WE need not look far for a reason for the Invocation; the Practice of the Poets is obvious, and the Wantonness of the Epicureans is as notorious. Epicurus is observed by Dionysius, Bishop of Alexandria, to fill his Book with Oaths and Adjurations: ^* [...]. He inserts many Oaths and Adjurations in his Books, swearing often and adjuring his Readers by Jupiter and all the Gods: And we may find Lucretius too sometimes of this humour: But I rather believe, that like a Poet, and according to the Principles of his Philosophy, he applies himself to Venus, that is, the common natu­ral appetite to Procreation; which nevertheless he treats as a Goddess, and gives her all her Titles, as if really he expected some assistance: yet even here he shews his Spight to Religion, and scatters bitter reflections on the then Fashionable Devotion. And had he stopt here, had he not propos'd Principles of Irreligion drawn from the Happiness of the Deity, which therefore must be universal, and against all Religion under whatsoever denomination; he might have been read with much Profit, and Satisfaction, as an excellent Satyrist against the Heathen Worship, for he severely scourges the Mad Zeal of Men-sacrificers: and tho perchance he hath not pro­pos'd a true Instance in Iphigenia, yet Histories, both Sacred and Profane, of former and present Ages, give us too many sad Relations of such Cruelties. But since he openly declares that the Design of his Writing is to free Men from the Fears of that Hea­venly Tyrant, Providence, and induce perfect Sere­nity, that boasted [...] of Epicurus, and in pursuit of this, endeavours to maintain the great Dictate of his Master, Nihil beatum, nisi quod quie­tum; Nothing is happy but what is supinely idle and at ease: I shall examine his vain Pretensions, and in order to it present you with a Summary of the Epicurean Religion.

If any Man considers the Inconsistences that are in the Epicurean Notion of a Deity, how the Attri­butes disagree, and how the very Being thwar [...]s all their other Philosophy, he will easily agree with Yully, and admit his Censure to be true, Verbis po­nunt, Re tollunt Deos: In Words they assert, but in Effect they deny a GOD: which is seconded by Dionysius in Eusebius, ^* [...]. 'Tis evident that after Socrates was put to death, being afraid of the Athenians, that he might [...] seem what really he was, an Atheist; he fashioned some empty shadows of fantastical Deities: But since Antiquity hath but three Atheists on record, why should we increase the Catalogue? He therefore asserts a Divine Nature, and proves it from the common consent of Mankind; which doth not [...] from any Innate Idea's, as Gassendus phrases it, those being altogether strangers to his Hypothesis: for every Idea is a Mode of Thinking, and no Thought can arise, according to the Epicurean Principles, but from a previous Image; and therefore Lucretius makes the Cause of this General Consont to be the con­stant deflux of Divine Images, ^a which strike the Mind: And Atticus the Platonist ^b asserts it to be the common Doctrin of the Garden, [...]. That the good Emanations from the Gods bring great Advantages to those that re­ceive them: To this Democritus his Prayer, [...], That he might receive good Images, and ^c Cicero agrees, and I hope Gassendus his bare denial cannot stand in competition with all these. This Divine Nature is brancht out into many, his Gods are numerous, and even exceed the Catalogue of Apollodorus; and this he gathers from that [...], which must be in the Universe, Si enim mortalium tanta multitudo, immortalium non minor, & si quae in­terimant, item quae conservent, Infinita, Their Sub­stance is not immaterial; and Velleius reprehends Plato for his [...], as inconsistent with Sense, Prudence and Pleasure, and yet he cannot allow it to be a Coalition of Atoms, for that would destroy their necessity of Being, and infer Discerpibility; but they have quasi corpus, and quasi sangui [...]em, a Fancy perchance receiv'd from Homer,

They are of the Figure of a Man, That seeming the most beautiful, and the only receptacle of Rea­son, without which the Gods cannot be vertuous, nor happy: Their Knowledge infinite, and bound­less; for Velleius in Tully, to confute Pythagoras, boldly enquires Cur quidquam ignoraret Animus Ho­minis, si esset Deus? Easie and quiet is their Life; and therefore unconcerned with the affairs of the World; for being full of themselves, why should they look on others, or trouble their Minds with the consideration of less Perfection, when they can expect no advantage nor addition to their Happi­ness: yet these Glorious Beings are to be reverenced for the excellency of their Nature. Our Piety and Religion must be Heroical, not forced by Fear, or raised by Hope: Interest must not bribe, nor Ter­ror affright us to our Duty; but our Devotion must be free, and unbyassed by the sollicitations of the One, or the impulse of the Other. These, in short, are Epicurus his Deities, and this is the Sum of his Religion: A sufficient Instance, that Men may dream when they are awake, and that absurd Fancies are not only the consequents of Sleep. Let [...]s look on the Favourers of these Opinions, and what [...]re they but exact Images of Timon's Philosophers?

For, as Tully long ago observed, 'tis their usual Cu­ [...]tom to avoid Difficulties by proposing Absurdities; [...]hat the less may not be discerned, whilst all Mens Eyes are on the greater. For first, not to require [...]n Explication of their unintelligible quasi corpus, [...]nd quasi sanguis, it is very easie to be prov'd, and [...] direct Consequence from their established Prin­ [...]iples, that the Matter of the Deities is perfectly like [...]at of our Bodies, and so discerpible; nor can [...]ey find any secure retreat for their Gods, beyond [...]e reach and power of troublesome Atoms, which [...]attering every where must disturb their ease, de­ [...]troy their quiet, and threaten a dissolution. For [...]nce the Images that flow from them, move the [...]ind, which they assert Material, those must be [...]ody, Tangere enim & tangi sine corpore nulla potest [...]. And since 'tis the Nature of Body to resist, the [...]reater and heavier the Atoms are, the stronger and [...]e more forcible will be the stroak on the Divine [...]bstance; and consequently in this dissolution of [...]orlds, in these mad whirls of Matter, unless [...]ey remove them beyond the infinite Space, their [...]eities must be endangered: for they are not per­fect Solids, and above the power and force of Im­pulse, such combinations being unfit for Sense, or Animal Motion. And thus the Epicureans must ne­cessarily fall into that absurdity, for which Velleiu [...] lashes Anaximander, Nativos esse Deos, & longis in­tervallis orientes & occidentes. But since they offer as a reason, that Immateriality is inconsistent with Sense and Pru [...]nce, I shall consider that in it's pro­per place▪ and now examine how Omnisciency can agree with their Gods. Lucretius in his Fifth Book asks the question, How the Gods could have those Ideas of Man, Sun, Moon and Stars, before they were form'd? From whence 'tis easily concluded, that they imagine the Divine Perception arises from the same Causes that Man's doth, viz. from some subtile Images that flow from the surfaces of Things, and enter at the Senses. Now it had been an attempt worthy the soaring Wit of our Poet, to have de­scribed the passages of these Images; how they reach the Happy Seats entire, how these light Airy things are undisturbed by the rapid whirls of Mat­ter, and how at last they should all conveniently turn round, and enter at the Eyes of the Deity. For if ours can ascend thither, why not the Forms of these things, that lie scatter'd through the infinite Worlds reach us? No, their Gods must be as sensless, as they are careless; no intruding Images must disturb their thoughts, or turn them from the contemplation of their Happy Selves; no doubt their Ease will scarce agree with such troublesome agita­tions, and like the soft Sybarite, should the Image of a Man digging incroach upon them, they must necessarily undergo a [...].

As for the Figure they please to allow them, we must needs acknowledge it a wonderful chance, that Man (for that's the most proper Opinion) should [...] much resemble the Divine Nature; but I had [...]ather believe all the Adulteries in the Poets, than that Man was made after the Image of the Deity with­out his Direction. Besides, what need of all these Members? Why must they have Eyes, unless they have a Looking▪ glass in their Hands? Why Mouth, [...]nd Teeth, which will never be imployed? and why doth not that fancied [...] in the Universe, re­quire Immortal Men, and Immortal Beasts? for that would make the Equability more perfect. These [...]re absurdities fit for the Credulity of an Epicurean, [...]eyond imagination had not these Men abetted [...]hem, and made good to the utmost that severe Re­ [...]lection of Tully, Nihil est tam absurdum quod non al [...] ­ [...]uis è Philosophis asserat.

Now I come to consider, whether Providence is [...]nconsistent with the happiness of the Deity.

And here the Epicureans are prest with the Con­ [...]ent of Mankind, there being no Nation but hath [...]ome shadow of Piety, which must be founded on the Belief of Providence, That being the Basis of all Na­tural Religion. The Stoicks took the Notion of their [...], their Intelligent and [...]iery Spirit, from the excellent▪ order and disposition of the Universe. The [...] Mind of Anaxagoras is sufficiently known. Nor was Aristotle an Enemy to Providence, tho, as 'twas generally thought, and as Atticus the Platonist words it, [...], confining Providence within the Moon' [...] Orb, he leaves nothing below to his direction, and com­pares him to Epicurus; [...]. For 'tis the same thing to us to have nò Dèity at all, as to have such a [...] with whom [...] can have no Communication. And Athenagoras delivers it as the Doctrin of the Peripatum [...]: That Providence takes care of nothing below the Skie: And Origen, [...]. Aristotle 's Opinions concerning Providence were somewhat less im­pious than those of Epicurus: But Authority will pre­vail little with a proud Epicurean, whose Talent it is to scoff at all beside his own Sect, and underva­lue every Man that is not delighted with the weeds of his Garden.

And here it must be observed, That as Epicurus circumscribed the Deity with the Finite Figure of a Man; so he measured all his Actions by the same Model, and thought and intermedling with the Af­fairs of the World, would bring cares, trouble and distraction; because he sometimes observ'd a ne­cessary Connexion betwixt these two, in those little intervals of Business that disturbed his Ease and quiet. A fond Opinion, directly contra [...]y to the Consent of the World, his own Principles and Pra­ctice. For what trouble can it be for that Being, whom a bare Intuition (for he grants him Omnisci­ent) acquaints with all the springs and wheels of Nature; who perfectly knows the frame, and with a nod can direct and rule the Automation: For Self-existence necessarily infers Omnipotence. For what can determine the mode of Existence in that Being. what confine its Power, what circumscribe it, since it depends on nothing but it self? And since the Deity is the most excellent of Beings, how can it want that Amiable Attribute Benevolence? Will not an Epicurean commend it in the Master of the Garden? Will he not be prodigal in his Praises, and call the Athenian a God for his Philosophy, and make his numerous Books ( Laer [...]ius calls him [...]) an argument for his [...]? And are all these commendations bestowed on him, because he made himself unhappy? Or must the Deity be deprived of that perfection, which is so lovely in Man, and which all desire he should en­joy; because when dangers press, they seek for re­lief to Heaven; and passionately expect descending succour? Which sufficiently declares that the be­lief of the Providence, is as Vniversal, as that of the happiness of the Deity, and founded on the same reason; for, as Tully argues, fac imagines esse quibus pulsentur animi, species quaedam duntaxat objicitur, num etiam cur beata sit? cur aeterna? And consequently, the same Reason dictating that Providence is an At­tribute, requires as strong an assent, as when it de­clares Happiness to be one, since neither can be in­ferred from the bare impulse of the Images. For suppose the stroke constant, yet what is This (as Lucretius would have it) to Eternity? And why may not any thing we think upon, be esteemed immortal on the same account? Suppose the Impulse continual, yet what conexion between that and Happiness? So that the Epicurean's Argument recoils against him­self, and he is foiled at his own Weapons.

And now who can imagine such absurd Princi­ples proper to lead any rational Enquirer to Sereni­ty? Will it be a comfort to a good man to tell him as ^a Aristophanes speaks, [...], instead of Jupiter a Whirl-wind rules, when 'tis his greatest interest that there should be a mer­ciful Disposer who takes notice of, and will re­ward his Piety. It will be an admirable security no doubt for his honesty, to assure his malicious ene­mies, that nothing is to be feared but their own discovery: And unless their Dreams prove trea­cherous, or their Minds rave, they are secure in their villanies, and may be wicked as often as they can fortunately be so; as often as Occasion invites, or Interest perswades. When Common-wealths may be preserved by breaking the very Band of Society, [...] as ^b Poly­bius calls Religion? when Treasons may be stifled by taking off from Subjects all obligations, but their own weakness, to Duty; and when a Demo­cles can sit quietly under his hanging Sword; then the denial of Providence, then the belief of a World made, and upheld by chance, will be a remedy a­gainst all Cares, and a necessary cause of that desired [...], serenity of Mind.

The two Principles of Epicurus are Body, and Void; that the former is Sense sufficiently declares; and the latter is here evidently proved by two (for the others are easily eluded) Arguments: The first is drawn from motion; the second, from the par­ting of two flat smooth Bodies.

^b Plutarch roundly tells us [...] All the natural Philosophers from Thales to Plato deny'd [...] Vacuum. But ^c Laertius declares, that Diogenes Apolloniates, who lived in the time of Xerxes pro­nounced, [...], Void space is infinite. For the Antiquity of that Opinion I shall not be sollicitous, tho the Reasons are strong, and obvious enough to make it ancient; for what is more obvi­ous than motion? And how necessarily this infers a Vacuum, is very easily discovered. Motion is change of Place, which change is impossible in a Plenum; for whatever endeavours to change its place must thrust out other Bodies; and so if the Full be infinite, the Protrusion must be so; if fi­nite, the Endeavour is in vain; and therefore all must be fixed in eternal rest, and Archimedes him­self with his Engine would not be able to move the least Particle of Matter. ^a Cartes proposes a so­l [...]tion, much applauded by his admirers, but a lit­tle attention will find it vain, and weak, and con­tradictory to his own settled Principles. For when any Body moves in a strait line, it must give the Body that lies before it, the same determination with [...]t self; and how this determination should al­ter, and the Motion prove circular, neither Cartei, nor his followers, have condescended to explain. But grant (tho the former reason hath proved i [...] impossible) that there may be such an attending Circle of Ambient Air, yet unless it be perfectly Mathematical, (a thing very hardly supposed) each Particle will require another attending Circle, and so not the least Fly stin her wing, unless the whole Universe is troubled. To this may be added, that 'tis unconceiveable how the most solid Matter (for such is his first Element) can so soon alter its fi­gure, or be so easily dissolved and fitted to the different spaces that lie between the little Globules. We see Gold and Adamant resist the roughest stroke, 'tis Pains and constant Labour that must dissolve them; how then can we imagine this Element will yield? But indeed [...]artes proposes his Ambient at­tending Circle as the only way to solve the Pheno­menon of Motion in a Full, which he thought he had sufficiently before evinced: But his Argu­ments are weak and sophistical. For in the first of his Meditations, he never takes notice of Impe­netrability, in which the very Essence of Mat­ter consists; and in the second Part of his Princi­ples, he mistakes the notion of a Void, and confounds Substance and Body: Take his own Words. Vacuum au­tem Philosophico more sumptum, h. e. in quo nulla pla­nè sit substantia dari non posse manifestum est; ex e [...] quod extensio Spati [...] non differt ab extensione Corporis: Nam cùm ex eo solo quòd Corpus sit extensum in longum, latum, & profundum, rectè concludamus illud esse Sub­stantiam, quia omnino repugnat ut nibili sit aliqua ex­tensio: Idem etiam de Spatio, quòd Vacuum supponi [...]ur, concludendum est; quòd nempe cùm in eo sit extensio, necessariò etiam in ipso sit substantia: For Void doth not exclude all Substance, but only Body; and Sub­stance and Body, are not convertible in the full la­titude of an universal Proposition.

Secondly, 'tis evident, that when two smooth flat Bodies are separated by a perpendicular Force, the ambient Air cannot fill all the space at once, and therefore there must necessarily be a Void, and this ^a Mr. Hobs a great Plenist, freely confesseth would fol­low, if the Bodies were infinitely hard; but since Nature knows no such, any Bodies tho perfectly smooth, may be separated by a force that overcomes their solidity, and yet no Vacuum ensue. A pretty Invention, but extreamly agreeable to the Phaen [...] ­menon; for in the exhausted Receiver, where there is no prop of Under-Air left to sustain it, the lower Marble falls in by its own weight. Mr. Hobs adds ano­ther Argument, which is of no force against the Vacuist, but overthrows his own Notion of a Ma­terial Deity: These are the Words. He that created Natural Bodies, is not a Fancy, but the most real Sub­stance that is; who being infinite, there can be no place empty where he is, nor full where he is not.

Now the other reasons of Lucretius are insuffici­ent: For that drawn from the different weight of Bo­dies, would infer immense vacuities in the Air, which is two thousand times ^a lighter than Gold; and that from Rarefaction, and Condensation, is not co­gent, tho 'tis the most rational opinion, and more agreeable to the mind of Aristotle, than that which is commonly proposed as his. ^b [...]. That is Dense between whose parts there is a closer; That Rare between whose Par­ticles there is a looser connexion.

Sextus Empiricus declares, that Epicurus hated the Mathematicks, and we may believe Lucretius follow [...] his Master; since in his Disputes concerning the indivisibility of Atoms, he proposes the populat argument against the known and demonstrated property of Quantity, infinite Divisibility: For a [...] long as Mathematicks can boast any certainty, th [...] must be acknowledged to be such.

I shall not engage in this unnecessary Controversie, (tho I believe those common Arguments against in­finite Divisibility are empty Sophisms, and a little at­tention (as whoe're considers the method in which they are proposed must observe) will find them full of contradictions, and founded on absurdities:) for the indivisibility of an Atom, proceeds not from the littleness, but the Solidity: for since the Atoms are of different figures, some Triangular, some Square, &c. 'Tis absurd to imagine, that the Mind (by which only Atoms are perceived) cannot fancy a Diagonal in the Square, or a Perpendicular erected to the Basis of the Triangle: yet from this Mental to the Physical Divisibility of an Atom (as Cartes pro­ceeds) is extreamly weak and deficient. That there are some solid Particles, Lucretius hath evi­dently proved: These Democritus called [...], first Magnitudes, Epicurus [...]. Atoms from their indissoluble Soli­dity, but as ^a Dionysius observes, [...]: they so widely disagreed that Epicurus made all his Atoms to be leasts, and therefore insensible, but Democrit [...]s suppos'd some of his to be very great: Heraclides [...]: but none of all his reasons prove them unchangeable. For if Solidity, i. e. immediate Contact were a necessary cause of indivisibility, it would follow, that no piece of Matter could be divided, because the parts that are to be separated, enjoy an immediate Contact, and that Contact must be between S [...]rfaces as large as Atoms, or, at least, some of their fancied Parts. Besides, let two hard Bodies perfectly smooth be joyned together in a com­mon Superficies, parallel to the Horizontal Plain, and certain Experience will assure us, that any force that is able to overcome the resistance of the supporting Air, will easily divide them. His other Arguments are all unconcluding: for suppose the Se [...]ds not eter­nal, i. e. divisible, 'tis a strange inference, There­fore Beings rise from nothing, since any Body, and therefore one of these solid Particles, is not reduced into Nothing by division, but only into smaller parts: And the weakness of the rest is so obvious, that I shall not spend time in declaring it.

The rest of the first Book, contains a successful Dispute against Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, and others, and concludes with the immensity of the All, where tho he hath scatter'd many things, (as the Motion, and Weight of Atoms, &c.) which deserve examinati­on, I shall not disturb him in the midst of his Triumphs, but only take notice that, p. 31. l. 18. he overthrows his own Opinion, concerning the Nature of the Deity, and makes it subject to the same dissolution with o­ther Compounds