REligion has been so long in Pos­session, so powerful have been its Influences, and so universal its Authority, so nearly is Man­kind concern'd in all it promives or threat­ens, [Page 2]and such mighty Consequences attend the Truth or Falshood of its Pretensions, that I have often wonder'd how the Men of these latter days, who are at such a di­stance from the first Rise of things, durst dispute a Title so well owned and attest­ed; the Denial of which is so dangerous, and which, if it had at first been false, they have no possible means left of dispro­ving; whereas on the contrary, the Evi­dences of its Truth are still in being, still fresh, and in all their strength of Convi­ction: as I hope in some measure to make good in the following Discourse.

I am very sensible I am engaged in a Subject, which several great and learned Men have already, and some of them very lately, treated of, with the wisest Refle­ctions and justest Reasoning imaginable. But, besides that Truth it self is fruitful, and a Subject of this nature hardly ever to be exhausted, the same Object may ad­mit of different Views, there may be new and more suitable ways of offering the same things to the Understanding, or old Arguments may be strengthen'd and fenc'd in from the Objections that have been for­merly rais'd against them by some additi­onal Supports: or, if there should be no­thing [Page 3]of all this in what I have to say, it may be sufficiently justified to the Adver­saries I have to deal with, if the same things are repeated again to their Shame and Confusion, who have hitherto found nothing to answer to them, and are yet in their Sins and Unbelief.

But since it is not so much their Convi­ction, which nothing but unpromis'd irre­sistible Grace can effect, as the securing and confirming others in the Truth that I chiefly aim at; since the encreasing and propagating a true sense of Religion among Men is my principal Design, and not a learned Triumph over an Adversary, I have suited my Method accordingly, and con­sequently have made Choice of such a one which in the general Management is diffe­rent, tho' in several parts of it, it must ne­cessarily fall in with that of others.

The Certainty and Necessity of Religion, is what I undertake to prove, and there­fore I shall consider Religion all together in the full Latitude and Extent of the Notion, and shall not insist wholly upon the Proof of a God as a first Cause, Mover, or Eternal Being, but so far only as the Existence of God is included in the Idea of Religion, and [Page 4]that in order to shew the necessary Connexi­on betwixt the Being of God and the Obli­gations of Religion: But since these Obliga­tions result from the Nature of Man, as well as the Being and Attributes of God, and from the Relation the one stands in to the other, I shall chiefly make Choice of such Arguments, as, being taken from what we know of our selves, are best per­ceived by us, and entertain'd with the least Resistance or Suspicion.

All nice and philosophical Reasonings I shall forbear, as much as I can; but, where the Nature of the Subject, or the particu­lar Prejudices of the Persons to be satisfied require a more speculative and metaphysi­cal Proof of things, I shall chuse out such Arguments of this kind, as will give the Understanding the least difficulty to com­prehend, and shall avoid all such, which tho' convincing to some that are already well used to Speculation, may chance to be suspected by others of too much Fine­ness, and so will probably, tho' very un­justly, create in them a Disgust to all the rest. And I shall all along take a due care to distinguish betwixt such Notions and Opinions as are absolutely necessary to the Being of Religion, and those others, which, [Page 5]tho' oftentimes used in the Defence of it, and earnestly contended for, do not de­stroy what they were brought to prove if they should be false, nor so much as alter any thing in the Nature or Obligations of Religion.

Now in order to pursue my intended Method with the more Clearness, I think my self obliged in this place to give an ac­count what I mean by Religion; a right Notion of which being first laid down, 'twill afterwards more easily and plainly appear, whether there be any such thing; and if there be, whether it is reasonable or necessary for Mankind to be influenced by it.

By Religion then, in general, I mean all that Worship, Service, or Obedience, we that call our selves Men are to pay to God; or whatever we are, in any respect, obliged to upon the Prospect of his Favour, or un­der the Penalty of his Displeasure in this or a future State. From whence 'tis plain, that in order to make it appear there is such a thing as Religion, we must prove that there is a God, or some superiour Be­ing, who can, and does oblige Man to live after such a particular manner; and [Page 6]that Man is capable of, and actually under such an Obligation, the Performance or Neglect of which, will be attended with very different Consequences, and those sufficient to determine him to act one way rather than another.

But if a Man was desirous of convincing such Persons as denied all this, where should he first set out in his Proof? What Order should he give his Thoughts? Where must he take his Rise when he is to prove original Foundation-Truths? What Evi­dence will be powerful enough to prevail upon those who love a Lye, and hate to be reform'd? How are they to be attempt­ed who are strongly fortified with their Prejudices, and have hardly left a Man that would attack them any Ground to stand upon? Such an unreasonable Defi­ance of the common Sense of Mankind, is justly thought by the Wisest Men to de­serve no other Confutation but that of Pu­nishment? However, since those who are yet innocent or indifferent may be corrup­ted, and those who are just entring upon the ways of Irreligion may be farther ad­vanc'd and confirm'd in them by more set­tled Atheists, the same is to be done for the Security of those as should be applied [Page 7]to the Conviction of these, if they were judged capable of being convinc'd; and therefore the Method to be used upon this Occasion must be such as will surest de­stroy the Pretences of Atheism, as well as give the easiest Account and most undeni­able Proofs of Religion; that so the Argu­ments made use of by the Perverters of Mankind may lose all their Power and Force upon others, by losing the Advantage of coming unanswer'd.

In order therefore to satisfy those who have not quite renounc'd their Reason of the Truth of Religion according as I have before described and stated it, and the Falshood of those Grounds upon which it is opposed, I shall proceed in this man­ner.

First, I shall give some Account of the Nature of Man, the Nature of God, and that Relation there is between them, so far as is necessary to establish the Notion of Religion.

Secondly, I shall prove that there is a God, or a Being of such a Nature as I be­fore supposed.

Thirdly, From the Knowledge I have shewn we have, or are capable of having, concerning the Humane and Divine Na­tures, I shall deduce a positive and direct Proof of Religion.

Fourthly, I shall farther evince the Truth of Religion, from a Comparison of it with Irreligion, and the necessary Consequences arising from thence.

Fifthly, I shall consider the Grounds and Pretences of Irreligion, what can be al­ledged in Defence of it, and what are the usual Pleas for it; and from thence shew the Absurdity and Folly of their Principles and Actions who have no better Reasons for what they Believe and Do, than those upon Examination will be found to be.

Sixthly, I shall make some Enquiries in­to the Causes of Atheism and Irreligion, or the Reasons that induce Men to take up such Opinions.

And conclude with a short Explication of the different Notions of Atheism and Deism.

[Page 9]I. First then, I am to give some Account of the Nature of Man, the Nature of God, and the Relation there is between them, so far as is necessary to establish the Notion of Religion.

The Knowledge of Religion, as of all other Things whatsoever, must begin from the Consideration of our Selves. Now our Existence being granted, the same Consci­ousness that satisfies us of this, if we care­fully attend to what passes within us, will farther inform us, that we are capable of Thinking, Perceiving, and Knowing; which Capacity is usually stiled Understanding; and that we have a Power of determining our selves to Think and not to Think, or Perceive and not Perceive certain Objects or Ideas, and to move and not to move certain parts of our Body, and by that means other contiguous Bodies; as like­wise a Power of Acting and not Acting, ac­cording to our own Determination: that is, we can actually entertain a Thought, or dismiss it; cause a Motion, or hinder it, when we have so determin'd with our selves, and that barely by determining so to do: which general Power of determining our Selves, and executing our own Determina­tions [Page 10]or Commands, is call'd the Will, and includes all that, is active within us. And upon further Reflexion we may find, that in several Instances we have an equal Pow­er to determine our selves to Think or not to Think, to Move or not to Move, and in several Instances an equal Power to Act or not to Act according to such Determi­nation; but in several others we can deter­mine our selves but one way; and in some, where we can determine our selves either way, we can obey but one Determination: In the first Cases we act with Liberty, in the latter we are under a Necessity: But all our Actions, in all the several Instances be­fore mention'd, are stiled voluntary, as pro­ceeding immediately and effectually from our selves, only when the Acting or not Acting proceeds wholly from some extrin­sick Violence surmounting the Strength of our Bodies, which is properly call'd Force as distinguish'd from Necessity; the Effects of which cannot truly be said to be ours, but belong to those Beings who employed that Force upon us.

'Tis plain also from Experience, that we are capable of Pleasure and Pain, by which I mean all manner of agreeable and disagreeable Sentiments, whether caus'd [Page 11]by our selves, or occasion'd by any thing without us; that these are the first and on­ly Springs of Action which set all our Pow­ers a-work, and give Rise to all our Deter­minations, the obtaining the one and a­voiding the other being the whole Employ­ment of the Soul; and that there are some Things which we are naturally, by our very Frame and Make, pleas'd or displeas'd with, without being taught by one another to be so, and consequently, that we desire and do, are averse from and forbear seve­ral things in Compliance with these first original Sentiments: From whence it fol­lows, that there is something antecedent to all manner of Action begun within our selves, which is the Reason of it, without which it had not been, which when taken away or ceasing, the Action ceases too, and there follows a Rest, Acquiescence, or Satisfaction. This Reason or Motive of Action is call'd an End; the Perception of which at a distance, or future, as such as would be, all things consider'd, more a­greeable to the Mind when present, than any thing it feels now, is the Cause of all those Actions which are look'd upon as re­quisite for the Attainment of it. Now if this Representation be true, and the Acti­ons [Page 12]proper and fit, a Man is said to act wisely, and for his true Interest and Ad­vantage; but, when either of these Con­ditions is wanting, he acts foolishly, and to his Disadvantage.

But, since by the same Experience we are inform'd that we may, and often do, act foolishly, and to our own Prejudice, by lessening or discontinuing our present Satisfaction, or bringing more Pain and Trouble upon our selves than we already feel; and that the only Cause of this, is the different Representation of things fu­ture from what they are perceived to be when present, both in themselves, and in their Consequences and Dependances; we are from hence convinc'd that there is no other way of remedying this Evil, and preventing our being accessory to our own Misery, but by rectifying our Perceptions of Things, which, being future, do not by immediate Impressions assure us that they really are what they appear to us to be. And, if we strictly examine our selves a­bout these Matters, we shall find that what we now actually feel or perceive we cannot possibly imagine to be otherwise than as we feel or perceive; that is, we must be undeceivably conscious of all our own Sen­sations [Page 13]and Perceptions: But how we shall hereafter be affected, we can no otherwise know than by knowing the different Na­tures of the Things that are to affect or be affected, with the Connexion and Depen­dance of one thing upon another, in order to promote or hinder the one's being so af­fected by the other.

Now, as to the Knowledge we are ca­pable of in this kind, we are to consider these farther Observations upon our selves: That there are some Ideas or Notions that appear with that Light and Clearness to our Understandings, that we immediately perceive them in all their Extent, and a ne­cessary Agreement or Disagreement betwixt them, and afterwards the Dependance or Independance of others upon them; to the Truth of which Appearances we cannot possibly deny our Assent: That there are some Propositions which do not appear with such Evidence as to command our As­sent, but have more to incline us to believe them true than false; and this according to different degrees: That there are others that appear with equal Motives of Credi­bility, which hold us in Suspence, and will hardly suffer us to determine either way: And a great many things we have no [Page 14]manner of Notions of at all, for the Truth or Falshood of which, nothing at all ap­pears to us.

But, besides these general Differen­ces in the Appearance of things as cer­tain, probable, doubtful, or exceeding our pre­sent Reach, we are moreover to take no­tice of two other kinds of Difference; the one between the real Nature of Things and their Appearances to us, the other be­twixt the Appearance of Things to us with respect to Truth or Falshood, and their Ap­pearance to us with respect to Action, and the Consequences of it, Happiness or Mi­sery. As to the first of these Differences, we find that what we are once really cer­tain of, always appears certain to us; and what cannot appear to us but as certain, we cannot possibly conceive should be o­therwise in its own Nature: But what is in its own Nature certain, may appear doubtful to us at one time, and probable at another; and what we assent to as probable now, may afterwards command our Assent as certain; and there are things, which, al­tho' we are not certain of their Truth or Falshood, we are sure we know as much as we can of, by the strength of our present Faculties. As to the other Difference in [Page 15]the Appearance of things, with respect to Action and its Consequences, it often so happens, that where the Truth of a Thing seems doubtful to us, it plainly appears to be safer, and more to our present Advan­tage, or affords a better Prospect of future Happiness to act one way than another: and abundance of Instances there are in which we find our selves under a Necessity of Acting one way or other where neither side appears certainly true, but one only probable, or both equally doubtful.

This is all the Account of Humane Na­ture which I thought necessary to my pre­sent Design of establishing the Truth of Religion: And I perswade my self, I have said nothing upon this Subject, which any Man, that fairly consults himself, can pos­sibly call in question. But, if any Obje­ctions do lye against any part of what I have now laid down, they shall be consi­dered before I make use of it as a Proof of any thing else.

All Questions concerning the Origine and Substance of the Soul, its Union with the Body, and separate Existence, I have purposely waved, as things which do in a great measure lye out of the Reach of na­tural Reason, and consequently admit of [Page 16]no certain Proof from thence; are, as com­monly handled, involved in great Ambi­guity of Terms, and, which way soever explain'd, I think, as far as I have hitherto seen, make no manner of change, either as to the Truth or Nature of Religion. Whe­ther the Soul be infused or derived, materi­al or immaterial; whether it depends upon the Body in all its Actions, or sometimes acts of it self, is dissolved with it, or exists after it, if what I said before concerning our own Experience be true, it will be found that Religion has a very good bot­tom to stand upon, without being sup­ported by any of these Opinions. But if the Soul came from without the Body, is of a different Nature from it, can Act in­dependently of it, and Exist after its Dis­solution, as there are several very probable Reasons, and a great deal of certain Reve­lation for, then are there so many addition­al Arguments for the Truth of what may be sufficiently prov'd without 'em, from plainer and more undeniable Principles; as I shall endeavour to make good in the following Discourse.

The next Thing I am to do, is to con­sider the Nature of God, or what that No­tion [Page 17]or Idea is to which I affix that Name: which in short is this; An Eternal Being of all possible Perfections in himself, and from whom every thing else deriv'd its Being, and whatever belongs to it.

But, to give a more particular Account of my Thoughts in this Matter, I conceive God to be One unchangeable Being, of an intelligent Nature, who always necessarily Existed of himself, who knows every thing that can be known, who can do every thing that is possible to be done, who does every thing he wills, and nothing but what he wills himself, who enjoys an un­alterable State of the greatest Happiness that can be enjoy'd, who never wills or does any thing inconsistent with this State, who makes himself the ultimate end of all he does, and next to that the Good or Happiness of all such Beings as are ca­pable of it; which together with all other Beings, and every thing that belongs to them, were from him, and depend upon him for their Continuance; and lastly, who brings about whatever he wills or designs by the fittest and most proper Means.

This seems to me to be the easiest No­tion of God we are capable of concei­ving; [Page 18]and if it can be proved that there really is such a Being as is here describ'd, I think 'tis all that's necessary upon this Subject, with respect to what I have un­dertaken: For whether we represent God to our Thoughts as a pure and simple act, a spiritual Substance, or subtle Matter; as the whole mass or Substance of the World ta­ken all together, or as the Soul and active Principle of it; as confined to the Heavens, or diffused through the whole extent of Being; as the Maker and Creator of all things, or as the Principle and Fountain from whence they flowed; or consider him under any other Idea our Reason or Imagination can frame; if we allow all the Characters of a Deity before mentioned, 'tis the same thing, as to Religion, which soever of these Opinions we embrace, as will hereafter appear: But, if any of them are urged to overthrow that Notion of a Deity I have given, the Proof of such a Being to which that Notion belongs will be a full and sufficient Answer to them.

Now as to the Relation there is betwixt God and Man, we thus conceive; That God is our Creator and Parent, the Author of our Being and Nature, and all the Pow­ers and Capacities of it, and that we are [Page 19]his Creatures, the Issue of his Power, and the Workmanship of his Hands; that God is our Protector, Governor, and Master, and we are his Dependants, Subjects, and Ser­vants; that God is our Benefactor and Au­thor of all our Happiness, and we obliged and indebted to him for whatever we enjoy. All which Relations do necessarily result from the Natures of the Being related, as will plainly appear upon a just Comparison of them together, and will be farther ma­nifested when we enter upon the particular Proofs of Religion.

Supposing therefore that I have given a true Account of the Nature of Man, which being taken from Experience, can admit of no other Proof, nor no greater Certain­ty; the only thing remaining to be done, before I come to the main Argument I pro­pos'd, is to prove,

II. That there is a God, or a Being of such a Nature as I have endeavour'd to represent; which is the second Thing I undertook.

In discoursing of which Subject, that I may express my Thoughts with the more [Page 20]Clearness, give every Argument its due weight, and everywhere proportion my Building to my Foundation, I shall consi­der the Being of God under the different Degrees of Possible, Probable, and Certain.

First then, As to the Possibility of such a Being, I cannot imagine any Man of such an irregular Make of Understanding, as to apprehend that Description I have given of a Deity to be absurd and chimerical, or to have any Inconsistency or Contradiction in it. I am sure I have said nothing but what I very well conceive my self, and I think is as easily conceivable by any Body else; and I have used the plainest and most in­telligible Expressions I could upon this Occasion.

But, farther to assist the Weakness of our Understandings in framing a more di­stinct Conception of God, we will consider the several Idea's of which this complex Notion is made, and see whether they will not suit very well together.

Now 'tis plain to any Man that reflects upon the Ideas he has in his Mind, that he has a Notion of Time, and the several Periods of it, which he can place at what distance he pleases to measure the Durati­on [Page 21]of any thing by, but never at such a distance by all the Addition his Imagina­tion is capable of, but that he can still suppose some Being to exist both before and after; which Being, before and after which he cannot conceive any Time or other Be­ing, he calls Eternal.

In like manner, when we consider the Variety of Beings in the World, with their several Modes and Relations, we are not able to imagine or suppose such a number of any of them that there cannot still be a greater; and this possible Variety of Things never to be exhausted is stiled Infinite. And if we can conceive such an Infinity of Things possible, we can conceive a Power proporti­onable that can produce whatever is possi­ble to be produced, and a Knowledge an­swerable to that which can know whatever can be known, and that is whatever can be.

Thus it is we conceive an eternal intelli­gent Being of infinite Knowledge and Power.

And this we do very easily without such Intensness of Thought, and nice Abstracti­on, as People are apt to imagine; for we find Infinity almost in every Thing: All our Studies and Enquiries lead us to this Notion.

When we consider the Extent or Dimen­sions of Matter, we lessen and magnify [Page 22]them till we are lost either way, and still find our selves as far from any Bounds as when we first set out upon the Search: When we run our Thoughts over the Va­riety of natural Bodies in the World, the more Differences we observe, the more we com­prehend possible, each new Difference ta­ken notice of, affording an inconceivable Variety of Combinations with those ob­serv'd before.

'Tis the same thing if we contract our View, and keep within the Compass of one Kind or Division of Bodies only, as Plants, Minerals, and the like, the farther we advance our Observations, the more still do the Species or Sorts multiply upon us, and the possible Variety of more does proportionably encrease, till confounded with the growing Prospect, we are content to admire what we tried in vain to reach.

'Tis thus also in the intellectual Nature. The different Degrees of Knowledge, Power, and Happiness, we are conscious of, do sufficiently assure us, that we are capable of greater and greater still; and, whatever Notion we can frame of our own State with respect to any of these Qualifications, from the utmost top of what we are arrived to, we can look farther still, and conceive [Page 23]higher Advancements of each kind possible in our selves, in other Men, or at least in other Beings of larger Capacities; and this in a continual Rise, without any thing to terminate our View.

From whence we are farther enabled to conceive, that God is infinitely happy as well as infinitely knowing and powerful; that is, that he enjoys all the Happiness that can possibly be enjoyed by any Capacity of being.

Having got thus far over the Notion of a Deity, I think, we may with less Difficulty conceive, that such a Being as this did ne­cessarily exist of himself; that is, that an eternal Being had nothing before it to be the Canse or Author of its Existence; And far­ther, that he is unchangeable or always the same; that is, that an eternal Being always is, and a Being of infinite Knowledge, Power, and Happiness, is always alike, knowing, powerful, and happy. The actual Production of all things, which are not God, from him, and their Dependance upon him for their Continuance, and all other Circumstances of their being, are no hard Things to be conceived by those that acknowledge he can do all things possible; and he that knows every thing that can be known, [Page 24]may as easily be supposed to effect what­ever he designs by the fittest and most pro­per means, and that is to be infinitely wise: And what other Reason or Motive can we frame for an intelligent Being of infinite Happiness to act upon, but his own free Pleasure? And who can hinder the Al­mighty from doing what he will? But that the Happiness of all such Beings as are ca­pable of it, so far as it is consistent with his Wisdom to grant them the Enjoyment, should be very agreeable to his Good Will and Pleasure, we are not, I believe, dispo­sed to doubt.

And this compleats the Account I have before given of the Nature of God in short, and have now examined over again more particularly.

From all which, I think, I may safely conclude, that the Idea we have form'd of a God is no Chimera or extravagant work of the Imagination, but a very possible consistent Notion; and that those who affirm there is some such Being to which this Idea belongs, cannot be censured for vain incoherent Thinkers, who have put things together without any ground or warrant from Reason.

How far the bare Conception of such an Idea as that we have framed of God, or [Page 25]the meer Possibility of such a Being, does, without the Assistance of other Principles, prove the Reality of his Existence, I shall not here examine. The Arguments drawn from hence, tho' in themselves perhaps certain, to several Persons convincing, and not to be disproved by any, do not fit eve­ry Understanding, nor have that regular uniform Face of Truth which takes at first sight as well as pleases after farther Exa­mination: only thus much I shall alledge in their Defence, that the greatest and commonest Objection made against this kind of Proof is very ill grounded.

For 'tis usually urg'd, that Arguments drawn from the Idea or Possibility of a God, are of no force in this particular Case; be­cause they do not universally conclude. It cannot be said that whatever is possible, or we have an Idea of, for that Reason actu­ally is, and therefore 'tis thought that the actual Existence of a God does by no means follow from the Possibility or Conception of such a Being; whereas the Conclusion may hold in this Case, and no other what­soever: for Conception supposes Possibility, and Possibility a Correspondent Power; and a Power of Existing, when applied to such a Being as God, must necessarily infer Actu­al [Page 26]Existence; as might be farther made out if there was occasion for it: but, because the unusual Niceness of the Proof may pro­bably raise some Prejudice against it, I shall wave the Prosecution of it; and to cut off all Colour of Advantage from such as are disposed to cavil, I shall content my self at present with having shewn that 'tis very probable and conceivable, that there may be a God, and pass on to the next Enquiry I am to make, whether it is not very probable that there is one.

A common Argument for the Being of a God, (and 'tis never the worse for being common) is the general Concurrence and Agreement of Mankind in the Acknowledg­ment of this great Truth. We will consi­der the Argument it self in its full Strength, and then see what fairly follows from it.

The Sum of what may be said upon the first is this: That all Accounts and Rela­tions of the present State of the World, and all the Histories of past Ages that are now extant do agree to assure us, that, since the first Memory of Things was preserved till now, there was no period of Time, nor any Nation under the Sun, in which the Being of a God was not acknowledg'd and [Page 27]believed by a vast Generality of all that were then and there living.

And farther, that not only the greatest part of Mankind taken in gross, nor the greatest part of every Nation considered as a distinct Society of Men, were of this Be­lief, but the greatest part of every Sect or Division, as they stand distinguish'd by their different Opinions in other things, their different Capacities, Interests, Ways, and Manners of Thinking; as, the Learned and Ignorant; those that had examined the Point, and consider'd the Reasons for and against it; and those who had only had it proposed to them, without any proof either way but what was immediate­ly offer'd from the nature of the thing; the Mahometan and Idolater who add absurd things to the Nature of God, as well as the Jew and Christian who think more consi­stently of him; those that hold the World to be Eternal, or made by Chance, as well as those who look upon it as the Effect of Wisdom; those that explain the Works of Nature by Mechanical Powers, and those that in their Account of the System of Things make use of Intelligences and abstra­cted Notions: not only the Religious and Superstitious, and such as expect any good [Page 28]or ill Consequences should attend their Belief of a God, but those whose other Opinions declare they have nothing at all, or very little, to hope or fear from a God, as the Epicurean, the Sadducee, the Hobbist, and the Deist: and lastly, all sorts of wicked Men who are uneasie under the Thoughts of a God, and endeavour to shake them off.

Those few that in different Ages of the World have opposed the common Belief, have had no Followers, and several of them at the Seasons of greatest Seriousness and Recollection have renounc'd the Opinions they maintain'd at looser hours: so univer­sally has the Opinion of a God obtained among Men.

From whence I think I may fairly infer thus much at least, That such a Perswa­sion as this is very suitable to the Ʋnder­standing, and agrees very well with all the Principles of our Knowledge; and therefore, tho' it could not be certainly proved to fol­low from those evident Perceptions we have of other Truths, yet being readily enter­tained by our Reason, without any Oppo­sition from them, it must upon this Ac­count only be extreamly probable and fit to be believed.

For suppose it to be an Error, what can we assign for the Cause of such an universal Error?

'Tis possible indeed, that the Generality of Mankind may be deceiv'd in a Judgment founded upon the Reports of Sense or Ima­gination; they may believe that the Sun is very near of the same bulk in which it ap­pears to the Eye, when 'tis so many times bigger than the Earth; or, that it moves when it stands still; or, if they do not be­lieve Wrong in either of these Points, there may be something else of such a Nature supposed, in which all Mankind may be mistaken, as most of the Learned think the rest of the World are in both these Judg­ments. But the Notion and Existence of a God are Matters of pure Thought and Rea­son, in the Conception of which, Sense and Imagination have no share; and therefore they can never owe their Original to them.

'Tis true, the Mind, by the Help of these Faculties, may make a great many false Representations of the Deity, and conse­quently occasion a great Variety of Errors concerning him; but it cannot be inferr'd from hence, that therefore those Notions and Opinions of a God in which all Men agree proceed from the same Fountain as [Page 30] these additional Errors do, in which they dif­fer so very much, and that consequently, in their own nature, those may be as much Errors as these other are, tho' they are nor yet discovered to be so.

The contrary, I think, is very plain: For the Difference of the Representation in this latter Case proves an Incapacity in the Faculties to perceive the Objects they were employed about; whereas in the other Supposition, the Constancy and Universality of the Perception is an Argument both of the Suitableness and Truth of the Matter perceived.

There's nothing in the Idea of God, as I have endeavoured to describe it, that falls under the Cognizance of our Senses, nor is any Man conscious to himself that he has perceiv'd God at any time this way; and therefore all sensible Ideas applied to him must be as wild and extravagant as the Ideas of blind Men concerning Colours, or at least of those of any other Men concern­ing the Inhabitants of Planets and ethereal Regions, because there is no manner of Re­semblance betwixt the Ideas of one Faculty and those of another, nor any discoverable betwixt a new Idea and those we perceive already: so that if we should endeavour to [Page 31]represent a pure Idea, which is the Object of Reflexion only, by sensible Images, no wonder if the Representation be very diffe­rent, when all the Ideas of Sense have an equal Pretence to be Representatives, no one being liker the Original it stands for than another: And the same may be said with respect to a new unknown Idea; for, what­ever it be in its own Nature, and whatever Resemblance there be betwixt that and any other we have already perceived, out of our whole Stock of Ideas we have no more reason to chuse one than another to re­present it by; and consequently, different Men must represent it to themselves very differently: From whence it plainly appears, that if the Notion of God be purely intelle­ctual, or if there be something sensible in it, and we are not conscious to our selves that we have actually perceiv'd it, as 'tis plain we are not, the sensible Representations of him must be very various, and therefore very false: But when all Men think alike con­cerning Objects not perceivable by Sense, 'tis not only a certain Sign that their Ideas are suitable and proportionate to the Faculty that perceives them, but 'tis very probable also they are truly sorted and put together.

Where-ever there is a general Agreement in the Perception, there is certainly an Uni­formity in the Appearance, which is as ne­cessary to make an universal Error as an uni­versal Truth; and therefore, supposing all Men mistaken about the Bulk or Motion of the Sun, it necessarily follows from hence, that whatever appears to the Sense in this Case appears the same to all Men; so that the Errors occasion'd by this means are not in the Sense, but belong to another Faculty; nor are they either necessary or invincible, not necessary, because we need not have made any Judgment at all concerning these Appearances offered to our Sense, several Requisites to a just Sensation being want­ing, without which, we know, we cannot judge with Assurance; not invincible, be­cause our Opinions concerning these things may be afterwards altered and corrected by Reason; which, being a Faculty superior to Sense, may preserve us from the Illusions of it.

But when all Men agree in Matters of pure Reflexion and Reason, we have all the Assurance we can have, that they are in the right. For whence should any Error pro­ceed? 'Tis certain the Appearance must in this Supposition be uniform, and the Faculty [Page 33]employed about its proper Object. Besides, if there be a Clearness in the Appearance, the Understanding necessarily closes with it, and if in such a case it should be deceived, there is no higher Faculty to correct the Mistake: How then can we imagine the Minds of Men to be so disposed as to be under a Necessity of being deceiv'd, as they must be if a constant universal Appearance of Truth should be only the Veil of Falshood: For how can any Man help believing that to be true which always appears so to him, and concerning which he can receive no other Information from himself or any body else?

But here perhaps it may be said, where the Evidence is not so strong as to command our Assent, Error may wear the Face of Truth, tho' we have not yet been able to discover the Cheat; and therefore 'tis our own Fault if we are deceived in this as well as in the other Instances of Sense, since we are not under a necessity of giving our Judg­ments according to the Appearance. To which I answer, that allowing a bare Possi­bility of erring in the present Case, all that I design'd to prove from this Argument of General Consent holds good still; which is, that because all People have agreed to ac­knowledge [Page 34]a God, 'tis therefore very proba­ble there should be one, and very agreeable to the Reason of Mankind to believe so; so that altho' a Man is not from hence fully convinc'd of the Certainty of it, he cannot help believing 'tis a very reasonable Opinion, and that there's very great likelihood 'tis built upon sure Foundations, tho' he has not yet search'd so far as to discover them: For he cannot give an Account how all Men should come to be mistaken in a mat­ter of this Nature; and, if they were, how they could ever be undeceived: which may be done in all the Instances of Sense or Imagination in which any Error can be judg'd possible.

All that can be farther supposed to coun­tenance a Suspicion, is, that possibly there was a time when Men believed otherwise, but some People having started such an Opinion, and drest it up very plausibly, it took mightily in the World, and so was handed down from one to the other, and in succeeding Generations spread and pre­vail'd, till it became universal. But there is no manner of ground for such a Supposi­tion:

1. Because, let us look as far back as we can, there are no Marks or Footsteps to [Page 35]be found of the Rise and Original of this Opinion, no gradual Propagation of it dis­coverable, it being in every Age we have any account of, as universally believed as it is now.

2. Because no parallel Instance can be as­signed which might give any colour for a suspicion in this, no Perswasion of the like nature having ever been detected to be an Error after so long and so wide an Esta­blishment.

I do not know of any Opinion whatso­ever that actually obtained so universal a Be­lief as that of a God, and afterwards was proved to be false; and 'tis very difficult to imagine how such a thing should come to pass: however I can conceive and al­low it to be possible, that a mistaken mat­ter of fact or a conjectural Hypothesis of some­thing belonging to natural Knowledge, may, at some distance of time from its first ap­pearance in the World, be pretty general­ly believed as certain, and afterwards by a Discovery of fresh Circumstances in the one, or making new Observations about the other, a great part of Mankind may come to be of another Opinion, of the Truth of which they may be much surer: but these are things of a very different Nature from that [Page 36]we are discoursing upon, and an Error in either of these cannot prove the Possibility of a Mistake in the Case in question. For, be­sides that a distant matter of fact, and a na­tural Hypothesis of something out of the present Reach of our Senses are hardly ever known to the greatest part of Mankind taken in general, and therefore a general Belief of them can respect only the Learn­ed, whereas the Being of a God has in every Age been actually and expresly believed by the generality of all sorts of Men; besides all this I say, the Notion and Existence of a God, being Matters of Reason and Refle­xion only, do not depend upon any such particular Circumstances of Time or Place, or other external Helps and Instruments of Knowledge as are the peculiar Privileges of a few, to whom the rest of the World must be beholding for all they know concerning several Truths, as is plain in the Cases be­fore mention'd.

All the Observations of Sense, upon which the Belief of a God is founded, lie open to every man, and are the same now they ever were; and the Inferences drawn from them are very easie, and within the reach of common Capacities. If some have refined upon them, and carried their Reasonings [Page 37]much farther than others, it has been on­ly to satisfie the unwarrantable Scruples and Suspicions of a few Pretenders to Learning, who make use of that little Knowledge they have to argue themselves out of all. But the Generality of Mankind, both Lear­ned and Ignorant, have so firmly believed upon the first plain obvious grounds of As­sent, as not to require or stand in need of farther Satisfaction; and therefore their Faith cannot be owing to the plausible Co­lours or specious Reasonings of any first Inven­tors of false Notions and Opinions.

But, after all, allowing the Supposition to be true, tho' I think it impossible that it should, that there was a time in which God was no where acknowledged in the World; whoever invented the Notion, whatever were the Motives it was first invented up­on, or the Arguments upon which it was first believed, the Propagation of it after­wards, and the Constancy and Universality of the Belief ever since, must be owing to the Agreeableness of such an Opinion to the common Reason of Mankind, and all their other Knowledge, and to the Strength and Sufficiency of those Reasons upon which it is now, and has been so long received. For all the first Motives and Arguments, if they [Page 38]were any other than what we have now, and which have been the same in all Ages we have any Knowledge of left, have been all lost, and consequently their Influence spent, long ago; neither in any of the an­cient Discourses yet extant concerning the Being of a God, is there any Appeal made to Authority or Antiquity; as if Men were ob­liged to believe this Truth because it was so antient, or because such and such emi­nent Persons had first recommended or en­joyned the Belief of it: But all the Argu­ments made use of are wholly built upon the Reason of the thing, which is always the same; the same plain Reasons for the Be­ing of a God have always had the same Influence, which, upon Examination, will be found to have no Art or Sophistry in them, and every body may examine them that will.

Nothing then remains, but to enquire into the Force and Validity of those Rea­sons upon which our Belief of a God is ori­ginally founded.

I suppose it now but a probable Perswasion, arising from that Readiness and Assurance of Assent with which we embraced this Truth, and yielded to the first obvious [Page 39]Proofs of it, upon a bare Proposal of them to the Understanding; in which Perswasi­on we are very much confirm'd by know­ing that all Mankind have constantly agreed with us in it, being fully satisfied from hence, that no peculiar Temper of Mind or Scheme of Thoughts, no private Interest or national Byass, has disposed us to make a wrong Judgment, but something common to the whole humane Nature.

This is all the ground the Generality of the World believe upon; and tho' to a nice Examiner of things it is not certain irresi­stible Conviction, yet 'tis sufficient to justify a full and entire Assent, and to warrant our acting according to it. For to suspect a thing to be false, and act as if it were so, upon a bare Possibility imaginable that it may be so; or rather, because we have not re­ceived the highest degree of Proof the thing is, in its own Nature, capable of, when, at the same time, we have no manner of Reason to distrust what we have; can be neither rational, prudent, nor safe.

However, Since there are Persons whose Actions and at least pretended Opinions come up to this Character, we will consider the common Proofs of a Deity more closely and throughly, and see if what upon the first [Page 40]View appears so probable, and makes so strong an Impression upon the Mind, may not, upon farther Examination, strike us with that Certainty and Evidence that we cannot resist, without questioning all our other Knowledge, and disclaiming all man­ner of Distinction betwixt Truth and Falshood: which is,

III. The Third Consideration I propo­sed in treating of this Argument: Whether it is not only a possible or probable Opinion that there should be a God, but a certain and infallible Truth that there is one.

All the common natural Arguments and Reasons upon which the general Belief of a God is founded, are taken from the visi­ble frame of things called the World, and those several parts of it which fall under every man's Notice and Observation; up­on a slight Survey of which, any man that is in the least capable of Reflexion, where­ever his Thoughts light, will perceive or imagine that he perceives plain Marks and Tokens of Power and Wisdom, much of the same kind, tho' in proportion far greater than he has observ'd in any of the most wonderful Effects of humane Skill and [Page 41] Strength; the immediate Result of which, I believe, would be this Conclusion, That certainly there is some Being, exceedingly more powerful and knowing than Man, who was the Author and Contriver of this stu­pendous Fabrick.

And, if Admiration and Curiosity invite him to farther Enquiries, as 'tis difficult to suppose they should not, the Compass and Extent of the whole Work, the Variety of Objects in it, the Constancy and Uniformity of some Appearances, and regular Changes and Revolutions of other, the Connexion and Dependence of the several parts, the Union and Confederacy of multitudes of different kinds towards some common Production, and the various particular Ends and Uses of things, all assistant to one another, and sub­servient to some general Design; all these, I say, well consider'd and weigh'd together, would strengthen and confirm his former Judgments, and farther dispose him to con­clude, That the Author of all these Instan­ces of Power is able to do whatever else can be conceived possible, nothing else concei­vable seeming more difficult to this Inqui­rer than what he sees already done; That a Being of so much Knowledge as his Works declare him, so vastly exceeding Man's, is [Page 42]able to do Things which are far above Man's Reach and Comprehension to con­ceive at all; And that he who has so wise­ly order'd and disposed every thing he has made to such proper Ends, has exercised his Power so far and no farther, because it was most agreeable to his Wisdom so to do.

There's nothing, I think, in all this, but what is easie and natural, and what may very well be imagin'd to be found out without the help of much Learning or an extraordinary Talent of Reflexion; and yet this is what has constantly, in all Ages, satisfied both the Learned and the Thought­ful, and stood the Test of Time, and So­phistry, and Malice.

But suppose some extravagant Thinkers, entirely under the Government of their Senses and Lusts, because they were not by when the World was made, and do not see the Hand which supports the Frame, and moves all the several Wheels of it, should therefore distrust all their Reason­ings of this kind, and doubt the Being of a God notwithstanding the Testimony of Na­ture; is there no certain Proof to be given that They are not mistaken who believe a God upon these Grounds? Several have [Page 43]already shewn there is, and this is what I shall at present endeavour to make good in the clearest and most unexceptionable manner I can.

But, before I enter upon this Argument, I think it necessary to enquire what Cer­tainty is, that we may know what kind or degree of Proof may be properly and truly called Certain, and what not.

Now Certainty or Evidence (which I shall all along take in the same Sense) consi­dered in the Things or Ideas which are the Objects of our Understanding, is a necessa­ry Agreement or Disagreement of one part of our Knowledge with another; as applied to the Mind, 'tis the Perception of such Agreement or Disagreement, or such a firm well-grounded Assent as excludes not only all manner of doubt, but all conceivable pos­sibility of a Mistake: And thus I suppose, and take it for granted, that we are certain of all our own Perceptions and Sensations, whatever we feel or are conscious to our selves of; and that we are fully and un­deceivably assured of a great many of our Judgments founded upon the just and well-regulated Reports of our external Senses, to the same degree as we are of the Agree­ment [Page 44]and Disagreement of any pure intelle­ctual Ideas.

Except this be allowed, we have no Principles to reason from, nor indeed any Knowledge at all, not so much as Scepticism; but universal Darkness and Confusion co­ver humane Nature: But he that grants thus much, and is true to his own Reason, must acknowledge there is a God; as will appear from the following Considerations.

Being then, as I suppose, by an infallible Consciousness, satisfied of our own Operations and Existence, and, by a passive Perception of various kinds and sorts of Impressions by the help of certain Organs of the Body, ful­ly convinced of the reality of things with­out us, of different Natures or Manners of Existence, upon a farther Exercise of our active Powers, and Application of our Sen­ses to external Objects, and then review­ing and reasoning over the Observations that result from thence, we come to these cer­tain Conclusions:

That there are a great many Changes in the World; That a great many new Ap­pearances present themselves, which before were no where to be found, some of which are observed to disappear again, as others likewise are, the rise and original of which [Page 45]we never knew; That under all these Changes and Varieties of Appearance, there is something which is constantly the same which we call Matter or solid extended Sub­stance; That the different Appearances our Senses inform us of in Matter, proceed im­mediately from the Differences of Bulk or Number, Figure, Motion, and Rest; That we are conscious of several things in our selves, which we perceive as different from all these; That we were not always thus conscious, but that there was a time when this Consciousness, and all that we perceive in our selves as distinct from Matter, which we call Mind or Spirit, was joined and uni­ted to a certain portion of Matter, or Col­lection of material Particles called humane Body; That, when this humane Body chan­ges its Appearance, and such a particular Union of the parts of it is dissolved, then that Consciousness, and all those internal Ope­rations which are now the Object of it, cease to be joined with that Matter they were just before united to.

Being well assured of the Truth of all these Conclusions, we are from thence im­mediately led to these following Enquiries.

How comes all this about? How came there to be such a thing as Matter? When [Page 46]and by what means did it exist? What is the Cause of all those Changes that are continu­ally making in it? And why does it exist after so many different manners? Whence are we our selves? What was it that gave us such conscious Beings? How are they united to Matter? What limits the Conti­nuance, and afterward dissolves the Bond of this wonderful Union?

Now in pursuance of these Enquiries, we find it utterly inconceivable and impossi­ble that any thing should make it self; that a Being which once did not exist should begin to be of it self, by the force of its own Nature or Power, without the Assi­stance of some other Being which existed before it: From whence we are irresistibly convinc'd that something must be eternal, otherwise nothing could ever have been; for if any Time can be supposed in which nothing did exist, nothing would ever have existed at all, unless a Being that once was not could put it self into Being; but that is impossible, and 'tis certain something now really is, therefore something must be eter­nal.

And as from hence 'tis evident that something must be eternal, so 'tis plain from the several Changes we observe in the World, [Page 47]the Succession of new conscious Beings, and different Dispositions of Matter, that every thing is not so; now, if something be eter­nal, and a great many things are not eter­nal, then it plainly follows, that every thing that is not eternal was made by that which is; (i. e.) originally received its Be­ing, and whatever belongs to it, from an eternal Author or Cause: otherwise, either something must be supposed to have made it self, which before is proved to be impos­sible, or one temporary Being must make an­other, which it cannot do but by the Force and Efficacy of such Powers which together with its Existence it received from some other Being, and so on till we come to the eternal Fountain of all Power and Being.

The only Question then is, What is eter­nal? for upon this depends the Resolution of all our other Doubts and Enquiries: For the better and more certain Satisfacti­on in which, I shall

First, Consider all the Claims and Pre­tensions made to this glorious Prerogative of eternal Existence:

Afterwards, I shall examine what those Attributes are that must necessarily belong to an eternal Being:

And then shew that that Being to which all these Attributes agree, is what we call God, and there is no other Being that is or can be invested with the like Characters.

1. First then, As to the Claims and Pretensions to eternal Existence, these, I think, are all the Suppositions that can be made; either that Matter alone is eternal, or that the only eternal Being is what we call Mind and Spirit, or that Mind and Matter are both eternal.

But Matter alone or co-eternal with Mind, may be considered under several different Respects: for either we imagine it as having been from all Eternity rolled up in one en­tire solid Mass, without any Distinction or Motion of its parts, or as loose, and divided into innumerable little Particles, all in con­stant Agitation or Motion; out of which quiet Mass or moving Atoms the present frame of things was in time struck out and form'd: or else we must suppose that the World, as it now is, has eternally existed under the same Form as to the principal parts of its Structure, with a constant Succession of se­veral of the chief Species or sorts of things in it.

There's nothing else imaginable but an eternal Succession of new Worlds and new Spe­cies of Beings in them; which is an Opi­nion too extravagantly absurd to be own­ed by any body: For in this Hypothesis every new World must make it self, other­wise they are only new Forms which all owe their Production to some common Prin­ciple which is eternally the same, and then the Hypothesis falls in with some other before mention'd.

2. But which of those has Truth and Certainty of its side, is the next thing to be enquired into; and the Matter will best be determin'd by considering the necessary Attributes and Characters of an eternal Being.

It has been proved already, that all Be­ings which exist in Time must be made by something that was eternal, because it was impossible they should have existed any other way: The same will now appear à pri­ori from the Nature of an eternal Being, the inseparable Characters of which are necessary Existence and all possible Perfection; which are both included in the Notion of an eter­nal Being, and both evidently infer one another: so that an eternal Being must exist [Page 50]necessarily, and have all possible Perfection; and whatever exists necessarily must have all possible Perfection; and whatever has all possible Perfection must exist necessarily.

An eternal Being must exist necessarily because it exists of it self, by the nature of its own Being; for it always was what it is, it always had the same Nature it has, and therefore there always was the same Reason, which is the same necessity for its existing; which may farther be proved thus:

That Being is said to exist necessarily which not to have existed we conceive utter­ly impossible, but 'tis utterly impossible that what we allow to be an eternal Being might not have existed: For then we must suppose some Power sufficient to hinder its Existence, which we cannot do without allowing the Existence of some other eternal Being by whose free Power This exists to which we deny a necessity of Existence; but then what we take from the one must be granted to the other, and there must be some original eternal Being which always necessarily exist­ed: and this is sufficient to my present pur­pose, tho' I think it may be proved also, that there can be no eternal Derivations or Emanations from this Fountain but must have the same necessity of Existence as the [Page 51] original Being from whence they flow.

The other necessary Character of an eter­nal Being is, that it has all possible Perfecti­on; that is, that there is nothing conceiva­ble or in the Nature of things possible, which added to it would give it any Advantage, or in any sense render it more perfect than it is.

This is a plain and certain Consequence of its necessary Existence; for if any Perfection was wanting, then a Being of greater Per­fection might be conceived possible, which could have hinder'd the Existence of this; and if so, then its Existence is not neces­sary, because it is not impossible but it might not have existed; but an eternal Be­ing does exist necessarily, as has been proved before, therefore it is endued with all possi­ble Perfection.

But farther, if there can be an eternal Being, necessarily existing of all possible Per­fection, as 'tis plain there may, whatever is eternal, and necessarily exists, must have also all other possible Perfection, except we suppose that two eternal necessary Beings of unequal Perfections, and independent of one another, may possibly exist at the same time; which is an Absurdity there's no manner of countenance or colour of Rea­son [Page 52]for. For why should not one eternal necessary Being have as much Perfection as another, when both are supposed independent and neither of them to have any other Prin­ciple of its Existence and Perfection but its self? Why should the one limit its own Perfections, and the other not? Or, if it could not have from it self any more, whence should this Impotence proceed in one eternal necessary Being, which was not in another? Eternity and necessity of Existence are the same in both; whatever is eternal and necessary is equally so; and therefore where-ever these Attributes are found, there must be the same Powers, and all the like Consequences must flow from them.

Another way of proving that an eternal Being must have all Perfection possible is, that the very Notion of Possibility does im­ply a Power somewhere correspondent to the utmost extent and capacity of things possible; so that to say a thing is possible, is to say, there is some Power capable of pro­ducing or having it; and therefore if you suppose an eternal necessary Being to want any Perfection, what is imagin'd to be want­ing to it must be, for that very reason, im­possible: For it cannot be conceived to want what is in its own Power to have, and it [Page 53]can receive nothing from any other Being: For no other Being of greater Power is con­ceivable or possible; not a temporary Being, because its Existence and Perfection is deri­ved from that which was eternal; not an eternal necessary Being, because this which is supposed imperfect is as much an eternal necessary Being as the other, and therefore must have all the same Perfections: So that when I say that the Perfection supposed wanting is, for that reason, impossible, I do not mean only that 'tis now impossible, con­sidering the present Constitution of things, but that 'twas absolutely and from all Eter­nity impossible; because there never could be any greater Power than what an eternal necessary Being must have.

3. Now if something certainly is eternal, and necessary Existence, and all possible Per­fection, are the essential Characters of an eternal Being, as has sufficiently been pro­ved, then this eternal Being must be what we call God; the Characters and Attributes of an eternal Being belonging to Him and no other, as will easily appear by applying them to the several Hypotheses before men­tion'd.

That thinking, and willing, and percep­tion of Pleasure, are Perfections, cannot be doubted of by us Men, who can frame no Notions of any other, every thing else owing all the Goodness and Perfection it is esteem'd for to its Ministry and Subserviency to these. For were there no Beings that enjoyed these Perfections, there would be no difference betwixt a regular World and a Chaos, Mul­tiplicity and Variety of Being, and eternal universal Nothing.

These therefore must be the principal Characters of an eternal Being; and his Knowledge, and his Power (which is his Will) and his Happiness, must be commen­surate to his Existence, that is eternal neces­sary Qualifications, bounded only by him­self; and whatever else is made by this eter­nal Being, as 'tis proved every thing is that is made, must be made for his good Pleasure, and the Happiness of those Beings which are capable of it; there being no other end that such a Being as we here suppose can act upon; and all his Works must carry the Marks of their Author upon them, that is, be such as are fit for a Being of those glori­ous Qualifications to make and design for such Ends.

Thus may the whole Idea of God, as it is before described, be easily made out by positive direct consequence from the Princi­ples just now laid down and proved; as plainly appears from the nature and extent of the Principles themselves, and those In­stances I have given in the chief and most distinguishing, most contested Characters of the Deity.

But I am sensible this way of proving a God, tho' in it self the truest and most concluding, and the only direct way of de­monstrating this Truth, as proceeding by a regular Connexion of plain intelligible Ideas, the Natures and Properties of which are as much known to us, as those of Fi­gures and Numbers; I am sensible, I say, that notwithstanding all this, the Proof I have now given of a God is not like to meet with so general an Acceptance, or con­vince so far as a lesser degree of Evidence in another kind; because the Demonstration consisting of a great many parts, and the Ideas upon which it is founded being pure­ly intellectual, and not admitting of any sensible Representation, there are but few that are capable of so much Steadiness and Attention of Mind as is required to per­ceive the whole force of the Proof.

But then 'tis certain, that those who deny a God must not own themselves to be of this number, because they will from hence be proved to act very unreasonably in denying what, by their own Confession, they do not understand, and consequently are not fit Judges of; which is as absurd as to de­ny a Proposition in Mathematicks without being able to understand the Demonstration given of it: and here it will be allowed by all, that the Demonstration is never the less true and concluding, because there are but few that have made so great a progress in this Science, and are so well vers'd in this sort of reasoning as to perceive the Validity of it.

And therefore I hope I may be excused if I have spent some time and pains in what may be call'd a metaphysical abstracted proof of a Deity, for the Satisfaction of such as by steady Reflexion and a just Use of their Reason will easily understand it, and for the Shame and Confusion of those, who renouncing common Opinions and Arguments upon no Grounds, pretend to new Discove­ries in Matters they do not understand, and consequently cannot disprove.

However, I have been as short as I pos­sibly could upon the positive part of the [Page 57]Argument, and as plain as the Subject would give me leave, having made use of the commonest easiest Terms the Language would furnish me with upon such Matters as I have had occasion to speak of: so that all the Difficulty I can imagine in the Apprehension of what I have said, must arise from the nature of the Ideas and from the connexion and variety of Consequences, which are not easily to be comprehended in one view without any Assistance from Sense. But this could not be avoided.

Having therefore as clearly and intelligi­bly as I could, in a positive direct manner proved that there is a God, by shewing, That there certainly is some eternal Being; that all the Characters and Attributes of an eternal Being do agree and belong to that Idea we have conceived of God; and that therefore that eternal Being, which certainly is, is as certainly what we call God: Ha­ving, I say, positively and directly proved this, I proceed to make good the same Truth negatively or by way of Consequence; which, taking this for proved That there is some eternal Being, I do by shewing that the Characters and Attributes of an eternal Being can agree to nothing else but what [Page 58]we call God, therefore they must agree to God, therefore that eternal Being which cer­tainly is, must be God.

In the Prosecution of which Argument, tho' I make use of the Principles insisted upon in the former, and the Conclusions from them not being direct, have not in their own nature the same degree of Evidence as positive immediate Deductions have, yet I question not but I shall be better and more generally understood, and more satisfacto­rily prove what I have undertaken, to a great many Persons this way than the other.

It has been proved already from the pre­sent Existence of things, that something must be eternal; we have reckon'd up the seve­ral Pretensions that can be made to Eterni­ty; and consider'd the Characters and Attri­butes of an eternal Being.

Now, if that which is eternal be not God, and the Characters and Attributes of an eternal Being do not belong to him, then something else must be eternal, and some other of the fore mention'd Suppositions must be true; but upon Examination, I be­lieve it will be found that none of those Sup­positions which exclude the being of a God can be true; and therefore, what I have, proved concerning God must stand Good.

This it is my present Business to shew; and moreover I shall endeavour to make it appear, that as God is certainly eternal, and nothing else can be eternal exclusive of him, so likewise he is the only eternal Being, and whatever in any of the other Hypotheses is conceived to be eternal, if it really is so, must in some manner entirely belong to him.

First then, Let us frame to our selves a Notion of Matter alone, with its Parts all uniced and atrest: and when we have done so we shall easily judge how impossible it is to conceive that This should have exist­ed necessarily of it self from all Eternity, and that in time the World, and all things in it, in the manner we now behold them, should proceed from or be produced by it.

But, without running over all the Chara­cters of an eternal Being, the Absurdity of this Supposition will sufficiently appear by what we plainly perceive, and know, and what constantly and irresistibly offers it self to our senses and understandings in the pre­sent frame of things.

Solidity or the Power of Resistance, Ex­tention, Figure, Motion, Perception, and Will, are the chief of all our Ideas, and what we are the best acquainted with; and [Page 60]so far as we perceive them distinct from one another, Seperately existing or necessari­ly connected our Reasonings about them are the surest of any we have; so that, if we are mistaken in these, I cannot see how we have, or are capable of having, any Know­ledge at all.

Solidity, Extension, and Figure, I do not only perceive to be constantly united, but necessarily and inseparably to co-exist toge­ther in the same Subject, which I call Matter or Body; so that, wherever any one of these is found, I certainly conclude from thence, that there are the other two also; but it does not follow, that where ever these three co-exist together there is Motion, Perception, or Will, there being no necessary Connexion between any of these Ideas and the other Ideas of Matter before mentioned, as is plain, not only from the Natures of the Ideas themselves, but from their separate Existence actually perceived by us.

How then does Matter, which we sup­pose to exist without any Motion, Percep­tion, or Will, come to have Motion added to it?

All the Motion we perceive in Bodies without us is made by Successive Impulses from from one Body to another, where every por­tion [Page 61]of Matter owes its Motion to some other, but this cannot help us to conceive how Motion should begin where every thing is at rest: the only Idea we receive from Body in Motion is that of a Capacity of being moved when it is at rest, and not of a power of mo­ving its self: this we have from what passes within us, when, without any external Im­pulse upon us, by a bare Thought or Deter­mination of our selves we begin a Motion in our own Bodies and, by that means, com­municate it to others which were before at rest; which power of beginning Motion we call Will: but Matter is supposed to exist without Perception and Will, and conse­quently without this power of beginning Motion in its self; and there being nothing else to communicate it to it, it must eternally continue in the same state of Union, Indi­stinction and Rest.

There needs no more for the over­throwing this Hypothesis, no stress being ever laid upon it.

In the next place then, if we imagine all the parts of this Material World loose from one another, and all in motion, 'twill be quite as irrational to think that so it must have been eternally and necessarily, till [Page 62]at some certain time the scattered moving Atoms met together, or were disposed after such a manner as produced the present Structure and Constitution of things.

Many are the Absurdities and Inconsi­stencies this Opinion is chargeable with; but I shall at present instance but in two.

The first is, the supposing an eternal motion of different Particles of Matter be­fore the Production of the World; which implies an infinite succession of Effects with­out any Cause to produce them: For Moti­on being something distinct from Matter, and separable from it, does not necessarily exist, because Matter exists, for then it would always exist in every Particle of Mat­ter, nor does it exist of it self by a necessity independent of the necessity of Matter's Existence, because it cannot exist without it; and Matter could not produce it in its self from all Eternity, because it cannot produce it at all; and therefore there can be no such thing as eternal Motion or suc­cession of Motion in different parts of Mat­ter, because every Motion is a meer Effect and Passion, and there is no active power any where assignable or conceivable that could produce or cause such an Effect: so that to suppose an eternal Motion without an eter­nal [Page 63]Power of moving, is one very great Ab­surdity those are guilty of that set up the Hypothesis of Atoms.

The other is, the ascribing such new Ef­fects to Matter and Motion together in the pro­duction of the World, as for a whole Eternity before never proceeded from them, and could not possibly at any time be produced by them. For Matter and Motion not implying Per­ception and Will, several Bodies in motion being now actually perceived to exist with­out them, and the whole System of moving Atoms being in the present Hypothesis supposed so to exist before the Beginning of the World, we shall never be able from hence to account for the Existence of Beings en­dued with Perception and Will, which are Qualifications, in their own Natures as ut­terly distinct from those of Extention, Fi­gure, and Motion, as Figure and Motion are from one another or from any other Ideas we perceive.

That these last may be, where the other are not, is plain: How then do those other come to be added to them? If Matter at rest, whatever degree of Extention or kind of Figure it is imagin'd to have, can never make us conceive any possibility of Motion in it without the help of something else be­sides [Page 64] Extention and Figure; neither can Matter and Motion together, what-ever variety of Bulk, Texture, or Motion we re­present to our selves, give us any Idea of perception and Will, or a power of producing them: But Matter in motion must eternally move on, or rest and move by turns if you please, without advancing to any new Per­fections: which is too plain to need any proof, if it had not been very learnedly and fully made out already by others, and there­fore I shall not enlarge in the Disparage­ment of matter, nor expose this ridiculous Scheme of things by shewing all the peculiar Inconsistencies in it; but leave the farther Disproof of it to those general Arguments, which equally conclude against all the false Hypotheses concerning the being of the World, which I reserve till I have done with them in particular.

And the next of them to be considered is that in which it is supposed that the World has eternally existed under the same Form that we now behold it, as to the principal parts of its Structure, with a con­stant Succession of several of the chief Species or sorts of things in it.

This Opinion of the Eternity of the World has been the most exploded of any, tho' most of the Favourers of it have at the same time asserted the eternal Existence of a God too; and the Reason of this is, because the greatest part of the most anci­ent Philosophers and learned Men thought they perceived such visible Marks and To­kens of the Newness of the World, in the Rise, Propagation, and Increase of Societies and Governments, Languages and Laws, Arts and Sciences; and the Tradition of the Ori­ginal and Beginning of Things was in their time so fresh, and so generally received in all Countries, that few of them were able to reconcile all this with the eternal Duration of the World: And this Tradition having all along continued, and the Truth of those an­cient Observations having been more and more confirm'd by many new Inventions of things since, and some of them of such ge­neral Use that 'tis impossible to imagine they should not have been invented before if the World had been of a very long conti­nuance, or have been lost again after they were once invented, the same Objections have constantly lain against the Eternity of the World; and these have been strength­en'd by several other Arguments drawn from [Page 66]the many Absurdities and Inconsistencies that seem to be implied in the Notion of eter­nal Succession.

All which, and whatever else can be said against the Eternity of the World when as­serted together with the eternal Existence of a God, do more strongly conclude against this Supposition, when the Being of a God is not taken into it, under which respect I now consider it; and thus consider'd, it is moreover, besides what has been already alledg'd, attended with the same Difficulties and chargeable with the same Objections as the former Hypothesis was.

For Matter and Motion were no more ca­pable of eternally producing such a Succession of various Objects as we perceive in the World, than they were of producing them and the World together in time; and yet, if we suppose an eternal Succession of new Objects without a God, they must all be pro­duced by the Power of Matter and Motion: For every particular new Object, being pro­duced in time, must owe its Being to that which was eternal; and nothing in this Supposition being eternal but Matter and Motion, which, under all Changes, continue the same, every new Generation of Beings must have their Original from these, the [Page 67] precedent Generation having no other Powers nor Differences from the succeeding, but what arise from the various Disposition of Matter and Motion.

This is plain as to all such Beings as want the Faculties of Perception and Will; and, upon Examination, the Case will be found to be the same with respect to such as are endued with these Qualifications: For even these also, in the present Hypothesis, must be allowed to derive their whole Be­ing from Matter and Motion; because they are temporary Beings, which began to be, and there is nothing else eternal but Matter and Motion, and consequently there is no other Cause assignable for their Production.

Which need not be proved to those who hold the Eternity of the World without a God, because there are none, I believe, of this Opinion, but do ascribe the Original of Perception and Will to Matter and Motion, making the former only different Modisica­tions of the latter: in which they act very consistently with themselves, in making an absurd Scheme all of a piece, not blending Truth with Falshood, but taking in all the Absurdities that do any way depend upon one another, and belong to the main buil­ding.

However, that I may leave no room for Exception from any side, I think my self obliged to shew that, if Perception and Will are not the Issue and Effects of Matter and Motion, as has already been shewn they are not, the Existence of intelligent Beings with­out a God is inconceivable and impossible; be­cause no other Cause of their Production can be assigned.

For suppose it should be enquired how such a purticular man came to exist, how he came to begin to be a conscious Being, he did not put himself together in such a man­ner as we now perceive him to exist, he did not give himself those Capacities and Powers he is conscious of, together with his Consciousness of them; this is a flat Contra­diction, and granted to be so on all hands.

Whence then did he derive this mighty Difference of Being we perceive in him, by which he is distinguish'd from all other that fall under our Cognizance? Not from some intelligent Being of infinitely greater Perfe­ctions, of the like kind with those he per­ceives in himself; not from any mechanical Powers of Matter and Motion: both these Causes are set aside in the present En­quiry.

Nothing then remains, but that the Man which now exists, and sometime ago began to be, must have received his Existence, and all those Qualifications which distinguish him from Matter, from some other man of the like nature with himself, who existed before him; but this is absurd and irrational, not only upon the account of the infinite Subordination of Causes and Effects which follows from this Supposition, which, by every body, is rejected as a shocking repug­nant Notion; but because it is hereby af­firm'd that one Being may solely by its own power produce another Being of the same Na­ture and Perfections with its self, which I take to be the next Impossibility to a Being's making it self.

For supposing the Existence of a God, and that that may be allowed we have seen before, 'tis impossible that God should have another God of all the like Perfections with himself, but of a distinct Existence, pro­ceeding from him: in like manner, we conceive it utterly impossible that any kind of Matter should produce the least new Par­ticle of Matter: nay, one part of Matter ne­ver imparts any Motion to another without losing its self what the other receives; and in all other material Productions there is on­ly [Page 70]a new disposition of the parts of Matter, and not any new Being of a distinct Nature from it; which new Disposition is not re­ceived entirely from some other Being of the same kind or texture with its self, but from material Particles and Motions conveyed from several distant parts of Nature; and yet such different dispositions of Matter as are observ'd in the World cannot be conceived to be the product of Matter and Motion alone, without the Assistance and Regulation of some other Being of higher Perfections, as has been shewn before. How then is it possible that one Mind or conscious Being should produce another entire distinct Mind or Being of equal Perfections with its self, without losing any thing from it self, or borrowing any Assistance from any other kind of Being existing in the World? and what is as strange, do all this without be­ing conscious of this its chief Perfection, as well as it is of all its other?

This, I say, cannot possibly be; and therefore, if the World be eternal without a God, all the continual Changes and new Pro­ductions that have ever been in it must be ascribed to matter and Motion; but, Mat­ter and Motion not being able to produce such Effects, from hence I conclude that the [Page 71] Eternity of the World considered as it now is, without the eternal Existence of a God is impossible.

And thus I have consider'd all the seve­ral Hypotheses which pretend to give any account of the present Constitution of things called the World, with exclusion to the Being of a God.

I shall now take a short Review of each of them in conjunction with the Existence of a God, and then pass to more general Refle­xions to shew the Incompetency and Falshood of any other account whatsoever that can be given of the Original and Existence of things besides that of their proceeding in some manner from God.

But, before I enter upon the Considera­tion of these Hypotheses, which do all, tho' in different manners, establish an eternal Co-existence of Matter and Mind, I think it necessary to premise something concerning the Nature and Distinction of these two kind of Beings, as far as we are capable of perceiving them; that so I may cut off a great many Disputes and Mistakes occasion'd by the Confusion of our Ideas upon this Subject, and what I have to say afterwards may be better understood.

I do not perceive any such Connexion be­twixt the Ideas of Perception and Will and those of Extension, Figure, and Motion, that where-ever the former are, there must the latter be also; nor do I see any Rea­son why Perception and Will may not exist separately from Extension, Figure, and Mo­tion, as well as Extension, Figure, and Mo­tion may exist separately from Perception and Will; only because these are actually per­ceiv'd so to exist, and we have not yet been actually conscious of such a separate Existence of the other. But this does not hinder but that Perception and Will may so exist, and have a Subject or Substance of their own, distinct from that which sup­ports these Qualities of Extension, Figure, and Motion.

If Thinking and Willing were common to every Being we knew, we could no more frame an Idea of a pure material Substance existing without these Qualifications, than we can now of a pure thinking Substance, existing without those Qualities we attri­bute to Matter only: but 'tis certain from an actual Separation of these different Ideas perceivable in different Subjects, that some of them may exist without the other, tho' without this actual Separation we could not [Page 73]have been so certain of it; and therefore, tho' the other have never yet been perceived to exist separately from these, it does not follow from thence that they cannot so exist: but, considering the vast distance and distinction in the Natures of the several Ideas, without any conceivable Resemblance or Relation to one another, 'tis very proba­ble they do arise from different Principles, and are founded in different Subjects.

However, having no farther Certainty of it from natural Reason, and I purposely wave all other Proof at present, let us sup­pose that Perception and Will, Extension, Figure, and Motion, have all the same com­mon Subject to support them, are radically and ultimately founded in the same Sub­stance, and issue from the same Principle; which Subject, Substance or Principle, we know nothing more of than that it is some­thing which sustains these different Quali­ties, or whatever else we call them, which could not exist of themselves without it: Supposing, I say, all this, 'tis ridiculously, and without any colour of Reason, inferr'd from hence, that therefore Perception and Will are only different Modifications or Dis­positions of Extension, Figure, and Motion, or do in some manner or other wholly re­sult [Page 74]from them: For why may not distinct Qualities co-exist together in the same Sub­ject, without being made one from another? or why should Perception and Will be Mo­difications of Extension, Figure, and Moti­on, any more than Extension, Figure, and Motion are different Modes of Perception and Will? I cannot see what ground they can have for the contrary of either of these, who affirm what we call the Mind or Soul of Man to be nothing else but Matter un­der a peculiar Disposition of its Parts.

But that Thinking and Willing, upon a Supposition that they actually exist in mat­ter and cannot exist without it, are not there­fore Modifications or Effects of the other Qualities of Matter which are antecedently in it before the Addition of these, may be farther illustrated by this Instance.

Motion is something added to the origi­nal and essential Qualities of Matter, owes its Capacity of existing to it, and cannot exist without it; but 'tis plain that Motion is no Extension or effect of Solidity, Modi­fication or Figure, which are every thing we conceive in Motion before Matter is ad­ded to it; but something in its own nature distinct from all these, and not resulting from any conceivable Difference of them: So [Page 75]that it does not follow that, because Mat­ter is solid, or so and so extended or figured, that therefore it must be in motion.

And if this be true of Motion, it must be much more so of Perception and Will: For Motion does involve Matter in the very Idea of it: there's no conceiving of Motion without conceiving at the same time some­thing that is moved; and I cannot consider a thing as moved, without considering it as extended too, and Extension necessarily im­plies the other essential Properties of Matter: but I can form a Notion of Perception and Will, and be conscious of something per­ceiving and willing, without having any Ideas at the same time of Solidity, Exten­sion, Figure, or Motion; and therefore, if Motion may be joyned to the other Qua­lities of Matter without resulting from them, tho' they are necessarily implied in the Idea we have of it, 'tis much more probable that Perception and Will may co-exist with Mo­tion and all the rest of the material Quali­ties, without being the effects or product of them, when they carry no Marks of such an Original upon them, and in their Con­ception have no manner of appearance of any Relation to them. And, if it does not follow that because Matter is of such a na­ture, [Page 76]and so modified, therefore it moves, much less can it be inferr'd that, because Matter is so and so disposed and moved, therefore it thinks and wills.

This being premised, it plainly appears from hence, that 'tis much more probable in Reason that God should be the only eternal Being, than that Matter, any way consi­dered, should be co-eternal with him: For the Notion of God is full and compleat, with­out any Consideration of Matter, and the Addition of the Idea of Matter to it does not add any thing to the Perfection of the Divine Being.

The Power of producing Matter and Mo­tion, and forming an infinite variety of Be­ings out of them, is indeed a Perfection ve­ry worthy of God, and what we justly at­tribute to him; but the actual Existence of any of these does no way heighten the Idea we have of him, whom we conceive to be as perfect in himself before their Existence, as after it.

The actual Communication of some of his Perfections to a particular rank of his Crea­tures, and the giving them the Use and Enjoyment of his other Works, do raise a new Idea of him in them, which they call [Page 77]by the name of Goodness; but this they look upon only as a voluntary opening and disclosing the Glory of his original Na­ture, and not a necessary additional Advanc­ment of it.

It is therefore most agreeable to our Reason, and all the Notions we have of the Divine nature, that God should have existed alone from all Eternity, and in time produced the World and all things in it.

But, if any Man had rather believe that Matter at rest, or Matter and Motion, or the present Frame of the World with the se­veral kinds of beings in it, were co-eternal with God, he must at the same time hold that

Whatever was co-eternal with God did either subsist eternally of its self, dictinctly and independently of him,

Or is really a necessary part of the Di­vine nature, and helps to make up the Idea of God,

Or did eternally proceed from him because he had eternally an effectual will to produce it:

But, the first of these Suppositions cannot be true; for neither Matter it self, nor Mat­ter and Motion, nor the present Constitution of things can be eternal independently of God; [Page 78]because, as has been fully proved already, neither of them can be supposed to have existed eternally without a God.

From which proof it sufficiently appears, that neither of them have the essential Proper­ties of an eternal Being viz. necessary Exi­stence and all possible Perfection; nor the Con­sequence of them, viz. the actual production of all temporary Beings:

For which soever of them is supposed, there are suppos'd also wanting those Per­fections we ascribe to God, which are cer­tainly the chief if not the only ones imagi­nable by us. And there can be no necessity of Existence where these are wanting, be­cause then we may suppose a necessary eter­nal Being with them which will be of greater Perfections than another necessary eternal Be­ing without them; but we cannot suppose two necessary and independent eternal Be­ings of unequal Perfections, therefore what wants any of these Qualifications, we ascribe to God, cannot exist necessarily and of it self.

And further, what we suppose destitute of Knowledge and Will can have no suffici­ent power of producing Temporary Be­ings, was it in its self allowed to be eternal; as is manifest from what has been said up­on the several Hypotheses that exclude the Being of a God:

And therefore what ever is supposed eternal which does not enter into the Idea we have given of God, must be taken into it as necessarily belonging to the Divine Na­ture, or be look'd upon as the free eternal effect of his eternal Will.

Thus some have affrm'd that the World, and every thing we see or know, is God:

Others, that all things flowed from God; by which, if they mean necessary Emanati­on, they must be referred to his Being and Essence, if production to his Will.

So that however we express our selves upon these Matters, every thing that we can imagine; or frame any Notion of, must be either God, or some way proceed from him, be reckoned to his Nature or his Works.

The Inference from all which is this: That 'tis most rational to think that no more belongs to the Idea of God than what we have before ascribed to him, and that he did in time, of his own free will, produce every thing not contained in that Idea, even ori­ginal Matter and Motion as well as the frame and Structure of the World, and the Variety of particular Beings in it.

But if any Man asserts the Eternity of any of these together with God in the full [Page 80]extent of the Idea we have given of him, however his Opinion may be true or false, it can make no change in our Thoughts with re­gard to Religion: the Idea of God, being so far the same here as we have establisht it the same Consequences will every where flow from it; and the Assertors of any such Opinion will bear the same Relation to God, and be under the same Obligations with us that dif­fer from them in some other things relating to God; which however held, have no other Influence upon us than as we are oblig­ed not to Entertain any false Notions of God willingly when we may have better In­formation; or, if we cannot, yet other Opi­nions may appear more suitable to our Rea­son, and more for the Honour of God; which I take to be the present Case, and there­fore shall wave any further Enquiry into these Matters, as having no prospect of a Possibility of knowing any thing more about them.

Thus have I, with as much Brevity and Dispatch as the Subject would allow, exa­mined all the Accounts that are or can be given of the present Existence of things. And, from particular Observations upon each of them, not all that might be made but such as I judg'd sufficient for my pur­pose, [Page 81]I think, I have made it very evident, that there must be a God, or Being of such a nature as I before described, who was the true and only Cause or Author of every thing we see, or know, or has over been, beside him; and without the Supposition of such a Being, the World could not pos­sibly have ever existed any other way.

I shall now add some general Reflexions to strengthen the common Hypothesis con­cerning the Original of the World, and so conclude the Proof of a God.

That the World is as we now perceive, must be ascribed to Chance, Necessity, or Wisdom; but Chance is nothing, Necessity without a God unintelligible, and therefore Wisdom, or what is meant by it, God, who is a wise Being, made the World, and all things in it, in the form and manner we now behold and admire.

The World's being made by chance is be­ing we know not how, being made without any Cause: and to speak thus, is to use Words without any Meaning under them.

There's no Man that has made any En­quiries into the Nature of Things, but knows, that nothing can be that before was [Page 82]not, without owing its Original to some real positive Being of antecedent Existence. Inadequate and insufficient Causes are often assigned for the Production of things; be­cause being next to, and immediately prece­ding the Effects, they are solely taken notice of, without any regard had to their Subor­dination to, or Direction by others; and of­tentimes something is thought to be the next and immediate Cause of a thing which is no ways concern'd in it: but in both these Cases, 'tis by reason of some real Ef­ficiency observed that these Judgments are made, which must all proceed from some real Being, tho' there may be a Mistake in attributing it to a wrong one, or to one that had only a share in the Effect; and there­fore there must be something real assign'd, which was as much and as properly the im­mediate Cause of the meeting of the Parts of Matter in order to make a World, as the parts of Matter so met were the Cause of the Production of the World; which can be no­thing else but such and such particular Deter­minations of Figure and Motion in the seve­ral parts of Matter; but these must be ei­ther eternal, or the Effect of certain eternal sixt Rules resulting from the Natures of Mat­ter and Motion, or be made by a divine [Page 83]Power; in all which there can be nothing casual, but every thing necessary or provi­dential.

For, supposing the whole System of Matter so and so figured and moved, we cannot con­sider it as indifferent to several Effects, but necessarily determined to one, which must in­evitably follow such a supposed Disposition, unless something extrinsical to Matter should restrain or change the Determination. If any thing extrinsical to Matter, or besides Mat­ter and Motion be allowed, it must be God; if there be nothing else existing but Matter and Motion, then are all the Effects resulting from them necessary, because what­ever Disposition or Motion of Matter we suppose, and whensoever in the whole ex­tent of Eternity we suppose it, every fol­lowing Effect must have been what it is, and there could have been no other pro­duced in the room of it.

The Reason why certain Portions of Matter so and so figured and moved do not always necessarily produce the same Effects is, because their particular Determinations are restrained or over-ruled by the necessary Im­pulses of other extrinsical Matter, or the greater Power of the Divine Will; which, being unperceiv'd by us, make us look [Page 84]upon several of these particular Effects as casual, which can only, and that very im­properly too with respect to our Comprehen­sion, be stiled so; whereas in reality, with respect to the universal Nature and Efficiency of things, they must be either necessary or voluntary.

But if we consider the whole Frame and Collection of things together, we cannot form any sort of Idea of Chance, either in the World as it now is, or in its original Formation, unless we will be so ridiculous as to say every thing that is is casual; that every thing that has been from all Eternity happen'd by chance, and that it was by chance that Matter and Motion were eternal, or that any thing existed at all, Chance having the same Title to all these Effects as to any one of them.

I need not consider the other Occasion we take of forming this Notion of Chance from the Indifference we are oftentimes conscious of in our selves with regard to several contrary Actions, which makes the following of one Action rather than ano­ther, where the Cause seems equally dis­posed to both, be look'd upon as a casual Result rather than a proper Effect. This may be accounted for otherwise by the [Page 85] Preponderancy of some motive determining us to act this way rather than another, and the seeming Indifference be shewed to be the effect of our Ignorance of the whole Nature and all the Consequences of the thing in question, and the several Reasons and ways of acting; but there is no occasion for such a Proof, because those that say the World was made by chance cannot be supposed to use the Word in this Sense, forasmuch as they do not acknowledge that God or any intelligent Being was concern'd in the Pro­duction of it; or, if they did, would they be so absurd, and entertain such low No­tions of him, as to think that some chance Thought or Action of his produced it.

'Tis plain then, that Chance is nothing else but an insignificant Word, and an igno­rant Pretence, which has no Sense nor Rea­son under it, and therefore can give us no manner of light in our Enquiries into the Nature and Original of things.

Neither will Necessity, which is the next thing to be consider'd, give us much bet­ter Satisfaction: For, if we examine this Notion well, 'twill evidently appear that there can be no Necessity for the present Exi­stence of the World in the manner we be­hold.

The Question is not, whether 'twas ne­cessary that God should make such a World as this, supposing there is a God, tho' this may easily be proved that 'twas not; but, whether 'twas absolutely necessary there should be such a World as this without a God: and I think it may be certainly demonstrated that it was not. For nothing can be said to be absolutely necessary, but what 'tis altogether impossible should be otherwise; but 'tis not impossible that the World should never have existed, or should ever be destroyed now it does exist: For if this be absolutely impossi­ble, then is it absolutely impossible that there should be any thing of greater Perfection and Power than the World; for if there was, that Being of greater Perfection and Power than the World could have hindred the World from existing, or could now destroy it; but 'tis not impossible there should be such a Being because it is not impossible to conceive such a Being, for what may be conceived to exist may exist.

But if any Man shall say he cannot con­ceive such a Being as could hinder Matter from existing, or destroy it now it does exist, because he cannot conceive a Power of making something out of nothing, or of redu­cing something to nothing, the last of which [Page 87]is here supposed, and no Account can be given of the present Existence of things without allowing the first if such a Being as this in question is supposed, and the Neces­sity of the World's Existence is taken away: If any Man, I say, should object this, I answer, that it seems to me conceivable enough from the Idea. I have of God, that what is here ascribed to him may fall with­in the compass of his Power; which reach­ing to all things possible, that is, to all things which do not imply a Contradiction, may extend to the Acts of Creation and Annihilation; which, tho' the manner of the Performance be incomprehensible, cannot be proved to carry any Contradiction in them.

However, if there be those that pretend they cannot comprehend the Possibility of these Actions, yet this is very conceivable by any Man, that there may be some Being of that Perfection and Power, that tho' he could not hinder Matter from existing, or reduce it to nothing afterwards, yet he might have hinder'd it from being put into any Motion, Form, or Order, and continued it in that State, or could reduce it now to a confused, unmoving Chaos, or scatter it in­to innumerable incoherent Particles. There's no manner of Difficulty for a Man to frame [Page 88]a Notion of these things, who has seen fre­quent Instances of the same kind of Power in a lesser degree exercised by Men. And this is sufficient to overthrow the Necessity of the present Frame and Constitution of things, which was the thing design'd.

If therefore the World and all things in it, in the Condition we now behold, do not subsist by a necessity of Being, nor are the result of Chance, it immediately follows that they are the Effect and Product of Wis­dom, the Workmanship and Contrivance of a wise Agent.

This is certainly the most rational Hypo­thesis that can be devised or imagined; for we that maintain this Opinion, have clear and distinct Ideas of Power and Wisdom by which we explain the Original of Things; but those who ascribe the Existence and Structure of the World to any thing else, have no manner of Ideas of what they as­cribe them to. No Man has any Idea of Chance or Necessity, except he annexes the Idea of Power to them; and he can have no Idea of Power without Knowledge, all Power proceeding originally from Mind, which by Consciousness we are Sensible of, and we can frame no Notion of any other Seat or [Page 89] Spring of Power; and therefore we make some Mind or intelligent Being the Author of every thing, as being the only conceiva­ble Fountain of all Power.

Our Notions of Wisdom, Contrivance, Design, are as clear as that of Power, and known the same way: And if they are ever plainly perceivable in their Works and Ef­fects they are so in the Frame and Con­stitution of the World, and the several parts of it. If we have any reason to conclude that Towns and Cities were built, and King­doms and Commonwealths were modell'd by the Thought and Contrivance of intelligent Beings, we have much more Cause to be­lieve that the Universe was made, fashion'd, and disposed by the Counsel and Wisdom of some more perfect and capacious Mind; the Marks and Prints of Wisdom being plainer and more legible in the Oeconomy of the World than any of the most admired Works of Man.

And therefore, if we allow our selves to have any Ideas of Power and Knowledge we must confess that Power is inseparable from Knowledge; and that there is no Power but there is some Knowledge commensurate to it, it being utterly inconceivable that any thing should be, or be made, which there is no Being that knows.

And this, I think is of it self Ground enough to believe there is a God who was the Author of the World and every thing in it, without carrying the Proof any high­er; but for those that will not be satisfied with this, I have given a farther Demon­stration of the Being of God, not with any Hopes of convincing them, but to make it impossible for them to urge any thing to the contrary.

Thus have I finished the Proof of a God, and (as I think) made it very evident, that there really is such a Being, and that what we call God is a Being of such a nature as I before described, invested with all these Characters and Properties I there attributed to him.

Which Considerations, together with those plain and easy Reflexions before sug­gested upon our selves and our own Nature, if carefully attended to, will certainly con­vince us of the Reality of all those Relations I have supposed between God and Man; and furnish us with many direct and undeniable Arguments of the Truth and Necessity of Re­ligion: which is the third Thing I propo­sed, and the principal part of the Design I am pursuing in this Discourse.

[Page 91]III. From the Knowledge I have shewn we have or are capable of having concern­ing the Humane and Divine Natures. I shall deduce a positive and direct Proof of Re­ligion.

Religion, in short, is whatever we are obliged to by God. In order therefore to prove there is such a thing as Religion, we must shew that Man is capable of being ob­liged to act after such a particular manner, that God has a Power of obliging him so to act; and that Man is actually under such an Obligation, or God does actually will and require something of him.

Now 'tis plain by the Account we have before given of the Nature of Man, and eve­ry one that consults himself may find it to be so, that he has in several cases a Power of determining himself to act or not to act, and a Power of acting or not acting accor­ding to such Determination; that he is influ­enced to act several ways by different Mo­tives and Prospects; and that he oftentimes suffers himself to be influenced by certain Considerations, which he might and ought not to have acted by, as he plainly perceives and knows by condemning himself afterwards [Page 92]for what he has done; and that he often neglects or refuses to obey such Motives and Incitements to Action which he ought to have followed, as his own Approbation of them before and after the Neglect or Re­fusal convinces him of. From whence it evidently follows, that a Man may be obli­ged to act one particular way rather than another; that is, there may be such Reasons and Motives for his acting this way, that, upon a just Ballance of all the several In­ducements that could be offered to him for any other, he must acknowledge ought to determine him; so that should he act the way, he must necessarily approve himself, and should he act any other he must necessarily condemn himself.

That Being which has a Power of offer­ing such Reasons and Motives to any Man as these, may properly be said to have a Power of obliging him to act such or such a way.

And that God has this Power is very ma­nifest if we consider what it is that influen­ces and determines us to act; which being nothing else but some kind of Pain or Plea­sure in present or in prospect, God, who can do all things possible, and consequently who can put us into, and continue us to [Page 93]all Eternity in a state of Pain or Pleasure, the greatest our Natures are capable of, can, by annexing these to different ways of acting, offer such Motives to us, as we shall be forced to acknowledge ought to de­termine us to act one particular way; and therefore God can, if he please, oblige us so to act.

The only Question then is, Whether we are actually under such Obligation; whe­ther God has prescribed such Actions, and annexed such Consequences to different kinds of Action as make it necessary to our Hap­piness to act that particular way he has prescribed.

But, before I enter upon the particular Resolution of this Question, I think it re­quisite to give a fuller Account of the Na­ture and Ground of what we call Obligation or Duty, together with the Right and Pow­er of obliging.

Now 'tis plain from what has been al­ready said, That an Obligation with respect to Man is nothing else but such a Reason or Motive as when duly offered to him necessa­rily determines him to chuse or prefer one way of acting before another; and this Reason or Motive can be nothing else but a greater degree of Misery or Happiness to be [Page 94]avoided or obtained by thus acting, than all things considered can be avoided or ob­rained by acting any other way. Such a Reason or Motive as this, does, in the strictest and properest Sense of the Word, oblige us to act according to it; or, which is all one, we ought, or it is our Duty, so to do; that is, we find our selves under a necessity of Judging thus.

There is no other Notion or Ground of Obligation imaginable; or if there be any other pretended, upon Examination it will be found to be ultimately resolvable into this.

What is meant by the Right and Power of obliging, in what respects they are the same, or, at least, only distinct Conceptions of the same thing, and in what respects they are different, will plainly appear if we consider the several Instances to which these Notions are applied.

All the Beings capable of obliging or be­ing obliged are those we call intelligent Be­ings; which, as far as our Knowledge, in these Matters reaches, are only God, An­gels, and Men.

Whether there are any Angels or middle Natures betwixt God and Men, and how they Act with regard to other intelligent [Page 95]Beings, natural Reason does not certainly in­form us, but, in general, with respect to all the intelligent Beings we can frame any Notions of, it may be affirmed that no one has a Right or Power of obliging another to act such a particular way be prescribes, any farther than he has a Power of contribu­ting to the Happiness or Misery of that Be­ing he so prescribes to.

Thus we are led to conclude by all we know concerning God and our selves;

For first, as to God; I am not able to comprehend, how he can any otherwise in­duce an Obligation upon Men to obey him, or live according to the Rules he prescribes, than by making them know that he has it in his Power to render them happy or mise­rable, according as they obey or disobey him; and that he will certainly make them the one or the other, as their Actions shall deserve.

'Tis not his great and supereminent Power in creating Men and giving them Being, which is solely in its self the ground and foundation of his Title to their Obe­dience: This, without a capacity of be­ing happy, could never become a Reason or Motive of acting to them, and conse­quently, could never [...] found any Obli­gation: [Page 96]For was Misery the certain unalter­able Condition: of their being, and they were sure their Misery was to have no End, and was capable of no Increase, how could the Author of their Being be imagined to oblige them to obey his Commands, or act one way rather than another, when he could not offer or propose any thing to them which would determine them so to act; all degrees of Pleasure, or lesser Pain, being supposed impossible; so that which way so­ever they acted, there could be no ground for approving themselves for it, because they were not capable of that or any other Pleasure, nor for condemning themselves, because their Misery was not capable of that, or any other Addition. They might indeed, by an overruling Power, be forced to such and such Actions; but this is not a rational Obligation, which is acknowledg­ed and submitted to as suitable and agree­able to Reason, and performed with the full Concurrence of the Will of those that obey it.

In vain then, and very falsly, do some nice abstracted Thinkers magnify the meta­physical Excellence and Perfection of pure Be­ing or Existence, even when joined with the extreamest degree of Misery: a Mo­ment's [Page 97]Experience would soon convince them that to be, was no otherwise the Perfe­ction of a rational Being than as it gave him a Capacity of being happy: but if they could be supposed to continue in their Opinion in such a State, and think it better to be miserable than not to be at all, the Satisfaction of knowing themselves to be must out-bal­lance the other Misery they felt, and con­sequently, upon that account, give the Author of their Being a Title to their Obedience: but then his Right of obliging them would be solely founded in his Power of making them less or more miserable, by gi­ving, continuing, or taking away, that Sa­tisfaction, they enjoy: which confirms the Truth of what I assert.

This will farther appear if, in the next place, we consider the Right and Power of obliging that Men have or pretend to have over one another; which, whatever kind or extent it be of, must be all founded in, and commensurate to, their power of contributing to the Happiness or Misery of one another.

But oftentimes it so happens, that some Men demand to be obeyed by others, and require them to live according to their Orders and Directions, when, at the same time, they have no Power, nor ever will [Page 98]have, to reward their Obedience, or pu­nish their Disobedience so as to make it more for their Interest while they live here to obey than disobey them. Upon which account, the Right of obliging is oftentimes lookt upon as existing separate from the Power of obliging, but without any ground.

For, if there be a God that will judge the Actions of Men, and give to every one according to his work, and the Persons re­quiring Obedience from others are com­mission'd by him to require it, they have a Power as well as a Right of obliging them to it, for they have a Power of proposing such Motives and Raesons for their acting, as are sufficient to determine them to obey ra­ther than disobey, viz. the Rewards and Punishments annexed by God to their Obe­dience or Disobedience; and consequently they have a Power of contributing to their Happiness or Misery, tho' they cannot be the immediate Instruments of either them­selves.

But, if there be no God, then are they not commission'd by him to command others, but they usurp upon the common Liberty and Equality of Mankind; and, in this cafe they have no more a Right than they have a [Page 99] Power of obliging those whose Interest it is with respect to this Life not to obey them; as will more fully appear hereafter, under another Head.

Another Instance there is, where the Power of obliging is, or may be exercised without the Right, and that is, when some Men by the Advantages of more Skill and Strength than others, without any Authority from God command their Obedience upon the pro­spect of great Rewards and Punishments, in such things where the Persons so com­manded are left to their Liberty by God to act either way, as shall seem best, or most for their Advantage to them in this Life: In which case, those that prescribe such particular Actions to others, have a Power of obliging them to obey because they have a Power of determining them to act by the Consideration of greater Happi­ness to be obtained, or Misery to be avoid­ed by acting that particular way they pre­scribe than would attend the contrary way of acting, but they have no Right to use this Power, because they are themselves un­der greater Obligations, with respect to God, not to employ it, than those upon whom it is exercised are with respect to them to obey it: but if there be no God, then is their Power their Right.

From all which it follows, that where­ever there is a Right of obliging there is a Power of obliging, and, where there is an absolute uncontroulable Power of obliging there is, for that very Reason, a Right al­so; but where there is a subordinate depen­dent Power of obliging, it may be exerci­sed without Right, that is, contrary to some Obligations which the Persons who exercise it owe to a Superiour Power.

But here, by a Right of obliging I would be understood to mean a Liberty of offering such Motives and Considerations to rational Be­ings, as when duly applied will determine them to act according to them, with the full Con­sent of their Mind, and make them infallibly approve and be pleased with themselves for so doing; not a title to order and dispose of them and their Actions by an irresistible: Force, accor­ding to the free and unlimited Pleasure of that Being to whom the Title is supposed to belong.

Whether God has such a Right as this over his Creatures, is no part of the En­quiry now; but that he has such a Right and Power of obliging as I have explained, is sufficiently proved from the necessary At­trilutes of God before specified, and from the Nature and Ground of all Obligation, of which I have here given a particular account.

Whether God has a Right and Title to our Obedience upon any other Foundation but that of his Power to make us happy; whether 'tis possible for Man to act volun­tarily upon any other Reason or Motive but that of his own Happiness; and whether Happiness be the ultimate End of all our Actions, and the ultimate Ground of all Ob­ligation, or only a subordinate but necessary and inseparable Consideration; if what I have already said upon these Matters does not satisfy, I shall no farther dispute; because I am very well assured that whatever other Grounds or Motives of our Obedience to God may be imagined by some who pre­tend to act upon more noble and disinteressed Principles than that of their own Happiness, 'tis impossible to persuade a Man who does not yet believe any Religion at all to be­come religious, except it can be plainly, or probably at least, made out to him, that he shall better his Condition by it. This I am sure is the only Argument that can pre­vail upon an Unbeliever to embrace Religi­on; and I sirmly believe whoever fairly consults himself, will find that he neither does nor can act upon any other ground, 'Tis true indeed, we often act without knowing or considering what the Conse­quences [Page 102]will be, and we are made and dis­posed after such a manner, that we readily acknowledge our selves obliged to submit to the Will and Commands of God without any express Consideration of future Happiness to be obtained by our Obedience; but if it could be evidently prov'd to us that Misery would be the certain Consequence of those Actions we thought our selves upon the first View obliged to, we should then be forced to acknowledge that we were mistaken in our first Judgments, and that it would be more reasonable to act another way which we were assured would be more for our Happiness.

These Things being premised, I return to the main Question, Whether we are actually under any Obligations to God, or which is the same thing in other terms, Whether there be any such thing as Beligion? And in this manner I shall prove there is.

First, I shall shew that there is such a par­ticular way of acting, such a course of Acti­ons, or Scheme and Model of living, which whoever duly and fairly reflects upon, will be forced to acknowledge that if he did live after That manner he should approve himself [Page 103]for so doing, and if he lived otherwise, he should condemn himself for it; and there­fore, he that finds himself necessarily deter­min'd to approve such a particular way of living, and to condemn the contrary, must acknowledge that he ought or is obliged to act accordingly. From whence I shall draw this Inference, that therefore all things consi­dered, it must be more for his Happiness to act this way than any other, because were it not, his free unbiassed Judgment could not, upon a fair Ballance of all the several Reasons and Motives of Action, approve him when he did so act, and condemn him when he did not; there being nothing else but the different Motives of Happiness and Misery that can determine the Mind to these different Acts: And from thence it follows, that he is truly and really obliged to act as he judges he ought to act.

Secondly, I shall prove that God, who was the Author of our Being, gave us such a Nature, by which we are neceflarily de­termined to judge after this manner, with that End and Design that we should exercise and employ those other Faculties and Powers he has furnish'd us with suitably hereunto; and that consequently, what our Reason tells [Page 104]us ought to be done, we are commanded by God to do; that 'tis God who proposes those pre­vailing Reasons and Motives which deter­mine us to act, and gives them all the Power and Influence they have over us; and therefore, what God has made to appear reasonable or unreasonable to us to do, will accordingly conduce to our Happiness or Misgry, and upon that account oblige us to act or not to act. And farther, I shall en­deavour to shew under this Head, that God purposely created us after such a man­ner with a Design to oblige us to such and such Performances, not only from the ge­neral Consideration of the Make and Nature of Man, but from many other Tokens and In­dications of such an End or Design plainly visible in the World. And the Sum of what we are thus obliged to by God, is what we call our Religion.

Thirdly, I shall positively and directly prove from the Nature of Religion it self, that a regular Practice of all those Duties or Obligations of which it consists would cer­tainly conduce to the greatest Happiness Man is capable of, considered only in his present Condition, as included within the Bounds of this Life.

Fourthly, I shall shew that the Defect of such a Practice, and the Consequences of it, do necessarily lead us to the Acknowledg­ment of such a future State, as is sufficient to determine us to prefer one particular way of acting before another, upon such Reasons and Motives. that is, such Degrees of Happiness and Misery as we are sure greater and more powerful cannot be offered to us.

From all which Considerations, the Cer­tainty and Necessity of Religion will be plain­ly and fully evinced.

1. First then, I am to shew that there is one particular way of acting which we are necessarily determined to prefer to any other; so that, upon a clear and impartial View of pure natural Reason, we cannot but like, approve, or be pleased with this way of acting, and dislike, condemn, or be displea­sed with the contrary; and farther, that we must judge or acknowledge that what we thus like or approve we ought or are obli­ged to do, and what we dislike or condemn we ought or are obliged not to do; and con­sequently that we are really obliged to act ac­cording [Page 106]to such Judgments, because it must be more for our Happiness so to act.

That there are some natural Notions of Good and Evil, Right and Wrong, or some such certain Distinctions founded in or result­ing from the Natures and Relations of things, as cannot be altered or destroyed by any arbitrary Agreement or Institution whatso­ever; and that these are perceivable by the bare use of our Reason the same way that any other part of our Knowledge is, are Truths which the greatest and wisest part of Mankind have constantly owned, however they may have differ'd in assign­ing which they were, and what were the true Grounds and Foundations of them.

Now, to put these Matters beyond all reasonable doubt, and to cut off all occa­sion of Contest concerning them, I only desire this may be granted me, that there are some things so clearly and fully proposed to the Mind, that a Man cannot deny or with-hold his Assent to them, and that where­ever this happens, there is the greatest Cer­tainty we are capable of: This being grant­ed, it necessarily follows that we may be as certain that such or such Things ought or ought not to be done, as that such or such [Page 107]Things are or are not after this or that man­ner, or are so and so related to one another.

As for Example: I may be as fully satis­fied that I ought to desire and endeavour after my own Happiness, and that I ought not to take away the Happiness of another Man, when I know I shall not add to my own by it, as I can be of the Truth of these Propositions; that every thing that moves is; that 'tis impossible the same thing should exist and not exist at the same time; that is, in both these Instances the things assented to have the same Suitableness or Agreeable­ness to our Reason, and the same Force or Violence would be offered to our Under­standings by a Denial of either: Which is all the Ground and Criterion of Certainty as­signable by us.

Several other moral Propositions might be brought, or deduced from these, that car­ry an irresistible Conviction along with them, not to be over-ruled by any after Conside­rations: But the common Rules and Maxims of Morality which are look'd upon as natu­ral, are not so general as those before instan­ced in, nor have in all respects the same degree of Certainty belonging to them; but what they are, how they are known, and how far they partake of Certainty and Evi­dence, [Page 108]I shall now give a short Account, and from thence prove that we are necessarily determined to assent to and approve these also, and to condemn and deny the contrary of them; and consequently, that we have all the Reason in the World to believe it will conduce more to our Happiness to act up to these Principles, than to pursue a diffe­rent course of Life.

The highest and most general moral Du­ties commonly instanced in, are such as these, That God is to be worshipped, that Pa­rents are to be obeyed, and all other natural and civil Relations proportionably to be respe­cted; that we ought to abstain from all sorts of Intemperance and Excess, and provide all things necessary for the continuance of our Life; that we should not do any other man an Injury, but contribute all we can to the Happiness of Mankind, and more particularly that Society we are of.

Now these, and such like Propositions as these, are known or found out by the Use and Employment of our natural Faculties the same way that all other Truths are; that is, Men are taught or made to have the Ideas these Terms belong to, or they get them by their own Observation, and then, by com­paring them together, they immediately [Page 109]acknowledge such or such a Relation be­twixt them, without being influenced by any other Motive to judge so but what re­sults from the Things themselves.

The Relations indeed of moral Ideas, as well as the Ideas themselves, are commonly learnt from others first, before Men are ca­pable of finding them out themselves; but this is no more an Argument that their As­sent to such kind of Propositions is only the Effect of Education, and consequently a meer Prejudice and no right Judgment, than it would be an Argument to prove that all the Mathematical Knowledge a Man has is nothing else but a Set of false Notions thrust upon his Understanding by Educati­on, because he happen'd to be taught the first Grounds and Elements of this Science while he was young, before he was capa­ble of finding them out by his own Obser­vation; for, when we afterwards come to review the moral Knowledge we got when we were Children, let us be never so jealous over our selves, and take all the Care we can to deliver our selves from the Prejudices of Education, we shall still adhere to and be farther satisfied of most of those Truths we were then taught, as is sufficiently pro­ved by the Experience of several thus edu­cated, [Page 110]the Certainty and Impartiality of whose Judgment, has been strengthen'd by the joint Assent of several of a contrary Edu­cation.

And, for a farther Illustration of this Point, should we suppose a Person entirely ignorant of all such Matters, but capable of understanding them when proposed, and one of these moral Rules or Maxims should be barely explained to him, without any Reasons offered to move or incline his As­sent either way, I believe 'tis very difficult to imagine how he could judge otherwise than we do.

As for Example: Suppose such a Person as this was justly inform'd concerning his own Nature, and the Nature of God, and what was meant by Worship and all the No­tions contrary to it, and he was ask'd which he should rather do, perform such Acts as would express this Worship, or neglect, slight, and omit them, or else ridicule, dis­honour, and blaspheme that Being we call God: or suppose he was told what a Parent was, and that such a Person was his Parent, and that he was himself sensible of a great many Kindnesses he had received from him, and it was proposed to him, after a due Explication of what was meant by these [Page 111]things, to murder him, defend him from some imminent Danger without any hazard to himself, or stand still and do neither; who is there that would not believe that in these Cases, fairly proposed and stated, such an unprejudiced Person as this would not chuse to worship his God and defend his Parent?

We have therefore the same Reason to conclude that moral Truths concerning humane Action are knowable the same way that all other Truths are which terminate in Speculation only; and that Men know more or fewer of them according to the dif­ferent Capacity and Application of those that are employed in these Enquiries.

And as to the Certainty and Evidence of such Truths as these, 'tis, as in all other kind of Knowledge, greater or less accor­ding as the Propositions considered are near­er to or farther from the first general Axioms or Rules of Morality, from whence all the rest are deduced; such as are those before mention'd of seeking our own Happiness, and not taking away another Man's when we can­not add any thing to our own by it, and such as immediately follow from hence, as that we ought to prefer a greater Good or Pleasure to a less, a lesser Evil or Pain to a greater, and the like, the Evidence of which is as [Page 112]great as of any Metaphysical or Mathemati­cal Axioms whatever.

But the other moral Duties I had occasion to instance in concerning the Worship of God, Obedience to Parents, &c. which are less general, have not the same degree of Evi­dence because the Certainty and Necessity of the Connexion of those Actions with our own Happiness, which is the original Foun­dation of all Action and Duty, is not so clearly discoverable that we immediately per­ceive it impossible, it should be otherwise; but the Evidence of such Propositions as these which I have mention'd before as the common Principles of Morality is so great, that, when they are fairly offered to the Under­standing, without any Consideration of our own Happiness being concern'd in them; if this may be supposed, as in several Instances no doubt it may, in such a case I say, we cannot refuse our Assent to them; and if so, there can be no reason assign'd why we should judge wrong when there is nothing supposed to determine the Mind either way but the Nature of the Ideas themselves we judge of, and all Men in the same Cir­cumstances necessarily judge the same way; and then it follows, that these moral Propo­sitions have the same degree of Evidence as [Page 113] any other concerning Matters of meer Spe­culation: But the Truth or Falshood of these former depending upon their Connexion with our Happiness, the Evidence of them, if true, must be the same in proportion with the Evidence of this Connexion.

Now the Reason we have to conclude that there is a Connexion betwixt such moral Actions and our Happiness so as to be firmly persuaded that the Performance of these Acti­ons, which without any visible relation to our Happiness we prefer and approve, will be attended with more Pleasure and less Pain than such Omissions or Actions, which, with­out any prospect of Misery, we condemn; the reason, I say, we have thus to con­clude is this: we find our selves under an absolutely necessity of desiring and endeavour­ing after our own Happiness and every thing that we know tends to it, and of flying and avoiding whatever we apprehend may lessen or take it away and put us into a con­trary State of Misery; we find also, that Pleasure and Pain, Happiness and Misery are the only Principles and Motives of Acti­on, and the obtaining the one, and avoid­ing the other, the only Ends of all Endea­vour and Pursuit; and therefore, we can­not conceive it possible that Beings so made, [Page 114]of such a Nature and Constitution as this should be also contrived after such a manner as to be necessarily determined to approve those Actions, and judge they ought to do them, which would tend to their Misery, and to condemn those Omissions and Performances, and judge that they ought not to be guilty of them which would procure their Happiness.

Except then it can be proved from Rea­son, or it is some other way discoverable, that acting according to these moral Rules will certainly be attended with more Misery or less Happiness than acting against them, the present Approbation of our Judgment is a sufficient Argument that they are true, and that the Observance of them will con­duce more to our Happiness than the Neglect or Violation of them; and if it is impossible to prove the contrary, as I think it is, and will plainly appear hereafter when I come to consider a future State, then are we ne­cessarily determin'd to make such Judgments concerning our Actions, as I have menti­on'd; and if we are necessarily determin'd to judge thus, we have the same or very near the same Reason to conclude that the Observation of such moral Rules, or such a par­ticular way of acting as our Reason approves will contribute more to our Happiness than that it condemns; and consequently that we are [Page 115] obliged so to act; as we have to conclude that what we are necessarily determined to give or refuse our Assent to should be true or false accordingly.

For the only Standard and Criterion of Happiness as well as Truth being the origi­nal Frame and Constitution of the Mind, and the Mind being as capable of Happiness as Truth, nay, if these can be separated, and there is any Precedence of one to the other, being made first and principally for Happi­ness, there is as much ground to suppose that Men are not deceived when they are necessa­rily determined to Judge such a thing ought or ought not to be done, as when they are determined to judge such a thing is or is not; and if so, then consequently such a thing as they have thus necessarily judg'd ought or ought not to be done, will as certainly tend to their Happiness or Misery accordingly, if they act agreeably to the several Judgments they made; for otherwise they would have been deceived in so judg­ing: and when the Mind is no other way concern'd in any thing else than as it has a re­lation to its self, and has nothing to do to know any further, why should it not judge as truly and certainly of the Suitableness and Unsuitableness of other things to its self, [Page 116]as of their Agreement and Disagreement among one another?

Since therefore these general Principles or Rules of humane action, which are common­ly lookt upon as the first Foundations of all Morality or Duty, are found so very agree­able to our purest and most impartial Rea­son, that upon a bare proposal of them, without any perceivable relation to our Hap­piness they command our Assent and Approba­tion, and we cannot but acknowledge that what we approve we ought to do, and what we condemn we ought not to do, it may, I think, be very fairly inferr'd from hence, that it would conduce more to our Happi­ness to act according to them than to act otherwise; and consequently, that we are really and effectually obliged, in the full ex­tent and force of the Word, to a strict and careful Observation of these Measures in the whole Course of our Lives.

From all which it plainly appears, that the Certainty of these moral Axioms or Pro­positions, which I have placed in the second rank, falls very little short of the Evidence of those first irresistible Judgments or rather Impressions concerning our own Happiness which are inseparable from our Nature and from our Thoughts; for these are known [Page 117] in themselves by immediate Intuition the same way that those are; and if their Con­nexion with our Happiness, or with those first Propositions concerning it before men­tioned, cannot properly and strictly be said to be known either by Intuition or Demor­stration, yet that there is such a Connexi­on betwixt them, is, in the highest degree that can be, probable, or what they call mo­rally evident. And this is the least that can be inferred from what has been alleged upon this Head: and I am very cautious of laying more stress upon any Argument than it will unquestionably bear.

2. The next Step I am to make in the Proof of Religion is, to shew that what our Reason approves or condemns, and tells us we ought or ought not to do, we are com­manded by God to do or not to do, who gave us such a Nature by which we are necessarily determined to judge and be affected after such a certain manner, with that End and Design that we should act accordingly, of which End and Design he has given us several To­kens and Indications: which is a farther Confirmation that 'tis more for our Happiness to observe these Measures of acting than not; and consequently, that we are obliged by God to observe them.

That we received our Beings, together with all the Powers, Capacities, and what­ever else belongs to them, from God, is ve­ry evident from the Account before given of the Divine Nature, and is a Truth co­incident with that of our Existence; and therefore, when we are necessarily determi­ned to judge or be affected after such a man­ner that 'tis plainly out of our Power to judge or be affected otherwise, we must conclude that such a Determination is foun­ded in our very Frame and Make, and con­sequently is the Work of God; who, being an intelligent and wise Being, must be sup­posed to order every thing he makes to some End; and there being no End he can be supposed to design any thing for but that which it is capable of, and which it is peculiarly fitted to attain, what Reason can be given why we should be capable of such Actions, and peculiarly disposed to them by a necessary Approbation of them, if it was not designed by God we should act ac­cordingly?

And farther, Since by our very Nature and Constitution we find our selves invinci­bly and irresistibly determined to seek and endeavour after Happiness, and avoid Mi­sery, [Page 119]we have all the reason in the World to conclude, that Happiness is the ultimate End of our Being and all our Actions; and therefore, the same God who made us after this manner, having made it also necessary for us to approve such Actions and judge them fit to be done, and to condemn others as not fit to be done, we cannot conceive it possible that he should make it necessary for us to aim at Happiness in all we do, and likewise make it necessary for us to approve such Actions, and judge our selves obliged to do them as would not tend to our Happi­ness: for this is to design and determine us to a certain End, and at the same time to make it necessary for us to prefer and approve such means as are contrary to it, and to condemn such as would lead us thither; which is a perfect Contradiction to a wise Being, and cannot be supposed of God.

As therefore we have reason to be satis­fied, to the Exclusion of all Doubt, from the Natures of our selves and other things, that, what we are necessarily determined to judge is or is not, ought or ought not to be done, must be in the truth and reality of things according as we have judg'd concer­ning it, because it is impossible to conceive we should be so disposed with relation to [Page 120] other Beings and our own Happiness, as to be under a necessity of being mistaken in the clearest and most immediate Perceptions con­cerning either we are capable of; so like­wise when we consider our selves and all other Beings as made and contrived by God, this great Truth being allowed, we are farther and more directly convinc'd of all other Truths we find our selves necessarily determined to assent to; the Nature of God being a full and express Warrant to us that we cannot be deceived by him, and con­sequently that we are not mistaken in any of those Judgments which we are necessarily de­termined to make, because 'tis God that de­termines us.

But if any Suspicion of a Mistake could be entertained, there seems to be less ground for it in those Judgments in which our Happiness is immediately concern'd than in the Judgments we make upon things that have no relation to us; for 'tis more reasonable to think God should make us af­ter such a manner that 'twas necessary for us to judge wrong in Matters, where the Consequences would be the same to us whether we judg'd right or not, or were wholly ignorant of them, than to imagine that he should purposely determine us to judge [Page 121]wrong where Happiness and Misery depend upon our Judgment.

Thus it appears that God did design to oblige us to such a particular way of acting or living, from the general Consideration of the Nature of Man, whereby he is necessari­ly determined to approve some Actions and to condemn others, and to judge thus of himself that he ought to do what he so ap­proves, and that he ought not to do what he condemns: and therefore we are obliged to obey the Commands of God and our Nature, and pursue our own Happiness by the Di­rections God has given us, and in the Way and Method he has pointed out to us.

But, besides the express Judgment of our Reason, which he has set as a certain unerring Guide to lead us to Him and Happiness, he has given us several other Tokens and Indications of his Design and our Duty, both in the Frame and Disposition of our Minds, and in the Oeconomy and Consti­tution of Humane Society.

And first, as to the Frame and Dispositi­on of our Mind; he has not only given us such Capacities and Powers whereby we are enabled to know and perform such Actions [Page 122]as he requires of us, but he has made us sensible of all our Obligations by giving us such Inclinations and Propensions to those particular Actions he has design'd to oblige us to, that, as soon as ever any Occasion offers it self, we immediately close with it, so that the Action prevents all the Exer­cise of our Reason, or at least is so quick, that we are not sensible of any antecedent Judgment or Deliberation concerning it.

Thus upon the receipt of any conside­rable Kindness, we presently find our Souls ready and disposed to all the Acts of Love and Esteem we are capable of; and, with­out considering that this is a likely way of procuring more Advantage to our selves by engaging the good Opinion of all that are Witnesses of those Returns we make, we immediately break out into all the external Actions that are any ways expressive of a grateful Sense of Mind. So, in like man­ner, when by Reasoning, Information, or any visible Indications of Power, we are induced to believe that such or such a Be­ing is able, at his Pleasure, to contribute very much to our well or ill Being. Happi­ness, or Misery, as soon as ever we are satisfied of this, we are immediately consci­ous of all those different Sentiments of Love [Page 123]Fear, and Reverence, and a Disposition to do what we think most agreeable to the Will of such a Being; and our outward Behaviour is suitable to these inward Sen­timents without any express Consideration that we shall thereby recommend our selves to this Being, and dispose him to make use of his Power in our Favour only, and not to our Disadvantage.

Now 'tis plain, that in both these Cases our Actions are not the Effects of pure Rea­son only, tho' upon Examination they are found to be exactly agreeable to it; for be­sides that upon the strictest Observation of what passes within us, we are not sen­sible in these Instances of those Steps and Degrees which we are conscious of in all manner of reasoning, and which distinguish this Operation of the Soul both from Intu­ition and Sensation; nor do by Intuition per­ceive a necessary and immediate Connexion betwixt these Actions and our own Happiness; besides all this, I say, if we acted by rea­son only, what need would there be of those previous Sentiments we feel? We might per­form all the outward Actions upon a bare ra­tional Prospect of the Advantages we were likely to procure to our selves by them: but, if we look into our selves, we shall [Page 124]be convinced that we cannot help having those Sentiments we feel upon such Occasi­ons, that we do not reason our selves into them, and, if by the Unhappiness of our Temper, or any other way, we should want these Sentiments of Gratitude, Re­verence, or the like, we should find some difficulty in reasoning our selves into the same outward Behaviour as would have fol­lowed, if we had been so affected; and, tho' we were never so well convinced that our Happiness was really concern'd in such a Behaviour, all our Actions would come slower, be performed with more Constraint, and less Conformity to one another, than if they had proceeded from a lively natural Sense, till Habit, which is another additi­onal help to Reason, had given us greater Ease and Dispatch.

And thus we should find our selves ori­ginally made and disposed with respect to all the general Duties of Morality and Religion, if we entred upon a particular Examination of our whole Frame and Constitution: from whence we may conclude, that these natu­ral and original Inclinations and Propensions to some Actions, and Restraints from and Aversions to others, which we feel in our selves without being conscious of any pre­vious [Page 125]Deliberation concerning the Reasonable­ness or Unreasonableness of what we do, or, after Judgments of this Nature made, we look upon as certain Motions of the Soul carrying us on to act according to such Judgments with more Ease, Quickness, and Application of Mind than we should have done upon the bare Conviction of our Reason without them: All these Dispositions, I say, and Sentiments of the Soul being given us by God, and assisting us conformably to the Dictates of our Reason in discharging what we call the Duties of Religion, we have suffi­cient Cause from hence to conclude, that God did design us for the Practice of such Du­ties, and consequently, that an obedient Compliance with this Design will contribute more to our Happiness than our Disobedience can; which is a farther Proof that we are actually under Obligations to God, or that there really is such a thing as Religion.

Which Obligations, together with God's Right of obliging, we are constantly put in mind of by the Oeconomy and Constitution of Humane Society, and the several Relati­ons in it.

The different kinds of Government and Sub­jection to be found in the World, are the [Page 126] chiefest Marks and Characters by which Men are distinguish'd from one another in Socie­ty; these take up a large share in their Thoughts and Discourses, and a great part of their Actions are influenc'd and deter­mined by the Notions and Opinions they have of them; all which do lead us to ac­knowledge that we are under higher Obliga­tions of Obedience to God than we can be to any humane Governour whatsoever; for, whether we consider our selves as Servants, Children, or Subjects, or any other way in­feriour to others, whatever Reasons we al­ledge for our Duty and Obedience to Ma­sters, Parents, or Princes, or for their Right of commanding us, they will conclude more strongly upon us when we consider our selves with relation to God.

Now all the Reasons and Grounds of our Obedience to Men, and of their right of obliging us, are Power Goodness and Property. When a person has a Power of contributing to my Happiness or Misery, and I do, some way or other, belong to him, so as to be call'd his, I look upon my self as obliged to obey him or act according to his Will; and if, besides his having this Power and Property, I consider him as more inclinable to do me good than ill, I conceive my self under [Page 127] higher Obligations of Obedience to him.

But God has all these Titles to our Obe­dience in the highest degree possible, for, by giving us our intire Being and every thing that belongs to our Nature, 'tis plain that he has not only a greater Power of contribu­ting to our Happiness or misery than any man can have, but also a greater Property in us by this Act of Creation or Production than can accrue to any Man by Conquest Purchase, Covenant, Generation, or any other way whereby Men come to have a Pro­perty in one another. And that he has more Goodness towards us, or is more incli­nable to contribute to our Happiness than Misery, is manifest from his own Nature enjoying Happiness, and that other Cha­racter of it, his Wisdom in designing every thing for the best Ends they are capable of, as also from the Benefits we have already received from him.

The inference I draw him from hence is, that, as our Reason and Judgment which tell us what ought or ought not to be done, and natural Inclinations and Aversions pre­venting or seconding our Reason, but always conformably to it, which dispose us to action, were given us by God with a design of engaging us to act accordingly, [Page 128]so were we put into such a State and Con­dition with regard to one another, that the necessary Relations resulting from Soci­ety might put us in mind of our relation to God, and the proper peculiar Actions consequent upon it; so that by a constant traditional Education in the exercise of these Duties of Subjection of different sorts to one another, we should be led to the Ac­knowledgment of our Obligations to a Su­perior Being more easily than if every Man had been left to himself to find them out by the use of his own Faculties only, without these particular Occasions of setting his Rea­son and Inclinations on work.

All which Considerations concerning the State of humane Nature and Society, are at least very probable Arguments that we are actually obliged by God to such a particular way of living as we call Religion; and con­sequently, we have Reason to conclude that a careful practice of Religion, all things considered, will contribute more to our Happiness than a Neglect or Transgression of it, because the same God who designs us for Happiness designs us also for the Practice of the Duties of Religion, tho' we do not yet perceive an immediate Connexion betwixt Re­ligion and Happiness; which is the next thing to be proved.

[Page 129]3. In the third place then I shall give some positive and direct Proof from the Na­ture of Religion it self, that a regular Practice of all those Duties or Obligations of which it consists would certainly conduce to the greatest Happiness Man is capable of, con­sidered only in his present Condition, as in­cluded within the Bounds of this Life.

'Tis plainly percieved upon a short tran­sient View and Comparison of the Humane and Divine natures that Man was made and designed by God for Happiness; and we are more nearly and necessarily convinc'd by the irresistible Desires of Happiness, and Aversions to Misery we Experience in our selves, and by our constant unalterable En­deavours to attain the one and avoid the other, that the Enjoyment of the purest most unallayed Happiness we are capable of must be the ultimate End of our Being and all our actions.

Since therefore God has made us capable of, and designed us for such an End, and we find our selves necessarily determined to aim at this End; since the only way of attain­ing this End is by our Actions, and we are assured by Experience that all our Actions [Page 130]do not lead to this End, but Misery as well as Happiness may be the Effect and Consequence of our Actions, it follows from hence, that there must be one particular way of acting, which, if steadily pursued, will certainly procure us greater Happiness than we can possibly attain by any other.

And farther, if we are designed for Hap­piness, and this Happiness be attainable only by one particular way of acting, 'tis certain that the same God who designed us for such an End must design also that we should act such a particular way as would conduct us thither.

In Conformity to which Designs, we cannot but believe that, as he has given us a certain Knowledge of and necessary Deter­minations toward our End, he must have gi­ven us also sufficient Tokens and Indications of the Means that lead to it; and, upon Examination we are satisfied that he has so, by framing our Minds after such a manner that we are necessarily determined to ap­prove some Actions and to condemn others, and to judge our selves obliged to do what we approve, and to avoid what we con­demn; by giving us such natural Propensions and Aversions agreeable to the Judgments of our Reason, as by a sudden and unper­ceivable [Page 131]Influence dispose us to, and assist us in the Performance of the same Actions which Reason prescribes; and by putting us into such a state or condition of Life with respect to one another, where the different kinds of Government and Subjection, and the Notions and Actions resulting from thence unavoidably lead us to the Acknow­ledgment of God's Superiority, Power, and Right of obliging, and the Necessity of our Obedience to him, in all the several Instances of Duty, in which we conceive our selves bound to any governing Relati­on among Men, but in a higher and more exalted manner, as becomes the mighty Inequality between God and Man.

From whence we are farther led to con­clude that all other Duties and Obligations we apprehend our selves under, with respect to our selves or others, are the Effect of our Obligation to God the Supreme Governour of the World, whose Power and Right are over all things, original and independent, and all other Powers and Rights are derived from and dependent upon him; the Sense of which Obligation makes all our Actions that are duely influenced by it termed Religious, tho' God is not the immediate Object of them.

And these are sufficient Marks and Evi­dences to assure us that God does require us to act such a particular way, and con­sequently that we are actually obliged to frame our Lives according to those Rules and Measures which come under the Name of Religion, unless it can be shewn from more certain Discoveries of the Nature of Man and the Design of God, that notwithstanding all these fair Appearances, Religion is not the Way to Happiness. But, as 'tis manifest from what we have already observed of the Nature of God and our own Frame and Constitution, that no higher Assurances can be given us of the Truth of any thing than we have had in this matter from a Concurrence of our Reason, natural Incli­nations, and external Condition, and that we cannot be deceived in assenting to such Testimony; so, upon farther Experiences and Obserxations taken from our selves and the State of Mankind with relation to Religion, we shall find that Religion is in its own Nature so suted and suited to the Nature of Man, so propertion'd to the origi­nal Dispositions and Desires of the Soul, as by a proper Tendency aad Esicacy to promote his Happiness.

This appears first by what we feel in our selves. What just and impartial Reason approves we find a Pleasure in approving; Inclination superadded to Judgment height­ens the pleasing Sentiment; acting what Nature inclines to and Reason warrants, is accompanied with a new and higher Satis­faction, all which we repeat and enjoy over again upon Reflexion. And, if any Pain or Uneasiness mixes with the Pleasure, or attends it, that does not arise from the same Thoughts or Actions that this does, but from a contrary Application of Mind in our selves or others, which opposes and ob­structs us in the Practice of Religion, or from some other extrinsical Caeuse that has no Dependance upon or Connexion with Religion; so that the due Performance of any Religious Action is never properly the Cause of any Pain or Trouble to him that performs it, however in some Instances it may seem to be the Occasion of it.

But, in order to be farther satisfied of the natural Connexion betwixt Religion and Happiness, and that we may more clearly perceive that the latter is the true and ge­nuine Effect of the former, we should take off our Thoughts from the present State of [Page 134]Mankind, and represent to our selves ano­ther Generation of Men. living together in a constant regular Observance of all the Du­ties and Obligations of Religion: for there we should behold such a glorious Scene of Happiness rising before us, that, consider­ing the necessary Circumstances of our mortal Condition, we could not possibly imagine or form an Idea of any thing in this Life be­yond it.

This would be a State of universal Peace, Safety, Tranquility, and Love; where there would be no Injuries nor Tears, no Envy nor Distrust; where every Man would find all the Pleasures of Friendship in the Com­pany of every Man, and feel his own agree­able Thoughts towards others redoubled by knowing that they had all the same Sen­timents for him: In such a State as this all the natural Appetites and Desires of the Soul would be satisfied, without a painful Eagerness in the Pursuit, or Satiety in the Enjoyment; and there would be no irre­gular imaginary Desires to create the Unea­siness of Disappointment: then every Man would be pleased with all he did, and have his Satisfaction heightned by a full and entire Assurance that his Actions were ap­proved by the World, and acceptable to God.

Was true Religion so universally and ex­actly practised among Men, they would engage the Power and Wisdom of the supreme Governour in their Favour by the Honour, Respect, and Obedience they paid him; they would be sure of all the Benefits and Advantages of humane Strength and Skill by a mutual Performance of all the Duties of Society; and by an equal regular Conduct and Management of their own particular Capacities and Powers, they would preserve themselves in the fittest and properest Con­dition of enjoying those agreeable Satisfa­ctions God had put within their Reach, and prolong the Enjoyment of them by continuing their Lives to the utmost Term they could, by any Endeavours of their own, carry them to.

Whoever takes a full and distinct View of Religion, in all its Power and Extent, must acknowledge that these are the true and necessary Effects of it, where its Influ­ence is freely dispensed, without Check or Opposition from contrary Causes. And what greater Happiness than this can we, without a larger Date of present Life or a prospect of another, conceive our selves capa­ble of? or, at least, is attainable by any other Actions besides those of Religion?

But this, I confess, is all but an imagi­nary Scene, a bare Idea or Pattern drawn by the Mind, which never was, and perhaps never will be exemplified in the reality of things: and therefore it does not necessari­ly follow from hence that, when the Gene­rality of Men act contrary to Religion, as now they do, those few that are mixt with them, and live exactly according to the Rules and I recepts of it, shall enjoy more Happiness than any of the rest, much less such whose Practice is inconstant and defective, which is certainly the Case of the best and most careful Observers of those measures of act­ing which Religion prescribes.

However, thus much, I think, may just­ly be inferr'd, That Religion is in its own Nature productive of Happiness and nothing else, and consequently was design'd and or­dain'd by God that it should obtain this Effect.

From whence I conclude, that if Man was made for Happiness, and directed and disposed to seek it by the means of Religion, and these means are found to be in their own Nature sufficient, but are some way or other, without the Fault of the Person that uses them, render'd ineffectual for the pre­sent; from hence, I say, we may certainly [Page 137]conclude that God, who in his great Wis­dom has order'd all these things, did not order them in vain, or with an Intention of deceiving; but has contrived it so, that some time or other the End to which they all point shall be obtained; and therefore, if a full and exact Observance of all the Du­ties of Religion be not attended with a suitable Happiness in this Life, 'tis a strong Proof that there will be a future State, in which there will be Rewards answerable to the highest Performances and Expecta­tions.

We have Reason also, from the Goodness and Wisdom of God, to hope, that the sin­cere Endeavours of those, whose Course is sometimes interrupted with voluntary Transgressions of the Rules prescribed them, will notwithstanding, by some Fa­vour or Grace, procure them a State of Hap­piness. But this we may be sure of, that God will put a mighty Distinction betwixt such as do but sometimes deviate from those religious measures they have proposed to themselves, and those who constantly act by different Principles.

4. The Proof of this Conclusion is the fourth thing I proposed in order to the [Page 138]Establishment of the Truth and Necessity of Religion. Here then I am to shew, that the Defect of a general and regular Practice of Religion, and the Consequences of this Defect, do necessarily lead us to the Ac­knowledgment of such a future State as is sufficient to determine us to prefer one par­ticular way of Life before another, upon such Reasons and Motives, that is, such degrees of Happiness and Misery, as we are sure greater and more powerful cannot be offered to us.

'Tis very plain, that Religion is not uni­versally practised in the World, nor do the generality of any Nation or Society of Men make their Duty to God the governing Principle of their Actions. 'Tis manifest likewise, that those few who are sensible of their Obligations, and endeavour to dis­charge them, do in many Instances neglect them, or act contrary to them: upon which Accounts it happens, that as there is a great deal more Misery in the World than our mortal Condition would otherwise subject us to, so it oftentimes falls to the religious Man's Lot to have the greatest share of it.

Nor is all the Trouble and Uneasiness he suffers the Effect of vicious Habits and Im­pressions [Page 139]mixing with, and obstructing the Performance of his Duty, or carrying him to contrary Actions, tho' very much is ow­ing to this Cause, but a great many Affli­ctions and Calamities are laid upon him by the Malice and Hatred of wicked Men purely for his being religious; so that, did he perfectly and compleatly fulfil all his Duty to God, there's Reason to believe his Mi­sery would be proportionably encreased as far as it was in their Power to do it.

From whence it plainly follows, that God has provided some other state of Hap­piness for such as live exactly according to his Purpose and Intention here; which will be so full and sufficient a Recompence for all the Misery they have suffered in this Life, as to justify their Obedience to God upon such Terms.

For, if God design'd Man for Happiness, as 'tis certain he did, and appointed Religi­on to be the means to it, as manifestly ap­pears from his annexing Pleasure to the pu­rest and most unmixt practice of it, as well as from several other Indications, 'tis im­possible to suppose that God should suffer his Ends to be defeated after a due and pro­per Use of the means, by the derived de­pendent Power and Contrivance of other Be­ings, [Page 140]and order it so, that those who were most diligent and exact in observing the truest measures of acting, should, for that very reason, meet with the least Success.

Should we therefore suppose a few per­fectly religious afflicted and tormented by wicked Men barely upon that account, as there can be no other, if they are what we suppose them to be; we must then con­clude that God has mighty Blessings in store for them, in comparison of which their present Sufferings are as nothing.

From hence also we may infer, that those whose sincere Resolutions and Endeavours are not attended with exact and universal Per­formance, and yet, who are rendred more mise­rable by the Actions of wicked men than they otherwise would have been for the sake of those degrees of Religion they come up to; 'tis reasonable, I say, to conclude that those will, some time or other, receive more Hap­piness or less Misery than others proportiona­bly to the difference of their Obedience and Affliction now: For, according as they have pursued the Means, so will their Attain­ments of the End be; or, if no Reward be due but to a full Discharge of all Obligations, it cannot be imagin'd that those who have Perform'd some part of what they were [Page 141]obliged to, and endeavoured at general Obe­dience should be punished as high as those who have been guilty of a greater or of a total Neglect, Contempt, or Volation of their Duty.

However therefore it be as to the manner of it, 'tis very agreeable to the Wisdom and Designs of God, according to all the Indica­tions he has given to Mankind of them, to make the Condition of those who act by the Principles of Religion preferable, to that of others who act by contrary Measures, which it would not always be, was there no other State of Life after this is ended.

From all which it plainly follows that there must be a Future State in which Men will be distinguish'd from one another by different degrees of Happiness and Misery ac­cording to the different regard they had to Religion in this Life.

The Certainty, of which State we are farther convinced of by the general Wants, Miseries, and Imperfections of our present Nature, which proceed from some Princi­ple or Disposition within us, contrary to that of Religion; which Principle or Dis­position is the Reason of that universal Wickedness which reigns in the World.

Did Mankind enjoy all the Happiness they were otherwise capable of in this mortal Condition, yet, so long as they found in themselves Capacities and Desires of grea­ter unknown degrees of Pleasure, which from the present Frame and Constitution of things they had no Hope or Prospect of, and felt an Uneasiness at the Thoughts of parting with those Enjoyments they were possess'd of, by the unalterable Decree of Death, which they knew themselves subject to; were they I say in such a Condition, they would have great Reason from hence to conclude, that God did design them for some other more perfect State, where their whole Capacities would be filled, all their Desires satisfyed, and no kind of Pain or Uneasiness check or allay the Fullness of that joy: not that they had then any cause of Complaint, as if God had not dealt kindly by them, in granting them lesser de­grees of Happiness than what they were ca­pable of; but because, in such a case as is supposed, their Capacities and Desires would be given them in vain; which does not seem consistent with the Wisdom of God; and moreover the Uneasiness of Defining what was impossible and the painful Fears and Apprehensions of what was certain, which [Page 143]they would then experience, would appear inconsistent with God's Design of making Man for Happiness; and therefore t'would be more agreeable to all the Notions we have of God, and all the Observations we have made upon his other Works, to suppose that, had this Life been the Extent of Mans Being and Happiness, God would not have given him a sense or prospect of any other: upon such a Supposition as this 'tis highly rational to think that constant even Content­ment would have bounded all his Thoughts, that his Soul would always have remained at the same equal Poize, and that he would have lived without desiring more than he en­joyed, and died without any previous Fears of loosing that.

And, if there is good ground to believe that there would be a State of future Happi­ness tho' Men enjoyed all they were capable of here according to the present Circumstances of their Nature and Condition, because their Happiness here was not compleat by reason of some Pain and Uneasiness mixt with it, and because their Capacities and Desires exceeded all their actual Enjoy­ments; how much more reasonable is it to make the same Conclusion now when we, every way, fall so short of the Happiness the [Page 144]condition of this Life would allow us, as will plainly appear if we compare the pre­sent State of the World with that Draught and Representation we have before given of Humane Life under a regular Practice of the Duties of Religion.

We are now not only conscious in gene­ral of larger Capacities, of Happiness than what we enjoy; but there are several kinds and degrees of it within our Knowledge and seemingly within our Reach and Power, which, with all the Endeavours we can use we are not able to attain; and the more Wants we are sensible of, and the better and more particularly we know what they are, the stronger are our Desires and the greater the Uneasiness of Defeats and Dis­appointments, which Experience assuras us, are very frequent; The Satisfactions we meet with are commonly very short and mixed with Pain, and we have a great many other things to fear besides death.

But the Troubles and Calamities of Hu­mane Life are too well known to need being insisted upon, and too large a subject to be particularly treated of in this place. 'Tis sufficient to my purpose to remark in gene­ral what I think may very safely be affirm­ed, that, if what falls to every Man's share [Page 145]was fairly computed, the Misery of the greatest part of Mankind would out-weigh their Happiness.

If therefore Man was design'd by God for Happiness, and was so framed that he can­not enjoy compleat Happiness in this Life with­out a mixture of Uneasiness, and yet has Capacities and Desires of greater than he can conceive belonging to his Nature and the necessary Circumstances of it here; and farther if Mankind be now involv'd in such a State or Condition of Life in which they all actually enjoy much less Happiness than they find themselves by Nature capable of here, and the greatest part of them have a larger Share of the Troubles than the Advantages of Life; from hence I think it may be truly and certainly inferr'd, that there will be another State of pure compleat Happiness, answerable at least to the highest Notions and Conceptions we are able to frame of it.

But since, as has before been proved, God has not absolutely and unconditionally determined all Men to be happy, but has made Happiness and Misery to depend upon our Actions, and consequently has annex'd Happiness to a particular way of acting, we have all the Reason in the World to be­lieve that the Happiness of another State [Page 146]will be the Portion of those, and those only, who live according to the Rules of Religion here; and this, I believe, no body is dis­posed to doubt of that owns a future State, and therefore I shall spend no time in an unnecessary Proof of it.

And, if there are none to be found that exactly discharge all the Obligations of Re­ligion, yet 'tis more agreeable to our Rea­son to conclude that those who sincerely endeavour to do it, shall by the especial Grace and Favour of God, in some such way or manner as to his Wisdom shall seem fit, be rendred capable of future Happiness, than to believe that all Mankind shall be mise­rable, and none obtain Happiness, contra­ry to all the Marks and Indications of the Des [...]gn of God in making Man.

Granting therefore what I think has been sufficiently proved under this Head, that there will be a future State in which all Men will be happy or miserable, according as they have behaved themselves here, with regard to what we call Religion: this I say being allowed, it manifestly follows from hence that it is more for our Happiness to act up to the Rules and Directions of Re­ligion, than to pursue any other Measures, whatever we should happen to suffer in [Page 147]this Life for so doing; because the Happi­ness of a future State will so far outweigh all the sufferings of this, that when we come to enjoy it we shall be forced to ac­knowledge, that the end and reward of our Labours was very well worth all the Troubles and Difficulties we found in the way to it; and if it be absolutely, with re­gard to the whole extent and duration of our Being, more for our Happiness to live Reli­giously than otherwise, then are we in the highest and strictest sense obliged to live so, which was the thing I undertook to prove.

Nay further, if besides the natural Plea­sure which results from Religious Acts while we are practising them here, God has given us a certain Prospect and well ground­ed Hope of a State, of greater Bliss hereafter, I dare venture to assert that generally speak­ing, Religion will prove the surest way to Happiness even in this Life; so that, tho' sometimes the Sufferings of some particular Men upon that account, may exceed all the noble Satisfactions Religion can afford them here, yet all things consider'd, and the diffe­rent Methods of acting weigh'd together with all the probable Consequences that, according to the common course of things, may attend them, there will be sufficient [Page 148]reason for a wise Man to prefer the practise of Religious Duties to the ways of Irreli­gion upon the score of the present Happiness he is very like to enjoy by that means, reckoning in the Hopes and prospect only and not the Possession of another State: as will more plainly appear under the next Gene­ral Head of Discourse:

Which is a Proof of Religion from a Comparison of it with Irreligion, and the necessary Consequences arising from thence.