Divine dialogues containing sundry disquisitions & instructions concerning the attributes and providence of God : the three first dialogues treating of the attributes of God and his providence at large / collected and compiled by the care and industry of F.P.

Author: More, Henry, 1614-1687.1668

DIVINE DIALOGUES, Containing sundry Disquisitions & Instructions Concerning the Attributes and Providence of God.

The Three First DIALOGUES, treating of The Attributes of God, and his Providence at large.

Collected and compiled by the Care and Industry of F. P.

‘Thy Wisedome, O Lord, reacheth from one end to another mightily; and sweetly doth she order all things.’ Wisedome 8. 1.

LONDON, Printed by Iames [...]l [...]sher, Anno Dom. 1668.

[Page]

THE PUBLISHER TO THE READER.

Reader,

THough it may well seem needless to preface any thing in particular touching these [...] Three First Dialogues, we being in so great a measure prevented by what is already noted in general in the Palaeopolite's Epistle to his Friend; yet because [...] other two went not out of my hands [...]ithout something a larger Preamble, [...] have thought it not amiss to preface [...] little in way of commendation of these. [...] then, the subject of the First [...] these Three Dialogues is the Attri [...]utes of God; of the Two latter, the [Page] Adjusting of the Phaenomena of the World to the Goodness of his Providence. Arguments that will easily allure the Attention of the Curious, and I think handled with that plainness, that full comprehension and carefull circumspection, that they will also satisfie the Ingenuous. But they that have a minde to finde flaws will easily phansie they see them even there where they are not. The main Scope of the Authour in the handling of the Attributes of God seems to be, to cut his way with that Caution and Iudgement, as neither to lessen the Majesty of the Godhead by a pretence of making his Nature so universally intelligible to all Capacities whatsoever, (for it is well known how dull and short-sighted some are) nor yet on the other side to make his Existence incredible, by puzzling and confounding even the best vnderstandings with highflown Notions and hard Repugnancies, yea perfect Contradictions, upon pretence of magnifying the Nature of God the more thereby. As if the more perplext [Page] and self-inconsistent the Nature of God were, it were the more glorious and adorable; and that were not a Reprehension of our Saviour to the Samaritans, but an Encomium, where he saies, John 4. 22. Ye worship ye know not what. Which yet is the condition of all those that dress up the Deity with repugnant Attributes, and an Invitation to the Atheistically-given to quit both the Deity and his Worship at once.

Which consideration I conceive made the Authour of these Dialogues not onely with sound Reason to beat down, but also with a due and becoming Contemptuousness to explode that new fond Opinion of the Nullubists, who, forsooth, imagine themselves so superlatively intellectual above other men, in declaring that God is no-where, though they cannot deny but that he is. In which lofty adventure though they boast themselves as so safely elevated above the Region of Imagination, yet I do not doubt but this high Lift of their thoughts will be found at last to be but [Page] as a tumid Bubble on troubled waters, and that the Levity and Puffiness of their Spirits has carried their conceptions (if they have any of the thing they pronounce of) above the levell of common Sense and Reason.

In his adjusting of the phaenomena of the Universe to the Divine Goodness, it is considerable that he has declined no Difficulties the wit of man can imagine or invent, but brought them all into view, or at least the hardest of all, and such Specimina of all kindes, that in all likelihood, what-ever new Instances may occur to men, or they may on set purpose excogitate, will be easily satisfy'd by the Solution of these foregoing Examples.

That also is not to be pretermitted, how he has fitted Solutions and Hypotheses to the severall degrees and capacities of the mindes of men, that the Argument may not be too big for some, and too little for others. To say nothing how in the representing of the gross Barbarities of the Manners and Religions in the Vnciviliz'd parts of [Page] the World, he does by not an unpleasant Satyricalness dexterously endeavour the quickening of the Civilized parts into a sense and abhorrence of the least shadow or resemblance of those execrable Barbarities.

And that again, methinks, is very sober and humane, in that in the setting out these Genius's of severall sorts and sizes, as I even now intimated, there is nothing of reproach cast upon any, but he that has not the Fate to be a Philotheus or a Bathynous, is notwithstanding allow'd to be a Sophron. All which Dispensations in their kinde are laudable and honourable; and it is certainly want of Iudgement or Good nature that makes them contemn one another. For those that are arrived to any due measure of real Piety and Vertue finde so great a Perfection in that, that those whom they see arrived to the like degree there with themselves, let their other Capacities be what they will, they will easily give them the right hand of Fellowship, and acknowledge them their equals. But for those whose [Page] either Knowledge or Ignorance is accompanied with so high a pitch of Rudeness and Immorality, as that they contemn and reproch all that are not of their own size in either, it is but just if they find themselves lightly perstringed in the Parable of those two loudsinging Nightingales of Arcadia that so rudely awakened Bathynous out of his Divine Dream.

Lastly, For the observation of Decorum of Persons, though it be not neglected or transgressed in any part of all the Five Dialogues, yet it is more full and articulate in these Three; whenas the peculiar Character of Hylobares had no occasion distinctly to shew it self in the Two last. But the Characters of all the others are more or less discernible in all Five, but most of all that of Cuphophron. In the Character of which Person the Dramatist seems to have been judicious even to Physiognomonicall Curiosity, [...]e intimating him to be one of so little a Stature. Which comports excellently well with that gaiety of Manners, that versatility [Page] of Wit, and lightsomeness of Humour, that discovers it self all along from the beginning to the end in the person of Cuphophron. For this qualification of Manners is most incident, according to the rules of Physiognomie, to men of a little stature, their Heat and Spirits being something over-proportionated to the bigness of their Bodie; which makes them quick and chearfull, and of a sudden apprehension, obnoxious to Raptures and exalted Resveries, though reaching short, or else shooting over, and not easily hitting the Truth. Which therefore agrees well with the Platonicalness of Cuphophron's Genius. Besides that it may be the Authour may have some regard to the littleness of Des-Cartes his Stature, of whose Wisedome Cuphophron is introduced such an excessive Admirer. As if the lesser-sized Bodies were the fittest Sheath or Case for a Cartesian Wit. Not to note farther, that Plato also was of no procere Stature.

Severall such like Prettinesses accompany the nervose prosecution of [Page] the main Subject of these Dialogues: wherein to the free and ingenuous I think the Authour will not easily seem to have over-shot himself in any thing, unless in his over-plain and open opposing that so-much-admired Ph [...]losopher Renatus Des-Cartes, on whom persons well versed in Philosophicall Speculations have bestowed so high Encomiums, especially a Writer of our own, who, besides the many Commendations he up and down in his Writings adorns him with, compares him (in his Appendix to the Defence of his Philosophicall Cabbala) to Bezaliel and Aholiab, as if he were inspired from above with a Wit so curiously Mechanicall, as to frame so consistent a Contexture of Mechanicall Philosophy as he did. And the late learned Authour of Philosophia Scripturae Interpres, after an operose, subtile and copious endeavour of evincing that Philosophy is the best Interpreter of Scripture, as if all that pains had been intended in the behalf of Des-Cartes, to set him in the infallible chair, he concludes all at last with a [Page] very high and unparallel'd Elogie of the Cartesian Philosophy. Wherefore it may very well be questioned whether it was so advisedly done of the Writer of these Dialogues, to adventure the exposing of his own Credit, by so openly opposing and oppugning the great Name and Authority of so very famous and eminent a Philosopher as Cartesius.

But for my part, I must confess, the more he may have exposed himself by this freedome, (provided that he be in the right, which the impartial Reader must judge of) the Points that are controverted are of such great consequence, that I think it is in him the more conspicuous Act of Vertue, and that that very ground upon which this Imputation of Over-shooting himself is raised is a Principle to be abhorred by all good and generous Spirits; namely, As if it were a point of Imprudence to be less tender of a man's own private Credit then of the Glory of God and the publick Good; or, As if any one ought to lose any esteem by doing what is r [...]ally [...]orthy and laudable.

[Page] Besides, he does but follow the Pattern of that very Authour that is observed so highly to have commended Des-Cartes, most of the Allegations against his Philosophy being more fully pursued in that Encomiast's Writings. And in that very Epistle to V. C. where he makes it his business to apologize for him, and to extoll him and magnifie him to the skies, yet he does plainly and apertly declare, That it is a kinde of vile and abject [...], or superstitious idolizing of Matter, to pretend that all the Phaenomena of the Universe will arise out of it by mere Mechanical Motion. And yet in the same Epistle he seems to acknowledge that there may be some few effects purely Mechanicall. Which I believe was from his over-great desire of making Des-Cartes seem as considerable as he could with any judgement and Conscience. But for my part, upon my more seriously considering what occurrs in these Dialogues, I am abundantly assured that there is no purely-Mechanicall Phaenomenon in the whole Vniverse.

[Page] Nor ought that Authour so to be understood in the comparing Cartesius with Bezaliel and Aholiab, as if he did really believe he was supernaturally inspired. For with what face can any one put that sense upon such an high-flown Complement, whenas he does as well up and down in his Works plainly and zealously confute Des-Cartes, where he findes him faulty in things of any concern, as praise him and commend him where he deserves it? Which is a plain indication he did not take him to be infallibly inspired. And it may be the right Exegesis of Bezaliel and Aholiab's being filled with the Spirit of God, Exod. 35. 35. is but their being filled with wisedome of heart for those Mechanicall Curiosities of Work; as it is signified toward the end of that Chapter, That they had a special and extraordinary Genius that way, which was the gift of God in Nature. Besides that every great thing in Nature according to the Hebrew Idiom has its denomination from God. Exod. 35. 31. And therefore to be filled with the Spirit of God in wisedome [Page] and understanding, &c. is to have a great measure of Wisedome and Vnderstanding in such and such things. As without question Des-Cartes had a great deal of Wit and Sagacity to finde out the most credible Material Causes of the Phaenomena of the World, and to order them into the most specious Contexture that the thing is capable of, to make up a Mechanicall Philosophy. But that these things can neither arise nor hold together without an higher Principle that must superintend and guide them, this great Encomiast of his does as plainly declare in Antidot. [...]b. 2. [...]. 2. sect. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14. [...]. 12. sect. 1, 2, [...], &c. Immortality of the Soul, lib. 3. 6. 12, 13. severall places, as the Contriver of these present Dialogues does.

But as for the Authour of Philosophia Scripturae Interpres, I must confess I do much admire, that after he has laboured so much to make good his Argument, he should pitch upon Des-Cartes his Philosophy as such a safe Oracle to consult about the meaning of Scripture. It is true, that severall strokes of it are very fitly applicable to a Philosophical sense of the Six daies Creation: [Page] but those are such as are comprehended in the Pythagorick frame of the Vniverse, and correspond with the ancient Cabbala; are no new Inventions of the Cartesian Wit. And the truth is, that which makes Des-Cartes his Philosophy look so augustly on't is, in that he has interwoven into it that noble System of the World according to the Tradition of Pythagoras and his Followers, or, if you will, of the most ancient Cabbala of Moses. But the rest of his Philosophy is rather pretty then great, and in that sense that he drives at, of pure Mechanism, enormously and ridiculously false.

But now for those Principles or Passages in his Philosophy that are more peculiarly his own, there is nothing more estranged from the Genius of the Scripture and the service of Theologie then they. For fuller satisfaction, and for the suavity of the Co [...] ceit's sake, let us make triall in some few. It is a grand Principle with him, that where-ever we cannot but conceive an Extension or Expansion, [Page] we must likewise necessarily conceive there is Matter. And therefore because we cannot but conceive an indefinite Space round about us extended, we cannot but conceive Matter all along extended. Which plainly implies, we cannot but conceive there is Matter, what-ever else there is. Whence it follows, that its existence is necessary of it self and independent of God, because in its very Notion or Idea it cannot but [...]e conceived to be; we being not able otherwise to conceive but that there is an indefinite Extension round about us. How this will comport with the absolute Perfection of God, or how sound a sense it will render of the first Verse in Genesis, I leave to any one to conjecture.

Again, It is as confessed a Principle with him, that Matter alone with such a degree of Motion as is supposed now in the Vniverse will produce all the Phaenomena of the World, Sun, Moon, and Stars, Air, Water, Earth, Plants, Animals, and the Bodies of Men, in such order and organization as they are found. Which Principle in his Philosophy [Page] certainly must prove a very inept Interpreter of Rom. 1. 19, 20. where the eternall Power and Godhead is said clearly to be seen by the things that are made; insomuch that the Gentiles became thereby unexcusable. But if the Cartesian Philosophy be true, it was their ignorance they could not excuse themselves. For they might have said, That all these things might come to pass by Matter and mere Mechanicall Motion; and that Matter excludes Motion in its own Idea no morè then it includes Rest: so that it might have Motion of it self as well as its Existence, according to the former Implication. See also how fit a Gloss this Principle will afford upon Acts 14. 17. and how well that Text agrees with the first Section of the first Chapter of Des-Cartes his Meteors.

A third peculiar property of his Philosophy is, Princip. [...] part. 1. Artic. 28. A seeming Modesty in declining all search into the Final causes of the Phaenomena of the World: as if, forsooth, that were too great a presumption of humane wit, to pry into the Ends of God's Creation; whenas indeed [Page] his Philosophy is of that nature, that it prevents all such Researches; things coming to pass, according to it, as if God were not at all the Creatour and Contriver of the World, but that mere Matter Mechanically swung about by such a measure of Motion fell necessarily, without any more to doe, into this Frame of things we see, and could have been no otherwise then they are; and that therefore all the particular Vsefulnesses of the Creation are not the Results of Wisedome or Counsel, but the blinde issues of mere Material and Mechanicall Necessity. And things being so, it is indeed very consistent to cast the consideration of the Final Cause out of the Mechanicall Philosophy. But in the mean time how fit an Interpreter of Scripture this Philosophy will be in such places as that of the Psalmist, O Lord, how manifold are thy works! in wisedome hast thou made them all, I understand not. For, according to this Philosophy, he has made no [...]e of them so. Let the zealous Cartesian reade the whole 144 Psalm, and tune it in this point, if he can, to his Master's Philosophy. [Page] Let him see also what sense he can make of the first to the Corinthians, Ch. I. v. 21.

Fourthly, The Apparitions of Horsemen and Armies encountring one another in the Air, 2 Macch. 5. let him consider how illustrable that passage is from the last Section of the 7. Chapter of Des-Cartes his Meteors, and from the conclusion of that whole Treatise.

Fifthly, Isai. 1. 3. That of the Prophet, The Oxe knows his owner, and the Ass his Master's Crib; as also that of Solomon, The righteous man regardeth the life of his Beast, Pro. 12. 10. but the tender mercies of the wicked are cruel: what an excellent Gloss that Conceit of Des-Cartes his, of Brutes being senseless Machina's, will produce upon these Texts, any one may easily foresee.

And, lastly, Gal. 5. 17. where that Enmity and conflict betwixt the Flesh and the Spirit is mentioned, (and is indeed as serious and solemn an Argument as any occurrs in all Theologie) what light the Cartesian Philosophy will contribute for the more [...] this so important Mystery, [Page] may easily be conjectured from the 47 ^th Article of his Treatise of the Passions, where the Combate betwixt the superiour and inferiour part of the Soul, the Flesh and the Spirit, as they are termed in Scripture and Divinity, is at last resolved into the ridiculous Noddings and Ioggings of a small glandulous Button in the midst of the Brain encountred by the animal Spirits rudely flurting against it. This little sprunt Champion, called the Conarion, (or Nux pinea) within which the Soul is entirely cooped up, acts the part of the Spirit, as the animal Spirits of the Flesh. And thus by the Soul thus ingarrison'd in this Pine-kernell, and bearing herself against the Arietations or Iurrings of the Spirits in the Ventricles of the Brain, must that solemn Combat be performed, which the holy Apostle calls the War betwixt the Law of our Members and the Law of our Minde. Rom. 7. 23. ‘Spectatum admissi risum teneatis, ami [...]i?’ Would not so trivial and Iudicrous an account of Temptation and Sin occasion Bod [...]nus his [...]lack-smith to raise as derisorious [Page] a Proverb touching actual Sin, as he did touching original, and make them say, What adoe is there about the wagging of a Nut, as well as he did about the eating of the Apple? Besides, if this Conflict be not a Combat betwixt two contrarie Lives seated in the Soul her self, but this that opposes the Soul be merely the Spirits in such an Organized body, (as Cartesius expresly affirms;) the Souls of the wicked and of the godly in the other state are equally freed from the importunities of Sin.

These few Tasts may suffice to satisfie us how savoury an Interpreter the Cartesian Philosophy would prove of Holy Scripture and Theologicall Mysteries. So that Religion can suffer nothing by the lessening of the Repute of Cartesianism, the Notions that are peculiar thereto having so little tendency to that service. Indeed if Cartesius had as well demonstrated as affirmed that Matter cannot think, he had directly deserved well of Religion it self. But how-ever Providence has so ordered things, that in an oblique way his Philosophy [Page] becomes serviceable to Religion, whether he intended it or no, or rather, that of it that was most against his intention, namely the Flaws and Defects so plainly discoverable in it. For the unsuccessfulness of his Wit and Industry in the Mechanicall Philosophy has abundantly assured the sagacious, that the Phaenomena of the Vniverse must be entitled to an higher and more Divine Principle then mere Matter and Mechanicall Motion. Which is the main reason that his greatest Encomiast does so affectionately recommend the reading of the Cartesian Philosophy: Sect. 14, 15. as you may see in the Preface to his Treatise of the Immortality of the Soul.

These things, I think, duly considered will easily clear the Authour of these Dialogues from all imputation of Imprudence, in opposing the renowned Philosopher in such things as it is of so great concern thus freely to oppose him, especially he going very little farther then his highest Encomiasts have led the way before him.

Nor can I bethink me of any else that may have any colourable Pretense [Page] of a just Complaint against him, unless the Platonists, who haply may judge it an unfit thing that so Divine a Philosophy should be so much slurred by introducing Cuphophron, a Platonist, uttering such tipsie and temulent Raptures and Rhetoricall Apologies, as he does in the Second and Third Dialogues, for the extenuating the hideousness of Sin; besides the ill Tendency of such loose and lusorious Oratorie. And yet the judicious, I believe, will finde those passages as pertinent and usefull as those that bear the face of more Severity and Reservedness; and will easily remember that the Character of Cuphophron is not simply a Platonist, but an aiery-minded one, (as indeed both the danger and indecorum of Light [...] mindedness or over-much Levity of spirit is both represented and perstringed all along in his person;) which therefore does not redound to the discredit of Platonism as such, but to the discovery of the hazard of that Philosophy, if it meet not with a minde that is sober and well ballasted. And for the ill Tendency of his rapturous Eloquence, that [Page] fear is altogether groundless; since of all the force of Reason and Rhetorick he produces, there is so perfect and convictive a Confutation, that there is not the least colour left to palliate Immorality; for as much as it is so clear [...]y evidenced that Sin and Vice are no [...], as Cuphophron's Sophistry [...] onely pursuances of a [...] things in themselves absolutely [...], and perfectly contrary to the [...]ill and nature of God.

But it was a matter of no small moment to bring into view all that could plausibly be said in the behalf of so pleasing a Monster, that it being all enervated and demonstrated to be weak and frivolous, the Minde of man might be the more firmly radicated and es [...] blished in what is good: and that ev [...]l men also might take notice, tha [...] the more-severely vert [...]ous are not [...] of the wi [...]tiest Pleas and [...] they can frame for their adherence to Sin, nor at all at a loss how utterly to de [...]eat them. And that therefore those that are cordially good are not so out of simplicity and ignorance, (as the [Page] falsely-deemed Wits foolishly conceit them) but out of a clear and rational discernment what is best, and out of an holy sense and relish of the Divi [...]st things. To the latter whereof as those conceited Wits lay no claim; so is it as manifest that they have as little right or title to the former, no man willingly continuing in Wickedness but out of a base Stupidity of minde and Imbecillity of Reason.

But these things, Reader, thou wilt best understand by perusing the Dialogues themselves, from which I have too long detained thee by an over-tedious Preface; which I must intreat thee to impute rather to my desire that thou mightest reap a clear satisfaction without the least Scruple or Disgust, then that I have any suspicion of either thy Candour or Iudgement.

Farewell. G.C.

[Page]

THE EPISTLE Of Fr. Euistor, the Palaeopolite, to a Noble Friend of his, touching the ensuing Dialogues.

Honoured Sir,

IT is now well-nigh two years agoe since I gave you Intelligence touching that notable Meeting I had the good hap to be at in Cuphophron's renowned Arbour: Wherein I signify'd to you the great satisfaction Philopolis received in those Conferences, and how excessively Hylobares was transported with Philotheus his Converse, being made thereby so firm a Convert to the belief of Spiritual Beings, and of the Accuracy of that Divine Providence that has the Government of the World. But though the Hints I gave then of the severall Days Discourses made you so passionately desirous of having the whole matter of those Disceptations more fully communicated to you, and all the Five Days Conferences [Page] recovered, if it were possible, into so many Dialogues: yet, for all the care and industry I could use, I could not till now bring about what you so earnestly requested.

But now, partly out of my own Records I made to my self there a-nights after every Day's Discourse, and partly by communicating since that time either by Letters or word of mouth with those that were there present, (especially Sophron, a man of a very firm memory as well as of an able judgement) I think I have at length recovered all that passed in every Day's Conference, even to the minutest Humours and Circumstances of our Converse: Which I have done with that faithfulness, that I have not omitted such passages as may seem to redound to my own discredit; as being more then once not over-handsomely abused by our young Friend Hylobares, who, you know, is free enough in that kinde with his familiar Acquaintances. Which made him fly upon Cuphophron so frequently as he did, even to the admiration, and offense [Page] sometimes, of my worthy Patron Philopolis.

These two, I mean Hylobares and Cuphophron, are, as it were, the small Mean and Treble in this Heptachordon or Instrument of seven Strings. And indeed they are all along (especially in the Three first Dialogues) as acute and canorous as two stridulous Swallows on the top of a Chimney. The rest you will find grave enough, and my self some degrees below Gravity, that is to say, pretty solemnly and authentickly dull. How ever, I served to supply the place of an Historian to them; as I do to you in the rehearsall of the whole matter. Wherein I recording the Humours and Passions of men as well as their Reasonings, if any thing be faulty in any phrase of speech or Comportment of the young men, yet you are to consider that it had been a Fault in me to have omitted it; esp [...]cially the Blemishes of the less perfect being so discernible in the company of those more-accomplished persons, and therefore the more likely to beget a [Page] disrelish and aversation in the Reader to such Miscarriages. Which is the main Scope of all Moral Writings, whether Poetry or History.

But what may seem more harsh in those youthfull persons, compared with the discreet and unexceptionable demeanour of those of more mature age, will yet be found very sutable and harmonious to the Persons themselves, if you have but recourse to the particular Characters in the Page before the Book; which briefly represents the Genius of every Actour. Which if you firmly fix in your mind, and carry with you all along as you reade, you will at least be assured that I am not altogether an unskilfull Dramatist, how-ever you may doubt whether I be so exact an Historian.

Farewell

From Palaeopolis, Novemb. 29. 1666.

Yours to command, Fr. Euistor.

[Page]

THE CONTENTS OF THE Three first DIALOGUES.

I. THE Preference of Vertue and assurance of an happy Immortality before the Pleasures and Grandeur of this present World. 1.
II. The Description of Hylobares his Genius, and of Cuphophron's Entertainments in his Philosophicall Bowre. 4.
III. Philopolis his Quere's touching the Kingdome of God, together with his sincere purpose of proposing them. 13.
IV. Hylobares his Interposall of his Quere's: first, touching the Existence of God, and Divine Providence. 18.
V. The Existence of God argued from the orderly Designs discoverable in the Phaenomena of Nature. 20.
VI. Severall Instances of that general Argument. 22.
VII. That necessary Causality in the blind Matter can doe as little toward the orderly Effects in Nature, as the fortuitous Iumbles thereof. 28.
[Page] VIII. That there is no Phaenomenon in Nature purely Mechanicall. 31.
IX. That there is no Levitation or Gravitation of the Aether or of the vulgar Elements in their proper places. Whence 'tis plain that Matter's Motion is moderated from some Diviner Principle. 33.
X. That the Primordialls of the World are not Mechanicall, but Vital. 36.
XI. Instances of some simple Phaenomena quite contrary to the Laws of Mechanicks. 39.
XII. The fond and indiscreet hankering after the impossible Pretensions of solving all Phaenomena Mechanically, freely and justly perstringed. 43.
XIII. The Existence of God argued from the Consent of Nations, from Miracles and Prophecies, from his Works in Nature, and from his Idea. 49.
XIV. The Obscurity of the Nature of God, and the Intricacy of Providence; with preparatory Cautions for the better satisfaction in these Points. 54.
XV. The Attribute [...] of Eternity. 57.
XVI. An Objection against the All-comprehension of Eternity, with the Answer thereto. 66.
XVII. Another Objection, with its Answer. 71.
XVIII. The Attribute of Immutability. 73.
XIX. Of the Deity's acting ad extra. 78.
XX. The Attribute of Omnisciency. 80.
[Page] XXI. The Attribute of Spirituality, and that God cannot be Material. 87.
XXII. The false Notion of a Spirit. 90.
XXIII. That there is an Spiritual Being in the World. 92.
XXIV. That Extension and Matter are not reciprocall. 93.
XXV. That there is an Extension intrins [...]call to Motion. 96.
XXVI. That there is an immovable Extension distinct from that of movable Matter. 101.
XXVII. That this Extension distinct from Matter is not imaginary, but real. 104.
XXVIII. A fresh Appeal touching the truth of that Point to Reason, Sense, and Imagination. 111.
XXIX. The essential Properties of Matter. 118.
XXX. The true Notion of a Spirit. 124.
XXXI. The Attribute of Omnipresency. 132.
XXXII. Cuphophron's Paradox of God's being no-where. 135.
XXXIII. The Confutation of that Paradox. 139.
XXXIV. That all Spirits are some-where. 142.
XXXV. The Grounds of Cuphophron's Paradox (that Spirits are no-wh [...]re) produced and examined. 151.
[Page] XXXVI. That God is essentially present every-where. 157.
XXXVII. The Arborists affected liberty of dissenting in unnecessary Opinions, and friendly Abusiveness of one another in their Philosophicall Meetings. 160.
XXXVIII. The Conclusion. 164.

The Second Dialogue.

I. THE Introduction, containing Philopolis his Thanks for the last day's Discourse; with a touch by the bye of Inspiration, and of the Difficulty of the present Subject. 168.
II. The two main Heads of Objections against Providence, with certain Laws to be observed in disputing thereof. 172.
III. Evils in general how consistent with the Goodness of God. 175.
IV. The Arguments of Lucretius against Providence. 181.
V. Providence argued against from the promiscuous falling of the Rain, and undiscriminating discharges of Thunder-claps. 187.
VI. An Answer to Lucretius his Arguments. 198.
VII. Of Death, how consistent with the Goodness of Providence. 211.
VIII. Of Diseases. 217.
IX. Of War, Famine, Pestilence, and Earthquakes. 220.
[Page] X. Of ill Accidents happening to brute Creatures, whereby their lifes become miserable. 226.
XI. Of the Cruelty and Rapacity of Animals. 232.
XII. Of the Rage of the Elements, the Poison of Serpents, and Wrath of wilde Beasts. 239.
XIII. Of Monstrosities in Nature. 244.
XIV. Of Fools, Mad-men, and men irreclamably Wicked from their very birth. 252.
XV. The best Vse to be made of the saddest Scene of the things of this World. 262.
XVI. How the Entrance of Sin into the World can consist with the Goodness of Providence. 264.
XVII. Cuphophron's L [...]natick Apologie whereby he would extenuate the Hainousness of Sin. 268.
XVIII. A solid Answer to the foregoing Apologie, though ushered in with something ludicrous Preamble. 281.
XIX. A more sober Enquiry into that Dif [...] culty, How the Permission of Sin in th [...] World can consi [...]t with the Goodnes [...] of God. 29 [...].
XX. The first Attempt of satisfying the Di [...] ficulty, from that Stoicall Position of [...] invincible Freedome of Man's Will. 29 [...].
XXI. The second Attempt, from the consid [...] ration of some high Abuses of a vincib [...] [Page] Freedome, as also from the nature of this Freedome it self. 299.
XXII. The third and last, from the Questionableness whether in compute of the whole there does not as much good redound to the Vniverse by God's Permission of Sin, as there would by his forcible keeping it out. 308.
XXIII. How consistent it is with the Goodness of Providence, that God does not suddenly make men holy so soon as they have an hearty minde to it. 314.
XXIV. The Parable of the Eremite and the Angel. 320.
XXV. That the Adversity of the Good, and the Prosperity and Impunity of the Wicked in this Life, are no Arguments against the Accuracy of Providence. 329.
XXVI. A civil, but merry-conceited, bout of drinking in Cuphophron's Arbour. 338.
XXVII. The marvellous Conjuncture in Hylobares of an outward Levity and inward Soberness at once. 343.
XXVIII. His serious Song of Divine Providence. 345.
XXIX. The breaking up of the Meeting. 348.

The Third Dialogue.

I. COnjectures touching the Causes of that Mirth that the Meeting of some persons naturally excites in one another. 350.
II. Hylobares his Relapse into Dissettlemen [...] [Page] of minde touching Providence, with the cause thereof. 355.
III. Paucity of Philosophers no blemish to Divine Providence. 357.
IV. Reasons in general of the gross Deformity in the Religions and Customs of the Savage Nations, as also of the variety of this Deformity in Manners & Customs. 361.
V. Of the barbarous Custome of going naked. 366.
VI. Of the ridiculous Deckings and Adornings of the Barbarians. 369.
VII. The Lawlesness of the Barbarians and their gross Extravagancies touching Wedlock apologized for by Cuphophron, Advocate-General for the Paynims. 376.
VIII. Of the [...], and the men of Arcladam that lie in Child-bed for their Wives. 383.
IX. Of the Pagans Cruelty to their Enemies, and inhumane Humanity to their Friends. 385.
X. Their killing men at Funerals to accompany the dead. 388.
XI. The Caraiamites murthering good men to seize on their Vertues. 391.
XII. Of the Anthropophagi or Cannibals. 393.
XIII. Of the Atheism and the Polytheism of the Barbarians. 398.
XIV. Of their Men-Sacrifices. 402.
[Page] XV. Of their worshipping the Devil. 404.
XVI. Of their sacrificing men to the Devil. 408.
XVII Of Self-Sacrificers. 416.
XVIII. The meaning of Providence in permitting such horrid Vsages in the World. 419.
XIX. The Madness of the Priests of the Pagans. 421.
XX. Of their Religious Methods of living in order to future Happiness. 430.
XXI. Of their Opinions touching the other State. 433.
XXII. The Vnsuccessfulness of Cuphophron's Advocateship hitherto in reference to the ease of Hylobares his Perplexities. 437.
XXIII. Severall Considerations to make us hope that the state of the World may not be so bad as Melancholy or History may represent it. 440.
The first Consideration. 442.
The second Consideration. 445.
The third Consideration. 450.
The fourth Consideration. ibid.
The fifth Consideration. 451.
The sixth Consideration. 452.
The seventh Consideration. 453.
The eighth Consideration. 454.
XIV. Excellent Instances of Morality even in the most barbarous Nations. 455.
The ninth Consideration. 461.
The tenth Consideration. 462.
[Page] The last Consideration. 463.
XXV. Cuphophron's rapturous Reasons why God does not dissolve the World, notwithstanding the gross Miscarriages in it; with Hylobares and Sophron's solid Animadversions thereon. 464.
XXVI. Hylobares as yet unsatisfied touching the Goodness of Providence, by reason of the sad Scene of things in the World. 470.
XXVII. An Hypothesis that will secure the Goodness of Providence, were the Scene of things on this Earth ten times worse then it is. 473.
XXVIII. Bathynous his Dream of the two Keys of Providence, containing the above-mentioned Hypothesis. 480.
XXIX. His being so rudely and forcibly awaked out of so Divine a Dream, how consistent with the Accuracy of Providence. 492.
XXX. That that Divine Personage that appeared to Bathynous was rather a Favourer of Pythagorism, then Cartesianism. 496.
XXXI. The Application of the Hypothesis in the Golden-Key-Paper, for the clearing all Difficulties touching the Moral Evils in the World. 502.
XXXII. Severall Objections against Providence fetch'd from Defects, answered partly out of the Golden, partly out of the Silver-Key-Paper. 514.
XXXIII. Difficulties touching the Extent [Page] of the Universe. 520.
XXXIV. Difficulties touching the Habitableness or Unhabitableness of the Planets. 523.
XXXV. That though the World was created but about six thousand years ago, yet, for ought we know, it was created as soon as it could be. 536.
XXXVI. Hylobares his excess of Ioy and high Satisfaction touching Providence, from the Discourse of Philotheus. 549.
XXXVII. The Philosopher's Devotion. 552.
XXXVIII. The Hazard and Success of the foregoing Discourse. 556.
XXXIX. The Preference of Intellectual Joy before that which is Sensual. 557.
XL. That there is an ever-anticipative Eternity and inexterminable Amplitude that are proper to the Deity onely. 559.

Errata.

Pag-75. lin. 2. reade Ac—Aq. p. 151. l. 24. r. Res cogitantes. p. 213. l. 16. r. as in. p. 278. l. 18. r. [...] p. 339. l. 13. r. neighbour P [...]ilothe [...]s. p. 340. l. 4. r. Philoth. p. 345. l. ul [...]. r. bear. p. 441. l. 14. for have, r. hear. p. 457. l. 20. r. Hathney and the Brasilian.

[Page]

The proper Characters of the Persons in the ensuing Dialogues, with some Allusion to their Names.

Philotheus, A zealous and sincere Lover of God and Christ, and of the whole Creation.
Bathynous, The Deeply-thoughtfull or profoundly-thinking man.
Sophron, The Sober and wary man.
Philopolis, The pious and loyall Politician.
Euistor, A man of Criticism, Philologie and History.
Hylobares, A young, witty, and well-moralized Materialist.
Cuphophron, A zealous, but Airie-minded, Platonist and Cartesian, or Mechanist.

The general Character.

All free spirits, mutually permitting one another the liberty of Philosophizing without any breach of Friendship.

[Page 1]

DIVINE DIALOGVES, CONTAINING Several Disquisitions and Instructions touching the ATTRIBUTES OF GOD AND HIS PROVIDENCE IN THE WORLD.

THE FIRST DIALOGUE.

Philotheus, Bathynous, Sophron, Philopolis, Euistor, Hylobares, Cuphophron.

Cuph.

THrice welcome, The Preference of Vertue and assurance of an happy Immortality before th [...] Pleasures and Gra [...] deur of thi [...] present world. O I. Philotheus, who have brought along with you two such desireable Associates as Bathynous and Sophron. Will you please to make a step up into the Garden?

Philoth.

With all our hearts. There [...]s nothing more pleasant these Summer [Page 2] Evenings then the cool open Air. And I'll assure you it is very fresh here, and the Prospect very delightsome.

Cuph.

Methinks I envy Greatness for nothing so much as their magnificent Houses, and their large Gardens and Walks, their Quarters contrived into elegant Knots adorned with the most beautifull Flowers, their Fountains, Cascades and Statues; that I might be in a more splendid capacity of entertaining my Friends. This would be to me no small prelibation of the Joys of Paradise here upon Earth.

Philoth.

For my part, Cuphophron, I think he need envy no body who has his Heart full fraught with the Love of God, and his Mind established in a firm belief of that unspeakable Happiness that the vertuous and pious Soul enjoys in the other State amongst the spirits of just men made perfect. The firm belief of this in an innocent Soul is so high a prelibation of those eternal Joys, that it equalizes [Page 3] such an one's Happiness, if he have but the ordinary Conveniences of life, to that of the greatest Potentates. Their difference in external Fortune is as little considerable as a Semidiameter of the Earth in two measures of the highest Heaven, the one taken from the Surface of the Earth, the other from its Centre: The disproportion you know is just nothing.

Cuph.

It is so.

Philoth.

And for gratifying your Friends; They that are in a capacity of being truly such, are as fully well satisfy'd with your ordinary Entertainment, as if you were Master of the Fortunes of Princes. Besides that it would be hazardous to your self to live in that affected Splendour you speak of, as it is not altogether safe to affect it. For both the desire and enjoyment of external Pomp does naturally blinde the eyes of the Mind, and attempts the stifling of her higher and more heavenly Operations, engages the Thoughts here [Page 4] below, and hinders those Meditations that carry the Soul to an anticipatory view of those eternal Glories above.

Cuph.

What you say, Philotheus, may be, and may not be: These things are as they are used. But I must confess I think worldly Fortunes are most frequently abused, and that there is a danger in them: which makes me the more contented with the state I am in.

Philoth.

And so you well may be, Cuphophron: for though you will not admit you live splendidly, yet it cannot be deny'd but that you live neatly and elegantly. For such are the Beds and Alleys of this little spot of Ground: and such also that Arbour, if the Inside be as neat as the Outside.

Cuph.

That you may quickly see, Philotheus.

Philoth.

All very handsome, II. Table, Cushions, [...] his Genius, and of Cuphophro [...]'s Entertainments in his Philosophical Bowre. Seats and all.

Cuph.

Here I love to entertain my Friends with a frug [...]l Collation, a [Page 5] cup of Wine, a dish of Fruit and a Manchet: The rest they make up with free Discourses in Philosophy. And this will prove your greatest Entertainment now, Philotheus, if Philopolis, Euistor and Hylobares were come.

Sophr.

No Entertainment better any-where then a frugal Table, and free and ingenuous Discourse. But I pray you, Cuphophron, who is that Hylobares? Is it he who is so much famed for holding That there is nothing but Body or Matter in the world; That there is nothing Iust or Vnjust in its own nature; That all Pleasures are alike honest, though it be never so unaccountable a satisfaction of either a man's Cruelty or his Lust?

Cuph.

O no, it is not he. For I verily believe I know who you mean, though it never was yet my fortune to be in his company, and I least of all desire it now. For he is a person very inconversable, and, as they say, an imperious Dictatour of the Principles of Vice, and impatient of all [Page 6] dispute and contradiction. But this Hylobares is quite of another Genius and extraction; one that is as great a Moralist on this side rigour and severity of life, as he is a Materialist, and of a kind and friendly nature.

Bath.

That is not incredible: For I see no reason why a Soul that is infortunately immersed into this material or corporeall Dispensation may not in the main be as solid a Moralist as a Mathematician. For the chief Points of Morality are no less demonstrable then Mathematicks; nor is the Subtilty greater in Moral Theorems then in Mathematicall.

Sophr.

In my mind it is a sign of a great deal of natural Integrity and inbred Nobleness of spirit, that maugre the heaviness of his Complexion that thus strongly bears him down from apprehending so concerning Metaphysicall Truths, yet he retains so vivid r [...]sentments of the more solid Morality.

Philoth.

That will redound to his greater Joy and Happiness, whenever [Page 7] it shall please God to recover his Soul into a clearer knowledge of himself. For even Moral Honesty it self is part of the Law of God, and an adumbration of the Divine life. So that when Regeneration has more throughly illuminated his Understanding, I doubt not but that he will fall into that pious admiration and speech of the ancient Patriarch, Gen. 28. 16 Verily God was in this place, and I knew not of it. Wherefore those that are the true lovers of God must be friendly and lovingly disposed towards all his Appearances, and bid a kinde welcome to the first dawnings of that Diviner Light.

Cuph.

But besides the goodness of his Disposition, he has a very smart Wit, and is a very shrewd Disputant in those Points himself seems most puzzled in, and is therein very dexterous in puzzling others, if they be not through-paced Speculatours in those great Theories.

Sophr.

If he have so much Wit added to his Sincerity, his case is the more hopefull.

Cuph.

[Page 8]

What he has of either you will now suddenly have the opportunity to experience your selves: for I see Philopolis and the rest coming up into the Garden. I will meet them, and bring them to you. Gentlemen, you are all three welcome at once, but most of all Philopolis, as being the greatest Stranger.

Philop.

I pray you, Cuphophron, is Philotheus and the rest of his Company come?

Cuph.

That you shall straightways see, when you come to the Arbour.

Philop.

Gentlemen, we are very well met. I am afraid we have made you stay for us.

Philoth.

It was more fitting that we should stay for Philopolis, then he for us. But we have been here but a little while.

Cuph.

A very little while indeed; but now our Company is doubled, so little will be twice as little again. I am very much transported to see my little Arbour scored with such choice Guests. But that mine own Worthlesness [Page 9] spoils the conceit, I could think our Company parallel to the Seven wise men of Greece.

Hyl.

I warrant the Septenary will be henceforth much more sacred to Cuphophron for this day's Meeting.

Cuph.

The Senary at least.

Hyl.

You are so transported with the pleasure of the presence of your Friends, O Cuphophron, that you forget to tell them how welcome they are.

Cuph.

That is soon recounted. I sent into my Arbour just before Philotheus came this dish of Fruit, and this Wine, the best, I hope, in all Athens; and I begin to Philopolis, and bid you now all welcome at once.

Hyl.

You was very early in your provision, Cuphophron.

Cuph.

I did early provide for our privacy, that there might be no need of any body's coming here but our selves.

Hyl.

A large Entertainment.

Cuph.

I keep touch both with my promise to Philopolis and with my [Page 10] own usual Frugality in these kind of Collations: And yet, Hylobares, you have no cause to complain; you have to gratifie all your five Senses. Here is another Glass, tast this Wine.

Hyl.

It is very good, Cuphophron, and has an excellent flavour.

Cuph.

There's to gratifie your Tast then, Hylobares, besides the delicacy of these ripe Fruit, which recreate also the Nostrils with their Aromatick sent; as also does the sweet smell of the Eglantines and Hony-suckles that cover my Arbour.

Hyl.

But what is there to gratifie the Touch, Cuphophron?

Cuph.

Is there any thing more delicious to the Touch then the soft cool Evening-Air, that fans it self through the leaves of the Arbour, and cools our bloud, which youth and the season of the year have overmuch heated?

Hyl.

Nothing that I know of: nor any thing more pleasant to the Sight then the Faces of so many ingenuous Friends met together, whose Candour [Page 11] and Faithfulness is conspicuous in their very Eyes and Countenances.

Cuph.

Shame take you, Hylobares, you have prevented me: It is the very Conceit and due Complement I was ready to utter and bestow upon this excellent Company.

Hyl.

It seems good wits jump, and mine the nimbler of the two. But what have you to gratifie the Ear, Cuphophron?

Cuph.

Do you not hear the pleasant Notes of the Birds both in the Garden and on the Bowre? And if you think meanly of this Musick, I Pray you give us a cast of your skill, and play us a Lesson on your Flagellet.

Hyl.

Upon condition you will dance to it.

Sophr.

I dare say Philopolis thinks us Athenians very merry Souls.

Philop.

Mirth and Chearfulness, O Sophron, are but the due reward of Innocency of life; which, if anywhere, I believe is to be found in your manner of living, who do not [Page 12] quit the World out of any Hypocrisie, Sullenness, or Superstition, but out of a sincere love of true Knowledge and Vertue. But as for the pretty warbling of the Birds, or that greater skill of Hylobares on the Flagellet, I must take the liberty to profess, that it is not that kind of Musick that will gain my Attention at this time, when I see so many able and knowing persons met together; but the pursuance of some instructive Argument freely and indifferently managed for the finding out of the Truth. Nothing so musicall to my ears as this.

Cuph.

Nor, I dare say, to any of this Company, Philopolis.

Philop.

But I am the more eager, because I would not lose so excellent an opportunity of improving my Knowledg. For I never met with the like advantage before, nor am likely again to meet with it, unless I meet with the same Company.

Cuph.

We are much obliged to you for your good opinion of us,

Philopolis.

But you full little think [Page 13] that you must be the Beginner of the Discourse your self.

Philop.

Why so, III. Cuphophron?

Cuph.

For it is an ancient and unalterable Custome of this place, Philopolis his Quere's touching the Kingdome of God, together with his sincere purpose of proposing them. that in our Philosophical Meetings he that is the greatest Stranger must propound the Argument. Whether this Custome was begun by our Ancestors out of an ambition of shewing their extemporary ability of speaking upon any Subject, or whether out of mere civility to the Stranger, I know not.

Philop.

I believe it was the latter, I am so sensible of the advantage thereof, and do not onely embrace, but, if need were, should claim the privilege, now I know it; but shall use it with that modesty, as to excuse the choice of my Argument, if it shall appear rather a Point of Religion then Philosophy. For Religion is the Interest of all, but Philosophy of those onely that are at leisure and vacant from the affairs of the world.

Philoth.

[Page 14]

Let not that trouble you, Philopolis: For, for my part, I look upon the Christian Religion rightly understood to be the deepest and the choicest piece of Philosophy that is.

Philop.

I am glad to hear you say so, Philotheus; for then I hope the Argument I shall pitch upon will not appear over-unsuitable. It is touching the Kingdome of God.

Cuph.

Philopolis hath both gratify'd Philotheus, and most exquisitely fitted himself in the choice of his Argument, his Genius and Affairs being so notedly Politicall. It must be a very comprehensive Argument, in which Religion, Philosophy and Policy do so plainly conspire.

Philoth.

It must, indeed. But what are the Quere's you would propose touching the Kingdome of God, O Philopolis?

Philop.

They are chiefly these. First, What the Kingdome of God is. Secondly, When it began, and where it has been or is now to be found. Thirdly, What Progress it hath made [Page 15] hitherto in the world. Lastly, What Success it is likely to have to the End of all things.

Philoth.

These are grand Questions indeed, Philopolis, insomuch that I am mightily surprised that so weighty and profound Quere's should come from a person that is so continuedly taken up with affairs of the World.

Cuph.

I dare pawn my life that the noise of the fifth Monarchy, or the late plausible sound of setting Jesus Christ in his Throne, did first excite Philopolis to search after these Mysteries.

Philoth.

I am not so curious to enquire into the first occasions of Philopolis his search after these things, as solicitous for what end he now so eagerly enquires after them. For it is a great and general errour in mankind, that they think all their Acquisitions are of right for themselves, whether it be Power, or Riches, or Wisedom, and conceit they are no farther obliged then to fortifie [Page 16] or adorn themselves with them: whenas they are in truth mere Depositum's, put into their hands by Providence for the common good; so that it were better they had them not, then not to use them faithfully and conscienciously to that end: for they bring the greater snare upon their own heads by such acquired Abilities, and make themselves obnoxious to the greater condemnation, unless they use them, as I said, as the Depositum's of God, not to their own Pride or Lust, but to the common good of the Church, of their Prince, and of their Countrey.

Philop.

I acknowledge that to be exceeding true, Philotheus. And next to those are they obnoxious that craftily decline the acquisition of any Power or Knowledge, that they may not run the risques of Fortune in witnessing to the Truth, or assisting the publick Concern: which Hypocrisie I being aware of, am so far from being discouraged, that my Zeal is the more enkindled after important [Page 17] Truths, that I may the more faithfully and effectually serve God and my Prince in my Generation, though with the hazard of all that I have.

Euist.

Which he has once already more then hazarded in the Cause of his Sovereign, besides the hazard of his life in five or six bloudy Battels. But I hope he will never have the occasion of running that hazard again.

Philoth.

O admired Philopolis, you are of a right faithfull and upright spirit; verily I have not discovered more true Vertue and Nobleness, no not in the most famous Philosophical Societies.

Philop.

I love to feel my self of an express and settled Judgement and Affection in things of the greatest moment; and nothing, I think, can be of greater then the Affairs of the Kingdome of God, to know who are more properly and peculiarly his People, that my Heart may be joyned with them, where-ever they are discoverable in the world, and my Hand may relieve them to the utmost [Page 18] extent of the activity of my narrow sphear. For it seems to me both a very ignoble and tedious condition, to be blown about with every winde of Doctrine or transitory Interest, and not to stick to that wherein a man's loss proveth his greatest gain, and Death it self a translation into eternal Life and glory.

Hyl.

This were an excellent Temper in Philopolis indeed, IV. to be thus resolved, Hylobares interpos all of his Quere's: first, touching the Existence of God, and Divine Providence if he were sure not to fall short in his account.

Sophr.

But suppose he was not sure, seeing he ventures so little for so great a stake, I think his Temper is still very singularly excellent and commendable.

Philoth.

But what needs any such supposition, O Sophron? for as sure as there is a God and a Providence, such a single-minded soul as Philopolis will after this life prove a glorious Citizen of Heaven.

Hyl.

I am fully of your opinion, O Philotheus, that Philopolis his future Happiness is as sure as the Existence [Page 19] of God and Divine Providence. But the assurance of these has hitherto seemed to me very uncertain and obscure: whence, according to right Method, we should clear that Point first. For there can be no Kingdome of God, if God himself be not, or if his Providence reach not to the Government of the Universe, but things be left to blinde Chance or Fate.

Philop.

For my part, Gentlemen, I could never yet call such Truths into doubt, though Hylobares has divers times attempted to dissettle me at my House near the other Athens, where sometimes he gives me the honour of a Visit. But all his Reasonings have seemed to me Sophistical Knots or Tricks of Legerdemain, which though they might a little amuse me, yet they could not move me at [...]ll from my settled Faith in God and [...]is Providence.

Philoth.

So great a firmitude is there [...]n Life against all the subtle attaques [...]f shifting Reason. This farther con [...]rms me in an Observation I have [Page 20] made a long time ago, That there is a kind of Sanctity of Soul and Body that is of more efficacy for the receiving or retaining of Divine Truths, then the greatest pretences to Discursive Demonstration.

Philop.

But though I want nothing to confirm me in these Points, yet if Philotheus could convince Hylobares of the truth of them, and beat him at his own weapon, it would be to me a pleasant spectacle; provided he come to my proposed Theme at the last.

Philoth.

It is a great wonder to me that a person so ingenious as Hylobares, V. and so much conversant in Philosophy, The Existence of God argued from [...] [...] derly Desig [...]s discoverable [...] the Ph [...]nomena [...]f [...]. should at all doubt of the Existence of the Deity, any more then he does of Philopolis his Existence or my own; for we cannot so audibly or intelligibly converse with him as God doth with a Philosopher in the ordinary Phaenomena of Nature. For tell me, O Hylobares, whether if so brief a Treatise as that of Archimedes de Sphaera & Cylindro had been [Page 21] found by chance, with the delineations of all the Figures sutable for the design, and short Characters (such as they now use in specious Arithmetick and Algebra) for the setting down of the Demonstrations of the orderly-disposed Propositions, could you or any else imagine that the delineating and fitting these things together was by Chance, and not from a knowing and designing Principle, I mean from a power Intellectual?

Hyl.

I must confess I think it in a manner impossible that any one that understood the purpose of those Figures and the adnexed Demonstrations should doubt but that the Description of them was by some intelligent Being.

Philoth.

But why do you think so, Hylobares?

Hyl.

Because it is the property of that which is Intelligent to lay several things together orderly and advantageously for a proposed Design. Which is done so constantly and repeatedly in that Treatise, and so methodically, [Page 22] that it is impossible to doubt but that it is the effect of some Intellectual Agent.

Philoth.

Wherefore where-ever we finde frequent and repeated Indications of pursuing skilfully a Design, we must acknowledge some Intelligent Being the cause thereof.

Hyl.

We must so.

Philoth.

But what a small Scroll and how few Instances of pursuing a Design is there in that Treatise of Archimedes, in comparison of the whole Volume of Nature, wherein, as in Archimedes every leading Demonstration to the main upshot of all (which is the Proportion betwixt the Sphear and Cylinder) is a pledge of the Wit and Reason of that Mathematician, so the several subordinate Natures in the world (which are in a manner infinite) bear conspicuously in them a Design for the best, VI. and therefore are a cloud of Witnesses that there is a Divine and Intellectual Principle under all? [...]

Hyl.

This is better understood by Instances, Philotheus.

Philoth.

[Page 23]

It is. And I will instance in the meanest first, I mean in the most loose and general strokes of the Skill of that great Geometrician, as Plutarch some-where calls the Deity. As in the nature of Gravity, which precipitates thick terrestrial parts downward through both Air and Water, without which power no Beasts nor Fowls could live upon the Earth or in the Air, dirt and filth would so flow into their mouths and stop their breath; nor could Fishes subsist in the Water. 2. In that strong tug against over-much baring the subtilest Matter in these lower Regions, that thinner Element being disproportionated to the Lungs of either Birds or Beasts; as is to be more fully understood in those excellent Experiments of the Airpump. 3. In the Parallelism and the due-proportionated Inclination of the Axis of the Earth, and the Latitude of the Moon from the Aequator.

Hyl.

I cannot deny but that these [Page 24] Laws are better then if things had been otherwise.

Philoth.

4. The contrivance of the Earth into Hills and Springs and Rivers, into Quarries of Stone and Metall: is not all this for the best?

Hyl.

I conceive it is.

Philoth.

And what think you of Land and Sea, whenas all might have been a Quagmire?

Hyl.

That also is for the best. For on it depends the pleasure and profit of Navigation. Besides that the Sea is the fountain of Moisture that administers to the Springs underneath, as the Springs supply the Rivers above-ground, and so imitate the Circulation of the Bloud in man's Body.

Philoth.

Cast your eye also upon the variety of Herbs and Trees, their Beauty, their Virtue and manifold Usefulnesse, the contrivance of their Seed for propagation; and consider if all be not for the best.

Hyl.

It would require an Age to pursue these things.

Philoth.

[Page 25]

Well then, let us for brevity sake consider onely the severall kinds of Animals: which, beside the Usefulness of some of them especially and more appropriately to mankind, (as the Dog and the Horse for Services, and Oxen and Sheep for his Food) their external Shapes are notoriously accommodated to that Law or guise of life that Nature has designed them; as in general the Birds for flying, the Fish for swimming, and the Beasts for running on the ground; the external frame and covering of their Bodies are exquisitely fitted for these purposes. Besides what also is very general, that contrivance of Male and Female for Propagation, and that notable difference of Fishes and Birds being oviparous, that there might be the more full supply for th [...] great Havock that would be necessarily made upon those kind of Creatures by their devouring enemies. To these you may add the instinct of Birds in building their Nests and sitting on their Eggs; [Page 26] the due number and position of the Organs of Sense and peculiar Armatures of Creatures, with the instinct of using them: That those Fowls that frequent the Waters, and onely wade, have as well long Legs as long Necks; and those that are made for swimming have Feet like Oars: and that no Birds have Paps, as Beasts have. All which things, and infinite more, do plainly argue the accuracy of Design in their framing.

Hyl.

Things are, I must confess, as if they were plainly designed to be so.

Philoth.

But to put an end to these Instances, which, as you said, a whole Age would not suffice to enumerate; the inward Anatomie and use of Parts in many thousand kinds of Animals is as sure a demonstration of a very-curiously contrived Design in each of these Animals Bodies, as the severall Figures and Demonstrations in the above-named Book of Archimedes are of the Writer's purpose of concluding the Truth of each Proposition [Page 27] to which they appertain. That in Man's Body is notorious. The fabrick of the Eye, its safe and usefull situation, the superaddition of Muscles, and the admirable contrivance of the Flesh of the whole Body in a manner into that usefull Organization; those of the Larynx for Speech and Singing; the industrious perforation of the Tendons of the second Joints both of Fingers and Toes, and the drawing of the Tendons of the third Joints through them; the Ventricles of the Heart and their Valvulae, as also the Valvulae of the Veins; the fabrick of these, and the apparently-designed Use of them, and of a thousand more, not onely in Man, but analogically in the rest of Animals, are as certain a pledge of the Existence of a God, as any Voice or Writing that contains such Specimens of Reason as are in Archimedes his Treatise are an Argument of the existence of some man or Angel that must be the Authour of them.

Hyl.

[Page 28]

The weight of Reason and the vehemence of Philotheus his Zeal does for the present bear me down into this belief whether I will or no. For I easily feel the force of his arguing from these few Hints, having perused the latest Treatises of this Subject, and being sufficiently versed in Anatomicall History; which, I must confess, urges upon me, more effectually then any thing, the Existence of God.

Philoth.

Which belief, methinks, you should never be able to stagger in, if you consider that in these infinite kinds of living Creatures, none of them are made foolishly or ineptly, no not so much as those that are gendered of Putrefaction. So that you have infinite examples of a steddy and peremptory acting according to Skill and Design, and abundant assurance that these things cannot come to pass by the fortuitous Jumbling of the parts of the Matter. VII. That necessary [...] in the bli [...]d M [...]tte [...] [...] doe

Hyl.

No, Philotheus, they cannot. But though they be not the results [Page 29] of such Fortuitous causes, as little toward the orderly effects in Nature as the fortuitous Iumbles thereof. why may they not be the effects of Necessary ones, I mean, of the necessary Mechanicall Law of the Motion of Matter? As a Line proportionally cut, if the greater Segment subtends an Isosceles whose Crura each of them are equal to the whole Line, each Angle at the Basis will necessarily be double to that of the Vertex. And this will be the necessary Property of this Triangle.

Philoth.

But what does this prove, whenas there is no necessity in the matter that any Line should be so cut, or, if it were, that any two Lines of equal length with the whole should clap in with the greater Segment to make such a Triangle, much less to inscribe a Quinquangle into a Circle, or that the motion of the matter should frame an exact Icosaëdrum or Dodecaëdrum, whose fabrick much depends on this proportional section of a Line, as you may see in Euclide? And yet there is a more multifarious Artifice in the structure of [Page 30] the meanest Animal. I tell thee, Hylobares, there is nothing necessarily in Matter that looks like an Intellectual Contrivance. For why should blind Necessity doe more in this kind then fluctuating Chance? or what can be the motion of blind Necessity but peremptory and perpetual Fluctuation? No, the necessary and immutable property of such a Triangle as thou hast described, with such a Basis and such Crura, is in thy own Minde or Intellect, which cannot but conceive every Triangle so made to have such a propriety of Angles, because thy Minde is the Image of the eternall and immutable Intellect of God. But the matter is lubricous and fluid, and has no such intellectual and immutable Laws in it at all, but is to be guided and governed by that which is Intellectual.

Hyl.

I mean as Cartesius means and Professes, that the Mechanicall Deduction of Causes in the explication of the Phaenomena of the world is as close and necessary as Mathematicall Sequels.

Philoth.

[Page 31]

Nay, I adde farther, that he conceives his own Mechanicall Deductions to be such. And I must confess I think they are as much such as any will be; and so excellent a Wit failing so palpably, makes me abundantly confident, that the pretence of salving the Phaenomena by mere Mechanicall Principles is a design that will never prove successfull.

Hyl.

Why? VIII. where does Cartesius fail, O Philotheus? That there is no Phaenomenon in Nature purely mechanicall.

Philoth.

Nay, rather tell me, O Hylobares, where he does not; or rather instance in any one Phaenomenon that is purely Mechanicall.

Hyl.

The Earth's being carried about in this our Vortex round the Sun.

Philoth.

That is very judiciously pitched upon, if the Deferent of the Earth, I mean the Vortex, were the result of mere Mechanicall Principles.

Hyl.

Why? is it not? what can Mechanicall motion doe, if not produce that simple Phaenomenon of Liquidity?

Philoth.

[Page 32]

The matter of the Vortex is not simple enough, not to need the assistence of an higher Principle to keep it in that consistence it is.

Hyl.

Why so, Philotheus?

Philoth.

Because Disunity is the natural property of Matter, which of it self is nothing else but an infinite Congeries of Physicall Monads.

Hyl.

I understand you, Philotheus. And indeed there is nothing so unconceivable to me as the holding together of the parts of Matter; which has so confounded me when I have more seriously thought upon it, that I have been prone to conclude with my self, that the Gimmers of the World hold together not so much by Geometry as some natural Magick, if I knew what it was.

Philoth.

You may do in due time. But in the mean while it is worth our noting, that there is another great flaw in this most hopefull Instance you produce of pure Mechanism. For the Earth never got into this Orbit it is now moved in by virtue of [Page 33] those Mechanicall Laws Cartesius describes, nor is still detained here by them.

Hyl.

Why not?

Philoth.

For if the Earth had been bandied out of one Vortex into another, as is supposed, all that looser and lighter matter that hung about it had been stript from it long before it came hither: (as if a man should fling out of his hand Feathers, Chaffe and a Bullet together, the solidity of the Bullet will carry it from the Chaffe and Feathers, and leave them behinde) and so the Matter of the third Region of the Earth had been lost, whereby it had become utterly unhabitable.

Hyl.

I never thought of this before.

Philoth.

And then the descending of the Earth to this Orbit is not upon that Mechanicall account Cartesius pretends, That there is no Levitation or Gravitation of the Aether or of the vulgar Elements in their proper places. namely the strong swing of the more solid Globuli that overflow it. For if there were such an actual tug of the Globuli of the Vortex from [Page 34] the Centre toward the Circumference, Whence 'tis plain that Matter's motion is moderated from some diviner Principle. the Pressure would be intolerable, and they would even mash themselves and all things else apieces.

Hyl.

I am again surprised, Philotheus, but I must ingenuously confess, I think so.

Philoth.

But there being no such hard Pressure, no Levitation or Gravitation (as is also manifest in the Elements vulgarly so called) in locis propriis, is it not a manifest Argument that all is not carried according to Mechanicall Necessity, but that there is a Principle that has a Prospection for the best, that rules all?

Hyl.

It is very manifest, in that neither the Celestial matter of the Vortices nor the Air nor Water are pressitant in their proper places, that it is for the best. Else how could any creatures live in the Air or Water? the weight of these Elements would press them to death.

Philoth.

Must not then some diviner Principle be at the bottom, that [Page 35] thus cancells the Mechanicall Laws for the common good?

Hyl.

It should seem so; and that the motion of Matter is not guided by Matter, but by something else.

Philoth.

That seems very evident from light things that rise up in water. As for example in a deep Bucket of water, where we will suppose a thin round Board forced to the bottom, of almost the same wideness that the Bucket is: the water of the Bucket we will suppose so heavy, that scarce two men shall be able to bear it. Now tell me, Hylobares, how this thin Board does get to the top, so massie a weight lying on it. The whole water that lies upon it does actually press downward, and therefore rather presses it down, then helps it up.

Hyl.

It may be the weight of the water gets by the sides under it, and so bears it up by its own sinking.

Philoth.

That is ingeniously attempted, Hylobares. But you must consider that the water that lies upon [Page 36] the Board to press it down is, it may be, forty times more then that which you conceive to press betwixt the rim of the round Board and the Vessel.

Hyl.

I am convinced that the rising of the round Board is not Mechanicall. X. But I pray you deal freely with me, That the Primordialls of the World are not mechanicall, but vital. Philotheus, for I perceive you are cunninger then I in that Philosophy; has Des-Cartes truly solved no Phaenomenon in Nature mechanically?

Philoth.

He thinks he has solved all mechanically he treats of. But, to deal freely, I finde none of his Solutions will hold by mere Mechanicks: not his formation of Suns, Stars nor Planets; not the Generation nor Motion of the Magnetick particles; not his Hypothesis of the Flux and Reflux of the Sea; not the figure and colours of the Rainbow; not the Winds, nor Clouds, nor Rain, nor Thunder: neither of these, nor of any other Phaenomena, has he given sufficient Mechanicall causes. Nay, I [Page 37] will adde at once, That that simplest and first Hypothesis of his, Princip. Philos. part. 3. sect. 46, 47. That all the Matter of the Universe was first cast into small parts equal in motion and magnitude, and that hence the Suns or Stars and Vortices arose in the distinction of the Matter (by the mutual fridging of those Particles one against another) into the first and second Element, I will adde, I say, That this first Original of things is most grosly repugnant to the actual proportion of these Elements one to another. For from this Mechanicall way, so stated as he has declared, it will follow that the Sun overflows the Orbit of Saturn no less then ten millions four hundred eighty four thousand Semidiameters of the Earth: which one would think were intimation sufficient to give us to understand, that the Primordialls of the World are not Mechanicall, but Spermaticall or Vital; not made by rubbing and filing and turning and shaving, as in a Turner's or Blacksmith's Shop, but from some universal Principle [Page 38] of inward Life and Motion containing in it the seminal forms of all things, which therefore the Platonists and Pythagoreans call the great [...] of the World.

Hyl.

This is admirable: and it would be a great pleasure to me to see these things made out by Reason, that I might the more clearly understand how much that great Wit has fallen short in his account.

Philop.

I prithee, dear Hylobares, deny thy self that pleasure at this time: for I fear all the time of my abode here in the Town will not suf [...]ice for such a Task.

Philoth.

It would, I must confess, be something too copious a digression.

Cuph.

And the more needless, forasmuch as it cannot be deny'd but that Des-Cartes's Deductions are not always so mathematically or mechanically certain as he took them to be. But however, though he fails in his attempt, yet the Mechanicall Philosophy may stand firm still. It is not the [Page 39] errour of the Art, but of the Artist.

Philoth.

But it is a shrewd presumption, O Cuphophron, that when so transcendent a Wit as Des-Cartes, and so peculiarly Mechanicall, fails so palpably even in the general strokes of Nature, of giving any such necessary Mechanicall Reasons of her Phaenomena, it is too palpable a presumption, I say, that the pretence it self is rash and frivolous, and that it is not the true and genuine mode of Philosophizing.

Philop.

What Philotheus says seems to me infinitely credible, though I be no pretender to Philosophy.

Philoth.

But if we produce even among the more general Phaenomena of Nature such Instances as plainly thwart the acknowledged Laws of Mechanicks, XI. let Cuphophron tell me then what will become of his pure and universal Mechanism he pretends to run through the whole frame of the World. Instances of some simple Phaenomena quite contrary to the Laws of Mechanicks.

Cuph.

I will tell you, when you have produced them.

Philoth.

[Page 40]

But tell me first whether you do not firmly believe the motion of the Earth Annual and Diurnal.

Cuph.

I do, and every one else I think that has any skill in Philosophie.

Philoth.

Why then you must necessarily hold a Vortex of Aethereall matter running round the Sun, which carries the Earth about with it.

Cuph.

I must.

Philoth.

And being so great a Mechanist as you are, That the Particles that have swallowed down the Earth thus far into our Vortex, that even those that are near the Earth, so many of them as answer to the magnitude of the Earth, are at least as solid as it.

Cuph.

They are so.

Philoth.

And that therefore they move from the Centre with a very strong effort.

Cuph.

They do so.

Philoth.

And so do the Vortices that bear against our Vortex.

Cuph.

No question, or else our Vortex [Page 41] would over-run them, and carry them away with it self.

Philoth.

Do you or any else either here or under the Line at mid-day or mid-night feel any such mighty Pressure as this Hypothesis inferrs?

Cuph.

I believe, not.

Philoth.

There is one thrust at your pure pretended Mechanism.

Cuph.

Well, at it again; I will see if I can lie at a closer Ward.

Philoth.

The Phaenomenon of Gravity, is it not perfectly repugnant to that known mechanicall Principle, That what is moved will continue its motion in a right line, if nothing hinder? whence it will follow that a Bullet flung up into the Air must never return back to the Earth, it being in so rapid a motion with that of the Earth's.

Cuph.

I understand what you mean; you thrust at the Mechanicall Philosophy before, you have now shot at it.

Philoth.

I and hit the mark too, I trow: so that it is needless to adde that of the great weight hanging at [Page 42] the Sucker of the Air-pump, and drawn up thereby beyond all the accounts of Mechanick Philosophy, with other things of the like nature.

Hyl.

I expected these Instances of Philotheus, and understand the force of them throughly out of a late Dr. More's Antidote, lib. 2. ch. 2. Immort. lib. 3. ch. 12, 13. Authour, and must ingenuously confess that they seem to me such as contain little less then a Demonstration, that all things in Nature are not carried on by Principles merely Mechanicall.

Cuph.

If they be so good, I pray you let us hear some more of them, Philotheus.

Philoth.

When I have heard your answer to these.

Cuph.

My answer is, O Philotheus, that these Instances seem for the present demonstrative and unanswerable; so far Hylobares and I concurr. But I hope I may without offence profess that I think the cause of the Mechanick Philosophy is not therefore quite desperate, but that when our active and searching Wits have made farther Enquirie into things, they may [Page 43] finde out the pure Mechanicall causes of that puzzling Phaenomenon of Gravity.

Philoth.

I but Hylobares may take notice, that the Authour he mentions does not onely confute the false Solutions of that Phaenomenon, but demonstrates all Mechanicall Solutions of it impossible, it being so manifestly repugnant to the confessed Laws of Mechanicks.

Hyl.

It is very true.

Cuph.

That may seem a Demonstration for the present, which to posterity will appear a mere Sophistical Knot, and they will easily see to loose it.

Bath.

I believe by the help of some new-improved Microscopes.

Philop.

Nay but in good earnest, XII. O Cuphophron, The fond and indiscreet hankering after the impossible pretensions of solving all Phaenomena Mechanically, freely and justly perstringed. (if you will excuse my freedome of speech) though I have not that competency of judgement in Philosophicall matters, yet I cannot but deem you an over-partial Mechanist, that are so devoted to the Cause, as not to believe Demonstration against it till Mechanicks be farther [Page 44] improved by posterity. It is as if one would not believe the first Book of Euclide till he had read him all over, and all other Mathematicall Writers besides. For this Phaenomenon of Gravity is one of the simplest that is, as the first Book of Euclide one of the easiest. Not to adde what a blemish it is to a person otherwise so moral and vertuous, to seem to have a greater zeal for the ostentation of the Mechanical wit of men, then for the manifestation of the Wisedome of God in Nature.

Sophr.

Excellently well spoken, O Philopolis. Prov. 27. 19. As in water face answers to face, so the heart of man to man. You have spoken according to the most inward sense and touch of my very Soul concerning this matter. For I have very much wondred at the devotedness of some mens spirits to the pretence of pure Mechanism in the solving of the Phaenomena of the Universe, who yet otherwise have not been of less Pretensions to Piety and Vertue. Of which Mechanick pronity [Page 45] I do not see any good tendency at all. For it looks more like an itch of magnifying their own or other mens wit, then any desire of glorifying God in his wise and benign Contrivances in the works of Nature, and cuts off the most powerfull and most popular Arguments for the Existence of a Deity, if the rude career of agitated Matter would at last necessarily fall into such a Structure of things. Indeed if such a Mechanicall Necessity in the nature of Matter were really discoverable, there were no help for it: And the Almighty seeks no honour from any Man's Lie. But their attempts being so frustraneous, and the Demonstrations to the contrary so perspicuous, it is a marvell to me, that any men that are vertuously and piously disposed should be so partially and zealously affected in a Cause that has neither Truth nor any honest Usefulness in it.

Cuph.

O Sophron, Sophron, full little do you consider what a wonderfull pleasure it is to see the plain Mechanicall [Page 46] sequels of Causes in the explication of the Phaenomena of the World as necessarily and closely coherent as Mathematicall Demonstration it self.

Sophr.

Certainly, O Cuphophron, you are much transported with the imagination of such fine Spectacles, that your mere desire should thus confidently present them to you before they are. But for my part, I conceive there is far more pleasure in clearly and demonstratively discovering that they are not, then there would be if it were discoverable that they are. And that way of Philosophizing that presses the Final cause, [...] the [...], as Aristotle calls it, seems to me far more pleasing and delicious then this haughty pretence of discovering that the Frame of the World owes nothing to the Wisedome of God.

Bath.

All things must out, O Sophron, in the promiscuous ferments and ebulliencies of the spirits of men in this Age, that that Wisedome which [Page 47] is the genuine fruit or flower of the Divine Life may in succession of time triumph over the most strutting attempts or performances of the highest natural Wits.

Cuph.

What wisedome is that which flows out of the Divine Life, O Bathynous?

Bath.

That which leads to it; which the Mechanicall Philosophy does not, but rather leads from God, or obstructs the way to him, by prescinding all pretence of finding his Footsteps in the works of the Creation, excluding the Final cause of things, and making us believe that all comes to pass by a blinde, but necessary, Jumble of the Matter.

Cuph.

Well, be the future Fate of things what it will, I doubt not but Cartesius will be admired to all posterity.

Bath.

Undoubtedly, O Cuphophron; for he will appear to men a person of the most eminent wit and folly that ever yet trode the stage of this Earth.

Cuph.

[Page 48]

Why of wit and folly, Bathynous?

Bath.

Of wit, for the extraordinary handsome semblance he makes of deducing all the Phaenomena he has handled, necessarily and Mechanically, and for hitting on the more immediate material Causes of things to a very high probability.

Cuph.

This at least is true, Bathynous. But why of folly?

Bath.

Because he is so credulous, as not onely to believe that he has necessarily and purely Mechanically solved all the Phaenomena he has treated of in his Philosophy and Meteors, but also that all things else may be so solved, the Bodies of Plants and Animals not excepted.

Cuph.

Posterity will be best able to judge of that.

Philop.

Cuphophron is very constantly zealous in the behalf of the Mechanick Philosophy, though with the hazard of losing those more notable Arguments deducible from the Phaenomena of Nature for the proving [Page 49] the Existence of a God: And yet I dare say he is far from being in the least measure smutted with the soil of Atheism.

Cuph.

I hope so.

Philop.

Wherefore, XIII. O Cuphophron, The Existence of God argued from the Consent of Nations, from Miracles and Prophecies, from his Works in Nature, and from his Idea. let me beg the liberty of asking you what other inducements you have to believe there is a God. Is it the Authority of the Catholick Church? or what is it?

Cuph.

I have a very venerable respect for the Church, O Philopolis, which makes me the more sorry when I consider how much they have wronged or defaced their Authority in obtruding things palpably impossible, and most wretchedly blasphemous, with equal assurance and severity as they do the belief of a God.

Euist.

I conceive Cuphophron reflects upon their barbarous butchering of men for their denying the Article of Transubstantiation.

Cuph.

It may be so. Who can believe men upon their own Authority [Page 50] that are once deprehended in so gross and impious an Imposture?

Euist.

But these are not the Church Catholick, but onely a something-more-numerous Faction of men. But not onely these, but the whole Church, and indeed all Nations, believe that there is a God.

Cuph.

Indeed Tully says, Nulla gens tam barbara, &c.

Euist.

It is consent of Nations therefore, O Cuphophron, that you chiefly establish your belief of a Deity upon.

Cuph.

That is a plausible Argument, Euistor.

Euist.

But the History of Mircacles and Prophecies, with their Completion, a far greater.

Cuph.

They are very strong Arguments that there are invisible Powers that superintend the affairs of mankind, that have a greater Virtue and comprehension of Knowledge then our selves.

Bath.

And so may be able to bring to pass what themselves predict in [Page 51] long succession of Ages. As if the Government of the World and the affairs of mankinde were intrusted into the hands of Angels.

Sophr.

But some Miracles are so great, and Predictions of so vast a compass of time, that none but God can rationally be thought to be the Authour of them.

Bath.

Most assuredly God himself superintends and acts through all.

Philop.

Is this then the Basis of Cuphophron's Belief.

Cuph.

I will tell you, O Philopolis, because I see you so hugely desirous, what is the main Philosophicall Basis of my belief of a God.

Philop.

What is it?

Cuph.

The innate Idea of God in my minde: the arguings from thence seem to me undeniable Demonstrations.

Philop.

I believe they are the more prevalent with you because they are Des-Cartes his.

Cuph.

It may be so. And they are so convictive, that I do very securely [Page 52] disregard all that other way of arguing from the Phaenomena of Nature.

Philop.

I have read those Reasonings of Des-Cartes, but they seem to me hugely high and Metaphysicall, and I meet with many men that look upon them as Sophisticall; most men some of them, others all. But it is the privilege of you high and exalted Wits to understand the force of one another's Notions the best.

Cuph.

I must confess, O Philopolis, there is an extraordinary and peculiar congruity of spirit betwixt me and Des-Cartes.

Philop.

I but we ought to consult the common good, O Cuphophron, and not decry the more vulgar intelligible Arguments, or affect such a Philosophy as will exclude all from laying hold of God but such as can soar so high as you raised Wits can. Arguments from the Phaenomena of the World are far more accommodate to a popular understanding.

Cuph.

Wherefore I talk at this rate onely in our free Philosophicall Meetings.

Philop.

[Page 53]

It is discreetly done of you.

Hyl.

Well, Cuphophron, you may hug your self in your high Metaphysicall Acropolis as much as you will, and deem those Arguments fetched from the frame of Nature mean and popular: but for my part, I look upon them as the most sound and solid Philosophicall Arguments that are for the proving the Existence of a God. And I wonder you do not observe that mighty force that Philotheus his comparing of the Volume of Nature and Archimedes his Book of the Sphear and Cylinder together has for the evincing some Intellectual Principle to be the Framer of the World. For those Figures and Characters annexed to each Proposition with an effectual subserviency to the Demonstration of them is not a more manifest indication of an Intellectual Agent, then an hundred thousand single fabricks of Matter here in the world are of the like Agency; the parts being so disposed to one End, as the management of the Demonstration [Page 54] to one Conclusion, and the subordination of severall Conclusions to one Final and ultimate one: Which Subordinations of things are also most evidently and repeatedly conspicuous in Nature.

Philop.

On my word, Philotheus, you have not spent your labour in vain on Hylobares, that does thus judiciously and resentingly recapitulate your main Reasonings from Nature for the Existence of a God. I hope now, Hylobares, Philotheus may proceed to treat of God's Kingdome, we being all so well assured of his Existence.

Hyl.

I must confess, XIV. while I am in this Company, [...] I am like Saul amongst the Prophets. Philotheus his Zeal and smartness of arguing carries me away captive, whether I will or no, into an assent to the Conclusion. And indeed when at first I set my eyes on this side of things, there shines from them such an intellectual fulgor, that methinks the very Glory of the Deity becomes visible through them. But [Page 55] when I would more fully comprehend his Nature, and approch more nigh him, the same Glory, that recreated mine eyes before, strikes me blinde, and I lose the sight of him by adventuring to look too near him. This is one entanglement and confusion of minde, that I understand not the Nature of God. And the second thing is this, The obscurity and Intricacy of the ways of Providence.

Sophr.

Is it not consonant to the transcendency of so high a Nature as that of God, Hylobares, that it be acknowledged Incomprehensible, as also to his infinite Wisedom, that his ways be past finding out?

Bath.

This is excellently well spoken, O Sophron, if it be rightly understood: otherwise, to give no other account of the Nature of God and his ways then that they are unintelligible, is to encourage the Atheist, and yield him the day; for that is the thing he does chiefly applaud himself in, that he is secure there is neither head nor foot in the Mysteries of Religion, [Page 56] and that the very Notion of a God implies a contradiction to our Faculties.

Hyl.

I desire onely so to understand God, that nothing be attributed to him repugnant to my Vnderstanding, nor any thing found in the world repugnant to his Attributes.

Bath.

I believe Philotheus will make this good, that nothing is truly attributed to God but what is most certainly existent in the world, whether we understand it or not; and that there is nothing in the world truly in such circumstances as are repugnant to the Attributes of God.

Philoth.

I conceive Bathynous means this, that unless we will entangle our selves with making good some fictitious Attributes of God, or defend his Providence upon false suppositions and circumstances, there will be no greater entanglements touching the Notion of God and his Providence, then there would be in the nature of those things we are sure do exist, though there were no God in the [Page 57] world. Wherefore, Hylobares, let me advise you to this, since you have such fast and certain hold of the Existence of the Deity by the repeated effects thereof in Nature, not to let that hold goe upon any grounds that are uncertain or false. For the Scripture declares nothing contradictious touching the Nature of God: nor is there any humane Authority that has any right to be believed when it propounds Contradictions: nor are we bound to burthen the Notion of a Deity with any thing we are not assured implies Perfection. These Cautions if we use, no man, I think, need be much entangled in his thoughts touching the Nature of the Deity.

Hyl.

This is a hopefull Preamble, XV. Philotheus, The Attribute of Eternity. and therefore I will the more chearfully propound my Difficulties, which are drawn from these five Heads; from the Eternity of God, from his Immutability, from his Omnisciency, his Spirituality, and his Omnipresencie. For, to my understanding, the very Notion of Eternity [Page 58] implies a Contradiction, as some describe it, namely, That it is an essential presence of all things with God, as well of things past, present, as to come; and that the Duration of God is all of it, as it were, in one steddy and permanent [...] or Instant at once. If there cannot be a God, but he must be in such a sense as this eternall, the Contemplation of his Idea will more forcibly pull a man back from the belief of his Existence, then his effects in Nature draw a man to it. For what can be more contradictious, then that all things should have been really and essentially with God from all Eternity at once, and yet be born in time and succession? For the reality and essence of corporeall things is corporeall; and those very individuall Trees and Animals that are said to be generated, and are seen to grow from very little Principles, were always, it seems, in their full form and growth: which is a perfect repugnancy to my Understanding. For it implies that the same thing that is already [Page 59] ready in being may, notwithstanding, while it is, be produced of a-fresh. That eternall duration should be at once, is also to me utterly unconceivable, and that one permanent Instant should be commensurate, or rather equal, to all successions of Ages. Besides, if the Duration of God be all at once, sith no Agent acts but within the compass of its own Duration, God must both create and destroy the World at once. Whence it seems impossible that eternall Duration should be indistant to it self, or without continuation of Intervalls.

Philoth.

You argue shrewdly, Hylobares, against that Notion of Eternity that some have rashly pitched upon, but without the least prejudice to the belief of God's Existence, if you have but recourse to those Cautions I intimated at first, That we are not bound to believe Contradictions upon any man's account. These are oversublime reaches of some high-soaring Wits, that think they never fly high enough till they fly out of the sight [Page 60] of common Sense and Reason. If we may charitably guess at what they would be at in this so lofty a Notion, it may be it is onely this, That the whole Evolution of Times and Ages from everlasting to everlasting is so collectedly and presentifickly represented to God at once, as if all things and Actions which ever were, are, or shall be, were at this very Instant, and so always, really present and existent before him: Which is no wonder, the Animadversion and intellectual Comprehension of God being absolutely infinite according to the truth of his Idea.

Hyl.

This, I must confess, is a far more easie and passable Notion then the other.

Philoth.

Yes surely; and not harder to conceive how Continuity of Duration is also competible to the Divine Existence, as well as Eternity or Life eternall, which comprehends the Idea's of all Things and Ages at once in the Intellect of God. For it is as a vast Globe wholly moved on [Page 61] a Plane, and carried on in one exile Line at once: or like the Permanency of a steady Rock by which a River slides; the standing of the Rock, as well as the sliding of the River, has a Continuity of Duration. And no other way can Eternity be commensurate to Time then so; that is to say, the Comprehension of the Evolution of all Times, Things and Transactions is permanently exhibited to God in every moment of the succession of Ages.

Hyl.

What makes the Schools then so earnest in obtruding upon us the belief, that nothing but nunc permanens is competible to the Divine Existence?

Philoth.

It may be out of this conceit, as if that whose Existence was successive would necessarily break off, or at least may hazard to fail, one part of successive Duration having no dependence on another. But it is a mere Panick fear: For the continuation of Duration is necessary where the Existence of the thing is [Page 62] so. And such is manifestly the Existence of God from his own Idea.

Bath.

And this necessary Existence of God I conceive to be the most substantial Notion of his eternall Duration: which cannot well be said to be successive properly and formally, but onely virtually and applicatively; that is to say, it contains in it virtually all the successive Duration imaginable, and is perpetually applicable to the succeeding parts thereof, as being always present thereto, as the Chanel of a River to all the water that passes through it; but the Chanel is in no such successive defluxion, though the water be. Such is the steddy and permanent Duration of the necessary Existence of God in respect of all successive Durations whatsoever.

Philoth.

I do not yet so throughly understand you, Bathynous.

Bath.

I say that successive Duration properly so called is incompetible to God, as being an Essence necessarily existent, and therefore without beginning: [Page 63] but the most infinite successive Duration that you can imagine will be found to have a beginning. For what-ever is past was sometime present: And therefore there being nothing of all this infinite Succession but was sometime present, the most-infinitely-remote moment thereof was sometime present: Which most-in [...]initely-remote moment was the Terminus terminans thereof, which plainly shews it had a beginning.

Philoth.

You say true, Bathynous. There must be a most-remote Moment in Succession, and a most-infinitely-remote one in infinite Succession. But being the most-infinitely-remote Moment cannot be Terminus copulans, there being nothing for it to couple with future Succession, and therefore it being Terminus terminans, and of necessity having been once present, it is plain that at that present was the term or beginning of this infinite supposed Succession.

Or briefly thus, to prevent all possible Exceptions against the most-infinitely-remote [Page 64] Moment in an infinite Succession, as if they were [...], I would rather argue on this manner; viz. That forasmuch as all the Moments past in infinite Succession were sometime present, it thence plainly follows that all the Moments in this infinite Succession, or at least all but one, were sometime to come. And if either all these Moments, or all but one, were sometime to come, it is manifest that the whole Succession (or at least the whole bating but one Moment) was sometime to come, and therefore had a beginning. I understand the strength of your reasoning very well. And therefore when I spake of the successive Duration of God, I did not mean Succession in that proper and formal sense, but onely a virtual, applicative or relative Succession; as you might gather from some passages or expressions in my speaking thereof. The Duration of God is like that of a Rock, but the Duration of natural things like that of a River; their Succession passes [Page 65] [...], as Heraclitus speaks. And therefore they that give successive Duration properly so called to the steddy Permanency of a necessary Self-existence, seem like those that phansie the Shore to move by reason of the motion of the Ship. ‘Provehimur portu, terraeque urbèsque recedunt.’

We apply our own fluid successive Duration to the steddy Permanency of the eternall Duration of God: whose Duration, though steddy and permanent, and without all defluxion and succession, (as being indeed nothing else but his necessary Self-existence) is notwithstanding such as the most infinite successive Duration past can never reach beyond, nor future ever exhaust. Whence it is plain, that though the eternall Duration of God be really permanent, yet it is impossible to be an indivisible Instant, and to be perfectly and in all regards indistant to it self, and not to comprehend all possible successive Evolutions that are.

Hyl.

[Page 66]

This is very well, XVI. Philotheus: but yet there are some Scruples still behinde. An Objection against the All-comprehension of Eternity, with the Answer thereto. I must acknowledge that Eternity in your sense bears along with it no palpable Contradiction; but methinks it is not altogether free from a marvellous strange Incredibility.

Philoth.

What's that?

Hyl.

That all the Noises and Cryings, and Houlings and Shreekings, and Knockings and Hammerings, and Cursings and Swearings, and Prayings and Praisings, that all the Voices of men, the Squawlings of children, the Notes of Birds, and Roarings and Squeekings of Beasts, that ever were or shall be, have ever been in the ears of God at once: And so all the Turnings and Toyings of every visible Object, all the Dispersions, Motions and Postures of Hairs, and Leaves, and Straws, and Feathers, and Dust, in fine, all the little and inconsiderable Changes of the ever-agitated Matter which have been, are, or ever shall be, are, and ever were, [Page 67] and ever shall be in the sight of God at once. This seems to me (though not an impossible, yet) a very incredible Privilege of all-comprehending Eternity.

Philoth.

This is a wild, unexpected fetch of yours, Hylobares, and as madly expressed. But if you will answer me soberly to a question or two, you shall see the difficulty will vanish of it self.

Hyl.

I will.

Philoth.

Whether do you think, O Hylobares, that this Privilege, as you call it, is really a Privilege, that is, a Perfection, of the Divine Nature, or no?

Hyl.

I cannot tell.

Euist.

Those Philosophers in Maimonides, which I do not well remember whether he calls the Sect of the Loquentes, would tell us roundly that it is not; they presuming God's Providence reaches no farther then the Species of things, but that he little concerns himself in Individuals.

Bath.

I suppose then that they hold [Page 68] that he has concredited the Administration of his more particular Providence to severall Orders of Angels, and in some sort to Men and all intelligent Creatures, in whom he has implanted a Law for the rightly ordering Individuals.

Euist.

It may be so.

Bath.

Which if they could order as well as if God himself look'd on, as it is no addition to God's Happiness to have made the World or to meddle with it; so it would be no detriment to the World if he were conceived to be wholly rapt into the contemplation of his own Divine Excellencies.

Euist.

This, I must confess, is not much abhorrent from the Aristotelean Theologie.

Bath.

But it is intolerably false, if the frame of the Creation be not such as that the standing Spirits hugely exceed the number of the lapsed.

Euist.

They need do so. Besides, what a ridiculous thing were it to offer sacrifice or pray to God, if he [Page 69] were always so rapt into himself that he never were at leisure to hear us?

Bath.

That is most pertinently observed, Euistor: And all pious men must acknowledge that they draw power and influence by their earnest Devotions to the Deity.

Hyl.

And therefore I easily acknowledge that all things in present Succession lie open to the eyes of God. But whether all Voices and Sights whatsoever from everlasting to everlasting be represented continually to him at once, for all that this short Sally of Bathynous and Euistor has given me some time to think of it, yet I must still profess I cannot tell.

Philoth.

Well then, Hylobares, in such a case as this you know the above-mentioned Rule, That you are not to let goe your hold of those solid and certain Grounds of the Existence of a God, for what is either false or uncertain.

Hyl.

You say very true. Nor does this at all shake my belief.

Philoth.

[Page 70]

But farther to corroborate it, answer me but this one question, Hylobares. Is it not necessary that that part of the representation you made of Eternity be either a Perfection, or an Imperfection, or a thing of Indifferency?

Hyl.

That cannot be deny'd.

Philoth.

If it be an Imperfection, it is to be removed, and so the Difficulty is removed therewith: If an Indifferency, it is in different whether you remove it or not: If a Perfection, being that it is not impossible, as you cannot but acknowledge, no man need hesitate, nay he ought not, but to attribute it to God. So that be your fate what it will in the determination of your assent to any of these three parts, it can be no impediment to the belief of God's Existence. This is the thing that made your Objection seem so considerable to you, that you did not consider, that though all those Voices and Sights are perceived in the Divine Being at once, yet they are per [...]eived in [Page 71] the same distances and distinctnesses that they are found in in the very succession of Ages. For infinite Comprehension admits, or rather implies, this.

Hyl.

You are a man, XVII. O Philotheus, Another Objection, with its Answer. of the most dexterous art in facilitating our adherence to the belief of a Deity that ever I met with in my life. I have but one Scruple more touching God's Eternity, and I will pass to the next Attribute. The eternall succession of God's Existence seems to imply a Contradiction. For unless every denominated part be infinite, the whole cannot be infinite. And if every denominated part, suppose the tenth, the hundredth, the thousandth, be infinite, there are so many Infinites.

Philoth.

I understand you very well. But you must consider that either God has been ab aeterno, or the World has been so. Wherefore something being so certainly eternall, it is no repugnancy that God be so. So that you see there is no more [Page 72] perplexity or difficulty on the account of God's being, then if he were not in the world, according to the last of my preliminary Advertisements. Nay, indeed, the most inextricable Perplexity of all would be to admit a World ab aeterno without God. For an eternall Flux of Motion of the Matter would be eternall Succession properly so called; which Bathynous shrewdly suggested to be impossible. And if it ever rested, and afterwards was moved, there must be a first Mover distinct from the Matter. Which seems necessarily to inferr there is a God; and the rather, because if Matter was of it self, it must eternally have rested before it moved.

Hyl.

This Difficulty has vanished so of a sudden, that I am half ashamed I ever propounded it.

Philoth.

I have met with not a few that this would have seemed no small Difficulty to; so that it was not unworthy the propounding.

Philop.

But I pray you proceed to [Page 73] the next Attribute, Hylobares: for I am hugely pleased to see the succesfulness of Philotheus.

Hyl.

The next is Immutability, XVIII. which seems to me a necessary Attribute of God, The Attribute of Immutability. forasmuch as Mutability implies Imperfection. But here humane understanding does seem to be caught in this Dilemma; That either we must acknowledge a mutable God, or an immutable one: If the former, he is not properly God; because God excludes all Imperfection in his nature: If the latter, he is not to be worshipped; for all the good that was to come will come without our worshipping him; and none of the evil can be kept off by all our Services, because he is immutable. Wherefore we must either grant an imperfect God, or a God not to be worshipped: either of which is so absurd, that it seems forcibly to suggest that there is no God at all.

Philoth.

This seems a smart Dilemma at first, Hylobares; yet I think neither Horn is strong enough to [Page 74] push us off from our belief of the Existence of a God. But for my part, I will bear the push of the former of them, and grant that God is mutable; but deny that all Mutability implies Imperfection, though some does, as that Vacillancy in humane Souls, and such Mutations as are found in corporeal matter. But such a Mutability as whose absence implies an impotency to or incapacity of the most noble acts imaginable, such as the Creation of the World, and the administration of Justice to men and Angels, is so far from being any Defect, that it is a very high Perfection. For this power in God to act upon the Creature in time, to succour or chastise it, does not at all discompose or distract him from what he is in himself in the blessed calmness and stilness of his allcomprehensive Eternity, his Animadversion being absolutely free and infinite. So that they that would account this power of acting in time an imminution to the Perfection of God [...]re, I think, as much out in their account [Page 75] as if one should contend that A c [...] A q. is less then A c. alone.

Hyl.

This is convincing.

Bath.

And that you may be the more throughly convinced of the weakness of your Biaion, I will bear the push of the latter Horn, and deny that the Immutability of God would imply that he is not to be worshipped. For what is the Worshipping of God but the acknowledging those supereminent and Divine Excellencies in him to which the World owes its Conservation and Subsistence, and from which is that beautifull Order and wise Contrivance of things in the Universe? It is therefore a piece of indispensable Justice to acknowledge this rich Fountain and Original of all Good, and not the less, because he is so perfectly good, that he cannot be nor act otherwise, but is immutably such. Besides that this Praise and Adoration done to him are actions perfective of our own Souls, and in our approches to him he is made nearer to us; as the opening of [Page 76] our Eyes is the letting in of the light of the Sun.

Hyl.

What you say, Bathynous, I must confess will hold good in that part of Worship which consists in Praising of God: but I do not see how his Immutability will well consist with our Praying to him. For things will be or will not be whether we pray unto him or no.

Bath.

But you do not consider, that though this were, yet our Praying to him is an acknowledgment of his being the great Benefactour of mankinde; and it is like Children asking their Fathers Blessing, who yet would pray to God to bless them whether they ask it or no. Besides that while we pray to God for internall good things, for Grace, Wisedome and Vertue, we do ipso facto open our Souls to receive the Divine Influence, which flows into our Hearts according to the measure of the depth and earnestness of our Devotion. Which is, as I said, like the opening of our Eyes to receive the [Page 77] light of the Sun. Nor do we alter or change the will of God in this, because it is the permanent and immutable will of God, that as many as make their due Addresses to him shall receive proportionable Comfort and Influence from him. And, lastly, for externall good things, though we should imagine God still resting in the immutable Sabbatism of his own ever-blessed Eternity, and that nothing is done in this world ad extra but by either natural or free created Agents, either good men or those more high and holy orders of Angels, that are as the Ears and Eyes and Arms of God, as Philo somewhere insinuates, and who are so steddily and fully actuated by the Spirit of God, that they will do the very same things that God himself would doe if he were to act ad extra in the affairs of the world: upon this Hypothesis of things, notwithstanding the Immutability of God, it implies no incongruity to pray unto him. For he does not onely hear and behold all things [Page 78] at once, but has eternally and immutably laid such trains of Causes in the world, and so rules the good Powers and over-rules the bad, that no man that prays unto him as he ought shall fail of obtaining what is best for him, even in externall matters.

Hyl.

This is a consideration I never thought of before. But it seems to me not altogether irrational.

Euist.

But, XIX. methinks, something needless, Of the D [...] ity's acting ad extra. because the Divine Records do testifie, that the very Deity sometimes steps out into externall Action; as in our Saviour Christ's feeding the multitude with five loaves and two fishes, in his raising the dead, and in that great execution he is to doe on the Globe of the Earth at the last Day.

Bath.

The Deity indeed does act here ad extra, but not the bare Deity, as I may so speak, but the Divine Magick of the exalted Soul of the Messias.

Euist.

But what will you say to those passages in the Old Testament, [Page 79] Bathynous, such as the dividing of the Red sea, the making of the Sun and Moon stand still, the keeping of Shadrach, Meshach and Abed [...]ego harmless in the fierie Furnace, and the like? did not the bare Deity, as you called it, step out then into externall Action?

Bath.

You know, Euistor, there was a mighty East-winde that blew all night, and divided the Sea; and that there appeared a fourth man in the fiery furnace like unto the Son of God. And, in brief, all the Miracles that were done by Moses or any way else among or upon the people of the Iews were done by virtue of the presence of the same Christ, who was the Conductour of the Israelites into the Land of Canaan, and the Residentiary Guardian of that People.

Euist.

Indeed I remember some such opinion of some of the ancient Fathers, but I look'd upon it as one of their Extravagancies.

Sophr.

And I upon the Hypothesis of Bathynous as a very high reach of wit; but methought Philotheus had [Page 80] fully satisfied Hylobares his Dilemma before.

Hyl.

I must ingenuously confess, XX. that I think neither of the Solutions so weak but that they sufficiently enervate my Argument touching the Immutability of God: The Attribute of Omnisciency. and therefore I willingly pass on to his Omnisciency.

Philoth.

What is it that pinches you there, Hylobares?

Hyl.

A certain and determinate Prescience of things contingent, free and uncertain. For it seems otherwise to take away the Liberty of Will and the nature of Sin: For Sin seems not to be Sin, unless it be voluntary.

Philoth.

It may be not, Hylobares. But why do you then attribute such a Prescience to God as is involved in such dangerous Inconveniences?

Hyl.

Because it is a greater Perfection in God to foresee all things that are to come to pass certainly and determinately, then the contrary.

Philoth.

And would it not be a greater Perfection in the Omnipotency of God to be able to doe all things, [Page 81] even those that imply a Contradiction, then not to be able to doe them?

Hyl.

It would. But because they imply a Contradiction to be done, no body thinks the Omnipotency of God maimed or blemished in that it reaches not to such things.

Philoth.

Why then, Hylobares, if certain Prescience of uncertain things or events imply a Contradiction, it seems it may be struck out of the Omnisciency of God, and leave no scar nor blemish behinde; for God will nevertheless be as omniscient as he is omnipotent. But if it imply no Contradiction, what hinders but we may attribute it to him?

Hyl.

But it seems necessary to attribute it to him: else how can he manage the affairs of the World?

Philoth.

O Hylobares, take you no care for that. For that eternall Minde that knows all things possible to be known, comprehends all things that are possible to be done, and so hath laid such trains of Causes as shall most certainly meet every one in due time [Page 82] in judgement and righteousness, let him take what way he will.

Hyl.

I understand you, Philotheus.

Philoth.

And you may farther understand that, according to some, what you would attribute to God as a Perfection sounds more like an Imperfection, if well considered.

Hyl.

Why so, Philotheus?

Philoth.

Is it not the perfection of Knowledge to know things as they are in their own nature?

Hyl.

It is so.

Philoth.

Wherefore to know a free Agent, which is undeterminate to either part, to be so undeterminate, and that he may chuse which part he will, is the most perfect knowledge of such an Agent and of his Action, till he be perfectly determinate and has made his choice.

Hyl.

It seems so.

Philoth.

Therefore to know him determined before he be determined, or while he is free, is an Imperfection of Knowledge, or rather no Knowl [...]dge at all, but a Mistake and Errour: [Page 83] and indeed is a contradiction to the Nature of God, who can understand nothing but according to the distinct Idea's of things in his own minde. And the Idea of a free Agent is Vndeterminateness to one part before he has made choice. Whence to foresee that a free Agent will pitch upon such a part in his choice, with knowledge certain and infallible, is to foresee a thing as certain even then when it is uncertain; which is a plain Contradiction or gross Mistake.

Hyl.

You do more then satisfie me in this, Philotheus, That to conceive things undeterminate determinately, or that they will be certainly this way while they may be either this way or that way, is an Imperfection or contradiction to the Truth. But there is yet this piece of perplexity behinde, that this pretence of perfection of Knowledg will necessarily inferr an imperfection or inability of Predicting future Actions of free Agents, and take away Divine Inspiration and Propheci [...].

Philoth.

[Page 84]

That is shrewdly urged and seasonably. But you are to understand, that so much Liberty as is in Man will leave room enough for millions of certain Predictions, if God thought fit to communicate them so throngly to the world. For though I question not but that the Souls of men are in some sense free; yet I do as little doubt but there are or may be infinite numbers of Actions wherein they are as certainly determined as the brute Beasts. And such are the Actions of all those that are deeply lapsed into Corruption, and of those few that are grown to a more Heroicall state of Goodness: It is certainly foreknowable what they will doe in such and such circumstances. Not to adde, that the Divine Decrees, when they finde not men sitting Tools, make them so, where Prophecies are peremptory or unconditionate.

Bath.

What Philotheus has hitherto argued for the reconciling of the Divine Omniscience with the Notion of [Page 85] Man's Free will and the nature of Sin, bears along with it a commendable plainness and plausibleness for its easiness to the understanding. But in my apprehension, for all it looks so repugnantly that there should be a certain foreknowledge of what is free and uncertain, yet it seems more safe to allow that Privilege to the infinite Understanding of God, then to venture at all to circumscribe his Omniscience. For though it may safely be said, that he does not know any thing that really implies a Contradiction to be known; yet we are not assured but that may seem a Contradiction to us that is not so really in it self. As for example, To our finite Understanding a Quadrate whose Diagonial is commensurate to one of the Sides is a plain Contradiction, and we conceit we can demonstrate it to be so, that is to say, that the Ratio of the one to the other is unconceivable and undefinable. But dare any one be so bold as to [...]ffirm that the Divine Intellect it self, whose Comprehension [Page 86] is infinite, cannot define to it self the Ratio of a Diagonial Line in a Quadrate to the Side thereof? The Application is very obvious.

Philoth.

It is so, Bathynous. For I suppose in brief you mean this; That as the Diagonial Line and Side of a Quadrate, which to our apprehension are incommensurate, are yet commensurable to the infinite Comprehension of the Divine Intellect; so a certain and infallible Prescience of uncertain Futurities, that seems inconsistent to us, may notwithstanding be deprehended abundantly consistent by the all-comprehensive Understanding of God. A very safe and sober Solution of the present Difficulty. I am very well contented it should be so, Bathynous, and that what I have offered at therein should pass as spoken by way of Essay rather then of Dogmatizing, and according to the sense of others rather then mine own.

Philop.

I never saw that saying so much verified any-where, that Wisedome is easie to him that understands, [Page 87] as in Bathynous and Philotheus's discourses. Are you not throughly satisfied hitherto, Hylobares?

Hyl.

I must confess I am. But now I come to the most confounding Point, and which is such as that I fear it is fatal to me never to be satisfied in.

Philoth.

What is that, Hylobares?

Hyl.

The Spirituality of God. XXI. It is the proper Disease of my minde, The Attribute of Spirituality, and that God cannot be Material. not to be able to conceive any thing that is not material or corporeal. But I hope it is not a Disease unto death.

Philoth.

God forbid it should be, Hylobares, so long as it is no impediment to the belief of the Existence of God, and of all those Attributes that are requisite for the engaging a man's Soul in the pursuit of true Piety and Vertue. God will at last bring such an one to the true knowledge of himself, what-ever his Ignorance may be for the present. And for my part, I am not fond of the Notion of Spirituality nor any Notion else, but so far forth as they are subservient to [Page 88] Life and Godliness; that there may be as much Happiness in this life as humane affairs are capable of, and that we may be eternally happy in the life to come. Otherwise I have no such great solicitude, that any should be such trim and precise Speculators of things, as not to erre an hair's breadth in matters of great perplexity and obscurity.

Euist.

I reade that some of the Fathers have been of opinon that God is a kinde of pure subtile Body.

Bath.

That may very well be. But then they had not that true and precise Notion of a subtile Body that most Philosophers have in this Age: but it is likely they understood no more thereby, then that it was a subtile extended Substance; which, for my part, I conceive in the general may be true. But to say it is properly a subtile Body, is to acknowledge it a Congeries of very little Atomes [...]oying and playing one by another, which is too mean a conception of the Majesty of God. Besides that it is [Page 89] unconceivable how these loose Atoms, which are so independent of one another, should joyn together to make up the Godhead; or how they do conspire to keep together, that there is not a dissolution of the Divinity. Or thus: If this multitude of Divine Atoms be God, be they interspersed amongst all the matter of the World? or do they keep together? If they be dispersed, God is less one then any thing else in the World, and is rather an infinite number of Deities then one God or any God; and this infinite number in an incapacity of conferring notes to contrive so wise a frame of the Universe as we see. But if there be one Congeries of Divine Atomes that keep together, in which of those infinite numbers of Vortices is it seated, or amongst which? or how can it order the matter of those Vortices from which it is so far distant? or how again do these Atomes, though not interspersed, communicate Notions one with another for one Design? Do [Page 90] they talk or discourse with one another? or what do they doe? And then again—

Hyl.

Nay forbear, Bathynous, to go any farther, for you have put me quite out of conceit with a Material Deity already, the more my grief and pain. For to make a Material Deity, I must confess, seems extremely ridiculous; and to make a Spiritual one, impossible: So that I am in greater streights then ever I was.

Philoth.

Why, XXII. Hylobares, The fa [...]se Notion of a Spirit. what conceit have you of a Spirit, that you should think it a thing impossible?

Hyl.

Is it not infinitely incredible, Philotheus, if not impossible, that some thousands of Spirits may dance or march on a Needle's point at once?

Cuph.

I, and that booted and spurred too.

Hyl.

And that in one instant of time they can fly from one Pole of the world to the other?

Philoth.

These things, I must confess, seem very incredible.

Hyl.

[Page 91]

And that the Spirit of man, which we usually call his Soul, is wholly, without flitting, in his Toe, and wholly in his Head, at once? If the whole Soul be in the Toe, there is nothing left to be in the Head. Therefore the Notion of a Spirit is perfectly impossible: or else all things are alike true: for nothing seems more impossible then this.

Philoth.

But whose description of a Spirit is this, Hylobares?

Hyl.

It is, Philotheus, the description of the venerable Schools.

Philoth.

But did I not preadvertise you, that no humane Authority has any right of being believed when they propound Contradictions? Wherefore their rash description of a Spirit ought to be no prejudice to the truth of its Existence. And though the true Notion of a Spirit were incomprehensible, yet that would be no solid Argument against the Reality of it; as you may observe in the nature of eternall Succession, which we cannot deny to be, though [Page 92] we be not able to comprehend it.

Hyl.

That is very true indeed, XXIII. and very well worth the noting. That there is a Spiritual Being in the World. But how shall we be so well assured of the Existence of a Spirit, while the comprehension of its Nature is taken for desperate?

Philoth.

That there is some Intellectual Principle in the World, you were abundantly convinced from the works of Nature, as much as that Archimedes his Treatise De Sphaera & Cylindro was from a Rational Agent: and even now it seemed ridiculous to you beyond all measure, that a Congeries of Atomes should be Divine and Intellectual: Wherefore there is something that is not Matter that is Intellectual, which must be a substance Immaterial or Incorporeal, that is in a word, a Spirit.

Hyl.

I am, I must confess, very strongly urged to believe there is a Spirit as well as an eternall Duration, though I can comprehend neither.

Philoth.

And that you may be farther corroborate [...] in your belief, consider [Page 93] the manifold Stories of Apparitions, and how many Spectres have been seen or felt to wrastle, pull or tug with a man: which, if they were a mere Congeries of Atomes, were impossible. How could an arm of mere Air or Aether pull at another man's hand or arm, but it would easily part in the pulling? Admit it might use the motion of Pulsion, yet it could never that of Attraction.

Hyl.

This indeed were a palpable demonstration that there must be some other substance in these Spectres of Air or Aether, if the Histories were true.

Euist.

We reade such things happening even in all Ages and places of the world; and there are modern and fresh examples every day: so that no man need doubt of the truth.

Hyl.

These Experiments indeed strike very strongly on the Imagination and Senses, XXIV. but there is a subtile Reason that presently unlooses all again. That Extension and Matter are not reciprocall. And now methinks I could wish the nature of a Spirit were more unknown [Page 94] to me then it is, that I might believe its Existence without meddling at all with its Essence. But I cannot but know thus much of it, whether I will or no, that it is either extended, or not extended; I mean, it has either some Amplitude of Essence, or else none at all. If it has no Amplitude or Extension, the ridiculous Hypothesis of the Schools will get up again, and millions of Spirits, for ought I know, may dance on a Needle's point, or rather, they, having no Amplitude, would be nothing. If they have any Amplitude or Extension, they will not be Spirits, but mere Body or Matter. For, as that admired Wit Des-Cartes solidly concludes, Extension is the very essence of Matter. This is one of the greatest Arguments that fatally bear me off from a chearfull closing with the belief of Spirits properly so called.

Philoth.

It is much, Hylobares, that you should give such an adamantine Assent to so weak and precarious an [Page 95] Assertion as this of Des-Cartes. For though it be wittily supposed by him, for a ground of more certain and Mathematicall after-Deductions in his Philosophy; yet it is not at all proved, that Matter and Extension are reciprocally the same, as well every extended thing Matter, as all Matter extended. This is but an upstart conceit of this present Age. The ancient Atomical Philosophers were as much for a Vacuum as for Atomes. And certainly the world has hitherto been very idle, that have made so many Disputes and try'd so many Experiments whether there be any Vacuum or no, if it be so demonstratively concludible, as Des-Cartes would bear us in hand, that it implies a Contradiction there should be any. The ground of the Demonstration lies so shallow and is so obvious, that none could have missed of it, if they could have thought there had been any force in it.

Hyl.

It is true, this might in reason abate a man's confidence a little, [Page 96] Philotheus; but the apprehension is so deeply rivetted into my minde, that such Rhetoricall Flourishes cannot at all loosen or brush it out.

Philoth.

Well then, XXV. give me leave, That there is an Extension intrinsecall to Motion. Hylobares, to attaque you some other way. Did you not say even now, that what-ever has no Extension or Amplitude is nothing?

Hyl.

I did, and do not repent me of so saying. For I doubt not but that it is true.

Philoth.

Wherefore Extension or Amplitude is an intrinsecall or essential Property of Ens quatenus Ens, as the Metaphysicians phrase it.

Hyl.

It is so.

Philoth.

And what is an intrinsecall or essential Attribute of a thing, is in the thing it self.

Hyl.

Where should it be else?

Philoth.

Therefore there is Extension in every thing or Entity.

Hyl.

It cannot be deny'd.

Philoth.

And it can as little be deny'd but that Motion is an Entity, I mean a Physicall Entity.

Hyl.

[Page 97]

It cannot.

Philoth.

Therefore Extension is an intrinsecall property of Motion.

Hyl.

It must be acknowledged; what then?

Philoth.

What then? Do you not yet see, Hylobares, how weak an Assertion that of Des-Carte [...] is, That Extension and Matter are reciprocall? for you plainly see that Extension is intrinsecall to Motion, and yet Motion is not Matter.

Hyl.

Motion is not Ens, but Modu [...] Entis.

Philo [...]h.

Nay, by your favour, Hylobares, Motion is Ens, though in some sense it may be said to be Modus corporis.

Hyl.

Methinks I am, I know not how, Philotheus, illaqueated, but not truly captivated into an assent to your Conclusion.

Philoth.

That is because you are already held captive in that inured Conceit of Des-Cartes, that makes you suspect solid Reason for a Sophism.

Hyl.

[Page 98]

If Motion were a thing that was loose or exemptitious from Matter, then I could not but be convinced that it had Extension of its own; but being it is a mere Mode of Matter, that cannot pass from it into another Subject, it has no other Extension then that of the Matter it self it is in.

Philoth.

But if it have another Essence from the Matter it self, by your own concession it must however have another Extension. Besides, you seem mistaken in what I mean by Motion. For I mean not simply the Translation, but the vis agitans that pervades the whole body that is moved. Which both Regius and Des-Cartes acknowledge exemptitious and loose, so that it may pass from one part of Matter to another.

Hyl.

But what is that to me, if I do not?

Philoth.

It is at least thus much to you, that you may take notice how rashly and groundlesly both Des-Cartes and Regius assert Extension and [Page 99] Matter to be reciprocall, while in the mean time they affirm that which according to your own judgement does plainly and convincingly inferr that Extension is more general then Matter.

Hyl.

It is, [...] must confess, a sign that the apprehensions of men are very humoursome and lubricous.

Philoth.

And therefore we must take heed, Hylobares, how we let our mindes cleave to the Opinion of any man out of admiration of his Person.

Hyl.

That is good advice, and of great consequence (if it be given betimes) for the keeping out of Errour and Falshood. But when a Phancy is once engrafted in the Minde, how shall one get it out?

Philoth.

I must confess I marvell much, Hylobares, that you being so fully convinced that every real and Physicall Entity has an intrinsecall Extension of its own, and that Motion is a Physicall Entity different from Matter, you should not be presently [Page 100] convinced that Motion has also an intrinsecall Extension of its own. To which you might adde, that the manner of the Extension of Matter is different from the nature of the Extension in Motion: the former being one sing [...] Extension, not to be lessened nor increased without the lessening and increase of the Matter it self; but the other a gradual Extension, to be lessened or augmented without any lessening or augmenting the Matter. Whence again it is a sign that it has an Extension of its own, reduplicative into it self, or reducible to thinner or weaker degrees; while the Extension of the Matter remains still single and the same.

Hyl.

I must confess, Philotheus, that I am brought to these streights, that I must either renounce that Principle, That every Physicall Entity has an intrinsecall Extension of its own, as much as it has an intrinsecall Essence of its own, (which I know not how to doe;) or else I must acknowledge [Page 101] that something besides Matter is extended. But I must take time to consider of it. I am something staggered in my judgement.

Philoth.

Give me leave then, [...] Hylobares, That there is an immovable Extension distinct from that of movable Matter. to follow my blow with one stroke more, and see if I cannot strike your Opinion to the ground.

Hyl.

Do, Philotheus. I will stand the shock of it.

Philoth.

Place your self then under the Aequinoctial Line, Hylobares.

Hyl.

Is it not better being in this cool Arbour?

Philoth.

I hope the mere Imagination of the Torrid Zone will not heat you. But you may place your self in a more Temperate Clime, if you please.

Hyl.

What then, Philotheus?

Philoth.

Shoot up an Arrow perpendicularly from the Earth; the Arrow, you know, will return to your foot again.

Hyl.

If the winde hinder not. But what does this Arrow aim at?

Philoth.

This Arrow has described [Page 102] onely right Lines with its point, upwards and downwards, in the Air; but yet, holding the motion of the Earth, it must also have described in some sense a circular or curvilinear Line.

Hyl.

It must so.

Philoth.

But if you be so impatient of the heat abroad, neither your body nor your phancy need step out of this cool Bowre. Consider the round Trencher that Glass stands upon; it is a kinde of short Cylinder, which you may easily imagine a foot longer, if you will.

Hyl.

Very easily, Philotheus.

Philoth.

And as easily phansy a Line drawn from the top of the Axis of that Cylinder to the Peripherie of the Bas [...]s.

Hyl.

Every jot as easily.

Philoth.

Now imagine this Cylinder turned round on its Axis. Does not that Line from the top of the Axis to the Peripherie of the Basis necessarily describe a Conicum in one Circumvolution?

Hyl.

[Page 103]

It does so, Philotheus.

Philoth.

But it describes no such Figure in the wooden Cylinder it self: As the Arrow in the aereal or material Aequinoctial Circle describes not any line but a right one. In what therefore does the one describe, suppose, a circular Line, the other a Conicum?

Hyl.

As I live, Philotheus, I am struck as it were with Lightning from this surprizing consideration.

Philoth.

I hope, Hylobares, you are pierced with some measure of Illumination.

Hyl.

I am so.

Philoth.

And that you are convinced, that whether you live or no, that there ever was, is, and ever will be an immovable Extension distinct from that of movable Matter.

Hyl.

This evidently demonstrates the existence of the ancient Democritish Vacuum, and withall that Extension and Matter are not convertible terms; for which yet Cartesius so much contends. This Conceit is [Page 104] struck quite dead with the point of the Arrow describing a curvilinear Line in the steady Aequinoctial Circle. And if it should ever offer to flame out again into life in my thoughts, I would use the Conicum as an Extinguisher to smother it.

Philop.

What a chearfull thing the apprehension of Truth is, that it makes Hylobares so pleasant and so witty?

Cuph.

But methinks he claps his wings before the Victory, XXVII. or rather s [...]bmits before he be overcome. That this Exte [...]sion distinct from Matter is not imaginary, but real. For it may be seasonably suggested, that it is real Extension and Matter that are terms convertible; but that Extension wherein the Arrow-head describes a curvilinear Line is onely imaginary.

Hyl.

But it is so imaginary, that it cannot possibly be dis-imagined by humane understanding. Which methinks should be no small earnest that there is more then an imaginary Being there. Diog. Laert. in vi [...] [...]picuri And the ancient Atomists called this [...] acuum [...], the [Page 105] intangible nature; which is a sign they thought it some real thing. Which appears farther from their declaring, that this and Atomes were the onely true things, but that the rest were mere Appearances. And Aristotle somewhere in his Physicks expresly declares of the Pythagoreans, that they held there was a Vacuum, from an infinite spirit that pervades Heaven or the Universe, as living and breathing in virtue thereof.

Euist.

I remember the passage very well: it is in the fourth Book and the sixth Chapter. [...].

Bath.

As if this Pythagorick Vacuum were that to the Universe which the Aire is to particular Animals, that wherein and whereby they live and breathe. Whence it is manifest the Pythagoreans held it no imaginary Being.

Hyl.

And lastly, O Cuphophron, unless you will flinch from the Dic [...]ates of your so highly-admired [Page 106] Des-Cartes, forasmuch as this Vacuum is extended, and measurable, and the like, it must be a Reality; because Non entis nulla est Affectio, according to the Reasonings of your beloved Master. From whence it seems evident that there is an extended Substance far more subtile then Body, that pervades the whole Matter of the Universe.

Bath.

Excellently well argued, O Hylobares! Thou art become not only a Disciple, but a very able Champion for the Truth of Immaterial Beings, and therefore art not far off from the right apprehension of the Nature of God. Of whose Essence I must confess I have always been prone to think this subtile Extension (which a man cannot dis-imagine but must needs be) to be a more obscure shadow or adumbration, or to be a more general and confused apprehension of the Divine Amplitude. For this will be necessarily, though all Matter were annihilated out of the World. Nay indeed this is antecedent [Page 107] to all Matter, forasmuch as no Matter nor any Being else can be conceived to be but in this. In this are all things necessarily apprehended to live and move and have their being.

Sophr.

Lord, Psal. 90. 1. 2. thou hast been our dwelling-place in all generations. Before the Mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the Earth or the World: even from everlasting to everlasting thou art God.

Bath.

Whence the Cabbalists have not vainly attributed those Titles of [...] and [...] unto God, who is the Immovable Mover, Receptacle and Sustainer of all things. Answerable to what Hylobares noted of the Opinion of the Phythagoreans, who have a great affinity with the ancient Cabbalists.

Cuph.

What Mysterious conceits has Bathynous of what can be but a mere Vacuum at best?

Bath.

It is an Extension plainly distinct from that of Matter, and more necessarily to be imagined in this distinctness then that Extension of Matter, and therefore a ground infinitely [Page 108] more certain of the Existence of an infinite Spirit then the other of indefinite Matter. For while that Extension which Cartesius would build his Matter on is conceived movable, this Spirit is necessarily supposed in which it moves, as appears from Philotheus his Instances. So that this is the Extension onely which must imply the necessity of the existence of some real Being thereunto appertaining; which therefore must be coincident with the Essence of God, and cannot but be a Spirit, because it pervades the Matter of the Universe.

Cuph.

It is onely the Capacity of Matter, Bathynous.

Bath.

What do you mean by Capacity, Cuphophron? Matter in potentia?

Cuph.

Yes.

Bath.

But we conceive this Extension loosly distinct from that of Matter: that of Matter being movable, this immovable; that of Matter discerpible, this indiscerpible. For if it [Page 109] were discerpible, it would be also movable, and so ipso facto distinguish it self from the indiscerpible and immovable Extension. But when Ens potentiâ is once made Ens actu, they are one and the same undivided Essence actually existent, nor can possibly be loose from one another while they are: As your Metaphysicall wit cannot but easily apprehend.

Cuph.

I cannot so easily apprehend it in this case, Bathynous, who must, with Des-Cartes, make Extension and Matter reciprocall. For I am certain I am illaqueated with a mere Sophism, forasmuch as I easily conceive that, if God were exterminated as well as Matter out of the World, yet this Extension you talk so magnificently of would to my deluded phancy seem necessarily to remain. But if there were no God nor Matter, there would be nothing. Which is a plain sign that this remaining Extension is the Extension of nothing, and therefore that it self is nothing but our Imagination.

Bath.

[Page 110]

This is cunningly fetch'd about, O Cuphophron. But if you well consider things, this Fetch of yours, which seems to be against me, is really for me. For in that you acknowledge that while you conceive God exterminated out of the World, this Extension does notwithstanding remain, it is but an Indication of what is true, that the conception of God's being exterminated out of the World implies a Contradiction, as most certainly it does. For no Essence that is exterminable can be the Essence of God, forasmuch as his Essence implies necessary Existence. Wherefore that God which you did exterminate, that is to say, conceived exterminable, was a figment of your own: but that Extension which remains to you whether you will or no, is really and indentifically coincident with the Amplitude of the Essence of God. Whence we may see not onely the folly, but the impiety, of the other Position, which would transplant that main Prerogative of God, [Page 111] I mean his necessary Existence, upon Matter, upon pretence that whatever is extended must be such; and withall necessarily exterminate God out of the Universe with as many as cannot conceive any thing to be but what is extended, that is to say, has some kinde of Amplitude or other.

Hyl.

And therefore it had been my inevitable fate to have been an Atheist, XXVIII. had not Philotheus so fortunately [...]reed me from so mischievous a conceit by those Instances of the Co [...]icum and Arrow. A fresh Appeal touching the truth of that Point to Reason, Sense and Imagination. For I do most immutably apprehend thereby, that there is an Extension distinct from that of Matter, which though we should admit to be imaginary, yet this at least will result therefrom, That Extension being thus necessarily applicable as well to imaginary things as to real, it is rather a Logicall Notion then a Physicall, and consequently is applicable to all Objects as well Metaphysicall as Physicall.

Cuph.

As well Phantasticall or Imaginary as Physicall, you should say, [Page 112] Hylobares. For if any real thing be extended, it is ipso facto Matter, as that Oracle of Philosophy has concluded, I mean Renatus Des-Cartes.

Hyl.

That is again spitefully interposed, Cuphophron, (but not at all proved) and yet repugnantly to your own admired Oracle, who has declared, as I told you before, that Nihili nulla east affectio. Wherefore there being a measurable Extension distinct from that of Matter, there is also a Substance distinct from Matter, which therefore must be immaterial, and consequently Metaphysicall. But that there is an Extension distinct from Matter, is apparent in that Instance of the Conicum.

Cuph.

There is no real description of a Conicum, Hylobares, nor in any Extension but that of the wooden Cylinder it self. These are Whims and turnings of our Phancy onely: and then we make grave Theologicall Inferences, and Uses of Reproof, as if we carried all before us.

Hyl.

Answer me but with patience, [Page 113] Cuphophron, and I doubt not but I shall quickly convince you, that there is more then Phancy in those arguings. I will appeal to your Reason, your Imagination, and your Sense. What therefore is it, O Cuphophron, to describe a Figure, as the Mathematicians speak, but to draw some Extensum or some point of it through the parts of some other Extensum, so that the parts are passed through of that Extensum in which the Figure is said to be described?

Cuph.

Right, Hylobares, that is plain at first sight.

Hyl.

This to gratifie your Reason. But farther too to caress your Sense and Phancy, let us imagine for that wooden Cylinder a glass one, with a red Line in it for its Axis, and from the top of this Axis, another red Line drawn down to the Peripherie of the Basis; which Lines would be visible to your very sight through the transparent Glass.

Cuph.

A fine thing to play with, Hylobares; what then?

Hyl.

[Page 114]

I would have you play with such a thing, O Cuphophron, but in such sort, as to make it turn swiftly upon its Axis. And there will appear to your very sight a red Conicum, like the usual shape of an Extinguisher. If the Line were blew, it would be like it something in colour as well as figure. This I conceive (for I never try'd it, nor thought of it before now) you might distinctly see in the Glass.

Cuph.

A goodly sight: but what of all this?

Hyl.

I demand in what Extensum this Conicum is described.

Cuph.

In the same it is seen, namely in the Glass, Hylobares.

Hyl.

You answer what is impossible, Cuphophron, and against your first concession. For the red Line does not pass through the parts of the Glass, but is carried along with them, and therefore cannot describe the Conicum in it. But there is a Conicum described even to your very [...]ense. In what Extensum therefore is [...]scribed?

Cuph.

[Page 115]

In an imaginary Extensum.

Hyl.

But what is imaginary, Cuphophron, is a Figment made at pleasure by us: But this Extensum we cannot dis-imagine, as I told you before, but it is whether we will or no: For no Figure can be drawn but through the parts of some Extensum.

Cuph.

I am cast upon the same Answers again that I was before: Then it is the Idea of a possible Extensum, which indeed the glass-Cylinder actually is.

Hyl.

That is to say, It is the particular or individual possible Idea of that Extensum which the glass-Cylinder is actually.

Cuph.

It is that, or else I confess I know not what it is. It is a mockery of the minde, it is a troublesome Fallacy.

Hyl.

But you do not mean any Idea in our Brain by this possible Idea. For the red Line that describes the Conicum is in the Glass, not in our Brain.

Cuph.

Therefore I must mean the Object of that Idea.

Hyl.

[Page 116]

But is not the actual describing of a Figure in a mere possible Extensum like sense to the writing of an actual Epistle in a possible sheet of Paper? Besides, this particular or individual possible Idea of the Extensum which this particular Cylinder is ac [...]ually is an immovable Extensum, but this Cylinder removable from it even while it does exist. How can it then be that particular possible Extensum which the Cylinder is actually? But admit it could be, and let this Cylinder be removed from this possible immovable Extensum, and another Cylinder of the same bigness succeed into its place. Now this second Cylinder is actually that particular Extensum which still the same individual possible Extensum is or was potentially. And so both the first and second Cylinders are one and the same individual Cylinder: For one individual Possibility can afford no more then one individual Actuality in the world. And therefore one and the same Cylinder is in two distant places at once.

Sophr.

[Page 117]

This makes Cuphophron rub his temples. I believe he is confounded in the midst of this hot and hasty Career he has taken afresh in the behalf of Des-Cartes. Let me help him a little. It may be that immoveable possible Cylindricall Extensum is the Genus of the two other Cylinders, and, as I remember, Pri [...]. Philos. p [...]r. Des-Cartes intimates some such thing.

Hyl.

But how can that which is immovable, 2. sect. 10, 11. O Sophron, be the Genus of those things that are movable? And we will suppose both these Cylinders removed from this possible Cylindricall Extensum, and thus the Genus will be deserted of its Species, and the Species destitute of their Genus. Which can be good in no Logick but Cuphophron's or Des-Cartes's. But if by Genus you mean a mere Logicall Notion, that is onely in the Brain, which the red Line is not, but in the Glass.

Sophr.

Nay, I perceive there is no dealing with Hylobares when his wit is once awakened. I am presently [Page 118] forced to sound a retreat. And yet I care not to cast this one conceit more at him before I run away. What if I should say it is onely spatium imaginarium, Hylobares?

Hyl.

Then you would onely say but what in effect Cuphophron has said twice already. But I tell you, Sophron, that the Extension of this Space which you call imaginary is real. For whatsoever is a real Affection or Attribute any-where, (and you know Extension is so in Matter) is everywhere real where it is deprehended to be independently on our imagination. And that this Extension is actual, necessary and independent on our imagination, is plainly discoverable in those Instances of the Arrow and Conicu [...].

Philoth.

You are an excellent Proficient, Hylobares, that can thus vary, emprove and maintain things from so few and slender hints. I never spoke with better success to any one in all my life touching these matters.

Hyl.

I finde my self hugely at ease since your freeing me, XXIX. O Philotheus, The essential Proper [...]ies of Matter. [Page 119] from that prejudice, that whatsoever is extended must be Matter. Whence I can now easily admit the Existence of Spirits; but have therefore the greater Curiosity, and find my self finely at leisure, to be more punctually instructed concerning the nature of them.

Philoth.

I dare say, Hylobares, you will be able abundantly to instruct your self touching that Point, if we do but first carefully settle the Notion of Matter, whose essence I conceive consists chiefly in these three Attributes, Self-disunity, Self-impenetrability, and Self-inactivity.

Hyl.

But I desire, O Philotheus, to know the distinct meaning of every one of these terms.

Philoth.

By Self-disunity I understand nothing else but that Matter has no Vinculum of its own to hold it together, so that of it self it would be disunited into a Congeries of mere Physicall Monads, that is, into so little particles, that is, implies a Contradiction they should be less.

Hyl.

[Page 120]

I understand the Notion well enough. But what makes you attribute Disunity to Matter rather then firm Union of parts, especially you attributing Self-inactivity thereto?

Philoth.

Because there is no Vinculum imaginable in Matter to hold the parts together. For you know they are impenetrable, and therefore touch one another as it were in smooth Superficies's. How therefore can they hold together? what is the Principle of their Union?

Cuph.

O, that is very clear, Philotheus; that s [...]upendious Wit Des-Cartes plainly tells us that it is Rest.

Philoth.

But I pray do you tell me, Cuphrophron, what is Rest?

Cuph.

That is easily understood from Motion, which Des-Cartes intimates to be the Separation or translation of one part of Matter from the other.

Philoth.

And so Rest is the Vnion or Vnseparateness of one part of Matter from another.

Cuph.

I can imagine nothing else [Page 121] by it. For if a whole mass of Matter move together in one hard piece, the whole is moved; but the parts in respect of one another, because they do not separate one from another, are said to rest. And on this account Motion is said to be reciprocall, because indeed Separation is so.

Philoth.

Then Rest and Vnseparateness of parts are all one.

Cuph.

It seems so.

Philoth.

And Vnseparateness and Vnion all one.

Cuph.

The very same, I think.

Philoth.

Why then, Rest and Vnion is all one, and so the Principle of the Vnion of the parts of Matter is the Vnion of their parts.

Hyl.

That is, they have no Principle of Vnion at all, and therefore of themselves are disunited.

Philoth.

And there is great reason they should have none, forasmuch as they are to be bound together in such forms and measures as some more Divine cause shall order.

Cuph.

I think in my heart Philotheus [Page 122] and Hylobares have both plotted a conspiracy together against that Prince of Philosophers, our admired Des-Cartes.

Hyl.

Philotheus and I have conspired in nothing, O Cuphophron, but what so noble a Philosopher would commend us for, that is, the free searching out of truth: In which I conceive we are not unsuccessfull. For I must confess I am convinced that this first Attribute of [...], as Philotheus has explained [...] true. And for Self-impenetra [...]y▪ it is acknowledged of all sides. but what do you mean, O Philotheus, by [...]finactivity?

Philoth.

I mean that Matter does not move nor actuate it self, but is or has been alwaies excited by some other, and cannot modifie the motion it is excited into, but moves directly so as it is first excited, unless some externall cause hinder.

Hyl.

This I understand, and doubt not of the truth thereof.

Cuph.

This is no more then Des-Cartes [Page 123] himself allows of.

Bath.

And good reason, O Cuphophron, he should doe so. For there being no Medium betwixt Self-activity and Self-inactivity, nor betwixt Self-union and Self-disunity, nor any immediate Genus to these distributions, as Cogitation and Figure are to the kindes or modes under them, it is necessary that one of the twain, and [...] an indifferency to either, should [...] the innate Property of so simple an Essence as Matter: and that therefore Self-inactivity and Self-disunity should be the Properties thereof, it being a passive Principle, and wholly to be guided by another.

Philoth.

You say right, Bathynous; and the Consectary from all this will be, That Sympathy cannot immediately belong to Matter.

Hyl.

Very likely.

Philoth.

We are fully agreed then touching the right Notion or nature of Matter, Hylobares.

Hyl.

We are so, Philotheus.

Philoth.

Can you then miss of [Page 124] the true Notion of a Spirit? XXX. The true Notion of a Spirit.

Hyl.

Methinks I finde my self able to define it by the rule of Contraries. For if Self-disunity, Self-inactivity, Self-impenetrability, be the essential Attributes of Matter or Body; then the Attributes of the opposite species, viz. of Spirit, must be Self-unity, Self-activity, Self-penetrability.

Philoth.

Very right. And have you not as distinct a Notion of every one of these Attributes as of the other?

Hyl.

I will try. By the Self-unity of a Spirit I understand a Spirit to be immediately and essentially one, and to want no other Vinculum to hold the parts together but its own essence and existence; whence it is of its own nature indiscerpible.

Philoth.

Excellently well defined.

Hyl.

This I am carried to by my Reason. But methinks my Imagination boggles and starts back, and brings me into a suspicion that it is the Notion of a thing that cannot be. For how can an extended Substance be indivisible or indiscerpible? For quatenus [Page 125] extended it must be divisible.

Philoth.

It is true, it is intellectually divisible, but Physically indiscerpible. Therefore this is the fallacy your Phancy puts upon you, that you make Indivisibility and Indiscerpibility all one. What is intellectually divisible may be Physicall [...] indivisible or indiscerpible: as it is manifest in the nature of God, whose very Idea implies Indiscerpibility, the contrary being so plain an Imperfection. For whatsoever is discerpible is also movable: But nothing is movable but must be conceived to move in that which is a necessary and immovable Essence, and which will necessarily be, though there were nothing else in the world: which therefore must be the holy Essence of God, as Bathynous has very well noted already, and seems to have light upon the true [...], which Aristotle sought for above the Heavens, but Bathynous has rightly found to be every-where. Wherefore at length to make our Inference; If it imply a [Page 126] Contradiction, Hylobares, that the Divine Extension should be discerpible, extended Essence quatenus extended cannot imply Physicall Divisibility.

Hyl.

It is very true, Philotheus.

Philoth.

What hinders then but Spirit quatenus Sp [...]rit, according to the right Idea thereof, be immediately or essentially one, that is to say, indiscerpible? For what is immediately and essentially one, and not instrumentally, or one by virtue of some other, is necessarily and immutably one, and it implies a Contradiction to be otherwise, while it at all is, and therefore is indiscerpible.

Cuph.

Why, Philotheus? cannot the Omnipotence of God himself discerp a Spirit, if he has a minde to it?

Philoth.

He may annihilate a Spirit, if he will. But if a Spirit be immediately and essentially one, he can no more discerp it, then he can separate that Property, of having the power of the Hypotenusa equal to the powers of both the Basis and [Page 127] Cathetus, from a rectangle-Triangle.

Cuph.

You know, Philotheus, Des-Cartes asserts that God might change this Property of a rectangle-Triangle, if he would.

Philoth.

He does indeed say so, but by way of a slim jear to their ignorance, as he deems it, that are not aware of his supposed mechanicall necessity of the result of all the Phaenomena of the World from the mere motion of the Matter. This piece of wit I suspect in this Paradox of that great Philosopher. However, I will not contend with you, Cuphophron: Let but a Spirit be no more discerpible then that Property of a rectangle-Triangle is separable from it, and then we are agreed.

Cuph.

I am well pleased that we can agree in any thing that is compliable with the Dictates of the noble Des-Cartes.

Philoth.

So I dare say should we all, O Cuphophron: But I must pursue my purpose with Hylobares. What do you understand by Self-activity in a Spirit, Hylobares?

Hyl.

[Page 128]

I understand an active power in a Spirit, whereby it either modifies it self according to its own nature, or moves the Matter regularly according to some certain Modifications it impresses upon it, uniting the Physicall Monads into particles of such magnitude and figure, and guiding them in such Motions as answer the end of the spiritual Agent, either conceived by it or incorporated into it. Whence there appears, as was said, the reason why both Disunity and Inactivity should belong to Matter.

Philoth.

Very accurately and succinctly answered, Hylobares. You are so nimble at it, that certainly you have thought of these Notions before now.

Hyl.

I have read something of them. But your dexterous defining the Attributes of Matter might of it self make me a little more chearfully nimble at defining those of a Spirit, especially now I can close with the belief of its Existence, which I could never doe heartily before. And for the [Page 129] last Attribute, which seemed to me the most puzzling, I mean that of Self-penetrability, it is now to me as easie a Notion as any: and I understand nothing else by it, but that different Spirits may be in the same space, or that one and the same may draw its Extension into a lesser compass, and so have one part of its essence lie in the same space with some others: By which power it is able to dilate or contract it self. This I easily conceive may be a Property of any created and finite Spirit, because the Extension of no Spirit is corporeall.

Philoth.

Very true. But did you not observe, Hylobares, how I removed Sympathy from the Capacity of Matter?

Hyl.

I did, Phi [...]theus; and thereby I cannot but collect that it is seated in the Spiritual or Incorporeall Nature. And I understand by this Sympathy, not a mere Compassivity, but rather a Coactivity of the Spirit in which it does reside: which I conceive to [Page 130] be of great use in all perceptive Spirits. For in virtue of this Attribute, however or in what-ever circumstances they are affected in one part, they are after the same manner affected in all. So that if there were a perceptive Spirit of an infinite Amplitude and of an infinite exaltedness of Sympathy, where-ever any perceptive Energie emerges in this infinite Spirit, it is suddenly and necessarily in all of it at once. For I must confess, Philotheus, I have often thought of these Notions heretofore, but could never attribute them to a Spirit, because I could not believe there was any such thing as a Spirit, forasmuch as all Extension seemed to me to be corporeall. But your Aequinoctial Arrow has quite struck that Errour out of my minde. For the more I think of it, the more unavoidable it seems to me, that that Exten [...]on in the Aequinoctial Circle wherein the Arrow is carried in a curvilinear motion is not onely an Extension distinct from that of the Aereall Circle, [Page 131] but that it is an Extension of something real and independent of our Imagination. Because the Arrow is really carried in such a curvilinear line, and we not being able to dis-imagine it otherwise, we have as great a certainty for this as we have for any thing. For it is as certainly true as our Faculties are true: And we have no greater certainty then that of our Faculties. And thus was the sole obstacle that kept me off [...]rom admitting the Existence of Spirits demolished at once by the skilfull assaults of Philotheus.

Philop.

I am exceeding glad of it, Hylobares, and must owe Philotheus many thanks for his successfull pains. The Spirituality of God then is not the least prejudice to your belief of his Existence.

Hyl.

Not the least, Phi [...]opolis. The Notion of a Spirit is now to me as easie and comprehensible as that of Matter; and the Attributes of a Spirit infinitely more easie then the competibleness of such Properties as they must be forced to give to Matter [Page 132] who deny there is any such thing as a Spirit in the world.

Philop.

Why then, you may without any more adoe proceed to the last Attribute of God which you propounded.

Hyl.

I will, XXXI. Philopolis. It was Omnipresency, The Attribute of Omnipresency. I mean the essential Omnipresency of God. For attending to the infinite Perfection of God according to his Idea, I cannot but acknowledge his Essence to be infinite, and therefore that he is essentially present every-where. And for those that would circumscribe the Divine Essence, I would ask them, how they can make his Essence finite, and his Attributes infinite; or to what extent they conceive him circumscribed. To confine him to a Point were intolerably ridiculous. And to pretend that the amplifying of his Essence beyond this were any advantage or Perfection, were plainly to acknowledge that the taking away his essential Omnipresency is to attribute to him an infinite Imperfection. For any Circumscription [Page 133] implies an infinite Defect. These considerations, O Philopolis, force me to believe that God is essentially Omnipresent, and that he pervades all things, even to all infinite imaginable spaces. But when I have thus concluded with my self, I am cast off again with a very rude and importune check, as if this were to draw down the Divinity into miry Lakes and Ditches and worse-sented places, and to be as unmannerly in our thoughts to the true God as Orpheus is in his expressions to the Pagan Iupiter, ‘ [...].’

Euist.

It is the very verse that Gregory Nazianzen quotes in his Invectives against Iulian the Apostate, and does severely reproch the Poet for the Slovenliness and Unmannerliness of his style.

Cuph.

And well he may, Euistor.

Euist.

But how shall we redeem our Imagination from this Captivity into such sordid conceits?

Cuph.

I can tell, Euistor, and I am [Page 134] very glad of the opportunity of the shewing the usefulness of a peculiar Notion I have of the Omnipresency of God, to solve such Difficulties as this of Hylobares.

Hyl.

For the love of the truth, good Cuphophron, declare it.

Cuph.

But it is so sublime, so subtil and so elevated, O Hylobares, (though not the less solid) that I question whether it will be discretion to commit it to unprepared ears.

Hyl.

Why? you see, Cuphophron, that I am not altogether an undocible Auditour of Metaphysicks, by Philotheus his success upon me. Besides, it is against the professed freedome of Philosophizing in these our Meetings to suppress any thing, and the more injurious, in that you have set our mouths a-watering by the mentioning of so excellent a Notion, and so serviceable for the solving this present Difficulty touching the Divine Omnipresence.

Cuph.

Well, Hylobares, because you do thus forcibly extort it, I will not [Page 135] suppress my judgement concerning this matter.

Hyl.

What is it then, dear Cuphophron?

Cuph.

That God is no-where: XXXII. and therefore neither in miry Lakes nor dirty Ponds, Cuphophron 's Paradox of God's being no-where. nor any other sordid places.

Hyl.

Ha ha he. Cuphophron, this is a subtil Solution, indeed, to come from one that does, I think, as firmly adhere to the belief of a God as any one in the whole Company. If all the Atheists in Italy, in England, in Europe, should hear this pious Solution of thine, they would assuredly with one voice cry out, Amen, venerable Cuphophron.

Cuph.

It's much, Hylobares, the Atheists should be so universally devout.

Philop.

This Solution seems to me point-blank against the very words of Scripture; If I climb up into Heaven, thou art there; if I descend to the bottom of the Sea, thou art there also; and the like. And again, In him we [Page 136] live and move and have our being. If we have all this in him, we have it no-where, if he be no-where, nor are we any-where our selves.

Philoth.

I suppose that Cuphophron's meaning is, that God is no-where circumscriptivé.

Cuph.

I mean he is no-where essentially, Philotheus.

Philoth.

Monster of Opinions!

Sophr.

The Pythagoreans and Platonists, and all the established Religions of the Civilized parts of the world, are for the essential Omnipresence of God: onely Aristotle places him on the Primum mobile; whom Pomponatius, Cardan and Vani [...]us follow. Nor do I know any other Opinion, nor could I imagine any more Divisions touching God's Presence, but of those that would place him at least some-where, or else of those that would declare him every-where. But now we are come from every-where to some-where, and from some-where to no-where at all. This is a strain of wit, I suppose, [Page 137] peculiar to this present Age.

Cuph.

It may be so, O Sophron. For I think no Age within the Records of History has produced more elevated Wits then this present Age has done.

Bath.

I suspect this new Conceit, O Cuphophron, of God's being no-where, is the waggish suggestion of some sly and sculking Atheists, (with which sort of people this present Age abounds) who, upon pretence of extolling the Nature of God above the capacity of being so much debased as to be present with any thing that is extended, have thus stretched their wits to the utmost extent to lift the Deity quite out of the Universe, they insinuating that which cannot but imply as much in their own judgments. For it is evident that that which is no-where is not at all. Wherefore it must needs make fine flearing sport with these elevated wits, while they see their ill-intended Raillery so devoutly taken up for choicest and sublimest pieces of natural Theologic by well-meaning, but less [Page 138] cautious, Contemplators of Philosophicall matters.

Euist.

Is not this something inhospitall for us all to fall upon Cuphophron thus in his own Arbour at once?

Cuph.

No, Euistor, there is nothing committed against the laws of Hospitality, but all transacted accor [...]ing to that Liberty that is given and often made use of in these our Philosophicall Meetings. They are not at all uncivil, though you be extremely much a Gentleman, Euistor, and it may be a more favourable Estimatour of my distressed Opinion then the rest.

Euist.

I must confess I think none can conceive better of your Person, Cuphophron, then my self; but your Assertion of God's being no-where is the most odd and unexpected Assertion that ever I heard in my life; and, but that you are so very well known for your Piety otherwise, I should have thought to have been the voice of a down-right Atheist. You will pardon this liberty.

Cuph.

I told you at first, Euistor, [Page 139] that the Notion was more then ordinarily subtil and sublime: These things are not apprehended in an instant.

Hyl.

I but a man may in almost less then an Instant discover the Assertion to be impossible, XXXIII. supposing God has any Essence at all, The Confutation of that Pararadox. as Philotheus or Bathynous could quickly convince you.

Philoth.

The Cause is in a very good hand; I pray you proceed, Hylobares.

Hyl.

Tell me then first, O Cuphophron, whether God be not as essentially present every-where as he is any-where.

Cuph.

That I must not deny, Hylobares: He is.

Hyl.

And whether his essential Attributes be not in his Essence, not out of it.

Cuph.

Who can imagine to the contrary?

Hyl.

And whether Omnipotency, wherein is contained the power of moving th [...] Matter, be not an essential Attribute of God.

Cuph.

That is univ [...]rsally acknowledged.

Hyl.

[Page 140]

And that he does or did sometime move at least some part of the Matter.

Cuph.

That Des-Cartes himself asserts, with whom I am resolved to stand and fall.

Hyl.

Now I demand, if it be possible for the Matter to be moved by the Power of God, unless there be an Application of God's Power to the Matter.

Cuph.

It is not possible, Hylobares.

Hyl.

Nor the Power, being onely in the Essence, not out of it, to be apply'd without the Application or presence of the Essence to that part of the Matter the Power acts upon.

Cuph.

I am surprised.

Hyl.

And therefore there being a necessity that the Essence of God should be present to some part of the Matter at least, according to your own concession, it is present to all.

Cuph.

And so I believe you will inferr, Hylobares, that the Divine Essence is in some sense extended.

Hyl.

That indeed, Cuphophron, [Page 141] might be inferred, if need were, that there is an Amplitude of the Divine Essence.

Bath.

It might; but this in the mean time most seasonably noted: How that that Atheisticall Plot laid against the Existence of God in that bold Assertion, [That there can be no Extension or Amplitude, but it must necessarily be Matter] being defeated by the Notion of the essential Omnipresence of God, to make sure work, and to baffle the Truth, they raised this sublime and elevated Fiction, that in stead of God's being every-where, according to the universal Opinion of all sober men, that his Nature is such that he can be no-where: without which far-fetch'd Subterfuge they could never have born two faces under one hood, and play'd the Atheist and Deist at once, professing God was no-where, and yet that he was.

Cuph.

Is this your Sagacity or deep Melancholy, Bathynous, that makes you surmize such Plots against the Deity? For I have no more Plot [Page 142] against God, then against my own Soul, which I hold to be a Spirit. And I hold God to be no-where, not as he is God, but as he is an Intellectual Spirit: for I hold of all Spirits, that they are now-where.

Hyl.

It seems then, Cuphophron, that the Plot aims farther then we thought on, not onely to exclude God, but all the Orders of Spirits that are, out of the world.

Cuph.

I know not what you call excluding out of the world, Hylobares; I am sure I do not mean any excluding out of Being.

Hyl.

That is mercifully meant, XXXIV. O Cuphophron; That all Spirits are some-where but we cannot conceive they are, if they may not be upon any other terms then you conceit them. And it is a wonder to me, that you do not easily discern your own Soul to be some-where, if you can distinctly discern her to be at all.

Cuph.

I do most intimately and distinctly perceive my own Soul or Minde to be, and that I am it, and yet without being any-where at all.

Hyl.

[Page 143]

But cannot you also think of two things at once, O Cuphophron?

Cuph.

Every man can doe that that can compare two things or two Idea's one with the other: For if he do not think of them at once, how can he compare them?

Hyl.

Let not go therefore this perception you have of your self, but raise up also the Idea or Remembrance of the indefinitely-extended Matter of the Universe, which is discontinued no-where, but reaches from your self to infinite spaces round about you, or is continued from infinite spaces round about till it reach your thinking Selfship. Can you be surrounded by all this, and yet be no-where? Or can you compare your distinct Selfship with this immense compass, and yet not conceive your self surrounded?

Cuph.

I compare what is no-where with that which is every-where, and finde them to be [...].

Hyl.

You suppose your Minde or Soul no-where first, or rather say [Page 144] so, though you cannot conceive it, and then you cry out that the Universe and she are [...]. Which errour, if you were unprejudiced, this Consideration would convince you of, especially back'd with what palpably falls under sense.

Cuph.

What's that, Hylobares?

Hyl.

The Soul's being touch'd and transfix'd, as it were, from real Objects ab extra round about, from above and beneath and from every side▪ Which would be notoriously perceptible to you, if you could pearch your self, as a Bird, on the top of some high Steeple.

Cuph.

It is more safe to suppose the Experiment, then to try it. But what then, Hylobares?

Hyl.

There being from above and beneath and from every side round from those externall Objects (suppose of Sight) Motion transmitted to the perceptive Soul her self through the Air and Organs of her Body, and she palpably perceiving her self thus affected from things [Page 145] round about her, it is manifest from thence that she is in the midst of them, according as she plainly feels her self to be, and that consequently she is some-where.

Cuph.

That which is no-where cannot be in the midst of any things. It is onely the Body that is in the midst of those Objects, which obtrudes this mistake upon the Soul, whiles she thinks herself to be in the midst of them, whenas indeed she is not.

Hyl.

But the Body with all its Organs, and those more externall Media betwixt the Body and the Objects, are but the Instruments whereby the Soul perceives those distant Objects round about. Wherefore she herself must needs be where the lines of Motion through these continued Instruments of her Perception do concentre. Nay indeed the transmission of any single Motion through Matter that affects the Soul is a palpable argument that she is some-where. For how can that which is some-where, as Matter and Motion [Page 146] are, reach that which is no-where? How can they come at it, or it at them? Princ. part. 1. Artic. 71. Not to adde, that Des-Cartes himself expressly admits that those Objects the Soul sees and flies from or pursues are without her. Wherefore many of these in a compass must needs surround her, and therefore they being without her, she must be within them, and so of necessity be some-where.

Cuph.

The Philosopher, it may be, there slips into the ordinary Conceit of the Vulgar.

Hyl.

Again, Cuphophron, if the Souls of men be no-where, they are as much in one man's Body as another's, and one man's Soul may move another man's Body as well as his own, and at what-ever distance that man is from them: which seems impossible for any finite Spirit to doe, nor are there any examples of their doing so.

Cuph.

You give the reason your self, Hylobares, why they cannot act at any distance; namely, because their power is finite.

Hyl.

[Page 147]

And you, Cuphophron, acknowledge Souls to be nearer and farther off, in that you acknowledge they cannot act at any distance. But that which is nearer and farther off is some-where, at least definitivé.

Cuph.

And that one man's Soul does not move another man's Body, is because it is vitally united onely to one.

Hyl.

Is it then united to the inside of the Body, Cuphophron, or to the outside?

Cuph.

That is a captious question. For whether I say to the inside or to the outside, you will infer the Soul to be some-where. But that which is no-where cannot be united to either side.

Hyl.

And therefore is not united at all.

Cuph.

These things will not fall into every man's capacity.

Hyl.

Again, Cuphophron, is the Soul united to the Body by its Essence, or by some essential Attribute of the Soul?

Cuph.

There is another Caption, [Page 148] Hylobares: For I foresee your Sophistry, that if I say the Essence of the Soul is united with the Body, then the Soul must be where the Body is. But if I say by an essential Attribute, the Soul must be where the essential Attribute is, and consequently where the Body is: so that it will come all to one.

Hyl.

Or thus, Cuphophron, Does not the So [...]l move the Body?

Cuph.

What moves the Bodies of Brutes, Hylobares? Is not their Soul mere Mechanicall motion, according to that admirable Philosopher?

Hyl.

But I ask you, does not the Rational Soul by the power of its Will move the Body?

Cuph.

Else there were no exercise of Free-will in external Actions.

Hyl.

Is then the power of moving the Body thus by her Will in the Soul, or out of the Soul?

Cuph.

In the Soul, Hylobares.

Hyl.

How then can this power be exerted on the Body to move it, unless the Soul be essentially present [Page 149] to the Body to exert it upon it?

Cuph.

By a certain emanative Efficacy that comes from the Soul.

Hyl.

And flows like a Streamer in the air betwixt the Soul and the Body.

Cuph.

You run always into these extensional Phantasms, Hylobares, the busie importunities of which, when I am rapt up into my Metaphysicall Sublimities, I look as contemptuously down upon, as upon the quick wrigglings up and down of Pismires and Earwigs upon the extended surface of the Earth.

Hyl.

You have a very ele [...]ated Soul, I must confess, O Cuphophron. But I pray you look down a little lower and closer on this emanative Energy of the Soul upon the Body, and pursue it from the Body to the source of it, the Soul, where ends it, Cuphophron?

Cuph.

In the Soul, Hylobares.

Hyl.

But where is then the Soul?

Cuph.

No-where.

Hyl.

Why then it ends no-where, [Page 150] and began from no-where.

Cuph.

That must needs be, because the Soul is no-where.

Hyl.

But this is marvellously mysterious, O Cuphophron, that there should be a continued Emanation betwixt two things, whereof one is some-where, and yet the other no-where; the intermediate Emanation also proceeding but to a finite distance.

Cuph.

Metaphysicks were not Metaphysicks, Hylobares, if they were not mysterious.

Hyl.

Had you not better admit of an Immaterial or Metaphysicall Extension with Philotheus and my self, then to harbour such unconceivable Notions, that lie so unevenly in every man's minde but your own?

Cuph.

I am not alone of this minde, Hylobares. And as for Philotheus his opinion and yours, (since you have adopted it) I have heard what has been said all this while, and have thought of these things over and over again, but your Reasons move me nothing at all.

Hyl.

[Page 151]

Tell me then I pray you, XXXV. Cuphophron, The Grounds of Cuphophron's Paradox (that Spirits are no-where) produced and examined. what is it chiefly that moved you to be of the Opinion that you are, That no Spirit can be any-where, or that the Soul of man is no-where?

Cuph.

O Hylobares, there be convincing Reasons of this seeming Paradox, if they meet with a minde capable of them: but the chief are these two. First, In that the Minde of man thinks of such things as are no-where, as of many Moral, Logicall and Mathematicall Truths, which being of the nature to be no-where, the Minde that conceives them must be necessarily no-where also. The second, In that Cogitation, as Cogitation, is ipso facto exempted or prescinded from all Extension. For though we doubt whether there be any Matter or any Extended thing in the world, yet we are even then assured that we are Recogitantes. Which shews that Cogitation has nothing at all to doe with Extension, nor has any Applicability to it; forasmuch as [Page 152] we perceive our selves to think, when we have not the least thought of any thing extended. Wherefore our Thoughts having no Relation or Applicability to Extension, they have no Applicability to Place, and consequently neither they nor our Mindes are any-where.

Hyl.

I partly understand what you would be at, Cuphophron, but not so fully as to discover any strength at all in your Reasonings. The weakness of the first Ground you may understand from hence; That it will as well follow, that the Soul or Minde of man is some-where, because it thinks of things that are some-where, as that it is no-where, because it thinks of things that are no-where. Besides that those things which you say are no-where are some-where, I mean those Moral, Logicall and Mathematicall Truths. For they are in the Minde or Soul; and the Soul I before demonstrated, I think, to any unprejudiced Auditour, to be in the Body, and the Body you cannot deny [Page 153] but to be some-where. It is true, some of those Truths, it may be, as they are Representations, respect neither Time nor Place; but as they are Operations or Modes of a Subject or Substance, they cannot but be conceived to be in that Substance. And forasmuch as there is no Substance but has at least an essential Amplitude, they are in a Substance that is in some sort extended, and so by virtue of their Subject must necessarily be conceived to be some-where. For the Mode of a thing is inseparate from the Thing it self.

Cuph.

But here you run away with that, Hylobares, which I will not allow you to assume, viz. That there is a Substance of the Minde or Soul didistinct from Cogitation. I say that Cogitation it self is the very Substance of the Soul, and therefore the Soul is as much no-where as if it had no substance at all.

Hyl.

But observe, Cuphophron, that in your saying that Cogitation it self is the very Substance of the Soul, you [Page 154] affirm the Soul is a Substance. And so my Argument returns again upon you; though the saying the very Operation is the Substance is a manifest falshood. For the Operations of the Soul are specifically distinct, and such specifically distinct Operations succeeding one another must be, according to your account, so many specifical Substances succeeding one another. So that your Soul would not be alwaies the same specifical Substance, much less the same individual; then which nothing can be more wilde and extravagant. Again, the Soul is accounted a permanent thing by all men, but her Operations are in flux and succession: How then can the Operations be the Soul her self? or what will become of Memorie? There is therefore, O Cuphophron, a substance of the Soul as distinct from its Operations or succeeding Cogitations, as the Matter is from the Figures and Motions that succeed in it.

Cuph.

I am not yet convinced of that.

Hyl.

[Page 155]

And now for your second Ground, which would inferr from our being assured we think, while we doubt whether there be any extended thing in the World, or, it may be, think of no Extension, that therefore our Minds have no relation or applicability to any Extension whatsoever; The weakness of this Reasoning you may easily discover, if you will but consider, That Intension of Heat or Motion is considered without any relation to Extension, and yet it is related to a Subject extended, suppose to a burning-hot Iron. And we think without at all thinking of Time or of the course of the Sun; and yet our Thought is applicable to Time, and by the motion of the Sun may definitively be said not to have commenced till such a minute of an hour, and to have ceased by such a minute. And there is the same reason of Place as of Time, that is to say, such a man's Thoughts may be said definitively to have been conceived in such a place, as well as within such a time. [Page 156] And, to conclude, it seems a mere Sophism, to argue from the precision of our Thoughts, that the Things themselves are really prescinded one from another; and it is yet far worse, to inferr they have not any relation or applicability one to another. If they were so unrelated indeed in the full and adequate apprehension of them, as well circumstantial as essential, then I confess the Inference might be sound: But when the Minde is so set on the Metaphysicall rack as to pull those things asunder that are found together in nature, and then to say they have no relation to one another, or to leave out by inadvertency what cannot be excluded from the perfect Idea of s [...]ch or such a Being; all Conclusions from such Principles must be like the Principles themselves, defective or distorted. And therefore, being so little satisfy'd with Cuphophron's Solution of the present Difficulty touching the Divine Omnipresence, I foresee that Philotheus must have the sole honour of [Page 157] fully easing and settling my mind in a right and rational apprehension of all the Attributes of God.

Philoth.

The honour of that satisfaction is due to God alone, Hylobares who has given you so quick an apprehension, and so impartial a love of the Truth, where-ever it is found.

Hyl.

That honour I do unfeignedly render to God that is his peculiar due; and yet I think there is a civil Gratitude due also to those that he vouchsafes to make Instruments of his Goodness and Bounty, as he has at this time made you, Philotheus. And therefore you having had so excellent success hitherto, I desire you would proceed to the Solution of this last Difficulty, touching the Divine Omnipresence.

Philoth.

I will, XXXVI. Hylobares, That God is essentially present every-where. and I believe you will find it one of the easiest you have propounded, though I must confess it may seem odd at the first sight, as it has done to very famous Criticks in Points of Theologie, who mainly from this consideration, [Page 158] that the foul and ill-sented places of the Earth are an unfit Receptacle of the Divine Presence, have made bold to confine the Godhead to the Heavens. Which opinion of theirs is rather to be imputed to the nicety of their Sense then to the sagacity of their Wit. For all those things that seem so foul and disagreeable in nature are not really so in themselves, but onely relatively; and what is one Creature's poison is the delight and food of another, and what is the death of the one is the life of the other. So that we may easily conceive, though God has an apprehension of what-ever is, that yet there is no necessity at all that he should be disaffected, disgusted, or any way annoy'd by being present with any thing: nay rather, that it is impossible he should, every thing that implies Imperfection being incompetible to the Divine Essence; so that he need not withdraw himself from it, he suffering nothing by immediately residing in it, no more then he can [Page 159] be wounded with a sword or prick'd with a thorn; and there is the like reason for any other ingratefull Sense. For all is to be resolved into the motion and figure of the particles of the Matter variously impressed upon the Organs of our Bodies: And what Unholiness or absolute Defilement can there be in any either motion, figure, or exi [...]ty of such particles? Wherefore the frame of all natural things whatsoever, nothing at all excepted, is no less inoffensive, no less holy, no less agreeable to the Eternall Minde, then the lines of a Picture or Statue are to a Limner or Statuary, no part whereof gives him the least disgust or aversation from the matter he has thus shaped or figured; for Art and Skill and Reason runs through all. Whence it appears that this exception against the Omnipresence of God is nothing but a fallacy put upon our own inadvertent thoughts, while we phansie God liable to the same inconveniencies that we our selves are by reason [Page 160] of our weak and passive Senses.

Philop.

This seems to me, though less versed in Philosophy, a very plain, solid and intelligible Solution of the present Difficulty. But Cuphophron's Hypothesis is, I must confess, to my slower apprehension infinitely Paradoxicall, and methought was very intelligibly confuted by Hylobares, though with some circumstances that to me seemed not so becoming toward so worthy and obliging a person as Cuphophron.

Cuph.

I thank you, XXXVII. Philopolis, The Arborist's affected liberty of dissenting in unnecessary Opinions and friendly Abusiveness of one another in their Philosophicall [...]eeti [...]gs. for your sensibleness on my behalf. But in contest he ordinarily looks as if he were abused who is thought to be overcome. Besides, it is an usual thing in our Meetings, and to which we are much inured who are so familiarly acquainted, to abuse one another into the Truth, by shewing the ridiculousness of the Errour, and intimating from what disproportion of temper of minde it may arise. For this subderisorious mirth is so far from giving any offence to us who understand [Page 161] one another, that it is rather a pleasant Condiment of our Conversation, and makes our serious Discourses the less tedious to our selves, and, I think, sometimes not the more ungratefull to Strangers, when they understand that there is not the least enmity under it.

Philoth.

That solicitude, Philopolis, which you seem to have for the excusing of Hylobares, we on the other side, I think, ought to have in the behalf of Cuphophron, who was not at all behind-hand with him in any jocant wit or humour.

Cuph.

I confess it, in that sense I have already explained unto Philopolis.

Philop.

You pass away your time in a marvellous way of pleasant [...]y and innocency, O Cuphophron, while those things which may seem blemishes elsewhere are truely the badges of Vertue and good nature amongst you. But it is much that, there being so great consent of Affection and Friendship amongst you, [Page 162] there is not likewise the same consent of Opinion.

Cuph.

That is a thing we do not so much as affect, unless it be in those things that are necessary for proficiency in Piety and Vertue.

Philop.

Are then the Opinions of God's being no-where and of his being every-where alike conducive to Vertue and Piety?

Cuph.

Yes, Philopolis, if they be rightly understood. For he that saies that God is no-where, holds notwithstanding that his Providence and protective Presence is every-where. So that it is no discouragement to Vertue and true Piety. Wherefore the case stands thus betwixt Hylobares and my self. He has a great zeal against my Opinion of God's being nowhere, for fear it should be thence inferred that there is no God at all: And I have as great a zeal for my Opinion, because if I acknowledge God any-where, I must acknowledge him extended, and to me it is all one to acknowledge an extended [Page 163] God, and no God at all. For what-ever is extended, is either Matter, or as uncapable of Cogitation or Perception as Matter it self. For if any entire thing, any Form or Figure be perceived by what is extended, nothing in the extended Percipient perceives the whole, but onely part. Which is a sign that our own Souls are not extended, much less the Essence of God. But I will not renew the Dispute.

Philop.

I am surprized with an unexpected Subtilty of. Cuphophron's: how will you rescue me, Hylobares?

Hyl.

Very easily. Do you not remember the Notion of Sympathy, Philopolis, in virtue whereof whatever the least real point of the Essence of the Perceptive part of the Soul, suppose, does perceive, every real point of the Perceptive must perceive at once?

Philop.

I partly understand you, Hylobares: but now I see you so good at these Notions, we will discourse some time more fully of them at my [Page 164] house. In the mean time I think you cannot but be fully satisfy'd with Philotheus his Solution of this last Difficulty touching the Divine Omnipresence.

Hyl.

Very fully.

Philop.

And I am abundantly pleased with the consideration, that the widely-different Apprehensions betwixt you and Cuphophron touching God's Omnipresence, meet together and join so strongly in one common zealous design of turning off whatever may seem to supplant his Existence.

Hyl.

I believe it is a great satisfaction to us both.

Philop.

But I triumph in nothing so much as that Philotheus has so throughly convinced you, XXXVIII. that there is nothing in all the Divine Attributes so intricate as to hinder your closing heartily with the belief of a God. The Con [...]sion.

Hyl.

There is nothing, I thank God and Philotheus, in all those Attributes we have hitherto considered that seems not extremely much more easie [Page 165] then any other Hypothesis that ever yet came into my minde. But there is a main Attribute behinde, which is the Goodness of God, the Notion whereof though it be not hard to conceive, yet to make the Phaenomena of the World and the passages of Providence constantly to comport with it, I foresee may prove a very great Difficulty.

Philop.

This therefore is the second Obstacle, Hylobares, you at Sect. 14. first mentioned.

Hyl.

It is so.

Philoth.

And I fear will be too copious a Subject to be entred upon at this time.

Philop.

I conceive so too. And besides, I have some Letters to dispatch by the Post this night, which I must not neglect. For we may rectifie our inward thoughts so soon as we find our Errour; but if any errour or neglect be committed in outward affairs, though the errour be discovered, the loss is many times irrecoverable, and the inconvenience incorrigible.

Cuph.

[Page 166]

That is very true. But, according to the ancient custom of Athens, you have a right, Philopolis, as well of putting an end to as beginning the Dispute.

Philop.

This Law was undoubtedly an intended Civility by your Ancestors, O Cuphophron, but in this circumstance of things I look upon it as a piece of Cruelty; that I must doe execution upon my self, and by mine own act deprive my self of that ingenuous Converse which I could enjoy with pleasure even to break of Day.

Cuph.

It is the common loss of us all, especially mine, who enjoy myself no-where so well as in so excellent Company. But it is in your hand, Philopolis, to remedie this: For you have the right of appointing the time of our meeting again, as well as of dissolving this present Meeting.

Philop.

Have I so? This makes amends for the other misfortune, which I will repair by a more timely [Page 167] appointment. I adjourn therefore this Meeting till tomorrow at five a clock in the after-noon, if Philotheus and the rest be agreed.

Philoth.

Agreed.

The End of the First Dialogue.

[Page 168]

THE SECOND DIALOGUE.

Philotheus, Bathynous, Sophron, Philopolis, Euistor, Hylobares, Cuphophron.

Philop.

YEsterday's performance, I. O Philotheus, The Introduction, containing Philopolis his Thanks for the last day's Discourse; with a [...] by the by of Inspiration, and of the difficulty of the present Subject. has indeared to me the memory of that day, of this place, (this sacred Arbour wherein we are again so happily met) and of your excellent self and the rest of this worthy Company, for ever. I never reap'd so much pleasure in so few hours in all my life. In which notwithstanding the chiefest Satisfaction was, that my dear friend Hylobares was so fully satisfied touching those most intricate Theories concerning the Nature of God and his Attributes. It rema [...]ns now, Philotheus, that with the like happy success you clear his mind of those manifold Scrupulosities and Difficulties it seems laden wit [...] touching the Providence of God.

Philoth.

[Page 169]

Your extraordinary kinde resentment, O Philopolis, of my former endeavours is no small obligation upon me to doe the best I can in this present Task. But I cannot omit to take notice, that your over-proportionate propensions towards my self makes you seem not so just to others, who bore their part in whatever contributed either to your own delight or Hylobares his satisfaction. Nor can I alone sustain this day's Province, but must implore the help of others, especially in so copious and various a Subject.

Cuph.

Yes, Philotheus, that is supposed. Euistor, Bathynous and the rest will assist; nor shall I fail to put in for one, when occasion requires, and I finde my minde moved thereunto.

Euist.

Cuphophron expresses himself in such phrase, as if it were hopefull that he will speak by Inspiration.

Hylob.

He seems to me, Euistor, so to doe sometimes: Of which some passages of yesterday's discourse are [Page 170] fresh Instances. For he was severall times so highly rapt and divinely inspired, that I profess I think no humane understanding could reach his meaning.

Sophr.

Nullum numen abest, si sit prudentia. So I think close and cautious Reason in a calm and pure spirit is the best Inspiration now-adays in matters of Contemplation, as well as Prudence in the common Practices of life.

Cuph.

I am as much for illuminated Reason, O Sophron, as any man living can be.

Hyl.

So am I, Cuphophron; provided the Illumination be not so bright and fulgent as to obscure or extinguish all perceptibility of the Reason.

Sophr.

I always thought right Reason it self to be the Illumination or Light of the Minde, and that all other Light is rather that of the Eye then of the Understanding.

Hyl.

Let Cuphophron look to that, O Sophron, and defend his own magnificent style.

Philop.

[Page 171]

But be you pleased in the mean time, O Hylobares, according to the purpose of our present meeting, to propound your Difficulties to Philotheus touching Divine Providence, and to the rest of this judicious Company.

Sophr.

How becomingly does Philopolis exercise his office, and seasonably commit the Opponent with the Respondent, like a long-practised Moderatour? I wish Philotheus no worse success then he had yesterday. But I cannot ominate so well touching this Congress. I fear such a Storm will be raised as all the Wits in Europe will not be able to allay. So intricate, so anfractuous, so unsearchable are the ways of Providence.

Cuph.

I wonder whence Sophron took this ill Omen, Hylobares.

Hyl.

I suppose from our two sporting together, which he look'd upon as the playing of two Sea-calves before a Storm.

Sophr.

I wish, Hylobares, you prove [Page 172] Calf enough to bring no Objections but what Philotheus or some of us may sufficiently answer.

Philop.

I earnestly with Philotheus assistence enough and ability from above, that he may with satisfaction answer the greatest Difficulties that either Hylobares or any one else can produce touching Divine Providence.

Sophr.

That indeed is the more desirable of the two, and my heart and vote goes along with yours, O Philopolis.

Philop.

Begin then, if you please, O Hylobares.

Hyl.

I have in my minde such a croud and cloud of Difficulties, that I know not where to begin, or when I shall make an end.

Sophr.

Did not I tell you so, II. Philopolis? The two main H [...]ads of Objections ag [...]inst Providence, with [...]

Hyl.

But I believe they are mainly reducible to these three Heads, or rather, if you will, to these two more general ones, The Evils that are in the World, and The defect of Good. For when you have senced as well as you [Page 173] can, Philotheus, and pretty well satisfied us that all things here upon Earth are at least well enough, and that there is no such Evil discoverable as implies the first Principle of all things not to be the Sovereign Goodness; there is yet this Difficulty behinde, How it can consist with the Goodness of God, that this good Scene of things should begin no sooner or spread no farther, that is to say, that there should be no more Earths then one, or that this one or all should have been but six thousand years ago or thereabout.

Sophr.

This very last Difficulty, Philopolis, is able to confound any mortal living.

Philoth.

Dear Sophron, be not so dismay'd; I dare pass my word that nothing that is holy or sacred shall suffer any detriment by this conflict, when I have declared the Laws of the Combate, and what Weapons we must be confined to, namely to mere Reason and Philosophy. In which Field I must notwithstanding [Page 174] confess that I suspect Hylobares will prove a stout Champion. But it's much if we be not all able to deal with him. And forasmuch as it is so plainly evident from a world of Phaenomena, that there is a Principle that acts out of Wisedom and Counsel, as was abundantly evidenced by yesterday's discourse, and as roundly acknowledged; it shall be severely expected and exacted of Hylobares, That he do not oppose false or uncertain Hypotheses, or popular Mistakes and Surmizes, or vagrant and fictious Stories, against certain Truth, such as is discoverable every day before our eyes.

Philop.

That is very equitable and reasonable.

Philoth.

And if he cannot keep his Philosophicall fingers from meddling with the Holy Writ, that he do not handle it so ineptly, as to draw expressions accommodated to the capacity of the Vulgar into a Philosophicall Argument, or to inferr a Negation from the preterition of such or such a Subject.

Euist.

[Page 175]

It is incredible that Hylobares, professing himself a Philosopher, should betake himself to such Nugacities as are exploded even by the Theologers themselves, who notwithstanding spend their main study on the Holy Scriptures.

Hyl.

These Laws, O Philotheus, I accept as just and right.

Philoth.

And if they be kept to, III. Hylobares, Evils in general how consistent with the Good [...]ess of God. as stout a Retiarius as you are, you shall never be able to catch me in your Net, or entangle me in any of your Intricacies touching Divine Providence. For as for that which you have proposed in general touching the Evils in the World, whether they be those that seem more Tragicall, or else lesser Miscarriages in the Manners of men or the Accidents of Fortune, if such things were not, where were the Objects of Sighs and Tears, of Smiles and Laughter? So that what you bring as an Argument against Providence, is in my apprehension a very palpable Argument for it. For it is plain that that [Page 176] Power that made the World foresaw the Evils in it, in that he has so exquisitely fitted us with Passions correspondent thereto.

Hyl.

This is ingeniously inferr'd, O Philotheus, so far as it will reach, namely, to prove there is a Providence or Fore-sight of God: but you seem to forget the main Question in hand, which is, Whether the measure of his Providence be his Goodness, and that nothing is transacted against that Attribute. But your concession seems to imply that he knowingly and wittingly brought Evil into the World; which seems therefore the more grossly repugnant to his Goodness.

Sophr.

Methinks, Gentlemen, you are both already agreed in a Point of so great concernment, namely, That there is a Divine Providence, that if there were any modesty in mortal men they might be content with that bare discovery, without so strictly examining or searching into the Laws or Measures thereof, but apply themselves [Page 177] to the Law of Life which God has written in their hearts, or expressed in the Holy Writ, that it may go well with them in the Conclusion.

Philop.

That is very piously and judiciously noted, O Sophron.

Bath.

So it is indeed, O Philopolis: But yet I humbly conceive that it is not alwaies an itch of searching into, but sometimes a necessity of more punctually knowing, the truth of the Mysteries of God, that drives some mens spirits into a more close and anxious meditation of so profound matters. As it may well doe here in this present Point touching the Measure of God's Providence, namely, Whether the Rule thereof be his pure Goodness, or his mere Will and Sovereignty. For if it be his Goodness, all free Agents have all the reason in the world to apply themselves to that Law of Life which Sophron mentions, because their labour shall not be in vain in the Lord, as the Apostle speaks. But if the measure of his Providence be his mere Power, [Page 178] Will or Sovereignty, no man living can tell what to expect in the conclusion. All true Believers may be turned into Hell, and the wicked onely and the Blasphemer ascend into the Regions of Bliss. For what can give any stop to this but God's Iustice, which is a branch or mode of his Goodness?

Philop.

Methinks, Bathynous, that you both have reason, both Sophron and your self; nor do I desire Philotheus to desist from the present Subject, though I much long, I confess, to hear him discourse of the Affairs of the Kingdom of God.

Philoth.

That shall be done in due time, Philopolis. In the mean while I dare avow to Hylobares, that there are no Evils in the World that God foresaw (and he foresaw all that were to be) which will not consist with this Principle, That God's Goodness is the Measure of his Providence. For the nature of things is such, that some Particulars or Individuals must of necessity suffer for the greater good of the Whole; besides the manifold [Page 179] Incompossibilities and Lubricities of Matter, that cannot have the same conveniences and fitnesses in any shape or modification, nor would be fit for any thing, if its shapes and modifications were not in a manner infinitely varied.

Hyl.

I partly understand you, Philotheus; I pray you go on.

Philoth.

Wherefore I inferr, That still the Measure of God's Providence is his Goodness: Forasmuch as those Incompossibilities in Matter are unavoidable; and what-ever designed or permitted Evil there seems in Providence, it is for a far greater good, and therefore is not properly in the summary compute of the whole affairs of the Universe to be reputed evil, the loss in particulars being so vast a gain to the Whole. It is therefore our Ignorance, O Hylobares, of the true Law of Goodness (who are so much immersed into the Life of Selfishness, which is that low Life of Plants and Animals) that makes us such incompetent judges of what is [Page 180] or is not carried on according to the Law of that Love or Goodness which is truly Divine: whose Tenderness and Benignity was so great as to provide us of Sighs and Tears, to meet those particular Evils with which she foresaw would necessarily emerge in the World; and whose Gayety and Festivity is also so conspicuous in endowing us with that passion or property of Laughter, to entertain those lighter miscarriages with, whether in manners or fortune: As if Providence look'd upon her bringing Man into the World as a Spectatour of a Tragick-Comedy. And yet in this which seems so ludicrous, see, Hylobares, what a serious design of good there is. For Compassion, the mother of Tears, is not alwaies a mere idle Spectatour, but an Helper oftentimes of those particular Evils that happen in the World; and the Tears again of them that suffer, oftentimes the mother of Compassion in the Spectatours, and extort their help. And the news of but one ridiculous Miscarriage [Page 181] age fills the mouths of a thousand men with Mirth and Laughter; and their being so liable universally to be laught at makes every man more carefull in his manners, and more cautious in his affairs, especially where his path is more slippery.

Hyl.

I perceive by these beginnings, that you are likely to prove a marvellous Mysta of Divine Providence, O Philotheus.

Sophr.

I wish with all my heart, Philopolis, that Philotheus may come off so cleverly in the particular Difficulties that will be proposed, as he has done in this general one. For there are infinite unexpected Puzzles that it's likely a busie searching Wit, such as Hylobares, may unluckily hit upon.

Euist.

What, IV. do you think any harder or greater, The Arguments of Lucretius against Providence. O Sophron, then are comprised in those elegant, though impious, Verses of Lucretius?

Sophr.

What Verses do you mean, Euistor?

Euist.

Those in his fifth Book Dererum [Page 182] rerum Natura, where he proposes this Conclusion to himself to be proved, viz.

Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam

Naturam rerum—

Sophr.

And by what Arguments, I beseech you, does he pretend to inferr so impious a Conclusion?

Euist.

The Argument in general is the Culpability of Nature, — Tantâ stat praedita culpâ and that therefore it cannot be the work of God: and I think he brings in at least half a score Instances of this Faultiness, as he phansies it.

Sophr.

Lucretius is esteemed so great a Wit, that it were worth the while, Euistor, if you thought fitting, to give your self the trouble of recounting those Instances.

Philop.

A very good motion, and such, O Sophron, as whereby you may easily guess whether Philotheus has undertaken so desperate a Province as you imagine. For it's likely that so great and elegant a Wit as Lucretius would, out of those many, [Page 183] pick the most choice and most confounding Puzzles (as you call them) that the Epicurean Cause could afford him. And therefore if these should not prove such invincible Arguments against the Goodness of Providence, it may be the better hoped that there are none absolutely such.

Sophr.

You say well, Philopolis, and that makes me the more desirous to hear them.

Euist.

And that you shall, Sophron, upon the condition you will answer them.

Sophr.

Either I or Philotheus or some of us will doe our best.

Euist.

I will not repeat the Verses themselves, for I should doe that but brokenly; but I believe there are very few of the particular Instances in them but I remember firmly enough. As first, That so much of the Earth is taken away from us by the Barrenness of Mountains and Rocks, by the inaccessibleness of large Woods inhabited by wilde Beasts, by the overspreading of the Seas, and by huge [Page 184] vast Marishes: Besides that the Torrid and Frigid Zones are unhabitable, the one by reason of the excess of Heat, the other by reason of the extremity of Cold: That that part of the Earth that is inhabited by men is of so perverse a nature, that if it were not for Man's industry and hard labour, it would be all over-run with Thorns and Brambles: That when with much toil he has made the ground fruitfull, and all things look green and flourishing, often all this hope is quash'd by either excess of Heat and Drought, or violence of Rain and Storms, or keenness of Frosts. To which he adds the infestation of wilde Beasts, that are so terrible and hurtfull to mankinde both by land and by sea; the Morbidness of the Seasons of the year, and the frequentness of untimely Death; and, lastly, the deplorableness of our Infancy and first circumstances of entring into life; which he sets off so pathetically, that I cannot but remember those Verses whether I will [...]

Sophr.

[Page 185]

I dare say they are very good ones then, if you like them so, Euistor: I pray you let us hear them, if it be no trouble to you to repeat them.

Euist.

No, it is not Sophron. The Verses are these:

Tum porrò puer, ut s
 [...]vis project us ab undis
Navita, nudus humi jacet, infans, indigus omni
Vitai anxilio, cùm primùm in lumi­nis or as
Nixibus ex alvo matris Natura pro­fudit,
Vagit
 [...]uque locum lugubri complet, ut aequum est,
Quoi tantum in vita restat transfire malorum.

Cuph.

They are a very empassionating strain of Poetry, Hylobares; methinks I could have fallen a-weeping while Euistor repeated them. I remember them very well. But is there not something in the following Verses about Childrens Rattles? For these are not all.

Hyl.

[Page 186]

Let me intreat you of all friendship, Euistor, to repeat to Cuphophron the Rattle-verses, to keep him from crying.

Euist.

They are these that Cuphophron means, and immediately follow the former:

At variae crescunt pecudes, armenta, feraeque,
Nec crepitacula eis opu' sunt, nec quoiquam adhibenda est
Almae nutricis blanda atque infracta loquela,
Nec varias quaerunt vestes pro tempo­re Coeli.

What think you of these Instances, O Sophron?

Sophr.

I must ingenuously confess that if Lucretius have no better Arguments against Providence then these, nor Hylobares then Lucretius, their force will not seem so formidable to me as I suspected; but I must on the contrary suspect, that they are ordinarily very small motives that precipitate those into Atheism and Epicurism that have of [Page 187] themselves an inward propension thereunto.

Philoth.

Are these the same Arguments, Hylobares, that you intended to invade me withall?

Hyl.

These are onely of one sort of them referrible to the Classis of Natural Evils, V. and but few of those neither. Providence argued agai [...]st from the promiscuous falling of the Rain, and undiscriminating discharges of Thunderclaps. But to speak the truth, Philotheus, I had not so dinumerately and articulately mustered up or shaped out the particular Arguments I would urge you with, though I felt my mind charged with multifarious thoughts; and that pressed the forwardest that had left the latest impression on my mind on the Rode as we rid hither to this City, upon our being overtaken with so great a Storm of Thunder, Hail, and a mighty dash of Rain, that we were wellnigh wet to the skin. For I began to think with my self how consistent those kinde of Accidents could be with so good and exact a Providence as men imagine. For the High-waie [...] yield no Crop; nor do we our selves [Page 188] grow by being liquored without-side, but within: besides the wetting of all our Clothes, and the indangering the catching of an Ague or a Fever. Wherefore if Providence were so exact, the Rain would be alwaies directed to such places as are benefited thereby, not to such as it does no good to, but trouble and mischief to those that are found there.

Philoth.

Your meaning is then, Hylobares, that it is a Flaw in Providence that the Rain is not restrained from falling on the High-ways. But in the mean time you do not consider how intolerably du [...]ty they would be, especially in Summer, and how constant a mischief that would prove and troublesome both to horse and man.

Hyl.

I but it rains as much on the High-waies in Winter-time as Summer-time, be they never so deep in wet and mire already: which methinks is not consistent with so accurate a Providence as you contend for.

Philoth.

And this, Hylobares, I warrant, you take to be an impregnable [Page 189] Argument, a stout Instance indeed, in that you place it thus in the front of the Battel. But if it be sounded to the bottome, it will be found to stand upon a ground no less ridiculous then that Comicall conceit in Aristophanes, of Iupiter's pissing through a Sieve as often as it rains: or what is a more cleanly and unexceptionable expression, that the descending of Rain is like the watering of a Garden with a Watering-pot by some free Agents; where they do not water the Walks of the Garden, but onely the Beds or Knots wherein the Flowers grow. Which is the most Idiotick and unphilosophicall Conceit, Hylobares, that could ever fall into the minde of any man of your Parts. For the committing of all the motions of the natural Phaenomena, as they are called, to any free Agents, were the utter abolishing of all natural Philosophy, and indeed of Nature it self; and there would be no Object left of Speculation in these things, but either Metaphysicall or Moral. [Page 190] And by the same reason that you require that the Rain should onely fall upon such plats of the Earth as are destined for Grass, for Corn, for Trees, and the like, you must require also that the Sun should not shine on the High-waies for fear of infesting us with dust, and that it should divert its beams from the faces of tender Beauties; that the Shadow of the Earth should withdraw to those that travel in the night; that Fire should not burn either an usefull building or an innocent man; that the Air should not transmit the voice of him that would tell a Lie, nor the Rope hang together that would strangle the guiltless, nor the Sword of the violent, be it never so sharp, be able to enter the flesh of the just. These and many millions more of such sequels would follow in Analogie to this rash demand.

Hyl.

I must confess, Philotheus, that what you urge makes so great an impress upon me, that it has almost dash'd me out of conceit with this [Page 191] first Instance, which I thought not so contemptible. But though with but a broken confidence, yet I must persist, and demand, if Providence would not be more exact, if all things were carried thus as my Instance implies they should be, then it is now as they are.

Philoth.

No, by no means, Hylobares. For the Scene of the World then would be such a languid flat thing, that it would disgrace the great Dramatist that contrived it. For there would be no compass or circuit of any Plot or Intrigue, but every thing so shallow or sudden, so simple and obvious, that no man's Wit or Vertue would finde any Game to exercise themselves in. And assure your self, it is one fundamental point of the Divine Counsel, and that laid deep in his Wisedome and Goodness, that at least on this terrestrial Stage there should be sufficient difficulty and hardship for all Sensible and Intellectual Creatures to grapple and contest with, that an ignoble and corruptive [Page 192] torpour may not seize their bodies and spirits, and make their life languid and their Faculties useless, and finde nothing to doe in the world but to eat and drink and sleep. For there are very few men given to Contemplation, and yet fewer successfull in it. That therefore that I contend for is this, That in these general, but constant and peremptory, strokes of Nature there is an exact Providence of God; and that which you account a Defect is indeed a Perfection and a surer pledge of a Divine Foresight, that does thus manifestly in the compute of things defalcate either useless or hurtfull super [...]uities; as this guideance of the Rain from the High-ways in Winter. For has he not given man wit and art to make a supply by good wax'd Boots, oil'd Coats and Hoods, and eyes in his head to chuse his way, if one be better then another; or if all be intolerable, politicall wit to make Laws and Orders for the mending of the High-ways? For thus are men honestly employed [Page 193] for their own and the common good. And judge you what a ridiculous thing it were, that the Sun should so miraculously turn off his beams from every fair Face, whenas the same End is so easily served by the invention of Masks; or that the continued Shadow of the Earth should be broken by sudden miraculous eruptions or disclusions of light, to prevent the Art and officiousness of the Lantern-maker and the Link-boy; or lastly, that the Aire should not resound a Lie, nor the point of a Sword pierce the skin of the innocent. For this were an exprobration to the Wisedom of God, as if he had mistook himself in creating of free Agents, and by an After-device thus forcibly ever defeated their free Actings, by denying them the ordinary assistences of Nature. This would be such a force and stop upon the first spring of Motion, that the greatest trialls of mens spirits and the most pompous externall solemnities would be stifled thereby, or utterly prevented; and all Politicall [Page 194] Prudence, Sagacity, Justice and Courage would want their Objects. Wherefore this indifferent and indiscriminating constancy of Nature ought to be; it being reckoned upon in those Faculties God has endow'd both men and other Animals with, whereby they are able to close with the more usual advantages of these standing Laws of Nature, and have sense and foresight to decline or provide against any dangerous circumstances of them; and that with at least as much certainty as is proportionable to the considerableness of the safety of such an individual Creature as cannot live always, nor was ever intended to live long upon Earth.

Hyl.

I partly understand what you would be at, Philotheus, and indeed so far, that I am almost disheartned from propounding the remainder of the Meditations that met me on the Rode touching the Hail also and the Thunder. For methought Nature seem'd very unkinde to pelt a young Foal so rudely with so big Hail-stones, [Page 195] and give him so harsh a welcome into the world.

Philoth.

Tush, Hylobares, that was but a sportfull passage of Nature, to try how tight and tinnient her new workmanship was; which if it were not able to bear such small Fillips, it would be a sign that things hung very crazily and unsoundly together. Wherefore Nature does but justifie the accuracy of her own Artifice, in exposing her works to a number of such trialls and hardships. This is but a slight Scruple, Hylobares; but surely some profound conceit surprized your minde in your meditations touching the Thunder.

Hyl.

The main thing was this, That if Providence were so exact as some pretend, those Thunder-claps that doe any execution should ever pick out some notoriously-wicked fellow to make him an example, and not strike an heedless Goat brouzing on the side of a Rock, or rend some old Oak in a Forest.

Philoth.

This indeed is more [Page 196] shrewdly urged. But are you sure, Hylobares, that this were the most perfect way that Nature could pitch upon?

Hyl.

So it seems to me.

Philoth.

I suppose then it is because you take this to be the most effectuall way to make men good.

Hyl.

Why not, Philotheus?

Philoth.

But suppose a mighty, if not an almighty, Arm out of the Clouds should pull men by the ears as often as they offered to offend, would not that be more effectuall?

Hyl.

One would think so.

Philoth.

Wherefore upon this ground you should require that also, Hylobares.

Hyl.

But that would be too great a force upon free Agents, O Philotheus.

Philoth.

And how do you know, Hylobares, but that other would be so likewise?

Hyl.

I must confess, Philotheus, it is an hard matter to define what measure of force is to be used by Providence [Page 197] to keep men from Sin.

Philoth.

And therefore a rash thing to prescribe laws or ways to Providence in so obscure a matter. Besides, there are so many notoriously wicked, that there would be such thundring and rattling, especially over great Cities, that we should be never quiet night nor day. And those that escaped would be forward to phansie themselves Thunder-proof; and others, that there was no Judgement to come, because Vengeance was taken so exactly in this life. Besides that you seem to forget that the strokes of Nature levell not at particulars. For she is an unperceptive Principle, and cannot act pro re nata, or suspend her self from acting; and that the end of Thunder is not to forestall the last Day of Judgement, but for clearing the Air, and sending more fattening showrs into the bosome of the Earth.

Hyl.

But do Thunderbolts conduce any thing to that, Philotheus?

Philoth.

Those are very seldome, [Page 198] Hylobares; and I deny not but they may have their moral use: but best so moderated as they are, not so constantly vibrated as your Curiosity would have them. For if every perjured or notoriously-wicked person is to be pelted from Heaven with Thunderbolts, people will presume them innocent when-ever they die without this solemn Vengeance done upon them.

Hyl.

Well, I perceive I must produce new Objections, and such as I have thought on more deliberately. For these Philotheus easily blows away.

Philop.

We will give you some little time of respite to consider, VI. Hylobares. For I believe Euistor and his Lucretius will think themselves slighted if no man vouchsafes those Lucretian Instances any Answer. [...]

Fuist.

If Philotheus thinks his hands will be full enough other-waies, I pray you, Philopolis, let Sophron play the Philotheus as well as I have play'd the Hylobares.

Sophr.

[Page 199]

Why truely Philotheus his discourse is able to make us all Philotheusses. And methinks, following his footsteps, it is no such difficult business to answer all those Instances of Lucretius. I shall willingly attempt some of them my self. As that Complaint of the Earth's being run over with Thorns and Thistles, if man by his hand-labour did not cultivate it. For besides that we know that Curse that came upon the Fall, it is fit that we in this life should have something to grapple with, to keep us from Idleness, the Mother of Mischief. And that the Husband-man's pains are sometimes lost by Ill weather, over-much Heat, or Wet, or the like; he is taught thereby not to sacrifice to his own Net, but to depend upon God, and to give him the praise when he is successfull, as also to be frugal and provident, and to lay up for an hard year. But for that imputation of so much of the Earth's being unhabitable by reason of extremity of Heat or Cold, we find by [Page 200] experience that it is mostly a mere calumnie of Nature. For the Torrid Zone is habitable, and a considerable part of the Frigid: and that which is not is so little, that it is inconsiderable. And to speak briefly and at once: The Inclination of the Axis of the Earth is so duely proportionated for the making it as habitable as it can be, that the wit of man cannot imagine any posture better. Now for those Allegations, That Rocks and Mountains and Woods and the Sea take up so great a part; what-ever elegancy there may be in Lucretius his Poetry, the Philosophy of such Objections, I am sure, lies very shallow. For it is as unskilfully alledged against Nature that all the Earth is not soft molds, as it would be that any Animal is not all Flesh, but that there is Bloud also and Bones. The Rocks therefore, beside other uses for conveying the subterraneous Water, may serve also for consolidating the Earth. And it is manifest that the Hills are usually the Promptuaries of Rivers [Page 201] and Springs, as Geographers make good by infinite examples. Not to adde what a treasury they are of Minerals and Metalls, and wholesome Pasturage for Sheep, as the Rocks delight the Goats and the Coneys. But the Poet seems to speak so unskilfully, as if he expected all the face of the Earth should be nothing else but rank green Meadow; whenas to exclude the Sea, would be like the draining of an Animal of its Heartbloud. Or if things could be so contrived as that all the Surface of the Earth should be rich Meadow, and the World thereby thick inhabited by men, the Air, in all likelihood, would become so unwholesome, that Plagues and Death would ever and anon sweep away all. Wherefore long Tracts of dry and barren places are the security of so much Health as we enjoy: Which is of more consequence then to have the Earth pester'd so with Inhabitants, and ever and anon to have all to stink with Noisomeness, Pestilence and Death.

Bath.

[Page 202]

And it is questionable, Sophron, whether these places that seem mere forlorn Solitudes be not inhabited by at least as considerable Creatures as Men.

Cuph.

I'll pawn my life, Bathynous means some Aereall Daemons or Spirits.

Bath.

And why not, Cuphophron?

Cuph.

Nay, I know nothing to the contrary.

Hyl.

But I do.

Cuph.

What's that, Hylobares?

Hyl.

Why, I pray you tell me, Cuphophron, how can a Spirit, that is nowhere, be in dry and barren places more then in Meadow-pastures.

Cuph.

Away, Hylobares, you are a very Wag. I perceive you will break your brown study at any time to reach me a rap upon the thumbs.

Euist.

Gentlemen, I know not whether you be in earnest or in jest touching these Aereall Genii in remote Solitudes. But this I can assure you, that besides the usual and frequent fame of the dancing of Fairies [Page 203] in Woods and desolate places, Olaus and other Historians make frequent mention of these things; and that there are Daemones Metallici, that haunt the very inside of Mountains, and are seen to work there when men dig in the Mines. What merriment they also make on the outside of vast and remote Hills, that one Story of Mount Athos may give us an Instance of, Polyhist. c. 37. as the matter is described in Solinus. The impression of the passage sticks still fresh in my memory even to the very words. Silet per diem universus, nec sine horrore secretus est: lucet nocturnis ignibus, choris Aegipanum undique personatur; audiuntur & ca [...]tus tibiarum & tinnitus cymbalorum per oram maritimam. But of a more dreadfull hue is that Desart described by Paulus Venetus, Lib. 1. c. 4 [...] ▪ near the City Lop, as I take it, in the Dominions of the great Cham. ‘This Wilderness, saith he, is very mountainous and barren, and therefore not fit so much as to harbour a wilde Beast, but both by day and [Page 204] (especially) by night there are heard and seen severall Illusions and Impostures of wicked Spirits. For which cause Travellers must have a great care to keep together. For if by lagging behinde a man chance to lose the sight of his company amongst the Rocks and Mountains, he will be called out of his way by these busie Deceivers, who saluting him by his own name, and feigning the voice of some of his Fellow-travellers that are gone before, will lead him aside to his utter destruction. There is heard also in this Solitude sometimes the sound of Drums and Musicall Instruments, which is like to those noises in the night on Mount Athos described by Solinus.’ Wherefore such things as these so frequently occurring in History make Bathynous his Conceit to look not at all extravagantly on it.

Sophr.

Our Saviour's mentioning Spirits that haunt dry places, gives some countenance also to this Conceit of Bathynous.

Euist.

[Page 205]

And so does the very Hebrew word [...], whose Notation is from the field. But all these must be lapsed Spirits therefore.

Bath.

I, as sure as men themselves are lapsed, then which nothing is more, Euistor.

Euist.

And so lapsed Spirits and lapsed men divide the Earth amongst them. And why not the Sea too, Bathynous?

Bath.

You mean the Air over the surface of the Sea: For the Sea is sufficiently well peopled with Fishes.

Euist.

'Tis true.

Sophr.

If this were not as Poeticall as Lucretius his Poetry it self, his Arguments against Providence were very weak indeed. But this is to bring in again the Nereîdes and Oreades of the Pagans.

Euist.

And if so, why not also the Hamadryades and other Spirits of the Woods, that the vast Woods Lucretius complains of may not be left to wilde Beasts onely, no more then the Sea to the Fishes?

Sophr.

[Page 206]

In my apprehension Lucretius seems mightily at a loss for Arguments against Providence, while he is forced thus to fetch them from the Woods.

Cuph.

Because you think, Sophron, that no Arguments can be brought from thence but wooden ones.

Sophr.

Indeed, Cuphophron, I was not so witty: But because the plentifull provision of Wood and Timber is such a substantial pledge of Divine Providence, the greatest Conveniences of life depending thereupon.

Euist.

That is so plain a case, that it is not to be insisted upon. And yet it is not altogether so devoid of difficulty, in that the great Woods are such Coverts for wilde Beasts to garrison in.

Bath.

But you do not consider what a fine harbour they are also for the harmless Birds. But this is the Ignorance and rude Immorality of Lucretius, that out of a streight-lac'd Self-love he phansies all the World so made for Man, that nothing else [Page 207] should have any share therein; whenas all Vnregenerate persons are as arrant brute Animals as these very Animals they thus vilifie and contemn.

Sophr.

I thank you for that, Bathynous; for from hence, methinks, an Answer is easily framed against his Objection from Man's being liable to be infested by horrible and hurtfull Beasts. For considering the general Mass of Mankinde was grown such an Herd of wicked Animals, that is, Beasts, what repugnancy to Providence is it that one Beast invades another for their private advantage? But yet Providence sent in such secret supplies to these Beasts in humane shape, that seemed otherwise worse appointed for fight then their savage enemies armed with cruel Teeth, and Stings, and Horns, and Hoofs, and Claws, (which she did partly by endowing them with such Agility of body and Nimbleness in swarming of trees, as Apes and Monkeys have now, but chiefly by giving them so great a share of Wit and Craft and [Page 208] combining Policy) that Lucretius has no reason to complain against Nature for producing these Objects that do but exercise mens Policy and Courage, and have given them an opportunity of so successfull a Victory, as we see they have obtained in a manner throughout the whole World at this very day. And lastly, for that lamentable Story of the circumstances of the entrance of Infants into this life, it is [...], it is mere poeticall Smoke or Fume, that vanishes in the very uttering of it, and is so far from being a just Subject of Lucretius his complaining Rhetorick against Providence, that it is a pregnant Instance of the exactness and goodness of Providence in Nature. For there being so much wit and care and contrivance in Mankinde, both Male and Female, the weakness and destituteness of the Infant is a gratefull Object to entertain both the skill and compassion of that tenderer Sex, both Mother, Midwife, Nurse, or what other Assistents: Though perhaps [Page 209] there has come in a greater debility in Nature by our own defaults. But how-ever, that Body that was to be an Habitacle for so sensible a Spirit as the humane Soul, ought to be more tender and delicate then that of brute Beasts, according to that Physiognomonicall Aphorism of Aristotle, [...]. Nor is the crying of the Infant so much a presage of the future Evils of life, as a begging of aid against the present from them about him, by this natural Rhetorick which Providence has so seasonably furnished him with. And for Lambs, and Calves, and Cubs of Foxes, they are not so properly said to need no Rattles, as not to be capable of them, they having not so excellent a spirit in them as to be taken up with the admiration of any thing. For the Child's amusement at the Rattle is but the effect of that Passion which is the Mother of Reason and all Philosophy. And for that last of all, That mankinde clothe themselves according to the Seasons of the year, it is [Page 210] their Privilege, not their Defect: For brute Beasts, when it is cold, willingly apply themselves to the Fire. But thus silly are ordinarily the Reasonings of those men that have a minde there should be no God.

Euist.

I promise you, Sophron, you have laid about you very notably, I think; and though I am something taken with the Elegancy of the Poet, yet I must confess I cannot but be convinced that his Reasonings are very weak.

Sophr.

I have answered as well as I could thus extemporarily; and if I have omitted any of the Objections, Hylobares, if he see it worth the while, will resume them, and propose them to Philotheus, who is more exercised in these Speculations.

Philoth.

None more able in this kinde then your self, O Sophron: And I cannot but commend your caution and discretion, that you intimate, that the Fulness and Solidness of the Cause we contend for is not to be measured from what we utter thus extemporarily [Page 211] in the defence thereof; as if we in a moment could finde out all the richness of that Divine Wisedome that is couched in the Contrivance of Nature and in the ordering of the World. It is sufficient that we shew, that even to our present thought such Reasons occurr as are able to stop the mouths of them that are not partially affected, and to give a tast how that, if they would search farther into the Reasons of things without prejudice, they will still finde Nature less faulty, or rather more and more perfect at the bottom.

Philop.

I think it is not without a special Providence, VII. O Hylobares, that you are fallen into the company of so many skilfull and successfull defenders of Providence; Of Death▪ how consistent with the Goodness of Providence. and therefore I desire you would produce the most considerable Scruples that ever diseased your minde. For if any-where, you will here finde a Cure.

Hyl.

I shall produce all, Philopolis, and consequently the most considerable, but in such order as they occurr [Page 212] to my memory. And for the present these are those that swim uppermost in my thoughts; viz. Diseases, War, Famine, Pestilence, Earthquakes, and Death it self, the sad effect of so affrightfull causes. These, methinks, do not so well consist with that benignity of Providence that Philotheus contends for.

Philoth.

These are indeed sad and terrible Names, Hylobares; but I hope to make it appear, that the World in general are more scar'd then hurt by these affrightfull Bug-bears. I will begin with that which is accounted the most horrid, I mean, Death it self. For why should mankinde complain of this Decree of God and Nature, which is so necessary and just? I mean not onely in reference to our Lapsed condition, which incurr'd the penalty of Death; but that there is a becoming Sweetness in this Severity, in respect both of the Soul it self, as it is so timely released from this bondage of Vanity, and also in regard of our peccaminous terrestriall Personalities [Page 213] here. For I hold it an Oeconomy more befitting the Goodness of God, to communicate life to a succeeding Series of terrestriall persons, then that one constant number of them should monopolize all the good of the world, and so stifle and forestall all succeeding Generations.

Hyl.

I do not understand that, Philotheus. Why may not a set sufficient number of men, equal to the largest number of the Succession, be as meet an Object of the Divine Goodness, as a continuall Succession of them? For there is an equal communication of good in the one case and in the other.

Philoth.

If there be this equality, it argues an indifferency whether way it be; and therefore it is no flaw in Providence what-ever way it is. But yet I say that way that is taken is the best: because that in this terrestriall condition there would be a satiety of the enjoyments of this life; and therefore it is fit that, as well-saturated Guests, we should [Page 214] at length willingly recede from the Table.

Euist.

I believe Philotheus alludes to that of Lucretius, where he brings in Nature arguing excellently well against the [...]ond Complaints of Mankinde:

Quid tibi tantopere est, mortalis, quòd nimis aegris
Luctibus indulges? quid mortem con­gemis ac fles?
Nam si grata fuit tibi vita ante acta pri
 [...]rque,
Et non omnia, pertusum congesta quasi in vas,
Commoda perfluxêre atque ingrata interiêre,
Cur non ut plenus vitae conviva rece­dis?

Philoth.

But my eye was most upon the following Verses:

Nam tibi praeterea quod machiner in­veniámque
Quod placeat nihil est, eadem sunt omnia semper.
Si tibi non annis corpus jam marcet? & artus


[Page 215]Confecti languent, eadem tamen om­nia restant,
Omnia si pergas vivendo vincere sê­cla.

From whence I would inferr, That there is more joy and pleasure arises to men in this way of Succession of mankinde, then if there were the same men alwaies. And the Theatre of the World is better varied and made more delightfull to the invisible Spectatours of it, as also the Records of History to them that reade them. For it were a dull thing to have alwaies the same Actours upon the Stage. Besides that the varieties of mens Ages would be lost, and the prettinesses of their Passions, and the difference of Sexes, which afford their peculiar pleasures and delights one to another. And there is the same reason for Brutes, who when they die, though they finde not themselves in the other State, as we do, yet they no more miss themselves after Death then they sought themselves before they were born.

Hyl.

[Page 216]

I must confess, Philotheus, that the case is at least so disputable, that a man cannot lay any just charge against Providence from this Topick.

Philoth.

Besides, Hylobares, it seems to be of the very nature of terrestriall Animals to be mortal, and that without the force of a Miracle they cannot endure for ever. What therefore could Providence doe better, then to make their Species immortal by a continued Propagation and Succession? For that is the infirmity of our particular nature to dote upon Individuals: But the Divine Goodness, which is Vniversal, is of a more released and large nature; and since Individuals will be thus fading and mortal, concerns her self onely in the Conservation of the Species. To all which you may adde, That unless you could secure this terrestriall World from Sin and sense of Grief and Pain, not to be able to die, to the generality of men oppressed and tormented by the Tyranny and Wickedness of others, might prove the greatest [Page 217] Infelicity that could befall them. Immortality, Hylobares, joyn'd with Pride and Ambition, would easily bring the World to this pass: And men now, though mortal, yet conceive immortal Enmities one against another.

Hyl.

That's shrewdly suggested, VIII. Philotheus. But admit the necessity of dying, Of Diseases. what necessity or conveniency of the frequentness of Diseases? Which is an Head in Lucretius which Sophron forgot to speak to.

Philoth.

As for Diseases in general, Hylobares, they are as necessary Sequels of the terrestriall Nature as Death it self. But as Death would visit us more slowly, so would Diseases less fiercely and frequently, if it were not for our own Intemperance and irregular Passions; which we are to blame for what we finde most intolerable, and not to tax Providence, which has contrived all for the best, and has let nothing pass without mature judgement and deliberation. For Diseases themselves, though the natural [Page 218] sequels of a mortal Constitution, may well be approved of by the Divine Wisedom for sundry Reasons. As first, While they are inflicted they better the minde in those that are good, and are but a just Scourge to them that are evil; and the pleasure of Recovery doth ordinarily more then compensate the over-past misery in both. So little cause have either to complain of the neglect of Providence in such visitations.

Bath.

Nay, indeed, I think that mankinde have so little reason to complain, that they have rather a very high obligation to admire and extoll that Providence that suffers so many outward Evils, as they are called, to rove in the World. For where they hit, they frequently put us into such capacities of seriously bethinking our selves of the duties of Piety and Vertue as we should never meet with, for all the boasts of our Free will, unless these heavy weights were cast into the balance to poize against our propensions to follow [Page 219] the Lusts and Pleasures of life, and the ordinary Allurements of the World.

Philoth.

That is excellently well observed indeed, Bathynous.

Hyl.

But I pray you proceed, Phi [...]otheus.

Philoth.

I was observing in the second place, That the sick being a spectacle to them that are wel, make them more sensible of their own Health, and should stir up in them thankfull Devotion towards God their Preserver, and engage them to employ their Health to the best purposes. And lastly, That Diseases are a notable Object of man's art and industry and skill in Medicine: The exercise whereof does very highly gratifie them that are either lovers of Mankinde or of Money. That therefore that does naturally accrue to the condition of a terrestriall Creature, why should God interpose his Omnipotency to disjoin it, especially it bringing along with it such considerable Conveniences? Nor must we think much [Page 220] that sometimes a Disease is invincible: For thereby Sickness becomes more formidable to the Patient, without which it would not prove so good Physick to his Soul; and general success would lessen the estimate of the Cure, and the pleasure of escaping the danger of the Disease; as likewise it would diminish the Joys and Congratulations of Friends and officious Visitants. For it is fit that things should be set home upon our Passions, that our Delights thereby may become more poinant and triumphant.

Hyl.

You come off jollily, IX. methinks, Philotheus, Of War, Famine, Pestilence, and Earthquakes. apologizing thus in the general. But if you will more closely view the particular grim countenances of those more horrid Disasters of mankinde, War, Famine, Pestilence, and Earthquakes, which I intimated before, these one would think should abate your courage.

Philoth.

Concerning these, Hylobares, I answer, first in general, That it is worth our taking noti [...]e of, how Divine Providence has counted upon [Page 221] this extraordinary expense of man's bloud and life, the Generations of men being not considerably scanted for all these four greedy devourers of them. And therefore we ought to consider what a testimony of the Perfection of the works of God in Nature the greatest Disasters of the world are. For if they did not appear, we should think it liable to none, but that it stood wholly on its own leggs. But we now seeing it liable to so great ones, and yet such as are perpetually triumphed over by that Wisedom and Counsel of God that is so peremptorily carried on in the nature of things, we are thereby manifestly convinced of a Providence even from such things as at first sight seem most to contradict it. To which you may adde that eminent use of the Calamitousness of this Scene of things, if we must needs think it so, namely the serious seeking after a Portion in those Regions that are not subject to such horrid Disasters, those Sedes quietae, as your Lucretius calls [Page 222] them, Hylobares, and in imitation of Homer, that more religious Poet, describes them very elegantly. I believe Euistor could recite the Verses.

Euist.

I remember them very well, Philotheus.

Apparet Divûm numen, sedésque qui­etae,
Quas neque concutiunt venti, nec nu­ 
 [...]ila nimbis
Aspergunt, neque nix acri concreta pruinâ
Cana cadens violat, sempérque innu­bilus Aether
Integit, & largè diffuso lumine ri­det.

Hyl.

But I do not intend to be thus put off with an old Song, Philotheus: I desire to hear your account of those four more dismall Particulars I proposed.

Philoth.

Why, that is no such hard Province, Hylobares. For as for War and its effects, it is not to be cast upon God, but on our selves, whose untamed Lusts, having shaken off the yoke of Reason, make us mad after [Page 223] Dominion and Rule over others, and our Pride and Haughtiness impatient of the least Affront or Injury. And for Famine, it is ordinarily rather the effect of War then the defect of the Soil or unkindliness of the Season; which if it were, mens Providence and Frugality might easily prevent any more direfull ill consequences thereof; and present necessities set mens wits on work. And there is also that Communication betwixt Nations and Countries, that Supplies are usually made in such like Exigencies. I confess Plagues and Pestilences would seem more justly chargeable upon God, did we not pull them down upon our selves as deserved Scourges for our Disobedience. And though whole Cities be sometimes swept away with them, as that of Athens and Constantinople, yet we are to consider that such acute Diseases make quick dispatch; which makes Earthquakes in like manner the more tolerable. For whether they be Islands or Cities that are thus swallowed into the ground [Page 224] or sunk into the Sea, it is a present Death and more speedy Buriall. Thus perished those two famous Cities of Achaia, Helice and Buris; as also, according to Plato and some others, an ancient Atlantick Island sunk into the Sea. But what more then ordinary mischief came to the Inhabitants? For the Souls of the good, having once left their Bodies, would easily find way through the Crannies of the Earth or depth of the Sea, and so pass to those Ethereall Seats and mansions of the Blessed. And for the Souls of the bad, what advantage the Atheist can make to himself by inquiring after them I know not. If a man's phancie therefore be not suddenly snatch'd away, these things are nothing so terrible as they seem at first sight; nay, such as we of our own accord imitate in Sea-fights, which have sunk I know not how many thousands of floating Islands thick inhabited, by the thunder and battery of murtherous Cannons. But it is the skill of the great Dramatist to [Page 225] enrich the History of the World with such Tragicall transactions. For were it not for bloudy fightings of Battels and dearly-bought Victories, the strange Changes and Subversions of Kingdoms and Empires, the horrible Narrations of Countries depopulated by devouring Plague and Famine, of whole Cities swallowed down by unexpected Earthquakes, and entire Continents drown'd by sudden Inundations, the Spectatours of this terrestriall Stage-play would even nod for want of something more then ordinarily notorious to engage and hold on their attention. Wherefore these things are not at all amiss for the adorning of the History of Time, and recommending of this Theatre of the World to those that are contemplative of Nature and Providence. For the Records of these fore-past Miseries of other Ages and Places naturally engender a pious Fear in the well-disposed, and make all that hear thereof more sensibly relish their present tranquillity and happiness. And, [Page 226] which is ever to be considered, the unexhaustible stock of the Universe will very easily bear the expense of all these so-amusing Pomps and Solemnities: which therefore give the more ample witness to the Wisedom and Power of the Deity.

Hyl.

But we seek more ample witnesses of his Goodness, O Philotheus.

Philoth.

Why, it is one part of his Goodness thus to display before us his Wisedom and Power, to perfect our Natures, and bring us into admiration and love of himself. For you see all these things have their Usefulness, that is, their advantageous regard to us. For God wants nothing.

Hyl.

Nay, X. I see you will make every thing out, Philotheus. [...]f ill Accidents happ [...]ni [...]g to brute Creatur [...]s, whereby th [...]ir [...] become miserable. Nor dare I adventure to propose to you the Murrain of Cattel or Rots of Sheep, whenas you have already suggested that touching the mortality of men which you will expect should stop my mouth. And I confess you may adde, that they may be swept away sometimes for the Wickedness or Triall of [Page 227] their Owners. And therefore I will not so much insist upon the death of dumb Creatures, as upon such Accidents as may make their lifes more lingringly miserable; as the putting some Limb out of joint, the breaking of a Bone, or the like. For why does not that invisible Power that invigilates over all things prevent such sad Accidents? it being as easie for him that made them to keep them from harm, as it was to make them; he being able to doe all things without any trouble or disturbance to himself, and being so good and benign as to despise none of his innocent Creatures.

Philoth.

This is pertinently urged, Hylobares. But I answer, That God has made the World as a complete Automation, a Machina that is to move upon its own Spring and Wheels, without the frequent recourse of the Artificer; for that were but a Bungle. Wherefore that the Divine Art or Skill incorporate into Matter might be manifest, absolute Power does not interpose, but the condition of every [Page 228] thing is according to the best Contrivance this terrene Matter is capable of. Wherefore these ill Accidents that happen to living Creatures testifie that there is nothing but the ordinary Divine Artifice modifying the Matter that keeps up the Creature in its natural condition and happiness. Whereby the Wisedome of God is more clearly and wonderfully set out to us; that notwithstanding the frailty of the Matter, yet the carefull Organization of the Parts of a Creature does so defend it from mischief, that it very seldom happens that it falls into such harms and casualties as you specifie. But if an immediate extraordinary and absolute Power did always interpose for the safety of the Creature, the efficacy of that Intellectual Contrivance of the Matter into such Organs and Parts would be necessarily hid from our knowledge, and the greatest pleasure of natural Philosophy come to nothing. Which is of more concernment then the perpetuall security of the Limbs of every [Page 229] Beast; especially it happening so very seldome that any of them are either strain'd or broken, unless it be long of us, and then Providence is acquitted.

Hyl.

How long of us, Philotheus? For these mischances are incident to more Creatures then we ride on, or make to draw at either Plough, Coach, or Cart.

Philoth.

As for example, when one shoots at a flock of Pigeons or a flush of Ducks, do you expect that Divine Providence should so guide the shot that it should hit none but what it kill'd outright, and not send any away with a broken leg? By the same reason neither should it be in our power to break the leg of a Bird, if she were in our hands. And, which is of greater moment, the Judge should be struck dumb so soon as he began to give Sentence against the Innocent; the Sword should fall out of the hand of him that maintains an unjust Quarrell; the lips of the Priest should be miraculously sealed up so [Page 230] soon as he began to vent false Doctrines, and delude the people with Lies; and the dangerous Physick of either an unskilfull or villainous Physician should never be able to finde the way to the mouth of the credulous Patient. The sense of which would be, That God should make man a free Creature, and yet violently determine him to one part. Which would make useless the sundry Faculties of the Soul, prevent the variety of Orders of men, silence these busie Actours on this Stage of the Earth, and by this palpable Interposall, as it were, bring Christ to Judgement before the time. Thus would the Ignorance and Impatience of the unskilfull raise the Theatre before the Play be half done, the intricacy of the Plot making the Spectacle tedious to them that understand it not. But let the Atheist know there will be a [...], Christ coming in the Clouds, that shall salve up all, whom he shall see at length to his own sorrow and confusion.

Philop.

[Page 231]

Excellently good indeed, Philotheus!

Hyl.

And it is well it is so, Philopolis, for otherwise it were intoler [...]ble. For he repeats but what he said before upon my first Objection. But [...].

Philop.

I pray you, Philotheus, proceed.

Philoth.

In the mean time God has not left us without excuse, having given us the admirable works of Nature and the holy Oracles to exercise our Faith and Reason. But so frequent and palpable Interpellations in humane affairs would take away the Usefulness of both, and violently compell, not persuade, the free Creature. And thus would our Intellectuals lose their most proper and pleasant Game, the seeking out God by his footsteps in the Creation. For this were to thrust himself upon us whether we would or no, not to give us the pleasure and exercise of searching after him in the tracts of Nature; in which there is this surprizing [Page 232] Delight, that if we meet with any thing that seems less agreeable at first sight, let us use the greatest wit we can to alter it, upon farther triall we shall finde that we have but made it worse by our tampering with it. So that we alwaies finde that what-ever Evil there is in the World, it is to be charged upon the incapability of the Creature, not the envy or over-sig [...]t of the Creatour. For did things proceed from such a Principle as want [...]d either Skill or Goodness, that were not God.

Hyl.

That is acknowledged on both sides. XI. But this is the thing we sweat at, of the Cruelty and Rapacity of Animals. to make the Phaenome [...]a of the World correspond with so excellent a Principle. Which, methinks, nothing does so harshly grate against as that Law of Cruelty and Rapine, which God himself seems to have implanted in Nature amongst ravenous Birds and Beasts. For things are there as he has made them, and it is plain in the Talons, Beaks, Paws and Teeth of these Creatures, that they [Page 233] are armed fittingly for that Tragicall design. Besides that Commission that man hath over the lives of them all.

Cuph.

I am heartily glad to see this puzzling Objection brought upon the Stage; not that I would have the cause of Providence any way entangled or prejudiced, but that there is so fit an opportunity of shewing the unparallel'd usefulness (in the greatest exigencies) of the peculiar Notions of that stupendious Wit Des-Cartes: amongst which that touching Brutes being mere Machina's is very notorious.

Philop.

So it is indeed, O Cuphophron.

Cuph.

And the usefulness here as notorious. For it takes away all that conceived hardship and misery that brute Creatures undergo, either by our rigid Dominion over them, or by their fierce Cruelty one upon another. This new Hypothesis sweeps away all these Difficulties at one stroke.

Hyl.

[Page 234]

This is a subtil invention indeed, Cuphophron, to exclude brute Creatures always from Life, that they may never cease to live.

Cuph.

You mistake me, Hylobares; I exclude them from life, that they may never die with Pain.

Hyl.

Why, few men but die so, Cuphophron, and yet scarce any man but thinks it worth the while to have lived, though he must die at last in such circumstances. And there not being that Reflexiveness nor so comprehensive and presagient an Anxiety or present deep Resentment in Brutes in their suffering as in rational Creatures, that short Pain they undergo when they are devoured by one another cannot be considerable nor bear the thousandth proportion to that Pleasure they have reaped in their life. So that it is above a thousand times better that they should be animated with sensitive life, then be but mere Machina's.

Philop.

Truly, methinks Hylobares argues very demonstratively against [Page 235] you, Cuphophron; and that therefore the Cartesian Hypothesis in this case is so far from helping out any Difficulty in Divine Providence, that it were the greatest Demonstration in the world against the Goodness thereof, if it were true; namely, That such an infinite number of Animals, as we call them, capable of being so truly, and of enjoying a vital happiness, should be made but mere senseless Puppets, and devoid of all the joys and pleasure of life.

Hyl.

I expect a better Answer from Philotheus, or else I shall be very much left in the dark.

Philoth.

My Answer in brief is this: That this is the Sport that the Divine Wisedome affords the Contemplative in the speculation of her works, in that she puzzles them at the first sight even to the making of her self suspected of some Oversight, and that she has committed some offence against the sacred nature of God, which is Goodness and Iustice it self; which yet they afterwards more accurately [Page 236] scanning finde most of all agreeable to that Rule. As certainly it is here. For what is so just as that Aphorism of Pythagoras his School, [...], that the worse is made for the better? And what so good wisedome, as to contrive things for the highest enjoyment of all? For I say, as I said before, That Divine Providence in the generations of Fishes, Birds and Beasts, cast up in her account the Supernumeraries that were to be meat for the rest. And Hylobares is to prove whether so many Individuals of them could come into the World and continue so in succession, if they were not to be lessened by this seeming cruel Law of feeding one upon another. And besides, we see sundry Species of living Creatures this way the most pleasantly and transportingly provided for. For how delightfull a thing it is for them by their craft and agility of body to become masters of their Prey, men that make to themselves a fortune by their own wit, policy and [Page 237] valour, let them be Judges. Where something of consequence is in chace, it makes the pleasure of the Game more solid, fills the Faculties with more vigour and alacrity, and makes the Victory more savoury and valuable. As running for a wager makes a man feel his limbs with more courage and speed, and finde himself more pleased that he has overcome his Antagonist. Wherefore the Animal life in Beasts and Birds (and they were never intended for any thing higher) is highly gratify'd by this exercise of their strength and craft, and yet the Species of all things very copiously preserved. But to complain that some certain numbers are to be lopp'd off, which notwithstanding must at last die, and if they lived and propagated without any such curb, would be a burthen to the Earth and to themselves for want of food, it is but the Cavill of our own Softness and ignorant Effeminacy, no just charge against God or Nature. For the Divine Wisedome freely and generously [Page 238] having provided for the whole, does not, as Man, dote on this or that Particular, but willingly lets them go for a more solid and more Universal good. And as for Beeves and Sheep, the more ordinary food of Man, how often is the Countrey-man at a loss for Grass and Fodder for them? Judge then what this foolish pity of ever sparing them would bring upon them. They would multiply so fast, that they would die for famine and want of food.

Hyl.

What you say, Philotheus, I must confess is not immaterial. But yet, methinks, it looks very harshly and cruelly, that one living Creature should fall upon another and slay him, when he has done him no wrong.

Philoth.

Why, Hylobares, though I highly commend this good nature in you, yet I must tell you it is the Idioticalness of your phancie that makes you thus puzzled in this case. For you phansie Brutes as if they were Men: whenas they have no other [Page 239] Law then the common Law of Nature, which is the Law of Self-love, the cravings of which they will satisfie, what-ever is incommodated thereby. As the Fire will burn if it take hold, though to the consumption of a whole Forest, notwithstanding the Wood never did the Fire any hurt, that it should use it so: so every Animal would satisfie its own craving appetite, though it were by the devouring of all the world beside. This every Sparrow, Titmouse or Swallow would doe. So that if you will indulge to that phancy, they are all wicked alike; and therefore it need not seem so harsh that the Devourers are also to be devoured. But it is the most true and Philosophicall apprehension, to impute no more wickedness to devouring Brutes then to swallowing Gulfs of the Sea or devouring Fire.

Hyl.

Why, XII. Philotheus, that is the thing I was going to object in the next place; Of the Rage of the Element [...], the Poison of Serpents, and Wrath of wilde Beasts. I mean, as well the Rage of the Elements, as the Wrath of wilde [Page 240] Beasts, and several Monstrosities of Creatures that occurr, whether whole Species or single Individuals. For do not these discover some malignancy in the Principles of the World, inconsistent with so lovely and benign an Authour as we seek after?

Euist.

I can tell you an Hypothesis, Hylobares, that will sufficiently solve this Objection, if you and I could close with it.

Hyl.

I warrant you mean the Behmenicall, the corruption of the Divine Sal-nitre by the Rebellion of Lucifer against his Maker. These things I admire at a distance, Euistor, but, as you say, I have not an heart to close with them. For I cannot believe that there is any might or counsell that can prevail against God; or that he can overshoot himself so far, as to give the staffe out of his own hands in such a measure as is taught in that Hypothesis. Wherefore, Philotheus, I desire a more credible account of these things from you.

Philoth.

I shall offer you, Hylobares, [Page 241] a very easie and intelligible Supposition.

Hyl.

I pray you what is it, Philotheus? I long to hear it.

Philoth.

Onely this; That this Stage of the Earth and the comprehension of its Atmosphere is one of the meanest, the least glorious and least happy Mansions in the Creation; and that God may make one part of the Creation less noble then another, nay it may be his Wisedom requires it should be so at length in process of time; as the Art of Painting requires dark Colours as well as those more bright and florid in well-drawn Pictures. Therefore I say the nature of things, even of all of them, Sin onely excepted, is but less good here, not truly evil or malignant.

Hyl.

How does that appear, Philotheus?

Philoth.

It is manifest, for example, that there is no such malignant heat as is supposed in Fire, but all is sound and sacred, if it be in due measure and in right circumstances apply'd. [Page 242] For it is well known that the gentle and comfortable Rays of the Sun may be so crouded together in one point by the artifice of Glasses, that they will be so furiously hot as to melt hard metalline bodies. And little question is to be made but that there are certain particles, good store, in Nature, of a form long and flexible, that the ordinary heat of the Sun raising into a Vapour, and he or some higher Principle still more strongly agitating them, will cause mighty Winds and Tempests, and these Tempests vehemently toss the Sea, and make it rage and roar. But that Sea-voiages become dangerous by this means, is but the exercise of the wit and observation of man, and has occasioned a more accurate Art of Navigation. And if some Ships notwithstanding be cast away, it ever makes the Passenger that has any Piety in him pay his Vows at Land with greater religion and devotion. And for the Wrath of Beasts, it has nothing more diabolicall in it then [Page 243] natural Choler and the flames of Fire, which do no more hurt then the pure beams of the Sun passing through a pure Glass, whose figure onely makes them burn. But the power of God indeed seems more barely set out in these fierce Beasts of prey, such as the Lion, Bear, and Tiger, and is yet more terrible in huge scaled Dragons and Serpents. But if these kind of Creatures bear any mischief or poison in their teeth or tails or their whole bodie, that poison is nothing but disproportionality of particles to the particles of our own or other Animals bodies. And Nature has armed us with caution, flight and abhorrency from such dreadfull Spectacles. But we must not make our abhorrency the measure and true estimate of others Natures. For those poisonous Creatures are not poisonous to their own kinde, and are so far from mutual abhorrency, that they are joyned in the nearest link of love that can be, whereby they propagate their Species. [Page 244] Wherefore these Objects of so terrible an aspect are not evil in themselves, but being capable of the delights of the Animal life as well as any other, and being so egregiously direfull to behold, as living Symbols of that Attribute of Power unqualified with Goodness, they were rightly brought into Being in this Region of Sin, as ready Instruments of Divine Wrath, notorious Ornaments of the Theatre of the World, and a great enrichment of the History of Nature, which would be defective, did it not run from one extreme to another. For even variety of sweet things cloy, and there is no remedy so good as the mixture of sharp, bitter and sowr.

And therefore those more sacred and congruous Laws of Nature are sometimes violated by her own Prerogative, XIII. as is manifest in the birth of Monsters; Of Monstrositi [...]s i [...] Nature. which I look upon as but a piece of Sportfulness in the order of things, as when a well-favoured Boy makes a wry mouth out of wantonness, [Page 245] whereupon the sudden composure of his countenance into its natural frame seems the more lovely and amiable. But for these prodigious Deviations, they are not many. For it is the rarity of them that invites the people to look after them. And it is a plain argument they are well pleased with these novel Spectacles, they so willingly parting with their moneys to have the sight of them. For these diversities of Objects in the World variously touch the minds of men, playing upon their severall Affections and Faculties as a Musician on the sundry Keys of an Organ or Virginals. And that Stop which is a Discord of it self, yet not being too long stood upon, makes the succeeding Harmony more sweet. And so it is in that which is uglily defective or misshapen, it quickens the sense of that due Shape and Elegancy we see ordinarily in other things. But that there are whole Nations absolutely monstrous or misshapen, such as the Cynocephali, Acephali, Monoculi, Monocoli, & [Page 246] the like, it will be then time enough to answer to that Difficulty, when the truth of the Story is cleared. The probability of which I think Euistor is as able to judge of as most men, he taking so special a felicity in reading of Histories.

Euist.

That there are such monstrous Nations mentioned in History, O Philotheus, it cannot be dissembled. But for the credibility of the Story or pertinency to this Subject, that is not so clear. For in my apprehension Historians do very much betray their vanity in the very circumstances of what they relate. As in the Monocoli of Tartarie, which, they say, have but one Arm as well as but one Leg; but they adde, that they run so swift on that single Hand and Foot, that no Horse can keep pace with them. Which if it were true, what great charge could be laid against Nature for making so admirable and usefull a Fabrick? There is also a People near California, called Enoticoeti, which they say have long Ears that [Page 247] reach to the very ground, but withall so large and thin and limber, that they hang like a Skarf behinde or before them; which they spread and lie in a-nights on the ground, (if any be so foolish as to believe it:) from whence they are called Enoticoeti, as having their Ears for Sheets to lie in. So that when they travel they may in utramque aurem dormire, and be afraid of no contagion but what they carry with them.

Cuph.

This is a pretty privilege, Euistor. But I would be very loth to be so liable to be lugg'd by the Ears up and down as they are, for all their security of wholesom Sheets.

Euist.

For my part, I must confess, I look upon it as a very Fable; as I do also upon those several Stories of the Monoculi. And S ^r Iohn Mandevill, to outbid the mendacity of all his predecessours, thought it not enough to feign Nations with one Eye in their heads onely, but also such as had none at all, but onely two Holes like empty Sockets where the lights [Page 248] should be placed. But to give you my conjecture, I think the first occasion of this fable of the Monoculi was raised from the Scythian Arimaspi, which were famed to be such, and indeed have their name from thence, as Eustathius notes upon Dionysius Afer, [...].

Philop.

What's that, Euistor?

Euist.

[...] in the Scythian language is as much as one, and [...] as much as to say an Eye. So that Arimaspus signifies as much as one-ey'd. And Aeschylus in the same Authour calls them [...], the one-ey'd Army, as being excellently-well-exercised Archers, and having by frequent winking on one eye lessened it so much as in a manner to have lost the use of it. I believe there is no more in it then this; and can hardly conclude with Eustathius, that in process of time they begot Children quite deprived of one of their Eyes. But be that how it will, that was no fail of Nature, but a fault of their own. But surely from such slight hints as these [Page 249] might so many loud Lies be spred abroad in the world. And when they had once brought it to one Eye, they might then place it according to the easiness of their phancy, not on one side of the Nose, but, as Pliny does those of the Arimaspi, Hist. Nat. l. 7. c. 2. in the midst of their forehead.

And as for the Acephali, they might be nothing but some strong hutchback'd people, that having their Heads very low and their Shoulders high, men in humour and derision might say that they had their Mouths in their Breasts and their Eyes in their Shoulders. For men love to express themselves so as to raise admiration.

And lastly, for the Cynocephali, it is a thing incredible, and betrays the falseness by the circumstances of the Report. As that they understand one another by Barking and Howling, and partly by Signs with their hands and fingers; that they have long Tails like Dogs, and that they engender as Dogs do, and that the [Page 250] humane way is by them, forsooth, accounted more shamefull and dishonest. I believe the truth of the existence of those Apes that are called Cynocephali gave the first ground to this amplify'd Fable; [...]ist. Nat. l. 5. c. 15. which you may see more enlarged in Eusebius Neirimbergius, but rejected even by him as a vain Report.

And as the Cynocephali are but Brutes, so I conceive those terrible men with Horns beyond Cathay, and those humane shapes with long Tails that straggle on the mountainous parts of the Island Borneo, with other sportfull Variations and Deviations from the usual Figure of Man, were but so many several kinds of Satyrs, Monkeys and Baboons, that are of a middle nature betwixt Men and Beasts, as the sundry sorts of Plant-animals are betwixt Beasts and Trees. And as the perfectest of Plant-animals come very near an absolute Animal, as the Boranetz not far from the Caspian Sea amongst the Tartars; so the perfectest of Satyrs and Apes may very [Page 251] well come so near Mankinde that they may be suspected to be of humane Race. But that they can ever be improved to the accomplishment of a Man, I think as little probable, as the turning of a Zoophyton into a perfect Animal.

Philop.

On my word, Hylobares, Euistor has laid about him more then ordinary in this point.

Hyl.

I must confess, Philopolis, that Euistor has spoke so probably touching these Stories of humane Monstrosities, that I cannot have the face upon so uncertain Reports to lay a charge against Providence, whose exactness is so conspicuous in things of assured and certain knowledge. And therefore I would now pass from this Classis of natural Evils, if that three more of this kinde (if I may call them all natural) did not forcibly detain me. For indeed they are such as do more amuze me and dissettle me then any I have yet proposed.

Philoth.

I pray, what are those, Hylobares?

Hyl.

[Page 252]

That sad Spectacle of natural Fools, XIV. of Mad-men, and of men from their very childhood irreclamably Wicked. Of Fools, Mad-men, and men irreclamably Wicked from their very birth. I cannot devise how such Phaenomena as these can well comport with so benign a Providence as you seem to plead for. To me, Philotheus, they are the most dismall sights in the world.

Philoth.

And, to deal ingenuously with you, Hylobares, there is nothing does more contristate and melancholize my spirit then any reflexions upon such Objects. But yet I cannot conclude but that God may be exactly Good and Just in his dealings with men for all this. For we must consider that Mankinde by their Fall are lapsed into a parallel condition with that of Beasts in a manner, and, by their being invested with these terrestrial Induments, do put themselves into all those hazards that the Brutal life is obnoxious to, that is to say, not onely the Diseases of the Body, but the Maladies also of those better Faculties of Perception and Imagination, [Page 253] of natural Wit and Sagacity, and of natural Humour and Disposition. The distemper of any of these seizes the Soul, if it meet with so ill a fitted Body. For we see that some Beasts are egregiously more sottish and slow then others of their own kinde, and more mischievous and unmanageable, as is observable in Dogs and Horses. And several Brutes are capable of becoming mad. These mischiefs follow this terrestrial Fate of things, which none can be secure from but those that inhabit not in these houses of clay. And who knows but he that is born a natural Fool, if he had had natural Wit, would have become an arrant Knave? which is an hundred times worse. And to have been in a capacity of being good, and yet to range out into all manner of Wickedness, is more horrible then to have ever had a senselesness of what is pious and vertuous uninterruptedly from the very birth. And as for Mad-men, it is notoriously known that the greatest cause is ordinarily [Page 254] Immorality, Pride, the want of Faith in God, or inordinate love of some outward Object. But no Madness but that which is purely a Disease is to be charged upon Providence: for which there is the like Apologi [...] as for other Diseases; which if we should admit they did not always good to the afflicted, yet it cannot be denied but that they do very naturally tend to the bettering of the Spectatours, as this sad Object of Madness ought to doe; to make men humble and modest, and masters of their Passions, and studious of purification of Soul and Body, and close adherers to the Deity, that so horrid a distemper may never be able to seize them; to keep down the ferocity of Desire, and to be wholly resigned to the Will of God in all things, and not to seek a man's self no more then if he were not at all; not to love the Praise of men, nor the Pride of the world, nor the Pleasures of life, but to make it his entire pleasure to be of one Will with [Page 255] his Maker, nor to covet any thing but the accomplishment of his will in all things.

Hyl.

This Divine Madness, you will say, Philotheus, will extinguish all natural Madness, as the pure light of the Sun does any course terrestriall Fire.

Philoth.

This Divine Sobriety, Hylobares, will keep our animal spirits safe and sober.

Bath.

I conceive, Philotheus, that Hylobares may not call that excellent state of the Soul a Divine Madness out of any reproach to it, but for the significancy of the expression. For Madness is nothing else but an Ecstaticalness of the Soul, or an Emotion of the Minde, so that a man is said not to be himself, or to be beside himself. The misery of which in natural Madness is, that he being thus unhindged, he roves and is flung off at randome whither it happens, or lock'd into some extravagant phancy or humour that is to no purpose, or else to ill purpose. But Divine Madness is, [Page 256] when a man by studiously and devotionally quitting himself and his own animal desires through an intire purification of his spirit, being thus loosened from himself, is laid fast hold on by the Spirit of God, who guides this faithfull and well-fitted Instrument, not according to the ignorant or vicious modes of the World, but his motions keep time to that Musick which is truly holy, Seraphicall and Divine, I mean, to the measures of sound Reason and pure Intellect.

Hyl.

I meant no worse, Bathynous, then you intimate; but you have apologized more floridly and Rhetorically for me then I could have done for my self. And therefore this rub being removed, I beseech you, Philotheus, proceed in your well-begun Apologie touching those Difficulties in Providence which I last propounded.

Philoth.

I will adde therefore these two considerations. First, That this Life is short, and that no more is required of these ill-appointed persons [Page 257] for Wisedom and Vertue then proportionally to the Talent committed to them. So that their danger is diminished according to the lessening of the measure of their Capacities. Secondly, That it is our Phancie rather then our Reason that makes us imagine these Objects so much more sad and deplorable, then what we see in the ordinary sort of men. For, as I was intimating before, which of these two is the more deplorable state, to be a Fool by Fate or upon choice? And are not all things Toies and Fools-baubles and the pleasures of Children or Beasts, excepting what is truly Moral and Intellectual? And how few, I pray you, amongst many thousands do seriously spend their studies in any thing weightily Moral or Intellectual, but fiddle away their time as idlely as those tha [...] pill Straws or tie knots on Rushes in a fit of Deliration or Lunacy? The Wits of this Age contend very much for this Paradox, That there is no other Happiness then Content; but it is [Page 258] the Happiness of natural Fools, to finde their Content more easily and certainly then these very Wits. And there is in this case much the same reason of Mad-men as of Fools. And what is the gaudiness of Fools Coats but the gallantry of these Wits, though not altogether so authentickly in fashion? Besides, this may excuse Providence something, that the generality of men do usually flock after Fools and Mad-men, and shew themselves delighted with the Object.

Bath.

They are pleased, it may be, to see some more mad and sottish then themselves, and so congratulate to themselves the advantage and preeminency, as they phansie, of their own condition.

Hyl.

It may be they approch to them as to alluring Looking-glasses, wherein they may so lively discern their own Visages.

Philoth.

You may have spoken more truly in that, Hylobares, then you are aware of, saving that generally [Page 259] men are more foolish and mad then these Looking-glasses can represent them. Nihil tam absurdè dici potest quod non dicatur ab aliquo Philosophorum, is a saying of Cicero. And if the Philosophers themselves be such fools, what are the Plebeians? Could ever any thing more sottish or extravagant fall into the minde of either natural Fool or Mad-man, then, That the eternall God is of a corporeall nature and shape; That the World and all the parts of it, the organized Bodies of men and beasts not excepted, are the result of a blinde Iumble of mere Matter and Motion without any other guide? What more phrantick then the figment of Transubstantiation, and of infallible Lust, Ambition, and Covetousness? Or what more outrageous specimen of Madness, then the killing and slaying for the Non-belief of such things? A man is accounted a natural Fool for preferring his Bauble before a bag of Gold; but is not he a thousand times more foolish that preferrs a bag of Gold, a puff of Honour, a [Page 260] fit of transient Pleasure, before the everlasting Riches, Glory and Joys of the Kingdome of Heaven? No man wonders that a Mad-man unadvisedly kills another; and if he did it advisedly and of set purpose, yet it being causelessly and disadvantageously to himself, he is reputed no less mad. How notoriously mad then are those that, to their own eternall damnation, depopulate Countries, sack Cities, subvert Kingdoms, and not onely martyr the bodies of the pious and righteous, but murther the Souls of others, whom by fraud or violence they pollute with Idolatrous and impious practices; and all this for that gaudy Bauble of Ambition, and a high Conceit of one Vniversal Spiritual Monarch, that ought to wallow in Wealth, and tumble in all the fleshly and sensual Delights of this present World? Wherefore, to speak my judgement freely, Hylobares, seeing that there would be such abundance of men mad and foolish and wicked according to the ordinary [Page 261] guize of the world, it does not misbeseem the Goodness of Providence to anticipate this growing degeneracy in some few, by making them Fools and Mad-men as it were by birth or fate: that Folly and Madness being represented to the sons of men in a more unusual disguise, by hooting at it, they may doe that piece of justice as to reproch themselves thereby, who are upon their own cost and charges more reprehensibly wicked then they that never came within any capacity of being vertuous, (if there be any such) and more outrageously mad and abominably sottish in the eyes of him that can judge rightly, then any natural Fool or Bedlam; or rather, that using that seasonable reflexion which Plato somewhere commends upon the consideration of the ill carriage of others, [...], they may finde by such analogies as I have hinted at, that they are far worse Fools and Mad-men then are hooted at in the Streets, and so for very shame amend their lives, and [Page 262] become truly wise and vertuous. For what can be more effectuall for the raising an horrour and detestation of what is ugly and dishonest in our selves, then the reflexion, that what we so abhorr in others is more in our selves both as to degrees and other circumstances; and that whereas others may seem an Object of pity, our selves deserve the highest reproof and scorn?

So that you see, XV. Hylobares, The best Use to be made of the saddest Seene of the things of this World. that even in these pieces of Providence that seem most forlorn, most dark and desperate, a very comfortable account of the Divine Goodness does unexpectedly emerge and shine forth. Which would still clear up into a more full satisfaction, the more leisure and ability we had to search into things. But if you cannot keep your Eye from being fixed on the black side of Providence rather then on the bright side thereof, and must ruminate on the particular Evils of Plagues and Pestilences, of War and Famine, of devouring Earthquakes, [Page 263] of that cruel and savage custome of both Birds, Beasts and Fishes, in preying and feeding one upon another, which is a shadow of the most outrageous Violence and Iniquity imaginable; if you will melancholize your Phancie with the remembrance of the groans of the maimed and sick, the dread of ravenous Beasts and poisonous Serpents, the destroying Rage of the Elements, the outrageousness of the Distracted, and the forlornness and desolateness of that forsaken Habitacle, the Body of a natural Fool, (whom therefore we most usually call a mere Body;) this consideration also has its grand use, and it is fit that so sunk a condition of mankinde as this terrestriall life is should be charged with such a competency of Tragicall Fatalities as to make the considerate seriously to bethink himself of a better state, and recount with himself if he be not, as they say, in a wrong box, if he be not stray'd from his native Countrey, and therefore, as the Platonists [Page 264] exhort, [...], if he ought not seriously to meditate a return, and to die betimes to this World, that Death at last striking off the Fetters of this mortal Body, the Soul may emerge far above the steam of this Region of Misery and Sin. O praeclarum diem, cùm ad divinum illud Animorum concilium coetúmque proficiscar, cúmque ex hac turba ac colluvione discedam!

Euist.

It is part of that excellent Speech of Cato to Scipio and Laelius. What say you now, Hylobares, to Philotheus his assoiling these your last and most puzzling and confounding Difficulties about natural Evils?

Hyl.

I say Philotheus discourses excellently well, XVI. Euistor, How the Entrance of Si [...] i [...]to the [...]orld can consist with the Goodness of Pro [...]ide [...]ce. and beyond my expectation. And I cannot deny but that there being such a Lapsed state of mankinde, that Providence upon this supposition does manage things to the best even in those Phaenomena we call natural Evils; and that the frame of things, taking them in their full comprehension, could [Page 265] scarce be better, so far as my understanding reaches, then it is. But the greatest Difficulty of all remains touching this sinfull Lapse, (which is the second Head of Evils I had in my thoughts to propose to Philotheus) That Providence should ever suffer so abominable, so diabolicall and destructive a thing as Sin ever to appear on this Stage of the Universe: a thing that has brought in such a Tragicall train of Miseries upon us, and is in it self so detestable and hatefull both to God and man. I know not how to make sense of these things.

Cuph.

I am even glad at heart to see Hylobares so much puzzled with this Difficulty, it giving me the opportunity, with Philotheus his leave, to raise him into as high a pleasure by the agreeableness and perspicuity of the Solution. And, methinks, I finde upon me a very great impetus of spirit to doe him this friendly office.

Philoth.

I pray you proceed then, Cuphophron; I hope your success will be the better.

Cuph.

[Page 266]

That I shall doe right willingly: For I hold it a matter of great importance, that mankinde have a right understanding of one another's actions and manners, and that they be not over-harshly censorious, and think every thing Infernall and Diabolicall that is not in so high a degree Good as the rest. For my purpose is, O Philopolis, to clear unto the world such Principles as may sweeten the Passions of men, or excite in them onely the sweet Passions, and take off all Anger, Hatred, and Indignation against their mutuall carriages; that seeing so little hurt done or meant, they may live quietly and neighbourly one with another.

Philop.

That is an excellent Plot, O Cuphophron, and very advantageous to as many of us Justices of Peace as desire to get as much time as we can to bestow upon the more profitable parts of Philosophy. But I would rightly understand this Plot of yours.

Cuph.

I perceive Hylobares (which [Page 267] is a symptome of his great sense of Vertue) looks upon that which we ordinarily call Sin or Wickedness to have such an essential and infernal Poison and hellish Perverseness in it, so abominable and detestable, and so contrary and repugnant to the nature of God, that it seems a Contradiction that they should both coexist in the world together, but that the wrath of the Almighty ought to have thunder-struck or stifled so horrid a Monster in the very birth, not onely by reason of those natural Evils it unavoidably brings upon mankinde, but even for its own diabolical Vgliness and Detestableness. But for my part, Gentlemen, I commend his zeal more then his judgement, in his adhering to so groundless an imagination.

Sophr.

I wish, Cuphophron, you beginning so daringly, that your judgement do not prove as little as your zeal. You are such an extoller of the sweet Passions, and so professed an enemy to those more grim and severe ones, that I fear, to bid adieu to [Page 268] them for the milder repose of our mindes, you would persuade us to shake hands and be friends with Sin it self.

Cuph.

You know not what I would, Sophron, nor I scarce my self; but something I am very big of, and desire your Assistence or Patience in my delivering of my self of it.

Hyl.

I pray you let it be neatly then, and a cleanly conveiance, O Cuphophron.

Cuph.

It shall be very dry and clean. XVII. For it shall be onely a disquisition touching the mere nature of Sin and Wickedness, Cuphophron's Lunatick Apologic whereby he would extenuate the [...]ainous [...]ss of Si [...]. in what it consists: Whence we shall make the duest estimate of the Poison of its condition. And I wish my breath may be as gratefull and agreeable to your eares, as this fresh Evening-aire, wafted through the sides of my Arbour, and steeped in the cooling beams of the moist Moon, (whose strained light through the shadow of the Leaves begins to cast a tremulous Chequer-work on the Table, [Page 269] our Clothes and Faces) is delightfull and comfortable to my heated Temples.

Philop.

It begins indeed to be late of the Night, Cuphophron, but it is not the less pleasant to continue our discourse in this chequer'd Moonshine, especially you having thus raised our expectations. Wherefore I pray you proceed.

Cuph.

In my judgement no man has so luckily pointed at the true nature of Wickedness as Mercurius Trismegistus, in that short saying, [...], That Wickedness is connate or natural to Beasts. Which yet I am so far from believing in that sense the words sound in, that I hold it incompetible to them. But rather, as that mirrour of Wisedom, Moses, has defined in his Law, when the Leprosie is all over a man, no part untainted, that he is to be reputed as clean; so Brutes, who are constituted onely of Sense and the Animal Affections, without any participation of an higher Principle, they are [Page 270] uncapable of Sin. And if there were any Rational Animals, be they in what shape they will, from the sight of whose mindes that higher Principle was ever excluded fatally and naturally, they would be as the Mosaicall Leper, or rather as an ordinary Brute, devoid both of Sin and Conscience, relishing onely the Laws of the Animal Life: wherein when we have considered how much there is of the Divine Wisedome and Goodness that contrived them, we shall not have so venemous a conceit concerning the Creation of God, or be cast upon Manicheism or Gnosticism, phansying the sign of the Devil's paw, or senting the Sulphur of Hell in every thing as strongly as the Bishop's foot in milk burnt to the Skillet bottom.

Nay, I may say that those mysterious depths of Satan which the Theosophers so diligently discover, such as are Ipseity, Egoity, or Selfishness, it is nothing else but that sovereign or radicall Principle in the Animal [Page 271] life, which is Self-love. Of which if there be no necessity in Nature that it should be, (as indeed we see sometimes the Affections of Creatures to be carried out so to others that they forget themselves) yet it was fit for Divine Providence to settle this Principle in them all, That every thing should love it self very heartily and provide for it self; as the Roots of Trees without all scruple draw to themselves all the nourishment they are capable of, not regarding what Tree withers, so they flourish, in which notwithstanding there is nothing of either Devil or Sin.

But now that Providence did very well in implanting so smart a Self-love in every Animal, is manifest. For those more notable Functions of the Animal life, such as depend on Strength and Agility, Craft and Sagacity, could not be exercised to any considerable degree without this Principle. A Crow would not have the heart to pick at a Worm, nor a Swallow to snatch at a Fly. And [Page 272] there is the same reason for those more notable and industrious Insidiations of other stronger and more crafty Creatures that hunt after their prey. Besides, every Animal in respect of it self has in some sense or measure a resemblance of that Divine Attribute of Omnipresence; for be it where it will, it cannot leave it self behinde. Wherefore it is fit it should be indued with this great Love and care of it self, being in a more constant readiness to pleasure, help and provide for it self then for another. Lastly, it is a thing unimaginable, unless Brutes were indu'd with intellectual Faculties, (and then they would be no longer Brutes) that they should be able to have so free and reflexive Cogitations as to seek the emprovement and live in the sense of the publick good. And if their thoughts and phancies were always taken up or gadding after the welfare of others, the height of life and joy in every one would much be diminished and obscured. For Phancy [Page 273] is far weaker then the present sense of the body: And if you would have it any thing strong, how calamitous must the lives of these Animals be, who must die, must be maimed and suffer mischief, as often as any of their Fellow-animals suffer any of these things? Wherefore it is better for the whole generations of brute Animals, that every one love and regard it self, then that they be all distracted and tortured with ineffectual thoughts concerning the welfare of others. We see therefore, O Philopolis, the Wisedome and Benignity of Providence, that has so firmly engrafted this Principle of Self-love, the root of undisturbed Joy and of Self-preservation, in the Animal life. From whence is also in Animals that eminent love of their young, and their kindness and tameness to them that feed them. And for those Passions in Animals that look more grimly and infernally on't, or at least seem to have a more nauseous and abominable aspect, as Wrath, Envy, [Page 274] Pride, Lust, and the like, they are but the branches or modifications of this one primitive and fundamental Passion, Self-love. For what is Wrath, but Self-love edged and strengthned for the fending off the assaults of evil? What Envy, but Self-love grieved at the sense of its own Want, discovered and aggravated by the fulness of another's enjoyment? What Pride, but Self-love partly desiring to be the best or to be approved for the best, and partly triumphing and glorying that it is now become none of the meanest? And, lastly, what is Lust, but Self-love seeking its own high delight and satisfaction in the use of Venery?

These are the main misshapen Spawn of that monstrous Fiend, that deeply-couched Dragon of Hell, Self-love; which if we eye more accurately, we shall find as necessary and usefull in the Animal Life as the Mother that bears them. For as for Wrath, and also Craft, (which I forgot to mention before) it is plain [Page 275] they are as unblameable in Beasts as Prudence and Valour in men. And for Pride and Gloriation, it is but a natural Spur to quicken their Animal Powers, or but the overflowing of that tickling sense they have of those perfections Nature has bestowed upon them; and shews how mightily well-pleased they are with them, and what thankfull witnesses they are of that Goodness and Wisedom that framed them. And for Lust, who dare blame it in the brute Creature, there being distinction of Sexes, fitness of Organs, and sufficiency of Spirits prepared by the Divine Wisedom in Nature for it? Besides that it is one of the most important Acts, as well as accompanied with the greatest and most enravishing Joy that the Animal Life will afford. A matter of that consequence, that the Generations of living Creatures would cease to be without it; and the Sun and Moon be constrained once again to shine on an empty Earth; and the shadows of the Trees to shelter nothing but either [Page 276] the Trees themselves, or the neighbouring Herbs and Flowers. That which looks most like a Fury of all this litter is Envy; which as bad as it is, yet methinks Aristotle slanders it, whiles he would make it such a Passion as was not raised from the sense of our own Want, but merely out of the sense of another's good, without reference to our selves; which for my part I look upon to be such a Monster as I suspect is scarce to be found in the Regions of Hell.

Philop.

That's a marvellous charitable conceit of your's, Cuphophron.

Cuph.

But that Envy that is, O Philopolis, is a genuine result of the Animal Life, and more usually in a passive melancholick Spirit, and is a Grief arising from the sense of our Want discovered, as I said, and set off more stingingly to us by the more flush and full representations of another's Happiness. But that there should be any more wickedness in Grief then in Joy, or in Pain then in Pleasure, is a thing my understanding [Page 277] cannot reach to. For then Repentance it self would be a Sin.

Sophr.

It's well you pass so favourable a censure on those more sowr Passions, O Cuphophron; I thought you had been onely for the sweet Affections.

Cuph.

It is in virtue of the sweet Affections, O Sophron, that I speak so favourably of the sowr. But to tell you the truth, I had rather give them good words at a distance, then to receive them into my house, or entertain any more inward familiarity with them. To my peculiar temper they are but harsh Guests.

Sophr.

I have but interrupted you, Cuphophron, I pray you go on.

Cuph.

Wherefore we conclude that no branch of the Animal Life is simply sinfull, poisonous or diabolicall, they being really the Contrivances of the good and wise God in the frame of Nature, or else the necessary sequels of such Contrivances. And that therefore those men that are so strongly enveagled in the Pleasures [Page 278] and allurements of this lower life are rather lapsed into that which is less good, then detained in that which is absolutely evil. And it is but a perpetuall gullery and mistake, while they are so hugely taken with so small matters, they being in the condition, as I may so say, of Children and Fools, of whom it is observed, That a small thing will please them: though it be a doubt whether these things be so small and contemptible, if that be true that the Divinest of Philosophers have asserted, That the whole World and the parts thereof are but so many Symbols and Sacraments of the Deity; every thing being either [...], some more perfect image, or at least some picture, shadow, or footstep of the Divinity. Upon which if our eyes be stayed and our Affections entangled, as it is a real testimonie of our approvement of the excellency of the Archetype, so are we in some meaner sort religious, we adoring thus and doting upon these congruous Gratifications we [Page 279] receive from these particular Shadows of that perfect Good, untill we are called up to an higher participation of him. But that even those that seem to flie from God seek after him in some sort, is apparently necessary, there being nothing but Himself, or what is from Him, in the World: otherwise he could not be that absolutely-perfect Good, whose Goodness, Wisedome and Power fills all things. And I think there is no perceptive Being in the whole Universe so estranged from its Original, but it is either courting or enjoying these or some of these Attributes in some rank and measure or other, they ever trying and proving what they can doe in matters of either Pleasure, Wit, or Dominion. And the sincere and undistracted fruition of any one part of any of these has so mightily taken up the minds of some men in complexion fitly framed for such delights, that they have sacrificed even their Lives, Liberties and Fortunes, to these slighter glimpses of the great Godhead, whom [Page 280] they thus unwittingly and unskilfully seek to adore, and so become in a sort religious Martyrs for a part, which they that make profession of their love and honour of the entire Deity seldome are persuaded to undergoe.

Now sith it is something of God that the mindes of all Spirits (even of those that seem to be in actual Rebellion against him) are set after, it is a very hard thing to find out how he should look upon himself as disesteemed, whenas all the Creatures are mad after something or other of His, most religiously prizing it even above their own Beings. For it is onely their ridiculous mistake to cleave to that which is of less worth and moment, and therefore deserves laughter and pity more then fury and revenge. Not to adde what a childish and idiotick conceit it is, to phansie God in the similitude of some Aged tetricall person, impatient of and obnoxious to Affronts and Injuries; w [...]en neither any can be really done [Page 281] him, nor any is intended against him; but men out of a debasing Modesty or Laziness of spirit take up with smaller good things, when they may be more welcome to greater. Which Solution as it may well satisfie Hylobares touching his Querie, why God Almighty did not at the first appearance of Sin straightway with sulphureous Thunderbolts strike it dead upon the spot; so it may be also an excellent Antidote against the rage of the more grim and severe Passions, mitigate the harshnesses of severall Disgusts in humane life, and generally sweeten the Conversation of men one with another.

Hyl.

Sweet Cuphophron and mellifluous, XVIII. young Nestor in Eloquence, that hast conceived such raised Notions from the wafts of the Evening-air and the chequered Moon-shine, A solid Answer to the foregoing Apologie, though ushered in with somethi [...]g a ludicrous Preamble. whose Tongue is thus bedew'd with bewitching Speech from the roscid Lips and nectarine Kisses of thy silver-faced Cynthia! But dost thou think thus to drown our sense of [Page 282] solid Reason by the rapid stream or torrent of thy turgid Eloquence? No, Cuphophron, no: one touch of right Reason will so prick the tumour of thy Brain thus blown up by the percribrated influence of thy moist Mistress, the Moon, that these Notions that look now so fair and plump, shall appear as lank and scrannell as a Calf that sucks his Dam through an hurdle; and all thy pretences to right Ratiocination shall be discovered as vain and frivolous as the idlest Dream of Endymion.

Sophr.

In the name of God, what do you mean, Hylobares, to answer so phantastically in so serious a cause?

Hyl.

Did not he begin thus, O Sophron? I onely answer my phantastick Friend according to his own Phantastry. Which yet you may observe I have done very hobblingly, it being out of my rode. But yet the sense is very serious and in earnest, viz. That it is a kinde of Lunacy, not Reason, that reigns thus turgidly in Cuphophron's copious Harangue; that is, [Page 283] in brief, He seems in this Rapture, be it from what influence it will, to be wittily and eloque [...]tly [...]ad.

Sophr.

Nay, if you mean no otherwise then so, it's well enough; but it beginning to be late, it had been better expressed in shorter terms. And I pray you, Hylobares, since you think Cuphophron mad, make him sober by discovering to him his Deliration.

Hyl.

I hope I shall very briefly discover it to the rest, but I know not how far he may be in love with his own Lunacy. That there is no Poison or harm in any of the Animal Functions or Passions, I easily grant him, and it may be the least in the sweetest. For I was before convinced by Philotheus that there is nothing substantially evil in the World. But it is immensely manifest, that those things that are good in themselves, yet by misapplication or disproportion may cause that which is unsufferably naught. As in a Musical Instrument whose Strings are good and the [Page 284] Stick good, yet if they be touch'd upon when they are out of tune, what more harsh and intolerable? And so may the exercise of the Animal Functions or Passions, though good in themselves, yet if they be either set too high, or exercised upon undue Objects or in unfitting circumstances, become very nauseously evil. To spit is one of the Animal Functions, good and usefull in it self, and to spit into the mouth of a Dog and clap him on the back for encouragement, is not indecorous for the man, and gratefull also to the Dog: But if any one had gone about to spit into Cuphophron's mouth, and clap him on the back to encourage him in that rapturous Oration he made, he would have thought it an intolerable absurd thing, and by no means to be suffered.

Cuph.

Why, so far as I see, Hylobares, that was needless; you making as if Dame Cynthia, aliàs Diana, had spit into my mouth already, and clapt me on the back, as one of her Hunting-dogs, [Page 285] and so put me into this loose Rhetoricall career.

Hyl.

Something like it, Cuphophron, it may be. But now you are out of this career, how do you like this Instance of the exercise of the Animal Functions, That men and women should stale and dung (like Mares and Horses in a Stable) in any room or company they came into? It is something a course Question, Cuphophron, but very substantially to our purpose.

Cuph.

That's stinkingly naught, Hylobares.

Hyl.

But they then but exercise their Animal Functions. And were that quicker sense revived in us whereby we discern Moral good and evil; Adultery, Drunkenness, Murther, Fraud, Extortion, Perfidiousness, and the like, all these would have infinitely a worse Sent to our Souls, then this which you say is so stinkingly evil can have to our Noses. And yet in all these things there is nothing but an undue Vse of the Animal [Page 286] Faculties. And forasmuch as Order and Proportion and the right Congruity of things are those things in the world which are the most Intellectual and Divine, the confounding and opposing of these must be the greatest Opposition and Contradiction that can be made or devised against the Divine Intellect or Eternall Godhead. For although the Faculties of the Soul of man be but gradually differenced as to Goodness, that is to say, that some of them are better then other some, others onely less good: yet the Incongruity and Disproportionateness of the Use of them are diametrically opposite to the Congruity and Proportionateness of their Use, and have the greatest Contrariety that can be betwixt Good and Evil; and are really such, the one good, the other evil, not a less good onely.

Sophr.

Excellently well argued, Hylobares I and it was as seasonably intimated at first, That there is a sense in a man, if it were awakened, to which these moral inc [...]ngruities are as [Page 287] harsh and displeasing as any incongruous Object, be it never so nauseous, is to the outward Senses. But a mere Notional or Imaginary Apprehension or Conception of these Moral Congruities and Incongruities does not reach that due Antipathy we ought to have against Sin and Wickedness: whereby also we do more lively understand how contrary and repugnant they are to the Will of God. But besides this fallacy in general, Hylobares, there were severall particular Passages, in my minde, very rash and unsound; but especially that, which makes our inordinate Adhesion to some parts of the Creation a Religious Worship or Service of God.

Bath.

There may be some shew of wit in such like conceits and expressions; but undoubtedly, O Sophron, such exorbitant Adhesions to the Creature is so far from being the due Worship of God, that it is down-right Idolatry. For neither the whole Creature nor part is God himself. [Page 288] And therefore to love them more highly and affect them more devoutly then the pure Godhead, that is to say, to love them most of all, is to doe that honour to them which is onely due to God. Which is to play the Idolater.

Sophr.

That is very true, Bathynous, and the same that the Apostle glances at, when he calls Covetousness Idolatry.

Bath.

That also, O Sophron, is very perversly and un-Platonically done of Cuphophron, that, whereas the Platonists from that Notion of things having some Similitude or at least some Shadow of the Divinity in them, would draw men off from the doting on these meaner Objects, that they might approch nearer the pure and essential Fountain of these more minute Delights, and enjoy them there more fully and beatifically; he by a strange rapturous Rhetorick and perverted Ratiocination would charm them in the present enjoyment of these smaller perfections, and fix them [Page 289] down to that, which ought onely to be a Footstool to stand upon to reach higher.

Philop.

Gentlemen, although the wit and eloquence of Cuphophron's Harangue is indeed notable, and your opposing so diligently the ill Consequences of his Enthusiastick Rhetorick very commendable: yet I must crave leave to profess, that I take his Sophistry to be so conspicuous, that I think it not needfull for any body more operosely to confute it. I believe it was onely a sudden Rapture, a blast that came with this Evening-Aire, and will be blown over again with the Morning-winde, and this influence of the Moon dried quite up by the greater heat and warmth of the next meridian Sun.

Cuph.

Indeed, Philopolis, it was a very sweet waft, and smelt wonderfull odoriferously of the Eglantines and Honey-suckles. But if it be not so salutiferous, I wholly submit it to your severer judgements.

Hyl.

In the mean time I am quite [Page 290] at a loss for satisfaction touching the weightiest Difficulty I have yet propounded, XIX. viz. A more sober Enquiry into that Difficulty, How the Permission of Sin in the World can consist with the Goodness of God. How it can be consistent with the Nature of God, who is Goodness it self, to permit Sin in the World, if it be so real an Evil, and not onely a less good, as Cuphophron's inspired Muse, like a bird of Athens, has so loudly sung to us this Moonshine night.

Philop.

I pray you, Hylobares, make your address to Philotheus: you know how successfull he has been hitherto.

Philoth.

If that would quiet your minde, Hylobares, I could indulge to you so far as to give you leave to think that, although Sin be in it self absolutely evil, (as being an Incongruity or Disproportionality onely betwixt Things, not the things themselves, for all things are good in their degree) yet the Motions, Ends or Objects of sinfull Actions are at least some lesser good: which I charitably conceive may be all that Cuphophron aimed at in that Enthusiastick Hurricane he was carried away [Page 291] with, and all that he will stand to upon more deliberate thoughts with himself.

Cuph.

Yes, I believe it will be thereabout to morrow morning, after I have slept upon't. And I return you many thanks, Philotheus, for your candid Interpretation.

Philoth.

But methinks the Question is in a manner as nice, Why God should suffer any Creature to chuse the less good for the greater, as permit him to sin. For this seems not according to the exactness of a perfectly-benign Providence.

Hyl.

You say right, Philotheus; and therefore if you could but clear that Point, I believe it will go far for the clearing all.

Philoth.

Why, this Scruple, Hylobares, concerning the Souls of men, is much-what the same (if not something easier) with that concerning the Bodies of both men and beasts. For the Omnipotency of God could keep them from diseases and death it self, if need were. Why therefore are they [Page 292] subject to Diseases, but that the Wisedome of God in the contrivance of their Bodies will act onely according to the capacity of corporeal matter; and that he intends the World should be an Automaton, a self-moving Machina or Engine, that he will not perpetually tamper with by his absolute power, but leave things to run on according to that course which he has put in Nature? For it is also the perfection of his Work to be in some sort like its Artificer, independent; which is a greater Specimen of his Wisedome.

Hyl.

But you should also shew that his Goodness was not excluded the Consultation, XX. O Philotheus. The first Attempt of satisfying the Difficulty, f [...]om that Stoicall Position of the invincible Freedom of Man's Will.

Philoth.

No more is it, so far as there is a Capacity of its coming in, for any thing that humane reason can assure it self to the contrary. For let me first puzzle you, Hylobares, with that Position of the Stoicks, That the minde of Man is as free as Iupiter himself, as they rant it in their language, and that he cannot [Page 293] compell our Will to any thing, but what-ever we take to must be from our own free Principle, nothing being able to deal with us without our selves: As a man that is fallen into a deep Ditch, if he will not so much as give his fellow his hand, he cannot pull him out. Nor may this seem more incongruous or inconsistent with the Omnipotency of God, then that he cannot make a Square whose Diagonial is commensurate to the Side, or a finite Body that has no figure at all. For these are either the very Essence or the ess [...]ntial Consequences of the things spoken of, and it implies a contradiction they should exist without them. So we will for dispute sake affirm, that Liberty of Will is an essential Property of the Soul of Man, and can no more be taken from her, then the proper Affections of a Geometricall Figure from the Figure; unless she once determine, or intangle her self in Fate, which she cannot doe but of her self, or else fix herself above Fate, and fully [Page 294] incorporate with the simple Good. For, to speak Pythagorically, the Spirits of men and of all the fallen Angels are as an Isosceles betwixt the Isopleuron and Scalenum, not so ordinate a Figure as the one, nor so inordinate as the other; so these Spiri [...]s of men and Angels are a middle betwixt the more pure and Intellectual Spirits uncapable of falling from, and the Souls of Beasts uncapable of rising to the participation of Divine Happiness. Wherefore if you take away this vertible Principle in Man, you would make him therewithall of another Species, either a perfect Beast, or a pure Intellect.

Hyl.

This Opinion of the Stoicks is worth our farther considering of. But in the mean time why might not Man have been made a pure Intelligence at first?

Philoth.

Why should he so, Hyloares, sith the Creation of this middle Order makes the numbers of the pure Intellectual Orders never the fewer? Not to adde, that your demand [Page 295] is as absurd as if you should ask why every Flie is not made a Swallow, every Swallow an Eagle, and every Eagle an Angel, because an Angel is better then any of the other Creatures I named. There is a gradual descension of the Divine Fecunditie in the Creation of the World.

Hyl.

This is notable, Philotheus, and unexpected. But were it not better that God Almighty should annihilate the Individuals of this middle vertible Order, as you call it, so soon as they lapse into Sin, then let such an ugly Deformity emerge in the Creation?

Philoth.

This is a weighty Question, Hylobares; but yet such as, I hope, we both may ease our selves of, if we consider how unbecoming it would be to the Wisedome of God to be so over-shot in the Contrivance of the Creation, as that he must be ever and anon enforced to annihilate some part of it, as being at a loss what else to doe, and if they should all lapse, to annihilate them all.

Hyl.

[Page 296]

Why? he might create new in a moment, Philotheus.

Philoth.

But how-ever these would be very violent and harsh, though but short, Chasma's in the standing Creation of God. I appeal to your own sense, Hylobares, would that look handsomely?

Hyl.

I know not what to think of it. Besides, if that were true that some Philosophers contend for, That all the whole Creation, as well particular Souls and Spirits as the Matter and Universal Spirit of the World, be from God by necessary Emanation, this middle vertible Order can never be turned out of Being. But that the Stability of God's Nature and Actions should not be according to the most exquisite Wisedome and Goodness, would be to me the greatest Paradox of all.

Philoth.

Why, who knows but that it is better for them to exist, though in this Lapsed state, and better also for the Universe, that so they may be left to toy and revell in the slightest [Page 297] and obscurest shadows of the Divine fulness, then to be suddenly annihilated upon their first Lapse or Transgression? For to be taken up with a less good is better then to be exiled out of Being, and to enjoy no good at all.

Hyl.

That it is better for them is plain according to the opinion of all Metaphysicians: but how is it better for the Universe, Philotheus?

Philoth.

How do you know but that it is as good for the Universe, computing all respects, if it be not better? And that is sufficient. For Man is betwixt the Intellectual Orders and the Beasts, as a Zoophyton betwixt the Beasts [...] the Plants. I demand therefo [...], if the Zoophyta some of them [...] degenerate into mere Plants, while others emerge into the condition of Animals, and so they should ever and anon be ascending and descending, what great hurt were done: what contradiction to the Divine Goodness would there be in this?

Hyl.

[Page 298]

I confess, Philotheus, I see no great hurt in that.

Philoth.

Man therefore being of such a mixt nature, and of so invincible a Freeness, that he may either associate himself with Angels, or sort himself with Apes and Baboons or Satyrs of the Wood, what more hurt is there, he so doing, then that there are Apes and Baboons already? and who can tell just how many there ought to be of any of those Orders; or why there must be just so many Orders of Apes or Satyrs, and no more?

Hyl.

I must confess it were a rash charge against Providence on this account, and hard to prove but that it is indifferent, as touching Individuals of this or that Order, to have some thousands more or some thousands less, it may be Myriads, and yet the good of the Universe much-what alike concerned in either Number. And there is the same reason proportionally touching the number of the Orders themselves. Such variations as these, [Page 299] it's likely, may not bear so great stress with them, as to force God to betake himself to that extremest of Remedies, Annihilation.

Philoth.

But now in the second XXI. place, The second Attempt, from the Consideration of some high Abu [...]s of a vincible Freedome, as also from the nature of this Freedome it [...]elf. Hylobares, supposing mankind of a vincible Freeness or Liberty of Will; what, would you have God administer some such powerfull Philtrum to all of them, that he might even force their Affections towards those more precious emanations of himself which are more properly called Divine?

Hyl.

Yes, Philotheus, I would.

Philoth.

But I much question how this will alwaies consist with the Divine Justice. For I think it as incongruous that the Divine Goodness should alwaies act according to the Simplicity of its own nature; as it is unnatural for the Beams of the Sun to be reverberated to our eyes from severall Bodies variously surfaced in the same form of Light, and not to put on the face of divers Colours, such as yellow, green, red, purple, and the [Page 300] like. For as the various Superficies of Bodies naturally causes such a diversification of pure Light, and changes it into the form of this or that Colour; so the variety of Objects the Divine Goodness looks upon does rightfully require a certain modification and figuration of her self into sundry forms and shapes, (as I may so call them) of Vengeance, of Severity, of Justice, of Mercy, and the like. This therefore is the thing I contend for, That free Agents, such as Men and Angels, may so behave themselves in the sight of God, that they will become such Objects of his Goodness, that it cannot be duely and rightfully expected that it should act according to its pure and proper benign form, dealing gently and kindly with all the Tenderness that may be with the party it acts upon; but it must step forth in some of those more fierce and grim forms, (I speak after the manner of men) such as Vengeance and Iustice. And I will now put a Case very accommodately to [Page 301] our own Faculties. Suppose some Vertuous and Beautifull Virgin, royally descended and Princely attired, who, venturing too far into the solitary Fields or Woods, should be light upon by some rude Wretch, who, first having satisfied his Lustfull desires upon her by a beastly Rape, should afterwards most barbarously and despightfully use her, haling her up and down by the Hair of the head, soiling her sacred Body by dragging her through miry Ditches and dirty Plashes of water, and tearing her tender Skin upon Briars and Brambles, whiles in the mean time some Knight-Errant or Man of Honour and Vertue (but of as much Benignity of spirit as God can communicate to humane nature without Hypostaticall Union) is passing by that way, and discerneth with his astonished eyes this abhorred Spectacle: I now appeal to your own sense and reason, Hylobares, whether it be enough for that Heros to rescue this distressed Virgin from the abominable [Page 302] injury of this Villain, and to secure her from any farther harm; or whether there ought not to be added also some exquisite Torture and shamefull Punishment worthy so hainous a fact, and proportionable to the just indignation any noble spirit would conceive against so villainous a Crime, though neither the wronged person nor punished party were at all bettered by it.

Hyl.

For my part, Philotheus, I should be in so high a rage against the Villain, if I were on the spot, that I should scarce have the discretion how to deliberate to punish him so exquisitely as he deserved; but in my present fury should hew him a-pieces as small as Herbs to the pot. I should cut him all into mammocks, Philotheus.

Philoth.

Wherefore, Hylobares, you cannot but confess that Goodness it self in some circumstances may very justly and becomingly be sharpened into Revenge: Which must be still the less incongruous, in that the Revenge [Page 303] is in the behalf of injured Goodness, though she get nothing thereby but that she is revenged.

Euist.

To this case that Notion of Punishment appertains which the Greeks call [...], Noct. Att. l. 6. c. 14. as Gellius observes; which nothing concerns the Reformation or amendment of the punished, but onely the Honour of the injured or offended.

Philoth.

Right, Euistor. But in the mean time it is manifest from hence, as I was making inference to Hylobares, That the Divine Goodness may step forth into Anger and Revenge, and yet the Principle of such Actions may be the very Goodness it self. Which therefore we contend is still (notwithstanding that evil which may seem to be in the World) the measure of all God's works of Providence, even when Sin is punished with Sin, and Men are suffered to degenerate into Baboons and Beasts.

Hyl.

I grant to you, Philotheus, that a man may behave himself so, as that all that you affirm may be true, and [Page 304] that even the highest Severity may have no other Fountain then Goodness. But where Goodness is Omnipotent, as it is in God, how can it consist therewith not to prevent all occasions of Severity and Revenge, by keeping his Creature within the bounds of his own Laws, and by communicating to all men and Angels such an irresistible measure of Grace, that they could never have possibly been disobedient to him?

Philoth.

To this, Hylobares, I answer, That God having made a free Creature, (and it is impossible to prove he did amiss in making it) Omnipotency it self (if I may speak it with reverence) is not able to keep off certain unavoidable respects or congruities it bears to the Divine Attributes: As it is a thing utterly unimaginable that even the eternall Intellect of God should be able to produce a finite Number that did not bear a certain proportion to some other finite Number first given. This free Creature therefore now made, [Page 305] necessarily faces the severall Attributes of God with sundry respects. And this native Freedom in it challenges of his Wisedome, that she shew her best skill in dealing with a Creature that is free with as little violence done to its nature as may be. Which we see the Wisedome of God has practised upon Matter, as I noted awhile agoe. And yet the defacement of rightly-organized Matter is as real an entrenchment upon or opposition of what is Intellectual or Divine, (I mean the Divine Idea's themselves) as Vice or Immorality. As the Divine Wisedome therefore forces not the terrestriall Matter beyond the bounds of its own natural capacity, to fend all Animals Bodies from Diseases and Death; no more should the Divine Goodness universally in all free Creatures irresistibly prevent the use of their own nature. And therefore being free, they ought, according to the congruity of their condition, be put to the triall what they will doe. And if the miscarriage [Page 306] be upon very strong Temptations that did even almost over-power the strength of the free Creature, this state of the case is a meet Object of the Mercy of God. But if it have strength enough, and has been often and earnestly invited to keep close to and to pursue after those things that are best, and yet perpetually slights them and shuffles them off, the party thus offending is a congruous object of the Divine Slight and Scorn; & it is but just that such an one be left to follow his own swindge, and to finde such a fate as attends such wilde courses. For it seems a kinde of disparagement, to pin Vertue and divine Grace upon the sleeves of them that are unwilling to receive it. It would be as unseemly as the forcing of a rich, beautifull and vertuous Bride upon some poor slouching Clown, whether he would or no.

Hyl.

But God may make them willing.

Philoth.

That is, Hylobares, you may give the Clown a Philtrum or [Page 307] Love-potion. But is not this still a great disparagement to the Bride? Wherefore for the general it is fit, that God should deal with free Creatures according to the freedom of their nature: But yet, rather then all should goe to ruine, I do not see any incongruity but that God may as it were lay violent hands upon some, and pull them out of the fire, and make them potent, though not irresistible, Instruments of pulling others out also. This is that Election of God for whom it was impossible for others that have arrived to a due pitch of the Divine Life. But for those that still voluntarily persist to run on in a rebellious way against God and the Light that is set before them, and at last grow so crusted in their Wickedness, that they turn professed enemies of God and Goodness, scoff at Divine Providence, riot and Lord it in the world, with the contempt of Religion and the abuse and persecution of them that profess it; that out [Page 308] of the stubborn Blindness of their own hearts, being given up to Covetousness, Pride and Sensuality, vex and afflict the consciencious with abominable Tyranny and Cruelty; I think it is plain that these are a very sutable Object for Divine Fury and Vengeance, that sharp and severe Modification of the Divine Goodness, to act upon.

Hyl.

Truly this is very handsome, Philotheus, and pertinent, if not cogent.

Philoth.

XXII. But lastly, The third and last, from the Questionableness whether in comp [...]t [...] of the whole there does not as much good r [...] dound to the Universe by God's Pe [...]mission of Si [...], as [...]here would [...]y his forcible keepi [...]g it out. Hylobares, though we should admit that the whole design of Divine Providence is nothing else but the mere disburthening of his overflowing Goodness upon the whole Creation, and that he does not stand upon the terms of Justice and Congruity, or any such punctilio's, (as some may be ready here to call them) but makes his pure Goodness the measure of his dealing with both Men and Angels; yet I say that it does not at all contradict, but that God may permit Sin in the World, he having the [Page 309] privilege of bringing Light out of Darkness, and the nature of things being such, that the lessening of Happiness in one is the advancement of it in another: As it is in the Motion of Bodies, what agitation one loses, is transferred upon another; or like the Beams of the Sun, that retunded from this Body are received by another, and nothing is lost. So that in gross the Goodness of God may be as fully derived upon the Creation, though not so equally distributed to particular Creatures, upon his permitting Sin in the World, as if he did forcibly, and against the nature of free Creatures, perpetually keep it out. This is that therefore that I would say, that the Vices of the wicked intend and exercise the Vertues of the just.

What would become of that noble Indignation of minde that holy men conceive against wicked and blasphemous people, if there were neither Wickedness nor Blasphemy in the world? What would become of those [Page 310] enravishing Vertues of Humility, Meekness, Patience and Forbearance, if there were no Injuries amongst men? What had the Godly whereupon to employ their Wit and Abilities, if they had no enemies to grapple with? How would their Faith be tried, if all things here below had been carried on in Peace and Righteousness and in the Fear of God? How would their Charity and Sedulity be discovered in endeavouring to gain men to the true Knowledge of God, if they were alwaies found so to their hands? Terrestriall Goodness would even grow sluggish and lethargicall, if it were not sharpened and quickned by the Antiperistasis of the general Malignity of the World.

There are no generous Spirits but would even desire to encounter with Dangers and Difficulties, to testifie their love to the parties they are much endeared to; and it is an exceeding great accession to their enjoyments, that they have suffered so [Page 311] much for them. But if the World were not generally wicked for a time, no Soul of man could meet with any such adventure, and the History of Ages would be but a flat Story. Day it self upon this Earth would be tiresome, if it were alwaies Day, and we should lose those chearfull Salutes of the emerging Light, the cool breathings and the pleasing aspects of the Rosie Morning. The Joys and Solemnities of Victories and Triumphs could never be, if there were no Enemies to conflict with, to conquer and triumph over. And the stupendious undertakings of the Saviour of Mankinde, and the admirable windings of Providence in her Dramatick Plot which has been acting on this Stage of the Earth from the beginning of the World, had been all of them stopped and prevented, if the Souls of men had not been lapsed into Sin. And the sweetest and most enravishing Musicall touches upon the melancholized Passions (so far as I know) of both men and Angels had [Page 312] never sounded in the consort of the Universe, if the Orders of free Agents had never played out of tune.

Nothing therefore of the Divine Goodness seems to be lost, whenas the very Corruption of it, as in a grain of Corn cast into the ground, makes for its encrease; and what of it is rejected by some, is by the Wisedome of God so unavoidably conveyed upon others. But that it is best that all should partake alike of the Overflowings of God, will, I think, be no less difficult to prove, then that all Subordination of estates and conditions in the world should be taken away, and that God should not have created any of the more vile and contemptible kinde of Creatures, such as the Worm, the Fly, the Frog, and the Mouse. Wherefore it being so disputable a Point, whether it be not in it self as good that there should be those that are rightly called evil and wicked in the World, as that there should be such and such viler or more mischievous Creatures on the [Page 313] face of the Earth, it is an unexcusable piece of Rashness to conclude, that the Permission of Sin is any such Argument against the Goodness of that Providence that guideth all things. For why should she generally force or certainly determine the Faculties of men that are naturally free, and so perpetually keep them off from acting of Sin, whenas Sin it self is so pompously led captive by the power of Righteousness, and by the admirable Wisedome of God serves for the equal advancement of his intended Goodness?

Hyl.

Your Reason, or your zealous Eloquence, or both of them jointly, strike so strongly upon my minde, O Philotheus▪ that I am, whether I will or no, constrained to look upon it as a desperate Doubt or Difficulty, and such as I never hope to be resolved of, Whether, considering the comprehension of all, God's permission of Sin be more becoming his Goodness, or his perpetuall forcible hindering thereof. And therefore the Goodness [Page 314] of Divine Providence being so conspicuous in other things, I think I ought not to call it into question from matters that be so obscure, but to surmize the best.

Sophr.

Excellently well inferred, Hylobares.

Hyl.

But there are yet two Scruples behinde touching the Circumstances of this Permission that something gaul my mind, which if Philotheus please to free me of, I shall sleep the quieter this night.

Philoth.

What are those Scruples, Hylobares?

Hyl.

XXIII. The one is, How co [...]sistent it is with the Goodness of Providence, that God does not suddenly make men holy so soon as they have [...] hearty mi [...]d to it. Why, though it may not prove worth the while for Divine Omnipotency to prevent all Sin in the World by absolutely determining the humane Faculties to the best Objects, that yet, when these Faculties of men are determined to the best Objects, there should not appear a more palpable assistence of the Deity to make the ways of Religion and Godliness more easie and passable to poor toiling Mortals, who [Page 315] are so pittifully tired and wearied out in their pious Prosecutions, that they often forfeit not onely the Health of their Bodies, but even the Soundness of their Minds, and are given over either to miserable Mopedness or Distraction. The other in brief is, The externall Adversitie of the Just, and Prosperity of the Wicked. For in this God does not seem to assist the converted Wills of men so favourably as he may.

Philoth.

That it is an hard thing for us Mortals, whose abode is in houses of Clay, to arrive to any due pitch of Purity and Goodness, experience does so frequently witness, that it cannot be denied. But that this is no real blemish to the benignity of Providence, if a man look more narrowly into the nature of the thing [...] he may easily satisfie himself from manifold reasons. For, first, If we had any Modesty in us, we may very well suspect that the Pain and torture we undergoe in the process of our Regeneration is but a just punishment [Page 316] of our former Sins, in which they that stay the longest come out with the greatest Sorrow and di [...]iculty. 2. Besides, In other things we hold it not indecorous, that matters of greatest price should be purchased with answerable pains. For what has God given us severall Faculties for, but to employ them to the emprovement of our own good? 3. Again, By this means of God's acting according to our nature, not by his absolute power in some mighty and over-bearing miraculous way, the Acquisition of the Holy life becomes a Mystery, and men to the great gratification of one another record the Method and, as I may so say, the artifical Process thereof. A thing of greater moment then the finding out the most sovereign Elixir or the Philosopher's Stone. 4. The tiresomeness of the Fight makes the Victory more pleasant and sensible, and the continuance of the Quarrell fixes more deeply upon our spirits an Antipathy against Sin; and the hardness [Page 317] we finde in winding our selves out of the bondage of Wickedness will more strongly establish us in the Kindgdome of Vertue. 5. It is a meet triall of our Faith and Sincerity, and entire Affection to God. For when we perceive our selves hold on notwithstanding all these Combats and Incumbrances, we are assured in our selves that we are in good earnest, and that we shall at last obtain, if we faint not. 6. And that therefore we ought rather to examine our own Sincerity, then accuse Providence. For if our love to Goodness be sincere, and not lazy and phantasticall, it will hold out with patience; which Vertue is exercised and increased by these present Trialls. 7. We are also to examine our Faith and opinion concerning God's will and power, whether we think him as well willing as able to help all those that sincerely seek after him; which is essentially congruous to the Divine Nature and Goodness; and whether we believe that through his power we may be [Page 318] inabled to get the conquest over all the Enormities of the Animal Life. And if we think God is not so good to his Creature, let us consider whether we could serve the Creature so, if we were in God's stead. If we could, it is the wickedness of our own Nature that has thus infected the Notion of God in us, and so our own evil spirit is our Fury and Devil that at last may chance to drive us into Madness. If we could not deal thus our selves, how foolish a thing is it not presently to collect, that we cannot be more benign then God, and that therefore the fault is in our selves that we are no better? Moreover we are to consider, that Clearness and Serenity of Minde is not to be had without the forsaking all manner of Sin; and that if we hope otherwise, it is an Indication of our own Hypocrisie, that we would hold a League with both Light and Darkness at once. And therefore we see as touching religious Distraction, that we our selves may be the causes of it, [Page 319] and that it is but the just result of our own Insincerity. But for down right-Madness proceeding from Melancholy, it is natural Disease, and respects the Physician rather then either the Philosopher or Divine. 8. and lastly, The great Desertions, dark Privations, desperate Temptations, Enfeeblements of Minde and Body, or what-ever other Inconveniences, as they seem to be, occurr in this process towards the due pitch of Regeneration and Newness of life, they very effectually and naturally make for that most precious and truest piece of Piety, I mean Humility; whereby the Soul is so affected, that she very feelingly and sensibly acknowledges that all the good she does or knows is wholly from God her Maker, and that she is nothing of her self. Wherefore she is just to God, in attributing all to him; and milde and meek-hearted towards men, even to those that are yet out of the way, being conscious to her self, that the ordering of her ways [Page 320] is not from herself, but that God is her strength and the light of her paths. Wherefore there being such genuine advantages in this slow process of them that move towards what is truly good, and that congruity to our Faculties, and to the nature of the things we seek after, it seems to me as unreasonable that God should use his absolute Omnipotency in making men good in a moment, so soon as they have a minde to be so, as to expect he should make the Flowers suddenly start out of the Earth in Winter, or load the Trees with Autumnall fruit in Spring.

Euist.

XXIV. There's nothing can stand against the power of Philotheus his Reasonings. The Parable of the Eremite and the Angel. This first was by far the more difficult Probleme of the two, and how easily has he solved it? The other, which is the more ordinary, never seemed to me to have the least force in it, since I met with the Story of the Eremite and the Angel.

Philop.

I pray you what Story is that, Euistor?

Euist.

[Page 321]

I hope, Philopolis, you would not have me to interrupt Philotheus, by reciting of it.

Philoth.

By all means let's hear it, Euistor. I shall not proceed quietly till you have told it. It will at least give me some respite, who have spoken so much already, and it is likely may save me the labour of proceeding any farther on that Subject.

Euist.

I will not tell it, O Philotheus, but upon condition that you will afterwards proceed as copiously as if I had said nothing.

Philop.

I will undertake he shall, Euistor.

Euist.

The Story then in brief is this. That a certain Eremite having conceived great jealousies touching the due Administration of Divine Providence in externall occurrences in the World, in this anxiety of mind was resolved to leave his Cell, and travell abroad, to see with his own eyes how things went abroad in the World. He had not gone half a [Page 322] day's journey, but a young man overtook him and joyn'd company with him, and insinuated himself so far into the Eremite's affection, that he thought himself very happy in that he had got so agreeable a Companion. Wherefore resolving to take their fortunes together, they always lodged in the same house. Some few days travels had over-past before the Eremite took notice of any thing remarkable. But at last he observed that his Fellow-traveller, with whom he had contracted so intimate a Friendship, in a house where they were extraordinary well treated stole away a gilt Cup from the Gentleman of the house, and carried it away with him. The Eremite was very much astonished with what he saw done by so fair and agreeable a person as he conceived him to be, but thought not yet fit to speak to him or seem to take notice of it. And therefore they travel fairly on together as aforetimes, till Night forced them to seek Lodging. But they [Page 323] light upon such an house as had a very unhospitable Owner, who shut them out into the outward Court, and exposed them all night to the injury of the open weather, which chanced then to be very rainy. But the Eremite's Fellow-traveller unexpectedly compensated his Host's ill entertainment with no meaner a reward then the gilt Cup he had carried away from the former place, thrusting it in at the Window when they departed. This the Eremite thought was very pretty, and that it was not Covetousness, but Humour, that made him take it away from its first Owner. The next night, where they lodged, they were treated again with a deal of Kindness and Civility: but the Eremite observed with horrour that his Fellow-traveller for an ill requitall strangled privately a young Child of their so courteous Host in the Cradle. This perplext the minde of the poor Eremite very much; but in sadness and patience forbearing to speak, he travelled another day's [Page 324] journey with the young man, and at Evening took up in a place where they were more made of then anywhere hitherto. And because the way they were to travell the next morning was not so easie to find, the Master of the house commanded one of the Servants to go part of the way to direct them; whom, while they were passing over a Stonebridge, the Eremite's Fellow-traveller caught suddenly betwixt the legs and pitched him headlong from off the Bridge into the River, and drowned him. Here the Eremite could have no longer patience, but flew bitterly upon his Fellow-traveller for these barbarous Actions, and renounced all Friendship with him, and would travel with him no longer nor keep him company. Whereupon the young man smiling at the honest zeal of the Eremite, and putting off his mortal disguise, appeared as he was, in the form and lustre of an Angel of God, and told him that he was sent to ease his minde of the great [Page 325] Anxiety it was incumbred with touching the Divine Providence. In which, said he, nothing can occurr more perplexing and paradoxicall then what you have been offended at since we two travelled together. But yet I will demonstrate to you, said he, that all that I have done is very just and right. For as for that first man from whom I took the gilded Cup, it was a real Compensation indeed of his Hospitality; that Cup being so forcible an occasion of the good man's Distempering himself, and of hazarding his Health and Life, which would be a great loss to his poor neighbours, he being of so good and charitable a nature. But I put it into the window of that harsh and unhospitable man that used us so ill, not as a Booty to him, but as a Plague and Scourge to him, and for an ease to his oppressed Neighbours, that he may fall into Intemperance, Diseases, and Death it self. For I knew very well that there was that Inchantment in this Cup, that they [Page 326] that had it would be thus bewitched with it. And as for that civil person whose Childe I strangled in the Cradle, it was in great mercy to him, and no real hurt to the Childe, who is now with God. But if that Childe had lived, whereas this Gentleman hitherto had been piously, charitably and devoutly given, his Minde, I saw, would have unavoidably sunk into the love of the World, out of love to his Childe, [...]he having had none before, and doting so hugely on it; and therefore I took away this momentanie life from the Body of the Childe, that the Soul of the Father might live for ever. And for this last fact, which you so much abhorr, it was the most faithfull piece of Gratitude I could doe to one that had used us so humanely and kindely as that Gentleman did. For this man, who by the appointment of his Master was so officious to us as to shew us the way, intended this very night ensuing to let in a company of Rogues into his Master's house, to [Page 327] rob him of all that he had, if not to murther him and his Family. And having said thus, he vanished. But the poor Eremite, transported with Joy and Amazement, lift up his hands and eyes to Heaven, and gave glory to God, who had thus unexpectedly delivered him from any farther Anxiety touching the ways of his Providence; and thus returned with chearfulness to his forsaken Cell, and spent the residue of his daies there in Piety and Peace.

Philoth.

It is an excellent good Story indeed, Euistor, and so much to the purpose, that it is plainly superfluous to adde any more words touching this Theme.

Philop.

But I believe, Philotheus, that neither Euistor nor Hylobares will be so satisfy'd.

Euist.

For my part, I challenge the performance of your promise, O Philopolis, that the condition upon which I told the Story may be made good to me, namely, That Philotheus be never the briefer in his Satisfaction [Page 328] to Hylobares for my unseasonable Interpellation by this Parabolicall Story.

Hyl.

And I am of that childish humour, that I do not relish any drink so well as that out of mine own usual Sucking-bottle; wherefore I expect farther refreshment, Philotheus, from your more nervous Eloquence.

Philop.

My credit also, Philotheus, is at the stake, if you do not utter your Sentiments upon this Subject.

Philoth.

But in the mean while, Philopolis, it does me good to observe what fine sense Hylobares speaks in so unmeet a demand, as if strong meat were for babes.

Hyl.

But strong drink may be for them; for some give such to Children so soon as they be born.

Philop.

Nay he is even with you there, Philotheus; you had better have fallen directly upon the matter without these delays.

Philoth.

Well then, Philopolis, I will doe so, becaus [...] you urge me so much [...] it, though in my own [Page 329] judgement I think it needless. The Difficulty propounded alwaies seemed to me one of the easiest to be solved, though the most ordinarily complain'd of, I mean, the Impunity and Prosperity of the Wicked, and the Affliction and Adversity of the Good.

For first, XXV. What is alledged concerning the Impunity of the Wicked is not onely false, but impossible. That the Adversity of the Good, and the Prosperity and Impunity of the wicked in this Life, are [...]o Arguments ag [...]i [...]st the Accuracy of Providence. For how can the Wicked escape Punishment, when Wickedness it self is one of the greatest Penalties? or how can they be said to be prosperous, who have nothing succeed according to their own scope and meaning? For every man means well, as Socrates wisely determines; but it is the perpetuall unhappiness of the Wicked that he does that which is ill. So great is his Ignorance and Impotency, that he cannot reach the mark he aims at; but wishing the best to himself, as all other men do, yet notwithstanding he really prosecutes that which is worst. And therefore with the wise he can be no Object of Envy, but of [Page 330] Pity. And it is an unmeet thing that any sentence concerning Divine Providence should be carried by the Votes of Fools. When a Drunken man breaks Glass-windows, ravishes women, stabs men in the streets, and does many such Villainies as these, I appeal to you, Hylobares, what Privilege or Prosperity is there in this, (though he were not to be punished by the Magistrate) having done that which indeed he had no true minde to doe, but did heartily detest and abhorr when he was sober? This is the true state of all Wicked men whatsoever; let their power be never so high, they act like Drunkards or men in a Dream, such things as they will be ashamed of so soon as they are sober or awakened.

Sophr.

This is the very Philosophy of the Apostle, O Philotheus, What fruit have ye then of those things whereof ye are now ashamed? [...]om. 6. [...]1.

Philoth.

Now as it is evident, Hylobares, that they are punished in the forfeiture of that high Happiness that [Page 331] consists in the peace and joy of a purify'd Minde, wherein resides the true Knowledge of God, and a living sense of the Comeliness and Pulchritude of Grace and Vertue; so likewise there is an Infliction of internall Pain to their very Senses. For what Torture can there be greater then that Rack of Pride, those Scorpion-stripes of Envy, those insatiable scorching Flames and Torches of Furies, untamed Lust? what then strangling Cares, then the severe Sentences of their own prejudging Fears? what Dungeon more noisome, horrid or dismall, then their suspicious Ignorance, and oppressing loads of surprising Grief and Melancholy?

Again, it is farther manifest that the Wicked are plagued even in this life; for they are a mutual plague and scourge one to another, and take the office of Executioners and Hangmen by turns. For all the noise of Injury and Injustice in the World is ordinarily nothing else but a complaint that wicked men abuse one another. [Page 332] Wherefore why should it be expected that Divine Providence should forthwith take vengeance of the Executioners of his own Justice?

But for those few Righteous that are in the World, they are bettered by those things that seem to the Idiot and unskilfull the onely Evils that Mortals can fall into. But the Infelicity of the Godly is commonly this, that they will scramble with the men of this World for such things as are the most proper Happiness of those that are wicked. For they fighting with them thus as with Cocks on their own Dunghill, it is no marvell they come by the worst; for this is their hour and the power of Darkness.

Thirdly, It is manifest that the Peace and Impunity of the Wicked is very serviceable for the exercising of the Vertues of the Righteous, whereby they may discern their own Sincerity or Hypocrisie, and discover whether it be the pure Love of Piety that puts them in such a garb, or the desire of the Praise and Countenance [Page 333] of men; whether the profession of their Faith in God and of future Happiness be formal, or real. For if it be real, what will not they be able to undergoe? and what an high Cordial must it be unto them, to have an unfeigned sense and belief of that great Compensation they are to receive in the World to come? Not to mention what a great satisfaction the consciousness of constant Sincerity is to the Soul of a man even in this life also. Wherefore the strokes of the Confusion and unrighteous Disorder in the World do in a manner miss the Righteous, and hit heavy onely there where they should doe, upon the Ungodly themselves. But what reaches those that are deemed more just, they are in all reason and modesty to look upon it as either a Punishment of some Reliques of Vices in them, or as an Exercise of their Vertues, that God may be glorify'd in them. Wherefore if any thing harsh happen to a good man, he will forthwith examine himself if his [Page 334] heart be clean: which if it be not, he is to look upon it as a Chastisement; if it be, he will bear it and embrace it as a Triall from God, and as an occasion whereby he may glorifie the Power of God in him. But if he doe not thus, it is a sign his heart is not clean, and therefore why should he grumble that he is punished?

Fourthly, That Tyranny, Murther, Perjurie, Blasphemy and exorbitant Lust has been notoriously and exemplarily punished by a kinde of Divine Vengeance, and above all the expectation of men, even in this Life, in severall persons, is so noted in History, that I need name no Instances. But to pursue every Monstrositie of Wickedness with present Punishment here in this World, were not to make men good, but to hinder the wicked from mischieving and scourging one another, and from exercising the Vertues of the righteous.

Fifthly, In that Wickedness is not so constantly and adequately punished in this Life, there is also this [Page 335] Convenience in it, That it is a shrewd Argument to any indifferent person that understands the Nature and Attributes of God, that there is a Reward to come hereafter in the other Life.

To all which I adde in the last place, that the affairs of this World are like a curious, but intricately-contrived, Comedy, and that we cannot judge of the tendency of what is past or acting at present before the entrance of the last Act, which shall bring in Righteousness in triumph: who though she has abided many a brunt, and has been very cruelly and despightfully used hitherto in the World, yet at last, according to our desires, we shall see the Knight overcome the Giant. And then I appeal to you, Hylobares, whether all things have not been carried on according to the natural Relish of your own Faculties. For what is the reason we are so much pleased with the reading Romances and the Fictions of Poets, but that here, as Aristotle says, things [Page 336] are set down as they should be, but in the true History hitherto of the World things are recorded indeed as they are, but it is but a Testimony that they have not been as they should be? Wherefore in the upshot of all, if we shall see that come to pass that so mightily pleases us in the reading the most ingenious Plays and Heroick Poems, that long afflicted Vertue at last comes to the Crown, the mouth of all Unbelievers must be for ever stopped. And for my own part, I doubt not but that it will so come to pass in the last Close of the World. But impatiently to call for Vengeance upon every Enormity before that time, is rudely to overturn the Stage before the entrance into the fifth Act, out of Ignorance of the Plot of the Comedy, and to prevent the solemnity of the general Judgement by more petty and particular Executions. These are briefly the six Heads, Hylobares, which I might have insisted upon to clear Providence from this last Allegation, had [Page 337] there been any great Difficulty in the matter.

Hyl.

What you have already intimated, Philotheus, from these six Heads, and Euistor suggested by that handsome Parable, has, I must confess, so fully satisfy'd me in this last Point, that it makes the Difficulty look as if it had been none at all.

Philop.

In this last Point, Hylobares? that's but one Point. But I pray you ingenuously declare how much at ease you finde your self touching the other Difficulties you propounded.

Hyl.

Very much, I'll assure you, Philopolis, touching all of them for the present. But what dark clouds may again overcast my minde by our next meeting, I cannot divine aforehand. But you shall be sure to hear of it, if any thing occurr that dissettles me. In the mean time I am sure I finde my self in a very gay and chearfull condition.

Philop.

We may then very seasonably adjourn this Meeting, O Cuphophron, [Page 338] to six a clock to morrow in the afternoon.

Cuph.

I shall then be again very happy, XXVI. O Philopolis, A civil, but merry-conceited, bout of Drinking in Cuphophron's Arbour. in my enjoyment of so excellent Company. In the mean time my Service to you in this Glass of Wine; for I think neither you nor any one else has drunk since they came hither, they have been so intent upon the Discourse.

Philop.

It is utterly needless this Summer-time, O Cuphophron.

Cuph.

It is very convenient to drink one Glass, to correct the Crudities of the nocturnall Air and Vapours. This therefore is truly to your Good health, O Philopolis.

Philop.

Well, since it must be so, I thank you kindely, Cuphophron.

Hyl.

Nay, Gentlemen, if you fall a-drinking, I may well fall a-whistling on my Flagellet.

Cuph.

What, do you mean to make us all Horses, to whistle us while we are a-drinking?

Hyl.

Nay, Cuphophron, I whistle that you may drink, and all little enough [Page 339] to make Philotheus, Bathynous and Sophron to take off their Glasses.

Bath.

I believe Hylobares his Whistling may have a more symbolicall meaning in it then we are aware of, and intimate to us that Eating and Drinking are acts common to us with the Beasts.

Philop.

Be if so, Bathynous, yet these acts are sometimes necessary for men also. Nor is it inconvenient to drink to my next neighbour Philotheus, not onely to fortifie him against the nocturnall Vapours, but likewise to recruit his Spirits, which he may have over-much expended in his long and learned discourses.

Philoth.

The fresh Air, Philopolis, moistened with the Moon-shine, as Cuphophron noted, is as effectual to that purpose, if I had been at any such expense.

Philop.

But this Glass of Wine will help to correct the Crudity of that moisture: wherefore my Service to you, Philotheus.

Philoth.

[Page 340]

I thank you heartily, Philopolis, I will pledge you.

Philop.

It is very good Wine.

Philoth.

I shall commend it the more willingly to Bathynous, a little to warm and chear his thoughtfull Melancholy. Bathynous, my Service to you.

Bath.

Your Servant thanks you, Philotheus.

Philoth.

I perceive Philopolis has a very judicious Tast.

Bath.

It is ordinarily the pure effect of Temperance to have so. But yet my palate is something more surd and jacent. However I will trie. I promise you it seems to me very good, Philotheus, and such as Cato himself would not refuse a Cup of: which makes me with the more assurance drink to my next neighbour, even to Sophron, to chear him after his conceived Fears and Affrights touching the Success of this Dispute concerning Providence.

Sophr.

The good Success, Bathynous, chears me more then all the Wine [Page 341] in Athens can do. And therefore not so much to be cheared, as out of my present Chearfulness, I will, readily pledge you one cup. For Sobriety is not in drinking no Wine at all, but in drinking it moderately.

Bath.

Well, my Service to you then, Sophron.

Sophr.

I thank you, Bathynous.

Euist.

But certainly, if my memory fail me not, Cato, as grave as he was, would drink more Cups of Wine then one at a time.

Sophr.

Nor do I think that moderate Drinking consists in one Cup, but in drinking no more then is for the Health of both Soul and Body. And one Glass will serve me for that end at this time.

Euist.

Your Definition is very safe and usefull, I think, O Sophron.

Sophr.

And therefore my singular respects to you, Euistor, in this single Glass of Wine.

Cuph.

See the virtue of good Canarie, the mere steam of whose volatil Atoms has so raised Sophron's [Page 342] phancie, that it has made him seem for to offer to quibble before the Glass has touched his lips.

Sophr.

It is marvellous good Wine indeed. I warrant you, Euistor, this will rub up your memory to the purpose, if the recalling how many Cups grave Cato would take off at a time, may warrant our drinking at any time more then is needfull or convenient. I pray you tast it.

Euist.

I thank you, Sophron, I should willingly pledge you, though it were in worse liquour. They have all of them had each man his Glass but Hylobares, but have excogitated such pretty pretences to accost them they drank to, that I finde I need to have my wit rubb'd up as well as my memory, to hold on this ingenious humour.

Cuph.

Do not you observe, Euistor, how studiously Hylobares has play'd the Piper all this time? Take your Cue from thence.

Euist.

Hylobares, not to interrupt you, my humble Service to you in a Glass of Canarie, to wet your whistle.

Hyl.

[Page 343]

I thank you kindly, Euistor; but I profess I was scarce aware what I did, or whether I whistled or no.

Philop.

Methinks those Airs and that Instrument, XXVII. Hylobares, seem too light for the serious Discourse we have had so many hours together. The marvellous Conjuncture in Hylobares of an outward Levity and inward Soberness at once.

Hyl.

But I'll assure you, Philopolis, my thoughts were never more serious then while I was piping these easie Airs on my Flagellet. For they are so familiar to me, that I had no need to attend them, and my minde indeed was wholly taken up with Objects sutable to our late Theme. And even then when I was playing these light Tunes, was I recovering into my memory, as well as I could, some part of a Philosophick Song that once I had by rote, (both words and tune and all) which has no small affinity with the Matters of this day's Discourse.

Philop.

It is much, Hylobares, you should be able to attend to such contrary things, so light and so serious, at one and the same time.

Hyl.

[Page 344]

That's no more, Philopolis, then Euistor did in his Story of the Angel and the Eremite. For I look upon the twisting of a man's Mustachio's to be as slight and triviall a thing as the playing on the Flagellet. And yet I believe he was at it at least twenty times with his fore-finger and his thumb in his rehearsing that excellent Parable, though his Minde, I saw, was so taken up with the weightiness of the sense, that his aspect seemed as devout as that of the Eremite, who was the chief Subject of the Story.

Euist.

I pray you, Hylobares, take this Glass of Wine for a reward of your abusing your Friend so handsomely to excuse your self, and see if it be so good for the rubbing up the memory as Sophron avouches it. For then I hope we shall hear you sing as attentively as you have regardlesly whistled all this time.

Hyl.

The Wine is very good, Euistor, if it be as good for the Memory. But I believe I had already recalled [Page 345] more of those Verses to minde then what is convenient to repeat at this time.

Philop.

I prithee, Hylobares, repeat but them you have recalled to memory; it will be both a farther ratification of this unthought-of Experiment, and a sutable Close of the whole day's Discourse.

Hyl.

Your desire is to me a command, Philopolis; and therefore for your sake I will hazard the credit of my Voice and Memory at once.

Where's now the Objects of thy Fears,
XXVIII.
Needless Sighs and fruitless Tears?
His serious Song of Di­vine Pr
 [...] ­vidence.
They be all gone like idle Dream
Suggested from the Body's steam.
O Cave of Horrour black as pitch!
Dark Den of Spectres that bewitch
The weakned Phancy sore affright
With the grim shades of grisly Night!
What's Plague and Prison, loss of Friends,
War, Dearth, and Death that all things ends?
Mere Buglears for the childish minde,
Pure Panick Terrours of the blinde.

Collect thy Soul into one Sphear
Of Light, and 'bove the Earth it bear▪


[Page 346]Those wilde scattered Thoughts, that erst
Lay loosely in the World disperst,
Call in; thy Spirit thus knit in one
Fair lucid Orb, those Fears be gone,
Like vain Impostures of the Night,
That fly before the Morning bright.
Then with pure eyes thou shalt behold
How the First Goodness doth infold
All things in loving tender Arms;
That deemed Mischiefs are no Harms,
But sovereign Salves, and skilfull Cures
Of greater Woes the World endures;
That Man's stout Soul may win a state
Far rais'd above the reach of Fate.

Power, Wisedome, Goodness sure did frame
This Universe, and still guide the same.
But thoughts from Passions sprung deceive
Vain mortals. No man can contrive
A better course then what's been run
Since the first Circuit of the Sun.

He that beholds all from an high
Knows better what to doe then I.
I'm not mine own: should I repine
If he dispose of what's not mine?
Purge but thy Soul of blinde Self-will,
Thou straight shalt see God does no ill.
The World he fills with the bright Rays
Of his free Goodness. He displays
Himself throughout: Like common Air
That Spirit of Life through all doth fare,


[Page 347]Suck'd in by them as vital breath
Who willingly embrace not Death.
But those that with that living Law
Be unacquainted, Cares do gnaw;
Mistrusts of Providence do vex
Their Souls and puzzled mindes perplex.

These Rhythms were in my minde, Philopolis, when the Flagellet was at my mouth.

Philop.

They have an excellent sense in them, and very pertinent to this day's Disquisitions. I pray you whose Lines are they, Hylobares?

Hyl.

They are the Lines of a certain Philosophicall Poet, who writes almost as hobblingly as Lucretius himself; but I have met with Strains here and there in him that have infinitely pleased me; and these, in some humours, amongst the rest. But I was never so sensible of the weightiness of their meaning as since this day's discourse with Philotheus.

Philop.

Well, Hylobares, if you ruminate on no worse things then these while you play on your Flagellet, it will be an unpardonable fault in me [Page 348] ever hereafter to disparage your Musick.

Euist.

I think we must hire Hylobares to pipe us to our Lodgings, XXIX. else we shall not finde the way out of Cuphophron's Bower this Night, The breaking up of the Meeting. as bright as it is.

Hyl.

That I could doe willingly, Euistor, without hire, it is so pleasing a divertisement to me to play on my Pipe in the silent Moon-light.

Philop.

Well, we must abruptly take leave of you, Cuphophron, and bid you Good night: Hylobares is got out of the Arbour already, and we must all dance after his Pipe.

Cuph.

That would be a juvenile act for your Age, Philopolis.

Philop.

I mean, we must follow his example, and betake our selves homewards; for it is now very late. Was it a delusion of my sight? or did there a Star shoot obliquely as I put my head out of the Arbour?

Bath.

If the Dog-star had been in view, one would have thought him in danger from Hylobares his charming Whistle.

Euist.

[Page 349]

No Hags of Thessaly could ever whistle the celestial Dog out of the Sky, Bathynous.

Cuph.

How sublimely witty is Euistor with one single Glass?

Euist.

Good night to you, dear Cuphophron.

Cuph.

Nay, I will wait on you to your Lodgings.

Philop.

By no means, Cuphophron; we will leave you here in your own house; unless you will give us the trouble of coming back again with you.

Cuph.

Good night to you then, Gentlemen, all at once.

Philop.

Good night to Cuphophron.

The End of the Second Dialogue.

[Page 350]

THE THIRD DIALOGUE.

Philotheus, Bathynous, Sophron, Philopolis, Euistor, Hylobares, Cuphophron.

Sophr.

WHat tall Instrument is this, I. O Cuphophron, Conjectures touching the Causes of that Mirth that the Meeting of some persons naturally excite in one another. that you have got thus unexpectedly into your Arbour?

Cuph.

The tallness discovers what it is, a Theorboe. I observing yesternight how musically given the Company was, in stead of Hylobares his Whistle, (which is more usually play'd upon before Bears or dancing Dogs then before Philosophers or Persons of any quality) have provided this more grave and gentile Instrument for them that have a mind to play and sing to it, that so they may, according to the manner of Pythagoras, after our Philosophicall Dissertations, with a solemn Fit of Musick dismiss our composed mindes to rest.

Sophr.

[Page 351]

You abound in all manner of Civilities, Cuphophron: But do not you play on this Instrument your self?

Cuph.

No, alas! it is too tall for me, my Fingers will not reach the Frets. But sometimes with a careless stroak I brush the Gittar, and please my self with that more easie Melody.

Hyl.

And it would please any one living to see Cuphophron at that gracefull Exercise, so as I have sometimes taken him; He is so like the Sign at the other end of the Street.

Cuph.

This Wag Hylobares, I dare say, means the Sign of the Ape and the Fiddle. This is in revenge for the disparagement I did his beloved Syrinx, the Arcadian Nymph.

Philop.

I never heard that Hylobares had any Mistress before.

Hyl.

This is nothing, Philopolis, but the exaltedness of Cuphophron's phancy and expression; a Poeticall Periphrasis of my Flagellet, which in disparagement before he called a Whistle.

Philop.

[Page 352]

But your imagination has been more then even with him, if he interpret you aright. Let me intreat you of all love, Hylobares, to suppress such light and ludicrous Phancies in so serious a Meeting.

Hyl.

I shall endeavour to observe your commands for the future; O Philopolis, but I suspect there is some strange reek or efflux of Atomes or Particles.

(Cuph.

Of Particles, by all means, Hylobares, for that term is more Cartesian.)

Hyl.

Which fume out of Cuphophron's body, and infect the air with mirth, though all be not alike subject to the Contagion. But for my self, I must profess, that merely by being in Cuphophron's presence I find my self extremely prone to Mirth, even to Ridiculousness.

Philop.

As young men became disposed to Vertue and Wisedome merely by being in the company of Socrates, though he said nothing unto them.

Cuph.

[Page 353]

And I must also profess that Hylobares is not much behinde-hand with me. For I can never meet him, but it makes me merry about the mouth, and my heart is inwardly tickled with a secret joy. Which, for the credit of Des-Cartes's Philosophy, I easily acknowledge may be from the mutuall recourse and mixture of our exhaled Atomes, or rather Particles, as Cartesius more judiciously calls them: for these Particles are not indivisible. Some also are ready to quarrel one another at the first meeting, as well as Hylobares and I to be merry: and you know some Chymicall Liquours, though quiet and cool separate, yet mingled together will be in such a ragefull Fermentation, that the Glass will grow hot to the very touch of our Fingers.

Euist.

This is learnedly descanted on by Cuphophron: but, by the favour of so great a Philosopher, I should rather resolve the Probleme into some Reason analogous to that of [Page 354] those Seeds which Solinus says the Thracians at their Feasts cast into the fire, Polyhist. c. 15. the fume whereof so exhilarated their spirits, that they were no less merry then if they had drank liberally of the strongest Wines.

Hyl.

Pomponius Mela also relates the same of them. [...]e situ Orbis l. 2. c. 2. But nothing, methinks, illustrates the nature of this Phaenomenon better then that Experiment of a certain Ptarmicon, (Seed or Powder, I do not well remember) which cast secretly into the fire will unexpectedly set the company asneezing. Suoh I conceive to be the hidden Effluvia of Cuphophron's Complexion, which thus suddenly excites these ridiculous Flashes of my ungovernable Phancy, to the just scandal of the more grave and sober: Which Extravagance I must confess is so much the more unpardonable to my self, by how much my own minde has been since our last Meeting more heavy-laden with the most Tragicall Scenes that are exhibited on this terrestriall Globe; which endeavour to [Page 355] bear against all those ponderous Reasons, those dexterous Solutions and solid Instructions which Philotheus yesterday so skilfully produced in the behalf of Providence.

Philop.

Why, what remains of Difficulty, Hylobares, either touching the Natural or Moral Evils in the World?

Hyl.

Touching the Natural Evils, II. Philopolis, I rest still pretty well satisfy'd; Hylobares his Relapse into Dissettlement of minde touching Providence, with the cause thereof. and in that general way that Philotheus answered touching Moral Evils, his Solutions seemed to my Reason firm enough: but when in solitude I recounted with my self more particularly the enormous Deformities and Defects that everywhere are conspicuous in the Nations of the Earth, my Phancy was soon born down into a diffidence and suspicion, that there is no such accurate Providence (as Philotheus contends for) which does superintend the affairs of Mankinde.

Bath.

That is to say, Hylobares, After that more then ordinary Chearfulness [Page 356] raised in your spirits by your re-acquaintance with those many and most noble Truths that Philotheus recovered into your mind, (by his wise discourse) at which the Soul of man, at her first meeting with them again, is as much transported, as when two ancient friends unexpectedly meet one another in a strange Countrey, as Iamblichus somewhere has noted, I say, after this more then usual transport of Joy, your spirits did afterward as much sink and flag, and so Melancholy imposed upon your Phancy. But there is no fear, things having succeeded so well hitherto, but Philotheus will revive you, and dissipate these Clouds that seem so dark and dismall to your Melancholized Imagination.

Hyl.

I believe you will more confidently conclude it Melancholy, Bathynous, when you have heard what an affrightfull puzzle one thing then seemed to me.

Bath.

I pray you, Hylobares, propound it to Philotheus.

Hyl.

[Page 357]

Well, III. I shall, Bathynous, and it is briefly this; Paucity of Philosophers no blemish to Divine Providence. How squalid and forlorn the World seemed to me by reason there are so very few Philosophers in it. For the rest of Mankinde seemed to me little to differ from Baboons or Beasts.

Cuph.

O Hylobares, how dearly could I hug thee for this meditation! This is a Consideration framed after the Sentiments of my own heart. It is a thing I have often in secret bewailed the World for even with tears, I mean, for the paucity of Philosophers; and then most of all, that amongst these few there should be so very few pure and thorough-paced Cartesians. These serious thoughts in private have afflicted my heart very sore.

Philoth.

I pray you, Cuphophron, be of good comfort, and you, Hylobares, let not this Scene seem so Tragicall to you. For it is a great question, whether the Philosophers be not more ridiculous, then they, that are accounted none, deplorable or contemptible. [Page 358] Besides, why is this to be charged upon Providence, that there are so few? The Book of Nature lies open to all, and the generality of men have wit for observation: But it is their own fault, that they had rather please their Senses then exercise and improve their Reason. But admit that few are born to Philosophy, yet all in a manner are born to far better matters: that is to say, It is in the power of every man to be Religious, Iust, and Vertuous, and to enjoy the wholesome Pleasures of the Animal life in a pious and rational way. Wherefore there being so short a cut every-where to Prudence and Religion, (if a man be sincere and faithfull,) I see not how any one is excluded from the most substantial Happiness humane Nature is capable of. But for other Knowledge, if it were every man's, it were scarce the enjoyment of any man. But the confident Ignorance of the rude and the unexpected Paradoxicalness of the skilfull do fitly furnish out the Stage of [Page 359] things, and make more for the sport and pleasure of life, and enhance the price and compensate the labour of finding out or apprehending the more abstruse Theories in Philosophy.

But this peculiar Philosophicall Happiness is but a very small accession to that Moral Happiness which is common to all men, if they be not wanting to themselves; as, To be loyall to a man's Prince, To be true to his Religion so far as it is true, To deal faithfully with all men, To be kinde to his Neighbors, To relieve the oppressed, To be an hearty lover of God and of the whole Creation. A man thus affected, and armed with so much Prudence as not to deny or assert any thing beyond his clear comprehension and skill in speculative matters, but to admire and adore the ineffable Wisedome of his Creatour, this man, I say, is a more complete, perfect and unexceptionable person, and more solidly happy, then any Philosophers I know that have left their Writings to the World as a lasting Testimony of their Wit, [Page 360] Des-Cartes himself not excepted; whose gross Extravagancies (such as making Brutes mere Machina's, the making every Extension really the same with Matter, his averring all the Phaenomena of the World to arise from mere Mechanicall causes) will be more stared upon and hooted at by impartial Posterity, then any other pieces of wit he may have light on can be admired or applauded: Which hazard those that adhere onely to Vertue and true Piety are alwaies secure from.

Hyl.

What think you of this, Cuphophron?

Cuph.

With Philotheus his leave, I think the Cartesian Philosophy a very fine thing for all this. What think you, Hylobares?

Hyl.

I think Philotheus has spoken in the main very solidly and home to the purpose, and that the Prudent vertuous man is far a more noble and goodly spectacle then any Philosophicall Knight-errant whatsoever. If he can blow away the rest of those Mists [Page 361] and Clouds that sit upon my mind with like facility, I hope I shall be in an utter incapacity of raising the least doubt concerning Providence for the future.

Philop.

Try what Philotheus can doe, Hylobares. Propound to him the rest of your Difficulties.

Hyl.

The rest of my Difficulties, IV. O Philotheus, Reasons in gen [...]ral of the gross Deformity in the Religions and Customs of the Savage Nations, as also of the variety of this Deformity in Manners & Customs. arise from the view of the Manners and Religions of the barbarous Nations, such as they are described in History, and which indeed are such, so sordid and ridiculous, so horrid and enormous, that they would even force a man's Phancy into a distrust that in those Nations Divine Providence has quite forsaken the Earth. For if she cast her eye upon them, why does she not either reform them, or confound them and destroy them?

Philoth.

That the face of things, in some parts of the barbarous Nations especially, looks very durtily and dismally, I cannot but acknowledge: but the Causes being found out, Admiration [Page 362] ought to cease. For that Mankinde is in a lapsed condition it cannot be denied, nor that a great part of the invisible Powers are sunk into the Animal life with them. Now that which is the most high and powerfull in the Animal life will not let its hold goe so long as it can hang on. Whence the most Active Spirits in this Region get the Dominion over the more Passive, and the Kingdome of the Prince of the Air has proved very large over the Nations of the Earth, they being so deeply lapsed and immersed into the Animal Nature. Wherefore we cannot expect but that both the Rulers and the ruled having fallen from the holy Light and the Divine benignity of the Aethereall nature, that the effects of that Government and the garb of their Manners should be cruel, squalid, deformed and ridiculous; a judicious sense of true Pulchritude and Decency not being able to reside in so dark and distempered Complexions, and their envious Guardians caring more [Page 363] to tyrannize over them and to make sport with them, then to spare them or to be true Guides to them in any thing. All therefore that can be done is, to mitigate as well as we can the sad horrour and mad aspect of this strange Theatre, which strikes the Phancy so strongly and so harshly. For the wound, by your own proposall of the Difficulty, Hylobares, I perceive reaches no farther then the Phancy; which is an intimation the better parts of your Minde stand sound. And there is another passage I noted, which I shall make use of for the cure of your Phancy also, viz. That this squalid Face of things is onely in those barbarous Nations: wherein there is imply'd a tacit concession that the civilized parts of the World are at least passable.

Hyl.

I must confess it seems to import so much.

Philoth.

And the Christian World most of all.

Hyl.

One would think so, Philotheus.

Philoth.

[Page 364]

Wherefore to satisfie your Reason and quiet your Phancy, if any of us shall shew that either there is no great hurt in such Customs of the barbarous Nations that seem strange and uncouth to us, or that we our selves have something analogous to them, much of this surprizing horrour and astonishment will be taken off.

Hyl.

I hope so.

Philoth.

In the mean time it is worthy the noting in general, That there being this Lapse in mankinde, it is far better that their Obliquities and Deformities in Manners and Religion be very much varied, then that they should be every-where one and the same. For that would make Transgression look more like a due and settled Law of Life and firm Reason: But now the freeness of the internal spirit of man, that is so active and reflective, having broken the Animal Life into such varieties of Fooleries and Vanities, whether National, Provincial or Personal, we become a mutual [Page 365] Theatre one to another, and are in a better capacity of censuring what is evil in our selves by reflecting upon others; the Deformities we espie in others being nothing else but a reprehensive Parable touching our selves. For the whole Mass of mankinde is like a company fallen asleep by the Fire-side, whom some unlucky Wag has smutted with his sooty and greazy fingers, and when they awake, every one laughs at the false Beards and antick strokes in other mens Faces, not at all thinking of his own. But assuredly it is a very easie intimation to him to reflect upon himself, and to look into the Glass whether he be not smutted also. Wherefore seeing there must be Faults in the world, methinks it is more agreeable to Reason and Providence, that there be a Variation of them, though the strangeness thereof surprises us, then that the Jar should be alwaies on the same String; that Folly and Wickedness may not seem familiar to us in every place we meet with it, but that we [Page 366] may be astartled at the new and unexpected guizes thereof in others, and thereby take occasion to examine if we have nothing akin to it in our selves. This may be said in general, Hylobares, but to particulars no answer can be returned, till you propound them.

Hyl.

That I shall doe as they occur to my mind; V. but I must implore the aid of Fuistor where I am at a loss. Of the [...]arbarous Custome of g [...] ing naked.

The first brutish and barbarous Custome that occurrs is the going stark naked, as some Nations do, if my memory fail me not.

Euist.

The Inhabitants of the West-Indies did so, as Americus Vesputius reports. And Paulus Venetus relates the same of the Abraiamim in the Kingdome of Lae. Again, in the West-Indies particularly the Maids of Venesuella are said to goe as naked as they were born.

Philoth.

I do not deny but that some Nations may goe stark naked, as questionless there may be many with little or no Covering on them, [Page 367] the parts of Modesty excepted: but as to these latter, that this is any such Flaw in Providence, I understand not. For the Clemency of the Clime under which these people live, the goodly Structure of their Bodies, the true Shape and Symmetry of Parts, their prodigious Agility, Strength, and Nimbleness in Running, Swimming and Dancing, their freedom from care of providing, and the trouble of putting on and putting off their Garments, their long Lives, unwrinkled Skins, easie Child-birth, virgin-like Breasts, and unsophisticated Venery, the imposture and gullery of fine Clothes, (like pernicious Sauce) never begetting in them a false appetite, nor administring occasion of Lascivious phancies; I say, these are so considerable Concomitants of the Nakedness of these people, (which Historians joyntly take notice of) that it may not onely apologize for this seeming Barbarity, but put us to a stand whether they be not either more rational or more fortunate in [Page 368] this Point then the Civilized Nations. I am sure, some Sects of the Civilized World look upon it as a piece of Perfection to imitate them, if not to out-doe them, as the Adamites and such like. And those two severer Sects of Philosophers, the Stoicks and Cynicks, will abett them in it, who contend there is no Turpitude in any thing but Sin; from which they willingly acquit the works of God and Nature. That more general shame in mankinde, of having their more uncomely parts seen, is undoubtedly an indication by God and Nature, that we are born to higher and more excellent things then these corporeall pleasures. But to be ashamed to be naked, and yet not to forbear those Sins that this Shame was intended a Bar to, such as Whoredome, Adultery and Sodomie, is to turn their Clothing into Cloaks of Hypocrisie, and to be but Apes and Satyrs still in green Coats. This is a tast of what may be said touching such uncouth Spectacles. But it would be [Page 369] too laborious a task for me, Hylobares, to answer every particular you may produce. I had rather employ my thoughts, while you are proposing them to others, in finding out some summary Answer to all, upon a [...]uller view of your Allegations, or Euistor's Relations.

Philop.

Philotheus makes but a reasonable motion, Hylobares. Give him some respite, and propound your Particulars in common to all, or any that are ready to answer.

Cuph.

A very good motion, Philopolis.

Hyl.

The next then, VI. Cuphophron, Of the ridiculous Deckings and Ado [...] nings of the Bar [...] rians. shall be touching the ridiculous Adornings or Deckings of the Barbarians. The embroidering of their Skins with Flowers, Stars, Birds, and such like pleasant Figures, this indeed has as little hurt in it as that kind of work in Womens Petticoats. But the painting of their Skins with Serpents and ugly Beasts, as the Virginians are said to doe, how vilely must that needs look?

Cuph.

[Page 370]

That's a slight business, Hylobares, if you consider the design, which I suppose is to make them look more terrible of aspect; a thing that seems to be affected in the Civilized parts of the World, many Families bearing Coats of Arms wherein are seen as venemous and poisonous Monsters. Not to adde how general an Humour it is amongst men, to desire Power more then Goodness, and to be feared rather then to be loved.

Euist.

But what say you, Cuphophron, to the Gentry of Calecut, who stretch their Eares as low as their Shoulders, that they may be large enough to be laden with variety of rich Jewells?

Cuph.

I say it is not so unhandsome, it may be, Euistor, as unsafe, unless they be well guarded. It is a [...]air invitation to have them effectually pulled by the Eares, to the hazard of their Eares and Jewells at once.

Euist.

Indeed I think so too, Cuphophron. But what shall we think of the [Page 371] Tartars and Maldives cutting off all their Hair of the upper Lip?

Cuph.

Why, Euistor, I think it an excellent way for the more cleanly drinking, and supping of their Potage.

Euist.

But is it not very ridiculous in the Virginians, to cut away half of their upper and lower Beards, and leave the other half behind?

Cuph.

It is not, I must confess, so sightly. But who knows but that there may be some usefulness of it, as in the Amazons cutting off their right Breasts, the better to draw their Bow and Arrow? It may be also, when they take Tobacco, they slaver on the shorn side of their Chin.

Euist.

But O the beauty of black Teeth, the affected Ornament of the Inhabitants of Venesuella!

Cuph.

And so it may be, for ought we know, as lovely as black Hair and black Eyes and Eye-brows: a black Sett of Teeth would fit excellently well with these. For my part, I know not whether Jet or Ivory [Page 372] looks more pleasantly; either, methinks, looks more handsomely then a row of Teeth as yellow as Box, which is the more ordinary hue of our Europeans.

Euist.

But the Laws of Miction amongst those of the West-Indies is a pitch of Slovenliness beyond all Cynicism, the men and women not sticking to let fly their Urine even while they are conversing with you.

Cuph.

That is very consequentially done, Euistor, to that simple Shamelesness of being stark naked. For it is those Parts, rather then any Loathsomeness in the liquour that proceeds from them, (which is both wholesome to be drunk in sundry cases, and many times pleasant to the smell) that require secrecy in that Evacuation. Wherefore there seems more of Iudgement then Sottishness in this Custome, unless in the other Exoneration they use the like Carelesness.

Euist.

Cautious beyond all measure. No Miser hides his Bags of muck with more care and secrecy then they endeavour [Page 373] to unload themselves of that Depositum of Nature. They are very Essenes in this point of Cleanliness, O Cuphophron.

Cuph.

Why, this makes amends for the former: I thought they would easily smell out the difference.

Hyl.

Methinks, Euistor, you ask a little out of order. The present Theme is the Deckings of the barbarous Nations. But you see Cuphophron is excellently well appointed for all.

Cuph.

An universalized spirit, a Soul throughly reconciled to the Oeconomie of the World, will not be at a loss for an Apology for any Phaenomenon.

Euist.

There are far harder then these to come, O Cuphophron. But I will onely give one step back touching Ornaments. Is not that Bravery which Americus Vesputius records in his Voiage to the New-foundworld very ghastly tragicall? For he saies sundry of those Nations had quite spoiled their Visages, by boring of many great Holes in their [Page 374] Cheeks, in their Chaps, in their Noses, Lips and Ears; and that he observed one man that had no le [...]s then seven Holes in his Face, so big as would receive a Damask prune. In these they put blew Stone, Crystall, Ivory, or such like Ornaments. Which I the easilier believe to be true, having spoke with those my self that have seen Americans with pieces of carved Wood stuck in their Cheeks.

Sophr.

Cuphophron scratches his head as if he were something at a loss. In the mean time, Euistor, take this [...]ill Cuphophron has excogitated something better. That which is rare (we know) is with all Nations precious, and what is precious they love to appropriate and transferr upon themselves as near as they can: whence rich men eat many times not what is wholesomest, but the hardest to be got. So if there be any thing more costly then another, they will hang it on their Bodies, though they cannot put it into their Bellies, such [Page 375] as their Ear-rings and Jewells. But these Barbarians seem to exceed them in the curiositie of their application of these Preciosities, they fully implanting them into their very Flesh, as if they were part of their natural Body.

Hyl.

Well, Sophron; but how rude and sottish are they in the mean time, that they thus cruelly wound their poor Carcases to satisfie the folly of their Pride and Phancy?

Sophr.

But the boring of the Face and the slashing of the Skin I believe will prove more tolerable, then the cutting and piercing of the Heart with Care and Anxiety, which the Pride of more civilized places causes in men of high Spirits and low Fortunes. Besides, Hylobares, it may be our ignorance to think they undergoe so much Pain in the prosecution of these phantastick humours. For these Holes and Slashes may be made in their Bodies when they are young, like Incisions on the Bark of a tree or a young Pumpion, that grow in bigness [Page 376] with the growth of these Plants. And how safely and inoffensively such things may be practised on young Children, the wringing off the Tails of Puppets, and Circumcision of Infants used by so many Nations, are sufficient examples.

Cuph.

I thank you for this, Sophron; some such thing I was offering at, but you have prevented me. Proceed, Euistor or Hylobares, whether of you will.

Hyl.

I prithee, VII. Euistor, T [...] Lawleness of the Barbarians and their gross Extravagancies touching Wedlock apologized for by Cuphophron, Advocate-general for [...] P [...]ynims. puzzle Cuphophron, if you can, touching the Political Government of the Barbarians.

Euist.

Does not that seem marvellous brutish, O Cuphophron, that in some places they had no Government at all, as in Cuba and New Spain, whose Inhabitants went naked, acknowledged no Lord, but lived in common Liberty, as Cosmographers witness?

Cuph.

Is that so unreasonable or brutish, O Euistor, that those that are not burthened with the incumbrance of Riches should neglect the use of [Page 377] Laws; the chiefest Controversies amongst men arising concerning Honours and Wealth, those two great incitements to Injustice? Wherefore those Barbarians seem so far from any Degeneracy in this, that they rather resemble the Primevall Simplicity of the Golden Age, where there was neither Judge nor Gaoler, but common Liberty prevented all occasions of Injury. Here Adultery was found impossible, there being onely difference of Sexes, no distinction of the married and unmarried state, or appropriation of any single Female to one solitary Man. Which some eminent Sages of Greece (to omit the suffrage of some of the more spiritually-pretending Sectaries of this present Age) have look'd upon as a special part of the most perfect platform of a Commonwealth their wisedom could excogitate. Assuredly the power of Nature is so wire-drawn through so many ceremonious Circumstances, of Parentage, of Portion, of Alliances, and then so fettered [Page 378] and confined by the religious tie of Marriage, whether the parties can well hit it or no, that her vigour is very much broken, the Generations of men weakned, and their days shortened, in most parts of the Civilized World: whenas those Tenants in common you speak of seldome are sick, and ordinarily live to an hundred and fifty years, as I have read in Historians. So that the confinements of the Law of Marriage seem instituted for the good of the Soul rather then the health and strength of the Body. But outward Laws not reaching adulterous Affections, the Hypocrisie of the Civilized Nations has made them too often forfeit the sincere good of both Grace and Nature at once.

Sophr.

This is smartly, but madly and surprizingly, spoken, Cuphophron, and more like a Poet or Philosopher then like a Christian.

Cuph.

This is nothing against the Sanctity of the Laws of Christianity, which undoubtedly are infinitely above [Page 379] not onely the Lawlesness, but the best Laws of other Nations. But forasmuch as I finde my self as it were Advocate-general of the Paynims, I must plead their Cause, and make their Case look as tolerable as I can.

Bath.

Which you do, Cuphophron, over-Lawyer-like, supporting your Clients without any regard to the Truth, while you impute the Health and Longaevity of these Barbarians to their promiscuous Venerie, rather then to their ranging abroad in the open Air, to their Fastings and Huntings, and other Hardships of life. But I have interrupted Euistor.

Euist.

I pray you then, Mr. Advocate, what say you to that Custome of the West-Indians, who offer their Wives or Daughters to a Stranger in token of Friendship and Hospitality? Of the Bridegroom his not lying with his own Bride the first night, but some other of the like quality? Of the King of Ca [...]ecut, in the East-Indies, his not lying with the Queen the first night, but one of the [Page 380] Priests, who has five hundred Crowns for his Pains, as you may reade in the Voiage of Ludovicus Patritius? What to the Custome of the Province of Camul belonging to the Great Cham, where the Master of the house, in an high strain of Hospitality, commits his Wife and his whole Familie to the Stranger, to use his Wife and all he has with the same liberty himself doth; and that his Enjoyment may be entire, quits his house for the time, that the Stranger may seem to have no Corrival? as Paulus Venetus relates.

Cuph.

This is marvellous pretty, Euistor. But I conceive the Custome comes from hence, in that they take Marriage to be no part of Religion, but of Nature, and look upon their Wives merely as the best Chattel they have, and therefore in an high strain of Friendship offer them to be enjoy'd by their Friends. In which kind Simplicity the Camulites seem to exceed all the rest.

Euist.

But what think you of the [Page 381] Priest of Calecut, Cuphophron?

Cuph.

I think that his lying with the Queen the first night pretends to an auspicious Consecration of her Womb to future Fertility; and that his five hundred Crowns are a reward of this religious performance.

Euist.

But it is a strange act of Religion, to lie with another man's Wife.

Cuph.

The direction of the Intention, Euistor, is all in all. The Priest does not intend to commit Adultery, but to consecrate the Womb. But what blemish is this in Providence, that Paynim-Priests are as crafty as some of the Christian, who upon Spiritual Pretences too often promote an Interest of the World and the Flesh, as these Calecut-Priests seem to doe, they both reaping the pleasure of lying with the Queen, and strengthening the Interest of the Priesthood by mingling the Sacerdotal with the Royal seed, the first-born of the Queen being in all likelihood as much the Son of a Priest as Heir to the Crown?

Philop.

[Page 382]

I thought Cuphophron had not been so nimble a Politician.

Hyl.

His zeal, Philopolis, for the Paynims makes him more then ordinarily quick-witted.

Euist.

But what excuse will his wit finde out for the other excess in Matrimony, that, I mean, of the Tartars, who think Marriage so holy, that they believe their God Natagai to have Wife and Children, and therefore if their Sons or Daughters die before age, yet they celebrate a Marriage betwixt parties thus deceased, that they may be Man and Wife in the other World?

Cuph.

That they make Marriage so Sacramental a thing, need not seem strange to us. But that they conceit God to have Wife and Children, is more extravagant, and yet not much more then that opinion of the Anthropomorphites, who phansie God in the form of a Man. Which Conceit certain Monks of Aegypt were so mad upon, that they forced the Bishop of Alexandria to subscribe it for fear of his life.

Euist.

[Page 383]

I perceive no small matters will puzzle Cuphophron's invention: VIII. and therefore though the [...], Of the [...], and the men of Arcladam that lie in Childbed for their Mives. and the men of Arcladam that lie fourty days in Childbed for their Wives, present themselves to my memory, yet I will pass them over.

Cuph.

That's a very odd thing of the men of Arcladam, Euistor: I pray you, what is it?

Euist.

When the Woman is delivered, she gets out of the Bed as soon as she can, and follows the businesses of the house; but the Man lies in for so many days, and does all the offices of a Mother to the Infant, saving the giving it suck: and the Neighbours come a-gossiping to the Man lying thus in bed, as in other Countreys they do to the Woman. And they of Arcladam give this reason for this Custome, because the Mother had a sufficient share of trouble in bearing the Child and bringing him forth, and that therefore 'tis fit that the Man should ease her now, and take off part of the care to himself, De Region. Orient. l. 2. c. 41. as Paulus Venetus reports.

Cuph.

[Page 384]

If the Men of the Country had had Milk in their Breasts, which severall men have had, according to the testimony of many credible Writers, Philosophers, Physicians, and Anatomists, the Custome had been more plausible. But such as it is, it has its reason, as you see, and it was not a pure piece of Sottishness that carried them unto it. And for the [...], in that the Women rule them, it is a sign that it is fit they should. For it is in virtue of their Strength, Wit, or Beauty; and you know the Iambick, ‘ [...].’ They chose their Kings of old from the Beauty of their form, as Lucretius notes. And why do men rule the women, but upon account of more Strength or more Wisedome? But where the women rule the men, it is a sign they have more Strength or Wit, and therefore have a right to rule them. And indeed where do they not rule them? insomuch that the whole World in a manner are of [Page 385] the [...]. So that this is no peculiar Disorder amongst the Barbarians, such as Mela and Diodorus Siculus mention.

Hyl.

The Women are much beholden to you, Cuphophron, for your so kinde and careful Patronage of them.

Cuph.

I am of a large spirit, Hylobares; I love to be civil to all Sects, Sexes, and Persons.

Hyl.

Cuphophron swallows all down very glibly. IX. But, Of the Pagans Cruelty to their Enemies, and inhumane Humanity to their Friends. as I remember, there are some direfull Stories of the Pagans cruelty to their Enemies, and inhumane Humanity to their Friends, that, methinks, should a little turn his Stomack, Euistor.

Euist.

There are very savage Customes recorded in Pomponius Mela touching the Essedones, Axiacae and Geloni. The last clothe themselves and their Horses with the Skins of their slain Enemies; with that part of the Skin that covers the Head they make a Cap for themselves, with the rest they clothe their Horses. [Page 386] The Essedones celebrate the Funerals of their Parents with great Feasting and Joy, eating their Flesh minced and mingled with Mutton; (which is the manner of their Buriall of them) but tipping their Sculls with Gold they make Drinking-cups of them: as the Axiacae quaffe in the Heads of their slain Enemies, as well as drink their bloud in the field. In Castella del Oro the Inhabitants also eat their own dead. But in the Island Iava, as Ludovicus Patritius reports, the Children do not, like the Essedones, eat their Parents, but when they are old and useless, sell them to the Anthropophagi, as the Parents do the Children, if desperately and irrecoverably sick in the judgement of the Physician. For they hold it the noblest kinde of Burial to be interred in the Belly of a man, and not to be eaten by Worms: To which if any expose the Body of his dead Friend, they hold it a crime not to be expiated by any Sacrifice. The Laws also of the Sardoans and Berbiecae, which [Page 387] Aelian relates, Var. Hist. l. 4. c. 1. are very savage; the one commanding the Sons to knock the Fathers o'th' head when they are come to Dotage, the other prohibiting any to live above seventy years.

Hyl.

Stop there, Euistor: let's hear what excuse the Advocate of the Paynims can devise for these horrid Customes.

Cuph.

Truly, Hylobares, these things must seem very harsh to any civil person, especially at the first sight. But yet there seems, if we make farther search, to be something commendable at the bottom of some of these. For the Parricide that is committed by the Sardoans and Berbiccae seems to arise out of Compassion to their Parents, they not enduring to see so sad a spectacle as helpless and wearisome Old age, a heavy Disease, and yet uncurable by any thing else but Death. And those of Iava, that sell, either the Parents their sick Children, or the Children their aged Parents, to the Cannibals, it is both to ease them of their pain, and procure [Page 388] them, as they think, the most honourable Buriall. And it is no small countenance to these barbarous Customes that S [...] Tho. More's Vtopia allows painfull and remediless Diseases to be shortened by some easie way of death. Which seems to me another kinde of Midwifery, to facilitate the birth of the Soul into the other world, as Midwives do the entrance of the Body into this. Which may be the reason why the Essedones are so jocund at the Funerals of their Friends, they looking upon it as their Birth-day into the other State.

Euist.

The Thracians do so indeed, X. if we will believe Pomponius Mela, [...] who adds, that their Wives contend who should be buried with their dead Husbands. As also do the Indians. And Acosta reports that the Kings of Peru and the Nobles of Mexico had their Wives, nearest Friends and Servants, killed at their Funerals, to bear them company into the other World.

Cuph.

This is harsh, I must confess, Euistor; but, it may be, not so silly [Page 389] and unpolitick. For this Custome might be begun for the safegard of Husbands and Kings from being poisoned by their Wives, nearest Friends, and Servants.

Euist.

But what a mad Solemnity was that of the Funeral of the Great Cham of the Tartars, which Paulus Venetus describes, when his Body was carried to the Mountain Alchai? De Region. Orient. l. 1. c. 54. For they slew every one they met in the way, horse and man, saying these words, Ite, & Domino nostro Regi servite in alteravita. It is thought no less then twenty thousand men were slain thus on this occasion at the Funeral of the Great Cham Mongu. There seems not in this so much as any Plot or Policy, Cuphophron, but mere savage Barbarity.

Cuph.

It is very wild indeed, Euistor: But the opinion of the Immortality of the Soul and personal distinctness of the deceased in the other life is both sober, religious, and Philosophicall; and the Impression of the belief thereof on the spirits of [Page 390] the People very usefull and Politicall, for the making them warlike and just; and this Solemnity of more force to impress this belief, then all the subtil Ratiocinations of the Philosophers.

Euist.

But it is so barbarously cruel, O Cuphophron.

Cuph.

Who knows, Euistor, but most of these men were Voluntiers, and had a minde to serve the Great Cham in the other World? Otherwise they might have kept out of the way. And the Ambition of living Princes sends more to Orcus then this Superstition about the dead Cham of the Tartars, and, methinks, in more uncouth Circumstances. For he that dies in the service of his living Prince leaves him he serves, but he that dies in love to the deceased Cham goes to the Prince he loves.

Euist.

Very elegantly answered, Cuphophron.

Hyl.

Cuphophron is such an Oedipus, that he will stick at the Solution of no Riddle.

Euist.

[Page 391]

But I have one more to try his skill to the purpose, XI. an accustomary Cruelty of the people of Caraiam, The Caraiamites murtheriag good men to seize on their Vertues. such as it is hard to say whether it be more ridiculous, or barbarous.

Cuph.

I prithee, Euistor, what is it? I love to hear such Stories.

Euist.

The forenamed Authour tells us that the people in this Country, when a Traveller from forein Nations lodges with them, the man of the house, if he perceive the Stranger to be one of an excellent carriage and vertuous behaviour, prudent and sober in his words and actions, and very eminent for his Goodness and Honesty, he will be sure to get up at midnight and kill him, conceiting that thereby he shall for ever detain the Prudence, Vertue and Honesty, nay the very Soul, of this Traveller in his house, and that he will be a perpetuall Lodger there.

Bath.

Surely Euistor plays the Wag with Cuphophron, and contrives a Story to pose him.

Euist.

In the word of a Gentleman, [Page 392] Bathynous, I relate no more then what I read, and what any one else may reade, in M. Paulus Venetus his History of the Oriental Countreys, in his second Book and the fortieth Chapter.

Cuph.

I could easily suspect Hylobares of such a piece of Waggery, but I believe Euistor will deal bonâ fide with me, and play no tricks; and therefore I am glad Hylobares has committed this Province to him. But as for his Story of the Inhabitants of Caraiam, I do not see that the Cause of the Paynims is much detrimented thereby. It should seem these Pagans were as greedy after Vertue as the civilized Nations after Mony, who ordinarily murther the Owner to make themselves masters of it. They therefore were more ignorant, but we more wicked. But what farther Mystery there may be in the matter no man knows. It may be they intended the deceased for some Lar familiaris, whose Soul they would propitiate by some religious Ceremonies [Page 393] after they had trespassed so far on his Body, which they had killed in honour and love to his Vertues, though with small kindness to his Person. But whether it be more tolerable to murther men out of love to their Vertues, or out of hatred to them, I leave, as a new Disquisition, to more subtil Casuists. I am sure the Iews had no other cause then that to kill our Saviour, although they lived under the Institutes of no less noble Law-giver then Moses himself, and were then the choicest part of the Civilized World.

Hyl.

You do but play with Cuphophron. XII. I pray you, Of the Anthropophagi or Cannibals. Euistor, try what gusto he hath for the Diet of the Cannibals.

Euist.

Had not you better resume your Province, Hylobares, and assault him your self?

Hyl.

It cannot be in a better hand then yours, Euistor, who so particularly remember Stories. Besides that Cuphophron is out of all jealousie of being abused by you, which will make [Page 394] his Answers come off more glibly.

Euist.

Well then, since it must be so, I will adde to this single example of slaying men to seize upon their Souls, that of murthering them to feed upon their Bodies, a Villany, Cuphophron, very frequently mentioned as well in ancient as modern Historians: As of the Anthropophagi about the Nyssean Mountains in India, which Eustathius notes; as also those of Scythia, noted by Pomponius Mela. And Solinus takes notice not onely of these Anthropophagi of Scythia, but mentions also others in Aethiopia. The truth of which things later discoveries seem to ratifie. Christophorus Columbus tells us of Cannibals not far from the Island Hispaniola, that eat Man's-flesh, and salt or souse it as we do Beef, Pork, Bacon, and Brawn: That they geld those they take young, as we do Capons, to make them eat more tender; and keep Women alive to breed on, as we do Hens to lay Eggs. This Island of Cannibals is called Insula Crucis, of which you [Page 395] may reade more in the Voiage of Columbus. The men of Zipangai, (that belongs to the Tartar) if they light on a Stranger, unless he can redeem himself, kill him and eat him, calling their Friends and Kinsfolks to the Feast. In Timaine, a Town of Castella del Oro, they sold Man's-flesh in the Shambles, as Cosmographers write. As also that the Brasilians celebrate their Festivals, making themselves m [...]rry over the body of a fat man cut into Collops; and that the Enemies they take in War they roast and eat, dancing round about them.

Cuph.

Enough, Euistor, my stomach is surcharged already; nothing is more nauseous then the Phancy of those things is to me. Nor can I devise what may be said in the behalf of so high Barbarities. Onely it is to be noted, That these sad Objects are more a torment to the well-natur'd living then any farther mischief to the dead: and that flaying of men of their Estates and Livelihood, or taking away their [Page 396] Lives, is an harder Cruelty to the sufferer: and that it is not so much the conscience of Decorum, as queaziness of stomach, that makes our modern Europaeans abstain from their Enemies Carcasses. Besides, whether is it more barbarous out of scorn and hatred to kill men to feed their Dogs withall, as the Spaniards used the poor Indians, or for the Indians or other Barbarians, out of an appetitious liking of Man's-flesh, more honourably to bury it in their own bowells? a Funeral-solemnity that some of them use, and think it the last good deed they can doe for their deceased Friends. Wherefore we can onely make this deplorable Conclusion, That the unmercifulness of the Europaeans is not less, but their Hypocrisie more, then that of the uncivilized Indians. For that horrour they profess and abhorrency from the Flesh of dead men (which instinct, questionless, God and Nature has implanted in us as a bar against all Cruelty to our kind) does not [Page 397] keep them off from doing all the [...]eal Cruelty that is committed by the Savage Nations. Whence they seem to me to be self-condemned, while they boggle at the less kindes of Crueltie, and so frequently practise [...]he greater; straining at the Gnat, (as [...]t is said) but in the mean time swallowing down the Camel.

Sophr.

I promise you, Cuphophron, I did not think you could have made [...]o passable work out of so crooked and knotty a matter. At least thus much I think is true, That to them that make so light of War and Bloudshed and Murthering of men to seize on what they have, to them, I say, to whom this substantial Cruelty seems tolerable, these men should not think it intolerable in Providence, that she permits those slighter and more innocuous shadows thereof. For all those seeming Cruelties are but the flagellation of the absent, and they take up and use at their pleasure onely what he has left: but the killing and murthering of a man is a present [Page 398] tormenting him, and forcible driving of him out of all that he has. Which I speak to shame the civilized Nations, in shewing them that they frequently commit acts that are infinitely more cruel and barbarous then those which they themselves judge the most horrid and outragious of all the acts of the Barbarians.

Cuph.

I am glad, O Sophron, to see so grave a Judgement fall in with mine.

Sophr.

I must confess, Cuphophron, that you have made a pretty shuffling show of mitigating the harshness of the secular Barbarity of the Paynims, as you call them: but I fear you will not have half the success in palliating the gross Enormities of their Religions.

Hyl.

And that, Sophron, is the very next thing that I would have Euistor to exercise Mr. Advocate-general's Wit in.

Euist.

In what, Hylobares?

Hyl.

In finding any tolerable excuse for their gross Opinions touching XIII. [Page 399] God, Of the Atheism and the Polytheism of the Barbarians. for their Polytheism and Idolary, for their Men-Sacrifices, Devil [...]orship, Sacrificing men to the Devil, [...]nd the like.

Euist.

I understand you, Hylobares, [...]nd shall accordingly propound Instances to Cuphophron. In the first place therefore, Cuphophron, I pray you, what do you say to the Brasili [...]ns, that are reported to acknow [...]edge no God at all, and yet to be so addicted to Divination, that they grow mad therewith?

Cuph.

To this I answer, That in that they are so much addicted to Divination, it is a suspicion that they do believe there is a God; and may be slandered as Atheists, because they worship no Idols nor any visible Object.

Euist.

That is very charitably surmized of you, Cuphophron.

Cuph.

But suppose they be Atheists, how many thousands are there of such kinde of Cattel in the most civilized parts of Europe?

Euist.

But others of the Indians, [Page 400] Cuphophron, to make amends, hold more Gods then one. They of New-England worshipped Kesan their Good God, and the Devil beside, that he might not hurt them.

Cuph.

And so by worshipping the Devil acknowledged two sovereign Powers or Principles, a good one and [...] bad one: Which though it be a great Errour, yet is such as very great Wit [...] have fallen into. For S ^•. Augustine himself, before he became Christian was a Manichee. And Plutarch, in his Isis and Osiris, entitles Plato to the like Errour, [...] He tells us also that Zoroaster was of the same Opinion; and that they named these two distinct Principles Oromasdes and Areimanius; and that the Aegyptian Osiris and Typhon answer to them. So that it is not any sign of so great Sottishness, if the Barbarian [...] of America were lapsed into this strange mistake.

Euist.

But your Paynims, O Cuphophron, seem to have made not onely two, but even two thousand [Page 401] Deities, while they worshipped Sun, Moon, Starrs, Beasts and Plants, Sea, Land, Winde, Thunder, Caves, Hills, the tallest and most spreading Trees, nay what-ever living Creature they met with first in a morning, as some chuse Valentines, or rather not chuse them, but embrace the first they meet on Valentine's-day.

Cuph.

This cannot be deny'd, Euistor, but that the barbarous Nations did religious Worship to innumerable Objects of this kind, but not as to the supreme Power of all, (which was the primary or ultimate Object of all their Adoration) but rather as to Images and Symbols of that ultimate Object. And how great a part of the Civilized World, even of them that are called Christians, contend that the worshipping of Images in such a sense as this is laudable and right?

Euist.

I think both much-what alike laudable.

Bath.

I have thought often of this point, and that very impartially as well as anxiously, and I cannot for my [Page 402] life find any excuse for those of the Roman Church to clear them from Idolatry, but the same with better advantage may be alledged for the Pagans, they having no written Law against worshipping Images as the Romanists have, who acknowledge the Bible to be the Word of God.

Euist.

That is very material. XIV. But what mitigation can you find out, O Cuphophron, Of their Men-Sacrifices. for that horrid and hideous way of worshipping these Objects, as that of the Scythians about Taurica Chersonesus, who sacrificed Strangers to Diana, that is, to the Moon?

Cuph.

This is very harsh: but I pray you let me ask you this one question, Euisior, Did never any man suffer in the civilized parts of Europe, for being estranged from certain Religious Lunacies which bloudy and Ty [...]anicall Obtruders urged upon them under no less penalty then Death?

Euist.

I must confess that History furnishes us with Instances of not onely many H [...]catombs, but severall [Page 403] thousands of Holocausts of Man'sflesh butchered by that bloudy Church of Rome, and sacrificed to the honour and interest of their great Diana. You know what I mean, Cuphophron.

Cuph.

I do. And I pray you how much better is this then the Pagans sacrificing of men to Diana Taurica?

Euist.

Both exceeding bad: And yet I must propose to you other things as ill or worse. As that barbarous Custome of the Ammonites, who sacrificed their children to Molech or Milchom in the valley of Tophet, so called from the Drum that was there beat to drown the lamentable Cries of the murthered Infants.

Cuph.

This I must confess is exceeding barbarous, Euistor, to sacrifice though but a single Son to that cruel Idol. But, methinks, it seems more destructive to mankinde, that those that either are or ought to be Patres Patriae, (I mean great Princes and Emperours) unprovoked by any Injury, but merely out of a desire of Dominion [Page 404] and Rule, are so lavish of the bloud of their Subjects, as to expose numerous Armies of them to the Slaughter; they smothering in the mean time the groans of the dying and maimed by the sound of Drums and Trumpets, and other clattering noises of War, while they thus sacrifice to the cruel Idol of Ambition, as the Ammonites to Milchom in the valley of Tophet. And will History acquit the civilized World of this piece of Barbarity, Euistor?

Euist.

The Grand Seigniour is deeply guilty of this cruel kinde of Idolatry: and I wish it were not to be found too much in Christendome it self.

Cuph.

So do I.

Euist.

But, God be thanked, we are so clear from one horrid crime of the Pagans, that we have nothing like it in Christendome.

Cuph.

What's that, XV. Euistor? Of their worshi [...] ping the Devil.

Euist.

Why, it is the worshipping the very Devil himself. Which that the Pagans did, is manifest from their [Page 405] Temples and Images, from the madness of their Priests, and from their Sacrifices. The Peruvians worshipped two carved Idols, a black Goat and a long Serpent, both of them perfect Symbols of Satan, and such as himself loves to appear in. In the City of Goa their Pagods or Idols are of so detestable a form, that no man can imagine how ugly and deformed they are: yet these they consult as Oracles, and by the power of the Devil have Answers from them. The Chinois also worship a Devil-Idol standing on an high, but something duskish, place of their Temples, having two huge Horns on his Head, with a most terrible Countenance, with sharp Claws in stead of Hands and Feet, and his Head uglily starting out from the midst of his Breast, as Gotardus describes him. But the most horrible description of a Temple is that of the King of Calecut's, where they worship his God Deumo: for the true God Tamerani he serves not, because, though he made the World, yet he [Page 406] has given up the Government of it, as they con [...]eit, to Deumo. This Temple has its Entrance garnished with numbers of Devils made in Wood artificially turned and carved. In the midst of the Chappel there is a Seat like a Throne of Brass, with a brazen Devil sitting upon it, with a Crown on his Head, like that of the Roman Pontife, (as Ludovicus Romanus describes it) out of which come three Horns. There are four others also that turn in after such a manner, as that they seem to support his Head. He has also four Teeth standing out of his foul wide gaping Mouth, and a threatning Look, with terrible staring Eyes, and Hands with crooked Nails like to Hooks; but his Feet not unlike to a Cock's. In every corner of the Chappel is likewise placed a Devil made of Brass, with such art, as that he seems to be in the midst of Flames wherein Souls are scorched in most direfull manner, whom the Devil also is devouring up, putting one Soul into his mouth [Page 407] with his right hand, and reaching underneath at another with the left.

Cuph.

If there had been written upon the Walls of the Chappell, Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor, (as they say there is in Mahomet's Mosco's, Non est nisi Deus unus) all had been complete.

Euist.

Can there be any thing possibly parallel to this, Cuphophron, amongst our Civilized Europaeans?

Cuph.

I think nothing, unless it be the Religion of the Superlapsarians, the Object whereof is Infinite Powe [...] unmodified by either Iustice or Goodness: which is that very Idol of Typhon or Arimanius I spoke of. For this Imagination of O [...]nipotent Power and Will acting without any regard to Iustice or Goodness, is but an Idol, no real thing. If it were, it were more horrible then the Indian Deumo, or any Devil that is. But it could not be God: For God is Love, and every thing acts according to what it is.

Sophr.

Very well argued, Cuphophron.

Philop.

[Page 408]

In many things Cuphophron seems to be on a more then or [...]inary good pin to day.

Euist.

But I believe he must stretch his wit to an higher pin them he has done hitherto, to pretend to make any tolerable answer to what follows.

Cuph.

Why, XVI. what strange thing is that which follows, Of their sacrificing men to the Devil. Euistor?

Euist.

The Sacrificing of men to the Devil. Those of Peru frequently sacrifice their Children for the success of the affairs of their Ingua, for Health, Victory, or the like. The Son was also frequently sacrificed for the health of the Father. They of Mexico had a▪ Custome of sacrificing of their Captives. Whence their Kings wore often stirred up by their Priests to make war upon their neighbours, to get Captives to sacrifice to the Devil, they telling them their Gods di [...]d for hunger, and that they should remember them. The Devil also him [...]lf is said to appear in Florida, and to complain that he is thirsty, [Page 409] [...]hat humane bloud may be presently [...]hed to quench his thirst.

The solemnity of sacrificing Cap [...]ives to Vitziliputzly in Mexico within [...]he Palisado of dead mens Sculls is most horrid and direfull: where the [...]igh Priest cut open their Breasts with a sharp Flint, and pulled out [...]heir reeking Hearts, which he first [...]hew'd to the Sun, to whom he offe [...]ed it, but then suddenly turning to [...]he Idol, cast it at his face; and with [...] kick of his foot tumbled the Body from the Tarrass he stood upon down the Stairs of the Temple, which were all embrew'd and defiled with bloud. These Sacrifices also they ate, and clothed themselves with the Skins of the slain.

Cuph.

Now certainly this Custome of the Americans is very horrible and abominable, thus bloudily to sacrifice men to that Enemie of Mankind, the Devil. And therefore it were very happy if we had nothing in these Civilized parts of the World that bore the least shadow of similitude with it.

Euist.

[Page 410]

Why? have we any thing, Cuphophron?

Cuph.

Why? what is the greates [...] horrour that surprises you in this Custome, Euistor?

Euist.

To say the truth, Cuphophron▪ I do not find my self so subtile an [...] distinct a Philosopher as explicitly t [...] tell you what, but I think it is, first, That mankind should worship so ugly and execrable an object as the Devil▪ and then in the second place, Tha [...] they should sacrifice so worthy an [...] noble a thing as an humane Body▪ which is in capacity of becoming the Temple of the Holy Ghost, to so de [...]estable an Idol.

Cuph.

You have, I think, answered very right and understandingly, Euist [...]r, if you rightly conceive what makes the Devil so detestable.

Euist.

Surely his Pride, Cruelty and Malignity of nature, and in that all Love and Goodness is extinct in him, which if he could recover, he would presently become an Angel of Light.

[...]ath.

Euistor has answered excellently [Page 411] well, and like a Mysticall Theologer.

Euist.

To tell you the truth, I had it out of them.

Cuph.

But if he has answered right, Bathynous, it is a sad consideration, that we have in the Civilized parts of the World those that profess a more odious Religion then the Mexicans that sacrifice men to the Devil, I mean, the Superlapsarians. For the Object of their Worship is a God-Idol of their own framing, that acts merely according to Will and Power sequestred from all respect to either Iustice or Goodness, as I noted before, which is the genuine Idea of a Devil. To which Idol they do not, as the Mexicans, sacrifice the mere Bodies of men, but their very Souls also; not kicking them down a Tarrass, but arbitrariously tumbling them down into the pit of Hell, there to be eternally and unexpr [...]s [...]ibly tormented, for no other reason but because this their dreadfull Idol will have it so. Can any Religion be more horrid [Page 412] or blasphemous then this?

Hyl.

I perceive you begin to be drawn dry, O Cuphophron, you are fain so to harp on the same string. This is but your Typhon and Areimanius you mentioned before. I expected some more proper and adequate Parallelisms to Euistor's fresh Instances, especially to that of sacrificing to the Idol Vitziliputzly.

Cuph.

Do you think then, Hylobares, that it is so hard a thing to find something in the Civilized World more peculiarly parallel to that dreadfull Ceremonie? What think you of the Roman Pontif?

Euist.

How madly does Cuphophron's phancy rove? and yet how luckily had he hit, if he had but made use of the usual name Papa? For that is also the Title of the high Priest of Mexico, who sacrifices men to Vitziliputzly, Hist. Ind. lib. 5. c. 14. as Iosephus Acosta tells us.

Cuph.

I thank you for that hint, Euistor: It seems then there will be a consonancy betwixt the verbal Titles as well as an Analogie betwixt [Page 413] the things themselves.

Hyl.

I would gladly hear that Analogie, Cuphophron. Not that I should take any such great pleasure in finding the Papacy so obnoxious, but that it pleases me to observe the versatil sleights and unexpected turnings of your movable Phancy.

Cuph.

Nor care I to tell you for either the one or the other, Hylobares, but that I may adorn the Province I have undertaken in the behalf of the poor Paynim. The Analogie therefore briefly is this: That as the high Priest of Mexico with his Officers pulled out the Heart of the Captives, kicking down their Bodies for the Assistents to eat their Flesh, and clothe themselves with their Skins: so the Roman Pontif, by his cruel Inquisitors discovering the true Religion of the faithfull Servants of Christ, whom they hold in a forcible Captivity, murthered them, and gave their Estates for a spoil to his cruel Ministers and Assistents, to feed and clothe them. Does not this occurr often [Page 414] enough in History, Euistor?

Euist.

It cannot be deny'd, many thousands have been thus butchered.

Hyl.

But to whom were they sacrificed, Cuphophron? You have omitted a principal term that ought to have been in the Analogie.

Cuph.

I would I knew what Vitziliputzly signified.

Euist.

If that will do you any service, Hist. Ind. lib. 5. cap. 9. I can tell you what it signifies expresly out of Iosephus Acosta, viz. The left hand of a shining Feather.

Cuph.

Very good, very good: have patience then a little. Why may not then the Sun easily signifie the heavenly Glory, or the Glory of God; and this shining Feather the vain and foolish Pomp and Glory of the World, or the Pride of Life?

Hyl.

That is not much strained, C [...] phophron; but what then?

Cuph.

Wherefore as the high Priest of Mexico pretends to sacrifice to the Sun, shewing him the smoaking Heart of the Captive when he has pluck'd it out, but presently [Page 415] turns about, and does really and substantially cast the Heart of the sacrificed to the Idol Vitziliputzly: So the Roman high Priest, when he murthers holy and righteous men (under pretence of Heresie) for deny [...]ng such Falshoods and Blasphemies as are onely held up for the supporting the Interest of the Papal Sovereignty and Sublimity, pretends these Murthers Sacrifices to the Glory of God, and for the vindication of His Honour; whenas they are really and truly bloudy Oblations and cruel Holocausts Offered up to that Idol of Abominations, Pride of Spirit, and vain Mundane Glory and Pomp, and a remorseless Tyranny over the Souls and Bodies of men: which is such a quintessential Lucifer, that it is that whereby Lucifer himself becomes a Devil.

Hyl.

All this from Vitziliputzly signifying the left hand of a shining Feather. Ha, ha, he. Wit and Phancy whether wilt thou goe? How merrily-conceited is Cuphophron, that can thus play with a Feather?

Sophr.

[Page 416]

I promise you, Hylobares, though the Phancy of Cuphophron may seem more then ordinarily [...]udibund and lightsomely sportfull, yet what he points at seems to be overlamentably true, viz. That many thousands of innocent Souls have been made Burnt-offerings to the Luciferian Pride of the Roman Hierarchy, and the Sons of God (which is worse then the Mexicans case) thus cruelly and perfidiously sacrificed to the first-born of the Devil.

Euist.

This is too true to contend against it.

Hyl.

I wish it were not so. But in the mean time we can never take Cuphophron at a loss.

Euist.

So methinks, and I have but one kinde more of Tragicall Instances to pose him with.

Cuph.

What's that, Euistor?

Euist.

In some parts of the World they are their own Executioners; XVII. as those of Narsinga and Bisnagar, Of Self-Sacrificers. who cut their Flesh in pieces, and cast it on the Idol's face, or putting a piece [Page 417] of their own Flesh on the pile of an Arrow, shoot it up into the Air in honour to their Pagods, as Gotardus writes. After which Ceremony they cut their own Throats, offering themselves a Sacrifice to their Idol. The King of Quilacare, upon a silk Scaffold, in view of his people, after some solemn Washings and Prayers, having first cut off his Nose, Ears, Lips, and other parts, cuts his own Throat, as a Sacrifice to his Idol. Gotardus, as I remember, addes, that the [...]e is loud Musick sounding all the time. This is done every Jubilee.

Cuph.

Whether Satan put them upon this Slavery out of his scorn and hatred of Mankinde, or that he pleases himself in feeling his own Power, or in seeing examples of the great affection and fidelitie of his Vassals, (as imperious Whores pride themselves in commanding their Lovers some signall Hardship or Penance, as being a more sure testimony (if they perform it) of a more then ordinary worth in themselves, that has engaged [Page 418] them in so perfect a Bondage) or whether it be out of all these put together, is not so requisite to dispute.

Hyl.

No more is it, Cuphophro [...], it is so little to the present purpose.

Cuph.

But I was coming to something which is more near to the purpose, namely, That the nearest to these Self-Sacrificers to Satan are those sad Disciples of certain Mystae▪ of dark and sowr Dispen [...]ations, who, having no knowledge of a Deity but such as is represented unto them in the dreadfull shape of the Indian Deumo above described, (that is, Will and Power disjoyned▪ from all Iustice and Goodness) having first almost fr [...]tted a-pieces their very Heartstrings with tormenting thoughts and anxious Suspicions, do at last either hang or drown themselves, or else [...]t their own Throats, as a sad Sacri [...]ce to that ghastly Idol which their false Teachers had set up in their melancholi [...]ed Phancies. But no Amulet against such diabolical Impostures [Page 419] comparable to that divine saying of S. Iohn, God is Love; and he that abideth in love▪ abideth in God, and God in him.

Sophr.

That is very profitably and seasonably noted, XVIII. O Cuphophron: The meaning of Providence in permitting such horrid Usages in the World. and though my Judgement is not so curious as to criticize on the perpetuall exactness of your applications of the sad Miscarriages of the Civilized parts of the World to those gross Disorders of the Barbarians; yet your comparisons in the general have very much impressed that note of Philotheus upon my spirit, That the more externall and gross Enormities committed by the barbarous Nations are as it were a reprehensive Satyr of the more fine and Hypocriticall Wickednesses of the Civilized Countries; that these civilized Sinners, abominating those wilder Extravagancies, may withall give Sentence against their own noless Wickedness, but onely in a lesseugly dress. Whence it cannot be so great wonder that Providence lets such horrid Usages emerge in the [Page 420] World, that the more affrightfull face of Sin in some places might quite drive out all similitude and appearance of it in others.

Bath.

True, Sophron; but this also I conceive may be added, That Divine Providence having the full comprehension of all the Periods of Ages, and the Scenes of things succeeding in these Periods, in her minde, permitted at first and afterwards some parts of the lapsed Creation to plunge themselves into a more palpable Darkness, that a more glorious Light might succeed and emerge. The lovely splendour of which Divine Dispensation would not strike the beholder so vigorously, did he not cast his eyes also upon that Region of Blackness and sad Tyranny of the Devil in preceding Ages over deluded mankind [...], such as Euistor has so plentifully discovered. All these things therefore seem to have been permitted in design to advance the Glory and adorn the Triumph of the promi [...]ed Mess [...]as, the t [...]ue Son of God [Page 421] and Saviour of the World.

Sophr.

That may very well be, Bathynous. Nor is it any Injustice or Severity in God to make use of the Impenitency of Sinners to better purposes then either themselves or wiser persons are many times aware of. But we interrupt Euistor by this unseasonable descanting upon Cuphophron's performances.

Euist.

I was onely a-going to adde something of the Madness of the Heathenish Priests, XIX. as the last Note of the Satanicalness of their Religion. The Madness of the Priests of the Pagans. But it is scarce worth the while.

Cuph.

Nay by all means let's hear that also, Euistor.

Euist.

That the Maenades, the Priests of Bacchus, were mad, appears in their very Name, whose Notation is from that distemper. The Priest of the Samadees, a People subject to the Muscovite, begins his holy things with howling, which he continues till he grows mad with it, and then falling down dead, after orders his Sacrifice, and finishes the Solemnity [Page 420] [...] [Page 421] [...] [Page 422] he was about. The Hoxiones also, or Priests of China, when they consult their Oracles, cast themselves on the ground, stretching out their hands and feet, another reading in a Book, to whom are Responses made by some Assistents that sing and make a noise with Bells or Cymbals. In the mean time the Spirit comes upon him that lies prostrate, who, rising with staring eyes and distorted countenance, falls a-prophesying and answering such Questions as the By-standers demand.

Cuph.

These are mad guizes of Religion indeed, and yet not an unfit resemblance of as mischievous a Madness amongst too many of our more civilized Religionists.

Euist.

I believe you mean the howling Quakers, as uncivil as they are. For they began in that tone at first, and fell down dead in Trances, and afterwards getting up fell a-prophe [...]ying, uttering out of their swoln breasts very dark Oracles, declaring against all Ord [...]r and Ordinances, decrying [Page 423] all Reason as a work of the Flesh, and pretending to an unaccountable Spirit, and to a Light within that is invisible to all without who have not lost their spiritual eye-sight. None conceive they see it but such as are either blind or in the dark.

Cuph.

There are great and good things the Quakers pretend to, Euistor, but they soil them by so wild a way of profession of them, and indeed in particulars seem to contradict what with so loud a voice they in the general extoll. But that Madness I hinted at is more Epidemicall then this Sect, there being more besides these that never think themselves Divinely-wise till they grow so staringly mad that the eye of Reason seems to have quite started out of their head, and Fumes and Phancies to be the sole guides of their Tongue.

Sophr.

I suppose, Cuphophron, you perstringe that general Disease of ungovernable Enthusias [...] dispersed up and down in Christendome. And yet there is another kind of religious [Page 424] Madness more spreading and no le [...]s mischievous then this.

Cuph.

I pray you what is that, Sophron?

Sophr.

So fix'd and fierce a belief in an infallible Priesthood, that what they dictate for an Oracle, be it never so repugnant to all our outward Senses, to all our internall Faculties of Imagination, Reason and Vnderstanding, never so contradictious to whatsoever is holy, vertuous, or humane, yet they embrace and stick to it with that zeal and heat, that they fly in the faces and cut the throats of not onely them that gainsay, but even of those that will not profess the same abominable Errours with themselves. If so enraged an Heat, kindled upon so enormous a Mistake as never any Lunatick could think or speak more contradictiously, joyn'd with as high Outrages as ever mad-man did commit, for all manner of Murther and Cruelty, if this temper or spirit be not the Spirit of Ma [...]ness, and that of the highe [...]t strain, I know not what [Page 425] belongs to the Spirit of Sobriety.

Cuph.

Certainly it must be a great matter that thus transports Sophron, and makes him something unlike his usual self.

Sophr.

To tell you the truth, I had mine eye on the Artolatria of the Romanists and their Article of Transubstantiation, with all the wild Concomitants and Sequels thereof.

Cuph.

You could not have pitched upon a greater reproch of the Civilized World. I profess unto Sophron, though no man can have a greater aversation then my self from slighting or reviling that which others embrace as the most sacred and solemn Point of their Religion; yet amongst ourselves I cannot but declare, that this Figment of Transubstantiation comprises in it such a bundle of Barbarities, of unheard [...] of Sottishnesses, and savage Cruelties, that there is no one thing parallel to it in all Paganism. The manifold Impostures of the Priests of the Pagans, their [...], [...]hether it be the feeding [...]n the Flesh [Page 426] of Enemies, or entombing the bodies of their dead Friends in their own Bellies, whether their gross Idolatries in the general, or their Sacrificing men to their Idols, all these Abominations are as it were tied together in this fictititious Fardel of Transubstantiation. For was there ever any Indian so imposed upon by their Priests, as to believe they had a power by a certain form of wo [...]ds to turn a Cake of Maize into a living Man, and that the Miracle is done by them, though the Cake of Maize appear still to their Sight, to their Touch, and all their other Senses, as perfect a Cake of Maize as before? And how can these look upon the Indians as such a barbarous people, for either feeding on their Enemies, or burying their dead Friends in their own Bowells, whenas they themselves profess that they eat and grinde a-pieces with their teeth, not dead, but living Man's-flesh, and [...]hat not of an Enemie, but their dear [...]st Friend and Saviour? Can any [...]hing [...]eem more barbarous then this? [Page 427] And then to uphold this Figment, (which seems invented onely for the pomp and vain-glory of the Priest, that he may be accounted a stupendious Wonder-worker, a Creatour of his Creatour) to maintain this Fiction, I say, by the murthering many a thousand innocent Souls that could not comply with the Imposture, what is this inferiour to Sacrificing Captives to the Idol Vitziliputzly, as I intimated before?

Sophr.

I am glad to see you, Cuphophron, so heartily resent the unsufferable Wickedness of that Point of the Roman Religion. I thought you had been so high-flown a Philosopher, that you had taken no notice, no not so much as of these grosser Miscarriages in the Religions of the World: which had been an unpardonable neglect.

Cuph.

If I flew higher then the strongest-winged Fowls are said to do in the time of Pestilence, yet the sent and noisomeness of this crass and barbarous Miscarriage could not but [Page 428] strike my nostrills very hotly, and detain my Sight.

Sophr.

The truth is, Cuphophron, that no Phaenomenon in all Providence has more confoundingly astonished me and amazed me then this of Transubstantiation in all its circumstances. If the Priests of Peru had thus imposed upon those Savages, how should we either have bemoaned them or derided them! O poor Peruvians! O sottish and witless Paynims, devoid of all Sense and Reason, that are thus shamefully imposed upon by their deceitfull Priests! Or else, O miserable people, that must either profess what it is impossible for any one entirely in his wits to believe, or else must be murthered by the grim Officers of the Ingua, incensed against them by the Complaints of an imposturous and bloudy Priesthood! But this to be done in the most Civilized parts of the world!

Hyl.

Nay, this consideration would make any one sigh deeply as well as your self, but me especially. Does [Page 429] not this, O Sophron, subvert utterly all the belief of Providence in the world?

Sophr.

God forbid, Hylobares. No, it more strongly confirms it, there nothing happening to degenerated Christendome in all this but what is expresly predicted in the holy Oracles; 2 Thess. 2. 11, 12. That in the time of the Man of Sin, God would send upon them that loved not the truth strong Delusions, that they should believe [...]a Lie; and particularly pointing at this reproachfull Figment of Transubstantiation, it is said of the Beast, Apoc. 13. 6. that he should blaspheme the Tabernacle of God, which, undoubtedly is the Body of Christ; which, for the enhancing of the glory of the Priest, they thus foully debase and abuse.

Hyl.

These things neither Cuphophron, as I think, nor my self are so well versed in as fully to judge of; but we presume much of your judgement and gravity, O Sophron: which is no small ease to us for the present.

Cuph.

In the mean time, Hylobares, [Page 430] I hope you have spent all your force against me and my Paynims.

Hyl.

Not all, XX. but the chiefest, Of their Religious Methods of living in order to future Happiness. or rather in a manner all: for my other Remarks on the barbarous Nations touching their Religions are more slight, and such as bear too obvious a resemblance to the known Miscarriages of Christendome; such as the over-severe, or over-loose, methods of living in reference to future Happiness. An example of the latter whereof may be the Doctrine of the Bo [...]zii of Iapan, who teach the people, that if they pray but to Amida and Zaca, two holy men that lived here, and satisfied for the Sins of the World, though they doe it but carelesly and remissly, yet they shall not fail of everlasting Happiness.

Euist.

But Gotardus taxes these Bouzii for a Religious Order of Atheists.

Cuph.

And yet severall Sects in Christendome that would be thought no Athei [...]ts, as the Antinomians and Liber [...]ines, and others that would be [Page 431] loth to be noted by those names, have too great an affinity with these Bouzii and their Followers in their Life and Doctrine. But I spare them. But▪ what instances have you of the over-severe method, Euistor?

Euist.

There is an odd example of the Indian Abduti, who for a time lived very rigidly and severely, but that Dispensation once being passed over, they gave themselves up to all Dissoluteness, and conceited they might doe so with authority.

Cuph.

That is very easie to parallel to the condition of some Spiritualists, who, under pretence of having subdued the Flesh by more then ordinary Austerities, and of having arrived to the Liberty of the Spirit, return again to the gross Liberties of the Flesh, to the great grief and scandal of the more sober Professours of Religion.

Euist.

Some chast Votaries of the Turks set a great Iron ring on their yard, using themselves as we do our Mares that they may not take Horse. [Page 432] Those of Mexico slit that member for the same devout purpose.

Cuph.

This is a sign that these hast Votaries are in good earnest. But to pretend to undertake a Vow of Chastity more strong then iron or adamant, and yet to lie with other mens Wives rather then to break it, is such a mysterious Juggle or contradictious point of Hypocrisie, that the very Pagans would be ashamed of it.

Euist.

They might be so indeed, Cuphophron, nor does there any thing of importance occurr to my minde that looks like a sullen piece of Severity in Paganism, but the same may be produced in the very same terms in the present Romanism; as long and tiresome Pilgrimages, voluntary Whippings and Scourgings, immoderate Watchings and Fastings, and the like. These are the Exercises also even of them that serve Idols and worship the Devil, as well as of them that pretend to be the genuine Servants of the Lord Iesus.

Hyl.

But is there nothing observable [Page 433] touching their Opinions of the other State, XXI. in order to which they may undergo these Hardships? Of their Opinions touching the other State.

Euist.

That is worth the noting, that most of the barbarous Nations have some glimpse or surmize of the Soul's Immortality, and of a State after this Life. But it is often mixed with very feat Conceits. As they of Peru hold that after death men eat and drink and wantonize with Women.

Cuph.

Who knows but that they may understand that mystically, as the Persians expound like passages in Mahomet's Alcoran?

Bath.

Besides, these Europaeans seem to me in some sort to Peruvianize, that think they can by bargain and contract buy future Happiness with Mony as we do Fields and Orchards in this life; not considering that if Paradise be not opened within us by virtue of true Regeneration into the Divine Life, all the Wealth in the Indies will not purchase an entrance into the eternall [...]aradise in Heaven.

Euist.

[Page 434]

The Brammans also in the East-Indies have a most ridiculous conceit touching the Transmigration of Souls, namely, That the Reward of a vertuous Soul is, that she may pass out of a Man's body into the body of a Cow.

Cuph.

That's ridiculous indeed, if the expression be not Symbolicall, and hint not some more notable thing to us then we are aware of. For that the Transmigration of mens Souls into the bodies of Beasts has a Mysticall or Moral meaning both Plato and some of his Followers have plainly enough intimated.

Euist.

And Go [...]ardus expresly writes, that these Bra [...]nan [...] had the knowledge of Pythagoras and of his Philosophy, then which nothing was more Symbolicall. I will produce but one observable more, and then give Cup [...]ophron, or rather my self, no farther trouble. For Cuphophron turns all off with sport and pleasantry.

Cuph.

You have produced nothing yet, Euistor, at all hard or trou [...]esome.

Euist.

[Page 435]

Nor will I begin now: For it is onely that they of S. Sebastian de la Plat [...] have neither Image nor Idol.

Cuph▪

It is a sign they are the more pure. Worshippers of the Deity.

Euist.

If they be not Atheists: But that which I was going to adde was that fond imagination of theirs, that after Death they should come into a pleasant place which they dreamed to be situated beyond certain Hills, which they could point at with their fingers.

Cuph.

It were a question worth the starting, whether this American Elysium or the Scholastick Empyreum be the more likely Rendezvous of blessed Souls departed this life.

Hyl.

I pray you, what think you of that, Cuphophron?

Cuph.

I think the Coelum Empyre [...]m of the Schools is a childish Figment. For what ground is there that the first Heaven should be Cubicall, unless it be for the young Angelick shapes to whip their Gigs on the flat and smooth floor thereof? Wherefore the [Page 436] rude Indians, so far as I know, may come nearer the mark then the subtil Schoolmen, though they both seem to me widely enough to miss it.

Hyl.

But I am for the Empyreum of the Schools rather then for that [...]ly [...]ium of the Americans. For the American Elysium is somewhere, viz. beyond the Hills that those of S. Seba [...]tian de la Plata use to point at. But if the Empyreum of the Sch [...]ols be a mere childish Figment, it is no-where.

Cuph.

There's a reason indeed, Hylobares; how can it then be the real Rendezvous of separate Souls?

Hyl.

Separate Souls are Spirits, Cuphophron, but Spirits are no-where: where can they therefore more fitly have their Rendezvous then in the Scholastick Empyreum, which is nowhere also?

Cuph.

Shame take you, Hylobares, have you hit on that piece of Waggery once again? Is this all the thanks I have for bes [...]irring my [...]elf so stoutly to ease your aggrieved imagination, that was so oppressed and [Page 437] burthened with the consideration of the sad Scence of affairs in the Pagan World and Ages?

Hyl.

For that friendly Office I return you many thanks, XXII. O Cuphophron, The u [...]successf [...]lsess of Cuphophron's Advocateship hitherto in ref [...] rence to the [...]as [...] of Hylobares his P [...]rple [...] ities. and must confess you have in your attempts shewn a great deal of Versatility of wit and nimbleness of phancy, and that not without the mixture of some Solidity sometimes. But the less there had been of that, it had been the better.

Cuph.

That's a Paradox indeed: why so, I pray you, Hylobares?

Hyl.

For your endeavour being perpetually to shew that things were as ill in a manner in the Civilized parts of the World as in the Barbarous, this was not to ease me of my sad perplexing thoughts, but to redouble the burthen, and make the waies of Providence appear to me twice as dismall as before.

Cuph.

This Hylobares has a mind to baffle me, and make me ridiculously unsuccessfull in every thing I attempt. Did I not persist in the way th [...]t Philotheus [Page 438] himself seemed to point at, viz. to undeceive your Phancy, that was so horribly struck with the strange Enormities of the Pagan World, by intimating that for the Civilized Nations, that you had a better conceit of, that the Heathen were in a manner little worse in their Opinions and Practices then they?

Hyl.

Nay, I confess, Cuphophron, that that was pretty well levelled at my Phancy. But in thus quieting my Phancy, you have roused up my Reason, to give me a more lasting and invincible disquiet then I laboured with before. For my Reason tells me, that if the World be all over so bad in a manner as it is in the barbarous Countries, I ought to be less satisfied with Providence now then ever.

Cuph.

Alas! Hylobares, I am sorry I have made your Sore worse, but you must make your address to him who prescribed the Plaister. Philotheus was the Physician, I but his Surgeon or Apothecary that administred the Physick according to his prescript. [Page 439] He ought to set you right again by his greater skill.

Philoth.

I pray you deal freely and ingenuously, Hylobares, are you really more pinched then before? or is it a counterfeit complaint and a piece of sportfull Drollery with Cuphophron?

Hyl.

To deal plainly with you, Philotheus, it is mixt. But I am very much still dissettled, and therefore implore your farther help.

Philoth.

Will not this consideration, Hylobares, both ease your Phancy and gratifie your Reason too, That upon the observation that there are some very sottish Conceits and Practices even in the Civilized World, where all things otherwise look so chearfully and splendid, we may also conceive the like of the barbarous Nations, and not immerse or defix our thoughts on those things onely which are so reprehensible and hideous amongst them, but think there may be much also of natural gayety and jollity, and that that dark [Page 440] Scene does not becloud all times, places, nor persons?

Hyl.

That's well suggested, Philotheus, and is accommodate to the relieving one's Melancholy a little. Wherefore because you have begun so well, I pray you hold on, and communicate to us the thoughts which your own silence all this time and our discoursing may have occasioned you to pitch upon, in order to a fuller and more perfect cure of my present Malady. For it is no more then you promised, and I hope Philopolis will see that you keep your word.

Philop.

There needs no other obligation, I dare say, for Philotheus to doe that office of friendship, then his own goodness and sincere zeal for the Truth, and hearty desire of delivering Souls from the bondage of Ignorance and the rack of Doubt and Anxiety in so great matters.

Philoth.

I wish I were as able as I am willing in that kinde, XXIII. Philopolis. Severall Considerations to make us hop [...] that the state of the World may not be so bad [...] as Melancholy or History may represent it. But I will attempt it, and that two waies. First, by shewing that the [Page 441] World may not be so enormously ill as Hylobares his Melancholy surmizes it: Secondly, by hinting an Hypothesis which, if embraced, will plainly make good, that be the World as bad as it will, yet it is not inconsistent with the Divine Goodness (which we contend is the measure of his Providence) to permit it.

Hyl.

I, that Second, Philotheus, were a Remedy indeed, such as would quite eradicate all future possibility of such Diffidences as I labour under. But I shall willingly have you treat of the First in the first place.

Philoth.

Cuphophron with a great deal of dexterity of wit answered the particular Instances that Euistor produced of the most ugly Usages amongst the barbarous Nations. I shall onely rehearse certain brief Heads that will serve in general to break the force of such Arguments as either others offer or offer themselves to our thoughts, to invalidate the belief of such an Exactness of Providence as we plead for, and [Page 442] boldly pretend to inferr, that if there were a God, these things could not be permitted in the World; as you in the beginning complained, Hylobares.

Hyl.

That horrid Squalidity in the Usages of the barbarous Nations presseth hard toward that Conclusion, Philotheus; especially when a man is immersed in Melancholy.

Philoth.

But that you be not hereafter so easily imposed upon, let me desire you to remember those Considerations that I was ever and anon thinking on all this time you were discoursing. The First Consideration. As First, That Historians may write things that are false, whether they pretend to be Eye-witnesses themselves, or take thing up upon the reports of others. Old men and Travellers may lie by authority, as it is said in the Proverb. Wherefore either negligent enquiry, or the vanity and affectation of telling strange things, may fill Histories with many false Narrations; and so though Euistor did not intend to deceive Cuphophron, yet he may haply have exercised [Page 443] his wit in severall Objects that never had any existence but in the pages of Historiographers. And therefore I could not but smile to see how nimbly Cuphophron analyz'd the Politicks of that Custome of the high-Priest's lying with the King of Calecut's Bride the first night, as if it were a design that the Son of a Priest and the Heir to the Crown should concurr in one person: whenas the Sons of the King do not succeed in the Kingdom, but his Nephews on the Sister's side, as Aloysius Cadamustus tells us in his Navigation to those parts.

Philop.

That's very strange, Philotheus. I pray you what may be the reason of it?

Philoth.

He says it is this; Because the Queens of Calecut are perpetually attended by no less then ten Priests a-piece, (for, according to him, the King has two Queens) and they are often compressed by them; which he is persuaded to be for his honour so to be dealt with; but this mixt Of [...]spring not to be so fit to [Page 444] succeed as Heirs to the Crown.

Philop.

This quite spoils all the witty descant that Cuphophron made on that supposed Custome, if Aloysius Cadamustus be a more credible Writer then Ludovicus Patritius.

Euist.

Which is a very hard thing to prove, Philopolis.

Philoth.

But in the mean time Historians contradicting one another, or differing so much in their Narrations, makes things so uncertain, that no wise man will suffer himself to be born down by Stories into any Anxieties touching Providence, before he be well assured of the truth of them. I am sure Epicureans and Atheists are very circumspect how they believe any Stories about Apparitions or Witches, though never so true, lest they should be disturbed in their mindes with over-urgent suspicions of the Existence of God. Why should they then that believe there is a God from certain Indications of him, be cast into Anxieties about Providence from Stories and Reports that are uncertain?

Hyl.

[Page 445]

That's but a reasonable Caution, Philotheus: I pray you go on.

Philoth.

And a Second is this; The Second Consideration. That touching Ceremonies as well civil as religious, and most of all Opinions, we are to consider, there may be lay'd down the narration of the Symbols without any Key of Mythologie added thereto. Of which sort, for ought I know, may be the Brammans transmitting the Souls of the best men into the body of a Cow; a thing as likely as Iupiter's carrying Europa on his back through the Sea in the form of a Bull. Which Palaephatus resolves onely into an Homonymie in words, and tells us that it was a man of Crete, (an Island peculiarly sacred to Iupiter) whose name was Taurus, that carried Europa into Crete out of Tyre, as he had carried many other Maids captive thence before.

Hyl.

But what is this Story of a Bull to that of the Cow the Brammans speak of?

Philoth.

Very much, Hylobares. For I must confess I think it is such another [Page 444] [...] [Page 445] [...] [Page 446] Homonymie of words, the same word signifying both a Cow or Oxe, and a Cherub, that is, an Angel, in the Oriental Tongues. Is it not so, Eui [...]or?

Euist.

The Criticks do write of some such Etymologies.

Philoth.

And therefore the wiser amongst the Brammans, unless they have lost their Pythagorick Tradition, surely understand by this Transmission of good mens Souls into the body of a Cow, the assecution of the Cherubick or Angelick body, which is the greatest reward of the vertuous Soul that can be, and the end of all the Pythagorick Purgations.

Hyl.

This is an unexpected and surprizing account of that seeming gross Conceit of the Indian Brammans.

Cuph.

I thought it was Symbolicall.

Philoth.

They of Narsinga are Worshippers of the Sun and Moon.

Hyl.

It may be so: A gross and sottish Religion.

Philoth.

And they have a Tradition, that when either of them are [Page 447] eclipsed, they are bit by the celestiall Dragon.

Hyl.

On my life their Priests are concealed Almanack-makers, and have turned into a superstitious Parable (which the People understand not) the Philosophy of Caput and Cauda Draconis.

Philoth.

Then you see another real Truth wrapt up in the Homonymie of words; and that this is no Sottishness in the Priests of narsinga, but our Ignorance that understand not their Mythologie. Who knows therefore but that they may be as subtil in their Worshipping the Sun and Moon, and pretend they worship not them, but the Deity that is in them and in all things? as the Europaeans plead for their worshipping Images, that they worship God or Christ in them.

Hyl.

In this they may be both alike subtil or sottish.

Euist.

But was there ever any conceit so silly as that of some of the Americans, (though I have forgot the Country wherein they live,) who [Page 448] have this Tradition amongst them [...] That God shot a multitude of Arrows into the Ground, from whence sprung Men and Women, and that thus the World was peopled?

Cuph.

It may be it is a Riddle concerning the [...].

Hyl.

What a youthfull conceit has your Phancy slipt into, O Cuphophron?

Cuph.

It's good enough to allow amongst the Americans.

Hyl.

What? then you have left off being Advocate-general for the Paynims.

Cuph.

It were no wit to defend them in so slight a matter.

Bath.

It may be the first Authour of that Aenigma needs no defence, the Parable bears so fair an Analogie to that passage somewhere in Plotinus, [...].

Cuph.

Why, do you think, Bathynous, that Pythagoras or Plato ever travelled into America?

Bath.

No, but there may have been wise men in all parts of the [Page 449] Earth, for ought I know, who in Symbols and Parables have insculped the memorials of their Wisedome in the mindes and memories of rude people; as some walking in solitary Woods or Groves carve their Names in the Barks of Trees, which grow with the growth of the Tree they are carved on. But it may be in a little time men know as little of the meaning of these Parables, as the Stock or Bark of a Tree does of the person whose name it bears. And to tell the rude people of the mysticall meaning of their Traditionall Allegories, as if the Story were but a Parable, but the Mystery the Truth, would be as harsh to their minds, as it would be hard to a Tree, if it had Sense, to have the true Effigies of the man whose name it bears carved on it, in lieu of the Name which it has already, and which has grown and spread in the Bark with the growth of the Tree. It would be as dolorous to them as using the Incision-knife to carve their live flesh. And [Page 450] therefore it would make them furiously oppose the manifestation of the Truth.

Hyl.

What pretty unexpected fetches has the thoughtfull mind of Bathynous! But I eagerly desire that Philotheus would hold on in his proposed Method.

Philoth.

In the Third place therefore, The Third Consideration. Hylobares, you are to consider, That the prejudice of Custome may so infect our Phancies, that for matter of Ornaments of the body or other civil Ceremonies, we may unawares tax those that are really as good as our own. There is a great latitude in these things, and they vary even in the most Civilized places from one extreme to another, and that very often in one Age: and the Habits of our Fathers or Grandfathers seem as strange to us as those of Strangers and Foreiners.

Hyl.

This is a Point that least of all troubles me, Philotheus.

Philoth.

But Fourthly, [...] As for Moral Deformities and Extravagancies, [Page 451] it has been hinted already, that there being Folly and Wickedness all over the World, it is better there should be this variegation of it, then that it should be every-where in the same dress; that seeing it out of the more familiar habit, we may the more easily discern the ugliness of it, and the more courageously hoot at it, and so at last heartily detest it, be it in what mode or habit it will. Thus is Vanity and Vileness laughed and jeared at even upon its own Stage, while it is in acting, and in due time will, it may be, quite be hissed off the Stage by the Spectatours; that is to say, they will be as much ashamed to frame dark and dismall Idol-Imaginations of God, as to worship the Devil; and to live as if there were no God in the World, as to profess openly they think there is none.

Sophr.

I pray God hasten those Times, Philotheus.

Philop.

Amen, I pray God.

Philoth.

Fifthly, The Fifth Consideration. you are to consider, Hylobares, That this Terrestriall Globe is the very Dregs of the [Page 452] World, and the most proper Region of Evil; and that therefore to judge of the full benignity of Divine Providence by what we find here, were to measure the Happiness of some famously-flourishing and excellently-well-ordered City by the condition of them that live in the Hospitals or Gaols. For, according to the opinion of the ancient Philosophers, Philo, Plato and others, there may be many Aereall and Aethereall Concamerations above this Earth and lower Air well replenished with happy Souls or Spirits, such as are arrived to that condition that Plutarch sets down in this Aenigma, That they are the Citizens of that Region where the Inhabitants eat no Meat, nor do their Bodies cast any Shadow.

Hyl.

That's a good and comfortable consideration to those that rejoyce more in the good of the Universe then their own.

Philoth.

And those that are such curious Enquirers into Providence ought to be so minded. [...] But I proceed. [Page 453] Sixthly, therefore, consider, That whatsoever evil mankinde groans under, they have brought it on their own heads by their Disobedience and revolting from the First Good, and by preferring the full swindge of the Animal life before the orderly Pleasures and warrantable Joys of the Divine.

Sophr.

And therefore, Philotheus, I think we have greater reason to magnifie the Mercy of God, when we see any sad Object in the World, that every man is not in so ill a condition, (whenas we have all made our selves obnoxious thereto) then to repine against Providence, because we see some are.

Philoth.

You say very well, Sophron; and we may also adde, That there are very few in the world so miserable, but they would take it very hainously of any one whom they understood to goe about to take away their life.

Because (which is to be observed in the Seventh place) The Seve [...]th Consideration. the Lapse of [Page 454] Man (as touching Happiness) is but into lesser Enjoyments, out of God's blessing (as the Proverb is) into the warm Sun; he catching at Good even then, if we may believe Socrates, when he closes with that which we ought in such circumstances of Defect or Obliquity to call by the name of Evil.

Sophr.

And good reason too, Philotheus.

Philoth.

Eighthly, The Eigh [...]h Co [...]sideration. we are to take notice, That in the most disadvantageous parts of the World there is a possibility of emerging out of the Wickedness and Ignorance of the place, if a man be sincere: If he be not, his Hypocrisie is ipso facto punished. For those that of late years have gone about to convert the Indians to the Faith, have found them very capable, and not onely so, but exceeding witty and subtil, nothing infe [...]iour to the Civilized Nations, as I have heard from them that have made observation. And I doubt not but if Euistor would make it his [Page 455] business to set out the commendable things amongst the barbarous Nations, as much as he has those things that look the most horridly and reprochfully, it would alleviate Hylobares his melancholick Conceits of things very much.

Euist.

I must confess, XXIV. Philotheus, E [...]ce [...]lent Instances of Morality even in the most barbarous Nations. that I meet with such Specimina of Peace and Righteousness amongst the barbarous Nations so called, that it were desirable we could finde the like amongst us Christians. The barbarous Americans themselves seek future Happiness from these Principles; promising that Prize to the just and peacefull, and adjudging the injurious, cruel and covetous to a dark, slippery and disconsolate Pilgrimage after this life, where they shall cut their Feet with hard Flints, and enjoy no comfort, rest, nor quiet in any thing. Whence Hathney, a Peruvian Noble-man, would not be baptized, because he would not goe to the place where the cruel and covetous Spaniards went, though they called it by [Page 456] the specious name of Heaven. I should think as much from fear of being in like condition after this life with these bloudy Manslayers, as out of detestation of their accursed Companie: whose insatiable desire after Gold made them insufferably injurious, to the shame of all Christendom, as if they had no other God but this; as a Brastlian upbraided to them, who took up a Wedge of Gold, saying, Behold the God of the Christians.

Sophr.

So easie a thing is it for one son of Wickedness to reproch another.

Euist.

But if you reade but the description of the Country of Mangi in the East-Indies, and of their King Fakfur, as Paulus Venetus sets things down, with what Justice, Peacefulness and Kindness all affairs were administred, and with what Security they lived, and how safely Strangers might travell night and day through all parts of his large Kingdome, and that though Tradesmen left open their Shops by night, no man would [Page 457] enter to steal any th [...]ng; you would bestow a better title on these surely, O Sophron, then you did on the Spaniard or Brasilian.

Sophr.

They seem to deserve a better, Euistor.

Euist.

The like character particularly does Ludovicus Patritius give of the City Cambaia, averring that they keep most professedly to that royal Law, Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri nè feceris.

Hyl.

But where find you any such examples in the West-Indies, Euistor? For that is the most notorious Region of Barbarity.

Euist.

It cannot be denied. And yet you see they have a discrimination of Good and Evil, by that Story of Hathney the Brasilian. And even that People which Americus Vesputius describes in his first Voiage, to be as remote from all that which we call Civility as can be, they being without Government, Laws, or Clothing, yet their Humanity and Kindness to Strangers is said to exceed all belief; [Page 458] they receiving them when they were landed with all expressions of Joy and Gladness, with Songs and Dances, with Mirth and Junkettings, offering them every thing they found pleasing to themselves, and doing all honour and respect imaginable to them, inviting them by their Friendliness and Hospitality no less then eighteen leagues into their Country, and entertaining them thus liberally nine daies from place to place. And as they waited on them in such numerous companies, if they saw any of the Strangers wearied, they would of themselves ease them by carrying them in their Hamocks, and were wonderfully officious in conveying them over Rivers, by sleights and artifices they had, for both their ease and safety. Happy he that had the opportunity of shewing his Kindness to any one of them, in getting him on his Back or Neck to swim over the River with him. With these high, but natural, strains of real Civility and Humanity did they conduct the Strangers [Page 459] also back again to their Ships. Where they having entertain'd them for a day, and after given them notice that they were to go away next morning, the Natives having sufficiently pleased themselves in viewing and admiring the largeness and artificialness of their Vessells, they very friendly took leave, and left them.

Cuph.

It had been a pretty experiment to have shot off some of the Cannon while these poor ignorant Paynims were in the midst of their astonishment and admiration.

Euist.

They did so, Cuphophron, having no design to experiment any thing, but onely to discharge a Gun or two according as is usual on such occasions. But it had a ridiculous effect.

Cuph.

I pray you tell what, Euistor.

Euist.

Those that were on the Shore leapt into the Sea, and dived; as Frogs affrighted at some sudden noise or disturbance leap from among the Grass or Flags on the bank into the River.

Cuph.

[Page 460]

I understood before they were able Swimmers.

Euist.

To admiration, Cuphophron.

Sophr.

But that was not so well done of Americus and his Company, to terrifie them so with so sudden and dreadfull a noise, after all their Civilities.

Euist.

It scar'd them indeed, but they soon perceived the Strangers meant them no hurt; and they had no grounds of fearing any Injury from them, being conscious to themselves of meaning them none, and of having done all Kindness to them they could.

Philoth.

You see, Hylobares, how much of the Law of Reason and Goodness is implanted even in those Nations that are to the utmost barbarous, they are [...], Lovers of mankinde, or [...].

Euist.

Why may we not then adde that which follows in Homer, — [...]?

Philoth.

That's a very high expression, Euistor, for them; but not unapplicable to the best sort of Christians. [Page 461] For our o [...]n Religion testifies that God is Love, and that Love is the fulfilling of the Law.

Hyl.

It is a chearfull consideration, that there is the emergency of so much Good in a people that seemed in so squalid and forlorn a condition, and so utterly hopeless.

Philoth.

But imagine, The Ninth Consideration. Hylobares, a Nation or Country in as squalid and forlorn a condition as you will, this may also, in the Ninth place, ease your phancy, That though the Succession of such a Nation continue for many Ages, yet the particular Souls that make up this Succession in such a disadvantageous abode, their Stay is but short, but their subsistence everlasting after this life. So that their stay here is nothing in comparison of their duration hereafter.

Hyl.

This indeed were something, Philotheus, if their quitting of this Life were a release from all that evil that hangs about them here.

Philoth.

Who knows, Hylobares, but the present Disadvantages to [Page 462] them that are sincere may prove Advantages to them in the other state; and by how much more forcibly they seemed to be born down to Evil here, that by the special Providence of God, at the releasment of the Soul from the Body, there is the more strong and peremptory Resiliency from this sordid Region of Misery and Sin?

Hyl.

If that be, your Argument is not devoid of force, nor do I know how to confute it. For I know you will say, that what-ever Good does accrue to such sincere Souls, it is in virtue of the miraculous Revelation of Iesus Christ to them.

Philoth.

You conjecture right.

Hyl.

But what shall we think of those Barbarians in whom there never was any thing of the Divine Life, nor any moral possibility of acquiring it?

Philoth.

If this were, The Tenth Consideration. which is hard to admit, I must confess I could not think so hardly of God, as to imagine that they must answer for that Depositum [Page 463] that never was put into their hands. And therefore it were the safest to conceive, which you may note in the Tenth place, (nor can we define any thing more determinately therein) That they will be committed to such a state after this Life as is most sutable and proportionable to such a Creature. To which you may adde in the last place, The last Consideration. That on the Stage of this Earth, a throughly-castigated Body, though it be the fittest habitacle for the Divine Light and Heavenly Life to abide in, yet it is more inept for the enjoyment of that more full and sensible Sweetness of the Animal or Bestial; and that so Reflexive and Animadversive a Spirit as the Soul of Man given up wholly to the pleasures of the Animal Life reaps an higher measure of delight therefrom, and that with more punctual and pompous Circumstances, then any Beast whatsoever. Son, remember that thou in thy life-time receivedst thy good things, &c.

Cuph.

I partly understand you, [Page 464] Philotheus, and cannot but applaud the felicity of your Invention, that has hit upon so many and so pertinent Considerations to bear up the minde of Hylobares from sinking into any Distrust of the Goodness of Providence. But, XXV. methinks, Cuphophron's [...]apturous Reasons why God do [...]s not dissolve the World, notwithstanding the gross Miscarriages in it; with Hylobares and Sophron's solid A [...]imadversions thereon. I could adde one Consideration more, to make the number even, and such as will meet with the most passionate expression in Hylobares his Complaint; as if God should rather dissolve the World in an high indignation against the Miscarriages of it, then suffer it to go on in such a wilde course as it seems to have done in the Manners and Religions of the most barbarous Pagans. My Meditation, I must confess, is something Metaphysicall; but I hope it is not above the capacity of Hylobares to understand it.

Philoth.

That he will best know when you have delivered your self of it, Cuphophron.

Cuph.

The summe of it is to this purpose, (and I wish my self better success then formerly, for I have been [Page 465] very unlucky in my delivering my self hitherto) That the universal Object of Man's Understanding, Religion and Veneration, is much-what according to that Inscription in the Temple of Isis or Minerva in Sais, an ancient City of Aegypt, [...], I am whatsoever was, is, or is to come, and no mortal hitherto has ever uncovered my Veil. This I conceive is the hidden Essence of the eternal God, who is all, and from whom all things are in such sort, as that they may in some sense be said still to be him.

Hyl.

This is Hypermetaphysicall, O Cuphophron, very highly turgent and mysterious. What do you mean? That God is so the Essence and Substance of all things, that they are but as dependent Accidents of him? If there were nothing but Matter in the World, this Riddle would be easily intelligible in this sense, and all Phaenomena what-ever would be but the Modifications of this one Substance. [Page 466] But for my own part, I was abundantly convinced by the first day's discourse, That there is an Immoveable Substance distinct from that of the Moveable Matter: which distinction is so palpable, that nothing can be said to be God in any good sense but God himself, at least no Material thing can.

Cuph.

You have almost struck quite out of my thoughts what I was a-going to say next, Hylobares.

Philop.

Cuphophron seems to be full of something; I pray you give him leave to vent himself.

Cuph.

I have recovered it. Now I say, whatsoever is represented to the Soul is not God himself, but some exteriour manifestation: [...]. And whatsoever is more eminent and extraordinary, Nature from religious Complexions has easily extorted veneration thereto, it being as it were a more sensible appearance or visible stirring of that great Godhead that inhabits this august Temple of the World. Wherefore God and his holy [Page 467] Temple filling all places, the passionate Motions of all Creatures are a kinde of Divine Worship, they everywhere seeking and crouching to him to enjoy some Benediction of him, or else singing his Praises in triumphant Accents, and in transporting expressions of their present Enjoyments; some even wasting themselves in the complacency they take, though in but smaller matters which he bestows on them, or rather permits them to take them, though he could wish they would make choice of better. But these, though small in themselves, seem great to them that are pleased with them; these lesser communications of the embodied Excellencies of the Deity so filling their pusillanimous spirits with Joy and Rapture, that they even willingly forfeit all the rest, and turn as it were Martyrs and Self-sacrificers to but so faint a Shadow or scant Resemblance of the first uncreated Perfection: whose beautifull Nature is solidly born witness unto by so ready and [Page 468] constant a Profession, (though many times with sad After-inconveniences) and by so religious an adhesion to so slender and evanid Emanations thereof. Which Mistakes therefore should in all likelihood move Pity rather then Vengeance in the Deity, whose meaner gifts are so highly prized and received with such eager Devotion. Wherefore as uglily disordered as the affairs of mankinde seem, Hylobares has no reason to conceit that God's Vengeance must be presently poured down upon their heads, they not so much reproching him, as befooling themselves, by their ill choice.

Hyl.

What think you, Gentlemen? has not Cuphophron made a very rapturous Harangue?

Sophr.

If the full stream of his Phancy and Eloquence had not carried away his Judgement, and miss-led it into such scandalous expressions as well as real Mistakes, the Musick of his words had been no offence to mine ears. But to me it seems the remainder [Page 469] of yesternight's Resverie which he fell into when he had so plentifully imbib'd the Evening-Air impregnated with the moist Influence of the Moon, which it seems has given him this second Intoxication. For though his words pass the tongue very glibly, yet the sense of some passages seems very unsound to me, and to be rather the wild fetches of Wit and Phancy, then the suggestion of true Reason: As that they that make such an affectionate choice of meaner good things, Pleasure, suppose, in stead of Vertue, seem notwithstanding religiously to give glory to God, in that they so highly esteem these lesser shadows of that Fulness and Perfection that is in Him; whenas really it is a reproch to God, to have those things that are least like him preferr'd by a rational Creature before those things that are most like him, as true Vertue and the Divine Life most certainly is. This therefore is extravagantly false and scandalous. Besides that it is a gross affront to the [Page 470] Almighty, whenas he bids us make choice of one thing, that we will make choice of another.

Hyl.

You have said enough, O Sophron, to enervate all such slight pretensions. These Moon-shine Conceptions of Cuphophron are very abortive, and suddenly vanish in so clear a Light. Besides, if there had been any force of Reason mingled with his high-flown Eloquence, what makes it to the main Design, That Providence has its Rule and Measure from the Divine Goodness?

Philop.

You unmercifully fall upon the rear of those many Considerations which Philotheus and Cuphophron have joyntly offered you. XXVI. But what think you of the whole Body, Hylobares as yet u [...]sati [...]fy'd touching the Goodness of Providence, by reason of the sad Sce [...]e of things in the [...]orld. Hylobares? Is your Scepticism in this point so powerfull as still to be able to bear up against them?

Hyl.

I must confess, O Philopolis, that many things have been suggested from Philotheus that are very considerable, and much to the purpose they aim at: but I am so in love with [Page 471] the Opinion, That the Goodness of God is the measure of his Providence, that the desire I have `it should be true, it may be, makes the Defence thereof seem weaker to me then it is. I must ingenuously confess, I do not find my self so perfectly yet at ease in my minde touching this matter; and Cuphophron's shrewd Reflexions on the Analogies of the Miscarriages of the Civilized Nations which they bear to those of the most barbarous in Manners and Religion, have rather rankled the Sore then healed it, and have made it the more incurable.

Cuph.

Was ever man so unfortunate as I in my officiousness to serve my Friends with that small pittance of Wisedome that God and Nature have bestowed upon me? When I reason shrewdly, that is to say, solidly, then I fester the Sore; when my Arguments naturally tend to mollifie, soften and asswage the anguish of the Sore, then they are weak, abortive, Moon-shine-Conceptions. Well, I see [Page 472] the Fates cast the whole honour upon Philotheus of curing Hylobares his Malady. And I wish him good Success therein.

Philoth.

I thank you, Cuphophron. And I shall soon find out what my Success is like to be, by asking Hylobares but one Question.

Hyl.

I pray do, Philotheus: I shall answer you with all freedome.

Philoth.

Tell me then, Hylobares, whether you do not think that some free Agents, whether the Spirits of Angels or of Men, may not so misbehave themselves, that if you saw the [...] tumbling in stifling flames of Brimstone, and heard them howling for extremity of Torture, and hideously blaspheming God out of an impenitent vexation of mind and diabolical fixedness in that which is evil, being committed to a State of Devils and of Hell; whether, notwithstanding the dismalness of this Tragicall sight, you cannot easily conceive but that such a state of things, though it were all over the face of the Earth, might [Page 473] consist with the Iustice and Goodness of God?

Hyl.

With that part of his Goodness which we call Iustice, you mean, Philotheus.

Philoth.

Be it so, Hylobares.

Hyl.

That I was convinced of yesterday, by your Parable of the defloured Virgin, and the condign punishment of the Villain that defloured her and abused her so barbarously; that, even in such Severity as tended not at all to the Emendation of the punished, the infliction notwithstanding of the Punishment might have its rise and take its reasons and measures from Goodness it self.

Philoth.

Can you stick to this without any diff [...]dence, XXVII. Hylobares, A [...] Hypothesis that will secure the Goodness of Providence, were the Scene of t [...]i [...]gs on this Earth ten times worse then it is.

Hyl.

Yes surely, this seems to me a clear case.

Philoth.

Why then, Hylobares, I have one single Catholicon, which, if you can receive it, will quite purge out of your minde the lowest, the last, and the least remaining dregs of Diffidence that you can have touching [Page 474] the Goodness of Providence, though the Scene of things quite over the Earth were ten times worse then Euistor has described them.

Hyl.

I marry, Sir, this is something indeed, Philotheus. This is that which will clear up my thoughts to the purpose, and set me at perfect ease. I thought there was some great thing wanting still to the full satisfaction and quiet of my Minde: I beseech you let me know it therefore, Philotheus.

Philoth.

It is one of the Two famous Keys of Providence, even the Golden one.

Hyl.

Why, are there just Two?

Philoth.

Two main ones.

Hyl.

And if the one be Gold, I pray you what is the other? a Silver-one?

Philoth.

So they call it.

Hyl.

O how I long to have these Keys delivered into my hand! I pray you, Philotheus, produce them.

Philoth.

Not while Bathynous is in the company.

Hyl.

Why so, Philotheus? Bathynous [Page 475] seems one of the worthiest persons in the whole Company to receive them.

Philoth.

You would say so, if you knew all.

Hyl.

I pray you conceal nothing from me.

Philoth.

It was he that first received them, and that many years ago, when he was scarce older then your self: And therefore none of us think it decorous to take upon us to deliver these Keys to any one while he is in presence, we ever reserving that honour to him that first received them.

Hyl.

That's an handsome Ceremony. O thrice happy Youth, whom the bright face of Wisedome so early shined upon! But, I pray you, where did he receive these Keys, Philotheus?

Philoth.

In a Dream.

Hyl.

What, has all my expectation then vanished into a Dream?

Euist.

You know, Hylobares, what high strains of Philosophy are delivered in Somnium Scipionis.

Hyl.

[Page 476]

You say right, I was but in jest, and expect no less Truth now, nor of meaner importance, then before.

Euist.

I pray you, Bathynous, what kind of Dream was it? For there are five severall sorts, according to Macrobius, namely, In Soma. Scip. lib. 1. cap. 3. [...].

Bath.

Truly, Euistor, I have not yet considered that so Critically, never since I had it.

Euist.

But you could easily tell me, did I but describe the natures of these five severall sorts of Dreams to you.

Hyl.

O impertinent Euistor, that wouldst cause such needless delaies by catching at this occasion of shewing thy skil in Critical Trifles, whiles I in the mean time am almost quite consumed with excess of desire to have so important an Arcanum communicated unto me, for the establishing my Minde in that great and fundamental Truth I so eagerly seek after!

Euist.

Let me beg of you, Bathynous, to put Hylobares out of pain, [Page 477] for I see he is highly impatient.

Bath.

It is a Dream I had in my youth, of an Old man of a grave countenance and comportment speaking unto me in a Wood.

Euist.

That very intimation shews it to be that kinde of Dream that the Greeks call [...], the Latines Oraculum.

Hyl.

A good Omen, Euistor, I thank you for that. I'll forgive thee all thy Criticall Impertinencies hereafter for this passage sake.

Euist.

And I will jointly beg of Bathynous to tell us this Dream of his; for I am almost as eager of it as your self. I would fain see how exquisite an example it is of that kinde of Dream which in English we should call an Oracle.

Bath.

I profess, Gentlemen, I am much ashamed to seem so light-minded as to tell my Dreams before Strangers, especially before so grave a person as Philopolis.

Hyl.

The proper term, Bathynous, is not a Dream, but an Oracle.

Bath.

[Page 478]

But I am more ashamed to pretend to speak Oracles then to tell my Dreams.

Cuph.

You did not speak the Oracle, but the Oracle was spoke to you.

Bath.

But if I had not spoke it afterwards, Cuphophron, none of you had ever heard it.

Philop.

Call it a Dream, or an Oracle, or an Oracular Dream, it matters not, Bathynous, so we may enjoy the hearing of it. For I am neither so unskilfull nor morose as to have the slighter conceit of any one for telling his Dream, especially in such circumstances: nay, I think it is his duty rather so to doe.

Bath.

Well then, since it must be so, Gentlemen, upon the permission of Philopolis and the importunity of Hylobares, I shall recite to you my Dream as exquisitely and briefly as I can. You must know then, first, Philopolis, of what an anxious and thoughtfull Genius I was from my very Childhood, and what a deep and strong sense I had of the Existence of [Page 479] God, and what an early Conscienciousness of approving my self to him; and how, when I had arrived to riper years of Reason, and was imbued with some slender Rudiments of Philosophy, I was not then content to think of God in the gross onely, but began to consider his Nature more distinctly and accurately, and to contemplate and compare his Attributes; and how, partly from the natural Sentiments of my own Minde, partly from the countenance and authority of holy Scripture, I did confidently conclude that infinite Power, Wisedome and Goodness, that these three were the chiefest and most comprehensive Attributes of the Divine Nature, and that the sovereign of these was his Goodness, the Summity and Flower, as I may so speak, of the Divinity, and that particularly whereby the Souls of men become Divine; whenas the largest communication of the other, without this, would not make them Divine, but Devils.

In the mean time, being versed in [Page 480] no other natural Philosophy nor Metaphysicks but the vulgar, and expecting the Laws of the externall Creation, whether visible or invisible, should be sutable to that excellent and lovely Idea of the Godhead which with the most serious devotion and affection I entertained in my own breast, my Minde was for a long time charged with inextricable Puzzles and Difficulties, to make the Phaenomena of the World and vulgar Opinions of men in any tolerable way to consort or sute with these two chiefest Attributes of God, his Wisedome and his Goodness. These Meditations closed mine eyes at night; these saluted my memory the first in the morning: These accompanied my remote and solitary walks into Fields and Woods sometimes so early, as when most of other mortals keep their Beds.

It came to pass therefore, XXVIII. O Philopolis, Bathynous his Dream of the two Keys of Providence, containing the above-mentioned Hypothesis. that one Summer-morning having rose much more early then ordinary, and having walk'd so long [Page 481] in a certain Wood (which I had a good while frequented) that I thought fit to rest my self on the ground, having spent my Spirits, partly by long motion of my Body, but mainly by want of Sleep, and overanxious and solicitous thinking of such Difficulties as Hylobares either has already, or, as I descry'd at first, is likely to propose; I straight way reposed my wearie Limbs amongst the Grass and Flowers at the foot of a broad-spred flourishing Oak, where the gentle fresh morning Air playing in the Shade on my heated Temples, and with unexpressable pleasure refrigerating my bloud and spirits, and the industrious Bees busily humming round about me upon the dewy Honey-suckles; to which nearer noise was most melodiously joyned the distanced Singings of the chearfull Birds reechoed from all parts of the Wood; these Delights of Nature thus conspiring together, you may easily phansie, O Philopolis, would quickly charm [...] wearied body into a profound [Page 482] Sleep. But my Soul was then as much as ever awake, and, as it seems, did most vividly dream that I was still walking in these solitary Woods with my thoughts more eagerly intent upon those usual Difficulties of Providence then ever.

But while I was in this great Anxiety and earnestness of spirit, accompanied (as frequently when I was awake) with vehement and devout Suspirations and Ejaculations towards God, of a sudden there appeared at a distance a very grave and venerable Person walking slowly towards me. His Statu [...]e was greater then ordinary. He was clothed with a loose silk Garment of a purple colour, much like the Indian Gowns that are now in fashion, saving that the Sleeves were something longer and wider; and it was tied about him with a Leviticall Girdle also of Purple; and he wore a pair of Velvet Slippers of the same colour, but upon his Head a Montero of black Velvet, as if he were both a Traveller [Page 483] and an Inhabitant of that place at once.

Cuph.

I dare warrant you it was the Ghost of some of the worthy Ancestors of that noble Family to whom these Woods did belong.

Hyl.

You forget, Cuphophron, that Bathynous is telling of a Dream, as also (this third time) that Ghosts, that is, Spirits, are no-where, and therefore cannot be met with in a Wood.

Philop.

Enough of that, Hylobare [...] I pray you proceed, Bathynous, a [...] describe to us his Age and his Looks, as well as his Clothing.

Cuph.

I pray you do, Bathynous: I love alife to hear such things as these punctually related.

Bath.

Did not the ruddiness of his Complexion and the vivacitie of his Looks seem to gainsay it, the snowy whiteness of his Hair, and large Beard, and certain senile strokes in his Countenance, seemed to intimate him to be about sixscore years of age.

Sophr.

There is no such contradiction in that, Bathynous: For Moses is [Page 484] said to be an hundred and twenty when he died, Deut. 34. 7. and yet his eye was not dim, nor his natural force abated. But, I pray you, proceed.

Bath.

While he was at any distance from me, I stood fearless and unmoved, onely, in reverence to so venerable a Personage, I put off my Hat, and held it in my hand. But when he came up closer to me, the vivid fulgour of his Eyes, that shone so piercingly bright from under the shadow of his black Montero, and the whole Air of his Face, though joyn'd with a wonderfull deal of Mildness and Sweetness, did so of a sudden astonish me, that I fell into an excessive trembling, and had not been able to stand, if he had not laid his Hand upon my Head, and spoken comfortably to me. Which he did in a Paternal manner, saying, ‘ Blessed be thou of God, my Son, be of good courage, and fear not; for I am a Messenger of God to thee for thy good. Thy serious Aspires and breathings after the true Knowledge of thy Maker and [Page 485] the ways of his Providence (which is the most becoming employment of every Rational Being) have ascended into the sight of God; and I am appointed to give into thy hands the Two Keys of Providence, that thou maiest thereby be able to open the Treasures of that Wisedom thou so anxiously, and yet so piously, seek'st after.’ And therewithall he put his right Hand into his left Sleeve, and pull'd out two bright shining Keys, the one of Silver, the other of Gold, tied together with a Sky-coloured Ribbon of a pretty breadth, and delivered them into my hands; which I received of him, making low obeisance, and professing my thankfulness for so great a gift.

And now by this time I had recovered more then ordinary strength and courage, which I perceiv'd in a marvellous way communicated unto me by the laying of his Hand upon my Head, so that I had acquired a kinde of easie confidence and familiarity to converse with him; and [Page 486] therefore, though with due Civility, yet without all Fear, methought I said farther to him, These are a goodly pair of Keys, O my Father, and very lovely to look upon: but where is the Treasure they are to open? To which, smiling upon me, he straightway replied, The Treasures, my Son, be in the Keys themselves. Then each Key, said I, O my Father, will need a farther Key to open it. Each Key, said he, my Son, is a Key to it self; and therewithall bad me take notice of the Letters embossed on the Silver Key, and there was the like artifice in the Golden one. Which I closely viewing in both, observed that the Keys consisted of a company of Rings closely committed together, and that the whole Keys were all bespattered with Letters very confusedly and disorderly.

Set the Letters of the Keys in right order, then said he, and then pull at their Handles, and the Treasure will come out. And I took the Silver Key; but though I could move the [Page 487] Rings by thrusting my Nails against the Letters, yet I could not reduce the Letters into any order, so that they would all lie in straight Lines, nor was there any Sense in any Line. Which when that aged Personage saw, You must first know the Motto, said he, my Son: That is the Key of the Key. I beseech you then, said I, O my Father, tell me the Motto. The Motto, said he, my Son, is this, Claude fenestras, ut luceat domus. Having got the Motto, I set to work again, and having reduced those Letters that made up that Motto into a right Line, I, holding the lower part of the Key in my left hand, pull'd at the Handle with my right, and there came out a Silver Tube, in which was a Scroll of thin Paper, as I thought, but as strong as any Vellum, and as white as driven Snow.

Having got this Scroll, I took the boldness to open it. The Figure thereof was perfectly square, with even Margins on all sides, drawn with Lines of a sky-coloured blew, very [Page 488] perfect and lovely. In the midst was described the Figure of the Sun in blazing Gold: About the Sun were six Circles drawn with Lines of the same-coloured blew. Two of these Circles were very near the body of the Sun; the other four more remote both from him and from one another, though not in equal distances. In every one of these Circles was there the figure of a little Speck like a Globe, but of two distinct colours; the one side toward the Sun shining like Silver, the other being of a duskish discoloured black. About those little Globes in the third and fifth Circle there were also drawn lesser Circles of blew, one about the third, and four about the fifth: and in each of these Circles was there also a small Globous Speck, of a lesser size then those in the middle. Something there was also about the Globe of the sixth Circle, but I cannot remember it so distinctly. Beyond these Circles there was an innumerable company of Starlike Figures of Gold, of the same [Page 489] hue with that of the Sun, but exceeding-much less, which carelesly scattered, some were found a pretty distance from the Margin, others towards the Margin; othersome were cut in two by the blew Line of the Margin, as if it were intimated that we should understand, that there were still more of those golden Stars to an indefinite extent. This Scheme entertained my gazing eyes a good time; for I never had seen such before, and was resolved to impress the Lines thereof perfectly in my memory, that I might afterwards discourse more readily thereof with this venerable Personage. For I knew the purpose thereof by the Inscription on the upper Margin, which was, The true Systeme of the World. Having thus satisfy'd my self, I rolled up the Scroll again, and repositing it in the Silver Tube, easily thrust in the Tube into the other part of the Key, and disordering the Line of Letters that contain'd the Motto, all was lockt up again safe as before.

[Page 490]Having pleased my self so well with opening this first Treasure, I had the more eager desire to assay the other; and knowing all attempt to be vain without the knowledge of the Motto or Key of the Key, I besought that Divine Sage to impart it to me. That I shall doe right willingly, said he, my Son: And I pray you take special notice of it. It is, Amor Dei Lux Animae. An excellent Motto indeed, said I; The Key is a Treasure it self. However I set me to work as before, and reducing the Letters to such an order that a Line of them did plainly contain this Motto, I pulled at both ends of the Golden Key, as I did in the Silver one, and in a Golden Tube continued to the Handle of the Key there was a Scroll of such Paper, if I may so call it, as in the other, exceeding white and pure, and, though very thin, yet not at all transparent. The Writing was also terminated with even Margins on all sides as before; onely it was more glorious, being adorn'd richly with [Page 491] Flower-work of Gold, Vermilion, and blew. And I observed that twelve Sentences filled the whole Area, written with Letters of Gold. The first was, The Measure of Providence is the Divine Goodness, which has no bounds but it self, which is infinite. 2. The Thread of Time and the Expansion of the Vniverse, the same Hand drew out the one and spred out the other. 3. Darkness and the Abysse were before the Light, and the Suns or Stars before any Opakeness or Shadow. 4. All Intellectual Spirits that ever were, are, or ever shall be, sprung up with the Light, and rejoyced together before God in the morning of the Creation. 5. In infinite Myriads of free Agents which were the Framers of their own Fortunes, it had been a wonder if they had all of them taken the same Path; and therefore Sin at the long run shook hands with Opacity. 6. As much as the Light exceeds the Shadows, so much do the Regions of Happiness those of Sin and Misery.

These six, Philopolis, I distinctly [Page 492] remember, XXIX. but had cursorily and glancingly cast mine eye on all twelve. His being so rudely and forcibly awaked out of so Diviac a Dream, [...]ow co [...]istent with the Accuracy of Pr [...] vide [...]ce. But afterwards fixing my mind orderly upon them, to commit them all perfectly to my memory, (for I did not expect that I might carry the Keys away with me home) by that time I had got through the sixth Aphorism, there had come up two Asses behinde me out of the Wood, one on the one side of the Tree, and the other on the other, that set abraying so rudely and so loudly, that they did not onely awake, but almost affright me into a discovery that I had all this while been but in a Dream. For that aged grave Personage, the Silver and Golden Keys, and glorious Parchment, were all suddenly vanished, and I found my self sitting alone at the bottome of the same Oak where I fell asleep, betwixt two rudely-braying Asses.

Euist.

These are the usual Exploits, Bathynous, of this kind of Animal. Just thus was the Nymph `Lotis, lying fast asleep on the Grass in a Moonshine-night, [Page 493] awakened by the loud Braying of Silenus his Ass. Asses are as it were the Trumpeters of the Forest, Bathynous, that awake careless men out of deep Sleeps.

Hyl.

If your Memory did not far surpass your Phancy, Euistor, you would not be so good an Historian as you are. Surely the Braying of an Ass is more like to the blowing of a Neatherd's or Swineherd's Horn then to the sound of a Trumpet. Besides, the Braying of Silenus his Ass was the saving of the Nymph's Virginity: But this, O Euistor! O Bathynous! was there ever a more unfortunate Mis-hap then this? This Story has quite undone me. It has wounded my belief of Providence more then any thing I have yet taken notice of. That God should ever permit two such dull Animals to disturb so Divine a Vision as it seems to me; and that so mysterious, so heavenly and intellectual a Pleasure, and so certain a Communication of such important Truths, should be thus [Page 494] blown aside by the rude breath of an Ass. To what a glorious comprehension of things would this Scene have proceeded! What accurate Information touching the Fabrick of the World! what punctually-satisfactory Solutions of every Puzzle touching Divine Providence might you after have received in your intended Conference with this venerable Personage, if these impertinent Animals by their unseasonable loud Braying had not called your Ecstaticall Minde into the Body again, which is as unfit for Divine Communication as themselves!

Bath.

Do not take on so heavily, O Hylobares, nor be so rash a Censurer of Providence, no not so much as in this Paradoxicall passage thereof. For how do you know but all that which you phansie behinde, had been too much to receive at once? Old Vessells fill'd with new Wine will burst. And too large a Dosis of Knowledge may so elate the Spirits, that it may hazard the Brain, that it [Page 495] may destroy Life, and chase away Sobriety and Humility out of the Soul.

Sophr.

This is very judiciously advertised of Bathynous, is it not, Hylobares?

Hyl.

I cannot disown Truth whensoever I meet with it.

Bath.

But besides, though you should judge so extraordinary-charitably of me at that age, Hylobares, as that I might have received all that behind, (which you surmize was lost by that Accident) without any hazard to the Morality of my Mind: yet I can tell you of a truth, that I take that Accident, that seems so Paradoxicall to you, to be a particular Favour and Kindness done to me by Providence, and that it fell out no otherwise then (could I have foreseen how things would be) I my self should even then have desired it; that is to say, I found my self more gratify'd afterwards, things happening as they did, then if that Divine Dream, if we may call it so, had gone on uninterruptedly [Page 494] [...] [Page 495] [...] [Page 496] to its full Period. For it would but have put me into the possession of all that Truth at once, which in virtue of this piece of the Dream I got afterwards, with an often-repeated and prolonged Pleasure, and more agreeable to humane Nature.

Hyl.

I profess, XXX. Bathynous, That that Divi [...]e Personage that appeared to Bathynous was rather a Favou [...]er of P [...]thagorism, then Cartesianism. this is not nothing that you say. Nay indeed, so much, as I must acknowledge my exception against Providence in this Passage very much weakned. But what use, could you make of the Silver Key, when that Divine Personage explained nothing of it to you?

Bath.

It was as it were a pointing of one to those Authours that conform the Frame of the World to that Scheme; as Nicolaus Copernicus and those that follow that Systeme. But it is no-where drawn nearer to the Elegancy of the Silver-Key-Paper then in Des-Cartes his third part of his Principles.

Cuph.

That's notable indeed, Bathynous. This is a kinde of Divine [Page 497] Testimonie to the truth of all DesCartes's Principles.

Bath.

No, by no means, Cuphophron: For in the Golden-Key-Paper, in that cursory Glance I gave upon all the Sentences or Aphorisms therein contained, amongst the rest I espy'd one, of which part was writ in greater Letters, which was to this sense, That the Primordials of the World are not Mechanicall, but Spermaticall or Vital; which is diametrically and fundamentally opposite to Des-Cartes's Philosophy.

Cuph.

There is great Uncertainty in Dreams.

Bath.

But I must confess I think the thing true of it self. And if I had had full Conference with that Divine Sage, I believe I should have found his Philosophy more Pythagoricall or Platonicall, (I mean his Natural Philosophy, Cuphophron) then Cartesian. For there was also mention of the Seminal Soul of the World, which some modern Writers call the Spirit of Nature.

Cuph.

[Page 498]

So many men, so many mindes.

Bath.

But I doubt not but that it is demonstrable by Reason, that the Primordials of the Universe are not purely Mechanicall.

Cuph.

So many men, so many Reasons, so many Demonstrations.

Hyl.

I believe Cuphophron takes it very ill of you, Bathynous, that the old grave Person you met with in the Wood was not a thorough-paced Cartesian, or else he is in a very Scepticall mood: which I do not desire to be in, especially in so weighty Points as these concerning Providence. And therefore let me intreat you, Bathynous, to unlock that Difficulty I propounded last to Philotheus, by virtue of your Golden Key.

Bath.

You must excuse me there, Hylobares; I would not be so injurious to Cuphophron as to make him a false Prophet, who so expresly foretold a while agoe, that the Fates had designed that honour solely for Philotheus.

Philoth.

[Page 499]

And it seems, in the like Complement to Cuphophron, I must again resume my not unpleasant burthen of serving Hylobares; which I shall doe according to the best skill I have.

Philop.

I pray you do, Philotheus; for I am very ambitious you should work upon Hylobares a perfect Cure.

Philoth.

I shall endeavour it, Philopolis. But I must first take the liberty to chafe the benummed part, and soundly chide Hylobares that he is not cured already, nor has been sufficiently sensible of that Clearness and Evidence for the Unexceptionableness of Divine Providence which has been hitherto produced. Which I must profess I think to be such, that those that have not some peculiar humour or phancy, or labour not under the burthen of their own Idiosyncrasie, cannot but be fully satisfied with, without the flying to any such highswoln Hypothesis as that Systeme of the World represented in the Silver-Key-Paper, or Pre-existence of Souls, [Page 500] which is part of the Golden one. So that any farther Solution of the present Difficulty, were it not for Hylobares his own fault, and the peculiarity of his own Phancy that still molesteth him, were plainly unnecessary and superfluous. How many thousands of sober and intelligent persons have been fully satisfied touching the Accuracy of Divine Providence without any such far-fetch'd Helps?

Sophr.

Which is a shrewd Indication, that those Arguments, distinct from these more aiery Hypotheses and finely-contrived Phancies, are the more natural strength and arms, as it were, of humane Understanding, (by whose strokes it bears it self up in these profound Mysteries from sinking into Infidelity or Atheism;) but those more big and swelled Hypotheses, but as a bundle of Bull-rushes or a couple of Bladders ty'd under the Arms of some young and unskilfull Swimmer.

Hyl.

And I for my part, Gentlemen, do profess my self such a young [Page 501] and unskilfull Swimmer in these Depths, and therefore would gladly be supported by the artificial use of these Bladders, that my Melancholy may never sink me to the bottom.

Cuph.

And I commend your wit, Hylobares, that you can so well provide for your own safety. For I dare undertake that these Bladders are so big, so tough, and so light, that if they be but well ty'd on, a Cow or Oxe may securely swim on them through the Hellespont, or rather through the main Ocean, and never fear drowning.

Hyl.

I thank you for that encouragement, Cuphophron, and shall therefore the more earnestly beg of Philotheus, that he would use all the Art and Skill he has to tie them on me as fast as possibly he can, (that of Preexistence especially, the Reasons and Uses thereof) that the string may never slip nor break, to my hazard of ducking to the bottom.

Philoth.

That I will do, Hylobares [...] but on this condition, that you ever [Page 502] remember that what I do thus firmly fasten on you is yet but by way of Hypothesis, and that you will no longer make use of these Bladders then till you can safely swim without them.

Hyl.

That I do faithfully promise you, Philotheus, in the word of a Gentleman. Wherefore, without any farther Interruption, I pray you proceed.

Philoth.

To begin therefore where we left. XXXI. Do you still, [...] Hylobares, adhere to that Truth, that free Agents may so hainously misbehave themselves, that even according to the Laws of Divine Goodness they may be detruded into the state of Devils and of Hell, and therefore far more easily into a state less deplorable?

Hyl.

That I said, and do still say, is to me a clear case, Philotheus.

Philoth.

Let us then but assume out of the Golden-Key-Paper that which is so clearly contained therein, the Preexistence of Humane Souls, and all these black and dark Difficulties that [Page 503] thus over-cloud your Understanding will instantly vanish.

Hyl.

Why so, Philotheus?

Philoth.

Because supposing Humane Souls were created in the Morning of the World, and in such infinite Myriads, there has been time enough since that for as many and more then hitherto have peopled the Earth, to have transgressed so hainously before their entrance on this Stage, that by a just Nemesis measured and modify'd by the Divine Goodness it self they may be contrived into the worst and most horrid Circumstances, into the most [...]qualid and disadvantageous condition and state of living, that Euistor has produced any example of amongst the most Barbarous Nations.

Hyl.

This reaches the Point home indeed, Philotheus, and does perfectly pull up by the roots all pretension to this last and greatest Scruple, if we were assured of the truth of the Hypothesis.

Philoth.

Why, did not your self call this Dream of Bathynous a Divine [Page 504] Dream, before I came to make this important use of it? And every Divine Dream is a true Dream. But you serve me just so as Cuphophron did Bathynous. Whiles it seemed to serve his turn to credit Des-Cartes's Philosophy, so long it was a Divine Testimonie; but when it proved contrary, then there was little certainty in Dreams. This seems a piece of Levity in you both.

Hyl.

But I hope in my self the more pardonable, O Philotheus, by how much more important a thing it is that the ground of a man's belief of the Goodness of Divine Providence should be solid and unshaken, then that Des-Cartes's Principles should be deemed a piece of such infallible Wisedome. Cuphophron's vilification of the Dream proceeded out of a partial zeal in the behalf of the Cartesian Philosophy: my distrust of it, out of an excess of desire it should be true. For I must confess, if this one Point in it of Pre-existence appear to me certainly true, all my [Page 505] Doubts and Difficulties touching the Moral Evils in the World will suddenly melt into nothing. Nay, if I could believe Bathynous his Dream to be a Divine Dream, the first Aphorism in the Golden-Key-Paper puts all our Controversies to an end, it declaring the Measure of Providence to be the Divine Goodness, which has no bounds but it self, which is infinite. Wherefore it was the most calamitous Accident that could ever have befallen the Philosophicall Republick, that [...] two unlucky Asses so rudely broke off Bathynous his Conference with that venerable Sage, who, I surmize, in that intended Discourse would have communicated the Reasons and Grounds of these Conclusions to Bathynous. For true Reason is so palpable and connatural to a Man, that when he findes it, he feels himself fully satisfi'd and at ease.

Philoth.

I commend your Caution, Hylobares, that you are so loth to build great Conclusions upon weak or uncertain Principles. Wherefore [Page 506] let me offer to your consideration a Point of which I presume you will acknowledge your self more certain, that is, The Possibility of the Preexistence of the Soul; I demand of you, if you be not very certain of that.

Hyl.

Yes surely I am; I see no repugnancy at all in it.

Philoth.

Then you are not certain but that the Soul does pre-exist.

Hyl.

I confess it.

Philoth.

And uncertain that it does not.

Hyl.

That cannot be denied; it is the same, I think, I granted before.

Philoth.

Therefore, Hylobares, you make your self obnoxious both to Providence, and to my self. To Providence, in that you bring in uncertain Allegations and Accusations against her, and so soil the beauty and perfection of her waies, that are so justifiable where they are perfectly known, by opposing Phancies and Conceits, such as you your self acknowledge you are not certain of. To me, in that you covenanted with [Page 507] me at the first, never to alledge uncertain Hypotheses against known Truth.

Hyl.

This is true, Philotheus; you make me half ashamed of my Inconstancy. But in the mean time I do not finde my self in that full ease I desire to be, while as well the Pre-existence of the Soul as her Non-Preexistence is an uncertain Hypothesis.

Philoth.

If you cannot finde Divine Providence perfect without it, it is your own fault that, as to your self, to save you from sinking, you do not make use of it as a true Hypothesis. And forasmuch as you finde it so hard to discover Divine Providence to be perfect without it, that is no small Argument that the Hypothesis is true.

Hyl.

I must confess I think it is a safer Argument then Bathynous his single Dream.

Philoth.

Nay, it were in it self, Hylobares, a solid Argument, supposing Providence cannot well otherwise be salved; as it is for the Copernican [Page 508] Hypothesis, that nothing else can give a tolerable account of the Motion of the Planets. And I must tell you farther, Hylobares, that this Hypothesis of the Soul's Pre-existence is not the single Dream of Bathynous sleeping in the grass, but was deemed a Vision of Truth to the most awakened Souls in the world.

Hyl.

That's very good news, Philotheus; for I do not at all affect Singularity, nor love to finde my self alone.

Philoth.

If the Dream of sleeping Bathynous be a mere Dream, the most famously-wise in all Ages have dream'd waking. For that the Souls of men do pre-exist before they come into the Body, was the Dream of those three famous Philosophers, Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle; the Dream of the Aegyptian Gymnosophists, of the Indian Brachmans, and Persian Magi; the Dream of Zoroafter, Epicharmus, and Empedocles; the Dream of Cebes, Euclide, and Euripides; the Dream of Plotinus, Proclus, [Page 509] and Iamblichus; the Dream of Marcus Cicero, of Virgil, Psellus, and Boethius; the Dream of Hippocrates, Galen, and Fernelius; and, lastly, the constant and avowed Dream of Philo Iudaeus, and the rest of the most learned of the Iews.

Cuph.

I pray you let me cast in one more example, Philotheus.

Philoth.

I pray you doe, Cuphophron.

Cuph.

The Dream of the Patriarch Iacob when he slept in Bethel, and dream'd he saw Angels descending and ascending on a Ladder that reached from Earth to Heaven; whereby was figured out the Descent of Humane Souls [...], and their Return from thence to the Aethereal Regions.

Hyl.

O egregious Cuphophron, how do I admire the unexpectedness of thy Invention! This is your Dream of the mysterious Dream of the holy Patriarch.

Cuph.

And who knows but a very lucky one?

Hyl.

[Page 510]

But I pray you tell me, Philotheus, did any of the old Fathers of the Church dream any such Dream as this?

Sophr.

This is a very becoming and commendable temper in Hylobares, that his younger years will enquire after the Judgement of the ancient Fathers in the Primitive Church touching so important a matter.

Cuph.

Those Primitive Ages were the youngest Ages of the Church, but the Ages of persons much the same now that were then.

Hyl.

Notwithstanding this flurt of Cuphophron's wit, I beseech you, Philotheus, satisfie me in the Question I propounded.

Philoth.

This at least, Hylobares, is true, That the Primitive Fathers in the most entire Ages of the Church dream'd not the least evil of this Dream of Pre-existence; the Wisedome of Solomon, which expresly asserts it, being appointed by them to be read in their publick Assemblies. [Page 511] Nay, our Saviour himself, when he had a most signal occasion to have undeceived the Iews in that Point, if it had been false or dangerous, in the Question touching the man that was born blind, took not the least offence at the supposition. Whence you will the less wonder that either S ^t. Austin, Basil, and Gregory Nazianzen, were [...]avourably affected touching the Opinion; or that Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, Synesius, Arnobius, and Prudentius, were express Assertors thereof.

Hyl.

This truly, Philotheus, casts me into so great a security from any harm in the Hypothesis, that if you hold on as you have begun, the power of your speech will unavoidably charm me into the same Dream.

Philoth.

You know the worst of it then, Hylobares, that your Minde will be at perfect rest touching the present Difficulty concerning Providence. And if Testimonies thus please you, be assured of this, That there was never any Philosopher [Page 512] that held the Soul spiritual and immortal, but he held also that it did pre-exist.

Hyl.

That is very considerable.

Philoth.

And do not you, Hylobares, hold the Soul of man to be an Incorporeal indiscerpible Substance, a Spirit?

Hyl.

I do, and I thank you that I do so, Philotheus.

Philoth.

How then comes it to pass that you, being of so Philosophicall a Genius, should miss of the Pre-existence of the Soul? For there being no other considerable Opinion in view but Creation, Traduction, and Pre-existence; Creation of pure Souls, and the Infusion of them into impure Bodies, and in such horridly-impure Circumstances as sometimes happens, is a repugnancy to the Purity of God, who is supposed then to create them: but Traduction a derogation and contradiction to the Spirituality and Indiscerpibility of the Soul it self. Wherefore it necessarily remains, that these two being such absurd Opinions, [Page 513] the third must take place, and that the Souls of men do pre-exist.

Hyl.

O Philotheus, that venerable Sage in Bathynous his Sleep could not have argued better then thus, if they had come to conference. I do not dream, but I see with the eyes of my Minde wide open in broad day, the Reasonableness of this Hypothesis, That the Souls of men did exist before they came into these terrestrial Bodies.

Philoth.

And in this Day-light, Hylobares, all your Difficulties do vanish touching that part of Providence that respects the Moral Evils, whose hue seemed so dismall to you out of History, and their permission so reproachfull to the Goodness of God.

Hyl.

They are all vanished quite, and those touching Natural Evils too, so far forth as they respect the Souls of Men.

Philop.

This is a good hearing. We are infinitely obliged to Philotheus for his pains. Are there any more Scruples behinde touching Divine Providence, Hylobares?

Hyl.

[Page 514]

Onely those Objections fetch'd from Defects conceived to be in the Administration of Providence. XXXII. For though we be convinced that all things that are are rightly ordered; Severall Objections against Providence, fetched from Defects, answered partly out of the Golden, partly out of the Silver-Key-Paper. yet it may be demanded why there are no more of them, why no sooner, and the like.

Sophr.

Indeed, Hylobares, you seem to me hugely over-curious in such Inquisitions as these. Is not the whole World the Alms-house of God Almighty, which he had a right to build when he would, and to place us his eleemosynary Creatures in it no sooner then he pleased? He does but utisuo jure in all this. And it is an outrageous Presumption, to expect that he should not act according to his own minde and will, but according to the groundless enlargements and expansions of our wanton and busie Phancies. So long as we see that the things that are are well and rightly administred, and according to the Laws of Goodness and Justice, it is a marvellous piece of Capriciousness to complain, [Page 515] that such things with the unexceptionable Oeconomie of them began no sooner, nor reach no farther.

Bath.

You speak very gravely and soberly, O Sophron, and that which has very solid sense at the bottom, if rightly understood. For God has no obligation from the Creatures to make them sooner, or more, or larger, and the like. So that if he had made the World no larger then the vulgar phansy it, a thought suppose above the Clouds, or had stay'd the making of it till a year ago, or had not made it yet, nor ever intended to make it; he did in all this but uti suo jure, as you speak. But in that he has made it much larger and sooner, to what leading Attribute in God is that to be imputed, O Sophron?

Sophr.

Surely to his mere Goodness, Bathynous.

Bath.

You acknowledge then his Goodness the leading Attribute in the Creation of the World, and his Wisedome and Power to contrive and execute what his Will actuated [Page 516] by his Goodness did intend.

Sophr.

Speaking more humano, so it seems to be.

Bath.

But this is a marvell of marvells to me, That the Goodness of God being Infinite, the effects thereof should be so narrow and finite as commonly men conceit, if there be no Incapacity in the things themselves that thus streightens them. That one small share of the Divine Goodness should be active, but that infinite Remainder thereof, as I may so speak, silent and inactive, is a Riddle, a Miracle that does infinitely amaze me.

Sophr.

O Bathynous, my very Heart-strings are fretted with fear and anxiety, when you plunge us into such profound Disquisitions as these, out of which there is never any hope to emerge. I pray you, Hylobares, ask modestly touching these things. I wonder you are not throughly satisfi'd about Providence already: I am sure I am.

Hyl.

And I desire but to be so too, [Page 517] Sophron. What will satisfie one man will not satisfie another.

Philoth.

That is very true, Hylobares, which I perceiving, it forced me to mention the Golden Key of Providence to you. For we do not wantonly and ostentatively produce those Keys, but at a dead lift, when no other method will sati [...]ie him whose minde is anxious and solicitous touching the Waies of God; that by these Hypotheses he may keep his Heart from sinking.

Hyl.

It is a very laudable custome, Philotheus, and such as I find the benefit of already. For I find the very first Difficulties of this last and present Head I intended to propose, to melt away of themselves in virtue of that light from the Golden Key, I mean that of Pre-existence. For I intended to have propounded it as an Objection against the Goodness of Divine Providence, That, whereas the Soul can live and subsist out of this terrestriall Body, (for so it does after death) she should not be created [Page 518] before this terrestriall Mansion, and enjoy her self before she come into the Body, as well as afterwards. But this Doctrine of Pre-existence has plainly prevented the Objection. Another Objection also, touching the Messias coming into the World so lately, is in my own judgement much enervated by this Hypothesis. For who knows but the Demerits of Humane Souls were such, that it was consonant enough to the Goodness of God, not to communicate the best Religion to the World till that time it was communicated?

Philoth.

That is no inept consideration, Hylobares. But besides, it is a strange Presumption to determine when it is just fit time for Providence to use her strongest Effort for reclaiming of straying Souls: And to reclaim them as soon as they have strayed, is next to the keeping them forcibly from ever straying, which is to hinder a free Agent from ever acting freely. Wherefore seeing the Souls of men were to use their own [Page 519] liberty, there were certain pompous Scenes of affairs to proceed upon either supposition, whether they stood or fell, and not all presently to be huddled up in an instant. And what Light Providence brings out of the Darkness of Sin, I did more particularly intimate unto you in our yesterday's discourse.

Hyl.

I remember it, Philotheus, and rest very well satisfy'd.

Philop.

To expect that the Messias should have come into the World so soon as Adam had fallen, is as incongruous as to expect the reaping of the Crop the very same day the Corn is sown, or that Spring and Autumn should be crouded into the same months of the year.

Hyl.

This is abundantly plain. And another Difficulty also which I intended to propose, touching the Plurality of Earths or Worlds, quite vanishes: while I contemplate the Paradigm of the World's Systeme in the Silver-Key-Paper, that bears me up as stoutly on the left hand from sinking [Page 520] as the other Hypothesis on the right.

Bath.

Do you not see, Sophron, that you are worse s [...]ar'd then hurt? Do you not observe how these great and formidable Difficulties crumble away of themselves, when a judicious eye has had once but a glance into the Truth?

Sophr.

It's well if all will come off so clear.

Hyl.

But there are some little Scruples remaining, XXXIII. Philotheus, Di [...]ficulties touching the Extent of the Uni [...]e [...]s [...]. partly about the Extent of the Vniverse, partly about the Habitableness of the Planets and Earths.

Sophr.

I thought so.

Philoth.

Propound them, if you please, Hylobares.

Hyl.

Whether the Universe be Finite, or Infinite. For if it be Finite, it is infinitely defectuous, if it may be Infinite.

Philoth.

That's well put in, If it may be; but try whether it may be or no, Hylobares.

Hyl.

How, Philotheus?

Philoth.

[Page 521]

Phansie it as Infinite as possibly you can.

Hyl.

I phansie it absolutely infinite.

Philoth.

Then every Part thereof is infinite.

Hyl.

You mean every denominated Part, Philotheus; else the number of parts is onely infinite, not the parts.

Philoth.

I mean the denominated Parts, a third, a fourth, a fifth, &c. But a middle third part is bounded by the Extremes, and therefore the Extremes themselves are boundable. And consequently when you have phansied the World as infinite as you can, you must be inforced still to conclude it finite.

Hyl.

It seems so, if it be not a Fallacy.

Philoth.

Wherefore if the possibility of an Infinite World be unconceivable to you, it can be no imputation to the Goodness of Providence if it be found Finite.

Hyl.

But is it found Finite, Philotheus?

Philoth.

[Page 522]

No Art nor Oracle that I know has declared it so. That not onely the Globe of the Earth but her very Orbit is but as a Point to the Circuit of the nearest fix'd Stars, offers rather toward a detection of the infinite Vastness of the World then of the Finiteness thereof. How vastly distant then are those little fix'd Stars that shew but as scattered Pin-dust in a frosty night? In what immense removes are they one beyond another? O Israel, Bar. 3. 24, 25. how great is the House of God! how large is the place of his possession! Great, and hath no end; high, and unmeasurable. They are the words of the Prophet Baruch.

Hyl.

It seems then that the Infiniteness of the World is declared by that Oracle rather then the Finiteness thereof.

Philoth.

It is so vastly big, Hylobares, that there is little doubt but that it is as immense as it can be, and that is enough to shew that the Dimensions thereof take their measures from the Divine Goodness. Whence it is clear [Page 523] that Providence is unexceptionable in this Point.

Hyl.

It is so.

Sophr.

I wish Philotheus come off so well in the other.

Philoth.

Be courageous, O Sophron; we'll doe our best, when Hylobares has proposed it.

Hyl.

That the Silver-Key-Systeme is the true Systeme of the World I am well enough persuaded of, XXXIV. and that consequently it were in vain to object the Solitude of this one Earth in this immense liquid space of the World, Difficulties touching the Habitableness or Unhabitableness of the Planets. whenas this Systeme exhibits so many more to our view. For we can no sooner discern our own Earth to be a Planet, but we must therewithall detect also that the rest of the Planets are so many Earths, as indeed the Pythagoreans did expresly call the Moon our [...] or opposite Earth. Arist. de Coelo, lib. 2. c. 13. But the Difficulty I come to propound is touching the Habitableness of them, which I suppose will not be deny'd; but then there is this Snare we are caught in, That if we conceive them [Page 524] to be inhabited by mere Brutes onely, there will be a defect of men to keep good quarter amongst them; but if they be also inhabited with Men, these men will want the means of Salvation; for that they are in a lapsed state is supposed in their becoming terrestriall Creatures: either of which is inconsistent with that exquisite Goodness of God that is pleaded for.

Philoth.

That's a knotty Problem indeed, Hylobares.

Sophr.

Why do you smile, Philotheus? methinks it is a very formidable Question.

Philoth.

I smile at something that extraordinarily pleases me.

Sophr.

I pray you what is it that pleases you so much, Philotheus? I would gladly know it, that I might smile also for company.

Philoth.

It is Sophron's honest and sober solicitude touching the Solution of the present Difficulty, which so becomingly betrays it self in the very air of his Countenance, and even then when there is least fear of miscarriage.

Sophr.

[Page 525]

That were good news, Philotheus, if it were true.

Philoth.

It is a less Puzzle then that about the Salvation of them of the New-found World upon Earth, I mean those of America, who heard not the least whisper of either Moses or of Christ till within this Age or two. In what capacity of Salvation were they then, O Sophron, for some thousands of years together, who yet are certainly of a lapsed race? (whenas whether all Souls that enter into thicker Vehicles in any part of the Vniverse be lapsed, is uncertain.) And we cannot deny but that vast Continent has been inhabited, as also the adjacent Islands, all that time, though they heard as little of Christ as they that live in Saturn or the Moon.

Sophr.

That cannot be deny'd, Philotheus. But you know either your self or some of us has answered this Point already, That those Americans that lived sincerely according to the Light they had, God might impart more to them, and finally in some [Page 526] extraordinary way or other communicate the knowledge of Christ to them to their eternall Salvation. For you know a just and honest Creditour, if the Debt be satisfy'd by a Friend, though unknown to the Debtour, yet he will free him from all Suits at Law and Arrests, and what-ever other Troubles or Inconveniencies attend a Debtour whose Debts are unsatisfy'd. Whence the Passion and Atonement of Christ might take effect with the sincere Americans, though they knew nothing of the History thereof. And therefore being reconciled by the death of Christ, Rom. 5. 10. they should be much more saved by his life, as the Apostle speaks.

Philoth.

It is very well and piously argued, O Sophron.

Hyl.

I think so too, Philotheus.

Philoth.

Had I not therefore reason to smile at Sophron, being so well furnish'd to satisfie a greater Difficulty, to see him so hugely confounded at the less?

Hyl.

[Page 527]

But why take you this to be the lesser Difficulty, Philotheus?

Philoth.

Because there is more Elbow-room for framing of Answers to it. For first, suppose we should affirm that all the Earths in the Universe, besides this of ours, were inhabited merely with Brutes; That is no Argument at all against the Divine Goodness, no more then it would be against the accuracy of Policy in a great City to see all the Gaols therein devoid of Prisoners, and that they were left to the sole possession of Bats and Cats, of Rats and Mice, and such like Vermine. It were rather a sign of a more exquisite Government and good disposition of the People, that there were now found no such Criminalls amongst them. And for the pretence of having some rational Creatures amongst them to keep good quarter; what rational Creatures are there that rule among the scaly Nations of the vast Ocean?

Hyl.

None, unless Tritons and SeaNymphs.

Philoth.

[Page 528]

You may as well phansie Fauns and Satyrs and other Sylvatick Genii to range these Earths supposed destitute of humane kinde, and to superintend their brutish Inhabitants for their good, though at a more remote and careless distance.

Hyl.

As probable as the black Hunter ranging the Forest with his vocal, but invisible, Hounds in Fountainbleau.

Euist.

I remember the Story very well, it is recorded in the life of Henry the fourth of France.

Hyl.

But there being such an infinite number of Earths as there is of Stars or Suns, it is incredible, Philotheus, that it should be the onely Fate of this Earth of ours to be inhabited with men.

Philoth.

But how do you know, Hylobares, that there is such an infinite number of Earths? For you covenanted at first not to bring in mere Suspicions and Surmizes reproachfully to load Providence withall.

Hyl.

But if that innumerable company [Page 529] of [...]ixt Stars have no Planets dancing about them, that is to say, habitable Earths, that will be a real reproach to Providence indeed, as if Divine Goodness were infinitely defectuous in that Point.

Philoth.

Nay, that were rather an auspicious sign, Hylobares, that the Intellectual Orders of Creatures are not so much, or rather so universally, lapsed as they might be conceived to be, and that the Divine Goodness has a more successfull and effectual Dominion over the Universe then you imagined. For as much as the Light exceeds the Shadows, so much do the Regions of Happiness exceed those of Sin and Misery. It is an Aphorism of the Golden-Key-Paper.

Hyl.

I perceive you are prepared to meet one at every turn, Philotheus.

Philoth.

It is but common Civility to meet him that makes towards one. But now in the second place, Hylobares, let us suppose that all the Planets or Earths be inhabited with rational Creatures, yet these rational [Page 530] Creatures may be as specifically distinct as the Earths or Planets they inhabit, but agree all in Rationality; as the sundry species of Dogs here on Earth agree in Latrability. They having therefore no specifick cognation with the Sons of Adam, what have they to doe with that Religion that the Sons of Adam are saved by? Nay, I adde farther, that these varieties of rational Creatures in the other Planets, as they all agree with one another and with us in mere natural Reason, so they may all disagree from us in this essential Property of being capable of true Religion; no Properties but those either of the Animal or middle life being essential to them. In virtue whereof they may be good Naturalists, good Politicians, good Geometricians and Analysts, good Architects, build Cities and frame Commonwealths, and rule over their brother-B [...]utes in those Planets, and make as good use of them as we doe; but be as uncapable of the Divine Life, or of being good Citizens of the Heavenly [Page 531] Kingdome, or genuine Sons of God, as the very Brutes they rule over.

Cuph.

O how do I flutter to be acquainted with this kind of People, Hylobares! they are pure Philosophers, I'll pawn my life on't. O that the invention of the Gansaws were once perfected, that I might make my first Visit to our Neighbours in the Moon!

Hyl.

But it would be pretty in the mean time if the Art of Telescopes were so far perfected, that we might discern their shapes and persons distinctly, Cuphophron, and see whether it were worth the while to make a Visit to them, whether they be not a Nation of mere Apes and Baboons.

Cuph.

I dare say, Hylobares, if we could but see these Apes and Baboons through our Telescopes, we should sometimes finde them as busily tooting through their Tubes at us, as we at them.

Hyl.

That were a rare hit indeed, Cuphophron, that the Sons of the Mechanick [Page 532] Philosophy should be so lucky at Bo-peep, Des-Cartes his Dioptr. cap. 1. and be able to take a mutuall interview of one another at such a distance. If I could once hear this news, I should presently suspect that those pieces of Ice that I. Metius is said to have contrived first into Telescopes tumbled out of the Moon.

Cuph.

Well, well, Hylobares, you jear all things; but you know not what Time may bring forth.

Hyl.

But in the mean time I am very serious in my conference with Philotheus, which your Raptures have thus interrupted. The scope of whose Discourse on this Point is, to shew that these other Earths may not be inhabited by any other Creatures then such as are essentially uncapable of true Religion, though he may haply allow them to doe such Venerations (those in the Moon par [...]icularly) to our Earth as the Cercopithecus and Elephant are said to doe to the Moon, and so may exercise a natural Idolatry, and that, it may be, in magnificently-exstructed Templ [...]s, [Page 533] even in this utter incapacity of true Religion, and consequently of Salvation; their condition in that respect being much like that of Brutes. Which Hypothesis once admitted, (and it is such as it is hard to demonstrate to be false) the present Difficulty I must confess does quite vanish. But because from the prejudice of Custome, and habitual experience of our own Earth's being inhabited by Men properly so called, we have such an invincible propension to think the same thing comes to pass in all other Earths or Planets; I beseech you, Philotheus, ease my thoughts touching their means of Salvation in this state of the Question, if you can.

Philoth.

Those that are saved of them are saved by the same means that the Americans and the rest of the Pagan World, that never had the opportunity of hearing of the History of Christ, were or are saved. The Ransome is paid into a very righteous hand, that will not exact the Debt [Page 534] twice, as Sophron very soberly and judiciously suggested.

Cuph.

Who knows but the Passion of Christ was intimated to the Inhabitants of those other Earths by the miraculous Eclipse that then happened, the Sun win [...]ing to the rest of the World, to give them notice far and wide what was transacting on the stage of the Earth in the behalf of all?

Hyl.

You are a man of rare Devices, Cuphophron. How came then the Americans not to lay hold on this opportunity? For they had no knowledge of the Suffering of the Messias, till such time as the Christians brought it thither, and fetch'd away their Gold.

Cuph.

You know it is night with them, Hylobares, when it is day with us; and therefore they missed the information of that Miracle.

Hyl.

But they might have taken hold then of the miraculous Eclipse of the Moon, which was every whit as prodigious and conspicuous, these [Page 535] two Luminaries being then in Opposition, and Christ was crucified about Noon.

Philoth.

Cuphophron's conceit is witty, but over-slight and humourous for so solemn and serious a matter. The summe of my Solution of this Difficulty, Hylobares, is this: Lapsed Souls, where-ever they are, that recover into Sincerity, are saved as we are saved, [...], by the Divine Humanity, or Humane Divinity, of the Son of God: which is the inmost and deepest Arcanum of our Christian Religion. And it is the Privilege of the Christian World, that they have this Mystery so plainly and distinctly communicated to them by the preaching of the Gospel. But the efficacy of the said Mystery may be also derived to them that never hear it sound externally and historically to their outward ears. For the Spirit of the Lord passes through the whole Universe, and communicates this Mystery to all Souls, where-ever they are, that are fitted to receive it, in a [Page 536] more hidden and miraculous way, such as himself and at what time himself shall please to make use of. This I think the most sober Solution of the present Difficulty, upon supposition that there are any Men properly so called that inhabit those Planets or Earths you speak of. Which, whether there be or no, is uncertain to us; and therefore the Allegation of such Uncertainties against certain Testimonies for the exquisite Goodness of Divine Providence, (as I have often intimated) ought to be esteemed of no value.

Hyl.

I must confess it, XXXV. Philotheus, That though the World was created but about six thousand years ag [...], yet, for ought we know, it was created as soo [...] as it could be. and crave your pardon. But I find my very Impertinencies in my conference with you successfull and edifying. Let me propose to you but one Scruple more, Philotheus, and then I shall give you no farther trouble.

Sophr.

I am glad we are at length so near getting out of the Briars.

Philoth.

I pray you, what is that Scruple, Hylobares?

Hyl.

It is again about the Pre-existence of the Soul.

Sophr.

[Page 537]

Nay, if he go back, Philotheus, look to your self; he will come on again with such a career, and give you such a push as you never felt yet.

Philoth.

That cannot be help'd, Sophron, I must bear the brunt of it as well as I can. Speak out therefore, Hylobares, and tell your Scruple.

Hyl.

My Scruple is onely this, How it can consist with the infinite Goodness of God, which you say is the Measure of his Providence, (since that Humane Souls can pre-exist and enjoy themselves before they come into these terrestriall Bodies) that they were created no sooner then cum Mundo condito, which is not six thousand years agoe; whenas they might have enjoy'd themselves infinite millions of thousands of years before.

Philoth.

If we rightly understand the nature of the Soul, Hylobares, this is no such hard Probleme. For you must understand it may be an essential Property of the Soul, either vitally to actuate some material Vehicle [Page 538] or other, or else not to act at all. Wherefore it had been a frustraneous thing to create Souls so infinite a space of time before the corporeall World was created, that Hypothesis supposed.

Hyl.

This may be true for ought I know, Philotheus: but admitting it so, it casts me still into an equal perplexity touching the Divine Goodness, in that she has not thought fit that the corporeall World should be created till within six thousand years agoe, whereas it might have been created an infinite time before, and ought so to have been, that Humane Souls might so early come into play, and live and act in their respective Vehicles.

Philoth.

This is something indeed, Hylobares.

Sophr.

Did not I tell you so, Philotheus? Our Ship is sunk in the very Haven, when we were ready to land.

Philop.

Your heart is sunk, O Sophron, pluck up your spirits, and be of good chear. Is this the utmost [Page 539] of your Difficulty, Hylobares?

Hyl.

It is; cure me but of this Anxiety, Philotheus, and I shall declare my self as sound as a fish, and perfectly freed from all Scruples touching Divine Providence.

Philoth.

But your self must assist me then in your own Cure. Tell me therefore, Hylobares, why do you think that the World was not created till about six thousand years agoe?

Hyl.

That's plain from the Chronologie of Holy Scripture.

Philoth.

But have you no other Argument for it, Hylobares?

Hyl.

None at all that I can tell of, Philotheus.

Philoth.

Why then, Hylobares, the case stands thus. If you heartily adhere to the truth of the Scripture, as you ought, I will declare you as sound as a fish; and this intricate discourse about Providence might have been the less needfull. But if in a Philosophicall Wantonness you will not concern your self in the Letter of the [Page 540] Scripture touching Theorems of Philosophy, you have already declared your self as sound as a Fish.

Hyl.

You have caught me like a Fish in a Net, Philotheus: but I must freely confess I do not perceive my own Soundness yet, unless I should be so unsound as to quit the Scriptures.

Philoth.

That you will never do, if you rightly understand them. For they are most assuredly the Truth of God.

Hyl.

But how does this Truth consort with his Goodness, whenas it declares to us that the World has continued but about these six thousand years?

Philoth.

This Earth and Heaven that the Conflagration is to pass upon assuredly commenced no longer ago, Hylobares. But I pray you how high would you have the Commencement of the World to begin, and in what order, that it may fill out the measure of that Idea of Goodness which you would have its Continuation stretch'd upon?

Hyl.

[Page 541]

I would have it begun no sooner then it was possible, which is infinite Myriads of years sooner then it began.

Philoth.

Well then, Hylobares, begin it as soon as you will in your Philosophicall way, and in what order you will, and see what will become of it. You young men are marvellously wise.

Cuph.

O that I had Hylobares his Province now! what rare work could I make of it?

Hyl.

I prithee, Cuphophron, take it. I know thou wilt manage it nimbly and wittily.

Cuph.

Cartesianly enough, I warrant thee, Hylobares; you shall see else if I do not. And I will smartly say at first, That the World was to begin so soon as God was, his Omnipotency being coeternall to himself; and therefore what-ever he could produce in any moment, he could produce as soon as he was, which was from everlasting. Wherefore the Matter might have been created from [Page 542] everlasting, and, having a due measure of Motion imparted to it, might within a little time after have fallen into the contrivance of Vortices and Suns, according to the description of the Cartesian Philosophy; that is, say I, Mechanically, with Des-Cartes, but Bathynous Spermatically, from an old Pythagorick Dream in a Wood. But it is not material now which way it was. For whether way soever, in process of time, after these Suns had shone through the Universe with a [...]ree Light, some of them being inveloped with Spots grew perfectly opake, and being suck'd in by their neighbour- Vortices became Planets or Earths.

Euist.

These are, Diog. Laert. in vita Parmen. it may be, those extinct Suns or cold Suns that Parme [...]ides the Pythagorean taught, adding also, that men were generated out of the Sun; meaning surely these extinct or cold ones, that were turned into Earths or Planets.

Cuph.

That's a pretty Observation, Euistor.

Hyl.

[Page 543]

I, and an handsome confirmation also of Bathynous his Dream, that the Rise of the World was not merely Mechanicall, but Spermaticall or Vital; this Parmenides being a Pythagorean. But this is not the present business. I pray you return to your Province, Cuphophron, and bring things to a conclusion.

Cuph.

The conclusion is manifest of it self: That if the World did not commence so early as I have described, sith it was possible it might doe so, (but infinite Myriads of years later,) that the infinite Goodness of God is not the Measure of his Providence, but that he has been infinitely less good then he might have been to the World and to humane Souls, if they have continued but six thousand years.

Sophr.

This is smart indeed, Cuphophron.

Cuph.

I love what I take upon me, Sophron, to doe it thoroughly and smartly. What say you to this, Philotheus?

Philoth.

[Page 544]

I say you have charged stoutly and home, O Cuphophron; but I shall make the force recoil again upon your own breast, if you will but freely and ingenuously answer to what I demand.

Cuph.

I shall, Philotheus.

Philoth.

Was there not a first six thousand years of Duration from the beginning of the World, supposing it began so timely as you have described?

Cuph.

According to my Hypothesis it began from everlasting, and therefore the numbring of years from this time to that will have no exitus. We shall never come to the first six thousand years.

Philoth.

That's true, O Cuphophron; but you answer craftily, and yet you plainly imply that there was a first six thousand years, though we cannot come at them: but that is because we begin at the wrong end. By the same fallacy you may conclude that there is not a last six thousand years, beginning your account from everlasting, [Page 545] as you call it, because your numbring will finde no Exitus to us. And yet we are, suppose at this moment, in the last moment of the last six thousand years; and so we shall be alwaies of some last six thousand, or at least have been so in such divisions.

Cuph.

That cannot be denied.

Philoth.

Wherefore, Cuphophron, pitch your animadversion on the right end, that is to say, on the beginning of this infinite Duration, as you phansie it, I mean, on that Intervall of time wherein all the whole Universe was either lucid or transparent, there being nothing but Suns then according to your Cartesian Hypothesis, no Earths or Planets: was that time infinite?

Cuph.

I must confess it seems to me incredible that it was so. Methinks within less then an infinite Series of time some of the Suns should be inveloped with Spots, become Comets, and afterwards Earths or Planets.

Philoth.

Well then, if that Intervall of time was finite, it had a finite number of six thousand years.

Cuph.

[Page 546]

Of six thousand years repeated, you mean, Philotheus.

Philoth.

I mean so, and would from thence infer, that there is most evidently therefore in that finite Intervall a first six thousand years as well as a last.

Cuph.

It seems impossible to be otherwise. But well, what of all this, Philotheus?

Philoth.

Let us phansie now our selves, O Cuphophron, or any other rational Beings, Philosophizing at the end of those first six thousand years immediately succeeding the most early Commencement of the World that was possible, (for you pitched as high as possibly you could) and entertaining themselves with the very discourse we are now upon; would not they with your self notwithstanding conclude, that the World might have been made an infinite Series of time sooner?

Cuph.

Not if they knew it (as we suppose it) made as soon as possibly it could be.

Hyl.

Very well answered, Cupho [...]hron.

Sophr.

[Page 547]

It is too well answered. This Cuphophron has a mischievous wit with him when he is set upon't.

Cuph.

I told you, Sophron, I love to doe all things smartly.

Philoth.

I pray you doe, Cuphophron, and tell me farther, whether the Ancient of days was then but of six thousand years continuance; and whether those Disputants we speak of, unless it had been told them by Divine Revelation that the World began as soon as it could, would not confidently have conceived it might have begun an infinite Series of time before; and, lastly, whether we knowing by Divine Revelation that the World began about six thousand years ago, it may not for all that have commenced as soon as possibly it could; and God, who is Omnipotent, could as early create Planets as Suns or Stars, and order all things as he is said to doe in six days Creation, or as we finde them to be at this day.

Hyl.

Answer, Cuphophron: why do you gape and stare, and scratch [Page 548] your head where it itches not?

Cuph.

I pray you, Hylobares, take your Province again, if you will, and manage it your self: I have enough of it.

Hyl.

Why, what's the matter, Cuphophron?

Cuph.

I am confounded.

Hyl.

I am convinced.

Cuph.

Convinced afore-hand, I warrant you, at all adventures, before Philotheus has made any Conclusion. What would he infer from all this?

Philoth.

That though with the Holy Scriptures we admit, as all Orthodox people do, that the World was created but about six thousand years ago, yet, for ought we know, it was created as soon as it could; and therefore Hylobares his Allegation, of the Possibility of the World's being created an infinite Series of time sooner, is of no validity against our Assertion of the exquisite Goodness of Providence, which I have contended for all this time.

Hyl.

I, and your's is the Victory, O [Page 549] admired Philotheus, XXXVI. but mine the Triumph. Hylobares his excess of Ioy and high Satisfaction touching Providence, from the Discourse of Philotheus. [...]!

Philop.

What's the matter with Hylobares, that he raps out Greek in this unusual manner? What is it that he says, Euistor?

Euist.

It is a broken Sentence of a transported Barbarian in Aristophanes. O how am I pleased! how am I delighted! how am I rejoyced, and could even dance for joy!

Philop.

I suppose Hylobares speaks better Greek then you English, or else its as barbarous and rude as the Barbarian himself.

Euist.

I know what you mean, Philopolis, I humour'd it on purpose to the Barbarian's Greek. I am rejoiced is as good English as [...] is Greek, if we will believe the Criticks.

Hyl.

Euistor is got to his sapless Criticks again; but I am brim-full of the pleasure of important Things and Notions. O happy Philopolis, that brought us to this Conference! O thrice-blessed Philotheus, that has so divine a Gift of easing the minds of [Page 550] the serious in their anxious Perplexities about the most concerning Matters!

Philop.

I am glad Philotheus has wrought so great a Cure.

Hyl.

A Cure, Philopolis? it is more then a Cure. I am not onely at perfect ease touching all Doubts about Divine Providence, but in an ineffable Joy and Ecstasie, rapt into Paradise upon Earth, hear the Musick of Heaven, while I consider the Harmonie of God, of Reason; and the Vniverse, so well accorded by the skilfull voice of Philotheus. How lightsome is my Heart, since my minde has been eased of these Perplexities! how transported are my Spirits, how triumphant and tripudiant, that I am ready even to skip out of my skin for Joy!

Cuph.

If you be so dancingly merry, Hylobares, you would doe well to call for a fit of Musick: I have provided an Instrument almost as high as your Raptures. Musick joyn'd to this mood will put you upon a rare pin indeed.

Sophr.

[Page 551]

Hylobares wants no aid for the increase of his Joy, but rather for the regulating of it. For in my apprehension he is in a very great Emotion of minde.

Philoth.

Melancholick persons are sometimes in such a condition upon such like occasions; Truth being to the eye of the Soul what Beauty is to that of the Body, very transporting.

Sophr.

I believe a solemn Lesson on the Theorbo would finely compose him, and Bathynous I know has skill on that Instrument, and can sing to it.

Philoth.

You say right, he can. I pray you, Bathynous, give us a cast of your Skill.

Bath.

I am a very sorry Musician, to venture to sing in such company. I sing sometimes and play to my self in the dark some easie Songs and Lessons, but have not the confidence to think others can be pleased with such mean Musick.

Cuph.

You may play and sing in the dark here too, Bathynous, if you will. The Moon's light comes not so plentifully through the Leaves of the Arbour [Page 552] as to discover whether you blush or no, in case you should be out. Come, I pray you, be confident. I'll reach you the Theorbo.

Philop.

I pray you, Bathynous, let's hear what you can doe. I know it will be gratefull to Hylobares.

Hyl.

I shall like a Song of Bathynous his chusing; I know it will not be impertinent to our present purpose.

Bath.

It's an excellent Theorbo, Cuphophron: It deserves a more skilfull Hand to touch it then mine. How sweet and mellow, and yet how majestick, is the Sound of it!

Hyl.

O how that Flourish charms my Spirits! You have a very good Hand on the Lute, Bathynous.

Bath.

I'll sing you a good Song, Hylobares, though I have but a bad Hand, and a worse Voice: and it shall be out of your own beloved hobbling Poet, The Philosopher's Devotion.

Hyl.

None better: I pray you let us hear it.

Bath.

Sing aloud,

XXXVII.

His Pr [...]e rese [...]rse

Who [...] m [...]e the Vnivers [...].

[...]

[Page 553]He the boundless Heaven has spred,

All the vital Orbs has kn [...]d;

He that on Olympus high

Tends his Flocks with watchfull Eye,

And this Eye has multiply'd,

'Midst each Flock for to reside.

Thus as round about th [...]y stray,

Toucheth each with out-stretch'd Ray.

[...]imbly they hold on their way,

Sh [...]ping [...]ut their Night and Day.

Summer, Winter, Autumn, Spring,

Their inclined Axes bring.

Never slack they, none respires,

Dancing round their Central Fires.

In due order as they move,

Echo's sweet be gently drove

Thorough Heav'n's vast Hollo [...]ness,

Which unto all corners press;

Musick that the heart of Jove

Moves to Ioy and sportfull Love,

Fills the listening Sailors ears

Riding on the wandring Sphears.

Neither Speech nor Language is

Where their voice is not transmiss.

God is good, is wise, is strong,

Witness all the Creature-throng;

Is confess'd by every Tongue.

All things back from whence they

As the thankfull Rivers pay (Sprung,

What they borrowed of the Sea.

Now my self I do resign:

T [...]ke me whole, I all am t [...]in [...]

[Page 554]Save me, God, from Self-desire,

Death's pit, dark Hell's raging Fire,

Envy, Hatred, Vengeance, Ire:

Let not Lust my Soul bemire.

Quit from these thy Praise I'll sing,

Loudly sweep the trembling String.

Bear a part, O Wisedom's Sons,

Freed from vain Religions.

Lo, from far I you salute,

Sweetly warbling on my Lute.

India, Aegypt, Arabie,

Asia, Greece, and Tartarie,

Carmel- Tracts and Lebanon,

With the Mountains of the Moon,

From whence muddy Nile doth run,

Or where-ever else you wone,

Breathing in one vital Air,

One we are, though distant far.

Rise at once, let's sacrifice

Odours sweet, perfume the Skies.

See how Heav'nly Lightning fires

Hearts inflam'd with high Aspires!

All the substance of our Souls

Vp in clouds of Incense rolls.

Leave we nothing to our selves,

Save a Voice; what need we else?

Or an Hand to wear and tire

On the thankfull Lute or Lyre.

Sing aloud, His Praise rehearse

Who hath made the Vniverse.

Hyl.

Your Judgement is very sound, [Page 555] O Sophron; this solemn Lesson on the Theorbo did not so much increase my Passion of Joy, as regulate, establish, and fix it. Methought I was placed in the third Heaven all the while I heard so sweet an Instrument, so lively a Voice, and so exalted Philosophy and Morality joyn'd together in one Harmony.

Cuph.

You was a very great way off then, Hylobares, if you mean the Cartesian third Heaven.

Hyl.

I mean an higher Mystery, Cuphophron. A man may be in the Cartesian third Heaven, and yet be as silly a fellow as I was before I conferred with Philotheus.

Philop.

You are the most rapturous and ecstaticall Company of people that ever I met with in all my life; a kind of Divine Madness, I think, rules amongst you, and the efficacy of your Converse is able to make others mad for Company. I am sure when Philotheus comes to my beloved Theme, if he manage it with the like success he has done this, it will hazard my being at least inwardly as [Page 556] much transported as Hylobares. Which I would willingly try to morrow more timely in the afternoon, betwixt three and four of the Clock, because my occasions will call me next day out of Town.

Philoth.

I am sorry to hear of your so sudden departure, Philopolis; but we shall not fail at that time you appoint to give you the meeting here.

Sophr.

And I hope Philotheus will manage your Theme, XXXVIII. Philopolis, The Ha [...]r [...] and Success of t [...]e f [...]egoing Dis [...]o [...]se. with a more steddy and secure Success then that of Hylobares. For the truth is, I have had many an aking Heart for you all in this doubtfull Dispute; your Hardiness seeming to me as reprovable as theirs who, when they may securely stand on the firm Land, or safely pass over a strong-built Bridge, will chuse to commit themselves to some weather-beaten Cockboat, when the Winde is very rough and the Waves high and tossing, onely out of a careless Wantonness, or desire to conflict with Danger. Methought ever and anon I saw the Boat r [...]ady to [...]opple over, and your selves [Page 557] put to swim for your lives, or drown.

Philop.

But Providence did marvellously assist her so earnest and affectionate Advocate, O Sophron.

Sophr.

She did, and I heartily congratulate your safe arrivall to Land.

Cuph.

But this is but a dry and ineffectual Congratulation, O Sophron. Come, begin to them in a Glass of good Canarie, to comfort their chill hearts after the perill of this Shipwreck and sad Sea-storm. Hold, I'll open the Bottle.

Hyl.

Stay your hand, XXXIX. O Cuphophron. The Preference of Intellectual Joy before tha [...] which is Sensual. There's none so chill or cold at heart as you imagine. I am sure I am all Joy and Warmth without the help of any such Liquour.

Cuph.

It may be you are over-hot, Hylobares; Sack is good even in Fevers, and it is not unlikely but that a Glass of it may cool you.

Hyl.

All the heat that I have at this time, be it never so much, is so sacred and divine, that I will not diminish it in the least degree upon any pretense.

Philop.

I pray you, Cuphophron, keep [Page 558] your Bottle entire till another time. I perceive it is now utterly needless, and your Liquour is too good to be cast away in vain.

Philoth.

We all overflow with such Joy, O Cuphophron, as no terrestriall Wine can procure, nor increase, nor ought to diminish.

Euist.

Indeed I think we doe, Philotheus; I would not drink a Glass of Sack now, no not for forty pounds.

Cuph.

I have not the luck of it at this time to contribute to the pleasure of this excellent Company in any thing, my Wine it self being as rejectaneous as my Reasonings.

Hyl.

O dear Cuphophron, be not you solicitous touching these things. I'll assure you, your performance was marvellous noble, and worthy the great Parts and Wit of Cuphophron.

Cuph.

It's a comfortable circumstance, that the censure of Hylobares is so favourable, whose humour is to abuse in me what-ever is or is not abuseable. But I profess to thee, Hylobares, I was never so confounded in all my life as in that point of the [Page 559] World's possibility of being created from everlasting. I am perfectly puzzled in it to this very day.

Hyl.

Why, I prithee, Cuphophron, how many hours, or rather minutes, is it since that confusion first surprized thee?

Cuph.

My minde has been so jumbled betwixt Time and Eternity, XL. that I think I can speak sense in neither. That there is an everanticipative Eternity and inexterminable Amplitude that are proper to the Deity onely. What a marvellous thing is this, that God, who was Omnipotent as soon as he was, and who was from all Eternity, and could create Suns and Vortices within a moment that he was Omnipotent, yet should not be able to create the World so soon, but that there would be an Eternity of Duration necessarily conceivable before the World's Creation?

Bath.

Yes, Cuphophron, and this marvellously- anticipating Eternity is the proper and necessary eternal Duration of God, which nothing can reach or exhaust; as that inmost Extension or Amplitude which will necessarily remain after we have imagined all Matter, or what-ever else is removeable, [Page 560] removed or extermina [...] out of the World, is to be look'd [...] no as the permanent Expansion or [...] of the radical Essentiality [...] God.

Cuph.

This is obscurum per obscuriu [...] Bathynous; but doubtless it is an highly-Metaphysicall Point, and a [...] ought to muster up all his Metaphys [...] call forces that would grapple with [...] This is a noble game for me alone [...] my self to pursue in my Arbour.

Philop.

Or on your Pillow, Cupho [...]phron; for it is very late. And there [...] fore, courteous Cuphophron, we'll [...] you Good night.

Cuph.

You say well, Philopolis, [...] will not be amiss to consult with one's Pillow, as the Proverb is, and [...]leep upon't.

Philop.

Gentlemen, you'll remember the appointed time to morrow.

Philoth.

We will not fail you, Philopolis.

The end of the Third Dialogue.

FINIS.

This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Text Creation Partnership. This Phase I text is available for reuse, according to the terms of Creative Commons 0 1.0 Universal. The text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission.