that Casuistical doctrine which is most Jesuitical; I mean, that of the lawfulness of Subjects taking Arms against their Sovereign; nay of selling, buying, imprisoning, deposing and murthering of Kings by their Subjects; I need not name those Casuists, Mr. Baxter knows whom I mean. But of this no more at this time, neither should there have been so much, if Mr. Baxter had not forgotten what he might have learned at School without going to the University; that Qui alterum accusat probri, ipsum se intueri oportet, He who chargeth another with a crime, ought to look home to himself: and it is but just, Ʋt qui ex maledicendo voluptatem ca­pit, malè audiendo amittat; That he who takes plea­sure in speaking ill of others, should lose that plea­sure by having his own faults told him.

And indeed I have very often and very much wondred, that of all men living Mr. Baxter should reproach us so frequently, so loudly, and so ground­lesly as he does, with what he knows himself and [Page 98] his party may most justly and undeniably be re­proached with, unless he thinks the calling of an honest Woman Whore first will make her that calls her so, to be thought an honest Woman. And in­deed men are apt to believe that one would not for shame accuse another of what he knows himself to be more guilty; but experience proves the contra­ry. And I hope I have proved it too, partly by con­firming my Charge against Mr. Baxter, and partly by confuting his Calumny against me. But the truth is, when Mr. Baxter is in his fit of raving a­gainst Mr. B. cares not what he says against the Bishops. Bishops and the Episcopal party, he cares not whether what he saith be true or false, pertinent or impertinent, so it be virulent and scandalous enough; having amongst many other of their spe­culative and practical Maxims, learned of the Po­pish Puritans, the Jesuits, calumniari audacter, to charge boldly, as hoping that aliquid hoerebit, some­thing will stick, though it be never so improbable or incredible; at least that those of their own Party will believe any thing of or against us, which is per­haps all they care for; of which practice that Mr. Baxter is often and very much guilty in his treating of me, I have given some Instances already, and shall give more hereafter.

CHAP. XIII.

IF it be objected, that I have said nothing yet in answer to the Creatise, which Mr. Baxter saith he writ on purpose to prove my Charge against him, to be a gross mistake; I confess I have not, because in truth I do not see how I am concerned in it, or how That Treatise of his imper­tinent to this business. any thing I charge Mr. Baxter withall, is disproved, or so much as offered to be disproved by it. Inso­much that (as I said before) if Mr. Baxter had set out that Treatise by it self, and had not in the Pre­face to another of his Treatises told me himself, it was purposely written against me, I should not have taken any notice of it at all; neither do I yet, (af­ter the reading of it over and over again and again) see any reason why I should put my self to the trou­ble of writing, or any body else to the trouble of reading, any thing in reply to it; because if all and every one of his sixty three Metaphysical Propositi­ons, (of which that Treatise of his doth consist) were all of them so many Mathematical Demonstrations (as perhaps he thinks they are) yet my Charge of Mr. Baxter would still stand in full force against him, being not so much as touched, much less o­verthrown, by any of those Propositions. For His charge repeated. what was that I charged Mr. Baxter withall? was it not this? That he at the Conference in the Sa­voy [Page 100] denyed the command of a thing lawfull in it self, and commanded by lawfull authority, to be a lawfull command, if by accident it might be the cause or occasion of Sin? Yes, will Mr. Baxter say, but then His sham Answer, by accident I meant not every accident, but such an accident as the Commander might and ought to prevent; as for example, the commanding it under an unjust penalty (for that he will have to be an ac­cident) or the commanding of it, though the Com­mander knows or foresees it will by accident be the cause or occasion of some such evil, or mischief, as he can and ought to provide against. And in the one or the other of these two notions of an accident, would Mr. Baxter have his Assertion (of the unlawfulness of a Command of a lawfull thing by lawfull Authority, if by accident it may be the occasion of Sin) to be understood; and I cannot blame him; for Secundoe cogitationes sunt meliores, Second thoughts are like­ly wiser and better than the first. But that he did not then by such an accident as made a lawfull com­mand with the re­ply to it. unlawfull, mean an accident in either of those notions is evident, by his frequently and finally de­nying the command of a thing lawfull in it self to be lawfull, if by accident it may be the cause of Sin, though it be not injoyned under an unjust penalty, and though the accidental evil or mischief, it may be cause or occasion of, be such as the Commander either cannot or ought not to provide against. Now, he that denies such a command as this to be lawfull, or (which is all one) asserts such a command as this to be unlawfull, because by accident it may be the cause of Sin, cannot either Grammatically or Logi­cally be understood, to mean such an accident or accidental Sin as the Commander ought to provide [Page 101] against; and consequently, if he mean any thing, he must needs mean such an accident, or acciden­tal evil, as not the Commanding, but the Com­manded party, is to answer for. And therefore as The conse­quence of his Assertion. I said then so I say now, That to assert the lawfull command of a lawfull thing, to be unlawfull, upon such an account, or because it may by such an ac­cident (as Mr. Baxter must needs be understood to mean) be the cause or occasion of Sin, is destructive of all Legislative power Divine as well as Humane: And therefore Bishop Morley was not grosly mista­ken either in charging Mr. Baxter with such an asser­tion, or in charging such an assertion with such im­pious and pernicious consequences, as he affirms, and I confess I did.

But Mr. Baxter doth grosly abuse me, and his His soul dealing. Reader too, by substituting a true Assertion instead of a false one for himself, and a false one instead of a true one for the Bishop and his party. As if that which he asserted, was, The unlawfulness of the command of a lawfull thing, if either it were com­manded under an unjust penalty, or the Comman­der of it did foresee it would be the cause of some such great evil or sin, as he was obliged to prevent; and that which we had asserted, was, The lawfulness of a Command of a thing lawfull in it self, though it were commanded under never so unjust a penalty, or though the Commander of it foresaw it would be the cause of such an evil or mischief as he might and ought to prevent. And as to make the latter of these two Assertions to be believed to be ours, he brings in the aforesaid Suppositions and fraudulent instances of selling of poyson, &c. So to make the former to be believed to have been his Assertion [Page 102] then, he asserts that, and none but that now; ho­ping his friendly or unwary Readers will believe it was the very same which he asserted then. And this indeed he might have reason to hope for from his Friends at Kidderminster, who he knew would believe whatsoever he told them, to be, as he said it was, especially telling it them in print, and before there was any thing in print to the contrary; but that he should think to impose such a belief upon the impartial part of the World, after the truth of what I charge him with had been so long before at­tested in print, under the hands of two such men, as the Bishops of Ely and Chester, (who could not chuse but know what was then said on both sides) is a confidence that never any yet even of Mr. Bax­ter's own party hath assumed, and I believe never will.

Good reason therefore had I to reprint that Let­ter The Attesta­tion annexed to the printed Letter proves the charge of that Assertion against Mr. B. of mine together with the aforesaid Attestation annexed to it, that what is in question betwixt Mr. Baxter and me might truly and clearly be stated, (namely, whether he did, or did not assert what I charge him with) which being onely matter of fact, and consequently no way to be decided but by Wit­nesses, and such Witnesses as cannot justly, nor ever were actually, either by Mr. Baxter himself, or any of his party, in so many years since excepted against; and they having testified so clearly and effectually (as they do) that charge of mine against Mr. Baxter; I know not what needed to have been done more, for my justification and his conviction, but the re­printing of the testimony of two such Witnesses as Nothing he saith now can invalidate that testimo­ny. they are. Against whose Testimony, as to the in­validating of it, nothing he asserts now, though never [Page 103] so true, nor none of the Instances he gives of such an Assertion, though never so pertinent, do, or can signifie any thing; for that which I charge him with, and what the aforesaid Witnesses testifie a­gainst him, is onely concerning what he asserted then, and not what he hath asserted at any time since, or doth assert now; which, as is already proved, is very far from being the same which he asserted then. And this Mr. Baxter himself must needs confess, un­less he will say (as I think he will not) that there is no difference betwixt denying (as he did then) the command of a lawfull thing to be lawfull, though it be not commanded under an unjust penalty, and the denying (as he doth now) the lawfulness of such a command if it be commanded under an un­just penalty; or as if it were all one to assert (as he did then) the command of a thing lawfull in it self to be unlawfull, if by accident it might be the cause or occasion of evil or sin, though it were such an evil or sin as the Commander was not obliged to prevent; and to assert (as he doth now) such a com­mand to be unlawfull, if the evil or sin which it might be the cause of, were foreseen and ought to have been prevented by the Commander: But these What he saith now, contrary to what he said then. Assertions being so contrary, (as they are) to one another, Mr. Baxter's asserting that which is true now, will not excuse him from having asserted that which was false then, which was all that I charged him with. If he hath changed his mind since, and be ashamed to own and maintain now, what he then held and asserted, and therefore sought to palli­ate and disguise it as well as he could, yet he ought not to have excused himself by accusing me, (and which is much worse) by endeavouring to make it [Page 104] to be believed that we of the Episcopal Party asserted the Command of a lawfull thing to be lawfull, if it were commanded by lawfull Authority, though under never so unjust a penalty, and though the Commander did foresee that it would by accident be the cause of never so great a mischief, and such as he knew he was bound to prevent; as the selling of Poyson by an Apothecary who foresees it will be made use of to poyson some body; and thereby im­plying that they were onely such things as this, or of the like nature to this, which we asserted, and he denied to be lawfull; which is evidently and equally His false re­presentation of the thing false in relation to us, and to himself also; for we never asserted the lawfulness of the one nor denied the unlawfulness of the other, as he would have it to be believed we did; so that to what I charged him with before, I must now add not onely his want of ingenuity in disguising and misrepresenting what He asserted or denied, but his being guilty of Calumny also, in disguising and misrepresenting what we as­serted or denied, at the aforesaid Conference in the Savoy.

And therefore this being the ground of all that he That Treatise of his ground­ed on a false supposition. hath said in that Treatise, of which he saith it was purposely written against me to confute my gross mistaking charge against him, needs no refutation, because it proceeds all the way ex falso supposito, upon a false supposition, as if what he asserts there, were the same that he asserted at the Conference; or as if, because what he asserted afterwards was true, therefore what he had said before was not false; or lastly, as if, because he doth not continue to say so, therefore he never did say so; by which kind of Logick he might as well conclude he never thought [Page 105] it lawfull to fight against the King, because he now doth not, or at least pretends he doth not; or that he never writ all his Political Aphorisms, because he tells us since that he hath recanted some of them; or that he never thought it lawfull to subscribe and conform, when he was ordained by a Bishop, because he doth not think so now: such Inferences as these are not, nor cannot be true, when they are affirm­ed of any fallible and mutable subject, as all men are both in their Words and Actions; and Mr. Baxter (will some men say) hath been so as much as any man in both of them. So that having sufficiently The issue of the whole matter; His charge stands good. proved, that which I charged Mr. Baxter with, which was, what he asserted then, I have sufficiently discharged my self from being so grosly mistaken as he pretended, or indeed from being mistaken at all; And therefore need say nothing, or at least no more than I have said already in answer to the afore­said Book or Treatise of his, which onely tells us what his Judgment of things sinfull per accidens is now but not what it was then; which was the thing and onely thing I charged him withall, which he is so far from disproving, that he doth not as much as deny it, or take any notice at all of it, in this whole Treatise, which he pretends purposely to have written for the confutation of it; which it is so far from confuting, that there be several of his own Propositions in that Treatise that do implicitly and His own Trea­tise fights a­gainst him. consequentially justifie my Charge against him, by proving that Proposition of ours to be true, which he then denied as false.

For Example, Prop. 31. Vid his book of Things sinfull by ac­cident. He saith, Rulers may command many things which the Subject may by acci­dent make sinfull for himself to doe. And in the next [Page 106] Proposition, he saith, There be some accidents ren­dring the Act commanded unlawfull, which the Com­mander may and ought to make provision against, or prevent; But there are some which he neither can, nor is bound therefore to forbear or to change his Laws; because (as it follows in the next Proposition) the publick welfare is not to be hazarded to save a parti­cular person from himself, and from his sinfull inclina­tion to ill doing. And of such Laws, and of such evils, and of such onely per accidens did our Pro­position in express terms affirm then, what Mr. Bax­ter asfirms now, but then denied.

Again, Propos. 36. Mr. Baxter saith, Wicked men are so much inclined to turn all things into sin, that it is not possible to command any thing so good, which bad men may not make sinfull use of. Which I hope Mr. Baxter intends not for an Argument to prove the command of lawfull things by lawfull Authority to be unlawfull; nor consequently, to justi­fie his aforesaid denial of our aforesaid Proposition, or to disprove my Charge against him for denying of it.

Much less doth that Instance he gives in his 48 The instance of an Aptthe­cary's selling poyson can­va, ed. Proposition come near to what is controverted be­twixt him and me, and was then controverted be­twixt him and our Disputants at the Savoy. I mean the so often alledged aforesaid instance of an Apothe­cary's selling of Poyson to one whom he knows will use it to murther himself, or some body else with it; which to maintain or justifie to be lawfull, because it is a sin per accidens, is, saith Mr. Baxter, an inhumane Errour: And so indeed it is; and therefore as we were worse than the worst of men, if his imputation of it to us were true; so it being so false, that nothing [Page 107] can be falser, I will not say what Mr. Baxter is, but I will say that his imputing that inhumane Errour Mr. B 's slan­derous impu­tation. unto us, as being held, taught, or countenanced, or any way connived at by us, or by any Casuist of ours, is an inhumane and Diabolical slander. For we would have Mr. Baxter know, that we are not so muddy brain'd (as he is pleased to say we are) but we can and do distinguish betwixt what a Man doth or may foresee, and what he doth not or can­not; as likewise betwixt what a Commander can, and is obliged to hinder, and what either he cannot, or is not obliged to hinder. The former is Mr. Bax­ter's Apothecary's case, and therefore we do not call his selling of Poyson (knowing what mischief will be done with it) a sin or cause of sin per acci­dens; Mr. Baxter may call it so if he pleases, Nobis The Case rightly stated. non licet esse tam disertis, but we that love to speak plain English, and to call a spade a spade, do not call such a selling of Poyson, a casual or an accidental, but an intended and a presumptuous sin; not a Chance-medley, but wilfull murther in the Seller, as well as in the Buyer of the poyson. Because though the selling and the buying of poyson be not sinfull per se, or in it self, abstracting from the End for which, and the Intention with which it is sold or bought, because it may be sold and bought and used for a good end as well as for a bad; yet in Mr. Bax­ter's Apothecary's case, the selling as well as the buying of it is sinfull per se and not per accidens, be­cause the Seller is supposed to foresee what the Buyer will doe with it. For according to our Grammar, and our Logick too, per accidens is not always nor onely opposed to per se, but to praevisum and prae­destinatum, to what is foreseen and design'd afore­hand [Page 108] also; so that whatsoever falls out or comes to pass contra or proeter intentionem or opini­onem agentis, Contrary to the intention or opinion or expectation of the Agent, may be said to be per accidens, whether it be per se or no. And in this notion of per accidens Mr. Baxter's Apothecary's selling of poyson, cannot excuse him from being a Murtherer, or guilty of murther per se, and not per accidens onely; no not though per accidens there were not that ill use, that he thought there would be, made of it.

I might say the like of his Impropriety of speech, when he tells us, That the command of a lawfull thing under an unjust penalty is a sin in the Commander per Another in­stance of his, misapplying the term per accidens. accidens. For though an unjust penalty be an acci­dent or accidental as to the command it self, because it might have been commanded under no penalty at all, or under some other more equitable penalty; yet in respect of the Commander and commanding of it, it is sinfull per se, and not per accidens; not­withstanding Mr. Baxter's Metaphysical notion to the contrary: which I note the rather, that he and his admirers may see that he is not the Man of that di­stinctness in his Notions, nor of that propriety and accurateness in his Expressions, as he would be thought to be; the want whereof he doth so fre­quently and so insultingly impute to his Adversaries upon all occasions, and particularly in this Treatise of his which we are now speaking of.

CHAP. XIV.

IN the beginning of which Treatise, speaking of the Men he had to doe with at the Savoy-Conference, he saith, that Vid. The Nonconfor­mists judg­ment of things sinfull by Ac­cident, p. 1. as they were men of confounding Practices, so they were men of confus'd Conceptions, and such as could not be reconcil'd to distinctness and congruity of speech. For with this Encomium of those that disputed with him, he be­gins that Treatise of his, which he saith he writ His Encomi­um of the E­piscopal party. purposely against me; but I am sure that cha­racteristical Preface thereunto cannot so properly be meant of me, as of those that disputed with him; at least it cannot be meant of me onely, but of them also, nor of them and me onely neither, but of the whole Episcopal party, at least as to the first Clause of the Character whereby he describes his Adversaries, when he saith, They were Men of Why he calls them men of confounding practices. confounding Practices; for so he takes it for gran­ted the Bishops and Episcopal party are, because they will not consent to the alteration of the set­led Government, either in Church or State; or the letting in of Wolves and Foxes in Sheeps cloathing into the Sheepfold; I mean all the several sorts of Sectaries, who dissent as much perhaps or more from one another than all of them do from us: and consequently such, as if they were admitted with­in the Pale of the Church, would bring in a very Babel of Confusion along with them. And it is [Page 110] this, and nothing else but this, I mean the keeping of Anarchy and confusion out of the Church and State, which Mr. Baxter is pleased to call a con­founding practice: But then he should have re­membred who They are, whom he so rudely re­flects Whom he must mean by that Title. upon, and who are the Men of such confoun­ding practices: Surely, They were not the men he had to doe with, whether by them he means any or all of the Conforming Party that were at that Conference; for what do We conform to but the Laws? and who are the Makers of those Laws for Conformity, and for excluding all that will not conform, but the Parliament? That is, the King, with the consent of Lords and Commons, (and not the Bishops, who doe nothing but in obedience to those Laws,) are the Men whom Mr. Baxter (if he speaks properly, as he would be thought to do always) must needs mean by the men of confoun­ding Practices; which how he will justifie if he be called in question for it, he were best to consider.

But as for the men of confused Conceptions, and such as could not be reconciled to distinctness Whom he means by the men of confu­sed concepti­ons. and congruity of speech, I doubt not but he meant Me for one, (as I doubt not neither but he meant me for one of the men of confounding Practices also) but as he meant more besides my self, when he speaks of men of confounding Practices, so he must do also, when he speaks of men of confus'd Concepti­ons; because he speaks of men in the plural num­ber, speaking of both the sorts of them; and there­fore by the men of confused Conceptions, though he may, and I believe doth mean me for one, yet he must needs mean those that disputed with him as well as me, and rather them than me, or [Page 111] any other of the Bishops that were there; for the Disputants on our part were they, that he and his Assistants had to deal with.

And they were men that, I dare say, were ne­ver Their just Vindication. thought by any, but Mr. Baxter, to be men of such confus'd Conceptions, and so irreconcileable to distinctness, and congruity of speech, that is, so ut­terly without Logick or Grammar as he would have them thought to be. I am sure the University of Cambridge did not think them to be so, when two of them were made the Primary Professours of The­ology in that famous University: Neither did the King think them to be so, when he made all three of them Bishops: nor did We that were then Bi­shops, think them to be so when we made choice of them to be ours and the Churches Advocates in a Cause of so high concernment as that was. But Mr. Baxter having been so shamefully nonpluss'd as he was at that Disputation, would have it to be be­lieved Mr. B 's de­sign in so ter­ming them. by those that were not there, that he had, or should have had much the better of it, if the men he had to deal with, had not been men of such confus'd Conceptions that they could not understand his meaning by his words, or of such impatience (for that's part of his character of them also) that they would not give him leave to explain himself more fully than he did.

This might have had some colour of reason in it, The Manage­ment of the conference at the Savoy how it was. if the Conference betwixt our and their Disputants had been oral, or by word of mouth, which is always indeed lyable to heat, and eagerness, and impatience, and misunderstanding of one another, whilst they are arguing, as likewise, to misrepor­ting afterwards of what was said of either side.

[Page 112] But this Conference was by writing, to prevent jangling and all other the aforesaid inconveniences, which oral interlocutory Disputes are subject to; as likewise that each party might have time to consider what they were to stick to, and abide by, before they writ it down, and to peruse it afterwards, and if need were, to alter or amend any thing they saw amiss in it before they delivered it to those that were to answer or reply to it. And thus were our Arguments delivered unto them by us, and thus were their Answers to our Arguments delivered un­to us by them, all of them written with Mr. Bax­ter's The Dissen­ters Answers written with Mr. B 's own hand. own hand, who seem'd to be the Dominus fac­totum, The Ruler of the Roast, in the business.

The Arguments and the Answers that were writ­ten down, and interchangeably delivered from one Party to the other, were the very same in terminis which I have before recited, and which are attest­ed The same as are attested in the Bishop's printed Let­ter. by the subscriptions of the aforesaid witnesses printed above 20 years since, and now again re­printed with the Letter whereunto they were first annexed; which Attestation, together with the Arguments and Answers which are attested, I de­sire the Reader seriously and impartially to peruse and consider, and then to judge whether the men Mr. Baxter had to deal with were Men of such con­fus'd Conceptions, and so irreconcileable to distinct­ness and congruity of speech, as he would have them thought to be: or whether indeed he himself were not evidently and inextricably confus'd, puzzled and perplexed in his Answers to their Arguments; espe­cially when he gave his final Answer to their last Syl­logisme, Mr. B 's fi­nal answer strangely pee­vish and ab­surd. the Major Proposition whereof, I am con­fident, would never have been denied by either of [Page 113] his Assistants, had not he, (being such a [...], Lover of preheminence, such a [...] and [...], so contentious and self-will'd, as he is,) overruled them both. For who not blinded with prejudice or transported with passion (as Ma­ster Baxter often is, and as it seems then was) would have denied (as he did) the truth of this Proposition, (viz.) That Command which comman­deth an act in it self lawfull, and no other act where­by any unjust penalty is enjoyned, nor any circumstance whence directly or per accidens any sin is consequent, which the Commander ought to provide against, hath in it all things requisite to the lawfulness of a Com­mand; and particularly cannot be guilty of comman­ding an Act per accidens unlawfull, nor of comman­ding an act under an unjust penalty? This, this (I say) was the Proposition which Mr. Baxter did, in Writing with his own hand, finally deny to be true; and this is that which I charge him withall, and from which (as I then told him) it necessari­ly follows, that no Law, either humane or Divine, can be lawfull; because there is no Law of either sort but may by some accident or other, be the cause or occasion of sin.

For example, Preaching, and Fasting, and Pray­ing, The Conse­quence of it urged. and Thanksgiving, are all of them God's holy Ordinances; but may not any, nay all of these Or­dinances of God himself, be by accident the occa­sion of sin? nay, were not all of them so in a ve­ry high degree in the late Times? being made use of in their several seasons, to stir up and encourage the People to rebell against their Sovereign; and to plunder and murther their fellow Subjects: But [Page 114] did this make God's commanding all or any of these holy Ordinances to be unlawfull? by Master Baxter's Logick it must do so, because by acci­dent they were the cause or occasion of very ma­ny, and very great sins; and such sins as the Com­mander foresaw, they would be the occasion of, and might have prevented if he would, by suffering no ill use to be made of them; (which is more than any humane Lawgiver can doe) and yet he did not, nor would not prevent those accidental e­vils, either by forbearing to make such Laws, as he knew would be the occasion of sin, or by re­pealing, or altering, or dispensing with them after they were made, or by remitting and not inflic­ting the punishment that was due to the transgres­sours of them; all which he might have done if he would; but he would not because he was not obli­ged to doe so, and because it seemed best to his in­finite wisedom not to doe so.

But Men, Mr. Baxter will say, or humane Law­givers, are obliged (though God be not) to pre­vent A rejoynder to Mr. B 's Reply. or provide against all (even accidental) evils which they can prevent, or provide against.

'Tis true, but not by making no Laws at all. For Meliùs vivitur ubi nihil licet, quàm ubi omnia, It is better living under the severest Laws, than under none at all. And if there be any Laws made for men to live by, or to live under, such is the pride and the pravity of humane nature (as Mr. Baxter himself confesseth) that there will be transgressions of them, and such transgressions as the wisest hu­mane Lawgiver cannot foresee, or the most power­full of them be able to prevent; and consequently, [Page 115] no humane Lawgiver is bound to doe so; for, Nemo tenetur ad impossibile, No body is bound to impos­sibilities.

Neither is a Humane Lawgiver bound to prevent all the Evil which it is possible for him to prevent, if it be not to be prevented, but by making no Laws at all; or if it be not to be prevented, but by omitting or forbearing to doe some important pub­lick good, which as a Lawgiver he is bound to doe. So that no accidental evil which the Lawgiver either cannot or ought not, (and by ought not, I mean, is not bound or obliged) to provide against, can make the command of a thing lawfull in it self The Conse­quence char­ged home. to be unlawfull. And he that denies this (as Mr. Baxter did) must (as I said before) consequently affirm no command, either of man or God to be lawfull; because there is no command, either Hu­mane or Divine, but is liable to such accidental e­vils, as man either cannot or ought not, and God hath not thought fit, to provide against, any otherwise than by forbidding, and threatning to punish the transgressours of them; which Humane Lawgivers are obliged to doe also; which being all they can doe, and consequently all they are obliged to doe, neither they, nor their just Laws, or lawfull Commands, are to be blamed or repealed, because they accidentally prove to be the occasion of such evils as the Lawgi­ver either cannot, or is not bound to provide against. And such sins as these must he needs mean, who de­nies (as Mr. Baxter did) the command of a lawfull thing by lawfull Authority, under no unjust penal­ty, to be lawfull, because, by accident it might be [Page 116] the occasion of some such sin as the Commander was not bound to prevent or provide against.

And therefore I would fain have Mr. Baxter speak out, and tell us plainly and distinctly, (being such A Call to Mr. Baxter. a Master of distinctness as he is) what these acci­dental evils or sins are, that can make such a com­mand as he denied to be lawfull to be unlawfull. Sure I am, they can be no such evils or sins as by his aforesaid Instances he would make it to be be­lieved they are. For they are all of them such as the Commander is obliged to hinder or provide a­gainst; but he must instance in some such accidental evils or sins which the Commander is not bound to hinder or provide against, and then prove that a lawfull command, by being the cause or occasion of such an accidental evil or sin, becomes unlawfull; which when he hath done, erit mihi magnus Apollo, I shall take him for a great Prophet; and then I will confess that I have been grossly, very grossly mistaken in my charging of him, as I did.

In the mean time, he hath grossly, very His gross shuffling and cutting. grossly abused his friends at Kidderminster, in that Narrative of his, where by shuffling in of one Pro­position instead of another, a true one instead of a false one, he would make them believe that it was the true one that he asserted, viz. That the Com­mand of a thing lawfull in it self was unlawfull if it were commanded under an unjust penalty, or would be the occasion of some such evil as the Commander foresaw and ought to prevent. And not the false one, viz. That the Command of a thing lawfull in it self was unlawfull though it were not commanded under an unjust penalty, nor would be the occasion of any such ac­cidental [Page 117] evil or sin as the Commander was bound to prevent; which was that indeed and in truth which Mr. Baxter asserted, and not the former: And up­on his asserting whereof, I do very well remem­ber, (and so may he too, if he will) I stood up, and said, There is no more Disputing with this man who doth in effect deny any of God's commands as well as Man's to be lawfull. For what Law or Command of God is there, that may not be the His Assertion the occasion of breaking up the Confe­rence. occasion of some such evil or sin? And so the Disputeended; for Contra Principia negantem non est dispu­tandum, There is no disputing against a man who de­nies principles: And certainly this if any is a Prin­ciple among Christians, That all God's commands are just and righteous; which none of them are or can be, if by accident to be the occasion of sin can make them not to be so; which I affirmed to be the Con­sequent of what Mr. Baxter had asserted.

But I did not charge him with asserting the con­sequence it self; nay, I did not charge him, and much less all or any other of the Nonconformists, He is not charged with it as his judg­ment. besides him, with asserting that which he did assert, as theirs, or his own judgment; (as by the Title page to his Treatise of sinfulness per accidens (which he saith was purposely written against me) he would make his Readers believe I did) but I charged him with it, In his prin­ted narrative to his friends of Kidder­minster. as a desperate shift he was forced to make use of; for so he himself saith I said I did, (when I charged him with what he had asserted) which im­plies that I did not charge him with that Asserti­on, as that which was, or which I did believe to be indeed his Judgment; but rather, with what contrary to his Judgment, he was fain or forced [Page 118] to assert [...] to serve his turn for the present, as not knowing how otherwise (all at once) to impeach the lawfulness of the Injuncti­ons of our Church in the Common-Prayer-Book (which was then his business) and consequently to justifie his own and his Party's refusing to obey and conform to them.

And as when I charged him with what he had Nor is He, but the Assertion, charged with its Consequen­ces. asserted, I did not charge him with it, as with that which I thought to be his Judgment; much less, when I charged that Assertion of his with those im­pious and absurd Consequences that may be, nay, must be inferrr'd from it, do I charge him with as­serting all or any of those Consequences: For a man may abhor the necessary consequences of his own Opinion, as I believe all well meaning Papists (and sure there be some Papists that are well mean­ing men) do detest and disclaim all the necessary consequences of their blasphemous Doctrine of Tran­substantiation, and as I believe Mr. Baxter doth the necessary consequences of that Assertion I charged him with. Nay, I am apt to believe that Mr. Bax­ter himself, now he sees what will necessarily follow upon that Assertion of his, is sorry and ashamed that ever he did assert it, and wishes with all his heart he had never asserted it; but his heart is too great to suffer him to confess it, and he values his reputa­tion with his Party at too high a rate to acknowledge His reputati­on more valu­ed by him than truth. that ever he was guilty of so much weakness, as to have denied what he did deny, and consequently to have asserted what he did assert. And therefore (as I said before) he would fain have it to be believed that it was another thing that he denied and asserted, [Page 119] than indeed it was. But all that he hath done hitherto, or can doe hereafter, to that end, will be all in vain, and to no purpose, as long as two such Witnesses, as the Bishop of Ely and the Bishop of The Attesta­tion utterly spoils all his endeavours of clearing himself. Chester, who disputed with him, have attested it under their hands, presently after the matter of fact, and when it was fresh in every man's memory, with­out having been contradicted or excepted against either by Mr. Baxter himself, or any of his party in his behalf, though it be above twenty years ago, since this Attestation of theirs was first prin­ted.

And therefore whatsoever Mr. Baxter hath said since, or doth say now, or shall say hereafter, it will never make what he did say then to be non dictum, not to have been said, or what he writ then to be non scriptum, not to have been written; so that he may as well call back yesterday as unsay what he had said; repent it he may, but recall it he cannot. If therefore that Pamphlet of his con­cerning That Treatise of his wholly useless to that purpose. sinfulness per accidens was purposely writ­ten (as he saith it was) to prove Bishop Morley was grossly mistaken in charging him with what he did assert then, because he doth not assert it now, or because he now doth assert the contrary; the pub­lishing of it to that end is not onely vain and use­less but absurd and ridiculous, unless Mr. Baxter thinks his own Party does believe of him, as the Bygott-Papists do of their Pope; namely, that he never erred, because he cannot err; which is Blas­phemy to be said of any but of God. For Errare, labi, decipi, suit, eritque semper humanum, to err, to slip, to be deceived and mistaken, hath been and [Page 120] will always be the effect and character of Humane frailty. And therefore Mr. Baxter ought not to have taken it so heinously to be charged, and to be charged ashe was with an [...], with that which is but an humane infirmity; for so, and no more but so, is all Errour. But the denying of it, and much more the persisting in it, and defend­ing of it, and most of all the defending of it by dis­guising it and making a false representation of it; seems to have somewhat of a much worse principle in it, and makes the Errour to be much more cul­pable, than otherwise it would have been; for Causa Patrocinio non bona pejor erit, A bad cause will but prove worse by standing out in it and en­deavouring to make it good.

It would have been therefore much more ingenu­ously, and much more excusably too, done of Mr. Baxter, if, as when he speaks of his Politi­cal Aphorisms, he saith he would have some part at least of that Book to be taken pro non scripto, as if it had never been written; so in speaking of what I say he said in the Conference at the Sa­voy he would not have said it was non dictum, a thing that he had not said; but that he would have it taken pro non dicto, as a thing he wished he had not said: and so he might have saved all the pains he hath taken, and all the trouble he hath given his Readers, in his Metaphysical Casuistical Treatise of things sinfull per accidens; wherein there is no­thing to prove Mr. Baxter did not say, what I say he did at the Conference in the Savoy; nor conse­quently to prove that I was grossly mistaken in [Page 121] charging him with it; [...], Which is the thing I was to make out.

Which being the onely Instance he hath given of The Ʋpshot: the Bishop's charge a­gainst Mr. B. no mistake. the many mistakes in matter of fact, which he saith there are in that long ago printed, and now reprinted Letter of mine; They that observe how (notwith­standing all the disingenuous, fraudulent, scandalous, and injurious Artifices he hath made use of) he foully fails in the proof of this one mistake onely; will (I hope) hardly take his own bare word for proof e­nough, that there are many, or indeed any other mistakes in matter of fact in that Letter of mine, as he pretends there are, and no doubt would not have omitted to specifie, if he could have proved any of them.

CHAP. I.

ANd now having (as I suppose) sufficiently vin­dicated my self from what Mr. Baxter hath excepted against (as a gross mistake of mine in mat­ter of Fact) in my so long ago printed (and now reprinted) Letter: I am (if I can, and I doubt not [Page 124] but I can) to vindicate my self from a much higher charge of Mr. Baxter's against me, which is no less Mr. B. char­ges the Bishop to be a defier of Deity and Humanity. than, That I am a defier of Deity and Huma­nity. An horrible and a diabolical Crime, if true; and therefore an horrible and diabolical Slander, if false; which, whether it be or no I am now to examine.

But first, I must make it appear, that Mr. Baxter doth indeed, and in totidem verbis, in plain terms, charge me to be so; For proof whereof, I refer my self to a printed Paper of his, now before me, sub­scribed R. B. and pretended to be a Recantation or Revocation of some of his Political Aphorijms in That he doth so prov'd out of his Recan­tation, his Holy Common wealth; in which Paper (which together with some of his Aphorisms I have caused to be reprinted) he saith, He doth not reverse all the matter of that Book, nor all that more than ONE hath accused him of; which he saith he cannot without defying Deity and Humanity, as they, saith he, (meaning his accusers) defie them both.

In which words it is observable, that the word One is printed in a different Character, from any of the rest, on purpose no doubt, that the Readers of that pretended curtail'd Recantation, may take no­tice of whom he means by that One, which it was easy for any that had read my Collection of some of his Aphorisms, to guess at; but this is certain, that whomsoever he means by that One, he saith of him in express terms, that he is a defier of Deity and Hu­manity.

Now that he means me by that One, though it be not clearly and plainly exprest in that Paper, and out of his Answer to a Letter of Dr. Hinckley 's, yet it is more than intimated in Mr. Baxter's An­swer to a Letter of Dr. Hinckley's; wherein he doth [Page 125] repeat what the Doctor had said touching those A­phorisms of his, which I had collected and printed, so as though neither of them name me, yet it cannot be doubted, but both of them mean me; the rather, because Mr. Baxter doth there, and in that place of his Letter, set down the very words of the first of those Aphorisms I have collected, from denial of which Aphorism, or rather from the denial of another Proposition substituted by him in the place or instead of that Aphorism, he doth in the afore­said Paper infer and conclude that One he speaks of to be a defier of Deity and Humanity.

But to put it out of question that I am the man he means by that One in the aforesaid Paper, and whom he there makes to be a defier of Deity and Hu­manity: And out of his Apology for the Noncon­formists Mi­nistry. p. 138. There is a late (I will not say the last) Book of his (for he may have writ two or three since for ought I know) wherein he saith, He wonders that Bishop Morley (there you have whom he means in words at length, and not in figures or figurative in­timations onely) did put the denial of this amongst the accused passages of his Political Aphorisms, where (saith he) I expressly speak of God's limitation.

But what, or of what was that denial of Mr. Bax­ter, which he wonders the Bishop puts among the ac­cused passages of his Aphorisms? Why, It was (saith he) my denial that there was any such thing in the World as a lawfull unlimited Monarchy, or humane Power, expressly speaking of limitation by God. But Mr. B. gives a false ac­count of the Bishop's accu­sing of him. where doth Bishop Morley accuse Mr. Baxter for de­nying there is any lawfull Monarchy, or humane Power, unlimited by God? He doth it (saith Mr. Baxter) among the Passages of my accused Aphorisms. But why doth not he name the passage where, or [Page 126] the particular Aphorism wherein I do accuse him, for his denying the aforesaid Proposition, or for his denying there is any lawfull Monarchy, or any o­ther humane Power, unlimited, or not limited by God? I will tell you why he doth not, because in­deed he cannot; there being no such Aphorism nor any such Passage in any of those Aphorisms of his, which I question him for, or accuse him of.

There is indeed an Aphorism of his (viz.) the first of those which I have collected and exposed, The true ac­count what it is the Bishop accuseth him of. wherein he saith, That of Governours some are limit­ed, and some are unlimited, and those which are de facto unlimited are Tyrants, and have no right to their unlimited Governments: And the reason why I put this Aphorism of his into the catalogue of those which I except against, is his affirming that such Governours (I presume he means all such Gover­nours) as are de facto unlimited, are Tyrants and have no right to their unlimited Governments. It is (I say) his affirming of this, and not his denying the lawfulness of a Monarchy or any other power or species of Government that is not limited by God, that I question him for or accuse him of. For if he thinks the affirming of that and the denying of this to be all one, he is very much mistaken: but the truth is that he is not at all mistaken as to this particular; he knows well enough, that it is not all one to af­firm the one and deny the other; for if he had thought it had been so, why did he not specifie the Aphorism it self (which I except against) in termi­nis, as it is set down in my Collection, and as he sets it down himself in his aforesaid Letter to Dr. Hinckley? It had been much more fairly and in­genuously done of him, if he had done so, and much [Page 127] more pertinently too, as to the business in hand; there being no question betwixt him and me (in re­lation The Question rightly stated. to the truth or falshood of the aforesaid Apho­rism) whether all lawfull Monarchies or humane Powers are limited by God or no? but whether all such Governours as are de facto unlimited (not by God but by Men) are Tyrants, and such as have no Right to their unlimited Governments. The former I never did, nor no man that is not a downright professed Atheist can deny to be true: The latter I affirm to be false, and not false and erroneous onely, but dangerous and seditious also; and I doubt not but by God's assistance to prove it to be so.

In the mean time, let no man think it was the not discerning or not animadverting the difference betwixt what Mr. Baxter affirms in his Aphorism, and what he denies in his Paraphrase of it, that makes him substitute the one for the other; Non sic notus Ʋlysses, The cunning man is better known than so. No, he doth it artificially and designing­ly, that he might the more probably and plausibly infer from the one, what he knew he could not with any colour of consequence infer from the Mr B 's arti­fice to vent his gall against the Bishop. other; and thereby to vent the overflowing of his Gall against me, in revenge of my publishing of those Aphorisms of his, whereby he seems to be so much galled.

And hence it is, that as in the aforesaid recanting His wretched falshood in charging the Bishop. or rather canting Paper of his, instead of my de­nying all unlimited Governours to be Tyrants and to have no right to their unlimited Governments (which he affirms in his Aphorism) he saith, I deny all hu­mane Powers to be limited by God, and thence infers that I am a defier of Deity and Humanity: So here [Page 128] again in that aforesaid late printed Book of his, in­stead of my denial of what he affirms in the afore­said Aphorism, he saith, that I accuse him for de­nying that there is any lawfull Monarchy or humane Power unlimited by God; and then infers That he who asserteth the contrary (as he implies I do) is 1. (saith he) an Enemy to God, because he denies God to be the universal Sovereign, which is Atheism. His zealous descant upon it. 2. He is an Enemy to Kings, because he renders them odious to Mankind by drawing such a picture or description of them, as to say a King is absolutely un­limited in his power, and therefore may deny or blaspheme God, and may destroy City and Kingdom, and kill all the innocent People when he pleaseth. 3. He is an Enemy to all Mankind, who would bring them all into such a slavery to such a Monster. By which large, and indeed monstrous Paraphrase of his, not upon what I do indeed assert, but upon what he would have his Readers believe I do assert, he explains what he means when he said I was a defier of Deity and Humanity.

Sed ne soevi, magne Sacerdos; But do not bluster so, mighty Presbyter! Is this the humble, the meek, the mortified and daily dying Mr. Baxter? Tantoene animis Coelestibus irae? Have heavenly minds such boisterous passions? And why not, may some Friend of his say; can a man be too zealous for God, or too angry with any that defies God, or that denies his Sovereignty over all his Creatures, and consequently over all humane Pow­ers or Governours? Was not Moses the meekest man alive, and yet was not he angry, very angry, so angry that he brake the Tables of stone where­in the Law was written by God's own hand, be­cause [Page 129] the People had by their Idolatry broken the Law, written by God's own hand in the Tables of their hearts? The like may be said of Phineas, of David, and of St. Paul, who was so angry that he wished that the [...] & [...], The disturbers and overturners, of the Church in those times were cut off (which by the way is as bad, if not worse than silencing.) Why then should Master Baxter be blamed, if he thinks no words bad e­nough for those that are the defiers of Deity and Humanity, and the Enemies to God, to Kings, and to all Mankind?

True; but who, or where are they that are so? Who they are he means in that descant. they are those (saith Mr. Baxter in one place) that deny all humane Powers to be limited by God. But who are they that deny all humane Powers to be limited by God? they are (saith Mr. Baxter in ano­ther place) Such as deny all Governours whether li­mited or unlimited to be Subjects themselves, and under the Sovereignty and laws of God. But who are they, or who is he, that denies either this or the former of those two Propositions? Bishop Mor­ley for one (saith Mr. Baxter in the aforesaid late Book of his) and therefore he is a defier of Deity and Humanity; and so are others too for the same reasons, as he tells us in his Paper of Recantation (but they it seems must be nameless.) Well, but how doth he know that Bishop Morley doth or ever did deny either, That all humane Powers are limi­ted by God, or that all Governours are subject to God? Did he ever hear me say so himself? or can he produce any Witness that is fide dignus, That may be believed, who told him so? I am sure I never thought so, and therefore I am sure I never said so. [Page 130] But because he grounds my being a defier of Deity and Humanity upon this supposition, and upon this supposition onely, That I deny all Humane Powers to be limited by God, or That all Humane Gover­nours are Subject unto God; And because there be many that will believe whatsoever he saith, because he saith it:

Be it known to Mr. Baxter and all Baxterians in the World, that I Bishop Morley do in my own name The Bishop's solemn decla­ration con­cerning Go­vernours. (and I am confident may doe it in the name of all the Episcopal Party, that is, of the whole Church of England truly so called) not onely confess and acknowledge, but declare, and aver, and avow; first, That all Humane Powers, and not Humane onely, but Terrestrial, Celestial and Infernal Powers also, are subject to God and limited by God; that is, by the Power, the Will and Wisedom of God, so that none of them can doe more or less, or otherwise than he wills or permits them to doe; and that he restrains, overrules and orders whatsoever they doe, as he pleaseth, in order to his own most wise and just ends.

Secondly, I do acknowledge and declare also, that all humane Powers, or Governours, the Supreme as well as the Subordinate, and the Ʋnlimited (I mean the unlimited by humane Pacts and constitu­tions) as well as the Limited, are all of them limit­ed by God; and that not by his Power onely, but by his Laws also, either as they are written by him in Mens hearts, or revealed by him in his Word; and that as all the Heathen World (Kings as well as Subjects) were limited by the former; so all the Christian World, (Kings and States, as well as Sub­iects) are limited by the latter, and by the former [Page 131] also; so as to be thereby obliged (though not ne­cessitated) to observe the Dictates, and to doe no­thing contrary to either of those Laws; and if they doe not accordingly, that they are answerable to God, and punishable by God for it, as he is [...], King of Kings and Lord of Lords, as much or more than any of the meanest of their Subjects.

This is, and always was my Creed as to this par­cular; and therefore, instead of defying Deity and His disavow­al of Mr. B 's charge. Humanity, I defy Mr. Baxter and all the Baxterians in the World, to prove that I ever did dicto vel scrip­to, By saying or writing, directly or indirectly, in terminis vel in sensu oequipollenti, In downright terms or equivalent meaning, formally or conse­quentially, deny all or any humane Powers, or Governours, either de jure, As to matter of right, or de facto, As to matter of fact, to be limited by God; or that I did ever accuse Mr. Baxter or any body else for affirming it.

And therefore I do now accuse him for having Mr. B. a false accuser. falsely accused me of such a Crime as is no less (as he himself saith) than the defying of Deity and Hu­manity; which is a very high degree not of Pro­faneness onely, but of Atheism and Blasphemy also; and therefore highly criminal, and highly punisha­ble even here in this world in them that are guilty of it; and per legem talionis, By that law which re­quires like for like, in those also that accuse any man of it, and cannot prove it; especially in one Church man accusing another, and more especially (according to the ancient Canons of the Church) in a Presbyter accusing a Bishop of so high a Crime as this is.

[Page 132] But Mr. Baxter it seems will joyn Issue with me upon this point, and will prove that though I did not in terminis defy Deity and Humanity, by de­nying in terminis all humane Power to be limited His conse­quential proof of the charge. by God; Yet I am nevertheless a defier of Deity and Humanity, because I do consequentially deny all humane Powers to be limited by God. And that I do consequentially deny all humane Powers to be limited by God, he proves, or thinks he proves, or rather indeed would have others think he proves it (for I am confident he himself believes it no more than I do) because I deny this Aphorism of his, That all unlimited Governours are Tyrants, and have no right to their unlimited Governments; so that the proof of my being a defier of God, because I deny all humane Powers to be limited by God, depends upon the truth of this Syllogism:

• He that denies all unlimited Governours to be Tyrants, and such as have no right to their unlimited Govern­ments, doth consequentially, or by necessary consequence, deny all humane Powers to be limited by God.
• But Bishop Morley doth deny the former,
• Ergo, he doth deny the latter also.

Well, suppose he did so, yet if (being not so clear-sighted as Mr. Baxter is, nor having such a His Metaphy­sical Micro­scope. Metaphysical Microscope as Mr. Baxter hath to see so far into a milstone as Mr. Baxter doth) the Bishop doth not discern either the necessity, or probability, or possibility of any such consequence, must he because he is [...], moap-ey'd, or because he hath no better a discerning faculty than God hath given him, must he needs (I say) be therefore a defier of Deity and Humanity? when if he saw or did believe there were any such consequence, he would be as ready to [Page 133] condemn the opinion from whence it is inferr'd, and to anathematize the maintainers of it, as Mr. Baxter himself is, or can be?

But thanks be to God, we have a more mercifull Judge than Mr. Baxter is; for Woe be to the Bishop, We are not to be judged by consequences. and Woe be to Mr. Baxter himself; nay, Woe be to the best and wisest of all mankind (neither of which do I think that I or Mr. Baxter himself is) if we were to be judged by the consequences of all our O­pinions at the last day. For, I know nothing by my self, says St. Paul (who was spiritually as wise and as good a man as perhaps ever any mere man was) yet I am not, saith he, thereby justified: and there­fore though our hearts do not condemn us (says St. John) yet God who is greater than our hearts, may. And truly I know no Man that hath more reason to be afraid to be tried by Consequences than Mr. Baxter himself hath, as I think I have made it ap­pear already from the Consequences of what he asser­ted at the Savoy-Conference, and shall make it ap­pear more and more before I have done with him.

And therefore it is for his sake more than for mine own (at least upon this occasion) that I would not have men judged of by the Consequences of their O­pinions, though never so truly inferr'd from them, if they be denied by them. But I say not this, as No such conse­quence in the case. any way or in any the least degree acknowledging that there is any such Consequence logically or ra­tionally to be inferr'd, as Mr. Baxter saith there is from my denying of his aforesaid Aphorism to be true, that therefore I deny all humane Powers to be limited by God. An unlimited lawfull Mo­narchy, in what sense.

But doth not (saith Mr. Baxter) he that main­tains (as the Bishop doth) that there is such a thing [Page 134] in the world as an unlimited lawfull Monarchy or hu­mane Power, consequentially deny, that all humane Powers are limited by God? No, (saith the Bishop) if by unlimited he means unlimited by men, or by humane Laws or constitutions; for some humane Powers may be unlimited in this sense, and yet all of them notwithstanding be limited by God: I, but saith Mr. Baxter, this subterfuge will not serve the Bishop's turn; for in my Aphorism which he noteth as false, I do expressly speak of God's limitation. Do you so, Mr. Baxter? then the Printer hath done you great wrong, or mine Eyes are grown so dim with age, as no spectacles will enable me to see any such words as limitation of God or by God, either in the Text or Margent of that Aphorism which is now in question; no nor in the Paraphrase which you give us of that Aphorism in the aforesaid late Book of yours, which I have now before me: where indeed it is said that Bishop Morley maintains, (though he had not maintained it then, but means to do it now) that there may be a lawfull unlimited Monarchy or Sove­reign Power; but it is not said there nor any where else, that Bishop Morley maintains there may be a lawfull Monarchy or any other Government (law­full or unlawfull) unlimited by God. But he that denies that aforesaid Aphorism (may Mr. Baxter re­ply) doth consequently maintain there may be such a Monarchy or Sovereign power unlimited by God; because Mr. Baxter doth expressly speak of limita­tion by God. He doth so indeed in the words im­mediately subjoyn'd to that Aphorism, but not in the Aphorism it self, neither doth he speak of it in the words subjoyned, to explain what he meant by the limitation he speaks of in the Aphorism before, but [Page 135] rather to intimate that it was not a limitation by God, which he before spake of. For having said in his Mr. B 's Go­vernours, some limited, some unlimited. Aphorism, that Of Governours some were limited and some unlimited, and that the unlimited were Tyrants and had no right to their unlimited Governments; he adds (as a reason why the unlimited were Ty­rants, and had no right to their Governments) For they are all subject themselves, and under the Sove­reignty and Laws of God. Which is in effect, as much and no more than if he had said, Though I tell you, that of Governours some are limited and some are unlimited, I do not mean any of them are unlimited or not limited by God; and what is this but a plain confession that by limitation of Gover­nours in the aforesaid Aphorism, he means their limi­tation If he means limited by men, the con­sequence is a­voided. by men, and not by God? And then (Ihope) a man may deny all such Governours to be Tyrants, that are not so limited, without denying them to be li­mited by God; and consequently without incurring the Censure of being a defier of Deity and Humanity. For why, of these Governours or humane Powers that are all of them limited by God, may not some of them be unlimited or not limited by men, that is by humane Pacts, Laws or Constitutions?

And if this be not Mr. Baxter's own meaning, I would fain know how he will make good his divi­sion of Governours, into some that are limited, and some that are unlimited? For, if his meaning be If he means limited by God, this, that of Governours some are limited by God, and some are unlimited by God, he must needs own that assertion to be his, which he would impose upon me; namely that all humane Powers are not limited by God; and consequently besides his unavoidably The conse­quence falls upon himself. involving himself in a palpable Contradiction (for [Page 136] what can be more contradictory, than to say that all Governours are, and some are not limited by God? he doth necessarily make himself, what he would have me thought to be (viz.) a defier of Deity and Humanity, if to deny all humane Powers to be limited by God, be consequently to defy Deity and Humanity. For what more evident or undeniable consequence can there be than this? Some Governours, or some humane Powers, are un­limited, that is, not limited by God; Therefore All Governments, or all humane Powers, are not li­mited by God; but the Antecedent or former of these two Propositions is Mr. Baxter's (if by li­mitation in his Aphorism he means limited by God as he saith he does) and therefore the Con­sequent or latter of these two Propositions must be his also.

Neither will his de facto doe him any service at all, to help him at this dead lift: for, whereas he saith in his Aphorism, Some are limited, and some are de facto unlimited (supposing him still to mean unli­mited as well as limited by God) I would fain know what de facto was put in for, and written in ano­ther Character, to make it the more observable? Was it, because there was some Metaphysical myste­ry couched in it? If so, he should have explained himself so, as that we, who want his higher Intel­lectuals, might have understood what he meant by it; but if he meant no more than ordinary Grammar and Logick enables us to comprehend; namely that de facto is to be understood as it is opposed to de jure, and then (still supposing that by limited and unlimited he means limited and un­limited by God) the meaning of that part of his [Page 137] Aphorism must be this, that of Governours, though all are limited by God de jure, yet some of them are unlimited by God de facto. And then I de­mand of Mr. Baxter, where there are, or ever All Gover­nours limited by God de facto as well as de jure. were, or ever can be any Governours unlimited or not limited by God de facto as well as de jure, that is, that are not de facto under the Sovereignty and Laws of God, (which is Mr. Baxter's own ex­pression of what he means by being limited by God) and then I say, I would fain know who and where those Governours are that are unlimited by God de facto. And if there neither be, nor can be any such, Mr. Baxter's division of Governours is be­come a Cripple, and hath but one legg left to stand on; One of the membra dividentia, The members of the distinction, being no where to be found in Rerum Natura, In the world. And he might as truly and rationally have said, Of Governours there are some that are somewhere, and some that are nowhere.

CHAP. II.

ANd here I might leave the poor Man intangled in his self-contradictions, and fallen himself into the pit which he had digged for me; but I re­member that if our Enemie's Ox or Ass, and much [Page 138] more if our Enemy himself be fallen into a Pit, we are obliged in charity to doe what we can to help An expedient to help Mr. B. out of his own pit. him out. And truly it will be no hard matter to doe it, if Mr. Baxter will be so charitable to himself, as to lend us his own helping hand towards it, by telling us truly and plainly what Governours he means by those he says are Unlimited de facto, and His Gover­nours de facto unlimited, what. by telling us too by whom de jure they ought to be limited; for there must be some such unlimited Governours somewhere or other, or else (as I said before) his division which must be Bipes, two­legg'd at least (as all Logical divisions are) having lost one of its leggs, will be stans pede in uno, Stand­ing onely upon one legg, and so no division at all. But there are no Governours that are not limited by God saith Mr. Baxter, and limited de facto as well as de jure saith the Bishop, and I think Mr. Baxter will not in cool bloud deny that they are so: and therefore Mr. Baxter's de facto Ʋnlimited Governours must needs be such Governours, as though they are both de jure and de facto limited by God, yet are de facto unlimited by Men, or by hu­mane Pacts and Constitutions.

Speak out, Mr. Baxter; was not this your mean­ing in your Aphorism? Give glory unto God, and confess the truth, especially when it will be for your own advantage; for hereby you will extricate your self from those otherwise inextricable difficulties you will inevitably continue to be involv'd in; I mean the aforesaid self-contradiction and self-condemnati­on, which will both of them evidently and unde­niably follow, and fall upon you, if you persist in your asserting that by Limited in your Aphorism, you mean limited by God. For then by Ʋnlimited [Page 139] you must mean Ʋnlimited by God also. And is it not a plain contradiction for you to say as you do in His self con­tradiction set home, if he means li­mited by God. your Aphorism, that some Governours are unlimited or not limited, (meaning not limited by God) and to say as you do say in the words immediately follow­ing, that they are all limited by God? Is not this (I say) as plain a contradiction as to say, Omnis homo est rationalis, Every man is rational, and Aliquis or Qui­dam homo non est rationalis, Some man is not rational? It is so in our Logick, I know not what it may be in Mr. Baxter's. Again, is not the affirming of some Go­vernours to be unlimited or not limited by God a de­nial, that all humane Powers are limited by God? and consequently doth not Mr. Baxter by affirming the former deny the latter, and thereby prove him­self to be what he says I am, a defier of Deity and If he mean li­mited by men, his charge a­gainst the Bi­shop falls. Humanity? Whereas, if he would acknowledge that by limited and unlimited Governours, in his Apho­rism, he means limited and unlimited by men, or by humane Pacts and Constitutions, (as no doubt he did, and as by the whole drift and Tenour of all that follows from that Aphorism, to the very end of that whole Book it manifestly appears he did) neither would he have had any pretence to charge me with being a defier of Deity and Humanity, nor I have had cause for the vindicating of my self from being guilty of so horrid a Crime, to charge him with contradicting and condemning himself as guilty (upon the same supposition) of the same crime which he chargeth me withall: and consequent­ly with pronouncing the terrible censure of being a defier of Deity and Humanity against himself; though really neither He for asserting, nor I for denying the truth of that Aphorism of his, do deserve to be bran­ded [Page 140] with so black and supersevere a stigma or brand as that is.

And therefore I do not positively charge him, as he doth me, to be a defier either of Deity or Huma­nity; but all that I have said hitherto, hath been first and principally, for mine own Vindication from Mr. Baxter's calumny and aspersion; and (2.) in order thereunto, to let the World see, first, This Godly Man's candour and ingenuity in stating the question concerning the truth or falsehood of this Mr. B 's Inge­nuity in shuf­fling in one Proposition instead of a­nother. Aphorism of his, betwixt him and me. For where­as he cannot choose but know that what I except against, and deny to be true in this Aphorism, is his asserting all unlimited Governours to be Tyrants, and to have no right to their unlimited Governments; he shuffles in another Proposition instead of this, and such a one as is neither affirmed or denied in this Aphorism, as if the Interloper were the same which I denied, (viz.) That all humane Powers are limited by God. But this is but Antiquum obtinere, To doe what he hath ever done; he cannot leave this jug­ling trick: for as he used it once before to disguise what he had asserted at the Conference at the Savoy, so he useth it now to disguise his Aphorism now in question, and will use it again and again upon the like occasion, as we shall see hereafter.

Secondly, as by his shuffling in one Proposition in­stead of another, a true one instead of a false one, you may observe Mr. Baxter's sincerity and inge­nuity, so by his shuffling in of this rather than of any other, into the place of that which was in que­stion, you may observe his excessive charity to­wards me, and those of my Order. For designing His design to make the Bi­shop odious. to make a Bishop, and especially Bishop Morley, (for [Page 141] so he is always pleased to call me, (not honoris gratiâ, For honour's sake, you may be sure) when by name he speaks of me) as odious as he could to all man­kind, what more probable, or to the Sectaries more plausible, a Medium could he have devised to make use of to that End, than first to shuffle in this Propo­sition (All humane Powers are limited by God) and then to make me the denier of it, and finally there­upon to pronounce me a defier of Deity and Hu­manity?

Lastly, you may observe likewise his wonderfull skill in the art of reasoning, and the Transubstan­tiating power of his Logick, by which he will needs infer from my maintaining there may be a lawfull His strange Logick. unlimited Monarchy, I do therefore deny all hu­mane Powers are limited by God. O the weight of a Straw, when it is turned into a Club and weild­ed by such a Hercules! For what doth all this sig­nifie, but that he had rather bely himself, than not slander me, and that he had rather contradict and condemn himself, than not say something to make a Bishop, and especially Bishop Morley; to be thought to be an Atheist and a Blasphemer? not animadverting perhaps that the fiery darts which he slung at the Bishop might with much more force be retorted against himself; for aliquando bonus dormitat Homerus, Sometimes honest Homer is caught napping; or as we say, It is a good horse that never stumbles; and Malice sometimes is blind, as well as Love.

By this time, I think, it is evident enough, ac­cording to Mr. Baxter's own way of reasoning, that either he himself is a defier of Deity and Hu­manity, [Page 142] or Bishop Morley is not. And God forbid, that by any concluding argument either of us should be proved to be so. But now this bold and groundless Calumny (from which, for the honour of my Order as being a Bishop, as well as for my His calumny cleared. personal reputation as I am a Christian, I was bound in the first place to vindicate my self) be­ing removed out of the way; it is high time to come to the consideration of that which was, or ought to have been the [...] the main Question, or the onely subject matter of debate betwixt Mr. Baxter and me in relation to this An address to the main Question. Aphorism: namely, whether I had reason to set down this in the Catalogue of those Aphorisms I excepted against, either as false and erroneous, or as dangerous and seditious; (and I confess I set it down, both as false and erroneous, and as dangerous and seditious also;) which I am now to prove it is.

CHAP. III.

ANd that we may not any longer Andabatarum more pugnare, Fight blindfold or in the dark, as Mr. Baxter loves to doe, without discovering or discerning what that is which is affirmed by one or denied by the other, I will once more repeat the The Aphorism in question. Aphorism it self which is This. ‘ —Of Governours some are limited, some de facto unlimited; the unlimited are Tyrants, and have no right to their unlimited Governments—’ This is Mr. Baxter's Aphorism in terminis; and this I confess is one and the first of those Aphorisms of his, which I think are all of them nigro signanda lapillo, To be marked with a black cole; as being all of them, (I mean all that I have specified) not onely false and errone­ous, but, as I said before, dangerous and seditious also;

And I put this Aphorism of his in the first place, because it is the most general, as speaking of all Go­vernours, Sovereign as well as Subordinate, law­full and unlawfull, limited and unlimited; and pronounceth all the Unlimited, without ex­ception, to be Tyrants, and to have no Right to their unlimited Governments. 2. I put it in the first place, because Mr. Baxter seems to have laid it as the Foundation or Corner-stone, upon which he [Page 144] superstructs all that follows, not in my Collection onely, but in that whole Book of his Holy Common­wealth This Aphorism the foundati­on of his Holy Common­wealth. (as he calls it) from Page 106 to Page 490. that is to the end of the Book: Upon this foundation (I say) all his several discourses that follow in that whole Book are superstructed;

As, 1. That Of the objective or material diffe­rences of Government.

2. That Of the efficient and conveying Causes of Power.

3. That Of the happiest Commonwealth, and best form of Government.

4. How a Commonwealth may best be reduced to a Theocratical temper.

5. Of the Sovereigns Power over the Pastours of the Church.

6. Of the Sovereigns Prerogatives and Power go­verning by Law and Judgments.

7. Of due Obedience to Rulers, and of Resistance.

8. And lastly, Of the late War; (for so he calls the late horrid Rebellion) for the justifying whereof, as this Aphorism is laid as the foundation, so all the aforesaid discourses that are built upon it, are espe­cially and finally designed and intended; but most especially two ofthem, I mean that Of the efficient and conveying Causes of Power, and that Of due Obe­dience to Rulers, and of Resistance. These (I say) are the reasons why I put this before all the rest of his Aphorisms which I except against in my Col­lection.

And this I except against, first, as considered in it self, without relating to Us or to our Governours either Civil or Ecclesiastical, and so considered I say it is false and erroneous: and secondly, I except against [Page 145] it also, as it may be considered, and as I verily be­lieve it was intended, with a respect to our Govern­ment here in England; and so considered, I say it is dangerous and seditious.

First then I say that what Mr. Baxter affirms in this Aphorism, (namely, that Governours de facto unlimited are Tyrants, and have no right to their This Apho­rism of his charged with falshood. unlimited Government) is false, and erroneous con­sidered in it self, as it is set down in general terms, without relation or application to any particular species or form of Government.

For proof whereof, and in order thereunto, I will presume to take for granted, 1. That by Govern­ours Three things premised. (of whom he saith some are limited, and some are unlimited) he means Sovereign or Supreme Go­vernours; Subordinate Governours being all limited by the Supreme, (and therefore none of them un­limited.)

2. That by limited and unlimited is meant li­mited and unlimited by Men; there being no such thing as any Governour, how great or absolute so­ever, that can be said either de jure or de facto to be unlimited by God, as I have already proved.

And therefore, 3dly. I shall take it for granted al­so, that by his de facto unlimited Governours, he means such as are not de facto limited by men or by humane Pacts and Constitutions; and consequent­ly of all such Sovereign and Supreme Governours it is that he affirms, that they are Tyrants, and that none of them have any right to their respective so unlimited Governments.

These things premised, I demand first of Mr. Bax­ter, what he thinks of Paternal Government or the Of Paternal Government. [Page 146] Government of Fathers over their Children, which was the first and most natural Government that ever was in the World, and was antecedent to Proprie­ty in Nature, as well as in Time; though Mr. Bax­ter doth Magisterially pro more suo, According to his custom, define Vide His Apology for the Noncon­formists Mi­nistry. p. 138. Propriety to be in Nature antecedent to Dominion.

But to let that pass, I demand (I say) whether Paternal Government was either de facto or de jure a limited Government by any humane antecedent Law, Pact or Constitution?

If so, I demand again, by whom or betwixt whom, was it made to be so? There were no Men to make it to before Adam, (unless Mr. Baxter will allow of the dream of the Preadamites) nor any besides Adam, untill the World began to be peopled with his Children; of all whom, I presume, Adam the first Gover­nour, unlimi­ted. Mr. Baxter will not deny their Father Adam to have been the lawfull Governour, though he was not, nor could not be limited by them, nor by any antece­dent Covenant or Constitution made betwixt them and him: whence it follows, that either all de facto unlimited Governours are not Tyrants, and such as have no Right to their unlimited Govern­ments, or that Adam the Father of all Mankind, and the first Governour that ever was in the World, was a Tyrant, and had no right to Govern his own Children, as he did, and his Childrens Children also, or at least had a right to do so as long as he lived; which was very near a thousand years. So that if any during that time did not submit to his Govern­ment, it was not because he was not a lawfull, though an unlimited Governour; but because who­soever disobeyed or resisted him, were not onely [Page 147] unnatural Children but rebellious Subjects; of whom Cain that killed Abel his Brother was the first, and Cain the first Rebel. probably so were all descended from him, a wicked and rebellious generation, who for their rebellion against God and God's Vicegerent their Father Adam, their Sovereign Lord and King, were all swept a­way by that universal Inundation and Deluge, wherein all mankind perished, but Noah and his Family onely, who were none of the cursed offspring of Cain, but the Posterity of Seth, whom God gave unto Adam, instead of Abel, whom Cain slew.

After the Deluge, the first Monarch of the new Noah the first Monarch af­ter the floud. World de jure was Noah, and probably de facto too as long as he lived, or at least as long as he and his Children and his Childrens Children lived together or near one another; and were all one people, and of one language (as the Text tells us they were) un­till they set upon the building of Babel: but assoon as there was a confusion of Tongues, some speaking one language and some another, then (saith the Text) they were scattered over the face of the Earth; those that spake the same language and understood one another going together to the same place, and plant­ing themselves in the same Countrey; which being then uninhabited was jure naturali, By the right of nature, primi occupantis, His that took first possessi­on; and jure Divino positivo also, By God's positive law; God himself telling us, that he hath given the earth to the children of men; that is, to be possessed, inhabited, and cultivated by them.

So that there were as many several Colonies which An account of Government after the con­fusion of lan­guages. afterwards grew into as many several Nations, as there were then several Languages, and as many se­veral [Page 148] Governours in chief over them, who if they were not the Fathers and Heads of the several Colonies (as probably enough they might be, and then the Regiment might still be Paternal) yet were without doubt such, as for their eminent courage and vertue, were submitted to by the rest of the same Language; or took upon themselves to be first their Conduc­tors to their several places of habitation, and then to be their Kings or Supreme Governours after they came thither, and became one People or Body-Politick.

So that upon this division and distribution of Ʋnlimited Monarchy most ancient. Mankind into several Countreys and Nations, were those first Kings, whom Justin speaksof, when he tells us that Principio rerum; Gentium, Nationumque Impe­rium penes Reges erat, That all Nations at first were governed by Kings, & arbitria Principum pro legibus erant, And the Will of the Prince (saith he) was the Law of the People: so that as Monarchy (next to the Paternal) was the most ancient of all Govern­ments, so Arbitrary or unlimited Monarchy was the most ancient of all Monarchies. I say most ancient; I do not say the best; for I do willingly acknowledge a Political Monarchy, (such as ours is in England) Political Mo­narchy (as ours is) better than Despo­tical. where the people are Governed by a King governing by Laws, and by Laws made for them by the King, with their own consent, is incomparably a much bet­ter Government both for King and People, than an absolute, arbitrary and Despotical Monarchy is, or can be; as I did at large assert and maintain in the Sermon I preached at our present King's Coronation, and after­wards printed by his Majestie's special command; which I add to shew, that the King himself was of the same Judgment as to that Particular.

[Page 149] But yet for all that I am not afraid to affirm, that Mr. Baxter's Political Aphorism I am now speaking Mr. B 's opi­nion of unli­mited Gover­nours false and dange­rous. of, viz. That all unlimited Governours are Tyrants, and have no right to their unlimited Governments, is false in it self, and the publishing of it, as it is capitally criminal in a Subject of any unlimited Go­vernment, so it is of dangerous consequence and se­ditious, even in a limited or Political Government, of any Species or kind whatsoever.

For there is no species or kind of Government, whether it be Monarchical, or Aristocratical, or Demo­cratical, Ʋnlimited Governours not Tyrants, because unli­mited. but it may be limited or unlimited, and it may be more or less limited; but none of them are therefore Tyrannical, because they are unlimited.

For Tyrannus a Tyrant, properly so called, I mean as now the word signifies; (for at first it sig­nified Two sorts of Tyrants. neither more nor less than a Monarch, or One governing All) is either Tyrannus usurpatione, a Tyrant by Usurpation, or Tyrannus exercitio, a Tyrant in Administration; that is, such a one as doth either violently and injuriously usurp the Govern­ment which he hath no right to; or though he hath a right to it, doth wickedly and injuriously behave himself in the exercise of it. And such in Cromwell in both senses a Tyrant. both respects was Cromwell (if ever there were any) notwithstanding Mr. Baxter's magnifying of him, when time was, and exhorting his Son to follow his example in Governing as he did; which was, as he saith, to his immortal glory, and yet was as arbitrarily and as unlimitedly, as ever any of the Assyrian, or Persian, or Roman Empe­rours did heretofore, or as the Turk or great Mogul now do.

[Page 150] And so may any unlimited Monarch doe, and yet Several unli­mited Mo­narchs, no Tyrants in either sense. be neither an Usurper, nor an unjust Governour, nor consequently be a Tyrant in either of the true no­tions of a Tyrant, as Cromwell was in both: for as in the Monarchies before named, and in all other Kingdoms in all parts of the World, the Succession of Princes one unto another was Hereditary, general­ly at least, and I think I may say universally, till oflate, and consequently They cannot all of them be said to have been Usurpers, or Tyrants by Ʋsurpa­tion; so many of them have been Just, and Wise, and Temperate, and every way most excellent Prin­ces; and so beloved by their Subjects while they lived, that they were Deified and adored by them af­ter they were dead; and consequently they were not all of them Tyrants in the Exercise of their Go­vernments, though they were unlimited by any an­tecedent Pact, Covenant or Constitution betwixt them and their Subjects: which is enough to prove that all de facto unlimited Governours are not Tyrants, and consequently to prove this Aphorism of Mr. Bax­ter's which affirms they are so, to be false. Neither if it could prove them to be Tyrants Exercitio, that is to govern Tyrannically, would that prove them to have no Right to their Government, supposing them to be no Usurpers.

CHAP. IV.

BUt Mr. Baxter perhaps will reply, All of them Mr. B 's mean­ing perhaps, that all Go­vernours ought de jure to be limited. are therefore Ʋsurpers because they are unlimi­ted, as indeed he seems to insinuate by annexing de facto to unlimited; as if de jure all Governours ought to be limited in their governing by antecedent Covenants and Compacts betwixt those that are to govern, and those that are to be governed by them; and therefore those Governours that are not so limi­ted or precontracted with, are Tyrants, and such Tyrants as have no right to govern, because de jure, by right, they ought to be limited or precontracted with. And this I do verily believe to be Mr. Bax­ter's genuine sense and meaning in this Aphorism; and he that reads what he writes afterwards, espe­cially in his Aphorisms and discourses of the Causes of Conveying power, and of Obedience and Resistance, will I am confident be of my mind as to this par­ticular.

Now if the reason why he doth so magisterially pronounce all those Governours that are de facto No obligati­on that all Government should be so limited by any law. Ʋnlimited to be Tyrants, and to have no right to their Governments, be, because they ought de jure to be limited, I mean so limited as is before declared; [Page 152] I demand quo jure, By what right or law, they are obliged to be so limited? Was it jure divino positi­vo, By divine positive law? or was it jure divino naturali, By divine law of nature? or was it jure gentium, By the law of nations? for one of these three it must be, or else it could not be obligatory to all Governours and all Nations that are to be Govern­ed by them.

But first it was not jure divino positivo, By divine positive law. For where or in what place of God's 1. Not by the positive law of God. word, either of the new or old Testament, do we reade any positive command of God, that the Kings or Governours of all Nations, or of any Nation, should be antecedently limited by Pacts or Cove­nants agreed upon betwixt them and the People, over whom they were to reign, before they could have any just Right or Title to governor reign over them? I am sure the Kings of Israel, though they were limited by God, not as Men onely, and as all other Kings are, but as Kings, or in the execution of their Kingly Office, and that jure positivo, By posi­tive law, as well as jure naturali & morali, By na­tural and moral law; yet they were never limited by the people either antecedenter or consequenter, neither à parte ante nor à parte post; nor was there any command of God, or so much as any intimati­on from God that they should be so.

Again, as such limitation of Governours by the 2 Not by the law of nature. People is not de jure divino positivo, By any positive law of God, there being no positive Command in God's word for it; so it is not de jure divino natura­li, By the law of nature, neither; for then it would have been de facto likewise at first as well as after­wards; and in all places as well as in some; especially [Page 153] in such places, where there are no other rules or Laws for the People to live by, but the dictates of Nature onely; as in all inhabited places of the late­ly discovered New world, where we find no other Government, but by Kings or Monarchs, no nor o­ther Kings or Supreme Governours, but such as are unlimited.

Lastly, as such a limitation of Kings or Supreme Governours by the People, is neither de jure positivo 3. Not by the law of Nati­ons. nor naturali, Neither by any positive law, nor by the law of nature; so it is not de jure Gentium, By the law of Nations, neither; For nothing is de ju­re Gentium, By the law of Nations, but that where­in the interest of all Nations is concerned; as free­dom of Trade and Commerce, the inviolableness of the Persons of Ambassadours, &c. but how is the in­terest of all other Nations concerned in this or that particular Nation's being governed by a limited or unlimited Prince or Governour? and supposing the first Kings or Sovereigns to have been unlimited, as Justine and all other Historians tell us they were; and as in all probability they were indeed in the first plantation of the World: and supposing too their unlimited Governments to have been Heredita­ry, as all History Humane and Divine do testify also: I would fain know, how the Heirs and Successours of such unlimited Princes could come to be limited. It could not be upon the account of a conditional Election; for an Election cannot be, but into a place that is void; but in an Hereditary Kingdom there is never any vacancy, because in an Hereditary Kingdom The King never dies, though the man The King ne­ver dies, how to be under­stood. who was King doth; for immediately assoon as the Father ceaseth, the Son or next Heir begins to [Page 154] be King, and to be King as his Father was, that is, an unlimited Sovereign as his Father was, and so from generation to generation. And then Mr. Bax­ter must grant, that the Hereditary Successours of unlimited Governours may have a Right to their un­limited Governments, and such a right as their Sub­jects cannot deprive them of, without such a Go­vernour's own consent; nor he deprive his Heirs of the same right, by his consenting to the limitation or lessening of it, unless they and every one of them consent to it also.

Or else he must prove that a free People, or a People that were sui juris, At their own disposal, and under no Government at all (if there were ever such a people in the World) might not voluntarily and lawfully submit themselves to the Government of one or more Governours, without any antecedent Pact or Covenant to limit him or them in his or their Government; and for proof of this he must produce some universal binding Law to the contrary; which untill he can doe, I do and must still affirm, that unlimited Governours (supposing them to be no U­surpers, and that they do not reign tyrannically, as certainly there be some that do not) are not all of them Tyrants, because they are unlimited; or such as have no right to their Governments upon that account onely; and consequently that this Aphorism of Mr. Baxter's, which affirms the contrary, is false; The conse­quence dri­ven home. and would be Treason and justly punishable as Trea­son, if it were affirmed by a Subject of a Despotical Prince or Sovereign, such as all Kings at first were; and such as all Kings in the East and West -Indies, and in Africk, and some in Europe, as the Turk and Musco­vite and French King, are at this day.

[Page 155] Whereunto may be added the unlimited Right Conquerours in a just war unlimited. and Title which Conquerours have over those they have conquered; I mean such Conquerours, as by a just War are become Lords and Masters of the lives and fortunes of those they have subdued; whe­ther they be Rebels or Enemies; and therefore as they may justly save the lives of as many or as few as they please, so, and much more so, may they justly govern those, whose lives they have saved, as they think fit, and most for their own advantage; as the Israelites did the Gibeonites, making them Instances out of Scripture. Hewers of Wood and drawers of Water; that is, by employing them in all manner of drudgery, and servile works: And thus and worse than thus, Da­vid did to the Ammonites, even to all the people of the cities of Ammon (saith the Text) which he had conquered, putting them under sawes and harrows of iron, and making them pass through the Brick-kilns, because they had violated the jus Gentium or the law of Nations, by the barbarous usage of his Ambassa­dours, whom out of kindness he had sent unto them. And yet (which is observable) the Ammonites were none of those Nations, which God had devoted to destruction, and commanded the Israelites to make war upon; but it was a War the Ammonites had justly drawn upon themselves with the sad and severe effects of it.

And what if our King having been so long, and The like Case supposed be­twixt our King and the Algerines. so continuedly, and so outragiously injured and pro­voked by the Algerines robbing and pillaging of his Ships, and inslaving and murthering of his Sub­jects, should make War upon them, and by God's blessing vanquish and subdue them, making himself [Page 156] Master of all they have, both of strength and wealth, both by Sea and Land, and of that den of Thieves it self (I mean the City of Argiers,) might he not, if he would, justly destroy them all? or if he thought it better for himself, or more for his own Interest, sell them all for slaves, or use them all as slaves to tugg at the Oar all their life long in their own Gal­leys, or to dig in Mines and Quarries, or to mend high ways, or to put them to any other toilsome or sordid labour, and to have nothing for it but brown Bisket and water for their food, and for their clothing any thing that will but cover their naked­ness; and all this while to be beaten as often and as much as their Task-masters shall think fit to inflict it? This would be very hard usage you will say, but no harder than that wherewith they have used others; nor no harder than a Conquerour may most justly inflict on such inhumane Monsters, and such profest Enemies of all mankind, as they are. Howsoever I hope Mr. Baxter will not deny such a Conquerour to be an unlimited Governour of those whom he hath so conquered, and yet to have a just right and Title to his unlimited Government, as every Master hath likewise over his slaves, whether they be born in his house, or bought with his money, without capitulating with them before-hand, how he shall govern them, or how they will be governed by him.

But may not a People though conquered in a just Whether a­conquered peo­ple may after submission free themselves by force? War, and deservedly made and used as slaves and Vassals by the Conquerour, doe what they can, to free themselves from that slavery and servitude? Mr. Baxter thinks they may, as appears by what he saith Page 193 of his Holy-Commonwealth, where Mr. B. saith, I. [Page 157] he tells us that Dominatio, that is, (in his sense) any unlimited Government is penal to the Subjects, and they may escape it if they can, yea though they have submitted themselves to such a servitude: and conse­quently, à fortiori, By stronger reason, they may doe what they can to free themselves from it, if they be forced by a Conquerour to submit to it.

But this was not the judgment or doctrine of the Prophet Jeremy; for Nebuchadnezzar had no right The prophet Jeremy of another judg­ment. or title, but that of Conquest, to that unlimited power he exercised over the Jews by making what Viceroys he pleased to govern them, and by impo­sing and exacting what tribute he pleased from them; and by forcing their King his Vassal to take an Oath of Allegeance to him, which is called the Oath of God, and for the breaking whereof Zedechiah (whom Nebuchadnezzar after he had deposed Jehoiachim, 2 Chron. 3. 13. Jerem. 5. 2. made his Viceroy under him) seeking to free himself and the people from that bondage or unlimited power, which the King of Babylon exercised over them, is by God himself declared to be a Rebel, and his endeavouring to cast off that unlimited yoke is called Rebellion; and Rebellion it could not be, Zedekiah 's casting off the yoke of the king of Baby­lon, called Rebellion and punished as such. unless it had been a rising up against a rightfull So­vereign: and therefore as God called it a Rebellion, so he punish'd it as a Rebellion by giving up Jerusalem and Zedechiah himself into the hands of him against whom he had rebelled; who after he had slain his Children before his eyes, he presently caused them to be put out, that the slaughter of his Children might be the last thing he should ever see; and then carried him captive unto Babylon, and kept him in a dungeon till he died: he caused likewise the walls [Page 158] of Jerusalem to be broken down, and the House of God it self, that glorious fabrick, that wonder of the World, to be destroyed, and all the Nobility, Clergy, Gentry, and Artificers of the Nation to be carried away captive also, together with all the wealth and whatsoever was worth the carrying a­way, leaving nothing but some of the poorer sort of labouring People to dress and till the ground, and to keep it from being overrun with wild beasts. So that all the Jews got by this and their former Rebellion against the King of Assyria, was but the making of their yoke harder to be born, and hea­vier than it was before; as it seems by the Prophet Jeremy's sad bewailing of it in his Book of Lamenta­tions. And as the Prophet Jeremy declares the Ef­fects, so the Prophet Ezekiel declares the Causes of Witnessed by the prophet Ezekiel. this their miserable condition; namely their Perjury, breaking the Oath of Allegeance they had taken, and their revolting from their obedience they had sworn to the King of Babylon, who had conquered them and forced them to submit to his unlimited power in Government of them; which if it had been unlawfull for them to obey, God would not have suffered them to be punished as they were, for endeavouring as they did, to free themselves from it; at least he would not have called that endeavour of theirs a Rebellion, and specified it as the main cause, for which they were so punished.

And it is very observable, that though God had promised to free them from that yoke, which first the Assyrians had laid upon them, and afterwards Their delive­rance at last from the Babylonish captivity, was not by force of Arms. the Persian Monarchs did keep them under; yet, when after their seventy years Captivity was accom­plished, and the prefixed time of their deliverance [Page 159] was come, as the Text tells us Daniel knew by Books (namely by what he had read in the former Prophets) it was, God would not suffer them so much as to endeavour to deliver themselves by strong hand, or by rising up in Arms against their unlimited So­vereign, as no doubt he could have done if he would; but he put into the heart first of Cyrus, and after­wards of Artaxerxes Kings of Persia, then their Ma­sters and unlimited Sovereigns, not onely to give them leave to return into their own Countrey, but abundantly to furnish them with Money and Mate­rials of all sorts, for the rebuilding of the Temple and City of Jerusalem, as is recorded at large in the Books of Ezra and Nehemiah.

And like unto this was their former Deliverance out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage, As neither was that from the E­gyptian bon­dage. from whence after a long and grievous slavery they were brought out by a strong hand indeed, but not by a strong hand of their own; for as they never attempted any thing against the arbitrary unlimited Government they lived under, during their very long and very cruel slavery in Egypt, so when at last they went out of it, they went not out without Pharaoh's leave to doe so; though there were above Six hundred thousand fighting Men amongst them, a number sufficient to have made their way by force against all the Power Pharaoh could have raised to hinder it; but God would not give them courage, or suffer them to doe so, to the end that there might The reason of this, to give no counte­nance to re­bellion. be no countenance or colour for Rebellion, against even the most unjust, and injurious, and tyrannical So­vereign Powers, to be found upon record in his Word, as allowed by him in his own People, to justifie or en­courage any other people or persons, upon any pre­tence [Page 160] to rebell against their Sovereigns, whether li­mited or unlimited; nay whether they were no Ty­rants or Tyrants, so they were not Ʋsurpers, and consequently Rebels themselves against their right­full Sovereign.

For, as I have already proved, that all unlimited Go­vernours are not Tyrants, because they are unlimited: so I am now to prove that all Tyrants do not lose their right to their Government, because they are Tyrants or because they govern tyrannically, still supposing them to be no Usurpers.

CHAP. V.

NOw what or whom Mr. Baxter himself doth mean by Tyrants here in this place, it is plain What a Tyrant is, in Mr. B 's notion. and evident from what he saith Page 86. of his Po­litical Aphorisms; where distinguishing betwixt an Ʋsurper and a Tyrant, he tells us, that An Ʋsurper is he that wants a Title, and A Tyrant is one that doth abuse it, or useth it not as he ought to use it; that is (saith he) for the common good. So that in his Notion of a Tyrant, he that hath never so just a Title to the Government, if he govern not as he ought to govern, is a Tyrant; and if he be a Tyrant, [Page 161] he hath no Right (saith he) unto his Government, whether it be limited or unlimited.

No, saith Mr. Baxter, I do not say he hath no right to his Government, but that he hath no right to his unlimited Government, whereby I confess I know not what he means, unless it be this, that an unlimited Governour is not a Governour, but a Ty­rant; and that he hath no right to his unlimited Go­vernment, because there ought to be no such Go­vernment.

But then again, what will become of his division of Governours, and consequently of Governments also, into some that are limited, and some that are unlimited? If he reply, that though de facto, As to matter of fact, there be some Governours and Go­vernments that are unlimited, yet de jure, As to matter of right, they ought all of them to be limi­ted; and consequently, no man can have a right to an unlimited Government, because a Government that is unlimited is no rightfull Government. If this be his meaning, it is but petitio Principii, A beg­ging of that which is in question, nay of that which A Gover­nour's being unlimited, no hindrance to his Right. I think I have put out of question already, by the Instances I have given. (1) of Paternal Govern­ment in the Old World before the Floud. (2.) Of the first Monarchs in the New World after the Floud. (3.) Of all Conquerours over those whom they have conquered in a just War; who were all of them un­limited Governours by any humane Constitution, and that not de facto, As in fact, onely, but de jure, In right, also; there being no positive law of God, nor no humane antecedent Pact, or Constitution to the contrary. Such likewise were the Roman Empe­rours; and yet their Right and Title to their unli­mited [Page 162] Government was never question'd, either by Christ himself, or by any of the Primitive Christi­ans, who were his first and best disciples. So that there is no more to be said to prove that it is not the Governour's (I mean the Sovereign or Supreme Governour's) being unlimited that can make him to have no right to his unlimited Government.

Neither need there to be much said to prove, that A lawfull Go­vernour's be­ing a Tyrant, doth not for­feit his Right. it is not the lawfull Governour's being a Tyrant (whe­ther he be limited or unlimited) that can make him lose or forfeit the right he had, or hath, unto his Government, so as to free his Subjects from their obligation of obedience to him, or warrant their taking up of Arms, or rebelling against him, and consequently to depose him and put him to death: for upon the same ground, and by the same reason the former may be done, the latter may be done also. So that the Presbyterians are no more excusable from being our late blessed King's murtherers, than the In­dependents; the latter inferring the Conclusion from the Premisses of the former. But this by the way onely. I proceed to the proof of what I have in hand, namely,

That a lawfull Sovereign, whether limited or un­limited, The Propo­sition to be proved. doth not lose or forfeit his right to his So­vereignty or Government over his Subjects by being a Tyrant, or by Governing them in a Tyrannical man­ner; so as upon that account his Subjects may law­fully disown or rebell against him.

1. Because there is nothing in God's word to war­rant Several ar­guments to prove it. it.

2. Because there is much to be alledged out of God's word to disprove it.

[Page 163] 3. Because the Doctrine and Practice of the Pri­mitive Christians is against it.

4. Because it seemeth to be a contradiction to the nature of the thing it self to maintain it.

5. And lastly, Because supposing, but not grant­ing it to be true, it would be mischievous to Man­kind and destructive to humane Society in the prac­tice of it.

And first, this Aphorism or Assertion of Mr. Bax­ter's, viz, That a Sovereign or Supreme Governour (whether limited or unlimited it matters not) hath no Right, or forfeits the Right he had, unto his Go­vernment, if he be a Tyrant, or Governs otherwise than by the Laws of either God or man or both he ought to do; is False, because there is nothing in The 1. Ar­gument. Scripture either of the old or new Testament to warrant the truth of it. For this being a matter of so important and universal a concernment as it is, in regard of all Times, Places and Nations, though God foresaw that some, nay many, very many of the Kings or Supreme Governours, both unlimited and limited, not onely of other Nations, but of his own People, would be Tyrants, that is, such as would govern their Subjects, not with Equity, Justice and Moderation, as they ought to doe; nor accor­ding either to Divine or humane Laws (though of their own making) but according to their own Will and pleasures: yet there is no mention of any for­feiture of their Right to govern their Subjects that they incur by it, nor of any permission for their Subjects to rise or rebell, no nor so much as to de­fend themselves by any kind of force against them; much less to depose them or to set up others in the stead of them: which if they might have done, or [Page 164] if it had been best for them to doe so, God no doubt (having so special and peculiar a care of them and kindness for them more than he had for any other of the Nations) would have permitted them (at least) to have done what they could, to have freed themselves from so heavy a yoke, and told them how, and when, and in what case they might have done so: which because he hath not, we may be sure it was not his Will they should doe so, and conse­quently it was not lawfull for them to doe so; and if not for them, then certainly 'tis for no other Subjects of any other Nation neither.

Again, besides this proof of the falseness of this Aphorism ab authoritate Scripturae negativè, From the authority of Scripture in a Negative way, The 2. Argu­ment from Scripture Af­firmatively. because there is nothing in Scripture to justifie the truth of it by: there be many Affirmative and po­sitive places in Scripture to prove the contrary; namely, that Sovereign Princes or Supreme Gover­nours do not forfeit their Right to their respective Governments though they be Tyrants, or because they are Tyrants; nor are their Subjects disobliged from their Allegeance and Obedience to them in all lawfull things because they are so. Such are all those places in the New Testament, which command obe­dience to the Sovereign or Supreme Governours that then were; and particularly to Nero himself Obedience to Nero himself, strictly com­manded. the Roman Emperour, who was not onely one of the worst of Men, but the greatest of Tyrants that ever was in the World. And yet it was in his time, and for subjection and obedience to him, and not to the Roman Senate as partakers of the Sovereignty with him, (as Mr. Baxter would have it) that those strict commands were given to the Christians of [Page 165] those times, that were his Subjects, to obey him in all his lawfull commands, and not to resist him, not [...], though they could not obey him, when he commanded what was sinfull or unlawfull.

Moreover it is observable, that as the Prince then reigning, when these commands of obedience to him, and not resisting of him, were given to the Christians by the Apostles, was a most merciless and cruel Tyrant toward all his Subjects in general, and And that when Christi­ans under his actual perse­cution. most of all to those that professed themselves Chri­stians in particular: So it is observable (I say) that at this very time this cruel Tyrant did actually per­secute the Christians in a most horrible and outra­gious manner and measure; and yet even then, when and whilst they were so cruelly persecuted by him, they were commanded to behave them­selves as dutifull and obedient Subjects towards him, and that for Conscience sake, and not for fear of punishment onely, or for fear of being worse and worse used by him; which the Apostles (who knew the mind of God much better than we do) would never have commanded them to doe, if Nero, by his tyrannical usage of them, had lost his right to go­vern them, or ceased to be their Sovereign.

Lastly, as it is observable at what time these Precepts of obedience to Sovereign Princes, and of not resisting them, were given to their Christian Subjects, (namely, when the worst of Men, and greatest of Tyrants, and first Persecutour of Christi­ans was their Sovereign) so it is worth our obser­vation also, to take notice of the Persons, whom the Holy Ghost made choice of to publish and pro­claim Why S. Peter and S. Paul made choice of, to preach up obedience. these Precepts unto the World. They were St. Peter and St. Paul; of whom the one had been [Page 166] reproved by Christ, whilst he was upon the Earth, for resisting the Magistrate, though it were in de­fence of Christ himself; and the other was reproved by Christ from Heaven, for obeying the Magistrate's sinfull commands by persecuting Christ in his mem­bers: but both of them had now better learned Christ, namely, neither to obey the Magistrate when he com­manded them to doe that which was sinfull, nor to resist him when he persecuted them for not obeying of him. And what they had learned themselves, they of all the rest of the Apostles were the fittest to teach o­thers; because as the one of them was more peculiarly than any other of the Twelve, the Apostle of the Jews; so the other of them was as peculiarly the Apostle of the Gentiles; and both of them so by God's own appointment: so that the whole world being ac­cording to Scripture divided into Jews and Gentiles, the whole world or all Mankind might be taught this doctrine, which it so much concerns the peace of the world, that all men should learn and practice, namely, the Doctrine of indispensable either active or passive Obedience of Subjects to their Sovereigns, how ill soever they are governed or how much so­ever they are oppressed by them.

CHAP. VI.

ANd as this was the doctrine preached both to Jews and Gentiles by the Apostles; so was it believed and practised by the Primitive Christians, The 3. Argu­ment from the practice of the Primitive Christians. who followed herein the example of Christ their head, of whom as it was foretold by the Prophets, so it is recorded by the Evangelists, that he was oppressed, and he was afflicted, yet as a sheep before the shearer is dumb, so he opened not his mouth, but without murmuring or contradiction submitted him­self to the sentence of an unjust Judge, and patiently endured the execution of it; leaving to us an Exam­ple (as St. Peter tells us) of suffering as he did without resisting those that are in authority, though they use it or abuse it unjustly and injuriously, and though it be in our power to resist it, as I am sure it was in Christ's. And herein (I say) the first and best of his Disciples follow'd his example; I mean the Primi­tive Christians of the three first Ages, that is, all the Whilst under Heathen and Tyrant Prin­ces. while they were subject to Heathen and Tyrannical and persecuting Princes; and yet we do not reade that ever they did so much as make any the least doubt of the right, those Tyrannical and persecuting Princes had to govern them: much less did they upon the pretence of those Princes having forfeited their Right to their Government, ever take up arms either offensive or defensive, against any of them; as no doubt they might and would have done, if [Page 168] they had thought or had been taught, that those Princes had either had no right to govern them, because they were unlimited, or that they had forfeited the Right they had, because they were Tyrants.

For it was not out of Stupidity, or because they were insensible of their sufferings, neither was it Their non-re­sistance not for want of power, &c. out of Pusillanimity, or want of courage to encoun­ter with their enemies, though never so numerous; for how could they that did not fear death, the most painfull and tormenting death, fear any thing that men could doe unto them? nor lastly, was it Weakness or want of power to make resistance or to defend themselves against their persecuting Princes, that was the cause they did not, (as not onely Bellarmine and other Papists, but many of those that call and think themselves to be the best of Protestants, are not ashamed to say it was) but mere Conscience of their But cut of conscience to God. duty to God, in obeying even such Princes as those were, by doing whatsoever they commanded which God had not forbidden, willingly and chearfully, and by suffering meekly and patiently whatsoever they did wrongfully inflict upon them, for not obey­ing them when they could not obey them and God too; as it undeniably appears by those Apologies that were made in the name of all the Primitive Christians of those times, by Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Athena­goras, and others, who all of them tell their perse­cuting Emperours, that it was not for want of force or courage, but merely for conscience sake and be­cause their Religion had forbidden them to doe so, that they did not take up Arms to defend themselves against those Powers that God had set over them; [Page 169] though the power they received from God were never so ill used or abused by them.

Which having made appear from Precepts of Scripture, and from the Practice of those Precepts by the Primitive Christians, one would think there need no more to be said to justifie my exception a­gainst this Aphorism of Mr. Baxter's, as being con­trary to what was taught by Christ and his Apostles, and what was practised by the first and best of their Disciples.

CHAP. VII.

BUt yet because there is something in the Old Testament (which is the word of God as well as the New) which may seem to favour Mr. Bax­ter's opinion; namely, That Tyrants have no right to their Government, or that Sovereign Princes by becoming Tyrants do lose or forfeit the right they had unto their Government; we will consider what can be alledged out of the Old Testament to prove that Assertion.

There is no such Law I am sure, nor no such po­sitive declaration of God's Will, that a King or Sove­reign Prince ceases to be a king or Sovereign, when he is, or because he is a Tyrant; or that his Subjects shall cease to be his Subjects, or cease to acknow­ledge and obey him as their Sovereign upon that [Page 170] account, or indeed upon any other account whatso­ever: much less is there any thing said in the Old Testament to warrant or justifie the deposing of So­vereign Princes by their Subjects, upon any pre­tence of male administration of their Government in any kind or any degree. And therefore if there were never so many Examples or Instances in matter of fact to the contrary, they would never prove the thing it self to be lawfull. But indeed there is but one Instance or Example in the whole Old Testament appliable to this purpose, and that is that of Reho­boam, The ten Tribes revolt from Rehoboam examined. from whom the ten Tribes revolted, for but threatning he would oppress them more than his Fa­ther had done.

Now from this one Example onely, there be some that do conclude, that Subjects in case of Tyranny and oppression by their Sovereigns (especially if there be otherwise no hope of their being eased or freed from it) may lawfully doe as the ten Tribes did, revolt from them and set up others to reign over them.

But as, à facto ad jus non valet argumentum, From matter of fact to matter of right is no good conse­quence; so neither, à semel facto ad semper sic faci­endum, From a thing's having been once done, to have it alway so done, is no good consequence nei­ther. So that supposing, but not granting, that it was lawfull for Jeroboam and the Ten tribes to doe as they did, because Jeroboam had been formerly told by the Prophet Ahljah, That God would give him those ten Tribes to reign over them; and be­cause God himself, speaking of the revolting of the ten Tribes from Rehoboam; saith 1 Kings 12. 24 expressly, that the thing was from him: supposing I say that upon these [Page 171] considerations this fact of Jeroboam's and the ten Tribes in revolting from Rehoboam, and setting up Suppose what they did, might be by special Commission. Jeroboam in his stead to reign over them, had been no Rebellion of the People against their lawfull So­vereign; but an execution of God's command a­gainst him, who, though he was their Sovereign, was but God's Subject; and therefore might be punished by him, when, and how, and by whom, and to what degree he pleased; as having forfeited to him for his own and Father's sins all the power and dominion he had over his Subjects, as derived from him, and held of him, and that but durante bene placito, During his good pleasure, onely; what I say if, upon such considerations as these, that par­ticular fact of Jeroboam and the ten Tribes were justifiable, would it follow that any other Subject or Subjects, without such a special or particular Commission from God, as they had, might doe as they did? Would it not follow as well that any The like cases of Abraham. man might commit Murther, and the most bar­barous and the most unnatural of all murthers, I mean the murther of his own and onely Son, be­cause Abraham was not onely permitted, but com­manded by God to doe so, nay and commended by God for being so ready and so willing as he was to doe it? And would it not follow as well likewise, Of the Israe­lites. that any man might rob, and spoil their Neigh­bours, because the Israelites did so to the Egyptians and were blameiess, because God who is Lord Pa­ramount of all mens lives and fortunes, (and to whom all men have forfeited themselves and all that they have by their sins) had given them a special and particular Commission to doe so? Whereunto I Of Phineas. might add the killing of Zimri and Cozbi by Phineas, [Page 172] which was done no doubt by God's special inspira­tion, because God was so well pleased with it, that the Plague in the heat and height of it presently cea­sed; and Phineas was by God himself highly com­mended and rewarded for it. And yet I believe, Those cases applied. that if any man were indicted and arraigned either for Robbery or Murther, though those that he rob­bed were Egyptians, that is never so much his own or God's enemies, or if those that he killed were actually committing never so great a sin: I believe, I say, that one's pleading the Israelites robbing of the Egyptians to justifie his theft, or the other's pleading of Phineas his killing of Zimri and Cozbi to justifie his murther, would not save either of them from the Gallows: so neither will the pleading of what was done by Jeroboam and the ten Tribes, (supposing it done by God's special Command or Approbation) justifie or excuse any other for doing what they did, unless they could make it appear they have the same Warrant, that they had for the doing of it; which I am sure is not now to be ex­pected, no more than it is to be expected that the Sun should stand still, as it did once at the com­mand of Joshua; or go backward, as it did another time at the entreaty of Hezekiah. We are to be No warrant hence for us to do the like. governed, and to govern our selves by those Laws and Rules which God hath given to all mankind in general, and not by such extraordinary dispensa­tions as God hath been pleased to give some men at some times in particular; and much less by any pre­tended or fancied Enthusiasms or inspirations of our own; so that supposing this revolting of the ten Tribes from Rehoboam, and the setting up of Jero­boam to have been lawfull, it will not prove it to be [Page 173] lawfull for any other Subjects to doe so too upon the same pretence (viz. upon the pretence of being ne­ver so grievously oppressed) unless they have the same special Warrant of God for it.

But (2dly.) I affirm that what was done by Jeroboam and the ten Tribes was an unlawfull and The Revolt sinfull against the fifth Com­mandment. a sinfull action, I mean their revolting from Reho­boam their lawfull Sovereign notwithstanding his Fathers or his own oppression of them, because it was a transgression of an everlasting Statute or Or­dinance of God (I mean the fifth Commandment of the Moral Law) whereby all mankind is obliged to honour and obey not onely their natural Parents, but all their lawfull Superiours, and especially him that is Supreme, who is Pater Patrioe, the Father as well as the Ruler of all his Subjects, and set over them by God to be so. And therefore, as a Father The case be­twixt a King and his Sub­jects the same as betwixt a father and his children. doth not lose or forfeit the authority of a Father, by being not so good, so carefull, and so kind a Father as he ought to be; nor are his Children there­by discharged from paying him that duty and obe­dience which they owe unto him, no not although they be never so harshly or hardly dealt with, or used by him: so neither do Kings or Supreme Go­vernours lose the Authority they have over their Subjects, or cease to be their Kings, because they govern them otherwise than they ought to do; nor are their Subjects upon that account disobliged from their Allegeance and Obedience they owe unto them. For if Servants, as St. Peter saith, are to obey their Masters, and not onely such as are [...] and [...], Or betwixt a Master and his servants. 1 Pet. a. 18. good and gentle, but such as are [...] too, such as are froward and perverse, that is, such as are not onely hard to be pleased, but severe in com­manding [Page 174] and cruel in chastising them also; much more are Subjects to obey and to continue in obedi­ence to their Sovereigns, though they be never so severely dealt with by them; and therefore the revolting of the ten Tribes from Rehoboam, being their lawfull Sovereign, upon the account of their having been oppressed by his Father, and upon his threatning them to be more oppressed by himself, was not lawfull; unless they had had a special Com­mand or Commission from God for it; which it No such speci­al commission for the Re­volt as won supposed. doth not appear they had either by any express words of the Text, or by any necessary consequence that can be inferred from it, either in relation to what was done by Jeroboam, or what was done by the ten Tribes.

CHAP. VIII.

ANd first as to what was done by Jeroboam, though it may seem to be justifiable, as if it had been done by a special Commission from God, Jeroboam 's case stated. because God had told him by the Prophet Ahijah, that he was to be King over the ten Tribes after they were rent off from the other two Tribes; yet did he not thereby give Jeroboam either Commissi­on or permission to rend them off, or to doe any thing towards the rending them off himself. For [Page 175] the words which God spake by Ahijah the Prophet to Jeroboam were not, Thou shalt rend, but, I will rend the Kingdom out of the hand of Solomon, and I 1 Kings 11. 31. will give ten Tribes to thee, and not, Thou shalt take ten Tribes unto thy self, by using either force or fraud, or any other sinister, seditious or unlawfull means, either for the getting or the keeping of the Kingdom which God had promised to give him. But Jeroboam did both. For first, whether out of a distrust of God's performance of his promise, or His distrust and impati­ence. out of an impatience to stay God's own time for it, no sooner was Solomon dead, but home comes Je­roboam out of Egypt, not called by God but by a discontented party of the People, to whom after in all probability he had aggravated their grievances, and thereby incensed them as much as he could a­gainst the present Government, he offered himself to be their Head, and as such marched with them, to expostulate and capitulate with their King, ho­ping they would receive an unsatisfactory answer, as they did, and thereupon would presently make him their King, as they did also: So that he had it not from God, who onely had power to dispose of it, (for by him, as he himself tells us, Kings reign) but from the People, the People that were then under an obligation of obedience to a lawfull Sovereign and consequently had no power to dispose of them­selves, or to become Subjects to another, no more than he had a right to become their King, untill he that promised him he should be so, had made him so, which he could and infallibly would have done in his own good time, without any thing done on Jeroboam's part but the relying upon the promise of God onely; which he distrusting or being too [Page 176] impatiently ambitious to stay for the performance of it, took his own seditious and rebellious way for the hastening, as he did afterwards for the keeping of himself to be a King. For as he caused the ten Tribes to revolt from Rehoboam in order to the ma­king himself their King, so he caused them to revolt from God also by setting up other Gods, and other Priests, and other places of worship, thereby making a formal Schism in the Church, to prevent a possibility of re-union in the State. So that as he sinned and made Israel to sin for the getting, so he sinned and How he made Israel to sin. made Israel to sin much more for the holding and keeping of the Kingdom, which he might have had and kept much longer than he did, if he had stayed God's leisure for the having, and done no­thing to displease God for the holding of it. Where­as if he would have done as David did, he should have had the success that David had, without sin­ning himself, or making so many Thousands to sin with him and for him, as hedid.

David was not onely told by the Propet Samuel that he should be King, as Jeroboam was by the David 's case alike and his different be­haviour. Prophet Ahijah; but he was anointed too, which Jeroboam was not. And yet when it was twice in his power to have stept up into the Throne by destroy­ing Saul (whom the men of these times would have said, as Abishai did, that God had delivered into his hand to be destroyed by him) he would not doe it, nor suffer it to be done, but said, God forbid that I should lay my hand on the Lord's anoin­ted; 1 Sam. 26. 8, 9, &c. as the Lord liveth, the Lord shall smite him, or his day shall come to die, or he shall descend into battel and perish; howsoever the Lord forbid that I should stretch forth mine hand against the [Page 177] Lord's anointed. This was David's resolution, and this should have been Jeroboam's resolution also, to have expected God's performance of his promise in his own time, and in his own way; and not have snatched the Crown out of God's hand, and put it himself upon his own head, before God had anointed his head for it.

Moreover it is observable, that is was not that The ground of Jeroboam 's pretence. for which Ahijah the Prophet told Jeroboam, God was so angry with Solomon, that he would rend a­way ten Tribes of the twelve from his Son (which was Idolatry) it was not that (I say) which Jeroboam pretended to be the cause of his rising and rebelling, and his stirring up the ten Tribes to re­bell against Rehoboam; but it was a more popular pretence and such a one as the generality of the Peo­ple is usually most concerned in, and concerned for; namely, the publick grievance by Taxes and Tri­butes, which how necessary soever for their own de­fence and safety, do always seem an insupportable burthen to the Subjects. And therefore the ambitious Aspirers of all times have always made use of this Topick, first to discontent the People with their pre­sent His artifice to discontent the people. condition, though it be never so tolerable, nay never so good a one, and then to promise them a relief of all their imaginary grievances, if they will be ruled by them; which the foolish People belie­ving first call them their Patriots, and afterwards (if they can) make them their Princes, who com­monly prove the greatest of Tyrants; and then the People that raised them find and feel the fruits of their own folly, and when it is too late to help it, repent of it. And yet such is the incorrigible mad­ness as well as folly of the multitude, that though it [Page 178] hath been never so often entrapp'd, it always hath been, and still is and ever will be apt to be taken with the same bait, how dear soever it hath cost them formerly.

It was not long before this, that Absalom by the counsel of Achitophel made use of the same artifice Absalom 's rebellion rais­ed by the same artifice. to stir up the people, and to make them to rebell against their King and his Father, by making them believe, first, that they were oppressed by David, and had not justice done them; and secondly, if he were in power every man should have right done him, and no man should have cause to complain amongst them. This they were so foolish as to be­lieve, though their condition then was better than ever it had been before, or ever it was afterwards; for it was David a man after God's own heart that was then their King, and who as himself (or rather God's Spirit by his mouth) tells us, fed them with Psalm 78. 73. a faithfull and true heart, and ruled them prudently with all his power; and if prudently, then justly no doubt also: and yet it was his not doing of justice that was made the pretence of the rebellion against him; and by whom? by Absalom, one whom the People knew to have been a murtherer of his own brother, and therefore not to be a very likely man to govern them either more justly, or more merci­fully than his Father did: so that as the pretence of their rising up against David was groundless, so their setting up of Absalom in his stead was folly and madness.

And now one would have thought, the ill success they had in that action would have made them more wary than to be tempted and prevailed with again, so soon at least as afterwards they were, to [Page 179] another rebellion against the Grandchild of David upon another, and that perhaps upon as groundless a pretence as the former; I mean this of Jeroboam, which we are now speaking of. For the pretence of Jeroboam and the ten Tribes rebellion against Re­hoboam Jeroboam 's pretence in­quired into. was, because he would not ease them of the heavy yoke which they pretended Solomon his Fa­ther had laid upon them: which had it been true to never so great a degree, would have been no just cause of the Rebellion of Subjects against their So­vereign, as is already shewn. But I do not find in the History of Solomon's Reign, from the begin­ning to the end of it, as it is very particularly re­corded No mention of a yoke in So­lomon 's. reign. in the first book of Kings, and in the second of Chronicles, any mention of so heavy a yoke, or indeed of any yoke at all that was laid upon any of the Complainants, I mean upon any of the ten Tribes of Israel. I reade indeed in the fourth Chap­ter of the first book of Kings, Verses 20, 21. That there was a great Tribute or Levy made by Solo­mon, The great Tri­bute was a Levy of men. for the building of that glorious Temple of God in Jerusalem, which was the wonder of the World, and for other his many and magnificent Structures; and that this Tribute and Levy was of the Persons of his Subjects for bond-service, that is to make them to work as slaves or bond-men under Task-masters, and that not for wages, but for meat and drink onely to maintain them in life and health and strength, to endure the hardship and toilsome labour they were put to.

But what Subjects of Solomon's were these, And that, not of the chil­dren of Israel. that this heavy Yoke was laid upon? They were, saith the Text, The People that were left of the A­morites, Hittites, Perizites, Hivites and Jebusites, [Page 180] which were not of the children of Israel. The Chil­dren therefore of those aforesaid Nations, whom the Children of Israel were not able utterly to de­stroy, were those upon whom Solomon Levyed the aforesaid Tribute of men for bond-service. But of the children of Israel, (saith the Text, verse 22 of the same Chapter) did Solomon make no bondmen, but they were men of War, his servants and his Princes, and his Captains and his Rulers of his Chariots and of his Horsemen: which certainly were all of them very honourable and very profitable Employments.

And that this was so and no otherwise, we have it again attested, 2 Chron. 8. 7, 8, 9. where the Text repeating the former Narrative, that they were the Children of those Nations onely who were to be, and were not consumed, whom Solomon made bond-men, and made to pay Tribute; that is, he made some of them bondmen and the rest to pay Tribute. But of the children of Israel (saith the Text) did Solomon make no servants for his work, or to work in his building; neither did he for ought I can find make them pay any Tribute at all; nor indeed had he any need to doe so, having all the Nations from Euphrates to the border of Egypt his Tributary Subjects; so that not onely he but all Israel were so rich, that silver in Jerusalem was as stones in the street (saith the Text in one place) nay, it was nothing accounted of in the days of Solomon, saith the Text in another place. So that what this heavy yoke was that the ten Tribes complained of, I can­not imagine, unless they were sick of a surfeit of plenty, or weary of being too well at ease. And People apt to grow weary of their hap­piness. that there is such a sickness, such an Epidemical dis­ease, and that the Common People of all times [Page 181] and places are very apt to be infected with it, we have found by our own experience very lately; and I pray God we may not find it again very shortly; though never People had less reason to complain than we had then, or have now; or than the Israelites had (for ought appears from the History of those times) when Jeroboam and the ten Tribes complained of the heavy yoke they groaned under, which, had it indeed been as grie­vous as they said it was, or as Rehoboam threat­ned it should be, yet would not that have been cause enough to warrant or justifie them in doing what they did, I mean their renouncing his So­vereignty over them, or their Rebellion against him; their Rebellion I say, for so God calls it, who always calls both Things and Persons by their right and proper names. Men may, and often do call evil good and, good evil; but God doth not; or if he do call some things or persons by better names than in rigour and propriety of speech they deserve to be called by; as when he calls those that are his servants good men, and the works which they doe in obedience to him, good works, because for Christ's sake he accounts them to be so, and accepts and rewards them as if they were so, In what sense some men and works are called good. though neither the Men nor their Works be ex­actly and entirely good, or without any leaven or mixture of bad in them; and consequently God out of his gracious condescension, and to encou­rage our sincere, though weak endeavours to please The Revolt is called Rebel­lion. him, may and doth call some things and persons by better names than they deserve to be called by; 1 Kings 12. 19. 2 Chron. 10, 19. yet he never did call any thing or person by a worse name than in exact propriety of speech it was [Page 182] worthy of: And therefore that which God called Rebellion (as he did this of Jeroboam's and the ten Tribes renouncing of Rehoboam's Sovereignty over them) was Rebellion; and what is Rebellion but the resisting or rising up against one whom we ought to obey? so that God by calling that which Jeroboam and the ten Tribes did, a Rebellion, doth thereby declare that Rehoboam (notwithstanding the unwise answer he gave them, and the hard usage his threatning made them believe they were to expect from him) was still their Sovereign, and still to continue to be so; otherwise their re­nouncing of him and setting up another instead of him would not have been a Rebellion, and I am sure if it had not been so, God would never have called it so; for every resistance is not a Rebellion, but onely the resistance of one whom we ought to obey. We are commanded to resist the Devil, and to renounce the Dominion he usurps over us, be­cause he is an Ʋsurper, and is not our lawfull Sove­reign; and therefore, though we are often com­manded to resist him, yet we are never said in Scripture to rebell against him.

CHAP. IX.

AS to what may be said out of Scripture to justi­fy what Jeroboam and the ten Tribes did, from being a Rebellion, or a sinfull and unlawfull action: as first, that it was but the fulfilling of a Prophecy or the doing of that which God had foretold he would Two argu­ments to justi­fie the revolt. have to be done; and secondly, that when Rehobo­am had gathered together a very great army, in­tending by force to reduce the ten Tribes to their former obedience and subjection; God forbad him by the Prophet Shemaiah to doe so, saying, Ye 1 Kings 12. 24. 2 Chro. 11. 4. shall not go up nor fight against your brethren the children of Israel; for this thing is from me.

I answer first in general that God in plain and ex­press The Answer in general. words having said it was Rebellion, nothing that can be gathered out of any other words of the Text can make it to be no rebellion; for the Col­lection made out of God's word by men may be false, but God's words themselves must be true.

Secondly, and more particularly to the first of the places before quoted, to justifie that which was done by Jeroboam, that it was but the doing of that which God by the Prophet Ahijah had foretold was to be done, I answer, that God's foretelling a thing God's foretel­ling a thing to be done is not the cause of doing it. to be done, doth not justifie or excuse either the doers or the doing of it; if either the thing it self be evil, or if he that doeth it hath no Commission from [Page 184] God for it; or doeth it with an ill mind, or by ill means, or to an ill end, a concurrence of all which circumstances there were in this fact of Jeroboam's, and all of them evil and sinfull, and therefore all of them from his own evil and sinfull disposition, and none of them from God, but by his permission onely; and as the bare permission, so the bare fore­telling of a thing to be done is no way the cause of the doing of it; and consequently can neither justi­fy nor excuse the doing of it, if it be evil in itself or done with an ill intention, or any otherwise in all respects than it ought to be done. The foretelling therefore of Jeroboam, by Ahijah the Prophet, that he should be King, and reign over the ten Tribes of Israel, can no more excuse him for the way he took to make himself King, nor the ten Tribes for assist­ing him in it, than Elisha the Prophet foretelling Hazael that he should be King of Syria, did justifie or excuse him for murthering Benhadad his Master, The like case of Hazael, &c. that he might be king in his stead; or than God's foretelling the crucifying of Christ, did justifie or ex­cuse either the malice of the Jews in accusing, or Pi­late's injustice in condemning of our Saviour.

As to the other place before objected, where God by the Prophet Shemaiah saith, the thing was from The evil of sin from God, one­ly by permis­sion. him; I answer, that the thing, namely, the Re­bellion of Jeroboam and the ten Tribes, may be con­sidered as it was malum culpoe, An evil of sin, or as it was malum poenoe, An evil of punishment; that is, as it was an evil of sin in those that were the actours in it; and so it was not from God but permissivè, or by his permission onely; or as it was an evil of punish­ment justly inflicted upon the house of David for the sin of Solomon, not the sin which Jeroboam and [Page 185] the ten Tribes did falsely (for ought appears in Scrip­ture to the contrary) lay unto his charge, namely, the oppressing of his Subjects, but for his Idolatry, for his forsaking of his God, which as Ahijah told Jeroboam was the sin that God charged him withall, and for which God did not command or give Jero­boam a Commission or leave to rebell against Rehobo­am the Son of Solomon, but onely suffered him to doe so; for God (as St. James tells us) as he is [...], as he is not to be tempted himself with evil, so he doth [...], tempt no man to evil; but (as it follows in the same place) every one is tempted by his own lust; and so was Jeroboam; for it was not his zeal for God, but his own ambiti­on that made him doe what he did to get the King­dom, as appears by what he did, after he had got­ten it, for the keeping of it; for it was the same lust, the same ambition that tempted him first to make Israel to sin by joyning with him in rebellion against his and their King, that tempted him after­wards to make Israel to sin by joyning with him in Rebellion against his and their God, by setting up the Calves at Dan and Bethel to be worshipped by them.

Neither was the one of these actions of Jeroboam more or less from God than the other; for as they were both of them morally evil or sinfull in them­selves, and intentionally and designedly evil in the doers of them, so neither of them were from God; because God is not nor cannot be the authour or accessary of any such evil; but as they were evils of punishment, the former an evil of punishment to The evil of punishment is from God. the House of David for Solomon's Idolatry, and the latter an evil of punishment to the house of Israel, for [Page 186] the ten Tribes joyning in Rebellion with Jeroboam against their lawfull Sovereign; so they were both of them from God, as all evils of punishment are, whether inflicted immediately by God himself as Plagues, Famines, Droughts, Inundations gene­rally are, and as the drowning of the whole World by Noah's floud, and the burning of Sodom and Go­morrah by fire rain'd down from heaven, particular­ly were: or whether they be executed by some men upon others, whether justly or unjustly, whether with or against God's command, whether by good men or bad, nay whether they be executed by Men or by Devils, (as those evils inflicted upon Job were) they are still from God, either as punishments and effects of his vindicativejustice to his Enemies, or as chastisements and effects of his fatherly care and kindness to his Children: so that whatsoever the evil be in it self, and how sinfully soever it may be contri­ved and executed by men, yet it may be most justly made use of by the Divine Wisedom either for the punishment of his Enemies, or for the bettering of his servants. And thus, and no otherwise than thus, may Jeroboam's and the ten Tribes rebellion, or ra­ther the rending off the ten tribes of Israel from the house of David by that Rebellion, be said to be from God; and God's forbidding Judah to fight with Israel upon that account doth not argue his appro­bation of what had been wickedly done by those of Israel, but his own resolution to confirm and con­tinue the punishment which he himself had justly inflicted upon those of Judah, who no doubt were the followers of Solomon in his sin of Idolatry and re­bellion against God; as those of Israel were in being followers of Jeroboam in their rebellion against the house of David.

[Page 187] I have insisted the longer upon this particular, be­cause it seems to be the onely Instance, that can with any colour of reason be alledged from Scripture to justifie the rebellion of Subjects against their lawfull Sovereign: For that which was done by Jehoiada against Athaliah was done for the lawfull King a­gainst a most wicked Ʋsurper; and that which was done by Jehu against Jehoram, was done by a spe­cial The case of Jehu and Je­roboam un­like. and particular command of God, such a one as Abraham had for the sacrificing of his Son, and as the Israelites had for spoiling the Egyptians, and as Elijah had for killing the Priests of Baal, as plainly appears from the second book of Chronicles Chap. 22. 7. where it is said, That the Lord anointed Je­hu the son of Nimshi to cut off the house of Ahab: whereas Jeroboam was not anointed at all; and David though he was anointed, yet it was not to make him presently and actually King, but one­ly a designing him to be King after the death of Saul, who continued to be the Lord's anointed and Da­vid's lawfull Sovereign, as long as he lived, and was at several times and upon several occasions ac­knowledged by David himself to be so; though Saul had forsaken God, and was forsaken of God long before. But Jehu when he was anointed was actually made King; for the Prophet who was sent to anoint him, when he poured the Oylon his head, (saith the Text) said unto him, Thus saith the Lord 2 Kings 9. 6, 7. God of Israel, I have anointed thee King over the People of the Lord, even over Israel, and thou shalt smite the house of Ahab thy master, that I may a­venge the bloud of my servants the prophets, &c. And so what Jehu did against the house of Ahab, he had a special Warrant, and an express and positive com­mand [Page 188] from God for the doing of it; and as he had God's command to doe it, so he had God's approba­tion of it, and reward for it, after it was done; for the Lord said unto Jehu (saith the Text, 2 Kings 11. 30.) ‘Because thou hast done well in executing that which is right in mine eyes, and hast done to the house of Ahab according to all that was in mine heart, thy children of the fourth generation shall sit upon the throne of Israel.’ But Jeroboam had neither God's command to doe what he did before he did it, nor God's approbation for doing what he did af­ter he had done it; neither were Solomon or Re­hoboam usurpers, as Athaliah, and Ahab, and Jehoram were.

To conclude, as the Examples even of the best mens actions recorded in Scripture do not make The general rule to be fol­lowed, unless there be a spe­cial dispensa­tion. what they did to be lawfull, any farther than as they were agreeable to the general rule of all mens actions, the Moral Law of God; or as they had a special, a certain and a positive Dispensation from God the Lawgiver himself to doe something upon some oc­casions otherwise than by the general Rule they were obliged to doe; and Exceptio in non except is firmat regulam, An exception to a Rule strengthens the Rule in things not excepted: So the doing of that which was justifiably done then, by virtue or war­rant of such a Dispensation, is not justifiably to be imitated by any man or number of men now, when no such Warrant, no such Dispensation, from the Lawgiver himself, in so certain, so immediate, and so miraculous a manner as it was then, is to be ex­pected, whatsoever our mad Enthusiasticks may pre­tend to the contrary.

CHAP. X.

BY what hath been said already, partly from plain Precepts of Scripture commanding all Christians to obey, and forbidding them to resist, their lawfull Sovereigns, though never so unlimited in the Constitution, or never so Tyrannical in the exercise of their Government, (for who ever was, or could be more so, in both respects, than NERO was, in whose reign those Precepts were given?) and partly from the Practice and profession of all Christians, agreeable to those Precepts in the Pri­mitive and purest times; together with the Answer to such Objections, as have been, or may be made from some few misinterpreted and misapplied exam­ples out of Scripture to the contrary: though by what hath been said upon these heads, it hath (I say) been sufficiently proved, that Kings or Soveraign Princes and Governours do not lose their Right to govern their Subjects, though they be Ʋnlimited or Tyrants, and govern otherwise than by God's or their own Laws they ought or are obliged to govern; and consequently that their Subjects do not upon that account cease to be Subjects, so as to be disob­liged from obeying even such Sovereigns; from obey­ing To obey ac­tively and passively, what. them (I say) either actively or passively, that is, by obeying them in all their lawfull Commands wil­lingly and chearfully, and by suffering for not obey­ing [Page 190] them in their unlawfull Commands meekly and patiently, and never in any case, or upon any pro­vocation, to resist, rebell, or take up either offensive or defensive Arms against them; there being nothing to warrant the one more than the other in the word of God or in the practice and judgment of the first and best of Christians; which one would think should be enough to convince all that are Christians now, of the unlawfulness of it.

And yet of all Christians, those that seem to be most opposite to one another in all things else, (I mean the Papists and the Presbyterians, with other of our Sectaries) agree in this one thing, I mean in the lawfulness of Subjects taking up Arms Papists and Presbyteri­ans agree in the doctrine of resisting Kings. against their Sovereigns: though the former, to wit the Papists, like the old Pharisees, hold nothing to be lawfull, for which they have not a Tradition from their forefathers, and the latter, to wit the Presbyte­rians and their Complices, like the old Scribes hold nothing to be lawfull, for which they have not ex­press Scripture. And yet, as both Scribes and Pha­risees agreed in thinking it lawfull to oppose and fight against the Lord Christ, so both Papists, and Presbyterians, and other Sectaries agree in holding it to be lawfull to oppose and fight against the Christs of the Lord, I mean Kings; though as neither of those had then, so neither of these have now any Warrant either from Scripture or Tradition, that is, either from the written Word of God or from the practice of their primitive Predecessours, to plead for it.

CHAP. XI.

BUt perhaps it may be said (though it cannot be said rationally by any that hold either of the The objection. aforesaid Principles) that though there be nothing to be alledged either from Scripture or Tradition, that is, either from the written word of God or from the prac­tice of the Primitive Christians, to justifie the taking up either of offensive or defensive Arms by Subjects a­gainst their Sovereigns, yet it may be lawfull by the From the law of Nature. Law of Nature, which is the unwritten word of God, or rather word of God written in mens hearts. And this Law of Nature, say they, is as truly the Law of God, as that which is written in Scripture; and there­fore whatsoever is justifiable by the Law of Nature, may be and is lawfull, though there be no express War­rant for it, either from Scripture, or from the prac­tice of the Best of men in former times; because it being known by all men to be lawfull by the Law of Nature, it needed not to be declared to be so by Scripture, nor attested to be so by any Mens Practice or Example. Neither will it follòw, say they, that what was lawfully done at one time must necessa­rily be done at all times, or that it should not be lawfull for Christians to doe that now which it was not expedient for the Primitive Christians to doe From their inability to resist. then; because being so comparatively few and fable, [Page 192] as they were then, their taking up of Arms against their persecuting and oppressing Princes would rather have increased than lessened their sufferings. And what if it were upon that account, and upon that account onely (for so some of these [...], Despisers of Government and Blasphemers of Sovereign Princes, have dared to argue) that Christ and his Apostles did give those Precepts And that the precepts of not resisting were tempo­rary. in Scripture of not resisting even the worst of Prin­ces; and consequently that they were to oblige those to whom they were given, no longer than un­till they were strong enough to resist, without fear or danger of being the worse for it.

To this I answer, first, that to have such a thought of Christ or his Apostles, who wrote what they The Answer, That to think so is no less than blasphe­my. writ, [...], As they were moved or inspired by the holy Ghost, (and for all ages and times as well as for those wherein they were written) is worse than with David's fool, to say in his heart, that there is no God. For to Blas­pheme God is worse than to deny him; and how can a Man or the Devil himself blaspheme God more than to make men believe, that he who is Truth it self is a Lyar, or at least a deceiver, one that hath sent his Ambassadours the Apostles, nay his Son himself into the World with Credentials under his broad Seal, (I mean the doing of Miracles) in his name to assure the Christians, because Chri­stians to be the best of Subjects. World and the Princes of the World, that those that were Christians, were, because they were Christi­ans, to be the best of Subjects; such as how ill so­ever they were used, or how much soever they were oppressed, nay how cruelly soever they were persecuted by their Princes, yet were indispen­sably obliged by their Religion never to rebell, or so [Page 193] much as to attempt to defend themselves by force against even such Princes; and consequently that the Princes and Potentates of the world, whatsoever Religion themselves were of, needed not to fear, nor consequently ought not in reason to persecute any of their Christian Subjects, who were obliged by their Christianity it self, because they were Christians, to be the best of Subjects, and to continue to be so, how numerous or how powerfull soever they might grow to be, or how heavy or hard the yoke might be which they groaned under, which being published and made known to the world to be the will of God, as it was by St. Peter his Apostle or Ambas­sadour to the Jews, and by St. Paul his Apostle or Ambassadour to the Gentiles; for any that comes after them (whether it be a Bellarmine, a Buchanan, or a Baxter,) to endeavour to make it to be believed, that God and his Ambassadours St. Paul's and St. Peter's meaning was, to oblige Christians to be such Subjects to such Sovereigns, so long, and no longer than they were too weak to resist them; but assoon as they were able, that they were then left at liber­ty, with God's good leave, not onely to revolt from them, but to revenge the wrongs they had suffered under them; for any men now I say to make it, or endeavour to make it to be believed, that this was Christ's or his Apostles meaning, what is it, but to make it to be believed that Christ was indeed such a one, as the High Priest falsely told Pilate he was, [...], A deceiver; and that his Apostles The Blasphe­my made out. were Legati ad mentiendum missi, Ambassadours sent on purpose by him to deceive those they were sent to? as perhaps some Ambassadours may be sent from one earthly Prince to another. But to say [Page 194] that Christ hath done so, or that he had, or could have any need to doe so, is in a very high degree to Blaspheme Christ himself as well as his Apostles, and to make whatsoever they taught besides to be sus­pected of insincerity; and consequently the whole Christian Religion to be but a design or contrivance for worldly ends onely, as it is indeed by the Pa­pists made to be, and by all such Protestants also as make Religion a Cloak for any kind of licentious­ness in general, and especially for the lawfulness of the Rebellion of Subjects against their Sovereigns, as all they do, that would have those Apostolical Precepts against resisting of Princes by their Subjects to be but Temporary, and to be obliging not in point of Conscience but in point of Prudence and for fear of punishment onely, which is in terminis, directly to contradict the Apostle or rather the Holy Ghost speaking in or by the Apostle, who tells us in ex­press terms, that there is [...], a ne­cessity Subjects obli­ged in Con­science. for Subjects to be Subjects, and consequently by no means nor upon any provocation [...] to resist or rebell against their Sovereigns, and that not [...], (saith the Text) for wrath onely, not for fear of punishment onely, but [...], for Conscience sake, and especially for Conscience or for fear of offending God, more than for fear of offending man; and therefore if at all for fear of punishment, it must be more for fear of that punishment which the Text calls damnation, and which God will inflict hereafter upon those that re­bell against his Viceroys and consequently against himself, than for fear of any punishment that can be inflicted upon them by Men here.

[Page 195] I will conclude this Topick with that saying of Gro­tius in the fourth Chapter of his first book de jure Bel­li A not able say­ing of Groti­us. & Pacis, and in the seventh Section of that Chapter viz, Certè Christianis Veteribus qui recentes ab A­postolorum & Apostolicorum Virorum disciplina eorum Proecepta & intelligebant meliùs, & perfectiùs imple­bant, summam ab iis injuriam fieri puto, qui quo mi­nùs ipsi se defenderent in certissimo mortis periculo, vires putant illis non animum defuisse. ‘Certainly there cannot (I think) be a greater injury done to the first Christians, who coming newly from the Discipline of the Apostles and Apostolick men, did better understand and more perfectly practise their Precepts, than there is done by them that think the reason why they did not defend them­selves, when they were sure to die if they did not▪ was not because they would not have done so if they could, but because they wanted strength to doe so.’

Which saying of Grotius I desire the Reader to take special notice of, the rather, because Grotius himself in the very same Section seems to make it lawfull for Christian Subjects to resist the Supreme Magistate in several cases; and some of them such, wherein the Primitive Christians did not think it lawfull for them to doe so, as Grotius himself in his aforesaid saying tells us; and because it is upon the authority of Grotius, and what Grotius saith to justi­fie the resisting of Sovereigns by their Subjects, that Mr. Baxter doth especially ground his justification of the Rebellion against our late Sovereign. Therefore whether those sayings of Grotius be true or no in themselves, or whether (if they be true) they be pertinently and rationally applyed by Mr. Baxter, [Page 196] for his and his Parties doing what they did in the late War against the King or no, we shall examine hereafter.

In the mean time to the Doctrine of the Scriptures, The judgment of the Church of England in the case. and the practice of the Primitive Christians, we will subjoyn the Judgment of our own Church, the Church of England, as of that, which of all Churches now extant in the World, is both for her Doctrine, Government, and publick form of Worship, the most Apostolical; whatsoever the Papists or any other Hereticks, or the Presbyterians or any other Schismaticks and Sectaries do or can say to the con­trary.

But what the Judgment of the Church of England Where the Churches judgment to be found. is, as to this, or any other particular (whether it be matter of Faith or Manners, Doctrine or Practice) it is not to be collected or concluded from the sayings or writings of any one or more particular Doctours of the Church, though of never so great eminency for Learning, or for Piety, or both, but from the Church her self, speaking to us as she doth, first, in her Articles, 2dly. in her Catechism, 3dly, in her Homilies, 4thly. in her Liturgy (which is a Conser­vatory of Doctrines as well as a form of publick Wor­ship) and 5thly. in her Canons.

In all these I say the Church speaks to us her self (by her representative Body in Convocation) decla­ring what her own Judgment is, and what she will have the Judgment of all those to be (whom she will admit to be of her Communion) as to matter of doc­trine in the three former, and as to matter of practice in the two latter.

Now as to this particular, of which we are now speaking viz. Whether it be lawfull for Subjects in [Page 197] any case, or upon any provocation, forcibly, or by taking up of Arms, to resist their Sovereign: our Church hath clearly and fully declared her judg­ment negatively in her Homily against Insur­rection; which Homily being recited and appro­ved Her judgment subscribed to by all that are ordained. in the Thirty fifth Article of the Book of Ar­ticles is subscribed unto by all that subscribe un­to those Articles, as all those do that are legal­ly Ordained in our Church; and consequently, as Mr. Baxter himself did, if he were Ordained by a Bishop, as he saith he was. But perhaps Mr. Baxter will say for himself what I remember Mr. Jacomb said for Mr. Calamy, of whom when I had Mr. Cala­my 's frank subscription. said at the Conference in the Savoy, that he had at his Ordination not onely subscribed to what the Church required him to subscribe unto, but added Non invitus nec coactus, sed lubens libens­que subscribo, (which was more than was re­quired of him) to shew that he did it freely, willingly and heartily. True indeed (said Mr. Jacomb) Mr. Calamy did so then; but he hath since been heartily sorry for it; and repented of it. And so it seems Mr. Baxter hath done also.

And therefore I do not subjoyn the Doctrine Why the judg­ment of our Church quo­ted. and Practice of Ours to the Doctrine and Practice of the Primitive Church, as thinking Mr. Baxter or any of the Dissenters from our Church will be moved at all by it; but to shew that the Doctrine and Judgment of our Church is in this particular (as it is in all other matters of any moment both doctrinal and practical) the same with that of the Apostles and Primitive Christians, and consequent­ly that they who condemn or despise this doctrine [Page 198] and practice of Ours do thereby or by so doing condemn and despise the doctrine and practice not of the Primitive Christians onely, but of the Apo­stles and of Christ himself also.

CHAP. XII.

BUt perhaps Mr. Baxter may say that in this Aphorism of his, we are now speaking of, he What Mr. B 's meaning, that Tyrants have no right to their govern­ments. doth not say, that either Ʋnlimited Governours or Tyrants have no right at all to their respective Go­vernments, simply and absolutely; but onely that they have no right to their Ʋnlimited or Tyran­nical Governments, and consequently, that his mean­ing is, that although (notwithstanding their being Ʋnlimited and Tyrannical) they may have a right to govern, yet they have no right to govern unlimitedly or Tyrannically.

But as to the first of these, namely, That unli­mited Governours have no right to their unlimited Governments; it is absolutely false, as I have more It is not; that they have no right to go­vern tyranni­cally. than sufficiently proved already. And although the second, namely, That no Governour hath a right to be a Tyrant, or to govern tyrannically, be true; yet that this truth is not the truth, at least not the [Page 199] whole truth of Mr. Baxter's meaning, appears by many of his following Aphorisms and Comments up­on them, especially by those wherein (as if he were totius mundi arbiter, The Ruler of the whole world, or Rex regum and dominus dominantium, King of kings and Lord of lords, that is, a Protestant Pope, or the Catholick moderatour and decider of all con­troversies) Vid. his Tract of obedience to rulers and howfar resi­stance is un­lawfull àpag. 346. ad pag. 375. of his holy common­wealth. he boldly and Magisterially defines and states the Cases wherein Subjects may or may not resist their Sovereigns. For as of his special grace and favour he gives Kings, even limited Kings, leave to transgress their bounds to such or such a degree, without forfeiting their right to their Crowns, and without being lawfully resisted by their Subjects for so doing; so if they pass the limits he assigns them (as if he should say to Kings, as the King of Kings Vid. ibidem à p. 375. ad p. 456. saith to the waves of the Sea, Hitherto, O ye Kings, ye may go and no farther) then (saith he) they depose themselves, and then their Subjects ceasing to be Subjects, their rising up or making war against them can be no Rebellion.

Whereby it plainly appears, that when he saith But that they have no right to govern at all. Tyrants have no right to their unlimited Govern­ments, his meaning is not that they have no right to govern tyrannically, but that they have no right to govern at all. For that Kings have a right to go­vern tyrannically, or that they doe no injury to their Subjects, how much soever they do oppress them, I never heard of any Christian or Heathen, that was of that opinion but Mr. Hobbs onely. But I am as Mr. Hobb 's opinion and Mr. Baxter 's alike explo­ded by the Bishop. far from Mr. Hobbs his opinion, namely, That Kings do not injure their Subjects, when they govern them otherwise than by God's Laws and their own they ought to govern them, as I am from Mr. Baxter's, [Page 200] namely, That Kings do forfeit their rights to their Crowns, That Subjects may resist them, or defend themselves by force against them, when they doe so, to any degree whatsoever.

In all therefore that I have said hitherto for the justifying of my exception against this Aphorism of Mr. Baxter's, there is nothing, I am sure, to justi­fie either the Tyrannical Government of unlimited and despotical Sovereigns, or the illegal and arbi­trary Government of limited and political Sove­reigns; Lawfull So­vereigns not to be resisted; but onely to prove that lawfull Sovereign Princes, whether limited or unlimited, are not to be resisted by their Subjects: which is no more than St. Paul asserts, speaking of the worst of Princes; nor no more than what may rationally, nay ne­cessarily, According to the first insti­tution of Kings by Sa­muel. be collected from what Samuel said to the People of Israel, when they would needs have a King, as other Nations had, and when God bids him tell them the manner of their King, or what man­ner of Kings they must expect to have sometimes, even such as all other Nations had sometimes, bad as well as good; and that they were to endure the one as well as the other, as all other Nations did al­so. For when he had told them, not what all or any Kings ought to doe, or lawfully might doe, but what some Kings violently and wrongfully would doe; and which if any of their Kings should doe (as he foresaw many of them would doe) all that they were to doe to help themselves, was onely to cry unto God to help them; and consequently, that though Kings govern never so unjustly, or never so contrary to God's Laws or their own (as some of the Kings of Judah as well as those of Israel did) yet they must not forcibly be resisted by their sub­jects, [Page 201] but all that Subjects in that case can or ought to doe, is to cry unto God: Preces & lachrymoe, Prayers and tears, being the onely arms the Pri­mitive Christians did use, or thought lawfull for Christians to use against such Princes.

And now let Mr. Baxter lay his hand upon his heart, and consider, who it is that in one place he calls a defier of Deity and Humanity; and in ano­ther Samuel and St. Paul, &c. blasphemed, as defiers of God and man. place, an Enemy to God, to Kings and to all mankind. It is not Bishop Morley, at least it is not Bishop Morley onely; but Samuel the Prophet, and St. Paul the Apostle, and St. Peter too; or ra­ther the Holy Ghost himself that spake by them: so that what was intended by Mr. Baxter as a reproach to Bishop Morley, is become Blasphemy against God himself, whose truth it is; for the maintaining whereof Bishop Morley is so heinously reproached. And therefore as St. Peter said to Ananias, when Ananias thought he had lyed to St. Peter onely, Thou hast not lyed unto men, but unto God; so might I say unto Mr. Baxter, that he hath not reproach­ed me, or not me onely, but the Holy Ghost him­self, in calling that doctrine a defiance of Deity and Humanity, and an Enmity to God, to Kings, and to all mankind, which was by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost taught by Samuel the Prophet in the Old Testament, and by St. Paul and St. Peter in the New.

But is it possible, will some say, that Mr. Baxter being so sober and discreet, and so meek a man (as he is thought to be) should publish in Print so ve­ry severe a censure against Bishop Morley, or any man else that is called a Christian, because and onely because he maintains that and nothing but that [Page 202] which was taught by Christ and his Apostles, and was believed and practised by the next and best of their Disciples?

I answer, that Mr. Baxter hath censured Bishop Morley as a defier of Deity and Humanity, and as an Enemy to God, to Kings, and to all mankind, is evi­dent from the places before quoted out of his printed Papers; and that he hath no other but the aforesaid cause for it, is evident likewise from what I have now said to disprove that Calumny: but the way he takes to induce his Readers to believe it, is worth the observation; it being the very same artificial jugling trick which I have observed him to make Mr. B 's Jug­ling. use of more than once before; I mean his putting a false Proposition of his own, instead or in the place of a true one of mine, and then inferring from the false one, what he knew could not be inferred from the true one, he chargeth me with what he in­fers from it.

Thus by misreporting what was affirmed by us and denied by him at the Savoy-Conference, he Some Instan­ces of it. thence infers that I was grossly mistaken in the re­port I had made of what he said at that Confe­rence.

And thus again, because I had excepted against that Aphorism of his as false, which affirms all un­limited Governours to be Tyrants, and to have no right to their unlimited Governments, He makes me say, that all humane Powers are not limited by God, and then infers that I am a defier of Deity and Hu­manity.

And so here likewise, because I say that lawfull Sovereigns are not to be resisted by their Subjects, though they be Tyrants, or though they do govern [Page 203] otherwise, than by God's or their own Laws they ought to govern, he would make his Readers to believe that I justify Tyranny it self, and that Kings may lawfully doe what they list to their Subjects, and take away what they list from them, their Lands, their Houses, their Wives, their Children, and their Lives also; and all this, because I say they are not to be resisted, if they doe so, by their Subjects. And doth not St. Paul say so too, when he chargeth the Christians upon pain of damna­tion not to resist Nero? who did all these out­rages, and more, and worse also; for he caus­ed Nero 's cruel­ties. them to be impaled with stakes thrust into their bodies up to their throats, and then besmear­ing them all over with combustible matter, set Pone Tigel­linum tadi lucebis in illâ, Quâ stantes ardent qui fixo gutture fumant. Juven. Satyr. them on fire to burn like Flamboe's to give light to Passengers, as they went along by night in the streets of Rome. And dares Mr. Baxter say that St. Paul, because he forbad his Christian Subjects to resist this monster, did therefore approve all the horrible cruelties and outrageous crimes that he was guilty of, or that he did thereby encou­rage all or any other Kings to doe as he did? and consequently was an Enemy to God, to Kings, and to St. Paul under the same charge of Mr. B. with the Bishop. all Mankind? I think he dares not; and yet if this Inference of his be good against me, it must from the same Premisses be good against St. Paul also; for the same Premisses will always infer the same Conclusion: and therefore St. Paul is, or Bishop Morley is not, upon this account, what Mr. Baxter saith he is, an Enemy to God, to Kings, and to all Mankind. But what is Mr. Baxter then in the mean time? certainly either not so good a Logician, or so good a Christian as he would be thought to be.

[Page 204] I am sure he is not such a Christian as those of the Primitive times were, who neither wanted The primitive Christians, fools in Mr. B 's opinion. courage nor force to defend themselves against the strongest, as well as the cruellest, of their persecu­ting Princes; and consequently in Mr. Baxter's opi­nion, were no better than fools or madmen, to suffer so tamely and so patiently (as they did) not onely the loss of all they had, but death it self, and death with the most exquisite torments, under their Pagan persecuting Princes, and under some Chri­stian heretical Princes also, rather than they would transgress those Precepts of St. Paul by so much as offering to defend themselves against their Sove­reigns, whether Pagans or Hereticks, or against those that were commissioned or impowered by them.

And this doctrine of the unlawfulness for Sub­jects to defend themselves by force against the most cruel of their most persecuting Princes was univer­sally believed and practised for diverse hundreds of years after Christ, without any one instance to the contrary, but once onely; and then, that was when an Heretical Arian Emperour was resisted by his Heretical Novatian Subjects; for whom (I mean the Novatian Hereticks) Mr. Baxter seems Mr. B 's kind­ness to the No­vatians, [...]ence. to have a very great kindness; but whether upon this account (I mean, because they were the first Christian Subjects that ever resisted their Sove­reign) or because the first founder of them made himself a Bishop (in another man's Diocese) as Mr. Baxter and all Baxterians would be; or be­cause they were the old [...] the first Puritans or pretenders to extraordinary purity and strict­ness of life (as Mr. Baxter and his followers now [Page 205] do) whether I say it be upon any or all of these accounts I know not: but this I know that Mr. Baxter as often as he mentions them, speaks very favourably of them, although they were (as much as the Orthodox Christians themselves were) for and yet they for Bishops. the Government of the Church by Bishops, and by such Bishops as the Orthodox Bishops then were and as ours now are, I mean Bishops of a different and Superiour Order to Presbyters, and exercising Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction and authority over them. And therefore there must be some particular and special reason, why Mr. Baxter is so kind to them.

In the mean time it is observable, that as They were then, so are They now, the greatest preten­ders to strictness and severity that then took and now take unto themselves a liberty which God ne­ver gave them, nay which God by his Prophets and Christ by his Apostles hath forbidden them to take, I mean the taking up of Arms by Subjects against their Sovereigns, though but defensive onely.

CHAP. XIII.

THe contrary doctrine whereunto which we maintain might have been suspected of flat­tery to Kings, (as Mr. Baxter calls it,) if it had not been St. Paul's as well as ours; or if, because we teach that Kings are not to be resisted by their Sub­jects, The Doctrine of non-resi­stance, no flat­tery to Kings, as Mr. B. calls it. it would follow therefore that we taught likewise, that such Kings as govern otherwise than by God's Laws and their own they ought to do, were not accountable to any, or not punishable at all for so doing. Whereas Mr. Baxter knows that we of the Church of England believe and teach that Kings the greatest of Kings, are as much nay more Kings ac­countable to God and pu­nished by him. accountable to God, and punishable by God, either here or hereafter, for whatsoever they doe amiss, than the meanest of their Subjects are to them or by them; and so much the rather; because they are not punishable but by God onely.

And therefore as it would not onely be absurd but ridiculous, that because a man saith the Deputy Mr. B 's ab­surd conclusi­on, set forth by a like in­stance. Lieutenant or Viceroy of Ireland is not to be questi­oned or punished by any in Ireland for what he doth amiss there; therefore he is not to be questi­oned or punished at all; or that he whose Viceroy [Page 207] he is, namely, the King of England may not or will not punish him, either there, or when he comes home: so it is equally absurd and ridiculous, to conclude (as Mr. Baxter does) that Bishop Mor­ley, because he holds that Kings are not accounta­ble to or punishable by their Subjects, therefore he must needs encourage them to be Tyrants, as if they were not, or as if Bishop Morley thought and taught they were not, answerable to God and punishable by God for their Tyranny, either here or hereafter; and that not onely for their oppres­sion and ill usage of their Subjects, but for the dishonour they have done unto God, whose Vice­roys and Representatives they are; and therefore should be as he is, not onely just and righteous, but mercifull and benign and gracious to all their Subjects. Thus we Believe and thus we Teach.

And withall we believe and teach also, That Subjects who suffer wrongfully, and yet patiently, Subjects ad­vantage from wrongfull suf­ferings. under oppressing, Tyrannical and persecuting Prin­ces, (as the Primitive Christians did, and re­joyced when they did so) shall be sure to be ei­ther the sooner delivered from sufferings here, or to be finally so recompensed and rewarded here­after, that they shall find to their unspeakable and endless comfort and joy, that it was good for them that they were so oppressed and afflicted. Thus I say do we believe, and thus do we teach both Kings and Subjects; and if both Kings and Subjects did believe and doe as we teach them, neither would Subjects have cause to complain of their Kings, nor Kings to be jealous or afraid of their Subjects.

[Page 208] More to blame therefore are they (whosoever they are) that teach the contrary either in relation to Kings or Subjects.

Such in relation to Kings are the Habbists and other the like Atheistical flatterers of Kings, who The Hobbists censured on the one hand. would make them believe, they may doe what they list, without doing any injury to their Subjects; and without being answerable to God for it; and that either because there is no God at all, or that there is no other life after this.

And such in relation to Subjects are the Papists, the Presbyterians, Independents, and the rest of the Sectaries, who teach it to be lawfull for The Papists and Sectaries on the other; Subjects, when they are grieved and oppressed by their Sovereigns to such a degree, or (which is all one) when they think themselves to be so, to take up Arms against them; whereby they shew them­selves to be much more such, as Mr. Baxter would have Bishop Morley believed to be, I mean Enemies to God, to Kings, and to Subjects, and consequently to all Mankind than Bishop Morley is.

1. For first. are not they Enemies to God, who teach men to rebell against God? and is it not re­bellion As Enemies to God. against God to rebell against the Viceroy of God? who because he is God's Viceroy is accountable for what he doth, well or ill, to none but God. And therefore in this case, (if any) God may most Emphatically say, [...], Ven­geance is mine, I will repay; it belongs to me and to none but me to call mine own Viceroys to an ac­count, and to punish them when and how I think fit; and therefore for Subjects to take the sword in this case, is to take it, or rather to wrest it out of God's hand, as well as the King's; and to use it [Page 209] against the King, is to use it against God; and there­fore they that take it and use it, if they do not pe­rish by the King's sword, I mean the sword of War or of Justice, here by bodily death; they shall un­doubtedly, except they repent before they go hence, perish by the sword of God, Bodies and Souls too in the life to come.

2. Are they not Enemies to Kings, who teach Enemies to Kings, that Kings may be resisted and deposed by their Subjects for male-administration of their Govern­ments, whether real, or but imaginary and preten­ded onely, of which the Subjects themselves are to be the Judges? and consequently the best of Prin­ces as well as the worst are to reign but precariò, Upon precarious terms, or durante bene placito, Du­ring the good pleasure of the people.

3. Are not the Teachers of this doctrine Ene­mies And enemies to all subjects. to all Subjects as well as to all Kings? first by making their Kings jealous and afraid of them, and therefore more inclined or perhaps necessitated to weaken and impoverish and keep them under; (as Pharaoh did the Israelites) by laying heavy burthens upon them, and oppressing them (more than otherwise they would have reason or perhaps a will to doe) that they may not be able to rise up against them, when such Demagogues as our Schis­matical Preachers are, have a mind to stir them up to doe so: Who, secondly, doe what they can to rob Subjects of that inestimable reward, which God hath promised to all such as suffer wrongfully, and yet patiently, or as St. Peter phraseth it [...], as it becomes Christians: and not onely so, but thirdly, do engage them, instead of suffering less wrongfully, to hazard the suffering of more right­fully [Page 210] from their Princes, if they do not prevail in their Rebellion, and to a certainty of suffering infi­nitely much more from God whether they prevail or not, if they die in or after their rebellion without repentance.

And now I think I have sufficiently justified the reasonableness of my exception to that Aphorism of The Bishop's justification of his exception against Mr. B 's Aphorism; Mr. Baxter's (which he saith he wonders Bishop Morley did except against) by having proved it to be false in both the particulars that are asserted in it. As first, That all unlimited Governours are Ty­rants, and (2dly) That no unlimited Governour or Tyrant hath a right unto his Government; and con­sequently that the Subjects of Ʋnlimited or Tyranni­cal Governours are not obliged to obey them, but may resist them, at least for defending of them­selves against them; both which particulars having proved to be false, I hope I have sufficiently vindicated my self also from that horrible calumny of being a defier of Deity and Humanity, and an Enemy And his Vin­dication of himself from being a defier &c. and an enemy to God, &c. to God, to Kings and to all mankind, as Mr. Bax­ter, out of his abundant Zeal and little charity, saith I am, and would make his unwary Readers believe me to be; not from any thing I say my self, but from what he is pleased to say for me; and then (as if I had said it my self) to infer from it the calumny which he before intended (but could not tell how to doe it otherwise) to fix upon me. Of which disin­genuous and insincere artifice of his (as I said before) we have seen several Instances already, and shall see more hereafter.

CHAP. XIV.

ANd yet before we proceed any farther, we are to take notice of and remove a shrewd Remo­ra or obstruction out of the way, which Mr. Baxter hath laid, to take away from us the authority of one of the principal places of Scripture, where­on we ground our doctrine of the Ʋnlawfulness of resisting of Sovereigns by their Subjects in any case or upon any provocation whatsoever; Rom. 13. for the unlawful­ness of resist­ing rescued. and that is the 13 Chapter of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, and in that Chapter especially upon the 2d. Verse, whereof the words in Greek are these, [...], which by our last and by our most authentical Translation are rendred in English thus; Whosoever resisteth the power, viz. the Sovereign Power or the [...] the higher power, (as it is called in the verse before) resisteth the Ordinance of God; and they that resist shall receive to themselves dam­nation. And it is against our Translation of some words, or rather of one of the words in this Verse, that Mr. Baxter makes this objection, not against the word power, nor as Sovereign power is meant by it; [Page 212] (though contrary to St. Paul's meaning and the truth of the Roman History, he will have the Sove­reign Power there meant, not to be in the Emperour alone, but in him and the Roman Senate also, as he The Senate of Rome had part of the Sovereignty with Nero. H. C. p. 353. faith it is in the King and Parliament here in Eng­land (and one as truly as the other) neither doth he except against the translation of the word [...] by the word damnation, though it always doth not signifie so severe a judgment:) but he tells us that the word [...] is not properly transla­ted by the word resisting: And why so? because Mr. B 's ex­ception a­gainst our Translation. saith he, There is a Resistance contrary to Subjection, and that is forbidden, and there is a Resistance not contrary to Subjection, and that is not forbidden. H. C. p. 352. Might he not as well have said, there is an [...], to resist, contrary to [...], to be subject, and there is [...], to resist, not con­trary to [...], to be subject? And therefore St. Paul did not speak properly, when he opposed the one unto the other; and yet St. Paul tells the Corinthians (who were Grecians) that he spoke more languages than they all, and no doubt under­stood the propriety of them as well as they did. Howsoever we are sure that St. Paul understood Our Transla­tion vindica­ted. God's meaning and how to express it so as he would have it to be understood; neither is it to be doubted, but that a commissioned Company of so many learned men, as were employed in the last and most accurate Translation of our English Bi­ble, did very well understand St. Paul's meaning, as he expressed it in Greek; and knew how to ren­der it as properly in English, as any one private man ought in modesty to think he can or could have done, especially if he be no greater a Critick [Page 213] in the Greek language than Mr. Baxter appears to Mr. B. no great Critick in the Greek. be by the several Instances a Vid. a vin­dication of the Primitive Church in an­swer to Mr. B 's Church History. learned man gives of his many gross mistakes of the meaning of se­veral Greek words quoted by him in his Church History; which I would not have observed, but that I find Mr. Baxter so full and fond of his mend­ings of the magnificat, I mean his frequent and needless finding fault with our Churches Transla­tion.

And truly I could wish that even such as are more skilfull in the Original Languages in which A remark in general upon those who censure our Translation. the Scriptures were written, than Mr. Baxter seems to be, would forbear in their popular Sermons, and in their English Treatises, to censure so boldly (as some of them do,) such and such places of Scrip­ture as they have or take occasion to speak of, as either not truly, or not properly translated in our Bibles, when there is no necessity for their so do­ing; and when they may thereby give occasion to their unlearned Auditours or Readers, to doubt of any other, and perhaps of all other places of Scrip­ture, as well as of those by them quoted, and cen­sured, viz. Whether they be truly or properly trans­lated or no: which may bring them at length to question and doubt of the truth of the whole written word of God; and whither that may bring them God knows; perhaps to Quakerism or some other kind of Fanaticism, or perhaps to downright A­theism.

And therefore I say I could wish, and if I had The danger and vanity of such bold cen­sures. authority enough, I would take care, that neither in Sermons, (unless in the Ʋniversities and other like learned Auditories) nor in any of our ordinary English Books of Divinity, any sense or Exposition [Page 214] should be given of any place, passage or word in the Scripture, other than is rendred in the allowed and vulgar English Translation which is used in our Churches; and that not onely (though chiefly) for the reason before specified, but also because (as it is commonly used) it is more for ostentation of a man's self, than for edification of the People; nay many times it is made use of also to countenance and abett some Heretical or Schismatical opinion of a Party, or to gratifie some Novel fancy or No­tion of a man's own, contrary to or differing from the received doctrine or usage of the Church.

And for one or both of these ends, I think I may, Some exam­ples of Mr. B 's thus doing. without breach of Charity, believe Mr. Baxter doth so often find fault with and vary from the allowed Translation of the Text, and will have another of his own devising preferred before it.

For example; the word [...], as often as it oc­curs in the New Testament, is rendred in our Trans­lation by the word City, and most truly and pro­perly, as being derived from the word [...] as consisting of many, or a multitude of People co­habiting or incorporated together. But Mr. Bax­ter [...] a city with him stands for a Market town. will have it (as he often tells us) to signifie not a City but a Market town; as if he thought the Noun [...] to be derived from the Verb [...] vendo, to sell; contrary to all Etymology or Analogy of derivation of one word from another, and con­trary to the use, and sense, and signification of the word [...] in all Greek Writers profane as well as Sacred.

And why then would Mr. Baxter have it signi­fie a Market town? it could not be (if he knows any thing at all of Greek) out of ignorance onely; [Page 215] but it was because being not able to deny (with­out contradicting all Antiquity) that every Bishop even in that first age of the Church and so down­wards was Bishop of a [...] a city, and conse­quently of as many several Congregations, as were in or belonging to that [...] or City, he had no o­ther way to make his own Novel fantastical no­tion of a Congregational Episcopacy, or that no Bishop was or ought to be Bishop of more than one Because he would have no Bishop of more than one congregation. Congregation, possibly reconcilable with the Primitive Notion of Episcopacy, but by making the word [...] contra jus normámque loquendi, Against the right and rule of speech, to signifie not a City consisting ordinarily of many Congregations, but a Market town; which yet if it were true, would not serve his turn neither, because there be Market towns even with us here in England, that have some of them many, and many of them more than one Congregation, and consequently according to Mr. Baxter's Hypothesis ought every one of them to have more Bishops than one also.

Another instance of Mr. Baxter's disliking our Translation is, because it doth not favour, or rather indeed, because it doth condemn his own opinion and practice, and not his own onely, but the opinion and practice of his whole Party, is that I named before, and am now more particularly to consider, I mean our Translation of the word [...] by the word resisting; which as he saith [...] not properly rendred, he saith, to resist. is not a proper Translation of the word [...]: And why so, good Mr. Baxter? why! because He and his Party have resisted their Sovereign; and therefore some resistance of Sovereigns by their Subjects must be lawfull, and if lawfull, then not [Page 216] forbidden by St. Paul, and consequently by Mr. Baxter's Logick [...] (which it seems he confesseth or implies at least to be forbidden by St. Paul to all Subjects in all cases) is not, cannot properly be translated by the word resisting, be­cause resisting of Sovereigns by their Subjects is law­full (say they) in some cases.

And indeed it would be so, if not obeying were the first and chief resisting; or the proper and To resist is more than not to obey. primary signification of the English word resisting were simply not obeying, and no more, as Mr. Bax­ter tells us it is. For not to Obey their Sovereign in Vid. Holy Common­wealth p. 37. p 377. some cases is so far from being unlawfull, that it is the duty of all Subjects to doe so in all such cases wherein they cannot obey their Earthly Sovereign without sinning against their Heavenly Sovereign: and yet in those very cases (as I said before) though they may and must disobey their earthly Sovereign, yet they may not, they must not resist him; but meekly and patiently Submit to what punishment (though never so unjustly) he shall please to inflict upon them. Whereby it plainly appears that sim­ply not to obey is not to resist, much less is it to resist in the chief and most proper signification of the word, as Mr. Baxter saith it is.

But God forbid it should be so! for then sins of ignorance and sins of infirmity would be more pro­perly a resisting of God than sins of wilfull obstina­cy So to resist God is more than not to obey him. and presumption; and the best of God's servants might more properly be said to resist God than the greatest of his Enemies; because the best of his ser­vants do not always obey him, nay do never obey him in all things, nor in any thing as they ought to obey him, though they be never so carefull and [Page 217] desirous to doe so. And can such as these proper­ly, nay most properly be said to resist God? can they who humble themselves under the mighty hand of God, because they cannot obey him as they would, be said to resist him? God forbid! for God resists them that resist him; and who are they? not the humble but the proud: for to the humble (saith St. Peter) he giveth grace, but he resisteth the proud, [...] saith the Text; God sets himself in Battel aray (as it were) against the proud to resist them, when they rise up (as it were) to assail and defie and provoke him, as Pharaoh and Julian the A­postate did.

For indeed the word [...] as well as the word [...], which are both of them used in the same sense in the aforesaid place (viz. Rom. 13. 2.) by St. Paul, (and are therefore both of them rendred by the same word in our Translation) are both of them Military terms; and the genuine, primary [...] and [...] to resist are both Mi­litary Terms. and proper signification of the one as well as of the other, is to be in a military posture of resisting, that is of defending ones self against one that assails him, and therefore purposely used by St. Paul to teach all Christian Subjects, that though they were never so wrongfully or never so much oppressed or persecuted by their Sovereigns, they should be so far from assailing or making war against them, that they should not so much as defend themselves by a forcible resisting of them, though they were as­sailed by them; as Mauritius and his Legion were, who being Six thousand six hundred well armed and very valiant men, suffered themselves to be all killed upon the place, without drawing a sword or [Page 218] lifting up a hand in their own defence against any of them that were sent by their Emperour to be the Executioners of his most unjust and cruel commands: for it was for no other crime but because they were Christians, and would not sacrifice to Heathen Idols as the rest of the Army did.

And for the aforesaid reason of St. Paul's did our Translatours render both the aforesaid words of St. Paul, Our Transla­tours of St. Paul 's judg­ment, as Mr. B. is not. by our English word to resist, not onely be­cause to resist in a military notion is the primary and proper sense and signification both of [...] and [...] the words in the Text, but because they were (as our Church is) of St. Paul's judgment, namely, That it is unlawfull for Subjects to take up defensive as well as offensive Arms against their Sovereign: of which Judgment, because Mr. Baxter and those of his party are not, therefore the word [...] must not be properly translated by the word resisting.

CHAP. XV.

BUt to leave this [...], or bickering a­bout a word, (though I hope it was a Di­gression What meant by Resisting. not altogether useless and impertinent) by resisting we mean a forcible resistance, or taking up of Arms by Subjects against their Sovereign, whether offensive or defensive, upon any pretence whatsoever: which I affirm to be unlawfull, not onely because it is impious and irreligious; but because it is irrational, and impolitick, and impru­dent also.

That it is impious and irreligious hath been pro­ved already; first, because it is not onely not allow­ed Resistance impious and irreligious. but contradicted and forbidden by God's word; and secondly, because it was not onely not practised, but disclaimed and declared against, by the Pri­mitive and best Christians. I am now to prove it to be irrational, as well as impious, and impolitick, and imprudent, as well as irreligious.

And first, I say, 'tis irrational because it is in­consistent with the necessary, natural and essential Irrational al­so, as incon­sistent with the being of a Body Politick. constitution of all Government, in all National Socie­ties, of any kind whatsoever; and consequently de­structive to the very being it self of the body Politick.

[Page 220] For in all National Societies (I mean such as are [...] or independent upon any other So­cieties) The necessity of a Supreme power in all Bodies Poli­tick. there is, and of necessity always must be, some where or other an [...], that is, a Supreme Power, or a Supremacy of Power, whereunto all other powers in the same Society are Subordinate, as being derived from it, and sub­servient and accountable to it, and overruled and punishable by it: the supereminent and Supreme Power it self, and whosoever is intrusted and in­vested with it, being always, and in all cases, [...], unquestionable, and consequently un­punishable: because to question, to judge, and to That Supreme power, unque­stionable. punish, are all of them Acts of Authority and Juris­diction, which cannot be exercised but by a su­periour on his inferiour; but Supremo non datur su­perior, The Supreme hath no superiour above him, in the same Body Politick; and where the Supre­macy is, there can be no liableness to coercion.

Now this ratiocination or dictate of Reason is grounded upon a dictate of Nature it self; namely, The reason of this, grounded upon Nature that in the Subordination of things and persons unto one another, the [...]e cannot be Progressus in infini­tum, A progression to infinity. And therefore that which Grotius saith to this purpose is evidently and necessarily true; namely, that in Imperiis quia non datur progressus in infinitum, omniuò aut in aliqua Grotius his testimony persona, aut Coetu consistendum est, quorum peccata queniam superiorem se Judicem non habent, ultori Deo sunt relinquenda: That is, ‘In Governments, because there cannot be an infinite or endless progress, we must of necessity set a stop in some one person or company of men, whose faults or miscarriages, because they have no [Page 221] Judge above them, are to be left to God the Avenger. O utinam vir ille magnus, &c.’ I wish that great man had said so always, and without exception; for any one Exception, (of which he hath divers) will make the whole Rule it self to be useless and insignificant, as we shall see here­after.

In the mean time that there is such an [...] or Sovereign Power in every National in­dependent Government or Body Politick, Mr. Bax­ter doth not deny; and that it may be not onely in one, as in Monarchy, but in more than one as in an Aristocracy or a Democracy, I will not gain­say; though I must needs observe by the way that Ab initio non fuit sic, From the beginning it was not so. And that there is but one of these three forms or kinds of Government of God's making, and that was Monarchy. For as God made the first Man after his own Image, or after the Image Monarchy, God's govern­ment. or likeness of himself, so he made the first Govern­ment of mankind here on earth, that of Nations I mean as well as that of Families, and particularly that of his own People the Jews, after the Image or likeness of his own Government in Heaven; which was, and is, and ever will be, Monarchical: neither do we find in Scripture any Precept for obe­dience to be given, or for prayers to be made for any Sovereigns, or Supreme Governours, but for Kings onely. The other two sorts of Government, (of which the last (viz.) Democracy is incompara­bly the worst) are but Mens inventions, and shall have an end, as all other Inventions of men shall have also: but Monarchy, as it was from everlasting, so it shall be to everlasting.

[Page 222] But to let this pass; whether it be a Monarchy, or an Aristocracy, or a Democracy, the Sovereign Mr. B 's just and loyal opi­nion of the Sovereigns power. Vid. Holy Com. p. 72. or ‘ Those that have the Sovereign Power are (saith Mr. Baxter) above all the Humane Laws of the Commonwealth; that is (saith he) they have Power to make Laws, and to repeal them, to correct, add to them, and dispense with them, and pardon the breach of them to particular per­sons; and the Sovereign (as he is Sovereign) is not bound to keep them, or to suffer by them. And the reason of this (saith he) is evident from the nature of Sovereignty (mark that,) because he that is the Sovereign is the highest, and there­fore hath no higher to obey.’

Euge, Mr. Baxter! Well said, so far Loyal Mr. Baxter! And farther yet, namely, in the next A­phorism to this, That a Sovereigns is not free from the obligation of the Laws of God, nor from the fun­damental Contracts of the Commonwealth (he must mean where there are such fundamental contracts) nor from any of his own publick promises, nor to make Laws against God's Laws or the common good: whereunto if he had added, though he be free from being questioned or quarrelled with for it by his Subjects; hitherto I could have been content to have gone with him in his Politicks, but no farther; for Spoiled by his following A­phorisms. as to what he adds in his next and some other of his following Aphorisms; as,

1. That the same natural Person may be both So­vereign and Subject, and that as Sovereign he H. C. p. 73. may pardon others, and as Subject he may be punish­ed himself.

[Page 223] 2. That Sovereignty is divisible, so that some part of it may be in the King, and some part in others of the same Body Politick: or (as in his own words) A mixt Commonwealth is that in which the other two, or all three forms of a Commonwealth (viz. Monarchy, H. C. p. 87. Aph. 79. Aristocracy and Democracy) are so conjunct, that the Supremacy is divided among them, sometimes equally and sometimes unequally.

3. That it may be called a Monarchy, where one hath not the sole Sovereignty; and that England is such H. C. p. 87. 88. a Monarchy.

4. That the Existence of the natural Person or Persons of Sovereigns, or of such as have the Sove­reignty, H. C. p. 74. is not necessary to the existence of a Com­monwealth, but the natural existence of Subjects is necessary. So that there may be Subjects that are Subjects to no-body, and consequently Subjects that are no Subjects, or a Body without a Head which is really no body at all, either in a natural or poli­tical capacity.

These and the like Assertions of Mr. Baxter I take not onely to be falsities, but self contradictions: and Ʋpon these suppositions Mr. B. justifies the late Re­bellion; yet upon some of these absurd suppositions, if not up­on all of them, he endeavours to justifie the late horrid Rebellion or (as he calls it) the late War a­gainst the King. And upon the same grounds he may, and consequentially dath (horres [...]o referens, I trem­ble at the thought of it) the cutting off his head also. For if he were not a Monarch but in name onely, And by con­sequence the King's mur­ther. as Mr. Baxter saith he was not, and therefore had but a part in the Sovereignty as Mr. Baxter saith he had not: And if he that hath but a part of the So­vereignty be a Subject as well as a Sovereign (as Mr. Baxter saith he is) and as a Subject may be punished [Page 224] (as Mr. Baxter saith he may) why might not the Democratical Independents justifie what they did to him afterwards, as well as the Aristocratical Pres­byterians The Indepen­dents as justi­fiable as the Presbyteri­ans. could justifie what they did to him before? I mean their making War against him, and their buying, selling and imprisoning of him, and taking away all that he had from him but his life onely: and that in all probability they would have done also, if he had not been taken away from them as he was by the Independents, who had been their Servants untill then, but then began to think of making themselves their Masters, by getting the King's Person out of their power into their own; but still proceeding upon the same Presbyterian Principles from the first to the last; I mean upon the aforesaid Assertions of Mr. Baxter, which are all of them inconsistent with the very being, or essen­tial Constitution of any Body Politick whatsoever.

For first there can be no Body Politick without Those Asserti­ons of Mr. B 's taken to task. some to govern as well as others to be governed; and of those that govern, (ne detur processus ad infinitum, That we may not run upon an endless errand) one or more that are Sovereign or Supreme: And there­fore the Existence of the natural Person or Persons of Sovereigns, or him or them that have the So­vereignty, is as necessary to the Existence of a Com­monwealth or any Body Politick as the natural ex­istence of Subjects is. Otherwise there might be Subjects which were Subjects to no-body, and conse­quently no Subjects at all: which is as absurd as to say there may be the Existence of a Body without the Existence of the Head of that Body, which was one of Mr. Baxter's aforesaid Assertions.

[Page 225] Again in all Bodies Politick, He or they that have the Sovereign Power, are above all the rest of the body whereof they are Sovereigns, and therefore cannot be Subject to any or all of them; and if so, then the same natural Person cannot be both a So­vereign and a Subject too, which was another of Mr. Baxter's aforesaid Assertions.

Again, if he that is a Sovereign cannot be a Sub­ject (as it is a contradiction in adjecto to say he can be) then he cannot be questionable or punishable for any thing he does, as Mr. Baxter saith he may be.

Again, Sovereignty is a thing which is in its own nature indivisible, so that in whomsoever it is, it is Wholly, and in whomsoever it is not wholly it is not at all; and consequently cannot be divided ei­ther equally or unequally, as Mr. Baxter likewise saith it may be.

Finally, that it may be called a Monarchy, where One hath not the sole Sovereignty, is true, (be­cause that which is not a Monarchy, may be called a Monarchy) but that it may truly be so called is false; as it is false likewise, that the Kingdom of England is such a Monarchy, as Mr. Baxter in the last of his aforesaid Assertions saith it is.

But of the two last of these Particulars I shall have occasion to speak more at large, when we come to examine, whether the Body Politick of England be such a mixt Body Politick, as Mr. Bax­ter saith it is; and whether the Sovereignty thereof be not in the King alone, but so divided, as he affirms it to be betwixt the King and the Parlia­ment: upon which Supposition onely he justifies, [Page 226] or presumes to justifie the late Rebellion to have been a just war against the late King.

Whereby it plainly appears, that even in Mr. Baxter's own opinion, where the Sovereignty is not divided, but wholly in one and the same person (as it is not onely in all Despotical, but in all Kingdoms properly so called, whether Despotical or Political) or wholly in one and the same Coetus, or Assembly, (whether Aristocratical or Democratical) it ought not, it cannot be resisted without shattering in pieces the very essential constituting parts of the Common­wealth, by dividing the members from the head, which is all that I am concerned to prove at pre­sent; namely, that Subjects resisting their Sovereign, is inconsistent with the very being of a Body Politick, of what Species or denomination soever it is.

CHAP. XVI.

AGain, suppose it were not Inconsistent with the Being, yet if it be inconsistent with the Well-being of the Body Politick or Common­wealth, for Subjects to resist or rise up in Arms a­gainst their Sovereign, that is enough to prove it to be unlawfull; and consequently the endeavouring to make the People believe it to be lawfull, by wri­ting or preaching in defence of it, is dangerous and seditious, and such a thing as ought not to be en­dured in a well-governed State, of any kind what­soever.

Now that this doctrine, That it is lawfull for Resistance in­consistent with the well-being of Bo­dies Politick. Subjects in any case to resist or rise up in arms against their Sovereign, is inconsistent with the Well-being of all Bodies Politick or Commonwealths of what kind or denomination soever, and consequently in­consistent with the welfare or well-being of all Man­kind here in this World, methinks should need no other Argument to make it to be believed, but this one onely; that it undeniably makes all Hu­mane Societies to be always and unavoidably lia­ble to the worst of evils, that can befall any State As being an occasion of Civil War, the worst of evils. or humane Society, and that is a Civil War; which besides the horrible mischiefs it brings with [Page 228] it; it commonly ends in a more insupportable Tyranny and bondage of the whole body of the People, than what was pretended to have been the cause of it. For proof whereof I might appeal not onely to the Testimony of all Histories of all Ages and of all Nations as well as of our own, but to the personal Experience of many thousands yet living, who have all of them seen, and many of them felt, what I have said of a Civil War to be true; namely, that it is the greatest of Evils a State is subject unto, and consequently ought not to be engaged in for the preventing, avoiding, or remedying of any that are less.

Nor are they (will Mr. Baxter say) the Pecca­dillo's No small mat­ter in Mr. B 's opinion, that will excuse resisting. of the Prince, or the petite Grievances of Sub­jects by their Sovereigns, that can excuse their re­sisting or rising up in Arms against them: but they must be such as are of Publick Concernment; and such as against which by the Laws of Nature for Self­preservation, men are not onely permitted, but ob­liged to defend themselves.

I know that Grotius (who is often, but not always Grotius puts a case, but contradicts himself and the Primitive Christians in his answer to it. pertinently cited by Mr. Baxter) in his answer to this question, An Lex de non resistendo nos obligat in gravissimo & certissimo discrimine, that is, Whe­ther the Law of non-resistance doth oblige us in a most grievous and most certain hazard, seems to grant, that in such a case it may be lawfull for Sub­jects De jure belli & pacis, lib. 1. c. 4 p. 104. to resist their Sovereigns. But then it is obser­vable (first) that it is a contradiction to his own ge­neral Rule viz. Summum imperium tenentibus re­sisti jure non posse, That those who have the Su­preme Power cannot lawfully or by right be re­sisted. Secondly, it is a Contradiction to the judg­ment [Page 229] and practice of the Primitive Christians, and consequently to the doctrine of the Apostles, and of Christ himself. For as Grotius himself tells us in one place, Consuetudo veterum Christianorum est op­tima legis Christianoe interpres, that is, The custom of the old Christians is the best Interpreter of the Christian Law, in the general; so in this very par­ticular he tells us in another place, namely, in that before by me cited and which I desired to be obser­ved; Nempe Christianis veteribus qui recentes ab Apostolorum & Apostolicorum virorum disciplinâ, A passage of his before ci­ted, concern­ing the Pri­mitive Chri­stians, compa­red with this. eorum proescripta & intelligebant meliùs & perfecti­ùs implebant, summam fieri injuriam puto ab iis, qui, quo minùs ipsi se defenderent in certissimo mortis pe­riculo, vires putant illis non animum defuisse. In which saying of his taking it for granted, that the Primitive Christians, which did best understand the Apostolical Precepts, and did most perfectly conform their practice thereunto, would not nor did not defend themselves, no not in certissimo mor­tis periculo, when they were sure to be killed if they did not: and that not because they wanted either strength or courage, but because they thought as they were taught that it was not lawfull for them to doe so. And there cannot (saith Grotius in that place) a greater injury be done to those Primitive Christians, than to think otherwise of them, that is, than to think that it was not for Conscience sake, but for want of strength that they forbore to defend themselves in certissimo mortis periculo, In the most certain peril of death; which is I think all one with in gravissimo & certissimo discrimine, In the most grievous and most certain hazard; so that if it be lawfull for Christians to doe that [Page 230] now ingravissimo & certissimo discrimine, In the most grievous and certain hazard, which the Primitive Christians, who best understood (saith Grotius) the Apostolical doctrine, thought it not lawfull for them to doe then in certissimo mortis periculo, In the most certain peril of death, that is, in the very same case; it must be by virtue of some other Gospel, or of some special dispensation, that we have, and they had not; or that those Apostolical Precepts de non resistendo Supremam potestatem ha­bentibus, Of not resisting those who have the Su­preme Power, were to be no longer in force, than untill the Christian Subjects should have power e­nough to resist their Sovereigns, or at least to de­fend themselves against them. Which opinion, how derogatory it is to the simplicity, sincerity and veracity of the Gospel, and consequently how unworthy to be owned by any that owns himself to be a Christian, I think I have sufficiently proved already: nor can I suspect a man of so great Learn­ing and Ingenuity, as Grotius was, ever to have been of this opinion, though I cannot see how he can be defended from leaning towards it, when he affirms, or seems at least to affirm, that may be done now by Christian Subjects, which was never done, nor never thought lawfull to be done in the very same case by the Primitive Christians, though they had strength enough to doe it, and though (saith he) they best understood the Apostolical Pre­cepts, and did most punctually comply with the mean­ing of them. He himself in effect disal­lows his own Answer.

And therefore lastly, it is observable, (and I am willing to observe it for that Great man's sake) that such a resistance of Sovereigns by their Sub­jects, [Page 231] even in such a case, in gravissimo & certissimo discrimine, In the most grievous and most certain hazard, is not to be allowed (saith Grotius) Nisi cum hoc fortè additamento, si fieri possit absque maxima Reipublicoe perturbatione aut exitio plurimorum inno­centium, Unless it can be done without a very great perturbation or disturbance of the Commonwealth, and without the destruction of very many innocent Persons: which in effect is all one, as if he had said, it is never to be done at all. For how there can be a forcible resistance of Sovereigns by their Subjects, or how Subjects can rise up in Arms, and make use of them either offensively or defen­sively against their Sovereigns, Absque maxima Reipublicoe perturbatione & exitio plurimorum in­nocentium; Without a very great perturbation of the Commonwealth, or without the destruction of very many innocent persons, I cannot under­stand: except we can imagine the Sovereign will have no Subjects to fight for him, (which Christ supposeth all Kings of this world have) on that there will be fighting without killing; or that none or very few of those, that are innocent of ei­ther party, will be kill'd; which in a Civil War De jure Belli ac pacis p. 112. (which of all other Wars is commonly the most bloudy and most cruel) is not to be imagined. And consequently if Kings are not to be resisted by their Subjects, but in such a case as this, they are never to be resisted at all; because there can never be such a Case: so that Grotius his main Axiome, Summam potestatem tenentibus resisti jure non posse, That those who have the Supreme Po­wer cannot lawfully he resisted, is still safe and without exception.

[Page 232] Neither is the truth of it impeached by any of those several Instances, which he (I mean Gro­tius) Some instan­ces of his, wherein Re­sistance may seem lawfull, examined. subjoyns, and which seem (saith he) to be Exceptions to this Rule, but indeed are not.

1. For as to the first of those Instances, it speaks of such Kings, as were never Kings at all but in name onely, as the Kings of Lacedoemon were.

2. The second speaks of those that had been Kings, but ceased to be so by their own voluntary resig­nations, as Diocletian did, and some of our Saxon Kings did also, and retir'd into Monasteries.

3. The third speaks of such Kings as would alienate their Kingdoms unto Strangers, whom the Subjects may refuse to obey without resist­ing their own Sovereigns, and are bound to doe so, not onely in regard of the natural Allegiance all Subjects owe to their natural Sovereign and to him onely as long as he lives, or as long as he con­tinues to be their Sovereign; but in regard that after his death or after he voluntarily ceaseth to be their King, they owe the same Allegiance to his legal Successour in all Hereditary Kingdoms: And therefore (saith Grotius) the act or at­tempt of such an Alienation is null in it self and consequently is not at all obligatory to the Sub­ject.

4. The fourth speaks of such Kings as Verè hostili animo in totius Populi exitium feruntur, that is, Such Kings as would if they could destroy all their Subjects, and endeavour to doe so; Sed vix vide­tur (saith Grotius) id accidere posse in Rege men­tis compote, But this (saith he) is hard to be ima­gined of any King that is mentis compos, that is in his wits, or that is not stark mad: and if he be [Page 233] stark mad, or not mentis compos, not in his right mind, then his case is the same with that of Kings that are Minors or Infants, and his Kingly Power is to be administred in his name by such, as by the Laws or Customes of his Kingdom, are to have the custody or care of him, while he continues in that condition, who are no more to be resisted by the Sub­ject, than the King himself was before he was in that condition.

5. The fifth instance is of such Kings, as In ipsâ delatione imperii, In the very making of them Kings are made Kings upon this express condition, That if they doe this or that, so or so, Subditi omni obedi­entioe vinculo solvuntur, The Subjects are discharged from all obligation of obedience to them: for then (saith Grotius) he that was King became a private person again. But I say, such a one was never a King at all, properly so called: because in the very Act, whereby he was made or rather called a King, he was indeed made a Subject to them (whomso­ever they were) that had power to question whether he had done this or no, and to un-king him if he had, nay if he had not, if they should think he had, or say he had though they thought or knew he had not.

6. The sixth Instance is, when the King hath but a part of the Supreme Power; and the Senate and the People have another part of it. But then say I (as I said before) the King is no King properly so called. I mean is no Sovereign, but a piece of Sovereign (if there can be such a thing,) and it is the Sovereign, He or They, that have the Sovereignty or the whole Sovereign power, that I say are in no case to be re­sisted by their Subjects.

[Page 234] 7. The seventh and last is the same in sense with the fifth, though it differ in words or in the manner of expression, both of them speaking of one as King who is indeed no King, that is, no Sovereign, as no man or number of men in any Society of men can be said to be, that have others in the same Society equal with them, and much less superiour to them, as they must be to whom they are obnoxious and ac­countable for their ill managery of their Government, and who have authority to deprive them of it, and depose them from it.

And of none but such Kings as these, that is, such as are not Kings indeed but in name onely, are all Th [...]se Instan­ces of his are of Kings and n [...] Kings. the aforefaid Instances (wherein Grotius seems to grant it to be lawfull for Subjects to resist their Kings) to be understood, but two onely, and those are the third and the fourth, in the former of The third In­stance. which there is nothing either said or meant of the Subjects resisting of their Sovereign, but onely of their not obeying him, if he would have them be­come Subjects to a stranger; which they cannot doe, if they would, without becoming injurious not one­ly to him, but also to his Successours (as I said be­fore.) And there is a great difference betwixt resist­ing and not obeying of Sovereigns by their Subjects, though Mr. Baxter will needs have not obeying to be resisting in its primary and most proper signi­fication.

As to the other of these two Instances, which The fourth Instance. may be meant of Kings properly so called (I mean such Kings as are indeed Sovereigns) namely the fourth, wherein upon supposition there were such a a King as would doe and did what he could to ruine his own Kingdom, and to destroy all his [Page 235] own Subjects; Grotius grants indeed, that in such a case Rex abdicat Regnum, or the King renounces his Kingdom, or doth ipso facto declare he will be no longer their King, because voluntas imperandi & voluntas perdendi non possunt simul consistere, ‘Be­cause a Will to reign and a Will to have none to reign over are inconsistent with one another.’ But withall he tells us, it is hardly credible, (he might have said utterly incredible) there should be such a King unless he were mad, and if he be mad, there be other ways (as I said before) to hin­der him from doing himself or his People so horrible a mischief without their taking up of Arms or rebel­ling against him.

So that I do not see how it can be rationally con­cluded Those Instan­ces but seem­ing Excepti­ons. out of any of the aforesaid Instances, that it is lawfull to resist him or them that have the Sovereign Power. Neither indeed doth Grotius propose them to infer any such conclusion, but rather to establish the contrary, as appears plainly by the words immediately preceding, which are these; Diximus summum Imperium tenentibus resisti jure non posse; nunc quoedam sunt, quoe Lecto­rem monere debemus nè putet in hanc legem delin­quere eos, qui reverà non delinquunt, that is, ‘We have said (saith he) that is, we have positively affirmed or concluded that those that have the Supreme Power may not lawfully be resisted; but now we are to give the Reader a Caveat, that he may not think those to be transgressours of this Law who indeed are not, or that to be a transgression of this Law which indeed is not.’ And then he proposeth all the aforesaid Instances, as seeming to be, but not being indeed inconsistent [Page 236] with the Law (as he calls it) of not resisting the Su­preme Power, wheresoever it is placed, or whoso­ever they be that are invested with it; that Law of The Law of non-resisting, the foundati­on and preser­vative of hu­mane society. not resisting the Supreme Power being the very foundation upon which all Humane Societies of all kinds are built and superstructed, and the Palladi­um, The pledge of security, whereby they are pre­served in their several forms or constitutions, so that from or against this Law there lies no ex­ception nor any dispensation with it, by any humane Authority upon any pretence either of Civil or Religious Interest, or upon any either pretended or real Grievance of the Subject by their Sovereign, in any kind or degree whatsoever.

CHAP. XVII.

ANd the Reasons for this, besides what hath been already produced out of Scripture, are; First, Because the object of humane Prudence in the constitution of humane Societies, and Kingdoms Other reasons for non-resi­stance. or Commonwealths, is not to prevent all such Grie­vances as possibly may be; no nor all such as (con­sidering the pravity and perversness of humane na­ture) ordinarily will be, and of necessity must be, even in the best constituted and best managed State or humane Society whatsoever. For as St. Paul saith, Oportet esse Hoereses, There must be Heresies in the Church; not, as if it were not better there were none, but because as long as men are men, that is, such cross-grain'd creatures, and of such different Morals and Intellectuals from one another as they are, there cannot chuse but be some Heresies in the Church; so, and for the very same reason, oportet esse gra­vamina, there must be, that is, there cannot chuse but be Grievances in the Civil State or Common­wealth also. And therefore the object of humane pru­dence (seeing it cannot prevent or provide against all evils that may or will be in all States) it is as much as may be to prevent or provide against those that are the greatest rather than the lesser, and those that are likely to happen often, rather than those that [Page 238] are not likely to happen at all, or very seldome; and those that are inconsistent with the being, ra­ther than those that are inconsistent with the well-being onely of a State or Body Politick. For as in the body natural, so in the body Politick, no reme­dy is to be prescribed or applyed that is worse than the disease. And therefore,

Secondly, Any gravamina, nay all the gravami­na or grievances, that Subjects can suffer under their Sovereign, are to be endured, rather than they are to rebell or to rise up in Arms against him; because that will be the cause of more and greater evils, than any of these are, or can be, against which it can be made use of for a remedy: For no Tyranny can be so bad as Anarchy, and any Government, how Tyrannical soever, is better than none. And there­fore it was the saying of one of the wisest Statesmen that ever was in the World, Iniquissimam pacem justissimo bello antefero, I prefer, said he, the most injurious Peace, that is such a peace wherein men are obnoxious to the greatest injuries, before the most just War; he means the most just Civil War, or such a Civil War, as may seem to have the justest or most justifiable causes for it: because indeed any Civil War, upon what grounds or pretences soever it be undertaken, puts the whole body of the Com­monwealth into a much worse condition than it can be under any Government or any Governours what­soever. For whilst there is a Government, though neverso unjust or injurious, there is some authority and execution of Laws for the protection of the in­nocent, if not of the Subjects against the Sovereign, yet of the Subjects against one another; but Silent leges inter arma, When rebellion is up there is no [Page 239] safety for any man against any man, not for Fathers against their Children, nor for Brethren against Bre­thren, Non hospes ab hospite tutus, One friend is not safe from another. To conclude, Rebellion is the ingagement of the whole body of the Commonwealth against it self, and will if it be not suppressed make it at length Felo de se, A murtherer of it self, and to end either in the desolation or dissolution of it self. So that whereas all other evils are but prejudicial to the well-being, This, I mean Rebellion or a rebelli­ous Civil War, is always in its tendency, though not always perhaps in the event, destructive to the very Being of all States and Humane Societies whatso­ever; and consequently to the peace and welfare of Subjects as well as Sovereigns, that is, to all and every one of mankind. And therefore this being the greatest of all Evils, it is never to be made use of to prevent or redress any that are less, and con­sequently never to be made use of at all; because all other evils incident to a Body Politick are less than this, and that not onely taken singly but joint­ly also.

And yet Thirdly, there is one Reason more, why in humane prudence and according to the dictates of right reason, the Rebellion of Subjects against their Sovereign ought not to be allowed; no, not though possibly it might so happen that (humanely speaking) there could be no other way or means to preserve the very Being of the Body Politick: as for example, in one of the aforesaid Instances or Cases which is put by Grotius (but put by him as hardly credible) supposing there should be such a King as would pro­fess so implacable a hatred to his Subjects, that he would if he could destroy them all; and that he [Page 240] will endeavour to doe so: The question is whether, because possibly there may be such a Case, there ought not to be some exception from the aforesaid general Rule of the unlawfulness of Subjects taking up of Arms to resist their Sovereign in any case whatso­ever; I answer No; and that not onely because St. Paul in his prohibition to resist the Supreme Power hath made no such exception, though one of the Supreme Powers, whom he forbid the Christians to resist, did wish the whole body of the Roman peo­ple had but one head, that he might cut it off at one blow; and another of them had set the capital City of his Empire on fire, commanding his Souldi­ers to kill all the Citizens that endeavoured to quench the burning of their Houses; he himself in the mean while playing upon an Instrument all the time it was a burning: Neither will I insist upon the Judgment and Practice of the Primitive Christi­ans, who though they knew their Sovereigns the Heathen Emperours had professed they would, and really did what they could to destroy all their Chri­stian Subjects; yet the Christians did not think that either this profession or practice of their Sovereigns (which was an evident and undeniable demonstra­tion of their implacable hatred against them) was sufficient to dispense with them for resisting of or for defending themselves against them: as was notably exemplified by what was done and suffered by Mauritius and his Legion according to that Heroi­cal story before recited. But I will not insist, I say, upon any Argument drawn from any religious To­pick, to justifie my denial of any exception to be made to the general Rule of non-resisting of Sove­reigns by their Subjects, or for dispensing with Sub­jects [Page 241] to resist their Sovereigns in any case whatsoe­ver, though possibly there may be such a Case (as Barclay, and Grotius out of Barclay, puts) even a­mong Christians. But that which I insist on at pre­sent is this, that abstracting from the consideration of what God hath either commanded or forbidden in his Word, as likewise from the consideration of Hea­ven or Hell, or of any other life after this, where men are to be rewarded or punished for what they have done here; it is not onely prudent and conveni­ent, but absolutely necessary to the peace and wel­fare, and safety, and happiness of all mankind here in this world, that men should be taught and believe, that the resisting of Sovereigns by their Subjects is always and utterly unlawfull in any case whatsoever; Resistance unlawfull e­ven in Groti­us his Case. yea though possibly such might be the Case, as that they would all be destroyed, if they did not resist: and that for these reasons.

First, Because it is not onely very improbable, but as Grotius himself saith scarcely credible, there should ever be any such Case.

Secondly, Because (according to a Maxime of our own Law) A mischief is better than an inconve­nience; that is, (as I conceive) it is better for a State to run the hazard of a greater future evil, which may either not happen at all, or (if at all) very rare­ly, than for the avoiding of it to admit or submit to a lesser, whereunto it may always and must very often be obnoxious.

Thirdly, Because, if it be allowed to be lawfull for Subjects to resist their Sovereign in such a Case as Grotius puts, or in any other case whatsoever; it will be always and altogether as dangerous both to Prince and People, as if it were granted in never so [Page 242] many other cases also; because that one may alway be pretended to be the present case, and the People may be always made to believe it is so, though it be never so improbable to be so.

As may appear by divers Examples besides those I have already quoted out of Scripture, especially that of David, who though he was the best of Kings that Nation ever had, yet his Son Absalom made the People believe that he neglected to doe them justice in hearing their complaints, and redressing their grievances, and thereby stole away their hearts from his Father, (saith the Text) and made them to rebell against him.

But to instance in one Example or two more, nearer home and nearer our own times.

It is not long since the Princes of the House of Lorrain, I mean the Guises, being excluded by An Instance, from the Ho­ly League in France. Henry the Third of France from the chief managery of affairs, which they formerly had in that Kingdom, resolved to gain that by force, which they could not keep by the King's favour; and to that end, to stir up the People under some publick and plausible pretence to joyn with them in a rebellion against the King. But what that pretence should be, which the People should be baited withall, being debated by the chief of the Faction, and some being of one mind and some of another, Henry Duke of Guise, being head of the whole party, stood up and said; What need is there of any debate or consultation as to this particular? can there be a better, or more plausible, or more efficacious Motive to stir up the People to joyn with us against the King; than to The Catholick Religion, the pretence there. make them believe the Catholick Religion is in danger, and that the King is not onely a favourer of the Hu­gonotts [Page 243] but a Hugonott himself in his heart, and there­fore that it is absolutely necessary for all good Catho­licks to joyn in an Association or Holy League for the defence of the Catholick Faith, and to oppose the bringing in of Hugonott Heresie against all per­sons of all conditions whatsoever, and consequent­ly the King himself? It was easily agreed to by all the rest of the Conspiratours, that this was a very plausible pretence indeed, but withall so incredible as to the King's particular, as that it would not be ve­ry difficult onely, but impossible to make the People believe it, and consequently to make them rise up against the King upon that account; it being gene­rally known and believed that that King was as Bigott or zealous a Roman Catholick as any was in France; having been himself not a Spectatour onely but an Actour also in the Massacre of the Hugonotts at Paris not long before; and was still such a Devote, that he was never almost seen in publick but betwixt two Capuchins, with a Crucifix in his hand and his Beads at his girdle. Whereunto the Duke of Guise replied laughing, Let me alone (said he) with the managing of that part of the affair. I will undertake within one month by those I will set on work (mean­ing the Jesuits, the Friars and other Popular Prea­chers) to make the King to be believed over all France to be as arrant a Hugonott as any in Geneva. And so he did; whereupon that Rebellious Associa­tion (which by its Godfather the Pope was called the Holy League) was made against the King, and as bloudy a War as ever was in France was raised and maintained by it; neither did it end with the death of the King (who was murthered by a Jacobin Friar) but continued against his Successour upon the same [Page 244] pretence and with the same intentions: the deluded People in the mean time being made to believe by their Ghostly Fathers, that it was God's Cause they fought for, and that those that died or were killed in it, were sure to go immediately and directly to Heaven, without dropping into Purgatory by the way.

Another Example of the same kind we had here The like In­stance from our late Re­bellion in England. of late amongst Our selves; that is of the Peoples being stirred up by their Preachers to joyn with a factious, ambitious and discontented Party of the Nobility, Gentry and Commons in a Rebellion against our late Sovereign Lord of ever blessed memory, upon as false and groundless a pretence, as that was against the King of France. For, as there the People were made to believe by their Popish Preachers, that their Religion was in danger, and that their King was an Hugonott or Presbyterian, though as I said before he indeed was (as he prosessed himself to be) a very zealous and rigid Papist, and had given more than proof enough that he was so: Even so our People here were by their Presbyterian and other their Schismatical Preachers made to believe, that the Pro­testant Religion here was in very great danger, and The Prote­stant Religion the pretence here. that Popery was very likely to be brought in, because the King was a Papist or Popishly affected at least; whereas it was evident to all the world both by his Profession and his Practice, that he was as truly a zealous and devout Protestant as any the best of his Protestant Subjects, and moreover as resolute a de­fender of the Protestant Faith as it is setled and esta­blished by Law in the Church of England against both Papists and Schismaticks, as any King could or ought to be; I might add, as knowingly so too as ever any [Page 245] King was, but his Father onely. And yet thousands of his Subjects were made to believe that he was a Papist in his heart, and upon that account were per­swaded and engaged to fight against him; nay many of them were made to believe, that the Protestant Religion it self, as it was established by Law, was but disguised Popery, and that the Common Prayer Book was but the Popish Missal or Mass Book trans­lated into English, and that the Bishops with all the Episcopal Clergy were an Antichristian Hierarchy, and were or would be all of them Vassals to the Pope, as soon as they had an opportunity safely to pro­fess themselves to be so. Now if the People could be made to believe (as we see they were) that such a King as He was, and such a Church as Ours is, were Popish or Popishly affected, against all Evidence both of reason and of sense to the contrary; what is there that they cannot be made to believe? and consequently what security can there be for Kings from their Subjects, either for their Power or their Persons? or for Subjects from their fellow Subjects, or for preserving of the publick Peace for a moment onely? If there be any one, I say any one case of any kind in any degree, wherein Subjects may be allow­ed without scruple of Conscience to take up Arms against their Sovereign; that one (as I said before) shall always be pretended and believed to be the Case, as often as the contrivers and trumpeters of Sedition and Rebellion will have it to be so, though there be no ground or reason at all for it, as it is evident there was not in either of the aforesaid In­stances or Examples.

I know there were other pretences besides that of Other preten­ces made use of for the late Rebellion. Religion, to justifie the Rebellion against the late King, [Page 246] as his breach of Trust, his violation of Laws, his bringing or endeavouring to bring in Arbitrary Go­vernment, and (as Mr. Baxter would have it to be believed, though Grotius thinks it incredible that any King in his wits should do so) his professing himself an Enemy to the whole body of the People by making War against them all, (as if he meant to be a King without Subjects) and finally what­soever was thought to be most likely to make either his Person or his Government or both to be feared and hated by the whole Nation, though really and truly there was no more ground for any of them than there was for his purpose of bringing in Popery; which though the Grandees of the Faction knew well enough, yet they knew too that it would serve their turn as well as if it were true, if the People could be made to believe it was so, and withall that they might lawfully, nay that they were bound in con­science with their Lives and Fortunes to defend them­selves, their Wives and Children, from being made slaves (for that's the style it must run in) by the King or his Evil Counsellours, who ought to be brought to condign punishment by force, if it cannot be done by Law; against which the People were made to be­lieve the King did protect those Evil Counsellours of his. And by this means was that Good, that Godly, that Gracious, that Just and every way Vertuous King of ours, brought first to be rebell'd against, and at last to be murthered by his own Subjects in his ca­pital City, and before his own Palace gates. And thus may the best Prince that ever was, will be or can be in the World, be exposed, traduced and ruined; and the best Government in the World be brought to confusion and dissolution: and all the Subjects, for [Page 247] fear of an imaginary slavery, be made Slaves indeed to those whom they helped to make them so; there being no way to secure any Prince, State or People, from being always obnoxious to these fatal mischiefs, but the maintaining of this Axiom or Maxim of true Policy, as Sacred and inviolable (viz.) That The doctrine of Non-resi­stance recom­mended. Sovereigns are not forcibly to be resisted by their Sub­jects in any case or upon any provocation whatsoever. And that this Maxim may be kept Sacred and in­violable, as being the Palladium, the Preservative of the publick peace, and of the very being, as well as of the well-being of Humane Society; it ought to be the special care of him or them that have the Supreme Power to forbid under very severe penalty, the printing, preaching, or any way infusing or in­sinuating into the ears or hearts of the People any Doctrine to the contrary, as being not onely false and erroneous, but dangerous and Seditious also; so seditious and so dangerous, that if the Sovereign have not power to secure himself from the Pulpit and the Press, or if he do not make use of that power, I am afraid that it is not his Scepter nor his Sword, that will be able to secure him from his People, or his People from themselves, I mean from cutting the throats of one another.

CHAP. I.

AND thus having, as I conceive, sufficiently proved it to be unlawful for Subjects to rise up in Arms against their Sovereign, in any case or upon any provocation whatsoever; as being not only contrary to the Precepts of the Gospel, and the Practice of the Primitive Christians, but to the Dictates of right Reason also: I thought there would have been no need of saying any more to prove the The Bishops grounds to prove the late War unlawful. late War here in England to be Unlawful; because I took it for granted, that it was a War made against [Page 242] the King, and that our King was our only Sovereign, and that those that made the War were but Subjects, meer Subjects, and no more than Subjects. But Mr. Baxter tells us,

First, That the late War was not made against Mr. B's contra­ry grounds to justifie it. the King.

Secondly, That the King was not our Sovereign, at least not our sole Sovereign. And,

Thirdly, That those that made the War were not meer Subjects, but had their share in the Sovereignty, and that in the chiefest part of the Sovereignty (namely the Legislative power) as well as the King had.

And upon these grounds he builds his Babel of confusion; and of the solidity of these grounds he is so very confident, that he saith he will confess him­self His confi­dence of these grounds. to have been a Rebel, nay, a most perfidious Re­bei, and that he will offer his Head to Justice as a H. C. p. 489, 490. Rebel, if these grounds of his can be solidly confu­ted. Let us try therefore, whether they be so im­pregnable, as he presumes they are or no. I for my part am so far from thinking them to be so, that they seem to me to have no solidity at all in any of them.

We will begin with the first, viz. that the late The first of them confide­red. War here in England was not a War against the King, and therefore could not be a Rebellion. The Consequence I confess to be good; But how doth he prove the Antecedent? why, he proves the Antece­dent, namely, that the War was not against the H. C. 476. ad sinem istius pa­gine. The Parlia­ments Decla­ration. King, because the Parliament declared it was not against the King, but only against his evil Counsellors, and his Delinquent Subjects, that misled him, and were his Enemies as well as the Commonwealths. And it was [Page 243] upon this account, saith Mr. Baxter, that I served the Parliament; nor do I know (saith he) that I Ibid. ever fought against the King, unless every one of the Kings Soldiers was a King; or some one of them at Mr. B. perso­nally ingaged in the War. least. From which saying of his, I observe by the way, that Mr. Baxter himself, in obedience to the Parliament, did himself personally fight against the Kings Soldiers, but not against the King, unless some one of those Soldiers he fought against was the King; as if no body can be said to fight against the King, but one that hath a personal Combat or Duel with the King. And perhaps the Parliament, not The Parlia­ments design in that Decla­ration. thinking it time yet to speak out, did hope to make the People believe, that they made War against De­linquent Subjects only, and not against the King; be­cause they did not, as the King of Syria did, 2 Chron. 18. v. 30. com­mand their General and his Officers to fight with nei­ther small nor great, but only with the King. It is true, the Parliament did not so: but it is true too, that they did not except the King from being fought with neither; nor consequently from being kill'd. For, as Mr. Baxter saith, it is to be suppos'd those that Mr. B's own confession in the case. H. C. p. 422. fight would kill those with whom they fight: and then what might have become of the King, if Mr. Baxter had hapned to encounter him when he was a fight­ing with other of his Soldiers? But, to let this pass, as spoken of occasionally only, Mr. Baxter tells us, that he and those that engaged with him in the late War were obliged to believe the Parliaments Declarati­on that it was not a War against the King, because the H. C. p. 471. Parliament were not only the most competent Wit­nesses and Judges, but the chosen Trustees of the Peo­ples Liberties.

[Page 244] But whom or what doth Mr. Baxter mean by such By Parliament Mr. B. means the House of Commons. Parliaments as the People are obliged to believe? surely not the King, Lords and Commons, which is the true notion of a Parliament; no, nor the Lords and Commons (who both of them together are but the Body of a Parliament without a Head.) For the reason which he gives, why they (the People) are obliged to believe them, is, because they are their chosen Trustees; but so are the House of Commons only, and not the Lords. So that whatsoever the House of Commons declare or remonstrate unto the People, is to be believed to be true, and just, and legal, and the People to act accordingly; and some there will always be that will do so.

For Example, the House of Commons in the late The ground of Felton's Mur­thering the D. of Bucking­ham, a Vote of the House of Commons. Kings time Voted the Duke of Buckingham (this Dukes Father) to be an Enemy to the publick; and therefore Felton thought himself obliged to kill him, and did so, and for no other reason but that only. For being presently apprehended and ask't why he did it? Look (said he) betwixt the Crown and Lining of my Hat, and you shall find the reason why I thought my self bound in conscience to God, and in duty to my King and Country to do it. And there (as he told them they should) they found a Paper sticht to the inside of the Lining with the aforesaid Vote of the House of Commons written upon it. And this was told me by a very credible Witness Sir Tho. Alisbury, then one of the Masters of Requests, but formerly Secretary for the Admiralty to the afore­said Duke, who was by when he was Murder'd, and heard the aforesaid Examination of Felton, and his justifying of what he had done upon that ac­count of the aforesaid Vote of the House of Com­mons, [Page 245] which was taken out of his Hat, and seen and read by the aforesaid Sir Tho. Alisbury.

I have repeated the Story of this matter of fact, The dange­rous conse­quence of such Votes. the rather, because there have been of late divers such Votes passed in the House of Commons against several Persons of eminent Quality and Dignity, who were all of them to be supposed to be innocent until they were proved to be guilty; and yet be­fore any such proof made, or any proceeding a­gainst them per legem terrae, or according to the Law of the Land; as some of them were, so all of the like quality, that is, all the Nobility, may be con­demned by a Major party of a House of Commons, as Enemies to the Commonwealth, or of King and Kingdom; and according to Mr. Baxter's Doctrine, must by the People be believed to be so; and con­sequently they that are so Voted, how many, how great, and how innocent soever they are, they are to be exposed to have their throats cut by any Fana­tical Zealot, or (which is worse) to be torn in pieces by the inraged Rabble, as the two Dewitts were lately in Holland, and as Dr. Lamb was in London in the Reign of King James. For it is but giving of the Word in such a season, and down goes that Voted, or rather that Devoted Person, and is knock'd on the head before he can open his mouth to speak for himself, when perhaps he is not the Man they took him for neither.

What is become in the mean time of Magna Char­ta? No man safe in such cases. Where is the security thereby provided, for the Lives, Liberties and Properties of Free-born English-men? when an arbitrary Vote of the House of Commons, if it be believed (as Mr. Baxter saith it must be) by the People; and be put in execution [Page 246] (as Mr. Baxter cannot deny but it may be, because it hath been) may take away any mans life, how innocent soever, without any farther process, or a legal proof of any crime against him. For who is there that can secure himself from such a Vote? or that can be secured after he is devoted by such a Vote, from being killed by the next man that meets him in the Streets? for there be more Feltons (saith Mr. Baxter) than one; neither will the hanging of one discourage all the rest from hazarding their lives upon the same account, as long as they are possessed and actuated with the same principle, (viz.) that it is not only lawful, but a glorious and meritorious deed, to kill any man that is an Enemy to the Pub­lick; and withal that he is obliged to believe that any, or as many, as the House of Commons shall declare to be so, are so.

It was high time therefore for the King to give a stop to such proceedings by dissolving the late Par­liament, to prevent the proscribing of all that were about him and employed by him, and perhaps the remonstrating against himself also as their Predeces­sors had done against his Father: which Remon­strance The Remon­strance of the House of Com­mons made use of for the destruction of the Kings Person. made by the then House of Commons, as it was intended and made use of at first by the Presby­terians to begin and carry on their Rebellion against the King and his Party; so was it made use of at last also by the Independents for the destruction of the Kings Person: the pretended male-administration of the Government (which was the matter of the Remonstrance) being that for which he was indicted and condemned and put to death by the Indepen­dents. And yet that very Remonstrance it was that Mr. Baxter in the place before quoted saith, the Peo­ple [Page 247] were obliged to believe, and consequently to act thereupon as afterwards they did, and yet good man he was in the mean time far from being guilty of any hurt to the Kings Person, or destruction of his Hol. C. p. 489, Power.

But why was he or the rest of the People obliged Parliaments not infallible nor impecca­ble by Mr. B's own confessi­on, to believe either that Remonstrance or his Declarati­on of the House of Commons? were they infallible that they could not be deceived themselves, or were they impeccable that they could not deceive others? neither the one nor the other: For Mr. Baxter him­self tells us, it is well known that Parliaments, quà tales, (as such) are not divine, religious, Protestant, or just: That sometimes the major part in either or both Houses may be the worst. And therefore I should think not always to be believed in what they declare, nor al­ways to be complied with by the People (whose Trustees they are) in whatsoever they command or undertake. For if They be such as Mr. Baxter saith They may be, may They not betray their trust, and act contrary to the Interest of those that trust them? Yes, saith Mr. Baxter, they may, and consequently may (saith he) forfeit their power as well as Kings; nay, in some cases (saith Mr. Baxter) We are all, (that is the whole Nation) to take part with the King against the Parliament: as First, If they would depose Holy Com-w. pag. 437, 438. the King unjustly, or change the Government; or, Se­condly, If they notoriously betray their trust in funda­mentals, or in points that the Common good depends on (as if ever any Parliament did, That we are now And in some cases to be de­ferred by the People. Ibid. speaking of did, and did it most notoriously) there (saith he) the Peoples duty is to forsake them and to cleave to the King against them. But who shall be Judg whether they do so or no? or if there be a di­vision [Page 248] betwixt those between whom the Sovereignty is divided (as Mr. Baxter supposeth it is betwixt King and Parliament here in England) and the one usurps, or is pretended to usurp upon the other; What then? why then, saith Mr. Baxter, it belongs Holy Com-w. pag. 439. to the People to judg whose cause is best and to resist the usurping party. But the People (as he tells us in another place) cannot themselves judg for themselves; Mr. B's incon­sistence in the resolution of such cases. and therefore (saith he) the Constitution of the Go­vernment having made the Parliament the Trustees of our Liberties, hath made them our Eyes by which We must discern our dangers: And therefore (as he saith a little before in the same page) We are obliged to be­lieve them as the most competent Witnesses, and Judges, and the chosen Trustees of our Liberties. So that if there be a difference betwixt the King and the House of Commons, and the House of Commons would depose the King never so unjustly, or change the Government never so notoriously, or betray their trust never so perfidiously, yet if the House of Com­mons themselves will not say they do so, but declare the contrary, the People are to believe them and to side with them against the King; yea, and against the House of Lords too, if they joyn with the King: which how it can consist with the Doctrine of Co-or­dination, or with his own aforesaid Assertion, that in some cases the People are to cleave to the King against the Parliament, he were best to consider.

In the mean time, thanks be to God, We have a The Law a sure Rule. better and a more certain Rule of right and wrong and to be guided in what We are to believe and do, than an arbitrary Vote of the major part of the House of Commons; and that is the known Law of the Land. For verissimum illud (saith Grotius) ubi semel [Page 249] à jure recessum est, incerta esse omnia; In Prolegom. de jure Belli & Pacis. when we are once out of the road and rule of the Law, we know not whither We are a going, nor what we are a doing.

If therefore the question be, Whether the late War The E. of Es­sex his case in Q. Elizabeths time. was made against the King or no; it is not a Decla­ration of the House of Commons, or of both Houses, either pro or con, that will decide the question; but Ad legem, ad legem, it is the Law that must do it, and the Law hath done it. For when the Earl of Essex in Queen Elizabeths time, at his Arraignment for Treason and Rebellion against the Queen, (be­cause he took up Arms without her Commission) pleaded that he did it for the Queen and not against her; because his meaning was only to remove Cecill and Cobham and Raleigh and other evil Councellors that were about her, and were hers and the States Enemies as well as his; protesting then, as Mr. Bax­ter does now, that he meant not any the least hurt to the Queens Person or diminution of her Power: upon which often reiterated protestation of the Earls, especially that of his meaning no hurt to the Queens Person; the Sages of the Law, that were Assessors to the Lords that were his Judges, being askt by the Lords, what was the Judgment of the The Judges Opinion in that case. Law in that Case; Pronunciarunt, si quis attentaverit ita se firmare, ut Rex resistere non potuerit, Rebellionis tenetur, &c. ‘They pronounced or declared that Cambd. Eliz. ad Ann. 1601. if any man should attempt to make himself so strong that the King should not be able to resist him, he is guilty of Rebellion.’ Item that the Law interpreteth that in every Rebellion there is a con­spiracy against the Life and Crown of the King; for a Rebell will never suffer the King to live or [Page 250] reign, who may afterwards punish or revenge such his Treason or Rebellion. Which Interpretation of the Law of England they confirmed,

First, By the Imperial or Civil Law, whereby to A threefold confirmation of that their opinion. do any thing against the safety of the Prince is repu­ted to be Treason.

Secondly, By the force of Reason; because it can­not be but that he, which hath once given Law to his King, should never permit the King to recover his former authority, or to live, left at any time after he should revenge it.

Thirdly and lastly, They confirmed it likewise by Examples drawn from our English Chronicles of Ed­ward the II. and Richard the II. both which being once by force of Arms gotten by their Subjects into their Power, were not long after Deposed and made away also.

I have repeated at large what was then said to be Three Obser­vations drawn from thence. the Law of England by the authorised and sworn Ex­positors of the Laws, I mean the Judges. And from what was said by them then in that particular Case, I observe,

First, That Arms taken up, or Forces raised by Subjects of what condition or upon what pretence soever, without the Sovereigns leave or commission, are in construction of Law taken up and raised against the Sovereign.

Secondly, That such Forces so raised, against whomsoever or to what end soever they are preten­ded to be employed, are in construction of Law in­tended not only to take away the Kings Power but his Life also.

And, Thirdly, Because the Law presumes, that those that have taken away his Power will not let [Page 251] him live, for fear he may recover his Power, and revenge himself of those that took it away from him; I cannot chuse but think that the Presbyterian Party, though they did not at first intend to take away the Kings life, yet after they had taken away his Power, and made him their Prisoner, and used The Presbyte­rians would have done what the In­dependents did, had they been let alone. him so barbarously as they did whilst he was their Prisoner, I cannot chuse but think, I say, that (had not the Independents taken him out of their hands) they would have taken away his life at last also, though not by a formal publick judiciary Tryal as the Independents did; but some way or other they would have done it. For who can believe they would have suffered him to live, or at least to live as a King, whom They could not chuse but think they had provoked beyond a capacity of being Par­doned by him, if ever he should be in a condition to be revenged of them? And why should We think they would have stuck at making him away in the dark or in a Prison, whom before they had so often indeavoured to kill in the open Field? For it is to be supposed, saith Mr. Baxter, that those that fight would kill those they fight against; and therefore Holy Com. p. 422. it is to be supposed likewise (say I) that those that commissioned their Armies to fight against their King (as the Presbyterian Parliament did the Earl of Essex) did commission them likewise to kill the King if they could. For I never heard that the King was excepted from being fought against, and The Kings Person excep­ted in none of their Commi­ssions. consequently from being kill'd, in any of their Com­missions: or that so much as any private Instruction or Intimation was given to my Lord of Essex or to any of his Officers, much less to all of them, to spare the King: such a one I mean as David gave to Joab and [Page 252] the Officers of his Army for the sparing of Absolom. So that there was no more care taken by the Parlia­ment for sparing of the King's life, than for sparing the life of any of those whom their Armies were commissioned to sight against and kill; and conse­quently they were commissioned to kill the King as well as any of the rest They were to fight withal.

And if so, then not only those that commission'd The Presby­terian Clergy taxed, as to the late Kings Death. those that fought against the King, but those that stirred them up, and encouraged them to fight against the King, did stir them up and encourage them to kill the King also: and if so, how can the Presbyte­rian Clergy of those times, especially the London and Parliament Preachers, be excused from being intenti­onally guilty of the late King's death, before he was Fid. Evangil. Armatum. actually murthered by the Independents.

But of all the rest how will Mr. Baxter excuse Mr. B. parti­cularly char­ged. himself who tells us it is to be supposed that those that fight would kill those they fight against, and consequently that those that encourage them to fight, do encourage them to kill those whom they fight against, and withal confesseth that he encoura­ged thousands to do that which the Law calls fighting against the King; how will he, I say, excuse himself from being, consequentially at least, if not intentio­nally, guilty of the late Kings Death? How then can he with any ingenuity or sincerity say, that he was never guilty of hurt to the Person or destruction of Hol. Com. p. 489, & 490. the Power of the King? And yet he doth say so, and that so confidently, that he professeth likewise that if either this or that (viz) that if either he was guil­ty Notwith­standing his confidence. Ibid. of hurt to the Person, or destruction of the Power of the King, can be proved against him, he will never gain-say them that call him a most perfidious Rebell, [Page 253] and tell him he is guilty of a far greater sin, than Murther, Whoredom, Drunkenness, and such like.

In the mean time he doth confess, and is convin­ced, Rebellion, as Mr. B. owns, a greater sin than Murther, Whordom, Drunkenness, &c. it seems, that a Rebel is a worse man and a grea­ter sinner, than a Drunkard, or a Whoremonger, or a Murtherer, if he be indeed a Rebel, though per­haps he doth not think so; which is a severer sen­tence than I durst have pronounced upon many of those that were indeed Rebels, but did not think Some were Rebels, who did not think themselves so. themselves to be so; but were misled by their spi­ritual guides, who made them believe that to fight against the King was to fight for the King; and that all the while they were doing God and the King good service: which the greater diminution it was of their sin that were so deceived, the greater ag­gravation it was of their guilt that did so deceive them. And yet those, that were the least sinners of these Rebels, were according to Mr. Baxter's account greater sinners than Drunkards, Whoremongers and Murtherers: so that if he could as truly (as he doth boldly and frequently) charge most of the Episcopal Party with Drunkenness and Ʋncleanness and Pro­faneness, yet seeing he cannot charge them with Re­bellion against their Sovereign, they will still be less evil, how bad soever they are, than the best of those of his Party, if They were Rebels, as I think They have acknowledged themselves to be, by suing for and taking out their Pardons for their Re­bellion.

Neither can the Bishops and the Episcopal Clergy be so answerable to God and the World for the dis­soluteness, The Schisma­tical Clergy under a just reproof. debauchery and Profaneness of those of their Party (were it as general and as great as Mr. Baxter would have it believed to be) as the [Page 254] Schismatical Clergy are for the Rebellion against the King, their Sacrilege against God; and for the plun­dering and murthering of their fellow Subjects by those of their Party; because none of them can say with any colour of truth or credibility, that any of our Clergy did ever incourage any of our Party to be dissolute, or debauch'd, or profane, or blasphemous, or Atheistical, in any kind or in any degree: much less did We commend them for being so, or pray to God to make them so, or thank God because they were so; but We can say and say it truly, that the Schis­matical Clergy were not only Rebels and the greatest of Rebels themselves, but did what they could, by preaching and praying and fasting and thanksgiving, to make the whole Nation (as they did all that were their Proselytes) to be Rebels; if at least the fighting of Subjects against their Sovereign be Rebel­lion; or if those that are guilty of hurt to the Person of the King or destruction of his Power be Rebels, as Mr. Baxter saith they are.

CHAP. II.

NOW that all those, that fought and that com­missioned and encouraged others to fight in the late War, were guilty of the Destruction of the The King's Power destroy­ed in the late War. King's Power, is so undeniably evident and appa­rent, that it needs no proof. Unless Mr. Baxter will say, that the King never had any Power at all; for I am sure they brought him to that pass by that War, that he had no power at all at last, witness his con­dition at Holmby, where he was so far from having the Power of a King, that he had not the Liberty of a Subject, neither as to the liberty of his Person, or of his Conscience; For they would not allow him one of his own Chaplains to assist him in the service of God. And to this diminution or rather annihilation of power was that good King brought by those, who were all of them commissioned by the Presbyterian Par­liament, and many thousands of them encouraged by Mr. Baxter himself (as Mr. Baxter himself con­fesseth) The Presbyteri­an Party who destroyed his Power, by Mr. B 's own confe­ssion, Rebels. so that if those that were guilty of the de­struction of the King's Power were Rebels, (as Mr. Baxter saith he will not gainsay but they were) then Mr. Baxter and those of the Presbyterian Party [Page 256] were all of them Rebels. For it was whilst that Par­ty was in power, and it was by that power of theirs, that the King's Power was destroyed, and he left ut­terly unable to defend himself against the Indepen­dents, Anabaptists, and other Fanaticks, who after his Power was destroyed by the Presbyterians de­stroyed his Person also.

And therefore supposing, but not granting, that Nor consequent­ly can they be: absolv'd from the guilt of the King's murther. neither Mr. Baxter, nor any other of the Presbyte­rian Party had intended any hurt to the King's Person; yet that will not absolve them from being guilty of the hurt that was done unto his Person, or of the King's murther: no more than those Thieves, who (as Salmasius saith) having robbed and disarmed a man, and left him bound hand and foot to be devoured of wild Beasts, because they do not actually hurt or kill him themselves, can be said not to be guilty of his death, if afterward by a Lion or a Bear or a Wolf he be destroyed and devou­red.

And thus much for proof that the late War was The late War then was made against the King. made against the King, notwithstanding the Parli­ament (as Mr. Baxter calls it) declared to the con­trary; and consequently was a Rebellion properly so called; as likewise for proof, that those that were engaged or did engage others in that War, (what­soever their intentions were or might be) they were all of them guilty of the destruction of the King's Power: and consequently perfidious Rebels, and worse than Whoremongers, Drunkards, and Mur­therers in Mr. Baxter's own judgment, notwith­standing his Protestation to the contrary.

We have done skirmishing with Mr. Baxter's for­dorn-hope, and a forlorn-hope it was indeed, if he [Page 257] did hope he could induce any to believe, not only against their reason, but against their sence also, that which verily I believe he doth not believe him­self; namely, that the late War was not made against And that though the Par­liament decla­red it was not. the King. I am sure he did not, at least he was not bound to believe it (as he saith he was) because his and the Peoples Trustees for their Liberties (that is the House of Commons) had declared it was not: unless he will say that the House of Commons is such a body of men, as is either infallible or impeccable; so that whatsoever they or the major part of them declare must needs be so as they declare it to be, and that the People are bound to believe it to be so, because they have no other way to inform them­selves, but by their Trustees; and because these are such Trustees, as they are sure will not, cannot be­tray the trust reposed in them: and yet Mr. Baxter himself saith, (as I noted before) that the Major part of both Houses may be the worst, and such as the People are bound to take part with the King against them. How then can he with any ingenui­ty, or hope to be believed, say that he and the People were bound to believe, that the late War was not made against the King, because one or both Houses of Parliament had declared it was not? And yet this is the only Argument he brings for the proof of it.

But truth will out sometimes before a Man is aware, and though he takes never so much care to suppress it. For whereas in the place before quoted, Mr. Baxter (though he confesseth he fought against the Kings Soldiers) yet he affirms he fought not against the King, thereby implying that he thought it unlawful to fight against the King, though not against those commissioned by him: yet in another [Page 258] place he saith, it is no resisting of Power but of In­justice, to fight against the King and his Soldiers for H. Com. p. 419. the common good; thereby implying, that to fight against the Kings Soldiers or his Army, is to fight against the King; or that it is as lawful to fight against the one as against the other; and conse­quently it is evident that notwithstanding the Par­liaments Declaration to the contrary, Mr. Baxter Mr. B. proved to believe so himself. himself did believe the late War to be made against the King, and must therefore have been (at least in this particular) an [...], one self-con­demn'd, in pretending he did, and was bound to believe it was not made against the King, but against his evil Councellors, and other his Delinquent Subjects only.

CHAP. III.

AND this doth farther appear by the little con­fidence Another Topick of Mr. B 's that the late War was not Rebel­lion. he himself seems to have in this Topick. For supposing (as he had all the reason in the World to suppose) that the aforesaid Declaration of the Par­liament (as he [...], abusively and falsly calls it) would signifie nothing with considering and un­derstanding men, as to the justifying of the late War from being a down-right Rebellion, as indeed it was; he seems to quit this as an indefensible Out-work, and retires to that which he thinks to be a much stronger Hold; and which if he can maintain, he thinks, that though he should grant the late War to have been made against the King; yet it was not, could not be a Rebellion, because it was not made by Subjects against their Sovereign. For the King of England, (saith he) according to the constitution of Because the King, he saith, is not sole So­vereign. our Government is not our sole Sovereign, but there be others that be partners with him in the Sovereignty it self; and of this he is so very confident, that he saith in positive and express terms, that if any man Mr. B 's bold offer. Vid. Praef. to Holy C. prope finem. can prove that the King was the highest power in the time of those Divisions, He will offer his head to justice for a Rebel.

[Page 260] Which saying of his seems to require some animad­version upon it, as not being an absolute denyal of the Kings Sovereignty, or of the Kings being the highest Power, but of his being Sovereign or highest Power, during those times of division only; which seems to im­ply that he was (even in Mr. Baxters opinion) the So­vereign or highest Power before those times of division.

And if this be his meaning, as it must be, (if there What Mr. B 's meaning is in denying the King to be the highest Power in the time of our divisions. be any meaning at all in those words) then it is not from the Constitution of the Government (as Mr. Bax­ter saith it is) that the King, I mean our King of England, is not the Sovereign or the highest Power always and in all times and to all intents and purpo­ses: but it was from the Alteration of the essential Constitution of our Government, and from the ini­quity of those Times and Persons that made that al­teration; that the King did not, nor could not then exercise those Acts of Sovereignty or Supreme Power, which was as legally invested and as inseparably in­herent The King's Power taken from him, his Authority re­mained good. in him, even then, as ever it was before. For though the [...], the Power, might and was, yet the [...], the Authority, was not nor could not be taken from him, but by taking away his Life also.

Unless Mr. Baxter will say (and there seems to The Act, which the King past, for the Parlia­ments sitting, be some such secret intimation in that saying of his I last quoted) that the King himself gave away his Sovereignty, or that he made his two Houses of Par­liament partakers with him in it, when he passed an Act for their sitting until They themselves should be willing or content to be dissolv'd. I confess this was a very great alteration in the very fundamental constitution of the Government, and I confess the King passed such an Act: the very great streights he [Page 261] was then in, together with the minatory importuni­ty of the two Houses, backt by the insolent and tu­multuous behaviour of the Multitude, necessitating him (as it were) to do that, which never any of his Predecessors did before him, (and I hope never any of his Successors will do after him.) I mean to pass such an Act as that was: Although that Act gave neither of the Houses singly, nor both of them Gave them no more Power, than they had before. jointly, any whit or jot of more Power (but only of sitting longer) than what They or their Prede­cessors had before, or their Successors now have. And I hope Mr. Baxter will not say that is a Power to repeal Acts, to make Ordinances of equal validi­ty and obligation with Acts without the Royal As­sent to them, to raise Armies and Monies to maintain them upon their fellow-subjects and against their fel­low-subjects and against the King himself also. Did the Act, that gave them a Power to sit until they thought fit to be dissolved, give them Power to do all, or any of these things before specified? and many other, as bold, as bad and as illegal as any of those were? or because they had leave to sit as long as they listed, had they leave to do what they listed also? No, no; it was their ingrateful and ungraci­ous abuse of the Kings too gracious favour to them, that was the cause of all those evils, that afterwards upon that occasion befel Him and the whole Royal Family, and all his Loyal Subjects. And therefore The worst Act, that blessed King ever did. of all the Acts that ever that good King did, I take the passing of the aforesaid Act, for the sitting of the two Houses, not during his, but their own pleasures, to be the worst, not only in point of prudence and policy, as most prejudicial to the Crown and Govern­ment in general; but in point of Right and Justice [Page 262] also, to all and every one of the rest of his Subjects: I mean as many of them as were capable of chusing, and of being chosen Parliament-men; who were all of them by the passing of this Act excluded from ha­ving what was due to them, in either of those capa­cities; and consequently, from the Rights and Pri­viledges of Free-born Englishmen, as long as those Parliament-Men, that were then in being, should please to sit; and that might be, ar was (as We saw afterwards) as long as they lived, or at least as long as they could; I mean till the Army, which they raised, made them to rise whether they would or no; and yet there want not some that say they are still in being.

But to return from this digression, because it is Mr. B grounds his denyal of the Kings Sove­reignty upon the constitution of the Government. not upon this particular occasional alteration of the Government, that Mr. Baxter doth openly and pro­fessedly ground his denyal of the Kings Sovereignty here in England; but upon the fundamental and es­sential constitution of the Government it self; and consequently he denies England to be a Kingdom and our King to be a King properly so called. For he himself defines a Kingdom to be such a Common­wealth His definition of a Kingdom. H. C. p. 85. or body Politick as hath but one Person only for its Sovereign. So that according to this definiti­on, all Kingdoms that are Kingdoms indeed are Mo­narchies, and all Kings that are Kings indeed or Kings properly so called are Monarchs. I say Kings properly so called, because some have been called Kings, who were really no Kings, as the Kings of Sparta or Lacedaemon were; who were but Generals The Lacedae­monian Kings, only titular. of their Armies only, the Sovereign Power of the State being in those that were called the Ephori or Overseers, to whom those they called their Kings [Page 263] were legally accountable for all their actions, and by whom they were legally punishable, even with death it self, for their delinquencies; whereas the Ephori were accountable to none, nor punishable by any; and therefore the Sovereign Power of the State was in them, and consequently their Kings were Kings and no Kings, that is Kings in name and title only, but really and indeed no more than Subjects. So that the Government of Lacedaemon was not Regal The Government there Aristocra­tical. or Monarchical, but Aristocratical: and so Thucydi­des calls it. For as speaking of the Athenians, he calls them the [...], the Multitude, or Populace, because their Government was Democratical, so speaking of the Lacedaemonians he calls them the [...], the Best sort of People, or the Nobless, be­cause their Government was Aristocratical; whereas if it had been truly Regal, or their Kings had been truly and properly called Kings, he should have cal­led them [...], Royalists or Kings-men, or [...], the Subjects of Monarchs, because their Government would then have been Monarchi­cal. For a Government to be Regal and to be Mo­narchical is all one, there being no King properly so called but he is a Monarch, that is, one that go­verns all and is subject to none, and consequentially accountable to none for any thing he doth in his own Kingdom.

And this is true of all Kings properly so called, whether they be greater or less, Successive or Ele­ctive, All Kings in­deed unaccoun­table to the Reo­ple: and whether they be Despoticall or Politicall; for both Successive and Elective Kings properly so called may be either Despoticall or Politicall: for as the Successive Kings in the three first Monarchies were Successive and Despoticall, and are so still in [Page 264] the East and South parts of the World and in both the Indies: so those of the fourth and last Monar­chy also, (I mean) the Roman Emperors, whether Successive or Elective, were all of them Despoticall; and so in Europe are the successive Emperors of Turky and Russia and Tartary at this day, that is such as are not only Monarchs, that is such as have the whole Sovereign Power solely in themselves (as all Kings or Monarchs properly so called have also) but have and exercise that Sovereignty or Sovereign Power without being bounded or limited by any Laws or Rules to govern by, but as Lords over their Vassals absolutely and arbitrarily according to their own Will and Pleasures. Whereas Politicall Kings and Even Political Kings, who are obliged to go­vern by Law; Princes, whether Successive, as the Kings of Eng­land and of France and of Spain; or Elective, as the Emperor of Germany and the King of Poland; are obliged to govern according to the Political Constitutions and Laws of their several respective Seigniories and Dominions, but not so as to forfeit their right to their Crowns or to be accountable to any judicatory, or punishable by any Power here on Earth, if they do not do so; no, though they be Kings but by Election only; so they be And though Kings by Electi­on only. elected to be Kings indeed, and not in name and title only, as the aforesaid Kings of Lacedaemon were, and as the Dukes of Venice now are, who are Subjects to the Senate there, as the Kings of Lacedaemon were to the Ephori in Sparta, though those were Successive, and these Elective. For it is not their succeeding or being elected, or being cal­led Kings, that makes them to be Kings indeed; but their being invested with Kingly Power, that is to be over all and under none, whether they be born [Page 265] or elected to be so; or by what name or title soe­ver they be called, whether Kings, Emperors, So­phies, Sultans, or but Dukes only. For the Duke of Florence is as much a Monarch in his own Do­minions, as any of the former are in theirs.

He therefore that is born or chosen to be such All such Kings accountable to God only. a King is not nor cannot, after he is such a King, be accountable or punishable for any thing he does, how unjustly or how much against Law soever it may be, but to God only, and by God: because all within his own Dominions are his Subjects, and none without his own Kingdoms and Dominions (though they be never so much greater or more powerful Kings than he) have any thing to do with him, and much less have They any authority over him, which they must have that can justly pretend to punish any man, how great a Delinquent soever he may be, or what wrong soever he hath done against others or against themselves.

CHAP. IV.

BUT may not the People, that chuse one to be their King upon such or such conditions, upon The Question. his non-performance of such conditions Depose him or take away that Power over them they gave unto him? I answer, that if they chuse him to be their King indeed, and not in name and title only, The Answer. then he did thereby become their King indeed, that is, their Monarch, or Sovereign Lord over all of them; and consequently they did all of them be­come 1 Reason. The People upon their choice part with all the Power they had. his Subjects without any Power Civil or Mili­tary left in themselves but subordinate to him or de­rived from him, and consequently such as could not lawfully in any case, or upon any provocation be used against him: The People having by such an Election parted with all the Power they formerly had, without any reservation, and much less power of resumption. And this was well understood by Valerian the next Successor but one to Julian the Valerian 's Re­ply in the like case. Apostate, who being chosen by the Army to be their Emperor, and they crying out to him to name another to be Consors imperii, a Partner in the Em­pire, or one to govern with him, he gave them this notable Answer. [...] Vid. Zozom. lib. 6. cap. 6. [Page 267] [...]. It was in your Power, O my Soldiers, said he, to chuse me to reign over you; but now you have chosen me, that which you demand belongs not to you but to me: and it becomes you as Subjects to be quiet (or not to meddle with matters of Government) and to me as your King and Emperor to consider what is fit to be done.

Again I answer that, even in Elective Kingdoms, 2 Reason. A King so cho­sen hath hic Kingly Power immediately from God, and not from the People, as Mr. B. grants. he that is chosen by the People to be their King hath not his Kingly Power from them that chose him, but from God: which is in express terms not only granted but asserted by Mr. Baxter, and he values himself upon it, as being upon that account a better friend to Kings than (as he saith) some Episcopall men are; and indeed if he were always and in all he saith consistent with himself he would not be so great an Enemy to Kings, as in this and many other of his Aphorisms (which I have colle­cted out of his Book of a Holy Commonwealth) he hath shewed himself to be. For if it be not the People, who chuse him to be their King, that give him his Kingly Power, but that he hath it immediate­ly from God, I wonder by what right or authority they can pretend to take that from him, which not they but God hath given to him. Surely they will not say they may do it whether God will or no; and of Gods Will that they should do so, or may do so, They can have no declaration or significati­on, but either from some plain positive standing Rule in Scripture or from special extraordinary and immediate Revelation, such as Abraham had for the sacrificing his Son Isaac, or as Jehu had for the de­stroying the House of Ahab. But as to this latter, [Page 268] as I hope Mr. Baxter is not yet Fanatick enough to pretend, so I am sure he can find no such declarati­on or signification of Gods Will for the former, I mean in the Scriptures either of the Old or New Te­stament, as They were always and universally under­stood by the first and best Christians.

It is true indeed that in the Scripture God hath Nothing in Scripture, for People to con­troul their Kings. commanded Kings or Sovereign Princes to govern according to his and their own Laws too that are conformable unto his, and threatned them if they do not, and punished them when they have not. But where or in what place of the Old or New Te­stament hath God appointed or permitted all or any of the People to do so? I mean, to punish their Kings by Deposing them, or by taking any part of the Kingly Power he had given them, away from them? Surely God did not only foresee but foretell, that many of the Kings of his own People the Jews would be, some of them Idolaters, and some of them Murtherers and Adulterers, and some of them Tyrants and great oppressers of their Subjects, as appears by Samuels Speech unto them at the Election of Saul their first King; but he doth not give them, or any order of Men among them there or any where else any either commission or permission authoritatively to enquire into their Kings Actions or to call them to an account for them. And therefore the Kings of Juda and Israel were Kings indeed, and so are The state of the Jewish Kings. those Kings whether Despoticall or Politicall, whe­ther Successive or Elective, which have no ordinary standing legal Power or Judicatory above them, whereunto they are Subject and accountable, as the Lacedaemonian Kings were unto the Ephori, and therefore were no Kings indeed but in name and in [Page 269] title only. But there is no such legal ordinary standing Power or Judicatory here in England above our King (for Rex in regno suo non habet su­periorem, imò nec parem, the King in his own Kingdom hath none above him, no nor equal to him, is a Maxim of our Law) and therefore our King must Our King, ac­cording to Mr. B 's own Prin­ciples, a sole So­vereign. needs be a Sovereign and a sole Sovereign, accor­ding to Mr. Baxters own Principles and Concessi­ons. For this is one of Mr. Baxters own Princi­ples, that every Commonwealth or Body Politick must have a Sovereign; the form of a Commonwealth (saith Holy Com. p. 61. he) being the relation of Sovereign and Subjects to each other; as likewise this is another of his Apho­risms or Principles that the Sovereign of one Common­wealth Ibid. p. 62. must be one and but one: and by but one he must needs mean but one Person, or but one Caetus or Company of men; and consequently in which soever of them it is, it must be solely and wholly: so that to be Sovereign and not to be sole Sovereign seems to be a contradiction in adjecto. From whence I argue, that if there must be a Sovereign or Supreme Power in every State or Body Politick, and that be the Sovereign or Supreme Power which by the Legal Constitution hath no Superior Power above it, then the Regal is the Sovereign or Supreme Power in England; because accor­ding to the Legal Constitution of this Kingdom there is no Power Superior to it or Predominant over it, but all other Powers are derived from it and Subordinate and Subject and Subservient to it.

Again, if the Sovereign of one Commonwealth, State or Kingdom must be One, and but One on­ly, then if the King of England be a Sovereign (as [Page 270] having no Superior he must needs be) he must be a sole Sovereign also.

Neither do I see how either of these Con­clusions can with any colour of reason be deny­ed, but by assigning some Power in some Per­son or Persons, which by the Legal and Funda­mental Constitution of this Kingdom is above the The King hath no Superior to judg him, nor Peers to try him. King, or at least equal to him. But as it is a Maxim of our Law (as I said before) that Rex in regno suo non habet superiorem, the King in his own Kingdom hath none above him; so it is a Maxim too that he hath not parem neither, none equal to him: so that according to our Law as there is none to judg him because he hath no Su­perior, so there is no Way of trying him, because he hath no Peers; those whom We call Peers being his Subjects though They are Pares or Peers in relation to one another.

CHAP. V.

THIS one would think were enough to prove the King of England not only to be our So­vereign but our sole Sovereign; and consequently the Kingdom of England to be properly and indeed (as it hath always been accounted both at home and abroad) a Monarchy, or a Government in chief by one and by one only.

No, saith Mr. Baxter, it hath not always been accounted to be so. For it hath been a Contro­versie, Mr. B. starts a Controversie, which form of Government the English is. saith he (having spoken before of Monar­chy, Aristocracy and Democracy) to which of these forms our English Commonwealth was and is to be reckon'd; and the uncertainty of this (saith he) was H. C. p. 87. one cause of our Wars.

Whereunto I answer, that I never heard, nor I ve­rily This Controver­sie never heard of, till the late times. believe ever any body else did hear of any such Controversie here in England, at least as to the Civil Government. As to the Ecclesiastical Government indeed of the Church there hath been a Controver­sie betwixt us and the Church of Rome, whether the King or the Pope be the Governor in chief of it; as likewise betwixt us and the Presbyterians, whether the King or a National Synod ought to have the Su­preme managery of it. But as to the Civil Govern­ment [Page 272] of the State, there was never any question made (for ought I ever heard) by any of the other­wise Dissenting Parties, but that it was Monarchicall, and that the King was the sole Sovereign of it and in it, before that Rebellious Parliament set up for a The Rebell-Par­liament modest at first. share in the Sovereignty: which they did not at first neither; but did in all their Addresses to him acknowledg him to be their Sovereign, and that not as they were particular Persons only, but as they were the representative Body of all the Commons of England: neither did the House of Peers ever make the least doubt of doing so also; nor of taking the Oath of Allegiance as to their Sovereign. So that there being then no controversie of the Kings Sove­reignty over the whole Nation, whether diffusively or representatively considered; nor consequently whether this Kingdom were a Monarchy properly so called or no; this Controversie, (I say, there being then no such controversie in being;) could not be one of the causes of the War, as Mr. Baxter saith it was; I am sure it was none of the causes then pre­tended.

And yet I am apt enough to think that the con­trivers The secret design of some, from the first, to change the Go­vernment. and promoters of the War that were then leading-men in the House of Commons, and some of them in the House of Lords also, did from the very beginning design and intend a real change and alte­ration of the Government it self, though They open­ly pretended but a reformation of abuses that were in it only. I mean they did intend to turn the Mo­narchy into an Aristocracy, and to make a Duke of Venice of the King; as appears by the 19 Propositi­ons, which when they thought themselves strong enough to own they made to him. But this They [Page 273] concealed for a long time from the main Body of their Party, for fear it might alienate most or many of them, that had any thing of Loyalty or Consci­ence, from them. Or if they did communicate this arcanum, this secret of their grand design to any, it was only to those whom they were sure of, as desi­ring such a change of the Government as themselves did, and whose help they were to make use of for the bringing of it about; I mean the popular Pres­byterian and other Schismatical Preachers; and per­haps Mr. B. makes the Kingdom of England, a mixt Common­wealth. Mr. Baxter was one of them: Otherwise I should wonder how he comes to say, as he doth, the Parliaments have affirmed it (namely the King­dom of England) to be a mix'd Commonwealth. H. C. p. 87. For sure by Parliament he meant Parliament-men: for Parliaments say nothing but by Votes or Orders of the respective Houses, and I verily believe there never was any such Vote pass'd in either of them; if there were, he should have done well to have named those Parliaments or at least some one of those Parliaments that had affirmed the King­dom or (as he calls it) the Commonwealth of Eng­land not to be Monarchical, but a mixed Govern­ment; which no doubt he would have done, if he could, being so desirous, as he seems to be, to have it so. My Lord Cook 's judg­ment in the Case.

But I can tell him of one who was Speaker of the House of Commons, and as Learned a one in the Laws and Legal Constitutions of this Realm, & like­wise as knowing what were the Powers and Privi­ledges of both Houses of Parliament, as ever was be­fore or since Him in the Chair; and that was my Lord Cook who saith and saith it positively as a known and undoubted truth, ‘That this Kingdom of ours [Page 274] is a Monarchy, and Monarchy successive by in­herent In the Preface to his fourth Book of Re­ports. Birth-right; adding that of all others it is the most absolute and perfect Form of Govern­ments, excluding Interregnums and with it infinite inconveniences. His judgment to be preferr'd be­fore foreign Lawyers and Divines.’

And now what say you, Mr. Baxter? Do you not think this Oracle of our Law (for so I think he is esteemed by those of his Profession) do you not think (I say) that he understood the Legal and Fundamental Constitution of this Kingdom, as well as you do or any of those foreign Lawyers or Divines, whose judgments perhaps you may rely on and be misled by? I name Divines as well as Lawyers, because some of the Protestant as well as Popish Divines have done what they can to lessen the Power of Kings: the latter to make them [...], and [...], to make them accountable and subject to the Pope, and the former to make them accountable and subject to the People, to their own Subjects, which is as dan­gerous and much more dishonourable than the other.

CHAP. VI.

AND yet this so dangerous and so dishonoura­ble a subjection of Kings to their own Subjects doth Mr. Calvin, the Patriarch of the Presbyterians, Calvin the Pa­triarch of the Presbyterians. approve of; I call him the Patriarch of the Presby­terians, because he was the first that after 1500 years Government of the Church by Bishops, invented and set up a Government of the Church by a Parity of Presbyters without Bishops; and this and this only can properly and truly be called Calvinism; What properly Calvinism. whatsoever he holds besides, even the most rigid of his Tenets, having been held by some of the School­men and some of the Fathers also.

But this Calvin I say (though otherwise a very Learned and (as our judicious Hooker saith of him) incomparably the wisest man that ever the French Church Calvin con­demns Resistance of Kings by pri­vate men, but obliges some sort of Magistrates to it. did enjoy since the hour it did enjoy him,) though he doth not allow of the resisting of Kings, even the worst and most tyrannical of Kings, by such of their Subjects as are but private men, and consequently [Page 276] not by the generality of the People; yet, Si qui nunc sunt (saith he) populares Magistratus ad mode­randam Regum libidinem constituti (quales olim erant qui Lacedomoniis Regibus oppositi erant Ephori; & quâ etiam fortè potestate (ut nunc res habent) funguntur in singulis Regnis tres Ordines, quum primarios con­ventus peragunt) adeò illos serocienti Regum licentiae pro officio intercedere non veto, ut si Regibus impoten­ter grassantibus, & humili Plebeculae insultantibus con­niveant, corum dissimulationem nefariâ perfidiâ non carere affirmem; quia Populi libertatem, cujus se Tutores Dei ordinatione positos nôrunt, fraudulenter produnt.

I have put down this passage of Calvins in his own words, which for the English Readers sake may be thus translated. ‘If there be now (saith he) any such popular Magistrates constituted (I presume he meant legally constituted or appointed by Law) for the moderating or restraining the lust or unbrid­led appetites of Kings) such as were of old time the Ephori to the Lacedaemonian Kings; and which Power also (as things now are) perhaps the three Orders or Estates have in several Kingdoms when they meet in Parliament) I am so far from forbid­ding them (saith he) to interpose their Authori­ty for restraining the raging licentiousness of Kings; that if they do but connive at them, when they impotently domineer and insult upon the poor Commonalty, I do affirm that connivence of theirs is a nefarious persidiousness, because they do fraudulently betray the Peoples Liberty, whereof they know they are made the Guardians by Gods appointment.’

In which passage of Mr. Calvins (wherewith he concludes his Book of Institutions) I observe that [Page 277] he speaks not with that confidence and clearness as he useth to speak with, in declaring his judgment upon other occasions, nor as he doth in the Para­graph preceding this, in which he doth positively and resolutely condemn the resistance of Kings by their Subjects in any case or upon any provocation whatsoever; and for this he brings undeniable ar­guments and proofs out of Scripture, and answers clearly and solidly all objections to the contrary. But when he comes (with his deprivatis hominibus loquor, that is, I speak of private men) to tell us that by Subjects that are not to resist their Kings he means private Men only; what he gave with one hand he takes away with the other, by not only per­mitting and allowing, but by obliging and injoyn­ing some that are Magistrates to restrain their Kings from oppressing or insulting (as he calls it) over their People, and to bind their Kings as it were to the good behaviour; which how it can be done, if Kings have no mind to be so bound, but by force, he doth not tell us; and how it can be done by force without the assistance of private men, he doth not tell us neither; nor consequently without making private Subjects to resist their King, which as he told us before was utterly unlawful in any Case whatsoever. So that he seems, as to this point, to speak very doubtfully and warily. For first he doth not say there are now any such Magistrates, that are to be Umpires, as it were, betwixt Kings and their His wariness in expressing him­self. Subjects, with Power to curb and restrain Kings from governing of their People otherwise than they ought to do; such as (saith he) were the Ephori in relation to the Lacedemonian Kings: but he saith si qui nuno sunt (if there be any such Magistrates [Page 278] now, as the Ephori were then) and as fortè (saith he) perhaps he doth not say certé, for certain, or absque dubio without doubt, the Conventions of the three Estates are in those Kingdoms wherein are such Conventions, (meaning I presume the King­doms of England and France and others, if there be any other of the like Constitution) so that if such a Convention or Assembly of the three Estates have no such Power as the Ephori had (as Calvin doth not positively affirm they have, but that fortè or perhaps they may have, and consequently that forté and per­haps they may not have neither) then hath Calvin this to say for himself, that if such Conventions or The three E­states have no such Power, as he supposeth. Assemblies have no such Power (as most certainly they have not, nor ever had where Kings were Kings indeed and not in name only, as the Spartan Kings were) he hath this (I say) to say for him­self, that what he positively affirms afterwards, that such Magistrates or such Assemblies may and ought to do for the restraining and curbing of Kings, was only upon supposition that they were legally invested with the same Power over their respective Kings, as the Ephori were legally invested with over the Kings of Lacedaemon: which if it be not true (as he that saith but perhaps it is, doth thereby grant that per­haps it is not neither) then is not he chargeable with that which follows; namely, with this Opinion or Doctrine, that such popular Magistrates (as he calls them) or such representative Assemblies of the Peo­ple might and ought to do what the Ephori did. And thus these two little Adverbs Fortè and Ferè, Per­haps and Almost do (as the Proverb saith) save Perhaps, a salvo for a Lye. many a Lye, and are of great use to insinuate that unto others as true, which we are not sure of our [Page 279] selves; as also for the bringing men off from being answerable for what they so warily and doubtfully affirm, if they be questioned for it and undeniably convinced of the falshood of it.

And truly that Calvin himself did doubt, whether Calvin himself doubts, whether there be any such Magistrates, as he speaketh of. there were any such Magistrates in any of those Kingdoms he seems to speak of, that had such Power and Authority in relation to their Kings as the Ephori had in relation to the Kings of Lacedaemon; I make no doubt at all: and that not only in regard of his Fortè, perhaps, which I have already spoke of; but also because he gives us not so much as one In­stance of the [...], that there are any such Magistrates, nor one argument for the [...] of it, that there should be any such, either from Reason or from Authority either Divine or Humane, that is, from either any Example or Precept of Gods Law, or of any Hu­mane Constitution in any Kingdom; though by saying (as he doth) that those Populares Magistra­tus are the Tutores, the Guardians or Defenders of the Peoples Liberty against the violence of Kings, Dei Ordinatione by the Ordinance of God, he seem­eth No such Magi­strates, by God's Ordinance. to think that they are by Gods own appoint­ment: which is very strange it should be so now, and was never so in the Kingdom of his own framing for his own People, for whom he professeth he had a greater kindness than for any other Nation; and therefore no doubt would have made such a provi­sion for their security from being oppressed by their Kings, whom he foresaw would be such oppressors as many of them proved to be. But we see he did not. And therefore if there be any where such Magistratus Populares or Tutelares Populi, Guardi­ans of the People, to protect the People against their [Page 280] Kings; I conclude that it is not an Ordinance of God but an Invention of man, and such an invention as is likely to embroil States and Kingdoms in a Civil War, The inconveni­ence and mis­chief of such Magistrates, if there were any such. (which is the worst of Evils) rather than to pre­serve the publick peace and quiet by keeping fair quarter or a good correspondence betwixt King and People. For quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? Who shall take care of the Keepers of our Liberties themselves? For who shall secure either King or People from these securers of the People from the King? May not they be as cruel, as covetous, as voluptuous, as self-seeking, and every way as careless of the publick good as the worst of Kings? Nay, are they not more likely to be so? all of them having a divided Interest of their own from that of the Publick, and each of them from that of one another. Whereas the Kings Inte­rest, (if he be a King indeed and not a titular King only) is one and the same with the Publick, both in regard of himself and of his Posterity also, if his King­dom be Hereditary; and consequently if he do that which is best for himself, he must needs do that which is best for his People also; so that supposing him to be Wise for himself there will be no danger of his doing any thing wittingly and willingly that will in­danger the Peace and Prosperity of his People: be­cause that which will endanger theirs will endanger his own also. But supposing the King, for the pre­sent, as bad as bad may be, yet he may mend, or if he do not, he is mortal, and his successor may be better; or if not, yet at the worst, it is more tole­rable to have one ill Governour in chief than many, and the worst of Monarchies is better than the best of Oligarchyes; because it is easier to satisfie the lust, the cruelty, the avarice or any other inordinate ap­petite [Page 281] of one, than of many; especially of many that have no body to controll them as the Ephori had not. And such it seems Calvin supposeth there are or ought to be in all Kingdoms: at least those that are his followers believe that to have been his meaning; namely, that though it be unlawful and damnable for private Subjects to resist the King or supreme Go­vernour; yet it is not only lawful but laudable for such Magistrates as are supposed to be Guardians of the Peoples Liberties, redigere Reges in ordinem, to reduce their Kings, and that by force, (if it cannot be done otherwise) and to keep them within the bounds of Law and Equity according to their dis­cretion.

And no doubt they were the followers of Calvin, whom Grotius speaks of when he says, Inventi sunt This opinion of Calvin and his Followers tax­ed by Grotius. nostro saeculo viri, eruditi quidem illi, sed temporibus & locis nimiùm servientes, qui sibi primùm (ita enim credo) deinde aliis persuaderent, ea quae jam dict a sunt locum habere in privatis, non etiam in magistrati­bus inferioribus, quibus jus esse putant resistendi injuriis ejus, cujus summum est imperium, imò & peccare eos ni id faciant: Quae opinio admittenda non est. ‘There are men (saith he) in this age of ours (which was next to that of Calvins) learned in­deed, but too much serving the times and places wherein they live, who having first been perswa­ded themselves, (for so I charitably believe) did afterwards perswade others that what I have be­fore spoken of (meaning the unlawfulness of re­sisting of Sovereigns by their Subjects) is to be un­derstood of private men, and not of inferior Magistrates also; whose Right they think it is to resist the injuries of him that hath the supreme [Page 282] Power; nay, that they sin if they do not. Which opinion, saith he, is not to be admitted;’ he might have said, is to be detested, as being such a [...] such a root of bitterness, as [...], when it springs up, will [...], turn all up-side down, wheresoever it is admitted.

But what was Grotius his reason, why this opini­on Heb 12. 15. His reason for it. was not to be admitted? Why because, saith he, though those Magistrates are in rela­tion to their Inferiors publick Offi­cers, Nam Magistratus illi inferio­rum quidem ratione habità sunt publicae personae, at superiores si considerentur privati sunt. Grotius de jure Belli & Pacis. l. 1. cap. 4. sect. 6. yet in relation to their Superi­ors they are but private Persons, especially in relation to the Supreme; from whom all inferior Magistrates derive their Power. And yet they were such Ma­gistrates who drove their Bishop out of Geneva, who was their Prince, their Sovereign Prince, as well as their Bishop, before Calvin came thither in­deed, but I do not find that ever he blamed them for it.

But doth not Grotius himself allow of the resist­ing of Kings by their Subjects in several Cases? Yes, Another passage of Grotius, wherein he al­lows resistance of Kings. he doth so, but not without contradicting himself, and the Apostolical Doctrine and Practise in one of them, as I have already observed, and as to the rest I have spoken already also, excepting the last but one of them only. And that is, when the King hath but a part of the Sovereignty, and the People or the Senate hath a part of it also; for then (saith he) Si Rex habeat partem summi Imperii, partem alteram populus aut senatus; Regi in partem non suam involanti, vi justè opponi poterit quia catenus imperium non habet: quod locum habere censeo, etlamsi dictum sit belli potestatem penes Regem fore: id enim de Bello externo intelli­gendum est, cùm alioqui quis­quis Imperii summi partem ha­beat, non possit non habere eam partem tuendi potestatem, quod ubl fit potest Rex suam Imperii partem belli jure amittere. Grot. Ibid. if the King invade that part which is not his, or which doth not belong to him, he may justly be resisted; because as to that his Power doth not [Page 283] extend: which (saith he) I do think may be truly affirmed though the Power of the Sword or of making War be said to be in the King; for that is to be understood in relation to a foreign War only. Whereas otherwise whosoever hath a part of the Sovereignty cannot but have a right to defend his part of the Sovereignty, whereby it may so hap­pen that the King may by the Law of Arms lose that which was his own part of the Sovereignty.

I have set down this passage of Grotius both in his own words and mine at the full length, because it is upon Grotius's supposition and resolution in this case, that Mr. Baxter grounds the justice of the Par­liaments War against the King, and the injustice of This passage the ground of Mr. B's justifying the late War. the Kings against the Parliament; and that with so great a confidence that he saith he is willing to forfeit his head if he be disproved in either. We will therefore, First, Examin whether there can be such a Case as Grotius supposeth or no; Secondly, If there be such a Case, Whether that be the case in England, as Mr. Baxter saith it is.

CHAP. VII.

AND first as to the first of these Particulars (I mean the Supposition it self) namely the divi­sion of the Sovereignty or Supreme Power; the No such Case possible, as Gro­tius supposeth. very possibility whereof, that there should be such a thing in any Body Politick whatsoever, seems to be a contradiction in terminis in down-right terms, to what Grotius himself affirms to be an inseparable property of Sovereignty; namely, that it is quid per se indivisum, a thing of it self undivided, and by quid Sovereignty in­divisible. per se indivisum a thing of it self undivided, he must needs mean id quod suâ naturâ est indivisible, that which in its own nature is indivisible, or something that cannot be divided; because otherwise to say that Sovereignty or Supreme Power est quid per se indivisum, is a thing of it self undivided, should not distinguish it from any other subordinate Power which may be actu or per accidens indivisum, actually or by accident undivided, though potentiâ and per se potentially or of it self it may be divisible into never so many parts or particles. Now if Sovereign­ty be (as according to Grotius it is) per se indivi­sum quid, a thing of it self undivided, or suâ naturâ [Page 285] indivisibile, that which in its own nature is indivisi­ble. I cannot see with what congruity of reason it can be said to be divided, as Grotius in the very same period saith it may be, sivè per partes potentia­les sive subjectivas, either by its potential or its sub­jective parts. For as for that division of the Roman The division of the Roman Em­pire, no division of Sovereignty. Empire per partes subjectivas, by its subjective parts; when the Eastern part of it was governed by one and the Western by another, and the Northern per­haps by a third, as it was by the three Sons of Con­stantine, there was indeed a division of the Empire and a fatal one it was, but there was no divisi­on of Sovereignty; for every one of the three was a Sovereign in his own part or portion of the Empire, just so as during the Heptarchy of the Saxon Kings Our English Heptarchy such. here in England, the Island was divided into seven several Governments, but every one of the seven was a Monarchy and had a Sovereign of its own in­dependent upon any of the other, so that there was then no more a division of Sovereignty than there was afterwards when Edgar became Monarch of the whole Island, or than there is now by the addition of the Kingdom of Scotland and Ireland to it.

I know the Roman Emperors did sometimes assu­mere Partners in the Empire, upon what account. sibi socios in imperio, take to themselves part­ners or companions in the Empire; but then the Sovereignty was either wholly and jointly in both of them, as it was in the two Consuls after the expulsi­on of the Kings, or as it is in the whole Venetian Se­nate at this day: or else he whom the Emperor as­sum'd as his companion in the Empire was thereby designed only to be his Successor, as the King of the Romans is now in Germany, but continued a Subject and subordinate to him that assumed or adopted him, [Page 286] as long as he lived. So that in this case there was no division of the Sovereignty it self no more than in the former.

And much less can there be said to be a division of The Case, when a King is con­ditionally ele­cted. the Sovereignty per partes potentiales by its potential parts (as Grotius saith they are called) when a Peo­ple that is sui juris Regem eligens, quosdam actus (scilicet potentiae) sibi servet, alios autem Regi defe­rat, that is, when a free People in chusing them­selves a King reserve some Acts of Power to them­selves as well as they give others to their King; ne­que tamen id fit quotiescunque Rex promissis quibus­damque obligatur, but I would not have this (saith he) to be understood to be the case when Kings are obliged or oblige themselves by certain promises on­ly; (mark that Mr. Baxter,) sed tunc id fieri intel­ligendum est, si quid Populus adhuc liber futuro Regi imperet per modum manentis Praecepti, aut si quid sit additum Regem cogi aut puniri posse. ‘But this (saith he) that is, this division of Sovereignty, per partes potentiales by its potential parts or acts of Power, is to be understood when the People being as yet free enjoyn their King that shall be (and that by a standing Law or Precept which they will have always to be continued in force) to do or not to do this or that; or if any thing be added to imply that the King may be or is to be compelled or punished if he do otherwise.’ Then or in this Case Grotius seems to think there is a divi­sion of the Sovereignty it self betwixt the King (so conditionally elected) and the People so magisteri­ally electing him. And upon this not only false but (pace tanti viri dixerim, let me speak it by favour and with leave of so great a man as he was) in my [Page 287] opinion absurd supposition he adds, that in this case the People may not only defend by force their own part of the Sovereignty if the King invade it, but jure belli by right of War, take away his part also, if they over­come him in the Contest. Which perhaps may be true upon the supposition of such a division of the So­vereign Power, or rather (to say the truth) upon supposition of such a conditional Election made by the People of such a Magistrate as shall have the title of King and be entrusted with the managery of some part of the publick affairs either of War or Peace, but so as to be accountable to the People or to some judicatory appointed by the People, whe­ther he hath kept or exceeded the bounds and limits of his delegated Power and Authority or no, and if he have, to be liable not only to the forfeiture of it, but to be punished for it also.

And what is this but to be such a King as those of A King thus E­lected, a King in title only. Sparta were? who as Grotius himself tells us were not Kings indeed, but in name and title only; be­cause indeed (as he tells us also) they were subject to the People or to the Judicatory of the Ephori ap­pointed by the People by whom, si peccarent Reges illi in leges ac Rempublicam non tantum vi repelli pote­rant, sed si opus sit puniri morte, quod Pausaniae Lace­demoniorum Regi contigit; and therefore (saith he) those Kings (and consequently, say I, ‘all such Kings as those) if they offended against the Laws or against the Commonwealth they might not only be resisted by force, but if need were punished by death, as Pausanias one of their Kings was.’ And this he affirms to be the case of omnium Principum qui sub Populo sunt, of all Princes who are under the People; and if they be under the People, they cannot [Page 288] be over the People too, but the People must needs be over and above or superior unto them. And then how can Grotius rationally or consistingly with him­self No division of the Sovereignty in this Case, as being wholly in the People. say there is a division of the Sovereignty or of the supreme Power betwixt such a People and such Kings as these are? He might as well have said that the Sovereignty is divided betwixt the King and the General of his Army by Land or the Admiral of his Fleet by Sea or the Vice-Roy of any of his Provinces; for as the King reserves the whole Sovereignty or su­preme Power unto himself, how great soever the Title or Power is which he delegates unto others: so in the aforesaid case put by Grotius the People re­tained the whole Sovereignty unto themselves, not­withstanding any Power or Title they are pleased to give to him whom they chuse to be their King.