SECT. I. The True Force of the Apostles Argu­ment Over-seen; and made to rest where he never intended it.

THe chief Argument for our Obedience is intended in the first words of the Apostle's Propo­sition, he is the Minister of God, as they are distinguished from the La­tin words, to thee for Good; as is more plainly expressed by the Syry­ac Translation Minister dei, sed tibi in bonum. But this is little heeded, tho' it be congruous to the Scope and Reason of the Apostle's whole Dis­course upon this Point. We must, saies he, be Subject: Rom. 13, vers. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Why? because, he is [Page 14] the Higher Power, vers. 1. Because All Power is of God, appointed of God. The Ordinance of God. Our Ruler, and God's Minister. i. e. One that wears God's Image, God's Name, God's Sword, Minister & vicarius dei, as the words of our Law are, plainly alluding to these of the A­postle: Thus we see, the Argu­ment used by the Apostle, takes its strength from the Fountain of Hu­mane Authority, and not from the End of it, as this Argument would insinuate.

2. Indeed the Apostle notes also, the great End of all Authority; and assures us, it is appointed for our Good: and this is a very great Encouragement of Subjection and Obedience, that the Wise and Good Governour of the World, has ap­pointed [Page] his Ministers to rule us for our Good: and worthy of a better Acknowledgment than it usually obtains. But who sees not, that the Apostle intends this Considera­tion rather as a Motive to our Obe­dience and Subjection, than a Con­dition of the Obligation.

We must needs be Subject, part­ly (if you will) because he is a Minister ordained for our good; but principally and chiefly, because he is the Minister of God, he is a Mini­ster to us for Good: this indeed commends Obedience to us as mat­ter of Prudence, rather than Consci­ence. Therefore observe it, that he might effectually superside this Sophism, and fit his Argument be­yond this Quirk and fine Subtilty, he repeats the very words for the more direct Obligation of Consci­ence [Page] [He is the Minister of God] and omits the words before, viz. [to thee for Good] the very words they ground their Argument upon. He is, saies he in this very same Verse, the Minister of God, an A­venger, &c. and thereupon imme­diately concludes, Wherefore we must needs be Subject, not only for Wrath, but also for Conscience sake. As if he had said, Not only for Wrath, because he is an Avenger, to execute Wrath; but because he is the Minister of God for Conscience-sake.

Thus, if otherwise there might have been a Doubt, where the A­postle intended the force of his Ar­gument, whether upon the first, or last part of his Proposition, the Apostle himself hath resolved us, and the Ground of that Doubt is gone.

Yet supposing we could admit that the Force of the Apostle's Ar­gument doth rest upon the latter words [to thee for Good] unless our Sense of these words, be the same with the Apostle's, we are still de­luded with a gross Fallacy.

This therefore is next to be con­sidered, what the Apostle means by [GOOD] in this Text? And whether we do not Mistake his Meaning, and argue from a wrong Sense: and Abuse of his words. This is my other, and my chief Ex­ception to the Argument.

SECT. II. Of the True Sence of this Expression, [To thee for Good.]

NOthing can be rightly con­cluded from these words beyond their intended and true Meaning. And seeing the Argu­ment rests here, it is necessary we should have a right Notion of the Goodness the Apostle speaks of.

1. 'Tis evident he doth not in­tend a particular and private Good, especially in prejudice of the gene­ral & Publique Good: For this Cause, saith he, pay you Tribute and Custom; [Page] and these, I think, but few reckon to their particular Advantage.

2. Neither can we understand the Good here, to be a Good by Ac­cident only: the Law and Govern­ment hath a direct Tendency to the good of the whole Community, and every Member of it, yet by Accident it may be prejudicial to some good Man, and ought so to be to all Wicked Men: a Terror to Evil-Doers. And indeed, our Rulers, even then, when they are Avengers of Wrath, upon such, are the Mi­nisters of God to us for Good. We Conclude, the Apostle must in­tend, Salus populi, or the Publick Good, which is the proper Effect of, and directly flows from a right Use of Government, upon the whole Body of the Common-wealth, [Page 20] and consequeutly upon every parti­cular person as he a Member of that publick Body.

Now, if you imagine the Good we may expect from Government, to be either a private good, or our own particular Ease and Satis­faction (which we may account our good, without regard to, or in pre­judice of the publique good) or the Evil which accidentally falls from good Government, upon the Diso­bedient; to be contrary to the Good in the Text; we abuse the Apostle, and deceive our selves; for you see this Good consists with our private Loss, by Tribute and Custom, and with the execution of Wrath and Evil upon Evil-Doers. And yet notwithstanding both, our Rulers are Ministers of God to us for Good.

[Page 21] 3. But this offers a Third Distin­ction, somewhat more direct to our purpose.

This Good may be supposed, either in the Matter of the Laws whence they are said to be Good Laws. Or with respect to the Ex­ecution of the Laws.

1. The First, namely, the Good­ness of the Matter is only intended by the present Objection. But can­not possibly be thought to be the Good which the Apostle intended. Read his whole Discourse here, and you shall not find one word bordering upon the Goodness of the Laws. This the Apostle pre­sumes; that the Laws were good. And gives us an excellent instance [Page 22] and Example of his Modesty, not rashly to Judge the Laws; or with­out plain Evidence, to call them into question. So their specious Argument when all is done finds no place in the Text.

2. For nothing can be well more plain and evident, then that this Text only speaks of that Good, which is the Effect of, and follows the just Execution of the Laws Good, Natural, Civil, Moral and Spiritual: the Defence of our Persons and E­states: the keeping of the Peace: the punishment and Reformation of Wickedness, and Vice: and the Maintenance of True Religion and Virtue: as Interpreters generally agree upon the place.

In praecedente membro potestatem, hic potestatis distributionem & [...], [Page 23] a deo esse testatur. Bez. in verb.

Yea, the same is manifest from the whole Context: the Text affirms he is the Minister of God to us for good. How so? No otherwise, but as he executes the Laws imparti­ally: and is thereby a Terror to Evil-Doers, and a Praise to them that do well. Again, therefore wilt thou not be afraid of the Power? do that which is good; for he is the Minister of Vers. 3, 4, 5. God to thee for Good: but if thou do that which is Evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the Sword in vain: for he is the Minister of God, a Revenger, to execute Wrath upon him that doth E­vil. And then concludes upon the whole, Wherefore we must needs be subject, &c.

Now I hope, the Objectors, to say no more, need not boast of their Advantage from this Text.

SECT. III. Of the Judge of the Goodness of the Laws.

BUT suppose we should also grant, that the words do ex­tend to the Good of the Matter of Laws. May it not be doubtful, whether the Laws be good or not? And if this be the Controversie be­twixt the Rulers and the People, how shall it be determin'd? There seems to be a Necessity to resolve this Point, before it be drawn into Pra­ctice, one way or other.

The Question then is, When the goodness of the Laws is disputed, [Page 25] who shall be the Judge, those that should be the Doers of the Law, or the Makers of it? Here it seems reasonable, that seeing, as you heard, the publick good is the pro­per intendment of all Laws, and that our Legislators are Publique Persons, and of Publique Capaci­ties, and Conversation, the Advan­tage should lie on their Part; espe­cially, when the matter of Humane Laws clasheth not with the Di­vine: at least, is not so evidently against the Law of God, as Obe­dience to the Laws of Men, is re­quired by the Law of God. For we must ever obey the Laws of our Rulers; but when, by so do­ing, we shall Violate GODS Laws. So that our clear Know­ledge of God's Laws, in that very Point, is supposed in order to our [Page 26] Warranty to disobey Man 's. This Rule is positively allow'd and ex­press'd by Mr. Baxter himself, as well as all other Learned Men, that have considered the Point.

But I shall hence take occasion to discuss the Matter more amply; and I shall therefore, first Distin­guish, and then State the Question, as I intend to handle it, and then pursue it.

1. 'Tis agreed, that the Matter of a Law, may be either Evil, per se, i. e. when it is contrary to the Moral or Positive Law of God; or only inexpedient, tho', in genere lawful. For the Apostle acknow­ledgeth, that some things are law­ful, that are not expedient. All Things (saith he) Are Lawful for [Page 27] Me; but All Things are Not Ex­pedient.

2. As to the first kind; 'tis also agreed, that if the Matter of the Law be Evil, per se, at least so e­vidently, against God's Law, as the Command of Obedience therein is e­vident, the Subject is bound to judge it Evil, and against God's Law: and to Obey God rather than Man. As Tol. in loc. Ut si aliud jubet proconsu, sic si aliud Imperator aliud Imperator; obediendum est Imperatori, aliud Deus jubeat, &c.

Man's Laws, whose Matter is against God's Law (as St. Aug.) are really No Laws, and cannot ob­liege us: but the Reason of it ought to be weighed. It is not properly or immediately, because such Laws are against the publick [Page 28] good (as the Argument supposeth) this indeed ought to be the End of all Laws: but the Formality of the Evil of Laws, lies in their Con­trariety to God's Laws. That, chief­ly makes them sinful. And they are therefore void, and not binding, because God hath a prior Obligatiou upon us by his own Law, contrary thereunto, who is in the first place to be obey'd.

But if the Law of our Prince, upon the reason of a prior Obligation cannot bind us; much less can a Law, we unwarrantably put upon our selves, though it be the Solemn League and Covenant.

3. As to the second kind: 'tis also agreed, that God doth not allow any Legislators to impose and require any thing in their Laws, that is [Page 29] inexpedient, and not conducing really to publique good; tho' it be not di­rectly contrary to the Word of God; for they are intrusted with Salus Populi, and the good of the publique, is the only End of all Government.

Quod necessarium non habet conjun­ctionem cum fine publici comodi non po­test praecipe lege humana. Suarez.

But impious and inconvenient, have not the same Latitude, neither can we safely argue from one to the o­ther. Indeed, every thing that is impious is inconvenient; but not e con­tra. Laws whose Matter is impious, cannot bind us, are indeed No Laws: But it doth not follow, that Laws in some respect inconve­nient, are not to be observed when made, tho' they ought not to have been made, or ought to be altered. [Page 30] The Reason is, because the Mat­ter of such inconvenient Laws may not be against the Law of God: God may not have before concer­ned himself with it, in specie, one way or other; but hath left it to his Ministers amongst indifferent things undetermined: And tho' they are Men, and may err in the Applica­tion of them, and not observe ex­actly Isidore's Rule, Lex erit conve­niens, &c. Yet it doth not follow, these Laws lose their Force, or the Ruler his Office, but that he is the Minister of God still.

4. Now we are arrived at the very Question, Who is to be the Determin­ing Judge in the Case of meer Ex­pediency: and in this case, how far the Subject is bound to acquiesce and obey.

Indeed, some have objected the Unlawfulness, and others, the Doubt­fulness of some Matters in our own Laws. But these have been abun­dantly answered, and baffled over and over again, by very many Pi­ous and Learned Men, especially Bishop Sanderson and Dr. Faukner; therefore in those two Cases, I refer my Reader that desires Satisfaction, to those Excellent Authors.

The only considerable Doubt, that I find amongst some of our sub­tilest Dissenters, is touching things Inexpedient; and as I said, our Que­stion here is, who shall finally Judge of these. To which I betake my self.

SECT IV. Who is the Proper Judge of the Expe­diency of the Laws.

THE Question is, Who shall Judge whether the Laws be Expedient or not, the Rulers or the People? I mean, so to Judge, as to determine whether they are fit to be observed or not.

Obj. On the Peoples behalf, it is urged, That they have a Iudgment of Discretion: by which they ought to judge of the Reasonableness of their own Actions, and consequent­ly of the Laws that require their O­bedience

Answ. 'Tis confess'd, a Judgment of Discretion, is the Right and Liber­ty of all Mankind. Yet this Liber­ty of Judgment, is two-fold, ei­ther Natural, and at large: or Ci­vil, as bounded and restrain'd and limited by our relation to our Rulers and Society; and their Concern and Interest in us. I have a Liberty at large to go to LONDON, or not; to go thither when I please: but if I have promised to come thither at such a day, and not before, my Li­berty of going thither is restrained by that Civil Obligation, I have put up­on my self.

To apply it. Every man, doubt­less, hath Liberty, Reason and Pow­er, to judge of the Law as it is, or as he apprehends it: and indeed, [Page] it seems impossible he should do o­therwise: i. e. he must think as he thinks. So that, if the Law be Evil, and he know it to be so, he must so judge of it: if it be only in­expedient, and not otherwise Unlaw­ful, he must judge it to be just so. And thus he may use his Judgment or Discretion, about the Matter of the Law, as a Reasonable Creature, and of Common and Natural Right.

Yet he hath a Judgment of Dis­cretion too, in a Politick and Civil Sence, as he is a Reasonable Citizen and Subject. And here, he hath not the like extensive and unhounded Liberty. For his Reason is now limited, by his State and Relation, by which he is concerned with his Re­latives, and they, in him. And he may thence see Reason, to make another Judgment of Expediency, at [Page] least, both of the Laws and the Necessity of Obedience. Now he ought to judge, that he is in a State of Subjection and Communion: That publick Order and Peace ought to be valued beyond a little private Satis­faction: That God's Ministers are the proper Judges of what is fit and expedient with respect to the Publique Advantage; that may sometimes disagree with his private Interest: That God himself Com­mands our Obedience, and hath not limitted us to things Expedient. And that while we Obey his Mini­sters, we obey God himself. And that, tho' we see no Convenience in the things required, yet our Go­vernours may; and in that Case, the less Reason we discern in the Matter of the Law, if not against God's Word, the purer is the Ho­nour [Page] and Obedience we yield to our Rulers, and to God himself: and it need not be stiled implicit, blind and bruitish Obedience, that hath all this Light and Reason to guide it.

Lex nullo privato commodo, sed pro communi utilitate conscripta, ideo in ipsa Constitutione ista Consideranda sunt. Quia cum leges institutae sunt, non erit liberum arbitrium judicare de ipsis, sed oportebit judicare secundum ipsas. Isi­dor. 2 Stymol. Which my Lord Coke highly applauds. Whence we find the Judgment of the Peo­ple, touching Laws, is distinguisht. When they are once publisht we may not judge of them, but we must judge according to them; as more anon.

So likewise their Discretion is al­tered, [Page 37] or at least limitted by the definition which our Law books give of it discretio est decernere per le­gem quid sit justum. At least, it is our Discretion, not to judge the Laws themselves unjust, without very evident Proof: and not at all Inconvenient so as to refuse to observe them, if they be not evidently un­just.

But of this also more distinctly in the following Sections.

SECT. V. If we may Judge of Lawfulness, yet not of Expediency.

Objection.

THE strongest Argument on the Peoples behalf, now fol­lows to be examin'd: 'Tis groun­ded upon our Concession, and is this; You allow the Subject Liberty to judge of the Lawfulness of things required by Law; what Reason can be given, why they should not equally judge of the Expediency of them?

Ans. The Reason of the Difference is plain. God is Lord Paramount, to whom all, both King and Subject, [Page 39] owe undoubted Obedience. Now, in his Laws, he hath antecedently de­termin'd what is Virtue and Vice, what is Duty and what is Sin: and hath so publisht his Mind and Will therein, that all may and ought to know it; and take notice of it at their Peril. But he hath not pleased to deal so with us in mat­ters of meer Expediency. These, he hath left undetermin'd, and devol­ved them upon the determination of Human Prudence, in the course of his Ordinary Providence. So that when Man commands what God forbids, we must not do it, be­cause God hath forbidden it. But when Man commands that which we judge inexpedient, if not forbid­den by God, we must do it, because God hath not forbidden it; and be­cause our Superiour commands it; [Page 40] whom God hath requir'd we should obey, next to himself.

Now, that we may speak more plainly to this great Point; let us consider Laws in Act and already made, and constituted: and Laws in Power, and not yet enacted; but to be made.

SECT. VI. The Liberty of Judgment in the People, with respect to the Making of Laws, The Writ Convenes them, Ad Faciendum & Consentien­dum.

IN our most excellent Constituti­on, 'tis granted, That the Peo­ple of ENGLAND, have a very great Liberty of Judgment, for the Prevention of Evil or Inexpe­dient Laws. But this Province being above my Sphear, I should not have aspired to touch it, had I not been somwhat provoked to vindicate my self, against the Charge of Impea­ching the Liberty of the Subject in [Page 42] this kind. I hope, that will excuse a small Adventure upon it: And I shall come off well, if I have not need of Pardon, both for medling with this politick Point, and (not for straitning, but) too much en­larging the People's Priviledge as to the making of Laws.

This Priviledge belongs to our People, both at large, and in their Representatives in Parliament.

1. It is the Natural and Civil Right of all English Men, being li­beri homines, to use their Judgment of Discretion for the Choice of Wise and Good Men to represent them in Parliament, in order to our having Good and Wholsom Laws, free from Evil or Inconvenience: yea, and to inform them when assem­bled, [Page 43] and chosen, what they con­ceive may be fit to be made a Law. And by the same Reason, what is Inconvenient in any Law already in be­ing, in order to the Altering or Re­pealing of it. And no doubt, these things require a great deal both of Judgment and Discretion too, both about Laws, either to be made, or already constituted. And lastly, per­haps the Laws have allowed the People within the Bounds of Law to make Petitions, at least by their Representatives (as well as private Significations) to the fore­said purposes. If that be a good Rule in Law, which my Lord Coke mentions: Extra Parliamentum nulla petitio est grata, licet necessaria; in par­liamento nulla petitio est ingrata, si ne­cessaria.

[Page 44] 2. But this Priviledge is more perspicuous and ample in the Peo­ple as they are represented in Parlia­ment. They are called together ad faciendum & consentiendum, touch­ing Laws to be made (ordinari de negotijs ante dictis) of weighty Mat­ters: Concerning the King, the State, and Defence of the Kingdom and Church of England; as the Writ speaks. And the Sheriff is therein strictly charg'd to do his Duty; lest through defect—or by an improvi­dent Choice, dicta negotia infecta rema­nerent: The greater Matters of the King, Church and Kingdom remain undone.

Hence 'tis necessary that a Wise Election be made, and Discreet [Page 45] Knights, Citizens and Burgesses be sent to Parliament, where they are to use all their Judgment and Discretion in order to such Laws, as may be beneficial to the Publick, and consequently good and expe­dient. And as none but Discreet Persons are therefore to be chosen, so unless, when chosen, they may exert their Discretion and Judgment in Parliament, they seem to be chosen to no great purpose.

I know the Learned Knight, Sr. R. F. would improve those words [ad faciendum & consentiendum] in Diminution of the Power of the House of Commons. But if they be not expresly and in terminis cal­led to Consult; they seem to be so plainly enough in the consequence of these very words.

I dare not affirm what the Ex­tent or Meaning of the word, Fa­ciendum, is: If the Meaning of it be only, that they shall put the Laws in Practice, methinks the word is mis-placed: For should not they Consent to the Laws, before they Do them? Besides, their send­ing Home again, rather than their Calling to sit in Parliament, seems rather to be fitted for that pur­pose, viz. the Execution of the Laws: Yea, if they had nothing to do about making the Laws, why should they be chosen, or called up at all? Why might not the whole Kingdom, without so much Ceremony and Solemnity, be ob­liged ad faciendum in this sence, by a general Publication, or Appoint­ment of the Laws to be read in se­veral [Page] parts of the Country, as was anciently done? Or lastly, How comes it to pass, that the KING in the Writ of Summons, intimates that the, dicta negotia, the great Af­fairs for which they are called, will remain undone, if due Electi­ons and Returns be not made?

But they are called also, ad con­sentiendum: to Consent to the Laws that shall be made. Well, but must not (usually) something be done by them, in order to the ma­king those Laws, to which they are thus to consent? whether it be the framing of Bills or Petitions, I shall not determin. But I have heard, that our Laws are Ld-Coke. usually grounded upon such Bills or Petitions: and I have greater Au­thority for it than Sr. R. F.

However, they are called to Consent: and if this be not in termi­nis to Consult, it sufficeth, if their Consent be necessary to the making of our Laws; for then their Con­sent here, doth not suppose the Laws already made, but to be made. For I know not, that their Con­sent is ever signified, as they are a House, after the Laws are made; they are usually Prorogu'd or Dis­solved upon passing the Bills.

It is bold to say that ever the En­glish Laws were made without the previous Consent of the People, some way or other sufficiently ex­pressed.

Leges cum fuerint approbatae consensu utentium, & sacramento Regum confir­matae mutari non possunt nec distrui, sine [Page] communi consensu & consilio eorum &c. Bracton, li. 1. c. 2. Whence the Name Parliament implies Parli­zing, as J. Jenkins notes: And ac­cordingly Spelman's Definition of a Parliament is, Parliamentum est so­lemne colloquium omnium ordinum Regni Authoritate Regis, ad consulen­dum statuondum (que) de negotijs Regni indictum.

There is no Act of Parliament but must have the Consent of the Lords, the Commons, and the Roy­al Assent, as it appeareth by Re­cords and our Books. Coke of Par­liaments.

'Tis certainly now too late to say, Laws may be made Without the Consent of the Commons in Parliament. Is it not affirmed to [Page 50] be the Glory of the English Liber­ty, that no Laws bind us but what are made by our selves. See over the Stile of our Statutes; anciently, they seem to have been made upon the Petition; and of late, with the Advice and Authority of Parlia­ment.

In Ancient Time all Acts of Parlia­ment were in the Form of Petitions, as my Lord Coke observeth; but both imply an Antecedent Consent in the People.

Yet tho', I like not the mentio­ned Knight's Reasoning or Design very well, give me leave by the way to remark, that his Learned & Smart and Bold Antagonist, seem'd somewhat transported to another Extream, when his Argument temp­ted [Page] him to make a Bill of Exclusion of the King and the Bishop out of the Fifth Commandment. For the Decalogue, hath been hitherto ta­ken as the Summary of the Moral Law, to which, as to their Foun­tain-Heads, all Moral Duties are reducible: and consequently, all the Moral Parts and Precepts in the Scriptures, besides, are but Expo­sitions of those Ten Words. And I cannot remember that any other Person doth (and I am sure I can­not my self) reduce Honour and Obedience to the King or the Priest, so often injoyned in the Word of God to any of the Ten Command­ments, but to the Fifth; at least, so directly and intelligibly, as to that.

But to return, and apply this [Page 52] Discourse. If the Consent of the Commons be necessary in order to the making our Laws; this Con­sent is supposed to be rational, and to be expressed with due Liberty: therefore they must Debate, and at least Consult with themselves, and if occasion require, Confer also, and, as it were, Consult with the Lords. And consequently, 'tis confest, they are to use their Judgments about the Lawfulness and Fitness of the Mat­ter of Laws: And they are there­fore intrusted, from all parts of the Kingdom, to see that such Laws, and no other, are to be made, but what are expedient, and for the publique Good: or as they are excellently described and limitted by Isidor, in the place so much celebrated by my Lord Coke, and commended as a Rule for all Parliaments to follow. ‘Erit [Page] lex honesta, justa; possibilis, secundum naturam & secundum consuetu­dinem patriae, tempori (que) conveniens, necessaria & utilis, manifesta quo (que) ne aliquid per obscuritatem incau­tum captione contrudat, nullo pri­vato commodo, sed pro communi civi­um utilitate conscripta; ideo in ipsa constitutione ista consideranda sunt; quia cum leges institutae fuerint, non erit liberum arbitrium judicare de ipsis, sed oportebit judicare se­cundum ipsas.’

SECT VI. When Laws are once made, we ought to rest satisfied with their Conveniency. Many Reasons for it.

I Know not that any thing can be added to the Conditions of Good Laws, which are given us by Isidore. These, we see, are to be considered, in ipsa constitutione, while the Laws are making: that is, by the Legislators. Whether they be convenient —& pro commune civium utilitate, or for the publique good. But when they are once instituted, there is left no liberum arbitrium, no liberry to judge of them, but it be­hoves [Page] every one to judge according to them, and how to observe them.

When the Laws are once made, the People at large, (among whom the Parliament Men themselves, when dissolv'd, are to be num­bred) are to acquiesce in them, and the Conveniency of them, and to put them in practice, else they are made to no purpose. And what­ever Liberty men may naturally as­sume, to judge of the Fitness of such Laws, as they are Citizens and Subjects, in this their Civil Capaci­ty, they are not to be Judges but Do­ers of the Law.

Do not we choose Discreet and Wise Men, and send them to Par­liament for this very purpose, to consider what is Expedient to be [Page] made a Law? Do not we devolve our own Power of Judgment in this Case, upon our Representatives, and trust them with it by our very Election? If we give them not this, we give them nothing. Yea, we have thereby put them into the Place, and made it their Office and Duty, to Judge for us. And the Wise men of the Kingdom, by our Act and Consent are together to consult what is best, and have there­by infinite Advantages to judge of publique Conveniencies, beyond the rest of the people scattered up and down the Kingdom: Besides, it is an evident part both of the Na­tural and Civil Honour due to our Law-makers, and Rulers, to sub­mit our Judgments to their Determi­nations in matters of meer Order and Conveniency: and an absolute [Page] Necessity for Peace and the publick Good, obligeth us to it.

As to our Case; When the Laws are made, our Law-makers, whom we intrusted for that purpose, have already judged them Convenient. Now, what Reason have we to ex­cept against them, if they be not against the Law of God? If you say (as some do) the Civil Authori­ty hath made Laws in the Matters of Religion? 'tis well known, they are also injoyn'd by the Spiritual Power: If others are offended at the Ecclesiastical, the same things are required by the Civil Laws. And if one of these Powers be not thought Sufficient, you have both: and in­deed, in each of them, you have your selves: For according to our excellent Constitution, you your selves [Page] have determined in your Represen­tatives, both in the Parliaments and in the Convocation, what is Conveni­ent both in Church and State: And if any are dissatisfied with the Con­stitution, and would have that Alter­ed to please a Humour, they are scarce tolerable.

All the Commons in the Realm are re­presented in Parliament by the Knights and Burgesses, Coke's Instit. p. 4, 158. And Sr. Thom. Smith saith, Every En­glish Man is intended to be there present either in Person, or by Procuration; and the Consent of the Parliament is taken to be every Man's Consent. And no Laws are made but in this sence they are said to be, Quas vulgus elegerit, ac­cording to the Old Law.

If you say, The Rulers ought to [Page] judge what is expedient in making the Laws; this is nothing, if the Subject hath Power yet to judge them inexpedient, and to refuse to obey. Say, what shall give the bind­ing Sentence as to practice? the Law or private Opinion? That is, plainly, Who shall Govern, the Rulers, of the People? For certainly, they govern, that rule, practise and finally deter­mine what is fit to be done; whe­ther they be Children, or Parents; Servants, or Masters; Wives, or Hus­bands; or Subjects, or Princes.

If you say, The Subject ought to yield for Wrath's sake, this placeth Government only in strength: but then, where is Conscience, where is Christianity? Is it not like Christian Meekness, and Peaceable Subjecti­on, and Self-denyal, and the Do­ctrine [Page] of the Gospel, to conclude; that God hath provided for the Order & Quiet of the World: he hath therefore stated things necessary himself: and for things of lesser moment and Ex­pedience, he hath ordained Govern­ment, to prevent or end all Contro­versie.

The sum is, the Judgment of Dis­cretion about God's and Man's Laws. And the Nature, End and Use of Government, if well considered, may effectually convince us, that, so far as Man's Laws contradict not God's, tho' we should imagine some­thing in them not so convenient as we could desire, yet they are to be submitted unto as the Rule of our Practice, and in Conscience of Gods Ordinance, and Command, and of the publique Good and our Duty to [Page] be obey'd: And we are to rest satisfied with this; that our Laws are made by the Higher Powers; who are of God; ordained of God; the Ordinance of God; and our Rulers and Gover­nours, (and such as we our selves chose to make Laws for us;) and the Ministers of God; and for our good too; viz. for publique Order, Safety and Quiet; Wherefore we must needs be subject, not only for Wrath, but Conscience sake.

SECT. VII. Inexpediency of Law overballanc'd, expedient to Obey.

YET once more, Suppose we could allow the people at large to judge the Laws already constituted; and to have power left them, to discern their inexpedi­ency, and to suspend their Obedi­ence in such a Case: This still ac­knowledgeth the matter it self to be indifferent, and the practice only in such Cases, not so fit as we would desire.

Now, it is a clear Rule, that, that is so inconvenient or inexpedit, [Page 63] may be found; by a considering and discerning Judgment, upon the whole, to be expedient. And the matter to change its quality; if over-ballanc'd by a greater Inconve­nience on the other side: as Lead it self becomes light, when a greater weight is in the other Scale.

This Rule is so undoubted, that it sometimes extends to things posi­tively commanded by God himself. For, when a Matter morally neces­sary, shall be neglected for the practice of a positive Duty of God's own Worship, the present Practice of such Duty, becomes not neces­sary, yea sinful, in the Judgment of our Saviour and great Law­giver: Go and learn what that mean­eth. I will have Mercy, and not Sacri­fice. [Page 64] I prefer Mercy, tho' it be but to thy Neighbour's Ox, to my own Service: yea, in that case, I pro­hibit attendance on my self, and my own Worship: I will not have Sacri­fice.

Apply this seriously, and admit the Law requires something that in it self and singly considered, is in­expedient: Is there nothing in thy refusing Obedience, more inconveni­ent, and of more Evil Consequence than that supposed Inconvenience, which the Law requires? What if our not yielding to an Inexpedient in the Law may indanger, if not prevent and frustrate the Real Good of God's Ministry and Go­vernment, we so much contend for; and bring greater positive [Page 65] Mischiefs upon us? Now, hath not God given us the Judgment of Discretion to ballance Incon­veniences, to weigh uprightly one against another, and to judge and determine what is best and safest to be done? And indeed, to admit of the less Inconvenience, as reasona­ble and wise men, for the preven­tion of greater?

1. To help us in this Compari­son, let us First consider, that the Law is to be understood to be com­mon and general, and the Inconve­nience to concern all others, as well as our selves: And if so, Why should not all others observe and boggle at the Inconvenience as well as our selves, and then judge wisely, what will be the Conse­quence?

[Page] 2. Secondly, 'Tis a Rule that seems not to be question'd by any that have, with any tolerable Learning, disputed this Point; that when the Law requires that which we judge inconvenient, if not forbidden by the Law of God, it is not to be disobeyed, if that In­convenience cannot be Omitted sine scandalo vel contemptu: with­out Scandal or Contempt. The Reason is, because the Scandal of our Brother (as St. Paul teacheth us) and the Contempt of Authority, is more inexpedient, than the Pra­ctice of a bare Inexpedient requi­red by Law.

But such Disobedience in a Matter of meer Inexpediency, must needs be notoriously guilty of both.

[Page] 1. It cannot be without Scan­dal to others: For such our Dis­obedience must of necessity Scan­dalize others, especially if Consci­ence be pretended; because it na­turally tempts and induceth others, at least, if we have any influence upon them, either by our Parts, or Reputation, or Interest, or Au­thority, or any other Obligation, to break the Laws, after our Ex­ample, as is too too manifest by daily Experience.

2. And for Contempt of Autho­rity, we can hardly be guilty of more or greater, than by refusing to Obey the Laws, because we judge them Unfit or Inexpedient: For, if we forbear to speak Evil [Page] of Dignities, this is certainly to Despise Dominions. And declares openly, that we account our Ru­lers Weak or False, Ignorant or Malicious. i. e. Knaves or Fools, that made the Laws.

3. Yea, this Principle, if pursued and practised, is so highly injurious to Government it self, both wayes, both by Scandal and Contempt, that it plainly dissolves the Power and Ob­ligations of all Laws; for none can secure us, that what is said against one or two Laws, (that they are inconvenient) shall not be charged on the rest. It makes the Prudence of the People the only Law to them­selves; for thus a Law, to them is no Law, if they judge it inexpedi­ent. Therefore it sets the Consci­ence [Page] at so wild a Liberty, that when it shall be improved a little further by fcrupulous People, it must needs end in perfect Ataxy and a general Distraction.

4. Nay, hath it not already sadly divided us? loosned all Duty and Respect to Governments? wasted the Conscience of due Obedience? and enervated our Laws? and di­sturbed the Order, and broken the Quiet and Peace both of our Church and State? And do we not see a Black Cloud arising hence, and gathering upon the Face of our Prosperity; darkning the Age; threatning all the Good we expect from God's Ministers; and even ex­posing our Constitution it self to all imaginable Danger.

Yea, which is more sad yet; doth it not seem to Ecclipse and Ob­scure the Brightness and Glory of our Profession; and hazard the ve­ry Light of our Gospel; and the Re­moval and Loss of the best Religi­on (once restored, and often pre­served with Wonders of Providence) from us and our Posterity forever? and the Re-admission of such a Re­ligion as we most fence against, and as you will find but untoward­ly consisting, either with Liherty, Property or Piety. Consider it sad­ly; for if this should happen, both we, and the Children unborn, may have Cause, hereafter, and too late, to Curse, such Unwarranta­ble Nicenes and Pernicious Scrupu­losity.

[Page 71] 5. Lastly; If all these Mischiefs are at too much distance, and we cannot see so far off; Let me speak home to you that yet indulge to your selves this Groundless Disobedi­ence. Methinks your own present Inconveniencies by it, should be put into the Scale. Doth not it render you obnoxious to Law and Justice? You, perhaps, have hitherto esca­ped; but are you not liable every day to have your Peace and Quiet and Possessions disturbed? Doth not your Disobedience to the Law expose your Persons and Fa­milies, as well as others, to the Penalties of Law? Neither can you well expect it should be other­wise, if you continue Obstinate, and refuse to obey it. For our [Page] Rulers are Ministers of God to us for Good, and ordained on purpose to prevent the fore-mentioned Mischiefs; and therefore they must be a Terror to Evil-doers; that is, all that violate and regard not their Laws; and Revengers of Wrath up­on all that do Evil; especially such Evil, as if not suppressed, may undo all: Yea, are they not, and do they not think themselves bound in Conscience, both of their Trust and Duty, to God and Men, in Conscience of yours and the pub­lique Good, not to suffer all to run to Confusion.

Perhaps you take it to be in your Choice, whether you will O­bey or Suffer: Deceive not your [...]elves: God Commands you as well [Page 73] as Man; and certainly God's Com­mand reacheth the Conscience what­ever you dream of Man's. And you must answer to God as well as to Man for your groundless Dis­obedience; especially when, by it, you thro' away or hazard the Blessings and Talents he hath put into your Hands, and intrusted you withal: This is ungratefully to Despise the Riches of his Good­ness. God and Nature have gi­ven you a Law of Self-preservati­on; and you have no Liberty to destroy your selves, by neglecting your Duty to your self, and affron­ting his Providence.

No Man is so absolutely his own, but God, the King and Country, his Relations and Dependents, [Page 74] have some Interest in him. Men that have Estates and Families, and Parts and Capacities fitting them for their's and the publick Service, may not causlesly throw them away, or dispose of them, but when and as God calls for them. And if the Law requires nothing of them, which God forbids; they cannot, for any other Satisfaction, suffer their Estates to be wasted, their Wives and Children to be distres­sed, their Lives to be sowred and obscured, and their Parts and Ca­pacities rendred Useless to God, their King and Country, by the Choice of Punishment for their Dis­obedience.

Active Obedience, so far as lawful­ly you can, is necessary, even from [Page] the Word of God Himself; were there no other Argument for it, but that of Wrath, viz. Escaping Punishment. For we must needs be subject, even for Wrath's sake; and the very Argument from Wrath, obligeth the Conscience.

Now, all these considered, let me beseech you to reason this Point calmly by your selves. You have had the Inconveniencies of your Dis­obedience, laid against some things inexpedient, as you suppose, requi­red in our Laws. And you say, you have a Judgment of Discretion: hath not God given you this Judgment to weigh these one against another? And do you not discern the Dif­ference between them? Certain­ly, the Matter being supposed in [Page] it self Indifferent, that is, not any wayes forbidden by God, the less inexpedient is eligible, and to be cho­sen before the greater: Yea, as you have seen, 'tis comparatively ex­pedient for us, to obey the Laws that we think inexpedient, for the avoiding those greater Mischiefs of Disobedience. And upon the whole, I can hardly imagine, that you should still think it Fit, for a small Satisfaction to a Humour or a Scruple to incur the guilt of so many, great and Real Evils, both upon your selves and the whole Kingdom.

Let us, therefore, so mannage our selves, that our Rulers may be Ministers of God to us for Good in­deed: which must be obtained by [Page 77] a MEAMS contrary to the Cause, of the aforesaid Evils, our unac­countable DISOBEDIENCE. That is, By a Peaceable, and Cheerful, and Conscientious OBE­DIENCE to them and to the Laws. I speak as unto WISE MEN, Judge what I have said, and the GOD of PEACE give you Understanding.

The Sum of the Answer is this. The Apostle's Words, as here insisted on, First allow, what your selves condemn; RESIST­ANCE of our Rulers: Besides, you take little of no Notice of that which is Argumentative in them, and place the Force of his Argument where he did not in­tend [Page] it: For the Necessity of our Duty, lies in the first words of the Proposition [HE IS the MI­NISTER OF GOD] and the later words [TO THEE FOR GOOD] are rather a Motive to our Obedience. Further, should we yield, that if the Laws be not FOR GOOD, the Obligation to Obedience ceaseth; yet you plain­ly mistake the Good which the Apostle intendeth; for it is not the GOOD of the Matter of the Laws, but of the EXECU­TION of them; and thus his Argument is directly Against, and not for Disobedience. Again, should we yet allow, that the GOOD of the Laws themselves, is here meant; yet 'tis only the Good of Publick Convenience, of [Page 79] which the RULERS, and not Private Men are the proper Judg­es. Lastly, Suppose it were fit that Private Men might Finally Judge of the Conveniency & In­conveniency of Publick Laws; yet they are to Judge equally of the Convenience and Inconvenience of DISOBEDIENCE: And if you Judge Righteous Judg­ment, you will certainly find, that the Inconveniencies of DISO­BEDIENCE, do exceedingly overballance the supposed Incon­venience of the Laws: And con­sequently, for the avoiding those greater Evils, both Publique and Private, that follow upon your Disobedience, Obedience to the Laws that you judge inconveni­ent, in such a Case, becomes E [...] pedient, [Page 80] and Good; and even by your own Argument, NECESSA­RY.

All which I hope hath been suf­ficiently proved to the Satisfaction of the Sober and Peaceable Dissen­ters.