SInce the First Dialogue was Printed ther is come out a Socinian Sheet against it, In­tituled, Remarks on Mr. Char­les Leslei's first Dialogue on the Soci­nian Controversy. And I think it Pro­per to take notice of it here, for it may help to Illustrat more at Large what is there said in short. And be­cause I hear some say, it is well Wrote, and that many lay Stress up­on it.

(1.) First I Observe that this Re­marker has not kept up to that Cha­racter the Socinian Writers give them­selves (but without much Reason, as I have shew'd in these Dialogues) of being the fairest Adversaries, and an Example to all others of Managing Controversy without Heat or Passion, or Personal Reflections. For he has treated me in a very Rough Manner, calling the Instances I bring Ridicu­lous, p. 1. And that I am Paganish in in my Notions, p. 6. And says, p. 1. If such poor Philosophy, such shallow Reasoning, and such gross Divinity, must baffle the Socinians, I confess they ought to be the last who pretend to the Character of Men of Reason.

But notwithstanding all this Con­tempt of what I have said, I can­not but think it has given him some Trouble, because it has made him so Angry. For it is Losers that have leave to Talk at this Rate. And as you shall see him Talk afterwards.

(2.) My Argument was, That we cannot Charge any thing to be a Contradiction in one Nature, because it is so in Another, unless we under­stand both Natures. Because a Na­ture we understand not cannot be Ex­plain'd to us but by Allusion to some Nature we do understand. And ther is that Difference in Natures that no Allusion will lie betwixt them, that is, none that is Proper, that will come up to the thing, or give a Person who Knows not the Nature a true Idea of it, or even Reconcile it from Contradiction, while he Considers the Nature he do's not Understand, by way of Allusion to another Nature which he do's Understand.

(3.) To Illustrate this I gave seve­ral Instances, of which this Remar­ker has p. 1. pick'd out two to shew his Wit upon. One is, That if a Man cou'd he Suppos'd to be with­out Thought, it wou'd be Impossible to make Him Apprehend what it was, or the Progress of it, as from Hence to Rome in an Instant, &c. It is Com­mon to say to a Man that is Muse­ing, Where are you? And to Answer I was at Rome, or such a Place. Now supposing any one (if it were possi­ble) not to know what Thought was, he wou'd Apprehend your Body was Remov'd to Rome and Back again as soon as you cou'd speak. And by Allusion to the Motion of Body, this cou'd not be Reconcil'd to him from being a Flat Contradiction, that any thing cou'd move a Thousand Miles as soon as a Yard.

In answer to this the Remarker tells you p. 1. That when you think of Rome or any other Place, 'tis only the Idea of it in your Imagination which you Con­template, [Page 2]and not a Leap or Local Mo­tion of your Thoughts to it.

Who knows not this that has any Thought? But upon the Supposition that a Man did not know what Thought was, he cou'd have no Apprehension of it but as of a Local Motion. And what you call Idea he wou'd fancy to be some Horse or Coach that Carry'd you very Swiftly; which yet wou'd not solve the Contradiction as to him, because the Swiftness of the Motion, suppose it a Cannon Bullet, cannot go two yards so soon as One.

(4.) But because it may be too Ex­travagant to suppose a Man without Thought, tho' some have very Little; and Suppositions are Allow'd in Argu­ment even of what never was; yet I Insist not on this, but have given another Instance which is Fact, and daily before us, that is, of a Man Born Blind. And how you cou'd give him any Notion of Sight, or Ex­plain to him how the Eye can Reach a Star as soon as the Top of the Chim­ney? He can feel his Eye with his Hand, and that it is there Fixt and do's not go out of his Head, how then can he Imagin it gets a Thousand Miles off in an Instant, while he Feels it do's not Stir at all? He can have no Notion of this but by Allusion to some other of his Senses which he has. And by the word Reach, how the Sight can Reach a Star, he fancies Arms or Legs, that being all the way by which he can Reach to any thing. And then know­ing that the Motion of Legs or Arms must go one yard before it go's two, he takes your Description of Sight to be not only some Strange and Wonder­ful thing, which he will readily Grant; but he will Insist that it is a flat Con­tradictior. And therefore that he must not Believe it. And it is Im­possible to Explain it so to him as to Reconcile it from being a Contradicti­on to him.

To this says the Remarker very In­geniously, when we see the Stars, our Eyes move not up to them, but their extended Rays strike upon the Eye. But the man Born Blind wou'd say, No­thing Strikes upon my Eye, for then I shou'd Feel it. And he knows nothing what you mean by Rays or by See. Nor cou'd think of any other way but that the Eye must get up [...] the Star, or the Star come do [...]n [...]o the Eye. And your talking of Rays will not Solve the Contradiction one bit as to him. Nor can he be any other­wise Convinc'd than by Persuading him that what is a Contradiction in one Nature he understands, must not be Concluded to be so in another Na­ture he do's not understand, and that the Nature of Sight is such as that no Allusion from any other of his Senses can make him Apprehend what it is. Nothing but this can Silence his Mur­murings about Contradiction.

Is it not Reason then that our Murmurings about Contradiction in the Nature of God shou'd be Silenc'd, see­ing it can be told us no otherwise than by such Words and Allusions as are Proper to Man; And that the Divine Nature is Infinitly more Di­stant and Diverse from the Nature of Man than one of our Senses is from another? And as the Contradiction the Blind-man conceives in the Na­ture of Sight is Caus'd by his com­paring it with the Motion of his Legs or Arms, and that occasion'd by improper Words we must use to him, all others being Ʋnintelligible to him but what have Allusion to some of the Senses he has: So in like manner those Contradictions we Conceive in the Nature of God are all Occasion'd by the improper Words which must be us'd to us in Expres­sing of His Nature, all Words being totally Ʋnintelligible to us, which have not Allusion to something we un­derstand. And thus we Conceiving [Page 3]of God after the manner of Men, make all those things to be Contra­dictions in God which in our Con­ception of the Words are a Contra­diction to Men. As that several Per­sons shou'd not be several Men, and that the Father shou'd not be before the Son, &c. Whereas these Terms of Father, Son, Persons, &c. are not pro­per to the Nature of God, (tho' the most Proper we can use or under­stand) And therefore we are not to Conceive of them in the manner they are us'd and apply'd to Men, nor draw Consequences from them as we do when these Words are Apply'd to Men. Otherwise we shall Run into the like Contradictions as the Blind-man about Sight.

This will throw off all that the Remarker says of Inferring three Gods from the Term of three Persons, be­cause it is so among Men. He talks like a Blind-man of Colours, of things which he must Confess he do's not understand; yet will be inferring Contradictions in them. He owns he cannot speak Properly of them, yet finds fault with the Terms we use, because they are not Proper, tho' he can find none more Proper.

(5.) He may as well say, That God is not Eternal, because we have no word to Express Duration higher than the word Beginning, and ther can be no Beginning in Eternity.

He may say it is a Contradiction that all things shou'd be Present with God (which yet he will not Deny to be an undoubted Verity) because it is a Contradiction to Men, that the Past or Future shou'd be Present, be­cause then a thing wou'd be Past and not Past, Future and not Future at the same time.

These and other things I menti­oned in my first Dialogue, but the Remarker takes no notice of them, nor will own the Absurdity of infer­ring Contradictions in God from Con­tradictions in Man, occasion'd by the Improper Terms we are Forc'd to make use of to Express God after the manner of Men.

(6.) But he has laid his Stress up­on this Instance I brought of the Blind man. And here he thinks he has an Advantage of me. And I am willing to join Issue with him up­on it, That if he can find out any Words that are Proper, whereby to Express the Nature of Sight to a Man Born Blind, and that he will give the Blind-man leave to draw Consequences and infer Contradictions from such Words according as he un­derstands them; then I will under­take to solve all the Contradictions that he pretends to muster up in the Terms whereby we Express the Ho­ly Trinity. And let him shew any Difference betwixt these Cases if he can, only this, That far greater Di­sparity ought to be Allow'd as to the Propriety of Words when Terms belonging to Men are spoke of God, than when what belongs to one of our Senses is Apply'd to another.

(7.) And now let the Reader Judge what occasion he had of thus Insul­ting me, p. 1.

‘But are you indeed (says he to me) so very weak as to think you move all the way to Rome, and are got thi­ther as soon as you think of it? No, Sir, whatever hast you may be in thi­ther, you go no faster than your Legs can carry you. And shou'd You Challenge all the Philosophy in the World? Who have so little as not to know, that when you think of Rome, or any other Place, 'tis only the Idea of it in your I­magination which you Contem­plate, and not a Local Motion of your Thoughts to it. In like man­ner, when we see the Stars our [Page 4] Eyes move not up to them, but their Extended Rayes strike upon the Eye. I see you have a Head much fitter for entertaining and coining Mysteries, than for Explai­ning or Defending 'em. It's a wonder you did not think rather, that Rome or Constantinople shift and come into your Head: And then since in other Cases a lesser Ves­sel cannot contain a greater, nor a Nut-shel hold an House; you might wonder how your little Head should hold such great Ci­ties; And with the same Philoso­phy infer, that what is a Contradi­ction to Nutshels is none to Heads, and Challenge all Philosophy to Re­concile it.’

Now, Reader, has he not fully un­derstood me, do you think, and an­swer'd me smartly?

(8.) But will you see him freely Confessing what he thus Ridicules? He says in this same p. 1.

‘Indeed there may be something attributed to one Nature, where there is nothing Inconsistent, or Contradictory to it; while if at­tributed to another it might meet with somthing Inconsistent, whence a Contradiction will arise in the one and not in the other.’

Now this is the whole of what I have been contending for. I desire no more of him. And having gran­ted this, how can he Deny that what is a Contradiction in one Nature, that is, of Man, may not be so in another Nature, that is, of God? Or are ther any two Natures more Distant and more Different than the Nature of God and of a Creature? Or do we understand the Nature of God more Perfectly and Clearly than our own Nature? Is it not Reasonable then what I said, as he Quotes my words, p. 2. That we must not ob­ject Contradictions in the Incomprehen­sible Nature of God, from Comparing it with our own. Because we Ʋnder­stand not his Nature. To which the Remarker says,

(9.) ‘I should grant this, in an object of which we have no know­lege at all: But surely if I have some, tho' a partial knowlege of the Infinite God, I may discern what is Contradictory to that lit­tle knowlege of him. Nor is any thing more usual or Just, than to Deny such or such a Doctrine, be­cause Incompatible to the Divine Attributes, to his Spirituality, Eter­nity, Goodness, &c.’

To which I reply, That the Nature and Attributes of any thing are Dif­ferent. We may know the Attri­butes, when we cannot know the Na­ture. As we may see the River, but cannot Reach the Spring whence it flows. And this Dispute of the Trinity is not about any of the Attri­butes of God, but Concerning His ve­ry Nature and Essence, and how His Being is Compos'd, (if I might use that Word) of which I may say we are totally Ignorant, it is a Light In­accessible to us, we know Nothing of it at all. And therefore cannot Charge Contradiction in the Revela­tion that is given to us of it. If we look Directly upon the Sun in its Strength, we see Nothing at all, it Strikes us Blind. But if we turn our Backs, we Discern the Light that comes from it. The Attributes of God are the Rays of the Sun, but His Nature is the Sun it self, we cannot Look upon it. It is Utter Darkness to Us, through the Ex­cess of the Light. We can Discern Nothing at all in it, or say it is Thus or Thus, or that This or That is Contradictory to it. Alass, how little do we know of our own Na­ture; [Page 5]We know it only by the Ef­fects and the Qualities we find in our Selves. But what it is in its self we cannot tell, we are Exceed­ingly in the Dark. And so as to the Nature of Trees, Flowers, Plants &c. We find by Experience such Effects and Vertues in them, but we know not the Nature or Essence of them, no not of a Pile of Grass, why of that Colour, Shape, or Vertue. How then can we Know what the Nature of God is? Or can we say it is not Rightly Reveal'd to Us in the Holy Scripture? Do we Know of what Composition our own Souls are made? Or how they Act in Us? Do we Know any thing at all of the Soul but by the Effects? We Know we Think, therefore we Conclude we have a Soul, but what that Soul is in its self, we Know not. Yet we wou'd Know the Nature of God!

(10.) This brings me to a Criti­cism of the Remarker upon the Parallel I made use of concerning the three Faculties of the Soul. He says, p. 3. That the Memory is not another Faculty, but only an Act of the Ʋnderstanding. Now I thought that the Ʋnderstanding was only Con­versant about what was then Pre­sent before it. And that the Me­monry brought back Past things, and so made them Present to the Ʋnder­standing. Whence a Man may have a good Ʋnderstanding, and yet a bad Memory. Do we say of the Ʋnderstanding that it Forgets? I take Truth or Falshood to be the Objects of the Ʋnderstanding. But is Love or Hatred so? A Man may have an Aversion, and not know the Reason of it.

Are ther Antipathys in the Ʋnderstand­ing? I think this is generally Attri­buted to the Will, and it is Agreed that it is a Distinct Faculty from the Ʋnderstanding. And if ther be Different Faculties in the same Soul, it Answers all the Purpose for which I brought that Parallel. Nay, if it be but so Thought, it do's as well for me, to Solve the Objection about Contradiction, That Men shou'd not think a Plurality of Persons in God to be a Contradiction when the same Diffi­culty arises from a Plurality of Facul­ties in the Soul. For Three Facul­ties can no more be One Faculty, than Three Persons can be One Per­son. And yet these Different Fa­culties make up but One and the Self same Soul.

(11.) But I have Sufficiently Caution'd that I intend not to bring any Proof from these Parallels, Nor lay the stress of the Cause upon them, yet I thought them not altogether Useless, to shew Men how far they may Mistake in Charg­ing Contradictions: from one Nature to another.

(12) I have likewise told, That no Parallel in Created Natures can Answer Exactly or Come up to the Nature of God, only Point Him out at a Great Distance, and with In­finite Disproportion. And therefore that we must not Argue Strictly from the One to the Other. Yet the Remarker will not Observe this, but Argues of the Persons of God as of Human Persons. And says, p. 4. If three Divine Persons be like three Human Persons—And if three Divine Persons should as Properly be accounted three Gods, as three Hu­man Persons can, in Strict Speech, be accounted three Men—Thence he Infers three Gods &c.

He cannot I think but see the Fallacie of this Argument, after all that I have said. But he will not see it! He will still Argue Strictly from the Word Person, and Apply it to God in the same manner that it is Us'd among Men. If he wou'd Apply the word Father so, (which himself gives to God) or God's be­ing said to Repent, to Grieve. &c. What Work wou'd he make, what Contradictions might he Infer? His Brother Socinian Mr. Biddle (as I have shew'd) turn'd Anthropomorphit by this sort of Argument, and from Man being said to be made after the Image of God, held God to have a Body, and of Human Shape. And he might as well have made Him a Bird too, because ther is Mention made of His Wings and Feathers! Psal. xci. 4. This Savours not of the Sagacity the Socinians think Peculiar to Themselves.

(13.) From the like Gross Con­ceptions the Remarker, p. 7. raises Difficulties how a Begotten Being can be God. Thinking of Begetting af­ter the Manner of Men! And then the Father must be in Time, as well as in Nature, before the Son. And it having been told him that sup­posing the Sun to be Eternal, its Light wou'd be as Eternal, he Re­plys, p. 7. That this Parallel will not do, for that the Light which (says he) You call an Effect of the Sun, is indeed the very Sun it self, so may well be as, Old. By which the very Sun we see in the Firmament, and is many times Bigger than the whole Earth, can Creep through a Cranny, and be All of it in this Room, and in a Thousand other Places at the same Time! This will help Trans-Substantiation not a lit­tle! But is it so indeed that this Subtile Socinian can see no Diffe­rence betwixt the very Sun it Self, and the Light that flows from it? It is then time to have done Di­sputing with him. And he Runs into as Great Absurdities to get Rid of these Parallels as he Charges upon me for making Use of them.

He says (as before Quoted, Sect. 4.) That when we See the Stars, our Eyes move not up to them, but their extended Rays strike upon the Eye. But if the Rays or the Light be the very Star it self, then the very Star it self Strikes upon the Eye. Let him Consider whether ther is any thing so very Gross as this in any of the Parallels I have produc'd. And on whose side lies the poor Philosophy, and Shallow Reasoning.

(14.) Therefore leaving this Sub­ject, I will now only Answer an Observation he makes from Scrip­ture, wherein he says, p. 2. God Almighty is Perpetually express'd in the Singular Number, Ʋnder One, He, Me, Thou, &c. Now lest the Reader of these Remarks should be Carry'd away with this, I must mind him, That this Socinian says this, without taking any Notice of the Texts I have given to the Contrary in the 2d Di­alogue p. 32, &c. Beginning with the first of Genesis where God is Spoken of in the Plural as well as the Singular Number according to the Hebrew, He is there called Gods, and Ʋs, as well as God, and Me. And is He not spoken of in the Plural Number in the Form of Baptism in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost? The Remarker ought to have Mark'd this, and not to have put the Objection over again, without saying something to the Answer had been made to it.

If this sheet gives him not full Satis­faction, I shall be willing to hear from him again.