THE Just Right OF MONARCHY In general, but more especially of the KINGS of SCOTLAND, asserted against Buchannan and others.

LƲCIFER might in Reason have contented himself with that share of Knowledge, Glory and Power, which was bestowed upon him, by his Almighty, and Bountiful Soveraign. And Adam should have rested satisfied, with the Glory of having been made after the Image of God, and with being his Lieute­nant in this lower World. But there are such strong Charms in Ambition, and Vanity, that the one resolved to hazard [Page 2] all that he possessed, as being second, ra­ther than not try if he could be the first, and the other, desiring to improve his pre­sent share, forfeited those excellencies which he enjoyed. How jealous then should frail and fallen man be, in debates with those, whom the Almighty has ap­pointed to be his Vicegerents amongst them; and to whom he has said, Ye are Gods. And how hard is it for us to con­quer that Vice, which the one could not resist, though he was all Light, and the other though he was all Innocence?

What Nations under Heaven were so happy as we, under the Reign of King Charles the First? Secure against all Inva­sion from abroad, by the situation of our Country; and from all Oppression at home, by its Laws, and the gracious Con­cessions of our excellent Monarchs: But more especially in that Age, by the innate Vertues of that King, who was severe to none but to himself; and whose Preroga­tives, no Laws could bound so much as His own Goodness did. And yet weary with the burden of our own prosperity, we lusted after new improvements of Li­berty and Property: And after we had emptied our own Veins, and Purses, in [Page 3] fighting for these, all we gained, was to be Slaves, and Beggars. And having kill'd for Religion a King, who had more of it, than all who fought against him, we split our own Church into a thousand pieces, and from its murthered Body, did arise those Sectarians, like so many Worms, and Insects. But yet God Almighty desiring to try us once more, and make us for ever inexcusable, did not only deliver us from that Slavery that we had drawn up­on our selves, but because we were all Crimes, he gave us a King who was all Clemency, and who deserves to have been Elected, if he had not been born our King: And yet after that he had also condescend­ed to all our new Extravagancies, and that by His Conduct, all Sciences flourish, and Trade is so increased, that Riches are be­come a Plague. We are now troubled with Jealousies, because we can be troubled with nothing else: And murmuring against the gentlest and best of Kings, we are tor­mented daily with Apparitions, Visions, Plots, Pamphlets and Libels. But under whom can we expect to be free from Ar­bitrary Government, when we were, and are afraid of it under King Charles the First, and King Charles the Second? And [Page 4] what King, or Government, can be se­cure from those, who Conspire the death of this most merciful Prince, and of this so ancient, and so well moulded Govern­ment?

Amongst the other wicked Instruments in these Rebellions, I must confess that our Country-men Buchannan (one of the chief Ornaments, and Reproaches of his native Country) the Authors of Lex Rex, Naphtali, and Jus Populi Vindicatum, have been Ring-leaders, who have endeavoured extreamly to poyson this Nation by perswad­ing the People:

1. That our Monarchs derive their Rights from them.

2. That therefore since they derive their Right from the People, they are account­able to them for their administration, and consequently they may be suspended or de­posed by them.

3. That the People may Reform with­out them, and may rise in Arms against them, if the Monarch hinder them to Re­form.

4. That the People or their Representa­tives may Exclude the Lineal Successor, and raise to the Throne any of the Royal Fami­ly who doth best deserve the Royal Digni­ty.

These being all matters of Right, the plain and easie way which I resolve to take for refuting them, so as the learned and unlearned may be equally convinced, shall be first, by giving a true account of what is our present positive Law. 2. By demonstrating that as our present positive Law is inconsistent with those Principles, so these our positive Laws are excellently well founded upon the very nature of Mo­narchy, and that those Principles are in­consistent with all Monarchy: And the third Class of my Arguments shall be from the Principles of common Reason, Equity and Government, abstracting both from the positiveness of our Law, and the na­ture of our Monarchy: And in the last place I shall answer the Arguments of those Authors.

As to the first, I conceive that a Trea­tise, De Jure Regni apud Scotos, should have clear'd to us what was the power of Mo­narchs by Law, and particularly, what was the positive Law of Scotland as to this point; for if these points be clear by our positive Law, there is no further place for debate, since it is absolutely necessary for Mankind, especially in matters of Government, that they at last acquiesce in something that is [Page 6] fix'd and certain, and therefore it is very well observ'd by Lawyers and States-men, that before Laws be made, men ought to reason; but after they are made, they ought to obey: which makes me admire how Buchannan and the other Authors that I have named, should have adventur'd up­on a debate in Law, not being themselves Lawyers; and should have written Books upon that Subject, without citing one Law, Civil, or Municipal, pro or con: Nor is their Veracity more to be esteemed than their Learning; for it's undeniable that Buchannan wrote this Book, De Jure Regni, to perswade Scotland to raise his Patron, though a Bastard to the Crown: and the Authors of Lex Rex, Jus Populi Vindicatum, and others, were known to have written those Libels from picque against the Go­vernment, because they justly suffered un­der it.

I know that to this it may be answered, That these Statutes are but late, and were not extant in Buchannan's time, and conse­quently Buchannan cannot be refuted by them.

2. That these Statutes have been obtain'd from Parliaments, by the too great influ­ence of their Monarchs, and the too great [Page 7] Pusillanimity of Parliaments, who could not resign the Rights and Priviledges of the People, since they have no Warrant from them for that effect.

To the first of which, I answer, that my Task is not to form an Accusation a­gainst Buchannan, but against his Principles, and to demonstrate, that these Principles are not our Law, but are inconsistent with it, and it is ridiculous to think, that any such Laws should have been made, before those Treasonable Principles were once hatched and maintained, for Errors must appear before they be condemned: and by the same Argument it may be as well urged, that Arius, Nestorius, &c. were not Hereticks, because those Acts of General Councils, which condemned their Heresies, were not extant, when they first defended those opinions; and that our King had not the power of ma­king Peace and War, till the Year 1661.

But, 2dly, For clearing this Point, it is fit to know that our Parliaments never give Prerogatives to our Kings, but only declare what have been their Prerogatives, and particularly in these Statutes that I shall Cite, the Parliament doth not Confer any New Right upon the King, but only ac­knowledge [Page 8] what was Originally his Right and Prerogative from the beginning, and therefore the Parliament being the only Judges who could decide whether Buchan­nans Principles were solid, and what was Jus Regni apud Scotos. These Statutes hav­ing decided those points controverted by him, there can be hereafter no place for Debate, and particularly as to Buchannan, his Book De jure Regni apud Scotos, it is expresly condemn'd as Slanderous, and containing several offensive Matters by the 134 Act, Parl. 8. Ja. 6. in Anno 1584. which was the first Parliament that ever sate after his Book was printed.

To the 2 d, I answer, that it being con­troverted what is the Kings Power, there can be no stronger Decision of that Con­troversie in Favours of the King, than the acknowledgment of all Parties Interested, and it is strange and unsufferable to hear such as appeal to Parliaments, cry out against their Power, their Justice, and De­cisions; and why should we oppress our Kings, and raise Civil Wars, whereby we endanger so much our selves to procure powers to Parliaments, if Parliaments be such ridiculous things as we cannot trust when they are impowred by us? and if [Page 9] there be any force in this answer of Buchan­nans, there can be none in any of our Laws, for that strikes at the Root of all our Laws, and as I have produced a Tract of reitera­ted Laws for many Years, so where were there ever such free unlimited Parliaments in any Nation as these, whose Laws I have Cited? 2dly, Whatever might be said, if a positive Contract betwixt the King and People were produced, clearing what were the just Limits of the Monarchy, and bounding it by clear Articles mutually agreed upon, yet it is very absurd and ex­travagant to think, that when the Debate is, what is the King of Scotlands just Power and Right, and from whom he Derives it, that the Laws and repeated Acknowledge­ments of the whole Representatives of the People assembled in the Supream Court of the Nation, having no open force upon it, but enacted at several times, in many several Parliaments, under the gentlest, peaceablest, and wisest Kings that ever they had, should not be better believed than the Testimonies of three or four byass'd and disoblig'd Pedants, who understood nei­ther our Laws nor Statutes, and who can bring no clear fundamental Law, nor pro­duce no Contract nor Paction restricting [Page 10] the King, or bounding his Government. 3dly, That which adds a great deal of Au­thority to this Debate, and these Statutes is, that as this is clear by our positive Law, so it is necessarily inferred from the nature of our Monarchy, and is very advantagi­ous for the Subjects of this Kingdom, which I shall clear in the second and third Arguments that I shall bring against those Treasonable Principles, nor can they be seconded, by any solid Reason, as I shall make appear in answering the Arguments of those Authors.

I know that Nephthaly, the Author of Jus Populi, and our late Fanatical Pam­phlets, alleadge that our Parliaments since 1661. are null and unlawful, because many who have right to Sit as Members, or to Elect Members, were excluded by the De­claration or Test: but my answer is, First, That these were excluded by Acts of Par­liament, which were past in Parliaments prior to their exclusion, and so they were excluded by Law, and no man can be said to be illegally excluded from his Seat in Parliament, who is excluded by a clear Sta­tute. 2dly, If this were not a good an­swer, then the Papists might pretend that they are unjustly excluded, because they [Page 11] will not take the Oath of Supremacy, and because they are Papists; and how can the Fanaticks pretend to make this objection, since they by the same way excluded the Kings Loyal Subjects in the Year 1647. and 1649. &c. Or how would these Au­thors have rail'd at any Malignant for using this Argument against them, which they use now most impudently against us with far less justice, for their Parliaments were unjust upon other Heads, as being inconsistent with the fundamental Laws of the Kingdom, and so their Acts of exclusi­on were null in themselves. 3dly. All the Statutes made since 1661, are neces­sary consequences of former Laws, and so are rather renewed than new Laws. 4ly. If their reasons were allow'd there could be no end of controversie, for all who are excluded would still alleadge that they were unjust­ly excluded, and consequently there could be no submission to Authority, and so no Society nor Peace.

The last answer that our Dissenters make when they are driven from all their other grounds, is, that they, though the lesser, are yet the sounder part of the Nation; but this shift does not only overturn Mo­narchy, but establishes Anarchy, and [Page 12] though they were once settled in their be­loved Common-wealth, this would be suf­ficient to overturn it also, for every little number of Dissenters, nay, and even the meanest Dissenter himself; might pretend to be this sounder part of the Common­wealth, but God Almighty foreseeing that pride or ignorance would suggest to frail Mankind this principle, so inconsistent with all that Order and Government, where­by he was to preserve the World, did therefore in his great Wisdom convince men by the light of their own Reason, that in matters of common concern, which were to be determined by Debate, the greater num­ber should determine the lesser; and such as drive beyond this Principle, shall never find any certain Point at which they may rest: and by the same Reason, the Law has pronounc'd it safer to rest in what is de­cided, though it be unjust, than to cast loose the Authority of Decisions, upon which the Peace and quiet of the Common­wealth does depend, who would be so humble and just, as to confess that his Ad­versary has the juster side? Or who would obey if this were allow'd? And what Idea of Government or Society could [Page 13] a man form to himself, allowing once this principle.

It is also very observable, that those who pretend to be the sounder part, and deny obedience upon that account, are still the most insolent and irregular of all the Society, the greatest admirers of them­selves, and the greatest enemies to peace, and so the unfittest to be Judges of what is the sounder part, though they were not them­selves Parties. But what pretence is there for that Plea in this case, where the foun­dations of our Monarchy have been unani­mously acknowledg'd by many different Parliaments, in many different Ages, chosen at first from the Dictates of Reason, and confirm'd, after we had in many Rebelli­ons, found how dangerous all those popu­lar pretences are, and in which we agree with the Statesman, Lawyers and Divines of all the well-Govern'd Nations under Hea­ven, who are born under an hereditary Monarchy, as it is confess'd we are.

To return then to the first of those Points, I lay down as my first Position, that our Monarchs derive not their Right from the People, but are absolute Monarchs, deriv­ing their Royal Authority immediately from God Almighty; and this I shall endea­vour [Page 14] to prove, first from our positive Law.

By the 2. Act Par. 1. Ch. 2 d. in which it is declar'd, that His Majesty, His Heirs and Successors, have for ever, by vertue of that Royal Power which they hold from God Almighty over this Kingdom, the sole choice and appointment of Officers of State, Counsellors and Judges.

But because this Act did only assert that our Kings did hold their Royal Power from God, but did not exclude the people from being sharers in bestowing this Do­native, therefore by the 5th. Act of that same Parliament, they acknowledge the Obligation lying on them in Conscience, Honour and Gratitude, to own and assert the Royal Prerogatives of the Imperial Crown of this Kingdom, which the Kings Majesty holds from God Almighty alone; and therefore they acknowledge that the Kings Majesty only, by vertue of His Roy­al Prerogative, can make Peace and War, and Treaties with forraign Princes.

Because this last Statute did only assert that the King did hold His Imperial Crown from God alone, but did not decide from whom our Kings did only derive their Power; therefore by the 2 d. Act Par. 3 d. [Page 15] Ch. 2 d. It is declar'd that the Estates of Par­liament considering that the Kings of this Realm, Deriving their Power from God Almighty alone, they do succeed Lineally thereto, &c. Which Statutes do in this agree with our old Law; for in the first Chapter of Reg. Magist. vers. 3. these Words are, That both in Peace and War, our Glorious King may so Govern this King­dom committed to Him by God Almigh­ty, in which He has no Superiour but God Almighty alone, which Books are ac­knowledg'd to be our Law, and are cal­led the Kings Laws by the 54th. Act Par. 3 d. Jam. 1. and the 115. Act Par. 14. Jam. 3.

These our Laws both Ancient and Mo­dern, can neither be thought to be extort­ed by force, nor enacted by flattery, since in this we follow the Scripture, the Pri­mitive Church and their Councils, the Ci­vil Law and its Commentators, and the wisest Heathens, both Philosophers and Poets. As to the Scripture, God tells us, That by him Kings Reign, and that he hath anointed them Kings, and that the King is the Minister of God. David tells us, That God will give strength to his King, and deliverance to his King, and to his Anoint­ed. [Page 16] Daniel sayes to Nebuchadnezar, The God of Heaven hath given thee a Kingdom. And to Cyrus, God gave to Nebuchadnezar thy Father a Kingdom, and for the Ma­jesty that he gave him, all Nations trem­bled.

As to the Fathers, Augustin de Civit. Dei, l. 5. c. 21. Let us not attribute unto any other, the Power of giving Kingdoms and Empires, but to the true God. Basil in Psal. 32. The Lord setteth up Kings and remov­eth them. Tertul. Apol: contra gentes, Let Kings know, that from God only they have their Empire, and in whose power only they are. And Irenaeus having Prov'd this point fully, ends thus, l. 5. c. 24. By whose Com­mand they are born men, by his likewise they are ordain'd Kings. This is also acknow­ledg'd by the Councils of Toledo 6. c. 14. of Paris 6. c. 5. vid. Council aquis gran. 3. c. 1.

Amongst late Divines, Marca the fa­mous Arch-Bishop of Paris, Concord. sa­cerd. & imperii, l. 2. c. 2. n. 2. asserts, That the Royal Power is not only bestowed by God, but that it is immediatly bestowed by God upon Kings: and Refutes Bellarm. de laico, c. 6. maintaining, That the Je­suits Doctrine in this, lessens Authority, and [Page 17] raises Factions, and contradicts both the Design and Word, of God. Duvalius de suprem, potest. Rom. Pontif. p. 1. q. 2. Asserts that Kings derive their Rights by the Laws of God and Nature, non ab ipsa Republica & hominibus; and in all this the Fanaticks and Republicans agree with the Jesuits against Monarchy.

In the Civil Law this is expresly as­serted, Cod. de vet. Cod. enucleand. Deo anctore nostrum gubernante imperium quod nobis a coelesti majestate traditam est, Nov. 6. in init. Nov. 133. in proem. in Nov. 80. 85, 86. Justinian acknowledges his Ob­ligation to care for his People, because he received the Charge of them from God, and certainly Subjects are happier, if their Kings acknowledge this, as a duty to God, than if they only think it a Charge con­fer'd on them by their People, and that they are therefore answerable to them.

That the Doctors and Commentators are of this opinion, is too clear to need Citations, vid. Arnis. cap. de Essentia Ma­jest. Granswinkel. de jur. Maj cap. 1. & 2.

As to the Heathens, Hesiod. in Theog. ver. 96. says [...] Kings are from God. Homer sayes their Honour is from [Page 18] God, [...] —Iliad. 1. verse 197. Themistous asserts, that the Regal Power came from God, Orat. 5. whith whom agrees Dion. Chrysostom Orat. 1. diotog. apud Stob. serm. &c. Plat. de legibus. &c. But above all, Aristotle in polit. [...]. And Plu­tarch. Agis & Cleom. [...].

If to these Statutes and Citations it be answered, That God Almighty may indeed be the principal and chief Author of Mo­narchy, and that Monarchs may derive their Power from him, as from the Su­pream Being, that directs all more im­mediate Causes, and yet the People may be the immediate Electors of Monarchs, and so Kings may derive immediately from them their Power; and thus these Statutes are not inconsistent with the principle laid down by Buchannan and others, whereby they assert, That Kings in general, and par­ticularly the Kings of Scotland, derive their Power immediately from the People.

To this my answers are, that first, If we consider the propriety of the Words, there can be nothing more inconsistent, then that Kings should derive their Power from God Almighty alone, and yet that [Page 19] they should derive it from the People, for the Word Alone, is of all other words the most exclusive. 2dly, The design of the Parliament in that acknowledgement was to condemn, after a long Rebellion, the unhappy Principles which had kin­dled it; and amongst which, one of the chief was, that our Kings derived their Power from the People, and therefore they might qualifie, or resume what they at first gave, or might oppose all Streaches in the Power they had given, and might even punish, or depose the King when he transgressed, none of which Principles could have been sufficiently condemned, by acknowledging that, though God was the chief Author, yet the People were the immediate Electors. 3dly, There need­ed no Act of Parliament be made for ac­knowledging God to be the chief Author, and first Fountain of every Power, for that was never controverted amongst Chri­stians. 4thly, That foolish glosse cannot at all consist with the Inferences deduced from that Principle in the former Statutes: for in the 2. Act, Par. 1. Char. 2. It is in­ferr'd from His Majesties holding His Roy­al Power from God alone, that therefore he hath the sole choice of his own Of­ficers [Page 20] of State, Privy Counsellors and Judges; And in the 5th. Act, it is inferr'd from the same Principle, that because he derives his Power from God alone, that therefore it is Treason to rise in Arms without his Consent, upon any pretext whatsoever: and in the 2 d. Act, Par. 3. Char. 2. It is concluded, that because our Kings derive their Power from God Almighty alone, therefore it is Treason in the People to interrupt, or divert their Succession, upon any Difference in Reli­gion, or other pretext whatsoever; whereas all this had been false, and improper Rea­soning, if the design of the Parliament had not been to acknowledge that our Kings derived not their Power from the People for though they derived their Power from, God, as the supream Being only, and not as the immediate bestower, and if the People were the immediat bestowers of that Power, then the People might still have pretended, that they who gave the Power, might have risen in their own Defence when they saw the same abused, and might have diverted the Succession, when it de­scended upon a person who was an enemy to their Interest: but how false this glosse is, will appear more fully from the fol­lowing [Page 21] Arguments; and it is absolutely inconsistent with St. Augustins opinion, formerly cited, wherein he forbids to at­tribute the giving of Kingdoms to any o­ther but to God.

My second Argument for proving that Kings derive their Power from God alone, and not from the People, shall be from the principles of Reason. For First, The Almighties design being to manifest his Glory, in Creating a World, so vast and regular as this is, and his goodness in Governing it, and that Men might live peaceably in it, having both Reason and Time to Serve him, it was consequential that he should have reserved to himself the immediate dependence of the supream Power, to shut out the extravagant and restless multitude, from those frequent Revolutions which they would make, and Desolations which they would occasion, if they thought that the Supream Power depended on them, and that they were not bound to obey them for Conscience sake; so that those expressions in Scrip­ture were very useful in this to curb our Insolencies, and to fix our restlesness; and it seems that Kings are in Scripture, said to be gods, to the end it might be [Page 22] clear that they were not made by Men. 2dly, God Almighty being King of Kings, it was just, that as inferiour Magistrates derived their Power from the King, so Kings should derive their Power from God, who is their King; and this seems to be clear from that analogy, which runs in a Dependence, and Chain through the whole Creation. 3dly, as this is most suitable to the principles of Reason, so it is most consonant the analogy of Law, by which t▪is declar'd, that no Man is master of his own Life or Limbs, nemo est Dominus membrorum suorum; and therefore, as no Man can lawfully take away his own Life, so neither can he transfer the power of dis­posing of it to any other Man; and consequently this Power is not derived to Kings and Princes by privat Men, but is bestowed upon them by God Almighty; who is the sole Arbiter of Life and Death, and who can only take it a away, because he gave it: And if it be objected, that this last branch of the Argument, seems either to prove nothing, or else to prove that there can be no Elective Monarchies. To this it is answered, that even in E­lective Monarchies, the Nomination pro­ceeds only from the People, but the Roy­al [Page 23] Power from God, as we see in infe­riour Magistracies, such as Burrows Roy­al, &c. the People Elect, and so the No­mination is from them, but the power of Governing proceeds from the King, and not from the Electors, and therefore as the People who Elected the Magistrates in these Towns, cannot Depose them by their own Authority; so neither can the People Depose their King, but the pu­nishment of him belongs to God Almigh­ty. I confess, that if the People Choose a King with express Condition, that they may punish him as the Lacedaemonian Kings were punishable by those Magistrates, call'd the Ephori, the Kings are in that case accountable to the People, but then they are not Monarchs, having supream Power as our Kings have, and who are therefore declar'd to hold their Power immediately from God, and not to be at all punishable by the People.

The 4th Argument that I shall use, for proving that our Kings derive not their power from the People, shall be from the natural Origin of Monarchy, and of ours in particular, which I conceive to be that Right of Paternal Power which is stated in them; for understanding where­of, [Page 24] it is fit to know, that God at first created only one Man, that so his Children might be Subject to him, as all Children yet are to their Parents: and therefore the Jesuitical and Fanatical Principles, that every man is born Free, and at Liberty to choose what form of Government he pleas­eth, was ever, and is most false, for every man is born a Subject to his own Parents, who, if they were not likewise subject to a Su­periour Power, might judge and punish them Capitally, lead them out to War, and do all other things that a King could do, as we see the Patriarchs did in their own Families. And as long as it is known who is the Root of the Family, or who repre­sents it, there is no place for Election, and people Elect only when the memory of this is lost, and such as overcome the Heads of Families in Battle, succeed to them in their Paternal Right

If it be answered, that the Father may by nature pretend to a power over his Children, or it may be an Elder Brother over his younger, yet there is no tye in nature subjecting Collaterals, as Uncles, and their descendents to those descended from the Eldest Family. To this I reply, that 1. This power over all the Family [Page 25] was justly given by nature, to shun divi­sions, for else every little Family should have erected it self in a distinct Govern­ment, and the weakest had still been a Prey. 2. We see that Abraham did lead out to War, and in every thing act as King, not only over his own Children, but all the Family, and whole Nations, are call'd the Children of Israel, the Chil­dren of Edom, &c. 3. That must be con­cluded to be establish'd by natural instinct, which all men in all Ages and Places al­low and follow; but so it is, that all Na­tions in all Places, and Times have ever al­low'd the Eldest Son of the Eldest Family to govern all descended from the Stock, without new Elections; and the Author of the late famous Moral Essayes hath ad­mir'd this as one of the wisest Maxims that we have from Natural Instinct; for if the wisest, or strongest were to be chosen, there had still been many Rivals, and so much Faction and Discord; but it is still certain who is the Eldest Son, and this shuts out all Debate, and prevents all Dissention: For applying this to our Case, it is fit to know, that if we believe not our Historians, then none else can prove that the People of Scotland did at first Elect a King that being contrary to the acknow­ledgements [Page 26] of our own Statutes and all Buchannans Arguments, for restraining Kings, being founded upon the authority of our Historians, who (as he sayes,) assert that K. Fergus was first Elected King by the People: if he be not able to prove that our Kings owe their Crowns to the Election of the People, without any inherent or previous Right, all his Arguments vanish to nothing: but on the other hand, if we consider exactly our Historians, we shall find that our Kings Reign over us by this Paternal Power; and though I am not very fond of Fabulous Antiquities, yet if Tradition, or Histories can be believ'd in any thing, they should at least be believ'd against Buchannan, and those who make use of them, to restrain the power of our Kings: and by our Histories it is clear, that Gathelus having led some Forces into Egypt, he after several Victo­ries, setl'd in Portugal, call'd from him Portus Gatheli, from which a Colony of that Race transported it self into Ireland, and another into Scotland; nor should this be accounted a Fable, since Cornelius Tacitus, in the Life of Agricola, makes the Scots to be of Spanish, and the Picts to be of German Extraction.

The Scottish Golonies finding them­selves [Page 27] opprest by the Britains, and Picts, they sent over into Ireland to Ferquhard, and he sent them a considerable Supply, under the Command of Fergus his Son, who having secur'd them against their Enemies, all the Heads of the Tribes ac­knowledged him for their King, and swore that they should never admit of any other Form of Government then Mo­narchy; and that they should never obey any except Him and his Posterity, which if they brake, they wish'd that all the Plagues and Miseries that had formerly fallen on their Predecessors, might again fall upon their Posterity, as the punish­ment of that Perjury. All which Religious Vows and Promises seal'd by those dread­ful Oaths voluntarly given, were graven on Marble Tables, and Consign'd for pre­servation into the custody of their Priests: and these are Boetius own words, Fol. 10. From which I observe, 1. That as our Laws assert, that our Kings derive their Power from God, and not from the People, so we ought not to believe the contrary upon the Faith of our Historians, except they were very clear, and unanimous in contradicting our Laws, whereas it ap­pears to me, that our Laws agree with our History, for Gathelus was not at all [Page 28] Elected by the People, but was himself the Son of a King, and did conquer by his own Subjects, and Servants, and all those who are descended from his Collonies, were by Law oblig'd to obey the Eldest Son, and Representative of that Royal Fa­mily. And Ferquhard is acknowledg'd to have been his only Successor, nor did ever any of the Scotish Tribes pretend to the Supremacy, and our Histories bear, that none of our Tribes would yield to another; and the Fatal Marble Chair that came from Spain, remaining with those who went to Ireland, does evince that the Birth-right remain'd with them; and there­fore when Fergus the Son of Ferquhard came over, he brought over with him the Marble Chair, which was the mark of Empire. And Boetius immediately upon his arrival calls him King, and Fordon the most ancient of our Historians, lib. 1. cap. 36. calls him, Fergusius Filius Ferardi aut Ferquhardi ex antiquorum Regum prosapia genitus, qui ambitione Regnandi stimulatus magnam sibi Juvenum copiam assimulavit & Albionem continuo progressus est & ibidem super eos Regem primum se constituit, that is to say, he made himself the first King; therefore K. James. Basil. Doron. pag. [Page 29] 201. asserts, that K. Fergus made himself King and Lord as well of the whole Lands, as of the whole Inhabitants. 2. We read nothing at all of the consent of the Peo­ple, but of the Heads of the Tribes, who had no Commission from the People, each of them having by his Birth-right a Power to Command his own Tribe, and conse­quently, the Royal Power was not de­rived to Fergus from the People, but had it's Original from this Birth-right that was both in them, and Fergus, and he succeed­ed in the Right of those Chiefs to Com­mand their respective Families; and Boetius brings in King Fergus, lib. 1. num. 5. Speaking of himself, as a pious Parent, as one who owes to them what a Parent owes to his Children: sunt pij Parentes in Liberos propensi, & debemus vobis quod proli genitores. And the consent given by the Chief of the Clanns, and the People did not give, but declare the former Right, as our consent now does in Acts concerning the Prerogative, and as the Vote of the Inquest does in the Service of Heirs; and thus at the Coronation of our Kings, it is still said by our Histo­rians, that such a man was declared King, communi suffragio & acclamatione. 3. This [Page 30] consent being only given in the Army cannot be said to have been univer­sally by the People, nor do we read that the People did Comissionate the Army, or that the Army consulted the People; and in general it cannot be instanc'd, that the People did in any Nation universally consent to Election, nor is it possible all the People can meet. And in Poland which is the only Elective Monarchy we know, the Free-holders only consent, and yet every private Man and Woman have as great interest, according to these pretend­ed Laws of Nature, as they have: & potior est conditio negantis. Nor do we find that the Commons, and mean People have any interest in the Elections of our Magi­strates, or Parliament Men; so that Popular freedom by Birth, and the interest of the People in Popular Elections are but meer Cheats invented to engage the Rabble, in an aversion to the establish'd Government, when factious and insolent Spirits, who cannot submit themselves to Government, design to cheat the Multitude by fair Pre­tences, and to bride them by Flattery.

If it be pretended, that it is not cer­tain, whether King Fergus was eldest Son to Ferquhard, nor is it probable, that if he [Page 31] had been such, he would have preferr'd an uncertain Conquest in Scotland, to his secure Succession in Ireland. To this it is answer­ed, that all our Histories bear, that King Ferquhard sent his Son Fergus, and when a Son is spoken of indefinitly, in such Cases, he is actually understood to be the Eldest. 2. He brought with him the Marble Chair, the mark of Empire, which would not have been allow'd to a younger Brother. 3. It is said, that having settled the affairs of Scot­land, he returned into Ireland to settle the differences there about the choosing of a new King, which does import that he should have been King if he had not prefer'd Scot­land to Ireland; and the reason of this pre­ference was because Ireland was then divi­ded amongst many Kings, and his Predeces­sors had but a very small share of it at that time, and Scotland being a part of a greater Isle, be probably found in this greater Isle, a higher flight for his Hopes and more lati­tude for his Ambition.

But albeit the Kings of Scotland had been originally and at first Elected by the People, yet it does not at all follow neces­sarly as Buchannan, Dolman, and our other Republicans pretend, that therefore they may reject them at their pleasure, or which [Page 32] is all one, when they imagine that the Kings Elected by them serve not the ends for which they were designed, and that for these Reasons. 1. It cannot be de­ny'd, but that the People may consent to an Election of a Monarch without Limitations; for from the Principles of Nature, we may learn, that whatever is in ones power may be by them transfer'd upon another; and there­fore, if the People be invested with a power of governing themselves, they may cartainly transfer this Power upon another and we see that all Christians, and even our Republicans allow, that men may sell themselves to be Slaves, a custom not on­ly mention'd but approv'd by God him­self, so far does consent reach beyond what is necessary for maintaining this Point. 2. If this could not be, then there could be no such thing as absolute Mo­narchies, which is against the receiv'd Opinion of all Nations, and against the Doctrine of all Authors, who, though they debate that this, or that Monarchy, in a particular Countrey is not Absolute, yet it was never controverted by any man alive, but that the People m [...]ght consent, and in many places have consented to ab­solute Monarchies; and by the famous Lex [Page 33] Regia, amongst the Romans, Populus ei & in eum omne Imperium suum, & Potesta­tem transtulit, instit. de jur. nat. gent. & civ. §. 6. Mention'd likewise by that Fa­mous Lawyer Ʋlpian, l. 1. ff. de consti­tut. Princ.

3. We see this consequence to be very false in many other cases, and therefore it cannot be necessary here, for we find that a man chooses a Wife, yet it is not in his power to put her away; Cardinals choose the Pope, and Chapters the Bishop, and yet they cannot depose them; the Common Council choose Magistrates, and yet they cannot lay them aside.

4. This Reasoning is condemn'd as most fallacious, by most learn'd, and disinterested Lawyers, and therefore it cannot be infal­lible, as is pretended: vide Arnisaeum cap. 3. num. 2. Haenon. dis. Pol. 9. num. 44. Panorm. ad cap. 4. de Cler. non residend. Zasius ad l. non ambigitur num. 3. ff. de legibus. Nor have any Lawyers differ'd from this common opinion of mankind, except some very few, who have differ'd from a Principle of Pique, rather than of Judgment.

The next thing that I am to prove in this my first Proposition, is, That Our [Page 34] King is an absolute Monarch, and has the Supream Power within this his King­dom and this I shall endeavour to prove, First, From our positive Law. 2. By se­veral Reasons deduc'd from our Funda­mental Laws and Customs. 3. From the very nature of Monarchy it self, and the Opinion of Lawyers who write upon that Subject, and who define Absolute Monarchy to be a Power that is not li­mited or restrained by coactive Law. Arnisaeus, de essentia Majest. cap. 3. num. 4.

By the 25. Act Parl. 15. Ja. 6. The Parlia­ment does acknowledge, That it cannot be deny'd, but his Majesty is a free Prince, of a Soveraign Power; having as great Liber­ties and Prerogatives, by the Laws of this Realm, and Priviledge of his Crown, and Diadem, as any other King, Prince, or Potentate whatsoever. And by the 2. Act. Parl. 18. Ja. 6. The Parliament consenting to his Majesties restoring of Bishops, declare and acknowledge the ab­soluteness of our Monarchy, in these words: The remedy whereof properly be­longs to his Majesty, whom the whole Estates, of their bounden duty, with most hearty and faithful affection, humbly and truly ac­knowledge to be a Soveraign Monarch, abso­lute [Page 35] Prince, Judge and Governour, over all Persons, Estates and Causes, both Spiritu­al and Temporal, within his said Realm.

And by the first Act of that same Par­liament: The Estates and whole Body of this present Parliament, acknowledge all with one voluntary, humble, faithful, united heart, mind, and consent, his Majesties soveraign Authority, Princely Power, Royal Preroga­tive, and Priviledge of his Crown, over all Persons, Estates, and Causes whatsoever, with­in his said Kingdom.

And because no Acts were ever made, giving Prerogatives, nor even declaring Prerogatives to have been due, until some special controversie did require the same, so that Possession, and not positive Law, was the true measure of the Prerogative; there­fore the Parliament doth in that same Act approve, and perpetually confirm all the Royal Prerogatives, as absolutely, amply and freely in all respects, and considera­tions, as ever his Majesty, or any of his Royal Predecessors possessed, used, and exercised the same; and they promise that his Majesties Imperial Power, which God has so enlarg'd, shall never be in any sort impair'd, prejudg'd, or diminish­ed, [Page 36] but rather reverenc'd, and augment­ed as far as possibly they can.

In the Preface to our Books of Law, call'd Regiam Majestatem, it is acknow­ledg'd that the King has no Superiour, except the Creator of Heaven and Earth, who governs all. Forreign Lawyers al­so, such as Lansius de Lege Regia, num. 49. and others, do number the King of Scotland amongst the Absolute Monarchs.

My second Argument for proving our King to be an absolute Monarch, shall be from my former position, wherein I hope I have prov'd sufficiently, that our Kings derive not their Right from the People; for if the King derive not his Power from the People, the Monarchy can never be limited by them, and con­sequently it must be an absolute Monar­chy; for, there could be nothing more unjust, more unnatural, and more inso­lent, then that the People should pre­tend a Right to limit and restrain that Power which they never gave; and the only reason why Buchannan, and his Complices, do assert our Monarchy to be a qualified and limited Monarchy, being th [...] the People, when they first Elected our Kings, did qualifie and restrain their [Page 37] Government. This position being false, as appears by the absolute Oath, and origi­nal Constitution above set down, which is lessened, or qualified by no condition whatsoever, therefore the conclusion drawn from it must be false likewise.

The third Argument shall be deduced from the Nature of Monarchy, and in or­der thereto, I lay down as an uncon­troverted principle, that every thing must be constructed to be perfect in its own Nature, and no mixture is presum'd to be in any thing; but he who alledges, that the thing controverted is added against Nature, must prove the same; and there­fore since Monarchy is that Government whereby a King is Supream, the Monarch must be presum'd, neither to be oblig'd to Govern by the advice of the Nobility, (for that were to confound Monarchy with Aristocracie) nor by the advice of the People (for that were to confound it with Democracie;) and consequently if Bu­channan, and others design to prove, that our Kings are obliged to Govern, by the ad­vice either of the Nobility, or People, or are subject to be Chastised by them, they must prove, that our Kings, at their first Creation, were Elected upon these Con­ditions, [Page 38] the very Essence and Being of Monarchy, consisting in its having a Su­pream and absolute Power. Arnisaeus c. 30. Vasquez l. 1. Controv. c. 47. Budaeus in l. princeps. Zas. ibid. ff. de legibus, pone enim says Arnisaeus, populum in Regem ha­bere aequalem potestatem neutrum pro summo venditari posse. When we hear of a Mo­narch, the first notion we have is, that he is a Subject to none; for to be a Sub­ject and a Monarch, are inconsistent; but if we hear that his Nobility, or People, or both, may Depose, or punish him, we necessarily conclude by the Light of Nature, that They, and not He, are the supream Governours. Thus we see, that in allowing our King to be an absolute Monarch, we have only allow'd him to be a Monarch, and to have what naturally belongs to him, and that by as necessary a consequence; for as every Man is presumed to be reasonable, because reason is the Es­sence of Man, so is a King presum'd to be absolute, except these limitations where­by the Monarchy is restrained, could be prov'd by an express Contract.

4thly, How is it imaginable, but that if our Predecessors had Elected our Kings upon any such Conditions, but they would have [Page 39] been very careful to have limited the Monarchy, and this Contract had with these conditions been recorded; where­as on the contrary we find, that albeit great care was taken to record the Oath of Allegiance made to the King, and to grave the same upon Marble Tables, con­sign'd unto the custody of their Priests, as sacred Oracles; yet none of all our Historians make the least mention of any limitations in these Oaths, or by any o­ther Contract; and to this day our Oaths of Supremacy, and Allegiance, are clogged and lessened by no limitations.

If it be answered, that these limitations do arise from the nature of the thing it self, there being nothing more unrea­sonable, and contrary to the nature of Government, than that a Monarch, who was design'd to be a Protector to his People, should be allow'd to destroy them. To this it is answered, That Monarchy by its nature is absolute, as has been prov'd, and consequently these pretended limitati­ons are against the nature of Monarchy and so arise not, ex natura rei, nor can there any thing be more extravagant, than to assert that, that which is contrary to the nature of Monarchy, should arise from [Page 40] its nature, and it might be with greater reason pretended, that because the great design of men in Marriage, is to get a Help­er, that therefore they may repudiate their Wives, when they find them unsuppor­table, and that the putting them away in such cases, is consistent enough with the nature of their Oath, though simple, and absolute; this cause of Divorce arising from the nature of Marriage it self: This is after Vows to make Inquiry, and what Vow or Oath could be useful, if the giver were to be Judge how far he were ty'd, and if his conveniency were the measure of his Obligation. But since I shall hereafter ful­ly prove, that these limitations are as dan­gerous to the Subjects, as to the Prince, and that ten thousand times more Murders, and other Insolencies have been committed in Civil Wars, upon the false pretence of Liberty, than ever was committed by the worst of Kings; it must necessarily follow, that those limitations ought not to be ad­mitted after an absolute Oath, for shunning inconveniences, which at the ballance ap­pear, to be no weight.

5. It cannot be denyed, but our Kings have ever had the Power of Peace and War, the calling and dissolving of Parlia­ments, [Page 41] and a negative Voice in them, the remitting of Crimes, and nomination of Judges; and therefore it must be pre­sumed, that since the Law has not limited them in those things, it has limited them in nothing; for by involving us in War, they may expose our Fortunes, our Wives and Children to the greatest of dangers; and it had been great folly to limit them in any thing, after those great Prerogatives were allowed: And though our Histories do bear, That Peace and War were ordinarily determined by the ad­vice, and consent of the Nobility, yet that does no more infer a necessity not to do otherwayes, than the ordinary stile of all our Proclamations, bearing to be with advice of our Privy Council, infers a ne­cessity upon the King to do nothing with­out their advice; and how could the con­sent of the Nobility have been necessary in the former Ages, since all their Right flowed from the King Himself, and that neither they then, nor the Parliament now, had, or have a Power equal with the King, much less above Him, as shall be fully proved in the first Conclusion, that I am to draw from this Doctrine; only to what I have said, I must here add, that [Page 42] it being proposed to our Predecessors, at the swearing the Oath of Allegiance to King Fergus, Whether they would be go­vern'd by a King, who should have ab­solute Power, or by the Nobility, or by a Multitude? it was answered, That lest they should have many Kings in place of one, they abhorr'd to bestow the Absolute Power either upon the Nobility, or upon the Multitude.

6. I cannot but exceedingly commend our Predecessors, for making this reaso­nable choice of an absolute Monarchy; for a Monarch that is subject to the impetuous caprices of the Multitude when giddy, or to the incorrigible Factiousness of Nobility when interested, is in effect no Govern­ment at all; and though a mixt Monar­chy may seem a plausible thing to Meta­physical Spirits and School-men, yet to such as understand Government, and the World, it cannot but appear impracticable; for if the People understand that it is in their Power to check their Monarch, the desire of command is so bewitching a thing, that probably they will be at it upon all occasions, and so when the King commands one thing, the Nobility will command another, and it may be the [Page 43] People a third. And as it implies a contradi­ction, that the same Persons should both command and obey: so where find we those sober and mortified men, who will obey, when they may command? Let us consider what dreadful extravagancies, and cruelties appear'd at Rome, betwixt the Tribunes of the People, and the Senate: one of six Kings had a Son, who ravish'd a Woman, and thereupon the Kings were expell'd, but every year almost produced a Civil War, wherein vast numbers of free Romans were murther'd; and in the contest betwixt Sylla and Marius, 90 Senators, 15 Consuls, 2600 Gentle­men, and 100000 others were murther'd, and after the whole Common-wealth was exhausted in the Wars betwixt Caesar and Pompey; and in the immediate succeeding War betwixt Augustus, Anthonie, and Le­pidus, wherein every man lost either a Brother, a Father, or a Son, Rome re­turn'd again to its Monarchy, and was ne­ver so happy, as under Augustus. The People of Naples complaining lately of their Taxes, put themselves under the Command of Reforming Massaniello, by whose ex­travagancies they suffer'd more in one Moneth, than they had done under the Spa­nish [Page 44] cruelty in an hundred years. But our late Reformation in Britain seems to have been permitted by God, to let us see that mixed Governments having power to Reform Kings, are more insufferable than Tyranny; for by it we saw that the mul­titude consists of Knaves and Fools, and both these are the worst of Governors; that the best of Kings will be thought wick­ed, when Subjects are his Judges, who resolve not to obey, and that it is impos­sible to know what is right, when every man is Judge of what is wrong. The im­practicableness likewise of this popular Su­premacy, will yet more convincingly ap­pear, if we consider that the People are to be Judges, because of their natural free­dom, for then all men should have equal right to be Reformers, and these can never meet nor consult together: And if it be answered, that the People may send their Representatives, my Reply is, that the great­est half of the Nation are neither Free­holders nor Burgesses, and yet those only are call'd the Representatives of the people; and what absurd Tricks and Cheats are us'd in choosing even those Representatives, and it may be the resolution prevails by the Vote of the greatest Fool or Knave in the [Page 45] Meeting; and if any one man remove by sickness or accident, at the passing of a Vote; or if any of the multitude be brib'd, or have prejudice, though on a most unjust account, that which would have been the interest of the Nation, turns to be against it, so infallible a Judge is the multitude. And I have seen in popular Elections, hun­dreds cry for a thing, and thereafter ask what was the matter.

7ly, If the Proceres Regni, or No­bility are to be the check upon our Kings, and to be trusted with this coercive power of calling them to an account, as Buchan­nan pretends; then I desire to know who invested them with this power, for it was never pretended that it is naturally inhe­rent in them: And if the people invested them, I desire to know by what Act the people transferr'd this power upon them, for they have no Law, nor original Con­stitution for this, as our Kings have for their Right; and passing over the dangers may arise from their having this power, because of the Factiousness, Poverty, Picques, Humors, or Ignorance that may be incident to them; it seems to me strange, why we the people should trust such to be our Checks over the King, who are His [Page 46] own Creatures, owing their Honours to Him, and expecting dayly from Him Im­ployments and Estates? and if they and the people differ, who is to be Judges of those Controversies? Nor can the Nobility and Commons assembled in Parliament have this coercive power, for the Reasons which I shall hereafter offer; and there­fore none has it, but the King is Supream in himself, and accountable to none, save God Almighty alone. But more of this will be found in the Sequel of this Dis­course, upon other occasions.

8ly, Whatever proves Monarchy to be an excellent Government, does by the same Rea­son prove absolute Monarchy, to be the best Government; for if Monarchy, be to be commended, because it prevents Divi­sions, then a limited Monarchy, which allows the People a share, is not to be com­mended, because it occasions them; if Mo­narchy be commended, because there is more expedition, secresie, and other ex­cellent Qualities to be found in it, then ab­solute Monarchy is to be commended above a limited one; because a limited Monarch must impart his secrets to the people, and must delay the noblest designs, until mali­cious and factious Spirits be either gain'd or [Page 47] overcome: And the same analogy of Rea­son will hold in reflecting upon all other advantages of Monarchy, the Examination whereof I dare trust to every mans own breast.

9ly, It was fit for the People that their Kings should be above Law, because the severity of Law will not comply with that useful, tho illegal Justice which is requisit in special cases, for since summum jus is summa injura, and since impossibile est sola innocentia vivere, we may well conclude, that absolute Monarchy is necessary to protect the guilty innocent by Remissions, to break Laws justly, in a Court of Chancery, and to crook them uprightly in our Courts by an officium nobile. For strict and rigid Law is a greater Tyrant, than ab­solute Monarchy.

I know that some pretend that the 25. Act 15. Par. Ja. 6. declaring the King to be an absolute Prince, is only to be interpreted in opposition to the Popes Authority, he be­ing so far absolute, only as not to be Subject to the Pope, who pretended then a Juris­diction over all Kings. But the answers to this are clear; First, This Statute is made to declare the Kings of Scotland to have Right by their Inherent Prerogative, to their exacting Customs for all Merchan­dise, [Page 48] because they are absolute Monarchs, which Argument had been ridiculous, if this absoluteness had only been in opposition to the Pope, nor is there any mention of the Pope in all this Statute; and what interest hath the Pope in our Customs. 2dly, When the Kings power is by our Statutes rais'd above the Pope, it is done by de­claring him Supream, and not by decla­ring him absolute. 3dly, All Lawyers, and States-men, divide Monarchies in ab­solute and limited Monarchies, and the word Absolute, is still taken in opposition to limited, as is clear by Arnisaeus, Bo [...]in, &c. And whereas it is pretended that these words in this Statute, acknowledging the King to be absolute, are only exprest tran­siently and enunciatively, but are not Decisive and Statutory. It is answered, that our Parliaments never give our Kings Prerogatives, but only acknowledge what our Kings have by an Inherent and Inde­pendent Right; and these words in this Sta­tute, are of all others in our Laws, exprest with most of Energy, for they are usher'd with, It cannot be deny'd, but His Majesty has as great Liberties and Prerogatives, as any Monarch whatsoever: and this acknow­ledgement is made the Foundation of His [Page 49] Right to exact Customs. And in true Reasoning, nothing is made the Proposition of an Argument, but that which is most uncontrovertable.

I foresee that our Fanaticks and Repub­licans, will be ready to misrepresent ab­solute Monarchy, as Tyranny: But a Ty­rant is he, who has no Right to Govern; and so he may be oppos'd, as the common Enemy of all the Society. And it is ridi­culous to pretend with Hobs, That we are oblig'd to obey whoever is once in possession; for that were to invite men to torment us, and to justifie Crimes by success. Nor can it be from this deduc'd, that since it is lawful to oppose any who are in Posses­sion, that it is therefore lawful to oppose our Monarchy: because they have (as Algernon Sidney pretends) Ʋsurpt over us, a power inconsistent with our natural Liberty. And owe their Right to that Prescription, which the greatest Tyrants may maintain by force, and to that consent which they may procure by Violence, or Flattery. For to this I answer, That our Monarchs have their power establisht by Birth-right, by Consent, by Prescription, and by Law; which are all the ways whereby any Right can be legally Establisht. But it is a gross [Page 50] mistake in Buchannan, and others, to con­clude a lawful King punishable as a Ty­rant, because he becomes vitious: For though God may punish him as such, yet his People cannot; that were to raise the Servant above the Master, and to occasi­on a thousand Disorders to redress one; and when King James acknowledges, that a good King thinks Himself made for his People, and not His People for Him. That is only said with reference to the King's duty to God, but not with Relation to the Peoples Duty to their King. And when Tra­jan delivering the Sword to the Proconsul, said, Pro me, si rectè impero, si male, contra me. Grotius observes justly, That this was spoke as a Philosopher, and not to subject himself to the others Jurisdiction. And so Buchannan did most traiterously advise the Printing this on our Coin. Nor do's this Title of absolute Monarch, empower him to dispose of our Estates. For it is fit to know, that Government is the Kings, and Property is the Subjects Birth-right. Mo­narchy is a Government, and so can include no more, than what is necessary for Govern­ment. And though the Turk or Mogol, ar­rogate to themselves, the total Property of their Subjects, in this they are Tyrants, and [Page 51] not Kings. And when our Statute above­mentioned, says, That our Kings have as much power as they, this is only to be un­derstood of what Right they have by the Nature of Monarchy, Rex nomen est juris­dictionis non dominii, say the Lawyers: For the Law having said, that all things were the Emperours, l. bene a Zenone. §. Sed sci­mus C. de Quadr. Praescript. The Emperour asked the famous Lawyer Bulgarus, in what sense all was his, who is mightily prais'd for having answer'd, Omnia Rex possidet imperio singuli dominio, Accurs. in praem. ff. in Verb. Sanctioni: For what is once ours, cannot be taken away without our consent: And therefore by the 5. Act, 1. Par. Ch. 2. It is declared lawful for the King to make Gari­sons, His Majesty entertaining them on His own expence. And by the Act 3. Pav. 3. Ch. 2. It is declar'd that the people shall not be subject to free Quarter, &c. And yet right reason teacheth us, that all the Land of Scotland having been once the Kings (for the Law saith, that the King is Susitus rati­one Coronae, in all the Lands of Scotland) His Majesty is therefore presumed Proprietor of all, and every thing belongs to him, if some other cannot instruct a right, which is the sense of that Law, Nemo terram nisi authori­tate [Page 52] Regia possideto: And of King Malcolm Can­mor's Law, that Rex distribuit totam Terram Scotiae hominibus suis. And it therefore clear­ly follows, that the King has Dominium di­rectum, a right of Superiority, as all Superi­ors have, and that the people on whom he has bestowed those Lands, are oblig'd to con­cur in the expence with him, for the defence of it. For as if he had retain'd the Property, he would have been able with the Fruits and Rents to have defended it. So it is not agree­able to sense or reason that they to whom he has granted it should not be oblig'd to de­fend it, especially seeing all the Rights made by the King, are in Law presum▪d meer Do­nations; For it cannot be deny'd but that all Lands were originally granted by the King, and so must have originally belong'd to him­self: for no person can give what is not his own; and our Law acknowledgeth, that all Lands belong to the King, except where the present Heretor can instruct a Right flowing from our King, and that he is the Fountain of Property, as well as of Justice. 2. In Law, all who are ingag'd in a Society, as to any thing that is the Subject of the Society, should contribute to its preservation; and there­fore the King having the Dominium dire­ctum, and the Vassal Dominium utile, it fol­lows, that the Vassals of the Kingdom should [Page 53] contribute towards its preservation, and the King may expect justly an equal Contributi­on towards the defraying the necessary ex­pence, and thence it was, that by our old Law all Heretors were obliged to furnish some unum Militem, unum Sagittarium, or Equi­tem: Some a Bow-man, some a Souldier, some a Horse-man: But afterwards the King having changed those Tenures, or because all betwixt 60. and 16. were obliged to come to the Field with 40. dayes Provision, which was all that was then necessary; it follows, that now that way of making War being al­tered, the Subjects should contribute to­wards the way that is necessary for defend­ing the Kingdom. 3. The King by His Forces protects our Persons, and by his Na­vies protects our Commerce; by His Am­bassadors manages all our publick Affairs, and by His Officers, and Judges, administrates Justice to us: And so it is just that all this should be done at our expences, and that we should defray the publick expences of the Government, and so much the rather, be­cause by a special Statute with us, it is de­clared that the King may impose what He pleases on all that is imported, or may forbid us to export any thing without which we could not live; and what ever he gets [Page 54] from us, he distributes amongst us, without applying one shilling of it to his own pri­vate use.

The King, or whoever has the manage­ment of the Government, have in the opini­on of Lawyers, Dominium eminens, a Para­mount and Transcendent Right over even private Estates, in case of necessity, when the common Interest cannot be otherwise maintained; and this Grotius, though no violent friend to Monarchy, doth assert ve­ry positively and clearly, l. 1. c. 1. § 6. & l. 3. c. 19. num. 7. and it cannot be denied but that a King may take any mans Lands, and build a Garison upon it, paying for it; and that in case of a Siege, the King may or­der whole Suburbs to be burnt down for the security of the Town: And whence is this power, save from that Paramount and Super­eminent Right that the King has over all private Estates, for the good of the whole Society and Kingdom? Nor can it be deny­ed, but that the King may in time of War, Quarter freely; and it is in his power to de­clare War, when, or where he pleases: Nor do the former Statutes contradict this, for they exclude not Necessity that has no Law, and is it self that Law which gave David right to eat the Shew-bread, and the [Page 55] Christian Emperours, right to sell the Goods of the Church for maintaining their Armies, with consent of the Primitive Fathers; and this is so necessarily inherent in all admini­stration, that the very Master of a Ship has power to throw overboard the Goods of Passengers and Merchants in a storm, for the preservation of the Ship: And they are not enemies to the King only, but to themselves, who would deny the King this power.

The third Classis of Arguments that I am to use against these Principles, shall be from Reason, and Experience to fortifie and cor­roborate our positive Law, and the nature of our Monarchy; for since humane Reason it self is lyable to so many Errors; and since men when they differ, are so wedded to their own Sentiments, that few are so wise as to see their own mistakes, or so ingenuous as to confess them, when they see them: Therefore Prudence and Necessity have obliged men to end all Debates by making Laws: and it is very great vanity and inso­lence in any private men, to justify their own private Sense against the publick Laws; that is to say, the Authoritative Sentiments, and the legal Sense of the Nation.

If we were then to Establish a new Mo­narchy, were it not prudent and reasonable, [Page 56] for us to consider what were the first Mo­tives which induced our Predecessors to a Monarchy; and Boethius and Lesly both tell us, That lest they might be distracted by obeying too many, it was therefore fit to submit to one; if then this Reason was of force at first to make us submit to a Mo­narchy, it should still prevail with us to obey that Monarchy, and not gape idely after every new Model: Ne multos Reges sibi viderentur creare, summam rerum aut optima­tibus, aut ipsi multitudini permittere asper­nabantur, sayes Boethius, fol. 6 Here the ad­vantages of being govern'd by Aristocracie, or Democracie, were expresly considered and rejected; so that we have our Predeces­sors choice, founded on their way of Reason­ing, added to the Authority of our Law; and after we their Successors, had seen the mischiefs arising from the pretences of Liber­ty and Property, with all the advantages that seeming Devotion could add to these. Our Representatives, after two thousand years experience, and after a fresh Idaea of a long Civil War, wherein the Arguments and Reasons produced by Buchannan, were fortified and seconded by thousands of De­bates: They did by many passionate Con­fessions, and positive Laws acknowledge, [Page 57] That the present Constitution of our Monarchy, is most excellent, Act 1 Par. 1. Char. 2. ‘That inevitable prejudices and miseries do accompany the invading the Royal Prerogative, Act 4. That all the troubles and miseries they had suffered, had sprung from these Invasions, Act 11. That all the bondage they had groaned under, was occasioned by these Distrac­tions, Act 2. Par. Sess. 2. Ch. 2.’ So that we have here also a Series of Parliaments, attest­ing the reasonableness of the Constitution of our Monarchy, and His Majesties Pre­rogatives.

2. We must not conclude any thing un­reasonable, or unfit, because there are some inconveniencies in it; for all humane Con­stitutions have their own defects. But I dare say, the Principles of my Adversaries have more than mine; for Common­wealths are not only subject to err, because they have their passions as well as Kings, but they are subject to more passions: for,

1. They who Govern in Common-wealths and Aristocracies, have Rivals whom they fear, and against whom, upon that account, they bear Revenge, which Kings want.

2. They are not so much concerned in those they Govern as Kings; the one con­sidering [Page 58] the common Interest, as a Tenant does Lands of which he takes his present advantage, though he should de­stroy it; the other caring for it, as a Pro­prietor does for his own Ground; the one Jading it, as a Man does a hired Horse; the other using it as a Man does his own.

3. The People are ordinarily Governed by those who are the worst of men; for these ordinarily can flatter and cheat most, and can best use the Hypocrites Vizor: Where­as the best Men ordinarily are abstemious, modest, and love a private Life, and were there ever such Villains as those Rebells who Governed us in the last Age? And can we deny but our pretenders to Liberty and Property in this Age are the Cheats of the Nation? Who, to be in Employment, hate such as are in it, or are such as are discon­tented for being put out of it, or are Bank­rupts, who resolve to make up their broken Fortunes by it.

4. Even good Men when they are raised to Govern, grow Insolent, of which Prin­ces are not capable, for they are still the same, and their Passions do not rise because their fortunes do not.

5. Kings and Princes know they will be Charged with what they do; but the multi­tude [Page 59] knows, that the Publick in gene­ral, and not any one Man will be blamed: and so every private Man thinks himself secure, whilst he shifts it over on another; or else lessens it, by dividing it amongst ma­ny.

6. The multitude are very subject to Facti­ons, most Men scorning to obey their fel­low Subjects; and when they are in Factions, who knows whom to obey; and those Facti­ons will again subdivide in new ones, and so in infinitum; and when either prevails, they spare none, because their Opposites are Enemies: But Kings pity even Rebels, re­membring that they are their own. And I dare say, that more were Murthered and Ruined in one year, of the last Reforming Age, than suffered by the great Turk, the Mogol, and the King of France in twenty years. And more severity was exercised in one year by those Reformers, than by all this Race of our Kings these 600 years.

7. If it be said, That Kings have ill Mi­nisters, so have Common-wealths; and we observ'd in Scotland, that after we had taken from our King the Prerogative of chusing Judges and Counsellors, our Parliament did the next year, chuse the greatest Block-heads, and Idiots in all the Nation, whom the Ring­leaders [Page 60] advanced, to the end they might Govern all themselves; to which Cheat, Kings cannot be liable, it being their Interest to have able Ministers. And whereas Kings have no Interest to prefer one to another: yet in Popular Governments, every one en­deavoures to prefer his own Relations.

8. In difficult Cases, haste and expedition re­quires, that one should be trusted: and even the Romans behoved in great dangers, to imploy a Dictator, who was accountable to no man for any thing he did.

9. There can be no Secrecy in Popular Go­vernments, as in Monarchy, and what ma­ny must know, all may.

10. Enemies may always get some in popu­lar Governments to side with them, and upon specious pretexts, to retard all good Designs; and when popular men are Debating for shadows, the occasion slips away irrecover­ably.

11. Either Common-wealths imploy no extraordinary persons, being ever jealous: or if any man become such by great Actions, or long Experience, he is presently ruined. If we consider the severity of Venice against their Nobles, and their executing Men with­out citing or hearing them, and that upon meer jealousies, we must confess with a wise [Page 61] Spaniard, who has collected the arbitrary courses practis'd and allow'd in that State, that there is less liberty there, than under the worst of Monarchies; nor was ever any peo­ple so miserable as Rome, during their Re­publick, having been ruined in every age with Civil Wars, and having had no great man, who died not miserably, after many false and popular Accusations; nor find we amongst the many Grecian Heroes in Corne­lius Nepos, that two escap'd the peoples fu­ry: and did not De Wit find little of that Justice which he magnified in Repub­licks?

But whatever may be said against the in­conveniences arising from the passions, hu­mors, & insolencies of the Populace in Com­monwealths, yet much more may be said a­gainst the allowing that Prerogative to them under a Monarchy; for that were to distract for ever the Government betwixt two con­tradictory Supream Powers, and make the People miserable in not knowing whom to obey when they differ, and to make Go­vernment, which should defend them a gainst a Civil War, become the cause of it; for how can it be in reason expected, but (if the People know they can controll the King, that ambitious, and discontented Ringlead­ers, [Page 62] or ignorant and bigoted Multitudes, will be alwayes endeavouring to use this their Prerogative, since it seems alwayes glorious, and oft-times advantagious to oppose Kings; whereas on the other hand Kings cannot but be always jealous of, and fear popular Invasions, and both these Powers, shall like Neighbouring Princes, be always endeavouring to gain advantages upon one another, and in these Contests shall be spent all the time and pains that should be bestowed in resisting the Common Enemy, which cannot but very much lessen the Love which Princes ought to have for their People, and the Respect which People ought to have for their Prince; and how can it be imagined, but that in this case the Peo­ple shall always groan under greater misfor­tunes than those which we felt betwixt the Bruce and the Baliol, and those which our Neighbours felt in the Contest between the Houses of Lancaster and York. All which cannot but appear very probable, as well as dreadful to those who consider the late Rebellion, wherein the People pretending that the King had violated their Liberties, they murder'd and pillag'd all such as were not of their Opinion, and after they had [...]uin'd their Prince, the People divided and [Page 63] fought one against another, the greater part pretending they ought to be obeyed, be­cause of their numbers, and the lesser pre­tending that they were the sounder part, and had the better Cause, and it is impossible in such a case to find a Judge of Controversies. Which is another unanswerable Argument a­gainst the Peoples Supremacy, by which all they can gain is an endless Liberty of ruin­ing one another without hope of Redress. Nor can Parliaments remedy this, for we have seen opposite Parliaments sitting at the same time forfeiting one another, whilst the astonished multitude stood at a Gaze, not knowing whom to obey, and praying that God would Re-establish our lawful Monar­chy, with which, when it was Miraculously Restored, they were so overjoy'd as men are when they are freed from the Gallies, in which they had been treated as Slaves.

And whereas these Republicans pretend that the King is but a Physician, this shews that they design to have no King, for any man may lawfully change his Physician, and Buchan­nan's laying so much weight on this Argu­ment, makes me suspect much his honesty, for no man can have so mean an opinion of his Sense. And his comparing the Monarch to [Page 64] a Tutor, is very extravagant; for no man is sworn to have such a mans Heirs for Tutors: the one is chosen by God, the other by the Patient; the one has a right by Law that is unalterable, the others employment, is meerly precarious. But though he were a Tutor, no man can remove his Tutor at pleasure, as they say the People may remove their King. Nor is a Tutor to be laid aside, but by an Action before a Superior Judge, wherein he is to be proved to have Malver­sed; and therefore since there is no Superior Judge except God, and that the People are not his Superiors, it clearly follows that the People cannot lay aside their King: Only I joyn so far with Buchannan in those Rheto­rical expressions, that I really think the Mul­titude is always so mad, that they need a King to be their Physician, and of so weak a Judgment like Minors, that they need him for a Tutor, and without his assistance and protection every hypocritical Bigot, and am­bitious Usurper would cheat them at his plea­sure, and make them not only a prey, but but a Tool in their own Slavery

Nor is their any force in that Argument, The King was made for the People, and not the People for the King; and therefore the People are nobler than the King, and ought [Page 65] to be prefer'd to Him. For to this it is an­swered, that,

1. The Question here is not, who is more preferable, but who is the Superiour? And though one good Christian be preferable to a thousand, who are not so, yet his Interest in the Commonwealth is not preferable; the wiser part is still preferable to the greater part: and yet the greater will over-rule the wiser. A Shepherd is ordained for the Flock; and yet it cannot be concluded, that a Flock of Brutes is to be preferred to any reasonable Creature.

2. The Kings Interest and the Peoples are inseparable in the Construction of Law, which presumes, That what the King does He does for the People, and there is none a­bove the King, that can Judge Him, if He does otherwise.

3. Whether the Kings Power be derived from God, or from the People? yet if it be derived from God, it is preferable, because of Gods Ordinance: Or if from the Peo­ple, it is preferable, because they, by Elect­ing Him King, have consented that it should be so; and they having Trusted Him with the publick Interest, the publick Interest is still preferable. I know that Buchannan and others, value themselves much upon the In­stance [Page 66] of the Bruce and Baliol, in which the people did Declare, That they preferred the Bruce, because the Baliol had enslaved the Kingdom to the English. And it is ge­nerally urged, That all Lawyers are clear, that if a King alienate His Kingdom, His people may disclaim Him. But my an­swers are, That if a King will alienate His Kingdom, the Subjects are free in that case (if at all) not by their power to re-assume their first Liberty; but because the King will not continue King, and they are free by his Deed, but not by their own Right. 2. Even in that case, Lawyers do irritate and annul the Deed; but dissolve not the Contraveeners Right. And as to that par­ticular Instance, it is well known, that King Robert the First, or the Bruce, as we call him, was desirous that the Parliament should threaten to choose another; if He submit­ted his Interest to the Popes Decision, who pretended then to be the Supream Judge, over all Kings. But though the Bruce, to please the people, should have shunned to quarrel with what they did in such a Jun­cture; yet that could not wrong the Mo­narchy, nor His Successors, as shall be proved.

Having thus cleared, that the Kings power is not derived from the people, even though they had Elected Him, and that He is an absolute King, both by our Laws, and the Nature of our Monarchy; and that all this is most consistent with right Reason, I come now to draw some Conclusions from these Principles.

The first Conclusion shall be, That our Parliaments are not co-ordinate with our Kings, in the Legislative Power; but that the Legislative and Architectonick Power of making Laws (as Lawyers term it) does solely reside in the King, the Estates of Parliament only consenting, which will fur­ther appear by these Reasons.

1. It cannot be denied, but we had Kings long ere we had Parliaments (we never having had any Parliaments till King Kenneth the Thirds Time, Anno Dom. 988. according to the Computation of the seve­rest Re-publicans themselves; for till then, we read only of the Proceres Regni, or the Nobility, or Chiefs of Clanes, and Heads of Families, who assembled upon all occa­sions, to give the King advice) and there­fore our Parliaments cannot pretend that they were designed as a Co-ordinate power [Page 68] with the King, while he did what was right; much less to be his Judge, when he did what was wrong.

2. That our Kings made Laws of old without any consent, and that these were submitted to by the people, is clear, not only from our Histories, which do tell us, that such Kings made such Laws, without speaking any thing of either Nobility, Peo­ple or Parliament, but even from our old Books of Statutes, wherein there is no men­tion made of the consent of either the No­bility or Parliament: The Laws at that time beginning simply, The Kings Statutes, as in all the Statutes of King William, King Alexander the Second, and in the Statutes of King Malcolm Canmore: King David the First, and King David the Second, where there is not so much as mention made of the Nobility, or the Parliament, in the very beginning of the Statutes, and that at other times the Nobility were only called, and that only the Nobility did sit, is very clear from the Inscriptions of those Parlia­ments, such as in the Parliament of King Alexander the Second, which bears, to have been made with the common consent of the Nobility, cum communi consensu Comi­tum suorum, without speaking of any other [Page 69] State. Nor do I find a word of Burgesses, till the Parliament of King Robert the Third, in 1400. and even according to this late Constitution, it is undeniable that the Parliament have not even an equal power with the King, much less a power above him.

3. How can that Judicature have a Co­ordinate power with the King, when no man can sit in it but by a priviledge from the King? but so it is, that all that are Mem­bers of Parliament, sit there by a special priviledge from the King, and there is no­thing considered to capacitate them to sit, but the Force and Energy of that Privi­ledge, without respect, either to what Land they possess, or what number of People they represent. And thus the Nobility and Bishops, sit there, by vertue of the Kings Creation; and the King may Create a hundred Noblemen that morning that the Parliament is to sit, though none of all the hundred have one foot of Land in Scotland; and though the Knights Barons must have some Land, else they cannot Represent any Shire; yet though a Gentleman had 5000. pounds Sterling a year, he could not sit there, except he be the Kings immediate Vassal, and hold his Lands of His Majesty [Page 70] in capite: So that he sits not by vertue of his Land, but as Capacitated by the King. And though those who Represent the Bur­rows Royal are Commissionated by the peo­ple of their Burghs; yet the people who send them, are not considered in that Com­mission, but the Power only which the King gives them to send: For though a Town had a hundred thousand Inhabitants, and another only twenty Inhabitants: yet these hundred thousand could not be Re­presented in Parliament, except the King had erected their Town into a Burgh Royal, From which I evince two things. 1. That the Parliament is the Kings Council, in which he may call any He pleases, and not as the peoples Representatives only, since there are great multitudes in the Nation, Represented by none there: For though they Represent their Constituents in Parlia­ment, yet the power of sending Repre­sentatives, is derived from the King Origi­nally, and flows not from any proper Right inherent in those whose Representa­tives they are. 2. That Judicature can­not have a Co-ordinate power with the King, which he needs not call unless He pleases; and which he can dissolve when He pleases: and in which, when they are as­sembled, [Page 71] He has a Negative Voice, by which He can stop all their Proposals and De­signs; For, if they were Co-ordinate with the King, then par in parem non habet im­perium; and it is against common Sense to think that these two can be equal, since the Power of the one flows from the other: By which is likewise clear, that the great principle laid down by Buchannan, viz. That the King is Singulis Major, Ʋniversis Minor, greater than any one, but less than the collective Body of the Parliament ta­ken together, is absolutely false; because he has a Negative Voice over that col­lective Body, and as they cannot Meet without him, so he can dissolve them when he pleases, and I confess it seems to me un­intelligible how they can be greater than the King, by vertue of a power which they derive from the King.

4. The Parliament is called the Kings Council, as is clear from the Inscriptions of all our old Parliaments.

Thus the Statutes of Alexander the Se­cond begin, Alexander, By the Grace of God, King of Scots, did by the Common Council of his Earls Decree, &c.

The Statutes of King Robert the First, bear, to be by the Common Council of his Prelates, &c.

The first Statute of King Robert the Se­cond, bears, that none who is elected to be of the Kings Council, shall bring another to it who is not elected.

The 8. and 13. Parliaments of King James the First, and the 2. 3, 4. and 7. of King James the Second, bear for inscriptions, The Parliament or general Council of such Kings. And the first Act of that 8. Parlia­ment of King James the first, Bears, Quo Die Dominus Rex deliberatione & consensu totius Concilii, &c. And it is against Sense, to think that any mans Counsel can have Authority over him, for, as we say, Coun­sel is no Command.

5. The Parliament was but the Kings Baron Court, as is very clear to any man who will read the old Registers of Parlia­ment, in which he will see that the Parlia­ment was assembled, and the Suits were called, and Absents Outlawed as in other Baron Courts, whereof many publick Re­cords are extant, and I shall only set down that of the 8. Parliament Ja. 1. The words of which Inscription are, In the eighth Par­liament, or General Council of the Illustrious Prince James, by the Grace of God, King of Scotland, holden at Perth, and begun, ratified and approved by the three States of [Page 73] the Kingdom, as sufficiently and rightly sum­moned, the twelfth day of July, in the year of our Lord, one thousand four hundred and twenty eight, continued from Time to Time; the Bishops, Abbots, Priors, Earls, Barons, and all Free-holders, which hold in Chief of our said Lord the King, and certain Bur­gesses of every Burrow of the Kingdom being summoned and called in due and wonted man­ner; all those assembling that ought, would and might be concerned; but some were ab­sent, some of which were lawfully excused, o­thers absenting themselves through Obstinacy, whose Names appear in the Rolls of the Suits, were every one of them amerc'd ten pounds for his Contumacy. And that the King was Judge what Barons should come to the Parliament, is most clear by the 75. Act Par. 14. Ja. 2. whereby it is declared, No Free-holder under the sum of twenty pounds shall come, except he be specially called by the King, either by his Officer, or by Writ; and though afterwards the King allowed two Barons of every Shire, to be sent to repre­sent all the Barons for saving Expences, yet even after that Concession, it is declared by the 78. Act Par. 6. Ja. 4. That no Free­holder be compelled to come, except our Sove­raign Lord writ specially for them.

It being thus clear, that the Parliament is the Kings Baron Court, it seems a won­der to me how it could have entered into the heart of any sober man to think that any mans Baron Court, and much less the Kings Baron Court, should have power and jurisdiction over him, and that it should be lawful to them, as Buchannan and these o­ther Authors assert to punish him, or lay him aside, all which Assertions are equally impi­ous and illegal.

6. When the King resolves to lessen any way his own Power, this is not done by the Authority of the three Estates, as cer­tainly it would be, if they had the power to lessen his Authority, but the King does the same from his own proper Motive, as when the King binds up his own Hands form granting Remissions in cases of fore­thought Fellony, Ja. 4. Par. 6. Act 63. And when an Act was to be made, forbid­ing the Lords of the Session to admit of pri­vate Writings from the King to stop the pro­cedure of Justice, this is not Enacted by the three Estates, but only by the King, and is founded upon the Kings own pro­mise, Act 92. Par. 6. Ja. 6. And in all Acts of Parliament the King only Sta­tutes as Legislator, and the Parliament [Page 75] only Advise and Consent, which shews that they are not Co-ordinate with the King, as is asserted by Buchannan and others, much less above him. And the Acts of Parlia­ment in the late Rebellion having run thus, Our Soveraign Lord, and the three Estates; contrary to the Tenor of all the Laws that ever were made in Scotland. The Parliament returning to their duty, ordained that Style to be altered, and to bear as formerly, Our Soveraign Lord, with Advice and Consent, &c.

But lastly, what advantage can the peo­ple have by placing their security in the Par­liament, since they are so liable to Passions, Errors, and Extravagancies, as well as Kings are, and have, if Buchannan be believed, betrayed the interest of the Kingdom, since King Kenneth the Seconds time, now above 700. years; and they are ordinarily led by some pragmatical Ring-leaders, who have not that kindness or interest to preserve the Kingdom that Kings have: and since the King may make so many Noble-men and Burghs Royal at pleasure, by whose Votes he may still prevail, what security can we have by giving them a power above the King, or how can they have it?

From all which it may clearly appear, that we have had Kings long ere we had Parlia­ments, and that the Parliaments derive their power from the King; and that at first our King only called the Heads of Families, and his own Officers, as his Council, with whom he consulted, without any necessity to call any others than he pleased, there being no Law, Article, nor Capitulation obliging him from the beginning thereunto: And our Kings were so far from having Parlia­ments associated with them in their Empire, that there is no mention at all of them, or of any condition relating to them in the first Institution of our Kings above related; nor were there any Parliaments in being at that time. But after the Feudal Law came to be in vigor, then our Kings looking up­on the whole Kingdom as their own in pro­perty, King Malcolme Canmore did distri­bute all the Land of Scotland amongst his Subjects, as his Liege-men, which is clear by the first Chapter of his Laws; and ac­cording to the Feudal Law, all the Vassals of our Kings compeared in their Head-Court, and therein consulted what was fit for the Kingdom; but thereafter the way of making War, requiring Money, and Pro­perty belonging to the Subject, as Govern­ment [Page 77] did to the King, it was necessary to have their consent for raising Money: And from this did arise the inserting the advice and consent of the three Estates in our Acts of Parliament.

From this also it is very clear that their opinion is very unsolid and ill founded, who think that Kings can do nothing without a special Act of Parliament, even in matters of Government. As for instance, that he cannot restrain the Licence of the Press, or require his Subjects to take an Engagement for securing the Peace; for these and the like being things which relate immediately to Government, the King has as much right to regulate these, as we have to regulate and dispose of our Property, Government being the Kings Property.

2. Though the Monarchy had been deri­ved from the People, yet as soon as our Kings got the Monarchy, they got ever thing that was necessary for the Aministrati­on of it, which as it is common sense and reason, so it is founded upon that most wise and just Maxime in Law, Quando aliquid conceditur, omnia Concessa videntur, sine qui­bus concessum explicari nequit.

3. I desire to know where there is yet a Law giving the King a Negative voice, a [Page 78] power of Erecting Incorporations, or a power to grant Remissions for Crimes, or Protections for Civil Debts, and yet the peo­ple is far more concerned in these; and the King's having power to do these, and a thousand other things, doth rather oblige and warrant me to lay down a general Rule, that the Kings of Scotland can do every thing that relates to Government, and is ne­cessary for the administration thereof, though there be no special Law or Act of Parliament for it, if the same be not contrary to the Law of God, Nature or Nations.

The second Conclusion that we draw from these former Principles, is that Princes can­not be punished by their own Subjects, as Buchannan and our Republicans do assert, which is most clear by the former Laws, wherein it is declared, That the King is a Soveraign and absolute Prince, and deriving his power from God Almighty, that it is Trea­son to endeavour to depose, or suspend the King. Wherein our Law is founded on the nature of Monarchy; for if he be Su­pream, He cannot be judg'd; for no man is judg'd but by his Superior, and that which is Supream can have no Superior: and on [Page 79] the Principles of the Law of Nature and Na­tions, because saith the Law, No man can be both the Person who Judgeth, and the Per­son Judg'd; and it is still the King who Judgeth, since all other Judges do represent him, and derive their power from him, Ipse se praetor cogere non potest, quia triplici officio fungi nequit suspectum dicentis, & coacti, & cogentis L. Ille a quo ff. ad Trebell. It is a prnciple in all Law, that Jurisdiction and all other Mandats cease with the power that granted it, and therefore as they ac­knowledge that a King cannot be cited till he have forfeited His just Right, so as soon as he has forfeited it, all the power of the ordinary Judges in the Nation falls, and be­comes extinct, and no other Judge can Judge Him, because no other Judge can sit by vertue of any other Authority, till it be known that he has forfeited his, and that cannot be till the event of the Process; and if the People be Judges, yet they cannot as­sume the Government till the King has for­feited it: And why also should they be Jud­ges, who have neither knowledge nor mo­deration, who are acted by humor, and de­light in insolence? and how shall they meet? Or who shall call them? Nor can the Par­liament Judge them, because they derive [Page 80] their Right from the King, as shall be prov'd: And though they were equal, yet no equal can Judge another, par in parem non habet Imperium, nemo sibi Imperare potest. No man can command himself, l. si de re sua ff. de recept. Arbitr. Nemo sibi legem imponere. potest. l. quid autem ff. de denat. inter. vi­rum & uxorem, and therefore the Civil Law which is ours by Adoption, does posi­tively assert, That Princeps legibus solutus est, the King is liable to no Law, l. princeps, ff. de legibus: For though He be lyable to the Directive Force of the Law, that is to say, He ought to be Governed by it as his Di­rector: Yet He is not lyable to the Coercive Force of the Law, as all Lawyers that are indifferent do assert, Harmenpol. l. 1. tit. 1. Sect. 48. [...]. The King is not Subject to the Law, because offending against it, he is not punisht, vid. Granswin­kell. cap. 6. Arnis. cap. Francisc. a victoria Relect. 3. num. 4. Ziegler. de jur. Majes. cap. 1. num. 12. with whom the Fathers also agree, Ambros. in Apol. David cap. 4. Liberi sunt Reges a vinculis delictorum, neque enim ullis ad poenam vocantur legibus, tuti Im­perii potestate Isiodorus 3. sent. cap 31. po­puli peccantes Judicem metuunt, Reges autem [Page 81] solo Dei timore; metu (que) gehennae coercentur: and in this Sense, they take these words, Psal. 51. —Against thee, thee only have I sinned; and I was glad to find in Bishop Ʋshers Power of Princes, amongst many other Citations, That the Rabbies, and par­ticularly Rabbi Jeremiah own'd, that no Crea­ture may Judge the King, but the Holy and Blessed God alone, in which also Heathens a­gree with Jews and Christians, E [...]phantas the Pythagorean makes it the Priviledge of God, and then of the King, to be Judg'd by none, Stobeus Sermon 46. and Dion in Marco Aurelio tells us, That it is certain, free Monarchs cannot be Judg'd, save by God alone, and if it were otherwise, we should see them very unsecure, for the ambition and avarice of insolent Subjects should never or seldom miss to form their Process, and why should Parties be Judges? But to de­monstrate the Justice which Kings and Prin­ces are to expect from the Populace and Mo­bile, let us remember their Material Justice, in the usage of ovr Saviour, when they cry­ed, Crucifie him, Crucifie him; their Sentence against King CHARLES the Martyr, when they were at the height of their pre­tensions to Piety, and a publick Spirit; their usage of De Witt, the Idolizer of them, and [Page 82] their Commonwealth: and if we want a true Idea of their Form of Process, we will find it in their usage of the Archbishop of St. Andrews and others, no Enditement, no Citation, no Defences, no Sentences, no time to prepare to die: and yet all this are the Dictates of pure and devout publick Spirits. Buchannan's Bloody Arguments for this position are, That Tyrants have been Murthered with Applause, and Princes would become licentious, if they were not Restrained, by the just fear of being cal­led to an account: That the Roman and Venetian Magistrates have been punish'd by the people, and that the ordinary Judges of the place have Judg'd them: and that some of our Kings, as well as those of other Na­tions, have been punish'd as Tyrants.

To which I answer shortly, that Incon­veniencies must not prevail with us to break our Oaths, and overturn our Laws, for nothing has so great inconveniency in it as this has, these being but partial and this a total Inconveniency. And the En­glish Lawyers agree, that a mischief is bet­ter than an Inconveniency, and this should have been considered, before we swore to Monarchy: and if the People were Electors, as, they never were; yet they should have [Page 83] reserv'd this Power, or else they cannot now challenge it. But though our Law were not clear, at it is most uncontroverted upon this point: Yet right Reason should perswade us to have reserv'd no such Power: For as Kings may err, so may the Judges who are to Try them: and it is more probable their Tryers will, because they may be acted by Revenge, Ambition, or Popularity; and there is nothing so lyable to err as the Popu­lace.

The Romans and Venetians might have punish'd their Magistrates, because these Magistrates were not Vested with a Supream Power; nor were they Soveraigns as our Monarchs are. And those Judges who Try'd them, deriv'd not their Power from those Magistrates whom they Try'd, as our Judges do; for the same consent, and compact by which they were made the Chief, the others were made also Magistrates, which cannot be said of Absolute Monarchs, who derive not their Power from the People as these do, and the Instances of Kings who have been Murther'd, are Crimes in them, who did commit them, and so should not be Rules to us and many of the best of Kings have been worst us'd. But who can escape by innocence when King CHARLES the [Page 84] Martyr fell by Malice? Such also as cry up the Murtherers of Tyrants, who had no just Right, never meant to allow the Ar­raignment of lawful Monarchs, who, when they err, have God only for their Judge; and if they fear not Him, and eternal Pu­nishment, they will not probably fear mor­tal Men, and their own Subjects whom they can many ways escape.

2. There is no Creature so unreasonable, but he will use his own with discretion, though there be no Law obliging him to it, nor Punishment to be inflicted, if he do o­therways: who burns his own House, or drowns his Lands, though he may do it? For the Law considers, that a King is either mad, and if so, he will respect no Law, and should not be punisht, at least he will not stand in awe for fear of it, or else he is of a sound Judgment, and then he needs no Law; and therefore, Why should we ap­prehend that a King will destroy His own Kingdom?

3. A King is also obliged by His Fame, to do things worthy of His high Trust, and things able to abide that conspicuous light to which he is exposed.

4. Though his People ought not to rebel, yet no thinking man can be sure that they [Page 85] will not. And therefore even the greatest Tyrants fear such Accidents, though they know they are not bound by those Laws, that tye Subjects. And if all these fail, yet we must reverence God's Dispensations, and expect a redress of these unusual Emergen­cies from his Divine Goodness, for whose sake we suffer them; rather then expose all to ruine, by endeavouring a revenge, that may be so unjust, in the preparative, and dangerous in the event.

Doleman does here urge, that although the People have conferred upon the King, the Power and Jurisdiction which naturally resided in them, yet they have not so dele­gated that Power, as to devest themselves of all Jurisdiction privatively, so that they still retain a cumulative Jurisdiction, by which, in case of necessity, they may judge the King, and all other Delinquents. To which my Answers are. 1. It is fully proved, that the King derives not his Pow­er from the People, and so they connot re­tain that Power which they never had. 2. A Cumulative Jurisdiction, is only granted to those who cannot devest themselves of the Power they give, because Supream Pow­er is essential to their Character, and there­fore, though a King retain a Cumulative [Page 86] jurisdiction, when he delegates his Power to a Subject, it cannot at all be inferred, that therefore the People retains the same, when they transfer, all their Power upon the King; for the one designs to make a King, who is to be Supream; and the other de­signs to gratifie a Person, who is to remain still a Subject. Populus jus omne in Caesarem transfert, & qui totum dicit nihil excipit. The People may be a People without a Cu­mulative Power, or without being Supream, but a King cannot; and I admire, why Doleman, who compares always the King to the Husband, and the Common-wealth to the Wife; the King to the Head, and the Common-wealth to the Body, can think, that it is Lawful for the People to judge and punish their King, since it is not lawful for the Wife to judge her Husband, or for the Body to cut off the Head.

The 3. Conclusion which I shall draw from the former Principles, shall be, That as it is not lawful for Subjects to punish their Kings, so neither is it to rise in Arms a­gainst them, upon what pretext soever, no not to defend their Liberty nor Religion. Which Conclusion also I shall endeavour to Establish on sure foundations of Positive Law. Reason, Experience, and Scripture. [Page 87] As to our Positive Law, it is clear, for by the 3. Act Par. 1. Ja. 1. ‘It is declared Rebellion to rise in Arms against the Kings Person: And by the 14. Act 6. Par. King Ja. 2. It is Treason to Rebel against the Kings Person or Authority: By the 25. Act Par. 6. Ja. 2. It is Treason to rise in fear of War against the Kings Person or his Majesty, or to lay hands upon his Person violently, whatever age they be of, or to help or supply those who commit Treason. By the 131. Act 8. Par. Ja. 6. All the Subjects are forbid to Convocate for holding of Councils or other Assem­blies without his Majesties express War­rant; and by the 12. Act 10. Par. King Ja. 6. The entring into Leagues or Bonds without his Majesties special Command is declared to be Sedition.’ Most of which Acts are prior to Buchannans time, and con­sequently he was very inexcusable in advan­cing this Rebellious Principle. And these Laws having excepted no case, exclude all cases and pretexts of rising in Arms against the Lawful Monarch; but our unhappy Country-men having by a long and open Rebellion, opposed the most devout, and most just of all Kings, upon the false pre­tence of Liberty, and Religion, the Parlia­ment [Page 88] of this Kingdom, from a full Convicti­on of the Villainies of those times, and to prevent such dangerous Cheats for the fu­ture, they did by the 5. Act, Par. 1. Char. 2. declare it to be Treason for any number of his Majesties Subjects to rise in Arms up­on any pretence whatsoever, and to shew that all such Glosses as were us'd by Bu­channan were absurd, and did not make void the first Laws, though general, the Parliament did by the 4. Act of that 1. Par­liament declare that any Explanation or Gloss, that during the late Troubles hath been put upon these Acts, as that they are not to be extended against any Leagues, Councils, Conventions, Assemblies, or Meet­ings, made, holden, or kept by the Subjects, for Preservation of the Kings Majesty, the Religion, Laws, and Liberties of the King­dom, or for the publick Good either of Church or Kingdom, are false and Disloyal, and contrary to the true and genuine mean­ing of these Acts. Which Statute is a clear decision against Buchannan, finding that the Statutes that were prior to his time, and all other such general Statutes made in favours of the King, did formerly strike against his Principles and Distinctions. As also to pre­clude all avenues to Rebellion by teach­ing, [Page 89] defending, or encouraging others to Rebel upon these pretexts, as the former Act declared, that actual rising in Arms was Rebellion. So by the 2. Act Sess. 2. Par. 2. Charles 2. It is declared Treason for any Subject to maintain these Positions, viz. That it is Lawful for Subjects upon Pretence of Re­formation or any other Pretence whatsoever to enter into Leagues, or Covenants, or to take up Arms against the King, or any Commissionated by him.

2. All the Arguments formerly produc'd against the power of the Subject to punish His Person, do fully prove likewise that they have no power to rise in Arms against him. For either the collective Body of the Sub­jects are superiour to him, and if so, they may not only rise up in Arms against him, but they may punish him; but if the King be superiour to them, as has been formerly prov'd, then it cannot be lawful for Sub­jects to rise up in Arms against him, no more than it is to punish his Person. Nor can I see how all such as declare for a Defensive War, are not to be concluded guilty of de­signing to murther the King; for if the King come in Person to defend His own Right, as certainly he will, and must; Can it be thought they will shoot at none, [Page 90] lest they kill him? and if they shoot, how can they secure His Sacred Person? and if they kill him in the Field, are they less guilty of his murther, than those Ruf­fians who lately design'd it? Or doth it les­sen the Guilt that these design'd to kill him alone privately? whereas our moderate men will in face of the Sun, and with display'd Banners against God and him, kill with him all such, as being perswaded that they are obliged before God to assist him, expose their lives for their Duty.

3. That dangerous, though specious Principle of defensive Arms, is inconsistent with that order of Nature which God has established, and which is absolutely necessary amongst all other humane Relations; and by the same Analogy, by which we allow Sub­jects to rise against their Prince, we may much more allow Children to rise against their Parents, Servants against their Masters, Souldiers against their Officers, and the Rab­ble against their Magistrates: for the King does eminently comprehend all these rela­tions in his Soveraignty, as inferiour Bran­ches of that Paramount, Monarchial pow­er. And what a glorious state should Man­kind be left in, if Anarchy were thus Esta­blished, and every man should be invested [Page 91] with power to be his own Judge? Or dares any reasonable man assert, that this is fit to be allowed in the present condition of Mankind; for since the generality of men can scarce be contained in their Duty by the severest Laws that can be made, what can be expected from them, when they are loosed from all Law, and are encouraged to transgress against it?

If the Multitude could prove that they were Infallible, and that no Oppression could be expected from them, something might be said, why we might ballance them with Authority. But since both Rea­son and doleful Experience, teach us, that generally the Multitude consists of Knaves and Fools, who alter not to the better by Conspiring together, nor become juster, for being led by such ambitious, and discontent­ed Spirits, as ordinarily lead on Rebel­lions, it is safer to obey those of the two fallible Governours, whom God hath set over us, and whom the Law ties us to o­bey, and to whom also we are bound by the Oath of Allegiance; especially seeing thus we may probably expect, that they will be more careful of us, as being their own, than meer Strangers, who use us only for their own Ends. And at the worst in the [Page 92] King, we can have but an ill Master; where­as in allowing Subjects to usurp, we may fight to get our selves hundreds of Tyrants, and these too fighting one against another, so that we shall not even know which of these Divils to obey.

4. This Position is against the very Na­ture, not only of Monarchy, but of all Go­vernments; For who will obey when they may resist? And who can be Judges whether the pretences upon which Arms are taken, be lawful, or not? And therefore since it is unlawful for Subjects to take up even De­fensive Arms, until it be found that the King against whom these Defensive Arms are taken up, be a Tyrant, and an Oppressor: It clearly follows, that these Subjects must first have a Power to judge, and find that the King has erred, which is to declare the People to be Judges of their King; and we may be soon convinced that this Principle is against the Nature of all Government, if we consider that if it were lawful for Sub­jects with us to rise against the King, it should be lawful for those in a Common­wealth, or Aristocracie, to rise against their Governors, since these may err as well as Kings do; and if this were allowed, all Na­tions should always have one Rebellion ri­sing [Page 93] out of the Ashes of another, for only they who prevail'd should be satisfied, and all the rest would certainly conclude that they might more justly oppose these Usur­pers, one or more, then the first did their lawful Prince; and thus Government which is design'd for the security of the State, should run in a Circle fixt upon no cer­tain Bafis, and determined by no sure Mea­sures.

5. This Principle is dangerous for the Subjects, as well as for the King and other Governors; for if Kings be perswaded that Subjects think this Opposition lawful, then they will be still jealous of them, and will be necessitated on all occasions to secure a­gainst such Oppositions, and so this Doctrine tends more to make our King a Tyrant, than to make us free. And if the difference betwixt King and People, should draw both to Arms, where can we find a Judge, to whom both Parties will submit? So that to allow this power in the People to debate, is to allow a difference that can never end; and in that case, what innocent man shall be able to know whom he may securely follow? And the best Issue that could be expected from these debates, would be, that the one half of the Nation should ruin the other: So [Page 94] comfortable and just is this Rebellious Do­ctrine.

6. If we consult either our own Experi­ence, or History, we will find that these Pretences of Liberty, and Religion, have al­ways been used by those who loved neither, and that they have been ordinarily used a­gainst the best of Kings, and so prove to be meer Cheats upon their parts who use them, and absolute Villainies, if we consider against whom they are used; and it cannot be o­therways, for the worst of men are always readiest to take Arms, and the best of Kings are most inclined to suffer insolence to grow up by degrees to Rebellion: And as few or none ever took up Arms against their King, in whom even the dullest did not see other motives than a love to Liberty and Religion, so when they who did take up Arms upon these pretences, did succeed in their at­tempts, they became themselves greater grie­vances to the people, than those lawful Pow­ers against whom they pretended to pro­tect them: And when others rose against them upon the same pretence, they did in the severest manner declare that to be Re­bellion in others, which they contended to be lawful in themselves.

7. So dangerous is this Principle, that [Page 95] it has been always us'd as a Tool to promote contrary designs, and to serve the worst of men in all the opposite sides. And thus we see that the Bigot Papists have by it over­turn'd Thrones, disinherited and murdered Kings. In which the most impious of their Doctors have been admir'd and followed by the rigid Phanaticks, who did notwith­standing teach, that all Papists were to be extirpated, and unquiet Spirits in the esta­blish'd Republicks of Rome, Venice, and Flo­rence, have by this Principle endeavour'd to overturn and disquiet as much their own Commonwealths, as our Republicans have impiously endeavour'd to destroy Just Mo­narchy, thereby to settle an usurping Com­monwealth.

8. The only pretext that can justifie the rising up in Arms, being, that it is lawful to all Creatures to defend themselves; the pre­tence must be dangerous, since its limits are uncertain: For how can Defensive Arms be distinguished from Offensive Arms? Or who­ever begun at the one, who did not proceed to the other? Or, what Subject did ever think himself secure after he had drawn his Sword against his King, without endeavour­ing to cut off by it that King against whom he had drawn it? the hope of Absolute [Page 96] Power is too sweet, and the fear of pun­ishment too great, to be bounded, and match'd by the best of Men: And how could we expect this moderation from those who at first wanted patience to bear the law­ful Yoke of Government, but because ex­amples convince as much as reason, let us re­member how when this Nation was very happy in the Year, 1638. under the Govern­ment of a most Pious and Just Prince, born in our own Kingdom, we rais'd an Army, and with it Invaded His Kingdom of England upon the pretence that He was Govern'd by wicked Counsellors, and design'd to intro­duce Popery; and this was justified as a De­fensive War, by a long tract of General As­semblies, and Parliaments: and if this be a Defensive War that is justifiable, what King can be secure? Or, wherein shall we seek se­curity against Civil Wars? Or what can be more ridiculous than to pretend the invading Kingdoms, murthering such as are Commissi­onated by the King, after that Invasion, en­tring into Leagues and Covenants against him, both at home and abroad, the robbing him of his Navies and Militia, and denying him the power to chuse his own Counsel­lors and Judges, are meerly Defensive: but God Almighty, to teach us how dangerous [Page 97] these Defensive Arms are, and how impossi­ble it is to regulate Lawless violence, how gentle and easie soever the first beginnings are, suffered our War, which was so much justified for being meerly Defensive, to end in the absolute overthrow of the Monarchy, and the taking away the life of the best of Kings; and it is very remarkable, that such as have begun with the Doctrine of giving only Passive Obedience in all things, as in re­fusing to pay just Taxes, to concur in securing Rebels, &c. have from that stept up to defen­sive Arms, and from that to the power of Re­forming by the Sword, and from that to the power of Dethroning and Murther­ing Kings by Parliaments, and Judicatures, and from that to the Murthering and As­sassinating all who differ'd from them, with­out any other pretence or formality whatso­ever, so hard a thing it is to stop when we begin once to fall from our Duty: And so easie a thing it is to perswade such as have allowed themselves the first degrees of guilt, to proceed to the highest extravagancies of Villanie.

Oh! What a blindness there is in Error? And how palpably doth God desert them, who desert their Duty; suffering them after they have done what they should have ab­horred, [Page 98] to proceed to do what they first ab­horred really? To these I must recommend the History of Hazael, who, when the Pro­phet foretold him, 2 King. 8. 12, 13. That he should slay their young men with the sword, dash their Children, and rip up their Women with child, answered him, am I a dog, that I should do such things? and yet he really did what he had so excerated.

The moderation likewise of these modest pretenders to Self-defence, and Defensive Arms, will appear, by the bloody Doctrine of their great Rabbies. Buchannan not only allows but invites Subjects to murder their King. And Lex Rex, Pag. 313. tells us, That it is a sin against Gods Command to be Passively Subject to an unjust Sentence, and that it is an Act of Grace and Virtue to re­sist the Magistrate violently, when he does him wrong: and after that horrid Civil War was ended, the Author of Nahptali doth justifie it, pag. 16, and 17, in these words, ‘Combinations for assistance in vi­olent opposition of the Magistrates, when the ends of Government are preverted (which must be referr'd to the discretion of them who mind Insurrection) are ne­cessary by the Law of Nature, of Cha­rity, and in order to Gods Glory, and [Page 99] for violation of this Duty of deliver­ing the oppressed from Magistrates, Judg­ment comes upon People.’ From which he proceeds, Pag. 18, and 19. do assert that, ‘not only the power of self-defence, but vindicative, and reforming power is in any part of the People, against the whole, and against all Magistrates, and if they use it not, Judgment comes on (supposing their capacity probable to bear them forth) and they shall be punish'd for their con­nivance, and not acting in way of vin­dication of Crimes, and reforming Abuses.’

Before I enter upon those Arguments, which the Scripture furnishes us with, against these Rebellious Principles; I must crave leave to say,

1. That Defensive Arms seem to me very clearly inconsistent with that Mortification, Submission, and Patience, which is recom­mended by our Blessed Saviour, in all the strain of the new Testament; and how will these People give their Coat to a Stranger, or hold up their other Cheek to him, when they will rise even in Rebellion against their Native Prince.

2. As the taking up of Arms is incon­sistent with the temper requir'd in a Christi­an; so it seems a very unsuitable mean for [Page 100] effectuating the end, for which it is design'd, since Religion being a Conviction of what we owe to God, how can that be comand­ed, which should be perswaded? and how can Arms become Arguments? Or how can External Force influence immaterial Substances, such as are the Souls of Men. And we may as well think to awake a mans Conscience by Drums, or to per­swade his Judgment by Musquets; and there­fore the Apostle speaks only of spiritual Arms in this our Warfare, The Sword of the Spirit, and the Helmet of Salvation, &c. But, good God, how could the ex­travagancy of forcing the Magistrate by Arms, in Defence of Religion, enter in­to Mens heads? When it is unlawful even for the Magistrate himself, to force Religi­on by Arms. And as Subjects should not be by the King forced to Religion; so if they use Force against the King, the pretext of Religion, tho specious, should not defend them. And therefore when the sons of Ze­bedee desired fire from Heaven, upon those who oppos'd even our Saviour he told them, that they knew not what Spirit they were of.

3. It seems very derogatory to the power of Almighty God, that he should need hu­mane assistance, and it is a lessening of the [Page 101] great esteem that we ought to have for the energy, force and reasonableness of the Christian Religion, that it needs to be forc'd upon men by Arms, as if it were not able to force its own way. This Mahomet need­ed for his Cheats, but our Blessed Saviour needs not for his Divine Precepts, and there­fore when Peter offered to fight for him, our Saviour checkt him, commanding him to put up his Sword, and to perswade him the more effectually, assures him, That all they who take the Sword, shall perish by it, and that his Kingdom was not of this World, and so he needed no such worldly help, but if he pleas'd to call for Legions of Angels, his Omnipotent Father would send them, and sure Angels are fitter and abler Instruments to carry on such a work of Reformation, than Rebellious Regiments of Horse and Dragoons.

4. Our blessed Saviour foreseeing that Mans Corruption would in spite of Christi­anity, prompt him to resist; he therefore did command by the Apostle Paul, Rom. 13. v. 1. and 2. Let every Soul be Subject to the higher Power, for there is no Power but of God, the Powers that be are ordained of God, whosoever therefore resisteth the Power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist [Page 102] shall receive to themselves damnation. In which Text, it is very remarkable, that the Apostle urges this Christian duty of submis­sion, as being a mark of mans immediate dependence upon God, and as that, which when contemned, brings eternal damnation. And whereas it is pretended that this Text commands only submission to Magistrates, whilst they Act Piously, and Vertuously, because only in so far they are Gods Vice­gerents, but forbids not resistance to their impious commands. It is answered, that the Text has no such limitation, and we must have so much respect to the Scripture, as to think that if God Almighty had design'd to allow such an opposition, he would have warranted it, in as clear Terms, as he com­manded the submission; and the reason why this submission is commanded, is not be­cause the Power is rightly us'd, but because the Power is ordained of God. And we see that St. Paul himself did think that the power should be reverenc'd, even when a­bus'd: for when the High Priest was Inju­ring him, he acknowledged that he was obliged not to speak evil of the Rulers of his People, Acts 23. 2. And if this place of Scripture, and the submission therein com­manded, were so to be limited, we behoved [Page 103] likewise so to limit the fifth Commandment, and not to honour our Parents, except when they are Pious, nor to obey them, if they vex or trouble us; and St. Paul having written this Epistle to those, who were then living under that monstrous Emperour Caius, did clearly design, that the Christian Reli­gion was to be admired for commanding Subjects, not only to obey good Princes, but even submitting peaceably to Tyrants. And suitable to this Doctrine are these Texts, Heb. ch. 12. v. 9. We had Fathers of our flesh, who corrected, and chastened us, after their own pleasure, and we gave them reverence; and lest we might think that Text rather a Narration, than a Command, it is told us Peter 2. v. 18. Servants be subject to your Masters with all fear, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward, for this is thanks-worthy, if a man for conscience toward God do endure grief. And v. 20. If when ye do well, and suffer for it, ye take it patiently this is acceptable to God, for even hereunto were ye called.

Our blessed Saviour's practice, did likewise agree most admirably with his Precepts and Doctrine formerly insisted on, for though no man ever was, or can be so much injur'd as his blessed self, nor could ever any de­fensive [Page 104] Arms have been so just, as in his quar­rel, yet he would not suffer a Sword to be drawn in it, and to discourage all Christians from using Arms, he told those who were offering to defend even himself with Arms, that whosoever should draw the Sword, should perish by it; and it seems that God Almighty permitted Peter, to draw his Sword at that time meerly, that we might upon that occa­sion be for ever deter'd from Defensive Arms, by this our Saviour's Divine example and reasoning.

The last Argument I shall produce, shall be from that most Christian Topick us'd by St. Paul, Rom. 3. 8. We should not do ill that good may come of it.

And therefore since disobedience to Magi­strates, but much more to Rebel against them, is forbid by the Laws both of God and Men: This disobedience and opposition, cannot be justifi▪d by pretending that it is design'd for Reforming the Nation. And if it be an­swer'd, That this opposition, is not in it self ill, because the design justifies it. It is to this reply'd, That if this answer be suffici­ent, then the former excellent Rule is of no use; for when a Servant steals his Masters Mony to give to the Poor; or a Son cuts his Fathers Throat, because he is vicious; or [Page 105] when Jacques Clement Stabbed Henry the 3. and Ravillack Henry the 4. of France, they might have alleadg'd the same in their own defence. Nor know we surer proof that any thing is impious, or unlawful, then when the Laws of our Nation have forbid it as a great Crime, they being against and contra­ry to no positive Law of God; but rather suitable to the same; and own'd as such by Christian Synods and Divines: there being no necessity to enforce this going out of the Road. All which holds in this case, nor can it be imagin'd how Reforming by Arms, can be thought necessary, since God both can without a Miracle, Turn the hearts of Kings, in whose hands they are, as Rivers of Waters. And can send devout Men to influence Kingdoms. And should not we rather suffer Patiently as the Primitive Christians did, that his Divine Majesty may be by our Patience prevail'd upon, to Re­form us now, as he did of old our Prede­cessors from Paganism; by our own Kings, in a Regular way, than upon every Notion of Bigot and Factious Ring-leaders over­turn all Government, and Order, rent all Unity, and involve our Native Countrey in Blood and Confusion. And whilst we are fighting for the terms of Religion, lose [Page 106] the true efficacy of Piety, and Devotion: for what use can there be of Patience, Hu­mility, Faith and Hope; if we will pre­sently repair our selves, submit to no Ma­gistracy that differs from us, and believe that Religion cannot subsist except by us?

The Fathers also of the Primitive Church have inculcated so much this Doctrine eve­ry where, both by their Doctrine and Pra­ctice, and both these are so fully known, that I shall remit this point to those Learn'd Men who have fully handled it. Only I must remember that excellent passage of St. Ambrose, who being commanded to deliver up his Church to the Arians, says, Volens nunquam deseram, coactus repugnare non no­vi; dolere potero, flere potero, gemere potero; adversus arma, milites Gothos, Lachrymae meae, mea arma sunt, talia enim sunt muni­menta sacerdotis; aliter nec debeo nec possum resistere. Which Prayers and Tears are like­wise call'd the only Arms of the Church by the great Nazianzen in his first Oration against Julian, and by St. Bernard in his 221. Epistle. But more of this is to be found, Tom. 2. Concil. Galliae pag. 533. Where it is fully prov'd, that all Subjects ought humbly and faithfully to obey the Regal [Page 107] Power, as being ordained by none but God with whom the wise Heathens agree; for Marcellus Eprius (Tacit. lib. 4. hist.) pray'd for good Princes, but obey'd bad ones; and Terentius in the same Author An. lib. 6. §. 3. confesses, That the Gods had bestow'd on the Emperor the sole disposal of all things, leaving nothing to Subjects, save the honour of obedience. But because these of that per­swasion rather will believe Calvin than the Fathers, I have taken pains to consider in him these few passages, cap. 20 lib. 4. Insti­tut. §. 27. Assumptum in Regiam Majestatem violare nefas est, nunquam nobis seditiosae istae cogitationes in mentem veniant tractandum esse pro meritis Regem, §. 29. Personam sus­tinent voluntate Domini, cui inviolabilem Ma­jestatem ipse impressit, & insculpsit, §. 31. Pri­vatis hominibus nullum aliud quam parendi, & patiendi datum est mandatum. And all this Chapter doth so Learnedly and judici­ally impugn this Doctrine, that it is a won­der why Calvinists should differ from Cal­vin.

I know that to this it may be answered, That the same Calvin does qualifie his own words, which I have cited, with this follow­ing Caution, Si qui sunt (saith he) populares Magistratus, ad moderandam Regum libi­dinem [Page 108] constituti (quales olim erant qui Lace­demoniis regibus oppositi erant Ephori; & qua etiam forte potestate (ut nunc res habent) fun­guntur in singulis regnis tres ordines; quum pri­marios conventus peragunt) adeo illos fero­cienti Regum licentiae, pro offico intercedere non veto; ut si Regibus impotenter grassantibus, & humili plebeculae insultantibus conniveant, eorum dissimulationem nefaria perfidia non carere affirmem; quia populi libertatem, cujus se tutores Dei ordinatione positos norunt, frau­dulenter produnt.

To which my reply is, That these words must be so constructed, as that they may not be inconsistent with his former clear and Orthodox Doctrine, of not resisting Su­pream Powers, the former being his posi­tive Doctrine, and this but a supervenient Caution, and they do very well consist; for though Calvin be very clear, that Kings cannot be resisted, yet he thinks that this is only to be meant of those Kings who have no Superiors to check them by Law, as the Kings of the Lacedemonians had, who by the fundamental Constitution of their Monarchy, might have been call'd to an ac­compt by the Ephori, and so in effect were only Titular Kings: Or of such Monarchs as had only a co-ordinate Power with the [Page 109] States of their own Kingdom; and even in these Cases, he does not positively assert, that these Monarchs may be resisted, but does only doubt whether if there be any such Su­perior or co-ordinate Magistrate representing the People, they may not restrain the Rage and Licentiousness of their Kings: But that Caution does not at all concern the Jus Reg­ni apud Scotos, because this cannot be said of the Kings of Great Britain, since the States of Parliament are only call'd by the King, and derive their Authority from him, and the Legislative Power is solely in the King, the States of Parliament being only Consenters, he, not they, can only make Peace and War, and grant Remissions, and against him and not them Treason on­ly is committed, and the Law Books of both Nations do affirm, that the King is Su­pream, and consequently even according to Calvin's Doctrine, neither his People, nor any of their Representatives, can justly oppose, and much less punish him.

I know that Grotius is by the Republi­cans, and the Fanaticks, oft-times cited to defend this their Doctrine, of opposing Prin­ces; but though his Testimony might be justly rejected, as being himself born under a Commonwealth, yet he is most impudently [Page 110] cited, for he lib. 1. cap. 4. does positively lay down as a general and undoubted Rule, That Summum imperium tenentibus, resisti non potest, Those who have the Supream Pow­er cannot lawfully be resisted; which Rule he founds upon the Principles of Reason, the Authority of Scripture, and the Practice of the Primitive Church; and though he limits the same thereafter by some excepti­ons, yet it will easily appear, that these ex­ceptions extend not at all to our Case.

For the first relates only to such Kings, as have receiv'd their Power with express condition, that they may be tryed by other Magistrates.

The second to such as have voluntarily resign'd their Empire, as Charles the 5th. did; and so the one may be oppos'd, because they were only Titular Kings: and the other, because they left off to be Kings, and conse­quently we are concerned in neither of these Cases.

The third limitation is only in the Case where he who was truly a King, has alie­nated his Kingdom to Strangers; In which Case, Grotius does contend, That Subjects may refuse to obey, because he ceaseth to be their King. But as this is not our Case, so even in that Case Grotius is very clear, that [Page 111] if this alienation be made by an Heredi­tary Monarch, the alienation is null, as being done in prejudice of the lawful Suc­cessor, but he does not at all assert that the Monarch may be thereupon depos'd by his People.

The fourth relates only to such Kings, as from a hatred to their Countrey, design its Destruction and utter Ruine; but as he confesseth himself, Id vix accidere potest in Rege mentis compote; and consequently can take only place in a mad Man, in which Case all Laws allow the Kingdom to be rul'd by Governours, and Administrators in the King's Name, if the madness be Na­tural, and a Total depravation of Sence. But if by Madness be meant a moral Mad­ness, and design to ruin the Kingdom and the Subjects, as was, and is most impiously pretended against King CHARLES the first, and King CHARLES the 2 d, the best and most reasonable of Kings; then Opposition in such Cases is not at all war­ranted by Grotius, who speaks only of a Physical and Natural Madness; for else e­very thing that displeaseth the people should be call'd Madness; and so the exception should not limit but overturn the general rule, and should Arm all Subjects to rebel [Page 112] against their Princes, and make them the Soveraign Judges in all Cases. Which is inconsistent with Grotius's own Doctrine, and is excellently refuted by his own Rea­sons.

The fifth relates only to Kings, who by the fundamental Laws of the Kingdom are ty'd to such and such Conditions, so as that if they fail in them, they may be op­pos'd.

The sixth relates only to Kingdoms where the Power is equally divided betwixt the King and the Senate.

The seventh is in case the King was at first invested by the People, with express reserva­tion to them to resist in such and such Cases, and so is almost the same with the fifth, and all these three differ little from the first. And with Grotius's good leave, they err also in this, that they are not properly exceptions from his own rule, for the rule being on­ly, that Supream Powers cannot be resist­ed, these Powers are not Supream, and they needed not be caution'd by an excep­tion, since they did not fall under the rule. But neither of these Cases extend to us, since our King is by the Acts of Parliament formerly cited, declared to be Supream over all Persons and in all Causes, nor made our Predecessors [Page 113] any such express reservations at the first erection of the Monarchy, and conse­quently by Grotius own positive Doctrine cannot be resisted. And so far is Grotius an enemy to such Fanatical Resistance, up­on the Pretence of Liberty and Religion, that num. 6. he calls the Authors of those Opinions, Time-Servers only. And Grono­vius a violent Republican and Fanatick, taxes him extreamly for it, in his Observati­ons upon that fourth Chapter, whose Ar­guments produc'd against Grotius I shall answer amongst the other Objections.

Gronovius's first Argument why it should be lawful to resist the Supream Magistrate in defence of Religion, is, because if it be not Lawful for Subjects to Arm themselves for Religion against their Prince, it should not be lawful for their Prince by the same rule to defend himself against Turks and In­fidels, who would endeavour to force him to comply with their Impieties. But to this it is answered, That Resistance to Superiors is expresly forbid by the Laws of God and Nature, as is said, but this cannot be extended to Cases where there is no Sub­jection nor Allegiance; and it may be as well argu'd, that because one private man may beat another who offers to strike him, [Page 114] that therfore a Child may beat his Parent, or a Servant his Master, or that because I may violently resist a private man who offers to take away my Goods unjustly, that there­fore I may oppose the Sentence of the Ma­gistrate, because I forsooth do not think the same just.

His second shift is, That our Saviour com­manded only absolute submission without resistance in the Infancy of the Church when he himself was miraculously to asist his own Servants, but this Submission was to end with the Miracles, to which it re­lated. As to which, my answer is,

1. That all Commands in Scripture may be so eluded, nor is there any Duty more frequently and fully inculcated than this is, and that too in the same Chapters amongst other Duties, which are to last for ever, such as Submission to Parents, and Masters, and this is founded upon plain reason and conveniency, and not upon Miracles.

2. This was receiv'd and acknowledged by the Pagans, as has been fully prov'd, though it cannot be pretended that they rely'd upon any such miraculous assi­stance.

3. It cannot be deny'd but the Fathers of the Primitive Church did recommend [Page 115] and justifie themselves in their Apologies to the Heathen Emperours for bearing patient­ly, when they were able not only to have resisted but to have overthrown their Per­secuters, as is clear by the Citations out of Tertullian, Cyprian, Lactantius, Augustine, and others, to be seen in Grotius, De Jure Belli, lib. 1. cap. 4. num. 7. And it had been great impudence as well as sin in them to have boasted of a recent matter of Fact, which was not true: nor could there be a greater injury done to the Primitive Christians, as Grotius observes, than to ascribe that to their Weakness, which they consider'd as an ef­fect of Duty; and why should the Heathen Emperours have suffered those to multiply, who obey'd only because Disobedience was not safe, for they might have certainly con­cluded, that by the same Principle that they obeyed only because they were weak, they would disobey as soon as they were able.

4. If the first Christians in general had obeyed only because they were not able to resist, then any private Christian had re­sisted when he was able, or would have fled or conceal'd himself, whereas it is acknow­ledg'd in the other answers press'd by Gro­novius himself, that they sought for Mar­tyrdom, and so these two answers are incon­sistent; [Page 116] and the Theban Legion, and others, did submit themselves voluntarily to Mar­tyrdom with their Arms in their hands, and when they were able to have overthrown the Emperour.

And lastly, If this Doctrine were allow'd, no Society could subsist, for when Dissen­ters grew strong, the lawful Magistrate be­hov'd to perish; whereas Jesus Christ did contrive the Christian Religion; so as that all Governours should reasonably wish their Subjects to be Christians; and so as no Christi­an should attempt to overthrow the order and establishment of Civil Government, and that they should not be drawn away from practise of Christian Devotion by the car­nal desires of being Great and Strong in the World, nor have any hopes in the Arm of Flesh to the lessening of their immediate de­pendence upon him.

His third shift is, That his Doctrine of Submission and of dying for the Christian Religion without making Resistance, was only the Practise, but not the Command of the Primitive Church, and proceeded from their immoderate affectation of the Crown of Martyrdom, as Milton also pre­tends. But since the express Command of Scripture is founded upon such clear Reason, [Page 117] and since (as Grotius well observes) the Practise of the Primitive Christians, who liv'd so near the Age wherein these Scriptures were pen'd, is the best Interpreter of the Scripture, it is horrid Impiety to make those blessed Martyrs pass for vain Hypocrites, and distracted Self-murderers, and it becomes us with holy reverence to imitate those whom the Christian Church has ever ad­mir'd.

The fourth shift is, that the Protestant Churches have been reform'd by such In­surrections as these, contrary to the Royal Authority. But this is fully answered by the learned Henry More in his Divine Dia­logues, and by Du Moulin in his Philanax Anglicus; where likewise are to be found the many Testimonies of Protestant Chur­ches, and Protestant Divines, condemning positively the taking up of Arms against the Soveraign Power, even for the defence of Religion; and the very Presbyterian Confession of Faith at Westminster, is so posi­tive as to this point, that the Presbyterians themselves can never answer it. The sum of which answer is, That the King of Spain coming by Marriage in place of the Duke of Burgundy, the said King of Spain could pretend to no more Power than they had, [Page 118] nor could the House of Burgundy pretend to any more Power by marrying the Heirs of the Counts of the several Provinces, than those Counts had over their Provinces; and therefore since none of these were Sove­raigns over their Provinces, the Provinces might have resisted the King of Spain when he oppress'd them; and consequently that Resistance cannot defend such as resist Su­pream Powers upon pretence of Religion, Grotius de Antiq. Reipub. Batav. cap. 7.

The opposition made by the Protestants in France, was not occasion'd by Religion, but upon a Quarrel betwixt the Princes of the Blood and the House of Guise in the Mi­nority of Francis the 2 d, and is defended most excellently by King James himself, not to have been Rebellion, in his Defence of the Right of Kings, pag. 14.

The Opposition made by the Princes of Germany to the Emperour, was founded up­on the inherent Right in the Princes, by the Golden Charter of the Empire. And Luther himself declar'd, that Magistratui non erat resistendum, and has written a Book to that purpose; nor would he engage in the Confederacy for Defensive Arms at Smalcald, until the Lawyers declared that [Page 119] that Resistance was lawful by the Laws of the Empire, Vide Slydan Hist. lib. 8. anno 1531.

The War that arose in Switzerland, was not occasion'd by Religion; for the Refor­mation was once establish'd with the con­sent of the Magistrate. And the Erup­tion that was made by other Cantons upon the Reform'd Cantons eleven years after that Establishment, Vide Slydan, anno 1522. Nor was it Calvin who banish'd the Prince and Bishop of Geneva, for he fled eight Months before upon the detecting of a Con­spiracy, by which that Bishop was to deliver over the Liberties of that City to the Duke of Savoy, and for which his Secretary was hang'd, Vide Turretin. Annal. Reformatio­nis, anno 1529 And albeit those who Re­form'd in Scotland, in the Reign of Queen Mary, pretended Authority from the King, yet they were certainly Rebels, and are condemn'd by Rivet, a famous Protestant Divine, who also inveighs bitterly against this Principle, Castiga Not. in Epist. ad Bal. fac. cap. 13. num 14 sub finem.

From all which, I observe, First, That all the Protestant Divines by making Apolo­gies for such of their Profession as have ri­sen in Arms against Supream Powers, must [Page 120] be thereby concluded to be asham'd of the Principle.

Secondly immediately upon the quieting those Rebellions, all the Protestant Chur­ches have in their Confessions of Faith, de­clared their abhorrence of that Principle; which being the product of Conviction and Experience, joyn'd with Duty, must be the most judicious and sincere Testimony of all others.

Thirdly, All those Rebellions have been occasion'd by a mistake in Point of Law, and not in point of Religion; for the Di­vines, as I have related, have been abused by the Lawyers: and therefore, since in the Isle of Britain, the Laws of both King­doms have declared the Rising in Arms against the King to be Treason, although for the defence of Religion; it necessarily fol­lows, that this must be unlawful in point of Conscience in this Kingdom.

Fourthly, Though good things may be occasion'd by a Rebellion, yet that does not justifie a Rebellion; for though Jeroboam was allow'd by God to rise against Rehobo­am, yet God Almighty himself calls his revolt Rebellion, 1 Kings 12 19. and 2 Chron. 10. 19. and it is observable, that after this Re­volt, there was but one good King amongst [Page 121] all the Rebellious Kings of Israel; whereas amongst the Kings of Judah, who were law­ful Kings, there was but one or two who were any ways impious; so far does God bless a lawful Succession.

Some also use as a shift against this Or­thodox Doctrine, that the reason why the Primitive Christians did not oppose their Emperours in the defence of the Christian Religion, was, because they had not been secured at that time in the Exercise of their Religion by the Laws of the Empire; and therefore the practice of those Christians can be no Argument why we may not now rise to defend the Orthodox Religion, since it is now established by Law. But this Ob­jection is fully answered by that great An­tiquary Samuel Petit. Diatriba de Jur. Prin­cipium edictis Ecclesiae quaesito, where he clearly proves, that they were actually se­cured by the Edicts of the Emperours in the days of the Emperor Tiberius, and down­ward, and yet they would not rise in Arms though they were persecuted under those same Emperors, because the Word of God and the Christian Religion did command Obedience under Persecution, and did for­bid Resistance and taking up of Arms.

The Arguments that can be produc'd to [Page 122] justifie this Principle of Defensive Arms, are almost answered in the former Article, viz. That there is a mutual Obligation be­twixt King and People, so that when He breaks the one, they are free from the other, and that all Government is Esta­blisht for the advantage of the People, and thus these few Arguments peculiar to this Point, remain now only to be here re­solv'd.

1. That Self-defence is by the Law of Na­ture allow'd to all, and even to Brutes, why then should men who may lose more, who deserve better, and can use self-defence more innocently, be debar'd from it?

2, We see in Scripture, that the People deserted and oppos'd their Kings for Reli­gion.

3. This has been allow'd with us in the instance of King James the third, against whom his Subjects rose in Rebellion, for misgoverning and oppressing His People, and this opposition, was first justified by God, in the success he gave to their Arms, and thereafter by a special and express Act in the ensuing Parliament, which stands yet unrepeal'd.

To which I shortly answer, That as to the first of Self-defence in Brutes, we must [Page 123] still remember, that God hvaing design'd Government to bridle the Extravagancies ofrestless Mankind, he has appointed Magi­strates to be his Vicegerents and Represen­tatives, and has entrusted them with his Power, and so opposition to them is unlaw­ful, because it is not lawful against him; and because if it were allow'd, all would pre­tend to it, and so there should be no Or­der, nor Government. And that this may be the better observ'd, God has endowed man with Principles fitted for these ends of Order and Society, amongst which, one is, That the publick Safety of the whole is to be preferr'd to the Safety of any one man, or of any number of private men, who are not to be considered as the pub­lick, because that is the publick Interest, which is the Representative of the Nation, and that this Principle may be the better obey'd, he has commanded men to suffer in­juries, rather than occasion Disorders, and has promised to reward Patience and Sub­mission for his sake, with eternal Life, a Nobler Prize, than we here can contend for.

This being then Premis'd, it is answer­ed, that though Brutes may defend them­selves, because Order and the common [Page 124] good of Societies are not there concern'd; yet there is no reason to extend this to Men, whose Self-defence against Authority occa­sions more mischief, than it can bring ad­vantage: And if this Argument hold, it would prove, that every man who is unjust­ly Condemn'd, or at least thinks so, may kill the King, or His Judge; Servants might bind their Masters, and the People of any private Town might pull down their Judge from the Bench, when they thought he opprest them. And as these must submit, because they expect Reparation from a high­er Tribunal: So God has promised Repa­ration to those who suffer for his sake; and the greatness and sureness of this Re­ward, makes this no uncomfortable Doctrine, and this Submission is as necessary, and ra­ther more, for mens preservation, than Re­sistance; and is a kind of Self-defence, since opposition to Authority would bring a cer­tain ruine, and confusion, in which more, would perish, than opposition by private Self-defence would preserve. Upon which Christian Principles also, Ames. a Protestant and Calvinist Divine has resolv'd, In bonis temporalibus tenetur quisque personam publicam sibi ipsi praeferre, bonum enim totius pluris fa­ciendum est quam bonum alicujus partis Cas. [Page 125] conscient. l. 5. cap. 7. Thes. 14. and Lex Rex confesses, p. 335. That a private man should rather suffer the King to kill him, than that he should kill the King, because he is not to pre­fer the Life of a private man, to the Life of a publick man.

And whereas it may be pretended, That though this opposition should not be trust­ed to any private man, yet Parliaments and the Collective Body should, and may be trusted with it. But to this I have an­swered formerly, That all Convocations without Authority from the King, and all rising against him are indefinitely declared unlawful, and justly; for whoever wants Authority, is but in a private capacity, none having a publick capacity, save the Magistrates. And if they be allow'd to rise, because their quarrel is just, it must be as just to allow a lesser number, if they have the same Justice in their pretence, and we have frequently seen, that the same Per­sons who magnified the multitude for their numbers, did shortly thereafter divide from them, pretending that they were the Sanior pars, or juster Party.

The Examples produc'd by our Republi­cans of the revolt of Libna, 2 Chron. 1. 21. And of Jeroboam, because he had forsaken [Page 126] the Lord God of his Fathers, and of the Ten Tribes from Rehoboam, because of Re­hoboam his oppression, 1 King. 12. prove not at all the lawfulness of the Subjects defe­ction from their Kings, because these de­fections are only Related, but not allow'd in Scripture, and are recorded rather as in­stances of God's vengeance upon the wick­edness of these Princes, than as examples justified in these Revolters, and to be fol­low'd by such as read the Sacred History: In which, when Examples are propos'd by the Spirit of God for our imitation, they are still honour'd with the Divine approba­tion. And I hope my Readers will still re­member, that I design not by this Treatise to encourage Princes to wickedness by Im­punity, but only to discourage Subjects from daring to be the punishers.

The great esteem which the great Bishop Ʋsher has justly, even among Republicans and Fanaticks, for Learning and Devotion, has prevail'd with me, to set down two Ob­jections used by him, with his pious Answers hereto.

The first is, ‘Suppose (say they) the King, or Civil Magistrate should command us to Worship the Devil, would you wish us here to lay down our Heads upon the [Page 127] Block, and not to repel the violence of such a Miscreant, to the utmost of our Power: and if not, What would be come of Gods Church, and his Religion? To which the Holy Man answers, That even when the Worship of the Devil was comanded by the cruel Edicts of persecuting Empe­rours, the Christians never took up Arms against them, but used fervent Prayers, as their only refuge:’ And St. Peter animates them to this patient suffering 1. Pet. 4. 12. 13. Beloved, think it not strange concerning the fiery Tryal, but rejoice, in as much as ye are partakers of Christs sufferings. But let none of you suffer as a murtherer, or a Thief, or as an Evil-doer, or as a Busie body in other mens matters. By which last words, if I durst add to so great an Author as Bishop Ʋsher, the Apostle seems expresly to me to have obviated the dreadful Doctrine of ri­sing in Arms upon the pretence of Religi­on, and the killing such as differ from them; which if the Christians did allow, they ought to pass for Murtherers, and to forbid them to meddle in matters of Government upon this pretence; because then they ought to suffer justly, as busie bodies. And here Bishop Ʋsher does most appositely cite St. Augustine, in Psal. 149. The World rag'd, [Page 128] the Lion lifted himself up against the Lamb, but the Lamb was full stronger than the Lion: The Lion was overcome by shewing cruelty, the Lamb did overcome by suffering. And St. Jerome, Epist. 62. ‘By shedding of Blood, and by suffering, rather then doing injuries, was the Church of Christ at first founded; it grew by Persecutions, and was Crowned by Martyrdoms.’

The second objection is, If mens hands be thus ty'd, no mans Estate can be secure; nay the whole frame of the Commonwealth would be in danger to be subverted, and utterly ruin'd. To which he answers, That the ground of this objection is exceeding faulty, and inconsistent with the Rules of Humanity, and Divinity; of Humanity, because this would impower private Per­sons to Judge, and so should confound all Order, and invite all men to oppose Autho­rity, and make Subjects Accusers, Judges, and Executioners too; and that in their own Cause, against their own Soveraign, and against Divinity, because it is contrary to the Scriptures, and Fathers, who command Submission, Humility, and Patience, Rex est, si nocentem punit, cede justitiae, si innocen­tem, cede fortunae, Seneca de Jura. lib. 2. cap. 30. If the King punish thee, when thou art guilty, submit to Justice: If when thou [Page 129] art innocent, submit to Fortune. And if a Heathen could be induced by his vertue to submit to blind Fortune, how much more ought a Christian to be prevail'd upon by Devotion to submit to the All-seeing Pro­vidence of the most wise God, who maketh all things to work joyntly for good to them that love him? And as St. Augustine piously ad­viseth, Princes are to be suffered by their People, that in the exercise of their pati­ence, temporal things may be born, and Eternal hop'd for.

The instance of King James the Third being punished by his Subjects, is so far from being an Argument able to justifie Subjects rising in Arms against their King, that this part of our History should for ever convince all honest men of the dangers that attend Defensive Arms: For this Prince was so far from being one of those Tyrants, against whom Defensive Arms are only con­fest to be just, That few Princes were more meek and careful of his Subjects. But be­cause he imploy'd such as himself had rais'd, finding that the Nobility had too often been insolent Servants to their Prince, and severe Task-masters to the People; the Nobility thinking more upon this imaginary neglect, [Page 130] than their own duty, did from combinati­tions, proceed to Arms, and rejecting all conditions of peace, they were at last curs'd with a Victory, in which this gentle Prince was murthered, whilst he sought to save his Sacred life in a deserted Mill. By which we may see, that these Defensive Arms so much hallowed in our late Debates, are but the Militia of Pride, Vanity and Ambiti­on; and that if they be allow'd, the best of Princes will ever fall by them.

And as to the Act 14. Par. 4. Ja. 4. Whereby it is pretended that the opposing, and even the killing K. Ja. the 3. in Bat­tel is justified, and which Act was never Re­peal'd: It is answered,

First, That this Statute was made by the same Rebels who had opposed their lawful Prince, and so was rather a continuing of their Rebellion, than a justification of it.

Secondly, That abominable Statute pro­ceeds on the pretence of K. James the 3d. calling in the English, and designing to en­slave the Kingdom to Foreigners, which was not prov'd as is ought to have been, though the pretext had been legal, as it was neither legal nor true in the least circumstance, and [Page 131] the Noblemen and Barons are Condemn'd, without being cited or heard; though the Act be not a Statute but a Verdict, so un­just are all Rebels, who are forc'd to main­tain one Crime by another.

Thirdly, In the new Collection of our Statutes made by Skeen, and Authoriz'd in many subsequent Parliaments, that abomi­nable and Treasonable Act is not inserted, which was the best way to rescind it, be­cause it was thought a reproach to the Na­tion to have any formal Law made to re­scind the Statute, which would have pre­serv'd its memory in anulling its Authori­ty.

Fourthly, Many Statutes since that time are made, declaring the rising in Arms against the King and his Authority, upon any pretence whatsoeve to be Treason; and expresly rescinding all Acts and Statutes to the contrary, as Rebellious and Trea­sonable, and there needed no more Posi­tive Statutes to rescind that Rebellious and Treasonable Combination rather than Law.

As to the 44. Act 6. Par. Ja. 2. From which its urged, that because that Act de­clares it Treason to assault Castles, and Pla­ces where the Kings Person shall happen [Page 132] to be, without the Consent of the three Estates: And that it is therefore lawful to assault the same with the Consent of the three Estates, and consequently to rise in Arms with the Consent of the three Estates, is no Treason. It is answered, that it being but too ordinary in the Minority of our Kings to have great Factions amongst the Nobility (which shews also the danger of placing the Supream Power in the Proceres Regni) one of the Factions ordinarily ei­ther having made the young King Prisoner, or using to assault the Castle where he was really preserved: It was therefore most wise­ly declared by this Statute, That to lay hands upon the Kings Person violently, what Age the King be of, young or old, or to As­sail Castles or Places where the Kings Per­son shall happen to be, without the Consent of the three Estates, shall be punished as Treason. That is to say, that so great respect was to be had to his sacred Person, that no violence was to be offered to the Place where he was, until the same was allowed by the three Estates. But in all the former Laws, as well as those made in our Age, it is still declared Treason to rebel against the Kings Person, or to refuse to assist him without adding, except the same be done by [Page 133] the three Estates, which shews that there's no­thing design'd in this Act in favour of their Authority, and that this King was Minor the time of this Act; and that he had great Troubles in his Youth, is very clear from the short characters given of our Kings, by Skeen, in the end of our Acts of Par­liament.

It will (I hope) easily appear by the ballance of these Arguments, that at least the Municipal Laws of our Nation, which punish Defensive Arms as Treason, should be obey'd by our Countrey-men, since, as I have oft inculcated, the Laws of any Na­tion should still be obey'd, except where they are inconsistent with the Word of God; and the most that the most violent Republicans alive can say upon this Subject, is, that the case may be debated by pro­bable Arguments, and that neither of the Positions want their inconveniencies, so that in this, as in all other Debates, the Law of each Nation is the best Judge to decide such Controversies, and therefore such as maintain these Principles, after so many positive and reiterated Laws, are ob­liged for preserving the Peace of humane [Page 134] Society, and the Order which God has establisht, to remove from places where they cannot obey, for they will always find some place where the Government will please them, and better they be disquieted, than the Government of the whole World should be disturb'd: But if they will stay, and oppose the Government, it must be ex­cus'd, to execute those who would destroy it.

Having thus glanc'd only at Answers to these Objections, because I think the Objections rather plausible than strong, I shall sum up this Debate with these Re­flections.

First, Buchannan, and our Republican Authors, debate all these Grounds, as if we were yet to form the Government, under which we were to live, wheras we live un­der, and are sworn to a Monarchy, fixt by Law and Consent, time out of mind, and the Levellers may as well urge that no No­bleman should be dignifi'd, nor no Gentle­man enriched above a man of good sence; and Tenants may argue that it is not rea­sonable, that they bearing God's Image [Page 135] as well as the Master, should toil to feed their Lusts: Thus Reason may be distort­ed, and we call that Treason and Providence, which pleases us best.

Secondly, Most of their Citations and Au­thorities, are the Sentiments of those Greeks and Romans who liv'd under Common­wealths, and so magnifi'd their Countrey in opposition to Usurpers; whereas our King is the Father of our Countrey, and whatever they said of their Countrey, we should say of him, and therefore these Citations concern us no more than the Law of England binds Scotchmen; they praise their own Children and Servants, for their Faithfulness and Obedience to them, and yet they rail at us for being faithful to our great Master and chief Parent under God.

Thirdly, Most of the Authors cited and admir'd by them, are Heathens, particular­ly Stoicks, who equall'd themselves not on­ly to Kings, but to their own Gods, and against whose selfishness and pride, all Chri­stians have justly exclaim'd, and so they are not competent Judges, nor sure Guides to Christians, in the exercise of those purely [Page 136] Christian Vertues of Humility, Submission, Self-denial, Patience, Faith, and Reliance upon God.

Fourthly, They balance not all the con­veniences and inconveniences of either Go­vernment, but magnifie the one, and conceal the other; and thus it is true that Kings may be Tyrants, but so may, and usually are the Leaders of the Rabble: Cromwel was such, and Shaftsbury had been such; he was such in his Nature, and had been such in his Government; and the Distractions of a Ci­vil War, which ordinarily attend Compe­titions amongst Republicans, destroy more than the Lusts of any one Tyrant can do, which made Lucan, tho a Republican, and of the Pompeyan Party, conclude, after a sad re­view of the continued Civil Wars betwixt Sylla and Marius, Caesar and Pompey, with­out considering what followed under the Trium viri.

Fifthly, Those who debate against Magi­stracy, gratifie their own Vanity and Inso­lence; [Page 137] but such devout men as Ambrose, Augustine, Ʋsher, and others, debate against the dictates of Interest, as well as Passion; which two, nothing save Grace can over­come, and there can be no surer mark of Conviction than to decide against these.

Lastly, Even Buchannan repented his hor­rid Doctrine, Cambden, 10. year of Queen Elizabeths Reign, in 1567.

But forasmuch as Buchannan being trans­ported with partial affection, and with Mur­rays bounty, wrote in such sort, that his said Books have been condemned of falshood by the Estates of the Realm of Scotland, to whose Credit more is to be attributed; and he himself sighing and sorrowing, sundry times blam'd himself (as I have heard) be­fore the King, to whom he was School-ma­ster, for that he had imploy'd so virulent a Pen against that well deserving Queen, and upon his Death-bed wished that he might live so long, till by recalling the truth, he might even with his Blood, wipe away those Aspersions, which he had by his bad Tongue falsly laid upon her, but that (as he said) it would now be in vain, when he might seem to dote for Age, &c.

Idem, Anno 1582.

And not content with all this (speaking of their surprizing the King) they compell'd the King against his Will, to approve of this intercepting of his Letters to the Queen of England, and to decree an Assembly of the Estates, summoned by them to be just, yet could they not induce Buchannan to ap­prove of this their Fact, either by writing, or perswasion by Message, who now sorrow­fully lamented, that he had already under­taken the Cause of Factious people against their Princes, and soon after Died, &c.