The Preface to the Reader Examined.

AS the Preface to his Catechism is Tri­partite, so shall be my Answer. First, He declares against Perjury, with which he couples the Oath of Allegiance; so, joyn­ing in Communion Falshood with Truth, Light with Darkness, Christ with Belia [...] Divers, says he, by taking an unlawfu [...] Oath have encreased the Evil of Perjury. If so, then 'tis to be hoped that divers who have taken a lawful Oath have decreased the Evil of Perjury; and since the Oath of Allegiance may be such (for any thing opposed by him) I know not why it may not work a perfect Cure to that Evil, in the Sphear of Loyalty; whereas an Equi­vocating Oath (such as he now offers) is so far from Curing that presently it Kills Perjury, 'tis Confessed, is the worst o [...] Sins, and Equivocation in an Oath is the worst of Perjuries. Barefac'd perjury i [...] soon discovered, and the Author ofte [...] shamed into Repentance; but perjury in Masquerade, or Equivocation, lies con­cealed; and, when disclosed, it stands up­on it's terms of Justification, and has eve [...] a Colour for the mischief it does, which [Page 77] renders it Incurable. He that by Oath Equivocates with his King, can never be true to his God. And since your Antifimbria gives a Challenge to him who presumes to say, that any of your Society holds the Doctrin of Equi­vocation, since it was very lately Con­demned by Innocent the 11th. my An­swer, by his favour, is, That if Antifimbria be the Catechist, and the Catechist be of your Society, Antifimbria is the man, and the Oath he offers to take, is my Evi­dence.

From hence I step to the second part of his Preface, wherein he discloses a My­stery. Some sayes he, who took this Oath, have since slept at a Minister's Sermon, and took the Cheering Cup; others have renoun­ced the Popes Supremacy, and the greatest part, abused by the specious Title of Allegi­ance, swore what they meant and meant what was just.

This is a Hodg-podg of good and bad together, all put to the account of the Oath of Allegiance; whose hard Fate it is, that for it's sake, even what is best in an Oath must be hated; for, what can be more Rational in a Man than in due Circumstances to Swear what he means, [Page 78] and mean what is just. For, if he swears otherwise than what he means, he must either Lye, or, to give it a finer Term, must Equivocate. But he add's thus, their meaning was far from the words they swear. Was it so? Then clearly they did not swear what they meant; which can only be when their words and their meaning go together. And, if any who have taken this Oath have renounced the Popes Supremacy, I hope it was in Temporals; and that's the very Life and Soul of the Oath of Allegiance. But, if the Abjuration was of purely Spirituals, it can no more be charged upon this Oath than upon the Oath or Vow made in Baptism. Nor is the deserting Commu­nion with the Roman-Catholick-Church, or taking the Cheering Cup, as he calls it, in the Protestant Church, or any other by assing from the Roman Catholick-Faith, neer so much the Effect of this Oath as the disorders of Private Members of his or any other Religious Family is to be imputed to the vow of blind Obedience to their General, since the Oath is no Cause of them.

In the third part of his Preface he seems to have a priviledge to say any thing; and [Page 79] therefore imposes upon the defenders of the Oath, as their Doctrin, that they swear not to the words as they lye, but only their Opinion; and yet, whoever amongst the approvers of the Oath of Allegiance, con­tented himself with the bare thought or only Opinion of the Truth of it? How often have they declar'd That a Rational settled Judgment or imoral Certainty, and such as is required in all Oaths to justify a prudent and Conscientious Man, (though possibly the thing sworn may be other­wise) is requisit to take this Oath? Has he so soon forgot the Lesson I read him out of the most Eminent of his Four and Twenty Elders in Escobar, when he had censured them and all others as disinge­nuous, who were not of his mind? Is his new Oath with which he professeth to Live and Dy, more binding than this? Will he disobey the Pope in case he de­clares this new Oath to contain many things repugnant to Faith or Salvation? If not, his Allegiance will certainly Dy with him, but he'l not Dy with his Al­legiance. If he disobey the Pope, I con­clude with this Evidence against his Pre­face, that he is obliged to burn his Ca­techism, and so shall neither by it convince [Page 80] his Adversaries nor confirm his Friends, much less reclaim others, which is his design.

The Account of his Preface is thus. First, he makes this Deduction, some have of late been Perjur'd, Ergo, a law­ful and good Oath ought not to be taken. Secondly, things unconnected and disparate he makes to be Cause and Ef­fect. Thirdly, what is most perfect in an Oath is by him reputed Vicious. Fourthly, he Imposes upon the defenders of the Oath Opinion in lieu of Certainty as a requisit to an Oath; Lastly, he prefers an Equivocating Oath to an Oath that is Clear and Candid. Reverend Father, is this Christian Doctrin? Now before I take his Catechism in Peeces, I shall of­fer you a few Notes, short, clear, and easy, the Observation of which alone is a ful vindication of the Oath of Allegi­ance and a Total Defeat to his Cate­chism.

My first Note shall be, that, since our understandings are so fruitful and various in their Productions, and our words so few that they cannot adequate every di­stinct Notion of the Mind, it must ine­vitably follow that many words must be [Page 81] Equivocal, that is, must contain many different meanings, from whence must rise great Obscurities in speech and wri­ting; for the clearing of which a regard must be had to Circumstances, as time, place, person, antecedents, consequents, the end and motive of speech, &c. All or some of which do usually give light to the Auditor or Reader, and fix words to a determinate sense; if therefore in the Oath of Allegiance there be any word in it self Obscure or Equivocal, and if it be circumstanc't by these or some of these advantages, 'tis render'd unequivocal and clear.

My second Note is, that, as in all Arts the signification of Terms is borrowed from the Masters of those Arts, so is it in the art of Equivocating or other Dodg­ing in speech; the Teachers of which, as they have delivered us these following Terms, Equivocation, Mental Reservation, Material prolocution, and Mental Evasion: so have they given us the sense of them. Equivocation is when a word of it's self capable of many Senses is by Circum­stances fixed to one only, in which the Auditor understands it, but the speaker craftily means another; for example, be­ing [Page 82] to journey I desire my friend to buy me a Horse; he promises me so to do, meaning a painted Horse; this is Equi­vocation; for, though the word Horse may signify a Real or Painted Horse, yet in these Circumstances it can only im­port a Real Horse: Secret or men­tal Reservation is, when part of a sense is exteriously pronounced by words, and another part which should make out the whole sense is interiourly hid or reserved in the mind of the speaker, so to im­pose upon his Auditor; as if, being in­terrogated, whether I did see Peter to day? I should reply (having notwithstanding seen him) No, reserving in my thoughts, not in the Church. Material prolocution is a pronouncing of words parrat-wise without any meaning. Mental Evasion is a general expression and common to all these Cheats by words. Now as E­quivocation, ceases to be in words, when all Circumstances concurr to give them a determinate sense, so it fares with men­tal or secret reservation, when what o­therwise would be hid and reserved in the mind is laid open by declarative Cir­cumstances; for then nothing is conceal­ed, and what is not concealed is not mentally or secretly reserv'd.

My third note shall be, that this Term Heretical is Equivocal in it self as having divers plain and common significations; for, since Use and Custom is the Rule of speech, consonant to which this word Heretical imports Opposition, sometimes to the word of God written (in which sense 'tis always used by Protestants,) sometimes to universal Tradition, and sometimes, to the definitions of General Councils, or to some Consequence deriv­ed from any of these, clearly there is not any one of these Oppositions but what is the plain and common sense of the word Heretical; hence it is that the o­pinion that there were Antipodes, was anciently by some censured for Heretical, as by others the standing of the Sun and rouling of the Earth has lately been. Hence the Divines in the Schools do day­ly Object Heresie to each other with­out refusing communion with each o­ther; and upon any one of these Methods the Censores Librorum and Bishops at their Tribunals have proceeded to the censure, Heretical. If then in the Oath of Allegi­ance there be Circumstances restraining it to any of these notions. Evidently that must be the plain and common sense of the word.

My last note is, that Popes, though ne­ver so holy and learned may in their private Letters or Breves, nay and in their Bulls too, proceed from misinfor­mation from others, as also upon their own private opinion, and by so doing may Err to the great prejudice of others; in which case there must be a Rule by which the errour may be discovered; and if it prove fatal to Church or State, the Pope is not to be obey'd. These notes pre­mised, I shall apply them to particulars as my Method shall direct me.

His first and Second Chapters Examined.

IN the first two Chapters he states the Question, whether the Oath of Alle­giance be Lawful or no? then sums up the requisits to a Lawful Oath, as that it must have Truth, Lawfulness of the thing sworn, and a necessity to swear. Then, to make sure work of it, 'tis resolv'd the Oath of Allegiance shall fail in all, and so fairly concludes it every way unlaw­ful. The proofs of his bold assertion are ranged in his following Chapters, through which I shall attend his march. But, [Page 85] first, I shall smooth a Rubb or two which in these two Chapters he thought fit to put in my way. The first is, that the Title of Allegiance does ill become this Oath; and his reason is, because the grea­test part, is meerly speculative and asser­tory, and therefore no Oath of Allegiance. So that in his Opinion the Title squares only to the promisory part, which he tells you is in order to bind our selves to another, but an assertory Oath is a swearing in order to be believed. I beseech him in his next Catechism to declare what it is in the Oath he calls meerly speculative? Is the Kings right to the Crown there asserted a meer speculation? Fare-well then King, whom this Catechist has ren­dred only King of Fairies, and whose Kingdom at this rate, is but a Fools Paradise. Otherwise I should think that every Subject that by Oath asserts the right of his Prince, and abjures the Pope's and Subject's Power to depose or murther him, were by vertue of this Oath (though no promisory Oath should follow) to defend his Prince, and oppose the Pope and rebells. The right of a Prince and the duty of a Subject are Correlatives, they live and expire toge­ther; [Page 86] no man can assert the one, but must assert the other: if so, 'tis clear the assertory part of the Oath is not meerly speculative, or in order only to be believed, but also tends to practise. Again, is not the assertory part of the Oath as much the duty of a Subject as the promisory? Will the King take it well or think him worthy of trust who by an Oath pro­miseth to obey and defend him, whose right to command he refuseth to assert? Evidently then the assertory part of the Oath is as much the Duty, Fidelity, or Allegiance of the Subjects towards their King as the promisory; it being the bot­tom upon which the promisory part is grounded; and therefore who sticks to own the Kings right to command, is as unfaithful to him as he who denies him a promise to obey. I conclude then, that not only the promisory but also the as­sertory part of the Oath makes up the Oath of Allegiance.

The second remora he puts in my way is, to impose upon the defenders of the Oath, that they content themselves with a bare probability of the truth they swear; when 'tis manifest they never bate an Ace of a moral certainty: though the [Page 87] Men of his School, as Valentia, Escobar, and others have advanced this Doctrine he now lays to the charge of others. Escobar moral. theol. Tract. 1. Exam. 3. cap. 3. Valentia and others in the places formerly cited by me. And, whereas he objects, that Illiterate persons under­stand not the words, nor have any Mo­ral certainty of the truth of the Oath, I must dissent from him, and do believe they have as great certainty that the King holds not his Crown from the Pope, that he is Supreme in all Temporals, that as such, he is to be obeyed, that no man may rob him or murther him, that his Subjects are bound to defend him a­gainst all Conspirators; and that all this is the indispensable Law of God, as any of your learned School-Men, though they cannot put their discourse into the right figure and mood.

Let us now account for these two Chapters, First to assert the Kings right, and to renounce all power of the Pope and Subject to depose or murther him, is deny'd by him to be a part of the Subjects due Allegiance to the King. Se­condly, he imposes the Doctrine of some of his own School upon others against [Page 88] their express declaration to the contrary. Lastly, he concludes the generality of men uncapable to understand, that rob­bing, and murthering, is against the Law of God. Reverend Father, is this Christi­an Doctrine?

His tbird Chapter Examined.

THis Chapter begins with reciproca­ting the old saw; And since he will neither give any reason why my an­swers to his thred-bare objection does not satisfy, nor can improve it any farther, my answer is still in force against him. The objection was, and now is, from the Title of the Statute wherein the Oath is contained, which runs thus, An Act for the discovering and suppressing Popish Recusants; and, as if the Title could not be verifi'd by other parts of the Statutes, or as if all parts of the Sta­tute must be in the Title, he inferrs from thence, that the Oath of Allegiance was designed to distinguish betwixt Papists and Protestants, not betwixt Loyal and disloyal Papists; though the Law-maker for whose safety, and by whom the Oath was made into a Law, both in his Pre­monition [Page 89] and Apology to Christian Prin­ces, & the Law it self, declares against him. So that in his judgment, to take the Oath is in the eye of the Law, to be a Protestant, to refuse it a Papists; and so by the Title of the Law a Quaker is rendred a Papist.

Reverend Father, to rid my hands for ever of this so often repeated objection, pray observe that I voluntarily and free­ly, and without any force from his way of arguing, have and do give him his objection. What then? ought not the Oath be taken by a Papist? Absur'd! For, put case that the King and Parlia­ment (being perswaded that the Papists commit Idolatry) should oblige their Subjects by an Oath to renounce Ido­latry, would not the refusal of this Oath (with the same Justice) by the design of the Law distinguish betwixt Papists and Protestants. And must a Papist therefore refuse this Oath? Nay, ought he not to take it the sooner, so to undeceive the world, and unmake the Sign? This is our case: Some eminent persons of your Society asserted at that time the deposing and King-killing Doctrin; the Gunpow­der-plot-men put it into Practise, amongst whom some of your Society were [Page 90] charged with it, and executed for it. The King and Parliament, supposing it (as well they might) to be the Doctrine of our Church, fram'd an Oath to ab­jure it; This Oath now by Law, is be­come to many a distinctive sign betwixt Protestants and Papists; what then must a Papist do who abhors that Doctrin? Clearly, he ought to abjure it, so to un­deceive the People, and unmake the sign. From hence I conclude, that the Objection from the Title of the Statute is dispatch'd.

But, if he will not accept of my deed of Gift, then I resume my Liberty to dis­sent from him; and I have for my De­fence King James, who best understood the Design of his own Law, and assures all Christian Princes, that The Oath was made for a true Distinction, not betwixt Pa­pists and Protestants, but betwixt Papists of quiet Disposition, and in all other things good Subjects; and such other Papists as in their Hearts maintained the like violent bloody Maximes as the Powder Traitors did. Prem. pag. 9. and in his Apology: and this he writ at that time, when both the Title and the Statute was in the Eye and Mouth of every Man: Wherefore nothing but the Defence of a bad Cause could force this Catechist to Derogate from the Credit, [Page 91] Truth, and Honour of this Prince, whose Testimony the Statute it self does Ratify, declaring that the Oath was framed, For the better Trial how his Majesties Subjects stood affected in point of Loyalty and Obedi­ence. Now had the Oath been devised for distinction in Religion, probably the words would have been thus, For the bet­ter Trial how his Majesties Subjects stood affected in point of Religion. To that of King James, no reply with Justice can ever be made; but to the Statute he of­fers thus, That such a preamble is like­wise prefixed To the Ordaining the taking of the Communion in the Protestant way. And yet it is no distinctive sign betwixt loyal and disloyal Catholicks, but betwixt Protestants and Catholicks. I reply, That the Receiving the Communion in the Pro­testant way, is in it self Essentially a sign of Protestant Religion; but to Renounce by Oath the deposing or murthering Pow­er, and to declare it to be against the Word of God, is no Essential sign of the Protestant Religion, but only of Loyalty; Consequently, whatever the Preamble be, the Oath of Allegiance is a sign of Loyalty, and receiving communion in the Prote­stant way is a sign of Profession of that Re­ligion?

The Expences of his Third Chapter are thus. First, It is a Repetition of the same Objection ten times answered with­out the least Improvement. Secondly, He gives his Adversary advantage against himself. Thirdly, He expects that the Title of the Statute, should be as large as the Statute. Fourthly, To compass his Design, he confounds the Nature or Es­sence of things. Reverend Father, is this Christian Dictrine?

His Fourth Chapter examined.

IN this Chapter he begins to take the Oath asunder, and divides it into two parts; the one Assertory, and the other Promissory; and against each part moves many vain and impertinent Scruples. E­very thing he meets with is a Giant, but of his own creation. His first encoun­ter is against the Assertory part, which once more he degrades from sharing in any part of Allegiance, because it is not a promise of Fidelity, therefore it is no Oath of Allegiance. As if it were not as much a duty of a Subject, to maintain by Oath the Right of his Prince, upon which all pro­mise of Fidelity must be built, as the pro­mise [Page 93] it self. Since therefore both parts are a performance of the Subject's duty, both parts do integrate and compleat the Oath of Allegiance.

Before he advances farther, he thought it expedient to expose to view these follow­ing words of the Oath, And all these things I do plainly and sincerely acknowledge and swear, according to the express words by me spoken, and according to the plain and common sense and understanding of the same words, without any Equivocation or mental Evasion, or secret Reservation whatsoever. This is a snare in which he hopes to catch the swearer tripping by perjury, as acting contrary to his Oath. His first Gim­crack is from the first words of the Oath thus, I A. B. do truly and sincerely acknow­ledge, profess, testify and declare in my Con­science before God, and the world, that our Soveraign Lord King Charles is Lawful and Rightful King of this Realm, and of all o­ther his Majesty's Dominions and Countries. Who would have thought that any good Subject should have stumbled at this? Is it an imputation to the Oath that 'tis too clear? What plain-meaning man is there who understood not these words, till now he meets with this following [Page 94] cross and crabbed Comment? To testify (he tells you) as importing something di­stinct, from my acknowledging, in the Ri­gour of the express words is to bear Witness: to declare, as distinct, from professing, is as it were to act the part of a judge in clearing a thing not so well known. Surely this Ca­techism runs the fate of many Comments which is to be more obscure than the Text. For, what exigence is there that these four words, I acknowledg, profess, testify, & declare, must have all distinct meanings? Is it from the nature of the Law, or Oath? Evidently no. For, since 'tis the design of the Law-maker, by the use of words, to be clear and easy; and since nothing con­duces more to that design than synoni­mous words giving light to each other (for some of necessity will be more ob­scure than others) 'twould be preposte­rous to expect from the nature of an Oath or Law a distinct Sence for every word: Nay, 'tis against all Experience, for both in the Canon and Civil Law, in Statutes, in Bonds, in Indentures, in Deeds, and in the Breves, and Bulls of Popes, no­thing is so frequent as redundance of words in the same Sence; and all little enough to render the Acts or Obligations clear, sure and binding.

Secondly, Why must the words of this Oath be used in the most rigo­rous sence? methinks the plain and com­mon sence (required by the Oath) should not be always the most rigorous sence. And I am very certain that, if all words were used in their rigorous sence, few would understand them, and so they would be unfit for Oaths. Thirdly, what warrant has he, that these words Testify and declare in my Conscience do import in rigour, to bear Witness before a Judge, and to act as it were the part of a Judge? Since nothing is more familiar in plain and Com­mon Sence, than to Testify and declare a matter in a man's Conscience without the thought of any act of Jurisdiction. Fourthly, To testify and declare in a man's conscience, that the King is right­ful King, is so far from questioning the Kings right, that it places it beyond all question. For, whereas at the time this Oath was framed, and before, several Divines of the Society and others, main­tained the deposing and murthering Pow­er, which gave rise to the Powder-Plot; this Oath was made, wherein these words, amongst others, were industri­ously inserted, to cut off all such preten­ded [Page 96] Power. So that what question was about the Kings right, was started by the men of deposing and murthering Prin­ciples, against whom, and their Doctrine, this Oath was made.

Another Bone too hard for his Di­gestion, is that he cannot Swear, The King is Rightful and Lawful King of all his Do­minions. Because he knows not what they are, or what Right the King has to them. My Answer is, That the Oath requires not that the swearer should know every spot of Land possessed by the King, ei­ther in Europe, Affrica, or America; but only that he swear in particular, That he is Rightful and Lawful King of this his Realm, and (in general) of all other his Dominions. So that what ever change has been made of his Dominions since the framing of this Oath, either by gain or by loss to the Crown; nothing is more certain, than that he is lawful King of all his Dominions; we may therefore with all security in Conscience conclude, that in the first Clause of this Oath, there is neither Equivocation, secret Reservati­on, mental Evasion, or any just cause to asperse this Oath?

His Bill of Charges runs thus. First, [Page 97] he denies it to be part of the Subjects Allegiance or Fidelity, to assert the right of his Prince. Secondly, in defiance of reason, and his own experience he re­quires in an Oath, that every word have a distinct sense from others. Thirdly, he confounds the plain and common sense of words, obvious to every understand­ing, with their rigorous sense, known to a few only. Fourthly, he forces the words, testify and declare, from their plain and common sense, that he may fault the Oath. Fifthly, to declare the King's right, so, that no body can justly take it from him, he tells you, is to question the Kings Right. Finally, he has a scru­ple to swear the King is Lawful King of his Dominions; as if Dominion could be his, and not his. Reverend Father, is this Christian Doctrine.

His Fifth Chapter Examined.

THe design of this Chapter, is to ren­der the takers of the Oath perjur'd, as using secret reservations inconsistent with the Oath, obliging them, to the plain and common understanding of the same words [Page 98] without Equivocation, mental Evasion, or se­cret Reservation. His first charge of per­jury, is from the third Clause or branch of the Oath, which (if you credit him) is thus, I declare in my conscience before God, that the Pope, neither of himself, nor by any other means, with any other, can de­pose the King. Had he been a fair dea­ler, he would have cited the words as they are in the Oath thus: nor by any other meanes with any other, hath any pow­er or Authority to depose the King. Which differs from this other expression, can de­pose the King. For Authority in the Oath, coming after Power, does limit it to a just and Lawful Power; whereas can depose, implies a power either just or unjust to depose the King, and the Oath meddles not with an unjust power of de­posing him; but, because it is a Maxime in the Law, id solum possum quod licite pos­sum, I will suppose he meant well. What does he inferr from those words? that neither the Pope, nor King, nor Prince, nor Emperour, hath any power or Autho­rity to depose the King? To this I an­swer him out of his own Instruction, that by these words of the Oath, nothing is designed but an Exclusion of the Popes [Page 99] Spiritual power to depose the King. He resumes thus, do the express words of the Oath bear this reservation? I answer, here is no Reservation, but the plain and common sense of the words, as they are under­stood by all man-kind; for, when menti­on is made of the Pope's Power of depo­sing Soveraign Princes, who ever under­stands any other, but such as Popes have claimed; and what Pope ever laid claim to the deposing power, or procee­ded to the deposition of Soveraigns, but by vertue of a Commission from Jesus Christ, as being Vicar and Supreme Pa­stor upon earth? Gregory the seventh was the first, that made use of that pow­er; several others have followed his steps: examin their pretences, turn over their Bulls and publick Declarations, and see if they plead not a Commission from Christ, as being Supreme Pastors. This is the sense of Bellarmin, Suarez, Mari­ana, Becanus, Hessius, Lessius, Tolet, Va­lentia, Gretser, Hereau, and all those of the Society, who with so much heat have advanced the Popes deposing Pow­er. In fine, this is known, and common, even Lippis & tonsoribus; so that, though the power of deposing be in it [Page 100] self Equivocal, and may imply a Spiri­tual or Temporal power, yet, when 'tis attributed to the Pope, 'tis then fixed to a Spiritual power, and is so under­stood by all.

He still pursues me thus, that by this Oath, 'tis not only sworn that the Pope, neither of himself, nor by any Authority of the Church, or See of Rome, has any Au­thority to depose the King; but also that the Pope by no other means, with any other, has power or Authority to depose the King; which implyes that no body can depose the King; not a Pope, nor King, nor Emperour. I answer that, if this be his consequence, he must needs have a very hard opini­on of both the Framers and Takers of the Oath; the one for forcing men to swear against a Noon-day light, and ex­perience, and the others for so swearing. But to defeat this consequent, no more is requisit than to look upon the pro­mise, which is, that the Pope by no other means, with any other has power or Autho­rity to depose the King. So that still 'tis the Popes Power or Authority, which is only renounced by this Oath, not any other. For those words can only im­port that the Pope, what ever means, [Page 101] he makes use of, though, he has the Em­perour or the great Mogul on his side to aid him, has no Power or Authority to depose the King. And this is truth; though it may be, the Pope alone is stronger than the King, and can bring more forces into the field. By this you see what little care he has in deriving his consequences; which, though feeble, he leaves to shift for themselves.

Possibly he may advance farther, and make this Objection. May not the Pope, being a powerful Prince, and injur'd by the King, right himself by force of Arms: and, so, if victory be of his side, dispossess the King of his Dominions? Undoubtedly he may; but not by that Power and Authority, which is renoun­ced by the Oath, as is evident from the common notion all men have of Power and Authority to depose, when placed in the Pope. And therefore, when it shall happen that the Pope does war with the King, or other Princes, if he be stronger than they, he may dispossess them, as they may him; but then this is not done by what we call Papal Pow­er or Authority, but by natural strength and Reason; and, in such cases, we must [Page 102] use the same Terms, as custom gives to other Princes, when they are Victori­ous, as that they have conquered or subdued such a Prince or King; it not being so usual to say, they have deposed such a Prince; and when the word deposing is apply'd to the Power of a Temporal Prince, all men understand it to be a Temporal Power; but, when 'tis spoken of the Pope, no man thinks upon any other, than his Spiritual Power as Christ's Vicar. When therefore the Pope con­quers by his Temporal Sword, the Cir­cumstances he is in declare to the world in what sense the word deposing Power is used. From hence I must con­clude, that from the common use or plain sense of the word deposing (when joyn'd, to the Pope's power without other cir­cumstances) is meant only his Spiritual Power, and that without any Equivoca­tion or secret Reservation; for, where nothing is conceal'd or hid, nothing is reserv'd.

The next clause he jumps upon is this, I do believe in my conscience, and am resolv'd, that neither the Pope nor any person whatsoever, hath power to absolve me from this Oath. This clause he tells you [Page 103] is no more true, than the former, and I am much of his mind. The reason he gives is, because the King by quitting his Crown may quit me of my Allegiancc. Besides, the power of Victory transfers Allegiance from one King to another. This branch, I confess, has not much of swea­ring in it, but is full of solid Truth. For, although the power of Victory may transfer Allegiance from one Prince to a­nother, and the King by quitting his Crown, quits me of my Allegiance, yet that's not done by any Absolution; for Absolution or absolving from Oaths, are by use and custom, Terms appropria­ted to Acts of Spiritual or Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, as is likewise absolution from sin; and, in this sense were always un­derstood in this Oath; this being the common notion of the words without a­ny Equivocation or secret Reservation. And, truly, if the Translation of Allegi­ance from Prince to Prince, or from King to his Successor by a voluntary gift may be termed Absolution from the Oath of Allegiance, with as much justice a dy­ing Prince, may be said to absolve his Subjects from their Oath, by Transfer­ring their Allegiance to his Successor, [Page 104] which was by Oath obliged to the Pre­decessour; for, though by death the per­son be taken from the dignity which is continued in the Successour, yet in his sense of Absolution, the Subject is as truly absolved or quit of his Oath of Allegiance given to the predecessour, as he should have been if resignation had been made to the Successour before death. To allude therefore to the lameness of his discourse, I introduced him in the last answer I made to this Objection, putting this question: What if the King should dye, is not the Subject quit of his Allegiance? Shewing by the folly of that question, how far he prevaricated from the true sense of the Oath.

But after all this pother about nothing, let us put the case, that not only the power of deposing in general, but even when 'tis appropriated to the Pope in particular, as also the power of absolving, were Terms Equivocal or imply'd a se­cret Reservation, is it not in the sphear of Concomitant Circumstances to clear them from that state, and fix them to a manifest Certainty? Thus then I discourse; the design of this Oath, was the preser­vation of the King, his Heirs and Suc­cessors, [Page 105] from the pretended Spiritual Power of the Pope in deposing Princes, and absolving their Subjects from their Allegiance. King Henry the Eight, (be­fore this Oath was thought upon) was made an Example of that Power; for though he was not actually deposed, yet the Pope had declared him deposed, his Sub­jects absolved from their Allegiance, and all persons Excommunicated who should obey him. Queen Elizabeth had her share in some sad effects of this Extra­vagant Power. Upon pretence of this Power it was that the most detestable Powder plot was laid, to have destroyed King James and all the Royal Family in the great Assembly of the Kingdom; for whose safety and defence against this Power the Oath was made. Bellarmin, Suarez, and others of that School main­tain'd that Power by their Pens. King James and others (his Subiects) where­of some were Roman-Catholicks, vigo­rously opposed them. From hence 'tis evidently concluded, that the Power of Deposing and Absolving from the Oath, must be understood of Spiritual Power in the Pope or Church, and that no se­cret Reservation intervenes, since nothing [Page 106] is concealed which by clear and undeni­able circumstances, is not revealed. So ends this Chapter.

The summe of his gains in this fifth Chap­ter is this; First, he corrupts the words of the Oath. Secondly, he will have words to signify without rule, Thirdly, in signifi­cation of words he has no regard to subjecta materia, or the matter in hand. Fourthly, by vertue of his Logick, he can make one to be two, or two to be one. Fifthly, he minds no Circumstances in the understanding of words. Finally, to beat down the Oath, he forces the word Absolve out of his proper, to an improper sence. Reverend Father, is this Christian Doctrin?

The Sixth Chapter Examined.

THis Chapter speaks loud, promiseth much and performs little; a deep mouth is a sign of slow heels; for the game which he thought was in his hand, is beyond his reach. Three things he at­tempts in this Chapter. First, to justify the Popes Breves: Secondly, to stop the mouth of his Adversary: Thirdly, to clear himself of his Loyalty. God send him a [Page 107] good Deliverance. The method to his design is to charge the fifth branch of the Oath with a small parcel of Heresies or Articles repugnant to Faith, in number no more than five. The Pope, though he declares in his Breve, that there are many things against Faith in the Oath, yet in his wisdom thought it fit to con­ceal them; nay, being from time to time with humble supplication sollicited to de­clare them, would never condescend to any discovery. How came the mystery to be now reveal'd? Is this Catechist the Pope's Nuncio, has he any warrant from him to define what is Heresy? If not, he is deeply guilty of usurping a power of defining, no more appertaining to him, than to the King and Parliament, against whom he is so earnest for using their judgment only of discretion in Censuring a proposition for Heretical.

The Clause of the Oath which he now attacks runs thus. And I do farther swear, that I do from my heart abhor, detest, and ab­jure, as Impious and Heretical this Damna­ble Doctrin and Position, that Princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be Deposed or Murthered by their Sub­jects or any whatsoever. Before I enquire [Page 108] into the Heresies with which he chargeth this Clause. I have two exceptions a­gainst him; the first is, that he permits so many synominous expressions to pass uncontrouled in this Clause, for which he so hotly inveighed against the first: For Doctrin and Position, abhor and detest, to swear against, and abjure, seem to march in synonymous couples. My second ex­ception is, that he passeth by this cen­sure as Impious, tacitly allowing the Doctrin abjur'd to be Impious, though not Heretical. Whereas in truth, there is the same rule for both; the repugnance to the Word of God giving both denomi­nations; and therefore whoever may swear to abhor aposition as Impious, may abjure it as Heretical. But these are only points of incogitancy; his Eyes and Thoughts being fixed upon a bunch of Heresies which hangs from this branch of the Oath.

The First Article against Faith in this Clause, he declares to be, for a Secular Power, much more a Protestant, to usurp the Supremacy due to the Church in deciding what is Heretical. Had he been pleased to have term'd it against good manners, for the Secular or Protestant Power to [Page 109] have gone before the Spiritual or Church, in deciding what is Heretical, it had been more moderate; but to say 'tis against Faith, 'tis unpardonable. For, what if a General Council should afterwards de­fine the same Doctrine to be Heretical, which King James and his Parliament have done in this Oath, (which for ought he knows in good time it may) would they have acted any thing against Faith, meerly because they prevented the Coun­cil? If so, then all those Pious Christians, who declared Arianism, Eutychianism, Be­rengarianism, and the like, to be against their Faith, before the three Councils de­fined the same, did all act against Faith. Nay, the hot De-fide-men of the Schools, who so highly value themselves upon their Doctrine, crying out, The Church, the Church, at every turn, and knocking their Adversaries on the head, with hoc est Hereticum, will not be exempt from this censure; since a thousand propositions have been by them declared Heretical, never thought of by any Council. No­thing is more frequent amongst the Cen­sors of Books, than such Qualifications; and shall it be said, they have all usurp't the Supremacy of the Church in so do­ing, [Page 110] or that they have acted against Faith? If so, let them be all Hereticks for com­pany.

The second point he defines to be a­gainst Faith in this Clause is, a comply­ance in the Swearer with that Usurped Power; it being, sayes he, an Approbation of that Usurpation. Is it not pleasant, that what he has concluded against the Maker, and Swearer of this Clause, may all be true, and yet the Clause it self be clear and innocent? So it is; for a bare Usur­pation of the Supremacy in declaring what is Heretical, as also a bare compliance with that usurpation are the faults of the persons, not of the Clause; which may be very good and orthodox whilst the Usur­per and Complyer are not. How then comes it to be concluded, that this is a­gainst Faith in this Clause?

The third Heresy he fastens upon this Clause, is, That it makes a doctrine Here­tical, which has never been condemn'd by the Church. I answer, that neither the Oath­maker, nor the Church her self, can ren­der by their condemnation, a doctrine He­retical, which was not so before their Condemnation: If then the Doctrine, which by this Clause is declared to be [Page 111] Heretical, be such in its self before the declaration, (as it may be, for any thing now opposed) how can the declaration of it in this Clause be against Faith? A­gain, do not Catholicks as well as Prote­stants repute that to be Heretical which is repugnant to the clear Word of God? Do not the Divines in the Schools censure that for Heretical, which is in Opposition to an evident consequence derived from Faith? And is not either of these the plain and common sense of this word Heretical? Why then, in the acceptation of that word, must we be ty'd up to his humorous Notion, since common use, which gives life to words, has left us at liberty? And, seeing the Law-maker's Rule of Faith (in whose sence we are to swear) is the Word of God written, if what in this Clause is declared to be He­retical, be truly against that Rule, how is it possible this Clause should be incon­sistent with Faith? Is not this an odd piece of Doctrine to be put into a Cate­chism?

His fourth and fifth charge against this clause of the Oath are, that it makes that to be Faith, which is not. And that to be Heresy, which is none. But because I have [Page 112] onely his bare word for this Assertion, I shall only oppose my Negative to his Af­firmative. But the truth is, the five He­resies he has charged upon this clause, do all center in this last; so that all five could be but one, and that's left Unprov'd; A great Cry, but no Wooll!

To solace Kings, and deliver them from the fears they may be in from the Depo­sing Doctrine, he tells them that the De­posing Doctrine is no part of Catholick Faith: Nor doth any man, sayes he, as a Catholick, believe it. What a rich Cordial is this to the heart of the King! But I fear it will not much please Paul the Fifth, or those who are of opinion that the re­nouncing the Deposing Doctrine is the renouncing Faith. However, the King has gained this one point of him. And 'tis hoped another may, by a little impor­tunity, be wrested from him. For greater Security then of the King, I put this Que­stion to our Loyal Catechist: Is the Depo­sing Doctrine no part of Jesuitism? For (to say nothing now of the King-Killing Doctrine) did not the most eminent Di­vines of the Society, as Bellarmine, Tolet, Suarez, Lessius, Becanus, Hessius, Mariana, Valentia, Gretser, Hereau, and many others; [Page 113] and some of them to the Kings face assert the truth of this Doctrin, and even put it to the account of Catholick Faith? Again, may a man be a good Subject, and hold this Doctrin? if so, where's the Kings safety? Nay he is more expo­sed to danger than if it were a part of Catholick Doctrin? for, in that case, his enemies being bare-faced and known, he could better provide against them; but now he knows not friend from foe. Father Whitebread your Provincial (of whom I will have the good opinion that he neither did tell a lye, nor E­quivocate at his death) deliver'd him­self thus at his execution; nor can any man as a Catholick believe that 'tis lawful upon any occasion or pretence whatsoever, to design or contrive the death of his Ma­jesty, or any hurt to his person? This is part of his last speech, as I have in my last letter to you evinc'd against this Ca­techist both out of the copies which were printed by Authority, and also out of those copies sent by your Fathers to Rouen, to be translated into French, and printed there; to this I gave this con­struction with the Vulgar, to whom he addressed his speech, that no Catholick can [Page 114] believe it lawful to design the death of the King, &c. Against this construction your Catechist excepted in a former print, and by these words, no man as a Catholick can believe it lawful to design the death of the King, he tells us is only meant, that 'tis not a part of Catholick Doctrin, to believe it lawful to design the death of the King, not that it is repugnant to Ca­tholick Doctrine. So that Father White-bread, notwithstanding his fair speech, might (upon other principles) have be­lieved in his heart that it was lawful to design the death of the King. Now, if this be not to Equivocate with his Au­ditors at his death, I have lost all my senses; and do appeal to the judgment of man-kind if by this he could clear him­self of what was laid to this charge, which was his main design. By this you may clearly see what little security accrues to the King by this position or principle, no man as a Catholick can be­lieve it lawful to kill the King, when at the same time, this other position may be true too, any Catholick may believe it lawful to kill him. This is the deduction he makes from the last words of his Pro­vincial.

Against the security, given the King by the Oath of Allegiance, he argues thus; After a man has sworn the deposing Doctrine to be Heretical, he may afterward find it not to be Heretical, as one may ea­sily do; then is he free from this Oath. I suppose if this had been so easy to find, this Catechist and his Consorts would not have laboured so many years in the inquest of it, to so little purpose. In the mean time we will stand to the Doctrine of the Oath, and (as we have just cause) believe it unchangeable. And so long the King may sleep securely. But what assurance has the King from the Linsy-Woolsy Oath of this Catechist, which is, that he will never hold nor teach this Doctrine of deposing, though it be not He­retical? Is not this to reckon without his host? How can he swear this without consulting the Pope, or his General? Has he so soon forgot the men of his order, who have taught the deposing Doctrine, and might have continued so doing till this day, if a timely period had not been put to it, by a severe prohibition from the General? And was this prohibition any more than a positive order, mutable at the discretion of the General? And [Page 116] when the interest of the Society may re­quire it, may not this prohibition cease, and a new positive order be given un­der the same precept of strict obedience, to advance the deposing doctrine? May not the Pope whom he styles Judge in the case of all Oaths, declare this new Oath to be unlawful, it being against the exercise of his Power owned by ma­ny of his Predecessours? Will he in these events disobey his General, and the Pope? If not, adieu Oath, farewell Alle­giance, and good night King.

In a former dispute with this Cate­chist, I asserted the particle as in this cen­sure, as Heretical, to import either Iden­tity with Heresy, or only a Similitude to Heresy, and that both of them were the plain and common notions of the par­ticle. To this he now replies, that, though the particle as may sometimes imply Identity, and sometimes Equality, yet in our present Circumstance it can only import Identity, because it then one­ly brings Equality, when it relates to dif­ferent Subjects, which. sayes he, is not in our case Then he exemplifies in this proposition, let him be to thee as a Hea­then, where he owns that a Similitude one­ly [Page 117] or Equality intervenes, because the particle as relates to different Subjects. For my part looking upon the particle as in these two following propositions, let him to thee as a Heathen, and this other, let him be to thee as an Heretick, or as Heretical, or Diabolical, &c. I see no difference in the particle as that in the first it should import similitude or Equa­lity, and in the last Identity; For, to say that the particle relates to different Subjects in the one proposition, and not in the other, is to begg the question; for of this 'tis we enquire, whether the par­ticle as signifies Sameness, or Difference in the Subjects unto which it relates.

To enlarge himself upon this matter, he pretends to a general rule, how to know when the particle as implies Iden­tity; which, if you will believe him, then is, when it applies an Adjective to a Substantive. Let's make experiment of this Rule in these two propositions, let Peter be to thee as a Heathen, and let Pe­ter be to thee as an Heretick, or as Here­tical, Diabolical, or what he pleases. All these predicates are Adjectives, which do fall upon the Substantive Peter. In the first proposition he owns the particle as [Page 118] to imply only similitude or equality, and yet the word Heathen is an adjective, as much as Heretick, Heretical, or Diabolical; for there are heathen Women, and hea­then Doctrines as well as heathen Men; clearly then the rule fails in his own example. Now, that a General Rule should allow an Exception is no great wonder; but, that the Exception should lye in the very example, urg'd by the propounder, is prodigiously absurd.

The particle as being thus common to Similitude and Identity, he puts this question to himself; whether in this clause it may be restrained by the swea­rer to a Similitude, and he answers him­self negatively; because, if both sences be not sworn to, there will be a secret Re­servation which the Oath excludes. But I must beg leave to dissent from him; for, when a word may have two plain & com­mon significations and no Circumstances do biass it to one more than to the o­ther, 'tis in the swearer's choice to use it as he pleases, so he swears truth in ei­ther sense; nor is there in so doing any danger of secret or mental Reservation, which then onely happens, when a part of a proposition is pronounced by the [Page 119] mouth, & another part is reserved secretly in the mind to piece up the whole, so that without it the sense (as intended by the speaker) would not be compleat. As if, you asking me whether I did such or such a thing, I answer no, reserving in my mind, so as I am obliged to tell you; this later part of the proposition is se­cretly reserved, and so the proposition is vicious, because it is destructive to Hu­mane Society. But, in our case, where a word or proposition may have two plain and common meanings, and both true, I may swear the one, and abstract from or not mind the other, for I re­serve nothing in my mind to piece out, the sense of the proposition, since my meaning is what the words do plainly and exteriously import; and since both senses of the proposition are true, it im­ports not in what sence I took it, for either of them satisfies the Magistrate, and so no body is deluded.

I affirm'd it was a rule in all Laws, that if a word may have two Significati­ons, whereof one renders the Law Just, the other Unjust, it ought to be taken in that sence which renders the Law Just. Also, I added that in Penal Laws, words [Page 120] are to be interpreted in the most favou­rable sence. To this I have his Assent as to other cases, but not in this; because by the words of the Oath, sayes he, All mental Evasions, and secret Reservations, are excluded. I answer, out of my foresaid Notes, that when a word is equivocal, or a sence in a proposition seems to be reser­v'd, if circumstances do determine it, then 'tis no more Equivocal nor the sence re­serv'd; for, what is not conceal'd is not reserv'd. But these Rules of rendering the Law just by a fit interpretation of words, and favourable in penalties, are circumstances so known, that if any thing were otherwise Equivocal in this Oath or seem'd to be reserv'd, they fix them to a Just and Favourable sence; consequently, as to the point of Justice and Favour there is nothing concealed, so nothing Equivocal, nothing reserv'd. This I bring ad abundan [...]iam, not that there is any need of this Observation for any thing now opposed, since the words are left in their plain and common sence. And, as to the word Heretical, the Cir­cumstance of the Law makers, owning the the Scripture to be their Rule of Faith, hath determined it's Sence. And, if it [Page 121] had not, yet the Oath, abstracting from materially or formally Heretical, terms of School-invention, may be taken in that Abstraction; as I may swear a man is a Living Creature, though by my words 'tis not resolv'd what living Creature he is.

Reverend Father, when you see a Ca­techist advancing his own Figments in lieu of Christian Doctrin, you cannot but think his case desperate. In all my dis­putes with him and his Consorts, I re­quired for the taking this Oath the same certainty which all mankind expect to find in all other Oaths; that is, a rational judgment or moral certainty; for, these are my words which he read in my Let­ter now cited; but, by his wonted Arti­fice, he conceals them to possess his Rea­der with this Errour, that I hold Opini­on in the Swearer defence enough a­gainst Perjury, and that the Oath runs to this purpose, I think the Pope cannot Absolve me, I think that Doctrin is Hereti­cal. I think King Charles to be my lawful King, &c. Whereas in truth there is not any thing of this sound in all my Let­ters. Upon this sandy Foundation he builds his Castles. True it is I asserted, [Page 122] that a Moral Certainty was consistent with an Absolute Possibility of the thing being otherwise; and that, there­fore, the swearer did only assert the truth of the thing as it is in his Conscience or Rational Judgment, not always as it is in it's self, otherwise few or no Oaths would be taken; and that this Moral Certainty would render the swearer se­cure in his Conscience from all Perjury, and justify him before God and Man. Whereas, to swear positively what he thinks to be true, is, if not perjury, at least to expose himself to it, which (though what he swears happens to be true) leaves a guilt upon his Conscience, and renders him in excusable before God and man. By this you may see the Impostor detected, and his Ignorance exposed, in not distingushing betwixt the two Cer­tainties, Moral, and Metaphysical, and al­so Opinion; the first admitting an abso­lute possibility of a thing being other­wise than is affirm'd, the second exclud­ing it, and the third standing with an actual fear and doubt that the thing is otherwise. I conclude then, that he who takes this Oath, must not onely think, but must be Certain, and verily judge, that [Page 123] the King is Rightful and Lawful King, &c. and that the deposing or murthering Power is to be renounced as Impious and Heretical.

Against this Conclusion, he opposeth his Evidence for the contradictory part; and, his reason is, because he is certain, there is no definition of the Church to make it Heretical; and he is as certain that neither private Men, nor Uniuersi­ties, can make it Heretical. I answer, that neither they, nor Bishops, nor Popes, nor Councils, nor Angels, can make any Doctrin Heretical, but only the Opposi­tion it has to the Word of God. Again, I answer, that to disobey my Prince in Temporals, is as Opposit to the Word of God, and also to the Doctrin of the Church, as 'tis to disobey the Pope in Spirituals; if therefore it be Heretical to teach it Lawful to disobey the Pope, 'tis full as Heretical to teach it lawful to dis­obey the King. And, if it be Heretical to teach it lawful to disobey him, 'tis equally Heretical to affirm it lawful to depose him, which I think is the worst kind of Disobedience. Finally, I have al­ready evinc'd, that a Doctrin may be Htretical before any Definition of a Ge­neral Council.

Before the end of this Chapter, he re­fers us to the Sorbon, and bids us examin what Opinion that famous School held, as to this point, in Henry the third, and Henry the fourth's dayes, as also at the Siege of Paris. I have, upon several exi­gences, enlarged my self upon this pas­sage, being forced unto it by his and o­thers importunity; and, since he is de­lighted with the repetition of it, I shall reduce into a summary what is more dif­fused in my Letters. Thus then; This Doctrin, within the compass of these times, was declared (to omit a score of other severe Censures) to be contrary to the Word of God. And not only by the Sorbon was it thus declared, but also by seven more Universities, as Caen, Rhemes, Tholouse, Poictiers, Valence, Bourdeaux, and Burges, and all this in the year 1626. This Doctrine, as being against the Word of God, was censured by the faculty of Paris, in Bellarmin, Suarez, Becanus, and Santarellus; whereupon, by order of Parliament, some of their Books were burnt. And this Do­ctrine so Censured by the Sorbon, to be a­gainst the Word of God, the most eminent of the Society in France, did solemnly en­gage by a promise signed under their [Page 125] hands, dated March 16. 1626. to sub­scribe; by which instrument also they faithfully promised never to profess any Opinion or Doctrine contrary to what shall be maintained by the aforesaid Clergy and University of the Kingdom, or the Sorbon in this matter. Finally, by decree of Parlia­ment, June 27. 1614. the Fathers of the Society throughout France, were obliged, under pain of High Treason, to preach in their publick Sermons against the Depo­sing Power, as being repugnant to Chri­stian Doctrin, which accordingly they did. Thus in short, have I given you the Transactions of France, and the Sorbon, re­lating to the affair in hand.

He interrogates thus, Did the French Jesuits subscribe to the Censure? I answer, they promised to subscribe; if then they did not subscribe, they were to blame; an honest man will stand to his pro­mise. Their promise is extant, dated March 16. 1626. He proceeds; Did they subscribe the deposing doctrine was Hereti­cal? My reply is in the Affirmative; for whoever subscribes a doctrine to be against the Word of God, subscribes it to be Here­tical. In the upshot, he desires to know, whether they subscribed it any more than as [Page 126] their own Opinions? And I must declare, that I cannot resolve him, whether they did subscribe it so much as their own Opinion, or against it. However, if they stand to their promise, and subscribe to the Censure, that being positive, the Sub­scription must also be Positive; unless he knows of any Exception made in their De­claration.

This Chapter has put him to Charges; the Summe Total is, First, a discovery of his Ignorance in the notion of what is Heretical. Secondly, he numbers the same thing five times over, and knows it not, because it is differently worded. Thirdly, he dreams of a Clubb of five Heresies in one branch of the Oath, where none but himself can discover any. Fourthly, to swear the deposing doctrine to be Here­tical, he fancies is no Security to the King; as if the owning his Crown to be from God is of no force. Fifthly, though the deposing doctrine be never so often taught and practised by other Principles, yet, if it be not a part of Catholick Be­lief, he thinks the King safe. Sixthly, he will not own that there is any security in the Oath of Allegiance, though the swea­rer holds the Oath to be Indispensable. [Page 127] Seventhly, he makes the Pope judge of the Lawfulness of all Oaths, and yet offers to take an Oath in defiance of the Pope. Eighthly, he gives a Rule for the particle as, and in the application contradicts himself. Ninethly, he understands not the meaning of a Secret Reservation. Tenthly, he imposes upon the defenders of the Oath Opinion in lieu of Moral Cer­tainty. Eleventhly, he confounds Moral with Metaphysical Certainty. Twelfthly, he takes Councils to be Authors of our Faith. Thirteenthly, he is an ill bird, and beraies his own nest, discovering the shame of some of the Society in France. Fourteenthly, he dodges about the Subscrip­tion of the French Jesuits, now owning, and then disowning it. Finally, he scru­ples to be an honest man, that is to swear to what he subscribes. Reverend Father, is this Christian Doctrine.

The Seventh Chapter Examined.

IN this Chapter a Hue and Cry is made after the former Clause; 'tis again search'd into, and a new Evasion brought to light. The clause is, I swear that I do [Page 128] from my Heart, abhor, detest, and abjure as Impious and Heretical, this damnable Doc­trine and Position, That Princes which be Excommunicated or Deprived by the Pope, may be Deposed or Murthered by their Sub­jects, or any whatsoever. This Proposition, (he tells us) as being exposed to Quibbles, is not proper to be sworn by every Ideot. I am much of his mind. But this Propo­sition as it is exposed in the clear Terms of the Oath, and not quibbled upon as Sophisters, is proper enough to be sworn, not indeed by every Ideot, such as the Laws of God and Men exempt from Oaths, but by the Illiterate as well as the Lite­rate; for would he, and some few others, lay a side their learned Obscurities, by which they design to darken all that comes in their way, the proposition, as it lies, is intelligible to all those whose Capacity does fit them for an Oath.

For the better understanding of the Scruple, he allows it to be Heretical to assert it Lawful to murther the King, but not to Depose. This supposed, he argues thus, I do not swear the propositi­on, saying a Prince excommunicated may be depose and murthered, but may be deposed or murthered, to be Heretical. My first re­ply [Page 129] shall be, that it is equally against the Law of God to assert, that a Prince Ex­communicated may be Deposed, as it is to assert that he may be Murthered. For he who by his Command obligeth us not to murther, does equally oblige us not to Steal or Rob. Since therefore to depose a Prince is to rob him of his Crown, 'tis against the Law of God, and, conse­quently, 'tis heretical to affirm it Law­ful. He ask's, who has defin'd it? I an­swer, God in the Decalogue, in Holy Scripture, by Universal Tradition, 'tis written in the hearts of all good Christi­ans, and the repugnancy to any one of these principles renders a position Here­tical.

My second reply is, that in case I should allow him that the doctrin of deposing were not heretical, yet the proposition sworn in this clause to be Heretical would still be so: For, if it be Heretical to af­firm it Lawful to murther the King, then for murther's sake 'tis Heretical to as­sert it Lawful to depose or murther him. For Example, if it be a Heretical positi­on to say it is Lawful to do evil, he that shall say 'tis Lawful to do good or evil, delivers a position heretical; for, [Page 130] by that position 'tis left to a man's choice to do either lawfully: If therefore either of the parts of that position be heretical, the whole must be so, because bonum ex integra causa, malum vero ex quolibet defectu. He concludes this assertory part of the Oath with a Quere or two; first, how a man can swear that this Oath is admini­ster'd unto him by good and lawful power? I answer, because it is administer'd unto him by his Lawful Magistrate impow­erd by God so to do. Secondly, how he can swear by this Oath, heartily, willingly, and truly upon the Faith of a Christian? I an­swer, because 'tis the will of God that Subjects perform their duties to their Prince, not repiningly but cheerfully, hilarem enim datorem diligit Deus.

His accounts of this Chapter are but short. First, he denies it to be Hereti­cal to teach it Lawful to rob or steal. Secondly, he weighs not the truth of this maxim, bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quolibet defectu. Thirdly, he wonders how a Magistrate can administer a law­ful Oath. Fourthly, he quarrels with Sub­jects for swearing Allegiance to their Prince heartily, willingly, truly, and in the Faith of a Christian. Reverend Fa­ther, Is this Christian Doctrin?

His Eight Chapter Examined.

THis is a Chip of the Old Block, still tautologies, still repetition of old stories. The Assertory part of the Oath is again excommunicated from an Oath of Allegiance, and my task is to Absolve it. Again, then to assert by Oath the Kings Right, when required, and to renounce all power to depose or murther him, is the duty of every good Subject, and without which to promise Allegiance would be a vicious and an unjust Act. And, since the Oath is made out of both parts, my inference, in opposition to his, is, that by this Oath nothing but pure and candid Allegiance was intended by the Law-maker.

We are now arrived to the promiso­ry part of the Oath, against which he seems to have only this exception, that the swearer by it does promise to disclose, not only all traiterous Conspiracies against the King, but all Treasons. Now many most important points of Religion being by the Law made Treasons (as to main­tain any Authority in the See of Rome, to be Ordained Priest by Authority derived [Page 132] from that See, and then to come and remain in the Kings Dominions, to reconcile or be reconciled to the Roman Religion, &c.) he cannot (sayes this Catechist) make dis­covery of these things without betraying his Religion, and he who will do so, will be a Traitor to his King. For my part I see no necessity why the swearer should be reputed a Traitor either to the one or the other; since both the Law and Law-makers, as also practitioners in the Law, or Custom (all which are the best inter­preters of the Law) do exempt him from such discoveries; as shall be evinced by this following induction. The Statute wherein the Oath is contained assures him that the design in framing this Oath was, for the better tryal how his Majesties Sub­jects stood affected as to their Loyalty. The Law-maker himself, that King for whose safety the Oath was made, forecasting that some unhappy Catechist would wrest all things in the Oath to the worst sence, pre­vents his Objection by declaring that nothing is by this Oath required but a pro­fession of that Temporal Allegiance or Civil Obedience, which all Subjects by the Law of God & Nature do owe to their Lawful Princes, with promise to resist and disclose (pray ob­serve [Page 133] what) all contrary Uncivil violence. Premon. pag. 9. Now to maintain a Spiritual Authority in the See of Rome, to be a Roman Priest, to reconcile or be reconciled to the Roman-Catholick Church, are not things repugnant to that Temporal and Civil Allegiance, which all Subjects by the Law of Nature do owe to their Lawful Soveraigns: Clearly then the discovery of any of them comes not within the verge of this Oath: And therefore the Charge which is brought of High Treason against a Priest at the Bar has no connexion with the Treasons to be discovered by vertue of this Oath, Roman Priesthood being only Treason by a particular positive Law, and all the Treasons to be revealed by this Oath, are onely such as are against Temporal and Civil Allegiance due to all Princes by the Laws of God and Nature.

The next Expounder of the Law is Custome (Optima interpres legum est consue­tudo) by which all words are to be regu­lated. To Custome then I appeal; and demand whether ever any Person of Worth and Honour amongst Protestants who have taken this Oath and are ac­quainted with Priests, and persons by [Page 134] them reconciled to the Roman Church, do think themselves in Conscience oblig­ed to discover them, believing them guil­ty of no other Treason than that of Or­ders, and reconciling or being reconciled. That they do not, is more clear than Noon-day light. Nay, 'tis observed that none but the scum of people, who either out of Malice to some private person, or for fil­thy lucre, are Informers of this Nature; and, as such, are by Protestants them­selves reputed vile. And, whereas the Law has provided penalties for those who con­ceal such treasons as are against Natural, Temporal and Civill Allegiance, yet the bare knowledg of a Priest and not revea­ling him is not punished by Law.

To reinforce the Objection he argues thus. The signification of Words is taken from the will of men, which cannot be more clearly expressed than by their Laws; since then by the Laws these things above mentioned are Treasons, and all Trea­sons by this Oath are to be disco­vered, it seems to him evident that those also ought to be discovered, or a secret Reservation (excluded by the Oath) must intervene, rendering the swearer perjur'd: This is the Sum of his discourse. To [Page 135] which I thus reply; that, though words signify by the will of men, and the will of men be expressed by their Laws, yet the words of the Law cannot alwayes ex­press the will of the Lawmaker unless vest­ed with concomitant Circumstances; fo [...] if a word in a law may have divers sen­ces, it must be fixed to some one in par­ticular. This being so, and the word Treason, in the Oath being by all Circum­stances (as by the words of the Statute, by the design of the Lawmaker interpret­ing his own Law, and by common use and practise of the Law) fixed to such a determined sort of Treason, that, and onely that, is by vertue of this Oath to be discovered. Nor is there room here, for any secret reservation: for, these Circum­stances laying all things open, nothing is secret, nothing reserved. My conclusion of this Chapter, in opposition to his, shall be, not like him to applaud my self, but to referr my Answer to men of impartial Judgment; to whom I present this following account.

First, he excludes from an Oath of Al­legiance the first and greatest Duty of a Subject to his Soveraign. Secondly, he is endless in his repetition of the same [Page 136] thing often answered, without advance. Thirdly, he is incorrigibly obstinate a­gainst the plain words of the Law, Law-maker and practise of the Law. Fourthly, he minds not Circumstances to understand words by. Finally, he puts a Reservati­on where nothing is reserved. Reverend Father, Is this Christian Doctrine?

His Nineth Chapter Examined.

NOthing is more usual with him than to reckon without his Host; he is not content to style the Pope Chief Judge in Spiritualls, unless it be with the Lustre of Soveraign; a Character, which, may be, the Pope himself will not admit, and those who maintain a General Council to be above the Pope will not allow. Though he supposeth it as a known maxim. True it is, amongst the Roman-Catholick Pre­lates the Pope is Chief Judge, but they are also Jure Divino Judges. So that in the Court of Judicature he is neither Mo­narch nor Soveraign. But, suppose he were Soveraign Judge in Spirituals, as the King is in Temporalls, does it follow from hence that I must rather obey the Pope [Page 137] by refusing the Oath than the King by taking it? Yes, sayes he, because the Law­fulness or Unlawfulness of an Oath, as a point of conscience, lyes within the verge not of a Temporal, but Spiritual Jurisdicti­on. If so, I believe the new Oath of Al­legiance which he offers the King in the name of Catholicks, will end in a jug­gle; especially he declaring with certain­ty the Pope to be Infallible Judge: for, though it does not renounce the Pope's Power of deposing, yet it stands in de­fiance of that Power, and renders it vain & ridiculous, as never practicable; nay the Subject swears by it that he will stand by the King, and disobey the Pope, if he attempts to depose him. And, can a­ny man of sence perswade himself that such an Oath can be acceptable to the Pope who claims the deposing power? will he ever permit such an Oath with­out declaring it Unlawful. And, if he shall declare it Unlawful and by his Breve prohibit it to be taken, must he not be obeyed as an Infallible Judge? By his Doctrine, 'tis Evident he ought. You see then, this Catechist by the offer of his new Oath designs to delude both Pope and King. But this answer is only ad hominem.

My Second Answer more direct is, that, the King being the sole Judge in Tem­porals, 'tis presumed he best knows his own Temporal Concerns, and the Extent of his Power, as the Pope does his in Spirituals; if then, in the defence of his Right in Temporals, he frames an Oath to be taken by his Subjects, and declares (as King James did) that he requires by that Oath nothing but Civil or Tempo­ral Allegiance, and, if it be clear unto his Subjects that nothing is comprehen­ded in the Oath but Temporal Allegiance, my Answer, I say, is, that it is within the verge of the Temporal Power to judge of the Lawfulness of his own Oath; for the Lawfulness depending upon the good or ill design of the Law-maker and the words of the Oath, of which himself is the Interpreter, the design being only to contain his Subjects within the bounds of their Temporal Duty, and the words importing no other than Temporal Alle­giance, whoever wrests his words from the design and sence by him declared in­vades his Right. Otherwise, the Pope asserting his own right or power to de­pose Kings, may, and will render all Oaths, repugnant to that Power, illegiti­mate. [Page 139] For, 'tis but declaring them to be against his Spiritual Power, and all is in his own hand, and the question of de­posing is at an End. Nay, at this rate of arguing, the Pope may hedge in all things within the Circle of his Jurisdicti­on; for, since there is nothing that bears not the badge of Good or Evil, Lawful or Unlawful, all things must be brought to the Spiritual Court; and then what need of Kings, when the Spiritual Power alone can govern the Universe?

Thirdly, Admit the Pope were Judge, as to the Legality, or Illegality of the Oath, must his Decision always prevail? what if he were impos'd upon by Syco­phants, as is the fate of all Princes more or less? what if he gave too much credit to sinister suggestions; as that his Supre­macy in Spirituals was invaded, his power of Excommunication, and his Jurisdiction of Binding and Absolving wrested from him? Now, that he was in these unhappy cir­cumstances, is too evident to those who have perused the Books of the Mis-infor­mers against the Oath, all of them using such figg-leaf pretences.

But let us also allow that there was fair dealing in the Informers, may not this [Page 140] Judge be too Indulgent to his own private Opinion; and so as to deceive himself and others? Undoubtedly he may; for on all sides 'tis confess'd that Popes may err in their private Opinion; and as clear it is, that, the errour once discover'd, no­thing can justifie an Obedience to such a Power or Judge, when the Crowns and Lives of Princes, the Catholick Religion, and the Fortunes, Liberties and Lives of all Catholick Subjects must otherwise be­come a sacrifice to his Errour. To this great truth I have the Pope himself assent­ing; Innocent the Third a great and wise Prelat, who (as he is cited by a learned Cardinal, Franc. Zabarel. de Schism.) de­clares thus: We are not to obey the Pope when there is a vehement presumption, that the state of the Church may be disturbed, or o­ther mischiefs like to follow. Nay, it were a Sin to Obey, because every one is bound to prevent future evils. Innocent. de sent. Ex­comm. cap. inquisit. But another great Cardinal warrants us, in such cases, not to obey the Pope, though he should pro­ceed even to Excommunication; so Panor­mitanus Alledged by Sylvester in these terms; We are not, sayes he, to obey the Pope, if it may be presumed our obedience will [Page 141] trouble the state of the Church, or because of any future Evil or Scandal, though the Precept were under pain of Excommunication latae sententiae. Sylvester ex Panormitan. verbo obedientia. num. 5. Cardinal Tolet a Jesuit avers the same truth. Tolet de sept. peccat. mort. cap. 15. in a more ample manner; so also many others.

To take away the Ground upon which I now stand, he tells me, that 'tis the ge­neral sentiment of Catholicks that the Pope is Infallible in points of Doctrine. First, I de­mand how many Catholicks he has con­sulted upon this point wherein he is so positive? For I believe they will not stand to his engagement, at least in so conside­rable a number. To father opinions upon all Divines, all Catholicks, the whole Church, &c. are tricks now so common that they will take no longer. Secondly, that incon­siderable number in the Church which defends Personal Infallibility, do they hold the Pope otherwise Infallible than defi­ning Faith ex Cathedra? And will any man assert the Pope's private Letters to the Catholicks of England (for so Eudaemon one of your Fathers terms them) to be De­finitions of Faith? If so, pray what point of Faith is defined by these Breves? can [Page 142] there be a definition of Faith, and nothing defined? Again, was it ever heard, that a Definition of Faith was sent in a Letter to a small number of men, and not directed to the Whole Church? Besides, where are all the Formalities, all the Ceremonies which the de-side men themselves seek for for in Faith-definitions? Is not this to ren­der the Catholick Faith more absurd than her very enemies could wish it?

But, for a more easie dispatch of the Errour of our Catechist, who engages for Popes more than they will for them­selves, I shall shew you what sence some of the greatest and humblest of Popes had of their own frailty in being often surpri­zed by mis-informations; upon which, by an exigent of feeble nature, they were forced to ground themselves. Gregory, tru­ly the great, seeing some to wonder that a Pope should be by misinformation cir­cumvented, replies thus; Why do ye won­der that we are deceived being but men? Have you not observed that David a King who had the Spirit of Prophecy, gave an Un­just Judgment against the Son of Jonathan; Who therefore will think it strange that Im­postors should surprize us sometimes; Us, I say, who are no Prophets? We are over­whelmed [Page 143] with affairs; and our spirits being diverted by so many things are the less at­tentive to any thing in particular, and so may be more easily mistaken in some one thing. Greg. Dialog. 1. Chap. 4. Af­ter him I offer you Alexander the Third, who in his Breve or Letter to the Arch-Bishop of Ravenna (which is now a Law in the Canon) declares thus, If it happen sometimes that we send to your Fraternity such Decrees as you are not satisfied with, trou­ble not your self at it, for you may either with reverence put them in execution, or give us an account why you think you ought not. And we shall take it well at your hands, that you execute not any decree which might bave been procured from us, either by Surprize or Artifice. Cap. Siquando in rescrip. Thus may you see these two great Pre­lates confuting our little Catechist, by own­ing that in their Letters or Breves, they may be Circumvented by Surprize and Artifice.

Personal Infallibility he confesses, is no Article of Faith, but I judge it (saith he) definable. Well then, we are in a fair way of having a new Article of Faith, if the Church will rely upon his judgment. But, if I mistake not, the Church will [Page 144] have more than his pretended Certainty, which he assures us is very great; but, to what degree, whether of a high Proba­bility, Moral, Physical, or Metaphysical Evidence, he knows not: To evince this Certainty (whatever it be) he drops two or three Topicks with this enforcement; Who can think this, who can judge that, who can imagine or surmise another thing? So that, if you do but think, judge, or imagine otherwise, his Topicks are non-plust. And I cannot blame him to touch them onely gently, since he knew both Protestants and Catholicks had often an­swered them beyond reply.

Quitting at last his post, or his pretence to personal infallibility, he brings into a parallell the Spiritual with the Tempo­rall Judge thus; If the Pope may be dis­obey'd in the point of Conscience, why may not Secular Judges be disobey'd in Temporalls? I answer, that neither of them against the Law of God is to be obey'd. And where­as he would conclude, as from a max­im, that a sentence of a Judge passed up­on Misinformation, ought to stand good, untill it be repealed by himself better infor­med, or by a Superiour. Nothing is more certain, than that every sentence of a Judge [Page 145] (be he Pope or King) which is repug­nant to the Law of God, is ipso facto void or null, and that without farther demur. This he tells you is a way to pervert all Judicature, and to place every private per­son above the Judge. My reply shall be, to put him in a Circumstance where his Superiour or General to whom he has vow'd Special Obedience, layes his Commands upon him which in his Judg­ment clearly controul the Law of God; Then I ask him, What he would do in that case? Will he obey? 'twill be a sin against his Conscience, which dictates to him out of the Gospel, That he must obey God rather than man. Will he disobey? That cuts the throat of his own Argument; for then the Objection re­turns upon him, that this is to confound all, and place every private person above the Judge. What this Catechist will do in this case I cannot resolve; but, for my part, I would do what all good men have done upon the like occasion; that is, I would make use of my Reason which God has given me; and, if it be clear un­to me, that my Superiour (be he Pope or King) commands me to sin against the Law of God, I should freely disobey him; [Page 146] but with this submission, to receive what penalty he shall inflict upon me within his sphere; for this the nature of all Government requires. Now, by doing this, I cannot be said to judge the acti­ons of my Superiour with the judgment of Authority; but I make use of the Judg­ment of Discretion, by which I and every man is to govern his Actions. And, if this Rule be observed, there can be no danger of placing a private person above the Judge; for he submits to the punishment of the Judge, and onely prefers God before Man.

His next position is, That the Pope may judge in his own Cause. To this I answer as I did in my last, (though according to his custome he over-leaps it) that, where there is a just cause of Dispute, as he owns there is betwixt the Pope and all Kings in point of Deposing, there is truly party and party; nor can either of them be Judge. For, though both of them will Judge for themselves, because neither will own that the other has a just cause to dispute; yet, if truly there be just cause of dispute, neither of them can be properly Judge; for, if one be Judge, the other must submit to his de­cision, and so can have no just cause to dispute.

Our former discourse has been built upon the supposition that the Pope had authentickly prohibited by his Breves the Oath to be taken; so that what follows, as it is in the dark, so if it were allow'd him for true, 'twould advance nothing to his conclusion. But I cannot let pass his Confidence, in being so positive that Mr. Blackwell published the two Breves of Paul the fifth; whereas, it is evident, both out of Mr. Blackwell's own writings, that he was so far from publishing them, that he severely reprov'd Dr. Worthington for doing it without, nay, against his Order; without which no publication could then be Authentick; and at the same time he writ unto all the Clergy, the Gentry, and Nobility, animating them to take the Oath; declaring it to be a duty incumbent upon them by the Law of God. Nay, the Fathers of your Society themselves (whose importunity had procured from the Pope this irregular power of an Arch-Priest in lieu of a Bishop, thinking to have served them­selves of him when first they presented him to the Pope) have, and do lay it to his charge, that he refused to publish them. And what afterwards was done either by Mr. Birket, the next Arch-priest, or Bishop [Page 148] Smith, is so obscure, and of so little con­cern to the main dispute, that to redeem farther trouble of arguing it with him, I shall rather afford him some grains of allowance, and refer him to my forego­ing discourse, than trifle time, in a mat­ter, which, though it be granted, will a­vail him nothing.

Another instance of mis-information I took from the word Murther'd in the Oath, which was translated by the term Occidi, which is a Generical word, and may be used in a good or bad sence; whereas the word Murther is alwayes the Killing a man against the Law of God. He answers, that, if this were so, then when the Command, non Occides, is trans­lated into this English, Thou shalt not Kill, it were to misinform the People of God's Command. His Inference would be ve­ry proper, if the Church in her Cate­chism did not declare what sort of Kil­ling God did prohibit by his Law, reser­ving to the Magistrate the power of the Sword; and this Answer was given him before, it being an Objection I had made by way of anticipation; for there I re­ply'd, that in the Decalogue the Church is not ty'd up to the plain and common [Page 149] sence of the words, as we are by the Oath. Then he asks, Whether any can think the word Occidere apply'd to the Sacred Persons of Kings, can signifie Chance-medley; if not, sayes he, it implies an Unlawful Killing. How? Is there no mean betwixt Chance-medley, and Unlawful Killing? What thinks he of Killing by the stroke of Ju­stice? Is that either Chance-medley, or Unlawful? Again, what conceit has he of all those Authors cited in my former Letters for defending the Lawfulness of Killing Kings in case of resistance after deposition? Did they not believe and maintain, that deposition did desecrate their persons, and consequently, that Kil­ling them, in case of refusal to be deposed, was lawful? Did they believe it either Chance-medley, or Unlawful? Pray let him peruse the places cited, and then give his Judgment. Since therefore words are not to be understood at his rate, I con­clude that the plain and common sence of the word Murther, which the Oath re­quires we should stand too, is not expres­sed by Occidi; consequently the Pope was imposed upon by the Translator, & the Oath forbidden is not our Oath of Allegiance.

The Pope having by his Breve decla­red [Page 150] that it must be well enough known to us that the Oath without prejudice to Catho­lick Faith and Salvation of our Souls can­not be taken, since it contains many things which are manifestly repugnant to Faith and Salvation, from this declaration I argued thus; that, since we our selves are of all men most conscious to our selves of what we know, or of what we are ignorant (that being a matter of fact, for the most part depending from our sences, and al­wayes concealed within our own Breasts) and, since it is so far from being well e­nough known to us that there is any thing in the Oath repugnant to Faith or Salvation, that neither our selves could ever discover it, nor our Adversaries, whose concern it is to discountenance this Oath, could after so many years industry point it out, from hence I say I conclude that it was not the will of the Pope to o­blige us by his Breves to abstain from ta­king this Oath. And from this knowledge derived from sences and thus concealed, I asserted that every man knows what he knows and also what he knows not much better than any man, even the Pope can tell him. Upon this to render me dis­respectfull to his Holyness he singles out [Page 151] some of my words from their fellows by which they are to subsist, and then declares that I challenge the Pope to make good his words; when it is rather an humble Submission, professing our Ig­norance of what the Pope supposeth us to be knowing. After this, he runs him­self out of Breath with questions alrea­dy answered, as thus, Is not this against Faith, is not that so, is not a Third, Fourth, and Fifth thing so? To all which in their due places I have given my answer. Now to the levelling of his accounts for his Nineth Chapter.

First, having declared the Pope to be the Soveraign Judge of the Lawfulness of an Oath, at the same time he offers to take an Oath in defiance of the Pope's Power. Secondly, he owns the King to be Supream Judge in Temporalls, yet will not allow him to Judge of what is Temporal in the Oath. Thirdly, he would have the Crowns of Princes, the Lives and Fortunes of Subjects to stand or fall from the Single and Bare Opinion of a Pope. Fourthly, he engages for the Ge­nerality of Catholicks without their war­rant, and against truth. Fifthly, he holds the private Letters of a Pope directed to [Page 152] a few men to be as Infallible as a Faith-definition; So that as many periods as are in the Popes Breves, or private Letters, so many new Articles of Faith are coin­ed. Sixthly, he is certain the Pope is Infallible, but with what Certainty he knows not. Seventhly, right or wrong, a­gainst the Law of God, or with it, a Judge, he holds, must be obeyed. Eight­ly, he is injurious to the Memory of Mr. Blackwell the Arch-Priest. Ninethly, he distinguisheth not betwixt Killing and Murthering. Lastly, he makes the Pope Omniscient. Reverend Father, Is this Chri­stian Doctrine.

THE ANSWER To His APPENDIX.

THe Catechist, having printed and publish't his Catechism, he thought fit to send post after it an Appen­dix in a Manuscript, by way, I suppose, of Refutation of it; for I never saw two things more at odds one with another than the Catechism and this Manuscript are. For, in his Nineth Chapter of the Catechism, he gives out that the Gene­ral sence of Catholicks is to hold the Pope to be Infallible in points of Doctrine, and he himself tells you he is certain the Pope is in­fallible in deciding points of doctrine; and, though he owns that 'tis not Faith that the Pope is Infallible, yet he judges [Page 166] it defineable. Now against himself he ar­gues thus in his manuscript; What, sayes he, if the Pope should command a man to swear the deposing Doctrine to be an Article of Faith? he answers himself thus, he ought not to be obeyed; and he gives for his reason, be­cause he is certain 'tis no Article of Faith. Is not this rare dodging with the King and Pope? In the Catechism, Chap. Nineth, he was certain the Pope was Infallible in deciding Faith, the Pope now [in the hypothesis] has declared a point of Doctrin to be of Faith, and commands him to swear it to be so, but is not to be obey­ed; nay, he assures you there is certain­ty against the Pope's infallibility, against which certainty the Pope cannot declare. Is not this to make the Pope infallible and not-infallible when he pleases? Again, both in the Catechism and in the Appendix he de­clares the Pope to be Judge as to the Law­fulness or Unlawfulness of an Oath; This being so, does not the Pope (when he com­mands him to swear the deposing Doctrine to be an Article of faith) by such a com­mand declare that Oath to be Lawful for him to take? Clearly then to say the Pope in that case is not to be obey'd, is to make him judge and no judge as to the [Page 167] Lawfulness of an Oath. Finally, in his Nineth Chapter has he not declared the Pope to be Soveraign Judge in Spiritualls? If then he shall declare it to be an Ar­ticle of Faith that by vertue of his Spiri­tual Power he can depose Kings, ought not this Catechist believe that power or right to be a Spiritual Right, and conse­quently, obey when the Pope shall com­mand him to swear it? In his Appen­dix he tells you, no; for he has a demon­stration against his own Catechism. Rid­dle now my riddle, what's this? Infalli­ble, and not infallible, a Judge and no Judge, a Soveraign and no Soveraign, how can that be? Reverend Father, Are these the Mysteries of Christian Doctrine?