BEFORE I make any Formal Returns to the Positions ad­vanc'd by this Zealous Advo­cate for REASON, I shall endea­vour to fix or state the several Mea­sures and Principles of Human Know­ledge; I mean, with respect to the Objects of it, as it includes the Know­ledge of Objects of Sence, of Corpo­real [Page 2] and Spiritual Substances, of Fi­nite and Infinite, and of Revealed Truths.

And, first, I can freely grant (what has cost our Adversary some Pages to prove,) viz. [ ‘That no­thing in Nature can come to our Knowledge, but by some of these four Means, viz. the Experience of the Senses, the Experience of the Mind, Humane and Divine Revela­tion, Sect. 1. Cap. 3.’]

But yet I think it very absurd, to advance one Rule or Standard for every Part or Branch of Humane Knowledge, and thereupon form Ar­guments, and charge Contradictions and Absurdities, without making the least allowance or distinction, with respect to the nature of the Object, or the methods of knowing it. Here is the Source of all our Adversary's Mistakes and Miscarriages, where­by (as will anon more fully appear) he has cast a Cloud upon Reason, rather than improv'd its Native Lustre and Glory.

And, First, as for the Knowledge of Objects of Sense; it's certain the [Page 3] Mind of Man, the proper Seat as well as Principle of Humane Know­ledge, is here entertain'd by the Ob­jects of the Material World; for, Nothing but Matter in the ordinary course of Natural Knowledge make an Impression upon the outward Senses, so as to transmit, and fix an Idea in the Mind, suitable to the nature of the Ob­ject. And certainly here is the great original Stock of Humane Knowledge; for the Senses are not only the stand­ing Vehicles to all those Ideas, that are lodg'd in the Mind, (since even Faith and Revelation come by Hea­ring) but these very Ideas, if posi­tive, and formed on Things and Substances, are little else but the Re­semblances of material Sensations, or the Ideas of some Object of Sense. However, exalted and refined may be the Ideas of Angels and glorified Spirits, that have things presented to the view of the Mind by an imme­diate Intuition, it's manifest we that are cloath'd with Senses and Matter, and those of a very coarse allay, must have all our Ideas tinged with mate­rial Adumbrations: These are that [Page 4] Glass upon the Mind through which we see darkly, and that wonderful­ly incrassates and disguises the Ima­ges of Things. It's true, in Objects of Sense our Ideas must be compa­ratively clear and exact, because we are seated in the very heart or cen­ter of the material World, where its Objects perpetually crowd in up­on our Senses, and are continually presented to our view and observa­tion: But yet, in Objects of Sense, which we daily see and converse with, we can by no means pretend an adequate Knowledge; for, we cannot comprehend or penetrate in­to their proper Essences, or radical Substances; no, we can go no fur­ther than Properties, Powers, or Fa­culties, that discover themselves in their Effects, strike the Senses, and leave an Impression, whence a di­stinct Idea is form'd. Again, We cannot pretend to discover the true Modes of these Properties, Powers, or Faculties, so as to discern where­in the precise Nature of 'em con­sists; for, at least, we can only re­semble it by some Ideas that are [Page 5] form'd by the noblest of Senses, that of Seeing; thus of Smells, and Tasts, and the like: So that we see the highest Philosophical Exercita­tions, even in matters of Sense, are at last wrap'd up in that we can justly call a MYSTERY. Its true, Ob­jects of Sense, tho' form'd from Ef­fects and Properties, create a very certain and indisputable Knowledge, because confirm'd by daily and con­tinued Observation, and because the proper Objects of that part, which (as before concluded) is not only the Vehicle, but first Elaboratory of all Ideas; I mean the outward Sen­ses. And therefore, in Objects of Sense, we must receive and embrace a Thing as it presents itself to the view of our Senses, since we are assur'd, that GOD has appointed no other way of communicating matters of this nature to Mankind. And to receive an Object of Sense contrary to the Testimony of all our Senses, (tho' upon the pretended Authori­ty of Revelation) must overturn all the Measures and Principles of Hu­mane Knowledge, obliterate the No­tices [Page 6] and Distinctions of Truth and Error, raze the prime Faculties and Motrements of Reason, and reduce Man, the Glory of the Creation, and GOD's Image and Representa­tive, infinitely below the level of Brutes that perish. For this reason we may reject the Doctrine of Tran­substantiation, notwithstanding the highest Pretences to Miracle or My­stery, since it implies a Contradiction of the Testimony of all our Senses in matters of Sense.

But, Secondly, let us consider Hu­mane Knowledge as engag'd about the Objects of the Spiritual World, or Spiritual or Immaterial Beings; for this must very much alter the Scene of Knowledges, and fix it upon new Measures and Principles.

And, 1st, It's indisputably evi­dent, that our Knowledge of Spi­rits is of a mix'd nature, since it takes its rise partly from the Pow­ers of Natural Reason, and partly from Revelation. The Knowledge of God and our own Souls, may in some measure be traced from the Powers of Natural Reason. The [Page 7] Frame of our own Beings, as well as that of the Universe, will instruct us, That there must be an Eternal, All-wise, and All-powerful Mover, agreeable to the Sacred Language: The invisible things of Him from the Creation of the World, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His Eternal Power and Godhead, Rom. i. 20. but as for the Existence of other Beings, we call Spirits, or their Orders and Societies, we must wholly receive it from Revelation. Again; As for the Nature and Ideas of a Spirit, this must certainly rest on the Instructions of Reason and Revelation; and after the best that can be given, God knows, our Attainments are very lame and im­perfect; the excellency of our own Faculties and Operations tell us, That we are acted by a Principle within, that must be highly distinct from Matter, or least, that we see and handle much more from that Great GOD, whose Workmanship is this very Reason that thus di­ctates. This very Argument suffi­ciently [Page 8] instructs us, We ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto Gold or Silver, or Stone gra­ven by Art and Man's Device, Acts xvii. 29.

But now, tho' from good Argu­ments we may conclude, That a Spirit is a Being somewhat distinct from Matter, yet our most exalted Idea will be but a meer Negative, or if Positive, a Resemblance of a refined Aerial kind of Matter; so that our Ideas of a Spirit is much more ab­struse, imperfect, and conjectural than that of a Body, notwithstan­ding the utmost assistances of Re­velation.

And here I'm oblig'd to make some Returns to what this Infalli­ble Reasoner, with the Authority of a Great Man on his side (as he calls him), has deliver'd on the Subject; it amounts to this: We have as clear an Idea of Spirits as Bodies, since both are only to be known by their Properties, and the Properties of a Spirit are as clear as those of a Body. See Sect. 3. Cap. 2. N. 16, 17, 19. But, with Submissi­on [Page 9] to the Infallible Chair, though some Properties which belong to those Beings we call Spirits, are clearly known and agreed upon, yet they are not so many, nor yet so distinguishing as those of Bodies; for, besides the Properties of parti­cular Bodies, that distinguish each other, there are Properties certain­ly known, that belong to a Body as a Body, and distinguish it from Spirit, and every Being that can be imagined; such are extension of Parts, and a Faculty of possessing a Place in proportion to 'em. These are for the most part Objects of Sense, and Self-evident; but we can­not decipher or determine any pecu­liar Properties that belong to a Spirit as a Spirit, and distinguish it from Body or Matter, and every thing else. We may indeed conceive Spirits as Finite Beings, by the resemblance of Bodies, and consequently make 'em exist in a place, and possess sometimes one place, and sometimes another; but we can form no Idea how they exist in places, as we do of Bodies. As for Thinking, Reason­ing, [Page 10] and Willing, these seem to be too remote, to be the distinguish­ing Properties of a Spiritual Sub­stance as such, being Faculties that seem to slow after its Radical or Original Properties are given. I am sure they cannot be so in the Opinion of my Author's Great Man, since in one place he tells us, [It's impossible without Revelation to discover (whether Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of mat­ter fitly dispos'd) a Power to per­ceive or think.—And again, I see no Contradiction in it, That the first Eternal Thinking, Being, or Omnipotent Spirit, should, if he pleas'd, give to certain Systems of created sensless Matter, put toge­ther as he thinks fit, some degrees of Sense, Perception, and Thought.] Lock's Human Vnderstanding, Lock 's Human Vnderst. lib. 4. cap. 3. Lib. 4. Cap. 3. N. 6. And therefore I think it appears, there's a vast Difference between the Knowledge of Spirits and Bodies; insomuch that we may justly pronounce, That no positive Ideas can be formed of Spirits, as Spiritual Substances, but what carry [Page 11] the resemblances of Matter in 'em; other Ideas must be form'd by com­paring 'em with Matter, and pro­nouncing what they are not, rather than what they are.

But, Thirdly, let us examin the Measures and Extent of Humane Knowledge, with respect to the Ob­ject, as it is Finite or Infinite. As for the Knowledge of Finite Ob­jects, an Estimate may be taken from what has been deliver'd on the two preceeding Arguments, the Subject of which being chiefly Fi­nite Objects: The present Enqui­ry then is, after the Knowledge of Infinite Objects; and here certain­ly the Nature of the Being that thinks and knows, will determine the Case, I mean, demonstrate the Imperfection of Humane Knowledge; for it's an Absurdity in Terms, as well as in the Nature of the Thing, to imagine that a Finite Mind should gain a perfect Comprehension of an In­finite Being; insomuch, that it seems no Presumption to affirm, That GOD, by vertue of His Omnipo­tence, after He hath instated us in [Page 12] the Beatifick Vision, and discover'd things that Eye hath not seen, nor Ear heard, nor Heart conceiv'd; or, in a word, after we have seen Him as He is, cannot possess us with an adequate Idea of His Immense and Infinite Being: So that with respect to the Godhead we must affirm, That our Ideas are made up of Negatives, and consequently with Clemens Alex. affirm, That we ra­ther know God by concealing what He is not, than what He is: ^* Or, at least, if we attempt any positive Conceptions, we are forced to sha­dow 'em forth by some Finite Ideas which we have taken up, and are already implanted in us. Thus the Divine Attribute of Wisdom we are forc'd to resemble by a Faculty of Discerning and Comprehending, infinitely surpassing the Sphere of Humane Knowledge. Thus the Im­mensity of God, by a vast space, or an Idea that is without Bounds or Limits, or is not to be circumscrib'd. [Page 13] Thus Eternity, by an endless Suc­cession of Time. Thus we see, af­ter our nicest Conceptions, and af­ter the most accurate Characters and Descriptions from Revelation it self, we are forced to call in Fi­nite Objects, and measure the Bles­sed Attributes of our Creator by Finite Ideas; an Undertaking so un­worthy of him, that it seems to be a piece of petty Larceny, or rather a lesser sort of Idolatry, as 'tis a kind of Representation of the Invi­sible GOD, by things that are seen, by a kind of Gold, or Wood, or Stone, graved in the shallow Un­derstandings of Impotent Men. Here our Weakness, our Blindness, plainly discovers it self;▪ for tho' Knowledge in Finite Objects may appear bright and shining, here it must suffer an Eclipse, and lye con­founded in depth of Mystery; and, in a word, humbly make St. Paul's Recognition: O the depth of the Riches of the Wisdom, and Power, and Immenseness of God! how unsearcha­ble, &c.

[Page 14] But, Fourthly, let us descend to the last Stage of Humane Knowledge, I mean that about matters of Re­velation. And, first, it's certain that pure Matters of Revelation are things of which the Mind, by its own intrinsick Light, can form no Ideas; and consequently we cannot pretend to know any thing more of them, than GOD in a reveal'd way is pleas'd to communicate. It's true, He seems to be obliged to communicate Himself in such a man­ner, that His Revelations, at least, may bear a resemblance to some of those Ideas we have already con­ceiv'd, or by the Power of Natu­ral Reason can attain to. Thus does He reveal a Saviour that is GOD-Man, he's oblig'd to ascribe such Characters of Divinity to him, as are agreeable to the reveal'd Characters of the Godhead, and those Ideas we can form of it; and in like manner as to his Humanity; for otherwise I cannot conceive how any reveal'd Truth can be imprinted on the Mind, without Special Inspiration. But then, on the other hand, when [Page 15] God publisheth a reveal'd Truth in such Characters as suffice to inform us what he intends by it, viz. a Savi­our that is GOD-Man, or the like, he is not oblig'd (neither is it any way requisite to the reception of a reveal'd Truth) to demonstrate the modus of the Vnion of the two Natures: First, Because the Subject of Revelation being Matters not attainable by Reason, and GOD the Author of them, as long as we have an Idea of the thing, or an Idea of what GOD proposes to be believ'd, the modus of it is to be placed on the Infinite Power and Veracity of God. Secondly, Because a leading Design of Revelation being to establish a Confidence in God's Power and Ve­racity, in order to an absolute Obe­dience and Worship, He did not in­tend to make us Philosophers, but reveal'd what was useful and neces­sary, and directs us to adore, when we cannot comprehend.

From what has been deliver'd we may form two or three Infe­rences; 1st, With respect to this last Argument, Whatever our Attain­ments [Page 16] may be in Matters of Sense and Natural Reason, it appears, that pure Matters of Revelation lye at a great distance from us; and con­sequently Knowledge cannot pene­trate much beyond the Surface, since they are not only things in their own nature profound and in­tricate, but all our Discoveries rest on the good Will and Pleasure of GOD, that communicates 'em. And therefore, if Revelation itself tells us, we know but in part, or im­perfectly, we may safely affirm it, and place all Difficulties on the Im­perfections of Humane Knowledge, or the Depths and Mysteriousness of Reveal'd Truths. 2dly, It's a notorious Absurdity to argue from Ideas of Objects of Sense, or Ma­terial Objects against Immaterial ones; or Finite against Infinite, much more against Reveal'd ones. For it manifestly appears, that the Measures of Humane Knowledge are to be taken from each respe­ctive Object; for, as every Object hath a distinct Essence or Nature, so it hath distinct Properties and [Page 17] Modes peculiar to its Nature; and the Ideas we conceive of the one, may not reach or measure the o­ther. This is even so clear, that even in Properties that are common to several Objects, such as Spirits and Bodies, when apply'd to their respective Objects, carry no manner of Resemblance to each other.

Thus it's an inseparable Proper­ty of a Spirit and Body to occupy a Place, and yet the manner of existing in a Place is, no doubt, vastly different; insomuch, that I cannot find how any Ideas of the Vbi of Bodies can conclude any thing against that of Spirits, much less measure or define it. And, by a Parity of Reason, we may say as much of the Unity of a Body, and the Unity of an Infinite Spi­rit; for the Unity of the Godhead or the Divine Essence may be pre­serv'd, and yet communicate it self to Three Personal Subsistences: and it must be absurd to deny this, be­cause it will not comport with our common Ideas of the Unity of a Body. 3dly, In Matters of Revela­tion, [Page 18] it's as absurd to Argue against Reveal'd Truths, when the thing re­veal'd is describ'd in such a manner, that we may know what is intended by it, because we cannot comprehend the Modus of it; since this would oblige us to reject several things, even in Objects of Sence, that are hitherto Vnquestionable. What I have hi­therto deliver'd, is by way of Prin­ciple; and I shall stand by it as such, in defiance of the utmost At­tempts of our assuming Reasoner; and having laid this Foundation, I promise my self Success, in unravel­ing his Arguments and Positions.

And first, to take him in the order we find him, before he gives you a State of the Question, he begins with the main Burden of his Song, and intro­duces you with some Sarcastical Re­flections, upon the Managements, and Maxims of Divines, about Reli­gion. As if the generality of Chri­stians had no Notion of Religion, but Mystery; and Divines unanimously owned their Ignorance about it, [ Whilst they gravely tell us, we must adore what we cannot comprehend;] and [Page 19] yet majesteriously obtrude contra­dictory Comments, as infallible De­monstrations of an unfathomable Mystery.

It's visible this whole Paragraph is spent upon the Clergy; for, who are to account for Mens Ignorance or absurd Notions in Religion, but those whose Business it is to in­struct and remove 'em? Again; Who are to answer for Contradi­ctions, but the Clergy, that resolve all into unfathomable Mystery, and yet by their peremptory Comments pretend to unravel all to a De­monstration? This is a Strain of impregnated Malice, that runs thro' the whole Book; where the Cler­gy, by Insinuation, Consequence, or downright Assertions, are charg'd with Imposture, as if they had in­dustriously combin'd to resolve all Religion into Mystery, even to the carrying on of Contradictions: For in one place he makes it an Asylum or Shelter to their Ignorance; in another, an Artifice of Usurpation, to oblige the Laity to admit no­thing as a Branch of their Creed, [Page 20] till it hath been ratified from their Confessor's Chair. In a word, he represents 'em as Introducers of Deism; he might have added, as Subverters of all Religion too, since he makes 'em labour in nothing but Absurdities and Contradictions. And now you have the Character or Temper of the Man, and see where his poyson'd Arrows are di­rected. I shall with Patience, or rather Contempt, pass by all Stri­ctures of this kind, and content my self with the Confidence of wiping off his Calumnies by confuting his Positions. To return then,

As for the Comments of some Divines, neither the Church, nor Body of the Clergy are to account for the Indiscretions which Heat or Passion has surpriz'd some of them into; but, I'm perswaded, the Com­ments of others will stand the Test of Reason and Argument, to establish those Truths we call MYSTERIES, better than those of his Faction or Perswasion, to shake or overturn 'em.

As for the Maxim that instructs [Page 21] us to Adore what we cannot Compre­hend, I think it's extreamly proper where we can prove a Mystery; for if God recommends an Article of Faith that exceeds the Comprehen­sion of a Finite Mind, we may rest satisfied with an imperfect Idea, (even tho' it be no more than what is needful to point out to us what God intends by it) and then sur­render our Judgments to His Infi­nite Veracity for the rest: A consi­derable Instance of Obedience (even the Obedience of Faith) as well as Adoration.

After this, he presents us with the Opinions of some particular Per­sons, or, at least, the Fictions of his own Brain, concerning the Autho­rity of Fathers, Councels, and Scri­pture, and the Rules of interpret­ing it: But I'm concern'd to assign what Deference is to be paid to Fa­thers or Councels, or what Rules to be observ'd in interpreting Scripture, till he thinks fit to charge our Con­stitution with Error in these matters. This is foreign to the Argument we are now engag'd in. The next [Page 22] thing he presents us with, is, Two Opinions of nameless Parties con­cerning the Use of Reason in Reli­gion, and the Sence of Scripture; and, at last, makes all sides (that differ from his Notions) joyn in this Position, (for I can put no other gloss on his words, when he affirms) That both from different Principles agree, [ That several Doctrines of the New Testament belong no further to the Enquiries of Reason, than to prove them Divinely reveal'd; and, that they are properly Mysteries still, Ib. N. 6.] That there are Doctrines in the New Testament that may be properly call'd Mysteries still, I do not question; but I can evince in the Sequel of this Tract. But I cannot find where the Church of England has declar'd herself, That Reason hath nothing to do with some Reveal'd Doctrines, but only to prove them divinely reveal'd; for, certainly, Faith it self is a ratio­nal Assent to a Divine Truth; and Reason will not only be concern'd to en­quire and prove, whether God hath deliver'd it, but to form some Idea [Page 23] (tho' an imperfect one) of the Nature of this Truth; at least, such an Idea as will convince us what it is God pro­poses to our Belief.

Else we assent to we know not what. But after the utmost Re­searches of Reason, our very Rea­son may inform us, that there may be a great deal in this Truth or Doctrine, with respect to the Na­ture or Modes of the thing, which She can by no means comprehend, and consequently may still be justly accounted a Mystery.

And now we come to his own Po­sitions: [ On the contrary we hold,— That nothing reveal'd, whether as to its manner or existence, is more ex­empted from its Disquisitions, than the ordinary Phoenomena of Nature; and that there is nothing in the Gospel con­trary to Reason, nor above it, and that no Christian Doctrine can be properly called a MYSTERY. N. 7. This he pro­poses as the State of the Question, agreeable to the Title of his Book, and consequently all that follows is only a confirmation or making good [Page 24] of this Position. I must confess, I should be so fair to him, as to wait his Arguments; but because nothing shall stick upon the Reader, I shall make something of a return to such Decretory Assertions, in the order we find them:

And, First, this great Reasoner seems to play the Sophister, and ex­press himself in a very ambiguous manner: He tells us, That no Re­veal'd Truth is exempted from the Disquisitions of Reason. And truly, if he intends no more, than that the sublimest Reveal'd Truths may be examin'd by Reason▪ as far as she is able to comprehend them, we shall entirely joyn with him; for Reve­lation is thus far an Address to the Reason of Mankind, and she may lawfully endeavour to discover and conceive as much of their manner and existence as possible; Provided she does not reject what she cannot com­prehend, and that too upon this very Argument, Because she cannot compre­hend the whole Manner and Existence of them.

Thus far Reason may be concern'd, [Page 25] and yet Reveal'd Truths may be just­ly said to be above Reason, and my­sterious, and consequently his Positi­ons do by no means answer his De­sign, which is to prove, That No­thing is mysterious, or above Rea­son.

But if he intends, that Matters of Revelation, both with respect to their Manner and Existence, may be scann'd and comprehended by Rea­son, as easily as the Phoenomena of Nature; this we utterly deny, and with very good reason too: 1st, Be­cause there's no connexion in the Consequence, the Phoenomena of Na­ture are often Objects of Sence, and of a finite nature: But there are re­veal'd matters that are in their very frame spiritual and infinite, and con­sequently not to be comprehended by a finite Mind or Reason, much less with that ease and clearness that Objects of Sence are convey'd to the Mind. Again, Matters of Sence are knowable and comprehensible by the Powers of Natural Reason; but there are Matters of Revelation that are not only incomprehensible in [Page 26] their own nature, but knowable no further than God is pleas'd to com­municate or impart to us. This is clear from what has been already laid down and concluded, and there­fore this can be no Consequence; the Phoenomena of Nature are easily com­prehensible, therefore all matters of Revelation are so. This is so absurd, that I do not question but I shall make it appear in the Sequel of this Discourse, ‘That there are some Matters of Revelation, which if scann'd by Ideas of Objects of Sence, carry the appearance of Contradictions; and yet this can be no Argument against the Truth of 'em, or that we are mistaken in the purport of the Holy Ghost, (as the Socinians would have it) when what we contend for is represent­ed in the clearest Characters and Descriptions.’ And yet, this is the top of our Adversary's Reasonings. But, 2dly, as for Reveal'd Matters being mysterious, or above Reason, it's already concluded, That the radical Essence of Objects of Sence, and much more the Modes of their Properties, [Page 27] or their Existence, are above the Comprehension of Reason: If so, what hath been deliver'd upon Mat­ters of Revelation, will oblige us to conclude, against our Adversary, ‘That they cannot be fully compre­hended in their Nature or Exi­stence, much less in the Modus of it; and consequently, that they are in the highest sence mysterious, and above Reason.’

But to proceed, in the next place he entertains you, pursuant to the Notions of his great Man, with a large account what Reason is, and what she is not; the Means of In­formation, and Ground-Perswasion: And I must freely own, that I can for the most part agree with him, and his great Man; at least it is not re­quisite to enter upon a nice Exami­nation of every Paragraph, because I find he makes no particular Appli­cation of what he has so elaborately delivered in several Chapters, to prove his main Design. He tells us, Chap. 4. Sect. 1. [ That the Ground of Perswasion is Evidence, and Evidence he defines, an exact Conformity of our [Page 28] Ideas, or Thoughts, with their Objects, or Things we think upon.] The De­scription, I think, is well enough; but all this concludes nothing to prove what he contends for, viz. That nothing is above Reason; for the imperfect Ideas of Infinite and Incomprehensible Beings, must car­ry a Resemblance, or Conformity to the Object, or the Characters of an Incomprehensible Being; and yet it does not follow, but our Ideas are imperfect, and that there is a great deal in the Object, of which we can­not form any clear Idea. Indeed, if this were not so, he might justly infer, That there's nothing above Reason in Revelation. In a word, since he hath so industriously stated the Nature of Reason and Humane Knowledge, he should have proved, That there are no degrees of Evidence, or Knowledge, with respect▪ to the Na­ture of the Object, or Means of Infor­mation: That we have as clear and compleat an Idea of Infinite Beings as Finite, of an Infinite Spirit as an Ob­ject of Sence: That reveal'd Objects occurr by the same way as Objects of [Page 29] Sence do; or, That the Extent of re­veal'd Knowledge, does not depend on the Good Will and Pleasure of God, in communicating what he pleaseth on eve­ry Object. This would have clear'd off all Dispute, and proved what he thinks he's able to evince, viz. That the Evidence of all the Ideas of the Operations of the Mind, is as infalli­ble as our own Being, Cap. 4. N. 14. That what is reveal'd in Religion, may be as easily comprehended, and found as consistent with our common Notions, as what we know of Wood or Stone, of Air, Water, or the like, Sect. 3. Cap. 2. N. 12.] Or, in a word, that there's nothing in Religion, or Revelation mysterious, or above Reason. The two latter of these Parodoxes will receive such Replies as are proper in the Sequel of this Discourse; but I cannot pass the first without a few Remarks: And, to put the most favourable Construction on an Ambiguous Assertion, I pre­sume, he affirms, That the Evidence of our Ideas which we form of the seve­ral Acts or Operations of the Mind, (viz. Thinking, Contemplating, Know­ing [Page 30] or Comprehending) are as infallible as that of our Beings. This is a Maxim advanc'd to prove, That we are to have the same Evidence in all speculative Ideas, and consequently in all Ideas of pure Matters of Reve­lation; for this is his Application of it: [ Let us now but strictly require this Evidence in all the Agreements and Disagreements of our Ideas in Things meerly speculative, &c. Ib.]▪ To shew the Weakness or Inconclusiveness of his Arguments, and the Falseness of his Positions, I shall instance in the general Act or Operation of the Mind, that of Thinking. And,

First, If he intends no more than that we have an Evidence (that we think, when we actually think, or that we have a Faculty to think) as infal­lible as that of our Being, I will easi­ly joyn with him: But, can this be an Argument, that all our Ideas of Speculative Objects, particularly of all Matters of Revelation, (that are form'd by Thinking) rest upon an Evidence as clear as that of our Be­ing? Again, If he contends for an Idea of the Nature of Thinking, that [Page 31] carries an Evidence in it, as clear and infallible as that of our Being; I say, we cannot form an Idea of the Na­ture of Thought, but by retreating to some particular Instance or Object of Thought, and reflecting how the Mind exercises itself upon it; and before we can form a perfect Idea of the Nature of Thought, we must compre­hend or discern the manner of the performance, and this will carry us into a great many Difficulties and Conjectures. We may indeed con­clude, that Thought requires the ap­plication of the Object to the Mind, or rather the application of the Mind to the Object, which may justly be called Attention. Thus far the Idea of Thinking is clear and evident: But then, if we enquire into the manner how this or that Object is commu­nicated or apply'd to the Mind, this seems to be inconceivable, even in Objects of Sence; for, who can pre­tend to describe how Material Ob­jects are imprinted on an Immaterial Soul? Therefore we may conclude, that the Ideas we can form of the Nature of Thinking, and consequently [Page 32] of the Operations of the Mind, do not carry an Evidence in 'em as in­fallible as that of our Being.

But further; Admit we, that we could describe the precise Modus of the Nature of Thinking, and conse­quently had an Idea that carries as much Evidence in it as that of our Existence, it's absurd to conclude, that the Mind can form Ideas of the highest Speculations equally evident and infallible. The Consequence, in plain terms, is no other than this, Because the Evidence of the Ideas of one particular Object is infallible, therefore the Evidence of the Ideas of every Object is so. And certain­ly this is a Position that must pro­nounce all our Ideas equally clear and perfect, and the Means of In­formation infallible, and consequent­ly there can be no Objects falsly re­presented to the Mind, nor no Ideas false or imperfect. This is Mystery with a witness, or rather Positions that in his own Language are, [ The Primary and Vniterical Origin of all his Errors, Ib.] But, I think, he suf­ficiently confutes himself in the fol­lowing [Page 33] Paragraphs, when he pro­nounces some things dubious and ob­scure, and allows false Ideas may be contracted by Precipitancy or Inat­tention, by Affection and Preposses­sion, N. 18.

And now for the Second, Sect. II. where he introduces us with a Description of what is contrary to Reason, [viz. What is evidently repugnant to clear and distinct Ideas, or to our common Notions, is contrary to Reason.] Now truly this I think is a very lame, im­perfect, or at least fallacious Descrip­tion, unless it be ballanced with some Limitations and Restrictions.

As first, It can only hold in Ob­jects of the same Species, or Nature; Thus we can only argue from Objects of Sence, against Objects of Sence, from Finite against finite, and from Mat­ters of Revelation against pretended Matters of Revelation: For its the greatest Absurdity in Nature, to con­clude any thing against any revealed Truth, or Doctrine, whose Object is purely Spiritual, and absolutely Infi­nite; because it doth not accord with [Page 34] our Ideas in Objects of Sence; I'm sure the Holy Ghost instructs us better, in obliging us to compare Spiritual Things with Spiritual. A sufficient Inhibi­tion truly against discarding reveal'd Truths by any other Ideas, then what are formed from antecedent Notices of Revelation.

Thus for our Saviour's Divinity, before we yield an Assent to it, it's requisite the Characters and Proper­ties of the Godhead, which are in the Books of Revelation ascrib'd to the Father, with respect to the God­head, shou'd be ascrib'd to the Son But then when this is done, it's ab­surd to reject this great Truth, as contrary to Reason, upon the force of an unreasonable Consequence formed by comparing the incompre­hensible Godhead with Objects of Sence.

Thus the Son cannot be God, be­cause it must destroy the Unity of the Godhead; for the Unity of the God­head must be destroy'd: Why? Be­cause such Unity and Plurality can never be admitted in Objects of Sence, and consequently not in the [Page 35] sublimest Matters of Revelation. But what is this but to prostitute the Glory and Majesty of the Invisible and Incomprehensible Godhead, by the vilest Representations? What is it but a making him like Gold, Wood or Stone, or Things graven by Man's Art. Certain I am, such Maxims as these are the highest Contradicti­ons to Reason; for if they might take place, it must shake the Foun­dation of all Revelation, even those lively Characters which the Word of God hath given of the Godhead: If they must be scann'd, or measured by common Notions, or Ideas that re­sult from Objects of Sence.

Secondly, Before we pronounce any thing contrary to Reason, we must be sure that we have a clear and perfect Comprehension of the Thing; for tho' our Ideas that are seemingly repug­nant to it, be never so clear, how shall we judge of the Repugnancy, as long as we cannot pretend to a perfect Idea on both sides? This I'm sure is a very reasonable Injunction, between Objects of Sence, and Mat­ters of Revelation; so that if God [Page 36] hath delivered any revealed Truth, and by comparing it with the Ideas and Characters of other reveal'd Truths, we must conclude, he in­tended such a particular thing, and at the same time discern the Incom­prehensibleness of it; insomuch that we cannot form an adequate Idea; it's absurd to reject it, because this imperfect Idea will not comport with certain clear Ideas in Objects of Sence. ‘ Here if any Difficulties, Ab­surdities, or Contradictions arise, Rea­son will direct us to place 'em upon the Weakness of our Vnderstandings, or our imperfect way of comprehending such unfathomable Objects; and with St. Paul, engage us to cry out, Who is sufficient for these things?’ And now if my Adversary will add these Li­mitations to his Definition (as I'm perswaded he'll be forced to do) I do not question, but I can wipe off all the Absurdities produced in the following Chapter, at least by shew­ing their Impertinence to the Case before us. And on this account, I pass by 'em, as well as because there's nothing in 'em, that affects any thing [Page 37] already delivered, but either con­firms, or may be fairly solved by it. I therefore proceed to his Argument, Sect. 2. Cap. 1. N. 4.

The first thing I shall insist upon is, [ That if any Doctrine of the New Testament be contrary to Reason, we have no manner of Idea of it: To say for instance, that a Ball is White and Black at once.] Here he suffici­ently discovers himself; he tells us before, That whatever is repugnant to common Notions, is contrary to Reason; and what his common No­tions are, the Instance before us, suf­ficiently informs; that is, in plain English, whatever does not comport with the most trite Ideas of Objects of Sence is contrary to Reason; and therefore the most sublime revealed Truths (whose Objects are Spirits, and Infinite Spirits, and consequent­ly the Ideas we can pretend to, must be highly imperfect) because we cannot adjust them with the most common Ideas of Sence, are contra­ry to Reason. But the Absurdity of this Assertion, I hope, I have suffici­ently exploded.

[Page 38] But, to deliver my own Sentiments of matters of this nature once for all, I do believe there's an eternal and universal Harmony in Reason, as well as things both created and un­created. The Reason of Mankind is certainly an immediate Transcript of Infinite Reason, and all the Coun­cels, Decrees, and Declarations of Heaven are the Dictates of Infinite Reason, and the Reason of Mankind must be establish'd upon the unalte­rable Rules or Measures of Infinite Reason; and therefore there can be no Ideas of Infinite Truths or Ob­jects (provided they are compleat and perfect, such as GOD can con­ceive of Himself) which really con­tradict the Rules and Measures of Humane Reason, if she were enabl'd to comprehend 'em as clearly as her Maker.

But yet, I think, I have made it appear, that after all the Researches of Reason, there are reveal'd Objects of which we can form but very im­perfect Ideas, both with respect to their Nature, Existence, and Modus, and yet we may form such an Idea as [Page 39] instructs us what GOD intends we should believe.

From hence we may conclude, ‘That as their nature is peculiarly di­stinguisht from all other Beings, so is the Modus of their Existence:’ So that it's highly absurd to deny our Assent to the Truth of it, because we can form no Idea that will com­port with those we have form'd on Objects of Sence, and consequently ad­judge it to be contrary to Reason. ‘This is a Contradiction to the Eternal Laws of right Reason, which, in Cases of this nature, di­rect us to fix the Absurdity or Con­trariety on the Imperfections of our Understanding, or the False­ness of the Rule, in judging Mat­ters of Revelation by Objects of Sence.’

In a word, from what hath been said, we may, in express terms, af­firm, That we can form imperfect Ideas of Matters of Revelation, so far as to know what GOD proposes to our Belief: And yet, when we proceed to examine the Modus of their Existence, we cannot reconcile [Page 40] it with the Ideas of Objects of Sence; and, for all this, we must not pro­nounce any thing of this nature con­trary to Reason; or esteem those im­perfect Ideas, no Ideas at all.

Give me leave to illustrate this matter in an Instance which the So­cinian chuses to advance his own Hy­pothesis, by exploding it; I mean, the Divinity of our Saviour: We affirm him to be possess'd with the Fulness of the Godhead, because his Divinity is describ'd in Characters that are peculiar to the Godhead, and such as correspond with those Ideas of the Godhead as are form'd by the Assistance of Revelation. He rejects his Divinity, because he proceeds further, and examins the Modus of its Existence, with respect to the U­nity of the Godhead, and its Union with Humane Nature; and there­upon forms a Modus by some com­mon Ideas or Notions, and then compares it with other Ideas of the same rank and quality, and rejects those Ideas which Scripture has gi­ven us of his Divinity, by pronoun­cing such a Revelation absurd and [Page 41] contrary to Reason, because the Modus of its Existence with the Uni­ty of the Godhead and Humanity, (a thing form'd and hammer'd out of his own shallow Understanding,) does not comport with common I­deas of Objects of Sence. Here, I think, is a Complication of Absur­dities, or things that run counter to the eternal Measures of right Rea­son; the Godhead of our Blessed Sa­viour is rejected and deny'd, as con­trary to Reason, not because we want Revelation for it, since we may read it in the clearest Characters; but we must expound these away, 1st, Because we cannot comprehend the Modus of its Existence (a thing that often exceeds our Comprehen­sion) even in Philosophical Disquisi­tions. 2dly, Because we cannot form a Modus that comports with com­mon Ideas or Notions in Objects of Sence. ‘But, if Consequences of this nature are suffer'd to take place, against such legible Characters of Divinity, it must overturn those Ideas of a GOD, which Revelation and Natural Reason hath furnish'd [Page 42] us with, since the Characters of both are equally clear and un­deniable.’

I have dwelt too long on this Ar­gument, but not without Design, be­cause I would not be oblig'd to make a formal Return to every little Pas­sage that runs against us, or dispels every Speck of a Cloud that's rais'd upon Sophistry or False Arguing: I am sure I have offer'd enough to take off the Force of what he hath suggested in the following Paragraph, N. 5. for, he's a compleat Conjurer, raises his own Devil, and then lays it, frames an Objection, and gives his own Answer to it; it's this: [ If any will think to evade the Difficulty, by saying, That the Ideas of certain Do­ctrines may be contrary indeed to com­mon Notions, yet consistent with 'em­selves, —he's but just where he was.] Now, I have already deliver'd the Measures of forming reveal'd Ideas, not by comparing 'em with Objects of Sence, but Spiritual Things with Spiritual: I will admit, indeed, it may be done by common Notions; if he'll restrain his common Noti­ons, [Page 43] as he does in the close of his Pa­ragraph, or, at least, with some Im­provement added to 'em; for I can freely subscribe: [ That we cannot otherwise discern His Revelations, but by their conformity with our Natural Notices of Him,] GOD he means; or, at least, those Improvements we receive of Him from Revelation. And in this sence our Saviour's Divi­nity is not contrary to common No­tions; for we can form an Idea of it agreeable to those Characters which Revelation and Natural Reason gives us of the Godhead; but, then the Difficulty lies in comprehending the Union and Existence of the two Na­tures together, which we call the Modus of the thing; and this, we say, is not to be measur'd by com­mon Notices, for, to a Finite Mind, it's Incomprehensible: ‘But then it is not a Doctrine of Christianity, that we should comprehend it; much less is it a Doctrine of Reason or Christianity that we should ex­clude or cashier the clearest Cha­racters of our Saviour's Divinity or Incarnation from being a Doctrine [Page 44] of Christianity, because we cannot comprehend the manner of the U­nion of the two Natures, nor form any clear Idea of it, at least, such as will comport with common No­tions.’ It's true, we may resemble it, as it is done in one of our Creeds. As the reasonable Soul and Flesh is One Man, so GOD and Man is One CHRIST; but we do not advance a Similitude into a compleat Idea, or an Article of Faith.

But, to offer a word or two more, if this method of Arguing may be admitted, I cannot conceive but it must explode the Belief of the Soul, or any Principle distinct from Mat­ter, because we cannot fix the Modus of its Union, or conceive an Idea of the manner of its incessant Inter­courses with the Body.

To conclude this Argument, from what is said, I think here's enough to defeat our Adversary's Triumphs, even over his own Objection; for, we may safely affirm, That as the Nature of the Godhead is distin­guish'd by Properties peculiar to it self, so we may justly conclude, that [Page 45] it has a manner of Existence with Humanity so peculiar to itself, that we must not pretend to comprehend it, by comparing it with Objects of Sence; and yet we can freely own, that there's neither Necessity nor Possibility of its being comprehend­ed by us, or of determining what is the precise Modus of it.

And thus much of his Notion of Self-consistence. And as for his Sar­castical prophane way of Arguing, when he tells us, That Four may be cal­led Five in Heaven; he might know, ‘That Numbers are only empty Deno­minations, and no Arguments to be form'd from 'em, but as apply'd to Things; and then, if we consider Heavenly Objects with respect to the manner of their Existence, a Vnity and a Trinity may be con­sistent, for any thing he knows to the contrary.’ And this is sufficient to prevent any modest Man from pronouncing Contradictions upon such unfathomable Truths, by mea­suring their Modus by Common No­tions, things that exceed our Com­prehension as much as they are be­sides [Page 46] the Business of our Curiosity or Faith. Here we may discern the Origin of his ill Reasonings to be want of distinguishing Things, I mean the Being of a Thing, and the Manner of its Existence, with respect to itself, or as 'tis united to something else.

From hence I pass to N. 9. for no­thing intervenes that directly con­cerns the present Controversie, or, at least, has not had a Reply to it. And here I cannot joyn with him, when he affirms, That a seeming Contradi­ction, (even in Matters of Revelation) is to us as much as a real one; for, I think, the Difference is palpable in all cases, but especially in Contradicti­ons upon the Nature of Things; for ‘We call that a seeming Contradicti­on, when there's a Repugnancy dis­covers itself, but we have not a clear and perfect Conviction of it:’ And, I suppose, this must arise for want of a clear and perfect Idea of each Term, or rather Object, of the Con­tradiction; and, till this is gain'd, Reason must suspend, and neither determine that she is in the right or wrong, till fresh Evidence offers to [Page 47] turn the Scale. But now, a real Con­tradiction, or rather a clear Contradi­ction, (for it should pass under this Name with respect to our knowledg of it) is, ‘When we have a clear and unquestionable Idea of both parts of it, or both Objects, and thence conceive an irreconcilable Repugnancy.’ But now, in mat­ters of pure Revelation, whose Na­ture is spiritual and infinite, I can­not see how Reason can direct us to pronounce or determine real or clear Contradictions between them and Common Notions, because we can­not pretend to an adequate or clear Idea; I mean, that which is compa­ratively so, with respect to those of Objects of Sence, and consequently cannot decree what real Repugnancy lies between them: And therefore, if seeming Contradictions or Difficul­ties arise, by comparing reveal'd Truths with common Ideas or Notions, Rea­son cannot (as this Author would have it) pronounce a real Contradi­ction, and suspect there can be no re­veal'd Truth, especially when there are the clearest Characters of the [Page 48] thing corresponding with Ideas of the same nature. ‘Here Reason must oblige us to place the Contradicti­ons on our Inabilities in compre­hending Matters of this nature, and yield an Assent upon the Authority of Infinite Power and Veracity:’ For when Revelation has set forth the thing in the clearest Characters, and the very same in which the fun­damental Article of all Revelation is represented to us, I mean that of the Godhead, if seeming Contradictions must be suffer'd to discard it, it's im­possible we can yield any Assent to the Being of a GOD; for, where the Characters are as clear for one as the other, and both rest on the same Au­thority, that of Revelations to dispute the one, must call in question the other.

Proceed we, in the next place, to consider what is deliver'd on the Au­thority of Revelation, he means that which is Divine, Cap. 2. N. 11. And here I cannot be reconcil'd to the Distinction he gives us: [ Revelation is not a necessitating Motive of Assent; [Page 49] but a Mean of Information.] Now, truly I can see no Absurdity in say­ing, That the same thing may be a Mean of Information, and a Motive of an Assent too, for an Information carries an Assent along with it pro­portionable to the Credit or Autho­rity of the Informer. Now Revela­tion is certainly a Mean of Informa­tion, since it presents us with new Objects, which Natural Reason could never discover: But, besides this, it is an Information that proceeds from Infinite Veracity, attended with Infi­nite Power, Wisdom, and Goodness: Herein it's distinguish'd from Hu­man Revelation; And therefore, when once we are assur'd (so as to yield a firm Assent) that such a particular Article is reveal'd, it becomes the most necessita­ting Motive of Assent; I mean, to the Truth of it; because, this being gran­ted, here's Infinite Veracity, Wisdom, Power and Goodness against our Im­perfect Conceptions, and the seeming Difficulties founded in 'em. When once we assent or yield it to be Di­vine Revelation, I think, we may safely affirm, against this Reasoner, [Page 50] [We may believe purely upon his Word, without Evidence, (at least such as he requires) in the things 'emselves]. Here the Authority of him that speaks, not my Conception of the thing, or what he says, is the Ground of my Perswasion].

But, to proceed, as for what this Reasoner says of GOD's Omnipotence and Contradictions, N. 13. no one is so silly to imagine, that real Contra­dictions are an Object of Omnipo­tence; but there may be Contradi­ctions which we apprehend as real▪ that in truth are but seeming ones▪ and particularly when we cannot ful­ly comprehend the nature of both the Terms or Objects; and it's already concluded, that in matters of Reve­lation Reason will often direct us to suspect our Judgments, and esteem 'em as such: And then, I hope, there's ‘no Absurdity in Pronouncing, seem­ing Contradictions and Impossibi­lities, a proper Subject of God's Omnipotence: Thus far our Savi­our will bear us out, for all things are possible with God, Matt. xix. 26.’

But, to pursue him a little further, he tells us, N. 16. speaking of GOD's [Page 51] Revelations, [His Words must be in­telligible, and the Matter possible. And as for unintelligible Relations, we can no more believe them from the Revela­tion of GOD, than from that of Man, for the conceiv'd Ideas of Things are the only Subjects of believing, and there­fore all Matters reveal'd by GOD or Man, must be equally intelligible and possible: We are then to expect the same degree of Perspicuity ( he means, with respect to the knowledge of the Ob­ject) from GOD as from Man, tho' more of Certitude from the first than the last: he means with respect to the Veracity of the Publisher.]

Answ. What has already been de­liver'd upon Matters of Revelation, I hope, will satisfie any reasonable Man, how far a reveal'd Truth is re­quir'd to be intelligible. It's conclu­ded, GOD has discover'd so much of the Nature of reveal'd Truths as is useful or necessary; and consequent­ly, He has, at least, discover'd so much as is sufficient to inform us, upon Prin­ciples of Revelation, what He propo­ses to our Belief, but He did not in­tend to make us Philosophers, so as [Page 52] to enable us to comprehend the Mo­dus of reveal'd Truths, or form an Idea of the Manner of Existence, in order to believe the Truth of 'em. This we cannot pretend even in Phy­sical Disquisitions; nay, I think, it's justly concluded, that in Matters of Revelation, which are for the most part Spiritual and Infinite, we are not to dispute the Possibility of their Exi­stence, by measuring 'em by Objects of Sence; for, in reality, this is the same with comprehending the Modus of their Existence, ‘since we cannot absolutely declare against the Possi­bility of their Existence, without a Faculty of comprehending and de­termining the Modus of it, and pas­sing an Estimate upon it as absurd and impossible: And therefore we say, That Matters of Revelation are to be understood so far as to con­ceive what GOD proposes to our Belief, but not to comprehend the Modus of their Existence; such Ideas are not the necessary Subjects of Faith.’

Again, In Humane Revelation the Object is Matters of Fact, and thing [Page 53] we attain to by the Testimony of our Senses, and consequently are things that lye within the proper Verge of Humane Understanding.

Again, They are Discoveries made by Persons upon the same level with ourselves, and, consequently, such as are not only liable to be mistaken, but may sometimes industriously lead others into Mistakes. And both these are Arguments that will engage us to demand an absolute Comprehension of the Nature of the Thing, and all its Circumstances; so that before we can come to a final Datermination, or yield an Assent to the Truth of any such Relation, ‘We must compre­hend the Nature of it so exactly, as to be able to judge, not only of the Possibility, but Probability of it.’ And, I hope, no one can have the Face to demand all this Evidence from GOD. Therefore we may conclude, against our Majesterial Reasoner, That the same degree of Perspicuity is not requir'd from GOD, as from Man. In a word, if we cannot form a perfect Idea of reveal'd Truths, much less of the Modus of their Exi­stence, [Page 54] we cannot judge of the Possi­bility of 'em: If indeed we were able to form an Idea of the Modus of their Existence, that will comport with common Notions, tho' this be not the true Modus, we may safely pronounce them possible; ‘but we cannot pretend to reject the Possi­bility of 'em, unless we could judge of the real Modus, and shew, that it's absurd and impossible:’ There­fore we may conclude, that all Mat­ters reveal'd by GOD or Man, are not requir'd to be equally intelligible and possible.

But, to proceed, as for those In­stances of Scripture, that follow in this or the next Chapter, to prove Christianity a rational intelligible Religion; they only prove, That Reason is a concurring Instrument in embracing all religious Truths, not by teaching us to comprehend the Nature of 'em, but to engage our Assent, where we cannot fully com­prehend upon rational Motives and Convictions: ‘And we think we act upon rational Motives and Convictions in Matters of Revela­tion, [Page 55] when we know as much of the thing as satisfies us, what it is GOD proposes to our belief, and yet find some things contain'd in 'em incomprehensible in their own nature, and rely upon God's Vera­city, Power, Wisdom, and Good­ness, rather than reject the whole, because we know but in part.’ Nay further, in the case of Miracles, we grant, that Reason may judge of the reality of 'em, because they are Ob­jects of Sence, and are to be examin'd by the Testimony of the Senses, by Ideas of Objects of Sence, and the Exercitations of Reason upon 'em, and because Miracles are the uncon­troulable Demonstrations of the Spi­rit, or Means of Conviction, for pro­ving the Divine Original of Revela­tion; ‘And we can freely grant, that Reason must act by common No­tions, to prove Revelation to be tru­ly Divine:’ But when this is done, there's no Consequence that Reason must still measure reveal'd Truths by common Notions, and reject 'em if she cannot fully comprehend 'em, or if she cannot make 'em comport with common Notions; which is the thing [Page 56] our Adversary labours to prove.

The remaining Instances, which only declare the Perspicuity of the Moral Law or Christian Precepts, an Ingenious Reader will presently di­scern how foreign and impertinent they are to his Design.

At the same rate he trifles, when he raises an Objection from the Cor­ruption of Humane Reason; as if, by making his own Answers and Obje­ctions, he had vanquish'd all our Ar­guments, gain'd the Field, and might triumphantly maintain, That there's nothing in the Christian Religion my­sterious, or above Reason; for, I do not anywhere find the Ch. of England fixes the Controversie on this Bottom▪ and therefore this is Reply enough to two of his Chapters, viz. 3, 4.

And now we come to the Third Section, Sect. III. where we are introduc'd with an Account of what's mysterious and above Reason. I shall for the most part take his own Accounts of it, and therefore shall not much dispute any thing in the first Chapt. only I cannot forbear to remark, how lame or im­perfect, or, at least, industriously [Page 57] equivocal, all his Descriptions are: He gives us two Significations of a Mystery, the first I shall not examin; his second is, (I suppose he speaks his own Opinion, else he should have declar'd the contrary) [ It is made to signifie a thing of its own nature incon­ceivable, and not to be judg'd of by our ordinary Faculties and Ideas, tho' it be never so much reveal'd.] Indeed, I think the first part of this Descri­ption is a Mystery; tho', I suppose, he means, in the nature of the thing, or by reason of its Immensity, it's in­conceivable to us, or with respect to Humane Comprehension; but then, who knows how far he intends to carry this, I mean, represent a My­stery inconceivable? If he intends it so as that we can form no manner of Idea of it, then he imposes a manifest Absur­dity upon the World; for no one ever called that a MYSTERY that we could have no Notion of; for, such a thing may be as well Nothing, as Mystery, for any thing we can tell. And therefore Mystery, at least, supposes an Imper­fect or Inadequate Idea, (as appears from all those Instances I have hither­to [Page 58] produc'd) otherwise we could not know what God proposes to our Be­lief. But then, if we enquire further into the thing, and endeavour to un­ravel the Modus of its Existence, we can either form no distinct Idea, or, at least, none that will comport with common Notions. And thus far we affirm, That Mysteries are not to be judg'd of by our ordinary Faculties and Ideas, tho' never so clearly re­veal'd. N. 1.

I proceed to Chap. 2. where, after having promis'd a wonderful Perspi­cuity in the Case before him, he af­firms, [ That nothing can be said to be a▪ Mystery, because we have not an ade­quate Idea of it, or a distinct View of all its Properties at once; for then eve­ry thing would be a Mystery. Sect. 8.] Now truly I'm much of his Mind, for I'm perswaded that no Finite Understan­ding can conceive all the several Pro­perties of any one Being, at once in a distinct view: This is the Peculiar of an All-wise GOD; and if an ade­quate Idea must imply a distinct view of every Property at once, and My­stery opposed to it, every thing must [Page 59] be a Mystery to every intelligent Be­ing but GOD: So that here's a No­tion rais'd, that proves nothing, and no one requires it. We will there­fore pass this as an Unphilosophical Blunder, and describe an adequate Idea to be what he aims at, viz. A clear and distinct Idea of the Nature and Properties of an Object. This (he contends) cannot be fairly opposed to MYSTERY, because, in the Know­ledge of Humane Bodies, GOD has sufficiently answer'd the Ends and Designs of it, by enabling us to com­prehend the principal Properties of Bodies, and the Uses of 'em: And therefore what remains cannot be MYSTERY, N. 19, 20. This is truly a Reason which is more cogent on the other hand, as well in Philosophi­cal as Reveal'd Disquisitions: GOD has discover'd, or enabl'd us to com­prehend, as much as is useful or ne­cessary in both these Cases; but, af­ter all, we can pretend no further than some principal Properties: And since Reason tells us, there's a great deal undiscover'd and incomprehen­sible, we may justly affirm, That [Page 60] there are Mysteries in Nature, as well as Revelation; so that we are behol­den to him for his Argument, tho' he had no Friendly Design in it. Indeed, if he would be content to carry us no further than the force of his Argu­ment naturally tends, we should pre­sently joyn in an amicable Accom­modation, which is in other terms no more than this: ‘There can be no Mystery in Revelation, (he might have added, nor in rerum natura) I mean, in this Notion of it; be­cause we know as much as our Fi­nite Understandings are capable of, or as much as is necessary or useful.’ If this may be admitted, it's a sub­stantial Reason to conclude against the Possibility of a Mystery.

But we may say there are Myste­ries, not because we know not as much as is necessary and useful, but because after we know the principal Pro­perties of Things, or as much as is ne­cessary or useful, we can discern a great deal which we cannot comprehend. And this holds good not only in Matters of Revelation, but Nature too. Our Adversary confesses as much; for tho' [Page 61] we have a competent Idea of the Properties of Bodies, that is, as far as they are useful to us, yet we are not able to comprehend the Modus of their Operations, nor indeed the true Causes of a great many obvious Ef­fects.

Again, In reveal'd Truths we can form, at least, an imperfect Idea of what GOD proposes to our belief. Thus we form an Idea of our Savi­our's Divinity, from those Characters which Revelation and Natural Rea­son gives us of the Godhead. We be­lieve him to be possess'd with the ful­ness of the Godhead, because the same Characters are ascrib'd to him that are ascrib'd to the Father in respect of the Godhead; but we cannot form an Idea of the Manner of the Union of this Divinity with Humane Nature, nor its Consistence with the Vnity of the Godhead, at least so as to make it comport with common Notions: So that in respect of the Modus of things, whether as to their Existence or Operations, even in those of Natural Bodies, as well as Matters of Revela­tion, there are Mysteries in Nature, [Page 62] (and that properly) as well as in Re­velation.

Our Adversary indeed would call this an Inadequate Knowledge, but no­thing Mysterious or above Reason; but I hope to prove it a Mystery even in the received sence of the Word, as well as the reason of the Thing, and that too on his own Concessions and Principles. And,

1st, It's certain his Evasions con­cerning Inadequate Ideas will do him no service, to take off the Denomina­tions of Mystery, or above Reason; for we affirm, That Things are Myste­rious, and above Reason, because we can form but very imperfect and in­adequate Ideas of 'em. ‘It's cer­tainly absurd to imagine that any thing can be mysterious, or above Reason, which we are able fully to comprehend; and it's equally ab­surd to say, that things are mysteri­ous, when we can form no Idea at all, since we can pronounce nothing when we know nothing: But, to confess, that of most things we can form but imperfect and inadequate Ideas, is to prove a thing to be my­sterious; [Page 63] for, if we know and ac­knowledge, that our most improv'd Ideas are inadequate, we must con­clude there's something behind, ei­ther as to the Modus or Rationale of Things, which Reason cannot com­prehend.’ And I know no better denomination, than to say, That Things are in this respect mysterious, or above Reason.

To make up the strict Notion of Mystery, we are not to consider the Necessity or Usefulness of what we cannot comprehend; but the grand Question is, Whether there are not Modes and Properties of Things, that by reason of the Imperfection of Human Vnderstanding, or the Immensity or In­tricacy of the Things 'emselves, cannot be comprehended by us? ‘For it is the Abstruseness or Inaccessibility of Things that make the Mysteries, not the Necessity or Usefulness of what is incomprehensible.’ And therefore if there be Things in this material World which we cannot comprehend, we may truly affirm, That there's a Mystery in Nature, or that Natural Causes or Effects are thus [Page 64] far above Reason, or mysterious; much more may we affirm it of Matters of Revelation: And therefore, to use the Instance of a vain insulting Adversa­ry, Tho' we live upon Water, and see and handle it daily, there may and is something in it mysterious, and above Reason, inasmuch as we cannot form an Idea of every thing that truly belongs to it. And yet no wise Man will be tempted to make such a practical In­ference as this Reasoner hath sug­gested, that is, resolve never to en­quire into its Nature, nor imploy it in his House or Grounds See Sect. 3. N. 10.. But, in Matters of Revelation, we know how inadequate our Ideas are, ‘as much as Finite differs from Infinite, Nega­tive from Positive, and Sence from Spirit: Must they not then con­tain things above Reason, because they are only thus inadequate?’

But further, As for the original Import of the word MYSTERY, I am not concern'd to trace it in the pri­mitive Uses of it, it's sufficient if by Custom it hath obtain'd another Im­port (it may be) every jot as proper as the former. Our Author owns, [Page 65] that in approved Classicks it's com­monly taken for obscure and intri­cate Matters, such as cannot well be comprehended or seen into See N. 5. Sect. 3.. And this, I think, is equally proper with that other describ'd by him, which implies something beyond a Veil, not discernable till that is remov'd: And in this sence the Types under the Mosaick Law he accounts Mysteries; for those which thro' the Imperfecti­ons or Weakness of Reason, or the Immensity, Distance, or Intricacy of the Object, may be as little discern'd as those that have a Veil over 'em; and then they seem to be equally my­sterious, and above Reason. In a word, Mystery is something shut up from our View or Cognizance, and it is not material whether this be done by a Veil or other Impediments or Ob­structions; and consequently Mystery and an Inadequate Idea may be very consistent; I do not mean, that which arises from affected Ignorance, but the Intricacy of the Object, and the Weakness of Humane Reason under its highest Improvements.

[Page 66] But, to clear up his Understanding in this matter, by a few Arguments drawn from his own Positions, the Riches of his own inexhausted Brain, he tells us, Cap. 3. N. 27. That certain Gospel-Doctrines are call'd Mysteries, with respect to the Jews, [ not▪ that they knew nothing of 'em, but they were not clearly and fully reveal'd till the New Testament-times, being veil'd be­fore by various Typical Representati­ons, &c.] Well, you see he allows Mosaick Types to be Mysteries, and gives the reason, Because they saw 'em thro a Veil; or, in St. Paul's Lan­guage, with respect to further Disco­veries, thro a Glass darkly: And what is this, but that they knew them in part, or by inadequate Ideas? I'm sure our Knowledge is as much cramp'd in several of those Instances produc'd by our Author, from the In­tricacy and Immensity of the Things 'emselves, as those Gospel-truths shut up from the Iews by the Mosaick Veil of Types and Figures: ‘And conse­quently, why is not the one as much a Mystery to us, as the other to the Iews, and for this very reason, be­cause [Page 67] we know them inadequately.’

But, to go a little further with him, I remember, in the State of his Que­stion, as well as in other places, he gives us to understand, That all Re­veal'd Matters may be judg'd of even by common Notions, both as to their Man­ner and Existence, as easily as the or­dinary Phoenomena of Nature; and therefore concludes, That there's no­thing in the Gospel contrary to Reason, or above it; and, That no Christian Doctrine can be properly call'd a MY­STERY. This is the State of the Que­stion; and what he asserts must be a Criterion, in judging what is mysteri­ous or above Reason: So that we may hence conclude, and that upon his own Principles too, That that Thing whose Manner or Existence cannot be con­ceiv'd, even with as much ease and clearness as the ordinary Phoenomena of Nature, is a Mystery, and above Reason. Certainly here is a fair Con­cession, and such as will make things mysterious, because we can but form inadequate, Ideas; for, as this Author confesses, we can form Ideas of the Beings of Things, and know as much [Page 68] as is useful from their Properties and Effects, whilst we are ignorant of the manner of their Existence or Produ­ction: See N. 8, 11.—(the one of Plants, and the other of Rain). Here he manifestly fixes our inadequate I­deas upon the Modus of Things, with respect to their Operations and Exi­stence; that is, our Ideas are inade­quate, because we cannot decipher wherein their Modus consists, tho' we know their principal Properties by their Effects and Uses.

And now we may call in his own Principles to conclude against him, and affirm, That inadequate Ideas must necessarily imply a Mystery, for inadequate Ideas imply our Igno­rance as to the Modus of Things, and that thing whose Modus cannot be comprehended, according to his own Principles, is mysterious, and above Reason. Here, I think, he pretends to Out-do the most improv'd Arts of Priestcraft, whilst he declares for no­thing but Reason, and banishes Myste­ry out of the World, and yet imposes things that surpass the highest Myste­ry; since he labours to make the [Page 69] World embrace his Contradictions for the undoubted Decrees of Reason: [This is, in his own language, trifling with a witness, or pitiful shifting or fooling, or what not, and such as discovers a mighty Scarcity of good Arguments, N. 13.] But he hath not done with us yet, and therefore concludes with an obliging Proposal, [ If they will still be fooling, and call these things My­steries, I'm willing to admit as many as they please in Religion, if they will allow me likewise to make mine as intelligible to others as these are to me, Ib.]

I hope I have made good the first part, That there are true and proper Mysteries, even in the Schools of Na­ture. And, if so, it's manifest, not­withstanding his vain Triumphs, we have an Argument à majori, That there are Mysteries in Revelation: I say, it's a majori to every one but him, that has the Face to assert, That an infinite incomprehensible Spirit is an Object equally intelligible with Objects of Sence, or with Wood or Stone. As for the last part of his Proposals, I believe every one will consent, ‘That he shall make all those reveal'd [Page 70] Truths we call Mysteries, as intelli­gible as he's able, provided he'll promise not to reject 'em, because he fails in his Undertaking; or, in a word, because he cannot make them compare with common Ideas or No­tions.’

And now, I hope, I have said enough to invalidate all the Argu­ments of this Chapter. But lest he should think me rude, or that I neg­lect him too much, I shall make some short Returns to a few Passages that are yet behind. And,

1st, He instructs us what it is to comprehend a Thing, viz. [When its chief Properties, and their several Vses, are known to us; for to compre­hend, in all correct Authors, is nothing else but to know; and as of what is not knowable we can have no Idea, so is it nothing to us. I shall, for once, ad­mit, that in the common Notion of Humane Perception or Comprehen­sion, we think we know or compre­hend a Thing sufficiently, when its chief Properties, and their several Uses, are known to us; but may we not at the same time discern, that [Page 71] there are others we cannot conceive, and that the Modus or precise Nature of those we know are inconceivable: And so we may, without Offence, or in a strict and proper way of Speech, affirm, That there's a great deal my­sterious in the thing, and above Rea­son; and yet we do not pronounce it above Reason, (as he suggests, ib.) be­cause we know no more than con­cerns us; but because there's some­thing inconceivable, tho' to conceive it does not so directly concern us.

But, 2dly, as for that which is my­sterious even in Matters of Revelati­on, we do not pretend that it is any thing to us; I mean, as if we were oblig'd to comprehend or define the precise Modus of the thing; This is to be a Mystery and no Mystery. However, since we discern in certain reveal'd Truths something which we cannot comprehend, we may believe those reveal'd Truths to be so far mysterious, ‘and they so far concern us, as to pay the Obedience of Faith to 'em, and not reject the Whole, because we cannot comprehend Every-thing that belongs to 'em.’ This ought [Page 72] to be an Eternal Rule to our Author in matters of Revelation, because it's founded upon his own Words and Principles: We believe the Divinity of our Saviour, because we have not only its Uses set forth, but we have it represented in the principal Proper­ties of the Godhead, even such as are ascrib'd to GOD the Father; and consequently, in the Sence of this Author, we may be said to compre­hend or know this Divine Truth. Therefore if any thing arises as to the Modus of its Existence, or otherwise, that is mysterious, (not knowable, or of which we can have no Idea) his own Rule directs him, that this is no­thing to him, and consequently is by no means to be an Argument against this Divine Truth: I'm sure, if 'tis not ridiculous not to supersede our Disquisitions in matters that do not directly concern us, (another Asserti­on of his, ib.) it's undoubtedly ridicu­lous to make Disquisitions in such Cases, and make them an Argument for reject­ing the clearest reveal'd Truths; which is the constant Practice of the Modern Reasoners or Disputers of this World, the Socinians.

[Page 73] But, to proceed, the next thing re­markable is, a compendious Rule to acquire Useful Knowledge, N. 11. viz. Not to trouble ourselves nor others with what is Vseless were it known, or what is impossible to be known at all. Whereas in the Paragraph imme­diately preceeding, he seems to charge us with saying, That Things are above Reason, because we know no more than concerns us, or is useful. And yet allowing this Notion, he tells us, that it is ridiculous to supersede our Disqui­sitions about it upon that Score; that is, according to his own Notion, tho' we know as much of it as concerns us, or is useful. A bless'd Law-giver truly, to institute Contradictions al­most with the same Breath; for, I think, he cannot avoid the Charge, without flying to that which is as abominable in his very Thoughts as this reproachful to his Reason; I mean, by Pleading he intended a Mystery.

And now, having given you enough of the Doctrinal part, he car­ries us to Application; but truly, I hope I have disabled him so visibly [Page 74] in the former, as supersedes the Ne­cessity of a formal Reply to the lat­ter. I shall only recite the Application he has made, and rather refer than an­swer; [ 1st, That no Christian Doctrin, no more than any ordinary piece of Na­ture, can be reputed a Mystery, because we have not an adequate or compleat Idea of whatever belongs to it.] As for what may be attributed to inadequate Ideas, I have said enough in this Chapter; and tho' we may not say, ‘That the want of an adequate Idea is the formalis ratio that constitutes a Mystery, yet our Inabilities in com­prehending some things that are really lodg'd in it, or really belong to it, makes it a Mystery;’ and as is al­ready prov'd with as good reason as those things he counts mysterious, viz. Intelligible Truths beyond the Veil.

2dly, [What is reveal'd in Religi­on, as it is most useful and necessary, so it must and may be as easily comprehen­ded, and found as consistent with our common Notions, as what we know of Wood or Stone, or the like.] We cer­tainly agree, That GOD hath only re­veal'd as much as is necessary or use­ful; [Page 75] and, in matters of pure Revela­tion, no more than will give us an Idea of the Thing, or what it is GOD proposes to our Belief; and therefore make this an Argument, that there are Things that belong to it, of which we cannot form a distinct Idea, and, consequently, from hence give it the Denomination of being Mysterious.

Now, as for the mysterious part of any reveal'd Truth, we affirm, That it exceeds our Comprehension, other­wise the Mystery must cease: But, as it exceeds our Comprehension, so we say, it is not necessary to be compre­hended; much less do we allow, that it may be comprehended by common Ideas or Notions, or scann'd by those Ideas: So as that, in case it doth not correspond with 'em, we cannot call in question the Truth of what is re­veal'd and comprehended.

No, here, in case Curiosity tempts us to dive into the mysterious part of any reveal'd Truth, and upon the closest Researches, we find ourselves unable to comprehend; ‘We are to adhere to the Substance of the [Page 76] Truth, where we cannot compre­hend the Modus of it; or, in other Terms, adore, where we cannot comprehend.’ But as to our com­prehending by common Notions, or, as easily as we can comprehend, Wood, or Stone, or the like, I ob­serve,

1st, This Gentleman makes all Objects of Humane Knowledge e­qually comprehensible. And,

2dly, That we may take our Mea­sures for comprehending any one, by those Idea's we have formed of o­thers; but I have elsewhere suffi­ciently discovered the Falseness of both these Assertions; and there I shall not enlarge, but rest upon the Conclusiveness of what hath been offered.

3dly, When we do as familiarly ex­plain such Doctrines as what is known of Natural Things (which I pretend we can) we may then be as See N. 12. Sect. 3. properly said to comprehend the one as the other. This is a very bold Undertaking, and not to be believed 'till he gives us good Reason, and nothing less than Matter of Fact for Demonstration, [Page 77] especially if he intends that part of those Doctrines we justly call myste­rious. But then, in using this Fami­liarity, ‘We must engage him not to explain away the Substance of any Doctrine, nor to reject the Do­ctrine, if he fails in his Explication.’ And now we come to attack him in his Strong-hold, that is, his Appeal to the Voice of Scripture: See Cap. 3. Sect. 3. And truly Scripture is an unquestionable Tribunal for the Decision of all Con­troversies in Matters of Revelation; and as to their present Controversies, as far as Scripture can determine, every one may desire to put the Case on this Issue, and Appeal to this Tri­bunal (as well as he) provided he is satisfied Scripture is on his side; and he may with greater satisfaction be reputed Orthodox with this on his side, than to pass for Orthodox with the whole World, and have it against him. But then in case he either mi­stakes the Sence of Scripture, or has recourse to it, to make it come up to the State of his Case, and prove more than what can be inferr'd from it; it's very bold to say, that Scri­pture [Page 78] has engaged him in this Error, if it be one: Here I'm sure Scripture will be no Protection to him, against a just Charge of Error, because he makes an Appeal to her, and retreats under her Wing for Shelter; when in reality he charges his own false Reasonings, or the Arguments of some particular Passions, not to say unjust Propositions on Scripture, as if all were the unerring Counsels and Dictates of Divine Truth. And truly this Reasoner does little less, when he attempts to prove, that there are no Mysteries in Christianity, because he endeavours to shew, that the word Mystery in the New Testa­ment, is no where applied to the Thing we contend for, viz. a Thing that with respect to Humane Reason, contains something in it altogether incomprehensible: For is it not absurd to argue against a Thing from the signification of a Word, which might never have been used in Scripture, and yet the Thing found there? and tho' it is used, yet our Author, pur­suant to the Mind of Scripture, fixes Three several Significations on it, [Page 79] and consequently it can be no Argu­ment that it hath not a Fourth; be­cause it does not appear in Scripture; unless he could prove that the Holy Ghost thought it necessary to reveal all the Notions or Acceptations of the word Mystery; therefore if this Ad­vocate for Reason allows the whole Case, as he pretends, to be put upon this Issue, it will presently be given against him, for want of a good Consequence. So that in truth, if the Controversie is to be determined by Scripture, (as no doubt it ought) it must unavoidably turn upon this issue, ‘Whether there are not Truths set forth in Scripture, in which, if we enquire into the Nature of 'em, a great deal is contain'd in 'em, which we cannot comprehend, and consequently are mysterious, and above Reason; whether Scripture deliver 'em under these Denomina­tions or no.’

This may be true, tho' the Word Mystery were no where to be found in Scripture, or tho' Scripture had not so much as hinted, that there were any thing mysterious or incom­prehensible. [Page 80] If this can be proved, our Adversary must acknowledge, that there are Mysteries in Christia­nity still. The Instances of our Sa­viour's Incarnation already produ­ced, move upon this Supposition; and I shall be ready to prove it, whenever he shall think fit to im­pugn the Truth of it. But besides this, I shall in some measure conde­scend to his own Method, and tho' I shall not Examine every Passage of Scripture, to see whether he has rightly stated the Signification of the Word, yet I do not question, but we may offer as strong Arguments to ap­ply it sometimes to the Sence we con­tend for, as he hath done for another; and besides this, I hope to produce some Passages of Scripture, that as­sure us there are still those things in Christianity, we properly call Myste­ries; and if this be performed, I hope it may without Affectation be said, that his Appeal to the Tribunal of Scripture is defeated.

And, 1st, because I do not design Opposition, or Disputes, for Opposi­tion's sake; I shall own that the [Page 81] Word MYSTERY is used in the several Sences he hath put upon it.

I. For the Gospel in general.

II. For some unfolded Secrets. And,

III. For things veil'd by Parables: but this is by no means an Argument that there is no other signification to be found in Scripture: for I am per­swaded, I can prove the contrary with as much Authority and Force of Reason as he can produce against it; I mean, that it's sometimes used to express the Incomprehensibleness of certain Truths, tho' reveal'd. And,

1. That Mystery must imply some­thing that is in the Nature of it to us incomprehensible, St. Paul seems to have assured us, But we speak the Wis­dom of God in a Mystery, even the hid­den Wisdom of God, 1 Cor. 2. 7. All sides agree, that the Apostle points at the Fundamental Articles of the Christian Faith, and particularly the Redemption of the World by Jesus Christ, and more primarily the most abstruse part of it, his Incarnation.

2. It's visible the Apostle speaks of it as a Mystery, even when he re­veals [Page 82] it; for he reveals the Wisdom of God in a Mystery. He now speaks to the Perfect, that had own'd the Gospel, and the Divine Authority of his Preaching, as appears from the preceding Verse; and it's their pecu­liar to have the Meat of the Word, or the Mysteries of the Kingdom of GOD, communicated to 'em; and therefore, tho' this Wisdom of GOD be a Mystery, and consequently he delivers it as such, yet the Perfect be­lieve, when they cannot compre­hend, because it is the Wisdom of GOD: I am sure this Notion is a­greeable to the Judgment of Clemens Alexandrinus; for he uses the very Word of the Apostle, and calls it, [...]; nay, he makes this an Argu­ment, why the Fundamental Truths of the Gospel should only be com­municated to the Pure and Perfect, [...], &c. ut supra, Strom. Lib. 1. And therefore since the Apostle reveals it in a Mystery, it must be so, because it contains some­thing in it that is incomprehensible. Hence we may justly Vindicate our [Page 83] English Translation, which does not joyn, [...], as our Adversary would have it; but makes it a Repetition, or Enlarge­ment upon the Divine Wisdom, viz. even the Hidden Wisdom. It's true, our Adversary endeavours to evade this Exposition, because we are told in the 10th Verse, But God hath re­vealed them to us by his Spirit: But the Words manifestly referr to those Things, which, in the preceding Verse, God is said to have prepared for them that love him, which are chiefly the Benefits of our Redem­ption, and the Consequent of this fundamental Revelation; or at least, if it must be this fundamental In­stance of Divine Wisdom, it is only reveal'd so as to let us know, what God intends by it, and assures us of the Truth of it, but not to compre­hend the whole Nature of it; or in a word, it is so reveal'd, as any o­ther thing is reveal'd in a Mystery; that is, when something remains in it, that is not to be comprehended; so that, in Truth, here's Mystery in two Sences:

[Page 84] 1st, With respect to the Incom­prehensibleness of the Thing. And,

2dly, With respect to the Thing before it was communicated to us.

And thus far not only the Natural Construction of the Words, but the Authority of a Learned Expositor carries us, Vid. Theophilact. in locum, [...].

But Secondly, I shall insist on that noble Passage of St. Paul to Timothy, Ep. 1. Cap. 3. Ver. 10. ‘And without Controversie, great is the Mystery of Godliness; God was manifested in the Flesh, justified in the Spirit, seen of Angels, preached unto the Gentiles, believed on in the World, received up into Glory.’ It's obser­vable, our Adversary expounds as accurately, as he reasons; for he produces this for his eighth Passage, where Mystery is put for the Gospel in general, whereas it's manifest the Words cannot, without the greatest Violence, be applyed to any thing but a Divine Person, represented un­der [Page 85] certain Divine Characters, and in­deed to none but our Saviour, the Corner-Stone of the Gospel, but not the Gospel; for truly the Apostle seems, in this place, to have given a description of his whole Media­tion. I am sure the Current of the Fathers, as well as of after Com­mentators, apply it to none but our Saviour. But now since our Saviour's Incarnation is this Mystery of God­liness, it's evident the Apostle does not speak of what it was before it was reveal'd, but what it is after it is preach­ed and believed on in the World, and therefore he calls it a Mystery, not because it was so before it was re­veal'd, but because it still remains so; and thereupon he endeavours to re­present it as such, by inlarging upon the Nature and Incomprehensible­ness of it; God was manifest in Flesh, the Foundation of this My­stery, the following Characters be­ing only their Appendages that take their rise and concenter in it. This is an Exposition that discovers itself so clearly, that we find our Adver­sary industriously huddling up this [Page 86] Passage, as it were, in a Mystery, without giving any tolerable account of it; and at last is forced to confess, That the gracious Manifestation of Christ and his Gospel, is to us won­derfully stupendous and surprizing, N. 30. So that we plainly read My­stery in the very Sence we contend for: I am sure we have the Opinion of some Ancient Church-Writers to ratifie it. Of this Opinion we find Athanasius in his Tract against Pau­lus Samosatenus de Incarnatione Verbi, where he gives his Judgment, è Ca­thedra, as Archbishop of Alexandria; for first he lays open the Attempts of this Heretick, in endeavouring to Subvert the Doctrine of our Sa­viour's Incarnation, and stiles it, [...]; and to prove it such, cites this very place of our Apostle. Secondly, He represents the danger in attempting to unfold such profound Difficulties, that are only with safety to us be­lieved, and in a word, enjoyns us to adhere to the Apostolick Faith, with­out admitting new Terms or Notions, [...], and above all, [Page 87] [...], to dread the Disquisition of such a Mystery. But besides the Opinion of this great Man, we have the Comment of Isiodore the Pelusiote, and Theophilact, fixing the Mystery of Godliness in the Incomprehensibleness of it. Thus the former, Lib. 2. Ep. 192. [...], and pursuant to this, expostulates, Who can comprehend the Miracle of his Conception, transacted with­out Coition, or imagine how the Divine Nature can be circumscrib'd, that is Immense, and not to be circumscrib'd? And Theophilact proceeds in the same Strain thus, [...], in Locum. And now this is some­thing more certainly than calling it a Mystery, with respect to the Ages preceding the Gospel; for I think this Passage in itself admits of the Exposition before us more naturally, than that our Adversary contends for; besides we have the Authority of the Learned in past Ages. And [Page 88] since I have made it appear he has no advantage over us in his whole Hypothesis, I know not why we may not in his own Language pro­nounce against him, that Mystery in the New Testament, is sometimes put for a thing inconceivable in itself, and not to be judg'd of by our ordi­nary Notions, however reveal'd. This likewise calls to mind the Tri­umphs of our Adversary upon a Pas­sage, which as we allow, stiles the Gospel a Mystery, under this Noti­on; it's Rom. 16. 25.—But is now made manifest, whereupon he Ex­postulates, In what sence could this Secret be made manifest, if it re­main'd still Incomprehensible? A mighty Favour indeed, to bless the World with a parcel of Unintelligi­ble Notions. I confess, I incline to the former sence, I mean a Mystery, with respect to the Ages preceding the Gospel, but can see no foundati­on for Absurdities, no more than for his vain Triumphs, if we take it in the Sence he pretends to explode; for this Reasoner, had he not been too much used to confound things to­gether, [Page 89] might have learn'd, that the highest Mystery is not wholly unin­telligible; and it may be properly said, to be manifested in as much as God has communicated by the Apo­stle's preaching what's useful and ne­cessary, and as much as will inform us what God proposes to our Belief: ‘Again it's manifested, and that too to our unspeakable Comfort, since the vast Designs of Divine Love, and the unexpressible Benefits to us-ward in it, are abundantly laid open; and I think these are Fa­vours or Blessings too rich to be ex­posed in Ridicule or Burlesque.’

But further, If the use of the Word in Scripture will not prove the thing we contend for, there are suf­ficient hints in Scripture to prove it: I shall first insist on St. Paul's Ac­counting the preaching of Christ un­to the Greeks foolishness; but unto them which are called, the Power of God and the Wisdom of God, 1 Cor. 1. 23, 24.

Now this place is generally inter­preted of the Incarnation of Christ, or the Union of the two Natures in­to [Page 90] to one Divine Person: And those that embrace and believe it, must resolve it into the Infinite Power and Wisdom of God, not as a common, but special Act, and consequently a thing incomprehensible as they are; and on this account, it's to the Greeks, the great Masters of Reason, Foo­lishness; because, as it is represented to us, it contains in it, Things that can never be reconciled with com­mon Notions, or Ideas. What com­mon Ideas can satisfie us, that the Son of God should speak by a Man, or as the Sacred Canon hath it, in the form of a Man; that God should have a Son, and that he should suf­fer as the Son of God? What com­mon Ideas can represent to us, that Christ could have a Being before the Worlds, as God; that he should be born a Man, and exist as such, and yet not as a Man, begotten of a Man? These things, the most improved Notices of Natural Reason cannot confirm, or warrant, no not our Ad­versary with all his Reason. If any thing, it's the Arian, or Socinian Hypothesis (tho' advanced contrary [Page 91] to the Current of Scripture) that may pretend most to be a Rationale in this matter. And yet our Adver­sary seems to explode this as much as that of the Trinitarians, because they are forced to allow Divine Worship to be paid him, [ Cap. 1. Sect. 2. N. 2. I am mistaken if either they, or the A­rians can make their Notions of a dig­nified, and Creature-God, capable of Divine Worship, appear more reasona­ble, than the Extravagancies of other Sects, touching the Article of the Tri­nity.] But to return, It's manifest here we learn how the Doctrines of Christianity came to be branded with the Imputation of Foolishness, viz. Because they will not comport with common Notices, or the received Prin­ciples of Natural Philosophy: for I have evinced it, upon the Objecti­on of Trypho against Iustin, and St. Clement's Comment on the place, [...]. Dial. cum Trypho, p. 269. [Page 92] And St. Clement, in locum, thus, Lib. 1. Stromat. [...]. Here we see this great Man does not charge the Greeks with false Principles of Philosophy, as the Ground of their Error, for he re­presents the Thing as much inconsist­ent with such principles as they could, and makes this the Foundation of their unjust Charge, I mean in pro­nouncing the Doctrines of Christia­nity Foolishness; and indeed he calls 'em [...], but it can be on no o­ther account, than because they would admit of nothing but Natural Reason, and Philosophy, and there­upon would try all revealed Truths by common Notions, or Principles of Philosophy, and reject 'em as absurd and foolish, because they could not make these deep Things of God to comport with common Ideas of Ob­jects of Sence. Indeed Celsus ob­jects much the same things against Origen; for upon every turn, he en­deavours to ridicule the Divinity of our Saviour, by representing it incon­sistent [Page 93] with the Principles of Natural Reason: And now give me leave to make one single Remark, since it occurs so naturally: Are not these the very Principles which our Advo­cate for Reason moves upon? So that an unprejudiced Person might su­spect that I'm dealing with a Celsus, or a Trypho; or that they were risen from the Dead. But to conclude this Argument, it's manifest St. Cle­mens must believe, That the Funda­mental Doctrine of the Christian Re­ligion, still contains in it something that cannot be comprehended by Natural Reason, that cannot be re­conciled to common Ideas, or Prin­ciples of Natural Philosophy, and consequently something that's My­sterious and above Reason: And there­fore if this Reverend Father is not mistaken in the purport of the Holy Ghost (as we have good Reason to conclude, he is not) the New Testa­ment does contain the Thing (if not the Word) we contend for, I mean, proposes to our Belief, Things that are Incomprehensible, or above the Comprehension of Human Reason.

[Page 94] The last Argument I shall pro­duce, is two or three Passages of Scripture, which (because they bear an Affinity to one another) I shall examine and conclude them under one Argument.

I begin with St. Paul's account of Humane Knowledge, even under this last State of Revelation; for he includes himself, and the whole Col­lege of Apostles, who undoubtedly enjoyed the Special Assistance of the Spirit of God; nay, St. Paul had been caught up into the Third Heaven, where he was almost overwhelm'd with abundance of Revelations, 2 Cor. 12. And yet he tells us, We know but in part, and we Prophesie in part, 1 Cor. Cap. 13. ver. 9. and the Rea­son assigned is, We see through a Glass darkly, ver. 12. so that the Impedi­ment seems to lie upon the Mind, or the Immenseness of the Object, not in God that denies us a competent Revelation; for this is the last Reve­lation of himself; and therefore this Glass argues an Imperfection, or In­ability in comprehending some of those Truths that are revealed; but [Page 95] if this Glass be a Veil which God casts before our Eyes, like that upon the Iews, in as much as he does not impart in this Life a clear Discovery of certain Gospel-Truths, then, ac­cording to the Mind of our Author, there are still Mysteries in the Gospel, in the highest Sence; but truly St. Clemens fixes it upon the Imperfecti­ons of Humane Knowledge, since he represents the Mind in this Earthly Tabernacle, as viewing Things through Sences after a gross corpo­real manner, whereas in another World our Knowledge will be high­ly enlarged, for then it will be Face to Face; or, as he expresses it, [...]: That is, by a pure and naked Application of the Mind, or Intuition.

Again, it's manifest the Object of this Imperfect Knowledge, is the deep things of GOD, or, in plain terms, the fundamental Revelations of the Go­spel; for, the Apostle must at least comprehend, if not principally intend them, when he tells us, And we Pro­phesie but in part; that is, those Truths [Page 96] we publish to the World are only re­veal'd in part, since we can only pre­tend to know or comprehend them in part. And truly St. Clement as­serts as much of St. Paul himself, not­withstanding his abundance of Re­velations, for thus, on his words 2 Cor. xii. 4. (where, no doubt, he re­ceiv'd the chiefest Instructions of his Apostolick Office) He was caught up into Paradise, and heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for Man to utter; he observes, that there was no Law nor Precept given that obli­ged him to stifle any of those Chri­stian Truths GOD had committed to him; so that in saying, it is not law­ful, he intended to represent the In­effability of the Divine Nature, or the things of GOD; [...]. And, to confirm this Notion, he cites three Passages that represent the Incomprehensibleness of the Divine Nature, Rom. xi. 33. Oh! the depth of the Riches both of the Wisdom and Knowledge of God! And again, But we speak the Wisdom of God in a Mystery: [That is, even when we [Page 97] speak it, else it proves nothing in this place,] 1 Cor. ii. 7. And lastly, Colos. ii. Ver. 23. To the Acknow­ledgment of the Mystery of God in Christ, [as you have it in the Ancient Readings] in whom are hidden all the Treasures of Wisdom, or Know­ledge. This is a very remarkable Passage, and therefore I must beg leave to enlarge upon it.

As for the Sence of St. Clement, it's visible he looks upon it to be a Mystery, tho' reveal'd and acknow­ledg'd, and to be a Mystery because it contains something in it which is [...], or [...], for other­wise it can be no Argument to prove what he had just before asserted. Indeed, our Adversary thinks he has evaded the Force of this Exposition, by telling us, (without any tolerable Proof) That the Words are to be un­derstood of the Gospel of CHRIST; but if it be the Gospel of CHRIST, it may be stiled a MYSTERY, in respect of its Fundamental Truths, inasmuch as they contain in 'em something that's hidden or mysterious; for thus much the following Verse apparently hints▪ [Page 98] [...], [ i. e. in which, if this Exposi­tion obtains] are hidden [...]: It's manifest the Apostle speaks of it as reveal'd, nay, as it is when acknow­ledg'd and embrac'd, and yet there is something hidden or mysterious. Thus we may conclude, against our Reaso­ner, that Mystery may be put for the Gospel, and yet call'd so, because it contains certain Truths, whose Na­ture cannot be fully comprehended, or certain Truths, that contain some­thing in 'em that to us is incompre­hensible. But yet, for all his maje­sterial decisive way of expounding Scripture, I think the words more naturally point at the Mystery of our Redemption, in the Incarnation of the Son of GOD, especially if we add hereto the ancient Reading used by these Fathers, St. Austin, and St. Am­brose, to the Acknowledgment of the Mystery [not Knowledge of Mystery, as this vain Disputer of this World would have it] of GOD in CHRIST, for, 1st, [...], which immediately follows, must more naturally be ap­ply'd to Christ, not to Mystery, agree­able to our Translation, In whom all [Page 99] the Treasures, &c. This is agreeable to the Sentiments of Origen, [...], In Hierom. Hom. 8. pag. 99. 2dly, If the Gospel of Christ, and not Christ himself, was intended, it would be improper to say, that the Treasures of Wisdom are hid in it, being a reveal'd Insti­tution: Therefore we may justly conclude, pursuant to the Mind of St. Clement, That the Incarnation of our Redeemer (the Foundation of our Redemption, and Fountain whence all the Treasures of Wisdom and Knowledge derive) is the Mystery of GOD in Christ, which is to be acknow­ledg'd, not unravel'd or fully com­prehended; for, since it is expresly propos'd as a Mystery, and remains one when embrac'd or acknow­ledg'd, it must be so, because it car­ries in it something that is hidden or incomprehensible.

Indeed Origen manifestly joyns in this Notion; for, in his Comment on Matt. xiii. 44. he makes the Field to be the Holy Scriptures, that set forth all the Means of Salvation with the greatest clearness; but the Trea­sure [Page 100] to be CHRIST, because in Him all the Depths of Wisdom are hid, in Him, in a Mystery, citing this very Passage of St. Paul, by way of Proof, [...] [ dissertis verbis] [...].

And now give me leave to make an Appeal, as he does, [to all Equi­table Persons, N. 35.] Whether, by as good Reason and Authority, it does not appear, That not only the Sence of the Word, but the Things we contend for, are recorded in Scri­pture, as any he has produc'd to the contrary? So that, in truth, we are ready to [render up ourselves] to the Voice of Scripture, as well as submit the Merits of the Cause to it, without being influenc'd and carried away by such weak Practisings as he has set forth, in a Dialogue that would me­rit some Stripes, if perform'd by a School-boy, rather than Applause, as 'tis the Product of a pretending Ma­ster of Reason. See Sect. 36.

And now I have done with his Scripture-authorities, but cannot pass by one Remark of his, which I find [Page 101] to be the chief Improvement that graces his Second Edition: [ Nor is it undeserving our particular Notice, that Mystery is here made the distinguish­ing Mark of the False and Antichristi­an Church; (See Rev. xvii. 5.) And no doubt but as far as any Church allows of Mysteries, so far it is Antichristian, and may, with a great deal of Iustice, tho' little Honour, claim Kindred with the Scarlet Whore.] Here is a very bold Stricture, and yet a Man with half an Eye may discern, that his Observation is as irrational and ridi­culous as his Inference; for Mystery, in this place, I suppose, would not have pass'd for a distinguishing Mark, had not her Doctrines and Practices merited the other part of the Title, viz. The Mother of Har­lots, and Abomination of the Earth; had she not held a golden Cup in her Hand, full of Abominations and Filthi­ness of her Fornication, Ver. 4. and been drunken with the Blood of the Saints, and with the Blood of the Mar­tyrs of Iesus. But as for his Inference, had he consulted St. Paul's Second Epistle to the Thessalonians a little [Page 102] better, he might have learn'd, that there's a Mystery of Iniquity as well as Godliness; but perhaps he was un­willing to be disappointed of a mali­cious, tho' illogical, Suggestion; he might there have inform'd himself, That it was always the Devil's Busi­ness to imitate the True Religion by mighty Signs and lying Wonders, if it were possible, to deceive the very Elect; nay, that Antichrist sitteth in the Temple of GOD, shewing himself that he is GOD, and consequently he must pretend to Mystery with a wit­ness: So that, upon the whole, this Gentleman may as well assign the Devil's Miracles for a distinguishing Mark of Antichrist, and prove the true Religion to be nearly related to Antichrist, the Scarlet Whore, and the Devil, because she proceeds up­on the Authority of Miracles: Nay, rather we may upon his Argument affirm, That Miracles are a distin­guishing Mark of the true Religion: And since Antichrist and the Devil pretend to Miracles, the Religion they pretend to must be true too. Whereas we know these to be Divine [Page 103] and Authoritative, those Diabolical and Usurped, so we pronounce this the Mystery of Iniquity, that the My­stery of Godliness.

The next thing that offers itself, is, the Suffrage of the Primitive Church. It's true, there are a great many things intervene, wherein he labours more to give us a Specimen of his Wit, that Reason: But truly, I think, they are both of a piece, for I can discover nothing that deserves a single Reflection, much less a formal Reply. I proceed therefore to the Suffrage of the Fathers, to whom he makes an Appeal. He tells us in­deed, [ It is not out of any deference to their Iudgments, N. 40.] and there­fore we must conclude he submits to it, because he's perswaded they pe­remptorily declare for his Opinion; but I hope to prove the contrary: For tho' he confesses he has bestow'd a great deal of Pains upon 'em, yet this is so far from discouraging us from entering the List, that I hope to make it appear, that his Pains are either an Effect of his Ignorance in these Authors, or of his Dishonesty [Page 104] in suppressing their Opinions. And, first, all that he proves out of the Fa­thers is, That they have asserted other Notions of Mystery than what we contend for; whereas he himself assigns four or five different Notions; and if Classick Authors were consul­ted, we could produce some more: and therefore he might as well re­ject one of his own Notions, because the Fathers have not mention'd it. But I find this Author, upon every turn, shamefully betrays his Reason, for he knows not what is incumbent upon him to prove, and therefore we need not wonder if he proves not his main Design: I'm sure he's now to prove a Negative, (or that which a­mounts to it) if he proves any thing, viz. That the Fathers, he cites, no where apply the word MYSTERY to things beyond Humane Comprehen­sion; or, that those Notions of the word Mystery, which he finds record­ed, are deliver'd exclusively of all o­thers; for, if he has neither cited all their Notions or Acceptations of the word, nor prov'd, that they are ex­clusive of all others, he proves no­thing [Page 105] against the acceptation of the word we now contend for; and if so, the most cursory Reader will pre­sently pronounce, That he must give up the Cause, in case he fixes it on this Issue, I mean the Authority of Fathers. But because I will take no advantage of his weakness, I will go along with him in his own Instances. And,

1st, What he cites from Clemens Alexand. concludes nothing; for, I know no Christian that denys the Christian Religion to be [ an Illumi­nation, because it brought hidden things to light, and that with respect to the Mosaick Veil.] But this only proves one of his own Notions, that is in­deed allow'd by us. But to be short with him; Whereas he has the Face to tell us, That several of those Texts of Scripture alledg'd by him, are by this Father expounded on his side, and con­sequently against our Notion: I shall appeal to what has been already ci­ted from him, to prove the quite con­trary See p. 46, 48.. Indeed I could add a great deal more to discover his Judgment of the Inconceivableness of certain [Page 106] Objects of Faith, or Matters of Re­velation; and, because I'm engag'd, I shall produce a few Instances: And, first, where he stiles Christianity an Illumination, he speaks of the Fulness of Christ, as a Mystery reveal'd in­deed, but the Nature of it known to a very few; and he proves it from the Incomprehensible Nature of GOD, Strom. lib. 5. [...], and yet more fully on Moses's words, Exod. 33. ver. 18. Shew me thy Glory; [...]. 2. p. 365. Strom. lib. That is, by the Effects of his Power. Again, on St. Paul's words, 1 Cor. 5. Christ our Passover is sacrificed for us; Strom. lib. 5. he observes, [...]. Here it's evident he argues from the In­comprehensibleness of the Divine Nature, and consequently must fix the Mystery on this Bottom, as well as the want of Revelation. Indeed, we may justly argue à majori, from the Sence of this Father, if the Na­ture [Page 107] of the Godhead be, in the Opini­on of this great Man, so highly in­comprehensible, how much more must the Fundamental Article of the Christian Religion be so, the con­sists of the Union of the Divine with Human Nature, and consequently, in a proper sence, mysterious. See N. 42.

Thus much for St. Clement; the next Authority is Iustin Martyr, which concludes nothing to his pur­pose: For, First, he only uses the Word in a loose Sence, and not ex­clusive of any other signification; and if this may be an Argument against that Sence which this Reasoner de­claims against, it will be so against others, which he has expresly as­signed. This may serve for a suffi­cient Return to the next Paragraph, where Tertullian stiles all Religious Rites, or Acts of Worship, Mysteries; which among the Heathens were ge­nerally kept secret: yet, tho' this be an allowed Sence of the Word, it can be no Argument, but that My­stery, even in Tertullian's time, was apply'd to Things in 'emselves ab­struce or incomprehensible. Of the [Page 108] same stamp are his Arguments from Origen, which prove no more than what all sides own, viz. that Myste­ry, in a vulgar, or more loose Sence, is put for Symbols, Types, or any ab­struse or sacred Matter. N. 44.

Certainly, had this Gentleman consulted any other Pieces of this Learned Father, he might have in­form'd himself, that he uses Mystery even in Divine Matters, for Things that are to us incomprehensible. Thus, in the forecited Passage, speak­ing of the Thing as it now is, he ex­presses himself, [...]. [ Vt Supra. See pag. 56.]

Again, on the Words of our Savi­our, Mat. xix. 24, 26. he observes, That GOD was able to make a Ca­mel pass thro' an Eye of a Needle; and yet no one but God or Christ, or he to whom he shall reveal it, is able to comprehend it, [...]. Afterwards he challenges any Man to Illustrate or Explain such Myste­ries; being Things only compre­hended, [Page 109] as well as performed, by GOD, [...]. Pag. 382. 1 Vol.

But now in the close of this Para­graph, he thinks he sufficiently ex­plodes our Notion of Mystery, when he tells us Origen [was far from thinking any Doctrine of our Religion a Mystery, in the present Sence of the Word, that he expresly affirms them to agree all with common Notions, and to commend themselves to the Assent of every well-dispos'd Hearer.] This truly looks very plausible; but I'm perswaded, Origen, in making good this Assertion, will run counter to the Notions of this Indefatigable Reaso­ner: For First, It's well known, who the Holy Father was engaged with, a Learned Heathen, who had formed an Objection, That the Chri­stians were to believe Things, tho' in themselves never so absurd or ridi­culous; and therefore it was his bu­siness to take off the Objection, by shadowing forth the Reasonable­ness of every Doctrine: He begins [Page 110] with the Doctrines of Natural Re­ligion, the Being of a God, and our Love towards him; but when he comes to the Mystery of our Savi­our's Incarnation, he makes a stand, and repeats Celsus's Objection, viz. [...]. The Answer is remarkable; for it evinces the Divi­nity and Incarnation of our blessed Saviour, as a standing Doctrine of the Christian Church, to the Eter­nal Confusion of all Socinian Preten­ces to Antiquity. Let our Accusers know, that we (as it were speaking the Sence of the Christian Church) do not only think, but are fully per­swaded, that he is Originally, or in the Beginning GOD, and the Son of GOD; nay, he is the Substantial Word, Wisdom, and Truth; and as for his Mortal Body, and Human Soul, we attribute the greatest Things to it; in as much as a most exact and compleat Union with his Divi­nity, it obtains a kind of Divinity; so that we may still treat our Blessed Saviour, GOD and Man, (as GOD) with the highest Acts of Divine [Page 111] Worship. His words are these: [...].

You see the great Design of the Apologist is to represent how such Honour and Dignity is derived upon the Humanity of our Saviour, and consequently the Reasonableness of paying Divine Worship to him even as GOD-Man, or GOD Incarnate; and pursuant to this, to justifie those Ho­nours that accrew to the Body of our Saviour, he appeals to the Natural Transmutations of Matter, whereby Bodies are often highly refin'd and improv'd, and then ingeniously con­cludes, Why should not the Infinite Power of GOD therefore be able to change the Mortal Body of Iesus? [...].

Thus we see how, out of Igno­rance, or a worse Principle, the Di­sputer of this World (for the Title belongs to him, tho' not so deserved­ly [Page 112] as those on whom St. Paul bestows it) has Misrepresented the Sence of this great Man, whose main Design was, to shew the Reasonableness of paying Divine Worship to the Blessed Jesus; and this he sufficiently per­form'd, by asserting his Divinity, but he did not attempt to demonstrate the Modus of the Union of the two Natures by common Notions. He has indeed expresly asserted our Sa­viour's Divinity, as well as Humani­ty, in the highest Notion of it; and I defie this profound Reasoner to state the Union of both Natures by common Ideas or Notions, much less to give us as familiar an Idea of it as we have of Wood or Stone. Till he has done this, he trifles, and we shall still believe that our Saviour's Incar­nation is thus far a Mystery. Thus we have turn'd those very Fathers he most relies on against him; and tho' he has the Confidence to fix a pe­remptory Challenge upon the Wri­tings of the three first Centuries, I could produce as much more, had I not a regard to my own Time, and that of the Reader's, which ought [Page 113] to be a sufficient Consideration with every Man, to prevent him from en­gaging in Impertinences, or dwelling too long where Necessity does not re­quire it: I shall therefore only beg Leave to add the Judgment of Ire­naeus,—Si autem omnium quae in Scripturis requirantur absolutiones non possumus invenire,—credere autem haec talia debemus Deo, qui & nos fe­cit; rectissimè scientes, quia Scripturae quidem perfectae sunt, quippe à verbo Dei & Spiritu ejus dictae: Nos autem secundum quod minores sumus & novis­simi à verbo Dei & Spiritu ejus, scien­tiâ mysteriorum ejus indigemus; & non mirum est, si in spiritualibus coelestibus, & in his quae habent Revelari hoc pati­mur nos, quandoquidem eorum quae an­te pedes sunt—quae & conteruntur à nobis, & videntur & sunt nobiscum, multa fugerunt nostram scientiam, & Deo haec ipsa committimus;—Si ergo & in rebus creaturae, quaedam quidem eorum adjacent Deo, quaedam autem & in nostram venerunt scientiam, quid mali est, si & eorum quae in Scripturis requiruntur, universis Scripturis Spiri­tualibus existentibus, quaedam quidem [Page 114] absolvamus secundum gratiam Dei; quaedam autem commendemus Deo, & non solum in hoc saeculo, sed in futuro, ut semper quidem Deus doceat, homo au­tem semper discat, quae sunt a Deo? [Here, by way of Confirmation, he cites St. Paul, 1 Cor. xiii. v. 13.] Sem­per enim fides quae est ad magistrum nostrum permanet firma, asseverans no­bis, quoniam solus vere Deus, [and af­terwards concludes] si secundum hunc modum quem diximus, quaedam quidem quaestionum Deo commiserimus, & fi­dem nostram servabimus, & omnis Scri­ptura ideo nobis data, consonans nobis invenietur. Lib. 2. Adv. Haer. cap. 47. Ed. Eras. I have cited this at large, because I find every thing agreeable to the Hypothesis I have hitherto advanc'd. As,

1st, Mystery is indisputably ap­ply'd to reveal'd Truths, beyond the reach of Humane Comprehension.

2dly, Such reveal'd Truths, appa­rently deliver'd in Scripture, are not to be rejected; because we cannot re­solve the Difficulties that seem to accompany the Belief of 'em, but to embrace 'em as the Word of GOD, [Page 115] and consequently as founded in infi­nite Wisdom and Veracity.

3dly, Our Unskilfulness, not to say Inabilities, in comprehending Ob­jects of Sence, or Physical Matters, is made an Argument, that there are Mysteries in Matters of Revelation.

I have hitherto confin'd my self to his Rule, i. e. the Fathers of the Three First Centuries; but truly I can see no just reason why the Fa­thers of after-Ages may not be ad­mitted into the present Controversie, at least as Witnesses, if not Judges. I'm sure there can nothing abstract, but his groundless Fiction of a gene­ral Combination, to resolve all Reli­gion into Mystery: For, as for the re­ceived Use or Signification of the Word, certainly after-Ages may be as competent Judges as those of the First Century: And, as for the Con­troversie itself, Whether there's any Doctrine in Christianity mysterious, certainly that Age ought to be ap­peal'd to, that had a more special oc­casion to bring the Controversie up­on the Stage, and this the Arrian Age, and those that follow'd it; for, [Page 116] in this Age it's well known, those Do­ctrines we contend, are mysterious, were more nicely controverted. I shall therefore add to those Passages already cited, a few more, which prove the Use of the word to be ap­ply'd to things incomprehensible; and that there are Doctrines in Chri­stianity pronounc'd Mysteries, and that too for the Incomprehensibleness of 'em. The first I shall instance in is Dionys. Areop. where in one place he describes our Saviour's Incarnati­on, [...], Cap. 4. de Coelest. Hierarch. In ano­ther place, [...], Sect. 9. Cap. 2. de Divinis Nomin. The second Instance is from a Tract entitl'd, Expositio Fidei, rejected indeed as a Piece of Iustin Martyr; yet from Leontin's, and other conclu­ding Arguments, justly esteem'd to be the Product of the Arrian Age: He stiles the Unity and Trinity, [...], and confesses it cannot be [Page 117] unfolded by Words, [...], and upon the Incarnation of Christ, [...]: And in such deep Research, at last, concludes with this Rule: [...].

And now we may conclude this Chapter much in the same strain that he does N. 45. I do not find but [ the Fathers of the three first Centuries have exactly the same Notions of My­stery, as well as those that follow them,] and for an Allay to his Jealousies, I think they are pretty consistent as well as unanimous; but then this Consistency and Unanimity happens to be against a trifling Reasoner, and therefore I must take the Reverse to his concluding Period, [ and justly hope, by this time, the Cause of Incom­prehensible and Inconceivable, or My­steries in Religion, will be more zea­lously maintain'd by all that sincerely re­spect Fathers, Scripture, or Reason.]

I come now to the Fourth Chapt. Sect. 3. which is an Answer to some Scripture-Objections, and particular­ly [Page 118] from the Nature of Faith. I now find this Discourse swells upon me beyond Expectations; and therefore, as for the Scripture-passages cited by him, tho' there is more in 'em than he has suggested, yet I shall pass 'em, especially because I think the Merits of the Cause does by no means turn upon 'em: I shall therefore take up his Friend's Arguments concerning the Nature of Faith, and try if he may not be compel'd by dint of Ar­gument, since he would not embrace the Advice of his Friend, N. 51.

And first, As for what he has de­livered, N. 52, 53. I find nothing but what has already received an Answer, [ particularly what is cited, Sect. 2. c. 2, & 7.] or at least, but what amounts to no more than will be concluded by what I'm going to offer; and therefore he may take it for a full, or competent Answer, viz. Reason is a necessary Hand­maid, or Instrument of Faith; in­somuch, that we must believe upon Rational Motives and Convictions: And thus far, I know no Son of the Church of England, that will dissent [Page 119] from him. As for what is delivered, N. 54. [That Faith consists of two parts, Knowledge and Assent.] I think no one will be so absurd to deny it; for I'am perswaded there can be no Assent without Knowledge: There­fore, in a word, had I known his Design, I should have excused the la­bour of citing so many Texts to prove it, and in a few words grant, That in those things we call the pure Credenda of Religion, we are at least to know so much, as will enable us to form an Imperfect Idea of what it is God proposes to our Belief; but it does not imply such a Knowledge, as enables to unravel and comprehend the whole Nature of the Object, or the very Modes of its Existence, or Properties; or much less, give a Rationale of every thing that belongs to it, No, if we know as much as instructs us what it is God proposes to our Belief, we submit all the Difficulties that may arise from the Belief of it, to God's Power and Wisdom, and yield an Assent (notwithstanding some seem­ing Absurdities) upon the Infinite Veracity of God. This distinguisheth [Page 120] Faith from a bare rational Assent in common Matters; and all this is consistent with what he has deliver­ed, N. 55, 56. and therefore I shall not ingage in a particular Examina­tion of what is there offered. To proceed then in order to a clear De­monstration of this Notion of Faith, I shall not consider the Case of A­braham's Faith (being the next thing that offers it self) but shall instance in the Belief of the Creation: Thro' Faith we understand, that the Worlds were framed by the Word of God; so that Things which are seen, were made of Things which do not appear, Heb. xi. v. 3. Here I think is a vast difference between God's creative Power, in raising the World out of nothing, and restoring a dead Person to Life again, before the corruptible part was any wise dissolved. Indeed I cannot conceive how we can form an Idea of the pos­sibility of such a Production; that God should raise so vast a stock of Matter, even all created Nature, and every thing that we can form any to­lerable Ideas of, and yet without a­ny [Page 121] Materials to work upon, can ne­ver be comprehended. The Plato­nist supposed a Soul to the World, and the Aristotelian a first Mover, but could never give any tolerable account of the Rise of Mundane Matter, without making it eternal. In short, they always taught, That an Agent necessarily supposes a Pati­ent really distinct from the Patient, especially in external Actions: And we know in Numbers it's universal­ly true, Ex nihilo nihil est. And we can conceive no otherwise in Nature, at least the Reasoner cannot on his Principles pretend to it; for he tells us, we can form no manner of Idea of nothing; and therefore how it is possible to form an Idea of the Cre­ation by common Ideas, when all our Ideas take their rise from Crea­ted Beings, even that of the Infinite and Eternal Being, are resembled by Objects of his own production. It's true, we say this is an effect of Infi­nite Power, but we have no notion of the Thing, unless we apply Infi­nite Power to that which is the Sub­ject of it, which is nothing into e­very [Page 122] thing; and when all is done, we form an Idea of this Infinite Power, purely by the Effects of it in Finite Beings: So that upon the whole, it's evident, the Belief of the Creation, (that implys a Production of all things out of nothing) is an Object that exceeds Humane Comprehensi­on; and consequently we may con­clude, that Faith (which yields an Assent to the Doctrine of the Creati­on) often implys an Assent to a Thing that contains something in it, that is Incomprehensible. And in­deed, that Objects of Faith contain Things that exceed Humane Com­prehension, is a Truth so indisputa­ble, that Faith in the Judgment of the Primitive Church-Writers, was on this account distinguished from Knowledge or Science. ‘It's true; In all Objects of Faith, we are to know so much of 'em, as to direct us what it is God proposes to our Belief. And Secondly, We are to believe, That it is God that propo­ses 'em. Thirdly, In all Acts of Faith we are to yield an Assent to the Truth, or Being of Things; and [Page 123] this supposes, that we have formed at least an imperfect Idea of their Nature; but for the Quomodo sint, that is, for the Manner of their Be­ing, or Existence, that may be an act of Knowledge, or Science, but not of Faith; so that if seeming Contradictions or Absurdities arise on this account, and consequently are thus far justly Incomprehensi­ble, Faith throws us upon the Infi­nite Veracity of God.’ All this I shall endeavour to confirm by the Authorities of the Primitive Church. And,

First, The Passage already cited from Irenaeus manifestly instructs us, That there are Difficulties and MY­STERIES in Revealed Truths, which Humane Reason cannot comprehend, and obliges us to commit all such Matters to GOD, because they were delivered by his Word and Spirit; and what is this, but to embrace and believe upon his Infinite Veracity? And at last concludes, That if we observe the Method, Fidem nostram servabimus, & omnis Scriptura à Deo nobis data, consonans nobis invenietur: [Page 124] Does not this imply, that there are things contained in Matters of Faith, that are Incomprehensible? Yea, ra­ther that all seeming Difficulties, or Absurdities that arise from 'em, when scann'd by common Notions, or I­deas, are to be committed to God as the best Expedient to preserve a right Faith, see Pag. 64. But,

Secondly, Clemens Alexand. seems to state the Notion of Faith more clearly, in opposition to Science: And first he fixes the Foundation of Faith in the Word of GOD, or the Holy Scriptures, and represents it as an Irrefragible Foundation, that car­ries the highest Demonstration in it; and that we are to enquire no further than Ipse dixit, upon which he ad­vances this Maxim, [...]. And to let us see how far he extends it, he instances in the fore-cited Pas­sage to the Heb. Cap. xii. v. 12. and thence proceeds to state the Diffe­rence between Science and Faith, thus, [...], Vid. Stro. Lib. 2. P. 362, 3, 4. and in his 5th Book he's [Page 125] more full, [...]. Here we see, Faith is resolved into the Infinite Power and Veracity of GOD; insomuch, that we are obliged to believe, as soon as we know it to be the Word of GOD, or as soon as we know GOD propo­ses any thing to our Belief: Here we find Science and Faith opposed, the one requiring Demonstration or Ar­guments, drawn from the Nature of the Thing; the other, not so: There­fore we must conclude, That if GOD proposes any thing to our Belief, that contains Matters incomprehensible, or not reconcileable with common Notions; Faith, in the Opinion of this Father, will command an Assent; inso­much, that his Infinite Power and Ve­racity must over-ballance all seeming Absurdities and Contradictions.

But to conclude this Argument, I shall produce the Judgment of St. Chrysostom: Thus he assigns the Reason, why the Natural Man can­not receive the Things that be of GOD, 1 Cor. ii. v. 14. viz. For the [Page 126] Immensity of the Things 'emselves, far exceeding the Comprehension of the most Improved Reason; and for the want of Faith, [...], Hom. 7. And upon the Article of the Crea­tion, Heb. xi. v. 3. he tells us, The Mind that is prepared for the Reception of Faith, must be [...]; she must be elevated above Sence, and all sensible Objects, and pass over the Weakness of Hu­mane Reasonings; and afterwards; Whereas, says he, Faith is vilified as a Thing that is void of Demonstra­tion, [...]; or rather, a Thing full of Folly, [...], the Apostle shews us in this one Instance, [...]; for the very Article, says he; is not established by Reason, but rather the contrary, [...]. Hom. 22. In Epist. Heb.

Again we find him describing Faith under the very same Notion, [Page 127] Hom. 23. in Ter. Iohan. where, up­on Nichodemus's Words, How can a Man be born when he is old? v. 4. he observes, [...]. Upon which he enlarges, and tells us, It is the Question of Hereticks upon the Incarnation of our Blessed Saviour, (demanding, [...]) that by the weakness of com­mon Notions, or Reasonings, de­stroy his Immense Nature, [...]; and at last concludes, That such Practices, or Questions, [...]. And on the Second Part of the Question, about entring the Womb a Second time, he observes, When a Man proceeds upon common Notions, or Reason­ings in Spiritual Matters, and does not receive the Dictates of Faith, [...]. He talks like a Drunken or Mad­man, uttering the most absurd and ridiculous things.

And now, certainly, we may con­clude, what St. Chrysostom's Notion of Faith was, without drawing In­ferences; [Page 128] and that it every way a­grees with that of Clemens Alexan­drinus: It's therefore manifest, Faith is distinguished from Knowledge, or Science, not only as the Objects of it are Matters of Revelation, but as they contain Things that are incom­prehensible; and yet it yields an As­sent upon the Infinite Veracity of the Word of GOD: I'm sure this Great Man has dropt such unlucky Words against our Adversary's Principles, or his Methods of Examining Divine Truths, as if he were risen from the Dead, and were preparing to accuse him of Heresie, or some sly Maxims that look that way. I should there­fore advise him to weigh the Opini­on of so Great a Person, before he advances too far: and yet, when I consider what severe Censures he has past upon the Writers of this Age, I despair of Success in giving Advice in this kind; for I cannot think he'll ever be perswaded to take his Mea­sures of Faith, from an Age, or any Writer in it, when he makes 'em, as it were, to have entred into a League to turn all Religion into Mystery, [Page 129] and this another to be Name for Im­posture, or Priestcraft: If this be true, to be instructed by such a Race of Men, is, in plain English, to take up one's Faith from those that have fallen away from the Faith; but of this I shall say more in the last Chapter.

To return then: It's now abun­dantly evident, that the Notion of Faith which we now contend for, is not a Thing contrived to advance a particular Hypothesis, or serve a par­ticular Design, but by no means such a one as he suggests, viz. [To stop the Mouths of such as demand a Reason where none can be given, and to keep as many in Ignorance, as Interest shall think convenient. See N. 48.] But I hope an Impartial Reader will find it establish'd upon a good Foundati­on, or in a word, upon such Reasons as he is not able to subvert or remove; beside, if it be a Contrivance, we have this Apology, that it is not a late Forgery, since we have traced it almost as far as any Ecclesiastical Records, (besides those of Scripture) admit of; and this is a considerable [Page 130] Presumption of the Injustice of such foul-mouthed Aspersions, 'till he gives us a better Set of Arguments to re­move it; which is the next Thing that should be examined: but truly there appears so little in 'em, that I think they scarce deserve a distinct Examination:

The First is, [ If Faith were not a Perswasion resulting from the previous Knowledge and Comprehension of the Thing believed, there could be no De­grees nor Differences of it.] Now First, It's manifest, the Argument is advanced on a false Supposition, (and that which runs thro' all his Obser­vations) viz. That we deny all De­grees of a previous Knowledge of the Object; whereas we say, there must be at least such a previous knowledge of the Object, as instructs us what it is GOD proposes to our Belief; but there's no necessity of Comprehend­ing the Absolute Nature of the Thing, so as to be able to give a Rationale of every Thing that really belongs to it; and that too, by trying it by common Notions. And more­over, we say, the different Degrees [Page 131] of Faith, do by no means rise from such a Comprehensive Knowledge: No, when once we know what GOD proposes to our Belief, the Degrees of Faith arise from the Application of GOD's Veracity to our Minds and Consciences; if the Mind is pos­sessed with a deep Sence of it, as to engage us to place an absolute Confi­dence in it, tho' we cannot form a Rationale of the Thing, yet we may embrace it with the highest Degrees of Faith: I'm sure, this is the Doctrine which [ this Man of Reason] might have learn'd from S. Paul, in the Case of Abraham, Who against Hope, belie­ved in Hope,—and being not weak in Faith, he considered not his own Body now dead, nor yet the Deadness of Sa­rah's Womb: he staggered not at the Promise thro' Vnbelief, but was strong in Faith, giving Glory to GOD, and being fully perswaded, that what he had promised he was also able to perform; and therefore it was imputed to him for Righteousness, Rom. iv. 18, 19, 20, 21.

2d Arg. [ The Subject of Faith must be intelligible to all, since the Be­lief [Page 132] thereof is commanded under no less a Penalty than Damnation.] As for the Intelligibleness of Objects of Faith, I have already stated how far that is necessary; but, with Submissi­on, I think the Sin and Damnation of Unbelief, arises, not because GOD has furnish'd us with a perfect Ra­tionale of the Nature of every Ob­ject of Faith, and we reject it; but because he hath furnish'd us with Means sufficient to know what he hath proposed to our Belief, and to know that he hath proposed them, and we will fully reject 'em; and consequently what he proposes: but more especially, because he hath asserted the Truth of 'em, by the highest Demonstrations of the Spirit, in mighty Signs and Won­ders: This was the Case of the Iews; but now ye say, Ye see, there­fore your Sin remaineth.

4th Arg. [ Except Faith signifies an Intelligible Perswasion, we cannot give others a Reason of the Hope that is in us.] The Inference is apparently false; for we certainly give a Rea­son (and that too, according to the [Page 133] Mind of St. Peter) of any Article of Faith, when we prove that it is Re­vealed by GOD, and that we yield an Assent to the Truth of it (tho' we cannot remove every Difficulty that may arise from it) upon the Autho­rity of Infinite Veracity.

As for his Third, and Fifth Obser­vations, I shall Appeal to any un­prejudiced Reader, whether there's any thing in 'em, that deserves a particular Reply, more than in those Objections he first framed, and then answered: For as the former prove nothing against the Incomprehensi­bleness of Matters of Faith, so the latter were never advanced, to prove the Necessity of admitting such Ob­jects of Faith. Upon the whole then, I think it appears, there are Matters of Faith that contain Things in 'em, which are Incomprehensible, and yet Faith yields an Assent upon the Authority of Infinite Veracity, and consequently it's an uncontroula­ble Argument, there are Mysteries in the Christian Religion.

The next thing to be considered, is, his Reply to the Argument of Mi­racles, [Page 134] Cap. 5. Sect. 3. And, First, he entertains you with the Nature of a Miracle. And as for the Descripti­on he gives us, I find, in the Main, no Reason to except against it; after this, he guards it with some Limita­tions: The First of which is, That a Miracle is not to be admitted contra­ry to Reason; I suppose, he means con­trary to common Notions, or those Idea's which Reason has formed from Sence, Experience, or Instru­ction. And, no doubt, this is a ve­ry just Limitation: ‘For a Mira­cle is performed upon Objects of Sense; and 'tis an Address to our Senses, or a Demonstration accom­modated to the outward Senses, by some sensible Effects, or Opera­tions; and consequently, nothing is to be admitted as a Miracle, that contradicts the Testimony of the Senses:’ and we are, at least, so far Judges of its possibility, that in Case it manifestly contradicts the Testi­mony of our Sence, we may justly rank it among Impossibilities, and reject it as such. But further than this, I cannot discern, that we are [Page 135] competent Judges of the Possibility of any Miracle; for to judge of its Possi­bility, supposes a knowledge of its Mo­dus: But this our Adversary will not allow; [ For the manner of Miracles, (says he) is not explicable. N. 77.

Thus far we are agreed; but I know not how this Limitation, much less those that follow, affect the present Controversie. Indeed, he at last comes to the Point, and tells us, [ Miracles are not above Rea­son, tho' we know nothing of the Mo­dus.] But I would fain know, why a Thing that contains somewhat in the Nature of it, which exceeds Hu­man Comprehension, is not as pro­perly above Reason, or Mysterious, as a Thing (in itself intelligible) only it lies dormant, because shadowed thro'a Veil, I'm sure, Origen tells the contrary, Comment. in Mat. 19. 24, 26. ut supra. See pag. 61.

But I have exposed the Folly of this Assertion in another place. In­deed, I should have turned his own Arguments upon him, had he not prevented me, by reviving 'em in such a manner, as gives me a better [Page 136] advantage over him. We have it thus, [ As the beginning of my Book, I maintained, the Manner, as well as the Thing was explicable. But of what? Of Miracles. No, surely; but of those Doctrines, in Confirmation of which the Miracles are wrought. See N. 77.] This is truly an unaccountable Paradox. Miracles are certainly the Demonstrations of Sence, and conse­quently are to be scann'd and judg'd of by common Ideas, even the most clear and indisputable, such as result from Objects of Sence; but it's con­cluded, that Matters of Revelation are founded on Objects that are Spi­ritual and Infinite, and consequently are to us more abstruse and incom­prehensible.

Again, Miracles are a direct and immediate Address to the Sence and Reason of Mankind, and are design'd to give an unquestionable Credit to every reveal'd Truth, since they pro­cure the Testimony of Infinite Vera­city in the behalf of it; and there­fore, all the Reason and Arguments in Nature will direct, that they should pass the severest Scrutiny. But in [Page 137] Matters of Revelation it's concluded, that a great deal rests upon the Au­thority of Infinite Veracity, and this depends upon the Evidence of Mira­cles; and therefore it's absurd to de­mand a clearer and more precise Com­prehension of the Nature of reveal'd Truths than of Miracles.

This Gentleman owns, that Mira­cles are a Confirmation of reveal'd Truths; that is, at least, as they are an absolute Attestation of their Divine Original: And this is an uncontroul­able Demonstration of the Truth of them. Indeed I'm perswaded the meerest Novice in Logick will tell him, That we are to have, at least, as adequate a Knowledge of that which is to confirm, as that which is confir­med by it; or that the Premises are to carry as great Evidence in 'em as we expect in the Conclusion: There­fore it's absurd to say, that the Modus of Miracles is inexplicable, and the Modus of all reveal'd Truths not so. Indeed this Gentleman seems to have furnish'd us with Weapons to fence against him with the greatest Advan­tage; for if such Positions as these [Page 138] must pass for Truth, it must be Truth in a Mystery. And truly, we could not have desir'd a better Argument against him; for, if the Modus of Objects of Sence be inexplicable, cer­tainly the Modus of reveal'd Truths are much more inexplicable; the Im­menseness of whose Nature to a Fi­nite Mind, renders them incompre­hensible.

Again, the Modus of Objects of Sence is not to be explain'd by Ideas of the same kind; much less, is the Modus of Infinite and Spiritual Ob­jects to be explain'd by the Ideas of Objects of Sence: ‘So that, in a word, since Miracles (as Objects of Sence, with respect to the Modus of 'em) are inexplicable, and by conse­quence justly to be esteem'd above Reason, much more are Matters of Revelation, with respect to their Modus, to be esteem'd inexplicable, above Reason, and consequently my­sterious.’

I come now to examine, in the last place, his pretended Historical Ac­count of the Rise of Mystery, and the Causes of it, under this Title, [ When, [Page 139] why, and by whom were Mysteries brought into Christianity, Cap. 6. Sect. 3.] And truly I am perswaded what has already been deliver'd will be esteem'd (by an impartial Rea­der) a sufficient Confutation to this whole Chapter, (at least if it answers the Title) without examining any Paragraph: However, I think it de­serves no Answer, but a short Reply to the Title, and that is capable of no other, but such as we give to an im­pertinent Question of the Romanists, Where was your Religion before Lu­ther? ‘As to the time when Mystery was introduc'd, I hope it's suffici­ently prov'd to be of the same Date with Christianity itself, being foun­ded not in Names or Words only, but in Certain Truths, that are pro­pos'd as Objects of Faith. But, 2dly, for the Person by whom, or that introduc'd it, I'm perswaded there's enough offer'd to charge it upon the Blessed Author of the Institution. Lastly, For the Reason why Myste­ries were introduc'd, I shall leave 'em to this notable Reasoner to di­spute it out with the Infinite Wis­dom [Page 140] of GOD, in not creating Man with larger and more comprehen­sible Faculties, or not contriving some more familiar Method of Re­demption.’ And now, if what has already been deliver'd stands good against this Author, (there being as yet no reason to suspect it) I'll appeal to all the World, whether it does not destroy the malicious Suggestions of this Chapter, which make Mystery to be a Trick of Priestcraft, contriv'd for the support of Secular Grandeur and Dominion.

But, to descend to a few Particu­lars; He observes, (and that too with a great deal of Contempt and Scorn) That the Christian Church initiated their Converts in a Way and Method not much unlike that of the Heathen World; which is the most he can make of all his Allegations. Now we own, the Christian Converts were gradually initiated, that they were rank'd in several Classes, and had a Discipline, and Instructions, peculiar to each Class, and thereupon prohi­bited the publication of the sublimest Parts of Religion, to any but those [Page 141] that had gone through the inferiour Classes; and truly, such Injunctions have not only the unquestionable Dictates of Prudence for their Vindi­cation, but Apostolick Practice and Approbation; for 'tis the establish'd Method with the Hebrew Converts, as well as those at Corinth; they were brought on gradually to Per­fection, first by Milk, then by strong Meats, the one accommodated to Babes in Christ, the other to those of full age; see Heb. v. ver. 12, 13, 14. and 1 Cor. iii. 2. where it's proba­ble the Iewish Converts were first in­structed in those Scriptures that set forth the easiest parts of our Saviour's Offices, as Prophet, Priest, and King; but afterwards, those that asserted his Divinity. I'm sure St. Clement makes these Babes to be the Catechu­mens, or those that were instructed in the Catechistick Parts of Christia­nity; but the Perfect, those that were instructed in the sublimest parts of Religion; to wit, the Essence of the Divine Nature. But now the great Crime is, that all these Measures of Initiation were taken from the Hea­thens: [Page 142] And this is prov'd, because they are much the same.

It is not now my business to exa­mine the Parallel; tho' I must confess there are, in a great many things, very lively Resemblances: But as for the Crime, I cannot discern where that lies, since the Christians did not sym­bolize with any Design to form a Comprehension between Heathenism and Christianity; nor (as this Author suggests) out of an Opinion of any Religion contain'd in such Rites, see N. 97. but out of a Zeal for GOD, and the Souls of Men, they, in St. Paul's Language, became all things un­to them, that if possible they might en­large the Territories of Christ's King­dom, and save some; for, as long as they acted on these Principles, I think there was no more Guilt in 'em, than in St. Paul's occasional Compliances with Iewish Rites. Indeed our Ad­versary elsewhere [ Num. 78, 79.] gives this very account of these Ini­tiations or Compliances; and there­fore, I cannot conceive how he can justifie so base an Aspersion, viz. N. 90. [Here is enough to shew how [Page 143] Christianity became mysterious, and how so Divine an Institution did, thro' the Craft and Ambition of Priests and Philosophers, degenerate into meer Pa­ganism.] It's well known there are other Accounts given of those Reli­gious Rites that were introduc'd in the Primitive Church, than those al­ready assign'd; and those too, that are abundantly sufficient to vindicate the Lawfulness of 'em: I shall refer him to St. Cyril, the Author he has cited, who is very particular on this Sub­ject.

But, in a word, it's manifest they were in 'emselves the best Expedients to maintain the Discipline of the Church, and establish a regular and uniform Piety, as well as orthodox, clear, and well-digested Faith; so un­just is the Charge, that makes 'em Artifices to introduce Mystery, Igno­rance, and Blind Obedience.

2dly, As for those Emblematical Rites introduc'd in the Administrati­ons of the Christian Sacraments, they might possibly contribute to the esta­blishing Mysteries in a Iewish Sence, as it is used for Typical Representa­tions: [Page 144] but they seem to have no ten­dency to establish Mystery in the sence we contend for; I mean, as it is put for Incomprehensible Truths.

But let us reflect a little on the Base­ness of this Accusation: Here's a ge­neral Combination in the Pastors of the Catholick Church, and a great many Hellish Designs form'd in the Womb of it; Ambition and Covetous­ness is the original Spring, Ceremony and a great many superfluous Rites the Instrument, and the grand De­signs were to turn Religion into My­stery, even to that degree, that in the Opinion of this Author, it has made a Divine Institution degenerate into Paganism; N. 90. But, for what Reason? Purely because some Chri­stian Rules of Discipline resemble the Religious Rites of Heathens; for, there can no other be fix'd on those that are truly Primitive. If this be so, I'm sure the Censure is extrava­gantly absurd. What if a sober Hea­then acts upon the strict Rules of Ju­stice, and abhors Slander and Detra­ction, more than this Calumniator; must not a good Christian practice [Page 145] the same Virtue, for fear of being charg'd with Paganism? I'm sure the Case is the same where the Thing is innocent or lawful.

Indeed, this Gentleman declaims against Mystery very heartily, but I am afraid he has too much dealing with one sort of it; for, such Illogical, such Groundless, such Vile Aspersions, must take their Rise from the Myste­ry of Iniquity, that reigns in the high places; for 'tis nothing else but the Language of him that is justly stiled, the Accuser of his Brethren.

But, to proceed a little further, I find he has an immortal Abhorrence of the Cross in Baptism, of Altars, of the Dedication or Consecration of Charches, Musick, the Rites of Burial; and, in a word, of the Institution of National Churches, which he seems to call Human Faction, or Policy, in one place; [See pag. 172. Ed. 2. and V­surpations upon Mankind in another, N. 93.] Now these are Rites and Sanctions enjoyn'd and practis'd in the Establish'd Church of England; and when he thinks fit to discover wherein the Evil of them consists, or that the People of this National [Page 146] Church are not obliged to yield an Obedience to 'em, I promise an An­swer, and such as will set him off in his own Colours and Language too; that is, prove him an impertinent Trifler. It's true, he seems to ex­plode 'em, because [ nothing like these are in the Writings of the Apostles, but they are all plainly contain'd in the Books of the Gentiles, and was the Substance of their Worship:] when we make such things the Substance of our Worship, then let him accuse us: ‘But as for the Necessity of finding the particular Ceremonies in the Writings of the Apostles, we say there's none; it's sufficient we find 'em by a fair Consequence, inas­much as we find an Ecclesiastical Power commissioned to enact pru­dent Laws for the Peace and Unity of the Church, for the maintenance of Decency, Order, and Uniformi­ty in the Publick Worship of God; and as long as Ceremonies are cho­sen, with respect to the Number, so as not to bring a Burden, and create Distraction in the Publick Worship of God, and with respect to the Nature of 'em, inasmuch as [Page 147] they carry a manifest Tendency to­wards the Advancement of the Ends of Religion.’

Again, we say Apostolick Practice or Tradition, and an uninterrupted Custom of the Primitive Church, is certainly a considerable Argument not only of the Lawfulness, but Au­thority of 'em, especially so as that none shall dispute an Obedience, when once they are enjoyn'd by our proper Ec­clesiastical Superiours. I'm sure Ter­tullian makes this an express Rule of Obedience in these matters, tho' this Author, by the help of a false Cita­tion, seems to insinuate the contrary: Harum & aliarum ejusmodi disciplina­rum si legem expostules Scripturarum nullam invenies: Traditio tibi praeten­detur [by way of Rule, whereas he reads it, praetenditur] Auctrix, consue­tudo confirmatrix, & fides observatrix, Lib. de Coron. c. 4.

But to draw towards a Conclusi­on, I do not now intend a formal Vindication of Ceremonies; howe­ver, I think I have offered enough to publish the Ignorance or Impudence of the Man; when he asserts, That [ nothing is so naturally opposite as Ce­remony [Page 148] and Christianity, N. 95.] What, even those that are appointed to determine (for Decency, and U­niformity's sake) the Natural Cir­cumstances of Publick Worship, such as Time, Place, and Manner? ‘Let him make this out by dint of Argument, and I'll engage (as was offered before) he shall have a fair Answer.’ And now I have gone thro' a tedious Harrangue, which whether it be more made up of Im­potent Malice, or Illogical Conclu­sions, is disputable; and therefore, I think myself happy to arrive at his Conclusion, and more happy that I find little in it, that either deserves, or can justly provoke a Reply: for I find him either bantering the World with his own Objections, and An­swers, which if placed in the Bal­lance, will not weigh a Grain to ef­fect the Merits of the Cause either way, or giving 'em an account of his next Undertakings, tho' in his last E­dition, he's so prudent to add a Reserve, that I'm much afraid will baulk the Expectation of the Thing; for he let's us know, he'll take his own time for it, as a thing not in the Command of [Page 149] any Mortal; and I'm perswaded he'll prove the Maxim by experimental Demonstration; for, I believe, want of Health, or Business, or something else, will make it a good while before he puts his finishing hand to his new intended System of Divinity. One or two things, however, I cannot but remark, before I take a final leave. And,

First; After all this Argument, the Reader may imagine that the Diffe­rence between us is not considerable; for he allows, That we cannot pre­tend to an Adequate Knowledge of Things; and we say, That Divine Truths are chiefly Mysterious, in re­spect of the Modus of 'em; and as it's impossible to comprehend the Mysterious part of 'em, so we grant it's not necessary to be known, or comprehended: But yet for all this, the Difference is very considera­ble; for this Gentleman perempto­rily affirms, That the Modus of all Revealed Truths, is explicable; see Num. 77. Sect. 3. And in the Con­clusion he tells us, If his Hypothesis stands good, [ Whatever Instance can be alledged (he means in contradiction [Page 150] to it) must either be found not Myste­rious, or if it prove a Mystery, not Divinely revealed;] so that he has formed a most Compendious Rule for discarding the fundamental Do­ctrines of Christianity, if any be proposed, whose Modus he cannot comprehend, and that too by com­mon Ideas, or Notions, his Hypo­thesis directs, That they are to be rejected as not Divinely revealed: Indeed, whosoever surveys his Hypo­thesis, may at the first glance discern this to be the Design, though he had not blabed out the Secret in the close of it; and certainly the Design is so pernicious, and (tho' formed on a weak Hypothesis) liable to influence an unwary Reader, and cheat him out of the main of his Creed, that I wonder this Gentleman has escaped so long without being chastised by some Pen more accurate than I can pretend to.

The Second thing I shall take no­tice of is, The Provisions he has made against an Answer; for he tells us, That [ no particular Instances, or Do­ctrines of any sort, can serve for a proper Answer to this Discourse.] This [Page 151] is pretty well truly! He has been ve­ry Majesterial in advancing his own Positions, and will he be as absolute in prescribing to his Answerers? As if nothing must pass for an Answer, that is not formed by his Model, or has not received his Imprimatur. As for the force of Instances, it's very well known, that an opposite Instance is perfect Demonstration against a pe­remptory, and universal Position in an Adversary; and the force of Posi­tions, Arguments, or Notions that exist in Theory, or Universals, are best illustrated and imprinted by In­stances. I'm sure he proceeds by these Measures in all his Reasonings, and will he debar others of those Priviledges he allows himself? This is to make himself the absolute So­vereign of Reason and Argument; as if the rest of Mankind had no Right to use any more of either, but what he cantons out by his own Weights, and Measures. But he tells us, Instances can be no Answer to his Discourse, [ As long as the Rea­sons of it hold good:] Very true, for if the Reasons hold good, the In­stances [Page 152] alledg'd against 'em must be impertinent, or incompetent: But the Instances I have produced are levell'd against his Reasons and Posi­tions too, and, I hope, they sufficient­ly destroy both, and then the Method of Answering will justifie itself with­out his License or Approbation.

In a word, as for this Answer, I offer it to every candid impartial Reader with Deference and Submis­sion, who, I question not, will pass over some little Slips or Blots that may arise thro' heat of Argument, if the main Lines are correct and clear. And as for this Gentleman, or his Zealous Admirers, I tender the Sub­stance, or principal Parts of it, to be treated as he has peremptorily resol­ved at the foot of his Discourse; I mean, give it no more Quarter than he will to Error; but, according to his utmost Abilities and Opportunities, expose it in its true Colours, that he may not be charg'd as an Accessary against himself, in rendring his own Labours ineffectual, by weakly min­cing or softening of any thing.